Arguments of the Declamations

it is stretched out, holding ^A a gilt bronze apple ^A a little distance from the body, upon which a cross of the same material is raised. And it seems to declare with what confidence he extends the other hand in movement and threatens gravely. For that apple signifies the world, which he, holding it in his hand, having obtained the empire of the whole world, has entrusted to the power of the cross.

OF THE PROTECDICUS AND NOMOPHYLAX

GEORGE PACHYMERES

AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY

THAT THE SPIRIT IS CALLED THE SPIRIT OF THE SON BECAUSE IT HAS THE SAME NATURE AS HE, OR BECAUSE IT IS SUPPLIED BY HIM TO THE WORTHY

If by natural power fire is adurent, because it would consume ^B (and it performs this often, and that which is suited to be consumed, it consumes), I ask which of these two is prior: performing and consuming, or the faculty itself naturally adurent; or the faculty of aduring itself, or the act of consuming? Clearly everyone will affirm the faculty. Unless someone wishes to assert that action is prior to nature itself. But when this is necessarily affirmed—that is, that fire possesses the natural faculty of being adurent, and that this is prior to the consuming, and not the reverse—I still ask concerning causes and effects: which of these is prior, either in being or in concept? The cause, entirely. For we do not say that the posterior is the cause of the prior. And indeed it is the law of the Dialecticians, concerning those who ask "why," to render the cause. And this

we supposed before. ^A If, therefore, anyone should ask why fire burns by nature, it is not a good defense to say: because it burns the wood. For it is possible for fire even not to burn the wood, and not to exert its natural power, even while possessing it. He who posits such a cause errs in two ways: by claiming that the posterior is the cause of the prior, and by claiming that which is contingent as that which is by nature and necessity. But if one should ask why fire burns wood, it is reasonable to render the cause that fire is by nature burning. If, however, one should seek the cause of this again—namely, how fire is by nature burning—one would conceive of something else prior, and not that it burns the wood. For this was shown to be something posterior, and something that could also not come to pass. How, then, could that which is contingent, and that which is by nature posterior, be the cause of what is prior? ^B Perhaps one might argue that the element is fine-bodied and naturally easily moved; and that, because from within it is naturally a stimulant to rekindling by the speed of its power, and by the fineness and the active nature of its substance, and other such things. Thus, in the matter at hand, one might dare, with a small argument, to weigh the great. For if the Holy Spirit is, and is called, the Spirit of the Son before all time, but is given and supplied in time to the worthy by the Son, it is something acknowledged by all without a doubt that that which is before the ages is, by its very nature, prior to that which is in time, and prior to the action itself. If, therefore, one should ask why the Spirit is supplied to the worthy by the Son, the answer is reasonable: because He is, and is called, the Spirit of the Son. For that is the cause, but this is the effect. But if one were to ask again: Why is the Paraclete called, and why is He, the Spirit of the Son? — it is not possible for anyone to say: because the Spirit is supplied to the worthy by the Son. For this is posterior, and in time, and therefore an effect. The answer is therefore foolish, even if the interrogation is made with reason. And we shall not hesitate to declare that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son before all time and is supplied by the same in time, but that we should make that which is posterior to be the cause of the prior, and that which is in time to be the cause of that which is before the ages—this can by no means be done. ^C Wherefore, if the being supplied with the Spirit by the Son to the worthy is not the cause of His being, and being called, the Spirit of the Son, just as He is also of the Father, some other cause must be sought by those who are truly worthy of this inquiry. And if something must be ventured: that the Spirit is processionally from the Father through the Son, and by reason of the natural mediation of the Son, through whom the Only-Begotten is preserved to Him, the Spirit’s being from the Father is not hindered as from a cause. For "per" (through) is from some cause, and does not subsist of itself. However, an "ex" (out of) sufficiently demonstrates by itself and alone from whence something is. But as to the second answer, which was that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son because He is of the same nature with the Son, one must meet it thus: If the light is of the same nature as the ray—for both are together from the sun, and the light is indeed called of the ray, just as it is, naturally, of the sun. But the ray is not called of the light, unless in a distinct sense, as being expressive of the light. One must seek the cause of why these things are so, and are so called. One must therefore seek, in such matters, the—

^A more and the less; whether it is more manifest that this is of that, or that the consubstantial is of that. And everyone would acknowledge that the being of "this of that" is more extensive than being consubstantial. For this house is Socrates', and this chair is Plato's, but the house or chair is not consubstantial with those philosophers. But if we seek only among consubstantials, we do not find that the "this of that" follows in all cases; rather, it is lacking in most of these instances too. For Peter is consubstantial with Paul, and Paul with Peter; but neither is Paul Peter's, nor Peter Paul's. ^B Much more would the consubstantial be less in its being and being called "this of that." For then the consubstantial would simply be less than the "this of that" in being and being called, if the latter does not convert with the former, while the consubstantial converts with it. But since it is lacking, and not all that is consubstantial to one is called "this of that"—in many instances the "less" is present in the consubstantial in relation to "this of that."

This being granted, one must first inquire: which is more extensive, the cause or the effect? And everyone will agree, without contradiction, that the cause is more extensive. Therefore, if someone should ask, "Why is the light called [the light] of the ray?" he would answer foolishly if he said, "Because it is consubstantial." But if someone should ask, "How are these things consubstantial?" he ^C could answer that it is because "this is called of that," although in most consubstantials that cause does not obtain. Thus, too, in the proposed question, one might dare to speak. For if being and being called "Spirit of the Son" is more extensive, as we are compelled to admit from what has just been said about the consubstantial—if someone should ask, "Why is the Spirit consubstantial with the Son?" it must be answered reasonably: that the Holy Spirit is called the "Spirit of the Son." For it is not adventitious to Him, as the things we possess are to us, but it proceeds eternally and naturally. Just as, therefore, if one were to ask, "Why is the Son consubstantial with the Father?" we say that the Son is the Son of the Father, and furthermore, He is from the Father according to substance, but not as creatures are. But to answer, when asked why the Spirit is called "of the Son," that it is because He is consubstantial with Him, is an ignorant answer and not in accordance with dialectical laws. ^D For the consubstantial is less extensive than "this of that." And how can we blame as cause the "less" for the "more"? For a cause is either more extensive or equal, if it converts, but never less extensive. Therefore, with this ground removed, one must inquire for the cause: how is the Holy Spirit called the "Spirit of the Son"? But if one must dare something here: it is because the Spirit is from the Father through the Son. And just as when speaking about the sun, by saying "the light [is] through the ray from the sun," we signify both the mediation of the ray and set before our eyes the sun as the cause of the light; so also in this matter, when we say the Spirit [is] "through the Son," we leave it to be sought: the cause from which He is, to which, as to a principal cause, it is attributed.