Fragments on the Epistle to the Corinthians

^A be believed if he had said these things? And would they not have been provoked to perform reprehensible acts? For if, even when he called himself the Son of the Savior—although the ungrateful and senseless Israel itself was often called 'son'—they nevertheless leaped upon this expression, and grumbled against the truth, and attributed a cause for blasphemy to the speaker, to what zenith of evils would they not have run, if the One who took our flesh and came to save the human race had proclaimed himself the Father? For this reason, therefore (as far as human reasoning can attain), it is not the Father who becomes man, but the Son, so that the message of salvation might be most acceptable to men, and so that the masterful and philanthropic work, exceeding every word of compassion and providence, might be brought to its conclusion.

6. Likewise, if the Holy Spirit had undergone the incarnation, it would have afforded the Jews the same pretext for ingratitude and unbelief, and a refuge for annoyance and self-willed stubbornness, ^B under the guise of averting calumny. For if they held in their minds a certain dim conception of the all-holy Spirit, it was nonetheless because, by hearing the oracles of the prophets, they learned that it was something superior to human nature, and that nothing was common to flesh and spirit, and thus they imagined a certain divinity concerning it—this, from the prophecy of Isaiah: *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, for which he has anointed me*, and that of David: *Take not thy holy Spirit from me*, and Moses describing the generation of the world: *The Spirit of God was moving over the water*, and a myriad of other things; ^C from which they reasoned that the nature of the Spirit was more divine than that of man, even if they did not attain to a purely theological understanding of Him. Rather, the Sadducees would have mocked and ridiculed the mystery, and would have torn and mangled with their hands and teeth, had one given it to them, the One who had appeared in the flesh, since they could not even endure to say or conceive that anything could come into existence at all, just as they did not for the nature of angels. Since, therefore, the incarnation of the Father and of the Spirit would have been utterly unacceptable to the Jews, and the salvation of the race—which was the goal and providence of the Divine, and for which the emptying of the Unemptiable attained its purpose, through the Incarnate Son—would have been far from being accepted, ^D it is fitting that the Son, both according to much other wisdom, ineffable and incomprehensible to human reasoning, by the good pleasure of the Father and the operation of the all-holy Spirit, taking on our flesh, accomplished the salvation common to the race.

QUESTION CCXXVIII. [Coisl. Taur. LXXVI.] De natura et persona. What was that which appeared in Christ? Was it nature or per-

QUESTION XXVIII

hypostasis? But if it is a hypostasis, and it is also that which is not apparent—namely, the hypostasis of the Word—then there are two, which is absurd. But if it is nature, the absurdities increase; for it is universal and not visible to the eyes (for it is understood also as belonging to many). Furthermore, how is a nature carried in the womb or born? And a thousand other things. It is neither nature nor hypostasis, but a part of the composite hypostasis of the Word, which is an in-hypostatic thing. ^A If someone, however, should declare in his answer that it is none other than the hypostasis of the Word, adding thereto, he might perhaps be answering the Nestorians not ill. Is the Trinity indivisible in itself, or is it divided only by properties and notions? And is there nothing existing in which the hypostasis of the Father is present while that of the Son, or that of the Spirit, is absent, but rather, as much as fills the hypostasis of the Father, so also does each of the others fill it, and vice versa? How, saying that the hypostasis of the Son has become incarnate and has been born, shall we grant that this happened without the hypostasis of the Father and the Spirit, or that those also were born and became incarnate? In the case of generated and corruptible things, it is possible to demonstrate this, so that they are indivisible in hypostasis, and while one of these is acting or suffering, none of the others acts or suffers the same thing; therefore, it is much easier to grant this in the case of the impassible and incorruptible hypostases. Let the illuminating and heating quality of fire be a ^B demonstration: for each of these acts, being inseparable from the other, and while one is acting, the other does nothing of its own in that act. Furthermore, if the begetting of the Son from the Father does not divide the inseparable existence of their hypostasis—either by place, or by time, or by operation—but only signifies the property of the hypostasis of the Son, then neither will becoming incarnate and being born of the Virgin divide Him from the Father or the Spirit, but will only manifest an idiom of the composite hypostasis of the Son; for iron, when it is struck and suffers in one of its qualities, does not suffer in its gravity. ^C

QUESTION CCXXIX. Hujus quæstionis pars prior jam exstat supra col. 1023.

2. Some of the ancients said that there is neither a composite hypostasis, just as they said there is no composite nature, but they called the hypostasis of the Word incarnate and un-incarnate, but no longer composite. But the more recent theologians, I think, took "composite" to mean "incarnate" and that alone. But some say: How then is the composite the same as the simple? For neither is the simple the same as the composite, nor the composite the same as the simple; ^D and these are absurdities. Thus, in the simple hypostasis of the Word, [there exists] the temporal and the originated, just as in the composite; and ten thousand other things. And in the composite, again, it is found that nothing originated is seen, and finally, [that it is] not even incarnate; for the simple has these. And because of these and other such arguments, the ancients rejected the term "composite." Or do we not call it composite, but always simple, positing it as both un-incarnate and incarnate? The same consequences will follow: for if the un-incarnate and the incarnate hypostasis are one and the same, either the properties of the un-incarnate will belong to the incarnate, and the incarnate [...]

^A properties to the un-incarnate. Or, if you prefer, since he who denied and he who testified and confessed with his own blood are one and the same hypostasis, will you for that reason say that denying and testifying are the same, or that the things observed and found in the one who testifies must be observed and found in the one who denies? For it is not the same thing to say that the hypostasis is one and the same, and [to say] that the things observed with differences in the hypostasis are one and the same; and there are countless examples of this. Peter clothed, for instance, and Peter naked; Socrates the philosopher and the one who is not a philosopher; Paul formerly the persecutor, and the preacher; and ^B countless other things, of which the hypostasis is one and the same, but the things pertaining to the hypostasis are not the same.

QUESTION CLXXX. [Coisl. Taur. LXXXVIII.] On divinity.

1. Whether divinity and God are the same, or different? And if they are different, what is this, and what is divinity apart from God? If they are the same, then each of the three hypostases is God, and therefore divinity. Those, then, who blame the form of the word, because "divinity" is spoken in the feminine gender, but the hypostases are not, are mistaken; for then it would not be right to call the Spirit God, since the one is of the neuter gender and the other of the masculine; nor [could we speak of] the Father, Son, and Spirit as one hypostasis, since the genders of their names are dissimilar; nor could man be called an animal or a ^C substance, and countless other things. Therefore, the distinction of genders is not the reason why we hesitate to call the Father, or the Son, or the Spirit "divinity," just as we call them "God." Or is it possible to say that these things are equivalent, just as "man" and "humanity," but that just as we call Socrates a man, but not humanity, so it is also with God and divinity? But is this not actually increasing the difficulty, rather than solving it? For if "man" and "humanity" are equivalent, why, when "man" is applied, is "humanity" not also applied? It seems to some that nothing prevents this, and that "man" and "humanity," "God" and "divinity" are the same, and that the one can be used in place of the other: for man and the nature of man, and the species of man, are the same; but yet "man" is predicated of Socrates (for Socrates is indeed a man), but nature or species is not: for we do not call Socrates the nature or species of man. But this is not similar to the aforementioned, for nature, and species, and essence, and other similar terms, since they are logical terms, cannot by any means be applied down to the furthest individuals, but stop at those ^D to which they relate; whereas divinity and humanity are not logical terms, but terms for natural things.

2. But even if this is true, nonetheless "man" and "the nature of man" are found to be the same, of which the one is said of Socrates, but the other is not. What, therefore, prevents the same from following in the case of other arguments?

^A For perhaps it is not possible to say that man and the nature of man are not the same; and further, we say that man and the mortal rational animal are the same, and indeed that the laughing animal is also the same as man. And not all things that are said of one, will also be said of the remaining ones. For the laughing animal is a property of man, but man is no longer a property of man. And the mortal rational animal is the definition of man, but man is no longer the definition of man; and yet in the highest degree, these things are the same. But if someone were to object to the logical terms in these cases, such as the property and the definition (for when these are removed, whatever the one is, the other is also), yet in these cases what would he object to? For man is a substance and an animal, while the laughing animal is neither a substance nor an animal; for there would be many substances and animals that are "man."

^B But even if these things are true, they are not similar to the things proposed from the beginning. For man and humanity, and God and divinity, if indeed these are the same, are not the same according to the similarity of the things mentioned; for neither is the one a property of the other, nor a definition, but as one might say, they are two names for one subject, like "garment" and "clothing." How then is it that where the one is, the other is not also, or whatever belongs to the one does not also belong to the other? We say, therefore, that man and humanity are the same, as they declare the same subject and thing, but they are not apprehended in the same way. But when we say "man," we conceive of the nature of man as incorporated into the hypostases; but when we say "humanity," we define the same nature of man, not in the same way, but as abstracted from the individuals and taken by itself. Thus, man and humanity are the same, but they are not apprehended in the same way. Therefore, it is not the case that where one is, the other is; or where one is, the other is not the same. Instantly, in the case of Socrates, both "man" and "humanity" are said of him, but not in the same way. For we say that Socrates is a man, but we do not say that he is humanity, but that he "has" it. And again we say that humanity is the nature of Socrates and of the other men, and that it is comprehensive of the individuals; for not one of them falls outside of it. So if not always in the same way, yet where "man" is said, "humanity" can also fit. If, therefore, the argument is true, perhaps it will provide us with clarity on the questions raised even in the case of God and divinity (as much as divine things can be imagined in human examples).

^C 3. If the hypostasis of the Father and of the Spirit was present along with the soul and body of Christ, that is, with the Lordly man (for there is nothing of existing things to which the Trinity, which oversees and provides for all, is not ^D present), and if the Son is said to have been incarnate and to have become man by being present, why would the Father and the Spirit not be said to be these things? Or is being present twofold? The one is as providing (as has been stated), according to which sense the Trinity is said to be present to the Lordly man, just as it is said to be present to all existing things. But just as nothing of existing things is said to have been born of God through the fact that He is present to them, so neither is [the Trinity] said to have been incarnate or to have become man. It is said, however,

to be present to another, as the soul is to the body, when both have come together into one hypostasis; and according to this meaning we say that only the Son is present to the Lordly man, but no longer the Father or the Spirit. And according to the first meaning ^B the hypostasis of the Word was present to all, as we have said, to men, and simply to all existing things; but according to the second meaning it is so no longer, but only to the Lordly man; just as the mind in us is indeed present to all things upon which it happens to be directed, and which it perceives and understands, yet it is also present to the brain, or, if you do not like this, to some other bodily part; and the presence is not similar; for the one is according to essence and existence, that in the defined bodily part, while the other is according to mere intellection and perception.

4. ^C Whether the hypostasis of the Word, that is to say Christ, is the same as His natures, or different? From either side, it makes the matter difficult: for if it is the same, since there are two natures, there will therefore be two hypostases; and since there is one composite hypostasis, there will therefore be one composite nature; but if it is different, these things are God and man; therefore hypostasis and nature are not the same; which would indeed be even more absurd; for from both hypotheses many other absurdities arise. We say, therefore, in conclusion, that it is not absolutely the same, nor absolutely different, but in a certain way the same, and in a certain way different; for according to the essential definitions of the natures, Christ is the same as His own natures, but according to what are atoms, and what can then be spoken of in the plural (and whatever things are similar to these), it is different. Not only for the mystery of Christ, if anyone proposes a question of this kind, will the aforementioned solution be appropriate, but also generally for all things in which the terms "nature" and "hypostasis" can be employed: just as Socrates and the horse, in their own nature, are not entirely the same, nor entirely different, but in a certain way the same, as has been said, and in a certain way different.

QUESTION CCXXXI.

1. We say neither in the universal, nor individually; for it is not necessary that one of these must hold true; for the question is not according to contradiction. For if Christ assumed man in the universal, suppose not in essence, nor to become man in sense, but in intellect and imagination only (for this is the essence of the universal elsewhere), and in another way also that he is not circumscribed in place according to the nature of humanity; for nothing of the universals is circumscribed locally. Furthermore, also, if Christ assumed man in the universal, and this universal is that which is contemplated in many hypostases, Christ will be (since He assumed man in the universal) many persons, or rather, infinite. You might also conclude that He is not consubstantial with us; for when God the Word had assumed man in the universal, we would no longer be men; for whence would this exist

in us, and in what way would we have been rendered common with Christ? Again, another absurdity underlies these statements, namely, that each of the individual men would both be a man and not be a man. For each of us, according to true reasoning, is and is called a man. But if man in the universal, according to which all were said to be men, has been assumed by God the Word, how shall we be men? Because of these things, then, and many others, we do not say that Christ assumed man in the universal. Nor, moreover, is it right to say that Christ assumed an individual man. For if this were granted, Christ would not be one ^B person, but two; for then it would be said that Christ assumes an individual man, if He were to take the nature with its properties, which is nothing other than a person. What then, someone will say, did Christ assume, if He assumed neither man in the universal nor an individual man? We reply that He did indeed assume human nature, but the Word Himself supplied the properties, and thus no absurdity will follow.

2. Does the name Christ have the force of a definition, or is it significative of essence, just as "man" or "horse"? It has neither the force of a definition nor a power to signify essence, but it has the capacity to demonstrate a certain thing. For the name Christ signifies one person, ^C but not one nature. For Christ is not spoken of in a uniform way, but to that very name, which is one, the meaning of two things is shown, of divinity and of humanity; and for this reason Christ is called both God and man, and Christ is one.

QUESTION CCCXIX [Coisl. Taur. XCIV]

QUESTION CCCXX [Coisl. Taur. XCVII]

is not to be put on, because this custom existed among the nations concerning the dead. For those mourning ^A cut off their hair and offered it to the deceased. Hair was shorn not only near the forehead but also wherever it is accustomed to grow on the back of the head; and all these things were customary and legal practices of the nations.

QUESTION CCCXXI [Coisl. Taur. CVIII]. Why did the raven, which is unclean, minister to the prophet?

THE END OF THE SUPPLEMENT.