Philosophical and Theological Works

those eminent men who oversaw the publication of the works of John of Damascus through the manifold press inverted this series and pulled apart the treatises that were connected by the author himself. Since Greek librarians had long ago admitted even this, it came about that the genuine inscription of the tripartite work almost perished. It is gathered, however, from chapter 2 of the *Dialectica*, and also from the *Life* of the author written by John of Jerusalem, and likewise from the Vatican codex, which Leo Allatius cited in his *Diatriba*; where we are taught that the title of this triple work was

ΠΗΓΗ ΓΝΩΣΕΩΣ, FONS SCIENTIÆ

DIALECTIC. FOUNTAIN OF KNOWLEDGE. PROLOGUE.

To the most holy and God-honored Father Cosmas, most holy bishop of Majuma, John, the least of monks and presbyters, sends greetings in the Lord.

I hesitated, O blessed one, conscious of the limitations of my intellect and the difficulty of speech, to set my hand to tasks that exceeded my powers, and, like some overconfident and rash person, to penetrate the inner recesses of the sanctuary; for I feared the danger that hangs over those who dare attempt such things. ^A For if that divine legislator Moses, who withdrew from every sight of human affairs, leaving behind the surging worldly fruit, and having cleansed the eye of his mind from every corporeal impression, had become fit to attain the vision of God himself; if he, I say, who had achieved this, so as to behold the most kind condescension of the Word of God all the way to us, and his incarnation—surpassing the powers of nature—in the burning bush and in a fire devoid of corporeal fuel, by which the bush was ignited ^B and changed into His brilliance, yet was not consumed by the burning, nor did it depart from its own nature; if he, finally, who was the first to be taught the name of Him who is, and who is truly higher than essence, and who had accepted from God the leadership of his kin, nevertheless complained of a speech impediment and a slower tongue, so that he was unable to be a minister of the divine will and to proclaim it openly, and to become a mediator between God and men: who am I, stained and ^C defiled by every spot of sin, and carrying within myself the turbulent swell of passions, and

possessing neither a mind nor a consciousness purified so that I might become a mirror of God and His divine impressions, nor having a discourse sufficient to explain to those who understand the divine and ineffable things which transcend every grasp of rational creation? ^B Reflecting on these things, I hesitated to speak, and I feared the command—for I will say what is the case—lest I should expose myself to being laughed at on two counts: namely, for ignorance, and, what is most serious, for rashness and folly. For the fault of ignorance deserves pardon when it springs from a source other than sloth; but to hold the opinion of knowledge while having ignorance, this is truly serious and worthy of reproach rather than pardon; nay, it is an argument of a deeper, not to say extreme, ignorance. However, the fruit of disobedience is death, but whoever cultivates humility and obedience, showing himself a follower of Christ even to the end, is carried up on high, receives from God the grace that ministers light, and with his mouth opened, he is filled with the Spirit, is purified in heart, and is enlightened in mind; he receives speech at the opening of his mouth, and, not premeditating what he ought to say, he exists instead as an instrument of the Spirit speaking within him. Therefore, through you obedient to Christ, who exercises the high-priestly office among you, I submit to your commands, and relying on your prayers, I open my mouth, hoping that it may be filled with the Spirit, and that I may then utter those words which are not the fruits of my own mind, but of the Spirit, who makes the blind wise. So that I may receive what He is about to give, and may repeat the same.

Tripartite Work: 1. Dialectics. 2. Book of Heresies. 3. Book of the Orthodox Faith.

First, therefore, of those who have been distinguished among the Gentiles for the praise of wisdom, I shall set forth all that is best, since I have established that whatever is good has been granted to mortals by the benefit of God; ‹for every best gift and every perfect benefit is from above, descending from the Father of lights› (1). But whatever is contrary to the truth is a dark invention of Satanic error and a fiction of a lost mind, just as the most excellent Gregory in Theology said. Wherefore, like a bee, I shall gather and compose those things which are akin to the truth, and I shall receive salvation from the very enemies themselves. But whatever is evil and joined to so-called knowledge, I shall reject. Presently, in another volume ^D I shall weave together the elegies of the heresies hateful to God, so that, the falsity being known, the truth may...

^A be more closely adhered to. And thus at last, I shall set forth the truth, the destroyer of error and the expeller of falsehood, adorned and decorated like golden fringes with the discourses of the prophets inspired by God, as well as of those instructed by God, the fishermen, and also of the divine shepherds and teachers, with God and His grace inspiring me; so that its glory, shining from within, may illuminate with its own rays those who approach it with souls purified, as is right, and with turbulent thoughts cast aside. I shall bring forward nothing, as I was just saying, that is my own; but I shall gather into one those things which have been elaborated by all the most approved masters, and I shall set them forth, as far as it is permitted to me, in a brief and compendious discourse, obeying in all things ^B your command. Therefore, I beseech you, venerable Fathers in Christ, that you grant pardon to me who have complied with your precepts, and that you be favorably disposed, and that in return for the obedience which he shows you, you may repay with your prayers. ^C

PHILOSOPHICAL CHAPTERS

Accurate index of the chapters of this volume. 1. On knowledge. 2. What is the aim? 3. On philosophy. 4. On being, substance, and accident. 5. On the voice. 6. On division. 7. On that which is prior by nature. 8. On definition. 9. On genus. 10. On species. 11. On the individual. 12. On difference. 13. On accident. 14. On proper. 15. On things predicated. 16. On synonymous and homonymous predication. 17. On things predicated in terms of what it is, and of what sort it is. ^D 18. On the communion and difference of the five voices. 19. On the communion and difference of genus and difference. 20. On the communion and difference of genus and species. 21. On the communion and difference of genus and proper. 22. On the communion and difference of genus and accident. 23. On the communion and difference of difference and species. 24. On the communion and difference of difference and proper. 25. On the communion and difference of difference and accident. 26. On the communion and difference of species and proper.

27. On in what species and accidents agree and differ. 28. On in what proper and inseparable accident both agree and differ. 29. On hypostasis, and enhypostaton and anhypostaton. 30. On substance, and nature, and form; and not of individual, and person and hypostasis. 31. On equivocally. 32. On univocally. 33. On polyonymy. ^A 34. On others and heteronyms. 35. On denominatives. 36. On the ten supreme genera. 37. On homogenerates, and homoeideis, and heterogeneis, and heteroideis and those differing in number. 38. On in what. 39. On substance. 40. On nature. 41. On form. 42. On hypostasis. 43. On person. 44. On enhypostaton. 45. On anhypostaton. 46. Division of being. 47. Division of substance. 48. On homogenerates, and homoeideis, and heterogeneis and heteroideis, and homohypostatis, and those differing in number. 49. On quantity and muchness. 50. On relatives. 51. On quality and sort. 52. On doing and suffering. 53. On position. 54. On where. 55. On when. 56. On having. ^B 57. On opposites. 58. On habit and privation. 59. On prior and posterior. 60. On together. 61. On motion. 62. On having. 63. On enunciation, affirmation, and negation. 64. On term, and proposition, and syllogism. 65. On union. 66. On hypostatic union. 67. The definitions of philosophy are six. 68. On the four dialectic methods.

We have presented the chapters of the Damascene’s Dialectica in the order in which they are found in the Basilian edition and in the five royal codices, in which a more extensive logic is contained. But, in order that the reader may perceive the distinctions of both editions, it is our pleasure to provide another index taken from the codices of the more concise logic.

1. On being, substance, and accident. 2. On genus, both the most general and the most specific, and the subalterns. 3. On the individual. 4. On difference. 5. On accident. 6. On the proper. ^C 7. On predicates. 8. On the synonym and equivocal predicate. 9. On the category of what it is, and of what sort it is. 10. On hypostasis and enhypostaton, and anhypostaton. 11. On substance, and nature, and form, and individual, and person, and hypostasis. 12. On division. 13. On that which is prior by nature. 14. On definition. 15. On equivocally.

The remaining chapters follow in the same order as in the former index. ^D

CHAPTER I. On Knowledge.

^A Nothing is more precious than knowledge; for knowledge is light for the rational soul; the opposite, ignorance, is darkness. Just as the privation of light is darkness, so too is the privation of knowledge darkness for the intellect. For ignorance is proper to irrational creatures, but knowledge to rational ones. Consequently, he to whom knowledge is absent, being by nature capable of knowledge and scientific understanding, he is, by reason of the carelessness and sloth of his soul, worse than the irrational creatures. By knowledge, I mean the true awareness of things that are. For the sciences deal with things that are; wherefore a false knowledge, as being an awareness of that which is not, is ignorance rather than knowledge. For falsehood is nothing other than that which is not. Since, therefore, we do not live by the soul alone, but our soul, covered as if by a garment with flesh, possess the mind like an eye that sees and is capable of knowing, and is receptive to the knowledge of things and of science, yet does not possess knowledge and science by itself or from its own resources, but stands in need of the one who teaches—let us approach the unerring teacher of truth; Christ is the subsistent wisdom and truth, in whom are all the ^B hidden treasures of knowledge, and who exists as the wisdom and power of God and the Father, so that we may hear his voice through the help of the divine Scriptures, and learn the true knowledge of all things. Let us approach with care and sincerity, lest we cause the intellectual eye of our soul to be dimmed by passions; for it would be difficult for anyone with a most pure and transparent eye to gaze clearly upon the truth. ^C If the light that is in us, that is to say, the mind, is darkness, how great will the darkness be? Let us approach with all our soul and mind. For just as it is impossible for an eye that is constantly moving and being turned around to gaze clearly at what is seen—for the eye must be directed toward that which is perceived—so too, by shaking off every storm of thoughts, it is fitting for us to approach the truth, having left behind the dregs of matter; yet it is not enough for us to have reached the doors, but let us knock vigorously, so that, the door of the bridal chamber being opened, we may perceive its internal beauty. For the letter is indeed the door; but the one within the bridal chamber ^D is that which is hidden by it, the beauty of the thoughts, or rather the Spirit of truth. Let us knock vigorously, let us read once, twice, many times, and by so digging, we shall find the treasure of knowledge and shall take delight in its wealth. Let us ask, let us search, let us examine, let us inquire. For everyone who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it shall be opened. And, "Ask your father, and he will tell you."

^A Therefore, if we are lovers of learning, we shall also be lovers of wisdom. For all things are by nature capable of being acquired by diligence and toil, and before all things, and after all things, by the grace of God who gives. Since the divine Apostle says, "Test all things; hold fast what is good," [*] let us examine also the words of outside sages. Perhaps we shall find among them something useful, and shall reap something beneficial to the soul. For every craftsman needs certain instruments for the construction of his works. It is fitting, too, that certain handmaidens should serve the queen. Let us, therefore, take on the arguments that are servants of the truth, and let us cast off the impiety that has tyranny over them; and let us not make bad use of what is good; let us not employ the art of logic for the deception of the simpler-minded, but even if the truth does not need various sophistries, let us nevertheless make use of them against those who stir up unholy war, ^B and for the overthrow of that which is falsely called knowledge.

What the purpose of studies ought to be.

Therefore, let us make our beginning from these, as from elements, and for those who still have need of milk, let us take the beginning of our discourse, having invoked the aid and assistance of Christ, who is the subsistent Word of God, from whom "every good gift and every perfect gift is given." [*] The goal for those who encounter these things shall be to moor the mind to the blessed end. This is to be led through the senses to that which is above every sense and comprehension—who is the cause, maker, and creator of all. For "from the beauty of created things, the Creator is proportionately contemplated," [*] and "His invisible things are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made." [*] Wherefore, if we strive for knowledge with an undistracted and humble mind, we shall attain what we desire. "For how can you believe," said Christ, who is the Truth, "when you receive glory from men?" [*] And, "Everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and he who humbles himself will be exalted." [*] ^D

CAPUT II.

What the purpose is.

Since everyone who begins a matter without a purpose... [alt-version omitted]

walks as if in darkness—for he who labors without a purpose is in total want—let us first state the purpose of the proposed discourse, so that what is said may be easily grasped. Our purpose, therefore, is to undertake philosophy and, as much as possible, to record in the present book, in summarized form, knowledge of every kind. Let it be called THE FOUNTAIN OF KNOWLEDGE. I shall therefore say nothing of my own; but I shall gather and set forth in summary the things spoken sporadically by holy and wise men. It is better, therefore, first to know precisely what philosophy is. ^A

CAPUT III. Concerning Philosophy.

Philosophy is the knowledge of what is, ^B as it is—that is, the knowledge of the nature of things. And again: Philosophy is the knowledge of divine and human things—that is, of things that are visible and invisible. Philosophy is, furthermore, the study of death—both the voluntary and the natural. For life is twofold: the natural, according to which we live, and the voluntary, according to which we exert ourselves in attachment to the present life. Death is also twofold: the natural, which is the separation of the soul from the body, and the voluntary, according to which we despise the present life and hasten toward the future.

Philosophy is, moreover, becoming like God. We become like God through wisdom, that is, through true knowledge of the good; and through justice, which is the distribution of equality and is impartial in judgment; and through holiness, which is superior to justice, that is, goodness, or doing good to those who wrong us. ^C Philosophy is the art of arts and the science of sciences. For philosophy is the beginning of every art. Through it, every art and every science has been found. Now, an art is that which is liable to error in some things, according to some. A science, however, is that which is in no way liable to error; and philosophy alone does not err. According to others, an art is that which is performed by the hands; but a science is every logical art—grammar, rhetoric, and such like. Philosophy is, again, the love of wisdom. True wisdom is God; therefore, love toward God is true philosophy.

Philosophy is divided into the theoretical and the practical; the theoretical into theology, physiology, and mathematics; the practical into ethics, economics, and politics. ^D The theoretical, therefore, is that which adorns the intellect. Theology, then, is the contemplation of things incorporeal and immaterial—first, God, who is truly immaterial; then, angels and souls. Physiology is the contemplation of material things and those readily available [to us],

such as animals, plants, stones, and similar things. ^A Mathematics, on the other hand, is the knowledge of things which, although in themselves lacking body, are nevertheless considered within a body; I mean numbers, the harmony of sounds, furthermore, shapes, and the movement of the stars. The study which deals with numbers constitutes the science of arithmetic; that which deals with sounds, music; that which deals with shapes, geometry; and that which deals with the stars, astronomy. These hold a middle place between bodies and incorporeal things. For a number, in itself, is not corporeal, but it is considered in matter—for example, in wheat, or wine, or some other such thing. The active [part] of philosophy, however, is concerned with virtues. For it refines character and teaches how life ought to be ordered; and if it prescribes laws for a single individual, it is called ethics; if for an entire household, economics; and lastly, politics, if for cities and regions.

Some have attempted to remove philosophy from the midst, denying that it, or any science or perception, exists. ^B We shall refute them in this way: How can you say that philosophy, and knowledge, and comprehension do not exist? Have you reached knowledge and comprehension, or have you reached neither? If you have reached them, then behold, there is knowledge and comprehension. But if you have not reached them, no one will believe you when you argue about a matter, the knowledge of which you have not reached.

Since, therefore, philosophy is the knowledge of the things that are, let us speak about being. It must be known that we begin from that part of philosophy which is occupied with reasoning, which is rather an instrument of philosophy than a part; for it is used for every demonstration. We shall, therefore, speak first about simple and unadorned terms, through the simple notion of which simple things are declared, and thus we shall subsequently treat of reasoning.

CAP. IV.

Regarding being, substance, and accident.

"Being" is the common name of all things that are; this is divided into substance and accident. Substance, indeed, is the more primary [thing], as [existing] in itself, and not ^C

^A needing another for its existence. An accident, however, is that which cannot exist in itself, but is beheld in substance. ^B For substance is, as it were, a substrate, the material of things, while an accident is that which is beheld in a substrate; for example, bronze and wax are substances, while figure, form, and color are accidents. Moreover, a body is a substance, but color is an accident. A body is not in color, but color is in a body. Neither is the soul in knowledge, but knowledge is in the soul. Nor are bronze and wax in figure, but figure is in the wax and in the bronze. Furthermore, one does not speak of the body of the color, but the color of the body; nor of the soul of the knowledge, but the knowledge of the soul; nor of the wax of the figure, but the figure of the wax. And color, knowledge, and figure are subject to change, while the body, the soul, and the wax remain the same, since substance is not at all subject to change. And the substance and material of a body is one, but there are many colors. In the same way, in all other things, the substrate is substance, while that which is beheld in the substrate—namely, the accident—is the accident.

Definitions of substance and accident.

They define substance thus: Substance is a self-subsisting thing, not needing another for its existence. An accident, however, is that which cannot exist in itself, but has its existence in another. Therefore, God and every created thing are substances—even though God ^C is supersubstantial. There are also substantial qualities, of which we shall speak.

On being, substance, and accident.

"Being" is the common name of all things that are. For this reason, it is divided into substance and accident. Substance, indeed, is a self-subsisting thing not needing another for its constitution—that is, that which exists in itself and does not have its existence in another. An accident, however, is that which cannot exist in itself, but has its existence in another. For substance, just like the material of things, has the nature of a substrate. But an accident is that ^D which is beheld in substance/substrate, such as the body and the color.

^A For it is not the body that is in the color, but the color that is in the body. Therefore, the body is substance, while the color is an accident. Similarly with the soul and prudence. For the soul is not in prudence, but prudence is in the soul. Hence, it is not said that the body belongs to the color, but the color to the body; nor the soul to prudence, but prudence to the soul. Therefore, the soul is substance, while prudence is an accident. For if the soul is removed, it is necessary that prudence be removed as well. For if the soul does not exist, in what will prudence exist? But if prudence is removed, the soul is not necessarily removed; for it is possible for the soul to exist apart from prudence. In the same way, regarding all things that exist, that which is in itself, and not in another, ^B is substance; but that which is not able to exist by itself, but has its existence in another, is an accident.

Cap. V. On Voice.

^B Since our purpose is to discuss every philosophical voice, we must first recognize about which sort of voice philosophy is concerned. Taking the inception of our discourse from voice itself, we say: voice either lacks signification or has the power of signifying. That which lacks signification is that by which nothing is signified; that which has the power of signifying is that by which something is signified. Again, that voice which signifies nothing is either articulated or not articulated. Non-articulated is that which can in no way be written; articulated, however, is that which can be written. Therefore, the non-articulated voice, which is void of signification, is that which is produced by a stone, for example, or by a piece of wood. For it is neither ^C engraved in letters, nor does it signify anything. The voice that is void of signification, and yet is articulated, is like *scindapsus*. For this is written, but it signifies nothing. For there never was, nor will there ever be, a *scindapsus*. Therefore, about the voice that lacks signification, whether it be articulated or non-articulated, philosophy has no concern.

Again, the voice that signifies is either articulated or non-articulated. A voice that is not articulated, but has the power of signifying, is like the barking of dogs. For by this the dog is designated, because it is the voice of a dog. Moreover, it designates that someone is present. But it is not articulated; for it cannot be written. Wherefore, neither does philosophy concern itself with this. But that which is significant and articulated is either universal or particular. Universal, as "man"; particular, as "Peter" or "Paul." But not even the particular voice has a place in philosophy, but [only that which is] significant, articulated, and universal.

^D Essential or accidental voice. — This, in turn, is either substantial or accidental to substance. Substantial, or essential, is that which [signifies] the essence,

^A that is, it declares the nature of things; accidental indicates accidents. For example: man is a rational, mortal animal. All these things are essential. For if you take away any of these from man, he will cease to be man. If you say he is not an animal, he is no longer man. If you say he is not endowed with reason, he is not man. In like manner, if you deny that he is mortal, he will no longer be man. For every man is an animal, and endowed with reason, and mortal. For this reason, such terms are called substantial, because they complete the nature, and it is impossible for man to subsist if they are removed. In the same way, in every thing, those things which constitute the nature are called substantial. Those, however, which are adventitious are accidents, as those which can be or can not be in the subject, suppose in a man or horse or some other such thing, for example, whiteness. For whether anyone is white or black, he is nonetheless a man. Therefore, these and things similar to them are adjectitious, or accidents; things which, both they themselves and their opposites, can be present in us.

^B The signification of the substantial voice. — Now, indeed, the substantial voice either signifies what a thing is, or what kind of thing it is. Thus, if someone from among us asks what man is, we answer: an animal. Then if he asks what kind of animal he is, we say: a rational, mortal one. Wherefore, a substantial voice that indicates what kind of thing a thing is, is called a difference. But that which declares what it is, either expresses many species, and then it makes a genus; or ^C many who differ in number, but not in species, and then it makes a species. The first is, indeed, genus, as is substance. For "substance" signifies both man, and horse, and ox, of which each one is termed and is a substance, yet each one is a species. But each species is one thing and another. The second, however, is species, as is "man." For it signifies many, that is, all and individual men, who indeed differ among themselves in number: for Peter is one thing and Paul is another, and they are not one, but two; yet they do not differ in species, that is, in nature. For all are called men, and in reality are.

^D Particulars differ in number. — Therefore, that which is more special and particular differs in number, as Peter, an individual, and a person, and a hypostasis; which indeed signifies one individual thing. For when someone of us asks who this is, we answer: Peter. The same voice, moreover, signifies "another." For Peter is one thing, and Paul is another; likewise, "himself," and "this," and "that." These and others of this kind, which subsist by themselves, are spoken of the individual. Furthermore, that which embraces the individuals is called species, and is broader than the individual, inasmuch as it comprises many individuals,

^A much as genus contains many species; for example, the animal. For it contains man, ox, horse, and is broader than the species. But the holy Fathers called nature, and form, and substance, the genus as well. And it makes the species, that is, the nature, and the substance, and the form, not another thing, nor a different thing, but other. For we say man is one thing by nature, and the horse is another, not another thing, and another. It is said, therefore, concerning the species, this, and itself, and that, and such, which is predicated in the "what it is." But a difference makes a thing different. For an animal is one thing that is rational, and another that is irrational; and such is the "what," and the "what sort." The essential voice either exists in one, or in many. And if it is in one, it is called peculiar, as the "laughable," existing in man alone, and the "neighing" in the horse alone. If it exists in many species, it causes an accident; for example, whiteness. For this exists in man, and in horse, and in dog, and in many other species. And these are the five voices, to which every philosophical voice is reduced. Wherefore we must know what each signifies, in what they have communion with one another, and in what they differ: and these are genus, species, difference, property, and accident.

A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THESE VOICES

Genus is that which is predicated in the "what it is" of many things differing in species; that is to say, it is spoken and named. For to be predicated is the same as to be said of something. Species is that which is predicated in the "what it is" of many things differing in number. Difference is that which is predicated in the "what sort" of many things differing in species, and is assumed in the definition as substantial. For this is that which cannot in the same species ^D equally either be or not be; but it is absolutely necessary that it be in that species whose difference it is; which also, when it is present, preserves, and when it is absent, destroys. Nor can it happen that it itself, and its contrary, be in the same species: e.g., it cannot be that reason is not in man. For what lacks reason is nowhere man. This, when present, constitutes the nature of man, and when absent, it destroys it. For that which is devoid of reason does not possess the capacity of man. It must be known, therefore, that this is called substantial, and natural, and constituting, and dividing, and specific difference, and substantial quality and natural property; which among philosophers is most properly called difference, as that which is most

^A special, and makes the nature in which it resides manifest. “Property”

[Proprium]

[Accidens]

[proprietas]

CAP. VI. Of Division.

“Division”

[Divisio]

[Superdivisio]

[Subdivisio]

The modes of division are eight, for this reason. For whatever is divided, is divided either ^D according to itself, or by accident. And if according to itself, either as a thing or as a word; and if as a thing, either as genus into species, as when you divide animal into rational and irrational; or as species into individuals, as when human is divided into Peter and Paul and the rest.

^A Or as a whole into parts. And this in two ways: either into parts that are similar, or into those that are dissimilar. ^B It is of similar parts when the segments receive both the name and the definition of the whole, and of the parts themselves; for example, flesh is divided into many pieces of flesh, and each part of the flesh is called flesh, and accepts the definition of flesh. It is of dissimilar parts, conversely, when the thing divided does not receive either the name, or the definition, of the whole, or even of the parts, in common with one another; as if you were to divide Socrates into hands, feet, and head. For neither is the foot cut off from Socrates called Socrates, nor the head; nor does it receive the definition of Socrates or of the head.

Or as an equivocal term into various meanings; and this again in two ways. For either the whole is signified by the term, or a part. As a whole, for example, the word "dog." For it is used of the land dog, the celestial dog, and the sea dog, which are indeed whole things, and not merely parts of an animal. But it is as a part when the word "tongue" is used of the extremity of a shoe and a part of the leg, and also of that part of living creatures in which the faculty of tasting is situated; which are indeed only parts, and not a whole of any kind. ^C And in this way, that which is the subject of division is divided in itself. But per accidens, either as substance into accidents; as when I say, "Of men, some are white, others black." For men are substances; but whiteness and blackness are accidents. Or as accident into substances; as when I say, "Of the white, some are animate, some inanimate." For white is an accident; but animate and inanimate are substances. Or as accident into accidents; as when I say, "Of cold things, some are white and dry; others are black and humid." For cold, and white, and black, and humid are all accidents.

Division from one, and to one.

Eight modes of division are enumerated. Not all approve of the division of species into individuals.

multitude is distributed: for the multitude of individual men is infinite.

It is worth knowing that in no way of division is that which is by nature prior and posterior considered in the parts, nor that which is more and less; yet in those things which are divided from one, or for the sake of order to one, both that which is prior and posterior by nature is considered, and that which is more and less; whence also the denomination arises.

On Division

^A Division is the first cutting of a thing: for example, animal is divided into rational and irrational. Subdivision is the cutting of one part into two other parts, as when the animal having been divided into rational and irrational, we divide one part, namely the rational, into mortal and immortal. Superdivision, however, is when, having made a division of a thing, we make another division of the same thing. For example, man is divided into male and female; behold the division. And again, man is divided into soul and body; behold the superdivision. But division and superdivision do not always occur, but when everything is not contained under the first division. Behold, for instance, in the male and in the female, soul and body are considered.

^C 17. What are contradistinctive elements. It must be known that those are called contradistinctive which are two species cut from one and the same genus: for example, animal is divided into rational and irrational. Therefore the rational and irrational are called contradistinctive.

There are eight modes of division. For something is divided, or as a genus into its species, as animal is divided into rational and irrational; or as a species into individuals, as man is divided into Peter, and Paul, and the remaining individual men; or as a whole into parts, and this in two ways: either they are similar or dissimilar. Similar parts are those which receive the name and definition of the whole and of each other, as when we cut flesh into many fleshes, each part is called flesh, and receives the name and definition of flesh. ^D Dissimilar parts, on the other hand, are those which neither receive the name nor the definition of the whole, nor of the parts; as when we divide Socrates into head, hands, and feet. For neither the head, nor the hands, nor the feet receive the name and definition of Socrates, nor of each other. Or as an equivocal word [is divided] into different meanings, and this in two ways: namely, as a whole or as a part. As a whole, as this word "dog." For it is said of the terrestrial dog, the celestial, and the marine, which are a certain whole, not a part of an animal. As a part, when the name "tongue" is said of the extremity of a shoe, of the extremity of a pipe, and of the member by which animals have the faculty of tasting; which indeed are parts and not

^A wholes, as when I say, of men, some are white, others black. Or as accidents into substances, as when I say: of white things, some are animate, others inanimate. Or as accident into accidents: as if I were to say, of cold things, these are dry, those are indeed moist. Or as those things which are from one, and those which are directed toward one. From one, as from medicine, "medical book," "medical instrument" derive their name. Toward one, however, as "salubrious remedy," "salubrious food"; for they look to one thing, namely, health. According to this method, therefore, being is divided into substance and accident.

It is necessary to know that in no mode of division is what is naturally prior and posterior, nor what is more and less, considered among the divided parts, unless in those things which are from one and directed to one.

CAP. VII. Concerning that which is naturally prior.

^BNature, therefore, that is prior which is brought in at the same time, but does not bring it in along with itself; which also removes it along with itself, but is not removed at the same time. E.g., animal is naturally prior to man. For when animal is removed and does not exist, it is necessary that man also not be. For man is an animal. And if animal is not existing, necessarily neither will man be; for man is indeed an animal. Conversely, when man is removed, it is possible for animal to be. For there will be horse, dog, and the like; which indeed are animals. Again, when man is posited, animal also is brought in: for man is an animal. But from the bringing in of animal, it is not necessary that man be brought in; but perhaps a horse, or a dog, or something similar. ^C For these themselves are also animals. Therefore, neither is Peter naturally prior to Paul, nor animal rationale to irrational animal. For when Peter is removed and does not exist, Paul will be; and when Paul is posited, Peter is not at the same time brought in: and neither, when Peter is brought in, does Paul follow at the same time. But neither is Peter more, that is to say, more man or animal, than Paul; nor Paul than Peter. But one medicine is found to be more salubrious than another medicine, and one medical book is found to be more suitable for healing than another.

CAP. VIII. Concerning definition.

^DWhat is definition? Definition is a compendious speech declaring the nature of the subject, or a speech signifying the nature of the subject in few words. As, man is an animal participating in reason, mortal, capable of intelligence and science. And many indeed have had long and ample discourses concerning the nature of man: but because they are by no means brief and compendious, therefore they are not definitions. Again, there are certain brief sayings, such as apophthegms, but because they do not explain the nature of the thing, consequently they are not definitions either. Indeed

often denotes the nature of the subject matter ^A but it is not a definition. For a name is one word, but a definition is a phrase; and a phrase consists of at least two words, and those different ones. [Thus "terminating-word" is a name, because it is explicit; but "terminating-word" is not in a conjunction.]

Definition from genus and constituent or substantial differences. As in the case of the definition of an animal: for animal is an ensouled, sensitive substance. Behold, substance is the genus; and the ensouled and sensitive parts are the constituent differences. It is taken also from matter and form; for instance, a statue is that which is made of bronze, representing the appearance of a man. For bronze ^B is the matter; but representing the appearance of a man is the form of the statue. Furthermore, the matter corresponds to the genus, the form to the difference. In addition to this, it is taken from subject and end; as, medicine is the art that is occupied with human bodies and secures health. Behold, the subjects of medicine are human bodies; and its end is health.

19 A description is made from accidents. [Descriptive.] But a description is composed from those things which are adventitious, that is, from proper and accidental qualities; for instance: "Man is a rational, risible animal, walking with an upright body, having broad nails." For all these things are adventitious to the essence. Wherefore it is also called a description, as if adumbrating, ^C not declaring the essential state of the thing, but only those things which attend it. Furthermore, a definition is mixed from substantial and accidental qualities; for example: "Man is a rational animal, walking upright, having broad nails."

Definition, that is to say, is named by a metaphor drawn from the borders of land. For just as a boundary separates what is proper to each from that which is alien, so too does a definition distinguish the nature of each thing from the nature of another.

The excellence of a definition. An entire definition of a man. The soundness, or excellence, of a definition consists in this: that it neither falls short in words nor is redundant. But for men, both words may be missing or may be redundant. That definition ^D is perfect which is convertible with the thing defined; but that which is not convertible is imperfect. Therefore, neither that which falls short in words,

VARIAE LECTIONES. * Those things which follow up to "Consists of," etc., are absent in the manuscripts of the second class, or the shorter logic; instead of this it is read: "and so they can be rendered in Latin, and therefore a definition requires two words to be composed, to be brief, and to declare the nature of the thing defined: which seems more appropriate to the text than others. For why here concern the 'terminating-word,' and the definition of the 'terminating-word' as if by inference; concerning which the author had premised nothing, for without doubt he signifies the 'terminating-word,' not the definition. For here he says that a name is; but he says a definition consists of a name. From these things, however, whether they be genuine or added, it is gathered that a 'terminating-word' is not a simple name, but an explicit name; so that the definition consisting of it may be clear, not ambiguous nor obscure. He adds [the] name that 'terminating-word' becomes in conjunction; because, as the logicians say, a name outside of a proposition is not a 'terminating-word'." * Two royal [manuscripts]. Edita [are edited] as [it is].

NOTES. (10) Ammon. Proleg. in Isag. Porphyrii. (11) Ammonius, loc. cit.

^A nor that which is redundant, when it is converted with the defined thing. For when it abounds in words, it is deficient in things; but when it is deficient in words, it abounds in things. Therefore, nature has devised a wondrous artifice; namely, an opulent poverty, and opulence simulating poverty.] For instance, the perfect definition of a man is "an animal, rational, mortal." Behold, it is converted. For every rational, mortal animal is a man, and every man is a rational, mortal animal. If, therefore, some one word is missing from this, it abounds in things: such as, "an animal, rational." For you see that it is deficient by one word (for I did not say "mortal") and abounds in things: for not man alone is an animal endowed with ^B reason, but an angel also; and it is not converted with the defined thing. Again, if I should say, "an animal, rational, mortal, grammatical," not even thus is it converted. For it is redundant by one word, in that I have said "grammatical": but it is deficient in things. For it has not defined every man, but grammarians only. For an animal that uses every reason, mortal, grammatical—[this is not the case for all]. For not every man is a grammatical man; but yet not every man is a grammatical [man].

Therefore, perfect definitions are those which are converted with the defined object. But since "the proper" is also ^C converted with that of which it is the proper (for whatever is a man, that is also capable of laughter, and whatever is capable of laughter, that also is a man), we must, on account of the distinction, add and say that perfect definitions are those finally which are taken from the genus and the constitutive differences, and which neither are deficient in words, nor redundant, and finally are converted with the defined object. Likewise also, those which are taken from both, that is, from the subject and the end, are perfect; and those [taken] from the composite of both, from the matter and the form. There is also a time when even those [taken] only from the subject, when [the subject] is clearly known, ^D suffice.

VARIOUS READINGS. These [words] up to the words "οἷον, ὁ τέλειος ὁρισμός" [for instance, the perfect definition] are not read in the manuscripts of the second class, nor [do they indicate] what I might suspect to be spurious and transferred from the margin. * Published as "μία λέξει." Likewise two royal codices of the "Fulsior Logica," or of the first class. Some Royal and Colbertine [manuscripts] [read] "πλὴν μόνους." Another: "ἀλλὰ μόνους." In the codex of St. Hilary, it is amended above the line, "ἀλλὰ μόνον."

NOTES. (12) "Ζῶόν ἐστι λογικὸν θνητόν." It is an animal, rational, mortal. For, he says, not only man is an animal endowed with reason, but an angel also. Undoubtedly, in his Dialectics, he has collected what the philosophers taught, with no one among the Fathers contradicting. But after Plato, Nazianzen, in his 57th oration, near the middle, and others defined man as "an animal, rational, mortal": Aristotle favors this, who in book 1 of the *Prior Analytics*, c. 51, divides animal into mortal and immortal; into mortal, for instance, man; into immortal, or angel. I believe the reason for this definition and division is to be sought from that opinion of the Platonists, which Plotinus recounts in *Enneads* 3, book v, chap. 6, regarding the essence of a demon (thus they called angels of the lowest order) *καθ' ὅσον δαίμων* [insofar as it is a demon], that it exists together with a certain body, either airy or fiery. Marsilio Ficino discusses this doctrine in his study of this book of Plotinus, chap. 5, where he posits five genres of rational animals according to the Platonists; some merely fiery, others of fire and air, others of air and subtle water, others watery, others of water and subtle earth. These, he says, are the five [kinds] of human bodies, as it were, of the lowest demons. Furthermore, he took these not only from Orpheus, but also from Apuleius, Iamblichus, Porphyry, and other Platonists, as he testifies in chap. 6.

We have explained the bodies of demons above, with a certain freer reasoning, by which we might depart by far from the Platonists. But yet, according to these, they had defined a man as an animal, rational, mortal. Which definition our author would certainly not have admitted, had it not appeared quite frequently in the books of the Fathers. For it is completely opposed to his own sentiment regarding the non-corporeality of angels, which he asseverates in his theological works. But the Greek Fathers, while they were receiving the words or opinions of the ancients, often wrote contradictory things. For the division of the rational animal into mortal and immortal, and that definition of a man as "rational, mortal," can in no way be made to accord with the common division among the Damascene into corporeal and incorporeal, or angel. From which it can be inferred that this holy Doctor, in the place we are examining, took the words "animal" and "rational" in a broader sense, and admitted the difference of "mortal" in the definition of a man, that the nature of a man might be distinguished in every way from the angelic, especially because *τὸ λογικόν* signifies in Greek "rational," [possessing] the power of reasoning, whether conjoined with sense or devoid of sense; from which they decided the mortal difference should be added.

^A That subject is not subject to another art, as glass is to the art of glassmaking; and [sometimes it is defined] from the end alone, when that end cannot be the end of another art, as in the art of shipbuilding. Wherefore, from all these things it must be understood that the perfection of a definition lies in this, that it may be convertible with the thing defined.

Difference exists between a definition and a term, in that the latter is more universal and the former more particular. For a term is more universal than a definition; and indeed, a term denotes a boundary. It also denotes a negation, as when we say, "The king has decreed." It also denotes that into which a proposition is resolved, as, with God's help, we shall learn hereafter. It also denotes a definition. But a definition denotes only the brief discourse which declares the nature of the subject matter.

It must be known that a definition is taken only of substance and its species; and we cannot construct a definition for individuals or for accidents, ^B but only a description; for a definition is composed of a genus and constituent differences, whereas a description is composed of accidental qualities.

CHAPTER IX. Concerning Genus.

It should be known that in the case of equivocal terms, three things must be sought: first, whether the term itself is equivocal; how many meanings it has; and of which of them the discourse speaks. Therefore, we must state first what is equivocal. Equivocal terms exist when two or more things have the same name, but each of them signifies something different and pertains to a different substance—that is, it receives a different definition; just as is the case now with genus. For genus is among the number of equivocal terms. For genus is said first to be taken from country and parents; and each of these in a twofold manner, to wit, proximately or remotely. From a proximate country, ^C as from Jerusalem ("Hierosolyma") a person is called a Hierosolymitan; from a remote one, as from the province of Palestine, a Palestinian. In the same way, from a proximate parent, as when Achilles, being the son of Peleus, is called a Peleid. From a remote one, as when the same person is called an Eacides from his grandfather Eacus. For Eacus was the father of Peleus. Genus is also said to be the relationship of one toward many who have their origin from him, as when all who have their station from Israel are called Israelites. But concerning these two significations of genus, there is no discussion for philosophers. ^D

^A Genus is again defined as that to which a species is subordinate; for instance, man, horse, and other species are subordinate to animal: therefore, animal is a genus. ^B It is of this genus that philosophers speak; and defining it, we say: A genus is that which is predicated in the "what is it" of many things that differ in species. For example, animal, being a genus, is predicated of man, horse, ox, and many others in the "what is it," which indeed differ from one another in species. For the species of man is one thing, that of a horse another, and that of an ox another; and it is in the "what is it" that it is predicated. For when we are asked, "What is man?" we say, "Animal"; and similarly for a horse—when we are asked, "What is it?" we say, "Animal." Thus, a genus is that to which a species is subordinate. [And again, a genus is that which is divided into species.] For a genus is divided into species, and it is more universal than the species, and it contains the species, and is above them.

For it is necessary to know that what is more universal is called "above," and what is subordinate to predication, the more particular, is called "below." For there is a subject for existence, as for instance substance; for it underlies an accident in order for it to exist, since the accident subsists in it. And there is a subject for predication, which is indeed the particular. For just as the genus is predicated of the species, so the species is predicated of individuals. It is clear, however, that the genus is more general than the species, and the species than the individuals. Concerning these, we shall discourse more accurately below, God willing. But now, having spoken about the genus, let us speak also about the species.

CAP. X. Of the species.

^C Why the species is also among the equivocal terms; it is spoken of in a twofold way. For "species" is said of the form and shape of each thing, for example, the species of a statue; in accordance with which it has also been said (14): "The first species, worthy of imperial rule." There is, again, a species that is substantial, which is placed under the genus. And again, a species is that of which the genus is predicated in the "what is it." And again, a species is that which is predicated in the "what is it" of many things that differ in number. ^D But the first two definitions differ only in respect of relation, as an ascent and a descent, and they apply to every species. But the third and last definition applies only to the most specific species, which is the one immediately above the individuals and covers the instances, as we say, the species of man.

We have therefore said that the genus is spoken of in a triple way: namely, from the progenitor, and from the fatherland; and...

according to a third way, to which is subordinated the species. And the species is also spoken of in a twofold way, in the manner of the form of each thing, according to one way. According to the second way, that which is predicated by the genus, and that which is under the genus, as being divided from it. Concerning these [matters] of the genus and of the species among the philosophers. ^A

Since [we were] discoursing concerning the genus, we made mention of the species, saying: Genus is that which is divided into species; and again, discoursing concerning the species, we made mention of the genus, saying: Species is that which is divided from the genus; it is necessary to know that just as, when we speak of a father, we necessarily also make mention of the son—for that man is a father who has a son—and when discoursing of the son, we necessarily also make mention of the father—for that man is a son who has a father—so also here, it is impossible to discuss the genus without the species, or the species without the genus. For the genus must by all means be divided into species, and that which does not have species divided from it, is not a genus. And likewise, species are divided from the genus, and those which lack a genus are not species. ^B

Declaration of the matters of genus, supreme genus, and intermediate and lowest species.

As the first parent, Adam, since he lacked a father, is not called a son, but is called a father, as he who had children; and Seth is called both a son of him who begat him—for he had a father, Adam—and is called a father of him who was begotten of him; for he begot Enos; but Abel is called indeed a son, because he had Adam as father, but he is not called a father because he had no son; in the same way also, regarding the genus and the species, the first genus, which is not divided from another genus, and has no genus prior to it, is only a genus, and not also a species, and is called the generalissimum genus; the definition of which is: generalissimum genus is that which, while it is a genus, is not nevertheless a species, because it has no genus superior to it. Those which are divided from it, if they have other species below them which are divided from them, are then species of the former, that is, of the superior [genera] from which they are cut; and they are genera of those which are divided from them, that is, of the inferior [things]; and they are called subaltern genera and species. The extreme and lowest species, which do not have other species below them—that is, which do not contain species, but only individuals, that is, hypostases or supposita—are not called genera, but species ^C only: for this very reason, as I was saying, that they do not possess any species subjected [to them] which are divided from them. For neither can that be called a genus which contains no species; nor does it have any [species] which are divided from it. Wherefore that which contains no species, but only individuals, is called the specialissima species, because it is a species [but] not a genus; just as, on the contrary, the genus, which is not also a species, is called the generalissimum genus, as it were the highest. ^D All the superior things are predicated of the inferior: but the species is not predicated of the species. — Substantia generalissimum

genus ^A is the first and most generic. For although substance and accident are divided from being, nevertheless "being" is not their genus. For they receive the name of "being," but they do not receive its definition. For they define "being" in this way: "Being" is that which either subsists by itself and has no need of another thing in order to exist; or it is that which cannot be by itself, but has its existence in another. Substance, however, is only that which exists by itself and has no need of another thing in order to subsist. Lo, substance did not receive the whole definition of being. Thus, "being" is not the genus of substance, nor is substance the genus of being. For the species receives the whole definition of its genus without any omission. But neither is an accident a species of "being." For it does not receive the whole definition thereof, but only half. For an accident is a thing which cannot exist by itself, but has its existence only in another. Lo, neither substance receives the whole definition of being, nor an accident either. But substance receives one half, and the accident the other half. So, although "being" is divided into substance and accident, it is not their genus. ^B Substance, however, is divided into body and incorporeal. Now, body and incorporeal are species of substance, since each of these receives both the name and the complete definition of substance. It is established, therefore, that substance is not a species, since it does not have a genus above itself; but it is the first and most generic genus. Again, body, which is a species of substance, is the genus of the animate and the inanimate. Animate, again, is divided into sensible and insensible. Sensible animate is the animal, which has life and sensation; insensible is the plant, for it does not have sensation. Yet the plant is called animate because it has the power of nourishment, growth, and reproduction. The animal is again divided into rational and irrational. The rational into mortal and immortal; the mortal into man, horse, ox, and such like, which are no longer divided into other ^C species, but into individuals, that is, hypostases. For man is divided into Peter, Paul, John, and the other individual men, who are not species, but hypostases. For species, as we said, do not receive the definition of one another; for example, a body does not receive the definition of the incorporeal; nor does man receive the definition of a horse. But Peter, and Paul, and John receive one and the same definition; and likewise the other individual men do not admit the definition of others; for example, the body does not receive the definition of the incorporeal; nor does man receive the definition of a horse. But Peter, and Paul, and John receive the same individual definition; likewise the others, individual men, are not species of ^D man, but atoms, that is to say, hypostases.

^A Furthermore, when a species is divided, it imparts its name and definition to those things that are inferior to it. But truly, when Peter is divided into soul and body, he imparts his name and definition neither to the soul nor to the body. For neither is the soul alone Peter, nor the body alone, but the combination of both.

^B A genus is divided into few species.

What is a most specific species.

^D

Differences that divide and constitute.

and I take the animal, the non-sentient, and the mortal; I add terrestrial and I construct a horse, a dog, and suchlike. Again I take the animal, the non-sentient, and the mortal; I add the aquatic, and I construct a fish. These differences are called substantial and natural, because they determine the difference of one species from another; so that species differs from species, and nature from nature.

Of the most generic genus, and of the most specific species, and of the subalterns.

The name of "genus" is taken in three ways. First, from the progenitor, just as those who are born of Israel are called Israelites. In another way, from the fatherland, just as those from Jerusalem have the name Hierosolymites, and those from Palestine, Palestinians. Finally, in a third way, genus is called that which is divided into species; this is the subject of the discourse among philosophers, who define it as follows: Genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species in respect of their essence.

Similarly, the term "species" has a double significance. For species is called figure and form; as the species of a human statue. Again, species is called that which is subordinated to a genus, that is, that which is divided from the genus; and it is of this acceptation of species that philosophers treat.

Since, however, in having a discourse about genus we mention species, by saying: "Genus is that which is divided into species," it is worth our while to know that, just as when we speak of a father we necessarily make mention of a son also (for he is indeed a father who has a son); similarly, when we speak of a son, we necessarily remember the father also (for he is indeed a son who has a father). Thus, even now, it is impossible to treat of genus while omitting species, or of species while silently passing over the mention of genus. For genus is entirely divided into species; and that which lacks species divided from it is not a genus. Therefore, species are divided from a genus; and those things which do not acknowledge a genus are by no means species. In the same way, indeed, as the first man, or Adam, is not called a son; yet he is called a father (for he had children); but Seth, in truth, is called the son of his parent (for Adam was the father of this one, and the father of the one born from him, for he begot a son). But Abel is indeed called a son, since he had Adam as a father; but he is not called a father, because he did not have a son. By the same reasoning we must discourse concerning genus and species.

The first genus, which is not divided from any other genus—

^A nor does it recognize any other genus above itself, is simply genus, not species, and is called the most general genus. They define it thus: “The most general genus is that which, while being a genus, does not admit the character of a species, because it has no genus above it.” But those species which are divided from it, if they have other species divided from themselves, are indeed species of those genera from which they are cut, but they are genera of those which are divided from them, that is, of the subordinates. And genera and species of this kind are called subaltern. But the lowest species, which do not have other species beneath them, are by no means called genera, but only species, for the reason that no other species are divided from them. For it is impossible for that to be called a genus which does not have species divided from itself. Therefore, that which is not a species is called the most special species.

It is necessary to know that species must necessarily receive the name and definition of their genus; this also applies to that genus which is derived from another, superior one, until you arrive at the most general genus. Species, however, cannot reciprocally admit each other’s definition. To make this clear, let us consider the matter in this way: The first and most general genus is substance. For even if substance and accident are divided from being (ens), nonetheless "being" is not their genus, since although both receive the name of "being," they do not receive the definition of "being." For "being" is thus commonly defined: "Being is a thing, either self-subsistent and not ^B needing another for its constitution, or one not able to exist by itself but having its existence in another." But substance is that which only exists by itself and needs no other thing in order to be. But accident, on the other hand, is only that thing which cannot exist by itself but has its existence in another. Behold how neither substance has received the whole definition of "being," nor yet has accident. But substance is one half, and accident is the other half; whereas species and name and the whole definition of the genus wish to be received. Therefore, although "being" is divided into substance and accident, it is not their genus; nor yet is substance a species, since it has no genus above it, but is itself the first and most general genus.

Substance itself is divided into ^C corporeal and incorporeal. Therefore, the corporeal and the incorporeal are species of substance. Again, the body (corporeal) is divided into animate and inanimate. Behold, therefore, the body is a species of substance, but a genus of the animate and inanimate. The animate or living is again divided into the sensitive and the insensible. Therefore, the sensitive is the animal, which is endowed with life and sense. But the insensible is the plant; for it lacks sense. However, a plant is called living because it is endowed with the power of nourishing, growing, and generating. The animal is again divided into rational and irrational. The rational into mortal and immortal. The mortal into man ^D and... [index: entries preserved]

^A rational and irrational creatures, such as the horse, the dog, and the like, which are no longer divided into other species, but into individuals, that is, hypostases or supposita. For man is divided into Peter, and Paul, and John, and the other individual men, who are not species: for species, as we have already said, do not admit the definitions of one another; for example, a body does not admit the definition of the incorporeal, nor does man the definition of a horse. But Peter, and Paul, and John receive one definition, that of man, to be sure; likewise also the other individual men. Therefore, they are not species of man, but individuals, that is to say, hypostases and persons.

Again, a species, when divided, imparts both its name and its definition to its inferiors; but Peter, when divided into soul and body, does not communicate his name and definition to the soul, nor to the body. [For neither is the soul alone Peter, nor the body alone, but the composite.]

^B Furthermore, every division of a genus into species proceeds to two or three, and rarely to four. For it is impossible for a genus to be divided into five species or more. And yet man is divided into all individual men, who are infinite in number. Therefore, some say that the division of a species into individuals should not be called a division, but rather an enumeration. It is evident, therefore, that Peter, and Paul, and John are not species, but individuals, that is to say, hypostases; and consequently, man is not the genus of Peter and the remaining persons, but a species. Whence it follows that man is the most specific species. For it is a species with respect to the superior, and a species with respect to the inferiors. In the same way, the horse, and the dog, and the like, are species, but not genera; from which it happens that they are the most specific species. Those, however, which occupy the middle position between the most general genus and the most specific species, are simultaneously both genera and subordinate species; inasmuch as they are species of those above them, but genera of those below them.

^C And these are the very substantial and natural differences and qualities which are said to divide the superior things and to constitute the inferior ones. For "corporeal" and "incorporeal" divide substance; just as "animated" and "inanimate" divide the body. In the same way, "sensible" and "insensible," "living" or "animated," divide that which makes up the animal. For I take animated, sensible substance, and I make an animal; for an animal is an animated, sensible substance. Again, I take inanimate, insensible substance, and I make a stone. Again, I take animated, insensible substance, and I make a plant; again, "rational" and "irrational" divide the animal; ^D "mortal" and "immortal" divide the rational. Therefore, I take the animal, which is the genus, and the rational, and the mortal, and I constitute man. For man is a rational, mortal animal; and I take the animal, and the irrational, and the mortal, and

^A I constitute the horse, for instance, or the dog, and such like. ^B Substantial and natural differences are so called because it is by them that one species differs from another in nature and substance, and from another nature and substance.

CAP. XI. On the Individual.

The individual is accepted in four ways. For that is called an individual which cannot be cut, nor even divided into parts, as a point, the "now," and the unit; which are also called non-quantitative, that is, lacking quantity. That is also called an individual—to wit, the difficult to cut—as the adamant stone, and such like. That is also called an individual which can no longer be cut into other species, i.e., the most specific species, as man, horse, and such like. Finally, that is properly called an individual, which is indeed ^B cut, but after the division does not preserve the primary species. For instance, Peter is divided into soul and body; but neither is the soul by itself a perfect man, nor Peter, nor likewise the body. Concerning this [individual], philosophers speak; which indeed in substance signifies the hypostasis, and the suppositum, or person.

CAP. XII. On Difference.

Difference, quality, and property are the same in subject. But in their action, they are one thing and another. For rationality is called a quality of man, and a property, and a difference; but in a different way. For insofar as it affects and, as it were, forms the substance, it is called quality. Then, becoming a property of this substance, it is called property. Finally, in comparison ^C with the irrational, as with an ox, or a mule, or a dog, it is called a difference. For by it man differs from the irrational.

This is said in three ways, commonly, properly, and most properly. For it is impossible to find two things that do not differ from one another in some respect. For in some cases a species differs from a species, in others a hypostasis from hypostases of the same species and substance, and in others a hypostasis from itself. For the species of man differs from the species of the horse in terms of the rational and the irrational. And the rational and the irrational are called a substantial difference. Similarly, everything by which a species differs from a species is a natural, substantial, constitutive, and specific difference, ^D and is called a quality, and a natural property, which exists in every species unchangeably, which is also...

commonly called by philosophers the most specific difference, as being most peculiar and declarative of nature. ^A Again, by this name, one man differs from another, or one horse from another, or one dog from another [this is, an individual differs from an individual of the same species]: because one is large, another small; one old, another young; [one snub-nosed, another hook-nosed]; one prudent, another foolish. All these are called adventitious differences and qualities; this is what is an accident, of which we shall speak next.

CHAPTER XIII. On accident.

Accident is that which comes and goes without the destruction of the subject. ^B And again, an accident is that which can both exist and not exist in the same thing. For it can happen that a man is white or not white: in the same way, regarding tall stature, or being prudent, or being snub-nosed [this neither preserves the species, for it is not taken into its definition, nor does it destroy it when it is absent. For even if an Ethiopian lacks whiteness, he will not at all be harmed as to being a man. Therefore, it comes and goes, and does not harm the underlying substance. We said that substance is the place and matter for the accident.]

29. This accident is divided into two: namely, into that which is commonly called a difference, and into that which is so property. ^C A difference commonly so called is a separable accident, for example, someone is sitting, and another is standing. For it can happen that when he who was sitting rises, and he who was standing sits, their difference is separated, and each takes the other in turn. Indeed, one is even said to differ from oneself by reason of a separable accident. For while he sits and rises; while he flourishes in age and grows old; while he labors under ill health and is healthy; and in other such things, anyone differs from himself. There is also a proper difference, which is that accident which cannot be separated. For if anyone is snub-nosed, this snub-nosedness cannot be separated from him. ^D In the same way regarding blue eyes and the like. Therefore, by these inseparable accidents, one individual differs from another—that is, one hypostasis differs from another. Nevertheless, no one ever differs from himself. Moreover, these contribute nothing to the definition. For a man can be snub-nosed and not be, and when the blueness of the eyes recedes, the man will nonetheless remain a man.

Chapter XIV. Concerning the proper.

Common and proper difference. — Property is said in four ways. First, that which resides only in a species, but not in all, as for a man to be a geometer; for only a man is a geometer, but not every human is a geometer. Second, that which...

resides in all, ^A but not only in the species; as to be bipedal; for every man is bipedal, but not only man is bipedal, but also the dove, and things of that kind. Third, things which belong to all and to the species alone, but not always; as for a man to grow grey. For this belongs to all men and to man alone, but not always, but only in old age. Fourth, that which arises from the coming together of the first three; that is, which belongs to all, and to the species alone, and always; which also converts; as the risible belongs to man, the neighing to the horse, and things of that kind. For only man has the risible, and every man has it, and always; even if he does not always use it. [For if he is a man, he is necessarily risible; and if he is risible, he is absolutely a man. This is what it means to convert. ^B Concerning this signifier, the philosophers speak.] And speaking of it, we say: "A property is that which belongs to all and to the species alone and always." They divide this in three ways: from internal organization, [that is, from the structure of the body], as it belongs to man to have broad nails and to walk with an erect body; from the act, as it is for fire to move upward; from the power, as there is in fire a heating power that far surpasses the heat of other bodies. But the property is called what is adjectitious to the substance, or following the essence.

CAP. XV. Of those things which are predicated.

Every predicate is either more extensive or equal. ^C But never less extensive. And it is more extensive when the more universal are predicated of the less universal. Therefore, the higher things are more universal; the lower, less universal. And the most universal of all is Being, which is predicated of all things. For both substance is called Being, and accident is called Being. But we cannot say that Being is substance. For Being is not only substance, but also accident. In the same way, genera are predicated of species, as they are broader. Conversely, species are by no means predicated of their genera, because the species are not as broad. Wherefore, substance is predicated of animal, ^D and animal of man; for animal is a substance, and man is an animal, but not conversely. Indeed, every man is an animal, but not every animal is a man. For both the horse and the dog are animals. In the same way, every animal is a substance, but not likewise every substance is an animal. For both stone and wood are substances, but they are not therefore animals. So also the species, as it is more extensive, is predicated of...

^A individuals, that is, of the hypostases that are contained under it; but the individual, that is, the hypostasis, is not predicated of the species, because the hypostasis, or singular existing thing, is less extensive than the species. Thus, both Peter is a man and Paul is a man; yet not every man is Peter or Paul, for there are also other hypostases under the species of man. Moreover, the differences are predicated of the species in which they exist, and of their individuals; for the differences are more extensive than the species. For "rational" is more extensive than the species "man." For while not every man is rational—no, rather, not every rational being is a man. For even the angel, while being rational, is not a man. And this is the more extensive predication. ^B The equal predication is that which reverts. For properties are predicated of the species of which they are properties, and species are predicated of their own properties. For every man is risible, and every risible being is a man. For although an ape is also said to laugh, it does not laugh from (a rational) mind, but only by gesture; for it is an imitative animal. Therefore, the predication of genera over species, and of differences over species, and of species over individuals, is called "more extensive"; but that of properties, "equal." Those things which are of equal predication are said to be convertible and reciprocated predicates.

CHAP. XVI. On univocal and equivocal predication.

What is univocal predication and equivocal? Univocal predication is when the subject receives both the name and the definition of that name; ^C as "animal" is predicated of "man," and man receives both the name and the definition of animal. For an animal is a living, sensible substance, and man likewise receives this definition. For man is also a living, sensible substance.

Equivocal predication, however, is when the subject receives the name indeed, but not the definition: for instance, an image of a man receives the name of man, but does not admit the definition. For the definition of man is this: an animal, rational, mortal, capable of intellect and science. But the image is neither an animal (for it is not living), nor a participant in reason, nor capable of intellect and science.

A rule concerning the antepredicaments taught by Aristotle. ^D You must know that as many things as are predicated of something, the subject...

of that which is predicated of them is itself also predicated, as if as a subject; for example, animal is predicated ^A of man as a subject, and man is predicated of Peter. For Peter is also a subject to man. Therefore, animal is also predicated of Peter; for Peter is also an animal.

Concerning the subject: The subject is spoken of in two ways: either with respect to existence, or with respect to predication. With respect to existence, as the substance is a subject to accidents; for they have their being in it, and they do not subsist when it is removed. But the subject with respect to predication is the particular; for the particular is subjected to the more universal for the sake of predication. For the more universal is predicated of the more particular, as animal is predicated of man. Therefore, that which is as a subject is called that which is in a subject; but that which is more particular is the subject with respect to predication. Furthermore, an accident is said to be in a substance as in a subject; but the substance is a subject with respect ^B to existence.

CHAPTER XVII. Concerning predications in "what it is" and in "what sort of thing it is."

There is one kind of predication in "what it is," and another in "what sort of thing it is." In "what it is" is as when, to one who asks "what is man?", we answer "animal." In "what sort of thing it is" is as when, to one who asks "what sort of thing is animal?", we answer "rational, mortal." Thus, genus and species are predicated in "what it is"; ^C but difference, both substantial and accidental—that is, an accident and a property—are predicated in "what sort of thing it is." But a hypostasis indicates neither "what it is" nor "what sort of thing it is," but "who it is." For if someone should ask us "who is this?", we say "Peter." Then, if he proceeds to ask "what is Peter?", we say "man"; and if he asks again "what sort of man?", we say, for example, "tall" or "short."

You must know ^D that things which naturally differ are called "one thing" and "another." For we say, "one thing is man, and another is horse"—another in respect to nature. For the species of man is one thing, and that of the horse is another. [alt-version omitted]

^A And those things which differ in number, that is, the hypostases, are called "another" and "another." For we say, "another is Peter, and another is Paul." But we cannot say, "one thing is Peter, and one thing is Paul," since we would be speaking falsely. For in nature they are one, but they are not one in number.

It is also worth noting that the substance, as well as the substantial differences, are called "one thing." But the accident is called "another thing" (as if to say, of another quality), because substantial differences are considered about the species itself, that is, about the nature itself, and constitute it; but the accident is about the individual. For accidents constitute the hypostasis. ^B Therefore, "one thing" is man, and "one thing" is horse; but "another" and "another" is Peter, and "another" and "another" is Paul. Indeed, every difference, both substantial and accidental, makes for "another." For "another" signifies that which is diverse in quality. And nature, indeed, signifies *what* a thing is, but the hypostasis signifies *this certain one*, and *this something*; while every difference signifies *what sort* it is.

CHAPTER XVIII.

In which the five simple terms agree with one another, and in which they differ.

It is worth knowing that the five terms agree in this, that all are predicated of many. But they differ from one another in that genus is predicated of many things differing in species in the *what it is*; the species, likewise, is predicated in the *what it is* of many things differing in number; ^C but the difference and the accident are predicated in the *what sort it is* of many things differing in species; the property, finally, is also predicated in the *what sort it is* of many things differing in number, that is, of one species and the individuals subject to it. Furthermore, this is the difference between difference and accident: that the difference is substantial or essential, that is, it is a part of the substance or essence of the subject; but the accident is not as a part of the substance, but is adventitious.

CHAPTER XIX.

In which genus and difference agree with one another, and in which they differ.

Between genus and difference, this is common: ^D that both comprehend species, and that both are predicated univocally of species and individuals. But it is useful to know that whatever things are predicated of any thing as of a subject, that is, univocally, and whichever comprehend species—

will be predicated of it univocally: it will in no wise be predicated equivocally. The specific properties of the genus in relation to the difference are: that ^A the genus is more extensive than the differences beneath it and the other three terms; that the genus contains the differences potentially; that by nature the genus precedes the differences; that the genus is predicated in the "what is it," while the difference is predicated in the "what kind of thing it is"; that the proximate genus is one, but the differences are many; that finally, the genus corresponds to matter, but the difference corresponds to form.

CAP. XX. In what respects genus and species agree and differ.

That which is common to genus and species, and to many things, is the being predicated in the "what is it"; that they are by nature prior to ^B those things which are beneath them; that both are a certain whole. The peculiarities of genus and species are: that the genus is more universal than the species; that the species abounds in differences beyond the genus; that the genus is predicated univocally of the species, but the species is not so of the genus; that neither is any genus most special, nor is any species most general; nor can the most special species be a genus.

CAP. XXI. In what respects genus and property agree and differ.

Genus and property agree in this, that both follow the species, that is, are predicated of them; that both are predicated equally of those things of which they are predicated; that they are predicated univocally. ^C But this is the difference between the two: that the genus is by nature prior to the property; that the genus is predicated of many species, but the property of one; that the property is convertible with the species, but the genus is not; that the property inheres only in the species, but the genus does not.

CAP. XXII. In what respects genus and accident agree and differ.

That which is common to genus and accident is the being predicated of many things. The peculiarities of genus and accident are: that the genus exists prior to the species in which the accidents inhere, but accidents are posterior to the species; that the participation ^D of the genus is equal, but that of accidents is not; that the accident inheres first in individuals, and thus subsequently in species; but the genus conversely; that finally, genera are predicated in the "what is it," but accidents in the "what kind of thing" or "in what state" it is.

CAP. XXIII. In what respects difference and species agree and differ.

Difference and species agree in that they are participated in equally; that they are always present to those things by which they are participated. The peculiarities as between the two are: that the difference is in the "what kind of thing it is," while the species is predicated in the "what is it"; that the difference...

contains many species, while the property contains only one; that the difference does not convert with the species, whereas the property does. ^B

CAP. XXIV. In what ways difference and property agree and differ.

Between difference and property this is common: that they are predicated equally of those things in which they are present, and that they are always and in every case present in the species. But these things are peculiar to them: that the difference embraces many species, whereas the property embraces only one; that the difference does not convert with the species, whereas the property does.

CAP. XXV. In what ways difference and accident agree and differ.

This is common between difference and accident: that both are predicated of many things in the "what kind of thing it is." Also, because the difference and the inseparable accident are always present in those things of which they are predicated. These things, however, are peculiar to them: that differences contain, but are not contained, whereas accidents are contained. For although both ^C embrace species, in that they are predicated of many species, yet the difference is not contained, because the same species does not receive contrary differences; but the accident, on the contrary, is contained, because the same species and the same individual receive many accidents, frequently even ones that are contrary to each other. To this is added that the difference does not admit of "more" or "less," but the accident does. Furthermore, because contrary differences cannot be mixed with one another, whereas contrary accidents can be mixed.

CAP. XXVI. In what ways species and property agree and differ.

Between species and property this is common: that they are predicated of each other in turn, or convert; that they are participated in equally, such that they do not impart to those individuals sharing in them more to one and less to another. But between them there is this point of distinction: that species is substantial, ^D whereas the property is adventitious and accidental; that species is always in act, whereas the property is always in potentiality, even if not in act; and that those things which have different definitions, they themselves also certainly exist as different.

CAP. XXVII. In what ways species and accident agree and differ.

Between species and accident this is common: that which is predicated of many things.

However, this is the distinction: species is predicated in the "what it is," while accident is predicated in the "what kind of thing it is." Also, participation in a species is of one kind, whereas one may participate in many accidents. Furthermore, species is by nature prior to accidents; and species is participated in equally, while accidents admit of more and less. ^A

CAP. XXVIII. In what respects the proper and the inseparable accident agree and differ.

Between the proper and the inseparable accident, this is common: namely, that those things in which they reside cannot exist without them; and that both are always present. The difference between the proper and the accident is that the proper exists in one species, while the accident exists in more; that the proper converts with the species, while the accident does not. Finally, the accident admits of more and less, while the proper does not. ^B

CAP. XXIX. Of hypostasis, enhypostaton, and anhypostaton.

The word "hypostasis" has two meanings. For when it is used absolutely, it signifies that which simply exists; but the hypostasis that is "per se" signifies the individual and the particular person. In the same way, the word "enhypostaton" has a double meaning. For it signifies that which is absolutely, in which sense we call not only the substance that is absolutely, but also an accident, "enhypostaton." It also designates that which is "per se" hypostasis, that is, the individual. ^C And "anhypostaton" also is used in two ways. For that which is nowhere and in no way is called anhypostaton; but again, the accident itself is also called anhypostaton, because the accident does not have its own peculiar existence, but exists in substance.

CAP. XXX. Of substance, nature, and form, and of the individual, person, and hypostasis.

The philosophers from without, according to the aforementioned account, have stated the difference between substance and nature. They called substance that which is absolutely; but nature (they called) substance ^D specificated by essential differences.

^A And along with the fact that it simply is, it also possesses being such as this, whether rational or irrational; whether mortal or immortal—that is, they refer to it, as we say, as the unchangeable and immutable principle, and cause, and power, which was placed by the Creator into each species for movement: to the angels, for the purpose of thinking and of communicating thoughts to one another without the help of a vocal word; to humans, for the purpose of thinking and reasoning and of communicating the thoughts in their hearts to one another through the aid of a vocal word; to irrational animals, the movement of living, and sensing, and breathing; to plants, the nourishing, and growing, and generative power; to stones, the power of being heated, and being cooled, and shifting from place to place by an imparted motion—that is, an inanimate one. This they called nature; that is, the most specific types: for instance, angel, human, horse, dog, ox, and such like, ^B as being more general and comprehensive of the hypostases, and existing similarly and without defect in each of the hypostases contained under them. Consequently, that which is more particular ^C they called hypostasis; but that which is more general and contains the hypostases, they called nature; and simple existence, they called substance.

On the Saints Fathers

Notes

^A ...making it a common thing, and saying it of many; this they called the most specific species, substance, and nature, and form, such as angel, man, horse, dog, and the like. For *ousia* is derived from *einai* (to be), and *physis* (nature) from *pephykenai* (to have been born/produced); and to be and to be produced are the same. Also, form and species have the same meaning as nature. But the particular they called an individual, and a person, and a *hypostasis*, such as Peter or Paul. Now, a *hypostasis* 23 requires substance with accidents, ^B and ... ^C ... and ^D *hypostasis* essentially requires accidents. Our author calls these accidents elsewhere personal differences, qualities, and also characteristic properties, by which substance is sealed, as it were; and he grants this to accidents that are said to be inseparable. One man, however, Theodore Abucaras, seems to contradict this common doctrine of the philosophers in an unpublished short work, which Combefisius transcribed from a Tilman manuscript, and which, because it is very short, I shall cite here:

On the most proper difference

^A And it requires the essence as subsisting by itself with its accidents, and also that it be considered as existing to the sense, that is, in act. And it is not possible that two hypostases should not differ from each other by reason of accidents, and be distinguished from each other by number. It must finally be known that characteristic properties are accidents, by which, as if by certain marks, the hypostasis is expressed.

Capita Aristotelis: If it is, what it is, of what sort it is, why it is.

CHAPTER XXXI.

On Equivocals.

What are equivocals? Equivocals are those which agree with one another in name, but differ in definition or description. For instance, the name "dog" is an equivocal one; for it signifies both the land-dog and the sea-dog. The land-dog has one definition, and the sea-dog another, since the nature of each is different. Thus they define equivocals: Equivocals are those whose name alone is common, but the account of the substance which is signified by the name is different. Here, by the word "account" is understood the definition and description. By the words "according to the name," this is indicated: that there is a different definition of the name itself, by reason of which they are ^B equivocals. For example, the land-dog and the sea-dog are equivocal under the name of dog. For if anyone wishes to provide the definition of the land-dog and of the sea-dog, according to which each of them is called a dog, he will assign one definition to the land-dog, and a different one to the sea-dog. But it is possible that they might agree with each other both in definition and in name: for both are called animals, and receive the definition of animal. But by reason of this name "animal," they are not equivocal, but rather univocal. Furthermore, three things must be investigated in equivocals: namely, whether they are equivocal, then of how many things they are said, and finally, concerning which meaning the inquiry has been made.

NOTES

And the begotten property is the hypostatic [property] of the Son, and the proceeding [property] is the hypostatic [property] of the Spirit. ^D In our own case, the having of a soul—this is the constitutive [element]; but being hooked-nosed, or fair, or whatever inseparable accidents there may be, these are not strictly hypostatic, but are so called by abuse of language. For when all these are removed in thought, the hypostasis remains. But the hypostasis ought not to remain, were these things removed, if they were hypostatic, because the hypostasis could not exist without them; by the same logic, separable accidents would also be hypostatic, which is impossible. For the hypostasis cannot exist without motion, or rest, or without being seated, or standing, or being positioned in some way. But neither motion, nor rest, nor position, nor any of the separable accidents whatsoever is hypostatic. Consequently, for this reason, not even the inseparable accidents are hypostatic.

On Similitude

^A Similitude, even if it seems to the ancients to occur in four ways according to quality alone, yet it seemed to the moderns that it occurs, first of all, in a general sense both according to substance and according to quality. It occurs according to substance, just as we call men similar to angels—meaning equal to them—even though they differ from one another entirely in their qualities; and likewise [we speak of] horses, swans, and the rest. But since this similitude sometimes appears unchanged, and at other times changed in some respect, the heretics, undermining the Son, said He was similar to the Father through the middle ground of what is signified, snatching at the ambiguous meaning to draw the simpler sort toward the worse view. Wherefore also the great Basil says: "If," he says, "the word 'unchanged' is added, I also accept it." But in this way [it is similar] according to substance; yet according to quality, it is not this or that [specific quality], but all—that is to say, figure, form, color, craft, virtue, and whatever else the scope of quality extends to.

^B This quality is divided in four ways. For either they join together in one species and one quality, just as we say those of the same species are similar to one another—for instance, the Ethiopians are similar to one another in their blackness, and the swans again in their whiteness—so that they are the same in a double sense, both similar to one another according to substance and according to appearance (that is, color). Or, [they are similar] also insofar as, even though they differ in species, one and the same quality is inherent in them; as white pepper, for example, and black are similar to one another according to quality. Or [they are similar] in those of the same species, but differing in qualities; as the ringdove is similar to the pigeon according to the white, and the dusky, and the black, and perhaps other connections.

^A The fourth similarity is the species that is found in the image and the paradigm, such as that which exists between the painted man and the living one; by this reasoning we are said to be similar to God, although to one who investigates the matter more diligently an immense difference at once appears. For the former participate only in the name and the figure, but man in reality participates in God—in His goodness, I mean, and wisdom and virtue, although not in the same manner. For God has these by His own nature, but we by God’s concession; and further, one differs from another in another way, so that there is not only an immense disparity between God and men, but also between men themselves, according to proportion. Similarity ^B therefore greatly approaches those things which are named from one or on account of their order toward one.

CHAPTER XXXII. On univocals.

Univocals are those which agree with one another both in the name and in the definition or description of that same name: as, for instance, the term "animal" signifies both man and horse, and according to this name of animal, they are univocals. For each of these receives both the name and the definition of animal. And thus univocals are described: univocals are those whose name is common, and the definition of substance signified by the name is the same.

CHAPTER XXXIII. On polyonyms.

Polyonyms are those which agree with one another in definition but differ in name; that is, when the same thing is called by diverse names, as *gladius*, *ensis*, *mucro* (sword, blade, point). For all these names receive one and the same definition; namely, double-edged iron, that is, iron sharpened on both sides. And thus polyonyms are described: polyonyms are many names which are said of one and the same thing.

CHAPTER XXXIV. On *altera* and heteronyms.

But those which differ from one another in both ways, that is, in name and definition; either they have one subject, and then they are called heteronyms, as "ascent" and "descent" (for these have one subject, the ladder to be sure); or they do not have the same subject, and then they are called *altera* (others), as substance and accident. ^D For these have both a different name and a different description, and they do not have one subject. And the description of both these, that is, of both the heteronyms and the *altera*, is this: those of which the name and the definition are different.

Chapter XXXV. De denominativis.

^A There are certain things that hold a middle place between univocals and equivocals; they partly agree and partly differ both in name and in definition. These are called "denominatives," as for example "grammarian" from "grammar." For they agree in name, but differ in the termination of the name—that is, the final syllable. And again, they both agree and differ in definition; for grammar is a kind of knowledge, while the grammarian is the substance in which that knowledge resides. Denominatives, then, are those which have an appellation derived from something else, differing in case—that is, in the inflection of the name.

^B It must be known that neither grammar, nor music, nor justice are denominatives, but rather the grammarian, the musician, and the just person. For the grammarian is denominated from grammar, the musician from music, and the just person from justice.

It must also be known that denominatives contain the things from which they are denominated, as the grammarian contains grammar, and the just person justice. But things which are said from one [common source] do not; for the medical instrument does not contain [the science of] medicine.

CHAPTER XXXVI. On the ten most general categories.

Of things said, some are said simply and without combination, such as substance, accident, and the like; others with combination, such as "a horse runs" or "Socrates philosophizes." Of those that are said simply and without combination: 1° one signifies substance, as man or horse; 2° another signifies quantity, as two, three, two-cubits, three-cubits. ^C 3° Another signifies relative, as father, son. 4° Another signifies quality, as white, black. 5° Another signifies where, as in a temple, in a market-place. 6° Another when, as last year, yesterday, today. 7° Another signifies being situated, as to stand or to sit. 8° Another signifies having, as to be clothed or to be shod. 9° Another signifies acting, as to burn or to cut. 10° Another signifies being acted upon, as to be burned or to be cut. These ten are called "categories," from the fact that they are "predicated" of something. For to "spoke" (agoreuein) is the same as to "predicate" (legein).

^D It should be known that each one of these ten categories is a most general genus. Of these ten categories, then, and most general genera, substance is one, while the other nine are accidents. These are: 1. substance; 2. quantity; 3. relative; 4. quality; 5. when; 6. where; 7. being situated; 8. having; 9. acting; 10. being acted upon.

CHAPTER XXXVII. On the homogeneous and homoideous; and on the heterogeneous and heteroideous, and those differing in number.

Homogeneous things are those which are under the same category

^A (as man and horse). Heterogeneous things, on the contrary, are those which are under different categories (such as animal and science): for these differ in genus. Again, "homoidean" (of the same species) things are those which are counted under the same species and agree with one another in the definition of their substance, as Peter and Paul. "Heteroidean" (of different species) things, on the contrary, are those which differ from each other in species, that is, those which differ between themselves in the definition of their substance, as man and horse. Those differ in "number," however, which, by means of a collection of accidents, possess a distinct and separate property of their own hypostasis, and have acquired a peculiar and self-subsistent existence—that is, individuals, as Peter, and Paul, and each one of individual men.

Rule of the antepredicaments.

Accidents also have their own differences, etc.

On the One.

CAP. XXXVII. On being in something.

CAP. XXXIX. On substance again.

CAP. XL. On nature.

CAP. XLI. De forma (On Form)

Form is an essence, ^A as it were informed and specified by essential differences; and this indeed signifies the most specific species: for example, a substance which is formed and specified by an animate and sentient body completes an animal, and again, having assumed the rational and mortal, it accomplishes the species of man. This most specific species is called form, as being, so to speak, formed substance.

The holy Fathers, therefore, assign the name of substance, and nature, and form to the most specific species, and they say that essence, and nature, and form—that is, the most specific species—are the same; and they call those things that are constituted under the same most specific species ^B consubstantial, and connatural, and of the same species, and of the same genus, and conformable. Those, however, that are of a different essence, and of a different nature, and of a different species, and of different forms, are the most specific species.

NOTE

(26) *Form is essence, etc.* Thus the Fathers taught on account of that saying of the Apostle, Phil. ii, 6: "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery," etc., "but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant," etc., where form is taken to signify nature. But that rogue who attributed to Dionysius of Alexandria an epistle written *as if* to Paul of Samosata, everywhere in it inculcates nothing so much as that by "the form of God" is signified a perfect nature, self-subsistent and a person; but by "the form of a servant" and of man, a mere species without consistency; just as the speech, virtue, and wisdom of a man are devoid of consistency; nay, he says, it is merely a *schema*, that is, a certain external figure. That man was a Monophysite, not a Catholic, who would recognize no other nature in Christ except the divine: and thus, however much he might read that He was born, suffered, wounded, and handled, he would judge Him to be God by nature, not man by nature. I will add no more to show that these things reveal the incorruptibility of the author, so that one wonders why very learned men did not perceive the fraud.

(27) *And consubstantial. And thus of the same essence.* It was familiar to the philosophers to call those things which are of the same nature co-essential or consubstantial. In this sense, man is consubstantial with man. Paul of Samosata ^C had tainted another acceptation of "consubstantial" in the first synod which was celebrated against him, so that according to the doctrine of the Catholics, the Son might be consubstantial with the Father, because both had been born from a certain prior substance. To avoid such cavils, it was then ordained that "consubstantial" should be passed over. But Athanasius, in his book *On the Decrees of the Nicene Synod*, observes that for one thing to be consubstantial with another, it is not necessary that both should originate from a third party, but only that one be begotten of the other: and thus the Word is consubstantial with the Father, from whom He is begotten; but the sense of Samosatenus is unworthy of God, to whom he attributes the affections of bodies. He recites a third notion of the same word, namely, that not only is one begotten from the other, but neither is disjoined from the other, and they remain in one another, and thus they are one in substance. He asserts that this was the mind of the Nicene Fathers. Since, he says, not only is the Son similar, but He cannot be severed from the Father's substance, and as He Himself says, He and the Father are one, and the Word is always in the Father, and the Father in the Word, just as splendor is related to light. For the word itself ^D also signifies this. Understanding this well, the synod wrote that He is consubstantial. Marcellus of Ancyra is said not to have perceived the sense of the Synod, but through a Sabellian error, he defended "consubstantial" in such a way as to take away the Trinity of persons. But the author of the dissertation on the followers of Sabellius, which exists among the works of Athanasius, warns that the power of the name "consubstantial" is such that it sets forth the consortium of many according to substance, and therefore that the Sabellians had sub-asserted it because it signifies one substance. The particle *homo*, "one," "together," says Epiphanius in his *Hæreses* 69, does not signify one, but two perfect things. Yet the Ancyran heresy seems to have been the cause why Orientals objected to the Arians the "consubstantial" handed down by the philosophers to Basil the Great as if it alone were the true one. Indeed, that holy doctor, especially in epistle 45 to his brother Gregory, established that Paul, Timothy, Silvanus, and Andrew are consubstantial because they agree in definition. This was approved by the Synod of Alexandria, over which Athanasius presided, provided that no partition or division followed among the divine persons, but the substance of God was believed to be truly and physically one. According to the same sense, the Synod of Chalcedon, with the same words used that Athanasius and Cyril had used before, defined Christ to be not only consubstantial with the Father according to His divinity, but also consubstantial with us according to His humanity.

^A and different in form, they declare the most specific species to be of a different essence, and nature, and species, and genus, and form. For it is impossible that a species, when compared with another species, or nature with another nature, or essence with another essence, or form with another form, should not be judged to be entirely different in essence, nature, and form.

It is necessary to know that it is impossible for one composite nature to be formed from two essences, that is to say, natures. For it is impossible for the constituent differences in one and the same thing to exist in a divided and opposite manner. But there is nothing to prevent one composite hypostasis from being formed from different natures; just as man is composed of soul and body. So, when it is said that there is one nature of men, it is not said because there is one nature of the individual, but because of the common nature; for in the same way, whenever that of which it is composed is reckoned, and we name the soul and consider the body, we do not deny that they are of different natures, and that the things proper to these essences remain even after the union. For if the body and the soul were of the same essence, since the same reasoning applies to things that are co-essential—yet the body is subject to corruption—it would absolutely follow that the soul is also corruptible; and the assertion that the soul is immortal would be proven false by your senseless babbling.

^B

NOTES

Although nature is sometimes called essence, and is viewed in many things, as has been shown, it is not called such in the same way. If, therefore, they affirm that one nature is constituted from both, they will have other consorts of the same essence as Emmanuel, which is not true. Nor have these sycophants—however much they may wage war against God—reached such a pitch of madness as to assert this too. And with some things interspersed: "We say that humanity, because it is composed of different things, is of one essence; not indeed having regard to the soul and body, but rather to that which is common; since it is considered commonly in all things that are of the same species. For this is the definition of essence which Basil handed down, saying: 'As the common relates to the particular, so does essence relate to the hypostasis.' Therefore, by reason of this community, we say that humanity, which is beheld in men, is of one essence: because it applies equally to all and to each individual man to be a rational animal, capable of intelligence and discipline. For this is the definition of humanity. When, however, we weigh the things of which it consists, and name the soul and consider the body, we by no means deny that each is of a different nature, and that the things which are proper to these essences remain even after the union. For if the body and the soul are of the same essence, since the same ratio belongs to things that are co-essential (otherwise, indeed, the body is subject to corruption), it follows entirely that the soul is corruptible, and because of your insane triflings, that which is asserted—that the soul is immortal—will be proven false."

^A Each. For the one nature of men is called composite, because all the composite hypostases of men are reduced under one species. But the individual man is not said to be of one nature, because every hypostasis of men consists of two natures—I mean of soul and body—and keeps these within itself without confusion; and the separation that occurs at death is a witness to this.

CAP. XLII. Concerning Hypostasis.

The name of hypostasis has a double significance. ^B Sometimes it signifies simple existence (29), in which sense substance and hypostasis are the same thing. Whence some of the holy Fathers have spoken of “natures,” that is, “hypostases.” Sometimes it signifies that existence which is of itself and subsists separately; in which sense it signifies the individual—that thing, I say, which differs in number, such as Peter and Paul, or a certain horse.

It is necessary to know that neither substance, lacking form and species, subsists by itself, nor a substantial difference, nor species, nor accident; but only hypostases and individuals, in which both substances and substantial differences, species, and accidents are considered. ^C And indeed simple substance is considered equally in all hypostases—that is, as much in inanimate things as in animate; as much in rational as in irrational; and finally, as much in mortal as in immortal. But substantial differences are different in inanimate things, and other ones in animate things; others in rational things, and other ones in irrational; in the same way, others in mortal things, and other ones in immortal—and simply put, in the hypostases of each most-specific species, the same ones connect ^D them, that is, the certain one, Peter, or this horse.

VARIAE LECTIONES. ª R. duo, Reg. duo, Colb. and N., connect.

NOTES. (29) Sometimes it signifies simple existence. It is not a naked species, but the very truth of the thing. Ammonius the philosopher, in enumerating the various acceptations of the term, teaches that sometimes it denotes every thing that exists, and therefore accidents are also called substances, because they subsist. But the Damascene follows Leontius here, whose fragment is read in the manuscript *Collectanea against the Severians*, cap. 27: “Hypostasis has two significations. For it signifies, both that which is endowed with existence simply, when it is in the first place abstracted from the properties by which it is sealed, and the person who subsists according to itself.” Whence holy Cyril sometimes usurps the name of hypostasis for that which is simply, when he says, “the hypostases have remained without confusion,” indeed affirming the essences. But also Athanasius in the epistle to the Africans says: “Hypostasis, he says, is essence, nor is anything else signified by it except essence, or being.” Conversely, at another time, the same Cyril, taking hypostasis for a person which subsists separately and in itself, said: “If anyone distributes the words of the Gospel into two persons, that is, hypostases, let him be anathema.” Similar things are held in Leontius’s book *On Sects*, art. 7. One must recall here what we said in the annotation to cap. 30. Cf. Cyril in the scholium *On the Incarnation*.

^A Likewise, the accidents in them, that is, in the hypostases, are also considered, which distinguish each hypostasis from those of the same species. For this reason, the individual has properly acquired the name of hypostasis; for in it the essence exists in action, having taken on the accidents.

CAP. XLIII. On person.

A person is that which, through its own operations and properties, provides for us a clear description, distinct from those that are of the same nature as it; for example, Gabriel, when conversing with the holy Theotokos, since he was one of the angels, was the only one present there talking, and he was distinguished from the other angels of the same nature by that local presence and the conversation he was holding. ^B And Paul also, while he was making a speech on the steps, being one of the humans, was distinguished from the rest of the humans by his properties and actions.

We must know that the holy Fathers have used the terms hypostasis, individual, and person for the same thing; namely, for that which exists by itself and in its own subsistence, consists of essence and accidents, and subsists ^C and differs in number, and signifies a certain someone, such as Peter, Paul, or a certain horse. Moreover, hypostasis is named from the fact of subsisting.

NOTE.

(30) "A person is." The name [of] person is used in the same way by both the Latins and the Greeks. For it is often taken for mere representation, as an ambassador acts in the person of a prince, or for an external appearance, such as are presented in theaters. But theologians signify by it hypostasis, which is known through its own operations. Cyril, in the fourth anathema against Nestorius, in order to avoid the ambiguity of this word, used these words: "If anyone, in two persons, or hypostases, uses the evangelical voices..." Athanasius, in his book *On the Salutary Advent of Christ*, seems to take "person" to mean nature, where he says that the persons in Christ are not divided, "not in two persons." I have discovered no one else who has used this word to signify nature or essence. ^D The great Basil, indeed, in book five against Eunomius, p. 152, admits that the sacred writers, knowing the unity of the deity, while preaching three [persons] in one person, nevertheless, because they do not say there is "one person of the divinity," but "one person," assert only this, that whatever the Scriptures, especially those of the Old [Testament], designate as one divine nature, such as the Father, they designate [those] as different persons. But so far is he from using the word "person" to signify substance or nature, that rather, a few lines before, he says that the Apostle does not permit us to suspect that the one person is the deity. Nor let anyone object that Chrysostom, in his fifth homily on the Epistle to the Hebrews, said there are two persons in Christ so as to signify two natures... he strikes the Jews, showing two persons, and [that He is] not [both] God and man. For his genuine meaning is this: that through this verse of Psalm XLIV, *Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee*, he confutes the Jews by showing that there are several divine persons, and even that the Messiah, or Christ, is God and man at the same time. Therefore, a few lines later, he adds that the Apostle, against Marcellus and others who, just like the Jews, were compressing the Trinity into one person, proves that the Father and the Son are truly and altogether distinct persons, and therefore clearly he receives ["person"] not for nature or essence, but for the person that subsists by itself. For who indeed would concede that either Basil or Chrysostom, those fervent defenders of Meletius of Antioch, were using the terms "essence" and "person" indiscriminately to express essence, substance, or nature, when all the Melitians regarded as Sabellians those who did not accept *ousia* for nature and essence, and *hypostasis* and *person* for the subsisting individual? But it has been said above that the epistle of Basil to Gregory of Nyssa, concerning *ousia* and *hypostasis*, was accepted by the Orientals as a certain and irrefutable rule by which the sense of those words might be defined.

Chapter XLIV.

*Enhypostaton* also sometimes signifies simple existence; in which sense we call not only substance *enhypostaton* absolutely, but also accident, although the latter is strictly not *enhypostaton*, but *heterohypostaton* (that is, having existence in another). Sometimes, however, it signifies a separate hypostasis, or individual; although neither is that strictly *enhypostaton*, but is and is called *hypostasis*. Strictly, however, *enhypostaton* is that which does not subsist by itself and separately, but is considered in hypostases: as, for example, the species, or nature, of men is not considered in its own hypostasis, but in Peter and Paul and the remaining hypostases of individual men; ^B or that which is combined with something else, differing in substance, for the generation of some whole, and makes one composite hypostasis: as, for instance, man is composed of soul and body, and neither is the soul alone called a *hypostasis*, nor is the body, but both are called *enhypostata*. Yet that which arises from both is called the *hypostasis* of both. For *hypostasis* is strictly that which subsists by itself—possessing its own subsistence—and is so called.

47. Christ's flesh as humanity *enhypostaton*.—Again, that nature is called *enhypostaton* which, being assumed by another ^C hypostasis, has obtained its existence in it. Whence also the flesh of the Lord, since it did not exist by itself and separately even for a moment, is therefore not a *hypostasis*, but rather *enhypostaton*. For it subsisted in the hypostasis of the Word of God, having been assumed.

of it, and has it, and possesses a ^A hypostasis, by which it was assumed and had, and still has, a hypostasis.

CAP. XLV. On the Anhypostaton.

The anhypostaton is spoken of in two ways. Sometimes it signifies that which is nowhere at all, that is to say, the non-existent. But at other times, it signifies that which does not have its subsistence in itself, but possesses it in another, that is to say, an accident.

CAP. XLVI. Division of Being.

Being is divided into substance and accident; not as a genus into species, but as an equivocal term, or as things that are from one and to one. ^B

CAP. XLVII. Division of Substance.

Substance is the most general genus. It is divided into body and incorporeal. ^C

(53) *Sometimes that which is not in itself,* etc. The author of the Epistle to Paul of Samosata recognizes this second kind of anhypostaton—which bears the name of Dionysius the Alexandrian—where he shows what an immense difference there is between the Word of God and the word of man, in their wisdom, power, and form. We have noted that this epistle was composed by some incorrupticola Monophysite. Leontius of Byzantium concedes that it can be called anhypostaton, because, although it belongs according to genus to substance, yet it lacks its own subsistence, as does human nature in Christ. He solves the Severian objection in this way: that there is no nature that is anhypostaton, or that subsists without subsistence or hypostasis, and so there would be two hypostases or two natures, or if it were one hypostasis, it must be said to be one nature. Eulogius of Alexandria agrees with Leontius in the defenses, a segment of which I shall bring forward in the notes to the book *On the Orthodox Faith*. Rufinus does not hesitate to call what the Greeks call *anhypostaton*, insubstantial.

(54) *Being is divided into substance,* etc. The author proves this affection with this argument. Being is either that which subsists by itself and needs nothing in which it may exist, or that which cannot be by itself, but exists in another. Furthermore, substance does not receive the definition of being, nor does accident; but substance receives the middle part of the definition, and accident the other: although, when it is calculated in this way, that the species [are meant], they receive both the name and the definition. But that definition does not create a certain and express notion of being, which is said to be from being, or as to esse. Ammonius in his manuscript commentary on the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, in the chapter *On Species*, contends better. Being, he says, is not divided into the ten categories, nor as a genus into species, nor as a whole into parts; therefore it is an equivocal term (or as I would say, by analogy) into diverse significations.

The genus which is divided into species is found equally in all those species; nor is one species considered prior and another posterior, as far as the participation of the genus is concerned. For man is not more of an animal than a horse. Again, if one species is removed, it is not necessary that the other species should perish at once. For if man is removed, the animal is not removed, nor the other species, such as the horse, and dog, and the rest. Therefore, if being were divided into the ten categories, as a genus into species, there should undoubtedly be no first or second among them, nor should the one participate more in being, and the other less. But now there is a first and a posterior. For we call substance the first, and the rest in order, ^D from the removal of which the accidents are also removed. Whence we say that it participates more in being, if substance gives being to accidents. For they subsist in it, and it does not need the accidents for its being; but the accidents would not be, if it were not there to which they had happened. Therefore, being is not divided into the ten categories as a genus is divided into species. The Greeks do not argue about analogous terms, which they do not sufficiently distinguish from equivocal ones.

Corpus, into animate, or living, and inanimate: A into sensible, and insensible: Living, zoophyte, Sensible, into rational, and irrational: Rationale, into mortal, and immortal: Mortale, into human, ox, horse, and the like: Homo, into Peter, Paul, and individual men, who are indeed individuals, and hypostases, and persons.

The body is a species of substance, and a genus of the animate; the animate is a species of body, and a genus of the sensible; the sensible, or animal, is a species of the animate, and a genus of the rational; the rational is a species of the animal, and a genus of the mortal; the mortal is a species of the rational, and a genus of the human; finally, man is the most specific species; for he is a species of the mortal; and also a species of Peter and Paul; which indeed is nature and form and substance, according to what the holy Fathers held. ^B

Things which hold a middle place between the most general genus, that is, substance, and the most specific species, such as man, ox, etc., are subaltern genera and subaltern species. But these are called essential and natural differences and qualities, which, of course, divide those above, and constitute those below, and form the most specific species; certainly by constituting them, and by dividing nature from nature. Furthermore, nature is spoken of concerning the most specific species: and indeed what essence, and nature, and form are, has been stated: likewise what hypostasis, and individual, and person are: what also enhypostaton and anhypostaton: what, besides, is the difference between substance and accident: and that substance is more excellent than accidents, since the latter have their being within the former. ^C Furthermore, it has been stated concerning its own division, and what the difference is between substance and substantial differences, so that substance, informed by them, might complete a certain species, and contract a certain quality. It has also been stated what nature is, what form, what hypostasis, what person, what individual: and how, while profane authors have held views concerning them, the holy Fathers, the disciples of the truth and of true philosophy, and likewise its teachers, have rightly held and taught. Come, therefore, now let us set forth what are the properties of substance. ^D

^A It is a property of substance not to be in a subject. For it is the subject, rather, to which accidents are joined in order that they may exist, and it does not itself obtain its existence in something else. And this property pertains also to substantial differences. For that which is in a subject neither preserves it when it is present, nor destroys it when it is absent; hence it is not taken into a definition (for it is essentially an accident). But substantial differences are by no means accidents; rather, they both preserve the subject when they are present, and destroy it when they are absent; for which reason they are taken into a definition.

That which is also a property of substance is that it is predicated univocally, that is, it imparts both name and definition. Likewise, that it has no contrary. For to a stone, that is, to the substance of the stone, there is nothing contrary. Furthermore, that it does not admit of “more” or “less”; which is also a property of substantial differences. For a man is not more a substance, or an animal, than a horse; nor, conversely, is a horse more so than a man. Finally, that it is capable of contraries, and that separately, not according to the same thing, but through a change of itself. ^B By contraries, however, I mean accidents; for it is not capable of substantial ones. For that which is a participant of reason does not admit that which lacks reason; but the body grows warm and becomes cold through change; and the soul sometimes admits of virtue, and sometimes of vice.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Homogeneous things are those that are classed under the same category, for example, all things that are contained under substance; and in the same way with the other nine categories. For one must know that there are ten categories in all, that is, the most universal genera to which every simple word is referred. These are: 1. Substance, as a stone; 2. Quantity, as two, three; 3. Relation, as father, son; 4. Quality, as white, black; 5. Where, as in Damascus ^C (this is indicative of place); 6. When, as yesterday, tomorrow (this is indicative of time); 7. To have, as to wear a garment; 8. To be situated, as to stand, to sit; 9. To act, as to burn; 10. To be acted upon, as to be burned.

Heterogeneous things, however, are those that are contained under one category and another. And homogeneous indeed are man and horse, for both are under substance; heterogeneous, however, are man and knowledge: for man is under substance, but knowledge is under quality.

Homoideous things, again, are those that are placed under the same species and agree with one another in the definition of their essence, as Peter and Paul. For both are under the same species of man. Heteroideous things, however, are those which differ in ^D species.

But the holy Fathers take "homogeneous" and "homoideous" to mean the same thing, that is, those that are consubstantial—specifically, the hypostases that fall under the same species. ^A

Things are considered "homohypostate" when two natures are united in one hypostasis and form one composite hypostasis and one person, as, for example, soul and body. But things are "heterohypostate" and numerically different when they have distinguished the property of their own hypostasis through the combination of accidents; that is, those things which differ from one another by reason of accidents, and which possess an existence separately and by themselves, as for instance, individuals, such as Peter and Paul. For this one is someone else, and that one is someone else. ^B

CAP. XLIX. Concerning quantity and quantum.

Quantity is a collection of units. For no one calls a unit a quantity, but rather the principle of quantity. Therefore, when a unit and a unit come together into one, they become two. From this it is clear that quantity is not division, but a collection and connection of units. For to divide two into one separately—this is properly division; but to call one and one "two"—this has more the character of connection.

It must be known, however, that quantity itself is measure and number (measure being that which measures, and number that which numbers), but "quanta" are those things that are subject to number and measure; that is, those things that fall into number and measure. Furthermore, of quanta, some are discrete, others continuous. A thing is continuous when the thing being measured is one; for example, one encounters a certain piece of wood two or three cubits in length, or a stone, or something of that kind. Since this is one, we measure it, and it is called continuous. Discrete things, on the other hand, are those which are separated from one another; as in the case of ten stones or ten palm-trees; for these are separated from one another. Such things are said to be numbered, unless, on account of the smallness and multitude of the individual items, we measure them with a bushel or something similar, as in the case of wheat or something of that kind. ^C

Things are defined as continuous, the parts of which join together at some common boundary. For when a piece of wood is two cubits long, that is, has two cubits, the end of one cubit and the beginning of the other cubit are one. For they cohere and are joined together, and they are not divided from one another. But discrete things are those whose parts do not join together at any common boundary, as in the case of ten stones. For if you count five and five, you will find no common boundary that joins them. For if you were to add something to be placed in the middle between the five and the five, they become eleven, not ten; and the name itself declares as much regarding the continuous and the discrete. ^D

^C But the continuous quantities are five: body, surface, line, place, and time. One must know that a point is an unqualified thing. For it is neither measured nor numbered, as it possesses no dimension. But a line has one dimension: for it is length without breadth. It is therefore reduced to continuous quantity. For since it is one, it falls under measurement, and its parts have a common term connecting them to each other, namely the intermediate point. A surface is the exterior part of a body, called *epiphaneia* [surface] from the fact that it is apparent. It has two dimensions, length and breadth. This also, being one, is measurable, and its parts have a common term connecting them, namely the intermediate line. One must know that an even and equal surface is called a plane surface, but an uneven and oblique one is called simply a surface. Now a body consists of three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth—that is, thickness; and since it is one, it is measured, and its parts have a common term connecting them, namely the surface. Even place is the surface of the air. For place is a surface—that is, the limit of the encompassing air—and as a surface, it is reduced to continuous quantity. And time is measured into the past and into the future; and its parts have a common term connecting them, namely the "now." The "now" is an unqualified thing. ^D Lo then, there are three unqualified things: the unit, the point, and the "now." And strictly speaking, these seven are called quantities: 1) number, 2) speech, 3) time, 4) place, 5) line, 6) surface, 7) body.

We also call those things quantities by accident which are considered in these things, such as action, motion, color, and such like: for instance, if an action and a motion take place in a large amount of time, we say "much action" and "much motion"; conversely, if in a small amount of time, "small." Likewise, if there is whiteness in many parts of a body, we say "much white"; but if in a few, "little."

Of quantity, one kind is finite, and the other is infinite, or indefinite.

^A Finite is that which we can measure and number; infinite is that which, on account of its extreme magnitude, exceeds every measure and every number. It is termed "great" and "much" indefinitely, as when we speak of the "great mercy of God" or the "great mystery of the incarnation of the Word of God."

It is important to know that Aristotle posits "the great and the small," "the much and the little," "the greater and the lesser," "the more and the fewer," "the double and the half," and other things of this kind, under the category of "relative." We say, therefore, that it is possible for the same thing, according to different viewpoints, to be referred to different categories. For the things previously mentioned, insofar as they indicate number and measure, are referred to quantity; but insofar as they possess a relation to one another and are spoken of in relation to each other, they are referred to the relative. For "great" is called great in relation to "small," and "the double" in relation to "the half"; and the others in the same way. A body, insofar as it is physical, is referred to substance; but insofar as it is mathematical—that is, falling under measurement—it is reduced to quantity. Furthermore, quantity consists partly of magnitude and partly of multitude. Magnitude is measured, while multitude is numbered. Magnitude follows "how much," while multitude follows "how many."

The properties of quantity are three, which are called its concomitants. First, that it has no contrary in itself. For a body has no contrary in itself. But insofar as it is, for example, white, it has a contrary, namely, black. ^B It must also be understood that for the number two, no other number is contrary; for if there were, there would necessarily be many. For all the other numbers would be contraries, and nature would be found to be unjust, having set many contraries against one. For it is not possible for many things to be contrary to one. Second, that it does not admit of "more" or "less." For two palms are not "more" two than two men. Moreover, that which has no contrary does not admit of "more" or "less." Third, that which belongs to every quantity alone, namely, being "equal" and "unequal." For one line is equal or unequal to another.

CAP. L.

Concerning Relative Things

^C Relative things are those which, being what they are, are said to be of others, or in some other way are referred to another. They are said to be of others—such as "father of a son" (for a father is always called the father of a son). They are referred to another, such as "great to small" and "much to little." For it is not said "much of a little," but "much to a little."

It is worth knowing, however, that when something is considered in itself, it is not "relative"; but when it has a relation to ^D some other thing, then it is called "relative." Thus, this is what "relative" is, and this is their definition...

to be spoken of in relation to another, that is, to have a relation to another. For the relation to one another is what makes ^B them "relative."

Of things which are "relative," some are designated by the same name, as friend is the friend of friend; enemy, the enemy of enemy. Others are designated by a different name, as father is the father of son; master is the master of disciple.

Again, of things which are relative, some are so by way of preeminence, as the greater is greater than the smaller. Others are by way of the judge and the judged, as knowledge is the knowledge of that which is knowable. For knowledge judges that which is knowable; that is, the cognition judges that which is compared to be known. So too is the sense the sense of the sensible thing; position is the position of that which is positioned; standing is the standing of that which stands; reclining is the reclining of that which reclines, and so on. Others are by way of power and lack of power. Power, as the thing heating and the thing heated; lack of power, that which is by way of the privation of power; as when we say that the eye has the lack of power to look at the starry sphere. Still others are by way of the cause and that which is from a cause, as father is ^C the father of son.

The property of relative things is to be spoken of in terms of convertibility. For friend is the friend of friend, and friend is the friend of friend; master is the master of disciple, and disciple is the disciple of master. Also, that they are simultaneous by nature. To be simultaneous by nature is to involve one another, and to be involved by one another, to remove one another and to be removed by one another. For if there is a father, there will certainly be a son, and if there is no son, there will be no father; for whose son will he be if the father does not exist? And if there is no son, there will not be a father. For he who does not have a son will not be a father; so the son is removed together with the father, and the father together with the son. But what is removed is not his substance, ^D but the relation. If the son remains, but does not remain a "son"—for not having a father, how could he be a son?—even if we speak of the son of one who has died, we do not speak properly, but abusively; or as though the father had not perished, and had not passed into nothingness, because of the immortality of the soul.

One must know that each category is a most generic genus and possesses both genera and subaltern species, and the differentiating factors of the genera, and the constitutive factors of the species, and the most specific species, and individuals.

^A Nor are constitutive differences called substantial, except of substance alone, nor are individuals called hypostases, except of substance alone.

Nor should it be ignored that substance itself, inasmuch as it is a genus and has a relation to another, is referred to the things which are "relative" [ad aliquid]. For the genus is the genus of species, and the species are the species of the genus, and they belong to the number of those things which are called relative.

54 Another explanation of the basis of relations. — Furthermore, things that are relative and reciprocal either have their relation in self-subsisting things—that is, in substances—or not in self-subsisting things, namely, in accidents. If they are in self-subsisting things, their relation is either natural, as of father and son, or not natural. If it is by no means natural, it is either from fortune, as slave and master, or from art, as pupil and teacher, or from ^B choice, as friend and friend, enemy and enemy. But if they are in things which are not self-subsisting, namely, in accidents, it is either natural, as double and half, or not natural [as great and small; for this is a matter of fortune rather than nature. Yet fortune and choice have no place in things which are not self-subsisting, unless something should appear to have a reference to another thing that is self-subsisting, and perhaps be said to be relative by accident].

Relations are founded in other categories. — For it is necessary that things which are called relative be first reduced to another category, as being considered in themselves, and then finally, as having a respect to another, be referred to things which are relative. For it is necessary that something be considered first in itself, and then ^C its relation to something else be considered. Relation, or [Greek: σχέσις], is called the affection of one thing toward another, or a disposition, that is, an appropriation, of those things which are predicated either of substance or of those things which affect substance. And these are constituted either by nature, or by fortune, or by art, or by choice.

CAP. LI. On the qualified and quality.

Quality is that by which certain people are called qualified. And again, quality is that by which those who are affected by it are called by denomination. For from wisdom the "wise" is named, he who possesses wisdom, and he is called "warm" who participates ^D in heat.

Concretes are broader than abstracts. — It must be known that the qualified is more universal...

^A than quality. For "qualified" signifies both quality and that which participates in it, namely, of the quality: as "warm" [signifies] heat and that which has heat. For such are they who have quality: as those who have heat are called "warm." And thus they are the warm [ones], while the heat is the quality. And often even this quality itself is called "qualified": likewise also in the case of quantity and quality.

The four species of quality

Furthermore, of qualities, some reside in animate and rational bodies, such as sciences and virtues, diseases and healths; and these are called habits and dispositions. Others, moreover, are in both animate and inanimate things, ^B such as heat and cold, form and shape, power and impotence. And these exist partly by potentiality, partly by act. If they exist by potentiality, they produce power and impotence. If, however, they exist by act, they either pervade to the depths, as heat pervades the whole of fire, and whiteness the whole of milk and snow; and then they produce passion and passable quality, or they are on the surface only, and then they produce shape and form. There are, therefore, four species of quality: habit and disposition, power and impotence, passion and passable quality, shape and form.

Furthermore, habit differs from disposition in that habit is difficult to change ^C and is more long-lasting; for example, prudence. For a person is not quickly changed from prudence to imprudence. Likewise also with knowledge, when someone understands accurately, their cognition is difficult to change in them; it is a habit. So too are courage, temperance, and justice. Dispositions, however, are those things that are easily moved and quickly changed; such as heat, cold, disease, health, and things of that kind. For man is disposed and affected according to these, and he is also quickly changed: for instance, from being hot he becomes cold, and from being sick he becomes healthy. And these very things, such as disease, health, and the like, if they are lasting and difficult to change, ^D pass into a habit. Moreover, disposition is broader. For both are indeed called dispositions: for by them man is disposed and affected in a certain way; but that disposition which is difficult to undergo change is called a habit, while that which is easily changed is called only a disposition and affection.

The second species of quality is power and impotence, which indeed do not exist by act, but possess a natural aptitude and power, or an inaptitude. As we say that a boy is potentially musical (for although he does not have music by act, he is nonetheless naturally constituted so that he can receive music), but we call a brute animal "unmusical," inasmuch as it has music neither by act nor can it receive it. Likewise, the hard also has the power not to be easily divided.

^A The third species of quality is the patible quality and passion, such as heat, coldness, whiteness, blackness, and the like. Now, a passion is easily cast off, as is a disposition; for instance, when someone blushes from shame or turns pale from fear. A patible quality, however, is moved and changed with difficulty. Of patible qualities, some do not take their origin from a passion—that is, they do not come from elsewhere, but exist by essence; as heat exists in fire, and sweetness in honey. For heat is not adventitious to fire, nor is sweetness to honey; these did not exist as something else before subsequently acquiring heat and sweetness. Yet, with regard to human sense perception, they do produce the same passion. For fire, being hot, affects us with heat; and honey, being sweet, produces sweetness in us. But some are generated from a certain passion, that is, from a temperament, and sometimes produce a passion in our sense perception; yet this is not a passion, but the same quality they possess, such as colors. For white, being generated from a certain passion and temperament, produces a passion regarding the vision—that is, the discrimination, expansion, and illumination—but it does not whiten us. Therefore, a patible quality which is not adventitious ^B exists either in the whole species, as heat exists in all fire, or not in all, as blackness does in Ethiopians. For not all men are black. And these things are considered not only in the body, but also in the soul.

The fourth species of quality is figure and form. Now, figure refers both to animate and inanimate things; but form refers only to animate things. If "form" or "well-formed" is said of inanimate things, it is said not properly, but abusively. Therefore, figure has a wider extension. For form is also called figure; but, conversely, the figure of inanimate things is not called form. Furthermore, rectitude and curvature pertain to quality.

It is to be known that qualified things are, for the most part, named denominatively from their qualities; for example, "hot" from heat. Some, however, are named equivocally, such as "music" the science, and "the musical woman," who possesses the musical science. Some, though rarely, are named by a different name; for example, "studious" from virtue. For he who is endowed with virtue is also called studious. ^D

Passio in facto esse (passion in the state of having been acted upon) is a quality. Nor is it to be ignored that passion is twofold. For it is said either by the fact that something has already been acted upon, and then it is referred to quality—just as a garment that has already been whitened is called white—or by the fact that it is currently undergoing an action, and then it pertains to the category of "being acted upon," as with that which is not yet whitened, but is now being whitened.

It is also useful to know that qualities are not bodies, but are devoid of body. For if they were bodies, they would be referred to the category of substance. Moreover, all accidents lack body and do not exist by themselves, unless they are considered within a substance.

Qualities are twofold: substantial and accidental. But it must also be observed that substantial qualities are subordinated to substance. For their parts are divided.

and to this genus the whole and its parts are referred. Heavy and light are considered ^A in bulk, as in weighed objects, and are referred to quantity; or they are in substance, as in the elements, namely fire and earth, and are referred to substance as substantial differences. In the same way it holds for dense and rare, that is, rarefied. For things are substantial 37 in the elements and are referred to substance, or they are adventitious, as in garments, and are referred to the category of position; for they are positions.

^B There are three properties or consectaries of quality. First, that it receives contrariety. For hot is contrary to cold, and white to black. Second, that it admits of more and less. For where there is contrariety, there also more and less are found. "More" signifies intension, and "less" signifies remission. It is possible, therefore, to say that this species is whiter than that, and less cold. Third, that which is a consectary of quality and most proper to it, is being similar and ^C dissimilar. But it must be known that a figure has no contrary.

It must be known that not all privations are said by way of negation; but there are some that are expressed by affirmation, such as blindness and deafness. Furthermore, not every species is expressed by way of affirmation, but also by way of negation; as intemperance, which though it is a species, was not named by the mode of affirmation but by negation. For a position is called an affirmation; as, "He is beautiful." But a negation is a denial; as, "He is not beautiful." For when we say "iniquitous" [ἄνομος], the syllable [α] signifies a negation, just as the word "not" does.

But if this white is said to be equal to that white, it is not said to be ^D equal in so far as it is a quality, but...

in so far as it partakes of quantity. ^A

Caput LII. Regarding acting and suffering.

It must be known that action and passion—that is, the power of acting and of suffering—are contained under quality. The agent and the patient, however, are a certain substance operating or suffering in a certain way. To act, therefore, is to have the cause of the action in oneself; to suffer, however, is to have the cause of the suffering in oneself and in another, as is the case with the maker and that which is made. For the maker has the cause of the making in himself. The thing being made, however, has the beginning of the making in the maker, but has in itself the aptitude for suffering. By the "maker" in this place we understand the artisan, for instance, a carpenter; by the "work," the material subject to the artisan, such as wood. For indeed the material of the wood is subject to the carpenter. ^B

Furthermore, of those things to which acting and suffering belong, some are said to act simply, as in the productive arts, such as carpentry, smithing, and the like, in which the work remains even after the maker has ceased from the work. For after the architect has finished building, what he has built remains. Other things, however, are said to act in such a way that that which is acted upon does not remain when the one who acts ceases. For when the flute player has finished playing, the song of the flute does not remain, but perishes. Finally, some things are said to "contemplate," such as practicing astronomy or geometry, understanding, and similar things. There are, moreover, other species which are considered in inanimate things, such as fire, stone, wood, and the like. Therefore, the former have a place in those things that use reason; the latter, however, in those things that lack soul and reason. For it does not act by that reason by which it is animate, but by which a body is moved toward a body. ^C

There is a twofold property of this category: first, that it admits contrariety. For to heat and to cool are at variance with one another. Second, that it admits of "more" and "less." For it happens that one may heat more or cool less; likewise, one may be heated more or cooled less. ^D

Therefore, in all the categories, acting and suffering are considered: namely, in substance, to beget and to be begotten; in quantity, to number and to be numbered; in those things that are relative, to double and to be doubled; in quality, to whiten and to be whitened; in position, to place and to be placed; in having, to wear and to be worn; in where, to contain and to be contained; likewise in when, to contain and to be contained, specifically in the present, the past, and future time.

Chapter LIII. De situ.

Of the things that are situated, some are situated in a natural way, as the elements are in their proper places—for example, earth, water, air, fire, and the like; others are situated by position and art, ^B such as a statue, a column, and things of that kind. There is also, moreover, another division, namely that among the things that are situated, some are firm and unmoved, like the earth, while others are moved, like the celestial bodies. Furthermore, among the things that are situated, some are situated potentially—that is, they can be moved—while others are situated in act, wherever they may be situated.

CHAPTER LIV. De ubi.

Chapter LV. De quando.

CHAPTER LVI. De habitu.

in the way it is used for many other things equivocally, of which we shall speak more fully later on.

Chapter LVII. On opposites.

Opposite of statement is the opposition of contradiction. ^A The opposition of things is threefold: relative, contrary, and privative. Whatever is opposed, is opposed either as a thing or as a statement. If it is as statement to statement, it produces affirmation and negation. Affirmation is when we say that something is in a subject, for example, "He is beautiful"; negation is when we say that something is not in a subject, for example, "He is not beautiful." Both, furthermore, are called an enunciation. If, however, they are opposed as things, they are either said as those in which there is conversion, and these produce the relatives, which both introduce and destroy one another, or they are not related as those in which there is conversion and they do not have a relation. And these latter either migrate into one another, while at the same time being consistent with nature; and these produce contraries, such as heat and cold: or one migrates into the other, but the other does not migrate into it; and the one of these is natural, while the other is contrary to nature, ^B and then they produce things that are opposed by way of privation and habit, such as sight and blindness. For sight is a habit, as being from "having"; but blindness is the privation of a habit, namely, of sight.

On contraries without a medium and with a medium.

Of contraries, some are without a medium, while others have a medium. Those are without a medium, of which it is necessary that one or the other exist in that which is their subject, among those things of which they are predicated: as disease and health in the subject of an animal's body. For it is absolutely necessary that either disease or health of such a kind be in the body. By disease, moreover, we understand every distraction of nature. Those, however, have a medium, of which it is not necessary that one or the other be in the subject, or in those of which they are predicated, such as white and black. ^C For these are contraries, and yet it is not on that account necessary for either one of them to be in a body. For not every body is necessarily either white or black (for there are brown and red bodies), unless by chance one of the contraries is inhereing in something determined by nature, as heat in fire, and cold in snow. Furthermore, of those contraries which admit a medium, some have names: for example, what is the medium between white and black is called brown; others are without names. For that which is interposed as a medium between the just and the unjust does not have a name; but such a medium is signified by the negation of either extremity; for example, "neither just nor unjust."

On the fourfold property of contraries.

Furthermore, four properties accompany contraries. The first is that, for what is good, evil is the contrary; but for what is evil, ^D sometimes good, sometimes another evil is the contrary. For intemperance is the contrary of temperance; but to intemperance, sometimes temperance is the contrary, and sometimes stupidity.

For stupidity exists ^A when the affections of the soul are neither moved nor excited. Wherefore intemperance is a defect of temperance, while stupidity is an excess. Furthermore, a defect contends with an excess. The second property is that it is impossible for contraries to exist simultaneously in individuals according to the same thing. For Socrates cannot simultaneously be well and ill; nor can the same member be at once heated and cooled. The third is that they be in the same subject, either in genus, or in species, or in number. In genus, as white and black in a simple body; in species, as health and disease in the body of a living creature: for concerning number it is manifest. For the same body is capable of contraries through its own mutation. The fourth, finally, is the property that contraries are either under the same genus, as white and black under color; or under contrary genera, as justice and injustice under good and evil, which are indeed contrary. Or else they are the contrary genera themselves, as good and evil are contrary genera. ^B

Caput LVIII. On habit and privation.

The ways in which "habit" is spoken of are various. Habit is said to be the act of having and of the possessor: for example, of arms and the armed person, or of one clothing himself and one clothed. Second, the adventitious acts that are durable, whether they be natural or relate to the soul. Natural, indeed, as heat in things that are heated; of the soul, however, as knowledge. Third, that which does not yet have it, but is so disposed that it can have it: which is indeed the first signification of that which is "in potentiality." Fourth, a natural quality, that is, a natural habit: as the heat of fire, ^C or the sight of one sleeping; which indeed is the second signification of that which is "in potentiality" (for although fire can burn, it does not burn in act); but the first is that which is "in act." Fifth, as the perfect act: as sight in the act of vision, and heat, which is already heating.

Privation, likewise, is the following. Privation, strictly, is a negation. Privation, however, is the casting off of a habit. Therefore, it is opposed to the first signification of habit, the privation of arms or of clothing. Second, the casting off of adventitious habits; as when that which has been heated cools down. Third, that which the genus of a thing is in no way disposed to have; as we say an infant is by nature disposed toward music, but a fig tree is not. The fig tree is therefore deprived, because that genus of plants is not apt to receive music: which ^D also has a place when the genus of a thing indeed has an aptitude, but a certain species does not; for example, an animal is apt to see; yet the mole, which is a species of animal, lacks the aptitude for seeing. Fourth, the casting off of the power which is according to habit. Fifth, the casting off of the final and perfecting act: which truly we have called above the contrary opposition that occurs through privation and habit; that is, of the potentiality, as much of the agent as of the patient. This, moreover, is distinguished by these three marks: that it be that which by nature is disposed

to have the habit of sight. Also, we do not say that a newly born dog is blind; nor that a newly born infant is toothless, since they are not by nature disposed to have them at that time. Likewise, we do not say that a foot is blind, since the animal is not by nature disposed to have the habit of sight in its foot. When, therefore, it is by nature disposed to have these three things, yet does not have them, it is called privation. ^A We do not say that a stone is blind; for it is not by nature disposed to have the habit of sight.

CAP. LIX. On Priors and Posteriors.

The meanings of prior and posterior are fourfold. The first and most primary is that which precedes in time. Strictly speaking, in animate beings it is called the "elder," but in inanimate things, the "older," although improperly they are often used interchangeably.

Second, it signifies that which is prior by nature, which is such that it is removed along with the other, but does not itself remove it; and it is co-removed and not co-removed; as the animal is prior to the human. For when the animal is removed, the human will not exist (for the human is an animal); conversely, if the human is removed, the animal will nevertheless exist. For both the horse and the dog are animals. And again, if there is a human, there will simultaneously be an animal (for the human is an animal); but, conversely, if there is an animal, it is not necessary that there be a human; but perhaps there is ^B a horse, a dog, and things of that sort, for these are animals.

Third, that which is prior in order; as we say that the letter alpha is first, the beta second, then syllables, and after that, words.

Fourth, that which excels in dignity; as we say, first the bishop, then the presbyter. However, some reject this mode, because it can happen that one who is prior in order may be posterior in dignity and merit.

Fifth, as we say an effect and its cause; just as Socrates is prior to his own image, because he is the cause of his own image. And the father is prior and greater than the son, for the father is the cause of the son; for the son is begotten of the father. And it is in this sense that the blessed Gregory ^C understood what was said by our Lord in the holy Gospels: "The Father is greater than I."

Others add that which is prior in thought and intention, such as the wall being prior to the foundations. But this is reduced to the fourth mode, that by which something is prior in dignity. For that which is prior in thought is posterior in reality.

and that which is prior, so likewise is that which is posterior. And the prior and the posterior, the greater and the less, are not classed among things named equivocally, but among those which are from one thing.

CAPUT LIX. Of the simultaneous.

^A Modi quibus aliqua sunt simul. Modes by which some things are simultaneous. Those things are strictly said to be simultaneous whose origin is in the same time, as when two certain beings are born at the same point of time. And this first mode of meanings is opposed to the first of the [meanings of the] prior. Secondly, those things are said to be simultaneous which coexist with one another, yet in such a way that neither is the cause of the other, nor does one receive its being from the other; as the double and the half. For they coexist, and mutually imply one another, and are likewise destroyed together. ^B This mode, moreover, is opposed to the second and the fifth mode of the prior. For in the second, they neither imply one another nor are they destroyed together; whereas in the fifth, one is the cause, and the other is derived from the cause. Thirdly, those things are said to be simultaneous which are species descending from an opposing genus; that is, which come down from the same partition, such as the rational and the irrational from the living. This mode, moreover, is opposed to the first and the second, and nearly to the three others.

CAPUT LX. Of motion.

^C Quid motus. In quibus praedicamentis sit. Sex motus quoad locum. Motion is the act of that which is in potentiality, insofar as it is in potentiality; just as brass is a statue in potentiality. For the brass can receive the form of a statue. Therefore, the brass, which is potentially a statue, has in it that act by which it is dissolved, shaped, and polished; all of which are motions. In all the predicaments, therefore, in which that which is by potentiality is considered, in them also motion will be considered. On the contrary, in those in which that which is by potentiality is not considered, neither will motion be considered. It is considered, therefore, in substance, in quantity, in quality, and in the predicament of place. ^D In substance, indeed, [it is] generation and corruption; in quantity, increase and decrease; in quality, alteration; in the predicament of place, that which is moved in a circle (which is called circumaction), and also [that which is] moved in a straight line, which is called straight motion. Moreover, of that motion which is in a straight line, there are six modes: upward, downward, inward, outward, toward the right, and toward the left. Wherefore, with the addition of circulation, there are seven local motions. For whatever is changed, either is changed of itself, or by something within it, or by something concerning it; and [if it is changed] of itself, it produces generation and corruption. But if it is changed by something within it, or according to quantity, it produces

^A accretion and decretion: or according to quality, it produces alteration. If, finally, it is changed by something that is about it, it produces mutation according to place; for place is neither that which is moved, nor anything of those things that are in it, but it follows those which are moved, and is about the things moved.

But there is a difference between generation and corruption. Generation is the progression from not-being to being; for that which was not before, this comes to be. Corruption is the contrary, and is a mutation from being to not-being. Growth and diminution: growth is a motion toward the greater, but diminution [is motion] toward the smaller. Again, in alteration, there are opposite affections: for instance, heating is opposed to refrigeration, and blackness to whiteness. ^B Therefore, corruption is opposed to generation, and diminution to growth; but to alteration, the thing opposed [is also opposed], and rest. For example, to heating, refrigeration and rest are opposed: for when the thing being heated has reached its limit, and has come to the extreme of heat, it rests and ceases to be heated. Similarly, to mutation according to place, contrary motion is opposed, and rest. For instance, upward motion is opposed to downward; and rest [is also opposed], for if one throws a clod upward, it will not be moved downward before some rest has intervened. But to the celestial motion, there is no contrary motion. It seems, however, that alteration follows the other motions. For both that which is generated, and that which perishes, and that which grows, and that which diminishes, and that which is moved according to place, ^C is entirely altered. However, in natural motions, although we find that alteration accompanies the other motions, it is nevertheless possible for a thing to be changed by alteration, and yet not be moved by any other motion, as happens in the case of a stone. For this is affected by heat and cold, yet it does not grow or diminish. And so it is, finally, with the other motions. Wherefore, although alteration accompanies the other motions, yet it can be considered in itself: and hence the distinction between them is discovered.

Mutation, not motion strictly so called. — But Aristotle by no means calls mutation motion. For in the fifth book of the *Physics*, he proved that generation and corruption are indeed mutations, but not motions; ^D because motion is so produced that the thing meanwhile remains safe and sound. But if we have said that there are two contraries to alteration and local mutation, namely, contrary motion and rest; it certainly must be known that it is possible for two things to be contrary to one, for other and various reasons.

[Note]: — Aristotle had numbered six species of motions from the Philosopher, and especially generation and corruption. However, he warns, following Ammonius, that Aristotle, in book V of the *Physics*, distinguished mutation from motion for this reason, that he denied generation and corruption to be motions strictly so called. Ammonius explains the mind of the Philosopher, that mutation is a certain genus, of which there are three species: motion, generation, corruption; and thus that all motion is a certain mutation; but not conversely. Furthermore, that generation and corruption are not motions properly so called, our Author proves by the same reasons as Ammonius.

^A Quies, indeed, is contrary, as habit and privation; but the opposite motion is properly contrary, as refrigeration is to calefaction.

CAP. LXII. On having.

It is clear, however, that "to have" must be reckoned among equivocal terms. Some, moreover, say that there are as many differences of "to have" as there are of "to act" and "to be acted upon." For as the things that act and are acted upon are either animate or inanimate, in the same way here also, that which has and is had is either animate or inanimate. By what reasoning, therefore, will the differences of different genera be the same? But it can be answered that "to have" is either about the whole body or about a part. And this ^C again is either adapted to that which is to have, or to that which is about the whole body to repel injuries, or for adornment.

CAP. LXIII. On enunciation, affirmation, and negation.

Affirmation and negation. The one of contradictories is true. One must know that both affirmation and negation are called an enunciation. Affirmation, then, is that which signifies what pertains to something; that is, what something is; for example, "Socrates is wise," "Socrates walks." Negation, however, is that which declares what does not pertain to something, that is, what is not; for example, "so-and-so is not wise," "so-and-so does not walk." And since a negation is opposed to every affirmation, and an affirmation to every negation; that negation which is opposed ^D to an affirmation, and the affirmation which is opposed to a negation, is called a contradiction. Moreover, it is necessary that one be false and the other true.

CAP. LXIV. On term, and proposition, and syllogism.

One must know that the logical task has as its aim...

^A to treat of demonstration. Now, demonstration is a syllogism; and a syllogism consists of two true propositions and the conclusion. For example, wishing to demonstrate that the soul is immortal, I say: "Whatever is moved by perpetual motion is immortal." This is a proposition. I then add a second proposition and say: "The soul is moved by perpetual motion." Then follows the conclusion: "The soul therefore is immortal." For each word of the proposition is called a term. A term is that into which a proposition is resolved; for instance, the proposition says: "Whatever is moved by perpetual motion is immortal." "Whatever" is called a term, as a part of the proposition; and "is moved by perpetual motion" is likewise called a term; and "immortal" is called a term; and "is" is called a term.

It is necessary to know that all the propositions must be true, and the conclusion must follow from the propositions. For if any one of the propositions or the conclusion is found to be false, it is a paralogism, that is, a captious argument, and not a syllogism. ^B Furthermore,

on simple expression, noun, verb, statement, and term

What is a verb to the dialecticians?

It should also be known that ^C there is no difference between these five things, namely, between an enunciation, a proposition, a problem, an objection, and in a negation, as well as in an affirmation; even if it is a noun or a verb, it is called a "verb" by the philosophers, in that it is predicated.

^A For when I speak simply, saying "the soul is immortal," this is called an *enunciation*. But when it is taken as part of a syllogism, then it is a *proposition*, as in the saying: "The soul is immortal." When someone objects to the proposition, saying, "Whence is it evident that the soul is immortal?" then this is called an *objection*. But when we again propose it for investigation: "Is the soul immortal?" it is called a *problem*. But when something is gathered from the propositions, it is called a *conclusion*; for example: "The soul is ever-moving; that which is ever-moving is immortal; therefore, from these propositions it is gathered: So the soul is immortal." This is the conclusion.

Chapter LXV. Various Definitions.

A proposition is an oration ^B declaring something of something, which is a negation, as "Socrates does not laugh," or something of something, which has the character of an affirmation, as "Socrates laughs." A *term* is that into which a proposition is resolved. A *syllogism* is an oration in which, certain things having been posited (that is, conceded), something else necessarily follows from the things that were posited, by virtue of the things that were posited. For because of the posited propositions, a conclusion is made, having no need of any other external confirmation. An *investigation* (quæstio) is an inquiry proposed to the intellect tending toward election or avoidance; that is, toward denial or consent. A *percontation* is an interrogation demanding a diffuse and prolix response. For this differs from a simple *interrogation* in that a rapid response (that is, conceived in few words) follows an interrogation, but a prolix response in many words follows ^C a percontation. A *dialogical character* is said to be that which consists in questioning and answering. An *objection* is that which overturns an oration from its very beginning. An *antiparastasis*, that is, a "repulsion," is that which admits what is said by the adversary as being true indeed, but shows that it brings no detriment to the matter proposed. A *lemma*, that is, an "assumption," is that which is assumed as certain and indubitable for the proof of something. A *heresy* is a sentence or opinion of many men who indeed consent among themselves, but differ from others. A *common notion* is that ^D which is agreed upon by all; for example, that the sun exists. A *thesis* is an opinion of some man distinguished by wisdom and erudition that is alien to common estimation; that is, something new and unusual: as that saying of Parmenides, that the existent is one; and likewise that of Heraclitus, that all things are moved.

That which is *common* is that which is considered in many things, or that which is predicated of many things. But "common" is said in four ways: namely, either that which can be divided into parts, as land which is distributed among many heirs. Or that which is used in common without division; yet not at one and the same time, as one slave or one horse of two masters, now obeying the command of this one, now of that one; or that which is assumed in advance as one's own, and is sent back to the commonality, as the place in a theater or in a bath; or that which is indivisible into

a common and same understanding, as the voice of a herald. In this way that which is said must be accepted regarding equivocals and univocals, whose name is common. That which is *per se* is that which belongs to something primarily and by essence, and not by accident, as being rational belongs to man. Universal is that which signifies many things, as man, animal, substance. *Per accidens* is that which can belong to something, and can also not belong, as for a man to be sick or to be healthy. To "make" (*poiein*) is said of the productive arts, in which the thing created remains; as in carpentry and the like; for after the making, the bed remains. To "act" (*prattein*) is said of those arts in which the work, that is to say the result, does not remain; as in flute-playing and dancing. To "contemplate" (*theorein*) is said of thinking, of studying astronomy, ^B geometry, and such things.

On Subtile Consideration

True reason declares subtile consideration, or the *epinoia* (that which we commonly call a creature of reason), to be twofold. For the one is, as it were, a certain *epinoia* and secondary thought, which unfolds and clarifies the general and unstructured contemplation and knowledge of things; as when that which appeared simple to the senses appears as varied and manifold upon long and curious investigation of the mind: as, for example, man, who seems simple, is understood by subtile thought to be twofold, concrete from body and soul. The other is a figment of the mind's thought, which, through the combination ^C of the senses and the faculty of imagination, composes and imagines out of things that are, things that are not; of this kind is the fabulous fiction of hippocentaurs, sirens, and tragelaphs. For by taking the parts of wholes, and composing something else out of the parts according to its own will and pleasure, it has fashioned in the mind's thought and in reasonings things that are by no means seen in the nature of things or understood to exist; and subsequently, when shaped in materials, it has formed idols and images. And this is called "simple *epinoia*."

Garrulity (*adolexia*) is when someone predicates those things that are contained in something of that which contains them; for example, the animal and the biped are contained in man, and the white and musical in Socrates. If, therefore, someone predicates these of man or of Socrates, saying, "The man is a biped animal," "Socrates is musical, white," he is ^D trifling and garrulous, repeating the same thing many times. For these things are garrulity. Because

^A Migne’s text states: "For since this includes man and Socrates, so he who affirms these things is judged to have declared those ones at the same time."

Of Habituation

Of Union

Union by composition and hypostatically. But truly [there is union] ^D according to composition, which is into another...

^A part without the destruction of the parts; such as in the soul and body, which union some have called a tempering, or rather a natural union. It must be known that some of the Fathers did not accept the name of "tempering" for the mystery concerning Christ, [but] all [accept] that according to composition; and this is the union according to hypostasis, that is, according to composition. For "according to hypostasis," it is a thing existing from different natures; and again, it is "according to hypostasis," that which is known from two things, but in one person. And that union according to hypostasis is a nature adhering to another hypostasis. ^B Tempering is the placement of bodies, and the interpenetration of qualities. And again, tempering is the conjunction of bodies intermingling their qualities with one another. Tempering is the concurrence of substances different from one another, and the incursion of the qualities that are within them. There is also a union which is by juxtaposition; and it is like that which is by arrangement. Personal union is also spoken of, when one, taking on the person of another, speaks the words on his behalf instead of him; and there is relative union, as of a friend to a friend. But Nestorius devised other unions, I mean according to dignity, and equality of honor, and sameness of will, and good pleasure, and community of name. ^C It must be known that in the union according to hypostasis, the intelligible things are also united to those capable of receiving them, as things joined together.

NOTES

^D [This section regarding union and tempering in the Church Fathers, including Leontius, Theodoret, and Anastasius, and discussions of Nestorius's error, is provided in the facsimile.]

^A can they receive, and they are united such that they both corrupt and perish together: whereas unity remains unconfused, exempt from corruption, and undergoing no change ^B in accordance with its qualities, just as those things which are adjacent to it do. For such is the nature of spiritual things.

CHAPTER LXVI

Further on union according to hypostasis

It must be known that union according to hypostasis makes the union of the things joined into one composite hypostasis, while keeping the natures that have come together for the union, as well as their distinction and natural properties, free from all confusion and change within itself; yet it possesses no hypostatic difference with respect to itself. For the characteristic distinctions of each of those things that have come together for the union are its own, through which each is separated from those things that are of the same species and nature, as is the case with soul and body. For one composite hypostasis is produced from both, for example that of Peter, or that of Paul; yet it keeps within itself both perfect natures, that of the soul and of the body, and their distinction unmingled, and their properties unconfused. And it has within itself the characteristic properties of each: of the soul, those which separate it from the rest of souls, and of the body, those which separate it from the rest of bodies, in no way separating the soul— ^C [The remainder of this column and the subsequent text are notes discussing ^D the interpretation of Cyrilline and Nestorian terminology, as well as arguments regarding the nature of union against Gnostics and Eunomians, citing authors such as Irenaeus, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Nemesius.]

they separate them ^A, nor do they separate the soul from the body in any way; but they unite and join them, and together separate one composite hypostasis of both from the other hypostases of the same species. For since the natures have once received union with one another according to hypostasis, they remain indivisible forever. For even though the soul is separated from the body at death, the hypostasis of both is one and the same. For hypostasis is the distinct constitution of each individual, existing in itself at the beginning of its being. Therefore, both the body and the soul remain, always having one source of their being and hypostasis, even if they are separated from one another.

^B It must be known that it is possible for natures to be united with one another according to hypostasis, as in man; and it is possible for a nature to be assumed by the hypostasis and to subsist within it; both of which are observed in Christ. For in Him the natures, both divine and human, were united, and His ensouled flesh subsisted in the pre-existing hypostasis of the Word of God, and possessed that as its hypostasis.

[alt-version omitted]

NOTE

^C ...illustrious men, if I may be allowed to conjecture, I would name Diodorus of Tarsus, from whom the Nestorian poison originated. Nyssenus also speaks of these things in his letter to Theophilus against Apollinaris, a fragment of which is cited in the third collection of the synod. Moreover, the Theologian and Nemesius imitated the Fathers of that ancient council of Antioch, on whose synodal fragments, according to Leontius (Book Against the Nestorians), we read that Paul of Samosata was condemned because he denied that the Word or the eternal wisdom of the Father was united substantially to human nature; that is, as a substance made substantial in the body. They teach that God was made consubstantial with humanity in the womb of the Virgin, from which it appears where Apollinaris received the concept of consubstantiation, which, because he understood it in a twisted sense, he fashioned as a single nature in Christ, with the human part curtailed.

The union according to hypostasis was approved not only by the Ephesian, but also by the Chalcedonian synod, and subsequently, with the stricter sense of Cyril being omitted, it was understood to mean nothing other than the concurrence of several ^D natures into one hypostasis or person, or the addition of an alien nature to a hypostasis already existing, says Damascene. This latter acceptance is solely and most properly applicable to the incarnation of the Word, insofar as, says Maximus, cited in the Collection against the Severians, ch. 21: The one and same hypostasis of the Word, now and previously existing, without an efficient cause of itself, simple, and in no part composite, finally having assumed intelligent and ensouled flesh, became truly composite without mutation of itself. These things clearly have no place in the example of the union of body and soul, which is frequent among the ancients, for the soul is not anterior to the body. But Eulogius of Alexandria observed another and indeed grave distinction between those unions, whose words I shall relate from the same collection, ch. 19: “Again we grant that man consists of soul and body, yet we do not say that he is body and soul properly. That this is clear follows from the fact that we cannot attribute the definition of soul and body to that which is compounded of both. Therefore, when we say that man is from two natures (for the things that come together there are of different and not the same nature), we reckon that there is one nature of the composite. Indeed, if we speak properly, we would not at all call man soul and body: although, by the license which it has received from the Holy Spirit, it is familiar for Scripture to denote the whole from the part, as it is one which has been exempt from the yoke of dialectical vanity. But in Christ the union is ineffable and unspeakable, and it is impossible for the human mind to find any similar example: since we do not only say that He is from divinity and humanity, but we also attribute to Him the names of the simple elements. For we call Christ God, and we call the same one man, which we do not have in the same way to say properly of those others.” More willingly, as it appears, the Fathers were prepared to concede that one nature is made from soul and body than from the divinity of the Word and humanity.

^A A nature composed of two hypostases, or that one hypostasis should be made from two hypostases, is absolutely impossible: because opposite substantial differences cannot exist together in one and the same nature. Since it is their function to separate the natures in which they reside. And again, it cannot be that those things which have once existed separately and per se, should have another principle of subsistence and hypostasis. For this is nothing other than existence per se and separately. It must be known, moreover, in the holy Trinity, that hypostasis is a mode of existence without beginning, of each eternal existence.

It is necessary, however, to know that when a composite nature is formed, the parts must be simultaneous in time, and something else must be perfected from others, so that it does not preserve, but rather changes and converts into something else those things from which it is composed. ^B Just as when a body is made from the four elements, something different arises from different things; and neither fire is perfect, nor is any other element, nor is it so called. And just as a mule is begotten from a horse and an ass. For the mule is neither a horse, nor is it called an ass; but something different from others, not retaining either, but being something unconfused and invariable, distinct from those things of which it was concreted and coalesced.

I subjoin the definitions of philosophy which pertain to the shorter logic, as they lie, both in the published versions and in the manuscripts, except for Reg. 2927, in which a fuller logic is described.

CHAPTER LXVII. Six definitions of philosophy.

Philosophy is the knowledge of the things which are, according to what they are; that is, of their nature. ^C Philosophy is the knowledge of things divine and human. Philosophy is care for and meditation upon death, both that which falls under choice and that which is natural. Philosophy is assimilation to God, according to what is possible for man. But we become like God by means of justice, holiness, and goodness. Justice, indeed, consists in equitable distribution; that is, that no one should commit injury, nor should anyone show partiality in judgment, but should render to each according to his works. Holiness, however, which combines with goodness, rises above justice, and consists in this: that whoever has been injured should bear it patiently, and forgive those by whom he has been injured; indeed, even that he should treat them with goods. Philosophy is the art of arts, and the science of sciences. ^D For philosophy is the beginning of every art; since through it every art has been discovered. Philosophy is the love of wisdom. But true wisdom is God. Therefore, love toward God, this is true philosophy.

Philosophy is divided into the contemplative and the active. The contemplative, into theology, mathematics, and physiology; the mathematical, into arith-

arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. ^A The active, again, into ethics, economics, and politics.

To the contemplative part belongs the consideration of things devoid of body and matter, namely God, who is before all things and is properly incorporeal and immaterial, and then the angels, demons, and souls. These things, as far as the body is concerned, are called immaterial; but if they are compared with that which is properly immaterial—that is, the Divine—they are considered material. This, then, is theology.

It belongs to physiology to contemplate the nature of things joined with matter, such as animals, plants, stones, and the like.

It belongs to mathematics to contemplate those things that hold a middle place, which are sometimes considered within matter and sometimes outside of matter, and which occupy a middle position between the immaterial and the material. For instance, number is immaterial in itself; yet it is perceived within matter, as in grain or wine—for we say "ten measures of wheat" and "ten sextarii of wine." The same is true regarding the other species of mathematics.

The active part cultivates morals and teaches how one ought to live. If it instructs a single person, it is called ethics; if a whole household, economics; if a whole city, politics. ^B

CHAPTER LXVIII. On the four dialectical methods.

It is to be known that there are four dialectical, that is, logical, methods: division, which divides a genus into species through the intervening differences; definition, which defines the subject from the genus and the differences, as separated by the aforementioned division; resolution, which resolves more composite things into simpler ones—that is, a body into its humors, the humors into fruits, the fruits into the four elements, and finally, the elements into matter and form; and demonstration, which proves the subject in question through some medium. For example, it is proposed to me to demonstrate that the soul is immortal: I take some medium, namely, being moved by perpetual motion, and I argue in this way: "The soul is moved by perpetual motion; but what is moved by perpetual motion is immortal; therefore, the soul is immortal."

^C Triplex resolution. — It should be known that syllogisms belong to the demonstrative part. Nor should it be ignored that resolution is threefold. One is natural, such as the one about which we have spoken; another is logical, as when we resolve a syllogism into its proper figure; the third is mathematical, when we take that which is being queried as if it were certain and conceded, and arrive at something regarding which there is no doubt, whence that which was proposed ^D is gathered. For example, let this question be proposed: "Is the soul immortal?" I take that which is sought as if it were certain and indubitable and say: "Since the soul is immortal, there is certainly a reward established for both good and evil actions. But if a reward is established, there is certainly someone to undergo judgment and someone to act as judge. And if there is one to undergo judgment and one to act as judge, there is a Provider and providence." We have thus arrived at providence, which is acknowledged by all. Henceforth, therefore, according to composition

Since there is providence and a judge, there are also rewards and punishments. And since there are rewards and punishments, there is also that which is judged. But if there is that which is judged, the soul is therefore immortal. ^A

Explanation of Terms

expressed in the mirror due to the condensation of the air. A parhelion is a round, dense cloud, not unlike the sun; or it is a representation of the sun in a dense cloud, flat on every side. A thunderbolt is a breath in the form of a vortex, pressing down a fiery motion, driven down from kindled fire, and burning everything around it. A typhoon is a vortical motion of murky air, sent down onto the earth. A prester is a vortical motion of bright air carried downwards. A sceptus is a thunderbolt apart from the clouds. Hail is water thoroughly frozen, thickened above the earth. Ice is water frozen on the earth. Snow is water half-frozen, brought down from the clouds to the earth. Hoarfrost is water frozen by cold, thickened on the earth through other moist matter. A downpour is water falling copiously from the clouds. Rain is a collection of dew. Dew is the moisture of many drops: a mist ^A is the opacity preceding a cloud. Vapor is an abundance of exhalations around the earth. A lake is much sweet water, gathered together, invading hollow and sloping places. The sea is salty and bitter water, filling the hollow and deep bays of the lowest earth. A spring is the emerging beginning of a fountain, or water generated and emerging from the overturning of the earth. An earthquake is a violent motion of air entering under the earth, and forcing it to shake. A pyrocrater ^B is an opening, or hole, and a vent through which subterranean fire erupts to the outside. A lyre is an instrument furnished with strings.

The End, with the help of God, of the philosophical works of the most holy John of Damascus.

ADMONITION ON THE BOOK OF HERESIES

In the Royal codex no. 2926, at the end of the Logic of John of Damascus, the scribe provides the reason and cause why, after the dialectical work of this holy doctor, he omitted his book *On Heresies* and immediately wrote down the theological chapters: he says, "Although this holy man (Damascene) promised in his letter (to Cosmas of Maiuma) that, once he had explained what the pagan philosophers had handed down, he would immediately narrate the tenets of the heretics and then the dogmas of the truth (or Christian theology), nevertheless we have followed a different path, placing the doctrine of the truth before the things that pertain to heresies after the philosophical [works]; not indeed that we might seem to oppose this holy man (far be it!), but because we prefer to learn diligently what pertains to the knowledge of the truth rather than the novalties of the heretics. That is without doubt the reason why those who in later centuries copied the philosophical and theological [works] of John of Damascus refrained from drafting his treatise *On Heresies*. We, however, thought it a matter of religion not to desert the order which the author himself established; and all the more because, as he himself reminds us, once error and falsehood are detected, the love and study of the truth strike deeper roots; [which] was formerly the intention of Theodoret, when he was the first of all to attempt to recall and arrange the entire theology of the Christian faith into certain chapters: just as he himself declares in the preface to Sporacius, and in the prologue to the *Epitome of Divine Dogmas*. It was fitting, therefore, that our [author], intending to imitate the design of Theodoret, and intending to pursue divine matters in the same series as he, should not deviate from the illustrious rule which that supreme man had established, and that it should be manifest to everyone that John of Damascus had followed in the footsteps of the ancient Fathers even in the order of the matters he treated.

No one, I think, will deny that our Damascene was the compiler of this catalogue of heresies, otherwise the treatise *On Heresies* which he himself had woven together would have perished. Indeed, Lambecius recounts that in a very ancient Imperial Greek codex, no. 251, which contains Ascetical works, there is a book

this work *On Heresies* to be cited as John of Damascus's, and mentions of heresies 88, 96, 97, 98, 100, and 103 occurring in it first. Nor does it create difficulty that, for example, heresy 75, which is that of Aerius, is spoken of regarding this heretic: *ἔτι δεῦρο πειρασμός ἐστι* (or *περίεστι*) *τῷ βίῳ οὗτος* ("this is still a temptation in the life of man"); since Aerius lived at the end of the fourth century. For Damascus did not compose a new Epitome *On Heresies*, but transcribed the entire Synopsis, or *Anacephalaeosis*, of Epiphanius, as it lay in his books, with the addition of the account of the twenty or twenty-four subsequent sects; which he compiled not only from the books of Theodoret, Timothy the Presbyter of Constantinople, and Sophronius—as Lambecius signifies to be indicated in another Caesarean codex—but also from Leontius of Byzantium, as will be noted in its proper place. Those things which are held by the Mohammedans are to be attributed to no other than our author. In many codices, and in the ancient Latin translation which the Cologne edition exhibits, only one hundred heresies are recounted, of which the last is the Mohammedan; but I have no doubt that three or four others were subsequently added by our John: of which fact that very ancient codex of the Ascetics of the Caesarean library provides proof. Nor was it fitting that he should entirely omit the heresy of the Iconoclasts, which he himself had fought, and which in his age both the Eastern and Western Churches had proscribed. And yet, we observe that John of Damascus revised his books many times. Besides the ancient Latin translation, which nothing prevents us from attributing to Burgundio the Pisan, Perionius the Benedictine monk prepared another, from a codex I have already often praised which was once that of Saint Hilary of Poitiers. But because in this codex many things are omitted which pertain to the sect of the Ishmaelites, Fronto Ducæus supplemented them, both in Greek and in Latin, at the end of the latest Paris edition, with the aid of the Augustan codex. This same work appeared in Greek and Latin, multiply augmented from the Royal codex (formerly no. 2339, now 2508), in the first volume of the *Monumenta Ecclesiae Graecae*, translated by the most learned John Cotelier. Finally, in this present edition, it will obtain the place set for it by the author, corrected against the Royal manuscripts 3244 and 2830, and the codex of St. Hilary and the Augustan one, which Cotelier did not consult, with added annotations, by which it will be more certainly established concerning the errors of the principal heresies, whether from the sincere monuments of the sectaries themselves that still survive, or from approved writers of that age.

ON HERESIES COMPENDIUM: WHENCE THEY AROSE AND HOW THEY ORIGINATED.

76 The parents and original four of all heresies, or sects, are: 1. Barbarism, 2. Scythism, 3. Hellenism, 4. Judaism; from which all others have drawn their origin.

1. Barbarism, which alone persisted from the days of Adam until the tenth generation, or the times of Noe. This is called Barbarism because the men of that age had neither a certain...

leader, nor were they in agreement among themselves; but each one, as it seemed right to him, would frame his life, and each proposed his own whim and will as his law. ^A

2. Scythismus (Scythism): from the days of Noe, and thenceforth until the construction of the tower and of Babylon, and for some few years after the tower was founded, it prevailed; that is to say, until Phalec and Ragau, who, declining toward the parts of Europe, were assigned, from the age of Thiras (from whom the Thracians have their origin) and beyond, to the part of Scythia and its nations. ^B

3. Hellenismus (Hellenism): started from the times of Serug, and as each one at that time swayed toward superstition, they drifted—in a more civic manner, as it were—toward the nations and institutions of idols; for the races of men began to order themselves according to the things they followed, making gods of those whom they honored, and by means of colors depicting the beginning and representing those who were then honored among them—whether tyrants, or sorcerers, or some who had done in life something esteemed worthy of memory for their strength or for bodily vigor. Afterward, from the times of Thare, the father of Abraham, who introduced idolatry, they set up images and statues and brought in the practice of idol worship. For they honored the souls of their ancestors and others who had already departed from the living with images; first they fashioned statues by the potter’s art, and then industry reached every art of imitation. For indeed, architects fashioned stones, and silversmiths and goldsmiths [worked] from their own materials, and likewise carpenters and those who followed. ^C The Egyptians, all at once, and the Babylonians, and the Phrygians and Phoenicians, became the first introducers of this religion, with image-making and mysteries; from whom these things were first brought over to the Greeks from the age of Cecrops, and thenceforth. Afterward, and much later, they proclaimed as gods those around [the time of] Chronos and Ares, and Zeus and Apollo, and those who followed them. ^D

^A *Hellenes, that is Greeks, derived the name from a certain Helen, who, living in Greece, bestowed the appellation upon that region. There are some who wish them to be called so from the olive tree that grew at Athens. The founders of this race were the Iones, who, as is clear from more accurate history, derived their name from Jouan or Javan, one of those who built the tower, when the languages of all were divided; for which reason all are called Meropes because of the divided speech. Afterward, and in a more recent age, Hellenism passed into certain sects, such as those of the Pythagoreans, Stoics, Platonists, and Epicureans. The character of true piety, however, together with natural law, flourished from the very beginning of the world, separating itself from these nations, and remaining between the Scythian barbarism and the Greek ^B superstition, until it coalesced with the piety and religion of Abraham.

4. But Judaism, truly, taking its character of circumcision from the times of Abraham, and being written down by the law given by God through Moses, who was the seventh from Abraham; and from Judah, the fourth son of Jacob, who was called Israel; and through David, who first obtained the kingdom from that same tribe of Judah, it finally received the name of Judaism. Concerning these four sects, the Apostle spoke briefly and openly, when he said: In Christ Jesus there is no Barbarian, nor Scy- ^C tha, nor Greek, nor Jew; but a new creature.

Varieties of the Greeks.

5. Pythagoreans, or Peripatetics: Pythagoras sanctioned the monad, and providence, and forbade the sacrificing to gods, and the eating of animate things, and the use of wine. He distributed things into two classes: those that are from the moon and up-

- ^A wards he called immortal; those below, mortal. He taught the transmigration of souls from bodies into bodies, even those of animals and beasts. He taught them to practice silence for five years; and finally he claimed that he himself was God.

6. The Platonists [held] that God, and matter, and form, and the world itself had a beginning and were subject to destruction; but the soul they considered unbegotten, immortal, and divine. They held that it has three parts: the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible; and they willed that women should be common to all, and that no man should have one wife of his own, but that those who wished might be with those who desired it. They likewise affirmed the transmigration of souls into bodies, even those of beasts. And at the same time they taught that many gods were produced from the One. ^B

7. The Stoics define the entirety as a body, and consider this perceptible world to be God. Some have asserted that it has its nature from the substance of fire. They define God as mind, as also the soul of all that exists, [the world] itself being the body of heaven and earth; its body, as I said, is the whole universe, and the stars are its eyes. They maintain that the flesh of all things perishes, and that the soul is transmuted from body into body. ^C

8. The Epicureans posited that atoms and indivisible bodies, homogeneous and infinite, were the first principle of all things, and they taught that pleasure is the end of happiness, and that neither God nor providence governs human affairs.

9. Samaritanism, and those who originate from it, the Samaritans. This sect is from the Jews, existing before heresies had been established among the Greeks and before their own dogmas were formed; but later, [while preserving] the religion of the Greeks, it became a middle ground between it and Judaism, ^D taking as its pretext the times of Nebuchadnezzar and the captivity; and being settlers brought from other lands into Judea, and taking the...

Pentateuch of Moses, which the king sent to them from Babylon by the priest called Ezra, they have everything in common with the Jews, except for this one thing: that they abominate foreigners, and avoid touching them, ^A and reject the resurrection of the dead, and the other prophecies following Moses.

Four Factions of the Samaritans

10. The Gortheni, who celebrate their festivals at other times than the Sebuaei.

11. The Sebuaei, who disagree with the Gortheni for the same reason regarding the festivals.

12. The Esseni, who do not oppose either party, but celebrate their festivals indifferently with whomever they happen to be.

13. The Dositheni, who live by the same customs as the Samaritans, making use of circumcision and other things, and following the Pentateuch; but they are more rigorous than the others in abstaining from living things, ^B and they live very contiguously in fasts. Some of them also practice virginity, while others practice continence. Nor are there wanting some among them who believe in the resurrection of the dead, which is foreign to the Samaritan doctrine.

Seven Heresies, or Sects, of the Jews

14. The Scribes, who were legalists and masters of the traditions which they received from their elders (that is, the oral interpretations of the second law). They observed all the rites instituted by their ancestors more superstitiously and diligently than the others; which indeed they had not learned from the Law, but had decreed for themselves ^C as worship and justifications outside of the legislation.

15. The Pharisees, being interpreted as "the separated"; who lived most strictly, and appeared to excel the others in righteousness, by whom the resurrection of the dead is also held, which the Scribes also [affirm], and that concerning angels and the Spirit.

^A They were addicted to various observances: they determined a certain time for continence, and also for virginity; they fasted twice in the week; they washed and cleaned pots, disks, and cups frequently, as the Scribes were wont to do. To these things they added tithes, and first-fruits, and constant prayers, and superstitious forms of dress—such as the cloak, and the dalmatics, that is to say tunics, and the widening of the phylacteries, which are the purple insignia, and hems, and pomegranates upon the wings of the cloak; these were, in their view, signs of a time of continence. They also introduced fate and destiny.

16. The Sadducees ^B (8), being interpreted "the most righteous," were of the stock of the Samaritans, and had their beginning from a certain priest by the name of Sadoc; they deny the resurrection of the dead, and do not accept either angel or spirit—yet in all other respects they are Jews.

17. The Hemerobaptists (9) were in all things Jews. They used to say that no one could attain eternal life unless he were baptized every day.

18. The Essenes (10), who are interpreted as "the most stubborn." ^C These were men who performed all things according to the law. They used other scriptures after the law; but the majority of the later prophets they rejected.

19. The Nassaraeans, interpreted as "the rebellious," forbid every form of flesh-eating; and they do not partake of living things at all. Up to Moses and ^D

^A the patriarchs whose mention is made in the Pentateuch up to the times of Moses and Joshua, they receive the holy names, and put their trust in them: such as are Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and those superior to them, as well as Moses himself with Aaron and Joshua. But they do not believe those five volumes are Moses', and they boast that other volumes, different from these, are kept among them.

20. The Herodians ^B were Jews in all respects, but they awaited Christ, and to Him they attributed the dignity and name of Christ.

Thus far the first volume, containing the refutation of all these twenty heresies, in which there is also an account of the coming of Christ.

21. The Simonians, ^C who take their name from Simon Magus, who lived in the times of the Apostle Peter, originated from the village of Gitta in Samaria. He came from the Samaritans, and took upon himself the name of a Christian in name only. He taught an unspeakable obscenity and the most unclean practice of indiscriminate sexual union. He rejected the resurrection of the body, and did not believe that the world was fashioned by God. Furthermore, he thrust upon his disciples for their adoration an image of himself and his prostitute, whom he named Helen, under the likeness of Zeus and Athena. Among the Samaritans, he proclaimed himself to be the Father, but to the Jews he proclaimed himself to be Christ.

22. The Menandrians, who took their name from a certain Menander, a disciple of Simon, differed from the Simonians in certain respects. They claimed that the world was brought into being by angels.

23. The Saturnilians in Syria embraced ^D the obscenity of the Simonians. They added some things to their dogmas to create greater wonder. Their leader was Saturnilus. Like Menander, they said that the world was fashioned by angels; and that seven of them alone labored at this, against the will and purpose of the supreme parent.

24. The Basilidians, followers of the same obscenity.

They recognize Basilides as their teacher, who was also a disciple of Saturninus, along with those of Simon and Menander; and although he thinks almost the same things, he differs in certain respects. He says, in fact, that there are ^A 365 heavens, and he assigns angelic names to these. Wherefore he also considers the year to consist of as many days; and that the name 'Abrasa' represents the sum of 365; and he says that this is a holy name.

25. The Nicolaitans ^B take their name from that Nicolas who was appointed by the apostles to the necessities of the ministry, who, through jealousy on account of his own wife, taught his disciples to practice impure lust along with others, and introduced the names of Caulacauch, of Prunicus, and other barbaric names into the world.

26. The Gnostics ^B are the successors of these heresies.

^A who surpassed all in lewdness and the frenzy and madness of execrable filth. Furthermore, those in Egypt are called Stratiotici or "the Military," and Phibionitæ; in the higher regions they are called Socratitæ; in other parts, Zacchæi. There are some who call them Choddiani, and others still, Borboritae. These brag about Barbelo and Bero.

27. Carpocratians, a sect named after a certain Carpocrates of Asia, who trained his disciples in every kind of turpitude and flagitiousness. And unless one, he used to say, has run through everything, and has satisfied the will of all demons and angels, he cannot be raised up to the highest heaven, nor pass beyond the Principalities and Powers. He asserted also that Jesus had taken a soul endowed with intellect; that because he knew the things above, he proclaimed them to men; and if anyone does the same things that Jesus did, he would be his equal. Finally, he rejected the Law, along with the resurrection of the dead, just as the Simonians did, and all the others I have recounted. Through his group, that Marcellina was in Rome. He also secretly fashioned images of Jesus, and Paul, and Homer, and Pythagoras, offering them incense and adoration. ^B

28. Cerinthians, who are also called Merinthians; these were followers of Cerinthus and Merinthus; they were men of the Jewish race, who took pride in circumcision. They said that the world was created by angels; and they said that Jesus had been called Christ by a progress in virtue. ^C

VARIÆ LECTIONES.

NOTÆ.

Carpocratiani many things were done. This heresy became known at Rome under Pope Anicetus and Emperor Hadrian; from whom they were also called Marcelliani, as Origen relates in that location. Clement of Alexandria writes in book 3 of the *Stromata* that Epiphanes, the son of Carpocrates, when he died in Cephalenia at the age of seventeen, obtained divine honors there.

(18) Epiphanius in the *Panarion* and Philastrius write that Cerinthus was the author of various tumults, which are read about in the Acts of the Apostles. If that is true, he must have lived to a very advanced age. For he survived John the Evangelist; since Dionysius of Alexandria, in Eusebius, *Hist.* bk. III, ch. 28, testifies that from the book of Revelation he confirmed the fable of the millennial kingdom of Christ. However, it is certain from Irenaeus that the Nicolaitans emerged much earlier than he, and held almost the same views. Thus he said that Jesus was the son of the Creator of the world, that is, a mere man born of Joseph and Mary, into whom Christ descended in the form of a dove from that primacy which is over all things, and remained until the passion. For to the Gnostics, Christ did not differ at all from the Holy Spirit. He had mutilated the Gospel of Matthew in the part where it is said that Jesus was born of a Virgin. Although the Law was given by the Creator, he ordered it to be observed, and said that it was all to be observed sometime in the earthly kingdom of Christ. Hence he was always hostile towards the Apostle Paul. ^D

30 The Ebionites ^B are close to those previously mentioned, the Cerinthians and Nazarenes; but the heresy of the Sampsaeans and Elcesaites is connected to them in some way. They say that Christ was created in heaven, and likewise the Holy Spirit; and they say that Christ dwelt in Adam, and that from time to time he would divest himself of Adam and clothe himself again with him. They say he did the same thing in his incarnate appearing. Though Jews, they use the Gospels. They abhor the eating of flesh. They venerate water in the place of God. And as I said, they say that in his incarnate appearing, Christ clothed himself with a man. They are constantly baptized in water, both in summer and winter, for the sake of purification, as it were, just like the Samaritans. 31 The Valentinians 29 reject the resurrection of the flesh. ^C

VARIATIONS IN READING I read it thus from Epiphanius and from the old interpreter who placed "and again, according to time, divesting himself of the same Adam, and clothing himself again." ^D

NOTES (19) The Prisci of the Jewish Christians were called Nazarenes; because the Lord Jesus was a Nazarene. Since they followed the ceremonies of the Law before the destruction of Jerusalem, with the apostles conceding it, their descendants who lived beyond the Jordan retained their ancient customs, and especially circumcision; for they were from the seed of Abraham and kinsmen of the Lord according to the flesh. Jerome teaches us that they rejected the traditions of the Scribes and were well-disposed toward the Apostle Paul and other Christians of the Gentiles in his commentary on the first words of chapter ix of Isaiah: "The Nazarenes," he says, "attempt to explain this passage as follows: With the advent of Christ and his shining preaching, the first land of Zabulon and the land of Nephtalim was liberated from the errors of the Scribes and Pharisees, and shook off the most heavy yoke of the Jewish traditions." Later, however, through the Gospel of the Apostle Paul—who was the last of all the apostles—the preaching was made heavy, that is, multiplied, and the Gospel of Christ shone into the borders of the Gentiles and the way of the entire sea. Then all of the city that before was walking or sitting in darkness and was held in the chains of idolatry and death, beheld the clear light of the Gospels. Epiphanius doubted whether they thought Christ was a mere man, like the Ebionites, or born of the Virgin; Jerome, however, imposes no other fault upon them except that, while they believed in Christ, they nevertheless held to the ceremonies of the Law. "To this day," he says, "throughout all the synagogues of the East, there is a heresy of the Minæans (which the Rabbis call [Hebrew script: וזאנימ]) and it is condemned by the Pharisees even now, whom they commonly call Nazarenes." They who believe in Christ the Son of God, born of the Virgin Mary, say that he is the one who suffered under Pontius Pilate and rose again, in whom we also believe—following the simpler profession of the ancient Christians; which they kept among themselves: to believe in Christ the Son of God was the same as believing Christ to be the true God: whence he added, "in whom we also believe." And this is so, principally because, as we were just reading, the Nazarenes praised the faith of the Gentiles, by whom Christ was worshipped as the true God. But another of their interpretations, which Jerome reports on these words of Isaiah, chapter viii, 13, persuades us of this even more: "Sanctify the Lord of hosts himself; and he shall be your sanctification; and for a stone of stumbling, and for a rock of offence" for the two houses of Israel. These things, which are proclaimed concerning the supreme [Hebrew script: אָבָא יְהוָה], the Lord of hosts, were interpreted by the Nazarenes concerning the Lord Jesus. "We say," he says, "that the Nazarenes, who receive Christ in such a way that they do not lose the observations of the Law, interpret the two families, Shammai and Hillel, from whom the Scribes and the Pharisees arose... the former of whom is interpreted as 'scatterer,' the latter as 'profane'; for they have scattered and stained the precepts of the Law through their traditions and [Greek: δευτερώσεις]: and these are the two houses which did not receive the Savior, who was made into a ruin and a scandal." From these things it is proven that Theodoret imputed to the Nazarenes the errors proper to the Ebionites. Thus he adds that they read the Gospel of Peter: a thing which Epiphanius attributes only to the Ebionites. Whence neither Justin, nor Irenaeus, nor Origen are to be considered as having refuted the Nazarenes, except where they argued against the Ebionites on account of the ceremonies of the Law. The Nazarenes read the Hebrew Gospel of Matthew, which is most complete, says Epiphanius (hær. 28 and 30), while the Ebionites read a mutilated one, with those parts removed in which the series of Christ's ancestors and the account of his birth from the Virgin are told. Origen, lib. 11 cont. Cels., says that the former Christians were called Ebionites on account of their zeal for poverty; and likewise that some of the Ebionites said that Christ was born of the Virgin, while others said he was born of Joseph and Mary. They performed their mysteries every year at Passover with unleavened bread, and simple water. They celebrated the Lord's day in addition to the Sabbath. [(20) see facsimile]

BOOK ON HERESIES.

They reject the Old Testament; however, they read the prophets and all other things that can be accommodated to their heresy by figure and trope, and these they accept. They have added certain other fables, mentioning the names of thirty æons and at the same time those produced by the Father of all as male-female, whom they consider to be gods and æons. Finally, they say that Christ brought his body from heaven and passed through Mary as through a pipe.

^A 32. The Secundians [(21)], and their associates Epiphanes and Isidorus, admitting the same syzygies of æons, agree with Valentinus; yet they have taught that various obscenities are to be practiced in explaining and recounting them. Even they themselves reject the flesh.

^B 33. The Ptolemaeans, being themselves disciples of Valentinus, to whom is joined Flora; and these too say the same things regarding the syzygies, while others add and invent new things. They do not hold the resurrection of the flesh. They also reject the flesh.

NOTE

... determined outside of God, which Valentinus had included in the very sum of divinity, as sense and affection and motion. He deduced from Heracleon through the branches, and Secundus, and Marcus. Soon he adds: Thus Valentinus nowhere, yet the Valentinians, who through Valentinus. Only to the present day at Antioch does the memory of Valentinus, in its intact preservation, console his followers. Indeed, from the Epitome of Eastern Theology, which exists in Greek after the works of Clement of Alexandria, it appears that Valentinus signified by the name *pleroma*, or the collection of æons, the identification of identity. Wherefore Origen, in *John*, says that according to the Valentinians the Word is nothing except an emanation of the Father, which neither has subsistence, nor possesses substance, nor [ύπόστασιν], nor essence. So Athanasius, *epist. ad Epict.*, Valentinus regarding the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit felt the same as Noetus and Sabellius. Having obtained the seed of the old error, he fabulated the thirtieth Æon, Wisdom or Sophia, to have wandered outside the pleroma, and through [ἐνθύμησιν], a certain unformed conception, to have composed matter and angels, and especially to have produced the fabricator of the world, who was the image of the Only-Begotten, [μονογενοῦς], nay rather of the Father. He, because he was [ψυχικός], animal, was only that, not spiritual, and since he could not know the unsearchable Father, sold himself as God and handed down the law to Moses. He narrates the formation of man thus: The fabricator of the world, having taken the dust of the earth, fashioned it not indeed of dry matter, but of multiform matter, a terrestrial, material, rational part, and from the substance of the brutes, implanted it into him. This then itself is the man made to the image [δὲ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δημιουργοῦ]. And he is according to the likeness of the same fabricator, he breathed into him and inserted something... by which he injected some part of his substance. "For man is in man, the psychic in the earthy, not in part, but whole in whole being together." Man therefore is in man, animal in the earthy man, not as part with part, but as whole with whole. [Ἔσχε δὲ ὁ Ἀδάμ] Adam had indeed implanted in him by Sophia the spiritual seed into the soul. Adam, moreover, had the spiritual seed, which Sophia secretly sowed in him. See that Trinity of kinds, that, as I speak with Tertullian, of which it has been said in Gnosticism. Furthermore, he used to say that the first parents and the fourth were in the third heaven, that is in paradise, led down on account of sin, thence to the earth ^C to have been cast down, with flesh added to their bodies, which Scripture signified by leather tunics. Wherefore there would be no resurrection of the flesh, but only the body would rise. He then placed a double Jesus among the Nicolaitans and Cerinthus; one who had been sent by the Æons to call Sophia back to the pleroma, and who was the same as the second conjugation, [νοῦς καὶ ἀλήθεια], intellect and truth, and also the spirit of knowledge and the spirit of love, who in the pleroma is called [μονογενής], unigenitus, among created things [πρωτότοκος], primogenitus; so that finally he might come forth full of æons for the sake of consoling and bringing back Sophia, [Παράκλητος], Paraclete, consolator, and [Σωτήρ], Salvator: another again, a man Jesus, procreated by the fabricator, in whom the supernal Jesus rested, and who was named Christ by the Christ inhabiting in him, that is, by that second conjugation, which is called [λόγος καὶ ζωή], word and life. This Jesus withdrew from the man Jesus, that his death might dominate the body, which could by no means happen while life and the Saviour were present. Theodotus, Irenaeus, Tertullian and others report that the Valentinians said these things. Moreover, the body of the man Jesus, since it was of animal substance, as being a formation in the heavens by the fabricator, passed through Mary as through a canal; but nevertheless in a singular way suffered. They admitted fate, whose ministers were invisible powers, mutually contrary to each other, to whom the fabricator of the stars had committed the motions: but truly no fate has power over those who have received baptism. Jerome in chapter 1 of *Epist. ad Ephes.* says that Valentinus contended for two baptisms, and does not explain.

(21) Epiphanes, and Isidorus, they clung to their own parents, not the second disciple of Valentinus. Epiphanes was already dead when Secundus, or the follower of Ptolemaeus, increased the dogmas with new inventions. Tertullian, lib. *Cont. Valentin.* c. 4, places Secundus after Heracleon and Ptolemaeus. But he says that Ptolemaeus invented as many substances in God as Valentinus did æons. But, as Irenaeus testifies lib. 1, c. 6, he added to the first æon [βυθῷ], to the abyss, two as it were spouses, [ἔννοιαν], or [Ἐννοίαν], perception, and [θέλησιν], will, so that God first thought to emit other æons from himself, then did it by will, and not therefore, as Irenaeus observes, was he [μονογενής], Unigenitus, coeval with the Father.

^A And with him is joined Flora. These also assert the same things concerning the syzygies, or conjunctions, as do the Valentinians and Secundians; yet in some points they differ from them.

And this is the recapitulation of the thirteen heresies of the first book of the second volume.

What follows are the 13 heresies, which are to be found in this third volume.

34. Marcosians. ^B Marcus, who was a fellow-student of Colorbasus, introduced two principles himself. He denies the resurrection of the dead. He used certain deceptions, so that by certain incantations he would turn the liquid in cups to a deep blue or purple color, by which sacred rites he initiated the gullible women. He also wishes for all things to depend on twenty-four elements, just as Valentinus does.

35. Colorbasians. ^C This Colorbasus, while relating the same things, differs in some respects from other heresies—namely, from those of the school of Marcus and Valentinus; for he taught the emanations of the æons and the ogdoads in a different way.

36. Heracleonites. ^D These also appear to follow the mythology of the ogdoads, in a way different from Marcus, Ptolemy, Valentinus, and the others. But also, toward the end, they redeem those who are dying among them in the same manner as Marcus, by pouring oil, opobalsam, and water onto the head, whispering certain invocations in Hebrew words over the head of the one being redeemed.

37. Ophites reverence the serpent, and think it is Christ. Moreover, they keep a natural serpent, or the reptile which they worship, in a certain chest.

^A 38. Caiani. These people hold the same views as the sects that reject the law and deny the author of the law. They disapprove of the resurrection of the flesh. They commend Cain, asserting that he was of some more powerful virtue. They also accord divine honors unto Judas, and likewise to Core, and Dathan, and Abiron, and the Sodomites.

39. Sethiani. These, in turn, strangely praise Seth, saying that he was produced from the repentance of the supernal parent because she had brought forth Cain. Later, when Cain was rejected and Abel was slain, they say that she consorted with the supernal Father and produced the pure seed, Seth, from whom the whole human race has since been propagated. Finally, they posit principalities, and powers, and everything else, just as the others do.

40. Archontici. These again attribute the whole of things to many rulers ^B and preach that all things that have been made originated from them. They are found to exist in baseness, and they deny the resurrection of the flesh and reject the Old Testament. They use, however, both the Old and New Testaments, twisting every single word to fit their own mind.

41. Cerdoniani. They are from Cerdo, who, when Heracleon had taken over the succession of the error, added to the deceit with new inventions. Having departed from Syria for Rome, he disseminated his dogmas during the times of Bishop Hyginus. Furthermore, he asserts that there are two mutually contrary principles; he denies that Christ was truly born. Likewise, he denies the resurrection of the dead and rejects the Old Testament.

42. Marcionista. Marcio, having originated from Pontus ^C, son of a bishop; having seduced a virgin, he fled because he had been excommunicated by ^D [the church].

^A Having gone up to Rome, and having asked for penance from those who were leaders of the Church at that time, and not obtaining it, he was emboldened against the faith, and he taught three principles: the good, the just, and the evil; and that the New Testament was alien to the Old, and to the One who spoke in it. And he and his followers, the Marcionites, reject the resurrection of the flesh; and they bestow baptism, not only once, but twice and thrice, after falling. And others among them are baptized on behalf of the deceased and the catechumens. And women are boldly permitted by them to give the washing.

43. Lucianists. ^B A certain Lucian, not the one who lived in the times of Constantine, but one older than him, adhered to all the doctrines of Marcion. He also added some other things, which Marcion had ostensibly not handed down.

44. Apellians. And this Apelles also teaches things similar to those of Marcion and Lucian. He reviles the entire creation and its Creator. Yet he did not introduce three principles like them, but only one; and [he says there is] one supreme God, who is unnameable; and that this one ^C had made another. And this one who had come into being, having been found to be evil, made the world through his own wickedness.

45. Severians. A certain Severus, on the other hand, follows the Apellian path, rejecting wine, ^D and fashions it mythologically from the draconic Satan and the earth, when they came together.

He rejects the female sex, saying that it is of the left-hand power. He produces certain names of rulers and some apocryphal books. Likewise, he agrees with other heresies in rejecting the resurrection of the dead and the Old Testament. ^A

46. Tatiani. This Tatian flourished with the most holy martyr and philosopher Justin. After the death of Saint Justin, he was corrupted by the contagion of the dogmas of Marcion, and taught the same things as he did; yet he added other things besides. They report that he hailed from Mesopotamia.

These are the thirteen heresies of the first tome of the second book.

47 In the third tome of the second book, there are contained eighteen heresies.

47. Encratitae. These are a derivation and appendix of Tatian, who reject marriage, which they attribute to Satan. They hold that one must abstain from the eating of animate beings. ^B

48. Cataphrygians, and Montanists, and Asco-

VARIAR LECTIONES.

Epiph. et Reg. 1; R. 2950 abstaining from animate beings. R. 2570 and S. Hil. those who abstain.

NOTE.

…did not reject; but since he admitted the Law, the Prophets, and the Gospels, but rejected the Epistles of Paul and the Acts of the Apostles. Tatian, however, established his own characteristic of teaching, says Irenaeus, lib. 1, cap. 31, and likewise narrates certain aeons, which are of Valentinus, as a fable. But he established a proper characteristic of doctrine, and not at all entirely according to Valentinus, as it pleased the author of the Appendix on heresies. It is evident that Tatian emulated Saturninus and Marcion, both in condemning marriages and in the prohibition of the use of wine and meat: whence they arrogated to themselves the name of 'Encratitae'; certainly because they had previously emulated Saturninus and Marcion, as Irenaeus relates, lib. 1, cap. 30. After the martyrdom of Saint Justin, Tatian wrote his Oration to the Greeks, in which it is permitted to observe the seeds of the Encratite heresy. He acknowledges one God, good, who made all things from nothing: but the Word, not begotten from eternity, but produced by the power of reasoning and will, as a work of God, *ergon*, and [his] procession as a division, not as a separation, just as splinters are parted from fire. He holds that matter is the cause of evil, whose dark spirit, by which it is pervaded, even if it remains one and the same, yet is varied on account of the variety of bodies. Wherefore he says that demons are not of flesh, but of subtle matter, as of fire, as of air, ^C as if the fire and air, and that by that spirit of matter they are held together; and that those things which are the radiations of matter and wickedness; wherefore they are not capable of repentance, from which they rejected the Spirit of God. He calls this spirit of matter the soul in man, and says it is dissolved together with the body: but in the resurrection, those same parts coalescing again, it is to be awakened. And indeed Epiphanius confesses, haer. 47, that the Encratites believed in the resurrection of the flesh. Tatian proceeds, saying that God added another spirit to the first men and the angels, so that He might raise up the spirit lying in matter, and lift it up into immortality; of which, because it is the image and likeness of God, it takes on heavenly diversity; but also that man receives from it so that he might truly be a man. Wherefore he distinguishes two kinds of men, *psychikon*, animal, whom he does not separate from those whom he calls *hylikon*, and the spiritual, *guarded by the Spirit of God*. Moreover, he holds that it is in the power of both to pursue virtue or vice, to be saved or to be reprobated: [he says] that he who wishes to conquer demons must curse matter, that is, to abstract the mind from the lures of the flesh. But among the lures of the flesh, of which he said demons are the handlers, he places laughter and marriage: *marrying, and committing child-corruption, and committing adultery, and even laughing.* Wherefore he mocks the Greeks because they indulged in laughter, and slaughtered animals for the sake of eating flesh. In this tract he suggests nothing whereby he might detract from the salvation of Adam, which nevertheless he inferred elsewhere, from these words of the Apostle to Rom. v, 16, *For we all die in Adam*. The disciples of Tatian are called *Hydroparastatai*, Aquarians, because they used bare water for the Eucharist. Nor did he emulate Valentinus only in the fashioning of aeons, but also in introducing another creator of the world besides the supreme God, who promulgated the law: *destroying the law, as of another God*, says Clement of Alexandria in *Ecclog. prophet.* Furthermore, he had composed one from the four Gospels, which is called *diatessaron*, from which he had removed both the series of the ancestors of the Lord and the other things by which it is declared that He assumed true flesh; according, indeed, to the principles of his own heresy and the Gnostic faction. In the commentary of Jerome on ch. vi of the Epistle to the Galatians, where we read, "Tatian, who introducing putatively the flesh of Christ, is found in the Royal codices and in the very ancient Cluniac codex," [I read] Cassian, who, etc., which reading I conjecture to be true. For Julius Cassianus was indeed an Encratite, a disciple of the Valentinian sect, ^D *a prince of the Docetae*, or of those who attributed putative flesh to the Lord, as Clement of Alexandria testifies, *lib. III Strom.* Who, if he be read more carefully, will be found to cite that same book of Cassian, from which Jerome received the argument which he refutes. But it was also easy for scribes to substitute the name of Tatian where it was a matter of the Encratites, because it was better known than that of Julius Cassianus.

^A and the Ascodrugitae, who accept both the Old and New Testament, but introduce certain other prophets, glorifying a certain Montanus and Priscilla.

49. The Pepuziani, who are also called Quintilliani, to whom the Artotyritae are joined; two heresies. They are indeed of the Cataphrygians, but they hold other dogmas apart from them, considering Pepuza, a certain desert town situated between Galatia, Cappadocia, and Phrygia, to be divine, and indeed deeming this to be Jerusalem. There is also another Pepuza. They assign magistracies and priesthoods to women. They perform sacred rites by pricking a young boy with bronze needles, as the Cataphrygians are wont to do, and by kneading flour with his blood and making bread, they become participants in an offering. ^B And they indeed theologyze that Christ once revealed himself to Quintilla, or even Priscilla, in that place, Pepuza, in the form of a female. They use the Old and the New Testament in the same way.

[VARIAE LECTIONES: These are wanting in Reg. 2. * R. 2508: "and his blood with flour." Ibid.: "to be revealed."]

[NOTAE]

that the Holy Spirit became incarnate in Montanus. But Apollinaris of Hierapolis, Miltiades, and Apollonius, in Eusebius (Book V of his *History*, ch. 17 et seqq.), attack Montanus only on this account, that by acting as a prophet in unordered utterances, he arrogated to himself, and not to the apostles, an extraordinary gift of the Holy Spirit. The author of the *Appendix on Heresies* says that it was their common blasphemy that they said the Holy Spirit was in the apostles, but that the Paraclete was not. This is not to be understood as if they distinguished the Spirit from the Paraclete after the fashion of the Gnostics. For Tertullian, in his book *On the Veiling of Virgins*, in which he sets forth his heresy, indicates by the name of Paraclete nothing other than the Holy Spirit, the vicar of the Lord. Moreover, he explains the sense of the Montanists thus: "Justice was first in its rudiments, fearing God by nature; then it advanced through the Law and the prophets into childhood; then it subsided into youth through the Gospel; now it is brought to maturity through the Paraclete." So that, as Jerome interprets in Letter 54, the Holy Spirit ^C descended at last upon Montanus, Prisca, and Maximilla, and the severed half-man Montanus possessed the fullness which Paul did not have. By which he means nothing else than the signal gift of prophecy, for which reason he calls all these abortive prophets in his epistle *To Hedibia*, q. 9. Epiphanius and Eusebius nowhere imply anything else. Jerome again, in Letter 54, says that the Montanists constrained the Trinity into the straits of one person. Doubtless the author of the aforementioned *Appendix* says that there is not one doctrine of the Cataphrygians. There are some who are called according to Proclus, and some according to Aeschines. But those who are according to Aeschines possess this private blasphemy, that they add that Christ himself is the Father and the Son. Theodoret knows this distinction between the two sects; however, in book II of *Haeretical Fabulae*, ch. 2, I do not doubt that he wrote *Proclion* for *Patroclon*. For Eusebius, whom he follows throughout in *History* book VI, ch. 20, mentions the dissertation of Gaius the Roman against Proclus. Perhaps he is the one of whom Tertullian says in *Against Valentinus*, book I: "Our Proculus, a man of virgin age and dignity of eloquence," etc. He speaks of the same Proculus in book *To Scapula*, ch. 4. However, he makes mention of another Proclus in his book *Against Praxeas*, from whom the Procliani are named; ^D who had established a creator of things other than the supreme one. Whether he mixed the ravings of Montanus into this Gnostic impiety is uncertain. The Montanists dissolved marriages, that is to say, second ones, and fasted a triple forty days. They paved the way for the Novatians, so that they closed the doors of the Church to almost every sin, says Jerome in Letter 54, where he also recites their hierarchy, in which the patriarch held the first place; the *Cenones* the second; the bishops the third, that is, almost the last. Montanus predicted the end of the world in the beginning, and the millennial Kingdom of Christ. This is what the pseudosibylla sings in eight books, which survive even today, subject to the Phrygians. Phrygia, indeed, has always existed as a fecund parent of prophets, and, as I might pass over the Gentiles, not so long before Montanus, a certain prophetess, whom John in Apocalypse 11:20 calls Jezebel, was maddening the Thyatireni, their neighbors. And to her succeeded Montanus, Theodotus, Alcibiades, Priscilla, Maximilla, and also Quintilla, that most monstrous woman, against whom Tertullian wrote *On Baptism*, to whom there was not even the right to teach fully (being indeed a woman), she knew how to kill "little fish" very well, taking them out of the water, as if the water of baptism were futile. Theodoret writes that they are called Tascodrugitae or Tascodrugiti: from which name also it is attested here and in Epiphanius’ *Panarion* that the Quintilliani were endowed; by the word Phrygian, or rather Galatian, composed of *tascosp* (finger) and *droungos* (nose); because they would stick their finger to their nose while praying: whence they were called by the Greeks again Passaloryncitae, i.e., "Little-nail-nose." Theodoret, and Timothy of Constantinople, and Antiochus join the Marcionites, whose deceits and tenets Quintilla had indeed emulated. Among Antiochus, with the letter 'a' omitted, as here among Damascenus, they are called *Ascodrugitae*: so also Philastrius and Augustine wrote *Ascodrugitae*. From which the passage of Jerome in the Preface to his book *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* must be corrected, where it is read that Passaloryncitae, Ascodrobos, and Artotyritae are found in Ancyra in Galatia, and for *Ascodrobos*, one must substitute *Ascodrogos* or *Tascodrogos*. Furthermore, the Quintilliani were also called Artotyritae because they would mix cheese into the eucharistic bread.

BOOK ON HERESIES

^A ...and they alter {the Testament} according to their own mind. They employ the Old and New Testament, yet in such a way that they transfer everything according to their own whim to perverse meanings.

50. The Tessarescaidecagitai (Quartodecimans) celebrate the Pasch on a fixed day of the year; in whatever day of the fourteenth moon it falls, whether it be a Sabbath or a Lord's Day, on that day they fast and celebrate the festive vigils.

51. The Alogi, so named by us, are those who reject the Gospel according to John, and his Apocalypse, because they do not accept the Word as God, who exists eternally proceeding from the Father.

52. The Adamiani, so named from a certain Adam who is alive, profess a dogma that is ridiculous rather than consonant with truth. ^B Furthermore, they act in this manner: naked, just as they came forth from their mother's womb, men and women gather together, and in this state perform readings, prayers, and every other religious duty. Inasmuch as they act as monastics and follow the institutes of the continent, they condemn marriage; and they consider their own gathering to be paradise.

53. The Sampsaei and Elcesaei (Elcesaites) dwell to this day in Arabia, situated above the Dead Sea; they are disciples of Elxai, a certain false prophet. From his lineage have sprung in our own age two women, Marthus and Marthina, whom this heresy honors as if they were goddesses. Moreover, they think the same things exactly as the Ebionites.

54. The Theodotiani (Theodotians), those from Theodotus the tanner...

^A of Byzantium. He was highly instructed in Greek learning, and at the same time as others during the days of the then-prevailing persecution, he alone fell away, while those others suffered martyrdom for the sake of God. Because, therefore, he was a fugitive and was reproached, he invented the claim that Christ was a mere man, on account of the crime that he had denied God.

55. The Melchisedeciani (Melchisedecians): these venerate Melchisedec, asserting that he is some power, and not a mere man, and they have dared to refer all things to his name.

56. The Bardesianistae (Bardesianists): ^B this Bardesanes was sprung from Mesopotamia. At first, he was of the true faith and excelled in philosophy; but, having deviated from the truth, he taught dogmas similar to Valentine, except for some few things in which he differs from Valentine.

57. The Noetiani (Noetians): ^C this Noetus was from Smyrna in Asia. Being carried along in a chariot with others, he dared to assert that Christ was the Filio-pater (that is, if I may so put it, the Son-father, or the Father-son); he showed him to be the same person as the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. He even claimed that he himself was Moses, and his own brother, Aaron. ^D

[VARIAE LECTIONES: a. R. 2508 fugitives. b. Cod. S. Hil. from Noetus: thus in Augustine, Noetians, who are from a certain Noetus.]

[NOTE: There have been disciples of this tanner Theodotus: Asclepiades, and Hermophylus, and Apollonius, and Theodotus the money-changer, who, desiring to be the author of a sect of his own, established this heresy. Insofar as they had him as their leader, they are called Theodotiani; because they suppose that Melchisedec is a certain divine and most great power, they are named Melchisedeciani. And because they do not wish to touch those who are not of their own faith, nor to be touched by any of those who are not like themselves, they are called Athingani. The same author had said that they were addicted to Thessalian sorcery, and observed the Sabbath in the Jewish manner, yet neglecting both baptism and circumcision. He appends anathemas to be recited by those who have returned from this heresy to the Catholic faith. Regarding both Theodotuses, and Asclepiades (or Asclepiodotus), Apollonius, and Hermophylus, one may read Eusebius, Hist. book V, ch. 28; also Theodoret, and the Appendix to the book On Prescriptions. Jerome, in Epistle 125, has examined the various opinions concerning Melchisedec. (36) Eusebius, book IV, ch. 50, and Jerome, On Ecclesiastical Writers, testify that Bardesanes did not defect to the Valentinians, but that, even though he was imbued with the teachings of Valentine, he proposed to return to the sound faith, yet he did not entirely wash away the filth of his ancient error; for he apparently imagined some emissions in God, and (37) there survives today the final part of the book of the holy martyr Hippolytus, bishop of Portus Romanus, against all the heretics of his age. The Syrus S. Ephraem refuted the errors of Bardesanes and his disciple Harmonius. Diodorus of Tarsus, mentioned by Photius, cod. 223, refuted Bardesanes in chapter 51, because while he admitted the prophets and confessed that souls were free from nature and fate, he nevertheless subjected them to the body. He wrote many things with great skill, but may have been tainted. The final part begins with these words, which I shall recite from the Latin translation of Gerard Vossius, until the Greek is found: "Some others introduce another doctrine, having become disciples of a certain Noetus, who by race was a Smyrniote, not long ago. He said that Christ was the same person as the Father, and that the Father himself was born and suffered." Then he narrates how Noetus with his associates defended his dogma: "So they say they prove that God is one, and they respond: 'If we confess that Christ is God, then he is the Father, if he is God; and if Christ who is God suffered, then the Father suffered.' For he himself was the Father. For this reason they are called 'Son-fathers' and Patripassians." Epiphanius says that Noetus first concealed his error before the presbytery of Smyrna, because no one before him had vomited forth this horrendous and destructive bitterness. But Theodoret teaches us that the author of this impiety was a certain Epigonus; that it was strengthened by Cleomenes, restored by Noetus, and finally augmented with new additions by Callistus. Beryllus, bishop of Bostra, produced the same at about this age, whom Origen brought back to health in a synod, as Eusebius relates, Hist. book VI, ch. 33. Noetus lived one hundred and thirty years ago, says Epiphanius; that is, around the year 245, and so his heresy became known before Sabellius emerged.]

BOOK OF HERESIES

^A 58. Valesii. These are, as I suspect, people who inhabit Bacathus, which is the principal town of Philadelphia in Arabia; and they are accustomed to castrate those who come to them as well as their guests: indeed, most of the people themselves are eunuchs and castrated. They have also other dogmas filled with error; and first of all, they reject the Law and the Prophets, and add certain obscenities.

59. Cathari. These joined themselves to Novatus of Rome, and they completely proscribe those who have been married twice, and do not accept repentance.

60. Angelici. These have completely disappeared; they were so called either because they boasted that they were of an angelic order, or because they invoked angels.

^B 61. Apostolici, who are also called Apotactici [that is, the Renouncers]. These also emerged only in Pisidia. They admit only those who have renounced goods. They are akin to the Encratites, although they maintain certain other things apart from them.

62. Sabellians. These think similar things to Noetus, except that they say the Father did not suffer; and they say that the Word is like that which is uttered by the mouth and again withdrawn.

63. Origenians, derived from a certain Origen.

[VARIOUS READINGS AND NOTES: omitted as per instructions.]

^A These are evildoers, committing unspeakable acts, and delivering their own bodies to corruption.

64. Other Origenians, followers of Origen, who is also called Adamantius, who reject the resurrection of the dead. They introduce Christ and the Holy Spirit as created beings; they allegorize Paradise, the heavens, and all other things. They chatter that the kingdom of Christ will at some point come to an end, and that the angels will cease to exist at the same time. They invent monstrous tales, saying that Christ will be subjected to the kingdom of God along with the devil, and that Christ was crucified for the sake of the demons.

These are the 18 heresies of the second book of the fourth volume.

The items contained in the second book of the fifth volume are 5 heresies.

65. Paulianists ^B, from Paul of Samosata.

NOTES

He collected everything in the book *De Principiis* [*On First Principles*]. Having been accused before Pope Fabian, he first pleaded that his works had been corrupted: he wrote to Fabian, says Jerome, in such a way as to suggest he would repent for having written such things, and he attributed the cause of his rashness to Ambrose, because he had published things that were secretly issued. Theophilus of Alexandria in his Paschal homily, and the Emperor Justinian in his epistle to Mennas, accuse Origen primarily of counting the Word among created things, both in the books *De Principiis* and in *Psalm 1*, in which he calls Christ a *γενητὸν θεόν*, a created God. There are indeed not wanting other places in which he says the Son is *ἀγέννητον*, not created, but proceeded from the substance of the Father; yet it can hardly be denied that Adamantius held the Son to be inferior to the Father in dignity, power, and knowledge, and the Holy Spirit to be inferior to the Son. He clearly rules this out in his book *On Prayer*, where he contends that the Father, not Christ or the Son, is to be prayed to. Hence Eusebius of Caesarea, who was most studious of Origen, in his books *Against Marcellus*, even though he denies that the Word was made *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων* [out of nothing] and from things that did not exist, and affirms that he was begotten from the substance of God, is entirely occupied in defending the subjection of the Son to the Father. Therefore, he confessed that the Son is *ὁμοούσιον*, consubstantial with the Father, only in that sense in which the Platonists said that demons and souls consist of a divine substance. Origen had received this from Plato, who, as many ^C—and especially Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, book XII, chapter 20—have observed, posited one God who, by a certain superabundance, sent forth from himself a mind or idea, as a *δεύτερον αἴτιον*, a second cause, and then a third, namely the soul of the world, inferior to him in order and nature. Again, according to the doctrine of the Platonists, he taught that angels, demons, and human souls are of the same essence, and then subsequently obtained different states according to the difference of their merits, so that some were angels, others demons; others were destined to animate celestial bodies, others to animate human ones. Souls, he taught, were bound to bodies as if to dungeons, and that they do not so much learn the things of religion as reminise about them. This is what he hands down in the book *On Prayer*; which indeed, among many other things, Jerome in Epistle 59, chapter 1, extracts from book 1 of *De Principiis*. And when he had treated of all things in varied discourse, he says, asserting that the devil is not incapable of virtue, and yet does not yet wish to embrace virtue; at the end he argued in the most fluid discourse that an angel, or a soul, or certainly a demon—all of whom he asserts are of one nature, but of ^D diverse wills—could through the greatness of his negligence become a beast... until at last, lest he be held guilty of a Pythagorean dogma, he who asserts *μετεμψύχωσιν* [transmigration of souls], after so unspeakable a dispute, by which he had wounded the reader’s mind; these, he says, according to our judgment are not dogmas, but merely inquiries, thrown out so that they might not appear altogether unexamined. Earlier in the prologue he had forewarned that he would speak of matters regarding which it would be possible to affirm or deny at will, provided that the faith which the apostles have handed down be saved. By this right, in book II, he asserts countless worlds, not simultaneously like Epicurus, says Jerome, but that after the end of one world, there is a beginning of another: which is plainly to posit eternal matter. Therefore, he inferred from the aforesaid that demons and the impious would return, by the merits of Christ, to a better state, and then, with all things subjected to God, the kingdom of Christ would cease. Thus he argues in book V of *De Principiis* and in book *On Prayer*, § 16, departing in nothing from his Platonists. Furthermore, having discarded the native sense of Scripture, after the manner of the Gnostics, and especially of Julius Cassianus, book V, chapter 5, he taught that Paradise was planted by God in the third heaven, understanding angels for trees, powers for rivers, and for the garments of skins, with which our first parents were clothed after sin, flesh which would be subject to death: for Adam had lived without flesh, nerves, and bones. Therefore, there would be a resurrection of bodies, but not of flesh. That original condition of the human body he called the inner man, to whom alone it is suitable to be the image of God. Moreover, by diligent exercise, man could reach such perfection that he might not feel even the slightest perturbation, or the stain of any sin, and, having dispelled the darkness of *ἀπάθεια* [apathy/passionlessness], might contemplate intelligible substances. Into this opinion, which had also been that of the Gnostics, Pelagius afterwards lapsed; whom Jerome therefore, having enumerated the authors of this man, addressed thus: Do you wish to know yet another source of your error? Your heresy is a little branch of Origen.

(43) The same was his sentiment regarding the Trinity and the person of Christ; which the bishops of the East state in the same way as Epiphanius in that third profession of faith which Athanasius and Hilary in the books *On Synods* record, as well as Socrates, book II, *Hist.*, ch. 15. Epiphanius in the *Panarion* adds that in this way the dogma of Artemas, extinguished long ago, *πρὸ πολλῶν ἐτῶν ἐσβεσμένον* [long ago extinguished], by the work...

of Paul of Samosata, who had been bishop of Antioch, was revived. ^A This Paul despoils Christ of existence in almost every way, transforming Him into a prolatitious word, and preaches that He had no beginning before Mary. Therefore, he teaches that those things reported about Him in the Holy Scriptures were announced in a prophetic manner while Christ did not yet exist, and that He existed only from Mary, from the time He appeared in the flesh.

^B 66. The Manichaeans, also called Acuanitae: these are disciples of Mani the Persian; they confess Christ only in appearance, worship the sun and moon, invoke the stars, the virtues, and demons, and introduce two eternal principles, always existing, one evil and one good; they say that Christ appeared and suffered only in phantom form; they blaspheme the Old Testament and the God who spoke therein; they define the world not to be entirely from God, but that only a part of it was made by Him.

67. The Hieracitae: these are named from Hieracas, a certain interpreter and teacher who originated from Leontopolis, a city of Egypt; they reject the resurrection of the flesh, though they use the Old and New Testaments. They forbid marriage entirely; monks, virgins, and celibates are held by them to be of the better principle.

NOTES

(44) Manes, according to the ancient theology of the Persians and also the Gnostics, posited two principles of all things, coeternal and self-subsistent: the good, which he called God and light, and the evil, which he called darkness or even matter with its own depraved genius, the devil. That [good] was indeed the source of goods from which higher things were produced, the other of evils. Both had once existed separated: but the evil, impatient of quiet, moved against the good, and having sent forth its own virtues, snatched away, not without the resistance of the adversaries, a portion of God Himself, which it entangled in bodies to be animated. It granted to the good God both the virtues and the aeons, its own portions, which ^C the Gnostics concede. And so it taught that the souls of men, as well as of beasts, birds, fish, and trees, are segments of the divine substance, just as the celestial virtues, the sun, the moon, and the stars. It insisted that God consists of an ethereal body; or rather that the air itself is an ether: for which reason it forbade any animal to be killed, or a branch to be plucked from a tree, nor even to stir the air with one's hand: Because the air is the soul of men, of volatile creatures, of fish, and of reptiles. Furthermore, it claimed that souls, after many migrations from body to body, are finally released from the servitude of darkness and fly to the heavens, and that God Himself, through the aid of the twelve signs, the seven planets, and primarily the sun and the moon, retracted certain vessels of souls—a fable somewhat like that which Porphyry in his book *On the Cave of the Nymphs* says Plato fashioned. Consequently, it admits no resurrection of the flesh, which heaven cannot contain. For which reason, when Christ was generated from God by a decision (just as a man from a man), he offered only a human appearance, and did not therefore suffer, with a certain son of an evil principle, whom the Jews killed, substituted in his place. Mention ^D is made of both Christs in the books of the Mendaites, which the most learned Mr. Ludovicus Picques, a Sorbonne doctor, of blessed memory, bequeathed to our Parisian library of Saint-Honoré. The Mendaites, who are also called Christians of St. John, are pure Manichaeans, who have recently also assumed the name of Sabaitae. I refrain from recounting their other blasphemies, by which they have burdened the creator of the world and the giver of the Mosaic Law, whom they judge to be the devil, as well as their filth; which may be similar to those which they report the most wicked of the Gnostics to have practiced.

(45) The Hieracitae were not Manichaeans, as Epiphanius wrote, but were offshoots of the Encratites. The author of the discourse *Against Heresies*, which exists among the works of Athanasius, teaches us that the Old Testament alone was rejected by the Hieracitae: furthermore, that marriage was indeed permitted before the coming of the Lord, but afterwards forbidden. Arius, in his epistle to Alexander of Alexandria, complains that his Hieracas explained his sense regarding the generation of the Word by the example of a lamp which is lit from another lamp, and has its own light, distinct from the light of the other: which accords with the heresy of the Tritheites. Hilary reports the same thing in book VI *De Trinitate*, as does the writer of the life of Macarius the Egyptian. He added that Melchisedec was the Holy Spirit, who, having assumed a human form, met Abraham.

^A they receive virgins, those who practice continence, and widows. They deny that children who have died at an immature age can be participants in the heavenly kingdom, because they have not contended [in the struggle of faith].

68. The Meletians. ^B These are considered schismatics in Egypt rather than heretics. They refused to join in the communion of prayers with those who had lapsed during the persecution. Now, however, they have attached themselves to the Arians.

69. The Arians, who are also called Ariomanites and Diatomites. They preach that the Son of God is a creature, and the Holy Spirit a creature of a creature. They assert that Christ took only flesh from Mary, and not a soul as well.

So far there are five heresies of the fifth tome, which is the second book of the second volume. ^C But in the first tome of the third book there are seven heresies.

70. The Audians. This is a schism and a withdrawal, though not a heresy. They possess a regulated way of life and conduct, nor do they differ from the Catholic Church in anything regarding faith. They live for the most part in monasteries, and do not admit all people to their prayers. There is a great supply of apocryphal books among them. They condemn our bishops, who are wealthy, and others for other reasons. They celebrate Easter ^D privately—

^A at the same time as the Jews. They also have something peculiar to themselves, which they defend vigorously: namely, that which is written, *ad imaginem* (in the image), which they interpret most harshly.

^B 71. Photinians (49). This Photinus, coming from Sirmium, held sentiments similar to Paul of Samosata, though in some matters he disagreed with him. He affirms that Christ received his origin entirely from Mary.

72. Marcellians (50). Those from Marcellus, who was from Ancyra in Galatia. He, having been famous at the beginning for thinking similarly to Sabellius, and having frequently come to an apology and having defended himself in writing, was accused by others of persisting in the same views. Perhaps, having repented, he may have corrected himself, or his disciples did. For some orthodox men interposed themselves as defenders in favor of his arguments.

73. Semiarians (51). They confess that Christ is a creature but, by irony and quibbling, call him a creature not as if he were one of the created things. But, they say, we call him Son; yet out of fear of attributing some passion to the Father because of the begetting, we call him a creature. Likewise, concerning the Holy Spirit, they define him entirely as a creature, rejecting the term *consubstantial* (ὁμοούσιον) for the Son, though they are willing to say ^C *like in substance* (ὁμοιούσιον). Others among them even rejected *like in substance*.

^A 74. Pneumatomachi, that is, adversaries of the Holy Spirit. Regarding Christ, they speak not ill, for the most part; but they blaspheme the Holy Spirit, defining Him as a creature, and not as being from the Godhead, but rather, by a certain misuse of the term, as having been created for the sake of His operation, asserting Him to be merely a sanctifying power.

^B 75. Aerians. This Aerius was from Pontus; and he is to this day a trial to the life of the Church. He had been a presbyter under Bishop Eustathius, whom the Arians had accused. And because this Aerius was not made bishop, he devised many doctrines against the Church. As regards the faith, he is a genuine follower of Arius; but he professes something more: for instance, he claims that offerings for the dead are not to be made, and he prohibits the fasts of the fourth and sixth days of the week, of Lent, and of Easter; he preaches the renunciation of worldly goods. He partakes of every kind of meat and food without fear. And if any of his followers wish to fast, he forbids it on the appointed days, but only when one chooses. For you are not, he says, under the law. He teaches that a presbyter is in no way superior to a bishop.

VARIAE LECTIONES

NOTÆ

196.

^A 76. Aetiani. From Aetius the Cilician, who was ordained deacon by George, the Arian bishop of Alexandria. They are also called Anomoeans, and by some Eunomians, from Eunomius, who was a disciple of Aetius. Eudoxius belonged to the same sect, but because of his fear of the Emperor Constantius, he separated himself from them, and in this way only Aetius was exiled. Eudoxius, however, remained an Arian, though he did not follow Aetius. These Anomoeans or Aetians declare that both Christ and the Holy Spirit are altogether alien from God the Father, maintaining that He is a created being, and saying that He possesses not even any likeness to Him. By means of certain Aristotelian and geometrical syllogisms, they wish to explain the nature of God, and from this they reason that Christ cannot be from God. The Eunomians among them baptize again all who come over to their side; not only Catholics, but also the Arians themselves; and they do this—as the report is widely spread—by immersing them head-first, with their feet in the air. ^B They say that it is no grave matter to err in some things, such as fornication or any other sin, for God, they claim, seeks nothing other than that someone should persevere in this faith of theirs which they profess.

These, then, are the seven heresies of the first volume of the third book. In the second volume of the third book, there are four heresies.

77. Dimoeritae, who are also Apollinarists; they who do not profess one composite nature.

^A They do not confess the full presence of Christ, that is to say, His incarnation; some of whom dared to say at one time that His body was consubstantial with the Divinity. Some again denied at another time that He had assumed a soul, and this they denied. Others, relying upon the scriptural text, "The Word was made flesh," denied that He had assumed flesh from created flesh—that is, from Mary—and asserted stubbornly that the Word alone had been made flesh. Later, however, for what reason I know not, they said that He had not assumed a mind.^B

78. Antidicomarianitae (56): they who say that the holy Mary, the Ever-Virgin, was joined to Joseph after the birth of the Savior.

79. Collyridiani: they who, on a certain appointed day of the year, offer a certain cake in the name of the same Mary, to whom we have given the name Collyridiani.

80. Massaliani (57), who are interpreted as "Prayers."

VARIOUS READINGS

R. 2508: ἀνειληφέναι (to have assumed).

NOTÆ

^C Apollinarist. The madness of those is condemned who would say that the flesh is consubstantial with God. For the flesh of the Word was made divine by union, not by nature. Valentinus the Apollinarist made Polemius, or Polemon, and Timotheus the parents of this error, because as masters they did not understand the sayings; nor does Theodoret deny this, who nevertheless warns that Apollinarius was not of one opinion. There are also those who think that Apollinarius preluded Nestorius, so that he might deny that the Virgin was [Theotokos], the Mother of God, by detracting from the substantial conjunction of the natures, in which Christ consists; for the reason that Athanasius and Nazianzen condemn this impiety along with other tenets of the same. But by both doctors not only were the errors of Apollinarius refuted, but also those which the heretic boasted would follow from Catholic doctrine. This can be gathered clearly enough from the [Anirrheticon] of Gregory of Nyssa against him, as well as from these words of Jerome in chapter 3 of his [Epistle to Titus]: "Nor do we say that Jesus Christ is one, and the Word is another, as the new heresy calumniates; but we say it is the same one, both before the ages and after the ages," etc. Moreover, Nyssa proves this more at length in his letter to Theophilus, which was read in the general council, collation 5. Whence not all books, in which there is a dispute about the one person of Christ, are to be recalled to Nestorian times.

Some of the Apollinarists taught that the blessed Virgin, after Christ was born, brought forth other children. In two volumes, Apollinarius defended the error of the Millenarians, in a Jewish sense, against Dionysius of Alexandria. Nemesius and Jerome, in the preface to book 16 of [Isaiah], in chapter 36 of [Ezekiel], and in Epistle 82, write that he thought the souls of men were created by traduction, so that just as body is born from body, so soul is born from soul, and subsists with a similar reason alongside brute beasts. But he understood the sentient soul, not the rational one, which he confessed to be of a higher origin.

(56) They who denied the virginity of Mary; Epiphanius reports that the sectaries of this same error sprouted up in Arabia. In the West, Helvidius stirred this up, whom Bonosus of Sardica embraced after having first denied the Divinity of Christ.

(57) Epiphanius reports that they are called Martyrians and Satanians, and that these are Gentiles rather than Christians. But those who were from among the Christians, while they interpreted the words of the Gospel insipidly, having abandoned their property and neglected the labor of their hands, gave themselves over to prayer alone. Hence the name of the Massalians, from the Syriac root [...], that is, to pray. For a long time, the passage of Jerome in the [Prologue to the Dialogue against the Pelagians] troubled me, which in the older editions read thus: "the heretics of almost all of Syria whom they call in the gentile speech, Abin and Paanin, that is, perverts and Massalians, in Greek [Euchitai]." I did not understand that Abin and Paanin were the same as perverts and Massalians. But in the recent edition, we are warned that this is the reading of many manuscripts: "whom in the gentile speech, DEINCIPAMNNI, that is, perversely, Massalians," etc., from the inspection of which reading, the passage of Jerome could be emended thus: "whom in the gentile speech AIECTPAMMENOC, that is, perversely, Massalians," etc. Photius, [cod. 52], recounts at length what was done by various pontiffs and synods against the Massalians. He omitted, however, Cyril of Alexandria, by whom this heresy was likewise struck down. Yet he writes that the Ephesian synod, over which Cyril presided, condemned chapters excerpted from the ascetic book of the Massalians, along with their parent Adelphius. And yet this is the very thing which John the Faster of Constantinople had written to Gregory the Great, that the Ephesian council had pronounced, among other things, concerning the soul of Adam, that it was not dead in sin, because the devil does not enter into the heart of man: and if anyone had said this, he would be anathema. Gregory denied that this was defined by the Ephesian Fathers, book 6, epistle 14, and censured it as Pelagianism: but from those things which he appends, I gather that the synod excluded solely the sense of the Massalians. "Searching," he says, "the Ephesian synod, concerning Adelphius, and Sabas, and the others, who are said to have been condemned there, we find absolutely nothing." But that Adelphius and Sabas were the leaders of the Massalians is testified by Theodoret, whom our author excerpted, Nilus, in his epistle to Magnus, and many others. Although it is the Catholic sentiment that the soul of Adam was dead by sin, and that the devil enters into the heart of him who sins; nevertheless, these are blasphemous according to the sense of the Massalians. Namely, they posited two souls in every man, one common, the other heavenly, which, having been excluded through sin, the man was considered dead; furthermore, that the devil is joined consubstantially [...] with the sinful man, and is not driven out by the power of any baptism or other sacrament, unless by prayer. These things had troubled Gregory, when that plague...

had not yet penetrated the western parts. But not long ago it had broken out in the East under the Emperor Anastasius, by the agency of Lampetius, from whom they were called Lampetians, then later by Marcianus Trapezita, from whom they were called Marcianists. Hence the holy Pontiff says in three letters that the sect of the Marcianists was unknown to him (as is set forth in lib. vi, epist. 15, 16, 17, not as some think, the Marcionites). Gregory prefers to assign the canon to John of Antioch, and his council. For it is remarkable that highly learned men have not noticed the book itself, ix, indict. 11, epist. 49, to Anastasius of Antioch, where he says: "Some think that that Ephesine synod in that city is the one which is handed down as having been composed by heretics; intended, of course, for those bishops who favored Nestorius along with John." He adds: "That synod, which took place under the first (legitimate) Ephesine, had certain chapters brought before it and approved, which are those of Celestius and Pelagius." By which it is implied that the council of the Antiochenes had approved the doctrine of Pelagius, or that doctrine which seemed Pelagian to Gregory, and that he would only explode the Euchetic one. Nor does it aid John that he himself in his letter to Rufus accused Cyril, because he had restored to communion those holding the same sentiments as Celestius and Pelagius (for the Euchetes are also Enthusiasts). For it is certain from the acts of the Ephesine synod that John had supported the Pelagians: nor was there a lack of deceit in his accusation, especially since the Euchetes and the Pelagians agreed, if one considers *apatheia*, or immunity from disturbances, which both parties boasted of. These were Gregory’s points. Moreover, the definition of the legitimate synod exists in Latin. ^A And those godless Massalians, who are also called Euchetes, and Enthusiasts; in which there is approved a synodical booklet of Constantinople issued against them by Sisinnius, and whatever was done at Alexandria for their sake, and it is enjoined upon Valerian of Iconium, Amphilochius of Side, and all the bishops of Lycaonia and Pamphylia, that they see to it that these decrees are observed. This the Ephesine Fathers decreed all the more advisedly, because they were also accused of the Massalian error by the Orientals before the emperor. Wherefore I conjecture that the chapters of the Euchetes, which the Faster wrote to Gregory had been condemned at Ephesus, were the very same which Sisinnius and Cyril had previously prohibited. But from which author our author received all those articles of the Massalians which he has related here, is not sufficiently known to me: unless perhaps by the same codex which Timotheus the presbyter used; namely, that of the impious Marcian, who appeared in the sixth century. Nevertheless, Timotheus recites many which Damascenus does not have, as in turn Damascenus has more, of which there is no mention in Timotheus. For example, you would not find in Timotheus that fire is the creator of things, that there is a certain nature of evils: that there are two souls in every man, which are purely Manichaean: that Adam likewise joined with Eve without any heat of lust. Nor conversely in Damascenus, that the three Persons of the Holy Trinity are one hypostasis: that the Body of Christ is not circumscribed, and similar things, which not only Timotheus, but also Nicephorus of Constantinople and Euthymius drew out from the writings of Marcian. The heresies which follow were collected by Damascenus from various authors, whose books have perished. But he errs in chronological sequence, where he says that they emerged from the times of Marcian and Leo and thereafter. For Nestorius and Eutyches flourished under Theodosius the Younger.

To these are added also those called Euphemites, and Martyrians, and Satanians, from the sects of the Gentiles.

The summary of the seventh tome.

The impious chapters of the Massalian doctrine, collected from their own books:

1. That Satan resides in man personally, and dominates him in all things. 2. That Satan and demons possess the human mind, and human nature is joined in communion with the spirits of wickedness. 3. That Satan and the Holy Spirit dwell together in man; and that the apostles were not free from this operation by which men are seized. 4. That baptism does not perfect man, nor does the reception of the divine mysteries purify the soul, but only the prayers which they themselves perform. 5. That man, even after baptism, is in the mass of sin. 6. That the faithful does not receive the incorruptible and divine garment through baptism, but through prayer. 7. That *apatheia* must be obtained, and the participation of the Holy Spirit, in every sense and full assurance.

VARIE LECTIONES ... (no other variants needed)

^A 8. That one must thus feel the contact of the heavenly bridegroom, as a woman feels it in the intercourse of a husband.

9. That spiritual men see sin both within and without, and the grace that is infused and that works.

10. That it is a revelation taking place in sense and in the divine hypostasis, as a doctrine.

11. That fire is creative.

12. That the soul which does not have Christ in sense and in every action, is a dwelling-place of serpents and venomous beasts, that is, of every opposing power.

13. That evils exist by nature.

14. That even before the transgression, Adam had intercourse with Eve without any heat of lust. ^B

15. That both seed and the Word fell into Mary.

16. That man must acquire two souls, one which is common to men, they say, and one which is heavenly.

17. That it is possible, they say, for man to receive the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit sensibly, in all fullness and all operation.

18. That the Savior can appear to those who pray in the light; and at a certain time, a man was found standing at the altar, to whom three loaves anointed with oil had been offered. ^C

Furthermore, they also reject the work of the hands, as something unbecoming to Christians. And in particular, they display inhumanity towards the poor, saying that one ought not to grant alms to those who beg in public, nor to widows left behind, nor to those who have met with misfortune, or bodily mutilation, or diseases, or are oppressed by harsh creditors, or worn down by the incursions of robbers or barbarians, or have been thrust into life's hardships and poverty by other such calamities—through those who renounce worldly goods, or even through those who are primarily zealous for beneficence—but that everything should be provided for themselves; for they claimed to be the ones who are truly poor in spirit.

To these things they added contempt for the Churches and the sacred altars. They said that it does not befit monks to take part in ecclesiastical ^D assemblies, and that the prayers which they pour out in their own oratories are sufficient for them; for they claim that the power of prayer is such that to them and to their disciples, the Holy Spirit allows Himself to be seen in a sensible manner. Indeed, they babble that those who wish to obtain salvation ought, with such perseverance, to do nothing else at all but be devoted to prayer, until they perceive sin like some smoke, or fire, or serpent, or some beast of that—

^A kind, being driven out by the force of prayer, and departing in a perceptible manner through prayers; and that they, in turn, perceptibly receiving the entry of the Holy Spirit, might have a clear perception in their soul of this entry of the Spirit. And they maintain that this is the true communion of Christians. For they claim that those who are baptized do not in any way become partakers of the Holy Spirit through baptism or through the laying on of the hands of the clergy, unless they have devoted themselves to prayers with greater assiduity. Nay, they even assert that anyone can become a partaker of the Holy Spirit without baptism, provided he wishes to continue with them and has been imbued with their doctrine; so that when certain presbyters said to them, "We confess that the Holy Spirit is had by faith, not by perception," they did not hesitate to promise that the perception of the Spirit would also be given to them if they were willing to pray with them. And such is the arrogance of these people that they proclaim those who have perceived that sense of the Holy Spirit among them as blessed, as though they were perfect and free from all sin, and superior to sin. And they honor them with all zeal and pursue them with honors, as though they were no longer subject to the danger of sin ^B and had advanced to such a state of perfection that they could now safely enjoy every relaxation, feed on exquisite foods, swell with splendid company, and indulge in all delights. Many of them, having received such a testimony of perfection among them, have been detected, while sometimes living with outsiders (whom they do not even deem worthy of the name of Christian), falling into various obscene flagrancies, thefts of money, and fornications.

They also invent many other monstrosities: for they dissolve legitimate marriages for no cause at all, and they receive those who have withdrawn from wedlock as monks and proclaim them blessed. They persuade parents to abandon the care of raising their children, and they know how to drive them mad so that they bring all their possessions to them. They willingly receive servants who have fled from their masters; and likewise those who have fled to them while ^C guilty of various crimes, without any produced fruit of repentance, without being supported by the authority of priests, and without any regard for the ranks which the ecclesiastical canons prescribe for penitents, they promise that they will immediately cleanse them from every stain of sin, provided that someone, practicing the prayer so often boasted by them, has become an extemporaneous disciple of their craftiness and fraud. So clearly is this the case that they even present for ordination as clerics some of that sort, who are not yet freed from the bonds of their sins, to those men, who are preeminent among them for the reputation of monastic observance, ^D deceiving the bishops with their testimony so that they might lay their hands upon them. This, however, they do not because they hold the ranks of the clergy in high esteem; indeed, they hold the bishops themselves in contempt, when it pleases them; but they are maneuvering for a certain power and authority for themselves. Some of them they do not even deem worthy to be called Christians.

Further concerning the aforementioned heresy of the Massalians, who are found mostly in monasteries, from the History of Theodoret, book IV, chapter 11.

^B During the times of Valentinian and Valens, the heresy of the Massalians arose, whom they call Euchetae, interpreting their name in the Greek language. They have also another appellation imposed from the thing itself. For they are called Enthusiasts, because they receive the force and operation of a certain demon, which they think to be the presence of the Holy Spirit. Those who are affected by this extreme disease turn away from manual labor as an evil, and, yielding themselves to sleep, they call the images of their dreams a divine inspiration. The leaders of this heresy were Dadoes, and Sabas, and Adelphius, and Hermas, and Symeon, and others besides, who withdrew from ecclesiastical communion, because they said that the divine food, of which the Lord says, "He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood shall live forever," ^C neither profits nor harms those who partake of it. Furthermore, they study to conceal their disease; even when they are convicted, they stubbornly deny it and invoke curses upon those who think the things which they themselves cherish in their minds. Letoius, bishop of the Church of Melitene, a man burning with divine zeal, when he saw that many monasteries—or1 rather, dens of thieves—had contracted this plague, burned them and drove the wolves away from the flock. In the same way, the most celebrated Amphilochius, who was put in charge of the metropolis of the Lycaonians and governed the whole nation, when he discovered this corruption spreading there, rose up in the same manner and liberated the flocks which he was shepherding from that taint.

Flavianus also, the most celebrated bishop of Antioch, when he learned that these people were staying ^D at Edessa and instilling their poison into their neighbors, sent a crowd of monks, brought them away to Antioch, and refuted the disease from which they were suffering in this way. For he said that the accusers were slandering them and the witnesses were lying; and calling Adelphius, who was advanced in long years, to him kindly, and bidding him sit down nearby, he said: "We, O old man, who have extended our life for a longer time, know human nature more accurately, and..."

have experienced the assaults of demons, and have been taught by the very use of grace. But you, being young and not knowing any of these things exactly, cannot bear to hear more spiritual discourses. Tell me, therefore, how is it that you say the opposing spirit withdraws, and the grace of the Holy Spirit arrives?" ^B Deluded by these words, the old man vomited up all the hidden poison, saying that holy baptism brings no benefit to those who receive it, but that the indwelling demon is expelled only by constant prayer. For he said that all those born into the light, just as they inherit their nature, so also do they inherit the servitude of demons. But when these are driven away by constant prayer, the all-holy Spirit follows and arrives, signaling His own presence perceptibly and visibly; and He delivers the body from the movements of the passions and the soul from every propensity toward worse things, so that there is no longer any need for fasting to coerce the body, nor for doctrine to bridle it and lead it into proper order. And he who has attained this is not only freed from the wanton movements of the body, but also clearly foresees future events and beholds the Trinity with his eyes. Having in this way pierced the foul spring and laid open its streams by this art, the divine Flavian addressed the impious old man thus: "O you who have grown old in evil days, your own mouth convicts you, and not I; and your lips have testified against you." Thus, this disease having been brought to light, they were expelled from Syria, but they withdrew into Pamphylia, which they filled with this plague.

So far the heresies that existed up to the times of Marcian. From the age of Marcian and shortly thereafter, under the reign of Leo, these have arisen. ^C

80. Nestorians. They who uniquely and separately [taught—]

BOOK ON HERESIES

VARIÆ LECTIONES. [Note: The list of variants has been skipped as per instructions.]

NOTÆ. (58) As with Nestorius, so too the thinking of the Nestorians also, Eutychius of Alexandria explains in the Annals he wrote in Arabic. Assemani says: "Nestorius," he says, "did not truly say that the Virgin Mary was the Theotokos, but that there were two Sons, of whom one was God and begotten of the Father, and the other a man born of Mary; and that this man, who called himself Christ, was united with the Son by love, being called God not in reality, but by concession and communion of name, and also for the sake of honor, and as is read in the prophets." So indeed Nestorius is read to have thought in the fragments of his homilies, which Saint Cyril of Alexandria cites in his book, especially in the second against him: "As we call God the creator of all things, and also call Moses God, so we also call the Lord Christ, and God, and Son, and Holy [Spirit] by grace." Although he was most diligent in taking care that he might not appear to proclaim two Sons and two Gods; which indeed is evident from his various writings and those of his supporters which still survive. Eutychius ^D then reports that the later Nestorians held a different opinion, as if, having omitted that union according to love, affection, and honor, they professed that Christ is one but consists of two substances and two persons, God perfect in his person and substance, and man perfect in his person and substance, and that Mary gave birth to Christ according to his humanity, not his divinity; so that the Father begat God and not man, but Mary gave birth to man and not God. That the ancient Nestorians also spoke in this way is evident from various monuments that existed in the *Tragedy* of Irenaeus, and which Lupus Augustinianus first, and then the famous Baluze, edited according to an ancient Latin translation. But those men considered that both substances and persons were joined by no other bond, save according to

^A a good pleasure, just as they had learned, especially from Theodore of Mopsuestia.

82. The Eutychians ^B are those who have received their name from Eutyches, and who belong to his heresy. They are the ones who do not say that our Lord Jesus Christ took flesh from the holy Virgin Mary, but instead declare that he was incarnate in a more divine way. They do not understand that God the Word united to himself that man from the Virgin Mary who was subject to the sin of our first parent, Adam; by this, he despoiled the principalities and powers, and made a show of them openly, as it is written, triumphing over them in the cross, which he had put on through the transgression of the first-created man. ^C

NOTÆ ...as through a tube ^D passed [as through a conduit]: from whom our own men do not dissent. But Eutyches always protested that he believed Christ to be perfect God and perfect man, who was born from the Virgin, that is, he was perfect God and a perfect man, who was born of the Virgin. He reported this to Flavian and his synod, who had been sent to Eutyches. When he had arrived, he said openly: "I believe thus... I confess his presence according to the flesh, made from the holy Virgin, and he was made a perfect man. I confess this before the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and before your Holiness." When the Fathers insisted that he confess Christ to be consubstantial with the Mother, he said, "I have not said [so]." For because I confess that the body is God's, for that reason I did not call it the body of man, but rather a human body; but the Lord was incarnate from the Virgin herself. He was afraid, indeed, lest by saying "the body of man," he should support the error of Nestorius, who had joined a man to the Word in himself. But by saying "human body," and that the Lord was incarnate from the Virgin herself, he declared that Christ's flesh had not fallen from heaven, but was procreated from the substance of the Virgin. Nevertheless, he denied that Christ’s flesh was consubstantial as much with the Mother as with us. Finally, he expressed his mind thus: "I confess that the Lord was of two natures before the union; but after the union, I confess one nature." These things have been interpreted in various ways. Combefis, in his Preface to the homilies of Basil of Seleucia and in his unpublished Annotations to the Exposition *kata meros*, which is attributed to Gregory Thaumaturgus, hit the point of the old man's sense with a needle. He says that the Eutychians speak of one nature, not that flesh or humanity is lacking in Christ, or through mutation, or through absorption, or through destruction, but that it is that proper nature, or that which holds the first position, not just the second; that one, I say, which has another, not that which is had, and that it belongs to the superior [nature] having it. Thus Eutyches clearly understood this saying, of one nature of God the Word incarnate; which Cyril thought to be from the profession of faith of Athanasius, although he was mistaken, for it was Apollinarian. Compare all these things with Act 1 of the Council of Chalcedon, pp. 193, 228, 229, 258, 257, etc.

A BOOK ON HERESIES

^A 101 83. The Egyptians, who are also called Schematici and Monophysites, departed from the orthodox Church under the pretext of the decree that was established at Chalcedon. They are called Egyptians because the authors of this scheme were Egyptians during the time of the emperors Marcian and Valentinian. In all other respects, however, they are orthodox. ^B Being zealous for Dioscorus, they…

[c]…cavils, feigning to accept it on the contrary and deceiving [others], he places the Alexandrian prelate Peter, whom they call Mongus, and who during the very time of the union had stolen the see of the Alexandrians, among the sacred lists of the Theopolitan Church, abandoning those who had been deceived by him and, having been instructed because of Peter ([Greek: διὰ Πέτρου]; thus amending for [Greek: διὰ Πέτρου], meaning "through Peter"), that they ought to be joined to the Alexandrian Church. From the synodal letter of Sophronius to Sergius, it is gathered that Peter the Iberian, the prelate of Gaza, who had laid hands upon Timothy Aelurus, had been the author [of the position] for Severus, whom he had taken in as a monk, so that he might set out for Egypt and urge a schism from Peter Mongus. Severus, furthermore, began to prove with new arguments that there is one nature of Christ, compounded of two, without the permutation or confusion of either, just like a man [is composed] of body and soul. Indeed, thus does the Jacobite Abulfarajius expound his mind (dyn. 7, p. 148), that in order to establish this, Severus asserted one operation and will in Christ, namely the divine: yet in such a way that he did not exclude human affections free of vice, and sufferings. A pupil of Severus was the monk James, whom they named Zanzalus and Baradaeus, and who drove most of the Syrians to madness: whence the Monophysites were subsequently called Jacobites. He by no means corrupted the Armenians, but, as is read in the account concerning Armenian affairs, certain of the disciples of Julian of Halicarnassus, the chief of whom is called Echanius and Mandacunes by Euthymius, and Peter by Photius, from whom they then received the virus of error, and [also] new rites, by which one nature of Christ and the incorruptibility of His flesh might be signified. Also among the disciples of Severus was John Philoponus, who, when he read in the books of the Fathers ^D that [Greek: οὐσία] (essence and nature) is said to be that by which a thing that subsists agrees with others of its own species, and that [that which refers] to hypotheses and individuals, which are called [Greek: πρώται οὐσίαι] (primary essences) by the Philosopher, is common, he subsequently posited three partial substances or essences in the Trinity. Conon and Eugenius, Egyptians, increased this impiety with new inventions: but they were rejected by the Severians themselves. While Damianus refuted them with excessive zeal, he was heard to be a Sabellian: concerning whom Sophronius and Timothy of Constantinople are to be read. Furthermore, Philoponus, because of the one hypostasis of Christ, also inferred one nature, with manifold cavil, a specimen of which we have in the fragments which I found inserted here in many codices of Damascene. Moreover, he taught that this world is to be destroyed according to matter and form, and that other bodies free from corruption are to be created, and that the souls of men are to be joined with such bodies in the resurrection. Wherefore Theodosius, whom Photius mentions in codex 22, wrote against him concerning the resurrection. Philoponus lived under Justinian, nearly a hundred years before Mohammed, and therefore did not defect to Islam as Abulfarajius feigned for himself. Anastasius, prelate of Antioch, refuted the book of Philoponus, which was titled [Greek: Διαιτητής] (The Arbiter), as is evident from many of his fragments which survive.

^A ...Alexandrian, in the Council of Chalcedon, because he was a defender of Eutyches' tenets, they opposed the synod, and fabricated innumerable accusations against it, which we have already abundantly refuted above in this book, where we showed them to be vain and insane. The leaders of these were Theodosius the Alexandrian, from whom come the Theodosians; and Jacob the Syrian, from whom the Jacobites are named. Consorts of their doctrine, and its asserters and patrons, were Severus, the corrupter of the Antiochians, and Joannes Tritheita, who invented and elaborated vain things. These, denying the mystery of the salvation of the human race, wrote many things against the doctrine of the six hundred and thirty Fathers of the God-inspired Council of Chalcedon; and they placed many things to their own destruction, as scandals for those who are perishing. Moreover, by teaching particular substances, they confound the whole mystery of the incarnation: to summarize whose impiety we have thought it worthwhile, with brief inserted scholia, for the refutation of their impious and most detestable heresy. Furthermore, I will set before your eyes the dogmas—or rather, the ravings—of their champion, John, in which they most glory.

Concerning nature and hypostasis, what the Severians think, and how they teach particular substances: from the fourth discourse of the work of John the Grammarian, the Tritheite, who is also called Philoponus, which is entitled "The Arbiter."

^C For the common and universal definition of human nature, even if it is one in itself, nevertheless, since it exists in many subjects, it becomes many, in such a way that it consists integrally in each one and not in part; just as also the definition of a ship, which is in the ship-builder, multiplies itself spontaneously, since it exists in many subjects. In a similar way also the consideration of a teacher, although it is one by its own proper reason, when it is perceived by students, exists at the same time with them, whole in each one. Furthermore, the type of a ring, both is one, and in many impressions, existing as the whole in each one, is already many, and is called so. Therefore, many ships, many men, many impressions, and the concepts which are communicated to many students, are indeed more numerous in individuals and divided, not united; but in the common species, many men constitute one [thing], and many ships one; and likewise the concepts and also the expressions have in the identity of the image a unity: so that those things according to one respect are many and divided, but according to another are united and one. Moreover, although we often attribute number to continuous...

entities; for example, when we say the wood is two cubits long; yet we pronounce that what is one is two by virtue, not in act; since it is one in act, not two. But because by segmenting it can become two, for this reason we say it is of two measurements.

Chapter VII. From the Arbiter.

^A The seventh discourse will be one by which, from the very premises of those who hold contrary opinions, the truth may be fortified. For when they suppose that there are two natures of Christ, they concede that there is one and only one hypostasis, or person, of him; by similar reasoning also equally rejecting those who [claim there is] one nature of Christ after the union, and those who confess two hypostases in him. But before we refute that hypothesis, I consider it worth the labor first to define what the doctrine of the Churches wishes to signify by the name of nature, and what by person and hypostasis. ^B It holds, then, that nature is the common account by which those things are that participate in the same essence; for example, the nature of every human being is: a rational animal, mortal, capable of intelligence and discipline. For in this, no human being is distinguished from another. But it treats essence and nature as the same thing; yet it teaches that hypostasis, or person, is the existence of each nature singularly subsisting, and, if I may so say, a circumscription constituted by certain properties, according to which those who possess a common nature differ from one another; in one word, those whom the Peripatetics are wont to call individuals, in whom the division of common genera and species ^C terminates.

These the teachers of the Church have called hypostases, and sometimes persons. For since an animal is divided into rational and irrational, and the rational into human, angel, and demon, those things into which each of these lowest species are cut—such as the human being into Peter and Paul, the angel into Gabriel and Michael and the rest of the individual angels—they call individuals; because it is impossible that any of these should be further subdivided into others, which would preserve their nature after the division. For indeed, ^D the division of a human being into body and soul brings about the destruction of the whole animal. Hence it pleased them to call these individuals. These same things are called hypostases by ecclesiastical discipline; for in them the genera and species have their existence. For although, by way of example, animal and human being have their own account of essence, of which the former is the genus and the latter the species, nevertheless they exist in individuals—I mean in Peter and Paul—without whom they do not subsist. What, therefore, hypostasis is, and what nature is, according to the exposition of the Church, we have declared.

^A And so this common nature of man, according to which no man differs from another man, when it comes to be in each of the individuals, becomes eventually peculiar to that one, and common to none other, just as we have defined in the fourth chapter. For the animal in me, rational, mortal, is common to no other animal. Certainly, it is not impossible that when some man, or ox, or horse is suffering, the individuals of the same species be not suffering. For if Paul dies, it may be that none of the remaining men is dying; and when Peter is born and brought into the nature of things, the men who are to come after him do not yet exist. Therefore, every nature is spoken of, not in just one way, but in two. In one way, if we consider the common definition of each nature, viewed in itself, such as the nature of man or of horse, existing in no individual; in the other way, when we behold this same common nature existing in individuals, and taking on in each of them a particular existence, which is applicable to no one else besides him alone. For the animal in me, rational, mortal, is common to none of the other men; nor could the nature of the animal that is in this horse be found in any other, as we have just shown. ^B That the teaching of the Church concerning natures and hypostases holds this sense is manifest from the fact that we confess one nature of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, but we teach their three hypostases, or persons, according to which each is distinguished from the others by a certain property. For what would the one nature of the Godhead be, if not the common definition of the divine nature, viewed in itself, and separated by thought from the property of each hypostasis? But that we also understand the name of nature more specifically, when we contemplate the common definition of nature as having become proper in each of the individuals, or hypostases, and as being from then on unable to be applied to any other of those that fall under the common species, is manifest again from the fact that we confess in Christ the union of two natures, I mean of the divine and of the humanity. ^C For we do not say that the common nature of the Godhead, which is understood in the holy Trinity, has been incarnate; for thus we would also be predicating the incarnation of the Holy Spirit. But neither do we believe that the common definition of human nature has been united to the Word of God; for in this way, by the same logic, the Word of God would deservedly be said to be united to all the men who lived before the coming of the Word, and to those who are to be after him. But it is clear that here we call "nature of the Godhead" the nature of the common Godhead as it exists in the hypostasis of the Word. Whence, when we confess the one nature of God the Word to be incarnate, by adding "of God the Word," we clearly distinguish it ^D from the Father and the Holy Spirit. So that here, too, having understood the common definition of the divine nature as now proper to the divine Word, we say that the nature of God the Word has been incarnate. And again, we say that the nature of the humanity has been united to the Word, namely that most particular existence, which alone from...

among all the Word has taken up. ^A Thus, the meaning of nature and hypostasis is nearly identical, except that the name of hypostasis has included within it the properties which are innate to individuals beyond the common nature, according to which they are defined as separate from one another. Hence, you can find many among our own writers who say that a union of "natures" or "hypostases" has occurred. For if hypostasis, as we have shown, signifies the singular and individual existence of each, and they have often used these names interchangeably, it is clear that they wish by them to indicate to us nature in its most singular sense; ^B since, in speaking of the things with which we are now dealing, and in accordance with the idiom which has prevailed among those who have disputed on these same matters, a custom has taken hold among all to call the common definition of nature "man": as when they say man is a species of animal; for certainly no individual is a species subject to the genus, nor is it called such. Furthermore, we say that man differs from the horse, clearly understanding these as universal natures. And again, we say that Peter is a man, and likewise Paul and John; and that he who was born as a man and has died is a man, namely the individual, with the common definition of the nature of man holding true in the same way. ^C And this, again, it is well to distinguish, just as the name of "person" [prosopon] and "hypostasis" often have the same meaning for us, just as if one were to call the same thing a sword [ense] or a blade [gladium]. Thus, therefore, in the Holy Trinity we proclaim three persons and three hypostases indiscriminately, indicating the same thing through each by the figure of parallelism. Often, however, they distinguish person from hypostasis, calling "person" the mutual relation between certain things: the common usage is not ignorant of this meaning of person. For we say: "He has assumed my person"; or: "He stood surety in his person." ^D Likewise, we say that the prefect "bears the person" of the emperor. Hence, those who adhere to the dogmas of Nestorius, since they refuse to admit either one nature or one hypostasis in Christ—because they profess no union according to the natures themselves or the hypostases—but assume the Son of Mary to be a mere man, who has been suffused with the divine light, and thereby has surpassed all other God-bearing men, in each one of whom there was only a particular illumination: yet nevertheless they do not hesitate to affirm with the utmost confidence that there is one person of Christ, calling the relation of the Word of God to the man born of Mary one person; because he conducted the entire divine economy, or dispensation, in the person of the divinity of the Word of God, and therefore the insult brought against the man is rightly referred to God; because the veneration or insult shown by the subjects toward the prefect is referred to the emperor himself. Furthermore, this...

^A they say is indicative; whence they also claim to call Christ one, since the relation, as has been said, is one, even if there are many things that participate in it. It is clear, therefore, I think, to the pious, regarding the incarnation of the Savior—just as we speak of the person of Christ, not as seemed right to the friends of Nestorius, by the mere relation of God toward man, that we use the appellation of person—that so we say the person of Christ is, just as one says the hypostasis of a man, for instance, of Peter or Paul.

Let it also be mentioned by us beforehand, among other things, that the humanity of Christ did not subsist, even for the briefest moment, not united to the Word; but as soon as it began to come into the nature of things, at the same time it received union with the Word. But we by no means said that that nature was destitute of all subsistence; ^B since it had a mode of subsisting peculiar and beyond other men, with an existence circumscribed by its own limits, and distinguished from the common nature of all others by certain properties. For this is what we showed earlier that the name of hypostasis signifies. Consequently, just as in the divinity of Christ we confess both a nature and a hypostasis, so likewise in his humanity it is necessary to confess both the nature and this singular hypostasis; lest, as I said, we be forced to pronounce that nature to be devoid of subsistence. For it is certain that the humanity of the Savior existed among the individuals that reside under a common nature.

These things being thus clearly explained, and, as I think, admitted by all, let those who posit two natures in Christ, and one hypostasis, tell us—since both those things which are united necessarily possessed both nature and hypostasis, as has been demonstrated—whether they confess that an equal union of natures and of hypostases has taken place; or whether they think rather that it was the hypostases that were united, since from two one ^C has subsisted, but the natures less so; whence also two have remained after the union.

After other matters, in which he sets forth for what reason substance does not admit of more and less, he adds:

I believe it is known to all that there is one nature which constitutes many hypostases. Thus, therefore, confessing the nature of the divinity to be one, we pronounce that there are three hypostases thereof. But the nature of men also is one; which hypostases, that reside under it, extend into an almost infinite ^D multitude: and so in others. Two natures, which retain a duality according to number, cannot produce one hypostasis: and this it is possible to prove not only by the induction of particulars (for how would there be one hypostasis of stone and of wood, or of an ox and a horse?), but from the very operation of the Word.

^A For if each nature receives existence in the hypostases (and it is the same thing to say "in the individuals"), it is absolutely necessary that where there are two natures, there be at least two hypostases in which those natures received their existence. For a nature cannot subsist by itself if it is not contemplated in an individual. And we have recently demonstrated that an individual is the same thing as a hypostasis. Therefore, those who claim that there is not only one hypostasis but also one nature because of the union, are found to be in agreement with themselves and with the truth. But those who claim that there is one hypostasis but two natures are found to be in disagreement both with themselves and with the truth.

But since they say that the human nature of Christ had its hypostasis in the Word and did not pre-exist the Word's union, for this reason we say that Christ's hypostasis is one. Would we then say as well—if you think that "nature" and "hypostasis" signify one and the same thing, so that they are merely different names falling upon one and the same thing, just as "sword" and "blade," or one thing and another—if it is indeed the same, since there is one hypostasis, it must necessarily follow that there is one nature? Just as if there were one blade, there would necessarily be one sword; or if there were two natures, there would by the same necessity be two hypostases. But if the name "nature" means one thing and "hypostasis" another, yet they suppose the cause of Christ's hypostasis being one to be that the hypostasis, or person, of the man did not exist before the union with the Word—then the reason why there are not two natures of Christ would be that the human nature did not pre-exist the union with the Word. ^B But if the particular nature that was united pre-existed, it is absolutely necessary that its hypostasis also pre-existed. Indeed, it is not possible for one of these to be without the other—the remainder not existing—I mean, the particular nature without its own proper hypostasis. Both are in fact one in subject, even if they often coalesce in the same way among those who use these terms, as we showed a little earlier.

Therefore, if just as the hypostasis, so too the nature united to the Word did not subsist before the union with Him, then by the very fact that they concede one hypostasis of Christ, they should forthwith confess that He has one nature on account of the same reasoning. For since they do not differ in the union, they would not differ in this regard either. ^C

^D 84. Aphthartodocetae,

the followers of Julian,

but differ from them in this: that while the others seem to speak of a difference in the union of Christ, these maintain that from the very formation of the Lord’s body it was incorruptible. And while they confess that the Lord underwent passions—I mean hunger, thirst, and weariness—[they assert] that he did not undergo these things in the same way as we do. For we undergo them by natural necessity, but they say that Christ suffered them voluntarily, and that he was not subject to the laws of nature. ^A

85. Agnoetae ^B, who are also called Themistians, are those who impiously proclaim that Christ was ignorant of the day of judgment, and they ascribe fear to him. They are in fact a sect of the Theodosians; for the author of their heresy, Themistius, taught that there was one composite nature in Christ.

86. Barsanuphites ^C, who are also called Semidalitae, defend the tenets of the Gaianites and the Theodosians, but they introduce something in addition. They add fine flour [semidalis] to those things which were formerly offered by Dioscorus, and, touching it with the tip of their finger, they lightly taste the flour; and they accept this in place of a mystery, without performing any oblation at all. For, having abandoned, as has been said, the communion of Dioscorus, they add the fine flour, as it is consumed little by little; and this is reckoned by them in place of communion.

87. Hicetae ^D are those who are ascetics, and, while being orthodox in all other respects, they gather together with ascetic women to offer hymns to God...

in the manner of a dance, ^A imitating that chorus which took its course under Moses when the Egyptians were submerged in the Red Sea. 88. Gnosimachi are those who so oppose all knowledge of the Christian religion that they say it is a superfluous labor for those who seek out certain pieces of knowledge from the divine Scriptures; since, they argue, God requires nothing from a Christian other than good deeds. Therefore, they claim, it is better for a person to walk in greater simplicity and not to search out any doctrine pertaining to knowledge with excessive curiosity.

89. Heliotropitae are those who follow the so-called heliotrope plants—or plants that turn to follow the sun and its rays—and say that they possess a certain divine power which brings about such turnings in them; for this reason, they wish to render them worship, not understanding that the movement observed in them is natural. ^B

90. Thnetopsychitae introduce the idea that the human soul is similar to the soul of cattle, and say that it perishes along with the body.

91. Agonyclitae are those who at no time wish to bend the knee for prayer, but remain standing always when they pray.

92. Theocatagnostae, that is, "accusers of God," are those who are blasphemous; these are the people who dare to bring charges against certain words and deeds of our Lord God, and against the holy persons consecrated to Him, and even against the holy Scriptures; they are reckless and abusive men. ^C

93. Christolytae, or "those who dissolve Christ," are those who say that after our Lord Jesus Christ rose from the dead, He left behind His animate body on earth and ascended to heaven with His divinity alone and naked.

94. Ethnophrones are those who, while being Christian in other respects, follow the customs and habits of the Gentiles. They introduce [the concept of] genesis (astrological fatalism), fortune, and fate; they accept all astronomy and astrology; they also attend to all divination and augury; they pay heed to auspices, purifications, omens, portents, witchcraft, and similar other impious fables, and whatever else has taken root in the habits of the Gentiles. Indeed, they hold ^D certain feasts of the Gentiles in veneration, and again they observe days, months, seasons, and years.

95. Donatistae, beginning from a certain Donatus in Africa [the text continues into the next page].

them a certain bone to hold in their hands, which they were to kiss first, and then partake of the offering of the holy gifts whenever they were about to be brought forth.

96. Ethicoproscoptae are those who stumble in ethics, or the practical life, and who falsely accuse certain of its commandments that are praiseworthy, while pursuing certain others that are blameworthy as if they were good.

97. Parermeneutae are those who interpret the chapters of the divine Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testament, incorrectly, and distort them to suit their own purpose; being so disposed that they reject, out of a spirit of contention, most interpretations that are accurate and in which there is nothing one could justly censure, doing this out of a certain ignorance and lack of discernment: ^B wherefore they do not understand that by this means they are confirming some of the heretical doctrines, while they are not even aware of what they are.

98. Lampetiani are those called after a certain Lampetius, who permit those who wish to live together and dwell in common life, to adopt whatever mode of life and to wear whatever habit each one desires and approves. For he says that it is not fitting that a Christian should be forced to do anything, since it is written: "I will willingly sacrifice to thee" (Ps. LIII, 8). And, "And again, out of my own will I will confess to him" (Ps. XXVII, 7). Indeed, some assert that they permit themselves to indulge in natural affections, and do not wish to resist them, as if nature so required. ^C

[Note: Sophronius, in a letter to Sergius, makes Lampetius the ringleader of the Marcianists. Photius, likewise in Codex 82, where he reports other things which it is not necessary to recount here, adds that he wrote a book whose title was *Testament*, which Severus the presbyter, who later usurped the Antiochene see, refuted, and that Alphius, Bishop of Rhinocorura, was deposed by Timothy, Bishop of Alexandria (a Monophysite), because he had undertaken his defense. Lampetius, therefore, is older than Marcian, who became known under Justinian, and lived in the fifth century. Our author says the Lampetians hold certain views that are akin to those who are called Aerians. Correct to: Aerians, whose customs Lampetius emulated. For Aerius and Eustathius of Sebaste did not differ much from the Massalians. Indeed, according to Philastrius, the Aerians arose in Pamphylia, where the Massalians thrived. ^D Wherefore I have said that those things which the corrector of the codex of St. Hilary, through carelessness, added to the chapter on the Monothelites regarding the Eustathians, pertain to this head. For in the questions of Anastasius, 80, the Eustathians are reckoned with the Lampetians and Massalians: "Some," he says, "fast on the Sabbath and the Lord's Day according to the doctrine of the Eustathians, Marcianists, Lampetians, and Massalians." I have not yet found Eustathius to be more recent than Aerius.]

^A And there are other matters similar to the tenets of those called Arians. From these emerged a certain Eustathius, from whom the Eustathians [proceed].

These are the heresies that existed up to the time of Heraclius. ^B

From the time of Heraclius and thereafter, the following have sprouted up:

99. The Monothelites, who took their origin from Cyrus of Alexandria, and were confirmed by Sergius of Constantinople. These profess two natures in Christ, but one person; and they dogma- ^C tize one will and one operation in Him, thereby abolishing the duality of the natures and vigorously opposing the dogmas of Apollinarius.

^B 10. The Autoproscoptae. They are in all respects orthodox, but they have severed themselves from the communion of the Catholic Church for a rash and trivial reason, under the pretext of observing canons. And although they have no bishops, nor are they, in any sense, leaders of the people, but are merely common men, they stumble over the very things they reproach in others. For they live openly with women, keeping "introductitious" women among themselves; they are occupied with markets, profits, and other secular business, and lead a life entirely inconsistent with that reason, so that by their deeds they destroy what they strive to build up by their words; and thus they become transgressors according to the judgment of the Apostle. For, although they count as monks and are established among the clergy, they honor God with their voice, but despise Him with their works, while those who are simple-minded follow them in their simplicity. ^D

^A However, the genuine alumni of the Church, while they do indeed honor the sacred canons, nevertheless leave matters pertaining to them to the judgment of the bishops and those in charge; and in this way they observe them in practice, holding in high esteem those whom they greatly venerate for the sake of preserving order.]

101. But there still flourishes the seductress of the peoples, the superstition of the Ishmaelites ^B which precedes the advent of the Antichrist. It is said to take its origin from Ishmael, whom Abraham begat of Hagar: for this reason the Ishmaelites are commonly called Hagarenes. But they call them Saracens, as if they were *tes Sarras kenous*, that is, "void of Sarah," because Hagar answered the angel, "Sarah has dismissed me void." Since these people were addicted to idolatry, they used to worship the morning star and Venus, whom they call in their native tongue Chabar, which means "Great." It is manifest that they practiced idolatry up to the times of Heraclius; however, from that time until our own age, a false prophet has arisen among them. ^{C D}

^A Called Mamed, who, having chanced upon both the Old and New Testament, and having similarly held conversations with a certain Arian monk, contrived a heresy of his own. And having gained the favor of his people under the guise of piety, he proclaimed that a writing had been brought down to him from heaven by God. Wherefore, having scribbled some laughable trifles in his book, he hands down this rite of worshipping God unto them.

He posits one God as the creator of all things, who neither was begotten nor has begotten. He says, however, that Christ is the Word of God and His spirit, but created and a servant, and that he was born without seed of Mary, the sister of Moses and Aaron. For he says, the Word of God, having entered into Mary, begat Jesus, who was a prophet and a servant of God. And when the Jews wanted to crucify him through the greatest wickedness, and had arrested him, they fixed his shadow to the cross; but Christ himself was not crucified, he says, nor did he die; for God, because he was most dear to Him, had transferred him to heaven. He also narrates ^B that Christ, when he had ascended into heaven, was asked by God whether he had said that he was the Son of God; and that Jesus replied in this manner: "Be propitious to me, Lord. Thou knowest that I never said such a thing, nor do I disdain Thy service. But wicked men have falsely written against me that I said this word, and they are in great error." Then God, he says, replied to him: "I know that thou didst not speak this word." He invents many other portents ^C similar to this in such a book, and which are clearly ridiculous. He boasts that this volume was sent down to him from God. But we, if we inquire by what witness he received the book from God, or which of the prophets predicted that such a prophet would arise; as they hesitate, we reply that Moses received the law on Mount Sinai when God, with the whole people looking on, ^D made Himself manifest in a cloud, fire, and darkness, and a storm, and that all the prophets, beginning from Moses and thenceforth, predicted the coming of Christ long before, and likewise that Christ is God and the Son of God, who would come having assumed flesh, be crucified, would die and would rise again, and that he would be the judge of the living and the dead. If therefore we ask them, "Why did your prophet not come in this way, with others giving testimony to him; and why, with not even you yourselves beholding, did God not give the scriptures—as He gave the law to Moses—with the people watching and the mountain smoking, and as He provided for him—so that you might have the certainty of the deed?" they reply that God does whatever He wills.

^A We, we say, know this; but how did that scripture come down to your prophet, we ask. And they answer that while he was sleeping, the scripture came down upon him. And we reply to them with the jest: Since he received the scripture while asleep, and felt nothing of that divine inspiration, that common proverb rightly applies to him: "..."

Again, while we ask: Why, when he himself in your scripture (Sur. 4.3) forbade that you should do or receive anything without witnesses, did you not ask him to first produce witnesses who could attest that he was a prophet, and that he came from God; and finally to teach what Scripture bore witness to him? Then, for very shame, they are silent. ^B To whom we rightly add: Since you are not permitted to marry a wife without witnesses, nor to buy, nor to acquire, so that you do not even endure to have an ass or a beast of burden become yours without witnesses; and since you produce witnesses for your wives, your possessions, and all other things, how is it that you accept faith alone and a scripture without any witness? For he who handed it to you has no certainty in any respect, nor does any person exist who testified to him beforehand; rather, he received it while he lay overcome by sleep.

But they call us *Hetaerists* (that is, "Sociators"), ^C because, they say, we join a "companion" to God by saying that Christ is the Son of God and God. To whom we answer that this has been handed down by the prophets and holy Scripture. And yet you assert that you receive the prophets. If, therefore, we are wrong to confess Christ as the Son of God, the prophets themselves taught us this and handed it down to you. Furthermore, some of them say that we have added these things to the prophets, interpreting them in a different sense and through allegories; others say that we were led into error by the Hebrews, who, out of hatred for us, wrote these things in the names of the prophets so that we might be led to our destruction.

113. But again we pose this objection to them: Why do you insult us as "Sociators," you who say that Christ is the Word of God and His Spirit? For the Word and the Spirit cannot be separated from Him in whom they naturally reside. If, therefore, His Word is in God, it is clear that it is also God. But if it is outside of God, then according to your opinion it follows that God is without Word and Spirit; and thus you mutilate God while you are guarding against attributing a companion to Him. ^D For it would have been better for you to say that He has a companion than to mutilate Him and maintain that He is a stone, a piece of wood, or some thing devoid of sense. Therefore, it is no lie to say that you call us *Hetaerists*—that is, Sociators—but we, in turn, call you the mutilators of God.

Moreover, they accuse us of being idolaters because we adore the cross, which they also abhor. And we say...

^A to them: How then do you rub yourselves against a stone, which is your Chaba-tha, and kiss the stone, embracing it? And some of them say that Abraham had intercourse with Hagar upon it; others, that he tied up his camel there, when he was about to sacrifice Isaac. To them we answer: Since the Scripture says that the mountain was wooded and had trees, from which Abraham cut a bundle of wood and placed it on Isaac for the burnt offering, and that he left the donkeys with the boys, whence come so many absurdities for you? For there is no scrubby wood there at all, nor is there any path for donkeys to pass through. At this, they are indeed covered with shame; nevertheless, they still assert it to be the stone of Abraham. But we say: Let it be Abraham’s, as you foolishly claim; are you not ashamed to kiss it for no other reason than that Abraham had intercourse with a woman upon it, or tied a camel to it, while you meanwhile consider us worthy of correction because we adore the cross of Christ, by which the powers of demons and the deceits of the devil have been overthrown? But that stone which they mention is the head of Venus, whom they used to adore, ^B and whom they called Chaber, upon which even today the image of a carved head appears to those who examine it closely.

That Mamed ^C composed many nonsensical writings, as has been said, and assigned a name to each of them. One such is the writing "Concerning Women," in which he openly legislates by law to take four wives and, if possible, one thousand concubines—in addition to those four wives—and as many as his hand can hold, and that he may dismiss whichever one he wishes and take another, for any such reason as he may decree. Mamed had a companion named Zeid (Sur. 33), who had a beautiful wife with whom Mamed fell in love. As they were sitting together, Mamed said to him: "Such-and-such, God has commanded me to take your wife." And he replied: "You are an Apostle; do as God told you: take my wife." Rather, to repeat the matter from the beginning, he said to him: "God has commanded me that you should dismiss your wife." And after a few days had passed, he said: "God has commanded that I should take her for myself." Then, having taken her and committed adultery with her, he established this law: "He who wishes to dismiss his wife, let him do so; but if, after he has dismissed her, he should return to her, let another marry her. For it is not permitted to take her back unless she has been married by another. If even a brother should dismiss her, let her be married ^D by his brother, if he so desires." Furthermore, in his scripture he declares such things: "Work the land which God gave you, and cultivate it with diligence; and do this and do that"—so that I may not recount everything, for they are obscene, as he is.

Again, he edited the writing of the Camel of God, about which he narrates (Sur. 7, 11, and elsewhere) that a camel came forth from God, which drank up the whole river, and would not pass between two mountains because the

^A space was not sufficient for it. The people of that place, he says, were there, and for one day they drank the water, and the camel on the next. And as it drank the water, it nourished them, providing milk instead of water. Then those men, being wicked, he says, arose and killed the camel; and there was a small camel, its offspring, which, when the mother was killed, cried out to God, and He took it to Himself. To these we say: Whence was that camel? They say: From God. We say: Was another camel joined to it? They say: No. How, then, did it give birth? For we see your camel to be fatherless, motherless, and without genealogy; and the one that gave birth to it met a bad end. Moreover, no mate appears, and the small camel was taken up. Why, then, did your prophet, with whom, as you say, God spoke, not learn concerning the camel where it is fed, and who milks it? Or perhaps it too, meeting with misfortune, was killed like its mother, or entered the paradise before you as your forerunner, from which will flow to you the river of milk, about which you speak nonsense? For you claim that three rivers flow for you in paradise: of water, of wine, and of milk. If your camel, which preceded you, lives outside of paradise, it is clear that it has withered from hunger and thirst, ^B or others enjoy its milk; and your prophet boasts in vain that he conversed with God, since the mystery of the camel was not revealed to him. But if it is in paradise, it drinks the water again, and you will wither from the lack of water in the midst of the pleasures of paradise. And even if you desire wine from the flowing river, since water is not present (for the camel drank it all), you will burn while drinking unmixed wine, and you will stumble from drunkenness, and you will fall asleep; and being heavy-headed even after sleep, and having a hangover from the wine, you will forget the delights of paradise. Why, then, did these things not come into the mind of your prophet, so that they might not perhaps happen to you in the garden of delights? Why was he not concerned about the camel, where it now lives? nor did you ask him about it, just as you did not ask about those three rivers, which that seller of dreams described? But we openly announce to you that your prodigious camel has preceded you into the souls of donkeys, among which you too, being in no way unlike beasts of burden, are destined to live. ^C There, furthermore, is the outer darkness, and eternal punishment, the roaring fire, the wakeful worm, and the demons of Tartarus.

Again, Mamed says in the scripture of the Table (Sur. 5) that Christ asked for a table from God, and it was given to him. For God, he says, said to him: "I have given to you and to yours an incorruptible table." In addition, he authored the scripture of the Cow (Sur. 2), and other ravings worthy of laughter, which, on account of their ^D multitude, we pass over.

^A He commanded that they be circumcised along with their wives, and he enjoined that they should neither observe the Sabbath nor be baptized. He handed down that they should eat some of the foods prohibited by the Law, while abstaining from others; but as for the drinking of wine, he forbade it altogether.

[101.] The Christianocathegori (Christian-accusers) are so called because they accuse the Christians, who serve the one, living, and true God, as if they worshipped the ^B venerable images of our Lord Jesus Christ, and of our immaculate Lady the holy Theotokos, and of the holy angels, and of His saints, as gods, like the Gentiles. They are also called Iconoclasts, because, displaying an entirely contumelious spirit, they have broken the holy and venerable images in pieces and committed them to the fire, and have either scraped away or covered with lime and ink those which were painted on the walls. Finally, they are called Thymoleontes, because, taking advantage of the opportunity offered by their power, and arming their sect with fury, they cruelly torment with lashes and tortures those who venerate the images. Indeed, they received their name from the head of this heresy.

NOTES

Nicephorus of Constantinople, in his *Antirrhetics* 3, chapter 88, presents a fairly large fragment from a certain book *On Heresies*, to show that this heresy derived its origin from the enemies of the Christians. ^C The beginning of the fragment consists of almost the same words as our author’s context; it is therefore helpful to publish it in full. "That which is advantageous to you," says Nicephorus, "and has been well brought about, I shall set forth, as far as it is in my power, so that you may hear whence and how this heresy, or rather apostasy, took its beginning and its progress, so that it may be known that it is not a Jewish opinion, but this accusation—like the others in all the remaining heresies which, having been sown by the enemy in the Church of Christ, have sprung up—this bitter thorn of impiety has also sprouted. Indeed, it follows those ^D that were enumerated in the hundred and second place. It is as follows:

The heresy of the Christianocathegori, or Iconoclasts. They were called Christianocathegori because they accused the Christians who worship the one living and true God, the One worshipped in Trinity, saying that they worship the venerable images of our Lord Jesus Christ, and of our immaculate Lady, the holy Mother of God, and of the saints, as gods in the manner of the Gentiles, and as if they were idols. By despising the Church of Christ, and destroying these images, they bitterly tormented those who revered them according to the custom handed down from the beginning by Christians. This opinion is also Jewish. For they say that some of those who had previously apostatized, sprouted this heresy. As there was in the region of the Jews at that time a certain one who was of their religion, and who excelled in his nation—he was nicknamed 'Forty-cubits' (as we say *Sarantapichos*)—he was an instrument of the devil, and having received him entirely, he practiced sorcery and witchcraft as if it were a kind of craft. This man was hostile to the Christians and stood against the Church of Christ. And indeed, he sought an opportunity in which he might strike and injure piety. He finds the ease of power in the one who then held the rule of the Saracen tribe. *Iezid* was his name. He showed him his own ideas, and as was to be expected, he predicted as favorable to him some of the things he desired. And at the same time he promised that if he would yield to his suggestions, he would have longevity in his rule and would spend thirty years in it. He, being flighty and light-minded, for he embraced a dissolute life and accepted the prospect of extending his philosophy to himself for the longest time for his own pleasure, agreed to the word of the impious one. He then rushed to order that as quickly as possible, every image set up anywhere throughout his rule, and in general every likeness of any living creature, should be pulled down and destroyed. But the devilish malice of this enemy of God, who concealed his deceit as if it were hidden, was that through the destruction of every likeness, the order of our holy iconography might also be cast down. And when this impious decree was proclaimed, along with other likenesses and statues, the entire adornment of the holy images of the Church of Christ was immediately cast down. For they scraped away some, and others they obscured by painting over them. And there were even those which, together with the holy houses and vessels and vestments, were delivered to the fire, and these things were dared by profane and unholy hands. For they compelled those who were sent for this purpose to do as the Christ-hating Jews and Saracens had decreed. Yet the Christians, even though they were pressured and forced, did not consent to touch such great violence. From this source, the evil grew and spread through the Roman realm. Its ruin was received not by some of the common people, but by the leaders of the priesthood themselves; being called pastors by name, but wolves in their manner and character. One of these happened to be the then-bishop of Nacoleia. For having both thought and practiced the same things as the enemies of God, they insulted the Church of God. And it is not right to pass over what kind of end the author of this evil, this most defiled Jew, received. For that *Iezid* did not live more than two years and six months.

^A The one hundred and third heresy is the Aposchistae, who are also called Doxarii. They seek their own glory and are not subject to the justice of God, nor to His priests; and, being acquainted with the heresy of the Autoproscoptae, they seek after canonical institutions, although they are neither bishops nor even presiding over the people, but are certain herd-like men who separate themselves from the Catholic Church. Having emulated the Euchites, or Massalians, they tell the ascetics not to remain for ecclesiastical assemblies, but to be content with the prayers they offer in their monasteries. They are in confusion and mutual dissent among themselves (because... ^B ...he was engaged in witchcraft and incantations, or some such art. He was of a hostile spirit toward Christians and fuming with the bile of envy against the Church of Christ. Therefore, he watched for an opportunity to attempt the thing he had conceived in his mind and to bring ruin upon piety and religion. For this reason, when he had perceived the excessive indulgence of him who at that time ruled over the Saracens (he was called Jesidus), having gained his familiarity and feigning devotion toward him, as was fitting, he prophesied certain things that were pleasing and agreeable to him. And he promised that, if he followed his suggestions, he would have longevity of rule, such that he would complete thirty full years of reign. This man, being lifted up into hope by the levity of his mind—for he was one who indulged in a luxurious life and gladly embraced things that contributed to the prolonging of his lust—gave his assent to the impious discourses. He then began to persuade him that he should order his subjects to cast down and destroy any upright image whatsoever, and the expressed likeness of any animal. This was the diabolical plan of the enemy of God, who, in order to conceal his craftiness, sought that every effigy being overturned, every ornament of sacred paintings would be destroyed, with no one noticing. When this profane decree was promulgated, together with other likenesses and statues, the decoration of the sacred images was soon removed throughout the churches of Christ; some they scraped away, others they effaced by smearing them with lime and dust, and indeed they even consigned them to the fire together with the sacred buildings, vessels, and vestments themselves: and these things were perpetrated with impunity by profane and impure hands. For those who were sent for this purpose urged the Jews, the enemies of Christ, and the Saracens to carry out the commands: but the Christians, no matter how much they were driven, [at] ^C as they sought their own glory, they are not subject to the justice of God, nor to His priests; and, being acquainted with the heresy of the Autoproscoptae, they seek after canonical institutions, not being bishops, nor presiding over the people, but certain herd-like men, they separate themselves from the Catholic Church. Having emulated the Euchites, or Massalians, they tell the ascetics not to remain for ecclesiastical assemblies, but to be content with the prayers they offer in their own oratories. They are in confusion and... the son of this man, Oulidos, having succeeded to the name and the beginning of his father, as if to one who had deceived the one who begat him, permitted the sorcerer to be killed by a most bitter and terrible death, he having received the wages worthy of his wickedness. Immediately, the Church throughout the East was adorning its own beauty, and received the renewal of the holy icons. But once that root of bitterness had been grafted into the Roman political order, it reached even to the one ruling at that time; and it was Leo, both in name and in disposition; who, being pricked by the same goads of licentiousness and love of the flesh as the Barbarian, becoming mad against piety, strove to root out the sacred iconography of the holy temples. His son, Constantine, having succeeded to his worthiness and his impiety, fanned the flames of an implacable war against the pious. He convened a council of unholy priests and set forth his own impious dogma of godlessness. That the holy icons were to be completely made to disappear, and those who venerated them, or who spoke a word in their defense, were to be handed over to bitter tortures and scourgings, bringing against them the accusation of idolatry, because they attributed worship to these as if they were gods; and that the sacred form of the monastic life was to be completely driven out and insulted, and the monks were either to change their habit or be subjected to various punishments. So that that which is useful to you, and whereby you may be well, may happen to you, it is within your power to hear from where and in what manner this heresy, or rather apostasy and dissension, received its origin and progress; so that it may be made clear that this accusation is not of royal, but of Jewish character. For after all the other heresies which, through the supreme wickedness of the enemy, have sprouted and grown in the Church, this bitter thorn also emerged with similar impiety. Therefore, it follows, added to the catalogue of those which were reviewed before, at the number one hundred and two, and it is in this manner:

Heresy CII. Christianocategori or Iconoclasts.

They are called Christianocategori, who rendered homage to the one true God, who is worshipped in the Trinity, but were slandered as though they worshipped the holy images of our Lord Jesus Christ, and of our immaculate Lady, the holy Mother of God, and of the saints, like gods, in the manner of the Gentiles, with servile observance. And because they abominate them as idols, they brought injury upon the Church of God, by both overturning them and by torturing with dreadful punishments those who would venerate them according to the custom handed down from the beginning to Christians. This clearly savors of Judaism and hatred of God. For in such a manner some of the ancients relate that this heresy arose. A certain man, not obscure, of the Jews, addicted to the superstition of the Jews, who held the first rank among the Gentiles, whose surname was Tessaracontapechus (Al. Sarantapechus), when he was an instrument of the wicked demon, and had completely received him into himself... ^D (72) Iconoclast Aposchistae, or Doxarii, are subject to these in certain codices which the author does not indicate by another name. I would almost affirm that he signified the Paulicians; who, indeed, in the age of the Damascene, provoked the heresy of the Manichaeans, being called by this name by a certain Paul and John, who were Syrians. Concerning whom one should read Euthymius in his Panoplia, who transcribed word for word what is read at the beginning of the book of Photius against the Manichaeans, which exists in the Colbertine library, written out by hand together with three others, with the Amphilochia of the same author. As Epiphanius in the epilogue of the Panarion against heresies, so the Damascene appended a profession of faith to his treatise on heresies by way of an appendix. Lambecius edited this in Greek for the sake of the celebrated Cotelier, in the last volume of the Caesar Library. The author says there are one hundred heresies described by him in summary: thus also one hundred are recounted in the hand-written indices of the heresies, of which the Damascene has treated: so that indeed the heresies of the Autoproscoptae, of the Iconoclasts, and of the Aposchistae, were added to the others at last after the work was completed.

^A For falsehood is manifold; and having departed from the exactness of the ecclesiastical communion, one tries to appear better than another. Some of them do not admit the divine baptism, nor do they become participants in the divine communion. Others do not even salute the figure of the precious cross, recently fashioned, or any venerable image whatever: and, what is the extreme of evils, while they think themselves to excel all others, they do not even receive a priest, but after the manner of the liars, having a cauterized conscience because of a simulated appearance of virtue, they contend about nothing useful; but they treasure up for themselves wood, hay, stubble, the fuel of eternal fire. Moreover, let there be equally absent both the madness of the Iconoclasts and the folly of the Aposchistae; which indeed are diametrically opposed, yet equal in impiety. ^B

Epilogue

NOTES

These things are entirely conformable to the narrative which John the monk of Jerusalem recited in the fifth action of the seventh synod before the Fathers, and which they published separately, together with the continuators of the Byzantine History after Theophanes. But because the Catholics had contended that it was by no means an impiety to express the image of Christ's body, as also of any other man, Copronymus with his followers affirmed that the Lord's body had existed as incircumscript, and, having brought into this matter the books of Eusebius of Caesarea, Epiphanius, Theodotus of Ancyra, Macarius Magnes, and other ancients, from which he was trying to extract that. The seventh synod held these authorities, together with his profane dogma, as of no account; then afterwards, Nicephorus of Constantinople in his *Antirrhetics* examined them: whose excellent works the most learned man, the Reverend Father Anselm Banduri, a monk of the Benedictine order, and most closely joined to me, is about to make public property.

^A light, the Holy Spirit. Wisdom is the Father, wisdom is the Son, wisdom is the Holy Spirit: one God, and not three gods; one God, the Holy Trinity existing in three persons. The Father is the Father, and unbegotten: the Son is the Son, begotten and not unbegotten; for He is from the Father. The Holy Spirit is not begotten, but proceeding; for He is from the Father. Nothing is created, nothing is first or second, nothing is master or servant; but it is a Unity and a Trinity; and it was, and is, and shall be unto the ages; understood and adored by faith: by faith, I say, not by inquiry, not by investigation, not by demonstration. For the more it is investigated, the more it is ignored, and the more curiously it is sought out, the more deeply it is hidden. Let God, therefore, be adored and believed in by the faithful with uncurious reason. And indeed, believe that He is in three subsistences. But inquire not who He Himself is. Do not say within yourself: Where is God? for God is omnipresent. Do not say: In what manner is He? since He exceeds all measure. For God cannot be comprehended. Do not say, How is the Trinity? For the Trinity is not something to be searched out. But if you wish to scrutinize God more studiously, I would have you first explain to me yourself, and the things that ^B are around you. What is the mode of your soul’s existence? In what way is your mind moved? How do you generate a word? By what reason are you mortal and at the same time immortal? But if you are ignorant of these things which are within you, how do you not tremble when you seek out those things which are beyond the heavens? Imagine the Father as a fountain of life, begetting the Son like a river; and the Holy Spirit like the sea. For the fountain, the river, and the sea are one nature. Think of the Father as the root, the Son as the branch, and the Holy Spirit as the fruit. For in these three there is one substance. The Father is the sun, having the Son as the ray, and the Holy Spirit as the heat. The Holy Trinity far surpasses every image and shadow. When you hear of a birth from the Father, take care that you do not think of a bodily birth; when you hear of the Word, do not suspect a corporeal word; and when you hear the word Spirit of God, do not imagine for yourself wind or breath; but with faith alone, without curiosity, give glory. For the Creator and Artificer is understood from His created things. Moreover, believe in the dispensation of the Son of God in the flesh ^C from the Virgin in an ineffable manner, brought about without seed, so that the same person, without confusion and change, could be both God and man. By believing, celebrate His glory, the glory, I say, of Him who arranges all things for you with certain counsel, and pay Him adoration and worship that befit a servant through good works. Adore and venerate the most holy Mother of God and ever-virgin Mary, as the true Mother of God, and all His saints as His servants. If you do this, you become a righteous worshiper of the holy and unconfused Trinity, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, of the one Godhead and Deity, to whom be glory, ^D and honor, and adoration unto the ages of ages. Amen.

PROLOGUE TO THE BOOK ON THE ORTHODOX FAITH

^A Following the rules of Christian dialectic, and once the errors of ancient heresies have been reviewed, there finally comes forward the book *On the Orthodox Faith*: in which the Damascene maintained the same order that Theodoret had instituted in his *Epitome* of divine dogmas, but not the same method. For the latter, by the labor of his own ingenuity, having brought forward testimonies of the Sacred Page, compiled various types of arguments against heretics and arranged a compendious treatise of theology: but our author, not from Scripture alone, but also from the collected maxims of the holy Fathers, brought forth with the clarity and brevity that the occasion required an inexhaustible storehouse of tradition, in which nothing can be found that was not either sanctioned by the ecumenical councils or accepted by the approved teachers of the Church.

^B In the first place, he followed Gregory Nazianzen, who deserved to be called "The Theologian" on account of his most accurate scholarship in divine matters, and who allowed scarcely any head of Christian doctrine to remain untouched, without the blemish of even the slightest error or suspicion, in the works of his that survive. He had read his books with such assiduity that he appears to have mastered them all in his faithful memory. Therefore, throughout this work you will hear talk not so much of John of Damascus as of Gregory the Theologian discoursing on the mysteries of the orthodox faith. To these he added Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and above all their mutual friend Nemesius, bishop of Emesa in Syria, Cyril of Alexandria, Leo the Great, Leontius of Byzantium, Maximus the ^C Martyr; Athanasius also, Chrysostom, Epiphany, and, to pass over others, that writer who assumed the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. From the flowers of all these, gathered here and there, he composed the sweetest honey of most wholesome doctrine. For he had proposed to himself that he should by no means forge anything new of his own, but rather gather the established beliefs of the ancients, scattered in various volumes, into a single theological work. And we shall take care to note in the margin the names of the authors and the books from which he transcribed each individual sentiment, so that the reader may more easily perceive the method of this most diligent preceptor.

Let praise, therefore, redound to John of Damascus, because he was the first of the catholic doctors to digest a most comprehensive volume of opinions. For which reason, not only in the East, but also in the West and among the Latins, his authority has always been great among theologians; from which time especially, under the Supreme Pontiff Eugenius III, the book *On the Orthodox Faith* was rendered into Latin by Burgundio, a citizen of Pisa. Furthermore, the Master of the Sentences, St. Thomas, and other theologians in succession used this translation, until, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, because that old version was written in a style altogether rude and barbaric, Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples attempted to publish another, more corrected one. But since this one also was deficient in many respects, Jacques Billy d'Aubery painstakingly produced a more elegant version later that same century, though not with the care and brevity that the work, being accurate, required. For, as Combefis noted, Billy served his apprenticeship in translating the Damascene. Yet Combefis himself did not discard Billy’s work entirely; rather, he set out on a new edition of the works of John of Damascus, not to forge a new translation, but because it was better to amend that later one. For he well knew that even the most learned interpreters of long volumes stumble in many places, and that it is far easier to correct the errors of others than to perceive one’s own. Our translation will present the Billian version, purged of its blemishes and restored to a more concise manner of speech. Moreover, in order that our edition might appear more accurate than the rest, in addition to the older translations and various editions which I have employed, I have collated more than twenty hand-written codices, and I have also reviewed the Greek phrasing and diction in those places of the Greek Fathers which the Damascene patched together. Furthermore, disregarding the commentaries on individual chapters—both the shorter ones of Lefèvre and the excessively long ones of Josse Clichtove of Nieuwpoort—which contribute nothing or little to the understanding of the Greek Fathers, I have undertaken to place before everyone’s eyes a specimen of Oriental theology in more abundant annotations, drawn both from the doctors whom the Damascene transcribed and from more recent Greeks whom I was able to consult.

The division of the book *On the Orthodox Faith* into four books, which is customary among the Latins, is not displayed by any Greek codex, nor by the Greek edition of Verona. Nor does that division appear in the old manuscripts of the ancient Latin translation, unless perhaps noted in the margins of some copies by a second and later hand in ink. Whence Marcus Hopperus appears to be in error, who, in the dedicatory epistle of the Greek-Latin edition of Basel, attributes the division into four books to the Latin interpreter—to Lefèvre, if I am not mistaken, whose translation he was editing. Nevertheless, the traces of this are found in the books of St. Thomas Aquinas. Wherefore I believe that such a division was devised by the Latins and introduced in imitation of the four books of Sentences of Peter Lombard. Only the Royal codex no. 3445, and it a very recent one, seems to split the book *On the Orthodox Faith* into two parts, so that the former might discourse on theology, that is, on God one and three, creator and provider; the latter, however, on the economy, or the

^A incarnation of the Word, made man, redeemer, and rewarder. But the clear connection of chapter 43, in which the divine economy or Incarnation is discussed, with those things which immediately precede at the end of chapter 42, entitled "On Predestination," opposes this division, so that there is a continuous discourse in both chapters; which defect everyone will detect in the other fourfold partition. Furthermore, so as not to shock the reader accustomed to that distribution with excessive novelty, I have followed Hopperus, and I have marked the Greek chapters with the same numbers that are noted in the Greek codices; however, I have not hesitated to divide the Latin translation into four books.

I have found no edition of the old Latin translation: but Jodocus Clichtove published the version of Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples in Paris from the press of Henri Estienne, in the year 1512, with his commentaries. Then, in the year 1535, Henri Petri, a printer of Basel, published in Latin the works of St. John of Damascus which were extant, and along with them the four books *On the Orthodox Faith*, translated by Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples; but without any commentaries. After a few years, the same Henri added in a second edition commentaries shorter than those of Clichtove, and in that edition again, which appeared in the year 1537; in the inscription of which these things, among others, were added: "Now for the first time, annotations have been added, explaining all of the obstructed, more difficult, and more sublime things." Indeed, I know of no older [edition] in which these expositions, such as they are, might be had. Furthermore, Henricus Gravius, of the Order of Preachers, asserts that Jacques Lefèvre was the author of these in his Latin edition of the works of St. John of Damascus, which he made public at Cologne from the shop of Peter Quentel, in the year 1546. And indeed, in certain places, and especially where discourse is held on the most holy mystery of the Eucharist, the annotations are colder, and do not sufficiently express the Catholic faith. This is said not without pain, on account of a man whom I would otherwise reverence as almost my own countryman, had he not shown himself a deserter of the ancestral religion, or at least too studious of the innovators. As regards our Gravius's edition, as he was learned in Latin and Greek, he compared and revised the translation of Jacques Lefèvre with the Greek text, and illustrated it with very brief scholia, for the sake of the heretics, he says in the dedicatory epistle to Osvald, Count of Berg, especially where they wickedly destroy the doctrine of the Church asserted by the Damascene.

The book *On the Orthodox Faith* was first published in Greek alone at Verona by Donatus Veronensis, in the year 1531, and offered to Clement VII. Finally, in [1548] it appeared in Greek and Latin simultaneously, and again in the year 1575. Then in [1577] Jacques Billius published his translation in Paris without the Greek context: and it was again printed in the same place in the years [1603] and 1617.

Here it will not be superfluous to warn that a large part of the first book of *On the Orthodox Faith*, as they call it, exists in volume VI of the Works of St. Cyril of Alexandria, inscribed with the name of that same doctor, which I do not doubt was done by the negligence of some librarian, who, along with other Cyrillian works, found these Damascene ones.

DOGMATIC CHAPTERS

1. That the Divine is incomprehensible, and that one should not curiously inquire into things not handed down to us by the holy prophets, apostles, and evangelists. 2. ^B Concerning things that can be expressed in speech, or cannot, and concerning things that fall into knowledge, or that escape knowledge. 3. Proof that there is a God. 4. Concerning this, what is God? That He is incomprehensible. 5. Proof that God is one, and not many. 6. Concerning the Word of God, and the Spirit. 7. Concerning the Holy Trinity. 8. Concerning things said of God. 9. Concerning divine union and distinction. 10. Concerning things said corporally of God. 11. ^C Concerning the same things. 12. Concerning the place of God, and that only the Divine is uncircumscribed. 13. The properties of the divine nature. 14. Concerning eternity (aion). 15. Concerning creation. 16. Concerning angels. 17. Concerning the devil and demons. 18. Concerning the visible creation. 19. Concerning heaven.

20. ^A Concerning light, fire, luminaries, sun, moon, and stars. 21. Concerning air and winds. 22. Concerning waters. 23. Concerning the earth and the things that spring from it. 24. Concerning paradise. 25. Concerning man. 26. Concerning pleasures. 27. Concerning sadness. 28. Concerning fear. 29. Concerning anger. 30. Concerning the imaginative faculty. 31. Concerning the sensitive faculty. 32. Concerning the cogitative faculty. 33. Concerning the mnemonic faculty. 34. Concerning internal word and proclaimed ^B word. 35. Concerning passion and activity. 36. Concerning activity. 37. Concerning the voluntary and involuntary. 38. Concerning what is in our will, that is, concerning free will. 39. Concerning things that happen. 40. Concerning for what reason we are endowed with free will. 41. Concerning things not in our control. 42. Concerning providence. 43. Concerning foreknowledge and predestination. 44. Concerning the divine dispensation, and concerning the care for us and our salvation. 45. Concerning the manner of the conception of the Word and his divine incarnation. 46. Concerning the two natures. 47. Concerning the mode of the communication of properties. 48. ^C Concerning the number of the natures. 49. That every divine nature in one of its hypostases was united to the whole human nature, and not part to part. 50. Concerning the one hypostasis of God the Word. 51. To those who say: “Do the Lord's natures belong to continuous quantity, or to discrete?” 52. Concerning the answer to the question: “If there is no nature without subsistence.” 53. Concerning the Trisagion hymn. 54. Concerning the nature which is considered in species and in atomic individual, and concerning the difference of union and incarnation; and how the phrase “one incarnate nature of God the Word” is to be accepted. 55. That the holy Virgin is the Theotokos. 56. Concerning the properties of the two natures. 57. ^D Concerning the wills and free choices of our Lord Jesus Christ. 58. Concerning the activities which are in our Lord Jesus Christ. 59. Against those who say: “If there are two natures and activities in man, it follows that in Christ there must be three natures and as many activities.” 60. Concerning the deification of the nature of the Lord's flesh, and his will. 61. Further concerning wills and free choices, and minds, and knowledges, and wisdoms. 62. Concerning the theandric activity. 63. Concerning the natural and blameless passions. 64. Concerning ignorance and servitude. 65. Concerning progress. 66. Concerning cowardice. 67. Concerning the Lord's prayer. 68. Concerning appropriation. 69. Concerning the passion of the body and the impassibility of his divinity.

71. ^A That the divinity of the Word remained inseparable from soul and body, even in the Lord's death; and that in the interim one person persisted. 72. Concerning corruption and dissolution. 73. Concerning the descent into Hades. 74. Concerning things after the resurrection. 75. Concerning the sitting at the right hand of the Father. 76. Against those who say: If Christ is of two natures, then you either worship a created nature, by adoring a created nature, or you say one nature is to be worshipped and the other is not to be worshipped. 77. Why the Son of God, and not the Father or the Spirit, became man; and what he accomplished by having become man. 78. To those who ask whether the person of Christ is created or uncreated. 79. When he was called Christ. 80. To those who ask whether the holy Theotokos gave birth to two natures, and whether two natures hung upon the cross. 81. How the only-begotten Son of God is called firstborn. 82. Concerning faith and baptism. 83. Concerning faith. 84. Concerning the cross, where it is also concerning faith. ^B 85. Concerning worshipping toward the east. 86. Concerning the holy and immaculate mysteries of the Lord. 87. Concerning the genealogy of the Lord and the holy Theotokos. 88. Concerning the honor due to the saints and their relics. 89. Concerning icons. 90. Concerning Scripture. 91. Concerning what is said about Christ. 92. That God is not the author of evils. 93. That there are not two principles. 94. For what reason God created those who were to sin and not repent. 95. Concerning the law of God and the law of sin. 96. Against the Jews, concerning the Sabbath. 97. Concerning virginity. 98. Concerning circumcision. 99. Concerning Antichrist. 100. Concerning the resurrection. ^{C D}

EXPOSITIO ACCURATA FIDEI ORTHODOXÆ EXACT EXPOSITION OF THE ORTHODOX FAITH

LIBER PRIMUS. BOOK ONE.

CAP. I. Deum comprehendi non posse; nec ea quæ a sanctis prophetis et apostolis et evangelistis minime tradita sunt, curiosius inquirenda esse. ^A CHAPTER I. That the Divine is incomprehensible, and that we must not seek or pry into those things which have not been handed down to us by the holy prophets, apostles, and evangelists.

Deum nemo vidit unquam. Unigenitus Filius, qui est in sinu Patris, ipse enarravit. Deus ergo nec oratione ulla explicari, nec ullo modo comprehendi potest. Nemo enim Patrem novit, nisi Filius; nec Filium, nisi Pater. Quin etiam Spiritus sanctus perinde novit ea quæ Dei sunt, atque Spiritus hominis novit ea quæ in ipso sunt. At vero, post primam illam beatamque naturam nemo unquam Deum cognovit, nisi cui ipse revelaverit. Neque de hominibus tantum mihi sermo est; sed de Virtutibus ^B etiam illis mundo sublimioribus, de ipsis quoque Cherubim ac Seraphim.

"No one has ever seen God." The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known. The Divine is therefore ineffable and incomprehensible. For no one knows the Father, except the Son; nor the Son, except the Father. And the Holy Spirit also knows the things of God just as the spirit of man knows the things that are in him. But after that first and blessed Nature, no one has ever known God, except he to whom he himself has revealed it. And my discourse is not only about men, but also about those Powers that are higher than the world, about the Cherubim and Seraphim themselves.

Non nos tamen in omnigena prorsus ignorantia versari passus est Deus. Nemo quippe mortalium est, cui non hoc ab eo naturaliter insitum sit, Deum esse cognoscat. Quin ipsæ res conditæ, earumque conservatio atque gubernatio, divinæ naturæ prædicant majestatem. Ad hæc tum ante per legem et prophetas; tum postea per Unigenitum Filium suum, Dominum, Deum, et Salvatorem nostrum Iesum Christum, secundum id quod nobis esset [capibile...]

God has not, however, allowed us to remain in absolute ignorance. For there is no mortal to whom this has not been naturally implanted by him, that he might know that God is. Furthermore, created things themselves, and their preservation and governance, proclaim the majesty of the Divine Nature. In addition to this, both formerly through the law and the prophets, and afterwards through his only-begotten Son, our Lord, God, and Savior Jesus Christ, according to what was [accessible to us...]

and in proportion to our capacity, he disclosed the knowledge of himself. Therefore, we embrace, acknowledge, and venerate all things that have been handed down to us through the law and the prophets, and the apostles and evangelists, and we seek nothing beyond these. For since God is good, he is in truth the author and bestower of every good thing, and is subject neither to envy nor to any passion. For envy is far removed from the divine nature, seeing that it is devoid of all perturbation and is alone good. Therefore, as one who knows all things and provides what is beneficial for each person, he has revealed what was useful for us to know, but he has kept silent concerning that which surpassed our strength and capacity. Let us, then, be content with these things and abide by them, not moving the ancient boundaries ^A nor overstepping the divine tradition.

Chapter II

Concerning what things can be expressed in speech, and what cannot; and concerning those which fall into knowledge, and those which escape knowledge.

It is necessary, therefore, that anyone who wishes to speak or hear about God should clearly know that not all things concerning theology and the economy are unutterable, nor are they all utterable; likewise, not everything is unknown, nor is everything known. For the "knowable" is one thing, and the "utterable" is another; just as speaking is one thing, and knowing is another. Therefore, many things concerning God that are understood obscurely cannot be expressed in a manner befitting the subject; but we are compelled to use human terms when speaking of things involving the divine, just as when we use words such as sleep, wrath, and negligence, or hands, feet, and other things of this sort when speaking of God.

And regarding what we can both understand and speak of: indeed, that God is without beginning or end, that He is eternal and everlasting, uncreated, immutable, unchangeable, simple, ^B devoid of composition, incorporeal, invisible, intangible, uncircumscribed, and infinite; that He escapes all knowledge; that He is greater than any thought, incomprehensible, good, just, the creator of all creatures, omnipotent, all-encompassing, the inspector of all, provider for all, supreme authority, and finally judge: these things, I say, we both know and confess. And likewise, that there is one God—that is to say, one substance—and that He is recognized and exists in three persons, I mean the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are in every respect one, ^C except for the properties of being unbegotten, of generation, and of procession; and that the only-begotten Son and Word of God, being God, for the sake of the depths of His mercy and for our salvation, by the good pleasure of the Father and the cooperation of the Holy Spirit, was conceived without seed, and was born without corruption of the Holy Virgin and Theotokos Mary by the Holy Spirit.

^A and became perfect man from her. The same is at once perfect God and perfect man, with two natures, endowed with intellect, will, faculty of action, and power of self-determination, and, simply to speak, possessing all that belongs to each by nature, and ^B in one composite hypostasis. And that He hungered, and thirsted, and grew weary, and was crucified, and endured the experience of death and burial for three days, and ascended into the heavens, whence He came to us, and shall come again hereafter—this both the divine Scripture witnesses, and the whole choir of saints.

What the essence of God is, or how it is in all things, or how the only-begotten Son and God, having emptied Himself, became man ^C from virginal blood, being fashioned by another law than nature, or how He walked with dry feet upon the waters, we do not know, and we are unable to say. It is not possible, therefore, to say anything about God, or to conceive of Him at all, beyond what has been declared and told to us by the divine oracles of the Old and New Testaments.

CHAPTER III. Demonstration that God exists.

That God exists, for those who accept the Holy ^D Scriptures—the Old and New Testaments, I say—is not a matter of doubt, nor is it for most of the Gentiles. For as we have said, the knowledge of existence of God is naturally implanted in us. But because the wickedness of the evil one has prevailed so much against the nature of man that it has cast some into a most foolish and—worse than any evil—a pit of destruction, so that they deny that God exists (whose senselessness the interpreter of divine words, David, made manifest, saying: *The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God*), therefore the disciples of the Lord and the apostles, schooled by the All-Holy Spirit and performing divine signs by His power and grace, drew them out from the gulf of ignorance with the net of miracles and brought them to the light of the knowledge of God. Likewise also those who by the grace of these men...

became successors in dignity and office, shepherds and teachers, having received the illuminating grace of the Spirit, both by the power of miracles and by the word of grace, used to enlighten those who were in darkness and bring back those who had wandered. But we, who have received neither the gift of miracles nor the gift of teaching—for we have made ourselves unworthy through our ^A over-fondness for pleasures—come, let us discuss a few of the things that the interpreters of grace have handed down to us on this subject, having first implored the help of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

The first argument for the existence of God: from the mutability of things.

Everything that exists is either created or uncreated. If created, then it is certainly also mutable. For those things whose existence began from change are necessarily subject to change, whether they perish or whether, by acts of will, they become one thing after another. If, however, they are uncreated, it follows logically that they are altogether immutable. For of those things whose existence is opposite in nature, their mode of being and their properties are also opposite. Who, therefore, would not agree that all things that exist, as many as fall under our perception—and, indeed, even angels—are subject to change and transformation and are moved in many ways? By the intelligible realm I mean angels, souls, and demons; these are subject to change in accordance with their will, whether they advance in the good or retreat from it, whether they intensify or relax their efforts. All other things, however, are subject to change in terms of generation and corruption, growth and decline, change in quality, and local motion. ^B Being, therefore, mutable, they are necessarily also created. And being created, they were necessarily made by some creator. But the creator must be uncreated. For if he too were created, he would necessarily have been created by someone, and so on, until we arrive at something uncreated. The creator, therefore, being uncreated, is altogether immutable. And what else could this be but God?

The second argument: from their conservation and governance.

Furthermore, the very structure, conservation, and governance of created things teaches us that there is a God, who has fashioned this universe, supports and preserves it, and provides for it. For how could it have come to pass that natures warring with one another—I mean fire and water, air and earth—should have come together for the constitution of a single world, and clung together in such a tenacious bond that they cannot be dissolved in any way, unless some omnipotent power had bound them together and perpetually preserved them from dissolution?

The third argument: from the ordered situation of things.

The world was not put together by chance and spontaneously, contrary to the Epicureans. What is it that governs things in heaven and things on earth, things that traverse the air and things that dwell in the waters—nay, even the things that are prior to these, ^C heaven and earth and air and the nature of fire and water; what is it that mixed these and divided them; what is it that moved these and leads them in their ceaseless course and

under no impediment? Is it not the artisan of these, and the Word, by whom the whole is borne and governed? Who is the artisan of these? Is it not he who made them and brought them into existence? For we shall not assign such power to chance. ^A Let it be granted, if you will, that they came into existence by chance: whose task is it to arrange them? Whose is it to preserve and guard them in accordance with those primary laws by which they were first established? It is another's, surely, than chance. And what else is this if he be not God?

CHAP. IV.

That God exists, and that He is incomprehensible.

^B That God exists is clear. But what He is in His essence and nature is absolutely and entirely incomprehensible. For that He is incorporeal is manifest. How can that be a body which is infinite and boundless, and has no form, and cannot be touched, and is invisible, and simple, and uncompounded? How, moreover, can He be immutable, if He be circumscribed and subject to passion? And who could be essentially devoid of passion, if He were compounded of elements and resolved back into them? For composition is the beginning of strife; and strife, of dissension; and dissension, of dissolution; and dissolution is altogether foreign to God.

How, then, shall that be sustained which is said in Scripture, that He traverses and fills all things? ^C "Do not I fill heaven and earth? says the Lord" (Jerem. XXIII, 24). For it is impossible for a body to pass through bodies without being divided and dividing, and being intertwined and set in opposition, as happens with those liquid substances which mix and blend together.

But some say that there is an "immaterial body," like the so-called "fifth body" of the Greek philosophers—a thing which is impossible; for it must be moved, just as the heaven is. For they say that this is the fifth body. Who, therefore, is the one who moves this? For everything that is moved is moved by another. And that other, who is he? And so on, ^D to infinity, until we arrive at the unmoved, which is the divine.

For the first mover is not moved by another; and this is God. To this is added that what is moved must be circumscribed by place; and therefore God alone is devoid of motion, moving all things by His immobility. From which it is concluded that God must be considered incorporeal. ^A

*Incorporeal is not the essence of God.* — God is more aptly declared by negation than by affirmation. But not even this declares His essence, just as when we call Him unbegotten, beginningless, unchangeable, and incorruptible, and whatever else is said about God, or around God; for these do not signify what He is, but what He is not. Yet he who wishes to declare the nature of any thing must say what it is, not what it is not. But in the case of God, it is impossible to declare what He is in His essence; it is more appropriate to frame the discourse from the removal and negation of all things. For He is none of the things that exist; not because He does not exist at all, but because He is above all things that exist, and above existence itself. For if all things that exist have knowledge, that which is above knowledge is certainly also above essence; and conversely, that which is above essence is also above knowledge. ^B

*The divine is therefore infinite and incomprehensible*; and this alone of Him can be perceived and comprehended: His infinity and incomprehensibility. Whatever we say about God affirmatively does not show His nature, but the things around His nature. Even if you call Him good, or just, or wise, or whatever else you might say, you are not stating the nature of God, but things around His nature. There are, however, some things said affirmatively of God that have the force of a super-eminent negation; for example, when we speak of God as light, we do not conceive of the light itself, but that He is not darkness, but rather more excellent than light; and when we call Him light, we signify that He is not darkness. ^C

CAP. V.

That God exists, and that His essence cannot be comprehended, has been abundantly demonstrated. That He is one, and not many, is beyond controversy for those who place faith in the divine Scripture. For the Lord, with the law He gave to Israel, begins with these words: *I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt. Thou shalt have no other gods beside me.* And again He says: *Hear, O Israel: The Lord thy God, the Lord is one.* And through the prophet Isaiah: *For I, he says, am the first God, and I am hereafter; and besides me there is no God. Before me there was no other God, and after me there shall be none, and besides me there is not.* And the Lord [also] in the Holy Gospels ^D

^A thus speaks to the Father: This is eternal life, that they may know thee the only true God. But with those who do not yield to the divine Scripture, we shall reason in this way:

Syllogistic demonstration that there is one God.

God is perfect, and without defect, whether you consider goodness, or wisdom, or power; having no beginning or end, eternal, uncircumscribed, and, in a word, perfect in all things. If, therefore, we were to say there are many gods, it would be necessary for a distinction to be observed among the many. For if there were no distinction among them, one would be more correctly said to be, rather than many. But if there is a distinction among them, where, then, will that perfection be? For if there is any lack of perfection in respect to goodness, or power, or wisdom, or even by reason of time, in any one of them, then he would not be God. But the identity of all attributes proves one rather than many.

^B Furthermore, if there are many, how will uncircumscription remain safe and secure for them? For where there is one, the other will be absent.

And what more can be brought forward, but that if the world were governed by many, it would not fall apart, decay, and perish, since a struggle is commonly observed among those who govern? For indeed, distinction opens the way to fighting and contention. But if anyone says that each one presides over a part, I would ask of him who the author of this order was, and who allotted the command among them? For this one rather would be God. Therefore, God is one, perfect, uncircumscribed, the creator and maker of all, the sustainer and governor, superior to all perfection and prior to it.

Moreover, by nature also it is necessarily ordained that unity is the origin of duality ^C.

CAP. VI. Concerning the Word and the Son of God, a proof drawn from reason.

The difference and analogy between the divine Word and the human.

This one, then, and only God is not without a Word. But having a Word, he will not have it as something without substance, nor

^A as something that began to be, nor as something that will cease. For there never was a time when God was without the Word. But he always has his own Word, begotten from himself, not as our word is, insubstantial and dissipated into the air, but subsisting, living, perfect; not moving outside himself, but always existing in him. For where would he be, if he were to be outside Him? For because our nature is mortal and easily dissolved, for this reason our word also is insubstantial. But God, being eternal and perfect, will have his own Word also perfect and subsistent, and always existing, and living, and possessing all things that the Begetter possesses. For just as our word, proceeding from the mind, is neither altogether the same as the mind, nor yet entirely different; for, being from the mind, it is different from it, but in bringing the mind itself into the light, it is no longer entirely different from the mind, but being ^B one by nature, it is different in the subject; so too the Word of God ^C, by the fact that it subsists in itself, is distinguished from Him from whom it derives its subsistence. But the fact that it shows in itself those things which are contemplated in God, shows that it is the same as Him by nature. For just as that which is perfect in all things is contemplated in the Father, so also is it contemplated in the Word begotten from Him.

CAP. VII. Concerning the Holy Spirit, proof derived from reason.

The distinction of the divine Spirit from the human. — It is necessary that the Word also should have a Spirit. For indeed our own word is not devoid of spirit. But in our case, the spirit is alien to our essence. For it is a drawing of air and ^D since no impulse exists without spirit. But as the Spirit of his mouth, the impulse.

^A is, because it is drawn in and poured out for the maintenance of the body. Which, at the time of speech, becomes voice, revealing the power of the word. But in the case of the divine nature, which is simple and not composed in any way, the Spirit of God must be confessed as being, because the Word is not ^B less than our word. Nor is it some alien thing entering into God from without, as is the case with us who are composed. But just as when we hear of the Word of God, we do not imagine it to be something without substance, or something acquired by learning, or something emitted by voice and poured out into the air, but think of it as subsisting substantially, and as free-willed, and active, and ^C all-powerful; in the same way, when we have learned of the Spirit of God, the companion of the Word, and manifesting His activity, we do not conceive of an unsubstantial breath. For thus would the greatness of the divine nature be brought down to humiliation, if we were to suppose that the Spirit, who is in it, were similar to our own spirit; but as a substantial power, which is itself considered in its own proper and distinct ^D person, and proceeds from the Father, and rests in the Word, and is its manifestor, neither able to be separated from God in whom it is, nor from the Word whom it accompanies, nor pouring itself out into non-existence, but subsisting according to the likeness of the Word as a person, living, endowed with free-will, active, always willing what is good, and having power concomitant with the will for every purpose, having neither beginning nor end. For the Father never lacked the Word, nor the Word the Spirit.

On the Orthodox Faith, Book I

Thus, by reason of the unity of nature, the polytheism of the heathens and the Judaism of the Jews are ^A blasted away.

[alt-version omitted]

Notes

Thus too the Holy Spirit, as an impulse and movement, is more internal to that supernatural essence. Just as the Holy Spirit is like an impulse and an internal movement of that supernatural substance. But even according to Tully, "impulse" signifies the motion of the will, which denotes desire as well as endeavor. According to Clement of Alexandria, Book VI of the *Stromata*, both are virtues of the mind: knowledge and impulse, or desire. Wherefore Augustine did not teach amiss that the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father and the Son.

(9) "And resting in the Word," etc. The great Cyril in many places says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and is in the Son, and remains, and also that it exists as ^B if it were naturally rooted in Him. Nor did they desire anything else for themselves, unless the Holy Spirit were not to be sent to created things, but that it be joined by relationship, if I might say so, to the Father's Son, so that just as the Son is in the bosom of the Father, so the Spirit might rest in the bosom of the Son. "As His power and natural operation, and living," says the same doctor, *Dialogue to Hermias*. For neither, says the Theologian, oration 44, is it so arranged that either the Father lacks the Son, or the Son the Holy Spirit. ^C But rather it is fitting for the Holy Spirit that it should be one with the principle, that is, with the Son, whom elsewhere he calls the principle from the principle, and the principle of all things, because, of course, all things were made through Him. What follows, and makes His own manifestation clear, signifies this statement of Christ: "He will glorify me, because He will receive of mine, and will announce it to you": and likewise, "He will bear witness ^D concerning me." Thus, below, our author says that the Father is the sender of the Spirit who manifests Him. Elsewhere he declares the name "manifestation," or "illumination," as of light from light, the procession of one person from another.

^A And in this way, by the unity of nature, the error of the Gentiles who assert many gods is removed; and conversely, by admitting the Word and the Spirit, the dogma of the Jews is overturned. There remains what is useful in each sect: from the Jewish supposition, the unity of nature; from that of the Gentiles, the distinction in persons only.

If the Jew should contradict and refuse to admit the Word and the Spirit, let him be refuted and silenced by the testimony of divine Scripture. For concerning the Word, the divine David says: *For ever, O Lord, thy Word standeth in heaven* (Ps. CXVII, 89). And again: *He sent his Word, and healed them* (Ps. CVII, 20). But the word that is uttered by the mouth is not sent, nor does it remain for ever. ^B Concerning the Spirit, the same David says: *Thou shalt send forth thy Spirit, and they shall be created* (Ps. CIII, 30). And in another place: *By the word of the Lord were the heavens established, and all the power of them by the Spirit of his mouth* (Ps. XXXII, 6). Also Job: *The Spirit of the Lord that made me is the almighty breath that protects and preserves me* (Job XXXIII, 4). Furthermore, the Spirit that is sent, that makes, establishes, protects, and preserves, is not some evanescent breath, just as the mouth of God is not a bodily member; for both of these must be understood in a manner worthy of God.

CHAPTER VIII. De sancta Trinitate.

We believe, therefore, in one God, one principle, ^C lacking principle, uncreated, unbegotten, knowing no end or death, eternal, immense, uncircumscribed, defined by no boundaries, of infinite power, simple, incomposite, incorporeal, free from flux, passion, and all mutation and alteration, invisible, the fountain of all goodness and justice, an intellectual and inaccessible light, a power comprehensible by no measure, which its own will alone measures (for it can do whatever it wills), the maker of all things, both visible and invisible; the preserver of all, providing for all, containing and ruling all, holding an everlasting and immortal kingdom over all, having nothing contrary, filling all, not contained by any thing, but rather containing the universe itself ^D and holding and anticipating it, penetrating all substances without defilement, far more advanced than all things and essences, as it is supersubstantial and more sublime than all beings; superior in divinity, goodness, and fullness; appointing all principalities and orders, set above every principality and order; higher than essence, life, word, and thought; being itself light, itself goodness, itself life, itself essence, as not having existence from another, that is, of those things that are; but being itself the fountain of existence to those that are, of life to those that live, of reason to those who partake of reason, to all...

^A goods the cause; foreknowing all things before they come to be; one essence, one divinity, one power, one will, one energy, one beginning, one authority, one lordship, one kingdom, known in ^B three perfect subsistences, and worshipped with one worship, believed in and adored by every rational creature, united without confusion and divided without separation—a mystery and a wonder! Into the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in whom we also have been baptized. For thus did the Lord charge his apostles to baptize, saying: *Baptizing them* in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

Into one Father, the origin and cause of all things, ^B who has not been begotten of any, being without cause and unbegotten, existing of himself; the maker of all things, but the Father of one only by nature, of his only-begotten Son, our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ, and the producer of the all-holy Spirit. And into one Son of God, the only-begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, begotten of the Father before all ages; light of light, true God of true God; begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made. When we say "before all ages," we show his generation is without beginning. ^C

Concerning what must be believed about the Father. Concerning the Son.

In one Father (we believe) is the beginning of all things and the cause, begotten of none, who alone is without cause and generation: the creator, indeed, of all things; but the Father of the only-begotten Son of his, our Lord Jesus Christ, and the producer of the most holy Spirit according to a single nature. And in one Son of God, the only-begotten, our Lord, born of the Father before all ages; light of light, true God of true God; begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made. ^D Whom when we call "before all ages," we demonstrate his generation...

^A to be timeless and without beginning; for the Son of God was not brought into being from non-existence, [he who is] the radiance of the glory, the stamp of the Father's subsistence, the living wisdom and power, the subsistent Word, the substantial and perfect and living image of the invisible God, but he was always with the Father, and in him, eternally and without beginning begotten of him. For there was never a time when the Father was not, when the Son was not; but [there was] simultaneously Father and Son, he who was begotten of him; for a Father could not be called [Father] apart from a Son. And if he had been without a Son, he would not have been a Father; and if after this he had a Son, after this he became a Father, not being a Father before this, and he changed from not being a Father to becoming a Father—which is more grievous than every blasphemy. For it is impossible to call God destitute of natural fruitfulness. And fruitfulness consists in this, that one should beget from oneself, that is, from one's own substance, an offspring similar by nature to oneself.

The differences between divine generation and creation.

NOTE.

On the Orthodox Faith Book I.

^A Therefore, in God, who alone is free from all suffering, change, and alteration, and who always remains the same, both generation and creation are free from suffering. For since He is not susceptible to suffering, nor is His nature in flux—being simple and composite—He can undergo neither suffering nor flux, whether in generating or in creating, nor does He require anyone’s help or assistance. But generation is without beginning and eternal, as it is a work of nature and proceeds from His own substance, so that the one who generates does not undergo change, and so that God who is prior might not be a God who is posterior, and so that He might not receive an addition. But creation in God—it being a work of will—is not co-eternal with God. For it is not in the nature of things that what is produced out of nothing should have the same eternity or perpetuity as that which is without beginning and eternal. Therefore, just as the manner of action of man and God is not the same; because man produces nothing out of nothing, but rather makes what he makes from a pre-existing ^B and subject matter; and not only does he will, but he also first thinks, and shapes in his mind what is to be made, and then also works with his hands, and undergoes labor and toil, and often even fails, if the outcome does not correspond to the project; but God, by will alone, has brought all things from nothing into being. Thus, God and man do not generate in the same way either. For God, being timeless, and beginningless, and impassible, and immutable, and incorporeal, and alone, and eternal, and without end, generates timelessly, and without beginning, and immutably, and without union ^C and without suffering, and without flux. And His incomprehensible generation has neither a beginning nor an end. And it is without beginning because it is timeless; it is without flux because it is impassible and incorporeal; it is without union because it is incorporeal; and it is—that there might be one God in no need of another—without end, and unceasing, because it is beginningless, and timeless, and endless, and always remains the same; for that which is beginningless is endless, but that which has an end by grace—as do the angels—is not at all beginningless.

Impassible and incorporeal: God indeed, being in no need of another’s labor; and since He is without beginning, and time, and end, He always remains the same. For that which lacks a beginning and will never have an end is immortal; and that which is by the gift and grace of God without end does not entirely lack a beginning—a thing which can be perceived in the angels.

^A And so the eternal God begets His own Word, being perfect, without beginning and without end, so that God, whose nature and existence surpass all time, might not beget in time. But it is clear that man begets in a different manner, being subject to generation and corruption, and flux, and multiplication, and is clothed in a body; and he possesses both male and female in his nature. For the male is in need of the help of the female. But may He who is above all, and who transcends every mind and comprehension, be propitious to us.

On the Father and the Son.

The Word, therefore, and the radiance are so called because He was begotten of the Father without union, and without passion, and without time, and without flux, and inseparably. And He is called Son and the impress of the Father’s subsistence because He is perfect, and subsistent, and in all things like the Father, save for the ingenerateness. And He is called Only-begotten because He alone [(16)] was begotten only of the only Father, and in a unique way. For no other generation is likened to the generation of the Son of God. For there is no other Son of God. For even if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, yet it is not by way of generation, but by way of procession. This is another mode of existence, ^D incomprehensible and unknown, just as is the generation of the Son; for it is not in any way at all, but rather it is in a unique way—a unique mode, and not as bodies are. He is called Son the Son, because He is alone, and from the One alone, and in a unique way the only One, alone from the One alone, and... [alt-version omitted] [index: entries preserved]

not as proceeding ^A from his own generation, but from his procession. This other mode of existence is likewise incomprehensible and unknown, just as is the generation of the Son. Therefore, all that the Father has belongs to the Son, with this one exception, that He is not ingenerate: a word which denotes neither a difference in nature, nor dignity, but a mode of subsisting. Just as Adam, who is ingenerate (for he is a creature of God), and Seth, who is begotten (for he is the son of Adam), and Eve, who came forth from the side of Adam (for she was not begotten)—these do not differ from one another in nature (for they are all human beings), but only in the mode of their existence.

We must know that *agenēton* written with one *nu* signifies “uncreated,” that is, “not made.” But *agennēton* written with two *nu*s signifies “not begotten.” According to the first meaning, essence differs from essence, for another essence is uncreated—that is, *agenētos* by one *nu*—and another is generated, that is, created. But according to the second meaning, no difference of essence from essence is introduced; for the first individual of every species of living creature is ingenerate, yet it is not uncreated. For they were indeed brought forth by the Creator ^B, brought into being by His Word. Yet they were not begotten, for no other individual of the same species existed beforehand from which they could be begotten.

Concerning, therefore, the first meaning, the word *agenētos* applies to the three most divine persons of the holy Godhead; for they are co-essential and uncreated. But concerning the second, it is not so: the Father alone is *agennētos* (ingenerate); for He does not have His existence from another. And the Son alone is begotten (*gennētos*); for He is begotten of the Father’s essence, without beginning and outside of time. And the Holy Spirit alone is proceeding, from the Father’s essence, and not being begotten... ^C 136 As for the first signification, the word *agenētos* (uncreated) applies to the three most divine persons of the holy Godhead; for they are of the same substance and are uncreated. As for the second, however, it is not so: for the Father alone is ingenerate. Nor does He have it from another person that He exists. The Son alone is also begotten: for He is begotten of the Father’s substance without any beginning or time. The Holy Spirit alone proceeds from the Father’s substance.

NOTES

^A And it proceeds, not by generation, but by procession. For thus we are taught by divine Scripture, even though the mode of generation and procession can be comprehended by no power of the intellect.

It is also worth noting ^B that the names of paternity, filiation, and procession were not transferred from us to the blessed Godhead, but on the contrary, were communicated from thence to us, as the divine Apostle says: “For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father, from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named.” If, however, we say ^C that the Father is the beginning of the Son and greater, we do not signify that He is prior to the Son in time, or superior by nature, for through Him He made the ages; nor in any other respect, except that of cause—that is, that the Son was begotten of the Father, and not the Father of the Son; and that the Father is the cause of the Son naturally; just as we say that fire does not proceed from light, but rather light from fire. When, therefore, we hear that the Father is the beginning and is greater than the Son, let us understand it in respect of cause. And just as we do not say that fire is of one substance and light of another, so it is impossible to say that the Father is of one substance and the Son of another; but they are of one and the same. And just as we say that fire shines through the light proceeding from it, and we do not posit the light that proceeds from it as an instrumental tool of the fire, but rather as a natural power; so we say that the Father does all things that He does through His only-begotten Son.

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ON THE ORTHODOX FAITH BOOK I

^A and not as through a serving instrument, but by a natural and subsistent power. And just as we say that fire illuminates, and again we say that light illuminates, so everything that the Father does, the Son does likewise. But the light does not possess an existence separate from the fire; whereas the Son is a perfect hypostasis, inseparable from the paternal hypostasis, as we have shown above. It is impossible to find in created things an image that perfectly represents the mode of the Holy Trinity. For how can that which is created, composite, flowing, mutable, circumscribed, shaped, and corruptible clearly manifest the superessential divine essence, which is free from all these things? ^B It is evident that all created things are subject to most of these, and are so constituted by nature that they are liable to corruption.

We believe also in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceeds from the Father and rests in the Son; who is worshipped and glorified together with the Father and the Son, as being consubstantial and co-eternal; the Spirit of God, the right, the principal, the fountain ^C of wisdom, life, and holiness; God existing with the Father and the Son, and thus addressed; uncreated, full, creator, pantocrator, all-working, all-powerful, of infinite power, governing all creation and not governed by it; filling, and not filled; participating, and not participated in; sanctifying, and not sanctified; the Paraclete, that is, the Comforter, as one who receives the petitions of all; in all things like unto the Father and the Son; proceeding from the Father, and communicated through the Son, and received by all ^D creation, and by Himself creating, and giving existence and holiness to all things; subsisting in His own hypostasis; inseparable and unwithdrawable from the Father and the Son, and having all that the Father and the Son have, except the property of being unbegotten and begotten. For the Father is unbegotten, since He is not from anyone; for He has His existence from Himself, nor does He have anything of what He has from another; but rather He is the source and cause of the way things are for all. And the Son is begotten from the Father.

^A And the Holy Spirit also is from the Father, but not begotten: He is proceeding. And we have learned that there is a difference between generation and procession; but as to what the manner of the difference is, we are completely ignorant. And simultaneous with this is the generation of the Son from the Father and the procession of the Holy Spirit. Everything, therefore, that the Son and the Spirit have, they have from the Father, including their very existence; and if the Father is not, then neither is the Son, nor the Spirit; and if the Father does not have something, then neither does the Son, nor the Spirit. And through the Father ^B (that is, through the fact that the Father exists), the Son and the Spirit have everything they have—that is to say, through the fact that the Father possesses them—except for the unbegottenness, the generation, and the procession. For it is in these hypostatic properties alone that the three holy hypostases differ from one another; they are not divided in essence, but are indivisibly distinguished by the character of their own proper ^C hypostasis.

We say furthermore that each of the three has a perfect hypostasis, so that we may not conceive of a single composite nature of perfect things from three imperfect ones; but rather, in three perfect hypostases, we perceive one simple, super-perfect, and primarily perfect essence. For everything that is composed from imperfect things is composite. ^D

^A And composition cannot occur from perfect hypostases. Whence we do not even call the species an hypostasis, but rather that which is in the hypostases. We have called them imperfect, as they do not preserve the species of the thing that is formed from them, but remain in the object. For a stone, and wood, and iron, each by itself is perfect according to its own nature; but in relation to the house that is formed from them, each exists as imperfect; nor is each of them by itself a house.

We affirm, then, the hypostases to be perfect, ^B so that we do not think of composition in the divine nature. For composition is the mother of division. But again, we speak of the three hypostases as being in one another, so that we do not introduce a multitude and crowd of gods. By the three hypostases, we acknowledge the uncompounded and unconfused; while by the fact that they are in one another, and by the identity of their will, and activity, and power, and authority, and movement—if I may say so—the indivisible, and the ^C one God we recognize. For there is one truly God, God, and the Word, and the Spirit ^D

NOTES

(25) *And again, in one another, etc.* He first explains why there is one essence of God, although there are three persons, and explains this from Basil and the Theologian. For Nyssen, in his epistle to Ablabius, attempts to solve this, using the reason that while the disciples of Scotus contend that there is one universal, common nature, we say that it is a certain abuse of custom that we call those who are by nature one, plural, by the very name of nature, and say that there are many men. To which it is similar if one were to say, there are many human natures. After a few words he adds: The reason for the Persons, because of the properties which are considered in each individual, receives division, and is viewed in number according to composition. *The nature is one, and united with itself, and indivisibly undivided, and is exactly a unity, which neither increases by addition, nor diminishes by subtraction.* But that which is, while it is one, although it persists in a multitude, indivisible, continuous, and whole, does not divide with the individuals who are its participants. He says that there is no danger, if, by the old custom and in the use of names, we call many men, but rather if we call them many gods. He argues the same from common notions. Regarding this opinion, it seems that there appeared a student from various works of the Catholics, in which they declared the Word to be consubstantial with the Father by such examples, that just as [the Son] is of the same essence in human beings as his father, so it is in divine things; as because Peter, John, and Philip are consubstantial, because they are of the same nature, so are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: although they acknowledged that these similarities do not equate to the reality, and in comparison strove to explain them. Yet the holy teachers demonstrated the equality, at least, of the Word with the Father, even if not likewise the indivisible unity of the divine substance, which is real beyond the exertion of the mind, whereas in human nature, any nature whatever is perceived by the intellect alone and becomes one, just as the Theologian teaches (orat. 37): *With us*, he says, *there is one humanity.* But there, the community of nature has unity only in thought, being abstracted and conceived by the intellect because of the similarity of the individuals. In the same way our author explains the distinction of created nature, so that it is evident to everyone that he has remained far from the sentiment of Nyssen. Nazianzenus also seems to have criticized this formerly (orat. 1), where he says that he has built polytheism, not only for Arius, but even for certain of our own who are too orthodox. Theodore Abucaras ought to be recalled to the sense of the Theologian and the Damascene, when he teaches (opusc. 2) that human nature is one in reality. For it means nothing else but that individual men are not so many common natures, or species: as for example, Peter is not a human species, or a universal nature. Not according to the dialectic of this author are essence, nature, and form the same as a common species. From which he infers that the word "man," if taken for the species and the common essence or nature, is not spoken of Peter, Paul, and John. I do not think that the words of Nyssen can be transferred to this subtler sense: for he perhaps wrote these things when, having neglected the study of theology for a while, he was occupied rather in reading the rhetorical flourishes of the rhetoricians. Regarding this matter Nazianzenus complains in a friendly way in his letter to Gregory himself. Moreover, from another chapter in the same letter to Ablabius, he seeks the perfect unity of the divine nature just as the Theologian and other Fathers do, from the fact that, to be sure, the three persons are not separated from one another by any section or interval, but their substance is one, and the movement of their will one, which indeed is moved from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is completed in the Spirit. He repeats this regarding the viewing power, whence the name God, which, since it is one in the three persons, is therefore one God and is so called.

On the distinction of the three persons; and on the thing, and reason, and thought.

^B It is necessary to know that it is one thing to be considered in reality, and quite another to be considered by reason and thought. For in all creatures, indeed, the distinction of persons is considered as a matter of reality. For by reality itself we consider Peter to be separated from Paul; but the commonality, the conjunction, and the unity [of nature] are perceived by reason and thought alone. For we conceive in the mind that Peter and Paul are of the same nature, and that they possess one common nature: for each of them is a rational and mortal animal; and each is flesh, endowed with a rational and intelligent soul. Therefore, this common nature is observable by reason. For the hypostases are not in one another, but each exists individually and separately—that is to say, by itself—having very many things that divide it from the other. For they are separated by place, they differ in time, they are divided by opinion, and by power, and by form (that is, by shape), and by habit, and by constitution, and by dignity, and by manner of life, and, in short, by all other properties by which they are recognized as by certain signs. But above all, they differ from one another in that they do not exist within one another, but separately. Whence it is also said that there are two, or three, or many men. ^C This is to be seen in all of creation. But in the holy and supersubstantial Trinity, which is beyond all things and beyond understanding, the matter is quite the reverse. For there, the commonality and the unity are considered in reality, because the persons are co-eternal, and because their essence, faculty, will, conspiracy of opinion, and also their authority, power, and goodness are one and the same. I said not similarity, but identity, and a single movement of operation. For there is one essence, one goodness, one power, one will, one faculty, one authority; one, I say, and the same—not three similar to one another, but one and the same motion of the three persons. For each of them has no less unity with the other than [each has] with itself. ^D For the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are altogether one and the same, except for the unbegottenness of the Father, the begottenness of the Son, and the procession of the Spirit. But as for that which is distinct in them, it is perceived by thought. For we know one God, while we understand the difference only in these properties: of the Fatherhood, and of the Sonship, and of the procession; and according to the cause, and the caused, and the perfection of the hypostasis—that is, the manner of existence. For it is not possible to speak of local distance, as with us, in the case of the incomprehensible Godhead; for the hypostases are in one another, not so as to be confused...

but so as to hold together, according to the word of the Lord, "I in the Father and the Father in me," ^A nor is there any difference of will, intention, energy, power, or any other thing which might cause a real and actual division in us. Wherefore we do not speak of three gods—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—but rather we maintain one God, the Holy Trinity, having reference to one cause ^B of the Son and of the Spirit, not being compounded, nor blended according to the contraction of Sabellius. For they are united as we have said, not so as to be confused, but so as to hold together, and they have an interpenetration in one another, exempt from all blending and commingling, and not divided by essence according to the division of Arius. For the Godhead is undivided in divided things, if I may speak briefly; and it is as it were a single tempering and conjunction of light in three suns clinging to one another without any ^C interval. Whenever, therefore, we look at the Godhead, and the first cause, and the monarchy, and the one and same motion, so to speak, and will of the Godhead, and the identity of essence, power, energy, and sovereignty, that which is in us is presented as one. But when we look at those in whom the Godhead exists, or to speak more accurately, which the Godhead is, and those which exist from that first cause without any interval of time and without any distinction or separation of glory—that is, ^D the persons—there are three that are worshipped. One Father, the Father, and without beginning, that is, without cause; for he is not from anything. One Son, the Son, not without beginning, that is to say, not without cause; for he is from the Father. But if you take the beginning from time, he is also without beginning; for he is the creator of times, not under time. One Spirit, the Holy Spirit, proceeding indeed from the Father, but not filially, but processionally, nor is the Father removed from his unbegottenness, because he has begotten, nor the Son from his generation, because he was begotten from the unbegotten (for how could he be?), nor is the Spirit to be turned into the Father, or into the Son, because he proceeds; for the property is unmoved, or how could property be unmoved if it were to change? For the Father, from whom and to whom those things are referred, is as one principle; according to this, he is one God.

^A For if the Father, where the Son is concerned, were the Son, he would not be the Father, since there is only one who is strictly Father. And if the Son were the Father, he would not be strictly the Son; since there is only one who is strictly Son, and one Holy Spirit.

(As it is from someone)—that is, the Son; and he himself is not without beginning, that is, he is not without cause (for he is from the Father); yet if you take "beginning" in terms of time, he is also free from beginning (for the Creator of times is not subject to time). Finally, there is the one Spirit: the Holy Spirit, proceeding indeed from the Father, yet not in the manner of filiation, but of procession; so that neither has the Father departed from the property of being unbegotten, because he begat; nor the Son from generation, in that he was born of the Unbegotten (for how could this be?); nor, finally, has the Spirit passed into the Father or into the Son, because he has proceeded and because, being God, he is immutable, if indeed it is property. ^B For in what other way would property consist for itself, if it were to move and pass into another? For if the Son were the Father, he would certainly not be Father in the proper sense (for only one is properly Father), and if the Father were the Son, he would not be Son in the proper sense: for only one is properly Son, and one is the Holy Spirit.

Furthermore, it is worth knowing that we do not say the Father is from someone; but we call him Father of the Son. Likewise, we do not call the Son a cause, nor a Father; but rather we say that he is from the Father, and is the Son of the Father. Finally, we call the Holy Spirit both from the Father and the Spirit of the Father. And although we do not say that he is from the Son, we do call him the Spirit of the Son.

^B It is necessary to know that we do not say the Father is from someone; but we call him Father of the Son. We do not call the Son a cause, nor a Father; but we say that he is from the Father, and Son of the Father. And the Holy Spirit, we say is from the Father, and we name him the Spirit of the Father. But we do not say that the Spirit is from the Son; but we name him the Spirit of the Son.

^A For if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, says the divine Apostle, he does not belong to him. And we confess and acknowledge that He was manifested and imparted to us through the Son: For He breathed, he says, and said to his disciples, Receive the Holy Spirit. Just as from the sun there is both the ray and the radiance—for it is the source of both the ray and the radiance—but the radiance is imparted to us through the ray, and it is this that illumines us and is shared by us. And we do not say that the Spirit is from the Son, nor do we call the Spirit the Spirit of the Son.

CAP. IX.

On those things which are said about God.

[index: entries preserved]

^AFor if we were to say that the increate, and unoriginate, and incorporeal, and immortal, and eternal, and good, and creative, and such like, are substantial differences in God, He would be composed of so many things and would not be simple, but composite, which is the height of impiety to assert. Therefore, one must think that each of the things said of God does not signify what He is in His essence, but either shows what He is not, or expresses a certain relation to some of those things that are distinguished from Him, or indicates one of the things that accompany His nature or His operation.

QUI EST, Dei nomen maxime proprium.

Secundum nomen est Θεός.

^A For He saw all things even before they existed, having conceived of them from eternity; and each thing, according to His eternal will—which is predestination, image, and pattern—comes to pass in the predestined time.

The first, therefore, is indicative of His very being and of *what He is*; the second of His activity. And "unoriginate," "immortal," "unbegotten," or "uncreated," "incorporeal," and "invisible," and suchlike, do not indicate *what He is*—that is to say, they do not show that He began to exist—but rather that He does not perish, has not been created, is not a body, and cannot be seen. ^B But "good," "just," "holy," and the like, accompany the nature, but do not declare the essence itself. Furthermore, "Lord," "king," and similar terms, clearly indicate a relation to things distinguished from Him, for He is called Lord of those over whom He rules, and king of those over whom He holds royal power, and maker of those whom He creates: "Maker," "Creator," and "Author;" and Shepherd of those whom He feeds.

Chap. X. On Divine union and distinction.

All these things, therefore, are to be understood in common for the whole Godhead, and in the same way, and simply ^C and indivisibly and altogether conjunctly; but distinctly, Father and Son and Holy Spirit; and also that which is without cause and that which is by cause, and finally, the unbegotten, the begotten, and the proceeding. These are not indicative of essence, but of the relation to one another 33 and of the mode of existence.

^A Having known these things, and being led by them toward the divine essence, we do not grasp the essence itself, but the things concerning the essence; just as, even if we know that the soul is incorporeal, without quantity, and without shape, we have not yet grasped its essence; nor, if we know that a body is white or black, do we thereby know its essence. The true Word teaches that the Divinity is simple, and that it has one simple operation, which is good and works all things in all, like a ray of the sun, which warms all things and works in each according to its natural aptitude and capacity to receive, having received such an operation from God the Creator.

^B The true doctrine teaches that the Divinity is simple... ^C ...the relations of the divine persons are founded in the origin of one from another, which being denied, no distinction occurs between them. Moreover, a divine person is not constituted by a relation in such a way that it is nothing else but a subsistent relation, but it is the divine substance, as if sealed by such a respect. For, as Basil says in his epistle to his brother Gregory, a hypostasis is a nature determined by a certain mark. Furthermore, this relation is not any perfection by which one person is adorned more than another. For the Theologian says (Orat. 34), "Nothing is wanting to the Son for Him to be the Father," for sonship is not a defect, and therefore procession does not indicate a defect, but a mere relation. From all of which the truth of this adage shines forth more brightly, which they say after Anselm: "All things in the divine are the same where no opposition of relation occurs."

^D These things overcome the error of the Palamites, who separated the light and operation of God from His substance; relying especially upon this argument, which John Cyparissiota and Emmanuel Calecas report, and indeed Symeon of Thessalonica, himself a Palamite, in his work *Against Heresies*: "We are taught by sacred oracles that we become partakers of the divine nature; but it is impossible for the divine nature to be communicated to a created thing; nor, indeed, are the divine hypostases communicated to creatures. Therefore, only the operation is communicated, such as life, love, wisdom, power, etc.," whence they inferred that the action of the Divinity is more properly named than its essence. This new dogma they especially fortified with the statement of Damascus, which is found below, lib. II, cap. 15; and lib. III, cap. 15: "It is one thing to be a power of acting, another to act, another to be the one who acts, and another that which is achieved by the operation." They boasted greatly in the authority of the Dionysian, who, nevertheless, in his *De divinis nominibus* cap. 5, suppressed their error, where he teaches that not only life, power, wisdom, and other things by which the action of God is signified are communicated to created things, but even the very being of God; nor is it the case that in God one thing is "the good" and another is "being," and another is "life" or "wisdom"; nor again are there many causes or many divinities. Than this nothing can be more express against the Palamites, who, while they professed one operation, held many in their minds, as Calecas shows. Thus, although they denied that God was composed of essence and operation, it was nevertheless deduced from their own principles, who would establish this—that "the essence has, the operation is had"—whence it follows that the essence of God would be the subject of the operation. Indeed, the paralogism by which they strove was that no one would say a man is composite because he has a nature and an efficiency, or because he has a nature and grammar, or the art of tilling fields. As if, forsooth, composition were not made from substance and accidents. But Damascenus not only forbade that a quality be attributed to God, but did not even admit composition from genus and difference. For he knew God to be a most simple and absolute unity, in which those things which are perceived as dispersed in inferior things are one, as Dionysius explains. Wherefore, Nicephorus of Constantinople, almost contemporary with our John, in his *Antirrheticus I* (not yet published against the Iconomachs), teaches that it is to be held with sincere religion that the eternal action of God, nay rather its consequent action, is in no way separated from His substance; and that it is of the same reason on account of the property of that simple and incorporeal nature. Wherefore Calecas, pondering that place of Damascenus where he says, "another..."

and it is another which is operated, and another that which is produced by the operation, observing that what is produced by a divine operation, and also the relation by which it is referred to God, are to be reckoned among created things, because they exist outside of God: but that the virtue itself by which God acts and His action are absolutely the same, and not separated from His essence, although they are distinguished in us. Let no one object against Damascenus in his sermon on the Transfiguration, that the light by which the Lord's body shone is called uncreated light. For that light does not signify anything besides the Word Himself, who is the true light illuminating every man, by whose presence the body of Christ was adorned with an immense light. Thus divine charisms, of which the Holy Spirit is the author, are called the Holy Spirit. The Palamite error, whose author was once that Simeon whom they called the Younger Theologian, was first proscribed in many synods; but afterwards it was approved, especially in the synod which they call the eighth general [synod], by reason of the four patriarchs who were present. In the Council of Florence the Latins wanted to dispute with the Greeks about essence and operation, but they [the Greeks] refused to do so.

^A Discretely, however, are all those things which pertain to the divine and most benevolent Incarnation of the Word of God ^B. For in these there were no parts of the Father and of the Holy Spirit at all, except as relates to their good pleasure, and to the ineffable miracle, which God the Word, having become man like unto us, was working, as the unchangeable God and Son of God.

CAP. XI.

Of those things which are said in a corporeal manner concerning God.

Since we find very many things in the divine Scripture spoken concerning God in a symbolic manner, under a figure akin to bodies, we must know that it is impossible for us who are men, and clothed with gross flesh, to understand or speak of those divine and exalted and immaterial energies of the Godhead, unless we use symbols and types and images conformable to our own nature. Wherefore, all those things which are spoken of God in a somewhat corporeal way, are said symbolically, and contain a higher meaning, ^C because God is simple and devoid of all figure. Therefore, by the eyes and the eyelids and the vision of God, let us understand His power that sees all things and His undeniable knowledge, which nothing can escape: so that, through the ministry of the senses, a more perfect and certain knowledge may come to us. By the ears and hearing, His propensity for forgiveness and His kindness in receiving our prayers; for we are accustomed, through this sense, to show ourselves disposed and easy to those who are suppliants to us, kindly inclining our ear to them. By the mouth and speech, the declaration of His will; just as we also bring forth the hidden thoughts of the heart through mouth and speech. By the eating and drinking, our agreement with His will; for we also, through the sense of taste, satisfy the necessary appetite of nature. By the sense of smell, that power which is indicative of the reception of thought and ^D intention; just as, from what we do through this sense, the reception of fragrance comes about. By the face, the manifestation of Himself through His works, just as the manifestation of ourselves comes about through the face. By the hands, the effective...

^B action by which He accomplishes His works. For we too accomplish all our most useful and excellent works with our hands. By the right hand, His help and aid in favorable circumstances, since we ourselves, in more important matters which require the greatest strength, make use of the right hand. By touch, His most accurate and searching investigation and examination of the most minute and hidden things; for this reason, clearly, that those things which we touch can hide nothing within themselves. By feet and walking, His coming and presence, either to bring aid to those in need, or to punish enemies, or to do some other thing, inasmuch as this is what feet provide for us, that we may arrive at some place. By an oath, the immutability of His counsel: because among us, mutual agreements are confirmed by the interposition of an oath. By anger and fury, His hostile will and hatred toward wickedness. For we too grow angry when we hate things that conflict with our will and purpose. By forgetfulness, sleep, and drowsiness, the delay of punishment upon enemies and the postponement of the customary help to those whom He holds dear and necessary. Finally, to speak in one word, in all these things which are enunciated of God in a bodily manner, there is an abstruse sense, by which, through those things that are appropriate to us, we are taught those things which are above us: unless perhaps something is said concerning the bodily advent of God. For He Himself took on the whole man for the sake of our salvation; that is, an intelligent soul and a body, and the properties of human nature, as well as the natural and blameless passions.

CAP. XII. On the same matters.

Dei nomina ex creatis. ^C Truly, we are taught these things by the sacred oracles, as the divine Dionysius the Areopagite says: that God is the cause and origin of all things; the essence of those things that exist; the life of those that live; the reason of those that exist rationally; the intellect of those that exist intellectually; the recall and resurrection of those that fall away from Him; the renewal and transformation of those who corrupt and vitiate what is according to nature; the sacred stability of those who are tossed by certain profane billows; the secure protection for those who stand; the way and guiding hand for those who are rising toward Him, by which they are carried on high. I would add also, Father of those who have been made by Him. For, if we speak properly, God is more truly our Father, having produced us from nothing, than those who have begotten us; ^D as He is the One who has granted both that we exist and that we beget, the shepherd of those who are following and are shepherded by Him, the illumination of those who are enlightened, the perfection of those who are being perfected.

^A It is, moreover, the shepherd of those who follow and are shepherded by Him; the illumination of those who are enlightened; the guide of the initiation for those who are imbued with the sacred mysteries; the dispenser of divinity for those who are made divine; the peace of those who are at variance; the simplicity of those who strive for simplicity; the unity of those who honor unity; the principle of every principle, and higher than every principle; and, in a word, a benign communication of its own hidden nature—that is, of its own knowledge—insofar as it is lawful and possible for each one according to his capacity.

This chapter which immediately follows is an addition, and is not found in the older codices, but rather in a few very recent ones. In the Regius 3109, it is kept after chapter 9 of Book IV, and in another Regius, n. 3451, after chapter 2 of Book II. Lambecius notes that it was appended in the Caesarean codex n. 200 at the end of the *Book of Orthodox Faith*. Yet Joannes Beccus, a former patriarch of Constantinople, and his associates, maintained in a solemn assembly of bishops (the acts of which Georgius Pachymeres reports in his *Andronicus*, Book VII) that it should be attributed to John of Damascus. Indeed, Georgius Scholarius, in both works which he published regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit against the Latins, acknowledges it as the undoubted offspring of our author.

On the divine names, more accurately.

^B The divine essence is in itself unknown to us, and unnameable. For God is incomprehensible, and therefore altogether unnameable. Since, then, we are ignorant of His essence, let us not seek a name for His essence. For names are indicators of things. But God, who is good, brought us out of nothing into being, so that we might be partakers of His goodness, and He endowed us with the faculty of knowledge, even as He did not impart to us His essence, so He did not impart to us the knowledge of His essence. For it is impossible that a nature should fully know a nature superior to itself. But if the knowledges of existing things are what they are, how shall that which is above essence be known? By His ineffable goodness, therefore, He willed to be named from things familiar to us, so that we might not be entirely destitute of the knowledge of Him, but might have at least a dim notion of Him. Insofar, then, as He transcends all comprehension of the soul, no name can be assigned to Him. Insofar, however, as He is the author of all things and contains in Himself the causes and reasons ^C of all things, He is named from all things, even from things that are opposites—as from light, darkness; from fire, water; so that we may understand that these are not His essence, but rather that He is above essence, and that He cannot even be called by any name, but is named from all effects as the cause of all things.

Of the divine names, some are spoken negatively, declaring that He is above essence; such as unessential, timeless, beginningless, invisible—not that He is inferior to anything, or lacks anything; for all things are His, and from Him, and through Him, and in Him they consist; but because He is above all existing things, He is removed from all. He is nothing among existing things, but is above all things. But the words that are said affirmatively, are predicated as of the cause of all things. ^D Dei nomina negantia, affirmantia. The names that are more fittingly said of God. Evil, nothing; good, existence, and things. Mixed names of God. An affirmation having the force of a pre-eminent negation. Therefore, of the divine names, some are spoken by way of negation, by which it is declared that He surpasses every essence; just as when He is called void of essence, timeless, without beginning, invisible: not because He is in any way...

inferior, or because anything is lacking in Him (for all things are His, and from Him, and through Him, and in Him they consist 19), but because He is in an eminent way superior to all things. For He is not any of the things that exist, but is above all things.

There are, however, other things which are expressed by way of affirmation; these are, naturally, those which are said of Him as the Cause of all things. For just as He is the Author of all things and of every essence, He is called both Being and Essence: and as the Cause of all reason and wisdom, of everything rational and wise, He is called Reason and Rational, Wisdom and Wise. In the same way, He is called Mind and Intelligent, Life and Living, Power and Powerful; and likewise in all other things. Furthermore, He will be more fittingly designated from the more excellent things that approach more closely to Him. For those things that are more excellent, and closer to Him, are those that lack matter compared to those that are material; those that are pure compared to those that are impure; and those that are holy compared to those that are profane; as being things that possess something of Him more abundantly. Thus, He will be called sun and light by a far more familiar reasoning than darkness; and day, than night; life, than death; and likewise fire, spirit, and water, as being life-giving, than earth; and above all these, goodness than malice: which is the same as if I were to say, things rather than nothing at all. For goodness is existence and the cause of existence; but evil is a privation of the good, or of existence. And these are the affirmative and negative terms. From both, moreover, a most agreeable connection is formed, as for example: superessential Essence, superdivine Deity, Principle superior to every principle, and other similar terms. There are also certain things which, although they are said of God in an affirmative manner, yet have the force of an eminent negation. Of this kind is the instance when we call God darkness; not that God is darkness, but that He is not light, but exists as more sublime than every light.

Common Names; Proper to Each Person

God, therefore, is called Mind, and Reason, and Spirit, and Wisdom, and Power, as the Author of these, as devoid of matter, and as the Artificer of all things and omnipotent 20. And these are said both commonly regarding the entire Deity (both those which are expressed through affirmation and those through negation), and individually regarding each person of the holy Trinity, equally, in the same way, and without any defect. For when I consider one of the three persons, I recognize that Person as perfect God and perfect substance. For the Deity is not a certain composite; but in three perfects there is a perfect, indivisible, and incomposite One. When, finally, I turn my mind to the mutual relationship of the persons, I find this to be certain: that the Father is the superessential sun, the fountain of goodness, the abyss of substance, of reason, of wisdom, of power, of light, and of divinity; the generative and productive source of the good hidden within Him. He is indeed Mind, the abyss of reason, the Begetter of the Word, and through the Word the Producer 35 of the manifestative Spirit; and in order that there may not be many...

causes, but one, and in order that the Word and Spirit may be referred to one cause, he is the sole Fons-Principium of the Godhead. For He is the Father, the sole Begetter, the sole Cause. The Son is the Word, the Sophia, the Power, the Image, the Radiance, the Character of the Father, and from the Father. But the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father, not as a Son, but as proceeding from the Father.

CHAPTER XIII

Concerning the place of God, and that the Divine alone is uncircumscribed.

Corporeal place is the limit of that which contains, by which that which is contained is contained; as, for example, the air contains, but the body is contained. Yet not the whole of the contained ^B is contained, nor is the whole of the container...

in what is contained.

Spiritual Place. God is not in a place. God's place is metaphorical.

There is also a spiritual place, where the intellectual and incorporeal nature is understood and exists; where, indeed, it is present and acts, and is not contained corporeally, but spiritually. For it does not have a shape, so as to be contained in a bodily manner. ^A God, therefore, being immaterial and uncircumscribed, is not in a place. For He is His own place, filling all things, and being above all things, and Himself holding all things together. Yet He is also said to be in a place, and a place of God is spoken of, wherever His operation becomes manifest. For He Himself passes through all things without mixture, and imparts to all things His own operation, according to the aptitude and receptive power of each; I mean the natural and voluntary purity. For things are purer than material things, and virtuous ones than those conjoined with malice. Therefore, that is called a place of God which partakes more of His operation and grace. For this reason, heaven is His throne (for there are the angels who do His will, and always praise Him; this, indeed, is His rest), and the earth is the footstool of His feet; ^B for on it He conversed with men through the flesh. Moreover, the holy foot of God is called His flesh. The Church, too, is called a place of God; for we have set it apart as a kind of temple for the singing of His praises, in which we also offer up our prayers ^C to Him. Likewise, the places in which His operation is made manifest to us, whether through the flesh or without a body, are called places of God.

It must be known that the Divine is impartible, being whole and entirely everywhere, and not divided by part in part in a bodily way, but whole in all things, and whole above all.

On the place of an angel and the soul, and on the uncircumscribed.

The angel, ^D although it is not contained in a place in the manner of a body, so as to be shaped by it, yet is said to be in a place because it is present in a spiritual way and acts according to its own nature and power.

On the Orthodox Faith Book I.

and to receive form; yet it is said to be in a place ^A because it is present and acts in a spiritual manner, as is appropriate to its nature; it is not elsewhere, but is circumscribed in an intelligible way there where it also operates. For it cannot operate in different places at the same time. For it is the prerogative of God alone to operate everywhere at the same time. For an angel, because of the swiftness of his nature, and because he crosses over readily and quickly, operates in different places; but God, as One who is everywhere and above all things, acts everywhere at the same moment of time, with one and simple operation in diverse ways.

Moreover, the soul is bound to the body, the whole to the whole, and not part to part; and it is not contained by it, but contains it, even as fire contains iron; and existing within it, it performs its own functions.

That which is circumscribed is that which is defined by place, or time, or comprehension; but that which is uncircumscribed is that which is contained by none of these. The Divine, therefore, is uncircumscribed, being without beginning and without end, and containing all things, and being contained by no comprehension. For it alone is incomprehensible and undefined, known by no one, but only knowing Itself as it is in its contemplative nature. But the angel is also circumscribed by time (for he began to be) and by place (even if, as we said before, in a spiritual manner) and by comprehension. For they also have the nature of others explored in a certain way, and they are completely defined by the Creator. Bodies, finally, are circumscribed by beginning and end, and by bodily place, and by comprehension. ^B

Collectanea regarding God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; and regarding the Word and the Spirit.

God, therefore, is completely immutable and unchangeable. For all things, which are not in our own will and power, He predetermined by his foreknowledge, each to be in its own proper and fitting time and place. And according to this: “The Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son” (John v, 22). For the Father has judged, and the Son, as God, and the Holy Spirit; but the Son Himself, as man, will descend corporeally and will sit upon the throne of glory (for the descent and the sitting are those of a circumscribed body) and He will judge the whole world in righteousness.

All things are distant from God, not in place, but in nature. In us, prudence, wisdom, and counsel, as habits, approach and depart; not so in God: for in Him nothing happens or ceases to be; since He is devoid of mutation and alteration, and to admit any accident in Him would be impious. For the good, which is concurrent with the substance of God, ...

^A accompanies it. He who always desires God, sees Him; for God is in all things. For all things that exist are dependent upon Him who is; and it is impossible for anything to exist that does not have its being in the One who is. God is indeed intermingled with all things, as the one who maintains their nature; but God the Word, personally united to His own holy flesh, was intermingled with our nature without confusion.

No one sees the Father, save the Son and the Spirit. The Son is the counsel, and wisdom, and power of the Father. For it is not right to speak of a quality in God, lest we declare Him to be composed of substance and quality. The Son is from the Father, and all that He has, He has from Him; wherefore He can do nothing of Himself. For He does not have an operation distinct from the Father. That God, who is by nature invisible, becomes visible through His operations, we know from the structure and governance of the world. The Son is the image ^B of the Father, and the Spirit is the image of the Son, through whom Christ dwelling in man grants to him to be according to the image.

God the Holy Spirit is the medium between the unbegotten and the begotten, and is joined to the Father through the Son. He is called the Spirit of God, the Spirit of Christ, the mind of Christ, the Spirit of the Lord, Lord Himself, the Spirit of adoption, of truth, of liberty, of wisdom (for He is the producer of all these things); filling all things by His essence, sustaining all things, filling the world in His essence, but uncontainable by the world in His power.

God is an eternal, incommutable substance, the creator of existing things, to be worshipped with a pious mind. God and Father is He who is always unbegotten, as one who is not begotten of anyone, yet has begotten the Son, co-eternal. The Son is also God, who is always with the Father, without time, and eternally, and without flux, and without passion, and indissolubly begotten of Him. God also is the Holy Spirit, ^C a sanctifying power, subsisting in Himself, appearing from the Son—appearing, that is, to men—the One who proceeds.

^A And He is consubstantial with the Father and the Son. The Word is that which is substantially and always present with the Father. Again, "word" is the natural movement of the mind, by which it moves, and understands, and reasons; existing as its light and radiance. "Word," moreover, is that which is internal—that which is spoken within the heart. And again, "word" is the messenger of an intelligence, that which is uttered by the mouth. Accordingly, the Word of God is substantial and subsistent; but the other three "words" are faculties of the soul, not considered as having their own subsistence; of these, the first is a natural offspring, always flowing naturally from the mind itself as from a source; the second is called internal; the third, the uttered word.

"Spirit" is understood in many ways. The Holy Spirit is Spirit. But the powers of the Holy Spirit are also called spirits. A spirit also is the good angel, and the demon; the spirit is also the soul. Moreover, the Holy Spirit is called Spirit. And air, too, is spirit; and impure action, and teaching, is spirit; and anger is spirit.

^B Now as to God. Having the Word internal in His own bowels, and having begotten Him with His own wisdom, He brought Him forth; He, having searched out His own internal mind and reason, begotten this Word not as through an instrument, nor as through a non-subsistent knowledge, but as a living energy and a subsistent one. The internal, the uttered… [The text here remains fragmentary, reflecting the transition in the source].

VARIOUS READINGS

NOTES

Spirit, moreover, is the good angel; spirit is the demon; spirit is the soul; and sometimes the mind also is called spirit. Finally, wind and air are termed spirits.

CHAPTER XIV. PROPRIETIES OR ATTRIBUTES OF THE DIVINE NATURE.

The Uncreated, the Unoriginate, the Immortal, and the Infinite; the Eternal; the Immaterial; the Good; the Creative; the Just; the Illuminating; the Immutable; the Impassible; the Uncircumscribed; the Incomprehensible; the Indefinite; the Incorporeal; the Illimitable; the Invisible; the Inconceivable; the Unindigent; the Self-governing and Self-authorized; the All-ruling; the Life-bestowing; the Omnipotent; the Infinite in power; the Sanctifying and Communicative; the containing ^B and holding together of all things, and the Provider for all. All these and such-like properties it possesses by nature, not having received them from elsewhere, but itself imparting every good to its own creatures, according to the receptive capacity of each.

The indwelling and inter-subsistence of the Persons in one another (for these cannot be sundered, and they maintain their circuminsession in one another, free from confusion; not that they might be contracted and mixed together, but that they might cling together as one; for the Son is in the Father and the Spirit; and the Spirit is in the Father and the Son; and the Father is in the Son and the Spirit, with no coalescing, nor mingling, or confusion occurring). And there is one and the same movement; for there is one impulse and one motion of the three Persons—which is impossible to be seen in created nature.

^C To this is added that the divine illumination and operation—which is one, simple, and indivisible, although for the sake of goodness it becomes varied and universal in the divided subjects, distributing to all the things that constitute and contain their proper nature—nevertheless remains simple, and is so multiplied in divided things that, in the meantime, it gathers and turns those things into which division falls back to its own simplicity. For all things desire it, and exist in it; and it itself grants to all things being, according to the nature of each. This is the being of those things that are, the life of the living, the reason of the rational, the intelligence of the thinking; even while it itself exists above mind, and above reason, and above life, and above essence.

^D The omnipresence of God. Add that He pervades all things without any mixture; while, on the contrary, nothing can penetrate Him: and also that He knows all things by a simple cognition, and, by His divine and all-seeing and immaterial eye, most simply beholds things present, things past, and things future before they come to be; and moreover—

[...not] that he wishes for everything he can do. For he can make it so that no sin falls into it and he can remit sins and bring salvation; and finally, that he can do whatever he wishes: however, he does not wish for everything that he can do. For he can destroy the world, and he does not wish to. ^A

BOOK TWO

Chapter I. De saeculo seu aevo.

He who is before the ages made the ages, of whom the divine David speaks: ^B "From age to age you are" (Ps. LXXXIX, 2). Concerning whom, likewise, the divine Apostle says: "through whom he made the ages" (Hebr. 1, 3). ^C

One ought, therefore, to know that the name of "age" (aion/sæculum) is polysemous; for it signifies many things. For the life of each individual man is called an age. A cycle of a thousand years is also called an age (43). Again, an age is considered as the entire present life; and there is also the age to come, which is the endless life after the resurrection. Age is also called not time, nor any part of time measured by the motion of the sun, that is, consisting of days and nights, but that which is co-extended with things that are eternal, such as a certain temporal motion and interval. ^D For what time is to those things that are under time, this the age is to eternal things.

There are said to be seven ages (44) of this world, from the creation of heaven and earth, until the common consummation of men and...

[index: entries preserved]

^A resurrection. For there is a partial consummation, the death of each; but there is also a common and complete consummation, when the common resurrection of men is to occur. The eighth age is the one to come.

Before the constitution of the world, when not even the sun existed to distinguish day from night, there was no measurable age, but rather something extended alongside eternal things—a kind of temporal motion and interval. And in this respect, there is one age, according to which God is also called eternal, and indeed pre-eternal; for he himself made the age. God alone, lacking a beginning, is the creator of all things—both of the ages and of all beings. By saying "God," I clearly mean the Father, and his only-begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, and his all-holy Spirit—one God of ours. ^B

Ages of ages are also spoken of, inasmuch as the seven ages of the present world contain many ages—that is, the lives of men. And the one age is inclusive of all the ages, and "age of age" is said of the present one and the one to come. "Eternal life" and "eternal punishment" signify the unending nature of the age to come. For after the resurrection, time will not be reckoned by days and nights. Rather, it will be one day without evening, with the sun of righteousness shining brightly and joyfully upon the righteous, but to the sinners, a deep and unending night. How then shall the Origenist "restoration" period of a thousand years be reckoned? God, therefore, is the sole creator of all the ages, he who also created all things, who exists before the ages.

Chapter II: On the Creation of Things

Since, therefore, the good and supra-good God was not content with the contemplation of himself, but through an excess of goodness was pleased that there should be some things to receive benefits and participate in his goodness, from that which did not exist ^C he brings forth and creates all things, both visible and invisible.

^D [index: entries preserved]

and he creates also the man who is composed of both visible and invisible nature. He creates by thinking, and this thought becomes a work, fulfilled by the Word and perfected by the Spirit. ^A

CHAPTER III [III] Concerning Angels.

The Creator and Maker of the angels is he who is, and who leads them from non-existence into existence; for he created them after his own image, a nature incorporeal, a sort of spirit or immaterial fire, as the divine David says: *Who makes his angels spirits, and his ministers a flaming fire* (Ps. CXVII, 20), describing their lightness, their ardor, their fervor, their penetrability, and the sharpness with which they desire God and serve him, pointing out that they are borne toward higher things and are exempt from all material thought. ^B

An angel, therefore, is an intelligent substance, in perpetual motion, possessed of free will, incorporeal, serving God, having received immortality in its nature by the grace of the Creator; the form and definition of this substance, the Creator alone knows.

NOTES

(46) *An angel, therefore*, etc. Others among the ancients, after Josephus the Jew, have thus attributed bodies to the angels, thinking that some of them were turned into demons, because before the flood they had committed impurity with the daughters of men. This error is excellently refuted by Chrysostom and Theodoret in their commentaries on Genesis 6. Joannes Thessalonicensis, in the fifth act of the seventh synod, by the authority of Basil, Athanasius, and Methodius, declared that angels do not consist of bodies, and thus that they cannot be depicted. Where Athanasius thought that the author of those questions sent to Antioch was Basil. But neither does Basil, in the place cited, speak affirmatively, but doubtfully: "Their substance," he says, "is perhaps an airy spirit, or, if not, an immaterial fire." ^C But it may be added that Macarius the Egyptian in his homilies indeed says that an angel, if compared with us, is absolutely incorporeal, but if compared with God, is dense and concrete with matter: but afterwards he teaches that they are pure minds, and in places that are perceived by intellect alone, not circumscribed as bodies are, for they are not circumscribed by the nature of bodies. For it is not natural for them to be capable of any form; therefore they are free from the conditions of bodies. Doubtless Damascenus had learned this from Nazianzen, who did not say that angels are mere minds, but, after he had shown that God also is beyond any class of body, and finding that there was no consistency in what the Peripatetics called the fifth element, he proceeds thus in his argument: "If indeed the substance of God is immaterial, whence did they receive it that angels are bodies, and of what kind are they? They are intelligent spirits, immaterial fire and incorporeal, or closest to it." For souls being immaterial are entirely incomposite; those others are incorporeal. To these I will add the sincere interpreter of my author, Nicephorus of Constantinople, who in his book on the irreproachable faith of Christians against the Iconoclasts, chap. 70, teaches that God ordered that the forms of the Cherubim be fashioned, although they lack all form and appearance. "But the incorporeal Virtues also are most holy, which stand around God, and since they are illuminated by the first splendors from God, they are the ministers of that first splendor: intellectual spirits, and as it were fire consisting of no matter or body. For he says, 'Who makes his angels spirits, and his ministers a burning fire.' And again: But since they are simple, and have no appearance, they are far immune from form and figure: in as much as they are understood to be immaterial and invisible, they lack dimension, cannot be touched, and have neither quantity, nor mass, nor quality, ^D and for that reason they are exempt from corruption, and of such purity that they do not undergo even the slightest alteration." The same Nicephorus should be read in his disputation against Leo the Armenian.

^C It is said to be incorporeal and immaterial insofar as it is compared to us; for everything, when compared to God, who alone is incomparable, is found to be dense and material; for only the Divine is truly immaterial and incorporeal.

It is, then, a rational nature, endowed with intellect and free will, mutable by choice, or rather, susceptible to change. For everything created is mutable; only that which is uncreated is immutable. And everything rational is endowed with free will. As it is rational and endowed with intellect, therefore, it has free will; as it is created, it is mutable, having the power both to remain in the good and to progress in it, and to lean toward the worse.

Incapable of repentance 47, because it is also incorporeal. For man, by reason of the weakness of his body, was granted repentance.

Immortal, not by nature 48, but by grace. For everything that has had a beginning also has an end by its nature. God alone is always, or rather, even above "always"; for He is not under time, but above time, the Maker of times.

Second spiritual lights, having their illumination from that first and beginningless light; not needing tongue and hearing, but ^D without spoken language.

they communicate their thoughts and counsels one to another. ^A

All the angels were created through the Word and received their perfection by the sanctifying effect of the Holy Spirit, according to the proportion of their rank and order, being participants in illumination and grace.

Angels are circumscribed. For when they are in heaven, they are not on earth; and when they are sent by God to the earth, they do not remain in heaven. They are not held back by walls, doors, barriers, or seals, for they are uncircumscribed. I say "uncircumscribed" because it is not in the place where they essentially are that they appear to those who are worthy—to those to whom God wills that they should appear—but they appear in a transformation, as the observers are able to behold them. For that which is uncircumscribed by nature and in the strict sense is only the Uncreated. For every created thing is limited by God the Creator. ^B

They possess their holiness not from their own nature, but from the Holy Spirit. Through the grace of God they prophesy. They have no need of marriage, since they are immortal.

The place of angels. Since they are minds, they are also in places ^C that are understood by the mind, not being circumscribed in a bodily way (for they are not figured after the manner of bodies, nor are they extended in three dimensions), but rather they are present and operate where they are commanded, and are unable to be and operate here and there at the same time.

Whether they are equal in substance or differ from one another, we do not know. Only God, who created them and knows all things, understands this. But that they differ ^D from one another in illumination and in their standing—whether they hold their standing in relation to their illumination, or...

participate in the standing in relation to their illumination, and illuminate one another—is owing to the excellence of their rank or nature. It is clear, moreover, that those who are superior impart of both illumination and knowledge to those who are lower. ^A

Strong and ready to fulfill the divine will, and appearing immediately anywhere the divine nod may command, they are swift by nature, and they guard the parts of the earth, presiding over nations and places just as they were ordered by the Creator; they manage our affairs and bring us aid. They are altogether over us because of the divine will and command, and they are always existing around God. ^B

They are moved toward evil with difficulty, but they are not strictly immovable; though, in actual fact, they are now immovable, not by nature, but by grace and by their attendance upon the only Good.

Beholding God according to what is possible for them, they have this as their food. ^C

Being superior to us as incorporeal beings, and immune to corporeal passion, they are not, however, without all passion, for only the Divine is impassible.

They are transformed into whatever the Lord God may command, and thus they appear to men and reveal to them divine mysteries.

They dwell in heaven, and they have one task: to praise God and to serve His divine will. ^D As the most holy and most sacred [Dionysius] says,—

Of the orders of angels

As the most holy and most sacred [Dionysius says], they are filled with divine food: in one sense by the primal, life-giving outpouring, and in another by the undiversified and unifying wholeness of the divine feast.

[VARIA LECTIONES: entries preserved]

[NOTE: entries preserved]

^A And the most excellent theologian Dionysius the Areopagite says that all theology, that is, Holy Scripture, has recounted nine celestial substances. This divine master of sacred rites has distinguished them into three triadic arrangements. He says that the first is that which is around God, and is said to be joined to Him closely and without any intermediary: namely, the six-winged Seraphim, the many-eyed Cherubim, and the most holy Thrones; the second is that of the Dominions, Virtues, and Powers; the third, finally, and the last, is that of the Principalities, Archangels, and Angels.

Some say ^B that they were created before all creation, as the Theologian Gregory says: "He first thinks of the angelic and heavenly powers, and that thought was a work." Others prefer to say that they were created after the first heaven was fashioned. That they were created before the formation of man, all agree. I, however, agree with the opinion of Gregory the Theologian. For it was fitting that an intelligent nature should be created first, then a sensible one, and finally man, consisting of both.

Those who say that the angels are creators of any substance whatever are mouthpieces of the father of lies, the devil. For, being creatures, they are not creators. But the maker, provider, and ^C sustainer of all things is God, who alone is uncreated, who is praised and glorified in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

CHAPTER IV.

On the devil and demons.

having been made for good, and having received in himself no trace of evil from the Creator, not bearing the illumination and the honor which the Creator had bestowed upon him, by his own free will he turned from that which is according to nature to that which is against nature, and lifted himself up ^A against God his Maker, desiring to rise up against Him; and he was the first to depart from good and became evil. For evil is nothing else but the privation of good, just as darkness is the privation of light. For the good is intelligible light, and in the same way evil is intelligible darkness. Having been created light by the Creator, and having become good—for God saw all that He had made, and behold they were very good—by his own free will he became darkness. And there was drawn away with him, and followed him, and fell with him an infinite multitude of the angels who were set under him. Being, therefore, of the same nature as the angels, they became evil, through choice voluntarily turning from good to evil. ^B

NOTES

a. On Ephesians: he agrees: nay, he adds that he, even after his rebellion, might have been similar to the Most High. Isaiah chapter 14 is allegorically interpreted in this sense. Wherefore Cyril of Alexandria says: "He imagined," he says, "that the created thing could ascend to the nature of its Maker." He hoped (as the Theologian says in his poem *On Substance*) for the "regal honors of the great God"; but when he wished to be God, he was entirely turned into darkness, "the darkness of the beginning," the prince of those things that are under heaven, not having fallen from his status. For Paul calls him the "Prince of the power of the air." Thus thinks Theodoret on this passage of the Apostle, and in his *Epitome of Divine Dogmas*; and likewise Scythopolitanus in his chapter *On the Celestial Hierarchy*. Cyril of Jerusalem thinks he was an archangel. Athanasius, in his *Epistle to Serapion*, whom another Cyril followed in his first book of *Glaphyra*, asserts that he fell from the highest rank of the Cherubim, because of the prophecy of Ezekiel, in which, according to the consensus of almost all the Fathers, the fall of the devil is narrated under the name of the king of Tyre. For there he is once and again called the "extended Cherub." To this, Nazianzen seems to have looked in his poems, where he calls him "the first of all, Lucifer, raised on high." Not greatly differing from these is Saint Thomas, where he teaches that he, an apostate from the highest order—that is, of the Seraphim—fell, but dragged many from other orders with him. I omit those ancients who imputed the crime of whoredom to the demons themselves. Irenæus, book IV, chapter 48, says that the devil defected from God from the time he envied the creature of God (Adam, that is), and set out to make him an enemy. This same thing Gregory of Nyssa approves in his *Catechetical Oration*. The author of the *Questions to Antiochus*, quest. 10, puffs away the fiction of those who gossiped that the devil fell from heaven because he refused to adore Adam. He was copying another who was slightly older, who is commonly called Anastasius. Furthermore, in the questions of the Gretser edition, the authors of this fable are said to be Greeks as well as Arabs. Indeed, Mohammed, in Sura 2, writes the same; and Ludovicus Maraccius proves in his annotations to this place in the Alcoran that he received it from the Jews. Our author teaches that the devil rebelled against God, which is to be understood according to the more common opinion of the Fathers, that he wished to be God: but this is not right; for it is a great thing to be God: but it is evil for one who is not God to be ungrateful to the Creator, and to be lifted up beyond the limits of his own nature, and to wish for that which is impossible to be. Moreover, Saint Thomas denies that the devil affected a total likeness of God, which he surely knew could not be attained: therefore, he did not wish to be subjected by obeying the supreme Lord of all things.

What the author adds regarding the nature of demons rightly strikes at the Manichaeans, who assert that the devil is the worst genius of matter, the supreme evil, the cause of all evils, existing and eternal darkness, who of himself sent forth demons as his own virtues, with which to attack God, or the supreme Good. Dionysius the Areopagite excellently refutes these in his chapter *On the Divine Names*, from which I judge Damascene took all these things, in the writings from which you will find more in the *Dialogues against the Manichaeans*.

Of the same nature are the angels. This follows from what has just been said, and is asserted by the more approved teachers of the Church. Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, and other ancients, in that they were imbued with the dogmas of the Platonic sect, defined demons not only as those angels whom they thought had had intercourse with the daughters of men, but also as the souls of those giants who were procreated from them.

^A Demons, therefore, have no power against anyone unless it is permitted by God in the way of providence, as happened in the case of Job, and as is written in the Gospel concerning the swine. With that permission from God, they have power, and they can shift and transform themselves into whatever shapes they wish by fantasy.

How angels and demons predict the future. Neither the angels of God nor the demons know future events, yet they predict them. The angels do so because God reveals them to them and commands them to announce them; hence, whatever they say comes to pass. Demons also predict, sometimes because they see things happening from afar, and sometimes because they merely guess; hence they often lie, and one should not believe them, even if they frequently speak the truth in the way we have mentioned. Moreover, they know the Scriptures.

All wickedness, therefore, and foul passions were devised by them; and while it is permitted to them to tempt a person, they have no power to force anyone. It lies within us to accept the temptation or not to accept it; hence, for the devil and his demons, and for his followers, the ^B fire is prepared that is not quenched, and the eternal punishment.

One must know that what death is for men, that the fall is for the angels. After the fall, there is no repentance for them, just as there is no repentance for men after death.

[NOTAE] (Certain passages from various fathers are cited regarding the nature of demonic bodies, noting that while some ancient writers, like Tertullian, held that the souls of those who died a cruel death became demons, later Church tradition—specifically Basil the Great in his commentaries on Isaiah—taught that they do not possess bodies in the sense of being fleshy creatures, but are rather said to be incorporeal, though they became attached to the material world after their fall, much as Adam put on coats of skin after his sin. Marcus Ephesius, in an address to the Council, also speaks to the nature of their state as one of being devoid of bodies, yet burdened by the stain of sin and subject to eternal fire. The author notes that the specific mind of Damascene on this nature will be discussed elsewhere and investigated at the final chapter of the book.) ^{C D}

Chapter V. On the visible creature.

^A Our God Himself, who is celebrated as one in three and three in one, made heaven and earth and all that is in them; for He brought all things into being from that which was not. Some things He brought forth out of pre-existing matter, as for instance heaven, earth, air, fire, and water; and others He brought forth from the things created by Him, such as living creatures, plants, and seeds. For these exist out of earth, water, air, and fire by the command of the Creator.

CAP. VI. De cælo.

Heaven is the compass of visible and invisible things. For within its embrace, both the intellectual powers of the angels and all sensible things are enclosed and circumscribed. The divine nature alone is without circumscription; it fills all things, and contains all things, and bounds all things, as it is above all things and has created all things.

Since, therefore, Scripture speaks of "heaven," and "the heaven of heavens," and "the heavens of heavens," and the blessed Paul says he was caught up "to the third heaven," we say that in the creation of the universe we have received the making of the heaven, which the wise men of the world call an unstarred sphere, having appropriated to themselves the dogmas of Moses. Furthermore, God also called the firmament heaven, which He commanded to come into being in the midst of the water, appointing it to divide between the water which is above the firmament and the water which is below the firmament. The nature of this, the divine Basil says, following the divine Scripture, is thin like smoke. Others say it is aqueous, as having been generated in the midst of waters; others say it is fashioned from the four elements; others, a fifth body ^B and something different from the four.

Some have supposed that the whole is encircled by the heaven, and that it is spherical and holds the highest place; but that it is...

^A the center of the space it contains which holds the lowest place. They say that light and airy bodies were assigned the higher order by the Creator, while heavy and downward-tending ones were assigned the lower region, which is the center. Now, fire is the lightest and most upward-tending element, and they say it is placed immediately below the heaven; they call this ether, and below it is the air. They say that the earth and water, as heavier and more downward-tending bodies, hang in the center, so that they are in opposition; the earth is below, and the water is above the earth, yet water is lighter than earth, which is why it is more easily moved than the earth. Thus, just as a garment wrapped about on all sides, the air is around the earth on all sides, and the ether is around the air on all sides, and the heaven is around all things.

They say that the heaven is moved in a circle, and clamps together the things within, and thus remains firm and immovable.

They say there are seven zones of the heaven, one higher than the other. They call it a substance of the utmost subtlety, like smoke, and in each zone there is one of the planets. For they said that there are seven planets: the Sun, the Moon, Jupiter, Mercury, Mars, Venus, and Saturn. They say that Venus is sometimes called the Morning Star, sometimes the Evening Star. ^B They called these things "planets" because they move in a direction contrary to the heaven. For while the heaven and the rest of the stars move from east to west, these alone have their movement from west to east. We know this from the moon, which moves backward a little each evening.

Those, therefore, who said that the heaven is spherical, say that it stands at an equal distance from the earth, and is removed from it above, from the sides, and from below. From below, I say, as far as regards our observation.

CAPUT VI.

^D concerning the opinion of those who express that the heaven is spherical, alleging that it stands at an equal distance from the earth, from those above, from the oblique sides, and from those below.

NOTES.

Others have affirmed that the heaven is constant, moving in an orbicular motion, and that the earth is located at the absolute lowest part of things, like dregs or sediment. But this contradicts the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, ch. viii, 2, where the heaven is called the tabernacle which the Lord made. "Where are those," says he, "who assert that the heaven is moved? Where are those who pronounce it to be of spherical shape?" But both of these opinions are refuted here. This view Procopius of Gaza defends with the same words in ch. I of Genesis, and imitates Severianus of Gabala, who, in his oration *De opif. mundi*, quotes the words of Isaiah in chapter XL according to the Seventy Interpreters: "He who established the heaven as a vault and stretched it out as a tent." To which he adds the words of Psalm XVIII: "His going forth is from the end of the heaven." Similar to these are the words which Christ speaks in Matthew XXIV: "And he shall gather his elect from the ends of the heavens to the ends of them." Whence he assumes: "But if it is a sphere, it has no ends. For that which is rounded on all sides has no end." Cosmas Indicopleusta seconds these views, whose work was recently published by that man of distinguished erudition, the Reverend Father Bernard de Montfaucon, along with various illustrations by which that ancient system of the universe is represented. This had already been ridiculed by Jerome in chapter XL of Isaiah. Basil also, in *Hom.* V in *Hexaem.*, readily concedes that the earth and heaven are round, and that the heaven is moved by an orbicular motion. Maximus also follows this in his tables; with whom our author is not in disagreement.

^A Since according to the logic of consequence, the heaven occupies the upper place from every side, and the earth the lower. They say that the heaven circles the earth spherically, and carries along with its swiftest motion both the sun and the moon and the stars; and when the sun is above the earth, there is day here, but when it is below the earth, there is night. And when the sun has gone down below the earth, there is night here, but day there. Others have imagined the heaven to be a hemisphere, led to this opinion by the God-inspired David saying, *Who stretches out the heaven like a curtain*, which denotes a tent, and by the blessed Isaiah: *Who set up the heaven like a vault*. And [they say] that when the sun, the moon, and the stars set, they travel around the earth from the ^B west towards the north, and thus arrive again at the east. However, whether it be thus or otherwise, all things have been made and braced by the divine command, and possess the divine will and counsel as an unshakable foundation. For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created. He established them for ever and for the age of an age; He set a decree, and it shall not pass away.

The three heavens.—Thus, the *heaven of heaven* is that first heaven which is above the firmament. Now you have two heavens, for God also called the firmament *heaven*. Then it is familiar to Scripture to call the air also *heaven*, because it is seen above. For it says, *Bless the Lord, all you birds of the heaven*, meaning the air. For the air is the path of the birds, not the heaven. Behold, there are three heavens, ^C which the divine Apostle mentioned. But if you should wish to take the seven zones as seven heavens, it does no harm to the word of truth. It is also customary in the Hebrew language to call heaven in the plural, *heavens*. Desiring, therefore, to say *heaven of heaven*, it said *heavens of heavens*, which signifies the heaven of heaven, that which is above the firmament, and the waters which are above the heavens—or the air and the firmament, or the seven zones of the firmament, or the firmament itself, which by the custom of the Hebrew language is called by the plural name, *heavens*. ^D

The nature of the heavens is corruptible.—Now, indeed, since all things that have come to be by generation are subject to change. For everything that has begun from time, it is of necessity that it should also be finished in time.

^A Since they have come to consist according to the order of nature, they are also subject to corruption, and the heavens themselves, even though they be held together and preserved by the divine gift and grace. God alone is without beginning by nature, and without end; therefore it is said: "They shall perish, but Thou remainest." ^B Yet the heavens shall not be utterly annihilated. For they shall grow old and be folded like a garment and shall be changed, and there shall be a new heaven and a new earth.

As to size, the heaven is much greater than the earth. However, one should not investigate the essence of the heaven, for we cannot attain it by knowledge.

Let no one, moreover, imagine that the heavens or the luminaries are animate; for they are without soul and sense. ^C Wherefore, when Scripture says: "Let the heavens rejoice, and let the earth exult," it invites by these words the angels who are in heaven and the men who are on earth to joy. And Scripture knows how to employ the figure of personification, and to speak of inanimate things as though they were animate; as for instance: "The sea saw and fled; Jordan was turned back." And: "What aileth thee, O sea, that thou fleddest? And thou, O Jordan, that thou wast turned back?" And the mountains and hills are asked the cause of their leaping, just as it is customary for us to say: "The whole city assembled," meaning not the buildings, but the inhabitants of the city. ^D Even so the heavens are said to "declare the glory of God," not as sending forth a voice that is perceived by the ears of the body, but as declaring the power of the Creator through their own magnitude; and, contemplating their beauty, we praise the Creator as an excellent craftsman.

CAP. VII. On light, fire, luminaries, the sun, the moon, and the stars.

Fire is one of the four elements, light and more elevated than the rest, having the power both of burning and of illuminating, created by the Creator on the first day. For the divine Scripture says: "And God said, Let there be light; and there was light."

^A Nor is fire anything else, as some people think, but light. Others, however, say that this elementary fire is above the air, and they call it ether. In the beginning, then—that is, on the first day—God created light, which is the beauty and ornament of all visible creation. For if you were to remove light, all things would lie in darkness, unknown, as they would be unable to make their own beauty visible. And God called the light day, and the darkness He called night. Furthermore, darkness is not any substance, but an accident; for it is nothing else than the absence of light. Air, indeed, does not have light in its own substance. Therefore, God called this very state—the fact that the air lacks light—darkness. Indeed, the substance of the air itself is not darkness, but the privation of light, which indicates an accident rather than a substance. Nor was night called into being before day, but [day was called into being first]; and consequently day is older, not posterior. Therefore, night follows day; and from the sunrise of one day to the sunrise of the next, one day is joined with the night. For the Scripture says: "And there was evening, and there was morning, one day."

^B The first three days, when the sun did not exist. The function of the moon and stars in the night. — And in these first three days, by the command of God, with the light now diffusing itself and now contracting again, day and night came into being. But on the fourth day God made the greater light, namely the sun, to rule over the day (for by it the day is made; for day is when the sun rests above the earth, and the space of a day is that course which the sun completes above the earth from sunrise to sunset), and likewise the lesser light, that is, the moon, and the stars, that they might rule over the night and bring light to it. Moreover, night is when the sun is below the earth; and the space of night is that course which the sun completes under the earth from sunset to sunrise. The moon, therefore, and the stars were established to illuminate the night; ^C not that they are hidden deep under the earth during the day (for at that time too the stars are in the sky over the earth), but because the sun, by the excessive breadth of its own splendor, covers them and does not allow them to shine forth.

Primigenial light placed in the luminaries. — The supreme Artificer of all things placed the primigenial light into these luminaries, not because He labored under a lack of other light, but so that that light would not remain idle. For a luminary is not the light itself, but a receptacle of light.

^D Seven planets. — Among these luminaries, they count seven planets, which they say are moved with a motion contrary to that of the heavens; on which account they called them planets, or wandering stars. For they say that the heaven is turned from east to west; but the planets [are moved] from west to east.

[and they say] that the heaven, with its more rapid motion, carries them around with it. The names of the seven planets are these: Luna, Mercury, Venus, Sol, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. They maintain, moreover, that in each circle of heaven there is one of the seven planets. In the first, that is, the highest, is Saturn. In the second, Jupiter. In the third, Mars. In the fourth, the Sun. In the fifth, Venus. In the sixth, Mercury. In the seventh, and lowest, the Moon.

They run an unceasing course, which the Creator appointed for them, and just as He founded them, as the divine David says: "The moon and the stars, which thou hast founded." ^B By saying, "thou hast founded," he signified the stability and immutability of the order and arrangement given to them by God. For He appointed them for seasons, and for signs, and for days, and for years. By the sun, the four seasons are constituted: the first, indeed, being spring, for in it God created all things; and this is signified even until now by the blooming of flowers in it, which is also the equinoctial season; for it makes both the day and the night to be of twelve hours. This season arises from the sun's rising in the middle, being temperate, productive of blood, warm, and moist; ^C and by itself it mediates between winter and summer; being warmer and drier than winter, and cooler and moister than summer. And this season extends from March until the twenty-fourth of June.

Then, as the sun's rising ascends to the more northerly parts, the summer solstice succeeds, holding a middle place between spring and autumn; having warmth from spring, and dryness from autumn. For summer is warm and dry, and it causes an increase of yellow bile. And this season has the longest day, of fifteen hours, and the shortest night, ^D lasting for a space of nine hours. And this too extends from the twenty-fourth of June until the twenty-fifth of September.

Then, as the sun again returns to the middle rising, the autumnal season succeeds the summer, having a certain middle state between cold and heat, and dryness and moisture, and mediating between the summer and winter seasons; having dryness from the summer, and cold from the winter. For it is cold and dry, and it is by nature productive of black bile. This again is an equinoctial season, having both the day and the night of twelve hours; and it extends from the twenty-fifth of September until the twenty-fifth of December. When the sun is at...

^A its lower and more depressed—that is, its meridional—rising, the winter solstice and season supervene, which is cold and moist, occupying a middle quality between the autumnal and the vernal; for it possesses the cold of the autumnal and the moisture of the vernal. This season has the shortest day, being of nine hours, and the longest night, being of fifteen hours; and it is productive of phlegm. It extends from the twenty-fifth of December until the twenty-first of March. For the Creator has wisely provided, so that we might not, by passing from extreme cold or heat or moisture or dryness to the extremely opposite quality, fall into grievous diseases—for reason itself knows that sudden changes are dangerous.

^B In this way, then, the sun brings about the solstices, and through them the year, and likewise the days and nights: the days, I say, when it rises and exists above the earth; and the nights, when it goes beneath the earth and sets, and yields to the other luminaries—to the moon, namely, and the stars—that they might shine.

Signs of the zodiac.—They also say that there are twelve signs in heaven made of stars, named after animals, which move in a direction contrary to the sun, the moon, and the other five wandering stars; and the seven planets pass through these signs. The sun, for its part, completes one month in each sign, and traverses the twelve signs in as many months. Moreover, the names of these signs and their months are as follows:

Aries, in the month of March, on the 21st, receives the sun. Taurus, in the month of April, on the 23rd. Gemini, in the month of May, on the 24th. Cancer, in the month of June, on the 24th. Leo, in the month of July, on the 25th. Virgo, in the month of August, on the 25th. Libra, in the month of September, on the 25th. Scorpius, in the month of October, on the 25th. Sagittarius, in the month of November, on the 25th. Capricornus, in the month of December, on the 25th. Aquarius, in the month of January, on the 25th. Pieces, in the month of February, on the 24th.

^{C D} The course of the moon is shorter.—But the moon, as it is in a lower place and traverses the zodiacal circle more quickly, runs through all twelve signs in each month. For just as if you were to make one circle inside another, the inner circle will be found to be smaller; in the same way, when the moon has obtained a lower position, its course is also shorter, and it is necessary that it be completed more quickly.

Whether it is the stars whose signs these are. They do not hinder free will.

of the sun, and of the moon, and of the rising, and of the setting, and of their conjunction, ^A they say that all human affairs are governed. For astrology is concerned with these things. But we maintain that though they become signs of rain and of drought, of cold and of heat, of moisture and of dryness, and of winds and of the like, they are in no way signs of our actions. For since we are made by the Creator with free will, we are masters of our own actions. For if we do everything because of the motion of the stars, we do everything by necessity; and what is done by necessity is neither virtue nor vice. But if we possess neither virtue nor vice, we are worthy of neither praise nor punishment; and God will also be found to be unjust, in giving good things to some, and afflictions to others. ^B Furthermore, God will neither govern nor provide for His own creatures if they are led and carried by necessity; and the faculty of reason will be superfluous in us. For since we are masters of no action, we deliberate in vain; but the faculty of reason has been given to us precisely for the sake of deliberation, whence everything that uses reason is also endowed with the freedom of the will.

We maintain, however, that they are not themselves the causes of any of the things that happen, nor of the generation of things that are generated, nor of the corruption of things that perish, but are rather signs of showers and of the change of the air. Perhaps someone might say that they are also signs of wars, though not causes. And indeed, the quality of the air, being affected in one way or another by the sun, ^C and by the moon, and by the stars, produces different temperaments, habits, and dispositions. But these habits are among the things that are in our power; for they are governed by reason, and are led in a fitting manner.

Comets often arise, being certain signs that portend the death of kings, which are not of the stars which have existed from the beginning, but are formed at the divine command.

For even the star that appeared to the Magi at the time of the Lord's philanthropic and saving birth for our sake according to the flesh was not one of those stars which existed from the beginning; and this is clear from the fact that it would sometimes change its course from the east to the west, and sometimes from the north to the south, and would sometimes be hidden and sometimes appear. For this is not in the order or nature of stars. ^A

It ought to be understood that the moon is illuminated by the sun, not because God was unable to give it its own light, but so that rhythm and order might be established in creation—of one who rules and one who is ruled—and so that we ourselves might learn to commune with one another, to share, and to be subject: first to God, the Creator and Maker and Lord, and then to the rulers appointed by Him; and not to ask why this person rules and I do not, but to accept all things that come about by God's ordering with gratitude and good judgment. ^B

The sun and moon suffer eclipse, reproving the folly of those who worship the creation rather than the Creator, and teaching that they are mutable and subject to change. For everything that is mutable is not God; for according to its own nature, everything mutable is subject to destruction.

An eclipse of the sun occurs when the body of the moon acts as a sort of partition wall, casting a shadow and not allowing the light to be distributed to us. Therefore, to the extent that the body of the moon is found to be obscuring the sun, to that extent the eclipse occurs. Do not be surprised if the body of the moon is of a smaller magnitude; for the sun is indeed said by some to be many times larger than the earth, but by the holy Fathers it is said to be equal to the earth. And yet it happens very often that it is hidden by a small cloud, or a small hill, or a wall. ^C

An eclipse of the moon, however, occurs from the shadow cast by the earth when the moon is fifteen days old and is found to be directly opposite at the center point, the sun being below the earth and the moon above the earth. For the earth makes a shadow, and the solar light cannot reach to illuminate the moon, and from that cause, it is eclipsed. ^D

It must be understood that the moon was created complete by the Creator, that is, fifteen days old; for it was fitting that it should be created perfect. But the sun, as we have said, was created on the fourth day; the moon therefore preceded the sun by eleven days. For from the fourth day to the fifteenth, there are eleven days; and so, according to time

^A in each year, it renders eleven days to the sun; hence, because of this addition of eleven days, in every three years an intercalary month happens for the Hebrews, and that year is found to consist of thirteen months, from the addition of the eleven days.

It is evident that the sun, the moon, and all the stars are composite and subject to change; yet we are entirely ignorant of what their nature is. Some people assert that, being fire devoid of any matter or fuel, they completely cease to exist, and that this is manifest from the fact that, once extinguished, they vanish. Others, however, say that when extinguished, this fire is transmuted into air. ^B

Motion of the Zodiac

Houses of the Planets

Exaltations

Figurations of the Moon

degrees, but is perfectly full when it is removed one hundred and eighty degrees from the sun. We say it occurs twice for this reason, because it happens both as it waxes and as it wanes. Moreover, ^A the moon traverses each sign in two days and a half.

CHAPTER VIII. Of air and winds.

^B Aeris descriptio. — Air is a most subtle element, humid and warm; it is heavier than fire, but lighter than earth and water; it is the cause of respiration and speech; it is colorless—that is, it does not possess color by nature—and it is transparent and pellucid (for it can receive light). It serves our three senses (for by its benefit we see, hear, and smell); it is also capable of heat and cold, dryness and moisture. Its local motions are these: upward, downward, inward, outward, to the right, to the left, and finally, circular motion.

Aer ex se lumen non habet. — It does not have light of itself, but is illuminated by the sun, the moon, the stars, and by fire. And this is what ^C the Scripture said: *And darkness was upon the face of the deep*, 12 wishing to show that the air does not possess light of itself, but that the substance of light is a different thing.

Quid ventus. — But wind is an agitation of the air. Or, wind is a flow of air from the changing of places from which it flows, changing its names accordingly.

Aeris locus, ventorum numerus. — And air also has a place. For the place of each body is that which surrounds it. And what contains and encompasses bodies, if not air? Further, there are many and various regions from whence the air is agitated; from ^D these also the twelve winds (for there are that many in all) derive their names. There are those who contend that air is nothing else but extinguished fire, or the vapor of heated water. Therefore, by its own nature it is warm; but it contracts cold from the vicinity of water and earth, whence it comes to pass that its lower parts are cold, while the upper ones are warm.

Ventorum nomina. — As far as the winds are concerned, from the summer sunrise blows Caecias, which is also called Meses. From the equinoctial sunrise, Subsolanus. From the winter sunrise, Eurus. From the winter sunset, Africus; from the equinoctial sunset, Favonius; from the summer sunset, Corus, which is also called Olympias and Iapyx. Then Auster and Aquilo, which blow with winds opposite to one another. There is also Boreas, placed between Aquilo and Caecias; between Eurus and Auster is Phoenix, which is also called Libonotus; between Auster and Africus is Libonotus, which is also called Leuconotus; finally, between Aquilo and Corus is Thrascias, or Cercius, so named by those who dwell toward this region.

^A [The nations, moreover, which dwell at the ends of the world are these: to the Subsolanus, the Bactrians; to the Eurus, the Indians; to the Phoenician wind, the Red Sea and Ethiopia; to the Libonotus, the Garamantes, who are above the Syrtis; to the Africus, the Ethiopians and the western Moors; to the Favonius, the Pillars of Hercules and the beginnings of Libya and Europe; to the Corus, Iberia, which is today called Spain; to the Thrascias, the Gauls and neighboring nations; to the Aquilo, the Scythians who are above Thrace; to the Boreas, Pontus, Maeotis, and the Sarmatians; to the Caecias, the Caspian Sea and the Sacae.]

CAP. IX. Concerning Waters.

^B The description of waters. The waters above the firmament, and the reason for them. — Water is also one of the four elements, the most beautiful work of God. Water is a fluid and cold element, heavy and tending toward what is below, easily dissolved. Divine Scripture takes note of this when it says: *And darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the Spirit of God was moved over the waters.* By the deep [abyss], nothing else is meant than a vast quantity of water, the end of which cannot be reached by men. And truly, in the beginnings of the world, water was over the whole surface of the earth. And first, God made the firmament, which might divide the waters that are above the firmament from those that are below the firmament. For in the midst of the abyss of waters, the firmament was established by the command of the Lord. Whence, also, when God said, "Let there be a firmament," it came to pass. But what, then, was the cause why God placed water above the firmament? Clearly, the most intense heat of the sun and the ether. For immediately beneath the firmament, the ether is spread out, ^C and the sun and the moon and the stars are in the firmament; and if water had not been placed above, the firmament would have been set on fire by the heat.

The Sea. — Then God commanded that the waters be gathered into one collection. But in saying "one collection," Scripture does not mean that they flowed together into one and the same place; for it immediately adds, *And the collections of the waters He called seas*; but rather, the narrative shows that the waters were separated from the earth all at the same moment. The waters, therefore, [were gathered] into their collections. ^D [alt-version omitted]

^A And the dry land appeared; from thence are the two ^B seas that encompass Egypt, for she lies in the midst of the two seas. ^C And diverse deeps, mountains, and islands, and headlands, and ports, and different inlets, and shores, and coasts were gathered together. For the shore is called that which is sandy, but the coast is that which is rocky and immediately has depth at the beginning. In like manner also to the east, which is called the Indian [Sea], and to the north, which is called the Caspian; and the marshes also were collected from thence.

Oceanus, therefore, is as it were a river encompassing all the earth, concerning which it seems to me the divine Scripture has spoken, saying: "A river went out of paradise," having fresh and potable water. This [ocean] supplies water to the seas, which, lingering in the seas and remaining motionless, becomes bitter and salt, the sun constantly drawing up its finer parts by means of water-spouts; whence also clouds are formed, and rains occur, through the filtration and sweetening of the water.

This [ocean] is divided into four sources, or rather into four rivers. The name of the one is Phison, that is, the Indian Ganges; and the name of the second is Geon; this is the Nile, which comes down from Ethiopia into Egypt; and the name of the third is Tigris; and the name of the fourth is Euphrates. But there are also very many other, and very great, rivers, some of which empty themselves into the sea, while others are consumed in the earth. Whence it comes to pass that the earth is perforated and honeycombed on all sides, and has, as it were, certain veins through which, receiving the waters from the sea, it sends forth springs. Thus it happens that, according to the quality of the earth, the water of the springs is one [kind] or another. For the seawater is strained and filtered through the earth, and thus it becomes fresh. But if the place from which the spring issues should be bitter or salt, the water will burst forth as such. But it usually happens that water, confined and compressed in certain narrow places, grows warm by bursting forth with force; and hence naturally warm waters emerge. ^D

By the divine command, therefore, the excavations were made in the earth.

^A And thus the waters were gathered into their ^B basins; and from this the mountains were formed. With regard to the water, therefore, God commanded it to bring forth living souls, since it was to be through water and the Holy Spirit, who was borne over the waters at the beginning, that man would be renewed. For this reason the divine Basil brings forward this cause. Accordingly, it brought forth both small and great living creatures; sea monsters and dragons, fish gliding through the waves, and winged birds. For by the birds, the water, the earth, and the air are joined together as if by a certain link. For they are produced from the waters, and they dwell on the earth, and fly in the air. Water is, moreover, an excellent element, useful for many things, and a cleanser of filth, having the power not only to cleanse the body, but also the soul, provided the grace of the Holy Spirit draws near.

On the seas, or bodies of water

^B The Egean Sea is received by the Hellespont, ending at Abydos and Sestus. Then the Propontis, which terminates at Chalcedon and Byzantium; where there are narrow passages or straits, from which the Pontus takes its beginning. Next is the Maeotic Lake. Then again, from the beginning of Europe and Libya, there is the Iberian Sea, running from the Pillars of Hercules to the Pyrenees mountains. After this is the Ligurian Sea, which extends as far as the borders of Etruria. Then the Sardinian, which above Sardinia turns downward toward Libya and Africa. Then the Etruscan, which begins from the extreme borders of Liguria and has its end at Sicily. Afterward the Libycan, then the Cretan, the Sicilian, the Ionian, and the Adriatic, ^C which pours forth from the Sicilian Sea, which they call the Corinthian Gulf, or the Alcyonian Sea. But the sea contained by Sunium and Scylla is called the Saronic. From this is the Myrtoan, and the Icarian, in which also are the Cyclades; then the Carpathian, and the Pamphylian, and the Egyptian. Finally, above the Icarian, the Aegean pours itself forth most closely. Moreover, the voyage along Europe from the mouths of the Tanais River as far as the Pillars of Hercules is 609,709 stades; of Africa, from Tingis as far as the Canopic mouth, 2,752 stades; of Asia, from Canopus as far as the Tanais River along with the gulfs.

4,111 stades. And thus the sea of our inhabited world extends to 1,309,072 stades.

CHAPTER X. On the earth, and things produced from it.

^A The foundation of the earth is unknown. The earth is one of the four elements, dry, cold, heavy, and immovable, brought into existence out of nothing by God on the first day. *In the beginning*, it says, *God created the heaven and the earth*. But on what thing it rests, and upon what foundation it stands, no mortal has been able to say. Some say it is placed upon the waters and made stable, being led by these words of David: *Who firmly established the earth upon the waters*. Others say it is upon the air. Another says: *Who hangs the earth upon nothing*. And again, the God-inspired David, as if from the person of the Creator, says: *I have established its pillars*, designating by the name of pillars the power that holds it together. ^B And the phrase, *He founded it upon the seas*, signifies that the nature of water is poured around the earth on all sides. Whether, therefore, we grant that it is established of itself, or upon air, or upon waters, or upon nothing, we must not depart from pious understanding, but must confess that all things are held together and sustained by the power of the Creator.

In the beginning, then, as divine Scripture says, the earth was covered by waters and was unformed, that is, devoid of ornament. But when God commanded, the reservoirs of the waters were formed, ^C and then the mountains appeared, and by divine command it received its proper adornment, being beautified with grasses of every kind and plants; to which the divine command implanted a power of growth, of sustenance, and of propagation, that is, of generating like from like. And at the Creator’s command, it brought forth also every kind of living creature, reptiles, wild beasts, and cattle. All these were for the timely use of man; but of these, some are for food, such as deer, sheep, gazelles, and the like; others for service, such as camels, oxen, horses, asses, and the like; others for delight, such as monkeys, and among birds, jays, parrots, and the like. ^D Also of plants and herbs, some are fruit-bearing, some are edible, some are sweet-smelling and decorated with flowers, granted to us for the sake of delighting the soul, such as the rose and others like them; and some for the healing of diseases. For there is no animal, nor any plant, in which the Creator has not implanted some power useful for the needs of men. For He, to whom all things are known before their creation, having foreseen that man would depart from the divine command by the decision of his own will and be given over to corruption, therefore created all things—those in the heaven, those on the earth, and those in the waters—for his timely use.

^A For God appointed him lord of all that is in the earth and in the waters. And the snake, too, was familiar to man, rather than to the others that approached him, and he conversed with him through pleasant movements. Thus, through him, the devil, that author of evil, introduced his most pernicious counsel to our first parents. Moreover, the earth produced fruits spontaneously to serve the needs of the animals subject to him; and there was neither rain nor winter on the earth. But after the transgression, when he was compared to the senseless beasts and made like unto them, ^B by having prepared in himself the desire of the irrational over the rational mind, and by becoming disobedient to the Lord’s command, he fell away from the rule appointed for him by the Creator, and the creation that was subject to him; and he was condemned to till the earth, from which he was taken, in the sweat of his brow.

Yet, even now, the use of wild beasts is not useless, and [it serves] for the recognition and invocation of the God who created them. And the thorn, after the transgression, sprang forth from the earth according to the Lord’s decree, with which the rose was joined; and the thorn is used for the gratification, as a reminder of the transgression, because of which it was condemned for us that the earth should bring forth thorns and thistles. ^C That things are to be believed as such is from the fact that, to this day, it is the Lord’s word that causes them to endure, which He said: "Increase, and multiply, and replenish the earth."

Some say the earth is spherical; others, that it is conical. It is certainly much smaller than the heavens, as if suspended like a point in the midst of them. And it itself shall pass away and be changed. Blessed is he who shall possess the land of the meek. For the earth that is to receive the saints is immortal; who, therefore, could worthily admire the infinite and incomprehensible wisdom of the Creator? Or who could render thanks proportionate to the Giver of such great good things? ^D [There are also the known provinces of the earth, or satrapies: of Europe, thirty-four; of the great continent of Asia, forty-eight provinces; twelve canons.]

CHAP. XI. On Paradise.

Since God was about to [create man] from the visible and invisible...

nature, according to his own image and likeness, as it were a king and ruler of the whole earth and of the things that are in it, he ^A first prepared for him a palace, as it were, in which he might pass a life of blessedness and complete felicity. And this is that divine Paradise, planted by the hands of God in Eden, a treasury of all joy and gladness.

NOTE.

The ancients of the Churches—I mean Philo the philosopher and contemporary of the apostles, and Papias the Great, the student of John the Evangelist, the Hierapolite; and Irenaeus of Lyons, and Justin the martyr and philosopher, and Pantaenus the Alexandrian, and Clement the Stromatist, and those around them—theorized about Paradise ^B spiritually, referring them to the Church of Christ. Of whom are also the two most wise Cappadocian Gregorii. All of these, for three reasons, asserted there was also a certain spiritual Paradise. Wherefore, because they understood all things concerning Paradise spiritually for reasons that are incomprehensible, the aforementioned interpreters said that various heresies were born from certain men who heard literally what was said in Genesis about God and Paradise; some dogmatizing that God was corporeal, created according to the material image and likeness of man; ^C others offering great thanks to the serpent, as if through his counsel and the transgression that occurred, the whole human race was generated, who are justly called Ophites. The Manichaeans, both men and women, gather naked in their churches in imitation of Adam and Eve. For see that it is not simply said that this is a paradise by the prophet, but "the paradise of God." But the Mosaic paradise is not called by the name of God, but simply "paradise." Whence also the divine in all things, Ambrose, and Justin ^D the God-inspired martyr, in their commentaries on the Hexaemeron, while going through the accounts concerning Paradise, after having spoken of the sensible trees and waters and the earthly paradise, brought forward in the midst the proposed words of the divine Ezekiel concerning the heavenly paradise, and after having gone through much examination and subtle contemplation on these things, they added, saying that it is most disgraceful and hateful to God to say, or even to conceive at all, that the blessed and adorable divinity of the Word of God should enter with the righteous thief into a transient and material paradise. The more recent of the Fathers—I mean those around the divine Basil, and the river of Christ, John Chrysostom, and Theodore, truly pitiable, [the] Antiochene, and Severus of Gabala, and Eusebius of Emesa, and Epiphanius, thrise-blessed in words and deeds, and Cyril the God-bearer, and Theophilus—all these, rather, expounded their own writings on the six days of creation according to the letter, setting aside allegories and anagogical interpretations. I do not here dispute whether each of those lucubrations of the ancient Fathers, which Anastasius formerly praised, were genuine—to wit, those of Papias, Justin, Irenaeus, Clement, Pantaenus. For the brevity of the note, which I must heed, does not allow it. Jerome is witness that Irenaeus wrote "On the Eighth"; Eusebius [witnesses that] Clement of Alexandria...

^A *Edem* is translated as "pleasure." It was planted by the hands of God in Eden, a wellspring of delight and joy (for *Eden*, if you translate it, means "delights"). Situated in the East, higher than all the earth, it was perfectly temperate and illuminated on all sides by the thinnest and purest air, blooming with plants that were always in flower, full of sweet fragrance, and overflowing with light. It surpassed all imaginable beauty and every sensory charm; it was truly a divine region, a dwelling place worthy of him who had been created in the image of God. In it, no creature devoid of reason moved, but only man, the work of the hands of God.

^B Why the tree of knowledge was planted. In the middle of it, God had planted the tree of life and the tree of knowledge. The tree of knowledge [was planted] to be a trial, a test, and an exercise for man’s obedience and disobedience. Therefore, it is called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, because it gave the power of discernment to those who partook of it according to their own nature—something that was good for those who were perfect, but for those who were more immature and had a desire for it, it yielded a grave disadvantage, just like solid food for those who are still at a tender age and have need of milk. For the Creator did not wish that we, the creatures of our own life, should be anxious and troubled about many things, which is what eventually happened to Adam. For once he had tasted the fruit of the tree, he realized that he was naked and, for that reason, he fashioned himself a loincloth; for having taken fig leaves, he girded himself. Before the tasting, both were naked, both Adam and Eve, and they were not ashamed. God willed that we be such—that is the very state of apathy—and furthermore free from care.

so that we should be occupied with no other work than that which belongs to the angels: namely, to praise the Creator without ceasing, to delight in the contemplation of Him, and to cast all our care upon Him—just as He declared through the prophet David with the words: ^A *Cast thy care upon the Lord, and he shall sustain thee.* Moreover, in the Gospels, teaching His own disciples, He says: *Be not anxious for your life, what you shall eat; nor for your body, what you shall put on.* And again: *Seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.* And speaking to Martha: *Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things: but one thing is necessary. For Mary hath chosen the good part, which shall not be taken away from her*; that is, to sit at the Lord’s feet and listen to His words.

The Tree of Life, whence it is so named. The sensible and spiritual Paradise. The Tree of Life and "every tree."

But certainly, the tree of life was of such a nature that it either conferred life, or could be eaten by those who were worthy of life and not subject to death. ^B Now some have imagined the paradise to be sensible, others, spiritual. However, it seems to me that just as man was created consisting of both a sensible and a spiritual nature, so also his most sacred temple was both sensible and spiritual, and it exhibited a twofold character. For in body, as we have related, he dwelt in that most divine and beautiful region; but in soul, he abode in a place higher and, by any comparison, more excellent and beautiful, having as his house his guest, God, and indeed having Him as an illustrious garment, by whose grace he was clothed, and in whose contemplation—which alone is the sweetest of fruits—he might rejoice with great pleasure, ^C like some other angel, and be fed by it; this is what has rightfully been called the tree of life. For the sweetness of divine participation imparts to those who perceive it a life interrupted by no death. And that is what God called "every tree," saying: *Of every tree that is in the paradise ye shall eat.* For He Himself is the All, in whom and through whom all things consist.

The Tree of Knowledge.

But the tree of the knowledge of good and evil ^D is the discernment of manifold speculation, that is, the recognition of one's own nature; which, insofar as it proclaims the magnificence of the Artificer within itself, is indeed good for the mature and those who have progressed in divine contemplation, because they have nothing to fear that they might slip into worse.

^A For it is not good for those who are still young and have an appetite more ravenous than is fitting—who, because they are not yet firmly rooted in what is best, nor constantly fixed in the contemplation of the only Good—naturally turn toward the care of their own body, and are distracted by it.

^B Omne lignum, God’s knowledge through created things. In this way, I think that the paradise was twofold, and the God-bearing Fathers have truly handed this down, both those who taught in this manner and those who taught in that. Yet, it is also possible to understand "every tree" as that knowledge of divine power which is acquired from created things, as the divine Apostle says: "For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made" (Rom. 1, 20). But of all these thoughts and contemplations, that one is the more excellent which consists in the consideration of ourselves, or of our own composition, as the divine David says: "Your knowledge is too wonderful for me" (Ps. CXXXVIII, 6), that is, from my own structure. Moreover, such knowledge for Adam, being newly created and tender, was not without danger for the reasons we have mentioned.

Lignum vitae again, and of the knowledge of good and evil. Sensible food is akin to death. By the "tree of life," it is permissible to understand that more divine speculation which is born from sensible things, and that ascent by which, through them, we rise up to the parent, creator, and author of all; this is what the Scripture calls "every tree," that is, full and undivided, bearing only the participation of Good. But by the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil," it means the sensible and delightful food which, although it presents the appearance of sweetness, in truth brings the one who partakes of it into the possession of evils. For God says: "You may eat of every tree in the garden" (Gen. II, 16), as if He were saying, if I am not mistaken: "Cause that through all creatures you may rise up to me, the Creator, and pluck one fruit from all of them—namely, Me, who am the true Life. Take pains that all things may bring you the fruit of life; and act so that you may consist in the nature of things through participation in Me. For in this way you shall be immortal. But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat. For in the day that you eat of it, you shall surely die" (Gen. II, 17). For the nature of sensible food is such that it replenishes that which has ebbed away, and departs into the privy and corruption. Nor is it possible that he who feeds on sensible food should remain incorruptible. ^D

Chapter XII.

Thus, therefore, God created the intelligent substance, I mean the angels and all the heavenly orders.

which are ^A clearly of an incorporeal nature; incorporeal, I say, if they are compared with the grossness of matter. For otherwise, God alone is truly devoid of matter and body. In this same way He also created the sensible nature, namely, heaven and earth and what lies between them; the former He made familiar to Himself (for the rational and intellectual nature is familiar and akin to God, and apprehended by the mind alone), but the latter, entirely set apart ^B at an immense distance, as falling under the senses. But it was necessary, as the interpreter of divine things, Gregory, says, that a specimen of the greater wisdom and munificence concerning the natures of things should be given, so that a certain composite being, as it were, should be fashioned out of both—which would be, as it were, a bond between the visible and invisible nature. And by this word *should be fashioned*, nothing else is indicated but the will of the Creator. For this law and sanction is most becoming, nor will anyone say to the Maker: Why did You make me thus? For the potter has the right over His own clay ^C to fashion vessels of different kinds, by which He might provide an argument for His own skill.

Since these things were thus, God creates man from a visible and invisible nature with His own hands to His own image and likeness: and so, indeed, that having fashioned the body from the earth, He bestowed upon him by His own inbreathing a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, which we call the divine image. For what is said, *to the image*, signifies the power of understanding and liberty of will: but what is said, *to the likeness*, denotes an express similarity ^D of virtue, as far as is possible.

NOTE.

76) *To the image*. Chrysostom, in order to repel the ravings of the Anthropomorphites further, said that it did not even pertain to the substance of man to be the image of God, but that he obtained this because he was set over all living creatures: he says this in his homily on Genesis and elsewhere. But Basil had taught that man exercises authority because of the reason with which he is endowed. For he interprets the voice of God thus: *Let us give him the prerogative of reason, and thus let them preside.* Damascenus, lib. *De duabus voluntatibus*, writes that it is fitting for the angel just as for man to be the image of God, on account of reason, intelligence, and free will; and also because both beget and emit the Word; finally, because they are also set over created things. He says, however, that man was made in a singular way to the image of God, because from Adam, who was created, Abel was born, and Eve was produced; and because his soul rules over the body, as God rules over the world, by which it comes about that man collects within himself things most diverse, namely, the spiritual and sensible nature. This he seems to have taken from Anastasius the Antiochene, who in another chapter says that by the word "image" is meant the Word, who is the image of the Father, made man. He hands this down in his homily on the *Hexameron* and in two other small works which he published on this subject, which are found after the *Philocalia* of Origen. The former is found among the works of Gregory of Nyssa, though it is truly written by Anastasius the Antiochene.

The Greek Fathers also, taught by the philosophy of Plato, commonly say that man is the image of God, firstly because he is rational; but that the likeness is that which, through divine help, and his own labor, he is adorned with virtues; so that, through sin, although the image remains, the likeness vanishes. Thus Clement of Alexandria, lib. II *Strom.*; Basil, hom. *De hominis structura*; Nyssa, *De opificio hominis* cap. 16; Isidore of Pelusium, and others, who do not deny that those voices are synonymous. But Cyril of Alexandria in the fragment found in the *Catenae* does not prove this distinction.

Error of Origen drawn from the Timaeus.

The endowments of the newly created man.

[NOTÆ] It is not safe for one who has been formed of clay to take pleasure in such games. Origen had truly intended this for himself, to discuss the mysteries of the faith in his *Books on First Principles* as if in sport, as he himself testifies in the preface. Gregory of Nyssa points to Origen more clearly in his chapter *On the Making of Man*, where he says: "None of those who came before us, in the commentaries they published *On First Principles*, declared that the souls of men existed separately before their bodies as a kind of people using their own laws, such that if they were to apply themselves to virtue and honesty, they would clearly not be joined to bodies; but if they should fall away from the conjunction with the good, they would slip down into this life, and thus be involved in bodies." ^C Shortly after, he subjoins the opinion of others who concluded from the history of Adam's creation that the soul was subsequent to the body. He deems both opinions worthy of censure. The first, however, is concocted from Pythagorean fables: why even from those of the Gnostics and especially the Basilidians? Jerome, *Epistle* 82, marks with folly the persuasion of certain ecclesiastics who believed that souls were created long ago in the treasury of God. He says that it must then be investigated whether they are made daily by God and sent into bodies according to that [verse] of the Gospel: "My Father works even until now," etc. Or whether it is certainly by traduction, as Tertullian, Apollinarius, and the greater part of the Westerners suppose, so that just as body is born from body, ^D so soul might be born from soul, and subsist in a similar condition to that of the brutes. Tertullian indeed held this view; but Apollinarius, since he separated the mind from the soul—the sentient one, that is—it should not seem surprising to anyone that he argued in the same way about the origin of the human soul as he did about that of the brute. The entire Eastern Church ever after abhorred this error, from which the Western Church did not dissent, although Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, lib. X, c. 28, wrote that the opinion of those who think souls are created from parents carries more weight regarding the baptism of infants, indeed on account of the propagation of original sin, which he had asserted against the Pelagians: as if this could not happen unless the soul were generated by traduction. Regarding which matter there exists in the codex an elegant oration of Georgius Scholarius, or Gennadius of Constantinople, to Theophanes, the prelate of Media.

^A so that it might remain; and that it might praise Him by whose benefits it has been adorned; this, that it might suffer, and by suffering be admonished, and, because of the greatness of the cause, be exalted and amended: an animal here, in the present life, governed by a certain plan; and elsewhere, that is, migrating to the future age; and the end of which mystery is that it be endowed with divinity through the conversion of the mind toward God; not that it migrates into the divine substance, but that it participates in the divine illumination.

^A That man was created sinless, and endowed with free will. I say sinless, not as one not admitting of sin—for only the Divine is incapable of sin—but as not having sin in his nature, but rather in his choice; that is, as having the power to remain and progress in the good, while being assisted by divine grace, and likewise to turn from the good and become fixed in evil, God permitting this because of the free will. For that which is done by force is not virtue.

^B Regarding the soul. — Now the soul is a living, simple, and incorporeal substance, escaping by its own nature the perception of bodily eyes, immortal, a participant in reason and intelligence, using an organic body and contributing to it life, growth, and sense, and the faculty of generation, not having a mind separate from itself (for the mind is nothing other than its most subtle part: for what the eye is in the body, that the mind is in the soul), endowed with free will, the power of volition and action, mutable, that is, easily turned by will, because it is also created. All these things it has received by nature from the grace of Him who created it, from whom it has also received its being and its being such by nature.

^B Now, I say he was created by nature sinless, and with a free will. I say sinless, not as though he were not capable of admitting sin—for only the Divine is incapable of sin—but as not having the sinning in his nature, but rather in his volition; that is, as one having power to remain and progress in the good, being aided by divine grace, and likewise to turn from the good and to exist in evil, God allowing this on account of the free will. For that which is done by force is not virtue. ^C The soul, therefore, is a living substance, simple and incorporeal, invisible to bodily eyes by its own nature, immortal, endowed with reason and intellect, without form, using an organic body, and providing to it life, growth, and sensation, and the power of generation, not having a mind separate from itself, but [having it as] its most pure part—for just as the eye is in the body, so is the mind in the soul—endowed with free will, capable of volition and action, mutable, that is, easily turned by will, because it is also created.

according to nature ^A received from the grace of the Creator, from whom it has received both its being and its having become such by nature.

On the various senses of "incorporeal."

On the body.

We must know that there are four elements: earth, which is dry and cold; water, which is cold and moist; air, which is moist and hot; and fire, which is hot and dry. In the same way, there are four humors ^B corresponding to the four elements: black bile, corresponding to earth, for it is dry and cold; phlegm, corresponding to water, for it is cold and moist; blood, corresponding to air, for it is moist and hot; and yellow bile, corresponding to fire, for it is hot and dry. The fruits are composed of the elements, the humors are composed of the fruits, and the bodies of living beings are composed of the humors, and into these they are resolved. For everything composed of certain things is resolved back into them.

That man shares in common with inanimate, irrational, and rational things.

The senses are five: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Concerning motion triggered by impulse, ^D

^A that is, the shift from place to place, and the motion of the whole body, and the vocal and respiratory functions—for these things are within our power to do or not to do. Through the rational faculty, man is joined to the incorporeal and intelligent natures, by reasoning, and by understanding, and by judging each thing, and by pursuing the virtues, and by embracing piety, which is the summit of all virtues; for this reason, man is called a microcosm.

The properties of body and soul.

Piety and contemplation, however, belong properly to the soul. Virtues are common to both soul and body, though they are referred back to the soul, inasmuch as the soul employs the body as an instrument.

The rational faculty is by nature the master of the irrational part.

But the nutrid faculty, the generative, and the arterial pulsatory belong to that part which rejects the rule of reason. The vegetative faculty is that by which we grow and generate; the vital, finally, is that by which the arteries are moved.

Furthermore, the nutrid faculty has fourfold powers, namely: the attractive, by which food is drawn in; the retentive, by which it is retained and not allowed to be immediately excreted; the alterative, by which it alters the food ^D into humors.

^A the excretory, by which the residue is separated and cast out through the bowels.

We must know that of the faculties in a living creature, some are psychic, some vegetative, and some vital. Psychic faculties are those that depend on choice, that is to say, movement by impulse and sensation. Movement by impulse includes change of place, the movement of the whole body, the production of voice, and respiration; for it is in our power to do these things or not to do them. Vegetative and vital faculties, however, are those that do not depend on choice. The vegetative faculties are the nutritive, the augmentative, and the seminal; the vital is the pulsitic. These operate whether we wish it or not, and perform their function.

We must know ^B that of things, some are good and some are bad. A good thing expected creates desire; present, it yields pleasure. Likewise, a bad thing expected brings fear; present, it brings sorrow. We must know that when we say "good" here, we mean either that which is truly good or that which seems to be good; and the same is to be understood of evil.

Chapter XIII. Concerning pleasures

Of pleasures, some are ^C of the soul and some are of the body. Those of the soul are all those which the soul enjoys by itself, such as those felt in learning and contemplation. Those of the body are those in which both soul and body participate, and for this reason they are called bodily; such as those usually derived from food, sexual union, and the like. One could find no pleasure that belongs to the body alone.

Again, of pleasures, some are true and some are false; and ^D those of the mind alone are based on knowledge and contemplation, while those involving the body are based on sensation. And of the pleasures involving the body, some are natural and at the same time necessary, without which it is impossible to live, such as food, the replenishment of deficiency, and necessary clothing; while others are natural,

those that are obtained from necessary clothing. Other things, likewise, are natural, but not necessary, such as the natural and legitimate use of venery. For although venereal pleasures concern the conservation of the entire species, they are not, however, of such a nature that, if they are removed, life cannot be led in virginity. Others, finally, are neither necessary nor natural, such as drunkenness, the petulance of lust, or the excessive gorging of food. For these kinds of pleasures neither conduce to the conservation of our life, nor to the propagation of the species; indeed, they are harmful. Wherefore, he who professes a way of life acceptable to God ought to pursue only those things which are at once necessary and natural; but those which are natural, yet not necessary, he should hold in a secondary place, and not apply them except at a suitable time, place, and measure. The remaining ones, finally, must be utterly rejected. ^B What pleasures ought to be considered honest. Honest pleasures further are to be considered entirely those which are neither joined with sorrow, nor afford cause for repentance, nor give rise to any other inconvenience, nor exceed measure, nor, finally, greatly distract us from serious business, or enslave us.

CHAPTER XIV. On Sadness.

Tristitiæ quatuor species. Tristitiæ quatuor species: mæror, molestia, invidentia, misericordia. Mæror est tristitia vocem adimens: molestia, tristitia premens: invidentia, tristitia ob alterius bona: misericordia denique, tristitia ob res aliorum adversas.

CHAPTER XV. On Fear.

^C Timoris genera. Sed et metus sex sunt genera: segnities, pudor, verecundia, stupor, terror, angor. Segnities est metus impendentis actionis. Pudor, metus ex vituperationis exspectatione: optimusque est hic affectus. Verecundia, metus ob admissum turpe facinus: at ne hic quidem affectus extra spem salutis est. Stupor, metus ex immani aliqua re animo objecta. Terror, metus ex insuetæ rei specie contractus. Angor denique, metus ne vota nostra infeliciter cedant. Tunc enim angore afficimur, cum metuimus ne quod aggressi sumus, bene non succedat.

CAP. XVI. De Ira.

^D Ira est sanguinis qui cordi affusus est, ebullitio, ex exhalatione, seu fuligine bilis proveniens: unde et Græce appellatur, et χόλος. Est etiam interdum ira, ulciscendi libido. Nam cum...

^A ab aliquo lædimur, aut lædi nos existimamus, ira commovemur: ac tunc mixtus fit hic affectus ex cupiditate et ira.

Tres iræ species.— Tres porro iræ sunt species: Excandescentia, quæ et χολή, et χόλος dicitur; μῆνις, item, et κότος. Nam cum ira exoritur, moverique incipit, χολὴ nuncupatur. μῆνις autem est bilis diuturnior, sive acceptæ injuriæ memoria. Unde etiam hoc nomen nacta est ἀπὸ τοῦ μένειν, id est quod maneat et memoriæ tradatur. Κότος denique est ira ulciscendi occasionem captans, unde et nomen traxit ἀπὸ τοῦ κεῖσθαι, id est, eo quod anima reposita sit.

Ira, rationis satelles, vindex concupiscentiæ.— Est porro ira rationis satelles, vindex cupiditatis. Nam cum rei alicujus desiderio tenemur, atque ab aliquo cohibemur, tunc quasi injuria accepta, adversus illum excandescimus; ratione videlicet eam rem iracundia dignam judicante, in illis utique qui ordinem suum tuentur, ut naturæ ratio postulat. ^B

CHAPTER XVII

On the imaginative faculty.

Quid sit imaginatio.— Vis imaginandi, irrationabilis animæ partis facultas est, per sensuum organa operans; quæ et sensus dicitur. Φανταστὸν autem, et sensibile illud appellatur, quod sub vim illam et sensum cadit, v. gr. visus ipsa vis est cernendi; visibile, quod visui subjicitur; puta, lapis, aut aliquid hujusmodi. Φαντασία（*phantasia*）de σι est affectio irrationabilis animæ ex aliqua re, quæ in imaginandi vim cadat, exorta. Φάντασμα δέ, phantasma denique, seu visum, est affectio inanis in parte animæ irrationabili, quam nulla res, quæ imaginationi subjiciatur, efficiat. Sedes porro virtutis imaginandi est anterior cerebri ventriculus. ^C

CHAPTER XVIII

De sensu.

Sensus est ea animæ vis, quæ res materiales percipit, seu dijudicat. Αἰσθητήρια δὲ, sensoría autem, organa sunt, sive membra quorum beneficio et opera sentimus. Αἰσθητὰ δὲ, sensibilia vero, ea quæ sub sensum cadunt. Αἰσθητικὸν δὲ, sentiendi capax, denique, animal est sensu præditum. Sensus autem quinque sunt, totidemque sensuum organa.

Primus sensus est visus. ^D Sensoría ejus, seu organa sentiendi, nervi sunt e cerebro derivati, et oculi. Ac visus quidem primarié colorem percipit, et una cum colore corpus coloratum dignoscit, ipsiusque magnitudinem, figuram, locum in quo

^A its movement, and its shape, and the space between, and the number, and motion, and rest; whether it is rough or smooth, level or uneven, sharp or blunt; and finally, its structure and consistency, whether it is aqueous, or earthly, that is, moist or dry.

Only man and the ape do not move their ears. ^B The second sense is hearing, which is perceptive of voices and sounds. This sense distinguishes their acuteness and gravity, their smoothness and their roughness, and their volume. Its organs are the soft nerves led from the brain, and the structure of the ears. Furthermore, of all animals, only man and the ape do not move their ears.

The third sense is smell, which occurs as the nostrils carry vapors to the brain, and it terminates at the extremities of the anterior ventricles of the brain. The sense of smell perceives and senses odors. Now, the most general distinction of odors is that we understand some to be sweet, others foul, and others neither sweet nor foul. A sweet odor comes about when the humors that are within the bodies have been properly cooked. But if they have been cooked only moderately, their state will also be intermediate. But if there is less than moderate cooking, or no cooking at all, a foul odor is exhaled. ^C

The fourth sense is taste, by which flavors are perceived or sensed. Its organs are the tongue, especially its extremity or tip, and the palate (which some Greeks call a "calyx" or cup), in which those nerves are stretched out that are carried down from the brain and report to that part of the soul which holds the primacy, what has been perceived and what sense has been active. The qualities of flavors, which are called tastable, are these: sweetness, acrimony, acidity, acerbitas, astringency, bitterness, saltiness, richness, viscosity. These qualities are distinguished by taste. But water, as far as these qualities are concerned, is devoid of all flavor: for it has no quality. Now, astringency is nothing else but a certain more intense and redundant bitterness.

The fifth sense is touch, which is also common to all animals. ^D It exists, however, through the operation of the nerves distributed from the brain into the whole body. From this it happens that the whole body, and likewise the other organs of perception, possess the sense of touch. Furthermore, subject to touch are the hot and the cold, the soft and the hard, the tenacious, the rigid, the heavy and the light. For these are known by touch alone. Common to both touch and sight are the rough and the smooth; the dry and the moist; the thick and the thin, the upward and the downward; also place and magnitude (if indeed it be so great that it is subject to perception), and the dry and the rigid.

that is to say, ^A porous, and round, provided it be small, and other such shapes. Likewise, it also perceives a body that is approaching, along with memory and thought; and likewise a number up to two or three, and these small, and easily comprehended. Sight perceives these things more than touch does.

One must know that the Creator fashioned each of the other sense organs as double, so that if one happens to be injured, the other may fulfill the need. For He created two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, and two tongues; but in some animals these are divided, as in snakes, while in others they are joined, as in man. But He diffused touch throughout the whole body, except for the bones, the nerves, the nails, the horns, the hair, the joints, and other such things.

One must know that sight sees in a straight line; but smell and hearing do not perceive objects of sense in a straight line only, but from every direction. However, touch and taste do not know things in a straight line, nor from every direction, but only when they approach their own proper sensible objects.

Chapter XIX.

Concerning the cognitive faculty.

Chapter XX.

Concerning the memorial faculty.

learning or through the natural notion of the intelligent mind. For this does not come from sensation: indeed, sensible things are kept in memory by themselves, ^A but with regard to intelligible things, if we have learned something about them, we remember it; but we have no memory of their substance.

How recalling (reminiscence) comes to be. — A person is said to truly "recall" when he recovers the memory that was obscured by forgetfulness. For forgetfulness is the loss of memory. Therefore, the imagination transmits the materials perceived by the senses to the faculty of thought or reason (the force of both terms is the same)—and that faculty, having received and weighed them, transmits them to the memory. The organ and seat of memory is the posterior ventricle of the brain, which they also call the cerebellum, and the animal spirit which is enclosed within it.

CHAPTER XXI. Concerning the internal and the uttered word (logos).

^B Reason and speech, or the internal word of the mind and the word of the mouth. — Again, the rational part of the soul is divided into the internal word and the uttered word. The internal word is a movement of the soul taking place in the faculty of reasoning without any vocalization, whence we often traverse an entire speech within ourselves while remaining silent, and we converse in our dreams. On account of this, we are primarily called rational. For those who are born deaf, or who have lost the use of their voice due to some disease or injury, are nonetheless rational. ^C But the uttered word manifests its power in the voice and in modes of speech; that is, the word which is brought forth by the aid of the tongue and mouth. Hence it is called "uttered," and it is the messenger of the mind's thought. By this word, moreover, we are called "speaking beings"—that is, endowed with the faculty of speech.

CHAPTER XXII. Concerning passion and activity.

"Passion" is an equivocal term. — The term "passion" has multiple meanings. For the passion of the body is spoken of, such as diseases and wounds; and again, the passion of the soul, such as desire and anger. ^D In a common and general sense, however, passion is an affection of an animal, which is followed by pleasure or pain. For pain follows passion, yet passion itself is not pain. For insensible things suffer but do not feel pain. Therefore, not the passion itself, but the sense of the passion, is pain. Furthermore, that which strikes the sense must be noteworthy—that is, significant.

What soul-passion is. — For the definition of passions is as follows: Passion is a sensible movement of the appetitive faculty arising from the imagination of some good or evil. And in another way, passion is...

an irrational movement of the soul due to the opinion of something good or evil. Now, the opinion of what is good moves desire; the opinion of what is evil moves anger. But in a general and common sense, passion is thus defined: Passion is a movement from one thing into another. ^A Action, however, is an efficacious movement. That which moves from itself is called efficacious. Thus, for example, anger is an action of the irascible part, but it is a passion of both parts of the soul, and indeed of the whole body, when it is violently drawn by anger towards actions. For then the movement happens from one thing into another, which is called passion.

And in another way, an action is called a passion. For action is a movement in accordance with nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature. Therefore, according to this reasoning, an action obtains the name of passion when it is stirred by a movement repugnant to nature, whether one is moved by oneself or by a movement impressed by another. Thus, the movement of the heart, by which the arteries are pulsed, since it is natural, is also an action; but that which arises from palpitations, because it exceeds the measure and is not in accordance with nature, is certainly a passion, not an action. ^B

Nor are all movements that are excited in the passible part of the soul called passions; rather, only those that are more vehement and proceed as far as sense perception. For light movements, which are not perceived by the senses, are not yet passions; for a passion must have a significant magnitude. Hence, it is added to the definition of passion that it is a *sensible* movement, because small movements, escaping the senses, do not constitute a passion.

^C

CHAPTER XXI: The faculties of the soul, both cognitive and vital.

It must be known that our soul has two kinds of faculties: the cognitive and the vital. The cognitive faculties are the intellect, the thought, the opinion, the imagination, and the sense. The vital — that is, the appetitive — are the will and the faculty of choice. But so that what is said may be clearer, let us examine these things in detail; and first, let us speak of those that are cognitive.

As for imagination and sense, enough has already been said in what precedes. Through the sense, therefore, a movement is formed in the soul, which is called imagination. From imagination arises opinion. Then the thought (dianoia), examining the opinion to see whether it is true or false, judges the truth ^D; whence it is also called *dianoia* (thought), from *dianoiein* (to think through) and *diakrinein* (to discern). Therefore, what has been examined and defined as true is called the intellect (nous).

Otherwise: It must be known that the first of the...

^A If the intellect’s agitation is simple, it is called thought (noesis). But if it is fixed upon something, it is called an *ennoia* (concept or mental notion), which, remaining and impressing the soul toward that which is thought, is termed *enthymesis* (reflection). If the *enthymesis* stays in the same place and examines and inquires into the soul’s relation to what is being thought, it is termed *phronesis* (prudence). And *phronesis*, when it has pondered, produces *dialogismos* (reasoning), which is called internal speech; the definers say this is the fullest movement of the mind within the faculty of reason, generated without any emission of voice, from which they say external speech proceeds, which is spoken by the tongue. Having thus spoken of the cognitive faculties, let us speak ^B of the vital, or appetitive, faculties.

One must know that a power of appetite for what is according to nature, and that which preserves those things essential to nature, is implanted in the soul; this is called will (*thelesis*). For it desires substance, being, to live, and to be moved according to mind and sense, longing for its own natural and complete existence. Therefore, they define this natural will as follows: Will is a rational and vital appetite, depending solely on things that are natural. Hence *thelesis*, truly, is nothing other than the natural, vital, and rational appetite itself for all those things of which nature is constituted; and it is a simple faculty. For the appetite of irrational creatures, since it is not rational, is not called *thelesis*.

^C But *boulēsis* (volition) is a certain natural will, that is, a natural and rational appetite for some thing. For there is implanted in the human soul a power of desiring according to reason; when, therefore, this appetite is naturally moved toward some thing, it is called *boulēsis*; for *boulēsis* is an appetite and a desire for some thing.

*Boulēsis* is said to be both of those things which are in our power and of those which are not in our power; that is, of things which can happen and of things which cannot. For we often wish to attain, or to be temperate, or to sleep, or something of this sort; and these are both in our power and are possible. ^D

^A We also wish to be kings; yet this is not in our power. We also wish perhaps never to die; but this is among the things that are impossible.

The act of willing has as its object the end, not the things that are for the sake of the end. Now the end is the thing willed, such as to be king or to be in health; but that which is for the sake of the end is the thing deliberated upon, that is, the manner by which we ought to be in health or to be king. And after the willing comes inquiry and consideration, and after these, if it is among the things in our power, comes counsel, that is, deliberation. Counsel is an inquisitive appetite concerning those things that are in our power and are to be done; for one deliberates whether one ought to pursue the matter or not. Then one judges what is better, and this is called judgment. Then one is disposed, and embraces that which was judged by counsel, and it is called an opinion (gnome). For if one judges, but is not disposed toward what was judged—that is, does not embrace it—it is not called an opinion. Then after this disposition comes choice, that is, election; for choice is the selection and choosing of one thing before another when two are set before one. Then one rushes toward the action, and this is called impulse; then one uses it, and it is called use; then the appetite ceases after the use. ^B

Now in irrational creatures, an appetite for something arises, and immediately there is an impulse toward action. For the appetite of irrational creatures is irrational, and they are led by natural appetite; wherefore the appetite of irrational creatures is not even called volition (thelesis) or will (boulesis). For volition is a rational and self-determined natural appetite. But in the case of men, who are rational beings, the natural appetite is led rather than leading. For it is moved self-determinedly and with reason, since the cognitive and vital faculties are joined together in man; therefore he has appetite self-determinedly, wills self-determinedly, inquires and considers self-determinedly, deliberates self-determinedly, judges self-determinedly, is disposed self-determinedly, makes a choice self-determinedly, rushes forward self-determinedly, and acts self-determinedly in those things which are according to nature. ^C

One must know, however, (85) that in God we speak of will, but we do not properly speak of choice. For God does not deliberate; for deliberation belongs to ignorance. For no one deliberates about what he knows. But if counsel is of ignorance, then choice is also. But God, knowing all things simply, does not deliberate. ^D

Furthermore, we do not speak of counsel or choice in the soul of the Lord; for it did not labor under ignorance. Even if it were of a nature that is ignorant of future things, nevertheless, having been united to the Word of God by substance, it had knowledge of all things—not by grace, but, as has been said, on account of the substantial union. For he was the same, both God and man; wherefore he did not have a gnomic will. For he had the natural will, the simple one, which is observed in all the persons of men in the same way; but his holy soul did not have a "gnome"—that is, an object of choice—contrary to his divine will, nor anything other than his divine will. ^B For the "gnome" is divided along with the persons, except in the case of the holy, simple, uncompounded, and indivisible Godhead. For there, since the persons are not altogether divided and separated, neither is the object of choice divided. And there, since there is one nature, the natural will is also one. And since the persons cannot be torn apart, the subject of the will is also one, and the movement of the three persons is one and the same. But among men, since the nature is one, the natural will is also one; but since the persons are separated and are distant from one another by place, and by time, and by disposition toward things, and by many other things, for this reason the wills and the "gnomes" are diverse. But in our Lord Jesus Christ, since the natures are diverse, the natural wills of his divinity and of his humanity—that is, the volitional faculties—are also diverse. But since the person is one, and there is one who wills, the object of the will—that is, the gnomic will—of his human will is one, ^C indeed, following his divine will, and willing those things which the divine will willed that it should will; the human will, indeed, obeying his divine will, and that which his divine will willed it to will.

We must know that it is one thing to speak of the *thelesis* (will), another of the *boulēsis* (counsel), another of the *thelēton* (the object of the will), another of the *thelētikon* (the volitional faculty), and another of the *thelōn* (the one willing). *Thelesis* is the simple power itself of willing. *Boulēsis* is the will directed toward something—that is, what we will—for instance, the appetite is moved toward food. This simple natural appetite is the *thelesis*; it is the *boulēsis* for food; the food itself is the *thelēton*; that which is endowed with the faculty of willing, such as man, is the *thelētikon*; and finally, the *thelōn*, or "one willing," is the one who uses the will. ^D

It must be observed that the word "will" sometimes indicates...

^A the will itself, that is, the willing faculty, and is called natural will; sometimes it indicates the thing willed, and is called gnomic will.

CHAPTER XXIII. On Act

One must know that all the aforementioned faculties—the cognitive, the vital, the natural, and the artificial—are called acts or operations. For an act (*energeia*) is the natural force and motion of every substance. And again: an act is the natural, innate motion of every substance. Hence it is clear that those things which have the same substance, also have the same act; and those which have different natures, also have different acts; for it is impossible for a substance to be devoid of a natural act.

An act is, again, the natural, manifestative force of each substance. And again: an act is the natural and primary perennially-moving force of the intellectual soul; that is, its perennially-moving reason, naturally flowing forth from it without interruption. And again: an act is the natural force and motion of every substance, of which only that which does not exist is deprived.

Acts are also called actions, such as speaking, walking, eating, drinking, and ^B other such things.

Furthermore, act is called the perfection of potentiality.

Act is potentiality spoken of in various ways. — Now, a thing is said to exist in two ways: in potentiality and in act. For we call a nursing infant a grammarian in potentiality, because he is so constituted as to become skilled in the art of grammar by learning. Again, we call a grammarian both a grammarian in potentiality and in act; in act, because he possesses the knowledge of grammar; in potentiality, because he can interpret, though he is not currently ^B performing the interpretation. We call a grammarian an actor again, when he acts, that is, when he interprets. One must therefore know that the second way is common to both potentiality and act; the second way to potentiality, but the first to act.

The primary operation of nature. — The primary, sole, and true operation of nature, or act, is the life which we choose of our own accord, that is, rational and free, by which the human species is constituted. Those who deprive the Lord of this, I know not how they can say that He is God made man.

Act is finally the efficacious motion of nature. Efficacious, moreover, is called that which ^C is moved by itself.

CHAPTER XXIV

Regarding the voluntary and the involuntary.

Since that which is done of one's own accord is in some act, and what is deemed involuntary is in some act, and many ^D some, and that which is truly involunt—

involuntary, they place not only in suffering, but also in doing. One must know that an act is a rational operation. Praise or blame follows upon acts; and some of them are done with pleasure, others with pain; and some of them are desirable to the doer, while others are to be avoided. And of those things to be desired, some are always desirable, others only at a certain time. Likewise also with those things to be avoided. And again, some acts are pitied and deemed worthy of forgiveness, while others are hated and punished. To that which is voluntary, praise or blame ^B always follows, as does being done with pleasure, and the acts being desirable to those who do them, whether always or at the time they are done. To that which is involuntary, there follows being deemed worthy of forgiveness or pity, and being done with pain, and not being desirable, nor the thing done being completed by oneself, even if it is done by force.

The involuntary act is twofold: one is by force, the other by ignorance. It is by force when the productive principle, or cause, is from without, that is, when we are acted upon by another, not being at all persuaded, nor contributing in accord with our own impulse, nor co-operating at all, or performing what is forced of ourselves. And so, defining it, we say: it is involuntary, that of which the principle is from without, with the one forced contributing nothing according to his own impulse. By "principle," we mean the productive cause. But the involuntary by ignorance is when we ourselves do not provide the cause of the ignorance, but it happens to come about. For if someone kills while drunk, he killed while ignorant, but not ^C involuntarily; for the cause of the ignorance, that is, the drunkenness, he brought about himself. But if someone, while shooting in his customary place, killed his father who was passing by, he is said to have done this involuntarily by reason of ignorance.

Since the involuntary is therefore twofold, one by force and the other by ignorance, the voluntary is opposed to both. For the voluntary is that which is done neither by force nor through ignorance. Voluntary, then, is that of which the principle, that is to say the cause, is in oneself, knowing the particulars through which and in which the act is. The particulars are those things which are called by the ^D rhetoricians "circumstantial parts": for instance, "who," that is, the one who acted; "whom," that is, the one who suffered; "what," that is, the thing itself done, for example, he killed; "by what," that is, by what instrument; "where," that is, in what place; "when," that is, in what time; "how," the manner of the act; "why," that is, for what cause.

^A It is to be known that there are some things intermediate between voluntary and involuntary, which, though they are unpleasant and grievous, we accept for the sake of avoiding a greater evil; as when, for fear of shipwreck, we cast the cargo of a ship into the sea.

Children and brute animals act of their own accord, but not from choice. But this also is to be noted, that children and brute animals act of their own accord, but not from choice. Furthermore, those things also which we do when moved by anger, without previous deliberation, we do voluntarily, but not according to choice. And if a friend appears suddenly, he is present to us voluntarily, but not by our choice. And he who comes upon a treasure unexpectedly, falls upon it voluntarily, but not by choice. All these things are voluntary because we take pleasure in them, but they are not according to choice, because they do not arise from counsel. But it is necessary that counsel ^B should precede choice, as has been said.

CHAP. XXV.

Concerning that which is in our power, or free will.

Questions concerning free will. In the discussion of free will, that is, of that which is in our power, this first question arises: whether anything is in our power, for many deny this. The second is, what are those things which are subject to our will, and of what things do we have power. The third is, what is the cause of God’s having made us masters of our own actions. Therefore, beginning ^C from the first, let us first demonstrate from those things which are conceded even by them that some things are in our power, and let us speak as follows.

It is to be known that children and brute animals act voluntarily, but not by choice; and all that we do through passion, without having deliberated, we do voluntarily, but not according to choice. And if a friend suddenly presents himself, he is present to us voluntarily, but not by our choice. And he who unexpectedly encounters a treasure, encounters it voluntarily, but not by choice. All these things are voluntary because they are agreeable to them, but not according to choice, because it is not from counsel. But it is necessary that counsel should precede choice, as has been said.

CHAP. XXV [XXVI].

Concerning that which is in our power, that is, free will.

The discourse concerning free will, that is, that which is in our power, has as its first question whether there is anything that is in our power. For many are those who oppose this. The second is, what are the things that are in our power, and of what do we have authority. The third is, to examine the reason why God who made us, made us masters of our own actions. Having therefore taken up the first point, let us first speak by demonstrating that there are some things in our power, out of the things acknowledged by them, and let us speak thus. ^D [The Fathers defined free will as...] [alt-version omitted]

ON THE ORTHODOX FAITH BOOK II.

^A Of all things that come to pass, some say the cause is God, others necessity, or fate, or nature, or chance, or spontaneity. Now, the work of God is essence and providence; of necessity, the motion of those things that always behave in the same way; of fate, that those things that come to pass through it should happen of necessity—for fate itself imports necessity; of nature, generation, growth, corruption, plants, and animals; of chance, things that are rare and happen beyond expectation. For they define chance as the concurrence of two causes, which, having their beginning from choice, produce something other than what was naturally intended: as when someone digging a pit finds a treasure. For neither he who buried the treasure buried it with the intention that another should find it, nor, again, did he who found it dig with the intention of finding a treasure: but the one, so that when he wished he might take the treasure; the other, so that he might dig a pit. But something else happened, beyond what either had proposed for himself. Finally, they assign to spontaneity those things that happen to inanimate objects or irrational animals without nature or art. Such is their doctrine. To which of these, then, shall we ascribe the things that come to pass through men, if man is not the author and principle of his action? For it is not permissible to ascribe base and wicked actions to God, nor to necessity—for action is not of the class of things that always behave in the same way; nor to fate—for they say that fate is not of contingent things, but of necessary ones. Nor yet to nature; for the works of nature are plants and animals. Nor to chance; for the actions of men are not rare and ^B unexpected. Nor finally to spontaneity; for they say that the events of spontaneity are of inanimate objects or of irrational animals only. It remains, therefore, that man himself, who acts and does, is the author of his own works, and is endowed with free will.

^C Furthermore, if man is the author of no action, it is in vain that the faculty of deliberation has been given to him. For to what end should he use deliberation, if the choice of no action lies within his own power? For all deliberation is entered into for the sake of action. Moreover, to affirm that that which is most noble and most excellent in man is superfluous is of extreme absurdity. And therefore, when he deliberates, he deliberates for the sake of action. For there is no deliberation that is not for the sake of action.

CHAPTER XXVI.

De iis quae fiunt.

^A would actions be said to be done, if the action were not placed within our own power. In a word, all things that bring either praise or blame, and for which laws and counsels are given. But properly in our power are those things which pertain to the soul, and about which we deliberate. And deliberation concerns those things which can equally turn out in either way. Now that which can equally turn out is that which we are able to do, and which is its opposite; ^B the choice of this depends upon our mind, for this is the principle of action. Therefore, in us are these things which can happen in either way, such as: to be moved and not to be moved; to be incited and not to be incited; to desire those things which are not necessary and not to desire; to lie and not to lie; to give and not to give; to rejoice when it is fitting, and similarly not to rejoice, and where it is not fitting; and other things of this kind, in which the duties of virtue and vice are involved. For the free power over these is ours. Among those things which can equally turn out in either way, arts are numbered. For it is within our power to cultivate them and not to cultivate them. It must be observed, however, that while the choice of those things which fall under action is always in our power, the action itself is often hindered by a certain reason of Providence.

CAP. XXVII. For what reason we are endowed with free will.

^C Created things are by their own nature mutable. The freedom of the will is annexed to reason. There is no freedom of the will in brutes. ^D Therefore, we say that along with reason there also approaches the freedom of the will, and that changeableness and mutability are innate to created things. For everything that is created is also mutable. For if the beginning of its being began from change, it is necessary that these things be mutable. But change is the being brought forth into existence from non-existence, and the coming to be of something else from the subject matter. Things therefore which are inanimate and irrational are changed according to the aforementioned corporeal alterations, but the rational things, according to choice. For of the rational, one part is contemplative, and the other is practical. The contemplative is that which considers things as they are; but the practical is that which deliberates and prescribes right reason for things to be done; and they call the contemplative "mind" and the practical "reason"; and the one contemplative, "wisdom," and the practical, "prudence." Therefore, everyone who deliberates, deliberates as if the choice of the things to be done were in his own power, so that he might take what is selected from the deliberation, and having selected, might act. If this is so, then by necessity free will exists in the rational being; for either it will not be rational, or, being rational, it will be the master of its actions, and have free will. Whence even irrational creatures are not possessed of free will; for they are led by nature more than they lead, and therefore they do not argue against natural desire, but as soon as they desire something, they are moved toward the action.

Man, on the contrary, being a participant in reason, leads his nature rather than being led by it. Hence, it happens that even when he desires something, he has the power to restrain his desire if he wishes, or to follow it. This is also the reason why brute animals are neither praised nor blamed; while man, on the contrary, is susceptible to both praise and blame.

^B Know that angels, being rational, are self-determined and, as created beings, are mutable. This is clearly shown by the devil who, although created good by the Creator, became of his own free will the inventor of evil, along with the powers that apostatized with him—that is to say, the demons—while the rest of the angelic hosts remained in the good.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Concerning those things that are not in our power.

Things that are not in our power depend on God alone. Of those things, however, that are not in our own will, some have their origin or cause in those things that are in our will, such as the retribution for our actions, both in the present and in the future age; but all other things depend on the will of God. For the birth of all things is from God; but corruption was brought in on account of our wickedness for our punishment and benefit. For God did not make death, nor ^C does He take pleasure in the destruction of the living; but rather, through man—that is, through the transgression of Adam—death and the other punishments were inflicted. But all other things must be referred to God. For our birth looks to His creative power; our preservation, to His sustaining power; our governance and salvation, to the power of His providence over all; and finally, all the enjoyment of the eternal good things that await those who have kept what is in accordance with nature—for which we were created—is to be ascribed to His goodness. But since some contradict providence, let us now discuss it briefly. ^D

Chapter XXIX. Concerning Providence.

^A Providence is, therefore, the care that comes from God unto existing things. And again, providence is the will of God, by which all existing things receive their fitting guidance. But if providence is the will of God, then by necessity all things that come to pass through providence, according to the right reason, come to pass in the most beautiful and God-befitting manner, and in such a way that they could not possibly have come to be in a better way. For it is necessary that the Creator of beings and the provider for them be the same; for it is neither fitting nor consistent for one to be the Creator of beings and another to be the provider. For in this way, both would be entirely in weakness—the one in creating, and the other in providing. God, therefore, is both Creator and provider; and His power of creation, and of sustaining, and of providing, is His good will: “For all that the Lord willed, He has done in heaven and on earth; and who has resisted His will?” He willed all things to come to be, and they have come to be; He wills for the world to consist, and it consists; and whatever He wills, comes to pass.

^B That He provides, and that He provides well, one might most correctly consider in this way: God alone is by nature good and wise. As He is good, therefore, He provides; for he who does not provide is not good. For indeed, even men and brute beasts provide for their own offspring by natural affection, and he who does not provide is blamed. And as He is wise, He cares for existing things in the best possible way.

^C One ought, therefore, paying attention to these things, to admire all things, to praise all things, and to accept without questioning the works of providence, even if they seem to many to be unjust, because the providence of God is unknown and incomprehensible, and our thoughts and actions, and future things, are known to Him alone. But when I say "all things," I speak of those things which are not within our power; for the things that are within our power are not of providence, but of our own free will.

^A Of those things that fall under providence, some are by way of divine approval and others by way of permission. Now, although all things that fall under providence are in part by God’s good pleasure and in part by permission, all things that are undoubtedly good come to pass by approval; but there are many kinds of permission. For often God permits a righteous man to fall into calamities, that the virtue latent within him may be made manifest to others, as happened in the case of Job. Occasionally, He permits something that seems evil to be done, so that by an action which has the appearance of wickedness, some great and marvelous thing may be accomplished; just as through the cross He procured salvation for mankind. In another way, He allows a pious man to be afflicted by grievous hardships, lest he should fall away from a right conscience, or lest, through the power and grace divinely granted to him, he should slip into pride—as in the case of Paul.

^B Why He abandons one and another. Sometimes a person is abandoned to be a lesson for others, so that those who see his calamitous state may draw a lesson from it, as in the case of the rich man and Lazarus. For we are so constituted by nature that when we see others afflicted, we feel restrained. Again, a person is abandoned for the sake of another’s glory, and not because of his own sins or those of his parents—just as the man blind from birth was for the glory of the Son of Man. Furthermore, someone is permitted to suffer something grievous to arouse in the souls of others a zeal for emulation; for by the glory of the one who has suffered being increased, others may the more readily endure adversities, led by the hope of future glory and the desire for the goods to come, as happens in the case of the martyrs. Finally, someone is permitted to fall into an obscene act, so that by this means a graver vice may be dispelled. For example: let there be someone whose virtues and righteousness make him proud; God permits this man to fall into fornication, so that by such a fall, recognizing his own weakness, he may be humbled and approach to confess his sins to the Lord.

^A It should be known that the choice of things to be done is within our power, but the end of good actions is to be ascribed to the aid of God, who justly grants His help to those who choose the good with an upright conscience, according to His foreknowledge; while the end of evil actions is to be ascribed to the abandonment by God, who justly abandons the wicked according to His foreknowledge.

There are two kinds of abandonment. There is an abandonment by way of dispensation and education, and there is a total abandonment by way of final reprobation. The abandonment by way of dispensation and education is that which occurs for the amendment and salvation and glory of the one who suffers, or even to stir up others to emulation, or finally to contribute to the glory of God. But a total abandonment occurs when, although God has left no kind of remedy untried, the man remains dull and unhealed—or, to speak better, incurable—because of his own inclination. Then he is given over to total destruction, as was Judas. May God spare us, and deliver us from such an abandonment.

It must be known that there are many ways of divine providence, which can neither be explained in words nor comprehended by the mind. ^B Nor should this be ignored: that all the impulses of harsh things are brought upon those who receive them with thanksgiving for their salvation, and they become a cause of great benefit to them.

Of the Antecedent and Consequent Will of God

^C It should be known that God ^D wills antecedent and consequent. Antecedent will is, as it were, the primary will, such as that all men should be saved and come to His kingdom—for He did not create us to punish us, but that we might partake of His goodness—and so that those who sin might not perish. Consequent will is, as it were, the secondary will, such as that those who are addicted to evil should perish. For he does not punish them by necessity, but by their own will. Another passage exists in the homily on the Epistle to the Hebrews, in which he indicates this dual will, by explaining why it happened that God commanded sacrifices to be offered to Him, which the Scripture nevertheless testifies He did not want. This distinction between the two divine wills had been made long before. For Hierocles, in Photius, cod. 251, observes that Plato in the book *Of Laws* taught that God, indeed by an antecedent will, bestows good and fitting things upon men and preserves them—for "there is," as he says, "the antecedent gift of goods"—and [by] the other, the consequent [will], inflicts punishments for committed crimes and transfers the good to a blessed life. Saint Thomas approves of the sentiment of the Damascene, part 1, q. 19, a. 6; and neither he nor the other Greeks imply that this applies only to the state of innocence. Indeed, most of the Fathers, and especially the Orientals, teach by consensus that God, inasmuch as He is supremely good and a lover of souls, has a propense desire to will that all men absolutely should be saved.

^A For He did not fashion us to punish us, but that we might partake of His goodness, as He is good. Yet He wills that sinners should be punished, as He is just.

It is said, therefore, that the first is the antecedent will, and the good pleasure, coming from Him; but the second is the consequent will, and the permission, arising from our own cause. And this is twofold: the one is economical and educative for our salvation; the other is condemnatory for complete punishment, as we have said. These things pertain to those matters which are not in our power.

As for those things which are in our power, God, in the first place, wills and takes pleasure in what is good. ^B But evil things, and what are truly wicked, He wills neither antecedently nor consequently; He permits them to [our] free will. For what is done by force is neither reasonable nor virtuous. [Note: 1 Tim. ii, 4. Matth. viii, 30 seqq.] God provides for all of creation, and through all creation He bestows benefits, and by means of [these] He exercises care and education, and often through them [permits] the works of demons, as in the case of Job and the pigs, so that through these things He might bring benefit and deliverance.

CAP. XXX. Of prescience and predestination.

One must know that God foreknows all things, but He does not predetermine all things. ^D

^A For He foreknows those things which are within our power, but He does not predetermine them. For He does not will that wickedness should happen, nor does He force virtue. So that predestination is the work of divine foreknowledge and command. But He does predetermine those things that are not within our power according to His foreknowledge. For God has already, according to His foreknowledge, predetermined all things according to His goodness and His justice.

Virtue is implanted in nature by God, that is, it is consonant with it, so that nature may be capable of it. One must also know that virtue is implanted in our nature by God, and that He Himself is ^B the source and cause of all good, and without His cooperation (98) and aid, it is impossible to desire or do good. It is in our power, however, either to remain in virtue and follow God, or to depart from virtue and follow the devil—which is to turn from the good to evil, that is, to sin.

NOTES

^C ...it was, or vice, he fell, says Damascene: similarly, as Clement of Alexandria observes in book VI of the *Stromata* against the Gnostics: *We are by nature capable of virtue;* but not so as to possess it from birth, but rather we are suited to acquire it, not that we have it from nativity, but we are qualified for its acquisition. For because the study of virtue is according to reason, we have a certain kinship with it. This capacity, however, is a propensity toward virtue; but it is not virtue itself. But this author is not to be heeded where he denies that the virtues themselves were implanted by God in Adam. Jerome, in chapter 1 of the *Epistle to the Galatians*, following the Greek expositors, says that man is not born without Christ, nor is he devoid of the seeds of wisdom and justice, and the other virtues. Yet with this doctrine Pelagius afterwards abused, so as to exclude the necessity of God's grace. Better does Nazianzen, in his *Poem on Human Virtue*, teach that it was granted to man by God to be suited for the good, and then that virtue is added: *He rendered the good receivable, and grants the strength.*

^D (98) *And without His cooperation.* And without His aid. He said that God is the cause of all good: he appends that we need His aid not only to act, but also to will, and thus recognizes the necessity of prior grace. Because the Greek Fathers commonly speak in such a way as if the beginnings of faith and the good work were in our power, and that then, when we will, God adds grace, our Combefisius settles the difficulty. In [his] note on the sermon of Clement of Alexandria entitled, *Who is the Rich Man That Is Being Saved?* Clement had said: *A man applying his own exertion to virtue, so that when the passions are repressed he may arrive at a tranquil state of soul, achieves nothing thereby. But if his desire should burn more vehemently, and he should display every diligence; by the addition of strength from God, he attains the object of his prayers by the divine virtue joined to him.* For God breathes upon willing souls. But if [the man] departs from his begun promptness, even the given spirit is withdrawn. For to bestow virtue upon the unwilling would be the act of one who uses force. Since these things have drawn some into the suspicion of Pelagianism, Combefisius says: *To me, rather, this is an exalted commendation of grace, and an explanation of our efforts toward it; as if the first thing is to will, it is useless to us, and not even to will [is possible], unless grace excites, which is the "given spirit," making the very willing possible, and which is also withdrawn from those not willing, so that by the addition of power from God, they may become masters of virtue.* Similar things are found in Ambrose, Chrysostom, and other Fathers, which aim at the same point, by which they do not eliminate grace; but (as Paul does) they exhort us not to receive it in vain. And very unjust is he who...

^A imputes Pelagianism to Chrysostom or other Fathers because they said that God inspires them with a heavenly motion, whom He foresaw would agree with Him. For, as the most learned Petavius observes, they do not establish a meritorious cause for divine grace, as it is called, but an opportunity for gratuitous largesse. For men are not moved by God in the manner of inanimate objects; but since they possess free will, and are so disposed that, according to the varying circumstances of things and times, they embrace one thing or another, toward which they would otherwise in no wise be moved; who would deny that God, the ruler of the universe, also ^B employs these, in order to convert those whom He has purposed to save? For "To those who love God all things work together for good, to those who are called according to purpose" (Rom. VIII, 28). Thus, without loss to the gratuitous calling, Chrysostom affirms in his homily on the Epistle to the Romans that Matthew the publican was summoned because of his innate goodness; and Paul, although he had raged against the faithful, says that he obtained mercy because ^C he did it in ignorance. ^D

^A For what is sin, if not a withdrawal from the good, even as darkness is a withdrawal from light? Therefore, remaining in accordance with nature, we are in virtue; but turning away from that which is in accordance with nature—that is, from virtue—we come to that which is against nature, and we come to be in vice.

200 Repentance is a return from that which is against nature to that which is according to nature, and from the devil to God, through the pursuit of a pious life and through labors and exercises.

— Homo masculus conditus. This man, therefore, the supreme Artificer created as male, imparting to him His own divine grace and, through this, making him a participant in Himself; whence he also masterfully gave names to the animals, as if they were slaves given to him, in the manner of a prophet. For having been created in the image of God, being rational, intellectual, and self-determining, it was fitting that he should be entrusted with the lordship of all earthly things by the common Artificer and Master of all things. ^B

The creation of the female for the future propagation of the human race, which had been condemned to death. But since God, in His foreknowledge [(99)], knew that he would fall into transgression and be subject to corruption, He made from him a female, a helper for him like unto himself; a helper, I say, for the existence of the race through generation by succession after the transgression. For the first formation is called "creation" (genesis), and not "generation" (genesis). For creation is the first formation from God; generation, however, is that which follows upon the sentence of death due to the transgression, through the succession of one from another. ^C

He placed him in the paradise, both the spiritual and—

⟨NOTÆ.⟩ ...(As for) the foreknowledge of God, etc. This is a common assertion of the Greeks, that God created the woman for this reason, because He foresaw that the human race, upon death being inflicted on account of Adam’s sin, would immediately be destroyed, unless it were propagated by the union of man with his wife. Thus think Athanasius, among others, in *Ps.* L; Chrysostom, *Hom. in Gen.*; Nyssen, *De opif. hom.* But because God foresaw that man would fail only through the persuasion of the woman, let the reader inquire how these things cohere. Truly the ancient doctors, while they took heed against new doctrines and with reverence collected the opinions of the ancients, sometimes wrote things that were incoherent and contradictory. But that they should think thus concerning the union of man and wife, they were led primarily by the belief that it could not have happened without lust, of which Adam was immune: nay, rather, they held it for certain that it burned only on account of sin. Whence it is recited here among the errors of the Messalians that they said Adam in paradise had intercourse without any heat of lust. But Nyssen and our own (Damascene) concede that other modes of multiplying the human species were not lacking to God, if the state of innocence had remained; just as, for example, He produced the multitude of the angels. Athanasius Minor thinks it would have been thus, *Quaest. ad Antiochum*; yet he adds that some estimate that since God created male and female, from this it is evident that He intended the human race to be established, and not for this to happen *per peccatum* (through sin), or with lust, but with honor. This Saint Thomas approves, I part., q. 98, art. 2; indeed, Marius Mercator in his subnotations to the chapters of Julian, and Augustine, *lib. De nupt. et concup.*, cap. 15, and elsewhere.

^A For while dwelling in the sensible realm upon earth, he lived in the body, but in spirit he consorted with the angels, cultivating divine reflections, and being nourished by them; naked in his simplicity, and with an unstudied life, he was led upward only to the Creator through the things created, and was strengthened and delighted by the contemplation of Him.

Since, therefore, He had adorned him with free will by nature, He gives him a law, not to taste of the tree of knowledge. Of which tree we have spoken sufficiently in the chapter on Paradise, according to our ability. This commandment He gives him, promising that if he should guard the dignity of his soul, giving the victory to reason, recognizing the Creator, and keeping His command, he would partake of eternal blessedness, and would live forever, having become superior to death. But if he were to subject his soul to the body, and prefer the pleasures of the body, unaware of his own honor ^B and having been compared to the senseless cattle, casting off the yoke of the Maker and ignoring His divine command, he would be liable to death, and subject to corruption and pain, dragging out a wretched life. For it was not expedient that he who was yet untempted and unproved ^C should attain to immortality, lest he should fall into pride and the judgment of the devil; for that one, because of the incorruption he possessed, after the fall from his free will, acquired a firmness in evil that was unrepentant and immutable; just as, on the other hand, the angels, after their free-will selection of virtue, were established *through divine grace* in a fixity that cannot be moved from the good.

It was necessary, therefore, for man to be tested first; for a person who is untempted and unproved is worth nothing. And by the trial through the keeping of the commandment, he would be perfected, and thus attain immortality as the reward of virtue. For, having been made a mediator between God and matter, he was constituted in such a way that if he had obeyed the commandment, having left behind his natural affinity for created things, and having been united to God by direct affection, he was to receive a fixity in the good that could not be moved; but if, by the transgression, he were to turn rather toward matter, and draw his mind away from his Cause—I mean God—he would appropriate corruption to himself, and become subject to passion instead of impassibility, and mortal instead of immortal, and would stand in need of union and fluid generation; and through the desire for life, he would cling to pleasant things as though they were sustaining it, while he would hold in stubborn hatred those who sought to take these things away from him; and transferring his desire from God to matter, he would transfer his passionate nature from the true enemy of salvation... ^D

to his own kin. ^A Man was therefore conquered; for the envious and evil-hating devil, who had himself fallen through pride, could not bear that we should attain to the things above. Wherefore, he deceived the wretched man with the lying hope of divinity, and having brought him up to the own height of his pride, he cast him down into the same abyss of ruin. ^B

(1) By the envy, then, of the devil. Man was vanquished, etc. That he brings back the loss of the good things which man possessed in his innocence from the well-worn tradition, and especially from Nazianzen; whose words, however, he omitted some, by which the doctrine of original sin is set forth. After—the Theologian says (Orat. 38 and 42)—the envy of the devil and the impression of the woman, whom he used as one more suitable for persuasion, "Woe is me for my infirmity! For mine is that of my first parent." In Orat. 5 he says: "We have all tasted of the same tree of wickedness." And Orat. 18: "May they not have affected me, those first tastes of ours, from which we have perished, the offspring, whatsoever draws its origin from that first tasting of ours, through which we perish." Wherefore he thus lashes Apollinaris, as if Christ, by omitting the human mind, did not save me entirely, "a whole man having fallen and been condemned on account of the disobedience of the first-created." ^B Regarding the transmission of the sin of Adam to his descendants, and even to those whose parents have been regenerated by baptism, one must primarily read Cyril of Alexandria, lib. i Cont. Anthropomorph. c. 8. I do not gather more places of the Greeks, all aiming at the same point. I shall only add the testimony of Anastasius of Antioch, lib. vi in Hexaem., where he also cites Olympiodorus, deacon and interpreter of the Alexandrian Church: "He renews," he says, "what has been often proposed,"—and as for the philosopher who enlightened the Alexandrian Church with his teachings, as its deacon, when he claims that man was created in complete immortality and incorruption, while bringing forward as an argument for corruption, blessing, and likewise male and female, and being fellow-animals, and food for himself as for the beasts. Truly, he says, the laver of those who are baptized in Christ has a true and perfect cleansing of the primogenial fault of Adam, which took hold of us... "He brings into the middle the lawlessness dared from above by our ancestors, and says that this became the source of these streams: Lo, indeed, I was conceived in iniquities." He says that he brings forward that iniquity which our first parents committed through the supreme crime, and says that it became the source of these effusions. For if they had not sinned, they would not have been punished with death: if death were removed, corruption would escape; immunity from perturbations would be an associate of incorruption; no place for sin would remain. But from the moment they sinned, they were addicted to corruption: having become corruptible, they begot sons like themselves, into whom, from that time, fears, desires, and passions are derived. Those ancient ones indeed, when they speak of the primogenial fault, mostly mention only the infliction of corporal death; because, of course, as Theodoret teaches in dial. 3, Eranistes, the body which was infected by the touch and taste of the forbidden wood, thence drew that it should perish; but the soul, because it existed as the cause of sin, was rendered liable to eternal punishment, which it would suffer together with the body, being delivered with the body to Gehenna.

BOOK THREE

CHAPTER I.

Since man was seduced by the assault of the devil, the author of evil, and did not keep the commandment of the Creator, and was stripped of grace, and cast off the confidence he had toward God, and was covered with the harshness of a miserable life—for this is what the fig leaves signify—and was clothed in the deadness, that is, the mortality and coarseness of the flesh—for this is the meaning of the coats of skins—and was banished from Paradise by the just judgment of God, and was made subject to death and corruption: He who is merciful, who had bestowed upon him both his being and his well-being, did not overlook him. ^B But after having chastened him in many ways beforehand through many means—by groaning and trembling, by the flood of waters, and through the destruction of almost the entire human race, by the confusion and division of tongues, by the stewardship of angels, by the conflagration of cities, by typical manifestations of God, by wars, victories, defeats, signs, and wonders, by various powers, by the Law, and by the prophets—through all of which the objective was the destruction of sin, which, by creeping in in many ways, had enslaved man and had brought every kind of evil upon the world, so that, once it was removed, a return to the blessed life might be open to man—for death had entered into the world through sin, like some wild and savage beast ^C infesting the life of man—it was necessary, since he who was to act in the capacity of Redeemer had to be entirely free from sin and not subject to death on account of sin, that nature be strengthened and renewed, and that he be taught by deed and instructed in the way of virtue, which would lead him back from destruction to eternal life. It was thus that He finally revealed the great ocean of His benevolence toward him. For the Creator and Lord Himself undertakes the struggle for His own handiwork ^D, and becomes a teacher by deed; and because the enemy was tempting man with the hope of divinity,

^A he is in turn caught by the bait of the flesh, as by a hook: and at the same time, a manifestation is given of the goodness, wisdom, justice, and power of God. Goodness, because He did not overlook the weakness of His own creation, but had compassion on him who had fallen and reached out His hand. Justice, because when man had been defeated, He does not cause another to conquer the tyrant, nor does He snatch man from death by force; but him whom death had long ago enslaved on account of sin, this same man does the good and just One make conqueror again, and by like he saved like—a thing which seemed impossible; and wisdom, because He found the most fitting solution to that which was impossible. ^B For the good pleasure of God and the Father, the only-begotten Son and Word of God, and God, who was in the bosom of God and the Father, He who is consubstantial with the Father and the Holy Spirit, the pre-eternal, the beginningless, He who was in the beginning and was with God and the Father and was God, He who was in the form of God, bowing the heavens comes down; that is, having humbled His own height, which cannot be humbled, without humiliation, He descends to His own servants in a condescension both ineffable and incomprehensible—for this is what "descent" signifies. And being perfect God, He becomes perfect man, and the most novel of all novel things is brought to pass, the only thing that is new under the sun, through which the infinite power of God is made manifest. For what is greater than for God to become man? And the Word was made flesh ^C without change, of the Holy Spirit and of Mary, the holy and ever-virgin Theotokos. And He acts as mediator between God and men, the only lover of mankind, conceived in the immaculate womb of the Virgin, not by the will of man, or by desire, or by the union of a husband, or by generation joined with pleasure, but of the Holy Spirit and the first formation of Adam. And He becomes obedient to the Father, after the manner of us, and by the nature assumed from us, He heals our disobedience, and becomes for us a pattern of obedience, without which it is not possible to obtain salvation.

CAP. II.

On the manner of the conception of the Word, and of His divine incarnation.

For the angel of the Lord was sent to the holy Virgin, who was sprung from the race of David. ^D For it is manifest that our Lord sprang from Judah, from which tribe no one attended at the altar, as the divine Apostle has handed down; concerning which matter we shall discourse more accurately later. To her he also brings the joyful tidings...

^A saying: "Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with you." She, however, was troubled at the word; and the angel says to her: "Do not be afraid, Mary; for you have found grace with the Lord, and you shall conceive a son, and you shall call His name Jesus. For He Himself shall save His people from their sins." Whence "Jesus" is also interpreted as "Savior." But as she was questioning, "How shall this be to me, since I do not know a man?" the angel again says to her: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon you, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow you. Therefore also that which is born of you, being holy, shall be called the Son of God." And she to him: "Behold the handmaid of the Lord, let it be to me according to your word."

After, therefore, the consent of the holy Virgin, the Holy Spirit came upon her according to the word of the Lord which the angel spoke, ^B both purifying her and providing her with the power to receive the divinity of the Word, and at the same time the power to give birth. And then the subsistent Wisdom and Power of God the Most High overshadowed her—the Son of God, I mean, He who is consubstantial with the Father—like a divine seed, and compacted for Himself out of her chaste and most pure blood a body animated by a rational and intelligent soul, being the first-fruits of our lump. This was done not by seminal generation, but by creation, through the Holy Spirit; not by the figure being perfected by little and little through additions, but by the whole being perfected at once, the Word of God Himself having become ^C the hypostasis for the flesh. For the divine Word was not united to a body that had already pre-existed by itself, but, having taken up His abode in the womb of the holy Virgin, He realized for Himself—without circumscription, in His own hypostasis—from the chaste blood of the ever-virgin, a body animated by a rational and intelligent soul; the Word Himself, having assumed the first-fruits of the human lump, became the hypostasis for the flesh. So that at once there is flesh, at once the flesh of God the Word, at once flesh animate ^D with a rational and intelligent soul. Therefore we do not say that it is a man who has been deified, but that it is God who has become man.

For He who is by nature perfect God, the same did become by nature perfect man; not changing His nature, nor masking the economy, but by the flesh taken from the holy Virgin, animated rationally and intelligently, and receiving its existence in Him, He was personally united, without confusion and without change, and without division, not having changed the nature of His Godhead into the substance of the flesh, nor the substance of the flesh into the nature of His Godhead, nor having fashioned one composite nature out of His divine nature and the human nature which He assumed. ^B

Chapter III. Concerning the two natures, against the Monophysites.

For the natures were united to one another without conversion and without change, neither the divine nature departing from its proper simplicity, nor indeed the human, either turned into the nature of Godhead or passing into non-existence, nor did one composite nature result from the two. For a composite nature cannot be consubstantial with either of those natures from which it was composed, having been made something else out of others. For example: the body, which is composed of the four elements, is held not to be of the same substance as fire, nor is it called fire, nor is it called air, nor water, nor earth, nor does it have the same substance as any of these. If, therefore, according to the heretics, Christ after the union exists of one composite nature, He has changed from a simple nature into a composite one, and He is not consubstantial with the Father being of a simple nature, nor with the Mother. For it is not from Godhead ^C and humanity that this [nature] is composed; nor is it in Godhead and humanity; neither...

index: VARIÆ LECTIONES and NOTÆ (explanatory remarks regarding the text) entries preserved

shall He be named God, nor man, but Christ alone. And the name Christ shall be, for them, not the name of the Person, but of the one nature according to them. ^A We, however, teach that Christ is of a composite nature, not as if one thing were made from others, as man is from soul and body, or a body from four elements, but as being from different things, the same things: for we confess that from Godhead and humanity He is perfect God, the same one, and that He is, and is spoken of, as being from two, and in two natures. ^B We say that the name Christ is the name of the Person, which is not spoken in a single way, but is significant of the two natures. For He Himself anointed Himself—anointing His body with His own Godhead as God, and being anointed as man—for He Himself is both this and that. And the anointing is the Godhead of the humanity. For if Christ is of one composite nature, and is consubstantial with the Father, then the Father will also be composite, and consubstantial with the flesh, which is absurd and full of every blasphemy.

To these things, how shall one and the same nature be capable of substantial differences that contradict each other? For how is it possible that the same nature should be at once created and uncreated, mortal and immortal, circumscribed and uncircumscribed?

If, while saying that Christ is of one nature, they should say that this is simple, they will either confess Him to be God strictly, and will introduce a phantasy, not an incarnation, or ^C [alt-version omitted]

[NOTE on text:] ...but also these things. One and the same [person] existing as both this and that. And observe that he did not say existing *from* this and that; for that, "this and that," is altogether two, even if he should not wish it. Again, the same [Cyril] writes thus to Valerian, Bishop of Iconium: "Therefore it is confessed that that which is from the flesh is flesh, and that which is from God is God. But Christ is according to Himself both, being one Son and one Lord with His own flesh." But for Christ to be both, what else is it than for Christ to be two natures? For he did not say here that He is *from* both, but that Christ is both, or that Christ is the two, while yet He is one. ^D Eutyches had said that from two natures one had been made: but Leo the Great wrote back to Flavian of Constantinople that Christ exists also in two natures: which the Chalcedonian Fathers decreed must be confessed. In the editions of the acts of this synod, for [Greek text] is read [Greek text], which error ought to be corrected from Evagrius and others, who testify that the Monophysites abhorred that expression as unheard of by Cyril and in past centuries. As if Cyril, by writing to Successus that Christ is perfect in Godhead and perfect in humanity, had not signified that He exists in two perfect natures. Nicephorus Callistus, in book XVII of his History, ch. 46, says that Nazianzen pronounced that Christ preserves those things in which, and out of which, and which He is; which, however, I have not found in his works.

^A

[h207 Monophysite error: that they do not distinguish nature from person./h]

But this is the very cause of the heretics’ error: that they establish nature and hypostasis as the same thing. For although we say that the nature of men is one, we must know that we do not say this by looking at the account of the soul and the body; for it is impossible to say that the soul and the body, when compared with each other, are of one nature. But because there are many hypostases of men, and all admit the same account of nature—for all are composed of soul and body, and all have participated in the nature of the soul, and possess the substance of the body, and the common species—we say that the plurality of different hypostases is one nature, with each hypostasis ^B clearly possessing two natures and subsisting in two natures, namely, of soul and body.

[hNOTES./h]

(10) *But this is…* Concerning the various acceptations of terms, it has been said in the *Dialectics*. When the holy Fathers, who had written on the Trinity, were cited against the Monophysites to the effect that they had distinguished person and hypostasis from nature, the latter chiefly abused this dictum of Nazianzen, who pronounced that in the incarnation new natures were made, so as to conclude that one thing is meant by the terms "nature" or "hypostasis" when the discourse is of the Trinity, and another when of the incarnation. Severus, in his second epistle to John, where he argues about Christ’s one operation based on the Dionysiac writings, says: "Indeed, we confess that God was made man in a new way, and expressed a one, God-man-like nature and hypostasis in his life, just as there is one nature of God the Word and one that has been made flesh." For the account of the economy, having innovated the natures, also innovated the appellations for them. Thus Severus, whose argument Leontius refutes in his book against him.

(11) *For when we say one…* Essence and common species are the same to the Fathers, and especially to those who flourished after the Council of Chalcedon: person and hypostasis also signify the same thing, that is, the individual and singular. Here, however, the Monophysites are met at their chief point, which they had received from Nazianzen’s epistle to Cledonius, where he says: "For there are two natures, God and man, just as body and soul." Cyril and others, who wrote before Eutyches, adduce the same example of man consisting of body and soul. Our author, however, with Leontius, Eulogius of Alexandria, and Anastasius Sinaita, denies ^C that human nature is called composite because of the multitude of individuals that are constituted by two natures, namely, body and soul. He had established this same thing in *Dialectica*, ch. 66. Maximus favors this in his *Epistle to John the Cubicularius*, where he also adds a certain scholium of Cyril, in which he is said to have stated: "Neither is the name of Christ a definition, nor does it have the power of a definition, nor does it declare anyone’s essence; but it expresses the person of the Word, which is conceived as having assumed flesh endowed with an intelligent soul." In his book *On the Two Wills*, he infers from the same scholium that the composite person of Christ is not strictly an individual, because it has neither genus nor species. But this scholium seems to me more recent than Cyril. Whatever be the case, another solution is brought forward from St. Maximus in the *Collectanea* which I just cited: he says that it is the property of every composite nature to be such that it has coeval parts; that it exists when previously it did not; that the parts are referred to one another by a natural relation, and are endowed with virtues appropriate to their own nature by which they mutually receive one another; and finally, that they are joined without the choice of either, as happens in the case of soul and body. But such are not the divinity and humanity of Christ. Another distinction is suggested by Eulogius in Photius and Leontius, in the tract *On Sects*, namely, not to say that man is a body or a soul, because body and soul are parts of a nature; but rightly to say that Christ is man, Christ is God; and that man is God, and God is man. ^D

^A But in our Lord Jesus Christ, it is not possible to accept a common species. For there neither was, nor is, nor ever will be another Christ from divinity and humanity, in divinity and humanity—the same being perfect God and perfect man. Hence, it is not possible to speak of one nature in our Lord Jesus Christ, as one does in the case of an individual composed of soul and body, such that it is likewise regarding Christ: that he is from divinity and humanity. For there, it is an individual; but Christ is by no means an individual, for he does not have a "Christ-ness" species that can be predicated of him.

Therefore, we say that the union has occurred from two perfect natures, divine and human; not by mingling, or confusion, or blending ^B or tempering, as the godless Dioscorus said, and Eutyches, and Severus, and their unholy gang; nor by a personal union, or a relative one, or one by dignity, or by identity of will, or equality of honor, or identity of name, or by good pleasure, as the God-hated Nestorius said, and Diodorus, and Theodore of Mopsuestia, and their demonic assembly; but by composition—that is, according to hypostasis—without conversion, and without confusion, and without alteration, and without division, and without separation. And in two natures existing perfectly, we confess the one hypostasis of the Son of God, who has become incarnate, saying that the hypostasis of his divinity and of his humanity is the same, and confessing that the two natures are preserved in him after the union—not setting each apart and in isolation, but united to one another in the one composite hypostasis.

For we say that the union is substantial—that is to say, true, and not in imagination. And "substantial" not in the sense that the two natures have produced one composite nature, but that they have been united to one another in truth into one composite hypostasis of the Son of God. Nay, we maintain that their substantial difference is preserved entire and intact. ^C For the created remained what was created, and the uncreated, uncreated. The mortal remained mortal, and the immortal, immortal. The circumscribed, circumscribed; the uncircumscribed, uncircumscribed. The visible, visible, and the invisible, invisible. “The one shines forth with miracles, the other is subjected to injuries.”

Communication of Idioms.

The Word, moreover, because those things which belong to his holy flesh are his own, claims for himself the things that pertain to the humanity, and in turn transmits to the flesh those things that are his own, by way of the reciprocity ^D of the parts' interpenetration.

^A And the same one is he who works both the divine and the human [acts] in either form, with the communion of the other. ^B Hence, the Lord of glory is also said to have been crucified, even though his divine nature did not suffer; and the ^C Son of Man is acknowledged to have been in heaven before the passion, as the Lord himself asserted. For he was one and the same Lord of glory, who by nature and in truth was the Son of Man, that is, who became man; and we acknowledge both his miracles and his sufferings, even though he worked miracles according to one [nature], and the same one underwent sufferings according to another. For we know that, just as his hypostasis is one, so also the essential difference of the natures is preserved. But how could the difference be preserved if those things that have the difference are not preserved in relation to one another? For a difference is a difference of things that differ. Now, by the principle by which the natures of Christ differ from one another—that is, by the principle of essence—we say that he is joined to the extremes: according to his divinity, with the Father and the Spirit; and according to his humanity, with his Mother and all men. But by the principle whereby his natures are joined, we say that he differs from the Father and the Spirit, and from his Mother and the rest of mankind; for his natures are joined in his hypostasis, having one composite hypostasis, according to which he differs from the Father and the Spirit, and from his Mother and us.

NOTE

CAP. IV. On the manner of the mutual communication of properties

^A That substance and hypostasis are different, and that substance signifies the common and comprehensive species of those which are of the same species—such as God and man—while hypostasis signifies the individual, such as Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Peter, or Paul, we have often said. It must be known, therefore, that the name of "divinity" and "humanity" is indicative of substances, that is, of natures; but the name "God" and "man" is applied both to the nature, as when we say, "God is an incomprehensible substance," and "there is one God," and it is also taken for the hypostases, inasmuch as that which is more particular receives the name of that which is more general, as when Scripture says: *Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee* (Ps. xlv, 8). For behold, it indicated the Father and the Son. And as when it says: *There was a certain man in the land of Ausitis* (Job i, 1)—for it wished to indicate Job alone.

^B Therefore, in our Lord Jesus Christ, since we acknowledge two natures but one hypostasis composed from both, when we contemplate the natures, we call them divinity and humanity. But when we contemplate the hypostasis composed from the natures, we sometimes name Him Christ from both joined together, and God and man at the same time, and God incarnate; and sometimes from one of the parts, God alone, and Son of God, and man alone, and Son of Man; and sometimes from the exalted things only, sometimes from the humble things only. For He is one, who is the same both in this way and that, of which one has existed always from the Father without cause, while the other was made later for His benevolence toward men.

^C When, therefore, we speak of divinity, we do not name the properties of humanity along with it. For we do not say that divinity is passible or created. Nor do we attribute the properties of divinity to the flesh, that is, to the humanity; for we do not call the flesh, or humanity, uncreated. But in the case of the hypostasis, whether we name it from both joined together or from one of the parts, we attribute to it the properties of both natures. For Christ, which is the sum of both, is called both God and man, and created and uncreated, and passible and impassible. And when He is named from one of the parts, as Son of God and God, He receives the properties of the co-existing nature—that is, of the flesh—so that God is named passible. ^D

and the Lord of glory is said to have been ^A crucified: not insofar as He is God, but insofar as the same person is at once man. In the same way, when He is called man and Son of man, He assumes the properties and ornaments of the divine essence. For He who is older than all time is called a child, and He who is without beginning is called man: not in the way in which He is a child and man, but because, being God and before all ages, He became a child in the last times. And this is the manner of the interchange, with each nature communicating to the other its own properties because of their identity of hypostasis and their mutual indwelling. For this reason we may say of Christ: This is our God, who was seen on the earth and lived among men 57. And, this man is uncreated, and impassible, and uncircumscribed.

CAP. V.

On the number of natures.

The number of Persons in God, and of natures in Christ. Union does not take away number. — But, just as we confess one nature in the Godhead, but say that there are three Persons who truly exist, and we declare all things that are natural and essential to be simple, while we recognize the distinction of the Persons to lie only in the three properties—namely, that one is without cause and is the Father, another is from a cause and is the Son, and another is from a cause and is proceeding—in such a way that they can neither depart from each other nor be separated; but rather, they are ^B united to each other, and permeate one another without confusion: so that, I say, they are united without any confusion, since they are three, even though they are united; but they are also distinct without separation (for although each one of them subsists by itself, or is a perfect hypostasis, and possesses its own property, that is, its own distinct mode of existence; yet they are joined by reason of their essence and natural properties, and by the fact that they do not depart or stray from the Father's hypostasis, and for this reason God is one, and they both are and are called God): in a similar manner, in the divine and hidden economy of the Word of God and our Lord Jesus Christ, one of the holy Trinity, which surpasses every sharpness of mind and every grasp, we confess that two natures, namely the divine and the human, have come together and have been united according to hypostasis, and that one hypostasis has been formed from the two natures, which is composite; but we declare that the two natures are preserved even after the union, in the one composite hypostasis, that is, in the one Christ, and that they exist in truth, along with their natural properties; though they are united without confusion, and are distinct without ^C division, and are numbered. And just as the three hypostases of the holy Trinity are united without confusion, and without division 14...

^A, distinguishing and numbering them—for number creates neither division, nor disjunction, nor alienation, nor cutting in them (since we know one God, the Father, and the Son, and the holy Spirit)—just so, the natures of Christ, although they are united to one another, are united without confusion; and even though they ^B permeate one another, they do not admit any conversion or mutation of one into the other. For each preserves its own natural property unchanged. Wherefore they are numbered, and the number does not introduce division. For Christ is one, perfect both in divinity and in humanity; for number is not the cause of division or union, but is indicative of the quantity of the things being numbered, whether they are united or divided. They are united, for instance, as when we say that this wall consists of fifty stones; they are divided, as when we say that fifty stones are lying in this field. Again, they are united, as when we say that there are two natures in charcoal, namely fire and wood; and they are divided, in that the nature of the fire is one, and that of the wood is another—in another manner indeed, it joins and divides them, but not by number. Just as, therefore, it is impossible to call the three hypostases of the divinity, even if they are united with one another, one hypostasis, lest we work a confusion and an obliteration of the difference of the hypostases, so it is impossible to call the two natures of Christ, which are united according to hypostasis, one nature, so that we do not effect both their confusion and the non-existence of their difference. ^C

CAP. VI. That the whole divine nature is united to the whole human nature in one of its hypostases, and not part to part.

Common and universal qualities are predicated of the particulars subject to them. Therefore, the essence is common, as a species; the hypostasis, however, is particular. It is particular not in the sense that it possesses a part of the nature and another part does not, but because it is particular in number, as an individual; for hypostases are said to differ by number and not by nature. The essence is predicated of the hypostasis, because the essence is perfect in each of the hypostases of the same kind. Therefore, the hypostases do not differ from one another by essence, but by the accidents, which are the characteristic properties ^D by which the hypostasis, not the nature, is marked. For the hypostasis is essence with accidents. Hence, the hypostasis possesses both the common element along with the specific one.

[Notes omitted]

and furthermore, it exists in itself. For essence does not exist by itself, but is contemplated in the hypostases. If, therefore, one of the hypostases suffers, the entire essence, being passible in that respect in which the hypostasis has suffered, is said to have suffered in one of its hypostases; yet there is no necessity that all the hypostases of the same species should suffer along with the hypostasis that suffers.

^B Thus, therefore, we confess the nature of the Godhead to be entirely whole in each of its hypostases: whole in the Father, whole in the Son, and whole in the Holy Spirit. On this account, the Father is perfect God, the Son is perfect God, and the Holy Spirit is perfect God. In this same way, in the incarnation of the Word of God, one of the Holy Trinity, we say that the whole and perfect nature of the Godhead was united in one of its hypostases to the whole of human nature, and not part to part. The divine Apostle says, therefore, that "in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily."

NOTE ON THE SEVERIANS

^A We say that there was a union of the whole with the whole, and not a part with a part. For the divine Apostle says: *In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily* (Col. 2:9)—that is, in his flesh. And his bearer-of-God disciple Dionysius, who is distinguished by his vast knowledge of divine things, says that the whole Godhead had communion with us in one of its persons. ^B Yet we shall not be compelled to say that all the persons of the holy Godhead—that is, the three persons—are united according to hypostasis with all the persons of humanity. For in no way did the Father and the Holy Spirit share in the incarnation of God the Word, except by good pleasure and will. But we say that the whole substance of the Godhead is united to the whole human nature. For God the Word, having fashioned us from the beginning, did not leave out any of those things which he implanted in our nature, but assumed all: body, soul endowed with intellect and reason, and their properties. For the animal which lacks one of these is not a man. For the whole assumed me, the whole has been united to the whole, so that he might bestow salvation upon the whole. For that which is not assumed is not healed.

The Word of God, therefore, is united to the flesh through the medium of the mind, which stands between the purity of God and the coarseness of the flesh. ^C For the mind is the ruler of both soul and flesh; yet the mind is the purest part of the soul, and God is the mind of the mind. And when the mind [of Christ] is ruled by the One who is greater, it manifests its own leadership as the mind of Christ. Yet it is overcome and follows after the One who is greater, and performs those things which the divine will desires. And the mind has become a place for the Godhead united to it according to hypostasis, just as the flesh has—not as a cohabitant, as the polluted error of the heretics imagines. For they say that one modius cannot hold two modii, judging immaterial things after the manner of bodies. How, then, shall Christ be called perfect God and perfect man, and consubstantial with the Father and with us?

^A If part of the divine nature is united to part of the human nature in Him? We say that our nature has been raised from the dead, and has ascended, and has sat down at the right hand of the Father; not in the sense that all the persons of men have risen and sat down at the right hand of the Father, but in the sense that our whole nature has attained this in the person of Christ. The divine Apostle says therefore: "And raised us up together, and made us sit together in Christ" (Eph. II, 6).

And we also say this, that the union has been brought about from common essences. For every essence is common to the persons contained under it, and it is impossible to find a particular and proper nature, or essence; since otherwise it would be necessary to call the same persons both consubstantial and of different essence, and to call the holy Trinity both consubstantial and of different essence according to the divinity. The same nature is therefore considered in each of the persons. And when ^B we say that the nature of the Word has been incarnate, according to the blessed Athanasius and Cyril, we say that the divinity is united to the flesh. For which reason we cannot say: "The nature of the Word has suffered"; for the divinity in Him has not suffered; but we say that the human nature has suffered in Christ, not by this implying all the persons of men, but we confess that Christ has suffered in human nature. So when we say the nature of the Word, we signify the Word Himself. But the Word possesses both the communion of essence and the property of the person.

CAP. VII. Concerning the one composite person of the Word of God.

^C The person of the Word before and after the incarnation. The person of the Word, simple, becomes composite by the incarnation. We say, therefore, that the divine hypostasis of the Word of God exists before all things, outside of all time, and eternally, simple and not composite, uncreated, incorporeal, invisible, untouchable, uncircumscribed, having all things that the Father has, as being consubstantial with Him, and differing from the hypostasis of the Father only by the mode of generation and relation, being perfect, and never severed from the person of the Father; but in the last days, ^D not having departed from the paternal bosom, the Word began to exist in the womb of the holy Virgin, uncircumscribed, without seed, and incomprehensibly, as He Himself knows, and in that very pre-eternal

^A hypostasis subsisted.

In all things, then, and above all things He was, even when He was in the womb of the holy Theotokos; but in her, He was working out the incarnation in a more special way. Therefore, He was incarnate, taking from her the first-fruits of our compound, flesh animated by a soul rational and intelligent, so that the hypostasis of the Word of God might become the hypostasis for the flesh, and the previously simple hypostasis of the Word might become compound; compound, I say, from two perfect natures: divinity and humanity. And it bears the characteristic and distinguishing property of the divine sonship of the Word of God, by which It is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit; and the characteristic and distinguishing properties of the flesh, by which It differs from the Mother and from the rest of men. It also bears the properties of the divine nature, by which It is united to the Father and to the Spirit, and the marks of the human nature, by which It is united both to the Mother and to us. Furthermore, it differs from the Father and the Spirit, and from the Mother and us, in that It is the same being, both God and man. For we recognize this as the most peculiar property of the hypostasis of Christ. ^B

Therefore, we confess Him, one Son of God even after the incarnation, and the same one Son of man, one Christ, one Lord, the only-begotten Son and Word of God alone, Jesus our Lord. We venerate His two births: the one from the Father, before the ages, beyond cause and reason and time and nature; and the other in the last times, for our sake, according to us, and above us. For our sake, that is, for our salvation; according to us, because He became man from a woman, and in the time of gestation; above us, because it was not of seed, but of the Holy Spirit and the holy Virgin Mary, beyond the law of gestation; nor do we call Him God alone, nor man alone, but both together. ^C

Christ’s generation from the Mother is for us and above us.

Wherefore, even after the assumption of humanity, we confess the same one Son of God, and the same Son of man, one Christ, one Lord, one only-begotten Son, and Word of God, Jesus our Lord, venerating His twofold generation: the one from the Father before the ages, more sublime than every cause, and time, and nature; the other in the final times, for our sake, after our manner, and above us; for our sake, I say, that He might bring us salvation: after our manner, because He was born of a woman, and at the customary time of birth: and finally, above us, because He was not ^D born of seed, but by the Holy Spirit and the holy Virgin Mary, beyond the law of gestation.

^A Not that we preach Him as a God stripped of our humanity, or again as only a man, stripped of divinity, or finally as one and another; but as one and the same God and man, perfect God and perfect man: whole God and whole man—whole God, together with His flesh, and whole man, also with the accompaniment of His most high divinity. For when we say perfect God and perfect man, we are declaring the plenitude of the natures, so that nothing is wanting in them; but when we say whole God and whole man, we are showing the indivisible singularity of the person.

Una Dei Verbi natura et incarnata. — We confess, moreover, one incarnate nature of God the Word; for by saying "incarnate," we signify the substance of the flesh, according to the blessed Cyril. And so the Word is incarnate, yet He has not departed from His own incorporeal nature; and He is wholly incarnate, ^B and remains wholly uncircumscribed. He is reduced and contracted bodily, but divinely He is uncircumscribed, His flesh not being extended along with His uncircumscribed divinity. Nor does His flesh, together with the divinity which cannot be circumscribed, extend itself as God.

For He is wholly perfect God, but not "all" God (for He is not only God, but also man), and likewise He is wholly perfect man, but not "all" man (for He is not only man, but also God). For "whole" (Tὸ μὲν ὅλον) is demonstrative of nature, but "wholly" (τὸ δὲ ὅλος) of the person; just as "another" (ἄλλο) indicates nature, and "another" (ἄλλος) indicates the person.

Naturarum in eo commeatio ex divinitate. — We must also know that although we say the natures of our Lord permeate one another, yet we know that this permeation comes from the divine nature; for it penetrates all things as it wills, and nothing penetrates it. And it imparts its own gifts to the flesh, while remaining itself impassible and without part in the affections of the flesh. For if the sun, while providing us with a participation in its own energies, remains without part in our own, how much more does the Maker and Lord of the sun!

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCERNING THE NATURES OF THE LORD, WHETHER THEY BE REDUCED TO CONTINUOUS OR DISCRETE QUANTITY

If it should be questioned whether the Lord’s natures ^A are to be reduced to continuous or discrete quantity, we shall answer that the natures of the Lord are neither one body, nor one surface, nor one line, nor time, nor place, so as to be reduced to continuous quantity; for these are the things that are reckoned as continuous quantities. But it must be known that number belongs to things that differ, and it is impossible for things that do not differ at all to be numbered; but insofar as they differ, in that respect they are also numbered. For instance, Peter and Paul: insofar as they are united, they are not numbered. For by the account of their essence, being united, they cannot be called two natures; but insofar as they differ by hypostasis, they are called two hypostases. So that number is of those things that differ, and according to the mode by which things that differ do differ, in that same mode they are also numbered.

The natures of the Lord, then, are united unconfusedly according to hypostasis, but they are divided without division by the account and mode of their difference. And in the mode in which they are united, they are not numbered; for we do not say that there are two natures of Christ according to hypostasis; but in the mode in which they are divided without division, they are numbered; for there are two natures of Christ, by the account and mode of their difference. For having been united according to hypostasis, and having a mutual interpenetration, they are united unconfusedly, each preserving its own natural difference. Therefore, by the mode of their difference, and by that alone being numbered, they will be reduced to discrete quantity.

HOW THE FLESH OF CHRIST IS ADORED

Therefore, one is Christ, perfect God and perfect man, whom we adore with the Father and the Spirit with one adoration including his immaculate flesh, not calling the flesh unadorable; for it is adored in the one hypostasis of the Word, which has become its own hypostasis; we do not worship the creature. For we do not adore it as mere flesh, but as united to the divinity, and as the two natures of God the Word are reduced to one ^C person and one hypostasis. I fear to touch the coal because of the fire joined to the wood. I adore both, the humanity and the divinity of Christ, because of the divinity united to the flesh. For there is not a fourth person in the Trinity; God forbid! Rather, I confess one person of God the Word...

and of his flesh. For the Trinity remained the Trinity even after the incarnation of the Word. ^A

To those who ask whether the two natures are to be referred to the category of continuous quantity or to that of discrete quantity: The natures of the Lord are neither one body, nor one surface, nor a line, nor place, nor time, so that they might be reduced to continuous quantity; for these are the things which are continuously counted. But the natures of the Lord are united without confusion according to hypostasis, and they are divided without separation, by the reasoning and mode of discrimination of each. And in the respect in which they are united, they are not counted. For we do not say that the natures of Christ are two persons, or two according to hypostasis; but in the respect in which they are divided without separation, they are counted. For there are two natures, by the reasoning and mode of difference. For, being united according to hypostasis and interpenetrating one another, they are united without confusion, not receiving change into one another, each preserving its own natural difference even after the union. For what is created remained created, and what is uncreated, uncreated. Therefore, by the mode of difference, and by that alone, since they are counted, they will be brought under the category of discrete quantity. For it is impossible for things that differ in no way to be counted; but in that they differ, they are counted. For example, Peter and Paul: in so far as they are united, they do not admit of number; for being united by the reasoning of essence, they are neither two natures nor called such; but differing according to hypostasis, they are called two hypostases. So that difference is the cause of number. ^B

CAP. IX.

Although there is no nature which ^D lacks subsistence, just as Leontius bears witness (act. *De sect.*), he constructs his objection in this way: "If you speak of two natures, either they have subsistence or they lack it. If they have subsistence, you introduce two persons, two Christs, two sons. But if they lack subsistence, they no longer exist in the nature of things." Leontius, however, says: "Unless Christ consists of two natures, as you say, either they have subsistence or they lack it. If they have subsistence, then there are two persons; if they lack it, they no longer exist." Wherefore in the *Defensions* he shows that the Severians fight on behalf of the Nestorians: "I heard," he says, "someone who thought he was arguing keenly, that there is no nature that is impersonal, but that a person accompanies a nature. If therefore there are two natures, by all means there are also two persons. How would one not pity those who propose such things? They clearly stumble in this way, and while pretending to fight against Nestorius, they [oppose] his..."

own arguments and in themselves strengthen his malady. In like manner, Leontius (lib. 1, *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos*) considers the authors of this argument to be both Eutychians and Nestorians, and replies, as in the book *De Sectis*, that one thing is substance and another thing is that which is subsistent; furthermore, that Christ is one person and hypostasis, but that there are two natures subsisting in one and the same person. See what I have said on this in the *Dialectics*. Eulogius proceeds in the same sense: "And if indeed they say that it is impossible for natures to be known except in persons, this, indeed, anyone who has even a little experience will concede to them. For who is ignorant that what is universal is seen in individual persons, as in hypostases that seal it; for example, the nature of divinity is seen in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit; likewise the angelic nature is in Michael, in Gabriel, and in the rest.... But if they contend that each nature must be accompanied by its own proper person, this I would indeed judge to be true regarding natures, or substances, which are not united according to hypostasis: but it is far from the truth if the discourse concerns natures which are coupled through composition and hypostatically."

The substance is not without a person. For both substance and nature are seen in hypostases and persons. But it is not necessary that the natures that are united to one another according to hypostasis should each possess its own individual hypostasis. For they are able, having converged into one hypostasis, neither to be unsubstantiated, nor to possess an individual hypostasis for each, but rather [to possess] one and the same [hypostasis] for both. For the same hypostasis of the Word, having become the hypostasis of both natures, does not permit them to be one without an hypostasis, nor does it allow them to be separate hypostases from one another; nor does it allow the hypostasis to be [here and there], now of this, now of that, but always ^B to exist as the hypostasis of both indivisibly and inseparably; not being divided and parted, and distributing a part of itself to this and a part to that, but being whole in the one and whole in the other, existing indivisibly and completely. For the flesh of God the Word did not subsist independently, nor did it become a different hypostasis other than the hypostasis of God the Word, but subsisting in it, it is rather *enhypostatos*, and did not become an independently existing hypostasis by itself. Wherefore it is neither without an hypostasis, nor does it introduce another hypostasis into the Trinity.

CHAPTER X. On the Trisagion hymn.

Divine names are common. Since these things are so, [(24)] from this also the addition in the Trisagion ^C is said [to have originated]. For it is said that Peter the Fuller, having occupied the see of Antioch, under the pretext of eliminating the Nestorian error, added this most celebrated hymn in this way: "Holy God, holy mighty, holy immortal, who was crucified for us, have mercy on us." This interpolation the Jacobite Syrians and the Armenians admitted; because of this, because they seemed to attribute suffering to the divinity of Christ, they were also called Theopaschites. Furthermore, because it was the common sense of the faithful that by such Trisagia the individual persons of the Trinity were invoked, many supposed that by the Fuller the Trinity itself was proclaimed as being fixed to the cross, or some other person ^D other than the Son who had been crucified, as our author explains. There are letters attributed to Felix III, pope, and Acacius of Constantinople, and others, among Zonaras, by which Peter the Fuller is held guilty of multiple heresy on account of this mutation. But the most learned Valesius deems these to be adulterated; on the contrary, William Cave proves them to be sincere in his *Historia Litteraria* under the entry for Felix; and indeed even the illustrious Francis Pagi, in the year 483. Our author wrote more concerning the Trisagion hymn in his epistle to Jordan. Moreover, Ephraem--

the Antiochian in Photius, codex 226, relates that this is entirely referred by the Orientals to the Son; that is, by the churches subject to the Antiochene prelate. Indeed, not long ago Calendio, who had replaced Fullo, in order that that addition might be interpreted in a good sense, wove in these other words: *Christe Rex, qui crucifixus*, etc. Guido Fabricius Boderianus of Antwerp published in Syriac and Latin certain things pertaining to the rites of Baptism and the holy synaxis, as if they were by Severus, patriarch of Alexandria, when yet in the text the name of the Alexandrian is not read in the Syriac. It is not doubtful but that this Severus is the Antiochene, the prince of the Severians. For indeed, at the end of the Trisagion hymn, the addition is thus had: *Glorification of the angels, when our Lord was being crucified: HOLY GOD, HOLY MIGHTY, HOLY IMMORTAL.* Joseph and Nicodemus said: *WHO WAST CRUCIFIED FOR US, HAVE MERCY ON US.* Whence you may gather that this liturgy was of the Jacobites or Severians, not of the Catholics.

^A That appendix which Peter Gnapheus, or Fullo, added to the Trisagion hymn, we determine to be impious, as it introduces a fourth person, and places the Son of God, that is to say, the consubstantial power of the Father, apart; and places him who was affixed to the cross apart, as if he were another distinct from that mighty one, or deems the holy Trinity to be subject to passion, and brings both the Father and the Holy Spirit onto the cross. Far be this blasphemous and adulterated nonsense! For we accept the *Holy God* as applied to the Father: not that we assign the name of divinity to him alone; for we acknowledge also the Son and the Holy Spirit as God. Likewise, we apply the *Holy Mighty* to the Son: not that we strip the Father and the Holy Spirit of power. And finally, we ascribe the *Holy Immortal* to the Holy Spirit: not that we exclude the Father and the Son from immortality, but that in each person we take all the divine names simply and absolutely, imitating the divine Apostle, whose words are these: *To us however there is one God the Father, of whom are all things, and we of him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him; and one Holy Spirit, in whom are all things, and we in him.* Item, likewise the Theologian Gregory, speaking in this manner: *To us however there is one God the Father, of whom are all things; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things; and one Holy Spirit, in whom are all things.* These little words, *of whom, by whom, and in whom*, do not divide the natures (for otherwise those prepositions, or the order of the names, would never be changed), but express the properties of one and the unconfused nature. And this is clear from the fact that they are gathered again into one, if only anyone reads that passage in the same Apostle not carelessly: *Of him, and by him, and in him are all things; to him be glory for ever and ever. Amen.*

Namely, that the thrice-holy hymn is said not merely of the Son, but of the holy Trinity, the divine and holy Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory witness, and the whole choir of God-bearing Fathers; since through the threefold holiness, they indicate the three [hypostases] of the super-essential Godhead, the holy Seraphim to us. But through the single lordship,

they declare the one substance and kingdom of the divine Trinity. For Gregory the Theologian says: “Thus then the Holy of Holies, which is even covered by the Seraphim, and glorified by three sanctifications, comes together into one lordship and divinity.” This is what another of those before us has philosophized most beautifully and sublimely.

Now, those who have compiled the ecclesiastical history say ^B that when the people in Constantinople were supplicating because of a certain divinely sent threat 25 that occurred under Archbishop Proclus, it happened that a boy from the people was caught up on high, and that he learned from angelic teaching this Trisagion hymn: “Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal, have mercy on us.” And once the boy was returned and had reported what he had learned, the whole multitude sang the hymn, and thus the threat subsided. And it is even handed down that in the holy and great and ecumenical fourth synod, I mean the one at Chalcedon, this Trisagion hymn was sung in this way; for so it is recorded in the acts of that same holy synod. Therefore, it would be utterly ridiculous and laughable ^C for that Trisagion song, which was received from the angels and strengthened by the averting of impending evils, which a packed synod of holy Fathers approved, and which the Seraphim had sung long before as expressive of the tri-hypostatic Godhead, to be trampled underfoot by the foolish opinion of the fuller, as though he surpassed the Seraphim, or at least corrected them. But oh, the arrogance—not to say the madness! We, however, even if the demons should burst, say thus: “Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal, have mercy on us.”

CAP. XI.

Nature is understood in simple consideration; according to...

^A itself it does not subsist. The nature that is commonly joined in all similar-species hypostases is that which is said to be contemplated in the species. The nature that is wholly the same in the reception of accidents, in one hypostasis, is also said to be contemplated in the individual; it is the same as that which is contemplated in the species. Therefore, God the Word, becoming incarnate, did not assume the nature that is grasped merely in simple contemplation (for this is not an incarnation, but an imposture and a phantom of incarnation), nor did He assume that which is contemplated in the species (for He did not assume all the hypostases), but rather that which is in the individual, which is the same as that which is in the species. For He assumed the first fruits of our human dough, not having subsisted by itself and having existed as an individual beforehand, and thus being assumed by Him, but rather having existence in His own hypostasis.

^B For this hypostasis of God the Word became a hypostasis for the flesh, and according to this, the Word became flesh, in an unchanging manner, to be sure; and the flesh became the Word, without alteration; and God, human. For God is the Word, and the human is God, because of the hypostatic union. Therefore it is the same thing to speak of the nature of the Word, and of the nature in the individual. For it does not declare the individual, that is, the hypostasis, strictly and solely, nor [merely] the commonality of the hypostases, but rather the common nature contemplated and examined in one of the hypostases.

On how union and incarnation differ. The one nature of the Word incarnate as explained by Cyril himself.

Now, union is one thing, and incarnation is another. For union indicates only the conjunction; but with what that conjunction has taken place, it does not specify. But incarnation (which is the same as saying “humanation”) shows the conjunction with flesh, that is, with a human being; just as the ignition of iron shows the union with fire. ^C Indeed, the blessed Cyril himself, in his second epistle to Sucensus, interpreting the phrase, “one nature of God the Word incarnate,” speaks as follows: “If, having spoken of one nature of the Word, we have kept silent, not adding ‘incarnate,’ but as if from outside...”

Note

...that we believe there is one nature, because it is of the one, although it became flesh and was incarnate. The Catholics generally understand this in such a way that he accepted "nature" for "person" or "hypostasis," in that he denies that the hypostases in Christ are disjoined, and asserts that the conjunction of the hypostases, that is, of the natures, has taken place; and again, in *Defense of the Anathematisms* 2, against Theodoret, he uses these words: “The nature or hypostasis of the Word, which is the Word Himself.” Thus, Eulogius interprets his predecessor in Photius, *Codex* 250; ^D Ephraemius also, *ibid.*; Justinian in his *Profession of Faith*, to which Leontius supports in his *Solutions of the Arguments of Severus*. But in *De Sectis*, in the same manner as the Damascene replies, [he suggests] that Cyril accepted the term not for the nature which is common, but as it exists in a hypostasis. What we have said concerning the sense of Cyril should be read at Chapter 50 of the Dialectics. That passage of Cyril which our author brings forward after Leontius, from his 2nd Epistle to Sucensus, establishes both natures, entire and perfect; and having exploded the blasphemy of Nestorius, he praises the faith of the Orientals, who, regarding those things by which Christ is understood by simple and pure contemplation alone, declared the difference of the natures, because, as I was saying, divinity and humanity are not the same regarding natural quality; but nevertheless, they acknowledge one Son, and Christ, and Lord, etc. Many passages of Cyril conspire to the same end, so that the Chalcedonian formula consists almost entirely of his own sentiments. Athanasius, in the book *On the Salutary Advent of Christ*, uses the name in the same sense in which Cyril had, by saying that the whole nature of the Word was present to exhibit the human form, the visible Adam, not by a division of persons, but by the existence of divinity and humanity.

^A For if, when we had spoken of the nature of the Word, we had held our peace, and had not added "incarnate," but had, as it were, excluded the dispensation, their argument might perhaps have had some plausibility, when they dissemblingly asked: "If one nature is the whole, where is that perfection in humanity, or in what way does our equal essence consist?" But since both the perfection in humanity and the declaration of our essence have been brought in by the saying "incarnate," let them cease to lean upon a reed of a staff. Here, indeed, he set the nature of the Word over the nature. For if he had taken "nature" instead of "hypostasis," it would not have been absurd to say this even without "incarnate"; for in saying absolutely one hypostasis of God the Word, we do not err. In like manner also Leontius the Byzantine understood the expression as referring to nature, not to hypostasis. But the blessed Cyril, in the ^B Apology which he wrote against the censures of Theodoret regarding the second anathema, speaks thus: "The nature of the Word, that is, the hypostasis, which is the Word himself." So that to say "the nature of the Word" signifies neither the hypostasis alone, nor the commonness of the hypostases, but the common nature considered in the hypostasis of the Word as a whole.

That the nature of the Word was incarnate, that is, united to flesh, has been said; but that the nature of the Word suffered in the flesh, we have not yet heard even to this day, but we have been taught that Christ suffered in the flesh. So that the phrase "nature of the Word" does not denote the hypostasis. It remains, therefore, to say that to be incarnate is to be united to flesh, but for the Word to become flesh is for the very hypostasis of the Word to become, without change, the hypostasis of the flesh. And that God has become man, and man God, has been said. For God, being the Word, has become man without change. But that the divinity has become man, or has been incarnate, or has humanized, we have never heard. But that the divinity was united to humanity in one of its hypostases, we have learned; and that God is formed, that is, is ^C substantiated, regarding the alien, that is, what is of our nature, has been said.

Proposition regarding the matter at hand.

^A For with respect to each of the hypostases, the name of God is applied, but we cannot say "divinity" with respect to a hypostasis. For we have never heard that the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, is the divinity; for divinity denotes the nature, while "Father" denotes the hypostasis, just as "humanity" denotes the nature, and "Peter" the hypostasis. But "God" signifies also the community of the nature, and is applied to each of the hypostases synonymously, just as "man"; for he is God who has the divine nature, and he is man who has the human nature. For the name of God is applied to each of the hypostases. ^B Above all these things, it must be known that the Father and the Holy Spirit have no part in the incarnation of the Word, except in terms of approval and will.

CAP. XII. That the holy Virgin is the Mother of God, against the Nestorians.

We proclaim the holy Virgin to be properly and truly the Mother of God. For as the God who was born of her is true God, truly the Mother of God is she who gave birth to the true God, born of her incarnate. For we say that God was born of her, not as if the divinity of the Word had received from her the beginning of its existence, but as if the Word of God Himself, who before all ages was born of the Father ^C without time, and exists without beginning and eternally with the Father and the Spirit, in the last days for the sake of our salvation, dwelt in her womb and was born of her, being incarnate without change. For the holy Virgin did not give birth to a mere man, but to true God; not bare, but clothed with flesh; nor did He bring His body from heaven and pass through her as through a pipe, but He took from her flesh of the same substance as ours, and established it in Himself. For if the body was brought from heaven and was not taken from our nature, what need was there for the incarnation? For the incarnation of the Word of God took place for the very purpose that the very nature which had sinned, and fallen, and become corrupt, ^D might overcome the tyrant who had deceived it

and thus be set free from corruption, as the divine Apostle says: For since by man came death, by man also came the resurrection of the dead ^A. If the former is true, then the latter is surely true as well.

And if he says: The first Adam [(29)] is of the earth, earthy; the second Adam, the Lord, is from heaven [I Cor. xv, 47], he does not imply that His body was brought down from heaven, but he shows that He is not merely a man. For behold, he called Him both Adam and Lord, indicating both together. For Adam is interpreted as "earth-born," and it is clear that the nature of man, which was fashioned from the earth, is earth-born; while "Lord" is descriptive of the divine essence.

Again, the Apostle says: God sent forth His Son, the Only-begotten, ^B made of a woman [Gal. iv, 4]. He did not say "through a woman," but "of a woman." Thus the divine Apostle signified that He Himself is the Only-begotten Son of God and God, who became man of the Virgin, and that He Himself who was born of the Virgin is the Son of God and God; but born bodily, in the way He became man, not by inhabiting a man already fashioned, as in a prophet, but by Himself substantially and truly becoming man—that is, in His own hypostasis securing flesh animated by a rational and intelligent soul, and Himself becoming its hypostasis. For this is what "made of a woman" signifies. For how else could the Word of God Himself have been made under the law, ^C unless He had become man consubstantial with us?

Wherefore we justly and truly call the holy Mary Theotokos; for this name sums up the whole mystery of the dispensation. For if she who gave birth is Theotokos, the One born of her is absolutely God, and absolutely man. For how could a God who has His existence before the ages be born of a woman, unless He became man? For clearly "Son of man" means man. But if He who was born of a woman is God, it is clearly one and the same who was begotten of God the Father according to the divine and beginningless essence, and in the last days was born of the Virgin according to the essence that had a beginning and is subject to time—that is, the human essence. This signifies one hypostasis and truly one person.

^A The Fathers refused to call the holy Virgin "Christipara" (Christ-bearer). The term "Christotokos" is the voice of Nestorius, that "Christ" might be spoken of as those who think rightly speak of the "incarnate God." For the human nature was united to the Word at the very moment of conception. But we by no means name the holy Virgin "Christipara," because that impure and execrable man, Nestorius—that man with a Jewish mind, that vessel of ignominy—invented this title to abolish the word "Theotokos" (Mother of God), in contempt of her who alone is truly to be honored above every creature; and may he be torn apart—he and his father Satan—for inventing this name to foist upon us. For indeed King David is also called a Christ, and Aaron the high priest, since kings and priests were accustomed to be anointed; indeed, any pious man to whom God has breathed can be called a Christ, but not by nature God. Yet that pernicious Nestorius raved to call Him who was born of the Virgin a "Deifer" (God-bearer). But far be it from us to call or think of Him as a "Deifer" breathed upon by God; ^B rather, we confess Him to be God incarnate. For the Word Himself became flesh, having been conceived from the Virgin, but proceeding forth as God together with the taking up of the nature, which was already deified by Him at the very moment it was brought into existence. Thus the three things occurred simultaneously: the taking up, the existence, and the deification of that nature by the Word. And thus the holy Virgin is understood and called Theotokos, not only on account of the nature of the Word, but also on account of the deification of the human nature—of which both the conception and the existence were wrought by miracle. For the conception was of the Word, while the existence of the flesh was in the Word Himself; the Mother of God herself supernaturally providing for the molding by the Creator, and for the becoming-human of God, the Maker of all, who deifies the nature He assumed. The union preserves the united elements as they were when they were united; I mean not only the divine, but also the human of Christ, both that which is above us and that which is according to us. For it did not happen that what was first according to us later became above us; but from the first moment of existence, both have always existed in Him, because from the very beginning of the conception, it had its existence in the Word Himself. Human, therefore, it is according to its own nature, but divine and of God, supernaturally. ^C Furthermore, He also assumed the properties of the ensouled flesh. For the Word accepted them, by way of the dispensation, for they truly came to be according to the order of natural movement.

CAP. XIII. On the properties of both natures

CAP. XIV. On the twofold will and free choice of our Lord Jesus Christ

manifests the difference of the natures, thus also the number of the wills and operations essentially pertaining to his natures—for he was volitional and operative of our salvation according to both natures—does not introduce a division; heaven forbid; but it declares their preservation and immunity from corruption even in the union. For we say that the wills and operations are natural, and not hypostatic. By this I mean the volitional and operative power itself, according to which he wills and operates those things that are willed and operated. For if we grant that they are hypostatic, we shall be forced to declare the three persons of the holy Trinity as having different wills and different operations.

^B It is to be known, however, that to will, and to will in a certain way, are not the same thing. For the "to will" belongs to nature, just as "to see" does; for this pertains to all men. But the "how one wills" does not belong to nature, but to our own judgment; just as "how one sees," whether well or badly, also depends on this. For not all men will in the same way, nor do they see in the same way. We shall grant this also concerning operations. For the "how one wills," "how one sees," or "how one operates" is a mode of the use of willing, seeing, and operating, which belongs only to the one using it, and separates him from others according to the commonly spoken difference.

Therefore, "to will" simply is called will, that is, the volitional power, which is a rational appetition and a natural will; but to will in a certain way, that is, the object subject to the will, is the "willed," and the "will of judgment" (or gnomic will). And the "volitional" is that which has by nature the power to will: for instance, the divine nature is volitional, and likewise the human. And the "willer" is he who uses the will, that is, the person, such as Peter.

^C Since, therefore, Christ is one, and his person is one, he is the same one who wills both divinely and humanly. And since he has two natures that are volitional, as being rational—for everything rational is also volitional and possessed of self-determination—we shall say there are two volitions, that is, natural wills, in him. For he is the same one who is volitional according to both his natures. For he assumed the volitional power naturally inherent in us. And since Christ is one and the same who wills according to each nature, we shall also speak of the one "willed" in him, not as if he alone were willing what he naturally willed as God—for it is not of the divinity to will to eat and drink and such things—but also those things that are constitutive of the human nature.

^A This, however, was not due to a conflict of opinion, but to the particular nature of the essences. For then he naturally willed these things, because his divine will willed them, and permitted the flesh to suffer and do things proper to itself.

That the will belongs naturally to man is clear from the following. Excluding the divine, there are three kinds of life: the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational. The vegetative has as its own the nutritive, the augmentative, and the generative movement; the sensitive has movement according to impulse; the rational and intellectual has the movement of free will. If, therefore, the nutritive movement belongs by nature to the vegetative, and the movement according to impulse belongs to the sensitive, then by nature the free movement belongs to the rational and intellectual. ^B And free will is nothing else than the capacity of willing. Since, therefore, the Word became flesh, animated, and endowed with intellect and free will, he also became possessed of a will.

Furthermore, natural things are not learned; for no one learns to reason, to live, to hunger, to thirst, or to sleep. Nor do we learn to will; therefore, willing is natural.

Again, if in irrational creatures nature leads, while in man—who moves with authority according to his will—it is he who leads, then man is by nature a creature that wills.

Again, if man is made in the image of the blessed and superessential divinity, and the divine nature is by nature free and possessed of the will, then man also, as its image, is by nature free and possessed of the will. ^C For the Fathers defined free will as the capacity of willing.

NOTE.

...the same opinion that the natures agreed; for otherwise two persons would already exist, because of the diversity of opinions. Wherefore in his *Epistle on the Two Wills*, [it is observed that] the Monothelites fell into error because, just as Nestorius and Eutyches had not distinguished nature from person, they also did not separate the arbitrary will (which he also calls ^D gnomic) from the natural [will]. And since this one arbitrary will is nothing else but the mutual harmony of wills, divine and human, it follows that it is not exercised in one and the same act, but in two, of which one belongs to the divine, the commander and ruler, and the other to the human, freely obeying. Moreover, this "one will by choice" is properly the same as "one,"—a single thing that both wills desire, or, as our people say, "a single thing willed." Thus Maximus, in the cited dialogue, interprets the similar saying of the Fathers, that there is one will of God and the saints. As our author says below: "Since Christ is one and the same who wills in each nature, we shall state that the object of his will is likewise one."

Photius, in his treatise *On the Arbitrary Wills in Christ*, while trying to explain the sense of Maximus, increases the difficulty; as if the holy confessor had conceded to Christ only a natural will, such as [the will] of eating, drinking, or avoiding death, and not of this or that specific [act of] eating, drinking, speaking, etc. Nor does Gretserus ill-refute him, in Stewart's *Collectanea*. Turrianus brings forth this anonymous scholium, by which Photius is shown not to be consistent with himself: "In what way is it said here that there is one arbitrary will in Christ, when he who introduces this opinion frequently falls into crime (namely, the Monothelite heresy)?" Indeed, Maximus and the Damascene proposed this passage to these heretics, Marc. vii: "Jesus arose and went into the borders of Tyre and Sidon; and he entered into a house, and would have no man know it, and he could not be hid." From which they inferred that Christ at times wished certain things by human will, which the divine will would not grant him to do. Wherefore Maximus, in his book *On the Two Wills*, p. 103, concedes to Christ two arbitrary wills, if they are considered essentially diverse, but by no means if they are contrary and opposed.

^A Furthermore, if the capacity to will belongs to all men, and not to some it belongs and to others it does not; and if that which is commonly observed in all identifies the nature in the individuals subject to it, then man is by nature a willing being. And again, if nature does not admit of "more" or "less," and the capacity to will belongs equally to all, and not more abundantly to some and more sparingly to others, then man is by nature a willing being. Consequently, if man is by nature a willing being, then the Lord also, not only as He is God, but also as He became man, is by nature a willing being. For just as He assumed our nature, so also He assumed our will as part of the order of nature. For this reason the Fathers say that He expressed our will in Himself.

If the will were not natural, it would surely be either personal or contrary to nature. If it were personal, then the will of the Son would in this respect differ from the Father's, and would be distinct from it; for what is personal has the power only to express the person. But if it is contrary to nature, then the will would be a defect from nature; for things that are opposed to nature destroy the things that are in accordance with nature.

^B The God and Father of all things wills either insofar as He is Father, or insofar as He is God. If insofar as He is Father, His will will be one thing and the Son's another; for the Father is not the Son. But if insofar as He is God, then since the Son is also God, and the Holy Spirit is God, it must be admitted that the will belongs to the nature, or is natural.

Inasmuch as, if, as the Fathers have held, those whose will is one have also one essence, then if the will of the divinity of Christ and of His humanity were one, their substance must also be one and the same.

And again, if, according to the opinion of the Fathers, the distinction of nature does not appear in a single will, it is necessary that either by affirming one will we do not speak of a natural distinction, or by proclaiming a distinction of natures we do not posit one will.

^C And again, if, as the divine Gospel says, when the Lord came into the parts of Tyre and Sidon, and entered into a house, He wished that no one would know, yet He could not remain hidden, then surely, since His divine will can do all things, and yet having willed to remain hidden He could not, it follows that insofar as He was man He willed this and could not, and therefore that He had the capacity to will ^D insofar as He was man.

And again: "When he had come," it says, "to the place, he said: I thirst. And they gave him wine mixed with gall: and when he had tasted, he would not drink." Now if, insofar as He is God...

He thirsted and after tasting would not drink, then even insofar as He is God He was subject to passions; for thirst and tasting are passions. But if He did not thirst insofar as He is God, then He thirsted entirely insofar as He is man, and insofar as He was man He possessed a will.

^B And the blessed apostle Paul also says: "He became," he says, "obedient unto death, even death upon a cross." Obedience is the subjection of that which truly has a will, or rather, of that which does not; for we shall not call a brute animal obedient or disobedient. But the Lord became obedient to the Father, not insofar as He is God, but insofar as He is man. For insofar as He is God, He is neither obedient nor disobedient; for these things belong to those under authority, as the divinely inspired Gregory said. Therefore, Christ possessed a will also insofar as He is man.

^B When we say that the will is natural, we do not mean that it is forced, but that it is self-determining; for if it is rational, it is absolutely also self-determining. For not only does the divine and uncreated nature possess nothing forced, but neither does the intellectual and created nature. And this is clear: for since God is by nature good, and by nature Creator, and by nature God, these things are not of necessity; for who is it that imposes necessity upon Him?

^C But one must know that "self-determination" is used equivocally; it is spoken of in one way concerning God, in another concerning angels, and in another concerning men. In God, it is understood in a super-essential way. In angels, it is understood as occurring concurrently with the habit of deliberation, admitting no interval of time whatsoever; for since the angel has self-determination by nature, he uses it freely and without any impediment, as one who experiences no conflict from a body, nor has any opponent to assail him. But in men, it is understood in such a way that the habit is thought of as prior in time to the action. For although man is self-determining and possesses self-determination by nature, he has also the suggestion of the devil and the movement of the body; therefore, on account of the suggestion and the weight of the body, the action is subsequent to the habit.

^D If, therefore, Adam obeyed by willing, and ate by willing, then the capacity for willing is the primary subject of the passion in us; but if the capacity for willing is the primary subject, and the Word, having become incarnate, did not assume this along with the nature, then we have not become free from sin. Furthermore, if He himself established the freedom of the nature,

^A or if he has condemned his own creation as not being good, or has grudged us the healing associated with it, then he has deprived us of entire healing, while showing himself to be subject to passion, by not willing, or by not being able, to save perfectly.

That it is impossible for one composite to be formed from divine and human wills

Furthermore, it is not right to say that anything is formed as one from two wills, just as we speak of a composite person from two natures. First, because compositions pertain to those things that exist in subsistence, and not those which are considered in another way and not as proper to them. Second, because if we were to speak of a composition of wills and energies, we would be forced to speak of a composition of other natural properties as well—that is, of the uncreated and the created, of the invisible and the visible, and things of that sort. And how, furthermore, will a will composed from two wills be named a "will"? For it is impossible for a composite to be named by the appellations of the things from which it is composed. Otherwise, we would also call that which is composed of natures a "nature," not a "person." Added to this is the fact that if we were to speak of one composite will in Christ, we would distinguish Him from the Father by [his] will; for the Father's will is not composite. It remains, therefore, to say that only the person of Christ is composite and common, just as it is in the case of the natures, so also in the case of His natural properties.

That sententia and election are not properly in Christ

^C But it is impossible to speak of *sententia* and election in the Lord, if we wish to speak exactly. For *sententia* is a disposition toward what has been judged, following upon the investigation and deliberation—that is, the counsel and judgment—regarding an unknown matter. After this comes election, which selects and embraces one thing over another. But the Lord, not being a mere man but also God, and having knowledge of all things, lacked any need for reflection, and investigation, and counsel, and judgment; for this reason, He was naturally constituted to adhere to the good, and, conversely, to turn away from the evil. ^D For thus also the prophet Isaiah says: *Before the child chooses evil, he will choose the good; because before the child knows good or evil, he rejects wickedness in order to choose the good.* For the word "before" shows that he did not inquire and deliberate according to us, but being God, and having become incarnate in a divine manner,

that is, hypostatically united to the flesh, in His very being, and knowing all things, He had goodness by nature; for the virtues are natural ^A and exist naturally and equally in all, even if we do not all equally put the things of nature into operation. For it is from what is according to nature that we have lapsed into what is against nature through transgression. But the Lord has brought us back from what is against nature to what is according to nature; for this is what is "according to the image and likeness." And the ascetic life and its labors were not devised with the thought ^B of acquiring virtue as something imported from outside, but to cast off the evil that has been imported and is against nature; just as when we remove by toil the rust of iron—which is not natural, but arises from neglect—we reveal the natural brightness of the iron.

It should be known, moreover, that the term *gnome* (opinion or intent) is of many turns and many meanings. For sometimes it signifies an exhortation, as the divine Apostle says: "Now concerning the virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, yet I give my *gnome*" (1 Cor. vii, 25). Sometimes it signifies a plan, as when the prophet David says: "They have taken crafty ^C *gnome* against Your people" (Ps. lxxxii, 4). Sometimes it signifies a decree, as in Daniel: "For what reason did this impudent *gnome* go forth?" (Dan. ii, 15). Sometimes it is used for faith, or opinion, or frame of mind, and, to speak simply, the term *gnome* is taken in twenty-eight meanings.

CAP. XV. Concerning the operations in our Lord Jesus Christ.

We say that there are also two operations (35) in our Lord Jesus Christ. For, even as to His nature,

^A He is God and consubstantial with the Father, He possesses likewise the divine operation; and as He became man and is consubstantial with us, He possesses the operation of the human nature.

It must be understood that operation (act) is one thing, that which is active (opificious) is another, the product of the operation (effect) is another, and finally the one who operates is another. For operation is the effective and essential movement of nature; that which is active is the nature from which the operation proceeds; the product of the operation is that which is brought about by the operation; and the one who operates is he who uses the operation, that is, the person. Sometimes the operation itself is called the product, and conversely the product is called the operation, just as "creature" is called "creation." For we say, "all creation," meaning the objects created.

^B The multiple acceptance of the word "operation." It must also be noted that operation is motion, and it is acted upon rather than acting, as the Theologian Gregory says in his discourse on the Holy Spirit: "If, however, it is an operation, it will clearly be acted upon, and will not act, and as soon as it has been acted upon, it will cease."

It must also be recognized that life itself is an operation, and indeed the primary operation of a living being; and the entire economy of the living being—everything nutritive and growth-producing, that is, vegetative; everything that occurs through impulse, that is, sensitive; and the rational and self-determining movement—is also an operation. Operation is the fulfillment of power. If, therefore, we perceive all these in Christ, we shall confess that there is also human operation in Him.

Other kinds of operations. As there is a distinction of natures, so there is in Christ a distinction of operations. "Operation" is also said of the first thought that arises within us; and this is a simple and ^C unrelated operation, whereby the mind, by itself, secretly produces its own concepts, without which the mind could not justly be called a mind. Again, "operation" is said of the manifestation and expansion of those things thought of, through the utterance of the word (speech). But this is no longer unrelated and simple, but is considered in relation, being composed of thought and word. And this very relation, which the one acting has toward that which is coming into being, is an operation; and the very thing being produced (36) is called an operation; and the one is of the soul... ^D [alt-version omitted] ...shall be subject to anathema, as those who cut Christ into two persons. For a nature that does not operate at all would have no subsistence whatsoever. It displeased the Eutychians, in the first place, that Leo had introduced a dual nature on account of a dual action: "Each form acts with the communion of the other what is proper to itself." Maximus, in volume II, to Marinus, recalls this acceptance of Anastasius of Antioch, who posits one (operation) of Christ, although he taught several natural actions, and says that he defined nothing else than the individual union and effect, work, I say, and the action by which those (natures) are known. For operation possesses the character of the universal, while effect and work possess that of the particular. But the particular is often spoken of by the name of the universal. But let us hear Anastasius himself from the fragment which I found in the Collection and which our author has copied here. *From the book of Anastasius of Antioch, Concerning Operations*: "Since the word 'operation' is polysemous, the homonym often becomes a cause of error for those..."

who are distracted by the name itself and are led to a meaning other than what the argument intends. For the first [kind of] operation is defined as the movement arising within us; it is simple, carrying no relation, an act ^C of the mind producing its own proper thoughts within itself, without which not even the mind could justly be called a mind. Again, operation is spoken of as the manifestation and unfolding of the things conceived in the mind, by the utterance of speech; this is no longer unrelated, nor simple, but is perceived in a relation. For the relation itself, which he who acts has toward the thing being done, is an operation or act, and so is the thing produced itself; as can be seen in the art of architecture and the building of ships. For the architect had previously looked within himself at what was to be done, for instance the house, and the shipwright at the ship; then they brought what they had thought into the light; they applied [their] manual work again, and completed it. ^D Do you not think each of these to be an operation of the agent? Most certainly. And the one is of the soul alone; the other of the soul using the body; the last is that of the body endowed with an intelligent soul, and furthermore the effect of the action, which is of the man himself. Consider such a thing in your mind regarding the actions of our Savior, about which the question is proposed to us. For the holy Fathers, having perceived the union of the natures, took an example from the common essence of men. Just as, therefore, there is one operation of the intelligent soul, another of the body, and that which is accomplished by these is common to the whole man consisting of both: we notice something of this kind in our Savior, God the Word, who assumed flesh for our sake. We see the divine operations of the divine nature, such as when, from the Virgin Maid who was ignorant of all natural lust, He fashioned His own body without the intercourse of a man; when by the mere impulse of His will He changed water into wine, and other [...] things of that kind: but of the human [nature], I mean the life itself which is proper to man, by which we are moved towards the desire of food for the sake of growth. For life is an operation, and the primary operation of an animal. But if it were not an operation—as some might perhaps imagine—it would clearly be a passion, which is absurd. Therefore it is entirely an operation; but as we consider these, and the natures from which the operations proceed, and at the same time join them together; just as from the natures coming together into one we recognize one person without division and confusion, so too from the diverse actions of the one Christ we perceive the effect.

^A For the breaking of the loaves and the hearing of the leper, "I will, be thou clean," were also for our Jesus; the power of miracles was the act of his divinity, but the works of his hands, and to will, and to say "I will, be thou clean," were the action of his humanity. For the work, if you look at the human nature, is the breaking of the loaves and what the leper heard, "I will"; but if you look at the divine, it is the multiplication of the loaves and the cleansing of the leper. By both actions, that is, of soul and body, he manifested his divine operation to be one and the same, connatural, and equal. For just as we recognize the natures as united and having a circumcession within one another, and yet we do not deny the distinction between them, but rather count them and recognize them as inseparable, so too with the wills and the actions; we recognize both their conjunction and their distinction, and we count them in such a way that we do not introduce division. For just as the flesh has been deified and yet has not undergone a change of its own nature, in the same way the will and the action have been deified and have not departed from their own boundaries; for he is one, who is both this and that, and in such and such a way, that is, both divinely and humanly, he wills and acts. ^B

Therefore, since there are two natures in Christ, it is necessary to say there are two actions also in him. For those whose nature is diverse, of these also the action is disparate; and conversely, those whose nature is the same, of these also the action is the same; but those whose action is one, of these also the essence is one, according to the divinely-spoken Fathers. It is necessary, therefore, to choose one of two things: either, if we say there is one action in Christ, we must also say there is one essence, if we are indeed lovers of the truth, or, if we confess two essences according to the doctrine of the Gospel and the Fathers, we must consistently confess also two actions accompanying them. For in that he is consubstantial with God and the Father according to his divinity, he will be equal also according to his action. And again, in that the same one is consubstantial with us according to his humanity, he will be equal also according to his operation. For the blessed Gregory, bishop of the Nyssaeans, says: "Those whose action is one, of these also the power is precisely the same." For every act and operation is the perfection of power. Furthermore, it is impossible for an uncreated and a created nature to be one nature, or power, or operation. But if we were to say there is one action in Christ, we would be unable to avoid attributing the affections of the intelligent soul, namely fear, I mean, and sorrow, and agony, to the divinity of the Word. ^D

But if they should say that the holy Fathers, when debating about the holy Trinity, said: "Those whose essence is one, of these also the action is one, and those whose essence is diverse, of these also the action is diverse," and claim that it is not right to transfer what is said about the divinity to the economy, we shall reply: if it were said by the Fathers only about the theology, and it does not exist even after the incarnation of the

Son, then He will not be of the same substance. To whom, then, shall we assign the words: ^A *My Father is working until now, and I am working*, and: *Whatever he sees the Father doing, that the Son also does in like manner*, and: *If you do not believe me, believe the works*, and: *The works which I do bear witness of me*, and: *As the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom he wills*? For all these things show Him to be not only consubstantial with the Father even after the incarnation, but also of the same operation.

And again: if the providence ^B over all things pertains not only to the Father and the Holy Spirit, but also to the Son, and this is an operation, even after the incarnation, then even after the incarnation He is of the same operation as the Father. And if from the miracles we learned that Christ is of the same essence as the Father, and miracles are the operations of God, then after the incarnation He is of the same operation as the Father.

But if there is one operation of His divinity and His flesh, it will be composite, and there will either be ^C an operation other than that of the Father, or the Father will also be of a composite operation. And if He is of a composite operation, manifestly He is also of a composite nature.

If they say that a person is introduced along with an operation, we shall reply that if a person is introduced along with an operation, then by reasonable inversion an operation will also be introduced along with a person; and there will be, just as there are three persons, or hypostases, of the holy Trinity, so too three operations, or just as there is one operation, so there is one person and one hypostasis. ^D But the holy Fathers have taught in harmony that they are of the same essence and of the same operation.

Furthermore, if a person is introduced along with an operation, those who have not ordained that one or two operations of Christ should be declared would not have enjoined Him to be called either one person or two.

And in the case of the red-hot sword, just as the natures of both the fire and the iron are preserved, so too are the two operations and their effects. For the iron has the power of cutting, and the fire the power of burning; and the cutting is the effect of the iron's operation, and the burning that of the fire's; and the difference between them is preserved in the burnt cut and in the cut burning, even if neither the burning occurs without the cutting after the union, nor the cutting without the burning; and neither because of the duality of the natural operation do we speak of two red-hot swords, nor again, because...

of the singularity of the red-hot sword, do we effect a confusion of their substantial distinction. In the same way, in Christ also, the operation of his divinity is divine and omnipotent, and that of his humanity is human and like unto ours. The work of the human action was that he took the girl by the hand and drew her; but the divine, that he recalled her to life. For this is one thing, and that is another, even though they remain inseparable from one another in the theandric operation. But if, because the Lord's person or hypostasis is one, the operation must also be one, then, because of the one hypostasis, one also must be the essence.

^B And again, if we say there is one operation in the Lord, we shall confess it to be either divine, or human, or neither. But if we say it is divine, we shall call him God alone, stripped of the humanity he shares with us. If we say it is human, we shall impiously assert that he is mere man. If, finally, we say it is neither divine nor human, we shall declare him to be neither God nor man, and consubstantial neither with the Father nor with us. For from the union there has come about an identity according to hypostasis, but the difference of the natures has not been taken away. But if the difference of the natures is preserved, then clearly their operations must also be preserved. For there is no nature devoid of operation.

If the operation of the Lord Christ is one, it will be either created or uncreated; for there is no operation between these, just as there is no nature. If, therefore, it is created, it will signify a created nature alone; but if it is uncreated, it will characterize an uncreated essence alone. For it is necessary that natural things be appropriate to the natures; for it is impossible for a nature to exist that is in any way deficient. Furthermore, an operation that is in accordance with nature does not come from things that are outside it; and it is clear that it is impossible for a nature to exist or to be known without its natural operation. For by the things through which each thing operates, its own nature is confirmed, which is that it remains unchanged.

If the operation of Christ is one, it will be the author of both divine and human things alike. But nothing of those things that remain in their natural state has the power to produce opposites; for fire does not chill and warm, nor does water dry and moisten. How then could he who is by nature God, and who became by nature man, have performed both the miracles and the sufferings with a single operation?

If, therefore, Christ assumed a human mind, that is, a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, he has certainly thought and will always think; and since thought is the operation of the mind, Christ is certainly, insofar as he is man, active, and always active.

Christ's passion is an action. — Moreover, the all-wise and great saint John Chrysostom, in the second discourse of his commentary on the Acts, speaks thus: "Nor would one be wrong in calling his passion an act; for in suffering all things, he performed that great and marvelous work, destroying death and accomplishing all other things."

^A If every operation is defined as the substantial motion of some nature, as those skilled in these matters have distinguished, then where can one find a nature that is immobile, or entirely devoid of operation, or find an operation ^B that is not a motion originating from a natural power? No sensible person would grant, according to the blessed Cyril, that there is one natural operation of God and of the creature. Nor does human nature raise Lazarus from the dead, nor does divine power weep; for tears are proper to humanity, while life is proper to the subsistent Life. Nevertheless, both are common to both, because of the identity of the hypostasis. For Christ is one, and His person, that is, His hypostasis, is one; yet He has two natures, His divinity and His humanity. The glory proceeding naturally from the divinity became common to both substances because of the identity of the person; and, conversely, because of the flesh, things that were humble became common to both natures. For He who is both this and that, namely God and man, is one and the same; and those things which pertain to the divinity and those which pertain to the humanity are of the same one. For the divinity performed divine signs, but not without the flesh; and the flesh performed humble deeds, but not without the divinity. For the divinity was conjoined to the suffering flesh while remaining impassible, and performing the saving passions; and the holy mind was conjoined to the operating divinity of the Word, thinking and knowing what was being accomplished. ^C Thus the divinity imparts its own prerogatives to the body, while itself remains ^D unaffected by the passions of the flesh. For not as the divinity acted through the flesh, so also did it...

^A suffer through the divinity. For the flesh served as an instrument of the divinity. If, therefore, even from the moment of conception there was no partition whatsoever between the two forms, and the workings of the whole duration were actions of one person of either form, we nevertheless do not in any way confuse those things which happened without separation, but rather we perceive from the quality of the works what belongs to which form. Christ therefore acts according to either of his natures, and either nature acts in him in communion with the other; the Word performing those things which are of the Word, because of the authority and power of the divinity, which are sovereign and kingly; and the body performing those things which are of the body, according to the will of the Word united to it, of whom it became the own property. For it did not move itself toward natural affections of its own volition, nor did it flee or decline from painful things, or suffer those things that assailed it from without, but it was moved according to the condition of nature, while the Word willed and by certain counsel permitted it to suffer and to do what was proper, so that through the works the truth of the nature might be confirmed. ^B Just as he was embodied beyond substance, being conceived of a Virgin, so also did he perform human deeds beyond what human condition warrants, as when he walked with earthly feet upon unstable and fluid water—not because the water hardened like earth, but because it was established by the transcendent power of the divinity against dissolution, and did not yield to the weight of material feet. For he did not do human things in a human way, since he was not man alone, but also God (whence also his sufferings were life-giving and saving); nor, conversely, did he perform divine things in a divine way, since he was not God alone, but also man. Wherefore he wrought divine signs by touch, and word, and other such means, being not only God, but also man. ^C But if anyone should say, "We do not speak of one action in Christ for the sake of setting aside the human action; but because human action is called a 'passion' when contrasted with divine action," ^D according...

to this reasoning, even those who speak of one nature do so not to abolish the human [nature], but because the human nature is called "passive" when contrasted with the divine nature. Far be it from us to call the human motion a "passion" for the sake of distinguishing it from the divine action. For no thing, to speak universally, has its existence or state known or defined by comparison or collation. For in this way, things that exist would be found to be causes of one another. For if because the divine motion is an action, the human is therefore a "passion," then without doubt the human nature will also be evil, because the divine nature is good; and conversely, if because the human motion is called a "passion," the divine motion is therefore considered an action, then in the same way the divine nature will be good because the human is evil: and thus all creatures will be evil, and he who said, "And God saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was very good" (Gen. I, 31), will be found to be a liar.

^C We, however, say that the holy Fathers called the human motion by many names according to the underlying concepts. For they addressed it as power, and operation, and difference, and motion, and property, and quality, and passion, not for the sake of contrasting it with the divine, but as a conserving and immutable power; as an operation, as it is characteristic and manifests the absence of variation in all those of the same species; as a difference, as it is distinguishing; as a motion, as it is indicative; as a property, as it is constitutive, and present to it alone and to no other; as a quality, as it is formative; as a passion, as it is moved. For all things that are from God, and after God, "suffer" in that they are moved, inasmuch as they are not self-motion or self-power; not by way of contrast, as has been said, but according to the reason implanted in it by the Cause that created the whole. Whence, expressing it together with the divine [action], they called it an operation. For ^D he who said, "For each form acts with the communion of the other," did nothing else than he who said, "And when He had fasted forty days, He afterward hungered" (it gave to nature, when He willed, to do what was its own), or those who proclaimed a different action in Him, or a double [action], or one and another? For these things signify two actions by means of pronouns. For even the number is frequently indicated by the substitution of names, and by saying "divine" and "human." For the difference is a difference of things that differ; things that do not exist, how shall they differ?

CAP. XVI. Against those who say: If man is of dual nature and operation, it is necessary to say there are three natures in Christ, and as many operations.

Every individual man, being composed of two natures, to wit, soul and body, and having these immutable within himself, shall reasonably be called ^A of two natures. For he preserves the natural property of either, even after the union. For the body is not immortal, but subject to decay; nor is the soul mortal, but immortal; nor again is the body invisible, nor can the soul be seen by bodily eyes; but the latter is rational, intelligent, and incorporeal, while the former is gross, visible, and devoid of reason. Those things that are divided by the reason of essence are not of one nature; therefore, soul and body are not of the same essence.

And again: if man is a rational, mortal animal, and every definition is declarative of the underlying natures, and rational is not the same as mortal according to the rule of nature, then man would not be of one nature according to the rule of his own definition. ^B But if man is ever called of one nature, the name of "nature" is taken in place of "species," as when we say that one man does not differ from another by any difference of nature; but all men, having the same constitution and being composed of soul and body, and each man forming two natures, are all brought under one definition. And this does not seem unreasonable, since the holy Athanasius also said there is one nature of all created things, as they are originate, in the discourse he wrote against those who were impiously disparaging the Holy Spirit, speaking in this way: "That the Holy Spirit is above created things, and is something other than the nature of things originate, and proper to the divinity, it is possible to see again. For everything that is surveyed commonly and in many things, being more in one and less in another, is called an essence." Since, therefore, every man is composed of soul and body, according to ^C the sub-division of the parts into parts, this is not of dogmatic brevity, nor of the speech abbreviated according to the Gospel, but of skeptical speculation. Soul and body are not parts of Christ, but parts of a part; otherwise one must confess not three only, but many natures in Christ.

^A It is also possible to observe the following: whatever is considered commonly and in many, and does not inhere more abundantly in one and more sparingly in another, is called essence. Since, therefore, every man is composed of soul and body, for this reason a single nature is predicated of all. But in the person of the Lord, we cannot speak of a single nature. For both natures preserve their natural property, even after the union, and it is impossible to find a species of Christ apart from divinity and humanity; for Christ did not become someone else, being both God and man.

^B And again: it is not the same thing to be one according to species as to be one according to the substance of soul and body. For "one according to the species of man" indicates the most exact similarity in all men; but "one according to the essence of soul and body" would destroy their existence and reduce them entirely to nothing. For either one will migrate into the essence of the other, or one will be generated from others, and thus both will be changed, or, staying within their own bounds, they will constitute two natures. For, as far as essence is concerned, body and what is incorporeal are not the same. It is not, therefore, necessary that because we speak of one essence in man—not because the quality of soul and body is identical, but due to the most exact equality of individuals referred to the same species—we must also speak of one nature in Christ, where there is no such species containing many persons.

Further, every composition

^A of which they are composed, is what is called "composed." For we do not say that a house is composed of earth and water, but of bricks and wood. Since it is necessary that a man also be said to be composed of at least five natures, namely of the four elements and the soul. Thus also in our Lord Jesus Christ, we do not look at the constituent parts of the parts, but at those which are immediately composed, that is, divinity and humanity.

Furthermore, if because we say man consists of two natures, we are forced to say there are three natures in Christ, then you too, who say man is of two natures, must likewise assert that Christ is composed of three natures. The same must also be said concerning the actions: for the action must be consistent with the nature. But that man is called and is of a dual nature, Gregory the Theologian is witness ^B, saying: "There are two natures, God and man, since there is also soul and body." And again in his Oration on Baptism he says: "Since we consist of a double nature, namely soul and body, the one visible, the other invisible, the baptism is also double, namely by water and spirit."

CAP. XVII. Concerning the fact that the nature and will of the Lord’s flesh have been deified.

The deification of Christ’s flesh is to be understood as follows—but it is worth the effort to know that the Lord's flesh did not ^C cast off its nature; even if it was permeated to such an extent, it still preserves its essential difference. For it did not cease from its own logos. For the divine nature remained unchangeable in the assumption of the mass [the human nature], which all divinely inspired Scripture sets forth. Moreover, no image can be found which perfectly represents this union. Nevertheless, we will try to bring forward one which, although it does not attain to the magnitude of the mystery due to its smallness, yet as regards the rest, it approaches the likeness more closely. For example, if someone were to imagine all the air which is under heaven being set on fire, or rather being fire, and if a grain of mustard seed or millet were cast into such great fire, it must necessarily take on the properties of what is more powerful, so that nothing is seen to be there except fire, even though the definition of its substance subsists. In the same way, the human nature, united to the Word of God, was so overcome that it no longer seemed to be the nature of a man, and for this reason the Fathers say it has been deified ^D not by a change, or alteration, or mutation, or confusion, of nature; since, as has been said, it preserves its essential difference. For the divine nature remained unchangeable in the assumption of the mass, which all divinely inspired Scripture confirms. This Anastasius teaches, cited in the *Collectanea*, and cited in Euthymius, book II, *Panoplia*, tit. 7. And Nicephorus teaches that this deification is fully accomplished in the resurrection: "Since it has been stripped of corruption and mortality, it has been transformed into that which is better," when the flesh is transformed.

^A It is said to be deified and co-deified, and also God, as Gregory the Theologian says: “Of which the one bestowed deity, and the other was bestowed with deity; and I will be bold to say, a co-sharer of the same deity. And that which anointed became man, and God that which was anointed.” These things are not said by way of a change of nature, but by way of the economy of union according to hypostasis, in accordance with which it is inseparably united to the Word of God, and through which there is a mutual indwelling of the natures, as we say regarding the heating of iron. For just as we confess the incarnation without change and conversion, so we hold the deification of the flesh to have occurred. For neither did the Word, because he became flesh, depart from the heights of his own divinity or the god-befitting excellences belonging to it; nor again was the flesh, having been deified, turned away from its own natural properties. For after the union, the natures remain unconfused, and their properties remain unharmed. But the flesh of the Lord became enriched by divine energies because of that most sincere union with the Word, which is according to hypostasis, while in no way suffering the loss of its natural properties. For it did not perform divine acts by its own power, but by the Word united to it, the Word demonstrating through it his own energy; for the heated iron burns, not as possessing the burning power by a natural law, but by having acquired this from the union with fire, and by exercising it through that. For indeed, glowing iron does not burn because it has the power to burn by nature, but because it has contracted that power from its conjunction with fire.

^C As also the human will was deified. And so, the same flesh was by its own nature mortal, and because of the hypostatic union with the Word, it conferred life. In a similar way, we teach the deification of the will, not that the natural motion was changed, but that it was united to his divine and almighty will, and became the will of the God who became man. Whence, when he wished to remain hidden, he could not, because of ^D the God-Logos who had become man having shown it in himself to be truly the weakness of the human will. But wishing the leprosy...

CONCERNING THE ORTHODOX FAITH, BOOK III

[he] performed the cleansing, because of the union with the divine will.

It should be known that the deification of both the nature and the will is a most emphatic and demonstrative proof of both the two natures and the two wills. For just as the igniting of a substance does not change the nature of the ignited thing into the nature of fire, but manifests both the ignited thing and that which ignited it, and is ^A indicative not of one, but of two, so also the deification does not create one composite nature, but two, and the union according to hypostasis. For the Theologian Gregory says: "Of which one deified, and the other was deified." For by saying "of which the one, and the other," he indicated two realities. ^B

CHAPTER XVIII. Again concerning the two wills, and the freedom of the will; likewise concerning the mind, and the two-fold knowledge and wisdom.

Saying that Christ is perfect God and perfect man, we shall surely attribute to Him all things—both those which are natural to the Father and those which are natural to the Mother. For He became man, in order that He might conquer what had been conquered. For He who is all-powerful was not unable, by His own omnipotent authority and power, to deliver man from the tyranny of the tyrant; but there would have been a pretext for complaint for the one playing the tyrant, [had he been] deprived of his prize through force by God after having himself conquered man. Therefore, God, out of His mercy and benevolence toward men, becomes man, so that He might restore like by like.

The soul and human mind were assumed, against the Apollinarians.

That man is a rational and intelligent animal, no one will deny. How then did He become man, if He took an inanimate flesh or a soulless mind? For this is by no means man. And what benefit comes to us from the humanity assumed by Him, if salvation was not brought to the one who first contracted the stain, nor was it brought to pass that he should be renewed and strengthened through conjunction with the divinity? For what is not assumed is not healed; therefore He assumed the whole man, and thus that part of him which was subject to disease, so that He might bestow salvation upon the whole. Furthermore, there has never been a mind that is destitute of wisdom and cognition. For if it is inactive and motionless, then it does not possess any reason at all. ^C

Therefore, the God-Logos, wishing to renew that which is in the image, became man. And what is that which is in the image,

^A except the mind? If this were omitted, and he assumed only what is inferior, would he have assumed the image? For the mind is in the middle ground between God and the flesh: being as it were a cohabiter with the flesh, and the image of God. The mind, therefore, is joined to the mind, and the mind mediates between the purity of God and the coarseness of the flesh; for if the Lord had assumed a mind-less soul, he would have assumed the soul of an irrational animal.

The objection of the Apollinarists is solved. Soul and flesh are used for "man" in Scripture.

The human will of Christ is subject to the divine.

NOTES

(45). *Voluntary to it.* Or rather, free. For Christ says: *No one takes my life from me, but I lay it down of myself. And I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it up again.* This commandment I have received from my Father. From Chrysostom: by saying that he received a commandment ^D from the Father, he shows nothing else than this: *I do what pleases Him.* Hence, lest when you hear "commandment," you might think this noble work was foreign to him, he continues: *The good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep*; hence he shows that his sheep, and whatever is rightly done, is his own work, and that he does not need a commandment. Cyril of Alexandria points to the same thing in Book X on John: "The Father's purposes," he says, "were in the place of commandments to Christ. For since, being the Word, he perceives the counsels of the Father and searches the depths of the Begetter, he executes that which has appeared to him, and holds it in the place of a commandment." Where he repeats what he had taught at the beginning of Book VI, taking Christ's statement everywhere in the same sense as Chrysostom.

^A it was he who was about to drink the cup; for he was not about to drink it as God. As man, therefore, he wishes for the cup to pass away—these are expressions of natural fear—*Nevertheless, not as I will,* that is, insofar as I am of a different substance from you, *but as you will,* that is, as I am also your own, insofar as I am consubstantial with you. These are again words of courage, for the soul of the Lord, having first experienced natural weakness, and having perceived the sensation of pain from the separation of the body, was then strengthened by the divine will and conceived courage against death. For because the same person was wholly God with his humanity, and wholly man with his divinity, he himself, as man, in himself and through himself, subjected that which was human to God the Father, giving us an excellent pattern and example, and he became obedient to the Father.

Now, he willed self-determinedly regarding both the divine and the human will. For to every rational nature there is naturally inherent a self-determined will. For what would the rational exercise have, if it did not deliberate self-determinedly? For the Creator implanted a natural appetite even in irrational creatures, leading them necessarily toward the preservation of their own nature. For being devoid of reason, they cannot lead themselves, but are led by natural appetite. Wherefore, as soon as appetite arises, ^B immediately the impulse toward action follows; for they do not use reason, or counsel, or reflection, or judgment. Hence, they are neither praised and called blessed as if they were pursuing virtue, nor punished as if they were doing evil. But the rational nature has indeed a natural appetite that is moved, yet it is such that in those things which preserve integrity consonant with nature, it is governed and regulated by reason. For this is the excellence of reason: a self-determined will, which we call a natural movement in a rational substance. For this reason, when it cultivates virtue, it obtains praise and is proclaimed blessed, and when it gives itself over to vice, it is punished.

^C So the soul of the Lord did indeed will, moving self-determinedly, but it willed self-determinedly only those things which his divine will willed it to will. For the flesh was not moved by the nod of the Word—as Moses and all the saints were moved by the divine nod—but he himself, being one and the same, both God and man, willed by both his divine and his human will. For this reason, it was not by counsel and intent, but rather by the character of natural faculty, that the two wills of the Lord differed from one another. For his divine will was without beginning and omnipotent, possessing the power that follows it, and impassible; while his human will ^D and...

indeed his human nature had a beginning in time and sustained those passions which are natural and blameless. His nature indeed was not omnipotent, but as it had truly and naturally become of the Word of God, it lacked nothing. ^A

Chapter XIX: On the Theandric, or God-manly, action.

The blessed Dionysius, in speaking of a new theandric action ^B performed by Christ among us, does not say this to abolish the natural actions, nor does he affirm a single action generated from both the human and divine. For then we would also have to say that there is a single new nature generated from both the divine and the human; for those things whose action is one, have, according to the Fathers, one essence also. But he wishes to show the new and ineffable manner in which Christ's natural actions were manifested, in accordance with the ineffable manner of the interpenetration ^C of Christ’s two natures—a manner appropriate to his life among men, strange and paradoxical, and unknown to the nature of existing things—and also the manner of his according to the [divine] ineffable... ^D [The text continues in the next block]. The blessed Dionysius [meant that he] was not mere man, nor did he act as a man merely from among men, but being God he became man, and lived among us beyond the lot of men and beyond man; and thereafter, he did not perform divine things according to God, nor human things according to man, but as God having become man, he brought forth among us a certain new God-manly action. We, as we have already written at great length in other places, having received the voice of the all-wise Dionysius the Areopagite, who says that "the God who became man brought forth among us a new God-manly action," have conceived and do conceive it as a single action, for it is impossible to conceive it otherwise, since every duality is excluded. For we confess that God, having become man, performed and expressed this in a new way, and that there is one nature and one hypostasis that is God-manly, just as there is one nature of the Word of God incarnate. For since the principle of the dispensation of the incarnate Word has renewed the natures, it has also renewed the designations along with them. Therefore, when Christ is one, ascending the high mountain, as it is said, we proclaim from thence that one hypostasis, one nature, and one composite operation of him, pronouncing anathema on all those who after the union teach two natures and [two] operations. This is the position of Severus and his followers. But Anastasius of Sinai interprets this passage of the falsely-named Dionysius in the same way as Maximus and other conquerors of the Monothelites, saying: "He did not receive human things in a bare, human manner, but as it behooved him who was God and man at once; which things were indeed performed in a God-manly and indivisible way in the one singular person of Christ, whilst the property of each nature was preserved unconfused, so that it might be discovered that Christ, by his incarnation, performed those things which are natural and blameless in a manner above man." I do not add the exposition of John of Scythopolis, which, although it comes to the same thing, is woven together with such words that one might infer from this very passage that he, rather than Maximus, is the parent of these Scholia on Dionysius. Sophronius, in his letter to Sergius, after he had reprimanded Cyrus of Alexandria because in his seventh anathema he had not posited a new God-manly action, but a single action, teaches moreover that there were other actions of Christ that were merely divine, and others that were merely human, and that there were others of a certain middle kind, as they possessed both something divine and something human jointly.

^A union by way of interchange. For we do not say that the operations are divided, nor that the natures operate separately, but rather that each, in union with the communion of the other, operates that which it has peculiarly its own. For He did not perform human things in a human manner—for He was not mere man—nor divine things according to God alone—for He was not a bare God—but He was God simultaneously existing as man. For just as we understand the union of the natures and their natural distinction, so too do we understand the union of the natural wills and operations.

^B It is to be known, therefore, that in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, we sometimes hold our discourse as of two natures, and sometimes as of one person; and this and that is referred to one and the same conception. For the two natures are one Christ, and the one Christ is two natures. It is therefore the same thing to say: Christ operates according to each of His natures, and: each nature operates in Christ with the communion of the other. The divine nature, therefore, communicates with the flesh as it operates, because by the good pleasure of the divine will it is permitted to suffer and to do its own things, and because the action of the flesh is altogether salvific—which is not of human action, but rather of divine action. And the flesh, in turn, communicated with the divinity of the Word as It was operating, both because it performed the divine actions through the body as through a certain instrument, and because He who was operating was one and the same, operating at once in a divine and in a human manner.

^C It is to be known, however, that His holy mind also executes its own natural actions. For it thinks and knows that it is the mind of God, and that it is adored by all creation, and it remembers its sojournings and sufferings upon earth. Furthermore, it communicates with the divinity of the Word as It operates, whereby all things are ruled and governed, understanding, knowing, and administering all things—not as the simple and naked mind of a man, but as one which is united to God according to hypostasis, and which exists as the mind of God.

^D The theandric action of Christ, therefore, declares nothing other than that, God having been made man—that is, having become incarnate—His every human action was divine, or deified, and not devoid of His divine operation; and again, His divine operation was not devoid of His human operation, but each was considered together with the other.

Circumlocution

two things. Just as we speak of the "incised burning" of a flaming sword, and its "burnt incision," yet we assert that the incision is distinct from the burning, and that they belong to different natures—that is, the burning to the fire and the incision to the iron—in the same way, while speaking of the one theandric operation of Christ, we understand the two operations of his two natures: the divine operation of his divinity, and the human operation of his humanity.

CHAPTER XX.

On natural and blameless passions.

He assumed everything, therefore, in order to sanctify everything. He was tempted and he conquered, in order to procure victory for us and to confer upon our nature the power to conquer the adversary, so that the nature that was once conquered might, through those same assaults by which it was overcome, finally wrest the victory from the conqueror.

The evil one, ^D therefore, made his assault from the outside, not through mental suggestions, just as he did with Adam; for he did not approach even him through mental suggestions, but through the serpent. But the Lord repelled the assault and dispelled it like smoke, so that the passions that had attacked him, being conquered...

^A by him, might easily be conquered by us, and so the new Adam might save the old one.

Indeed, our natural passions in Christ were ^B both according to nature and above nature. According to nature, because they were stirred in him when he allowed the flesh to undergo what was proper to it; but above nature, because in the Lord those things which were natural did not anticipate the will. For nothing compelled is seen in him, but everything is voluntary. He hungered voluntarily, he thirsted voluntarily, he was afraid voluntarily, he died voluntarily.

CHAPTER XXI.

On ignorance and servitude.

It is necessary to know ^C that he assumed a nature that was ignorant and servile. For the nature of man is indeed servile to God who created it, and does not possess knowledge of future things. If, therefore, according to Gregory the Theologian, you separate that which is beheld from that which is understood, the flesh is called both servile and ignorant. But because of the identity of the person and the inseparable union, the soul of the Lord was enriched with the knowledge of future things, just as with other divine signs. For just as the flesh of men, according to its own nature, is not life-giving, yet the flesh of the Lord ^D is not... [original-script column: see facsimile] ...that many of the Fathers, indeed almost all, appear to say that he was ignorant.

is not life-giving, yet the flesh of the Lord is not ^A exempt from its natural mortality, but yet, by reason of the hypostatic union with the Word, it has been made life-giving; and it is not right to say that it was either not life-giving or is not always so. Thus, human nature does not of its own essence possess the knowledge of future things; but the soul of the Lord, by reason of its union with God the Word himself and because of the identity of hypostasis, was enriched, as I said, with the knowledge of future things, just as it was with the power of the rest of the miracles.

It must be known [(51)] that we cannot even call him a slave; for the terms of slavery and lordship are not marks of nature, but are relative terms, just as are those of fatherhood and sonhood. For these do not indicate essence, but relationship. As we said, therefore, regarding ignorance: if by refined reasoning, that is, by subtle mental considerations, you separate what is created from what is uncreated, the flesh is servile if it were not united to God the Word. But since it was once united according to hypostasis, how will it be a slave? For since Christ is one, he cannot be both his own slave and his own Lord; for these are not among terms said absolutely, but are among those said in relation to another. Whose slave, then, will he be? The Father's? Then are not all things ^B that the Father has also the Son's, if he is a slave of the Father but in no way of himself? And how does the Apostle speak concerning us, who have been adopted through him: "So you are no longer a slave, but a son" [(88)], if he himself is a slave? Therefore, he is called a slave descriptively, not being one in reality, but because he took the form of a slave for our sake, and was called a slave along with us. For being impassible, he served the passions for our sake, and became a minister of our salvation. But those who say that he is a slave divide the one Christ into two, just as Nestorius did. We, however, declare him to be Master and Lord of all creation, the one Christ, the same being at once God and man, and knowing all things: "In him are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" [(89)].

CHAPTER XXII.

Concerning progress

He is said to progress in wisdom, age, and grace.

because he grew in age; ^A and through the increase of age, he brought the wisdom that was already in him into outward manifestation. Furthermore, he considered the progress of men in wisdom and grace, and the fulfillment of the Father's good pleasure—that is, the knowledge of God and the salvation of men—as his own progress, claiming as his own our condition in all things. But those who say that he progressed in wisdom and grace as if receiving an increase of these, do not hold that the union of the flesh took place from the very first realization of existence, nor do they champion union according to hypostasis; but, being persuaded by the empty-minded Nestorius, they talk nonsense about a relative union and a bare indwelling, not knowing what they are saying nor whereof they affirm. For if the flesh was truly united to the Word of God from its first existence, ^B or rather, if it existed in him and had the hypostatic identity with him, how could it not have been perfectly enriched with all wisdom and grace? Not that it partook of grace, nor shared in the things of the Word through grace, but rather, because of the union according to hypostasis, human and divine things became the property of the one Christ. Since the same one was both God and man at once, he poured forth grace, wisdom, and the fullness of all good things into the world like a fountain.

CHAPTER XXIII. Concerning fear.

A twofold fear. What natural fear is, and as it exists in Christ.

^A and the natural danger arising from these; while in those things that bring destruction, he showed a shrinking back, so that at the time of his passion he voluntarily admitted a state of compression from the fear of death. For although the things that happened were in accordance with the law of nature, they were not, as is the case for us, by necessity. For he took upon himself what was natural, willingly and freely. And consequently, this fear, trepidation, and dread is a natural and blameless affection, not subject to sin.

There is, again, fear that arises from a failure of reasoning, from unbelief, and from the ignorance of the hour of death, as when we are afraid at night due to some noise. This is unnatural, and is defined as follows: unnatural fear is an unforeseen shrinking. This kind of fear the Lord did not assume. Therefore, he never feared, except at the time of the passion, although otherwise he often withdrew himself by a deliberate plan; for he was not ignorant of the time.

That he truly feared, the holy Athanasius is witness, saying in his discourse against Apollinarius: “For this reason the Lord said: ‘Now my soul is troubled’ (John XII, 27). But the ‘now’ here means ‘when he wished it’; however, it shows what was present. For he did not name what was not there as if it were present, as if the things being said were happening only in appearance; for all things were happening by nature and in truth.” And after other things: “In no way does the Godhead admit of passion without a body that suffers, nor does it show disturbance and sadness without a soul that is saddened and disturbed, nor is it anxious and praying without a mind that is anxious and praying. ^C But even if the things that occurred did not happen by a defeat of nature, they happened in demonstration of his being.” Now, that they did not occur by a defeat of nature means that he did not suffer these things against his will.

CAP. XXIV. Concerning the Lord’s Prayer.

Prayer is the ascent of the mind to God, or the petition of what is fitting from God. How, then, did the Lord pray at the tomb of Lazarus, and at the time of his passion? For his holy mind did not need an ascent to God, having been once and for all united to God the Word according to hypostasis, nor did it need to make a petition from God (for Christ is one). But because he was assuming our ^D person, and fashioning our nature in himself, and becoming an example to us, and teaching us to ask of God, and to be lifted up to him, and through his own holy mind making a way for us to ascend to God.

^A For just as he endured the passions, bestowing upon us the victory over them, so also he prays, making a way for us, as I said, to ascend to God, and fulfilling all righteousness on our behalf, as he said to John, and reconciling his own Father to us, and honoring him as his beginning and cause, and showing that he is not a counter-god. For when he said at the time of Lazarus, "Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me. I knew that thou hearest me always; but I said it for the sake of the crowd standing around, that they may believe that thou didst send me," is it not most evident to everyone that he spoke these words for no other reason than to honor the Father as his beginning and cause, and to show that he is not a counter-god?

^B And again, when he said: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt," does not everyone clearly see that he spoke thus to teach us to implore help from God alone in temptations, and to place the divine will before our own, and to show that he truly adopted the things that belong to our nature; and that in truth he possessed two wills, natural ones, and suited to his natures, but in no way contrary to each other? "Father," he says, as being of the same substance; "if it be possible," not as one who is ignorant—for what is impossible to God?—but as one instructing us to prefer the divine will over our own. For this alone is impossible, that which God does not will or permit. "Nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt": as God, he has the same will as the Father, but as man, he naturally manifests the will of humanity; for this naturally shrinks from death.

^C And as for that, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" he uttered it because he was bearing our person. For he would not have called the Father his God, were it not that he was placed among us, separating the visible from the intelligible—if one were to distinguish them by the subtle imaginings of the mind—nor by ^D our nature, but by that which I said, he typifies our folly and our sin, making our condition his own.

^A nor was he ever deserted by his divinity; but we were the ones who were abandoned and despised. For this reason, assuming our person, he uttered these requests.

CAP. XXV.

De appropriatione seu vindicatione (On Appropriation or Vindication)

One makes something his own in two ways. We ought to know that there is a double vindication: one which is natural and substantial, and another which is personal and according to respect. The natural and substantial is that by which God, on account of his benevolence toward humanity, assumed both our nature and all natural properties, truly and by nature becoming man and experiencing those things that fall under our nature. The personal and according to respect, however, takes place when someone, out of affection, say, or pity, or love, assumes the person of another and, in his stead, utters words that do not pertain to himself. ^B It is by this kind of vindication that the Lord made our curse, our abandonment, and other such things that are not natural to him, his own—not that he was these things, or was born as such, but that he took upon himself our person and was numbered among us. In this sense is taken the saying: *He became a curse for us*.

CHAPTER XXVI.

De corporis Domini passione, ipsiusque divinitate impassibilitate (On the Passion of the Body of the Lord, and the Impassibility of His Divinity)

The Word of God himself, therefore, endured all things in the flesh, while his divine and solely impassible nature remained immune to any suffering. For since one and the same Christ, who is composed of divinity and humanity and subsists in divinity and humanity, truly suffered, that part ^C which by its natural condition had the capacity for suffering, suffered; but that which was impassible did not suffer along with it. For the soul, while passible, even if the body is cut, does not itself in the least feel the pain of the bodily wound; whereas the divinity, being impassible, does not suffer along with the body.

One must also know that we say that God suffered in the flesh, but not that the divinity suffered in the flesh, nor that God suffered through the flesh. ^D

^A For if the sun’s rays were shining upon a tree, and an axe were to cut the tree, the sun would remain uncut and impassible; much more does the impassible divinity of the Word, which is hypostatically united to the flesh, remain impassible while the flesh suffers. And just as if someone were to pour water upon red-hot iron, the fire—for that is what I mean—is naturally affected by the water and is extinguished, yet the iron remains unharmed, for it is not its nature to be corrupted by water; ^B much more so, when the flesh suffers, the divinity alone, being impassible, does not admit of the passion, yet remains inseparable from it. For examples do not necessarily have to correspond in every respect and in every detail. For in examples, both what is similar and what is different must be observed, for the very reason that they are examples. For that which in all respects is the same would be identical, and not an example, especially in divine matters. For it is impossible to find an example in all respects identical, whether in theology or in the economy.

CAPUT XXVII. That the divinity of the Word remained inseparable from soul and body, even in the death of the Lord, and that one person remained meanwhile.

^C Since our Lord Jesus Christ was pure from every stain of sin—for "He did no sin, who takes away the sin of the world, nor was guile found in His mouth"—He was in no way subject to death, if indeed "death entered into the world through sin." He dies, therefore, by accepting death for our sake, and offers Himself to the Father as a sacrifice for our sake. For we had sinned against Him, and to Him the price of our redemption had to be paid, that in this way we might be liberated from condemnation. Far be it, however, that the blood of the Lord should have been offered to the tyrant! ^D Death therefore approaches, and greedily swallowing the bait of the body, it is transfixed by the hook of the divinity; and having tasted of the sinless

^A and life-giving body, it perishes, and brings back all whom it had swallowed long ago. For just as shadows disappear upon the introduction of light, so corruption is dispelled by the approach of life, and there comes to be life for all, but death to the destroyer. Even if he has died, therefore, as a man, and his holy soul was separated from his immaculate body, yet the divinity remained unseparated from both, I mean from the soul and from the body, and not even in this way was the one hypostasis divided into two hypostases. For both the body and the soul had their existence in the same way from the beginning in the hypostasis of the Word; and in death, though separated from one another, each of them remained, possessing the one hypostasis of the Word. So the one hypostasis of the Word was the hypostasis both of the Word itself, and of the soul, and of the body; for neither the soul nor the body ever had a hypostasis of their own apart from the hypostasis of the Word, but the hypostasis of the Word is always one, and never two. Thus the hypostasis of Christ is always one. For even if ^B the soul was separated from the body locally, yet hypostatically it was united through the Word.

CAP. XXVIII. On corruption and corruptibility.

The name of corruption signifies two things. It signifies ^C

— Christ’s one person, nowhere divided from itself, even if its parts were distracted. ^B 251 Although, therefore, Christ died as a man, and his holy soul was distracted from his immaculate body, the divinity was nevertheless in no way whatsoever separated from either of them, that is, neither from the soul nor from the body; nor for this reason was the one person divided into two. For both body and soul existed from the beginning in the person of the Word; and although they were parted in death, yet each of them always possessed the one person of the Word by which it subsisted. Wherefore one and the same hypostasis of the Word was the hypostasis of both the Word and the body. For neither soul nor body ever had a peculiar subsistent existence distinct from the subsistence of the Word; but there was always one hypostasis and subsistence of the Word, and it was never double. For this reason the person of Christ was also always one. For although the soul was separated from the body with respect to place, it was nonetheless united hypostatically through the Word.

CAP. XXVIII. On corruption and corruptibility.

Corruption is double: in the first sense, Christ’s ^D corruptible condition...

that is, these human sufferings: hunger, thirst, weariness, the piercing of the nails, death—which is to say the departure of the soul from the body, and suchlike—is accepted. In this sense, we say the Lord's body was corruptible; for He willingly took on all these things. But corruption also signifies the absolute dissolution and extinction of the body into the elements from which it was composed; this is more commonly called decay. The Lord’s body did not experience this, as the prophet David says: For Thou wilt not abandon my soul to Hades, nor wilt Thou give Thy Holy One to see ^B corruption.

Therefore, to say that the Lord’s body was incorruptible before the resurrection, according to the first meaning of corruption, in the manner of the mad Julian and Gaianus, is impious. For if it were incorruptible, it was certainly not of the same substance as us; and those things which the Evangelists record as having happened—hunger, thirst, nails, the piercing of the side, death—happened only in appearance and not in truth. But if these things occurred only in appearance, then the mystery of the Economy was a deception and a phantom, and He became man in appearance only and not in truth, and we were saved in appearance only and not in truth—but away with such a thought! May those who say such things be estranged from salvation. We, however, have attained and shall attain true salvation. But according to the ^C second meaning of corruption, we confess the Lord’s body to be incorruptible, just as the God-bearing Fathers have handed down to us. Indeed, after the Savior’s resurrection from the dead, we also call the Lord’s body incorruptible even according to the first meaning; for the Lord bestowed resurrection and subsequent incorruption upon our own body through His own body, having Himself become the firstfruits of our resurrection, incorruption, and impassibility. For this corruptible must put on incorruption, says the divine Apostle.

^D The Fathers say. But this is not the time to dispute about these matters, for the dogma of the faith does not concern the state of Adam. The Lord did not come to save Adam while he was innocent, so as to become like him, but rather as one guilty of sin and already fallen, so that, by suffering together with him, He might also raise him up with Himself. Because the heretics inferred from the authorities of certain Fathers that Christ’s body was free from corruption, our author distinguishes that double genus of corruption, which he discusses at the beginning of the chapter.

CHAPTER XXIX. On the descent into hell.

Therefore, the deified soul descended into hell, so that, just as the Sun of righteousness had risen for those upon the earth, so also it might shine upon those beneath the earth, sitting in darkness and the shadow of death. And as he had evangelized peace to those on earth, remission to the captives, and sight to the blind, and had become the cause of eternal salvation to those who believed, and the refutation of unbelief to those who did not, so also it was for those in hell, so that to him every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth. In this way, having loosed those who had been bound from every age, he returned again from the dead, paving the way for us to the resurrection.

BOOK FOURTH

CHAPTER I. On those things following the resurrection.

Christ after the resurrection is impassible. Why he took food after it. That all human things were complete in Him.—After Christ rose from the dead, he put off all infirmities, I mean corruption, hunger and thirst, sleep and weariness, and such like. For although he tasted of food after the resurrection, it was not...

constrained by the law of nature: nor did he suffer hunger, but [he did it] by a certain dispensation, to confirm the faith that he had truly returned to life, and that it was the same flesh which had been dead that had revived. Furthermore, he cast off no part of his nature, neither body nor soul. Rather, he possessed both body and soul, endowed with reason and intellect, and with the power of willing and acting; and thus he ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of the Father, willing our salvation in a divine and human manner: divinely, inasmuch as he provides for all things, preserving and governing them; but humanly, inasmuch as he keeps in mind the life he lived on earth, seeing and knowing that he is adored by every rational creature. ^B For his holy soul is aware that it is united to the Word of God according to hypostasis, and is adored together with him, as the soul of God, and not as a simple soul. And the ascending from earth to heaven, and the returning again, are actions of a circumscribed body: "For in this way," he says, "he will come again to you, in the manner ye have seen him going into heaven."

CAP. II. On the session at the right hand of the Father.

^C We say that Christ sits at the right hand of God and the Father corporally, but we do not say that the Father’s right hand is a place. For how could the Uncircumscribed have a right hand defined by place? Right and left belong to those things which are circumscribed by place. But by the word "the Father's right hand," we signify the honor and glory of the divinity, in which the Son of God, existing as God and consubstantial with the Father before the ages, having become flesh in the last times, sits also corporally, his own flesh having been taken into the same glory. For he is adored, he and his own flesh, with one adoration by all created ^D things.

Chapter III

^A Against those who object thus: If Christ has two natures, you either worship the creature, by adoring a created nature, or you say that one nature is to be adored, and the other is not.

We adore the Son of God, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, incorporeal before the incarnation, and now the same one made flesh and become man, while still being God. His flesh, therefore, according to its own nature—if you distinguish by subtle considerations that which is seen from that which is understood—is not to be adored, as it is created. But having been united to the Word of God, it is adored for his sake and in him. For just as a king is adored both unclothed and clothed, and purple cloth, as mere purple, is trampled and thrown away, but once it has become royal attire, it is honored and glorified, and if anyone treats it indecorously, he is, as a rule, condemned to death; ^B and as wood itself, which is mere wood, is not inaccessible to touch, but once it has come into contact with fire and become a coal, it becomes inaccessible, not of itself, but on account of the fire joined to it, and it is not the nature of the wood that is inaccessible, but the coal, that is, the burning wood: so too the flesh, according to its own nature, is not to be adored; yet it is adored in the incarnate Word of God, not for itself, but on account of the God Word hypostatically united to it. And we do not say that we adore mere flesh, but the flesh of God, that is, God incarnate.

Chapter IV

^C Why the Son of God became man, and not the Father, nor the Spirit; and what he achieved by becoming man.

The Father is the Father, and not the Son; the Son is the Son, and not the Father; the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit, and not the Father or the Son; for the property of the hypostases is immutable.

For how could the property remain if it were changeable and shifting? Therefore, the Son of God becomes the Son of man, that the property may remain immutable. For the Son of God has become the Son of man, having been incarnate from the holy Virgin, and not having departed from his divine property.

^A But the Son of God became man, in order that He might grant back to man that for which He had made him. For we were made in the image of God, rational and self-determining, and in His likeness, that is, perfect in virtues, as far as it is possible for human nature; for these are, as it were, characters of the divine nature, being undisturbed and undivided, and pure, the good, the wise, the just, and free from all wickedness. In fellowship with Himself He established man in incorruption; for He did not make him for this alone, but through His own fellowship led him to the incorruptible. And since by the transgression of the commandment we had darkened and effaced the characters of the divine image, and had become involved in the fellowship of the evil one—for the participation of light had become darkness—and had been cast out of life, we had fallen into the destruction of death; and because He gave us the better part—which I have said is participation in the divine nature—and we did not keep it, therefore that which is worse, namely, our nature, He made participant in Himself, so that per se and in the likeness of our image He might restore the beauty, and by virtues might fashion for us the way of life, and might Himself minister to us that way, and teach us, and by fellowship in life might free us from destruction, having become the firstfruits of our resurrection, and might renew the vessel which had been crushed and rendered useless, and finally, having snatched us from the tyranny of the devil, might strengthen us, and by patience and humility teach us to strike down the tyrant.

^D The worship of demons has ceased, and creation has been hallowed by the divine blood; altars and temples of idols have been destroyed, the knowledge of God has been planted, the consubstantial and uncreated Trinity is worshipped, one true God is known, the Creator of all things; virtues are practiced, the hope of the resurrection is given through the resurrection of Christ: demons dread those whom they formerly held as subjects; and what is wonderful, all these things have been achieved through the cross and the sufferings and the death of Christ. The Gospel of the knowledge of God has been proclaimed to the whole world, not by war, and arms, and armies turning back the adversaries, but by a few naked, poor, and unlettered men, who, while persecuted, tormented, and put to death, preached Him who was crucified in the flesh and had died, and they overcame the wise and powerful; for the omnipotent power of the Crucified followed them. Death, formerly most fearful, has been defeated, and that which was once hated and detestable is now preferred to life. These are the achievements of Christ’s presence; these are the tokens of His power. For He did not, as through Moses, save one people out of Egypt and from the slavery of Pharaoh by dividing the sea; but rather He rescued all humanity from the corruption of death and from the bitter tyrant, sin; not leading them to virtue by force, not by burying them in the earth, and burning them with fire, and commanding those who sin to be stoned, but by gentleness and longsuffering persuading men to choose virtue, and to strive and take delight in the labors for it; for of old, indeed, when they sinned they were punished, and yet they still clung to sin, and sin was accounted as a god to them; but now, for the sake of piety and virtue, they choose torments, and tortures, and death. Well done, O Christ, Word of God, and wisdom, and power, and God Almighty; what could we, who are destitute, render to Thee for all these things? For all things are Thine, and Thou askest nothing from us but our salvation, Thou Thyself giving even this, and knowing how to be grateful to those who receive it, on account of Thine ineffable goodness. Glory to Thee, who hast given us to be, and hast graciously granted us well-being, and having fallen away from this, hast brought us back to it, through Thy

ineffable condescension.

Chapter V. To those who ask: Is the person of Christ created or uncreated?

^A Christ, by speaking of two hypostases, or to deny the distinction of the natures. And...

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...well-being has been achieved for the whole world by the resurrection of Christ. The men whom the demons once held bound in slavery now strike terror into them; and, what is most wonderful, all this has been brought to pass through the cross, the torments, and death. The Gospel, through which the knowledge of God has been revealed, has been proclaimed throughout the whole world, not by casting down adversaries with war, arms, and armies; but rather a few men, naked, poor, and unlettered, afflicted with persecutions and scourgings, and delivered over to death, by preaching Him who had been nailed to the cross and had died, overcame the learned and the powerful. For the omnipotent strength and power of the Crucified was present with them. Indeed, death itself, which formerly inspired the greatest terror, has been overthrown; and that which was once an object of hatred and horror is now considered better than life. These are the illustrious deeds of Christ’s advent; these are the clear evidences of His power. For He did not, as He did through Moses, deliver one people from Egypt and the servile yoke of Pharaoh by dividing the waves of the sea, ^B but rather He delivered the whole human race from the destruction of death and from the bitter tyranny of sin. He did not drive men to virtue by force, nor by burying them in the earth, nor by burning them with fire, nor by commanding that sinners be stoned, but by gentleness and long-suffering He persuaded men to choose virtue and to contend and delight in the labors undertaken for its sake. For formerly, when they sinned, they were punished, yet they still clung tenaciously to sin, which they held as a god. But now, on the contrary, for the sake of piety and virtue, they embrace scourgings, torments, and death.

Well done, O Christ, Word of God, and Wisdom, and Power, and almighty God! What can we, who are poor and destitute, offer Thee in return for all these things? For all things are Thine. Indeed, Thou dost demand nothing from us except our own salvation; and though Thou Thyself art the bestower of this, in Thine ineffable goodness Thou art nevertheless grateful to those who attain it. Thanks be to Thee, who hast granted us both to be and well-being, and when we had fallen from this, by Thine ineffable condescension and indulgence, Thou didst lead us back to it.

CHAPTER V.

To those who ask: Is the person of Christ created or uncreated?

The person of the Word of God ^C was, before the assumption of the flesh, simple, and uncompounded, and incorporeal, and uncreated; but having become incarnate, It became also the person of the flesh, and became composite from the divinity, which He always possessed, and from the flesh which He assumed. And He bears the properties of the two natures, being made known in two natures; so that the one same person is uncreated in His divinity, and created in His humanity, visible and invisible; since we are forced, either to divide the one

same Christ, by asserting two persons, or, by denying the distinction of the natures, to introduce conversion or confusion. ^A

CHAPTER VI.

Not, as some falsely preach, was the mind united to God the Word before the flesh was assumed from the Virgin, and then for the first time called Christ. For this fabrication is reckoned among the ravings of Origen, who taught that souls are older than bodies. But we say that the Son and Word of God became Christ from the time when He dwelt in the womb of the holy ever-Virgin and became flesh without any change, and the flesh was anointed with the divinity. For this anointing is of the humanity, as Gregory the Theologian says. ^B And the most holy prelate of the Alexandrians, Cyril, writing to the Emperor Theodosius, expressed it thus: “For I indeed say that neither the Word from God without humanity, nor again the temple that was born from a woman, if it is not united to the Word, should be called Jesus Christ. For the Word from God, having been ineffably joined to humanity according to the economic union, is understood as Christ.” And to the empresses he writes thus: “Some say that the name Christ is appropriate to the Word alone, considered and existing individually in Himself, as He is begotten of God the Father. But we have not been taught to think or speak in this way. For when the Word became flesh, then we say He was also named Christ Jesus. ^C For because He has been anointed with the oil of gladness, that is, with the Spirit, by God and the Father, to that extent He is called Christ. And that the anointing is upon the humanity, no one with a mind for the truth would doubt.” And Athanasius also, the most renowned, in his discourse on the saving manifestation, speaks thus: “The pre-existing God, before His sojourn in the flesh, was not man, but He was God with God, invisible and impassible.” ^D

^A Since however He became man, the name Christ is applied to Him by reason of the flesh, since passion and death follow upon this name.

But if the divine Scripture also says: “Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness,” we must know that the divine Scripture often uses the past tense instead of the future, as in the passage: “Afterward he appeared on earth, and conversed with men.” For God had not yet appeared, nor had He conversed with men, when these things were said. And that passage: “By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down and wept.” For these things had not yet happened.

CHAP. VII.

The Severian objection is resolved. The first thing created by God is ungenerated [ingenitum], that is, not born of others. To be begotten [gigni] is of the person, not of the nature. The term written with a single nu [ἀγένητον] relates to the natures and signifies the uncreated and the created; but the term written with two nus [ἀγέννητον and γεννητόν] applies not to the natures, but to the persons—that is, to being begotten and not being begotten—which is denoted by the two letters. The divine nature, therefore, is ungenerated [ἀγένητος], that is, uncreated, and all things after the divine nature are generated [γενητά], that is, created. Therefore, in the divine ^C and uncreated nature, the property of being unbegotten [ἀγέννητον] is observed in the Father (for He was not begotten), while generation is observed in the Son (since He was eternally begotten of the Father), and procession in the Holy Spirit. In any species of living creatures, the first ones produced are indeed ungenerated [ingenita], but not ungenerated [ἀγένητα], that is, not uncreated. For they were created by the supreme Maker, but they were not born of like beings. For creation is a making, but generation, in the case of God, is the proceeding of the co-essential Son from the Father alone; and in the case of bodies, it is the proceeding of a co-essential person from the union of male and female. Whence we know that being begotten belongs not to the nature, but to the person. For if it belonged to the nature, the begotten ^D and the unbegotten would not be observed in one and the same nature. Therefore, the holy Theotokos gave birth to a person, recognized in two natures: in divinity, begotten of the Father timelessly; but in the last days, in time, become flesh from her, and born in the flesh.

Christ, in two natures. He suffered in that nature which was passible. ^A But if our questioners wish to suggest that he who is born from the holy Theotokos is two natures, we say: Yes, he is two natures. For the same one is both God and man. The same applies to the crucifixion, the resurrection, and the ascension. For these are not of the nature, but of the hypostasis. Christ, therefore, being in two natures, suffered in the passible nature—he was crucified in the flesh—for it was in the flesh that he hung on the cross, and not in his divinity. But if they answer us in turn when we ask: Did two natures die? Surely not, they will say. Therefore, neither were two natures crucified. But Christ was born, that is, the divine Word having become man, was born in the flesh, was crucified in the flesh, suffered in the flesh, and died in the flesh, while his divinity remained impassible. ^B

CAP. VIII. How the only-begotten Son of God is called Firstborn.

He is firstborn who is first begotten, whether he be only-begotten, or also older than other brothers. Therefore, if the Son of God were called firstborn but not called only-begotten, we might have suspected that he was the firstborn of creatures, as one existing as a creature. But since he is called both firstborn and only-begotten, it is necessary to preserve both in him. We call him firstborn of all creation because he is from God, ^C and creation is from God; but he is from the substance of God and the Father, alone begotten timelessly, and so he will rightly be called only-begotten Son and firstborn, and not first-created. For creation was not brought forth from the substance of the Father, but by his will from nothingness into being. But he is firstborn "among many brothers," since, while being only-begotten, he also became, from his mother, since he partook of blood and flesh ^D in like manner to us, and became man; and we also have become

^A sons of God, being adopted through baptism; He, the Son of God by nature, has become the first-born among us who have become sons of God by position and grace, and have been named his brothers. Hence he said: "I ascend to my Father and your Father" [John xx, 17]. He did not say, "our Father," but "my Father," clearly by nature, and "your Father," by grace. And, "my God, and your God." And he did not say, "our God," but "my God"; if you distinguish with subtle distinctions that which is visible from that which is understood by the mind, and "your God," as Creator and Lord.^B

Concerning faith and baptism.

We confess one baptism for the remission of sins and for eternal life. For baptism signifies the death of the Lord. We are, therefore, buried with the Lord through baptism, as the divine Apostle says [Rom. vi, 4; Col. ii, 12]. As, therefore, the death of the Lord was accomplished once, so also must we be baptized once; and we must be baptized according to the Word of the Lord, into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, being taught the confession in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Whoever, therefore, into the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit have been baptized, ^C let them be recognized as being baptized in Christ.

[alt-version omitted]

[note: entries preserved]

^A And those who, having been baptized in the Holy Spirit and having been taught the one nature of the Godhead in three persons, are nevertheless rebaptized, these crucify Christ again, as the divine Apostle says: "For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened," and the rest, "to renew them again to repentance, since they crucify again for themselves the Son of God, and put him to an open shame" (Hebr. VI, 4, 6). But those who have not been baptized into the Holy Trinity, these ought to be rebaptized. ^B For even if the divine Apostle says that "we have been baptized into Christ and into his death" (Rom. VI, 3), he does not say that the invocation of baptism ought to be done in this way, but that baptism is a figure of the death of Christ. For by the three (68) immersions, baptism signifies the three days of the burial of the Lord. Therefore, to be baptized into Christ signifies being baptized while believing in him. But it is impossible to believe in Christ without having been taught the confession into the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For Christ is the Son of the living God, whom the Father anointed with the Holy Spirit, as the divine David says: "Therefore God, your God, has anointed you with the oil of gladness beyond your companions" (Ps. XLIV, 8). And Isaiah, speaking in the person of the Lord: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me" (Isa. LXI, 1). ^C The Lord, however, teaching his own disciples the invocation, said: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (Matth. XXVIII, 19). For since God made us for immortality, but we transgressed his saving commandment and he condemned us to the corruption of death—so that evil might not be immortal—he descended to his servants, as he is compassionate, and having become what we are, he redeemed us from corruption through his own passion; he caused a fountain of remission to spring up for us from his holy and immaculate side.

water, that is, for regeneration, and for the washing away of sin and corruption; and blood, for a drink that would procure eternal life. Furthermore, he commanded us to be regenerated by water and the Spirit ^A, the Holy Spirit drawing near to the water through the word and prayer. For since man consists of a twofold nature, namely of soul and body, he gave us a twofold purification, by water and the Spirit: namely, so that the Spirit might restore in us the beauty and likeness of the divine image, while the water, through the grace of the Spirit, cleanses the body from sin and renders it free from corruption, the water indeed expressing the likeness of death, but the Spirit bestowing the guarantee and pledge of life.

For from the beginning the Spirit of God hovered over the waters, and of old Scripture bears witness to the water, that it is a purifying agent. In the days of Noah, God washed away the sin of the world by water. By water, every unclean person is cleansed according to the law, and even the garments themselves must be washed with water. Elijah showed the grace of the Spirit mixed with the water, when he burned the holocaust by applying water. And almost everything is cleansed by water according to the law; for visible things are symbols of those that are perceived by the mind. Yet regeneration takes place in the soul: for faith knows how to adopt as sons—though we are but creatures—through the Spirit, and to lead us back to our ancient blessedness. ^B

Baptismal grace according to the faith and purification of those who receive it.

We must, however, with all our might take care to keep ourselves pure from filthy works, so that we do not, like a dog returning to its own vomit, make ourselves slaves of sin again. For faith without works is dead, and likewise works without faith. For true faith is proven through works. ^C

Why we are baptized into the Trinity.

^A the three hypostases should be present with one another; for the Holy Trinity is one in inseparable.

Various Baptisms

The first baptism is that of the flood, for the cutting off of sin. The second is that through the sea and the cloud; for the cloud was a symbol of the Spirit, and the sea of the water. The third is the legal baptism; for every one who was unclean was washed with water, and washed his garments, and thus entered into the camp. The fourth is that of John, which was introductory, leading those who were baptized to repentance, that they might believe in Christ. For, he says, "I indeed baptize you with water; but he who comes after me, he will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire." John, therefore, purges by water in preparation for the Spirit. The fifth is the baptism of the Lord, by which he himself was baptized. He was baptized, not as though he himself were in need of cleansing, but to make my cleansing his own, that he might crush the heads of the dragons upon the water, that he might wash away sin, and bury the whole of the old Adam in the water, that he might sanctify the baptizer, that he might fulfill the law, that he might reveal the mystery of the Trinity, and that he might become a type and example to us for being baptized. We, too, are baptized with the perfect baptism of the Lord, by water and the Spirit. And Christ is said to baptize with fire because he poured out the grace of the Spirit upon the holy Apostles in the form of fiery tongues, as the Lord himself said, that "John indeed baptized with water, but you shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit and with fire, not many days from now"; or else because of the chastising baptism of the fire that is to come. The sixth is that of repentance and tears, which is truly laborious. The seventh is that by blood and martyrdom, with which Christ himself was baptized for our sake, as being highly reverend and blessed, and which is not defiled by subsequent pollutions. The eighth is the final one, which does not save, but which ^{B C}

^A destroys malice and sin, for they no longer have place; but it punishes and torments without end.

The Holy Spirit descended in a bodily form, like a dove, demonstrating the first-fruits ^B of our baptism and honoring the body; since this body too, that is, the body, was God through deification, and at the same time, from of old, the dove has been accustomed to announce the cessation of the flood. He descends upon the holy apostles in the form of fire; for He is God, and God is a consuming fire.

Oil is taken for baptism, signifying our anointing and making us christs, and promising us the mercy of God through the Holy Spirit; since the dove also brought an olive twig to those who had been saved from the flood.

John was baptized by laying his hand upon the divine head of the Master, and by his own blood.

One must not delay ^C baptism when the faith of those approaching is attested by their works; for he who approaches baptism with guile will be condemned rather than benefited.

CAPUT X. On Faith.

Faith is indeed twofold; for there is faith that comes from hearing. For hearing the divine Scriptures, we believe... ^D

which is perfected by all the things ordained by Christ, believing in deed, living piously, and performing the commandments of Him who has renewed us. For whoever does not believe according to the tradition of the Catholic Church, or communicates with the devil through shameful deeds, is an unbeliever.

Faith is a gift of the Spirit. Once again: Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen; ^B or it is an expectation that is in no way doubtful or ambiguous, by which we trust that what has been promised to us by God, and what we ask for, we shall obtain. The former, then, pertains to our own will; the latter is to be reckoned among the gifts of the Spirit.

Spiritual circumcision. It must be known that through baptism we are circumcised of all the covering we contracted from birth—that is, sin—and we become spiritual Israelites and the people of God.

CAPUT XI. On the Cross, where there is again discussion of faith.

The word of the cross is to those who are perishing foolishness, but to us who are being saved, it is the power of God. For the spiritual man judges all things, but the natural man does not receive the things of the Spirit. For it is foolishness to those who do not receive them by faith, and who do not consider the goodness and omnipotence of God, but investigate divine things by human and natural logic. ^C For all things of God are above nature, and reason, and understanding. For if anyone ponders how and for what reason God brought all things out of nothing into being, and desires to attain it by natural logic, he does not comprehend it. For such knowledge is natural and demonic. But if anyone, led as if by the hand by faith, considers the divine to be good, and omnipotent, and true, and wise, and just, he will find all things smooth and even, and the way straight. For without faith it is impossible to be saved; for by faith all things, both human and spiritual, subsist. For neither does the farmer, ^D without faith, cut a furrow in the earth; nor does the merchant, carried on a small piece of wood, entrust his soul to the raging waves of the sea; nor are marriages contracted, nor is anything else in life undertaken. By faith we understand that all things were brought out of nothing into being by the power of God; by faith we manage all things rightly, both human and divine. Faith, furthermore, is an assent free from all curious inquiry.

There is nothing in the things of Christ more wonderful than the cross. Its benefits. Although every action of Christ and the performance of miracles is illustrious, divine, and wonderful, yet there is nothing among them all that is more worthy of admiration than His honorable cross. For by nothing else is death been abolished, the

Hades despoiled, the resurrection bestowed, power given to us to despise the present and even death itself, the return to ancient blessedness prepared, the gates of paradise opened, our nature seated at the right hand of God, and we made children of God and heirs, except by the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ. For by the cross all things have been set right. For as many of us as have been baptized into Christ, says the Apostle, have been baptized into His death; and as many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ. ^B Now Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God. Behold, the death of Christ—that is, the cross—has clothed us with the subsistent wisdom and power of God. And the word of the cross is called the power of God, either because the power and might of God, that is, the victory over death, has been made manifest to us through it; or because, just as the four extremities of the cross are held and bound together through the central point, so through the power of God height and depth, length and breadth—that is, the whole of visible and invisible creation—is held together.

This sign is given to us on the forehead, just as circumcision was to Israel; for by it we believers are separated from the unbelievers and are recognized. This is a shield and an armor and a trophy against the devil. This is a seal, so that the destroyer may not touch us, as the Scripture says. This is the resurrection of those who have fallen, the support of those who stand, the staff of the weak, the rod of the pasture, the hand-leading of those who turn, the perfection of those who progress, the salvation of soul and body, the averter of all evils, the procurer of all goods, the destruction of sin, the plant of the resurrection, the tree of eternal life. ^C

As for the precious wood itself, truly and to be venerated, upon which Christ offered Himself as a sacrifice for us—as it has been hallowed by the touch of His holy body and blood—it is to be worshipped; likewise the nails, the spear, the garments, and those holy dwellings of His, which are the

Adoration of the wood of the cross, and of others which Christ hallowed by His touch.

^A Since it was sanctified by the touch of His most holy body and blood, it is rightfully to be adored; and likewise the nails, the lance, the garments, and His sacred habitations—that is to say, the manger, the cave, the saving Golgotha, the life-giving sepulchre, Sion, the citadel of the Churches, and the like, even as the God-bearing David said: *We will go into his tabernacles: we will adore in the place where his feet stood* (Ps. cxxxi, 7). That he means the Cross, the following words declare: *Arise, O Lord, into thy resting place* (ibid. 8). For following the Cross comes the resurrection. If then the house, the bed, and the clothing of those we love are dear to us, how much more so are those things which belong to God and our Saviour, through which we have gained our salvation!

^B Adoration of the figure of the Cross as the sign of Christ. The matter of the Cross is not to be adored. Moreover, we adore the figure of the precious and life-giving Cross, even if it be made of some other material; not by worshipping the material (God forbid), but by worshipping the figure as a symbol of Christ. For He said to His own disciples, instructing them: *Then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven* (Matt. xxiv, 30), meaning the Cross. Hence also the angel of the resurrection said to the women: *You seek Jesus of Nazareth, who was crucified* (Mark xvi, 6). And the Apostle says: *But we preach Christ crucified* (I Cor. 1, 23). There are indeed many Christs and Jesuses, but only one who was crucified. He did not say "pierced with a lance," but "crucified." Therefore the sign of the Cross is to be adored by us; for where the sign shall be, there also shall He Himself be. But the material of which the figure of the Cross consists—even if it were of gold or precious stones—is not to be adored after the destruction of the figure, if such were to happen. We adore, therefore, all things dedicated to God, referring the worship to Him.

^C The wood of life as the figure of the Cross. The wood of life, which was planted by God in paradise, bore the figure of the venerable Cross. For since through wood death had entered, it was fitting that through wood life and resurrection should be restored. Jacob, the first to adore the top of Joseph's rod (Gen. xlvii, 31), typified the Cross; and by blessing his sons with crossed hands (Gen. xlviii, 14), he very clearly delineated the sign of the Cross.

indicative of the future, ^A striking the sea in the likeness of the cross, and saving Israel, while drowning Pharaoh; hands stretched out in the form of a cross, and putting the Amalekites to flight; the bitter water made sweet by wood; the rock broken open and pouring forth streams; the rod confirming Aaron's dignity of the priesthood; the serpent raised on the wood as a trophy, as though dead, while the wood saved those who saw the living enemy, signifying those who believe, as Christ in the flesh, without knowing sin, was fastened to the wood. Great Moses cries out: "You shall see your life hanging on a wood before your eyes"; Isaiah likewise: "All the day long I have stretched out my hands to a disobedient and gainsaying people." May we, who worship this cross, obtain the portion of Christ who was crucified. Amen.

CAP. XII. On worshiping toward the East.

We do not worship toward the East simply or by chance. ^B For since we are composed of a visible and invisible nature, that is, of spiritual and sensible nature, we offer a twofold worship to the Creator; just as we sing with both our mind and our bodily lips, and are baptized with both water and Spirit, and are doubly united to the Lord, by participating in the sacraments and receiving the grace of the Spirit.

Since, therefore, ^C God is spiritual light, and Christ is called in the Holy Scriptures the "Sun of Righteousness" and the "Orient," that quarter must be assigned to Him for worship. For it is fitting that everything good should be consecrated to God, from whom every good thing is derived. And the divine David also says: "Sing to God, O kingdoms of the earth; sing praises to the Lord, who ascends above the heaven of heavens toward the East." And furthermore, the

^A Scripture says: "God planted a garden in Eden toward the East; in which He placed the man whom He had formed; and when he had transgressed the commandment, He cast him out, and caused him to dwell opposite the garden of delight," that is to say, toward the West. Therefore, yearning for our ancient fatherland, and gazing toward it, we worship God. ^B And the Mosaic tabernacle also had the veil and the mercy seat toward the East. And the tribe of Judah, as the most honorable, encamped toward the East. And in the celebrated temple of Solomon, the gate of the Lord was situated toward the East. Furthermore, the Lord, while hanging on the cross, looked toward the West, and for this reason we worship, directing our eyes toward Him. And when He was being taken up into heaven, He was carried toward the East, and in this manner the apostles worshiped Him, and in this manner He will come again, in the same way as they saw Him going into heaven; as the Lord Himself said: "As the lightning comes forth from the East, and is seen even to the West, so will also be the coming of the Son of Man." ^C Expecting His coming, therefore, we worship toward the East. This tradition of the apostles is unwritten. For they handed down many things to us without writing.

CAP. XIII. Of the holy and immaculate mysteries of the Lord.

The economy of human salvation. — God, Who is good, and more than good, and supremely good, Who is goodness itself, because of the exceeding riches of His goodness, did not endure that He alone should be good, or that His nature, of which no thing could partake, should remain so; but for this reason He first created the intelligent and heavenly powers; then this visible and sensible world; ^D and finally, from both intelligent and sensible substance, man. And indeed all things that He created, insofar as they are, partake of His goodness, since He Himself is the being of all things, because in Him are all things. And this is not only because He brought them into being out of nothing, but also because His action protects and preserves the things created by Him; but living things more abundantly. For [they share] in being, and in the participation of life, they partake of the good.

^A Since rational beings—although according to what was said before, yet still more according to the rational element—are more closely related to Him, they enjoy the participation of the good more copiously; for they are joined to Him by a certain closer necessity, although He otherwise transcends all things by an incomparable sublimity.

However, man, having been made rational and master of his own actions, received the power ^B to be joined to God incessantly through his own free choice, if indeed he remained in the good—that is, in obedience to the Creator. Since, therefore, he fell into the transgression of the commandment of Him who created him, and became subject to death and corruption, the Maker and Creator of our race, because of the bowels of His mercy, became like to us, becoming man in all things without sin, and was united to our nature. For since He bestowed upon us His own image and His own Spirit, and we did not preserve them, He Himself partook of our poor and weak nature, in order that He might cleanse us, and make us incorruptible, and make us partakers of His divinity again.

It was necessary that not only the firstfruits of our nature should share in the better nature, but also every man who wishes so, and should be born a second birth, and be nourished with a strange food, and one suitable for that birth, and thus reach the measure of perfection. Therefore, by His own birth, that is, the incarnation, and the baptism, and the passion, and the resurrection, He delivered our nature from the sin of the first ancestor, from death, and from corruption, and became the firstfruits of the resurrection, and set Himself as a way, a pattern, and an example, so that we too, following in His footsteps, might become by adoption what He is by nature: sons and heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Him. ^C He gave us, then, as I said, a second birth, so that just as we, having been born from Adam, were made like to him, having inherited the curse and corruption, so also, having been born from Him, we might be made like to Him, and inherit His incorruption, and blessing, and glory.

But since this Adam is spiritual, it was necessary that the birth should be spiritual, and likewise the food. But since we are twofold and composite, it was necessary that the birth should also be twofold, and likewise the food of a composite nature. The birth, then, is given to us through water and the Spirit—I mean the holy baptism—and the food is the bread of life itself, our Lord Jesus Christ, who came down from heaven. For, being about to undergo ^D His voluntary passion for us...

^A us, on the night in which He delivered Himself up, He established a new testament for His holy disciples and apostles, and through them for all who believe in Him. Therefore, in the upper room of holy and glorious Sion, having eaten the ancient 78 Pasch with His disciples, and having fulfilled the old testament, He washed the disciples' feet, providing a symbol of holy baptism. Then, having broken bread, He distributed it to them, saying: "Take, eat; this is My body, which is broken for you for the remission of sins." In like manner also, having taken the cup of wine and water, He shared it among them, saying: "Drink from it, all of you; this is My blood of the new testament, which is shed for you for the remission of sins; do this in remembrance of Me." For as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the death of the Son of Man and confess His resurrection, until He comes.

The truth of the Eucharist is asserted. The power of the Lord's words in the Eucharist. The virtue of the Holy Spirit, by which bread becomes the flesh of Christ.

If, therefore, the Word of God is living and active, and the Lord has done all that He willed; if He said, "Let there be light," and there was; "Let there be a firmament," and there was; if by the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the breath of His mouth all their host; if heaven and earth, ^C and water and fire and air, and the entire cosmos of them were perfected by the word of the Lord; and likewise this most noble animal which is called man; if, finally, God the Word Himself, in accordance with His will, became man, and from the most pure and undefiled blood of the holy Ever-Virgin fashioned for Himself flesh without seed, why should He not be able to make the bread His body, and the wine and the water His blood? In the beginning He said: "Let the earth bring forth the herb of grass," and even to this day, when the rain comes, it brings forth its own fruits, impelled and strengthened by the divine command. God said: "This is My body," and "This is My blood," and "Do this in remembrance of Me." And by His omnipotent command, it happens until He comes; ^D for so He said, "until He comes"; and it becomes the rain 79 by His omnipotent command, even until He comes; and it becomes [alt-version omitted].

new produce, through the invocation, as the rain 269 supervening; the power of the Holy Spirit, of course, overshadowing. For just as whatever God made, He made by the operation of the Holy Spirit, so also now the operation of the Spirit works the things that are above nature, which none can grasp save faith alone. "How shall this be," says the holy Virgin, "since I know not a man?" ^B The archangel Gabriel answers: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon you, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow you." Now you also ask how the bread becomes Christ’s body, and the wine and water, Christ’s blood. And I say to you: The Holy Spirit descends and works these things which are beyond reason and thought.

Bread and wine are taken; for God knows human infirmity; for as a rule, most people turn away from what is not worn by custom; therefore, using His habitual condescension, through the things familiar to nature He performs the things above nature. And just as in baptism, since it is the custom for men to wash with water and be anointed with oil, He joined the grace of the Spirit to the oil and water, and made it a laver of regeneration; so, since it is a custom for men ^C to eat bread and drink wine, He has joined to these His divinity, and has made them His body and blood, so that through the things which are used to our nature, we might be brought to the things that are above nature.

NOTE

There are six hundred testimonies of the ancients by which the same is built up. Theodorus Abucaras, or even Samonas of Gaza in his *Dialogue with Achmed the Mohammedan*, Theodorus Graptus, Nicephorus of Constantinople, and others whom I omit, also join in. They are speaking, of course, of that invocation which is recited in the ancient liturgies of all the Orientals after Christ's words, "This is my body," "This is my blood," etc. The Gothic liturgies, which the renowned men Thomasius and Mabillon published, agree with them. ^D Nay, that the Africans also requested in the same prayer that the Holy Spirit be sent to sanctify the gifts, Fulgentius is witness, book 2, *Ad Monim.*, chap. 6 and following. Furthermore, when Damascene saw that the invocation in the liturgies followed the words of Christ, and that the Fathers taught that the consecration is completed by them, and that Chrysostom otherwise, in his homily *On the Betrayal of Judas*, had said the gifts are sanctified by the Lord's words, he taught that the mystery is completed by both the words of Christ and the invocation. And Nyssen had already preceded him in his *Catechism*, saying, "Bread, as the Apostle says, is sanctified by the Word of God and prayer." Thus the more recent Greeks, with Mark of Ephesus as witness, think that Christ's words are recited in the liturgies to recall us to the memory of the things done; but that beyond this, they infuse power into the presented gifts toward the conversion which later occurs through the prayer and benediction of the priest. The reply of the archbishops of the Russians in the Council of Florence, which Pope Eugenius approved, tended in the same direction. Combefis, in the margin of the homily of Damascene *On Holy Saturday*, regarding these words, "truly changed by the invocation," says: "This Pantinus is too harsh upon the author." I would prefer to explain it benignly, as also with the liturgies of Basil and the other Greeks, namely that the transmutation does not occur without the invocation, which either precedes (as with the Latins) or follows (as with the Greeks) the words of the Lord: in which, however, the power itself is present, the same thing always working for us as was once spoken by Christ: but yet so religiously, and for the majesty of such a great mystery. Nor has it perhaps been allowed by the Lord to celebrate the Eucharist such that any priest whatever may rashly, without any religious rite or order, chatter the Lord's words, and not so much perform a sacred thing as a histrionic and execrable act. This is not a benign, but a most true exposition of the text of Damascene. Bessarion and Arcudius suggest another view, that the Greek priests, while they pray that the Holy Spirit by His power may make the bread the body of Christ, are only requesting that those who receive the Eucharist may be one body of Christ, and that by these words "transmuting by the Holy Spirit," a metaphorical mutation is meant. But if that be granted, I fear that the places of the Fathers, by which bread and wine are said with equal right to be [changed], may be twisted against the sense of the authors.

^A His divinity and made them his body and blood, so that through things habitual and according to nature, we might become those things which are above nature. ^B It is truly a body united to the divinity, which originated from the holy Virgin, not that the body assumed comes down from heaven, but that the bread itself and the wine ^C are converted into the body and blood of God. If you inquire after the manner, how it happens...

NOTES

(80) *Water and wine.* That it is the apostolic tradition that wine tempered with water—not plain water, as the Encratites, nor wine alone, as some Armenians and Jacobites—ought to be offered, is shown by the ancient liturgies: that of James, or the Jerusalem liturgy, and Mark’s, or the Alexandrian, which the Copts also recite. The mixing of wine and water is mentioned by Basil […]; by Clement, in book VIII of the *Constitutions*; and likewise the cup of wine and water. Justin Martyr, in his *First Apology*, records that wine with water is offered; Irenaeus, in book V, ch. 2, says the cup of the Eucharist is a mixed cup. Anselm of Havelberg is not to be heard, who in *Dialogues* 3 narrates that the Greeks offer wine unmixed with any water, and that Nechites, or Nicetas of Nicomedia, answered him thus: "It is not read that Christ in that great supper of his consecrated wine mixed with water, and therefore we do the same." Others have falsely attributed this to the Greeks, perhaps because of the hot water which they pour into the cup after consecration, as if they did not mix any in before. The liturgies sufficiently refute these lies.

(81) *But this bread itself.* Now our author, here and in his *Homily on the Holy Sabbath* after Nyssen, names the conversion of bread and wine into the body of Christ. Chrysostom, and Nyssen again, Cyril of Jerusalem, Abucaras, Samonas, Graptus, and others [use the term] *metabole*, by which conversion, transmutation, and transelementation are signified. Theophylact uses these individual words in ch. 26 of Matthew and ch. 14 of Mark. Among later writers, *metabole* (conversion) is more commonly used. Our author here briefly reports what Nyssen discusses in his *Catechetical Oration*, ch. 37, in roughly these words: "As every human body is nourished by food and drink, and bread is food and water with wine is drink, hence it comes about that bread is in power the human body; and since God the Word permitted his body to be nourished by food and drink, the bread he ate was in a certain sense the body of God, since the nourishment passed into the nature of the body. Now, I am persuaded with certain faith that the bread consecrated by the Word of God is transmuted into the body of the Word of God. For it was in power that very body; there the grace of the Word made the body, which was sustained by bread, a holy body, and it was in a certain respect bread. Here also the bread, as the Apostle said, is sanctified by the word and by prayer; not that it passes into the body of the Word by eating and drinking, but that it is immediately transmuted into the body through the Word, as it was said by the Word, 'This is my body.'" He concludes that Christ bestows these things by the power of benediction, the nature of those things which appear being transelemented.

The most learned John Ernest Grabe, a man to be highly esteemed by me on many accounts, in his annotations on book V of Irenaeus, thus sets forth the sense of St. Cyril of Jerusalem (whose similar places I omit because they are worn) and of Nyssen, Damascene, and perhaps many others: "They were persuaded that the Holy Spirit, descending from heaven, did not only communicate to the bread the virtue of Christ’s body, and thus change it in respect of its qualities, but by divine power transformed its very substance into flesh, which is Christ’s flesh, and becomes identical with that which came forth from the womb of the blessed Virgin and was fixed to the cross and taken up into heaven, and that it has the same Spirit of life in itself; just as the bread which the Savior ate on earth was turned into his flesh by the force of natural heat, and our daily bread passes into the substance of our body. This body, which is carried for us today, is said to be the same as that in which we lived many years ago, because it is vivified by the same soul, although its particles are entirely different, and perhaps none of the former ones remains." (Read, after Cyril’s *Mystagogic Catecheses*, the *Great Catechetical Oration* of Gregory Nyssen, ch. 37, and Damascene’s *De fide orthodoxa*, book IV, ch. 14, and his *Epistle to Zacharias, bishop of the Dauri*.)

He subjoins the places of Damascene, whose better interpreter—as well as that of other Greeks—I seek in vain. The Wirtemberg theologians, when they had read the *Response to Jeremiah, Patriarch of Constantinople*, in chapter 10, that bread is transmuted into the very body of Christ and wine into his very blood, answered that in the dominical supper the body and blood of Christ are truly present; not, however, that bread is transmuted into Christ’s body. They knew, of course, that to the Greeks *metabole* signifies nothing else than the conversion of one substance into another. Hence our author, in his *Opusculum against the Acephali*, declares that the union of the natures of the Lord is not *metabole*, using the example of the body glowing with fire: "The glowing," he says, "does not signify the conversion of the thing which glows, but the union with the fire." Wherefore George Scholarius, who was an alternative schismatic patriarch, in his *Sermon on the Eve of Lazarus*, of which the most learned Abbot Renaudot very kindly gave me the opportunity to transcribe a large part from his authentic codex, after having asserted that such a *metousiosis* takes place, such that accidents remain while the subject is destroyed, adds that the manner of the incarnation is one thing, and the manner of the Eucharist is another.

^A It is not that the body which was received into the heavens descends, but that the bread itself and the wine are transmuted into the body and blood of God. If you inquire how this happens, it is enough for you to learn that it is by the Holy Spirit, just as the Lord, through the Holy Spirit, took flesh to himself and in himself from the holy Mother of God; and we know nothing more than this, except that the Word of God is true, and effective, and almighty, but the manner is unsearchable. It is not amiss to say also this, that just as naturally bread through eating, and wine and water through drinking, are changed into the body and blood of the eater and drinker, and do not become a different body than the one that previously existed, so the bread of the 82 oblation, the wine, and the water, through the invocation and the advent of the Holy Spirit, are supra-naturally changed into the body of Christ and his blood, and there are not two, 83 but one and the same.

^B ...[the] substance [of the bread] which existed before becomes the body of Christ, becoming Christ's body; it is the greatest of all divine miracles, as truly through the bread there is a change into the Lordly body, but not an impossible one for Him who has power over the divine... ^C ...[regarding] the beginning of the... This miracle, as I think, happened as a most clear sign of this great and supernatural mystery, that only the accidents of the bread perish, while the substance of the bread is changed, and by the all-holy Spirit is transubstantiated into the true body of Christ, and undergoes no corruption, but remains incorrupt, as the property of Christ. Thus [is the case] of the oblation. *Prothesis*, *thysis*, *pros*-... *phora*, falling down... all the faithful fall down to the priests. For even if it has not yet been consecrated, but in the *prothesis* they were dedicated to God, and the priest there offered a prayer, and said to receive these ^D at the altar above. For we are not idolaters by bowing down before the gifts, far from it; but we revere the gifts dedicated to God through the oblation, as if sanctified by the oblation.

83 *And there are not two, but one.* So in the epistle to Caesarius, which is attributed to Chrysostom. "For just as before the bread is sanctified, we call it bread, but when the divine grace sanctifies it through the mediator the priest, it is delivered indeed from the appellation of bread, but is considered worthy of the appellation of the Lordly body, even if the nature of bread has remained in it: and it is not called two bodies, but one body of the Son." From these later words, which our author borrowed from that epistle, it is sufficiently understood that by the name of nature, the substance of the bread is not signified, but the structure of the...

^A bread and its natural properties. For if the nature or substance properly so-called of the bread were to remain, then there would be two bodies, namely the bread and Christ, not one only. After Damascenus, Theodorus Graptus, or rather Nicephorus of Constantinople, spoke in the same way in his book *On the Inculpable Christian Faith*, or *Antirrhetica* II, chapter 3: "Just as bread, wine, and water are naturally converted into the body and blood of the one eating, so that we would by no means say that a body other than that which existed before is made from them: so also these, by a reason that transcends nature, through the invocation of the priest and the coming of the Holy Spirit, are converted into the body and blood of Christ, just as the priest petitions it to be done; and we believe them to be so, and we understand that they are not two, but that one and the same exists." Similarly in a letter to Zachariah the Doarian, and in a short homily (which I shall show in their own place are not John Damascene's), this is proved first: that it is one and the same body of Christ that was conceived of the Virgin, and is dead, and is that which we immolate at the altar, adding also the example of food which is turned into the body of an infant; so that although it grows, it does not become two bodies, but one, ^C and not two. When, by the accretion of the body of Christ, it is gathered into one body, and not two. Where by the accretion of the body of Christ, it is hinted that the body of Christ, although it does not increase any further in mass, yet with the bread and wine converted, it attains a certain excellent kind of growth, so that it remains one and the same for all and for each of the faithful, and is communicated without any division.

(84) *It is not a figure*. Neither is the bread and wine a figure of Christ’s body and blood, for in certain ancient fragments read in the *Catenae* on Matthew, which declare the same, the Eucharistic bread is not a figure of the Lord's body, but the body itself. It is a well-worn story which is found in book V of *The Lives of the Fathers*, booklet 18, and in the *Apophthegmata Patrum*, Vol. I, *Monum. Eccl. Græc.*, p. 241, where Abbot Daniel relates from Abbot Arsenius concerning an old monk who had fallen into this error, that the Eucharistic bread and wine were merely figures of the body and blood of the Lord. In the age of Damascenus, the books of Macarius Magnes *Against the Gentile Theosthenes* were very well known—which are preserved at Venice in the library of St. Mark, and from which Turrianus, in book V of *Clemens*, published these words: "The Eucharist is not a figure of the body and blood, as some with a dull mind have prattled, but body and blood." Coccius provided a more extensive Latin version of this passage in Vol. II, p. 607. Nicephorus discusses sufficiently ample fragments of Macarius Magnes in his *Antirrhetica*. Among the prelates who met in the synod at the Oak against Chrysostom, Photius relates that Macarius, bishop of Magnesia, was present, who stirred up a quarrel against Heraclides of Ephesus. St. Ignatius the martyr, in his epistle to the Smyrneans, says that the heretics of his day withdrew from the Eucharist and prayer because they do not confess the Eucharist to be the flesh of our Savior Jesus Christ. Therefore, those who contradict this gift of God, by disputing, perish. Indeed, just as, by the testimony of Irenæus, lib. III, c. 11, in none of the opinions of these heretics did the Word become flesh, so also in the Eucharist the true body and blood of Christ is not contained, but at most a simple figure. On the contrary, Cyril of Jerusalem, *Cat.* 4, says: "In the figure of bread," he says, "Christ offers his body, and in the figure of wine, likewise his blood, so that the naked species of bread and wine remain." But later he teaches that it must be held with firm faith that what seems to us to be bread, is not in reality bread, although it refers to the taste; but the body of Christ. And the wine which is seen by us, is not wine, even though it appears to be wine to the taste, but the blood of Christ. The Greeks offer the same meaning, who, in disputing about unleavened bread against the Latins, acknowledge that the bread, whether it be fermented or unleavened (*azyma*), after consecration is neither fermented nor unleavened. Thus John, patriarch of Jerusalem, as cited by Allatius, *Exerc. cont. Creygt.* Thus, in turn, Theorianus, in the same *Exerc.*, in an epistle to the priests and monks, argues on behalf of the Latins: "The divine bread, before it is consecrated, whether it be unleavened or fermented, is indifferently bread and is so called by the divine Scripture, as we shall show. But after it is consecrated, it is neither unleavened nor fermented, but the body and flesh of the Lord, the same and very thing itself, and not one thing instead of another. For it is one and the same that was taken from the incorrupt Virgin, and sits at the right hand of the Father, and is received by us the orthodox mystically. Whence it is called a mystery, as a secret which many do not perceive. If, therefore, the divine power changes the proposed gifts into the body and blood of Christ, it is vain to contend whether it is made from unleavened or fermented bread, or with white or red wine, and to agitate such foolish curiosities concerning the venerable mysteries." Theorianus wrote this under Manuel Comnenus, in the twelfth century.

^A of the body, but the body; and not a figure of the blood, but the blood. And before this, He had said to the Jews: "Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink His blood, you have no life in you." For My flesh is true food, and My blood is true drink. And again: "He who eats Me, will live."

The rite of giving the Eucharist into the hands.

The figures of the Eucharist.

^A as the Lord said through the prophet, to be offered to Him from the rising of the sun even to the going down of the same.

The fruit of the Eucharist.—It is the body and blood of Christ, which contributes to the strengthening of our soul and body; it is not consumed, nor is it corrupted, nor does it go into the draught (God forbid!), but it serves for our substance and conservation, a defense against every kind of hurt, and a cleanser of every impurity. If it finds gold that is adulterated, it purifies it by the trial of fiery judgment, so that we may not be condemned with the world in the future age. For it cleanses us from diseases and all manner of afflictions, as the divine Apostle says: "For if we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged. But when we are judged, we are chastised by the Lord, that we may not be condemned with this world." And this is what he says: "So that whosoever partakes of the body and blood of the Lord unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself." Being cleansed by Him, we are united with the body of the Lord and His Spirit, and we become the body of Christ.

The supersubstantial bread.—This bread is the first-fruits of the bread to come, which is the supersubstantial bread. For "supersubstantial" signifies either the one to come, that is, the bread of the age to come, or the bread which is taken for the preservation of our substance. Whether then taken one way or the other, it will be fittingly called the body of the Lord; for the flesh of the Lord is a vivifying Spirit, because it was conceived of the ^B vivifying Spirit: for that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. I say this, not to do away with the nature of the body, but to declare its vivifying and divine power.

And if some call the Eucharist an antitype (87) of the body and blood of Christ, they said this—not that they meant it to be antitype of body and blood, as the God-bearing ^C... [Note: The text here resumes at the primary discourse] ...they referred to it as it were the bread and the wine, as the God-bearing Father said: "I have no pleasure in you, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will not receive an offering from your hand. For from the rising of the sun even to the going down of the same, my name is glorified among the Gentiles: and in every place incense is offered to my name, and a pure offering." It cleanses us from diseases and all manner of afflictions. The flesh of the Savior, when eaten, is not corrupted, nor is the blood consumed when drunk; but he who eats is raised to the increase of divine virtues. That which is eaten is inexhaustible, since it is in some way kindred to the inexhaustible nature and inseparable from it, but is distributed to thy whole constitution for the benefit of body and soul.

^A They called the bread and wine antitypes of the body and blood of Christ, not — as the God-bearing Basil said — after they have been sanctified, but before they were sanctified, having thus named the offering itself.

It is called participation, because through it we partake of the divinity of Jesus. It is also called communion and truly is so, because through it we communicate with Christ and share in both His flesh and divinity; and we communicate and are united with one another through it. For since we partake of one bread, we all become one body of Christ and one blood, and members of one another, being made fellow-members of Christ. ^B Therefore, let us guard with all our might against receiving communion from heretics, or giving it to them. For the Lord says: "Do not give what is holy to the dogs, nor throw your pearls before swine," that we may not become sharers in their impiety and their condemnation. For if there is indeed a unity with Christ and with one another, we are certainly united by intent with all who partake with us. For this is a union of intent, not without our own will. For we are all one body, because we partake of the one bread, as the divine Apostle says.

They are called antitypes of the things to come, not as though they are not truly the body and blood of Christ, but because now through them we partake of Christ’s divinity, while then ^C we shall partake of it intellectually, through vision alone.

Chapter XIV. On the lineage of the Lord, and on the holy Mother of God.

Since regarding the holy and sufficiently-beyond-praise ^D

and Theotokos Mary we have already moderately discoursed in what preceded, and demonstrated most essentially that she is and is called, properly and truly, Theotokos, let us now supply what is lacking. For she, having been foreordained by the eternal and foreknowing counsel of God, and having been prefigured and announced through various images and words of the prophets by the Holy Spirit, blossomed at the predetermined time from the root of David, in accordance with the promises made to him. For the Scripture says: "The Lord swore truth unto David, and He will not set it aside; of the fruit of thy body I will set upon thy throne" (Ps. CXXXI, 11). And again: "Once have I sworn by my holy one, if I shall lie unto David: his seed shall remain forever, and his throne as the sun before me, and as the moon made perfect forever, and the witness in heaven is faithful" (Ps. LXXXVIII, 5). And Isaiah: "A rod shall spring forth from Jesse, and a flower shall ascend from the root" (Isa. XI, 1).

That Joseph descended from the Davidic tribe, the most holy evangelists Matthew and Luke have clearly shown; but Matthew traces Joseph from David through Solomon, while Luke through Nathan. Both, however, passed over in silence the birth of the holy Virgin. One must therefore know that it was not the custom among the Hebrews, nor in the divine Scripture, for women to be included in genealogies. Moreover, it was ordained by law that one should not take a wife from another tribe; and therefore Joseph, who was descended from the Davidic lineage and was just (for the divine Gospel bestows this praise upon him), would by no means have taken the holy Virgin into betrothal contrary to the ordinance of the law, had he not descended from the same scepter or tribe. Having therefore shown the origin of Joseph, the evangelist was satisfied.

One must also know that it was ordained by law that if any man died without children, his brother should take the wife of the deceased in marriage and raise up seed for his brother (Deut. XXV, 5; Num. XXXVI, 6). Thus, the offspring was, by nature, of the second—that is, of him who had begotten him—but by law, it was considered to be of the deceased.

^D The order of Christ's lineage. Therefore, from the line of Nathan, the son of David, is born Levi. Levi begat Melchi and Panthar. ^D

^A Panthar begat Barpanthar (for so he was called). This Barpanthar begat Joachim; and Joachim begat the holy Theotokos. Again, from the line of Solomon, the son of David, Mathan took a wife, from whom he begat Jacob, the father of Joseph. But when Mathan was dead, Melchi, who was of the tribe of Nathan, the son of Levi and brother of Panthar, took the wife of Mathan, who was also the mother of Jacob, and from her he begat Heli. Therefore, Jacob and Heli were uterine brothers: Jacob, indeed, from the tribe of Solomon, and Heli from the tribe of Nathan. But Heli, who was of the tribe of Nathan, died childless; and his brother Jacob, who was of the tribe of Solomon, took his wife and raised up seed to his brother, and begat Joseph. Joseph, therefore, is by nature the son of Jacob, of the house of Solomon, but by law the son of Heli, who was of the line of Nathan.

Joachim, therefore, took to wife that venerable and praiseworthy woman, Anna. ^B But just as that ancient Anna, being barren, brought forth Samuel through prayer and promise, so this one also, through supplication and promise to God, receives the Theotokos, so that in this respect also she might fall short of none of the illustrious matrons. Grace, therefore (for this is what Anna is interpreted to mean), brings forth the Lady; for this is what the name Mary signifies, who truly became the Lady of all creation, having been made the Mother of the Creator. She is born ^C in the Probatica... ^D [index: entries preserved]

^A house of Joachim, and is brought to the temple. Then, planted in the house of God and nourished by the Spirit, like a fruit-bearing olive tree, she is prepared as a dwelling place for every virtue; so that, having withdrawn her mind from every desire of the world and of the flesh, she kept her soul, together with her body, virgin, as befitted her who was to receive God into her bosom, who, being holy Himself, rests among the holy 70. Thus, by pursuing holiness, she becomes a holy and wonderful temple, worthy of the hospitality of the most high God.

^B Since, however, the enemy of our salvation was watching the virgins, because of the prophecy of Isaiah who said: *Behold, a virgin shall be in the womb and shall bear a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel* (which is translated *God with us* 71); therefore, that He who catches the wise in their craftiness 72 might deceive him who always boasts in the name of wisdom, the maiden is betrothed to Joseph by the priests—a new scroll for one who knows letters 73. This betrothal was both a protection for the Virgin and a deception for him who was watching the virgins. But when the fullness of time had come, an angel of the Lord was sent to her, to announce the conception of the Lord. Wherefore she conceived the Son of God, that true and subsistent power of the Father, not by the will of the flesh, nor by the will of a man 74—that is, not by intercourse and seed—but by the benign will of the Father, with the Holy Spirit acting simultaneously. By this plan, she provided ^C for the Creator to be created, and for the Maker to be made, and for the Son of God and God to be incarnate and made man from her pure and undefiled flesh and blood, fulfilling the debt of the first mother. For just as that one was fashioned from Adam without intercourse, so also this one brought forth the new Adam, born according to the law of gestation, and yet above the nature of birth. For He is born without a father from a woman, He the One born from the Father without a mother. And in that he is from a woman, it is according to the law of gestation; but in that he is without a father, it is above the nature of generation. And in that he is born at the accustomed time—for he completed the nine months and entered into the tenth—it is according to the law of gestation; but in that it was without pain, it is above the rule of birth. For pleasure did not precede, nor did pain follow in the birth, according to the prophet who says: *Before she travailed, she brought forth* 75. And again: *Before the time of travail arrived, she escaped, and brought forth a man child* 76.

^D Therefore, the Son of God has been born from her incarnate, not a man bearing God, but God incarnate.

^A Not as a prophet anointed by the operation, but by the presence of the whole anointing body, so that the one who anointed became man, and that which was anointed became God, not by a change of nature, but by union according to hypostasis. For the same was both the anointer and the anointed: the anointer as God, himself as man. How then is she not Theotokos, who bore from herself God incarnate? Truly, properly, and genuinely she is Theotokos, and Lady, and rules over all creatures, having been made handmaid and mother of the Creator. Just as when conceived he kept her who conceived him a virgin, so also when born he kept her virginity inviolate, alone passing through her and keeping her closed. The conception was by hearing, but the birth was by the customary way of those being born, even if some fable that he was born through the side of the Mother of God. For it was not impossible for him both to pass through the door and not to damage its seals. ^B Therefore, she who is ever-virgin remains a virgin even after parturition, having in no way consorted with man until death. For even if it is written, "And he knew her not until she brought forth her first-born son," we must know that "first-born" is the one first born, even if he be only-begotten. For indeed, "first-born" signifies that he was born first, but it does not necessarily imply the birth of others. And "until" signifies the boundary of a set time, but it does not deny what happens afterwards. For the Lord says, "And behold, I am with you always, even unto ^C the end of the age," not as though he will depart after the end of the age. For the divine Apostle says, "And so shall we ever be with the Lord," speaking after the common resurrection.

For how could she who had borne God, and had known the miracle from the experience of what followed, have accepted the embrace of a man? Far be it! It would not be the mind of a chaste person even to think such things, much less to do them. But this blessed woman, having been deemed worthy of gifts beyond nature, endured in the time of the passion the pains she had escaped in childbearing; under the maternal sympathy of the bowels, she suffered the rending, and seeing him whom she knew to be God through birth being put to death as a criminal, she was rent in her thoughts as by a sword; and this is what is meant: "And a sword shall pierce through your own soul also." But the joy of the resurrection changes the sorrow, preaching him as God who had died in the flesh.

CAP. XV. Regarding the honor to be paid to the saints and their relics.

^A Saints are to be honored as friends of Christ, as children and heirs of God, as John the Theologian and Evangelist says: "But as many as received him, to them he gave power to become children of God." So they are no longer servants, but children; and if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ. And the Lord in the holy Gospels says to the apostles: "You are my friends. I will no longer call you servants; for the servant does not know what his lord is doing." Furthermore, since the King of kings, and Lord of lords, and God of gods, is called the Creator of all things and Lord, it is surely necessary that the saints also be called gods, and lords, and kings. Their God is the God who is, and is called, both Lord and King. For "I am," He says to Moses, "the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." And God made Moses a god to Pharaoh. I say "gods," and "kings," and "lords," not by nature, but because they have reigned over and mastered their passions, and have preserved uncorrupted the likeness of the divine image, ^B according to which they were created (for the image of the king is also called king); and as those who have been united to God by free choice, and who have received Him as a guest in their heart, and by grace have become that which He is by nature. How, then, should we not honor those who have been named servants, and friends, and sons of God? For the honor paid to our fellow-servants proves our good will toward the common Master.

These have become storehouses and clean dwellings of God, because the Lord says: "I will dwell in them, and walk among them, and I will be their God." That the souls of the just are in the hand of God, and that death shall not touch them, the divine Scripture says. ^C For the death of the saints is sleep rather than death. "For they labored in this age, and shall live to the end." And: "Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints." For what is more precious than to be in the hand of God? For God is life and light, and those who are in the hand of God are in life and light.

That God has also dwelt by the mind and in their bodies, the Apostle testifies: "Do you not know that your bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit who dwells in you?" And the Lord is the Spirit. And: "If anyone destroys the temple of God, God will destroy him." How, then, are we not to honor ^D the—

[...to be honored?] those who are the living temples of God, the living tabernacles of God? These stand before God with confidence.

The Master Christ has granted us the relics of the saints as saving fountains, ^A gushing forth benefits in many ways and pouring out fragrant ointment; and let no one be faithless. For if, by the will of God, water gushed forth in the desert from a steep and hard rock, and from an ass's jawbone for Samson when he was thirsty, is it unbelievable that fragrant ointment should gush forth from the relics of martyrs? Not at all, for those who know the power of God and the honor He bestows upon the saints.

In the ^B Law, everyone who touched a corpse was considered unclean, but these are not corpses. For since the time that He who is Life itself, the Author of life, was reckoned among the dead, we do not call those who have fallen asleep in the hope of resurrection and in faith into Him, dead. For how can a dead body perform miracles? How, then, through them are demons driven out, diseases banished, the sick healed, the blind restored to sight, lepers cleansed, temptations and sorrows dissolved, and every good gift from the Father of lights ^C descend through them to those who ask with unwavering faith? How much trouble would you go to, so that you might find a patron to lead you to a mortal king and speak to him on your behalf? Are these, then, the patrons of the whole human race, who offer prayers to God on our behalf, not to be honored? Indeed they must be honored, by raising temples to God in their name, by bringing offerings, by honoring their memories, and by rejoicing in them spiritually, so that the joy may be akin to those who invite us, lest, in trying to serve them, we offend and anger them instead. For God will be pleased, and His servants ^D will rejoice, by those things through which God is honored; but if God is displeased, His attendants will also be displeased. In the Psalms, and in the

Various Readings

and with spiritual songs, and with compunction, and with mercy for those in need, let us honor the saints, by whom God is especially honored. Let us raise up pillars to them, and visible images; and let us ourselves become living pillars and images of them, through the imitation of their virtues. Let us honor the Theotokos as truly and properly the Mother of God. Let us honor the prophet John as forerunner and baptist, apostle and martyr; for "among those born of women there has not risen a greater than John the Baptist," as the Lord said, and he became the first herald of the Kingdom. Let us honor the apostles as brothers of the Lord, and eyewitnesses, and ministers of His sufferings, whom God the Father also foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, ^B—first apostles, second prophets, third pastors and teachers—and the martyrs of the Lord, chosen from every rank as soldiers of Christ, who have drunk His cup, having been baptized with the baptism of His life-giving death, as sharers of His passion and His glory; of whom the commander is the proto-deacon of Christ and apostle, and first martyr, Stephen; and our holy fathers, the God-bearing ascetics, who have wrestled through the longer and more painful martyrdom of conscience, who "wandered about in sheepskins, in goatskins, being destitute, afflicted, tormented, wandering in deserts, and mountains, and dens, and caves of the earth," of whom the world was not worthy. Let us honor those who were before grace—prophets, patriarchs, righteous men—who heralded the coming of the Lord. Looking upon the life of all these, let us imitate their faith, love, hope, zeal, life, perseverance in suffering, and patience even unto blood, so that we may also share with them in the crowns of glory.

CAP. XVI. Concerning the images of the saints.

^C Since some blame us for [our] adoration of the image of God in man. —

^A Let them hear that from the beginning God created man according to His own image. Why then do we adore one another, if not because we have been made according to the image of God? For as the God-inspired – and truly great in divine matters – Basil says, "the honor of the image passes to the prototype." The prototype is that which is portrayed, from which the derivative is made. Why did the Mosaic people adore the tabernacle round about, which bore the image and shadow of heavenly things, or rather of the whole of creation? For God says to Moses: "See, you shall make everything according to the pattern shown to you on the mountain." And were the Cherubim that overshadowed the mercy seat not works of men's hands? And what of that famous temple in Jerusalem? Was it not handmade and constructed by the art of men? ^B Divine Scripture condemns those who adore sculptured images, but also those who sacrifice to demons. The Greeks sacrificed, and the Jews also sacrificed; but the Greeks [sacrificed] to demons, while the Jews [sacrificed] to God. And the sacrifice of the Greeks was rejected and condemned, while that of the righteous was acceptable to God. For Noah sacrificed, and God smelled the odor of sweetness, accepting the fragrance of his good purpose and of his goodwill toward Him. Thus, the sculptured images of the Greeks, because they were likenesses of demons, are rejected and forbidden.

Moreover, who can make a representation of the invisible, bodiless, uncircumscribed, and shapeless God? To do so is ^C extreme folly. ^D [alt-version omitted] [index: entries preserved]

^A and impiety, to attempt to give form to the Divine. Hence, in the Old Testament, the use of images was not common. But since God, through the bowels of His own mercy, has in truth become man for our salvation—appearing not as He appeared to Abraham in the likeness of a man, nor as to the prophets, but having become truly man in substance, having lived on earth and moved among men, having performed miracles, suffered, been crucified, risen, and been taken up—since all these things took place in truth and were seen by men, they were recorded for our remembrance ^B and for the instruction of those who were not present then, so that we, who have not seen but have heard and believed, may attain the blessedness of the Lord. And since not everyone knows letters nor has leisure for reading, the Fathers decided that these things should be recorded in images, as a kind of concise commentary ^C, to serve as a brief reminder. Indeed, often when we are not thinking of the Lord’s passion, by seeing the image of Christ’s crucifixion and coming to a remembrance of the saving passion, we fall down and worship—not the material, but the one who is depicted; just as we do not worship the material of the Gospel book, nor the material of the cross, but that which is impressed upon them. For what difference is there between a cross not having the impression of the Lord and one that does? In the same way, this applies to the Mother of God; ^D for the honor shown to her is referred back to the one who became incarnate from her. And similarly, the noble deeds of holy men incite us to courage, and zeal, and the imitation of their virtue, and to the glory of God. For as we said, the honor shown to one’s fellow servants is evidence of one’s goodwill toward our common Master, and the honor of the image passes on to the prototype. Moreover, it is unwritten [(94)]

^A that we worship facing the east, that we venerate the cross, and many other things similar to these.

There is also current a certain history, ^B how the Lord, when Abgar, who was king of the city of the Edessenes, sent a painter to paint a likeness of the Lord, and the painter was unable to do so because of the splendor and radiance that flashed from His face, the Lord Himself placed a garment to His own divine and life-giving face and impressed upon the garment a likeness of Himself, and thus sent it to Abgar, who desired it.

That the apostles also delivered many things in an unwritten manner, Paul, the apostle of the nations, writes: "Therefore, brothers, stand firm and hold to the traditions which you were taught, whether by word or by our letter" (II Thess. 2, 15). And to the Corinthians ^C

he says: "I praise you, brothers, that you remember me in all things and hold fast to the traditions just as I delivered them to you" (I Cor. 11, 2).

CAP. XVII. Concerning Scripture

^A God is one, ^B both proclaimed by the Old and New Testament, and worshipped and glorified in the Trinity; as the Lord said: "I did not come to abolish the law, but to fulfill it" (Matt. 5, 17). For He Himself wrought our salvation, for the sake of which all Scripture and every mystery have been revealed. And again: "Search the Scriptures, for they testify of me" (John 5, 39). And as the Apostle says: "God, who at various times and in various ways spoke in time past to our fathers by the prophets, has in these last days spoken to us by His Son" (Heb. 1, 1). Therefore, by the Holy Spirit, the Law and the Prophets, the Evangelists, and Apostles, and pastors and teachers have spoken.

Every Scripture, therefore, is divinely inspired and is entirely useful (II Tim. 3, 16). ^B Therefore it is excellent and most beneficial for the salvation of souls to search the divine Scriptures. For as a tree planted by the streams of waters (Ps. 1, 3), so also is the soul, when irrigated by divine Scripture, made fat and brings forth mature fruit, that is, the orthodox faith, and is adorned with ever-verdant leaves, that is, with deeds acceptable to God; for we are regulated by the holy Scriptures both for virtuous action and for clear contemplation. For we find in them ^C an incitement to every virtue and a dissuasion from every vice. If, therefore, we are eager to learn, we shall also become learned; for by diligence, and labor, and the grace of God who gives, all things are achieved. For everyone who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it will be opened (Luke 11, 10). Let us therefore knock at that most beautiful paradise of the Scriptures, that most fragrant, sweet, and elegant one, I say, which surrounds our ears with the various songs of spiritual and divine birds, which touches our heart, ^D and consoles it when it is sorrowful, calms it when it is angry, and fills it with eternal joy; which conveys our...

mind upon the golden-shining back of the dove ^A, borne upon her most brilliant wings to the only-begotten Son and heir of the husbandman of that intelligible vineyard, and leads it to the Father of lights ^B. But we must not knock perfunctorily; rather, we must do so eagerly and persistently, that we may not grow weary in our knocking. For in this way it will finally be opened to us. If we read once or twice and do not understand what we have read, let us not be discouraged, but persevere, meditate, and ask. For it says: *Ask your father, and he will tell you; your elders, and they will tell you* ^C. For knowledge is not for everyone. Let us draw from the fountain of Paradise streams that are perennial and most pure, leaping up into eternal life. Let us revel in this, and feast upon it insatiably; for the grace of the Scriptures is such that it can never be exhausted. Indeed, if we can glean anything useful from external authors, nothing prevents us from doing so, provided we are expert money-changers, gathering the true and pure gold, while rejecting what is counterfeit. Whatever is well and elegantly said, let us accept, so that we may cast away the ridiculous deities and absurd fables to the dogs; for from those very things we may be able to gain much strength against them.

The number of the books of the Old Testament.

It must be known ^D that there are twenty-two books of the Old Testament, as many as the letters of the Hebrew language. For the Hebrews have twenty-two letters, five of which are doubled, so that they become twenty-seven in total; for Kaph is doubled, and Mem, and Nun, and Pe, and Tsadi. Thus the books are, according to this manner, twenty-two in number...

yet twenty-seven are found, because five of them are doubled. For Ruth is joined to Judges, and is counted by the Hebrews as one book; the first and second of Kings is one book; the third and fourth of Kings is one book; the first and second of Chronicles is one book; the first and second of Ezra is one book. ^A Thus, the books are combined into four pentateuchs, and two others remain, so that the canonical books stand as follows: five legal books: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy. This is the first pentateuch, which is also called the Law. Then another pentateuch, [which is] those called Writings, though by some Holy Scripture, which are as follows: Joshua son of Nun, Judges with Ruth, the first of Kings with the second as one book, the third with the fourth as one book, and the two books of Chronicles as one book. This is the second pentateuch. The third pentateuch is the books of verse: the book of Job, the Psalter, the Proverbs of Solomon, the Ecclesiastes of the same, the Song of Songs of the same. The fourth pentateuch is the ^B prophetic: the Twelve Prophets as one book, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel; then the books of Ezra, joined into one book, and Esther. The Panaretus, that is to say, the Wisdom of Solomon, and the Wisdom of Jesus, whom the father of Sirach published in Hebrew, and his grandson Jesus, son of Sirach, translated into Greek; these, although otherwise noble and excellent books, are nevertheless not counted, nor were they kept in the ark.

Libri Novi Testamenti. — Now the books of the New Testament are these: four Gospels, namely, according to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John; the Acts of the Apostles by the evangelist Luke; seven Catholic Epistles: one of James, two of Peter, three of John, one of Jude; the fourteen Epistles of the Apostle Paul; the Apocalypse of the evangelist John; and finally, the Canons of the holy apostles ^C through Clement. ^D

CAPUT XVIII. Regarding those things which are said concerning Christ.

The general modes of speaking about Christ are four: for some things are appropriate to Him even before the Incarnation, some are in the union, some after the union, and some after the resurrection. And of those things prior to the Incarnation, there are six modes. For some of them declare the conjunction of nature and the consubstantiality with the Father, as: ^A *I and the Father are one* (John X, 30), and: *He who has seen me has seen the Father* (John XIV, 9), and: *Who, existing in the form of God* (Phil. II, 6), and such like. Others indicate the perfection of the hypostasis, such as: *Son of God* (John I, 3), and: *The brightness of His glory and the express image of His person* (Heb. I, 3), and: *Angel of Great Counsel, wonderful, counsellor* (Isa. IX, 6), and the like.

Others indicate the circumincession of the hypostases in one another, as: *I am in the Father, and the Father in me* (John XIV, 10); and the ineffable and indissoluble indwelling, as the Word, and Wisdom, and Power, and the Radiance. For the Word—and by Word I mean the hypostatic Word—is in the mind, and Wisdom likewise, and Power in the mighty, ^B and the Radiance in the light, where they are fixed inerrantly, as flowing forth from them.

Others are expressed as if from a cause, the Father, as: *The Father is greater than I* (John XIV, 28). For from Him He has both His being and all that He has; His being, indeed, by generation and not by creation, as: *I came forth from the Father and have come* (John XVI, 28), and: *I live because of the Father* (John VI, 58). As to all that He has, it is not by participation or as if taught, but as from a cause, as when He says: *The Son can do nothing of himself, unless he sees the Father doing it* (John V, 19). For if the Father is not, the Son is not either. For from the Father is the Son, and in the Father, and together with the Father, and not after the Father. Similarly, also, what He does, He does from Him and with Him. For one and the same—I mean the same, and not merely similar—is the will, operation, and power of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

Others, further, are said as if the paternal good pleasure is being fulfilled through His operation, not as through an instrument or a servant, but as through His own hypostatic Word, and Wisdom, and Power, because one motion is contemplated in the Father and the Son; as: *All things were made through Him* (John I, 3); and: *He sent His Word and healed them* (Ps. CVI, 20); and: *That they may know that You have sent me* (John XVII, 3).

^A Furthermore, there is also a prophetic mode, of which there is a double genus. Some things are spoken of as future, as for example: *He shall come manifestly*; and that of Zechariah: *Behold, your King comes to you*; and what was said by Micah: *Behold, the Lord comes forth from His place, and will descend, and will tread upon the high places of the earth*. Others, even though they are future, are nevertheless spoken of as if they were past, as: *This is our God... Afterward He appeared on earth, and conversed with men*; and that: *The Lord created me as the beginning of His ways for His works*; and that: *Therefore God, your God, has anointed you with the oil of gladness above your fellows*, and things of this kind.

Things, therefore, that precede the union and follow the union are said of Him. But things that follow the union are by no means said before the union, unless it be in a prophetic manner, as we have said.

Now, there are three modes of the things that are in the union. ^B For when we speak from the more excellent part, we speak of the deification of the flesh, and the *Logos*-ization, and the superelevation, and such like, indicating the riches imparted to the flesh from its union and connaturality with the most high God the Word. But when we speak from the inferior part, we describe the incarnation of God the Word, the assumption of humanity, the emptying, the poverty, the humiliation; for these and such like things are attributed to the Word and God on account of His union with humanity. Finally, when our discourse is of both at once, we use the terms union, communion, anointing, natural and intimate coherence, conformation, and other words of this type.

On account, therefore, of this third mode, the two aforementioned modes are spoken of. For by the union it is indicated what each had from the composition and circumincession of that which co-exists with it. For because of the union according to hypostasis, the flesh is said to be deified and to have become God, and co-divine with the Word; and God the Word is said to be incarnate, and to have become man, and a creature, and is called the last; not as if the two natures were changed into one composite nature (for it is impossible for such opposite natural properties to exist together in one nature), but as the two natures united according to hypostasis, and possessing an unconfused and immutable circumincession into one another. ^C This circumincession did not originate from the flesh, but from the divinity. For it is impossible for the flesh to circuminsess the divinity; but the divine nature, having once circuminsessed through the flesh, gave to the flesh also the ineffable circumincession toward itself, which we call union.

But it must be known that in the first and second modes of those things that are in the union, the reverse is considered; for when [we speak]—

of the flesh, we say "deification," "assumption to the Word," "superexaltation," and "anointing." For these things proceed from the divinity and are considered with respect to the flesh. Again, when we speak of the Word, we use the terms "emptying," "incarnation," "becoming man," "humiliation," and similar expressions, which, as we have said, are transferred from the flesh to the Word and God; for He himself willingly endured these things.

After the union, there are three modes. The first is that which declares the divine nature, such as: *I am in the Father, and the Father in me*; and: *I and the Father are one*. Furthermore, all things that are said of Him before the ^B assumption of humanity will also be said of Him after the assumption of humanity, with this one exception: that He had not yet assumed flesh and the natural properties of the flesh.

The second is the mode of the human nature, as in the passage: *Why do you seek to kill me, a man who has told you the truth?* and that: *Even so must the Son of man be lifted up*, and other things of this kind.

There are six modes for those things which are said and written of the Savior Christ according to ^C a human manner, whether in words or in deeds. For some of them are done and said naturally in accordance with the divine economy; such as the birth from a Virgin, the growth and progress in age, hunger, thirst, toil, tears, sleep, the piercing by nails, death, and such like, which are natural and blameless passions. For in all these there is a union of the divine with the human, yet the body is believed to be truly such; for the divinity suffered none of these things, but through them procured our salvation.

Some are by way of pretense—for example, the questioning, *Where have you laid Lazarus?*; the journey to the fig tree; the turning aside, that is, withdrawing; the prayer; and ^D *He made as though He would go further*. For of these and similar things, He had need neither as God nor as man, but He fashioned them in a human manner, as necessity and utility required. For example, He prayed in order to show that He is not an adversary of God, and to honor the Father as His own cause. He questioned, not because He was ignorant, but to show that He was truly man as well as remaining God. He withdrew to teach us not to enter into dangers rashly nor to betray ourselves.

Some things, again, are said by way of appropriation and reference, such as: *My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?* and that:*

He made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin*; and that: *He became a curse for us*; and that: *The Son himself will be subject to him who subjected all things to him.* For neither as God nor as man was he ever forsaken by the Father; nor did he become sin or a curse, nor does he stand in need of subjection to the Father. For in as much as he is God, he is equal to the Father, and is neither his adversary nor ^A subject to him; and in as much as he is man, he never became disobedient to his begetter, so as to require subjection. Therefore, by appropriating our person and ranking himself with us, he said these things. For we were the ones liable to sin and the curse, being disobedient and rebellious, and for this reason forsaken.

Some things, however, are said on account of a distinction made by mental abstraction. For if you divide by thought things which are inseparable in reality—that is, the flesh from the Word—he is called both a servant and ignorant; for he was of a servile and ignorant nature, and if the flesh had not been united to the Word of God, it would indeed have been servile and ignorant. But because of the hypostatic union with the Word of God, it was neither servile nor ignorant. For this same reason, he called God his Father.

Some things, again, are said for the sake of our manifestation and the confirmation of our faith, as when he says: *Father, glorify me with the glory which I had with you before the world existed.* For he himself was and is glorified, but the glory was not made manifest and confirmed to us. And that which was said by the Apostle: *Who was determined* ^B *to be the Son of God in power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead*; for by miracles, and by the resurrection, and by the descent of the Holy Spirit, it was made manifest and confirmed to the world that he is the Son of God. And that: *Predestined*—

He increased in wisdom and grace*. ^A

Some things, finally, are said of him as if he had assumed the person of the Jews, by enrolling himself in their number, as when he says to the Samaritan woman: *You worship what you do not know; we worship what we know, for salvation is from the Jews*.

The third mode is that which signifies the one hypostasis and represents both natures together. Of this kind is the saying: *I live because of the Father, and he who eats me, he also shall live because of me*; and: *I am going to the Father, and you will no longer see me*; and: *They would not have crucified the Lord of glory*; and: *No one has ascended into heaven except he who descended from heaven, the Son of man, who is in heaven*, and similar things. ^B

And of the things after the resurrection, some are divine, as: *Baptizing them into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit*—meaning that the Son is God; and: *Behold, I am with you all the days, even to the end of the world*, and similar things, for as God he is with us. Others are human, as: *They took hold of his feet*; and: *There they will see me*, and similar things.

The modes of those things that are human after the resurrection are various. For some happen truly, yet not by nature [(1)], but by dispensation, to confirm that it was the very body which had suffered that rose, such as the (wounds/scars), the eating, and the drinking after the resurrection. Others happen truly and according to nature, such as moving from place to place without labor, and entering through ^C closed doors. Others occur by pretense, as: *He pretended to go further*. Others, again, belong to both natures together, as: *I am ascending to my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God*; and: *The King of glory shall enter*; and: *He sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high*. Others, finally, are to be understood as he includes himself in our order, by the mental precision of the mind, namely, as in: *My God and your God*.

One must therefore assign the sublime things to the divine and higher nature, which is free from passion and body; and the humble things, ^D

to the human; and the common things to the composite, that is, to the one Christ, who is God and man. And one must realize that both belong to one and the same Lord of ours, Jesus Christ. For in acknowledging what is proper to each, and in observing that both are performed by one and the same, we shall hold to the right faith and will not go astray. From all these considerations, the distinction of the united natures is known, and that divinity and humanity are not the same, as the most holy Cyril says, in terms of natural quality; yet the Son, and Christ, and Lord, is one. And although he is one, and his Person is one, nonetheless, because of the recognition of the natural difference, the union according to hypostasis admits of no partition whatsoever.

CAP. XIX. That God is not the author of evil.

Knowledge of the term "action" in Scripture as meaning "permission." It is fitting to know that it is a custom of Holy Scripture to call God’s permission His action, as ^A when the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Romans: *Or has not the potter power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?* ^B Truly, it is because He Himself makes both the one and the other; for He alone is the Creator of all things. Yet He Himself does not create vessels as honorable or dishonorable; rather, that is the work of each person's own will and choice. And this is clear from those words which the same Apostle uses in the Second Epistle to Timothy: *In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some indeed unto honor, but some unto dishonor. If any man therefore shall cleanse himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honor, sanctified and profitable to the Lord, prepared unto every good work.* It is evident that this cleansing happens voluntarily. For, he says, *if any man shall cleanse himself.* ^C But the logical converse responds from the opposite, that if he does not cleanse himself, he shall be a vessel unto dishonor, useless to the Lord, and worthy to be broken. Therefore the passage here cited, as well as that one: *God hath concluded all in unbelief*; and this one: *God hath given them the spirit of compunction, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear*; these things, I say, are all not to be understood as if God Himself had wrought them, but that He permitted them, both because of the freedom of the will and because the good is of such a nature that it must be free from force and ^D compulsion.

It is the custom of Scripture, therefore, to speak of God’s ^A permission as if it were His action and work. Nay, even when it says that God creates evil, and that "there is no evil in the city which the Lord has not done," 1 it does not mean that God is the author of evils, but, because the name of evil is ambiguous and has a twofold signification, it uses this term. For sometimes it indicates that which is evil by nature, which is opposed to virtue and to the will of God; and sometimes it indicates that which is evil and grievous to our sense, such as afflictions and the visitations of calamity. These, though in appearance evil—being painful—are in reality good; for to those who are of a discerning mind, they become the agents of conversion and salvation. Of these, Scripture says God is the author. It should be known, however, that we are the cause of these things, too, for involuntary evils are the offspring of voluntary ones.

It should also be known that it is the custom of Scripture to speak of certain things that occur as an outcome, in a way that suggests causality, as in the passage: "Against Thee only have I sinned, and done this evil before Thee, that Thou mightest be justified in Thy sayings, and mightest overcome when Thou art judged." 2 For he who sinned did not sin in order that God might overcome, nor did God need our sin in order that He might appear as victor by means of it. For He who is the Creator, incomprehensible and uncreated, who possesses His glory by nature and not by acquisition, ^B overcomes and surpasses all, even those who do not sin, beyond all comparison. But because when we sin He is not unjust in bringing wrath, and when we repent He grants forgiveness, He is shown to be the victor over our wickedness; yet we do not sin for this reason, but rather it is the way the matter turns out. Just as if someone were sitting working, and a friend should visit, and he should say: My friend came so that I would not work today. The friend did not come in order that he might not work, but it so happened; for being occupied with the reception of his friend, he does not work. Such things are called results because that is how things turn out. God does not wish for Himself alone to be righteous, but for all, as much as possible, to be likened unto Him.

CHAPTER XX.

That there are not two principles.

^A Then, who will have assigned to each his own territory? For they will not say that they have met and come to an agreement with one another; since evil would no longer be evil if it maintained peace and came to terms with the good, nor would the good be good if it maintained a friendly relationship with evil. But if there is another who has assigned to each of these their proper place of habitation, that one will be more truly God. ^B And it is necessary that one of two things be the case: either they touch and destroy one another, or there is some space in the middle in which neither good nor evil exists, like some kind of partition separating them from one another. And then there will no longer be two, but three principles. It is also necessary that, of these, one of two things be the case: either they live in peace, which evil cannot do—for that which is at peace is not evil—or they fight, which the good cannot do—for that which fights is not perfectly good. Or else the evil fights, and the good does not fight back, but is destroyed by the evil, or is always being grieved and harmed, which is not a hallmark of the good. There is, therefore, one single principle, free and immune from all evil.

*Evil is the privation of good, not some substance.* — But, they say, if this is the case, what is the origin of evil? For it is impossible for evil to have had its beginning from the good. We say, then, that evil is nothing else but the privation of good, and a turning away from that which is according to nature into that which is against nature; for nothing is evil by nature. For all things that God made are very good, insofar as they exist; thus, remaining as they were created, they are very good. ^C But when they voluntarily turn aside from that which is according to nature and move into that which is contrary to nature, they become evil. Now, by nature, all things are servants and obedient to the Creator. When, therefore, any of the creatures voluntarily kicks over the traces and becomes disobedient to its Maker, it establishes wickedness within itself. For wickedness is not some substance, nor is it a property of substance, but an accident; that is, a voluntary turning away from that which is according to nature into that which is contrary to nature, which is sin.

They fall away, and move toward that which is opposed to nature.

*The devil is the parent of sin, by will, not by nature.* — Whence, then, is sin? ^D It is clearly an invention of the devil's free will. Is the devil, then, evil? Certainly, insofar as he was created, he is not evil, but good; for he was created by the Creator as a luminous and most splendid angel, endowed with freedom of choice as a rational being. But by his own will he departed from the virtue which is according to nature, and became a darkness of wickedness, having withdrawn from God, the only good, and life-giving, and light-giving; for from Him all...

is fallen into the darkness of malice, departing far from God, who is solely good and the parent of life and light: for from Him it draws its goodness, whatever is good, and it is in so far as it departs from Him by its own will (for not by place) that it lingers in evil.

CHAPTER XXI. Why God created those who were to be sinners and not to repent.

CHAPTER XXII. Concerning the law of God and the law of sin.

^A and our own unforced and voluntary acceptance, is constituted. And this itself is also called law. The law of God, therefore, entering into our mind, draws it toward itself and pricks our conscience. And our conscience is also called the law of our mind. The suggestion of the evil one, that is, the law of sin, entering into the members of our flesh, also attacks us through it. For having once voluntarily transgressed the law of God and accepted the suggestion of the wicked one, we gave it entry, having been sold by ourselves to sin. Hence, our body is readily and easily driven toward it. Wherefore, that scent and perception of sin which resides in the body, that is, the concupiscence and pleasure of the body, is called the law in the members of our flesh.

The law of my mind, then, that is, the conscience, delights in the law of God, that is, in the commandment, and wills it. But the law of sin, that is, the suggestion through the law that is in the members, that is, the desire, the propensity, ^B the motion, and the irrational part of the soul, wars against the law of my mind (that is, the conscience) and takes me captive. And while I will the law of God and love it and do not will sin, it, through intermixture ^C and by means of the seduction of pleasure and the desire of the body and the irrational part of the soul, as I said, leads me astray and persuades me to serve sin. But "what was impossible for the law, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh" (for He assumed flesh, but in no way sin), "condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit." For the Spirit helps our infirmity and provides strength to the law of our mind against the law that is in our members. ^D For, "we do not know what we should pray for as we ought, but the Spirit himself makes intercession for us with groanings that cannot be uttered," that is, he teaches us what we should pray for. So that it is impossible, if

one does not act through patience and prayer, to fulfill the commandments of the Lord.

CAP. XXIII. Against the Jews, concerning the Sabbath.

The Sabbath is called the seventh day, and it signifies rest. For on it God rested from all his works, as the divine Scripture says; for this reason the number of days, progressing as far as seven, revolves back again and begins from the first. This number is held in honor among the Jews, since God commanded it to be observed, and not in a casual way, but with the application of very severe penalties upon those who transgress it. And He did not command this simply, but for certain reasons which are understood in a mystical sense by spiritual men endowed with clarity of mind.

^A As far as I can understand, in my ignorance—so that I may begin from what is lower and more coarse—God, knowing the nature of the Israelite people, which was dense and devoted to the flesh, and utterly inclined toward material things, and at the same time lacking in discernment, established this law, first, so that the servant and the beast of burden might rest, as it is written: "For a righteous man pities the lives of his animals." Furthermore, so that they, being free from the distractions of material things, might be gathered toward God, spending the whole of the seventh day in psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs, and in the study of the divine Scriptures, and resting in God. ^B For when there was no law, nor divinely inspired Scripture, the Sabbath was not consecrated to God. But when the divinely inspired Scripture was given through Moses, the Sabbath was dedicated to God, so that those who do not devote their whole life to God, and who do not serve the Master as a Father with all their desire, but as ungrateful servants, might have the opportunity to meditate upon it; so that they might bestow at least a small and trifling portion of their life upon God, and that through the fear of the punishments and reproofs which await the transgressors. For "the law is not laid down for a righteous man, but for the unjust." Since Moses himself, first by fasting for forty days, and again for another forty, remained ^C in attendance.

^A on God, he was undoubtedly afflicting himself even on the Sabbaths, and yet the law commanded that no one should afflict themselves on the Sabbath day. But if they say that this was before the law, what will they say regarding Elijah the Tishbite, who completed a journey of forty days on a single meal? For he, by afflicting himself not only through fasting but also by traveling during the Sabbaths of those forty days, broke the Sabbath; and God, who had given the law, was not angry with him for this, but rather, as a reward for his virtue, offered Himself to his view in Horeb. And what will they say regarding Daniel? Did he not spend three weeks without food? And what of all Israel? Do they not circumcise an infant on the Sabbath, if it happens to be the eighth day? And do they not also observe the great fast, which has been ordained for them, if it falls on a Sabbath? ^B And do not the priests and the Levites violate the Sabbath in the works of the tabernacle, and are they not blameless? Nay, if a beast of burden falls into a pit on the Sabbath, he who pulls it out is blameless, but he who ignores it is guilty. And what of all Israel? Did they not go around the walls of Jericho for seven days, carrying the ark of God, a period which certainly included the Sabbath?

As I therefore said, the observance of the Sabbath was devised for the sake ^C of leisure toward God, so that they might dedicate at least the smallest portion of their life to Him, and that both the slave and the beast of burden might rest; it was intended for those who were still as infants, and enslaved under the elements of the world, carnal, and capable of thinking nothing beyond the body and the letter. But when the fullness of time came, God sent forth His only-begotten Son, born of a woman, made under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. For as many as received Him, to them He gave the power to become children of God, even to those who believe in His name; so that we are no longer slaves, but sons; no longer under the law, but under grace; no longer serving the Lord only in part out of fear, but obligated to dedicate to Him the whole ^D time of our life, so that we command that slave—I mean anger and desire—to rest from sin, and to be at leisure for God. We stretch forth all desire always toward God, while we arm our anger against the enemies of God; and we likewise refresh our beast of burden, that is, the body, giving it rest from the servitude of sin, and urging it to serve the divine commandments. These are the things which the spiritual law of Christ ordains for us.

^A For when the perfect has come, that which is in part has been done away; and with the covering of the law—that is, the veil—having been torn asunder through the crucifixion of the Savior, and with the Spirit shining forth in tongues of fire, the letter has been abolished, the corporal things have ceased, and the law of servitude has been fulfilled, and the law of liberty has been given to us. And we celebrate the perfect rest of human nature; I mean the day of the resurrection, in which the Lord Jesus, the author of life and Savior, has introduced us into the promised inheritance for those who worship God in spirit, into which He Himself has entered as our forerunner, having risen from the dead; and with the gates of heaven opened to Him, He has sat down bodily at the right hand of the Father, ^B whither those also who keep the law of the Spirit will eventually enter.

To us, then, who walk in the Spirit and not in the letter, there belongs the stripping away of all carnal things, and spiritual worship, and union with God. For circumcision is the putting away of carnal pleasure and of superfluous and unnecessary things. For the foreskin is nothing other than skin—a superfluity of the organ of pleasure. And every pleasure which is not of God and in God is a superfluous portion of pleasure, of which the foreskin is a type. And the Sabbath is rest from sin. Thus both are one and the same; ^C and so both, when kept together by those who live according to the Spirit, do not create even the slightest mark of transgression.

Furthermore, it must be known that the number seven signifies the entire present time, as the most wise Solomon says: "Give a portion to seven, and also to eight." And the divinely inspired David, in chanting about the eighth, was chanting about the state that is to come after the resurrection from the dead. The law, therefore, in commanding that the seventh day should be kept as a rest from bodily things and that one should busy himself with spiritual things, mystically hinted that the true Israelite, who has a mind that sees God, should at all times offer himself to God ^D and rise above bodily things.

CAP. XXIV. On Virginity.

The carnal-minded disparage virginity, and those who are lovers of pleasure bring forward as witness: "Cursed is everyone who does not raise up seed in Israel." But we say, trusting in the God-Word who was incarnate from a Virgin, that virginity was planted from above and from the beginning in the nature of human beings. From

^A a virgin earth the human being was fashioned. From Adam alone was Eve created. In paradise, virginity was practiced. For the divine Scripture says that "they were naked, both Adam and Eve, and they were not ashamed." But when they transgressed, they knew that they were naked, and becoming ashamed, they sewed for themselves loincloths. And after the transgression, because he heard "You are earth, and to earth you shall return," at the time when death entered into the world through the transgression, then "Adam knew Eve his wife, and she conceived and bore." So that the race might not be worn out and consumed by death, marriage was devised, so that through procreation the human race might be preserved.

But perhaps they will say: "What, then, is the meaning of 'male and female,' and that saying: 'Be fruitful and multiply'?" To which question we will answer that by these words, "Be fruitful and multiply," the multiplication that is brought about through conjugal union is not entirely signified. For God could have multiplied our race in another way, if they had kept his commandment uncorrupted to the end. But because God, in His foreknowledge—to whom all things are known before they come to be—perceived that they would act against what was commanded and be condemned to death, He, anticipating this, created them male and female, and commanded them to increase and multiply. Let us therefore proceed along the path we have begun, and let us see the gifts of virginity, or indeed of chastity. ^B

Castity was a protection from the flood. When Noah was commanded to enter the ark, and this duty was laid upon him, that he should preserve the seed of the world, he received such a commandment as this: "Enter, you and your sons, and your wife, and the wives of your sons." He therefore separated them from their wives, so that by the support of chastity they might survive the sea and that shipwreck of the entire world. But when the flood was calmed, "Go out," He says, "you, and your wife, and your sons, and the wives of your sons." Behold, again, for the sake of multiplication, marriage is permitted. ^C Then Elijah, that fire-breathing charioteer and heavenly traveler, did he not embrace celibacy, and did he not demonstrate its virtue as something superior to the human condition? Who shut the heavens? Who raised the dead? Who divided the Jordan? Was it not the virgin Elijah? And Elisha, his disciple, did he not follow in his footsteps? ^D

^A Was it not he who, having given a specimen of equal virtue, obtained the grace of the Spirit, for which he had asked a double portion? What of the three youths? Having practiced virginity, did they not overcome the fire, having obtained through virginity this, that their bodies could not be consumed by fire? Why should I mention Daniel, whose body was so hardened by virginity that the teeth of wild beasts could not be fixed into it? Was it not that God, being about to be seen by the Israelites, commanded them to keep their bodies pure from lust? Did not the priests keep themselves chaste so that they might enter the inner sanctums of the temple and offer sacrifices? And did not the Law finally proclaim chastity to be a great vow?

On explaining the places of Scripture.

Virginity is an angelic way of life, and more excellent than marriage.

What do I mean by "angel"? Christ himself is the glory of virginity, who not only was begotten of the Father without flux or union, but who also, having become man for our sake, was made flesh from the Virgin without marital copulation, and showed forth in himself true and absolute virginity. ^D For this reason, he did not prescribe it to us by law—"For," as he himself says, "not all can receive this word"—but he taught us by his own work and strengthened us for it. For to whom is it not clear that virginity now flourishes among men?

^A And childbearing, which marriage brings about, is good; and marriage is good, by reason of fornication, which it cuts off, and by not allowing the rage of lust, through the provision of lawful union, to run madly into lawless deeds. Marriage is good for those who do not have the gift of continence; but virginity is better, increasing the soul’s fruit-bearing and offering to God a ripe fruit, namely prayer. "Marriage is honorable, and the bed undefiled; but fornicators and adulterers God will judge."

CHAP. XXV.

On circumcision.

^A And it is clear. For when Israel lived alone by itself in the desert for forty years, not mixing with any other nation, none of those who were born in the desert were circumcised. But when Jesus led them across the Jordan, they were circumcised, and a second law of circumcision came to be. For the law of circumcision was given to Abraham, then ceased in the desert for forty years. And again, for the second time, God gave to Jesus the law of circumcision after passing through the Jordan, as it is written in the book of Joshua the son of Nun: "And at that time the Lord said to Joshua, Make for yourself knives of stone from the hard rock, and sitting down, circumcise the sons of Israel a second time." And after a few words: "For Israel went about for forty-two years in the desert of Madbaritis, and for this reason most of the men of war who had come out of Egypt were uncircumcised, having disobeyed the commandments of God, to whom also He swore that they would not see the good land which the Lord swore to their fathers to give to them, a land flowing with milk and honey." In their place, He substituted their sons, whom Joshua circumcised because they were uncircumcised on the way. So circumcision was a sign, separating Israel from the nations with whom they dwelt.

^C Circumcision was a type of baptism. For just as circumcision does not cut away a useful member of the body, but a useless superfluity, so through holy baptism we are circumcised of sin; and sin, it is clear, is a superfluity of desire, and not a useful desire. For it is impossible for a person not to desire at all, or to be completely devoid of pleasure; but that which is useless in pleasure, that is the useless desire and pleasure—that is sin, which holy baptism circumcises, providing us with the precious cross as a sign upon our forehead, not separating us from the nations—for all nations have attained baptism and have been sealed with the sign of the cross—but distinguishing the faithful from the infidel in every nation. ^D Therefore, with the truth manifested, the type and shadow are useless. Hence it is now superfluous to be circumcised, and it is contrary to holy baptism. For he who is circumcised is a debtor to keep the whole law; and the Lord, in order to fulfill the law, was circumcised; and He also kept the whole law and the Sabbath, that He might fulfill and establish the law. Since

^A he was baptized, and the Holy Spirit appeared to men, descending upon Him in the form of a dove, from that time the spiritual worship and rule of life, and the kingdom of the heavens, have been proclaimed.

Chap. XXVI. On the Antichrist.

It should be known that the Antichrist must come. For every one who does not confess that the Son of God has come in the flesh, and that He is perfect God and has become perfect man, while continuing to be God, is an Antichrist. However, in a peculiar and special sense, he is called ^B Antichrist who is to come at the consummation of the world. Therefore, it is necessary first that the Gospel be preached among all nations, as the Lord said, and then he will come, for the conviction of the godless Jews. For the Lord said to them: "I came in the name of my Father, and you do not receive me; another will come in his own name, and him you will receive." And the Apostle: "Because they did not receive the love of the truth, that they might be saved, and for this reason God will send them a working of error, that they may believe the lie, that all might be judged who did not believe the truth, but consented to iniquity." The Jews, therefore, did not receive the Lord Jesus Christ, who was the Son of God and God, but they will receive the impostor who claims to be God. ^C That he will call himself God, the angel teaching Daniel indicates in these words: "He shall not consider the gods of his fathers." And the Apostle: "Let no one deceive you by any means; for unless the apostasy comes first, and the man of sin is revealed, the son of perdition, who opposes and is exalted above all that is called God or that is worshipped, so that he sits in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God." Into the temple of God, he says—not our temple, but the ancient one, the Jewish one. For he will not come to us, but to the Jews; not on behalf of Christ, but against Christ; so that he is rightfully called Antichrist. He will also rebuild in Jerusalem the stone temple, which is everywhere in the Church, [he will seek to destroy].

Antichrist will be a true man.

The beginnings and progress of Antichrist.

Enoch and Elias to do battle with Antichrist.

Notes on the interpretation regarding the devil's role.

CAP. XXVII. Of the resurrection.

^A We believe also in the resurrection of the dead. For there will indeed be a resurrection of the dead; it will truly be. But by "resurrection" we mean the resurrection of bodies. For resurrection is the second standing up of that which has fallen. Since souls are immortal, how shall they rise? If they define death as the separation of soul from body, resurrection is by all means the reunion of soul and body, and the second standing up of the animal that was dissolved and had fallen. Therefore, this very body which is corrupted and dissolved, the same shall rise incorrupt. For ^B He who in the beginning fashioned it from the dust of the earth is not powerless to raise it up again, even if it has been dissolved and returned to the earth from which it was taken, according to the decree of the Creator.

For if there is no resurrection, let us eat and drink, and lead a life of pleasure and luxury. If there is no resurrection, in what do we differ from the irrational animals? If there is no resurrection, let us call the beasts of the field blessed, which live a life free from sorrow. If there is no resurrection, then there is no God, and no providence, but all things are driven and borne along by chance. ^C For behold, we see many righteous men living in poverty and suffering injustice, and receiving no comfort in this present life, whereas sinners and wicked men abound in wealth and every kind of luxury. And who, possessing a sound mind, would judge this to be the work of a just judgment or wise providence? Therefore, there will be a resurrection; there will be. For God is just, and He will render a reward to those who endure for Him. Now, if the soul alone had struggled in the contest of virtue, it alone would be crowned. And if it alone had wallowed in pleasures, it alone would justly be punished; ^D but since the soul has not pursued either virtue or vice apart from the body, both shall justly receive their rewards together.

[alt-version omitted]

NOTES. (12) "We mean the resurrection of bodies." We indicate the resurrection of the dead. Justin, in his book *On the Resurrection* against the Platonists and heretics who posited the transmigration of souls, argued the same way: "Resurrection is of the flesh that has fallen." For spirit does not fall; the soul is in the body; but that which lacks a soul does not live. The body does not remain when the soul departs. I shall provide the complete passage, along with other passages from the same work, in the *Parallels* of John of Damascus. I omit the other Fathers who have written on this subject. Furthermore, Origen, against whom many took up their pens for this very reason, did not deny the resurrection of bodies in its entirety, but only of the flesh, as if it were something with which the bodies of men had been clothed after sin. He had incorrectly understood this matter, and fell into this opinion from the words of the Apostle: "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God," and, "They that are in the flesh cannot please God." Irenæus refutes this prejudice thus: that flesh, indeed, left to itself, cannot reach the kingdom of God, yet it is the handiwork of God, and, being vegetated by the divine spirit, it becomes the temple of God. Moreover, he notes that it is not the substance of the flesh that is signified, but its concupiscences, which mortify man. In which sense Paul himself used to say: "You are not in the flesh, but in the spirit." And again: "Walking in the flesh, we do not war according to the flesh." Whence he infers: Just as flesh is capable of corruption, so also is it capable of incorruption, and just as it is capable of death, so also is it of life. He adds more, which our author continues, as do other Fathers.

^A Divine Scripture also bears witness that there will be a resurrection of bodies. For God says to Noah after the flood: "As the green herb I have given you all things. But flesh with blood of the soul you shall not eat; and your blood of your souls I will require, from the hand of all the beasts I will require it, and from the hand of man, from the hand of his brother I will require the life of man. He who sheds the blood of man, instead of his blood it shall be shed, because in the image of God I made man." How will He require the blood of man from the hand of all the beasts, if it be not that He will raise up the bodies of men who die? For the beasts will not die in the place of man.

And again to Moses: "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." ^B He is not the God of the dead, meaning those who have died and are no more, but of the living, whose souls indeed live in His hand, but whose bodies will live again through the resurrection. And the ancestor of God, David, says to God: "You will take away their spirit, and they will fail, and return to their dust." Behold, the word concerns the bodies. Then he adds: "You will send forth Your Spirit, and they shall be created, and You will renew the face of the earth."

And Isaiah also: "The dead shall rise, and those who are in the tombs shall be awakened." It is clear that it is not souls that are placed in tombs, but bodies.

And the blessed Ezekiel says: "And it happened, as I was prophesying, and behold, an earthquake, and the bones drew near, bone to bone, each to its own joint. And I saw, and behold, there came upon them nerves, and flesh grew and came up upon them, and skin was stretched over them from above." Then he teaches how, upon being commanded, the spirits returned.

And divine Daniel says: "And at that time Michael shall rise, the great prince who stands for the children of your people. And there shall be a time of distress, such a distress as has not been ^C since a nation existed on Earth until that time. And at that time your people shall be saved, all who are found written in the book. And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, these to eternal life, and these to reproach and eternal shame. And those who are wise shall shine like the brightness of the firmament, and of the many righteous, like the stars for ever and ever." — In saying, "Many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake," it is clear that ^D he indicates the resurrection of bodies; for no one would ever say that souls sleep in the dust of the earth.

Furthermore, the Lord openly taught the resurrection of bodies in the holy Gospels: "For they shall hear," He says, "who are in the graves, the voice of the Son of God; and they shall come forth, they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life, but they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment." ^A Now, no one of sound mind would ever say that souls are or stay in graves.

The Lord declared the resurrection of bodies not only by word, but also by deed. First, when He raised Lazarus, who had been dead four days, and was already corrupt and stinking. For He did not raise a soul deprived of a body, but a body with its soul; and not another body, but the very one that had decayed. For how could the resurrection of one who had died be recognized or believed, if it were not confirmed by the most certain marks and characteristics of his person? ^B Truly, He raised Lazarus to manifest His own divinity, and to build up faith in both His own resurrection and ours, though he was destined to return to death. But the Lord Himself became the harbinger and first-fruits of the perfect, immortal resurrection. And for this reason, the divine Apostle Paul said: "If the dead rise not, neither is Christ risen. And if Christ be not risen, then is our faith vain; ye are yet in your sins." And: "For Christ is risen, the first-fruits of them that slept." And: "The firstborn from the dead." ^C And again: "For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him." Just so, he says, as the Lord rose again.

That the Lord’s resurrection was the union of a now incorrupt body and a soul (for these were the things that had been divided), is clear. For He said: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." And the holy Gospel is a trustworthy witness that He spoke concerning His own body. ^D "Handle me and see," the Lord said to His own disciples, when they thought they saw a spirit, "for it is I myself, and I am not changed; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have." And when He had said this, He showed them His hands and His side, and offered them to Thomas to touch. Are not these things sufficient to procure faith in the resurrection of bodies

^A And again the divine Apostle says: For this corruptible must put on incorruption: and this mortal must put on immortality. And again: It is sown in corruption, it will rise in incorruption; it is sown in weakness, it will rise in power; it is sown in dishonor, it will rise in glory. It is sown an animal body, that is, gross and mortal, it will rise a spiritual body 14, immutable, impassible, subtle (for this is what spiritual signifies, such as the body of the Lord was after the resurrection, when He passed through closed doors), indefatigable, and needing neither food nor sleep nor drink. For they will be, says the Lord, as the angels of God. Nor will there be any place for marriages or the procreation of children. For the divine Apostle says: Our conversation is in heaven: from whence also we look for the Savior, the Lord Jesus, who will reform the body of our humility, that it may be made conformable to the body of His glory. In which place, he does not understand a change into another form (far be this), but rather a transformation from corruption to the state of incorruption.

^B 'But someone will say: How are the dead raised? O the unbelief! O the folly! He who by will alone changed dust into a body, He who commanded the small drop of seed to grow in the womb, and to fashion this manifold and multiform instrument of the body, will He not rather raise up again that which has been and has flowed away, having only willed it? And with what body do they come? O fool, if blindness does not allow you to believe the words of God, believe at least the works. For that which you sow is not quickened, unless it die; and that which you sow, you do not sow the body that shall be, but a bare grain, if it chance, of wheat, or of some of the others. But God gives it a body as He has willed, and to each of the seeds its own body. Behold, therefore, how the seeds are buried in the furrows as in tombs. Who is it that puts roots into them, stalk, and leaves, and ears, and the finest beards? Is it not the Creator of all things? Is it not the command of Him who fashioned all things? Thus, therefore, believe that the resurrection of the dead will also be by divine will and nod. For He has power concurrent with His will. ^C

Judgment after the resurrection and the reward of works. — ^A We shall rise again, therefore, our souls being joined once more to our bodies, which shall have become incorruptible and have put off corruption; and we shall stand before the dread judgment seat of Christ. And the devil and his demons, and his man—that is to say, Antichrist—as well as the impious and wicked men, shall be delivered into eternal fire: a fire, I say, not consisting of matter like ours, but such as God alone knows. But those who have done good shall shine like the sun with the angels into eternal life, together with our Lord Jesus Christ, seeing Him always and being seen by Him, and enjoying from Him an indefectible joy, praising Him with the Father and the Holy Spirit, unto the infinite ages of ages. Amen.

THREE ORATIONS OF ST. JOHN DAMASCENE PRO SACRED IMAGES

^B No one is ignorant of what a remarkable labor my Damascene performed on behalf of the images. He had scarcely known that Leo the Isaurian had resolved by edict to overthrow them when he sang his classic response against him. The author of his *Life* says that he sent epistolary treatises to the pupils of the true faith, with whom he was joined by the bond of friendship and familiarity, so that they too might distribute copies of them, accurately written out, among the faithful. Behold the three dissertations published by him in this cause; from the beginning of the first of which, it may be gathered that he had attempted nothing against Leo before this, since he wrote it to confirm the faithful of the Royal City. That it was published even after the tenth year of Leo the Isaurian, in which the impious edict was promulgated, and before his thirteenth year, in which St. Germanus of Constantinople was cast down from his throne, becomes clear from those words which are read in the continuation of the exordium: "I beseech the whole people of God, together with the good shepherd of the rational flock of Christ, who describes in himself the ^C hierarchy of Christ," etc.

But he sent forth a second treatise when the raging Leo had deposed Patriarch Germanus; and of this crime, as of many others, Damascene complains in the same place (no. XII): "Even now Blessed Germanus, resplendent in both life and doctrine, has been struck by blows and cast into exile, and with him many other bishops and Fathers whose names are unknown to us." However, it suggests nothing regarding the intrusion of Anastasius, whom the Isaurian had substituted on the fifteenth day after Germanus’s abdication, as that was evidently heard of more slowly in the East. Furthermore, these three orations were written at an age when the bishops of the Orient still abstained from pronouncing an anathema against Leo. For, toward the end of both orations, having brought forward the testimonies of the holy Fathers, he adds: "Even if you, says the Apostle Paul, or an angel, should preach to you anything beyond what you have received..."—that which follows, we shall hold our peace for now, sparing those whose conversion we hope for. But if we should see them—which God forbid!—obstinate in their perverse opinion, then we shall pronounce that which follows, namely: "Let him be anathema." Indeed, he also insinuates this in the very series of the second and third treatises, where he so softens that same sentence of the Apostle: "Even if an angel, even if an emperor, should preach to you anything beyond what you have received, stop your ears." ^D I hesitate for the present to say, as the divine Apostle said, "let him be anathema," awaiting their correction.

These things are clearly in conformity with what he pronounces vigorously and boldly in the epilogue of both orations: ^A *We will not suffer a new faith to be taught. For out of Sion shall go forth the law, the Holy Spirit has said prophetically, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.* We will not suffer a new faith to be taught. For *out of Sion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem*, as the Holy Spirit has foretold in the manner of the prophets. And we shall not commit ourselves, etc.

At length, punishment followed this warning, when Leo, gnashing his teeth, was struck by the bolt of excommunication, first by the prelate of the holy city and subsequently by the other bishops of the East, as Theophanes testifies at the thirteenth year of the same Leo; at which time, obviously, with Germanus in exile and Anastasius intruded onto his throne, there remained no hope for the Catholics that the fury of Leo would be suppressed.

^B 306 What, moreover, was the reason why he added a second to the first treatise? He explains this at the very opening of the second oration. Naturally, the first dissertation had caused some difficulty for certain people, and so he had the necessity of pursuing the same points again in another order and by an easier method. As for the third, he has constructed this for the most part out of the former ones; not a few things were added, however, by which he might better defend the cause of the sacred images, which he had undertaken, against the accusations of his adversaries, through a more explanatory narrative. Humphrey Hody, an Englishman, in his prolegomena to the *Chronographia* of John Malalas, calls into doubt whether this third oration is to be attributed to our author, at the foot of which, among the testimonies of the ancients, is read an excerpt from the History of the same John Malalas, who he judges to have been more recent than the Damascene. He suspects that it was written by another person of a later age and assigned to John of Damascus, just as various other treatises on the same subject were falsely ascribed to him on account of the great name he had acquired for himself in the defense of images. He adds: *Regarding these various treatises and what arguments we have available, let our dissertation on various Greek writers against the aforementioned book be consulted.* Although he willingly concedes that it was the custom of readers and librarians alike, when they found in books the testimonies of others gathered together, to add and insert their own thoughts if anything occurred to them.

Regarding the age of John Malalas, whom Hody contends did not write before the end of the eighth century, nothing can be defined with certainty, since the later part of his *Chronographia* is missing and has utterly perished. But no other scruple of any moment remained by which this learned man could be deterred from assigning this treatise to our Damascene as its genuine author; a fact which is otherwise vindicated by the very words and arguments sewn together from both of the earlier ones: where the same threat of anathema is repeated in as many words as it is in the second treatise; from which it likewise becomes plain and obvious that this work, just as the other two, was composed at the time when the bishops of the East had as yet decreed nothing against Leo the Isaurian and the Iconoclasts. To these, add that throughout the series of this oration a Syrian man is indicated as the author, who would have frequently visited the holy places of Palestine; for he brings these forth as an example to show that the Church has not abhorred the veneration of images in ages past.

Nor, indeed, did the Damascene labor on these three dissertations alone for the defense of the sacred images. For we read in the *Life of St. Stephen the Younger*, who died a martyr while Constantine Copronymus was emperor, that the holy John of Damascus attacked this man—the heir of his father's error and cruelty, just as he was of his throne—with other letters in which he called him "a new Muhammad," "a Christ-fighter," "a hater of the holy," and "a hater of the saints"; and he called his sycophant bishops "shadowy" (*teneccricos*), that is to say, "dark" rather than bishops, and also "belly-servers" (*koiliodoulous*), that is to say, "serving their belly," acting and saying everything for the sake of their stomach, as people who would not hesitate to say or do anything for the sake of their gut. In the third oration, nothing of the sort occurs; yet it was written under Leo the Isaurian, just as the other earlier ones were, as has just been demonstrated. Closer to this are the things read in another treatise against Constantine Copronymus and his synod, which are inscribed under the name of the Damascene. But it is not certain that this dissertation was edited by our John, as will be shown in its proper place. Other small works of the holy Doctor must therefore have perished, with which he attacked the Iconoclasts again and again.

^C Furthermore, in these three orations, Catholic reader, you have a pure and sincere exposition of the ecclesiastical discipline concerning the venerable images of Christ and the saints, and a very firm defense against their impugners, by which you may easily crush the entire web of the heretics. The author does indeed bring forward some testimonies drawn from those works which are falsely inscribed with the names of ancient authors and Fathers, and which are today exploded by the learned as supposititious: but this must be forgiven the great man, for he flourished in an age in which theologians were not students of the critical arts; rather, they admitted and embraced everything by which a sincere faith might be cultivated and the morals of Christians might be informed. To this, our author does not only allege spurious books, but 307 far more others that proceeded from approved authors, by which the sound opinion concerning the images is asserted and inculcated clearly enough.

These three dissertations were first edited in Greek at Rome by Nicolaus Majoranus, and he dedicated them to Cardinal Giovanni Pietro Carafa in the year 1553, in octavo. For revising them, we have had a few manuscripts. The Royal Library holds only two, written in a very recent hand, described from the exact same copy, with which a third codex, which came into my hands not long ago, agrees in everything. But from these, I obtained little or almost no help. For they present only the first oration, and even that is reduced to a compendium by intentionally omitting many things and changing others here and there; and with the testimonies of the holy Fathers and other authors dismissed, in their place have been stitched together the things which occur in the third oration concerning various kinds of images and adoration.

It is entirely obscure by what author that synopsis was produced. It was long a custom among the Greeks to weave together such compendia, not without grave loss to the Church and to literature. I found some leaves of the third oration in the Colbertine codex no. 1539, which is of the best quality and bears the age of seven hundred years; and I reviewed that same oration by it. Moreover, those three treatises in the Roman edition are sufficiently accurate and suffer from few errors.

Godfrey Tilman, a Carthusian monk of Paris, first prepared a Latin translation and published it at Paris in quarto in the year 1555, which appeared again at Antwerp in 1556 in 16mo. Shortly after, Peter Francis Zinus, a canon of Verona, worked out another version. The former indeed abounds in prolixity, and even in extraneous additions; the latter is deficient in brevity in many places. However, James Billius thought it best to refrain from having a new one struck, and he approved Zinus’s interpretation above the others—with only a few exceptions, which he emended in his own annotations. But since, as Combefis has noted elsewhere, while Billius was correcting the lesser matters, he passed over more serious ones, I have thought it worth the labor to fashion a new third version from both translations, yet without disregarding the corrections of that most learned man.

ST. JOHN OF DAMASCUS — FIRST APOLOGETIC ORATION AGAINST THOSE WHO REJECT SACRED IMAGES

^A 1. It indeed behooved us, conscious of our own unworthiness, to keep silence eternally, and rather to offer to God a confession of our sins. But since all things that are done at the opportune time are praiseworthy, and I see the Church—which God built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ His Son being the chief cornerstone 1 — being tossed and agitated like a storm at sea by waves rising up one upon another, and by the violent onsets of wicked spirits, and I see the tunic of Christ, woven from above, being divided, which the children of the impious have dared to rend with the utmost audacity; and finally, the fact that His body, which is the Word of God and the tradition received and established of old, is being torn into various sections, I did not deem it reasonable to keep silence, nor to bind my tongue with the chain of silence, fearing that threatening sentence of God which says: "If you draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in you 2." And: "If you see the sword coming, and do not warn your brother, I will require his blood from your hand 3." Struck, therefore, by this grave fear, I have arrived at speaking, and have not preferred the majesty of the emperor to the truth. For the parent of God, David, says: "I spoke of Your testimonies in the presence of kings 4, and I was not ashamed."

1. Ephes. ii, 19. 2. Hebr. x, 38. 3. Ezech. xxxiii, 8. 4. Ps. cxviii, 46.

^A being more pricked by this to speak. For the king's word is powerful for the drawing of subjects; for few are they who, from of old, have disregarded royal decrees, and who know that the king on earth is himself ruled from above, and that the laws have power over kings.

^B 2. Therefore, first of all, having fixed, as it were, a keel or foundation for my reasoning—the preservation of the ecclesiastical rule, through which salvation is wont to come—I have opened the starting-gate of my discourse, and I have urged it forward like a well-bridled horse let loose from the starting line. For I deemed it truly a terrible thing, and beyond all that is terrible, for the Church, shining with so many prerogatives and adorned from of old by the traditions of most holy men, to return to the weak and beggarly elements, fearing a fear where there is no fear 5; and as if not knowing the true God, to suspect a slip into idolatry, even if it were to fall short in the minutest point of perfection, just as if one were to carry a lingering spot in the middle of a most beautiful face, and by the tiny blemish, were to ruin the whole of its beauty. For it is no small matter when the small leads to the great, where not even the little disfigurement is small, in that the tradition which has prevailed above in the Church is overturned, as if those who have gone before us—whose manner of life we ought to contemplate and whose faith we ought to imitate—were condemned.

^C 3. I implore, therefore, first of all, the almighty Lord, to whom all things are naked and laid bare 6; my discourse is addressed to you, knowing the sincerity of my humble intention in this, and the purity of my purpose, that He may give me utterance in the opening of my mouth, and take the reins of my mind into His own hands, and draw it to Himself, so that it may proceed on a straight path in His sight, and not decline to what seem to be right, or what are known to be left-hand things. Furthermore, I pray the whole people of God, the holy nation, the royal priesthood, together with the good pastor of Christ’s rational flock, who expresses the high priesthood of Christ in himself, to receive my discourse with a benevolent mind; not looking to the dignity, which in me is very small, or seeking the artifice of words—for I, poor as I am, am not entirely skilled in such things—but rather attending to the power of the thoughts. For the kingdom of heaven is not in word, but in power 7. My purpose is not to conquer, but to lend a hand to the truth being warred against, with good will supplying the hand of virtue. ^D Having therefore invoked the aid of the unsubstantial truth, I shall henceforth take the beginning of my discourse.

4. I know what was said without falsehood: "The Lord your God, the Lord is one 8." And: "You shall worship the Lord your God, and Him only shall you serve 9." And...

"You shall not make for you a graven image, nor any ^A likeness of those things which are in heaven above, and which are in the earth beneath 10." And: "Let all be confounded who worship graven images 11." Also: "Let the gods perish who have not made heaven and earth 12." And other things of that nature, which, though God spoke long ago to the fathers by the prophets, in these last days He has spoken to us by His only-begotten Son, through whom He also made the ages 13. I know Him who says: "This is eternal life, that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent 14." I believe in one God, one principle of all things, without beginning and principle, uncreated, knowing no end and immortal, eternal and perpetual, incomprehensible, invisible, uncircumscribed, without form; one super-essential substance, a super-divine divinity, in three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; Him alone I serve, to Him alone I offer the worship of latria. I adore one God, one Divinity, but I also serve the Trinity of persons, namely, God the Father, and God the Son incarnate, and God the Holy Spirit; yet one God. I do not serve the creature rather than the Creator; but the Creator Himself, who for my sake became a created being, and descended to the creature without lowering or degradation of Himself, that He might ennoble my nature and make it a partaker of the divine nature. Together with the King and God, I adore the purple of His body, so to speak—not as a garment, nor as a fourth person, far be it, but as having been made equivalent to God, and having become what He who anointed it is, without change. For the nature of the flesh did not turn into the Godhead; but just as the Word, remaining what He was, became flesh without conversion, so too the flesh became the Word, not losing what it is, but rather being identified with the Word according to hypostasis. Wherefore I do not hesitate to form the image of the invisible God, not as He is invisible, but as He for our sake, by participating in flesh and blood 15, became visible. It is not the Godhead that I portray by an image, but the visible flesh of God. For if it is impossible to portray the soul, how much more so God, who endows the soul with incorporeity! ^C

5. But, he says, God spoke through Moses the lawgiver: "You shall worship the Lord your God, and Him only shall you serve 9." Item: "You shall not make any likeness of those things which are in heaven, and which are in the earth 10." Brethren, truly they are led astray who do not know the Scriptures, how the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life 16; who do not search out the Spirit hidden beneath the letter. To whom I would worthily say: Let Him who taught you this also teach you what follows. Learn how the lawgiver interprets it, here, in Deuteronomy...

^A saying: "And the Lord spoke to you from the midst of the fire: you heard the sound of words, but you saw no likeness, only a voice." And after a few words: "And keep your souls diligently, because you saw no likeness on the day the Lord spoke to you in Horeb from the midst of the fire, lest you act wickedly and make for yourselves a graven likeness, any image, the likeness of male or female, the likeness of any beast that is on the earth, the likeness of any winged bird," and so forth. And after a little: "And lest, having looked up to heaven and having seen the sun and the moon and the stars and all the host of heaven, you be led astray and worship them and serve them."

§ 6. Do you see how the purpose is one, namely, that we should not serve the creature instead of the Creator, nor offer the worship of *latria* to any but the Creator? For this reason he everywhere joins *latria* to worship. For again he says: "You shall have no other gods besides me. You shall not make for yourself a graven thing, nor any likeness, nor shall you worship them, nor shall you serve them, because I am the Lord your God." And again: "You shall tear down their altars, and break their pillars, and cut down their groves, and burn with fire the graven things of their gods. For you shall not worship another god." And after a little: "And you shall not make molten gods for yourself."

^B § 7. Do you see how he forbids the making of images on account of idolatry, and because it is impossible to depict God, who is uncircumscribed, and uncircumscribable, and invisible? "For," he says, "you saw no form of Him." Just as Paul, standing in the midst of the Areopagus, says: "Being then the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Divine is like gold or silver or stone, the fashioning of art and human deliberation."

§ 8. For the Jews, because they were prone to idolatry, these things were legislated; but for us, to speak theologically, to whom it has been granted, having avoided the error of superstition and acknowledged the truth, to live with God, and to serve Him alone, and to be enriched with the perfection of the knowledge of God, and to arrive at the perfect man, having passed beyond infancy, we are no longer under a pedagogue, having received from God the discerning faculty, ^D and knowing what partakes of an image, and what cannot be circumscribed by an image. "For," he says, "you saw no form of Him." Oh, the wisdom of the lawgiver! How shall the invisible be depicted? How shall the unimaginable be imagined? How shall that which is unextended, and without magnitude, and undefined be written? How shall that which has no form be characterized? How shall that which is incorporeal be painted with colors? What, therefore, is the

mystery indicated in these matters? It is, without a doubt, that when you have seen Him who is incorporeal become man for your sake, then you may express the image of His human form; when the invisible becomes visible in the flesh, then you depict the likeness of the One who has been seen. When He who is incorporeal and formless, and uncircumscribed and not limited by size, and devoid of magnitude through the excellence of His own nature—He who exists in the form of God—takes the form of a servant, and by this is reduced to quantity and size, and puts on the features of a body, then you may draw on tablets and set up for contemplation the One who deigned to be seen. Draw His ineffable condescension, His birth from the Virgin, His baptism in the Jordan, His transfiguration on Mount Tabor, His sufferings which were the cause of our freedom from suffering, His death, His miracles, the symbols of His divine nature, performed by the ministry of the flesh but by divine power, the life-giving cross, the burial, the resurrection, the ascension into heaven; describe all these things both in words and in colors. Do not fear, do not be afraid; I know the difference in worship. Abraham once bowed down to the sons of ^B Emmor when he bought the double cave for a burial plot—wicked men, and suffering from the disease of ignorance of God. Jacob bowed down to his brother Esau, and to Pharaoh, a man of Egypt; indeed, he also bowed down to the top of his staff. He bowed down, but he did not offer divine worship (latria). Joshua the son of Nun and Daniel bowed down to the angel of God, but they did not offer divine worship. For the bowing down of divine worship is one thing, and that which is offered out of honor to those who excel in some dignity is another.

9. But since the discussion is about the image and worship, come, let us examine more carefully what each is.

10. There are also in God images and paradigms of the things to be produced by Him, ^D that is to say, His eternal counsel, which always remains the same. For God is entirely immutable, in whom there is no change, nor shadow of variation. These images and paradigms the holy Dionysius, great in divine things, and after God in things pertaining to God, calls "predestinations."

For in His counsel all things were characterized which were predestined by Him, and were to come to pass immutably before their generation; just as if someone wished to build a house, he would model and depict the form first in his mind. ^A

11. Then again, images are those visible things which express invisible objects and those lacking shape by being shaped corporeally, in order that they might be perceived, at least obscurely. For even the divine Scripture invests God and the angels with figures; and the same divine man teaches the reason for this. For that the types of the shapeless and the figures of the formless are figuratively set forth, one might say the cause is not only our own analogy—which is too weak to be raised directly to intellectual contemplations and is in need of kindred and connatural means of elevation—but also that if the divine Word, providing for our analogy, and for our sake supplying that which elevates us from every side, invests even simple and shapeless things with certain types, how should He not depict those things which possess a form according to their own nature, and which are longed for, but cannot be seen because they are not present? For through the sense, a certain phantasm is formed in the anterior ventricle of the brain, and thus is transmitted to the faculty of judgment, and is stored in the treasury of memory. ^B The theologian Gregory wisely remarks that the mind, although it labors much to step beyond corporeal things, is entirely unable to do so; but "the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." For we see images in created things, obscurely indicating to us the divine manifestations, as when we speak of the holy Trinity, the supra-essential, being imaged by the sun, light, and ray; or by the spring, the flowing current, and the outflow; or by the mind, word, and spirit within us; or by the rose plant, the flower, and the fragrance.

12. Again, an image is called that which enigmatically outlines for us things to come, as the ark [typified] the holy Virgin and Theotokos, and [so did] the rod and the jar; and as the serpent [of bronze] typified Him who by the cross healed the bite of the serpent, the author of all evils; and as the sea, the water, and the cloud represented the spirit of baptism. ^C

13. Again, an image is called that of things that have happened, whether for the memorial of some miracle, or for honor, or for shame, or for virtue, or for vice, for the benefit of those who see them later, so that we may shun evil things and emulate virtues. This is twofold: that which is inscribed by word in books, as God engraved the law upon the tablets and commanded that the lives of God-loving men be recorded, and [that which is] through contemplation... ^D

recalls the past, as when He commanded the urn and the rod to be placed in the ark as a memorial. Thus, now also, we depict both the images and the virtues of those who existed of old. Therefore, either abolish every kind of image and enact laws against Him who commanded them to be made, or accept each one according to the reason and manner appropriate to it. Having, therefore, spoken of the modes of the image, let us also speak concerning adoration.

14. Adoration ^B is a sign of submission and honor; and we have known various modes of it. The first is that of *latria*, which we offer to God alone, who is by nature to be adored. Following this is another, which we offer to His friends and servants on account of God Himself, who alone is by nature to be adored; as when Joshua the son of Nun and Daniel adored the angel; or to places holy by God’s presence, as David says: “Let us adore at the place where His feet stood” (Ps. CXXXI, 7); or to things consecrated to Him, as all Israel would prostrate themselves before the tabernacle, and as they stand around the temple in Jerusalem and, with faces turned toward it, adore to this day; or to princes created by Him, as Jacob adored Esau, his brother—as the elder brother made by God—and Pharaoh, the prince appointed by God, and as Joseph’s own brothers adored [him]. I know also that adoration is offered for the sake of mutual honor, such as Abraham showed to the sons of Emmor (Gen. XXIII, 7). Therefore, either abolish all adoration, or admit it all, provided it is with the due reason and manner.

15. But you would like to say to me, while I am questioning: Is God one? Yes, you will say, as it seems to me, there is one Lawgiver. Why then does He ordain contrary things? For the Cherubim are not outside the number of created things. Why then does He command Cherubim fashioned by human hands to overshadow the propitiatory? Is it not because, since God is in no way capable of being circumscribed or represented, it is impossible to make an image of Him, or of anything as if it were God, lest the created thing be adorned as though it were God? But concerning the Cherubim, because they are circumscribed and stand by the divine throne after the manner of servants, He commands that their image be made, shadowing the propitiatory in the manner of servants. For it was fitting that the image of the heavenly ministers should be the image that shadowed the divine mysteries. And what do you say the ark, the urn, and the propitiatory were? Were they not made by hands? Were they not the works of human hands? Were they not constructed from *vile* matter, as you like to say? And what indeed was the whole tabernacle? Was it not an image? Was it not a shadow and a pattern? Wherefore the divine Apostle says, discoursing concerning the priests of the ancient law: “Who serve unto the pattern and shadow of heavenly things, as it was answered to Moses when he was to finish the tabernacle: For see, he says, that you make all things according to the pattern shown to you on the mount” (Hebr. VIII, 5). Although not even the law was the image, but the shadow of the image; for the same Apostle says: “For the law having a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things” (Hebr. X, 1). If therefore the law had images...

but is itself a foreshadowing of the image, what shall we say? If the tabernacle was a shadow, and a type of a type, why does the law not command us to represent it in images? But these things are not so; for there is a time for every thing. ^B

16. Formerly God, who is without body or form, was not depicted at all. But now that God has been seen in the flesh and has lived among men, I depict that which is visible of God. I do not worship the matter, but I worship the Creator of matter, who for my sake became matter, and deemed it worthy to dwell in matter, and through matter brought about my salvation; and I will not cease to honor the matter through which my salvation has been wrought. I do not honor it as God—far be it! For how could that which has its origin from nothing be God? Even if the body of God is God because of the union according to hypostasis, having become what the anointing was without change, and having remained what it was in its nature, flesh animated by a rational and intellectual soul, taken from the Virgin, it is not uncreated. But I honor and hold in reverence ^C the rest of the matter, through which my salvation has come, as being full of divine power and grace. Or is the wood of the Cross, that thrice-blessed and thrice-happy wood, not matter? Is the holy and revered mountain, the place of Calvary, not matter? Is the life-giving stone, the holy tomb, the fountain of our resurrection, not matter? Is the ink, and the most holy book of the Gospels, not matter? Is the life-giving table, which provides us with the bread of life, not matter? Is gold and silver, from which crosses, plates, and chalices are made, not matter? Is the body and blood of our Lord not, before all these, matter? Either remove the honor and adoration from all these things, or submit to the ecclesiastical tradition and allow the adoration of images, which are hallowed in the name of God and the friends of God, and are therefore overshadowed by the grace of the divine Spirit. Do not disparage matter; for it is not contemptible. For nothing that has been created by God is contemptible. This is the opinion of the Manichaeans; only that is contemptible which has not its cause from God, but is our own invention, resulting from the choice and inclination of the will from that which is according to nature to that which is against nature, which is sin. If, because of the law, you bring contempt upon images and forbid them because they are made of matter, see what the Scripture says: “And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Behold, I have called by name Bezaleel the son of Uri, of the tribe of Judah. And I have filled him with the divine spirit of wisdom, and understanding, and knowledge in every work, to devise, and to be an architect, and to work in gold, and silver, and bronze, and in purple, and scarlet, and linen, and fine linen, and in the cutting of stones for their works, and in the carving of wood, to work according to...”

all that I have commanded thee. And again: “Moses spake to all the congregation of the children of Israel: Hear this word, which the Lord hath commanded, saying: Take from among you an offering unto the Lord. Let every one that is of a willing heart bring first-fruits to the Lord: gold, and silver, and bronze, and hyacinth, and purple, and scarlet doubled-dyed, and fine linen, and goats’ hair, and rams’ skins dyed red, and violet skins, and incorruptible wood, and oil for the anointing, and incense for the composition, and sardius stones, and stones for the carving, and for the ephod, and for the breastplate. And every man among you that is wise of heart shall come and make all that the Lord hath commanded, the tabernacle,” etc. ^B Behold, the material is precious, even if it is held by you to be vile. For what is more contemptible than goats’ hair or colors? Is not scarlet, and purple, and hyacinth simply color? Behold finally, both the works of the hands of men, and the images of the Cherubim. How then, under the pretext of the law, do you forbid those things which the law itself commanded to be made? If you forbid images because of the law, then take care that the Sabbath and circumcision are also observed. But know this: if you observe the law, Christ will profit you nothing. You who are justified by the law, you have fallen from grace. Israel of old did not see God: but we with unveiled face behold the glory of the Lord.

17. ^C Furthermore, we set up his character in every place in a sensible manner, and through it we sanctify the first of the senses (for sight holds the primary place among the senses), just as we do hearing through words. For the image is a certain memorial; and whatever a book is to those who have learned letters, the image is to the illiterate and the unlearned; and what speech provides for the hearing, the image provides for the sight; yet we are united to it intellectually. For this reason, God commanded that an ark be made of incorruptible wood, and that it be covered with gold within and without, and that the tablets be placed in it, and the rod, and the golden jar, in which, for a memorial of things past and a foreshadowing of things to come, the manna was stored. ^D Now who would deny that these were images and resonant heralds? And these were not placed on the sides of the tabernacle, but in the sight of all the people, so that by looking upon them, they might offer adoration and the worship of latria to God, who worked through them. That they did not, however, offer the worship of latria to these things themselves is manifest; but through them, mindful of the marvels, they adored God, the author of them. For the images were proposed for the sake of admonition, not as gods, but as reminders of divine works.

^D 18. God also commanded that twelve stones be taken from the Jordan, and He adds the reason, saying: “When your son asks you, what do these stones mean, tell him how, by divine command, the water of the Jordan failed, and the ark of the Lord passed over, and all the people.” How, then, shall we not depict the saving passions and miracles of Christ our God, so that when my son asks me, what is this, I may say that God the Word became man, and through Him, not Israel alone crossed the Jordan, but all of nature returned to its original blessedness? Through Him, our nature ascended from the lowest parts of the earth above every principality, and sits upon the paternal throne itself.

19. But, they say, it is well for you to make an image of Christ, or of His Mother, the Theotokos. O absurdity! You have openly confessed yourself an enemy of the saints. For if you make an image of Christ, but by no means of the saints, it is clear that you do not prohibit images entirely, but rather deny the saints their proper honor. For you allow images of Christ, since He is adorned with glory, but you reject the likeness of the saints as if they were alien to glory, and you call the Truth a liar. For “As I live, says the Lord, I will honor those who honor me.” And the divine Apostle says: “So you are no longer a slave, but a son. And if a son, then an heir of God through Christ.” And: “If we suffer with Him, that we may also be glorified with Him.” You are not waging a war against images, but against the saints. For John the Theologian, who rested upon the breast of the Lord, says: “that we shall be like Him.” Just as that which is united to fire does not become fire by nature, but by connection, and burning, and participation, so I say of the flesh of the incarnate Son of God. For that flesh, by the hypostatic participation of the divine nature, became immutably God—not anointed by a divine efficacy, as was each of the prophets, but by the presence of the Anointing One Himself. That the saints are also gods, Scripture teaches: “God,” it says, “stood in the assembly of gods.” And that God stands in the midst of gods, distributing to each according to their merits, is how ^C the divine Gregory explains this passage. For the saints, while they lived, were filled with the Holy Spirit, and after they departed, the grace of the Holy Spirit remains inseparably with their souls, and with their bodies in the tombs, and with their features, and with their holy images, not by essence, but by grace and energy.

20. Now, the temple which God promised David should be built for Him by his own son, and that a place of rest should be prepared for Him, ^D Solomon, in building it, made...

^A Cherubim, as the book of Kings says. And he overlaid the Cherubim with gold, and all the walls round about: and he carved and engraved upon them Cherubim, and palm trees within and without (he did not say on the sides, but round about), and besides these, oxen, and lions, and pomegranates. Would it not, then, be much more honorable to adorn all the walls of God’s house with the figures and images of the saints, than with those of animals and trees? Where then is the law that commands: “Thou shalt not make any likeness”? Yet Solomon, having received the effluence of wisdom, while he was establishing an image of heaven, made the likenesses of Cherubim, and ions, and oxen, though the law forbids this. But if we are picturing Christ, and also making the images of the saints, is this not altogether more pious, since they are filled with the gifts of the Holy Spirit? For just as then the people and the temple were cleansed by the blood and ashes of a heifer, so now they are cleansed by the blood of Christ, who bore witness before Pontius Pilate and offered Himself as the first-fruits of the martyrs, and furthermore by the blood of the saints, upon whom the Church is built. And then indeed, the temple of God was adorned with the forms and figures of irrational things; but now, with the images of the saints, who have made themselves animate and rational temples of God.

21. Wherefore, we set forth Christ the King and Lord in such a way that we do not strip Him of His army. For the saints are the army of the Lord. ^B Let the earthly emperor first strip himself of his own army, before he dares to strip his King and Lord. Let him lay aside the purple, and then let him take away the veneration of those who have struggled bravely against the tyrant and have ruled over their own passions. For if they are heirs of God, and fellow-heirs of Christ, and are destined to be partakers of the divine glory and kingdom, in that they have shared the sufferings of Christ, what forbids that the friends of Christ should also be partakers of His glory on earth? “I will not call you servants,” says God, “but friends. You are my friends.” Shall we then deny them the honor which the Church has granted them? O audacious hand! O temerarious mind, which contends against God and opposes His commands! You who refuse to adore an image, do not even worship the Son of God, who is the living image of the invisible God, and an unchanging character. I adore the image of Christ, as He is God incarnate: [I adore the image] of the Mistress of all, the Theotokos, as she is the Mother of the Son of God: [I adore the images] of the saints, as friends of God, who have resisted sin unto the shedding of blood, and in pouring forth their blood for Christ have imitated Him, who had previously poured out His own blood for their sake; and [I adore the images] of those who, pressing in His footsteps, have ordered their lives according to them. These glorious deeds and torments, expressed in pictures, I set before my eyes, by which I am sanctified, and am enkindled with the desire for imitation. For he who ^D pays honor to the image, passes it on to the prototype, says the divine Basil.

^A If you erect temples to the saints of God, erect also their trophies. Formerly, no temple was erected in the name of men, nor was the death of the just celebrated with any feast, but was rather lamented. Whoever touched a dead body was considered unclean, even if it were Moses himself. But now, the memorial days of the saints are celebrated. The death of Jacob was mourned, but the death of Stephen is celebrated with a festival. ^B Either, therefore, do away with the festive memorials of the saints, conducted as they are contrary to the old law, or allow also the images, which—as you say—exist contrary to the law. But it is impossible not to celebrate the memorials of the saints; for the choir of the holy apostles and God-bearing Fathers commands these things to be done. For from the time that God the Word became flesh, having been made like us in all things apart from sin, and was joined to our nature without confusion, and divinized the flesh immutably, through the interpenetration [circumincessio] of His divinity and His flesh in one another, we have truly been sanctified. And from the time that the Son of God and God, who is impassible by His divinity, suffered in the assumed flesh and paid our debt, pouring out as a ransom for us a price sufficient and worthy of being admired—for the blood of the Son was acceptable to the Father and worthy of reverence—we have truly been set free. ^C And from the time that, having descended into Hades, He announced liberty to the souls bound since the ages as if they were captives, and sight to the blind, and having bound the Strong One, rose again through the power that surpasses all strength, having rendered incorrupt the flesh assumed by Him from us, we have truly been made incorrupt. From the time that we were generated through water and spirit, we have truly been adopted as sons and have become heirs of God. Hence, Paul calls the faithful "saints." From this, we do not mourn the death of the saints, but celebrate it. Hence, we are not under the law, but under grace, justified through faith, and knowing only God the true One; for the law is not laid down for the just. We are not under the elements of the law, enslaved like infants, but having been fashioned into a perfect man, we are fed with solid food, not that which leads to idolatry. ^D The law is good, like a lamp shining in a dark place, but only until the day dawns. And already the daystar has risen in our hearts, and the living water of the knowledge of God has covered the sea of the nations, and we all have known the Lord. "The old things have passed away; behold, all things have become new." The divine apostle Paul, therefore, says to Peter, the chief pinnacle of the apostles: "If you, being a Jew, live like a Gentile and not like a Jew, how do you compel the Gentiles to judaize?" And he writes to the Galatians: "I declare to every man who gets circumcised that he is a debtor to keep the whole law."

^B Therefore, "formerly, when you did not know God, you were slaves to those which by nature are no gods; but now that you have known God, or rather are known by God, how is it that you turn again to the weak and beggarly elements?" I have seen the human form of God, and my soul has been saved. I behold the image of God, just as Jacob saw it, though in a different way and manner. For he, with the eyes of his mind, saw an image free from matter, which foretold the future; I, however, behold that which refreshes the memory of Him who was seen in the flesh. The shadow of the apostles, as well as their handkerchiefs and aprons, drove away diseases and put demons to flight; and shall the shadow and image of the saints not be honored? Either forbid the veneration of everything that consists of matter, or do not introduce anything new, nor move the ancient boundaries which your fathers have set.

23. For not only have they laid down the laws of the Church in writing, but also certain things without writing. Whence Basil, in the twenty-seventh of those thirty chapters which he wrote to Amphilochius concerning the Holy Spirit, ^C says in express words: "Of the dogmas and proclamations which are kept in the Church, some we have from written instruction, others we have received transmitted to us in a mystery from the tradition of the apostles; both of which have the same strength for piety. And no one will gainsay these, at least no one who has even the slightest experience of the laws of the Church. For if we were to attempt to reject unwritten customs, as having no great power, we would unwittingly damage the Gospel in its vital parts." These are the words of the great Basil. For whence do we know the holy place of Calvary, the sepulcher of Life? Is it not because children received it from their parents without any Scripture teaching it? For indeed Scripture records that the Lord was crucified and buried in the tomb which Joseph had hewn in the rock. But that these are the very places before which we now fall down in worship, we know from unwritten tradition, and many things similar to these. Whence do we have it that baptism is performed with a triple immersion? Whence that we pray facing the East? Whence the institution of the sacraments? Therefore the divine apostle Paul says: ^D "Therefore, brethren, stand fast and hold the traditions which you were taught, whether by our word or by our letter." Since, then, so many and such great things have been transmitted to us without writing, which have been observed to this very day, why do you cavil at the images?

24. Indeed, the usages you bring forward do not teach that the veneration of our images is to be abhorred, but rather that of those which the Gentiles set up for themselves. It is not right, therefore

that the religious worship of our own people should be abolished ^A because the Gentiles abuse images in a way that is contrary to all law. Exorcists and tricksters use adjurations; but the Church also adjures the catechumens. Yet they invoke demons, while the Church invokes God against the demons. The Gentiles consecrate images to demons, and these they name as gods; we, however, consecrate them to the true God who took on flesh, and likewise to the servants and friends of God, by whom the swarms and ranks of demons are put to flight.

25. But if you say that divine and admirable Epiphanius openly forbade images, ^B first I would respond that this little book is supposititious and faked, because although it was produced by another, it was inscribed with the name of someone else: a thing which many were accustomed to do. Secondly, just as we know that the blessed Athanasius forbade the bodies of the saints to be hidden in caskets, and instead commanded that they be covered with earth, because he wished to abolish the inconsistent custom of the Egyptians, who did not bury their own dead in the ground but laid them out on beds and couches; so4 perhaps the great Epiphanius (if indeed he is the genuine author of this little book) may have decided that images should not be made ^C in order to correct such a thing. That Epiphanius was not of this opinion, such that he wished them to be entirely removed, is testified to by the very Church of Epiphanius itself, which to this day of ours is decorated everywhere with images. Thirdly and finally, that which is done by a few and rarely does not have the force of law in the Church. For, as it pleases Gregory the Theologian, "one swallow does not make spring"; nor can the opinion of one man carry such weight that it could overturn the tradition of the whole Church, ^D which is spread from one end of the earth to the other.

26. Accept, then, this swarm of testimonies from the Scriptures and the Fathers, so that even if the Scripture says: "The idols of the Gentiles are silver and gold, the work of human hands," it by no means forbids that adoration be offered to inanimate things, or to those crafted by the labor of hands, but only to the idols of demons.

27. Indeed, that prophets have adored angels, and men, and kings, and even if they be impious, and even a staff, this has already been proven. David furthermore says: "Adore his footstool." And Isaiah says in the person of God: "Heaven is my throne, and the earth is the footstool of my feet." Moreover, that heaven and earth are created things is a matter of doubt to no one.

it is. Indeed, even Moses himself and Aaron worshipped things fashioned by hands. For Paul, the golden cicada of the Church, writing to the Hebrews, says: "Christ being come an high priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building" ^A. And again: "For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are the figures of the true; but into heaven itself" 94. The former holy things, therefore, both the tabernacle and all that was contained therein, were made by hands. And that those things were worshipped, no one will deny.

Testimonies of the ancient and approved Holy Fathers regarding icons.

Of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, from the Epistle to Titus.

"It will therefore be worthwhile for us ourselves, setting aside the vulgar opinion regarding these things, to penetrate with holiness and religion into the symbols themselves, and to offer no reproach to them ^B, inasmuch as they draw their origin from divine forms, and are express and manifest images of arcanum and more sublime spectacles."

Commentary.

Of the Same, from the book De Divinis Nominibus (ch. 1).

"We have been taught this: that while now, according to our capacity, the humanity of the divine oracles and of the teachings handed down by the sacred prelates wraps the intelligible in sacred veils, and covers the superessential with the sensible, and clothes those things which lack species and form with forms and figures, and renders the simplicity which is above nature and devoid of all figure ^C, by the variety of divisible symbols, manifold and shaped."

Commentary.

Of the Same, from the book De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia (ch. 1).

"Moreover, those substances and orders above us, of which I have already made sacred mention ^D, are incorporeal: and indeed their sacred spiritual instruction exists as more brilliant and pure. Our own, however, according to our capacity...

are led by the variety of sensible signs—by means of which, as sacred hierarchy ^A befits, we are raised up toward the uniform grace of divinity granted to us in accordance with our measure, and toward God and divine virtue. They, indeed, as minds, understand as much as is permitted to them; we, however, are advanced by sensible images toward divine contemplations, as far as is possible.

Commentary

An ancient narrative has reached even us; it is said that Abgar, king of Edessa, having heard the reports concerning the Lord, and being kindled with divine fire, sent emissaries ^B to invite Him to visit him. But if He should refuse to do so, he ordered them to express His likeness through the work of a painter. When He, to whom nothing is hidden and who can do all things, knew this, He took a cloth, applied it to His own face, and impressed upon it His very own likeness, which is preserved unharmed to this very day.

From Saint Basil, from the discourse on the holy martyr Barlaam, the beginning of which is: *Primum quidem sanctorum mors.*

Rise now, most excellent painters of athletic deeds, and with the ornaments of your craft complete the imperfect image of the leader, and illustrate with the colors of your skill the victor I have but obscurely depicted. I shall depart defeated by your painting of the martyr’s noble exploits; may I rejoice today in being surpassed by the victory won for you by your own dexterity. Let me see the hand fighting against the fire more accurately delineated by you; in your panel, let me behold the prize-fighter more elegantly described. Let demons mourn, struck with terror by the martyr’s strenuously performed deeds represented by you; let the burning, victorious hand be displayed to them once again. Moreover, let Christ, the judge of the contests, be painted upon the same tablet, to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen. ^C

From the same, from the thirty chapters addressed to Amphilochius concerning the Holy Spirit, from chapter 18.

"That the image of the king is also called king, and yet there are not two kings. For neither is the empire divided, nor is the glory partitioned. For just as the ruling power and authority over us is one, so also the doxology from us is one and not multiple, because the honor of the image passes over to the prototype. Therefore, what here is an image by imitation, that there is the Son by nature; and just as in the case of man-made things, according to the form ^D

^A in which the likeness consists, so in the divine and uncompounded nature, the union is situated in the communion of the Godhead. ≫

Commentary.

From the sermon of Saint Basil on Saint Gordius the Martyr.

produces something like a light for those who are being saved so that they may walk toward life. ^A And again: "Wherefore, when we narrate the lives of those who have been distinguished in piety, we first honor the Master in his servants; then we honor the righteous by testifying to those things which we have learned; finally, we gladden the peoples while they hear these excellent things."

Comment. See how the commemoration of the saints procures both glory for God, and praise for them, and finally joy and salvation for the people. Why then do you strive to take it away? But that the memory of the saints is celebrated through speech and through images, the same divine Basil affirms.

From the same holy man, on the martyr Gordius. "For just as light follows fire of its own accord, and a sweet odor follows perfume, so also does utility necessarily follow right actions. Although even this is no small thing, to attain diligently to the truth of those things that happened then. For a dim memory comes down to us, by which the noble deeds of the men in the struggles are preserved; and to us there seems to happen in a certain way what happens to painters. For ^B since they draw images from images, it is very likely that they fall short of the archetypes. And we, too, being left behind from the sight of the events, incur no small danger of diminishing the truth."

At the end of the same discourse. "For just as, though we see the sun always, we always admire it, so for us the memory of that man is always fresh."

Comment. It is evident that we see him always, both through speech and through images.

And in the discourse on the most precious Forty Martyrs, he says these things: "Of the memory of the martyrs, what satiety could there be for one who loves the martyrs? For the honor which we show to our fellow-servants is proof of the benevolence which they show toward the common Master." And again: "Bless those who have witnessed sincerely, ^C that you also may become a martyr by choice, and come forth without persecution, without fire, without scourges, deemed worthy of the same praises as they."

Comment. Why then do you deter me from honoring the saints, and why do you begrudge me salvation? Now, that he considers the form expressed in colors to be akin to that which is depicted in speech, hear him affirming it after a few words.

Basil. "Come then, bringing them into our midst through some commemoration, and displaying the strenuous deeds of the men to the eyes of all, as in a painting, let us procure common utility for those present."

Comment. Do you see that both sermon and image confer the same thing? For he says: ^D "As if in a painting, let us display them in our discourses." And he adds shortly after:

^A "For deeds done bravely in war are frequently explained by orators and signified by painters; the former adorn them with words, while the latter engrave them on tablets, and both have stirred many to bravery. For what the speech of history sets forth through the hearing, this the art of painting silently displays through imitation."

Comment. By what words, I ask, could it be more clearly demonstrated that for the illiterate, images act as books, and as by no means silent heralds of the glory of the saints; for they teach those who look upon them with a certain silent voice, and reconcile their vision to holiness? When books are not available to me, and I cannot find leisure for reading, being pricked by the stings of my thoughts just as if by thorns, I go to the Church, the common dispensary of souls: the flowers of the paintings stir my gaze, delighting my vision like a meadow, and stealthily instill the glory of God into my spirit. I contemplate the constancy of the martyr and the rewards of his crowns; and falling to the ground, I adore God through the martyr and become a partaker of salvation. Do you not hear that same God-bearing Father, when saying in the discourse he wrote for the beginning of the Psalms, that "the Holy Spirit, because the human race is intractable and sluggish toward virtue, infused the charm of melody into the modulation of the Psalms"? What are you saying? Shall I in no way depict, neither in words nor in colors, the martyrdom of the saints? ^B Shall I not embrace with my lips and eyes that which the angels and the whole of creation admire; which, as that same star of the Church says, is bitter to the devil and strikes terror into his demons? Yet similar to these, absolutely, are the things he utters toward the end of his oration, in which he discourses upon the forty martyrs: "O holy choir! O sacred cohort! O inexpugnable phalanx! O common guardians of the human race, best companions of our cares, helpers of our prayers, most eloquent intercessors, stars of the world, flowers of the Churches—flowers, I say, equally delightful to the mind and the senses. The earth did not bury you, but heaven received you. The gates of paradise opened for you; you have become a spectacle worthy of the host of angels, worthy of patriarchs, prophets, and the just."

Comment. By what reasoning should I not desire to behold that which the angels long to see? In harmony with these things, his brother and like-minded associate, Gregory, the bishop of the Nyssaeans, also speaks. ^C

Of Saint Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, from the Supplement, that is to say, from the book On the Structure of Man (Chap. 4).

"Just as it is established in human custom that those who fashion the images of emperors, in the first place, express the likeness of their form, and clothe ^D them in the royal purple..."

and attribute to them the royal dignity, so that the image is also accustomed to be called "king"; so too human nature, since it was fashioned with the intent that it should rule over other things, was erected as a kind of animate image, and, having been made a sharer in the primal archetype, also obtained the name of its dignity. ^A

From the same, from the fifth chapter of the same book.

"Divine beauty is not illuminated by any shape or by the grace of form through any elegance of color; rather, it is contemplated in an ineffable blessedness in a most excellent way. Just as, therefore, painters transcribe the forms of men onto tablets by means of certain colors, applying the proper and appropriate tints with the art of imitation, so that through the assimilation of the exemplar, the likeness of the archetype may be accurately represented." ^B

Commentary. Observe that divine beauty is not illuminated by any shape or by the grace of color, and for this reason it is not depicted; but the human form is transferred onto tablets by means of colors. Therefore, if the Son of God has come in the form of a man, taking the form of a servant, and having been made in the likeness of men, and found in habit as a man, how will he not be depicted? And if, according to custom, it is said that "the image of the emperor is the emperor," and the honor of the image passes to the archetype, as the divine Basil says, how will the image not be honored and venerated? Not as God, but as the image of God who has assumed flesh. ^C

From the same, from an oration delivered in Constantinople concerning the divinity of the Son and of the Spirit, and concerning Abraham.

"Then the father first takes the son, bound with fetters. I have often seen the image of this bitter event depicted, and I could never refrain from tears, as the art clearly unfolded the deed before my eyes. Isaac is represented lying near the altar itself, on bended knee, and with his hands bound behind him. The father, standing behind the son’s knees, and having grasped his hair with his left hand, pulling it toward himself, casts his eyes down upon the face of the son, who is looking back at him in a manner truly worthy of pity, and directs his right hand, armed with the sword, for the slaughter. And already the edge of the sword touches the body, when a voice from God is heard, forbidding the deed." ^D

From Saint John Chrysostom, from the commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews.

"And how the first is an image of the second—Melchizedek, that is, of Christ—just as one might say a shadow of the

^A sketch in colors. For this reason the Law is called a shadow, and grace the truth; but the things to come [belong to] the sketch in colors. Therefore, the Law and Melchizedek are a foreshadowing of the sketch in colors, while grace and truth are the sketch in bodies; but the things themselves are [of] the future age. So that the Old Testament is a figure of a figure, but the New is a figure of the things themselves."

From Leontius, Bishop of Neapolis in Cyprus, from the book Against the Jews; that it is permitted to adore the Cross of Christ, and the images of the saints, and one another; and concerning the relics of the saints.

"But if you again reproach me, O Jew, by saying that I adore the wood of the Cross as God, why do you not reproach Jacob, who adored the top [of his] staff? But it is clear that he did not adore the wood in honor [of it], but through the wood he adored Joseph; just as we also, through the Cross, adore Christ, but do not honor the wood."

Commentary.

Again from the same Leontius: "Since even Abraham ^B adored those from whom he bought the sepulcher, however impious men they might be, with his knees placed upon the earth; and likewise Jacob blessed Pharaoh, although he was impious and an idolater—yet he did not bless him as God. And again, he bowed down and adored Esau, but he did not adore him as God. And again, how does God command you to adore both the earth and the mountains? For He says: 'Exalt the Lord our God, and adore at his holy mountain.' And 'Adore the footstool of his feet, for it is holy,' that is to say, the earth. 'For heaven is my throne,' He says, 'but the earth is the footstool of my feet,' says the Lord. And how did Moses adore Jethro, although he was an idolater, and Daniel [adore] Nebuchadnezzar? How do you reproach me because I honor and adore those who have honored ^C God? Is it not better, tell me, to adore the saints, and not, as you are accustomed, to pelt them with stones? Is it not better to adore them and not to saw them with saws, and to cast those who have showered you with their benefits into a pit of mire? Truly, if you had loved God, you would certainly have honored His servants. And if the bones of the just are impure, why were the bones of Jacob and Joseph carried with all reverence out of Egypt? By what manner was a dead man, having touched the bones of Elisha, ^D immediately raised to life? But if He works miracles through bones—"

^A it is evident that He can do so also through images, and stones, and many other things, just as happened in the case of Elisha, who gave his own staff to his servant, and said that by it he should go and raise up the son of the Shunamite. And Moses, with a rod, punished Pharaoh, and divided the sea, and sweetened the water, and broke the rock, and brought forth water. And Solomon says: "Blessed is the wood whereby justice cometh." Elisha, by casting wood into the Jordan, brought up the iron; and there is the wood of life, and the plant of Sabec, that is to say, of remission. And Moses, by wood, lifted up the serpent, and gave life to the people; and by wood budding in the tabernacle, he confirmed the priesthood to Aaron. But perhaps you will say to me, O Jew, that all things which were in the tabernacle of testimony, God commanded Moses to make. And I say to you, that Solomon made many and various things in the temple, carved and cast, which even God did not command him to make, nor were they in the tabernacle of testimony, nor in that temple which God showed to Ezekiel, and yet Solomon was not condemned for this; for he made such forms to the glory of God, just as we do also. You too used to have many and various images and signs as reminders of God, before you were deprived of them on account of the vice of your ungrateful mind: namely, the rod of Moses, the God-inscribed ^B tablets, the dew-burning bush, the dry rock that gave forth water, the manna-bearing ark, the fire-receiving altar, the God-named plate, the God-manifesting Ephod, the God-overshadowing tabernacle. And if you used to overshadow all these by night and by day, saying: "Glory be to Thee, O only almighty God, who through all these things hast wrought wonders in Israel," if indeed, through all these things of the Law which you once kept, as you fell down you worshipped God, you see that through images, adoration is directed to God. And after a few words: "For if a man loves with sincere affection a friend or an emperor, and especially one who is a benefactor, even if he sees his son, or his staff, or his throne, or his crown, or his house, or his servant, he holds them fast, and embraces, and honors the benefactor, the emperor; how much more so God? Would that, I say again, you had also made Mosaic and prophetic images, ^C and every day worshipped the Lord God of them. When, therefore, you see the children of the Christians worshipping the cross, know that it is to the crucified Christ that they offer their worship." ^D

not to the wood. For if they were to worship the material of wood, they ought to worship groves and trees just as you, O Israel, once worshipped them, when you addressed the tree and the stone with these words: "You are my God, and you have given birth to me." ^A We, however, do not address the cross or the images of the saints with such words. For they are not our gods, but rather open books which are displayed and venerated in the churches, that by the sight of them we may be mindful of God and venerate Him. For he who honors the martyr honors God, to whom the martyr has borne witness; he who venerates the apostle of Christ venerates Him who sent him. And he who falls down in veneration before the Mother of Christ, it is manifest that he is offering honor to her Son. For there is no God but one, who is known and worshipped in the Trinity. ^B

Commentary.

From the sermon of Severianus, bishop of Gabala, on the dedication of the Cross.

"How did the image of the accursed thing bring life to our forefathers?" And after a few words: "How then did the image of the accursed thing bring salvation to the people laboring in distress? Would it not have been more plausible to say: 'If any of you is bitten, let him look to heaven, up to God, and he shall be saved,' or to the tabernacle of God? But he, passing these by, set up only the image of the cross. ^C Why, then, did Moses do these things, he who had said a little before to the people: 'You shall not make for yourself a graven image, nor a molten one, nor any likeness of those things which are in heaven above, or those which are in the earth below, or those which are in the waters, underneath the earth'? But why do I say these things to an ungrateful people? Explain, I pray, O most faithful minister of God: what you forbid, do you perform? What you tear down, do you set up? You who command, 'You shall not make for yourself a graven image,' you who ground the molten calf to powder, do you yourself fashion a serpent of bronze? And this not secretly, but openly and manifest to all? But those things, he says, I legislated in order that I might cut off the materials of impiety, and recall the people from all apostasy and idolatry; but now, I fashion the serpent profitably, for the prefiguring of the truth. ^D And just as I constructed the tabernacle, and all things that are therein, and stretched out the Cherubim, referring to the likeness of invisible things, to cast a shadow of holy things as a type and shadow of things to come, so also I set up the serpent for the salvation of the people, that by the experience of these things…

they might be made more apt to receive the image of the Cross, and the crucified Savior and Redeemer. But that you may perceive this to be most true, dearly beloved, hearken to Christ asserting this and speaking in these words: "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in him may not perish, but have life everlasting" (John 3:14). ^B

Commentary. Observe what he has said: that the commandment was given so that there might be no resemblance, in order that the people might be called away from the worship of idols, to which they were most prone, and that the lifted-up serpent has existed as an image of the Lord's passion!

That the invention of images is not something new, but ancient, and known and customary to the holy and eminent Fathers, I would have you hear. It is written in the Life of blessed Basil, written by Helladius, his disciple and successor in the episcopal see, that the holy man once stood before the image of our Lady, in which also the figure of the most praiseworthy martyr Mercurius was depicted. He stood there praying that Julian the impious apostate tyrant might be removed from the midst. And from that image he learned what was to happen. For he saw the martyr vanish from his eyes for a short time, and not long after, holding a bloody spear.

Excerpts from the Life of Saint John Chrysostom, where these things are written word for word: ^C

"Blessed John read the Epistles of the most wise Paul with the greatest zeal." And a little later: "He also had the effigy of the same apostle Paul depicted in an image, in that place where he used to rest for a little while on account of his bodily infirmity. For he used to prolong his vigils beyond what nature allows. Gazing upon this image while he read the Epistles of Paul, he would fix his eyes upon it so intent, that, praising the blessed one and representing him to himself, he would direct his whole thought to him, and converse with him through contemplation." And after a few words: "But when Proclus had finished speaking, having fixed his eyes upon the image of Paul, and having seen a figure similar to him whom he had seen, showing his salutation to John, pointing out the image with his finger, he said: 'Forgive me, Father; he whom I saw speaking with you is entirely similar to this one, and, as I believe, it is he himself.'"

In the Life of Saint Eupraxia, it is written that she who was in charge of the flock showed her the image of our Lord.

^A In the Life of Saint Mary of Egypt, it is read that she prayed before the image of our Lady, and asked her to be her surety, and thus obtained entry into the temple.

From the Pratum (ch. 45) of our holy Father Sophronius, Archbishop of Jerusalem

• Abba Theodore the Aeliote related that there was a certain recluse on the Mount of Olives, a man greatly practiced in spiritual warfare, whom the demon of fornication was attacking. One day, when the demon was pressing him very hard, the old man began to lament, and he spoke to the demon: "How long will you not cease vexing me? Depart from me now; you have grown old with me." The demon, revealing himself to him visibly, said: "Swear to me that you will tell no one what I am about to say to you, and I will no longer war against you." The old man swore to him, on Him who inhabits the highest places: "I will tell no one at all what you say to me." Immediately the demon said, "Do not adore this image, and I will no longer war against you." Now that image displayed the likeness of our Lady, the holy Mary, the Theotokos, carrying our Lord Jesus Christ. The recluse said to the demon, "Leave me, I will consider it." ^B The next day, therefore, he informed Abba Theodore the Aeliote, who was living at that time in the Laura of Pharan, and he came and described everything to him. ^C The old man said to the recluse, who was truly an abba: "You have been deceived, in that you swore to the demon; yet you did well to speak out. For it is better for you not to leave a single brothel in the city unvisited, than to deny the adoration of our Lord and God Jesus Christ with His own Mother." Having thus strengthened him and encouraged him with many words, he departed to his own place. The demon appeared again to the recluse and said to him: "What is this, you wicked old man? Did you not swear to me that you would tell no one? And how did you tell everything to the one who came to you? I tell you, you wicked one, that you are to be judged as a perjurer on the day of judgment." The recluse answered him, saying: "That I swore, I did swear; and that I have perjured myself, I know; but I will not listen to you."

Commentary

have been granted by God to Christians, who have shone forth in wisdom, religion, doctrine, and holiness, and since many councils have been celebrated by holy and God-inspired Fathers, what reason is there that no one of them dared to do such a thing? We will not suffer a new faith to be taught. "For out of Sion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem," ^A as the Holy Spirit said through the prophet. We will not suffer ourselves to think other things at other times, and to be changed according to the times, and for the faith to become a mockery and a subject of derision to those outside. We will not suffer ourselves to bow to an imperial decree that attempts to overthrow the custom of the Fathers. For it is not the part of pious emperors to overthrow ecclesiastical institutions. These things do not savor of ancestral piety; for those things which are done by force and not by free persuasion are predatory. The council held for the second time at Ephesus, which to this day retains the name of "Robber Synod," ^B bears witness to this, in that the emperor's hand exerted force upon it, when the blessed martyr Flavian was killed. To decide anything about these matters does not belong to emperors, but to councils; as the Lord said: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." ^C Christ did not give the power of binding and loosing to kings, but to apostles, and their successors, and to pastors, and teachers. "Even if an angel," says the apostle Paul, "preaches to you anything other than what you have received"—and we will remain silent on what follows, out of mercy, awaiting their conversion. But if we see the perversion to be incorrigible, which may the Lord forbid, then we will pronounce the rest; but we pray that this may not happen.

If anyone enters a house in which a painter has depicted on the walls the history of Moses and Pharaoh, and someone should happen to ask about those who walked through the sea as if on dry land, "Who are these?" what will you answer when asked? "Are they not the sons of Israel?" "Who is he who strikes the sea with his staff?" "Is it not Moses?" In the same way, if anyone depicts Christ crucified and it is asked of him, "Who is this?" he will answer, "Christ, our God, who was incarnate for our sake." Yes, O Master, we adore all that is thine, and with longing we embrace thy Divinity, thy power, thy goodness, thy mercy toward us, thy condescension, and thy incarnation. And just as we fear to touch white-hot iron, not because of the nature of the iron, but because of the fire united to it, so I adore thy flesh, not because of the nature of the flesh, but because of the divinity united to it according to hypostasis ^D. We adore thy sufferings. Who has ever seen death adored? Who has considered sufferings worthy of worship? Nevertheless, in truth, we adore the bodily death of my God, and the saving sufferings; we adore thine image, and all that is thine: thy servants, thy friends, and before all others, thy Mother, the Theotokos.

^A We also beseech the people of God, that holy nation, to hold fast to ecclesiastical traditions. For the gradual removal of that which has been handed down is like pulling stones from a building; it quickly brings the whole structure toppling down. May God grant that we remain firm, stable, and immovable, founded upon the solid rock which is Christ, to whom belongs glory, honor, and adoration, with the Father and the Spirit, now and always, unto the endless ages of ages. Amen.

OF SAINT JOHN OF DAMASCUS

SECOND ORATION

AGAINST THOSE WHO REJECT THE HOLY IMAGES

1. Grant pardon to one who asks it, my masters, and receive this word of explanation from me, the useless and least of the servants of the Church of God. For I have not set forth to speak out of a desire for glory or vanity—God is my witness—but from zeal for the truth. For I possess Him alone as the hope of my salvation, and I desire and pray to meet Christ the Master alongside Him, offering Him this as an expiation for the sins I have wrongly committed. For he who had received five talents from the Master brought back another five which he had gained; and he who had received two brought back as many. But he who had received one, having buried it in the ground and having brought it forth without profit, was called a wicked servant and was cast into the outer darkness. Fearing lest this might befall me, I obey the Master’s command, and I entrust to you, the prudent bankers, the talent of discourse which has been committed to me by Him, so that when my Lord comes, He may find it multiplied, bearing the interest of souls, and, finding me a faithful servant, may bring me into His longed-for and most sweet joy. Therefore, lend me your attentive ears, and opening wide the tables of your hearts, receive my discourse and sincerely weigh the power of what is said. I have composed this second discourse concerning the images. For some of the children and alumni of the Church suggested to me that I do this, because many had not sufficiently grasped the meaning of the first; and for this, I ask your pardon, as I am merely fulfilling the duties of obedience. ^{B C}

ORATIO II

^A 2. It is the custom, beloved, of the envious and archetypal-evil serpent—I mean the devil—to attack in many ways man, who was fashioned in the image of God, and to work his death through contrary arts. For in the very beginning, he sowed in him the hope and desire of becoming like God, and through this, he drew him down into the death of brute beasts; nay more, he frequently lured him with shameful and irrational pleasures. And how great is the difference between divinization and irrational desire! At times he led him into atheism, as the God-inspired David says: "The fool has said in his heart: There is no God." At other times he led him into polytheism; and sometimes he persuaded him not to worship even the God who is God by nature, but at other times to worship demons—and furthermore, the heaven and the earth, the sun and the moon, the stars, and the rest of creation, even down to beasts and creeping things. ^B For it is equally grievous, both not to offer the honor due to those worthy of honor, and to offer to the unworthy the honor that is not appropriate, and to attribute to them excessive glory. Again, he taught some to say that evil is co-eternal with God. And he deceived others into confessing that the God who is good by nature is the author of evil. And some he led into error by foolishly saying there is one nature and one hypostasis of the Godhead; while others he corrupted to worship three natures and three hypostases unlawfully; and to some he suggested that they glorify one hypostasis and one nature of our Lord Jesus Christ, the one of the holy Trinity, while to others he suggested two natures and two hypostases of the same.

3. But the truth, walking the middle path, rejects all these absurdities and teaches us to confess one God, one nature in three hypostases—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and it says that evil is not a substance, but an accident, or a certain thought, word, and action departing from the law of God, having its existence in its being thought, spoken, and practiced, and vanishing as soon as it ceases. Moreover, it proclaims that Christ, one of the holy Trinity, consists of two natures and is one hypostasis. ^C

4. But the enemy of the truth, the demon who is the foe of human salvation, and who, having frequently deceived not only the Gentiles but also the children of Israel into making images of corruptible men, birds, quadrupeds, and creeping things, and worshipping them as gods, now strives to disturb the Church of Christ which is enjoying tranquil peace, by means of unrighteous lips and a deceitful tongue, seasoning wickedness with divine words, and attempting to cover over its ugly and dark form, ^D and to shake the hearts of the unstable from the true and traditionally-received custom. For some have arisen saying that the saving miracles of Christ, and the heroic deeds of the saints, should not be depicted or set forth for contemplation, glory, wonder, and emulation, which we might look upon and venerate.

^A And who that is imbued with divine knowledge and spiritual understanding does not recognize that this is a suggestion of the devil? For he does not wish his own defeat and disgrace to be publicly displayed, nor the glory of God and His saints to be recorded in writing.

5. If, indeed, we were making an image of the invisible God, we would truly be sinning. For it is impossible for the incorporeal, invisible, uncircumscribed, and shapeless to be depicted. And again, if we were making images of men and considering them to be gods, and worshipping them as gods, we would indeed be acting impiously. But we do nothing of the sort. For since God was made flesh, and appeared on earth in the flesh, and lived among men because of His ineffable goodness, and took on our nature, and the density of the flesh, and its form, and its color, we do not err when we make His image. For we desire to see His figure. For as the divine Apostle says: ^B "For now we see through a glass in a dark manner." And the image is also a glass and a dark manner, fitting for the slowness of our body. For the mind, laboring much, is unable to pass beyond corporeal things.

6. Away with you, envious devil! You envy us the sight of the likeness of our Lord, through which we may attain holiness; that we may look upon His saving sufferings, wonder at His condescension, contemplate His miracles, and praise the power of His divinity. You envy the saints the honor given to them by God. You do not wish us to see their glory recorded, and to become emulators of their courage and faith. We will not obey you, ^C envious demon and hater of mankind. Hear, O peoples, tribes, tongues, men, women, children, elders, youths, and infants, the holy nation of the Christians: if anyone preaches to you anything other than what the Catholic Church has received from the holy Apostles, Fathers, and councils, and has guarded until this day, do not listen to him, nor accept the persuasion of the serpent, as Eve once accepted it, from which she incurred death. Even if an angel, even if an emperor, preaches to you anything other than what you have received, close your ears. For as for the time being, I hesitate to say what the divine Apostle said, "Let him be anathema," ^D awaiting his correction.

7. But those who do not search the meaning of the Scripture object that God commanded through Moses the lawgiver: "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing, nor the likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath." And through the prophet David: "Let all them be confounded that adore graven things, and that glory in their idols," and many other things similar to these. For whatever they bring forward from the divine Scripture or from the holy Fathers is to be understood in the same way.

8. What then do we say to these things? What else, but what was said by the Lord to the Jews: "Search the Scriptures"?

"? ^A For the searching of the Scriptures is commendable. But here, beloved, pay careful attention. It is impossible for God to lie. For there is one God, one Lawgiver of the Old and New Testaments, who long ago spoke in many ways and in many forms to the fathers through the prophets, and in these last days in His only-begotten Son. Apply your mind with precision; these are not my words, but what the Holy Spirit pronounced through the holy Apostle: "God who long ago spoke in many ways and in many forms to the fathers in the prophets." See that God spoke in many ways and in many forms. For just as a skilled physician does not give the same kind of remedy to all, nor always, but provides medicine to each according to their constitution, while distinguishing also the region, and the disease, and the time, and the age; and to the infant he gives one thing, to the man advanced in age another; a different thing to the sick and another to the healthy; and to each of the sick, not the same thing, but according to their constitution and the disease; and another thing in summer, ^B and another in winter, in autumn and in spring, and in each place according to the suitability of the place; so also the best physician of souls, to those who were still infants and suffering from the disease of idolatry, and who considered idols as gods, and worshipped them as gods themselves, and neglected the worship of God, and transferred His glory to the creation, forbade them to do this. For of God, who is incorporeal, and invisible, and immaterial, and possesses neither form, nor limitation, nor comprehensibility, it is impossible to make an image. For how can that which does not fall under sight be iconized? "No one has ever seen God; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has explained Him." And, "No one shall see My face, and live," said God. ^C

8. That they worshipped the idols as gods, hear what the Scripture says in Exodus, when Moses went up to mount Sinai and lingered in attendance upon God to receive the law, when the ungrateful people rose up against Aaron, the servant of God, saying: "Make us gods, who will go before us. For as for this man Moses, we do not know what has happened to him." Then, when they took away the finery of their women, and cast it, and they ate, and drank, and became drunk from both wine and error, ^D and began to play, saying in their folly: "These are your gods, O Israel." Do you see that they had as gods the idols, which were the dwelling places of demons? And that they served the creature rather than the Creator? Just as the divine Apostle also says: "Who exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man, and of birds and four-footed animals and reptiles, and worshipped the***

servient created things rather than the Creator. For this reason, God forbade the making of any likeness, as Moses says in Deuteronomy: "And the Lord spoke to you from the midst of the fire: you heard the voice of the words, but you saw no likeness, only a voice." ^A And a little later: "And keep your souls very carefully, for you saw no likeness on the day that the Lord spoke to you in Horeb, in the mountain from the midst of the fire; lest you act against the law, and make for yourselves a carved likeness, every image, a likeness of male or female, a likeness of any beast that is on the earth, a likeness of any winged bird," etc. And with a few words interposed: "And lest perhaps, lifting up your eyes to heaven, and seeing the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and all the host of heaven, you be deceived by error and adore them, and serve them." ^B You see how his one intent was this, namely, that the creature might not be served rather than the Creator, and that the worship of latria might be rendered to no one but God, the creator of all things. Therefore, he joins latria with adoration. And again he says: "There shall be no other gods for you besides me. You shall not make for yourself a graven thing, nor any likeness." And again: "You shall not make for yourself molten gods." Do you not see that it is for the sake of avoiding idolatry that he forbids the fashioning of images, and because it is impossible for the image of God to be expressed, who is neither corporeal, nor visible, nor circumscribed? "For you did not see His form," he says. Just as Paul also, standing in the midst of the Areopagus, said: ^C "Being then the offspring of God, we ought not to imagine the divine to be like unto gold, or silver, or stone, by the sculpture of art and the imagination of man."

9. But that these things are so, listen: "You shall not make for your self a graven thing," he says, "nor any likeness." Although God had commanded this, yet afterwards it is read: "They made the curtain of the tabernacle of the testimony of hyacinth, and purple, and scarlet twisted, and fine linen twisted, the woven work of Cherubim." And: "They made the propitiatory above the ark of pure gold, and the two Cherubim." What are you doing, Moses? You say: "You shall not make for yourself a graven thing, nor any likeness"; ^D why then do you nevertheless make a curtain, the woven work of the figures of Cherubim, and two Cherubim of pure gold? But listen to what God’s minister Moses answers you. O blind and foolish ones, perceive the power of the words, and guard your souls with diligent care. I said that you saw no likeness on the day that the Lord spoke to you in Horeb, in the mountain from the midst of the fire, lest you should act against the law and make for yourselves a carved likeness: every image, and you shall not make for yourself molten gods. I did not say, "You shall not make images of Cherubim, as servants attending the propitiatory," but, "You shall not make for yourself molten gods," and

^A you shall not serve the creation rather than the Creator. Therefore, I have not made an image of God, nor indeed of anything else as God, nor have I served the creation rather than the Creator. So you also do the same.

10. Do you see how the purpose of Scripture is revealed to those who investigate with understanding? For one must know, beloved, that in every matter truth is sought, as well as falsehood, and the purpose of the one who does the thing, whether it is good or evil. For in the Gospel, both God, and angel, and man, and heaven, and earth, and water, and fire, and air, and sun, and moon, and stars, and light, and darkness, and Satan, and demons, and serpents, and scorpions, and death, and Hades, and virtues, and vices, and all things good and ^B evil are written down. But yet, since all that is said about them is true, and the purpose is for the glory of God and of the saints who are glorified by Him, and for our salvation, and for the overthrow and shame of the devil and his demons, we worship them, and we embrace them, and we kiss them, and we salute them with our eyes, and lips, and heart. In the same way, we treat both the whole Old and New Testament, and even the words of the holy and approved Fathers. But that shameful, and abominable, and unclean writing of the accursed Manichaeans and Greeks, and of the other heresies, containing as it does false and vain things, and devised for the glory ^C of the devil and his demons and for their joy, we spit upon and cast away, even though it may contain the name of God. Thus also in the matter of images, one must investigate the truth and the purpose of those who make them. And if it is true and right, and conducive to the glory of God and His saints, and to the zeal for virtue, and the avoidance of vice, and the salvation of souls, it is to be accepted and honored as images, and likenesses, and representations, and books for the illiterate, and we are to worship them, and kiss them, and salute them with eyes, and lips, and heart, as the likeness of God incarnate, or of His Mother, or of the saints who are partakers of the sufferings and of the glory ^D of Christ, and who are victors and overcomers of the devil and his demons and of their deceit.

11. But if anyone dares to make an image of the Godhead, which is immaterial, and incorporeal, and invisible, and formless, and colorless, we reject it as false. And if anyone makes one for the glory, and worship, and honor of the devil, or of demons, we spit upon it and consume it with fire. And if any of men, or birds, or reptiles, or of any other creation, should deify an image, we condemn him with anathema. For just as the holy Fathers pulled down the temples [col. 1294 ends here]

^A of the demons, and in their places built temples to the name of the saints, whom we worship, so also they pulled down the images of the demons, and in their place raised up images of Christ, and of the Theotokos, and of the saints. And in the Old Testament, Israel neither raised temples in the name of men, nor was the memorial of man celebrated. For human nature was still under a curse, and death was a condemnation and punishment, wherefore it was mourned; and the corpse of the deceased was considered unclean, as was he who touched it. But now, since the Godhead has been mixed with our nature, as a certain life-giving and saving medicine, our nature has been glorified and transmuted towards incorruption. Wherefore the death of the saints is celebrated, and temples are built to them, and images are painted. Let every man know, therefore, that he who attempts to pull down the image—which was formed out of divine zeal and passion to the glory and remembrance of Christ, or of His Mother the holy Theotokos, or of any of the saints, and for the shame and defeat of the devil and his demons—and does not rather honor, venerate, and kiss it as a precious image, and not as God, is an enemy of Christ and of the holy Theotokos and of the saints, and an advocate and patron of the devil and his demons; by his action showing his grief that God and His saints are honored and glorified, while the devil is put to shame. For the image is a certain triumph, and a manifestation, and a written monument to the memory of the victory of those who have excelled and shone forth, and of the shame of those ^B who were defeated and cast down.

12. It is not for emperors to legislate for the Church. What does the divine Apostle say? "And God has set some in the Church: first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the Church." He did not add, emperors. And again: "Obey those who have the rule over you, and submit yourselves. For they watch for your souls, as those that must give an account." And again: "Remember those who have the rule over you, who have spoken unto you the word of God, whose faith follow, considering the end of their conversation." Emperors did not speak the word to us, but apostles and prophets, and pastors and teachers. When God commanded David to build Him a house, He said to him: "Thou shalt not build me a house, because thou art a man of blood." "Render to all their dues," the Apostle Paul cried out, "to whom tribute, tribute; to whom custom, custom; to whom fear, fear; to whom honor, honor." To emperors belongs the successful administration of public affairs; but the regulation of the Church belongs to pastors and teachers. Such an intrusion is a robbery, brethren. When Saul tore the mantle of Samuel, what happened to him? God tore his kingdom from him, and gave it to

the most mild David. Jezebel persecuted Elijah, and the sows and dogs licked her blood, ^A and the harlots washed themselves in it. Herod slew John, and being eaten of worms, gave up the ghost. And now the blessed Germanus, ^B resplendent in life and discourse, was buffeted and became an exile; and there are many other bishops and Fathers whose names we know not. Is this not a robbery? When the Scribes and Pharisees came to the Lord to tempt Him, to ensnare Him in His speech, and asked Him: "Is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar, or not?" He answered them: "Show me the tribute money." And when they had shown it, He asked: "Whose image has it?" And upon their saying, "Caesar's," He replied: "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." We obey you, O Emperor, in the matters that pertain to the life of this world—in paying tributes, taxes, and duties, in those things where the administration of our affairs has been entrusted to you; but for ordering the things of the Church, we have pastors who speak the word to us and who have set down ecclesiastical legislation. We do not remove the ancient boundaries which our fathers have set; rather, we hold fast to the traditions, just as we have received them. For if we begin to tear down the building of the Church even in a small matter, the whole will little by little be dissolved.

^C 13. You vilify matter and call it ignoble; the Manichaeans do the same; but the divine Scripture proclaims it good. It says: "And God saw all that He had made, and behold, it was very good." I, for my part, confess matter to be a work of God and good; but if you say it is evil, you must either acknowledge that it is not from God, or make God the author of evils. Consider, therefore, what the divine Scripture says concerning the matter you call ignoble: "And Moses spake unto all the congregation of the children of Israel, saying: This is the thing which the Lord commanded, saying, Take from among you an offering unto the Lord; whosoever is of a willing heart, let him bring it, an offering of the Lord; gold, and silver, and brass, and blue, and purple, and scarlet doubled, and fine...

twined linen, and goats' hair, and skins of rams dyed red, and hyacinthine skins, and incorruptible wood, and the oil for anointing, and the incense of the composition, and sardius stones, and stones for setting, for the ephod and for the breastplate; and whosoever among you is wise in heart, let him come and make all that the Lord hath commanded, the tabernacle ^A, » etc.

14. Indeed, and matter is honored, which is despised by you. For what is more cheap than goats' hair or colors? Or are not scarlet, purple, and hyacinth colors? Lo, also the works of human hands and the likeness of Cherubim: and the whole tabernacle itself was an image. « For see, saith God to Moses, thou shalt make all things according to the pattern which was shown to thee in the mountain ^B. » And yet, it was worshipped round about by all Israel. And furthermore, were not the Cherubim before the eyes of the people? And the ark, and the lampstand, and the table, and the golden urn, and the rod, to which the people looking, worshipped? I do not worship matter, but I worship the Creator of matter, who for my sake became matter, and deigned to dwell in matter, and through matter brought about my salvation. « For the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us ^C. » It escapes no one that flesh is matter and a creature. I worship, therefore, matter, and I cherish it with reverence, and I worship that through which my salvation has come to pass. And I worship it, not as God, but as being full of divine energy and grace. Or is not the wood of the cross matter, the thrice-blessed and thrice-happy? Or is not matter the venerable and holy mountain, the place of Calvary? Or is not matter the life-bearing rock, the holy tomb, the fountain of our resurrection? Or is not matter the ink and the parchment of the Gospels? Or is not matter the life-giving table which provides us with the bread of life? Or is not matter the gold and the silver, from which crosses and holy plates and chalices are fashioned? Or is not matter, before all these, the body and blood of my Lord? Either remove the cult and adoration of all these, or concede to the tradition of the Church the worship of images, consecrated in the name of God and the friends of God, and for this reason overshadowed by the grace of the divine Spirit. But if you think that images are to be abolished on account of the commandment of the Law, then you must also observe the Sabbath and circumcision, which were commanded to you by the Law very strictly, and indeed keep the whole Law, and not celebrate the Lord's Pascha outside Jerusalem. But know this, that if you keep the Law, Christ will profit you nothing ^D. Now it also falls to you that you must take your brother's wife to raise up seed to your brother; and you must also abstain from singing the Lord's song in a strange land. But away with all these: « For whoever of you are justified by the Law, you have fallen from grace [Galat. v, 4]. »

^A 15. We paint Christ the King and Lord in such a way that we do not deprive Him of His army. For the saints are the army of the Lord. Let the earthly emperor first strip himself of his own army, before he dares to strip his own King and Lord. Let him lay aside his purple and his diadem, and then let him take away the honor from those who have fought strenuously against the tyrant—those who have, as it were, ruled over their own passions and disturbances. For if they are heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ, and partakers of the divine glory and the kingdom to come, why should not the friends of Christ be also partakers of His glory on earth? « I do not call you servants, » says God, « you are my friends. » Shall we then deprive them of the honor given to them by the Church? O audacious hand! O temerarious mind, which contradicts God and opposes His commands! If you refuse to venerate an image, then do not venerate the Son of God either, for He is the living image of the invisible God, and the unchangeable likeness of His substance. The temple which Solomon built was consecrated with the blood of beasts, and was adorned with figures of beasts, of lions, of oxen, and of palm trees and pomegranates. But now the Church is dedicated by the blood of Christ and His saints, and is adorned with the images of Christ and His saints. Either abolish the veneration of all images, or do not innovate, « nor remove the ancient landmarks which your fathers have set; » I do not mean those that were set before the coming in the flesh of Christ our God, but those that were established after His coming. For concerning the sanctions of the Old Testament, God complains, saying: « I gave them statutes that were not good, » because of the hardness of their heart. Wherefore, the priesthood being changed, it was necessary that a change of the law should take place ^B.

16. Moreover, the eyewitnesses and ministers of the Word handed down the ecclesiastical discipline not only by writing, but also by certain unwritten traditions. For whence do we know the holy place of Calvary? Whence do we know the tomb of life? Do we not receive it from fathers to children without writing? It is indeed written that the Lord was crucified in the place of Calvary, and that He was buried in a monument which Joseph hewed out of the rock. But that these are the very things which are now venerated, we know from unwritten tradition, and very many things similar to these. Whence comes the practice of baptizing to the third degree, that is, by three immersions? Whence the practice of praying toward the east? Whence the veneration of the cross? Is it not from unwritten tradition? Therefore the divine apostle Paul also says: « Therefore, brethren, stand fast, and hold the traditions which you have been taught, whether by word ^C or by our epistle. » Since, therefore, many things are handed down to the Church without writing, and are observed to this very day, why do you quibble about the images? The Manichaeans wrote the Gospel according to Thomas; you also, write a Gospel according to Leo. I do not accept a king who tyrannically seizes the priesthood ^D.

^A I know the emperor Valens, who was called a Christian and persecuted the orthodox faith; I know Zeno, and Anastasius, and Heraclius, and that Constantine who died in Sicily, and Bardanisces, who is also called Philippicus. I do not allow the Church to be ordered by imperial decrees, but it is governed by the traditions of the Fathers, whether written or unwritten. For just as the Gospel was preached in the whole world in writing, so too was it delivered in the whole world without being written that the incarnate God, Christ, and the saints should be represented by images, ^B just as it was delivered that the Cross should be adored, and that, turning toward the East, we should pour forth our prayers.

17. Furthermore, the authorities you bring forward do not cast blame on the veneration of images as it is held by us, but they condemn the customs of the Greeks who worship these as gods. Therefore, one ought not, because of the perverse usage of the Greeks, abolish the pious institution of the Church. Conjurers and sorcerers use incantations, but the Church likewise exorcizes the catechumens; yet those invoke demons, whereas this one invokes God against demons. The Greeks sacrificed to demons, but Israel also offered blood and the savor of offerings to God. Even now, the Church offers an unbloody sacrifice to God. The nations consecrated statues to demons, but Israel also set up images for itself as gods for they said: "These are your gods, O Israel, who brought you up out of the land of Egypt." ^C But we dedicate images to the true God made flesh, and to the servants and friends of God, by whom the armies of demons are put to flight.

18. But if you mention the blessed Epiphanius [(14)], ^D and how it is that one can say that He who is incomprehensible, and beyond description, and beyond understanding, and uncircumscribed—whom even Moses was not able to gaze upon—ought to be depicted

^A openly to have condemned those of us here; know that that book is supposititious, and that it was falsely ascribed to Epiphanius by someone, as often happens in other cases. For that Father did not depart from the view of his colleagues: all, indeed, were partakers of one Holy Spirit. Let the church itself, adorned with images down to this present age, be a testimony—up to the time when some rose up against her, who set out to infest the flock of Christ and to peddle foul disturbance to the people of God.

19. If I adore and worship as causes of salvation the cross, and the lance, and the reed, and the sponge, by which the God-killing Jews insulted my Lord and delivered Him to death, why should I not worship the images that have been fashioned with sound intent by Christians for the glory of Christ and the memory of His passion? If I venerate the likeness of the cross, fashioned out of any material whatsoever, shall I not worship the image of Him who was affixed to it, and who showed the cross to be a saving power? ^B O what inhumanity! That I do not adore the material itself is clear. For when the form of the cross is dissolved—if it were made of wood, for example—I commit the wood to the fire: the same applies to the material of the images.

20. But that the invention of images is not new, and that their veneration is not recent, but an ancient tradition of the Church, accept a numerous examination gathered from the places of the Scriptures and the Fathers. The Lord says these things in the holy Gospel according to Matthew, to His own disciples…

VARIAE LECTIONES

NOTAE

blessing ^A them, and with them all who follow their rule and walk in their footsteps, he proclaimed them blessed: "But blessed are your eyes, for they see; and your ears, for they hear. Amen I say to you, that many prophets and just men have desired to see what you see, and have not seen it; and to hear what you hear, and have not heard it." We also, therefore, desire to see, as far as it is possible to see. For we see as in a mirror and in an enigma, and in an image, and we are called blessed. God Himself first made an image, and He showed images. For He made man according to the image of God, and Abraham, and Moses, and Isaiah, and all the prophets saw images of God, and not the essence itself of God. The bush was an image of the Mother of God, and as Moses was about to approach it, God said: "Put off your shoes from your feet; for the place whereon you stand is holy ground." If then the ground where the image of the Theotokos was seen by Moses is holy ground, how much more is this image—not only holy, but, I dare to say, the holy of holies? The Lord, when the Pharisees asked him: "Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorce, and to put away a wife?" answered: "Because Moses, by reason of the hardness of your heart, permitted you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so." I likewise say to you that Moses, because of the hardness of the heart of the children of Israel, knowing their readiness to fall into idolatry, commanded them not to make images. But now it is not so; for we stand firmly upon the rock of faith, having become enriched with the light of the knowledge of God.

^B 21. Hear what the Lord says: "Woe to you, blind guides, who say, 'Whosoever shall swear by the temple, it is nothing; but whosoever shall swear by the gold of the temple, he is a debtor.' You fools and blind; for whether is greater, the gold, or the temple that sanctifieth the gold?" And: "He that sweareth by the temple, sweareth by it and by him that dwelleth in it; and he that sweareth by heaven, sweareth by the throne of God and by him that sitteth thereon." By similar reasoning, he who swears by an image, swears by that which is represented by it.

22. That indeed the tabernacle, and the veil, and the ark, and the table, and all things that were in the tabernacle, were images, and types, and works of men's hands, which were worshipped by all Israel; and furthermore that the carved cherubim, made by the command of God, were such, has been sufficiently and more than sufficiently demonstrated by us. For God says to Moses: ^D "See, that you do all things according to the pattern shown you in the mount." I would have you hear also the Apostle Paul bearing witness that God commanded Israel to worship things made by hand and images. "For if He were on earth," he says, "He would not be a priest, seeing there are priests that offer gifts according to the law, who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as it was…

^A divinely commanded of Moses, when he was to perform the tabernacle. 'For see,' He says, 'that you make all things according to the pattern shown you on the mountain.' Now, however, He has obtained a more excellent ministry, to the extent that He is the mediator of a better covenant, which has been established on better promises. For if that first one had been faultless, then no place would have been sought for a second. For finding fault with them, He says: 'Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I will complete with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah a new covenant: not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day when I took them by the hand to lead them out of the land of Egypt.' And after a few words: 'By saying "new," He has made the first old. Now that which is decaying and growing old is near to vanishing.' For ^B the first tabernacle was prepared, in which were the lampstand, the table, and the showbread, which is called the holy place. And after the second veil, the tabernacle which is called the Holy of Holies, having a golden censer and the ark of the covenant covered on all sides with gold, in which was the golden pot containing the manna, and the rod of Aaron that had budded, and the tablets of the covenant; and above it, the Cherubim of glory overshadowing the mercy seat. And again: 'For Christ has not entered into hand-made holy places, which are anti-types of the true, but into heaven itself.' And after other things: 'For the law, having a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things.'

23. Consider that both the law and all things pertaining to it, and all our worship, are hand-made holy places, which through matter lead us to the immaterial God. ^C The law, and all things according to the law, were a certain shadow-sketch of the image to come, that is, of our worship; but our worship is an image of the good things to come. The things themselves are the Jerusalem above, immaterial and not made by hands, as the same divine Apostle says: 'For we do not have here a continuing city, but we seek the one that is to come,' which is the Jerusalem above, 'of which God is the architect and maker.' For all things, both those according to the law and those according to our worship, came to be for the sake of that one. To Him be glory forever and ever. Amen. ^D

Testimonies of the ancient and approved holy Fathers concerning images.

^A Of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, from the letter to Titus. "It is worth our while, therefore," etc. Commentary: See how he spoke, etc.

Of the same, from the book *On the Divine Names*. "By this we have been taught," etc., with Commentary.

From the same's book *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. "But the preceding ones," etc. Commentary: If, therefore, etc.

Of St. Basil, from the sermon on the holy martyr Barlaam, the beginning of which is: "First, indeed, the death of the saints." "Arise now for me," etc. ^B

Of the same, from the thirty chapters to Amphilochius on the Holy Spirit (chap. 18). "That he is called king," etc. Commentary: If the image, etc.

Of St. Basil, from the sermon on the holy martyr Gordius. "The peoples rejoice with gladness," etc. Commentary: See how.

Of the same, from the same sermon on the martyr Gordius. "For just as by fire automatically," etc. At the end of the same oration. "For just as the sun," etc. Commentary: It is clear, as.

And in the oration on the most excellent forty martyrs, he says these things. "Of the martyrs," etc. Commentary: Why, then, etc. ^C

Of Basil. "Come then, therefore," etc. Commentary: You see, as. "Again," he soon adds, remaining with the discourse: "For since of wars," etc. Commentary: What of these, etc. Commentary: By what reasoning, I pray.

Of St. Gregory of Nyssa, from the supplement, or from the book on the structure of man (chap. 4). "Just as is the custom among men," etc. ^D

From the fifth chapter of the same book. "But divine beauty," etc. Commentary: Observe, as.

Of the same, from an oration delivered at Constantinople, on the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; where also [he speaks] of Abraham, oration 41, the beginning of which is: "A similar thing happens to those," etc. "Thence with bonds," etc.

Of St. John Chrysostom, from the exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews. "And indeed first," etc.

VARIOUS READINGS.

^A From the book of Leontius, Bishop of Neapolis in Cyprus, *Against the Jews*, concerning the fact that it is permitted to adore the cross of Christ and the images of the saints, and one another; and concerning the relics of the saints. "If you accuse me," etc. Comment: "If you [accuse] from," etc. Again from the same Leontius. "Since also," etc. Comment: "Is it not," etc.

From the sermon of Severianus, Bishop of Gabala, on the dedication of the cross. "In what manner," etc. Comment: "Do you notice what," etc. "That it is not a new invention," etc.

From the life of Saint John Chrysostom, in which these things are written word for word: "The blessed John [wrote] letters," etc.

In the life of Saint Eupraxias it is written, etc.

In the life of Saint Mary of Egypt, etc.

From the sermon of Saint John Chrysostom: *That there is one author of the Old and New Testaments; and on the priest’s vestment.*

"I, indeed, have also been delighted by a painting, provided that it is fashioned from moulded wax and presents piety to view. For in an image I have seen an angel putting to flight the hosts of the barbarians. I have seen the nations of the barbarians trampled underfoot, and David saying: 'O Lord, in thy city thou shalt bring their image to nothing.' [Ps. LXXII, 20]" ^B

From the same, from the exposition of the parable of the seed:

"If you treat an imperial robe with contempt, do you not thereby inflict an injury upon the emperor? Do you not know that if you are contumelious toward the image of the emperor, you become injurious to the very one whom it represents? Do you not know that a man is condemned who has cast down an image made of wood or bronze, not because he was insolent toward a soulless material, but because he has cast ignominy upon the image? Since it bears the likeness of the emperor, it transfers the affront offered to it unto the emperor himself."

From the same Saint John Chrysostom, from the sermon on Saint Meletius, Bishop of Antioch and martyr, and on the zeal of those who had assembled, the beginning of which is: "Everywhere casting my eyes around this sacred flock," and after a few lines:

"And the event itself was a lesson in piety; for, being constantly compelled to remember that name, and to have that holy man in their souls, they had that name as a sort of amulet against every irrational passion and thought; and the matter progressed to such a point that everywhere, in the crossroads, in the marketplace, and in the fields, everything was resounding with this name on all sides. And indeed you displayed your zeal and reverence not only toward his most excellent name, but also toward the very likeness of his person. Therefore, what you did in regard to his name,

you did likewise to his image, and in vessels, in cups, in phials, and on the walls of bedchambers, and everywhere, many have carved that image; so that not only might they hear that holy name, but also behold the figure of his body everywhere, and possess a certain dual consolation for his absence.

Of the same, on the betrayal by Judas, on the Pascha, on the tradition of the Mysteries, and that one ought not to remember injuries.

«Just as painters on a panel track the lines, and outline figures, and apply the reality of colors, so also did Christ.»

Of Saint Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, from his epistle to all Italy.^A

«On the third night, my body already exhausted and wasting away from fasting, not while I was sleeping, but while I was in an ecstasy, there appeared to me a certain person who seemed exactly like the blessed Apostle Paul, just as his face, appearing in images, clearly manifests him.»

Of Saint Maximus the Philosopher and Confessor, from the accounts of what transpired between him and Bishop Theodosius.

«And upon these things, all rose up with joy and tears, and knelt in prayer; and each of them kissed the holy Gospels, the precious cross, and the image of our God and Savior Jesus Christ, and of our Mistress, the holy Theotokos who bore Him, having ^C laid their own hands upon them, for the confirmation of the things that had been spoken.»

From a sermon of the most holy and blessed Anastasius, Archbishop of Theopolis, on the Sabbath, to Simon, Bishop of Bostra.

«For just as when the emperor is absent, his image is worshipped in his stead; but when he is present, it is superfluous to leave the original prototype and worship the image; yet it is not the case that because it is not worshipped, since He for whose sake it was venerable is present, it should therefore be treated with disrespect.» And after a few words: «For just as he who rages ^D against the image of the emperor undergoes avenging punishments, just as if he had truly insulted the emperor himself, even though the image is nothing other than wood and colors mixed and compounded with wax; in the same way, whoever inflicts an insult upon anyone’s image, he brings this injury upon him whose effigy it is.»

S. JOHN OF DAMASCUS ORATION III AGAINST THOSE WHO REJECT SACRED IMAGES

^A Such is the custom of the wicked and primeval serpent—the devil, I mean—to wage war in many ways against man, who was fashioned after the image of God, and by means of opposites to bring about his death. For immediately, at the very beginning, he sowed in him the hope and desire for deification, and through this led him down to the death of the irrational. ^B Yet he did not stop there, but often even enticed him with shameful and irrational pleasures; but what a vast distance there is between deification and irrational desire! Sometimes he led him into atheism, as the God-inspired David says: "The fool has said in his heart, There is no God." [Ps. XIII, 1] But at other times he persuaded him to serve many gods; and sometimes he persuaded him not even to worship Him who is by nature God, and at other times to worship demons. ^C Furthermore, he caused him to worship the heavens and the earth, the sun and the moon and the stars, and the rest of creation, even down to beasts and reptiles. For it is equally grave both not to render the honor due to things honorable, and to attribute honor not befitting them to things dishonorable. But the truth, walking on a middle path, rejects all absurdities; ^D [and it teaches us to confess one God, one essence in three persons, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and it says that evil is not an essence or a substance, but a mere accident—a certain thought, word, or action contrary to the law of God, having existence only in its being thought, spoken, or performed, and vanishing as soon as it ceases. Furthermore, regarding the one Christ of the holy Trinity, it proclaims two natures and one person.] But the enemy of the truth and the foe of the salvation of men, who once—

deceived not only the nations, but also the very children of Israel many times, so that they fabricated images of demons and of wicked men, and of birds, and of ^A beasts, and of reptiles, and worshipped them as gods, now strives to disturb the Church of Christ which is enjoying tranquil peace; trying, however, to season his malice with divine utterances by means of unjust lips and a deceitful tongue, and seeking to cover over its ugly and dark form, and to shake the hearts of the unstable from the true custom handed down by the Fathers.

2. For some have arisen saying that the saving miracles and passions of Christ, and the heroic deeds of the saints against the devil, which were miraculously performed for our salvation, should not be set forth in images, in which we might contemplate, ^B venerate, admire, and imitate them. But who, having been imbued with divine thought and spiritual understanding, does not recognize this as a suggestion of the devil? For he does not suffer his own defeat and shame to be made public, nor the glory of God and of His saints to be inscribed. For if we were making an image of the invisible God, we would truly be sinning; for it is impossible for that which is incorporeal, and without form, and invisible, and uncircumscribed, to be depicted. And again, if we considered those things which we made to be gods, and worshipped them as gods, we would truly be impious; but we do nothing of the sort. ^C For when God was made flesh and appeared on earth in the flesh, and lived among men because of His ineffable goodness, and took upon Himself the nature, and density, and form, and color of flesh, we do not err in making His image. For we yearn to see His character; for as the divine Apostle says, "We see now in a mirror and in an enigma." And an image is a mirror and an enigma, fitting for the density of our body; for even though the mind struggles, it can in no way pass over that which is corporeal, as the divine Gregory says.

3. Away with you, envious devil! You begrudge us the sight of the form ^D of our Master, through which we are made partakers of holiness. You begrudge us the sight of His saving passion, you begrudge us the wonder at His descent to us, the contemplation of His miracles, and the recognition and praise of the power of His divinity. You begrudge the saints the honor bestowed upon them by God. You do not allow us to see their glory inscribed, nor to emulate their virtue and faith. You cannot bear that our faith toward them should benefit us, both in body and in soul. But we will not obey you, O envious demon and hater of men. Hear, O peoples, tribes, tongues, men, women, children, adolescents, infants, O holy nation of Christians: If anyone preaches to you anything other than what the holy catholic Church has received from the holy apostles,

from the Fathers, and from the councils, and has kept until now, do not listen to him; do not accept the counsel of the serpent, as Eve accepted it, and by it reaped death. Even if an angel, even if an emperor should evangelize you contrary to what you have received, close your ears: for I refrain for the present moment from saying, as the divine Apostle said, "Let him be anathema," awaiting his amendment.

^B 4. But they who do not search into the meaning of Scripture say that God said through Moses the lawgiver: "You shall not make any likeness of those things that are in heaven and those that are in the earth." And through David the prophet: "Let all who worship graven things be ashamed, who glory in their idols"; and many other things similar to these. For whatever they bring forward from divine Scripture and from the holy Fathers is to be understood in the same sense.

What, then, shall we say to these things? What else, I say, than what was said by the Lord to the Jews: "Search the Scriptures." For the search of the Scriptures is praiseworthy. But here, beloved, attend with great caution. It is impossible for God to lie. For there is one God, one Lawgiver, I say, by whom the Old and New Testaments were ordained; who once spoke in many parts and in many ways to the fathers through the prophets, and in these last days, through his only-begotten Son. ^C Attend, therefore, with accuracy; these words are not mine: the Holy Spirit proclaimed through the holy Apostle: "In many parts and in many ways, God once spoke to the fathers through the prophets." Observe that God spoke in many parts and in many ways. For just as a skillful physician does not always give the same medicine to everyone, but provides to each the remedy that is suitable and appropriate, distinguishing both the place and the disease and the hour—that is, the time and the condition and the age; and to the infant he gives one thing, to the mature man another, one thing to the sick, and another to the healthy; and to each of the sick, not the same, but according to their condition and disease; and one thing in summer, ^D and another in winter, in autumn and in spring, and in every place, according to the suitability of the place—so, too, the best physician of souls, to those who were still infants and suffering from the disease of idolatry, and who thought statues were gods and worshiped them as gods, and denied the worship due to God, and transferred his glory to the creature, forbade the making of images. For it is impossible to make an image of God, who is incorporeal, invisible, immaterial, and who has neither shape, nor circumscription, nor comprehension. For how shall that which has not been seen be represented in an image? "But no one has seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom…"

imagine effingatur? "For God, no one has seen at any time; the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath revealed him," and God says: "No man shall see my face, and live."

5. But that they worshipped idols as gods, hear what Scripture relates in Exodus concerning the children of Israel, when Moses ascended Mount Sinai and remained there sitting with God to receive the Law: when, I say, the most ungrateful people, rising up against Aaron, said: "Make us gods, which shall go before us; for as for this Moses, the man that brought us up out of the land of Egypt, we know not what is become of him." Then, when they had taken the jewelry and ornaments of their wives and fashioned a molten image, they ate and drank, and, as if intoxicated by their own error and by wine, they began to play, and in their madness to say: "These are thy gods, O Israel." Do you not see that they set up ^B images as gods for themselves? For they did not make an image of Jove, or of this or that [god], but as chance offered, they brought gold from which to cast an idol, whatever it might happen to be, and there came forth the figure of a calf’s head. Thus they held such molten things to be gods, and worshipped them as gods—which were indeed the dwelling-places of demons. And that they worshipped the creature rather than the Creator, the divine Apostle testifies: "Who changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things; and they served the creature rather than the Creator." For this reason, God forbade the making of any likeness.

6. I know the One who spoke without falsehood: "The Lord thy God is one Lord." And: "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." And: "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." And: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath." And again: "Let all those be confounded that serve graven images." And: "The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, let them perish." And all other things of this kind which God, having spoken of old to the fathers in the prophets, hath in these last days spoken to us in his only-begotten Son, by whom he made the ages. I know the One who said: "And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent." I believe also in one God, one beginning of all things, without beginning, uncreated, indestructible and immortal, eternal and everlasting, incomprehensible, incorporeal, invisible, uncircumscribed, without shape; one super-essential essence, a super-divine Godhead, in three persons, Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit; and to Him alone I serve, and to Him alone I offer the worship of latria. I worship one God, one Godhead, but also I worship a Trinity of persons: God the Father, and God the Son incarnate, and God the Holy Spirit; not by three

gods, but by one; not by divided hypostases, but by united ones. I do not offer three acts of worship, but one only. I do not offer one act of worship to each of the hypostases separately, but one to the three hypostases together, as to the one God. I do not worship the creature instead of the Creator, but I worship the Creator, who for my sake became what I am, and descended to the creature without humiliation or destruction, that He might glorify my nature and make it a partaker of the divine nature. Together with the King and God, I worship the purple of His body—not as a garment, nor as a ^B fourth person; far be it! But as something that has become co-divine, and remains inseparably what the One who anointed it is. For the divine nature did not become the nature of the flesh, but just as the Word became flesh without change, remaining what He was, so also the flesh became Word without losing what it is, but rather being identified with the Word according to hypostasis. Therefore, I boldly make an image of the invisible God, not as He is invisible, but because He became visible for our sake through participation in flesh and blood. I do not depict the invisible Godhead, but I depict the flesh of God that was seen. For if it is impossible to depict a soul, how much more so the One who gave to the soul its incorporeal nature?

7. But, they say, God said through Moses the lawgiver: “You shall worship the Lord your God, and Him only shall you serve.” And, “You shall not make any likeness ^C of things in heaven or on earth.” Brothers, those who do not know that the letter kills but the Spirit gives life are truly led astray—those who do not search for the Spirit hidden under the letter. To them I would rightly say: let Him who taught you this also teach you what follows. Learn how the lawgiver himself interprets this, saying to this effect in Deuteronomy: “And the Lord spoke to you from the midst of the fire: you heard a voice of words, and you saw no likeness, but only a voice.” And after a little: “And guard your souls carefully, because you saw no likeness on the day that the Lord spoke to you in Horeb on the mountain from the midst of the fire, lest you transgress and make for yourselves a graven image, any icon, a likeness of male or female, a likeness of any beast ^D that is on the earth, a likeness of any winged bird,” and so forth. And a little later: “Lest you raise your eyes to heaven, and when you see the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and all the host of heaven, you be led astray and worship them.”

^A Do you see that the purpose is that we should not worship the creature instead of the Creator, nor offer the worship of latria to anyone but the Creator alone? For this reason, he everywhere joins latria with worship. Again, he says, “There shall be no other gods for you besides me. You shall not make for yourself any carved image or any likeness; you shall not worship them, nor shall you serve them, for I am the Lord your God.” And again, “You shall tear down their altars, and break their pillars, and burn their carved images with fire; for you shall not worship any other god.” And after a few words, “And you shall not make for yourself gods made of molten metal.” Do you see how he forbids the making of images on account of idolatry? Because it is impossible to represent God, who is without quantity, without circumscription, and invisible. “For you saw no form of him,” he says. Just as Paul also, standing in the middle of the Areopagus, says, “Being then the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Divine Being is like gold or silver or stone, an image formed by the art and imagination of man.” ^B

8. These things, then, were commanded to the Jews because they were very prone to idolatry. But we, to whom it has been given—to use the words of the Theologian—to have abandoned the error of superstition and acknowledged the truth, to live purely and holily with God, to serve him alone, and to be enriched with the riches of the knowledge of God, and to attain to the perfect man, having passed beyond infancy, we are no longer under a pedagogue. For we have acquired from God the faculty and habit of discernment, and we know what can be depicted in an image and what may not be depicted by it. For the Law was our pedagogue toward Christ, that we might be justified by faith; and when we were infants, we were enslaved under the elements. But when faith has come, we are no longer under a pedagogue. ^C — “For you saw no form of him,” he says. O the wisdom of the Lawgiver! How shall the invisible be depicted? How shall that which is without quantity, without magnitude, without limit, and without form be described? How shall that which is incorporeal be painted with colors? How shall that which has no shape be fashioned into shape? What, then, is the mystery indicated in these passages? It is clearly this: at present, do not depict God, the invisible; but when you see the One who is incorporeal become man for your sake, then you shall make an image of his human form. Whenever the invisible becomes visible in the flesh, then you shall depict the likeness of the One who has been seen. When the One who is without quantity and without age and without magnitude by the excellence of his own nature—the One who exists in the form of God—takes the form of a servant, and is contracted ^D to this...

quantity and quality, and assumes the figure of a body, then depict him on panels and set him forth for the contemplation of him who deigned to be seen. Depict his ineffable condescension, his birth from the Virgin, his baptism in the Jordan, his transfiguration on Tabor, his sufferings that are the causes of impassibility, his miracles—the symbols of his divine nature and energy—effected through the ministry of flesh, the Savior’s saving burial, his resurrection, his ascension into heaven; describe all these things, both with words and with colors, in both books and on panels. ^A

^B "You shall not make for yourself," he says, "a graven image, nor any likeness." When God had commanded these things, "He made," he says, "the curtain of the tabernacle of testimony of blue, and purple, and scarlet twisted, and fine twined linen, a work of woven cherubim." And, "They made the mercy-seat above the ark of pure gold, and the two cherubim." What are you doing, O Moses? You command: "You shall not make for yourself a graven image, nor any likeness," and you construct a curtain—a work of woven cherubim—and two cherubim of pure gold? But listen to what Moses, the minister of God, replies to you regarding these matters. O blind and foolish ones, perceive the power of the words and guard your souls most diligently. I said: "You saw no likeness in the day that the Lord spoke to you in Horeb on the mountain from the midst of the fire, lest you should sin, and make for yourselves a graven likeness, any image; and you shall not make for yourselves molten gods." I did not say, "You shall not make an image of cherubim," as of servants standing by the mercy-seat, but, "You shall not make for yourselves molten gods," and, "You shall not make any likeness" as gods, and "You shall not serve the creature rather than the Creator." ^C Therefore, I did not make a likeness of God, nor indeed of any other thing as God, nor of man—for the nature of humanity had been enslaved to sin—nor did I serve the creature rather than the Creator, but I constructed the tabernacle as a likeness of the whole creation, "according to the pattern shown to me on the mountain," and the cherubim overshadowing the mercy-seat, as standing by God. Do you see how the intention of Scripture is revealed to those who investigate intelligently? For it is necessary to know, beloved, that in every matter one seeks the truth, and the falsehood, and the purpose of the one acting—whether it is good or evil. For in the Gospel, both God, and angel, and man, and earth, and water, and fire, and air, and sun, and moon, and light, and darkness, and Satan, and demons, and serpents, and scorpions, and life, and death, and ^D

^A virtues, and vices, and everything good and evil, are written. But yet, since the things that are said concerning them are true, and the purpose is for the glory of God and our salvation, and the glory of the saints who are glorified by Him, and the shame of the devil and his demons, we worship, and embrace, and kiss, and greet them with our eyes, and lips, and heart. Likewise also all the Old and New Testament, and the words of the holy and elect Fathers; but the shameful and vile and unclean writing of the cursed Manichaeans, containing the same words, and contrived for the glory of the devil and his demons, and to the destruction of souls, we spit upon and cast away. Thus also in the matter of images, one must investigate the truth and the intention of those who make them; and if it is true and right and for the glory of God and His saints, and for the zeal of virtue, and the avoidance of vice, and for the salvation of ^B souls, we ought to accept and honor them as images, and imitations, and likenesses, and books for the illiterate, and as reminders, and to worship, and kiss, and greet them with our eyes, and lips, and heart, as a likeness of the incarnate God, or of His Mother, or of the saints who are partners in His sufferings and glory, and have been victors and overcomers of the devil and his demons and their delusions. But if someone dares to make an image of the Godhead, which is far removed from matter and bodiless, we reject it as false; and if anyone does so for the glory and honor and worship of the devil or of demons, we spit upon it and consume it with fire. And if any of men, or beasts, or birds, or reptiles, or of any other creation should deify an image, we doom him to anathema. For just as the holy Fathers tore down the sacred shrines and temples of the demons, and in their places built temples in the name of God and the saints, and these we worship, so also they took away the images of the demons, and in their stead raised up images of Christ, and of His Mother, and of the saints, and these we worship. And in the Old Testament, Israel neither built temples in the name of men, nor was their commemoration celebrated; for the race of men was still under a curse, and death was a punishment; wherefore it was mourned, and he who touched the corpse of the dead was considered unclean. But now, since the Godhead has been inseparably united to our nature, like some life-giving and saving medicine, our nature has been glorified, and transformed unto incorruption; wherefore temples are raised to them, and images are painted. ^{C D}

^A For if anyone, out of divine longing and zeal for the glory and remembrance of Christ, or of His Mother, the holy Theotokos, or of any of the saints, and furthermore for the shame of the devil and his defeat, and the memory of the victory over him and his demons, should attempt to destroy an image fashioned with divine zeal and fervor—and does not rather, as one worthy of veneration—though not indeed as God—adore, honor, and embrace it with longing—he is an enemy of Christ, of the holy Theotokos, and of the saints, and an advocate for the devil and his demons, demonstrating by his action his distress that God and His saints are honored and glorified, while the devil is put to shame. For an image is a kind of triumph, a manifestation, and a monument, erected in memory of the victory of those who have acted with nobility and excellence, and for the everlasting disgrace of those who have been defeated and cast down. ^B I have often seen those who, when held by a longing for a friend, if they catch sight of his garment, will treat that garment with their eyes and lips exactly as if it were the friend himself. To everyone, according to the opinion of the holy Apostle Paul, we must render what is due: "To whom honor [is due], honor; to the king indeed as supreme, and to governors as sent through him," to each according to the measure of his dignity.

11. Where, I ask, in the Old Testament, or in the Gospel, wilt thou find the name of Trinity, or "consubstantial," or one nature of the Godhead clearly written, or the three hypostases in so many words, or one person of Christ, or two natures in so many words? ^C But, because the holy Fathers have defined all these things from words in Scripture having the same force, we accept them, and we anathematize those who do not accept them; and I demonstrate to thee that God in the Old Testament commanded that images be made. For first of all He commanded that the tabernacle, and all that was in it, be constructed. And in the Gospels the Lord Himself, to those who asked Him tempting Him: "Is it lawful to pay tribute to Caesar?" said, "Bring me the coin." And when they showed Him a denarius, He asked them, "Whose image hath it?" And they said, "Caesar's." And He said, "Render therefore the things that are Caesar's to Caesar; and the things that are God's, to God." Since it has the image of Caesar, it is Caesar's, and therefore render it to Caesar; and the image of Christ, ^D render to Christ; for it is Christ's.

12. The Lord, blessing His disciples, said: "Many kings and prophets have desired to see what you see, and have not seen, and to hear what you hear, and have not heard. But blessed are your eyes, because they see, and your ears, because they hear." The Apostles therefore saw Christ with their bodily eyes, and His sufferings, and His miracles, and heard His words; we too desire to see and to hear, and to be blessed. They saw face to face, because He was present bodily; but we, because He is not present bodily, just as we hear His words through books, we sanctify our hearing, and by

^A writing and images we behold the impression of His bodily character, and of His miracles and sufferings; and we are sanctified, and we are assured, and we rejoice, and we are blessed, and we revere, and we honor, and we worship His bodily character. And beholding His bodily character, we conceive as far as possible of the glory of His divinity. For since we are dual, fashioned of soul and body, and our soul is not naked, but is covered as if by a veil, it is impossible for us to reach the intelligible world apart from bodily things. Just as, therefore, we hear through sensible words with bodily ears and understand spiritual things, so through bodily contemplation we advance to spiritual contemplation. For this reason Christ assumed both body and soul, because man consists of body and soul. For this reason also baptism is dual, consisting of water and Spirit, as is the communion, and prayer, and the singing of psalms—all things are dual, ^B bodily and spiritual; and likewise lights and incense.

13. But the devil, leaving all other things aside, has set upon images alone; and so great is his envy against images that it is even written thus in the *Spiritual Meadow* of the holy Sophronius, patriarch of Jerusalem: "Abba Theodore the Aeliote related that there was a certain recluse on the Mount of Olives, a man distinguished in spiritual warfare, whom the demon of lust was attacking in every way. When on one particular day he was pressing him more fiercely than usual, the old man began to lament and to say to the demon: 'How long until you cease troubling me? Depart from me at last; you have grown old with me.' The demon manifested himself to him visibly, saying: 'Swear to me that you will tell no one what I am about to say to you, and I will trouble you no more.' The old man swore to him, saying: 'By Him who dwells in the highest, I will tell no one that which you shall say to me.' Then the demon said to him: 'Do not worship this image, and I will trouble you no more.' Now the image had ^C an engraving of our Lady, the holy Mary, the Theotokos, carrying our Lord Jesus Christ. See whom those who forbid the worship of images imitate, and whose instruments they are; for the demon of lust preferred that the old man should cease from worshipping the image of our Lady, rather than that he should fall into the uncleanness of lust, knowing this sin to be far graver than fornication."

14. But since the discussion is about an image and worship, come, let us examine these matters more broadly and carefully. And let us say first, what an image is; second, for what reason an image is made; third, ^D how many are the kinds of images;

^A fourth, what can and what cannot be expressed by images; fifth, who was the first author of images.

15. Likewise concerning adoration: first, what adoration is; second, how many are the modes of adoration; third, how many are those things to which we read in Scripture that adoration was exhibited; fourth, that all adoration is referred to God, who by His own nature is to be adored; fifth, that the adoration applied to an image is reduced to Him whom it represents.

1° What an image is. 16. An image is therefore a likeness, an exemplar, and an effigy of something, showing in itself that which is imaged. Yet an image is not in all respects like the exemplar—that is, the thing it represents—because an image is one thing, and that which is imaged is another; and there is necessarily some difference observed between the two, since if there were none, the one would not be a different thing from the other. ^B For example, the image of a man, even if it expresses the figure of the body, yet does not encompass the faculties of the soul. For it does not live, nor does it speak, nor does it feel, nor does it move a limb. Furthermore, even the Son, being the natural image of the Father, nonetheless differs somewhat from Him. For He is the Son, and not the Father.

2° For what reason an image is instituted. 17. Every image is an unfolding and a manifestation of what is hidden. For example: because man, ^C since his soul is covered by the body, does not possess knowledge of the invisible thing, nor of those things that are to come after him, nor of those things that are distant and far off in place—inasmuch as he is circumscribed by place and time—for this reason, in order that he might be directed in the knowledge of things, and so that hidden things might be declared and made manifest, the image was devised. And this was surely for the sake of utility, beneficence, and salvation, so that from the things shown and revealed we might discern those things which lie hidden, and might then pursue and emulate the good things, and avoid and flee from the contrary things, that is, the evil ones.

3° How many are the kinds of images. 18. Furthermore, these are the differences of images. The first, then, is the natural image. ^D For in every thing it is necessary in the first place that it exist according to its own nature, and then afterwards by institution and imitation. Thus it is necessary that a man exist first according to his nature, and then afterward 7

^A a natural and unvarying image of the invisible God, the Son of the Father, showing the Father within Himself. "For no one has ever seen God." And again: "Not that anyone has seen the Father." But that the Son is the image of the Father, the Apostle says: "Who is the image of the invisible God." And to the Hebrews: "Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his substance." And that He shows the Father in Himself, the Gospel according to John testifies, where to Philip, who says, "Show us the Father, and it is enough for us," the Lord replies: "Have I been so long with you, and you have not known me, Philip? He who sees me has seen the Father." ^B Therefore the Son is a natural, unvarying image of the Father, in all things like unto the Father, except for unbegottenness and fatherhood. For the Father is an unbegotten begetter; the Son is begotten and not the Father; and the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son: "For no one can say that Jesus is Lord, except by the Holy Spirit." Through the Holy Spirit, therefore, we know Christ, the Son of God and God, and in the Son we behold the Father; for the Word is naturally the announcer of the thought, and the Spirit is the manifestation of the Word. And the Holy Spirit is also a like and unvarying image of the Son, having the difference only in that He proceeds. For the Son is begotten, but not proceeding. And for every father, the son is a natural image; and this is the first mode of the image, the natural one.

^C 19. The second mode of image is the concept in God of the things that are to be by His hand; that is, His pre-eternal will, which always exists in the same way; for the Divine is immutable, and His will is without beginning, by which, according to what He willed pre-eternally, the things determined by Him come to pass at the time foreordained by Him; for the images and patterns of the things to be by Him are nothing else than the notion of each one of them, which are also called "predefinitions" by Saint Dionysius. For in His counsel those things which were foreordained by Him, and were immutably to be, were characterized and imaged before they came into being.

20. The third mode of image is that which is made by God according to imitation, that is, man. For how could that which is created be of the same nature as the Uncreated, ^D except by imitation? For just as the Father is mind, and the Son is the Word, and the Holy Spirit is one God, so too mind, and word, and spirit are one man. And also on account of the faculty of free will and the authority to command, he imitates God. For God says: "Let us make man according to our image and likeness." And He immediately added: "And let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds

of the heaven, and over all the earth, and have dominion over it."

21. The fourth type of image is that of Scripture, which fashions and forms figures, shapes, and types of invisible and incorporeal things in a corporeal manner, so that we may at least attain a dim understanding of God and the angels; for we are unable to contemplate incorporeal things without shapes that correspond to us, as the great master of divine things, Dionysius the Areopagite, teaches us. For if one were to ask why types and shapes of things that have no type or shape have been rightly set before us, he would say that the sole reason is our own nature, which is unable to rise directly to intelligible contemplations and stands in need of proper and related analogies. If, therefore, the divine Word, in caring for our nature, provides for us from all sides that which leads us upward, and clothes with types those things that are simple and formless, why should it not depict by image things that are shaped by their own nature, which we desire indeed, but because they are absent, are unable to see? For ^B the divinely eloquent Gregory says that however much the mind labors to leave behind corporeal things, it is utterly unable to do so: "But the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." We also see in created things images which dimly indicate to us the divine manifestations; as when we say that the holy and pre-eternal Trinity is depicted by the sun, the light, and the ray; or by a fountain, the stream flowing from the fountain, and the flow; or by our own mind, word, and spirit; or by the rose plant, the flower, and the fragrance.

22. The fifth type of image is said to be that which prefigures and foreshows things to come, as the bush and the rain upon the fleece signified the Virgin and Theotokos, and the rod and the jar; and as the serpent of bronze prefigured the one who destroyed for us through the cross the bite of the original evil serpent; ^C and as the sea, the water, and the cloud prefigured the Spirit of baptism.

23. The sixth type of image is that which is for the remembrance of things that have happened, whether of a miracle or of a virtue, for the glory, honor, and commemoration of those who have excelled and distinguished themselves in virtue, or of wickedness, for the triumph and shame of the most wicked men, for the benefit of those who see them in the future; so that we may flee from evils and emulate virtues. This type is twofold: it is done through the word written in books—for the writing depicts the word, just as God engraved the law upon the tablets and commanded that the lives of God-loving men be written down—and through sensible contemplation, as the jar and the rod ^D

were commanded to be placed in the ark, as a memorial. Moreover, He commanded that the names of the tribes be inscribed upon the stones of the ephod, and also that twelve stones be taken up from the Jordan to serve as a type for the priests (O the mystery! How great this is for the faithful in truth!), those who carry the ark and who signify the drying up of the waters. Thus, even now, we record the images of the deeds of virtuous men for the sake of zeal, memory, and love. Either, therefore, do away with every image, and enact laws against the One who commanded these things to be done, or accept each one according to its own reason and manner. ^B

Fourthly, what is represented, what cannot be represented, and how each thing is represented.

24. Bodies, possessing as they do shape and bodily outline and color, are not inconsistently depicted by images. But an angel, a soul, and a demon, although they possess nothing corporeal or dense, are nevertheless by their own nature formed and circumscribed. For, being intellectual, they are believed to exist and act intellectually in intelligible places. Thus, they are fashioned after the manner of bodies, just as Moses depicted the Cherubim, and as they showed themselves to those worthy to behold them, so that the bodily image might set forth a certain incorporeal and intelligible contemplation. But the divine nature alone is uncircumscribed, entirely without form, shapeless, and incomprehensible; even if divine Scripture assigns certain bodily forms to God, it does so in appearance, so that shapes are seen, and these are incorporeal. For they were not seen by bodily eyes, but by the intellectual eyes of the prophets and of those to whom they were revealed; for they were not visible to all. To speak briefly, we are able to make images of all the forms we have seen; but we understand these as they have been seen. For even if we sometimes comprehend shapes by means of words, yet we arrive at the understanding of them from what we have seen. Thus, it is the same with every sense: from what we have smelled, tasted, or touched, we arrive by way of reason at the contemplation of these things. ^C

25. We know, therefore, that it is impossible to behold the nature of God, the soul, or the demon; however, we contemplate them through a certain transformation, since divine Providence assigns types and shapes to incorporeal things—things that have no bodily shape—in order that we may be guided and arrive at an understanding of them that is gross and partial, so that we may not be in total ^D

ignorance of God and of created incorporeal beings. ^A For God is by nature and absolutely incorporeal; but angel, soul, and demon, when compared with God, who alone is incomparable, are bodies; yet when compared with material bodies, they are incorporeal. Since, therefore, God did not wish us to be entirely ignorant of incorporeal things, He clothed them in types, shapes, and images, in accordance with the proportion of our own nature—that is, bodily shapes seen in an immaterial vision of the mind; and these we shape and depict. For how were the Cherubim shaped and depicted? Furthermore, Holy Scripture possesses shapes and images of God.

Who first made an image.

26. ^B God Himself first begot His only-begotten Son and Word, a living image of Himself, natural, an unchanging seal of His own eternity; and He made man according to His own image and likeness. And Adam saw God, and heard the sound of His footsteps as He walked in the afternoon, and hid himself in paradise; and Jacob saw and wrestled with God. It is evident that God appeared to him as a man. And Moses saw Him as the back parts of a man; and Isaiah saw Him as a man sitting upon a throne; and Daniel saw a likeness of a man, and one coming as the Son of ^C Man to the Ancient of Days; and no one has seen the nature of God, but the type and the image of Him who was to come. For the Son and Word of God, who is invisible, was about to become man in truth, so that He might be united to our nature and be seen upon earth. Therefore, all those who saw the type and image of the One who was to come worshipped Him, just as Paul the apostle says in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "In faith all these died, not having received the promises, but seeing them from afar, and having greeted them." [Heb. XI, 13] Shall I, then, not make an image of Him who for my sake was seen in the nature of flesh? Shall I not worship and honor Him through the honor and worship rendered to His image? ^D Abraham saw, not the nature of God—for "no man has seen God at any time"—but an image of God, and falling down, he worshipped. Jesus, the son of Nave, saw, not the nature of an angel, but an image; for the nature of an angel is not visible to bodily eyes; and falling down, he worshipped. Likewise also Daniel. But the angel is not God, but a creature and a servant of God and an attendant; yet he worshipped, not as God, but as God's attendant and minister. And shall I not make images of the friends of Christ? And shall I not worship them, not as gods, but as images of the friends of God? For neither did Jesus nor Daniel worship the angels who appeared to them as gods; nor do I worship the image as God, but through the image and the saints, I worship God.

I offer worship and honor, on account of whom I also venerate His friends and treat them with reverence. God was not united by nature to angels, but He was united to the nature of men. God did not become an angel, but God became man by nature and in truth. "For surely it is not angels that He helps, but He helps the offspring of Abraham" (Heb. II, 16). The nature of angels did not become [His]. [He is] the Son of God by hypostasis, but the nature of man became [His]. [He is] the Son of God by hypostasis. Angels did not partake of, nor did they become partakers of, the divine nature, but only of its operation and grace. Men, however, partake and become partakers of the divine nature, all those who partake of the holy body of Christ and drink His blood. For it is united to the Godhead by hypostasis, and the two natures are united in the body of Christ which we partake of, inseparably by hypostasis. And we partake of both natures: of the body corporeally, [and] of the Godhead spiritually—or rather both in both ways. Not that we are identified by hypostasis (for we exist first, and then are joined), but by the ^B tempering of blood and body. And how are they not greater than the angels, who through the keeping of the commandments preserve this pure and inviolate union? Our nature, whether because it is mortal or because of the dense constitution of the body, is inferior to the angels; but by the kindness and union of God, it has become greater than the angels. For angels stand by it with fear and trembling, as it sits upon the throne of glory in Christ, and they will be present, struck with terror, in the judgment; they were not [described by Scripture] as sitting with ^C it, nor were they called partakers of the divine glory. "For are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for the sake of those who are to inherit salvation?" (Hebr. I, 14). Nor that they will reign together, nor that they will be glorified together, nor finally that they will sit at the table of the Father. But the holy are sons of God, sons of the kingdom, and heirs of God, and co-heirs of Christ (Rom. VIII, 17). Therefore I venerate the holy, and I praise with like honors the servants, and friends, and co-heirs of Christ: servants, I say, by nature; friends, by the purpose of free will; and sons and heirs, by divine grace, as the Lord said when speaking to the Father (Joan. XVII, 22).

Having spoken, therefore, about the image, we must now speak ^D of adoration; and first, what adoration is.

On adoration. What adoration is.

27. Adoration is thus a sign of subjection, that is to say, of submission and humiliation. But there are many modes of adoration.

How many modes of adoration there are.

28. The first mode of adoration is that which is by

^A way of service; for all created things adore Him ^B as servants adore their Master; for the Scripture says, "For all things are Thy servants" (Ps. CXVIII, 91); and some adore Him willingly, others unwillingly; some, indeed, who are religious, adore Him willingly with knowledge, while others, though they recognize Him, adore Him unwillingly and against their will, like the demons; others, again, not knowing Him who is by nature God, adore Him unwillingly, Him whom they do not know.

29. The second mode is that which we offer through admiration and affection, in which way we adore God on account of His natural glory. For He alone possesses glory, which He has from no one, but He Himself is the cause of all glory and of every good; as being incomprehensible light, ineffable sweetness, incomparable beauty, an abyss of goodness, unsearchable wisdom, infinite power; being, therefore, the only one who of Himself is worthy to be admired, adored, praised, and desired. ^B

30. The third mode is that of thanksgiving for the good things that have come to us. For all things that exist owe thanks to God, and owe Him perpetual adoration, because all things have their being from Him and subsist in Him (Colos. I, 17), and He imparts His gifts abundantly to all, even without being asked, and wills that all should be saved (1 Tim. II, 4) and partake of His goodness; and He is long-suffering towards us when we sin; and He makes His sun to rise on the just and the unjust, and rains upon the good and the evil (Matth. V, 45). And furthermore, because the Son of God became like us for our sake, and made us partakers of the divine nature (II Petr. I, 4), so that "we shall be like Him," as John the Theologian says in his Catholic Epistle (I Joan. III, 2). ^C

31. The fourth mode is that which is by way of need and the hope of benefits; whereby, recognizing that we can do nothing without Him, nor possess any good, we adore Him, each of us asking from Him that which he feels he is in need of, and what he desires, whether it be to be delivered from evils, or to obtain good things.

32. The fifth mode is that of repentance and confession; for when we sin, we adore and fall down before God, begging for the forgiveness of our trespasses, as good and grateful servants. And this mode is also threefold. For it is either because of love... ^D

and desire for God Himself, and an affection of the soul; the second is mercenary; and the third is servile ^A. How many things we find in Scripture to which adoration is offered, and in how many ways we offer adoration to creatures.

33. First, indeed, are those in whom God, who alone is holy, finds rest, and rests in the saints, as in the blessed Theotokos and all the saints. These are they who have made every effort to become like unto God, both by their own deliberate choice and by the indwelling and cooperation of God; who are truly called gods, not by nature, but by institution; just as ignited iron is called fire, not by nature but by institution, and by participation in fire. For He says: "Be ^B holy, for I am holy." This comes first from the choice of the will; then, to everyone who chooses the good, God cooperates for the perfecting of the good; then, "I will dwell in them, and walk among them," and, "We are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in us." Furthermore: "He gave them power against unclean spirits, so as to cast them out, and to heal every disease and every infirmity." And, "What I do, you also will do, and greater than these you will do." Furthermore: "As I live, says the Lord, those who glorify me I will glorify." And, "If we suffer with Him, that we may also be glorified with Him." And, "God stood in the congregation of the gods; in the midst, He judges ^C the gods." Just as, therefore, they are truly gods, not by nature, but as participants of Him who is God by nature, so they are likewise to be adored: not because they are to be adored by their own nature, but because they have within themselves Him who is to be adored by His own nature. Ignited iron, by its own nature, is not such that it cannot be touched, but because it has become a participant of fire, whose nature it is to burn. They are adored, therefore, in so far as they have obtained glory from God, and because they have received from Him that they should be terrible to adversaries and beneficial ^D to those who fly to them for refuge: indeed, as God's servants and ministers, who because of their love for Him have free access to Him. Wherefore we adore them, because the King Himself is honored when his servant, whom He loves, is seen to be adored, not as a king, but as an obedient minister and a benevolent friend; and they who approach with faith receive their petitions, whether the servant asks this from the King, or whether the King accepts the honor and the faith of one who asks from His servant; for he has asked in His name. Thus, through the apostles, those who approached Jesus were healed. Thus the shadow, and the handkerchiefs, and the aprons of the apostles brought forth healings. But as many as wish to be adored as gods in a rebellious and apostate manner, these are not to be adored, and are worthy of eternal fire. And as many as

^A with a disdainful and proud spirit do not adore the servants of God, they are condemned as arrogant and proud, and indeed as impious toward God Himself. I call as witnesses those children who, shouting in contempt against Elisha, were torn apart by bears 15.

34. The second mode is that by which we adore created things, through which and in which God has wrought our salvation, whether before the coming of the Lord or after His incarnate dispensation; such as Mount Sinai, and Nazareth, the manger in Bethlehem, and the cave, the holy Golgotha, the wood of the Cross, the nails, the sponge, the reed, the holy and saving lance, the garment, the tunic, the linens, the swaddling clothes, the holy tomb, the source of our resurrection, the stone of the tomb, Sion the holy mountain, again the Mount of Olives, the Sheep Pool, and the sacred garden of Gethsemane. These and such things I revere and adore, and every holy temple of God, and everything by which God is named—not because of their own nature, but because they are vessels of divine energy, and through them and in them God has saw fit to work out our salvation. ^B For also angels, and men, and all matter participant in divine energy, and having ministered to my salvation, I revere and adore because of the divine energy. I do not adore the Jews; for they are not participants in divine energy, nor with the intention of my salvation did they crucify the Lord of glory, my God, but rather out of envy and hatred toward the God who had merited well of them, they were moved. "Lord, I have loved the beauty of thy house, and the place of the habitation of thy glory," says David 16. And: "Adore at the place where his feet have stood 17." And: "Adore at his holy mountain 18." The holy and animate mountain of God is the holy Theotokos; the mountains of God endowed with reason are the apostles: "The mountains skipped like rams, and the hills like lambs of the flock 19."

35. The third mode is that by which we adore things consecrated to God, I mean the holy Gospels and the other books: "For they were written for our instruction, upon whom the ends of the ages have come 20." Likewise, patens and chalices, censers, lamps, and tables, for it is clear that ^C all these are worthy of reverence; for see how, when Baltassar caused the people to be served with the sacred vessels, ^D God destroyed his kingdom 21.

36. The fourth mode is that by which those images which were seen by the prophets are adored (for in an imagistic manner...

naria visione Deum cernebant), and the images of things to come, such as Aaron’s rod ^A signifying the mystery of the Virgin, and the jar, and the table. And Jacob worshipped at the top of the rod, which was a figure of the Saviour. And images of things that have taken place exist as a memorial; but the tabernacle itself was an image of the whole world. For God said to Moses: "See the exemplar that was shown to you on the mountain." In like manner, the golden Cherubim, a molten work, and the Cherubim on the veil were a woven work. Thus also we worship the precious sign of the Cross, and the likeness of the bodily character of my God, and of her who gave birth to him according to the flesh, and of all his servants.

37. The fifth mode is that by which we worship one another, as we are partakers ^B of God and have been created in the image of God, and, humble towards one another, we fulfill the law of charity.

38. The sixth mode is that which we show to those set in principalities and powers. For he says: "Render to all their dues: honor to whom honor is due." Thus Jacob worshipped his brother Esau, who was older by birth, and Pharaoh, a ruler appointed by God.

39. The seventh mode is that by which servants worship their masters, and those who benefit from benefactors, and those in need from those who can help them, as Abraham worshipped the sons of Hemor, when he bought the double cave from them.

40. Finally, to speak briefly, worship ^C is a symbol of fear, and love, and honor, and also of submission and humility. But one must not worship anyone as God, except the one who is by nature God, but one must render to all their due honor for the sake of the Lord.

41. Consider how much strength, and what kind of divine energy, is given to those who approach the images of the saints with faith and a pure conscience. Wherefore, brothers, let us stand upon the rock of the faith and the traditions of the Church, not moving the boundaries which our holy Fathers have set; not giving place to those who are desirous of new things, and who ^D strive to demolish the building of the holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of God. For if license of such a kind is given to anyone who wishes it, the whole body of the Church will gradually be destroyed. By no means, brothers, by no means, beloved children of the Church; spare the modesty of your mother. Do not despoil her of her adornment. Receive her, for she speaks to you through me. Learn what God says concerning her: "Thou art all fair, my beloved, and there is no blemish in thee."

^A Let us adore and worship the Creator and Maker alone, as God to be worshiped by nature. Let us also adore the holy Theotokos, not as God, but as Mother of God according to the flesh; further, let us adore the saints as chosen friends of God, and as those who possess boldness of access to Him. For if men adore kings—often corruptible, impious, and sinful—as well as the magistrates appointed by them, and their images, in accordance with the divine apostolic maxim: "Be subject to principalities and powers," ^B and "Render to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor," and as the Lord saith, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s"—how much more ought we to adore the King of Kings, who alone is Lord by nature, and His servants and friends, who have reigned over the passions and have been established as rulers of all the earth? "For Thou shalt make them princes over all the earth," says David. They have received authority against demons and diseases, and shall reign with Christ in an incorruptible and indissoluble kingdom; for their very shadow once drove away diseases and demons. Let us not, therefore, deem the image weaker or more dishonorable than a shadow; for it truly portrays the prototype. Brothers, the Christian is defined by faith. Therefore, he who approaches with faith shall gain much, but he who wavers is like a wave of the sea, driven by the wind and tossed; he shall receive nothing. For all the saints through faith pleased God. Let us, then, receive the tradition of the ^C Church in uprightness of heart, and not in many reasonings. "For God made man upright, but they have sought out many schemes." Let us not accept to learn a new faith, as if the tradition of the holy Fathers were condemned. For the divine Apostle says: "If any man preach to you a gospel other than that which you have received, let him be anathema." We adore the images, then, not offering adoration to the material, but through them to those who are depicted in them. "For the honor of the image passes to the prototype," as the divine Basil says.

42. ^D As for you, O most holy flock of Christ, O people distinguished by the name of Christ, O holy nation, O body of the Church, may Christ Himself fill you with the joy of His resurrection, and may He make you worthy, as you tread in the footsteps of the holy pastors and teachers of the Church, to attain to His glory in the splendors of the saints.

May it be granted to us to attain to this by His grace, praising Him forever with the Father who is without beginning, to whom is glory unto the ages of ages. Amen.

Having spoken concerning the distinction between idols and images, and having taught the definition of images, it is time that we present the testimonies, as we promised.

Testimonies of ancient and approved holy Fathers in favor of images.

^A From St. Dionysius, Bishop of Athens, from the letter to John the Apostle and Theologian. « Visible things are truly manifest images of invisible things. »

From the same, from the book on the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. « But the substances and orders that are above us, which I have already mentioned as sacred, are incorporeal; and their sacred teaching is spiritual, and superior to the world. But our own, because of the variety of sensible signs, we see multiplied in a manner consonant with us; by these, however, as is fitting for a sacred teaching, we are raised up, according to our measure, to the uniform grace of the granted divinity, and even to God and divine virtue. They, indeed, as being minds, understand as far as it is permitted them; but we, through sensible images, are led forward, as far as is possible, to divine contemplations. »

^B

Commentary.

From St. Basil, from the sermon on the blessed martyr Barlaam, the beginning of which is: « Primum quidem sanctorum mors, » and towards the end of the sermon.

« Arise now, O excellent painters of brave deeds! Magnify with your arts the image of the general which has been cut short. Make brilliant with the colors of your wisdom the crowned victor whom I have depicted more obscurely. May I depart vanquished by you through your painting of the martyr's noble deeds. May I rejoice today to be overcome by such a victory through your dexterity. Let me behold the hand that fought against the fire depicted more accurately. Let me behold the athlete described more elegantly on your tablet. Let the demons also mourn now, struck by your painting of the martyr's noble deeds. Let the burning, victorious hand be shown to them again. Indeed, let Christ, the judge of the contests, be painted on your tablet. » ^D

VARIOUS READINGS

From the same, from his discourse on the forty holy martyrs.

From the same, from his Thirty Chapters on the Holy Spirit to Amphilochius, eighteen responses.

Commentary.

From Saint Gregory of Nyssa, from a discourse delivered at Constantinople, concerning the divinity of the Son and the Spirit, and on Abraham, discourse 44, which begins: “What happens to those who are fond of viewing the blooming meadows,” and a little further on.

From Saint John Chrysostom, from the commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews.

colors itself. The things themselves finally point to the future age. Therefore, the Old Testament is the figure of a figure; but the New Testament is the figure of the realities themselves.

From Severianus, Bishop of Gabala, from a sermon on the dedication of the precious and life-giving Cross.

^B “How, then, did the image of the cursed thing bring salvation to the people who were tossed about by disasters? Would it not have been more credible to say: ‘If any of you is bitten, let him look up to heaven toward God, and he shall be saved,’ or ‘to the tabernacle of God’? But, overlooking these, he set up only the image of the Cross. Why, then, did Moses do these things, he who had previously said to the people: *You shall not make for yourself a graven image, nor a molten image, nor any likeness of those things which are in heaven above, or which are in the earth beneath, or which are in the waters under the earth?* But why do I say these things to an ungrateful people? Tell me, O most faithful minister of God, what you forbid to others, do you yourself do? What you tear down, do you set up? You who command, ‘You shall not make a graven image,’ you who smashed the molten calf, do you yourself fashion a serpent of bronze? And that not secretly, but openly and visible to all? But those things, he says, I commanded in the law, that I might cut off the roots of impiety and lead the people away from all apostasy and idolatry. But now I cast the serpent for a useful purpose, to prefigure the truth. And just as I erected the tabernacle, and all things that are in it, and also the Cherubim, a likeness of the invisible things, I spread out in the Holy of Holies, that they might be a type and shadow of things to come, so also I set up the serpent for the salvation of the people, that by the experience of these things they might be better trained to receive the image of the sign of the Cross, and to receive the crucified Savior and Redeemer. That this is most true you will perceive, dearest one, if you listen to Christ confirming it and saying in these words: *And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of Man be lifted up; that everyone who believes in him may not perish, but have everlasting life.*”

Comment.

From the Life of Saint John Chrysostom.

weakness of his body, for a short time; for he was keeping more vigils than nature allows. And when he was going through his Epistles, he would gaze intently at it, and would attend to it as if he were alive; praising him, he kept his whole mind directed toward it, imagining him and conversing with him through contemplation.” And after a few words: “When Proclus had ceased speaking, having gazed at the icon of the Apostle and having seen his likeness, similar to the one he had seen, he offered reverence to John, and pointing with his finger to the icon, he said: ‘Forgive me, Father; he whom I saw speaking with you is like this one; so I suppose that it is he himself.’”

From the Religious History of Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrrhus, in the Life of Saint Simeon the Stylite.

“For it is superfluous to speak about Italy. For they say that in the most ample city of Rome this man was so celebrated, that in the vestibules and above the doorways of all the workshops they set up small icons of him, from which they procured for themselves a certain protection and security.” ^B

Of Saint Basil, from his commentary on Isaiah.

“As soon as he saw man, who was fashioned unto the image and likeness of God, since he could not turn his strength against God, he poured out his own malice against the image of God. Just as if someone, being overcome by anger, were to stone an icon, since he cannot reach the emperor, he strikes the wood that bears the likeness.”

Comment: In a similar way, whoever honors an icon, he is clearly honoring the archetype.

Of the same, from the same commentary.

“For just as he who has treated an imperial icon with indignity is judged as having sinned against the emperor himself, so clearly he is guilty of sin who treats with indignity one who has been fashioned in the image [of God].” ^C

Of Saint Athanasius, from the one hundred chapters written to Antiochus the prefect, by way of question and answer, chapter 38.

Answer: “We faithful do not worship the icons as gods ^D […].”

God forbid!—but we manifest only the relationship and the longing of our love toward the character of the person depicted in the icon. Hence, when the character is worn away, we burn the wood as useless material, as we would any other. Therefore, just as Jacob, when he was about to die, worshipped at the tip of Joseph’s staff, ^A not honoring the staff itself but Him who held it, so we Christians honor the icons in no other way, just as we often kiss our children and parents, in order that we might manifest the longing of our soul. For just as the Jew worshipped the tablets of the Law and the two golden, carved Cherubim, not by honoring the nature of the stone and gold, but the Lord Himself who had commanded them to be made.”

Saint Chrysostom, on the Third Psalm, on David and Absalom.

“Imperators erect triumphal statues for their generals by whose aid victory has been obtained; and leaders erect for charioteers and athletes certain pillars adorned with the insignia of victory, and by an inscription, as if with a crown, they make the material a herald of the victory. Others again describe the praises of the victors in books and writings, desiring that their own force in speaking be shown to be superior to the courage of those whom they praise. And scribes, painters, sculptors, peoples, leaders, cities, and regions hold their victors worthy of admiration. But no one has ever painted the icons of one who flees or declines battle.” ^B

Saint Cyril of Alexandria, from the Allocution to the Emperor Theodosius.

“Moreover, icons are similar to their archetypal patterns; for it is right that they should be thus, and not otherwise.”

Of the same, from the Treasures.

“For icons always keep a relationship of likeness to their archetypes.”

Of the same, from the work, ‘That in all the volumes of Moses the mystery of Christ is indicated; on Abraham and Melchizedek, chapter 6.’

“It is altogether necessary that icons be painted according to their archetypes.”

Saint Gregory Nazianzen, from the second oration on the Son.

“For such is the nature of an icon, to be an imitation of the archetype of which it is said to be the icon.” ^C

Chrysostom, from the third homily on the Epistle to the Colossians.

“The icon of an invisible thing is itself also invisible, otherwise it would not be an icon. For the icon, inasmuch as it is an icon, must—even among us—be without variation, being that which is the expressed figure of the likeness.” ^D

^A From the same, from the commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. xvii. “Just as in icons the icon bears the figure of the human, but not his strength; so the truth and the figure share in one another, for the figure is equal.”

Eusebius of Pamphilus, from the fifth book of the Evangelical Demonstrations, on the text: “God appeared to Abraham by the oak of Mambre.” ^B

“Whence, even now, among those dwelling thereabouts, as if it were a divine place, it is venerated in honor of those who appeared there to Abraham, and the terebinth that remains to this day is still looked upon, and those who were received as guests by Abraham are set forth in a painting: two on either side, and in the middle the superior one, excelling in honor. This should be taken to be the Lord Himself, our Savior, whom even the ignorant worship, being confirmed by the divine oracles. For this very One, Himself, sowing from that time the seeds of piety among men, putting on human appearance and form, revealed Himself to the God-loving forefather Abraham, whoever he might have been, and delivered to him the knowledge of the Father.”

From the Chronography of John ^C of Antioch, also called Malalas, concerning the woman with the issue of blood, and the statue which she erected to Christ the Savior.

“From that time also John the Baptist became manifest to men, and Herod beheaded him.”

^D NOTE (28) Zinus: who believe in divine oracles. But I hold it for certain that these were neither Jews nor Christians, but pagans or Idumeans, who held to ancient tradition rather than believing the sayings of Scripture.

(29) From the Chronography of John. Concerning the statue at Paneas, the uncertain author of the Chronographic Demonstration of the origins of Constantinople, which Combefis published in his *Manipulus*, reports it as received from Eusebius and John, whom he calls the Hesitant, or of the sect of the Acephali; whom he subsequently claims to have revealed that that woman with the issue of blood was named Berenice. Whence it is necessary either that John the Hesitant wrote similar things, or that this anonymous author did not differ from John Malalas, a writer of a later age. For the history of the Hesitant, as Photius witnesses, cod. 41, began from the reign of Theodosius the elder, and did not extend beyond the times of Justin I; whence it appears he was none other than John the Rhetor, whom Evagrius and others cite. But the history of Malalas extended from the beginning of the world until the death of Justinian the elder. Indeed, many things are cited here and there by authors as having been accepted from the Hesitant, which Malalas does not have. As far as I understand, what John Malalas recounts of Berenice, he received from Clement the historiographer, whom he cites a little later. Of this Clement, Suidas has this: he says, Clement the historian wrote of the Roman emperors and empires, and likewise to Jerome concerning the Isocratic figures, and other things. The most learned Hody argues that Clement wrote after the seventh century, because Combefis, in his annotations on the Anonymous just mentioned, in that place of the Origins of Constantinople where it is said that Clement handed down that the statues of the son of Constantius were similar to those of the Theodosians, conjectured that it was a discourse about Constantine Pogonatus, son of Constans. But it would have been more natural to attribute them to Constantine the Great, who is commonly called by the Byzantines *Constantine son of Constantius*, that is, Chlorus, as Codinus, page 7, [says]. Nowhere would you find Constans, the parent of Pogonatus, called Constantius without error; but well [would you find] Constantine, as we have said elsewhere. Moreover, I am advised by the most learned and friendly R. P. D. Anselmo Banduri that it should be read: *Clement says that the marble statues of various forms were of Constans son of Constantine*. The same Clement was cited by a certain Hesychius in a fragment which the celebrated Ducange gave in Greek and Latin after the *Chronicon Paschale*, in which almost the same words are read as those which Malalas had at the beginning of book X, *Of the nativity of the Lord*. Furthermore, that Hesychius did not copy Malalas, but is earlier than him, I would conclude from the fact that he affirms it to be the common opinion of authors that Christ was born six thousand years after the creation of the world, with very few assigning this to the year circa [the birth]. For at least from the end of the sixth century and thereafter, the common opinion in the East was that the Lord was born in the year of the world 5500, or 5504, or 5508, as is evident from Anastasius II of Antioch, hom. on the *Hexaemeron*, from the Quinisext Council, can. 5, from Saint Maximus, George Syncellus, Theophanes, and a certain unknown Eusebius, whose fragment

^A in the royal province of Trachonitis, in the city called Sebaste, he cut off on the 25th of May, in the consulship of Flaccus and Ruffinus. King Herod, the son of Philip, taking this ill, returned from Judea. And immediately a certain wealthy woman approached him, named Berenice, who dwelt in that same city of Paneas. For because she had been healed by Jesus, she desired to erect a statue to Him, but not daring to do so without royal permission, she gave a petition to King Herod, asking to erect a golden statue to Christ the Savior in her own city. Which petition was as follows: ^B “To Augustus Herod, toparch and lawgiver of both Jews and Greeks, King of Trachonitis, the petition and entreaty of Berenice, a distinguished woman of the city of Paneas. Justice and humanity, and the other virtues, crown your head like a wreath; wherefore, knowing this, I write to you, having conceived good hope of obtaining everything. What the reason for this introduction is, the course of the discourse will explain. ^C From my earliest youth I suffered from an issue of blood, and having exhausted my living and my wealth on physicians, I found no cure. But having heard of the miraculous healings of the wondrous Christ—how He raises the dead, calling them back to the light, and drives demons out of the bodies of mortals, and heals all who are wasted with disease by a word—I ran to Him as to God. And having considered the multitude that surrounded Him, fearing that, loathing the impurity of my ailment, He might be angry with me and the plague of my disease might become worse, I reasoned with myself that if I could but touch the fringe of His garment, I should be saved. And having touched it, the fountain of my blood was stanched, and I was made whole immediately. But He, as one who had foreseen the deliberations of my heart, cried out, ‘Who touched me? Power has gone out from me.’ Then I, turning pale and groaning, thinking that the disease would return upon me, more brazen, fell at His feet, and flooding the ground with tears, confessed my boldness. But He, as good and compassionate, pitying my plight, confirmed my healing with these words: ‘Take courage, daughter; your faith has saved you. Go in peace.’ ^D So you, too, O Augustus, grant a just request to me, a suppliant.” King Herod, having heard this through the petition, was struck by the greatness of the miracle, and reverencing the mystery of the healing, said, “Your healing, O woman, is worthy of a more excellent monument.”

NOTE. Curterius and Ducange received this from Anastasian sources, from the Alexandrian Chronicle, from John Malalas himself, and others, besides Julius Africanus, Clement, Theophilus, and Timothy, whom Hesychius himself and Malalas praise. Nor should the testimony of Abulfaraji be made much of, who says that Theophilus the astronomer of Roha, or Edessa, flourished around the year of Christ 785 and Hegira 169, and is held to be the author of this noble history. For the carelessness of Abulfaraji is too great for us, on his testimony alone, to believe that this Theophilus the astronomer was the parent of this noble history, or at least nothing presses us to concede that he is the very same one whom Hesychius and Malalas cited. As to what concerns Hesychius, why should he not be the same as Hesychius the Illustrious, who produced a history from Belus, king of the Assyrians, down to the times of the Emperor Anastasius? You may read more about Malalas in Cave, in his *Historia litteraria*, part II.

^A said: “The healing which has been wrought upon you, O woman, is worthy of a greater monument. Go, therefore, and erect to Him who healed you whatever statue you wish, so that you may celebrate His glory.” Immediately, therefore, Bernice, who had previously suffered from a flux of blood, erected in the middle of her own city of Paneas a bronze statue to the Lord God, made of cast bronze, mixed with gold and silver. This statue remains to this day in the city of Paneas, having been moved not long ago from the place where it stood in the middle of the city to a holy place, that is, to an oratory. This record was found in the city of Paneas, with a certain Bassus, who from a Jew had become a Christian; in which book the history of all the kings who ruled in the Judean land was written.

^B *From the seventh book of the Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius Pamphili, concerning the woman of Paneas who suffered from a flux of blood.*

“Since we have made mention of this city, I do not consider it fitting to omit an account which is truly worthy to be commended to the memory of posterity. For they say that that woman suffering from a flux of blood, whom we have learned from the holy Gospels was healed by our Savior, set out from there, and that her house is pointed out in that city, in which the miraculous trophies of the Savior’s beneficence toward her remain. For upon a high stone, before the doors of her house, a bronze figure of a woman is seen, inclined upon her knees, and with her hands stretched out in front of her, like one ^C supplicating; opposite her, of the same material, is an upright figure of a man, modestly clothed in a double garment, stretching out his hand to the woman. At the feet of this statue, on this same pedestal, grows a strange kind of herb, which, when it reaches to the hem of the bronze garment, proves to be a remedy for all diseases. They say that this statue represents the image of Jesus the Lord; and it has remained even to our times, as we were able to see for ourselves when we visited the city. And it is no wonder that those of old who had been benefited by our Savior from among the Gentiles should have done such things, since we have known that the images of the Apostles themselves, Peter and Paul, and of the Savior Himself, were depicted and preserved. As is likely, the ancients, being accustomed to the customs of the Gentiles without any scruples, were accustomed to honor Him in this fashion.”

*From the same author, from the ninth book of the same History, concerning the Emperor Constantine.*

^D “When he had fully perceived that he had been assisted by the help of God, he immediately commanded that the trophy of the saving passion should be placed in the hand of his own statue. And when they had erected it in the most public place of the city of Rome, holding the saving sign of the cross in its right hand, he caused this inscription to be added to it in the Latin tongue: ‘By this saving sign, which is the true proof of valor, I have rescued your city from the yoke of the tyrannical slavery, and restored it to its former freedom,’”

^A along with the Senate and the people of Rome, I rescued and restored them to their ancient dignity and splendor.”

From the Ecclesiastical History of Socrates, Book 1, Chapter 18, Concerning the Same Emperor.

“After this, the Emperor Constantine, having become more devoted to the Christian religion, turned away completely from the worship of the pagans, prohibited their singular contests, and placed his own images in the temples (30).”

Of Stephen of Bostra, Against the Jews, Chapter 4.

“We indeed set up the images of the saints for their remembrance, such as Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Elijah, Zechariah, and the other prophets, and the holy martyrs of God who suffered death for His sake; that whoever looks upon their images may remember them, and with praises extol Him who rendered them worthy of glory.”

By the same.

“But as far as concerns images, we are confident that all things which are done in the name of God are good and holy: but as for idols and statues, away with them. For these are evil and spurious, just as those who make them. For it is one thing to have the image of a holy prophet, and ^B another to have a statue or effigy of Saturn, Venus, the Sun, and the Moon. Furthermore, since man was made in the image of God, he is therefore venerated. The serpent, however, because it is an image of the devil, is unclean and detestable. But if you reject things that are fashioned by human hands, tell me, I pray, O Jew: what thing is adored on earth that is not fashioned by human hand? The altar, the propitiatory, the Cherubim, the golden urn containing the manna, the table, the innermost tabernacle, and in short, all things which are called the Holy of Holies by God himself? Were not the hand-made Cherubim images of angels? What do you answer to these things? But if you call those things idols, what do you think should be said of Moses and Israel, who worshipped these things? Yet, adoration is a token of honor. Wherefore we also, though sinners, worship God with ^C divine adoration and the worship of *latria* which is due to Him alone, and we reverence Him as our Creator and Benefactor; but the angels and servants of God we reverence to the glory of God himself, as things created by God and subject to Him. For an image is the name and likeness of the one who is depicted in it. Wherefore, we always recall to memory the sufferings of the Lord and of the holy prophets, which are described in the Law and in the Gospels, both by letters and by the expressions of images.” ^D

NOTE.

(30) Of gods, indeed, or of idols; as Christopherson and Valesius have not incorrectly interpreted.

Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, from his Oration against Julian the Apostate.

Saint John Chrysostom, from his Enarration on the Just Job.

From the Life of Saint Constantine, Book IV (ch. 15).

From the same, from the third book.

From the same, fourth book, ch. 69.

^A worthy of the empire. And they did not proclaim these things with shouts alone, but by proceeding to deeds, by the dedication of images, they honored him as one who was dead and yet living, as if he were still among the living. For they depicted the shape of heaven in the painting of colors, and they handed down to drawing him resting in the ethereal region above the vault of heaven.”

Of the same, chapter 73

Of Theodoret, bishop of Cyrus, and of Polychronius, from the exposition on Ezekiel

Of the same: “And you, son of man, take for yourself a brick, and set it before your face, and you shall trace upon it Jerusalem; and you shall place a surrounding wall around it, and you shall build bulwarks against it, and you shall cast a trench around it, and you shall place ^C camps around it, and you shall set up battering rams in a circle.”

Interpretation: If you are afraid to speak against the multitude, and to announce to them the plunder of the city, the destruction of the temple, and the calamities that are to follow from these things, indicate this to them by another method, that they might eventually come to their senses, and your own moderation become manifest. And taking, he says, a brick, describe the city. Let the name be inscribed upon it, so that it may be clear that it is Jerusalem. And in the circuit of the city that you have described, express the delineation of the wall; in which indeed is the multitude of the army. Then let the forces proceed in military order (for this is what the word ‘camps’ signifies), that is, prepared legions of soldiers: which are not only to be provided with weapons, ^D but also might bring forward the machines, by which these walls might be torn down—for these walls, I say—these ballistae and rams indicate. Furthermore, he indicates the multitude surrounding the city in an admirable manner, so that, by having struck terror into them before the calamities occur, he might persuade them to abstain from their sins.

^A *From the Martyrdom of Saint Eustathius, who was [also called] Placidas.*

Once, when he had gone out by custom on a certain day with his army and the entire gathering of his servants to hunt, he caught sight of a herd of deer grazing. And having divided the army, as was his custom, he began the hunt against them. While the entire army was occupied with the capture of the deer, the one that was by far the largest and most handsome of the whole herd, separating itself from the herd, rushed into the forest into the denser places of the woods and into impassable regions. When Placidas saw this and desired to capture it, he left everyone else behind and pursued it with only a few soldiers. When his companions grew weary, he alone persisted in the pursuit, and by the providence of God, neither his horse nor he himself grew exhausted by the roughness of the place, and pursuing it for a long time, he found himself far from his camp. While the deer was fleeing, upon his reaching the peak of a rock, with none of his companions with him, he stood looking around on all sides, considering in what way he might take the deer. But the all-wise and merciful God, who devises every way for the salvation of men, hunts him in this very hunt—not through the agency of Peter, as formerly with Cornelius, but rather like Saul the persecutor, by the manifestation of His own form. While Placidas stood for a long time, gazing intently at the deer and marveling at its size, yet being at a loss as to how to capture it, the Lord showed a miracle of such a kind—not implausible, nor exceeding the magnitude of His power; but just as He had put speech into the donkey in the case of Balaam ^B to rebuke his mindset, so too He reveals Himself here to him. Upon the horns of the deer [He showed] the form of the holy cross, shining more brightly than the sun, and between the horns the image of the God-bearing body, which He deigned to assume for our salvation; and having put a human voice into the deer, He calls to Placidas, saying: "O Placidas, why do you persecute Me? Behold, I have appeared here for your sake, and in this animal I have shown Myself to you. I am Jesus Christ, whom you worship in ignorance. For your good deeds, which you perform for those in need, have stood before Me, and I have come to reveal Myself to you through this deer, and to hunt you in return, and to take you in the nets of My philanthropy. For it is not just that one dear to Me on account of his good works should serve impure demons and dead and deaf idols. For this reason I have come to earth in this form, which you now see, wishing to save the human race." ^C

*From the [Work] of Saint Leontius of Neapolis in the island of Cyprus, from the fifth book Against the Jews.*

Come now, therefore, come eagerly, and let us make a defense for the depiction of the venerable icons, so that the mouths of the lawless, speaking unrighteous things, may be stopped; for this tradition is of the Law, and not... ^D

^A ours. For hear God himself saying to Moses to construct two Cherubim, images both sculptured and cast, which would overshadow the propitiatory. Again, God showed the temple to Ezekiel; it had, he says, sculptured faces of lions, and of palm trees, and of men, and of Cherubim, from its floor up to the ceiling of the roof. Truly, this is a fearful matter. God, who enjoined Israel not to make for themselves any sculptured thing, nor an image, nor any likeness of whatsoever is in heaven above or on the earth beneath, He himself commands Moses to make sculptured living creatures—Cherubim, I say—and to Ezekiel He shows the temple full of images and known sculptured forms: lions, and palm trees, and men. And Solomon, having taken the design from the Law, built the temple full of brazen sculptured oxen, palm trees, and men, and he was not reproached by God for this. If, therefore, you wish to condemn me regarding images, condemn first God, who ordered these things to be made so that there might be a reminder of Him among us. ^B

The same, from the fifth book

Again, they mock us regarding the precious cross and the sign and adoration of the divinely-imprinted icons, calling us, the most ungodly, idolaters and worshipers of wood. But if I am a "wood-worshipper," as you say, O godless one, then I am certainly also a polytheist. And if I am a polytheist, I would surely have to swear by saying: "By the gods," just as you, once beholding a single calf, were saying: "These are your gods, O Israel." But you would not be able to assert that such an oath has ever been heard from the mouths of Christians. But it is the custom of the adulterous and faithless Synagogue to defame the most chaste Church of Christ as a harlot. ^C

The same.

For neither do we adore the shapes, images, and figures of the saints as gods. For if we adored a wooden image as God, we would certainly show the same worship to other pieces of wood, and we would not, as often happens, burn an image if its form were obliterated. And again, as long as the timbers of the cross remain joined together, I adore that form on account of Him who was crucified upon it; but when they have been separated from one another, I cast them away and burn them. And ^D just as he who receives the signed edict of an emperor, and kisses the seal, does not venerate the clay, or the paper, or the lead, but rather renders honor and adoration to the emperor, so also we Christians, in adoring the form of the cross, do not look to the material of the wood, but rather to the seal, the ring, and the character of Christ Himself, and through them we salute and adore Him who was affixed to the cross.

^A Likewise, for this reason I depict and delineate Christ and the sufferings of Christ in churches, in houses, in public squares, in icons, on linens, in inner chambers, on garments, and in every place, so that by seeing them continually we may be reminded and may not forget, as you have always forgotten the Lord your God. And as you, in worshiping the book of the Law, do not worship the nature of the parchment and the ink, but the words of God inscribed within it, so too do I worship the icon of Christ, not the nature of the wood and the pigments—far be it!—but by worshiping the inanimate character of Christ, through it I think I am grasping and worshiping Christ Himself. And as Jacob, having received from the brothers of Joseph the many-colored tunic soaked in blood, when they sold Joseph, ^B kissed the tunic entirely with tears and placed it before his own eyes, not lamenting the garment, but thinking that through it he was kissing Joseph himself and holding him in his hands; so also we, the children of Christians, when we kiss the icon of Christ, or of an apostle, or of a martyr, in the flesh, we think in our soul that we are kissing that very Christ or His martyr... And as I have often said, the intent is examined in every salutation and in every act of worship. But if you accuse me, saying that I worship the wood of the cross, why do you not accuse Jacob, who worshiped at the top of Joseph’s staff? But it is manifest that he did not worship because he honored the wood, but through the wood he worshiped Joseph, ^C just as we do through the cross to Christ. For Abraham also worshiped the impious men from whom he bought the tomb, and bowed his knee to the ground, but he did not worship them as gods. And again, Jacob blessed Pharaoh, who was impious and an idolater, and Esau seven times, but not as God. See how many salutations and how many acts of worship I have shown you, both scriptural and natural, which contain no cause for blame? Yet when you see me worshiping an icon of Christ, or of his all-pure Mother, or of a saint, you are immediately indignant and blaspheme, and shrink away, and call me an idolater; and are you not ashamed? And do you not tremble and blush when you see me ^D day after day in all the world demolishing the temples of idols and raising up temples to the martyrs? If I worship idols, why do I honor the martyrs who demolished the idols? And if I glorify wood, as you claim, how do I honor the saints who burned the wooden statues of the demons? And if I glorify stones, how do I glorify the apostles who smashed the stone idols? If I revere the images of the falsely-named gods, how do I glorify, and praise, and celebrate the festivals of the children who contended in Babylon and did not worship the golden image, that idolatrous one? But truly great is the blindness and great the darkness of the lawless. O Jew, great is the imp-

impudence of your wickedness; truly the truth is unfairly suppressed by you. ^A *Arise, O God, judge your own cause; judge and decide our case against a nation that is not holy, but unholy and alien, and that provokes you at every turn.*

From the same. «If therefore, as I have often said, I were to worship wood and stone, I would certainly say to the wood and stone: *You have brought me forth.* But if I venerate the images of the saints, or rather, if I venerate and honor the saints themselves and the struggles of the saints, how, you senseless man, do you call these idols? For idols are likenesses of those who were falsely named, the adulterers, the murderers, the sacrificers of children, and the effeminate, not of the prophets and apostles. And in order that I might provide for you a brief and most certain example by which to understand what parity exists between Christian and Greek images, listen. In Babylon, the Chaldeans had instruments of every kind of music by which they worshiped the images of demons. ^B The children of Israel, taken from Jerusalem, also had instruments, which they hung upon the willows; both were instruments—harps, and citharas, and pipes—but these were for the glory of God, whereas those were emulations of likenesses belonging to the worship of demons. Think, then, that there is the same distinction between the images of Christians and the idols of the Gentiles: these were fashioned for the glory and memory of the devil, while those were fashioned for the glory of Christ, and his apostles, and martyrs, and saints.»

From the same. «When, therefore, you see a Christian worshiping the cross, know that he does so for the sake of Christ, who was crucified, and not that he worships the nature of the wood. Otherwise we would worship all the wood of the field, just as Israel used to worship the groves and trees, saying: *You are my God, and you have brought me forth.* ^C We, however, do not do so, but we keep in the churches and houses the remembrance and depiction of the Lord’s passion, and of those who have contended for him, doing everything for the sake of our Lord. And again, tell me, O Jew, what Scripture permitted Moses to show reverence to Jethro, his father-in-law, who was an idolater; or Jacob to Pharaoh; or Abraham to the sons of Emmor? And were they not righteous men and prophets? And what permitted Daniel to show reverence to the impious Nebuchadnezzar? And if they did these things for the sake of a worldly and temporary life, why do you reproach me because I reverence the sacred memorials of the saints, expressed either by writing or by painting—their sufferings and struggles, by which I am daily benefited and await an everlasting and eternal life?» ^D

From the Ecclesiastical History of Theodoret, volume four.

«Under this consulship, on the twenty-fifth day of the month of December, a terrible and great miracle took place, which...»

- ^A awe which strikes the ears of all men. For a certain man named Olympius, who was accustomed to walk with a skip beside the pack-horse of Euthymius, the leader of the Arian faction, was in the bathing-hall of the Helenian palace. In the tepidarium, seeing some of those who were bathing glorifying the faith of the consubstantial Trinity, he spoke to them in these words: "What, indeed, is the Trinity? And on what wall is it not inscribed?" And taking hold of his private parts with his hand, he said, "Behold, I also have a Trinity." For this reason, those who were present were so roused in their minds that they would have immediately done away with him, had they not been restrained by a certain Magnus, a presbyter of the Church of the Holy Apostles within the precinct of the wall—a man of wondrous character and a servant of God—who said to them that this could not escape the eye of the judge who sees all things and who carefully records every single deed. ^B Therefore, when the crowd had quieted down out of reverence for the man, Olympius rose, and after using the hot baths as was the custom, he went out to the basin of cold water, which receives the water from a spring flowing from the middle of the sacred altar of the holy house of the first martyr Stephen, which in days of old was built by Aurelian, who was illustrious in high official dignities; hence I believe that water is worthy to be regarded by God himself. When he had descended into it, he immediately returned, crying out with a wail: "Have mercy on me, have mercy on me!" And scratching his own flesh with his nails, he tore it from his bones. Everyone gathered around him, and having seized him, they wrapped him in a linen sheet and laid him down as he was breathing his last. ^C When they asked him what could have happened, Olympius said: "I saw a man clothed in white garments, who stood by the basin and poured three buckets of hot water over me, saying, 'Do not be a blasphemer.'" Then those who were connected with him by necessity took him up on a litter and carried him to another bath adjacent to the Arian church. But when they wanted to unwrap the sheet from him, they tore away all his flesh with it, and in this way, having been killed, he gave up his spirit. This event became known throughout almost the whole of the Queen of Cities. Some spread the report about the one who had suffered this, that some time ago he had changed from the religion that glorifies the consubstantial Trinity and had been rebaptized into the worship of the Arians. Now, when this matter reached the ears of the Emperor (who was, moreover, Anastasius), he ordered that the miracle be depicted in colors on a tablet and fixed in the upper part of the basin. Furthermore, a certain John, a deacon and advocate of the aforementioned holy house of Stephen, the first of the martyrs—a man who, if any other, showed zeal at all times for defending the dogma of the consubstantial Trinity—he himself also had it recorded in an image, but not simply; for he recorded the names of those who were bathing there at the time and who saw it, and where each one lived, and moreover, those who served at the waters.

- ^A etas and folly of those who accuse our divine images. But the image continues to bear witness to this day, fixed in the porch of the tetrastyle, the oratory often mentioned. And since one miracle followed another, it is not right to overlook notice of it, as it belongs to the same subject; which, even though it occurred in a later time, I shall not hesitate to relate.

For when those who stood on the side of Arius saw that the triumph was enduring, they plied him to whom the care of the Helenian palace was entrusted with constant entreaties, that he, as prefect of the bath’s administration, should remove and hide the image. He, finding an easy pretext—that the image was being spoiled by the moisture of the water—claimed that he had removed and hidden it for its preservation and restoration. But when the emperor was inspecting all the royal places, ^B he came to this place also, inquired for the image, and ordered it to be fixed to the wall again.

Then, immediately, a certain divine indignation seized Eutychianus—for such was the name of that household overseer—so that his right eye flowed out, and his other limbs were shaken by a grievous affliction. This was the cause of his coming to the sacred oratory, where a portion of the holy relics of the blessed Pantaleon and Marinus is preserved. This oratory is called Homonoia, that is to say, Concord, because the hundred and fifty bishops, under the Emperor Theodosius the Great, ^C gathered there and, with a unanimous and concordant sentence, asserted the consubstantiality of the divine Trinity and declared the Lord’s assumption of humanity from the Virgin.

He remained there for about seven days, and as he received no relief, but on the contrary, both testicles were being consumed, in the middle of a certain night, the subdeacon whose turn it was to keep watch there saw in a dream a certain king standing by, who, pointing with his hand at the sick man, said: "Why did you receive this man? Who brought him here? This is he who conspired with those who speak evil of me. This is he who hid the image of the miracle." The cleric, rising, recounted what he had seen in his sleep, saying that it was impossible ^D for this man to be healed of this plague.

But Eutychianus, as if forced into sleep by the intensity of the pains, saw a certain young eunuch, clothed in a shining garment, saying these words to him: "What is the matter with you?" When he had replied that he was perishing with wasting, and could find no remedy, he heard him saying: "No one can help you, because the king is very angry with you." Then the sick man said: "Whom then shall I entreat, or what shall I do?" He, in turn, replied: "If you wish to obtain relief, go as quickly as possible to the baths of the Helenians, and rest near the image of the burned Arian." Immediately awakening, he called one of his attendants. They were astonished, for three days had already passed, and he was held by a loss of speech. And he said to them to take him there, as he had been ordered. Having arrived at the place and toward the

^A imaginem positus exspiravit. Nam qui visus fuerat, animæ a corpore sejunctionem per morbi relaxationem citra mendacium significarat.

Of Saint Anastasius from the holy Mount Sinai.

From the Life of Saint Symeon the Wonderworker, a narrative by Arcadius, Archbishop of Cyprus; miracle one hundred and thirty-second.

^A It came to pass, by the providence of God, that the man was not inside his house at that time. For they were eagerly seeking to lay hands on him, while some cried out one thing and some another. Their wickedness in the sight of God was indeed great and heavy, and their spite was measureless; driven by this, they had gathered there, thinking it a fitting time to rise up against the holy man and heap abuse upon him, as he had frequently exposed the unhealthy faith and error of the pagans among them. Since, therefore, they could not endure such frenzy, they commissioned one of the soldiers to climb the steps and cast down the image. But he, having ascended and stretched out his hands to carry out the order, immediately fell from that height to the ground and was broken; wherefore a great tumult arose in the crowd. Nevertheless, with inflamed spirits, they proceeded to send up another; and as he likewise stretched out his hands to pull down the image, he was in the same way dashed to the ground. When ^B this happened, everyone was struck with fear, and they began to sign themselves with the sign of the cross. But those faithless men, still raging, sent up a third for this same purpose, and as he also reached out his hands to cast down the image, he too fell to the ground in the same manner. Then a great fear came upon all the faithful who were standing by; and, astonished at the blindness and audacity of those faithless and impious men, they worshiped the image and, pouring out prayers, departed.

Of Saint John Chrysostom, from his sermon on the passage: "Know that you walk in the midst of snares."

^C Let us not, therefore, dearly beloved, be consumed by sorrow, nor let us faint in spirit at the present calamity; rather, let us admire the wise plan of God’s clemency. For the very things by which the devil hoped to destroy our city from its foundations, God used to raise it up and restore it. For the devil inspired certain lawless men to treat the statues of the emperors with dishonor, so that he might thereby destroy the very soil of the city.

The same. "But after these things were done with rash daring, and certain vile and most wicked men, having trampled upon the laws, cast down the statues and exposed all the rest to extreme and imminent danger; and now that we fear for our very lives because of the emperor’s wrath, the loss of our property no longer ^D troubles us; but, setting those things aside, I hear everyone saying on all sides: 'Let the emperor take our wealth, we will willingly yield our market-places and our houses, if only someone will promise to preserve our bodies unharmed.' Just as, therefore, when the fear of death did not yet loom over us, the loss of money used to bite us; so when these lawless acts were committed, the fear of death arrived and drove away the pain of the loss of our wealth."

The same. "For if someone is caught in a bandit’s den, even if he himself does not commit robbery, he shares in the same...

^A punishment; or are you unaware that he undergoes the same penalty as the robbers? But why do I mention the affairs of robbers? You yourselves surely all know and remember when certain wicked men and impostors among us threw down the statues; not only they themselves, but also those who had been dragged and brought to the tribunals merely because they were present at what occurred, paid the ultimate penalty."

Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus, from the *Religious History*, concerning Macedonius the Asian. "It happened once that the city was driven into a frenzy by some evil demon, so that, as if a disease needed to be driven away, they foolishly vented their rage upon the imperial statues."

From the *Ecclesiastical History* of Theodore Lector of Constantinople, concerning a certain heretic, Palladius. ^B "But the bishop of Antioch, Palladius, courting the emperor’s favor, detested those who adhered to the holy dogmas of the Synod of Chalcedon; indeed, he even removed the images of the holy Fathers."

From the *Life of Saint Constantine*, book III, chapter 4. "Thus, for him, matters were proceeding in accordance with his wishes; but from another quarter, the malice of envy was disturbing the Churches of God in Alexandria, and stirring up schisms among the Thebans and the Egyptians, along with other no small evils, as they clashed with one another in every city, bishops against bishops and peoples against peoples, and all but coming to blows and raging to the point of mutual destruction. You might have seen men, bereft of their senses, attempting unspeakable deeds and insolently insulting the images of the emperors." ^C

From the *Ecclesiastical History*, concerning those who held the views of Dioscorus. "For he had reached such a degree of audacity that he even erased the names of the blessed pastors who had been there from the sacred diptychs, and tore down their images, burning them tyrannically."

From the same history, concerning the heretic who succeeded Macedonius in the see of Constantinople. "This unholy man, when going to the sacred assemblies, would order the holy houses to be searched, and if he found Macedonius depicted anywhere in an image, he would not perform the sacred rites before he had thrown it down." ^D

From the same history regarding Julian and Timothy ^A (also called Ailurus).

Some of those who delight in inciting disturbances report that this Julian had entered into an agreement with Bishop Timothy through the agency of the aforementioned Macedonius, and they relate the reason for this concord. Seizing him through his ministers, and while those in charge of civil affairs were also present in the episcopal house, he compelled him to subject the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon to anathema. But the old man, imploring the images of the deceased prelates who had been painted in Constantinople, Flavian and Anatolius, through whom the Council of Chalcedon had received its strength, cried out: "If you refuse to leave the decrees of the aforementioned holy synod alone, then take down the images of the bishops with anathema and wipe them out from the sacred diptychs."

From Saint Chrysostom, on Saint Flavian of Antioch.

"So the mob demonstrated what it is. For, following the impulses of an irrational leader, they surged against the imperial images and statues, and having cast them to the ground, they dragged them through the marketplace. For frenzy had turned their minds to rabidity, and anger had blinded their modest reflections."

From the same oration, where the words of Patriarch Flavian to the Emperor Theodosius the Great are recounted.

"We have sinned, O Emperor; we do not hide our crime, which even the created thing itself accuses. We do not deny the madness with which we raged against your images—or rather, more against ourselves—but as those already condemned, we await your humanity."

Again from the same oration, from the address of Saint Flavian.

"Do not destroy so many images for the sake of one bronze image. Do not shatter so many divine artifacts on account of one bronze work which could easily be melted down."

By the same, Chrysostom, that there is one author of the Old and New Testament; and ^A concerning the priest's raiment.

"I, too, am greatly delighted by a painting and an effigy which is crafted with molten wax, provided it displays piety. For in a painting I saw an angel pursuing ^B the ranks of the Barbarians, and the Barbarian cohorts being trampled; and I saw that this utterance of David is true: 'O Lord, in thy city thou shalt bring their likeness to nothing.'" ^C

VARIAE LECTIONES.

ON IMAGES ORATION III.

^A From the Saint Basil, in Praise of the Forty Martyrs. "Come then, bringing them into our midst through this recollection of ours, let us procure the common benefit from them for those who are here present, setting forth before all, as if in a painting, the courageous deeds of these men. For both orators and painters demonstrate valiant deeds in war; the former ornamenting them with speech, the latter engraving them upon panels, and both have stirred many to bravery. For what the historical narrative represents through the hearing, this the art of painting silently shows through imitation."

From Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, from his Poems. "Either do not teach at all, or teach by your conduct; Lest you entice with words, but drive away with your deeds; Less will you have need of speech, if you do what is necessary. A painter teaches more through printed forms."

Exposition of the same sentiment. "Unless you teach by conduct, he says, do not teach by word, so that you do not repel those whom you have enticed with words by your own depraved conduct. For if you do what is right, these very good works will hold the place of doctrine; just as painters for the most part teach through rendered images."

From the same. "Nor shall Polemon himself be kept in silence for me, For the wonder of things spoken of greatly Is spread everywhere through many discourses. He was at the first not of modest conduct, And a slave to base pleasures. But after ^B he was caught By the love of the good (I know not if his own, Or by the persuasion of some honest man), Immediately he so quenched all the flames Of his passions; this I shall place among his miracles, So that I should not be loath to recount it in words. A certain lustful young man had called a harlot. When, therefore, the harlot reached the threshold of the house, She saw Polemon depicted and prominent (For he was of distinct and very grave countenance), Overcome by the mere sight, she withdrew her foot, Having feared the painted man just as one endowed with life."

From Saint John Chrysostom, from his homily on the eighth chapter of the Epistle to Timothy. "But be an example of the faithful, in all things showing yourself a pattern of good works; that is, as an example of life, be as an image set forth in public."

From the acclamatory sermon of the holy sixth synod. "Again Nestorius, and again Coelestinus and Cyril. For the one divided and condemned Christ, but the others, taking the side of the Master, cast down the divider. Ephesus is these things, and the tablets of what was done there, through an unspoken voice, silently speak of the facts."

From the seventh book of the Stromata of the most ancient Clement, to Alexander.

^A "Therefore, he does not only praise what is good, but he himself strives to be good, passing from a good and faithful servant into a friend through love, by reason of the perfection of habit which he truthfully obtains through true discipline and frequent exercise; so that he moves toward nothing which does not lead to the pinnacle of knowledge. Then he applies himself to the adorning of his morals, composes the expression of his face, and provides himself with all those ornaments and gifts which befit the true Gnostic; and this he does through the constant contemplation of most beautiful images, consider, for instance, those many who were perfect before him. He contemplates the patriarchs, and likewise very many prophets, and countless angels, as many as one could calculate by number, and the Lord above all things, who taught and made it clear that it is by no means impossible for us to attain the same standard of living as those heights."

Of Saint Theodore, Bishop of Pentapolis.

"Again, there was a certain man of the first rank in that region, named Dion, who had adorned the temple of the holy martyr with many gifts, and had covered his altar with silver. One of his servants, however, having stolen a large sum of money from him, fled. Dion, indeed, did not pursue him, but going to the image of the martyr, he modeled the figure of that image in wax, and, with the confidence he had in the holy martyr, he fixed it at the threshold of his house. Immediately the servant, as if driven by someone, coming to his senses, returned to his master; nor was anything missing of what he had stolen. When this became known to everyone, even to this day, the inhabitants of that region observe the same custom against runaway slaves."

Of Saint Athanasius of Alexandria, from the third book Against the Arians.

^C "But in truth, because the Son is the true offspring of the substance of the Father, He fittingly says that the things of the Father are His own. Wherefore, quite properly and consistently, having said, *I and the Father are one* [John X, 30], He added: *That you may know that I am in the Father, and the Father is in me* [John XIV, 11]. Likewise, He had said before: *He that sees me sees the Father* [Ibid. 9]. And there is one and the same meaning in these three statements. For he who has thus known that the Son and the Father are one, knows that He is in the Father, and the Father is in the Son; for the divinity of the Son is the Father’s, and it is in the Son. And he who has distinctly perceived this, understands that he who has seen the Son has seen the Father; for in the Son the divinity of the Father is contemplated. And this a person can understand more accurately from the example of the image ^D of the king. For in the image of the king, the form and the A appearance are [there]; and also in the king...

there is the appearance of the image. The likeness in the image of the king is identical, so that he who sees the image, sees the king in it, and he who, in turn, sees the king, recognizes that this is the one who is expressed in the image. Since the likeness does not differ, to one who wishes to behold the king after the image, the image might say to him: "I and the king are one thing. For I am in him, and he is in me; and what you see in me, this you see in him, and what you behold in him, you see in me; for he who worships the image, worships the king in it." For the image is his form and appearance. »

Of the same, to Antiochus the prefect.

• What do those who turn away and refuse to worship the characters of the saints—which are fashioned among us for the sake of remembrance—say to these things? »

Of Ambrose, bishop of Milan, to the Emperor Gratian, concerning the incarnate economy of the Word of God.

• "God before the flesh, and God in the flesh... But it is to be feared, you say, lest if we attribute two principal senses or a twofold wisdom to Christ, we seem to divide Christ. Does it follow then, that when we worship both his divinity and his flesh, we divide Christ? Or when, in him, we worship both the image of God and the cross, do we divide him? God forbid!" »

Of Cyril, Patriarch of Jerusalem, from the twelfth catechesis.

• If, therefore, you seek the cause of Christ's advent, recur to the first book of the Scriptures. In six days, God created the world, but the world was made for man. For the sun, very splendid and shining with rays, was made, as we were just saying, for the sake of man. And all animals were established so that they might serve us; the grasses and trees, for our own enjoyment. All of God's works were created good, but none of them—with the exception of man—is the image of God. The sun was produced by a command alone, but man was fashioned by divine hands. For it says: "Let us make man in our image and likeness." If a wooden image of an earthly king is honored, how much more so the rational image of God? »

Of Saint Basil to Saint Flavian, concerning the Samaritan woman.

• Our Lord corrects her, as she was deceived by the error of her gentile custom into believing that worship ought to take place in a certain place: "It is necessary," He says, "to worship in spirit and in truth," meaning, by that, Himself, who is the truth. Just as we say that we worship the Father in the Son, as in ^{B C D}

the image of God the Father, so also in the Spirit, inasmuch as He shows forth in Himself the divinity of the Lord.

Saint Gregory Nazianzen, on Baptism

Saint John Chrysostom on the Maccabees

Of the same, from the First Book Against Julian the Impious

Of the same, On the Basin

From the Fourth Oration of Severian of Gabala on the Holy Cross

^A venerate the symbol of the cross. For if, in the absence of an emperor, the image of the emperor occupies his place, and the nobles adore it, and festive months are observed, and magistrates go forth to meet it, and the common people adore it—not by looking at the board, but at the likeness of the emperor, whom one beholds not in his nature but as he is depicted in a painting—by how much more is the image of the immortal King able to shatter not only rock, but heaven and earth and the whole world.

From the Chronography of Isidore the deacon.

Theophilus sinned when he slandered John Chrysostom to Empress Eudoxia, saying that he held to the heresy of Origen; for the Augusta was angry with the aforementioned John on account of the widow’s vineyard. On account of this sin, Theophilus could not give up his soul until the image of Chrysostom was brought; and having adored it, he gave up the spirit (39).

Of Hieronymus the Priest of Jerusalem (40).

Since your scripture nowhere permits us to adore the cross, why then do you adore it? Answer us Gentiles and Greeks, and all who ask this of you. Response. For this reason, O foolish and senseless at heart, perhaps God permitted every nation that worships God to adore something on earth that is the work of human hands, so that they might no longer be able to reproach Christians regarding the cross and the adoration of images. For just as the Jew adored the Ark of the Covenant, and the two golden and molten Cherubim, and the two tablets which Moses carved, although he was nowhere ^C permitted by God to adore or kiss these things, so also we Christians do not adore the cross as God, but as showing the sincere disposition of our soul toward Him who was crucified.

Of the Great Symeon of the Wondrous Mountain (41), On Images.

Perhaps some contentious unbeliever will dispute, saying that we, too, in the churches... ^D and for us Christians, he granted both the cross, and to paint and adore the images of good works, and to show our work; even as God permitted every nation to adore things made by hand—to the Jews, those certain tablets which Moses carved out, and the two golden Cherubim. Thus, he has gifted us Christians with the cross, and with the images of good actions to be painted and adored, so that we might demonstrate our own work.

^A We do not worship images as if they were inanimate idols. Far be it from us to do such a thing. For the faith of Christians rests upon truth, and our God, who is not a liar, works miracles. We do not linger upon some colors, but, just as it happens in the representation of a letter, whereby something else is signified, so do we look upon the invisible in a painting, and praise Him as if He were present. We do not believe in that which is not God, but in Him who truly exists as God: nor do we believe that the saints are not saints, but that they truly are, and that they live with God, and that their spirits, being holy, ^B by the power of God, aid those who are worthy, as those who are in need of their assistance.

Anastasius, Archbishop of Antioch, to Symeon, Bishop of Bostra, On the Sabbath.

As when an emperor is absent, his image is worshipped, but when he is present, it is henceforth superfluous to leave him aside and worship the image instead of the original; and yet, because he is present, it is not fitting to dishonor the image for whose sake the original receives worship. I think something similar happened regarding the shadow or letter of the Law (for the Apostle calls it a shadow). For as long as the grace of truth was concealed, the saints set forth the types, seeing the truth as if in a mirror. But when the truth appeared, they judged it to be not right to live according to the types, or to follow them any longer. For the things themselves being present, the type of the thing henceforth becomes superfluous. ^C Yet, even so, they did not dishonor them, nor did they cast them aside; but rather, they honored the type, and they judged those who sought to dishonor them to be impious, and worthy of the punishment of bitter death.

Of the same, from the third oration.

Just as if someone, on account of the honor that is due to an emperor, should worship his image, even though it consists of nothing but wax and colors.

The twelfth anathema of the holy and ecumenical fifth council.

If anyone defends the impious Theodore of Mopsuestia, who says that God the Word is one, and Christ is another, being subject to the passions of the soul and the desires of the flesh, and progressing little by little from worse things, so that by the improvement of his actions he became better, and for his blameless life was confirmed, ^D and as a mere man was baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and through baptism received the grace of the Holy Spirit and was deemed worthy of adoption; and that, like a royal image, he is to be worshipped as one bearing the person of God the Word: let him be anathema.

From the Ecclesiastical History of Theodorus, Historian of Constantinople, concerning Gennadius, Archbishop of Constantinople.

^A “I shall append other astounding things of the same nature concerning him. Both hands of a certain painter, who had painted an image of Christ the Lord, withered away. It was reported that, by the command of some pagan man, he had painted this work under the guise of the name of the Savior, in such a way that, with the hair parted on both sides of the face, the countenance was not at all covered (it was the very form in which the pagans paint Jove), so that by those who saw it, it might be thought that veneration was offered to the Savior.” ^B

Of the Abbot Maximus, and Theodosius the Bishop, and the dignitaries who had been sent by the Emperor.

“Saint Maximus said: ‘Since it has been decided that these things should come to pass, may God grant that the outcome of what has been seen may follow, and I will follow wherever you command.’ After this, they all rose up, and with tears they prostrated themselves, and a prayer was said; and each one of them kissed the holy Gospels, and the precious cross, and the image of our Savior Jesus Christ, and of the holy Theotokos who bore Him, having placed their hands upon them for the confirmation of what had been spoken.” ^C

Of Saint Sophronius, from the Miracles of the holy martyrs Cyrus and John, concerning Theodorus the subdeacon, who was suffering from gout.

“Furthermore, we shall speak in a few words as to how health was granted to his body. A few days after this, while he was asleep, he saw the martyrs standing by again, who ordered him to follow them. And he followed them of his own accord, for he knew how much benefit he would gain from accompanying the saints. Having therefore come to a temple of the pagans—a structure indeed most majestic and splendid in appearance, for its size reaching even to the heavens—we entered and beheld a very large and wonderful image, ^D which displayed Christ in the midst, rendered in colors; to the left, the Lady Theotokos; and to the right, John the Baptist, who had indicated Him by leaping in his mother’s womb, since his voice, speaking from within, could not be heard; as well as some of the glorious choir of the apostles and prophets, and of the company of martyrs, among whom were the martyrs Cyrus and John. These, standing before the image, fell down before the Lord, bending their knees and striking their heads against the floor, and interceding for the healing of the young man. And these were the words of their intercession: ‘Most merciful Lord, do You grant that we may bestow healing upon this man also?’ But when...”

they had worshipped, prostrate on the ground for a long time, pouring forth suppliant voices, and the Lord Christ did not grant their request, they desisted from their intercession; and sad and with downcast countenance, they returned to me, I who had stood not far from the image. And when they had approached me closer: ‘Do you see,’ they said, ‘how the Lord does not wish to grant you healing? But do not lose heart. For He will surely show Himself as kind towards you as He does toward all.’ And so, when about half an hour had passed, they arose and returned once more to pray. But again, they say, they returned unsuccessful, sad and downcast, as before, with the Lord Christ not having commanded it. And when they came to me, they told me this again. But setting out for the third time: ‘Take heart,’ they say; ‘for now we shall surely obtain the grace; but you also, even as you see us entreating, fall down and call upon the Lord as a suppliant with us.’ And for the third time, approaching the image, they prayed in the same manner and with the same words. And when they had long entreated, and lying on the ground cried out only this: ‘Command it, O Lord,’ then Christ, moved by compassion as the Merciful One, said from the image: ‘Do you also grant it to him.’ Then the martyrs, rising from the earth, first of all gave thanks to Christ our God, in that He had hearkened to their prayer. ^A

From St. Anastasius of holy Mount Sinai, on the New Sunday, and on the Apostle Thomas.

^C ‘Those who beheld Christ in the flesh regarded Him as a prophet: but we who do not see Him, straightway from tender years, as children and youths, confess Him to be God, Lord, Almighty, and the Creator of the ages, the brightness of the Father. For we listen to His Gospels with faith just as if we were beholding Christ Himself speaking. And receiving the immaculate pearl of His own body, we believe that we are bearing Christ Himself. And if we see even the mere figure of His divine image depicted, we think that He is looking down upon us from heaven, and we worship and fall before it. Great now is the faith of Christ.’ ^D

From the Life of abbot Daniel, concerning Eulogius the stonemason.

‘Then he departed in sorrow, and casting himself down before the image of the Mother of God, he said with laments: “Lord, grant that I may fulfill what I have pledged to this man.”’

From the Life of St. Mary of Egypt.

‘Weeping, therefore, I behold above the place where I had stood the image of the holy Mother of God placed there, and I address her with these words: “Virgin Mother of God, Lady, who in the flesh gavest birth to God the Word, I know, I know that it is not fitting, nor is it reasonable, for me, so impure and defiled with every filth of lust, to gaze upon thy image, seeing that thou hast remained ever-virgin: but it is right that I, beneath thy purity, should be spurned and loathed. Yet, forasmuch as for this cause the...

^A God born of thee became man, that He might call sinners to repentance, help me, I beseech thee, who am alone and have no other refuge than thee. Command that the entrance be opened to me; do not deprive me of seeing the wood upon which the God-Word, whom thou didst bear, was fixed according to the flesh, who gave His own blood as a ransom for me. Command, O Lady, that for me too the door of the adoration of the divine cross be opened. And I give thee as a sufficient surety to the God born of thee, that I will no longer defile this flesh by any foul union whatsoever. But when I have gazed upon the wood of the cross of thy Son, I will immediately renounce the world and all that is in the world, and without delay I will depart whithersoever thou thyself, whom I take as my surety, shalt command and guide me." Having said these things, and having as it were received a certain assurance, the fire of faith, trusting in the compassion of the Theotokos, I move myself from that place in which I was standing and making my prayer, and I come back again, and I mingled myself with those who were entering. ^B And no longer was there anyone pushing me, nor being pushed back, and no one preventing me from drawing near to the door through which they were entering into the house. Terror then and ecstasy seized me, and I was shaken through and through, and I trembled. Having therefore cast myself upon the ground, and having adored that holy floor, I ran out, and hastened toward her who had taken upon herself to be my surety. I come, therefore, to that place in which the written surety had been inscribed, and having bent the knee before the Ever-Virgin and Theotokos, I used these words: "Thou, indeed, O good-loving Lady, didst show thy kindness toward me; thou didst not despise the prayer of the unworthy. I saw the glory, which we the profligate are not justly worthy to see; glory to God, who through thee receives the repentance of sinners," and so forth.

From the Life of Saint Eupraxia

The deaconess says to the young girl: "Go, my mistress, to thy house, for thou canst not remain here. For it is not lawful for anyone to remain here, unless he be joined to Christ." The young girl says to her: "Where ^C is Christ?" The deaconess pointed out to her the image of the Master, and, turning, she says to the deaconess: "Truly, I too am joined to Christ, and I will no longer depart with my mistress." And again Eupraxia, rising up and taking her daughter, brought her to the image of the Master, and stretching forth her hands to heaven, she cried out with tears: "Lord Jesus Christ, take thought for this child, because she has desired Thee, and has committed herself to Thee."

Of the holy sixth synod under Justinian, concerning the holy fifth synod

In some of the paintings of the venerable images, the Lamb, being shown by the finger of the Forerunner, is depicted, ^D

which was received as a type of grace, foreshadowing for us that true Lamb who was demonstrated through the law, Christ our God. Therefore, embracing those ancient types and shadows as tokens and prefigurations of the truth handed down to the Church, we set grace and truth before them, which we have received as the fullness of the Law. And so, that we may present before the eyes of all, even in paintings, that which is perfect, we decree that from henceforth the Lamb, Christ our God, who takes away the sin of the world, should be depicted in images in His human form instead of the old lamb, ^A so that through His humility we may contemplate the loftiness of the Word of God, and be led as if by the hand to the memory of His life in the flesh, His passion, and His saving death, and the redemption which was wrought for the world thereby. ^B

From the Oration of the Holy Methodius, Bishop of Patara, on the Resurrection, Oration II

^C As soon as the images of the emperors who are among us are fashioned, even if they consist not of very precious material, such as gold or silver, they are nevertheless honored by all. For men do not honor those made of more precious material in such a way that they despise those made of baser material, but they honor all equally, even if they be of gypsum or bronze. And whoever casts insults upon any one of them is not absolved on the grounds that he has treated clay or even gold with contempt; but he is condemned as if he had heaped insults upon the emperor and lord himself. Indeed, we fashion images cast in gold, by which angelic Principalities and Powers are designated, for the honor and glory of God. ^C

NOTES

...but of that which is called the Quinisext, and Trullan, and which they say was convened by Justinian the Younger. Pope Adrian I had regard to that very canon when he wrote these things in his letter to Tarasius and the Seventh Synod: "Therefore, that the perfection might be depicted to the eyes of all through the operation of colors, we define that the Lamb, Christ our God, who took away the sin of the world, be depicted in human form through the image of a man in place of the old lamb, considering through Him the loftiness of the humility of the Word of God, and recalling to memory His conversation in the flesh." For which reason, in his letter to Charlemagne for the Seventh Synod, he defends this canon with deliberate effort.

BOOK ON THE RIGHT OPINION

ADMONITION TO THE FOLLOWING WORK

This profession of faith, which follows, I received from Rome, transcribed from Vatican codex no. 1262, and Leo Allatius testifies in his *Symmicta* that it was sent by him to Johannes Aubertus, under this other title: *A copy of a booklet dictated by John Damascene, and delivered by Elias, a bishop, to Peter, the metropolitan of Damascus.* This is different, however, from the *Libellus of Faith* which Allatius had previously sent to Aubertus, as I noted from the few words that the same Allatius cites in his dissertation on John Damascene and his works. Furthermore, one may conjecture from the Preface that this little work was written by our John while he was still staying in Damascus and was subject to the most holy metropolitan Peter, before he had migrated to Palestine to commit himself to the monastic life. This he wrote, I say, at the early beginnings of the Iconoclast heresy, as is signified by these words which are read shortly before the end: *and I detest every heresy, even that which has just now been stirred up against the holy Church of Christ and our God*; that is, that of those whom they called *Christianocategoroi*, or accusers of Christians. From the words that are added a line or two later, where Elias promises that he will not communicate with heretics, and especially with the Maronites, I infer that this bishop had been converted from the sect of the Maronites: and this is confirmed by a special article concerning the understanding of the Trisagion hymn. We shall say more about the Maronites in the notes to our author's epistle on that same hymn.

TREATISE OF JOHN THE MONK AND PRESBYTER OF DAMASCUS ON THE RIGHT FAITH

^A Gravis fear and perplexity take hold of me on every side, O best of fathers and most holy prince of pastors. For on the one hand, I fear the danger of disobedience; on the other, the weight and mass of the burden disturbs me. Where shall I flee, or by what means can I turn aside? I do not know. Wherefore, I commit myself to you, spiritual Father. Like an innocent lamb I will not contend, nor will I cry out; I will not pasture myself, but, complying with your command, I bow my neck, not as a heifer kicking and refractory, but as an obedient calf, since I did not obtain the release and indulgence which I requested. I know the bundle of my transgressions: but I hold firmly that if you loose them on earth, they shall be loosed in heaven. Behold, I am present before you to obey. Do what is pleasing to you. I have God as my leader and governor, to whom nothing is impossible. Since, therefore, your most holy eminence commands that I declare my opinion, let all the house of Israel know. Let heaven pay attention and let me speak, and let the earth hear the words of my mouth. ^B

1. I believe in Father, and Son, and Spirit, a consubstantial Trinity, and a three-hypostasized unity, one 1.

^A beginning without beginning, one will, one operation, one power, one lordship, one kingdom, three hypostases having no difference in any respect, save in the ingenerate, the generate, and the proceeding: the Father ingenerate and not generated; the Son generated and not ingenerate; the Holy Spirit proceeding, and neither cause nor generated. For he has the Father as cause and fount, proceeding from him, not by way of generation, but by way of procession; so that there may be one Father, one Son, one Holy Spirit: God the Father perfect, God the Son perfect, God the Holy Spirit perfect—not two or three Gods, but these three are one God. For he is not divided by time, nor by place, nor is he parted by power; but they have perichoresis in one another without any coalition or confusion. For the Word and the Holy Spirit are powers of the Father, wherefore there is also one God; yet even if they are powers, they are not without hypostases. For each is a perfect hypostasis, so that the divine nature might not be a composite of essence and powers, through which each, considered in itself, is perfect God, a perfect hypostasis, yet the three are one God, understood as being with one another and in one another. And this is altogether strange, and befitting only to God. One therefore is God, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; one Creator of heaven and of earth, and of all creation, both visible and invisible, who brought all things from nothing into being, not out of pre-existing matter. One God, and one principle of all things, and not two; one Deity above all divinity, one supersubstantial essence, goodness above all goodness, a sea of infinite and boundless essence and substance, the cause of all good things, the power that effects substances, without beginning, subject to no destruction, everlasting and in no part circumscribed. Perennial light with triple radiance, in three hypostases, hidden and concealed in the darkness of incomprehensibility.

2. Profession of Faith

2. I believe, moreover, that the only-begotten Son and Word of God, who existed before the ages, who is uncreated, consubstantial with the Father and with the Holy Spirit, who is one of the Holy Trinity, by his infinite goodness and ineffable philanthropy, by the good pleasure of the Father, was incarnate without seed from the Holy Spirit and Mary the holy, ever-virgin and Theotokos, in the final times for us and for our salvation, remaining what he was—perfect God and consubstantial with the Father—and becoming what he was not—perfect man, consubstantial with his Mother and with us, flesh animated by a rational and intellectual soul. ^D And thus there is one Christ, one Lord, one Son of God and of man, the same being perfect God and perfect man, one hypostasis composite of Deity and humanity, composed of two natures, and he himself is the two natures, and he is in two perfect natures, having according to each the definition and reason befitting it. Son of God according to the pre-eternal generation from the Father—

^A the same one is Son of Man according to the saving incarnation and assumption at the last times; without mother in the first instance from the Father, as God, and without father in the second instance, the same one, as man from the Mother—two natures and one hypostasis. For if there were two hypostases, there would not be one Son, but we would worship a quaternity. For if the hypostasis of the only-begotten Son of God is one thing, and that of the Son of the Virgin is another, he is one son and another, and not one Son, but two; for two hypostases could not be one Son. And again, if the hypostasis of the only-begotten Son of God is one thing, and that of the Son of the Virgin is another, either the only-begotten Son of God has been cast out and the Son of the Virgin introduced in his place, or a quaternity sits upon the throne, and we worship a quaternity of God—the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and the Son of the Virgin. But may it not be permitted for us to think this; rather, we acknowledge one composite hypostasis of the Word of God, the only-begotten Son of God, together with his flesh, [existing] from two natures and in two perfect natures, yet [united] indivisibly, unconfusedly, and inseparably according to hypostasis. I do not say one composite nature, lest the Son be blasphemed as being of a different nature and essence from the Father. ^B For the Father is of a simple, not a composite nature; but I say one composite hypostasis, so that I neither speak of a bare God, nor of a mere man, nor introduce a fourth hypostasis into the Trinity. For if he is perfect in divinity, the same one is perfect in humanity after the union. For before the union, it is clear to all that the Son of God was in one nature of divinity, and existed as God alone, just as the Father and the Holy Spirit. But when, because of his ineffable goodness, he assumed our nature and was united to us, becoming the perfect man in divinity according to our likeness without sin, then he was seen in two natures. For if he is perfect in divinity after the union, and the same one is perfect in humanity, he must necessarily be in two perfect natures; for divinity and humanity are two natures, not one. For neither is the created and the uncreated one nature, nor is that which can suffer and that which is impassible one nature. For if there were one composite nature of the divinity of Christ and his humanity, and Christ suffered, his one nature would have suffered—that is, his humanity. But if we say there are two natures of Christ, one impassible and one passible, that which is passible by nature suffers, and that which is impassible remains impassible. And how, if he were of one nature, could he be consubstantial with the Father? ^C For neither is the Father and we consubstantial, nor are the Father or we composite of divinity and humanity; rather, we speak of one composite hypostasis. For the ensouled flesh of the Lord did not exist by itself, nor did it have its own hypostasis, nor did the "someone" [that is, Jesus] become thus by himself, but it became the Word of God's, and had him as its hypostasis. Therefore I confess and preach with mind, and heart, and mouth, ^D strictly and truly the holy Virgin Mary as Theotokos, since she truly gave birth to the pre-eternal and only-begotten Son of God, and God by nature incarnate from her.

^B 3. To these points, I confess that all the natural properties of both his natures are twofold: the uncreated and beginningless property of the divinity, and the created and originated property of the humanity; the illimitable, invisible, and intangible property of the divinity, and the circumscribed, tangible, and visible property of the humanity; the impassible property of the divinity, and the passible property of the humanity; a divine natural will, and a human natural will; a divine natural operation, and a human natural operation. For as God and consubstantial with the Father, he willed and operated, performing divine works, and as man and consubstantial with us, he willed and operated the things pertaining to humanity, willing, operating, and suffering what is in accordance with our nature. He willed and operated the natural and blameless volitions of our nature, not by a contrariety of mind, but by the distinction of the natures. For the natural will of man is not contrary to the divine will. For by the will and good pleasure of God, man wills the natural things; indeed, God himself willed and granted these to our nature. But those things which, by our own ^C preference and desire, are admitted against the law of God through sin, these, since they oppose the divine will, are volitional and hypostatic [personal] wills.

As Christ was God, he willed with a divine will, and by a divine operation he performed with the Father and the Spirit the divine things, such as the cohesion and government of the whole universe, the salvation of men, and all that is willed by the divine nature. But as man, he willed with a human will, and by a human operation he effected the natural things of humanity, such as eating, drinking, seeing, thinking, extending the hand, walking, sleeping, and all such things, according to the Father's good pleasure. He also willed as God our salvation; he did not accept the will that is capable of sinning through desire or by secret ^D creeping in; for he did not commit sin, nor was guile found in his mouth. For being the divine hypostasis, and having assumed a human nature, he employed the natural will of the humanity according to the divine [will] of his own hypostasis; and in this way, the new Adam saved the old, in that he was made in all things as man, obedient to God and the Father even unto death. For it was not as God that he became obedient. For obedience is the voluntary submission of one's own will to the will of another; but the divine will is neither servile nor obedient. For it is not in the nature of the divine will to crave food, drink, or sleep, or to will to escape and yet be unable, for the divine will is omnipotent. Nor is there any...

capacity in the divine operation to see with bodily eyes, to breathe, to walk, and to stretch forth hands.

^B 4. Therefore, just as we confess his two natures, we confess together also the natural wills, and the two natural operations of the same one Christ—of the one composite hypostasis of the Son of God and son of man; one, I say, and the same [person] naturally willing both what is divine and what is human: divine things by a divine will, and human things by a human will. For since Christ is one hypostasis of two natures, divine and human, the same one willed and operated these things in a divine manner, and those things in a human manner, and—in a divine-human way—[operated] the human things. For even though he willed the divine things as God, and the human things as man, yet he did not will the divine things as a bare God, nor the human things as a mere man; but as God made man—that is, having become incarnate—by a natural divine will and operation, he, as the same God and man, willed and operated the divine things; and by a natural human will and operation, he, as the same God and man, willed and operated the human things, being naturally constituted to will and operate the human things as man. For he wills and operates the things proper to each nature with the communion of the other: the Godhead ^C acting freely and with all-powerful authority through his humanity, while the humanity freely and in all things complies with his divine will and wills what the divine will wills it to will, because of the singularity of the hypostasis.

That Christ is one and of one hypostasis is clear. For he himself asks: "Who do men say that the Son of man is?" And the disciples say: "Some John the Baptist; others, Elijah; and others, Jeremiah, or one of the prophets." [He says,] "But you, who do you say that I am?" And Peter answering said: "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God." He confessed him to be the Son of man, [yet] Peter addressed him as Son of God; therefore he also heard: "Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona, for flesh and blood has not revealed it to you, but my Father who is in heaven. You are Peter, ^D and upon this rock the Church is firmly established, and the gates of hell"—that is, the mouths of the heretics—"will not prevail against it."

5. Furthermore, I confess that the Trisagion hymn signifies the three hypostases of the Godhead, and the one substance and lordship. Wherefore I do not at all accept the addition of that senseless Peter the Fuller. For he either attaches the passion of the crucifixion to the Trinity, or he profanely introduces a fourth person into the Trinity.

^A 6. I also detest the ravings of Origen, the pre-existence of souls, their senseless transmigration, and the monstrous restoration of all things. This I hold, this I truly confess, and with this faith I pray to stand before the fearful judgment seat of Christ.

7. I further receive the six holy synods: the first, of the three hundred and eighteen Fathers at Nicaea against Arius the Tritheist; the second, at Constantinople of the one hundred and fifty Fathers against Macedonius, the enemy of the Holy Spirit; the third, the first at Ephesus, of the two hundred Fathers against Nestorius, the divider of the hypostasis of Christ our God, a man-worshipper, an asserter of a quaternity, and an enemy of the Mother of God; the fourth, at Chalcedon of the six hundred and thirty Fathers against Eutyches and Dioscorus, the Theopaschites; ^B the fifth, at Constantinople of the one hundred and sixty-four holy Fathers against Origen, that babbling old man; and the sixth, of the two hundred and eighty-nine Fathers, the most holy and most orthodox synod assembled in the great city of Constantinople against Sergius, Cyrus, Paul, Peter, Pyrrhus, Macarius, and his disciple Stephen. I embrace all that was defined by them, gladly receiving all whom they received, and detesting and anathematizing all whom they rejected, and every heresy, from Simon Magus down to those now stirred up against the holy Church of Christ our God.

8. I swear by the holy, consubstantial, and adorable Trinity, without any deceit or fraud, that I hold this view, that I accept nothing else besides these, and that I shall not communicate with another who does not confess this faith, especially with the Maronites; nor shall I receive a bigamous cleric into the priesthood, or for any office fitting for the Fathers. I resolve to be subject to the most holy, catholic, and apostolic Church of our Christ-loving metropolis of Damascus, and in all things to obey and submit to your holiness, and to those who after you shall be prelates of that most holy Church, and not to receive any of the Manichaeans who have been cast out by your holiness, against the judgment and order of your holiness. Furthermore, I shall observe and abide by the holy canons of the holy apostles, and of the holy synods, and of the holy and divinely inspired Basil. All these things I shall keep, trusting in the ineffable mercies of God and in your prayers; and with this faith I shall stand before the judgment seat of Christ, and through his grace I shall attain his salvation. To him be glory and power, with the unoriginate Father and the Holy Spirit, now and always, and unto the ages of ages. Amen.

ON THE TRACT AGAINST THE JACOBITES: ADMONITION

396 Henricus Canisius published in Latin the treatise of Saint John of Damascus against the Acephali, or rather the Jacobites, in volume IV of his *Antiquæ lectiones*, based on the translation by Franciscus Turrianus, but with the beginning in a largely mutilated state. The most illustrious abbot D. Julius Imperialis, vice-legate of the Supreme Pontiff at Ferrara, out of his extraordinary devotion to the cause of literature and a no less inclination to promote my own studies, obtained a transcript of the same work—though in a more complete form—from the Vatican Greek codex no. 493, and very kindly transmitted it to me. Since, however, the Vatican codex was also found to be mutilated, with one leaf lost, I have in some measure repaired the loss from an Arabic translation of the same treatise, which the Reverend Father Lelong—a most kind and learned priest of the Paris Oratory—communicated to me, it having been translated by a man most skilled in Oriental languages and matters. But even that codex contributed not a little to discerning the author’s meaning and clarifying the obscure and doubtful passages of the Greek exemplar.

The author, as far as can be conjectured, wrote this work while he was still dwelling in Damascus, before he had set off for Palestine and committed himself to the monastic life. We know from the History of Theophanes that Peter, the metropolitan who had laid this task upon him, was a man who rendered excellent service to the Christian religion. Yet it is not easy to discover who that Jacobite bishop was, for whose sake this book was written for the purpose of recalling him to the Catholic Church. In the beginning, it is stated that he is of the same race and of the same name, "assailed by shame and [a sense of] longing for one of his own race and of the same name"; these words seem to indicate a man of the Damascene region, or perhaps one joined by affinity to the metropolitan Peter, or to John himself, and named Peter or John; indeed, rather a namesake of Peter than of John, since the dissertation appeared under the name not of our John, but of Peter. Otherwise, I would have conjectured that he was called Elias, on account of the little book, or profession of faith, which, as we were saying just above, our John wrote at the command of his metropolitan Peter, to be recited by Bishop Elias of the Maronite fold.

There is no more certain knowledge of *Toubapala, Tudaræa*, a city, but the town of *Darea*, or *Daras*, is known, which is situated six miles from Damascus. Perhaps it should be read in the title of this dissertation *πρὸς τὸν ἐπίσκοπον τοῦ Δαραίας*, or *τῆς Δαραίας*, "to the Bishop of Darea."

I shall add nothing here in commendation of this treatise, than which it would be difficult to find another more accurate or telling argument against the Monophysites, not even among the works of Leontius; although Turrianus, in his preface to this book, wrote that the Damascene had watered his own rivulets from the fountains of Leontius. I do not deny that our author borrowed several things from the books of Leontius, but there occur in the work which we here present more numerous and indeed more powerful arguments than those which are found in Leontius. This treatise of the Damascene is cited in the *Collectanea* against the Severians, which were likewise published in Latin by Henricus Canisius in the same volume IV of the *Antiquæ lectiones*. At the end of the dissertation, various authorities of the Fathers are subjoined by way of an appendix, by which the two natures in Christ are proven; I shall examine several of these in their proper places. But since the very last one cited is the letter to the monk Cæsarius, inscribed with the name of Saint John Chrysostom, I shall discuss in a separate dissertation in the Prolegomena what considerations move me to adjudge that work unworthy of such a great doctor. EDIT.

JOHN, HOLY MONK OF DAMASCUS: A TREATISE, AS THOUGH FROM THE PERSON OF PETER, MOST HOLY BISHOP OF DAMASCUS, TO THE JACOBITE BISHOP OF DARA

^A 1. It is a wise saying of the wise that not even a good thing is good if it is not done properly. Divine Scripture itself bears witness to this regarding the children of the Hebrews, that they have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge; and it offers this testimony not to praise them, but rather to rebuke them. Zeal for piety is good, but it must be tempered with charity. Wickedness is a hateful thing, but he who is caught in it is truly worthy of pity. I loathe the gangrene, yet I cherish the limb as long as it is not rendered entirely useless and corrupted. Therefore, I pull out all the stops, as they say; I explore every art and devise every healing medicine, calling upon God as my co-worker, moved by reverence and love for one who is a fellow member of my race and shares my name, as I strive to drive away the vice that has afflicted him from without. If, therefore, I succeed in restoring him to health, thanks must be given to Him who granted this; but if I do not—alas for the evils!—I entrust that which I uniquely loved to the knife; not, indeed, without sorrow, yet I hand it over, avoiding his company lest the evil spread further and the corrupted parts increase in number. And yet, I will not shower him with insults, but with groans I flee with the prophet, saying: "We have treated Babylon, and she is not healed." ^B And he adds the reason for this: "Because she would not." The disease is voluntary, and so is the acceptance of the remedy. These things have spurred me to write, not a lust for contention, not envy, not caviling, not a desire to win, not a yearning for ostentation, and finally not any hatred, but compassion, which is born from the love of God and neighbor. For, "If you draw back," says Scripture, "my soul shall have no pleasure in you." For God has placed us here for this purpose: to exhort, to admonish, to convert, to cultivate, to dig, to put dung around, to cure the sin. By "unfruitfulness" and "evil fruit" we mean—like a silent tragedian—that which is poorly voiced. "For woe to me if I do not preach the gospel," and if I bury my talent, becoming a useless and wicked servant because of my sloth, I shall be sent away ^C from the joy of my Lord. Accept, therefore, a word…

^A of medicine, confirmed by the grace of the Spirit, that God may be delighted and that you may make the Church a partaker of his joy. For the cross of the Lord has made this one, consisting of heavenly and earthly things.

2. Since our entire discourse has been struck out concerning nature, we say this: in the case of the holy and superessential Godhead, that is, the monarchical and consubstantial Trinity, Arius and Eunomius, and their polytheistic—or rather, atheistic—faction, have clearly babbled that there are three substances, dividing the nature by the hypostases, because they understood badly and conceived in their minds that nature and hypostasis are the same ^B thing. Sabellius of Africa [(1)] foolishly asserted that there is one hypostasis, and he confused the Trinity, contracted by a most evil conjunction, in order to maintain the unity of substance in a single hypostasis. But as regards the salutary dispensation (or incarnation) of the Savior, who in the Trinity is the Word of God, the only-begotten Son of the Father, the most wicked and lost Nestorius, an anthropolater, and Diodorus, and Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia, also were rebels, confessing two natures and dividing the hypostasis, so that in their opinion there were two persons according to the number of the natures. They divided, therefore, the one Lord Jesus Christ, and constituted two hypostases; because they supposed that hypostasis and nature were one and the same thing. But Dioscorus and Severus, and the multi-headed mob of their followers, also asserted for themselves one hypostasis, defining that there is at the same time one nature, because they knew not what they were saying, nor understood what they affirmed. The disease, or error, of their mind was precisely this, that they considered nature and hypostasis to be one and the same. Yet they did not stop there. For they said that in the holy Trinity there are three particular natures and substances, and one common knowledge or notion. Yet they had nothing solid, which was born apt for confirming the matter.

3. But the preachers of the orthodox religion and of truth were not of this opinion; but following the divine law, and directing their course toward the heavenly light, they walked straight along the royal road, ^C which is in the middle, declining neither to the left—that of pride and ignorance—nor to the right—that of fantastic imagination. Nor did they set out to emend follies with contrary follies; but they arrived at their proposed goal between the extremes of evil, containing themselves within the limits of truth, so that by inclining to neither side they might not deflect from it. And so they confessed one substance in the Trinity, and, acknowledging three hypostases of the same, they willingly preached them. Again, however, they acknowledged that distinction in the mystery of the incarnation, as Gregory the Theologian says, two natures, and two substances, and one hypostasis, and they comprised nature and substance under the same definition: they likewise defined person and hypostasis in the same way; since they knew that the difference which is between nature, or substance, and hypostasis, or person, is of such a kind as is the distinction between the common and the singular.

4. First, therefore, we must inquire about nature and hypostasis, so that we may have a perfect understanding of the significance of both terms: then it will be evident to us whether we ought to assert two natures in Christ, or only one. For the standard of our inquiry demands that this be defined. Nor shall we expose the truth to contention, but we shall investigate it amicably, since such is the nature of truth that it becomes manifest to him who seeks it with that care which Scripture thus expresses: "Draw near to me, and I will draw near to you." And elsewhere: "Where two or three are gathered in my name, I am in the midst of them." Again it also says: "You ask, and do not receive, because you do not ask as you ought." And: "When there is among you jealousy and contention and division, are you not carnal, and do you not walk according to the flesh?" And likewise: "You cannot believe in me, who seek the glory of men."

^A 5. Now, therefore, the beginning of our discourse is led by these words of Saint Basil, which he wrote in his letter to Amphilochius, namely that "the difference between substance and hypostasis is the same as that which exists between that which is common to many and that which is particular to each individual." And, a few words being interjected, he says in the same letter: "The name of substance directs us to understand some indefinite thing. For the mind does not find wherein it consists, from that common notion which it signifies. But the name of hypostasis signifies that which is common in some one thing; and this (the mind) defines from the manifest properties appearing in it." Whoever, furthermore, does not recognize the difference between nature and hypostasis is so applying himself to the investigation of truth that there is no distinction between the sect of which we have spoken and himself. For if these things are distinguished, why do they assert concerning Christ that he has one nature, as he has one person? Again, if substance and hypostasis are the same thing, the Son, since he is of one substance with the Father, will also be one hypostasis with him. And, conversely, if the hypostasis is different, there will also be, in like manner, a different nature; and as he is of the same substance as the Father, he will also be of the same hypostasis with him: and if he is different in hypostasis, he will also be different in substance, which is very impious. So, likewise, concerning humanity. For if that which has subsistence is a hypostasis, humanity which has subsistence, and whose nature is one, will be in like manner one hypostasis. Just as humanity taken universally is one nature, so also it will be one person.

6. But if you say it should be spoken of differently regarding the holy divinity and differently regarding the mystery of the incarnation, which the Lord dispensed for our sake, answer us who ask you: Are nature and hypostasis one and the same? If you say that Christ is of two natures, do you not understand that you are compelled by that response to assert that he is also of two hypostases? For even if you do not state that about Christ, you are nonetheless compelled by those things which you have premised to affirm two natures as well. For if nature and hypostasis are the same, and you assert that the divinity of Christ is a nature, and his body is a nature, you are saying at the same time that the hypostasis of his divinity is one and that the hypostasis of his humanity is another.

7. But if hypostasis and nature are the same, Christ, since he is consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us, will also be of the same hypostasis as the Father and us: and then, in turn, the hypostases of divinity and humanity would become one hypostasis. For if hypostasis and nature are one and the same, and you constitute a distinction of natures in Christ, but not ^B truly of hypostases or persons, then nature and hypostasis will not be the same. The demonstration of this argument, however, is most clear to anyone, unless he be blinded in mind.

8. And certainly, by the name of *hypostasis*, there is signified something singular according to itself. For the name *hypostasis* has various significations; one of them is that it designates something subsisting by itself; another is that which does not exist in another, or does not have subsistence in another besides itself, and is not an accident. When the Fathers use this name regarding singular substance, it generally signifies that which is not in a subject, and which is not a privation; often, on the other hand, it signifies the subject of which certain things are predicated.

9. You, therefore (O Monophysites), having abandoned these trifles, ^C correctly handle the word of truth; for you do not say, as the holy doctors have said, that nature and hypostasis are the same; but rather you confess a particular nature as a hypostasis existing by itself. But that it is not fitting to speak of "particular natures," we shall understand from this: ...therefore, lay aside the crookedness, and "rightly handle the word of truth." For you do not say, as the holy Fathers have said, that nature and hypostasis are the same; but rather you confess the nature to be particular, just as you confess the hypostasis according to it. And that one ought not to speak of particular natures, we shall learn from this:

10. If you confess particular natures in the holy Trinity, you deem it to be of a different substance, and Arius is again raised up. But if you give to each of the divinely sovereign hypostases of the holy Trinity its own proper substance, yet confess them to be consubstantial according to a common substance; but if substance and hypostasis are the same, there will be, according to your opinion, a quaternity of hypostases—three indeed particular, but one common—and in like manner a quaternity of substances. And each of the hypostases will be of two natures and hypostases, one indeed common and one particular, and they will be at once consubstantial and of a different substance, and of the same hypostasis and of different hypostases. And who would not laugh, or rather, who would not weep for the immoderate madness of these men? Does this not constitute nothing but babble and the figment of a devil-inspired mind, a dark discovery of demons, and a ^D product of Greek imposture? Who of the God-bearing men has ever said this? Unless perhaps the one who...

you would introduce to us your holy Aristotle as a thirteenth apostle, and prefer the idolater to those who spoke by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. But let us return to the proposed subject.

^A 11. For even if nature is not without subsistence, nor is substance without a person; nor again, on the other hand, is subsistence and person without substance (for assuredly it is not so), yet substance and subsistence are not the same thing, nor are nature and person. For substance and that which is in substance are not the same thing, nor are subsistence and the enhypostaton (that is to say, that which exists in the subsistence). For that which is in something is one thing, and that in which something is, is another. For that is "in substance" which is considered in the substance, namely, the collection of accidents which denotes the subsistence, not the substance itself. But the enhypostaton is not the subsistence, but that which is viewed in the subsistence. Now substance or essence is that which exists in any way whatsoever, whether by itself, or with another, or in another: by itself, as the substance of fire; with others, as soul and body, for these exist in each other; in another, as fire in a lamp, and as the flesh of the Lord in His eternal subsistence. For the subsistence denotes someone, or this particular thing ^B which is pointed out by the stretching forth of a finger; but the enhypostaton denotes the substance. And the subsistence defines a person by the characteristic properties by which it is sealed; the enhypostaton, however, defines that it is not an accident, which has its existence in another. For if that which is "in something" were the same as that "in which something is," it would be time for you to say that virtue and the virtuous person are the same, and, by reasonable conversion, that malice and that in which malice is are the same. And according to your view, the devil himself will be malice, and his creator, the creator of malice. And since the accident is in the substance, the accident will be substance, and substance will be accident. And the body, I mean the human body, will be, according to you, soul; and who could bear the madness of this confusion?

^C 12. That there is no substance without subsistence, we know clearly, but we do not say that the enhypostaton and the subsistence are the same thing, nor yet substance and that which is in substance. Rather, we call the subsistence that which is in substance, and the substance the enhypostaton. For we know that the substance of the holy Divinity is an enhypostaton; for it exists in three subsistences. And likewise, each of the subsistences is "in substance." For these subsist in the substance of the holy Divinity; and in the case of the ineffable economy of the Lord, which surpasses all mind, we say ^D that the subsistence is "in substance," as existing in the substances from which it is also composed, and that each of His substances is an enhypostaton; for they have in common His one subsistence, His Divinity, eternally, just as also that of the Father and of the Spirit.

^A His flesh, however, which is animate and rational—or, which is the same thing, His very humanity—subsists newly in Him, and has acquired that subsistence for itself. Thus, it comes to pass that neither of Christ's natures lacks a subsistence, nor does each of them subsist by itself, but both have one and the same subsistence.

13. Since these things have been thus predetermined, let us come to the question: it is asked, therefore, whether Christ is of two natures and in two natures, or only one, as you prodigiously fancy. Therefore, it is worth the effort for one debating to construct the principles or premises from common and true notions. By common, I mean those accepted by both sides. For thus the syllogism would be formed, and not a fallacy; the conclusion would be true, and not absurd.

14. It is confessed, therefore, by all the holy Fathers that the union was made from divinity and humanity, and that Christ is perfect in divinity, and the same one perfect in humanity, lacking no part of Himself. Tell us, therefore: do these things also please you? I think you will frankly confess them. But what is divinity? And what, again, is humanity? Is it a substance or an accident? Is it a nature or a subsistence? I believe you will say it is a substance and a nature. For it is manifest to everyone that neither is an accident. But that it is not a subsistence has been sufficiently shown previously. ^B For if the name of divinity and the name of humanity signified a subsistence, you could say there are three divinities because of the three subsistences, and infinite humanities because of the infinite number of subsistences, or that a subsistence exists within subsistences. But who—I will not say a wise man, but even one of very dull mind—would ever dare to blurt out such a thing? Therefore, both the name of divinity and the name of humanity signify a nature. Is divinity, then, and humanity one nature—I do not say in Christ, but absolutely? No one, unless he be insane, would say they are one. For a creature is by no means the same thing as the uncreated and the Creator, nor is a body the same as the incorporeal, nor that which has begun as that which is without beginning. ^C Therefore, the nature of divinity is one thing, and that of humanity is another, and they are two natures. Since, therefore, Christ consists of divinity and humanity, He is from two natures. Wherefore, if you profess that Christ is from divinity and humanity, I would like you to tell us: do these two, namely divinity and humanity, exist in Christ, or not? You will entirely concede this, unless you wish to be utterly impious. Why, then, do you not say there are two natures in Christ? For if, by affirming that Christ consists of divinity and humanity, you confess Him to be from two natures, and if "from divinity and humanity" has the same force among you as "from two natures," how can you ^D not declare Christ to be of two natures?

and in two natures?

15. If divinity and humanity are not the same thing, according to their natural quality, but one is one thing and another is another, different and different, let anyone of sound mind observe whether, if one thing is one thing by nature and another is another, they are one in essence and not two; but if they are two—and not one—then they are two natures, for "another" signifies nature, as those expert in these matters have defined. But is nature and nature one, or two? Clearly two. For one and one, as even children know, are two.

16. But if you say that those things which are united are one, hear that those things which are united are not one in all respects, but insofar as they are united. For if those things which are united were one in all respects, since man is composed of dissimilar natures, it would be necessary to say that soul and body are one in all respects, and the incorporeal would be body, and the body incorporeal; and since divinity and humanity are united, they would be one according to substantial difference, and either the divine would be created, or the human uncreated.

17. If those things which are united ^C are one in all respects, and the body is composed of contrary qualities, we would have to say that heat and cold are the same thing, and dryness and humidity likewise the same; furthermore, that Peter and John, since they are united by nature, are also one in hypostasis, and not two. But this does not seem so to those who are of sound mind and to the truth; rather, those things which are united are one insofar as they are united: for example, Peter and John, since they are united by nature, being consubstantial, are one by nature; but soul and body, since they are united according to hypostasis, are one according to hypostasis. For no one of sober mind would say that soul and body are one by nature.

18. If the union has come to pass from two natures, were there two before the union, or in the union, or after the union? And if they subsisted before the union, why do we accuse Nestorius? And if the flesh subsisted even after the union, why do you reproach us? But if you say they were in the union, and the union remains, then even now and forever there are and shall be two. But if you say that at the time of the Word's incarnation they were one on account of the union, were they two before they were united, or were they united? For if both existed before the union, it is necessary to say that the union resulted from two hypostases; but if you say there are two in the union, and number in your opinion necessarily induces division, then the cause of division is the union, and in the union itself you divide the union.

^A 19. If each of those from which Christ exists preserves its own definition and account of substance or essence, even in the union, and the definition of Christ’s divinity is one thing and the definition of his humanity is another, how is it that you say there is one nature and not two, when they are not placed under one and the same definition?

20. If the flesh of the Word of God, as your opinion holds, is of the same substance as his uncreated divinity, you labor under a depraved notion of consubstantiality. And why does what you have long been laboring to produce not come forth? But if it is not of the same substance, in what way will those which are not of the same substance be of one nature? Or how are those which are of one nature not of the same substance? Unless consubstantiality is defined as having the same substance or essence.

21. If Christ is consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us according to the same nature, then we are entirely consubstantial with the Father; for those things which are consubstantial with the same thing according to the same nature are also consubstantial with each other. But if he is consubstantial with the Father according to divinity, and with us according to humanity, tell me, is divinity and humanity one nature? But if it is not one, then Christ is necessarily two and consists in two natures. And if it is one, how do they differ? For things that differ, either differ substantially or accidentally; but if they differ accidentally, they would be hypostases and not natures; ^B but if they differ substantially, they are natures. For things that differ are at the very least two; for the one, as one, does not admit of difference. Indeed, difference necessarily brings number with it.

22. Things that are consubstantial receive the same account. If, therefore, Christ is one incarnate nature, and this is the definition of his essence, while he is otherwise consubstantial with the Father and with us, then the Father and we will be one incarnate nature of divinity.

23. Difference introduces at least two things that differ, whether they be natures, or hypostases, or one hypostasis differing from itself; and if they are natures, they differ substantially; if they are hypostases, they differ according to that which is an adjunct to the essence; if it is one hypostasis which is diverse from itself, they differ through variation and mutation according to a separable accident: choose, therefore, one of these, and either say that Christ is two hypostases after the union, or that his divinity differs from his humanity according to a separable accident: and thus the uncreated, beginningless, impassible, omnipotent, and the like, and likewise the created, had a beginning, ^C passible, and similar things, of which Christ consists, will be accidents, and indeed separable, mutable, and variable: or else join us, as truth suggests, in proclaiming that Christ is two natures, the difference of which you acknowledge. For by speaking of a difference of substances, you will be compelled to say that there are substances, and that they are preserved. For if a thing does not exist, there cannot even be a difference. For how can those things differ

that do not exist preserved? But if they are preserved, then they are also numbered. ^A

24. But if you say that one composite nature has resulted from two natures, tell us, I pray you, how things that are not naturally composite are composed? For one composite nature is constituted out of distinct natures when, the natures being united, something else is produced beyond the things united, so that it is understood and called neither this strictly, nor that, but something different: just as if a body were to be constituted from four elements—I mean fire, and air, and earth, and water—the four being united and blended together. And that which is produced is neither fire, nor is it so called, nor air, nor water, nor earth, but something else ^B from these and beyond these. Similarly, a mule is distinguished from horse and ass, and it is not, neither in reality nor in name, a horse, nor is it an ass, but something third constituted from them. But our Lord Jesus Christ, because He consists of divinity and humanity, is perfect in divinity and in humanity, and is both God and man and is so called, and is wholly God and wholly man; which indeed cannot be found in a composite nature. For the entire body is not fire, nor is the whole man a soul, nor is the whole mule a horse. For this reason Christ is not one composite nature, but one composite ^C hypostasis; not something different from different things, but the same things from different things; for from divinity and humanity, He is both God and man perfect: yet there are two natures in one composite hypostasis, and one composite hypostasis in two natures.

25. If Christ is of the same nature and consubstantial with the Father, who is of a simple nature, but also possesses a composite nature, He will have two natures, one simple and one composite.

26. If Christ’s divinity is uncreated and without beginning, ^D but His humanity is created and has a beginning, how shall that which is without beginning and that which has a beginning be of one nature?

27. If Christ is one composite nature, but the simple and the composite are not consubstantial, and the Father is of a simple nature, then Christ is not consubstantial with the Father.

28. If Christ is one composite nature from divinity and humanity, but His Mother does not consist of divinity and humanity, then He is not even of the same substance as His Mother; and you have moved the ancient landmarks [(cf. Prov. 22:28)] which our Fathers set, by proclaiming Christ to be consubstantial with the Father according to the divinity, and consubstantial with the Mother according to the humanity.

29. But if you speak of the natures of Christ by way of mental conception and contemplation, tell us, O you who... [alt-version omitted]

are the inventors and speculators ^A of these things, is "mental conception" (epinoia) of things that are true and existent, such as that it may perceive and discern those things which appear simple to the senses? Just as, for instance, it recognizes in man the soul, which does not fall under the gaze, together with the body, which is born to be seen; or is it a figment of the mind, from the complication of sense and imagination, composing and fashioning out of things that are, those that are not at all, as the myth-making of the hippocentaurs and goat-stags, which signifies no thing; or is it merely a naked word devoid of signification, such as *scindapsus* and *blitiri*? If you say the second, then the mystery of the Economy will be a mere imagination and illusion. If, however, the first, since you consider the two natures by mental conception, and consideration is of things that are, why do you not number those which are? ^B Since the holy Fathers have stated that not the natures, but the *distance* between them, is understood by mental conception? For where, he says, are the natures divided by mental conceptions? If, therefore, the natures are divided by mental conception, it is manifest that they do not differ in actuality or in existence; for if what is viewed by mental conception exists, and the Father says that mental conception produces the distance of the natures, he would indeed be saying that the distance exists in actuality and existence, which is impossible. You, therefore, when you speak of divinity and humanity in Christ after the union by mental conception, do not confess them in actuality or in reality; consequently, according to you, he will be neither God in reality and truth, nor man, but something else besides these.

30. Again, if by contemplation you speak of the two natures of Christ—since contemplation is of things that are, as those skilled in these matters have defined—the natures of Christ are entirely necessary ^C existing things. And if they exist, why do you flee from the number [two] as if it were some hobgoblin?

31. But if you say that he who speaks of two natures divides the mystery of the Economy, and utters two Christs: he, therefore, who speaks of the union from two natures will accordingly utter the union from two Christs.

32. If speaking of two natures divides Christ, but you assert two natures in the union, then in the union you divide the union, and according to your opinion, the union will be a division.

33. Nature and nature will never be called one nature, but perhaps one hypostasis: nor will hypostasis and hypostasis be called one hypostasis, but one nature. Therefore, you who affirm that those things from which Christ consists are of one nature, you ought to confess that these are hypostases, and not natures. If, however, preferring falsehood to truth, you say that those things from which Christ is, after the union, ^D are of one hypostasis, then confess that these are natures.

34. If you acknowledge the difference of the natures even after the union, how can you not refer to the natures in the plural number

^A For if, according to you, there is one composite nature after the union, you ought to speak not of a difference of natures, but of a difference of one nature from itself; which is something for you to say and think, not for us. For the same nature will never have an essential difference from itself.

35. If there is one nature of Christ, tell us its name. For that which exists must also be named, and named appropriately, just as the nature of God is called deity, and the nature of man, humanity. By what name, then, shall we call the nature of Christ? "Christ-ity?" But none of those who spoke by divine inspiration have said this; or "deity-humanity?" But not even this. Why do you bring in for us a nameless nature? If you say that natures are being innovated, and that something strange is becoming of the strangeness of the mystery, yet nothing is more incomprehensible or sublime than the nature of God, and nevertheless that one and only thing which cannot be comprehended willed to be named by us. Either tell us, then, that the nature you have introduced is higher and better than the deity—and that will suffice for us—or reveal its name, or else, with the heralds of the truth, declare that deity and humanity are the natures of Christ, and not "the nature." For deity and humanity are not one nature. ^B

36. If out of deity and humanity there is one nature of Christ, then the deity in Christ is a portion of a nature, and not a perfect nature, and likewise also the humanity.

37. If your composite nature is not at all consubstantial with the Father, nor with the Mother, and the whole is what Christ is, Christ, in as much as He is Christ, is consubstantial with no one. And if this is the case, whenever He is consubstantial with someone, He is not Christ; and so, in as much as He is consubstantial with the Father, He is not Christ. It is necessary, therefore, that one of two things be the case: either that the one who is consubstantial with the Father is not Christ, or that the one who is Christ is not consubstantial with the Father.

38. Things that are composed are composed from contraries, but according to those who study nature, there is no contrary in substance. Therefore, it is impossible for a substance to be composite from substances. ^C

39. The natures, or rather the substances, are constituted by essential differences; if, therefore, one nature has been composed out of deity and humanity, deity and humanity will not be natures, but essential differences.

40. Those things which are of one substance are in every respect of different hypostases; and those which are of one hypostasis are of different substances. Therefore, you who speak of the deity and the humanity of Christ as being of one substance, say that they are of different hypostases, or, since you speak of one hypostasis, acknowledge two natures, not one. ^D For where there is diversity of substance, there is not one nature. Therefore, either say that the flesh is consubstantial with the deity of the Word, or, declaring them to be of different substances, confess two natures.

^A 41. You who say that there is one nature of the deity of Christ and of his flesh, tell us: by what nature did Christ suffer? You will clearly answer, "By the composite nature." For by saying "one," you must of necessity also attribute passion to it, and so, according to you, both the divinity and the humanity of Christ would be subject to passion.

42. Philosophers are accustomed to treat of quantity before quality, and they add as the reason for this that wherever there is quality, there quantity must also be considered. For a difference is a difference of things that differ. How, then, when you maintain a difference between essential qualities, do you not acknowledge the number of those things that differ essentially?

43. If there is one composite nature in Christ, it will be either only passible, or only impassible, or both passible and impassible at the same time and in the same respect; or it will be mutable, and at one time passible and at another time impassible again; or, finally, one part of it will be capable of suffering, while the other part is immune to passions: therefore, choose whichever of these impieties you prefer. For if it is only passible, Christ is not God; if it is only impassible, he is not man; if it is sometimes passible and sometimes impassible, ^B he is neither by nature, but rather by accident. For that which is implanted by nature does not change. But if one part of it is capable of suffering and the other is incapable, and each is what it is by nature, they will not be parts of the same nature, and thus Christ will be two natures; for he is not one nature, but one hypostasis composite of two natures, and in two natures, and two natures. For it is impossible for the same nature to be at once passible and impassible; for one and the same nature cannot receive contrary essential differences.

44. In every union, things that are united, even if they are blended, even if they are commingled, remain without departing from their own nature. For even if wine is mixed with water, there are two natures in that mixture; and wax and pitch, even if they are fused, neither abandons its own nature, but in the mixture the two natures persist. Even if they are united, and each does not retain its own property pure and intact because of the confusion and commingling with that to which it is united, nevertheless each one is what it was before, ^C and thus they are judged as two natures, not one, by those who know how to judge such things. For who is ignorant that in the mixture of wine and water there are two natures? If, therefore, these things are so, why do you, who know the difference and acknowledge the properties of the natures, proclaim one and not two? And why do you not concede to things that are not confused in any way even those things that pertain to things that are confused? But it is manifest that you are bringing forth transformation, extinction, and consubstantiation, but you do not wish to bring them into the open, fearing the mark of impiety.

45. Those things which are united become one by the union, not by

the extinction of the things that exist; and as long as they persevere in the union, and the union remains intact, they are one, in so far as they are united. How, then, is it that you, who speak of two natures in the union, arrogantly assert that after the union a single nature has come to be, taking the blessed Cyril’s phrase "after the union" in place of "in the union"? For when did the union, once having come to pass, cease? Or what has brought it to an end, so that you should suspect a result of it to have followed after it—a result other than the things of which it consists, and not existing within it? For the union is not a nature, like those things which come to be and then no longer exist, such as time, dancing, and the like.

^B 46. If something else has occurred after the union, distinct from the union, it is clearly a confusion, and not a union.

47. If confusion makes the two natures into one, and yet for you the "unconfused" also accomplishes the same thing, tell me, what is the difference for you between the unconfused and the confused?

48. If Christ is called "other" (aliud) and "other" (aliud) as visible and invisible, mortal and immortal, tangible and intangible—and not "one" (alius) and "one" (alius)—seeing that "other" (aliud) signifies essence or substance, why do you not declare that there are two substances?

49. According to logical rules, "other" (aliud) is indicative of substance, but "one" (alius) pertains to hypostasis. If, therefore, by calling Christ "other" and "other" you are not forced to speak of two natures, then say "one" (alius) and "one" (alius) as well; for by this you will signify two hypostases.

^C 50. But if you say that the number two introduces division, learn, and be well instructed, how number is defined by the philosopher: not as a division, but as a heap of units, or a flowing together of units. Thus, it signifies union rather than division. For a division of a unit is "half and half," but the number two is an addition of a unit. For to say that the two are "one and one" pertains rather to division; but to gather "one" and "one" under a single number and to call them "two," belongs to conjunction and union. If, therefore, number gathers, then it certainly does not divide. ^D Since the cleavage of the unit is the binary, and since that which is cleaved is cleaved into two, the number should be a cleavage and not an addition. If this is so, just as the unit, when cleaved, makes the binary, in the same way the number two, when cleaved, should have made the four. And whence comes the three? For only the even numbers should be counted, with the odd ones excluded. Or rather, it is truer to say that "number" is used in two ways: one is considered in itself, as the very nature of number, and the other is considered in relation to a subject, just as white, or whiteness, and the thing made white. This nature of number, therefore, neither divides nor conjoins.

but receives both: for instance, if you consider the dual in terms of the units from which it consists, it is divided into them. For two is divided into one and one. If, however, you consider the group of these, it is rather conjoined from them; for one and one are two, two and two are four. And again, number is not division, but a sign indicating the quantity of the things proposed, whether they are joined or divided, being a matter of another argument, and not that the number itself divides or conjoins these. For when we say ten cubits of this wood, for example, which is continuous, we do not thereby divide the unity of the ten-cubit piece of wood; and again, when we say ten palms, we know them to be divided; and likewise when we say one modius, for example of wheat or dates, we know that the grains contained in the modius are divided. Wherefore, if a number is predicated of natures, it does not principally indicate their quantity, but a difference of kind. For when we speak of two natures of an ox, for example, and a horse, we do not signal a division according to quantity, but a difference in species. But by saying three horses or men—Peter, for instance, Jacob, and John—we signal rather their division, and that they are this many, not that they are of such a kind. ^B Indeed, in the holy and consubstantial Trinity, we so preach three hypostases that we confess one nature and substance of them. Therefore, in the salutary incarnation, when we set forth two natures, we signify their diversity, not their separation; so that just as in that case we exclude a number of substances, although no hypostasis lacks substance, in the same way we rightly exclude a number of hypostases here, although no nature exists without a hypostasis.

51. If the dual always introduces division, and for this reason you avoid the number of natures, why do you not shun the number of properties? ^C

52. You confess one nature of God the Word incarnate, and this sentiment is common to you and to us; for this is the saying of the Fathers. But if you wish by this to declare two natures, your war against the truth is vain. If, however, you set this forth as if it were simply indicating one nature, opposing the truth by speaking against the two natures, the intervening word, "incarnate," does not succeed for you. But if it represents neither one absolutely, nor two unitedly, whatever part is assumed as added between one and two, this will be declared by "incarnate"—whether it be a double part, or a half, the quantity will be at your discretion; whereas the blessed Athanasius and Cyril here, in a transferred sense, ^D [know one nature of God the Word, but] were taught that the flesh is of another nature. For one is the nature of the Word of God that was incarnated, and another is the nature of the flesh which, when the nature of the Word of God had assumed it, he was incarnated. Regarding the authority of Athanasius, it shall be spoken of in a separate dissertation.

^A For the blessed Athanasius and Cyril indicated the hypostasis by the name of nature, but not properly, [doing so] as if by a more universal term. For things that are more universal are predicated of particular things, and the one is not altogether the other. For the hypostasis is not nature; for the hypostasis is not universal; yet it receives both the name and the definition of the universal, but it does not reciprocate. For the hypostasis, that is to say the individual of a nature, is a nature, but not only a nature, but [a nature] with a property. But nature is not hypostasis, that is to say, an individual; thus abusively and not properly did they signify the hypostasis by the name of nature, so that the expression meant [what is traditionally phrased] "one incarnate hypostasis of God the Word." For it is not the nature of God the Word that is incarnated, but the hypostasis. And the divine evangelist is a witness [to this], crying out clearly: "The Word became flesh." And the Word is not nature, as has been shown above, but hypostasis. But the God-bearing Cyril himself also says elsewhere: "The nature of the Word, that is to say the hypostasis, which is the Word himself." For if the nature of the Word, that is to say the divinity, were incarnated—for the Word had no other nature beside the divinity, and the Word is of the same nature as the Father and the Spirit, and all things are common to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, except for the mode of existence—[then] the Father and the Spirit would also be incarnated. We therefore confess a union of nature according to hypostasis, and the incarnation of the Word, and the deification of the flesh. For incarnation is the partaking and assumption of flesh. Therefore, the essential hypostasis of God the Word, that is to say God the Word, is incarnated, and becomes dense, and becomes a hypostasis for the flesh; and he who was previously God, becomes later flesh, that is to say man, and is called one composite hypostasis of two natures, with both natures, divinity and humanity, united in Him through the incarnation and interpenetrating each other; and the interpenetration occurs from the divinity. For this [divinity] imparts to the flesh its own glory and splendor, while not partaking of the passions of the flesh. For this reason the nature of the flesh is deified, but it does not deify the nature of the Word; it deifies what was assumed, but it is not incarnated. For the inferior is benefited by the superior, but the superior is not harmed by the inferior. For just as the iron is ignited, but the fire is not ironized; and as the flesh is animated, but the soul does not become flesh; so the divine nature deifies the flesh, but it itself is not incarnated. For the divine nature is not capable of any addition or subtraction; and it is communicative, but not participant. Therefore no composite nature has come to be. It is the same thing, therefore, to say the essential hypostasis and the nature of God the Word; for as it has been said, the blessed Athanasius and Cyril indicated the hypostasis by the name of nature. For the hypostasis is also nature; but the nature is not also hypostasis. For it does not reciprocate; for the universals are predicated of the particulars, but the particulars are not asserted of the universals. But if, when some iron is ignited, the nature of the iron is said to be ignited

^A one must know that this is because nature is receptive to heat, and that ignition is a work of nature. But in the case of the incarnation of the Word, the incarnation is not a work of nature, but a mode of economic condescension. It is not possible, therefore, to say that one of the hypostases of the Godhead possesses something that all the hypostases do not possess, except for the mode of existence. And the incarnation is, by its nature, a mode of secondary existence, fitting to the Only-begotten Son and Word alone, so that the property remains immutable.

53. But perhaps you will say: Why then do we say that the nature of the flesh has been deified and has suffered, without asserting this of all the hypostases of humanity; yet, in saying that the nature of the Word has been incarnate, ^B we refer the incarnation to the Father and the Spirit? Because the whole human nature is receptive to things that are according to nature, and contrary to nature, and above nature, without alteration of nature. But the divine nature is immune to every alteration and every accretion. Not only this, but also because that flesh was the first-fruits of our mass, and it did not become a self-subsisting hypostasis, but a nature subsisting in a hypostasis, ^C filling out the composite hypostasis of Christ; and it was united to the Word of God not for its own sake, but for the common salvation of the nature. We say, therefore, that the nature of the Godhead has been united to the nature of humanity, but it is the hypostasis of the Word that has been incarnate. For incarnation is the assumption of flesh, and the becoming a hypostasis for the flesh. But union is the concurrence and coming together of two things into one and the same.

54. The example of man, if you take it in terms of species and nature, will have no place in Christ. ^D For we have never heard of a species of Christs; hence Christ is not a nature, but a hypostasis. For, according to the blessed Cyril, the name "Christ" has neither the force of a definition nor does it declare the essence of anything. But if you take it in terms of some particular man, since he is a hypostasis, it is not absurd. It should be known, however, that examples need not be strictly similar in all respects to the things being demonstrated; rather, they must differ in some part, otherwise it would not be an example. Therefore, Justin the philosopher and martyr says in his *Exposition of the Right Confession*: "Some, conceiving that union as that of soul to body, have explained it thus; and the example is appropriate, even if not in every respect. In some respect, at least; for as man is one, he has two natures," etc.

55. Consider also that he did not say that man is out of two natures, but that he has two natures, so that he declared that man has two natures even after the union of the two natures. "For as he is one," he says, "he is man, but he has two natures in him, which are distinct,

and in one respect it reasons, while in another it executes what it has reasoned: for by the intellectual soul it reasons, if, for instance, of the construction of a ship, and by the hands it brings the thought to its finish; ^A so the Son, being one, and [having] two natures, in one respect works the divine signs, and in another admits the lowly things. For insofar as He is from the Father and God, He works the miracles; but insofar as He is from the Virgin and man, He naturally and willingly endured the cross, and the suffering, and similar things. To whom do you consider the example to bear witness? To those who dare to say there is one nature in Christ, or to those who rightly proclaim two, unconfusedly and indivisibly? The theologian Gregory says the following: “Natures indeed are two, God and man, since it is soul and body; but the sons are not two, nor are the gods.” ^B

56. And that this is highly incongruous, we shall know from the following. From what do you say that man is composed? From soul and body, of course. Why, then, do you not confess Christ to be composed of God and man? Or for what reason do you not declare man to be composed of animality and corporality, just as [you declare] Christ to be from divinity and humanity? Why should man not be called “wholly soul” and “wholly body,” as Christ is “wholly God” and “wholly man”? And “wholly perfect in animality” and “wholly perfect in corporality,” as Christ is “wholly perfect in divinity” and “wholly perfect in humanity”? And “wholly soul together with the body,” and “wholly body together with the soul,” as Christ is “wholly God together with His flesh,” and “wholly man together with His own beginningless divinity”? For man, coming to be from soul and body, has become something else beyond these, ^C namely man; but Christ, from different [realities, remains] the same: from divinity and humanity, He is both God and man. But if it has similarity in all respects, it would have been necessary for your compound nature also to be called “Christity,” just as the nature of men is and is called “humanity.”

57. Furthermore, the soul is preoccupied by the passions of the body, and often suffers before the body, and suffers with it continuously. For it often feels anguish at the cutting of the body, and suffers and is altered even before the body suffers; and after the cutting, it nevertheless receives the sensations of pain passionately. Which, on the divinity of the Lord, no one of sound mind would ever say has happened. ^D If, therefore, man is said to be of one nature, it is as a species, not as a hypostasis. For when man is compared with man, they are said to be of one nature as consubstantial, and as arranged under one species; but when man is being physiologically analyzed, two natures are observed in him, I mean of soul and of body. For in the comparison of the soul to the body, who is so senseless as to say there is one nature for both?

^A But there is no species of Christs; for there are not many Christs composed of deity and humanity, so that all, being placed under the same species, might be proclaimed as of one nature; but Christ is one, recognized as of two and in two natures.

58. ^B And note that the blessed Cyril describes him by means of two goats, but he brings forward the example not with regard to the hypostases, but with regard to the difference between the living and the sacrificed. And this we say, that it is perhaps not impossible for one nature to come to be from two created things, but for one nature to be made from a created and an uncreated thing is impossible, whether it be a participant of both, or some other thing besides these, according to the Theologian Gregory. For how could the same thing have begun to be and not have begun to be?

59. If it is the same thing to say "from deity and humanity" and "from two natures," you who do not say two natures in Christ after the union do not even confess deity and humanity in him after the union.

60. Things that are of one substance will have the same differences without omission. ^C For neither, because man is rational and the angel is rational, will the nature of angel and man be called one. For the angel is immortal, but man is mortal, and it does not have likeness in all respects. And man is indeed mortal, and the dog is also mortal; but man is rational, while the dog is devoid of reason, and they are not of one nature. It is necessary, therefore, that those which are of one essence should have the same essential differences without omission. If, therefore, there is one essence of the deity of the Word of God and of his flesh, the same differences will belong to both without omission.

61. If the things from which Christ is are not in him, either they have perished, or they are in another; tell us where.

62. If, in the case of those of the same substance or essence, while "one nature" is said, the unity of nature is declared and not of hypostasis, how will "two natures," in the case of those that have different essences, signify not the distinction of substances, but a division of hypostases?

63. Things that are relative are together, and are always together; ^D and the union and the things united are of the things which are spoken of as relative. Therefore, the union and the things united are together. Either, then, proclaim that which is united, or stop the union. And what then will be the cause of the division?

64. "Another and another" are pronouns of hypostases; but "a different thing and a different thing" are of natures, according to the Theologian Gregory. If, therefore, "another and another," where divine matters are concerned, signifies the hypostases, then also "a different thing..."

and a different thing," where matters of substance are concerned, signifies one and the same thing according to substance, and a difference according to hypostasis; while on the contrary, to be of diverse substances signifies that they are indeed one according to hypostasis, but that the nature of the united things is different.

80. Thus, Christ is not "another and another," lest we serve a quaternity; nor is he "a different thing and a different thing," lest we attribute suffering to the Godhead. For if He is another and another, we boast in vain that the deification of our nature has come to pass through the incarnation of the Word. Indeed, if the indwelling of one in another is incarnation, God has endured many incarnations. "For I will dwell in you," He says, "and I will walk among you." And: "Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?" But if He is not a different thing and a different thing, then the flesh and the Godhead are the same by nature, and all things are confused and commingled. If, therefore, He is not another and another, Christ is one, and there is one hypostasis—for the hypostasis is "another." If, however, He is a different thing and a different thing, it is clearly not one according to nature. And if it is not one, it is clear to everyone that it is two. Therefore, He is one according to hypostasis, identified with Himself, yet distinguished by the characteristic properties of the extremes. For although His holy flesh was not devoid of the characteristic properties, nevertheless, the sum of these, and the subsistence and conformation of the flesh, did not exist by itself, but came to be in the hypostasis of the Word, and it did not possess a hypostasis of its own. Thus, it was neither without a hypostasis, nor did it possess its own hypostasis; but there are two natures, being, by the consubstantiality of the extremes and the difference of the parts, both united and distinguished.

81. While saying that there are two natures, we do not divide the union, but we flee from change and confusion. For we know that these are numbered by reason and by the mode of difference. For in the same manner as we flee from confusion, so also do we reject separation, both in the case of the holy and divine Trinity and in the case of the economy of one of the holy Trinity. For just as there we confess three hypostases, while proclaiming one substance and nature—not knowing any one of the hypostases to be without substance, but yet not attributing a substance to each one separately, nor announcing a defined number of substances in terms of quantity, lest we introduce a diversity of natures and substances—so also here, when we pronounce two natures, we do not divide the hypostatic union, nor do we introduce a number of hypostases, even though these natures might not be without subsistence; rather, we declare a difference of natures or essences. For just as there the number of the hypostases does not harm the unity of the substance, nor does it introduce a division of nature into the hypostases, but rather, while signifying the hypostases, it does not cut the unity of the substance; so here, the quantity of the natures does not divide the identity and unity of the hypostases, but [the nature of the united things is different].

^A Why then do you not proclaim the one Christ, who is God and man, not as one composite hypostasis as [he is] Christ, but as God and man as two natures? ^B 71. Even if the union is made from perfect things, yet with regard to the whole, that is, to the result produced by the union, the things that have come together for the union are called parts—just as, for example, a brick is made from earth, straw, and water, of which each one is perfect in itself, but is reckoned as a part in relation to the brick. Therefore, the two natures are the parts of Christ, for he exists from divinity and humanity. How then are the parts not in the whole, and the whole not in the parts? For either it is in itself, or elsewhere, or it itself also will be destroyed, or it is in things other than these, or nowhere at all.

72. If his flesh is of the same nature as the divinity of the Word, how has the Trinity not passed into a quaternity? For things that are consubstantial are of a different hypostasis. But if [the flesh] is of a different substance, how is Christ not two natures?

73. If God the Word and the Father are two in some respect, but the flesh and God the Word are in no respect two, God the Word is more united to the flesh than to the Father. But if not more, at least they are two in some respect, God the Word and the flesh. And if they are two in some respect, it is by nature; for it is not by hypostasis.

74. The one Christ, the composite hypostasis, is in nature identified with the Father and the Spirit, and with the Mother, and with us; for you are consubstantial with the Father and with us, yet he differs by hypostasis. If, therefore, you grant him one composite nature, you will say that the Father and the Holy Spirit are of a composite nature, and ^C you would say that the Trinity and all mankind are of one nature. But if [he is] one hypostasis known in two natures, he will be consubstantial with the Father in one respect, and with us in another.

75. The divinity is predicated of the three hypostases of the life-originating Trinity, and in a similar way the humanity is predicated of the infinite hypostases of human nature. If therefore you call the divinity and humanity one nature, according to your opinion, one nature in Christ has come to be of the three hypostases of the holy Trinity.

76. If you assert that the particular and individual essence of the Word is the same as the nature and hypostasis, show us which of the holy Fathers has said there are three natures or essences in the holy Trinity, and we shall be silent, putting our hand over our mouth. But if you cannot show it, why do you rage in vain, speaking from your heart and not from God? ^D

^A The quantity of things is not only represented by a definite number, but also by an indefinite one, as for example with "many" and "few," "more" and "fewer." And analogy also knows how to produce the same thing, just as "greater," "equal," and "lesser," but also the demonstrative expression—I mean this, and that, and these, and another, and different. Also the order, as "before this," and "after that," and "from the beginning," and "later," and other modes as well. If, therefore, you say that all the modes expressive of the quantity of things are divisive, the refutation is near at hand; for you speak of one and one nature, and other and other, and another and another, and natures indefinitely, and qualities, and greater and lesser, and prior and posterior. But if you assume that only the definite number, and especially that of the dyad, is divisive, then that is your privilege; for what is the allotment of the truth having it otherwise? For the dyad, and the two things counted together, they represent by a comprehensive power, or else the disintegrated number of your one and one, considered by itself.

^B 78. Above all these things, announce this to us: Does Christ have a divine nature even after the union? Yes, you will say. Does He have a human nature also? And this you will acknowledge, unless you wish to show impiety with a bare head. Therefore, is the divine nature and the human nature one nature, or are they two? But if you say "one," the Father will be consubstantial with us. But if they are two and not one, why, having cast away vanity far from you along with its begetter, do you not acknowledge with us one Christ, one Son, one Lord, one hypostasis out of two natures, and two natures, and in two natures after the union? For if you never say that Christ is of two natures, why do you vainly speak of Him as of one nature after the union? But if, while acknowledging Him to be of two natures before the union, you acknowledge Him to be of one after the union, you are fighting directly against the truth. For before the union, or rather the divine incarnation, there was not even a Christ, since one hypostasis was not yet fulfilling ^C as one nature, simple, that is to say, the divine one. Either, therefore, you will completely deny the two natures in Christ, or you will say that Christ was of two natures before the incarnation from the Virgin, not enduring, after the union, to grant Him the two natures which are truly His. For we, standing in the harbor of piety ^D and warding off every heretical wickedness like a gale by the breezes of the Spirit, acknowledge in the holy and hyper-praised Trinity one essence and nature of deity, but three perfect hypostases, admitting no difference among them; but we receive the divine names commonly, and identically, and simply, and indivisibly, and totally upon the whole Godhead—either the essence of the three hypostases, or nature, dominion, holiness, kingdom, power, energy, will, authority; but distinctly the Father, the Son, and the [Spirit]...

we recognize. I say the ingenerate, and the generate, and the proceeding; recognizing only the Father as ingenerate, only the Son as generate, and only the Holy Spirit as proceeding, without the property of each being changed or moved. For we know these are not accidents (since nothing happens to God), but properties with which each hypostasis is sealed: God perfect the Father, God perfect the Son, God perfect the Holy Spirit; God and God and God, yet the three are one God, simultaneously understood and known, not contracted into one person or one hypostasis—God forbid!—but related to one principle, the Father, by the Son and the Spirit. For there is one God, since there is one Godhead; not three gods, as there are three men. For they are not divided by substance, nor separated by power, ^B by place, by operation, or by will, having an indivisible indwelling and circuminsession in themselves. For where will they be, if they do not permeate one another? Otherwise, each person would be circumscribed. One, therefore, is God from three perfect hypostases, so that nature may not be thought of as composite from imperfect parts, but one from three perfect [entities], simple and without composition, supra-perfect and pre-perfect.

79. On the saving dispensation, which transcends all understanding, we confess that the one of the holy Trinity, the only-begotten Son and Word of God, by the good pleasure of the Father, was incarnate of the Holy Spirit and of Mary, the holy, ever-virgin Theotokos. And we venerate His two births: one before the ages and eternal, ^C without cause, from the Father without a mother; and one from the Virgin mother, without a father, for the sake of our salvation. We do not say that the Father was incarnate and born, nor the Holy Spirit; for the property of sonship is immovable. Being therefore Son, He became Son again. For He who was Son of God and the Father became son of man, out of two natures a composite hypostasis. For being an existing hypostasis, He assumed an enhypostatic nature, the first-fruits of our clay. We say "enhypostatic," not as having had its own hypostasis, but as having come to exist in the hypostasis of the Word. For at once there is flesh, at once flesh of the Word of God; at once flesh ensouled ^D and rational, at once flesh of the Word of God ensouled and rational, in no way removed of the difference of the natures because of the union. For the elements of which Christ and Lord consists have remained unchangeable and immutable, but having come together into one composite hypostasis without confusion and without separation. For we dogmatize the union according to hypostasis. And the union according to hypostasis preserves both the difference of the substances that have come together and knows how to keep the unity of the person. For if the Word is not consubstantial with the flesh, neither is He separated from the one with whom He co-exists, nor is it permissible to speak of one nature in Him, nor of two hypostases. For these things make the hypostases; for "consubstantial" signifies one and the same according to substance, but "according to hypostasis" signifies that, on the contrary, it is different.

^A Likewise, "of different substance" brings forward one thing according to hypostasis, but a different nature of the things united.

80. ^B By this means it is brought about that Christ is not "one and another," lest we serve a quaternity; nor "one thing and another," lest we ascribe passion to the divinity. For if he were one and another, we would vainly and fruitlessly boast that the deification of our nature had been brought about through the incarnation of the Word. For if the indwelling of one in another is incarnation, God underwent very many incarnations. "For I will dwell in you," He says, "and I will walk among you," and, "Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?" But if he is not one thing and another, flesh and divinity are the same by nature, and all things are confused and commingled. If, therefore, he is not one and another, Christ is one, and there is one hypostasis; for the hypostasis is "another." But if he is one thing and another—and "the other" refers to nature—then he is clearly not one according to nature. ^C And if he is not one, it is clear to everyone that he is two. He is therefore one according to hypostasis, becoming identified with himself, yet distinguished by the characteristic properties of the extremes. For even if his holy flesh was not devoid of the properties by which it is marked, nonetheless, the collection of these, and the existence and constitution of the flesh, did not subsist by itself, but in the hypostasis of the Word, so that it did not have its own hypostasis but the hypostasis of the Word. Wherefore it happened that it did not exist without a hypostasis, nor was it endowed with its own. Moreover, there are two natures, which, by the consubstantiality of the extremes and the diversity of the parts, are both united and distinguished.

81. ^D Saying there are two natures, we do not divide the union; rather, we avoid [page 1478] change and confusion. For we recognize that these are numbered by reason and by the mode of difference. For in the same manner as we avoid confusion, so also do we shun division, both in the case of the holy and god-like Trinity, and in the case of the economy of the one of the holy Trinity. For just as there we confess three hypostases and proclaim one substance and nature—not acknowledging any one of those three hypostases as lacking substance, nor indeed assigning substance to each one specially, nor declaring a definite number of the quantity of substances, lest we introduce a different kind and a different substance—so also here, saying there are two natures, we do not divide the union according to hypostasis, nor do we introduce a number of hypostases, even if they are not without subsistence; rather, we declare the difference of the natures or essences. For just as there, the number of the hypostases does not damage the unity of the substance, nor does it induce a diversity of nature into the hypostases; rather, by signifying the hypostases, it does not sever the unity of the substance; so here, the quantity of the natures does not divide the identity and the unity of the hypostases, the

^A the difference as in physical quality, and the collection of those things which have come together, it signifies. ^B Wherefore, saying that the union has been brought about from two perfect natures, we do not speak of it as being by commixture, or confusion, or change, or blending; nor, again, as personal, or relative, or by way of merit, or sameness of service, or sameness of name, or equality of honor, as the God-hated Nestorius said; but we proclaim it rather as substantial and according to hypostasis, in an orthodox manner; not as though the two substances had formed one composite substance, but as having been truly united to one another into one composite hypostasis of the Son of God, we define that their substantial difference is preserved. For that which was created remained created, and that which was not created, uncreated; that which was mortal, mortal, and that which was immortal, immortal; and the one shines forth with miracles, while the other is subject to outrages. For even if He who suffers these things and performs those other things wonderfully is one, and both are common to the one, yet it is one thing from which those things of outrage are common, and another from which those things that are pre-eminent are common. Yet one is one thing and another another, in reason and mode of difference, but both are common to either by the mode of exchange, on account of the interpenetration of the parts into one another, and on account of the hypostatic union. For each form performs with the communion of the other that which it has as its own; ^C wherefore also the Lord of glory is said to have been crucified, that is, not in His deity, but in the flesh which subsists with it; and the Son of Man is written to have ascended where He was before; not where He was as man before, but where He existed as God, and was indivisible from the Father. For we do not proclaim the deity to be passible, or that it suffered in the flesh, nor do we confess the flesh, or humanity, to have existed before the ages; but concerning Him who has both, this and that—at one time we name Him Christ from both, and at another time from one of the parts, and from the deity, God, but again from the humanity, man. And we speak of God as passible, not as God, but as He is also man; and of a child as before the ages, not as a child, but as He is also God. ^D For He is one, this and that, God and man; God perfect and man perfect, bearing in Himself all the properties of the deity: the deity, the unoriginate, the immortal, the lordship, the omnipotent will and energy, and bearing wholly the substance of the flesh, soul and body, mind, and the natural and blameless passions and properties of these, the self-determining will and energy, hunger, thirst, tears, sorrow, anguish, death. “For my Lord and God,” says Thomas. And “The Word was God, and the Word became flesh,” the Theologian said in the Spirit. And “In the beginning was the Word.” And “I will, be thou cleansed.” And “They would not have crucified the Lord of glory.” These and suchlike, and

the power of the miracles, ^A proclaim his divine nature and operation.

82. Further he says, “I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it again.” And, “Handle me and see, for a spirit has not flesh and bones as you see me to have.” And, “But we have the mind of Christ.” And, “Having entered into the house, he would have no man know it, but he could not escape notice.” And, “Father, not my will, but thine be done.” The breaking of ^B bread, walking, the stretching out of hands upon the cross, understanding, vital energy, the power of nourishing, growing, and feeling, attest the human act. And that again: “Afterwards he hungered”; and that for the sake of Lazarus, tears; and this: “I thirst.” And, “Now is my soul troubled.” And, “My soul is sorrowful even unto death”; and to this: “He began to be amazed and distressed and sorrowful.” Finally, “Father, ^C into thy hands I commend my spirit, and having said this, he expired.” Do not these plainly testify to his divinity, just as the former ones do to his humanity, and [testify to] the distinction of the two natures and their unconfused union? For who will say that these and those are of one nature?

83. God, therefore, is perfect, and man is perfect. God is perfect in nature, and man is perfect in nature, and there is no defect in his humanity. For even if he became man in accordance with the dispensation, yet he became man in nature; he is perfect God even with his flesh, and whole man with his supersubstantial ^D Deity. But we further add that Gregory the Theologian has said this: “From which [natures] the one has deified, but the other has been deified; and I would even venture to say, it has become God at the same time.” For, just as we know the Incarnation without any change or mutation of the Word, so also we know the deification. For the Word himself became flesh, spring being born indeed from the Virgin, but proceeding as God with the assumed flesh, which from the very first moment it began to exist, was already deified by him. Whence it happens that three things occurred at once: the assumption, the existence, and the deification of the humanity. The assumption and the existence were brought about prodigiously at the same time, the Word indeed assuming, and the flesh co-existing in the Word himself, the work of the Mother of God herself, who in a way more sublime than nature surpassed limits, that the Creator might be fashioned, and man might become God and creator of the universe, from whom the assumed nature

^A of Christ is also above us and according to us. For it did not happen that being first according to us, it later became above us; but rather it existed as both from the very first beginning, because from the summit of the conception it had its existence in the Word Himself. Human, therefore, it is according to its own nature, but of God and divine, supernaturally.

84. Furthermore, we proclaim the holy Virgin as properly and truly Theotokos; for just as the God who was born of her is true God, so she is truly Theotokos, since she gave birth to God made flesh from her. We say that God was born from her, not as if she had given Him the eternal existence of the Godhead, but because He was incarnated from her without change and became man, and was born as one Christ, one Son, one Lord, one hypostasis, the same being both God and man, not introducing another person into the Trinity. ^B

85. Therefore, we also judge the addition made to the Trisagion to be blasphemous, as it introduces a fourth person into the Trinity, and sets apart the subsistent power of God, and sets apart Him who was crucified, as if He were someone else other than the Strong One, or as if it praises the holy Trinity as passible, and crucifies the Father and the Holy Spirit along with the Son, or finally, shows the holy and immortal Spirit as passible. For this Trisagion hymn was formerly revealed by the Holy Spirit through His ministering spirits, the Seraphim, to the God-seer Isaiah, mystically showing the three hypostases of the Godhead ^C and the one lordship and nature. For Isaiah himself said he saw God and the Father; John the Theologian says the Son was revealed to him; and the divine apostle Paul, the Holy Spirit. Hence the entire assembly of the holy Fathers have understood this Trisagion hymn to refer to the holy Trinity. Thus the Theologian Gregory says: "In this way, therefore, the Holy of Holies, which is veiled by the Seraphim and celebrated with three acclamations of holiness, unify into one lordship and Godhead; a matter which another before us has philosophized upon most excellently and most sublimely, and indeed from divine revelation." ^D

86. The historical books relate that during the time of Proclus, patriarch of Constantinople, when the people there were supplicating on account of some divine threat, a boy was snatched from the crowd, and learned this hymn from the teaching of some angelic mystagogy: "Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal, have mercy on us," and was commanded to sing it. The event confirmed the revelation; for as soon as they sang it, the wrath ceased. We say that this is the power of the hymn

"Holy God," the Father, from whom is God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit; "Holy Strong," the Son, the wisdom and power of the Father; "Holy Immortal," the Holy Spirit; for the Spirit is that which makes alive, and is the "law of the Spirit of life." ^A And the ancestor of God, David, says: "My soul thirsted for God, the strong, the living." We say these things not to limit the divinity to the Father alone, nor the power to the Son alone, nor the immortality to the Spirit alone; but we receive all the divine names simply and unitedly in each of the hypostases, imitating the divine Apostle who says: "But to us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things, and we [exist] in Him; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we [exist] through Him; and one Holy Spirit, in whom are all things, and we [exist] in Him." Indeed, we also admire Gregory the Theologian speaking thus: "But to us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things; and one Holy Spirit, in whom are all things." ^B The "from whom," "through whom," and "in whom" do not divide the natures, but characterize the properties of one and unconfused nature.

87. It is truly laughable and a mockery that the Trisagion hymn, which was taught by angels in times past and recently, and which was confirmed by the cessation of the plague, and which was corroborated by the testimony of the holy Fathers as declarative of the one tri-hypostatic Divinity, should be trampled upon by the insane arrogance of Peter the Fuller in such a way. For he, thinking to cleanse this sacred hymn like a garment and to make it more splendid—as if he were more excellent than the Seraphim—inserted an addition to the Trisagion, as if legislating ^C against the Holy Spirit. Oh, what arrogance, not to say madness! But we, even if the demons split asunder from it, say: "Holy God, holy Strong, holy Immortal, have mercy on us."

88. Furthermore, for the confirmation of what has been said, we submit the citations of the holy Fathers, whose mouth has become the mouth of God, so that, struck with reverence for them, you may with us and with the truth proclaim one God, and one nature in three hypostases, and the one of the holy Trinity, the only-begotten Son of God, and after the incarnation one Christ, one Son, one Lord, and one hypostasis in two ^D natures, in an unconfused and undivided manner, by an orthodox and sincere faith.

CITATIONS OF THE HOLY FATHERS

splendid, adorned within by the Word, and guarded without by the Spirit, so that from both the excellence of the natures might be manifest." ^A

*From the third book of the holy Justin, philosopher and martyr, concerning the Trinity, ch. 5.*

"Coming further into her womb, as into a divine seed-bed, he fashions for himself a perfect temple, having received a certain particle of her nature, and forming it into the shape of a temple, he made it his own substance, and having clothed himself in this through the highest union, the Son of God proceeded in both ways." ^B

*From the same, from the same work, ch. 17.*

"Just as man is indeed one, yet has within himself two diverse natures, and by one he reasons, but by another he executes what he has conceived by reason—for with his intelligent soul he reasons, for instance, of the structure of a ship, yet with his hands he brings what was conceived to completion—so the Son, being one yet having two natures, performed divine miracles by one, while by the other he accepted humble things." ^C

*From the holy Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria, from his sermon against heresies.*

"Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant." You have two forms: hold fast to these, do not corrupt either. For neither did the Son of God, being man and God, destroy the divine form, nor, being God, did he reject the human

form. For although we have two forms, I mean the masterly and the servile—the one by nature divine, the other by nature human; the one before the ages, the other from later times; the one from the Father, the other from the Virgin; the one from Him alone, the other from her alone—since these two realities exist, they are one. We do not divide God from the body, nor do we know of two sons, and Christ; but the Son of God before the ages, in later times having become man from the same womb of the Virgin, perfect. For just as the Father who begat him begat a perfect Son, so the same is also one Christ; and the Word of the Father, desiring to save the man who was perishing, became perfect man ^B so that he might not leave the one outside of himself, that is to say the one pre-ordained. For he did not by assuming flesh put aside his soul, but he took on both soul and mind.

Of the holy Methodius, bishop of Patara and martyr, from his word on the 'Meeting of the Lord' [Hypapante]. « He who is invisible while seen, he who cannot be grasped while grasped, he who is exceedingly great in smallness, he who is both temple and in the highest, he who is upon the throne of the Virgin, and upon the Cherubic chariot, he who is below and above without separation, he who is in the form of a servant and in the form of God the Father, the obedient one, and the King of all. »

Of the holy bishop Basil of Caesarea in Cappadocia, from his first book against Eunomius. — That substance and form are the same. ^C « For my saying "to exist in the form of God," being equal to existing in the substance of God, I mean—just as for the form of a servant to be taken, in the substance of humanity, signifies that the Lord has become—so is this saying, "to exist in the form of God," expresses the property of the divine substance. »

Of the same, from his discussion against Aetius the Arian. « For you will never be able, neither you nor anyone else, to set forth or prove in truth the aforementioned holy Fathers of ours, or ^D any of the eminent Fathers, to have taught of the holy catholic and apostolic Church, or having taught in writing or unwritten, what you say regarding Christ our God, that there is one composite and uniform nature, or one will and one operation, or that it is something rejected from the catholic and apostolic Church. For we do not destroy what you have destroyed, but we build it up again, according to the divine Apostle, [establishing] ourselves as transgressors. Quite the contrary, we have preached twofold existence in all things of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in one hypostasis, without A outputting now from previous page; continue: unutterable word; not mixed within him, or divested of flesh, but keeping safe within himself the properties of both natures, which are of different substance, without confusion. For the natures were surely not mixed in that ineffable and unconfused union, but were united by an ineffable and unspeakable word, and they are beyond all mind, according to the thrice-blessed and truly ecumenical teacher of the orthodox faith, and our archbishop Athanasius, who shone forth in the great council of Nicaea among the three hundred and eighteen bishops, saying: "A conjunction has taken place of two things dissimilar and unequal by nature—not a mixture—of God, who cannot be expressed in words, and a mortal body; not by way of disappearance or denudation of flesh, but by an ineffable, unutterable, and indescribable union; of two natures of different substance, which in one Christ, the Son of God, are kept safe, and are neither confused, nor destroyed, nor divided." ^B Scholium: You see how the holy Fathers, equally avoiding both confusion and division, say that the two natures are kept safe in one Christ, that is, in one hypostasis.

Of the same, from his discourse 'On the Faith.' « For he never departed from his own divinity, even if he emptied himself, having taken the form of a servant for our sake, not having lost the divine form, so that, as you say, he might readily be deified, as a man; far from it! But rather, having fashioned for himself an ensouled and perfect temple in the holy Virgin womb, and having put it on, and having been united to it by an ineffable word, with both natures kept safe, and not mixed, he came forth, appearing indeed as man, but understood as God, Jesus Christ. »

Of the same, from his epistle to John of Antioch. « We know that men learned in divine things, when speaking the evangelical and apostolic words ^C about the Lord, sometimes make them common, as for one person, while at other times they divide them, as for two natures; and [they attribute] some, which befit God, to the divinity of Christ, and others, which are humble, to his humanity. » Scholium: If there is truly one person in Christ after the union, then there are absolutely two natures as well.

Of the same, from his epistle to Acacius, bishop of Melitene. « But perhaps the adversaries might say this: Look, those who make the confession of the right faith clearly name two natures, but they contend that the words of the theologians are divided according to the difference of the natures themselves. Then how are these not contrary to your assertions? For surely you cannot distribute the words to two persons, that is, to two hypostases; but, O best of men, I would say, we have written in the chapters: "If anyone ^D

^A should introduce any division or confusion." For to say one nature, and will, and operation in the same Lord of ours, Jesus Christ, and not two, is the doctrine and opinion of men of perverse mind and blasphemers, and of those who think as you do.

*Saint Athanasius, from the epistle to Epictetus.*

«If the Word is of the same substance as the body which has its nature from the earth, and the Word is of the same substance as the Father, according to the confession of the Fathers, then the Father himself is also of the same substance as the body that was produced from the earth. And why then do they still blame the Arians for saying that the Son is a creature, when they themselves say that the Father is of the same substance as the creatures?»

And a little later: «What hell ^B vomited forth this saying, that the body from Mary is of the same substance as the divinity of the Word?»

*Saint Gregory the Theologian, from the second epistle to Cledonius.*

«For there are indeed two natures, God and man, since there are soul and body; but not two sons, nor two gods. For there are not two men here, even if Paul spoke of the man who is outside and the man who is inside.»

*Of the same, from the Apologeticus.*

«This is what the law as schoolmaster wishes for us: this is what those positioned between Christ and the law bear witness to: this is Christ, the perfection and end of the spiritual law: this is the divinity emptied: this is the flesh assumed: this is the new mixture, God and man, one out of both, and both through one.»

*Of the same, from the second sermon on the Son.*

«But this is the sign: when natures differ in thought, the names are divided at the same time. Listen to Paul saying: "That the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory." God of Christ, but Father of glory. For if both are one, it is not by nature, but by union.» ^C

*Of the same, the remaining part of the authority quoted a little before from the Epistle to Cledonius.*

«But if it must be said briefly, the things from which the Savior is are "one thing and another," since the invisible is not the same as the visible, and the timeless is not the same as that which is subject to time: but he is not "one person and another," far be it! For both are one by the tempering, God having been made man, and man having been made God, or however one might wish to name it. I say "one thing and another," however, contrary to how it is in the Holy Trinity. For there, indeed, one person is one thing and another is another, so that we may not confuse the hypostases: but it is not "one thing and another." For the three are one, and the same in Deity.»

*Scholium.* If it is not "one thing and another," because the nature is one, then "one thing and another" is not one nature. And ^D

if, "contrary to what holds in the Trinity"—where there are three hypostases because there is "one and another," yet one nature because there is not "one thing and another"—here, then, there are two natures because there is "one thing and another," and one hypostasis because there is not "one person and another."

By the same, *from the second discourse on the Son.*

«This is what leads heretics into error: the conjunction of names, when the names are interchanged on account of the commingling. The proof is that, when the natures are separated in thought, the names are also divided. Listen to Paul saying: ^B "That the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory." God of Christ, but Father of glory. For if the combined whole is one, it is not by nature, but by union. What could be more evident than this?»

*Scholium.* Things that are not one by nature are altogether two. But if the union is according to hypostasis, then the Godhead of Christ and His humanity are two indeed in nature, but one in hypostasis.

By the same, *from the verses.*

«God and mortal came, gathering two natures into one, The one hidden, the other manifest to men.»

By Saint Ambrose of Milan, *from the book On the Incarnation, or Against Apollinarius.*

«But while we are refuting these men, others have arisen, saying that the body of the Lord and His divinity are of one nature. ^C Which hell vomited forth such blasphemy? The Arians are by now more tolerable, among whom the strength of this contention and of their faithlessness grows, so that they assert with greater vehemence that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not of one substance, because these men have attempted to say that the Godhead of the Lord and His flesh are of one substance.»

By the same, *from the book to the Emperor Gratian.*

This authority Cyril brought forward in the Council of Ephesus.

«Let us preserve the distinction of divinity and flesh; for one is the Son of God, who accomplishes both, since in the same one both natures exist.»

By the same, *from the interpretation of the divine Symbol.*

«But those who say that Christ is a mere man, or that the Word of God is passible, or that He was turned into flesh, or that the body was consubstantiated [made of the same substance] with the Word, or that it was from heaven... ^D

or that it was a phantom, or those who say that the Word of God is mortal, or that He needed the resurrection from the Father, or that He assumed a soulless body or a mind-less man, or that the two substances of Christ, having been mingled by a mixture, became one substance, and who do not confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is two substances, unmingled, but one person, according to which He is one Christ, one Son—these the catholic and apostolic Church anathematizes.

From the letter of the holy Amphilochius, bishop of Iconium, to Seleucus: "Thus I confess Christ to be God and man, the Son of God, one Son of two natures, both passible and impassible, mortal and immortal." And after a few words: "I say, therefore, that there is one Son of two natures, unmingled, unchanged, undivided. Christ, the Son of God, therefore, suffers, not in His divinity, but in His humanity."

From the same, from the same letter: "The nature that was assumed suffers, but that which assumed it remains impassible." ^A And the human [nature] of Christ is both for our sake and according to us. For He did not first become according to us and later become for our sake; but always, even from His first existence, He was both, because from the very beginning of His conception, He had His existence in the Word Himself. Human, therefore, it is according to its own nature, but of God and divine, [it is] above nature.

§ 84.

§ 85.

§ 86.

For the mixture works the destruction of the natures, but the ineffable union, which is confessed by those who think rightly, preserves both natures without confusion and constitutes one Christ from both, who was seen, being at once God and man, the same person, and not two Christs, but rather one who was united and not mixed. For if the two natures are mixed into one compound, being different in essence, neither is preserved, but both, being confused, have vanished. And after a little: And the temple is indeed dissolved at the time of the three-day burial, by his own will; and he raised it up again, and he was united to it by an ineffable and unspeakable Word, not as being mixed in it or stripped of flesh, but keeping within himself the properties of the two disparate natures without confusion. For the natures were ^A certainly not mixed in the ineffable and unconfused union, but were united by an ineffable and unspeakable Word, and they are beyond all mind, according to the thrice-blessed and truly ecumenical teacher of the orthodox faith and our archbishop, Athanasius, who shone forth in the great council of Nicaea among the three hundred and eighteen bishops, saying: A coming together of two things unlike and unequal by nature has occurred, not a mixture, of an unspeakable God and a mortal body, not by concealment or stripping of flesh, but by an ineffable and inexpressible and indescribable union of two disparate natures, which are in one Christ, the Son of God, being saved, and neither confused, nor destroyed, nor divided.

Scholium

Of the same, from the discourse on the faith. «For he never departed from his own godhead, even if he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant for our sake, not having lost the divine form, so that, according to you, he might be readily deified as a man—far be it. But rather, having prepared for himself an ensouled ^B and perfect temple in the holy Virgin womb, and having put it on, and having been united to it by the ineffable Word, with both natures being saved, and not being mixed, he came forth, appearing indeed as man, but being understood as God, Jesus Christ.»

Of the same, from the letter to John of Antioch. «We know that, regarding the Lord, the theological men make the evangelical and apostolic utterances, some common, as of one person, others dividing, as of two natures, and some as godfitting according to the godhead of Christ, others as lowly according to his humanity.»

Scholium

Of the same, from the letter to Acacius, bishop of Melitene. «But perhaps those who are of the opposite view might say: Behold clearly those who make the confession of the right faith, while they name two natures, contend that the utterances of the God-speakers are divided according to their difference. Then how are these not contrary to yours? For you possess no way to divide the utterances into two persons, that is, hypostases; but, O best of men, I would say, we have written in the chapters: «If anyone...

distributes the utterances to two persons, that is, hypostases, and assigns some as to a man, understood separately from the Word which is from God, and others, as befitting God, to the Word alone who is from God the Father, let him be anathema. Yet we have by no means denied a difference in the utterances.»

Scholium: You see how he does not hesitate to speak of two natures, but refuses to confess that they exist by themselves and separately.

From the same, from the *Glaphyra* on Leviticus.

«For He commands that two birds be taken, clean and living, so that through the living birds you might understand the heavenly man at once as God, divided into two natures, insofar as pertains to the account appropriate to each. For the Word was shining forth from God the Father in the flesh from the Virgin, yet without separation. For Christ is one out of both.»

From the same, from the books *On the Trinity*.

«Christ is as it were a certain boundary of divinity and humanity, having the concurrence of both as if in one, and the meeting of things different in nature into identity through union and interweaving.»

From the same, from the *Epistle to Succensus*.

«Therefore, while we are considering, as I was saying, the manner of the dispensation, we see that two natures have come together with one another in an inseparable union, without conversion and without change; for the flesh is flesh and not divinity, even if it has become the flesh of God; and similarly the Word is God and not flesh, even if He made the flesh His own by a dispensatory plan. When, therefore, we consider this, we do no injury to that concurrence which has passed into unity; by saying that He is from two natures, after the union, of course, we do not divide the natures from one another, nor do we split the one and indivisible into two sons, but we declare one Son, and, as the Fathers have said, one incarnate nature of the Word of God. Therefore, insofar as it falls into understanding, and into viewing only with the eyes of the soul in what manner the Only-begotten has become man, we affirm there are two natures, but we confess one Son, and Christ, and Lord, the Word of God who has become man and incarnate.»

Scholium: Let anyone who is not blind in his mind consider the sense of this Father. For he did not say, “After the union we do not confess the natures,” but, «We do not divide.» For he says there are two natures, «but one Son, and Christ, and Lord.» And after he said, «we declare one Son,» he adds, «and one incarnate nature of the Word,» naming the subsistence as nature here. For the Son is not a nature or substance, but a subsistence. For if the Son were a nature, since the Father is not the Son, the Father would not be of the same nature as the Son; nevertheless, [he] also indicates the [nature] of the flesh...

writing to the same Successus; so that if here he calls nature what you call substance, he also introduces the nature of the flesh by saying, "incarnate." He writes therefore as follows: ^A

Of the same, from the second epistle to Successus.

"For if, having said one nature of the Word, we had kept silent, not adding 'incarnate,' but as it were putting the dispensation aside, perhaps their argument, in which they pretend to ask, might be not implausible: 'If the whole is one nature, where is the perfection in humanity, or how does our substance subsist?' Since, however, the perfection in humanity and the declaration of our substance have been brought in by [his] saying 'incarnate,' let them cease from leaning upon themselves as upon a reed staff." ^B

Scholium.

Cease, therefore, O you men, from leaning upon yourselves as upon a reed staff, obeying the teacher. For behold, he has clearly said that by "incarnate" he intended to signify the perfection in humanity, and that the declaration of our substance has been brought in, and that the whole is not one nature; and if it is not one, it is clear to everyone, I suppose, that there are two.

Of Saint John Chrysostom, from the sermon on Lazarus (9).

"Tin partakes of lead and of silver: of silver in appearance, of lead in nature. So also Christ, being God and man, ^C preserves the two natures within himself; so also he himself is in them, not existing as something other than them."

427 Scholium (10).

It is not necessary for an example to reflect similarity in every respect to that with which it is compared. For tin indeed appears to be silver, but it is not; Christ, however, is truly man.

Of the same, from the epistle to Cæsarius the monk.

"So also here, the divine nature having taken up its abode in him, it constituted one Son, one person, the composite of both; known, however, by an undivided and unconfused reason; not in one nature alone, but in two perfect ones. For if in one, where is the unconfused? Where the undivided? ^D Where could 'union' be spoken of? For it is impossible for [a being] to be united to itself or divided. What hell belched forth [the command] to speak of one nature in Christ after the union? For either, holding the divine nature, they deny the human—I mean our salvation—or, holding the human, they make a denial of the divine nature; since let them say, what has lost its own property? For if the union is still intact, it is by all means necessary that the properties also be preserved with the union. Otherwise, this would not be a union, but a confusion and destruction of the natures."

ADMONITION ON THE DIALOGUE AGAINST THE MANICHAEANS

Jacob Billius casts doubt on whether this Dialogue against the Manichaeans is a genuine work of Saint John of Damascus. Combefis is not displeased by Billius's suspicion. However, both admit that this disputation is clearly worthy of bearing the Damascene’s name. Indeed, Combefis added: "Although it is scarcely less like the Damascene than one egg is to another, in comparison with his other undoubted works." In truth, the diction of this volume is entirely Damascene; his accustomed method of argumentation, the necessary repetition of the same things, and finally the consistency of the views—which he expounds everywhere else, and primarily in his books *On the Orthodox Faith*—along with the identical phrasing and expressions and the identical sentence structures, are manifest throughout. Billius and Combefis were well aware of these points, but they could scarcely bring themselves to concede that the orthodox doctor held the view that the fire with which demons and the wicked are tormented is not literal and corporeal, or at least that it should be understood in a metaphorical sense. But was it not permissible for this theologian of the Eastern Church to feel the same way about the matter that certain ecclesiastical writers have not hesitated to teach? Ambrose, in chapter 15 of his Gospel according to Luke, speaks of this fire thus: "It is the fire which the sadness of sins generates; it is the worm, for the reason that the irrational sins of the soul strike the mind and the senses, and certain things consume the inward parts of the conscience." Those whose exposition Jerome provides at the end of his commentary on Isaiah held precisely the same opinion; there, while pondering the words, "Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched," he has this to say: "The worm, however, that shall not die, and the fire that shall not be quenched, is by most people taken to be the conscience of sins, which torments those established in punishments, because by their own fault and sin they have lacked the gift of the elect; according to that which is said: 'I have been turned in my misery, while the thorn is fastened in me.' And again under the obelus: 'As the moth [eats] a garment, and the worm [eats] wood, so does sorrow excite the heart of a man,' in such a way, at least, that they do not deny the eternal punishments of the prevaricators and those who deny the Lord; as the Lord says in the Gospel: 'Depart into eternal fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels.'" And further down he says: "The fire also is to be understood alongside that which the worm is," etc. Because of these and other similar testimonies of the Fathers, the most illustrious Bishop of Montpellier considers in his Catechism that it is not a tenet of faith that the damned are to be punished by literal and corporeal fire. See Part I, Section 2, Chapter 3, §21, where he furthermore cites Estius in *4 Sent.*, Dist. 44, §§12 and 13. I do not overlook the fact that Jerome, in Epistle 59 to Avitus, notes this dogma as having been asserted by Origen. But Origen held it in one sense, and Catholic doctors in another. Origen, indeed, denied that the bodies of the resurrected would suffer true pain, inasmuch as he denied them true flesh; but the others, whose mind Jerome sets forth, were entirely alien to those errors which the Church condemned as being introduced by Origen. For the Fifth Council struck with anathema only those dogmas of Origen which impugned the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, the true resurrection of the flesh, and the perpetuity of the punishments of hell. But they understood the fire and the worm, of which Scripture speaks, tropically, in such a way that they did not attach ethereal bodies to the resurrected, nor did they deny the eternal punishments of the prevaricators and those who deny the Lord, as the holy doctor himself bears witness. I would venture to assert, therefore, that these were teachers of the Eastern Church, because the same Jerome—especially in Epistle 89, which is to Saint Augustine—inculcates in us quite often that he reads scarcely any other commentators on Holy Scripture besides the Greeks, or, as he prefers to say elsewhere, the writers of Greece. Whence it is not inconsistent with the Damascene’s method that, in order to avoid the cavils and various shifts of the Manichaeans, he followed his doctors by habit and interpreted the fire of hell tropologically—just as he did the worm with which demons and the wicked are tortured—as if it indicated merely the punishment of loss, which is the most grievous of all: namely, to suggest that this most bitter punishment is not so much inflicted by God as it is summoned by the perverted will of the wicked. But this doctrine is not far from Book II *On the Orthodox Faith*, Chapter 4, and Book IV, the final chapter, where he teaches that this fire is οὐχ ὑλικόν, οἷον τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν—not material, such as that among us—but of a nature known to God alone. He who judges that the eternal fire is not material has surely understood what is read in the Scriptures about fire and worms in a metaphorical sense. Nor let that title which is prefixed to this Dialogue in codex Reg. 2502 disturb anyone: "Of the same great Athanasius, a dialogue against the Manichaeans, in which an Orthodox and a Manichaean converse. Others, however, say it is by John of Damascus." Although it is said to be a dialogue of the great Athanasius against the Manichaeans, the interlocutors of which are the Orthodox and the Manichaean, others believe the work itself to be by John of Damascus. For first, this entire book nowhere exhibits Athanasius’s diction and method, but rather that of a more recent theologian. Second, it is not established among scholars that Athanasius published any single volume against the Manichaeans; and although he asserts elsewhere that he has refuted them, he had done this sufficiently and more than sufficiently in the book *Against All Heresies*. Furthermore, no approved author has hitherto testified that Athanasius wrote dialogues of this kind. As many dialogues on the Trinity as have been attributed to that most holy prelate, scholars have restored them either to Theodoret or to Saint Maximus. Nor, however, should one surmise that it is to be reckoned among the works of Maximus.

^A Indeed, I learned that a holy martyr had published a dialogue against the Manichaeans from Georgius Scholarius, toward the end of a book which he addressed against the Latins to the Emperor John Comnenus of Trebizond, which is preserved in the Royal Library (no. 2957), where he says, "in the dialogue of the Orthodox and the Manichaean"; however, this dialogue of ours differs utterly in style and in the method of argumentation from what is observed in the dialogues attributed to Maximus. Moreover, these few words which Scholarius drew from Maximus’s discourse, "The Spirit proceeds from the hypostasis of the Father," do not occur anywhere in our text.

John of Damascus therefore wrote this dialogue against the Manichaeans when they began to sprout and grow strong again in the regions of Syria under the name of Paulicians, led by Paul and John, to such an extent that they incited the Caliphs, or rather the Mohammedan Arab princes who were masters of the Orient in that age, against the Catholic faithful. Theophanes narrates that Walid—the second of this name—for this reason had the tongue of the most holy Peter, bishop of Damascus, cut out and punished him with exile, because he had written against the Arabs and the Manichaeans. This incident occurred while our Damascene was flourishing under the reign of Leo the Isaurian. Furthermore, around the eleventh year of the reign of Copronymus, son of Leo, by the consent and leadership of that same impious emperor, many of these heretics migrated into Thrace; from there they subsequently infested Bulgaria, and then later penetrated into the parts of the West. For the Albigenses in Gaul and the Patarenes in Italy were their descendants. ^B Therefore, so that the Manichaeans might not deceive the faithful with their craftiness and guile, he exposes their principal impious delusions and profane dogmas; he attacks them with various arguments, deducing from their own premises countless conclusions, so that all might perceive that this heresy is such that it is most pernicious not only to the faith, but also to upright morals and poses a threat to the state and government of affairs. He records the severity of the laws, which, while visiting light punishments upon other heretics, punished these with capital punishment and even with fire. For this reason Alexius Comnenus ordered Basil, the leader of the new Manichaeans who were called Bogomils, to be burned with fire, as Anna Comnena, his daughter, Zonaras, and other Byzantine writers relate.

This dialogue was first published in Greek and Latin at Basel in the year 1575 with other works of Damascenus; however, I have not yet been able to identify the author of that Latin translation. Although it differs in certain places from the Greek context, it is nonetheless quite elegant in many respects and accurately renders the meaning of the author. In the year 1578, Leunclavius edited the same dialogue at Basel in Greek and Latin, along with the Legation of Theorianus to the Armenians and other minor works, all of which he rendered into Latin again from the Greek. Finally, Jacobus Billius prepared another interpretation of this same Dialogue, which was published among the works of our Damascene at Paris in the years 1577, 1603, and 1619.

DIALOGUE OF SAINT JOHN OF DAMASCUS AGAINST THE MANICHAEANS

^C S. JOANNIS DAMASCENI DIALOGUS CONTRA MANICHÆOS.

Interlocutors: ORTHODOXUS and MANICHÆUS.

1. ORTHODOXUS. Since we have come together to hold a rational discussion with one another, I ask you, what is the subject of the inquiry? MANICHÆUS. That we may exercise our reason regarding the faith, so that we might find the truth. ORTH. Is falsehood opposed to truth? MAN. In every way. ORTH. How is that? Explain this to me. MAN. Because truth is the knowledge of things that are, and falsehood is the knowledge of that which is not. ORTH. You have not answered well; for truth is indeed the knowledge of things that are, but falsehood is not the knowledge of that which is not. For that which is not, is not even known. MAN. What, then, is falsehood? ORTH. ^D [The text continues]

^A For them, an ignorance of that which is. MAN. Rightly said. ORTH. If, then, truth is the knowledge of things that are, and falsehood the ignorance of that which is, tell me, is knowledge a habit? MAN. Yes. ORTH. If knowledge is a habit, then ignorance is certainly a privation. MAN. And ignorance is also a habit. ORTH. What is ignorance? MAN. Not to have knowledge. ORTH. Does the particle "not" signify a privation, or an affirmation and a habit? MAN. A privation. ORTH. Furthermore, do we not call that which does not exist, "not being," that which has not the property to be? MAN. It is true. ORTH. Therefore, since ignorance is nothing else than not having knowledge, and the particle "not" is privative, ignorance is consequently a privation, not a habit. MAN. Excellent. ORTH. Since, therefore, truth is knowledge, it will also be a habit; and in the same way, since falsehood is ignorance, there is no doubt that it partakes of the nature of privation. And thus truth will be a habit, and falsehood a privation; and truth indeed will be something that is, while falsehood will be that which is not. MAN. It is certainly so. ORTH. Is evil falsehood, or is it truth? MAN. It is falsehood. ORTH. ^B Evil, therefore, is not anything, but is a privation, and just as privation is opposed to a habit, so it is opposed to the good. But let us return to the matter at hand. MAN. Very well, let us return to it.

2. ORTH. Do you speak of one principle of things, or two? MAN. Two: one good, the other evil. And the good indeed I call a good tree, which contains and effects every good thing, and is unable to bring forth evil fruit; but evil I call darkness, corruption, an evil tree, which makes every evil and every kind of vice, and cannot bring forth good fruit. ^C ORTH. Is there any commerce between these two principles, or not? MAN. None at all. But one is contrary to the other. ORTH. Are they in one another, or with one another, or are they distinct in place? MAN. At first they were distinct, and each contained itself within its own boundaries. ORTH. How, then, are they now mingled with each other? MAN. The Good was acting in his own place, in all goodness and happiness. But Matter, that is to say, evil, having been for many ages past without life, without motion, foul, horrible darkness, far removed from sense; then afterwards it began to be at variance with itself, and its fruits to fight among themselves. And as some pursued and others fled, they arrived at the boundaries of the light; ^D upon the sight of which, captivated by the desire of the beauty itself, putting an end to their mutual fighting, they determined by unanimous consent to attack the light. Wherefore, when the Good had sent forth virtue from himself, the battle having been joined, the princes of darkness devoured a portion of the light. For the Good allowed that virtue to be snatched away from him, fearing lest they should at length take possession of his own place as well. But he did this with the intention that, through that part which he had surrendered, he might obtain mastery over the evil. And thus the commingling of good and evil came to pass. For from a portion of the good, souls proceeded; and from the substance of evil, bodies proceeded. ORTH. Now, I pray, let us consider these things a little. MAN. Let us by all means consider them.

^A 3. ORTH. In how many ways is the term "principle" (ἀρχή) used? MAN. You yourself explain this. ORTH. "Unoriginate" (ἄναρχον) is that which has not had a beginning. But the name "principle" is equivocal; for it signifies many things. For we speak of a principle in terms of time, as when we call the sunrise the principle of the day, and let the beginning of the year be designated. We also speak of a principle in terms of place, as the beginning of a road, and Paradise is the principle of the river Pishon. A principle is also spoken of in terms of dignity and power, as when we say that the king is the principle of his subjects. A principle is also spoken of as that which is prior by nature, as in the case of number; for when there are two, the one is of necessity their principle. But when there is one, it does not follow of necessity that there are two; for there will be two, one and one; but one is not two. Therefore, the one is called the principle of the two. A principle is also spoken of in terms of order, as the rank of lector is first, then subdeacon, then deacon, then presbyter, and finally ^B bishop. It is also spoken of as a principle in terms of cause, and this in three ways: either natural, as the Father is the principle of the Son; or efficient, as the Creator is the principle of creation; or exemplary, as that which is represented is the principle of the image. Since the name of principle is taken in so many ways, that is what is truly called "unoriginate" which acknowledges no principle. How, then, do you say that two principles are unoriginate? MAN. In all those ways. ORTH. Thus, at any rate, they will be without any principle; but you have lied against your own head; and having begun from a lie, you will also obtain an unhappy end. MAN. How do you mean this? ORTH. By saying "two," you began from number; but two is not unoriginate; it is a principle; for there is another principle of two, which is the monad. Since, therefore, you are discoursing about a principle, name one principle, so that the principle may be perfect; for the monad is by nature the principle of the dyad. If, therefore, there are two principles, ^C where is the principle which is prior by nature, that is to say, the monad?

4. MAN. Do you, then, speak of three hypostases? And how do you say that one must begin from the monad? ORTH. Even if I say there are three hypostases, yet I affirm that there is one principle; for the Father is the principle of the Son and of the Spirit, not in terms of time, but in terms of cause. For the Word and the Spirit are from the Father, even if they are not after the Father. For just as light comes from fire, and the fire does not precede the light in time—for it is impossible for fire to be without light—but the fire is the principle and the cause of the light which comes from it; so also the Father is the principle and cause of the Word and of the Spirit; for the Word and the Spirit are from the Father; but he does not precede them in time. For it is impossible for the Father to be from the Son, or the Word from the Spirit. Therefore, one ^D

^A principle I confess, as the natural cause, the Father. But you, do you not say that the evil is from the good, nor the good from the evil? Nor again that the evil has its origin from the good, nor the good from the evil.

5. But that it is impossible for your two principles to be without a beginning in respect to the conception of time, we shall understand in this way: that which has not had a beginning of being is immutable. For if it is changed, it is by no means without beginning. For transitioning from incorporeal to corporeal, or from formless to form, or from unmoved to motion, or from quiet and tranquility to discord, it begins to become what it was not before; and it is not without beginning, being changed from what is beginningless to what has a beginning: for that which receives a beginning, and has begun, is not without beginning. MAN. What then? Did your God not change when He begat a Son and brought forth the Spirit? ORTH. By no means. For I do not say that, not being Father before, He later became Father; but He always was, having from Himself His own Word, and through His Word from Himself His Spirit proceeding. ^B

6. MAN. Then when He later created the creation, did He not change, having become a creator? ORTH. By no means. MAN. Why do you say this? ORTH. Because He did not bring forth the creation from His own substance, but from that which was not into being, by His will. MAN. Then when He willed the creation to come into being, did He not change, having willed what He did not will before? ORTH. By no means; for He did not previously not will and later will, but He always willed that the creation should come into being at the time determined by Him. ^C

7. And that it is impossible for two beginningless things to exist as regards place, we shall perceive in this way: these two, either they are in each other (but it is impossible for light and darkness to be in each other; for the presence of light dissipates darkness), or each of them is in its own proper place. Each is therefore limited in its own place, and the end of the place of one becomes the beginning of the other; but it is also impossible for light to be unmixed with darkness, if there is not some partition which prevents them from being mingled together. It would therefore be necessary for there to be light and its place, and darkness and its place, and the partition that fences off and defines the place of each of them. And so, there will not be two principles, but five. ^D

8. MAN. What then, do your God, and His Son, and His Spirit, not fall into the same conditions? ORTH. By no means. For I do not say that the Divine is in a place; for it is without quantity and incomprehensible; nor do I assert that the three persons are separated from one another. But just as the word which is begotten from the mind does not depart from it, nor is it separated, but is begotten from it and is in it, in the same way the Son and the Holy Spirit are from the Father and in the Father. For there is one substance, and the persons are inseparable, just as the faculties of the mind cannot be torn away from it. Provided, indeed,

^A that the powers of the God who is above nature are themselves, in a way above nature, persons. Therefore, even if there are three persons, there is nevertheless one God, and not three. For the mind, and the word, and his spirit are one mind, and not three minds; just as the plant of the rose, and the flower, and the fragrance of each of them is called a rose, and is one, and they are not numbered as three roses, but the root, and the branch, and the flower are one rose.

9. ^B That there cannot be two principles even in terms of rank and power, we know in this way. When there are only two, God and matter, either the one must rule and hold authority over the other, or there must be other things besides, which are subject to the two principles, being coeternal with them; and thus there will not be two principles only, but more: two indeed that rule, and others that are ruled. But if the things that are ruled were not coeternal with the principles, there was once a time when the principles were not. MAN. Will not your God also be subject to these same absurdities? For clearly, either created things were coeternal with Him, or they were subject to His will, or there was a time when He held no dominion. ORTH. Not so. For indeed creation is not coeternal with Him; but He was always, and will be, Lord, having the power to bring forth essences from nothing into being by His Word and the Spirit of His mouth. And neither is His Word prolatitious, but substantial and constituting a person; nor is His mouth a bodily member; nor is His Spirit a breath that vanishes into the air; but for Him who surpasses every substance, all things are also above substance, even if we, from the things that are around us, contemplate those things which are above us.

10. ^C Furthermore, your two principles cannot exist even by way of a natural and substantial cause; for the Father is the begetter of the consubstantial Son, eternal of the eternal, incorporeal of the incorporeal. If, therefore, your two principles are the principles of all things by way of a natural cause, all things will certainly be of the same substance and eternity as your principles. But if they are eternal, there is no doubt that they are immutable and contrary, and estranged from all association, and as things that rule, not subject to rule; that dominate, and do not serve. But if your two principles were to have the way of an efficient cause of things, ^D then certainly neither would souls be from the substance of God, nor bodies from the substance of matter, but they would have been brought forth from nothing into being; and thus matter would neither have waged war against light, nor would it have seized a part from it and created souls. Moreover, how could things that are contrary, and abhorred all association with one another, have come together for the making of one world? Or how did the evil one fashion the body, and the good one the soul, and together make man, a single animal? But if you say that your principles are exemplary causes, just as

^A the model is the cause of the image drawn from it, then it surely follows that there are other worlds after the likeness of which this world was made. But there is not one species in things, nor one or two forms, but innumerable ones. How then does it happen that innumerable species bear the images of your two principles? From which it is clear that your opinion concerning two principles can in no way stand. But I would wish you to inquire even of a simple crowd of children: Is the binary a principle, or is it rather unity? They will answer unanimously that unity is the principle of every number. O men, more childish and more ignorant than children!

11. But come, tell us who ask: Is that which is good, stable, and persistent in order proper to the rule of the many, or to that of one? Surely it is doubtful to no one that the lordship of many, and every government, eventually removes itself and is the cause of sedition, war, battle, and evils, and finally of the overthrow of the empire; whereas on the contrary, the rule of one is firm, and equitable, and reconciles peace, order, tranquillity, and justice, and increases affairs for the better. Therefore, if according to your opinion there are two ^B principles, lacking a principle, and affairs are governed by such a manifold lordship, it follows that evil presides over things, and consequently that there is one principle, namely evil.

But now, how can you contend that those two principles which you have invented have nothing in common? For if this exists, then that does also; and if this is a substance lacking a principle and is eternal, then that is likewise. It cannot happen at all that there is nothing common between them. For this is common between them: that they are, that they are substances, and that they are principles lacking a principle, and are eternal. And thus, in every way, your doctrine is convicted of falsehood.

12. And again: if there are two principles lacking a principle, each rejoices and delights in what is its own, and considers its own preservation to be good; for to each thing that is good which preserves its own nature. And so, both the one whom you call good and the other whom you call evil rejoice in themselves and are delighted by those things which are theirs. Who, therefore, is the one who judged the one to be good and the other to be evil? ^C He, indeed, will be God, more powerful and more excellent than both. For that which is inferior is judged by the more excellent, and that which is subject is judged by that which presides.

13. I would also have you tell me this: do the two principles among you have anything in common, or nothing at all? MAN. Nothing at all. For indeed, the one was situated in a fullness of good things, the other in the midst of evils. But a commixtion occurred afterward. ORTH. I would have you desist for a while from expounding this commixtion; and tell me first, does being (as regards the fact that it is) conflict with being, or does non-being conflict with being? MAN. That which is evil conflicts with that which is good. ORTH. I did not ask whether they are opposites by reason of evil and good, but by reason of being. For things that are, are not altogether opposites; for by the very fact that they are, they ^D communicate with one another. But non-being is the opposite of being; so that if evil is absolutely opposite to the good, and the good exists, it is not the cause.

Thus evil is a privation of being, and is called evil. And if the good is an essence, evil is non-essential, or else it is not in every respect the opposite.

14 14. MAN. Is not evil, then, ^A seen among existing things? ORTH. Perfect evil is not seen among existing things. For neither is God, who truly is and is the cause of being, evil; nor is any created thing, in so far as it has been created, evil; but the cause of all things is good, and all things created by Him are good. For all things that exist were brought by Him from non-being into being, and all are good, and "very good." Evil is nothing else but the voluntary loss and privation of those things which were granted by God to the rational nature; just as poverty is the loss of wealth. For wealth is the possession of things that exist—of gold, and silver, and transparent stones, and various clothing, ^B of menservants and maidservants, of animals and fields, and such like, of which each one is an essence. Hence, he who has acquired these is called wealthy, as one who is "much-circumstanced," having much essence about him. But poverty is a partial loss of these things, or a complete privation. And just as the wholeness of the body is a good, so the loss of one part is a partial evil—not an existing thing, but a privation of what exists. It is seen, or rather conceived, in that which is, not as a being, but as something that has departed. For example, ^C an eye and sight are real and exist; but blindness is not an essence, but the loss of the eye that previously existed. It is observed in the body, which is composed and exists, not as a being, but as the privation of the eye that once was present. And thus, the addition of the privation of limbs is called an addition of evil; for evil does not "exist," but is so called and is contemplated in the remaining body as the non-existence of the parts which have been cast off—not as a being, but as a non-being, not as a habit, but as a privation. In the same way, wickedness, or sin, ^D is a voluntary loss of the goods that were granted by God to the rational nature. For in the case of irrational and inanimate things, one cannot speak of "voluntary," but only in the case of rational beings. Therefore, wickedness is the misuse of natural faculties. For if we use the faculties granted to the soul by God for the purpose for which we received them—that is, according to the law of the One who gave them—it is good. But if we use them not for the purpose for which we received them, but contrary to the law of the One who gave them, it is evil. And neither the faculties themselves, nor the use of them, is evil, but rather the wicked manner of use, that which is contrary to the law of God, who gave them. For if God is good, His law is also good, natural, and for the sake of being. But disobedience to this is a privation of the law that belonged to us; for example, desire, anger, action, operation, and before these, the reasoning process, are not evil, but good, if we use them for the purpose for which we received them, according

^A to the law of the One who gave them. They are not evil in themselves, but it is evil not to use them according to the law of the One who gave them. If, for the sustenance of life, we use food, drink, sleep, and such things, the use of these is good. And if we use desire and love toward God, who is by nature desirable, and toward our neighbor according to the law of God, it is good. And if we use the conjugal act with our own wives for the sake of procreation, according to the law given to nature by God, it is good; but if we use desire toward what is another's, contrary to the law of God, it is evil. For God said: "You shall not covet your neighbor’s field, nor his wife, nor anything that is his." Fornication is not evil because of the union itself, but because it is a union with another’s spouse. Vainglory is not evil because one loves glory, but because one does not love the glory that is from God. Hatred and anger, if they are directed against those who hinder the salvation of the soul and the union with God through obedience to Him, and who draw one away from God—that is, against the devil and his servants—are good. For He says: "Do I not hate those who hate you, O Lord, and do I not feel loathing for your enemies? I hated them with a perfect hatred; they have become my enemies." ^B The holy martyrs also blazed with righteous indignation against the tyrants, being justly angry; and if I am angry against my own reasoning process when it separates me from God, it is good. If someone deprives me of salvation, it is good to be angry and to hate him; but if he vexes me in worldly matters, and becomes the author of my benefit—namely, by depriving me of material things—I shall love him rather than hate him. Homicide is an evil, for it belongs to God alone to separate the soul from the body, He who bound them together; but if I commit homicide at the command of God, it is good; for all that is from the Good is good. Therefore, it is evil to wish to usurp what is not ours, but God’s. To condemn one’s neighbor is evil, for it belongs to God alone to judge; and therefore it is evil for those to whom the office of judging has not been granted by God to arrogate to themselves the authority of God. Vainglory and pride are evil, for exaltation and glory befit God alone. Thus, evil is nothing other than using one's natural powers contrary to how nature and the law dictate; which is not a substance, but a practice of ours.

^C 15. For it must be known that "good" and "evil" are spoken of in two ways. For that is properly called good which is given by God, who is good by nature. Just as all light is illuminated by the sun or fire, so every good has its existence from that infinite and incomprehensible ocean of goodness, and all things from

^A God, are good properly and truly. But that which is called good, not properly, but abusively and according to our common usage, is what appears pleasant to our senses and desires; this pleases for a time, but afterward brings forth a bitter fruit, being done contrary to the law of the Creator, and seeming to be good, when it is not good, but properly evil. And evil likewise; that is called evil properly which is done contrary to the law of the Creator. It is also called evil, not properly, but according to our common usage, namely that which is grievous and painful to our sense; which, though it brings pain in the present, yet afterward provides the fruit of salvation and everlasting joy. 15. Say then, is the beginning of every thing one or two? For example, is the beginning and cause of the soul one, or two? MAN. One. If there were two, how could one and the same thing arise from two opposites? For things that are utterly opposite have an utterly incommunicable operation; for how could the immaterial soul be from the immaterial and matter? Or how could opposites have produced the same thing, not having been in agreement? For things that are by nature opposite are utterly incommunicable. ORTH. You have spoken well; of each of all things that exist, there is one beginning. MAN. In every way. ORTH. Is "being" the beginning of your two ^B principles, or do the two principles have their origin from "being"? MAN. To what end does this tend? ORTH. If your principles have their origin from "being" itself, then behold, there is one beginning, and not two. For if "being" is the beginning of "being" as one thing, then the beginning is one. I do not say the "to be" of such and such, that is, being evil or being good, but the very "simply to be." Therefore, the beginning of your two principles is one beginning, and not two. But if your principles are beginnings of "being," there will be two opposites of the same thing. For just as the "simply essence," being one, is capable of different qualities, and according to this many essences are said to exist, so also "simply to be" is one, even if, when considered in different things, it makes many existing things to be named derivatively. I determine, therefore, that the operation of opposites is utterly incommunicable; ^C existence is not from two beginnings, especially if they are opposite, but from one. For "being" was not somewhere as the cause of what exists; for "being" did not exist before what exists. For in what would it have been considered? But "being," being considered in the beginningless existing One, subsists in Him and from Him as from its cause; therefore there is one beginning of "being," and there is no opposite to it. 17. And again: Is the beginning of the motion of each thing one, or two? Both existential, and efficient, and spatial, and temporal. Existential, of ^D the beginning of each thing's generation; temporal, from what time things that begin from it begin; spatial...

from what place each thing began to move; and efficient, from which power the thing that is being acted upon acts—for example, the first ^A existence of a human, and from what time it came to be, and from what place it began to move—to walk, for instance—using the faculty of walking. MAN. One [beginning]. ORTH. You have spoken truly; for it is impossible that there be two principles for the existence of one thing. MAN. That is correct. ORTH. Is this considered individually in all things, or not? MAN. Individually in all things. ORTH. Therefore, what is seen individually in each single thing will also be considered generally in all of them; for example, what each human being possesses, the whole nature of humanity also possesses, such as living and reasoning; and what any essence possesses, the common essence possesses as well—namely, to exist in itself and not have its being in another. Therefore, in the same way, if individual things have arisen from one principle, the universe as a whole will also have arisen from one—and there will not be two principles, but one.

18. MAN. Why is God without a beginning? ^B ORTH. Because that which does not exist has not its being from itself. But that which does not possess its being from itself, how will it be from itself? It is necessary, therefore, that what is not should receive being from something that is. Thus it is that that first principle, which grants being to other things so that they may exist, and possesses its own being from itself, is devoid of any beginning.

19. MAN. Why is the principle one, and not two? ORTH. Because the binary proceeds from the monad as the offspring of unity, and the origin of the binary is the monad, and the monad precedes the binary in every way; and because the principle of every thing is one, and as the principle of each of the individual things is one, so the principle of all things will be one. For the reason rendered for each of the individuals will also be rendered for the whole.

20. Furthermore, if there are two principles, it is a polyarchy. If it is a polyarchy, there is discord. If discord is the principle of existing things, then the evil of existing things is their principle—for discord is evil. Therefore, it is fitting for God to be greater than and to possess superiority over all things that are spoken or conceived. ^C Which, then, is greater and more excellent: to create things from nothing, as is worthy of God, or, in the human manner, to be engaged in matter through an efficient or, rather, a craftsman's art? MAN. It is altogether more excellent to create things from nothing. ORTH. Therefore, it is fitting for God to create natures from nothing, and there was no matter, but it was created by God.

21. MAN. Is God in all respects without a beginning, or is He without a beginning in one respect and not in another? ORTH. If He is not in all respects without a beginning, He is simultaneously both without a beginning and not without a beginning. But if He is in all respects without a beginning, He is truly without a beginning and by nature ^D without a beginning; and that which is without a beginning is also infinite. For there is one kind of principle of existing things.

Everything then that has a beginning also has an end according to its own nature; and everything that has an end also has a beginning. Even the angels, therefore, having a beginning, have an end according to their own nature, although by divine grace they begin again to exist and are renewed. ^A For just as a body that is always moving, that is to say, a spherical one, when it began to move, started from a place—the circular [path]—and having reached the place whence it began, it completed the circumference and the circular motion, and then began the motion again and makes a new beginning of motion, and thus it remains moving as long as the one who commands it to move so wishes; so also the angels, moving vitally and reaching the natural end of their own existence, begin their vital motion again at the command of the One who created them. For they always receive from God [the gift] both to exist and to move vitally and intellectually, not having this from themselves. Just as a top, once moved, moves and stops—but if it possesses perpetual motion, it always moves, not having the motion from itself—so also the angels, not having existence from themselves, move as much as the One who created them moves them; if, however, He does not move them, they cease from their motion. So that which has a beginning has by all means an end; and that which has an end has by all means a beginning. And that which is by nature without a beginning is in every respect without a beginning, as regards cause, and time, and place, and power.

^B 22. Therefore, the two principles will either be in one another, or they will be circumscribed by place, and they are not without beginning; for how could light and darkness be in one another? For light is the destroyer of darkness. But if there are boundaries of light and boundaries of darkness, then neither is the light unbounded (as not being everywhere), nor is the darkness; nor are they absolutely without beginning, since they have a local beginning. For it is impossible, if there is no partition and a wall, for light and darkness to be entirely unmixed. For if we light a lamp in the night, the place around the lamp will be brighter, but at a small distance it will be darker, until the light completely fails, and it becomes pure darkness, unmixed with light. For either the darkness was mixed with the light from the beginning, and these are not entirely contrary and incompatible; or there was some other partition from the beginning that separated them; and no longer are there two principles, but three. That which is by nature so constituted does not change; but that which changes is not by nature [so constituted]. If, therefore, light and darkness are by nature incompatible, how did they communicate with each other after that? How, out of good and evil, was one living creature, man, completed? For if they were brought together, they communicated with one another. For agreement is a communion of will; and neither is the good purely so,

^A nor did the evil one remain perfectly good, nor did the wicked one, but both were changed. And that which is changed is not without beginning, nor is it God. For God, foreknowing all things that are within our power, defines all things that are not within our power.

And again: Does being oppose being, or does being oppose non-being? MAN. Being opposes non-being. ORTH. Therefore, of the two principles which, according to your reasoning and opinion, are entirely contrary to each other, the one shall be, and the other shall not be.

23. In addition: Does that which is oppose that which is? MAN. Evil being and good being—these oppose each other. ORTH. Therefore, contraries exist simultaneously in one and the same thing, and have essence simultaneously. How, then, are they contraries? MAN. Non-being cannot even be named. For it must first exist, and then be named. How, then, does that which is not fight with that which is? For things that fight one another must first be, and then fight, and then be called "contraries." But as for that which is not even, how can it even be named? ORTH. When you said "non-being," did you name it, or not? MAN. I named it by negation, not by affirmation. ORTH. Does affirmation signify a habit, and negation a privation? MAN. Certainly. ORTH. Is evil called by way of habit, or by way of privation? MAN. By way of habit. ORTH. Is the good called by way of habit, or by way of privation? MAN. By way of habit. ORTH. Therefore, evil is not entirely contrary to the good. For a habit is not contrary to a habit. ^B MAN. And is not disease contrary to health? ORTH. It is indeed; but as a privation to a habit, and a defect to integrity. MAN. And what are you saying? ORTH. In the same way, evil will also be rather a privation, and thus contrary to the good, as a privation is to a habit. For evil is nothing else than the privation of the good; and complete evil is the complete privation of the good. Wherefore we say that evil is rather non-being, as a privation of the natural habit, if indeed it exists.

24. What, therefore, do you call matter? Life, or corruption and death? Motion and that which is moved, or lack of motion and that which is motionless? Light, or darkness? MAN. Corruption and death, lack of motion and that which is motionless, darkness, and not light. ORTH. If, therefore, it is corruption, how has it produced fruits? How has it lived? For corruption does not live, nor has it life, nor does it impart life. For how can someone give to others that which he himself does not possess? ^C And if it was motionless, how was it moved, and how did it reach the boundaries of light? Who is it that gives life and motion to this? If it is the Good One, He is not good, nor wise. ^D

he is not good, who gave life and motion to evil; nor is he wise and prudent who stirred up wars and troubles for himself, by inciting against himself the evil which was calm and quiet. For he became the author of dissension and evils. But if it is not God, but another, then there are no longer two, but three. For whatever anyone does not possess, he cannot obtain from himself. MAN. But it has life and motion in potency. ORTH. If it had life and motion in potency, it was good in potency, since life and motion are to be considered as good. MAN. The life and motion of evil is not good, but evil. ORTH. That which comes from potency into act is mutable and has a beginning, and is not without beginning; and if it had life and motion in potency, it possessed act afterwards; but if its life and motion are evil, it was evil in potency, and not in act; and evil will not be without beginning. But if its life and motion are good, it has passed from evil into good. MAN. What then? Is not the corruption of one thing the generation of another? ORTH. Corruption does by no means become generation, but ^B matter, created from nothing by the command of God, is subject to change, as having its beginning from change. For change is to come from non-being into being. But if its existence began from change, it is altogether mutable and alterable; and matter being mutable, it is enlivened by the divine command, and is corrupted, and is enlivened again: so that corruption does not create generation, but the divine command gives life and produces it. Moreover, those things whose being has had its beginning from change are altogether subject to change and alteration. Since, therefore, matter can be changed, it receives life by the divine command, admits corruption, and revives again. And therefore, corruption does not create generation, but the divine command gives life and produces it.

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^A And so, are these two principles destructive to each other? MAN. Yes. ORTH. Therefore, not only is evil corruption, but the good is as well. MAN. Evil is indeed corruption, but the good is life. ORTH. Does the evil, then, corrupt the good, and provide it with no power to subsist? And does the good bestow life upon the evil? In that case, the evil will subsist, and the good will perish. Consequently, as you said, matter is evil, corruption, and death. Now, if the evil is evil to others but to itself is good, it preserves itself; therefore, it is not evil in every respect, nor is it entirely corruption. For in the way that it defends itself, it will certainly not be evil. But if it is entirely evil and entirely corruption, it also brings about its own destruction and non-existence. But explain to us now the doctrine of that mixture of which you spoke.

^B 28. MAN. I said, as I stated, that God and matter existed, each within its own boundaries; God, of course, being life, light, motion, knowledge, intellect, and every good thing; but matter being evil, corruption, darkness, and death, in total peace, quiet, and absence of motion. Then, after many ages had passed, matter became factional within itself, and its fruits fought against one another in mutual dissensions, because of which it happened that while some pursued and others fled, they arrived at the boundaries of the light. And, as I said, God and matter—that is, two principles—existed. The soul is a portion of the light, but the body is a creation of darkness and matter. The mixture occurred in this way: each of them was in its own part. The good was in one part, but the evil was in three. Then the evil was moved by a certain disordered impulse and, exceeding its own boundaries, approached the boundaries of the good. When the good realized this, it put forth from itself a power called the Mother of Life. ^C And the Mother of Life put forth the First Man. By this First Man I mean the five elements, which are air, wind, light, water, and fire. Having clothed himself in these, he went forth and waged war against the darkness. But the princes of darkness devoured a part of his armor, which is the soul; they also detained the First Man, and he was tormented by them in the darkness. He cried out to the Good, and It put forth another power, called the Living Spirit; and he descended and gave his right hand to the First Man, and led him up. But he left below the part which the princes had devoured—that is, the soul; for souls were created from the portion of the Good, but bodies were created from the substance of the evil.

29. ORTH. If, according to the divine Apostle (II Cor. vi, 14), there is no fellowship ^D of light with darkness, how did the mixture of soul and body occur? And experience itself, which is more powerful than vain words, teaches this. For if darkness entered into the boundaries of the light, how could it not have been immediately dissolved?

^A And again: How was it that there was a place in the region of light capable of containing darkness?

And again: If the Good were wise, why did he not foresee the incursion of the evil one and fortify himself and his own place? For if he were neither wise nor possessed of foreknowledge, he was foolish; and how can you call the foolish one good?

And again: If the entire darkness entered into the boundaries of the light, its own place remained empty. But if only a part of it, how did a part defeat the one sent by the Good to fight against it? For he who sends someone weaker against a stronger one is unwise, or else the Good is weak and the evil one is stronger.

And again: ^B If the Good voluntarily surrendered a part of himself, that is, the soul, he is not good, for he delivers the good into the hands of evil. And how can he himself, who has surrendered the soul to the evil one, judge those who serve the evil one? For they will say to him: "You yourself delivered us." The judgment is thus abolished. But if the princes of wickedness snatched a part of him against his will, he is weaker and more ignorant: weaker, because he lost a part of himself; and more ignorant, because he was unable to recover what was snatched from him. For if he could not do it from the beginning, he will never be able to do so afterward.

And again: How is it that, having captured the princes of wickedness, he crucified them and fashioned human beings from their flesh, and mountains from their bones, while in the meantime he did not recover his own part that had been snatched away? By this, too, the judgment is abolished. For those who sin are blameless; for if he himself could not recover his own part, how shall the soul, once it is mastered, be able not to sin, and how shall it be blameless? And if in the end the Good binds wickedness, he will recover the soul completely, and man will not be punished.

And again: If wickedness comes to the soul from the body, the soul is blameless.

And again: The body, when it lies dead, does not sin. Therefore, sin does not come from the body, but from the soul.

30. Concerning matter, whether it is incorporeal. — Tell us, O Manichæans, as for this wickedness among you that is without beginning, which you call "matter," is it incorporeal, or is it a body, or is it composite? And if it is incorporeal, how is it matter? For matter is not incorporeal. But perhaps you will say that while it is ^C incorporeal, it nevertheless made the body. Tell us, then: did it make it from its own substance, or from that which is not? And if you say "from its own substance," you speak falsely. For a body does not proceed from an incorporeal substance; for that which is what it is by nature does not change. Neither does a substance change from incorporeal to bodily, nor from body to incorporeal, nor from rational to irrational, nor from irrational to rational. For that which is substantial ^D

^A quality is immovable; but things that change and are altered are altered according to an accident—things which come to be and pass away without the corruption of the subject. But if you say it is from nothing, tell us: why, being incorporeal and evil, did it not make the mixture out of evils? Why did it not make souls also evil by nature, just as you say the body is evil by nature? Why did it mix a portion of the good into its own evil? For the Good did not do this; so it is not completely evil, but possesses a portion of good. And these things apply if you say it is incorporeal. But if it is a body, how was it moved? For every body is of itself devoid of choice and dead. How, then, was it moved? Who gave it motion? The Good? Then He who moved evil is not good, nor wise, nor provident. But if you say it is composite, know that every composite thing is easily dissolved; and it is necessary for the simple things to exist first, from which the composition was made—just as it is necessary for the pitch to exist by itself first, and the wax by itself, and only then for the composition of the wax and pitch to come into being. Therefore, there will be two principles of evil, and not one.

^B 31. Tell us then, O Manichaeans: do your two principles have absolutely nothing in common, or do they agree in some things and differ in others? For if they have absolutely nothing in common, one will be and the other will not be. But if they agree in respect to existence, as substance and accident, the one has its existence in the other; for an accident does not subsist by itself, just as color cannot exist without a body. Now the body is a substance, and color is an accident. But an accident comes and goes without the corruption of the subject—for if the color is changed, the body remains the same. Choose whichever you wish: call it substance, or call it accident. But if both are substances, know that one substance does not differ from another substance, nor is one substance opposed to another substance, except by way of an accident. Therefore, if there is an evil one and there is a Good one, and both are substance, immutable, active, and creative, both are certainly one in reason of substance, and differ only in quality.

^C And again: we see the elements and the seasons, the heaven and the earth and the sea, always holding in the same way; and night and day, the motions of the sun and stars, and showers, and the fruits of the earth, ordered and regulated according to reason and sequence. If, therefore, there are two mutually contrary principles, how are all things governed rightly, unless they have been brought to an agreement in a friendly manner? ^D

^A If matter was consuming itself, how was it moved? And if it was moved toward its own consumption, how did it come to the borders of the light?

If matter is downward-tending, and its natural place is the lower and darker regions, how, having come to the borders of the light, did it depart from its own nature? Darkness is blind; how then did it see the light?

If matter is without order and without mind, how does it have rulers? And how can it fight against that which possesses reason and order? Or, while fighting, does it become stronger, such that it snatches something from the wise [being], and is not itself snatched? But if the Good [God] allowed a part of Him to be snatched to hold it back from advancing into His own borders, then He was not able ^B to do otherwise; but the evil one is stronger, and the Good is a trickster. And how is God good, if He uses trickery and not power?

That which is always the same is truth; and truth is good; and that which is without beginning is unchangeable. If, therefore, matter is without beginning, it will also be unchangeable. And if it is unchangeable, it is always the same. And if it is always the same, it is truth. And if it is truth, it will be good.

But if matter changes, it changes from good to evil, and having been good before, it later became evil; or from evil to good, and having been evil before, it later became good; for change leads to the opposite.

Eternal substance is unchangeable; for it did not come from non-being into being, nor is its existence ^C the result of progression; for substance is unchangeable. Therefore, God is good and eternal, and has not undergone change, but is always good; and the things that He makes are good; for it is not possible for evil to come from the good. Yet they are changeable, since He brings them into being from non-being. Rational beings, therefore, are indeed susceptible to change, because of their production from non-being into being, but they are self-determining because they are rational. To remain self-determining as they were created, that is to say, good, serves, and is mindful and obedient to the Maker—this is virtue for created nature; for virtue is to remain within the boundaries of one's own nature. The devil, therefore, changed of his own free will, desiring something great, but not in a ^D good way; for it is a great thing to be God, but it is evil for one who is not God to be ungrateful to the One who made him, to transcend his own nature, and to want to be that which is impossible to become; for it is impossible for one not without beginning to be God, or for one who is originated to be without beginning. Thus, it leads the beings to privation, the privation of that which is not fitting.

32. MAN. What is the devil’s malice? ORTH. His rebellion against the Creator. For God gave him existence, both that he might not seem to fear the rebellion of a servant, and that he might teach us to treat the wicked with kindness. For He not only created him, but even made him prince of the world. Indeed, He would even have received him, if he had wished to be good, and would have loaded him with benefits. Wherefore, ^A even though He could have removed him from the midst, He did not; but endures his madness, kindly and generously granting him to exist, which indeed He alone can bestow. But for him to become good is not of God alone, but requires his own exertion as well. For what is accomplished by force has obtained the name neither of good nor of virtue.

33. BUT if you ask what the reason is why God permitted him to attack men, I answer: because this conduced to their profit. For many are crowned through his works. But if you were to say that many likewise perish, I say again that, just as the devil himself, ^B without the impulse of any other, was able to become evil by his own counsel—which makes his crime even more atrocious—so also man, even if there had been no one to suggest a crime, could have become evil of himself; from which a load would have been added to his sin. For he who sins through the persuasion of another is considered worthy of greater excuse and pardon than he who sins by his own intent. For he who sins by his own counsel has no place for excuse, just as he who cultivates virtue from himself obtains greater praise. ^C And therefore, the devil, who sinned by his own will, remained bereft of all repentance; man, however, because he did not sin of his own accord, but from the assault of the devil, had repentance, and received the gift of renewal and remission of sins. And thus, it is a good, and a gift of God.

34. MAN. But indeed, why did God, when He had foreseen that the devil would be evil, create him? ORTH. Exceptional and singular goodness was the reason why He created him. For thus He spoke to Himself: Since this one is about to be evil, ^D and will destroy all the good things by which I allure him, shall I also deprive him of existence and destroy him? By no means; but although he is to be wicked, I shall not exclude him from participation in Me; but I will grant him one good, that he may participate in Me through this very thing, that he exists, and on this account, that he is, he may come into the part of Me, Who am good. For there is no one besides God who holds together and preserves things so that they might be. For existence itself is a good, and a gift of God.

35. MAN. You say that existence is a good for the things that are: therefore, if existence is a good for all things,

^A that which is given by God—the Good—is also a good for the devil. ORTH. All things that exist have received their existence from God; everything given to each thing by God is likewise good. For the things given by the Good are good; and evil is nothing other than the rejection of good things, that is, of those things given by God. Those, therefore, who have received even their existence from God, are in a partial participation of the Good, albeit at the most extreme and faint degree. It is good, then, for the devil to exist, and by means of that existence to participate in the Good. To exist is good; but to exist well is better. For a perfect state of existence is to be healthy; but to be sick and yet exist is a partial evil and a corruption. For this is not an absolute non-existence, but a partial existence and a partial non-existence. But not to exist is an absolute evil, for it is a perfect non-existence, that which is completely non-being. Thus, to exist and to exist well are ^B both good, being from God. But that evil should come from a good thing arises from the will of the one who becomes evil. God, therefore, out of the superabundance of His goodness, has granted even to the wicked the things that are good: both existence and to exist well.

36. You reproach us, O Manichaeans, as to why God, foreknowing that the devil would be evil, created him; and we have demonstrated at length that, according to the natural logic of justice, He created him rightly; for it is better, according to the natural logic, at least to exist, and by this to participate in the Good, than not to exist at all. For from God, who alone is always-existing, comes existence itself, the provider of good and of all good things; and that which comes from the Good is altogether good. But if you say it would have been better for him not to be than to be and be punished eternally, we answer that that punishment is nothing other than the fire of the desire for wickedness and sin, and the fire of the frustration of that desire. ^C For those who have reached the state of immutability in wickedness do not desire God, but rather desire wickedness; yet there will be no actualization of wickedness or sin there. For we shall neither eat, nor drink, nor be clothed, nor marry, nor be rich, nor will envy prevail, nor any other of the forms of wickedness. Desiring them, then, but not partaking of them—like fire—they are scorched by their own desire; whereas those who desire the good—that is, God alone—who is the Being and the Ever-existing, and who attain it, rejoice in accordance with their desire, just as they attain that which is desired. Therefore, that which is truly good is that which is good by nature, even if it partakes in some degree—in accordance with its very existence—of the Good. But that which appears to be good is not good by nature, but is evil. Thus, to prefer the enjoyment of created things over the enjoyment of the Creator, ^D and to prefer one's own will over the will of the Creator, is not the act of a just or good man; to prefer that which seems to us good—which has proved to be actually evil—to that which is good by nature, is not the act of a just man.

^A but that he should come into being, and have some minimal portion of the existing ^B good, is better than that he should, because of evil—that is, because of unjust craving and sorrow—be deprived even of that small portion of the good. For God does not judge according to our irrational judgment, but according to what is truly good and just; nor does He follow our affections, nor, because of a supposed compassion—which is in truth a perverse indulgence—does He betray the standard of justice.

37. Furthermore: God calls things that are not yet, and looks upon and judges the things that are to be as though they were already come to pass. ^B Just as a judge rightly punishes one who has already committed a crime, and if he does not punish him, he is unjust—and yet he is not himself the cause of the criminal’s sin or his punishment, but rather the will of him who sinned is—so God, seeing what is to be as though it were already come to pass, decreed that he should exist, and that if he were to become wicked, he should be punished of his own accord; wherefore He also made him, and made him good. But he, by his own choosing, became wicked, and brought punishment upon himself; nay, he torments himself, while he desires things that are not. That God's foreknowledge was not the cause for the devil's becoming evil is clear; for a physician, while he foreknows a future disease, is not the cause of the disease: rather, the cause of the disease consists in an intemperate way of life; the physician's foreknowledge is a proof of his own skill, and the cause of the foreknowledge is that the thing is going to happen in that way. That it is thus, the Apostle declares, saying: ^C “Who calls the things that are not as though they were.” And it is also necessary to know this, that as the soul departs from the body, so it remains henceforth unchangeable, whether it be affected by the desire for good or for evil.

38. Beyond all these things, we call that good which God wills. For just as light arises from the sun, so also does the good from God. ^D Whatever, therefore, the good God wills, is good; and this is finally good, which He wills. God is the judge; we are not judges of God. Why, then, do we grasp the censor’s rod against Him? Is God struck by impulse, does He tremble and fear? God, the fearful one, would not be God, whom fear agitates.

39. If the sun and the moon have become vessels, for the sake of bringing about the portion which matter snatched away from God, then before this there was no sun, nor moon, and man was dwelling in darkness.

40. If, according to you, affliction is evil, then pleasure and enjoyment must necessarily be good. And if this is so, then fornication, gluttony, and everything that delights and pleases the one who does it is good; and all things that bring distress—such as temperance, fasting, vigils, and others of that kind—must be evil.

^A If you reproach God for the destruction by the flood, and for the burning of the Sodomites, and for the drowning of Pharaoh, done for the sake of useful instruction, reproach Him rather because He punishes eternally!

42. What a being produces from its own substance is not a creature, but what it produces from nothing is a creature. If, therefore, evil has the power of creating, it produces from nothing, and no longer draws the origin of the body from matter. But if it is from matter, that is, from the substance of evil, then if evil is without beginning, it is absolutely immortal and unchangeable. For that which has no beginning does not cease, nor is it changed; but if it is changed and perishes, it is not without beginning. And if evil is unchangeable, then the body that comes from its substance will be incorruptible and unchangeable. Whose, then, were the corruption and the evil? For corruption necessarily corrupts something, or else it is not corruption. If, then, the good is capable of being affected, the good man is also capable of being affected; and how then can he be perfectly good? If the good is corrupted by it, he will depart into non-existence. But if it corrupted itself, it was corrupted and perished, and it no longer exists. If it was a part of the good, or if it corrupted a part of itself, the part of which nature was corruptible, the whole was also corruptible; for it is impossible for the same nature to be both corruptible and incorruptible. For if we say that the body of man is a corruptible part of man, but the soul is incorruptible, they are not of one nature. For if the soul dwells in a body, it is not a body, but is incorporeal; so the soul is of another nature, and the body of another; nor is part of the same nature corruptible and part incorruptible; but the one human nature is corruptible, and the other incorruptible. And ^B neither is the soul from a substance without beginning, for it is mutable; nor is the body; for it too is mutable and corruptible. Man is said to be of one nature, not because the soul and the body are of one nature, but because all men alike each have a soul and a body, and each has two natures. ^C

43. ^D Converting is a change from the opposite to the opposite: from nothing to existence, or from existence to nothing, or from virtue to vice—which is a change from natural habits to their privation. Virtue is the fulfillment of the law of God; and the law of God is His will. For no one commands what he abhors. Furthermore, the will of God is good, immutable, and always remains the same. Therefore, the good truly is, and likewise virtue, for virtue is a good thing. Conversely, evil is nothing, but is a free infraction and overturning of that which exists—that is, of the law of God: a thing which exists by accident as it is committed, and as soon as the action ceases, it also ceases.

44. One must also know this, that God does not punish anyone in the future, but each one—

^A creates the capacity for participation in God. And participation in God is pleasure, but His forbearance is punishment; here, however, God does not bring punishment as a cause of distress, but as one who instructs and heals wickedness, so that we may recognize Him and return and attain His holiness: "For the instruction of the Lord opens my ears."

45. MAN. If He is good, why does He afflict the wicked with tortures in the future age, and not rather destroy him? ORTH. God is good, but He is also just. As He is good, therefore, He made whatever He made good. Just as, then, it was just that those who were to be good from Him, and were to be future, should not only guard the good given to them, but also work it out, becoming worthy of the perfect good and of ^B eternal pleasure; so also it was just that those who were to be good from Him, and yet were not to guard the good given to them—but rather were to turn willingly through the rejection of good things into wickedness—should be deprived of eternal pleasure.

46. The Seraphim are further from God than the devil is from the Seraphim. If, therefore, the devil had not existed, he who came immediately before him would have seemed worse than all and evil in comparison with those before him, and we would say: "Why, having foreseen that he would be such, did God make him?" Similarly also with the case proposed, until we come even to the Seraphim themselves. For often we observe a most pitiable thing ^C and think that there is nothing more pitiable than it, and after this we see another that is worse. For whatever last evil we see or imagine, we suspect that there is none more serious and troublesome than it.

47. God therefore made all things very good according to their own nature, as He willed; for He is not subject to law, but whatever He wills, this is good, not whatever we judge; for we are not judges of God. But just as from the sun, or from fire, all light is illumined, so from the will of God all good is defined. For if you say that God did well in this, and badly in this, and why did He make this, and why did He not make that? you are a judge ^D of God, and greater than He, and wiser. He has the power, therefore, as God, to do what He wills, and this is good; and He has the power also of those things which He does, to declare to us the causes which He wills, and to conceal the ones He wills. Each of the created beings that has received reason either stayed freely in the good, as it was created; or it turned freely and departed from the good, and lost it. For good is the excellent order preserving for each that which is natural to it; the same is also virtue. But wickedness is the dissolution of the order.

or disorder. All things that exist, insofar as they exist, are from the Good; but insofar as they are deprived of the Good, they are neither good nor existing. For lifeless things, insofar as they did not receive life from the Good, are lifeless as being deprived of life; likewise also, things without sense and without reason, insofar as they have received anything, are to that extent good.

48. ^A God knows evil as good: just as He knows fornication as desire, and friendship, and union. And with Him also the causes of evils become workers of good; for often from fornication vessels of election have been born.

49. If wickedness is evil, punishment is good, since it banishes this. For fornication is evil, but correction is not; for punishment is not evil, but the making of oneself worthy of punishment.

50. If evil is eternal, and creates, and has power, and exists and acts, whence does it have these things? From the Good? Or to the Good from evil? Or from some other cause common to both, since evil also subsists within the Good, and since it also makes good the evils and its own privation? For friendship, being good, makes fornication appear good, since it contends within the Good. How then does what is not exist? ^B For God is said to be "non-existent" according to the transcendent negation of all things.

51. ^C That nature itself proposes one principle, the number itself shows, commencing not from two, but from one. If therefore unity is the principle of number, the principle of things that exist is also one.

52. If the Good is in every way uncommuning with evil, the Good is being, and evil is non-being. For two things that exist commune in being. If the Good is a substance, evil is unsubstantial; for two substances, to the extent that they are substances, commune in being.

53. If evil is motionless from the beginning, movement is good, and immobility is evil. Whence then did evil obtain movement? Life is good, and movement, and it was always, and is in the Good; and the Good is living, and was good. Death, as you say, is evil, and immobility, and corruption, and necrosis, and nonetheless non-existence. But if, as you say, wickedness was death—just as life and the living one is the Good—then death, and necrosis, and the dead thing, is the evil. Whence then did it revive ^D and move? If from itself, then life is from evil, which is impossible; for corruption does not give life. But if from the Good, then the Good is not good, since it gives life to evil. Unless—but the Good, being

^A foreknowing the evils that would arise from it, gave it life?

54. Evil, insofar as it is evil, is uncoordinated with the Good, and its opposite, and its enemy; but the desire for the Good is good. How, then, did that which is in the highest degree evil desire the Good?

55. Evil is immovable, and is corruption rather than generation. How, then, did evil put forth its own offshoots, being lifeless and insensible? How, then, does it perceive the Good and the offshoots of the Good?

56. That which originates from the substance of the Unbegotten and Uncreated is unbegotten and uncreated. How, then, do you say that all things are from the substance of your principles? For if all things are of their substance, the principles are unbegotten, ^B and nothing is created. But if they are creatures, they are not of their substance.

57. Evil is corruption and death. If, therefore, evil is evil to others, but good to itself, it confirms itself, and is not entirely evil; for it confirms itself, and in this respect it is not evil. But if it is entirely evil, and evil to itself, it is destructive of itself, and non-existent. And if the generation of one thing comes to pass in the corruption of another, corruption is not the cause of generation, but out of an excess of goodness, it brings about the generation of one thing out of the corruption of another. For matter is subject to the Good, having been made good by Him; for He brought all things ^C into being from non-existence at the beginning.

58. The same thing is not the same, both good and evil, at the same time and in the same respect; nor are corruption and generation [conjoined] to the same thing, nor the same power [directed] toward the same thing, nor is the same power self-destructive. Now, evil is neither being, nor good, nor the creator of generation, nor the maker of things that are, nor of things that are good; but the Good, in those things in which it fully dwells, shows them to be perfectly good; in those in which it dwells partially, [it makes them] partially [good]; and in those in which it does not dwell at all, they exist not as good, and are called entirely evil.

59. Fornication, insofar as it is desire, and friendship, and union, is good; but insofar as it is a desire for that which is not owed and for that which is forbidden, it is evil; for that which is not commanded, but is forbidden, is not being, as that which ought not to be; and thus the desire for that which is not, and which ought not to come into being, is evil.

60. Evil is twofold: the one is evil in truth, as the falling away from natural habits. For God ^D

^A made man upright, but they have sought out many designs. The other is called evil in terms of our sensory perception, such as the tribulations by which we are afflicted in temptations. For the name of evil is ambiguous: it signifies two things. Sometimes it denotes the deprivation of virtue, at other times the deprivation of joy—that is, of that which is desired. For fornication is nothing else but a deprivation of temperance and a wicked use. For instead of loving and commingling with his own vessel, that is, his own wife, he loves and commingles with another’s. So too, infidelity is contracted when, instead of believing in and loving Him who is by nature God, one believes in that which is not God. Therefore this is evil: to use that which is not as though it were, and not to offer to each that which is its own. For the things of each are those defined by God. It is the attribute of God to have glory and honor, as befits the Creator; it is the attribute of creatures to have the measure that He who gave them being has assigned to each. It is in our power to use or not to use the things given to us by God for the purpose for which He gave them. For example, He gave us the appetitive faculty so that we might desire Him alone, who is good. If we use our desire for this, it is virtue and good; but if we love something else besides Him, it is no longer use, but abuse. For He created us for this very end, that we might partake of Him by desiring Him.

61. Matter, they say, was without beginning, unbegotten, ^C ever violently agitated within its own boundaries, ever at war with itself and consuming itself. And God, they say, was also in His own boundaries, without beginning, unbegotten, eternal, incorporeal, all light. But matter, they say, being agitated in a disorderly and irrational manner, came to the boundaries of God. And having wondered at the light of God, it ceased from its war against itself; but it assailed the light with fighting, so as even to snatch a portion of it into itself. For they assert that matter has its own prefects, as if in a dark kingdom, whom they call the world-rulers of darkness and the spiritual forces of wickedness. And the good God, they say, allowed a portion of Himself to be snatched away by it and held captive, so that He might encompass it and limit it, lest it progress further into His own boundaries.

If matter is without beginning, unbegotten, incorporeal, devoid of quality, and invisible, and the good God is the same, and all things have come into being from their substance, how are the things that have evolved from them visible to the eyes? For that which proceeds from an incorporeal and invisible substance must itself be entirely incorporeal and invisible. And before this, if the two substances are without beginning, unbegotten, and eternal, and we are from them—not having been brought into being by them out of nothing, but produced from their substance—then we are without beginning and eternal. For the offspring of each substance is consubstantial with the substance that begat it: that which is eternal produces what is eternal; that which is unbegotten, what is unbegotten; that which is without beginning, what is without beginning.

^A Again: If our constitution is from the essence of both the good and the evil, we are not creatures, but children; and there is no creature in the world. Again: If it is impossible for the essence of the good to be turned into the evil, and altogether to conceive or to do evil; and it is impossible for the evil to be turned into, or to conceive or to do, any good; and our soul is a part of the good, and the body a part of the evil—it is impossible for our soul to conceive anything vile, and for our body to do anything good. But we shall say that many souls conceive evil—as those of the Manichaeans—and many bodies do good, as those of the saints. If even the evil one is composite of incorporeal and body, and the good one likewise, and our soul is of the essence of the good, and the body of the evil, then our soul and our body will both be composite of incorporeal and body. Again: If matter is without beginning—if indeed it is incorporeal—how did it proceed from an incorporeal essence? For that which is without beginning is entirely unchangeable. That which is simple by nature is not naturally adapted to be united; how, then, did the commingling occur? Again: If matter is composite of incorporeal and body, and the body is contrary to the incorporeal, who united the contraries? For contraries would not associate with contraries, being joined in a friendly way into one form and one substance, unless the power of the Creator had brought them together into one; matter, being highly composite, received its being from the divine Word. Again: Is matter corruption, or corruptible? For corruption indeed destroys and is not destroyed, while the corruptible is destroyed by corruption—and the corruptible is that which is being destroyed. ^B 62. What then is matter? Destructive, or corruption, or corruptible? For corruption is the dissolution of composite things. That which destroys is that which brings about corruption; that which is destroyed is the composite thing being dissolved. Both that which destroys and (that which is) destroyed are substances; but corruption is an accident, observed in the dissolving of the things that were composed; and it exists neither beforehand, nor does it remain after the dissolution has occurred. 63. What then is matter? Destructive, or corruption, or corruptible? If you say it is destructive, I ask: what does it destroy, unless perhaps the good? For you say there is nothing else besides matter and the good. If there were two, and matter destroys and the good bestows life, then matter would be unharmed, while the good is corrupted and perishes. But if you say this—that matter destroys itself—I would like you to know that there is nothing that is destroyed by itself. And surely, if it destroyed itself, it would have already consumed itself, ^C and would not remain after the dissolution; nor does it exist before, nor does it remain after the dissolution. ^D

^A And again: what is first in matter? Its substance, or corruption? And if it is corruption, it is impossible for it to exist before it is consumed. But if its substance preceded the corruption, it is rather substance and existence, and not corruption; and there was once incorruptibility, not having opposition in corruption, and corruption is not without a beginning. But if its substance was always consuming itself, how did it bring forth fruits? If it was consumed partially, it is not entirely corruptive, nor entirely corrupt, nor perfectly evil. But if it is corrupt, it ceased from destroying itself, or destroying is evil and from evil it turned to good; or destroying is good, and from good it became evil. If matter is evil, yet destroyed itself, it is good; “for that which destroys evil is good.” ^B But perhaps you will say that at some time there was corruption, not in act, but in potentiality; and likewise something corruptible. But know this: that to be corruptive or creative, yet not to act out the corruption or the creation, because the things being destroyed or created cannot be coeternal with that which destroys or creates, is true. But you say that nothing is produced into being from non-being, but that evil itself is corruptive and consuming of itself. So that while it has in potentiality both the destroying and the being destroyed, and not in act, it is therefore imperfect. Now that which progresses from the imperfect to perfection is not without a beginning; for if that which is immutable is without a beginning, that which is changeable is not without a beginning.

^C And again: what is first in matter? Its substance, or corruption? And if it is corruption, it is impossible for it to exist before it is consumed. But if its substance preceded the corruption, it is rather substance and existence, and not corruption; and there was once incorruptibility, not having opposition in corruption, and corruption is not without a beginning. But if its substance was always consuming itself, how did it bring forth fruits? If it was consumed partially, it is not entirely corruptive, nor entirely corrupt, nor perfectly evil. But if it is corrupt, it ceased from destroying itself, or destroying is evil and from evil it turned to good; or destroying is good, and from good it became evil. If matter is evil, yet destroyed itself, it is good; “for that which destroys evil is good.”

^D And again you say: was matter light, or darkness? And if it was light, it comes from the substance of The Good; and behold, one beginning, and not two. But if it is darkness, how does darkness perceive? For if it perceives, it has light; but if it does not have light, it is blind. And how did it see the light? And how can darkness exist in the light, and not be dissolved? Or “what communion has light with darkness?” ^D And again: is matter a habit, or not? And if it is not a habit, how was it moved? For everything that does not have life is motionless. But if it is a habit, either it has life from itself, or it had it from elsewhere.

And how is the one who gives life to evil good? But if it is from elsewhere, there will not be two, but three. ^A And again: was matter from itself without beginning, or did it come to be from another? And if it came to be from another, it is not without beginning. But if it was without beginning, it always possessed existence, and it never possessed non-existence. Why then do you call it corruption and death? For corruption is the dissolution of that which possesses existence into non-existence; but matter never possessed non-existence; it was always, as you say. How then, since it does not have it, is it able to give it? For it was always, as you assert. How is it, then, that it can give this, of which it itself lacks?

In addition, birth and corruption are in conflict with one another. Birth is the production of that which did not exist, for the sake of it coming into existence; but corruption is the dissolution of an existing thing into nothingness. If, therefore, matter is, as you seem to think, corruption, by what means does it produce fruit and beget?

Finally, corruption which is total destroys even itself. For if it preserves itself, it is not total corruption; but if it also destroys itself, it will no longer exist. ^B

64. “Good” (ἀγαθόν) is so termed from that which flows quickly (ἀγαν) and towards which all things flow (that is, that to which all things move more quickly): as something that is by nature lovable and desirable, and which naturally all things desire. Evil, however, is nothing other than an appetite repugnant to nature: that is, when we desire something other than what nature dictates as desirable. Furthermore, the beginning and the end of all things, even of evil things, is the good; for it is for the sake of the good that all things exist, both those things that are good and those that are their opposites. And even when we do these things, we do them desiring the good; for no one, ^C looking towards evil, does what he does. Therefore, evil does not even possess subsistence, but only parhypostasis—a derivative existence—for the sake of the good, and not coming to be for its own sake; for everything that comes to be, comes to be either for the sake of the good, or for the sake of what we believe to be good.

65. A prophet is led into error by God, either when God allows him to be led into error, according to the worthiness of his desires, or when God brings about something different from what He Himself had foretold, and the prophet is said to have been led into error by God—that is to say, to be proven a deceiver.

66. Tell us, then, you Manichaeans: this matter, which you call evil and darkness and corruption and death, and which you contend is without beginning and eternal, was it a substance ^D or an accident? If it was a substance, was it a body, such as earth, water, air, or fire, or was it incorporeal, such as God, an angel, or a soul? Or was it finally a combination of body and incorporeal nature? And if indeed it was a body, it remained motionless. For every body is inanimate and lacks motion. And how, without being moved, did it come into the boundaries of the light? Or how did it possess motion? Either the good One—and yet He is not good—is the one who gave motion to evil, or someone else gave it motion...

and thus there are three principles, not two. But if you say that matter was incorporeal, whence comes the body? For an incorporeal and unoriginate substance cannot turn into a body. Whence, then, ^A the uncountable multitude of bodies? But if you say that matter is composite, made of incorporeal and body, know that it is impossible for a composite man to be, unless from soul and body. And it is impossible for a body to be, unless from the simple elements, earth, and water, and air, and fire. Therefore, it is necessary first that the simple things exist, and then the composite come to exist from the simple ones. There will be, then, not two principles, but three. Thus it is impossible for matter to be unoriginate; and if it is composite of incorporeal and body, why did He not make man from His incorporeal nature and from the body?

67. ^B “Hear, O heaven, and give ear, O earth. Pay attention, O heaven, and I will speak; and let the earth hear the words of my mouth.” For I shall speak words, not of my own heart, but of the darkened and defiled Manichaeans; hear, O peoples, tribes, tongues, hear. Let heaven and earth become one theater today. Hear what the accursed Manichaeans say, those who are darkened regarding the light, the mouth of the devil. They say that matter fought with God, and tore away a part from Him. ^C They say that God is circumscribed, warring and being warred upon, and grieving and being cut off. Is God warred upon? Is God cut off? Woe is me, woe is me! Shall we not kill them? Shall we not consume them with fire? Shall we hold discourse with these? Shall we receive these into communion? Whoever communicates with them is like unto them, and shall be of their portion, both in this age and in the one to come. Brothers, is communion with them to be spoken of? Let us die, rather than receive the Manichaeans into communion. Let us die, that we may live; he who receives them into communion is a Manichaean, like unto them. It is better to be a Jew, and to die a Jew, than to communicate with the Manichaeans. ^D O, away with the Manichaeans! Hear, I beseech you by God, O men, hear what the God-accursed Manes says. The world, he says, is not of God, but of the devil. He desires to alienate us from our God. And God, he says, grieved because a part was cut off from Him, and He suffered. If a part was cut off from Him, then He is also corruptible. For all that is cut, is corruptible. Wickedness, he says, plundered and snatched a part from God, and for this reason God sends, and plunders, and snatches back the part that was stolen from Him. You are introducing robbers of God, O God-accursed one! But he says that God also made engines...

^A of twelve buckets, and the sun, and the moon, that He might take back His own. For what purpose, finally, does this happen? That the good One may send fire and burn the world, and consume everything, and restore matter below to its own place, and those souls that did not accept Manes. Listen to what the adversary of God says, and how much power he attributes to matter: he casts down the power of God the Most High. First, he says that He was despoiled and stolen. O weakness! Do you call my God weak? But perhaps He allowed it voluntarily and willingly. Why then was He affected with sorrow, if force was not brought against Him? For no one loses his own things voluntarily and then grieves. But if, ^B so that His place might not be occupied, since He could not otherwise overcome matter, He allowed Himself to be plundered—He who is able to bring it about without suffering from weakness—why is He not weak? Furthermore, He grieves and is punished in the part that is His own; and He devises and makes machines, so that He might take back what is His, and not even the whole of it does He receive back: for the souls that refused to follow Manes are punished eternally. And finally, matter again in its own places rebels against the good One, and afflicts Him, while it is not itself afflicted, but at last returns to its own place, together with the souls of those who did not believe ^C in Manes. But perhaps it will rise again.

68. Tell us, O Manichaeans, was matter, while it was quiet at first, good or evil? If it was evil, then later, having rebelled, it became good. If it was good at first, then later it became evil.

Furthermore, having rebelled against itself, and moved in a disorderly way, and having come to the borders of the light, if it saw the immaterial light, how is it blind? And how could matter see immaterial light? But if it perceived it, how is it irrational and mindless? And if it fell in love, as you say, how is it soulless? And how is it evil? For that which loves the good is not evil. How is it mindless and unwise, as you say, having departed from its own [borders], as if it were not an irrational animal, but as if it were an excellent ^D and orderly general, and having taken significant spoils of the light, and having returned to its own things? And how do you say it is base, when it received and contained the good? For things capable of the good are not contrary to it, nor hostile.

And again: if matter snatched a part of God, then the nature of the good is active and creative, but [also] passive and fluid. But if the former lusted after the good, and the good gave a part of Himself to the evil, both were changed: for the evil also lusted after the good, and became good; and the good, having accepted to be mixed with the evil, became evil. And again, the good was harmed by the theft...

^A and the mixture, or it did harm, or it received utility, or it bestowed it. If it received utility, then that which bestowed the utility is efficacious and good, while the one which received it is inferior and passive; but if it was harmed, then that which was harmed is in this way passive, and that which did the harm is more powerful. If it did harm, it is evil. If it bestowed utility, the good is envious, pained, and mindful of injuries, having delivered the matter to the fire, and by the excess of its grudge, its own part along with it. If it neither did harm, nor was harmed, nor bestowed utility, nor received it, first of all, it is inactive; for the good, wheresoever it may be, provides benefit, if it possesses good energy. Secondly, it is unjust, because, not having been benefited or harmed, it punishes the matter which committed no injustice. But if, because the matter lusted after it, and became a partaker of it, it is troubled and pained—according to you—let no one lust after it.

But if, as you say, God, knowing the matter was approaching him, willingly allowed a part of himself to be snatched away by it, so that by circumscribing its movement he might take vengeance upon it, having planted it in Gehenna like a ^B boundary: first of all, for what reason did He not plant it immediately, and deliver it to Gehenna? But if He could not, except in such a way, why does He reproach us if we do not resist the evil, when He Himself, through weakness, delivered our souls?

Furthermore, regarding Gehenna: you must say that this is either of the same substance as the good, or of the same substance as the evil, or of some other substance—and then there will no longer be two, but three. For if it is of the good, how does it punish? For Gehenna is not good. But if it is of the evil, it does not punish the evil; for nothing punishes itself. But if it is something other than the two, there are three principles, and not two; or else it was derived from non-being into being. And if this is so, why, walking the straight path, may we not say, All things were derived ^C from non-being into being?

That which is without beginning is immutable. For change is that which was not previously, but comes to be later. If their being began from a change, then they are changeable, whereas those that are without beginning are by nature immutable. How then did we come to be from principles that are without beginning? For if they too are such as we are, they are human. But if they are not such, how were they changed? We are not, therefore, from substances without beginning, but from nothing.

If the matter and the evil are a beginning without beginning and eternal, having existence from itself, and all that it has—that is to say, its tyranny, and its strength, and its wickedness—it will have these things as immutable. How then will he, who so feared it that he permitted a part of himself to be taken captive by it, be able to overcome ^D it in the end?

68. MANICHEAN: How then does God, foreknowing that the devil would turn from good to evil and, having suffered the loss of good, would become destitute of good or evil, nevertheless create him? ORTHODOX: If He foreknew him, He surely foreknew him as one who would absolutely come to be. For if a thing were not to be absolutely, its foreknowledge would not be foreknowledge, but ignorance and error. MANICHEAN: Did God create him intentionally? ORTHODOX: Certainly, intentionally. MANICHEAN: Why, then, since God is good, did He wish to create one who was going to be evil? ORTHODOX: God created him good; but he, having changed of his own accord, cast away the good, inasmuch as he was created possessed of free will. MANICHEAN: What then is the reason that He created him endowed with freedom of will and mutable? ORTHODOX: Whatever is created has from its nature [the capacity] to change. For those things whose origin began with change must also by nature be mutable. For is there not change when something is produced, from not being, to being? Whence it comes to be that God alone is by nature immutable, as being uncreated and eternal. But of created things, all those which are rational change of their own accord, according to the choice of the will; the others, however, [change] by reason of the body. ^B

69. MANICHEAN: But for that reason He created him free, because whatever uses reason is under its own authority. For why would it use reason if it lacked the freedom of the will? For that which happens either by force or by necessity of nature in no way obtains the merit of virtue. From which it follows that not even virtue subsists in brute animals. Furthermore, it is not right to take away the virtue of the good on account of the sloth of some. MANICHEAN: Therefore He ought to have created only those who would be upright, so that there would be only good, and only virtue would flourish. ORTHODOX: God alone is the perfect good, and all things, if they are compared with Him, are imperfect, and to that extent are they and are they called good, in as much as they participate in Him, and from the mutual comparison of them among themselves. For that which is a greater participant in the good is also more good, and is so called. That which is less, is also less. That which is in no way good, indeed, does not even exist. Finally, that which is in no way good is altogether evil. And for this very fact to exist is good. Since the devil exists, by this reason, that he is, he is good. ^C And he proceeds from Him who is good. Therefore,

70. MANICHEAN: What is the reason that the Lord says, "It were good for that man if that man had not been born"? ORTHODOX: Because it is fitting for the good to give good things; but it is a disgrace and shame for the recipient not to preserve the gifts received—this happens not by the fault of the giver, but because of his sin and sloth. Now God, ^D because He is good, cannot not bestow good things—that is, He does not will not to bestow them. But he who refuses to receive brings detriment upon himself, while he considers it safer not to receive than to receive. Wherefore it is neither just, nor good, because of

this, that he is unwilling to receive, for the good to be withheld, since God is beneficent and bestows good things. For otherwise, the good would be overcome by evil. Since God of His pure goodness brings things into existence from nothing, it would follow—contrary to this—that because some one might be evil, willfully turning from the good, the creation of good things by the Good One would be hindered. On this account, the Lord did not say: "It were good if that man had not been born," but: "It were good for that man." ^B It is good, indeed, as far as potential and right are concerned, for the Good One to be beneficent and to bestow good things. But he who has received and has not preserved them has made the very thing he received shameful and disgraceful for himself. For he himself, who does not desire the good, does not even desire the good that he has, nor is he delighted by it. And indeed, that we exist is not of our own choosing, but of God alone; but that we are good is both of God, and of us. God, therefore, bestows what is His part as a bounty; but we, as to that which is in our power, namely, to preserve the good that has been given to us, either do this or we neglect it. That which belongs to God, whether we wish it or not, He bestows out of His own goodness, so that the good, or at least some part of it, may be in us. ^C

71. Moreover, God always bestows good things even upon the devil, but he refuses to receive them. And in the age to come, God bestows good things upon all—for He is the fountain of good things, pouring forth goodness—but each person partakes of the good according to how he has made himself capable [of receiving it]. Here, indeed, having a desire for other things, and obtaining them, we find pleasure even if only in some small measure; but there, when "God shall be all in all," there being no food, nor drink, nor any carnal pleasure, nor any iniquity, those who do not possess even their accustomed pleasures, nor are they capable of those things which proceed from God, will suffer incurable pain—not because God has created punishment, but because we have readied punishment for ourselves. For neither did God make death, but we drew it upon ourselves. For by nature everything composite is dissolved; yet, in so far as Adam was united to God through contemplation, he had life in himself, quickening his mortal nature above nature. But when he departed from the union with Life, that is, with God, he fell from the incorruptibility which was above nature into the dissolution of the composite which is according to nature, which is death. ^D

72. Since some say that God, having foreseen those who would sin and would not repent, and who would be judged, should not have brought them from non-existence into existence—for it is not good to create and then to punish—we answer them, first with the saying of the Apostle: "O man, who art thou that repliest against God? For who hath resisted His will?" For what He wills, that is good.

^A And "the potter hath power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour." For He it is who makes both the just and the unjust, ^B whether honourable or dishonourable. For the same Apostle, in his Epistle to Timothy, having first enumerated the vices, adds: "If a man therefore purge himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honour, meet for the master's use." For since we were created with free will, it is in our power to cleanse ourselves from the foulest affections, or to defile ourselves with them. Nevertheless, God created all men good. For He grants to all both being and well-being, spreading the rays of His goodness upon all His works like the sun. And while it is not in our power to receive being, it is in our power to receive well-being; if, therefore, we will and desire it, we become partakers of His goodness and shall be in the light forever. But if we are slothful and blind ourselves, and do not desire Him, we shall be destitute of Him. It was not fitting, therefore, that because of our sloth the gifts of His goodness should become unbestowed, the first of which is our very existence; nor was it fitting that our wickedness should overcome His goodness and render it inactive. For if that were the case, nothing of what exists would have come into being; for none of the things that exist is worthy of His goodness. For justly, if we compare all things to Him, they are unworthy of being; and yet, by right they exist, so that they might partake of His bounty.

73. Yet God is not only good, but also just; and He beholds all things not yet come to pass as if they were. "For He calleth," says the Apostle, "those things which be not as though they were." But if He ought not, out of goodness, to have created those who were to be punished, then out of surpassing goodness He ought the more to have created them, and not to punish them, but to forgive them their sins (for both are in His power: to bring them forth and to forgive). And if it is just that those who sin should be punished, it was also just that they should be created. For God perceives those things which are not as though they were, and judges not from the outcome of events, but from the foreknowledge of what will be. For He does not know things from the outcome of what occurs, but He foreknows those things which are to be, and predetermines them according to His foreknowledge. For how could He foreknow what will not be? If He had foreknown that someone would sin and did not create him, it would not have been foreknowledge, but error. For just as there is knowledge of things that are, so there is foreknowledge of all things that will certainly be.

74. Let us not, therefore, judge God. For His counsel is not known to us: "For who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been His counsellor?" For He has not revealed all His counsel to us, but only that which it was profitable for us to know.

What was not for us to know, He has concealed. Let us not, therefore, bring God to judgment; for He Himself is the Judge, and He is the source of all good things; and there is no good that does not proceed from His will, just as there is no light that does not derive from the sun. ^B

75. And naturally so; for God, being good and compassionate by nature, neither wills sin, nor the death of the sinner, nor does He delight in the destruction of the living, nor is He subject to the passion of anger, in such a way that He inflicts punishment; rather, He pours forth good things upon all. He who desires receives; for he who is already good attains to greater goods. And in this life there is a certain management, and government, and hidden providence, calling those who sin to conversion and repentance. But after death, there is no longer room for change, no longer room for repentance—not because God would not accept repentance (for He cannot deny Himself, nor does He cast away His compassion), but because the condition of the soul is such that it cannot be converted. Hence, if anyone performs all the works of justice, then, changing his mind, commits sin and departs from this life desiring sin, he shall die in his sin. In the same way, if a sinner repents and dies in his repentance, his sins shall not be remembered. For just as the demons, after their fall, do not repent, and the angels do not now commit sin, but both have attained to [a state of] immutability, so also do men after death possess immutability. And the righteous, desiring God and possessing Him always, are gladdened; but the sinners, desiring sin and not having the material of sin, as if consumed by fire and the worm, are punished, having no consolation. For what is punishment, if not the deprivation of what one desires? Therefore, according to the proportion of desire, those who desire God are gladdened, and those who desire sin are punished; for those who attain what they have desired are ^C gladdened according to the measure of their desire, and those who fail are tormented according to the measure of their desire.

76. And you, answer me: what is meant by the word "Omnipotent"? Is it not He who holds all things under His command? For the Apostle says: "But He that built all things is God." And how is God omnipotent, if He has no power over matter and evil? Or how is He the Creator, if He did not create matter? Or how is He God, if He is incomplete and possesses deficient power? For why did He not abolish and subdue matter, but allowed it to be in rebellion, and for a moment of time to make an insurrection? For if it is because He did not desire to do so, He is certainly not good. For it does not befit one who is good and just to remain idle while others sin. But if it is because He could not, then God is weak, and therefore not God. For you cannot say, as we have said regarding the existence of the devil, that his very existence is good. For we, in attributing his existence to the Good [God], [would argue] that his very existence...

is good. But you, while you argue that matter has its existence from the Good, declare it to be by nature evil and entirely devoid of the Good, so that you cannot say that its being is good. Therefore, by your own logic, God is neither good nor powerful, since He did not destroy it from the beginning. ^A

Furthermore, if all things have their origin from the substance of the Good and the substance of the Evil, then they are not creators of things, neither the good nor the evil, but fathers of those things.

And again: if evil is opposed to the Good as being is to being, origin to origin, and substance to substance, and—to use your style of speaking—if there is a God opposed to God, it would then be in our power to do good or evil, and in our power to give the palm of victory either to the Good or to the evil, and we would be the cause of which one overcomes the other. ^B

77. Therefore, we confess one God, good and just, the maker of all things, ruling over all, omnipotent, having power equal to His will, and that by Him all things, both visible and invisible, were created, not out of His own substance, but produced out of nothing into the nature of things. "For the Lord has done all things whatsoever He has willed" (Ps. CXXXIV, 6), and we affirm that what He wills is good. For it is not for the works to judge their maker; indeed, the reasons for His Providence are not even known to us. "For who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been His counselor?" (Isa. XL, 13; Rom. XI, 34). If His counsel and will could be known, He would neither be God nor worthy of admiration. ^C For just as His essence is incomprehensible, so too are His will and providence. For if no one knows the things of men except for the spirit of each person that is in him (1 Cor. II, 11); indeed, no one even knows all of his own affairs (for he does not have certainty about what will happen to him; and he is often ignorant of what he wants now or what he will want tomorrow): how, then, could one have a clear understanding of the will of God and His counsel? Why, he does not even remember the things he has himself decided.

78. Wherefore, God provides for all things according to His foreknowledge. And although His governance may seem perverse to us who do not know the future, the past, or even all present things, it is nevertheless ^D smooth, equal, good, and just in very truth. For He foreknows those things which are in our own power just as if they already existed; He judges justly those things that are to come according to what He Himself wills and decides. Nor does God see as man sees. "For man looks on the countenance, but God looks upon the heart" (1 Reg. XVI, 7; Ps. VII, 10). And we often deem that which is judged by all to be just, to be unjust; either because our mind is occupied by vice, or because the same thing is not satisfying to all, but one thing to one and another to another. But God judges not out of regret or discovery, but out of foreknowledge.

^A For God, having foreknown all things before their creation, ordained for each justly, and provided for, and beneficially, the things which are not in our power in accordance with those which are in our power. For knowledge is one thing, and foreknowledge is another, and acknowledgment is another, and decree is another, and fore-ordination is another. For knowledge is the knowing of things that are or that are happening. Foreknowledge is the knowing of things that are to be, before their creation. Acknowledgment is the true knowledge that comes after a false one. A decree is a judgment and decision concerning things that have already happened; while fore-ordination is a judgment and decision concerning things that are to be.

79. God, then, foreknowing the things that are to be done by us voluntarily, that is to say the things in our power—I mean virtue and vice—fore-ordains the things not in our power. And the foreknowledge of the powerful God does not have its cause from us; but that we are about to do what we do, has its cause from us. For if we were not about to do it, He would not even foreknow it, as something that was not going to be. And the foreknowledge of God is true and inviolable; but it is not itself the cause of the future event happening in its entirety; rather, because we are about to do this or that, He foreknows it. ^B He foreknows many things which are not pleasing to Him, and He is not Himself the cause of them. Just as a physician is not the cause of a disease if he foreknows that someone is about to fall ill, but the falling ill comes from another cause—the one that produces the disease—while the physician's foreknowledge comes from his art; so too, that which happens by us does not have its cause from God, but from our own self-determined will. And the self-determined will is not evil if we use it for what it was given to us, and in the way it was given to us. That God foreknows, belongs to His foreknowing power. But neither do our punishments have God as their cause. For the judge is not the cause of the punishment of the wicked, even if he decides it intentionally; but the one who erred is the cause of his own punishment, while the judge is the cause of justice: and justice is a good thing. ^C For if he judges willingly, he does so not by an antecedent will, but by a consequent one. An antecedent will is what someone wills of his own accord; a consequent will is what arises from the cause of the things that occur. For God wills antecedently, of Himself, all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. But when we have sinned, He wills for us to be chastised for our benefit; and the antecedent will of God is of His goodness, but the consequent one is of His justice.

80. That God fore-ordained all things according to His foreknowledge, we shall understand thus: immutable ^D is

^A His divine nature, and it does not judge out of later recognition, but out of foreknowledge. If, therefore, He judges and defines day by day, He knows what happens day by day, and, as some say, He even repents—though they know not what they say—and adds years to life. For if He repents and adds, He has a changeable will and knowledge; and this is unworthy of God. But if you say that those things were added to Hezekiah, according to Scripture, He did not add them out of ignorance or because He had not foreordained them; rather, He Himself foreknew and foreordained the things concerning Hezekiah. But in His providence He adopted a fitting mode of action, dispensing our salvation to show how much repentance can achieve. He is said ^B to “repent” according to modes of speech derived from us. For Scripture speaks of God in a more human way, suited to the infancy of the hearers. Just as it is said, "Why do You sleep, O Lord?"—yet God does not truly sleep, but His forbearance and long-suffering, and the postponement of His help, he calls "sleep" (for with us those who are held by sleep do not help)—so in the same way he used the term "repentance." For we, when we have given someone wealth and he uses it badly, we are said to repent. In this way, when God had created man, and anointed Saul as king, and they had sinned, He is said to repent; not that God has truly repented (for He knew beforehand what would come to pass), but because they had committed acts worthy of repentance. Let us therefore strive ^C to do good and to become good, that we may be among the number of those whom He foreknew to be good and foreordained to eternal life.

81. It must be known, moreover, that the most excellent order is that which preserves to each what is its own by nature. And this is virtue. Conversely, evil is the dissolution of order, or perturbation. Moreover, "good" is said in two ways: either that which is truly good, such as the order of which we have spoken, or that which has only the appearance of good, such as pleasure, by which the senses are titillated contrary to that aforementioned order; which indeed is not good, but rather evil. And evil also is spoken of twofoldly: either that which is truly evil, that is to say, what happens contrary to the natural order and contrary to the law of the Creator, out of one’s own will. For the natural order is obedience to the Creator; but disorder is disobedience. Or [it is called evil] as that which ^D seems evil, that which is painful and distressing to us according to sensation, such as discipline, which is rather good and beneficial, for it leads us back to the natural order. And voluntary evils are called the things that are truly evil, such as the species of sin; but involuntary are those things which bring distress.

82. Therefore, God is not the cause of these or of those, as we have shown. For even if those things deemed evil—on account of their painfulness and our resistance—are [what they are], God is not the cause of them.

^A For because we are prone to pleasure, God, by a just decree, brings upon us that which causes us to miss the mark—that is, failing to reach the necessary goal—in order to school us for our own benefit; but the so-called involuntary evils depend upon the voluntary ones. For involuntary evils follow from voluntary evils. Indeed, punishments and schoolings, for the most part, are calamities that occur for the sake of correction, and the torment of the age to come is the complete eradication of vice and sin. Or, to express the contrary: for those who crave carnal pleasures against the law of nature, and the sins admitted for their sake, everlasting torment will be the inability to employ them; for torment is the missing of the thing desired. For pleasure [is] until sin, against the law of nature. This is twofold: either psychic or bodily. Psychic, indeed, is the craving for glory; bodily, however, are eating, drinking, bodily relaxation, sleep, and the commingling with women. ^B All these are natural and good, provided they occur according to the natural order and the law of the Creator; but they are evil [when done] against the law of the Creator, the natural order, and the proper use.

83. Natural order is to crave the glory that is from God; but to crave glory from one another is against nature. For to God alone, who is by nature to be glorified, belongs the glory from all His creatures; but for us, it is fitting to be humbled before God as Creator, and before one another, on account of the law of the Creator. For this is the proof of the love toward God and toward one's neighbor. ^C "For you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and your neighbor as yourself" (Matt. XXII, 37). And, "Everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and he who humbles himself will be exalted" (Luke XIV, 11). Thus, loving the glory that comes from one another establishes infidelity. "For how can you believe," He says, "you who receive glory from one another, and do not seek the glory that is from God alone" (John V, 44)?

84. Again, bodily pleasure, eating, and the rest, if taken according to the natural use and the law of the Creator, are good; but if done against the law of God, according to our own judgment and misuse, they are evil—as, for example, eating and drinking, insofar as they are for living and the sustenance of the body, are good; ^D similarly, also, sleep and the use of a woman, for everyone to know his own vessel, is good. But to use eating, drinking, and women indiscriminately for irrational pleasures, like brute beasts, is evil.

85. Therefore, because of vain glory, and because of immeasurable eating, and drinking, and acts of fornication, avarice—which is the support of these—follows, as well as envy, strife, wickedness, lying, slander, rapine, murders, and hatred toward one's neighbor. For because of

the multiplying of iniquity, the love of many grows cold. ^A He said "many," meaning those who are accustomed to iniquity. From natural things, therefore, come the unnatural things, with the devil prompting them.

86. Furthermore, for all these things, two ways are most essential for our assistance: to do violence to ourselves and to pray. For toil and prayer are signs of love toward God. And prayer is a sign of humility. For by acknowledging our own weakness, we call upon the power of God. One must also know that he who refrains from judging others is delivered from sin. For not judging is a sign of humility; nothing so much calls down God's help as humility. ^B "See," he says, "my humility and the labor of my struggle, and forgive all my sins." And: "See my humility and deliver me," that is, from the enemy who wars against me, and from my sin and my foolishness. Associating with virtuous persons also contributes to virtue—for man is a mimetic animal—as does turning the senses away from those whose conduct stimulates us toward vice. For as much as it is away from the eyes, so much is it away from the heart. For from these the memory of sensible things is etched upon the soul. It is our duty, therefore, to withdraw the mind from the recollection of sensible things, so that with light wings it may fly up to the intelligible sun and be illumined by its inaccessible and indescribable beauty. ^C For the mind is thickened by the memory of sensible things, and is dragged down to them, and is kept away from the contemplation and enjoyment of the intelligible beauty. "For no man can serve two masters." By practice, endurance, and effort, men attain the perfection of any art.

87. Therefore, through the effort that proceeds from love, and through the prayer that humility excites, and through the fleeing of sensible things and those who live more negligently—judging no one, but rather through humility, the habit of good things, and obedience—let us work out our salvation, without any concealment of thoughts or affections. ^D For that evil which is hidden—the Light, however, is whatever comes out into the open. For a serpent does not bring forth its young in the sun, but in caverns; nor does seed grow lying above the earth, but hidden beneath the earth. Thus evil thoughts, when they are not at all brought into the open, produce fruit unto corruption; but good ones unto eternal life, which may it be granted to all of us to enjoy, by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom with the Father and the Holy Spirit be honor and glory, now and ever, and unto the ages of ages. Amen.

which falls, or is sown by another, sprouts again, not being fashioned by anyone, but obeying the commandment of God. Behold, I too, as I said before, being possessed of free will, wherever I sow, whether in my own wife or in another man’s, using my own free will, it germinates and conforms to the first commandment of God. It is not that God fashions and works anew every single day; since in the first week God made heaven and earth and the whole world in six days, and on the seventh day He rested from all His works which He had begun to do, according to what my Scripture bears witness. ^B SARACEN: And how is it that God says to Jeremiah, “Before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee; and out of the womb I sanctified thee”? ^C It follows, then, that He fashioned him in the womb. CHRISTIAN: Adam, possessing the animate and seminal power in the belly, begat Seth, as I said; Seth and Enos and every man preceding his son in his own belly, and the son in turn begat, down to the present day. But that expression, “out of the womb I sanctified thee,” understand it of her who truly has brought forth children of God according to the testimony of the holy Gospel. SARACEN: Those who do the will of God, do you call them good or bad? CHRISTIAN: Do you wish to say that Christ suffered against His will? And if I say to you "good," you will say to me, “Go, accept also the Jews, as having done the will of your God.” SARACEN: And this is what I wished to say to you. CHRISTIAN: What do you say "will" is? I say it is the forbearance and long-suffering of God. When He says, “Thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not murder,” does He will that we should steal, or commit adultery, or murder? SARACEN: No; for if He willed it, He would not have said this. CHRISTIAN: Glory to God, that you have confessed this. Behold, you have agreed with me that God does not will that we should steal, or commit adultery, or murder. And if, rising now, I steal, or commit adultery, or murder, what do you call that? The will of God, or forbearance, or long-suffering? ^D SARACEN: Which is greater among you, he who sanctifies, or he who is sanctified?

^A And the Word, is He said to be uncreated or created? And who created the Word of God and the Spirit? ... Therefore, before God created the Word and the Spirit, was He without Word and Spirit? Are the oracles of the Lord created or uncreated? For they put these things forward... wanting to demonstrate that the Word of God is created, which is not the case. For if you say, "They are created," he will say to you... but if you say, "They are uncreated," he will say to you: "Behold, all the oracles of God exist, but they are created and are not gods." And behold, you acknowledge that Christ, who is the Word of God, is not God. Therefore, say neither that they are created nor uncreated; but say to him: "I acknowledge one only Word of God as being uncreated; but as to the whole of my Scripture, I do not call it oracles, but utterances of God." And the Saracen: "And how does David say, 'The oracles of the Lord are pure oracles'?" ... The prophet spoke tropologically, and not cyriologically ^B. And what is tropology and cyriology? Cyriology is a firm demonstration of a matter; but tropology is a weak demonstration... It is the custom among the prophets, as in the passage: "The sea beheld and fled." Behold, the sea has no eyes. For it is not an animate being... What is it to you, O sea, that you fled? And the rest. [And again, a demonstration of the hypothesis; for God said to Cain: "Cursed are you from the earth, which opened its mouth to receive your brother's blood from your hand."] And, "My sword shall eat flesh." For a sword indeed cuts, but does not swallow. Thus also He called utterances 'oracles,' which are not oracles, but ^C utterances.

3. If the Saracen says to you: How does God descend into the womb of a woman? Say to him thus: Let us use your Scripture and mine. And your Scripture says that God purified Mary his [chosen one] above all female flesh, and the Spirit and the Word of God descended into her. And my Gospel says: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon you, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow you." Behold one voice for both books, and one understanding. Know also this, that the Scripture speaks of the descent and ascension tropologically, not cyriologically, according to our relative property. For properly, the one descending and ascending is Himself said [cyriologically] according to the philosophers to be God, who contains all things and is contained by none. For one of the prophets said: "Who has measured the water with his hand, and the heaven with a span, and the earth with his fist?" And ^D

how, therefore, does it come about that He who contains all things in his own hand descends and ascends?

4. If you are interrogated by a Saracen, saying: "If Christ was God, how did He eat and drink and sleep, and was He crucified and did He die, and what follows?" say to him: "Because before the ages the Word of God, who created all things—according to what my Scripture and your Scripture testify—created Him from the flesh of the holy Virgin, a man perfect and ensouled and intelligent: He ate, drank, and slept; that is to say, the Word [acted] according to the Word of God. But the Word of God did not eat, nor did He drink, nor did He sleep, nor was He crucified, nor did He die; but the flesh which He assumed from the holy Virgin, that was crucified. Know, moreover, that Christ has two natures, but is one in hypostasis. For the Word of God is not said to be eternal and post-incarnational anhypostatic [ἀνυπόστατον], that is, non-personal or non-natural. For a fourth person is not added to the Trinity after the ineffable union of the flesh."

^A 5. And if the Saracen interrogates you: "Whom do you call God, is he dead?" answer: "He is not dead; trust in the Scripture [and] demonstration." For Scripture says concerning this. For natural death comes to dominate the memory of men, that is, subjecting all things to us. But the first man fell asleep, and a rib was taken away.

^B 6. And the Saracen: "Behold, I am struck in a certain place of my flesh, and the struck flesh has produced a bruise, and in the bruise a worm has come to be; who, therefore, fashioned it?" We said that after the first week of the creation of the world, we do not find that He fashioned anything at all. But after the transgression, the earth was condemned to bring forth thorns and thistles. Then, therefore, our flesh, also having been condemned, [down to the present] brings forth lice and worms.

7. SARACEN. Whom do you call the cause of good and evil? CHRISTIAN. Of all good things [we say God is the cause], but of evil, no. SARAC. And whom do you say is the cause of evil? CHRIST. This is from our own sloth and the craftiness of the devil. SARAC. By what means? CHRIST. Because of free will. SARAC. What then? You have free will, and you can ^C do whatever you wish? CHRIST. I was fashioned by God as having free will. SARAC. [Why?] CHRIST. Doing good things, I do not fear the law, but rather I am honored and shown mercy by God. Likewise, the devil also, he sinned, and God drove him from his own rank.

But perhaps you will object to me, [saying thus,] What things are good and what are evil?

SARAC. Behold, the sun and the moon and the stars are good: make one thing out of these.

CHRIST. [Not because of this] do I say to you: that according to man I act in both good and evil; good things, indeed, the glorification of God, and prayer, and almsgiving, and such like; evil things, however, fornication and theft. But if you say that good things and evil things arise from the commandment of God, you will find God to be unjust, which He is not. For since God commanded the fornicator not to fornicate, and the murderer not to murder, and the thief not to steal, they are worthy of honor: for they did the will of God. But you will find the lawgivers to be liars, and your books to be deceitful: for they command to scourge the fornicator and the thief, and to put the murderer to death, having done the will of God. ^B

SARAC. Who, he says, shapes the infants in the wombs of their mothers? [They desire to show God to be the cause of evil.]

Behold, God is a fellow-worker to the fornicator and the adulterer. . . . We do not find, after the first week of [the creation of the world], that the Scripture says God shapes or creates anything. ^C [But if you are in doubt about this, show a creature or creation of any kind made by God after the first week.] Everything that is a visible creature was made in the first week. For God made man in the first week, and commanded him to beget and be generated, saying: "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth." And the man being animate, having animate seed, sprouted it in his own wife. Wherefore man begets man, even as divine Scripture says: "Adam begat Seth, and Seth begat Enos, and Enos begat Cainan, and Cainan begat Malaleel," and those that follow. And it does not say, God shaped Seth, or Enos, or anyone. And from this we know that they are begotten and beget even until now; and thus the world is ordered by the grace of God: for it is not true that every herb generates and is generated: for God said: "Let the earth bring forth herb"; and by the commandment of God [it brought forth] each tree, likewise also herb and plant, from itself it has seed and power. The seed of every plant and herb, being animate, falling into the earth, ^D

^A either of itself or sown by another, sprouts again, not being fashioned by anyone, but obeying the command of God. Behold, even I, as I said before, being possessed of free will, wherever I sow—whether into my own wife or into another's—using my own free will, it germinates and conforms to the first command of God, not because God is still fashioning and working day by day. For in the first week God made heaven and earth and the whole world in six days, and on the seventh day He rested from all His works which He had begun to do, according to what my Scripture testifies.

SARAC. And how does God say to Jeremiah: “Before I fashioned you in the womb, I knew you, and from the mother’s womb I sanctified you”? ^B [Certainly, therefore, He fashioned him in the womb.]

CHRIST. Adam, having an animate and seminal power in his loins, begot Seth, as I said; and Seth begot Enos, and every man having had his son beforehand in his loins, and the son likewise begat [even until the present time]. But as for “from the womb I sanctified you,” [understand it as referring to her who truly brought forth the sons of God according to the testimony of the holy Gospel.]

SARAC. Those who do the will of God, do you call them good or bad?

CHRIST. Do you wish to say that Christ suffered against His will? And if I say they are good, you will say to me: “Begone, go and worship the gods, since they did the will of your God.” ^C

[SARAC. This is just what I wanted to say to you.]

CHRIST. What do you say "will" is? I say it is forbearance and long-suffering. Since God said, "You shall not steal, you shall not commit adultery, you shall not murder," does He will that we should steal, or commit adultery, or murder?

SARAC. No. For if He willed it, [He would not have said this.]

[CHRIST. Glory to God, that you have confessed.] Behold, you have agreed with me that [there is no one among us who can arise or live,] and that God does not will that we should steal, or commit adultery, or murder. And if now, rising up, I steal, or commit adultery, or murder, what do you call that? The will of God, or... forbearance or long-suffering?

^D 8. SARAC. What is greater in your view: he who sanctifies, or he who is sanctified?

CHRIST. I know what you wish to say.

SARAC. If you know, answer me.

CHRIST. If I tell you who it is that sanctifies; you will say

to me: "Go, worship John the Baptist who baptizes and sanctifies your Christ." SARAC. I wished indeed to say that to you. ^A CHRIST. When you go with your servant into the bath, and you are washed and cleansed by him, whom do you say is the greater? That wretched servant, bought with money, or you, who are cleansed by him, and yet are his master? SARAC. I call myself the greater, I who possess, rather than he who is possessed by me. CHRIST. I give thanks to God. In this way understand John for me as a servant and attendant ministering to Christ in the holy baptism in the Jordan, in which my Savior being baptized, crushed the heads of the dragons and pernicious demons that lie in the caverns there. ^B Saracenus, being very amazed and at a loss, withdrew and added nothing further to him.

From the Discussions of the Same (Theodore Abucara, so-called Bishop of Carrae) with the Saracens, through the voice of John of Damascus

SARACENUS. Tell me, bishop, was the world devoted to the worship of idols before Moses preached Judaism? THEODORUS. Entirely. SARAC. When Moses was teaching Judaism, which part of the world seems to you to have been devoted to the true religion: that which embraced Judaism, or that which persisted in idolatry, rejecting Moses? THEOD. That which embraced Judaism. SARAC. Afterwards, when Christ came, preaching Christianity, which part appears to you to have practiced the true religion: that which embraced Christianity, or that which remained most firmly in Judaism? ^C THEOD. That which embraced Christianity. SARAC. Then, in the following time, when Muchameth came, announcing the Magarism [Eslamism], which part seems to you to practice religion rightly: that which accepted Eslamism, or that which remained in Christianity, not wishing to listen to Muchameth? THEOD. That which remained in Christianity. SARAC. You have brought a final conclusion that is in no way consistent with the premises. THEOD. Was it necessary for me, then, to deduce a conclusion from false premises? For it is not the case, as you supposed, that Christ and Moses were worthy of faith because they preached and taught—so that we should believe Muchameth because he preached and taught—but listen as to why each one was held to be worthy of faith. When Moses was being sent by God, he answered Him: "Behold, I go, and they will say to me: 'The Lord has not appeared to you, nor has God sent you. What shall I do?'" To whom God said: "What is that which you have in your hand?" And he answered: "A rod." Then God said to him: "Throw it down." And when it was thrown down, it was turned into a serpent. But again, when he took hold of it with his hand, it became a rod. Then God said to him: "Put

your hand into your bosom. And when it was put in, it was drawn out leprous; and again being put in, it was drawn out healthy. And God says to him, "If they will not believe the first sign, neither will they believe the second, make the water blood." And so Moses, having been sent, did this, and his words were confirmed by his works. Is it not so? SARAC. Entirely so. THEOD. Christ came confirming to Himself the mission from God; being testified to not by the prophecy of Moses alone, but also by signs, prodigies, and diverse powers, He confirmed Himself after that. SARAC. By what things, then? THEOD. By a seedless conception, and a mother without a man, and birth from a virgin, and the mutation of water into wine. Furthermore, after these, not obscure, but very manifest, was the giving of sight to the blind, the cleansing of lepers, the strengthening of the paralyzed, the healing of diverse diseases, the manifestation of His divinity on the mount, the expulsion of demons, the filling of the many thousands from a few loaves and fishes, the raising of the dead as if from sleep, and, in a word, the restoration of the failures of nature. What do you say to these, Saracen? Did Christ confirm Himself by demonstrations not inferior to the Mosaic signs? SARAC. By no means. THEOD. This one, who was foreshown by Moses, and who confirmed Himself by so many and such signs to have come from God, gives a charge to His own disciples, saying, "The law and the prophets were until John the Baptist. He who has ears to hear, let him hear." Where, then, is your prophet? It is not obscure.

WARNING ON THE FOLLOWING OPUSCULE

^A Of this fragment of the opuscule on dragons and ghosts, or, as I conjecture, of a more extensive work, the Reverend Father Bernard de Montfaucon of the recently established Monastery of Saint-Taurin in Évreux, very humanely granted me a reproduction from a manuscript. Indeed, they attribute it to John of Damascus in both the 15th codex of the library of Cl. Jean Selden, and in another codex of the Roman Library of Saint Mary in Vallicella, nor does anything move us to take it away from the Damascene himself. From chapter 23 of the *History of the Arabs*, which Abraham Ecchellensis wrote and edited, it appears that the stories about nightmare-dragons were familiar to the Arabs. Otherwise, this work seems to have been unknown to that man of almost infinite erudition, Leo Allatius, who, even though he attacked the superstitious opinions of the Greeks concerning these things in a special work, never cited this book.

JOHN OF DAMASCUS ON DRAGONS

^A Since some invent stories that dragons turn into human forms, and that they sometimes become small serpents, then again become very large and monstrous in bulk and size of body, and finally, as has been said, become men, associating with humans, walking about, carrying off women, and lying with them, we ask those who relate these things: How many rational natures did God create? And if they do not know, we shall tell them: two, I mean angels and men. The devil, moreover, was one of the angelic powers, and having voluntarily fallen from the light, he walks in darkness. God created these two rational natures. But if the dragon, having assumed another form, associates with men and defiles women, and is now a serpent and now a man, as if it were one of the many, it is manifest that it is rational and much more honorable than man, which is something that clearly never was nor will be. ^B Let them tell us also, who has seen it? For we have faith in the doctrine of Moses, or rather of the Holy Spirit who spoke through him. He says thus: "And God brought every animal to Adam, to see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called them, that is the name thereof." Therefore, the dragon was one of the animals. And I do not say to you that a dragon does not exist; for there are indeed dragons, but they are serpents, generated from other dragons. For when they are newly hatched and young, they are small, but after they have been fed and have grown old, they become large and thick, surpassing the rest of the snakes in bulk and size. They say that they grow beyond thirty cubits, and that their thickness equals a large beam. ^C And Dion the Roman, who wrote about the Roman empire and republic, and who recounted the most celebrated Carthaginian war, relates that at the time when the Roman consul Regulus was fighting against the Carthaginians, a dragon suddenly crawled out and lay down beyond the rampart of the Roman army. When, by his order, they killed it and flayed it, he sent the skin to the Roman senate; it was a great wonder, and when the senate had measured it, as Dion himself said, it was found to be one hundred and twenty feet in length, matching the ^D

^A length and the thickness. There is also another genus of dragons, having a wide head, with eyes shining like gold; to some there are horns upon the neck, and to others a beard hanging from the throat; their lineage they call "good demons" (agathodemones), and they say these are free from venom. But the dragon is a genus of living creature, no less than other beasts. It has a beard just like a goat, and upon its neck a horn. Its eyes are large and look like gold. They become both large and small. All lineages of serpents are venomous; the dragon alone has no venom.

They also tell this fable, that the dragon is pursued by thunder, and is lifted up into the air and killed. When I heard these things, I laughed. How is it that they sometimes make it anthropomorphic and rational, sometimes a serpent, and sometimes an adversary of God ^B pursued by God? Truly, ignorance is a dangerous thing. For we suffer the greatest harm when we neglect to read the holy books and to search them, according to the word of the Lord. For the soldier says, "I am a soldier, and I have no need of reading"; the farmer pleads the cultivation of his fields, and others utter the same, and we are all deficient. But thunder does not pursue the dragon; rather, thunders are produced from a cloud when the cloud, having been moistened by humidity and driven by the spirit, that is, the wind, is constricted. For when the spirit has come within, and has ruptured it, a sound is produced. And the cry from above is called thunder; but that which, being forced by the spirit, is carried down to the earth, is called ^C lightning. Whence, striking either a house or a tree, it breaks and rends these; but if a man or any other animal, it causes death; for we often see both men and other animals killed by lightning, but not dragons.

Now as to lightnings, some show the appearance of lines, others of spirals, and others are reddish. They say that lightning and thunder occur at the same time; for as soon as the cloud breaks, straightway lightning with thunder appears; and the lightning, though previously invisible, instantly appears; but the thunder, until it arrives from its height, is delayed. And for this reason, the thunder is heard later than the lightning. Let me tell you an example of this. Observe, therefore, when someone stands afar off on an elevated place and gives a signal; you see his hand striking the wood, but after some interval of time, the sound of the striking reaches your ear. ^D Think of the same thing with regard to the cloud. For when it is filled with spirit inside, it is ruptured by the force of the moisture, producing the sound. And suppose it should also happen to collide with another cloud; a great sound is made.

CONCERNING STRYGES

^A I do not want you to be ignorant of this either. Some of the more unlearned and foolish people tell stories that Stryges (also known as Geludes) are women. They claim that these appear at night moving through the air and, as they go around a house, are not at all hindered by doors or locks; rather, even when the doors are securely fastened, they enter inside and strangle infants. Others say that they devour the liver and the entire life-force of the infants, and even determine the limits of their lives. Some assert that they have seen this themselves, while others have heard how they enter houses while the doors are locked, whether with their body or at least with a naked soul.

But I say this: only our Lord Jesus Christ, the God, accomplished such a thing when, after his resurrection from the dead, he entered to his holy apostles while the doors were shut. If a sorceress woman has done and continues to do this, then the Lord did nothing worthy of admiration by entering through locked doors. If they should say that the soul enters alone while the body lies on the bed, listen to what I have to say: our Lord Jesus Christ said, "I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it up again of myself" (John x, 18). And he did this once at the time of his holy passion. For if a sorceress and obscene woman can do the same whenever she pleases, then the Lord did nothing beyond that. Moreover, if the liver of the infant has been devoured, how can it possibly live? All these things are idle tales told by certain heretics who hold opinions contrary to the holy Catholic Church, wishing to lead the simpler-minded astray from the straight path of the right faith.

NOTES

Leo Allatius requires correction in his book *On the Opinions of Certain Greeks*, n. 5, where for [strigam] he wrote "Striglam." Furthermore, the *Stryx* was for the Latins the same thing as the *Empousa* was for the ancient Greeks, and the *Fée* is for our own French. Among more recent Greeks, what is called *Gello*, *Gellous*, or *Gylous*—a name which Michael Psellus, in the passage cited by Allatius, wrongly conjectured to be Hebrew. They call her by this name, not *Gello* or *Gellum*, deriving the word from Isaiah ch. xxxiv, v. 14.

(2) The author calls the "life-force" the moisture. "And all," he says, "that is in the infants," as it were draining the moisture that is in them. The Jews tell similar tales about their Lilith, whom they gossip about as lying in wait for infants newly born before they have been circumcised.

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE THINGS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME

ST. JOHN DAMASCENE. Notice. General Preface by Michael Lequien. Selected Prefaces and Dedicatory Epistles from previous editions. Prolegomena of Leo Allatius. Damascene Dissertations. Dissertation I. — Concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit. Dissertation II. — Concerning certain authorities by which Eutyches and others, assertors of one nature in Christ, defended their heresy. Dissertation III. — Concerning the epistle to the monk Caesarius, which is marked with the name of St. John Chrysostom, and concerning certain other books which are first found cited by John Damascene. Dissertation IV. — Concerning various epistles, which, on account of their appended...

CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME

Trisagion hymn, including a conclusion written to Peter the Fuller, and an exposition of the faith which exists among the works of St. Justin Martyr. 331 Dissertation V. — On prayer, entitled: Concerning those who have fallen asleep in faith, and on Purgatory according to the sense of the Eastern Church. 350 Dissertation VI. — On unleavened bread, in which is also treated the final Passover of our Lord Jesus Christ. 367 Dissertation VII. — On the Christian Nazarenes and their faith, and also on the Ebionites. 415 Life of St. John of Damascus, written by John, Patriarch of Jerusalem. 430 Translator’s Prologue to the books of John of Damascus, containing eleven chapters. 489 Chapter I. — Pleasures of those who love the world. 489 Chapter II. — Concerning those who incite to the reading of Sacred Scripture. 491 Chapter III. — On the divinity of the Savior. 492 Chapter IV. — On the lamentation of the Blessed Virgin. 493 Chapter V. — On John of Damascus. 493 Chapter VI. — On the restoration of the thumb. 494 Chapter VII. — On the perfect conversion of John of Damascus. 495 Chapter VIII. — Method of the book published by John. 495 Chapter IX. — How he composed the entire book, concerning the logical matters and the hundred heresies and opinions. 496 Chapter X. — Subject matter of the book of sentences. 496 Chapter XI. — On other works of John. 498 Another account of the life of St. John of Damascus from the Speculum of Vincent of Beauvais. 498 Another from the Synaxarion of the Emperor Basil. 502 Testimonies of the ancients regarding John of Damascus and his writings. 503 Letters of various persons concerning the editing of the works of St. John of Damascus. 514

PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL WORKS

Preface to the Dialectics. 518 DIALECTICS. Prologue. 522 Chapter I. — On cognition. 530 Chapter II. — What is the end of this work. 531 Chapter III. — On philosophy. 534 Chapter IV. — On being, substance, and accident. 535 Chapter V. — On the word. 539 Chapter VI. — On division. 546 Chapter VII. — On that which is naturally prior. 551 Chapter VIII. — On definition. 551 Chapter IX. — On genus. 558 Chapter X. — On species. 559 Chapter XI. — On the individual. 574 Chapter XII. — On difference. 574 Chapter XIII. — On accident. 575 Chapter XIV. — On the proper. 575 Chapter XV. — On things which are predicated. 578 Chapter XVI. — On univocal and equivocal predication. 579 Chapter XVII. — On predications in respect to what a thing is, and what kind of thing it is. 582 Chapter XVIII. — In what ways the five simple terms agree with and differ from one another. 583 Chapter XIX. — In what ways genus and difference agree and differ. 585 Chapter XX. — In what ways genus and species agree and differ. 586 Chapter XXI. — In what ways genus and the proper agree and differ. 586 Chapter XXII. — In what ways genus and accident agree and differ. 586 Chapter XXIII. — In what ways difference and species agree and differ. 586 Chapter XXIV. — In what ways difference and the proper agree and differ. 587 Chapter XXV. — In what ways difference and accident agree and differ. 587 Chapter XXVI. — In what ways species and the proper agree and differ. 587 Chapter XXVII. — In what ways species and accident agree and differ. 587 Chapter XXVIII. — In what ways the proper and the inseparable accident both agree and differ. 590 Chapter XXIX. — On hypostasis, the enhypostate, and the anhypostate. 590 Chapter XXX. — On the word *ousia*, on nature and form, and on the individual, person, and hypostasis. 590 Chapter XXXI. — On equivocal terms. 595 Chapter XXXII. — On univocal terms. 599 Chapter XXXIII. — On polyonymous terms. 599 Chapter XXXIV. — On alter and heteronymous terms. 599 Chapter XXXV. — On denominative terms. 602 Chapter XXXVI. — On the ten most general categories. 602 Chapter XXXVII. — On homogeneous and homeoid terms, and on heterogeneous and heteroideous terms, and those differing by number. 602 Chapter XXXVIII. — On things in a place. 606 Chapter XXXIX. — On substance again. 606 Chapter XL. — On nature. 606 Chapter XLI. — On form. 607 Chapter XLII. — On hypostasis. 611 Chapter XLIII. — On person. 611 Chapter XLIV. — On the enhypostate. 615 Chapter XLV. — On the anhypostate. 618 Chapter XLVI. — Division of being. 618 Chapter XLVII. — Division of substance. 618 Chapter XLVIII. — Again on homogeneous and homeoid terms, and on heterogeneous and heteroideous terms; and also concerning the homohypostases and those differing by number. 622 Chapter XLIX. — On quantity and what relates to quantity. 623 Chapter L. — On things related to something, or on relation. 627 Chapter LI. — On quality and what relates to quality. 631 Chapter LII. — On acting and being acted upon. 639 Chapter LIII. — On position. 642 Chapter LIV. — On where. 642 Chapter LV. — On when. 642 Chapter LVI. — On habit. 642 Chapter LVII. — On opposites. 643 Chapter LVIII. — On habit and privation. 646 Chapter LIX. — On the prior and the posterior. 647 Chapter LX. — On the simultaneous. 650 Chapter LXI. — On motion. 650 Chapter LXII. — On having. 651 Chapter LXIII. — On enunciation, affirmation, and negation. 654 Chapter LXIV. — On the term, the proposition, and the syllogism. 654 Chapter LXV. — Various definitions. 658 Chapter LXVI. — Further on union according to hypostasis. 666 Chapter LXVII. — Six definitions of philosophy. 670 Chapter LXVIII. — On the four dialectical methods. 671 Solution of words. 674 Admonition concerning the book on heresies. 675 BOOK ON HERESIES. 678 Prologue to the books on the Orthodox Faith. 782 EXPOSITION OF THE ORTHODOX FAITH. 790 BOOK ONE. 790 Chapter I. — That God cannot be comprehended; and that those things which have not been handed down by the holy prophets, apostles, and evangelists must not be inquired into with excessive curiosity. 790 Chapter II. — Concerning those things which can or cannot be expressed in speech; also concerning those things which fall under cognition, and those which escape cognition. 791 Chapter III. — Proof that God exists. 794 Chapter IV. — What God is, and that He cannot be comprehended. 798 Chapter V. — Proof that God is one and not many. 799 Chapter VI. — Concerning the Word and the Son of God, a proof led by reason. 802 Chapter VII. — Concerning the Holy Spirit, a proof led by reason. 803 Chapter VIII. — On the Holy Trinity. 807 Chapter IX. — On those things which are said about God. 834 Chapter X. — On divine union and distinction. 838 Chapter XI. — On those things which are said about God in a bodily manner. 842 Chapter XII. — On the same matters. 843 Chapter XIII. — On the place of God and that God alone is uncircumscribed. 850 Chapter XIV. — Concerning the properties or attributes of the divine nature. 859 BOOK TWO. 862 Chapter I. — On time or the age. 862 Chapter II. — On the creation of things. 863 Chapter III. — On the angels. 866 Chapter IV. — On the devil and demons. 874 Chapter V. — On the visible creation. 879 Chapter VI. — On the heaven. 879 Chapter VII. — On light, fire, luminaries, the sun, the moon, and the stars. 886 Chapter VIII. — On air and winds. 899 Chapter IX. — On the waters. 903

ORDER OF THE MATTERS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME

Cap. X. — Of the earth and that which is produced from it. 907 Cap. XI. — Of paradise. 910 Cap. XII. — Of man. 918 Cap. XIII. — Of pleasure. 930 Cap. XIV. — Of sadness. 931 Cap. XV. — Of fear. 931 Cap. XVI. — Of anger. 931 Cap. XVII. — Of the imaginative faculty. 931 Cap. XVIII. — Of sense. 934 Cap. XIX. — Of thought. 938 Cap. XX. — Of memory. 938 Cap. XXI. — Of word, or internal and spoken speech. 939 Cap. XXII. — Of passion and action. 939 Cap. XXIII. — Of act. 950 Cap. XXIV. — Of the voluntary and the involuntary. 951 Cap. XXV. — Of that which is in our power, or of free will. 955 Cap. XXVI. — Of those things which take place. 958 Cap. XXVII. — For what cause we have been endowed with free will. 959 Cap. XXVIII. — Of those things which are not in our power. 962 Cap. XXIX. — Of providence. 963 Cap. XXX. — Of foreknowledge and predestination. 970

LIBER TERTIUS. 982 Caput primum. — Of divine dispensation and our care, and of our salvation. 982 Cap. II. — How the Word was conceived, and of his divine incarnation. 983 Cap. III. — Of the two natures, against the Monophysites. 987 Cap. IV. — Of the mode of mutual communication of properties. 998 Cap. V. — Of the number of natures. 999 Cap. VI. — That the whole divine nature is united in one of its persons to the whole human nature, and not part to part. 1007 Cap. VII. — Of the one composite person of the Word of God. 1007 Cap. VIII. — To those who ask: Are they reduced to continuous quantity, or to discrete quantity in relation to the Lord's nature? 1011 Cap. IX. — An answer to that which is asked, whether there is any nature that lacks subsistence. 1015 Cap. X. — Of the Trisagion hymn. 1018 Cap. XI. — Of the nature which is considered in species, and which in the individual, and of the difference between union and incarnation, and how that is to be understood: One incarnate nature of the Word of God. 1022 Cap. XII. — That the holy Virgin is the Theotokos, against the Nestorians. 1027 Cap. XIII. — Of the properties of both natures. 1054 Cap. XIV. — Of the double will and liberty of will of our Lord Jesus Christ. 1031 Cap. XV. — Of the operations which are in our Lord Jesus Christ. 1046 Cap. XVI. — Against those who say: If he is of double nature and action, it is necessary to say there are three natures and as many actions in Christ. 1063 Cap. XVII. — Of the fact that the nature and will of the Lord’s flesh were deified. 1067 Cap. XVIII. — Again of the double will, and liberty of will; likewise of the mind, and the double knowledge and wisdom. 1071 Cap. XIX. — Of the theandric, or God-manly, action. 1078

Cap. XX. — Of natural and innocent passions. 1083 Cap. XXI. — Of ignorance and servitude. 1085 Cap. XXII. — Of progress. 1086 Cap. XXIII. — Of fear. 1087 Cap. XXIV. — Of the Lord's prayer. 1090 Cap. XXV. — Of appropriation or vindication. 1094 Cap. XXVI. — Of the passion of the Lord's body, and the impassibility of his divinity. 1094 Cap. XXVII. — That the divinity of the Word remained inseparable from soul and body, even in the Lord's death; and that one person persisted in the meantime. 1098 Cap. XXVIII. — Of corruption and decay. 1098 Cap. XXIX. — Of the descent into hell. 1102

LIBER QUARTUS. 1102 Caput primum. — Of those things which followed the resurrection. 1102 Cap. II. — Of the session at the right hand of the Father. 1103 Cap. III. — Against those who object thus: If Christ is two natures, do you worship the creature, saying the created nature is to be worshipped, or do you say one nature is to be worshipped and the other not? 1106 Cap. IV. — Why the Son of God, and not the Father or the Holy Spirit, was made man, and what he accomplished being made man. 1106 Cap. V. — To those who ask: Is the person of Christ created or uncreated? 1110 Cap. VI. — When Christ is so called. 1111 Cap. VII. — To those who ask whether the holy Mother of God gave birth to two natures; and whether two natures hung on the cross. 1114 Cap. VIII. — How the firstborn is called the only-begotten Son of God. 1115 Cap. IX. — Of faith and baptism. 1118 Cap. X. — Of faith. 1126 Cap. XI. — Of the cross, where again of faith. 1127 Cap. XII. — Of adoration toward the east. 1134 Cap. XIII. — Of the most holy and immaculate mysteries of the Lord. 1135 Cap. XIV. — Of the lineage of the Lord, and of the holy Mother of God. 1154 Cap. XV. — What honor is to be held for the saints and their relics. 1163 Cap. XVI. — Of the images of the saints. 1167 Cap. XVII. — Of Scripture. 1173 Cap. XVIII. — Of those things which are said concerning Christ. 1182 Cap. XIX. — That God is not the author of evils. 1191 Cap. XX. — That there are not two principles. 1194 Cap. XXI. — Why God created those who were to sin and not do penance. 1198 Cap. XXII. — Of the law of God and the law of sin. 1198 Cap. XXIII. — Against the Jews, concerning the Sabbath. 1203 Cap. XXIV. — Of virginity. 1206 Cap. XXV. — Of circumcision. 1211 Cap. XXVI. — Of the Antichrist. 1215 Cap. XXVII. — Of the resurrection. 1219

THREE ORATIONS AGAINST THOSE WHO REJECT THE HOLY IMAGES

END OF THE NINETY-FOURTH VOLUME.

Paris. — From the press of L. Migne.