MONITUM
We have already said that there are some who call these last two books into doubt; but that they are very few to be found, and that they cannot establish their own opinion with sufficiently firm arguments; and for this reason the contrary opinion has so prevailed that all have embraced it with one consent. It is worth noting again that this argument is treated in the Preface toward the end, with the greatest care that was possible.
OF THE SAME: COUNTER-ARGUMENT
A And difficulties and solutions against Eunomius from the divinely inspired Scriptures, concerning the things that are argued to the contrary regarding the Son, in the New and Old Testament, BOOK IV.1. If the Son is by nature God, and the Father is God by nature, the Son is not God in one way and the Father in another, but similarly; but if the Son is not God by nature, as those who are falsely called gods are said to be, he is not God at all. If the Son is one Lord by nature, and the Father is also Lord by nature, clearly it is not a different nature. And if the Father is called one God, and the Son is also God, it is not a different nature, but one. If there is one Lord by nature, although many are called sons by adoption, and one Son by nature, although [many] are named by adoption; since the word "adoption" is spoken in imitation of that which is by nature: for nothing can be named by adoption, unless that which is by nature precedes it. Therefore, if we are sons of God by adoption, it is necessary that the Son by nature should pre-exist.
A 1. If the Son is God by nature, and the Father is God by nature, not otherwise is the Son God, and the Father differently, but similarly; but if the Son is not God by nature, saying so is like those who are falsely called gods, and he is not God. If the Son is one Lord by nature, and the Father is also Lord by nature, it is clear that it is not a different nature. B And if then the Father is called one God, and the Son is also God, it is not a different nature, but one. If there is one Lord by nature, while many are called sons by adoption, and there is one Son by nature, while many are named sons by adoption [(52)], then the word "by adoption" is said in imitation of "by nature"; for nothing could be said to be "by adoption" if "by nature" did not precede it. If, therefore, we are sons of God by adoption [(33)], it is necessary that the Son by nature should pre-exist. Then there are also the true names of the essence of which they are names, [and] signs. And the Father is also truly Lord and God.
A If the "only-begotten" is not of generation, but because of the incomparable, then the Father is also only-begotten, for he is incomparable. But every creature, too, not being like another, is only-begotten; therefore there are many only-begotten, and the Son of God is not one. But if B the Son is not simply only-begotten, but is the Son who is only-begotten, and is only-begotten from the Father, the Son is indeed only-begotten, and not an only-begotten creature. If the Son is Creator by participation and the concession of the Father, and not by nature, then nothing of the things created by him exists by nature. For if the creator is not by nature, how could the things created exist by nature? If God acts as no one else, he will also generate as no one else generates; for God is incomparable to everything in everything. B That which is made is not from the substance of the maker, but that which is begotten is from the very substance of the begetter; therefore to make and to beget are not the same. If the Son is from God, yet not as from a Father, but as from another—and God is to us also the cause of existence, for from him are all things—then the Father is not in one way Father to the Son and in another way to us, but in the same way. And how is this not absurd? If nothing is like and equal to God except the Son, nothing among the examples will be said without difference; for God is above all. C That which is in the form of God is in the substance of God. For the form of God is not one thing and his substance another, lest he be composite. Therefore, whoever is equal according to form is also equal according to substance. If he who is begotten is inferior to him who begat, this is not a fault of the begotten, but a weakness of the begetter. For either through envy he did not make him equal, or through inability he did not beget one like himself. If the Father was before the Son, he was necessarily the father of some other being; for without a son, one could not be called a father. If he who has known the Son according to substance has also known the Father (for "If you had known me, he says, you would have known my Father also"), then the Son is consubstantial with the Father. For nothing incorporeal can be known from a dissimilar substance. If believing that Christ is the Son of God involves the necessity D that he pre-exist by nature. [alt-version omitted]
For if their operations are the same, their substance also is one. The operation of the Father and of the Son is one, as it is written: *Let us make man*; and again: *For what things soever the Father doeth, these also the Son doeth likewise*; therefore the substance of the Father and of the Son is also one. If the knowledge of the Father and the Son is eternal life, it is necessary that they be of one substance. For those things which are of diverse substances are not apprehended by one knowledge, nor can they vivify in a like manner. If the Son is truly the image of the Father, and every image is an image of either a substance, or a form, or a shape, or a species, or a color, and God is none of these, but only in substance, then the Son, being the image of the substance, is consubstantial with the Father. If the Father is incomparable in all things toward the Son, and in all things toward the creation as well, it cannot be that he is related one way to the Son and differently to the creation, but rather he is related similarly to both; therefore he is not only dissimilar to the Father, but even similar to the creation. And how is this not absurd? If, while calling the Son a creature, they do not mean it as one of the creatures, why, when we speak of a "begotten one," do they understand him as one of the begotten? If God does not beget, lest he suffer flux, nor create, lest he labor; if he creates without passion, how much more does he beget without passion? If the radiance of any light is begotten indeed from the light, yet not at some time, but without time and co-eternally with it (for there is no light without its radiance), then the Son, being the radiance, shall not be "at some time," but is co-eternal, since God is light, as David says: *In thy light we shall see light*; and Daniel: *And the light is with him*. If according to them the "begotten" is substance, just as the "unbegotten" is, and the Son of God is the begotten, then the Son is also the substance of God. If God begat the Son by will and not by nature: either, having willed once, he afterwards willed not, or he willed again and begat again. But if his will is not one, but diverse, he is no longer simple, C nor is he the author of one thing, but as he wills, so he acts. If God does not beget, it is either because he is unable, or because he does not will it. But if he is unable, he is inferior to a generative and perfect nature, and is indeed powerless; if, being able, he did not will it, he possessed it by nature but withheld it by his will. So if he has not yet begotten, then, having willed it, he will beget at some time. D If there was a "when" in which the Son was not, that very thing—the "when"—will be after the begetter, but before the begotten. The Son, therefore, is no longer before all things.
A Since we say that, the Father existing always, it is necessary that the Son also always exists, they say: "Therefore, since the Son is always a creator, and the creation will always be, in this way the creation will also be co-eternal with the Father and the Son." But he who speaks of a creator does not at the same time speak of the creation. For the building does not exist together with the builder, nor does the vessel with the shipwright. For the creation, indeed, is in the creator, but that which is created is after the creator. It is impossible to speak of a Father without the Son existing. And he who speaks of a Father does not speak of a Father simply, but of the Father of someone.
B "...God, and Lord, and omnipotent, and Sabaoth, and He who is, and Adonai, and Eloi," is what God is called in the Scriptures; but "unbegotten," nowhere. But if anyone were even to concede this, it would be appropriate to apply the name "unbegotten" and the previously mentioned names just as much to Jews as to all others; but to Christians alone, "Father of Christ." If, therefore, that which alone separates us from the rest is false, and not true, if the name is by adoption and not a reality by nature, our faith is false and our hope is vain. For he whose beginning is weak, his end is also feeble. Again they ask: "Was the Son begotten when he existed, or when he did not exist?" Their question is ambiguous and craftily devised. For, fearing to ask "when," and "in time," they say "when he existed." Ask them in return: "Did God beget the Son when he was already Father, or when he was not yet a Father?" For if he was Father when he did so, he, being, begot the existing one; but if he was not, he was made, and is not a Father by nature. C But all their contentiousness is excluded by the divine Scriptures, while Moses cries out concerning the Son: "He who is, sent me" (Exod. III, 14); and the evangelist: "In the beginning was the Word" (Joan. I, 1). And he does not say "was" just once, but four times. And again elsewhere: "He who is from God" (Joan. VIII, 42); and: "He who is in the bosom of the Father" (Joan. I, 18); and in other places: "He who is in heaven" (Joan. III, 13); and in the Apocalypse: "He who is, and who was, and who is coming" (Apoc. I, 8); and Paul: "Who being the splendor of the glory" (Hebr. I, 3); and: "Who existing in the form of God" (Phil. II, 6); and again: "Who is God over all, blessed" (Rom. IX, 5). If the Son is true God, and light, and immutable, and good, and holy, and Lord, and the Father also is these things, D yet it is not in the same manner, but rather in a greater manner—not by a superiority of essence, but by an overflowing of quality.
≫ A For one essence is not said to be "more" than another essence, but [this is said] of quality. For a man is not said to be "more" of a man than another man, but a good man is more than a good man, and a just man more than a just man. The nature of those begotten is the same as that of the begetter, even if the begotten have their being in a different mode. For neither is Abel, who was begotten through intercourse, different from Adam, though Adam was not begotten, but fashioned. If the cause is greater than that which is caused, and differs from it in essence, and every father is a cause, and every son is caused, then fathers are greater than their sons and differ from them in essence, and are not of one essence. But this is not true.
They ask: If the Father, having begotten the Son, ceased from begetting Him? And if they obtain the admission that He ceased, they infer: Therefore He also began to beget. For everything that has an end also has a beginning; therefore the Son was not always. We shall say, then: If that which terminates must have a beginning, then that which has a beginning must also terminate; therefore angels and all incorporeal things B having a beginning of their being must, by necessity, also have an end of their being. But this is absurd. It is possible, therefore, that what has begun to be does not end, and what has ended did not have a beginning. If not, then if the Son Himself has a beginning of being, then according to them He also necessarily has an end; since whatever has a beginning, they wish to have an end also. And how is this not blasphemous? Moreover, the foreknowledge of God, while lacking a beginning, has an end after the things it foreknew have come to be. Thus, that which has an end does not necessarily have a beginning.
The "one" in the case of incorporeal things is said either in respect of operation, or will, or essence. When the Savior said, *I and the Father are one*, He said it according to one of those things which we have just written. Therefore, if they say it is according to operation, they must also say it is according to essence; for the operation of those whose essence is different cannot be similar. But if they are one according to will, it is necessary not only that whatever the Father wills, the Son must also will, but C also that whatever the Son wills, the Father must also will. Therefore the Son will also command the Father in the things He wills, if indeed He is also commanded. But if He is only commanded, He serves under compulsion and unwillingly. If, however, they are one neither by operation nor by will, it remains, according to them, that they are one according to essence—that is, that the Father and the Son are consubstantial.
That the term "unbegotten" signifies a certain mode of existence, not essence.
D 1. If "unbegotten" were an essence, and "begotten" were an essence, and for that reason the Father and the Son were not consubstantial, then every thing begotten of necessity would be of one essence; therefore the Father and the Son...
A are the offspring of the Son of God. And how is this not blasphemy? If the unbegotten, being distinguished against the begotten Son, is an essence, and the uncreated, being distinguished against the creation, is an essence, then the unbegotten will be an essence, and the uncreated will be an essence. God, therefore, is two, and not one essence. Furthermore, every creation will also be one essence. But this is false; for while the creation is one, the essences are different. Thus, His immutability, and His state of being without beginning, and many other things will be essences. If someone, by calling the Father unbegotten and the Son begotten, declared their essences, and wished to state the mode of their existence, how else could he possibly speak than this? Therefore, "unbegotten" is a mode of existence, and not the name of an essence. If things that have a different origin of existence possess a different essence as well, then not even men are consubstantial. For the existence of Adam, who was formed from the earth, is one; another is that of Eve, who came from his rib; another is that of Abel, for he came from union; and still another is that of the One from Mary, from the virgin alone. And likewise also in the case of winged creatures and quadrupeds. If the Father is unbegotten because He was not begotten, and the Son is begotten—because of His having been begotten—then the unbegotten exists after the one who was begotten. For He had nothing against which He might be called unbegotten. For distinctions are of things that exist, not of things that do not exist. If there was a time when God was, but was not Father, having become Father He took upon Himself the name of Father. Thus God is indeed unbegotten, but the Father is begotten; therefore the same entity, being simple, is both begotten and unbegotten.
2. If the impossible is the contrary of the possible, and the foolish of the wise, C and all things that are distinguished against one another are contraries to one another, then the unbegotten is also a contrary to the begotten. The Father, therefore, is contrary to the Son according to essence, if at least "unbegotten" is not a mode of existence, but an essence. If the Son is a created thing and not an offspring, and all things that exist are created things, then the Father is called "unbegotten" in vain, since there is no offspring at all in relation to which He is called unbegotten. Therefore, He would more justly be called "uncreated" than "unbegotten." If "unbegotten" is a name, it is not an essence. For names are signifiers of essences, but are not themselves essences. But if "unbegotten" is the essence itself, let them state its name. For we do not know essences from themselves, but from names and operations, and especially the [things]...
A incorporeal. If "unbegotten" were the name of the essence of God, then either God, while knowing His own essence, remained ignorant of the name of the essence, or, even knowing the name, He deceived those who heard Him. For the Lord says: "Almighty is my name". And when asked by Moses what His name was, He said: "I am who I am." And again: "The God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob; this is my name eternal." And David says: "Lord is the name for you." But this name, "unbegotten," neither did He Himself ascribe to Himself, nor did any of the saints utter it. But if He neither deceived nor was ignorant (for it is impious to say either of these things), then "unbegotten" is not His name. Now, "unbegotten" is either an essence or an accident (for besides these, there could be nothing); but it is not an essence, for it is not even the term B contrasted with it—for the Son is begotten, not insofar as He is essence, but insofar as He was begotten. But if it is an accident, it is either naturally inherent, or it can be present and absent. But if it is naturally inherent, it is necessary for God to be both essence and accident. For such things necessarily happen to those to whom they are accidents. But if it is present contingently, there will be a time when He is unbegotten and a time when He is begotten. If they call God "unbegotten" because He was not begotten, they are not saying what His essence is, but what it is not. But no essence is known from what it is not, but from what it is. For "immortal," and "incorruptible," and "unchangeable" C signify not His essence, but that He does not die, nor is corrupted, nor changed like created things. Therefore, let them teach what God is, not what He is not. If "unbegotten" is not the name of an essence, but is essence-itself, and the Son is also an essence, then the Son is also unbegotten, and every essence is unbegotten. If "unbegotten" is the essence of God, and "begotten" is the essence of the Son, then the creature or the creation is not His essence. For there is one, and not many, essence: [which is] the Son. When someone says "man," or "stone," or "wood," he indicates a certain essence; but when he says "begotten," he does not signify an essence simply—since every begotten thing is one essence. If, then, the "begotten" is not indicative of any essence, then D clearly "unbegotten" is not either. If God is unbegotten because He was not begotten, so too is He incorruptible because He is not corrupted. Just as, therefore, "incorruptible" signifies His endless [nature], so too "unbegotten" signifies His being without beginning. But if He were unbegotten but not incorruptible, He would be without beginning but not without end; which is absurd. "Unbegotten" is not, therefore, an essence, but a declaration that He has not been begotten. If by nature the Father is unbegotten, and by nature the Son is begotten—if, however, He is a "begotten thing" by nature, He is no longer a creature. Since, therefore, [He] is a begotten thing by nature, it is necessary that He who begat be also a [begotten thing].
A For without a begetter, he could not exist. Let them, therefore, name the begetter, if the Father did not beget. If God is "unbegotten" in substance, and the Son is "begotten" in substance, and the Paraclete is a "creature" in substance, then [it follows that] Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are mere names without substances. Let them, therefore, baptize into an "unbegotten," a "begotten," and a "creature." For things are more powerful than names, and realities are more useful for operation than what is merely spoken. If, they say, the Father is unbegotten, but the Son is begotten, they are not of the same substance. For "unbegotten" and "begotten" cannot be of one substance. But we say that these are not substances, but names by which the existence of each of them is indicated. And nothing prevents one substance from having different names, just as the opposite is also true, that there can be one name for different substances in created things. B If the Father is unbegotten, and the Son is begotten, [it leads to the conclusion that] one and the same substance is both unbegotten and begotten. But we do not say the Son is a part of the Father, as if the substance were divided into unbegotten and begotten, but rather that the total [Son] is begotten from the total [Father]—two perfect [realities], and not two parts from some one thing. If the Savior came in the name of the Father, as He Himself says, "I have come in My Father's name," then it is necessary that whatever the Father is called, the Son must also be called. Therefore, He will also be called "unbegotten," if this name also belongs to the Father. And if "unbegotten" is a title of honor for the Father, and if it is necessary to honor the Son in the same way, according to His own voice which says, "That all should honor the Son, just as they honor the Father," then it is necessary also to call the Son "unbegotten," so that one honor for Father and Son may be preserved. C If the Son manifested the name of the Father to men, as He Himself says, "I have manifested Your name to men," and "unbegotten" is the name proper to His substance, let them show where the Savior called Himself "unbegotten." If God is greater than all, is He greater in substance, or because He is the cause of all, and has been begotten by no one? For if it is in as much as He is substance, then every substance is greater than all things; but if in as much as He is unbegotten, then substance and unbegotten are not the same thing. If the unbegotten is something, then the immortal, and the endless, and the disease-free, and the ageless D will also be "something." Therefore, since the unbegotten is a substance, whether it is so by substance, or by the fact that it is the cause of all; if the "unbegotten" is a reality, then so are the immortal, the endless, and the ageless.
A For these also are immortal and endless. But if it does not exceed by those things which it is not, but by those which it is (for not even a man is superior to a brute by not being inanimate or senseless—for these are characteristics of the irrational—but by being rational), so also will God be greater, not because He is unbegotten, but because He is the cause of all things. If the unbegotten is distinguished from the begotten by opposition, and yet the unbegotten is a simple substance, then by this fact—that it is immutable, immortal, and devoid of form—it will also be distinguished from the begotten in other respects. For if it is distinguished by some things, but not at all by others, it is composite and not simple. B If he who has known that God is unbegotten has accurately known what God truly is, then again, if there is nothing greater than to know God according to His own nature—indeed, if this is eternal life—then he who taught us that God is unbegotten will be found greater than those things which God has prepared for them that love Him. For it is impossible for a man, while he is a man, to know those things which "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have they entered into the heart of man." Yet sinners have also heard the name "unbegotten." Therefore, God has taught sinners the greater thing, either by Himself or through another, while He has reserved the lesser thing—which contributes nothing to eternal life—for the righteous. And how is this not absurd? "Unbegotten" is neither a definition nor a property of God. C For these terms are convertible with those of which they are a definition or property. For "man" is a rational, mortal animal, capable of intellect and knowledge; and if any thing is a rational, mortal animal, capable of intellect and knowledge, this is man; and that which is "laughable" is the property of man, and if any thing is laughable, it is a man. But if any one concedes that "unbegotten" is said of God alone, it does not immediately follow that if any thing is also God, this same thing is unbegotten. The Son, therefore, being God, is not unbegotten. Thus, "unbegotten" is neither a definition nor a property; for it is not convertible.
That the Son is not a creature.
1. If the Son is a creature of God, and every creature is a servant to the Creator; then Christ is a servant of God, and not the Son of God. D Therefore, He did not take the form of a servant when He was already Lord, but rather He was a servant. The power of the creature is not shared with the Creator: therefore there is nothing common between the Father and the Son, not even creation, if the Son is not a production, but a generation. If the Son is a generation, as one of those things which are born, every generation is a creature; the Son is not a creature; for the Son is not a generation in the way that those things are.
A If God could not create things less than the one Son, because it was not in his nature, then neither will the Son create diverse things, but only one thing. If lesser things are created by a lesser creator, and greater things by a greater, then there are many creators, since not all things are equal. If God is a creator by nature, he will not be the creator of one thing, but of many. For he does not create one thing from weakness, and another from envy and malice. If the Father’s power created through the Son, then the Father is the creator, not the Son, just as the tool is not the craftsman. It is not, therefore, too lowly a thing for the Father that those things which were made by the Son should be attributed to him. If God was ashamed to perform the creation of the existing world directly by himself, he will not accept its glorification either. For he will not wish to be thought the owner of things which he was ashamed to make when they come to be. If to create and to beget are the same for God, because he is simple, then it is also the same to save and to destroy, and to give life and to kill. B If this is the case, then salvation and destruction are the same, as are life and death. If Christ is the power and wisdom of God, and these are uncreated and coeternal with God (for he was never without wisdom or without power), then Christ is uncreated and coeternal with God. But if he is called the power and wisdom of God insofar as he is an operation, then we too might be called the power and wisdom of the Lord no differently than he himself is said to be the power and wisdom of God. But this is absurd. If the Son is not the eternal God, he is necessarily recent; if he is not true, he is false; if he is not such by nature, he is such by adoption. But it belongs to the impious to worship those who are recent, false, and not gods by nature. For, he says, you shall not have a recent God. And Paul says: "But then indeed, not knowing God, you served those who by nature are not gods" (Gal. iv, 8). C Either those who worship Christ in this way are impious, or he is God by nature and true, and thus they are pious. If the Son is an operation and not a generation, then neither the one who operated nor the thing operated is himself (for the operation is something different from these), and he is also without subsistence; for no operation has subsistence. But if he is the thing operated, he is a third [entity] from the Father, and not immediate. For the one who operated is first, then the operation, and then the thing operated. If the Son is "only-begotten" because he alone was begotten by the one [Father], he would more properly be called "only-created," being truly a creature according to Eunomius, but falsely called a generation. If the Son is the only creation of the Father, and all other things are of the Son, then when he says, "All mine are thine," it is possible to say so; but by adding, "And thine are mine," according to Euno...
Eunomius, it is no longer correct. For he himself could not be of himself. It is evident, therefore, that he was discussing their similarity and their substance, which is in all respects immutable and like, and that he was not speaking of creatures. A
2. If Christ creates and begets in like manner, he is also our creator and Father; for he is God, and has no need of the adoption that comes through the Holy Spirit, just as he had no need for us to be made his creatures through some other person; although many of the creatures do not even have the nature to receive the spirit of adoption, such as the irrational and inanimate things. If we who are creatures become sons through the adoption of the Holy Spirit, let them say if the Son is also a creature, through whom he attained to the adoption of the Father? If all things that the Father has are also the Son's, and the Father has nothing apart from those things that were made through the Son, unless—according to them—he has himself alone; then he ought to have himself also, which is impossible. If the image is totally B similar, as the Son is an image; and the creature is in no way similar to the creator, but in all things dissimilar; then, being the image of the Father, the Son cannot be his creature. If the incorporeal, while begetting, necessarily begets as a body, he will also see as a body, and hear as a body; and he will perform every operation as a body. But if these things have it otherwise, he will clearly beget in another way. One cannot bestow upon others what one does not possess oneself; if, therefore, the Son is a creature and a servant, he cannot make others free. That which is by nature a medium between certain things touches upon both extremes; if, therefore, Christ is by nature a mediator between God and us, and not by dispensation, then God and the creature are joined by nature. C If the Son is similar to the Father, yet not according to substance, it remains that he is so either according to form or according to operation. But by form it is impossible (for nothing incorporeal is in a form). And if it is according to operation, he would not have performed something alien, but such as he himself is, if indeed he is a workmanship of the Father and not a generation. Moreover, it has been said before that what is similar in operation must necessarily be similar in substance as well.
3. If the works of God are in faith, and not in demonstration, according to David who said: *And all his works are in faith* (Ps. XXXII, 4); how much more is the generation of the Son from the Father before the ages in faith, and not in demonstration? If God made the Son from nothing, and the Son made all things from nothing,
A they possess the same power and operation, those who are able to create from nothing, and nowhere is any difference in the things created to be discerned. For although the creature is diverse in many ways and by a manifold arrangement, the producers are not diverse; rather, the Son is one, through whom all things were made. If Christ is the first work of God from among those things that came from nothing, and if the Arians, believing thus, worship Him, yet Job calls the devil the first work of God, saying: *This is the first of the beginning of the creation of the Lord* (Job XIV, 14), they are unwittingly worshiping the devil, and not the Son of God. But if they say that he spoke of the first work of the Son, then the Spirit, according to them, is no longer the work of the Lord, or else He will be found to have been made after the devil. If our faith in the Son is the work of God (*For this, he says, is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent* [Joan. VI, 29]), then He Himself cannot be the work of God. For faith in Him and He Himself are not the same thing.
Upon that text: B *But when all things shall be subjected to him, then the Son also himself shall be subjected* (1 Cor. XV, 28). If the Son is subjected to the Father divinely, He would have been subjected from the beginning, from the time that He was also God. But if He was not subjected, but will be subjected later, it is humanly, as on our behalf, and not divinely on His own account.
Upon that text: *Therefore God also hath given him a name which is above all names* (Philipp. II, 9). If, after the incarnation, on account of obedience, the Father gave that name which is above all names to the Son, who was God, and every tongue confessed Him Lord; then before the incarnation He neither possessed the name which is above all names, nor did He receive from all the confession that He is Lord. Therefore, He became greater after the incarnation than He was before the incarnation, which is absurd. Such also is this: *All power is given to me in heaven and in earth* (Matth. XXVIII, 18). These things, therefore, must be understood in reference to the incarnation, and not to the divinity.
Upon that text: *My Father is greater than I* (Joan. XIV, 28). That which is greater is said to be so either by magnitude, or by time, or by dignity, or by power, or as a cause. But the Father could not be called greater than the Son in magnitude; C for He is incorporeal. Nor yet in time; for the Son is the Creator of times. Nor in dignity; for He did not become what He once was not. Nor yet in power; for all things that the
A Father does, the Son does likewise. Nor as cause; since He would be greater than Him and than us in the same way, if He were the cause of Him and of us. Therefore, the statement [of the Son] indicates a greater honor which the Son pays to the Father, not a diminution [of substance] on the part of Him who said it. Furthermore, that which is greater is not immediately of a different substance. For man is called greater than man, and horse than horse. Therefore, if the Father is called greater, it is not immediately of a different substance. In general, comparative terms are used of those things which are consubstantial, and not of those which are of different substances. For man is not, strictly speaking, called greater than a brute, nor a brute than an inanimate object; but man [is called greater] than man, and a brute than a brute. Therefore, the Father is consubstantial with the Son, even if He is called greater.
On the text, "But of that day and hour knoweth no man."
BIf the Son is the Creator of all things, and yet does not know the time of the judgment, then He is ignorant of that which He created. For He did not say that He was ignorant of the judgment, but of the time. And how would this not be absurd?
On the same text.
If the Son does not have the knowledge of all things which the Father has, He lied when He said: "All things that the Father hath are mine"; and, "As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father." But if it is one thing to know the Father, and another to know the things that are the Father’s, and if it is greater to know the Father than to know what is His—inasmuch as everyone is greater than his own possessions—then the Son, having known the greater C (for "No one," He says, "knoweth the Father, save the Son"), could not have been ignorant of that which is the lesser; which is impossible. Therefore, because it was not expedient for men to hear it, He kept silent about the time of the judgment. For constant expectation makes [men] more fervent in piety; but the knowledge that a long time would intervene would have made them more negligent in piety, hoping that they could be saved by a change of life later on. For how could He who knows all things up to that hour (for this is what He said) not also know that hour? In vain would the Apostle also have said: "In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."
On the same text.
If the Holy Spirit, who searches the depths of God, can be ignorant of nothing that is of God, and the D Son
A is ignorant; then according to them, the Holy Spirit is greater than the Son, whom they do not even wish to be equal.
On the text: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me." B If the Son truly said, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me," he was not only confessing his own fear and weakness, but he even considered that there was something which could not be done by the Father. For the expression, "if it be possible," was that of one doubting, and of one not persuaded that the Father could save him. But how could he who grants life to the dead not much more be able to preserve life for the living? Why then did he who raised Lazarus and many dead persons not provide life for himself, but asked for life from the Father, saying in fear: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me"? And if he were dying against his will, he could no longer be said to have humbled himself, becoming obedient to the Father unto death, nor that he gave himself up, as the Apostle says: "Who gave himself a ransom for our sins." But if he did so willingly, what need was there for the words: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me"? These words, therefore, must be understood as referring to those who were about to sin against him, so that they might not sin, and not as referring to himself; concerning whom, even while being crucified, he said: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." It is not necessary, therefore, to receive things spoken by way of dispensation C as if they were spoken simply.
On the text: "And I live because of the Father." If the Son lives because of the Father, he lives because of another, and not because of himself. But he who lives because of another cannot be Life itself. For neither is he who is holy by grace holy in himself. If so, the Son lied when he said: "I am the life"; and again: "So also the Son gives life to whom he wills." Therefore, one must understand what was said as referring to the incarnation, and not to his divinity.
On the text: "Neither can the Son do anything of his own self." If that which has self-determination is better than that which is under the determination of another, and man has self-determination, while the Son of God is under the determination of another, then man is better than the Son; which is absurd. And if he who is under the determination of another cannot make others possess self-determination (for he cannot bestow upon others by his own will what he does not possess himself), then the Savior, in making us possessors of self-determination, cannot be under the determination of anyone. D
On the same text. If the Savior could do nothing of his own self, but only when the Father commanded, he is neither good nor bad. For he would be the cause of none of the things that have been made. And how is it not absurd that men should be made to be the causes of both good and evil,
A or that the Son, who is God, should have no one who, according to his authority, is his Maker?
On the text, "I am the vine."
If the Savior is the vine, they say, and we are the branches, and the Father is the husbandman; and if the branches are of the same nature as the vine, but the vine is not of the same nature as the husbandman; then the Son is indeed of the same nature as us, and we are a part of him, but the Son is not of the same nature as the Father, but rather is in all respects alien. To such people we shall reply that it is not in regard to his divinity, but in regard to his flesh, that he has called us branches, according to the Apostle who said: "For we are Christ's body, and members in part"; and again: "Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ?" And in other places: "As was the man of dust, so also are those who are of dust; and as is the man of heaven, so also are those who are of heaven"; and, "Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall also bear the image of the man of heaven." If Christ is the head of the man, and God is the head of Christ, but man is not consubstantial with God Christ (for he is not God), whereas Christ is consubstantial with God (for B he is God), then it is not the case that, as Christ is the head of the man, so God is the head of Christ. For the nature of the creature and the creative deity do not coincide into one and the same thing. Consequently, he is the head of Christ insofar as he is Father, but he is our head insofar as he is Creator.
If it is the will of the Father that we should believe in his Son ("For this is the will of him who sent me, that everyone who sees the Son and believes in him should have eternal life"), the Son does not originate from a will, since our believing in him is found either with him or before him.
On the text, "No one is good."
If the Savior is not good, he is necessarily evil; for he is simple and admits of nothing that is intermediate. And how is it not absurd for the Maker of good things to be evil? Furthermore, if life is a good thing, and the words of the Son C are life, as he himself said: "The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and are life"; then how is it that, having heard "Good Teacher" from the Pharisee, he answers: "No one is good except one, God"? For he did not say "No one is good" having heard only "good," but... D before he assumed human nature, and for the patriarchs and the ancient Jews, it was necessary to believe in the one who was to come as Christ in order to attain salvation. Therefore, since we must necessarily believe in the Son in every age and time, it follows from this that the Son exists by nature, not by will, nor by adoption. — If it is the will of the Father that we should believe in his Son... the Son does not exist by the will, since our faith in him is found either with him or before him. This subtle reasoning is illustrated by another similar argument, which is found on p. 288: If our faith in the Son is the work of God... he himself cannot be the work of God. For faith in him and he himself are not the same. MARAN. — Some other things...
A "No one is good; but after he had heard, 'good master.' He answered then as if to one tempting him, as the Gospel says; or as if to one ignorant that God is good, and not simply a good master."
In the passage, "Father, glorify me."
If the Son were asking to be glorified by the Father according to his divinity, and not according to his humanity, he would be asking for what he did not have. But then the Evangelist would be lying when he said, "We have seen his glory"; and the Apostle, "For they would not have crucified the Lord of glory"; and David, "And the king of glory shall enter in." He is not, therefore, asking for an addition of glory, but that there might be a manifestation of the dispensation.
In the same passage.
If he were truly asking from the Father the glory which he had before the world was made, he would be asking for it as one having lost it. For he would not seek to receive what he already had. But if this is the case, he would have lost not only the glory, but also the divinity; for glory cannot be separated from divinity. He was therefore, according to Photinus, a mere man. It is evident, then, that having said such things, he spoke according to the dispensation of his humanity, not according to any deficiency of his divinity.
In the passage, "The firstborn of every creature."
If the Son were not a generation before creation, but a creature, he would be called "first-created" and not "firstborn." B If, because he is called "firstborn of creation," he is therefore "first-created," then because he is called "firstborn of the dead," he would be the first who died among those who are dead. But if he is called "firstborn of the dead" because he is the cause of resurrection from the dead, so too is he the "firstborn of creation," because he is the cause of bringing creation from non-existence into being. If the fact of his being called "firstborn of creation" shows that he was created first, the Apostle, having said, "All things were created by him and for him," ought to have said, "And he himself was made before all things." But by saying, "And he himself is before all things," he showed that he indeed always exists, while creation was made. For the word "is" agrees with, "In the beginning was the Word." C If, they say, the Son is the firstborn, he is no longer only-begotten, but there must be another, of whom he is said to be the firstborn. And yet, O wise one, even though he was born of Mary the Virgin alone, he is called her firstborn. For it says, "Until she brought forth her firstborn son." Thus, there is no necessity for a brother in order to be called firstborn. It could also be said that he was called firstborn even before D every birth; and further, that he is the firstborn of the dead. O wise men.
to be called. It may also be said that he who precedes every generation is called the firstborn; furthermore, with respect to those who by the adoption of the Holy Spirit are born of God, as Paul says: *For whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren* A.
On that which is written: The Lord created me
If He who is in the flesh says: *I am the way* and the same: *No one comes to the Father except through me*; He is also the One who said: *The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways*. Now, the terms "creature" and "work" are also used of birth, as in the passage: *I have created a man through God*; and again: *He made sons and daughters*; and David: *Create in me a clean heart, O God*, B not asking for something else, but clearly asking that the heart which existed might be cleansed. Moreover, it is also called a "new creature," not because some other creature has been made, but because those who are illuminated are being prepared for better works. If the Father created the Son for works, He did not create Him for His own sake, but for the sake of the works. Whatever is made for the sake of another thing, and not for its own sake, is either a part of that for the sake of which it was made, or is inferior to it. The Savior, therefore, would be either a part of the creature or inferior to the creature. It is therefore necessary to understand this regarding His humanity. Someone might also say that Solomon said these things about that Wisdom of which the Apostle also makes mention, where he said: *For since C in the wisdom of God the world did not know God through wisdom.* Furthermore, he who spoke is not a prophet, but a writer of Proverbs. Proverbs are images of other things, not the very things that are spoken of. If it were God the Son who was speaking, "The Lord created me," He would more fittingly have said, "The Father created me." For He never called Him His Lord, but always Father. Therefore, we must accept the term "begat" as applying to God the Son, but "created" as applying to Him who took the form of a servant. Yet in all these things, we do not speak of two—God separately and man separately (for He was one)—but we consider the nature of each by mental abstraction. For D neither did Peter understand two when he said: *Since therefore Christ suffered for us in the flesh.* If, they say, the Son is an offspring and not a work, how does Scripture say: *Therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly that God made him both Lord and Christ?* It must therefore be said here also that this was spoken concerning Him who is from Mary according to the flesh: just as also the angel bringing the good news [to the shepherds says that, "there is born to you today a Savior, who is Christ the Lord." The...]
word, "Today," could not be thought of as applying to Him who is before the ages. But what follows shows it more clearly, where he says: A "This Jesus whom you crucified." If when the Son was born, then wisdom came into being, false is that saying: "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God." For His wisdom did not come into being, but was always. And this therefore, as being said of the Father by David: "Become for me a God, a protector"; and, "You have become for me for salvation"; and Paul says: "But let God be true, and every man a liar"—so also the Lord is become for us from God wisdom, and sanctification, and redemption. If, therefore, the Father, by becoming a protector and true, is not a creature; then the Son, by becoming wisdom and sanctification, is not a creature. If the saying is true, "One God the Father," it is plainly true also that, "One Lord Jesus Christ the Savior." Therefore, according to them, neither is the Savior God, nor is the Father Lord. And in vain is it said: "The Lord said to my Lord." False also is that which says: "Therefore God, your God, has anointed you"; and that: "The Lord rained from the Lord"; and that: "God made according to the image of God"; and, "Who is God beside the Lord?"; and, "Who is God besides our God?" And John says that, "The Word was God, and the Word was with God"; and Thomas says concerning the Son: "My Lord and my God." B Therefore, concerning creatures and those who are called gods falsely and not properly, we must understand the distinctions, not regarding the Father and the Son.
On that text, "That they may know you the only true God."
The "true" is spoken in distinction to those who are called so falsely; but the "incomparable" is he who excels all things in all respects. When Jeremiah, therefore, said regarding the Son, "This is our God," will another be reckoned beside Him, or did he speak of one greater than the Father? But that the Son is also true God, John C himself says in the Epistle: "That we may know the only true God; and we are
A in His true Son Jesus Christ. He is the true God and eternal life. Therefore, we should not [(61)], because of the expression, "No other shall be reckoned to Him," B think that the Son is greater than the Father, nor that the Father alone is the true God; rather, both are to be referred to those who are indeed called gods falsely, but who are not gods in reality. Just as it says in Deuteronomy: "The Lord alone led them, and there was no foreign god with them." If God alone is invisible and wise, it does not immediately follow that He is in all things a God greater than all; but for God who is over all, He must by necessity surpass all. Did the Apostle, therefore, when he called the Savior the God over all [(62)], call Him greater than the Father? That is absurd. Likewise, this is also to be understood [(63)]. The great God cannot be less than another God. Did the Apostle, then, when he said of the Son, "We wait for the blessed hope and the appearing of the glory of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ," think that He is greater than the Father? For we wait for the appearing and presence of the Son [(64)], not of the Father. C These things, therefore, are read indiscriminately of the Father and the Son, and not with careful distinction. The expression, "To be equal with God," is nothing else than "to be equal to God." If, then, the Son did not think it robbery to be equal with God, how is He unlike and unequal to God? Yet the Jews are more pious than Eunomius. For when the Savior had called Himself the Son of God, as [(66)] is owed to the Son if He is truly the Son, and that He is equal to the Father: "They sought," he says, "to stone Him," not only because He was breaking the Sabbath, but because He was saying that God was His own Father, making Himself equal to God. Therefore, He is equal to the Father both according to the Apostle and according to the voice of the Savior, even if Eunomius does not wish it.
On the text, "It is not mine to give, but to those for whom it is prepared."
If the Son is not the Lord of judgment, so as to grant benefits to some and to punish others, how did He say: "The Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son [(68)]"? And elsewhere: "The Son of man has authority to forgive sins on earth"; and again: "All authority has been given to me in heaven and on earth"; and to Peter: "I will give to you the keys of the kingdom of heaven"; and to the disciples: "Amen I say to you, you who have followed me in the regeneration will sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of...