DISPUTATION ON THE SOUL
OF OUR HOLY FATHER GREGORY, BISHOP OF NEOCAESAREA IN PONTUS, SURNAMED THE THAUMATURGUS, DISPUTATION ON THE SOUL BY HEADS ADDRESSED TO TATIAN
A You have commanded, most excellent Tatian, that I send you a discourse and disputation on the soul, drafted with efficacious arguments or demonstrations, and that in this matter I should use no testimonies from the Scriptures; a method of instruction which, although it is true, and for those who wish to think piously, is more certain and better suited for proving than any human reasoning, you desire that I act in this way, yet not so that you might satisfy yourself—who are indeed already so instructed that you hold fast to the divine Scriptures and traditions and constitutions, and allow yourself to be moved from your position by no human arguments—but rather to convince those who think otherwise, and who refuse to place faith in the divine Scriptures, but by a certain skill in discourse strive to circumvent and deceive men who are unaccustomed to such disputations. Induced by these reasons, I have not sought to evade this treatment as if deterred by some lack of skill, but, trusting in your benevolence toward me, I have more promptly complied with your command and will: for you know, in your kindness and friendship toward me, how to bring into the sight and light of men those things which you judge to be excellent, and how to ignore and conceal those things which seem to have been less correctly stated. Knowing this, therefore, I have boldly set myself to write. I shall use that method of discourse and order which those who profess such matters are accustomed to use, when investigating in a knowledgeable and skillful manner.
B And first of all, I shall set forth by what standard the soul
can naturally be understood; then, by what arguments it is shown to exist; subsequently, whether it happens to be a substance or an accident; after that, in accordance with these, whether it is a body or incorporeal; then, whether it is simple or composite; again, whether it is mortal or immortal; and lastly, whether it is rational or irrational. For these are the things most customarily inquired into in a discourse concerning the soul, as they are most proper to it and capable of characterizing its nature. For the confirmation of those things that are to be examined, we shall use as demonstrations those common notions by which assent is accustomed to be procured for matters being currently handled. For the sake of brevity and utility, we shall use only those reasonings that are most valid for demonstrating those things which are being investigated, so that, instructed by their clear and easily perceived notions and proofs, we may more readily engage our opponents. Hence, therefore, let the beginning of our discourse and disputation be drawn.
By what standard is the soul understood?
I. Whatever things exist are known either by sense or are comprehended by B intellect. Those things which fall under sense are sufficiently demonstrated by sense itself; for as soon as it is applied, it presents to us the image and appearance of the subject. But those things which are comprehended by intellect are perceived not by themselves, but through their own actions and effects. Therefore, since the soul cannot be known by itself, it may deservedly be known from its effects.
Whether the soul exists.
II. When our body is moved, it is moved either from without or from within. That it is not moved from without is clear from the fact that it is moved neither by pushing nor by pulling, unlike things that are inanimate. But when it is moved from within, it is not moved naturally as fire is. For fire, as long as it exists, never ceases from motion; but when the body has become a corpse, it ceases to move, even though it remains a body. Therefore, if it is neither moved from without, like inanimate things, nor naturally, like fire, it is manifest that it is moved by the soul, which also provides life to it. If, therefore, it is established D that life is provided to our body by the soul, the soul is likewise known from its own effects.
Whether the soul is a substance.
III. That the soul is a substance is shown in this way: First, because the definition of substance rightly applies to it, which is of this kind: Substance is that which, while remaining one and the same in number, is capable of receiving contraries. That the soul, without departing from its own nature, receives contraries in turn is, I believe, clear to all. For justice and injustice, courage and cowardice, temperance and intemperance are seen in it in turn, although they are contraries. Wherefore, since it is a property of substance that it is capable of receiving contraries in turn, and it is shown that the soul admits to this definition,
A the soul is therefore a substance. Moreover, since the body also is a substance, it is necessary that the soul too should be a substance; for it is impossible that what receives life should be a substance, while that which imparts life should be non-substantive. Unless, perhaps, someone should be so insane as to affirm that that which has no existence is the cause of that which exists; or, conversely, that that upon which existence depends, and without which it cannot be, is the cause of that in which it resides.
Whether the soul is incorporeal.
IV. That the soul is within our body has been shown above; we must, however, understand how it is in the body. For if it lies beside it as one stone lies beside another, it follows that the soul is a body, and that the whole body is not animated, since it would adhere only to a certain part. But if it is commingled or fused with the body, it would fall away from the proper definition of the soul and consist of many parts, and would not be simple. For whatever has many parts is divisible and dissoluble; B and that which is divisible is composite; and what is composite is divisible in three ways. Now, a body added to a body increases its bulk; but the soul, being in the body, does not increase its bulk, but rather imparts life. Therefore, the soul is not a body, but incorporeal.
Furthermore, if the soul were a body, it would be moved either from without or from within. Now, it is not moved from without: for it is not pushed or drawn, as inanimate things are; nor is it moved from within, as animate things are: for it is absurd to speak of a soul of a soul. Therefore, it will not be a body; it is, then, incorporeal.
And again, if the soul is a body, it possesses sensible qualities and is nourished; but it is not C nourished. And if it is nourished, it is not nourished corporeally as the body is, but incorporeally; for it is nourished by reason and the Word. It does not, therefore, possess sensible qualities; for neither is justice seen by the eyes, nor fortitude, nor any other thing of that kind; and yet these are the qualities of the soul. Therefore, it is not a body; it is, then, incorporeal.
Furthermore, since every corporeal substance is divided into animate and inanimate, let those who affirm that the soul is a body say whether they would have it called animate or inanimate.
Finally, if every body has color, quantity, and shape, and nothing of this kind is observed in the soul, therefore the soul is not a body.
Whether the soul is simple or composite.
V. From the considerations, therefore, by which the soul is shown to be incorporeal, it is also most especially demonstrated to be simple. D For if it is not a body, and every body is composite, and what is composed is made up of parts, then it would also be multi-particulate. But being incorporeal, it is simple, since it is also uncompounded and indivisible.
Whether our soul is immortal.
VI. It seems to me a logical consequence that what is
A simple, also is immortal. And in what manner that is, listen: Nothing of those things that exist is self-corrupting, for otherwise it would not have existed even from the beginning. For things that are corrupted are corrupted by their opposites; wherefore everything that is corrupted is dissoluble; and what is dissoluble is composite; and what is composite is multipartite; and what is composed of parts, it is manifest that it is composed of different parts; and what is different is not the same: therefore, because the soul is simple, and not composed of different parts, being uncompounded and indissoluble, for this reason it will be incorruptible and immortal.
Moreover, whatever is moved by an alien motion, not having the vital faculty from itself but from that which moves it, remains only as long as it is held together by the power operating within it; and when that which operates ceases, that which was moved by it must also cease. Therefore, since the soul is moved by itself, it never ceases to exist. For these things follow one another in such a way that what is moved by itself, always moves; what always moves, never fails; B what never fails, lacks an end; what is devoid of an end, is not corrupted; what is not corrupted, is immortal. Therefore, if the soul is moved by itself, as was demonstrated above, it will be, according to the reason already proposed, incorruptible and immortal.
Furthermore, whatever is not corrupted by its own proper evil cannot be corrupted; but evil is contrary to good, and therefore it has the power to corrupt it. For there is no other evil of the body than passion, disease, and death; just as, on the contrary, its virtue is beauty, life, health, and a firm constitution. If, therefore, the soul is not corrupted by its own evil, and the evil of the soul is cowardice, intemperance, envy, and the like, and yet all these do not take away from it the faculty of living and moving: the soul is therefore immortal.
That our soul is a participant of reason
VII. That our soul is a participant of reason can be shown by many arguments: first, from the fact that it has discovered the arts useful for our life. C For no one would say that they were discovered rashly or by some chance, since he could not demonstrate them to be idle nor useless to life. If, therefore, the arts contribute to the usefulness of life, and what is useful is also praiseworthy; and praiseworthy things are compared by reason; and the arts are the inventions of the soul: our soul is therefore a participant of reason.
Then, from the fact that our senses are not sufficient for apprehending things, it is also demonstrated that our soul is endowed with reason. For we are not able to arrive at the knowledge of existing things by the application of sense alone. But because we do not wish to remain merely in these [sensations], it is immediately evident from this, that when the senses are not assisted by reason, they are too weak to distinguish and discern things which, although equal in D shape and similar in color, are yet different in nature. If, therefore, the senses, being irrational, produce in us a false perception of existing things...