A pla, from which the history of the Council of Florence can be aptly illustrated in certain respects. It is worthwhile here to compile a catalog of the books published by Mark, which we have encountered thus far. These are indeed as follows:
1. Homilies or two Orations on Purgatory delivered at Ferrara (39). 2. Homily that divine gifts are sanctified not only by the words of the Dominical B prayer, but also by the power of the Holy Spirit (40). 3. Epistle to George Scholarios, in which he censures him for having defected to the Latins. (We have published this epistle in the Appendix, n. 1.) 4. Solutions to certain doubts proposed by him (41). 5. Dialogue on the addition made by the Latins to the Creed. (In Appendix, n. 4.) 6. Epistle to the monk Theophanes, in which he praises his writings against the union with the Latins (42). 7. Another epistle to the same, which we have provided in the Appendix, n. 2. 8. Circular epistle to all those dwelling everywhere in the world and in the islands concerning the Florentine synod (b). 9. Epistle to Emperor John Palaiologos, a fragment of which Allatius displays in *De synodo Photiana*, p. 549. (Appendix, n. 5.) 10. Syllogistic Chapters currently edited by us. 11. Profession of faith refuted by Patriarch Gregory. 12. Epistle to Presbyter George against the rites and sacrifices of the Roman Church (43). 13. Antirrheticus against Andrew of Colossae. 14. Apology for his flight, written in the year 1440. 15. Treatise against the encyclical of Bessarion. 16. Final words to George Scholarios. (Appendix, n. 3.) 17. Homily on the Lord’s Prayer (44). 18. Poems and hymns to the Mother of God (45). 19. Several epistles (46).
(39) Testified by Montfaucon, in *Bibl. Coisl.* p. 406; in *cod. Coislin.* 289 (old 337) it is read: "Mark of Ephesus, homily delivered in Ferrara of Italy to the cardinals and other Latin teachers concerning the cleansing fire glorified by them." Beginning: "Since having answered with love to the things spoken by you..." Both orations exist in *cod. Paris.* 1218, 15th cent., catalog p. 256, n. 2, 3 (n. 4 is a refutation of objections). (40) "...are the Latin innovators, who in the holy mystery perfect the divine gifts by the Dominical words spoken by the priest, but the power of the prayer [perfects them] hereafter, as our orthodox Church glorifies." Beginning: "We have the exposition of the mystical liturgy from the holy apostles and the teachers who succeeded them." It exists in *cod. Mon.* 256 f. 127, in *cod. Coislin.* 290 (old 352. See Montfaucon *l.c.*), *Paris.* 1218, n. 9 (*Catal. l.c.*). Cf. also *Paris.* 1261, and printed at the end of the Liturgies of SS. James, Basil, and Chrys. ed. Paris 1560, fol. p. 158. In Latin in *Liturg. Cl. de Sainctes* Antwerp 1562, 8, p. 82. *Mon.* 256, f. 136 seq. under the title: "Solutions to someone who has posed the present questions, 1st Question. Of what shape is God?" Answer: "God has no shape, neither human nor any other like those of sensible things; for he is incorporeal and immaterial; everything that is incorporeal must necessarily not have shape." There are twenty questions. (42) In the cited *cod. Mon.* 256 is read f. 143 an epistle of Theophanes with this title: "To our most divine and most reverend emperor Lord John Palaiologos, the humble and least among the hieromonks, Theophanes, who is in the mountain of Monovyzos, in the island of ...". Beginning: "Would that I were abandoned by all, I think." There follows f. 146 a *Syntagma* of the same beginning: "The piety and true faith which is ours as Christians, which we have received and possess." At the end a scholion f. 155 b: "For these things were sent to the [bishop] of Ephesus by the most honorable among hieromonks, Lord Theophanes, while the holy [bishop] of Ephesus was then in Constantinople, so that he might bring them to the emperor, to see if the things written might appear correct, which the holy man having received, he not only praised it, but also wrote back these things to him." There follows f. 155 b, Mark's epistle: "Having received the writing of your holiness, I received no small comfort." "...written concerning the things occurring in the divine prayer, that is, of 'Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on me.'" Beginning: "How great is the power of the prayer and what [grace] it bestows on those using it..." Fragment of an epistle of Mark to George the presbyter, given by Allatius in *Creyghon exerc.* xi, p. 190. (44) *Cod. Paris.* 2075. (45) *Cod. Paris.* cit. (46) *Cod. Paris.* 965, 1191, 1218, 1286, 1295, 1310, 1527, 2005, 2075.
SYLLOGISTIC CHAPTERS AGAINST THE LATINS BY MARK OF EPHESUS, OF THE EUGENIKOS FAMILY, AND THE RESPONSE OF THE MOST WISE LORD GEORGE SCHOLARIUS TO THESE, ELABORATED AT THE REQUEST OF THE BLESSED MEMORY PATRIARCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE, LORD GREGORY, THE NEW CONFESSOR. NOW FIRST EDITED BY J. HERGENROETHER, PROFESSOR OF SACRED THEOLOGY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WÜRZBURG.
AEPHES. CHAP. I. Let us ask the Latins: If you wish the Son to have all that belongs to the Father, why do you not also make Him the Father? Because, they say, this has an opposition to the Son, and opposition has the power to distinguish persons, not to join them, so that there may be no confusion in them. If, therefore, opposition distinguishes the divine persons, as you maintain, O most wise, and if both opposites cannot simultaneously exist and coincide in any one of them, then neither will the cause and the caused coincide (for these too are opposites), nor will the Son be simultaneously caused and cause, just as the Son is not simultaneously the Father. What will they argue against this? They would say, perhaps, that He would also be the Father if He had someone to whom He could be referred (as the Son does). What an absurdity! Again that ridiculous sophism returns to us, and they do the same B thing—
A as those who declare and affirm that every man is begotten, and thus would say that Adam too would have been begotten if he had had a father.
RESPONSE OF GEORGE SCHOLARIUS
The Latins, when they hear the words of the holy Gospels: *All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine*; and again, *All mine are thine, and thine are mine*; and again, *I and the Father are one*; they are not forced by this universal word "all" to say that the Son is the Father or the Father is the Son; for the very words do not compel this, but rather they persuade and convince us to believe that the property remains immovable in the Son, and in the same way in the Father, if one rightly understands these words. Nor is it because they exclude properties from the statement that they also cast out those things which, in no wise, imply they are common—nay, the necessity of the matter perhaps even demands it. But they preserve the properties immovable and the communion in no way diminished; that is to say, they preserve in their statements both the personal distinction and the unity of the divine essence unshaken. B Moreover, they consider it equally foolish if someone, hearing the word "all," should include the property as well—which is absolutely impossible—or if one should suppose that the expression intends this; and if anyone, by excluding from the word what cannot be understood, also excludes that which is not necessary, yet not in any way impossible, but indeed, if not impossible, then even necessary, as far as divine things are concerned, in which the category of the contingent has no place. For no sound discourse would suppose that in the same way one should cast out along with the impossible that which can exist, nor is he wise who speaks thus, for it is an act of audacity to lie against the truth and its oracles.
It is sufficient, therefore, for the Latins that they consider these Gospel C passages to be understood while remaining immovably within the bounds of this twofold and most universal head of true theology: namely, the unity of the divine essence and the distinction of the persons. But they also have the doctors as patrons of their opinion, or, to speak more correctly, as guides and leaders: on one side, those who openly say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, who certainly would not have said this if, with the property of begetting, the property of spirating had also been cast out as some other thing; and on the other, those who interpret that expression, who exclude only the property of begetting from this universal utterance, all wishing the same thing in other words. If, moreover, they had known the property of the Father relative to the Son as "spirating" or "emission" (for one must not be overly concerned now with the elegance of terms), D and that it was a property to be cast out together with the other, then certainly all, or at the very least one, would have been found who would have cast it out; but as it is, no one has done so at all. But Cyril says: "We believe the Son to be co-eternal with the Father, and having all things equally, except for begetting." And the same author elsewhere: "In the Son..."
A in all things similar and equal to the Father, except for the one paternity." And Athanasius indeed: "The same things are said of the Son as are said of the Father, except that He is not called Father." And the same elsewhere: "The things that the Scriptures say of the Father, these they also say of the Son, except only that He is not called Father." And no one of the Fathers says: "except for spiration." But if the Theologian said "except for the cause," he either understands by "cause" the fountain and the cause without cause, just as the Oriental Fathers also seem to use this term for the cause, or he calls "cause" that which is opposed to the Son, that is, that which pertains to begetting. For otherwise he would neither have agreed with the saints who say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, nor with those who say that the Son has all things of the Father except the paternity and the being Father and the begetting—and nowhere have they said "production"—if indeed he himself also calls the "production" a cause at the same time; but it is absolutely necessary that he should agree with everyone.
The solution to the proposed argument
, while already clear from what has been said, will be even clearer when we do not go through every single point, but show from where he took his handle, and where the fraud lies hidden, which we shall detect and refute; and we shall cut off many words which he gathered with great ostentation, or for I know not what reason, and entirely beside the point. For, taking from the confession of the Latins the proposition which teaches that opposition distinguishes the divine persons, and joining to it at the same time the hypothesis of the Latins, according to which the Son is at once C originated and origin—which are opposites—he arrives at the conclusion: that the Son would be distinct from Himself through such an opposition and would constitute two persons, or that the opposites would have to be posited simultaneously in the same divine person. But neither is true; for one is impossible according to theological principles, and the other is impossible according to the common opinion of all; whence the supposition itself is impossible, namely, that the Son is origin just as He is originated. At the same time he shows, while not even accepting this, that the divine persons are distinguished by relative opposition; D for this is the mode of reduction to the impossible. The Latins, therefore, will say: "We grant the reasoning of the epicheirema; for it is admittedly impossible that the Son should be distinct from Himself, and that opposites should be in Him at the same time; but we deny the consequence, namely, that those impossibilities follow if the Son is origin and originated; for there is no necessity." And as to the first impossible point, we say that opposition in the divine is the cause of personal distinction, when that of the same—is to the same; but when it is of the same to one thing and another, then there is no cause of personal distinction in that which has the opposition, except in relation to those things which have such opposition alternately. A For if the ratio of principle and of that which is principled exists in the Son, which are opposed to one another, they do not distinguish the Son from himself, but from the Father and the Spirit, in that he has opposition and distinction towards the Father by the relation of the principled, but towards the Spirit by the relation of the principle. And this is found true in all cases. For paternity and filiation, or cause and caused, if you will, existed in Isaac, but because he had these in relation to one thing and another (for one was in relation to Abraham, and the other in relation to Jacob), there was one person of Isaac; but it was altogether impossible for it to be one person if he had been cause and caused in relation to the same thing, B I mean, in relation to the same species of nature. The same things must also be said regarding the second impossible point, namely, that those who hold that it is impossible for opposites to exist in the same thing at the same time, conceive this as being also in the same respect, and in relation to the same thing, and in the same manner, and whatever else the philosopher defines in his treatise on argumentation, of which if even one is lacking, neither does anything impossible follow, nor is there an argument according to the philosopher. The Latins, then, say that the principle and the principled are opposites and that they are in the Son, but not in relation to the same thing nor in the same manner; for the one is in relation to the Father, and the other in relation to the Spirit; and in relation to the Father, it is by way of generation, whereas in relation to the Spirit, it is by way of procession; and in this way, neither does anything impossible follow, C nor is the axiom destroyed. And thus his reduction to the impossible is dissolved. But he confirms this as if by an example, saying: "Just as it is impossible for the Son to be Son and Father, so it is impossible for him to be both principle and principled." But he does not speak correctly; for these things are not equal. For the name "Father" signifies a specific mode of cause, and because the Father cannot be Father of the Father, because the things which pertain to the superessential processions of the divine persons do not convert with one another, nor are the divine persons or their properties confused from one another, nor is there another Son in the divine in relation to whom the Son could be Father, D for this reason the Father cannot exist in the Son. But "principle" is a generic name, and it contains within itself both specific modes of the divine processions; and since there is something in the divine of which the Son can be the principle or producer—namely, the Holy Spirit—it is in no way repugnant for the Son to be in such a manner a principle or producer. It would indeed be repugnant and impossible, so far as it pertains to the Son himself, if this were opposed to the ratio of filiation; but procession is not opposed to (passive) generation; whence it is not altogether impossible. Wherefore, neither is the ratio similar, nor does he rightly reprehend the answer of the Latins.
A They indeed say that it is impossible for the Son to be the Father, since there is no one toward whom He might be Father; but as far as the dignity regarding opposites is concerned, it would not have been impossible; for the dignity of the same person having the capability of being both Son and Father, albeit toward different subjects, would not have been undone. But now it is impossible, not because of this, but because of the fact itself. Just as if Isaac had not begotten, but had died childless, it would not have been impossible for him to be both son and father, were it not for the fact that he was childless—not because of the dignity, but because he had begotten Jacob, and the same person was both father and son, and the B dignity of opposition is not undone.
Moreover, the example he adduces is altogether insipid and absurd. For the Latins do not say that every person in the Godhead is the Father. Then, as he himself adds, "But in truth the Son is not the Father," they reply that the Son would in truth be the Father if there were a person to whom He could be related; for in this way the example would be similar. But they do not say that the Father is the Son, just as he himself asserts that this is impossible. The Latins do, however, call Him the principle or producer of the Holy Spirit, not because it cannot be deemed impossible, but because they judge it to be necessary. He, however, in attempting to demonstrate that this is impossible, has concluded nothing.
But as a seasoning to the solution of this argument, I will add this, that his example is not even a sophism, and does not touch the subject at hand, even if it were to hold in a similar way. For according to the principles of the faith, it is not a lie that "every man is begotten," nor, if anyone were to seek an objection from Adam, would it be a false answer to say that Adam also would have been begotten if he had had a father, that is to say, if he had not been the principle (of the human race). For in so far as he is a man, it is necessary that he be begotten; C but in so far as he is a principle, it cannot happen. Just as if someone were to say that every continuous magnitude is divisible, and then at another moment, while pointing to a point—which is a continuous magnitude and yet not divisible—one were to reply that the point also would have been divisible, in so far as it is a continuous magnitude, had it not been the principle of the continuous magnitude; but now it is a principle, and for this reason it is indivisible; for it is necessary that a principle be indivisible, just as the unit in numbers. If anyone, therefore, were to say these things, he would in no way err. Thus also the true faith posits Adam as the principle of men, and in so far as this is not a hindrance, as an unbegotten principle, which nevertheless obtained its existence through creation; but this does not prevent every man being begotten. Wherefore, the objection sought from Adam is of no validity, nor would he who answers as that man does, be answering poorly at all.
EPHESIAN CHAP. II
If it is more honorable and noble to God to be the cause of the Godhead than to be the cause of created things, how, [if] the more honorable...
cause of the Godhead is communicable, why has the Spirit not shared in it? And if it is wholly incommunicable, as being proper to the Father, just as unbegottenness is, then the Son also will in no way share in it, even if the Latins desire this very much. A
SCHOLARIUS
The Latins, having learned from Athanasius, Basil, and many other teachers that the Son is second and inferior to the Father in order and in the dignity of principle, believe that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son as from the Father; they believe this necessarily, both from the canonical Scriptures, which contain many things that lead to this, and from the teachers of the Church celebrated among them, who explicitly teach the same. If anyone were to ask them: "Do you then say that the Holy Spirit is second from the Son in the order and dignity of principle, and third from the Father?" B they would not deny it, knowing that no absurdity follows from this. For if being second in order and in the dignity of principle is no obstacle to the natural dignity of the Son, neither will being third in order be an obstacle to the dignity of the Spirit; and if this were shameful for the Spirit, it would be no less shameful for the Son. The Latins only need to be careful that they state what they appear to believe correctly, and that they do not draw these conclusions poorly from the principles of the faith; as long as the teachers assert that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and the principles of the faith necessarily lead to this, it might not be necessary to respond to the implications of absurdity; for it would be more convenient for those who first thought this to defend it. C But if one should respond to the other implications of absurdities, yet not to this one. For it is not absurd in itself that the Holy Spirit is third in the dignity of principle and in order, nor does this cause a reduction in the dignity of nature, if indeed being second does not do so in the case of the Son. And again, if one were to ask them: "Is the Spirit, then, not a principle of the Godhead?" Truly, they will answer with confidence: "He is not, indeed." For of whom would He be the principle? For He will not be a principle of those from whom He is believed to have been originated, in terms of rotation (for, as Dionysius says, things pertaining to divine processions do not rotate backwards), D nor of Himself, nor of anyone else. But if the Greeks assert that it is absolutely necessary for Him to be a principle of something, let them either teach it themselves and give an account of their innovation, or let them not blame the Latins. For as long as it follows from the principles of the faith and is preached by the teachers that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son, even if it happens that He is third in order and in the dignity of principle, and even if He alone is a principle of nothing, and whatever else of such a sort follows,
which are in no way absurd, nor do they anywhere conflict with the dogmas. But let it be granted that these things are absurd: it is not so much against the Latins as against the teachers of the Church that they A impute these charges; rather, they bring common difficulties regarding the faith to bear, the solving of which would be the task only of him who first taught such a faith. The Latins, then, could say these things in their own defense. But indeed, they could also bring forward the saints who declare the Son to be greater than the Spirit, and the Spirit to be third after the Father in order and, clearly, in the dignity of causality. But even if they could bring forward no one, it would be enough for them that it is believed that the Son is less than the Father, and second in order and in the dignity of principle, and yet, no less than the Father, He is of the same substance and the same glory and is true God.
The solution to this argumentation, which is clear from what has been said, can also be set forth and illustrated in this way: If the Holy Spirit, he says (Ephesus), does not communicate with the Father and the Son in the causality of the Godhead, He will be less in dignity and Godhead; but the consequent (the condition) is false; therefore, the antecedent is also (false). Either, therefore, the Father and the Son are the principle of the Godhead, and the Spirit also communicates in this—which is impossible—or neither the Father nor the Son are the principle of the Godhead. He thinks, moreover, that he proves the result by B an argument *a fortiori* in this way: If the Spirit, not communicating with the Father and the Son in the causality of created things—which is something less for God—would Himself be less, how much more would He be less if He did not communicate in the causality of the Godhead, which is something greater for God. If, therefore, this acuteness of mind, according to him who speaks, excludes from the principle of the Godhead not only the Son, but also the Father, I grant and leave this to those who are in any way experienced in pondering and refuting such things. For in order that the Spirit might not be less in dignity and Godhead, it is necessary that He not fail to communicate with the Father in the causality of the Godhead; He will communicate, therefore. Or, consequently, the Spirit will also be a principle of the Godhead; but this is impossible, or else the Father is not. For if the Father is the principle of the Godhead, and the Spirit is not, according to him, the Holy Spirit will be less in Godhead. But the Latins will ask him—and with very good right, impelled by his own dilemma: If it is nobler for God to be the cause of the Godhead than the cause of created things, how, by not communicating with the Father in that which is nobler, will the Son not be inferior in dignity and Godhead? I suppose he will say that it is not at all necessary for C the Son to be a participant in all that belongs to the Father, even if they are most noble; for while he is a participant in the rest absolutely, as for those things which cannot possibly exist in the Son *as* Son, if the Son is not a participant in them, there is nothing absurd, nor is the Godhead and dignity of the Son thereby destroyed. Moreover, he will say that the principle of the Godhead is of such a kind, namely, properly belonging to the Father and such that it can in no way exist in the Son. But let us pass this over; for this is the very thing which is in question and concerning which the controversy exists. Meanwhile, he will say that that which cannot exist in the Son does not in the least harm the dignity of the Son if it be said that it does not exist D
A or that a similar answer and solution will not be sufficient regarding the Spirit, or even regarding the Son. But he does not answer anything else to the stated question beyond what has been said; and if he should answer anything else, it will be a lie and not even tolerable to the ears. For given that the Son is not the principle in the deity, this alone can be the answer to him who doubts concerning the dignity and deity of the Son, just as it is to him who might doubt how the Son is true God and consubstantial with the Father; if he does not share with Him in the quality of being unoriginate and unbegotten—a matter of such importance—it could not be truly answered in any other way than by the stated mode. B He said foolishly, moreover, that it is more noble for God to be the cause of deity than the cause of creation, since of those things which inhere in God, one is not more noble than another; but this those only dared to assert who, by innovating, have fashioned grades of the divine powers and operations, and whoever—being ignorant themselves—have adhered to those ignorant men. The truth, however, is this: that if anything belongs to God and to the Father as God, and not insofar as He is distinguished from the Son—that is, not as Father and generator—this must by nature also belong to the Son; and if it does not belong, whatever it be, in this respect the Son will be inferior to the Father. The same reasoning holds regarding the Spirit in respect to the Father and the Son. For if anything belongs to the Father and C the Son insofar as they are God, and not insofar as they have a relation and habitude to the Holy Spirit, this must also belong to the Spirit; and if it does not belong, the Spirit will be inferior to them in nature. But that spiration belongs to them insofar as they are referred to the Holy Spirit; therefore, it is not necessary that it also inhere in the Spirit, nor consequently that the Spirit should be inferior to them in nature. If it were not so, a place would be given to the Arians, who, because the Son is begotten, declare Him inferior to the Father in nature, and attempt to bring the Gospel into the patronage of their lie, declaring the Father to be greater than the Son. For they opined that from the fact that the Son does not have the Father's innascibility and that He is D less than the Father in the dignity of principle, He must necessarily be inferior in nature and have received a substance different from the Father; but these things are not so. Therefore, from all these things it is shown that both the series of this argument and its proof are altogether destitute of truth.
OF EPHESUS, CHAP. III
Those things which inhere in God must belong to Him properly and alone, and to Him only, and only those things, and always, and in every way.
A Those things which are natural and common to the three persons, and those which are hypostatic and personal to each of the three. For there is nothing there that is accidental, nothing acquired or subsequently added, and nothing that is not proper and solitary. B Just as, therefore, God is called good and wise and God and King and Creator, and is further called invisible and immortal and eternal, and is distinguished by all these names solely and properly in relation to creatures (for the Apostle says: *To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only wise God; and again: Who alone hath immortality and inhabiteth light inaccessible*), so too whatever might be said of each of the three persons separately is that which is said of it solely and properly in relation to the others. The Father, therefore, is Father and only and alone and properly and in only one way; the Son is Son and only and alone and properly and in only one way; and the Spirit likewise is the Holy Spirit.
Thus, too, is the Father uncaused or unbegotten only and alone and properly and in only one way; but He is also the cause, likewise, in the same manner; and therefore the remainder of the persons are only caused and alone and properly and in only one way. For when there are two, a cause and a caused, if the Father alone has the character of cause, then the remainder C of the persons are only caused and alone and in only one way. For one must consider that the word "only" is always said in relation to its opposite; for the Father is only the Father, but not also the Son, and the Son is only the Son, but not also the Father; and the Holy Spirit is only the Spirit, but not the Father or the Son; and the Father is only uncaused, but not also caused and having a cause; thus He is also only the cause, but not the caused; and therefore the remainder of the persons are only caused and none of them is the cause. For if any of them were also a cause, the "only" would be destroyed, and it would be neither only and properly the cause, nor only and properly the caused, to the contrary of which it has already been demonstrated that it must necessarily have a place. For the opposition is the cause of distinction, even according to the Latins themselves, and for both opposites to coincide in one of the thearchic persons is impossible—
D Whole is the Monad and whole is the Trinity, the Godhead; for the one is not monad, and the other not monad; for the Father is only and alone Father, and the Son is only and alone Son, and the Holy Spirit is only and alone the Holy Spirit... But if the Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son, the Godhead is no longer a whole monad; for the Father is no longer solely the Father—for how could He be, to whom the Son is associated as the paternal cause? The Son is no longer only the Son—for how could He be, who is also a father in part of the Spirit? The Spirit is no longer one and sole—for how could He be, when He is not from one and alone? The Trinity itself is no longer whole, but the Father is imperfect and, in addition, not good, inasmuch as He is "other" to the perfect procession of the Spirit; and the Son is not wholly Son, but is a "filiopater," a being constituted of imperfect parts; neither will be whole; and the Spirit, as is fitting for these, proceeds from such two. All things are divided and imperfect and removed altogether from the simplicity of the Monad.
A For one of these will not strictly exist, and for that reason it will also not exist at all. With these also agree the sayings of the saints, from among which Damascene says in his *Theological Chapters*: "The Father is the sole cause." And Theodore the Studite sings: "O sole begetter of the Only-begotten Son, O Father, and sole, sole light, radiance of light, and truly the holy Spirit of God, Lord of the Lord, solely holding what is truly." The Son, therefore, will not have the role of cause, since he ought to be solely caused and solely Son, just as the holy Spirit is also solely and remaining the Spirit of God and Father.
B
SCHOLARIUS
The Latins are so far from saying that anything is adventitious or comes later to God, that it is plain to many that, lest they should be seen either secretly to hold or to openly express such a thing, they contend against a double production or procession of the Spirit—which you yourself call double in reality—and you make the Son a participant in the temporal [procession], while you remove his eternal [procession] from him entirely; and you push and reduce the sayings of the doctors, which state that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, solely to a temporal procession. But we shall discuss later whether the procession of the holy Spirit is double, and whether they are separated from one another in reality; for now, however, it suffices that the Latins also assert that the temporal procession is the same as the eternal one, and they maintain that they are only distinct in concept, so that they might not be forced to posit any accident or adventitious element in God. But those who say that the temporal procession in the holy Spirit is a thing different from his eternal procession, these affirm that something does indeed approach and come to be in God later, even if they pretend C to deny this. But who more than the Latins confesses that all things strictly inhere in God, or rather that God is all things that are said to be, and that these are strictly so, both commonly and particularly in each of the persons? But that which concerns those terms—"only," "to the sole," "solely," and the rest—requires much investigation as to how they can be stated both concerning natural and hypostatic properties. But he, carelessly casting these aside, contradicts both the truth and himself in many places. But since he does not attack the Latins so vehemently here, we too, leaving aside their defense, proceed to the solution of the argument.The argument, therefore, is such: Everything said to be in God, whether as natural to the three persons, or as hypostatic and personal to each of the three, this must also strictly be, and solely, and to the sole, and solely D and always and in every way. But the nature of the "caused" is in the Son; therefore, it is solely in him, and therefore the nature of the "cause" is not. For, he says, "solely" is said in opposition to...
that which is opposed to it, that is, the "caused," and for this reason the Father is "cause" alone, and not "caused." A First, therefore, since whatever things he says inherent in God in his proposition, he divides into natural and hypostatic—that is, personal—and then adds: "The nature of the 'caused' is in the Son," the Latins will ask him—and very reasonably—where he places the nature of the "caused" among those things that belong to God: whether in the natural, or in the hypostatic and personal? For if it is in the natural, this must also belong to the Father; but if it is in the personal, it must belong to one person, either the Son or the Spirit; for those around him assert that personal attributes befit one person alone. B Each of these alternatives involves an impossibility; so either the proposition is not true, or the division of the attributes in God into natural and personal is not sufficient, or one of the impossible outcomes will necessarily be true. Let him therefore seek a defense; for either, finding none, he will cease even himself from asking the Latins whether they call "spirating" a natural and essential attribute, or a personal and hypostatic one, and from leading them into absurdities on either side—since he will see that he himself falls into similar ones—or, having spurned his own useless division and after condemning the other manner of dividing those things that inhere in God, perhaps he will divide them in favor of the Latins, and cease from contention with them. Then the Latins will say to him, "If your proposition, O most wise man, is true, the Son is in danger of being 'caused' alone, and the Father solely Father, and nothing else." C For it will not be permitted to him to place all those determinations in the major proposition, but in the conclusion not to take them all, but only those which he thinks helpful for his goal; for example, when he wishes, by concluding, to ascribe "principle" to the Father, to omit "solely," but when he wishes to vindicate "caused" to the Son, to cast out "by himself." For these are the ways of those who study sophisms, or who do not know what they are saying, and by their ignorance harm both themselves and others; just as nothing could be worse than, having set down his major proposition—as he himself accounts it—and having appended the minor, namely that "principle" belongs to the Father, and "caused" to the Son, to conclude that "principle" belongs to the Father properly and solely and only and alone and always and everywhere, and likewise that "caused" belongs to the Son. D For perhaps "the caused" belongs to the Son alone, but not *only* to him; for it also belongs to the Spirit. And perhaps "the cause" also belongs to the Father *alone*, but not *solely*; for he is not "cause" of those things from him in one way, but in two: as Father and as Producer. But neither does "caused" belong to the Son alone, nor "cause" to the Father alone; nay rather, it does not even befit the Father to be only Father to the Father, but also to be Producer, nor is "cause" attributed to him alone. For how could the Father be Producer were it not through the Son?
A But this is for later; for the present it suffices us that the proposition itself is neither self-evident, nor did he himself establish the necessity of the proposition. Rather, even when it is posited, many falsehoods are gathered from it, because it contains many determinations from which, in every conclusion, he assumes at his own discretion those that are useful to him. It was necessary, however, to assume them all, and thus the falsehood of the proposition would have been apparent in the falsehood of the conclusions. He also said foolishly that "only" is always said in relation to an opposite; for what is said in relation to an opposite is relative, wherefore "only" would also be relative. But this is not true; for "only" is not in relation to anything, but is rather eliminative, whether it is said of persons, or of an operation, or of any thing whatsoever. But, as it seems, he knows no difference between a relative term and an eliminative one. It is also possible to observe how he is refuted by himself. For after having said that "only" is used in relation to an opposite, he added: "For the Father is only Father, but not also Son," so that in this place he takes "Father" as an opposite to "Son"; and it is false that he is Father "only," for the Father is not only that which is opposed to the Son, but also something else, in that he has an opposition to the Holy Spirit, that is to say, Producer. Then he adds: "And only Son, but not also Father," so that if "only" is used in relation to an opposite, as he himself says, when he says the Son is only Son, but not also Father, he does not restrain the Son from producing. B For "Father," insofar as it is opposite to the Son, does not denote the Producer. But what need is there to go through everything which is said poorly in the present argumentation, because a weak foundation is posited for it by those unproven determinations of the proposition, which do not apply equally to all the things said about God, as he himself claims? He confirms the conclusions of his argument—namely, that the Father alone is the Principle, and consequently the Son alone is the principiate, and not indeed a Principle—with the sayings of Divine Damascene and Theodore the Studite, who, I suppose, would have owed him greater gratitude if he had tried to show them in agreement with the multitude of teachers, rather than if he should decide to set them alone, complying with his own will, against all other teachers and to revolt against them. It is indeed amusing that he even procures for himself the confirmation of his own doctrine from the chants, being apparently unable to seek it elsewhere. However, for those of the teachers who are more humane, and for auditors who possess greater wisdom, there is certainly no trouble in joining these two to those earlier great teachers. For the one says that the Spirit is only of God, namely of the Father and of the Son, of whom the Spirit is said to be; C for he does not say that it is only of the Father, but that it is only of God, which differs by a great deal. The other, even if this is truly the case in his theology, D
wishes the Father alone to be the principle, because he alone is the principle without principle, according to which meaning and cause we see all the Orientals using the name of principle and the preposition *ex* (from), from which also all disagreement with the Latins is removed for us. But he does not say that the Son entirely does not share with the Father in the procession and existence of the Holy Spirit; for how could he say this, who proclaims that he proceeds from the Father through the Son and is produced from the Father through the Son? In such a way it has been shown that the Ephesian’s conclusion in no wise proceeds, since his major proposition has been rendered entirely infirm, and from the things which he later wishes to use for its confirmation, he has taken nothing further.
OF EPHESUS. CHAP. IV.
We indeed, while we remove the Son from the cause of the Spirit, do not at all lower him from the dignity of God and Father; for we do not say that the cause of the Godhead is communicable, just as we do not say that the lack of principle or the ingenerateness of the Father, nor fatherhood itself, is. But the Latins, who hold the cause of the Godhead to be communicable, and then affirm it to be lacking in the Spirit, by all necessity render him inferior to the Godhead and dignity of the Father and the Son, and according to this they are forced to blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, just as they are also forced to do in many other ways.
SCHOLARIUS.
The Latins also here will use the same defense against the blasphemy charged against them as they used for the second argument, since this is the same as that one—I do not know in what way and with what wisdom C distinguished—and the solution given to that will also be sufficient for this. It would be appropriate to say only so much at present: if that very wise man had well understood the good of order, as far as it pertains to arguments and reasons, he would not have set forth as two separately those things which have altogether the same force; and as far as divine matters are concerned, about which the discourse is, he would have brought forth neither the second argument then, nor this fourth one now. For from the fact that he is ignorant of the good of order, he believes himself to be granting something great by attributing the cause of the Spirit to the Father alone, while excluding the Son from it, and he judges the Latins to be blaspheming because they do not dare the same things as he. But if, strictly speaking, that which does not partake of the cause that is in the Father is inferior to the Father’s Godhead and honor, as he himself asserts, then the Latins blaspheme against the Spirit, and he himself likewise against the Son; D and he is so much the worse, in as much as they, from those things by which they honor the Son, are accused of sinning against the Spirit, whereas he, while pushing the Son away from his fitting honor for the sake of contention, simultaneously casts the Spirit out from it as well. But when, given that the cause is shared-in with the Son, he says that the Spirit follows as being lower and lacking this,
A if indeed no one among the saints has decreed that the Spirit is from the Son and proceeds from the Son, and that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Spirit (and before all else, the Son himself says that all things that are the Father’s belong to him, and they all add, except for generation and fatherhood), then the blasphemy is surely on the part of the Latins. But if, from many sources and in many ways, it is necessary to concede and posit that the Son is the principle of the Spirit, how is it that he who removes the cause of the Spirit from the Son does not blaspheme all the more against God? If, moreover, he thinks that those teachers who say the Holy Spirit is from the Son and proceeds from the Son are blaspheming those who do not also say that the Holy Spirit is a principle of deity—inasmuch as they are separating him from the equality of honor with the Father and the Son—then, in this way, he will surely and nonetheless himself be blaspheming, by attaching the charge of blasphemy to the teachers. For that clever argument did not escape them, nor the fact that by saying the Son is the principle of the Spirit, but confessing that the Spirit is the principle of nothing, they would be rendering the Spirit lesser and would be blaspheming. Yet, nevertheless, they do not blaspheme while saying the Son is the principle of the Spirit (nor, therefore, does any necessity of blasphemy follow for the Latins; on the contrary, they rather obey B the doctrines of the teachers and the principles of the faith, among which is the order of the divine persons and their processions); nor do they honor the Father excessively, as this man does, by bringing ignominy upon the Son, and they believe that no excellence of honor is lacking C to the Spirit, when they say that he proceeds from the Father and the Son genuinely and naturally. For it is the same thing, as regards honor, both to proceed naturally from God and to produce God in this way. But if not producing God were to be a diminution for the Spirit, then not being produced by God would be a diminution for the Father; since both, as I said, have equal weight in terms of honor—both to produce and to be produced. But to be from no one and to be without cause, and to be the cause of nothing, and on the other hand to be from another but to produce another from oneself—these things follow the good of order, which is necessary to be present in the divine persons to a much greater degree. And the difference according to these things is a difference of order; D so far is it from harming the identity of the essence that they much rather display it openly. We confess the identity of nature, says the great Basil, since the Son is from the Father. And all—not to say more—the teachers speak in this way. Is the identity of the essence set aside, therefore, because the Father is not also from the Son? By no means. Therefore, the identity of the essence of the Spirit with the Father and the Son is also most brilliantly illuminated by the fact that he proceeds from the Father through the Son; and if neither the Father nor the Son is from the Spirit, the identity of the essence would not be set aside because of this, nor would the Spirit become lesser in terms of deity, nor does anything else stand in the way of the persons being what they are, either from one another or in some other way, save only for the good of order;
A so that it is manifest that to hold the contrary—that there is any other way of being or proceeding—destroys the good of order. So far are those people from blaspheming who, while keeping everything else unchanged, also preserve the good of order, in which all necessity consists. When this noble man perceives this well and decides to keep it, he will henceforth cease from thinking those who keep it to be blasphemers.
OF EPHESUS. CHAP. V.
Of those things which pertain to the divine nature, some are always spoken of only in the singular, even though they are understood in the three persons—just as "God," and "Creator," and "King," and "Good," and anything of this sort; for we say "one God," "one Creator," "one King," and "one Good"—the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Others, however, are always spoken of in the plural, even if they be in only two persons, as is the case for the "caused" [principiatum] with respect to the Son and the Spirit; for we say that there are two caused [things], and not one. B Since these things are so, and since the Latins assign the cause of the deity to two persons, namely to the Father and the Son, we ask of them to which of the aforementioned categories they join this.
If they say to the second, the absurdity is manifest of its own accord; for there will be two causes, just as there are two effects, and thus a duarchy will enter in, and the celebrated unity of the principle will be removed from the midst.
But if they say to the first, it is asked, first of all, how? For those things are common and natural, and pertain equally to the three persons. Then, and in this way, they will again fall into the same trap; for that one principle, in that it is "Genitor" and "Spirator," which is the Father alone, is not the same in number as that one principle, in that it is "Spirator" alone, which is the Father and the Son, as they themselves say. Therefore, even in this way there will be two principles and two causes, C and from every side the duality of principles surrounds them.
The cause of the deity, as the Latins themselves would say, pertains to the Father and to the Son in a different manner, and not in the same way; but to the Father indeed insofar as he is "Genitor" and "Spirator," but to the Son insofar as he is "Spirator" only. But the difference, according to the Fathers, introduces number along with itself. Therefore there are two causes of the deity, and the monarchy is from this point driven out by the Latins.
SCHOLARIUS
The Latins know how to preserve the one principle of all things above all else, and they ward off the double principle on every side, both in their confessions D and in instructions, and in written books, and this
A they impart in their initial theological instructions, when the teachers of theology set it forth to their students as one of the other sciences, not only with order but with exceptional care. For they do not, from the fact that they have read many of the writings of the learned, after having studied rhetoric a little before, take to themselves the name of doctor, or receive it from the populace or from the judgment—or rather, the lack of judgment and prejudice—of the uneducated. B But just as there is no one who can be a master of philosophy who has not first examined the philosophy of Aristotle and the commentaries of the ancients upon it, as well as the questions of more recent thinkers, and is able to refute everything and logically demonstrate it well, and dissolve every opposition, and stand ready to give an account of everything pertaining to philosophy; so too, they do not entrust theology to anyone unless he has first been a student for many years, has engaged in many discussions, has been exercised in all things pertaining to it, and has, under many teachers presiding over him, often given proof of the science he has thus acquired, so that he may be judged worthy of teaching theological matters. And he must become known to everyone through the judgment of those who are knowledgeable; it is necessary first to be a philosopher and a dialectician, and then to take up theology. Thus do the Latins value theology, and thus do they take great care that no one, owing to ignorance, should become a cause of harm C to himself and to others by handling theology, the greatest of all sciences, without method and art. For how could it be possible for anyone to perceive the consequences that follow from principles and connect them to these, or to separate those which do not rightly follow, and in general to be well-acquainted with the principles of sequence, and thereby regulate every argument and every opinion, unless he has learned many such things in dialectic, has often practiced them in other disciplines, and has also gathered many things from the rest of philosophy which, even if they do not serve to constitute theological science, nevertheless tend to adorn it? For it is entirely impossible to distinguish and divide the reasons for consequences—without which no one can be a master of theology, just as no one can be a master of any other science D—correctly, without dialectic and the rest of philosophy. But those who neither study nor know any of these things, but move forward to questions regarding the greatest matters without method and without any rule, these would push away and dishonor as spurious the pure dogmas, while they would eagerly embrace it if someone were to put forward something good and yet unapproved, and they would view with suspicion the safe things that are free of all suspicion, while they would speak boldly about things requiring great caution and much
A reverence, and this is much more true when someone who knows nothing is convinced that he knows, and is considered by others as an expert. What then is there of such a sort that one might blame in the Latins, or what is it that he who is about to engage in theology would expect them to fall into so easily—something which it is shameful for a geometer to suffer in his diagrams, and for a physicist in his logic regarding moving bodies, namely, to remove the principle from the middle?
How could someone easily believe that while the Latins are good geometers and physicists, and filled with all knowledge, they are yet such absolute ignoramuses in theology that, through the opinions they hold, they destroy one of the principles of theology which they themselves value highly and wish to guard, and concerning which they philosophize daily in both public and private discussions—and this while we are shouting at them to pay attention and be on their guard, and while the matter is not only shameful but also extremely dangerous? For what is more shameful and at the same time more dangerous than one who professes the science of theology, through the opinions he holds, destroying the principles of theology without even realizing it, and losing the salvation which is obtained most of all in the truth of the faith? B And what could be more shameful than that so many should suffer this? For I would have rather believed that the Latins, having learned and opined that the monarchy is not necessary in divine matters, were saying something that would ruin it, than that they would honor and wish to guard the monarchy—if indeed it is a principle of the faith—and yet, through what they otherwise say, be destroying it, not knowing that all who say those things are inevitably introducing a dual principle. The former would have been a case of negative ignorance, to which, since they are human, they might easily succumb; but the latter would be a case of willfully sought and privative ignorance, which those who are so well-imbued with dialectic and other philosophical disciplines cannot suffer, neither in theology nor in any other subject.
And although we know that many others before them, possessed of such wisdom, have been cast down into the abysses of heresies, yet neither were they as great a multitude, nor were they endowed with similar wisdom, nor were all the dogmatic questions so thoroughly clarified at that time, nor could there be so many teachers to serve as their guides to the knowledge of the truth. For we know that the other heresies were established rather through folly and ignorance; but Arius, Nestorius, and Sabellius, perhaps wise men indeed, began only from the Scriptures. For not yet did men pay such reverence to any of the teachers that they would adhere to his opinions without any doubt; C for perhaps there was no such person then. But in the contests against those heretics, as if in a certain training ground, others gave a specimen of wisdom, faith, and accurate exposition of doctrines, and immediately became luminaries of the Church, having been D venerated so much later that their theology became the canon and standard for all, and laws were established commanding this; and there are so many of them, and each left behind so many books, that from then on it is impossible for anyone to dispute any of the questions and doctrines in theology, for those who altogether have such—
A honor, so that their theology might be a rule and standard for all, and laws might have been laid down prescribing this. And so, many are they, and so numerous are the individual books they have left behind, that concerning no other problem or dogma of theology could they raise a doubt who know clearly how to judge such things, having been enlightened by so many doctors and the writings of so many individuals; and if indeed anything discordant is found even in these, they rightly compose and harmonize it with those methods by which the doctors of the Church themselves joined together the divine Scriptures and showed them to be consistent against those who attempted to divide them, and in this division confirmed the foundation of their own perverse opinion.
Since all these things are so, who would easily believe that the Latins truly abhor a duality of principle in God, but are yet driven into it again as if it followed necessarily from this opinion of theirs? For they themselves do not yield to anyone in wisdom, nor is it probable that, being wise, they should suffer this; but it is rather likely that those who do not understand the wisdom of the Latins beyond measure succumb to such a deception, thinking that those things result from the opinion of the Latins which are once and for all entirely separated from it.
But that this absurdity cannot in any way be inferred from the doctrine of the Latins, B a simple and true argument persuades us, and one which, if anyone should reject, he must of necessity also reject many principles of theology at the same time. For they say that the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit by one spirative virtue, because this virtue follows the essence of the Father and the Son, not the relations by which they are distinguished, and just as the power of generating and being generated is one in the Father and the Son, so too is the power of spirating one in them. For if the power which is in them, other than the power of generating and being generated, must be one, it is necessary that this one power introduces one operation, one procession, and one principle; neither, therefore, is it absurd that there is one spirative virtue in the Father and the Son, nor does it follow, since this is one, that the principle of the Spirit in the Father and the Son is not one, but C double. Moreover, the Father and the Son, abstracting from the relative opposition which they have toward one another—insofar as the one generates and the other is generated—as regards other things, are one, and one whole, and one in number. As, therefore, there is one God and one Creator and one sender, so also there is one principle of the Holy Spirit or one spirator. For if the Son could not share with the Father in the production of the Holy Spirit for some other reason, the case would be different; but if nothing else stands in the way, as far as the destruction of the monarchy is concerned, there is nothing to fear; just as if the Son could not be creator, nor the Holy Spirit, just as the Father is, the case would be clearly different; but as long as it is necessary that creation be common to the three, there is nothing to fear regarding the monarchy. For they create by one virtue, and as God, the power of creating resides in each of them, whence, since they are one God, they are necessarily also one creator. But if it is a marvel, the two sub-D
A admiration, seeing that the three hypostases are one principle and yet do not coalesce. But all who believe in this indeed marvel at it, nor do they believe any the less for that; rather, they believe precisely because they marvel. For divine things must be supernatural, above our mind and superior to it. This is how the matter before us stands. It is indeed wondrous, and even more than wondrous, that two hypostases, perfectly distinguished by their properties, should be one principle for the third person and one in number, and yet not be confounded with one another, nor distinguished by any difference of nature from the hypostasis that proceeds B from them. Nevertheless, this must concur with the other principles of the faith, and truth must exist alongside this paradox. Nor should the Latins be blamed if, following the words of the teachers, they believe that the Spirit is from the Son, and that the Father and the Son are one principle of Him, and then by certain reasonings comfort and console the weakness of the mind, as if in the absence of an exact solution—which it is not given to attain in this matter—they employed an apparent logic, taking as guides and leaders in this those same authorities from whom they received this opinion. For this, before fair judges, would incur no reproach whatsoever. But if, for the sake of contention C against us, they intended to confirm their own opinion—one entirely foreign, invented by them first and alone—and if, carried away by human wisdom into such reasonings, they were attempting to mask the falsehood of their mind and their deceit with fair-sounding words, this would indeed be strongly censured in them, and no pardon would be granted to them for introducing such innovations. But it is far from the case that anyone can truly level such a charge against the Latins. For it is not in reliance upon one teacher, nor upon the few and obscure words of any individual, but trusting in all their teachers together, and in some of our own who in many places and as if by design discourse D upon this matter, that they have arrived at the defense—insofar as it can be done—of the opinion of the saints. They did not seek to demonstrate it with arguments, but endeavored to soften and resolve the difficulty, both for themselves and for those of their brethren who were scandalized, just as they might answer that they take the greatest care in other questions of faith, if someone were to question them opportunely. And this is what those who wish to defend the Latins in favor of the monarchy—or rather in favor of themselves—would say; they will strongly entreat the man not to fear on their behalf, lest they might provide a passage for dyarchy, as he himself says, through the things they posit and believe. They are so far from fearing the force of the syllogism themselves that they believe it to be firm or indissoluble, just as they are easily able to solve it in this way. They will say, therefore, in the first place, that there are many things that condemn his principal proposition. For he takes the necessity from the verbal mode of expression, saying that the attributes present in the divine nature are spoken of in a twofold way; but this