overturns the mind: to such an extent does a man living with a woman impel the woman into the insanity of concupiscence; to such an extent is a woman living with a man able to induce even the forgetting of God Himself. Let us depart from Gehenna and from eternal fire! Why, while still breathing, do you bury yourselves in Hades and into horrible Tartarus? You who have companions and live with them, unlearn this evil teaching, which offers death and betrays salvation. Let us imitate the apostles, let us imitate the prophets, and walk in their footsteps, and let not the bait of a woman deceive us. A And let us ourselves, in turn, not lead a woman into fraud as if she were bait, out of vainglory and superstitious humility. But let all things be performed by us soberly, according to true and solid humility in Christ, so that we may be able to be delivered from the present evil time, according to the will of our Father and of our Lord Jesus Christ, His only-begotten Son: through whom and with whom [be] glory, power, and honor to the invisible Father with the holy and paraclete Spirit, now and unto all ages of ages. Amen.
OF SAINT BASIL THE GREAT
SYLLOGISTIC REASONINGS AGAINST THE ARIANS, That the Son is God in the divine sense
I. If the Son is God by nature, and the Father is God by nature, then the Son is not one God, and the Father another God. But if the Son is not God by nature, He is called God just as those who are falsely called gods are, and He is not God.
II. If there is one Lord by nature, and the Father is also Lord by nature, it is manifest that there is no other nature. And if there is one God who is the Father, and the Son is also called God, it is not a different nature, but one.
III. If there is one Lord by nature, while many are called lords by C position—that is, by standing or adoption—and there is one Son by nature, while many are named sons, and he who is called lord or son by position is called so in imitation of Him who is [such] by nature: for nothing would be said by position unless that which is by nature preceded it. If, therefore, we are sons of God by *thesis*, that is, by adoption, it is necessary that there first be a Son by nature.
IV. Whatever things are truly and totally of one substance, these are the signs of those whose names they are. But the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are properly and truly God: therefore the substance is the same as the names.
V. If the Son is not "only-begotten" by generation, but is "only-begotten" on account of incomparable excellence, D and every creature is not similar but dissimilar, then there would be many "only-begotten" ones, just as the Son is the only-begotten of God.
VI. The Son is not simply "only-begotten," but is "only-begotten" from the Father; the Son, therefore, is "only-begotten," and not an "only-begotten" creature.
VII. If the Son creates by *metabasis*, that is, by concession and the permission of the Father, and not according to nature, He is nothing other than less than the creatures made by Him, even according to nature; for of those of whom He is not Creator according to nature, how could He be a creature according to nature?
VIII. If God acts as no one else does, and generates as no one else generates; for God is in all things, and regarding all things, incomparable as God.
IX. What is made is not from the substance of the one making; what is generated is from the substance of the one generating: therefore, to make and to beget are not the same.
X. If the Son is from God, but not as from the Father, but as from a cause, and the cause is such that we also are—[namely, that] God is, for from Him are all things—not
otherwise the Father of the Son, and otherwise our [Father], but rather similarly; and how is this not absurd? XI. If there is nothing similar and equal to God except the Son, and [if] He is not the Son, He will be similar neither to God nor to the creatures. XII. That which is in the form of God is in the substance of God; for the form of God is not one thing and the substance another, lest He be composite. Therefore, he who is equal according to the form will also be [equal] according to the substance. XIII. If the begotten is less than he who begot, the one who is begotten is not to be blamed; but the infirmity belongs to the begetter, for he either envied and did not make him equal, or because he could not, he did not beget him similar. XIV. If the Father was before the Son, He was entirely the Father of another; for without the Son He would not be called Father. XV. If anyone has known the Son according to substance, he has also known the Father, for, He says, "If you had known Me, you would have known My Father also." Therefore, the Son is A *homoousios* to the Father; for nothing incorporeal can be known from a dissimilar substance. XVI. If to believe that Christ is the Son of God holds life, not to believe necessarily holds death. XVII. Those of whom the *energeiai*, that is to say the operations, are the same, of them the substance is also one: and the operation of the Father and the Son is one, as [that which is written]: "Let us make man"; and again: "What things the Father does, these the Son also does in like manner"; there is one substance, therefore, of the Father and the Son. XVIII. If the knowledge of the Father and the Son is eternal life, it is necessary that they also be of one nature; for those things which are of diverse substances are not perceived by one knowledge, nor can they vivify in like manner. XIX. If the Son is truly the image of the Father, and every image is an image either of substance, or of form, or of figure, or of species, or of color: but God is in none of these, but in substance alone: the Son, therefore, since He is the image of the substance, is of the same substance with the Father. XX. If the Father cannot be compared at all with the Son, but yet in all things He also cannot be compared with a creature; [if it is held] not otherwise with the Son, and otherwise with the creature, but similarly; He is not therefore dissimilar to the Father, but also similar to the creature, and how is this not absurd? XXI. If when they say the Son is a creature, they do not mean it as one of the creatures, why when we say it is *gennēma*, that is to say a germ, do they understand it as one of the germs? XXII. If God does not beget, that He may not undergo flux, and does not *ktizei*, that is, create or make, that He may not grow weary; if, however, He creates by suffering nothing, much more does He beget by suffering nothing. XXIII. If, as the radiance is begotten from all light, so [the Son] is from the Father—indeed from the light, yet not B at some time, but without any interval of time, and co-eternal with Him; for there is no light without radiance; therefore, since He is the radiance of the Father, He is not at some time, but co-eternal: for God and the Father is light, as David says: "In your light shall we see light," and Daniel: "And the light is with Him," and the Apostle: "Who being the radiance of glory," etc. XXIV. If a germ is a substance, in their opinion just as the unbegotten; but the germ of God is the Son; therefore He is the substance of God. XXV. If God begot the Son by will, not by nature, either when He willed once, [and] thereafter He could not will, or He willed again, and again He begot. But if His will is not one, but diverse, He is not simple; nor is He of one author, but, as He wills, He does. XXVI. If God does not beget, [it is] either because He cannot at all, or because He does not will; but if indeed He cannot, not only does He not have power, but a generative and perfect nature surpasses Him; more infirm, I say, is He than a generating and perfect nature. But if, while otherwise He could, He yet did not will; that which nature could, He restrained by will. Wherefore, even if He has not yet begotten, He will therefore will to beget at some time. XXVII. If at some time the Son was not, that very thing, "at some time," will be after Him who begot, but not before He is begotten; the Son is not, therefore, without the Father before all things, but after that "at some time" he will be found, and how is this not absurd? XXVIII. When we say the Father [is] always, it is necessary that the Son also be always. They say: Therefore because the Son is always, Creator and creation [are] always, and thus the creation will be co-eternal with the Father and the Son. But he who says Creator does not at the same time say creation: for neither is the building simultaneous with the builder, nor is the ship simultaneous with the shipwright. For the creation is in the creator: but that which is created is after the creator: but to speak of a father, without the son being posited, is impossible: and he who said father, did not speak simply, but said father of someone. XXIX. God is called in the Scriptures Lord, and omnipotent, and Sabaoth and Adonai, and Eloi, but unbegotten not at all. If, however, anyone concedes this, that He be called unbegotten, and with other names set forth, he will accommodate these to the Jews, and to all; but he will accommodate speaking of the Father of Christ to Christians alone. If, therefore, that which alone separates us from others is false, and not true; and the name is *thesei*, that is, by position, and not a thing by nature, the faith is false, D and hope is vain. For whose beginning is weak, the end is also weak. XXX. Again the Arians ask: Is the Son begotten as existing or not existing? An obscure and rude interrogation; for because it shames them to ask "when," and in time they say *to on*, that is, existing. In turn, therefore, they are to be asked: Did God the Father beget the Son as existing, or as not existing, Father? For if the Father is existing, He begot an existing one: but if He is not existing, He is begotten, and is not Father by nature.