thirty-two years of his reign. When, therefore, the bishops of the pure and right faith came to Valentinian, they petitioned that a synod be held. He replied: "To me, indeed, God has given to rule over the affairs of this world, but to you over the affairs of the Churches; therefore, this matter does not concern me; wherever it seems good to you, assemble and celebrate the synod." This was the response of one still in possession of an upright mind, not yet corrupted. A The bishops, therefore, assembling at Lampsacus, a city of the Hellespont, collected the dogmas of the right faith by their head points. And having set forth the faith of Lucian the martyr, they condemned the contrary view, subscribed to the faith set forth by the holy Nicene Fathers, and sent it to all the Churches. In Christ Jesus our Lord, to whom be glory.
THE OCTOECHUS AND PARACLETICE OF OUR HOLY FATHER JOHN OF DAMASCUS ON THE BLESSED VIRGIN.
We have referred [the reader] to our edition of the Greek Liturgy.
DISPUTATION OF JOHN THE ORTHODOX WITH A MANICHÆAN.
(Mai, *Bibliotheca nova Patrum*, tom. IV, part II, p. 104.)
ORTHODOX. If the body is from matter, but the soul is from the good God, as you say, opposites are certainly not combined without some artificer; just as black and white are combined by a painter, and hot species with cold ones by physicians; who, then, has combined opposite things with one another, namely soul and body, making one living being? B
MANICHÆAN. The good God, when matter was moving in confusion, taking a certain particle of His own substance, cast it into matter, wishing to entice it; and [matter], having received it, swallowed it; and thus, from the mixture of both, the composite [being] came into existence.
A These, therefore, are certain myths, having [about them] more that is incredible than it is ungodly; first, because no one composes himself in order to produce another. Furthermore, God is found from this to be capable of suffering and divisible, if indeed He took a part of Himself and cast it into matter. But also, matter itself shall be absolved of being evil, since it loved the good and swallowed the light sent from it. But answer me another thing: is God incorporeal? M. Yes, incorporeal. Q. How then does the incorporeal and simple [God] endure division or cutting? M. I do not say that division or cutting has happened to the divine essence, but an emission consubstantial with the one emitting. And I do not think you, being Christians, would dispute this; for do you not say that the Son and Word of God is [not] a fragment of the Father's essence, and yet He is acknowledged by you to be consubstantial with the Father, and is preached in the holy Scripture as having been sent into the world for the salvation of men? Thus, therefore, without any cutting having occurred, the good God emitted a certain power to check the disorder of matter. B Q. And thus, being refuted, you fall into the charge of [the very] cutting [you deny]. M. Refute it, and I will yield to your words. Q. That matter and God are divided into their own places, I know I have heard many times from the Manichaeans; and how the southern [part] is assigned to matter, and the northern, and eastern, and western [parts] to the good God. M. So we profess. Q. How then do you not fear the excess of such blasphemy, introducing a circumscribed God, whom you confess to be good and omnipotent, and this while He is circumscribed by the most wicked matter? For you give a limit to God, when you posit Him in a place; for place is the limit of that which contains, in as much as it contains in itself that which is contained; and God, being contained, is utterly circumscribed. And the very place that contains God is circumscribed by that boundary at which the matter of the place touches. And thus, according to you, God will be circumscribed by a circumscribed place, you who limit God within a certain place. But let these things be passed over; tell me, do you say that God, remaining in His own place, emitted the power from Himself, and sent it forth to the place of matter? M. Yes, I say this. Q. If then the emission from God happened in another place, with God having remained in another region, how was it not separated from the substance of the Father? For those things which are distant from one another by places must necessarily also be separated from each other. D And thus, therefore, is not the power of God, according to you, gone outside His own substance? Now that which is outside...
A of it exists, is entirely separated also from its substance. We, however, do not follow your impieties, nor do we affirm two principles separated by place, but one Creator of the universe, and the one beginning of all things, the Father and the Son, who fills all things, we believe as a dogma: acknowledging the Father in the Son and the Son in the Father, according to the saying which declares: "I am in the Father, and the Father in me." And, "All things that the Father has are mine." Whence also the inspired John, as if the Trinity were filling all things, says concerning the Word of God: "He came into His own, and His own received Him not." But according to you Manichaeans, He did not come into His own, but rather into things alien; if indeed He approached the place of matter, wishing to redeem the souls bound in an alien place, as you say. Wherefore, even that section which you kept recalling (affirmed by you not once), thinking thus to avoid the division of the divine substance, not even so did you avoid it; for you fall back into the same irreligion. But from where I departed, I turn my discourse back again. Answer me, therefore: is matter by itself, without admixture with God, simple or composite? B M. Composite. O. Is the composite made from simples? M. It is so. O. If, therefore, matter is composite, it is clear that it was composed by something else; for no one brings himself to composition. How then, having been composed by another, is it without beginning? Besides, composite things are composed from different things, which pre-exist, as electrum is composed from silver and gold; or things seen together, such as a head from bones, and flesh, and membranes, and nerves; for these exist together, though they are diverse, and none of them existed before the head composed from them. If, therefore, matter is composite, not even it itself is one principle, but many more if it be composite by itself and without any composition with God. M. Do you say, therefore, that matter is simple? O. I do not say that matter is simple, but I wish to demonstrate that it is not without beginning, nor unbegotten, as you say, and that it was not produced by God without its qualities: its qualities being always C variant, and changing one into another, as it pleased God its creator. For if it were simple, how could composite bodies be produced from one simple thing, I mean, from matter? Or how, in one simple thing—that is, in matter—do we find two contraries, generation and corruption? But if bodies are from it, it itself will also be a body; for that which is begotten from some body is itself also a body. But if matter is a body, then it is composite. And if it is composite, it is not unbegotten, as has been demonstrated.
M. Whence, then, come diseases and deaths and evils of this kind? For if they do not happen to be from matter without beginning, unbegotten, and by nature evil, God will be the cause of their generation.
O. Why do you consider diseases and death to be evils? And yet death frees the soul from the body and releases it from the bond of matter; and disease, in turn, wastes away the body—which you yourself think is an evil body—and often disease prevents the commission of sins which the sick person would have committed had he not been hindered by the disease. Furthermore, answer me this question: Ought one to hate malice?
M. I say yes.
O. How then do you hold in such high honor that which you pretend to hate, by calling it similar to the good God, eternal, without beginning, and unbegotten?
M. We do not make it similar to the good God; for we know God is the Most High, good, light-bearing, and omnipotent. Even if malice is without beginning, it is still far inferior to God. B
O. You seem to be unaware that the goodness and light of God are communicated, as a gift, to the holy angels and to us men as well; yet that which is characteristic of the divine nature—namely, to be without beginning and unbegotten—is not observed in anything else. But if you attribute to malice those things which are primarily and preeminently the characteristics of the divine nature, why would it not be held in equal honor with God? Tell me also, when do you claim God was omnipotent, if, by your own judgment, He has not yet overcome matter and its effects?
M. But there will be a time when He will overcome it as well. C
O. Therefore, He is not yet omnipotent now, since He has not yet overcome the matter that coexists with Him from eternity. But according to your words, that which He does not have now will be added to Him later; for while He is omnipotent now only in potentiality, He will later become so in actuality, proceeding from simplicity to perfection. Answer me: why is He not omnipotent now? Is it because He cannot, or because He will not? If it is because He cannot, how is He omnipotent at all? For He must always be omnipotent and endued with all power. But if it is because He will not, then first of all He begrudges the salvation of men, and secondly, He is found to be the cause of malice, because, D while being able, He is not willing to take it away.
M. Whence, then, come evils?
O. The question you have asked lacks rational sequence; for one must first know whether there is an evil, and what evil is, and only then seek out whence it originates.
M. Let us inquire in that way.
O. Of existing things, some are substance, some are quality, and some are active power. Substance is, for example, myself and you; quality is white, black, sweet, bitter, and whatever else of this kind is observed in underlying bodies. Aptitude is that by which the bodies that have come into being are naturally capable of—
A attaining—as, for example, hands have an aptitude for handicrafts, the tongue to serve speech, feet for walking, and a child for technical learning. An operation, however, is the activity according to nature, either of the irrational as irrational, or of the rational as rational. What, then, of the things mentioned do you define as being evil?
M. Operation. But it is established that every operation is the substance of an operation.
O. Every operation is indeed the substance of an operation; but I ask you, can malice, being an operation, also be a substance?
M. I say it is.
O. Firstly, you contradict yourself, while you say on the one hand that an active force is made from substance, and on the other B you posit that this is not an active force; whence you will also appear to suffer from the height of ignorance, even among those who are quite unskilled in dialectics. But I ask you, is every operation evil?
M. Not at all.
O. Which operation, then, do you call evil?
M. Homicide, adultery, injustice, and whatever is of this kind.
O. If homicide, according to you, is naturally evil, the judges who kill tomb-robbers and murderers do evil. And again, why is it that one who has relations with his own wife does not sin, but doing this with another’s wife does sin, when yet the action is the same? I suppose that because of these things, even against your will, you must admit that every operation is neutral; it is variegated, however, by the C judgment of the one performing it, becoming virtue or vice; for the one has relations with his own wife temperately, the other lewdly with someone else's.
M. Is desire not evil?
O. Not at all; for this too is neutral; and it is possible for it to be adorned by the governance of the mind. Truly, it is possible to desire even honorable things, for one man is a lover of the poor, another a lover of money; and one man has recourse to intercourse for the sake of procreation, another for the sake of pleasure.
M. Tell me this: did the corruption and decay of bodies come D from the good and incorruptible God?
O. The expression "from something" is used in many ways; for my son is "from" me substantially; a bench is "from" a carpenter; fruits "from" the earth; confiscations "from" a king. We, therefore, by no means say that corruption is from the substance of God, but that those things which are beneficial to us occur by His will. For if, things being corruptible, we are so crazed about them as to stir up trials and wars against one another, what would we not dare to do if He had produced them as incorruptible? And how were we to have perception of the gift of the incorruptible life, which our Lord has graciously bestowed upon us, if we had not first been in the experience of this corruptible and transient life, which He Himself prudently judged it good for us to taste beforehand? Otherwise, if corruption is evil, generation is undoubtedly good. But in
A that same body both generation and corruption occur; therefore, the nature of the body is not evil, as you insist, you who place the body in the class of evil things. But why do you, while you contemplate and declare those things which you judge to be evil in bodies, conceal the good things that flow from them? For, first of all, we are nourished and preserved by the fruits produced from the earth; we construct dwellings from stones and wood, by which we are freed from rain and cold, and we also avoid the scorching heat of the sun—that sun which you are not ashamed to deify; and with iron we not only plow the earth, but we also defend ourselves against attacking enemies. But if, being convicted by these things, you nevertheless persist in alleging putrefaction and stench, perhaps you are ignorant that those things which affect the soul are much more subject to putrefaction and stench? And yet, in your opinion, the soul is a substance of the good God; therefore, the good God will be the cause of these evils of putrefaction and stench which you disparage. B
M. If there are no evils in the world, why do laws punish them?
O. This most of all convicts your insanity; for unless it were in our own power to do evil or good, laws would not punish evildoers, since they often do not look at the act, but examine the intention of the one who acted: for instance, if someone throws a piece of wood and unintentionally kills a man, the laws of murder do not condemn him who did it. Or if someone has intercourse unintentionally with another man’s wife, having found her sleeping in his own bed, thinking she was his own wife, the laws acquit the accused of the crime of adultery, if this is demonstrated. Furthermore, answer me, why do you worship the sun?
M. Because it is the luminary of the world, a creature of the good God.
O. Is it corporeal or incorporeal?
M. Incorporeal.
O. How is the incorporeal perceived corporally? For incorporeal things are contemplated by the mind, but the sun is comprehended sensibly by the eyes and by circumscribed bodies. Besides, is there anything incorporeal that has corporeal qualities?
M. I do not think so.
O. But surely the sun has corporeal qualities; for it is hot and dry, which are qualities of bodies. The sun, therefore, is a body. Why then are you not ashamed to worship him whom you ought to hate, because he does things contrary to your dogma?
M. Why contrary?
O. Because he nourishes and holds together the bodies, which you say are evil. And no one contradicts this, unless he fights against experience. Tell me also this: do you confess that there will be a judgment?
M. Indeed.
M. The good God judges, and every soul that has sinned is judged. C
O. But then God will be found punishing Himself if He has sinned, if indeed the soul that is judged is of the same substance as He. How, then, is it condemned, the soul which has not acted
A of necessity by nature, and you say that evils come by choice? But since you say that there are two principles, God and matter, and that God is good, but matter is evil, and you dare to assign a separate and peculiar place to the nature of each, and you attach other myths to these, namely that matter, having seen the light of God, came into desire and rushed toward the light; which the good God seeing preparing for battle, cut off a part of His own substance and cast it upon her; and she, having received it, brought forth all bodies; since, therefore, you say these things, we shall make a short refutation of them. First, then, we must examine the action, whether it is suitable and appropriate to the nature of God; then the purpose of the action; and finally, the end. Let us see, therefore, in God first, whether what is done by Him is appropriate to the nature of God. What, then, is according to nature to God? Clearly, the uncreated, the incorruptible, and the good, and, according to you Manichaeans, remaining in His own place. But the action, on your hypothesis, is shown to be contrary to nature; for it injures all the things mentioned. For neither does the one good God remain one and uncreated, when He is divided into two or even more uncreated beings. Nor is He good; for where is he good who makes Himself an enemy, who hands over a part of Himself to His enemies? Or where would He be good, setting Himself free through the creation of the world, yet doing this to the destruction of those things which were created? And He did not even remain in His own place at all, for a part of Him passed over to the place of matter. B Second, we must inquire whether the action is consistent with the purpose. What, then, is the purpose? It is evident that it is victory. But it is shown that, in the purpose, the action has the opposite; for it is evident that the united is stronger than the divided, and that which is according to nature is stronger than that which has turned to what is contrary to nature, and that which remains in its own place is stronger than that which has fallen into another place. What, therefore, is consistent and becoming to the purpose? Rather to preserve strength, and not to make it weaker by division. Let us also see the third, whether the action is appropriate to the end. What, then, do you say is the end resulting from the victory? For you will say either the preservation of the constitution of God entirely, or freedom, or that He did not depart from His own place, or that matter might be destroyed, or that it might be changed for the better; but the action teaches us to think the contrary of these. For the constitution of God did not remain in its natural state, the part having been surrendered; nor was the freedom kept, for it served the generation of the world by putting a part of Himself into things created; nor did it remain in its own place, the part having departed to matter. Nor was the nature of matter destroyed or changed; for it remained what it was from the beginning, immutable; so that this hypothesis, which you have composed like a fable, appears vain and foolish in every respect. It is possible, however, to refute the absurdity of your irreligion also from the operations, and from the cause, and from the places which we shall subjoin. From the operation, indeed, it is completely overturned C thus: If the natures are contrary, the operations also are contrary. If, therefore, the operation of God is acknowledged to be creative, that of matter will be passive; but if this is so, it is therefore subject to God and ser-
serves Him. But if it is subject and serves, it is certainly not uncreated. A Furthermore, either both natures act, or both suffer; or one acts and the other suffers, or both suffer and act. But if both act, they will be gods; since to act is the office of God, and to oversee matter. But if both suffer, they will be different from each other, and another creator will be sought. But if one suffers and the other acts, the one that suffers is created, and the one that acts is uncreated. Finally, if both act and suffer, in so far as they act, they will be gods; in so far as they suffer, they will be matter. Therefore they will be the same thing: gods and matter, created and uncreated. You are also refuted by the cause. For what reason do we hypothesize that matter is evil? Is it because it is uncreated and a first principle, or because it is matter, or because it is a body, or because it is divided and changed? But if because it is both uncreated and a first principle, then God is also such. If because it is matter, and it is called matter because it is subject to generating things from itself, then according to this same hypothesis, not even God will be good, because He also is subject to producing from Himself souls and angels, as is your dogma, O Manichaeans. B If because it is body, it is not itself the cause of its being body, but God; for before He cast a part of Himself into matter, it was not body. If because it is divided and changed, God, according to your view, will be subject to the same evils; for if He is divided into the creation of angels and souls, yet no gods come from Him, it is clear that He is not only divided, but also changed. But if you say this is not the cause of matter being evil, but rather that it commits sins, it must be known that nothing which happens by necessity according to nature is a sin; for all sin comes from free choice, and choice comes from the soul; C but the soul, according to your view, is the substance of God; therefore, sin is from God, and not from matter, according to your most impious dogma. I shall also refute you from the places which you hypothesize, assigning one to God and another to matter, to show that you are teaching nothing at all. For if God is uncreated, and matter as well; and each, according to you, exists in its own place; and place is different in substance from those things contained within it, it will follow that the places are likewise uncreated; and thus you will find not two uncreated things, but four: God, matter, and the place of each. But if you say the places are older than the things therein contained, then God and matter will no longer be uncreated, D but rather the places which pre-existed them; but if you say that God and matter were before the places, then God and matter were not separated, but existed within one another; for there was as yet no place to separate them; and thus the argument concerning the contrariety you posit will be dissolved. For the nature of two contraries cannot exist within one another; so that on all sides your mythical monstrosity is refuted. Do not persist in these impious dogmas, neither for yourselves nor for others, but run toward the light of truth and cleanse from your souls the darkness of ignorance.