On the Divine Names

THE WORKS OF THE HOLY DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE ON THE DIVINE NAMES

SAINT DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE ON THE DIVINE NAMES

CHAPTER I

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.

§ I. Now then, O blessed one, after the theological ^B outlines, I shall pass on, as far as is possible, to the explanation of the divine names. Let the sacred law of the oracles be set before us again, that we may demonstrate the truth of what is said about God, not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the demonstration of the power which the Spirit has breathed into the theologians, by which we are united in an unutterable and unknown way to the unutterable and unknown through that more excellent

union of our rational and intellectual power and energy. In general, therefore, one must not dare to speak, nor even to conceive, anything concerning the supersubstantial and hidden Deity, except those things which have been divinely revealed to us in the sacred oracles. For the non-demonstrability of His very supernaturality, which is above all reason, and mind, and essence, is what we must attribute to the supernatural knowledge; aspiring to that inaccessible light only so far as the ray of the divine oracles has insinuated itself, by which we are tempered with a certain sobriety and sanctity in these more eminent splendors of divine things. For if one must believe the all-wise and most true theology, according to the capacity of each of the minds, divine things are revealed and contemplated; for the divine goodness, with a saving justice, proportions its own immensity to the measured things with a certain divine grace, which cannot be comprehended, as it distinguishes ^B that which is excessive in a manner becoming to God, as something incomprehensible. For just as things that fall under intelligence are unattainable and invisible to objects of sense, and things simple and untyped to those in configuration and type, and to those fashioned with bodily shapes the intangible and shapeless formlessness of incorporeal things—by the same principle of truth, the supersubstantial indeterminacy is above essences, and the union above mind is above minds; and to all intellects the One that is above intellect is unintelligible, and the Good that is above reason is ineffable to every word, the maker of every unity, and supersubstantial essence, and mind that is not understood, and word that is unutterable; it is lack of reason, and lack of intellect, and namelessness, being nothing of the things that are; and it is the cause of being to all, but is itself not being, as it is beyond all essence, and as it might itself properly and knowingly declare concerning itself. ^C

§ II.

Concerning this, therefore, as has been said, supersubstantial and recondite divinity, one must not presume to speak, nor even to conceive anything, except those things which have been divinely revealed to us in the sacred utterances; for as it has kindly handed down concerning itself in the sacred writings, the knowledge and contemplation of what it is, is inaccessible to all existing substances, as being superessentially excepted from all. You will also find many theologians who have praised it not only as invisible and incomprehensible, but also as unsearchable and untraceable, since there is no trace existing for those who have penetrated into its hidden ^D infinity. Yet the Good is by no means altogether uncommunicative to any of the things that are, but, fixing its supersubstantial ray firmly in itself, it shines forth in a way becoming to the Good through proportional illuminations on each of the things that are, and draws the sacred minds toward the attainable contemplation and communion and assimilation of it, as is permitted and holy to its...

^A sacred minds, which strive toward it as much as they are able, provided they do not insolently presume anything above their capacity regarding the divine illumination, nor fall headlong into perverse inclinations, but rather gaze steadily and with unfaltering eyes upon the ray that shines upon them, and, with a love commensurate to the illuminations granted to them, soar upward with a certain sacred reverence, modestly and holily.

§ III.

Following, therefore, these divine scales, which govern ^B all the holy distinctions of the celestial orders, we imitate the mystery of the supreme Divinity, which surpasses all intelligence and substance; and, with minds free from investigation and filled with sacred reverence, pursuing the ineffable things with a certain modest silence, we attend to the rays that shine upon us in the sacred Scriptures, and by them we are led toward the divine hymns, being supermundanely illuminated by them, and being fashioned by sacred chants of praise to contemplate the divine lights ^C which are granted in them for our capacity, and to praise the beneficent source of all illumination, just as it itself has expressed about itself in the Scriptures. For it is the cause and source and substance and life of all things; and for those who have fallen from it, it is a recall and a resurrection; for those who have obliterated the divine image in themselves, it is a restoration and a reformation; for those who are reeling because of some agitation, it is a holy foundation; for those who stand, it is a security; for those who are being led toward it, it is a guiding hand; for those who are illuminated, it is an illumination; for those who are being perfected, it is a perfecting principle; ^D for those who are being deified, it is the supreme Divinity; for those who are being simplified, it is simplicity; for those who are being united, it is unity; it is the super-essential and super-original source of every source, and the beneficent communication of that hidden secret, as far as it is permitted, and, to speak simply, the life of the living, the substance of beings, the source and cause of all life and substance, by reason of its goodness, with which it both brings all things into being and preserves them lest they perish.

§ IV.

These things we have learned from the divine Scriptures; and, so to speak, you will find almost the whole of holy Scripture, in order to declare God to us and to praise him, forming divine names according to the emanations of the divine goodness. Hence, in almost every theological treatise, we see the Divinity itself being holily praised, as a monad and unity, because of the simplicity of its supernatural indivisibility, from which, as from a unifying power, we exist as one, and, with our divided diversities being supermundanely gathered, we are brought to a certain deiform monad and...

^A union; but as for the Trinity, on account of the manifestation of its superessential fecundity in three persons, from which all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is and is named; and as the cause of all things, because all things were brought into being through its essence-making goodness; and as wise and beautiful, because all beings, while preserving their own nature uncorrupted, are full of every divine harmony and sacred dignity; and because it embraces the human race with singular love, in that it truly and integrally communicated itself to us in one of its persons, recalling to itself and lifting up our human lowliness, out of which the simple Jesus was ineffably compounded, and he who is eternal took on a temporal accession, and descended even into the depths of our nature, who superessentially transcends the whole order of nature ^B while keeping his own properties entirely intact and unconfused.

And whatever other deific lights our holy instructors have, in accordance with the Scriptures, gifted to us through the secret explanation of the mysteries, these we also have drawn; now, according to our capacity, while the kindness of the Scriptures and of hierarchical traditions uses sacred veils to shroud intelligible realities in sensible signs and supersubstantial realities in substances, and wraps forms and figures around things that lack form and figure, and multiplies and shapes the supernatural and figure-rejecting simplicity by the variety of divisible symbols. But then, when we have become incorruptible and immortal and have attained the most blessed Christ-like condition, then, as it is written, we shall always be with the Lord, ^C being filled with the most pure contemplations of his visible theophany, irradiated by his most bright splendors, no differently than the disciples in that most divine transfiguration, and participants of his intelligible illumination according to the mind that is free from passions and matter, in the unknown and most blessed lightnings of the most bright rays, we shall be joined to him in a union surpassing intelligence, in a more divine imitation of the supercelestial minds; for as the truth of the Scriptures says, we shall be like the angels and sons of God, being sons of the resurrection.

But now, as we are able, we use symbols appropriate to divine things, through which, according to our capacity, we are led to that simple and single truth of the intelligible sights, and after all our understanding of deiform things, putting to rest our intellectual operations, ^D we direct our gaze, as far as is lawful, into that superessential ray in which all the ends of all knowledge have pre-existed in an ineffable way, which it is impossible to conceive, or to speak, or to behold at all, because it is removed from all things and is super-unknown, and contains the consummations of all essential knowledges and powers together, and all of them superessentially

in itself anticipated, and placed in an incomprehensible power, being more eminent than all heavenly intelligences. For since all knowledges are of things that are, and have their end in the things that are, that which is beyond all essence and all knowledge is removed from them.

^B § V. But if it transcends all reason and all knowledge, and is established above mind generally and essence, as containing and embracing all things in its scope, and anticipating them, and indeed surpassing all grasp, since it falls not under sense, nor is it imagination, nor opinion, nor name, nor reason, nor contact, nor science, how can any discourse concerning divine names be shaped by us, when the divinity which is above essence has been declared to be ineffable and nameless? But as we said when we were setting forth our theological Outlines, that one, the unknown, the superessential, the Good-in-itself—I mean the triadic Unity, at once God and the Good—is impossible to speak or to conceive. But the angelic unions of the holy powers, which one must call either participations or receptions of the super-unknown and super-luminous Good, are also ineffable and unknown, and exist only in those angels themselves who have been deemed worthy of them beyond angelic knowledge. Therefore, the godlike minds, in imitation of the angels as far as possible, being united to God in this way (since such unification of the deified minds toward the supreme light of God exists through the cessation of every mental operation) laud Him most truly through the removal of all beings, having been truly and supernaturally illuminated in this by that most blessed union with God: that God is indeed the cause of all things, but He Himself is nothing, being superessentially removed from all things.

Therefore, it is not permitted for any of those who are lovers of the truth, which is above all truth, to celebrate the dearchic superessentially, or its super-substantial super-existence, ^C as reason, or power, or mind, or life, or essence; but rather to celebrate it as supereminently removed from every state, movement, life, imagination, opinion, name, reason, thought, intellection, essence, standing, foundation, union, limit, infinity, and all things that are. And since, as the existence of goodness, by the very fact of its being it is the cause of all things, the goodness-ruling providence of the Dearchy must be celebrated from all its products; for all things are around it, and for its sake, and it is itself before all things, and all things consist in it. And by its being, there exists the production and subsistence of all things, and all things desire it: the intellectual and rational things by way of knowledge; those inferior to these by way of sense; ^D and others according to vital movement, or an essential and receptive aptitude.

§ VI. ^A Knowing this, therefore, the theologians praise Him both as nameless and as having every name. As nameless, as when they say in one of the mystical visions of the symbolic theophany that the Deity rebuked him who said, "What is your name?" and, as if withdrawing Him from all divine naming, said, "And why do you ask for my name?" And this is wonderful. For is this not truly the wonderful name, that which is above every name, that which is nameless, that which is established above every name that is named, whether in this age or in the age to come? ^B Yet they also give Him many names, as when they again introduce Him as saying, "I am He Who Is," life, light, God, truth; and when the wise ones praise God Himself—the Maker of all things—from all the effects of all things: as Good, as Beautiful, as Wise, as Beloved, as God of gods, as Lord of lords, as Holy of holies, as Eternal, as He Who Is, as Author of the ages, as Giver of life, as Wisdom, as Mind, as Word, as Knower, as possessing pre-eminently all the treasures of all knowledge, as Power, as Potentate, as King of kings, as Ancient of days, as Unaging and Unchangeable, as Salvation, as Justice, as Sanctification, as Redemption, as exceeding all things in greatness, and as in a gentle breeze. ^C And they say that He is in minds, and in souls, and in bodies, and in heaven and on earth, and that He is the same in the same, in the world, around the world, above the world, supercelestial, supersubstantial, sun, star, fire, water, spirit, dew, cloud, stone itself, and rock, and all things that are, and nothing of those that are.

§ VII. Thus, therefore, to Him who is the Cause of all things and is above all things, it is fitting to be nameless, and yet again all the names of all things are fitting, so that the kingdom of the universe may be perfectly His, and all things may be around Him, and from Him, as from a cause, a beginning, and an end, all things may depend, ^D and He Himself may be, as the Scripture says, "all in all," and may truly be praised as the producer of all, the initiator, the perfecter, and the container, the guardian and the dwelling, and the one who turns all things back to Himself; and these things [are His] conjunctly, invincibly, and excellently. For He is not the cause of containment, of life, or of perfection merely in such a way that the super-named Goodness could be named from this alone, or from another providence.

^A And, in fact, all things harmoniously praise and name Him, as He has simply and limitlessly anticipated all things within Himself by the all-perfect goodness of His one and only cause-producing providence. ^B

§ VIII.

Indeed, theologians celebrate not only these divine names which are derived from universal or particular providences, or from those that receive providence, but also—moving from certain divine visions that have at times illuminated the masters of the mysteries or the prophets in sacred shrines or elsewhere—they name the super-effulgent and super-named Goodness for various reasons and powers. They attribute to Him forms and figures—human, or fiery, or electrum-like—and they praise His eyes, ears, hair, faces, hands, shoulder blades, wings, arms, backs, and feet. They fashion for Him crowns, seats, cups, and bowls, and other such mystic things, concerning which we shall speak with all our might in our *Symbolical Theology*. ^C

But now, gathering from the oracles as much as pertains to the present treatise, and using what has been said as a kind of rule to which we look while we proceed to the development of the intelligible divine names, let us, as the hierarchical law always enjoins upon us in every theology, behold with God-viewing mind the God-like contemplations and lend sacred ears to the interpretations of the sacred divine names. Let us place "holy things to the holy," as the divine scriptures hand down, and protect them from the derision and mockery of the uninitiated; nay rather, if there be such men, let us recall them from the war which they wage in this matter against God. These things must be guarded by you, O excellent Timothy, according to the most sacred instruction, so that you do not utter or divulge divine things before the uninitiated. And may God grant me to hymn the goodness-working plural names of the unapproachable and unnameable Godhead in a manner befitting God, and may He not take the word of truth from my mouth. ^D

[CORDERIUS' ANNOTATIONS: Thus, blessed man, after the theological information. From this it is clear that St. Dionysius had edited a certain other treatise on divine information, which, to the great damage of the Church and the grief of theologians, indeed perished, or certainly lies hidden elsewhere in darkness among the Turks or schismatics. And with good order, after the divine information, he writes about the divine names: for our mind must first be divinely illuminated and informed before it can speak fittingly of God. Hence also here, as we noted in the first general observation, he acknowledges that he will bring forward nothing except from the Holy Scriptures.

Ibid.: "Just as those things which fall under the understanding, etc." Hence St. Thomas, in the first part, q. 12, a. 2, concludes that the divine essence is not seen by the created intellect through any species from the side of the divine essence, but is apprehended and seen from the side of the created intellect, strengthened by some likeness (namely, the light of glory); as he proves more fully in that place, and as the scholastics dispute. Likewise q. 88, art. 2, on the occasion of this passage, he asks whether our intellect can arrive at understanding immaterial substances through the knowledge of material things; and he resolves that, since the quiddity of a material thing, which our intellect abstracts from matter, is of an entirely different nature from immaterial substances, we cannot perfectly understand immaterial substances through material ones; and at the same time he reconciles with this resolution the passage in the first chapter of *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, where, § 5, it is said that it is impossible for our mind to be aroused to that immaterial contemplation of the celestial hierarchies unless it has used material guidance.]

^A For it is permitted, he says, to ascend from material things to some sort of knowledge of immaterial things, yet not a perfect knowledge: because the comparison of material things to immaterial ones is not sufficient. For the likenesses, if any are taken from material things to understand immaterial ones, are very unlike, as Dionysius teaches in this place.

It is to be noted here how God cannot be comprehended by the intellect. For St. Maximus says regarding this passage, if there are incorporeal substances, both simple and intelligible and unified, they are not only not subject to the senses, like angels and souls, so as to be known through being, but neither can we comprehend them by knowledge through sensible things, which are of a lower order, nor can we behold their essence; how much more does God excel sense and sensible things, who is not substance, but above substance; nor simple, but above that which is simple; nor intellect, but above intellect; nor unity, but above unity; nor circumscribed by any boundary, but by His own infinity released from all things: who as He is in Himself can neither be investigated by reason, nor understood, nor named. When, therefore, you hear in Scripture the form of God, and the species, and the face, understand by anagogy, that is, elevated and above bodies, as is worthy of God: but when you hear unity, do not understand it as if certain varied things concur toward a union: for the discourse is not now about these, but about God, who is neither a principle of numbers, nor composite, but unified above simple substances. A unity that is the maker of unity. ^B After Dionysius, however, has removed from God all things that are in the nature of things, he next, following the mode of our language (for we cannot be carried above this), praises God from those very things from which he removed Him: and he calls Him unity, but the maker of unities, that is, of simple substances, such as angels and souls: and a mind not intelligible, that is, which is understood by no mind. For if the like is known by the like, if he were a mind, he would have to be known by minds: *But who has known the mind of the Lord?* There is, therefore, a mind above mind, and a name above every name. *And my name,* he says, *I have not revealed to them* a. Wherefore He is without a name to all. Nay, He is not even a being. For if He creates the things that are from nothing, He is therefore not from those things that are, but above those things that are. But if He says: *I am who I am* b, understand as is fitting, namely, that He is without beginning and without end, indeed also inscrutable, and similarly in other things that befit God by nature. He also says that God is devoid of reason and intelligence, just as below in chapter 7. Imitating Paul, he calls the wisdom of God devoid of reason and foolish, so that he might signify His excellence, that it so excels our reason that it is held to be alien to reason, so too mind, that it is thought to be insanity and foolishness; so in this place, because the knowledge of God surpasses the reason of a creature, and the intellect, and the names which are spoken of God by an infinite interval; when otherwise God can be investigated and understood and named from all creatures through reason, he says, however, that He is ἀλογίαν, ἀνοησίαν, ἀνωνυμίαν, that is, devoid of reason, of mind, and of name, namely, because of the supereminence of substance and intelligence. Just as light that is excellent makes for us a blindness of the eyes; and sound likewise that is excellent makes a deafness of the sense of hearing. ^C See what has been said in the seventh, eighth, and ninth general observations. John Cyparissiota in the premeditation of his Exposition of material things sets down this first axiom: That there is one God, partless, infinite, devoid of color, invisible, known by no natural representation, who altogether repels notice of when or how He is; whom in no way and in no part can the mind grasp, except only by faith from His creatures that He is, but not what He is. To which place P. Turrianus in his Scholia says: God is not known by any natural representation, as a stone is known by its species and likeness that is in the eye, because He is ἀνείδεος, as Dionysius says, that is, He lacks every species and likeness; for He possesses the likeness of no creature, nor can He possess it. Therefore we do not know God by seeing, which is to know ἐποπτικῶς, but ἐπιστημονικῶς, through creatures by reason, that is, from the likenesses of God that are perceived in creatures, God is known, not what He is, but that He is. But when he says that the mind can in no way and in no part grasp God except by faith, only that He is, not what He is; he does not deny that God can be known by natural reason, that He is, since this can be demonstrated from His effects, that saying of Wisdom xiii: *From the greatness and beauty of the creature the creator of them can be seen*; but he speaks of a higher knowledge that is necessary, such as faith is, according to that saying of Wisdom ix: *And if anyone has been perfected among the sons of men, if your wisdom, O Lord, is absent from him, he shall be reckoned as nothing.* For *without faith it is impossible to please God* c. This knowledge of God the blessed Basil calls intellectual comprehension through faith. For he says thus, discussing that, *Attend to yourself: Do not seek knowledge of God through the eyes, but commit faith to your mind, and have an intellectual comprehension of God.* In Greek he said κατάληψιν. Similarly, Saint Maximus spoke in his first theological century, ch. 8, for thus he says: Whatever things are known are named, and have in themselves demonstrable principles of knowledge. But God is not named an intellect by us; but is only believed to be, from those things which are known by us from creatures. When he says, *He is only believed to be*, he does not deny that He can also be known by natural reason from creatures; but he speaks of knowledge through faith, which God requires in us as necessary, which He Himself gives, firmer than any demonstration, of which the Apostle says: *He who comes to God must believe that He exists, and that He is a rewarder* d. He did not say, it is necessary to know that He is, although this can be demonstrated and known, because not all can grasp demonstrations; but all can believe, with God helping, and they ought to. ^D Moreover, the principles of this knowledge through faith are not undemonstrable, as the same Saint Maximus says: For, he says, faith is of those things which are above mind and reason. The same author, ch. 11 of the first century: All things, he says, whatever they are, we name as things previously perceived by intelligence, which have in themselves demonstrable principles of knowledge; but God is not named as one who is known, but rather He is believed to be from those things only which are perceived by intelligence; wherefore none of those things which are understood is compared with Him in any part. For all things that are understood have in themselves a principle of knowledge, because they are either in sensible things, of which there are phantasms, from which intelligible species are abstracted, by which the intellect informed understands; or they are incorporeal, which have within themselves the source from which they may be compared with sensible things, to whose phantasms, which are the images and likenesses of them coming to the mind, the intellect turns itself, so that it may understand something of incorporeal things. Moreover, likenesses are the principles of sensing and understanding, as Saint Thomas says, p. 1, q. 84, art. 3. But God cannot be compared in this way with a sensible creature; whence He is not understood in this way, but as a cause and by way of eminence, as S. Thomas says in the same place.

Concerning by which modes God exists as incomprehensible, see in Lessius, book 1, *De perfectionibus divinis*, ch. 2.

§ 11. *Concerning this, therefore*, etc. Again, Dionysius here inculcates that nothing is to be asserted about divine matters, unless so much as divine Scripture confirms. So also Plato in the *Timaeus*, on divine matters one must believe, he says,

that nothing can be known, and that it is impossible to express them. In the same place: “Its knowledge and contemplation is inaccessible to all.” For as long as we are outside our true fatherland, the highest knowledge of God is understanding, which does not yet reach the divine nature. We obtain, however, as much of divine knowledge as the ray of divine revelation, transmitted through the serene minds of the holy ones, has shown; in whom, indeed, as in translucent bodies, we perceive that divine sun which we cannot grasp in itself. Wherefore Saint Dionysius rightly teaches that we are restrained by certain limits regarding the contemplation of divine things. First, because we cannot reach beyond what that ray offers. Second, because that ray descends upon us in a measured way; not, indeed, to show us the divine nature itself, or whatever God beholds in Himself, or at least all those things which the angels look upon in the presence of God; but certain fewer and lower things, though without doubt most precious if compared with others. Third, because that ray demonstrates itself to each one according only to the capacity of the subject, with a certain just distribution preserved everywhere according to merit. In which, certainly, the divine Sun behaves just as if the celestial sun were to temper its light for individual eyes everywhere. God, therefore, offers Himself as if finite to finite minds, meanwhile hiding His infinity within Himself. Finally, he teaches that each one ought to regulate himself regarding this divine ray in such a way that he does not fall through sloth into what is worse because of its excellence, nor rashly through pride attempt anything beyond his strength.

^A § III. *These then are the divine names, etc.* He teaches that what shines in God above the limits of essence and intelligence is not so much to be investigated as to be venerated, and that the eyes of the mind, not in the least able to withstand this immense light, should be directed toward the sacred Scriptures, as if toward certain heavens, in which the divine names shine like stars adapted to our eyes: from which stars, indeed, the proper virtues of God, and the divine appellations and praises, shine forth to us, just as the virtues of the sun do in the stars. Whence we derive two things most especially. First, that we draw from hence divine rays congruent to our intellect; second, that we may rightly praise the divine sun, the fountain of such rays. Moreover, that wonderful powers lie hidden in divine names and appellations, both for declaring divine mysteries and for performing miracles, all the Hebrews believe, and Zoroaster and Iamblichus confirm. Many, however, abuse these sacrosanct names in amulets and illusions, wickedly and superstitiously, of which it is not necessary to speak here.

In the same place: *That He who is the cause and origin of all, etc.* Gregory of Nyssa in his *Commentary on the Song of Solomon*: “All things,” he says, “which we contemplate in the universe provide the substance for the divine names, by which we name God wise, powerful, good, holy, blessed, eternal, judge, savior, and others of this kind.” And Damascene in the first book *De Fide Orthodoxa*: “God, he says, because of His ineffable goodness, wished to be named after our affairs and in our manner, lest we be completely bereft of knowledge of Him.” Great Basil in the first book *Against Eunomius*: “Although there is one Lord, and one substance simple and void of composition, He names Himself in different ways, adapting to Himself denominations that differ among us according to our thoughts. For He imposes diverse names upon Himself, just as there are diverse operations provided, and a diverse relationship of them to those things which are done; but we say that God is recognized by us from His operations, yet we do not promise to approach His essence. For God’s operations descend to us; but His essence remains inaccessible.” Gregory of Nyssa, again, arguing against Eunomius: “I, he says, declare faithfully what I have learned from holy Scripture, that He who is above every name is named for us by many names according to the variety of His benefits. For He is called Light, when He dispels the darkness of ignorance; Life, when He grants immortality; Way, when He leads from error to truth. Thus He is called a tower of strength, and a fortified city, and a fountain, and a rock, and a vine, and a physician, and a resurrection, and all such names.” The same author again: “God indeed is in Himself that which is at last believed to be; but He is named by those who call upon Him, not by that which He is (for His nature cannot be explained) but rather from those things which He is believed to perform that pertain to our life; He has homonyms, or certain equivocal names.” And Basil the Great: “Insofar as the divine nature is concerned, nothing of those things which are conceived declares it.” From these things, therefore, it is clear that God becomes of many names for us because we are in need of His many benefits for maintaining life, and we are the ones who are entangled in difficulties, and in them we implore God with devised and discovered names. Wherefore this also is made manifest, that although God may be affected by many names from infinite operations, yet our intelligence does not thoroughly attain what nature He has. For since the question is twofold, *that* God exists, and *what* He is; the former, namely that He is, is agreed upon by all, but what He is, and of what nature, is known only to the blessed.

^B § IV. *These we have learned from the Scriptures, etc.; divine names form according to the emanations of divine goodness, etc.* Saint Thomas, *Prima Pars*, q. 13, art. 6: “These names of God,” he says, “good, wise, and the like, as to the thing signified, are predicated of God prior to creatures, because these perfections flow into creatures from God; but as to the imposition, he says, they were imposed upon creatures which we know first, for they signify created goodness, ‘good,’ and created wisdom, ‘wise,’ etc., which belong to God by essence *ἐξηρημένως*, that is, loftily and eminently.”

Ibid., art. 2, he interprets Dionysius thus: that he wished to signify that the names of God—good, wise, and others of this kind—were indeed imposed from the processions or providences of God flowing into creatures, but signify the very principle of things, insofar as goodness and life and wisdom are in Him first, and indeed more excellently than they are understood and signified by us. For it is one thing from which a name is imposed, and another in which it is imposed. Thus, the names of God are imposed from the providences, which others call processions, to signify the substance of God, although they do not signify it perfectly: just as this name ‘man’ perfectly signifies the substance or essence of man, because what God is cannot be comprehended by the intellect, as what man is can be comprehended; for he is a rational animal, which is the perfect essence of man that ‘man’ signifies. Nay, it should also be noted that the very word ‘eminence’ and ‘eminently,’ which Saint Thomas is accustomed to use when he speaks of the names of God, and explains what they signify in God, he has taken from Dionysius’s *ἐξηρημένως*, as I noted a little earlier, which he is accustomed to say may be interpreted in various ways: loftily, supereminently, eminently, exclusively, excellently, separately.

§ V. *Neither name, nor discourse.* Because, indeed, God cannot be explained by one name, nor by a discourse which consists of many words. And he says it is better than any appellation; because in no name can the whole of what is in Him be set forth. However, he understands this with respect to any created intellect considering His nature, because it does not see God as He is, and thus God cannot be entirely signified to it by any name. In the same manner, Justin in his *Second Apology for the Christians*, not far from the end, says that a name cannot be imposed upon God, and that if anyone contends for this, it is the height of madness. Nazianzen similarly in his thirty-fourth oration, which is the second concerning Theology, reports the opinion of Plato in the *Timaeus*, saying that it is difficult to perceive God by the intellect, but to speak of Him is impossible. He himself, however, Nazianzen, sets forth his own opinion to us from

^A Vasquez, who rightly correlates these passages, vol. I, in prim. part., disput. 57, q. 13, art. 1, cap. 3: "Nor does he," he says, "contradict Plato in any way, who taught that it is more difficult to speak of God than to perceive Him; because he says the latter is difficult, but the former is impossible." Nazianzen, however, considers both to be impossible, and the grasping of God even more so. For Plato was speaking of that knowledge of God which is granted to wayfarers—a knowledge that is obscure—and he correctly said it is difficult to perceive God without error, and it is impossible to speak of Him or to explain Him precisely as He is (for that is what he meant by "to speak of"). But Nazianzen says it is impossible to explain God not only in His quiddity and as He is, but even all those things that might be said of Him under a veil; for there is always something left to add: but to see Him as He is, which he calls "grasping," is certainly more impossible; for that is even further removed from the knowledge of wayfarers than is explaining God exactly under the veil and obscurity of faith. Conversely, Augustine, regarding another mode of knowledge, says: "God is thought of more truly than He is spoken of; but He is more true than He is thought of." This, however, is understood regarding wayfarers, who sometimes conceive more of God in contemplation than they are able to explain; yet God is still better and truer in Himself than He is thought of by us. These things, however, do not prevent that, if we speak from the side of him who hears the names or the discourse about God, the significance and knowledge of the names or the discourse should be equal to that which he himself has of God; for the knowledge of the hearer measures the meaning of the name. Hence, just as the blessed form a proper word and concept of God, so pure wayfarers can neither signify what He is by any word, nor attain it by a concept of the mind; as Nazianzen elegantly states in his Oration on Faith, which is the forty-ninth: "Certainly this is God, that when He is spoken of, He cannot be spoken; when He is estimated, He cannot be estimated; when He is defined, He grows by the very definition itself." He said that God grows by definition; because, although a definition is called the boundary of a thing, because the thing is enclosed therein as if by a limit and end, yet when we endeavor to define and determine God, it is such that something of Him always remains outside; because His nature cannot be known by the created intellect by its own power, nor sufficiently explained to the wayfarer, nor described by definition. See these things more fully in Vasquez, vol. I, in 1 part., disput. 57, q. 13, art. 1, cap. 3, from which these were gathered in summary.

Ibidem: *"That, therefore,"* etc. Here Dionysius denies of God whatever belongs by any formal reason to the properties of natural things, of souls and minds, or even of that universal being in which the Platonists place essence, life, and intellect; also motion, rest, identity, diversity, as genera of things; and again, infinity and limit, as if they were the first elements of all things. He also uses the letter of Plato which says: "Around the King of all things are all things, for His sake are all things, and He is the cause of all good things." Note, however, that two things pertain to the excellence of a cause; first, that the more excellent the cause is, the more it is separated from the conditions of its subjects; and second, that in proportion to its degrees of excellence, it diffuses its powers and actions further and wider. Wherefore, the first cause of all things is most separate from all, and yet is the most present; hence it is called "One" by the Platonists, and from this "Good." It has nothing in common with its effects, and yet it acts upon all things, acts in all, and preserves them assiduously. For God, as he teaches above, embraces, encompasses, and anticipates all things. He embraces them by the excellence of His power, as if circumfused from without; He encompasses them, gathering each thing together within Himself by His own nature, no matter how much they differ among themselves; and finally, He anticipates them, because even before they exist, He possesses them, and in a degree far more excellent than they are. From this Dionysius also proves that "Good" is a most accommodative name for God, both by reason of its being a principle, since it is to this "Good" that the most ample diffusion pertains; and by reason of its being an end, because all things desire the Good.

^B § VI. *"When the theologians knew this, they praise God,"* etc. He teaches by what reason all things can be denied of God and in like manner affirmed. Here is confirmed the sentiment of Mercury Trismegistus, who says that God is nothing of all things and that God is all things; also that God has no name, and possesses every name. For all things are in God almost in the same way, and yet are not, as a house is in the architect, as the forms of limbs are in the vegetative and seminal nature, as the fiery heat is in the sun, as in the unity of number, as the length of a line is in a point from which it is produced by Pythagorean reason, as lines are in the circular center, as all rays are in the center of the sun, and as heats are in light. Deservedly, therefore, Parmenides, also a Pythagorean according to Plato, denies and affirms all things of that one principle of things.

Note with St. Thomas here, from which places in Scripture these names of God are taken. Life and truth, John xiv, 6: *I am the way, the truth, and the life.* Light, John viii, 12: *I am the light of the world.* God, Exodus iii, 6: *I am the God of thy father.* Good, Luke xviii, 19: *No one is good but God alone.* Beautiful, Cant. i, 16: *Behold, you are beautiful, my beloved.* Wise, Job ix, 4: *He is wise in heart.* Beloved, Cant. ii, 16: *My beloved to me.* God of gods, Ps. xlix, 1: *The God of gods, the Lord, hath spoken.* Lord of lords, Apocalypse xvii, 14: *He is Lord of lords.* Holy of holies, Daniel ix, 24: *And the Holy of holies may be anointed.* Eternal, Baruch iv, 7: *For you provoked Him that made you, the eternal God.* Who is, Exod. iii, 14: *He who is, hath sent me to you.* Author of the ages, Ecclesiasticus xxiv, 14: *From the beginning, and before the world,* etc. Giver of life, Acts xvii, 25: *Seeing it is He who giveth to all life and breath.* Wisdom, 1 Cor. i, 30: *He is made unto us wisdom.* Mind, Isaiah xl, and to Rom. xi: *Who hath known the mind of the Lord?* In Greek it is *noun*, that is, mind. Word, Hosea i: *The word of the Lord that came to Hosea*; and Joel i: *The word of the Lord that came to Joel.* And similarly in other prophets; which, as Cyril says in his Commentaries on the first chapter of Hosea, signifies nothing else than that the knowledge of future things, like light, has illuminated the mind of the prophet to whom the word of the Lord came, that is, of the Holy Trinity. But that such a revelation did not take place in the prophets by tongue and words in our fashion, Paul teaches (says the same Cyril in the same place) when he says: *Do you seek a proof of Christ who speaketh in me?* Knower, 2 Tim. ii, and Dan. xiii. Superlative, or super-eminently, having all the treasures of all knowledge, Col. ii. Power, 1 Cor. i, where the interpreter calls it virtue. Powerful, Ps. xix. King of kings, Apoc. xix. Ancient of days, Dan. vii. Unaging, Ps. cii. Immutable, Isa. i. Savior, Matt. i: *For He, he says, shall save His people from their sins*; for from salvation is God called Savior. Justice, sanctification, redemption, 1 Cor. i. Exceeding all things in magnitude, Ps. cxliv. As in a gentle breeze, 1 Kings xix. And yet they say He is in our minds, Eph. iii (for Paul calls hearts "minds" there); and in souls, Wisd. vii: *Into holy souls, he says, He transfers Himself*; and in bodies, 1 Cor. vi, and 1 Thess. v: *That your whole spirit, and soul, and body may be preserved blameless*; this comes to pass by God dwelling in the mind, and soul, and body (Paul calls the mind "spirit" here), and 2 Cor. vi: *And I will dwell in them*, namely, in the minds, and souls, and bodies. And in heaven and on earth, 2 Cor. xii, 5.

^A Jeremiah xxiii. And at the same time in the same place, Dionysius explains the same in chapter 9, concerning the great and the small, and the same, etc. In the world, John i. Around the world, Ecclesiasticus xli. Above the world, Isaiah lxvi. Supercelestial and supersubstantial, Ps. cxii: *His glory is above the heavens.* The sun, Malachi iv. A star, Apoc. (Rev.) xxii. Fire, Deut. iv. Water, John vii. Spirit, John iv. Dew, Hosea xiv. A cloud, Hosea vi. In itself a stone, αὐτόλιθον, Ps. lxxx. For it is the foundation of virtue properly and of itself; it belongs to Christ because of his divinity, which is one and the same in the three Persons, which made in Christ himself the highest cornerstone, making both one, to whom it is fitting to be αὐτόλιθον. The Rock, 1 Cor. x. Blessed Peter is therefore (if we are to withstand the heretics of our time) the rock of the Church, as the Gospel testifies; yet he is not αὐτόλιθος nor αὐτόπετρα, that is, a stone by itself or a rock by itself: nor is he ever called so in the Scriptures, as Christ our God is, who is thus αὐτοθεμέλιος, that is, the foundation by itself, besides which foundation no one can lay another by itself, just as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians iii, for he speaks of this foundation by itself.

^B § VII. *Thus, therefore, to him,* etc. He teaches that God is all things in all. So also Plato says in the Epistles, that all things hang from God who governs, as from an efficient cause and likewise an end. Furthermore, in the fourth book of the Laws, he confirms the same with these words: *God indeed, as the ancient saying goes, holding the beginning and the end and the middle of all beings, proceeds in a straight line, according to nature moving around*, that is, God, as the ancients tradition says, comprehending the Beginning and the end and the middle of all things, conducts all things by a straight path, and according to nature circles all things. In the *Timaeus* also and in *Parmenides* he leads all things back from the One. Hence also Plotinus, Iamblichus, and the other Platonists, although they relate different things, virtues, and events to different causes proximately, nevertheless reduce all effects and causes to the first cause of causes, from whence all causes have both to exist, and to be causes, and that each one should act naturally, and be moved in a certain order. Nay, even the astrologers relate that through a certain aspect of the moon to the sun, the powers gathered in summary of all the stars are drawn; which indeed means that the powers of all things both exist from the sun, and consist in the sun, through light diffused everywhere, conferring individual virtues upon individual things. And so, not only does whatever the stars do, the sun also do, but also the virtues in the stars are different, as if the sun itself, for example, ^C 296 in Saturn, represents the sun’s light as Saturnian steadfastness itself, in Jupiter as nourishing virtue, in Mars as efficacious motion, in Venus as grace, in Mercury as agility and industry, in the Moon as vivid moisture, and similarly in the others, and so on. What wonder, therefore, if God is to be called by the names of all things, since God himself in essence is the very firmament of essence; in life, he is the intimate vigor for universal motion; in intellect, he is insight and likewise clarity; in all things, finally, he is the summit of every good? To this point tend the things which Dionysius argues concerning the universal action and kingdom and providence of God. And so universal and absolute is God’s kingdom, that he not only acts all things in all, but he himself is also excellently all things in all.

Note those words, *he anticipated all things simply and without limitation in himself*, in Greek, Πάντα δὲ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀπεριορίστως ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ ὄντα προείληφε, that is, he has so anticipated all things in himself, and is all things, that he is not compacted with them, nor united corporally; this is what it means for all things to be simply and without limitation in him, and for him to be all things, contrary to what Manichæus maintained, that God is, to use our translation, consubstantiated with all bodies. For (says Lessius in his first book *On the Divine Perfections*, chap. 1, § 6), as the world comprises every perfection of created things through the diverse particles and forms of itself, so God does not contain all things through some diversity of forms or parts, but through one most simple reason of his deity, through which he is all things formally or eminently. For through the reason of his deity he is not only God, but is also omnipotence, goodness, and so forth. Then through that same reason he contains every good of angels and of men, and of the whole creation, not only as it exists, but even as it is possible. Beautifully does Gregory Nazianzen express this sentiment in a certain poem: *In thee all things abide, and to thee all things hasten.* *Thou art the end of all, and one, and all, and nothing of these things:* *Since thou art neither one nor all, how shall I call thee* *Who art alone unnameable and all-named?*

He is said to be all things, because all things are contained in him, so that he is all things formally or eminently. He is said to be nothing of things, because he is above all things that can be conceived by us. In a similar way he is called unnameable and all-named; for although he may be called by many names, so that he may be conceived by us in some way, yet no name and no conception of ours can express him, as he is in himself. See these things more fully explained in the aforementioned place in Lessius.

^D § VIII. It is to be noted that divine names are derived not only from universal or particular providences, but also from certain visions of the Most High. Now the names which are taken from universal providences, says Saint Maximus, are King, Creator, Omnipotent, for these are names of divine Providence in general. From particular providences, God is called God of gods, Lord of lords, King of kings, for not all, but some are called gods, lords, kings. But from visions are taken the names of the revelations of God in symbols, which he writes at times appeared in temples, alluding to that vision of Isaiah, c. vi, and he seems to say that Isaiah saw in the temple that vision concerning the one sitting on the throne, and the seraphim above it. As for what follows next in Dionysius, these things are said concerning the vision of Ezechiel c. 1, and concerning another in c. x. He says, however, that human members are frequently attributed to God by the Scriptures, such as eyes, Ps. xxxiv: *His eyes look upon the poor.* Ears, Jacob (James) v:

The cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.* Hairs, Dan. vii: *And the hair of his head like pure wool.* Face, Ps. xxxiii: *The face of the Lord is against them that do evil.* Hands, Job x: *Thy hands... have fashioned me.* Shoulders, Ps. xc: *He shall overshadow thee with his shoulders.* Wings, Ps. xvi: *Protect me under the shadow of thy wings.* Arms, Ps. lxxxviii: *My arm shall strengthen him.* Back parts, Exod. xxxiii: *Thou shalt see my back parts.* Feet, Gen. iii: *And they heard the voice of the Lord walking in paradise.* Crowns, Ps. lxiv: *Thou shalt bless the crown of the year of thy bounty.* Seats, Ps. lxxxviii: *Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever.* Cup, Ps. lxxiv: *The cup of the Lord is in his hand.* Mixing bowl, Prov. ix: *He hath mingled his wine in a bowl, according to the LXX.*

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES (51)

The great Dionysius writes the present book to holy Timothy, the disciple of the great Paul, appointed by him as bishop of Ephesus. Since at that time the heresies of the philosophers in Ionia were flourishing, and the saint was having many dialectical harassments from them, knowing Dionysius to be wise—both in secular wisdom and in the divine and sacred wisdom, having been a student of the great Paul in this, and having busied himself much with the divine Scriptures—he asks to be taught by him regarding the matters proposed; and this is done. The great Dionysius therefore calls him a fellow-presbyter, that is, a co-bishop, just as he calls himself a presbyter, that is, a bishop. For this is declared even in the Acts of the holy apostles, where the great apostle of Christ, Paul, gives some instructions to the Churches of Asia.

Since this treatise is about the divine names, it must be understood that, in general and in all cases, names do not signify substances, nor what a thing is—for this belongs to definition—but a name is a certain etymology from the things present to the object named; for example, *anthropos* (man) is named from *ano athrein*, that is, looking upward. Therefore, what the existence of the Divine is, is inscrutable even to the angels themselves. But that He is named from certain of His effects (for example, as God, good, savior—which they call affirmative theology) and again from what is taken from our affairs by way of negation (which they call negative theology, such as: incomprehensible, formless, immortal)—to be named from these is not at all contrary to His holiness; for we do not multiply His nature, which is impossible, but just as we are led from certain composite descriptions of God in the Scriptures to an approach toward the knowledge of His simplicity, so also through names of this kind and their usage we are led to that which is unnameable. Hence, if anyone has said anything about God, it is above what he says; for He is beyond every name that can be named. For this reason, the formula of speaking by the preposition *hyper-* (above) and *auto-* (self) has been devised by the theologians in these matters; and God is called super-good and self-good, and super-infinite and self-infinite. The former is said because He is above these things and surpasses them incomparably; the latter, because He exists properly and primarily, and not through any participation or relation or comparison; for a name signifies either a body or a thing, but the Divine exists incomprehensibly and eminently above these.

^A§ 1. But now, O blessed one, according to the grace and participation of Him who is blessed, and not to ^B—not by death sub^C—^D

-^Aject is it, O Timothee, after theological information and pre-introductions. For another treatise has been prepared by the saint before this one, elementary regarding those things said about God in the Scriptures, of which the present one is a continuation. According to that one, therefore, I shall pass to the explanation of the divine names. He calls this explanation an "unfolding," as the divine names in question contain something deeper than what is apparent. Let it also be agreed here beforehand that we do not hand over nor constrain the truth of things said about God to the persuasion and speech of human ^B wisdom; for He is unconstrained and is above all existing things, so that He can never be surmised from them; for human wisdom borrows its demonstrations from sensible things. And if you should even call the immediate proposition itself, which is self-credible, one that is applied to the mind from partial sensible things, how could anyone reason about things that transcend every essence, unless at least by the highest vigor of the mind, through pure piety, one might be able to conceive them in an inexplicable manner? We do not, therefore, pursue the truth in the persuasiveness of human wisdom, but in the demonstration of the power of the theologians, by which ^C we are united spiritually to things ineffable and unknown; for this is what is ineffable and unknown. For if anyone were to utter anything for the sake of teaching, or were to know anything through learning, it is not appropriate to the conceptions regarding God, unless our intellectual faculties be strengthened by the Spirit-moved oracles, in order to be disposed toward such an ineffable union, according to the more excellent mode of our rational and intellectual power, through which we are able to utter and conceive something, and an operation of union, according to which we speak or understand. This, moreover, is because, by the like, it is possible for the like to be understood. We know, therefore, things that are in our sphere ^D through logical method and science, by speaking, and through intellectual power and operation, according to the appropriate proportion of the thing being known, we understand and are, as it were, joined and united to them. For as it holds in the case of sense, that we sense then when the sense is united to the sensible, so also it holds in the case of intellection; for the intellect is united to the intelligible, when it apprehends it. And these things are so with regard to other matters; but with regard to the divine, since we have nothing more akin to God than mind and reason, again, their best parts and, as it were, their flowers, are taken up cleansed, so that the mind may in some way know, and the reason may proclaim, the things that are beyond us.

General rule, therefore: one must not be bold to speak or even to conceive anything regarding the Deity, who is supra-essential both to sensible and intellectual, and hidden in nature, beyond those things which have been indicated to us from the sacred and divine oracles, in which our own mind and reason finds delight; for one must attribute the supra-essential knowledge of that ignorance which is above reason, and mind, and essence, to the supra-essentiality itself alone. And observe the knowledge of ignorance, not only of knowledge; for not only do we not have scientific knowledge of what God is (for this...

is impossible), but also we do not know what He is not. How, and for what cause, do we not know this, which is a matter of exact knowledge in things concerning us? When we know scientifically what a thing is, then we also know scientifically what it is not. For if we know the cause of a man being rational, namely that he uses reason (for this is the cause and the medium), we know the cause of the man not being irrational by this very medium. Since, however, there can be given no notion of what God is, the knowledge of what He is not is also a supernatural knowledge, which must indeed be attributed to God. Let us then look up to the heights as much as that ray of the sacred oracles allows itself to be insinuated to us ^B (for we do not learn God from the Scriptures as much as He is able, but as much as He allows), and let us compose ourselves toward the higher rays with sobriety and reverence regarding divine things. For if we must believe the all-wise theology of the great Paul (for he it is who says that according to the measure of the power of each is the illumination granted by God), we say this: that according to the capacity of each mind, whether human, as those first receiving the illumination, or angelic, which he is accustomed to call minds, as being essentially minds and understanding all things unitarily which flow from God directly into them—according to the capacity of each, I say, the divine things are revealed; not that God grudges the greater light, but that He ^C may preserve equity in the distribution of divine knowledge. For it is proper to justice to attribute to each according to merit. Therefore, while the knowledge of God is immense, we have need of measures. For if it were revealed to us without measure, we could not be preserved; just as a bodily eye could not receive the whole sun. Therefore, the supreme goodness of God, wishing to preserve either the propriety of justice or ourselves, as behooves God (for it is fitting for God to save, and not to grudge), withdraws His immensity from things measured and comprehended, as being incomprehensible, while bestowing the incomprehensibility of divine knowledge through a certain proportion. For just as things intellectual are imperceptible and invisible to things sensible, and the simple and uncompounded to those formed and composite, and the unfigured ^D to those formed according to shapes, by the same reason do divine things exist as incomprehensible. For if simple and unfigured things, even if they are certain substances, do not at all fall under the senses, such as angels and souls, how much more does God excel, since He is not a substance, but is above substance and infinite; nor is He a mind, but an unity above mind? But hearing of unity, let no one think of a concurrence of certain diverse things into a union; for the discourse is not now about such, but about God who is utterly uncompounded, and united above those things which are of one substance. For what is more simple than the one, and more of one substance? But the unity of God is transcendently above this, and the one that is beyond mind is unintelligible to all minds. For here our mind, being diversified, begins to form proofs and certain propositions

But when from these it draws a conclusion, it discovers one thing following from those that have been proposed. That one, however, which is above mind, is not of this kind, but is unintelligible and impossible to grasp by syllogism; which also is good beyond reason, and ineffable to every word. ^B Furthermore, when it has excluded from all things that are the things concerning God, following the measure of our own tongue (for it is not possible for us to exceed this), it praises God from those very things from which it has excluded Him. And it calls Him a unity, yet the maker of all unity, that is, the creator of simple substances, of angels, of souls; and a mind, but not intelligible, meaning that it is not understood by any mind. For if like is known by like, if He were a mind, He would need to be known by minds; but "Who hath known the mind of the Lord?" Therefore, it is a mind above mind, and a name above every name. "And my name," He says, "I have not declared to them"; wherefore He is without a name to all. But if He says, "I am who I am," it is understood as is fitting, that is, as without beginning and without end, and as the Divinity herself says concerning herself: for to the Divinity alone are the things concerning her own nature known, and she alone knows herself knowingly and properly. "For no one knows the Father except the Son; and the Son, except the Father." The same is true regarding the Holy Spirit; for no one knows the things of God, except the Spirit which is from God.

§ II. Concerning this superessential—for essence is spoken of in relation to being; but "being" implies the notion of some production; thus it would not be called, properly, essence, but superessential. Concerning, therefore, this superessential and hidden divinity, one must not presume to speak, nor even to think anything, beyond those things which have been declared by the divine Scriptures. For as she herself has transmitted concerning herself in the Gospels (when the Lord said: "No one knows the Father except the Son; and, No one knows the things of God except the Spirit which is from God," kindly seeing fit to restrain our irrational search), the knowledge and contemplation of her is inaccessible to all beings, as being beyond all things. And you will find many of the theologians saying that she is not only invisible and ^D incomprehensible (for this is the praise of God, when anyone speaks fittingly of God, just as the opposite is blasphemy, when one does not speak fittingly), but also unsearchable and untraceable, because her infinity is hidden. And not only is she not comprehended because of her infinity (for that which is limited is comprehended by that by which it is also limited; but God is the place of all things, not corporally, but creatively; for He himself fills heaven and earth and all things), but also no trace of any of those things that have passed through is visible upon this hidden infinity. And he says this, not as though some, who

^A have penetrated into it, have left no footprints, but because they have neither reached it, nor do the footprints of any appear; for how could the footprints of those who have not passed through be visible?

But if anyone hears that this is incomprehensible, it does not mean that its goodness is entirely and absolutely incommunicable to any of the beings that exist; rather, the Good, having the divine ray firmly established in itself (for it does not depart in any way from its own proper nature), through its goodness, is distributed in a manner befitting the Good, and appears in proportioned illuminations to each of the things that exist, according to the measure and order of each one's nature. For that which merely exists participates in the Being which is the True Being, according to that; that which lives, in the Life which is the True Life, according to that; that which is endowed with reason and mind, in that which is truly such, according to its being rational and mindful. ^B Furthermore, for the sake of the contemplation of it (which is attainable, and from which also arises communion and likeness), it stirs the holy angels to reach out toward such a Good, as is permitted, and neither to presume anything insolently toward the higher harmony and orderly gift of the theophany beyond their own capacity, nor to slip downward through an inclination toward what is worse. Rather, they steadily and unwaveringly reach upward toward the ray being given, as far as is possible for them, and they take wing, soberly and reverently, with a love proportionate to the illuminations that are proper and possible for them. And it is rightly added "impotently"; for even if someone attempts it, he does not attain it, but only darkens the eyes of the intellect and falls away from the true light, no differently than one who struggles to look upon the whole sun with a bodily eye. The divine powers, the Cherubim and Seraphim, imply this by covering their faces, declaring that they do not reach for a contemplation higher than that which has been granted to them. And this is what is said: "No man hath seen God at any time." Hence those who are wise in divine things assert that they have seen God's glory, but not God Himself.

§ III. Following these divine scales (that is, the divine equality and saving justice, because the illuminations occur according to the proper measure), according to which ^C scales the angelic powers are also governed in their own proper illuminations—for that which surpasses the mind and essence of all who are called gods, I mean the angels and saints, the mystery of the all-sovereign and royal Trinity—that which is hidden and incomprehensible to the reach of mind's searching, we honor with silent, empty-minded veneration; but the ineffable things we follow with a certain modest silence, and we attend to the brightnesses that shine upon us from the holy Oracles. And we are enlightened by the Scriptures and directed toward divine praises, or divine names. But we are not directed and formed in such a way that we follow irrationally and ignorantly, and in some obscure way without light, but in such a way that, by seeing those things, the illuminations proportioned to us are also provided, by which, being instructed, we may praise the beginning and cause of all illumination. And how He is the beginning and cause, the Lord Himself says in the holy Gospels: "I am the life, and the resurrection." Life for those who have slipped into the

^A corruption of the God-like image; for what corruption is to bodies, this is the corruption of the God-like image to souls—the resurrection of those who have fallen. Furthermore, for those who, according to some other unholy reasoning, are being shaken, so that their footsteps according to God are on the point of being poured out, He is a holy foundation, since the wavering itself is unholy; but things contrary are cured by their contraries. Furthermore, for those who stand, He is security: "For in God I shall make strength," says David. And for those being led up through contemplation to Him, He is a guide; for while they are still calling out, He will say, "Behold, I am here." And after the leading up, He is the illumination of those being illuminated; and step by step, for those being initiated, He is the beginning of their progress; and for those being deified, He is even the principle of deification. And furthermore, for those who separate themselves from multi-composite matter and are being simplified, He is simplicity; and for those being unified and having reached the truly One, He is oneness—the beginning of every beginning, and the communication of the hidden One through goodness, the life of the living, the essence of beings, the beginning and cause of all essences, which He both produces and sustains through goodness.

§ IV. We have learned these things from the holy Scriptures. And you will find every hymnology of the theologians referring the names of God to the divine operations, not to His nature, which contributes to His praise and interpretation; for those who symbolically reveal the ineffable mysteries of the divine are called interpreters. ^B Hence, in almost all the holy Scriptures, we see God holily praised as monad and oneness, since the monad is uncompounded and indivisible, but the oneness is something unitary and united and unifying, so that the indivisibility of God may be represented. For whatever is divided by bulk and quantities, this is divided like a body; but what is without parts is not even apparent, nay rather, it is above all incorporeality. Furthermore, since God, having conceived by His will, brought all things into existence, He was not multiplied, as some mind divided into thoughts, but remaining and continuing in the oneness indivisibly and unshed, He both brought forth all things in creation and sustains them; for even ^C until now He works. He is, therefore, supremely simplified, in an indivisible manner transcending all simplicity; for thence also arises our union. But how are we united, since we consist of partial diversities, according to which each one differs from another? But "one faith, and one baptism," and "Christ is not divided," according to the great Apostle. We are gathered, then, into a God-like monad, becoming simple and indivisible and we ourselves, as God, in accordance with what is fitting, and into a God-imitating union; that is, we are both being unified and we unify—for this is the God-imitating, according to which the peacemakers also are called "sons of God," because they imitate God. ^D Thus, either the many are united by peace, or even the one, by himself, is united in the same way. For as in the case of the things above the world, so also the lower parts of this visible world are turned toward the things that are above, and the

corporeal thing is situated in the living one (since in ^A His hand are all the ends of the earth, and indeed of the heavens also, for in Him, he says, are all things), so also does it happen in our case; for the soul is turned toward the spirit, in which the senses and the ratiocinations are established, by which we investigate reasons in speculation; because the spirit knows what is in man. The soul, therefore, being turned toward the spirit, and toward the senses that are in it, and through them toward the body, has its intellectual operations divided into diversities, and proceeding discriminately from primary thoughts to secondary ones, whether good or evil. He concludes, therefore, that we, by stretching toward God, become one by that Monad, being indistinct, our differences, which consisted of many parts, being gathered from division into a composition, and unified in a way above the world, that is, not sensibly but intellectually, since we do not in the least abhor their conjunction, but have become uniformly something one, just as He also is one, as He testifies in the sacred Gospels.

Again, the Trinity, as subsisting in three ^B persons, and on account of the paternal procession which is above conception and lacks a beginning, for the bringing forth of the Son and the Holy Spirit, from which every fatherhood in heaven (namely, the heavenly orders) and on earth (namely, the spiritual cognations and interlinkings—for Moses calls cognations "fatherhoods") is and is named. As for the Cause of beings, because all things were made from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit, having received existence, not through necessity, but through goodness. And as wise and beautiful, because all the creatures of God were and are very good. If, therefore, the Creator were not wise, how were they made? And if He were not beautiful, how are they beautiful? Yet they are beautiful, in so far as they remain in the natural order in which they were produced. But the perversion which is contrary to nature, whether it exists in angels, or in souls, or in any bodies whatsoever, destroys beauty, and by falling away from this, produces ugliness.

But He, embracing the human race with singular love, because in truth one person of the Trinity was incarnate, and assumed perfect man (for this is what the word "entirely" denotes) and communicated Himself to us, ^C recalling to Himself and joining to Himself human abasement, from which human abasement Jesus, simple in His divinity, is composed, and became dual in nature; and He who is eternal took on a temporal accession, namely, a conversation in the flesh; and furthermore, He existed in our nature, united to it according to hypostasis, He who transcends the whole order of nature by His divinity, having become incarnate immutably and inconfusedly. And whatever other doctrines are in accordance with the Scriptures, which the secret tradition of our teachers ^D bestowed upon us in mystery (for this is what "manifestly" means; and observe that the apostles delivered many things to the perfect through word of mouth, revealing them mystically; wherefore also the Apostle, writing to the Thessalonians, says that they ought to keep what they heard, whether by word or by epistle; and saying to Timothy that he had given a deposit in mystery), these we also remember; now indeed and at the time of life, according to the power of the

^A intelligence given to us, we use the veils of the Scriptures, as when it is said regarding God, that He is like fire, and like an elder, and like the Ancient of Days with Jacob, and whatever else is of this kind; and regarding the angels, that they are beast-like forms, and young men, and other such images. For these are the veils, since we are not able to have immediate access to the things themselves, and for this reason we have need of certain coverings, which are the things mentioned before. Through the philanthropy of these things, therefore, and whatever else [comes] from the hierarchical traditions, we possess our initiation. And note that many things were also transmitted to the saints as a mystery without writing.

What is the philanthropy of the Holy Scriptures? It is that, according to divine love, so that the intelligible and ungraspable [God] might be grasped by us, He used sensible symbols, as if they were certain veils; and He fashioned that which is without form, and simple things amidst the variety of divisible symbols; that is to say, when Scripture anthropomorphizes the Divine, adding feet and hands and a face to Him, it multiplied and fashioned that which is by nature one, by making and imaging it through symbols.

And now it is thus; but in the resurrection, when we shall have attained a Christ-like state (for this is what “the end” denotes ^B), we shall always be with the Lord, according to the Apostle, being filled both with the sight of his visible theophany, for He is always inseparable from the ensouled flesh which He assumed, shining upon us with evident brilliance, just as He appeared in the transfiguration; and we shall also be partakers of that intelligible illumination, which is union both above the mind and according to the mind (for it shall be accessible to us according to the mind), then more perfectly, when, having turned toward God, being perfectly illuminated from thence, we shall have become one in a unified manner, having been liberated from the differences according to composition that are in us—that is, from worldly desires and senses—for this is the impassible and immaterial mind.

But how shall we partake? By ^C unknown reachings of the rays. For as much as we shall draw near, by so much the unknown will come to be for us; and as much as we shall apply ourselves to contemplation, by so much the sea of the infinite will be broadened, in a more divine imitation of the angels—that is, a more accurate one; and he signifies from this, how that even now the life of the saints is angel-like in the praise of God, and in the contempt of carnal things, even if not absolutely; wherefore also the matters of imitation are more moderate, but then the imitation shall become more divine. For we shall be named "equal to the angels," according to the holy Gospels, and "sons of God," as being sons of the resurrection. For those who have become ^D co-participants in the death of the Master will also be [co-participants] of the glory, just as the Lord also says: "I go to my Father and your Father."

But these things are after the resurrection; now, however, we use appropriate symbols, regarding God, that is, and types and names. Yet we do not remain in these, but we are extended, as far as it is possible, toward the simple and unified truth. We say "simple," because it is partless and of one form; and "unified," because it is a unity. And if it is multiplied in various ways by symbols, and we, having ceased from all intellection of the God-like angels, and...

307 and tranquilizing and arresting our intellectual operations by the divine ray, we attend to it as far as is lawful. He says "tranquilizing or arresting" according to two methods of explanation: either because we arrest our understanding at the angelic spectacles, as if all knowledge of God ceases, and since nothing of those things is apprehended by the movement of the mind, but the divine ray shines upon us only above intellection on account of his goodness; or, tranquilizing, as if arresting our understanding at some confessed and clear proof, namely regarding the incomprehensibility of God, which is perceived by the cessation of the intellect; in which divine ray all the ends of all knowledges exist; for it does not pre-exist in part, but collectively and simultaneously. And from this it will be understood how the apostle says that we were in God before the foundation of the world. Therefore, one must know that as the production of all things is suspended from him as its cause and principle, since all beings are from him, it is logical that even when they were to be, they pre-existed in him as one who knew that he would produce them, and when he would produce them, as it is said, he who knows all things before their generation. This ray we can neither conceive with the mind, nor set forth in speech, nor behold in any other way, because it is exempt from all things, and anticipates every termination of notion, and essence, and power, and is placed above all celestial intelligences. And see how he proves this. Since the knowledges of some things are knowledges of beings, and if any known things are defined, which are themselves beings. Therefore, that which is more eminent than every essence and all things is, by all means, also exempt from every knowledge. Furthermore, one must know that essence is one thing, and power is another; for the former is of those things which subsist by themselves, but the latter is of those which have their being in another.

[V.] Having said that the Godhead surpasses every essence and knowledge, he asks how, therefore, it can be named (for names are declarative of subject matters) and how our discourse regarding divine names will be constructed, if, as has been said, it exceeds every discourse and every notion? And if it is above mind and essence, how will the mind reach it or apprehend it? For this, as creator, encompasses all things, because it fills heaven and 308 earth; and it comprehends, in that it provides, for in it all things consist, and it anticipates, because the reasons of all things, or rather the ends of all knowledges, pre-exist in it. But it is not simply, absolutely, and properly incomprehensible to all things, but is *per se* absolutely, and *per se* properly, and *per se* thoroughly incomprehensible. For that which is *per se* infinite is also ^D and [V. ] Having said that the Godhead surpasses every essence and knowledge, he inquires how then it shall be named (for names are suggestive of the underlying realities) and how the discourse concerning divine names shall proceed for us, if, as was said, it exceeds every word and every knowledge, and if it is beyond mind and essence, how shall the mind attain and grasp it? For it is comprehensive of all things, as creator, because it fills heaven and earth; and it is comprehensive, as provident, for in it all things consist; and it is pre-apprehensive, because the reasons of all things, or rather the ends of all knowledges, pre-exist in it. It is, however, not simply, absolutely, and properly incomprehensible to all, but is *per se* altogether, and *per se* properly, and *per se* thoroughly incomprehensible. For *per se* infinite, and *per se* absolutely incomprehensible; and as the underlying reality,

^A such also is its property. It does not fall under sense, for it is not a sensible object; nor ^B under imagination, which is a sensible configuration that manifests a sensible object, for imagination arises from the remains of certain impressions that persist, lacking fixed images upon any object. How, then, can that which is invisible be imagined? Nor does it fall under opinion, which is a kind of surmise appearing according to what seems to be the case; for even if opinion is more limited than imagination, and is closer to the intellect in its focus on a unity—in that it also applies itself to the conclusions of things without syllogism, just as the intellect does by simple intuition, whereas imagination has an infinite and indefinite multiplicity—yet opinion is not able to reach that which is beyond apprehension. Nor does it fall under a name; for how shall that which is beyond all knowledge be named? Nor under speech; for how can the ineffable be spoken? Nor under contact—intellectual contact, that is to say, which is by the mind; for those who apply themselves to intelligible objects with the mind seem, as it were, to touch them by understanding what they are, just as sensible objects are touched through sensible contact, yet we do not touch God even with the mind. Having thus mentioned the four knowing faculties of the soul—sense, imagination, opinion, and the intellect—he includes the remaining one, science, or rather discursive reason, for science comes about through certain pre-existing knowledges. But what knowledge of God could be pre-existing? Whence it does not fall under science either. How then shall that which is uncalled and not named by any cognisance be named, and which is not only uncalled but also stands above every title? For ^C as we said when we were setting forth the theological descriptions, that triadic and co-good and co-divine Unity, what it is according to its nature, can neither be spoken nor conceived. And what do I say of God, that He is inconceivable and unspeakable to us? But even those angelic unions of the heavenly powers, according to which they are united to God as far as it is fitting for angels to be united to God—these unions, whether one should call them "immissions" or "receptions" of the goodness of God, are ineffable and unknown. By "immission" one must understand the will of God, indivisibly divided into the unity of produced things, that is to say, into the production of each one. But since "receptions" do not square with such an understanding of immission, the expression must be understood differently in regard to the angels, and all the more so since both immissions and receptions occur in the angels toward the Divine. An immission is that by which they apply themselves to the goodness of God according to their own dignity; a reception is the actual revelation of the goodness of God that is exhibited to them. Accordingly, these things are not only unknown to us, as they are, but also to the lower angels, being known only to the highest ones, as they have been deemed worthy of the greater unions. By these divine unions, the God-like minds of the theologians and prophets, being united in an angel-like manner—since such a union comes to them in this way—bring to an end all intellectual activity; for ^D God is not in motion, but rather the divine is in rest and cessation.

^B And those who are deified, because of their purity, praise God most properly by way of negation, which they also call "negative theology," because he is not body, nor habit, nor power, and [because he is above] all rational things—as is also signified in what follows—being divinely illumined by such an ineffable union: that he is the cause of all beings, yet he himself is none of the beings, not as though he does not in any way whatsoever exist, but as one superessentially exempt from all. And he calls the theology of negation the most proper [way] in contrast to the theology of affirmation; for what he is not, we know, but what he is, we do not know. ^C

Knowledge is interjected. And to those who are becoming divine through purification, there is instilled knowledge. ^B The superessentiality and super-existence of the super-goodness—for it is above goodness and above being and above existence itself. For all these have the significance of production; but the divine is above all production. Therefore, it is permitted to none of those who are lovers of true reality to proclaim what the divine is, neither as reason, nor as power, nor as the other enumerated things; but he is above all these, and is transcendently removed, and is [removed] from every habit, and from every motion, and from all things that are involved with these. ^C Now, "habit" is an immanent quality; "motion" is that which is contrasted with rest and is predicated of many things—for motion leads forth—and "life" is that which reveals these things as active; "imagination" is that which forms images in the intellect; "opinion" is a firm conviction; "discursive reason" is the scientific habit of the soul; "intellection" is the activity of the mind; "station" is indeed also the rest which is contrasted with motion, and it is also the same as "stability," which is taken from the custom of the Greeks. For they were accustomed to install and establish in earlier times those whom they held to be gods among them. ^D "Union" is the contact and, as it were, a certain knowledge of the mind; "limit" is that which is not as a part in that which is limited, as the point is the limit of a line, and the "now" is the limit of time; but the "now" is in time, and not as a part of time, for a part of time is time. "Infinity" is the co-extension of the infinite. All these are not essence, but are seen around essence. But God again is supreme over this very essence, and is superessential and super-divine. And since he himself is the existence of goodness and not simply goodness, while all created things are beings, and have God as the cause of their being, in that very being which the divine power has transcendently as the existence of the goodness through which very goodness he also produced everything that is—and hence the foolish opinions of those who dared to say that the creative power is inherent in God by a certain nature, just as weaving is inherent in spiders, are dissolved; for God produced created things only because of his goodness, by an ineffable will. Since, therefore, these things are so, and God is the cause of beings in the very fact of [their] being, his providence—since there is no cause higher than this cause from which it might be hymned—will be hymned from the things caused,

^A because all things are around Him as around a cause, and a maker, and a principle—as one might say, for the sake of the clarity of what is being said, like the circumference around the center—and for the sake of Him, as the end of all things, and He Himself is before all things. For God is the principle and end of all things, yet supereminently and creatively; for it is not with Him, but in Him that all things consist; and in the fact that the Divine is, exists the production and subsistence of all things. All things desire this; the intellectual [things], that is to say, the angels, and the rational [things], that is to say, human beings, reach out cognitively toward the providence of God, desiring God according to their own capacity. But those things inferior to these—that is to say, the irrational [beings], whose soul consists of the elements and of material fire, and which have their being in a material spirit—these alone, being compelled by sense perception into hungering and thirsting, reasonably desire in a sensible way Him who provides, according to [the verse]: "All things look to you to give them their food in due time." ^B Yet others, as many as have only vital motion without sense perception, such as plants and herbs, which possess only a vital spirit constituting their own substance without sense—which indeed frequently wither when they are deprived of the natural spirit by which they are moved toward growth and flourishing—these also desire the divine Providence, in order to exist and to bloom; whence these too are brought into the 148th Psalm, to praise God because of their subsistence. But soulless things, in the fact that they have in themselves an existence at all, or in being this or that—for he called this essential and habitual aptitude, as it is the nature of a stone to be moved downward, and of fire [to move] upward, and of water ^C to take shape in everything—have a potentiality for existence; for he called this the movement of a stone downward, and of fire upward, and of water [to be shaped] in everything.

§ VI. Knowing this, the theologians—what is this? That it is impossible for the Divine to be hymned from any prior cause or notion, unless from the things caused; and they hymn Him as nameless, because He is set apart from all things; and again, from every name, because all things are caused by this cause. Nameless, indeed, as it is found in the book of Judges, saying to the one asking: "And why do you ask my name, and this is marvelous?" How is it marvelous? Explaining, he says, because it is above every name, and superior to every name that is named, whether in this age or in the future. But multinominal, as when they introduce Him speaking Himself, as in Sinai: "I am who I am"; and in others, Life, Light, God, Truth, as in the Gospels: "I am the life and the truth"; and again: "I am the light of the world"; and in the oracle to Jacob: "I am the God of your father." ^D And again, the theologians themselves speak of Him from the things caused, as also [they speak of] the eternal; for they call the maker of the eons eternal; but eternal is that which partakes of an eon. And thus Isaiah says: "The eternal God, who created the ends of the earth." God, however, is not posterior to the eon,

^A but is the creator of eons. And he calls Him "ageless," according to that: "But you are the same, and your years shall not fail"; and again, as exceeding all things in greatness; for He fills heaven and earth; and as in a gentle breeze, according to what is said in the Books of Kings: "But the sound of a gentle breeze, and there was the Lord." And indeed they say He is also in their minds, and in souls, and in bodies, according to that: "I will dwell in them and walk among them"; ^B and in the universe, and at the same time He is called "in-cosmic" when He is said to be in the world; "around-cosmic" when in the universe; and "hyper-cosmic" when He is said to be uncontained by the universe; and "hyper-celestial" and "substantially-above," according to that: "Above the heavens is the glory of the Lord"; and again "Sun of justice," and such like; and "a stone hewn from the mountain," and "a stone of stumbling," and "all things that exist" from the things caused, and He is none of the things that exist.

§ VII. Thus, therefore, to Him who is the cause of all things and above all things, it is fitting to be nameless, in as much as He is above all, and is none of these. ^C And again, all the names of things that exist befit Him, in as much as He is the cause of all things, and all things share in Him according to their capacity, so that He is perfectly the kingdom of the universe, exceeding all in dignity, and receiving a name from no one, but being in them by His providence and His embrace, and named from them. For all things depend on Him as from a cause and principle, as He provides essence to all, yet as from an end, as He encompasses their being. And He Himself is, as Scripture says, "all in all," who makes all things to subsist, as principle and end; not as if another were to begin, and He were to perfect, or as if He Himself were to give a beginning, and remit to another to perfect. ^D He Himself is the one who contains and guards, existing as a home and a sacred dwelling. This is a Greek phrase; for He turns the creature to Himself, saying: "Abide in me"; and again: "He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me." For just as we are as His temple, according to that: "I will dwell in them and walk among them," so also He Himself is our house. And he rightly added immediately "unitedly." For since he said that He is all things, and in Him are all things, so that no one might think that all things are heaped together in God, and from that fall into corporeal suspicions—some divisions and compositions—correcting this suspicion, he says "unitedly," as if indivisibly, and remaining in His own unity, or rather, even above unity, He is the home of all, and that "unrelatedly" [ἀσχέτως], meaning that He is not contained or circumscribed by anything; but rather "transcendently," for He is outside of all. For He is not only the cause of the cohesion of things that simply exist, or the life of those that live, or the perfection of intellectual and rational essences, as if He remained outside these so as to be named from these alone,

but because He also holds together, in a simple and uncompounded and boundless and unconquerable manner, all that exists, and has even pre-contained them within the goodness of His all-causing providence; for it is He who calls things that are not, as though they were. Harmoniously, therefore, and correspondingly, He is praised and named from all existing things as light, water, fire, dew, cloud, and such like.

§ VIII. Now, theologians do not only celebrate these divine names which are derived from the universal providences of the things provided for—such as King, Creator, Almighty, for these are names of divine providence in general. And again, those which are taken from particular providences, such as God of gods, and Lord of lords, and King of kings; for these are of particular providences, and of certain [beings]. They do not, therefore, praise divine names only from these, but also from certain divine visions, which, for example, have sometimes been revealed symbolically in sacred temples, that is, appeared in temples; for the Gentiles used to call the shrines of their gods "temples."

They name, therefore, the supra-luminous goodness, and attribute to it human forms, or fiery, or electrum-like, as is found in Ezekiel. And again, they speak of human limbs, as in the Psalms and other Scriptures, such as: "His eyes look upon the poor"; and: "Into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth"; and: "His hair is as wool"; and: "The face of the Lord is against those who do evil"; and: "Thy hands have made me"; and: "He shall cover thee with his shoulders"; and: "Under the shadow of thy wings shalt thou protect me"; and: "Thy arm has saved them"; and the "hinder parts of the Lord," of which Moses was deemed worthy; and: "They heard the voice of the Lord walking in paradise." Again, they place crowns around Him, as: "Bless the crown of thy kindness"; and thrones, as: "Thy throne, O God, is for ever"; and cups, as: "A cup in the hand of the Lord"; and bowls, as: "He mixed his own bowl"; concerning which it is possible to speak in symbolic theology.

Now, however, gathering together what belongs to the present treatise, and setting forth what has been said as a rule, [namely] that we name the Divine from existing things both affirmatively and negatively—affirmatively indeed, as cause from effects; negatively, however, as being none of those things that are—let us proceed to the explanation of the intelligible divine names. And as the sacred law guides us in all theology to look upon holy things holily, to speak of them holily, and to hear them holily, so let us behold the God-like contemplations with a God-perceiving mind, and let us apply our sacred ears to the unfolding of the divine names, instilling the holy oracles into holy ears, and rescuing them from the unholy laughter and mockery which those Gentiles, thick-witted and carnal, used to indulge in when they heard…

mockery and contempt, and to rescue such, if possible, from this fighting against God. These things, therefore, you must keep, most excellent Timothy; for you have the Apostle ^A also warning you that it is not right to speak of such things in truth to those who do not receive the word. But may God grant me to speak of the divine names of the ineffable divinity, which are derived from His good works, in a manner worthy of God, and to recount them! For all the works of God are good, and are performed for the sake of goodness, even if some are not pleasant to us, since we are justly punished for the sins we commit; which indeed is of the supreme goodness of God, the punishment itself becoming kindness, according to the divine Gregory; and may the Lord not take away the word of truth from my mouth, as David the king and prophet sings.

CAPUT II. Concerning copulate and distinct theology, and what divine union and distinction are.

^BSYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER. 1. He teaches that the name of good, beautiful, true, wise, and similar terms, are predicated equally of the whole Trinity, because by reason of nature, which is the same in the three persons, they pertain to God; and that not only essential attributes, but also emanations outwardly are so predicated. II. That those things which in the Scriptures are predicated of God copulately, that is, by reason of essence, are not to be distinguished; and that those which are said distinctly or personally are not to be confused. III. He expounds which are those things which are predicated copulately and which likewise distinctly. IV. He says that unions in God are called essential attributes, but distinctions are called emanations; and places before the eyes by example how the three divine Persons are united in their entirety without confusion. V. He teaches that the divine Persons are distinguished only by relation to each other, and that God is wholly participable and wholly non-participable; he explains the matter by example. VI. He meets an objection, and shows by the example of a seal that God is not unequally participated in on His ^C part, but that this happens from the defect of those who participate. And at the same time he teaches that the works of Christ are not common to the Trinity, because His Incarnation is not common to the whole Trinity, but is of the singular person of the Word. VII. He teaches that we know divine things only a posteriori from their participations. VIII. He teaches how all fatherhood and sonship is from God; and how effects are similar to their causes, not conversely causes to effects. IX. How the reason of the mystery of the Incarnation remained unknown to all. X. From the holy Hierotheus he shows how the divinity of Jesus is all in all, and above all; and how Christ participated in our nature above nature. XI. That God is said to be multiplied while He produces diverse things, yet that He is one in all things.

§ 1. The Goodness Itself is celebrated by the sacred writings, defining and explaining the entire divine essence, whatever it may be. For what else do we learn from the sacred utterances when they report that God Himself, in designating Himself, said: "Why do you ask Me about the good? No one is good but God alone"? This, indeed, having been examined by us in other places, has been demonstrated: that all the divine names befitting God are praised by the holy Scriptures not in part, but in the whole and perfect, and integral and full divinity; and that they themselves, all of them, are referred unparticipatedly, absolutely, without the observance of any difference, universally, to the whole totality, perfectly, and to the entire divinity. Since, as we remembered in the theological outlines, unless one should say that it is sung concerning the entire divinity...

^A but dares to tear apart and disparage the Unity, which is more than one and simple, it must be said that this ought to be accepted as concerning the whole Deity. For even the Word himself, who is by nature good, says: "I am the good" (Matt. xx, 15), and one of the divinely inspired prophets praises the good Spirit (Ps. cxlii, 10). And again: "I am who I am" (Exod. iii, 14); if they do not grant that this is pronounced of the whole divinity, but contend that it is described according to one part only, how will they understand that: "Thus says he who is, who was, and who is coming, the Almighty" (Apoc. i, 4), and: "But you are the same" (Ps. ci, 28), and: "The Spirit of truth who is, who proceeds from the Father" (Joan. xv, 26)? ^B And if they do not claim that the thearchic life is whole, how is the holy Word true which says: "As the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom he wills" (Joan. v, 21), and: "For it is the Spirit that gives life" (Joan. vi, 63)? Moreover, regarding the fact that the entire Deity holds the lordship of all things—concerning God who begot God, or concerning God the Son—it could not even be said, I think, in how many places of holy Scripture the name "Lord" is celebrated in Father and Son; and yet the Spirit is also Lord. And "the beautiful" and "the wise" are also preached concerning the whole divinity, as is "light," and "that which makes God," and "the cause," and whatever things belong to the whole thearchy, into which the Scriptures bring back the thearchic hymnody: ^C summarily, when it says: "All things are from God" (1 Cor. xi, 12); but specifically, as when it might say: "All things were made through him and in him" (Joan. i, 3), and: "All things consist in him" (Rom. xi, 36), and: "You will send forth your Spirit, and they shall be created" (Ps. ciii, 30). And that one might speak concisely, the thearchic Word himself said: "I and the Father are one" (Joan. x, 30), and: "All things that the Father has are mine" (Joan. xvi, 15), and: "All my things are yours, and yours are mine" (Joan. xvii, 10). And again, those things which are the Father's and his own, he assigns to the thearchic Spirit—communally and unitedly—the divine operations, the reverence, the springing and never-failing cause, and the distribution of the good-befitting gifts. And I do not think any of those trained in the holy Scriptures with uncorrupted intellects would contradict this, that all things which befit God by reason of a perfect Deity reside in the whole divinity. Since, therefore, we have proved and distinguished these things in the present instance briefly and in part, but elsewhere (as much as is sufficient) by the testimony of the holy oracles, whatever complete name of God we set out to explain, it must be thought to pertain to the whole divinity.

§ II.

^D If, however, anyone should object that in this way we introduce confusion against the distinction befitting the divinity, to such a one we must say...

that we do not consider him capable of being persuaded, as he is far off from the truth. For if there is anyone at all who stands against the sacred oracles, he will surely be far removed from our philosophy; and if the wisdom of the sacred oracles is of no concern to him, how could the guidance toward theological science be of any concern to us? But if he directs his gaze to the truth of the oracles, we, relying upon this same rule and light for our defense, shall proceed without hesitation, saying that theology delivers some things conjointly and others distinctly; and that it is not permitted to disjoin what is jointed, nor to confound what is distinct, but that, following theology as much as lies in our power, we must look upward toward the divine splendors. For from that source we receive the divine explanations as a most beautiful rule of truth; while those things which are stored up there, we strive to preserve within ourselves, adding nothing, subtracting nothing, perverting nothing. Meanwhile, we are preserved by the custody of the oracles, and from them we receive the strength to defend those who observe them.

§ III. ^B Therefore, the names coupled together into one throughout the whole divinity, as we have demonstrated at length from the sacred Scriptures in the *Theological Outlines*, are: supra-good, supra-divine, supra-essential, supra-living, supra-wise, and whatever else belongs to affirmation by way of supereminence; with which are enumerated all things that pertain to the rationale of cause: the good, the beautiful, the existing, the vivifying, the wise, and whatever else is from His good-befitting gifts, from which He is named the Cause of all goods. Distinct, however, are the ^C supra-essential name and reality of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, with no reciprocity made among these, nor any community at all introduced. Besides this, the perfect and immutable essence of Jesus, as it exists in us, is distinct and separate, as is whatever pertains to the substantial mysteries of His humanity.

§ IV. ^D I consider it expedient, however, that we should rather take up and explain again that most perfect mode of divine union and distinction, so that the whole discourse may be plain to us, avoiding all variety and obscurity, and defining distinctly, clearly, and orderly those things which pertain to it, as far as it is possible. For the authors of our theological tradition (as I have said elsewhere) call the divine unions those hidden collocations of that more than ineffable and supra-unknown mansion, which nowhere reveals itself; but they assign the name of distinctions to the beneficent processions and manifestations of the Godhead, and they say, following the sacred oracles...

that the divine unity, in a manner super-united, multiplies itself and spreads itself out in its goodness. United, then, according to the divine distinction, are those ineffable communications, substantifications, vivifications, deifications, and the other gifts of the goodness of the Cause of all things, according to which those things which are participated in without participation are praised—in accordance with the participations and the participants. And this is common and united and one to the whole Godhead: that it is itself participated in by each of the participants, wholly by each, and not in part by any, just as the center point in the midst of a circle is participated in by all the straight lines arranged within the circle; and as many expressions of a seal participate in the archetypal seal, and in each of the expressions the whole and same seal is present, and in no expression is it present in part. Yet the imparticipability—the cause of all things—surpasses these examples of divinity, since it possesses no contact, nor any other communion ^B of mixture, with those that participate.

§ VI.

But someone might say: "The seal is not whole and the same in all the shapes expressed from it." Now, it is not the seal that is the cause of this, (for it communicates itself whole and the same to each), but the difference between the participants makes the likenesses of the one, whole, and same archetypal form dissimilar. For instance, if the subjects are soft and easily molded, smooth and ungraven, neither resistant nor hard, nor fluid and unstable, they will possess the impress clear and distinct and remaining; but if anything is lacking of the aforementioned fitness, this will verily be the cause why the shape is less expressed and clear, and [why there] occur the other things which result from ineptitude in participating. Furthermore, in the beneficent restoration of us, this gift is distinguished from the Godhead: that for our sake the Word, who is above substance, assumed our substance, entire and true, and underwent and bore those things which are specific and singular to his human activity. For these things the Father and the Spirit did not share in any way, unless perhaps one were to speak regarding the benevolent and philanthropic ^C counsel, and according to all that eminent and ineffable divine operation which He who is immutable exercised, being among us, in so far as He is God and the Word of God. We, too, in like manner, endeavor to join and distinguish divine things in speech, according to how they are in themselves—either united or distinguished.

§ VII.

But those unions and distinctions—as many as we have found in the oracles to be reasons consistent with God—in ^D

^A regard to the union mentioned, and again, to the distinction, there are certain properties of both unions and distinctions. As, for instance, in the union of the Divine—that is, of the Supersubstantiality—the Supersubstantial Existence, the Deity who is above all deity, the Goodness that is above all goodness, the identity of the whole property of all things beyond all things, the unity that is above the principle of unity, the ineffable, the multivoiced, the ignorance, the all-unintelligible, the position of all things, the abstraction of all things, that which is above every position and abstraction, ^B the in-dwelling (if one must so speak) of the principal Hypostases within one another, and their establishment, entirely super-united, and in no part confused—just like the lights of lamps (to use sensory and familiar examples) which are in one house, and are entirely in one another entirely, having the distinction that subsists from one another properly and precisely, united by the distinction and distinguished by the union. For we see in a house where many lamps are present, that the lights of all of them coalesce into one light, and shine forth as one inseparable radiance; and no one, I think, would be able to distinguish the light of this lamp from the others—out of the air containing all the lights—and see one without the other, since they are all ^C unmixedly commingled in all. But also, if one were to take one of the torches out of the room, its own entire light will go out with it, not drawing any of the other lights with it into itself, nor leaving anything of its own for the others; for there was among them, as I said, a complete union of the all with the all, unmixed universally, and commingled in no part; and this, indeed, in the body of the air, and with the light hanging from material fire. Wherefore we say that the supersubstantial union is far more excellent, not only than the unions that exist in bodies, but even than those that occur in souls themselves and in minds themselves, which they possess in an unmixed and super-cosmic manner, ^D while these deiform and super-heavenly lights, through a participation proportioned to those who participate, participate in the union that is exalted above all things.

§ V. There is also, in the supersubstantial theologies, a distinction—not only that which I mentioned, that each of the principal Hypostases is established unmixedly and unconfusedly according to the union itself, but also that the items of the supersubstantial divine generation do not reciprocate one toward another. For the Father alone is the source of the supersubstantial Deity, and the Father is not the Son, nor is the Son the Father, while the proper praises of each of the divine Hypostases are piously guarded. These, then, are the unions and distinctions in that ineffable union and essence.

^A Furthermore, even that which is the most brilliant of all things said concerning God—the divine formation of Jesus from our nature—is ineffable by all speech and unknown to all intelligence, even to the very first of the most ancient angels. Indeed, we have mystically perceived that He assumed human form and substance; but we are ignorant of how He was formed from the Virgin’s blood by a law other than nature, and how, with dry feet, He who possessed the bulk of a body and the weight of matter walked upon the liquid and unstable substance, and of the other things that indicate the supernatural nature of Jesus. These things have been sufficiently explained by us elsewhere, and have been celebrated in a manner above nature by our illustrious teacher in his theological elements—which he received partly from the holy theologians, and partly comprehended through skillful investigation of the Scriptures by long exercise and time, and partly also drew from a more divine inspiration, having attained these things not only by learning, but also by experiencing [divine] things; and ^B by sympathy toward them, if one must say so, he was fashioned toward their unteachable and mystical union and faith. And so that we may set forth in brief the many and blessed visions of his most excellent mind, he says the following concerning Jesus in those theological elements which he collected:

The words of the most holy Hierotheus from the Theological Elements

^C The cause of all things, and that which fills all things, is the divinity of Jesus, which preserves the parts consistent with the whole, and is neither part nor whole, and is both whole and part, inasmuch as it comprehends and surpasses and precedes all, every whole, and every part in itself. It is indeed perfect among the imperfect, as the principal cause of perfection; but it is imperfect among the perfect, as that which is more than perfect and before perfection. It is form, the effecter of form in those things which lack form, as the principal cause of form; it is without form among those things which have form, as a substance above form, residing ^D unpollutedly upon all substances, and withdrawn into itself above every substance, defining all principles and orders, and placed above every principle and every order. It is the measure of beings, and an age, and above an age, and before an age. It is full in those things that are in need, and it overflows in those things that are full; it is ineffable and inexplicable, above sense, above life, above substance, possessing supernaturality supernaturally, and exceeding substance supersubstantially. Whence, since even as far as nature it has come forth out of kindness, and has truly become a substance, and the One who is above God has become man—(may those things which are sung by us, being above mind and word, be propitious!)—even in these things it possesses the supernatural and the supersubstantial, not only by...

having distinguished them separately in the theological institutions, so far as was possible, partly by explaining and unfolding them through true reason, and leading the holy and undistorted mind to the manifest visions of the scriptures, and partly, as is mystical, by applying them according to the divine tradition above the operation of the intellect. ^A For all divine things, even those which have appeared to us, are known only by participation; but what they themselves are, according to their own principle and seat, no sense attains, no nature and no knowledge penetrates. For instance, when we call the superessential hiddenness God, or life, or substance, or light, or Word, we intend nothing other than the powers which are brought forth from Him into us, whether deifying, or substantific, or vivifying, or wisdom-bestowing; but we apply them to Him upon this ^B total removal of all intellectual operations, seeing no vision, or life, or substance, which is precisely similar to the Cause that excels all things by every excellence. Again, we have received from the sacred scriptures that the Father is the primordial divinity, but that Jesus and the Spirit are, if one must so speak, offshoots of the God-generating divinity, and, as it were, divine blossoms and superessential lights; but how these things are, it is impossible either to say or to conceive.

§ VIII.

But thus far the study of our intellectual energy tends, that it may understand how all divine ^C fatherhood and sonship, from the supereminent patriarchy and son-principate of all, is granted both to us and to the supercelestial powers, from which it comes to be that gods and sons of gods and fathers of gods are the deiform minds, which are also called so, being spiritually perfected, that is to say, incorporeally, immaterially, intellectually, in the thearchic Spirit, who is established above every intelligible immateriality and deification, and the Father and the Son, as those who are supereminently removed from every divine fatherhood and sonship. For there is not an exact likeness between the caused and the causes; but the caused possess the images of the causes as far as is possible, ^D while the causes themselves are removed and established above the caused, according to the principle of their own origin. And that I may use examples familiar to us, pleasures and griefs are said to be productive of the being pleased and being grieved; but they neither are pleased nor are they grieved; and fire also, while heating and burning, is not said to be burned or to be heated. And if anyone were to say that Life Itself lives, or that Light Itself is illuminated, he will not, in my opinion, have spoken correctly, unless perhaps he says these things in another way, namely that the things which are of the effects pre-exist in the causes more abundantly and in accordance with essence.

^A And, having communicated Himself to us without confusion, having suffered nothing in regard to His super-abundance, by reason of that ineffable emptying; but what is also the most new of all new things, He was supernatural in our natural things, and super-essential in the things that are according to essence, exceeding all our things from us, above us.

These things, then, are sufficient. Let us proceed to the goal of our discourse, unfolding, as far as we are able, the common and united names of the divine distinction. ^B And that we may clearly determine beforehand concerning all things in order, we say, as has been stated, that divine distinction ^C is the benevolent processions of the Godhead. For, while bestowing upon all things that are, and overflowing with the participation of all good things, it is distinctly united, yet it is multiplied in a certain way singularly, and is multiplied from the One without departing; for instance, since God is super-essentially that which is, and bestows being upon things that are, and produces all essences, that one which is that Being is said to be multiplied by His production from Himself of the many beings. Yet, none the less, He remains that same One, remaining in the multitude, and united in the procession, and full in the distinction, for He is super-essentially exempted from all that are, and by the unitary bringing-forth ^D of all things, and by the un-diminishing flow of His never-failing communications.

Furthermore, when He who Himself is One, imparts the participation of His One to every part and whole, and to one and to multitude, He exists in the same way super-essentially, neither as part of the multitude, nor as a whole from parts; for in this way He is not one, nor does He thus participate in one, or have unity. But far from these, He is one in another way, above the one which is one to things that are, and [is] an undivided multitude, an inexhaustible super-fullness, producing, perfecting, and containing every one and multitude. Again, by his deification, whereby many gods come into being according to the capacity of each of those made godlike, it seems indeed to be, and is called, a division and multiplication of the one God; yet, he himself is the principle of such divinity, and is eminently God, and super-essentially one God, undivided in the divided, in Himself one, and neither mixed nor multiplied in these many. Having understood this supernaturally, our common guide and the manuductor to divine illumination for our preceptor, he who is great in divine things, the light of the world, speaks thus entheastically in his sacred writings: "For even if there be so-called gods, whether in heaven or on earth—as indeed there are many gods and many lords—but to us there is one God the Father, from whom are all things, and we..."

in Him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through Him. ^A For even in divine matters, the unions prevail over and precede the distinctions, and yet they are no less united even after the ineffable and unitary distinction of the One. These common and united distinctions of the whole Godhead—or rather, these beneficent processions—we shall attempt, as far as possible, to celebrate from the divine names which manifest them in the sacred oracles, having first premised that which has been stated: that every beneficent divine name, on whichever of the Thearchic Hypostases it may be placed, is to be understood as applying to the whole Thearchic totality without distinction.

ANNOTATIONS OF CORDERIUS

For a more exact understanding of this chapter, especially § I, see what is said in the General Observations, observations 5 and 40. There, likewise, note that not only do essential attributes pertain to the whole Trinity, but so also do the names which are taken from the production, conservation, and governance of created things. For the operations which theologians call "external" are common to the most holy Trinity and to the one Godhead which is the Creator of all.

§ II. *And if one has no care for the divine wisdom of the sacred Scriptures, etc.* Hence the sainted Thomas rightly proves (prima parte, quæst. 32, artic. 1, in corpore) that certain mysteries of faith, which exceed the grasp of reason, cannot be known except from the Scriptures or divine revelations. For he says that he who endeavors to prove the Trinity by natural reason alone detracts from faith in two ways. First, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists in being concerned with invisible things that exceed human reason. Whence the Apostle says that faith is of things not seen; and elsewhere: "We speak wisdom among the perfect; yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden" (1 Cor. II, 6). Second, as regards the utility of drawing others to faith. For when someone introduces arguments that are not cogent to prove the faith, it results in the derision of unbelievers; for they believe that we rely on such arguments and believe because of them. Therefore, things that belong to faith are not to be proven except by authorities acceptable to those who receive such authorities; among others, it suffices to defend that what faith proclaims is not impossible. Thus does Saint Dionysius here, and Saint Thomas from him.

§ III. Note the names *to hyperagathon*, *to hypertheon*, that is, "the supra-good," "the supra-God," etc., are said ^B by way of the *aphasis*—that is, negation by way of excellence—because they remove in God created goodness and attribute an surpassing and superlative goodness, namely, the uncreated, which overcomes every cognition and intelligence. See the general observations 4 and 9. Note likewise: *Ta de diakekrimena to Patros hyperousion onoma kai chrema*: "But the distinctions are the Father’s substantial name and the thing." The name of Father, says Turrianus (32), speaks of the *suprastance*, because in divine matters the name of Father or Son does not signify to us what we understand in creatures, namely, persons separated in reality and substance. He calls the "thing" (rem) of the Father not the substance itself, which is one and the same in the three, but he calls the "thing" of the Father, and the "thing" of the Son, and the "thing" of the Holy Spirit the properties which designate the order of origin or principle among them in the divine Persons; whence they are called *notional* properties or acts, because they are proper notions or designations of the persons, just as it is proper to the Father to beget the Son, the birth of the Son from the Father is proper, and the procession of the Holy Spirit from the one principle, the Father and the Son; these are called in Greek *chremata gnoristika*, that is, notional things or acts. For a thing, insofar as it pertains to relation, is predicated in the divine plurality; Saint Thomas, prima parte, quæst. 39, artic. 3, ad 3. In these, therefore, there is no reciprocity, nor community, neither in the names of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit themselves, nor in their "things," that is, in their acts or uses from which they flow. For neither does the name of Father befit the Son, nor does the name of Son befit the Father; because it is not the Son’s to beget, nor is it the Father’s to be begotten. Similarly for the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from both. It is furthermore worthy of observation that Dionysius here says that the Father’s name and *chrema*, that is, the thing, are distinct, as are the Son’s name and thing, and the Holy Spirit’s name and thing. For when he first placed the name of the Father, and the name of the Son, and the name of the Holy Spirit, and afterwards in the second place placed *chrema*, that is, the thing of the Father, which is to beget, and the thing of the Son, which is to be begotten, and the thing of the Holy Spirit, which is to proceed; he clearly taught what Saint Thomas also hands down, that prior and more principal ^C according to the mode of understanding...

are the relations than the notional origins; because the relations constitute persons, since the relations themselves are subsistent persons, whereas notional acts, ^A although they are the same in reality as the relations, yet according to the mode of signifying and understanding do not constitute persons, since they are their origins, whether the origin be signified actively, as generation, which as a notional act is attributed to the Father, and spiration, which is attributed to the Father and the Son; or passively, as nativity, a notional act which is attributed to the Son, and procession, to the Holy Spirit. For origins according to the reason of understanding are outside those things of which they are the origins, since an origin is, as Saint Thomas says, a certain way from a thing, or to a thing, as generation is signified as a certain way to the begotten proceeding from the begetter. Therefore, the affair (*res*) of the Father is to beget (for *chrēma*, as I said, signifies an affair), the affair of the Son is to be begotten, the affair of the Holy Spirit is to proceed. Thus Gregory in his first Oration on the Son: From the one not having a cause, he says, that is, from the Father, comes the affair of nativity: he is speaking of the Son. He called it *pragma* of birth, which Dionysius calls *chrēma*. He also signifies *pragma* as an act, from the verb *prattō*, whence the Latin theologians rightly call it an act, which the Greeks call a thing; for the same word *pragma* signifies both. I have noted these things because it matters not a little to know the vocabulary proper to any science.

Note in the same place those next words: *Further, there is a discrete and distinct, perfect, as in us, and immutable essence of Jesus, and whatever are the substantial mysteries of his humanity*, where he calls the human nature in Christ perfect, against Apollinarius; because it had a body endowed with a rational and intelligent soul, as we have; immutable, against other heretics who said that the human nature from the very beginning of the union was overcome by the divine, and made incorruptible, which was to deny the truth of human nature by denying its property. This was Julian of Halicarnassus. But he calls the substantial mysteries of his humanity hungering, thirsting, being fatigued, being wounded, and other things of this kind, which Christ truly suffered, and not fantastically according to the heretics; although these passions did not reach the divine nature, since it was otherwise in the same hypostasis, from which it did not differ except by reason and thought alone. Of this kind also are walking upon the waves [i], entering through a closed door to the disciples [k]: for these miracles Christ performed through the flesh by his divinity. *From these it becomes manifest* (says Cyparissiotus, Decad 9, c. 4) *that in the Trinity, which is above substance, person and substance are not the same by reason and thought, yet they are the same in reality and substance.* Similarly, the three divine persons are not distinguished from one another in reality and substance; but by reason and thought alone; for their essence is one, but there is no reciprocity between them; therefore no other opposition can fall upon them, except of those which are relative. For other oppositions are not assumed without matter; but oppositions in those things which are relative consist in a certain way above matter; because in this opposition the coupling is not severed; because their being is in a certain way to have themselves toward something. In which Cyparissiotus entirely agrees with the divine Thomas. For so far as the three divine Persons are the same in reality and substance, thus they are not distinguished among themselves except by reason and thought alone, as Saint Thomas affirms in Part 1, Question 39, Article 1, ad 1, when he says: *The relations themselves are not distinguished from one another according to what they are really the same with the essence; but the relations are the same in reality with the persons.* But so far as the relations, which are in the divine by themselves subsistent, have an opposition to one another, they are distinct really and they distinguish the persons really, and one person is not another; for this is what Cyparissiotus says, agreeing with the doctrine of Saint Thomas. But of them, that is, of the persons, there is no reciprocity among themselves, in so far as the opposition of relations falls upon them.

§ IV.

Note, however, at this place of Dionysius, that these words *monē* and *hidrusis*, that is, mansion and placing, seem to imply a distinction with them, and to be referred to a place (for what remains in something, and is placed, does not seem to be the same as that, in which something remains as in a place, and in which it is placed); therefore he applied a correction, saying, *and if it is right to speak thus*, if it is lawful to speak thus. But as for the example of lights, Dionysius did not use that, as some supposed, according to the opinion of those who handed down that light is a corporeal substance, and not a quality. For what Dionysius set forth, that the lights of lamps exist by themselves, he did not attribute to the lights, but to the lamps, which exist by themselves, as torches and tapers. Therefore, he compares burning torches, or lit lamps, existing by themselves with hypostatic properties subsisting by themselves, in the supersubstantial light of the Trinity, distinctly united and unitedly distinct. For ^B 326 if you walk in a hall illuminated by three lamps, three shadows result. Furthermore, if you place a large board opposite those lamps, in the middle of which is a hole, the lamps transmit three lights through that hole across to the opposite side. Whence we conjecture that the beaming lights in the air are not confounded with one another, but although they are joined in place, yet they are pure, and keep their property distinct among themselves. For their spiritual nature makes it so that they are not mixed together into a new and common form, as corporeal qualities are wont to be; and although astrologers may think that from many rays some new power is produced, yet in the meantime they are not mingled. But if lights, he says, because of an incorporeal property, although existing in a body, obtain that function, that they can be at once united with one another, and at the same time remarkably distinct among themselves, much more do those things have this, which are more separated from bodies, as the virtues and sciences of the soul itself; even more, the substances of souls themselves among one another; still more, the angelic intellects among one another; most of all, the divine Persons of the Trinity, by whose participation in a certain way of both unity and discretion, individual things in sequence for their own mode gradually report union and discretion. And what follows in Dionysius: *If one takes a lamp out of the house, all its proper light will go out with it, drawing nothing at all of the other lights into itself, nor leaving anything of its own to them*, he referred to the mystery of the Incarnation, as Pachymeres noted, and translated that from John XVI: *I went out from the Father.* For the Son, having become man, who was a certain light of humanity kindled by the light of divinity, did not draw the Father with him, nor the Holy Spirit, nor did he leave anything proper to the divinity to them; but rather he carried the same whole divinity, which is in them, remaining in them. To the same mystery of the Incarnation, Leontius the monk, a most learned author, referred this example in the book which he wrote against Nestorius and Eutyches.

For he teaches that substances can thus be united without mixture, just as the qualities of lights are united here without mixture, and the splendors of the stars are united, preserving the property of the quantity within the quality.

§ V. Regarding the words: *But the divine distinction is an emanation of God, befitting divine union.* Concerning the inexplicable emanation of the Trinity (says Saint Maximus), ^A one now philosophizes that God and Father, without time, in a manner befitting God and moving forward in love, proceeded to a distinction of persons, remaining in his whole self without diminution or partition, with his own splendor emitted more than unitatively and more than simply, so that he might exist as a living image; and with the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father venerably and more than eternally, as the Lord teaches: *But by the goodness of God, the cause and origin of all exists multiplied in three divine Persons*. Likewise Gregory the Theologian, arguing against Eunomius, says: *But there is also, in another way, a divine distinction, an emanation of God on account of his excessive goodness, toward the multiform creation, both visible and invisible; according to which (as Dionysius also says in this place), "from the participations and the participants are praised those things which are participated in non-participably," that is, from the participations and participants are lauded those things which are participated in without participation.* Explaining this passage, Saint Maximus says: *The Trinity, he says, the queen of the universe, is participated in by those which are able to participate in it, not comprehensibly nor participately.* For the same man declares both things: for God is participated in not comprehensibly nor restrictedly, but rather existing whole in the participation of each, and exempt from all. And again the same man in his *Theological Centuries*, century III, c. 7: *God, he says, who according to substance is not participable, when he wills otherwise to be participated in by those who can, does not recede from his own hidden nature and substance; when even the mode itself, by which he wills to be participated in, remains always hidden from all.* Further, the same man in those items brought forth in the *Dogmatic Panoply*: *God is participable according to his communications; but non-participable, inasmuch as nothing participates in his substance, or his life, or his wisdom, or anything of such things, which he has all in excellence and supremely.*

From these (says Cyparissiotus) it is evident, first, that there is a twofold emanation: one consists in God the Father, in his flowing toward his own, bringing forth the suprasubstantial Son and the Holy Spirit—two lights of one and the same divinity—univocally, in no way having departed from himself as a whole, but rather having moved toward himself without intermediate distance, from eternity toward the nature of the three persons. And this emanation, moved from the divine person into the divine persons in the Trinity, toward which it was moved, stood still and exhibited an uncreated motion. For every emanation, as it becomes the cause of those things which emanate, is an emanation of such a sort as are the things toward which the emanation is made. The other is that by which God is moved equivocally toward the creature, producing it in time: and by the former, indeed, he is known naturally, but by the latter, voluntarily. ^B

It is evident, second, that in its totality God is both participated in by us and is not participated in. Participated in, indeed, according to the reason of cause, that is, inasmuch as he produces all things from nothing, so that they both simply exist and exist well; but again he is not participated in according to our participation, and according to existence. For we do not participate in God just as species participate in genera, and as particulars participate in universals, and as those things which are under prime things participate in those very prime things. Nor do we participate in him according to existence, and that which Dionysius calls a mixed communion; as if we should say: Sentient life is a part of the substance of all things living by sense; and: All species concrete from matter participate in matter and form according to an added communion; for in these modes and reasons, he is in no way participated in by us. Nor, again, is there something in him which is participated in, and something which is not; for it is absurd if it be said that the existence of God must consist of two certain dissimilar things, namely, a participable and a non-participable one. See these things more fully in Cyparissiotus, decade 7, which is entirely about divine participations.

§ VII. The explanation can be gathered from the first notation of the first chapter.

§ VIII. Dionysius alludes to verse 15 of the third chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians, teaching that God is the Father of all, men and angels, by which common Parent men and angels are related. For he himself is the Father of all families, corporal and spiritual, and therefore to be adored and worshipped in common by all: it seems, however, he is noting the plurality of the principles and gods of Simon Magus and Valentinus.

§ IX. As to how the mode and mystery of the Incarnation remained hidden even from the highest angels, see above in Saint Dionysius, c. 7 of the *Celestial Hierarchy*, and Saint Thomas in the Epistle to the Ephesians, c. 3, lect. 4. Note here at the end of this paragraph that Saint Hierotheus is said to be taught partly by theologians, partly by the investigation of the Scriptures, and partly by a certain more divine inspiration, not only by learning, but also by experiencing divine things. For we perceive divine things in three ways, namely, by action, or by passion, or in a certain mixed way. By action, indeed, principally, when we obtain these things not from others who are learned, but by the investigation of reason; by passion, however, when we perceive them while divinely inspired; by a mixed way, finally, that is, partly by experiencing, partly by acting, where, when another is teaching, we are instructed by words or writings. For then, inasmuch as we are moved from elsewhere, we in some way experience, but inasmuch as we apply our own judgment and examination to it, we seem also to act. Furthermore, both study of others and one's own invention of divine things must be directed toward this as if toward a mark, so that we may be thoroughly exposed to God who is incessantly knocking. And we accomplish this by love for him alone. For we direct all things toward God, and we are subjected to God who is secretly knocking; and with him inspiring, and as it were moving and acting, we are suddenly moved, and thus we experience and are filled with the Spirit. ^C The affection of such a sort is called passion, both because it is loving (for love, transferring one into the loved, compels the lover to experience it from there), and because, with the actions of reason and intelligence then being vacant, we are formed by the divine light, and being formed, we experience. We are prepared for this light, indeed, by most fervent love alone. For just as vast heat purges and thins opaque materials, which are impassable to light, and renders them passable to light, so the loving fervor toward God, purging the mind from corporal perturbations and clouds, renders it as it were serene, and prepared for the divine light, with which we follow up a closer union with the intellect, and a faith more certain than human science.

§ X. For the understanding of the words of Hierotheus, note with Turrianus in cap. 2 of the 7th decade of Cyparissiotus: that this order is to be considered in the essences of things. First, the principles of things; second, the substance; third, the species of the whole composite proceeding from the form; fourth, the perfection of the thing itself, not only as regards the species, but as regards its own operation and end: for then a thing is perfect in every way when it obtains its end; fifth, various things, which individually are endowed with a certain proper perfection, and joined in a certain order, perfect a certain whole, as in the universe, and in man. Hierotheus therefore teaches how ^D

^A § 1. This present chapter is concerning united and distinct theology. For since the saint proposed to speak of the divine names, and divine names in some cases belong in common to the three divinely-ruling Persons, and in others to each one of the Hypostases individually, he therefore inscribes as "united theology" those names which appertain in common to the divine nature, but as "distinct" those which belong to each one of the Hypostases. And again, he calls "divine union" the hidden and incomprehensible knowledge of the divine nature (for no one will ever know what the very essence of the incomprehensible Trinity is), but he calls "divine distinction" the subsistent and adorable existences—that is, the ineffable splendor of the Son from the Father, and the inconceivable procession of the all-holy Spirit from the Father—that is, the whole divinely-ruling existence, or rather, not strictly existence, but super-existence; yet because all existence is from Him, it is called existence from the caused creatures. This whole divinely-ruling existence, therefore—that is, the one and only Deity (for it is his custom thus to call the Deity of the holy and only adorable Trinity, which is known in three Hypostases), he ^B proclaims that the Lord, in the holy Gospels, signifies this very thing to be goodness itself; that is, it is acknowledged with all reverence and piety. For the Lord himself, the divinely-ruling one, guiding us, said to him who asked: "Why callest thou me good? There is no one good, except one, God." This, then, has been examined by us in other places, that such names are not spoken partially of one of the divinely-ruling Hypostases, but of the whole and full Deity; and that all these common names are attributed indivisibly, not divided by allotment as if to one Person, but to each one individually, and to the three in common, absolutely—that is, not with some addition to one Person and without this to another; but without observation, ^C as to each one individually, and to the three in common; and as in common, so also to each one individually, and as a whole to the entire totality of the Deity. And indeed, as we have reminded in other places, he who says that the divine names are not common impiously rends asunder the unity of the adorable Trinity. It must be said, therefore, that the word "good" in the Gospels is to be taken as referring to the three divinely-ruling Hypostases; for even the Good-natured Word says: "If therefore thine eye be evil,

is thine whole body full of darkness" ^A (Matthew 20:15). And again, it is found in the Psalm of David, saying: "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the land of uprightness" [(Psalm 142:10)]; and again, the word spoken to Moses: "I am who I am" [(Exodus 3:14)]. If some desire to limit these to one Person, how will they interpret those words spoken in the Apocalypse of John the Evangelist concerning the Father: "Who is, and who was, and who is to come" [(Apoc. 1:4)]? Or, concerning the Son, those in David: "But You are the same" [(Psalm 101:28)]? Or, concerning the Holy Spirit, those in the holy Gospels: "The Spirit of truth, who is, who proceeds from the Father" [(John 15:26)]? And consider how he speaks of this usage; for it is not expressed in this way now. And again concerning Life: if these things were not said of the three Persons, how is it found in the divine Gospels that "as the Father raises up the dead and gives them life, even so the Son gives life to whom He will" [(John 5:21)], and "it is the Spirit who gives life" [(John 6:64)]?

As to the fact that the name "Lord" is also common, it can hardly be said how often this is spoken of God who generated (the Father), or of the generated God (the Son). But the Spirit also is Lord; and likewise the Good, and the Wise, and the Light, and the Deifying, and the Cause. All these names, I say, are predicated in summary of the whole Deity, according to the text: "All things are from God" [(Rom. 11:36)]; and they are predicated distinctly of each of the Hypostases: of the Son, when it says: "All things were made through Him and for Him, and in Him all things consist" [(John 1:3; Col. 1:17)]—for all have accepted this as referring to the creative Word. Concerning the Holy Spirit: "You shall send forth Your Spirit, and they shall be created" [(Psalm 103:30)]. And to speak summarily, the Lord Himself said: "All things that the Father has are Mine," and "All Mine are Yours, and Yours are Mine" [(John 16:15; 17:10)]. Yet He attributes these also to the most holy Spirit by way of communication and union. What are these? The divine operations—that is, the miracles, according to the text: "If I by the Spirit of God cast out demons" [(Luke 11:20)]. Veneration, according to the text: "But whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven" [(Mark 3:29)]. The fountain and distribution of graces, according to the text: "You shall receive power from on high, when the Holy Spirit has come upon you" [(Acts 1:8)].

And I do not think that any of those who are soundly instructed in the holy Scriptures will disagree with these things, that such names apply both generally and specifically, according to the reason and the cause, because each of the divinely-ruling Hypostases is perfect God, and the three again are one perfect God. ^D Since, therefore, these things—briefly here, but sufficiently in other places—have been defined, we shall endeavor to unfold whatever whole and common divine name (setting aside the proper and personal ones) is to be understood in a common sense.

§ II. But if anyone should say that we are thereby introducing confusion and are confusing the God-befitting distinction of the Hypostases, because we perhaps apply the divine name of the Son to the whole Deity, we...

nor do we deem him capable of persuading us that he says what is true in what he says against us. For if he resists the divine Scripture, he will be far removed from our philosophy as well; and if he is not concerned with the divine Oracles, how could we be concerned with his guidance and instruction? But if he accepts the truth of the Oracles, then we, using the Oracles themselves as a rule and a light, shall answer him: that theology delivers some of the names in a unified way, such as "God," "Good," and the like; but others in a distinct or divided way, such as "Father," "Son," "Spirit," "begotten," "unbegotten," "proceeding." And it is not possible either to divide what is unified or to confuse what is distinct; but one must, by following theology, look up to the divine illuminations. For since we have received our teachings from ^B thence, we strive to keep them as a certain canon, neither adding to them nor diminishing them—for this is the property of a canon—and furthermore, being immovable, we are guarded by the protection of the Oracles, and we become strengthened the more for this, namely, to be guarded while we are guarding them.

§ III. The unified names, then—that is to say, of the whole Deity, of the Trinitarian monad, as we have said elsewhere—are "above-good" and the rest to which the preposition "above" [supra] is prefixed, which calls for an abstraction according to supereminence; for "immortal" and "uncreated" are also abstract, but according to negation. "Above-good" is also abstract; for it is not simply good and wise, but beyond these and incomparably so, and for this reason they contain the abstraction in a supereminent way. Along with these are also the causative names; for "Good," "Beautiful," and "Being"—because the Divine has caused things to be beautiful, existing, and good—are named from the things caused; these are the unified names. But the distinct names are: the ^C superessential name of the Father, the superessential name of the Son, the superessential name of the Holy Spirit; for from these there occurs neither reciprocation nor community. For the Father is God, yet not God only as Father; and the Son is God, yet not God only as Son; and similarly regarding the holy and life-giving Spirit. There is also found another distinct theology, one peculiar to our Lord Jesus Christ and God, which is His perfect existence according to us; for He assumed flesh animate and participant in intellect; and He is unchangeable; for He remained what He was unchangeably, and He assumed what He was not, namely the Son of Man, subjection to a beginning and to time, and the other human things, and all the other mysteries of His philanthropy: hunger, thirst, toil, and the other things which He says are "essential," thereby excluding the opinion of imagination. ^D

§ IV. It is proper, therefore, to take up again the entire method of divine union and distinction and to set it forth and state it, so that the discourse may be clear, avoiding all obscurity and defining things as clearly as possible. For those initiated in sacred matters call, as I have also said elsewhere, "divine unions" the knowledges concerning the incomprehensible essence; and the essence itself of the incompre-

incomprehensible Trinity, no one shall ever know. But the divine distinctions, [that is to say] the to-be-worshipped subsistent existences—to wit, the ineffable radiance of the Son from the Father, and the inconceivable procession of the all-holy Spirit from the Father—these they call unions, because they declare the identity of the single nature; but they call the others distinctions, because they set forth the division of the persons. And these holy men say that there are certain things proper to union—namely, the good, the wise, the immortal—and others, in turn, proper to distinction: of the Father, the unbegotten; of the Son, the begotten; and of the holy Spirit, the processional. And there are some that are partial unions and some that are partial distinctions; clearly, it is common to the Son and the Spirit that they are from the Father, but it is proper, again, that the one is [so] by way of generation, and the other by way of procession. And again, it is common to the Father and the Son that the holy Spirit is both of the Father and of the Son; but it is proper that he is the Spirit of the Father, as proceeding from the Father, and the Spirit of the Son, as being con-substantial and proper to him. And these he calls unions and distinctions proper to the distinction. ^B Next he says what the divine unions are—or rather, what are the things common to the divine essence—namely, the superessential existence, and the superessential deity, and the goodness that is above goodness; since it is incomparably superior to those things above which God is said to be; declaring this, he spoke by means of exuberant negation. An identity superior to all things, of the entirety of God’s property that surpasses all—namely, of the good, and the wise, and such things; for these are the property of God by way of excess relative to creatures. Above every unity that exists in things, [He is] indivisible and simple, ineffable, and expressed by many terms; both because He is unnameable, and because He is named in diverse ways according to the diversity of those who receive benefits. [He is] unknowing and all-knowing; for in ignorance God is known. But do not take ignorance to be that which arises from lack of knowledge (for this is a certain darkness of the soul, and does not even [make] a knower, [since] he who is unknowable is not known at all, for this too is a species of knowledge), but rather that ignorance according to which, having been simplified beyond the conceptions and [having] surpassed every thought concerning God, we become simple. While we think we have grasped [Him], we remain in uncertainty because of the state of union; and firmly abiding in union, we do not know that we have not grasped [Him]—that is, knowing nothing else, we are ignorant as the unlearned. Nevertheless, we are ignorant of those things which are piously ignored by every creature. For established in this ignorance, we become in the form of Him who exists before all things, neglecting indeed all forms and concepts, but established in silence that is more excellent than any speech—by this very fact, that we do not know that we are ignorant; then again, returning ^C from that silence which is in wordlessness, and understanding that we were ignorant, we thenceforth refrain from inquiring about the Unknown. Yet again, God is all-knowing, as understood from benevolent thoughts that He exists, and from [His] works; from the ones, that He is Savior; from the others, that He is Creator. And he calls "position" the subsistence, as [existing] from God Himself, the subsistence that is of all things. ^D

^C But let us turn from mute silence and, recognizing that we do not know Him, let us abstain from the inquiry into what cannot be known. Conversely, God is called from every intelligible thing, since He is known to exist from His own friends and understandings, and also from creatures—from the former as Savior, from the latter as Creator. He calls "position," or affirmation, subsistence, as [existing] from God Himself, who is the subsistence of all. For philosophers call "position" those forms which are impressed upon matter; but "ablation" [is what occurs] when qualities are removed from forms, as for instance dryness and weight from earth; for then, perhaps, it will be water. God, therefore, who transforms all these things, is the position and ablation of all. He is the position of all, as He who posits and makes all things, and orders them so that they might subsist; for in Him all things consist. And He is the ablation of all, as He who composes and harmonizes the very position and creation of things, and removes from the things posited those things which are contrary to their nature. For since it is admitted that things which are generated must altogether be corrupted, but He, in the abundance of His goodness, removes the corruptibility of some, such as angels and souls, and transfers the corruptibility of others to incorruption, as [He will with] our bodies in the resurrection, it is manifest that He who is to us these things is Himself above position and ablation, being the foundation and root of all things, not locally, but according to cause. Nor is He Himself ^D an ablation of the things He has; for He possesses, of Himself, immortality, and incomprehensibility, and incognoscibility, and all such things; not as if He were not the opposite, but according to a certain property ineffable to all; for He is removed from all things and is not conceived or grasped by anyone at all, as though He had withdrawn Himself by reason of His infinity.

Again, there is the dwelling and establishment of the primordial persons within one another; for they are one, and one, and one, and the three are one. And what is this dwelling and establishment, such as the saying: "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me"? The divine apostle says this also regarding the Holy Spirit. This dwelling is not confused in its part, as the sensible example declares. For just as if three candles are lit in a house, while they are distinct in their hypostases, they yet possess a communion united by the light, and no one can distinguish the common light, as to which is of this and which is of another lamp. Having said these things, he transfers the discourse to the mystery of the dispensation, and explaining that evangelical saying, "I went forth from the Father, and I go to my Father," he says: Just as if one understands one lit torch to be taken out of a room—drawing no other lights with it, nor leaving any of its own for the others—the light being taken out is taken out; understand it likewise concerning the Incarnate dispensation. For the Son, coming from the Father and visiting the world, did not draw forth the Father and the Spirit with Himself, nor did He leave behind any of His own with them, but made His departure undivided from His own dwelling. However, the unions of bodies, both those considered elementally and those mixed in other ways, have a variation in powers and quality; likewise, the powers of the soul have their difference, and indeed the unions of the angels with the divine illuminations possess this in part and proportionately to their own orders; but the unity in the Holy Trinity, and all that pertains to it, being interrupted by none of the things mentioned, nor differing from itself, is rightly judged to be above these unions. The superessential unity is placed above, not [only] of the bodies…

but also of those ^A things that are in souls themselves, and even more in the angels themselves—which divine unions the supercelestial lights, the angels, possess in a way that is unmixed, unconfused, and supermundane, completely in complete things; for the illumination is not bestowed upon them partially, but totally and integrally, even if they themselves are united only according to their own capacity. Just as when the sun shines completely and perfectly, everything participates in the light according to its own capacity, so also it happens in the case of the angels, when they become participants of that divine and supereminent union according to their own proportion. There is a distinction in the divine [realm], not only that which we mentioned before—that the divine and simple nature is divided in an unconfused and indivisible manner into three Persons—but also that the notion of the Father, that is, the active generation of God, is not convertible with the others. For the Father alone is the source of the superessential Deity, ^B while the hymns piously preserve the properties belonging to each of the thearchic Hypostases. Behold another distinction, according to which the Father is distinguished from the caused ones, the Son and the Spirit. These are the unions and distinctions in that ineffable natural union.

^D § V. There is also, according to another reason, a divine distinction: that emanation of God, on account of the abundance of His goodness, toward the manifold forms of the invisible and visible creation. ^C Furthermore, the creative providences and the goodnesses of creation are common to the tri-hypostatic Unity. Do not, therefore, when you hear of "distinction," suppose that one Hypostasis possesses creation or providence separately, but [understand that Dionysius] called the processions of creation and providence "distinctions," as certain effusions of goodness distinct from the blessed and unconfused Trinity, according to which the things that are participated in—that is, the gifts—and the participants—that is, the effects—praise those things that are participated in without participation. ^D But God, who in His own nature subsists in three Persons, is participated in without participation; for this is common to the whole Deity, that the whole of Itself is participated in by each of those who participate, and not in part, even if the participants participate according to their own faculty—just as when a loud voice is raised, all who are present participate according to their own capacity, both man, and child, and brute animals; but some do so more strongly, others more weakly, according to the effectiveness of their faculty of hearing. And the voice is communicable, while remaining in itself incommunicable. Or, according to the examples proposed, just as straight lines falling from the circumference of a circle to its center participate in that [center] wholly, and not in part, because the point—which is also the center—lacks parts; and just as the impressions participate in the seal totally and not in part. But while he produces the examples,

the seal itself remains the same; however, the difference in those participating in one and the same primordial form renders the effigies dissimilar. For instance, if the material is simple, easily formed, or even smooth and unmarked by other preceding characters, and neither hard and resistant—like dried wax—nor, on the other hand, too fluid—like wax melted by heat—the impression will be clear. But if something is lacking, this will be the cause of obscurity, or distortion, or some other defect, which occurs on account of the ineptitude of those participating. Observe also another divine distinction regarding the Word incarnate, in performing and suffering those wonderful and astounding things which, as man, He both did and endured; for in these, the Father and the Spirit did not participate, unless someone might say, according to the benign good pleasure and will, and in the divine signs, by cooperating with the Son. Thus, we likewise endeavor to join and distinguish divine things by discourse, in the way they are truly and by nature united and distinct.

§ VII. But as for these unions and distinctions, whatever reasons for them agreeable to God we have found in the sacred Scriptures, we have explained elsewhere, each in its own place, ^C partly by elucidating them and by bringing a purified and tranquil mind to the very clear contemplations of the Scriptures (for thus does the sacred mind explain and interpret them), and partly by honoring them as mystical, and as surpassing the operation of the mind, namely, by silence and an incomprehensible mode. For the sacred mind does not apply itself to these things otherwise than through a total cessation of the intellectual movement of beings; for this is what is meant by "surpassing the operation of the mind," that is, when it is entirely encompassed by the incomprehensibility of God, then it attains what it was seeking. For all divine names, and whatever has been revealed to us, are known only through the participations, according to which we participate in God without confusion; for from the participations that are given to us by God, we also compose the names concerning God. But what these divine things are in themselves according to their own nature, exceeds every mind and essence; just as when we name that arcane super-essential One, God, God, or life, or other things, we understand nothing else than either the benign powers toward us, according to which we are deified, or substantiated, or vivified, and other things in like manner. Indeed, this divine super-existence will be praised in such a way, when, after having been released from every most active and intellectual operation, it receives us in the indivisibility of our mind through holy silence, as we apply ourselves to the gifts flowing forth from there; this

is the knowledge in ignorance, in which we discern neither deification, nor life, nor substance, which is plainly similar to that Cause which excels over all things by total supereminence. Venerable and sacred-fear-worthy are the names of the holy Trinity; for the Father is the fontal divinity, while the Son and the holy Spirit are certain shoots and blossoms and superessential lights. Shoots, indeed, from the vision of the olives of Zechariah; lights, however, from the Epistle of James the brother of the Lord, who makes mention of the Father of lights. These names, therefore, we have received from the sacred Scriptures; but in what manner they really are, we are able neither to utter nor to conceive.

§ VIII. Otherwise, our mental study thus far looks to how from this paternity and filiation every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named; from which it happens that spiritually and doctrinally even gods and fathers of gods—the divine and holy men—and sons of gods—those who progress in sacred doctrine—are so named. What, then, is "spiritually"? It is incorporeally and immaterially and intellectually; for the holy men, receiving this divinity and spirituality from the holy divine Spirit, who is above all immateriality and deification, and from the Father and the Son, who by supereminence surpass all paternity and filiation, participate in such a state. For there is not a perfect similarity between the created effects and the ^B causes—the divine Persons, I say; rather, the creatures have, as much as is possible, images of God, but the causes themselves are entirely exempt from the created effects. And, to use earthly examples, pleasures and pains are said to cause people to be gladdened or saddened, yet these pleasures themselves are not said to be gladdened, nor are the pains saddened. And fire warms and burns, yet it is not warmed or burned. Therefore, if someone were to say that the Life-bestowing and the Life-itself lives, and that the Light-itself is illuminated, he would not have spoken properly according to the correct principle of truth, ^C unless, perhaps, he were to say this in another manner: that these things are present in the causes more abundantly, essentially, and not by participation, before the caused beings.

§ IX. Furthermore, that which is the most manifest mystery of the whole theology, the human-friendliness of Jesus (since he has also manifestly and truly communicated with us), is nevertheless ineffable to every word and inconceivable to every mind, even to the first and most ancient angel, namely, to the most sublime and first order; for John, that theologian, speaks in the Apocalypse of those more ancient angels. And that he assumed flesh, we have received mystically; but how he was formed from virginal bloods by a law other than nature, and all other things which pertain to the explanation of the nature of Jesus—how he is recognized in two natures, acting according to man, ^D and working beyond man—is of another account, and is superior

to our reason and capacity. If, therefore, divine things ^A are ineffable, possessing a more subtle theology, what shall one say of the blessed Trinity? These things have been said by us elsewhere, and by our glorious teacher, the blessed Hierotheus, whom he possessed as teacher after Saint Paul; things which he, whether he had received them from the Holy Scriptures, or discerned them from the investigation of the Scriptures, through much exercise and practice, or had been taught by some more divine inspiration, had not merely learned, but endured, as one who had not received the doctrine of these things doctrinally through words, but being formed by divine illumination, and having the knowledge of things above nature imprinted as it were upon his mind. For this "sympathy" or "shared disposition" he called this initiation into more divine things. And in order that we may pass over his many and blessed words, let us ^B set forth in brief what he says concerning our Lord Jesus Christ and God, in his *Theological Elements*.

Of Hierotheus

§ X. Next, he sets forth word for word the writing of the holy Hierotheus, in which the blessed man says, showing how the Son is all things in all, and the head of all, according to the Apostle, because He is the fullness and bond of all, and preserves and keeps together the parts in the whole; and He is neither a part nor a whole, for ^C He is above these; yet He is both whole and part, as one who has encompassed all things; and He is superior by nature, and excels by causality, and is perfect in us who are imperfect, and imperfect in the perfect angels, as one who is more than perfect and pre-perfect, having no comparison of perfection with them; and He is the form of things without form, as Creator and principle of every form, and formless in respect to things endowed with form, as being above form. He is the Substance pervading all substances by His providence, and yet again removed in His nature from every substance, defining all principles and orders, and being set above every principle and order. He is the measure of beings, since all things are bounded in Him; and He is both age and above age, as the author of ages; just as He is perfect in the imperfect, and imperfect in the perfect, as being more than perfect; as full among those who are in need, and more than full among the full; ^D and whatever things are above these, that we may not recount them one by one. Hence, because He has also shared with us in flesh and blood, and was truly substantiated, and became man, yet even in these He possesses the perfections of the Godhead, not only in that He shared [our nature] without change, having suffered nothing from the inferior humanity into His own Godhead, but also, which is the most novel of all things, in that He was supernatural in our natural state—walking, but upon the unstable water; eating, but satisfying so many thousands—having all our attributes from us, yet excellently surpassing us.

§ XI. Of these things, enough; but as to the aim of our discourse

let us proceed, unfolding the common and united names of the holy Trinity, which are of divine distinction, inasmuch as they are divine gifts which are distinguished from God. And that we may clearly define it, we say that divine distinction belongs to the God-befitting gifts, as has been said; for while imparting the participation of goods to all things that are, in a united manner—that is, from the property of the one nature—it is distinguished into the gifts; and while being multiplied into particular benefactions, it is again united, because all benefactions are from the one God. And the gifts are indeed multiplied upon each individual, yet they remain in the one without departing, as if one might see them in the one who is that which they are; for God is He who is, but superessentially: and He brings forth the things that are; and while He grants being to them, that which is one is multiplied into the things which are many; yet nevertheless, in such multiplication, it remains in itself as something one, and in the distinction of particulars remains full, because it is removed from all things, and by the ^B unitary production (that is, at once, when He wills, and not bit by bit and by parts and minute fusion), because God, while creating things, diminishes none of His own goods, but being one, distributes the unitary power even to each part, whether of the world or of an animal; for every part is something one, both to the whole (for the whole is something one) and to one atom, and to the multitude—that is, to many—which are one in species, just as many men are one in nature. When, therefore, He imparts unity to all these, composing them from the principal elements which He Himself also established, and making each one in its constitution, it is again one in the same way, not divided into the multitude of created things, just as the selfsame and one power of an art, having fashioned many artificial things, and having presided over immaterial things, again remains one and simple in itself, being neither a part of the things made by art, nor any whole composed from them. For how can the art be a part of those things which consist by art, when it itself presides over the individuals? Or how can it be a whole composed of these, and the former exist from the latter, and the cause from the effects? And hence it is concluded that the divine is not such an “one” as is in us; for in us that which is one is either a whole or a part, but the Divine is above these; nor does it participate in the One; for how could it? For so, again, another certain one would be prior, of which God would be a participant: for that which is participated is prior to those things which participate in it. Nor is that which is one in it as if by accident, or even as an essential property; for that possesses the one, which is essence and being; but God is above essence and above being. By all these things, therefore, in a far more sublime manner, God is something one, above the one which is in things; nay, it is also a multitude, since it is multiplied into all the best gifts and providences, being not at all divided, but falling to each entirely, even if those which participate in it participate according to their own capacity. Wherefore it is inexhaustible and super-full; for if it were divided, it would be filled, everything and the one; and the multitude, bringing forth, perfecting, and containing, many gods having come to be, and those of the angels, and those of men by the divinization from Him in that which is godlike according to the power of each, which they receive from God. It seems indeed, therefore, from this, that the Divine is distinguished and multiplied, in divinizing each one; but the Arch-God is nevertheless one God, undivided

individual among things divided, united in Himself above all union; and He remains unmixed with the many, nor is He multiplied, just as the light of the sun, while it illuminates many, remains one and not multiplied. ^A Since our common teacher—my own teacher and the teacher of our great Hierotheos (who, as he is the teacher of the world, so is he its light)—the disciple of him who is truly the light of the world, namely the great Paul, knew this most excellently, he says this in a divinely inspired way: "For though there be gods many and lords many according to grace, such as the divine angels and holy men; but for us, there is truly one God, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit," who imparts to the many, according to an undivided and inseparable ^B communication of the name of His own Divinity and Lordship, yet without the Divinity being fragmented into parts of godheads, like gold into coins; nor do many gods complete the same Divinity, in the manner that many species complete one world. Rather, God is said to be multiplied, in accordance with the will for producing existences, being multiplied by providential processions, yet He remains again in Himself indivisibly one. Therefore, even in divine things, unions prevail over distinctions, which are clearly seen in a unified and singular way; for the Divinity and Lordship are not gathered together from many, but the multiplicity seen in those things is considered from its singularity. But this is the case with divine things; among our own affairs, the opposite occurs. ^C For in them there is no unity properly so called; rather, the pre-existing distinctions of the elements, while they concur and are unified, produce secondary unions arising from composition. In divine things, however, the One pre-exists, and after the distinction for the sake of benefactions, It remains again One and above the One. We, too, shall attempt to hymn these common, unified distinctions and benefactions of the whole Divinity, from the divine names in the Scriptures, with this being foreknown: that if any name is set forth, even one of any of the Persons—without the properties—for example, of paternity, ^D filiation, or procession, by which it is drawn to some certain [particularity], it is to be understood as applying to the whole Divinity itself.

CAPUT III. Which is the power of prayer, and concerning the blessed Hierotheus, and concerning religion and theological writing.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER. 1. It teaches that we must approach God through prayer; not because God is absent from us, but so that we may be present to God by our mental preparation. 2. He gives the reason why he wrote these theological books after the holy Hierotheus, and at the same time describes the praises of Hierotheus, and how, together with Peter and James, they were present at the falling-asleep of the most holy Virgin Mary, and what they did there. 3. He declares how humbly he feels about himself and his own writings.

§ I. ^A And first, if it seems good, let us examine the perfect and — as it manifests all the emanations of God — the "good-name," having invoked the Trinity, which is the principle of good, surpasses the good, and clarifies all its own best providences. For it is necessary for us to be drawn first by prayers to It, as to the principle of good, and then, drawing nearer to It, to be instructed in all the best gifts that are stored up with It; for It is indeed present to all, but all things are not present to It. ^B But when we entreat It with holy prayers, with a tranquil mind, and with an aptitude for divine union, only then are we also present to It. For It is not in a place, such that It might be absent from anything or might migrate from one place to another. Furthermore, to say that It is in all things is short of Its infinity, which both surpasses and contains all things. ^C Let us, therefore, stretch ourselves out by prayers to the higher beholding of the divine and beneficent rays, just as if we were to seize continuously with alternating hands, stretched out in front of us, a most luminous chain hanging from the highest heaven and let down to us; we would appear to be pulling it down, yet in reality we would not be drawing it down—for it is present above and below—but rather we ourselves would be lifted up toward the higher glimmers of the illustrious rays. Or as if, having stepped into a ship and holding onto ropes stretched toward us from a rock for the sake of help, we were not pulling the rock toward us, but were in truth ourselves and the ship toward the rock. ^D Just as, on the contrary, if someone standing in a ship were to push against a rock by the sea, he will by no means move that fixed and immobile rock, but will repel himself from it; and the more vehemently he pushes it, so much the further will he be removed from it. Therefore, before all things, and especially in theology, one must make a beginning with prayer: not as if we were drawing down the Power that is everywhere and nowhere present, but as if we were commending and uniting ourselves to It by divine commemorations and invocations.

^A And perhaps this is worthy of an apology: why, when our illustrious instructor Hierotheus has so transcendently gathered together the theological elements, we, as though those were insufficient, have written others, including the present theological treatise. For indeed, had he been pleased to treat of all theological matters in order, and had he unfolded the sum total of all theology in even the briefest expositions, no such madness or stupidity would have seized us as to imagine that we could penetrate these theological matters more clearly or divinely than he, or to wish to weary ourselves with redundant and futile labor by repeating the same things twice, thereby inflicting such an injury upon our friend and teacher, and upon us who, after the divine Paul, have been instructed by his words, as to embezzle his most renowned contemplation and revelation for ourselves. ^B But since he, in truth, expounding divine things in a manner befitting an elder, set forth for us summary definitions, and in one embraced many things—as, for instance, for us and for as many of us as are teachers of neophyte souls—enjoining us to unfold and distinguish with language proportionate to us the summary and unified convolutions of that man's most intellectual power; and since he himself has often urged us to this, and has sent back the book itself to us as something surpassing, for this reason we, on one hand, separate him, as a teacher of perfect and mature minds, for those who are beyond the many, as a kind of "second oracles" and consequences of the God-anointed; ^C but for those like us, we shall transmit divine things in a manner analogous to ourselves. For if solid food is for the perfect, what degree of perfection must it be to feed others with it? Rightly, therefore, have we also said this: that the direct, intuitive vision of the intelligible oracles, and the summary teaching concerning them, require the power of an elder; but that the knowledge and study of the discussions leading to this point are appropriate for those who are subordinate, consecrated, and ordained. Yet this has been observed by us with the greatest care: that we have in no way attempted tautology, nor have we dared to repeat the definition of the very same oracle that he had already elucidated. ^D For even among those of our own God-inspired hierarchs—as when we, as you know, and you yourself, and many of our holy brethren, had assembled for the viewing of the life-originating and God-receiving body; and there were present also the brother of the Lord, James, and Peter, the chief and most venerable summit of the theologians, and it seemed good after the viewing for all the hierarchs, as each was able, to hymn the infinite-powered goodness of the thearchic weakness—among all who held sway after the theologians, as you know, and of the other sacred initiates, he was wholly departing, wholly ecstatic from himself, and...

enduring the communion of those things which he was praising. Finally, by all who heard and saw him, as much by those who knew him as by the unknown, he was deemed to be divinely inspired and a truly divine hymnographer. But why do I relate to you what most divinely was said there? For, unless forgetfulness of myself has seized me, I remember that I have often received from you some parts of those hymns of inspiration; such was your zeal not to pursue divine things as a secondary work. ^A

§ III. But that we may pass over those mystical things—as ineffable to the many, though well known to you—at a time when it was necessary to proclaim our faith to the masses and to draw as many as were able toward our sacred instruction, many holy teachers surpassed ^B the majority in this office, both by the usage of time, by purity of mind, and by the sharpness of their demonstrations, as well as by other sacred institutions, so that we would never have dared to endeavor to gaze upon such a great sun. For we were conscious of ourselves, or rather we know, that we are not at all sufficient for understanding divine things, much less for expressing what is known insofar as it is ineffable. But since we are far removed from the capacity of divine men in explaining the theological truth, we have been led, even by an abundance of religion, to the point that we would presume neither to hear nor to speak anything regarding the divine philosophy, if we had not understood ^C that the knowledge of divine things—such as we are able to attain—is not to be neglected. And this, we were persuaded, not only by the natural desires of minds, which always lovingly, insofar as it is lawful, are excited toward the contemplation of divine things, but also by the most excellent institution of the divine laws itself; which, as it forbids us to investigate too curiously those things that are above us and exceed our merits and surpass our grasp, so it commands us to learn assiduously all things that are permitted and granted to us, and kindly to share them with others. Led, therefore, by these considerations—and deterred neither by labor nor by indolence from the lawful examination of divine things, lest we should allow those who lack the faculty ^D of contemplating things more sublime than us to remain destitute of support—we have applied our mind to writing, not presuming to bring forward anything new, but, by certain minute observations on particular parts, distinguishing and explaining those things which were truly handed down by the venerable Hierotheus in a subtle compendium.

345 ANNOTATIONS OF CORDERIUS. § I. And first, if it seems fit, let us weigh the name of the Good. On the occasion of this passage, Saint Thomas, in the first part, question 5, article 2, asks whether the good is prior to being in its definition. And the reason for doubting is because the order of names is according to the order of the things signified by the names, but Dionysius, he says, among other names of God, places "the Good" before "being"; therefore, the good is prior to being according to the definition.

^A Nevertheless, it resolves that "being," when it falls into the conception of the intellect prior to "the good," is also prior to it according to reason. For "being" is the primary intelligible, just as sound is the primary audible; because by this everything is knowable, insofar as it is actual, whence it is also prior according to reason.

But to the authority of Dionysius, and the argument taken from it, one responds that Saint Dionysius assigns the divine names according to the relation of cause that they imply concerning God. "The Good," however, since it has the nature of an object of desire, implies the relation of a final cause, whose causality is primary, because an agent does not act except for the sake of an end, and by the agent, matter is moved toward form, whence the end is called the cause of causes. And thus, in causing, "the good" is prior to "being," just as the end is prior to the form: and by this reasoning, among the names signifying divine causality, "the good" is set before "being"; see also Quæst. 13, article 11. Truly, however, the mind of Dionysius can be explained more easily thus: that since he assigns the names of God according to the emanations which are attributed to God by reason of goodness, whose proper act is to communicate itself to others, for this reason he interprets the name "good" in the first place. Whence it does not follow that the name "good" signifies the primary reason of all things in God.

Ibidem: *For it is necessary for us first through prayers, etc.* ^B Where note first, that through prayer one must beseech the knowledge of divine things from God; since it is the general medium for obtaining all spiritual gifts. For it is, as Saint Chrysostom says (34), like a certain key, through which we are able to open all the treasures of God, and from them receive whatever seems advantageous to us for attaining eternal salvation. For we can most certainly obtain all these things through prayer, as the same Saint Chrysostom proves profusely and beautifully from the Scriptures in those golden books *On Praying to God*. Here, only observe three things most necessary for the efficacy of prayer. First, to restrain the disturbances of the senses, which, being corporeal and distant by a very long interval from the divinity, distort us. Second, to expel from the intellect, like mists, the fallacies and machinations of the imagination. Third, to turn the entire affect of the will, now distracted into diverse goods, into the primary good with the entire intention of love: for thus the fervor of the supplicant joins the soul to God, just as sulfurous heat couples wood to a flame. To this tends that Zoroastrian saying: *If you direct a fiery mind to the work of piety, you will save even the decaying body thereby.*

Note secondly, that God is indeed present to all things, but not all things are present to Him. For even if God is intimately present to all things, and touches and preserves them by His substantial influx, He is nevertheless not reached by them. For (as Lessius well notes [35]) He is so present by place, or by local presence and non-distance to every thing, that He nevertheless differs infinitely by the rank of nature and loftiness, gathered into Himself, and most firmly subsisting in His purity, segregated from all things. Whence He is at once both most conjunctive and most remote, most present and most secret, most unitary or collected, and most diffusive. And although He descends to creatures in infinite ways through His influxes, He nevertheless remains stably fixed in His loftiness and immobile identity. We, however, are joined to Him through prayer, while we adore Him as present in all things, and contemplate all things in God.

But the divine Thomas inquires, in book I of the *Sentences*, distinct. 37, q. 1, art. 2, where he cites this place of Saint Dionysius, whether God is in all things by power, presence, and essence, in the saints by grace, and in Christ by being; and he answers that the distinction of these modes is taken partly from the part of the creature, and partly from the part of God. From the part of the creature, insofar as it is ordered toward God in a different way, and joined to Him, not only by a diversity of reason but also really. For when God is said to be in things according to how He is applied to them in some way, it is necessary that where there is a different mode of conjunction or application, there must be a different mode of being. Now, a creature is joined to God in three ways. First, according to similarity only, insofar as some similarity of divine goodness is found in the creature, but not such that it touches God Himself according to substance. And this conjunction is found in all creatures assimilating divine goodness: and thus God is in all things by essence, presence, and power. ^C 346 Secondly, the creature reaches to God Himself also according to its substance, and not only according to similarity: and this is by operation, as when someone adheres by faith to the First Truth itself, and by charity to the Highest Goodness itself. And thus is another mode by which God is spiritually in the saints through grace. Thirdly, the creature reaches to God Himself not only according to operation, but also according to being; not indeed as "being" is the act of the divine essence (because a creature cannot pass into the divine nature), but according to that which is the act of the hypostasis or person, into whose union the creature has been assumed. And this is the mode by which God is in Christ through the hypostatic union.

On the part of God, however, there is not found a diversity of reality, but of reason only, insofar as essence, virtue, and operation are distinguished in Him. Now, His essence, since it is absolute from every creature, is not in the creature except insofar as it is applied to it through operation, and according to that which He operates in a thing, He is said to be in the thing by presence, according to which the agent must be in some way present to the thing acted upon. And because the operation does not desert the divine virtue from which it exits, therefore He is said to be in the thing by power. And because the virtue is the essence itself, it follows that He is also in the thing by essence.

Note thirdly, from that which he subjoins: *Moreover, to say that He is in all things, what is this less than His infinity, and He exceeds and contains all things*, it is manifestly gathered that God is not only in this world, but also spread outside the world through immense spaces; just like a certain light not only occupying the whole world, but extending itself outward in every direction without limit: which Lessius well proves in book 11, *On the Divine Perfections*, chap. 2. For as he says, He coexists not only with duration of this kind, but also with the immense intervals that are outside the world, indeed, at once and at the same time occupying and equaling all intervals of places and times. Whence, just as before the world, no moment can be marked, however distant from the beginning of the world, in which God is not; so outside the world, no point can be imagined by the mind, however remote and detached from the world, where God is not, most fully with all His majesty, power, and glory. See more in Lessius at the cited place.

^D § II. *Peter, that supreme and most ancient summit of theologians.* Note hence the most firm argument from the authority of Saint Dionysius for the primacy of Peter, and consequently of the Roman Pontiffs, his successors. But he describes here how the apostles, with other disciples, among whom he himself was with Hierotheos, were present at the funeral of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and celebrated her with divine praises: see Baronius, vol. 1, at the year of Christ forty-eight.

^A § I. First, if it pleases, let us consider that which manifests the universal benevolence of God, namely the name of the Good, having invoked the holy Trinity, which is the source of all goodness and which kindly unfolds all its own providences. We must, therefore, be brought by prayers—or rather, draw near, according to the word: *Draw near to me, and I will draw near to you*, says the Lord—to be instructed in his gifts, or rather to experience them while we learn; for He himself is present to all, but not all things are present to Him, insofar as they recede through the affection for earthly things and the perturbation of their thoughts; yet when, through prayer and a tranquil mind, we become fit for divine union, then we also are present to Him. And, confirming that He is present to all, he says: For He is not in a place, such that He might be absent from somewhere, or move from one thing to another. For those things which are in a place are contained; and place is the limit of that which contains the content. Furthermore, to say that He is in all things falls far short of His infinity, by which He embraces all things; for He is not only in all things, but He also contains the universe; and not only does He contain it, but He also transcends the entire infinite comprehension. ^B Let us, therefore, apply ourselves to prayers, not that we might draw God down, but that we might rather be drawn up to God. And he first brings a pagan example from Homer; yet he adapts it most beautifully to divine matters; for he himself relates that a golden chain hung down from heaven. Just as, therefore, with a chain so constituted, he who little by little lifts himself from the earth, while he seems by alternating grasps to draw that chain toward himself, is in fact rather raised on high by ascending by degrees: so also he who prays intensely, through the works which he calls "hands," little by little by working and praying applies his mind to God. But if, once having been drawn on high, we let go of the hands of the chain, we fall from the height; for while we are being drawn up, we must also cling to God. There is a similar example regarding a ship, ^C so that we may understand our mind to be the ship, which is stirred by the winds of this life; the sea being this life itself, full of many storms; and the rock being Christ, whom, while we grasp, we remain unshaken, directing both our life and our way of living toward Him. Wherefore, before every work, and especially before every discourse about God, we must begin with prayer, not that we might draw to ourselves that power which is everywhere and nowhere present (for He is present everywhere, because He permeates the universe, but nowhere present, since no place is worthy of His rest), but that we might rouse ourselves and unite ourselves to God by divine commemorations and invocations.

§ II. And perhaps we might here provide an explanation of why, when the celebrated Hierotheos had collected theological principles, we, as though those were not sufficient, have written other treatises, as well as this present work ^D on theology.

^A For if he had deigned to discuss these matters more minutely, we should never have fallen into such madness or foolishness as to think that we could speak more learnedly than he on divine things, and thus—by saying the same things twice—both wrong a friend and teacher, and also, as we who became his disciples after the blessed Paul, misappropriate his writings and claim them as our own. But since he spoke gravely and learnedly, and set forth his teachings in brief and summary form, urging us and other instructors of minds still untutored to explain and distinguish, as far as possible, those compendious and short narrations of his unified and most intellectual power; and since you yourself have also frequently exhorted us to do this, and have sent his book back to us: for this reason we also assign the holy Hierotheos to those who are perfect, as a teacher of perfect minds, and we esteem his words as secondary oracles, following the divine and sacred ordinances of the apostles; but we shall explain divine things to those who, like us, are imperfect, having disciples who are not unlike us, their teachers. Of what perfection is he, who feeds others with solid food, when we ourselves are also called perfect, if it has been granted to us to partake of such solid food? We were, therefore, right to say that intuition by itself, and the more manifest and unveiled understanding, and summary teaching, require mature power, whereas explanation and instruction befit those who are subordinate, like ourselves. ^B It has been our practice, therefore, not to touch upon at all those things which have been clearly and distinctly set forth by the divine Hierotheos, so as not to appear in any way to be saying the same things over again; but rather to explain in more detailed concepts those things which were stated by him in summary (for this is to be taken from elsewhere); for this is what is sought, as he added at the end of the discourse. Now, however, entering upon the praises of the man, and how and of what nature were the things praised by him at the time of the falling asleep of the holy Theotokos, he cunningly, as it were, forgot the sequence of the discourse, and says: "When those God-inspired Fathers (and we were present with them) met at the time of the falling asleep of our all-holy Lady, the Theotokos, and it pleased the holy hierarchs to praise the infinitely powerful goodness of the 'divine weakness'—that is, clearly, the voluntary condescension of God down to the flesh without sin—as each was able according to his own strength, the great Hierotheos surpassed all the hierophants, being entirely, as it were, outside the body, entirely beside himself in the hymns and praises, and experiencing communion with the things being praised, and he was judged by all, both those who knew him and those who did not, to be divinely inspired." ^C Now, he says this, that he was considered divinely inspired by all, both by those who knew him and those who did not; or, which is better—for he did not say he was known, but that he was not fully recognized; he means he was recognized by those who knew the power of the things said, but he was not fully recognized by those who were not able to grasp the height of the hymns. Thus, he appeared divinely inspired even to those who ^D

understood the things said, and from this they judged these things to be something divine and beyond the multitude, worthy only of those who were divine and of men like him. I recall, moreover, having heard parts of those hymns from you; you have such zeal for divine things that you do not consider them as a secondary matter.

§ III. And so that we may omit many things that are hidden to the multitude, and known to you, or at least known to be ^A hidden and mystical; or because they are known to you, as one existing above the multitude and being divine: we say this for the present: how, when he wished to instruct many, and as many as he could to lead to the worship of God, he surpassed most holy teachers in many ways, by whom he was celebrated as a divine Master, so that we never attempted to look directly at such a sun? It is evident that he says the things composed by him, as he said those things, adding: “For we, according to the words ‘Know thyself,’ perceive of ourselves that we are not sufficient to understand or to speak of divine things. And we are far from the habit and science of those holy men; for we would have held great caution even in not hearing or speaking of divine ^B things at all, not only regarding things of which we are ignorant, but even regarding those which we know accurately, if we were not persuaded in our own mind that it is not right to neglect the knowledge of divine things that each one can attain with divine grace; as is manifest from him who did not spend his talent.” And they also persuaded us of this, that it is good to share one's knowledge with others—the natural desires of the divine angels, who always yearn for the fitting contemplation of God; and also the ordinance of the divine Scriptures, which forbids us to inquire too curiously into things that are above us, as the Wisdom of Sirach advises: “Do not seek things that are too high for you, and do not search out things that are deeper than you” (Eccli. III, 22). But it orders us to learn what we are able, as the divine ^C Apostle commands, saying: “And the things that you have heard from me, entrust them to faithful men” (II Tim. II, 2). Persuaded by such exhortations, not losing heart regarding the discovery of divine things as far as is possible, but also not bearing to leave helpless those who are still able to reach out toward things better and higher than our own state and power, when some could, by their study and meditation upon this doctrine of ours that crawls on the ground, ascend to some higher knowledge, we were ourselves stirred up by divine aid and applied our mind to writing, not presuming to introduce or teach anything new or foreign, but by more minute inquiries explaining the things that were spoken summarily by the holy and divine man (for this is what is meant by the truly Hierotheos), and making them ^D clear to the many.

CAPUT IV. Of the Good, of Light, of the Beautiful, of Love, of Ecstasy, of Zeal; and that evil is neither an entity, nor from an entity, nor in entities.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.

^A§ I. Come, let us now proceed by our discourse to the very name of the Good, which the theologians ^B attribute to the super-divine Divinity, distinguishing it from all things, and calling its thearchic existence, as I think, Goodness itself; and because the Good, as essentially good, extends its goodness to all things that exist. For just as our sun, not by reasoning or choice, but by its very existence, illuminates all things that are capable of participating in its light, according to their own capacity; so, too, the Good, which is above the sun, as the archetype is above a dim image, ^C just by its existence, lets fall the rays of its whole goodness upon all things that exist, in proportion to each. Through these [rays], all intelligible and intellectual substances, powers, and energies have come into being; through these they exist and possess life, which is inexhaustible and undiminished, free from any corruption, death, matter, and generation, and removed from that unstable, shifting, and variably tossed-about alteration; ^D and because they are incorporeal and immaterial, they understand, and as minds they understand in a super-worldly manner, and are themselves illuminated with the reasons of existing things, and in turn, toward their own kindred, those…

^A that are their own, they ferry across the gifts that flow down to them from the Good, and have their remaining in the Goodness, and their foundation is from thence, and their coherence, and their protection, and their hearth of good things; and desiring it, they possess both being and well-being, and they are fashioned after it as far as possible, and they are good-like, and communicate to those after them, as the divine ordinance instructs.

§ II.

Hence there are for them those super-worldly orders, the unions with one another, the reciprocal indwellings, the unconfused distinctions, the powers by which the lowest are ^B led upward to the higher, the providences of the superior for the inferior, the preservations of each of their powers, and the immutable revolutions unto themselves, the same and supreme desires of the highest good, and whatever else has been spoken by us in the treatise *On the Properties and Orders of the Angels*; nay, even those things which pertain to the celestial hierarchy, such as the angelic purifications, the super-worldly illuminations, and the perfective operations of the whole angelic perfection, proceed from the all-causal and fontal Goodness, from which also the good-like form was given to them, and it was granted that they might be able to manifest the Goodness hidden in them, and that the ^C angels might be so to speak the heralds of the divine silence, and like bright lights projected to interpret what is hidden in the sanctuaries. Furthermore, after those holy and sacred minds, souls also and whatsoever are the goods of souls are through that Goodness which transcends every good; thence it comes that they are endowed with intellect, that they have substantial life, exempt from corruption, that they have a being in common with the angels, and are able to aspire to their manner of living, under whose excellent guidance they may be promoted to the highest good of all things, and may become, according to their capacity, partakers of the illuminations flowing from the same, and may receive as much of the ^D good-like allotment as they are able, and whatever else has been enumerated by us in the treatise *On the Soul*. Moreover, if one must speak also of souls devoid of reason or of animals, whatsoever cleave the air, or traverse the earth, or creep upon the ground, or lead their life in the waters, or are amphibious, or live concealed under the earth and in caverns, or whatsoever simply excel with a sentient soul and life, these certainly are all also animated and vivified through the same Goodness. Plants likewise all have their nutritive and mobile life from the same Good; finally, whatsoever substance is devoid of soul and life exists through that very Good, from which it has also obtained its substantial state.

^A If, however, it is above all things (as in truth it is), the Good itself also fashions that which is without form; and in it alone that which lacks substance is an excellence of substance; that which is devoid of life is a most preeminent life; that which is without mind is supreme wisdom; and whatsoever exists in the Good is of the supereminent formation of things without form. And, if it be permissible to say so, even that which is not is gripped by a desire for that Good which is above all things, and even strives to be, in the Good, within the truly supersubstantial, through the removal of all things.

^B

§ IV.

And what shall one say of the solar ray itself? For light proceeds from the supreme Good, and is an image of its goodness; wherefore the Good is praised by the name of Light, as the archetype is made manifest in the image. ^C For just as the goodness of the Godhead, which is beyond all things, extends from the highest and most ancient substances down to the lowest, and is yet above all, so that neither do the higher attain to its excellence, nor do the lower pass beyond its encompassing reach—but instead it illuminates all that is capable of being illuminated, and creates, gives life, sustains, perfects, and is the measure of existing things, their age, number, order, range, cause, and end—so also this great, all-brilliant, and ever-shining sun, as a faint echo ^D of the Good, illuminates all that is able to partake of it, and has its light spread out, extending its own rays to the entire visible world, both above and below. And if any of these do not partake of it, this is not due to any weakness or insufficiency in its power of shedding light, but rather to the unsuitability of those things which, through their lack of receptivity to light, do not admit the participation of light. Indeed, the ray passes over many of these that are in such a state, and illuminates what lies beyond them, and there is nothing of the visible world...

^A and there is nothing of those things which can be seen which the sun does not reach with the mighty power of its splendor. Indeed, it contributes to the generation of sensible bodies; it moves them to life, nourishes, increases, perfects, purges, and renews them. It is the measure and number of the seasons and days, and of all our time—for this is that light, even though it was then unformed, which the divine Moses said distinguished that first three-day period of our days. And just as the Goodness turns all things toward itself and is the gatherer-in-chief of those things that are scattered, as a unifying divinity and principle of unity, and as all things desire it as their principle, as their bond, and as their end; and it is the Good (as Sacred Scripture testifies) from which all things have originated, and by which they have been produced as if from the most perfect cause, and in which all things subsist, as if kept and contained in a bottomless storehouse; and toward which all things turn as to their own end, and which all things desire—the intellectual and rational things knowingly, the sensible things sensibly, those things without sense by the innate motion of vital appetite, and those things that lack life but merely exist, by a certain tendency toward the mere participation of essence. ^B By the same logic of this manifest image, the light also gathers and turns toward itself all the things that exist: the things that view, the things that move, the things that are illuminated, the things that grow warm, and all that are held together by its beams. Hence it has the name "sun" [ἥλιος], because it makes all things "gathered" [ἀολλῆ], that is, it keeps all things safe and gathers the scattered. And all things that have the power to perceive desire it, either in order to see, or to be moved, and to be illuminated, and to grow warm, and finally to be contained and preserved by the light. I do not say this—as antiquity imagined—that the sun is God and the author of the universe who strictly governs this world that we see, but rather that the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, ^C as is His eternal power and divinity.

§ V.

Of these matters, truly, within symbolic theology.

^A as if the light were tasted and the eyes now, after the tasting, more eagerly desire the light, it imparts itself more and shines more copiously; because they have loved much; and it is always leading them further onward, in proportion to their zeal for looking upward.

§ VI. Light, therefore, is the name given to that Good which is above every light, as a primordial ray and an overflowing outpouring of light, illuminating from its own fullness every mind that is above the world, around the world, and in the world; and renewing ^B all their intelligent faculties, containing all things by extending itself above all, and excelling all by standing above all; and simply gathering together and making unitary every principle of illumination, as the prince of light, possessing in itself both what is above light and what is within it, and both what it has and what it pre-possesses, gathering and coupling into one all things that possess reason and mind. For just as ignorance is divisive of those who are led astray, so the presence of the intelligible light is for those who are illuminated a source of gathering and union, and a source of perfection; and furthermore, it is a turning back toward that which truly is, recalling them from many opinions, and contracting various perspectives—or, to speak more correctly, fantasies—into one true, pure, and uniform knowledge, and filling them with a single and unifying light.

§ VII. This Good is also praised by the sacred theologians as ^C beautiful and as beauty, and as love and as beloved, and by whatever other fair divine names designate the beautiful and beauty-making gracefulness. But the beautiful and beauty must be distinguished in the Cause which has embraced all things in one; for while we divide these things in all beings by distinguishing participations and participants, we say that that which partakes of beauty is beautiful, while beauty itself is the participation of the Cause that makes all things beautiful. But the superessential Beautiful is called ^D Beauty because of that beauty which it communicates to all things as a gift proper to each according to its measure, in that it is the cause of all beauty and grace, as it breathes out, in the manner of light, the beauty-making distributions of its primordial ray unto all things, and calls all things unto itself (whence it is also called *beauty*), and gathers all things into itself, as wholes in wholes. It is called Beautiful as being altogether beautiful and more than beautiful, and as always existing, beautiful in the same ways and in the same manner, neither coming to be nor passing away, neither increasing nor waning, neither beautiful in one respect and ugly in another, nor at one time and not at another, nor beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another; nor here, and not there.

^A It is, rather, as something beautiful in itself and with itself, always being uniformly beautiful, and as the original fountain of all beauty, pre-eminently anticipating and possessing within itself the beauty of everything. For in the simple and supernatural nature of all beautiful things, every beauty and every beautiful thing pre-exists unitarily as a cause. From this very beauty comes the existence for all things that are, so that each is beautiful according to its own rationale; and because of the beautiful there are all correspondences, friendships, and communions; and by the beautiful all things are united; and the beautiful is the beginning of all things as the efficient cause, and that which moves the whole and holds it together by the love of its own beauty; and it is the end of all things and that which is desired as the final cause (for all things are done for the sake of the beautiful); and it is the exemplary cause, because according to it all things are defined. Wherefore the beautiful is the same as the good, since all things in every respect desire the beautiful and the good; and there is nothing in the nature of things that does not participate in the beautiful and the good. The argument will even dare to say this: that even that which is not participates in the beautiful and the good—for then it is itself beautiful and good when it is hymned in God, according to the removal of all things, superessentially. ^B This one good and beautiful is, in a unitary way, the cause of all the many beautiful and good things. From it proceed the essential existences of all things, the unions, the distinctions, the identities, the differences, the likenesses, the unlikenesses, the communions of contraries, the non-minglings of things united, the providences of superior beings, the mutual interconnections of things of the same rank, the turnings of those that are lower, the preservative and immovable resting-places and foundations of all things and of themselves. And again, the communions of all things in all things according to the propriety of each, the correspondences, the unconfused friendships, the harmonies of the whole, the mixtures in the whole, ^C and the indissoluble hold of beings, the uninterrupted successions of things that come to be, all the restings and motions of minds, of souls, of bodies; for rest and motion for all things belong to that which exists above all rest and every motion, which fixes each thing in its own rationale and directs it to its own proper motion.

§ VIII.

Finally, divine minds are said to be moved ^D circularly, indeed, while they are united to the splendors of the beautiful and the good that are without beginning and without end; and linearly, when they proceed to the providence of those that are lower, directing all things straightly; and helically, because even while they provide for those that are lower, they remain unmoved

^A in identity around the cause of identity, that which is good and beautiful, dancing perpetually around it.

§ IX. The motion of the soul is, first, circular—that is, its entry into itself ^B from things without, and the unified turning-in of its intellectual powers, granting it a motion fixed and free from all error, as if in a circle; it turns it back from many external things and gathers it, first into itself, and then, having become like a unity, joins it to the powers that are unified in a single manner, and thus leads it to the Good and the Beautiful, which is above all things that are, and is one and the same, and without beginning and without end. The soul moves in a helical fashion in as much as it is illuminated with divine knowledge in a way proper to itself, not intellectually and unitarily, but logically and discursively, and by what one might call mixed and transient acts. It moves straightly when it does not enter into itself and move with a unified intellectuality (for this, as I have said, is the circular motion), but proceeds to things around it, and from external things, as if from various and manifold symbols, is led back to simple and unified contemplations.

§ X. Of these three motions, then, as also of those of sensible things in this universe—and by far prior to these, of the stability and fixity of each—the cause, and the conservation, and the end, is the Good and the Beautiful, which is ^C above all stability and motion; therefore, it is the cause of all stability and motion, that from which, and in which, and to which, and for the sake of which [they exist]. For indeed from it, and through it, are all substance and all life, whether of intellect or soul, and [all] of the whole of nature: the smallnesses, the equalities, the greatnesses, all measures, and the proportions, and harmonies, and mixtures of things that are, the wholes, the parts, every "one" and "multitude," the connections of parts, the unifications of every multitude, the perfections of wholes, the quality, the quantity, the size, the infinite, the comparisons, the distinctions, every infinity, every limit, all definitions, all orders, all excellences, the elements, the forms, all substance, all power, all activity, ^D all habit, all sensation, all reason, all intelligence, all contact, all science, all union; and, simply, everything that exists from the Beautiful and Good, and is in the Beautiful and Good, and is turned back to the Beautiful and Good; and all things whatsoever that are and come to be, exist and come to be for the sake of the Beautiful and Good, and all things look to it, and are moved and held together by it; and for its sake, and through it, and in it is every principle—exemplary, final, productive, formal, elemental—and, simply, every principle, every coherence, every limit—or, to sum it up, all things...

that are exist from the Beautiful and Good, and all things that are not exist hyper-substantially in the Beautiful and Good; and It is the principle and end of all things, being super-original and super-perfect. ^A Since "from Him, and through Him, and in Him, and to Him are all things," as the sacred Word says. Therefore, the Beautiful and Good is desirable, lovable, and beloved to all things; it is because of It and for the sake of It that things of a lower order love the higher ones by converting themselves toward them; that things of the same order love their equals by communion; that the greater love the lesser by providing for them; and that each loves itself by preserving itself. And all things, in seeking the Beautiful and Good, do and desire whatever they do and desire. Indeed, we may truly dare to say even this: that He who is the Cause of all things, by the excellence of His goodness, loves all things, makes all things, perfects all things, contains all things, and converts all things to Himself; and the divine love is good because of the Good. For that divine love itself, which works goodness in the things that are, because it pre-existed in the Good super-eminently, did not allow itself to remain in itself without fruit, but rather moved Itself to act according to the excellence of Its power, which is the producer of all things. ^B

§ XI.

Nor let anyone think that we celebrate the name of "love" contrary to the authority of Scripture. For it is alien to reason, in my opinion, and absurd, ^C not to attend to the power of the matter itself, but to the words. And this is not characteristic of those who wish to understand divine things, but of those who catch at hollow sounds and admit them only superficially to their ears, and do not wish to know what such a term signifies, and how it ought to be explained by other equivalent and more expressive words; but they are addicted to elements and lines that cannot be understood, to syllables and unknown words which do not strike their intellect in the least, but buzz around their lips and ears, as if it were not permitted to signify the number four by "twice two," or straight lines by "rectilinear" ones, or "mother" by "patriarchal," or anything else by that which is equivalent in many parts of speech. For right reason teaches that we use elements, syllables, words, writings, and terms on account of the senses, so that when our soul is carried by the faculties of intellect toward things perceived by the intellect, then the senses together with the sensibles are applied in vain; just as the powers of intellect, when the soul has already become deiform through an unknown union, ^D cast themselves like darting rays into the rays of the inaccessible light, with blindness as their target. But when the mind, through sensible things, strives to be excited toward those contemplative intelligences, [the senses are added as…]

in any case, more precious than the clearest words and visions; for when those things which are the objects of the senses are not at all clear, then indeed the senses cannot properly offer sensible objects to the mind. But that we may not seem to say these things while misrepresenting the divine scriptures, let those who reproach the name of "love" listen to them. "Love her," he says, "and she will keep you; surround her, and she will exalt you; honor her, so that she may embrace you," and all the other things that are celebrated according to the sacred theologies.

§ XII.

Yet it has seemed to some of our own theologians ^B that the name of "love" is more divine than that of "charity." For the divine Ignatius writes: "My love has been crucified." And in the introductions to the scriptures you will find someone saying concerning Divine Wisdom: "I became a lover of her beauty." Therefore, let us not fear this name of "love," nor let any discourse about it disturb or frighten us. For it seems to me that the theologians considered the name of "charity" and "love" to be common, but that they attributed "love" ^C more particularly to divine things, because of the absurd preconception that such men have. For although the true "love" is praised not only by us but by the scriptures themselves, as befits God, the multitude of men, not having grasped that unified essence which the divine name of "love" signifies, has slid down, in a manner appropriate to themselves, toward a divisible, corporeal, and fragmented affection, which is not true love, but an image, or rather a falling away from true love. For the multitude cannot, by ^D thought, grasp that singular, divine, and one love; wherefore, as a name that to the vulgar seems harsher, it is placed in Divine Wisdom, so that the multitude may be elevated and raised to the knowledge of true love, and be freed from the indecency which they conceive to be in it; and in us, in turn, where frequently men attached to the earth might think something absurd, a name that seems more honorable is placed. "Your love," says someone, "fell upon me, like the love of women." For those who rightly listen to divine things, the name of "charity" and "love" are placed by the sacred theologians according to the same power, corresponding to divine manifestations. And this is a power that is unifying, collective, and excellently tempering in the Beautiful and the Good, because it pre-exists in the Beautiful and the Good on account of the Beautiful and the Good, and proceeds from the Beautiful and the Good, for the sake of the Beautiful and the Good; it maintains equals by a mutual connection, moves the superior to the providence of the inferior, and finally inserts the inferior into the superior through a certain conversion.

^A There is, moreover, a divine ecstatic love, which does not allow its lovers to be their own, but [lets them belong] to those whom they love. This is declared by those superior things that are done for the providence of inferior things; by things of the same genus, through their mutual coherence; and by inferior things, through a more divine conversion toward superior things. Hence also the great Paul, having been seized by this divine love and having become a partaker of its ecstatic power, says with a God-inspired mouth: *I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me* ["]; acting as a true lover and one who has "exceeded," as he himself says, unto God, no longer living his own life, but the life of the Beloved, as one deemed most highly worthy of love. We must have the courage to say this too for the sake of the truth: that the Author of all things himself, because of the beautiful and good love of all things—by reason of the supreme excellence of his amatory goodness—goes out of himself in his providences for all things; and he is, as it were, charmed and delighted by goodness, affection, and love. And although he is above all things and exempt from all, he is ^B brought down to all things according to his suprasubstantial power, which goes forth without departing from itself. For this reason, those who are skilled in divine matters call him a "zealot," because he is held by a great and benign love for things, and he provokes them to the zeal of his own amatory desire, and thus he himself in a certain way manifests as a zealot, in that the desirable things are worthy of his zeal, and he is affected with zeal for the things for which he provides. In short, whatever is lovable and is love is altogether beautiful and good, is pre-established in the Beautiful and the Good, and exists and comes to be because of the Beautiful and the Good.

§ XIV.

What, then, do the theologians ultimately wish to signify when they sometimes call God "Love" and "Affection," and at other times "Lovable" and "Beloved"? Of the former (namely, love and affection), he is the Author, and, as it were, the producer and generator; but of the latter (that is, the lovable and the beloved), he himself is [the reality]. By the former (that is, by love and affection) he is moved, but by the latter (that is, as lovable and beloved) he moves; because he brings himself to himself, and brings [things] to himself, and moves [them]. In this way, they call him "Beloved" and "Lovable" as being the Beautiful and the Good; but they call him "Love" and "Affection" again as being a motive power ^C and one leading upward to himself, who alone is the Beautiful and the Good in himself and by himself, and as being a manifestation of himself through himself, and a benign procession of that surpassing union, and an amatory motion—simple, self-moving, self-acting, pre-existing in the Good, and overflowing from the Good to the things that are, and again returning to the Good. In this matter, both the end and ^D the beginning, the divine Love manifests itself differently, as a kind of eternal circle, through the Good, from the Good, and in the Good, and to the Good, revolving in an unerring revolution, and in the same, and according to the

same, and proceeding always, and remaining, and returning. Our own illustrious initiator into sacred things, moved by the divine Spirit, set this forth in his hymns of love, which it will not be inappropriate to call to mind, and to place like a sacred crown upon our discourse on love.

The words of the most holy Hierotheos from the hymns of love.

Let us conceive of love, whether we call it divine, or angelic, or intellectual, or psychic, or natural, as a certain unitive and combining power, moving the ^B superior to provide for the inferior, those of the same rank to mutual communication, and finally the inferior to the turning back toward those that are better and superior.

From the same, from the same hymns of love.

Since we have ordered the many loves from the one, and have set forth, one after another, what are the notions and powers of worldly and super-worldly loves, whereby the orders and arrangements of intellectual and intelligible loves excel, according to the stated scope of our discourse, after whom stand ^C those self-intellective and divine loves which are over the truly beautiful things that are there, and which have been fittingly celebrated by us; now, again, taking them all back into the one and contracted love, and the father of them all, let us fold them together and gather them from the many, first compressing into two their general amorous powers, over which presides and takes precedence, in every way, the incomprehensible Cause of all love, which is superior to all, and to which, as each of the beings is able, the total love of all beings is extended.

From the same, from the same hymns of love.

Come now, and having ^D gathered these things again into one, let us say that there is one simple power, self-moving, toward a certain unitive mixing from the Good down to the last of the things that exist, and from it again, in sequence, through all things to the Good, turning itself about itself, and through itself, and in itself, and always revolving in the same way back to itself.

§ XVIII.

But someone might object: If the beautiful and the Good is loved and desired and cherished by all (for it is sought after

^A by itself, and non-being as well, as has been said, and it contends in a way to be in it—since it is that which bestows form upon things lacking form, and in it even that which is not is spoken of as being and exists in a supra-essential way), how is it that the host of demons does not desire this beautiful and good, but, being attached to matter and having fallen away from the angelic stability they once held in the desire for the Good, becomes the cause of all evils both for itself and for others, as many as are said to be corrupted? Or how is it that the demonic race, produced from the wholly Good, lacks the form of the Good? Or how has the good, once produced from the Good, been changed? And what is it that corrupted it, and what in general is evil? And from what principle did it arise, and in which of the things that are does it exist? And how did the Good wish to produce it? Or how, having willed it, was it able to? And if evil exists from another cause, what is there other than the Good that is a cause for existing things? And how, with Providence existing, is there evil, whether it came into being at all or was not completely removed? And how is it that any of the things that are desire it rather than the Good?

§ XIX. Perhaps such a person, being ignorant of these matters, might raise these questions; but we will ask him to look to the truth of things, and first of all we shall confidently declare this: Evil is not from the Good; and if it is from the Good, it is not evil; for it is no more characteristic of fire to cool than it is of the Good to produce non-goods. And if all existing things are from the Good (for it is the nature of the Good to produce and preserve, while it is that of evil to corrupt and destroy), nothing of those things that are exists from evil; and evil itself shall not even be, if it were evil even for itself. ^C But if this is not the case, evil will not be entirely evil, but it has some share of the Good, according to which it exists at all. And if things that are desire the beautiful and the Good, and whatever they do, they do for the sake of what seems good, and every aim of existing things has the Good as its beginning and end (for no one, looking to the nature of evil, does what he does), how will evil be among existing things, or how could it exist at all, being deprived of such desire for the Good? Indeed, if all things are from the Good, and the Good is beyond the things themselves, that which is not is already in the Good, but evil is by no means so; otherwise it is simply not evil, nor is it that which is not; for nothing will be that which is wholly non-existent, unless it be said to be in the Good according to a certain supra-essential mode. The Good, therefore, will be established ^D as prior to and superior to both that which simply is and that which is not. Evil, however, is not in those things that are, nor in those that are not, but is even more remote from the Good than non-being, as something alien and less existent. From where, then, is evil? someone might say. For if evil does not exist, then virtue and vice are the same thing, and the whole and the part are analogous; or perhaps even that which fights against virtue is not in itself

^A evil. Yet temperance and intemperance, and justice and injustice, are opposites. And I do not mean this merely in terms of the righteous and the unrighteous person, or the temperate and the intemperate; for even before the outward difference between the virtuous and the opposing person manifests itself, the vices in the soul itself differ from the virtues, and the passions rebel against reason. From this, it is necessary to grant that there is something in opposition to the Good. For the Good is not opposed to itself; rather, as proceeding from one source and one cause, it delights in communion, unity, and friendship. Nor is the lesser good opposed to the greater; for even that which is less warm or cold is not opposed to that which is more so. Therefore, there is in the realm of existing things that which exists, and is set against and is ^B opposed to the Good, namely evil. And if it is a corruption of existing things, this does not cast evil out of existence; rather, it will itself also be something existing and a generator of beings. Or does not the corruption of one thing often become the generation of another? And evil will contribute to the completion of the whole, and by itself provide that the totality is not imperfect.

§ XX. To these points, true reason will answer that evil, as evil, produces no essence or generation, but only spoils and corrupts the subsistence of existing things that are subject to it. But if someone says that it is a generator and, by its own corruption, grants generation to another, we must respond truly: it is not as corruption that it ^C grants generation; rather, in that it is corruption and evil, it only destroys and spoils, while generation and essence come to be through the Good. Thus, evil will be corruption of itself, but a generator of things through the Good; and while as evil it is neither existing nor a producer of existing things, yet because of the Good it is both existing, and is a good thing, and is a producer of goods. Nay, more: the same thing cannot, in the same respect, be both good and evil, nor can the same power, in the same respect, be both corruption and generation—nor can there be self-power or self-corruption. That which is evil-in-itself is neither existing, nor good, nor a generator, nor a producer of existing and good things. But the Good, in those things in which it fully dwells, ^D makes them perfect, unmixed, and whole goods; those which partake of it in a lesser degree are imperfect goods and are mixed because of the privation of the Good. And evil is not, in any sense, either good or good-making; rather, that which approaches the Good more or less will be good in proportion. For the complete goodness which passes through all things does not extend only to the all-good essences around it, but reaches even to the lowest things, being present in some wholly, in others more weakly, and in others in the lowest degree, as each is able to partake of it.

^A And some things partake of the Good in every way, others more or less deprived, others have a dimmer participation of the Good, and to others the Good is present as a final echo. For if the Good were not present to each in proportion, the most divine and venerable things would have the rank of the lowest things. Furthermore, how would it be possible for all things to partake of the Good uniformly, when not all are suited for its total participation? But now, this is the pre-eminent magnitude of the power of the Good, that it empowers even those things which are deprived of it, and even their own privation, so that they may partake of it at all. ^B And if one must speak the truth boldly, even those things which are opposed to it exist and can oppose it through its power; or rather, to summarize, all things that exist, in so far as they exist, are both good and from the Good; but in so far as they are deprived of the Good, they are neither good nor do they exist. For in the case of other qualities, such as heat or cold, things that have been heated can continue to exist after the heat has left them, and many things that exist are bereft of life and mind—indeed, God is set apart from substance and exists [supra-substantially]. And, simply speaking, in all other things, whether a habit has been lost or was never present at all, the things themselves still exist and can endure; but that which is utterly deprived of the Good has not been, nor is it, nor will it be, nor can it exist, in any way whatsoever. For instance, the intemperate man, even if he is deprived of the Good according to ^C his irrational desire, in that respect he neither exists nor desires anything that exists, yet he still partakes of the Good according to that dim echo of unity and friendship. And even anger partakes of the Good by the very fact that it is moved, and desires to direct and turn what seem to be evils toward that which appears to be a good. Indeed, even he who seeks the worst life, as one who desires life at all, and one that is in his own view the best, by that very desire—as a desire for life, and one looking toward a best life—partakes of the Good. And if you were to remove the Good entirely, there would be neither essence, nor life, nor desire, nor motion, nor anything else. Thus, even the fact that generation comes from corruption is not a power of evil, but the presence of a lesser good, just as disease is indeed a defect of constitution, but not of the whole; for ^D if that were to happen, the disease itself would not subsist, but the disease remains and exists, possessing being in the least degree of order, and subsisting therein. For that which is totally devoid of the Good is neither existent nor among those things that exist; but that which is mixed, by reason of the Good in those things that exist, is, in this respect, among those things that exist and is existent, in so far as it partakes of the Good. Or rather, all existing things will be more or less so, in so far as they partake of the Good; for even in the case of the claim that something does not exist at all, it will not exist. But as for that which is partly existing and partly not existing, in so far as it has fallen away...

^A total lack of constitution, the disease itself does not subsist; the disease, however, remains and exists, in so far as it has a state and a minimal constitution, in which it somehow coheres. For that which is destitute of all good, neither is anything, nor does it exist among those things that are; but that which is mixed, exists in things on account of the good, and exists and is in things in so far as it partakes of the good. Indeed, all things that are will be more or less so in proportion to their access to the communion of the good; for as far as the state itself is concerned, if it were not to exist anywhere at all, it would not exist even at all. But that which is in part good and in part not good, in so far as it has deviated from that which always is, is not; but in so far as it is a participant in a state, to that extent it exists, and the state as well as the privation of its state is both maintained and preserved. Evil, too, which has failed of the good in every respect, will not be among those things which are more or less good. But that which is in part good and in part not good is opposed to some good, but not to the whole Good, and is therefore held by some communion of the Good; and in this way the Good gives a state even to its own privation through its own communication; for if the Good were entirely exterminated, there would be neither anything good at all, nor mixed, nor evil itself. For if evil is a certain imperfect good, then on account of the total absence of the Good, it would be as absent as the perfect good; and then only will evil exist and appear when it is evil to some, to whom it is contrary, while it is separated from others as being good. For the same things cannot contradict one another in all respects and according to the same things. Evil, therefore, is not anything.

XXI

^C But evil is not even in things that are. For if all things that are are from the Good, and the Good is in all things that are, and contains all things, evil will either not be in things that are, or it will be in the Good; but it certainly will not be in the Good (for neither is there cold in fire), nor will that which even makes evil good be able to be depraved. But if it is [in the Good], how will evil be in the Good? If indeed it is from it, that is absurd and impossible: for it cannot (as the truth of the Scriptures testifies) bring forth evil fruits, nor conversely. If it is not from it, it is clear that it has proceeded from another principle and cause; for either evil will be from the Good, or the Good from evil; or if that is not possible, both the Good and evil will exist from another principle and cause. For no duality is a principle, but a unity will be the principle of every duality. And yet it is absurd for two things that are absolutely contrary to proceed from one and the same [principle] and to exist, and for the principle itself to be not simple and unified, but divided and double, and contrary and repugnant to itself. Nor, indeed, is it possible for there to be two contrary principles of things, which are in one another and in the universe, and are fighting; for if this were granted, even God Himself would not be unscathed nor free from distress, if indeed there were something that offended Him; then all things would be unordered ^D and always fighting; and yet the Good imparts friendship to all things that are, and is self-peace, and

is praised by the holy theologians as the Giver of Peace. ^A Thus, all good things are friendly and consonant with one another, as if propagated from one life, and coordinated toward one good, peaceful, similar, and conversable among themselves; therefore, there is no evil in God, nor is evil anything divine. But neither is evil from God; for He is either not good, or He does good and produces good things; and this is not done sometimes and to some things, and at other times not, nor only to some—for in that case, movement and alteration would fall upon Him, and that too regarding the most divine thing of all, which is the Cause. But if the Good in God is His very substance, if God were to be changed from the Good, He would at one time be and at another time not be. And if He possesses the Good by participation, He would possess it from another, and would at one time possess it and at another time not possess it. Therefore, evil is not from God, nor in God, neither in an absolute sense, nor at a specific time.

§ XXII.

^B But neither is there evil in angels. For if the godlike angel announces the divine goodness, being that very thing secondarily by participation which is what is primarily announced by cause, the angel is certainly an image of God, a manifestation of the hidden light, a mirror pure, most clear, integer, immaculate, unstained, receiving in itself (if it is lawful to say so) the whole beauty of the good-formed deiformity, and clearly (as far as is possible) making the goodness of that most secret silence shine forth in itself; therefore, there is not even evil in angels, though because they punish those who sin, they are thought to be evil. By the same reasoning, then, the correctors of delinquents would be ^C evil, as would the priests who restrain the profane from divine mysteries. Yet it is not an evil thing to be punished, but to have become worthy of punishment; nor is it an evil thing to be restrained from sacred things in accordance with desert, but to have become defiled and unholy, and unfit for the most sacred mysteries.

§ XXIII.

But neither are demons evil by their nature; for if they were evil by nature, they would not be from the Good, nor would they exist in the nature of things, nor, if they were always evil by nature, would they have changed from being good. Furthermore, are they evil to themselves or to others? If to themselves, they also destroy themselves; but if to others, how do they destroy them, or what do they destroy? Their essence, their power, or their action? If their essence, ^D first of all, they do not do this contrary to nature; for they do not destroy those things which by nature cannot perish, but those things which are subject to corruption. Furthermore, not even that is evil in and of itself in all respects; nor does anything that exists perish insofar as it is essence and nature, but the principle of harmony and proportion is weakened by the defect of the natural order, while it is in the same state

that it ought to remain. Moreover, weakness is not something perfect; for if it were entirely perfect, it would remove both the corruption itself and its subject from the midst, and such a corruption would be the destruction of its own self, and therefore, as such, it would not be an evil, but a deficient good; for that which is entirely void of the good will not even exist at all, and the same reasoning applies to the corruption of power and action.

Furthermore, how are the demons, who were produced by God, evil? For the Good draws forth and establishes good things. Yet someone might say that they are called evil, ^A but not by reason of what they are (for they are from the Good, and have received a good essence), but by reason of what they are not, having grown weak (as the Oracles say) in keeping their own principality. For in what, I ask you, do we say the demons are depraved, if not in the cessation of the habit and energy of divine goods? Otherwise, if demons were evil by nature, they would have been always evil; but evil is unstable. Therefore, if they are always in the same state, they are not evil; for to be always the same is a property of the Good. But if they are not always evil, they are not evil by nature, but by the lack of angelic goods. ^B And they are not entirely void of the good, insofar as they are, and live, and think, and there is in them, in general, some movement of desire; but they are called evil in that they are weak in their activity according to nature. Therefore, evil for them is a turning aside, a departure from what is proper to them, and a failure, an imperfection, and an incapacity, and a weakness and avoidance and falling away from the power that preserves their perfection.

Furthermore, what is the evil in demons? An irrational anger, a mindless desire, a reckless imagination. But these, even if they are in demons, are not in all of them, nor are they entirely evil in themselves. For in other animals, it is not the possession of these things, but the destruction and corruption of these that is the evil of the animal; but the possession of them preserves and makes the nature of the animal that has them to be what it is. The demonic class ^C is not, therefore, evil insofar as it is according to nature, but insofar as it is not. And the whole good given to them has not been altered, but they themselves have fallen away from the whole good that was given. And as for the angelic gifts given to them, we do not say that they are ever changed; but they are both whole and all-luminous, even if they themselves do not see them, having closed their eyes—the powers that gaze upon the good. Hence, insofar as they are, they are also from the Good, and are good, and desire the beautiful and the good, in that they desire to be, and to live, and to know, and to participate in the things that are; and by the deprivation, and avoidance, ^D and falling away from the goods proper to them, they are called evil; and they are evil insofar as they are not; and in desiring that which is not, they desire the evil.

§ XXIV. But would anyone say that souls are evil? If it is because they provide for the evil in a providential and saving manner,

^A this is not evil, but good, and from the Good, and the one who makes even evil good. But if we say that souls are depraved, in what are they depraved, if not in the lack of good habits and actions, and through their own weakness in failing to reach their goal and slipping? For we say that the air ^B around us is darkened by the lack and absence of light, whereas light itself is always light, which even illuminates the darkness. Therefore, evil is not in demons, nor in us, as if it were some thing, but as a deficiency and privation of the perfection of their own proper goods.

§ XXV. But neither is there evil in brute animals. ^B For if you were to remove anger, and desire, and the other things that are mentioned—but which are not simply evil by their own nature—the lion, having lost its strength and pride, would cease to be a lion; likewise, if a dog becomes gentle toward all, it would not be a dog, since it is the nature of a dog to keep watch, and to admit those who belong to the house while repelling outsiders. Thus, the incorruptibility of nature is not evil at all, but its corruption, imbecility, and the falling away from both natural affections and actions and virtues. And if all things that come into being through generation have their perfection in time, then imperfection will no longer exist in the universal nature.

§ XXVI. But neither is there evil in nature as a whole. ^C For if all natural reasons are from the universal nature, nothing is contrary to it; but for the individual nature, one thing will be according to nature, and another will not be according to nature. For one thing is contrary to nature in one case, and what is natural for this is contrary to nature for that. The vice of nature, however, is that which is contrary to nature, and which deprives it of its natural properties. Thus, nature is not evil; but this is the evil of nature: that it is rendered powerless to fulfill those things which are proper to nature.

§ XXVII. But neither is there evil in bodies. ^D For ugliness and disease are a certain defect of form and a privation of order; but this is not altogether evil, but rather less beautiful; for if there were a complete dissolution of beauty, and form, and order, the body itself would also perish. Furthermore, that the body is not the cause of malice to the soul is evident from the fact that malice can adhere to someone even without a body, as is apparent in demons; for it is the same evil for spirits, and for souls, and for bodies—the weakness and falling away from the state of their own proper goods.

^A But neither is that trite argument valid: "In matter there is evil," as they say, "insofar as it is matter." For it also is a participant in beauty, in order, and in form. But if, being apart from these, matter by its own nature possesses no quality and no form, how can matter produce anything, when it does not even possess the capacity to be acted upon by itself? Furthermore, how is matter evil? For if it is in no way and nowhere—that is, if it does not exist—then it is neither good nor evil. But if it exists in some way, and all things that exist are from the Good, then it too would be from the Good. And thus either the Good would be the maker of evil, or evil, as being from the Good, would be good; or evil would be the maker of the Good, or the Good, as being from evil, would be evil. Or else, there are two principles, and these again depend upon one other, single head. But if they argue that matter is necessary for the completion of the whole universe, how is it that matter is evil? For it is one thing for a thing to be evil, and another for it to be necessary. And how does the Good produce anything from evil? Or how can that which is necessary to the Good be evil? For evil flees the nature of the Good. Moreover, how does matter generate and nourish nature if it is evil? For evil, insofar as it is evil, is neither generative, nor nourishing, nor in any way productive or preservative. And if they say that it does not itself produce evil in souls, but drags them towards it, how can this be true? For many of them look toward the Good. And yet, how could this happen if matter entirely drags them towards evil? Thus, evil in souls is not from matter, but from an unordered and errant movement. But if they say that this also necessarily follows from matter, and that unstable matter is necessary for those who cannot stand of themselves, how is it that evil is necessary, or that which is necessary is evil?

^C But neither do we say that privation, by its own power, opposes the Good. For a total privation is entirely powerless; but partial privation has power—not in that it is a privation, but in that it is not a total privation. For if there is a partial privation of the Good, it is not yet evil; and if it has come to be, even the nature of evil has passed away.

[XXX] To state the matter succinctly: the Good exists from the one and whole Cause, but evil exists from many and partial deficiencies. God knows evil as good, and with Him the causes of evils are beneficent powers. But if evil is eternal, and creates, and has power, and is, and acts, whence does it have these things? Or—

from the Good? Or does evil come from the Good? Or do both come from some ^A other cause? Everything that is according to nature is born of a definite cause; but if evil is without cause and without definition, it is not according to nature; for there is nothing in the nature of things that is contrary to nature, nor is there any rational principle of lack of skill in art. Is the soul, then, the cause of evils, just as fire is of heat, and does it fill with malice all things to which it approaches? Or is the nature of the soul good, but in its actions it behaves sometimes in one way and sometimes in another? If even its state is evil by nature, whence did it have its state? Is it from the good cause which is the producer of all things that exist? But if it is from this, how is it evil according to essence? For all its effects are good. If it is through its actions, not even this is immutable; if it were not, whence would the virtues come, unless it had been made good-formed? It remains, therefore, that evil is a certain weakness and a defection from the Good. ^B

§ XXXI.

The cause of good things is one. If evil is contrary to the good, the causes of evils are many; yet the reasons and faculties of evils are not efficient, but they are impotence, and infirmity, and an incongruous mixing of dissimilar things. Nor are evils immutable, nor do they always exist in the same way, but they are infinite and indeterminate, wandering in different ways in different things, and in these infinite ones. The beginning and the end of all evils, too, will be the good; for all things, both those which are good and those which are contrary, are for the sake of the good; for we perform even these desiring the good (for no one ^C acts with a view to evil in what he does; wherefore evil has no subsistence, but an accidental derivation, being brought about for the sake of the good and not of itself).

§ XXXII.

To evil, being must be attributed by accident, and for the sake of something else, and not from its own proper principle; so that what is happening seems indeed to be right, because it is done for the sake of the good, but in reality it is not right, because we suppose that to be good which is not good. It has been shown that what is sought is another thing, and what is done is another. Evil, therefore, deviates ^D from the way, beyond intention, beyond nature, beyond cause, beyond principle, beyond the end, outside the limit, outside the will, outside substance. Evil is therefore a privation, and a defect, and an infirmity, and an incongruity, and an error, and a frustration of the goal, of beauty, of life, of intellect, of reason, of perfection, of foundation, of cause; it is indeterminate, sterile, inactive, weak, confused, dissimilar, infinite, dark, lacking in state, and itself in no way, and nowhere, and is nothing. How, therefore, can evil, in its mixture with the good—

^A be anything at all, or be capable of anything? For if the good is being, and desirable, and powerful, and active, how could that which is contrary to the good—being deprived of essence, and will, and power, and operation—be able to do anything? Not everything is evil to all men, nor in every way, nor according to the same thing. To the demon, it is evil that it has turned away from the good mind; to the soul, that it is contrary to reason; to the body, that it is contrary to nature.

§ XXXIII.

How can evils exist at all if Providence exists? Evil, as evil, is neither a thing, nor does it exist among things that are. Nor does anything that exists escape Providence; for there is no evil that is not mingled with the good. And if nothing that exists is devoid of the good, and evil is a deficiency of the good, and nothing that exists is totally deprived of the good, then divine Providence is present in all existing things, and no existing thing ^B escapes Providence. Indeed, Providence even employs those who have become evil, for their own or others' private or common benefit, and provides for each of the things that exist in a manner appropriate to it. Therefore, we do not accept the careless argument of the many ^C who say that Providence ought to compel us toward virtue even against our will; for to destroy nature is not the work of Providence. Rather, as Providence that preserves the nature of each, it provides for those that are self-moved as self-moved, and provides for the whole and the individual in a manner appropriate to the whole and the individual, to the extent that the nature of those provided for is capable of receiving the benefits of a universal and all-encompassing Providence, which are bestowed upon each in proportion to its capacity.

§ XXXIV.

Evil, therefore, is not a thing, nor does evil exist among existing things. For evil is nowhere, as evil; and that evil comes to be is not from power, but from weakness. And for the demons, that which they are is from the good, and is good; but the evil for them arises from the falling away from their proper goods, and is a change of their state and the habitus, and a weakness of the angelic perfection ^D that belongs to them. They desire the good, in that they desire to be, and to live, and to understand; and in that they do not desire the good, they desire what is not; and this is not a desire, but a deficiency of true desire.

§ XXXV.

The Scriptures call those who sin in knowledge those who, regarding the unknowable knowledge of the good, or its performance

are weak, and those who know the will, yet do not act; those who have heard, yet are weak in faith or in the performance of the good. For some, to understand [the way] to become good is involuntary, according to a turning away or a weakness of the will. And, in short, evil, as we have often said, is a weakness, an inability, and a deficiency, whether of knowledge, or of true knowledge, or of faith, ^A or of desire, or of the performance of the good. Yet someone might say: "Weakness is not punishable; on the contrary, it is pardonable; if the ability were not granted, the account would be correct; but if the ability comes from the Good, who gives to all alike, according to the Oracles, what is proper, then the sin, the turning away, the avoidance, and the falling away from the possession of one’s own good things, which comes from the Good, is not laudable." But let these things be sufficiently stated by us, to the best of our ability, in the treatise *On the Just and Divine Judgment*, in which holy treatise the truth of the Oracles has refuted as irrational the sophistic arguments of those who assert injustice and falsehood against God.

But now, as far as we are concerned, the Good has been sufficiently hymned, as truly desirable, as the beginning and end of all things, ^B as the encompassing of all things that are, as the form-giving to those which are not, as the cause of all good things, as the non-cause of evils, as providence and absolute goodness, and as that which surpasses those things that are and those that are not, and even the evils, and which makes even its own privation good, being desirable, and lovable, and beloved by all, and as the true discourse has demonstrated, as I believe, concerning all other things previously mentioned.

375 CORDERIUS' ANNOTATIONS

§ 1. Note that he calls goodness the divine essence, the origin of divinity, in creatures, of course; because God is the author of divinity in all men and angels who imitate God and become like Him, of whom it is written: "I said, ye are gods" (Ps. LXXXI, 6). Hence, we frequently translate *thearchy* and *thearchic existence* as "deifying divinity" and "deifying God," which he calls *thearchy*. Commenting on this passage, St. Maximus says: "He calls God himself the 'substantial Good'." And a little later, he says: "God does not have goodness from accident as a certain quality, just as we have virtues; but rather, God is the substance of the Good, just as light is the substance of the sun." Here, take note that he does not mean that light is the substantial form of the sun (for light is not a substance, but a quality), but that the nature of the sun, which is a luminous body, does not consist without light—he says its substance is, i.e., it naturally follows the substantial form of the sun; just as heat is substantial to fire, i.e., naturally following the substantial form of fire. Explaining this passage, therefore, St. Maximus says: "Let no one suspect that Dionysius judges God entirely according to the example of the sun; but rather, it must be understood thus: just as the sun, since it is nothing other than light, does not have adventitious and conjoined light, which is called an accident; nor, as if it were an animal, or endowed with a soul, does it receive light inwardly by a will to do good, and distribute it to all (for quite the contrary, it is neither an animal, nor does it have a will to do good, for it lacks reason, nor does it receive light from elsewhere, for it is this very light itself, and it illuminates), so in God it is necessary to understand that God, specifically, does not have goodness conjoined to Him as a certain quality, as we have virtues; but rather, God himself is the substance of the Good itself, just as light is the substance of the sun; and as He who is that, He extends the very radiance of goodness into all things." Thus far Maximus; who, when he says that light, which is otherwise a quality, is the substance of the sun, speaks in the manner of philosophers, who properly refer the nature of something to that category to which that nature belongs. Furthermore, just as the sun distributes its light everywhere through the seven grades of things—namely, through the fixed stars, through the six planets shining with the same tenor always, through the moon with its varying light, through fire, through air, through water, and through earth—similarly, that supreme sun, God, distributes the good itself everywhere through seven beneficial grades of rays: namely, through angels, through souls endowed with reason, through souls living by sense, through vegetative souls, through celestial bodies, through elemental bodies, and through matter. It must also be said with St. Thomas in Part I, quest. 19, art. 4, by those words: "Just as the sun..."

^A that "our" will, of which he speaks, does not exclude an act of choice from God, as if God had produced created things not freely but of necessity; rather, it refers to choice in a qualified sense, insofar as He does not communicate His goodness to certain creatures only, but to all, since choice implies a certain discernment. Otherwise, as St. Thomas rightly proves in the same place, God, as the first agent, must be said to cause all things through intellect and will.

^B He teaches that the goodness of all things is derived from God as from a fountain. Hence, St. Thomas, in Part I, quest. 6, art. 4, concludes that every thing is called good by the divine goodness as the first efficient, exemplary, and final principle of all goodness; but it is formally called good by a likeness of goodness adhering to it, which is the formal goodness of each thing. That is, no thing is called good by the divine goodness as by a form that denominates it, just as a wall is called "right" from the right side of an animal; but each thing is called good from the goodness inherent in itself, which is a certain participation of the divine goodness, by which it is in some way assimilated to Him. The holy doctor proves this opinion as follows: although things which are called "relative" can be denominated from something extrinsic, as by a form (as in the example just cited), yet those that are called such absolutely cannot receive a denomination from something extrinsic, as by a form. In this, the holy doctor criticizes the opinion of Plato who, as Aristotle testifies in *Metaphysics*, text 6, posited the "ideas" of things as common, separate species from which individuals would be denominated. He criticizes him, however, not for positing a principle to something first—which through its own essence is Being and Good, such as God is—but for saying that every individual thing of such or such a nature is denominated from that first being, as by a form. He concedes, indeed, that a denomination can absolutely proceed from something as from an efficient or exemplary principle; this is the same as saying that there can be an efficient and exemplary principle of some form which, adhering to a subject, denominates it. Therefore, he asserts that all things are called good from the goodness inherent in them, as from a form; but from the goodness of 376 God, as from an efficient, exemplary, and final cause. See these matters more extensively in Vasquez, Vol. I, In Part I, q. 6, a. 4.

^C But if "Goodness itself" is above all things, etc. Here he teaches that "good" extends more broadly than "being," since it extends also to non-beings; which St. Thomas, in Part I, quest. 5, art. 2, interprets according to the Platonic saying—the Platonists, not distinguishing matter from privation, said that matter is non-being, and consequently argued that the participation of the good extends to more things than the participation of being, since prime matter participates in the good because it desires it (for nothing desires anything except what is similar to itself), but it does not participate in being, since it is posited as non-being. Or it must be said, he argues, that the good extends to existing and non-existing things not according to predication, but according to causality; so that by "non-existing" we do not understand those things that are simply and utterly non-existent, but those which exist in potency and not in act; because the good has the nature of an end, in which not only do those things which are in act rest, but also those are moved toward it which are not in act, but in potency only; whereas "being" does not import the relation of a cause, except only a formal, inherent, or exemplary one, whose causality does not extend except to those things which are in act. Furthermore, for something to be good, it is not necessary that it exist. For just as in certain essences of things abstracted by the intellect from existence we consider other properties, and predicate them of them; so too can we understand the nature of goodness, and enunciate it regarding them. For in a statement by which some thing is said to be "good," the verb "is" does not signify existence, but the connection of the extremes; just as when we say: "Man is an animal." However, when it is said that the "true" differs from the "good" in that the true is only in the intellect, while the good is in things, it is not to be accepted as if the good only pertains to existing things; but it is so stated because the true, which also is a property of being, does not pertain to things except through their relation to the intellect, whereas the good pertains to things from themselves, even though the concept of being and good is distinguished only by the intellect. For it is one thing for things to be distinguished only through the intellect, and another for something to pertain to them through the intellect alone, as Vasquez explains more extensively in Part I, q. 77.

^D Note, when he says: "that the Good is the cause of celestial principles and sub-terminations," Dionysius does not mean here—as some have interpreted—that celestial bodies are agent principles of those things which undergo birth and death, and that things are discerned according to those same bodies. He is not speaking here of principles of this sort, but of the principles and terminations of the celestial orbs, which God, in His goodness, made spherical, in which figure the beginning and the end, or goal, are the same. He did not say *apoparatoseis*, i.e., terminations, but *upoparatoseis*, i.e., sub-terminations, as St. Maximus observed; because the motion of a spherical body does not strictly have a limit, but, as it were, has a limit in being moved from some beginning to the same point as to a limit—for example, from the east to the same east point.

In the same place, a little later, he says: "The sun is an image of divine goodness, insofar as the very 'tenuissimum' [thinnest/slightest] of that good resonates in it from afar." In Greek it is *pollosty*, which the Roman poet Lucretius, lib. VI, translates as *multesimum*, in the same form as one says *centesimum* [hundredth] or *millesimum* [thousandth]. It signifies here the very thinnest of the final sound. "As if," says St. Maximus, "someone were to say something with a great shout: those standing by perceive the clamor and what is said; those at a distance hear less; but those who are far away hear a very thin sound without the meaning of the word. So," he says, "must one think of the light of the sun, if it is compared with the divine; namely, that the divine Light is infinite and cannot be compared with it, just as a most acute and clear-voiced shout is compared to a very thin and obscure sound."

In the same place: "For this is that light, even though it was not yet figured." St. Thomas in *Quaestiones Disputatae*, Vol. VIII, quest. 4, art. 2, ad 6, says that "that light," which is read as created on the first day, according to Gregory (37) and Dionysius, is the light of the sun, which, together with the substance of the luminaries—which is its subject—was produced on the first day according to the common nature of light; but on the fourth day, a determined power was attributed to the luminaries for determined effects, according to which we see the ray of the sun having some effects, and the ray of the moon others, and so on with others. And for this reason, he says, Dionysius states that that light was the light of the sun, but still "inform" [unformed], in regard to the fact that the substance of the sun was already present and held an illuminative power in general; but afterward, on the fourth day, it was formed—not indeed by a substantial form, which it had on the first day, but according to certain accidental conditions through the collation of a determined power, according to which a special and determined power was afterward given to it for particular effects. And according to this, in the production of this light, light is distinguished from darkness in regard to three things. First, in regard to the cause, inasmuch as the cause of the light was in the substance of the sun, but the cause of the darkness was in the opacity of the earth. Second, it is distinguished in regard to the place, because in one hemisphere there was light, and in the other darkness. Third, in regard to time, because 377 in the same hemisphere, according to one part of time, there was light, and according to the other part there was darkness. And this is what is said: "He called the light Day, and the darkness"

^A He called Night." Thus, that light did not clothe the earth from every side, because there was light in one hemisphere and darkness in another; nor was there always day on one side and night on the other, but in the same hemisphere, according to one part of time there was day, and according to another there was night.

From those things, therefore, which have been said by Dionysius ^B regarding the fourth chapter, it is clear that every light which is perceived is made by God; and that the sun is, in many ways and reasons, an image of the goodness of God. It is also demonstrated at the same time how, when God said on the first day, "Let there be light," He gathered together the light of that three-day period, which was without form and diffused, and brought it into the form of the globe of the sun, predefining for it circuits and annual orbits. Basil shows the same in his *Hexaemeron*, and Philoponus in the fourth book of *De Mundi Opificio*, chapters 16 and 17.

Truly, note that nothing portrays the nature of the Good more than light. First, because light appears in the realm of the sensible as the most pure and eminent. Second, it is dilated most easily of all, and most amply in a moment. Third, it arrives harmlessly for all, and penetrates, and is most gentle and pleasant. Fourth, it carries with it a nourishing heat, warming and generating and moving all things. Fifth, while it is present and exists in all things, it is not infected by any, nor mixed with any. Similarly, the Good itself super-eminently transcends the whole order of things, is dilated most amply, soothes and entices all things, yet forces nothing; it has love as if a heat for its companion everywhere, by which individual things are enticed everywhere, and willingly adopt the good; it is most present everywhere in the penetralia of things, yet has no commerce with them. Finally, just as the Good itself is inestimable and ineffable, so too is light; for no philosopher has yet defined it such that, while nothing is clearer than light, nothing is seen to be more obscure; just as the Good is both the most known of all things and, likewise, the most unknown.

Wherefore Iamblichus finally took refuge here, to name light as a certain act and a clear image of the Divine Intelligence; just as a ray flashing from the eye is an image of the sight itself. But just as, according to Plato, the sun produces both eyes and colors, and provides to the eyes the power by which they may see, and to the colors the power by which they may be seen, and joins both together in one by the light; so God is thought to bear Himself toward all intellects and intelligible things. And so, finally, He exceeds all these things, just as the sun exceeds the eyes and the colors. Finally, just as nothing is more alien to the divine light than matter which is entirely formless, so nothing is more remote from the light of the sun than the earth; wherefore bodies in which the condition of earth prevails, as being most inept for light, do not receive light within; not because light is impotent to penetrate—for while it does not illuminate the inside of wool or a leaf, it nevertheless penetrates a crystal in a moment, which is otherwise difficult to penetrate—so also the divine light shines even in the darkness of the soul, but the darkness does not comprehend it.

^C § V. For the highest Good is called intelligible light. Saint Thomas discusses this in Part I, q. 67, a. 1, whether "light" is properly said in spiritual things; and in the body he answers that one may speak of any name in two ways, namely, one way according to its primary imposition, the other way according to the use of the name; as is clear in the name of "vision," which was first imposed to signify the act of the sense of sight, but on account of the dignity and certainty of this sense, this name was extended, according to the use of speakers, to the knowledge of all other senses; and further even to the knowledge of the intellect, according to that: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." And similarly it must be said concerning the name of "light"; for at first it was instituted to signify that which causes manifestation in the sense of sight; but afterward it was extended to signify everything that causes manifestation according to any cognition whatsoever. If, therefore, the name of light be accepted according to its primary imposition, it is said metaphorically in spiritual things, as Ambrose says; but if it be accepted according to how it is in the use of speakers, extended to every manifestation, then it is said properly in spiritual things. See more concerning light in Saint Thomas, in *Sententiae*, II, distinct. 13, quaest. 1, art. 3.

§ VI. This Good is also praised as "the beautiful," etc. Note here with Saint Thomas, Part I, quaest. 5, artic. 4, ad 1, that the beautiful and the good are indeed the same in subject, because they are founded upon the same thing—namely, upon form—and on account of this the good is praised as beautiful, but they differ in reason; for the good properly looks to the appetite (for the good is that which all things desire), and therefore it has the nature of an end (for appetite is as it were a certain movement toward a thing), but the beautiful looks to the cognitive power (for those things are called beautiful which, when seen, please), whence the beautiful consists in due proportion, because the sense is delighted in things duly proportioned, as in things similar to itself; for the sense is a certain reason, and so is every cognitive virtue. And because cognition occurs through assimilation, and since similarity looks to form, the beautiful properly pertains to the account of the formal cause.

Ibidem: All things are said to desire the beautiful and the good according to every cause; because ^D God is the causative cause of all, who communicates His own goodness and beauty to all; and because He is the end of all; for all things were made so that they might imitate the divine goodness and beauty, as far as each is able. Furthermore, God is the exemplary cause; because all things, before they existed and were distinguished among themselves, were in Him, and according to the reasons and exemplars of all things which He had in Himself, all things were made and distinguished.

Ibidem, a little later: Then, he says, it is the Beautiful and the Good itself, when it is praised in God above substance, by removing all things. He explains, when that which is not participates in the beautiful and the good, when, namely, someone says: "This is not God, nor that, but He is above these"; this non-being, therefore—the removal, I say, of all things, or their negation—participates in the beautiful and the good, in so far as God is said not to be. It can also be said that this non-being is matter, as is accustomed to be said by Dionysius, in so far as it is devoid of beautiful form. It can also be said to be non-evil, as is also elsewhere said, and this also participates in the good, because it is done on account of something that is seen as beautiful and good. Thus Maximus and Pachymeres.

§ VIII and IX. Note that Saint Dionysius assigns three movements in the angels differently than in the soul; for he says that the circular movement of the angel is according to the illuminations of the beautiful and the good, but he determines the circular movement of the soul according to more (factors). The first of which is the entry of the soul from external things into itself. The second is a certain convolution of its own virtues, through which the soul is liberated from error and external occupation. The third is the union to those things which are above itself. Similarly, he also describes the "rectilinear" movement of both differently; for he says the straight movement of the angel is when it proceeds to provide for inferiors; but he places the straight movement of the soul in two things. First, indeed, in that it enters into itself; second, in that it is recalled from external things to simple contemplations. But he also determines the "oblique" movement differently in both; for he assigns the oblique movement in the angels from this, that while consulting those things that are inferior, they remain in the same perpetual state around God; but he assigns the oblique movement of the soul from this, that the soul is illuminated by divine cognitions in a rational and discursive manner. Whence Divine Thomas, Part I, quaest. 80, artic. 6, ad 2, answers that man, indeed, agrees with the angels in intellect generically, but the very...

faculty of understanding is much more sublime in an angel than in a man; and therefore it is necessary to assign these movements differently in men and in angels, according to how they differently relate to uniformity. For the intellect of an angel has uniformity in respect to two things. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from the variety of composite things. Second, because it does not understand intelligible truth discursively, but by a simple intuition. The intellect of the soul, however, receives intelligible truth from sensible things, and understands it with a certain discourse of reason. And therefore Dionysius assigns a circular motion in angels, in that they behold God uniformly and unceasingly without beginning or end, just as circular motion, lacking beginning and end, is uniformly around the same center. In the soul, however, before it arrives at this uniformity, it is required that its twofold deformity be removed. First, that which exists from the diversity of external things, in that it leaves behind exterior things: and this is what he places first in the circular motion of the soul, its entry from external things into itself. Second, another deformity must also be removed, which is through the discourse of reason, and this occurs, according to which all operations of the soul are reduced to the simple contemplation of intelligible truth. And this is what Saint Dionysius says, that a uniform convolution of its intellectual faculties is necessary, so that, with discourse ceasing, its intuition may be fixed in the contemplation of one simple truth. And in this operation of the soul there is no error, just as there is no error concerning the intellect of first principles known by simple intuition. With these things premised, in the third place is placed the angel-like uniformity, in that, indeed, leaving everything aside, one persists in the contemplation of God alone, and this is what Dionysius says. Then, indeed, it unites the soul, having become in some way uniform, with unified powers, and so at last leads it toward the beautiful and the good. Now, the straight motion in angels cannot be taken according to that which proceeds from one thing to another in considering, but only according to the order of their providence, according to that namely by which the superior angel illuminates the inferior ones through intermediaries. And this is what he means by saying that angels are moved directly when they proceed to the providence of inferiors, rightly directing all things. He places straight motion in the soul, in that it proceeds from exterior sensible things to the knowledge of intelligibles. Furthermore, he places oblique motion in the angel, composed of the straight and the circular, in that it provides for inferiors according to the contemplation of God; in the soul he similarly places oblique motion composed of the straight and the circular, according to the way it uses divine illuminations by reasoning through them.

^A § X. Note, here by Dionysius are understood the perfections of wholes, when from the copulation of parts arises the form, which is the perfection of the whole. *Quantum*, how great, or small this is—which in Greek is called *πηλίκον*—refers to a certain magnitude or smallness, as two-cubits, three-foot, two-foot; but *quantum* (as *τὸ ποσόν*) refers to [that which is] uncertain. The infinite, namely in potency, is that which belongs to continuous quantity according to division, and to discrete quantity according to addition. Comparisons relate to the relation of agreement, such as *same, equal, similar*; separations to the relation of difference, such as *diverse, unequal, dissimilar*. All infinity is called [so] because it is a multiplex infinitude, one of quantity, another of prime matter, which is not determined to one form, but is in potency to infinities. Every end, such as that of substance, of motion to an operation, and of operation and perfection. Definitions also are certain ends and terminations of things: therefore, where there is any end from these, there is no infinity. *Omnis intelligentia*, Saint Thomas reads in his text, *Omnis actio*, as if in Greek it had been *πᾶσα ποίησις* as elsewhere it is *πᾶσα νόησις*.

Ibidem a little later: *For divine love itself, which operates goodness in those things that are, because it existed beforehand in the highest degree in the good, does not allow itself to remain without offspring.* In Greek, *ὁ ἀγαθοποιὸς τῶν ὄντων ἔρως*; literally, *beneficent love of things*. In this place Saint Maximus says magnificently that good love, which existed before all things in the good, did not remain without offspring, but rather brought forth good love for us, through which we seek the beautiful and the good. Observe hence the divine motion: for love, the effector of good things, moved God to provide for us, and to constitute us; that, when He was moved, He might produce, and not remain devoid of offspring.

^B § XI. He teaches that the name of love is also used in the Scriptures. Where note from D. Thomas, I, II, quaest. 26, artic. 3, that four names are found pertaining in some way to the same thing, namely love, dilection, charity, and friendship. They differ, however, in this, that friendship, according to the Philosopher (38), is as it were a habit; but love and dilection are signified by way of act or passion; but charity can be accepted in both ways; however, the act is signified differently through these three; for love is something more common among them. For every dilection or charity is love, but not conversely. For dilection adds to love a preceding election, as the name itself sounds; whence dilection is not in the concupiscible, but in the will alone, and is in rational nature alone; but charity adds above love a certain perfection of love, in that that which is loved is estimated of great price, as the name itself indicates. When, however, Dionysius says in this place that love and dilection stand toward each other as four and twice two, it is to be understood as when love and dilection are in the intellective appetite; for thus love is the same thing as dilection.

^C § XII. Note that by these words: *And in those things which prepare an approach to the Scriptures*, he understands divine Scripture, as Saint Maximus says; whence is taken that [text] of Sap. vi, 2: *I became a lover of her beauty.* From which it is clear that what some have written is false, [namely] that Philo is the author of the book of Wisdom, which then, when Dionysius wrote these things, was not yet held among the canonical Scriptures; since clearly in this place Dionysius seems to number them among the divine Scriptures, which he calls *προεσαγωγάς*, that is, to express word for word, the pre-leading introductions of the Scriptures. And again a little later, he calls the sacred Scriptures in Greek *τὰ λόγια*, in which the name of love is found; but it is found also in Wisdom, from which the same Dionysius had brought forward authority: Sap. vi. But it must be explained why Dionysius called the books of Solomon *προεσαγωγάς*, which indeed one may understand from himself, since he designates the books of the Holy Scripture of the Old and New Testaments from the meaning and notation of the arguments of each book in the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, chapter three, concerning communion, where he says among other things: to expound the Scripture, the Wise [men] [giving] precepts of things to be done, or precepts concerning the actions of life—understanding the moral books of Solomon, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Wisdom, and the book of Wisdom of Sirach, which is called Ecclesiasticus; to these he added: or the songs of divine loves and divine images, understanding the Canticle of Canticles, which are symbols and images written by the same Solomon. Since, therefore, holy discipline [is] well and from the virtue of living—which is handed down in Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Wisdom of Solomon, and in Ecclesiasticus—it is necessary for understanding the holy Scriptures, which are not understood without faith, and faith, with the study of virtue neglected, is accustomed to be lost (just as the Apostle, 1 Tim.

1, 19, wrote): Some indeed, pushing this away (the good conscience, namely, which he had mentioned), have made shipwreck concerning the faith; and Wis. 1, 4: Into a malicious soul, he says, wisdom will not enter, nor dwell in a body subject to sin; whence Paul, admonishing Timothy (1 Tim. 4, 16), says: Attend to thyself and to doctrine (for he said "to thyself" first, because the virtue of the teacher and an upright life introduce [one] into the way of teaching rightly as a leader); therefore, as it seems to me, the divine Dionysius called the moral books of Scripture, which I mentioned, "initiatory introductions" (προεισαγωγάς), that is (to express the full force of the word), introductions that lead in as leaders for perceiving the wisdom of the Scriptures. 380 Splendidly, however, did the great Athanasius write on the final page of the book *On the Incarnation of the Word*: "He who desires to attain the understanding of the theologians must first cleanse and purify his soul, and approach them through the likeness of life and morals."

In the same place. Note those words which follow from 2 Kings 1: "Thy love to me was wonderful, passing the love of women," as being the words of David mourning the death of Jonathan. "Which the foolish," says Theodoret, "criticize, whereas David here, to signify the vehemence of his love and charity toward Jonathan, took a likeness and example from the most intimate love of wife and husband, which is so great that the law of marriage says: 'For this man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife'; a thing which Elcana also signified when, consoling his wife, he said, 'Am I not better to thee than ten children?' Therefore, as the marital union makes spouses one, so charity couples the souls of those who truly love one another into one." Thus Theodoret.

§ XIII. He hands down that there is also an ecstatic divine love, which does not allow those who love to be their own, but [to be of] those whom they love; and he proves this by the example of Paul, who, he says, went out of himself to God. Where Saint Maximus observed how, from this passage, one understands what the Apostle says in 2 Cor. 5:13: "Whether we are transported to God," namely, it is understood, as Dionysius accepted it, concerning the ecstatic love of Paul, which he described in his Epistle to the Galatians, saying in chapter 2:20: "I live, now not I; but Christ liveth in me"; so also Saint Diadochus understood this passage of Paul in his book *On Spiritual Perfection*, chapter 14. Concerning the same ecstatic love, Saint Maximus noted in the same place that it is understood in Ps. 115: "I said in my excess," that is, in ecstatic love for God.

§ XIV. Where he says that God is called love and charity, Dionysius interprets what Saint John says in 1 Epistle, chapter 4: "God is charity or love." For He Himself is the author and generator of love and charity, who brought forth these things which were in Him, that is, creatures, having been moved, namely, by charity. Thus it is said (says Saint Maximus) that God is charity, on account of the creatures, namely, which He produced. God is otherwise, lest anyone think this should be taken away, absolutely by Himself the super-essential charity, not created, but the creator of all.

Note in the same place that God is called love as a motive force, pulling upward to Himself. Where Saint Thomas observed a triple effect of love or charity. The first is that love or charity moves the lover to operation. Whence (that this may be observed in passing regarding the heretics, who teach that a man is justified by faith alone) just as water receives operation from fire, namely, heating, and is heated (for the operation of fire moves the water), so faith receives operation from charity, by which operation it is as it were quickened and heated, and without it, it grows cold, and, as blessed James says, is dead; from which it happens that such faith is that which avails in Christ, just as the Apostle wrote to the Galatians, which, I say, is moved by charity, namely, toward God. For the second effect is that it moves toward operation regarding the beloved; whence it is to be understood that the same Apostle said: "Which worketh through operation," namely, of charity. For the word *evproυμένη* [working/being worked] is to be taken passively, and it has been proven by us elsewhere. The third effect is that love shows itself toward him for whom it is. Whence blessed James, against him who boasts of faith without works, says: "Show me thy faith without works, and I will show thee my faith by works." Then the same Saint Thomas observed five properties of love or charity in those things which are recited here from Dionysius. The first is to proceed to unite him who loves with him whom he loves, and the more excellent love is, the more excellently it unites; whence, because love for God is excellent, it unites excellently with God, and is greater toward things more closely united. The second property of charity is that it makes him who has love or charity tend toward him for whom he has charity; contrary to what knowledge does, which draws the known thing to the knower, but love draws the lover to him whom he loves. The third property is for the motion of charity to be simple, because it is the first motion of appetite; and the first in any genus must be simple, because from it the rest in that genus exist as composites. The fourth property is for it to be movable by itself, because in any genus that which is by itself is prior to that which is through another; whence in the genus of motion, it is fitting that the first motion of the appetitive power, which is love, should be movable by itself. Whence fear, because it is like a violent motion entering from without, is not in charity, as blessed John says, but perfect charity casts out fear; because charity is a motion proceeding from within, as Saint Thomas says. The fifth property is to operate by itself, which is peculiar to charity, in which it differs from hope. For he who works on account of hope, works on account of another; but he who (says Saint Thomas) works from love, operates that thing by himself, as if this pleased him. It is worth knowing what charity effects, and what its properties are, in order to recognize its excellence and superiority over faith alone, which heretics boast of in vain, not understanding what they say.

381 He calls it a "loving motion," because insofar as love and charity flow from God Himself to creatures, He Himself is called the author of love and charity being moved; insofar, however, as He Himself is lovable and worthy of being loved, He moves and stirs to love all things to which the power of loving is conveniently infused.

Beautifully, Father Lessius explains this passage of Saint Dionysius in book 9, *On the Divine Perfections*, chapter 2: "First," he says, "he says love is a motive force, both because it moves God to descend to creatures, and to communicate His goods to them, and because it draws the created things themselves upward to God. Whence love is called *ecstatic* (ἐκστατικός), that is, producing ecstasy; because it transfers the lover from himself into the beloved, namely, God into the creature, and the creature into God. Truly, even if love moves God to creatures, yet it does not allow Him to rest in created things, but draws Him back from them together with the creatures into Himself, so that the creature may rest in Him at the same time as He; for all the good which He confers upon created things, He immediately reflects and refers to Himself, who is Himself by Himself, the good and the beautiful, which entices all to Himself, and pulls most powerfully. Secondly, he says it is *effusion* (ἔκφασιν), or a manifestation of God through Himself, because since God dwells in inaccessible light, so that He cannot be manifest to any creature by Himself, He goes out of Himself through love, and

it is thus manifested to creatures: first, through creation; second, through governance; third, through the mystery of the Incarnation; fourth, through doctrine, illumination, and justification; fifth, through the light of glory or glorification.

Third, he says that there is a benign process of that preeminent union, because the love of God toward creatures is a certain process, and like a germ of the love of God by which He loves Himself; just as the love of the means is a certain extension and as it were a shoot of the love of the end itself, and the knowledge of effects is a certain process of the knowledge of principles. By that preeminent union, he understands that love by which God loves Himself as the supreme good and the beautiful; for this is a certain vital union of God to Himself.

Fourth, he says that the love of God is an amatory motion, because love is a certain vital motion acting by itself to love, and making the lover pass from himself into the beloved. Simple, because the love of God in Himself is unique and most simple, even though the things to which it proceeds are infinite. Self-impelled (αὐτενέργητον), because divine love is not produced in God by another nor excited from elsewhere, but arises spontaneously from the very goodness of God. This motion preexists in the Good, because before every creature this love is in God: and from the Good it overflows into those things which are, and returns again into the Good, etc.

The same author in the following chapter gathers from what has been said eight properties of divine love. First, that it preexists eminently and originally in the beautiful and the good. Second, that it proceeds from the beautiful and the good as from a fountain, so that it already exists in God formally. Third, that it reflects itself immediately onto the beautiful and the good. Fourth, that for the sake of the beautiful and the good it extends itself and descends to creatures. Fifth, that it draws creatures upward, and turns them toward the beautiful and the good. Sixth, that divine love is ecstatic, because it draws the lover outside of himself into the beloved. Seventh, that divine love is a unitive force. Eighth, that the motion of love is circular. See these things treated more fully in Lessius, in the cited book, chapters 2 and 5.

^B § XVIII. And in the following sections up to the end he disputes at length what evil is and whence it comes; for the understanding of which it is to be noted here from Lessius, *On the Divine Perfections*, book XII, chapter 16, that the holy Fathers sometimes explain the malice of sin through the privation of good, not because it ought to be present in the act of sin itself, but because it ought to be present in the man acting, and is destroyed by that very sin; whence they declare the malice of sin from the effect which it causes in the soul, by despoiling it of the goods which it possessed, or ought to have had, namely, the good habits and functions by which it was conjoined to God; for this effect is better known to us than the intrinsic malice of sin. For that sin deprives man of divine grace, charity, and conjunction with God, and other virtues and eternal life, and renders him inept for good operations, is easily understood and from thence is best estimated how much malice there is in sin. And in this way Dionysius is to be understood here when he says: Evil in demons and in men is a privation of divine gifts, a defect of habits and operations, a falling away from natural goods, that is, from goods consonant with nature; although he himself speaks not so much of the malice of the transient act as of the evil which remains in the subject after the act, which is manifest to be situated in privations. In the same way Vasquez explains many other Fathers, but many of them can be explained of the privation which consists in a withdrawal from virtue, or from divine law, or from God Himself and the state of grace. See more on the nature of evil in Lessius, in the chapter cited throughout.

^C § XIX. *Evil is not from the Good, etc.* Note that Saint Dionysius understands that evil is not from the Good as from a cause per se; for in § 32 he says that evil is from the Good per accidens. That evil, however, can have no cause per se, is shown by divine Thomas from S. Dionysius in his *Disputed Questions*, the question *De Malo*, art. 3, by a triple reason. First, because that which has a cause per se is intended by its cause (for that which results beyond the intention of the agent is not an effect per se, but per accidens); but evil, as such, cannot be intended, nor in any way willed or desired, because every desirable thing has the nature of the good, to which evil is opposed as such. Whence we see that no one does any evil unless intending some good, as it seems to him; whence it remains that evil has no cause per se. Second, the same appears because every effect per se has in some way a likeness of its cause, either according to the same nature, as in univocal agents; or according to a deficient nature, as in equivocal agents; for every acting cause acts according to what it is in act, which pertains to the nature of the good. Whence evil, as such, is not assimilated to the acting cause according to that which is acting; it remains, therefore, that evil has no cause per se. Third, the same appears from this, that every cause per se has a certain and determined order to its effect: but that which happens according to order is not evil, for evil happens by omitting the order; whence evil as such has no cause per se; yet it is necessary that evil in some way have a cause. For it is manifest that since evil is not something existing per se, but is something inherent as a privation (which is indeed the defect of that which is born to be present, and is not present), that being evil does not naturally reside in that in which it is. For if some defect is natural to any thing, it cannot be called its evil; just as it is not an evil for a man not to have wings, nor for a stone not to have vision, because it is according to nature. But every being which is not naturally present in something ought to have some cause (for water, e.g., would not be hot, except from some cause); whence it remains that every evil has some cause, but per accidens, since per se it cannot have a cause; and everything which is per accidens is reduced to that which is per se. Since, however, evil has no cause per se, as has been shown, it remains that only the good has a cause per se. Nor can the cause of the good be anything per se except the good, since a cause per se causes its like; it remains, therefore, that of any evil whatsoever the good is the cause per accidens. It happens indeed also that evil, which is a defective good, is a cause of evil; nevertheless, one must arrive at the fact that the first cause of evil is not evil, but good. There is, therefore, a double way in which evil is caused from the good, namely, in one way the good is the cause of evil in so far as it is deficient; in another way, in so far as it is an agent per accidens. This is patent in the monstrosity of a birth, the cause of which is a deficient virtue in the seed, but the further cause of this defect is some altering principle which induces a quality contrary to the quality required for the good disposition of the seed: the more perfect the virtue of this altering principle is, the more it induces this contrary quality, and consequently the defect of the seed which follows. And thus the evil of the seed is not caused from the good in so far as it is deficient, but is caused from the good in so far as it is perfect, but per accidens. So also the cause of the corruption of water is the active virtue of fire; which indeed per se does not intend the destruction of the water, but the introduction of the form of fire into the matter to which it is conjoined, and thus per accidens the fire makes the water cease to be. See these things more fully in Sr. Thomas at the place cited above, where he disputes about evil in general.

^D § XXIII. *But neither are demons evil by their own nature.* Because, according to St. Thomas, *art.* 1, *quæst.* 63, *art.* 4, whose nature is ordered to some good according to the common notion of the good, this...

can be apprehended, and is an object of the will; whence, since demons are intellectual substances, they can in no way have a natural inclination toward any evil whatsoever, and therefore they cannot be naturally evil. See these matters discussed more fully by St. Thomas in his *Quaestiones Disputatae*, question sixteen on demons, article 2.

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES (39)

^A § 1. Therefore, a perfect distinction must be applied to that clause; for *age* (come now), according to ancient usage, is a certain dismissal of what has been said, and a beginning of what is to be said, as if he were to say: "Let those things which have been stated remain as they are; but now let us turn our discourse to the very name of Good, which theologians attribute by excellence to the Divinity, as from the One from whom all things proceed, since all things were produced by It on account of goodness, calling the very superexistence of God 'Goodness' and 'Goodness-itself'." For God does not have goodness as an acquisition or by accident, as if His essence were one thing and He possessed goodness accidentally; but He Himself, since He exists naturally as the substance of the Good itself, extends the splendor of His goodness to all things, by this very fact that He is good. Just as the sun is not distinct from light, nor does it illuminate by borrowing light from elsewhere (since it is light itself, and by this very fact that it is light, it naturally illuminates all things capable of receiving its light, without reasoning or choosing—for if it did not illuminate, it would not even be the sun; and what else could be conceived to illuminate, unless it be light? For this is what this holy man intends, and not simply that the sun is irrational and devoid of freedom, for this is manifest and nothing to the point); so too God, the Good above the sun, who is the primordial exemplar with respect to this obscure and dissimilar image, by His very substance whereby He is good, pours forth the rays of His goodness to things themselves according to the capacity of each. By these all intelligible and intelligent substances consist. ^C But the intelligible is one thing, and the intelligent is another; for that which is intelligible is, as it were, the food of that which understands; since that which is understood, or the intelligible, is nobler and is understood before that which understands, that is, the intelligent. Therefore, the superior orders near to God are properly to be called "intellectible," but the inferior ones "intelligent," as those which understand the superior ones; yet it is not to be thought that, because they are called intellectible, those things which are understood do not themselves understand; for they do understand, since they are minds and substances. Therefore they are understood, indeed, as being devoid of matter; but they understand things as incorporeal and supermundane beings, enlightened from above with the reasons of things, and mystically transmitting them to the inferior angels. He calls these "powers and operations," not because they are not subsistent, but because they are subsistent, living, and powerful and effective in their own proper motions; for by David it is ^D said...

^A that they are powerful in virtue. Alternatively, it may be understood in another way: "Virtues" [are so called] because, when creatures had not yet appeared, all things subsisted beforehand in God by virtue, being things which were to be produced by Him so that they might be; "Operations," because the creature was also brought to operation. On account of these rays of goodness, they both exist and live, and they possess life that is indeficient, and they are free from corruption, and death, and matter, and generation. Corruption, which extends more broadly than death, is a motion toward that which is not, which also pertains to inanimate things. But the divine powers are more sublime than generation, not because they were not made (since they were created), but because they do not consist of matter; for such are the things that dwell in generation and corruption, to which matter is subjected—if it receives form, it is fashioned, and behold, something has been made; but if it is deprived of form, it becomes something formless, and behold, the destruction of a certain being, and a motion toward that which is not. But the divine powers are even more sublime than these, both corruptions and generations, since they are also immaterial and exempt from all fluid variation. He says this because angels, too, were created mutable, but according to their intent, not according to their substance; hence, according to their ^B substance, they are also immutable. Therefore, they are intelligible insofar as they are incorporeal, and are known in some way both by each other and by us; and they are intelligent insofar as they are minds, and because they understand in a supermundane way, perceiving the reasons of beings through illumination, and not apprehending things sensationally as we do. But even if we frequently grasp the reasons, it is scientifically, and we possess the principles from sensation, and for this reason we have need of it; for we know nothing that escapes sensation, even if we also receive an understanding of it. But the divine minds are illuminated with the reasons in a supermundane way, and transmit them to their kindred; and their state, and firmness, and steady abiding, and preservation, are from the goodness of God, and the fact that they are like a dwelling and a divine altar of the goods which are from God. For the ^C ancients called "hearth" [hestia] that upon which they performed sacrifices. They also spoke of another intelligible hearth, the abiding of divine things around the same, which they also held sacred, and invoked in oaths, and called divine things "celestial." For even the Jew Philo, in his discourse on the flaming sword and the cherubim, says: "The abiding of the parts of the world, standing firmly, has been aptly named 'hearth' by the ancients." He calls the "parts of the world" the appearance of the sun, and the restoration of the moon to the same point, its increase and waning, the pouring forth of rains, the constitution and disposition of thunder and lightning, and all other things which happen forever according to the same causes; for the pagans also called these "divine" by contrast to those among us which, for varying and different reasons, are fluid and mutable. And that they again desire ^D the divine splendor, and also that they exist, and that they exist well, they possess from this same goodness, and they are fashioned after it in a God-like manner, and they share the gifts with those after them, as the divine law of distribution concerning them prescribes.

§ 1. From this divine goodness are their ranks and orders, their unions with one another, i. e., the divine

^A love for one another. This divine and unitive love brings them together, not by gathering them as if in a heap, but by binding them in love. For while things intelligible and things sensible are spoken of equivocally, some are united and mutually dependent, others are divided and heaped together. Of things intelligible, indeed, those that are united are such as light, life, the intelligible world, and the like; and according to such a union the orders of the angels are also unified and mutually dependent through divine love; but those that are divided and set alongside one another are such as a host, a particular order of angels, a family, and a choir. In things sensible, the union is [seen in] an animal, a tree, this sensible world; but the divisions are a flock, a people, a choir, a heap. ^B But these are the unions of the angelic powers with one another; they have, moreover, mutual penetrations and, again, inconfused distinctions. You should designate them as mutual penetrations, lest, understanding them as unions with one another, you should call it some natural union, according to which parts are united for the completion of some whole; but this penetration is free—such a union being brought about in them by the goodness of God. For things devoid of matter can penetrate one another inconfusedly, and again withdraw and be distinguished; and to this end are their first and second grades and orders. But you must consider how he posits inconfusion in their distinctions. For it was more fitting for this to be said regarding the mutual penetrations, where the suspicion of confusion also arises. However, he meets this by immediately assigning the distinction of properties ^C as well, lest that mutual penetration be considered confusion, since distinction immediately follows. But what did he say regarding the distinctions? He said "inconfused," declaring the immutability of their order; for according to such a distinction their grades and orders consist, according to which there is a first and a second. Therefore, he says in a way that you should not understand that because they penetrate one another and are again distinguished, their orders are changed, lest you suppose some confusion; but the same order remains for them, even if they penetrate one another. This again is of the goodness of God, that inferior powers are led upward to superior ones, and again that the superior ones provide for the inferior, so that neither are the former the principles of the leading [upward], nor are the latter unturned toward providence; for if one of the two were lacking, ^D nothing would come to be. But the divine goodness has so ordered things concerning them. Hence also are the guards of each power properly its own, and the immutable circumvolutions around themselves. Furthermore, do not suppose that because they desire higher things, they despise their own. But the divine minds revolve around themselves, not with a certain corporeal rolling, but in a supermundane and intelligible fashion, just as it is the nature of the mind to revolve—proceeding from itself to contemplations, and reverting to itself, but not moving outside itself in a scattered way. This is also hinted at by the many-eyed wheels in the divine Ezekiel. From the divine goodness, too, exist these identities and extremites regarding the desire for the Good. By identity must be understood the union with God that in no way fails; and by extremity, the inward turning of their contemplation toward [end of page concludes mid-word]

their own properties and ranks. But indeed, all that we have said in our book ^A *On the Celestial Hierarchy*—that it approaches the divine powers—is also from the goodness of God. What are these? It is, of course, the angelic purifications, the illuminations, the perfections. For they themselves are purified, and are illuminated, and are perfected, being hierarchized by the fountain of goodness, from which the *good-like* quality was granted to them, and the ability to manifest in themselves that secret goodness. For they also purify, and illuminate, and perfect those who suffer [as they do], doing these things and revealing the secret of the goodness ^B of God. For if the knowledge of God is glorified through me, how much more so through the angelic and divine powers? They proclaim—not by speaking, but by being understood within themselves—that divine silence, that supra-comprehensible manifestation of light of the One who exists in the inmost shrines and in the hidden abyss, according to that which is written: *He made darkness His hiding-place* [Ps. XVII, 12], as if they were secondary lights projected for the sake of interpreting, in whatever manner possible, that first brightness.

But even after the angels, souls—and all that is good for souls—exist from the ^C goodness of God: that they are intellectual, as those which think; that they are immortal; the very fact that they *are*; and that they possess power, being stretched forth toward angelic lives, to be led upward through them, as guides, to the divine supremacy of goodness, and to participate in the illuminations from God according to their own capacity, and to become partakers of the good-like gift, as happened in the case of Isaiah and Ezekiel—the former having received the coal, the latter being refreshed by the roll of the book—and whatever else has been said in our separate treatise *On the Soul*. Nay, even the irrational souls themselves, and all irrational living creatures—those of the air, the land, animals that creep, those in the water, those that are amphibious, those buried beneath the earth—all ^D these have been ensouled and made to live because of the goodness of God;6 and likewise the plants, and whatever substance is inanimate and devoid of life, have received, through that same goodness, the former the nutritive and growth-giving life, while the latter have received a substantial habit.

§ III. But if the Divine is actually *above* all things, just as the Good itself is, yet the privations in God are productive of excellences of positions, such as *formless*, *substanceless*, *lifeless*, *mindless*; for these, while possessing the concept of *not-being*, are nevertheless understood in a pre-eminent way in God, who is superessentially beyond all things according to the negation of all things (for He is none of the things that exist). And if it is permissible to say so, even that which *is not* yearns for the Good that is above all things (for if it does not exist, how does it yearn?); from which it is manifest that by *that which is not*, he has understood *evil*, since he shows that it does not exist; because even that which is called evil often comes about for the sake of the Good.

§ IV. But that which has escaped us is that the Goodness of God is the cause of both the heavenly and the cosmic—for they call the cosmos *heaven*—of their beginnings and their endings.

^C And for this reason too, God brought these forth out of the abundance of His goodness. ^A Heavenly beginnings and endings are to be understood as the spherical creation of the heavens, subsisting as if from a point or center of the will of God, moving in a circle; for a circular figure, starting from itself, terminates in itself. He says that the heavenly substance is neither increased nor diminished, as having attained its end perfectly and sufficiently; wherefore he also calls it immutable, not having swerved from that whence it was made; for that is perfect which neither increases nor diminishes. Note, however, that he says the heaven moves noiselessly and imperceptibly. ^B But the passage concerning the manifold movement of certain stars, by which they are transferred, he says of the planets; for he supposes that they alone are moved. What, then, could one say regarding the solar ray, which moves apart from the others by itself? Because to this also its own light is from this goodness of God, of which this light is a certain image; wherefore also the divine archetype is praised by the name of light, as the archetype in relation to the image of light. For as the goodness of God extends from the highest to the lowest, and is above all things—for God is in all things, and the divine is none of all these, neither as regards the higher reaching His excellence, for He is without beginning and has nothing higher, ^C nor as regards the lower passing beyond His compass, that is, being outside His embrace, for He is infinite, and there is nothing inferior outside Him—but He also illuminates those capable of receiving it according to the measure of their capacity; whence God is also said to be the measure of all things, in that He contains and knows the beginning and end of all, and the aeon, and number, and order, as one who contains and disposes things, for He created all things with good order; so also the sun exists as a manifest image of the divine goodness. But he beautifully and immediately corrects what seemed to be stated less appropriately concerning the sun, by calling it a certain most tenuous and final echo of that Good. For just as if someone shouting and crying out were to say something, ^D those present, endowed with sound hearing, hear the voice and the words; but those who are distant, as far as they are removed, hear the voice that much more weakly; and those who are removed by a greater distance receive a most faint echo, such that they hear a sound of some voice, but do not understand what has been pronounced. From this one may gather how great the solar light is, if it is compared with that true and divine one, so that the interval is both infinite and incomparable. Next he says how the sun represents God; because God illuminates all things which are capable of participating in Him through good institutions and actions or other dispositions, and having light spread out from above, He unfolds Himself and His rays to the whole visible world, both for those things which lack soul and sense, and for those which are endowed with reason and intellect. Just as, therefore, the sensible sun illuminates all things that are seen, and those things which do not participate in its light, do so because of their own opacity, [D-cont] so also in God, since His illumination and sanctification are overspread, all who wish are illuminated and sanctified. But again, just as God creates, so also the sun contributes to the generation of sensible bodies, and moves them to life, and performs other things, although not as the cause thereof in any...

free sense; but God, knowing that cold is altogether sterile, but that moderate heat produces generation, and that plants and seeds, like all bodies possessing life, have need of heat, for this reason caused the sun to have such a nature. This solar light, in the image of God who exists as the aeon and number of the whole universe, as its creator and container, is also a measure and number of hours, and days, and of all our time. By this also the triad of the first days, even though it was not then fashioned, was defined by contraction and expansion, as the divine Moses also declares; for he is the one who says that there was a first day, and again a second, and following that a third. And just as Goodness, ^B as principle and cause, gathers to itself all things that are scattered, and all things desire it; and as principle, for from it are all things, as the Scripture says; and as container, in which all things are as it were held fast in an all-containing depth and foundation; and as end, towards which all things look as to their own term, not natural but creative; and as that which all things desire, each according to the proper order of its nature—as angels and men do knowingly, brute animals sensibly, plants by the innate motion of their own life, and things devoid of life according to their very being, not that they may have knowledge, but that they may continue, held together by their natural and sole nature—so also the sun turns back to itself the things held by its radiance. For this reason it is called the sun [ἥλιος], because it makes all things together [ἀολλῆ] and assembled, and gathers the dispersed—and all things desire this, ^C animals for the sake of seeing, plants for the sake of being moved, and the others for the sake of being held together by its light. And I certainly do not say, according to the old and brilliant yet decaying pagan discourse (for both were once "Hellenes," as is shown in the Acts of the Holy Apostles) or indeed the "foolish" one—for the ancients called what is foolish "ancient"—therefore, I do not say, according to this foolish myth, that the sun, being a god, governs the world. But the invisible things of God, according to the Apostle, are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, and His divinity and eternal power are made manifest by the sun. ^D

§ V. Concerning Intellectual Light

§ V. But these things have been theologized in their proper treatise; now we must speak of intellectual light. God is therefore called light, but intellectual light, because He illuminates every angelic mind and drives out all ignorance from the souls in which He may come to be. Observe, however, that in the case of the angels, he has aptly said that the light illuminates, but in the case of souls, that it first drives out the darkness of error and thus illuminates. For the angels are simple and uniform, and having been partakers of the light from the beginning, they are all illuminated by an unwavering tension; but human beings, being double and carrying flesh about them, are habituated to worldly ignorance and errors; and they...

otherwise be illuminated unless the darkness be dispelled. Whence, since light by its nature cannot exist simultaneously with darkness, for this reason, upon the light entering, the darkness is put to flight; and as much as the light enters, so much do the souls, tasting of it, seek it the more; and the more they seek, the more the light shines upon them, because they have loved much, according to the holy Gospels. For the light does not shine forth suddenly, lest they be blinded, as happens to those who desire to gaze directly at the sun from deep darkness; but by degrees and according to the measure of those receiving it—neither overwhelming the weaker ones by its multitude, nor again being contracted below what is worthy, but [is bestowed] according to the capacity for looking upward of those who receive it. For this is what he also said above, that God is our order and measure.

^B § VI. That which is above every light is called the good light, because it illuminates from its own fullness every supra-mundane mind, namely, that of the superior powers; the circum-mundane, that is, the angelic, namely, of those who, according to the Apostle, are sent for ministry and are ordained for edification and service (for he also relates this in the book *On the Celestial Hierarchy*); and the mundane, namely, the human, according to the divine apostle and evangelist John, saying: *And of his fullness have we all received.* He speaks of the supra-mundane as spiritual, the circum-mundane as animate, and the mundane as carnal. Or alternatively, supra-mundane as that which teaches theology; circum-mundane, that which teaches natural contemplation; mundane, that which transmits practical virtue.

God is again light, because he renews all intellect-endowed powers, both the celestial and our own. But how does the light renew? Because, evidently, those things which relate to the soul and intellect are understood from the proportion of bodily things. Therefore, just as youth is that in which the body is best able to perform its functions, but old age is that in which it is not able, so also there is an old age of the soul and mind, in which it is not able to perform its office, but a youth, in which it is able. When, therefore, the mind is situated in the darkness of error and ignorance, it in a certain way grows old, and its powers become sluggish; but when the intelligible light shines upon it, it is renewed and is able to perform the things of its office.

Furthermore, that ray of intelligible light contains all minds, since it is above all and is contained by no one, and simply comprises the entire domain and power of the illuminating faculty, and excels, because it exists above all lights; and it possesses [them] beforehand, because it is their creator, and gathers all things, and couples them into one. But how the light gathers all things and couples them into one, he proves by the contrary. For just as ignorance divides those who wander (for he who is ignorant is distracted into many things), so the presence of light and of knowledge gathers those who are being illuminated; furthermore, it is also retractile, turning [one] back from polytheism toward the Truly Existing (just as, when the sun shines, the one looking at it is first turned toward it, and of this ...

^A primary object it receives the impression), and leading [those] various visions—which are, of course, distracted toward many things—toward one pure knowledge, to wit, the knowledge of God. Then, since what is seen receives a self-subsistent thing, and since phantasms are not images of real things, but are fashioned (that is why they are called "phantasms"), he says that—to speak more precisely—they are as it were fanciful formations, notions concerning sensible objects; for the imagination is accustomed to fashion even things that are not, and things of which we have come to no knowledge or view.

§ VII. This Good is ^B celebrated also as "the Beautiful," and "as Beauty," and "as Love," and "as the Beloved." Then, since the beautiful is that which partakes of beauty, while beauty is that which is partaken of; and since the beloved is that which partakes of love, while love is that which is imparted; and since in us these appear by way of distinction—in that some are habits, others habitual [states]—he says that it is not in this way with the Cause that gathers all things into one. For in one and the same [Cause] it gathers both the habits and the habitual [states], not as a habitual [state], nor as a habit, but as existing above these, and it becomes the cause ^C of such goods to others. Hence it is even called "Beauty" because of the beauty distributed from it to all things, and because it is the cause of all harmony and splendor (for beauty is the symmetry of limbs and parts together with a blooming complexion), or also because it calls all things to itself, and because it is always, and is never lessened or increased; for we know that excesses and deficiencies are called evils. It is not beautiful in some respect and in part, nor beautiful at one time and not at another, nor beautiful in relation to something, nor somewhere, nor to some [beings]—things which beauty entirely escapes, whereas our own beauty is necessarily subject to such definitions—but as that which ^D according to itself is uniformly forever being beautiful, since it is not divided into habits and beautiful differentiations. For our beauty is divided; for the beauty of an eye is one thing, and the beauty of a nose is another, and the beauty of a whole face is another, and that of hands is another. Nor is the [divine] beauty beautiful to some but not to others, but it is by nature accustomed to appear everywhere and in all things, a quality which our beauty does not have; for if it is by nature for all, it is because all things are very beautiful, though not uniformly. For the beauty of the sun is one thing, and the beauty of the earth is another, and the beauty of water is [another]—various kinds of beauty, and not gathered into one. But that which is truly Beauty, being uniform, is diversified according to the underlying subjects, and for this reason it is said to pre-possess beauty within itself, as being also the [Cause] of the creatures, and it possesses the beautiful in a superior way, as the fount and principle of all beautiful things. For even if there are many beautiful things, they are beautiful from it; for in that very transcendent beauty and causeless [Beauty], every beauty and every beautiful thing pre-exists causally. God is a unified beauty, since he is not beautiful by participation in beauty, so as to be divided into some subject and a quality; rather, He Himself is both the beautiful and Beauty, and is above these. But things that come from Him possess "the beautiful" by participation, as a quality.

^A For this reason, the beautiful is the interconnection of the elements, which he calls adaptations, and the orderly joinings of beings, which are called friendships and communions: for rational beings, their aspirations toward God, such as the Church of the firstborn in heaven, and again, this one on earth; for irrational beings, their gregarious associations; and for inanimate things, the connective sympathies they have toward one another. These, then, are united to the Beautiful, insofar as they are turned toward the cause. This Beautiful is both the beginning of all things, as an efficient cause, and the final cause, toward which every endeavor and appetite tends. It is the end of all things—for God might be called the end, as holding all things together and grasping them all for their security, and as the one for whose sake all things were brought into being and need nothing else for their perfection. Thus, He is also the middle, as He grants the extension of existence; and the end, as in His will all things are brought to a close, toward whom they have also been turned. He also calls Him the exemplary cause, because He preconceives within Himself the predefinitions of all future things, even before they are brought forth, as the Apostle says: "Whom He predestinated," and what follows. For this is how the holy man expressed it: that future things are foreknown and predestinated in Him, through that unified foreknowledge which encompasses all things. Therefore, just as all things desire the Good, so too do they desire the Beautiful, and there is nothing among beings that does not participate in the Beautiful, by way of participation in the truly Beautiful. ^B Yet someone will venture to say that even that which is not participates in the Beautiful. But how does he say that non-being participates? Because even that which is not is praised in God through the removal of all things, when one says: "The Divine is not this, it is not that, but is above these." This, then, is that non-being—the removal of all—which participates in the divine Beauty and Good, insofar as the Divine is called "non-being." You can also call matter "non-being," insofar as it is destitute of the beautiful form. You can also say that evil is "not good," insofar as it too participates in the Beautiful, because it is feigned by means of some appearing beautiful or good thing; yet the subsequent treatment gives us understanding of what is prior. Since he has mingled the Beautiful with the Good—for just as all things desire the latter, so too do they desire the former—he says that this is the cause of all such things, clearly in a unified way, even if it varies according to each individual thing, yet it remains one and simple. Just as the same sun warms both stone, ^C and garment, and watered earth, and water, though it does so differently according to the things receiving it; so from this come all the essential existences of created things. And it is well to say "essential": for existences in themselves are above essences—for existence is the very being something, while essence is the "what-it-is" of a being. Since, therefore, he is speaking about created things, he rightly added "essential" to "existences." They are called unifications, not because they are heaped together with it into one thing, but because God is their source and beginning, and they were brought forth from Him, subsisting according to subsistence, so that they might appear even in the distinctions of subsistences. And identities are the recurrences and unitive [principles] toward ^D

God, just as also likenesses are, since they are from Him and inhere in Him. Diversities are, as it were, a certain partitioned multiplication of the divine will proceeding toward lower things. Dissimilitudes [are so called] because that which is created is diverse from the Creator. Leagues (or covenants) are the temperings of contrary elements; coherences are the connection and consensus of the whole world. The non-mixings of united things are as in the community of the human race and the propriety of each human being; for by the common reason of essence we are all united, but by the propriety of each individual we are not commingled at all. ^C The immovable stations of all things [signify] that each thing subsists and is by itself. And again, the communions of all things in each individual. From this are corrected the opinions of two ancient philosophers, Empedocles and Anaxagoras. For Empedocles called the sphere [the result] of the friendship and commingling of all things, such that nothing could be discerned by itself from another before strife occurred and the division by which the world subsisted. But Anaxagoras said, "All things were together." He says, therefore, that each thing subsists by itself, and all things communicate with all things, and they do not depart from their own station, as if to become a sphere; nor, however, do they have a real communion such that, for example, there are in bread certain atoms of gold, wood, and iron which are not seen due to their smallness, as it pleased Anaxagoras, who called generation division; but rather they are in communion by power according to quality, so that it may be said, in a certain manner, that it is the very thing that is of water to become air and fire, and from earth to become water, and from food to become flesh, and the rest; so that the friendship is unconfused, and the complex indissoluble. He says that the successions of things that happen are unceasing: "For even until now He operates." And Aristotle solves that doubt in another way, while he says that all things arise from one another, and the corruption of this is the generation of another, and the corruption of another is the generation of this, and so he subjoins the reason, so that generation may not fail. But since God is the station and motion of all things, He exists above station and motion, as though establishing each thing in its own reason and moving it toward its own motion; therefore he says that all stations and motions, whether you speak of angels, or of souls, or of bodies, are from Him. Therefore, the station of minds is to be established in [their] striving toward God, even if they are sent forth and descend to lower things, so that they may provide help to those in ^D need.

^A § VIII. But since movement occurs in three ways, this movement is for those [beings] also threefold. It is circular when they turn upon themselves; it is straight when they proceed toward the providence of those things that are lower. For since every act of providence has an end (and the movement in a straight line always has an end), they move according to this, and fulfill the parts of providence; but when they revolve again into themselves, behold, the spiral movement also subsists.

§ IX. Again, the state of the soul is the immobility and stability of its own substance. Movement, however, is circular when it is stirred by the contemplation of the mind, and, having become within itself, it is gathered together from the exterior wandering of the senses, and is first collected into itself, and from thence is guided to God. ^B And this is the operation of the mind [according to reason]; but it is spiral when it goes forth to those things which exist in part, yet receives the notions not intellectually and unitarily; for this is the way of the angels, who, according to a sudden change, understand the supernal divine illuminations revealed to them according to the same measure. But the soul [understands] logically and discursively, that is, [by being divided] into the particular, and by being divided and learning from participation; for the mind, descending to reasonings, is in a way divided and needs many exemplars or species, while it seeks the mode of reason, in order that it may express what it has understood. Therefore, the soul operates in a mixed and transitory manner, even when it understands intellectually, since this is proper to the soul; wherefore it alone understands the things that transcend it. It is not understood, however, by anyone as if it were also intelligible, since it is the last of all intelligible things, so that even from this it might be called intelligible; not otherwise than a shell set in the bottom of the inexhaustible sea is sensible, or rather the water itself which exists above the heavens. But the soul is moved by a straight movement when it does not enter into itself (for this is to move circularly), ^C but by proceeding it considers those things which are about it and outside of it, into which, having risen as if into certain symbols, it is led again from these by a straight movement to simple contemplations, not by reasoning, nor by seeking scientific argument, as if it were led scientifically (for thus even divine things would be subject to scientific knowledge, and the movement would not be straight, but spiral); but from the creation of the world the invisible things of God are understood by simple and straight apprehensions, and not laboriously, above every operation and demonstration of the intellect.

§ X. Of these three motions, therefore—namely, of minds and of souls, and of those three motions themselves which are found in sensible things, and much earlier, ^D of the mansions and of the stations and of the stabilities of each, namely of the angel and of the soul and of the sensible thing themselves—God is the cause. But how is He the cause of the mansions much earlier than of the motions? Because, clearly, that which remains is more excellent than that which is moved; whence also divine things are immobile, while our things are and are called mobile; since also everything that is moved is moved by an immobile [being], and that which is immobile has no need of that which is moved.

^A How then does a sensible thing have these three motions, except that the elements have a straight motion—fire upwards, earth downwards—while the whole universe has a circular motion, and the planets have an oblique motion, since they move from the South toward the North, and in turn from the North toward the South, and revolve again to the same point? For all things are from God and through God, however small, great, or equal to others a nature may be, and defined by a certain measure, along with the proportions of bodily parts, the harmonies, the temperaments of the humors, the wholes, the parts, every unity and multitude. For there is a unity according to the connection of parts, as in a man or an ox; and there is a unity according to the union of a multitude, as in a people, a congregation, or a flock. And each thing has its quality and quantity—for this is the "such" and "how much"—as well as the communions and distinctions of the elements. ^B For just as something is united to another, so it is separated from another; thus fire, by reason of its heat, is united to air and separated from water. There is an infinity in magnitudes according to division, and an infinity in numbers according to addition; there is every limit, the interpretative reasons of all things, the orders, the mutual excellences, every substance and the habit that is in it, and every power and efficacy, and every sense, and reason, and contact—that is, knowledge—and science, and every union which through ignorance joins to the best things; and everything that is, is from Him, and in Him, and to Him looks, and by Him is held together. And in Him is every principle or exemplar, according to which that which is made comes to be; this, however, is the Idea, which is a self-perfecting, eternal understanding of the eternal God; or the final [principle], for the sake of which that which is made is perfected; or the efficient, which is separated from the effect; or the formal, according to which that which is produced comes to be; or the elementary or material, from whose subject that which is made comes to be. And all being-things are from the Good, and all things that are not are not said to be from the Good—for they have no subsistence—but they are in the Good; for this Good is spoken of by way of abstraction from all things. ^C

§ XI. ^D Here he introduces a discourse on love and says: "To all things, therefore, the beautiful and desirable and lovable is such for its own sake and on its own account, and not for the sake of something else; and not only do all things have love for one another by themselves. The lower things [turn toward] the higher, by turning themselves toward them; those of the same rank love what is like themselves, by sharing with them; and the higher [turn toward] the lower, by providing for them; and each thing loves itself, by preserving itself; and all things, directed toward the Beautiful and Good, do and will whatever they do and will. And simply, all things love one another and themselves, and God loves all things, so that He may render all things good. For this reason the divine love is also Good, and of a good thing that is suitable for the Good, and for the sake of the Good; for it comes to be so that it may perfect, and hold together, and sanctify. For this love also moved God to our production and providence, so that He might also act and be moved, and not remain sterile." It must be noted, however, that one should not pay attention to the words, but to the power of the end in view. For the Discourse sets these things forth divinely; nor, indeed, do we trifly with the appellation of love,

^A as the Greeks do—for this is not peculiar to those desiring to perceive divine things, but to those receiving sounds only as far as the ears, and keeping them outside the soul, not wishing to know that even through equivalent expressions which have much that is lowly, we are not prevented from uttering divine expressions. For those who foolishly cling to elements and words and syllables, which do not pass into the soul but ring somewhere around the ears, are just as if it were not permitted to signify "four" by "twice two," or straight lines by "right lines." For these are similar, or indeed the same, whether one says *matria* according to the Cretans, or *patria* (fatherland) according to us, and so with the rest. So as not to recount each one, it should be known why we use words and senses. For when we move the spoken word regarding something sensible, then we have need of expressions and writings and words for the declaration of what is being spoken. But if the soul is moved of itself toward intelligible things through upright operations, the senses, along with sensible things, are superfluous; for it fashions sublime things. But when it becomes deiform, progressing by small elevations and having insights into the inaccessible light through an unknown union, then even the intellectual operations are superfluous, just as the senses are, since the soul, already united to God, contemplates things higher than these. But when the mind imagines things creeping on the ground, and tries to be moved about something from the sensible realm, then it is necessary to select clearer words and things more distinct than those visible; because since the things lying before the senses are indistinct and obscure, ^B the senses themselves will not be able to present the underlying matters well to the mind.

§ XII. But that we may not seem to be subverting the divine Scriptures, come, let us establish the name of love from the Scriptures themselves. He brings forward as a witness Solomon himself, and the great Ignatius; and again Solomon, whose words he also hands down as introductions to the divine oracles and shadows of grace. Let no one, therefore, startle or disturb us regarding this; for the theologians consider the name of love and affection to be common; and some even judge the name of love to be more divine, as being more hidden, inasmuch as it is also more paradoxical. ^C For in as much as it seems indecorous and unbefitting to divine things, by so much is it also hidden, while we seek how and for what reason it is so called.

Since this, therefore, has been said by us in a way befitting God, the masses of men, not grasping the uniformity of the divine amatory naming—whether according to that by which God loves all things, since He is one and simple, and is love above all things, and is not divided into many ends, but into one, while He does good to all; or according to that by which we love Him ^D (for this love of His ought also to be uniform, according to the saying: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your mind, and with all your soul, and with all your strength," so that there is no place in the soul for another love when it is loving God)—this love of...

the ^A divine name, which the masses do not understand, has fallen away into love that is corporeal, distracted, and divided. For one person loves one thing, and another person desires another thing according to such love, which is not true love, but rather a phantom, or a falling away from divine love. For just as the art of cosmetics is a phantom of the art of gymnastics, by feigning with the dye of color the beauty that gymnastics truly produces, as the culinary art is of medicine; so too is corporeal love a phantom of divine love, for while it also inflames the soul, it is directed toward nothing lovable or stable, or rather, it is a falling away. For that divine love is proper to the soul, while this is alien and strange. Hence, because the soul possesses naturally and by grace the desire for the truly Good, and is heated with zeal for it, such heat and motion is indeed generated; but the intellect falls away from true judgment, is seduced by desire, imagines that what is naturally detestable is desirable, and embraces the transient as if it were abiding, as it is written: "They considered it as standing, and not as fleeing." And this is the falling away of divine love, from the impassible to the passionate, from the divine to the corporeal, from the immaterial to the material; for the unity of divine love is incomprehensible to the ^B multitude, and for this reason, as it is more difficult and deemed objectionable to attribute it to God, it is applied in order to lead them to the knowledge of true love, and so that they might quickly be freed from such a deluded opinion by knowing that the word "love" is considered objectionable, and least of all befitting to God. For thus he says in the *Celestial Hierarchy*, that what is more dissonant is conveniently stated about God, and all the more so the viler it is, as the mind is easily led away from it, considering that God is not this, but is spoken of thus according to some sublime rationale. For who would suppose God to be a panther, or a lion? But "Light," or "Fire," or "Spirit," when said of God, more easily deludes the intellect, for fear that He might be one of these. In the same way, regarding love and affection; in God, the difficult name of "Love" is applied, while in our case, where it would often be absurd to suppose something belonging to base and wretched men, "affection" is used more euphemistically, according to what is said in ^C the first book of Kings by David to Jonathan. Since those who rightly hear the sacred theologians place these two names as equivalent for the divine manifestations, signifying the unifying and tempering power pre-existing in God, on account of the Beautiful and the Good, so that, clearly, all things may be intermingled as loving this God, who is the beloved Beautiful and Good, and as being given forth from God on account of the Beautiful and Good again, so that, manifestly, things of the same rank are held together as lovers and beloved in turn; while the first move the lower and love them, providing for them so as to make them like themselves; and the lower are converted ^D toward the higher, affectionately inclined, so that they, as far as possible, may attain to the higher state.

^A § XIII. Furthermore, divine love is ecstatic; for it does not allow those who love to belong to themselves, but to the objects of their love. This is shown by the things previously stated; or rather, by the great Paul, who, being possessed by this divine love and saying, *I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me*, as a true lover, and having gone out of himself toward Him of whom he spoke and toward those who have gone out of themselves to God; and again, being in turn lovingly minded by the superior God, he lives not his own life but the life of the Beloved, when he says, *as dying, and behold we live*. For one must dare to say this also as a truth: that the very God of all, by reason of his exceeding goodness, goes out of Himself through His providences for all things and is, as it were, charmed by such goodness; for He says: *And what will I, if it be already kindled?* And from being far beyond all things, He descends inseparably to all things; wherefore they also call Him a Zealous One, as He shows great love for divine things and stirs up desire for Himself, and because the things desired and provided for by Him are enviable and blessed. For if they were not such, He would not be jealous toward them, because they deflect from Him and attach themselves to others. And in general, love is of the beautiful; for being beautiful, He loves such beauty, and remains in the beautiful and is diffused, expending Himself. For the loves of bodies, since they are of shifting things, flow away just like spring flowers; but the divine loves and those of divine things, as they are of permanent things, they too remain in their possessor, and exist as the cause of beauty; for that love is for beautifying the beloved, lest they be defiled by the impurity of matter. ^{B C}

§ XIV. Here he also asks why the theologians sometimes call Him love and affection, and at other times call Him the lover and the beloved. And solving the question, he says that, as the author and generator of divine love, He is called Love; but as He is Himself that which is loved, He is called the beloved, and according to the former He is moved toward the loving of others, and according to the latter He moves others to love Him. Or He is called the beloved because He has the power of leading and moving unto amatory conjunction in the spirit, that is, that He is the mediator and Himself the conciliator of that love by which He is adapted to His own creatures. He says, however, that He has the power of moving, as one who moves each thing according to its own nature to turn back toward Himself. And the name of "production" or "prostitution," even if it signifies an impure thing among the profane, yet here it signifies the conciliating mediation of the union with God, and in this way He is called the beloved; but Love again, and affection, as a kind of motive power, leads up toward Himself that which is solely and of itself good; and because it is a manifestation of Himself by Himself, with no other mediating, nor any love coming in from elsewhere, but from Himself into Himself; for such is that which is beautiful by itself. For just as we love the sweetness of honey, not becoming aware of it from elsewhere but from it, and not for any other reason but for the sweetness itself; and for this reason, ^D

^A the sweetness is inexplicable to those who are ignorant of it. For if we were moved toward it by some other things, perhaps we would be able to say something from these, and those who are ignorant would understand from these. Understand it in this way also regarding the divine and true sweetness, that love is from it; and it is itself the lovable, and through it, and in itself, and not because of something else. For such union is set apart from all things, and simple, and moved by the lovable itself. He says that the divine love is without beginning and without end, as proceeding from the Good and turning back to the Good according to a circular figure (since the line of a circle does not make it known to our sight where it began and where it ended). For indeed, the yearning of the Good is from it, and it looks again to it; and in it the loving of the connatural goodness and of those things straining toward the Good exists and remains. Next, he also adds a testimony of these things which have been said from the divine Hierotheos. ^B Hierotheos. § XV. Observe how the great Hierotheos philosophizes most excellently regarding the praiseworthy love; first, calling it divine, since God is himself the first cause of love, transcendentally and without cause. For if love itself is charity, as has been said before—and it is written: “That God is charity”—it is evident that God is the unifier of all, that is, love. From there, he proceeds transitionally to the angels, whence he also calls it angelic, where one might especially find that divine love of unity; for there is nothing discordant or seditious among them. Then, after the angels, he mentions also ^C an intelligent love, that is, one which is in divine men, those of the Church, to whom Paul says: “That ye may say the same thing,” and the Lord: “That they may be one.” Then also among other people, in whom there exists the discourse of friendship; for he called the love according to rational souls intelligent, but he called the love of irrational creatures animal. For out of this amatory power, birds fly in flocks, and land animals and swimming creatures congregate. He calls that love natural which belongs to animate beings and those without sense; and specifically those without sense, according to a constitutive aptitude, love the Creator because they have been brought into existence by Him; for according to their natural motion, even they are turned back toward God. ^D Of the same. § XVI. Since from the unitary and true love of God we have arranged many loves, the angelic, the intelligent, the animal, and the natural (for some of these are mundane, and others supramundane loves, among which those of the intelligent and the intelligible excel), come, let us gather them all back to their Father. Note, however, that intelligence is what understands, and intelligible things are what are understood; and the intelligent is surpassed by the intelligible, whence the food of those who understand is that which is unders

understood. ^A Thus, the intelligible things love the intelligent, but they do so provisionally, by communicating the benefit. It is therefore agreed that loves of this kind surpass the sensible ones. However, these intelligible and intelligent things have become such by participation in the truly Good, but the self-intelligible loves themselves are divine. For just as that which is good by participation is one thing, and that which is good simply is another; so also, there is one thing which is intelligible to someone, as that which is understood by him, and another which is simply intelligible, not as time or place (for these also are intelligible, since they are not sensible), but rather the intellect of intelligible things, and the Living, and Life, and Operation. ^B Therefore, he wishes to contract the amatory powers from many loves into two in general, the intelligible and the intelligent, over which the incomprehensible cause of all love surely presides and excels. He calls the creative power an "unrelated" cause; for it alone is separated from the effect—the material, the formal, and the final—while appearing in the effect. Toward this unrelated and creative cause, then, the total love from all things is extended; he calls that love "total" which is gathered from all the particular loves. God is also total and particular love, in that He is the cause and provides to all, according to the power of each, a certain amatory flow. How, then, can God be both the whole and the part, remaining present to Himself without egress? This is made clear by the analogy of sowing: for when the seed falls into the womb together without interruption, one embryo is formed; but if the seed is divided into various cells of the womb, each part forms an entire embryo—there will be, then, one part of the seed for the nose, another for the eye, and so on, and all are perfect. ^C Something similar must be considered by analogy concerning the perfect mind: for the whole operation encompasses the parts, and thus God is both total and partial love.

By the same.

§ XVII. Let us, therefore, gather the two amatory powers mentioned above into one, and say that one is the simple power, which moves from itself, and through itself, and not through any other power, and in itself: for it revolves inessentially from itself into itself as far as the extremity of things, and from this back into itself. After this, the saint sets forth the question of some, and it is almost entirely that of the Gentiles and the Manichaeans.

§ XVIII. He says, therefore, that someone might object: If the good is lovable to all (for even that which "is not" desires this—he calls the formless matter "that which is not"; for the good itself is that which gives form. Just as, therefore, matter desires form, so that which "is not" desires God. ^D Nay, more, that which "is not" is said to be above essence in God, since He lacks quantity, form, and figure; for God is not earth, not water, not fire, but is superessentially above all these), if, therefore, all things desire the good, how does

^A the host of demons not desire it? It must first be noted regarding non-being, that the ancients called this non-being not only formless matter, but also the ultimate baseness. Matter is called non-being, not because it is absolutely nothing, but because it is not any of the existing things; for even matter was produced by God from non-beings, but not, as some have supposed, as formless and unshaped. Hence, matter is not the principle of sensible things, but rather their fulfillment and the lowest point and foundation of existing things. And that which is sensible is not without matter, but, being something more excellent than matter, it participates in form in some way; therefore, matter will never be shown to be without form and qualities. For when was fire ever without heat or light, or water without cold, moisture, and its bluish color? For this reason, matter is also said to be observable only by reason and not graspable by sense, and it is said to be comprehended by a spurious mode of reasoning. It is said to be "this," but because it is not "this," it is worse than all things. For we speak in this way even concerning God, but there we say He is better than all things, and superessentially so. If, then, these things are so, how does the host of demons not desire the good, but, having fallen from its own state, become the cause of all evils both for itself and for those who are corrupted by it? And how, having been produced from the good, does it lack the form of the good, existing as a participant in Him who is good essentially and not by participation? For things that are made good by external desire for the good are called "good-formed," and not truly good; or how, once having become good, was it changed, while the good did not cease [to exist]? And what is it that moved it to malice, or rather, what is the principle of this? For it is not holy to posit two principles, according to the Manichaeans. But if the Good produced it, how did He will to do this? Or if He willed, how could He? For just as fire has a natural inability to cool, and will not cool even if something should happen—so also the Good-itself has a natural inability to produce evil. And how, while Providence exists and governs, by which all things remain in the good, does evil exist, or how is it generated? Or if it was ever generated, why is it not destroyed? And how is it that, having abandoned the good, anything desires evil?

^D § XIX. Exercising his style here regarding evil simply, and not regarding the demons, and resolving the questions, he says: "We are not about to say that evil is produced from the good, nor from evil. It is not from the good, because otherwise it would not be evil; for just as it is not for fire to cool, so it is not for the good to produce evil. Again, it is not from evil, because just as it is the nature of the good to produce and to preserve, so it is the nature of evil to corrupt and destroy." What then, one might say? Either evil no longer exists, or, being, it has some portion of the good, according to which it exists at all. Again, then, there is a difficulty on both sides. If evil does not exist at all, virtue and wickedness will be the same thing, which he posits later; but if it exists, and all existing things desire the good, and if anything is

^A done, it is done either for the sake of the good or for the sake of what appears to be good (for even envy itself arises because of that which appears good, and every scope of things has the good as its beginning and end); then evil also, in so far as it exists, will have an appetite for the good; for how could it exist at all if it were deprived of such an attachment to the good? If, therefore, all things that exist are both from God and in God, and this very thing that is not, such as matter, and those things which are predicated of God by way of negation superessentially, if evil is that which is placed in things, it will be in God; and that which is not in things will, in turn, be in God. But if it is not in God, what then could exist that is outside of things that are and things that are not? Since it is confessed that God is beyond those things that are and beyond those things that are not; and that which is "not" is said to be in the Good superessentially—not that it is this or that, but is superessentially beyond these things. Therefore, the Good is located beyond that which is and beyond that which is not; but evil is not only alien to things (for if it existed, it would be a participant in the good), but it is also removed from non-entities ^B and is even less being than they are, since that which is "not" is also placed superessentially in God. It is concluded, therefore, that evil is in no way anything at all; and if this is so, all things will be indiscriminate and praiseworthy; and not only will virtue be the same as malice, the whole with the whole, and the partial with the proportional—for example, fortitude with pusillanimity—but even that which is contrary to virtue will be virtue. Furthermore, forming a hypothetical syllogism, he destroys the consequence, saying: "Intemperance is contrary to temperance." And I do not say this in regard to the human beings themselves who participate in these things, for they might seem to be opposed for other reasons; but even before they come forth externally and appear, long before, in the ^C soul itself, the passions themselves—I mean, anger and concupiscence—dissent from the rational part of the soul. The latter is called the charioteer, while these are called the yoke-beasts, always indeed forestalling, yet sometimes also obeying, when, that is, reason holds the primacy. From this, therefore, it becomes necessary that there be given something contrary to the good; for the good is not opposed to itself; for all good things, having proceeded from one principle and one cause, rejoice in unity and do not in any way oppose one another. Let no one, therefore, say that a greater good is contrary to a lesser good; for to quantity there is nothing contrary, nor is what is more hot opposed to what is less hot. The consequence having thus been destroyed, it is concluded that evil exists and is opposed to the good; for the fact that evil is a corruption of things ^D does not eliminate this same evil from a state of being, since corruption itself sometimes makes for generation. Thus, the egg is indeed corrupted, but it is transformed into a bird; and the marrow of a bull's brain is transformed through corruption into bees, and that of a horse into wasps. It will be, therefore, not only existing, but will also contribute to generation and to consummation, and by itself will provide that the effect is not imperfect.

§ XX. After he said that it is concluded from such arguments that evil both exists and contributes to the generation of certain things, wh

^Aen he proposes another, truer argument, and says that evil, ^Binsofar as it is evil, produces no generation, but only corrupts, as far as it is able, the subsistence of existing things. And if anyone says that it is generative because the corruption of one thing is the generation of another, one must respond that it does not provide generation in respect of what it corrupts; for corruption indeed corrupts, but if anything is generated, it is generated from the Good, and evil will exist. ^C Note, in fact, that he is still exercising the argument, and for this reason he says it "is and is not." Therefore, evil will be in one sense corruption on its own account, but on account of the Good, it is generative. And on its own account it is neither a being nor productive of existing things; for being evil, how could it ever consist, and from whence could it have existence, being a privation? But on account of the Good, it is also both [a being] and productive of good things; a being, in that when the Good withdraws, that [evil] appears; and productive of good things, in that, in corrupting the formed substance, it introduces another form of the underlying matter, which, through the Good, receives the formation; or rather, because the transmission by reasoning of more accurate things is unimpeded in the divine oracles. The whole, he says, is of the Good, just as he will demonstrate later. For how will the same thing be both good, as it provides generation from the corrupting, and evil, as it is corrupting? ^D For there is not one power of the same and single object, according to the same respect, that is both corruption and generation; which is what would happen if we were to accept that evil is a power that does not corrupt of itself, but provides generation accidentally. For how could one and the same power be the motion of opposites? For even if a doctor is said to have the power to heal and the power to bring on a disease, the one is of himself, but the other is accidental, due to his absence or inattention; and we attribute the safety of the ship not only to the navigator present, but also the destruction to the one absent. For that which we blame for the presence of this, says Aristotle, we also blame for the absence of the contrary. But there is presupposed in these some power, in the one for healing, in the other for saving, the absence of which provides the contraries; and what becomes things according to habit is of itself, while those according to privation are accidental; whereas there, privation has it of itself, but habit accidentally. What, then, is this power that consists in privation, which is in the same thing both corruption and generation? For the privation of corruption is not generation, but the privation of generation and of being is corruption; nor is the absence of privation a form, but the absence of form is corruption and privation. Therefore, since evil is also self-corruption, and the Good is self-power towards generation, how could self-corruption be self-power, so as to be able to do something? But one must know that since self-evil, self-unmeasured, and self-unformed, and by itself essentially evil, is not evil to another—for this is a form and as it were an accident of malice. Just as, again, God is self-measured, and self-form-producing, and self-good essentially, but not good in another; for this is accidental. This self-evil, therefore, is neither a being nor productive, and it does not appear in any subsistence, but in the intrusion into the privation of the Good. And this is

^A what the great theologian Gregory says regarding the flight from the Good. How, then, evil—not being—steals in, he expounds more broadly, and ascribes the whole to the Good. For the Good, in those in whom it is perfectly present, makes them unmixed and whole goods; but in those in whom it is present less, they are mixed with evil. Yet evil is not in itself, but through the defect of the Good; since the complete goodness that passes through all things reaches not only to the celestial and divine powers, but is extended even to the last and earthly things; for this reason the earth is also called the footstool of God. And [the Good] is present to some in one way and to others in another, according to intensification and remission, and to the extremities according to a certain extreme resonance. For, as we have said, suppose someone shouting loudly, and one who is standing near and has a strong sense of hearing to take in the whole shout, while those standing at a distance [take it in] in proportion to the separation, and the one who is very far off perceives it most obscurely as a sort of final, faint echo; for if the participation in the Good were not thus, the most divine things would have the order of the last things. ^B But how was it fated for all to receive the Good equally, not being equally adapted to it? Now, however, this is the pre-eminent greatness of the power of the Good, that it empowers even those destitute of itself—not in another way or by something else, but by its own privation—to participate in it altogether. And this is: that which is impossible for men is possible with God. If it be permitted to speak boldly, that even those things which are repugnant to Him, by His own power both exist and struggle; for God sustains sinners, and indeed, many who struggle against His divine wills; and this is what is reserved for His own judgments, while we say, “By what judgments God knows, this happens, and this does not happen.” Or rather, to sum up: all things that are, insofar as they are good, both exist and are good from the Good; but insofar as they are deprived of the Good, they are not only not good, but they do not even exist. From this you can understand what was said by the prophet Obadiah ^C about sinners: *And they shall be as though they were not*. Wherefore even among those on the outside this is said, as in Homer, where someone speaks of goods of which he was once a participant but is now deprived, if they ever were. Hence it is concluded that absolutely evil, as being absolutely deprived of the Good, neither was, nor is, nor can be. And he says: Suppose the Good to be a habit; for although God is supersubstantially and by Himself the Good, and the essential Good, yet in those who participate [in it], the Good is also according to a certain habit. He therefore posits that some things remain in the habit, and even when the habit departs—as the heat of fire to those things warmed by it, and the coldness of snow to those chilled—they remain warm and cold. And again other things, which are not in the participation ^D of some habits, yet are preserved and exist. For how many things are devoid of life, how many without intellect, but yet they are, such as stones and plants and similar things? Come also to God Himself: He is beyond substance, and exists supersubstantially. And simply, in the case of others, whether [the habit] has departed

^B or was never acquired, it is possible for a thing to be and to subsist; but that which is in every respect deprived of the Good, as being evil itself, cannot exist at all.

He therefore sets forth the example of the intemperate man, who in his participation in evil neither exists nor truly desires [anything] (for such as is the love, such are the objects loved), yet in accordance with the very form of union and friendship he participates in the Good, if not of a real [Good], at least of an apparent one; for this is a certain dim trace of those friendships which are. And he who misuses anger is said to participate in the Good in so far as he is moved to correct those things which seem to be evil. Thus also he who desires the most wretched life participates in the Good insofar as he desires the life that seems to him to be the best. And he who pursues evil, in so far as he appears to be doing good, participates in the Good. So that if you were to take away the Good entirely, you would have taken away everything.

So also, that generation comes to be from corruption, as he said above, is not a power of evil, but the victory of a lesser good. Just as health is the order and symmetry of temperaments, and disease is a deficiency of such an order—though ^C not of the whole order, but of a part; for if it were of the whole, the animal would perish, and the disease would not subsist. Disease, therefore, is an absence of health, having as its constitution a minimal order. For if health did not flee, disease would not subsist, subsisting as it does in the departure of the state; nor would health be absent when overcome by disease; for in that way, the disease would have the primary order. But disease is the deprivation of health; for this reason he also said "subsisting alongside," for it does not have a subsistence, but rather a "sub-subsistence" in the fact that health is absent, just as darkness subsists alongside ^D the withdrawal of light.

Therefore, that which is in every way devoid of the Good does not exist; but that which participates in the Good, according to the Good, and in so far as it participates in the Good, is, to a greater or lesser degree, and is among existing things. Similarly, again, in the case of "that which is" according to negation: for that which is in no way and in no manner, which might even be said to be "that which is" by negation, will not be. But that which is in one respect and is not in another, in so far as it has fallen away from that which is truly being, is also not in some way of being, and its non-being is restrained and preserved; for he also said previously that he strengthens even the privations in accordance with how they are at all.

Therefore, that which is completely evil does not exist; but that which is in one respect good and in another not good, this is the one warring against some good, yet it is also itself mastered and contained by the Good through its partial participation in Him. For even if you speak of cowardice or daring, these also possess a portion from the Good: the former has the provident and life-loving [part], the latter the audacious and that which is prepared for dangers. For if the Good were to depart entirely, the remainder would be neither entirely good, nor mixed, nor indeed evil itself. The two [cases] have therefore passed by. For how would it be entirely good, from which the total Good has departed? And how, again, would it be evil itself, since all existing things are participants of the Good? This [latter] is that which is completely apart from the Good. But that it will not be left as something mixed in the total absence of the Good, he proves by saying thus: "If we concede that in the total absence of the Good the remaining evil is incomplete"

^A good, then some good remains in it. But if it is in the total absence of the Good, then both the perfect and the imperfect will be absent, and how will this be an incomplete good? For then only will evil appear to be an incomplete good, when there is not a total absence of the Good. But such a thing opposes some goods as evil, and is separated from others as good; for it is impossible for the same things to fight in all respects according to the same standards. Therefore, evil does not exist by itself.

§ XXI. Nor indeed does it exist in the things that are, as he will demonstrate by a hypothetical syllogism using a disjunctive conjunction. For if the Good is in all things that are, then evil either will not be in the things that are, or, if it is, it is in the Good; but this is impossible, that it should be in the Good; therefore, the former follows, that evil is not in the things that are. He confirms, therefore, the premise with an example, saying: "For neither is cold in fire, nor is depravity in that which even makes evil good." But if it exists, how will it be in this? If it were to subsist in some way from it, that is absurd, for a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruits, according to the holy Gospels. Nor, on the other hand, is the Good from evil, since that is dissonant and impossible. But if it is not from it, it evidently subsists from another cause, and behold two principles and causes. But no duality is a principle, for the monad will also be the principle of the duality. All these things are said against the Manichaeans, since duality is not a principle, but the monad is the ^C principle of all duality. Again, it is absurd for two opposites, the good and the evil, to proceed from one and the same [source], so that from this the principle would not be simple, but double; and [it would have to be] either contrary to itself, insofar as it produces opposites, or changed, so as at one time to produce the good, and at another time, having been changed, to produce the evil. If, then, the one is absurd because of these things, what indeed would the principles be? Are they again two opposites? But that is absurd; for it is neither likely that these should be in one another, nor that they should fight against one another; for thus not even God himself would be unscathed, and free from assault and molestation. Then all things ^D would be disordered and fighting, while some things existed under this [principle], and others under that: but this cannot happen, since the Good creates amity, and God is celebrated as peace itself; therefore also all good things are consonant (just as evils produce division; for *kakon* [evil] is said from *chazo*, which means to withdraw) and are the offspring of one divine life, and tend toward one Good. Therefore, neither is there anything in God, nor anything divine, nor is there evil from God; for either He is not good (and thus evil is from Him), or He does good, and [evil] is not from Him. For He will not, at one time produce good, and at another evil; for He would undergo change, and that too in regard to the most divine [nature] itself, the Cause.

^A If, however, God were one thing, and the substance of the good in Him another, then the good would inhere in God by accident; so that God would at one time possess the mark of divinity, which is the good, and at another time would not possess it, having cast it aside. And if He were to participate in the good, He would participate in it from another; and at one time He would participate, while at another time He would not participate, but would be a participant in evil—so that by participating in the good, He would produce the good, but by not participating in it, He would produce evil; which is absurd. Therefore, evil is not from God, nor is it in God, neither absolutely, nor at any given time.

^B § XXII. Moreover, evil does not exist even in the angels; for the angel is an image of God, existing as that which is secondarily by participation, which is primarily as a cause, that which is proclaimed—a manifestation of the hidden light and a most transparent mirror, receiving the impressions of beauty; and it is unstained by evil, or rather, it shines forth in itself, in a godlike manner, the goodness of that mystical silence. Consequently, evil does not exist even in the angels. By silence in the sanctuaries, he refers to the divine hiddenness; for base things are silenced on account of their deformity, but precious and divine things are also silenced on account of their venerableness, and because it is impossible to utter those things which lie within the sanctuaries, where the mind does not penetrate, however pure it may be and most capable of penetration due to its holiness. But someone might say that the angels are evil because they act as punishers. He resolves this objection most philosophically: first, by [the example of] the priests who debar the unworthy from the divine mysteries; next, he says that the very act of punishing someone is not evil, for it is a correction, and correction is a good; nor are those who punish evil, for it has been said: ^C *For he does not bear the sword in vain, for he is a minister of God, an avenger for wrath to him who practices evil.* d Finally, he proceeds to the resolution of the proposed problem, and says that not even the demons are by nature evil. He proves this by several arguments: first, how could it be otherwise, seeing they were fashioned by a good Creator, and [if they were evil] were they something else, since they were changed from good? For changes that are by way of alteration are not substantial, but are according to quality, just as those that are by way of increase and decrease are according to quantity; but change in substance is either generation or destruction. Since, therefore, they were changed, if they had changed in substance, they would necessarily have perished and passed into non-existence; but behold, they are immaterial substances, even if, in a different sense, they are said "not to be," insofar as they are evil. But you should mark that it is one thing for a thing to pass into non-existence and perish, and another for it not to be something. ^D For just as generation is in one sense absolute, as that which is according to substance, and in another sense relative, as that which is according to alteration—so also is destruction: one is absolute, that which is according to substance, and another is relative, that which is according to alteration. Thus, having undergone the destructive change of alteration, they are said "not to be"; but since they have not known that according to substance (for they are immortal), they are not said to perish and pass into non-existence.

d Rom. XIII, 4.

^A § XXIII. Then the saint, dividing the matter, asks: If they are evil, are they evil to themselves or to others? If to themselves, it follows that they destroy themselves (for evil has the power of destruction); but it is not so. But if to others (he distinguishes again), what do they destroy? Substance? Power? Or activity? (The difference between power and activity is such as that between a habit and the operation arising from a habit; for instance, the power of fire is calefactive, but the action is the heating of something.) If, therefore, they destroy substance, first of all, since they do not destroy those things which are by nature incorruptible, but rather those things which by nature exist as corruptible—which even without them were destined to perish—they do nothing against nature, but according to the nature of things. Furthermore, this is not entirely an evil, but is evil only in so far as the destruction, as is thought, takes place before the proper time; nor is it an evil to all, for to some it is a good, as in the case of wild beasts, serpents, and noxious herbs. Having therefore solved this by way of opposition, he now ^B solves it also by way of objection, that nothing of those things which exist perishes in its capacity as substance, so as to be utterly abolished and annihilated, but it is weakened by a defect of natural order, so that it becomes as it is. Yet this weakness is not a perfect corruption; for if it were perfect, then with the perishing of those things around which the corruption is concerned, the corruption itself would also cease. Therefore, the defect of order is not such an evil—or rather, it is not an entirely evil thing—which does not exist in things, but is a deficient good. And the same reasoning applies to power and activity; for if the subject of power and activity were to perish entirely, not only would the power and activity themselves not exist, but neither would the corruption itself. But if the subject were indeed preserved, yet the power and action were ^C to fail, this corruption would not be entirely evil, as it would not utterly destroy, but only the power and the activity. Moreover, corruption would very often be a good; for if the power and activity were of good things, their corruption is among evils; but if they were of evil things, then corruption would be a good, since it would allow the subject to remain, while destroying the evil habit and act. Furthermore, demons, in so far as they arise from the good God, are by no means evil, yet if anyone were to say they are evil, I would say so too; but not in the measure that they are this, but in so far as they are not this—namely, such as they were created. Since they too were brought forth for every good work, but they became infirm ^D because they did not guard their principality and the state in which they were created: for in nothing else are they evil than in the cessation of the habit of good things, and in the fact that they do not operate the good, so that they are evil according to their choosing, and not according to nature; otherwise they would always have been evil. But, on the contrary, if they were always evil, they would not be evil; whence it is concluded that if they are evil according to nature, they are not evil; for this is absurd. But an evil which always stays the same is not an evil, since that which is always the same is a property of the good; for the good is preservative of that which is the same, just as the evil is a dissolutive force. But if they are not always evil—for they were found to have been created good—they are not evil by nature, but in so far as they exist and live and think, they participate in the good, toward which life they also strive; and they are called evil because of their infirmity regarding their natural activity, and their departing from the things that are

^A Furthermore, what is the evil in demons? One might say: irrational wrath (for there is also found in us a rational wrath against the enemy and against sin) and mindless desire (for there is also found in others an intelligent desire: “With desire I have desired,” and, “A man of desires,” as of Daniel) and headlong imagination, imagining those things which will never come into existence. For there is also an imagination that is not headlong, through which we lay hold of those things that are and are possible. Since, therefore, such things—whether one calls them the better ones, as in the case of good men, or the worse ones, as in the case of demons—are constitutive powers in other animals, and it is not their presence, but their removal, that is destruction (for if wrath, imagination, and desire were removed, there would be no animal), for these reasons they are not evil, and thus they are not altogether evil even in demons, as they are not destructive. Therefore they are not evil by nature, but inasmuch as they are not good. And the good gift bestowed upon them was not altered, as if God had perhaps repented ^B that He had so honored them—far be it!—but they themselves have fallen away from the whole of the good, having closed their own vision-bestowing powers, even as it is said concerning Israel: “Their eyes they have closed, and with their ears they have heard heavily, lest they should ever turn and I should heal them.” For this reason, Satan is still called the Morning Star; and in the Gospels, it is said: “I was seeing Satan falling like lightning from heaven.” For they brought about disorder and destruction within their own angelic and light-bearing rank by their own choice, as is also found in Ezekiel: “Your knowledge was corrupted along with your beauty,”—that is, the light-bearing habit and angelic splendor. But how, while craving that which is not-being, do they crave evil, if it be not that God is Truth and Being? And that which is contrary to the truth is falsehood, which neither is, for it is altogether outside of God, nor is it an image of the truth. But since it persuades some that it is something, it will be a dark and dim ^C shadow of things that exist in any way whatsoever; wherefore it is by effect a shadow, and by effect a falsehood—that is, truly and essentially a falsehood, and hence by effect a non-entity. Just as, therefore, in things that are falsely, if the falsehood is removed, it removes the entire substance of the thing; so, too, he who loves falsehood, as do the demons, loves the non-existent, and he does not stand in the existent—that is, in the truth. The demons, therefore, as the Lord says, being liars and the fathers of lies, crave that which is not, and crave evil.

^D § XXIV. He passes to the so-called evil souls, exercising his argument also upon these, as to whether there can be in them anything evil according to substance, and he says: “But who would call souls evil? And yet, whether it be that the soul becomes evil through its association with other evils, or as if it were essentially evil—”

if indeed it does so by associating with them, it either associates as an evil one, running toward its like, or as a good one, that it might perchance be of help, according to what is said in the Apostle: “I became as one without law to those who were without law.” And these acts are not evil, since both occur in a providential and saving manner, the soul intending either to guard against evil or to change it into the good. Therefore, it also holds the former: that it associates with the evil as one who is evil, having a notion of providence and salvation, though it be apparent and not altogether true, because the evil soul acts with foresight, that the evil to which it associates might be saved. Therefore, he who from the beginning has taken his place among the saints associates as one who is good, that he might of course be of benefit, and on this account he is harmed; having overlooked the other—that it often associates with the evil as one who is evil—he demonstrates that this is good, insofar as it wishes to provide for and save what is perishing, even if it cannot, but rather results in itself becoming a participant in the evil. To this second point, he only objects: “If it associates as one who is good, so that it might benefit, and on this account is harmed, this is not evil, but good, and it is from the Good that even what is evil becomes good.” But if we do not grant this, but rather the other, that the soul is depraved by itself, by what other thing is it depraved, if not by the defection from good things? ^B Certainly it is not depraved in any substantial evil, just as the example of the air holds; for evil is not any substance, nor power, nor activity, but a defect and lack of perfection. And so, we who are governed by mind and reason are invaded by passions through a defect of good things; and for this reason they are not evil in themselves, insofar as they are something, but they are evil because they are not in the good, but are lacking from it.

§ XXV. In brute animals, moreover, these passions are not only not evil simply and absolutely, but if you were to remove them from the animals in whom they exist, the animals would not even be of the kind that they are called; so that, since they conserve nature rather than destroy it, they are by no means evil; for the destruction of nature is a defect of its natural dispositions and activities and powers. And since generation is a movement, and every movement is in time and is from the imperfect toward reaching perfection, the imperfect is therefore not contrary to nature, but within the nature that is fashioned to receive perfection; whence also the imperfect is not altogether nothing, since it is not entirely contrary ^C to nature. This he says in order to adapt the sense to what was said above; for he had said there that if the soul is depraved, it is depraved by perturbation; but perturbation is not some subsistent evil, but is a defect and emptiness of the perfection of good things; and this is imperfection. Therefore, what is imperfect is not contrary to nature, since even from this, not yet existing, something perfect is generated. If, therefore, the imperfect is not contrary to nature, it is in accordance with nature, because it is in accordance with nature. The entire notion of the passage, therefore, is such that if the soul is depraved, it is in the lack of good things that it becomes depraved.

and that evil is not something subsistent; saying through opposition that if passions were evil for all. Then he gives an instance, that they are not evil for all: for the nature of some animals consists in these things, and therefore they are rather not evil. Hence, there remains a doubt: how is it that in those who use reason, a privation of good—or at least an imperfection—is an evil, since the good is not being promoted and the soul remains imperfect; while in irrational animals, since they are incapable of reason, how shall we say that passions exist through the absence of good? We are therefore compelled to say here that there are also certain evils in themselves, which do not arise from the absence of good. Or we answer that even in brute animals such passions—such as anger and concupiscence—are in no way evil, but rather constitute their natures. If, therefore, it is denied that passions in brute animals are evil, the doubt is also removed; for if they are not evil, it will be superfluous to inquire whether they are evil in themselves and not according to an absence of good; for it is of that which simply is. We inquire also whether it is this way or that way; but concerning that which simply is not, an inquiry of this sort is superfluous and foolish. ^C

§ XXVI. Having cast out evil from the angels, and furthermore having cast out altogether evil also from the minds, from the souls, and moreover from the demons, he now casts it out also from other things, and first from the universal nature of beings. All the reasons and causes of natures, he says, according to which they have been made and exist, exist from the divine nature; which he calls "universal," because from it all things proceed. He called "universal nature" all things that were fashioned by God. There is nothing, therefore, in the nature of things, he says, which is universally opposed to all things; for what is against nature to one thing is nature to another, and this is good, since nature is the principle of motion and rest; and that which moves is the immovable reason, the divine art. Just as, therefore, we say that the reasons of art remain in artificial products, and often, when we behold these, we exclaim, "O wondrous art!" admiring what we see; so also in all natural things the reasons of creation remain. How, therefore, could anything be contrary to universal nature? And to what could the reasons of creatures be contrary? To the Creator? But this is impious. To themselves? And thus nothing would ever subsist. To some other entity? And it will be something distinct from the whole with which it will fight. Therefore, there is no evil even in the whole. If, however, anything happens to something contrary to the species of its creation, this is called "against nature," and not happening according to nature, as, for example, water being carried upward, and fire downward. But this occurs by a privation of nature; whence evil is not nature, but is rather an assault upon nature, which is also what is called "against nature."

^A § XXVII. Having said that evil is not in nature, he further says that it is not in natural bodies either. For just as beauty is a symmetry of members with good color, so deformity is a disproportion of the same. Yet deformity is not altogether evil; for if there were an utter dissolution of form and order, the body itself would also perish. And that the body is not the cause of malice to the soul, as some, holding a depraved opinion, wrongly blame the Creator, is manifest from the demons, who, being incorporeal, abound in malice; for in all things, malice is a certain falling away from one’s own proper goods.

§ XXVIII. Neither is matter an evil, as some falsely claim. First, because it will never be found formless, or stripped of all form; but with form, as a participant in form, it participates in beauty and comeliness. But if we consider it in itself as formless, suffering or undergoing nothing, how is it possible for matter to produce any evil, when it cannot even suffer anything? But if even God, though He can suffer nothing, makes all things, He transcends natural effects thereby, even though He is a cause, but an efficient one. The material cause, however, which is connatural to its effects, does nothing at all in its effects unless it has first undergone ^B being informed. This the saint says because certain philosophers claimed that evils arise from the irrational part of the soul, through its being mingled with matter and body, and the soul inclining toward this. Again, he contends concerning matter, and constructs an argument from division. For either it is in no way anywhere, and will have neither character; or it is somewhere: but those things which are, are from God, and it itself, as being from God, is good. Otherwise, since there are two things, God and matter, if one be supposed good and the other evil, it will happen that either the good makes the evil, or certainly the evil, insofar as it is from the good, is good; or, conversely, that the evil makes the good, or the good, insofar as it is from the evil, is evil. If one does not come from the other, it follows that there are two principles, ^C which is impious to say. But these must necessarily be reduced again to one thing, because the principle is unity, not duality. And this, whatever it may be, the same things must be said of it again: for either it will be good, and all things from it good; or it will be partly evil and partly good; and it will already be composite and not simple, and thus not a principle, but those are the principles from which it is composed, and this proceeds to infinity. ^D Since, however, some of the Gentiles said that the heaven and the stars are not corrupted because they were produced from the purest matter, whereas those things among us are from a base and crasser matter, and that for this reason they are corrupted, being unable to be established and to adhere firmly, the saint says: But if they say that matter was necessary for the completion of the universe, how is matter an evil? Note that he says Aristotle spoke of matter being necessary by hypothesis—that is, if a form exists, it is necessary that matter also exist.

Nor does iron necessarily exist, whether a saw is to be made or not. But since the Creator produces matter from evil and not from good, or since matter desires form, according to them, how is that which desires the good an evil? For evil flees from and fights against the good. How, moreover, can evil have a generative and productive power, since they say that matter nourishes nature, just as matter suited for combustion nourishes fire? If they were to say that matter itself does not produce evil, but being good has an attractive power toward evil, how is this true, since many souls, though bound to the body and to matter, look toward the good? If this attraction from matter were of necessity, then it would not have been necessary, so that the whole matter depends upon choice. If someone says that matter drags down those souls which are easily yielding toward it, while it cannot do so to others—just as fire burns those things close to it that yield to the fire by a natural susceptibility, but does not burn the salamander at all, and thus matter is necessary for dragging into wickedness those who are not established in themselves—how then is evil necessary, or how is that which is necessary evil? For that which is necessary by nature as if it were according to nature is not evil. Furthermore, liberty is no less confirmed from this, since it is placed within our own power either to be established in ourselves or not, but rather to be loosened and subjugated by the passions. ^B

§ XXIX. Since Aristotle, along with matter and form, posits privation as a principle—which is indeed contrary to form and is inherent in matter—he says that even privation itself does not fight against the good by its own power; for privation has no subsistence. And that which does not subsist, what kind of power will it have? If it is partial, such that this thing is [thus] and another thing is not, such a privation is not altogether evil; for while a partial privation of the good exists, the thing is not yet perfectly evil; and insofar as it occurs, we say it is being brought about to the extent that the good recedes. He spoke of those things which were at some time deprived, and of those which are now presently suffering privation, indicating from both that privation only then stands alongside [reality] when the good departs. ^C

§ XXX. Here he argues against the Manichaeans, in that he demonstrates that evil is not a being; for even if that heresy did not yet exist, he was inspired beforehand to provide things which would overturn their error. Perhaps such arguments also hold good against certain pagan opinions. He says, moreover, that the good is from the one Cause of all things (for he calls this the integral Cause), but that evil is not according to nature, but from many and partial defects of the good. He said "partial" in order to do away with the universal; for a total defect would simply do away with all existence. Therefore, evil is not something defined, but indefinite, as it arises from many [sources]. But how is evil from many defects? Plainly, insofar as the ^D

^A good fails, to that extent evil subsists in a way; according to the smallness and the time of the defect, so is the existence of the evil small and in time. Therefore, the first argument concludes in virtue two things: that the good is what is, and that the evil is what is not. And both are also concluded from the minor proposition alone: namely, that the good is a thing originating from the sole principle of all things, and thus it is; therefore, the good is a thing. And again, that evil is from many and indefinite defects, and is something that in this way is not; therefore, evil is not a thing.

God, he says, knows even those things which are called evil as good, calling evil such things as wars, diseases that correct character, deaths, and the like; for they are thought by us to be evil, but they are powers and causes that produce good, for through these, repentance and the knowledge of God and of piety have come to the many, and in the prophets it is called malice. Or otherwise: the cause of the evil in lasciviousness is concupiscence; yet this concupiscence is a power that produces good—to those who use reason, so that through it they may reach up toward the truly good; but to those bereft of reason, so that they may desire the things necessary for their own preservation.

God therefore knows, or rather recognizes, and even makes evil, not as evil, but as good. Therefore, nothing is evil of itself, for it would have nothing of the good, from which even the causes of evils are beneficent powers. But if evil is eternal, and is powerful, and acts, whence does it have these? Is it from the good? Or conversely, since it also possesses these goods, will these goods be from evil? But it is by no means fitting that the good should be perfected from evil; therefore, it will be the first. But the goods given from the good would render evil good; how then does it still remain evil? Or certainly, the matter is not thus, but these things accrue to both of them, both to good and to evil, from another cause? And what at last might this be? And if it exists, of what sort is it? And again, in the same place, these things will be said which are said here. Therefore, evil does not subsist of itself.

Moreover, that which follows from nature is defined; a definition is a principle explaining the essences of things, and declaring what it is that is. Every thing, therefore, that is according to nature is from a defined cause, through which that which occurs comes to be. ^C If, therefore, evil lacks a cause (for it was produced by nothing), it is deservedly not defined, since there is no definition of it that declares its essence; necessarily, therefore, evil is not even according to nature. But if it is contrary to nature, it will not have a principle in nature, just as ignorance has no principle in art; but everything that has no principle in nature neither exists nor subsists, but comes to be contrary to nature by the failure of that which is according to nature.

Furthermore, is the soul by nature evil, ^D as fire is hot, or are its operations entirely and altogether evil? But neither the first, for the good would not have produced that which is evil by nature; nor the second, for whence then would the virtues be? It follows, therefore, that evil is not something subsisting per se, but [is] a deficiency of the good. This is the whole sense of the discourse. This holy man, having brought forward the argument by way of question,

^A did not make his inquiry by way of division, so that the particle "an" might be disjunctive, as in, "Is the soul good?" — but he immediately pressed his inquiry, and placed that "an" declaratively, as if to say: "Is it the case that the nature of the soul is good, but in its operations it fares well at times, and at others fares not so well?"—which is to say that it is mutable. Having posited this, then, as true, and having clarified it, he attacks the primary claim: that the soul is not evil by nature, nor the cause of evils.

§ XXXI. Furthermore, evil is contrary to the good; thus, the cause of the good is one, but the causes of evil are many. Note, however, that in regard to the good, it is possible to name not only the efficient cause, but also the formal cause, and the "what it is to be" (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), just as he said above, in as much as it is also said to be ^B defined. But since we cannot name formal causes for evil (for nothing is evil by nature, such that it might be defined and imbued with form, and possess its own "what it is to be"—and for this reason he does not wish to speak of formal, but of efficient causes; and these are what he previously called particular deficiencies). Then, so that no one might suppose that these efficient causes of evils are powers, reasons, and forms, according to which it might be imbued with form, he says that they are not powers, but an incapacity and an incommensurate mixture of disparate things. For when a deficiency eventuates in the subject in relation to virtue, behold, a certain malice arises, and yet greater, and greater still, and this into infinity, and malice will never possess perfection. Correctly, too, is "incommensurate" ^C posited; for a commensurate mixture of disparate things is something formed and defined, and for this reason it is not evil, but good, as is to be seen in health, which consists in the proportion of contrary humors; and in harmony, which is called an "union" of many things mixed and looking toward diverse ends—things which, according to nature, always maintain the same state, as being defined according to the reason of their nature. For never will an olive tree spring from a grape-pit, but a vine; nor from an olive stone a vine, but an olive tree. Evils are indefinite, and [manifest] in other and still other infinite ways; and the beginning and the end of evils is the good; for while doing evil, we think we are doing good; for whatever we do, we do it desiring the good; for if it appeared entirely evil, there would be no impulse or desire in us toward it; for this reason, then, evil has no ^D subsistence toward which one might perhaps look while acting; but if it has any subsistence at all, it is for the sake of the good, and does not come into being of itself.

§ XXXII. For evil, to exist is according to accident, and not per se; for we do not do what we do by desiring evil, but we do desire the good, yet evil comes to pass; so that evil comes into being because of the good. Wonderfully, therefore, he shows that evil is insubsistent, calling it a privation of things ordered and natural; but a privation does not subsist per se, but [only] when it ought to be present and demands to be so, [yet] is not present: whence he also calls privation "sin" (ἁμαρτίαν)—that is, a missing of the mark and a falling away from what is appropriate—and "[missing] the aim,"

derived from the metaphor of those casting projectiles. ^A For just as those who cast outside the mark miss what is correct, so too we, failing [to achieve] the mark and the order, are carried away into a nature that is contrary to nature, irrational, imperfect, and mindlessly non-existent; whence he also declares that evil is in no way anything. Furthermore, against those who say that evil can do something of itself, he asserts, then, that evil does not subsist in any other way than in the mixture with the good, occurring only insofar as the good is deficient; for that which is entirely devoid of the good neither is anything nor can it do anything. From the contrary, therefore, he argues, saying: "If the good is that which is, and is an object of desire, and is powerful, and acts, then evil, being deprived of entity, will not possess these." ^B Furthermore, that evil does not exist of itself is clear from the fact that it is not the same in all things, but one thing in some and another in others, according as the lapse from the good occurs in each one. God, however, preserved the subordinations in the creation; for the mind, according to which divine and altogether immaterial spirits receive their substance, is superior to the soul; yet, having lapsed from the form of the good, it became a demon. The soul, however, insofar as it is intelligent and rational, acting according to reason, remains in its own property; but when moved against reason, it becomes evil. Finally, bodies, when moved contrary to nature, do not flourish.

§ XXXIII. Furthermore, if there is providence in all other things, evil does not exist of itself; for there would then also be providence over evil as a being. But providence is over all things; therefore, evil does not exist of itself. And this is the first mode of hypothetical syllogisms, proving the consequent by the positing of the antecedent; for providence exists in all things that are, ^C and nothing of those that are is entirely devoid of providence—that is, entirely deprived of the good. And what do I mean when speaking of goods that come to be or exist? Why, providence even uses the evils that come to be benevolently for the correction either of those who commit them or of others. Wherefore they speak badly, those who say: "Why did God not create us such that, even if we wished, we would not sin?" For this is nothing other than to say: "Why did He not make us mindless and irrational?" For to be led by necessity toward virtue would neither show that we are masters of ourselves, ^D nor would it allow our intelligent nature to exist. For take away our liberty, and we will neither be the image of God, nor will we have rational and intelligent souls, and our nature will perish entirely. He said "self-moving" (αὐτοκινήτων) instead of "having free will and self-mastery," not for those that move themselves—in distinction to the immobile, like houses, or those moved by others, like stones—for, discussing virtue, he took the "self-moving" as those having free will. He concludes, therefore, from this that evil is non-being, and its genesis is not according to power, but according to weakness. § XXXIV. And the change of the demons, from existing from the beginning out of the good, but not as evils, but as the offspring of the good, [came] not according to virtue, but according to its own genesis—and it is born not according to virtue, but according to weakness. § XXXIV.

XXXV. Since he has said that evil in each thing is a weakness and a deficiency of the good, and since the knowledge of goods and of beautiful things is itself among the goods, and it follows from this that every sin committed in action arises from a deficiency of such knowledge, how does the argument stand regarding, "Woe to those who sin in knowledge!" and, "He who knows the will of his Lord and does not do it, shall be beaten with many stripes"? Thus, if there were no deficiency of the good—that is to say, of knowledge—it would not be in the nature of sin to come to pass. ^B Wonderfully, therefore, he resolves the problem, [by showing] that in that case too, a certain deficiency and weakness follows; for those people also are infirm, either regarding faith—in that they hear, but do not possess a perfect faith in what is said—or regarding the act, according to a perversion of the desire, in which someone does not will the good, but the evil; for, in general, he who does evil does it because of a deficiency, either of doctrinal knowledge (which forgetfulness can often blur, and which he said above is generated from hearing), or of clear knowledge (which resides in one, naturally or through illumination, without a teacher), or of faith (so that one hears, but does not have perfect faith in what is said), or of the desire (because one desires poorly and sins in the matter of desire), or of the operation of the good (as when one wills to perform the good, but is hindered by something). Hence, from this, the difficulty arises. ^C Yet, one might say, weakness is excusable, not punishable. But the resolution is immediately ready. If we did not possess the ability [to do good], the argument would be correct; but since our ability comes from the Good, a lapse regarding the good is not praiseworthy. But these things we have discussed in another treatise, in which we have also contended against the captious and foolish arguments of some regarding these matters. Now, however, the Good has been sufficiently praised by us as the cause of all goods and the non-cause of any evil, as the one who gives form and is the end of beings—an end not natural, but creative (for the natural end is within that which is brought to an end, just as a point is in the line), and as one who even makes the evils themselves good, concerning whom it is to be desired and loved by all, and [we have demonstrated] whatever else this discourse has shown. ^D

CHAPTER V. On Being, in which also on Exemplars.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER. 1. It teaches that God, as He is in Himself, can neither be known nor explained; and it clarifies how the name of the Good is more extensive than the name of Being. II. It says its purpose is to preach God according to His providences or emanations. III. That those things which partake more of God are closer to Him. IV. That God is all things in all things eminently. V. That from God are age and time, and all things; and that the degree of being is the first or oldest gift of God. VI. That the degree of being and all things are from God and united in God. VII. That in God, as the cause of all things, even contrary things are united. VIII. That from God the celestial spirits, and souls, and all things obtain their degree of being, and whatever they have; and that God is in all things eminently, and it confirms this by the example of the sun; and at the same time explains what exemplars are. IX. It teaches that those things that are more principal in things are not properly relations, nor exemplars, but exemplified things, and that God embraces all things with His simple perfection. X. How God is the beginning and end of all things.

§ 1.

We must now pass on to the theological name of true Being.^A But we shall offer only as much commentary as the logic of our undertaking requires; for it is not our purpose to explain the superessential substance, insofar as it is superessential (for this is ineffable and unknown, and absolutely unmanifest, and surpasses the very union of the mind), but rather to celebrate the emanation of the deifying substance, which is the principle of all substance, into all things that are. For the naming of the Good from God clarifies all the emanations of the author of all things, and this naming of God extends from the Good to things that are, and to things that are not, and is above those things that are and above those that are not. The name of Being, however, extends to all things that are, and is exalted above the essences themselves. The name of Life reaches toward all living things, and is above living things. The naming of God from Wisdom reaches toward all things that understand, that reason, and that perceive, and is above all these.

§ 2.

These names of God, therefore, which disclose His providences, it is our purpose to preach;^C for our treatise does not promise to unravel and disclose the superessential goodness, and essence, and life, and wisdom of that superessential divinity itself, which, as the Scriptures say, has established its seat in the hidden places, above all goodness, and divinity, and essence, and wisdom, and life; but rather it praises the manifested providence, the producer of good things, the most excellent goodness, and the cause of all good things; so that it celebrates as being, and life, and wisdom, the producer and cause of substance and life, which imparts wisdom to those that partake of substance and life, and of mind and reason, and of senses. Our treatise does not say that the Good is one thing, and Being another, and Life or Wisdom another, nor that there are many causes and other deities productive of other things, some superior and others inferior, but that from the one God are all the good emanations, and the...

denominations of God praised by us; and that one of these declares the whole providence of the one God, while others manifest more or less general providences.

§ III.

Verily, someone may say: Since being is more extensive than life, and life than wisdom, why is it that living things excel non-living beings, sensitive things excel living beings, rational things excel sensitive ones, and the spirits themselves excel the rational beings and are positioned around God, and are nearer to Him? Yet it was fitting that those which partook of the greater gifts from God should be better and excel the rest. ^B This would indeed be said correctly if one were to posit that spiritual things were devoid of being and life; but since the divine spirits excel other beings by their own being, and live more excellently than other living things, and understand and know beyond sense and reason, and above all beings desire and partake of the beautiful and the good, they are certainly nearer to the Good, in that they partake of it more radiantly, and have received from it more numerous and greater gifts; just as rational beings also excel sensitive ones, in as much as they possess a richer faculty of reason, and sensitive ones excel others by sense, and others by life. And this is, as I believe, true: that those things which partake more of the one God, who is abundant in infinite gifts, are also nearer to Him and more divine than those which are surpassed by these. ^C

§ IV.

Since, however, we have also spoken about these things, come, let us praise the Good as being truly existent, and as the substance-maker of all things that are. He who is, exists as the supernatural substantial cause of all possible essence, and the effector of being, existence, subsistence, substance, and nature; the beginning and measure of ages; the entity of times, and the aeon of beings; the time of those things which come into being; the being for those things which are in any way, the generation for those things which are in any way generated. From Him who is, come aeon, and substance, ^D and existence, and time, and generation, and that which is generated. It is that which is in things that are, and in those which exist in any way, and in those which exist by themselves. For God is not a being in any one way, but simply and infinitely holds and anticipates within Himself the whole of being; wherefore He is also called King of ages, as in Him and around Him there is and consists the being of everything that is and exists, and in Whom there neither was, nor will be, nor was produced, nor is produced, nor will be produced, nor indeed is; but He Himself is the being for things that are; and not only those things which are, but the very being of things, is from Him who is pre-eternally; for He Himself is the age of ages, existing before every age.

^A Let us then begin again and say that for all things that are, and for all ages, being is from Him who pre-exists. And every age and time is from Him; and of every age and time, and every thing that in any way exists, He who pre-exists is principle and cause. And all things participate in Him, and He departs from none of the things that exist; and He Himself is before all things, and all things consist in Him; and, simply, if anything in any way exists, it is, is conceived, and is preserved in the Pre-existent. And before His other participations, Being itself is set forth; and Being itself, in itself, is older than Life itself, and Wisdom itself, and Divine Likeness itself, and all the things of which those that exist participate, [for] before all these they participate in Being; or rather, even those things in themselves, of which existing things participate, participate in Being itself in itself; and there is nothing that exists of which Being itself is not its substance and age. ^B Therefore, with good reason, God is celebrated as being, more originally than all other things, as He who is; for since He possesses Being more primordially and excellently, He first of all made Being exist—I mean Being itself, in itself—and through Being He caused everything that in any way exists to exist. Thus, all the principles of things that are participate in Being, and they are, and are principles, and are first, and afterwards they are principles. ^C And if you wish to name, of living beings, as living, their principle as Life itself; or of like things, as like, Likeness itself; or of united things, as united, Unity itself; or of ordered things, as ordered, Order itself; and of all other things, as many as participate in this or that, or both, or many, and are this or that, or both or many, participating, you will find that these participate first in Being, and that they remain first by Being; and afterwards, that they are principles of this or that, and by participating in Being are both existing and participated in. But if these things (which are numbered among the principles of others) exist through the participation of Being itself, much more so do those things which participate in those principles themselves.

§ VI.

Therefore, the first gift, Being itself, which the Super-Goodness brings forth with those things that are in themselves, is deservedly celebrated as the oldest and first of all participations; and from It and in It is Being itself, in itself, and the principles of things, and all things whatsoever that exist, and things that in any way exist; and this is done incomprehensibly, and collectively, and singularly. ^D For in unity every number pre-exists in a unified manner, and Unity holds in itself singularly every number; and every number is gathered into one and is in Unity; and in so far as it proceeds from Unity, to that extent

it is divided and multiplied. ^A And in the center, all the lines of the circle exist together in one copulation; and the point holds in itself all the straight lines uniformly coupled one to another, and to the one principle from which they have emerged, and in the center itself they are altogether coupled; and being at a short distance from it, they are little divided, but being further away, they are more so; and, to speak once for all, the closer they are to the center, the more they are coupled with it and with each other, and the further they are from the center, the more they are also separated from each other.

§ VII.

^B Nay, even in the whole nature of the universe, the reasons of each individual nature are gathered in one unconfused copulation; and in the soul, the virtues which provide for all parts of the body are uniformly coupled. It is not, therefore, absurd for those ascending from small and minute images and examples to the cause of all things to contemplate with supermundane eyes all things in the cause of all, even the things that are contrary to one another, uniformly and coupled. For it is the principle of things, from which both the very being itself, and all things that in any way exist, originate—every principle, every end, every life, every immortality, every wisdom, every order, every congruence, every power, every custody, every firmament, every permansion, every intelligence, every reason, every sense, every habit, every state, every motion, every ^C union, every complex, every friendship, every discrepancy, every distinction, every definition, and all other things whatsoever that are entities by being, characterizes all entities.

§ VIII.

And from this same cause of all, the intelligible and intelligent essences of the deiform angels, and of souls, and of the natures of the whole world, and whatsoever are said to exist either in others or to be by thought—in a word, those most holy and most ancient virtues, which are true essences, and are as it were stationed in the very vestibule of the superessential Trinity, possess both being and deiform being ^D from It, and in It, and after them the lower [possess it] in a lower way, and the newest [possess it] in the newest way, as regards the angels, but as regards us in a supermundane degree. Souls also, and all other entities, according to the same reason, have both being and well-being, and they both are and are well, while they obtain both being and well-being from Him Who is prior, and in Him they both are and are well, and from Him they begin, and in Him they are preserved, and to Him they are terminated. And indeed He distributes the first fruits of being to those more excellent essences, which the Scriptures call eternal; but being itself of all things

^A never fails; yet that very being is from Him who is prior; and His is essence, and He Himself is not essence; and in Him is existence, and He Himself is not in existence; and existence has Him, and He Himself does not possess existence; and He Himself is of the existing [thing] both age, and principle, and measure, being before essence and being and age, and the substantific principle of all, and the middle, and the end. And for this reason, by the Oracles, He who truly pre-exists is multiplied according to the thought of all things that are, and in Him is properly celebrated that He was, and is, and shall be, also that it came to pass, and comes to pass, and shall come to pass; for all these things signify to those who understand as it befits God ^B that He is beyond substance according to every thought, and is the cause of those things that are in all ways. For indeed He is not this thing, while that thing is not; nor is He in some way, while in some way He is not; but rather He is all things, as the author of all, and containing and anticipating in Himself all principles, and all the terminations of all things; and He is above all, inasmuch as He transcends all things super-essentially. Wherefore all things are spoken of Him and at the same time nothing of all things is He; He is of every figure, of every form, without form, without beauty, holding the principles and middle and ends of things loosely and abstractly in Himself, and shining purely upon all, granting that they may be according to one cause and the super-essential ^C copulation. For if that sun of ours, while being unique and shedding its light uniformly, renews, and nourishes, and protects, and perfects, and distinguishes, and unites, and warms, and makes fruitful, and increases, and changes, and establishes, and produces, and quickens, and invigorates the substances and qualities of sensible things, however many and diverse they may be; and if each of them participates in the one and same sun in a manner proper to itself, and the unique sun has uniformly anticipated in itself the causes of the many who participate in it; then by a stronger reason it must be conceded that in the cause of the sun itself and of all things, according to a unique super-essential ^D copulation, the exemplars of all things have pre-existed, since this [Cause] produces the very essences according to an excess of essence. We call exemplars, then, those substantific reasons of things in God, pre-existing unitarily, which the divine discourse calls pre-definitions, and divine and good wills, defining and effecting things: according to which He who is above substance pre-defined and produced all things that are.

§ IX

If, however, the philosopher Clement desires that the more principal things among those that are be called exemplars, he proceeds, indeed, when speaking thus, not through proper and perfect and simple names; but if we concede that this also is rightly said, it must be remembered [that he speaks thus]

of the Scripture which says: "I did not show these things to you that you might go after them, but that through the analogical knowledge of these things we might be led up, as far as we are able, to the Cause of all." ^A All beings, therefore, are to be ascribed to Him according to the one transcendent union of all things; since, commencing from Being itself—the essence-making procession and goodness—and passing through all things, and filling all things from Himself with being, and rejoicing over all that are, He holds all things within Himself in an excellence of simplicity, which shuns all duality; and He similarly contains all things according to His super-expanded infinitude, and is participated in by all things singularly, just as one voice, being one and the same, is participated in as one by many ears.

[X.] All things, therefore, have their beginning and end in One Who pre-exists them. ^B Beginning as Cause; and end as that for the sake of which; and the limit of all things, and the infinitude of all infinitude and limit in a pre-eminent manner, as of opposites. For in that One, as has been frequently said, He holds pre-existent all things that are, and has caused them to exist, being present to all everywhere according to one and the same [principle], and according to the same [principle] entirely; proceeding into all things, and abiding in Himself, and standing and moving, and neither standing nor moving; having neither beginning, nor middle, nor end; nor is He in any of the things that are, nor is He any of the things that are. And neither does anything of those things which exist eternally, or of those subsisting in time, belong to Him at all; but as He is removed from time, and from the age, and from all that are in the age, and from all that are in time; ^C because He is Himself the very Age, and [the Cause of] those that are, and the measure of things that are, and of those which are measured through Him and by Him. But let these things be spoken of more opportunely elsewhere.

CORDERIUS' ANNOTATIONS

§ 1. Note: when he speaks of God, that He surpasses the very coupling of the mind—that is, says S. Thomas, He exceeds the very coupling of the intellect of the blessed, who see the essence of God through the coupling of their own intellect with the essence of God itself; for although they see God Himself, yet there is not such a perfection of vision as is the perfection of the divine essence itself, and as is the perfection of the vision by which God sees Himself.

Ibidem: This naming of God from "good" is extended both to things that are and to things that are not, and is above them. Dionysius is accustomed to call, as S. Maximus noted, things that are, those devoid of matter; but those that have matter he calls things that are not, on account of [their] corruption. The name of "good" is also extended to the things that are not; because God calls those things which are not as though they were; for the participation of the good is the ability to be, as S. Thomas says. Or it is extended to those that are not because "not-to-be" is good, when we contemplate that in God, Who is above every thing that is—as, "[to be] is not [the same as to be] wise, holy," and other things of this kind, such as we know in creatures, which belongs to God, from Whom these things are removed, as S. Thomas says, not on account of defect, but on account of excess. Or "to be above those things that are and those that are not" signifies being uncircumscribed by place, that is, being everywhere.

Ibidem: The naming of God from "wisdom" is extended to all things that understand. By the name of "intelligents" he includes both angels and souls; and although Dionysius is wont to call souls "intelligents," when he distinguishes them from the angels, whom he is accustomed to call "intellectibles"—because angels have beneath them those by whom they are understood, namely souls, whereas souls do not have [such]—now, however, as I have said, by a common...

^A name he calls both angels and souls, because both angels and souls understand God, and by understanding God they convert themselves to Him. But by those things through which humans who are wayfarers reason, he understands; for the soul, while it is in the body, can reason through a conversion to phantasms, but not when separated. By those things which they sense, he signifies animals, which do not participate in reason, [but] which participate in the wisdom of God in their strivings innate to their nature, as the blessed Basil teaches in the *Hexaemeron*.

§ II. On the words: *He does not say that being good is one thing, and being [is] another.* He does not say this idly, says Maximus, but to rebuke those philosophers and Simon Magus, who posited gods [as] *kosmopoious*, that is, as the makers of the parts of the world, greater and more powerful [in relation] to the greater creatures, and weaker in relation to the weaker ones, descending according to their own degrees in their workmanship down even to matter. Therefore the name of good, he says, ^B embraces 434 all providence, but the other names [are] parts of providence, such as life, wisdom, reason. For all things that are, have been produced on account of the goodness of God, so that they might exist; and they are good, yet not all participate in life, or wisdom, or reason. For he calls those more general providences which we contemplate in many things, as life pervades plants and living creatures, both participants in reason and non-participants; but wisdom and reason belong to fewer things: for these are perceived only in those who use reason.

§ III. *Truly, someone will say, since being [is] more [than] life*, etc. Note here, with St. Thomas, 1-2, quest. 2, art. 5, that *being* simply accepted, according to which it includes in itself every perfection of existing, excels life, and all subsequent perfections (for thus *being* itself prepossesses in itself all subsequent goods; and in this way Dionysius speaks), but if *being* itself is considered as far as it is participated in this or that thing which does not grasp the whole perfection of existing, but has an imperfect *being*, as is the *being* of any creature; thus it is manifest that *being* itself with a superadded perfection is more eminent. Whence Dionysius says in the same place, that living things are better than existing things, and intelligent things [better] than living things. For this is the difference between the very participations of God, and the participants, that the more simple a participation is, the more noble it is; but the participant, the greater composition of participated gifts it has, the more noble it is: just as *to be* is more noble than *to live*, and *to live* than *to understand*, if one is understood without the other (for to all things *to be* would be preferred), but that which has more of these, exists better.

§ IV. On the words: *He is truly the effector of existence, of person, of substance, of nature*, note from St. Thomas [that] those things which exist can be considered both as singulars, and as species or genus, and as nature. For example, Socrates is a person, a human, an animal, a species and a genus, which by power contain singulars, because they can be thought in singulars; humanity is a nature, which neither in act nor by power contains singulars: therefore man according to substance consists of humanity, which is the nature of man, of which the parts are body and soul in the universal; according to existence he consists of this body and of this soul. The nature of genus or species, that is, of the universal, contains in act only those things which fall into the definition, as humanity which does not contain in act flesh and bones, which do not fall into the definition, as man [does] contain; because the notion of man abstracts from these, just as the notion of humanity abstracts; yet it contains in potentiality flesh and bones, because humanity can be thought in the universal name which is defined; but the principles of the individual it contains neither in act, nor in potentiality; for by humanity [one] is a man; but it is not, nor can it be thought to be, this man by humanity. In this way, *participation per se*, *participation*, and *this participation* behave, as for example, *life per se*, *life*, and *this life*. *Life per se* signifies the nature of life, that is, those things which fall into the definition of life. *Life* is the universal of the species, as the life of humans, the life of a horse, or the universal of the genus, as the life of an angel, of a man, of a horse. And just as God is the author of man *per se*, that is of humanity—[He] is, I say, the cause that the nature of man is to be a rational animal (for humanity contains this) and the author of man, and of this man; so He is the cause of *life per se*, and of *life*, and of this *life*. *Life per se* is not properly and truly an existing entity, as a man, a stone, just as [neither is] humanity; but that by which something is, as through *life per se* [it is] living, just as by humanity [it is] a man.

Ibidem: *For God is not existing in any manner, but simply and infinitely embracing the whole of being in Himself.* Because He gives substance to all things, through the participation of His own being, and He Himself is all things according to cause, and by His being makes all things that are, and in whatever way they are, to be; thus He is the cause properly absolute, and uncircumscribed. See on this matter fully and beautifully, Lessius, lib. 1 *De perfectionibus divinis*, cap. 1.

§ VI. *First therefore the gift is being per se.* Dionysius here, having approached to discuss generally on substance simply, and on participation simply, treated and showed first that there ought to be a subject, which he indeed said was the earlier gift of God, then the participation, which was made in that subject. Therefore, substance is proposed for the participation of participants *per se*; which is tantamount to saying [that] substance [is] made for participation; for unless we participated in substance, we would not be in the nature of things at all. Next, to the substance itself made for receiving participation, other participations are proposed.

Ibidem: *All things whatsoever that are, and that are in whatever way they are.* As those things which are in another as accidents, and which are in potentiality, and which are privations, and which do not have the whole of being at once, but are motions, are in God incomprehensibly, but in themselves finitely in themselves many, in God one; in themselves divided, in God coupled. Therefore, all things whatsoever that are in God are incomprehensible, and conjoined, and one; because they are the divine essence itself, incomprehensible, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, incomprehensibly united into one. See Lessius cited above, and in chapters 4 and 5.

435 § VIII. Note the words: *His is essence, and not He is essence; and in Him is existence, and not He is in existence; and He Himself has existence, and not He Himself has existence.* For *existence* has God, so that *existence* itself may consist, just as someone has life for his own existence; but God does not have *existence* in such a way that He is through *existence*. Just as therefore *existence* has God, so *existence* is of God, because it flows from Him; and as God does not have *existence* in such a way that He is through *existence*, so neither is God of *existence* itself, so that He is through it.

Ibidem: *And therefore, he says, by the pronouncements [it is said] that He who truly pre-exists is multiplied according to the thought of all those things which are.* That is, whatever might be thought, and toward whatever thing anyone might intend his mind, he will find in it the notion of the cause, that is, of the author, God. This therefore is to be multiplied, to see Him as the cause in many things. From St. Maximus and Pachymeres.

Ibidem: *And in Him it is properly celebrated, [that He] was, and is*, etc. Clearly just as Dionysius explains himself, insofar as they are understood as is fitting for God, so far they are properly said [to be] in God, and are in God; that is, insofar as He is, was, shall be, they participate in *being*; for all things are said of God according to cause, and are in God, and are understood suprasubstantially. But insofar as they are accepted thus, as when it is said, *God is, was, shall be*, it is signified [that] God participates in *being*, [these] are alien to God. Thus Pachymeres.

Ibidem: *[He] is every figure, every form, without form, without beauty.* St. Maximus, against that text, says, he opposed *being without form* to *being every figure*, because above bodilessness and above the vacancy of matter, not formed toward any of those things which are; but against that *every form* or beauty, he opposed *being without beauty*

^A in beauty. He says "without beauty," because beauty was made by Him, while He Himself is above beauty. But the authorities of Scripture are Isaiah LIII: "We saw him, and he had no form," etc. This was said concerning Christ according to his humanity, which is declared even more by what follows; rather, his form is dishonored and deficient more than in all the sons of men; for so it is among the LXX. He said "deficient" on account of the change of natural color into pallor, from the recession of heat to the inward parts as the blood contracts, and the surface cools, as Leontius of Byzantium noted, writing against the Aphthartodocetae, who denied that the flesh of Christ was corruptible, and consequently maintained that there were no natural passions in Him. But nothing prevents one from understanding Christ also, according to his divinity, to be without beauty, He who was the creator of beauty, and consequently not beautiful but more-than-beautiful, which is to be without form.

Note in the same place that exemplars are the substantial notions of things in God. He teaches, however, that they are called predestinations, and good and divine wills, which are definitive and effectuating of things; for although ideas in themselves are in the intellect, yet because they do nothing without the command of the will, nor exercise the office of an idea, he therefore calls them good wills. Clement of Alexandria, book V of the Stromata, near the end, says: "Barbarian philosophy (thus he calls Christian philosophy) knows another world, the intelligible, and another the sensible; the former is the archetype, the latter the image of it, which is called the exemplar." Boethius also elegantly describes this exemplar in *De consolatione* book III, meter 9, with these words:

Thou leadst all things by a supernal model, Thou, the most beautiful, bearing the beautiful world In thy mind, and forming it in a like image.

From which it is evident that ideas, properly and formally, are divine concepts by which God conceives individual things, as He is about to create them, or can create them. This opinion is also that of St. Augustine, book LXXXIII of *Questions*, q. 46, where he says: "For ideas are certain principal forms, or stable and immutable notions of things, which are not themselves formed, and by this are eternal and always remaining in the same state, which are contained in the divine intelligence"; and he adds that according to them all things are formed. These conform most perfectly to the divine concepts, which are properly in the mind of God, according to which God makes all things; because He makes all things such as are represented by those concepts, and on our account created things are said to live in God, as St. Augustine often testifies; because, indeed, the concepts of God, which represent them most exactly as living images, and thus in some way are seen to be the things themselves, are properly called life in God. These concepts, also, according to St. Augustine and Dionysius, are in God art and the effectuators of things, insofar as they direct the divine will in the creation of things; and by reason of these concepts the intelligible world is in the divine mind.

^B § IX. But if the philosopher Clement wishes to say that those things which are in principal things are exemplars, he proceeds indeed, when he speaks thus, not by proper and perfect and simple names. That is, by-itself-being, and by-itself-life, and by-itself-wisdom, and similar things, which are the principles and causes of things that exist, which live and which are endowed with wisdom, cannot properly be called exemplars; because—those things of which they are the principles do not come to be to imitate those very principles, but they come to be so that what divine wisdom ordained might be fulfilled in them, that is, what was in the idea and the divine exemplar. They are also not perfect exemplars, since they themselves have need of other exemplars. They are not simple, because they are at once formed toward an exemplar (which are commonly called *exemplata*) and are themselves exemplars. Thus divine Thomas.

But concerning the place in Exodus XXV: "He did not show it to thee," note that it is not word-for-word as cited by Dionysius, but according to the sense. Thus, indeed, apostolic disciples learned from the holy apostles to cite Scripture sometimes, just as the holy apostles themselves do at times; for thus says Scripture: "Look, and make according to the exemplar which has been shown to thee on the mount." When he says, "Look, and make according to the exemplar" (or exemplars, for there was not one exemplar, but many) "shown to thee on the mount," he says clearly enough that the exemplar, or exemplars, were shown—not for the purpose of worshiping them (for this would be to go after them, to worship them, and to hold them as gods) but the exemplars were shown for the purpose of making according to them the things which are to be made in the tabernacle and its vessels, and in the priests, and in their sacrifices, and in other things: "For the Law had a shadow of future goods," namely spiritual ones, which were indeed shown to Moses in the spirit, of which exemplars the images were all things which were done in the Law, as the same Dionysius says in the final page of chapter 4 of the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. Since, therefore, Clement saw that *ta noēta*, that is, the spiritual things shown to Moses, are called in the Scripture of Exodus *paradeigmata*, which are directed toward something, because they are referred to images (for an exemplar is said of an image, and an image of an exemplar), similarly Clement wished those which are in principal things to be called exemplars, which are referred toward something—toward those, namely, of which they are principles, as causes to effects, and effects to causes. If Clement takes it this way, as he clearly seems to have taken it, he took it correctly; and thus even those principal things which he calls exemplars are created, just as those spiritual exemplars shown to Moses on the mount, not indeed as those divine exemplars which are uncreated and eternal, the invisibles of God and to be adored, which are God Himself, the most simple, but as created exemplars, divinely informed in the mind of Moses, so that according to them he might make what God commanded him to make, which were all images, faintly and obscurely adumbrated by those exemplars.

Others had noted that this place cited by Dionysius is taken from Deuteronomy chapter V; but it fits on no account. I have followed Pachymeres, who referred it to that place of Exodus XXV, which I said to be cited by Dionysius according to the sense, as the apostles and holy Fathers are sometimes accustomed to do. Similarly, Dionysius also cited in the same place the location in the Epistle to the Romans, chapter I: "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, are seen"; he cited, I say, this place according to the sense, which is, as Dionysius says, that by the proportion of the knowledge of creatures we are led, as far as we are able, to the knowledge of the cause of all things. Thus, when he said: "His invisible things (that this may be noted in passing) Paul seems clearly to have understood to be the eternal exemplars in God, which are called ideas, according to which He knows all things by His own most simple essence, and He made all things as if by the principle and cause of all things, and He is all things as the cause of all things." Thus Turianus to Cyparissiotes, decade 5, ch. 4.

§ X. Therefore, the principle and end of all things, etc., and the infinitude of all infinitude, etc. Saint Thomas on this place: "From His infinitude," he says, "proceeds every infinitude and termination, as from an excelling cause, both transcending and effectuating opposites, because He has all things in Himself. Whence all things which are predicated of God can be denied of the same; because they do not belong to Him as they are found in created things, and as [it is written]."

Saint Maximus in Century 1, chap. 7, says: "They do not deny any beginning, middle, or end absolutely, but only that they can be predicated according to habit. But since God is infinitely and limitlessly superior to every habit, it is fitting that He should have neither beginning, nor middle, nor end; nor does He possess anything at all of those things in which nature, according to habit, can be compared to something else."

In the same place: "And nothing of those things which exist eternally or subsist temporally befits Him totally, etc. Universally," says Saint Thomas, "nothing from the number of creatures befits Him, but He is separated by a certain eminence;" and again: "He is also," he says, "separated from those things which are in time and the aeon by a certain eminence." Therefore, what Saint Thomas also said elsewhere, that these names of God—good, wise, and the like—signify that these things exist in God eminently, he took from Dionysius, whom he interpreted.

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES (41)

^A § I. We must now pass to the essential name of the truly existent Being. For just as he calls the name of the Good, so also the name of the Being, as it were a substitute name; for the being and the essence are the same. We shall remind [the reader] only of this much: that the aim of this discourse is not to explain the supersessential essence itself, in so far as it is superessential, but to expound the beginning, cause, and essence of every substance—not in so far as it transcends essence (for how could that which exists above essence be explained according to itself?), but in so far as we are led to It from other beings produced by It. For It is ineffable according to itself, and transcends even union; by union, he understands the unity and definition of being, according to which it is a being. For just as that which is not, is not one, but is produced from many and infinite lacks, so also that which is, is one, in so far as it is being and defined; above which exists that superessential essence, which is called one, not as the beginning of numbers, but because it exceeds all things, and can be numbered with nothing that is after It, because of the emptiness of composition and its simplicity. ^B Therefore, if you should also call God one, this will not explain the essence of God; for essence, strictly speaking, is not predicated of God, since He is superessential; wherefore He transcends this very union. Just as, therefore, we said of the Good, that divine goodness extends both to the things that are and to the things that are not (by those things that are not, I mean material things and matter itself), or those things that are in one respect but are not in another, and not simply those that are in no way whatever; or thirdly, according to what was said by the Holy Father, that even that which is not is beautiful, since it is contemplated in God through that which is superessential. Just as, therefore, goodness radiates through all things and again is above them—above the one, because it is not one of the beings; and above that which is not, because it gives form to all such things—so also the essential name of being extends to all things that are, granting being to all, and is above them, because It is not one of the beings. But someone might ask here, perplexed: How is it that, in the case of the Good, he says that goodness extends both to the things that are and to the things that are not, but in the case of Being, he does not say this, but only that it extends to the things that are? And it must be said, that that which is often remains not-being, being made good; for since matter is also called not-being, matter might seem to be good, when apprehended by a spurious reasoning and conceived apart from the forms, even if it is not such of itself, as having been produced by God and re-

- maining, in turn, a non-being. But how can being be coextensive with non-being, and at the same time remain a non-being? This is utterly impossible. The saintly [author], therefore, puts these things forward securely. ^A Likewise, the name of "life" of the good God extends to all living things, and is above them; and [the name] of "wisdom" extends to all rational and intelligent beings—I mean the angels—and to those that are sensitive, that is, to souls embodied, and is exalted above these. However, one must know that when he speaks only of angels and men, he calls the angels "intelligible" and our souls "intelligent"; ^B but now, since he is speaking of God, he rightly calls the angels, along with us, "intelligent," seeing that they, too, are nourished by understanding through the intellection of God, just as human souls are. And you should understand "sensitive" to include even the irrational [animals], as they also participate in divine wisdom in their natural impulses, as is evident in the spider, the ant, and all others in succession.

§ II. The discourse intends to praise these [titles] that reveal, represent, and manifest the providences of God; for it does not [speak of] that which is above every goodness and deity (for both angels and just men are called "gods"), which has placed its dwelling in the hidden places, according to the passage: *In the hidden place of the tempest* ^C; and that [other passage]: *He made darkness his hiding place*; but [it speaks of] that goodness which exists as the cause of all good things and of all that exists, and that life which is the cause of the living, and that wisdom which is the dispenser of wisdom. This is made clear from what follows, where the cause is gathered together with the effect, so that the cause may be clearly demonstrated from the effect—or [as] it is called, a demonstration, not indeed of the *why*, but of the *that*—as when we demonstrate the opposition of the moon by the eclipse. Since, therefore, God is good, and is being, and life, and wisdom, we learn [this] from the effects; but we do not know through what [cause] these things are, since he seemed a little before to speak of a foundation, having said that the Good is the cause of Being. And so in succession, lest some should foolishly seize upon an opportunity, he says that Being is not one thing and the Good another, and so on for the rest; ^D for there is one cause of all things, and not many; and there is one deity that brings all things forth. Here he rebukes those among the Greeks who are wise, and the heretics of the school of Simon, who say that the "gods" who are the fabricators of the world produce creatures that are the weaker the further they have descended, down even to the bottom of all things, which is matter; for they have assigned a peculiar creator even to this. Therefore, among these divine names of the one God, the name of "Good" is declarative of the total providence of God, while the remaining ones are indicative of partial providences, some of more universal, others of more particular [application]; for that of "Good" [signifies] the total providence, in that all things were produced and exist through goodness; while that of "life" [is of] a partial, yet more universal...

providence, for not all things live; whereas that of "wisdom" is even more partial, for not all things that live are wise. He calls those "more general" which are observed in a greater number of things; for [the gift of] life extends even to plants, and to animals both rational and irrational; but wisdom and reason are more partial.

^B § III.

Solution of the difficulty touching the order of divine gifts.

^C § IV.

How God is "He who is," and in what way things exist in Him by power.

^A The entity of the times—for let them be for signs and for years, says the Scripture; for time is measured by the course of the sun—that which for us is time, having a "before" and an "after," is for the things that are eternal an age. That, therefore, which neither was nor shall be, but only is, possessing this abiding existence, not changing into "shall be," nor having changed from "was" into "is," this is an age. For this reason, God is also called the age of beings, as having neither beginning nor end, neither "was" nor "shall be," but only that which is eternal and limitless; but time is of things that are becoming, because the things that are seen are images of the invisible and intelligible. And just as we call age that immutable and altogether total life, and one already without passage and inclined to nothing, and standing in one and toward one; so we say that time also rests at one time in the Ever-Existent, and appears when it was necessary both to establish the sun and for visible nature to come forth. The procession, therefore, toward the sensible of the Goodness of God, which produces these things, He calls the time of the things becoming, but also the being of things that are, and the generation of the things becoming, because from Him were moved and subsisted all things that are subject to generation, and those that are becoming under time. From this super-essential Being also the age subsists, which is understood to be extended along with the things that are; and the substance of beings, and the very being that is called according to substance. These are things of the powers that are above us and more divine. ^B And again, regarding the things that are according to us, even time, which is measured in things subject to generation by the "before" and the "after," and the generation of things that are subject to generation, and that which is itself becoming according to generation, and all the rest—both those that are in the things that are more divine, and those that subsist in any way whatsoever, namely, those according to us. But all these things are in a certain way "being"; for neither does the being of the angels comprehend that of men, nor that of these the angels, but each is self-subsistent and circumscribed, and because some having a beginning, do not have an end, and others have both a beginning and an end. But there is that which has no beginning but has an end, as the great Basil also discusses, speaking concerning the divine volitions of the providence of the cosmos, which indeed did not have a beginning, but some of them have had an end, and some will have. These, therefore, are all in a certain way "being," but only the Divine is not "being" in a certain way, but simply and limitlessly; for it holds the whole of existence enclosed within itself, neither beginning nor ending; wherefore He is also called the King of the ages, as encompassing every age and every being, and as having escaped the divisions of time—the "was," the "shall be," the "to become," and the "becoming." For these belong to things according to us and to our fluid nature. Moreover, He does not even have "being," for He is above it; He Himself is the being to the things that are; for not only do the beings come from God, but also the very being of the beings. For He Himself is the One who exists before the ages, according to David, the age of the ages, manifestly the sustainer of the eternal extension, the boundary of the eternal life, the One beyond that which does not fail. ^{C D}

^B § V. Let us then, returning to higher things, say this: for all beings, and for the very ages themselves according to which beings exist, the "to be" is from Him who is pre-existent; and this Pre-existent One is the principle and cause of all these, and all things consist in Him, since He is before those things which have obtained being by participation. For let us suppose a man: he first has "to be," and then he has "to live," "to perceive," and "to reason." And the invisible minds first partook of being, and thus of life and wisdom. These things, moreover, are distinguished even by way of thought. For just as in us the primary matter is conceived, from which we consist, so also in incorporeal minds, as if it were matter, the very being of each thing is conceived by way of the species of life, and in so far as it has been substantiated unto life, and wisdom, and likeness unto the Divine. For this reason he says that being as such is more ancient than life as such and wisdom as such, not because in God there is a division of this kind, whether simply or by way of thought—far from it!—but from Him, in all things that have come to be by His creative act, these things are understood. It is fitting, therefore, that before all other things in which beings participate of God, God Himself should be understood as the most ancient principle of being. For He attributes to the Cause those things that are conceived in the effects; and for that reason, he sets down with the same terminology all those things which he sets down as spoken of God, just as he does the very similarity as such by which the minds closest to Him are made like unto God; or rather, even these things in which beings participate—that is, "to be," "to move," "to reason," and the like. And these things, insofar as they are and appear in things, participate in being itself, so that from it they also are; and there is no being, however subsistent or considered in another—since even those things which are by accident are those which are considered in another—whose essence is not the very being of God Himself. Having the denomination of being more ancient than all others—I mean life, wisdom, goodness—from that which He gave to Himself, saying, "I am who I am" [Exod. III, 14], God is primarily praised from the fact that things exist, because this is His most ancient gift. For we have said that the being of God, which is more ancient than life, wisdom, and goodness, is incomprehensible. But from the fact that all things are, we conclude, as from effects, that God is the cause, nay rather, that He pre-exists and superexists. For if He did not pre-exist, those things which are would in no way subsist; and if He did not superexist, He would by no means have used such power. This God, in the predefinition of being itself, caused all things to subsist universally for the sake of His own knowledge; for by "to be" itself, the intellect makes its first contact, and then thus contemplates how they are. Therefore, he signified simple being, not being in some manner, when he said "being as such"; just as subsequently, when he spoke of life as such, similarity as such, and those things with them, he presented being as life, and simply "to live," not indeed the life of such a kind. As therefore by discourse

^A regarding qualities among us, for instance whiteness or blackness, we conceive a certain primary quality as such—that is, whiteness itself, which, coming upon subjects, both appears and acts (as the bodiless whiteness itself, upon coming to a body, makes it white)—so conceive for me, though proportionally, regarding the divine gifts: of life, of wisdom, which he called the principles of beings. For the principle and creator of our life is life itself, and of wisdom, wisdom itself. These, therefore, are first conceived to exist, and then in this way they are also the principles of living things; I mean the divine life itself, and the life which is in God. And he adds "as of living things," because again, existence is the same as of beings; and as of wise beings, wisdom itself is the principle, and the same of similar things. For we said also before, that he speaks of similarities by which the divine minds participate in God. Of these similarities, therefore, the principle is similarity itself, in which the divine being itself boasts; and of united things—that is, those limited by their own nature, and not scattered—for each of existing things subsists according to a certain unitary limit and is united to itself. Of these, therefore, again, the principle is the self-unity in God; and of all other things, as many as either participate in life, or in knowledge, or both, and are living, or wise, or both, or more, or even beings, and immortal, and intellectual, as in the case of the divine angels—of all these, therefore, you will find the self-participations, namely life itself, wisdom itself, and the rest; being participants of existence, and remaining in existence. For in whatever way these participate in existence and are, in that same way they are also participated in by others.

^B Habent, quinimo vel entia sunt, vel immortalia, vel intelligentia, ut in divinis angelis accidit; horum, inquam, omnium per se participationes reperies, scilicet ipsam per se vitam, per se sapientiam, et cetera ipsammet esse participare et in esse permanere; in quantum enim esse participant et sunt, in tantum etiam ab aliis participantur.

§ VI. If those greater things, which possess ^C each in itself, are in participation with the Existent, how much more does this make these things—which are participants of those—to have existence (for example, to be living, or wise) through their participation? And not (as someone might ignorantly suppose) that they possess these by themselves, and not through the participation of another? This argument from the greater is most forceful. Therefore, since God bestows this first gift upon beings, He is also first praised from it, and from Him exists the very being of all things, and in Him all things are contained, gathered up according to a certain ^D simple and comprehensive cause of all things, which is unrelated; for by no reason, or conception, or thing, does the divine have a relationship or communion toward existing things. But the following examples make it believable that all things exist from God, as the cause of their existence, being distinct from them, and that they consist in Him, though He is distinct from them. For unity, as the cause of numbers, in a unitary way, not being varied, or understood differently at different times, has encompassed all numbers; and the center of a circle encompasses all the straight lines from the circumference in a unitary way, and simply.

^A For the point is partless; how, then, could it encompass the straight lines in one way or another? Wonderfully, he has set forth this example of the circle to show how all things are unified in God in a unitary way, and how they are distinguished as they depart from Him, and to the extent that they depart, they receive dispersion. Moreover, in the nature that creates all things, all the reasons (logoi) of every individual nature are contained without confusion, just as in the soul its providential powers are coupled in a unified way—the nutritive, by which it nourishes; the augmentative, by which it increases that which is apt for generation; the sensitive, by which it presides over the senses; the opinative, by which it judges the things of sense; the imaginative, by which it fashions sensible things; the appetitive, by which it desires; and the rest in order. Thus, too, are the creative reasons in the Creator, and the forms of all things; and all remain unconfused, save that they are in Him, yet not as in a place (for neither is He Himself in a place, nor are those things that are in Him; but He holds them as He holds Himself, with all things existing simultaneously, yet distinguished in the part ^B indivisibly). Having taken the examples of the number and the center, he says that it is in no way absurd to ascend from such images to the summit of what is being discussed, provided we use supermundane eyes. For we have said that all things are contained in the Cause unitarily, just as all numbers are contained in the monad, and in a unified way, just as all the straight lines from the circumference are contained in the center.

§ VII. All things, therefore, that partake of a degree of being characterize the things that are. For if life were not, we would not live; if providence were not, we would not be provided for; if motion were not, we would not move. All things, then, whatsoever attain a degree of being, characterize the things that are. He speaks of "the things that are," however, not as substances, but as (accidents) which are observed in substances, and which also are from God; these, however, cannot subsist outside of a body, yet the holy Father has divided them by conceptual abstraction. ^C

§ VIII. And from this Cause of all things, the powers—intellectual to us, but intelligent toward God—have come into existence, as have souls and bodies, and whatsoever in any way exists in other things, such as color, shape, quantity, and other things that are observed around a body, or such as are said to exist through conceptual abstraction (epinoia), like intellect, sense, reason, and the like. He separates these from those, since the latter, even if they subsist in other things, are nevertheless subject to sense; but the former are in no wise subject to sense, but are known by conceptual abstraction alone. And so, the blessed powers—both the first, and those after them, and the last—are so in relation to those above them, not in relation to us; for in relation to us, ^D even the last are supermundane; and the principalities and all things are from God and in God; and not only their being, but also their well-being.

^A And the primary gifts of being, that is to say what is more sublime—namely, to exist immortally—have been granted to the intellectual powers, which he also called eternal, as participating in eternity; for the Scripture says: "For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." Now, being itself never fails the things that are, for when being fails, that which is does not exist. And being itself therefore comes from the Pre-existent, which is why being is in God, just as the other divine forms and concepts are, such as life, wisdom, and the like. Yet God is not in being; for He is prior to being—since being is His, just as life and light are, and He is not Himself [the property of] being.

What then is the meaning of saying that being "has" Him, and He is not that [being] itself? Or is it because, along with the other meanings of "to have," it is said to have that which is present by way of a habit—just as we are said to have an existence and a life, without which we would neither be nor have things—that this is the meaning here? Thus, being "has" God, in order that it may subsist and appear, and not that He has it in order to exist; for He Himself is the age of existence, and the beginning, and the measure, and the beginning, middle, and end of all things. For in every ^B application of the mind, one finds existing beforehand that upon which one might contemplate the concept of the Cause, that is, of the Creator. To be "multiplied," therefore, signifies that the same [God] is beheld as the Cause in many things, and that, as often as one applies oneself to each of all things, and as often as one looks, while contemplating the reality, one calculates that God is always the Cause; for according to this, He is multiplied in every concept, and is the beginning, middle, and end.

The Divine has neither "was" nor "will be," according to the great Gregory in his theology. ^C But neither is "is" strictly predicated of Him, according to this divine Dionysius; for "is" introduces a concept, in that it participates in being. But God does not participate in being; rather, being itself participates in God, and exists in God, as we said above. How, then, does the saint posit here that "was" and "will be" and the other things that are foreign to God are predicated of God in a primary sense? The saint himself, resolving the difficulty, says that these are understood as applying to God in a way befitting God; for all these things are both foreign to God and, again, are in God, in as much as they have partaken of being. For all things are spoken of God according to the concept of the Cause, and are understood in Him supersubstantially; for this is what it means, according to the philosophers, for this to be predicated [of Him]. As He is the cause of all—of "is," and "was," and "coming to be," and "will be"—He contains all things in Himself; but He is at once all—was, and will be, and is—which will never be said of any other. And not only affirmative, but also negative, and even more, privative terms are said of Him, and these at the same time, so that He is the same ^D and all-formed and formless, and all-shaped and shapeless—the former because He is the cause of all shapes and forms; the latter because He is above all these, in that He is above incorporeality, and above that which is formless and shapeless, while including the beginnings, and ends, and middles of things that are; for there is no beginning beyond which He is not.

God exists transcendently and exemptly; and no end after which God is not; and no middle in which God is not, according to that saying: *I am the first God, and I am after these; and beside me there is no other* ᶻ; for this is the beginning, the end, and the middle, according to a single and super-unified cause. For if the effects are many and the gifts infinite, yet the cause possesses that unified nature which is above all union, shining clearly upon all things like this sensible sun. For if the sun, subsisting from God, being one, illuminates many substances and diverse qualities in a uniform manner, and by one and unified light remaining the same, diverse operations occur; how much more should one conceive such a thing in God, who is the Creator of the sun itself and of all other things? And if the sun has uniformly preconceived the causes of such great works and motions, ^B shining upon all things unitely as a whole, and being found suitable to each, how much more shall we concede that the exemplars of all things exist in the Creator? And Plato, indeed, took the ideas and exemplars in a manner too mean and unworthy of God; but this Father, while he used the word, explained its meaning piously, saying that the exemplars are pre-existing reasons, and divine wills which define and make all things (for by the mere willing of God do all things consist), which the divine Paul also calls predeterminations, saying: *Whom he predestinated, them he also called* ᵃ; and elsewhere: *Having predestinated us unto his will* ᵇ. But as for his adding that He produces substances also according to the emergence from substance, it has this kind of explanation. He had said that the exemplars of all things are in God; then, as if someone were to say that the reasons of other things, such as providences, gifts, and motions, as the apostolic sayings hand down, are in God, in such a way that it might plausibly be inferred hence that the predeterminations of ministry and apostleship and their reasons are in God, ^C but that the exemplars of the persons themselves are not. And if anyone, therefore, were of such an opinion, and were to separate the actions from the persons, he asserts that the Creator possesses the reasons of these persons themselves, since He also produces their substances. For it is permitted to observe this in things of our own making, since we, indeed, when we do not produce substances, do not have the reasons for those substances with us; but nothing prevents us from having the reasons of habits and art, according to which a thing made by art might be completed. But God, since He is the producer of both the one and the other, reasonably possesses the reasons for both, as well of the substances as of the habits. ^D

§ IX. Now Clement, the philosopher and bishop of the city of Rome, as some interpreters say, followed a certain opinion which hands down that even in the generation of sensible things there are certain principal causes. Just as, therefore, in things intelligible there is reason to call them divine notions, or original reasons—

^A the ethereal quality of material fire, for instance, and as the waters of fountains, the supercelestial waters, which are in a way more immaterial than the lower ones, in that the ether itself exists by burning within itself, whereas the waters above the heavens are held together and contained without the fitting limitation; and being rather of a spherical and mobile nature, both are contained by the creative and divine will. For this reason he also says they are "relative to something": for those things are examples in relation to these, and the divine wills are, as this man says, simply original causes. Others, however, taking the holy Clement to mean that the intelligible things are examples of the sensible, and that the higher of these again are examples of the lower, bring forward a similar thing by way of explaining such an opinion. For suppose a line, the upper part of which is assigned to things intelligible, and the lower to things sensible; and of these, the first and highest part is assigned to those which hold the primacy—that is, things properly intelligible—and the part thereafter to the things that are intelligible but lower, and so on, according to the descent of the line. ^B For such an opinion desires to show that not all things are of the same dignity, but that some depend upon others, like subordinate species from universals. And this, indeed, is the opinion of some; but the whole meaning, as I suppose, so far as I can conjecture from the words themselves, is this: that since they call things present the shadows of spiritual things, as the great Apostle called the things of the law, so he, in turn, called those things the examples of these. For this reason he also said "relative to something," namely, the image in relation to the example, and the example in relation to the image. Accordingly, the Father says that, even if he called things intelligible the examples of things sensible (for, he says, "See that you make [them] according to the pattern that was shown to you," Exod. xxv, 40), ^C yet those intelligible things are not examples of such a kind that they should be worshiped like the divine wills; but those, too, are created things, and we have to hear concerning them, just as Moses said concerning sensible things as from God: "I did not show them to you so that you might walk after them, but that through them we might be led up to that which truly is and to the Creator." Since some of the Greeks said that the ideas and the examples are self-subsistent, in refuting them he says: For if the ideas were not simply and unitively notions extended above and supereminently over the one God, ^D God would be composite, made up of an example and himself—which he called a duality; everything, therefore, must be attributed to the First Cause. But one must not, because effects are partial and of different times, immediately suspect that there are certain self-subsistent divisions, or indeed any properly understood in God; but there is one and the same union, which is preeminently a universal unity; for according to one and the same not simply simplicity, but the eminence of simplicity,

^A it not only contains all things within itself, but also pre-possesses them, pre-defining its own substantive progress and the production of creatures from its own being, just as it does [its own] vivification from its own life, and [its] consummation from its own perfection. He said this because all things were made from God, and all things share in God according to their own capacity, and according as they possess a nature: for if they exist merely, they share in divine being; if they are sentient, in divine knowledge; if they are even intellectual, in divine intellection which exceeds all understanding. But it begins from the substantive progress, because we first perceive the being of anything, and then, in this way or that, [what kind of] being it is. Therefore, it began such a progress from its own being; for it was not enough for the goodness to be occupied solely with the contemplation of itself, but the Good needed to be poured out and to travel forth, in order that more things might be benefited.

^B § X. Yet [it] flows through all things by providence, and fills all things with being, and rejoices in all things that exist. He says this, not that God has a passion of joy and exultation, but [it is named so] from us ourselves rejoicing in the perfections of our own works, if indeed they proceed according to reason, and incur no reproach; for this is also the judgment added with emphasis in the divine and sacred Scripture: "Behold, they are very good." Consonant with these, also, is that which is said by the divine David, "The Lord shall rejoice in his works," and that of Solomon, "I was that in which He rejoiced." And, in fact, just as a single voice, heard by many ears, remaining one and the same, is perceived not in an earlier and later way, nor divisibly nor partially, but wholly, and totally, and ^C as a whole, and simultaneously, and in the same way, as one; so also is God shared by all uniquely and wholly, and is the beginning of all things as cause, and the end as that for the sake of which [they are]; for all things are for the sake of God, yet not out of necessity, but out of goodness; and He is the boundary of all things, as it were a container and limit. For nothing escapes His power and providence, but in Him all things are bounded, and He is the infinity of every infinity and boundary; for both infinity and boundary fall short of the divine infinity equally, just as those who look at the sun and the heavens fall short of them, or rather even more, and to a greater extent, and infinitely [further short]. But what is the infinity in things regarding us? Someone might say: Matter, which is always being transformed and changing into other and yet other forms. But nevertheless even this is bounded in God, however unstable and undefined it may be. Therefore, God is the infinity even of infinity, not as though He were transformed according to it, but because He produced even this from non-existence. But in saying "of infinity and boundary," he says it is as of opposites; for these are not properly opposed as habit and ^D privation (for the habit would have had to appear at some time, if this were the case, and thus the privation would come to be), but rather they are opposed as affirmation and negation; for it is spoken of as habit and privation, but understood as affirmation and negation. For that which has no boundary is called infinite, not that which is deprived of a boundary; in one sense, however, clearly, in a unified way, as has been said often, God is all things, and...

^A stands ahead as cause, and has made them exist as creator, and is present identically to all things and everywhere; and He proceeds to all things by His sustaining providence, and remains in Himself as being above all things and needing nothing. He is also said to be standing, because in Him no trace of change is discerned; and again moving, because He contains and holds together all things. And again, these are not the same, because He is above these things; for motion is an imperfect activity, while standing is total immobility; ^B which, if it were to occur after motion, would be called rest. That the Divine is above imperfect activity is clear; that it is also above all immobility is clear from the fact that He possesses all things transcendently, and not as they are and are understood. For even if total immobility is very consonant with God, yet that very thing is in God and is understood in God transcendently. Again, He is not in any of the things that exist, because He exists as incomprehensible in all; nothing of the eternal things belongs to Him, because He is also the creator of ages; nothing of temporal things, because He is also the creator of times. He calls the intellectual powers eternal ^C as participating in an age, and because they came into being as a nature before time; for time is reckoned from the creation of heaven and earth. And the phrase, "nothing belongs to Him," you must understand according to substance, and not according to any other conception, such as of government, and of constitution, and of such like things. Note then from this, that that which is without beginning is also eternal, yet not everything that is eternal is without beginning. And the Divine is itself age, because its being is not only not measured by time, but not even by an age, but it is itself an age to itself. He says that ages are the measures of the intellectual beings, and times are the measures of the sensible beings; for the intellectual beings are measured as if by the age as a measure, ^D even if those things which are measured and that which measures are called by the same name. For the angels are also called ages. So also in the case of sensible things; for those things which are measured by time are called times by the same name, as the motion of the stars and of the sun, and the periods of life; for being measured by time, they are called times; for time is one, but the measured times are things which are measured by the extension of this one time. Therefore, all these things are through Him, and from Him, and in Him.

CAPUT VI. Concerning Life.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER

I. It teaches that God is Life, from whom every life proceeds. II. That He imparts to each living thing a life appropriate to its nature. III. That all things are vivified and cherished by the divine life, which is above life, and that this very life is proclaimed in every way.

§ I.

^A Now we must hymn the eternal Life, from which Life-in-itself, and every life, flows; and from which living is disseminated, in a manner appropriate to each, to all things that in any way participate in life. Thus, the life of the immortal angels, and the immortality, and the incorruptibility itself of the angelic perpetual motion, exists and subsists from it and for its sake. Wherefore they are called ever-living and immortal, and yet again not immortal, because they do not have the being-immortal and the living-eternally from themselves, but from the vivifying and life-creating and sustaining Cause of all life. And just as we said regarding the One Who Is, that the Aon is the ^B being-itself of His existence, so here too [we say] that the divine Life is the life-giving and productive cause of Life-in-itself, and that every life and vital motion comes from the Life that is above all life and every beginning of all life. From It, even souls have their incorruptibility, and all animals and plants possess the living-state according to the final echo of Life. If this should be withdrawn, according to the Scripture, all life fails; and to It all those who had failed, due to their weakness in participating in It, turn back again and become living creatures once more.

§ II.

^C For It bestows, first of all, upon Life-in-itself the being-life, and upon all life, and upon each life the being that is appropriate to the nature of each. Moreover, to the supercelestial lives [It bestows] an immaterial, deiform, and immutable immortality, and a perpetual motion free from all error and deviation, extending Itself through an abundance of goodness even unto the demonic life; for not even that [demonic] life has its being and its life and its duration for it to remain, from any other cause than from ^D this. Furthermore, It gives to humans, composite though they are, a life that closely approaches the angelic; and by an exuberance of benevolence, It turns back and recalls us even when we have turned away, and (what is more divine still) It has promised that It will translate us entirely—I mean our souls and their conjoined bodies—to a perfect and immortal life. This is a thing which to the ancients perhaps seemed contrary to nature, but to me, and to you, and to the Truth, [it is] both divine and above nature. Above nature

δὲ ^A by which I mean the one which is visible, not that omnipotent [life] of the divine life; for to this, as being by nature the life of all lives, and especially of those that are more divine, there is no life that is against nature or above nature. Wherefore, let the contradictory discourses of the madness of Simon be driven far from the divine assembly and your holy soul; for it escaped him, as I suppose—even though he thought himself wise—that one who is of sound mind ought not to use the evident reason of sense as an ally against the hidden cause of all things. And this is what must be said to him, that to call it *against nature* is wrong; for nothing is contrary to it.

From it, all animals and plants are quickened and fostered. And whether you speak of spiritual, or rational, or sensitive, or nutritive and augmentative [life], or whatever other life it may be, or the principle of life, or the essence of life, it is from it that it lives and flourishes above every life, and uniformly pre-exists in it according to cause. For the super-vital and life-originating life is the cause of all ^B life, and the life-giver, and the fulfiller, and the divider of life; and it is to be celebrated from every life, according to the manifold nature of all lives, as being all-embracing and contemplated and hymned in every life, and as being in need of nothing, nay rather, as super-full of life, the Self-Life, and as Life-giving and super-vital above every life, or in whatever way one might, in a human manner, hymn that ineffable life.

ADNOTATIONS OF CORDERIUS

§ I. Now we must praise the eternal life, from which life in itself, and all life, flows. What "life in itself" is, gather from the Notes to § IV of the preceding chapter. To these, add this from St. Maximus: "As it is fitting to say, we must sometimes take 'God' to mean, when we say 'life in itself' and other things of that kind; and sometimes we mean the effector of these, that is, that he created these; because as a cause, indeed, he is called of these, and a principle, and more than a principle, by these names; while the things which participate in these, thence—that is, from the participated things—are said to exist, and to live, and to be divine." Therefore, God made the creation of life, and the creation of substance, the things themselves, I repeat. Let us first conceive of the thing itself, then let us form a general notion of that thing; e.g., life or substance considered universally, and afterwards in particular. ^C But he [Dionysius] says this, not as if to say that one life is God Himself, and another is the produced substantial life, existing, as it were, by itself outside of God, which those things that participate in life participate in; but rather, as he himself is his own interpreter in Chapter XI: "God is called 'life in itself,' and 'power in itself,' and 'similitude in itself,' and other things of this kind, because this is God, as essentially and divinely and efficiently; for this is the true source of them Himself; but he is the author of 'life in itself' and similar things, as bestowing the gift upon those which, among the things that exist, first participate in this gift." For all things, as it suits each one's nature, participate in such gifts; indeed, those that are the first and supreme among the celestial intelligences participate chiefly, while those which are next, participate after them. But when Dionysius expands the contemplation of these: "We do not say," he says, "that there is another divinity that produces life, apart from the more than divine cause of all things whatsoever that live, and the cause of life in itself." But if there is no other cause of living beings, nor any other divinity that produces life for living beings, except the more than divine life, and the more than substantial substance, and the singular and most splendid One Himself, and this is the sole cause of all things; it is evident that these things which are first and principally exist, and [which are] effects only, do not, as a cause, produce any of those things which exist afterward. Therefore, the good God is called the effector of those things themselves which are first, then of those which participate universally, as the life of all living things; in particular, as the life of men, angels, etc. Thus he proves that God alone is the cause of all things, whether they are called primary, or universal, or in particular, and whether they are said to be thus participated, or participating.

^A Note, however, as we indicated at § 4 of chapter V, that "life-in-itself" is a participation simply, which is not distinguished from the living things by which it is participated in reality; for in reality, life and the living thing are the same, just as humanity simply and man differ only in reason. For just as humanity alone encompasses those things that define a man—and not those things that make matter an individual—nor does humanity actually or potentially contain the principles that make an individual (whereas a man does contain them potentially), so "life-in-itself" contains those things that define the living thing, insofar as it lives. Therefore, just as a man is formally man by humanity, so the living thing lives by "life-in-itself." Participation, according to existence, is that life simply already received in a living subject, just as humanity, according to existence, is in this man who exists; for only individuals exist in the nature of things, whereas universals and abstracts exist only in the mind.

§ II. That which to antiquity indeed seems to be contrary to nature. Here he calls "antiquity" the foolish and fatuous opinion of the Gentiles, as Saint Maximus has left noted. Therefore, he says that this seemed so not to the ancients simply, but to the foolish ancients.

§ III. By it all things are enlivened and nourished, etc. God, says Lessius, in the sixth book *On Divine Perfections*, chapter 5, is not only life, but the first life and eternal life, and the very fullness and universality of life, the origin and consummation, the beginning and the end of all life; in whom also all things that do not live are life. For He is the super-vital essence and super-essential life, pre-containing every vital substance within Himself most eminently and simply, and comprehending them causally—forming, preserving, and perfecting everything outside Himself according to its own species. He is His own vital operation (if I may so speak), namely, His own intellect, His own love, His own joy, His own beatitude. From that super-vital fountain all things that in any way live draw their life, and obtain their vital faculties and movements, some more excellent, others less excellent, according to the degree and order of each; hence comes all life—both of plants and animals, and of men, demons, and angels—all life, natural and supernatural, of this age and the future, temporal and eternal. Finally, just as He Himself is the super-essential being of all existing things, so is He the super-vital life of all living things, as Dionysius says. See more in the divine Thomas, in the first part, question 18, and the following articles, where he discusses life.

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES

§ 1. He begins to speak concerning eternal life, namely, the divine. He calls it eternal, not because it participates in eternity (since it contains the eternities), but just as God is said to be both being and more-than-being—both because He is existence above existence, and because He does not participate in being, but is above being—so too is His life eternal, and again, more-than-eternal. It is eternal because He Himself is eternity and perpetuity to Himself; and it is more-than-eternal because He is also the creator of the ages. From this eternal life is "life-in-itself" and all life. By "life-in-itself" must be understood the exemplary reason of life in God; but by "all life" is to be understood that which is in the angels and in men, and furthermore in brutes and plants. For although all live and participate in life, yet the living is disseminated to each in its own way according to the reason of its nature. Moreover, it is specifically disseminated, since life is sprinkled upon all the members of the living thing, yet not by one and another part of life in one and another part of the body, but wholly in all, just as in seed distributed into its husks, the entire power of the seed exists in each part complete and perfect. ^B From this eternal life is the life of the angels, and it subsists, and they are called both immortal and not immortal: the former, because they are incorruptible; the latter, with respect to proper immortality, because they do not have immortality of themselves as it does, but by the participation of that eternal and divine life—which he also says has the power of preserving, ^C so that He not only bestows life upon things, but also contains them that they may persevere. And just as we said concerning being, that God is the eternity of the self-same being—that is, of the creative reason of being—so also, the reason of His life, by which...

the divine life is produced, exists as its cause. ^A These things are said against those who believe in ideas that are self-subsistent and co-eternal with the Creator. From this eternal life, rational souls possess immortality; all irrational animals live, and plants possess life according to the final echo, as we said before. Therefore, the lives of irrational animals and plants are not divine, but belong to material fire and spirit. David calls human life "spirit," saying: "You will take away their spirit, and they will fail" [Ps. CIV, 29]; and again: "You will send forth your spirit, and they will be created" [Ibid., 30], clearly referring to the return to life and the resurrection. For he uses "to take away" to mean "to be separated," showing that the spirit was given by Him from the beginning, and he says that they "fail" in their participation in this life because they do not have life from themselves and of their own, but as an adventitious gift from God.

^B § II. Because, therefore, they have an adventitious life, they grow weak in their participation of it, and they fail; and when they turn back again, they are again made alive. Therefore, the Life-in-itself, the very creative and paradigmatic reason of life, which is eternal in God, grants being to every life, both simply and in the way proper to each living thing in particular. To the angels, He gives life that is immaterial and godlike; for they are entirely substantial lives, moving always and unswervingly in living. ^C And He extends such life, because of His goodness (for the gifts of God are without repentance [Rom. XI, 29]), even to the demonic host; for the life of demons also came into being from, and is sustained by, the Life-in-itself. He also grants to humans, those souls mixed with bodies, an angel-like life, as far as is possible; for since we are in the middle between natural life and angelic life, we have the inclination toward both by our free choice; or rather, to speak more correctly, being constituted toward an angelic life, if ever we deviate through free choice, we are recalled and turned back by the superabundance of His philanthropy toward that which we were from the beginning; and, what is more wonderful, He promises that He will translate us entirely, according to the body, toward an incorruptible life. ^D This is a thing that, to the senseless opinion of the Greeks (for he calls this "antiquity" foolish and putrid), would be considered perhaps as "contrary to nature"; for they say that for matter to become immortal is contrary to nature. For while it is matter, and possesses according to its nature the power to transmute the forms within itself, how could it remain always immutable and immovable in itself? They, therefore, following nature, reasonably say that everything alien to nature is "contrary to nature" and can never come into being; but we, looking to God, who brought all things into existence from non-being by word alone and will, call that which seems to them "contrary to nature" divine and "above nature," and say it is possible for it to happen if God so wills. For if God wills something alien to be, we do not call it "contrary to nature"; for such a thing is a violence against nature, and not a constitution of nature, but a weakness, such that it is natural for it to return again to that which is according to nature, if it is freed from the violence.

^A But that which is above nature possesses a constitution and a transformation of nature, so that it comes to be when God wills, yet it remains also marvelous and in the identity of its own order, so that what was previously said to have a natural state is entirely unknown. Its own motions are indeed strange and above what we are able to express, yet they are its own and according to its nature. For even if it is said to be above nature, yet it is above this nature of ours which is seen and which it happened to have before, but not above the all-powerful and divine nature; for with the divine nature, as being the nature and constitution of all living beings, and especially of the more divine ones—I mean the angelic ones, or indeed those in the resurrection with living souls—there is no life that is contrary to nature or above nature. For what life could be contrary to nature and violent for God? And what life could be above his own nature? For what, and what sort of thing, could transcend the divine nature? Hence, when we say concerning God that this thing is, and is called, above nature, we do not mean his own—far be it!—but ours and that of all other things; and when, conversely, we say "according to nature," we do not mean ours and that of other things, but his own. ^B The arguments, therefore, of Simon which contradict the doctrine that says our bodies will be made immortal, let them be driven far away. To suppose, moreover, that one can provide demonstrations against the incomprehensible and altogether invisible Cause of all things from these manifest and sensible things is vain; for how will these things which are objects of opinion and sense overturn those things which are above sense and all intellection? Since there is nothing contrary to God, how will anything be for him contrary to nature or violent?

§ III. Since, however, that which lives is vivified by him—whether it be an angel, or a man, or a brute, or a plant—and from him is every beginning of life and the substance of life, it was also credible that the resurrection [is true], since we shall be resurrected by him to live again. He says the souls are the beginning of life (for through them the bodies which come to life live and are moved), but he says the souls themselves, the intellectual powers, are the essence of life (for these are substantial lives, self-moving, and immortal); and these live from that very divine life which is above all life, and they vivify bodies, in which divine life, even if there are many lives and of the same name as ours, yet they pre-exist in a unified way and according to one vital cause. Wherefore God, as the author and consummator of our life, as its sustainer and distributor, as the one who arranges the differences of all life—namely, intellectual, rational, sensible, and those which grow—exists as the principle of all. For it is contemplated in every life according to the multiple generation and variety of life; for the life of an angel is one thing, that of a man another, and that of a brute another, and that of a plant another; therefore it is contemplated as all-generating and diverse, those things which are united

is poured forth from it upon many others; for it is living in itself, and more than living, and life-giving, or by whatever other human term one might praise that ineffable and divine life, for it is not enough to say of it that it is in need of nothing, but one must add that it is more than full, inasmuch as the good of life is poured from it into many others; for it is self-living and super-living and life-giving or how else humanly one might praise that ineffable and divine life. ^B

CHAPTER VII. De sapientia, mente, ratione, veritate, fide.

SYNOPSIS CAPITIS. 1. Docet, sapientiam Dei esse omnis sapientiæ creatricem, supraque omnem sapientiam exsistere investigabilem et incomprehensibilem; neque secundum nostram intelligentiam metiendam esse. II. Ex ea Dei sapientia dicit angelos habere, quod sint intellectiles, et homines quod sint rationales, et res aliæ sensibiles. Quærit insuper, quomodo Deus omnia novit sine ulla actione; et quomodo omnia cognoscendo anticipet, et in seipso per sui notitiam cognoscat; et angeli quoque sensilia intellectibiliter percipiant. III. Ostendit, Deum, ut in se est, nobis ignotum esse, eumdemque nosci partim per notionem, partim sine notione, et hanc notitiam esse illa diviniorem ac veriorem. IV. Quomodo Deus Verbum sit, quod est simplex veritas et fidei fundamentum.

§ 1

Come, then, if it pleases, let us also praise the true and eternal life as wise, and as wisdom itself, or rather as the creative source of all wisdom, and as surpassing all wisdom and understanding. For God is not only ^C over-full of wisdom, and His understanding is without number, but He is founded above all reason, and mind, and wisdom. And the truly divine man, our common sun and that of our guide, having understood this supernaturally, says: "The foolishness of God is wiser than men," not only because all human thought is a kind of error when judged against the stable and permanent nature of divine and most perfect insights, but also because it is customary for theologians to describe things in God by using the opposite sense of privation. Thus, the Scriptures call the most splendid light "invisible," and Him who has many glorious attributes and names, they call "ineffable" and "nameless," and Him who is present to all and found from all, "incomprehensible" and "unsearchable." By this same method, ^D the divine Apostle is now said to praise the "foolishness of God," bringing that which appears in it as irrational and absurd back to the ineffable truth that is beyond all reason. But, as I have said elsewhere, if we take what is above us in our own way, and by becoming involved with the familiar world of the senses and by comparing divine things with things among us, we are deceived, pursuing the divine and ineffable Word according to what appears on the surface; whereas we ought to know that our mind possesses the power to understand, through which it sees intelligible things, and it possesses a union that transcends the nature of the mind, through which it is joined to things beyond itself. According to this, therefore, divine things must be understood, not in our way, but by having ourselves wholly cease from ourselves, and wholly

tranfuse ourselves into God; since it is far better that we should be God's than our own; for in this way divine things will be able to be given to those who have become ^A wholly of God. Let us, therefore, praise this folly and madness, as it were, and witless wisdom ^A by way of excellence, and say that it is the cause of every mind, and word, and all wisdom, and understanding; and that all counsel is from it, and from it is all knowledge and understanding, and in it are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden. For consistently with what has already been said, the cause, more than wise and all-knowing, is the producer of wisdom itself and of all wisdom, both universal and particular.

§ II

^B From it the intelligible and intellectual powers of the angelic minds possess their simple and blessed intelligences, not gathering divine knowledge through things divided, or from divided things, or through senses, or discursive reasonings, nor being encompassed by any commonality toward these things, but being pure from every material thing and multitude, they grasp those things which can be understood in divine matters in an intellectual, immaterial, and unified manner. And they have a spiritual power and operation, resplendent with an unmixed and immaculate purity, and sharp-sighted regarding divine intelligences, which, through the lack of division and matter and through deiform unity, is fashioned—as far as possible—toward the divine and more than wise mind and reason, through divine wisdom. Hence also souls obtain the power of reasoning, which, while it investigates the truth through certain digressions and the windings of things, falls not a little short of those unified minds on account of the divided and all-various multiplicity; but when at last they gather themselves from the many into the one, they emulate even the angelic intelligences, so far as is appropriate for souls. Indeed, if one were to call the senses themselves a certain obscure trace of wisdom, he would by no means err from the truth: for even the mind of demons, in so far as it is mind, is from it; but in so far as it is mindless, and does not know nor wish to attain what it desires, it ought more truly to be called a falling away from wisdom. But since divine wisdom has been called the principle, and cause, and procreator, and perfection, and custody, and termination of wisdom itself, and of all mind, reason, and sense; how then is God himself proclaimed as more than wise, as wisdom, and mind, and word, and knowledge? For how will he understand any of the things that are intelligible, if he does not possess intellectual operations? Or how ^D will he know things sensible, positioned far above all sense? And yet the Scriptures say that he knows all things, and that nothing escapes divine knowledge; but, as I have said many times,

divine things are to be received in a manner appropriate to God. For ^A a lack of mind and a lack of sensation are attributed to God by way of eminence, not by way of deficiency, just as we attribute the absence of reason to Him who is above reason, and imperfection to Him who is above all perfection and pre-perfect. And we accommodate the dark mist that escapes touch and sight to the unapproachable light, according to how it excels the light that is visible. Thus, the divine Mind contains all things by a knowledge separate from all things, having anticipated in itself, according to the cause of all things, the knowledge of all things; knowing and bringing forth the angels before the angels existed, and knowing all other things from within and from, so to speak, the origin itself, and bringing them into being. This, I think, is what the Scripture signifies when it says: *Who knows all things before they come to be* (Dan. XIII, 42). For the divine Mind does not learn things from the things themselves; rather, from itself, and in itself, as the cause of all things, it possesses the knowledge, the notion, and the essence of all things, and comprehends them beforehand. It does not attend to each one according to its individual species, but rather, knowing and containing all things by the single comprehension of the cause; just as light, according to [the nature of] the cause, anticipates within itself the notion of darkness, knowing the darkness from no other source than from the light itself. Therefore, the divine Wisdom, knowing itself, will know all things: immaterially, the things that are material; indivisibly, the things that are divisible; and unitarily, the things that are many, by the One itself both knowing and producing all things. For if God imparts existence to all beings according to one cause, he will know all things according to that same unitary cause, ^B as existing from himself and pre-existing in himself. He will not receive the notion of things from the things themselves, but will Himself be the granter of knowledge to each of these things, and to some things the knowledge of others. Therefore, God does not possess a knowledge of Himself and a separate, common knowledge that embraces all existing things; for the Cause of all things, knowing itself, would hardly be ignorant of the things that come from it and of which it is the cause. In this way, then, God knows existing things—not by the knowledge of existing things, but by His own [knowledge of Himself]. For even the angels, the Scriptures say, know the things that are upon the earth, not by knowing them through senses—sensible things though they be—but according to the power and nature of their deiform mind.

§ III. ^C Furthermore, it must be asked how we know God, who is neither an object of intellection nor of sensation, nor indeed anything at all of the things that are. Is it not perhaps truer to say that we know God not from His own nature (for that is unknown, and transcends every discourse and mind), but from the ordering of all things, as having been projected from Him, and possessing certain images and likenesses of His divine archetypes, [leading] towards the transcendence of all

^A by path and order, according to our ability, we ascend through the removal and the super-eminence of all things, and into the cause of all. Wherefore God is known in all things, and apart from all things; and God is known through knowledge, and through unknowing; and there is of Him understanding, and reason, and science, and touch, and sense, and opinion, and cogitation, and name, and all other things, and yet He is neither understood, nor spoken, nor named; and He is not any of the things that are, nor is He known in any of the things that are; and in all things He is all, and in nothing is He anything, and from all things He is known to all, and from nothing to anyone: for we speak these things rightly concerning God, and He is celebrated from all existing things according to the analogy of all things of which He is the cause. ^B And there is, again, the most divine knowledge of God, which is known through unknowing, according to the union that is above intellect, when the mind, standing apart from all existing things, and then leaving behind even itself, is united to those rays that shine from above, by which it is illuminated in that inscrutable depth of wisdom. Yet, as I said, He is to be known also from all things; for He is, according to the Scripture, the effective worker of all, and is always composing all things, and is the cause of the indissoluble connection and order of all things, and always connects the ends of preceding things with the beginnings of those that follow, and brings about the single concord and harmony of the whole universe.

§ IV.

God is also preached as Reason ^C by the sacred Scriptures, not only because He is the bestower of reason, and mind, and wisdom, but because He has uniformly anticipated the causes of all things within Himself, and because He passes through all things, pervading them, as the Scripture says, even to the end of all things; and most especially, because the Reason of God is simple above all simplicity, and is absolute from all things above all things, and above substance. This simple Reason is the truly existing truth, regarding which, as a pure and infallible notion of the universe, divine faith revolves—which is the constant foundation of the faithful, establishing them in the truth, and [establishing] the truth in them, while they have an indissuasible identity of the simple knowledge of the truth of the things to be believed. For if knowledge unites the things known with those who know, but ignorance is the cause of one's being always moved and at variance with oneself, ^D he who believes in the truth, according to the sacred Word, will be moved by nothing from the foundation of the true faith, in which he will have the constancy of an immovable and immutable identity. For whoever is united to the truth knows well how well he fares, even if many might argue that he is out of his mind; for it escapes them, as is natural, that he has departed from error into the truth through the true faith; but he himself truly knows himself, not (as they fable) to be insane, but to have departed from the unstable and

mutable motion of the omnimodely erroneous variety, into that truth which is simple and always exists in the same way, and is itself set free. ^A Thus, at any rate, the chief guides of our theology die every day for the sake of the truth, testifying, as is fitting, both in every word and every deed, to that singular knowledge of the Christian truth, that it is both more simple and more divine than all [forms of knowledge], or rather, that it is the only true, and one, and simple knowledge of God.

ANNOTATIONS OF CORDERIUS

§ I. Regarding the passage of Paul, I Cor. 1:25, see what we said above in the notes to the first chapter of this book, § I. The literal sense is: *That which is foolish of God*, i.e., that which the Gentiles and philosophers think to be foolish in a God and Christ born and having suffered, *is wiser than men*, i.e., it exceeds all human wisdom. Thus P. Cornelius.

In the same place: *That union, by which he is joined to things superior to himself, that his own nature far exceeds.* Here note that the act of faith is understood, by which we are directed here in this journey to apprehend divine things according to our capacity, which is a gift of God and of the supernatural order. Why, however, God willed for such sublime things, which exceed our capacity, to be believed by us, Lessius brings forward three beautiful reasons in his book *De perfectionibus divinis*, chapter 3.

The first, he says, is that, *captivating our intellect into the obedience of faith*, we may subject it wholly to God; and recognizing the weakness of our mind, and the height of divine wisdom, we may thus honor God.

The second is that our mind may be raised upward, and be elevated to divine things; for if God did not propose those things which exceed human capacity, the mind would not be lifted upward, but would remain in its own degree and in the lowest lot, and would not be disposed to the vision of God, for the faith of supernatural things is the medium between natural cognition and the blessed vision.

The third is that, since eternal life is above nature, those things also which lead to it ought to exceed the capacity of nature; hence the gift of faith is so greatly commended in the Scriptures, and is said to be had from divine illustration.

§ II. *From it the intellective and intelligent [beings], etc.* Hence the divine Thomas, in the first part, quaestio 55, article 2, concludes that angels, since they are abstracted from bodies, do not understand through species received from things, but through species naturally innate to them. For thus, he says, it is fitting to understand the distinction and order of spiritual substances, as is the distinction and order of corporeal ones. The superior bodies, however, have a power in their nature totally perfected by a form; but in inferior bodies the power of matter is not totally perfected by a form, but receives now one, now another form from some agent; similarly also the inferior intellective substances, namely human souls, have an intellective power not naturally complete, but it is completed in them successively, through the fact that they receive intelligible species from things; but the intellective power in superior spiritual substances, that is, in angels, is naturally complete through intelligible species connatural to them, for understanding all things which they can naturally know. And this is evident also from the very mode of being of such substances, for inferior spiritual substances, namely souls, have a being akin to the body insofar as they are the forms of bodies, and hence from that very mode of being it is fitting for them to obtain their intelligible perfection from bodies and through bodies, otherwise they would be united to bodies in vain; but superior substances, that is, angels, are totally absolute from bodies, existing immaterially and in an intelligible being, and therefore they achieve their intelligible perfection through an intelligible influx, by which they received from God the species of things known together with their intellectual nature. Whence the same D. Thomas from this very passage of Dionysius, quaestio 58, article 3, concludes that angels perceive whatever they know without discourse, and he confirms it by parity of reasoning. ^B For angels, he says, hold that grade in spiritual substances which celestial bodies hold in corporeal substances (whence they are also called by Dionysius "celestial minds"). But there is this difference between celestial and terrestrial bodies, that terrestrial bodies attain their ultimate perfection through change and motion, but celestial bodies obtain their ultimate perfection immediately from their very nature. Thus therefore the inferior intellects, namely of men, attain perfection in the knowledge of truth through a certain motion and discourse of intellectual operation; namely, while they proceed from one known thing to another known thing. But if they immediately looked into the very cognition of the known principle, as if they were notes, all the subsequent conclusions, there would be no place for discourse in them, and this is [the case] in angels, because they immediately look into those things which they naturally know—all things whatever that can be known from them; and therefore they are called *intellectuals*, because also among us those things which are immediately and naturally apprehended are said to be *understood*, whence the intellect is called the habit of first principles, but human souls, which acquire the knowledge of truth through a certain discourse, are called *rational*. Which indeed happens in them from the weakness of intellectual light; for if they had the fullness of it, as the angels do, they would immediately, at the first glance of the principles, comprehend the whole power of them, intuiting whatever could be syllogized from them.

Moreover, he teaches that angels, men, sensible things, and finally all things, were created by the wisdom of God, and in their own way proclaim the wisdom of God, as the great Basil beautifully [comments] on that [verse] of Proverbs 8:22, *The Lord created me the beginning of his ways*. He speaks, he says, of the wisdom of the world, which appears and sends forth its voice almost through those things which are seen, [meaning] that it was made by God, and that such wisdom decorates the things which were effected not by chance. For as *The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaimeth the work of his hands* [Ps. 18:2], they declare, I say, not with a voice, because they are not voices, nor words whose voices are not heard: in the same way...

there are certain sermons of wisdom published of old, which were sown together with the creature before other things in the fabrication of the world. This, while silent, cries out for its creator and Lord, that through it, you may refer yourself to thinking of him who alone is wise. Thus also may this place of Scripture be understood, that is to say, that there are nowhere any men, in whatever tongue and speech they may speak, who do not hear and perceive what the days and nights—by that fixed and mutual vicissitude of succession of theirs—proclaim and declare, namely, the knowledge of God, who made, moderates, and rules all things. Moreover, the construction of the Greek idiom is: *There are no speeches nor words*, to wit, of men, *whose voices are not heard*, that is, by whom their voices are not heard, namely, of the days and nights. Eusebius of Caesarea understood it thus in his most learned Commentaries, as Turrianus notes. From which it is clear that divine wisdom, and science, and mind, and the Word, and intelligence, create from nothing that wisdom which is widely patent and founded with the creature, through itself, and those things which, according to it, are wise of themselves, and every other wisdom which is found in those things that exist.

Ibidem: Therefore the divine mind comprehends all things by a certain eminent cognition, by which, according to the cause of all things itself, it anticipates the cognition of all things in itself, etc. For by comprehending its own essence, says Lessius, by this very fact, by the force of that comprehension, it knows most distinctly and clearly all possibles (under which are also contained the combinations of all possibles) which it can indeed of itself bring to pass; and by comprehending those, it knows further all things in particular, which each of them is able to do or suffer, and in what they might fall short; and not only this, but also what each would do on any occasion, if such or such an occasion were offered. Nor does it stop at these, but also clearly beholds what in very truth is to happen into all eternity, at what moments, in what places, on what occasions, and with what other circumstances. The reason is that in God the abstractive cognition of possibles, since it is of infinite perfection and efficacy in attaining the object, by this very fact—where those objects are in very truth to be—becomes an intuition of existents; nor is there need for another power or effort. Whence it is clear that every intuition of future things is by the force of the comprehension of the essence, and nothing else is required than the position of the objects, for then the cognition, which before, or in a prior sign of reason, was abstractive, passes into intuitive by the force of its own perfection. Thus Lessius, lib. VI, De perfectionibus divinis, cap. 1, who confirms these things from this present place of Dionysius.

^B § II. Furthermore, it must be asked how we know God; and he answers: From the order of all things, as if from a proposal by him, and by having in itself certain images and likenesses of his divine exemplars. For whatever species (says St. Maximus) and individual creatures, like the orders of angels and all sensible things, are images and likenesses of the divine ideas, that is, of the exemplars which are in God. Which, indeed, are the exemplars of the eternal intelligence of God, through which and according to which all things were in him, which were not other than he, and through them and according to them all things which he produced were made, just as the Blessed John in the Apocalypse, ch. iv, says the twenty-four elders said: All things were in him, and were created. It is said of the ideas that they *were*; but of the images and likenesses of the ideas, that is, of the exemplars, that they *were created*.

Ibidem he adds that, in order to know that supreme good, we ascend to the extent of our powers in the ablation and in the superlation of all things, and in the cause of all. For we ascend to the knowledge of God from creatures in three ways. In one way, by removing from him, in a negative manner, as if unbecoming, whatever things are seen as created; because we say that none of them is God, but we deny all things, saying: God is not an angel, nor a soul, nor any animal, or this, or that, whatever it may be. In another way, by removing from God the perfections of creatures, such as life, wisdom, and other such things; because the wisdom of God exceeds all created wisdom, and the life of God all life, and the other perfections surpass all other perfections of creatures. In a third way, insofar as all things are created by God, whatever are in the nature of things and the universe of the world. See what is said in the General Observations VIII and IX, as also the Annotations to ch. 1 of this book.

Ibidem below, by those words, *And always connects the ends of the preceding with the principles of the following*, he signifies that there is nothing middle between creatures, vacuum and void, but that everything is full of creature; for this is the definition of those things which touch one another, whose boundaries are together; he also signifies that there is a certain conspiracy of all parts in the universe, according to a convenient order and proportion, the extremity of fire conspiring and being joined with the principle of air, the extremity of air with the moisture of water, the extremity of water with the dryness of earth; and similarly, ascending from the element of earth to fire, a similar conjunction is found in the extremities of the former with the principles of the latter. In the same way in the seasons of the year, the extremity of winter with the principle of spring, the extremity of spring with the principle of summer, the extremity of summer with the principle of autumn; such conjunctions and conspiracies are called by Dionysius ^C ἀλληλουχίας, which cannot be expressed by one word in Latin.

§ IV. God is also preached by the Scriptures as reason. Commenting on this place, Saint Maximus: <"He is called," he says, "the Word of God, λόγος (logos), that is, reason, because he has the causes of all things in himself, for the reasons of all nature are in him, as in the cause of all creation; for through him are all things." For the ideas and exemplars are in him, not one thing in another, but they are eternal notions, and reasons making all things.>

Ibidem: This reason is simple and truly existing truth, etc. But how from this truth ^D all truth is derived toward us is beautifully handed down by Lessius in his sixth book, De perfectionibus divinis, ch. 4, saying: From the truth of divine wisdom, all truth descends into creatures, and that in two ways. First through creation, because they were founded and formed through wisdom, and that truth consists in conformity with that divine wisdom and art. From things, truth further passes into our cognition; because the truth of things is the measure and origin of the truth of our cognition. From our cognition it passes into our affections and mores, insofar as these are conformed to the judgment of prudence and the knowledge of the divine law; finally, into our sermons and writings, insofar as sermons are signs of the concepts of the mind, and writings are of sermons. In these, therefore, is seen only as it were the extreme of truth, and a certain resulting shadowy vestige. Second, truth descends from God into creatures through revelation and divine illustration; for this truth is not drawn from objects, but communicated directly through the infusion of light; in this way, truth of faith and of beatific vision is derived to us. See more regarding this truth in Lessius in the cited place; likewise the divine Thomas, 2-2, question one, article one, who proves from this place of Dionysius that the formal object of faith is the First Truth itself.

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES (43)

§ 1. Since we have spoken of the Good, of Being, and of Life, come, let us celebrate God himself as the good and eternal Life, and also as wise. For he had already said that we collect things which are above us from the things which are among us; for this reason, as if correcting himself, he says: Or rather, [let us celebrate him] as the cause of all wisdom—that is to say, of that which is in angels and in men—and as existing above all wisdom and composition. For it is neither rational nor fitting that the cause producing something should be of the same nature as the effect. Therefore, out of our own wisdom, we understand divine wisdom by way of supereminence, just as one understands a cause from its effects—not simply as a cause, but as a producing cause. For he is not only overflowing with wisdom according to the Scripture, which says that "of his understanding there is no number," but he is also above all wisdom. Recognizing this, the great Paul, the sun common to me and my preceptor Hierotheos, said that the foolishness of God is wiser than men; not only because our knowledge, when compared to that divine and unerring knowledge, is reckoned as error, but because it is the custom of theologians, by a certain turning away from our own things, to announce divine things through negations rather than through positive terms—for thus is the divine excellence manifested. He also called this in another place the power of a certain super-excellent negation; for since every habit is diminished by excess with respect to the things that are there, for this reason those things are spoken of by way of negation in opposition to our own. Thus, they also call the incarnation of God an "emptying," although it was full, or rather more than full, with wisdom, power, and salvation; and they even call the trophy of the cross the "weakness" of God. ^B In this way, then, the Apostle called the foolishness of God that which exceeds all wisdom and knowledge, bringing what seemed irrational and absurd to us—namely, how God is in the flesh or how he suffered bodily upon the cross—up to that truth which surpasses all reason. For this mystery would not be made clear by arguments based on sensory demonstrations, unless faith precedes it. But as I have said elsewhere, if we wish to grasp things above us in our own fashion, we are deceived, wrapped up as we are in familiar senses; whereas one ought to know that our intellect does indeed have the power to understand intellectible things (insofar as it understands by certain simple and indemonstrable apprehensions), but it understands only those intellectible things which fall under the faculty of its understanding. It will never apprehend higher things, however, unless by a certain super-eminent union it departs from all sensory and intellectible things, and furthermore from its own movement, and in this way receives a certain ray of divine knowledge. He does not, however, call this "union" a mixing or a contact—as one might say, which is also what is called [union]—as the saint also says later on: "When the intellect is united to the rays which are above nature." But since contemplations are inferior to the one who contemplates, and, logically, a scattering and division of the unity of the intellect occurs when it contemplates something; while when it is unto itself

^A it appears indivisible. For this reason, he calls the state that it has in accordance with itself "union," for it applies itself equally to divine contemplation, indivisible, unmoved, not thinking, but wholly—according to a certain unquivering immobility—while we become entirely God’s and not our own; for thus will one receive the divine ray.

§ II. We praise this wisdom, therefore, which does not admit of explanatory reason, nor comprehending intellect, nor enunciating wisdom (for in this sense he calls it irrational, mindless, and foolish, not by way of a disposition, but by way of negation and transcendence, and not by way of deficiency). We say, therefore, praising it by way of transcendence, that it is the cause of every mind, reason, and all wisdom, and that all counsel and understanding belong to it, according to that which is written: "Mine is understanding, mine is counsel and security," and "in it are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden," according to the great Apostle. For just as the eternal and divine life was called the provider of life-in-itself and of all other lives, so too is the all-wise Wisdom the cause even of wisdom-in-itself—that is, through itself, or rather acting as the creative reason of wisdom within itself—and the provider ^B of all wisdom, from which the intellective and intelligent powers of the angels possess their intellections. They are intelligent in relation to those above them, and all of them in relation to God; they are intellective in relation to those below them, and all of them in relation to us. For we are only intelligent, because we do not have another, lower intelligence by which we might be understood, since the soul that follows us is irrational and devoid of mind. The celestial Virtues, therefore, do not possess their intellections in divisible things, whereas we possess them in the divisible instruments of the senses. For hearing is one thing, sight is another, and so it is with the rest. And from these divisible sensible things we receive the knowledge of objects, or in thoughts that are in themselves divisible, but from divisible disciplines or objects of the intellect; for this is what is meant by "through wanderings." For we do not grasp disciplines simultaneously, but in time and divisibly. But the intellective natures, having no participation in all these things, are illuminated with the knowledge of truth by a single and simple intellection. Now, that which is under some common concept is of this sort: our kinds of knowledge, gathered from divided things, abstract some common element, and from that, as something previously known, another thing is brought into knowledge. For even those immediate propositions and primary species would not otherwise ^C at all lead to demonstration, unless they themselves were gathered into some common element from sensible and divisible movements. For just as in war, when a rout occurs, one man stands firm, and after him a second, and a third, and so on in order, and thus perhaps those who had previously ^D suffered a retreat gain the upper hand, so too in common knowledge, particulars and sensible things, when gathered together, create the common. For because many have frequently approached some fire or other and have been warmed, the universal knowledge has arisen, that every

fire warms; and by this common knowledge our mind is informed and learns something else. This does not take place in the angels; but, being pure from every material—that is to say, sensible—multitude of divisible notions, they understand divine things uniformly, not all things indeed, but as many as it is lawful for them to know, through the divine illumination by which they are enlightened and formed into unity: for in this lies their deiformity. Through this divine wisdom, souls also possess the power of reasoning. ^A Why, however, did he not say "intellective," but "rational"—that is to say, the power of reasoning? It becomes manifest from what is in abundance; for all things which souls know here, they perceive through diffuse arguments and demonstrations, and even through divisible sensations. But the soul understands things intelligible not in so far as it is a soul having reason, but in so far as it is mind or intellect; for then the mind understands things intelligible, when it departs from both the soul and itself. This is also signified by the divine Apostle, saying, "The natural ^B man doth not receive the things of the spirit" (1 Cor. 11, 14). Souls, therefore, fall short of those unified and angelic minds by the variety and divisibility of omnigenous knowledge. Then, since the knowledges according to the souls, which come to be through reason, are rolled together into one (for this is also the "in-itself" and the "universal" of demonstration), the souls are also deemed worthy of the angels. Therefore consider also that they understand in a unified way, if one might so speak; or otherwise, when they do not reach the unity of knowledge through reason, but through a laborious habit in accordance with virtue—which is even better; as it is possible to see in our great and divine fathers, ^C who, not by learning, but by the purity attained through virtue, arrived at great contemplations and knowledges more divine than according to man. Furthermore, one would not err if he declared the senses themselves to be a kind of final echo of the divine wisdom; for they also have a certain habit of perceiving and knowing the things which are subject to them, although they require bodily sensory instruments through which the soul may look forth. The demons, in so far as they themselves have a mind, have obtained it from the wisdom of God; but having become irrational, and not remaining what they were, they rather suffered a falling away from wisdom. For the demoniacal mind ^D covets and desires the equality with God, but does not know how it is possible to attain this—not being ignorant by nature, but voluntarily choosing that which is contrary to nature. Hence, also, since the mind of the demons is irrational, it shall be said to be not wise, but fallen from wisdom. But that the divine wisdom is the subsistence and cause of every mind and reason and every sense has been said; but how does the all-wise God Himself understand things intelligible, or the sensible things, having no intellective operations, and being established above every sense? Yet the divine and holy Gospels say, "Lord, thou knowest all things." It must be said, therefore, as I have often stated, that things said by way of privation regarding God are understood in a transcendent way regarding their opposites—the irrational, the mindless, the intangible, the invisible—so that the divine mind contains all things, having apprehended the knowledge of all things beforehand as the cause of all, knowing all things from within, and not

^A from another, or through some other pre-existing knowledge. And knowing from that very Principle—not the principle of the things produced, but the universal Principle of God—which, since it is not righteous to assume regarding God (for God is without principle and beyond principle), he tempered by saying, "if I may so speak." Appropriately, then, does the great Basil also posit that there are certain things which lack a beginning but have an end, speaking of the divine thoughts of creation. For from the beginning, if I may so speak, the concepts of creation were with the Creator. For this reason it is also said, "You who know all things before they come to be." He knows their origin, not that he learns from the things themselves what they are, as he declared, saying: “Not learning the things that are from the things that are, nor applying ideas to each individually, but as the Creator of his own works, he possesses the knowledge of them in advance, knowing how and in what manner he will produce them for generation.” ^B By these, perversion and defect, or frustration and inability, introduce evil, by the privation of that which is according to nature bringing in that which is contrary to nature. For this he brought forward the example of light; for by its privation darkness subsists, and its cause is the absence of the nature of light, just as habits are more primary than privations, and, as one might say, are their causes. Let no one, therefore, be led by these things to such absurd opinions as to say that God has the cause of evils within himself, or that he himself is to be concluded as their cause; for it has already been shown that evil is neither something that is, nor is it among the things that exist. The example also declares this. For just as if one were to suppose this visible light to be endowed with mind and reason, and then we were to ask it if it knows darkness, and it were to say that it knows it even before darkness existed—not, I say, knowing it through any experience (for how could light know darkness? for if there is light, there will be no darkness), but were to say it knows darkness in its capacity as light; and therefore it knows that if it should withdraw its own light, no one will see. So also God has in himself the knowledge of all things according to cause, not having acquired this by experience (since then God would be found to be posterior to the knowledge), or not knowing at some given time. Note, however, that darkness is an effect that comes from a defect ^C of light, which is against the Manichaeans. Hence he constructs the argument that by one and the same knowledge God knows both himself and all things; and for this reason, he knows immaterial things immaterially, divisible things indivisibly, and many things unitarily. For the divine knowledge is immaterial, indivisible, unitary, and simple. If we were saying that in the One—that is, in the one and simple creative power—he established various things, so too in the One—that is, in the unitary and simple knowledge—he knows the various things; but he is also the source of all knowledge, by which one will know both himself and other things. Therefore, God does not know himself by one knowledge and his creatures by another. If, then, he is the very cause of all, knows himself and from himself, how much more will he know the things from him? But by his own knowledge, and not by the knowledge of the things that exist. He attempts, then, from the lesser, that even

^A angels know sensible things, not by approaching them through the sense, but by making contact with them through a transcendent power. For he who, before Gideon, brought forth fire from the rock for the sacrifice, did not perceive it by sense, as we do, that fire is burning, but in a more sublime manner, and according to his own deiform power. If, then, the angels know sensible things in a manner better than that of the sense, how much more so does God know material things immaterially?

§ III. Concerning the divine names, regarding how we know God.

§ III. To these things he raises the question, how we are said to know God, who is also superlatively above things intelligible and above things sensible. It is true, ^B he says, that God is unknown in his own nature, but the beauty of the things created reveals the author of generation, that is, the maker in creation; for the arrangement of the creatures is a kind of image and likeness of the archetypes and creative reasons that are in God, according to which all things that exist were produced in him, just as it is also said in the Apocalypse of John the Theologian and Evangelist, that all things were and have come to be; for they were the archetypes of the creatures, of which the results of creation are images. In all creatures, then, God is known, as the craftsman is known in his handiwork; he being entirely separated in essence from all things. And from this, being unknown, he is known through this very ignorance; but he is also known through their opposites, and he is spoken of through both affirmations and removals. ^C For even if he said earlier that in God there is neither contact, nor intellect, nor reason, nor anything else—nevertheless, when we conceive these affirmative things in a fitting way, we say these things are his, and they cannot be transferred to him from us. For our own contact with the divine does not exist, but his contact with himself will be spoken of, just as also knowledge and intellect. But the negations will be placed upon us, because the divine is above all these things, and it is not possible for it to be grasped from these by us. For this reason, he is also celebrated by us from all things according to the proportion of all: from beings as Being, from living things as Living, from wise things as Wisdom. ^D And again, there is the most divine knowledge of God, which is known through ignorance according to the supra-mental union and conjunction, as he brings in, when he says, the mind departing from existing things and leaving itself behind, is united to the super-radiant rays, being illuminated by the unsearchable depth; from there and there, evidently, thus the illumination takes place, when, remaining there, leaving all things and itself behind, it is illuminated from there. The mind leaves itself behind, when it ceases entirely from its own motion, and altogether remains motionless, having nothing of its own, nor being that of itself, but being entirely of that divine hiddenness, which he called "unity" elsewhere. Yet according to another reason,

namely that of poetic fabrication, as we were saying, it is known from all things, not only as the cause of their production, but also of their conjunction, and as it always connects the beginnings of things that follow to the end of those that go before; for there is no middle space among created things that is empty, in which there is no creature; for the universe is full of all things. Even if you speak of the air, it also exists as a creature; according to this, ^A a "conspiracy" (that is, a consensus) is spoken of in the universe. For just as there is a conspiracy in an animal, when all its living members breathe together, so a consensus exists in the universe.

IV. How God the Word is praised, and what divine faith is

IV. Now he says also how God the Word, or Reason, is celebrated, not only according to what has been said before, because he is known from his effects as from their cause (for he is the bestower of all reason and wisdom); but because he has the causes of all things within himself: for the reasons of every nature are in him as in the cause of all creation; for the ideas and the exemplars are not one thing in another, but as eternal reasons, they exist within him. And he calls him the Word, because ^B he also passes through all things without impediment, and pervades all things even to the furthest limits, as the Apostle also says to the Hebrews: *For the word of God is living and effectual* (Heb. IV, 12), and what follows. And especially, because he is simple beyond all simplicity, and free from all matter, with a similarity taken from the word of our thoughts; for it is certain that our word also, when it is not written, is free from all matter. But how, one might say, is it also simple, when it consists of elements and syllables? But we are speaking not of the word that is uttered, ^C but of the internal word, according to which we are also called rational. This God the Word, since he is also truth itself, is deservedly the infallible knowledge of all things. But he immediately subjoins what knowledge is, saying: "Divine faith, which is the constant foundation of the faithful, establishing them in the truth, and the truth in those who believe, so that the faith of the truth becomes one thing with the believers; just as iron in the fire becomes one thing with the fire, and performs the same things as the fire." Therefore, it is said that "faith" and "believers" act in the same way; since those who believe have a certain simple knowledge, which is not divided nor doubtful; ^D because knowledge unites the things known with those who know, while ignorance becomes the cause of division for the one who is ignorant; for the one who is ignorant has a mind that is unstable and divided into many things. Therefore, nothing will move him who believes in truth from the home and foundation of faith. He therefore who, according to the Apostle (Eph. IV, 14), exists in the darkness of ignorance, fluctuating in that very error, is carried about by every wind of the wickedness of men, just like those who are tossed about by a storm at sea, and they think that the Gnostics are mad; just as Festus also said to Paul who was preaching the truth: *Thou art mad, Paul* (Acts XXVI, 24). The Gnostic, however, and in very truth

A Christian is one who has truly come to know Christ, and through Him has acquired the knowledge of God, the unified knowledge, I say, of the truth. He called our faith "unified," as it possesses the simple and unerring knowledge of that which is truly the proclamation of the truth. It is indeed placed outside the world, since it is not at all involved in the worldly opinion and error of the faithless, but the Christian knows himself to be sober and delivered from the multi-errant faithlessness; therefore, they die daily for the truth, not only jeopardizing themselves to the point of death each day for the sake of the truth, but also always dying to ignorance and living in knowledge, and thus being attested as Christians.

CAPUT VIII. On power, justice, salvation, and redemption; where it also deals with inequality.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER I. He asks how God, who is above all power and authority, is also called power or authority. II. He states that God is called power or authority, because He is omnipotent and the author of all power and authority. III. He shows how the divine omnipotence pervades all things. IV. [He shows] that He imparts all power and authority, which they possess, to the angels. V. Similarly, that He strengthens men, animals, and all other things and preserves them in their own state. VI. He demonstrates that it is of supreme power that God cannot deny Himself. VII. He hands down whence God is also called justice and how He fulfills its function. VIII. Why God leaves the holy to be afflicted in this world. IX. Whence God is also called salvation and redemption.

§ I. But since the theologians praise the divine truth and the supra-wise wisdom as power, and likewise as justice, and also call it salvation and redemption, come, let us also unfold these names of God, as far as we are able. That the Thearchy is exalted above every power, and transcends the power that is or is conceived in any way, I do not suppose anyone who has been nurtured in the divine oracles to be ignorant; for in many places theology hands down both the lordship of itself and [the lordship] even of the supercelestial powers themselves. How then do the theologians praise Him as power, who is exalted above all power? Or how should we accept in Him the name of power?

§ II. We say, therefore, that God is power, as being the one who contains in Himself and transcends every power; and as the author of all power; and as the one who brings forth all things according to an unbending and unlimited power; and as being the author of the very existence of power, both the whole and [that which exists] in each particular thing. And [He is power] as infinitely-powerful, not only in that He brings forth every power, but also in that He is beyond every power and the very "self-power," and in that He is "super-powerful" and can bring forth countless other infinite powers beyond those that exist; and in that one could never be capable of [producing] the infinite and...

super-infinite, it is fitting that one could not blunt the action—which is potent—of the power that produces powers; and it is fitting that the ineffable, unknowable, and inconceivable power of Him who transcends all things, which out of the abundance of its potency empowers even weakness, should hold together and maintain even the furthest echoes ^A of itself, just as we see even in the case of things that are perceived by the senses, that exceedingly bright lights reach even to dim faculties of vision; and they say that massive sounds penetrate even to ears that are not very well-suited to apprehend them. For that which entirely does not hear is not hearing at all, nor is that which does not see, vision. 38

§ III.

This therefore is the infinite-potent distribution of God that goes forth into all things that are, and there is nothing among the things that are that is so completely stripped [of power] that it does not possess some power: but rather it has either an intellectual, or a rational, or a sentient, or a vital, or an essential power; and indeed, if it is lawful to say so, [everything] has its very existence—which is [its] power—from the super-essential power. ^B

§ IV.

From Him are the godlike powers of the angelic orders; from Him also they have their unchangeable state, and all their spiritual and immortal and perpetual motions, and that very constancy and appetite for the Good which cannot be diminished, which they have received from the power of the Infinite Goodness, by whose gift they have it both to be able and to be these very things, and to desire always to be, and to be able always to desire that very ability. ^C

§ V.

Furthermore, the gifts of this indeficient power flow down even into humans, and into animals and plants, and into the whole nature of the universe; for it strengthens those things that are united, [leading them] to mutual friendship and communion, and [causes] those that are distinct to remain unmixed and unconfused, according to the reason and definition proper to each; and it preserves the orders and directions of this whole universe in their proper good, and guards ^D the immortal lives of the angelic unities inviolable, and preserves the substances and orders of the heavenly lights and the stars unchanged, and grants that the ages might exist; it distinguishes the revolutions of times by their progressions, and gathers them by their returns; and it makes the powers of fire unquenchable, and the outpourings of water perennial; it bounds the airy diffusion, and establishes the earth upon nothing, and keeps its life-giving births incorruptible; and indeed [it maintains] the harmony of the elements within one another, and their unmixed and...

indivisible union; it holds together the bond of soul and body, and awakens the nourishing and augmentative powers of plants; and it sustains the essential faculties of all things, and secures the indissoluble persistence of the whole universe, and grants deification itself, providing for this the powers required by those who are to be deified; in short, there is nothing at all among beings that is deprived of the omnipotent protection and divine maintenance of the ^A power. For that which in general has no power, neither is, nor is anything at all, nor is there any position for it whatsoever.

§ VI. But, says Elymas the magician, "If God is omnipotent, how is anything said by your theologian to be impossible?" He mocks the divine Paul, who says that God cannot deny Himself. ^B While I set this forth, I greatly fear that I may seem like a madman, laboring to overturn the sandy and fragile structures of playing children, and hastening, as if aiming at some unattainable target, to approach the theological sense of this passage. For a denial of one's self is a falling away from truth; but truth is that which is; and a failing of truth is a removal from the state of being. If, therefore, truth is that which is, and the denial of truth is a falling away from being, God cannot fall away from being, ^C nor can He not be; and, as one might say, He cannot have the inability to be able, and He does not have "not-knowing" by way of privation. The wise man, not understanding this, imitates those inexperienced athletes who often, fancying their opponents to be weak in their own imagination, bravely shadow-box against those who are not there, and constantly strike the air with empty blows; they imagine they have conquered their opponents, and boast themselves as victors, while not knowing the ^D power of those others. We, however, aiming as far as possible toward the theologian, praise God most powerful as omnipotent, as blessed and the only Potentate, as ruling in His power over the very ages, as having fallen away from none of the beings; but rather as excelling and preceding all beings by a supra-essential power, and as having bestowed by a copious outpouring of superabundant power, upon all things that are, both the power to be and to be this or that.

§ VII. Again, God is praised as justice, because He assigns to all things that which is in accordance with their worth, and provides for all things their appropriate measure, and beauty, and order, and arrangement, and all distributions and

^A particular limits, and is the author to all of their own proper [op-eration]. For divine justice arranges and defines everything, and keeping everything unmixed and undefiled from one another, it distributes to all beings that which is suitable to each, according to the worth that is incumbent upon each of the beings. And if we say these things correctly, those who cavil at divine justice, while they notice it not, openly condemn their own injustice; for they say that there should be in mortals immortality, and in imperfect things perfection, and in those which move themselves a necessity of being moved from elsewhere, and in mutable things identity, and in the weak a power of being perfected, and likewise that those things which are temporary should be perpetual, and those which are moved by nature should be immutable, and that temporary pleasures should endure for eternity, and in general that they award to some the things that belong to others. But it must be known that divine justice is in this very thing truly just, because it apportions to all things that which is their own according to the merit of each, and preserves the nature of each in its own proper order ^B and power.

§ VIII.

But someone might say: It is not a matter of justice to permit holy men to be destitute of help and trampled upon by any base persons whatsoever. To which it must be answered, that if those whom you call holy love earthly things which are sought after by the lovers of material things, they have already by this very fact fallen away completely from divine love. ^C Nor do I indeed understand in what way they can be called holy, who treat with contumely the things that are truly lovable and divine, while they by no means prefer them to things that should be avoided and are abominable, which they [the base] pursue wickedly. But if they truly loved the things that have real being, they would surely rejoice that they could become masters of their desire. Do they not then draw nearer to the angelic virtues, when, as far as possible, by their yearning for divine things, they withdraw from the affection of material things, and exercise themselves toward this in a very manly way, in the trials they undergo for the sake of the good? And so it can truly be said, that it is more befitting to divine justice that it never allows the manly strength of upright men to be enervated and softened by the largesse of material things; but rather, if anyone should attempt this, to strengthen them, supported by divine aid, in that glorious and unshakable state, and to reward them for their perseverance according to their merits.

§ IX.

Divine justice is also celebrated as the salvation of all, ^D because it preserves and guards the essence and order of each thing, pure and apart from others, and is the true cause that all things pursue their own action. If, however, one were to praise salvation, inasmuch as it rescues all things from worse things

^A and from the loss of their own goods, according to the capacity of each of those being saved, we shall certainly accept this herald of all-embracing salvation, and we shall consider him to define this also as the first salvation of all things—that which keeps all things immutable and free from sedition among themselves, and unswerving toward the worse, and guards all things, rendering each thing unassailable and unwarlike according to its own rationale, and banishing from all things every inequality and intrusion, and establishing the proportions of each, so that they cannot be moved into opposites, nor be displaced. For one would not be wide of the mark to celebrate this salvation of sacred theology, as that which rescues all beings—by the goodness which saves all things—from the loss of their own proper goods, in accordance with the capacity of each of the saved; and for this reason the theologians call it redemption, as it does not allow those things that truly exist to fall away into non-being. And insofar as, if anything should slip into what is faulty and disordered, and suffer some diminution of the perfection of its own goods, it also redeems this from that passion, and from that feebleness, and from that privation, filling up what is ^B lacking, and fatherly supporting that which is failed, and raising it up from evil—or rather, stationing it in the good, and filling up the deficiency of good, and ordering and adorning its disorder and uncomeliness, and rendering it whole, and releasing it from everything that is blemished.

But regarding these matters, and regarding justice, it has been said that the equality of all things is measured and defined by it, and every inequality—which is, through privation, the inequality of being in each of them—is banished. For if one were to take "inequality" to mean the differences that exist in the whole of all things in relation to the whole, justice is the guardian of this also, not allowing the whole, being intermingled within the whole, to be thrown into confusion, but preserving all beings according to the species of each, in which it is natural for each to be. ^C

***

ADNOTATIONES CORDERII.

§ 1. "For in many places Scripture," etc. Lessius, in book V *De perfectionibus divinis*, chapter 1, notes that He is called "omnipotent" in more than seventy places. The same is clearly asserted in many other places, as in Matt. x: "With God all things are possible"; Mark x: "All things are possible with God," etc.; Luke i: "No word is impossible with God." Hence, in the Symbol, as the chief foundation of the faith, it is said in the first article: "I believe in God the Father almighty [omnipotentem]," etc., because the principal dogmas of our religion rest upon this, e.g., the dogma concerning the creation of the world, its conservation and governance, the mystery of the Incarnation, the Eucharist, the resurrection, the beatific vision, and the like. It must also be noted, from the same Lessius, that there are two names in St. Dionysius by which divine power is explained, namely *pantodynamos* and *pantokrator*; and although these are sometimes taken for the same thing and signify the same as "omnipotent," nevertheless in Dionysius they signify different things and are to be explained by different words, a fact which the interpreters who translated from the Greek do not seem to have noticed. *Pantodynamos* ought properly to be translated as "omnipotent," of which Dionysius treats in this chapter; *pantokrator*, however, as "omnitenens" [all-holding], as is evident from the declaration of Dionysius which he has in Chapter X, where he treats of this name. There is, moreover, this distinction between these divine names: that God is called "omnipotent" [pantodynamos] in Greek because He is the author of every power, and all power and vigor that is in created things is from Him. Secondly, He is able to do all things, and by His power He produced all things, and is able to produce others without end—nay, infinitely infinitely (as Dionysius says in this chapter). Whence he calls Him [Greek phrase omitted], that is, "infinitely-powerful." But He is called "omnitenens," or *pantokrator*, because He holds and binds together all produced things, lest they be able to flow away; and He contains the parts of the world in their order and location, lest their order and connection be dissolved. Thus He is called "omnipotent," as the creator of all; but "omnitenens," as the conservator of all. ^D

§ II. "We say, therefore, that God is power, as one who possesses beforehand," etc. From these things (says Cyparissiolus, decade 5, VARIE LECTIONES).

one may perceive His properties. For it is observed how He pervades whatsoever exists, and, if it be lawful to say, existence itself, and that the universe which is, has its power to be from that Power which is above substance. Therefore, even existence is a work of power; yet existence itself is not power as if power were in a subject. Furthermore, there is a property beyond "being powerful"; since the super-powerful Power of God, who is beyond substance, has instilled in us an intellect capable of reason, so that He who produced and created the intellect may be above the power to produce other powers, different from those which exist, infinitely infinite; and that powers, infinitely produced from an infinite Power, can never blunt the creation of His super-infinitely empowering power. If, therefore, the power shown did not possess the power of receiving these powers, Dionysius would never declare that those infinite powers, produced by the empowering Power, cannot render His action blunted. Wherefore it happens that power approaches the good; for just as nothing is devoid of goodness, so neither is it devoid of power.

§ IV. "But," says Elymas, etc. He shows beautifully against Elymas that for God not to be able to deny Himself, not to be able to lie, and similar things, is not an argument of impotence, but of infinite power. As Theodoret also proves in the third dialogue against the Heresies: "Many such things," he says, "are found to be impossible for omnipotent God; but that He cannot do any of these is a sign of infinite power, not an indication of weakness; to be able to do them, however, would truly be a sign of impotence, not of power. How do I say this? Because each of these proclaims the firmness and immutability of God. For that Good cannot become evil denotes the supereminence of goodness; and that the Just can never become unjust, nor the Truthful a liar, this demonstrates stability and solidity in truth and justice. Similarly, true light cannot become dark, nor can He who IS become non-existent; for He has existence that is sufficient, and exists as immutable light. Searching through all other things, likewise, you will find that such inability signifies supreme power. Thus also in God, the divine Apostle both understood and placed such things, sometimes saying: 'It is impossible for God to lie' [d]; showing not that impossible thing as a weakness, but as very powerful; while writing elsewhere: 'He cannot deny Himself' [e]. Thus, again, that 'cannot' is demonstrative of infinite power. For even though, he says, all men should deny Him, God is Himself, and does not fall away from His own nature; for He possesses existence that is incorruptible, as that text signifies: 'He cannot deny Himself.' Therefore, that inability for change into a worse state indicates the redundance of power. In this way, many things are impossible for God, and indeed as many such things as are contrary to the divine nature.

§ V. "But God is praised again from justice," etc. Not that He is known as justice (for this, says Cyparissiolus cited above, we can neither utter nor conceive, just as there is no end to His greatness, and His intellect is no number), but He is known as justice from the justice which He produced in us, imposing on individual things order and description, and the other weights of all justice. For the justice of God, which is just, and loves justice, defines the order of each one of those things which exist, and produces it, and sets it according to its own action and according to His super-infinitely infinite justice, and has instilled into each justice produced by Him a virtue that renders to all, according to their dignity, either the proper action of the parts of the soul, or the mean between more and less, or an appetite granting equality, or again a disposition looking after things useful in common, or the knowledge of those things which are to be bestowed and which are not to be bestowed, or neither; and, to say it once, He left nothing without the honor of the justice produced by Him; nay rather He counts all the hairs of our head, and the sparrow of two pennies: He does not suffer it to fall into the snare without His most just will [f]; and He convicts our injustices, which are so called, of being aberrations of our desires. He fills all with His justice, and nothing of those things which are is deprived in any thing of His just salvation and conservation; whence it seems to me that the common saying holds true: "All men commit injury, but to no one is injury done." What sort of equality and due justice regards, and how these have a place in God, see in Lessius, book XII, *On the Divine Perfections*, chapter 1 and following.

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES (44)

§ I. But since theologians call God "Truth," and also "Virtue" or "Power," and "Justice" and "Salvation" and "Redemption," come let us explain these divine names also, presupposing that God incomparably exceeds every power which either exists or can be conceived. He did not say "intellective," for angelic powers also exist as intellective, to which it is manifest that God is superior; but simply "conceivable," as if to say: whatever power anyone might be able to conceive, God nonetheless incomparably exceeds it; since the Scriptures also call God the Lord of virtues or powers, according to that: [index: entries preserved]

^A minus virtutum ipse est Rex gloriæ; et: Dominus virtutum nobiscum, susceptor noster Deus Jacob.

§ II. How then shall we name that power which is exempt from every power? We say that God is called power, as both preceding and containing every power, and as the cause of all power, and as producing all things according to an immutable power; for He does not create by inclining toward the power, but existing immobile and inflexible, He produces from His own might; for He does not incline as one who becomes powerful in something. He said "immutable," that is, not descending from His own eminence, and as being the cause of the very being of power, and because He is of infinite power, not only in producing every power, but also in being above every power itself, even the self-power—I mean the exemplary principle of power—and in being able to produce infinite powers infinitely; and that His power is never blunted toward the creation of infinite powers, and that the excellence of His power is ineffable and inconceivable. ^B Indeed, how would it be ineffable, if it did not have the strength to be incomprehensible to anyone, or if it did not impart power through the abundance of the potential and the weakness of the powerless? By "weakness" he means these material and earthly bodies, which he also calls "extreme traces" because they participate in the divine power dimly and according to their own suitability, just as is the case regarding gnats, flies, and other things that have strength in their own centers. Whence God also says in Joel regarding the locust, the bruchus, and the eruca: "My great power." That the power of God reaches even to these weak things, look at what are powers according to sense, both the visible light and audible sounds; for the bright lights reach even to weak eyes, and loud sounds penetrate even to weak ^C faculties of hearing. For neither is light said to reach to a stone, nor sound to penetrate it, but only to those that are naturally capable of seeing or hearing, even if they are weak.

§ III. According to this reasoning, the power of God will extend to all things that exist, since all things are capable of power, whether intellectual and angelic, or rational and human, or sensory in animals, or vital in plants, or substantial in any other of all things, just as we say the adamant has the power of not being cut, while air has the impotence—or lack of such power—of the same. And even that very thing, "to be power" in itself, exists from the divine power.

§ IV. From such an infinitely potent power the angelic virtues exist, and have an immutable state, and all other things; for this is what grants to them to have power, and to be, and to desire always to be; this is what provides them with strength, so that they may always be able to desire that very power.

^A § V. Furthermore, the gifts of this indeficient power flow down even into men, and animals, and plants, and the whole nature of the universe. For it strengthens those things which are joined together—for example, the parts of a whole body—or even the elements, which in some respects communicate with one another, yet in other respects differ in regard to such a communion. It also strengthens those things which are distinct, so that each may subsist unmixed according to its own rationale. And since each thing has its order and proper direction, it strengthens these also, so that each may be preserved in its own order. It strengthens even the immortal lives of the angelic unities—that is, of those simple natures—so that they may be preserved inviolate. It also preserves the celestial orders immutable. But do not understand this immutability as being sempiternal, but rather as the immutability of the universal order. Indeed, it even allows the aeons to exist; for it can, as it were, extend a temporal motion and interval coextensive with sempiternal things. ^B It also strengthens temporal progressions—namely, the motions of the stars, which move gradually in a certain number of time through the spaces of the so-called twelve houses. It also strengthens the revolutions which return from a certain point to the same point. It strengthens the four elements, binding and containing each according to the proper order of nature. It strengthens the vivifying parturitions of the earth; it strengthens the nexus of soul with body; it stirs up the psychic powers to often foster and increase the plant, and by revolving into that very thing, it confirms the essential powers, and grants the deification of the just itself, offering them the power for this. And universally, there is nothing in the nature of things which does not exist as a participant in the omnipotent and divine power.

^C § VI. Although Elymas the sorcerer, in the Acts, contradicts this, saying: "If God is omnipotent, how is it said by your theologian, namely Paul, that there are things He cannot do?" And he maligns him for saying that God cannot deny Himself. And yet, when I propose this, I greatly fear lest I should appear to be attacking the sandy and weak structure of children, and aiming at the sense of this passage as if it were a target that could not be reached. But I say that God is Truth; and truth is being, while falsehood has neither consistency nor entity. If, therefore, truth were to deny itself, it would succumb to falsehood, and that which is and exists would not be at all. Therefore, that "inability" posited in God is a sign of infinite power; for it is just as if one were to say that God cannot make Himself not be God. ^D For just as light, in so far as it is light, cannot be darkness, so this too is impossible for God, on account of His superabundant truth. As therefore God has never known ignorance—just as fire does not know how not to heat—so neither can He "not be able"; which that wise man, in his irony, Elymas, not having understood,

^A imitates boxers who do not know how victory is won; who seem to themselves to be shadow-boxing with absent adversaries and think they are defeating their opponents, while they have not tested their strength. But we, aiming at the intent of the divine Paul, praise God as the blessed and only Potentate, as One ruling over eternity, and as having fallen short of none of the things that are (for if the capacity for being belongs to all things that are, certainly he who is in some respect "not able," unless we understand the saying in a pious sense, has fallen short of being in some respect, as the senseless Elymas says); rather, He has not only not fallen short of the things that are, but even exceeds and surpasses them by a superessential power, and has bestowed upon all things that are both the capacity to be and that this thing is, according to the overflowing wealth of His superabundant power.

§ VII. A definition of justice is a virtue that distributes according to merit, or the proper action of the intellectual faculties of the soul, or a mean between excess and deficiency, or a habit that distributes equality. By such definitions, therefore, he rightly develops the meaning of divine justice. For this reason God is called justice, as He distributes to all things according to merit, according to the proper definition of each one's nature, and as He is the cause of each thing’s proper action; for divine justice orders all things according to the merit of each. Those who pass judgment on divine justice and say that immortality should belong to mortals, and perfection to imperfect things, and the like—so as not to dwell on each one—speak unjustly. For they raise the complaint: why does man, being such an animal, decay; why does the mole lack sight; why is the stone not self-moving; why is the universe changed according to the seasons; why are transient pleasures not eternal? One must know that divine justice distributes to all things what is their own, and keeps each in its own order and power.

§ VIII. But some one might say: Why does He not aid the holy who are suffering injustice? ^D One must answer with a distinction: Do the holy love things present, or do they not? If they do love them, they are not holy, as they have fallen away from the divine love; for they are unjust to things truly worthy of love by preferring these to them, because they love that which is not enviable, passing over the true goods. But if they do not love them, but love those things which truly are, it is right that they should rather rejoice when they fall into temptations, as the great James also advises. For through these they obtain those desirable things, and then they approach the angelic virtues, withdrawing from material affection in circumstances that arise for the sake of the good; so that it may be truly said that it is more characteristic of divine justice that it does not allow those who desire to look toward eternal things to be deceived by pleasures through a dissolute life, but rather [to make] the surrounding

good and unshakable standing. And he calls it an unshakable standing, the disposition which does not yield at all to the titillation of earthly things, and which does not bend toward material things on account of temptations.

§ IX. This divine justice is also celebrated as salvation, because it justly preserves the reasons of each nature, and is the cause of the proper operation of each thing. He has called "proper operation" that motion which is proper to any nature; for neither can men do those things which are proper to angels, nor water those which are proper to fire, and conversely. ^B If indeed anyone were to say that God is salvation in another way too, as snatching all things away from worse things (and he calls "worse" those things which are alien and unworthy of each nature, or rather matter itself, which is devoid of form), we shall accept this man also as a divine praiser. For we shall judge this to be the salvation of all things, which preserves all things unchanged and unshaken, so that they do not incline toward the worse, and eliminates all inequality and alien action, and confirms the proportions of each. For if the moisture should desert the water, it will no longer be water; yet if it should overflow, it will be something else; wherefore such salvation will also be called liberation, since those things which are preserved are liberated from the defection of their proper goods, and are not permitted to be reduced to nothingness; and if anything should deflect toward sin, it liberates it from such an affection, ^C fatherly supporting it, and raising up the good, or rather, even before it falls into evil, establishing it in the good, and filling the defect, and absolving it from all harms.

This has indeed been said concerning these things and concerning justice, according to which justice the equality of all is measured and defined; and all inequality, which is taken according to the privation of equality, is exterminated. Observe, however, what kind of inequality is eliminated, namely that which is according to the privation of equality: for there is also inequality in every whole toward a whole as a difference, according to which each thing differs from each. Such inequality, therefore, divine justice guards, and does not exterminate; ^D for it does not say that inequality is to be simply exterminated, but that which exists in the particulars, that is, according to which anything of the things that are does not consist equally or similarly in its natural identity. But since he knew two ways according to which inequality is spoken of, he explains both, and says that God is called justice in so far as He measures the equality of all, and exterminates the inequality of each one. And he calls inequality that which happens according to the privation of equality, that is, excess. He also brings forward the other way of inequality: for he knows that some call intelligible and incorporeal forms and unities, that is, simple substances, equality and identity

to undergo corruption. For as He brought all things forth, so He also preserves them, that they may both be and remain as they were in the beginning.

CHAPTER IX. Concerning the Great, the Small, the Same, the Other, the Similar, the Dissimilar, State, Motion, Equality.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER. I. He says that God is called in the Scriptures great, small, same, other, etc. II. He explains in what sense God is called great. III. In what sense small. IV. In what sense same. V. In what sense other, and how length, breadth, and depth are to be understood in God. VI. In what sense God is called similar, although there is no similarity properly speaking between causes and effects. VII. In what sense he is called dissimilar. VIII. In what sense He is said to stand or sit. IX. In what sense He is said to be moved, and how a triple motion is suited to God. X. In what sense He is called equal.

§ I. ^B Since both the great and the small are attributed to the Author of all things, as well as the same and the other, the similar and the dissimilar, and state and motion, come, let us also contemplate these images of the divine names, as far as they are manifest to us. God is praised in the Scriptures as great, both in magnitude and in the "delicate breeze" that signifies the divine smallness; and as the same, when the Scriptures say, "But You are the same" (Ps. ci, 28); and as other, when He is depicted by the same Scriptures as having many forms and types; and as similar, as the founder of similars and of similarity; and as dissimilar to all, as one to whom nothing is similar; and as standing and immovable, and sitting for eternity; and as moved, as one who passes through all things; and whatever other divine names are celebrated by the Scriptures as equivalent to these.

§ II. ^C God is called great according to His own proper magnitude, which distributes itself to all great things, and which overflows and extends beyond every magnitude, encompassing every place, exceeding every number, surpassing every infinity; and according to His super-fullness and wonder-working, and His fountain-like gifts, insofar as these, being shared by all in an infinitely-flowing outpouring, remain altogether undiminished and possess the same super-fullness, and are not lessened by their participation, but rather overflow all the more. This magnitude is also infinite, and without quantity, and without number; and this is the excellence according to the absolute and super-extended outpouring of an incomprehensible magnificence.

^B “Little,” or “subtle,” is said of Him in that He escapes all bulk and distance, and passes through all things without impediment. Yet the “little” is also the cause of all elemental things; for you will never find the form of the “little” being unparticipated. Thus, therefore, is the “little” to be understood in God: as passing through all things and through all things in an unimpeded way, and working, and reaching even to the division of soul and spirit, of joints also and marrow, and as a distinguisher of the desires and thoughts of the heart, or rather of all existing things; for there is no creature invisible in His sight. This “little” is without quantity, and without magnitude, uncontained, infinite, indefinite, containing all things, but Itself can be contained by nothing.

§ IV. And “the Same” is supersubstantially eternal, unchangeable, ever abiding in itself, and having itself in the same way, present to all in the same way, and itself fixedly and undefiledly established in itself and by itself in the most beautiful boundaries of its supersubstantial identity; ^C immutable, without fall, permanent, invariable, unmixed, immaterial, most simple, needing nothing, not increasing, not diminished, unbegotten—not as if not yet made, or imperfect, or not made by this or that, nor as if in no way existing; but as altogether unbegotten, and absolutely unbegotten, and ever-existing, and perfect in itself, and the same according to itself, and uniformly determined by itself and in the same species, and the same also shining forth to all that are capable of participating in it, and arranging some things differently to others, an abundance and cause of identity, containing even the opposites in itself in the same way ^D according to the one and single cause that rises above the whole of identity.

§ V. “The Other,” furthermore, is spoken of because God is present to all things by His providence, and for the sake of the preservation of all becomes all things in all, while remaining in Himself and in His own identity without pouring out, and standing in one incessant operation, and bestowing Himself with unfailing power for the divinization of those who turn to Him; and the otherness of the multiform appearances of God according to the manifold visions, [index: entries preserved]

^A must be understood as signifying realities other than those which appear to the senses. For just as if one were in thought to represent the soul itself in the likeness of a bodily form, and were to assign bodily parts to that which is impartible, we would conceive of the parts attributed to it in another way, as is appropriate to its indivisibility; and we would call the head the intellect, the neck opinion—as being midway between reason and irrationality—the chest anger, the belly desire, and the legs and feet the nature, using the names of the parts as symbols of the faculties; so, and with much greater merit, must the variety of forms and shapes in Him who is above all be cleaned away by holy, God-befitting, and mystical interpretations. And if you wish to attach the tripartite shapes of bodies to the ungraspable and unshapely God, the divine breadth must be called the God-surpassing procession which extends to all things; the length, the power which expands above all things; the depth, that secret and unknowable quality which is inaccessible to all beings. But so that we do not deceive ourselves by the unfolding of these different shapes and forms, mixing up the incorporeal names of God with the names of sensible symbols—concerning which we have discoursed in our *Symbolic Theology*—let us now designate the divine otherness, not as a change of Him who is immutably the same, but rather as a singular multiplication and the simple emanations ^B toward all things.

§ VI

If one were to call God "Similar," as though He were "the Same," and as though He were similar to Himself, unitedly and impartibly throughout His whole being, the divine name of "Similar" is not to be condemned. Yet the theologians say that God, who is above all, insofar as He Himself is, is similar to no one, but that He bestows divine similarity upon those who turn to Him, as they imitate, according to their power, Him who is beyond all limit and reason. And this is the force of the divine similarity, that it returns all things that have been produced to their Author. These things, then, should be called similar to God, as having been fashioned according to His image and likeness; but God is not to be called similar to them, because not even a man is similar to his own image. For in the case of things of the same order, it is possible for these things to be similar to each other, and for the similarity to be reciprocated to both sides, and for both to be similar to each other according to the primary species of similarity; ^D but in the case of the Cause and the things caused, we will not admit the reciprocity. For He does not bestow the quality of being similar only upon these or those, but He is the cause of all things which participate in similarity being similar, and He is the hypostasis of the very self-similarity itself, and the similar in all things

^A exists as a trace of the divine similarity, and fulfills the conjunction of the same.

§ VII.

But to what end are these things said? For even Scripture itself declares God to be dissimilar, and comparable to nothing, as being different from all things, and, what is more wonderful, that nothing is similar to Him. Yet this is in no way repugnant to His similarity; for the same things are both similar and dissimilar to God: similar, indeed, according to that participation which is possible of Him who cannot be participated in; but dissimilar, according to the difference of effects from their causes, which is distant by an incomparably infinite number of parasangs. ^B

§ VIII.

What, then, shall we say concerning the divine station, or seat? What else, I ask, but that God remains in Himself, and is firmly fixed in the same immovable state, and is established above all things, and acts according to the same things and concerning the same, and in the same way, and is altogether immutable from Himself, and cannot be moved, and is entirely immovable? And this, indeed, is above substance; for He Himself is the author of every station and session, who exists above every session and station, and in Him all things subsist, ^C while they are preserved unshaken in the state of His own goods.

§ IX.

What, moreover, when the theologians again teach that He who is immovable proceeds to all things and is moved—must not this also be understood in a way befitting God? For we must piously conceive of Him being moved, not according to motion, or immutation, or alteration, or conversion, or local movement—whether direct, or circular, or a combination of both, or intellectual, or animal, or natural—but according to that by which God produces and contains all things in their natural state, and provides for all things in all ways, and is present to all things ^D incomprehensibly, embracing all things, in all the ways of providence and operation. Nay, the motion of the immovable God may also be proclaimed in a manner befitting God. And the direct motion is to be understood as the inflexibility and undeviating progress of His operations, and the birth of all things which is from Him; the oblique [motion] as their stable progress and fruitful station; the circular, finally, as the identity and connection of the means and extremes which contain and are contained, and the conversion of those things which have proceeded from Him back to Him.

^A If, however, anyone should take the divine name by which God is called "the Same," or that by which He is called "Justice," to apply to that by which He is called "Equal," it must be said that God is equal, not only as being without parts and incapable of being inclined out of straightness, but also as passing through all things and through all things equally, and as being the subsistence of equality itself, according to which He works the uniform passage of all things through one another, and provides for the equal participation of those who partake, according to the fitness of each, and distributes to all things in equal proportion to their worth, and as having grasped and unified in Himself all equality—intelligible, intellectual, rational, sensible, substantial, natural, voluntary—in a way that transcends all, according to the power that creates all equality and transcends all.

ADNOTATIONS OF CORDERIUS

§ 1. Since, however, "also great and small," etc. The passages of Scripture to which he alludes should be noted here, namely: regarding the "great," to Psalm 85: "For great art Thou," and to Psalm 146: "Great is our Lord." Regarding the "small," to that in Isaiah 9: "A child is born to us." The same, Psalm 101: "But Thou art the same"; and 1 Corinthians 12: "There is the same God who works all in all." The other, John 14: "And I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete." Similar, Genesis 1: "Let us make man to our image and likeness"; and Psalm 101: "I have become like to a pelican." Dissimilar, 2 Chronicles 6: "There is no God like to Thee." Standing, Psalm 81: "God stood in the synagogue of the gods." Sitting, Psalm 28: "And the Lord shall sit as King forever." Mobile, Wisdom 7: "Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things." Immobile, Malachi 3: "I am the Lord and I do not change."

§ 2. But God is indeed called great, etc. Here, says Lessius, he assigns various causes why God is called great. First, because He is the cause of all magnitude; for all things have from His bounty that they are great, and that for which each thing is such, that thing is more so. Second, because He is not only coextensive with all great things, but also expands and is poured out externally without limit, just as light is poured out around a glass sphere hanging near the sun. Third, because He encompasses every place, and understand this not only of the real place (for the outermost heaven, or its convex surface, makes this), but also of an imaginary one, however great a space beyond the heaven may be conceived. Fourth, because He exceeds every number; for numbers also are called great. He exceeds this magnitude of numbers by the magnitude of His power, wisdom, goodness, and extension; for He can do more, knows more, is equivalent to more, can coexist and be coextended with more, and can admit more within the bosom of His amplitude, than can be comprehended by any number, however great. Fifth, because He traverses all infinity. And infinity is fivefold. First in substances, insofar as the species of things run out into infinity, some being more perfect than others without limit, just as numbers without limit are some greater than others; second in magnitude; third in duration; fourth in numbers; fifth in qualities and intensive perfection. God traverses all this infinity with His magnitude, as it were coextending Himself with it and superextending Himself, and encompassing it within Himself and embracing the whole; for He embraces in Himself and surpasses every dimension, every eternity, every multitude, every intensive perfection that is imaginable, and all the species of things running out into infinity under many genera of substances and qualities.

St. Gregory, in the second book of his *Moralia*, chapter 12: "God," he says, "Himself remains within all things and outside all things, He Himself is above all things and below all things, superior by power, inferior by sustenance, exterior by magnitude, interior by subtlety, ruling from above, containing from below, surrounding from the outside, penetrating from within; and He is not superior in one part and inferior in another, or exterior in one part and interior in another; but one and the same, He sustains by presiding over everything everywhere, and presides by sustaining, and penetrates by surrounding, and surrounds by penetrating." See more in Lessius, book 2, *On the Divine Perfections*, chapter 1.

§ 3. But "small" or "subtle" is said in Him. Note: the name "small" said of God does not signify anything base or abject, as it does in created things, but the properties of the small—e.g., subtlety, penetrability, incomprehensibility, etc.—are found in God in an excellent way without any imperfection. He confirms this from the Apostle to the Hebrews 4:12, where it is said that the Word of God penetrates to the division of soul and spirit; because it examines and discerns the movements and thoughts of the soul, that is, the animal [faculties], and of the spirit, that is, the rational and spiritual [faculties]; and it also pervades the joints and marrow, that is, the innermost parts of man. St. Gregory, *Homily 21 on Ezekiel*, understands by joints the thoughts connected to one another, and by marrow the intentions, just as the Apostle explains himself in what follows. As if he were saying: He knows, examines, judges, and avenges absolutely all things, even the most intimate and hidden ones. And of the thoughts of the heart, being the *kardiognostes* (heart-knower), God who searches the reins and the heart.

^A § IV. *The same thing itself.* He treats here of the immutability of God, concerning which see beautifully and at length in Lessius, book 2, *On the Divine Perfections*. In the same place: *Ingenitum* (unbegotten), not as if not yet made, etc.; but as absolutely unbegotten, etc. See Maximus, Pachymeres, and Saint Thomas on this passage. Saint Athanasius, in the works he published against the Monophysites, says: "Unbegotten, that is to say, uncreated, is God alone." Following this, doubting how it could have occurred to Dionysius, the supreme theologian, to say that God is above everything unbegotten, he indicated many unbegotten things, that is, things not created. "But yet," he says, "how can this be? For no one is unbegotten except God alone." After that, again refuting the opinion of the Manichaeans, he cites Dionysius of Alexandria, the interpreter of this word, when he says: "External philosophy is accustomed to call every non-visible nature unbegotten; to things so called, the theologian Dionysius said that God is superior." And Saint Epiphanius says: "Unbegotten is clearly exempt from every cause, because one is unbegotten and worthy of veneration." But as to how "unbegotten" is a property and notion of God the Father, see the Scholastics in the first part, question 33, article 4.

§ V. *But another thing, because his providence is present to all*, etc. He posits here, says Saint Thomas, two ways by which the name "other" applies to God. First, that by his providence he becomes everything to all; second, that by diverse visions another thing is insinuated about God than the things seen. Athanasius uses the word "other" in divine matters differently in his *Dialogue with the Orthodox and Anomoean*, saying: "Other is substance, and other is person, other and other; therefore there is a composition." And explaining himself, he says: "I said 'other and other,' not as one thing and another, but as 'other' signifying the person, and 'other' the substance: just as a grain of wheat is called and is seed, and fruit, not one thing and another; but 'other' signifies the seed, 'other' the fruit." Where note, that "other" is said to signify in divine matters substance, and "other" person; because although substance and person signify one and the same thing, substance signifies it in one way, and person in another; and it is rightly termed in Greek *allo kai allo*, that is, "other and other," where there is only a different way of signifying. Just as seed and fruit signify one thing, namely, a grain of wheat; yet they are said to signify "other and other," not as if they were a different thing and a different thing, but because seed signifies that one thing in one way, and fruit in another. For seed signifies a grain of wheat in such a way that we understand another similar thing to be contained in it seminally; for it is seed, in which there is a seminal power to produce another similar thing. But fruit does not signify a grain of wheat in this way, but rather as being the fruit of another, or produced from something else; so also substance and person are one thing, and signify one thing, but person signifies the thing in one way, namely singularly, while substance signifies it commonly. "For as is the proportion of the common to the proper," (says Basil in his epistle to Terentius), "so has substance to person." This different way of signifying one and the same thing is therefore called by Athanasius "other and other," not because it is a different thing and a different thing, but because one and the same thing is signified in one way and another. For there can be multiple names for one thing, just as one name can apply to multiple things.

In the same place: *The divine length*, etc. He alludes to the passage of the Apostle to the Ephesians III, 18, which passage can fittingly be accepted of Christ as God. For although all dimensions in God are one, and one immensity, and God is as it were an intelligible sphere lacking dimension, as Ambrose explains, yet by distinguishing dimensions in God, as they are distinguished in created things, according to Dionysius, breadth is the process of providence widely expanded; length, omnipotence extending itself to all; deep, the unknown mystery of God. According to other Fathers, length is eternity, breadth is omnipotence, height is divine majesty, deep is the abyss of God's judgments and wisdom. Thus Saint Anselm, Saint Thomas, and others. For other senses, see Father Cornelius on the Epistle to the Ephesians. Above others, I prefer the explanation of Father Lessius, book 2, *On the Divine Perfections*, chap. 1, such that length is the long-suffering of God and his patience, by which for so many ages he has sustained sinners, expecting them to repentance; breadth is his charity, by which he embraces all nations, even his enemies; height is the loftiness of glory, which he has prepared for those who love him; deep is the damnation and abyss of miseries prepared for the impious.

§ VI. *But if one says God is similar*, etc. First, he teaches that the name "similar" is not to be rejected in God, insofar as he is said to be similar to himself, namely, unitively, impartibly, as being devoid of all parts, change, and otherness. In almost the same way of speaking, a man who is constant and prudent is said to be always similar to himself, because he moderates his manners according to virtue in every case and event by an equal reason, that is, being mindful to preserve an even mind in all things. Secondly, he says that although it is granted in some way that a creature is similar to God, it is in no way to be granted that God is similar to the creature; because in those things, he says, which are of the same order, a mutual similarity is received, but not in cause and effect. For we say that the image is similar to the man, and not the other way around. And similarly it can be said in some way that a creature is similar to God; not, however, that God is similar to a creature. Hence Saint Thomas, part 1, question 4, article 3, asks whether any creature can be similar to God; and he answers, since God is the universal agent and the principle of all being, not contained in any species or genus, that creatures are similar to him not according to the same specific or generic reason, but according to a certain analogy. For since every effect is assimilated to its cause, as that which necessarily has in itself either formally or eminently whatever it confers upon another, hence every creature is assimilated to God, at least insofar as it is, or even insofar as it lives, and most perfectly of all the rational creature, which alone was created to the image of God. And although this similarity consists in the participation of the same form, it is not according to the same reason, but an entirely different one; for being, living, and knowing, with respect to God and the creature, are either equivocal or highly analogous, and therefore in these there is no reciprocal similarity, because although the creature is similar to God, God is not similar to the creature, the reason for which is that the creature is made for a certain assimilation to God and imitates him, but not the contrary. Whence a reciprocal similarity is found only in those things which participate in a form of the same reason. See these things explained more fully by Saint Thomas in the cited place in the body of the work.

§ VII. *Scripture says God is dissimilar.* Note with Saint Thomas, cited above, that when Holy Scripture says that something is not similar to God, that is not contrary to assimilation to him; for the same things are similar to God and dissimilar. Similar, indeed, in that they imitate him, as far as they are able to imitate him who is not perfectly imitable. Dissimilar, however, in that they fall short of their cause, not only according to their intensity and remission, just as something less white falls short of something whiter, but because there is no correspondence in species or in genus.

§ VIII. *But what are we to say about the divine status or seat?* Note with Saint Thomas on this passage, that station and sitting are attributed to God in three ways. First, indeed, as regards the fact that he exists in himself: for God does not stand nor sit as if supported by something else, as we do, but he remains in himself, not indeed movably, as a man sits on a seat from which he can be removed; nor according to some diversity of himself from himself, just as a man differs from the place in which he sits or stands, but according to an immovable identity; nor like...

the common mode, just as any object is in some way in itself, insofar as it is contained within the limits of its own nature; but uniquely, he is simple in himself. For thus does he lean upon himself, so that he depends upon no other, and is fixed, and is placed above all things. Secondly, regarding operation, and this is what he says: God [is] according to the same [things], that is, according to the same wisdom, virtue, and goodness, and things of this kind; and around the same thing itself, regarding the object of his operation, because his operation is always around himself, insofar as by understanding and loving himself he works all things; and similarly according to the mode of operations, for he is not weakened or strengthened in acting. Thirdly, through the removal of every passion or transmutation from him, when he says: To be entirely immutable from himself and unable to be moved and to be entirely immovable, that is, that he does not have from himself any cause of his transmutation, and that he cannot be moved by any external thing in the opposite direction, but is totally immovable. And these things, he says, are above substance; because indeed he is the cause of all station and session which is found in created things, insofar as he is above every session and station, and all things are stabilized in him, who keeps them so that they are not moved from their station, and that they remain in their own goods.

§ IX. For it must be thought that God is moved, etc. Explaining this passage, St. Maximus says: God, he says, is not moved by any of these kinds of motion, but rather his will is called immovable motion, and [one] which remains in the same mode, by which he wills that those things which are, should exist, and [it is] the emanation of providence to all things. From these [things] it is evident that God is moved by none of those motions which Dionysius ingeniously enumerated, that only excepted which is external, and by which he produced creatures through his divine emanations; being multiplied, and distributed, and shared, not insofar as he is, but insofar as remaining immovable and impartible, and devoid of multiplication, and by the same tenor before and after, he produced all things by his will alone, and not thus retreating from himself in any way. For by what would he be moved, who fills all things with his substance? Rather, says Cyparissiotus, if one face remains, whose form is varied in no part and in no way, and we posit that many faces shine forth around from its splendor, it seems to me that I can make a conjecture about these things from this slight image and likeness. In this manner one might rightly say that God is not distributed, or multiplied in parts, but that we rather, as likenesses and images of his exemplars, have been distinct and varied, and have undergone multiplication and partition; for such affections are proper to likenesses, not to God. Thus by Dionysius, most skilled in divine things, this distinction which appears in God is named: for it is seen, he says, and is called the distinction and multiplication of one God; yet nevertheless, the first principle of divinity is above all nature, one God impartible in partible things, and joined with himself, and devoid of the mixture of many and of multiplication.

§ X. Or by himself the effector of equality according to which, etc. In the mixture of the elements, namely, such equality is concerned, which if it did not exist, generations in the world would not occur. For if any of the elements exceeds and abounds, that which is generated is corrupted.

Ibidem: That each is apt, etc. He says this on account of the equality of proportion, whether those things which exist occur by nature, or by grace; so that not all are illuminated equally by the sun, nor are all sanctified equally, but by proportion, as they are apt, or are deemed worthy.

Ibidem: Insofar as [he is] all equality, *noētēn kai noeran* (νοητὴν καὶ νοεράν), that is, intellectible and intelligent, that is, angelic. For thus he is accustomed to call angels *noētous kai noerous* (νοητοὺς καὶ νοεροὺς), because they have below them [things] by which they may be understood, and they themselves understand, but souls are not wont to be called *noētai* (νοηταί), that is, intellectible, because they do not have below them [things] by which they may be understood, but are called reasoning, and *noerai* (νοεραί) also, that is, intelligent, but not properly as angels. But he calls sentient equality that which is found in animals; substantial, that which is in substantial [things] (thus he calls those things which are without sense and motion); natural, that which is in natural [things] (that understands, which have any motion whatsoever; for nature is the principle of motion and rest); voluntary, in those which are endowed with will, who will to live justly: for justice is a certain equality. Moreover, God possesses every genus of equality anticipated in himself simply, as if in his eternal ideas and exemplars and notions. Thus St. Maximus.

PARAPHRASIS PACHYMERÆ (45)

§ 1. Since also the proposed names appear in the Scriptures: Magnus (Great), according to that [saying]: Great is our Lord, and great is his virtue. Parvus (Small), as in the third [book] of Kings: The voice of a thin aura, and there is the Lord. Idem (The same), according to that [saying]: I am and I do not change. Alius (Other), when he appears otherwise and then otherwise in Ezekiel. Similis (Like), when he is said to create man to his own likeness. Dissimilis (Unlike), when he says in Isaiah: To whom have you made me like? So that he has nothing like [him]. Stans (Standing), when he speaks to Moses: Here I stood before thou wert there. Sedens (Sitting), as Baruch, when he says: Thou sittest into the age; and elsewhere: Thou who sittest upon the cherubim, appear. Motus (Moved), as that: He ascended upon the cherubim. Since therefore these things are found in the Scriptures concerning God, come, let us also contemplate such divine names, as far as it is permitted.

^A The Word has transferred the expression of the images from the Greeks to the truth; for they used to make certain statues without hands or feet, and these they called Hermetic—evidently because they were solid—since they were square; or else they were indicative of certain things, for Hermes is the expression of a word, as the spoken word is of the internal and more inward word. They made them, therefore, with hollow doors, and set within them the images of the gods whom they worshipped, while on the outside they closed the Hermetic statues. Such Mercuries, therefore, appeared common, but within themselves they contained the adornment of the gods themselves. Similarly, he says, here too the names concerning the existing and alone true God, which are recounted in Scripture, appear indeed unworthy of God; but when unfolded, they have an interpretation worthy of God, and contain within themselves images and divine figures of the glory concerning God.

^B § II. God is called great, but not by comparison to another, but according to His own proper greatness; just as heaven, so to speak, is called great, not in respect to another smaller heaven, and the sun is called luminous, not in relation to anything, but in itself. Therefore, God is called great, not by the juxtaposition of another, but because of the incomparable and truly incomprehensible nature of the divine majesty. He is therefore called great as communicating Himself to all great things; for there is nothing great in created things, neither in mass nor in power, which is not called great according to the participation of Him who is poured over every magnitude, and contains every place, and exceeds every number. For since "great" is spoken of quantity, for this reason it comprehends magnitude, place, and number, which are species of quantity; taking magnitude as representing a line, surface, and body; but passing over time and vocal language—the former because He is the creator of times, the latter because he spoke of Him before, in as much as God is called the Word. He therefore comprehends place as incorporeal, and magnitude and number, in that the former can be divided infinitely, and the latter increased without limit. ^C For this reason he also adds: "And transcending every infinity." Miraculously, however, he sets down "Containing every place"; for place contains, but is not contained, because the boundary is that which contains; but God is beyond infinite, for of His kingdom there is no end. And indeed, He exists above every number; for although God is called "one" and "unity," yet He is even above unity; for, properly speaking, "one" has a connection to the many numbers existing from it, and is the principle of multitude. But God is called one because He is simple, indivisible, and incomposite. Yet even so, He is super-unified, and is above unity; for it is said of Him: "And of His understanding there is no number." He is also called great according to His more-than-fullness and magnificence, because the fountains of His gifts, being participated in by all, remain undiminished. ^D

^B § III. "Small" is again predicated [of God], as He is of a nature to admit of no bulk or interval, but exists above these; and it is used in another sense, because He penetrates all things without hindrance. For the small is, in a way, the original principle of all things, since all things that grow pass from the small into the large, and again in their decrease they return from the larger to that which is less. Now, an element is that of which something is composed, and into which it is resolved. Therefore, the "small" is called elemental either because the small is contemplated in the large, but the large is not in the small. For just as in a composite thing the simple are apparent, but the composite is no longer apparent in the simple—and, for example, elements are apparent in syllables, but not syllables in the elements—so here, the "small" is called elemental because it itself appears in the larger, but the converse is not true.

Thus "small" is also predicated of God, because of the apostolic words which it adduces, by which is manifested the speed of God’s progress to incorporeal things. For the showing that God reaches even to the division of soul and spirit declares that even the incorporeal and unified nature of the soul can be divided by God. Whence God also knows thoughts, since God penetrates even to the intellect and the intellection itself, as it has been said: "Thou hast understood my thoughts from afar." ^C Furthermore, He [reaches] between the soul and the spirit; in this spirit we have our senses fixed, through which the soul attends to sensible things and we have the power of understanding speculations. The wise men among the Greeks call this spirit a faculty and a kind of second, sensitive soul of the soul. This sensitive soul, then, penetrates even as far as the marrow, the veins, the arteries, the bones, and the whole body, to all of which God penetrates without hindrance, bestowing consistency on some, while insinuating Himself into others, so that no creature is hidden in His sight.

Take note, however, regarding the "spirit," that the spirit mentioned here, which we call the sensitive soul, is one thing, and that other spirit is another, of whom the great Paul says: "The natural man does not receive the things of the spirit." For there he calls "spirit" the spiritual grace which we faithful receive in holy baptism—a spirit of fortitude, of endurance, ^D of gentleness, of long-suffering, of intensity toward the good—according to which the spiritual appear to the natural to be insane, however much the latter themselves stray from the truth, as we were saying earlier.

§ IV. All things that are said to be in God are said to be so "supersubstantially." Hence, the "same" is also said to be true "supersubstantially," because He remains in Himself, and has stability according to the same things and in the same way, established in the most beautiful limits of the identity appearing around His substance. But from the limits it appears that it is not that He is now the same, but is of a nature to be poured out into otherness at some time; for that [which is created] often turns from identity into otherness, which is not established in the limits of identity. But God

^A comprehends the limits of identity. How then could He ever admit of otherness? He does not speak according to his habit in other places when he says "excess," as if to say that He exceeds the limits of identity; for he would depart from identity and fall into otherness, if he were to exceed identity. Now the Father is accustomed to speak of "excess" in those cases where the excess does not destroy what is fitting for God; but where there is such danger, he considers it sufficient to testify to the supreme nature of God. God, therefore, is immutable, and in regard to every movement, immovable.

But speaking of the "unbegotten" (*agenēton*), since the term "unbegotten" is understood in many ways, he clears away the ambiguous interpretations of the name; for it is termed either that which is not yet begotten, but is to be begotten, as Sarah said, "It is not yet born to me"; or as unfinished, like the tower in Chalane; or as not from this source, as "Paul the apostle, not from men"; or as not this [particular thing], as "Justus is not one of the twelve"; or as that which in no way exists at all, such as what the Gentiles invent, Scylla and Chimera, and the like. Therefore, specifically and absolutely, the "unbegotten" is attributed to God above all these; for it is defined in a single, unchanging way; singly because of the entirely incomparable nature of the divine, and unchangingly because of its immutability. And to define is equivalent to showing, as if by setting a boundary, or as that which is excepted and separated. And God, who is always the same and exists in the same way, bestows upon creatures the power to remain in identity. Likewise, therefore, all things, even those which are not of the same nature, are beheld in God; ^B for God is the cause of all things in the same way, that is, similarly.

§ V. But "otherness" must be thought to signify something else; for this construction has its meaning through inversion, namely: that while remaining in Himself and in His own identity, He becomes all things in all things providentially for the salvation of all, imparting Himself in diverse ways to the deification of those who have turned toward Him. For this reason the wisdom of God is also called "manifold"; and this same diversity of various forms is to be thought to signify that God appears in one way and another in the prophets; because He is something other than what appears, since all things are equally different from Him. For if He were any of those forms, why did He not appear through that one, since it could be entirely grasped, instead of through one and another? For just as, if we were to assign bodily parts to the powers of the indivisible soul, we ought to understand them in accordance with its indivisibility, through a certain anagogy and allegory, calling the mind the head, because the mind is the chief and most excellent part of the soul, just as the head is of the body; and opinion the neck, because just as the neck is in the middle between the head and the rest of the body, so also opinion is in the middle between the mind and the irrational, for it knows the conclusions of the intellect in a non-rational way; ^{C D}

anger indeed to the breast, since they say the irascible power is situated in the breast; desire to the belly, since they also map the concupiscible power of the body around the belly; and nature to the legs and feet, signifying thereby the stability and firmness of nature. How much more, then, regarding God, who is transcendent over all, ^A must we, in a manner befitting God, unfold, purify, and strip what is contemplated of all corporeal things. And indeed, if one should wish to attribute this tripartite dimension, which is proper to bodies—length, breadth, and depth—to the Divine, one must do so in a manner befitting God. One must understand by "breadth" the super-extensive progress of God toward all things, for the sake of bringing them into being, for sustaining them, and for providing for them; by "length," the power that transcends all things; and by "depth," the incomprehensible hiddenness. But I fear lest we be unaware of ourselves, mixing up those things that ought to be understood non-corporeally regarding God with the explanations of sensible symbols. We unfold, that is, the breadth, or the length, or the depth, or something else, wishing to lead them back from the corporeal; and yet again, because we have no other way to speak, we end up in the corporeal, calling progress a "power," or a "hiddenness," and such-like things, which themselves are indeed corporeal, even if they are higher than the former. Hence, these things have been spoken of elsewhere. Now, when we speak of "otherness" regarding God, let us not suspect that the Divine is changed into one thing and another, ^B but rather that, while remaining in its own simplicity, God produces the varied and multiform species of creation. For by "progress" it signifies the very movement, as it were, and impulse toward the creation of all things.

§ VI. If someone were to say that God is "like," in the sense that He is entirely like Himself in every way, this divine name is not to be rejected. But how can the Divine be said to be "like" any existing thing? Since divine Scripture says that He is ever the same, unchangeably, and unlike all things, in the passage: *Who is like unto thee among the gods, O Lord?* And again: *To whom have you likened me?* says the Lord; and again: *I have multiplied visions, and I was made like by the hands of the prophets*; that is, "I am the same to myself," as Irenaeus says in his books *Against Heresies*. In this way, because He is not "like" anyone, He grants likeness to those who turn toward Him. How? According to an imitation and power of those divine things which exist above all limit and reason, according to: *Be ye perfect*, and: *Be ye merciful as your heavenly Father*. ^C These things in God, indeed, exist properly and beyond every limit and reason; for in Him, mercy or perfection is not "this much" or "that much," but infinite. In creatures, however, it is according to the zeal and capacity of each. Whatever is produced, therefore, must be said to be "like" God, but God must not be said to be "like" them, because just as man is not "like" his image, but rather the image is "like" the man. For in the case of those things that are of the same rank ^D and same nature, [Peter... (next page begins)]

and Paul, it is possible for the likeness to be reciprocal, and for one to take precedence over the other.

§ VII. But in the case of the Cause and the things caused, we shall not admit any such reciprocity; rather, we would say that the things caused are like the Cause, but that the Cause is not like the things caused. For it is not their equal, but the Giver is more than those who participate. Indeed, God is the cause of all things being similar, and He is the Subsistence of true Likeness itself. For it is the manner of the Father to call God both "Being itself," and "the Subsistence of Being itself," and "Life itself," and "the Subsistence of Life itself." And he says these things, not as though he were claiming that God is one life, and that a different, essential life—as it were, subsistent near God—has been produced for things to participate in; but, as He explains Himself in the eleventh chapter, God is called Life itself, and Power itself, and Likeness itself, as being this primordially and divinely and causally; for He is these things in very reality. He is the Subsistence of Likeness itself, and of such things, as one who imparts this grace to those things that primarily participate in it; for all things participate in such things according to their capacity, the first and most supreme participating primordially, and the others consequently, in a lower degree. Nor should it be said otherwise that God is the Creator of the exemplary reason of likeness, as He who always possesses in Himself, without beginning and unitarily, the reasons of all things pre-existing, which he has also previously called "predeterminations." That likeness of all things, therefore, which is the unity of all, participates—through participation in the First Cause, that is, as a kind of trace of participation—in that which exists "according to the same things and in the same way." This "similar," then, which exists in this same way, is dissimilar and rejects the composition of all things, as Scripture testifies, saying: "There is none like unto thee among the gods, O Lord." ^B Yet this is by no means contrary to what has been said, when we stated that all things are like God, but God is not like any of them; for the same things are both like and unlike God: unlike, according to the imitation granted to each—for the imitation is not perfect; and unlike, because the things caused fall short of the Cause by infinite and incomparable distances.

§ VIII. It receives "standing" and "seat" as the same, reflecting upon the immovable identity of both. For by "standing," I do not mean that by which one becomes straight after having been bent in a seat, but He called that firm, immovable, and unchangeable nature of God a "firm standing," just as also "to sit" signifies having a perpetual and incomprehensible rest upon an ineffable foundation; for He is the Cause of the standing and seat of all things, in whom all things consist, preserved in their proper goods.

§ IX. When we find "motion" spoken of in regard to God, according to the passage: "Incline the heavens, and descend," ^D we shall properly interpret this movement; for He moves, not according to any of the six—

^A movements treated by the philosophers, neither according to generation, nor according to corruption, nor according to increase, nor according to decrease, nor according to place, nor according to alteration. And again, since movement occurs in three ways—either in a straight line, or in a circle, or from both in a spiral fashion, like the snake and the ship in the waters—He does not move according to these modes either. But neither is He moved by an intelligible movement, such as the mind revolving into itself and multiplying in thoughts. Not by a psychic movement, such as the soul is moved while it thinks and opines. Not by a natural movement, such as nature moves, for it is the principle of movement and rest. But the movement of the Immovable, Who is ever the same, is said to be His will regarding the things that are, and the processions of His providence toward all things, in that He is present to all by a comprehension of all things that is incomprehensible, absolute, and intangible. Having denied[d] such movements in God, and especially the bodily ones—the circular, the straight, and the spiral—he clarifies how one must understand movement in God in a manner befitting Him, interpreting back to their source the sensory movements in the universe. We understand the straight movement in God by virtue of His rectitude and inflexibility, and the generation of all things from Him; for creation exists from Him directly and straightaway, and not through any intermediaries that contribute to it at random. This is better clarified if one examines it starting from the generated things. For if you take any of the things that exist into your mind, you run straight to its maker, so that from the Cause, the concept of generation proceeds straight to the thing caused. Or it is declared in another way, because they say the movement according to generation is straight, since matter directly and of itself seeks the form; wherefore also the form, for the sake of which it is said to be, is as it were the goal toward which nature runs straight, not twisting itself into this and that, but looking to that which is most aimed for. Since, then, the movement according to generation occurs straight, we say that the Cause of generation is moved straight, in a manner befitting God. ^C And we call the stable progression and the fertile station "spiral"; for such a movement also possesses stability, because, even if it causes one to incline, it returns into the same, and at the same time, it participates in this regard with the circular, and it has a progression, according to which it participates in the straight movement. Since, then, the straight movement in God was taken to mean the cause and procession toward generation, we also take the spiral movement, partly as returning into Himself, because of His stability, and partly as proceeding from Himself, because of the fecundity toward the things created. Again, we speak of the circular movement, because of the identity, and because He contains all things. For note that those things which excel contain those things which are beneath them. ^D He calls the "extremes" those highest powers near to God, and the "middle" those that come after them, but are above all sensible things. The highest, then, contain the middle, and the middle contain the sensible. God, however, contains all things as a circle contains all that is within it, and turns them back to Himself as to their Cause.

...and true things of the senses. Moreover, God contains all things, as a circle contains all things that are within it, and converts them to himself as to their cause.

^A § X. Finally, if anyone equates the "same" and the "just" with the "equal" (for the same is that which is in all respects equal and like, and justice is the distributive aspect of equality), this also must be said: God is called "equal" not only as being partless (for that which throughout makes all things equal to something else has no part whereby it might exceed or fall short), but also as extending equally over all things, and as the Subsistent of equality itself (as we said before of likeness itself), according to which he manages the mutual penetration of things—as with the elements; for the equal blending of these, and the fact that none preponderates in their composition, produces the generations of the world. For if any one of the elements exceeds, that which is generated is corrupted. But when he speaks of the "equal participation of those who participate," lest it appear to anyone that he is saying that all things are sanctified and illuminated equally, he explains himself by saying: "According to the capacity of each and the equality of worth." And again, in another way, the Divine is called "equal" because, according to its own power productive of equality, it has anticipated all equality, according to the predefinition delivered elsewhere: the *intelligible* [equality], which does not fall under sense, namely that of the angels; the *intellectual*, which has simple and free intellections, or that of the intellect in itself; the *rational*, which receives notions of things through reason and speculation, namely that of rational souls; the *sensible*, which falls under sense, or that of the parts of the world, which are divided into essential and natural—that is, into things insensible and altogether immovable, and those which have some motion (for they define nature as the principle of motion and rest). Finally, they call *voluntary* equality that which is elective, which we do when we choose, and by the freedom of our own will we rightly order and do those things which are just.

CAPUT X.

Concerning the Omnitenent, the Ancient of Days; in which also concerning the age or eternity and time.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER. 1. It states why God is called "Omnitenent" or Lord of All. 2. Why he is called "Ancient of Days." 3. What time and eternity or the age are, and to whom they belong.

§ 1. But it is time for our discourse to hymn the many-named God as Omnitenent, and as Ancient of Days. He is called Omnitenent because he himself is the seat of all things, containing and encompassing all things, and establishing, grounding, and constraining them, rendering the universe indissoluble in himself, and producing all things from himself, as from an omnitenent root, and [bringing them] to himself as to the...

^A all-encompassing seat of all things, securing all that is contained in one all-surpassing containment, and not allowing them, having fallen away from himself, to be utterly destroyed, as if moving from their perfect home. The Deity is also called "Omnitenent" as holding all things by his dominion, and as presiding over those which he governs without being mixed with them, and as being desirable and lovable to all, imposing upon all his voluntary yokes, and the sweet pangs of divine and omnitenent love, and of his own indissoluble goodness.

§ II. God is praised as the "Ancient of Days," ^B because he is himself the aeon and time of all things, [being] before days, before aeon, and before time. Yet, it is fitting for God to be called also time, and day, and season, and aeon, as one who is immutable and immovable in relation to all movement, and remaining in himself while ever in movement, and as the cause of aeon, and time, and days. Therefore, in the sacred theophanies of the mystical visions, he is depicted both as old and young: the former signifying the Ancient One ^C who is from the beginning, the latter signifying him who is unaging; or [both] declaring that he proceeds from the beginning through all things unto the end; or, as our divine initiator says, indicating the divine antiquity of each—the elder signifying that which is first in order of time, while the young, or new, signifies that which is more excellent in number; since unity, and those things near to unity, are more primordial than numbers that have proceeded far into plurality.

§ III. I think it necessary, however, that we learn the nature of time and of aeon from the Scriptures. For it does not call "aeonian" everything that is ^D absolutely unbegotten and truly eternal everywhere, such as the impassible, the immortal, the immutable, and things that are always the same—as when it says, "Be lifted up, ye everlasting [aeonian] gates" (Ps. XXIII, 7, 9), and the like. Often it characterizes even the most ancient things by the appellation of "aeon," and at other times it calls the entire duration of our time "aeon," insofar as the specific property of aeon is that which is ancient and immutable, and that which measures the whole state of being. But it calls "time" that which is in generation, and corruption, and alteration, and which is at one time one way and at another time another; wherefore theology also says that we, being defined here by time, shall participate in aeon when we reach the incorruptible and always-same aeon. To the sacred writings, there is sometimes even an "aeonian time" and a "temporal aeon," even if we understand them more accurately and more properly as the beings which...

are related to ^A aeon, and those which are in generation related to time, as they are called and signified. We must not, therefore, simply suppose that the things called "aeonian" are co-eternal with God, who is before the aeon; but, following the most sacred oracles without deviation, we must accept that things are "aeonian" and "temporal," according to the modes known to them, while those things which are in the middle—participating partly in aeon and partly in time—are also counted among those things that exist and are generated. We must praise God both as aeon and as time, as the cause of all time and aeon; and as the Ancient of Days, as being before time and above time, and as the changer of seasons and times; and again as existing before the aeons, insofar as He is also before the aeon and above the aeon; and His kingdom is a kingdom of all the aeons. Amen.

ANNOTATIONS OF CORDERIUS

§ I. He is indeed called "Omnitenens," in Greek παντοκράτωρ, the force and differentiation of which word from παντοδύναμος, which means "omnipotent," see above in the annotations to chapter eight, § 1. ^B It is also said there of God that He presides "unmixedly," because there is no need for Him to mix Himself, as it were, with things and affairs in order to know them, or to govern them safely and securely, as is necessary for man—who otherwise would be unable to suffice alone for governance. Imposing upon all things voluntary yokes—that is, the appetites of nature—as seemly for each, as if they were laws imposed from within, which every nature obeys freely and of its own accord, and none resists, nor does it refuse obedience. And because appetites of this kind, and the innate impulses and inclinations, tend toward the loving of the supreme Good, in which they participate in various ways, therefore, inclinations of this kind are said by Dionysius to "bring forth divine love," just as the earth, warmed by the sun, brings forth fruit.

§ II. God is praised as the "Ancient of Days," etc. Because (says Lessius, in book IV *On Divine Perfections*, chap. 2) He alone lacks a beginning of duration, He alone never began, He alone occupies and encompasses all time and interval of duration. Hence He is called "the Ancient of days" in Daniel, chap. 7, because, as Dionysius explains here, He is Himself the aeon and time of all things, "before days, before aeon, before time"; which you should understand as applying to all time, even that which is comprehensible to the creature. For it would be a small thing for Him to have been before "real" time, which has not yet completed six thousand years, since even the angels, according to the opinion of certain Fathers, existed many aeons before that time, and praised God; but He was also before every imaginable time, however long that may be conceived to be. Take as many aeons before the world was founded as there are grains of sand on the seashore: God was already there. Take just as many myriads of aeons: God was there before. Multiply this immense number of aeons by itself: God is still infinitely more ancient. Moreover, He is said to be the "aeon and time of all things," because every aeon depends on His duration, and every time flows from Him, who gives and continues its own being to aeon and time. Whence in chapter 5 the same Dionysius says: *Αὐτός ἐστιν αἰὼν τῶν αἰώνων, ὁ ὑπάρχων πρὸ αἰώνων*—He is the aeon of the aeons, existing before every aeon; and a little before: *Ἀρχὴ καὶ μέτρον αἰώνων, καὶ χρόνων ὀντότης, καὶ αἰὼν τῶν ὄντων*—He is the beginning and measure of the aeons, and the entity of times, and the aeon of beings, all of which are to be understood causally. Every creature, however, has a beginning, because it is not from the substance of God, but from nothing; indeed, according to the opinion of the holy Fathers, it cannot even be eternal in the past. See the authorities of the holy Fathers on this matter in Lessius at the cited location. Therefore, God is the aeon of the angels who are in the aeon—whom he had previously called "eternal" or "aeonian" from the aeon—and the time of those things which are subject to time, that is, of all those things which were made after the column, from whose motion time exists, that is, the number of the motion of the heaven according to what is prior and posterior. He hears [Himself] *θεοπρεπῶς*, that is, as it befits God. For "aeon," or "age," is spoken of, and "time," and "day," but immutably, because all things that are in these—namely, in the aeon, and time, and day—receive change ^C fittingly for their own natures; but the aeon, and times, and days themselves, insofar as they are aeon, and times, and days, are immutable by a certain imitation of God. For since every mutation happens in time, in what time would the mutation of time itself occur? But the variations of the year—namely, of spring, summer, autumn, and winter—which we call "seasons," are indeed mutations of times and days according to their qualities, but not of times and days in themselves, that is, insofar as they are times and days.

§ III. It is worth the trouble that we learn the nature of time and the aeon from the Scriptures. Note that the Scriptures say in Ps. LXXIII: "Yours is the day, and yours is the night; you have fashioned the dawn and the sun," where it calls and praises God also as "time" and "day," and when it says in the same Psalm: "Summer and spring, you have fashioned them," where similarly God is called and praised as "season," which is called *καιρός* by the Greeks, just as time is called *χρόνος*. But this warns that these things are to be understood according to the modes known in the Scriptures, or according to the scope of Scripture, according to, I say, the nature of those things which in the Scriptures are called "eternal" or "temporal." For angels are said in the Scriptures to be "eternal" (Ps. XXIII: "Lift up, eternal gates"), because they are participants in the aeon and the most ancient of all creatures. "Aeon," or "age," also is said, in Greek *αἰών*, to be the extension or duration itself of time, as that in Matt. XXVIII: "Until the consummation of the aeon"; and Ps. LXXVI: "I have had eternal years in mind"; and II Cor. IV: "The God of this aeon." For it is just the same as if

the interpreter had translated it "of this age," or eternity, in Greek *aiōn*. Exod. XXI: "He shall be his servant into the age," or "into eternity." Scripture therefore calls this a temporal eternity, just as it is said in Paul, "eternal time." I Tim. I: "Before secular times," in Greek it is *aionia*, that is, eternal. And to Tit. I: "Before secular times," in Greek *aionia*, that is, eternal. And Rom. XVI: "According to the revelation of the mystery kept silent in eternal times"; it is the same word in Greek which in this place the interpreter translated as "eternal," and in others as "secular."

It is not alien to this chapter, according to Turrianus in *Cyparissioti* Decad. 8, cap. 3, to explain how what the Roman Pontiff believed concerning the creation of the angels is to be understood, which he proposed to Catholics for belief in the chapter *Firmiter*, concerning the Supreme Trinity. For the Decretal does not disagree with what Dionysius teaches here; indeed, it agrees, when it says, "the one principle of all things, the creator of all things visible and invisible, who by His omnipotent power simultaneously from the beginning of time created both creatures from nothing, the spiritual and the corporal, namely the angelic and the worldly, and then the human, constituted as it were of spirit and body." So far the Decretal. But this point must be expanded somewhat.

St. Athanasius asks in *Questions to Prince Antiochus*, question 4: "When, and how, and whence were the angels made?" And he answers the question: "Neither when, nor how they were made can be stated by human nature, except only this, that they were made by the Word of God from nothing." "But when?" some say, he says, "on the first day, others before the first day." But the Prophet testifies that they were created when he says: "Praise Him, all His angels; for He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created." For he says that Moses, because he knew that the Jews were addicted to idolatry, therefore did not make a discourse concerning the angels in Genesis, lest they worship them as gods, as they later did with the calf and other idols. Therefore, what could be learned from the holy Scriptures is that both creatures, to wit, the spiritual and the corporal, were created by God simultaneously and from nothing; "For all things were made through Him." And: "He who lives for eternity," says Ecclesiasticus, "created all things together."

The Decretal subjected both of these to the Catholic faith. Now, as for the fact that it wished the "simultaneously from the beginning of time" to be referred to the corporal creature—that is, to the world which is seen and whatever is contained in it, because it is written: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth"—it is not necessary, according to Scripture, that it be referred to the angelic nature, because, as Athanasius was saying a little earlier, human nature cannot say when the angels were created. But because we cannot understand, nor manifest to others, the duration of the angels—which is not subject to time, because it is entirely simultaneous and invariable, and which exists and is called in the sacred Scriptures *aevum*—except through the extension of our time, consisting of hours, days, and years, which Scripture sometimes also calls *aevum*, as Dionysius noted; for this reason the Pontiff proposed for belief that both creatures, spiritual and corporal, were created simultaneously from the beginning of time. Therefore, the Pontiff, imitating Dionysius, included both *aevum* and time under the name of time. Hence this Decretal does not forbid one from holding that the disciples of the apostles, Clement and Dionysius, whom many others followed later, felt that the angels were created before the world. For Dionysius interprets the saying, "Lift up, O eternal gates," as referring to the angels; because he says that to be ancient and invariable, and to be measured as a whole, is the property of the *aevum*. Wherefore, if the *aevum* is more ancient than time, and is called the *aevum*, and is the duration of the angels; then the angels were created before time, and before those things that are in time.

St. Maximus thinks the same in his first theological century. For if He had not created the angels before the time with which the world arose, He would have been more ancient than virtue, so as not to be virtue; and more ancient than goodness, so as not to be goodness, which seem absurd to St. Maximus. So also is to be understood what Epiphanius, disputing against the heresy of Paul of Samosata, says, that the angels were not created before heaven and earth. "For," he says, "this statement is clearly not mutable, that before heaven and earth there was nothing among created things; for 'in the beginning God created heaven and earth,' so that there might be a beginning, and nothing among created things should be before this very thing." So far Epiphanius.

It is most true that before heaven and earth there was nothing among created things, namely in time (for so it must be understood), but the angels were created in the *aevum*. For the *aevum* is the measure of those things that are not subject to time.

The same thing that this Decretal says was stated earlier by the synodal epistle of Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, sent to Honorius I, and not to Sergius of Constantinople, as Photius attests in his *Bibliotheca*. This epistle was recited at the sixth synod, and placed in the eleventh action. Speaking therefore of the creation of the world made by God, Sophronius confesses thus: "And for all things He determined a chronological beginning," that is: And for all things He decreed a beginning of time: because the angels, although they are immortal, have this in common with those things which are in time, that they were made, therefore He attributed time to them. The Pontiff clearly followed him in his Decretal, and Sophronius clearly followed Dionysius, whom he cites in the same synodical document (lest anyone say that Dionysius was unknown to Sophronius).

That the angels, therefore, were created before this corporeal world, Dionysius hands down in this place, and the Apostolic Doctrine lib. VII of Clement, cap. 12, and Gregory Nazianzen followed it in his sermon on the Nativity of Christ, and in his second [sermon] on Easter, and Damascene followed him lib. II *On the Orthodox Faith*. St. Basil the Great also teaches the same in the *Hexaemeron*, and Philoponus followed him lib. I *On the Creation of the World*, cap. 8, 9, 10, where he refutes the Mopsuestian, who thought the contrary.

However, as to how it is to be understood that spiritual and corporal creatures were created simultaneously, the former with the *aevum*, the latter with time—so that we do not pass this over either—the same Athanasius explained it lib. I *Against the Arians*, looking at that place in Ecclesiasticus cap. XVIII: "He who lives for eternity, created all things together." For he says that nothing among created things was fashioned before others of its own kind, but all things were made simultaneously by one and the same mandate. And he explains it more further a little earlier, when he says that there is nothing in created things that was made itself one and alone, and first before others, namely of its own kind, but together with all things, *kata genos kai taxin*, that is, with all things of its own kind or order. "For," he says, "none of the stars, or of the great luminaries, appeared in such a way that this one emerged into the nature of things earlier, and that one later; but all began their origin on the same day and at the same command, although some differ from others in splendor. Similarly in quadrupeds, birds, fishes, cattle, plants." Similarly, he says, "Adam, although he was formed alone from the earth, there were nevertheless in him even then the reasons for the succession and posterity of the human race." He then subjoins: "And from the creation of the visible world, we understand that its invisibles (he means the angels) were made by this kind of works as well, and we gather that not even among them was anything created separately in its kind, either earlier or later, but that all things that are of the same condition existed simultaneously." For He did not enumerate individual things.

But, he says, "throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates," etc. Athanasius concludes: "All the cherubim were therefore created at once, and likewise the seraphim, and at once the thrones, and similarly in the other orders, in which, so far as pertains to creation, there is nothing prior or posterior, ^A although they differ among themselves in glory and honor." Athanasius thus proves against Arius that the Word is not a creature. Otherwise, he says, it would be necessary that He be created simultaneously with others of the order of virtues, and not beforehand, although He might excel the others in glory. From which it again follows that He could not be the first and the beginning of others, as the Arians wished. For they maintained that the Word was created so that through Him God might create all other things, as if He were not of the number of all things; yet when such a beginning of all things, says Athanasius, was proven to be in all things, he thus concludes that the Word differs in substance and nature from the creatures, and that He alone is the image of the true God alone. From these things it is clear that the angels are older than temporal things, as being eternal (æviternos), since "aon" (the age) is older than time, though they are not co-eternal with God, since His eternity is His own, proper to Himself, and not communicable to any other creature. From which it becomes manifest that nothing, neither of the times, nor of the ages, nor anything of those things that are in the times or ages themselves, is co-eternal with the infinity of God, who is the cause of all things, and is above all things, and by whose will all things were made from nothing, whether they derived their origin from time or from the age (ævo). ^B Also, it seems fitting that those perfections which flow from God, and which are participated in by the creatures—that is, created—be older than time itself, with which creatures subject to time participated in them. Therefore holiness and goodness, charity, life, wisdom, and other perfections of God, participated in from God—that is, efficiently or causally—did not begin to be created with the creation of man, but earlier, namely before time, when the angels (that is, in the age) were praising God, not co-eternally.

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES (46)

§ I. It is also time to speak of the Omnitenent, and how God is called "Ancient of Days" by Daniel. He is called Omnitenent, therefore, from the metaphor of a rooted and native rock, upon which both the foundation of the building and the building itself are established. Then, when he says that the seat "contains all things," lest anyone should think that he said this because He co-exists with the created things themselves in the manner of the rock in the example cited, and does not contain them from without, he adds the following words. For it is not said of the rock that the rock contains or founds, but of God it is said that He is the efficient cause from which, as from an efficient root, all things are produced, and to whom, as to an efficient and provident foundation, they are turned back. ^C But by one supereminent containment He protects all things; since every procession of God, whether to create or to provide, is unique and simple, even if created and provided things participate in these functions in diverse ways. ^D He is also called Omnitenent in another way, because He rules over all and exerts authority, and His power satisfies all those who are governed by Him; which does not have a place among earthly kings, since they need men who are superior in order to govern. And if indeed they themselves happen to rule some on their own, they must, in a certain way, involve themselves in the affairs and learn those things which pertain to them so that they may preside securely: but God rules omnipotently, and presides without admixture. He is also called Omnitenent as being lovable and desirable to all; since all things are governed by Him voluntarily, and are borne toward Him by divine love, so that there exists no dissension, nor any forced and violent attraction; for this reason He is said to possess the Omnitenent dignity; for nothing shakes off the reins, nothing resists, nothing stands against, nothing yields while being forced, but all things, as creatures that know their Creator, toward…

^A them bring forth divine love. But the word, taken from those who are pregnant, shows something of the natural disposition within us, and our natural impulse and motion toward the Creator. For just as the earth, being warmed by the sun, is stirred to labor, so too the heart, carrying within itself that which is lovable, brings forth love.

§ II. God is celebrated as the Ancient of Days because He is the very eternity of the eternal angels; for he had previously called them eternal, as participating in eternity, though not as being without beginning. Time, however, belongs to those things that are subject to time, that is, to all things that have come into being after the production of the heaven, by whose motion time is introduced. Moreover, God is called time, and eternity, and day, in a manner befitting God, since He is immutable, because all things in these do change; but they themselves remain immutable as regards being times and days. For if they changed according to essence—and all change occurs in time—the change of time would also have to occur in time, and in what sort of time that would be, I do not know; but as regards being time and days, he said their immutability holds. Since, proceeding further, the saint speaks of time in terms of change—for you would call time that, and that must be granted; for summer and spring, autumn and winter, are the changes of time—so then, in a manner befitting God, God always remains moving within Himself. And thirdly, because He is also the cause of them; for we said before that God is called all things as the cause from the effects, even if He is above all things. Therefore, He appeared hoary to Daniel, having a head white as wool, but again as a youth to Abraham: ^B the former, because all things are from God and after Him, and younger than He; the latter, because He is free from old age in a vigorous and stable blessedness; or by both, by the old man and the young, it is signified that He proceeds through all creatures from the beginning to the end; or thirdly, as the divine initiator and teacher of the Father, Hierotheus, says, that by both His divine antiquity is indicated: by the old man, that the ^C ancient and first is declared; by the young man, since as in numbers the unit is more fundamental, while the number is younger, and the number is the one that appears in multitude, as it increases, it possesses the expression of later occurrence. Therefore God, as the cause of the creatures, holds the role of beginning and unit; but the creatures, as being from Him and caused by the multitude, reasonably, the former possesses that which is ancient, while the creatures possess that which is after the beginning and later, as from Him and as the cause of the multitude; but He Himself exists as that which is after the beginning and ^D later.

§ III. He begins to speak about time itself and eternity, most wisely securing the listener for piety, and saying that one ought not to assume that things called eternal represent, on that account, things co-eternal with God who is before the ages. For those things which are altogether and absolutely unbegotten and sempiternal in God are properly eternal; but the incorruptible angels are called eternal

according to the text: *Lift up, O eternal gates*, because they participate in eternity and are more ancient than other creatures. For this very extension of time, or age, is found and so named according to the text: *Until the consummation of the age*; and: *I have called to mind the eternal years, and I have meditated*; and again: *The god of this age hath blinded the minds of their unbelievers*; and what was said by Moses, who saw God: *He shall be thy servant forever*, or into eternity. These things, then, speak of a temporal eternity; but according to the Apostle it is called eternal time, and *kept in silence through eternal times*. ^B Therefore, the angels are called eternal, as participating in the property of eternity, which is antiquity and immutability, and that which is measured according to the whole of being; just as the theologian Gregory also says, that which is co-extended with beings. But it is the property of time to be concerned with generation and corruption; for it came to be along with the heaven and its motion; and again, when the elements have changed, time itself will perish, but eternity will be. Whence also we, who for now are subject to time here, will at some point become eternal, having become incorruptible. It is necessary, therefore, not to take those things that are called eternal simply as everlasting, but according to the divine purpose of the Scriptures and the modes known to belong to them—namely, that they are to be called eternal according to the natures of the subjects. Since, then, he attributes the things that properly *are*—I mean the divine things, which are above every creature—to eternity, even if they are above an age or eternity, he defined the things that come to be by time, and in between those that *are* and those that *come to be* he places the angels and souls, which partly participate in an age, inasmuch as they are immortal and free from destruction, and partly in time, because they are seen ^C in generation; but the kingdom of God is eternal, or rather, the kingdom of all ages; to Him be the glory. Amen.

CAPUT XI. Of peace, and what "being of itself" signifies; what "life of itself" is, what "power of itself" is, and things said in such a manner.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER

I. Describe what divine peace is, which coordinates and conciliates all things, and what its effects are. II. Also, how that unknown silence of God cannot be expressed. III. How God, as peace of itself, and the author of universal and particular peace, may peaceably conciliate all things and extend to all. IV. How peace is preserved between so many and so contrary things. V. How peace is found in those things that are always moving. VI. Nothing in the nature of things subsists without peace. VII. How God is said to be life of itself, wisdom of itself, etc., and the author of life of itself and of wisdom. And what goodness of itself is, and divinity of itself.

^D § I.

Come now, let us celebrate with peaceful praises the divine and conciliatory peace; for this is what joins all things together, and generates and produces the concord and connection of all things; wherefore all things desire it, as it turns their divided multitude back into a whole unity, and—

^A induces them into a concordant commemoration. Moreover, by ^B participation in the divine peace, the primary reconciling virtues are joined both to themselves and to each other, and to the one peace of the world. They also join things inferior both to themselves and to each other, and to that one perfect beginning and author of the peace of all, who, coming indivisibly to all things, as if by certain bolts and enclosures, connects that which is divided, defines, determines, and fortifies all things; nor does He allow things divided to be diffused into the infinite and the indeterminate, or to become disorderly, homeless, and destitute of God, or, having departed from their own unity, to be confusedly mixed with one another. Concerning, therefore, this divine peace and silence itself—which the holy Justus calls the 'unsounding' and the 'immobility' toward every emanation that is known—what it truly is, and how God rests and is silent, and how He is in Himself and within Himself, and is wholly with Himself, united above all else, neither entering into Himself nor, by multiplying Himself, deserting His unity (but rather going forth to all, while remaining wholly within, on account of the excellence of His union that surpasses all things), it is neither lawful nor possible for any of those things that exist to say or to conceive. But since it is not possible to speak of this or to grasp it by understanding, let us, being lifted up to the divine peace itself ^C as something placed beyond all things, attend to its participations, which are understood and named, and this so far as we, being men—and we especially, who are unequal to many good men—are able to attain.

§ II. And first, this must be said: that God Himself is the effector of peace, both of peace by itself and of universal and particular peace, and that He mixes all things with one another by their unconfused ^D conjunction—a conjunction by which, although things are indivisibly united and cohering without division or distance, each yet stands pure according to its own proper species, not obscured by the mixture with opposites, nor blunting any of the precision and purity of the union. Let us, therefore, contemplate one simple nature of peaceful union, which joins all things to itself, to them, and to one another, and preserves all things in an unconfused, pure, and mingled cohesion of all. Through this, divine minds, being united in their own understandings, are united also to the things understood, and again ascend to the unknown contact of those things which are established above the mind. Through this, souls, by connecting their own manifold reasons and gathering them into one intellectual purity, proceed in a way and order proper to themselves, through immaterial and indivisible understanding, to the union that is above understanding. Through this, the one and indissoluble connection of all things subsists according to His divine harmony, and is fitted together in perfect concord, unity, and communion, being gathered together...

without confusion and held together without dissolution. The integrity of perfect peace, through its most simple and pure presence of unifying power, reaches unto all things that are, joining all, and connecting extremes to extremes through the means, having been coagulated according to a single connatural friendship; and it even provides a portion of the enjoyment of itself ^A to the very extremities of the whole universe, associating all things with unities, identities, unions, and gatherings, while the divine peace remains indivisible, showing forth all things in one, and reaching unto all, and nowhere departing from its own identity. For it proceeds unto all things, and grants to all a participation in itself according to the property of each; furthermore, it overflows with the redundancy of peaceful goodness, and remains through the excess of union whole towards the whole, being also, according to itself, entirely united from above.

§ III.

But how, someone will say, do all things desire peace, when many things rejoice in diversity and distinction, and would never wish to rest voluntarily? Yet if he who speaks thus asserts that diversity and distinction are each thing's own property, and that no thing—while it remains in its own state—wishes to lose this, we shall by no means dispute this with him; rather, we shall affirm that this itself is also a desire for peace. For all things love to be at peace with themselves and to be united, and to be unmoved and unassailable in themselves and in their own properties. And that perfect peace is indeed the guardian ^B of each individual's pure property, through its peace-bestowing providences, keeping all things without sedition or confusion—both towards themselves and towards one another—and establishing all things in a stable and never-declining power unto their own peace and immobility.

§ IV.

Furthermore, if all things that are moved wish not to rest, but always to be moved with their own movement, even this desire to move pertains to that divine universal peace, which preserves all things from falling away from themselves, and guards the property and motive life of all things that are moved, so that it may not depart or fall away from itself; thus, being moved, they have peace with themselves, and in such a state, they perform what is their own. ^C

§ V.

But if anyone, asserting that diversity is a falling away from peace, maintains that peace is not dear to all, the primary response must be that there exists nothing in the nature of things that has completely fallen away from all

^A union; for that which is utterly unstable and infinite, and rests upon no seat and is fashioned as indeterminate, is not that which exists in essence, nor does it exist in anything. If one objects that those who delight in quarrels, angers, mutations, and instabilities are opposed to peace and the goods of peace, the truth is that they too are held fast by certain obscure phantoms of a peaceful desire, while they are driven by various perturbations, which they ignorantly desire to settle, and think that they possess peace if they can persist in draining the continuously flowing pleasures; and they are disturbed if they are frustrated in those matters by which they themselves have been conquered.

What, moreover, shall one say of Christ’s peaceful benignity? By it we are taught to wage war no longer, whether with ourselves, or with our neighbors, or with the angels, with whom it is instead necessary to cooperate as far as a man can in those things which pertain to God, according to the providence of Jesus himself, who works all things in all, and brings about a peace which is ineffable and ^B predestined from eternity, and reconciles us to himself, and in himself to the Father. Concerning these supernatural gifts, enough and more than enough has been said in the *Theological Institutions*, with the sacred Scripture bearing witness for us.

§ VI.

But since you asked me at another time by letter what I mean when I say "being-itself," "life-itself," "wisdom-itself," and you say that you have been in doubt with yourself ^C as to how I sometimes call God "life-itself," and at other times "the effector of life-itself," I have thought it necessary, O holy man of God, to free you from this doubt as far as I am able. And first, indeed, to repeat what has been said a thousand times, it is not contradictory to say that God is power-itself or life-itself, and to say that He is the effector of life-itself, or of peace, or of power; for the former is said of Him from the things that are, and especially from those that are first, as He is the cause of all things that are; but the latter is said of Him as He who exists supersubstantially beyond all things, including those that are first.

But you ask, in general, what we mean by "being-itself," or "life-itself," or however many things we posit as being absolutely and principally, and as having been created from God and the First. We answer that this is not a convoluted matter, but one that is straight and has a simple ^D explanation. For we do not say that "being-itself" is some divine or angelic substance, which is the cause so that all things that are may exist (for only He who is above essence is the principle, and the essence, and the cause of all things that are, and of "being-itself"), nor do we posit any other divinity that produces life, beyond the life that is above divinity and is the cause of all things whatsoever that live, and the cause of "life-itself"; nor, to sum up, do we mean the primal and creative substances and hypostases of things—which some have improvised and termed "gods of the beings" and "creators"—which, to speak truly and accurately, neither they themselves knew (as they are not) nor their fathers; but we speak of "being-itself," and "life-itself," and "deity-itself."

^A And we say that, in a primary, divine, and efficient manner, ^B He is the one principle and cause of all things, beyond principle and beyond substance. But as for the providences which flow from God—who is himself not participated in ^C—as He is participated in His gifts, we speak of "substance-itself-making," "life-itself-making," and "deification-itself-making," from whose participation those beings that have it, according to the fitness of each, are and are called beings, and living, and divine, and similarly in other things. Wherefore, that Good One is said to be the author of those things which are primary, and then of those which generally and universally participate in them, and then of those which participate in part. But what does it avail to speak of these things? Since some of our divine teachers ^D call the supra-good and supra-divine [God] the "constitutor" of Goodness-itself and Deity-itself, saying that the beneficent and deifying gift which has come forth from God is itself "goodness" and "deity"; and "beauty-itself" as the beauty-making inflow; and "all-beauty" and "partial-beauty"; and things "altogether beautiful" and "beautiful in part"; and whatever other things are said and shall be said in the same way, manifesting the providences and goodnesses participated in by beings, flowing forth from God (who is beyond participation) in an abundant inflow and overflowing, so that the Cause of all may, in strict accuracy, be beyond all, and, as the Super-substantial and Super-natural, may in every way transcend every essence and every nature.

CORDERIUS' ANNOTATIONS

§ 1. "Come now, divine peace, as the principle of reconciliation," etc. On the occasion of this chapter, the divine Thomas (2-2, q. 29, art. 1) asks whether peace is the same thing as concord; and in the body of the article he responds that peace includes concord and adds something to it. Whence, wherever there is peace, there is concord; but it is not the case that wherever there is concord, there is peace, if the name of peace is taken properly. For concord, taken properly, has reference to another, inasmuch as the wills of different hearts agree together into one consensus. But it happens that even one man's heart tends toward different things, and this in two ways. Firstly, according to different appetitive faculties, just as the sensitive appetite generally tends toward the contrary of the rational appetite, according to that saying: "The flesh lusts against the spirit" (Gal. v, 17); secondly, inasumuch as one and the same appetitive power tends toward different desirable objects which it cannot attain simultaneously, whence there must be a struggle of appetitive movements. Wherefore, the union of these movements pertains indeed to the reason of peace, but not to the reason of concord; whence concord implies the union of the appetites of different subjects desiring, whereas peace, over and above this union, implies also the union of the appetites of one and the same subject desiring.

Ibid.: "Of the divine peace itself and silence," etc. Where note, with St. Thomas, that silence is joined to divine peace, because noise and clamor are usually signs of a disturbed peace. He says, however, that this peace is called by a certain holy man, Justus by name, the "insonance" or "ineffability" of God; because, namely, neither can we speak of God, nor does He speak of Himself to us in such a way that we can perfectly know Him as He is. He also joins to peace the immobility of God toward every movement that is known to us; for although He is said to proceed insofar as He diffuses His likeness into things, yet He himself remains immobile in Himself in accordance with every such movement or emanation, as St. Dionysius also taught in *Celestial Hierarchy*, ch. 1, § 2. Rightly, moreover, are quiet, immobility, and silence joined to peace; because those things which possess peace are seen by this very fact to possess some quiet.

§ III. "But how, one may say," etc. He moves here the doubt of how all things can be said to desire peace, given such a dissension of appetites. This same question is raised from Dionysius by the divine Thomas (2-2, q. 29, art. 2), and with him he responds in the body of the article, from the fact that man desires something

appetent, it follows that he desires the attainment of that which he desires, and consequently, the removal of those things which can hinder that attainment. Now the attainment of a desired good can be hindered by a contrary appetite, either one’s own or another’s; and both are taken away by peace, as was said above, and ^A for God it is necessary that every desiring thing should desire peace; in so far, to be sure, as every desiring thing desires to arrive tranquilly and without hindrance at that which it desires, in which the definition of peace consists. Whence even those who seek wars and dissensions desire nothing but peace, which they do not think they possess. For as it is said in § 1, there is no peace if anyone agrees with another against what he himself would more desire. And therefore men seek to break this concord by warring, as though it contained a defect of peace, so that they may arrive at a peace in which nothing is repugnant to their will; and for this reason all who war seek through wars to arrive at a peace more perfect than that which they had before. Furthermore, since peace consists in the quiet and union of the appetite; just as an appetite can be simply of good, or of an apparent good, so also peace can be either true or apparent. True peace, indeed, cannot exist except in relation to the appetite for the true good (because every evil, even if according to something it may appear good, whence it may in some part quiet the appetite, yet has many defects, from which the appetite remains restless and perturbed); whence true peace cannot exist except in good things, and of good things; but the peace that belongs to evil things is an apparent, and not a true, peace. Whence it is said in Sapient. xiv, 22: *Living in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace.* Since, therefore, true peace is only of the good, just as the true good is had in two ways, namely perfectly and imperfectly, so also is there a twofold true peace. One, indeed, is perfect, which consists in the perfect fruition of the highest good, by which all appetites are united and quieted in the One: and this is the final end of the rational creature, according to that of the Psalm CXLVII, 14: *Who has set your boundaries as peace.* The other, however, is an imperfect peace, which is had in this world; because, although the primary motion of the soul may rest in God, there are nevertheless other repugnances within and without which perturb this peace.

Therefore, that we may briefly gather the properties of divine peace from the things explained in this chapter, in the words of Cyparissiota from decade 5, cap. 8. There is, he says, a divine peace, which unites diverse things into one (for it is said to be the gatherer and binder together even of those things which are of the most diverse genus and nature), ^B mixing many things into a temperament, not confusedly nor mixedly, but preserving the universals in each and reducing them into one simple concept of the mind. As when the mind reduces white, for example, and black and the other species of color into one simple concept of color, it preserves the universality of the genus in them; for neither does the agreement in the universality of the genus confuse the species; nor does the diversity of the species take away the agreement in the universality, but this concord and harmony proceeds from the divine peace. Then this divine peace most beautifully accomplishes, as it were, a union of multiple and diverse voices and sounds like a concert and symphony, changing nothing from the grave or acute, but rather they remain according to nature, adapted without confusion, so that a coupling is generated—beyond what can be thought—by certain amatory enticements, or, I know not what more divine to call it, reduced into a union. From which it becomes manifest that peace, and greatness, and smallness, and station, and motion, and being the same, and being diverse, and being like, and being unlike, these all are one peace in God. Therefore, both here and elsewhere it has been clearly said and demonstrated by Dionysius, that other and contrary things all exist in the same way and unitedly, and with no duplication in God; yet they are varied by the things produced by Him, having obtained diversity from those very emanations.

God is therefore, as was demonstrated earlier, like a substance which we can neither express in words, nor declare, nor know, and so also is His divine peace; furthermore His wisdom and His life, and whatever else is absolute, and whatever things now seem to be conveyed in Him according to contrariety. We praise this, however, according to His manifestations understood and named; that is, we praise Him from the things He produced, which fall under the understanding and under the senses, by which we, instructed from those things which are seen, are led to the thought of His great gifts, first revolving the actions themselves in our mind: as if one should first consider the creature or the fabric of the world itself by itself, gazing upon it as an action and motion of God, then refer the discourse to the products and created things. And the same Dionysius, 515 as in other places, so also now, ^C agreeing with himself, places the names with defining adjunction, "of life itself," etc., which, because they were explained above, we do not repeat.

§ VI. What I mean by *being itself*, etc. See what was said in the annotations above, cap. 5, § 4. Here only observe with Turrianus on Cyparissiota, decad. 8, cap. 3, how ingeniously Dionysius here corrected what Plato wrote in the Timaeus and Parmenides regarding species or ungenerated ideas, separated without destruction, immutable, consisting by nature, as the effectors of singular things, and transferred it to the true dogma regarding principles—not which exist as causes by themselves, nor are unmade, but which have in us a purely intelligible and immutable being flowing from God, and are as it were certain intelligible forms, separated from the things themselves only by reason. For that which is singular is posterior in intelligence, which cannot be understood without the prior things, which are whatsoever exists in species, and the species themselves, which are participated in by singulars, and have being prior according to notion. For this man would not exist in notion, unless the species of man first had intelligible being; nor would man be said to be according to notion, unless humanity first had intelligible being; for this contains what the "what-is" of the species of man is. Similarly in the rest. This life would not exist in notion, nor would this likeness, unless life and likeness were considered universally; nor would this exist, unless there were first according to notion the "what-is" of life itself and likeness itself, which is called life simply and likeness simply, or *life in itself* and *likeness in itself*.

God is said to be above *being itself*, in so far indeed as He can be thought by us. Just as God is also said to be above God, *ὡς ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι*, as Dionysius says, that is, according to our cognition; above God, I say, by participation, whom we know in creatures, as it is written: *I said: You are godsa*; so also is He good above the goodness which can be known by us in creatures. Therefore, *being itself* is said properly and in itself of the creature and of God, but equivocally, as *good* and *God*.

St. Maximus in the Theological Centuries, cent. 1, cap. 4, 5, 6. God is not, he says, a substance which is said simply or in a certain way, where the principle is: nor power as power, which is said simply or in a certain way, where the middle is; nor work as work, which is said simply or in a certain way, where the end is—the motion of his own substance according to power previously thought—but He Himself is both the effector of substance and above substance, the effector of power and above power, the firmness and force, ^D and the immortal faculty of all efficiency, and, to speak briefly, the author of principle, middle, and end. Where note from Turrianus cited above, that "substance simply" is to be understood as substance considered abstractly.

a Psal. LXXXI, 6.

516 PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES (47)

^A § I. Come then, let us also celebrate peace, which is the cause of all reconciliation; for it is that which joins all things together, insofar as it gathers their divided multitude into one, that is, into one desire for that [Principle]; for it calls this an integral unity. It is this which constitutes the structure of this universe, tempered from elements of diverse natures: and hence it has called the contrariety of qualities in them an "intestine war," that is, heat against cold, and moisture against dryness, and other similar things, which are united for the completion of one cosmos. Here, however, he piously resolves the arguments of the Greeks. For since among them many differ, and some contend that all things come to be from contrariety and war, while others from friendship and concord—so that by some it is said that strife was the creative principle, and by others friendship—the Father, by rightly moderating their arguments, establishes God as the maker of the universe.

It is also possible to understand "intestine war" in another way: that which is naturally between incorporeal and material things. For "the flesh," he says, "lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh" (Gal. V, 17). ^B And such a war divine peace leads to union, according to which those most ancient celestial orders are joined to themselves and to each other, and are led to one most perfect principle of peace, which, as it comes to all things indivisibly (for it does not come in some part, but wholly), secures and protects all things as if with certain gates or bars, and does not permit them to be divided into the infinite and the indeterminate—as if into a lack of the form of beauty, which external sages called "matter," terming it infinite, as being indeterminate and formless. Since, therefore, God is the creator of form and beauty, rightly ^C what has been deserted by God becomes formless and unadorned. Concerning this divine peace itself, whatever it may be, he excuses himself from speaking; for even Justus in the Acts, whom they also called Joseph,

^A he calls ineffable, as being silent and hidden; and though immobile, it is yet known by every movement; for this is what gives form to and moves all things, for the whole is super-united to the whole, and as it multiplies itself by the peaceful processions in each case, it never abandons its unitary simplicity. Therefore, to speak or even to think about this is neither possible nor permitted; but rather, considering this as unknown, let us contemplate its intelligible participations mentioned in the Scriptures, as far as is possible for humans, or rather for us who are inferior to those.

§ II. We say, then, first, that that divine peace is the producer of the ineffable peace of peace-itself, according to the arguments we made earlier regarding life-itself. He calls "the whole" the peace of each, insofar as all things, which are divided by natures, are reconciled and urged toward one desire; he calls "of each" that by which each thing, keeping its own unity, does not dissolve into corruption and non-existence, which he called above "infinite" and "indetermine." Note, however, that all things are said to have conjunction with one another, but the one is said to have unity with itself; and the one, being held together, does not dissolve into the infinite, while all things, when mixed, remain unconfused. For if, he says, even the elements have an indivisible connection and mixture with one another, ^C yet their qualities do not abandon their own extremity, for instance heat, dryness, and the rest, in the tempering of diverse species which is observed in the universe. For by "tempering" here we must understand not the mixing that occurs in moist things, which also destroys the underlying subjects, but the conspiracy and interdependence which preserves the things that exist in harmony. We shall therefore conceive of a single simple nature, as it were, of peace contemplated in all things, uniting all things to itself, and all things to one another, and all things to themselves, and keeping them both unmixed and tempered: unmixed, by the own quality of each; tempered, by the mixture toward one another. Through this, divine minds are united both with their own intellections and with the things understood; for they understand both themselves, and those that have ascended, and even things lower. When, therefore, they exercise their own [powers], and understand themselves, they are united to their own intellections; but when they understand the things that have gone beyond or the things that have gone under, then they are united to the objects of understanding. For that which understands is united by knowledge to that which is known, just as he who is ignorant is scattered, not having grasped what he did not understand. After these unions (which would not have happened if the thing understanding had not been at peace with itself, or indeed if the thing understanding had not been at peace toward the things understood), it is led up to that unknown and divine contact. ^D Again, in our own souls [518b] it is possible to find an indivisible and simple intellection, when they gather their manifold reasonings toward one intellectual purity; for then also toward the super-

-^A-intellectual union, according to their capacity, by a certain way and order they attain. Through this very nature of peace, a certain one and indissoluble connection of all elements exists, collected in an unconfused manner, because although they are mixed with one another, yet the extremities of their qualities are not in the least lost; they are mixed inseparably, because from this mixture of elements one certain nature is perfected. For this is peace, which connects extremes to extremes through the middle. He calls the elements extremes — earth, air, water, and ether — which are also in all respects contrary. But the middles, between earth and air, is water, which communicates with earth in coldness, and with air in humidity; and again, between water and ether is air, which communicates with water in humidity, and with ether in heat. ^B This also imparts friendship to the extreme limits of the universe, which are inanimate substances, in which no movement of growth or nutrition or any other is considered, and renders all things akin and related, insofar as all things are from God and turn toward God; for thus also the Apostle made use of an ancient saying, "For we are also his offspring." He states the reason according to which all things are related: intelligibles, by their unities, that is, according to that which in them is one and simple, and according to the identity of immortality; sensibles, by the unions or mixtures of diverse elements, and by the gatherings of such mixtures. For divine peace, showing all things in one and the same, ^C extends to all things, and communicates itself according to the capacity and dignity of all things; yet it remains, through its excellence of union and peace, whole with itself, whole, according to its whole being most super-united. Since it is super-united, it exists as the same to itself according to its whole nature.

§ III. From this point he introduces, in a certain way, the question of those who say: How do all things desire peace, since there are some things that take pleasure in division and enmity? And here he speaks clearly of which are the things that find pleasure in diversity, but in the solution he will clarify these matters more broadly. He therefore brings forward a threefold argument, and the first he admits, the second he rejects as impossible, and the third he finally moderates. If, therefore, he says, anyone speaks of the property of each thing, according to which this is fire, ^D that is water, and another thing is something else, having a different nature, I also admit such a diversity, which I do not call a distinction, but rather a union and consistency of each thing in its own state; for nothing of those things which exist desires to lose what it is; for all things wish to have peace with themselves, and the property of each is rather the guardian of its nature.

^A And why do I say this concerning those things which are not moved, but are without sedition and in quiet, when it also has a place in those things which are moved by any motion whatsoever, as one might see in the sun, or in the parts of the heavens, or in other things that are easily changeable, and incline now one way and now another? Just as it is with lightning, which immediately moves with a downward motion, and again an upward one; or with the sea, now surging, now quiet, wherein even that alternating motion does not constitute difference and diversity, but demonstrates the sameness of nature, since the nature of such a thing requires such movement and vicissitude for its own peace, and even then preserves its mobile life undisturbed, just as its nature dictates.

^B § V. But if he brings forward a second argument, asserting that diversity exists through a total falling away from peace, as the Manichaeans used to say that matter possesses self-subsistent instability, and circumvention, and infinity, and indefiniteness, let him know that there is no being which remains as such matter and subsists by itself; nor is it even found among things that exist, so as to be itself one of the informed creatures. If, then, it is not informed like other things, nor certainly, while it remains unformed, is it a thing, so as to subsist by itself, how shall we say that such a thing does not have peace? But if he says a third thing, that there are some who are averse to the Good, and who rejoice in contentions and rages, I say that these too are constrained by dark shadows of love; for being agitated by passions, and wishing through ignorance to appease the passions as if they were good, they seem to desire peace, while they desire to enjoy the passions with impunity, and think they have peace if they are filled with the passions that are always flowing, being always agitated by these same things. What, furthermore, might one say concerning the peace of Christ, by which all war has been dissolved, so that not only do we not have war with ourselves, nor with one another, nor with the angels, but we shall even cooperate with the angels themselves, performing the same worship and adoration of the Divine as they do, by which peace He reconciled us to Himself, and to the Father, and to the Spirit, concerning whom it has also been sufficiently spoken elsewhere.

^D § VI. From here he introduces and explains how he understands God to be Life-itself, and the producer of Life-itself, and the like, since he also set this down in the Epistles, and the holy Timothy doubted concerning it. He says, therefore, that it is not contradictory to say God is both Life-itself and the producer of Life-itself; for God is called this also from things that exist, as the cause of caused things, and especially from those that are in the first rank. I conceive, however, that by "those that are in the first rank" he meant the supramundane natures, as they primarily and purely participate in the divine gifts—life, immortality, and the rest. God, therefore, being called [so] from things that exist, as cause from caused things, could be called according to this the producer and cause of Life-itself—Life-itself from the caused. But what this Life-itself is, he says as he proceeds. When He Himself is called God and Life-itself, above all

all nature it is said; that is, also above the angels and every spiritual substance. From one example of life, we ought to think similarly about similar things. For just as we find God in other effects and named from them, and again as existing above these—fire and above fire, mind and above mind, spirit and above spirit—so also "Life-itself" is said as if from an effect, and He is also above it. What then, you might say, is this "Life-itself," of which God is the producer and cause? Is it a thing subsisting per se, and contemplated in itself? We do not say this; for there is no substance, whether divine or angelic, that is the *per se* cause of the essence of all things, or "Life-itself" by which living things live (for only He who is the suprasubstantial substance is the principle and cause that all things which are should exist, and is existence itself). Therefore, one may not say that there are certain principal causes and formative essences of things, just as the Gentiles prattled about many gods, whom neither they nor their fathers knew. But we say these things as follows: that God Himself, principled and causally, is Being-itself, Life-itself, Deity-itself; but again, participably, He bestows, I say, the providential powers. For since God is both imparticipable and participable—imparticipable, indeed, according to essence (for nothing of existing things participates in His essence, since according to His own nature He exists above those things which are), but participable according to His friendly participations and distributions, in so far as all things participate in Him and exist through Him. For that which is not a participant of Him neither is, nor will be, nor was; wherefore that which is, participates in Being-itself—not in God Himself, the cause of existence, that is, His essence—but in the distribution of this Being-itself, according to which God also comes to be participable. Likewise, that which lives participates in Life-itself, not in the divine essence itself, but in that "Life-itself" which is in Him—a divine distribution, I say, through which God is also participated. These He formerly called forms and exemplars and predefinitions, not confirming the Platonic doctrine—far from it!—but receiving in a pious sense those things which were spoken by them cheaply and unworthily of God. God is said to be the producer of these, as having these in Himself. Then, He is also said to have founded all these through essences, which subsist substantially by procession from Him; calling "total" or "universal" those which most perfectly participate in both essence and life and sanctification and all things, such as the angelic powers. Thirdly, those which are partial; for some participate only in entity, some in both entity and life, some even in entity, life, and wisdom; for the highest powers are participants of all. And ^D what need is there to speak further, when our teacher, the divine Hierotheus, says that God is the producer of Deity, whom he also terms "Beauty-itself," and "total beauty," and "partial beauty"—not that He is the same as the total and the partial, but that the cause of the gifts is named from those who participate in the gifts unequally; and He who is imparticipable according to the deity is participated according to the abundant outpourings of the gifts, so that the cause of all things might strictly exist above all things that consist according to any essence and nature, while He is participated according to the gifts, yet not participated at all according to His essence.

CHAPTER XII. Of the Holy of Holies, King of kings, Lord of lords, God of gods.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER. I. States the distribution of this chapter. II. Explains what sanctity, what kingdom, what dominion, and what deity signify. III. In what sense these names are predicated of God. IV. In what sense God is also said to be the Holy of holies.

§ I. Since, however, those things that had to be said on these matters have, as I think, received a fitting conclusion, He who has infinite names must now also be praised by us as Holy of holies, as King of kings, as reigning forever and beyond, and as Lord of lords and God of gods. First, therefore, we must say what we consider sanctity itself to be, and what kingdom, what dominion, and what deity signify, and what the Scriptures intend to indicate by the doubling of these names. ^A

§ II. Sanctity, then (if I may speak according to our custom), is purity free from every stain, and altogether perfect, and immaculate in every part. Kingdom is the distribution of every limit, and world, and law, and order. Dominion is not only the excellence over those of lesser rank, but is also the complete possession of all that is beautiful and good, and a true and unshaken firmness; for which reason "dominion" (κυριότης), derived from the Greek word for authority (κῦρος), signifies the same as firmation, firmament, and firm, and confirming or ratifying. Deity, moreover, is the same as the providence that oversees all things, which, in its omnigenic goodness, encompasses and holds all things together, and fulfills itself, and transcends all those things that enjoy the benefit of its providence. ^{B C}

§ III. These things, therefore, must be predicated absolutely of that transcendental Cause, and we must add that He is the pre-eminent sanctity, and dominion, and the supreme kingdom of all, and the most simple deity; for from Him and in Him, singly and abundantly, has emanated and been diffused every pure perfection of all sincere purity, and every arrangement and distinction of things, which banishes disorder, inequality, and disproportion, and establishes all things in well-ordered identity. ^D

^A And, rejoicing in the rectitude and rightness, and leading into participation those things worthy of it, He is the whole and entire possession of all good things, the whole good providence, ^B both beholding and holding together those things for which He provides, benevolently giving Himself for the deification of those who have turned to Him.

§ IV.

Since the cause of all things is most full of all things, according to the one excellence that surpasses all things, He is called the Holy of Holies and the rest, according to the overflowing cause and the set-apart transcendence, as one might say. For by as much as beings—whether holy, or divine, or lordly, or royal—surpass those that do not exist, and the very participations themselves surpass those who participate in them, by so much is the Cause who is above all beings, and above all participants and participations—the unparticipated Cause—set above all things. Moreover, the oracles call "holy," "kings," "lords," and "gods" those more primordial ranks in each case, through which the secondary ones, receiving the gifts from God, multiply the simplicity of their transmission in accordance with their own differences; the first of these, however, providently and divinely gather their variety unto their own unity.

NOTES OF CORDERIUS

§ I. Now since the things that were to be said about these matters, etc. St. Thomas on this place: "After," he says, "Dionysius has set forth the divine names by which is signified the emanation of perfections from God into creatures, he here sets forth the names of God which designate the governance of things. In which governance there are four things to be noted. First, the providence of divine knowledge, to which the name of 'deity' pertains; second, the power of executing the decree of divine wisdom, to which the name of 'dominion' pertains; third, the execution itself of guardianship, to which the name of 'king' pertains; fourth, the effect of governance, which is uncleanness from all disorder, and to this pertains the name of 'holiness'." On these matters, Cyparissiotus astutely (48): "Holiness, he says, and dominion, and kingdom, and divinity, taken absolutely in God, are His blessed silence and are above substance, but external to God they receive properties that look toward the creature. And that former one (that is, holiness) is a liberation from all wickedness and stain; dominion exhibits a true firmness free from falling; kingdom is a distribution of every rule, and ornament, and law, and order; while divinity is providence contemplating all things."

§ II. Holiness therefore, etc. God (as the learned Lessius notes, book 8, *On the Divine Perfections*) is called holy in many ways, most especially in five. First, radically, because the divine essence is the primary root and original fount of all holiness and purity. Second, objectively, because He is the object of all holiness; for all holiness is situated in love of and union with God. Wherefore He is also the measure of the whole and of holiness itself, whence, of course, holiness receives its species and mode; for holiness is purity. But just as impurity arises from contact with inferior things—as when a face or garment is spattered with mud, or when the soul is inordinately attached to inferior things through affection—so purity arises from contact with superior things, when the affection rises to and clings to things more sublime and noble. Moreover, the supreme of all, and the most simple, and the most pure, is God; whence supreme purity consists in adhesion to God. Therefore, since supreme purity is holiness, God is the objective ratio and measure of holiness.

524 Third, He is called holy exemplarily, or in the manner of a rule, because through the eternal law He is the rule of all holiness; for the conformation of the affection with the eternal law is true holiness.

Fourth, formally; for holiness formally is the purity of the affection; but the purity of the affection is the love of God, because it is an adhesion to that which is most pure and most noble. Wherefore, since God is the love of Himself, He is in this respect formally His own holiness; and because He loves Himself infinitely, as much, that is, as He is lovable, therefore...

Similarly, because He loves absolutely nothing except for His own sake, therefore He is holy also in the love of all creatures. Fifthly, He is called holy eminently and causally, as the fountain and principle of all holiness and purity in creatures; a principle, I say, that is eliciting, formal, exemplary, and final. See this more fully in Lessius at the cited place, and ibid. cap. 2, regarding what the difference is between divine holiness and that of creatures. Likewise, regarding the dominion of God, see the tenth book in the same place, which is on this subject. ^C He is called, moreover, God of gods, I mean of those of whom it is written: I have said: Ye are gods (Ps. lxxxi, 6). For it is God who sanctifies them and makes them gods by participation. Hence the divine persons are called by Dionysius and the Fathers "deifying," and the Holy Spirit is called the "over-God" Spirit, which in sanctifying them makes them gods, whether in heaven or on earth, as has been indicated elsewhere and is gathered from general observations.

^D § III. Therefore, all these things must be predicated absolutely of that transcendental cause. From these (says Cyparissiotus) it becomes manifest that names which are said of God in relation to something else bear one signification, but those which are uttered according to supereminence or transcendence bear another; and while the former might sometimes be superfluous and idle in a perfect work, the latter, which is uttered according to supereminence, always declares His excellence in the same way. And he proves this by the example of the fabrication of the universe. For on the seventh day, he says, He rested from all His works (Gen. ii, 2); wherefore He ceased from the creation of heaven, the sun, plants, animals, and, to speak universally, from the universal work which He had performed. For it was on account of the work that He was then called God the fabricator of the world. Therefore, God is always the fabricator of the world, but as if the fabrication of the world had now finished; just as He is a creator who does not always create; and is apt for laughing, who does not always laugh. But this is because God alone is the cause and effector (for He, the effector, excels the effects by infinite and immense intervals). Therefore, since Dionysius shows this excellence, he divided it into two parts: into things holy and not holy, and into participations per se and participants. And, he says, by as much as those things that are excel those that are not, and participations excel participants, by so much does God excel the holy and the non-holy, and the participations per se, and the participants. Therefore, the excellence of God permeates equally into participants, and into participations per se, and into things holy or divine, or dominant, or royal, and into those things that are not such. But if God excels both equally, what reason of production will those things have that are not holy, and those that participate—the same will the holy things and the participations per se have. But if the former are creatures of God, then these too are creatures of God. Nevertheless, properties also appear here; for the former (namely, participants and participations) are for an end, for the sake of which they were perfected, and their property is to be said in relation to something else, to have themselves in a certain way; however, of the latter (that is, what are said according to excellence), the property is being below God with those things that participate, and these are being participations per se, for both these and those were made.

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES

§ I. But since enough has been said previously about these matters, as I think, He who has infinite power, and therefore also has infinite names, must be celebrated by us also as the Holy of holies, and the King of kings, according to what is sung in the first song of Moses, and as the Lord of lords, and the God of gods. And first it must be said, without the duplication, what each of them is, and then, what the divine Scriptures mean by duplicating the names, such as Holy of holies, and Lord of lords, and the like.

§ II. Holiness, therefore, if one is to speak according to the external etymology of the name, is from the privative alpha and the word *agos* (impurity), as if to say *a-agios*, and through the blending of the two alpha letters into long aspirate *alpha*, *hagios* (holiness), clearly meaning that which is deprived of every impurity. Kingdom is the distribution of every order, every form, and every constitution and uprightness. Dominion, moreover, since one rules in two ways—either in that he is not overcome by the inferior, or in that he attains even to the superior—the holy man posits the latter, since the former is altogether too humble for God; thus also *kyriotes* is said to be derived from *kyros* (authority). Divinity is either from *theasthai* (from viewing), and observing, and providing; or from *peritheoin* (running around) and containing all things from everywhere, and filling everything inside itself, enjoying the gifts of providence; for all things are in His hand, according to the holy and divine Scriptures.

§ III. These things then are to be praised in God absolutely, clearly not in one respect and not in another, or as directed toward something else, but in a simple sense, that is to say, properly. For as He is called great in God without limitation, and without comparison, and not in relation to something else, so too are these names. And they are to be uttered not only absolutely, but with pre-eminence: super-holiness, and super-kingship, and above Lord, and ^A super-deity. For from the very simplest divinity itself, every pure and independent reason, along with the effects of holiness and kingship, is distributed to the things that have causes, in an unmixed and unrelated precision. For he calls this the arrangement of beings—that is to say, of all things—and the ordering, which also drives away all disorder and, by leading those deemed worthy of it into a well-ordered identity, is deservedly called one; and this is the unity, I mean that of identity and equality. This is the cause of harmony and sympathy and the salvation of all things, the reason for the unity which possesses itself according to the same things and in the same way. He said "rejoicing," or rather, exulting over His own works, according to what is said in the Psalms: *The Lord shall rejoice in his works* (Ps. CIV, 31). Again, from this simplest divinity also exists dominion; for he called this the total possession of all good things. This is the good providence which benignly imparts itself for the deification of those who have turned to it.

Chapter IV

§ IV. Since He is super-full of all things according to one pre-eminent excellence (for there are not many ^C excellences in God, but one, and that pre-eminent), He is called *Holy of holies*, and *King of kings*. For he says: as much as the pure nature and cause differs from the quality and the effect (for this is what the "being" is in relation to that which is not properly "being"), and as much as that which is participated differs from that which participates, so much does God, when He is called these things, differ from those which have them by participation; for all things are from God, but God alone is from nothing. And he religiously and piously explains those things which by some were thought to be spoken about a multitude of gods, from hearing that many gods are spoken of, according to the verse: *The God of gods, the Lord hath spoken* (Ps. XLIX, 1). For those teachers who excel in virtue have virtue collected in the soul in a unified way; but by teaching and communicating the virtues to others, they have the virtue multiplied according to the diversity of the multitude of those being taught. This must be considered also in the case of the incorporeal ^D orders; these indeed are proper to God; and just as from a fountain overflowing, the nearby vessels are filled first, and then the overflow itself is diffused into other vessels, and according to the multitude and diversity of the receivers, the things poured out are distributed and multiplied; so, by a somewhat crasser reasoning, it must be thought that the abundance of the distribution of divine gifts is distributed into all through the first arrangements. For the Apostle also was called a chosen vessel. Be it noted

it should be noted that he speaks of "communication" regarding God and the gifts that come from God, but of "distribution" regarding how the first things relate to the second. Thus, the second things multiply the simplicity of the distribution of the prior things; for by as much as the things participating differ, by that much do these gifts appear multiform. Yet the primary beings providentially gather this very variety of the second things back toward their own unity, and in as much ^A as this ascent occurs, it will arrive again at the unified nature of the communication from God.

CHAPTER XIII. De perfecto et uno.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER. I. He teaches in what sense God is called perfect. II. In what sense He is called one; and at the same time he shows that unity is found in all things. III. If unity were removed, all things would perish, and that all things exist from the one God; and how God is to be praised as one, and the Holy Trinity as the most eminent unity. IV. He sets forth the conclusion of the work.

§ I. Such are these things concerning these matters. But further, if it pleases the discourse, let us proceed to that which is most profound; for the theology of the Cause of all things attributes all things to Him, and at once both as all and as one it praises Him. Therefore, He is perfect not only as self-complete, and as ^B uniformly defined by Himself and through Himself, and as being most perfect whole throughout the whole, but also as supra-perfect according to the transcendence of all things; and as defining every infinity, and being spread out beyond every limit, and contained by nothing, nor grasped [by anything], but even extending to all things at once and above all things by indeficient gifts and unending operations. Moreover, He is called perfect as unincreased and always perfect, and as undiminishable, as having all things pre-contained within Himself, and abounding by one and the same ceaseless and more than full and ^C undiminishable bounty, by which He brings all perfect things to completion and fills each with its own fitting perfection.

§ II. But [He is called] One, because He is all things singularly according to the excellence of one unity, and is the cause of all things, without losing His own unity; for nothing of the things that are is devoid of the One, but just as every number participates in the unit, and one is called a dyad, and a decad, and a half is one, and a third and a tenth are one, so too do all things and every particle ^D of all things participate in the One, and by the very fact that things are one, they also are all the things that are. And that which is the cause of all things is not one of the many, but is the definer of every one and of the multitude, and of every one and of a multitude; nor even on the

^A part of the many is there any multitude that is in any way devoid of the One. But the many are so by their parts in the whole; and the many are so by their accidents in the subject; and the many are so by number or by powers in the species; and the many are so by their species in the genus; and the many are so by their processions in the principle. And there is nothing among existing things that does not in some way partake of the One that is in the singular in all things—all things and every whole, even the opposites—having pre-embraced them unitarily. And without the One there will be no multitude, but without a multitude there shall be the One, just as a monad exists before every multiplied number; and if one were to suppose all things to be unified, all things would be one in the whole. ^B

§ III. Furthermore, it should also be known that things are said to be unified according to the form pre-conceived in each, and the One is as the element of all things. If you were to take away the One, neither totality, nor part, nor anything else among existing things would remain; for all things in themselves uniformly anticipate and embrace the One. Hence, for this reason, Scripture praises the whole of God, as the cause of all things, under the designation of the One; and in this way there is one God and Father, and one Lord Jesus Christ, and one and the same Spirit, because of the superabundant indivisibility of the whole divine unity, in which all things are uniquely conjoined, and more than unified, and pre-existing above substance. Wherefore all things are justly and deservedly referred to it and attributed to it; from it, and out of it, and through it, and in it, and to it all things exist, and are composed, and remain, and are contained, and are fulfilled, and are converted. Nor will you find anything among the things that are, which does not, by the One according to which all divinity is superessentially named, both exist as that which it is, and be perfected and preserved. ^C We, therefore, being converted by the power of the divine unity from the many to the One, must singularly praise the whole and one Divinity, the One which is the cause of all, before every one and multitude, and part and whole, and definition and indefiniteness, and end and infinity; which defines all that are and being itself; and is the cause of everything and of all wholes, and at once before all things and above all things, and uniquely; and which defines that which is above the One itself and the One itself—inasmuch as that which is one is numbered among those things that are, for number is a participant of essence. But the superessential One, and the One that is, defines every number, and it is itself the beginning and the cause, and the number and the order, of the one, and of number, and of every existing thing. Wherefore the monad, and the Triad—the Divinity that is above all things—is not to be hymned as either the monad or the Triad known to us or to any other of existing things. ^D

^A No monad or triad, nor number, nor unity, nor fruitfulness, nor any other thing of those which are, or which are known to any of those which are, can reveal the hiddenness that is above all things, and above all word and mind, of that super-Deity which is super-essentially above all things. ^B It has neither name nor word, but is withdrawn into inaccessible places. And we do not even apply to it the very name of "Goodness" as if we were fitting it to Him; rather, out of a desire to think and to say something concerning that ineffable nature, we consecrate to Him first that which is the most venerable of names—and in this we would agree with the theologians, even though we fall short of the truth of the actual realities. Therefore, they too have preferred the ascent through negations, as it draws the soul away from things akin to it, and causes it to wander through all divine conceptions, from which the Godhead that is above every name, and every word, and every knowledge, is set apart; and at the very end of all things, it unites the soul to Him, in so far as it is possible for us to be united to Him.

§ IV.

^C We have gathered together these intelligible divine names and have unfolded them as far as is possible for us, not only falling short of their precision—for even the angels would truly say this—nor equal to the praise with which they are celebrated by the angels; for even the most excellent of the theologians among us are inferior to the very latest of the angels. Nay, we are not even on level terms with the theologians and their followers, and we are surpassed in this kind of praise even by our own peers. Therefore, if these things have been rightly spoken, and if we have, according to our measure, touched upon the true meaning in the explanation of the divine names, the whole matter must be referred to the Cause of all good, who granted the faculty of speaking, and of speaking well, in the first place. And if any of the things equivalent to these has been omitted, it must be supplied by us in this same way, according to these same methods. ^D But if these things are either not rightly or not perfectly expressed, and we have strayed from the truth either wholly or in part, it would be a matter for your philanthropy to correct him who is ignorant against his will, and to impart the word to him who is in need of learning, and to assist him who does not have sufficient strength, and to heal him who is unwilling to be sick; and, finding some things from yourself and others from other sources—all of which are to be received from the Good—to convey them to us. Do not withhold

yourself from bestowing this benefit upon a friend; for you see that we ourselves have not kept to ourselves any of the hierarchical discourses delivered to us, but have communicated them—and will continue to communicate them—unadulterated both to you and to other holy men, to the extent that we are capable of speaking and they are capable of hearing, in no way violating the tradition, unless we should chance to fail in our understanding or in our expression of it. But let these things be handled and spoken of in the way that is pleasing to God. And let this be the limit for us regarding the intelligible names of God; for I shall move on to symbolic theology, with God as my guide.

ANNOTATIONS OF CORDERIUS

§ I. Perfectus itaque est, etc. Rightly, as is his custom, and clearly does Lessius establish the perfection of God from this chapter, Book VII, *On the Divine Perfections*, chapter 2, saying that Dionysius here brings forward four reasons why God is called perfect.

First, because he is *autotelēs*, that is, perfect of himself, by which it is meant that he did not receive perfection from another, whether as from an efficient cause or as from a formal cause, as happens in creatures, but possesses all perfection from his own most simple essence; whence his own perfection does not rise from an accumulation of many things, as in creatures—of which none can be called *autotelēs*—but [arises] from one most simple thing, which he himself is, and thus of himself, according to every kind of perfection, he is most perfect.

Second, because he is *hyperteleis*, that is, super-perfect, which is to say, superior and more excellent than every conceivable perfection; for nothing so great, so eximious, and so excellent can be thought of by a created mind, but that God is infinitely more excellent and greater. This is indicated by that word *hyperteleis*.

Third, because he cannot be increased or diminished, as if containing all things anticipated and contained within himself through his own essence.

Fourth, because he is so full and super-full of all goods, that like an inexhaustible fountain he overflows and redounds, by the perpetual and incessant bestowal of gifts, into all created things.

Whence it is evident that God is called perfect because he is the author of every natural and supernatural perfection in all things, from the highest—those nearest to him—all the way to the lowest, from the first separate substance down to the lowest matter, and that his ray extends to all things, and that not once only, but assiduously and ceaselessly. For it is not sufficient that God has infused his gifts once, whether of matter, or of grace, or of glory, but this infusion and bestowal must be continuous and incessant; otherwise all things would vanish in a moment.

Nor only because he is the author as an efficient cause, but also because he is the exemplar and measure of every perfection. For in created things, something is said to be perfect in its nature because it is commensurated to its exemplar, according to which it is founded in such a species; just as in artifacts, that is perfect which exactly responds to the concept and rules of art; whence the exemplar itself is per se and originally perfect, without respect to another, as the primary rule of perfection. Therefore, he himself is called perfect, both as a fountain from which all perfection of nature flows into all things that partake of being in any way, and as a measure, upon whose commensuration the very definition of perfection depends.

Hence, from the same Lessius, chapter 1, collect the fourfold distinction between the perfection of God and that of even the most excellent creature. First, that God does not have his perfection and excellence from another, but only from himself; for he is the first act, the first perfection, and the first good, independent of all else, the inexhaustible fountain of all good and all perfection; but a creature has all its perfection and goodness from God. Just as in corporeal things the sun has light from itself—that is, not from some other body—whereas the stars have light from the sun.

Hence follows the second distinction: that the perfection of God is utterly unlimited and infinite, but that of the creature is limited and restricted to a certain species. For since the divine perfection is not from another, it has nothing from which it may be limited or receive a measure; and therefore it is necessary that it remain unlimited in the amplitude of its concept; but the perfection of the creature, since it is from God, is limited according to the mode which divine wisdom imposes upon it, just as all works of art receive measure, mode, and limit from the art of the craftsman.

Third, that God possesses all his perfection through his own simple essence, with no other form or real mode superadded; it is otherwise in creatures. For no creature possesses all its perfection through its own essence, but it has need of almost infinite forms and accessory perfections in order to be perfect, as is evident in the angels—whose nature, however, is the most simple and most perfect among created substances: for, to omit powers and intelligible species, they have need of many habits and illuminations, and acts both of intellect and of will, in order to be perfect.

Hence follows the fourth distinction, that the divine perfection can never be increased or diminished: for since he possesses in act every possible perfection, no accession can be made to him; and since he possesses it through his essence and from himself, no detraction can be made from him. For he would have to lose his own essence to abandon even the least bit of his perfection; but the perfection of a creature can be increased without end, and can be diminished even to nothing. Angels and blessed men, too, with God so disposing, could grow without limit in the clarity of the divine vision and in beatific love, and could also lose all their own good.

§ II. *“But unity, since it is all things uniquely,” etc.* Hence Cyparissiotus, in decade x, concludes the *Theologia* in ten chapters. First: That one ought not to seek in the Trinity, which is above substance, habits and dispositions; nor are there any things around it which complete its substance. Second: That there are not even any accidents which exist within its substance; nor are substantial differences to be understood in it, since even in incorporeal things, which are produced by it, one should not seek a difference of substance and energy, nor do these happen to exist as one thing apart from another. Third: That in the unity which is above substance, one must not everywhere seek the difference between the cause and the one having the cause, where it is said to exist from itself; and where its energy or operation proceeds from itself; and where it returns to itself from itself and through itself. Fourth: That in the unity of the Trinity one ought not to seek substance as one thing and energy or operation as another; nor should one be covered by the homonymy of the word *energy*, nor consider that substance and energy are not the same thing in it. Fifth: That in the unity which is above substance, one ought not to seek energy by itself without substance, and not existing through itself; nor to think of any other thing along with the unity itself, nor to distinguish its energy from it. Sixth: That in the unity of the Trinity one ought not to seek substance as one thing and goodness as another, nor the form as one thing and substance as another, nor life or wisdom or virtue as one thing, and the substance of the same as another. Seventh: Nor, likewise, should one seek its knowledge, or its charity, or its beauty, or its immortality and other such things as one thing, and its singular substance and existence, which is beyond the divine, as another. Eighth: That in the unity above substance one should not seek—because it is all things—that therefore it is many; and that all things are diverse; for that divine and blessed substance of it, which possesses all things, is all things, not as one thing in another, but without relation and collectively, having nothing double, and being above every one. Ninth: That in the unity which is above substance, it is not permitted to find its beginning, nor middle, nor end; nor is it any kind of whole, because in each one of those things which are understood it is whole and alone; nor is it any one of the things that are, because it itself is all things; nor is it permitted to embrace it with one name. Tenth: That the unity of the Trinity is above every substance, and above every unity and trinity known to us; and that it is neither substance, nor is it a unity, nor a trinity known by any one, nor infinite, nor numbered among many. See these things deduced more fully in Cyparissiotus in ten chapters, and proved from the Fathers and the Scriptures. Consult also St. Thomas, Part 1, Question 3, *On the Simplicity of God*.

§ III. *“But no unity or trinity,” etc.*, he explains that arcane matter. Note with Manuel Caleca, in his book *On the Trinity*, the images which the Fathers devised to liken them somehow to the Trinity. Gregory Nazianzen compares it with the eye of a spring, the spring, and the river; likewise with the sun, the ray, and the light; likewise with the mind, ^A *enthumesis*, that is, consideration, and the spirit, in which there is no division or separation; likewise with the triple sun and one commingling of light. Gregory of Nyssa, in his book *On the Trinity*, says these three things are in us, which are mind, word, spirit. The mind, he says, begets the word, the word moves the mind, and neither is the mind without the word, nor the word without the mind; similarly, without the spirit, which is in us, it will not be from the mind. These, he says, are equal, and cannot be separated from each other. Thus, he says, it is to be understood in the Trinity. Others compare it with the spring, the river, and the lake; with fire, flame, and light. Cyril compares it with the root, the branch, and the fruit; the same with the finger, the hand, and the arm; and others with the rose, the flower, and the scent. In all these, certain things are found that are inseparable from one another, which are assumed to declare that there are somehow three inseparable persons, distinct by properties, and of one substance, so that from one the *achōriston* (that is, the inseparability of the persons) is taken, and from another the *homoousion* (that is, consubstantiality).

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES (50)

§ 1. It proceeds to that ^A chapter which is most powerful, concerning the perfect and the one. But how is it the most powerful? Because the other divine names were said of one or another thing separately, but perfection is coupled with it; because it is preached as the cause of all things, with no effect left out, which is not denominated by this: where, however, nothing is lacking, perfection already exists entirely. And again, all things are said at once, and not this thing first and that thing later; or this more, and that less; or this for a longer time and more enduringly, and that for a shorter time and in passing; for all things are equally distant from it, whether you say angel or ant, just as ten and a thousand are equally distant from the infinite. Therefore, the cause cannot be said to be from some one of the effects, or if from one, then from all. Whence, if all things are said at the same time of God, now that *one* is also shown: for if that unity were not super-abounding within it, it would not befit all existing things all at once. Since, then, the divine is called perfect ^B in this way, not only as being defined uniformly in and by itself (for this is the definition of the perfect: that which is defined by itself and not from without, and by itself and not by accident, uniformly, or, to be defined in such a way as one may impose), but also

^A as super-perfect, according to the manner already set forth regarding the divine names, because the Cause is named from the effects, yet it is also above these and is transcendentally called super-good and super-essential. Furthermore, the Divine is called super-perfect from the perfection of the caused things; for it is itself its own limit and place, and nothing extends beyond God, but he himself determines even infinite things. For he himself embraces the ages which are infinite (for they have no end) by his infinite magnitude, surpassing them by his own infinity—which is manifold—and all undefinability of life, as in the case of intelligible beings; for with these, life is not limited as it is in the case of men, but they were created immortal; and God is limited within his own eternity, which is super-eternal.

§ II. Otherwise, it is also called perfect as being neither increased nor diminished; for that which has perfection admits of neither augmentation nor diminution, which is also of the nature of perfection. ^B And otherwise, because it also brings to perfection all perfect things according to one ceaseless and identical impartation. Therefore, that which brings to perfection uniformly and indivisibly, and is not diminished, will be full and more than full. It is also called One, since all things are united to the causes according to some one thing, and this [Cause] again transcends all things according to one; for there is nothing among beings that does not participate in the One; but just as every number participates in unity, and one is called a dyad and a decad; and if you mention a part, you will say one half, and one third, and one tenth, and so on; so also do all things, and every part of all things, participate in the One; and in the fact that this is one, all things are, just as in the fact that there is unity, all numbers exist, and this one is not one ^C of the many. For God is One, just as he is simple, and indivisible, and devoid of specific difference, and alien to all affections and accidents. Furthermore, this very One escapes being either greater or less than another, for that [God] exists above these, and moreover, as a principle, he defines both unity itself and multitude: for in God all are one, both those who existed before and those who will be; for there is not there something past and something future, by the participation of which this One defines the many, although in a diverse manner, and there is no mode according to which the many are not contained in the One. For those things which are many by parts are one by the whole, as a body; and those which are many by accidents are one by the subject, as man; and those which are many by number, ^D as Peter and Paul, are one by species, for both are human. But also those which are many by powers, for example, live coal, light, and flame, are one by form; for all are fire. And those which are many by processions, and by counsels or works, are one by the cause; for there is one from whom are the counsels or works, and there is nothing among beings that does not in some way participate in the One. I call One that which all things participate in, which according to all and entirely embraces within its own unity all things, and even total things, and even contrary things. How

^A all this is a complex whole will be stated later, when that preconcept is demonstrated. Furthermore, all things are said to be such when the species, parts, and differences of the one are taken; the whole, however, is when the parts collectively form one integral entity, for example, a man, the corporeal parts of man, or the parts of his essence, such as rational and mortal. Again, all contraries as well, for example, any element taken separately. And again, in the same [subject], contraries, when they are seen in some subject; for all things are constituted from contrary elements. That [notion of] unity, which someone might suppose is taken in other things according to a hypothesis or supposition—even in those things which do not exist in reality but are fashioned by reason—is not to be understood here in that way. Rather, it must be considered through this mental application on account of the identity of [all things’] creation from the one God, and because the whole is considered in the parts, and the parts in the whole.

§ III. ^B Above, he said that the One anticipates all things; but now, confirming this, he says: "Unless the unitary, namely the species or nature of humans, is first conceived, no one would say that humans are joined to one another according to the same notion of nature." Therefore, we say that things which are joined are united according to the pre-conceived species of each. And again, species and the many are referred—an element and principle being attributed to the One—to a genus, of which [that genus] they are the species; for example, horses, cows, and humans are brought back, in a certain way, to one thing, the animal. But he says this not because it is constituted before the many—as Plato posited, I mean, the Idea—but because, by conceiving it in the many, and rather after the many, one composes from these one element of the many. For our conception, gathering the many into one nature (which certainly happens ^C after the many), then holds such a single nature as a unitary thing, and having thus gathered it, conceives it after the many as constitutive and cohesive of the many. If, therefore, the One were taken away, neither the whole nor the part would exist, which are indeed also called unitary; and with these taken away, none of the things that exist would exist. The One, therefore, is all things in a unitary way, that is, according to one and the same reason. For the whole is not said to be one thing and the part another, nor has it anticipated this in one way and that in another; but lest anyone should suspect from this an Idea existing before the many, he adds "comprehends," implying that in some way that One is conceived not in itself, but in those many things. ^D Since, therefore, the One encompasses all things, and God is the creator of all, and is named from all effects as a cause, he is deservedly celebrated also by the name of the One, which he also proves from the apostolic saying, entirely on account of the indivisibility of unity—that the One is indivisible, and all things are contained in God according to the image of the One. For all things are contained also in Him, yet here as in an element and nature, but in God as an efficient and transcendent cause. The particles "by which" and "from which" the being is, must be referred to "are" and "are composed"; but "through which" and "in which" [are to be referred] to "they remain" and "are contained"; and "to which" [is to be referred] to "they are perfected" and "are turned back," even if the Father arranged the expressions under the one. And you would not find any of the existing things that is not in the One, and

for thus it must be arranged by inversion—and it is perfected, and is preserved, in that it is one, and it is named divinity superessentially, just as it is in other respects. But not absolutely in every one, according to which God is named one and the One; for by this one alone do things exist, and for this reason it behooves us also to turn from the many and scattered kinds of knowledge to the one that is the cause of all things, which is also prior to every one, that is to say, prior to every nature, and prior to every multitude, that is to say, prior to every individual thing; for this One is called neither small nor medium. And if one must even be bold, neither beautiful nor good; for these are in a way affections and relations and accidents, whereas this One itself is understood even above these; but affections, such as the small and the medium, are understood also with others, or dependently on others. ^B Therefore that simple and affectionless One should not be placed as a genus of things (for genera are entirely divided into species), nor as a point, nor strictly as a monad, for these have a connection with things that come after them; but this is most simple. But neither should one set that One as an entity, but as the principle of beings; for that which is, is essence, from *being*; but God is superessential, and above that which is, and for this reason He exists even above every limit, and above every infinity, and He defines that very *being*, and is solely the cause, that is, eminently and inimitably, both of all things and of all wholes, that is, of integrities; and at the same time He is also before all things and above all things as cause. Let it not, therefore, seem contradictory to some that at the same time [He is] before the things said by divine Scripture, that on each separate day He created and brought to being this or that. He said "at the same time," according to the power of the Creator; for He could, even in a momentary instant of time, bring all things into being, just as the great Chrysostom also understands regarding this matter. And God is above that one, as one who excels all things, and He defines every being that is one; for that which is one has the manifestation of number when applied to some thing. Therefore the one in things, that is, in creatures, is set down according to the concept of number; ^C and for this reason that which is one is said to look to number, or that which falls under number is one by opposition to two or three. Such a number, however, entirely participates in some substance; but the supersubstantial One exists most simple in itself. Miraculously, therefore, investigating the nature of numbers, he adds that the divinity, which surpasses all things, whether it be preached as monad or as triad, is not known either as monad, in the sense of a monad, or as triad, in the sense of a triad, by us or by others through numbers, but is known as God above every mind and being; for by saying what He is not, we understand what God is. Do not, therefore, hear that "there is no monad or triad" simply, but add "there is not" to that which has been made known; for the discourse desires to teach not the destruction of such a confession, but its unsearchable nature. For he says that the super-unified is indicated by the name of the monad, and the god-begetting by the name of the triad; ^D for the number was devised in order that the worshipful manifestation of the unutterable hypostases might be presented, just as the divine Basil and Gregory say. And he called the Father "fecund," as the Father of the worshipful Son, and of the Spirit co-worshiped with him

^A as the source, origin, and cause. Fecundity, however, or the unit, or any other name known to men or even to the intelligible powers themselves, cannot clearly represent the things of God that are hidden away from all. For how is it possible to name God from any of the things that exist, when He is nothing of all things, and is above all things? And why speak of other names, since even that most venerable name, "goodness," is not strictly proper to God? For the theologians, because they had to conceive and say something at all about God, being overcome by the longing for Him, applied the name of goodness to God, but strictly speaking God is "beyond-good" and "beyond-essence." ^B And the negations—or rather, the removals and privations—are not simply spoken of by the theologians in reference to God; for they are not to be understood as they are spoken, but are considered in a transcendental way. For no one who possesses wisdom would take terms like "immortal," "invisible," and "indigent" in a common sense, but rather, departing from the things signified, would ascend to the silent and more divine conceptions; for this reason, he rightly calls them "intelligible divine names" in what follows. For when the soul has abandoned all bodily sensations and worldly things (for he calls these "connatural"), it is thus joined to the pure knowledge of God, as far as is possible for human nature, just as the Apostle hints, saying: "And so we shall always be with the Lord"; and again: "Now we see through a glass in an enigma, but then face to face."

^C § IV. We have explained these intelligible divine names as far as it was possible, clearly not in a higher way, but we have delivered them more humbly according to the letter, not only to the angels—for the lowest of them is greater than all the theologians in the Church—nor only to the theologians (by whom he means his fellows, disciples, and ascetics, who have acquired divine illuminations through exercise and not through visions, like the apostles); at any rate, we have spoken not only more simply and humbly than these, but even to our own peers. These things, and those that follow, this Father speaks with a holy modesty. Therefore, if we have conjectured anything aright, thanks be to God, the author of all good things, who grants both the power to speak and to speak well. If, ^D therefore, we have spoken rightly, or still teach, and if any of the divine names equivalent to these are found in the Scriptures, one must also understand these according to the same methods of explanation. But if these things are not correctly expressed, and we have therefore strayed from the truth either entirely or in part, it pertains to your philanthropy, divine Timothy, to correct one who is involuntarily ignorant and desires to learn, and to help my weakness

and to heal him who does not wish to be ill. And again, it is of your philanthropy to transmit to us those things which you possess from yourself, or have learned from another—though, in truth, all things are received from God. Do not, therefore, weary of benefiting us even in part, since we also, if we have attained to any knowledge, have not kept it to ourselves, but have shared it and will continue to share it, according to the power we have to speak and the capacity of the hearers to listen. For this is the mark of philanthropy: to wrong in no way the tradition of the saints, unless we should prove unable to grasp it, either in our mind or in our speech. But as for these matters that follow, let them be as is pleasing to God, and let those things which we promised to speak be spoken accordingly. ^B Now, however, let this be the end of this treatise, and we shall pass on to another. Note, however, that he speaks of a "Symbolic Theology," which has not yet appeared. But if you wish to know the difference between the Theological Outlines and the Symbolic Theology, read the third chapter of the discourse On the Mystical Theology, about which we also, God willing, shall speak in due time.

OF THE HOLY DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE ON MYSTICAL THEOLOGY TO TIMOTHY

CAPUT I. What is the divine darkness.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTER.

§ I. ^A O Trinity, supernatural, and more than divine, and more than good, thou guide of the Christians in theosophy, direct us to that which is beyond knowledge, and beyond light, and the highest summit of the mystic oracles, where the simple, and absolute, and immutable mysteries of theology are revealed in the darkness of the silent, hidden initiation, which is beyond light; ^B where, in most darkened darkness, that which shines most brightly in the highest degree over-shines, and in that which is completely intangible and invisible, it fills the eyeless minds with beauties beyond nature.

These, then, are my prayers. But thou, O dear Timothy, in the intensive exercise ^C of mystical contemplations, both abandon the senses, and the intellectual operations, and all things sensible and intelligible, and all things that are not and that are; and, in so far as it is possible, be raised up in unknown unity to Him who is above all essence and knowledge. For, by the unconstrained and absolute ^D

^A and pure turning away of yourself from all things, and by being released from all and liberated from all, you will be raised up to the superessential ray of the divine darkness, in naked simplicity.

§ II. But see to it that none of the uninitiated hear these things; I mean those who cling to things that are, and imagine that there is nothing beyond the things that are, above essence, but who believe that they know through their own knowledge Him who has made darkness His hiding place. If the divine mysteries are beyond these, what would one say of those who are still more uninitiated, who characterize the super-eminent Cause of all from the things that are at the extreme of the nature of things, and say that it in no way surpasses the ungodly and manifold imaginative forms which they themselves fashion, whereas they ought to establish and affirm concerning it—as the Cause of all—all the affirmations of beings; and, on the other hand, to deny all these things more properly, as It is superessentially above all, and not to think that negations are contrary to affirmations, but rather that It is far prior to and above privations, being above every stripping away and position. ^B

§ III. It is in this sense, surely, that the divine Bartholomew says that theology is both great and very small, and that the Gospel is wide and great, and again concise. It seems to me that he has understood this—that the good Cause of all is both multiloquent and brief-spoken, and at the same time without speech, as It has neither speech nor intelligence, because It superessentially surpasses all things ^C, and is revealed without veil and in truth only to those who pass beyond all things both impure and pure, and who transcend every ascent of all holy heights, and leave behind all divine lights, and sounds, and heavenly discourses, and are absorbed into the darkness where He truly is, as the Scripture says, who is beyond all. For not without reason is the divine Moses ordered to be purified first himself, and then to be separated from those who are not like him, and after all purification he hears the many-voiced trumpets, and sees many lights, ^D pure and shedding forth manifold rays; then he is separated from the multitude, and with the chosen priests he reaches the summit of the divine ascents. And even in this, he does not meet with God himself, but contemplates—for He is invisible—not Him, but the place where He is. This I think signifies that the most divine and highest of things seen and understood are but certain hypothetical accounts of those things that are subordinate to Him who is above all.

^A His presence, which transcends all the conceptions of the mind, is declared to those whose intellect reaches out to the most holy heights of His places; and then, being loosened from both those things which are seen and those which see, it enters into the really mystical darkness of unknowing, in which it excludes all scientific apprehensions, and abides in that which is in every way untouchable and invisible, being wholly of Him who is above all things; and belonging neither to itself nor to another, nor to any other, but being united in the better part to Him who is utterly unknown, by the cessation of all knowledge, and knowing beyond the mind by knowing nothing.

ADNOTATIONS OF CORDERIUS.

Since mystical theology (as we show in chapter 11 of the Isagoge) is of a supernatural order, and transcends entirely the natural capacity, St. Dionysius rightly and as is fitting approaches it through prayer and the invocation of the most holy Trinity; for that most holy man knew that the discipline of this theology is by no means acquired by one’s own effort or striving, much less can it be handed down; but that it is to be referred to the supreme and singular benefit of the Highest Divinity, and is to be treated by His own instinct and inspiration, and ought to be communicated only to those capable of so great a gift. Therefore, he does not simply ask for some light whereby he may be illumined, as is wont to be done in other parts of theology; but he asks for that very grace of mystical theology itself, and its most distinguished prerogative, by which he may be led to its supreme peak. For this difference exists between this and other theological disciplines: that in the others the experience or possession itself of those things which are treated is by no means necessary, but only some light by which the intellect may in its own way recognize and examine the nature and properties of the object; but mystical theology embraces its object intimately within itself, namely God, and subsists and is completed in an intimate union with God, which is obtained by a pure and ardent conversion to God, which only divine grace can provide. This conjunction with God, therefore, he prays for himself at the very threshold of this book, and at the same time prefatorily commends to it this work by his prayer. Where it should be observed that this supplicatory preface comprises the epitome of this whole little book, and is obscure, as becomes the sum of an obscure matter. Moreover, what he indicates here obscurely and briefly, he expounds more fully and particularly throughout the rest of the book.

Pachymeres correctly observes that this precatory preface, as is the custom in mystical instruction, is composed in a mystical manner and with mystical terms, namely from words compounded with *hyper*, which exist as a kind of proper formula of mystical theology. Whence, immediately in the exordium, invoking the Holy Trinity, he declares not what It is, but what It is not, or rather what is above things, saying:

542 §. The supernatural Trinity, etc. Note that the Trinity is not called supernatural as if It were above the nature of God, since it is essential and most natural to Him to be fruitful, and to exist as one and the same in three distinct persons; but It is called supernatural with respect to us and the angels, and every created substance, because It can in no way be reached by any powers of nature, nor be known by any notion naturally, without the revelation of God, as St. Thomas teaches in Part 1, question 32, article 1, et seq. Similarly, It is said to be more than divine, more than good, that is, above divinity and above goodness as conceivable by any created intellect. The Holy Trinity is said to be the president of the theosophy of Christians, because only Christians acknowledge the mystery of the Trinity and of the individual unity through faith, and venerate it through religion, which is altogether divine wisdom, and eternal life, concerning which Christ Himself says: "And this is life eternal, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent." Now, indeed, Christians attain this in faith, as in seed, but afterwards in glory, as in fruit, by which the blessed are fully satisfied. Gregory the Theologian beautifully speaks to this purpose in his Oration *On the Establishment of Bishops*: "If," he says, "I could attain to having a perfect knowledge of all things here, what would be left for me? What would I hope for? The kingdom of heaven, you would say. But I think there is nothing other than this than to attain what is most pure and most perfect. The most perfect of all things that are, is the knowledge of God. But let us hold this in part, and let us go on to comprehend it while we are on earth; in part let us reserve it for the future, that from there we may have this fruit of our labor, the splendor, namely, of the whole holy Trinity, whatever it is, and of what kind, and how great, if it is permissible to say." Invoking this holy Trinity, therefore, he says: "Guide us to the more than undemonstrable, and more than shining, and highest peak of the mystical oracles." He rightly asks for divine direction, since mystical theology is of an order transcending nature, being that to which one arrives not by human industry, but by divine condescension alone. Therefore, it is "not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." And so very learnedly he calls its peak "more than undemonstrable, and more than shining"; since by no reasoning or demonstration (which, according to the philosopher, produces scientific knowledge) does one arrive at its notion, but only by the supernatural light of faith, or by peculiar revelation. Wherefore he significantly calls the holy Trinity (which is the highest peak of mystical theology) in Greek *hyperagnoston* [more than unknown], because what It is, is not only thus undemonstrable and unknown, as we can understand something to be unknown among creatures, but it is more than undemonstrable, and more than unknown; because we cannot naturally see God, nor can we draw from any creatures any knowledge, which...

declares to us the mystery of the most holy Trinity, while on the contrary, all knowledge which we have from creatures seems rather to show that this mystery is impossible. Wherefore, although this mystery is not against reason (as some have falsely said; for whatever is contrary to truth should not be called reason, but error), yet it is ^A above all natural reason, so that, setting aside revelation, it could never come into our minds as positively probable that this mystery is possible, because there is nothing from which we can conceive such knowledge, as theologians everywhere teach in Part I, Question 32.

At the same time, however, it is rightly said that this mystery is "more than shining," because where the light of reason is blinded and fails, there the light of faith shines more acutely in believing than any logical or mathematical reasoning does in demonstrating, since it is a supernatural and infallible light, which can neither be deceived nor deceive; whence, although it produces no evidence, it nevertheless has a certainty greater than any evidence. These things may also be accepted regarding that revelation which has clarity from the revealer, where simple and absolute things—that is, those which are naked as they are, without symbolic coverings, and without parables, and without words that require explanation—are understood and seen, God opening the mysteries, which, being thus shown and revealed, cannot afterwards be expressed in speech. Just as St. Paul, the instructor of Dionysius, wrote in that rapture of his concerning such a vision and revelation of mysteries, simple and absolute—that is, naked and open, with symbols and words requiring explanation removed—saying: "Which it is not lawful for a man to speak" (II Cor. XII, 4); for to this, it seems, Dionysius referred when he said here, "in the darkness that is more than shining of the silent, hidden mysteries." He called it darkness, which Paul called *arrheta*, that is, hidden things; for Paul saw and knew these most obscure things, which cannot be explained (just as neither darkness can be seen, nor those things which are covered by darkness), in the light of a most clear revelation without any symbols.

It should also be observed (lest anyone rashly criticize the interpretation, because we translate "are opened in the darkness") that it is wrongly read in the copies hitherto published as *egkalyptetai*, that is, "they are covered," whereas our Turrianus better found in the copy which Cyparissiotus had, *exkalyptetai*, that is, "they are uncovered." The manuscript Caesarean copy also supports this reading. It may also be not incongruously understood through "darkness" as faith, which is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing (Heb. XI, 1). Indeed, in it, because of its obscurity—as if in darkness—but because of the supernatural certainty which it shares from divine testimony, it is "more than shining," above all natural demonstration; a silence is found of a certain hidden or mystical doctrine, which is not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the demonstration of the Spirit and virtue, so that our faith might not be in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God (I Cor. II, 4). Which, in the most gloomy obscurity, because of the non-evidence of the things to be believed, shines more than clearly because of the evidence of credibility, which the marks of faith provide; it shines above all scientific demonstration because of the divine revelation upon which the assent of faith immediately rests, and from which it derives a certainty (as being supernatural) more infallible than any natural science.

And in the total intangibility and invisibility of the mysteries, escaping every touch and sight, it captures the mind's eyes with the most beautiful divine splendors, that is, according to the Apostle, reducing every intellect into captivity to the obedience of Christ (I Cor. X, 5). It super-fills with all joy and peace in believing (Rom. XV, 13), that they may be able to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length, and sublimity, and depth, and to know also the supereminent clarity of the knowledge of Christ, that they may be filled unto all the fulness of God (Eph. III, 18). These, he says, are my prayers, this is what I wish, what I desire. Next, informing Timothy unto mystical contemplation, he says: "But you, dear Timothy, in the mystical contemplations of divine and celestial things, you must cultivate yourself by diligent and intent exercise, not sluggish and remiss; and therefore leave behind the senses, which, as being animal, do not grasp those things which are of the spirit (I Cor. II, 14); and intellectual operations, to wit, those which the agent intellect naturally forms in the patient intellect from forms abstracted from sensible things; and the sensible objects of all the senses, and all the intellectual principles of natural sciences and reasonings, and those 'that are,' that is, the essences of things, which, because they are invariable, are properly said by philosophers to be; and those 'that are not' throughout, that is, all temporal things, which on account of their continuous mutation were said by philosophers not to be. So that you may rise unto the union, which is made through charity and the grace of Him who is above essence, as the author of essence, higher than any essence conceivable by us, and existing above every notion of a notion-designating essence, as much as is permitted by grace, through faith, undemonstrably without any natural notion, supernaturally. For faith, which no demonstration or natural notion supports, is the first step by which we ascend to charity, by which we are joined and united with God. Indeed, through the free—that is, voluntary—and absolute—that is, adhering to no creature—and pure—that is, sincere—departure of yourself, that is, of the soul and the affections of the body, from all things created, whether sensible or intelligible, in Greek *ekstasis*, that is, through a certain excess of love, and abstraction of the mind, and the negation of all things, you will be carried upwards to that supernatural one, at which all natural intuition stands amazed, the ray of the divine darkness, where God is apprehended through faith and enjoyed through the love of the soul, all things being withdrawn, as much the entanglements of the senses as of the reasonings, and, freed from all obstacles, you will be lifted up and anagogically sublimated.

Note here how he says *agnostos*, that is, undemonstrably, that one must rise to divine union without natural notion. For one should not curiously inquire, nor can it be demonstrated, how this mystical knowledge of theology is made through copulation with God, all other knowledge of things being left behind; that which the Apostle Paul signified when he spoke of that his copulation with God, in which he saw those hidden mysteries: "Whether in the body, or out of the body, I know not; God knows" (II Cor. XII, 3). "I know not," he says, that is, I do not curiously inquire, nor can I demonstrate; it is enough for me to have seen and heard those hidden words, etc. Lessius, in the Preface to the book *On Divine Perfections*, says that Dionysius here treats of that mode of contemplating, in which, the divine perfections having been accurately considered, insofar as they are offered as limited to a certain species and distinct among themselves, the mind rises to something more sublime and unlimited, infinitely more excellent than all those, and joins itself to it in an unknown manner by contemplation and love. Heisenius, on this passage, understands by "darkness" God under the aspect of uncreated and inaccessible light, having descended into the essence of the soul, which overflows and absorbs it with that inaccessible light; or certainly that supreme conjunction, by which the soul, above all sensitive and intellectual powers, above all senses or operations of the mind, immediately adheres to God through an intimate transfusion (if I may so speak) of the essence of God, which is infinite light, into the essence of the soul; through which the soul is constituted in a wonderful and special way as the seat of God, or also God is said to be the soul's. He calls it darkness for a twofold reason: First, because Scripture declares that God inhabits darkness. "Clouds and darkness are round about him" (Ps. XCVI, 2); and elsewhere:

"He made darkness his hiding-place" (Ps. XVII, 12). Furthermore, to the students of the mystical theology of the Chaldeans, Egyptians, and Pythagoreans, God is also a darkness and is held to be such—not that He admits any darkness into Himself (for "God is light, and there is no darkness in Him" [1 John I, 5]), but rather because, by His own nature, He is infinite and inaccessible light. Our Cresollus, in his *Mystagogus*, lib. I, cap. 9, observes that the wise men of all ages, sacred and profane, have seen this, having confessed with a most clear testimony how extremely difficult it is to find God—as Lactantius sets forth from Plato in *Institutiones*, lib. I, cap. 8—and that He cannot in any way be declared to the common people or explained. Wishing to signify this, the Hebrews say that the name of God is *aphonton*, *anexpheuneton*, inexplicable, and that He cannot be spoken or named. From them, I believe, the Egyptians derived the name for their chief God, *Amun*, whom the Greeks and Latins call *Ammon*; which name, says Manetho, signifies "occult" or "occultation." Hence the Saitae, celebrated among them for the name of wisdom, placed on the propylaeum of the temple of Minerva that noble inscription: "No mortal has ever unveiled my peplum." Justin Martyr, in his *Adhortation ad Gentes*, says that the philosopher Ammon for this reason called God *panchryphon*, "wholly occult." Whence it has come to pass that all the holy Fathers, along with St. John Damascene in *De fide*, lib. I, cap. 15, by the common consent of minds, call God *akatalepton*, "incomprehensible."

The second reason is that the union of this kind of cognition or intellection (which for Dionysius is light) is in itself wanting, inasmuch as it exists above all affirmation and negation; it does not hinder all cognition, whether in sense or in intellect, for the time that it exists, as he teaches at the end of this chapter. Yet he calls it *hyperphane*, "more-than-shining," lest anyone think it is mere obscurity, but in truth rather a maximum light and "supersplendid"—that is, a light which fills the soul with a splendor greater than can be conceived; which light, however, because of the excess of its own splendor, blunts and obscures the sharpness and light of the mind, not otherwise than as the splendor of the sun takes away light and vision from weaker pupils, and to the eyes of an owl it is actually night and darkness. For when God, since He is the most perfect light, expands and opens Himself more fully and effectively to our mind, He dazzles and stupifies it the more with His overwhelming splendor, so that it sees nothing else, according to that saying: "Thy knowledge is become wonderful from me; it is strengthened, and I cannot attain unto it" (Ps. CXXXVIII, 6).

Marsilius Ficinus brings forward another reason: that it is called darkness insofar as the soul has arrived at this point through certain negations, namely by denying that God is this or that or another thing; but it is called light because we obtain clear truth about God in no other way than by such denial. And for this purpose he not inappropriately accommodates the place from the same Psalm: "As his darkness, so also his light, and the night shall be illuminated as the day" (Ibid., 12).

From all these things (says Hersentius in the same place), it appears how aptly St. Dionysius has joined darkness with the highest light. For he ought not to have spoken only of darkness or obscurity, nor only of maximum light, because by one of these he would not have sufficiently expressed the property of this divine degree; wherefore he had to join both. But presently, when he establishes God as having in this mystic way slipped into the soul, or the soul's union with God, who is an inaccessible light, he calls it the "supreme darkness," because it so obscures and darkens the faculties given for cognition that they could conceive nothing and utter nothing. He calls the same *siges gnophon*, "the darkness of silence," because it effects a kind of silence in the faculties of the soul. Moreover, it could be called the "darkness of silence" in respect to itself; because this union, just as it is free from all cognition, speech, and motion, so it holds within itself the highest peace and profound silence. Finally, it is called silence because it transcends every affirmation and negation by a great and wide distance. But that this silence might not be seen to be idle or empty, and that by obscuring light it might be thought to be something that receives or bears light, he calls it *kryphiomysten*, "the mystic of arcana," a composite word most effective, which can be taken in both an active and a passive sense. For he is called a *mystes* who is initiated into the sacred rites and receives and guards the sacred arcana, and also he who hands down, speaks, and reveals them, as a *mystagogos*. In either way you take it, it yields an excellent sense. For if you take it passively, he says that this silence is a "mystic of arcana," insofar as the soul, reduced to that silence, receives into itself the divine arcanum itself by itself (by which reason Proclus, in his commentaries on Plato's *Theology*, illustrates contemplation by the comparison of the initiates who are initiated into religious arcana or sacred rites). But if you take it actively—a sense which has pleased all the interpreters—it signifies that this silence is, as it were, the teacher, initiator, and pedagogue of mystical things. For in another kind of theology, a man divinely inspired exists as the initiator of sacred rites; but in this mystic one, the teacher and director of divine oracles is the divine silence, or God Himself joined to the soul with the highest peace and silence. Then, in other theological institutions, the teacher is one thing and that which is taught is another; but here God Himself both teaches and is taught: He teaches, I say, insofar as He reveals and joins Himself to the soul; and He is taught and recognized through the very union or conjunction of the soul with the Divine Essence, of which the royal Psalmist says: "Taste and see that the Lord is sweet" (Ps. XXXIII, 9). He did not say, "See and taste," which would have had to be said in another kind of contemplation, in which the taste or spiritual affect arises from cognition; but "Taste and see," because mystical contemplation arises from the very taste and experiment of God as He is in Himself. Furthermore, note with the same Hersentius (from whom I have brought these things) that St. Dionysius, in order to show that this silence of arcane speech or interior doctrine—of which God Himself alone is the author—is by no means empty, has significantly called it *kryphiomysten*, that is, "teaching the arcana." Whoever wishes for more on the contemplation of God in darkness, let him see John de Jesu Maria in his little book *De mystica theologia*, and Thomas de Jesu, lib. I of *Divina orationis*, cap. 2 and 3, and the *theodidacton* Ruysbroeck, who, as the Spirit suggested, miraculously explains it in his Works.

But it is a wonder what St. Dionysius subjoins here about that darkness, that in the most tenebrous obscurity it shines more than most clearly, and in the all-encompassing intangibility and invisibility, it super-fills the minds captivated by the eyes with most beautiful splendors. This, beautifully, like the rest, is explained by Hersentius: that *to skotototato*, "most tenebrous," is the opposite of *to hyperphane*, "more-than-bright"; and to *aoratos*, "invisibility," *hyperkaleis aglaiai*, "most beautiful splendors," correspond. He interprets these splendors as the Divine Essence itself and its properties, which fall into the soul under the aspect of light and illuminate it; or as the cognition of the Divine Essence itself, or the Divine Persons in themselves, as far as they can be known, namely, their perfect union. He invites the splendors by the name of beauty for the reason that the Platonists (whose primacy our Dionysius deservedly claims for himself, as not only a most accurate follower of Plato but also a most Christian corrector) understand by the name of "the beautiful" both splendor and manifestation. Most aptly, therefore, does Dionysius in this place attribute the name of beauty to the divine splendors, which are the very properties of the Divine Essence; for in them, or in their transfusion into the soul and union, God Himself, who is the Supreme Good, is known in the most excellent way. And "most beautiful" [is used...]

because nothing more beautiful or more lovely than divine things can be conceived. Here it should be noted that he said not "splendor," but "splendors," because God does not fill the souls joined to Him with one kind of beauty and splendor, but with many and various kinds, as He is the source, abyss, and fullness of all beauty. Hence in the Psalms, it says: "The beauty of the field is with me" [Ps. XLIX, 11], meaning that which is various and manifold. In a word, a soul thus united to God is joined to the infinite beauties and splendors that are in Him, and is illuminated, adorned, and filled by them, so that it becomes godlike and casts itself into the rays of the inaccessible light, as he teaches in chapter 2 of *The Divine Names*. He does not say, however, "super-illuminates," but "super-fills": for divine illuminations, or the diffusions of divine lights into the mind, indeed illuminate, adorn, and increase it, but outside of this state and degree, they do not fill it; for it belongs to God alone to fill a soul capable of Himself. Whence it may not rashly be inferred that this apex of the mind, or mystical summit, approaches most nearly to the state of the blessed, in which God will be the fullness of the saints in such a way that, as the Apostle testifies, He will be all in all [1 Cor. XV, 28].

Moreover, that one may be thus filled by God, it is necessary first of all to empty oneself; since through a free and absolute (as St. Dionysius says) and pure withdrawal of oneself from all things, one is raised up to that supernatural ray of the divine darkness, having cast aside all things, and is lifted above all. For thus (as Rusbrochius says beautifully in the *Speculum Aeternae Salutis*, ch. 8), the supreme portion of our soul will never be unprepared for the reception of God, provided that it is altogether naked and void of forms or images, always looking into and tending toward its own principle, as it were the eternal and vivid mirror of God, whose essence and properties it perpetually represents in itself. Our soul’s substance has hence three certain properties, which are, however, one by nature. The first property is its essential and imageless nakedness, by which we are similar and united to the Father, and to His divine nature. The second property can be called the superior reason of the soul, which is the mirror of clarity in which we receive the Son of God, the eternal truth; and in clarity, we are similar to Him, but in receiving Him, we are one with Him. He calls the third property the spark of the soul, which is a certain natural inward propensity of the soul toward its origin, in which we receive the Holy Spirit, the love of God; and in propensity, we are similar to the Holy Spirit, but in receiving Him, we are made one spirit and one love with God. These three properties, in the one and undivided substance of the soul, are the vital flame and the origin of our supreme powers. Now this similarity and these properties exist by nature in all of us; but in sinners, they lie hidden in the depth of their own being because of the thickness of their vices. Wherefore, if we wish to feel and experience the kingdom of God lurking within us, we must be endowed with a virtuous and well-ordered life both outwardly and inwardly, and we must follow Christ in true charity in all ways, so that grace, charity, and virtues may be able to draw and elevate us to our supreme part, in which God lives and reigns. For that beatitude which is God, we cannot contemplate or feel by any art, nor by subtlety or sharpness, by means of natural light without the grace of God. And for this reason, God Almighty created the supreme powers of the soul to be capable of Himself (that is, of His grace and His gifts), by which we are lifted and renewed above nature, and by which we are made similar to Him through charity and virtues. Furthermore, through this supernatural similarity to God, which we acquire through grace and virtues, our memory is raised to a nakedness void of images, our intellect to simple truth, and our will to divine liberty; and so, finally, we become similar to God through grace and virtues, and beyond similarity, we are most happily united to Him.

^B Those who are not yet initiated into the mysteries of theology are not to be addressed. I mean those who cling to natural things, being deeply immersed in material things, and who imagine that there is nothing supernatural beyond natural things, the knowledge of which is arrived at through sensible objects, as they lack the light of faith, without which things that transcend the order of nature cannot be grasped. Indeed, since they abound in their own sense, they think they know Him by their own cognition, which they derive from creatures—namely God, who "made darkness His secret place" [Ps. XVII, 12]—because His nature can in no way be known by any created medium, especially insofar as He is triune in persons and one in substance. But if the institutions of divine mysteries, which are grasped through faith alone from things revealed by God and received from Holy Scripture and apostolic traditions, are above the grasp of these philosophers—who were considered wise among the Gentiles—what shall one say of those profane men who are even more rude, such as idolaters and the common rabble, who designate and describe the supreme cause of all things, namely God the creator of the universe, from things that are the extremes in the nature of things, for example, from material and sensible objects, and who attribute divinity to these base things? They say that it in no way excels the impious images of many forms, which they themselves fashion, each according to his own fantasy, depicting God in diverse ways. ^C When, in that divinity, as the cause of all things, which contains the perfections of all caused things eminently and super-eminently, as being transcendentally exempt, it was our duty to place and affirm, in that very manner which is fitting for God, by declaring concerning Him all the affirmations of beings—by saying, for example, "God is life," "God is goodness," etc.—rather than to deny all of them concerning Him more properly, by saying, for example, "God is not life," "God is not wisdom," etc.; such as what we conceive in the mind or imagine, as [He is] super-existent above all things that exist, or as they can fall into the created intellect. Nor should one think that negations are contrary to affirmations, because the same things are not affirmed and denied in the same way; but [that He is] far prior to and superior to privations. Because since God is pure act, existing essentially, and containing all simple perfections essentially, and is of Himself the cause of all things, in whatever manner they are conceivable; no privation of Him can truly be conceived, and the privations of all things whatsoever that are even possible, precisely that they may be truly conceived, cannot be conceived as anything but posterior to Him. For He is above every ablation—that is, negation—and position—that is, affirmation—as He anticipates and pre-possesses in Himself every conceivable perfection that can be affirmed or denied of anything, and that in a manner infinitely more perfect than can be devised, let alone explained, by any creature.

Notandum here first with Hersentius, that it was the primary concern of the ancient Christians that they should reveal nothing of the mysteries of our religion to those not yet baptized, and that, as Christ Himself commands, they should not "cast pearls before swine, nor give that which is holy unto the dogs" [Matt. VII, 6]. This they observed so sacrosanctly that they could not be brought, even by the most exquisite tortures, to disclose anything of the mysteries of the faith to the judges of the Gentiles, lest, of course, things not yet initiated should be profaned and become cheapened, or exposed to mockery. Wherefore it should not seem in the least strange if St. Dionysius, in these secret things of mystical theology, which are as the apex of the Christian religion, indicates a silence more than Harpocratic or Pythagorean, when even in other [books] of theology...

his own books he earnestly commends this, as in *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, ch. 1 and 2; *Divine Names*, ch. 1, and throughout elsewhere. This is because he had derived it not only from the discipline of the Christians, but had also received it from the institution of the Platonists, among whom it was held to be a form of impiety for secret theology to be divulged to the profane, as Plato inculcates twice in his Epistles. To this also refers that symbol of Pythagoras in Iamblichus: "Do not easily cast your right hand to just anyone," which is to say (as Iamblichus explains in the *Symbols*) do not entrust mysteries to the unproved and the uninitiated. For, as Maximus Tyrius rightly observes, such is the imprudence of the human mind that it venerates less those things which are open and accessible, but receives with admiration those which are abstruse. Hence, some do not improbably conjecture the reason why these writings of St. Dionysius were little known to the ancients: namely, because he himself wished them to be hidden, and to be communicated only to the prelates of the Church, as he insinuates at the end of ch. 1 of the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, and elsewhere, commending them to Timothy.

Second, it must be noted with Maximus what "position" is and what "removals" (ablatio) are. He says that for God to be all things is "position," and for nothing of these to be [God] as He is above substance, is "negation." Both are properly stated in the amplitude of God; as, "God is life, God is goodness" is position and affirmation; "God is not life, [God] is not goodness" is a true negation, because He is above these things which we understand through life and goodness. That negations are to be preferred to affirmations in God, Dionysius taught above in ch. 2 of the *Celestial Hierarchy*, where see also our Annotations. And for the confirmation of the things said there, it helps to understand what St. Maximus feels about this matter in *Century 2 of Theology*, ch. 59. He who philosophizes about God affirmatively, he says, makes the Word flesh, since he cannot from elsewhere than from those things which we see and touch, know God as a cause; but he who philosophizes negatively, by taking away, makes the Word spirit, in that He who was in the beginning, and was with God, is the One who is beyond all cognition, knowing correctly from absolutely none of those things which can be known. Hence it is clear that it is more proper to philosophize about God through negations than through affirmations, insofar as the one makes the Word spirit, the other makes the Word flesh. And affirming theology has the power of comparing, and figuring, and conjecturing; and it proves only this, namely that God is, from those things which were made by Him. Truly, denying theology demonstrates that God is above all things, and attains the truth most fully, for he who says that God is not anything of those things which are, but that He is super-substantial, and above all things. Moreover, as Dionysius taught above, negations in God are not contrary to affirmations, for indeed what affirmation affirms, this same thing negation does not deny. Furthermore, just as affirmation does not posit what God is, so neither does negation take away what God is. For what it does not posit, how could it take away? Finally, since neither affirmation nor negation attains the substance of God, they differ only in this, that he who says "God is not what we think or conceive" comes closer to the truth, since He is infinitely more perfect, and that in an order supernatural and transcendent, than can be conceived or thought by any intellect.

§ III. For this very reason D. Bartholomew (whence it is gathered that St. Bartholomew also wrote some theological works, as it is likely that other apostles, being questioned on divine matters and questions by letter as the occasion arose, at least replied to the same in writing, and handed down the most sublime oracles which they had derived from God Himself, which for some time, as letters are wont to be, were kept and communicated to the Catholics; but afterward perished through the injuries of time) says that there is a copious theology, that is to say, spread out—partly, for instance, from creatures as effects, as *a posteriori*, as philosophers say, one arrives at the knowledge of the Creator and first cause, which is a certain part of demonstrative theology, or at least that part which is symbolic, which, as Dionysius witnesses in the following chapter, has proven to be very long—and a minimal [theology], that is to say, the most brief, the part which is, to be sure, mystical, as Dionysius explains in the same place; or indeed because God *a priori* is indemonstrable, as that which is lacking [in comparison]. And the Gospel is ample and great, namely because of the amplitude and greatness of the things it contains, and yet again concise or contracted, that is to say (as I indeed interpret it) small in bulk, but in sense and perfection, maximum. Whence the Apostle P calls the Word "abbreviated," as it contains the most brief precept of faith and love, which succeeded to all the sinuous ceremonies of the law. Thus Anselm and Ecumenius. Or because it contains the Word incarnate, abbreviated and emptied even to the human nature, which saved the remnant of Israel. This, as it seems to me, is excellently understood, that the kind cause of all is also "multiloquent," insofar as, by creating all things, He manifests Himself in many ways. For all things say in their own way: "For it is He who made us, and not we ourselves." And in this way creatures are like a certain voice of God, whereby all beautiful things testify to Him who is most beautiful, sweet things to the most sweet, sublime things to the most high, pure things to the most pure, strong things to the most strong, and so of others: and "breviloquent" at the same time, insofar as He says all things in one Word. For "He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created." And of no speech, by which indeed it can be understood by us what He is, since neither is there a word by which that "what it is" can be expressed, nor is there an intellect by which it can be comprehended; because He stands above all created things, not by simple reason, but superessentially, that is, supernaturally; so that however much the intellect of a creature may be perfected in its own kind, it is never to arrive at a quidditative knowledge of God, nor at any notion of the most holy Trinity from which He can be known, without the light of the supernatural order, whether of grace or of glory. And without "coverings," that is, without symbols, concerning which ch. 1 of *Celestial Hierarchy* and elsewhere, the discourse is frequent. And it is clearly shown, not indeed intuitively or face to face, which belongs to the homeland alone, but through some intelligible abstraction, to those only who pass through all things that are impure—namely, material things—and those that are pure—namely, spiritual and intellectual things—not lingering in them, and transcending the whole ascent of all saints and summits. He understands those mountain-tops of the supreme spirits, which in ch. 1 of *Celestial Hierarchy* § ult.; and elsewhere, he calls vertices, in Greek ἀκρότητας. And all divine lights, namely such as that to Moses in the bush, in the 548 pillar of fire to the people of Israel, to Moses on Mount Sinai; to Elijah in the chariot of fire, and such as shone around the shepherds at Christ's nativity, and led the magi in Bethlehem, and the like. And "sounds," such as they were when Moses was with the Lord on Mount Sinai, also such as Ezekiel describes in 1, 24: "I heard," he says, "the sound of many waters, as the sound of the sublime God, when they walked, as the sound of a multitude, as the sound of camps," and the like. And celestial "discourses" that they leave behind, such as, for example, the Lord's were to Noah and to other fathers of the Old Testament, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, etc., also to Moses, especially on Mount Sinai; and to the prophets like Samuel, and the rest. And they are absorbed into the "darkness," namely that mystical one, of which [I spoke] above, § 1, and in the following chapter, the figure of which

was that cloud, which, as the Lord spoke with Moses, covered Mount Sinai. Where it is truly, as Scripture says, Ps. xcii, 6: *Clouds and darkness are round about him*; and Exod. xx, 21: *Moses drew near into the darkness where God was*, who is above all things, that is, created things. For it is not without reason that the divine Moses is first commanded to be purified himself, and then to be separated from the unpurified. For in Exod. xix it is read, in what manner God, who was about to descend in the darkness, commanded the people to be sanctified and washed: in which it is easy to understand that he, before the others, having been washed and purified, had approached the mountain. And after all purification, he hears many-voiced trumpets, and sees many lights, throwing forth pure and manifold rays. See Exod. xix and xx, where these are more fully described. Afterwards, he is separated from the multitude and with the chosen priests, one or several; for it is read that he ascended with Aaron. He reaches the highest peak of divine ascents, after he had indeed set boundaries for the people on the mountain, beyond which he could not go without danger, because he was not capable of such purity, nor could he sustain the rays of divine light from near by. But as yet, he is not dwelling with God himself. For these were still symbolic, and were preparing for the encounter with God. Nor does he see Him—that is, as He is in Himself (for He is invisible), that is, to every created intellect, the light of glory not yet having been raised up. For God, says Gregory the Theologian (51), is the highest and inaccessible light, which can neither be comprehended by the mind nor expressed by speech. But the place where he stood, that is, something created in which God might shine forth, [he does see]. For just as in the heavenly homeland God is as a mirror in which creatures shine, so in the path [of life], conversely, creatures are a mirror in which the Creator is seen; whence the Apostle says: *We see now through a mirror, and in a riddle* [1 Cor. xiii, 12]. The Same says: *The invisible things of God, from the things that are made, are understood, being seen* [Rom. i, 20] h.

I think this signifies that the most divine and highest of those things which are seen and understood are certain reasons [logoi] which subject to the mind those things which are subject to Him who excels all things; by which His presence, which overcomes every thought of the mind, is declared, appearing as if in the highest intelligible traces of His most holy places. This insinuates the anagogical sense of the preceding words (as Hersent rightly notes). Namely, those things which are wonderful, sublime, and unusual that God works, whether they fall into the senses or into the intellect—for example, signs, miracles, or miraculous appearances, revelations, etc.—are certain congruous reasons or arguments accommodated to signify that God has a certain presence there, where these things happen; for as He demonstrates Himself to be present in some place in a particular way, He works certain wondrous things there beyond custom. Thus, in the present proposal, that God might demonstrate to the Israelites that He dwelt on the mountain, and that the people might understand that they were receiving the commands of the law from God Himself, He sent forth clouds and lightnings and smoke, and willed that deep-sounding trumpets be heard; nay more, under a certain appearance and figure, He made Himself manifest to chosen men. Therefore, by all these things brought forward as an example, the holy Dionysius insinuates that God transcends all cognition entirely, and therefore [must] be sought above all cognition, both sensible and intellectual, by those who contend for the summit of mystical theology; so that if He has done anything holy and unusual in the lower grades of contemplation, such as His own appearances or revelations, they should understand that the particular presence and advent of God is denoted, yet know that God Himself as He is in Himself is by no means seen, since He exceeds all these things by much. Therefore, those who see prodigies effected by God, or who behold Him appearing to themselves under certain forms, whether intellectual or sensible, do not see Him properly, but only the place where He dwells in a certain manner. To this way, therefore, says Gregory the Theologian (52), if you were to philosophize about God, though you be Moses, and the God of Pharaoh; though you reach the third heaven, as did Paul k, and hear secret words; though you ascend above them to some state and order of angels or archangels. For although every heavenly thing and something supercelestial is of a much more excellent nature than we are, and is nearer to God, and is as it were His place; yet it is more distant from God and from His perfect intelligence than it excels this composite, humble, and downward-inclining nature of ours. Whence he adds: But then from those things which are seen, that is, mirrors and riddles, and from those things which are viewed, that is, minds and intelligences, through the abstraction of the mind, absolved and unencumbered, without a concept, he enters into the truly mystical darkness of unknowability 549 in which he excludes all scientific apprehensions, through the negation of all cognizable things, without a proper concept (since this cannot be had), by understanding and confessing only this: that God is infinitely more perfect than can be conceived by any creature, and can be fully known by no man or angel (that is, naturally, as He is in Himself, and by a proper concept). And thus he clings to the in every way untouchable and invisible, through love which transfers the lover into the beloved, existing wholly of Him who is above all things—that is, of God—through the full abnegation of self, and abstraction from all things, neither of any, nor his own, nor another’s. But with Him he is entirely unknowable, through the vocation of all cognition, coupled according to the better part, and by the very fact that he knows nothing, knowing above the mind, that is, through ecstatic love wholly absorbed into God, where he is perfected above mind, and speech, and reason. And this conjunction with God above the mind (says Cyparissiotus dec. 2, cap. 10) is to enter through perfect ignorance into that infinite, incomprehended, and immense sea of the divine nature, where all nature stands fatigued and dares not proceed further, and is transferred from a certain divine odor, and a certain distraction from body and from creatures, into a laudable and blessed state, more wonderful not only than can be said, but than can be understood by those who have never experienced this state.

From the aforesaid, gather first, from the citation of Saint Bartholomew, a sufficiently suitable argument for vindicating this holy book for Dionysius the Areopagite, as he here clearly, as also elsewhere, in *Divine Names* ch. 2, 3, and 11, testifies and professes that he drew many sentences from the mouth and oracle of the apostles. Nor should it delay us (says Hersent) that some men of most profound learning in our age make the author of these books much later than the time of the apostles, and dare—oh grief!—to defame the writer of such great works, of all others (if you except the canonical ones) the most truthful, most modest, and most holy, as his very writings abundantly testify, with the mark of a most shameful lie, as if he wished to reconcile praise and commendation to his books by fraud and imposture; who, however, by their own weight and excellence cannot but obtain praise and commendation among everyone. But we are so affected that we more readily believe Dionysius, who clearly professes himself to have seen and heard the apostles, than all others clamoring to the contrary. Gather second, from the same sentence of Saint Bartholomew, as Marsilius Ficinus explains it, that the mind undergoes three grades concerning God: First indeed it uses many words, second few, third none. And indeed it uses many words where, whatever things occur, it affirms and denies about God, indeed with equal words,

but in a diverse manner. Yet it deals with few words when it speaks of God under that aspect by which he is related to creatures, and creatures to him, as is done in the book *On the Divine Names*. Finally, it uses no words at all when it no longer refers created things to God, nor conversely God to them, but as God transcends all created things and all relations to created things, he affirms and denies nothing about God in himself, but worships God in religious silence, as is fitting. Then at last, Saint Dionysius says that the mind, by transcending the ascent to all holy summits, is absorbed into the darkness, where Marsilius Ficinus, through "summits" or "peaks," understands natures reduced to unity, but contemplated universally, which he says are three: namely, the corporeal, the animal, and the intellectual, whose thought and affection the soul must greatly surpass, in order to find the Good in itself. Hersent, however, more mystically, says that by "holy summits" are understood the higher degrees of divine contemplation and the spiritual life, to which the name of holiness is appropriate, in that they effect or at least increase this. And for this reason he says that Saint Dionysius named it an "ascent to holy summits," because indeed one must ascend as if by steps in the things of grace and divine contemplation, and indeed always ascend, according to that word: "Blessed is the man whose help is from thee, who has disposed ascents in his heart" [Ps. LXXXIII, 6]. And, "The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards, and increaseth even to perfect day" [Prov. IV, 18]. Moreover, the contemplative soul must transcend these degrees of divine contemplation and all the acts and perfections of the interior life, that it may arrive at a mystical and perfect communion with God. So that the sense is: whatever knowledge of divine things the soul may have attained, whatever state of interior perfection it may have reached, it must nevertheless be lifted far and wide above these, that it may be conjoined to God intimately and above the mind.

In those things, moreover, which Saint Dionysius subjoins concerning Moses entering into the cloud, Hersent rightly notes that this history is not brought forward as an example of the things aforementioned (for Scripture does not narrate that Moses had entered into that mystical darkness of which there is discourse in this book, or that — which is the same thing — he had been superessentially conjoined to God; but only that he had entered the cloud which had covered the mountain, in which God is said to have dwelt), but is recounted as a most beautiful and fitting allegory to illustrate the things being treated. And first indeed, through that purgation of Moses 550, he designates that the soul which tends toward the apex of the interior life must first die to sin, conquer the perverse motions of the flesh, and be purged of all these as much as is in its power. This degree, moreover, which is the first of the spiritual life, and in which one must chiefly lay oneself open to mortification, spiritual men call the purgative life or way; which the Pythagoreans established as the first and almost principal part of their philosophy. Through "lights" and "sounds," however, the illuminative way is understood, in which spiritual souls are exercised in the contemplations of God and divine things, and are increased by many lights and sounds of revelations and illustrations received from God, and proceed in the way of God with many intellectual words sent forth to God, and conversely many sent in from God, and gradually they are segregated from many things, while they are separated and depart not only from the intelligence of created things, but much more from the affection for them. ^A That Moses, however, ascends the mountain with select priests and enters the darkness alone, insinuates that it is for the few to ascend to the mystical summits, since indeed all from the people were indeed purged, and all heard the sound of the trumpet and saw the lightnings, yet it was granted to few to ascend the mountain and to see God. So also many live in the purgative way, fewer indeed in the illuminative, but very few arrive at the unitive. For Moses alone (as is had in Exodus ch. xx) approached the darkness in which God was, which history Saint Dionysius accommodates to the mystic theologian, who, with intellectual cognition set aside and left, as it were, behind him, is received into the bosom of mystical union, where there is the perfect darkness of ignorance, which in itself admits no intellectual light or cognition, and truly is mystical, because it is intimate and hidden, so that no mind is able to comprehend its reason.

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES (53)

The holy Dionysius, before the discourse *On the Divine Names*, put the *On the Theological Representations*, as a fore-contemplation of those things said sporadically in Scripture about God; but he subjoined the *On Symbolic Theology*, in which he taught what the translations from the sensible to the divine were, and the things following, more wordy than the *On Theological Representations* and *Divine Names*, for a reason which he states in the third chapter of *On the Mystical Theology*. After this one, therefore, he began that one. Let no one, then, think that the *On Symbolic Theology*, which he says he will pass to after the *On the Divine Names*, is the *On the Mystical Theology*, but know that it was composed by the holy Father after that one. But since the former is not currently found, the *On the Mystical Theology* is set here.

§ 1. Since he is about to discourse on *On the Mystical Theology* — that which is absolute, I say, from every symbol and name, and through the abstraction of all intelligible things, and the ceasing of all thoughts, is gathered, which in others also from in- ^B

he called the "inactivity" of the intellectual motion. For this reason, before his words, he uses prayer and makes his entreaty to the holy Trinity, saying: "Trinity, both above being, and above divinity, and above goodness—having that which is above goodness; the first, indeed, conveys the notion of production, namely 'being'; the second, that of efficacy, namely 'divinity'; the third, that of state, namely 'goodness'; and these do not in any way declare the nature of God." From this it is possible to learn that while he proposes to speak of mystical theology and prays to be enlightened for this, he composes this very prayer mystically. For he did not say what the Trinity is, but those things to which it is superior. For this is mystical theology: it is not sensation, nor reason, nor motion of the mind, nor operation, nor state, nor anything else of our own that can explain it. Rather, in the perfect cessation of the mind concerning it, we who are enlightened will know that it is above all things which the mind understands; and since it contains something mystical and ineffable, according to this alone will the discourses concerning it be, and it shall be called theology, because this is said about God, that He is above all things. Therefore, O holy Trinity, presiding over divine wisdom among Christians, guiding the mind so that it may think appropriately upon divine things and not seek wisdom in things superfluous, guide us to the supreme vertex, higher than which it is impossible to conceive or think, to the super-unknown and super-radiant, ^B which is above all negation of knowledge and all affirmation of light. For although such a height is unknown, it is not as if it is in no way existent, but as being indeed, yet surpassing equally every light; that is to say, every knowledge and every ignorance. For this is what is "super-radiant," and once again, "super-unknown." In that vertex, indeed, things simple and uniform and absolute—namely, those which are without symbols and as they are in themselves—are not, however, parabolically veiled as mysteries according to the super-luminous gloom of the secret and mystical silence. In this most dark gloom, by reason of the mystical and ineffable, there shine forth the most super-luminous things, by reason of the infinity of the gifts and providences and benefits of God, from which there shines forth that most secret thing of God, which, by its super-beautiful rays and splendors that escape those who would see it, fills minds lacking eyes, ^C which in another way he calls of many eyes—namely, the angelic and divine powers. For they are not full of sensible eyes, but their essence is a certain living mind, that is, a most sharp-sighted eye, which are even considered to be eyeless on account of that inaccessible gloom of the divine silence. Inasmuch, therefore, as God is invisible, in such measure are these minds also lacking eyes. For just as He, existing invisible, at once exceeds all beauty and desire, and is not on that account despised because He is not seen, but insofar as He is desired, He fills them with beauties; so also the minds, being eyeless with respect to that splendor, ^D and being full of eyes in another way, as possessing much knowledge of those things according to their own power, nevertheless yearn for the divine radiance; and they do not, because they do not attain it, disdain it altogether, but because they yearn for it, they are filled with beauties.

^A Since it is intangible, that is, unknown and invisible, it does not stop the desire of those who reach up, but rather rekindles it, and thus it fills them with beauties. But you, O good Timothy, be intense toward the mystical sights, so that ^B even thus you may penetrate the divine things as far as is possible for the intangible. For as with some rope, let us say, the one pulling a certain weight must be intense and must not slacken anything in between in his pulling power (for if he slackens, there is need again from the beginning for the gathering of the power and again for the intense tension; and if he slackens again, he will come back to the start and will accomplish nothing, since even a small slackening destroys everything); so also take it for the divine gazing, even if he says "contemplation." For the present, however, leave behind the senses, because it is above sense, and the intellectualities, because it is above intellect; and all sensible and intelligible symbols, both those that are not and those that are, equally the same. For they used to call sensible things not being, since they always partake of every change and are not always in the same way; but they called intelligible things being, as remaining in identity and ^C toward that union, that unified and indivisible and divine in some way intellection. For this is the union, according to which the mind is united and is brought together to understand something. Be extended unknowingly; however, do not let anyone suppose, because I say "unknowingly," that you, as not attaining perhaps to divine things, have ignorance, while someone else will know; but divine things are above every essence and knowledge and are absolutely unknown to all. He calls "unconstrained ecstasy" the withdrawal from every relationship. Having, therefore, no relationship, neither towards yourself, nor towards any of the creatures, and having yourself stripped away everything from yourself, and being absolved from all things, so that you neither hold anything of the lower symbols and sensible things, and on that account think yourself to be established, nor are yourself held by any of such things from being occupied with such matters, thus you will be led up to the ray of the divine incomprehensibility. 553 He calls "free excess" the withdrawal from every affection. Having, therefore, no affection, not even toward yourself, nor another towards any creature, and abstracting yourself from all things and being absolute from all, so that you do not retain anything of the lower and sensible symbols from which you might be confirmed; nor yet be retained by any of those things ^D by turning yourself toward such, so at last you will be brought to the ray of the divine incomprehensibility.

§ II. Note that he calls "uninitiated" those who are not otherwise without a share in the mysteries, but are still wrapped up in sensible things and imagine that the Divine is nothing beyond existing things—those, clearly, who believe indeed in the name of Christ, but have not come to a more perfect knowledge; but he calls those who are altogether without a share in any mysteries "idolaters." He says therefore: "See that none of these hear these mysteries; for if those who are not instructed have nothing higher to imagine, but think God to be such as they themselves can conceive, who according to the Scripture has set darkness as His hiding-place," clearly the One who is in the extreme ignorance

^A hidden. What, then, would one say about those who are even more uninitiated, and are idolaters? But when he says that the divine mystagogies are "above them," he does not mean that the divine things are perchance above these men, but are not above others; for what would be strange in this, seeing that they, being dull, did not grasp them? For he did not say, "Above the knowledge of these," but "Above them," as if to say, they did not even grasp this, that God is above what they are able to conceive; but even this had gone above them, and they think that by their own knowledge they know the Divine, suffering from a double ignorance: namely, the ignorance according to the disposition, both in that they are ignorant of divine things, and in that they do not know that they are ignorant. What, then, shall we say about the uninitiated, who characterize God from things lowest to them, that is to say, from inanimate materials and forms? ^B One ought, indeed, to attribute to Him every position of existing things, as we said in *The Divine Names*, because the Divine Numen is named from all things, as the Cause from effects; and all things are to be attributed to Him, as existing above all. For the axiom of contradiction does not have place there, as it does here; for here, in every matter, there is either affirmation or negation, and if the affirmation is true, the negation is false, or vice-versa; but there, both affirmation and negation are true according to the senses mentioned. But since the Divine is above every ablation and position, and above that which is not and above that which is, and above knowledge and above ignorance, it is much more above privations than it is above positions. ^C For he who takes away a position removes something defined, and perhaps the mind will slide over to something else, thinking that, when that was not, this or something else was; and even if one takes away everything, he will arrive at that which is "not in any way in any way." But he who removes a privation in these matters, regarding which the mind is not able to conceive any state, definitely gives one to understand that there is something incomprehensible which I mean. Behold a position: I speak of "light" regarding God; someone denies it, because God is not light: I suspect it is something other than light; he denies that too, and I slip to something else; if he denies everything, I shall think nothing at all. Come, look also at the privation. Behold, he speaks of a privation, that the highest peak is "unknown"; someone denies "the unknown," the intellect cannot be confirmed that it is "known" (for this is agreed upon by common notions); thus it is left over, ^D that there is something not only above knowledge, but even "above-unknown," and from these points the incomprehensibility is united to God. For this reason, the Father also sets it as more excellent that the Divine should be, and be called, "above privations" or "above positions."

III. Regarding the unwritten tradition of Saint Bartholomew the Apostle

§ III. After these things, he sets forth the tradition handed down unwritten by the holy apostle Bartholomew, who says that theology is both great and very small, and the Gospel is broad and great. And again, I think that what was lacking here was passed over in silence; for he ought to have said, and again, "narrow and small," and I think this was passed over in silence, either by the holy Bartholomew himself when he was uttering this sentiment, or recently by the Father, because of the...

incongruity of the thing. For how is that which has ensnared the whole inhabited world "narrow"? And how is it "small"—that which ^A contains the great mystery of godliness? This surely happened, as I think, out of reverence. But in some places it is found to be even more abbreviated. The saint, explaining the former clause, says that, as it seems to me, the divine Apostle spoke these things while having that in mind: that the Cause of all needs many words, and yet is spoken of in no word and a brief word; for it possesses no word or conception capable of manifesting its own nature. ^B Now, *polylogos* with the stress on the antepenultimate syllable—for *polylogos* is one who says many things, but *polylogos* (with the stress on the penultimate) is one who has need of many words; just as *prototokos* with the stress on the antepenultimate is the first-born, but *prototokos* with the stress on the penultimate is the woman who first gives birth, as even Homer indicates:

*Cinyra’s first-born son, not knowing birth before.*

Having said, therefore, that he possesses neither word nor conception, he explains it by saying: not because it is in no way whatsoever, but because it extends beyond all things superessentially, and appears only to those who pass beyond both the defiled and the pure, and who transcend every summit, and leave behind all lights, that is to say, all knowledge, and all sounds and words, that is to say, those things spoken about God in the Scriptures. He calls these "heavenly," as being spoken and delivered not according to human and earthly conception, but according to divine inspiration, and as being enshrouded in that divine darkness of unknowing, wherein He who is above all things exists. ^C Observe, too, how he said: "to those who pass beyond both the defiled and the pure," since even those things among us which are pure, when compared to that divine purity, are reckoned as defiled, according to what is said: "All the righteousness of man is as a menstruous cloth" (Isai. lxiv, 6), when compared to that divine righteousness, which has no number. Observe also that phrase: "who transcend every summit," both of sensible and intelligible things, not only, as it were, the things themselves, but also their summits. For the ancients used to call "summits" the purest part of each essence, from which the essence itself hangs directly, that is to say, continuously. Thus, the summit of the soul is the mind, and the burning desire of those who have ascended, and for our hierarchy that which brings it ^D near to immateriality. As again in sensible things, the most luminous part of fire, and the vaporous part of water, and the rest accordingly. The discourse therefore exhorts us to transcend even the summits of the saints themselves, and thus to apprehend the place in which God is, which is what also happened in the case of Moses. Note the order of the things that befell Moses before he was deemed worthy to enter into the darkness. For first he was purified, and thus was separated from the others. For after he had heard the trumpets along with the others, and had seen the divine lights, he is separated, and stands with the priests; and having entered into the divine darkness he does not see God (for "no one has ever seen God"), but he [sees] the place in which He stood, from which is indicated, [as to] the things of the mind...

and the things of the visible world, that these summit-points are certain hypothetical reasons for the things that are in God. He calls "hypothetical" these descriptive reasons, which is to say, those contemplative [reasonings] about existing things, which he said were placed under God, essentially signifying that they are known to be present in Him; for from these we are taught that He is present to all things, not by moving through them, but by way of providence. He calls the heavenly and intellectual essences that are around God "spiritual vertices," which he also termed "most holy places," beyond which He towers and from which He is absolute, being assimilated to them in no way at all.

Having pondered, therefore, the place in which God stood, and having then been released from the things that are seen—that is, from all sensible things—and from those who see—that is, from all rational things, I mean the intellectual and intelligent essences, and along with these, even released from our own souls—Moses thereafter entered into the darkness, that is, into the ignorance of God, where, having shut out all faculties of cognition, he became in the invisible, the one beyond the intellect, the one invisible to all cognitive faculties, even the God who is above all, and by such a manner he was united to ignorance and to cessation. I do not mean the cessation of one's own mind regarding Him, nor again the cessation of another's mind—in the sense of perceiving neither Himself nor anything else (for this is absolute stupidity and a paralysis of the intellect)—but that one has been united according to the higher state to the altogether Unknown, in the act of maintaining a cessation of all knowledge, by clearly and voluntarily and firmly leaving behind every external notion as something that confuses and hinders rather than helps, since He knows all things without any notion.

Indeed, does something similar not happen here plainly, when we wish to ponder something in our mind, but are often interrupted by someone who ostensibly wishes to contribute to that thought, and we become annoyed with them for having caused a disturbance, as they have destroyed that dim thought we had already impressed upon our minds? For what else does the mind desire then, except that, by the cessation of other things, it might be free to attend to the matter proposed?

Concerning the "darkness," note that the Hebrew has *araphel*, which Aquila and Theodotion rendered as "darkness," agreeing with the Septuagint; Symmachus, however, [rendered it as] "mist." The Hebrew says that the name *araphel* is that of a firmament into which Moses arrived; for they speak of seven firmaments, which they also call heavens, and they repeat their names one by one. But the saint understood by "darkness" ignorance, or the vacuity of notion. ^{B C D}

CHAPTER II. How one must also be united to, and offer praises to, the Author of all things, who is above all things.

^A We pray that we might enter into this super-luminous darkness, and, by means of blindness and ignorance, see and know that which is beyond vision and knowledge—this very inability to see or know. For this truly is to see and know, and to praise the Supersubstantial in a supersubstantial manner through the removing of all things that exist, just as those who, making a naturally complete statue, remove all the obstacles that hinder the clear vision of the latent form, and by this removal alone reveal the hidden beauty itself.

It is necessary, I think, to praise these removals in a way contrary to the affirmations; for we made those by beginning from the first principles and descending through the middle to the last; but here, by making our ascents from the last things to the most primordial, we remove all things, so that we may know clearly that ignorance which is hidden from all those who know, among all things that exist, and that we may see that supersubstantial darkness which is hidden by all the light that is in all things that exist.

CORDERIUS' ANNOTATIONS.

^B "We pray that we might enter into this super-luminous darkness." Nowhere more, says St. Maximus, does Dionysius declare what it is to know God through nescience than in this second chapter of the *Mystical Theology*, and in the fifth Epistle to Dorotheus, where you may see what we have annotated, as in the Epistle to Gaius, which is of the same argument.

Observe here only that to enter under the divine darkness is, by not seeing and not knowing, to see and to know; which is above vision and knowledge—to see, I say, and to know this very thing: that we do not see nor know. Thus, in the Epistle to Dorotheus, Dionysius interprets mystically that darkness into which Moses entered upon the mount in Exodus, to be that nescience by which he says God is known, in such a way that he who is deemed worthy is in that darkness, so that he truly sees and knows God by this very fact, that he does not see nor know, recognizing this very thing: that He is above all things intelligible and sensible. Divine darkness, therefore, says Dionysius, is that inaccessible light in which God is said to dwell—invisible indeed, because of superabundant brightness; inaccessible, because of an excessive and supernatural illumination. In this mystical darkness, that is, in this illumination, he is interpreted, as I said a little before, to be one who, by not seeing and not knowing, truly sees and knows God.

To understand what has been said—how, for instance, darkness may be light, and nescience may be knowledge—take, says St. Maximus, the example of the bodily eye. For what is caused by the absence of light, namely the vacating of the sense of the eyes, is also caused by fixing the focus of the eyes intently against the rays of the sun at midday; since, just as in darkness, so too in excessive light the eyes are dazzled, as happened to Peter and the other apostles on Mount Tabor in that famous transfiguration of Christ, where that light, when it appeared on the face of Christ and overcame the faculty of human sense, prefigured to the apostles the manner of mystical theology according to negation, as when we say God is infinite, incomprehensible, or super-good, or hyper-wise (that is, in a supereminent way), which are declared by negation; in which manner of theology the Divinity is according to substance ineffable, and more than unknown, leaving absolutely no trace behind itself, nor allowing in any way any notion of what He is. Because what is uncreated cannot be comprehended by a creature, nor can what is infinite be understood by finite things. From symbols of this kind, which are above sense (says St. Maximus in his speculation [on the matter] [cont.]

we believe only that God, who is beyond reason and intellect, exists; but what He is, and how He is, and of what quality, and where, and when, we do not dare to speculate, nor can we understand, nor do we attempt to conceive. ^A The mode of affirmative theology, which praises God from created things, as when we call God good, wise, just, signifying His operations and providences, signified white garments symbolically. For these were symbols of creatures, which were made according to divine ideas, and symbols of the words of Holy Scripture, by which divine things signified were, as it were, clothed, which were then made lucid, open, and clear to the holy apostles, and understood without any tortuous enigma and symbolic shadowing; and they revealed the Word of God hidden within them, when they had received perfect knowledge of God, and were freed from the affection of the world and the flesh, and had become in truth mystical theologians. ^B This mystical knowledge, however, is closest to the visible vision of God, which in Greek is called [Gk: θεοφάνεια] *theophaneia*, and is reserved for the future, when we shall see the divinity with the eyes of the mind, seen through the glorious body of Christ by glorified eyes: for then we shall see Him as He is, as the blessed John says (I John III, 2), where he does not signify that the essence of God is to be seen in the future with corporeal eyes, but as Theodoretus says in his *Commentaries* on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter IV, the divine nature, which does not fall under sight, nor can be discerned, will then be discerned—as much as is permitted—through the humanity of Christ, encompassed by divine light and shining, and casting forth rays, namely, with the eye of the mind. This is what Paul seems to have signified when he says: "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, in the face of Christ Jesus" (II Cor. IV, 6). ^C That is, He who once made the nature of light by His word alone, saying, "Let there be light" (Gen. I, 3), He also illuminated our minds with His own light, so that we might clearly see the glory of God through Christ. Of this kind is the vision for which St. Thomas (p. 1, quaest. 12, art. 3, ad 1) says that from the perspicacity of the intellect and the refulgence of divine light in glorified bodies, the divine presence is immediately known. ^D No differently than one who carves a native statue. When he has said that God is to be celebrated and known through the ablation of all things, he illustrates the matter with an apt comparison, and explains this negative theology most clearly with the example of a sculptor. For, he says, just as a sculptor or statuary elicits a genuine image only by the ablation of the surrounding and redundant matter; so mystical theology, by removing and denying all created things which are, as it were, positioned around God, in a certain way exhibits Him to us, naked in Himself. Maximos of Tyre, a philosopher of the Platonic sect, used a similar example in his *Sermon I on God*: "How does one hint at Him? Consider for me neither magnitude, nor color, nor figure, nor any other affection of matter; but just as if a beautiful body were hidden from view by many and varied garments, a lover would strip them off so that he might know it clearly, so now too strip off and take away by reason this covering, and the distraction of the eyes, and see what remains: that very thing itself which you desire." How, he says, can one explain Him? For do not think of magnitude, or color, or figure, or any other affection of matter; but as a lover, if some beautiful body existed, whose aspect many and varied garments took away, would strip it of them so that he could look upon it clearly, so even now strip off this clothing, and by thought take away whatever hinders the eyes, and what remains, you will see it just as you desire. ^A To this also the dogma of the Hebrews in the Kabbalah seems to consent, where Paulus Riccius, in book IV *De coelesti agricultura*, says thus: "The tetragrammaton God never presents Himself to the nations unless covered in a royal robe or a warlike cloak, no differently than a king is accustomed to stand by and be present to his leaders and ministers among mortals: but to the assembly of Israel, as among his own countrymen and intimates, he is offered and appears wearing only inner garments, having put aside his official robe and royal cloak, yet not entirely naked and bare; but to the holy men and monarchs of Israel, he stands naked, having rejected every cognomen (as if clinging to the embraces of a spouse), and rests, which that saying hints at: 'And I will betroth thee unto me for ever' (Ose. II, 19); and he declares that: 'I have taken off my coat; how shall I put it on?' (Cant. V, 3) etc. Which privilege is more singular to mystical theologians than to others, that God exhibits Himself to them more intimately and as if naked." ^B It is necessary, however, as I believe, for ablations to be different in a contrary way, etc. He delivers the difference of the proceeding of mystical theology from other theological sciences, because these, while they deliver and affirm various things about God, e.g., goodness, truth, wisdom, power, and other attributes, seem to decorate and clothe God, and consequently to hide and veil Him; on the contrary, however, mystical theology, by denying and taking away all these things from God (namely, according to our imperfect mode of conceiving and speaking), is to be considered as exhibiting God to us much more truly and clearly in Himself. Whence, just as he compared mystical theologians to sculptors, who carve their statues by the ablation of matter; so also, other theologians, who theologize by affirming various things about God, could not unjustly be likened to painters and modelers, who form their images by the addition of colors or plaster.

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES (54)

^A For does not this happen in some obscure way even here in our own vision, when we are preoccupied by some desire, and longing to see the object of our desire, when the desired object suddenly appears, our vision is gathered toward it, acting not partially but totally, and in this regard becoming motionless? Often, indeed, some even shade their eyes with their own hand, as it were to excite the faculty of sight. Whence come ecstasies and amaze- ^B ments, if not from the mind, sympathizing with external things, turning itself totally inward, and, having laid aside partial intelligences, remains totally motionless, becoming wholly one with the object? And for this reason, the human being appears to be beside himself. For it must be known that the mind bears within itself an image of the universe. The universe, indeed, moves in its parts in the process of becoming—perhaps this part happens to be in the west, which before was in the east, and another elsewhere; and so it is with all the parts, according to which even the heaven is said to move, yet according to the whole, it remains motionless in itself, as if turning in its own place. For this reason we also say that the mind, by putting aside partial intelligences, remains totally motionless. If, then, this is so in our own affairs, what might one say—what might one say or think—about that divine beauty? ^C Read also on this matter the holy man’s epistle to Dorotheus, so that it may be clarified to you to some extent what and of what kind this "knowledge in ignorance" is. For this is indeed to see—to not see; and to know—to not know, and thus to praise the Super-Essential in a manner appropriate to His Super-Essentiality. How? Through the removal of all things. For since we are unable to speak of Him positively as He deserves, because we can conceive of nothing among all things that is akin to Him, we praise Him through the removal of all things, and we do what those who carve a

natural statue

Andromeda

that there is a certain opposition in them when, celebrating Him through them, we declare God. For when we were pronouncing the positions in the book *On the Divine Names*, we began from the most primary things, and passing through the middle things, we set them down by descending to the final things. We first discoursed concerning the Being, and then after that concerning the Good, and afterward concerning Life, and following that we arrived through the other intermediate things to the final things, speaking of Him as Lord and King, and of the Ancient of Days, and speaking of such things. But with removals the opposite happens: ^B by making our ascent from the final things to the most principal, we remove what is posterior, and then even the most primary itself, saying: He is not inebriated, He is not described, He is not understood; and again: He is not a body, he is not an element, he is not a soul, he is not an angel, he is not life, he is not being, but God is above all these things. And thus, having arrived in an uncovered manner at complete ignorance, we know in some way that knowledge which is in ignorance: for he calls this the ignorance which is hidden by all things that are known in all beings, and that is a darkness hidden from all light in all beings. This, indeed, is because the knowledges of beings, and the positions concerning the Divine, do not uncover and bring into manifestation that which is unknown regarding God, but rather they cover it, since the mind has not there its base to dwell in, nor can it grasp anything intelligible from there, but rather falls into notions that are not appropriate, if it is not firm, and it immediately flies past the sensible things. ^C But the light in beings is not to be thought of as anything other than that by which beings are known insofar as they are beings, just as we also find in what follows. This light, therefore, which is in beings, and such knowledge of beings, rather obscures the Divine: for the natural science of things will not profit theology as much as it will harm it, while it brings that which is above nature down to those things that are proper to itself, and according to nature. But how we set the positions from the primary to the final, and the removals from the final to the primary, the Father himself will teach in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III. Quae sint affirmantes de Deo locutiones, quae negantes.

SYNOPSIS CAPITIS. He says that in the *Theological Outlines* he had explained those things which pertain to the triune and one God; in the *Divine Names* he had treated of the attributes by which God is named in Scripture; finally, in the *Symbolic Theology* he had explained those sensible images which are metaphorically pronounced concerning God: and at the same time he renders the reason why he had been more prolix in those books than in the *Mystical Theology*. At the end, he transmits the manner of forming positions and removals concerning God.

In the *Theological Outlines*, indeed, we celebrated those things which are ^D most proper to positive theology;

we have celebrated; how the divine and good nature is called one, and how it is three-fold; what is meant by the paternity and filiation attributed to it; what the theology of the Spirit signifies; how from the immaterial and indivisible good those lights of goodness, ^A proceeding from the heart, have sprung forth, and in it, and in themselves, and in one another, by an eternal propagation, have remained in [their] abiding state, never departing; how the super-essential Jesus has been embodied with the truths of human nature; and whatever else has been set forth by the oracles and celebrated in the theological outlines. ^B In the book *On the Divine Names*, how he is called good, how being, how life and wisdom and power, and whatever else pertains to the intelligible naming of God; in the *Symbolic Theology*, what are the transfers of names from sensible things to divine things; what are the divine forms, what the divine shapes, and parts, and organs; what are the divine places, and worlds, what are the wraths, what the sorrows and the rages, what the drunkennesses and the hangovers, what the oaths, and what the curses, what the slumbers, and what the wakenings, and how many other sacredly fashioned formations and configurations of the symbolic theology of God there are. And I think you have perceived ^C how the final things are more prolix than the first; for the theological outlines, and the exposition of the divine names, ought to have been more concise than the *Symbolic Theology*. For the more we ascend toward the heights, the more our words are contracted by the visions of intelligible things; just as even now, while we are entering the darkness that surpasses the intellect, we shall find not merely brevity of speech, but a total lack of speech and of intellect. And there, indeed, the discourse, descending from the highest to the lowest, was extended to a proportional breadth ^D according to the measure of the descent; but now, ascending from the lowest to that which surpasses all, it is contracted according to the measure of the ascent, and after the whole ascent, it will be entirely voiceless and will be wholly united to the Ineffable. But you will ask, why, when we establish divine positions from the Most First, do we begin the divine removal from the final things? Because, of course, when we establish [that] which is above every position, we had to lay the foundation of affirmation from that which is more akin to it; but when we remove [that] which is above every removal, we ought also to remove it from those things which are most distant; for is not God more life and goodness than air or stone? And is he not more not-drunk and not-angry than not-said or not-understood?

divine nature with all its essential attributes, and whatever the scholastics discuss at such great length in their most voluminous commentaries concerning God one and trine, the divine processions, the oppositions of the persons among themselves, their distinctions, and their ^A circuminsession within one another—to these, if one were to add the book of the Heavenly Hierarchy concerning which he had written about angelic properties, you would recognize that the first part of the divine Thomas had been most brilliantly described by Dionysius beforehand. Indeed, the first part of the second part, where it treats primarily of human acts, their goodness and malice, and of vices and sins, had a great foundation in the fourth chapter of *On the Divine Names*, where Dionysius discusses the nature of goodness and malice most extensively. Without a doubt, he would have brought greater resources to that part of theology had the books *On the Soul* and *On Intellectual and Sensible Things* not been lost to the injuries of time. As for the treatise on laws, there is no doubt that his book *On Legal Hierarchy* would have contributed a great deal, which likewise is not found. The second part of the second part, where right and justice are discussed, also has at least some foundation in the eighth chapter of *On the Divine Names*, where he treats of justice; it would certainly have received greater assistance from Dionysius’s book *On Just and Divine Judgment*, had it not likewise perished to the great detriment of the Church. Moreover, the treatise on grace and the theological virtues receives great light from various places in Dionysius, scattered here and there. Finally, the third part, where he treats of the Incarnation of the divine Word, in its entirety, just as Dionysius testifies in this place, was accurately treated by him in the book of *Divine Institutions*, in which he says that he wrote how Jesus, who was above substance, took on the truth and substance of human nature. The treatise on the sacraments appears to be explained as accurately and distinctly as possible in the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. Nor did he neglect that part of theology which is concerned with interpreting the Scriptures; for he says that he composed the *Symbolic Theology*, and that he wrote it more extensively than the others—the whole of which seems to have been concerned with interpreting the Scriptures: to such an extent that even this part of theology, which is devoted to explaining the Scriptures, was handed down most copiously by this holy man. And indeed, if those Works of Dionysius which were lost to the great detriment of theologians had existed, no author other than him would have been read in the schools, as a purer theology would have flowed forth from him, as from its very source.

As to the affirmative theology: See the annotations to the previous chapter and the general observations 8 and 9, where we have explained the nature and distinction of affirmative and negative theology. For an understanding of those things which he here briefly touches upon concerning the unity of the divine nature, the distinction of the persons, and their circuminsession, consult the second chapter of *On the Divine Names* and our annotations there, where the divine processions and the mutual circuminsession of the persons in one another are explained, as well as those things that are proper and substantial to Jesus. As for the *Symbolic Theology*, consult letter IX below, which is to Titus, and our annotations there, where those things which pertain to the symbolic theology are expounded. ^B For the more we strive toward higher things, etc. He provides the reason why, in proportion to our ascent to God, our knowledge is contracted. For, of course, the more we approach God himself, the more we also approach the unity of his being; whence it follows that our knowledge is also contracted and simplified, not unlike lines which, the more they approach the center from the circumference, are all the more contracted, until, meeting at the very point, they lose all extension and become one indivisible thing within themselves and with the point; just as conversely, the further they depart from the center, the more they expand and are distinguished from one another. Hence it happens that mystical theology, by deserting and transcending the knowledge of all individual things, whether sensible or intelligible, strives toward and arrives at its own center, which is God, and finally falls into an all-encompassing *aglosson* (inexpressibility) and *agnosian* (unknowing), through the failure of every word and natural intelligence, intimately joined to God himself in the mystical darkness.

Here it must be noted that position, just like ablation, is sometimes simple, sometimes hypothetical. A simple position is when we say, for example, God is life, goodness, and the rest. But a hypothetical one is when we add a comparison to the affirmation, as Dionysius does at the end of this chapter, saying: God is more life than a stone, and more goodness than fire. Simple ablation, or negation, is for example: God is not a stone, he is not angry, and the like. Hypothetical is, for example: God is more not-drunk than he is not explained by speech. Above both types of position and ablation is God. In hypothetical positions which are more appropriate to God, they take on that "more," as: God is more life than air. But conversely, in ablations which are more remote from God, they receive the "more," as: God is more not-angry than he is not-understood.

PARAPHRASE OF PACHYMERES (55)

and as being, and life, and wisdom, and virtue. And again, in the *Symbolic Theology*, what the translations from sensible things are, and what the forms are which the prophets conveniently attribute to the Divinity; and what the shapes, and the parts of the body—certainly what faces, and ears, and hands, and feet—and what the instruments, and the rest, so that we do not have to recount each one, which all ought to be said of God by way of negation. ^A You have, therefore, to know how things that are furthest from God, which he indeed calls the ultimate things, are more wordy. For by how much they are alien to God and not becoming, by so much do they require more words to be represented, as to how they are to be understood in God. For this reason, the *Theological Outlines* according to the *On Divine Names* are shorter than the *Symbolic Theology*, because in those we speak affirmatively. In the *Theological Outlines*, concerning God, that he is a Monad, that he is a Trinity, that he is Father, and Son, and Spirit; in the *On Divine Names*, that he is Being, that he is Life, that he is Wisdom, that he is Virtue. ^B But in the *Symbolic Theology*, since it speaks of symbols, shapes, parts, instruments, drunken revels, impulses, sleep, and watchings, all of which ought to be spoken of by way of negation, as alien and remote from God, it is natural that such things have resulted in being more wordy. For as we say things that are more proper to God, and draw back, and approach toward him, by so much are our discourses contracted to the views of the intelligible things. ^C He called the "views of the intelligible things" the contemplations which are becoming to their immaterial simplicity. He has used *peristellontai* [are constrained] for *systellontai* [are contracted]. That which he says will certainly happen even now in the *Mystical Theology*. For when we have completely entered into the darkness that is above mind and proper to God, we shall not only be brief in speech, but we shall find a complete lack of speech and of mind. He says "lack of speech" as the inability to represent by speech the things that are above speech, and "lack of mind" as that which is unintelligible, and which no one can understand, as it is above mind. ^D And there, that is, in the *On Divine Names*, the discourse increased from the highest toward a proportionate multitude: for "Being," since it is proper to God, had brevity; but "Ancient of Days," or some other thing more remote, naturally required many words. But now, ascending from the lower and many compositions and symbols toward the singular and supreme, it will naturally be contracted according to the measure of the ascent; and to such a degree, that after the ascent, it will be made silent and will be wholly united to the ineffable God, honoring him with reverent silence, who "made darkness his secret place" [Ps. XVII, 12]. But why, you ask, do we begin to make affirmations from the prime things, and negations from the ultimate things? We say that in the case of positions we use the hypothetical, that is, the suggestory, and as it were, a declarative affirmation, that God [is], that he is Life, that he is Goodness, or air, or stone, or fire, or spirit, or such things. The prior things are thus more proper and more kindred to God; therefore, he is more Life than air, and more God than stone, and more Goodness than fire, and more...