fleeing, he exposed the scandals of that heresiarch and solidly refuted his insane dogmas: this he did indeed magnificently, and he reported many things at once, more than others, concerning his tenets, as one who was once a member of the sect is found to have done; for which reason also the lucubration of such an author is rightly considered to be of great value. A Henricus Valesius, a man of the highest standing, says our esteemed Combefis. And he adds concerning himself and this translation of his: "I confess that it also caused me no small trouble, not so much because of the author’s own obscurity or any flaws that can be ascribed to him (which I do not consider to be so very base) as because of the copyist's hand, whether the errors were already inherent in the earlier exemplar or he added them himself. I hope it has come to pass, however, that through the labor I have put into it, I have almost entirely repaired it for the reader, and have left only a few places where he might stumble." So much for him. This edition, which is the only one in existence, we here present in a more emended and clearer form; and so that the context of the work may be plainer, we present it divided into sections. B
ALEXANDER, BISHOP OF LYCOPOLIS, TRACTATE ON THE TENETS OF THE MANICHAEANS.
ALEXANDER OF LYCOPOLIS, WHO HAD CONVERTED FROM THE GENTILES TO THE OPINIONS OF MANICHAEUS. C
Chapter 1. The Excellence of Christian Philosophy. The Origin of Heresies among Christians.
The philosophy of the Christians is called simple. Truly, it devotes the greatest care to the formation of character, while hinting at the more precise discourses concerning God; and the head of this study, in which the efficient cause is posited as most noble, most ancient, and the author of all existing things, all people would deservedly approve. For leaving aside those who pursue moral practices—such as what moral and rational virtue is, and whatever is said about morals and passions, which are labors—they dwell upon the hypothetical aspect. They do not render the elements by which each virtue is to be acquired, but rather, as it happened, they pile up coarser precepts, by the hearing of which the common crowd, as we learn from experience, makes great progress toward mildness; and the character of piety settles into their morals, giving life to the composition of character and disposition that is formed from such a habit, and leading them little by little toward an appetite for the good and the honorable. D
But given that this has been divided into many questions by those who followed, several have arisen, just as the governor of the city of Lycopolis, Alexander, having taken up the episcopal laws—and as he who testified with these words: "The one of the city of the Lycians, Alexander, having taken up the episcopal laws."
A They are eager for contention, some more skillful and argumentative than others, so that, so to speak, they have become more inquisitive; and indeed it has come about that some have even become leaders of heresies. By these, the structure of moral conduct, obscure in its character, was wasted away, since those who aspired to lead the heresies did not attain to the precision of the argument, and the common multitude was stirred up against it in a more factious manner. For there being no underlying rule or laws from which it is permitted to obtain a solution to questions—just as in other things, ambition falling into excess—there is nothing that it does not corrupt.
CHAPTER II. Manichaei, seu Manetis, aetas. Primi discipuli. Duo principia. Materia Manichaica.
B Thus also in these matters, while each one strives to surpass the one before him in the novelty of his opinions, they have cast this simple philosophy into an endless affair; just like the one called Manichæus, who is by birth a Persian. A certain Papus was the one who, by name, brought the doctrine of this man to us, and after him Thomas, and some others after them. He (Manichæus) is said to have lived in the time of the Emperor Valerian, and to have served in the army of Sapor the Persian, and having offended him in some way, to have perished. Such, then, is the rumor of his doctrine that came to us from the associates of the man. He posited two principles, God and matter. He said that God is good, and matter is evil. And God excels in good more than matter excels in evil. He does not call matter that which Plato calls the generator of all things, whenever it receives quality and form—whence he calls it the "all-receiver," the "mother," and the "nurse"—nor does he call it the element which Aristotle describes, around which form and privation turn; but something else besides these. For he calls that which is the disorderly motion in each of the beings "matter." He held that other powers have been arranged with God, as it were handmaidens, all of them good; and others likewise with matter, all of them evil. That which is bright, and light, and above, all these things are with God; but the dim, and the darkness, and that which is below, are with matter. And he held that God has appetites, but these are also good; and likewise with matter, but all of them evil.D Thus, the desire once came upon matter to arrive at the upper place; and having arrived, it marveled at the brightness and the light, as much as was with God. And indeed it wished to seize this sovereignty, having pushed God aside. He (God), however, wished to punish it, but was at a loss for an evil with which he might punish it; for there is no evil in the house of God. Therefore, he sent a certain power, that which is called by us the soul, against matter, which will be mixed with it through everything. There will be [the] C death of matter, the separation of this power at some time after these things.
A
Thus, therefore, through the providence of God, the soul is said to have been mixed with matter—a dissimilar thing with a dissimilar thing. And in this mixing, the soul suffers together with matter. For just as in a foul vessel its contents are often altered, so also does the soul, having suffered such a thing in matter, depart from its inherent nature into a state of malice. God, therefore, having pitied this, sent another power, which we call the demiurge, who, upon arriving and undertaking the creation of the world, separated from matter that portion of the power which had suffered no evil or taint from the mixing, and from this, first the sun and moon were created; but what had absorbed only a little and a moderate amount, that became the stars and the whole heaven. B But the part of matter from which the sun and moon were separated was driven outside the world, and that is fire—burning, but dark and lightless, resembling night. In the remaining elements, however, and in plants and animals existing in this universe, the divine power is mixed and distributed unequally. For this reason, the world was created, and in it the sun and moon, which preside over the birth and decay of things, always separating the divine power from matter and transmitting it to God.
CAP. IV. Lunar augmentation and decrement: Manichaean nonsense. Dreams about man and Christ. The senseless logic of abstinence.
This, indeed, is what was contrived: that for the demiurge and creator, another power should be available, one which leads [things] to the splendors of the sun’s light; and this is a manifest thing, as one might say, even to a blind man. For in its waxing, the moon receives the power that is being separated from matter, and during this time it becomes full of it. But once it has become full, during the waning it sends it up to the sun, and the sun departs with it to God. Having done this, it waits again until, at another full moon, the soul migrates to it; and having likewise received it, it allows it to pass on to God of its own accord. And this it labors to do throughout all time.
Sed et in sole ejusmodi simulacrum conspici, qualis est forma hominis; ambitiosiusque eniti ma- teriam ut ex se ipsa condat hominem, omni sua commista virtute, qui ipse quoque animæ quidpiam habeat multum tamen contulisse formam, ut homo majus aliquod, præ reliquis animantibus, commer- cium nancisceretur divinæ virtutis. Esse enim ho- minem divinæ virtutis imaginem: Christum vero esse mentem. Qui cum aliquando e supernis cœ- lique axe venisset, hujus plurimam partem virtutis ad Deum dimisisse. Ac demum in crucem actum, per eum modum scientiam præbuisse ; divinamque aptasse virtutem, ut in materia crucifigeretur. Quia igitur divinæ voluntatis ac decreti est ut ma- D
- A matter perish, to abstain from those things which are animate; but to feed on vegetables, and if there is anything devoid of sense. Also to abstain from marriages and sexual acts and the procreation of children, lest virtue take deeper roots in matter through the succession of the race; nor to remove themselves, attempting to cleanse the stain which virtue had contracted for itself from the admixed matter.
CHAPTER V. The worship of the sun and moon among the Manichaeans. Safeguards sought in Greek fables. The authority and faith of the Scriptures rejected by the Manichaeans.
These are indeed the more principal of the things they say and feel. They worship the sun and moon most of all, not as gods, but as the way by which it is permitted for them to attain God. But with the divine power completely separated, they say that the outer fire which has fallen, that is, it itself, and if any other part of matter remained, will burn it. B Those among them who are more elegant, and not inexperienced in Greek learning and literature, admonish us from their own sources. From ceremonies and mysteries: that by Bacchus, who was torn from the womb, is signified that the divine power is divided into matter by the Titans, as they themselves speak: from the fable of the poets about the battle of the giants, it is indicated that not even they were ignorant of the rebellion of matter against God. I, indeed, since I would not deny that these things are hardly sufficient to soothe the minds of those who receive a discourse without any examination, since even some who labored in philosophy together with us have been led to themselves by the deception of such discourses; who, however, now that I am about to undertake the examination of the matter as it stands, I do not know where to turn. For their hypotheses do not proceed through any legitimate reasons C so that it might be permitted to institute an examination through them. Nor are there any principles of demonstration, and so that we may see what follows: the discovery and unexpected gain is truly theirs, who are said to philosophize more simply. These, applying new and old scriptures to themselves, since they establish them as divinely inspired for themselves, conclude their own opinions from them; and then they seem to be argued against and refuted only when something not consonant with them happens to be said or done by them. And what for those who philosophize according to the rite of the Greeks are the principles of demonstration, the intermediate propositions; this for them is the voice and oracle of the prophets. Here, however, with all these eliminated, and since those things which I mentioned above D are said without any proof; and it is necessary that we make a response with reason, and not propose other more probable things, and which might be able to soothe more: the aggression is more troublesome, and hence all the more arduous, because it is necessary to institute various discourses. And whoever are of more accurate and certain truth, they would have escaped those whom they had already admitted by a certain credulity, if, when it happened to be used for soothing, they fell into the same snares and necessities. Wherefore there is need of much and great diligence, and clearly of God, who himself will be the guide and patron of the discourse.
Chapter VI. The two principles of the Manichaeans. They are troubled. The opinion of the Pythagoreans on principles. Good and evil are opposites. Victory from the good.
A They posit two principles, God and matter. If one separates that which is generated from that which is, the hypothesis is not equally base, so that matter might not make itself, and might not receive the argument of contraries—both acting and being acted upon—nor again might other like things be contemplated concerning the producing cause which it is perhaps not right even to speak of; although God does not need matter for his effects, since it is possible for all things to come into being in substance through that Intellect. But if, as seems more commonly said, matter is the inordinate motion of beings under Him, first, he is unaware that he is positing another producing cause (a malevolent one, indeed); and he does not see the consequence: that if God must be posited, and matter, another matter will stand under God, so that there is matter underlying each of the two producing causes. Therefore, B instead of two, it will be shown that he introduces four principles to us.
And the distinction posed by him on both sides is also wonderful. For if he thinks this is God, which is the good, and wishes that which is contrary to Him to exist, why does he not, like some of the Pythagoreans, set evil as a contrary to Him? It would be more tolerable, at least, for two principles to be spoken of by them—the good and the evil—continually warring with each other, though the good prevails over the evil. For if the evil were to prevail, all things would perish. For matter in itself is not body, nor is it strictly anything incorporeal, nor is it simply a "this certain thing," but it is a certain indefinite, which, when form approaches it, becomes defined; just as fire is associated with the pyramid; air with the octahedron; water with the icosahedron; C and earth with the cube. How, then, is matter the inordinate motion of the elements? It is not, therefore, subsistent by itself. For if it is motion, it should be in the thing moved; but matter is not thought to be such, but rather the first subject and unformed, and that from which other things come.
Since, therefore, matter is inordinate motion, was it always joined to the moving thing, or was it sometimes separated from it? For if it was ever by itself, it would not have been at all; for there is no motion without something moving. But if it was always in the moving thing, then again two principles will be posited: that which moves and that which is moved. To which of these, then, is it attributed, that we might establish it first together with God? D
Chapter VII. Vindicated from the disorder of motion. Circular. Straight. Of generation and corruption. Of alteration and the quality producing sensation.
To the discourse is added that appendix which is entirely foreign and completely inordinate. For when there is no motion, it might be justly called such. But what is the matter of the motions? Is it that which is straight, or circular; or those things which are changed by a quality affecting the senses, or the motion of generation and corruption? Indeed, circular motion is so decorous and composite that it is ascribed to the order of the universe; nor should this be blamed in the sense of the Manichæans, in which the sun and the moon are found, whom alone they say they revere as gods; but rather that which moves in a straight line; but...
even this also has a limit, in that it attains its own place. For that which is earthly ceases from motion entirely once it has reached the earth; and every animal and plant ends its growth when it has arrived at its own boundary. Therefore, if their rest were more reasonably to be called the death of matter, it would be a death brought about by them, a ceaseless end woven for it. But as for birth and corruption, it is not even possible to conceive of them as appropriate to this hypothesis, for matter is unbegotten for them.
If, however, they will attribute to it the motion of alteration (for they appear most likely to say this, since they say through matter both changes of character and the existence of vice in the soul) B it is worth considering how they can possibly say these things too. For, while altering it, it will always begin from a starting point; and proceeding through the middle, it will reach the end. But upon arriving at the end it will not stop, if indeed alteration is its essence; but it will turn back again through the same things to the beginning, and in like manner from there to the end; and it will never cease from doing this. For example, if it is altered from a to c, with b as the middle, the change will proceed from a to b, and from there to c. Then again, turning back from the extreme c to b, it will eventually arrive at a; and this will be forever. Just as the change from black, with dark gray as the middle, and white as the extreme. And again, conversely, the beginning of the alteration is from white, back to dark gray, and in the same way to black; C and again from white, the beginning of the alteration, and the same argument already follows.
Cap. VIII. Whether matter is malicious? Concerning God and matter.
Is matter the malicious cause by reason of alteration? That it is not more malicious than it is beneficent is thus demonstrated. For let the principle of alteration be from evil. Therefore, in this way the alteration is from this, through things of a middle kind, to the good. But let it be from the good. Again, therefore, the beginning is through things of a middle kind. Whether the motion is toward one extreme or the other, the reasoning is the same; and these things are said as a redundancy. For every motion is concerned with quantity; but quality is the leader of vice and virtue. We know, however, that these are also distinguished by genus. But are God and matter the only principles, or does he leave something else, which exists as a middle between these? For if there is nothing, these remain unmixed with each other; for it is well said that, in order for the extremes to be mixed, there must be something in the middle so that it may connect them; but if something else exists, it must of necessity again be either incorporeal or a body; D so that a third, adventitious principle has emerged.
But first, if God and matter are both entirely incorporeal, neither is in the other, except perhaps as grammar is in the soul; but to conceive this in God and matter is absurd. But if they mean as in a vacuum, as some say, that the vacuum is poured around the whole universe, the other again lacks substance. For the substance of the vacuum is nothing. But if it is as accidents, first indeed this thing is impossible; for being devoid of substance, they cannot exist anywhere.
A For substance is, as it were, a vehicle underlying accidents. If both are bodies, it is necessary that both be heavy, or both light, or intermediate; or one heavy, and the other light, or one intermediate. Whether, therefore, both are heavy, it is absolutely necessary that these same properties exist in light things and in those that are intermediate; or if they should differ, the one will necessarily be separated from the other. For a different place is claimed by what is heavy, and another by what is intermediate and light; for to one belongs the "upward," to another the "downward," and to another the "intermediate." And for everything spherical, the lowest part is the center; for from it, there is distance on every side to everything elevated up to the uppermost surface. And all heavy things again are carried from every side toward it. Therefore, it even came to me to laugh, hearing that matter, while it moves in a disorganized and disorderly way (for this is according to its nature for it), reached the region of God, or to light and brightness, and all things of that kind. But if one thing is body and another is incorporeal, first indeed what is body is alone movable; furthermore, if they are unmixed, each one is separate from the other according to its own nature; but if the one is mixed with the other, it would be either soul or mind or an accident. For thus alone does it happen that incorporeal things are mixed with bodies. B
CHAPTER IX. The ridiculous delusions of the Manichaeans concerning the movement of matter toward God. God, the author of the rebellion of matter, in the Manichaean sense. The desire of matter for light and splendor is good. Divine goods are not diminished by contact.
But in what way was it brought into the region and seat of God, or for what reason? For by nature, the "downward" and darkness—as they say—are its place, but the "upward" and light are contrary to nature; just as the movement was then contrary to nature for it. And something of this sort befell it, as if someone were to throw a stone or a clod of earth upward; for which reason that thing, being lifted up a little by the force of the thrower, when it has gone upward, falls and rushes back to the same place. Who, therefore, lifted matter to the higher place? Truly, by its own merits, and of itself, it would not be moved by that motion which is its own. But it is necessary that force was applied to it so that it was carried upward, not otherwise than to a stone or a clod. But they leave nothing with it except God. It is manifest, therefore, what is concluded from the argument: namely, that, as they suppose, God by force D and necessity lifted matter on high to Himself. But if matter is evil, its appetites must also be entirely evil. But the appetite for evil is evil; whereas that for good and honest things is itself very honest. Since, therefore, matter coveted what is splendid and light, its desire is not evil; just as neither is it if someone living wickedly should later burn with a desire for virtue. Otherwise, it is not free from crime if someone who is virtuous should come to a desire for evil. Just as if someone were to say that God desires the evils that pertain to matter. For the goods of God are not to be estimated as such things as great wealth, much land, and much gold,of which the portion of the possessor becomes A less if it is transferred by men to another. But if one must conceive at all of any image of these, one should, I think, and indeed as one might compare also the sciences, bring forward wisdom. Just as, therefore, neither wisdom nor science is diminished, nor does he who is endowed with them suffer any loss if another becomes a partaker of them: so it is not reasonable that God should have envied matter the appetite for the good; if indeed, according to them, it hungered for it.
Cap. X. Mythological gods: and Manichaean tenets similar to them. Allegory of the Homeric Theomachy. Emulation and envy in God, according to the Manichaean view. These vices are to be admitted in no virtuous person, and are shameful.
They have far surpassed the mythologists, those, for instance, who imagine either the mutilation of the genitals of Heaven, or the conspiracies plotted against Saturn by his son, so that he himself might seize the rule; or those who, in their turn, make Saturn swallow his children, and then be frustrated in his plan by the B substitution of a stone as an image. For how are the things said by them not similar to these? Since they openly speak of a war of matter against God; and yet they do not speak of these things by way of allegory, as Homer does, describing Jove as rejoicing at the battle of the gods among themselves in the Iliad, darkly signifying that the world is composed of unequal things, joined to one another, and now prevailing and now being overcome. And these things have been said by me because I know such men, when they are in want of proofs, gather from everywhere certain things from the poems, and make these a defense for their own opinions. But they would not have suffered this, if they had encountered whatever they read with some care.
And yet all evils are banished from the divine choir, especially emulation and envy. C But these men leave them with God, when they say that God plotted against matter because it desired the good. But for whom also did God desire to punish the matter which he possessed? For I think it is simpler to call God more precise than these men. The explanation of this notion is also not easy, as it is with other things. For it is not possible to describe it simply, but only through much education and labor. But this we all know, that wrath and the appetite for vengeance against matter are passions, existing in connection with him who is so pursued; but these passions could not D exist in any virtuous person, much less in the Good itself.
Cap. XI. The sent-forth Manichaean virtue. The powers of matter, with equal or lesser malice.
The discourse, wandering around, comes back to other things. For since they say that God sent a power into matter, it is worth considering whether this power, as far as the quality of the good is concerned, was lesser than God, or if it had it in a similar manner. For if it was lesser, what is the reason? For it partook of nothing of the things with God; and they introduce God as the one and only good, and matter as the one evil. But if it had it in a similar manner, for what reason did he, as if...
A a king were commanding, suffer this involuntary labor?
Furthermore, regarding matter, it will be asked whether they are similar in wickedness or lesser powers? For if they are lesser, they are certainly lesser in malice and depravity. Therefore, they would exist through communion with the good. Since there are two evils, that which is lesser must have become such through participation in the good. But they leave no good in matter. Therefore, another question arises again. For if some other power excels the governing matter in terms of malice, it is more sovereign; for that which is more evil should rule over the principle that is subject to it.
Cap. XII. The theory of the introduction of a virtue being disproved, the destruction of evil; that there is no diminution of evil from it. The opinion of Zeno, that the world will be burned up by fire alone, is refuted.
That God sent a power into matter B is said indeed without any proof; and it lacks all plausibility. Yet it is proper that it too should enjoy its own arguments and explanation. For they say the cause of this is that there might be no evil, but all things might be good. For it was fitting for a virtue to be mixed with matter, after the manner of athletes, who overcome their adversaries through close combat and grappling; so that, by the victory of the good, evil itself might be abolished. But I consider it far more impressive, and more worthy of the excellence of God, that he should have destroyed matter by the very first thought of existing things. Yet I do not think they accepted this C, because even now some evil exists, which they call matter. But nothing can more easily cease and be abolished than things which are such that one would not admit that they could be changed for the worse. For it was fitting that there should be some sense of this, namely that these things had been moderately diminished in some way, so that we might have better hopes for the future. For it was beautifully said against the opinion of Zeno of Citium, who, while arguing that the universe would be conflagrated by fire, reasoned thus: "Whatever has the power to burn will not cease until it burns everything; and the sun is fire, and what it has it will burn." From which he concluded, as he thought, that the entire universe was D to be consumed by fire. To whom one of the wittier men is said to have replied: "But I, yesterday, and a year ago, and long before, saw, and now likewise see, that the sun's fire has brought no decay." It should have happened little by little over time, so that we might believe that the whole will one day be conflagrated. And against the doctrine of the Manichaean also, although it rests upon no faith or reason, the same answer, I think, is appropriate: that these things have suffered no diminution; but that they existed even before, in the time of the first man who was created, when brother destroyed brother, and they exist even now; and the same wars, and more varied desires and lusts. Yet it was fitting that these things, even if they had not ceased, should at least have been diminished, so that we might augur that they would eventually cease with the passage of time. But since the same things have persisted ever since, what hope is there for the future
A regarding the sun and the moon? Nothing is lacking there. But as for the heavens and the stars, if he claims there is some such evil, it is reasonable for us to inquire in what follows what this might be. Now, according to them, disorder is evil, as is unordered motion. But these things always remain the same and exist in the same way; nor could anyone find fault with any of the wandering stars on the grounds that they chose to linger in the zodiac beyond the appointed time, nor with the fixed stars, as if they did not remain in their same place and rotate in harmony with the revolution of the whole, moving backward by one degree every hundred years. But if he blames the wildness of certain regions on earth, or if shipmasters complain of storms at sea: first of all, according to them, such things are B a portion of the good. For if nothing were to grow upon the earth, all living creatures would perish very quickly. And this implies that it is in the power of the divine potential, which is intertwined with matter, to transmit the greater part to God; and many moons would be required to be able to receive all at once such a multitude of souls drawing near. The same must also be said of the sea. For it is a godsend to perish, so that those things which are perishing may as quickly as possible find the way that leads to God. But wars on earth, and famines, and whatever else causes destruction, are in their view to be held in the greatest honor. For whatever is a cause of good things must be honored. And these things are causes of good because of the destruction that accompanies them, C as it transmits to God the power separated from those who perish.
Cap. XIV. Egyptian worship of harmful animals. Man as an artificer of evil. Lusts and injustices, chastised by laws and discipline. Contingent and necessary things, in which there is no stain.
And it seems we have been ignorant of the fact that the Egyptians justly worship the crocodile, the lion, and the wolf, because these, being much stronger than other animals, consume their prey and destroy it in every way; and likewise the eagle and the hawk, because the nature of these, too, is to kill the weaker animals in the air and on the earth. Perhaps, according to them, man is also held in the highest honor for this reason, because he is more accustomed than all others to tame D most animals through his inventions and arts, so that he himself might not be deprived of this good by becoming fodder for others. Again, therefore, they believe births are absurd, as they produce something great from small and insignificant seed; and they consider it far better for these to be destroyed by God, so that there might be a quick release of the divine power from its sojourn here.
But what would the Manichaean say, one might ask, in response to lusts, injustices, and everything of that sort? Consequently, discipline and the law are provided as helpers against these; discipline, indeed, by taking care that nothing of the kind happens among men, and the law by punishing any who are caught having committed an injustice.
A Furthermore, what is this accusation against the earth, should a farmer neglect to till and work it? For the rule of God, which consists in justice, is diminished whenever some things are naturally fruitful and others are not; or [when] from winds blowing according to another cause, it happens that some are benefited while others suffer things against their will. They are ignorant, necessarily, of the nature of contingent things and of what is necessary. For otherwise they would not turn such things into a portent and slander them.
CAP. XV. Libido and desire of sentient things. Demons, sentient animals. The sun also, and moon, and stars. Platonic, not Christian.
Whence, then, do pleasure and desire arise? For they say these are the greatest evils, and they have hated matter B—nothing else seems more so to them. Manifestly, these things pertain only to animals that are endowed with sense, and nothing else perceives desire and pleasure except those that have sensation. For what sensation of pleasure, sorrow, and pain has a plant? Or what sensation has earth, water, or air? And the demons, if they are sentient 5 animals, perhaps for this reason take pleasure in the established and legitimate sacrifices, and are troubled when these are lacking; whereas nothing of the sort can be conceived regarding God. Therefore, those who say: "Why do animals take pleasure and desire?" let them first raise the complaint: "Why are these creatures endowed with sense?" or "Why do they need food?" For if they were immortal animals, C exempt from corruption and growth—such as the sun and moon and stars, even though these are sentient—it would be outside of and exempt from such reproach. But man, being able both to sense and to judge, and being wise in potentiality (for he possesses the power to become such), he tramples upon that which is his own.
CAP. XVI. That some indeed are wise, and nothing prevents others from being so. Virtue must be acquired by diligence and study. Men are to be led to the good by a sounder philosophy. The common stadium of virtue is opened to all by Christ.
For it is truly worth our while to inquire of these men whether no human being can become virtuous, D or if it happens that some can? For if no one is wise, what then of the Manichaean himself? I pass over the fact that he says not only others can be virtuous, but also that there are others capable of making them so. But if there is anyone at all, what prevents all from becoming virtuous likewise? For that which is possible for one, is also possible for all; and by whatever works and by whatever means one might attain the pinnacle of virtue, by the same means all could attain it, unless they say that very much virtue and power is denied to such people. 4
Again, therefore, first: What need is there for the labor of education (since it would be possible to attain virtue while sleeping)? Or for what reason do these men especially encourage their hearers with hopes of attaining honor and virtue? For even while wallowing with harlots, they might possess their own good. But if discipline and better instruction and training
and A diligence, and assiduity in the pursuit of virtue rendered him such, then let all become such, and that unbridled motion of matter, which is so bruited about by them, is abolished.
It would be far better to say that wisdom is a tool given to men by God, so that what arises in them from desire and pleasure and lust, being governed by the sense they possess, might be led little by little toward the good, and thus the consequent absurdity might be removed by them. For in this way, they themselves, who profess to teach virtue, would be worthy of emulation for their purpose and their life; and there would be great hope that evil would someday cease, when all had become wise. And this seems to me to be what Jesus perceived; and so that the common folk—farmers, builders, masons, and the rest of the tradesmen and mechanics—might not be excluded from the good, he called a common assembly of all together, and by means of simple and accessible discourses, both lifted them up to an understanding of God and brought them B to a desire for what is good and honorable.
Chapter XVII. Exagitata Manichaica virtus in Materia. Si una virtus creata sine Materia, et reliquae. Virtus in materia explosa.
For when do they say God sent the divine power into matter? For if it always existed, and neither is God understood to be prior to it, nor is matter, then according to the Manichaean teaching there will again be three principles; and perhaps even very many will appear a little later. But if it is in some way adventitious, how does it exist apart from matter? And if it is a part of God, they declare that God is composite and corporeal in this way, which is absurd and impossible. But if he created it, and he is without matter, I marvel how neither he nor his disciples noticed that, if (as is said in C the true opinion, that the things which follow are hypostases, while God remains) God willed to create this power, how was he not also the author of all other things that were made, without the need for any pre-existing matter? These, then, are the absurdities that appear from this; but the matters that follow are these.
For did this power have a nature to flow into matter? If this was contrary to nature for it, how then was it mixed with it? And if it was according to its nature, then surely it was always with the matter. And if this is so, why do they call matter evil, being a mixture from the beginning with the divine power? How will it be destroyed, once the divine power that had been mixed with it has at some point withdrawn? For it D preserved what was good, and it is reasonable that it be the author of some other good to those to whom it is present, rather than that it should introduce corruption or some other evil to them.
Chapter XVIII. The solution and insistence of the Manichaeans. Skillfully ad hominem regarding Manes, who is himself in matter.
Their clever answer and evasion here is this: namely, just as we see that when the soul is separated from the body, the body itself perishes, so also where the power withdraws from matter, that which is left, namely the matter, will be dissolved
A For, first of all, they do not see that it is impossible for anything that exists to be corrupted into non-existence; for non-existence does not exist. But when bodies are dispersed and undergo some change, a dissolution occurs, so that part of them departs into the earth, part into the air, and part into something else.
Furthermore, they do not remember that they postulate matter to be an inordinate motion. But if it moves by its own reason, and its very essence is motion, and this does not accrue to it by accident, how is it reasonable that, upon the power withdrawing, it should cease to be what it was, even before the power descended into it? They do not see the difference, that every body devoid of soul is motionless; for even plants have a vegetative soul. Yet they say that the very essence of matter is motion—an inordinate one, however. It would have been better if, just as on a lyre that is playing out of tune, the harmony arrives and renders everything tuned, musical, and modulated, so the divine power, mixed with the inordinate motion—which they consider to be matter—had added to it a certain order in place of the disorder that was in it, and always continues to add what is worthy of the divine time. For how, indeed, was Manichæus himself capable of discussing these things, and when did he narrate them? For they concede that he himself was a mixture of matter and the power that was caught within it. B Whether, therefore, he spoke these things while in that inordinate motion, how is his view not evil? Or, if he spoke by the divine power, the dogma is already ambiguous and doubtful, in that by the part derived from the divine power it is a participant in truth, but by the part derived from the inordinate motion it participates in the other, shifting over into falsehood.
CHAP. XIX. Another Manichæan power, sought from previous and new absurdities. The power is efficient and passible, a creator, and concrete with matter. Bodies divided into three parts by Manichæus.
If it had been said that the divine power adorned and adorns matter, it would have been far wiser, and more conducive to gaining credibility for the doctrines and discourses of Manichæus. But indeed, God sent another power from the heavens. Certainly, what has been said regarding the former power is equally applicable to this one; and all the absurdities joined to the doctrine concerning their first power can also be brought forward now. For who could endure this other claim? For why did God not send one certain power capable of doing everything? C If the human mind is so varied in its approach to all things—so that the same person is geometric, the same is astronomical and architectural, and so on—was it then impossible for God to find such a power, one that was sufficient for Him in all things, so that He would not need a first and a second?
And why is the one power creative, while the other is more passible, so that it is well-disposed to be blended with matter? For I do not see here the cause of the order of the good and its superiority over it. If it was evil, it was not in the house of God. For since God is only good, and matter is only evil, D
A and that matter alone should exist as evil, it is necessary to call the remaining things "middle" and established in the middle. Yet a different factor and creator is found concerning these things that are middle, since they say one cause is the artisan, and another is that which is mixed with matter. Perhaps therefore this is the primary thing, and that which is from the primary, which even the moderns call [it] in the book *Concerning Differences*. And when the artisan virtue, whose power of founding had attacked the fabrication of the world, attempted [to work], they say that from matter what had remained in its own virtue even in the mixture was separated, and from this the sun and the moon existed. And that which had partaken of measure and of evil more sparingly, [became] the heaven and the stars. And ultimately, the remaining things intercepted within these things at random, which are mixtures of divine virtue and matter.
Cap. XX. Divine virtue, according to the same Manichaean, is corporeal and divisible. Divine virtue is itself matter, which makes all things: [an] inconvenient [conclusion].
I, indeed, beyond all these things, marvel how they do not understand that they make divine virtue corporeal, and [that they] cut it as if into parts. For why, even as matter, is divine virtue now passible and divisible throughout its whole self; and one part of it becomes the sun, and another the moon? For they clearly say that these things are from divine virtue; but this was what we said to be proper to matter, that being nothing in itself, but receiving shapes and qualities, it becomes all things that are divided and distinct. If therefore, as if from one subject, the divine virtue, only the sun and moon came to exist; and these are so different from one another, why then was not something else also made? C But if all things are to be made, what follows is manifest: that divine virtue is matter, and is itself that which is formed into shapes. But if the sun and moon are nothing else than what has been created from divine virtue; therefore, those things [which are] intercepted in all things are the sun and the moon: and each of the stars is the sun and [the] moon; and each other thing, both of the terrestrial animals and of the flying [creatures] and of those that are called amphibious. That even the conjurers themselves would not admit these things, I think is manifest to everyone.
Cap. XXI. Virtue [is] partly good, partly better. In the sun and moon [it is] intact, in others depraved: an improbable opinion.
If anyone, however, attends his mind to that which follows, the path may not seem straight, but [rather] one that is steeper and more tortuous than the previous one. For they say: that the sun and moon have contracted no taint from their commerce with matter. For now they cannot say how the remaining things went to the worse than their own nature would bear. For if even then, when it was by itself, the divine virtue was in such a mode as that it was partly good, and partly better, in the way that idle men tell the myth of the hippocentaurs, who, namely, were men up to the chest, but were horses in the rest of the body; both of which are good animals, but the human part in them is better: so also in divine virtue one may understand that one part of it is better and more excellent, and another [is] to be in the secondary parts and [is] worse. And likewise in matter, one part has a certain enormous malice and excess... Other things are other, and of other things there would be another account. D For it was admissible to suppose that the sun and moon from the beginning [were] more prudent, [when] the lesser evils of matter into the mix-
the less evil ones—out of which the mixture was made, so that they might consist in their own perfection and virtue; while, having sustained in the evils of so great an age such excellence in goodness, the remaining parts of it had collapsed, not indeed without providence, yet with equal providence, being more imbued with the malice that is in it, in proportion to the reason of each. For what is said about this power not differing at all from them, but being understood as entirely similar and of the same nature, is an improbable doctrine and opinion: that in the mixture, namely, one part remained sincere and pure, while another part had been imparted with a certain malice.
CAP. XXII. The moon’s light from the sun. The inconsistency of the souls received into it. The two floods of the Greeks.
They say, indeed, that the sun and moon, when they had gradually separated the divine power from matter, transmitted it to God. Moreover, if they had even a little experience in the ways of astronomers, they would not have fallen into these deliriums so as to think in this manner; nor would they have been unaware that the moon, which in the opinion of some lacks its own light, is illuminated by the sun, and that its B configurations are [relative] to its distances from the sun; and that the full moon occurs when it is distant from the sun by one hundred and eighty degrees, while the conjunction occurs when it is carried on the same degree as the sun. Furthermore, how is it not a marvel, in what manner it finally comes to pass, that there are so many souls and from diverse sources? For they are of the world itself, and of animals, and of plants, and of nymphs, and of demons; and among these they are distinguished by sight into winged, terrestrial, and those creatures which are amphibious; yet one single body, similar in every way, is always seen by us in the moon. What then is this continuity of the body? And indeed, when the moon is half-full, C it appears as a semicircle; and when it is more than half, [it appears as] the same again. In what way, therefore, are they taken up into the moon, and what vehicle do they use? For if it is light like fire, it is likely that it would not only arrive at the moon, but surpass whatever is above it; but if it is heavy, it is not possible for it even at the beginning to reach the moon.
What reason is there, then, that that which first arrives at the moon is not immediately transmitted to the sun, but waits when it is full until the remaining souls arrive? When, therefore, the moon, which was full, decreases, where does the power remain during that time, until the moon, having been emptied of the former souls, like a deserted city, D receives another colony in turn? For it would have been necessary for a certain treasury to be set apart in some part of the earth, or of the clouds, or of some other place, where the souls, being gathered together, would be ready to migrate to the moon.
But another question arises in turn. What is the cause, therefore, why it is not immediately filled? Or why does it wait again for fifteen days? This has no less wonder than what has been said; because never, from all the memory of men in the past, has the moon been full outside of the fifteenth day. Indeed, not even in the time of the flood under Deucalion, and even more so under Phoroneus
A when all the things that were upon the earth, so to speak, perished, and it came to pass that a great power of virtue was separated from matter. In addition to these things, one ought also to consider the production of generations, their choice and frustration, and likewise also their corruptions; for since these do not occur in the same way and order, neither should the order of the full moons nor the times of the waning moon be observed in such a manner.
CHAPTER XXIII. The image of matter in the sun, to which man: nonsense and delirium. Likewise delirium, that man was created from matter. Man, either a composite, or soul, or mind and spirit.
Nor should this matter be attended to in a perfunctory or light fashion. For if the divine power which is stored within matter is infinite, the sun and the moon, however much they labor, cannot diminish it in any way; for what remains after some part has been taken away is still infinite from that which is finite. But if it is finite, it ought to be perceptible to the senses, over such great intervals of time, how much of this power has been diminished from the world. Yet all things remain the same. B And whose spirits would not be moved by the absurdity of these claims, even when they say that man is a creature formed according to the image of matter seen in the sun? For indeed, images are likenesses of the archetypes. But if they leave the image in the sun, where is the archetype after which the image has been fashioned for them? For they will certainly not say that the man himself is the truly human being; nor the divine power, for this they mix with matter; but they teach that it is the image seen in the sun, which, as they suppose, was later created from the separation of matter. Nor, indeed, can they refer it to the creative cause; for they say this was sent for the salvation of the divine power, so that, according to their opinion, this must be attributed to the sun entirely; for it is for this reason, C of course, that upon its arrival and presence it came to pass that the sun and the moon were separated from matter.
Furthermore, they say that the image was seen in the sun, but that matter created man. By what manner, pray, or by what reason? For this cannot be a device of a sane mind. Besides the fact that, holding such a view, man would be an empty likeness of an empty likeness, and one who possesses no true existence, it cannot even be conceived how man exists as a work of matter. For to reason and to possess sensation is not a property of that matter which they themselves postulate. But who is the man they speak of? Is it that which is a mixture of soul and body? Or is it something else, or that which is entirely above the soul, namely mind and spirit? D But whether it is mind, how could the more perfect and better be the work of the inferior? Or, if it is soul (which they claim is the divine power), how, in robbing God of this divine power, do they subject it to the workmanship and creation of matter? But if they leave only the body, let them remember again that this, of itself, is immobile, while they say that the essence of matter is motion. Yet they do not think that any thing is drawn to matter by its own nature. Nor is that which is fashioned from these elements a fitting thing to be considered its work.
is. Clearly, whatever is created by someone is, by general acknowledgment, inferior to that person. For thus the world is inferior to the Creator, or Maker, and whatever are works of art are inferior to the artists. But they wish for nothing to be inferior to matter; and it is not fitting for the divine power to be mixed with matter, nor with that which is inferior to matter.
But those things which they say by way of B indulgence and dispensation, they do not even seem to understand themselves. For what reason is there why they should believe that the image of God was bound to the substance of human matter? Or why is the image itself not sufficient, as in mirrors, so that man might appear? Or why is the sun itself not sufficient for the birth and destruction of all things that are born, having emulated an image for the task of creating and making its own creation? What then did it have? If it was by the divine power mixed with it, was the divine power then in the role of an instrument, in such a way toward matter? But was it through an unordered motion that it thus imbued matter with form? Yet all similar things attain their end by means of imitation, through orderly arrangement and diligent workmanship. For we would never imagine that a house or a ship or any other artifact was produced by disorder; nor a statue, which art has devised for the imitation of a man.
Chapter XXIV. Christ is Mind, [according to the] Manichaeans. What of the Ecclesiastical view? The inconsistency concerning Christ. The suffering [viewed] as a shadow, the delirium of the Manichaeans. Nothing is suitable to the Word through fiction.
When they do not know Christ, yet still call him Christ, substituting another element and introducing a signification other than that which is properly understood of him, they give out that he is Mind. Now if, by calling both that which is known and that which knows, as well as his wisdom, by one and the same name, they are discovered to agree in this way with the things which ecclesiastical men say about him, what reason is there why they should reject the entire history which they call ancient? But if, as is the opinion of some, they maintain that he is adventitious and new, and one who has entered from without and by chance, let us examine it. For the leaders of this opinion, as what seems most persuasive, say that he entered after the seventh year, when the power endowed with sense had been formed and distinguished by organs. But if C Christ is Mind, according to them, then he will both be and not be at the same time; for before the mind and senses enter, he does not yet exist. But if, according to them, Christ is Mind, yet the mind enters into him while he is already existing, then again, according to their opinion, it will be Mind. Christ, therefore, is and is not at the same time. But if, according to their most approved sect, Mind is—as they also think—all things that are; since they profess matter to be unbegotten and equal—if I may so speak—to God in time and coeval with him, they maintain that this first Christ is both Mind and matter, if indeed Christ is that Mind which is all things; and matter is one of those things which are, which itself is unbegotten.
As an example and for show, they say that the divine power is in this manner also crucified in matter, and that he himself did not endure this suffering, as if indeed it were impossible for him to do this; which the Manichaean himself D
A undertakes to teach in his book: that, forsooth, the divine power has fallen into matter, and that it departs again. They devise this method. For while it is true that, to be said according to the doctrine of the Church, he gave himself up for the remitting of sins, this obtains some belief among the common people, even from the histories of the Greeks themselves, when they say that some have given themselves up in order to keep their cities safe. And the history of the Jews also has an example of this teaching, which prepares the son of Abraham for a sacrifice to God. But to subject Christ to the passion for the sake of demonstrating a fact is a mark of great ignorance, since the Word is established as a leader and messenger for the teaching and knowledge of things.
CAP. XXV. Manichaean abstinence from living creatures is ridiculous. That they abhor marriage is madness. The mythology of the Giants. An excessively allegorical interpretation.
They abstain from living things. If indeed there is some other reason for this abstinence, it must not be investigated B too curiously. But if it is on the ground that the divine power is absent from them or present in them more abundantly, this mentality and notion of theirs is ridiculous. For if stirps and plants are more material, how is it reasonable and rational that we should use that which is worse for food and sustenance? Or if the divine power is greater in them, such things are useful for food, since the faculty of the soul that performs nutrition and growth is more corporeal and gross.
But as for their abstaining from marriage and sexual intercourse, being afraid C that through the succession of the race the divine power might dwell longer in matter, I marvel how they themselves can even admit themselves to be what they claim. For if the providence of God is not sufficient to free divine power from matter both by means of generations and by those things which always remain the same, what can the cleverness and subtlety of the Manichaean devise in regard to this? For surely he does not mean that he has truly become a helper to God in this task by a giant-like service, so that, by abolishing generations, he might cause the divine power to depart from matter quickly?
What the poets D relate concerning the giants is plainly a fable. For those who discourse about these things bring forward such matters in a sense other than the words convey, concealing the dignity of their teaching under the guise of the myth; as when the history of the Jews says: "The angels came to commingle with the daughters of men"; for that which is stated in this way signifies that the powers of the soul which serve nutrition have descended from things above to things below. And the poets, who say that they emerged from the earth in armor, and then perished immediately upon stirring up rebellion against the gods, by thus insinuating the frail and fleeting nature of bodies, adorn their poetry for the sake of recreating the souls by the wonder of the event. But these men, understanding none of these things, wherever they can find a handle for some paralogism, greedily seize upon the discovery from wherever it may come, and rise up with every artifice to overturn the truth by any means.
CAP. XXVI. The Manichaean fire troubled. That fire is the matter itself.
A But that fire, endowed indeed with the power of burning, yet possessing no light, which exists outside the world, in what place does it reside for them? For if it is in the world, why has the world remained unharmed until now? For if at some time it were to corrupt it by drawing near, it is even now joined to it. If, however, it is apart, as if in its own seat and place on high, what subsequently happens to it so that it falls into the world? Or in what manner will it depart from its own place, by what necessity, or by whose driven violence? And what substance of such fire can be understood without fuel? Or how is moisture its fuel? But as to the things that are said about it according to the more natural reasons, it is not the task of this treatise to inquire.
However, it is entirely manifest from the things that have been said. For the fire existing outside the world is B altogether what they themselves call matter; since the sun and the moon, being pure from the pure, were separated from this fire by divine power, with no part of themselves left behind in this fire. This fire was matter by itself, completely removed from all association with divine power. Wherefore, when the world is emptied of all divine power opposing it, such fire will again be left behind; in what way, then, shall fire either corrupt anything or be corrupted by it? For I do not see by what reason corruption will come from that which is similar. For what will become matter, once divine power is separated from it, is what it was before it was mixed with that divine power. If, therefore, matter is going to perish once it is destitute of divine power, why did it not perish even before it obtained divine power or any gift of creation, so that matter might perish thereafter, and do so into infinity? And what is the benefit? For what was not brought about by the first will, how will it be brought about by the second? Or what is the reason for God to defer matters which cannot be seen to go well even in a man? For it is said that it is easy to attribute deliberation—which is impossible for them—to those who do not even choose to act when it is possible.
Otherwise, unless they mean something else, they are introducing a God who is above essence, and whom they speak of as a kind of new matter; and not that which wise men C think to be altogether joined together, or that which is the end of all things, and which can scarcely come into human understanding. Truly, does that dark fire have more power than the matter which is to be deserted by divine power, or less? And if indeed it is less, how will it conquer what is greater? If, however, it is more, it will indeed be able to draw it to itself, since it is of the same nature; yet it will not corrupt it, just as the Nile does not corrupt the gulfs D that are cut off from it.