Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa

NEMESIUS, BISHOP OF EMESA, ON THE NATURE OF MAN

^A That man is most excellently constructed of an intelligent soul and a body, and so well constructed that he could not possibly have been made or held together otherwise, is an opinion held by many good men. But since there is controversy regarding what is called the intelligent soul—namely, whether the faculty of intelligence comes to the soul as a certain nature distinct from a distinct nature, making it intelligent, or whether the soul possesses intelligence from itself and by its own nature, and this is its most beautiful part, just as the eye is in the body—some, among whom is Plotinus, defining the soul as one thing and the intelligence as another, want man to consist of three parts: body, soul, and intelligence. ^B Ap olinarius, who became bishop of Laodicea, followed them. For having laid this as the foundation of his own dogma, he constructed the rest in accordance with his doctrine. Others did not separate intelligence from the soul, but [held that it is] the ruling part within it.

^A Aristotle, for his part, thinks that the intelligence which is in potentiality is fashioned together with man, but that the intelligence which is in actuality enters into us from without; it does not contribute to the being and existence of man, but contributes to the advancement of the knowledge and contemplation of natural things. Therefore, he maintains that only a few men—those who have devoted themselves to philosophy—possess intelligence in actuality. Plato, however, looking at what is most excellent in man, and turning us toward the divinity and care of the soul alone, does not seem to say that man is the composite—soul and body—but rather an essence using such a body. He conceives of the things concerning man in a more noble way, ^B and from that very point he turns us toward the divinity and care of the soul alone, so that, believing ourselves to be the soul, we might pursue only the goods of the soul—virtues and piety—and not desire the pleasures of the body, as they are not of man, in so far as he is man, but of the animal; for man is an animal primarily, and a man secondarily, since man is also an animal.

And in another way, it is agreed by all men that the soul is more sovereign than the body. For by it, as if by an instrument, the body is moved. Death reveals this. For when the soul has departed, the body remains utterly motionless and inactive, just as, when the craftsman is removed, ^C the instruments remain motionless. It is known, moreover, that [the soul] shares with inanimate things, and participates in the life of irrational animals, and has partaken of the intelligence of rational beings. For it shares with inanimate things in terms of the body and the mixture of the four elements; with plants, [in addition to] these things, [it shares] also in the nutritive and generative power; with irrational animals, [it shares] in these things, and, by way of addition, also in the impulse-driven motion and— [the translation continues onto the next page]

and in the appetitive and sensory and respiratory power; for all these things are common to humans and to those devoid of reason, even if not all things are common to all. But through the rational [faculty] it is joined to the incorporeal and intelligent natures, by reasoning and thinking and judging each thing, and by pursuing the virtues, and by embracing piety, which is the summit of all virtues. Wherefore it is as if on the borderland of the intelligible ^B and the sensory nature, being joined on the one hand by the body and the bodily faculties to the irrational animals and the inanimate things, and on the other hand by the rational [part] to the incorporeal essences, as has been said before. For the Creator seems to join the different natures to one another little by little, so that the whole creation might be one and akin.

From this it is most especially shown that there is one Creator of all things that exist. For He did not only conjoin the individuals taken singly, but He also fitted all things that are everywhere together in an appropriate manner. For just as in each of the animals He joined the insensible [parts] to the sensory [ones], ^C bone and fat and hair and the other insensible things to the sensory nerves [and flesh and similar things], and made the animal composed of insensible and sensory [parts], and showed it to be not only composed, but also one; so also in regard to the rest of the creation by kind He has acted, joining them to one another by a little degree of affinity and variation of nature, so that the entirely inanimate things do not differ much from the plants which have the nutritive power, nor again do these differ from the irrational and sensory ^D animals, nor, further, are the irrational separated from the rational entirely and become incompatible and without any bond of a connective and natural kind. For a stone indeed differs from a stone by some power, but the magnet seems to have departed from the nature and power of the other stones, in that it clearly draws to itself and holds the iron, as if wishing to make it its own food, and not only in the case of one piece of iron

but that it also holds another by means of another, by imparting its own power to all those things that cling to it. ^A Iron, therefore, also holds iron, when it is held by the magnet. Then, moving in sequence from plants to animals, the Architect of the world did not arrive immediately at the power of walking and sensation, but progressed gradually and harmoniously toward it. For He fashioned the pinnas and sea-nettles as if they were sentient trees, since He fixed them in the sea like plants with their roots, and enclosed them in shells as if with wood, and caused them to stand still as if they were plants. ^B Yet He bestowed upon them the sense of touch, the common sense of all animals, so that they might share with plants in being rooted and standing still, and with animals in the sense of touch [and the faculty of perception]. The sponge, indeed, although it adheres to rocks and, as Aristotle has recorded, contracts and opens—or rather dilates—when it perceives something approaching, [and defends itself]. For this reason, those learned in these matters are accustomed to call all such things "animal-plants." ^C Furthermore, to the pinnas and things of that sort, He joined those that move indeed from one place to another, but cannot proceed far, but rather move about in one and the same place. Of this kind are most of the shellfish and the so-called entrails of the earth. And so, little by little, bestowing upon some more senses, and upon others the power of proceeding farther, He arrived at the more perfect of the irrational animals—I mean "more perfect" as those which possess all the senses and are able to move far. Then, passing further from the brute animals to the being possessed of reason, that is, man, He did not proceed to produce him immediately

^A but first implanted in the other animals certain natural intelligences, mechanisms, and cunning for their own preservation, so that they might appear almost as beings gifted with reason, and thus He brought forth man, the being truly gifted with reason. You will find the same principle of progression regarding the voice, if one inquires: from the simple and uniform utterance of horses and cattle, it is brought down little by little to the varied and diverse voice of ravens and mimicking birds, until it ends in the articulated and perfect speech of man. Moreover, He linked this articulated speech to thought and reason, making it the messenger of the movements of the mind.

And thus He harmoniously fitted and bound all things to all, and gathered into one the things understood by the mind and the things perceived by the senses, through the creation of man. ^B Therefore, Moses also rightly, in setting forth the creation of the world, said that man was made last, not only because, when all things had been created for his sake, it was fitting that the things pertaining to his use should first be prepared, and then he who was to use them should be brought forth—but also because, since there was an intelligible substance and, again, a visible one, there had to be a certain bond of both, so that this whole universe might be one and consonant with itself, and not alien to its own nature. Man, therefore, was brought into being as an animal that would join both natures together. Such, to speak briefly, is the wisdom of God, who fashioned this world.

Therefore, man being placed on the boundary of the irrational and the rational nature, ^C if he inclines toward the body and loves the things of the body more, he embraces the life of the irrational animals and will be numbered among them and called earthly, as Paul says, and will hear that word: "You are earth, and into earth you shall go," and: "He was compared to the irrational beasts and became like them." But if he inclines toward the rational...

^A and despising all bodily pleasures, he pursues the divine and most God-beloved life, and that which is befitting to a human, he shall be as the heavenly one, according to what is said: "As was the man of dust, so also are those who are of the dust, and as is the man of heaven, so also are those who are of heaven." The chief point of the rational nature is to flee and turn away from evils, but to pursue and choose what is good. Among good things, some are seen in the partnership of soul and body (for these too are referred to the soul, as the user of the body), such as the virtues; others are proper to the soul itself by itself, not needing the body, such as piety toward God and the contemplation of existing things ^B. Therefore, those who choose to live the life of a human, as a human, and not merely as an animal, pursue the virtues and piety. What these virtues and what piety consist of will be distinguished in what follows, when we have provided the account concerning the soul and the body.

For not yet being known what our soul is in its essence, it is not appropriate to discourse concerning its operation. The Hebrews ^C say that man was not created by nature either openly mortal or immortal from the beginning, but was placed as if on the boundary of either nature, so that if he should follow the bodily passions, he would be subjected to bodily changes, but if he should prefer the goods of the soul, he would be led over to immortality. For if God had created him mortal from the beginning, certainly He would not have condemned him to death after he had sinned; for no one condemns ^D a mortal to mortality. But if, on the other hand, He had created him immortal, He would not have made him in need of food; for nothing that is immortal requires bodily food; nor would He have so easily repented, and immediately made him who was created immortal to become mortal. For He does not appear to have done this in the case of the angels who sinned, but they remained immortal according to their nature from the beginning, another...

type of punishment awaits them. Therefore, one must either accept this opinion, or one must say that man was indeed made mortal, but in such a way that he could move toward perfection and finally attain immortality; this carries the meaning that man was created potentially immortal. ^B But since it was not advantageous for him, before he attained perfection, to know his own nature, He forbade him to taste of the tree of knowledge. For there were, and indeed still are, very great powers in the things that grow from the earth; but at that time, as at the beginning of the creation of the world, since they were pure and incorrupt, they possessed a most powerful effectiveness. There was, therefore, a certain fruit, which, if tasted, would provide him with knowledge of his own nature. But God did not wish him, before he was perfect and complete, to know his own nature, lest, once he realized that he was lacking in many things, he should pay attention to bodily needs, neglecting the care of the soul. For this reason, He forbade him to touch the tree of knowledge. But when he did not obey, and had known himself, he was both removed from perfection and came to desire those things which were for the use of the body. And so, he immediately sought to cover himself. For Moses says that he knew that he was naked. For before that, he was not conscious of himself, and lived in ignorance of his own nature. ^C Since, therefore, he was cast out from perfection, he was likewise excluded from immortality, which he will later receive back by the grace of the One who created him. And after the fall, even the enjoyment of meat was permitted to him. For before that, He had commanded him to be content only with those things that grow from the earth; for these were in paradise. But when perfection was despaired of, afterward, by condescension, the things of enjoyment were permitted.

Since man consists of a body, and every body is necessarily composed of the four elements, it is necessary that he fall into those ^D same affections to which the elements are subject—division, change, and flux—which pertain only to the body. Change, indeed, by which...

^A the animal is always being exhausted, both through the manifest pores and the hidden ones, of which we shall speak later. Therefore, it is necessary that either as much be introduced to replace what is exhausted, or that the animal be dissolved through the lack of what should enter. And since those things which are exhausted are dry, moist, and spirit, the animal must necessarily require dry and moist food, and spirit. Now our food and drink are provided through the elements from which we have been ^B constituted. For each thing is nourished by its own proper and similar substance, but is healed by its contrary. Of the elements, some we take directly, and some at the same time through the mediation of certain things—as water, which we take sometimes by itself, and sometimes through the medium of wine, oil, and all those things which are called moist fruits. For wine is nothing else than water affected by the vine in a certain way; similarly, we participate in fire, ^C sometimes directly, when we are warmed by it, and sometimes through the things which we eat or drink. For in all these there is a greater or lesser portion of fire dispersed. In the same way, we also participate in air; we enjoy it directly by breathing and having it poured around us, and by drawing it in while eating and drinking, but also through the intermediary of all the other things which we consume. But as for earth, we do not partake of it directly at all, but always through certain intermediaries. For earth becomes grain, and we eat the grain. Larks, and pigeons, and partridges often eat the earth itself, but man does so through the medium of seeds, ^D orchard fruits, and meats. Since, however, not only for the sake of comeliness, but also because of the excellence of the sense of touch, in which he excels all other animals,

^A mankind has not been clothed by nature with a thick hide, as oxen and other thick-skinned animals are, nor with large and dense hair, as goats, sheep, and hares, nor with scales, as serpents and fish 49, nor with a shell, as tortoises and oysters, nor with a soft shell, as crabs 51, nor with wings, as birds: we necessarily required clothing, which might compensate for what nature has bestowed upon other creatures. These, then, are the reasons why we have need of nourishment and clothing. But we have need of shelter—for the same reasons we require clothing and food, but most especially in order to escape the attack of wild beasts. Furthermore, we require physicians and medical treatment because of the bad mixtures of qualities and the dissolution of the continuity of the body 56. But since a change occurs with respect to quality, it is necessary to bring the condition of the body back to a balanced state by means of the contrary quality. For it is not the aim of physicians, as some think, to cool a body that has become heated, but to bring it back to a good state of balance 57. If they were to cool it too much, the disposition would veer into the contrary disease 58. There is need, therefore, for man to have food and drink, because of his evacuations and dissipations; ^B for clothing, because he possesses no strong covering from nature; for a house, because of the bad mixtures 59 of the surrounding air and because of wild beasts; and for medical treatment, because of the changes in qualities and the sense 60 that has been implanted in the body. For if sense 61 were not present in us, we would neither feel pain nor require medical treatment; but if we did not feel pain, we would surely perish, nor would we be able to cure a disease while remaining ignorant of the evil 63. But because of the arts and sciences and the utilities that flow from them, we have need of one another’s work; and for this reason many of us gather together in one place, and we share with one another according to the needs of life 65 in our relationships.

that gathering and living together which we have called a city—so that we might reap benefits from one another close at hand, and not from far away. For by nature man has become a gregarious and social animal. For no one is self-sufficient for all things.

It is clear, then, that states were established because of commerce and mutual instruction. And man has received two special prerogatives in this regard. For he alone, by repenting, obtains forgiveness, and his body alone, though mortal, is rendered immortal; and this is so for the bodily part because of the soul, and for the psychic part because of the body. For man alone among rational beings has had the special privilege of being found worthy of forgiveness through repentance. For neither demons nor angels, even if they repent, are found worthy of forgiveness ^B. And in this especially God is shown and called both just and merciful. For as for the angels, since they have no compulsion drawing them into sin, but are by nature free from bodily passions and needs and pleasures, it is reasonable that no forgiveness is granted to them when they repent; but man is not only a rational being, but also an animal. And the needs of the animal, as well as its passions, often ^C draw away his reasoning faculty. When, therefore, he recovers his senses and avoids these, and proceeds toward the virtues, he attains the mercy of the just one, that is, forgiveness. And just as it is proper to his essence to laugh—since this belongs to him alone, and to all, and always—so in the things that are by grace, it is peculiar to man, above all the rational creation, to strip off the causes of his past sins ^D through repentance. For this has been granted to man alone, and to all, and always, throughout the time of his life in the world; but after death, no longer. And thus some also wish that the angels, even after their fall,

should not be able to obtain forgiveness through repentance. For their fall is death ^A; but before the fall, in accordance with the likeness of the life of men, they too were considered worthy of forgiveness—which, because they did not do [note: i.e., repent], they possess for the rest of eternity a punishment that is unforgivable and which they suffer according to their merits.

It is evident, therefore, from these things that those who reject repentance are discarding the special gift and the peculiar property of man. It is, moreover, something proper and excellent in man, that ^B among every kind of living creature, his body alone is raised after death and proceeds to immortality. And this he attains, on account of the immortality of the soul, just as the other, on account of the weakness of the body and the many perturbations by which it is tossed, he possesses. Of man alone also is the knowledge of arts and sciences, and the exercise of these very arts. Wherefore they define man thus: a living being that participates in reason, mortal, capable of mind and science. A "living being," since man is an ensouled, sentient substance; which is the definition of a living being. "Participating in reason," so that he may be separated from those that lack reason: "mortal," so that he may be separated from the immortal rational beings. But the "capable of mind and science," ^C because through learning the arts and sciences come about for us, since we possess the power capable of both mind and the arts, but we acquire the activity from learning. And they say that this was added to the definition later. For the definition was sound ^D even without this; but because some introduce nymphs and certain other kinds of demons—beings that are long-lived, yet not immortal—in order to distinguish man from these as well, they added "capable of mind and science." For he who learns nothing of those things, but knows what he knows by nature, is not human.

^A It is, moreover, the dogma of the Hebrews that this whole universe was constructed for the sake of man; those things that are apt for carrying burdens, and oxen which are useful for the cultivation of the fields, and for these reasons, hay. For of the things that have been generated, some have been generated for their own sake, others for the sake of other things. For their own sake are all things that possess reason; for other things, both those that lack reason and those that are inanimate. If, however, these were generated for the sake of others, let us consider for the sake of what they were generated. Was it, then, for the sake of angels? But no one who is of sound mind would say that they were generated for the sake of angels. For those things that are generated for the sake of other things have been generated for their ^B maintenance, persistence, and relief; for either they are for the sake of the succession of the species, or for food, or for shelter, or for medical treatment, or for lifestyle and rest. But an angel has need of none of these things. For it has no succession of species, nor is it in need of bodily food, nor shelter, nor of the other things. And if not for an angel, it is clear that neither is it for any other nature that has surpassed the angel. ^C For by as much as it is superior, by that much more does the state of being free from need belong to it. One must therefore seek a nature that is rational, yet in need of the things mentioned before. What other nature, then, might appear to be such, if we set man aside? It follows, therefore, that it is for his sake that both irrational and inanimate things have been generated. Since, then, they were generated for his sake, as has been shown, for this reason he was also established as their master. But the duty of a master is to use those under his command according to the measure of their need, and not to behave wantonly for the sake of luxury, nor to treat those under his command ^D burden-somely and oppressively. Therefore, those who do not use irrational animals well are in error. For they do not perform the work of a master, nor of a truly just human being.

^A For it is written: “A righteous man regards the lives of his beasts.” But perhaps someone will say that nothing was made for the sake of another, but that each thing was made for its own sake. Therefore, having first separated the animate from the inanimate, let us consider whether it is possible that the inanimate were created for their own sake. For if these were for their own sake, how or from where would animals be nourished? We see that nature provides food for animals from the earth, consisting of fruits and plants, except for a very few that are carnivorous. And even these carnivorous animals take as their food those animals that feed on the earth, such as wolves and lions, which eat lambs and goats and swine and deer; and eagles, which eat partridges and turtledoves and hares and the like, which in turn feed on the fruits of the earth. And indeed, the nature of fish, being predatory towards one another, does not extend to all in devouring flesh, but ^B concludes with those that feed on seaweed and other vegetation produced in the water. For if all species of fish were carnivorous, and there were none that abstained from flesh, they would not have survived for even a short time, but would have long ago perished, some by mutual slaughter, others by scarcity of food. But so that this does not come to pass, some fish have been fashioned to abstain from flesh, and to graze, as one might say, upon marine vegetation, so that the others may be sustained by them. For the food of these is seaweed, and they themselves are the food of others, and these in turn are the food of others, so that by the nourishment of the last, which is constantly supplied from that earthy substance which is in the sea, the rest are preserved unharmed. Therefore, reason teaches that plants were produced not for their own sake, but for the sake of the sustenance and nature of humans and other animals. And if this is true, there is no doubt that the causes of their growth and origin were also established for the sake of the same animals. Therefore, the motions of the stars and the celestial spheres and the seasons of the year and the rains ^C and all such things were instituted for this purpose: that, with food being continuously supplied as if in a cycle, their nature would not perish at any time, since those

^A allows for the discovery that they exist for the sake of the fruits, and the fruits for the sake of the animals and man. It remains to be considered whether the nature of irrational creatures also exists for its own sake or for the sake of man.

But perhaps it is absurd to say that those things which are devoid of prudence, live guided only by natural impulse, are bent down toward the earth, and manifest their servitude through the shape of their bodies, were brought forth for their own sake. Since there are many things that could be said on this matter, and they would demand a work nearly their own due to their multitude, it is right not to strain the length of the present thesis, which does not allow for it. If, therefore, we look upon man as ^B if he were an image, and contemplate things outside ourselves, we would be drawing our proofs from the very essence of the things being investigated.

We see, then, in our own soul, the irrational part and its components—I mean appetite and spirit—given for the service of the rational part. The one is the ruler, and the others are the ruled; the one commands, and the others are commanded and serve the needs which reason suggests, whenever man remains according to nature. If then, in us, the rational part rules over the irrational, is it not likely that it also holds sway over the external irrational creatures, and that they have been given for its needs? For the irrational is naturally ordered to serve the rational, as was shown in the case of those things within us. ^C This is also made clear by the constitution of many animals, which are suited for the service of men: oxen and all beasts of burden for tilling the fields and carrying loads; the majority of birds, fish, and land animals for enjoyment; and the imitative ones for pleasure and relaxation. If some do not serve such needs, but some even harm man, it must be known that, while those intended for service were created primarily, ^D other things were established as well, so that nothing might be lacking to the creation and to this universe, which was capable of being created.

^A Yet even these have not altogether escaped the service of mankind; rather, reason gathers even poisonous things for their own proper benefit. For it makes use of them for the healing of the harm that comes from those very things, and for the cure of other infirmities. Such are certain preparations called theriacs, which reason has devised, so that by means of them it might also master these very things, and, just as if they had been conquered by enemies, might derive benefit from them. Man indeed possesses infinite powers contrary to these, granted by the Creator, which are able to ward off, to defend against, and to correct their onslaughts. For while some things serve other uses, all things by nature are generally formed to contribute to the healing of man, even those that otherwise appear to have no utility.

And let these things be said with respect to the present condition of our life; for in ancient times, truly, none of the other animals dared to harm man, but all things served him and obeyed his command, as long as he himself kept his own turbulent movements of soul, and that part which is void of reason, under control. But when he did not govern those turbulent commotions with reason, but rather surrendered himself to them, he was deservedly overcome by the wild beasts from outside. For sin brought with it the harm from these creatures. That this is true is evident from those who have passed their life in purity and innocence, whom we know to have refuted the attacks of beasts, as Daniel did the lions, and Paul the bite of the viper. Who, therefore, can worthily admire the nobility ^B of this animal, which in itself joins mortal things with immortal, and unites those that use reason with those that are void of reason, ^C and which bears within its own nature the image of the entire creation, wherefore it is called a little world…

^A, for which God has provided so excellently, through whom all things both present and future are, and for whose sake even God became man, seeing that he escapes mortality and tends toward immortality, and rests therein. Since he is made in the image and likeness of God, he rules over the orbs of the heavens; he lives a blessed life with Christ; he is a son of God, and is set over all rule and authority. Who could by speech express the advantages of this living being? He crosses the seas, he traverses the heavens by the contemplation of his mind, he understands the courses of the stars and their intervals and magnitudes; he possesses the earth and sea, he transcends beast and sea-monster; he perfectly masters every science and art and method; he converses through letters with whom he wishes, with nothing hindering him, as far as the body is concerned; he predicts the future. He rules over all, he masters all, he enjoys all, he speaks with angels and with God, he commands the creation, he issues orders to demons, he searches out the nature of things that exist, he diligently investigates the essence of God: he becomes a house and temple of God; and he attains all these things through virtues and piety.

But lest we seem to some to be spinning the praises of man ineptly, and not merely setting forth his nature, as we had proposed, we shall here conclude our discourse; although in truth, while we are explaining the preeminence of his nature, we are explaining the nature itself. Therefore, conscious of the excellence of our nature, and knowing that we are a heavenly plant, let us not de ^B—

let us adorn our nature, nor be judged unworthy of such ^A great gifts, nor let us despoil ourselves of such power, such glory, such blessedness, casting away for the sake of a fleeting moment and a trifling pleasure the enjoyment of all things eternal; but rather, through noble deeds and abstinence from evils and an upright purpose—which God is wont above all to assist—and through prayers, let us preserve our nobility and dignity. But of these things, enough. Since, however, the common opinion teaches that man consists of soul and body, come, so that the discourse may proceed in an orderly fashion, let us first treat of the soul, yet so that we omit the extremely subtle and thorny questions that are difficult for the common man to understand.

CHAPTER II. De anima.

^B Concerning the soul, the opinions of almost all the ancients differ among themselves. For Democritus and Epicurus, and all the chorus of the Stoic philosophers, say that the soul is a body. And these very same people, who desire the soul to be a body, do not agree among themselves regarding its essence. For the Stoics say that the soul is a spirit, warmed and ignited; Critias, blood; Hippon the philosopher, water; Democritus, fire; for he claimed that the globose shapes of indivisible corpuscles, by coming together, fire and air, produce the soul; Heraclitus holds that the soul of the universe is an exhalation from humid things, whereas the soul in animals is of the same genus, born both from the exterior exhalation and from that which is within the animals themselves. Again, among those who say that the soul is without a body (non-corporeal), there is an infinite dissension: some claiming its substance to be

^A immortal. Others, even if they consider it to be devoid of a body, still deny that it is a substance or immortal. For Thales was the first to say that the soul is ever-moving and self-moving. Pythagoras asserted it to be a number moving itself. Plato, a substance falling under the intellect, and moving itself according to a harmonic number. Aristotle, the first entelechy of a natural, organic body, having the potentiality of life. Dicaearchus, the harmony of the four elements, that is, the mixture and concord of the elements. For ^B he does not wish to say that which arises from sounds, but the harmonic mixture and concord of the hot, cold, moist, and dry things which are in the body. And from these it is clear that the others say the soul is a substance, but Aristotle and Dicaearchus exclude it from being a substance. Furthermore, besides these, some have thought there is one and the same soul for all things, which is divided minutely into individuals and again comes together into itself, as do the Manichaeans and certain others; while others have judged that there are many souls, and different in species; and others, that there are both one and many.

It is necessary, therefore, to prolong the discussion to refute so many opinions. ^C But in common against all those who say that the soul is a body, those arguments which were disputed by Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus, and by Numenius the Pythagorean, will suffice. And these are as follows: Bodies, which by their own nature are changeable,

and are infinitely divisible ^A in every way, with nothing left in them that is immutable, require something to contain and connect them, and as it were to constringe and hold them together, which we call the soul. If, therefore, the soul is a body of any kind whatsoever, even the most tenuous, what, in turn, is it that contains it? For it has been shown that every body requires something by which it is contained, and so on into infinity, until we reach something that is without a body. If, however, they were to say, as the Stoics do, that there is a certain tonic motion in bodies, which is carried simultaneously both inward and outward, and that the part which is carried outward produces magnitudes and qualities, while the part which is carried inward produces union and substance; it must be asked of them, since every motion proceeds from some power, what this power is and in what it is substantiated? If, then, this power itself were also some kind of matter, we shall again use the same arguments; but if it is not matter, but "material"—(and "material" is different from "matter," for that which partakes of matter is called material)—then what, pray, is that which partakes of matter: is it itself also matter, or is it immaterial? If it is matter, how is it material and not matter? If it is not matter, then it is immaterial; and if it is immaterial, it is not a body. For every body ^B is material. If, however, they were to say that bodies are extended in three dimensions, and that the soul, in passing through the whole body, is also extended in three dimensions, and for that reason is necessarily also a body, we shall reply that while every body is extended in three dimensions, not everything that is extended in three dimensions is a body. For even quantity and quality, being incorporeal in themselves, are measured by quantity in a bulk by participation. Thus, therefore, even in the soul, that which is without dimension is present in itself, but it is considered as having three dimensions by participation in that in which it is, because that in which it exists is three-dimensionally extended, and so the binding power ^C of bodies is incorporeal. But in animate beings, there is a binding power of the body, which is the soul. The soul, therefore, is incorporeal.

^A For place and quality, since they are devoid of body in themselves, acquire magnitude from an accident of size. Thus the soul in itself is present in such a way that it lacks all space; but accidentally, as it is in that which has a triple dimension, it itself also is understood to have a triple dimension. Furthermore, every body is either moved by an external force or is stirred by an internal motion of its own. If it is external, it is inanimate; if internal, it is animate. If, therefore, the soul were a body, and it were moved by something else, it would be inanimate; but if it were moved by itself, it would be animate. But both positions are absurd: to call the soul animate, or to call it inanimate. Therefore, the soul is not a body. Furthermore, if the soul is nourished, it is nourished by that which lacks body—for the soul’s food is learning; but no body is nourished by that which lacks body; therefore, the soul is not a body. Xenocrates concluded it thus: If the soul is not nourished, and every animal body is nourished, then the soul is not a body.

And these arguments are made generally against all those who say that the soul is a body. ^B But specifically against those who imagine that the soul is blood or breath, because when the blood or the breath is removed the animal dies, one must not state what some who fancy they are bringing forward some point have written, saying: "Therefore, when a part of the blood flows away, a part of the soul flows away." For such a statement is shallow and trifling. For in those things which are homogeneous, the remaining part is identical with the whole; for instance, both a large amount and a small amount of water is water; likewise with silver and gold and all things whose parts do not differ from one another in essence. ^C Thus, then, the remaining blood, however much there may be, is soul, if the blood is indeed the soul. That, therefore, is rather to be said: if this is the soul, upon the removal of which the animal dies, then surely phlegm and both types of bile are also soul. For whichever of these happens to fail, it brings an end to life. Furthermore, both the liver and the brain ^D

^A and the heart and the stomach and the kidneys and the intestines and many other things. For upon the removal [(61)] of which of these will the animal not die [(62)]? Moreover, many things are bloodless, yet endowed with soul, such as the cartilaginous creatures and the soft-bodied ones [(63)], for example, cuttlefish and squid [(64)] and *osmyli* [(65)] and all the testaceous and soft-shelled creatures [(66)], such as the spiny lobsters and crabs [(67)] and lobsters. If, therefore, these are endowed with soul [(68)] but bloodless, it is clear that [(69)] blood is not the soul. And against those who say that water is the soul, because water is seen to bring life [(70)] to all things, and it is impossible to live without water, there are many objections. For it is not possible to live without food; therefore, according to them, the soul would also have to be said to be every kind of food. Furthermore, there are many [(73)] animals that do not drink, as is recorded of a certain species of eagle. And even the partridge is able [(74)] to live without drinking [(75)]. But why is water soul more than air [(76)]? For it is possible to abstain from water for a long time, but from inhaling the air not even for the briefest moment; yet air is not [(77)] soul either. For there are many things that live, yet do not breathe [(78)] air, such as all insects, for example bees [(79)] and wasps and ants, and the bloodless ones, and those of the sea [(80)]. ^{B C D}

and everything that does not have lungs. For nothing that does not have lungs breathes air; and the statement reciprocates: nothing that does not breathe air has lungs. ^A

Since, however, certain arguments are also circulated by Cleanthes the Stoic and by Chrysippus, which are not to be despised, their solutions must also be set forth, as they have been explained by the Platonists. Cleanthes weaves a syllogism of this kind: Not only, he says, do we become similar to our parents in body, but also in soul, in passions, in habits, and in dispositions. Now, similarity and dissimilarity are observed in body, not in the incorporeal; therefore, the soul is a body. But first of all, the universal genus is not established from the particular. ^B Furthermore, the claim that [similarity and dissimilarity] are not in the incorporeal is false. For we say that numbers are similar whose sides have a proportion to one another, such as six and twenty-four. For the sides of six are two and three; and of twenty-four, four and six. And two has the same ratio to four as three has to six. For they are considered to be in a double ratio. For four is double two, and six is double three—yet numbers are incorporeal. Likewise, figures are similar to figures, as many as have equal angles and sides proportional about the equal angles; and they themselves admit that a figure is incorporeal. Further, just as it is proper to quantity to be equal and unequal, so it is of quality to be similar and dissimilar; but quality is an incorporeal thing; therefore, the incorporeal is also similar to the incorporeal. Cleanthes adds: No incorporeal thing sympathizes with a body, but body [sympathizes] with body; ^C

and the soul sympathizes with the body when it is ill or undergoing surgery, and the body [sympathizes] with the soul; for instance, when it feels shame, it turns red, and when it feels fear, it turns pale; therefore, the soul is a body. ^B But the other of the 3 premises is false, being posited according to the assumption, the one that says: No incorporeal thing sympathizes with a body. For why should this pertain only to the soul? Just as if someone were to say 6: No animal moves its upper jaw; but the crocodile 7 moves its upper jaw; therefore, the crocodile is not an animal. For the 9 proposition is false here also, in the assumption, the one that says 10: No animal moves its upper jaw. For observe: the crocodile is both an animal and moves its upper jaw. In the same way, whenever he says that no incorporeal thing sympathizes with a body, he adds to his assumption what is being sought in the negation 11. But if one were to suppose 12 it to be true that no incorporeal thing sympathizes with a body, yet the thing being inferred 13 is not agreed upon.

^A Since it is being sought whether the soul sympathizes with the body when it is sick or being cut. For it is questioned whether the body alone is what suffers, having received 15 the sensation from the soul, while it [the soul] remains unaffected, or whether it also sympathizes with the body. The former opinion prevails more among the more renowned philosophers; but one must not 16 construct syllogisms from things that are questioned, but from those that are agreed upon. Moreover, it is demonstrated 17 in addition, that certain incorporeal things also sympathize 18 with bodies. For instance, qualities 19, being incorporeal, also sympathize themselves when bodies suffer 20, inasmuch as they change along with the body in both its decay and its generation 21. Chrysippus says 22 that death 23 is the separation of the soul from the body; but no incorporeal thing is separated 24 from a body; for neither does an incorporeal thing touch a body. But the soul both touches and is separated from the body; therefore, the soul is a body 25. Of these assertions, the one—that death is the separation of the soul from the body—is true; but the other—that an incorporeal thing does not touch a body—is false if spoken universally, but true in the case of the soul. It is false universally, since a line, being incorporeal, touches a body and is separated from it; similarly also whiteness 27. But in the case of the soul it is true; for the soul does not touch 28 the body. For if it touches it, it is clearly adjacent to it 29; and if this be so, it is not adjacent to it in its entirety; for it is impossible for a body to be adjacent to a body in its entirety to its entirety; and thus the living creature will not be entirely ensouled. So that, if indeed it touches, the soul will be a body, and the living creature will not be entirely ensouled; but if the whole is ensouled, the soul neither touches ^B nor is it a body; but the living creature 30 is entirely ensouled; therefore it neither touches, nor is it a body, and it is separated ^C from the body. ^D

That the soul ^A is not a body is clear from what has been said; but that it is not without substance, must be treated next. Since Dicaearchus also defined the soul as a harmony, and Simmias, contradicting Socrates, asserted that the soul is a harmony—saying that it resembles the soul as a harmony and the body as a lyre—the refutations of this, which are laid out in the Phaedo of Plato, must be set forth. One of these is from those things previously demonstrated to him. For it has been demonstrated beforehand that learnings are recollections. Having taken this, therefore, as being admitted, he constructs the argument thus: If learnings are recollections, our soul existed before it came to be in the human form; but if it is a harmony, it did not exist before, but existed afterwards, once the body had been harmonized. For every composition has no other way of being than how the things ^B from which it is constituted have of being. For the composition, being a harmony, is a certain communion of the things that are composed, and it is not the case that it precedes the things from which it consists, but it happens to follow them. Therefore, they are in conflict with one another: that the soul is a harmony, and that learnings are recollections. But the former fact about recollections is true; therefore, it is false that the soul is a harmony. Furthermore, the soul both opposes the body and ^C acts as a ruler over it, whereas the harmony neither rules, nor does it act in opposition to its components.

^A It is not, therefore, the soul that is a harmony. Furthermore, one harmony is more or less a harmony than another, by reason of its being slackened or tightened, not by reason of the definition of harmony itself; for it is impossible that the definition 51 should itself be "more" or "less," but rather that the state of adjustment 52 admits of it. For if a high note and a low note, having been blended 55, are then slackened, they maintain the same ratio in the magnitude of the notes, but the harmony undergoes variation according to the state of adjustment, being tightened more or less 34. But one soul is not "more" or "less" a soul than another; it is not, therefore, the soul that is a harmony. ^B Furthermore, the soul admits of virtue and vice, whereas harmony does not admit of harmony and disharmony. It is not, therefore, the soul that is a harmony. Furthermore, the soul, in that it admits 55 of contraries by turns, is a substance and a subject 56, whereas harmony is a quality 57 and is in a subject; but substance is different from quality 58, and therefore the soul is something different from harmony. However, that the soul shares in harmony is nothing absurd, but it does not follow from this that it is a harmony; for even because it shares in virtue, the soul itself is not virtue. Galen, for his part, pronounces nothing definitive, but in his 37 *Demonstrative* 60 treatises he protests that he has asserted nothing concerning the soul; ^C yet what he does say makes it clear that he prefers the view that the soul is a temperament 61.

[alt-version omitted]

^A for it follows that the difference in characters is a consequence of this, as he attempts to demonstrate from the sayings of Hippocrates. But if this is so, he certainly opines that it is mortal as well; not indeed the whole soul, but only the irrational soul of man. Regarding the rational soul, he is in doubt, saying this: ^B That the temperament of the body cannot be the soul is clear from this: Every body, whether animate or inanimate, is compounded from the four elements. For the temperament of these makes bodies. If, therefore, the temperament of the body is the soul, nothing will be inanimate. And the argument is concluded thus: If the temperament of the body is the soul, and every body has a temperament, then every body has a soul; but if every body has a soul, then no body is inanimate; therefore, neither stone, nor wood, nor iron, nor anything else will be inanimate. But if he does not say that every temperament of a body is generally the soul, but rather some specific one, it must be asked: what temperament is that which makes an animal and holds the place of a soul? For whatever temperament he might name, we shall find the same thing in inanimate objects. For since there are nine temperaments, as he himself shows in his books *On Temperament*, eight indeed being unfavorable, and one being favorable—by the favorable one he says that man is tempered, yet not every man, but only him who is of a moderate temperament; and by the other unfavorable temperaments, the other animals according to their kind, with the varying degrees of intensity and remission. ^C But these nine temperaments are found even in inanimate objects, with the same degree of intensity and remission, as he himself again demonstrated in his *Simples*. Furthermore, if the soul is a temperament, and temperaments are changed by ages, by seasons, and by diets, then the soul is changed; but if it is changed, we do not possess the same soul—

but rather, according to the temperament, sometimes that of a lion, sometimes of a sheep ^A, and sometimes of some other animal; which is absurd. Furthermore, temperament does not oppose the desires of the body, but even assists them; for it is the temperament itself that moves and incites, while the soul opposes them: the temperament, therefore, is not the soul.

Furthermore, if the temperament is the soul, and if the temperament is a quality, and a quality both comes to be and passes away without the destruction of the underlying subject, then the soul would also be separated without the destruction of the underlying subject; but this is not true; therefore the soul is not a temperament, nor is it a quality. For they will surely not say that one of the contraries naturally belongs to an animal ^B, as heat does to fire. For that is immutable. But the temperament is seen to be changeable, or rather, it is these [men] themselves who, through the art of medicine, change temperaments.

Furthermore, the qualities of every body are perceptible, but the soul is not perceptible, but intelligible; therefore, the soul is not a quality of the body. Furthermore, the good temperament of the blood and breath, along with the disposition of the flesh, nerves, and other parts, is strength; and the good temperament of heat and cold, and dryness and moisture, is health ^C; while the symmetry of the limbs, along with a good complexion, produces the beauty of the body. If, therefore, the harmony of health, strength, and beauty is the soul, then it would be necessary that a man, as long as he is alive, would neither be sick, nor weak, nor deformed. But it often happens that not only one, but all three of these good temperaments ^D perish at the same time, and yet the man still lives; for it happens that the same man is simultaneously deformed, weak, and sick: therefore the good temperament of the body is not the soul. But,

you will ask, how then do certain natural virtues and natural vices pursue man? That indeed comes to pass from the temperament of the body. For just as some are naturally healthy and some are sickly by reason of their temperament, so some are naturally bilious and prone to irascibility; others are prone to fear; others to lust. But some restrain and overcome these things. There is no doubt, however, that they are restraining the temperament; and that which restrains is one thing, and that which is restrained is another. Therefore the temperament is one thing, and the soul is another. For since the body is an instrument of the soul, if it has been fittingly fashioned, it assists the soul and conducts itself ^A conveniently; but if not fittingly, it hinders the soul, and then the soul has sufficient trouble while it struggles with the ineptitude of its instrument; and if the soul is not very sober, it even becomes perverted along with it, just as the perversion of a lyre leads a musician into error, unless he first sets it aright. Wherefore, care must be applied by the soul, so that it may render the body a fitting instrument for itself, which it attains through reason and habits; as in harmony, so here, by loosening some things and tightening others, it may make the body suited to itself, and use it as a convenient instrument, ^B unless the soul itself becomes perverted along with it; for this also sometimes happens.

Aristoteles, who calls the soul an entelechy, nonetheless holds the same opinion as those who wish it to be a quality. But let us first explain what he calls an entelechy. He says that substance is understood in a threefold way: one, which exists as matter subject to change, which in itself is nothing, yet possesses the power for the birth of things; another, the form and species, through which matter ^C is determined; the third,

^A that which is produced from both, which finally is ensouled. Therefore, matter is power, and form is entelechy. And this also is understood in two ways: one, as knowledge; the other, as the contemplation of knowledge—that is, the one as a habit, and the other as an activity. ^B Since, therefore, the soul is, as it were, knowledge—because that it is soul involves both sleep and wakefulness—wakefulness corresponds by analogy to contemplation and activity, while sleep corresponds to possessing but not exercising [that activity]. Knowledge, moreover, is prior to the activity. Hence, he calls the form "first entelechy," and the activity "second." For instance, an eye is composed of a subject and a form; that which is the subject is the eye itself, while that which receives the faculty of sight—that is, the form—is the matter of the eye. ^C This is also called by the common name of "eye." But the form and first entelechy of the eye is the sight itself, which grants to the eye the faculty of seeing; the second entelechy of the eye is the exercise of its function, by which it sees. As, therefore, a whelp just born possesses neither entelechy, but has the power to receive the entelechy, so it must be understood concerning the soul. ^D For as in that case the faculty of seeing, once born, perfects the eye, so here, once the soul is born within the body, it perfects the animal, so that neither is the soul ever without the body,

nor the body without the soul. ^A For the soul is not a body, but it belongs to a body, and for this reason it exists in a body and in such a body; but of itself it does not exist. ^B Yet, in the first place, he calls the passible part of the soul "soul," separating the rational part from it. But one ought to have taken the soul of man as a whole, and not from a part, and that the weakest part, to make a pronouncement about the whole. Next, he says that the body has the potential to live, even before the soul is generated. For he says that the body has life in itself potentially. But the body, which potentially has life in itself, must first be a body in actuality; but it cannot be a body in actuality before receiving ^C the form; for it is matter devoid of quality, and not a body; therefore, it is impossible for that which is not a body in actuality to have the potential to produce something from itself. But if it is also a body potentially, how can that which is a body potentially have life in itself potentially? Furthermore, in other cases it is possible that one who possesses something does not use it—for instance, one who possesses sight but does not use it—but in the case of the soul ^D it is impossible. For even when one is asleep, it is not without the operation of the soul. For it is both nourished and grows, and uses imagination, and breathes, which is a primary proof of life. Therefore, it is manifest from these things that life cannot belong to anyone potentially, but must do so absolutely in actuality. For that which primarily forms the soul is nothing else but life; for life is cognate to the soul; but to the body it belongs in no other way than that which

is its participant. Wherefore, ^A he who says that health corresponds to life does not mean the life of the soul, but that of the body; and thus his reasoning is fallacious. For into corporeal substance the contraries fall in turn; but into that which is the species, they do not fall at all. For if the difference which constitutes the species should change, the animal itself would also change. Therefore, it is not the substance which is the species that is receptive of contraries, but that which is the subject, that is, the corporeal. The soul, therefore, cannot in any way be the entelechy of the body; but it is a self-complete, incorporeal substance. For it receives contraries in turn, vice and virtue, ^B which the species could not receive. Next, he says that the soul, being an entelechy, is immobile in itself, but is moved by accident. And it is not absurd, he says, that it should impart motion to us, while being itself devoid of all motion. For beauty moves us, although it is itself stirred by no motion. But even if this be so, beauty does not move a thing that is immobile, but rather that which is by nature such as to be moved. If, then, the body also had motion by itself, it would not be absurd for it to be moved by that which is immobile; but as it is, it is impossible for the immobile to be moved by the immobile. ^C Whence, then, does motion proceed to the body, if not from the soul? For the body is not self-moving. Desiring, therefore, to demonstrate the primary generation of motion, he did not demonstrate the primary, but the secondary. For if that which is not moving were to move [something else], he would be creating a primary motion; but since he moves that which is moved by itself and in another way, he explains the generation of a secondary motion. Whence, then, is the primary generation of motion to the body? For to say that the elements are moved by themselves, because some are by nature light and others heavy, is false. For if lightness and gravity were motion, light and heavy things would never

^A Will light and heavy things ever stand still ^B once they have reached their proper place? Gravity and levity, then, are not the causes of primary motion, but are qualities of the elements. But even if this were granted, how could ratiocination, opinion, judgment, and critical analysis be works of levity and gravity? If they are not works of these, they are not of the elements; and if not of the elements, then certainly not of bodies. Furthermore, if the soul is moved by accident, then the body is moved per se, which would mean that even if the soul were absent, the body would move per se. If this were so, an animal could exist without a soul: but these things are absurd; therefore, the initial premise is also absurd. Truly, it is not even true to say that whatever is moved by nature is also moved by force, and whatever is moved by force is also moved by nature. For the world, being moved by nature, is not moved by force. Nor, if something is moved by nature, does it also naturally subsist; for the world, the sun, and the moon, while they move according to nature, cannot cease according to nature. In the same way, the soul, since it is always moved according to nature, cannot subsist according to nature. For a state of rest is the destruction of the soul, as it is of any thing that is always in motion. Added to this is the fact that the problem sought from the beginning remains unresolved: whence is the body held together, since by its nature it is accustomed to disperse? ^C Sufficient, then, are these [remarks] from the many [arguments].

^A

Pythagoras ^B truly, by a certain symbolic manner, since he was accustomed to compare God and all things to numbers, also defined the soul as a number moving itself; whom Xenocrates followed—not that the soul is a number, but because it is found in things which are numbered and multiplied, and because it is the soul that distinguishes things, by imposing forms and types upon each. For it is the soul that separates species from species and shows them to be diverse, both by the otherness of the forms and by the multitude of the number, and for this reason makes things capable of being numbered; whence it is not entirely removed from the partnership and conjunction of numbers. And even he himself ^B bore witness for it, that it is self-moving. ^C But that it is not a number is clear henceforth: for number is a quantity, but the soul is not a quantity, but a substance; therefore the soul is not a number, even if they desire that the number also, among things perceived by the intellect, is a substance, as we shall say in what follows. Further, the soul is continuous; but number is not continuous: therefore the soul is not a number. Further, a number is either even or odd; but the soul is neither even nor odd: therefore the soul is not a number. Further, a number increases by addition; but the soul does not increase by addition. Further, the soul is self-moving; but a definite number is immobile. Further, while a number remaining one and the same in its nature is not able to change even one quality which exists in numbers, ^D the soul, one and the same remaining,

^A changes its qualities, passing over from ignorance into knowledge, and from vice into virtue; therefore, the soul is not a number.

Such, then, are the dogmas of the ancients concerning the soul. Eunomius, ^B however, defined the soul as an incorporeal substance created in a body, agreeing at the same time with Plato and Aristotle. For he took "incorporeal substance" from Plato, but "created in a body" from the teaching of Aristotle; not perceiving, though he was sharp, that he was attempting to bring together things that cannot be joined. For everything which has a generation, being at once corporeal and temporal, is corruptible and mortal. The words of Moses also agree with these things. For in describing the generation of all ^B sensible things, he did not explicitly say that the nature of intelligible things also came into existence in the same way; but some, guessing, hold this opinion, with whom not all agree. But if anyone, ^C from the fact that the soul was inserted after the body was fashioned, should think that it was generated after the body, he errs from the truth. For neither does Moses say that it was created at the time it was cast into the body, nor does reason support such a view. Therefore, let him either call it mortal, as Aristotle and the Stoics did, saying that it is generated in the body; or, if he calls it an incorporeal substance, let him refrain from saying it is created in a body, so that he may not produce the concept of a mortal and totally irrational soul. ^D

^A

Furthermore, according to him, the world is not yet full, but is still incomplete even now, and always in need of addition. For at least fifty thousand ^B intelligible substances are added to it every day. And what is most serious: when it is brought to completion, then it will be dissolved—according to him—when the last of men, those who will be at the time of the resurrection, fulfill the number of souls. What could be more irrational than to say that the world will be destroyed when it has been filled? For this way of acting is altogether like that of little children in the sand, who, as soon as they have finished their work, immediately disarrange what they have built. For to assert that souls are now produced by the reason of providence, and not by creation (for they do not say that a new substance, or one other than that which exists, is introduced, but that the existing one is multiplied by providence), is the mark of those who are ignorant of the difference between creation and providence. For the work of providence is to preserve the substance of perishable animals through mutual generation (I mean of those that are not produced by putrefaction, since the succession of these ^C is preserved again by another form of putrefaction); but the most excellent work of creation is to make things out of nothing.

If, therefore, souls come into being through mutual generation, they come into being by the reason of providence, and they are perishable, ^D just as other things that are produced by the propagation of a genus. But if they are brought forth from things that do not exist, this is creation; and what Moses says is not true: *God ceased from all His works* [Gen. II, 3]; but of these

^A things I shall speak later, as it is appropriate.

Let us consider the nature of each age and advance in instruction, not training the infant with the same discipline as the adolescent, nor the adolescent as the youth, nor him as the man of already robust and manly age. Indeed, one chastises the still tender, almost nursing child with a finger; the somewhat older boy with a cuff; the adolescent with a strap; the youth with rods; but when a man begins to be among men, if he has committed some more serious transgression, he is punished by the sword according to the law. Thus, the Lord has commanded things appropriate to each generation of men. For the ancients He corrected with fear, as if conversing with little children who were ignorant of the power of the Holy Spirit; but the perfect He deemed worthy of perfect mysteries. Even in the Gospel He says something like this to the disciples in many places: *You do not know what I am doing; but you will know later,* ^B that is, when you have become perfect. And again: *They did not know until He rose from the dead.* And Paul says: *For you were not yet able, nor indeed are you even now able,* showing that as times progress, more perfect commandments are given—commandments that, although they are always the same, nonetheless take on a different manner, and are regulated in one way for the young and in another for those who are more mature. For though the law established the formula, *An eye for an eye* [Exod. XXI, 24], it did not say to them, "Gouge out an eye for an eye," but, *If someone gouges out an eye, the eye of the one who gouged it out shall be gouged out.* And each person, sparing his own body, would offer his cheek to be struck, and he himself would not strike back.

And from that time, the things that are now clearly spoken in the Gospel were being observed, at that time indeed by necessity, as children being corrected, but now by choice, inasmuch as those who are perfect are persuaded. But if you profess that this is a contradiction—the saying, *An eye for an eye,* and that the murderer should be killed—lo, we see ^C the Savior also speaking about the day of judgment, saying that *the Lord of that servant will come*—and He understands Himself, who is Lord of all—*and will cut him into two parts and will put his portion with the unbelievers* [Matt. XXIV, 50, 51]. Therefore, you also arm yourself to slander the Savior Himself with your words again, and you would claim that He is not good, even though He was begotten of a good Father and is Himself good and just, and not different from the Father. You can therefore even alienate Him from the Father’s essence, O you who have suddenly appeared to us as a distributor and surveyor of laws, dividing all things into three. And by saying that certain things were written in the law symbolically as types, you have touched upon a little of the truth, so that by sprinkling these few things, you might pave a way for yourself to deceive and defraud in other matters. For it must not be denied that these things happened to them ^D as a figure; but they were written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the ages have come, as the most holy Apostle says [1 Cor. X, 11], speaking of circumcision, and the Sabbath, and other things. Would that you were truthful about everything, and no longer brought in a third middle god who does not exist

^A Let us now examine the opinion of the Manichaeans, which they hold concerning the soul. For they say that it is immortal and bodiless, but that there is only one soul of all things, cut into pieces and divided into individual bodies, both inanimate and animate. And they say that some things possess more of it, and others less—more, the animate; less, the inanimate; and by far the most, the heavenly bodies—so that the souls of the individual are parts of the universal soul. And if they meant that this was divided indivisibly, as a voice is among those who hear it, the evil would be moderate. But now they say that the very substance of the soul is divided; and, what is most grievous of all, they wish for it to exist properly within the elements, and to be divided with these at the birth of bodies, and again to come together at the dissolution of ^B the same bodies, just as water is divided and again collected and mixed. And they say that pure souls go into the light, being light themselves, but those that have been contaminated by matter go into the elements, and again from the elements into plants and animals. And in this manner, while cutting into its substance, making it corporeal and subject to passions, they say it is immortal. They fall, however, into contradictions. For by saying that the contaminated souls retreat ^C to the elements and are mixed together with one another, they say that they are then punished in their transmigrations, according to the magnitude of their sins, uniting them and again separating them by substance. For just as shadows, while the light is present, are separated, but when clouded and [night] has come, are joined—a thing that is impossible for

^A intellectual nature to be. ^B For shadows ^C are of the sensible realm, even if one were to concede that they can be separated and joined again.

Plato affirms that souls are both one and many.

^A that they merely exist and do not dissolve. They hold this to be the soul that governs the universe and the individual souls, which nevertheless have already been made by God, ^B in sending forth—meaning the Creator himself—and having given it laws, according to which it ought to govern this whole, which he also calls "fate," and granting a power sufficient to govern us. These matters have also been spoken of in the *Treatises on Fate*.

Commonly, therefore, all Greeks who have declared the soul immortal, have held the doctrine of transmigration. But they differ regarding the species of souls. For some say that the rational species is one, and that it passes into plants, and into the bodies of irrational animals; some say this occurs at certain fixed periods of time, others as it chances. Others say that there is not one species of soul, but two: the rational and the irrational. Some say there are many, as many as the species of animals. Particularly, those who follow Plato have differed ^B on this doctrine. For since Plato stated that irascible, angry, and rapacious souls are clothed with the bodies of wolves and lions, while those occupied with intemperance take on the bodies of donkeys and suchlike, some have understood the "wolves," "lions," and "donkeys" literally; others have discerned that he spoke figuratively, intimating their characters by means of the animals. For Cronius, in his book *On Rebirth* (for so he calls transmigration), intends for all souls to be rational; likewise also—

^A Theodorus the Platonist, in the book which is entitled *That the soul is all species*, and Porphyry 17 likewise. Iamblichus, however, taking the opposite course to these, says that there is a species of soul that corresponds to the species of animals 18, or rather, different species 19. He has even written a single-volume work 20 entitled, *That transmigrations do not occur from humans to irrational animals* 21, *nor from irrational animals* 22 *to humans, but from animals to animals, and from humans to humans*. And to me it seems that he, for this reason, has conjectured [the truth] well, not only regarding Plato’s opinion, but also the truth itself, as it is possible to demonstrate from many other things 23, but especially from these. For there is no movement 24 of the rational [faculties] 26 apparent in irrational animals 27. For there are neither arts, nor ^B teachings, nor deliberations, nor virtues, nor anything else pertaining to the rational [faculty] 28 in them.

From which it is clear that they do not partake of a soul that uses reason. For it is absurd to call those things that lack reason "endowed with reason." For even if in children who have just been born 29 there is present only a movement void of reason, yet we say that they possess a rational soul, because as they grow 31 they manifest the rational operation; but the irrational animal, manifesting the rational 52 at no age, would possess a rational soul to no purpose 35, as the power would be uselessly and entirely...

injected into the beasts and wild animals, since it could never demonstrate its own function. And this would be a charge against the Giver of having given a soul unsuited to the body; for this is not the work of a craftsman, nor one who knows order or harmony.

But if someone were to say that animals move rationally according to disposition, but that their formation is incapable of technical action 38 (attempting to confirm the argument from humans—for if only the fingers were removed from the hands 39, most arts would be destroyed), he does not dissolve the problem. For there still remains the same absurdity: that God should have fitted a soul into the body that was not suitable 40, but superfluous, useless, and inoperative 41, impeded throughout the whole of their life from its own proper activities, in addition to the fact that it makes their reasoning depend upon things that are obscure 42 and not agreed upon. For whence do we know that animals move rationally according to disposition?

It is better, then, to believe that a soul suited to each body was implanted, and that the animals have nothing more in terms of disposition than the natural simplicity that appears in their works 46. ^B For each species of the irrational animals moves according to an innate impulse, for the need and activity for which it was created from the beginning; and for these purposes it had its formation well-suited 48. Yet the Creator has by no means left them altogether without aid; rather, He has instilled into each a natural—not a rational—prudence; and to some He has even added a degree of cunning 50, like an image of art and a rational shadow, because of these things 51, ^C

^A that they might avoid present dangers and be on guard against future ones, and also so that He might unite and join together all created things, as has been explained by us above.

But that these are not led to act by reason, one may judge from the fact that all animals subject to the same species act in the same way, and their operations do not differ among such a multitude, except that one does more and another less, but the whole species is moved by one impulse of nature. For every hare uses cunning in the same way, and every wolf is cunning in the same way, and every ape mimics in the same way; which is not the case with man ^B. For there are countless ways of human actions. For that which has reason is free and its own master; hence, there is not one and the same work for all men, as there is for each species of irrational animal. For these are moved only by nature, and those things which are by nature are the same in all. But rational actions are different in one person from another, and they are not necessarily the same in all.

If they should say that souls are thrust into such bodies for the purpose of paying the penalty for sins which they committed when they were in human bodies, they are using that which is posterior to demonstrate the thing being sought. For why were rational souls cast into the bodies of animals, which were created first? ^C For surely not as though they had sinned in human bodies before they even existed in a human body.

The admirable physician Galen also seems to subscribe to our opinion, and to judge that there is a different species of soul in each species of animal. For he writes immediately at the beginning of the first book of his treatise *On the Use of Parts* as follows: "And if this is so, there will be many parts of animals, some larger, others smaller, and some altogether indivisible into a different species; but there is a need for all..." ^D

^A of them for the soul." For the body is its instrument, and for this reason the parts of animals differ greatly from one another, because their souls do also. And again, proceeding in the same book, he adds this concerning the ape: "But, O most wise accuser, nature might say to you, 'It was fitting for a ridiculous animal that a ridiculous bodily structure should be given.'" Thus he knows that there are different souls in bodies that differ in species. And these are the things said concerning these matters. ^B

If, however, we have demonstrated that the soul is neither body, nor harmony, nor temperament, nor any other quality, it is clear from these things that the soul is a certain incorporeal substance. For that it exists is agreed upon by all; but if it is neither body nor accident, it is clear that it is an incorporeal substance and none of those things that have their being in another. For these things come to be and pass away without the destruction of the subject; but when the soul is separated, the body is completely destroyed. And by using the same arguments it is possible to demonstrate that the soul is immortal. For if it is not a body (which was proven ^C to be by nature dissoluble and perishable), nor a quality, nor a quantity, nor any other of the things that perish, it is clear that it is immortal. Now there are many proofs of its immortality among Plato and others; but those are intricate and difficult to understand, and are with difficulty known to those who have been deeply occupied in those sciences. To us, however, for the demonstration of the immortality of the soul, the teaching of the divine Scriptures is sufficient, which has its credibility from itself, because it is given by divine instinct and inspiration; but against those who do not accept the writings of the Christians, it is sufficient to have ^D demonstrated that the soul is not among those things that perish. For if it is none of those things that perish, but is incorruptible, it is also immortal. And so, since this has been sufficiently established, it must be omitted.

CHAPTER III.

Concerning the conjunction of body and soul.

^A It must be inquired how the union of the soul and the soulless body takes place. For the matter is a difficult one. But if man consists not only of these, but also of the mind [(88)], as some have assumed, it is still more difficult [(89)]. And if man is something else besides these, as some have said, there is no solution to these questions. For all things that come together toward the constitution of a single nature are surely united [(90)]; but all things that are united are changed, and do not remain what they previously were [(91)], as will be shown [(92)] in the case of the elements; for once united, they have become something else. How, then, does either the body [(93)], when united with the soul, still remain a body [(94)], or, on the other hand, does the soul, being incorporeal and an ^B essence in itself [(95)], [how] is it united [(96)] to the body and become a part of the living being, while preserving its own essence unconfused and incorrupt? For it is necessary either that the soul and body, having been united, should both be transformed and corrupted together [(97)], as are the elements; or that they should not be united [(98)] at all, because of the aforementioned absurdities [(99)], but should be placed side by side, like dancers in a chorus [(1)], or stone by stone [(2)]; or that they should be blended, like wine and water. But that the soul cannot be merely placed side by side with the body [(3)] has been demonstrated in the On the Soul [(4)]. For there would be only that part of the body which is ensouled.

but that which is not joined would be inanimate. Furthermore, it is impossible to speak of things that are merely placed side by side, such as pieces of wood, to give an example, or iron, or anything similar, as being one. The mixture of wine and water destroys both. ^A For neither is the mixture pure water, nor is it wine; although such a mixture takes place by way of juxtaposition, it escapes the senses due to the fineness of the parts that are blended. This is evident from the fact that they can again be separated from one another; for a sponge soaked in oil draws in pure water, as does papyrus. But to separate what is strictly and truly united by means of the senses is utterly impossible. If it is neither united, nor placed side by side, nor mixed, what is the argument for the living being to be called one?

Plato, moved by this difficulty, ^B does not wish for the living being to consist of soul and body; rather, he wishes it to be the soul itself, which uses the body and is, as it were, clothed in the body. But this theory is also not free from some difficulty. For how can the soul be one with its garment? For the tunic is not one with the person wearing it. Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus, resolved the question we are seeking in this way. He said that the intelligible natures are of such a kind that, even when they are joined to those things that are able to receive them—as things that are, in a manner of speaking, co-received—they remain unconfused and incorrupt, as though placed side by side. ^C For in the case of bodies, the union necessarily effects an alteration of the things that come together, since it changes them into other things—just as the elements change into compounds, and food into blood, and blood

^A into flesh and the remaining parts of the body. But in the case of those things which we perceive by the intellect, a junction indeed occurs, yet no change follows. For that which is comprehended by reason is by nature prepared to reject every change of essence; but it either departs, or perishes into non-being, yet it admits of no transformation. But it does not even perish into non-being; for it would not have been immortal. And the soul, being life, if it were changed in the mixture, would be changed and would no longer be life. But what would it contribute to the body, if it did not provide it with life? Therefore, the soul is not changed in the junction. ^B This having been shown, that those essences which fall under reason and intellect cannot be changed, it necessarily follows that while they are joined, they do not perish together with those things to which they are joined. Wherefore, the soul is both joined, and joined without confusion, to the body: for the fact that it is joined, the consensus and conspiring of nature declares. For the whole animal consents and agrees with itself, inasmuch as it is one. But that the soul is not confused with the body is clear from the fact that it departs, in a certain manner, from the body ^C in sleep, and leaves it lying as if it were a corpse, while evaporating to it only the life, so that it may not altogether perish, by itself ^D and according to its own nature.

The evidence for the soul's survival in sleep

^A the same thing also when it examines something of the intelligible realm by itself. For then too, as far as possible, it separates itself from the body and becomes by itself, so that in this way it may direct its attention to things that truly exist. For being incorporeal, it has penetrated through the whole, like things that are compounded together, remaining incorruptible, like things that are unmingled, and saving its own unity by itself, and in whatever it may come to be, it transforms those things according to its own life, and is not transformed by them. ^B For just as the sun by its presence transforms the air into light, making it luminous, and the light is united to the air, unconfusedly and at the same time diffused; in the same way the soul, being united to the body, remains entirely unconfused; only in this does it differ, that the sun, being a body and circumscribed by place, is not everywhere that its light is, just as fire is not; for it remains also itself ^C bound in the wood or in the wick, as in a place; but the soul, being incorporeal and not circumscribed by place, is wholly through the whole

the whole is not present. For it is not held by the body, but ^A it itself holds the body; nor is it in the body as in a vessel or a skin, but on the contrary, the body is in it. For things which are perceived by the intellect are not hindered by bodies, but, passing and traversing through the whole body, they can be comprehended in a corporeal place. For since they are comprehended by the intellect, those things which are perceived by the mind are also in places. For they are either in themselves, or in superior minds, just as the mind is sometimes in itself while it reasons, and sometimes in the intellect while it understands. When, therefore, it is said to be in the body, it is not said to be in the body as in a place, but as in a certain inclination, and because it is present, just as we say God is in us. For indeed, by inclination and propensity toward something and by affection, we say the soul is bound by the body: just as we say one who loves is bound by the beloved, not by body or place, but by the inclination of the mind. For since it lacks magnitude, bulk, and parts, it cannot be bounded or circumscribed by any part of a place. For what part of a place can circumscribe that which has no part? For place exists together with bulk. For place is the limit of the container, by which that which is contained is encompassed. But if someone should say: "Therefore my soul is in Alexandria, and in Rome, and finally everywhere," he does not see that he is again speaking of a place. For that which is said in this way—in Alexandria, or simply here—is a place. But it is not in a place at all, but in an inclination. For it has been shown that it cannot be comprehended by a place. ^B

OF THE SOUL'S CONDITION ACCORDING TO WHICH IT IS SAID TO BE IN THE BODY

^A When, therefore, that which is understood by the intellect 80 comes into a relation with a certain place or thing that exists in a place, we speak, though improperly, of it being "there," because of its activity 81 in that place, taking the place to stand for the relation and the activity. For when we ought to say, "It is active there," we say, "It is there." 83 This mode of speaking would be more appropriate 84 and indeed applies most of all to the union of the Word of God with man, according to which, having been united, He remained unconfused and incomprehensible 86 — not, however, in the manner of the soul. 87 For the soul, since it is of a nature that is spread out, seems even to suffer in some way with the body because of its affinity with it, and at times it holds, and is held by it; but the Word of God, while in no way altered Himself by the communion 88 concerning the body and the soul, nor participating in their weakness 89, but rather imparting 90 to them of His own divinity, becomes one with them, remaining what He was 91 even before the union. This mode of blending or union is newer 92; and He is blended 93 and remains in every way unmixed and unconfused and incorrupt and immutable, not suffering 94, but only cooperating, nor being corrupted and altered along with them, but rather increasing 95 those things, while He Himself is not diminished by them, in addition to the fact that He remains 96 unchangeable and unconfused, since He is also 97 purely free from all alteration. Porphyrius 98 is a witness to this, who against the ^B

Christ ^A having moved his tongue. And strong are the testimonies of the enemies ^B which are on our behalf, and which admit of no contradiction. This Porphyrius, therefore, in the second volume of his *Miscellaneous Questions*, writes verbatim as follows: "It is not, therefore, to be denied that one substance may be accepted for the completion of another substance, and be a part of a substance, remaining in its own nature after completing another substance, and being at once with another, maintaining that which is in itself; and what is greater, it itself not being changed, but changing those things in which it may happen to be, into its own operation by its presence." He says these things concerning the union of the soul and the body. If the rationale is true regarding the soul, because it is incorporeal, it will be by far much more true regarding the Word of God, who is much more incomparably and in truth incorporeal. This directly stops the mouths of those who attempt to rail against the union of God with man. For many of the Greeks make a mockery of this, saying that

^A it is impossible, unreasonable, and improper for the Divine to be joined to a mortal nature by way of mixture and union. But we, having used those of them who are held in high esteem as witnesses, shall strip away this cause for complaint. It is said by some, and especially by the Eunomians, ^B that God the Word was joined to the body, not according to substance, but according to the powers of each. For they say that the substances which are united or mixed do not remain, but that the powers of the body are mingled with the divine powers; they say, according to Aristotle, that the powers of the body—which is surely, of course, that which is endowed with organs—are the senses. Therefore, the divine powers, being mingled with these, effect the union, according to them. But there is no one, I suppose, who would concede to them that the senses are bodily powers. For it was clearly defined in what went before what things are proper to the body, ^C what to the soul, and what to that which is composed of both; and in those proper to what is composed of both we placed the senses that operate through organs, and we said that these organs themselves belong to the body. It is better, therefore, as has been said before, that the union of the substances should take place according to the proper nature of the incorporeal, without confusion, with the more divine suffering no harm from the lower, but rather with the latter being benefited from the former; for the nature that is pure and ^D incorporeal penetrates everything without hindrance, yet nothing penetrates it; so that by

penetrating everything, it remains united, and by having nothing penetrate it, it remains unmixed and unconfused. ^A This mode of union, therefore, is not by the good pleasure of God, as seems to some of the illustrious men, but relies on nature. For that He took on a body, one might reasonably say occurred by God’s good pleasure; but that the union was not confused occurs according to God’s own nature, not by His good pleasure. For those degrees of souls, and the ascents and descents that Origen introduces, which relate nothing to the divine Scriptures nor accord with the dogmas of the Christians, are to be abandoned.

CAP. IV.

Every body is a ^B synthesis of the four elements and has come into being from them; and, more proximately, the bodies of blooded animals arise from the four humors: blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. As regards the bloodless, they arise from the other humors and from that which in their case corresponds to blood. Now, "proximately" is said when something is produced from them directly without any nature intervening; ^C just as from the four elements are produced the four humors, and from the humors what are called "similar parts," which are the limbs of the body. They conjecture that black bile corresponds to earth, phlegm to water, blood to air, and yellow bile to fire. Every synthesis of elements is either solid, or fluid, or spirit. But Aristotle holds that the bodies of animals are produced proximately from blood alone. For from this also

all the parts of the animal are nourished and grow ^A, and the seed also derives its origin from blood. But since it did not seem correct that the hardest bones and the softest flesh and fat should be produced from one and the same (substance), it pleased Hippocrates first that the bodies of animals should be constituted proximately from the four humors, so that the more solid parts might be formed from the more earthy and thicker (elements), and the soft parts from the softer ones. Often, however, the four humors are found in the blood, as can be seen in venesections, when at one time serous phlegm abounds in it, and at another, black or yellow bile; whence these men ^B seem in a certain way to agree with one another in this. There are, moreover, among the parts of animals, some that are similar, and others that are dissimilar. The similar (parts), for example, are: the brain, the membranes, the nerve, the marrow, the bone, the tooth, the cartilage, the glands, the ligaments, the membranes, the fibers, the hairs, the nails, the flesh, the veins, the arteries, the pores, the fat, the skin, and what seem to be their proximate elements: blood, insofar as it is pure blood, phlegm, and black and yellow bile. For a tendon is a composite thing, made of ligaments and nervous fibers; but the dissimilar (parts) are the head, the thorax, the hands, the feet, and the other members ^C of the human body. For the head is not divided into head, just as the nerve is divided into nerve, and the vein into vein, and the flesh into flesh. But whatever part is dissimilar consists of those which are similar parts, just as the head (is made) of nerves and flesh and bones and other things of that kind,

which they also call organic. ^B

The definition of similar parts is this: those whose parts are similar to the whole and to each other; and "similar" here must be taken to mean "the same." Not every animal possesses all the parts of the body, but some of them are found to be defective. For some are destitute of feet, such as fishes and serpents; and some are without heads, such as crabs and lobsters and some of the swimming creatures, for they have the organs of sense in their chest, because they do not have a head. Others are deprived of lungs, those, that is, which do not draw in air by respiration; others have no bladder, such as birds and all those that do not pass urine. And those that have a shell as a covering are deprived of most of their members; for it is only in a few of them that the state of being an animal exists. ^C And some things, though they possess them, seem not to possess them—just as deer seem not to have yellow bile, since they have it dispersed and hidden within the intestines. Man, however, has all things, and perfect ones, and in such a way that the matter could not possibly be otherwise.

In the position of the parts, too, there is great dissimilarity among animals. For some have udders on the chest, others in the belly, others under the thighs, and some have two, some four, and others more. For nature has almost measured the multitude of the udders to the number of those that are born. But if anyone wishes to extract these things precisely, let him read Aristotle’s history, which is On Animals. For it is not our intention to treat these things exactly, but to sketch them out, as it were, in certain forms. ^D Therefore, let us come to the discussion of the elements, which is the next subject of inquiry.

CHAPTER V. On the elements.

The mundane element is the smallest part of the body.

There are four elements ^A (89): earth, water, air, and fire, arranged in the order already mentioned, from the lowest to the highest. These are themselves both primary and simple in relation to other bodies. For every element is of the same genus as those of which it is the element (91). For the first principle is not of the same genus as those that come from it; but the element is entirely of the same genus. Now, that earth, water, air, and fire are elements (95) is clear. For in these, the extreme qualities appear in capacity and (94) in act; yet none of these sensible elements (95) is pure and unmixed with any other element; for all these are in some way slightly adulterated (96), and have partaken (97) of one another to a greater or lesser degree; yet even in the mixture (99) their nature is manifest. Each of the elements possesses, by pairing, two qualities (1) that define it. For earth is dry (2) and cold; water, cold and moist; air, moist and hot by its own nature; and fire, hot and dry. ^B Indeed, qualities cannot be elements by themselves. For it is not possible for bodies to consist of incorporeal qualities (3), nor is it possible for other bodies, which do not have the extreme quality in act, to be elements. For otherwise the elements would be infinite (4), since all existing things (5) possess quality in a greater or lesser degree, and it would be impossible to distinguish which are the elements of which (6). Therefore, the element (7) must necessarily be both a body, and a simple body, and one possessing in act the extreme qualities, I mean heat (8), cold, moisture, and dryness. For these alone, of all qualities, change the entire substance throughout; none of the other qualities does this. For neither does whiteness, when applied to a body (9), whiten it entirely, as heat [warms and cold cools, nor do any of the others (10), but rather the opposites to one another…]

are the elements, those which are contrary according to the two (11) qualities, as water is to fire, being cold and moist, while it is hot and dry; and the earth is to the air, being cold and dry, while it is hot and moist.

Since, however, it was not possible for contraries to be united to one another (12), if there were not some intermediate bond ordained, which was to connect them, the Creator placed in the midst (13) of the earth and the air, which are contraries, the water, and gave it two qualities, coldness and moisture, by which it was able (14), being joined to the extremes, to connect them together (15). For by the cold it is made akin to the earth; by the moisture it is joined to the air. Again, between the water and the fire, which are also contraries, He placed (16) the air, being akin to the water by the moisture (17), and to the fire by the heat; and thus He joined the contraries to one another by certain mediums (18), which connect both themselves and the things being connected (19). For such a bond is the best. Each one of them, then, He joined by one quality to that which is before it (20), and by the other quality, to that which is after it (21); for example, water is cold and moist; but by the cold it is joined to the earth, which is before it in the ascent; and by the moisture, to the air, which is after it (22). Similarly, the air is joined by the moisture to the water, which is before it; and by the heat, ^B to the fire, which is after it (24). And the fire itself is joined by the heat (25) to the air, which is before it; and by the dryness, to the earth through an inflection and reaching-back towards the extreme (26); and thus also the earth is joined by the cold to the water, and by the dryness to the fire through an inflection (27). For in order that not only ^C

the relation ^B according to the circle, He bent them in a way and turned the extremes toward one another; I mean fire and earth. For fire, once it has cast off its heat, becomes earth; and this is clear from thunderbolts: for fire, when it is carried down and cooled by the height, is turned into stone. Wherefore every thunderbolt is carried along with stone and sulfur; and the sulfur is, as it were, cooled fire, no longer hot in act, but in potency, yet dry and in act. ^C But the elements alone have the qualities in act; all other things, that is, have them in potency, unless they should be brought near to an element. And so that the elements, and the composite bodies made from them, might never fail, the Creator wisely contrived that the composite bodies should be able ^D to be transformed into the elements, and again the elements into one another, and that the composite bodies should be resolved into the elements.

And thus, out of a mutual and continuous generation, they are preserved constantly. For earth, when it has become mud, becomes water; and water, when it is thickened and becomes mud, becomes earth; and when it is heated and evaporates, it becomes air; and air, when it is gathered together and thickened, becomes water, and when it is dried, it is transformed into fire; and so also the

^A extinction of fire, when it has cast off its dryness, is turned into air. For air is the extinction of fire and the vapor of heated water. It is clear from both, therefore, that its genesis comes from heat; for both water when it is heated, and fire when it is extinguished, become air. By its own nature, therefore, it is hot; but it grows cold by its proximity to water and earth, so that its lower parts, those towards the earth, are cold, while the upper parts, those towards the fire, are hot. This happens because of the softness and susceptibility of the air; for it quickly departs from its own nature and is transformed. ^B Aristotle says there are two kinds of air: the one is vaporous, which is from the exhalation of water; the other is smoky, which arises from the extinction of fire. And the smoky air is hot; but the vaporous air, where it is produced, is also hot, but as it proceeds it is gradually cooled and finally turns into water. He introduced this twofold nature of air, both to escape certain other things that seem absurd, and because the higher parts, which are very far removed from the earth, appear colder. Moreover, all bodies arise from the union of these four elements, as much those of plants as those of animals, as nature draws the purest of the elements for the procreation of these bodies. Aristotle calls these bodies ^C natural; they are not composed by putting them together in a heap, but are joined and mixed together entirely throughout, and into one something and a

^A distinct body. For they are so joined that they can in no way be discerned, nor can earth be seen separately, nor water, nor air, and fire: since one thing, and something different from them, has been made from the gathering together of these four, as in the case of a tetrapharmacum. ^B For the tetrapharmacum itself is also something different from the things of which it consists; yet not in the same way. For the elements do not make bodies by the juxtaposition of the finest particles, as in a tetrapharmacum, but by change and unity. And again, bodies are dissolved into the elements when they are destroyed; and in this way all things remain perpetually, and are sufficient for the generation of all things that are, and they neither ever abound nor are diminished; wherefore they say that the birth of one thing is the death of another, and conversely the death of one thing is the birth of another, not only in the soul, as has been shown above, but also in the body.

Plato, however, holds that the three elements change into one another, ^C but that the earth remains immutable. For he compares the solids of the figures which are contained by straight lines to each element; with the earth, the cubic figure, because it is more immovable than the rest; with water, that which is most inept for motion of the rest, that is, the figure of twenty bases; with fire, the figure most excellent in mobility, the pyramid; with the air, which moves more easily than water but with more difficulty than fire, the figure of eight bases. From these forms he demonstrates that the three change into one another, but the earth does not undergo this. For the three, the pyramid and the octohedron and the ^D

^A dodecahedron, are composed of scalene triangles; but the cube is composed of equilateral triangles. Those, therefore, which are composed of scalene triangles can, upon being dissolved and coming together again, change into one another; but the cube, once dissolved, cannot change into any of the other three figures (for it consists of equilateral triangles, from which none of the other three can be formed), nor can any of the three figures be changed into a cube. It is necessary, therefore, that the bodies formed ^B according to these shapes should also have the same relationship with one another as those shapes had. Yet the earth is not entirely impassible; rather, it is divided by the more rarefied bodies, being resolved into its elements, but not transformed into the things that divide it. For, coming together again into itself, it is restored, as may be seen in water. For if you put a little earth into water and stir it, the earth is dissolved into the water; but if you cease stirring, once the water has settled, the earth subsides. The same must be understood for all earth; this is not a transformation, but a separation of mixed things.

Plato says ^C that earth is also dissolved by the sharpness of fire, and that, once dissolved, it is carried in it or in the expanse of the air, clearly, when the air dissolves it, or in water, when it is dissolved by water. He says in another way, dividing it, that each of the elements has three qualities: fire has sharpness, thinness, and motion; the other end of the elements, that is, earth (possessing qualities contrary to these), has bluntness, density, and ^D stability;

^A so that the fire and the earth are contraries according to these qualities—which was not the case according to the other qualities that were in conjunction. But they say that qualities were taken from each of the extremities, and in this way the middle elements came to be. For two qualities are taken from the fire, thinness and motion; and one from the earth, bluntness: and air is constituted, having three defining qualities—bluntness, thinness, and motion. Again, two qualities are taken from the earth, bluntness and density; and one from fire, motion: and water is formed, being defined by bluntness, density, and motion. There is, therefore, as sharpness is to bluntness, so fire is to air; ^B and as thinness is to density, so air is to water; and as motion is to stability, so water is to earth. As fire therefore is to air, so is air to water; and as air is to water, so is water to earth. For it is natural for plane figures to be contained by one middle, that is, by one proportion, but for solids to be contained by two middle terms. In another way, they say that the elements possess their qualities: for earth and water have weight, by which they are naturally borne downward; but air and fire have lightness, by which they are naturally borne upward. The Stoics also say that of the elements, some are active and some are passive; active being air and fire, and passive being earth and water. ^C Aristotle also introduces a fifth body, the ethereal and revolving one, not wishing the heaven to have been generated from the four elements; and he calls the fifth body "revolving" because it is borne in a circle around the earth, although Plato explicitly declares that it consists of fire and earth. For he says thus: “It must be corporeal and visible and tangible.”

^A And without fire nothing would ever be visible, nor tangible without something solid. And the solid is not without earth. Wherefore, God, setting out to compose the body of the universe, began by making it of fire and earth. But it is not possible for two things alone to be well composed without a third; for there must be a bond of union in the middle between the two. And that bond is best which makes itself and the things it binds into one as much as possible. And it is the nature of proportion to effect this most beautifully.” By calling the two middle elements a bond, he means that they are taken in accordance with the aforementioned proportion.

Those who defend the dogmas of the Hebrews differ concerning heaven and earth. For almost all others say that heaven and earth were produced from no pre-existing matter, since Moses says: “In the beginning God made heaven and earth.” ^B But Apollinarius maintains that God made heaven and earth out of the abyss. For Moses, he argues, did not mention the abyss in the creation of the world as having been created; but it is said in the Book of Job: “He who made the abyss.” Therefore, he wishes it to be understood that all other things were born from this as from matter; yet not that it is unbegotten, but that it is begotten, having been laid down by the Creator before all corporeal things ^C for the sake of the heaven itself. And the very name of the abyss (which means in Latin “without depth”) denotes infinity

^A of matter. But how this may be, it makes no difference. For in this way, too, God is shown to be the God and Creator of all things, having made all things from nothing.

But against those who say that there is only one element—either fire, or air, or water—what has been said by Hippocrates will suffice: “If man were one thing, he would never suffer pain; for there would be no source from which he could suffer pain, if he were one thing. But if he were also to suffer pain, there would be one thing that would heal him.” For it is necessary that what is going to suffer pain should be in a state of change, accompanied by sensation; but if there were only one element, there would be nothing into which it could change. If it did not change, but remained within itself, it would not suffer pain, even if it were endowed with sensation. It is also necessary for that which suffers to suffer from something; but if there were only one element, there would be no quality other than that of the one element, from which the living creature could suffer. But if it could neither change nor suffer, how would it suffer pain? ^B Having therefore shown that this is impossible, he brings in by way of concession: “But if he were also to suffer pain, there would be one thing that would heal him. But now, it is not one thing that heals, but many; therefore, man is not one thing.”

Furthermore, from those very things by which each of them endeavors to establish his own doctrine, it is most especially shown that there are four elements. For Thales, ^C saying that water alone is the element, attempts to prove that the other three are generated from it. For he says that its sediment is earth; its thinnest part, air; and the thinnest part of the air, fire. And Anaximenes, likewise, postulating air as the only element, attempts in a similar way ^D

to show that the other elements are generated and perfected from it. Heraclitus ^A and Hippasus the Metapontine, while naming fire, have used the same arguments. Therefore, since these men also say that fire is the generative ^B cause of the other elements, and others introduce water or air, it is proven from this that all elements change into one another. But since all things turn into one another, it is necessary that all be elements. For whatever one of the four you take, it will be found to be produced from another. The body, being the instrument of the soul, is divided along with the faculties of the soul. For it ^C has been constructed as suitable and apt for them, so that no faculty of the soul is hindered by the body. For to each faculty of the soul, so that it may perform its own function, specific parts of the body have been allotted, as the discourse will show in its progress. For the soul occupies the place of the craftsman; ^D the body, of the instrument; the matter is that in which the action is engaged; and the effect is the action itself. (For example, woman is set as the matter; for the action is toward her: the action being adultery, or fornication, or lawful intercourse.) But the powers of the soul are divided into the phantastic, the discursive, and the mnemonic.

CHAP. VI.

On Phantasy

The phantastic, then, is a power of the irrational soul acting through the sensory organs; the phantaston

^A is that which falls under the phantasy, just as the sensible falls under the sense. Phantasy is an affection of the irrational soul arising from some phantaston; while a phantasma is a void affection in the irrational parts of the soul, arising from no phantaston. The Stoics say there are these four: phantasy, phantaston, phantastic, and phantasma. They define phantasy as an affection of the soul that manifests both itself and that which caused it. For just as an affection arises in the sensory organs when one perceives, so too in the soul when one thinks, for it receives within itself an image of the thinkable. The phantaston is the sensible object that has produced the phantasy, such as white and everything that is able to move the soul; the phantastic is the void pulling ^B or distraction without a phantaston; and a phantasma is that by which we are drawn, according to the phantastic void pulling, as in the case of the insane and those suffering from melancholy. The disagreement among these exists only in the changing of the terms. Its instruments are the anterior ventricles of the brain, the psychic spirit that is within them, and the nerves emanating from them, which are saturated with the psychic spirit, and the structure of the ^C...

senses. There are, however, five seats of the senses, but one sense: the soul, which cognizes through the seats of the senses the affections that exist in them. And in that seat which is, above all others, earthy and corporeal—which is the sense of touch—it cognizes the earthy nature. ^A And in that which is most luminous, which is the sense of sight, it cognizes luminous things; just as also in the aerial—meaning the sense of hearing—it cognizes the affections of the air (for air is the substance of the voice, or the impact upon the air); and in the spongy and aqueous—which is the sense of taste—it perceives flavors. For it is naturally ordered that whatever falls under the senses should be cognized through something appropriate to its nature.

It was reasonable, therefore, according to this argument, since there are four elements, that there should also be four senses. But because vapor and the genus of odors are of a middle nature, between air and water (for it is thicker than air, but thinner than water; ^B and this becomes clear through the affliction of a head cold; for those who have a head cold draw in air by breathing, yet while drawing in this breath, they do not perceive the odors—for because of the obstruction, the thicker substance does not reach the sense), for this reason a fifth seat of the senses, the sense of smell, has been contrived by nature, so that nothing of those things capable of being known might escape the sense.

Now, sense is not a changing, but a discrimination of a change. For the seats of the senses are changed, and the sense discriminates that change. ^C Yet often the seats of the senses themselves are also called senses. And sense is the perception of things that fall under the sense. But this definition seems to be not of sense itself, but of its functions. Wherefore they also define sense in this way: An intelligent spirit, a

extending from the governing part to the organs. And also thus: A faculty of the soul perceiving sensible things; and the sensory organ: An instrument of the perception of sensible things. But Plato calls sense ^B the communion of soul and body towards external things. For the faculty belongs to the soul, but the organ to the body; and both, through phantasy, are perceptive of external things. And of the psychic parts, some are ministerial and subservient, while others are principal and governing. Principal indeed are the deliberative and scientific; ^C but ministerial are the sensitive, the movement according to impulse, and that of the voice. For movement and voice obey the will of the reason very quickly and almost without interval of time. For we wish and move at the same time and in the same act, needing no time between the will and the movement, as can be seen in the movement of the fingers. And some of the natural ^D functions are under the command of the deliberative part, such as those that are called the passions.

Chapter VII: Concerning sight

Sight is used equivocally, both for the sensory organ and for the perceptive faculty. But Hipparchus

^A says that rays extending from the eyes, like touches of the hands, touch exterior bodies and refer their perception to sight. Geometers, however, describe certain cones made from the concurrence of the rays that are sent out from the eyes. For they think that the right eye sends rays to the left, and the left to the right, and from their concurrence a cone is formed; ^B whence it happens that while the eye comprehends many things at once that can be perceived by sight, it discerns those things precisely where the rays have concurred. Thus, for this reason, we often look at the pavement and do not see the coin lying thereon, though we gaze for a long time, until the rays have converged upon the place where the coin lies; and only then do we see it, as if we had just then begun to pay attention. The Epicureans think that images of the things that appear fall into the eyes. Aristotle, however, thinks that not a corporeal image, but a quality arising from a change ^C in the air surrounding the visible objects reaches the eye. Plato, however, thinks that things are seen through a confluence of light, as that light which proceeds from the eyes flows out for a certain distance into the air, which is of the same nature as itself; while what emanates from the bodies is carried against it, and what is in the air—which is interposed and easily diffused and turned—is extended simultaneously with the fiery nature of the sight. Galen, agreeing with Plato ^D concerning sight, writes thus in the seventh book of his work *On Consensus*, speaking in a scattered fashion: "For if some part, or force, or image, or quality of the visible bodies arrived at the eye, we would not know the size of what is seen, such as a mountain, if it were to happen, of the greatest size. For it is altogether contrary to reason that an image of such a size should enter our eyes." Indeed, neither the visual spirit

^A can be expressed as having such power that it is diffused over everything that is seen. It remains, therefore, that the air which surrounds us becomes for us such an instrument at the time when we see, as the nerve of vision is in the body. For it seems that something of this sort happens to the air which compasses us: for the splendor of the sun, touching the upper extremity of the air, transmits its power through the whole mass of air, and the splendor which is carried through the nerves of vision has a spiritual nature, and falling upon that which surrounds us, and working an alteration at the first impact, it transmits it to a great distance, containing itself until it falls upon a resistant body. For the air becomes an instrument for the eye for the distinguishing of visible things, just as the nerve does in the brain; so that whatever relation the brain has to the nerve, the eye has to the air animated by the solar light. And that the air is naturally disposed to be assimilated to the bodies that approach it, is clear from the fact that it is changed by whatever is carried through it, whether it be someone’s ^B deep red, or blue, or even bright silver, while it is light.

Porphyry, in his book *On Sensation*, says that neither a cone, nor a likeness, nor anything else is the cause of vision; but that the soul itself, when it encounters visible objects, recognizes itself as being those things which are perceived by sight, because the soul contains all things that are, and all things that are are nothing else than the soul containing different bodies. For since he wishes there to be one soul of all things, he reasonably says that the soul which is endowed with reason recognizes itself in all things that exist. Now sight perceives ^C

^A this sense by means of straight lines, and when it perceives colors in the first place, it also at the same time judges the colored body, its magnitude, and its figure, and the place in which it is, and the interval, and the number, and the motion, and the state, and the rough and smooth, and the equal and unequal, and the sharp and obtuse, and the coherence, whether it inclines to the nature of water or of earth, such as whether it is moist or dry.

Therefore, that which is properly perceived by sight is color. For it is by vision alone that we perceive colors, and immediately along with the color we also perceive the colored body and the place in which the object seen happens to be, and the interval that lies between the one who sees and the object seen. For in as many of the senses as the body is also rendered manifest, in these the place is likewise immediately recognized, as happens ^B in touch and taste. But these indeed only perceive when they have been brought close to the body, except for those that will be explained afterwards; vision, however, perceives even when a great interval is interjected. Since, however, it discerns the objects proper to it from afar, it necessarily follows that it also perceives the interval by itself alone. It perceives the magnitude by itself alone only when it is able to comprehend the object seen in a single glance. But those things which are greater than can be comprehended in one aspect, in these vision requires both memory and thought. For since it sees them bit by bit, and not the whole at once in one intuition, it necessarily passes from one to another, and as each one strikes the sense in that transition, it is so perceived; and the things perceived earlier, memory preserves, and thought gathers both, that which was perceived by sense and that which was perceived by memory. Wherefore it perceives magnitude in two ^C ways: sometimes alone, and sometimes joined with memory and thought. But the number of those things that are seen, if it is more than three or four, which is not seen in one aspect, and also the motions and the figures of many angles, it never senses alone, but with memory and thought. For it cannot

comprehend five and six and seven, and more, without memory. So too neither the hexagons ^A and octagons and polygons ^B. And the motion that occurs by transition has one thing as prior and another as subsequent. But where there is a prior and a second and a third, this memory alone preserves. Now upward and downward, and the uneven and the even, and likewise also the rough and the smooth, and the sharp and the obtuse, are common to the touch and to the sight, since they alone judge of place. But they also need thought. For only that which falls upon the sense in a single impact is the work of sense alone; but things that fall upon it in multiple impacts are not of sense alone, but also of memory with thought, as was shown before.

The nature of vision reaches even to the bottom of ^C translucent things, first and most of all of air; for it passes through the whole of it. Secondly, it reaches the nature of stagnant and clear water, for we see the fish swimming; but we see less through glass and other things of that like, and it is clear that they must be illuminated; and this also is proper to it. But let no one be deceived, as though the perception of hot things belongs to sight, because when we see fire, we know immediately that it is also hot. For if you should trace the argument back to the first vision, you will find that, when the sight first ^D beheld the fire, it had perception only of the color and the shape; but when the sense of touch also approached, we learned that it was hot, which memory preserved, having received it from the touch. Therefore now, when we behold fire, we see nothing else but the shape and the color of the fire; but the thought, by means of memory, takes along with the things seen also the heat. The same argument applies to the apple. For if the apple is not constituted by color and shape alone, but also by fragrance and the quality of taste, sight, in perceiving these, does not know that it is an apple; but the soul preserves the memory that comes from the sense of smell and taste, and at the same time as it beholds, the thought is informed...

^A by this shape and color. When, therefore, we think a waxen apple is a true apple, it is not the vision 14 that is deceived, but the thought. For vision is not mistaken in its own proper objects; for it has perceived both the color and the shape.

The three senses, then—vision, hearing, and smell—perceive external objects, even those not moved toward them, through the intervening air; but the sense of taste perceives only if it is brought into contact with the subject to be perceived. The sense of touch, however, has both powers; for it exercises its function both when applied directly to bodies [(15)] and sometimes when a staff intervenes [(16)] [(17)]. Wherefore, the gaze sometimes requires the testimony of other senses, when that which is seen has been made by artifice to deceive, as in a painting. For it is the work of the art of painting to deceive the gaze with projections that are not real and with hollows [(19)], if the nature of the thing be such; where there is need for discernment, mostly by touch, ^B but sometimes also by taste [(20)] or smell, as in the case of the waxen apple. Sometimes, however, it presents the appearances effectively by itself, whenever it sees not from afar; for instance, it sees a square tower, but from a great distance it sees it as round; it is mistaken also when we see through mist or smoke [(22)], or some other similar thing that clouds the gaze. Likewise, also, when we see through water that is disturbed; for in the sea one sees an oar as though it were broken [(23)]. Likewise, also, when [(24)] it sees through some transparent material, as in the case of mirrors and glass and other things of that kind, or when that which is seen is moved rapidly [(25)]; for rapid movement confuses vision, so that one sees things that are not round as round, and things that are moving as though they were stationary [(26)], or when the thought is occupied with other things [(27)], as in the case of someone who has intended to meet a friend, and having met him [(28)], passes him by, because his thought is occupied with other matters [(29)]. But not even this is an error [(30)] of vision, but of the mind. For the sense indeed has seen and has reported it to the thought, but it [the mind] to those

things which were reported, did not attend. ^A For vision, in order to make a clear judgment, requires four things most especially: an unimpaired sense organ, appropriate movement and distance, and air that is pure and luminous.

CAP. VIII. Of Touch.

^B Every one of the other sense organs the Creator fashioned as twofold, and marked it off in a certain place and part of the body. For He made two eyes, two ears, and two passages for the sense which is placed in the nose, and He caused two tongues to grow in all animals—but in some these are separated, as in snakes; in others, joined and united, as in human beings. On this account, He made only two anterior ventricles of the brain, so that from each ventricle the sensory nerves might be sent down, and make the sense organs twofold. ^C But the reason why He made twofold organs is an extraordinary care for living creatures, so that if one should sustain injury, the remaining one might preserve the sense. Indeed, though most of the other sense organs may be destroyed, the animal’s life is not harmed in any way; but if touch be lost, the animal also perishes along with it. For touch alone, of all the senses, is common to all animals. For every animal has the sense of touch; but as to the other senses, not all animals have all of them, but some have some; yet the more perfect ones have them all. Since, therefore, the animal was to be judged as to whether it existed or did not exist by this sense, God did not assign to touch one single part, but almost the whole body of the animal. For, except for bones, claws, and horns, ^D and ligaments, hairs, and other such things, every part of the body partakes of touch. It results, therefore, that every instrument has a twofold sense, one of these, those which are properly...

its own, and the other, touch, just as is the case with sight. For sight distinguishes colors, and it perceives hot and cold things; but it perceives those [the colors] as sight, and these [the hot and cold] as a body. The same must be judged concerning taste, smell, and hearing.

How, then, is touch present in the entire body, if we say that the senses flow from the anterior ventricles of the brain? Is it not manifest ^A that the sense of touch comes from nerves being sent down from the brain and spread throughout every part of the body? And since often, when we have pricked our foot with a thorn, the hairs of our head immediately stand on end, some have thought that the affection, or the perception of the affection, is sent up to the brain, and thus the animal perceives. But if this account were true, the part that is being cut would not feel pain, but the brain would. It is better, therefore, to say that the nerve is brain. For it is a portion of the brain, containing within itself the psychic spirit throughout its whole extent, just as red-hot iron contains fire; for this reason, wherever a sensory nerve is implanted, that part partakes of sense through it and becomes sensory.

Nor is it perhaps absurd to say that there is sent up to the origin of the nerves—that is, the brain—not the affection itself, but a certain co-perception and report of the affection. ^B Now, the objects proper to the sense of touch are hot and cold, soft and hard, viscous and arid, heavy and light; for these are known by touch alone. Common to both touch and sight are sharp and blunt, rough and smooth, dry and moist, thick and thin, up and down; ^C for place, and size, when it is such that it can be grasped by a single act of touch, are also common to these, as well as dense and rare and round, when small, just as other figures are; and motion. [alt-version omitted]

^A Likewise, it also perceives the motion of the body approaching it, along with memory and thought. It likewise perceives number, but only up to two or three, and these small and easily grasped; yet sight grasps these better than touch, just as it does the smooth and the rough. 71 For these belong to the category of the smooth and the rough. 72 For unevenness 73 mixed with hardness produces roughness, while smoothness mixed with density produces sleekness.

It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, that these senses 74 have a great communion with one another. For one clarifies the errors 75 of the others. In a painting, for example, the eyes ^B see certain protrusions, 76 of the nose and other features; but touch, when applied, exposes the error of sight. And just as sight 77 always sees all things 78 through the medium of the air, so too does touch perceive hard, soft, and moist things through the medium of a 79 staff—but it does so syllogistically 80 and with thought; for man possesses this sense most accurately. By this sense, and by taste, he has an advantage over other animals, even though he is inferior in the other three senses. For while one animal surpasses man in one of the three senses, the dog excels in all three at once; for it hears, sees, and smells more acutely, as is evident from tracker dogs. ^C And although the whole body is an instrument of touch, as has been said before, 82 it is so most of all in the interior of the hands, and of these, even more so at the tips of the fingers; for we have these as certain accurate gauges of touch. 83 For the Creator fashioned the hands not only as an instrument for grasping, but also for touching. For this reason, they have thinner skin 84 and a muscle is spread out beneath the whole palm, and they are devoid of hair, so that they may better perceive what can be touched. 85 The reason why they do not grow hair 86 themselves is the muscle spread beneath. ^D Hands, however, which are harder, are stronger for grasping; those which are...

softer are more precise for feeling. Just as with the nerves, those which are harder are more suitable for movement, while those which are softer are more suitable for sensation. For these are also the organs of touch; through them the sense of touch comes to be. ^A

Chapter IX. De gustatu.

We have said above that the sight perceives in straight lines; but smell and hearing perceive not only in a straight line, but from all sides. Touch and taste, however, do not perceive by straight lines, nor from all sides, but only when they have drawn near to the objects that are subject to them, except for the things ^B which have already been explained. Now, taste is the sense that perceives flavors. Its instruments are the tongue—and especially its tip—and in addition to these, the palate; in these are the nerves derived from the brain, which are spread out and report the perception that has occurred to the command center. The qualities of flavors, which are called gustatory, are these: sweetness, acidity, acrimony, sourness, astringency, bitterness, saltiness, and greasiness. ^C It is these that the sense of taste judges. For this reason, water is said to be without quality, because it displays none of these qualities in tasting. For regarding other qualities, such as cold and moisture, water possesses an inherent quality. ^D Sourness and astringency differ from one another in that the one constricts more, and the other less. Therefore, the simple qualities which taste perceives are almost only these; but the composite ones are infinite. For each kind of animal and plant has its own proper qualities. For if, as it may happen, we receive the quality of pork, we receive another quality for goat. Wherefore, when we are ignorant of what kind the meat is that is offered, we judge by tasting; and this would not happen unless the quality of each thing that falls under the sense of taste were different. Accordingly, in a general way, no one could encompass them, since they are infinite and in-

^A every way different from one another. For even in things where one of the simple qualities predominates, even in these the difference of the tastes according to their kind is recognized. For instance, in a dried fig, a raisin, and a date, one quality predominates, namely sweetness, but the sense of taste discerns the difference between the kinds.

CAP. X. Of Hearing

Hearing ^B is the faculty for sounds and noises; it discerns their acuteness, gravity, smoothness, roughness, and magnitude. The instruments for this are the nerves, which are soft and derive from the brain, and the structure of the ears, and especially the cartilaginous kind within them. For cartilage is well-suited for sounds and noises. Only man and the ape do not move their ears, whereas all other animals that have ears move them.

CAP. XI. Of Smell

Smell ^C occurs through the nostrils, but it is completed at ^D the termini of the anterior ventricles of the brain. For these, being by nature most vaporous, easily take in vapors. For it has been stated before that each of the senses, according to a certain similarity and affinity, receives its own proper objects of sense.

^A It is not, however, as the brain has sent down a sensory nerve to the other organs of sense, that it has done so to the sense of smell; but rather it fulfills this need at its own extremities 23, and receives the exhalation of vapors. The most general difference between these vapors is that between a sweet-smelling odor and a stench, and that which lies between them, which is neither sweet-smelling nor a stench 25. Sweet scent is produced when the fluids in the bodies are thoroughly concocted; a medium scent when they are cooked moderately; and a stench when they are but little or not at all concocted 26 27.

CAP. XII.

On thought.

The power, the instruments, the parts, and the conjunction and difference of the parts of that faculty which we called the phantastic—as far as we were able—we have explained with sufficient brevity. That part, however, ^B in which thought resides, consists generally of judgments and assent, declination, and appetite; and specifically of the understanding of things, virtues, knowledge, the principles of the arts, the power of deliberation, and choice. And this is the part which, through dreams, foretells future things to us, which the Pythagoreans alone—following the Hebrews—declare to be true divination. Its instrument is the middle ventricle of the brain, and the animal spirit which is enclosed within it.

CHAPTER XIII.

De memoria.

That faculty by which we remember is the cause and storehouse of memory and recollection 59. Memory is, as ^{C D}

^A Origen says, a phantasy left within from some sense which is in act; but as Plato defines it, it is the preservation of sense and of understanding. For the soul perceives things perceptible to the senses through the sensory organs, and ^B opinion is born; but regarding things perceived by the intellect, it perceives through the mind, and an understanding is generated. Therefore, when it preserves the images of those things about which it had an opinion, and which it understood, it is said to remember. Yet Plato seems to speak in these passages not of the understanding strictly, but of discursive thought. For things perceptible to the senses are remembered in themselves, ^C but things perceived by the intellect are remembered by accident, since the memory of things intelligible also arises from a preceding phantasy. As for things strictly intelligible, we remember that we learned or heard them, but we do not have a memory of their essence; for the apprehension of things intelligible does not come from a preceding phantasy, but from learning or natural notion. But if we are said to remember what we previously saw or heard or otherwise knew (and the term "previously" has reference to past time), it is clear that things which come into being and perish, things which consist in time, are ^D memorial. And though there is a memory of absent things, it is not moved by the absent things themselves. Recollection is said to occur when forgetfulness interrupts memory. For recollection is the recovery of a fading memory; and it becomes fading through forgetfulness; and forgetfulness is the loss of memory. Yet one type of forgetfulness is perpetual, another is temporary, and it is of this latter kind that recollection consists. There is another type of recollection, which is not the forgetfulness of things perceived by sense and intellect, but of natural notions; and we call natural notions those which are present to all without being taught, such as the fact that God exists. Plato says that this is a recollection of the ideas; what the idea is, we shall say in what follows. Therefore, it delivers the phantastic faculty to the

^A discursive faculty, which, having received and judged what is seen, transmits it to the mnemonic faculty. The instrument of this, too, is the posterior ventricle of the brain, which they also call the cerebellum and the paracranis, and the psychic spirit within it. But since we say that the principles and roots of the senses are the anterior ventricles of the brain, the middle one [that of] the deliberative faculty, and the posterior one [that of] the mnemonic faculty, it is necessary to provide proof that matters stand in this way, so that we may not seem to believe what is said without reason.

A most sufficient proof ^B is that which is taken from the very activity of the parts. For when the anterior ventricles are injured in any way, the senses are impeded, while the deliberative faculty still remains intact; but if the middle ventricle alone is affected, the intellect falters, yet the sensory organs remain, preserving the natural sense. If, however, both the anterior and the middle ventricles are affected, reasoning is corrupted together with the senses; but if the posterior ventricle is harmed, memory alone perishes, while nothing is harmed regarding sense and thought. If, moreover, something should happen to the anterior, middle, and posterior ventricles, besides bringing the whole animal into danger of life, they destroy sense, ^C thought, and memory alike. This is shown by many other affections and the incursions of diseases, but especially by the madness of those suffering from fever. For some of those who labor under that disease, with only the thinking faculty injured, preserve the senses: such as the one Galen describes, who, when he was working wool in his presence...

^A exercise of the intellect. Galen reports that a certain man, during a bout of phrenitis, while a wool-worker was working near him, jumped up and, seizing glass vessels, rushed to the window and asked those passing by, calling each vessel by name, if they wished for it to be thrown down. When those standing nearby replied that they did wish it, he first threw down the individual vessels; then he asked if they also wished for the wool-worker to be thrown down. Since they thought the matter was a joke and a game, and for that reason said they wished it, he grabbed the wool-worker and threw him down from above. This man’s senses were intact; for he knew that these were vessels and that this was a wool-worker, but his reasoning was not sound. ^B There are others who suffer from a vain phantasy, thinking that they see things that they do not see, while judging all other things correctly and according to reason; in these cases, only the anterior ventricles are injured, while the middle one is intact. Moreover, through the afflictions that follow each specific member, its functions are impeded. For the animal is hindered from performing the function it is naturally prepared to perform, in that part which is affected or injured, just as when a foot is injured, we are hindered from walking. For that is the function of the foot.

CAP. XIV.

De ratione et oratione.

^A supply ^B the place of chords, the nose also contributing something to the end that the voice may be resonant or distinguished, as is apparent in those who sing.

CAP. XV. Other divisions of the soul.

They divide the soul in another way into powers or species ^C or parts, the body being divided in concert with the powers of the soul. ^D There is also another division of the rational part of the soul, into what is called the interior word and the uttered word. The interior word is the movement of the soul occurring within the ratiocinative faculty, without any utterance. Wherefore, we often go through an entire argument to ourselves while silent, and we converse in our dreams; and it is in this respect that we are all most especially rational. For we are not rational by the uttered word in the same way as we are by this one. For even those who are deaf from birth, and those who have lost their voice through some affliction or disease, are nonetheless rational. The uttered word, however, has its operation in the voice and in the dialects; and the instruments of the voice are many. For the interior muscles in the flanks, the thorax, the lungs, the trachea, and the larynx—and above all the cartilaginous part of these—as well as the recurrent nerves, the glottis, and all the muscles that move these parts, are instruments of the voice. But the mouth is the instrument of speech. For in it, speech is formed, fashioned, and, as it were, molded, with the tongue and the uvula holding the place of the plectrum, the palate acting as the sounding board, and the teeth and the peculiar opening of the mouth also contributing, with the nose furthermore adding something to the sonorous quality of the voice.

CAP. XV. Another division of the soul.

They divide the soul also in another way into powers or species or parts.

^A The soul is divided into that which pertains to plants—which is also called the nutrient and passible—and into that which is sentient, and into that which is rational. The instruments of each of these parts have been mentioned in part, and will be mentioned in what follows. ^B Zeno the Stoic says that the soul is eight-parted, dividing it into the governing faculty, the five senses, the vocal faculty, and the seminal faculty. Panaetius the philosopher holds that the vocal part belongs to the movement caused by impulse, and he says this most correctly; but he considers the seminal part to be, not a part of the soul, but of nature. ^C Aristotle, in the *Physics*, says there are five parts of the soul: the vegetal, the sentient, the motive in respect to place, the appetitive, and the discursive. He calls "vegetal" that which performs the functions of nourishing, increasing, and generating, and forming the bodies; he also calls the vegetal "nutrient," naming the whole after its most excellent part—that is, the feeding part—from which the other parts that we have just enumerated depend. ^D And so it is in the *Physics*. But in the *Ethics*, he divides the soul into two primary and most generic parts: into that which is participant in reason and that which is void of reason.

^A He further subdivides that which is void of reason into that which is obedient to reason and that which is not obedient to reason. Concerning the rational part, it has been spoken of in the preceding sections; now we shall discuss the irrational part.

CAP. XVI. Of that part of the soul which is void of reason, which is also called the passible and appetitive part.

There are those who say that what is void of reason exists by itself, inasmuch as a soul is discovered which is devoid of reason and is not a part of the soul that participates in reason. First, because it is found by itself in ^B brute animals, from which it is understood that it is a certain complete soul, and not a part of another. Secondly, because it is most absurd that that which is devoid of reason should be a part of reason. But Aristotle says it is both a part and a faculty, and he divides it into two parts, as we have said, which are named by the common name of "appetite," to which also pertains the motion by which animals are incited of their own accord for the sake of following or avoiding something. For appetite is the principle of motion: for as soon as animals have an appetite, they are moved of their own accord for the sake of pursuit. Of the part of the soul that is devoid of reason, one portion does not obey reason, and the other is obedient to reason. And again, that which is obedient to reason is divided into two ^C parts: into the concupiscible and the irascible. The instrument of the concupiscible part, which is born from sensation, is the liver; the instrument of the irascible part is the heart, a hard member capable of vigorous motion, destined for arduous and difficult tasks and for a strenuous impulse; just as, on the contrary, the liver, being a softer viscera, has become the organ of soft desire. These parts are called obedient to reason because they are naturally disposed to obey reason, to be subjected [to it], and to be moved ^D as reason commands, in the case of those men who are in a natural state.

^A These passions are also constitutive of the animal substance; for without them, life cannot consist. Since, however, the term "passion" is used homonymously, we must first distinguish its homonymy. For "passion" refers both to the bodily, such as diseases and wounds; and [it] refers to the psychic, concerning which our discourse is now, such as desire and anger; and it is, commonly and generally, the passion of an animal, which is followed by pleasure or pain. For pain follows ^B the passion, but the passion itself is not pain. If it were, everything that suffers would also feel pain; but now, things that lack sensation suffer indeed, but do not feel pain. Therefore, a passion is not a pain, but the sensation of a passion. And this must also be significant, so that it may fall under sensation.

The definition of psychic passions is as follows: A passion is a perceptible movement of the appetitive faculty toward the phantasy of something good or evil. ^C And otherwise: A passion is an irrational movement of the soul due to an opinion of good or evil. But they define a general passion thus: A passion is a movement in one thing from another. An activity, however, is a kinetic movement according to nature; and that is called "kinetic" which is moved from itself. Thus, therefore, anger is an activity of the irascible part; but [it is] a passion of both parts of the soul, and furthermore of our whole body ^D when, by anger, it is violently drawn toward actions. For the movement has occurred in one thing from another, which we said is a passion. And in another way, an activity is called a passion when it is contrary to nature. For an activity is movement according to nature, but passion is contrary to nature. Therefore, according to this reasoning, an activity, when it is not moved according to nature, is called a passion, whether it is moved from itself or from another. For instance, the movement of the heart according to the pulses is an activity; but [the movement] according to palpitations is a passion. From itself, indeed, is...

^A For there is also the movement according to the pulse, but it is not according to nature; and from this there is also the movement of the pulses, but it is according to nature. Therefore, it is not strange that one and the same thing should be called both a passion and an activity. For inasmuch as they are movements from the passible [part] of the soul itself, they are certain activities; but inasmuch as they are immoderate and not according to nature, they are not activities, but passions. Thus, then, the movement of the irrational [part] is a passion according to both meanings. However, not every movement of the passible [part] is called a passion, but those that are more intense and advance to sensation. For small and imperceptible [movements] are not yet passions. For a passion must have significant magnitude. Therefore, to the definition of a passion is added "sensible movement." For small movements, escaping sensation, do not produce a passion, as has been said.

CAP. XVII. Concerning the Appetitive [Part].

The irrational part of the soul, as we have said, which obeys reason, is divided into two parts, the appetitive and the irascible. Again, the appetitive is divided into two, into pleasures and pains; for when desire attains [its object], it produces pleasure; failing to attain it, [it produces] pain. ^B Again, according to another way, desire being divided, makes four species in all. For because among things that exist, some are good and others evil; and some are already present, while others are expected; according to these ways, the two being multiplied by two, the things of desire are divided into four. For there is good and evil, and again, present and expected. For the expected good is desire ^C (libido); but the present [good] is pleasure. Again, the expected evil, fear; but the present [evil], pain. For pleasure and desire revolve around good things; but fear and pain around evil things. Wherefore some divide passion into four: desire, pleasure, fear, and pain. We call things good and evil either those that are truly such, or those that are deemed [such]. And evil passions arise in the soul through these three: evil upbringing, ignorance, and depraved ^D

^A bodily condition. For if we are not rightly trained from childhood so as to be able to control our passions, we fall into their excess; and from ignorance, perverse judgments are rooted in the reasoning part of the soul, so that we think evil things to be good, and good things evil; and certain things arise also from the depraved condition of the body. For the bitter-choleric are irascible, and those ^B who are hot and moist in their temperament are prone to licentiousness. But evil habit must be corrected by good habit, and ignorance by learning and knowledge; and the depraved condition of the body is to be treated physically, by shifting it—as far as possible—to the temperate state by appropriate diet and exercise, and by medicines, if we have need of these as well.

CAP. XVIII. On pleasures.

^C Of pleasures, some are of the soul, others are of the body. Those of the soul are such as belong to the soul itself by its own nature, as those concerned with learning and contemplation. For these and such like belong to the soul alone. Those of the body are such as occur through the communion of body and soul, and are on that account called bodily, such as those concerned with food and sexual intercourse. But of the body alone ^D there are no proper pleasures, but only affections, such as incisions, fluxes, and qualities consistent with the temperament. For every pleasure is with a sense. And we have shown that sense belongs to the soul. That the meaning of the term "pleasure" is ambiguous and manifold is clear. For it falls under one genus and another, just as there are honorable and base pleasures. And some pleasures are vain, while others are true. Indeed, those that are placed in thought are directed toward knowledge; those that are perceived with the body are directed toward sense. And of these that are directed toward sense, some are natural, and others are not natural.

^A Grief is opposed to the pleasure found in drinking; but nothing is opposed to that which is found in contemplation. All these things, therefore, show that "pleasure" is an equivocal term. Among those called bodily pleasures, some are both necessary and natural, without which it is impossible to live, such as food, which replenishes deficiency, and necessary clothing. Others are natural but not necessary, such as unions according to nature and law. For these contribute to the preservation of the whole race, yet it is possible to live without them in virginity. Others are neither necessary nor natural, such as drunkenness and lascivious petulance ^B and gluttony, which exceed the need. For these contribute nothing to the succession of the race, as does lawful intercourse, nor to the maintenance of life; rather, they are even harmful. Therefore, he who lives in accordance with God should pursue only those pleasures which are at once necessary and natural. But he who is ranked in the second class of virtues after him should pursue both these and those which, while natural, are not necessary, provided that the proper measure, manner, time, and place are observed. All others are to be avoided by every means. In general, one should deem those to be honorable pleasures ^C which are not entangled with grief, do not cause repentance, do not produce other harm, do not go beyond due measure, and do not distract us greatly from more serious tasks or compel us to serve them. There are also specific pleasures which are in a certain way inherent in or annexed to the knowledge of the Divine, and to the sciences and virtues. We ought to consider these among those things that are to be primarily sought after, for they have influence not so that we may simply exist, or that the race may continue, but that it may be well with us, and that we may be good men and grateful to God, and they contribute to the perfecting of the human soul and intellect. For they neither heal the passions, as do those which satisfy the desires of nature, nor do they carry any previous or subsequent ^D or opposed grief; but they are pure.

and free from all ^A material entanglement, seeing that they are situated in the soul alone.

For, according to the opinion of Plato, some pleasures are false, and others are true. The false are those that arise with sensation and non-true opinion, and have pains entwined with them; the true are those that belong to the soul of itself, by itself, with knowledge and mind and prudence, pure and unmixed with pain, to which no repentance ever follows. Those pleasures which follow upon contemplation and noble actions, they call not passions, but "persuasions" (πείσεις). Some indeed properly call such pleasure "joy."

They define pleasure as: "a transition into a sensible nature." But this definition seems to be of bodily pleasure alone. For this is a certain fulfillment and a medicine for a bodily deficiency and for the pain that arises from that deficiency. ^B For when we are cold or thirsty, we take pleasure in warming ourselves and drinking, as we heal the pain that exists from the cold and the thirst. Therefore, these pleasures are good by accident, and not of themselves, nor by nature. For just as being healed is a good by accident, but being healthy is good by nature and of itself; so these pleasures, since they are certain cures, are good by accident. But the pleasures of contemplation are good of themselves and by nature; for they do not arise from a deficiency. It is evident, therefore, from this, that not every pleasure is a fulfillment of a deficiency. But if this is so, the ^C definition is unsound which says that pleasure is a transition into a sensible nature. For it does not encompass all pleasures, but omits that which comes from contemplation. Epicurus also, defining pleasure as the removal of all that is painful, says the same as those who claim it is a transition into a sensible nature. For he says that the removal of what is painful is pleasure. Since no transition is homogeneous or cognate with its own results, the generation ^D of pleasure—

^A must not be considered pleasure, but something else besides pleasure. For in the process of becoming, there is generation; but nothing of those things that are generated becomes and has been generated simultaneously, but it is evident that it happens by parts. Yet the one feeling pleasure feels it suddenly ^B; therefore, pleasure is not generation. Furthermore, every generation is of what does not exist; but pleasure is of things that already exist; therefore, pleasure is not generation. Furthermore, generation is said to be fast or slow, but pleasure is not. Furthermore, of goods, some are habits, others are activities, and others are instruments. A habit is like virtue, an activity ^C is like the exercise in accordance with it. And again, a habit is the faculty of sight, an activity is the act of seeing; instruments are those through which we perform some function, like the eye ^D and wealth and such things. But all the capacities of the soul, which are concerned with goods and evils, are faculties of certain habits. If, therefore, pleasure is a good and not an evil, it will consist only in these; but it is not a habit. For it is not as virtue; for it would not so easily change into the pain that is its opposite; nor is it as that which is opposed to a privation; for it is impossible for a habit and a privation to exist at the same time. But some people feel pleasure and pain at the same time, as those who scratch themselves; therefore, pleasure is not a habit. But neither is it an instrument. For instruments are for the sake of other things, and not for their own sake; but pleasure is not for the sake of another, but for its own sake; therefore, it is not an instrument. It remains, then, to consider it an activity of a function. Wherefore Aristotle defines it as: the unimpeded activity of a state that is in accordance with nature. For the things that impede an activity in accordance with nature bring pain; but also blessedness is an unimpeded activity of a state in accordance with nature. It follows, then, in accordance with this definition, that blessedness is pleasure, and the definition has been faulted.

^A Applying a correction, ^B he defined pleasure as the end of those activities of an animal that are in accordance with nature, so that pleasure is implicated in and coexists with blessedness, yet pleasure itself is not blessedness. Not every activity is a motion; for there is also an activity by way of immobility, according to which even God, the first Mover, acts, for the first Mover is immovable. Such also is the activity of contemplation in humans; for it exists by way of immobility. For indeed, that which is contemplated is one and the same always, and the mind of the one contemplating is fixed; for it is busied always about one and the same thing. If the pleasure of contemplation—which is the greatest, most sovereign, and true—comes about through immobility, it is clear that those which occur through lesser motions are, to the extent that they occur through fewer motions, both better and greater. ^B Pleasures are also divided according to the specific types of activities. For there are as many species of pleasures as there are of activities; and those of good activities are good, while those of base activities are base; and it is clear that for each sense there are different species of pleasures. For those of touch and taste are different, and those of sight, hearing, and smell are different; but those senses are more pure which do not approach the things that move the sense in a way that provides pleasure, such as sight, hearing, and smell. Also, there are two species of intellectual activities, and of these, one is practical and the other contemplative. It is clear, therefore, that there are also two species of the pleasures that accompany these activities. And of these, the contemplative is purer than the practical. But those which are proper to the human being, insofar as he is human, are the intellectual ones. For the sensory ones are common, as in the case of a brute animal, and are shared with other animals. Since, however, of sensory pleasures, some find pleasure in one thing and some in another—pleasures which do not appear good to the base, but to the virtuous—they are also good in themselves. For the correct judge of every matter is not the chance person, but he who is knowledgeable and disposed in accordance with nature. ^C

Chapter XIX. On sickness.

CHAPTER XX. On fear.

^ASloth is the fear of an action about to happen. Stupor is fear arising from a great appearance [of some object]. Being struck with terror is fear arising from an unusual appearance. Anxiety is the fear of slipping, that is, of failure; for when we fear that we might fail in our undertaking, we become anxious. Shame ^B is the fear in expectation of rebuke; this is an excellent emotion. Modesty [or verecundia] is the fear arising from a turpitude already committed; and this emotion also shows some hope of salvation. But shame differs from modesty in this, that he who is modest conceals himself because of the things he has committed, whereas he who is ashamed fears lest he admit some disgrace. The ancients, however, often abuse the names, calling shame "modesty," and modesty "shame." ^B* Fear arises by way of cooling, when all the heat runs together into the heart, which is the principal part, just as the populace, when in fear, flees to its rulers. ^B* The instrument of distress [anxiety/grievance] is the mouth of the stomach. For this is what feels the gnawing [morsus] in times of distress, as Galen ^C says in the third book of his *Demonstrations*, in this way: "To those who are in distress, much yellow bile flows down into the stomach, which provides them with that gnawing sensation (morsus); nor do they stop being distressed and suffering this gnawing until they vomit up the bile." For this gnawing happens to them below the cartilage at the middle of the chest, which is called the *xiphoid* (sword-shaped) [process]. The heart, however, is located much higher; for ^C of the diaphragm, the stomach is lower, but the heart is higher. But the ancients commonly call the mouth of the stomach the "heart," as Hippocrates and Thucydides ^C do, when describing the plague that was at Athens, saying: "When the pain was fixed in the heart, it would invert it, and the purgings of bile, what-

is inverted, is the mouth of the stomach, being forced to vomit—not the organ 88, the heart."

CAP. XXI.

Concerning Anger.

Anger is a boiling of the blood around the heart 90, brought about by the exhalation of bile or its agitation. Hence, it is called both *chole* (bile) and *cholos*. There are times, too, when anger 91 is an appetite for retaliation. For when we are wronged, or think we are being wronged, we become angry, and at that moment the emotion becomes a mixture of desire and anger. There are three species of anger 92: *orchē* (excandescentia), which is also called *chole* (bile) and *cholos*; *mēnis* (wrath); and *kotos* (rancor). For anger—in the sense of the initial movement—is called *orchē*, *chole*, and *cholos*; but *mēnis* is bile brought to a state of inveteracy; for it is said to be so derived from "abiding" 94 and having been handed down to memory; while *kotos* is anger watching for an opportunity for revenge: this, too, is said to be derived from "being laid up" 95. Anger is the attendant 96 of reason. For when reason judges that the event is worthy 97 of indignation, then anger steps forth 98, provided that they preserve their nature and their proper order.

Chapter XXII.

Concerning the irrational part, which does not obey reason.

That which acts in obedience to reason is thus constituted. Of that genus which does not obey 1 reason, there is the nutritive, the generative, and the pulsatile. It is called "natural," the nutritive and...

generative; but "vital," the pulsatile. ^A

CHAPTER XXIII. Of the nutritive part of the soul.

The natural powers of the nutritive part are four: attractive, retentive, ^B alterative, and expulsive. For every part of the animal naturally attracts to itself its own sustenance, and having attracted it, holds it, and having held it, changes it into itself, and thus expels what is superfluous. These are the faculties which administer food to the parts of the body, from which growth occurs, both in length and in breadth. Things that are superfluous are expelled by the bowels, by urine, by vomiting, by sweats, by the mouth, by the nostrils, by the ears, by the eyes, by exhalation, and by the ^C hidden pores. Now the other excretions are obvious: by the ears, that which is called earwax, which is the dirt of the ears; by the eyes, tears and rheum; by exhalation, the soot-like heat of the heart is expelled. They speak of hidden pores, the breathing of the whole body, through which, from the depths and by the contraction of the arteries, very many vapors escape through the porosity of the skin. The instruments of the nutritive faculty are the mouth, ^D the stomach, the belly, the liver, all the veins, the intestines, both biles, and the kidneys. For the mouth first prepares food for the belly, minutely cutting it up by means of the teeth and the tongue. For the tongue also provides the greatest service in mastication, gathering the food and placing it under the teeth, just as women who grind grain put it under the millstones with their hand. For in a certain way the tongue is the hand of mastication. Thus, then, being prepared, the food is sent on to the belly through the esophagus; for the stomach is not only an instrument for perceiving want, but also a passage for food. For it reaches up during the act of swallowing and draws in the food, and sends it on to the

[The stomach], when it has received [food], separates what is good and apt for nourishment from what is stony, woody, and unsuited for feeding; and that which is indeed good, converting it into juices, it sends to the liver through the veins, which draw from it and transport [it] to the liver—veins which are like the roots of the liver, drawing nourishment from the stomach ^A just as the roots of plants draw it from the earth. For the stomach is like the earth, which provides nourishment for the plants; the veins, which lead the juice up to the gates and the gibbous parts of the liver from both the stomach and the intestines through the mesentery, are like the roots; the liver itself is like the trunk; and the veins which branch off from the vena cava, which springs from the hollow parts of the liver, are like the branches and the outermost parts of the tree. For the liver, when it has received the juice from the stomach, concocts it and makes it like itself. And having flesh most similar to blood, it deservedly converts the juice into blood. The blood, however, is purified through the spleen, the gallbladder, and the kidneys; the spleen draws off the dregs ^B and makes them its own food; the gallbladder [draws off] the sharp [part], which remained in the juices from the food; and the kidneys [draw off] the serous humor, together with the sharp [remainder], so that, with the blood now remaining pure and useful for nourishment, it may be distributed to all the other parts of the body through the veins that are sown into them. And thus each of the parts, drawing the blood and containing it and changing it into its own nature, transmits the surplus to the neighboring parts, having become suitable food for them. And in this way all the parts are nourished, grow, and persist by means of the blood which the liver supplies ^C. However, this part is said to be void of reason, not obeying reason, because it does not perform its work according to our judgment or choice, but naturally.

CAP. XXIV. Of the pulses.

^B The movement of the pulse, which is also called the vital faculty, has its beginning at the heart, and especially at its left ventricle, which is called the spiracle, and it distributes the innate and vital heat to every part of the body through the arteries, just as the liver distributes nourishment through the veins. For when the heart is heated contrary to nature, the whole animal is immediately heated contrary to nature; and when it is cooled, it is cooled. For the vital spirit is dispersed from it through the arteries to the entire body. These three, moreover, the vein, the artery, and the nerve, are for the most part ^C intertwined with one another, having proceeded from the three origins that govern the animal: from the brain, which is the origin of motion and sensation, the nerve; from the liver, which is the origin of blood and the nutritive faculty, the vein, the vessel of the blood; and from the heart, which is the origin of the vital faculty, the artery, the vessel of the spirit. And as they consort with one another, they enjoy the benefits of each other. For the vein provides nourishment to the nerve and the artery; the artery imparts natural heat and vital spirit to the vein; and the nerve provides sensation to them and to the whole body. Whence it is impossible to find an artery without thin blood, a vein without vaporous spirit, or a nerve without sensation. ^D The artery is vehemently dilated and contracted according to a certain harmony and proportion, having the origin of its movement from the heart. But while it is being dilated, it draws by force thin blood from the adjacent veins, which, by becoming vaporized, becomes nourishment for the vital spirit; but while it is being contracted, it empties what is fuliginous within it throughout the entire body and through

the unseen passages, just as the heart empties the fuliginous matter through the mouth and nostrils in the process of expiration.

CAP. XXV. On the generative or seminal faculty.

The generative faculty, however, belongs to that part which does not obey reason. For we emit seed during dreams without our will; and the desire for intercourse is natural. We are moved toward it involuntarily; yet the act is universally acknowledged to be in our power and belongs to the soul. For it is accomplished through the organs of impulse, and it is in our power both to abstain and to restrain the impulse. The organs of the seminal faculty are primarily the veins and arteries. For in these, through the conversion of blood, the first moisture, which verges toward the nature of seed—just as milk is in the breasts—is created. For this humor is the nourishment of these vessels, because they were created from the seed from the beginning. Therefore, the arteries and veins cook the blood into a moisture that approach the nature of seed, so that they may be nourished; and whatever is left over from their nourishment becomes seed. It is carried first through a long circuit into the head, and then it is brought down from the head through two veins and two arteries. Hence, if anyone cuts the veins ^A that are alongside the ears and the carotids, he makes the animal sterile and unfit for [procreation].

Moreover, the veins and arteries become that tortuous and varicose-like plexus alongside the scrotum, where the warm fluid flows into each of the testicles; [one artery and one vein, full of semen.] In these parts, it is perfectly turned into semen, and by way of the varicose appendage which is after ^B the testicles, it is secreted along with breath, because it is also an artery that transmits it. That it is also carried from a vein is evident from the act of lust. For when they have had intercourse for a long time and have consumed the seminal and frothy humor, then, under the influence of the violent pull, they secrete pure blood. And women also have all the same parts as men, but within and not outside.

Aristotle and Democritus, indeed, do not wish for the woman's semen to contribute anything to the generation ^C of children. For they wish that what is discharged from women is the sweat of the member rather than semen. Galen, however, condemning Aristotle, says that women also emit semen and that the mixing of both semens makes the fetus; hence also is intercourse called a mixing—yet not perfect semen, like that of the man, but still crude and more liquid. Since such is the semen of the woman, it becomes nourishment for the man's, and from it a certain portion of the afterbirth, which is at the horns of the uterus, congeals, and what is called the sausage-shaped membrane, ^D which remains...

^A, a receptacle for the waste matter of the embryo. In every kind of animal, the female admits the male when she is able to conceive. Those, therefore, that can always conceive always admit union, as do hens, doves, and humans. But other animals, while pregnant, flee from union; the woman always admits it. For hens, because they lay almost every day, unite with the male almost every day. Women, however, as in other matters they are free in their will, so they are in intercourse after conception. For beasts are not directed by their own selves, but by nature; and the measure and time for them is established by the law of nature. For the irrational animals ^B are not regulated by themselves, but by nature, and they receive fixed measures and times.

CAP. XXVI. Another division of the faculties that govern the animal.

Others divide the faculties that are in an animal in a different way. And they call some psychic (soul-related), some natural, and some vital. The psychic are those that are by election and deliberation; the natural and vital are those that are without election and deliberation. And there are two psychic faculties: motion, by which animals are stirred of themselves and with appetite, and sensation. Furthermore, of the motion that is by appetite, there are three types: the power of ^C progressing, which is the moving of the whole body from one place to another; the power of producing voice; and the power of respiration ^D. For these it is within our power both to perform and not to perform. But the natural and vital [faculties],

^A as the nutritive, the augmentative, and the generative, being natural, as well as the pulse, being vital, are not in our power but occur whether we will or no. We have already spoken of the instruments of the other [faculties]; now we shall speak of the motion that is undertaken by choice.

CHAPTER XXVII.

There is, therefore, a motion which animals undertake by choice or by impulse, the primary principle of which is the brain and the spinal marrow, for this too is a part of the brain. The instruments are the nerves which arise from these, and the ligaments, and the muscles. ^B Muscles consist of flesh and nervous fibers and tendons, which are intertwined with the fibers of the nerves. Whence some persons have thought them to be sensory, because of the sensation that arises from the nerves intertwined with them. A tendon, therefore, is composed of ligament and thin nerves. A tendon differs from a nerve in that every nerve is endowed with the power of sensation, is round, and somewhat softer, and has its origin from the brain; whereas a tendon is harder, derives from bone, and is of itself devoid of sensation, and is sometimes flat. Now, the hands are an instrument for grasping and are most suitable for the practice of the arts. For if anyone were to remove the hands, or merely the fingers of the hands, he renders a human being ^C almost entirely useless for all the arts. For this reason man alone, since he is rational and capable of arts, has been gifted by the Creator with hands. The feet, on the other hand, are an instrument for locomotion; for it is by means of them that we move from place to place. Man alone sits, needing no support. For he alone bends his legs at two right angles, both at the hip and at the hams, the one set inward, the other outward.^D

^A Since therefore all things that move by means of nerves and muscles are psychic, they are all performed according to purpose. We have further shown that the senses and the voice are of this kind. This, then, is the reasoned distinction between psychic and natural operations. ^B But God, in His supreme providence, has woven the psychic operations together with the natural ones, and vice versa. For since the ejection of the remains of food and drink belongs to the expulsive faculty—which is one of the natural faculties—He, in order to prevent us from indecorously doing anything against our choice and will, where we ought not, when we ought not, or in circumstances where we ought not, acting by necessity, set certain guardians over these ejections, namely the muscles; and in this way He made the operations of nature into psychic ones. It is for this reason that we can hold back these ejections, often, and for a long time. Now the sensitive and soft nerves are sent down from the middle and anterior ventricles of the brain, while the harder ones, which possess the power of motion, are sent from the posterior ventricle and the spinal marrow. ^C But those from the spinal marrow are harder, and those from the lower parts of it are harder still. For as far as the spinal marrow departs from the brain, it becomes the more hard itself, and so too do the nerves which originate from it. Just as we have received our senses in pairs, so too have we received, in pairs, the origins of the nerves. For each vertebra of the spinal column sends out a pair of nerves, one of which proceeds to the right parts of the body, and the other to the left. For our whole body is almost divided into two, into right and left. Thus also for the feet, the hands, and each of the other parts, just as for our sensory organs, we have received right and left sides.

CAP. XXVIII. On Respiration.

^A For there are muscles which dilate the thorax, the principal instrument of respiration; and the sudden and sigh-like respiration which occurs during great pains, demonstrates that the operation is psychic. Moreover, the changes in respiration according to our needs are within our power ^B. For when we feel pain in any of the respiratory organs, or in those which move in conjunction with them—such as the diaphragm, or the liver, or the spleen, or the stomach, the small intestines, and the colon—we breathe in a shallow and frequent manner: shallow, so that we may not strike the painful part too violently, and frequent, so that the frequency may compensate for what was lost in the magnitude of the breath. For just as when we have pain in the leg, we extend it only a little while walking, for the same reason by which we also restrict our respiration; therefore, just as walking is a psychic operation, so too is ^C breathing. But while we can remain resting and not walking for a very long time and still live, it is not possible to hold our breath even for a tenth of an hour. For the heat that is within us is suffocated by the soot, and is extinguished, and immediately brings about death. For if anyone were to cover a flame in a vessel that has no outlet, it would extinguish it, having been suffocated by the smoke. Therefore, out of this necessity, even while we are asleep, the soul continues to perform its function in this regard, knowing that if it were to cease even for a very brief time, the animal would perish. ^D Thus, here again, the psychic operation is joined with the natural one. For it performs the respiratory function by means of an artery, which is a natural instrument and one that is always in motion, so that its function may never fail, just as it is with the other arteries. Whence some, not understanding this, have thought that respiration was merely a natural operation. But there are three causes of respiration: necessity, power, and the instruments. Necessity is twofold [alt-version omitted].

^A namely the preservation of innate heat and the nourishment of the psychic spirit. The preservation of natural heat is maintained by both inspiration and expiration; inspiration cools and moderately stirs the heat, while expiration discharges the soot of the heart. The nourishment of the psychic spirit, however, occurs through respiration alone, for a portion of air is drawn into the heart during its expansions. ^B

Power is the psychic power, for it is this which moves the instruments of respiration by means of the muscles, and primarily the thorax. With this, the lung and the rough arteries—which are a part of the lung—are moved together. For of the rough artery, the cartilaginous part is the instrument of the voice, while its membranous parts are the ligaments of respiration. That which is composed of both these is the artery itself, an instrument both for the voice and for breathing. The lung, therefore, is a structure composed of four elements: the rough artery, the smooth artery, the vein, and the foamy flesh of the lung itself; this flesh fills the spaces between the parts of the structure—that is, between the two arteries and the vein—like stuffing, ^C so as to become their seat and ligament. The flesh of the lung naturally concocts the spirit, just as the liver concocts the humor drawn from the belly. And for this reason, just as the liver embraces with its extreme fibers the belly that is in need of heat, so too the lung encompasses in its middle the heart, which is in need of the cooling provided by respiration. Connected to the rough artery at the junction is the bronchus, composed of ^D [alt-version omitted]

^A great cartilages, 74 to which the pharynx 75 is attached, and then the mouth and the nose. For we draw air from outside through both; and from there it passes further through the ethmoid 76 or spongy bone, which has been perforated, so that in the excesses 77 of the air, regarding its quality, 78 the brain may be in no way harmed by the breath 79 rushing in upon it all at once. The Creator also used the nose here for both breathing 80 and smelling, just as He used the tongue 81 for both voice, taste, and mastication.

Now, the most essential 82 parts for ^C existence itself and for the necessary needs of life are shared with the psychic 83 faculties. 84 And if anything has been passed over, 85 it will be easily understood from things already stated. Just as of all things that have come to be, some have come to be for their own sake, some both for their own sake 86 and for the sake of others, some only for the sake of others, and some have come to exist accidentally; so too in the parts 87 of the animal you will find the same order.

For all the aforementioned instruments are organs of the three principles 88 that govern the animal, and they have come to be for their own sake. For these have been fashioned primarily and in the first instance, which are also properly said to be according to nature, 89 and they receive their generation 91 in the womb from the seed 90 itself, just as the bones do. But yellow bile exists both for its own sake and for the sake of another. For it contributes to digestion, 92 and it moves excretion, and in this way it becomes in a certain manner one of the nutritive parts; furthermore, it also provides a certain heat to the body, just as the vital faculty does. For these reasons, therefore, it seems to have come to be for its own sake; but because it cleanses the blood, it seems to have come to be for the sake of another 93 in a certain way.

The spleen also contributes not a little to digestion. For since it is acid and harsh by nature, and pours out the secretion of the surplus black humor into the stomach, it binds it, makes it firm, and stimulates it toward digestion. In addition, it also cleans the liver. For this reason, it too seems to have come into being for the sake of the blood. The kidneys, moreover, are a cleansing [organ] of the blood, and they are the causes of the appetite for intercourse. For the veins which we said ^B enter into the testicles pass through the kidneys, and from there they derive a certain acrimony, which irritates the appetite, just as that acrimony which occurs under the skin causes itching. But insofar as the flesh of the testicles is softer than the skin, to that extent they are, being bitten by the acrimony, more agitated, and they create a frenzied desire for the emission of seed. These things, then, and others like them, have come to be in a certain fashion both for their own sake and for the sake of others.

The glands and the flesh, however, exist only for the sake of others. For the glands are a carriage ^C and a support for the vessels, so that they may not be ruptured when they are carried aloft during violent movements. Flesh has come to be as a covering for the other parts, so that in summer it may cool the animal, sending out moisture from within, and in winter it may provide for it the use of felted wool. The skin also is a covering for both the soft flesh and of all the other things that are included inside; but by nature it is flesh, having become callous both due to the surrounding air and by the bodies that come into contact with it. The bones are a support for the whole body, and especially the spine, which they say ^D is the keel of the animal.

The nails, commonly to all those who have...

need of them, provide the use of scratching, and beyond this, to one creature another [distinct use]. For to many of the animals they were given as a means of defense, as to those with hooked claws; and they are like an instrument of the irascible part [of the soul]; to many [they are] both a means of defense ^A and a support for the base, as to horses and every single-hoofed animal. And to humans, they were given not only for scratching and for driving away the acrimony of the skin, but also for the perception of fine things; for we grasp very fine things by means of them, and by pressing back against the tips of the fingers, they make the grasping of them firm. But the hairs came into existence by accident. For they consist of the most smoky vapors ^B exhaled from the body, which, upon condensing, are formed by accident. Yet the Creator did not make even these altogether useless; but, although they were created by accident, He brought it about that they contribute to the animals for a covering and an ornament: a covering for goats and sheep, but an ornament for human beings; and for some animals ^C both an ornament and at the same time a covering, as is the case for the lion.

CAPUT XXIX. On that which takes place voluntarily and involuntarily.

Since we have often 21 made mention of the voluntary and the involuntary, it is necessary to discourse also regarding these, so that we may not err in an accurate knowledge of them. Now, it is necessary for one who is about to speak on the involuntary and the voluntary 22 to set forth first certain rules and principles 23, by which it may be known whether that which is happening is voluntary or involuntary. Since therefore 24 everything voluntary 124 is in some action, and that which is considered involuntary is also in an action—as will be shown 26 shortly—and some indeed ^D place that which is truly involuntary not only in suffering but also in acting, it must be defined first 27 of all, what an action is. An action is a rational function. Praise or blame follows upon actions 28, and some of them are performed with pleasure, others with pain; [some of them are chosen, others are avoided; and of those that are chosen...]

some are chosen by the actor, and others are avoided; and of those that are chosen, some are always chosen, and others are so at a certain time; and likewise with those that are avoided. And again, some actions are objects of pity and deserve pardon, while others are hated and punished. Let these, therefore, be the criteria of the voluntary: ^A that praise or blame absolutely follows them, and that they are performed with pleasure, and that the actions are chosen by those who perform them, either always or at the time when they are performed. And the criteria of the involuntary are: that they deserve pardon or pity, and are performed with pain, and are not chosen. These things having been thus distinguished, let us speak first about the involuntary. ^B

CAP. XXX. Concerning that which is done involuntarily.

That which is done involuntarily is performed either by force or through ignorance. Now, regarding those things which are done by force, the moving principle is from without. For some other cause of the violence exists, and not we ourselves. Therefore, the definition of the involuntary through force is that of which the principle is from without, with the person to whom force is applied contributing nothing by his own impulse. The principle is here termed the efficient cause. But it is asked whether ^C these things are also involuntary, such as the jettisoning of cargo which sailors perform when they have fallen into a storm, or when someone submits to suffer or do a shameful thing in order to save friends or country. But these seem rather to be voluntary. For this reason, it is added to the definition, "with the person to whom force is applied contributing nothing by his own impulse." For in cases of this kind, they themselves voluntarily and by their own selves move the instrumental parts, and thus cast the burdens into the sea. The same thing happens to those who endure something shameful or grievous for the sake of a greater good, as Zeno, who bit off his own tongue and spat it out at...

^A Dionysius the tyrant, lest he should in any way reveal secret and hidden things. Likewise also Anaxarchus the philosopher, who suffered himself to be pounded by Nicocreon the tyrant, so as not to betray his friends. In general, therefore, when anyone chooses the lesser evil through fear of greater evils, or chooses the lesser evil—which he could not otherwise avoid—for the sake of the hope of a greater good, he does not endure a suffering or action unwillingly. For he acts according to his own preference and choice, and then these things become desirable when they are done, whereas they are not desirable in themselves. There are, therefore, things mixed from both the involuntary and the voluntary: involuntary, indeed, in themselves, but voluntary at that time because of the circumstances. For without the circumstance, no one would choose to do these things. The praise or blame that occurs for such actions also declares ^B that they are voluntary. For there will be no praise or blame for involuntary deeds.

It is not, however, easy to discern what ought to be chosen over what. It is necessary, for the most part, to choose what is painful over what is shameful, as Susanna and Joseph did, though not always. For Origen, indeed, in order not to fall into the disgrace and ignominy which the Ethiopians were displaying, offered sacrifice and fell from the whole matter. Thus, the discernment of such things is not easy. And it is even more difficult than this to remain in what has been decided. For terrible things do not strike fear in the same way when they are expected as they do when they are actually pressing upon us. But it happens sometimes that, when we have judged and determined something, we ^C depart from that judgment when we are in the midst of the terrible things, as...

^A it happened to certain ones in the case of martyrdom. For having steadfastly held out at the beginning, they gave way towards the end, softened by the trial of terrible things. And let no one think that the desire of intemperance or anger are involuntary transgressions, since these also have their beginning from without as the source. For both the beauty of a harlot excited the one who saw it to intemperance, and he who provoked it stirred up the anger. For although they have the efficient cause from without, yet they themselves act of themselves and through their own organic parts; nor do they fall under the definition of what is done involuntarily, since they themselves provide the cause of the beginning for themselves ^B by easily being captured by the passions because of a wicked upbringing. Thus, those who do these things are blamed, as having contracted the evil of their own accord. And that it is voluntary is clear: for they take pleasure in the action, whereas the involuntary was shown to be painful. Concerning the involuntary caused by force ^C these things have been said; it remains to speak regarding that which is caused by ignorance.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Of that which is done involuntarily through ignorance.

We do many things through lack of knowledge, from which we derive pleasure after the action, as when someone kills an enemy unintentionally, yet takes pleasure in the murder. These and other things of this kind they call "not voluntary," yet not also "involuntary." And again, we do certain things through ignorance, and we are pained at what has occurred. These they called "involuntary," in those cases where grief follows the things done. Of things done through ignorance, therefore, there are two species: one is the "not voluntary," the other is the "involuntary." Now it is proposed to speak only of the involuntary. ^D For what is not voluntary is more subsumed under those things which are voluntary, being mixed. For it has the beginning as involuntary, but the end as voluntary. For from the outcome, what was involuntary has become voluntary. Therefore they also define the involuntary thus: "The involuntary is that which is at the same time not voluntary, and also painful and accompanied by repentance." Again, it is one thing to do something through ignorance, and another...

to do it while ignorant. For if the cause of the ignorance is in our own power, we do things while ignorant, ^A but not by reason of an ignorance. For the drunken man and the angry man, when they do something base, the one has drunkenness, the other anger, as the cause of the things done by him, which were voluntary. For he could have avoided becoming drunk. He himself, therefore, has become the cause of the ignorance to himself. These things, therefore, are not said to be done through ignorance, but he acts being ignorant of them, things which are not involuntary, but voluntary. For this reason, those who do these things are also blamed by honorable men. For if he had not become drunk, he would not have done it; but he became drunk voluntarily, and therefore he did these things voluntarily. But we do things through ignorance when we ourselves do not provide the cause of the ignorance, but it happened thus; for example, if in a familiar place one, while practicing, accidentally struck and killed his father who was passing by. From what has been said, therefore, it is proven ^B that he who is ignorant of what is advantageous, and who thinks that base things are good, does not suffer an involuntary passion. For his ignorance is of his own wickedness; he is blamed, therefore, even in this case; and blame applies to voluntary things. Ignorance, therefore, is not involuntary regarding general and universal matters, or those things which are according to choice, but regarding particular matters. For we are ignorant of particular things involuntarily, but of universal things voluntarily.

These things having been thus distinguished, we must next state what the particular things are. These are what are called by the rhetoricians the circumstances: who, what, what thing, to whom, where, ^C when, how, why. For example: person, thing, instrument, place, time, manner, cause. A person, indeed, is the one who does, or with respect to whom the action is performed, as if

the son unknowingly struck his father. The fact is the very thing that happened, such as if someone, while wishing to strike another with his fist, should blind him. The instrument is, if one should throw a stone, thinking it to be a pumice stone. The place is, if while turning into a narrow alley, one should unknowingly strike someone he encounters. The time is, if at night, thinking a friend to be an enemy, one should kill him. The manner is, if one should strike someone lightly and not with great force, and kill him; for he did not know that the one struck lightly would die. The cause is, if someone should give medicine to anyone as if to heal him, but the person who used that medicine should die, because it was found to be poison. But not even a madman would be ignorant of all these things together. However, he who is ignorant of the most or the most important of these has acted through ignorance. The most important of these are the for-the-sake-of-which and the thing done, that is, the cause and the fact. ^B

CHAPTER XXXII. On that which is done voluntarily.

Since that which is done against one's will is twofold, happening through ignorance and through force, that which is done voluntarily is opposed to both. For it is that which is done neither by force nor through ignorance. And it is not by force, indeed, when the beginning of the action is in the agents themselves; nor is it through ignorance, if none of the individual circumstances are unknown, through which and in which the action exists. Having therefore combined both, we define that which is done voluntarily as that of which the beginning is in the agent, who knows the individual circumstances in which the action exists. But it is asked whether things that happen by nature are voluntary, such as digestion and growth. ^C But these are shown to be neither voluntary nor involuntary. For the voluntary and the involuntary are in the things that are within our power, whereas digestion and growth are not within our power. Whence, even if we are not ignorant of the individual circumstances, because they are not within our power,

it is said that we do them neither voluntarily nor involuntarily. ^A But those things done through anger and desire have been shown to be voluntary. For when they are done rightly, they are praised, and when they are done wrongly, they are blamed or hated; pleasure and pain follow them, and the principle of them is within us. For it was within them not to succumb easily to the passions. For through habits, such things are brought to a right state.

Furthermore, if these things were involuntary, no irrational animal would do anything voluntarily, nor indeed would children; but this is not the case now; for ^B we see them coming voluntarily to food, and they do so neither by force (for they are the ones moving of themselves), nor through ignorance; for they are not ignorant of food. When they have observed food, they take pleasure in it and move toward it as to a familiar object, and if they fail, they are distressed. But there is a criterion for what is voluntary: if one succeeds, there is pleasure, and if one fails, there is pain; from which it is evident that they possess desire and anger voluntarily; for anger also occurs with pleasure. And otherwise, if one does not say that things done through anger and desire are voluntary, one destroys the moral virtues. For these exist in a mean relative to the passions. But if the passions are involuntary, then the actions according to the virtues are also involuntary. For even these ^C occur according to a passion. But no one says that what is done according to reason and choice and one's own impulse and appetite, with knowledge of the individual circumstances, is involuntary. And it was shown that the principle also is within them; therefore, they are voluntary. Since we have mentioned choice ^D in many places, and that which is within our power, we must also discuss choice.

Cap. XXXIII: On Choice

What then is choice? Is it what is done voluntarily, that is, that of which the principle is in oneself, with knowledge of the individual circumstances?

^A For it does not follow inversely, as would be the case if choice and the voluntary were the same; for as it is, we find that the voluntary has a wider scope. ^B For every choice is voluntary, but not everything that is voluntary is a matter of choice. For children and irrational animals act voluntarily, but not by choice. And whatever we do out of anger without deliberation, we do voluntarily, but not by choice. Indeed, even a friend who appears to us suddenly, we welcome voluntarily, but we did not choose his arrival. And he who finds a treasure unexpectedly, finds the luck voluntarily, but not by choice. From all this, therefore, it is concluded that the voluntary and choice are not the same thing.

Is, then, appetite choice? Even this is not true. For appetite is divided into three parts: into desire, anger, and wish. But that choice is neither anger nor desire is evident from the fact that human beings have no communion with irrational animals in regard to choice, but only in regard to desire and anger. For if we have these in common with the beasts, but differ by virtue of choice, it is clear that choice is one thing, and anger and desire are another. ^C The incontinent man also demonstrates this, who is conquered by desire and acts according to it, but not according to choice. For in him, choice stands against desire. If they were the same, they would not conflict. And the continent man, also, who acts by choice, does not act according to desire.

That choice is not a wish, ^D is clear from this: it is not the case that for all those for whom it is appropriate to choose, it is also appropriate to wish. For we say we wish to be healthy, but no one would say they choose to be healthy; and one is said to wish to be rich, but it is not said that one chooses to be rich. Furthermore, "wishing" is applied even to things that are impossible, while "choosing" is applied only to those things that are in our power. Thus, we indeed say: "I wish to become immortal."

^A For wishing is of the end, whereas choosing is of things pertaining to the end, according to the same proportion that the "wishable" has to the "consultable." For the end is wishable, but the things pertaining to the end are consultable. Furthermore, we choose only those things which we think can be brought about by us, but we wish also for those things that cannot be brought about by us, such as that any general might be victorious. That, therefore, choice is neither anger, nor desire, nor wish, has been sufficiently demonstrated. And that it is not opinion either, becomes clear both through the same proofs and through others. For opinion is not only of things within our power, but also of eternal things. ^B Furthermore, we call opinion true or false, but we do not call choice true or false. And opinion is of universals, whereas choice is of particulars; for choice is regarding things to be done, and these are particulars. But neither is choice a consultation, that is, a decision. For consultation is an inquiry regarding things to be done by oneself; but the "choosable" is that which has been determined by consultation. It is clear, therefore, that consultation is concerning things still being sought, whereas choice is concerning things already determined. What choice is not, therefore, has been stated; let us say what it is.

It is, therefore, something mixed from consultation, and judgment, and appetite; and it is not appetite by itself, nor ^C judgment, nor consultation alone, but that which is composed of these. For just as we say that a living being consists of soul and body, and yet the living being is neither the body by itself, nor the soul alone, but the composite of both, so too is choice. That it is, therefore, a certain wish and consultation with approbation, if...

it is clearly evident also from etymology. For that which is chosen is the thing selected before another. But no one prefers anything without having consulted, nor chooses without having judged. ^A Since, however, we do not strive to carry into action everything that seems good to us, then choice and the choosable thing become that which has been selected from consultation when it obtains desire. Necessarily, therefore, choice is concerned with those things with which consultation is also concerned. It is gathered, then, from these things that choice is a deliberative desire for things that are in our power, or a deliberative appetite for things that are within our power. ^B For we desire what has been selected from consultation by choosing it. But since we said that choice is occupied with those things in which consultation also is, let us clarify in what things consultation is occupied, and about what things we consult.

Chapter XXXIV.

About what things we consult.

Before we explain about what things we consult, it is more correct to explain how consultation differs from questioning; for consultation and questioning are not the same thing, even if he who consults consults while seeking something, but they differ much from each other. For we inquire whether the sun is larger than the earth; yet no one says that he consults whether the sun is larger than the earth. ^C For inquiry is a genus of consultation; for it extends more widely; for every consultation is a certain inquiry, but not every inquiry is a consultation. And this has indeed been demonstrated. Moreover, we sometimes use "to consider" for "to consult," as in "I consider whether I ought to sail"; at other times, for "to meditate," as in "I consider my studies,"—we do not say "I consult my studies." But we are often troubled, hearing these names indiscriminately, thinking that to be the same which is not the same. ^D Since, therefore, the difference between these has become clear, it must be stated...

regarding what things we deliberate. We deliberate, therefore, concerning those things which are in our power and can be brought to pass by us, and which have an uncertain ^A end, that is, which can happen either in this way or in another. Now, that which is in our power has been mentioned, since we deliberate only concerning matters of action. For these are in our power. We do not deliberate concerning the so-called theoretical philosophy. For we do not deliberate concerning God, nor concerning things that happen by necessity; and by necessity I mean things that always happen in the same way, such as the cycle of the year; nor concerning those things which do not exist always, but always happen in the same way, such as the setting and rising of the sun; nor concerning those things which happen by nature, yet not always in the same way, but as a rule, such as for a sixty-year-old to go grey or for a twenty-year-old to grow a beard; nor, finally, concerning those things ^B which are said to happen by chance, which are among those things that happen less frequently.

For these reasons, then, the phrase "what is in our power" has been spoken of, but as for the phrase "by us," since we do not deliberate concerning all men nor concerning every matter, but concerning only those things which are in our power and are brought to pass by us. For we do not deliberate how enemies (97) or those living far away (98) might govern their state well, even though this is a matter of deliberation for them. But neither do we deliberate concerning all things which are brought to pass by us and are in our power (99), but it is necessary to add also, "which have an uncertain end." For if it is clear and agreed upon, we no longer deliberate; for deliberation does not exist ^C concerning works or actions conducted according to science or art. For the principles of these are defined, except for a few.

arts that are called conjectural ^A, such as medicine, gymnastics, and navigation. For we do not deliberate concerning these matters only, but concerning those things which, while being in our power and performed through us, have an uncertain outcome and can be done in this way or that. And it has been demonstrated that deliberation is not concerning the end, but concerning those things which lead to the end. For we do not deliberate about becoming wealthy, but about how and through what means we might become wealthy. To speak briefly, we only deliberate concerning those things that occur equally in either direction. And we must also discuss this subject here, so that nothing may be lacking for the clarity of the treatise. "Faculties" are said to be those things by which we are able to do something. For of everything that we do, we possess the faculty; and of those things for which we do not possess the faculty, we do not perform the actions either. Therefore, action is linked to faculty, and faculty to substance; for action proceeds from faculty, and faculty proceeds from substance, and exists in substance. ^B There are, therefore, these three things, as we have said, linked to one another: that which is able, the faculty, and that which is possible. By "that which is able" is meant the substance; by "faculty," that from which we have the ability; and by "that which is possible," that which is naturally constituted to come to be through the faculty. Of those things which are possible, some are necessary, and others are contingent. Necessary are those which it is impossible to prevent, or whose opposite is impossible. Contingent is that which can be prevented, or whose opposite is also possible; for example, it is necessary for a living man to breathe; for this, the opposite is impossible—that a living man should not breathe. But contingent is that it should rain today; yet the opposite is also possible for it, that it should not rain today. Again, of contingent things, ^C some are said to occur for the most part, others seldom, and others equally in either direction; for the most part, as the sixty-year-old being elderly; but to a lesser degree, as someone sixty years old...

^A not being elderly; and equally, to walk and not to walk, and to speak simply, to do something and not to do it. Concerning these, therefore, which are equally contingent, we alone deliberate. That is also equally contingent, which we have the power to do, as well as its opposite; for if we did not have the power for both, both the thing itself and its opposite, we would not deliberate. For no one deliberates about things that are accepted as certain, nor about things that are impossible. And if we had the power only for one of the opposites, this, then, would be something certain and not at all doubtful, while the opposite would be impossible.

CHAPTER XXXV.

De Fato.

^B Those who ascribe the cause of all things that happen to the revolution of the stars not only fight against common notions but also declare all government to be useless. For laws are absurd, and courts of justice superfluous, which punish those who are in no way responsible, and rebukes and praises are irrational; and prayers are also foolish, if all things happen according to fate; and Providence is also banished along with piety, along with the fact that man is found to be ^C merely an instrument of the celestial revolution; for by it he is moved ^D to actions, not only the parts of his body, but also the thoughts of the soul; and in short, those who say these things not only destroy the power of our free will, but also the very nature of the contingent; and thus they do nothing else but corrupt everything. And those stars themselves are unjust, making some men adulterers and others murderers; and, even before this...

the architect of these things, God, is brought in as the cause of them if He constructed them in such a way, and if He ^A of necessity imposes upon us the visitation of such evils; so that their absurdity is not merely set up within the civil order, but they also represent God as the cause of the greatest evils, besides the fact that their hypothesis is impossible to demonstrate. But those things are not even worth hearing, as they clearly contain blasphemy and absurdity. However, those who say that both our own power and fate are preserved (for to each of the things that come to be, something is destined by fate, just as it is for water to cool, and for each of the plants to bear such and such a fruit, and for the stone to move downwards, and for the fire to move upwards ^B, and so also for the animal to give its assent and to feel impulse; and when nothing from without and nothing according to fate opposes this impulse, then walking is perfectly within our power, and we will certainly walk): those who say these things (and they are illustrious men among the Stoics, Chrysippus and Philopater, and many other noble men) demonstrate nothing other than that everything happens according to fate.

For if they say that even our impulses are given to us by fate ^C, and that these impulses are sometimes hindered by fate and sometimes not, it is clear that everything comes to be according to fate, even those things which appear to be in our own power. And again, we will use the same arguments against them, demonstrating the absurdity of their opinion. For if, when the same causes are present, as they themselves say, it is entirely necessary that the same things ^D come to pass, and it is impossible that at one time they happen thus and at another time differently...

because they have been allotted thus from eternity. ^A It is also necessary that the appetition of the animal, all things and all ways remaining the same surrounding causes, come to pass in this way. But if the appetition also follows from necessity, where, then, is that which is in our power? For that which is in our power must be free; and it would be free if, the same causes surrounding, it were in our power to sometimes appetize, and at other times not to appetize. But if the act of appetizing also follows from necessity, it is clear that things pertaining to appetition will also come to pass according to fate, even if they occur through us, and according to our nature and appetition and judgment. For if it were possible for it ^B not to happen, the proposition would be false which says that, the same causes surrounding, it is necessary that the same things follow. And this will also be found regarding irrational creatures and inanimate objects. For if they place appetition in our power because we have it by nature, what prevents one from saying that burning is also placed in the power of fire, since fire burns by nature? A point which Philopator also seems to incidentally indicate in his book *On Fate*. Therefore, that which comes about through us by fate is not in our power. For by the same reasoning, something would also be in the power of the lyre and the flutes and other instruments, and everything lacking reason and soul, when certain persons employ them to effect something: which is truly ^C absurd.

Chapter XXXVI

To the wise men of the Egyptians, who say that the belief in fate placed in the stars is true, but that it is changed by prayers and apotropaic rites (for they say there are also certain cults of these very stars, which mitigate them, and other, superior ^D forces which... [alt-version omitted]

^A are able to turn them, and that for this reason prayers and the cult of the gods and apotropaic rites have been devised), we shall answer that they make fate the cause of contingent, not necessary, things. But the contingent is infinite; and the infinite is unknown. Therefore, by this, all divination is abolished, most especially that of those called genethliaci, which they themselves champion before all others as a kind of strong and ^B true thing. And if they say that the effects of the configurations are clear and are known to those skilled in them; but when a configuration does not result according to its own power, God has prevented it; we shall answer that this too is absurd. First, because they assume that only prayer is in our power and the cult of the gods, and nothing else besides. Then we shall dispute with them, asking how, when all other human actions ^C and choices are situated in some configuration of the stars, prayer alone is placed in our power? For it is doubtful why this is so, and what cause imposes this necessity.

Then, if there is a certain art and doctrine of these remedies, which prevents the power of fate, can all men attain this doctrine, or can some, and others cannot? For if all can, nothing prevents fate from being completely overturned by this reasoning, ^D since all would have learned the art that prevents the effects of fate; but if some can attain it and some cannot, who finally is he who prescribes this? For if fate itself makes some the worshipers of the Divine, and others it does not make so, again all things will be found to happen by fate. For the prayers and the cult which are in us, are not only not inferior to fate, but even superior, and now appeared clear, no less than fate itself.

^A And if it is not fate, but something else 98 is the cause of these things, that will be considered fate all the more. For in the very ability to succeed or not to succeed through prayer, the entire power of fate is contained. For in those who have the ability, fate is nothing; but to those who do not have it, all things happen according to fate 99. And it will be found that to some men everything is according to fate, and to others nothing is according to fate 1; and it is clear that he who determines this 2 is himself the most sovereign fate, and thus again all things 3 will be found to be according to fate, in addition to the distributor being unjust 4, whether he be some demon, or some other fate. For he does not distribute to men the method of the worship of the gods according to merit. For why is this man 5 more worthy than that one, when all are instruments of fate, and no one does anything from their own choice, or rather does not even choose? For in things that happen in this way 7, no one is either just or unjust; therefore neither worthy nor unworthy of grace 8; but he who distributes unequal things to equals 9 is unjust.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

They who say that the choice of things to be done 11 is in our power, but the outcome of the chosen things is in the power of fate 12 (and they are the wisest of the Greeks), partly they succeed, and partly they fail 13. For to place the choices of things to be done in our power,

^A but not necessarily their outcomes, is what those whom they call most judicious say; but to attribute these to fate is not right. For they will be refuted, first of all, by making fate imperfect, if it has one thing but not another; then by making it a consequence of our own judgment; for they say that the works of fate follow upon this, and thus it will be found to be moved by us rather than to be moving us, and man will be more sovereign than fate, as the one who shapes it through his own choice ^B—whereas one ought to say that providence is the cause of the outcome of things; for this is more the work of providence than of fate. For it is the property of providence to distribute to each according to what is fitting for each; and for this reason the outcome of what is chosen will sometimes be in accord with what is fitting, and sometimes it will not. But if fate is a certain unbreakable chain of causes (for this is how the Stoics define it), that is to say, an unchangeable order and connection ^C—not in accord with what is fitting, but causing the ends to come about according to its own motion and necessity—what would they say regarding those who are utterly foolish and simple, and for that reason devoid of choice? Do they possess the condition of being such according to fate, or not? For if not according to fate, they will fall outside of fate; but if they do so according to fate, it follows of necessity that not even the choice ^D remains in our power; for if that which is devoid of choice is under the sway of fate

then of necessity that which is of choice is also under its sway, and thus they will be led back to those earlier thinkers who say ^A that all things are by fate. But the struggle between reason and desire in the continent and the incontinent person is also superfluous; for if it is ordained by necessity that one should act and another should not act, what is the use of the conflict and the strife within him? But it is also fated along with this, not only to act, but to act in such a way. For what else does he who says this claim, except that choice also belongs to the things fated? For choice is that which fights with desire, and it conquers in the continent, but is conquered in the incontinent. Therefore, their initial hypothesis is destroyed. For choice is no longer in our power. ^B

Chapter XXXVIII

How Plato speaks of fate.

Plato uses the term "fate" in two ways. He places one in substance, and the other in the function of a duty. That which is placed in substance, he wishes to be the soul of the universe; that which is placed in the function of a duty, he calls a divine law, immutable on account of an inevitable cause. He also calls this law Adrastia, and says that it was given by the first and supreme God to the soul of the universe for the administration of all things, by which all things that come to pass are governed. He also calls this fate, situated in the function of a duty, providence. For he wishes fate to be comprehended by providence. For whatever comes to pass by fate also comes to pass by providence; ^C yet not everything that is of providence is also of fate. But the divine law itself, which he says is both providence and fate, comprehends all things within itself.

^A Some things it contains according to supposition, others by way of supposition. For it contains the antecedent causes—as it were certain principles and things dependent on our own choice, such as assents, judgments, and desires—by way of supposition; but it contains those things that follow these by necessity as being from supposition. And choice—that which is in our own power regarding actions—is according to supposition. ^B Yet, once the things in our power are posited, things belonging to fate follow from these very things, as if from a supposition. For instance, it lies in our power to sail; this is according to supposition. Now, given the supposition of our sailing, what follows from this supposition is that we either suffer a shipwreck or we do not. Therefore, he calls the things that result from and accompany the suppositions that are in our power—that is to say, the principles and actions—by way of supposition, so that the leading things, and those in our power, are according to supposition; but the following things are from supposition, and not in our power, but by necessity. For it is not the case that things are decreed by fate from eternity, but rather that they occur, having been preceded by the things that are in our power. ^C Consistent with this is the saying: "The fault is his who chooses; God is blameless," as well as "Virtue is without a master," and "There are divinations." His entire argument aims to show that choices and certain actions following from choice are in our own power, while the things that follow these, and the outcomes, are under the power of fate by necessity. But it has been demonstrated above that this is not rightly stated.

Since, therefore, on the one hand, he calls the constitution and will of God fate, and, on the other, makes fate subject to providence, he does not differ much from the divine Scriptures, which confirm that Providence alone governs all things. But he dissents from them in many respects, in that he says that…

^A the ends are necessarily consequential to the things that are in our power. We, however, say that the things brought about by Providence do not happen necessarily, but contingently, as follows. For if they were to happen necessarily, first of all, a great part of prayer 66 is cut off 67. For according to him, prayers would only be concerned with the initial movements of actions, so that we might choose the better course; but after the choice has been made, prayers for the rest would be futile, since all the things that follow are necessarily brought about. We, however, maintain that prayer is most powerful even in these matters 69. For it is in the hand of Providence whether the sailor is shipwrecked or not; yet one or the other does not happen by necessity, but contingently. For it is not fitting to say that God 71 is subject to necessity, nor that His will 72 is enslaved to necessity. For He is the creator of necessity itself. He imposed necessity 73 upon the stars, so that they might always move in the same way 74, and He set bounds to the sea, and established a necessary limit for universal and general things. If men wish to call this fate, because things that come to be by propagation happen in this way by necessity 75, so that all things that come into being by succession are subject to corruption 76, 77, we have no argument with them 78; for we do not dispute with them about names. But God Himself is not only situated outside 79 all necessity, but He is also its Lord and Creator. For since He is power and a nature possessing authority, He does nothing by the necessity of nature, nor by the decree of a law 80; but all things are contingent for Him, even those that are necessary 81. And to demonstrate this, He once caused the course of the sun and the moon ^B to stand still, though they are borne by necessity and always behave in the same way, in order to show that nothing…

^A happens to them by necessity, but that all things come to pass according to His own authority and potentiality. Yet He caused such a day, as Holy Scripture has noted, only to demonstrate this, and not to dissolve the law of the necessary motion of the stars, which had been set for Him from the beginning. In this way He also preserves certain men in life, like Elijah and Enoch, though they are mortal and subject to corruption, in order that through all these things we may understand His authority and His irresistible ^B will. The Stoics, however, say that when the planets are restored to the same position, both in longitude and in latitude, where each one was at the beginning when the universe was first constituted, they bring about the conflagration and destruction of existing things within set periods of time, and that the universe is again restored from the beginning to the same state. And because the stars are likewise moved again, everything that existed in the prior cycle is produced immutably. For they maintain that Socrates and Plato will be again, and each individual human being, with the same friends and fellow citizens, and the same things will befall them, and they will meet the same people and ^C handle the same matters, and every city, and village, and field will be restored in the same way. And they say that this restoration of the universe happens not once, but often, or rather infinitely and without any end, the same things keep returning. But the gods, who escape this destruction, attain and know in one cycle all things that will happen in the following revolutions. For there will be nothing new that has not been before, but all things in the same way, without any variation, even down to the smallest events. And on account of this restoration they say ^D that...

of the future ^A in the following 2 periods is strange when compared to what has happened 3 previously, but that all things are throughout the same and without change 4 down to the very smallest details. And for this 5 restoration, some say 6 that Christians imagine the resurrection, having been greatly led astray 7. For the oracles of Christ declare 9 that the things of the resurrection will happen once for all, and not by way of a cycle 8.

CAP. XXXIX. On free will, that is, on the things that are in our power.

The discussion on free will, that is, on that which is in our power, has 12 a first question: whether there is anything in our power, for there are many who contend against this 13. A second is, what are those things which are in our power, and over what things we have authority. A third is to examine the cause 14 for which God, who made ^B us, created us with free will. Having, therefore, 15 taken up the first point, let us speak first, demonstrating that there is something in our power 16, from the things that are acknowledged even by those who oppose us 17. For they say that all things that happen have as their cause either God, or necessity, or fate, or nature, or fortune, or chance 18. But the work of God is substance and providence; of necessity, the movement of those things which always behave in the same way; of fate, that those things which are brought about by it happen by necessity 19 (for it itself is 20 of necessity); of nature, coming-to-be, growth, decay, plants and animals; of fortune, things that are rare and unexpected; for they define 21 fortune as the meeting and convergence of two causes 22, taking their origin from choice, and which bring about something other than 23 what is customary.

^A For instance, someone digging a trench finds a treasure. God has not so set it, that he should find it; nor did the one who found it dig in such a way as to find a treasure. Rather, the one buried it so that he might take it away whenever he wished, while the other dug a trench; but something else happened, beyond what both had intended. The accidents of inanimate things or irrational animals are by chance, without nature or art.

To which of these, then, shall we attribute the things that come about through humans, if man is not the cause and principle of his actions? But it is not right to ascribe wicked and unjust actions to God, nor to necessity; for they are not among those things that always remain the same. Nor to fate; for the things of fate are not those that could be otherwise, but are necessary. Nor to nature; for the works of nature are animals and plants. Nor to fortune; for human actions are not rare and ^B unexpected occurrences. Nor to chance; for the accidents of inanimate things or irrational animals are by chance. It remains, therefore, that the man himself who acts and does the deed is the principle of his own works and is endowed with free will and power. Furthermore, if man is the author of no action, he possesses the faculty of deliberation in vain. For what use will he make of deliberation, if he is master of no action? And to declare that the most beautiful and most precious thing in man is superfluous would be of the most absurd. Therefore, if he deliberates, he deliberates for the sake of acting; for all deliberation is for the sake of action and is instituted for the sake of action. ^C Furthermore, the actions whose functions are in our power—these actions, which are consistent with those functions, are also in our power. But the functions consistent with the virtues are in our power: therefore, the virtues also are in our power. That the actions in accordance with virtue are in our power is also shown by what was well said by Aristotle regarding the moral virtues:

for those things which we learn to do, we do after having learned them. ^A For by learning to master our pleasures, we become temperate; and having become temperate, we master our pleasures. It is also possible to speak in this way: that meditating and exercising are admitted by all to be in our power; and meditations are the masters of the habits. For custom is an adventitious nature; if, however, meditation is the master of the habit, and meditation is in our power, then the habit also is in our power. And the habits being in our power, the actions in accordance with these habits are also in our power. For actions are suited to the habits. Therefore, he who has a just habit will do just things; and he who has an unjust habit, will do unjust things. It is therefore in our power to be just or unjust.

That some things are in our power is shown by warnings and ^B exhortations. For no one among men exhorts another not to be hungry, or not to be thirsty, or not to fly; for these things are not in our power. It is clear, therefore, that those things concerning which there are exhortations, these are in our power. Furthermore, if nothing is in our power, laws are superfluous; yet every nation naturally uses certain laws, knowing that it has the authority to do what it legislates. And most nations attribute the lawgivers to the gods, as the Cretans attribute them to Zeus, and the Lacedaemonians to Apollo. Therefore, the knowledge of what is in our power has been naturally implanted ^C in all men. The same things must be said regarding blame and praise, and all those things which refute the notion that all things happen according to fate.

Chapter XL.

is sufficiently demonstrated ^A. Let us next state what those things are that are in our power. We say, then, in general, that all things which are done voluntarily by us are in our power. For they would not be said to be done voluntarily if the action were not in our power; and, simply put, those things followed by blame or praise, and those about which exhortation and laws are concerned—and indeed this has been shown by us above. Propoerly, however, all things that pertain to the soul, and about which we deliberate, are in our power. ^B For we deliberate as if it were in our power to do, or not to do, what is proposed. It was shown in what preceded that deliberation concerns things that are equally contingent in either direction; and that is a contingent thing ^C when we have the power both for it and for its opposite. Our intellect makes the choice of this, and this is the principle of action. These, then, are the things in our power, those that are equally contingent, such as to move or not to move, to be impelled or not to be impelled, to desire things that are not necessary or not to desire them, to lie or not to lie, to give or not to give, to rejoice in things in which one ought to rejoice or not to rejoice, and whatever things of this kind there are, in which the works of vice and virtue consist; for of these we are masters. ^D The arts, too, are among those things that are equally contingent. For every art is concerned with the generation of things that are contingent, and that can both be and not be, and the principle of which is in the one who produces, not in that which is produced. For nothing that is eternal, or that exists by necessity, or that happens by necessity, is said to come to be by art; nor, indeed, are those things that happen in such a way that they could turn out otherwise, but which hold the power of being produced within themselves, as happens in animals and plants, said to be done by art. For they are done by nature, not by art. But if the efficient cause of those things that are done by art is external, what is the cause of those things that are done by art? Is it not the one who makes them, the artisan? For it is in the power of the artisan to produce. He, therefore, is the principle and cause of actions.

^A Therefore, the activities according to art, and the virtues, and all the acts of the soul and of reason, are under our control. It has been shown previously what the activities of the soul are.

But the many, thinking that "free choice" is spoken of in regard to every action, acquisition, and fortune, justly reject this argument; and the sharper minded among them, bringing forth the testimony of Scripture for reproof, say: "It is not in man to direct his own ways" (Prov. xx, 24); and they say, O best of men, how is a man in control of his own actions, since his way is not in his own power, and "the thoughts of men are vain" (Ps. xciii, 11), inasmuch as we are unable to bring into action the things we think of? And they say many such things, being ignorant of how "free choice" is spoken of. ^B For we do not have authority over becoming rich or poor, or always being healthy, or being robust by nature, or holding office, or in general over the so-called instrumental or fortuitous goods, or over those things which receive their end according to providence; but we have authority over those actions, choices, and movements aimed at virtue and vice, and those things where we are equally able to do the opposites, since choice precedes every action, and not only the action, but also the choice itself is subject to judgment.

And this the Gospel signifies: "Everyone who looks at a woman to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart" (Matt. v, 28); and Job offered sacrifices to God for the sins of his children committed in thought (Job i, 5). ^C For the beginning of sin and of right action is the choice. For the deed itself is sometimes permitted by providence, and sometimes it is hindered; for since there is both that which is under our control and also providence, it is necessary that what happens comes about through both; for if it happened according to only one, the other would not exist. Being, however, that the things which happen are mixed, sometimes it will turn out according to our control, sometimes according to the principle of providence, and sometimes according to both.

^A Since providence is partly common and partly particular, it is necessary that the same thing should happen to individuals as happens to the whole. For when the surrounding air is dry, bodies also become dry, although not all in the same way; and when a mother has not lived rightly and has given herself to luxury, those born of her are consequently born with poorly tempered bodies and with passions that are hard to steer. It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, that it happens that one may fall into a body temperament that is not fortunate, either through the common state of the surrounding air, or from the voluntary diet of one’s parents, or even because they themselves have surrendered to being corrupted by luxury; so that temperaments are sometimes produced out of a voluntary source, and providence is not at all the cause of such things. ^B When therefore the soul, yielding to the temperament of the body, gives itself over to desires or irascible impulses, and is either weighed down or slackened by things that come from fortune, such as poverty or wealth, it undergoes a voluntary evil. For the one who does not yield to the temperament of the body rightly performs its own function, and overcomes the bad temperament, so as to transform it rather than be transformed by it; and it establishes the affections of the soul in a good state through wholesome training and suitable diet. It is clear, therefore, from those who do succeed, that those who do not succeed ^C sin voluntarily. It is within our power... ^D [index: entries preserved]

either to yield to evil temperaments, or to resist and overcome them. But the majority, by putting forward their evil temperament as the cause of their sins ^A, attribute their wickedness to necessity and not to their own volition; and for this reason, they most absurdly deny that even the virtues are within our power.

CAP. XLI. For what reason we have been created with free will.

It remains to say for what reason we have been created with free will. We say, then, that free will is conjoined to the rational faculty, and that change and alterability are naturally inherent in beings that come into existence, especially in those that are generated from underlying matter. For the beginning of generation is change. For generation consists in the alteration of the underlying matter. One may understand what is meant by looking at all plants and animals, both terrestrial, winged, and aquatic. ^B For their change is continuous 16. That free will is also conjoined to the rational faculty is clear to those who have not listened carelessly to what has already been said about the fact that something is within our power. And perhaps it is not out of place to remind them of these same things again, since the sequence of our argument requires it. One part of the rational faculty is contemplative, the other practical; the contemplative is that which understands how beings exist; the practical is that which is deliberative, which defines the correct reason for things to be done. And they call the contemplative, intellect, and the practical, reason; and the former, wisdom, the latter, prudence. ^C And everyone who deliberates, deliberates as if the choice of things to be done lies with himself, so that he may choose what has been determined by his deliberation, and having chosen, act. Therefore, there is every necessity...

^A that he in whom there is consultation should also be the master of his actions. For if he is not master of his actions, he possesses the power of deliberation in vain. If this is so, free will necessarily exists along with reason. For either he will not be endowed with reason, or, if he be endowed with reason, he will be master of his actions; and if he is master of his actions, he will altogether have a free will to act. It has also been demonstrated that those things which are born from subject matter are mutable.

Therefore, from both it is concluded that man is necessarily possessed of free will and is mutable: mutable, because he is begotten; ^B possessed of free will, because he is endowed with reason. Wherefore, those who accuse God for not creating man of such a nature that no vice could fall into him, but instead rendered him of free will, foolishly accuse God for having begotten man as a being endowed with reason rather than empty of reason. For it is of necessity one of two things: that he should have been made devoid of reason, or, if he were a participant in reason and engaged in things to be done, that he should have free will. Therefore, every nature that is a participant in reason is of necessity endowed with free will and, by its own nature, mutable. But those natures which are made from subject matter are mutable in two ways, both on account of the matter, and by the very fact that they are created. But those which were not made from subject matter are mutable in one way only, namely that of their generation. Again, of these immaterial natures, ^C those which are in the regions near the earth, being occupied with affairs to be done through the association which they have with men, are more mutable than the others. But those which, on account of the excellence of their nature, dwell with God through their inclination and propensity, and enjoy blessedness through the contemplation of Him, and have turned themselves ^D entirely away from things to be done and from matter toward themselves and toward God alone,

^A they remain immutable; they are indeed endowed with free will, because they use reason, yet they are not mutable for the reasons already mentioned. And there is nothing to wonder at in this. For as many of the men who have become contemplative have separated themselves from things to be done, they have remained immutable. I think it has already been proven along with what has been said, that all rational natures were created in the best possible way from the beginning, and if they had remained as they were created from the beginning, they would have been far removed from all vice. But vice arises in them by choice; thus, indeed, those who have remained as they were at their initial creation possess blessedness. Only the angels among incorporeal beings have changed, and not even all of them, but some among them, as many as have inclined ^B toward lower things and have conceived a desire for earthly things, having departed from the relationship toward higher things and toward God.

Therefore, from the things demonstrated, it is manifest that because we are by nature mutable, we have mutable powers of choice; yet, because we possess mutable powers, one should not blame God for our being wicked. For vices are not in the powers, but in the habits; and habits are a matter of choice; therefore, we become wicked by choice, and not by nature. One might learn more accurately what is being said thus: In what has preceded, we said there is a power by which we are able to do each of the things we do. ^C Every power of choice is the same for opposites; for one and the same power is for lying and for telling the truth, and one and the same power is for living temperately and for living intemperately. But the habit of opposites is no longer the same, for example, of living intemperately and of living temperately, or of lying and of telling the truth, but of opposites contrarieties ^D

^A of habit. For to live temperately is a habit of virtue; to live intemperately, of vice. Vices, therefore, are not of the faculties, but of the habits and the choice. For it is not the faculty that causes us to live immodestly or to tell lies, but the choice. For it was in our power to tell the truth, and not to lie. If, therefore, vice is not a faculty but a habit, he who gave us the faculty is not the cause of our wickedness, but the habit, which is acquired through us and for our own sake. For it was possible to seek out the opposite habit, not that vicious one, by exercise. Now, faculty differs from habit in that all faculties are natural, while habits are acquired by us; and faculties cannot be imparted by teaching, whereas habits come through learning and custom. Wherefore, if a faculty is a certain natural thing and cannot be taught, while a habit is adventitious and imparted by teaching: then nature is not the cause of vices, but rather the fact that we have been trained viciously, and therefore have acquired a vicious habit. For it has been shown that every habit is acquired by us. Furthermore, that faculties are natural is evident from the fact that all possess the same faculties, except for those who are maimed. Conversely, that habits are not natural is perceived from the fact that not all have the same habits, but some have one, others another. For those things which are by nature are the same among all.

CHAPTER XLII. On providence.

^B That man is a being with free will, and over what things he has free will, and for what reason he was created with free will, has been sufficiently explained above. But since not everyone who has proposed to kill a man also kills him—but sometimes kills, and sometimes does not kill—because his choice is prevented, and he has not been accustomed. A stone, by nature carried downwards, could not be accustomed to be carried upwards, even if someone were to accustom it by throwing it upwards ten thousand times. For legislators, by accustoming the citizens, make them good. ^C But since it is not the case that everyone who has resolved to kill, ^D performs the killing—but sometimes he kills, and sometimes he does not, the choice having been obstructed, and not having been habituated.

^A Having previously stated that the cause of these things is providence, and not fate, our discussion of providence follows upon the treatise regarding free will; and this, too, is divided into three parts: first, whether there is providence; second, what it is; and third, to whom it belongs. Now, no Jew, not even one who is mad, could be ignorant of providence, since he knows the miracles that occurred in Egypt, and has heard of what happened in the desert, in which providence appeared to men even more clearly than in those things perceived by the eyes; and likewise, having pondered many works of providence both in the prophets and in Babylon, which admit of no doubt. But when we teach Christians all these things—that there is providence—we teach them especially that most divine work of providence, which, on account of surpassing love for the human race, is beyond all belief: that God for our sake clothed Himself in body. ^B But since our discourse is not directed toward these alone, but is also framed against the Greeks, come, let us demonstrate that there is providence also through other things, to which they grant credence. That there is, therefore, providence, one could demonstrate through the same things by which we showed that God also exists. For the endurance of all things, and especially of those that are in generation and decay, is a product of providence.

^A And the position and order of beings that are always preserved in the same way, the movement of the stars that never deviates in anything, the cycle of the year, the restoration of the seasons, the equality of nights and days each year—each increasing and decreasing in turn, yet by neither a lesser nor a greater measure—how could they have continued in this same way without someone to provide for them?

Indeed, even the punishment that follows sins, and even better, the disclosure of the sins themselves when, with no one available to convict, they are brought to light through certain circumstances, ^B shows that there is a providence. Both the Scriptures of the Hebrews and the literature of the Greeks are full of such histories. For such is the affair of Susanna, which has been committed to the holy Scriptures; and among the Greeks, there is the case of the poet Ibycus. For while he was being murdered by certain men, having neither an ally nor a witness to the injustice, he saw some cranes and said, "You, O cranes, avenge my murder." ^C Later, when the citizens were looking for the perpetrators and could not find them, as the theater was being held and the people were sitting to watch, cranes flew overhead. The murderers, seeing them, laughed and said, "Look, the avengers of Ibycus." One of those sitting nearby heard this and reported it to the magistrates; and the men, having been arrested, confessed to the murder.

There is a multitude of many other such things recorded in the writings of the ancients, which if anyone wished to gather, the discourse would extend to infinite length. ^D If the same method of conviction is not applied to all who sin, but some even seem to escape, let no one deny providence on this account. For God does not provide for human beings in one way only, but in many and diverse ways. However, it shows most clearly that there is a providence through the construction and provision of bodies that are born and perish.

^A, which is kept the same throughout. For the care of providence is manifest in every part of the body, which it is possible for the studious to collect from diverse writings. And the variety of colors in animals, always preserving the same order, cries out that there is a providence. Also, that which is agreed upon by all men—that it is necessary to pray and to honor the divine with offerings and shrines—is indicative of providence. For if the whole were without providence, how or whom would anyone pray to? Moreover, the zeal that is naturally cultivated for acts of kindness among those who are not perverse ^B indicates providence. For while expecting the reward from this, we choose to act.

But if providence is removed, injustice is granted to those able to commit it, while almsgiving and the fear of God are removed, and along with these, virtue and piety are also taken away. For if God does not provide, He does not punish, nor does He bestow rewards on those who do well, nor does He ward off injuries from those who are unjustly harmed. Who, then, would still worship God, if He contributed nothing to us in any way? Prophecy and all foreknowledge are also removed. But these things are not in agreement with what we see happening almost every day. ^C For there are many manifest appearances of the divine in times of need, and many aids are given to the sick in dreams, and many foreknowledge have been brought forth in each generation. Many who have murdered and have committed some impious act are terrified both night and day. Furthermore, God is good; and being good, He is beneficent; and if He is beneficent, He is also providential. Why must I recount the works of creation and the proportion ^D and those unable to make a return of kindness?

^A And its ^B harmony and position and order and the use which each provides to the whole, and how it is impossible for them to be well otherwise than as they now are, and how they admit neither of addition, nor is it possible for any existing thing to perish, but all things are perfect and beautiful, and have been fashioned wisely and with providence? But let us defer the exposition of these things to the discourse on creation, that we may not suffer what many of those who have written about providence have suffered. For they celebrate creation instead of providence, which indeed leads us to the discourse about providence, but nevertheless differs from it greatly. For providence and creation are not the same thing. For it is the work of creation to make what is produced well; of providence, to take good care of the things that have been produced. And these do not entirely coexist, as it is possible to see among men, who exercise any art and science of reason. For some of them bestow their effort only on producing correctly, and care for nothing further, as do builders and painters and sculptors; while others only take care and provide, as do cattle-herds and shepherds. Therefore, we too, in the discourse ^C on creation, would fittingly demonstrate that the things produced were produced well; but in the treatise on providence, we must declare that it is the administration which takes counsel for them after they have been produced. How, then, is man always born from man, and ox from ox, and each thing grows from its own seed, and not from another, if providence is absent? For if someone says that the thing proceeds in a chain as it was first created, this would be to say that providence is definitely linked to creation. For the fact that the created thing proceeds in a chain signifies that providence was included with the creation. For the administration of existing things after creation is the work of providence; and thus he would say nothing else but that the same one is both the creator and the ^D provider of existing things. But who, seeing the forms of men

^A in such an infinite multitude of differences, and nowhere exactly the same, would not admire the work, and, pondering the cause, discover that the difference in form is shifted in particulars for the sake of providence? For consider: if all preserved the same unchangeable character, what confusion of affairs would occur! What ignorance and darkness would possess man, who would recognize neither his own kin nor the stranger, nor distinguish the enemy or the base from the friend and the good! ^B All things would truly be “altogether,” as in the opinion of Anaxagoras. For if this were so, nothing would prevent one from mingling with sisters and mothers, nor from plundering, nor doing any other wickedness openly, if only he escaped for the moment; for once seen, he would not have been identified later.

Nor would law or policy be established; nor would fathers and sons know one another; nor would anything else among human affairs exist; for man would be blind ^C to men, having little provided to him for seeing; for he would distinguish nothing else besides age and size. How great a cause of good things for us has providence become, varying the form of men throughout all and everywhere, and never leaving off from doing this for a moment; which is also the greatest proof that providence extends even to particulars, ^D if each person is recognized even by the type of the formation of the character and by their voice, even if not by

is preserved, as if the form were sufficient. ^A For, as if by way of a corollary, providence also added the difference in colors, so that the infirmity of human nature might be succored in many ways. I believe also that most animals which are of similar form according to species—such as the crow and the raven—possess certain differences in appearance, by which they recognize one another in pairs. Crows and ravens, at any rate, are gathered in large numbers; yet they separate into pairs, since each of these animals recognizes the bird joined and by nature united to it. How, indeed, would they recognize one another if there were not in each a specific characteristic, not easily judged by us, but naturally and easily recognizable to those of the same species? Even signs, oracles, omens, and portents (for my discourse pertains to the Greeks), by their own logic, as they themselves say, preserving the outcomes of the things they show, certainly signify them by the principle of providence, and they attach the truth of the events to the things signified.

CHAPTER XLIII.

What is providence.

That providence truly exists is manifest both through these things and will subsequently shine forth through what is to be said. Let us say, therefore, what providence is. Providence is the care for existing things undertaken by God. They define it also in this way: ^C Providence is the will of God, through which all things that exist receive their fitting direction. But if providence is the will of God, it is of absolute necessity—according to right reason and in the most beautiful and God-befitting manner, and in the only way in which things can rightly exist—that what happens, happens, so that it does not admit of a better order. It is necessary also that the same one be the creator of existing things and their provider. For it is neither consistent nor fitting that one should create, and another take care of what has been created. For this, indeed, certainly belongs to weakness

^A There is also in animals much of an impression of what has been said. For everything that has generated also provides food for its offspring; and man, too, looks ahead as much as he is able to regarding everything else that concerns the conduct of life. Those things which do not provide, do not provide on account of weakness. It is demonstrated therefore that it is God who provides, and that providence is His will.

CHAPTER XLIV

^A Plato states that certain demons are appointed about the earth as guardians of human actions. He also holds that the second and third providence derive their being from the first, so that all things are governed by the power of the first God, who has appointed both the second and the third providers. Now, to refer all things to God and to say that all providence depends upon His will is worthy of praise; but to say that those who revolve the heavens constitute a second providence is not. For that which happens is not providence, but fate and necessity. For however those [heavenly bodies] are arranged, it is necessary for what happens to happen, and that it cannot happen otherwise; whereas it has long been shown that nothing subject to providence falls under necessity. As for the Stoic philosophers, by advocating both fate and that which depends on us, they leave no place for providence; indeed, they truly despoil our wills of freedom, as was proved by us above. Democritus, Heraclitus, and Epicurus do not wish for there to be providence either for the universe or for particulars. Epicurus, at least, used to say: "That which is blessed and immortal has no business itself, nor does it cause any for another; therefore, it is swayed by neither anger nor favor. For all such things are marks of weakness." For anger is alien to God; it is aroused by an event that occurs contrary to what we desire, but to God nothing happens contrary to His will. ^B These men, therefore, follow their own principles. For, holding that this whole universe was constituted by chance and at random, they reasonably maintain that all things are devoid of providence. For of those things of which no one is the creator, who could be the provider? For it is evident that things which are produced at random must be carried at random. Therefore, one must resist their primary premise. For once this has been undermined, what has been said will have sufficient force to demonstrate that providence exists. Wherefore, reserving the refutation of this for its proper time, let us proceed...

to the opinion of Aristotle and of others, who say that individual things are not provided for by a higher power. ^A

OF THE NATURE OF MAN: To the opinion of Aristotle and others, who deny that individual things are cared for by God.

For Aristotle indeed wishes that individual things should be administered by nature alone, as he obscurely implies in the sixth book of his Ethics to Nicomachus. For he suggests that this nature, being divine and present in all things that are generated, naturally prompts each thing to approach what is salutary and to flee from what is contrary. For every animal, as it has already been said, both chooses for itself suitable nourishment, and follows what is useful, and naturally knows the remedies for its ailments. But Euripides and Menander in certain places assert that the mind, which is present in each individual, provides for each person—though they say that God provides for no one. ^B

But the mind is perceived only in those things which are in our power. For it belongs either to things subject to action and the arts, or to contemplation. But providence concerns things which are not in our power, as, for example, whether one is wealthy or not wealthy, healthy or not healthy; for the mind can do nothing in these matters, and neither can nature, as Aristotle thinks. For the works of nature are clear. But what has the mind or nature to do with the fact that sometimes the murderer is punished, and sometimes escapes the penalty for his crime? Unless someone says that what pertains to the mind and nature belongs to providence, while what follows belongs to fate. But if the mind and nature belong to providence, and the things that follow belong to fate, then nothing will be in our power. But the matter does not stand thus. For the things that pertain to the mind, both that which is in action and that which is in contemplation, have been shown to be in our own power. And not all things that happen according to providence are of nature, even if the works of nature ^C come to pass according to providence. ^D

For many things that occur through providence are not works of nature, as was shown in the case of the murderer. For nature is a part of providence, not providence itself.

^A These men, therefore, attribute the providence of individual things to nature and to the mind; but others say that God cares for the permanence of existing things, so that nothing of what has been generated should fail, and that He exercises providence only over this; while individual things come to pass as they may. And for this reason many injustices, many murders, and, to speak summarily, every wickedness thrive among men; and of these, as it happens, some escape ^B justice, while others are even punished, since those things which are according to right reason and according to law do not come to pass at all. But where neither reason nor law holds sway, how could one say that there is a God who takes care? For it happens that good men are for the most part injured and suppressed and afflicted by countless evils, while the wicked and the violent are increased in power and wealth and offices and in the other goods that pertain to living a comfortable life.

But to me it seems that those who say these things are ignorant of many other tenets regarding providence, and especially of the immortality of the soul. For, assuming it to be mortal, they define human affairs by the limits of this life. ^C Furthermore, they hold distorted and perverse judgments about goods. For they think that those who are clothed in wealth and blooming with honors and delighting in other material goods are happy and blessed; but they count the goods of the soul as nothing, which by a great measure excel the bodily and external goods. For those things are better which are of the better things. Therefore, virtues excel wealth and health and the rest, just as much as the soul exceeds the body. Wherefore, both alone and joined with others, they make a man blessed; with others, they do so according to breadth, but alone and by themselves, according to circumscription. For of existing things, some are understood according to circumscription, as that which is two cubits long; but others, according to breadth, as a heap; for if from a heap you take away two modii, ^D

what is left remains a heap. ^A Likewise, if from that happiness which is according to breadth, you take away both the goods of the body and external goods, and leave only the virtues, the happy state also remains; for virtue is in itself sufficient for blessedness. Therefore every good man is blessed, and every wicked man is miserable, even if he should abound in all the goods of fortune, as they are called. Ignorant of this, ^B the many consider those alone to be blessed who are in good bodily health and are wealthy. For this reason they blame the providence which governs our affairs not only from the things that are visible, but also according to its own foreknowledge. For God, knowing that it is useful for the good man to be poor, and that wealth, if it were to come to him, would corrupt his character, wisely allows him to live in poverty; and knowing that the rich man, if he should fall into poverty, would often become more formidable—for he would perhaps attempt thefts, or murders, or other greater evils—he allows him to enjoy his wealth. Therefore, poverty has often been useful to us, as has burying our children and fleeing from our servants; for their salvation, had they become wicked children or thieves as servants, would have been more bitter than their destruction. ^C For we, knowing nothing of what is to come, and looking only at the present, do not judge rightly of the things that happen; but to God, even future things are as present.

But these things have been said against those who censure providence, to whom it would be fitting to say that which is in the Holy Scripture: Can the clay say to the potter, and what follows (Isa. xlv, 9)? For how is a man not to be shunned who makes laws against God and gives opposing commands?

^A Therefore, passing over these faults, or rather these impieties, let us demonstrate that it is not rightly said by them that individual things are deprived of providence, since it is God who takes counsel for the universal and general. For only these three causes can be cited as to why individual things are not governed by the providence of God: for either one might say that God is ignorant that it is right to take counsel for them also, or that He is unwilling, or that He is unable. ^B But ignorance and lack of knowledge are most alien to that blessed nature. For He is Himself knowledge, and wisdom, and science. And how could anything escape the notice of God, which even a person who is reasonably intelligent would not fail to perceive, namely, that if all individual things perish, the universal will also perish? For the universal is constituted of all individual things. For all species correspond to, and are reciprocal with, all individual things, and they perish together and are preserved together. Nor is there any obstacle to all individuals perishing if they are not governed by divine providence; provided that these perish, the universal also will perish. ^C But if they say that His only care is that all individuals should not perish, so that the species may be conserved, they do not see that they are saying that there is also a certain care for individual things, since by taking thought for individual things, as they themselves say, He defends the genera and species. But others say that God is not indeed ignorant, but that He is unwilling to provide. But this unwillingness happens for two reasons, either because of sloth or because it is unseemly. And who, unless he is mad, would charge God with sloth? For again, sloth is born of two things: pleasure and fear. For we are either drawn away by some pleasure and grow slothful, or we are kept from acting by some fear. But it is not lawful to imagine either of these in relation to God. But if ^D

^A they wish to excuse themselves from bringing in slothfulness, and say that it is not fitting for God (for it is unworthy of such great blessedness to descend to base and trivial things, and as it were to be defiled ^B by material and voluntary incongruities, and for this reason He does not wish to do so)—they are ignorant that they are attributing to God two of the most wicked passions: pride and pollution. For either the Creator neglects the governance and administration of individual things out of pride—which is a most absurd thing to say—or else He avoids it by shunning pollution, as they themselves say. Yet if they say that the sun, which by nature has the power to draw up every moisture, is not polluted, nor are its rays, when they shine upon mire, but rather remain unstained and pure, how do they imagine that God is defiled by the things that happen here? ^C

These are not the teachings of men who know the nature of God. For the Divine is untouched, incorruptible, undefiled, and superior to every change. For pollution and all such things are the works of change. How then is it not most absurd that any craftsman, and especially a physician, who cares for things in general, should leave nothing of individual things—not even the smallest—unskilled and uncared for, knowing that the part contributes to the whole, yet to declare that God, the Creator and Maker of all, is more ignorant than the craftsmen? But perhaps He wishes to, but cannot. And how is it not clearly absurd and an affront to call God weak and unable to do good? Besides, one might say in two ways that God is unable to provide for individuals: either because He is not by nature fit to provide for them, or because individual things are incapable of receiving providence. But that He Himself ^D is by nature fit to provide, they themselves admit by saying that He provides for things in general; furthermore, the lower things are not able to reach up to the higher, but the power of the greater reaches down even to the last and the most senseless, preserving them.

For all things depend upon the divine will, and from thence derive their permanence and safety. That even the category of individual and multiplied things is capable of providence is evident from those animals which are governed by certain authorities and magistracies, of which there are many kinds. For indeed both bees and ants, and most of those animals that live in flocks, are ordered under certain leaders, whom they follow in obedience. ^B One might contemplate this especially if one were to look at the society of human beings. For it is evident that it admits for itself the guidance and care of legislators and magistrates. And how could that which is capable of these be incapable of the providence of the Creator? A no small proof that even individual things are subject to providence is that knowledge of it is naturally sown within humans. For, when caught by necessity, we immediately flee to the Divine and to prayer, as if nature were leading us, without instruction, to the help of God; but nature would not lead us without a teacher to that which nature itself does not cause to happen. For in sudden disturbances and ^C fears, without choice or deliberation, and before we have considered anything at all, we invoke the Divine. Now, whatever follows naturally upon any thing has such power for demonstration that it can admit of no contradiction. What reason, then, led those who think these things to this opinion? First, it is because they think that the soul perishes with the body; second, because they are unable to find the reason for particular providence. But that the soul is not mortal, and that human affairs do not terminate with the boundaries of this life, both the transmigrations ^D of souls taught by the wisest of the Greeks make clear, and the places which are said to be allotted to souls according to the life of each, and the punishments...

which they undergo on their own account. ^A For these things, even if they deviate in some other respect, they nevertheless concede that the soul exists after this life and pays the penalty for its transgressions. But if the reason for individual Providence is incomprehensible to us, as indeed it is, according to the text: *How unsearchable are thy judgments, and thy ways past finding out!*—yet one ought not for this reason say that there is no Providence. For just because we are ignorant of the measure of the sea and the number of the sand, no one would say that the sea or the sand do not exist. For in this way they would also deny that a man or any other animal exists, because they do not know the number of human beings and of other animals. For particulars are infinite to us; and things that are infinite are also unknown to us. And while those things that are universal can often be grasped by reason, those that are individual cannot be.

But since there is in each individual man a twofold ^B difference—one by which he differs from another man, and the other by which he differs from himself (for great is the daily change and difference in each person, both in his manner of life and in his pursuits and needs and desires and the things that befall him; for this animal is quick to change, and rapidly alters with the needs of life and the times)—it is necessary that the Providence corresponding to each one be also different and varied and multifaceted, and that it accompany the incomprehensibility of the multitude of things, if indeed it is necessary that it be appropriate for each person in every matter and be his own; and since the difference between individual things is infinite, the reason for the Providence ^C corresponding to them is also infinite; but if it is infinite, it is also unknown to us. Therefore, one must not make one's own ignorance a reason for abolishing the care for existing things. For the things which you think are not managed rightly are, in fact, decreed by the Creator with reason; but you, being ignorant of the causes, say that they occur without reason. For what we experience in the case of other unknown things, this we also experience in the case of the works of Providence; from some conjecture, and that a dim one, we infer the things regarding...

it, taking as it were the images and shadows of its works from those things which come to pass. ^A We say, for instance, that some things come to pass by the permission of God; and there are many kinds of permission. For He often permits even the good man to fall into calamities, so that He may manifest the virtue hidden in him to others, as in the case of Job. He sometimes permits some of the absurd things to be done, so that by the act which seems absurd He may accomplish something great and wonderful, as by the cross the salvation of men. In another way, He also permits the holy man to suffer evils, so that he may not fall into arrogance, on account of a right conscience and the power given to him, as may be observed in the case of Paul. ^B

Someone is abandoned for a time for the correction of another, so that the others, observing his fall, may be instructed, as happened in the case of Lazarus and the rich man. For by nature it is so ordered that, while we behold others in evils, we ourselves are restrained, as it has been well said by Menander:

"Fearing the divinity in your own sufferings."

Another is neglected for the sake of the glory of another, not by his own vice or that of his parents, as he who was born blind, for the glory of the Son of man. Again, someone is permitted to suffer for the emulation of another, so that, the glory of the one who has suffered ^C being magnified, the suffering may become effortless to others, through the hope of the future glory and the desire of the expected good things, as in the case of the martyrs and those who have given themselves up for their country, or their race, or their masters, or their children, or their faith. ^D

^A If, however, it should seem to anyone irrational that a holy person should suffer evils for the correction of another, ^B let him know that this life of ours is a contest and a stadium of virtue. Therefore, the greater the labors, the greater the crowns. For the reward of our struggles corresponds to the measure of our endurance. For this reason, Paul was allowed to be afflicted with countless tribulations, so that he might carry away a greater and more perfect crown of victory. For all the works of Providence come to pass rightly and fittingly. But that God rules all things rightly, fittingly, and in the only way that is acceptable, ^C one who employs these two principles, which are agreed upon by all, will consider most rightly: God is good and God alone is wise. Accordingly, in that He is good, He is reasonably a provider; and in that He is wise, He provides for all things that exist wisely and in the best manner. For if He does not provide, He is not good; and if He acts not in a fitting manner, He is not wise. Therefore, one who attends to these principles should in no way condemn the works of Providence, nor blaspheme them without examination; but rather, one should accept all things as good, admire all things, and be persuaded that all things come to pass rightly and fittingly, even if they appear unjust to the majority, so that we may not, in addition to our blasphemy, heap upon ourselves much blame for our own ignorance. ^D When we say that all things happen rightly, it is clear that we are not speaking of the wickedness of men, nor of the works that are within our own power and are done by us, but rather of the effects of Providence, which are not within our own power. [alt-version omitted]

How then have divine men fallen into bitter deaths and unmerited slaughters? ^A For if unjustly, why did impartial Providence not prevent the murder? But if justly, then those who commit the murder are entirely without blame. To these things we shall answer that he who commits murder, commits it unjustly; and he who is murdered, is murdered either justly or for his own benefit. Justly, at times, because of certain wicked deeds unknown to us; but for11 their own benefit, because Providence forestalls the crimes they were about to commit, and because it is better for them to end their life at that point (as happened with Socrates and other holy men). But the one who commits the murder has killed unjustly; for he did not do it for that reason, nor because it was permitted to him, but voluntarily for the sake of gain and plunder. For action is in our power, but "passion"—that is, being murdered—is not in our power. ^B And no death is bad, unless it occurs because of sin, as is clear from the death of holy men. But the sinner, even if he ender his life in his bed, even if suddenly and without pain, has died badly, bringing upon himself sin as a grievous shroud. Yet the man who commits the murder has killed badly. For in the case of those who are killed justly, he has placed himself in the position of the executioner; and in the case of those killed for their own benefit, in the position of murderers and the impious. The same is to be judged concerning those who kill their enemies, take them in war, and inflict every sort of wickedness upon the captives ^C and upon those who work all manner of evil against the captives. The same also applies to those who covet more than is fair for themselves, and despoil others of their money. ^D

VARIOUS READINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

(59) "O holy men fell into bitter deaths and unmerited slaughters." [index: entries preserved]

SUPPLEMENTS OF VARIOUS READINGS

The pages noted are of the Antwerp edition, which we have taken care to have inserted into the text in bolder type.

Page 15. *The Hebrews, however, the man.* This passage is read in Anastasius, Quest. 24, p. 270 et seqq. in the edition of Gretser, Ingolstadt 1617. It is there: "At the beginning, one must immediately note that Anastasius sometimes adds certain things, sometimes omits others, and sometimes changes others, not rarely at his own discretion." *He fell in.* He may fall in. *Mortality.* The mortality. *Of food him.* Him of food. *Awaiting.* Expecting punishment, and not that. *It was prepared.* It was fashioned. *He forbade him.* To him is absent. *For they were.* For it contained the activity. Also, *of bodily need it came to be.* At the end he adds "needy." However, this, that it be added, is not necessary. Thus Philostorgius, p. 62, *of the command it becomes. Or, having become of fear.* *He sought.* He asked. *Mos, the Scripture, Moses.* *Having fallen then from perfection.* In the margin, *of perfection.* He was not yet perfect, but was still obliged to apply his efforts. Therefore, [it is] alien to this place. Soon the same omits it likewise. *He shall take.* He shall receive. *To him, enjoyment.* After "enjoyment," "from the earth" [is meant]. Page 16. *The matters of enjoyment.* After these he interposes, "for there is need (perhaps 'for' is better) for a human being, for a human being, of food and drink on account of the evacuations and dissipations, since according to evacuation." But these things which are added here are read on page 19. *Concerning which we shall speak later.* They are absent. For they did not pertain to the plan of Anastasius. *From which we were also constituted.* We have been constituted, we were constituted. *In need we were established.* Page 17. *It takes more than is fair, all animals.* All animals. *For the other [animals] with thick skins.* For other animals. *Of dwelling, etc.* And of dwelling not least, also on account of the escapes from wild beasts. *And on account of the beasts.* Page 18. *Imparted to the body.* To the body. *We were established in need of physicians and of medical treatment.* Page 19. *It is absent.* It is absent. *After he adds:* But these things are read on page 18. Page 26. *Since it is ancient of the irrational [creatures], etc.* These things are read in Anastasius, page 276, thus: "Since the ancient one needed none of these." *And obedient.* And of the irrationality in it. *From the wild beasts from without, reasonably.* From the irrational wild beasts from without. *Mos, for it came together.* *It is clear from those, the best.* The best teach (having lived the best life and having been harmed in nothing by such things, as Daniel from the lions and Paul from the viper). *Of him binding in himself.* In. *Of so great, etc.* He has been deemed worthy of such great honor from God and providence, that for his sake both the things to come and the present things exist, and God has become man. *Mos, having become according to the image and likeness of God, he dwells with Christ, of every principality.* Can one express his advantages? For he traverses the seas—in contemplation, the motions of the stars and the distances (and measures) and the sea-monsters; he holds in contempt (he despises), he attains every science and art (the art and method), he overreaches—by means of the—being hindered by the body, he prophesies—he enjoys—by all he is escorted, he converses with God, he commands demons—he searches—he becomes an heir of God and of His kingdom— [this] exclamation: "to Him be the glory unto the ages of ages." *Toward them we shall speak.* We shall speak toward these things, that he who kills. *If justly.* If justly. *To stand the life.* To establish the life. *To stand.* For by way of reward. *For not for this [reason], nor is it permitted to him, but.* *No one is evil.* Not even one is evil. *Of holy men.* For, he says, the death of his holy ones is precious. *Suddenly.* Suddenly. *Bringing upon himself the sin.* For, he says, the death of sinners is evil.

ANNOTATIONS OF THE OXFORD EDITOR ON NEMESIUS

^A Nemesius. Concerning what we think of our author, we have perhaps already said more than enough; yet it will have been worth the effort to note furthermore that in another of the manuscripts which we have used, this inscription is found: *Of Adamantius, also called Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa*, so that he is distinguished by the forename Adamantius. It is well established that there flourished in the fourth century a rhetorician of no small celebrity, called Adamantius; and this is especially evident from the letters addressed to him by Nazianzen and Libanius. But that this same person was not Nemesius, the prefect of Cappadocia and familiar of Gregory Nazianzen, is clearly evident both from the variation observable in the inflection of the names and from the very form and tenor of the letters; the same must be said of the Isidorus Nemesius mentioned above in a like manner.

^B Indeed, it will be fair to acknowledge that in that same manuscript which we have praised above, besides this treatise of ours, *On the Nature of Man*, there exists another of little import, as well as size, which is called the *Summary Discourse* of the same author, and which comprises about seven pages; it is cobbled together from our Nemesius and a short work of the same subject matter by Meletius; by this very equitable law of plagiarism, the former part is to be attributed entirely to Nemesius, and the latter to Meletius, with very few subsequent interpolations. This seems to be the very book which Gesner praises under the title *The Compendious Philosophy of Adamantius*, which he says exists in Greek at Venice, at the house of Saint Anthony.

Page 9. *Man is composed of an intellectual soul.* It is generally agreed among almost all that man consists of an ethereal and an earthly part, soul and body; whence our author says a little lower down: *Human nature, the common discourse suggests, is composed of soul and body.* Nor is there less consensus in approving the same fabrication of man, which he says Plato instituted in the *Timaeus*, p. 25, *as far as possible in the most beautiful and best way*. Whence Protagoras said that he is the measure of all things, *of things that are, how they are, and of things that are not, how they are not*. An esteemed eulogy applied by God to his works, that they were *very good* (Gen. 1:31). But whether the soul be one simple essence is not so universally held. Philo, in his book *On the Creation of the World*, says in the words cited by our author: *He bestowed upon the soul a distinct mind, just like the pupil in the eye.* Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, book 1, ch. 2: *God fashioned man, taking dust from the earth, and breathed into him a spirit and a soul.* Plotinus, whose testimony is adduced here, *Ennead* 1, about to give an account of what he understands by the word "mind," speaks thus: *I do not mean the mind which the soul possesses as a habit obtained from the mind, but the mind itself, which we also possess, and which is above us*, such as he repeats elsewhere in many places. Marcus Antoninus, in his *Meditations*, says that man consists of three parts, *the fleshly, the bodily, and the ruling part*. But this opinion did not dwell only among the heathens or the Jews. Irenaeus says in most expressive words: *There are three things of which the perfect man consists, flesh, soul, and spirit*, book V *Against Heresies*, c. 9; in book V, c. 6, similar things are to be found, and also in Tatian. Indeed, Augustine, in his *Tract on the Creed*, speaks thus: *Man has three parts, spirit, soul, and body, and thus man is the image of the Holy Trinity.* Truly, in his book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, c. 20, he criticizes Didymus for this very reason, because he wished the spirit to be a certain third substance in man. Nor is that surprising: for after the dogma of the Dimeritae (who were his followers) had spread, asserting that our Lord was constituted of three parts, *of flesh and soul and divinity, instead of the mind* (these are the words of Epiphanius, p. 1016), the orthodox, in order to defeat them all the more surely, henceforth renounced the previously received opinion concerning the three parts of the soul, although it might seem that they could claim for themselves a foundation from the Apostle’s words in 1 Thess. v, 23; and eventually he was accused of a certain heresy by later generations, for separating the soul from the spirit; by a law clearly similar to that by which immersion in baptism, now triple, then single, and again triple, was approved, according to the variety of dogmas which harassed the Church from time to time.

Ibid. *Aristotle.* These things are found in book II *On the Soul*, chapter 1.

Page 10. *But Plato.* Dealing with these things in many words, Socrates is introduced in the *Alcibiades*, who finally concludes: *Since man is neither the body, nor the combination of both, it remains, I think, that he is either nothing, or, if he is something, it turns out that man is nothing else but a soul.* Which Cicero in *Scipio's Dream* thus expresses: *You are not the one whom this form declares, but the mind of each is the person himself.* Indeed, the soul so entirely perfects man from itself that Plato judged that man should be called *himself in himself* by a word coined for that purpose.

Ibid. *And death declares.* These things are found in Damascenus; but let it be allowed to warn once that the greatest part of the second book of that writer was borrowed from ours.

Page 11. *For he did not only unite.* These things are indeed excellent; for the connection of things to unity, the order to the principle, the immensity to infinity, and conveniences to the father, consequently lead all things straight to God.

Page 12. *Aristotle related.* *History of Animals*, book 1, ch. 1.

Page 13. *Wherefore also Moses on the creation.* Philo in *On the Creation of the World* says: *Just as, then, those who give banquets do not invite them to dinner before they have prepared everything for the festivity, and those who organize gymnastic contests, etc., in the same way also the Ruler of all, as some arbiter and host, about to call man to both festivity and contemplation, prepared beforehand the things necessary for either.* To which he subjoins: *God made the heaven as the beginning, but man as the end; the former the most perfect of those things that are in the objects of sense, immortal; the latter the best of those things that are earth-born and mortal, a short, if one must tell the truth, heaven.* Basil, in *Some Place in Scripture*, 21: *Creation is first, but man is last, because He prepared for him, as for a housemaster, a house filled; for He did not create man first, so that he might be created a pauper, but He created the heaven as a spontaneous shelter, and spreading out the earth as a floor for his feet, preparing it for the feet of man.* Thus Nyssenus: *It was not fitting that the ruler should appear before those to be ruled.* Tertullian, indeed, *Against Marcion*, book II: *Who is worthy to inhabit the works of God, if not His image and likeness?* Euryphanus the Pythagorean: *He settled the divine, most precious animal, man, into the world, an honor to his own nature, the eye of the decor of things that are.* Lactantius, book VII: *God did not make the world for its own sake, but for the sake of man, who uses it: so also man himself for his own sake, that is, that there might be someone who could understand his works.*

Page 15. *But the Hebrews man.* Josephus indeed seems to think that they could at least have been very long-lived, if they had followed divine commands.

^A For thus he introduces God addressing the first-formed: "Old age would not come upon you so quickly, and life could become long for you," *Antiq.* lib. 1, c. 2. But that was Josephus, who sought above all that what he narrated might be accommodated to the grasp of the Gentiles. The author of the Books of Wisdom far otherwise (c. 1, 13): "God did not make death," etc., 1, 23: "God created man for incorruption," etc. And St. Paul to the Rom. c. v, 12: "Through sin, death." Theophilus of Antioch treats these matters more distinctly in *ad Autol.* lib. 11, p. 101: "Man was created intermediate, neither entirely mortal, nor altogether immortal, but capable of both," which he repeats a page or two later. Theodorus Abucara: "The body of Adam was by nature mortal and subject to passion, but by divine grace it was kept immortal and impassible." Indeed, if anyone should say that "the first-formed man, Adam, was created mortal in such a way that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would have died in the body—that is, would have departed from the body, not by the worthiness of sin but by the necessity of nature—let him be anathema." *Synod. Carth.* can. 112. To which Balsamon says: "God did not form Adam mortal, nor yet immortal, but intermediate," etc.

Page 16. *There are still even now powers.* Augustine, lib. VIII *De Gen. ad litt.* c. 5: "Although that tree nonetheless bestowed such bodily food as to firm up the human body with stable health, not as other food, but by some hidden infusion of health." See *De civ. Dei*, lib. XIV, c. 26.

Ibid. *In the temptation.* This is almost what the Rabbis say, that Adam did not recognize himself as naked because of the great prophecy and wisdom that he possessed; whence they say that Saul, when he prophesied (1 Sam. xix, 24), went naked, as also did Isaiah (xx, 2).

Ibid. *Of the enjoyment of meats.* Meaning, at least after the times of the flood this was allowed.

Page 17. *Of insensible transpiration.* Deservedly does insensible transpiration come under this consideration, since it is the primary one of all evacuations that happen to an animate body; a fact which we are taught by the static art beyond all expectation and almost belief.

Page 20. *And always and forever.* So true is what Tertullian says, that we are born to no thing but repentance, in his book *De pœnit.* near the end. And indeed, if it is true, as has seemed to some, that man should not be called a rational animal so much as a religious one, and that the worship of the deity enters into his very essence as the highest and most intimate prerogative of our nature—flowing immediately, as a certain proper property, from those principles of the species—then one ought by all means to repent of sins; nor is man to be called a laughing animal so much as a weeping one, who pursues his own sins with perpetual lamentation.

Ibid. *Before the fall.* Our author assumes an interval after the offense of the angels before God imposed punishment upon them; and he is not alone in this opinion: "Well did Justin say that before the Lord's coming Satan never dared to blaspheme God, since he did not yet know his own condemnation," in *Euseb. Hist.* lib. IV, c. 18, under the name of Irenæus. Epiphanius also: "Before the coming of Christ, Satan did not dare to utter any blasphemous word against his own Master, nor think of rebellion; for he awaited the coming of Christ," etc., *hæres.* 39. So also Isidore of Pelusium, lib. II, epist. 90, says: "The Devil, after Christ's advent, having heard the pronouncement of the sentence against him, breathed more fiercely against us," etc., all of which Œcumenius repeats in his commentary on the last chapter of the first epistle of St. Peter. Rupert, however, c. 21 of the book *De victoria verbi Dei*, expressly says: "It is to be understood that the devil was not cast down from heaven immediately from the beginning of sin, but that he also awaited by the patience of God." John Cassian, *collat.* 8, c. 10, dealing with the devil, says: "Therefore his former fall, by which he had perished through pride, and for which he had even deserved to be called a serpent, was followed by a second ruin through envy, and by the judgment of the Lord he was usefully cast down into the depths."

Page 21. *And of nymphs.* The author is Aristotle, who says that nymphs die; indeed, the water-lily, a marsh plant, is also said to be a "nymph" born of a nymph who died of jealousy over Hercules, *Plin.* lib. XXV, c. 7. The same author also, lib. X, c. 5, says that on the shore of the Olysponenses the lamentation of a dying creature was heard from afar; and in the time of Emperor Augustus many Nereids appeared lifeless, etc. Dalechamp adds that Gaza saw a Nereid cast onto the shore of the Peloponnese; a Triton swimming in the sea at Trapezunt; and a Neapolitan Triton, Bonifacius, preserved in honey. That there are, moreover, Hamadryad nymphs who are born with trees and perish with them—to pass over others—can be learned from Servius in the tenth *Eclogue*.

Page 23. *For the nature of fish.* Basil the Great has very similar things in his *Hexaemeron*. But that some fish at least do not prey upon others, Aristotle taught in his *Hist. animal.* lib. VIII, cap. 2: "The *kephalos* and the *kephireus* entirely alone do not eat flesh." Pliny, however, says otherwise; for in lib. IX, c. 17, he says: "The *Scarus* is given the primacy, for it is said to be the only fish that chews the cud and feeds on herbs, not on other fish."

Page 25. *And the poisonous things.* The human race complains unjustly about nature for producing poisons, since it is not yet sufficiently understood what deserves to be called a poison, for the Persian fruit is deadly in Persia but is held among us as a delicacy. Fruits that among the Americans are handled with impunity, not even with hands, become our daily food; indeed, things that bring death to one living creature provide nourishment to others. Moreover, through long use, poisons themselves come into favor with us, being hostile only in this name, that if perhaps the weariness of life takes hold of us, they refuse to take the unwelcome light from us—which is related to have happened to Mithridates. Indeed, even our bountiful mother, the earth, if she generates harmful juices, brings forth medicinal ones too; and, if we are to tell the truth, the earth has brought forth the remedies for our evils; we have made those things the poison of life, as Pliny says. If anyone desires more on this subject, let him consult the author's most elegant apology for poisons, lib. II, c. 63.

Page 26. *Of lions.* The Kabbalists say a divine character is imprinted upon man, by virtue of which all animals recognize him as their superior; but that there is a double character: one, by which he is feared, which is called [*left side*], a product, as they say, of the left hand and the sword of God; another, by which he is loved, [*right side*], arising from the right hand and the scepter of God. Whence it happens that, although beasts and all wild animals fear all men whoever they may be, still good men, in whom the better character has appeared, are loved and revered by them. In proof of this matter, they bring forward the examples brought up earlier. And lest we count these as the dreams of the Rabbis, almost the same is to be found in Theodoret, *orat.* 5 *De Providentia*. For after he has recounted the aforementioned holy men, he says of the wild beasts: "Since they saw in the image of the archetype the likeness to be kept very pure, they confessed their servitude and laid aside their beastliness," etc. Eusebius indeed testifies that wild beasts, when Christians were brought to the lions, not rarely abstained; whence Ignatius, in his *Epist. ad Rom.*, confesses that he lives in fear lest the same thing happen to him, whence he says: "May I have the benefit of the beasts that are ready for me; and I pray that they may be found quick to me, and I will coax them to devour me quickly, not as they were cowardly and did not touch some."

Page 28. *Democritus and Epicurus.* Our author rightly joins these two, since this is almost the difference between them: that what the one set forth learnedly, the other propagated unlearnedly and more happily for the grasp of the common people. And certainly who would not count him as the most accommodating man and excellent teacher, who warns his disciples at the very threshold not to torment themselves in learning arts and to weary themselves in turning over writers? "Every kind of learning, O blessed one, flee," as Diogenes Laertius quotes him. In the words of Quintilian, lib. II, c. 2: "Epicurus above all dismisses us from himself, who orders us to flee all learning with the swiftest navigation."

823 EDITORIS OXONIENSIS 824

^A Ibid. Balñç. That our author asserts Thales to have been the first to call the soul "ever-moving and self-moving," Diogenes Laertius proposes thus: "He was the first to say that souls are immortal." But I do not see how these statements cohere with those which the same Laertius immediately subjoins, that (b) he granted a soul even to stones. Unless, perhaps, marbles are to be called immortal because they endure for a long time, and being placed upon tombs, appear themselves to be in no need of being buried in a tomb henceforth.

Pag. 28. Πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον καὶ διάπυρον. This dogma concerning the igneous soul, nearly buried in its own ashes, learned physicians among us have attempted to revive by means of certain not-inelegant arguments, used as tinder, who have ingeniously, if not truly, illustrated that lamp which is perennially burning in the focus of the heart. But Democritus taught that the soul is pure and unmixed fire; just as our author immediately subjoins from Arist. lib. De anima, c. 2. Aristotle’s words are: "He says it is fire and warm; for among the infinite shapes and atoms, he calls the spherical ones fire and soul." This Epicurus, in his own fashion, expresses more emendately, as reported by Plutarch, in *Placita Philosophorum*: "A mixture of four things: of a certain fiery substance, a certain airy substance, a certain pneumatic substance, and a fourth which remains unnamed." Indeed, Hipparchus also said the soul was fire, according to Macrobius in his *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio*.

Ibid. Κριτίας δὲ αἷμα. The Holy Scriptures seem to favor this opinion; which, even before the Mosaic Law and its ceremonial worship, interdicted to all mortals the eating of blood, for this reason rendered by God the Most High: *That the soul is in the blood of the animal.* Moreover, it seems that the rationale for all sacrifices is to be sought from thence, as *without shedding of blood there is no remission* (Hebr. ix, 22). But there are more peculiar causes why this opinion should be commended by Critias (a). For he was a man, if ever there was one, whose soul was blood; a traitor to his country and a butcher; and one of the thirty tyrants—I know not whether to say he was the very tyranny of all thirty altogether.

Ibid. Ἵππων δὲ ὁ φιλ. ὕδωρ. John the Grammarian substitutes, for the philosopher, the surname "the Atheist." In the book *De anima*, he says: "From water, as Thales and Hippon, who is called the Atheist." But the opinion itself is branded by Aristotle with this mark: "Some have declared that water [is the principle], as Hippon," as if, in his judgment, that opinion were more absurd than the rest. Be that as it may, Thales, who, according to Laertius, *posited water as the beginning of all things*, did not do so without cause, as even Aristotle himself testifies; for in 1 *Metaph.* one may hear him discoursing thus: "For all things have their nutriment in moisture, and warmth itself is generated from this and lives by this." He adds, moreover, that the most ancient theologians were engaged in this opinion, whence Homer [wrote]: *"Oceanus the origin of the gods, and mother Tethys."* So that water is held to be the parent of things; the earth, which in Roman theology is Cybele or the mother of all gods, receiving them into her bosom and acting the part of a mother. For thus Eustathius interprets that passage: "Oceanus, that is, the moist nature; and Tethys, which is the common nurse of all." But if, as it pleased others, Tethys signifies the waters, that element shall acquire the right and dignity of both parents. Hence, certainly, Aristotle says in the passage cited above that for this reason the gods swore by the Styx, *and the oath of the gods is water.*

^D Ibid. Ἡράκλειτος. If this "obscure" one is to be understood at all, *ἀναθυμίασις* (exhalation) in his terminology appears to mean what is called "volatile" among the sons of the chymists, and is designated by the names of spirit, phlegm, and sulfur, drawn from liquids by the aid of heat. He posits his exhalations, according to Laertius, of a twofold kind: either *λαμπράς καὶ καθαράς* (bright and pure), that is, sulphurous and burning ones; or *σκοτεινάς* (dark ones), which create at least a cloud, or are merely moist/teeming with phlegm: upon the fermentation (*ζύμωσις*) of which with fixed and earthly parts, the generations or destructions of all things in the universe depend; and indeed, from the peculiar quality of these, they are conformed to their specific essences.

Ibid. Θαλῆς. That our author asserts Thales to have been the first to call the soul "ever-moving and self-moving," Diogenes Laertius proposes thus: "He was the first to say that souls are immortal." But I do not see how these statements cohere with those which the same Laertius immediately subjoins, that (b) he granted a soul even to stones. Unless, perhaps, marbles are to be called immortal because they endure for a long time, and being placed upon tombs, appear themselves to be in no need of being buried in a tomb henceforth.

Ibid. Πυθαγόρας. Page 44, our author provides sufficiently probable reasons by which to persuade that Pythagoras, who was wont to obscure almost all things with symbols, performed this also, when he said that the soul is number; i.e., to be understood in no other way than Aristotle himself does when he calls time the number of motion. By unity, indeed, he designates God, the first cause of things; and forms, since they are the principles of individuation, as well as the spirits and deities of bodies—nay, particles of a divine aura—he does not wrongly call numbers. Certainly, Plutarch interprets it thus: *he takes the number instead of the mind.* Indeed, Macrobius explains the famous Pythagorean sacrament: *"I swear by him who granted the quaternity to our soul,"* as meaning: "I swear by him who gave our soul the quaternary number," i.e., he gave it to us with its three faculties: the first of which is reason, which they call *λογιστικόν*; the second is spirit/animosity, which they call *θυμικόν*; the third is desire, which is called *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. *In Somn. Scip.* l. 1.

Ibid. Πλάτων. Lib. x *De Leg.*, as well as in the *Phaedo*. Ibid. Ἀριστοτέλης. Lib. II *De anima*, c. 1. Ibid. Δείναρχος. A certain rhetor of this name occurs, not obscure, a disciple of Isocrates, or as others say, of Theophrastus: whence he could not be considered wholly alien to philosophy; but Photius, who reviews his writings, mentions only his orations; and Cicero in *Brutus* and lib. II *De orat.* ranks him among the rhetors: nay, when Tullius mentions various opinions of philosophers concerning the soul, in *Tusc. quaest.* lib. 1, and expounds that opinion which says that the soul is nothing but one simple body, so shaped that it lives and feels by the temperature of nature, he confesses Dicaearchus to be the author of this. Moreover, when Plutarch in *Placita Philosophorum*, whose footsteps Nemesius almost always follows in this census of writers, writes that Dicaearchus brought this forward, I believe that through an easy slip "Dinarchus" has been interpolated for "Dicaearchus." Meanwhile, however, it must not be hidden that Herinias in his *Διαδρομῇ* also wrote "Dinarchus"; but Galen [wrote] "Dicaearchus" (which is closest), in his book *On the History of Philosophers*, and associated him with Epicurus.

Pag. 29. Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Δείναρχος ἀκούσιον. Dinarchus or Dicaearchus (for it is all one) in truth posited the soul as an accident and a temperament of qualities. But concerning Aristotle, this can be said no otherwise than insofar as by his authority forms are drawn out from the potentiality of matter, and since they cannot subsist apart, they seem to him to be *ἀνούσιοι*, that is, incomplete substances.

Ibid. Μανιχαῖοι. Epiphanius, *Haer.* 66, clearly explains the opinion of Manes, that he posited two principles, the one good, the other evil: "To posit in the world the subsistences of these two principles, and that the one principle made the body, but the soul is of the other; and that the soul itself is that which is in men and in every animal, and bird, and reptile, and beast; and not only so, but also..."

^A in plants, etc." This is, to be sure, taken from the very ancient doctrines of the Chaldeans, among whom Oromasdes and (a) Arimanius were those very principles which we have just mentioned; or, in the words of the Valentinians (as reported by Irenaeus, Tertullian, Theodoret, and others), Nous or (b) Achamoth, Ennoia and Love; divine knowledge, unity or God; and on the other part matter, duality, Orcus and Chaos, which were also called Sakkla and (c) Taldaboth. These doctrines, indeed, once accepted among the Pythagoreans and Platonists (the patriarchs of almost all heretics, as Tertullian testifies), were disseminated everywhere. Naturally, when foolish men could not conceive how anything could be made from nothing, they dreamed of eternal matter; and since religion was among them, they referred to God the evils which are seen everywhere in things; they attributed all those things to the contrary and inferior principle of matter. This prevailed to such an extent that even Lucretius might invent this excuse for his Epicurus, because he wished to show, quite piously, that the world was composed of atoms, namely: "In no wise created for us by divine power Is the nature of the world, which is endowed with such great fault." And indeed this is, above all others, the philosophy which brought very rich pretexts to the polytheism of the pagans. For after it was established among them that God is whatever you see, wherever you move, and that He animates all things: it was next in order that He could and should be worshipped in all things. Hence the evocations of souls, the choice of foods, magical lustrations, most polluted purifications, magical purgations and unspeakable rites by which they strove (to use the words of Plotinus, who was about to die, as recorded by Porphyry) to ^B bring back the divinity that is in them to the divinity that is in the All. Moreover, just as from the first cradle of Christianity the Church was opposed by these very arms through Simon Magus, Carpocrates, Valentinus, Marcion, and the rest of the Gnostics, so, as that philosophy was already flexing its muscles, it finally, under the auspices of Julian, acted as a rival to the same, and placed its soul in the wound.

Ibid. *Ammonius*. For this matter, consult Proclus in his Commentary on Plato’s *Timaeus*, and also John the Grammarian on Aristotle’s *De Anima*, who almost described these things which follow.

Ibid. *It requires what binds it together*. It is not badly said by the vulgar that the soul is given to brute animals as salt. For salt not only wards off putrefaction, but is also a principle of fixation. But the rational soul, which in Plato is called the charioteer, not only puts a bridle on the passions, but also moderates the humors of the body. And this is that which physicians mean when they put them under the guardianship of the soul, and teach by great experiments that other conditions are had in a living body than in a corpse.

Ibid. *Stoic "tonicity"*. Senses and motion are wont to be explained in such a way that if nerves, stretched after the manner of chords, are perchance touched in some part, some change pervades and affects the whole; whence, if agitation is introduced from within, it produces sensation; if it tends outwardly, it produces motion. But the Stoics seem to mean something else here, namely, that the cause of all operations in living creatures is a certain made and reciprocal counter-tension of those same nerves and the nervous parts of the body: just as one may see in spasms, in which, when parts are ^C moved, they seem to themselves to suffice for perennating motion, and also for facilitating the faculties of the soul, namely, in that reciprocal *synocha*, a tension internal, which the attractant faculty follows, which nutrition also follows; and external, that which is called expulsive, and makes a stage and passage for that which nourishes.

Page 31. *Of homogenous parts*. This reasoning displeases the author, not as if, by similar things, if anything were perchance taken away, less would depart than if the same amount were taken away from a body of dissimilar parts; but because by that diminution nothing would be left maimed; since indeed the smallest drop of water contains in itself the whole nature of that element as much as the whole Ocean.

Page 32. *We become like our parents*. Plutarch (d) recorded the reason from their doctrines: "That seeds are carried from the whole body and the soul, and that likenesses are fashioned from the same genera, the types and characters, just as if a painter were making an image of what is seen from similar colors."

Page 33. *Similar numbers*. In Euclid, book VII, definition 21.

Page 35. *Harmonia*. These are in Plato’s *Phaedo*.

Page 36. *Harmony by relaxing*. Harmony consists in ratio, namely, sesquialter, triple, quadruple, etc., which do not admit of more and less; but since it is established that consonance through systems, modes, tones, numbers, and the institution of numbers not only does not vary, but is intended and remitted; our author uses another word, of a broader significance, *harmoge* namely, which is rendered conveniently enough by Fred. Morel as "a joining of harmony," and it consists almost entirely in this, that parts respond and are adapted, and that with easy lapse tones gently coalesce and are mixed. Thus in painting, the dubious and as it were dim conjunction of lights and shadows is called *harmoge*. So Lucian in *Zeuxis* (e): "And the mixture and joint of bodies, by which the equestrian part is joined and connected to the female."

Ibid. *Again the soul*. The following things (f), previously missing, have been restored from manuscripts.

Ibid. *Galen however (g) declares*. In the treatise which Galen wrote about the books edited by himself, he makes mention of a commentary on *Demonstration*, which indeed nowhere appears; but it is altogether likely that that work belonged entirely to logic, since it is reckoned among his youthful lucubrations of that sort. To me, seriously considering this matter, it is held almost for certain that the *demonstrative discourses*, of which mention is made here, are opposed to practical and strictly medicinal ones, and signify nothing further, especially since that method of treatment is acknowledged by Galen himself in his book *On the parts of the medical art*, as his editor Rasarius observes in the Preface. Moreover, among his writings there still occur those things which are adduced here in testimony, namely in the fragment *On the substance of natural faculties*, where he says: "Of our (h) soul, some think it is a certain incorporeal substance, others a spirit, just as others think there is no proper existence for it, etc. I have assigned to myself (i) a certain middle station. For when pronouncing simply on other doctrines, of some things as if I knew the truth in them, of others as if I knew nothing of it, among which I have just gone through, I proceed as far as the probable." And a little later: *Probable...*

^A nature informing him permits him to feel correctly what he felt in Christ. But indeed Nemesius is not to be immediately considered an Origenist, which to some censors seemed more than enough unfair. For it is manifest that the dogma of the descent and transmigration of souls has been overthrown by him with most powerful arguments, on page 53 and page 62, as he rejects and abhors the ravings of the Origenists in most eloquent words. It cannot be concealed that he departed from the received opinion of the Church; but it must also certainly be said that it was not received at that time, when he wrote, since nothing had been defined on this part before the second Council of Constantinople. Certainly the divine Augustine hesitated, unsure whether he should resolve for or against. For in his Epistle to Evodius 102, he says that he is sending Orosius to Jerome (that is, from the extreme ends of Africa to him while he was staying in Syria) to ask about the origin of souls, what his opinion was. Since the words of the most holy Father do not seem to have been written incidentally, it will not be at all burdensome to add them: "I have asked and do ask our God, who called us into His own kingdom and glory, that He may wish that this which I write to you, holy brother Jerome, consulting you about things I do not know, be fruitful to us. For although you are much older than I, yet I—even though I am already an old man—consult you. But for learning what is necessary, no age can seem too late to me, because, even if it is more becoming for an old man to teach than to learn, yet it is more becoming to learn than to be ignorant of what one should teach." And yet Jerome had nothing in this question that he wished to answer clearly; but, having an excuse for himself, he repelled the burden, if not the ill-will, of such great doubt. For the most expeditious decision of the whole difficulty, which later pleased so many—that the soul is infused by being created and created by being infused—had not yet at that time attained currency. Pag. 50. ^B *Hexis life.* *Hexis* is properly said of those things which only have *einai*, or "being." Whence among Sextus Empiricus they are called *psilai hexeis*, or "bare conditions," absolutely the forms of inanimate things. Themistius, in book I of *On the Soul*, explaining this matter, says: "Perhaps the opinion of those from Zeno is also consistent with this, that God has permeated through all substance, positing that in some places there is mind, in some nature, and in others *hexis*." Ibid. *About this dogma they were divided.* Nothing is more varied and multiform than error. Therefore it is not at all surprising if, in the narration of metempsychosis, the patrons of this same thing do not agree much. More polished than the rest seems Empedocles, who thinks it is most fortunate for those souls to depart which pass from a human into a lion or a laurel tree: "But among beasts they become lions, mountain-haunting, sleeping on the ground, and laurels among the leaf-crowned trees." Namely, men then seem blessed to themselves, if they can plunder everything in the manner of lions, and finally, as if the deed were well done, be crowned with laurel. And it is equal to believe that the same pursuits survive even for the dead. But indeed this more than poetic metamorphosis of souls also permeated the Jews, so much so that to some it seemed likely that Pythagoras was taught by them. They seem everywhere to believe that the soul of Adam is adapted to David in succession, and finally to the Messiah. Nor do the Talmudists believe this now for the first time by the privilege of daydreaming which they enjoy. These had taken root before the ages of our Lord: whence we hear them asking in Matthew XVI, 14 about John the Baptist, whether he was Elias, or Jeremiah, or another prophet. Pag. 53. *Galenus.* These things can be found in the cited book. Pag. 56. *A sponge, therefore, oiled.* I have discovered by experiments repeated again and again that this matter is to some extent so. But indeed liquids, however they may be mixed... ^{C D}

are even yet able to be separated again; this will be proved by the daily practice of those who, in order to extract more successfully the finer spirits lurking between the wine vapours and the lees of the casks, pour in water in abundance and thus subject it to an alembic.

Page 57. *In sleep.* He does not bring forward this instance regarding sleep in order to conclude therefrom that souls are exempt from intercourse with the body, even if they wander there—since it is a settled fact that animals dream—but because at that time *it prophesies the future and approaches the intelligible.*

Page 65. *The element.* Nemesius, following Aristotle, recognizes the elements as the minima naturalia, or *the smallest part of the mixture of bodies.* Let the Epicureans of old and modern fashion, therefore, keep their "less than the smallest" of nature to themselves—namely, those atoms which they dream of and from which they hatch infinite worlds. For this is indeed their custom, that after they have contaminated things soberly spoken by others with their own emendations, they boast that they have discovered a new philosophy. Moreover, Nemesius himself denies *that any of the sensible elements is pure and unmixed.* When, therefore, he subsequently describes the transformation of elements into one another by a coarser thread, he is not to be understood as disputing about pure and unmixed elements, but of those which, turbulent and confused in this flux of things, fall under the senses.

Page 67. *According to the return.* These things can be understood more correctly if the four elements are inscribed in a circle, joined to each other by symbolic qualities, so that they at last coalesce: for thus it happens that this ascent and descent, the principle of priority and consequence, is placed before the eyes.

Page 69. *Aristotle.* All these things are described according to the mind of Aristotle and occur in *Meteor.*, lib. 1, cap. 3.

Ibid. *Tetrapharmakon.* There are two species of tetrapharmakon; one served as a medicine and was called *mysterion*. It consisted of four simples—gentian, aristolochia, laurel berries, and myrrh—mixed in equal weight. The other tetrapharmakon is a certain plaster or ointment, called *basilikon*. It consists, indeed, of wax, pitch, resin, and tallow, mixed in equal quantity. Nemesius seems to have looked to the latter, since it is established that Galen did so when he applied this instance in this very matter. For in his commentaries on Hippocrates’ *De natura hominis*, he says that there is nothing in the body that is "pure," just as a tetrapharmakon is not pure; for it is neither wax, nor pitch, nor resin, nor fat. ^A

Ibid. *Apollinarius.* In this opinion the author of the Book of Wisdom, ch. XI, 18, [states]: *Giving form to the world out of formless matter.* So also Philo: "For it was of itself disordered, qualityless, soulless, etc." So also Nyssen in *On the Creation of the World*: "By activity it was not yet [being], but in power alone it had existence." With whom agrees Augustine, lib. 1, *De Genesi*, and *Contra Manichaeos*: "The primary matter was made confused and formless, from which all things would be made which might be distinct and formed."

Page 74. *Things said by Hippocrates.* Namely, in the book *On the Nature of Man*.

Ibid. *From which they themselves attempt.* Themistocles used a not dissimilar argument to claim for himself the first parts in the naval battle at Salamis.

Page 76. *And the Stoics.* What follows is to be found in Plutarch, *On the Opinions of the Philosophers*, etc., lib. IV, which are also explained a little differently by Diogenes Laertius, lib. VII.

Ibid. *His instruments.* It is not shameful to confess that something human happened to our author when he wrote about man; that is, that he lapsed in a slippery matter, as have almost all physicians and anatomists. But indeed, who will institute an apology and render as excused the great Descartes—sometimes rightly his own oracle, and more often by our own fault—who, when he had commanded the pineal gland to be the seat of the soul, and that the nerves reached up to it and brought sensible species to them, did not only invent this, but also expressed it in images, and furthermore equipped it with valves, as can be seen in his treatise *On Man*? And this is a specimen of their rashness that must not be omitted—those who wish all animals to be machines: for it is too little, indeed, to explain the operations which are natural, vital, or animal in a jejune and (if pardon be granted to one speaking the truth) childish manner, unless they also invent very many things out of their own wit in these matters and lie splendidly. ^B

Page 77. *Pneuma, carried.* This is the definition of the Stoics (and it is found in Diogenes Laertius), among whom all images of rational animals are called *logika* and are derived from the *hegemonikon* [governing principle].

Page 70. *But it seems to Plato.* One may find these things in Plato’s *Timaeus*. And indeed, if we wish for a mechanical and mason's world, rather than its fabrication, which is sustained by just parts and joinings that exactly fit together, do we dream it to be built together with small hooks, barbs, and striations? Certainly, we would have said more correctly (which Plato intended) that God the Best and Greatest *geometrizes*, acting as a geometer and a skilled architect, rather than some unskilled craftsman who, with compasses and level to boot, builds a house that will soon collapse out of rough-hewn beams and stones piled up haphazardly. Certainly, whoever sees salts growing into cubes, octahedrons, dodecahedrons, etc., by a most certain law, will say that it is not far from the truth that the threads of things refer to a fixed principle of these, and are fashioned onto it like a web. ^C

Page 71. *Sharpness, rareness, motion.* If it were advantageous to trifle in a serious matter, it would be easy to institute a comparison with the first, second, and third element of Descartes. But it is not for us to dream philosophy.

Page 73. *Since Moses.* These have been added now for the first time by the editor.

Page 78. *Hipparchus.* The opinions of Hipparchus, as well as those of several other philosophers, concerning the nature of vision are brought forward from Plutarch, lib. IV, c. 13, *On the Opinions of the Philosophers*. But those things which he praises from Galen are contained in the book *On the Use of Parts*. But that great physician does not seem to have observed sufficiently that the distances of visible things are chiefly recognized by the angle under which the objects are seen. Meanwhile, however, from the same passage of Galen, one may observe the decussations of the rays and their configurations when they are admitted through a slit into a dark room—things well enough known in his century, although Kepler and other opticians applaud themselves in that experiment as if it were their own.

Page 79. *Air being a certain instrument.* Our author most correctly judges that the sun, as also other luminous bodies, imprints a force upon the airy system, which travels a very long distance until it is stopped by an opaque body, which Chrysippus explains: *As if the object seen were announced through a rod of taut air.* But what he says, that the sense then discerns its objects through straight lines, must be absolutely admitted, in so far as all things are explained according to the laws of straight lines, not only in direct vision but also in reflected and refracted [vision]. For spherical bodies, however they are brought into convex or concave surfaces, behave as [if they have] straight tangents. Yet perhaps the motion itself of the illuminated air is entirely circular, similar to that which is seen in water when a pebble is thrown into the middle of a pond; namely, *to ripple in straight circles to infinity, until it fills the surrounding air, as in the case of a pool struck by a stone*, as Plutarch expresses the matter. ^D

Pag. 82. *On the matter of number*. The power of counting demands not only memory but the use of reason. For Aristotle most correctly observes (sect. 3, prob. 6): *Man alone among other animals knows how to count.* Hence, a judgment is rightly taken from this regarding barbarous nations, some of whom—as is said of the Americans—proceed in counting no further than eight, others no further than four.

Ibid. *Or through a veil*. The refraction of a luminous ray into the air from water behaves, by Descartes' calculation, as 3 to 4, or rather 187 to 250. From glass into air, as 2 to 3, if Kepler is to be believed. But as our most learned countryman, Mr. Isaac Barrow, professor of theology and highly versed in mathematics, calculates, as 3 to 5.

Pag. 83. *Beholding the fire*. The fable of the Satyr kissing the fire is well known.

Pag. 84. *The oar in the sea*. Do not suppose our author thinks that refraction does not occur except in agitated waters. He explains here the cause of the multiple and repeated inflection, which is accustomed to appear while rowing as the waves are moved.

Ibid. *This is not an error of sight*. Epicurus extends this so far as to remove all error from the senses: whence, for his singular astonishment, he first brought it into his own mind and then wished to persuade others that judgments of things are founded in the senses. He feared, indeed, to use Cicero's words, that if one perception were false, none would be true. But Epicurus ought not to have been so solicitous about establishing truth, since he denies that either of two contradictory propositions is true or false, and thereby utterly destroys all laws of reasoning and every judgment of the mind. See Cic. lib. 1, *De nat. deorum*.

Pag. 85. *For each of the other organs [the author] makes the tongue double*. In order to prove that the senses are dual, our author grants us two tongues, with the epiglottis substituted for the function of tasting; which was done under the auspices of Aristotle, who says in book 2, *On the Parts of Animals*, concerning the tongue: *It is evident in this instance; for it appears cleft.* Galen certainly removes the uvula from the uses of taste and judges it to be comparable to the reeds of flutes. But this transcendent providence of nature, which our author desires in the sense of touch, is seen even more clearly in this sense, with the nerves almost all distributed in pairs of conjugations to either side of the body, so that when sensation or motion fails on one side, it may be retained at least from the opposite side, which is observable everywhere in cases of paralysis and hemiplegia.

Pag. 87. *For when irregularity is joined to hardness, roughness follows.* Undoubtedly bodies that are full of fixed particles of salt and earth, when they harden by the aid of heat, become rocks that are bristling and rough: but most oily things induce a certain glutinous viscosity and a sandarac-like polish. Meanwhile, however, when the unevenness of the parts is removed, the harder the bodies are, the more perfectly they are polished and smoothed with the greatest accuracy, as can be seen in marble and metals.

Ibid. *So too touch.* Thus, not even touch is [produced] by contact.

Ibid. *Hearing [is] not only in a straight line.* The voice is certainly diffused in the same manner as light, of which we spoke above, so that the motion impressed at a single point pervades everywhere in circles that are continually increasing. Yet, as it tends outward and is propelled, it behaves just as if it had always proceeded in straight lines.

Pag. 89. *Qualities of taste.* Aristotle reviews this in the same way in book 2, *De anima*, c. 10. He says truly that our faculty of tasting is most exquisite, *because it is a kind of touch*. From this he also shows that man is the most prudent animal. Would that others did not use the same argument, who esteem the palate more than the philosopher! Let them remember, however, that the same Aristotle branded these senses, above all others, with a mark of special ignominy, calling them *the most dishonorable and most disgraceful*. Gellius adds that we share these pleasures with the pig and the donkey, and that Hippocrates considered venereal pleasures to be a most foul disease, to wit, the comitial [epilepsy].

Pag. 90. *Toward sounds.* The imitations of the ear itself, the drums, as well as the soundboards of lyres—which, when attenuated to the form of thin plates or membranes, require supports—show the cartilage to be most suited to sounds. ^B

Ibid. *As with the other sense organs.* The matter is, in fact, quite the opposite. For nerves are accommodated to this sense alone. But since the mamillary processes are large in bulk, and in some animals hollow, soft, and unlike the rest of the nerves, they were considered to be parts of the brain.

Pag. 91. *Of humors.* He says that sweet odors arise from an exquisite concoction of humors, because when the aerial or spiritual and sulphureous particles—in which the chief principle of odors resides—first ferment in bodies, they are not yet sufficiently loosened from their bonds to be able to issue forth entirely: but when that work has progressed further, and the sulphureous parts conglomerate and, by their ferocity, emerge in a united band, they prick and weaken the sense organs: whence an intermediate state is most suitable for pleasant odors.

Ibid. *Judgments and assents.* These things are said according to the opinion of the Stoics, concerning whom see Gell. lib. XIX, c. 1.

Ibid. *Which alone he claims to be true divination.* In every religion of the Gentiles, primary importance was attached to dreams, whence he who sought divine warnings would sleep in some sanctuary. But Pythagoras, who abhorred even the slaughter of animals in sacrifices, *used bloodless [offerings]*, says Laertius, and, as Nazianzen says, *he dedicated the sacrifice to God with a clay ox*, although others mention a whole hecatomb once offered by him, specifically when he had discovered what the ratio of the hypotenuse was to the remaining sides of a right-angled triangle. In truth, he dismissed all inspection of entrails besides, reserving for himself only the oneirocritic [art]. Plutarch says: *He does not approve of sacrifice.* Certainly Cicero, book 1, *De divinatione*, shows that he approved of augury itself, and likewise Diogenes Laertius; but Porphyry says that in sacrifices he used *cocks and the tenderest of pigs*. As far as the Jews are concerned, by the prescription of the sacred law they were more averse to all superstition of divination, with various kinds of the same accurately enumerated in that place. Hence there is the famous story of Nosimachus, who was following Alexander into Persia: when the augur, asked about the journey, had replied, having pointed out a bird, that if the bird remains one must stay, if it flies one must proceed: he shot the bird with an arrow and replied to the angered augurs: *How can this [bird], not knowing its own safety, have predicted our advantage?* Certainly, although the Jews acknowledge two kinds of prophecy or divination, the dream and the vision, as Maimonides clearly says in *More Nevochim* part II, yet he explains both in such a way that you would say there is not much difference between them. He says that the dream is a known thing, so that there is no need to explain it; but he describes the vision thus: "In the vision of prophecy all senses are at rest, and that influence comes upon the rational faculty, and from it is diffused into the imaginative faculty, etc." Immediately, however, he subjoins the passage from Gen. xv, 12, where it is said, *a deep sleep fell upon Abraham*; which the same author explains more extensively in *Misne* tom. I, and *Jesude Haïtorah*, cap. 7.

Ibid. *Phantasia*. He hints that this is the difference between phantasia and memory, that, while the one [receives] things perceived (for nothing else comes to these faculties save through the gates of the senses) as if invested with a new habit in the sc-

second instance, our author rightly says these are transmitted to the memory, since the ideas of intelligible things are presented to the mind in place of phantasms.

Pag. 92. *That it is God.* If he restricts his *anamnesis* to primary notions, it will be almost the same as if he had said "instinct."

Pag. 93. *Since, indeed, [we judge] of the senses.* These things are found in Galen in his book *On the Eye*, if indeed it is truly Galen's; for it is questioned by critics.

Pag. 94. *Galen records such a thing.* Book *On the Affected Parts*, ch. 2.

Pag. 96. *Zeno the Stoic.* These things are not to be imputed to Zeno in any other way than whatever is done under their auspices is wont to be attributed to leaders. In reality, Chrysippus and his followers were of the aforementioned opinion. But if we credit Tertullian, ch. 14, *On the Soul*, Zeno divided [the soul] into three parts. More cautiously, therefore, Plutarch, whom our author has here for the most part described, sets it forth thus: "The Stoics say that it consists of eight parts," and finally compares the soul thus structured to a polypus, with tentacles, with which that animal apprehends all things, with wit sufficiently urbane against those who were wont to obtrude their *catalepsis*. In the same way, Diogenes Laertius: "They say the soul is eight-parted." ^A

Pag. 97. *Aristotle.* The philosopher teaches that the affections reside in the irrational part of the soul, *Rhetoric*, book 1, ch. 5; book *On the Soul*, ch. 9; *Topics*, book 7, ch. 7, and *Topics*, book 1, ch. 5, and elsewhere passim.

Pag. 98. *Affection is a motion.* To this definition it is wont to be added that this motion is with a non-natural change of the body, which our author calls "sensitive motion." In this, the Stoics are entirely homonymous regarding "affection," who avoid affections as if they were diseases and ailments, and wish it to be the same, that someone might wish to moderate them, as if he wished to be somewhat ill and to be insane with a certain reason. Yet they willingly embrace the same affections, however much they may displease under the name of "passions," under the title of "eupatheia." But it is customary among these men to wage war over the tips of words.

Pag. 101. *Of pleasures.* These things are said almost according to the mind of Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book x, in the first five chapters.

Pag. 102. *According to God.* Those who have said farewell to worldly affairs and are entering into the ascetic life and perfection (as most are fond of saying).

Pag. 103. *Pleasure [is a] generation.* Against this definition, which is Plato's in the *Philebus*, Aristotle also argues, *Ethics*, book vii, ch. 13, and book x, ch. 2. But the greatest part of men, namely those who suppose they were sent into the world on account of pleasures, who live to eat and do not eat to live, tenaciously defend this, since they pass their life in the same [pursuits] and daily celebrate births with drinking bouts. Let them remember, however, that this—whether it be an enigma or a definition—is rendered by Plato in the same place: "Pleasure is always (a) a generation, but it is not at all of the essence of pleasure," as if this birth always produced a miscarriage, and no vital offspring followed from it.

Pag. 104. *Epicurus.* Epicurus, for his extraordinary inconsistency, sometimes places the supreme good in pleasure, sometimes in indolence—that is, whether in good standing still or in motion—and sometimes he has placed it in *euthymia* and the delights of a mind well-conscious of itself in purity. In other places, however, we hear him professing that he does not understand any good that is separated from delicate and obscene pleasures, as Cicero [*says in*] *De natura deorum*, 11, 1. But in truth, what the same Cicero warns more often, that dogma of indolence pertains to Hieronymus of Rhodes as his own peculiar [doctrine].

Pag. 105. *Aristotle.* The following period, previously omitted, is supplied from our manuscripts.

Pag. 108. *The organ of grief is the mouth of the stomach.* Perhaps someone might say [it is] the subject rather than the instrument. But Helmont, and those others, if there be any, who have the soul so much in the dishes that they have placed the seat of the mind in the ventricle, would rightly and deservedly have believed every sense to be not only an instrument, but the origin and fountain.

Ibid. *Galen in the third book.* Meaning the commentaries on Hippocrates' *Prognostics*, concerning which matter we have treated above.

Pag. 111. *The veins are the roots.* Plato and Aristotle wish them to be so similar that man is for them merely an inverted plant.

Pag. 113. *Dilating from the...* In the circulation of the blood, the pneumatic arteries draw from the vena cava, and the great artery from the pneumonic veins, yet both through the mediation of the heart. If he had added that the veins elsewhere draw from the adjacent arteries, nothing could have been said more correctly.

Ibid. *But unintentionally.* A certain and unavoidable impurity followed from the Mosaic Law from this, so that if anything of the sort happened on the day before *Yom Kippur*, the *Sagan* was considered as a vicar of the High Priest, who might perform his duties. In the Christian Church, it is acted upon differently. Therefore, Timothy of Alexandria, in his canonical responses, teaches that those who had a nocturnal emission were to be kept from the sacred [mysteries] only under a condition: "If indeed [the emission] is subject to the desire for a woman, he ought not [to commune]; but if Satan is tempting him, so that through this pretext he is alienated from the communion of the divine mysteries, he ought to commune."

Pag. 114. *It is referred up.* The things which follow rely upon a double testimony of Hippocrates, and indeed not sufficiently firm, [even] with the Coan affirming them twice. He, however, has these words in the book *On Airs, Waters, and Places*, nearly at the end: and also in the book *On Seed*, which, however, Galen says belongs to Polybus. But let credit rest with the authors. Nearly every day among us the jugular veins are cut: but no sterility has been discovered to follow from that. Among the ancients, indeed, that opinion had taken root, that our bodies were as if joined together by symbols collected from everywhere by the individual limbs of the parents: whence a certain main road seemed to be paved, through which those stocks could be drawn from the farthest parts. But what our author says, "It is referred up, first indeed through a long course to the head," etc., does not in truth altogether abhor [the idea] that the chyliferous vessels of Pecquet were considered as spermatic.

Pag. 115. *But women.* An argument sufficiently unexpected; most convenient, however, for asserting the freedom of the will.

Pag. 116. *But the tendons.* The senses are most exquisite, whence it can by no reason be said that a tendon is insensible. It is fitting, therefore, that these words be understood of cartilage. For those words are wont to be used promiscuously among the ancients.

Pag. 121. *And yellow bile contributes.* Let the learned Sylvius deign to read this entire paragraph, and let him ingeniously say what he at last thinks of his happy invention, by which he hopes and boasts that he has blessed the whole world first. Nor will he regret the effort if he has considered what is subsequently recounted concerning the use of the spleen, kidneys, glands, and other parts.

Pag. 123. *We have spoken of voluntary and involuntary.* What follows concerning the sources of human actions are altogether exacted according to the mind of Aristotle, and are taken for the greatest part from the third book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

^A Page 125. *On Zeno*. These things, previously sought after, have been restored from the manuscript. But this history occurs everywhere; yet, owing to the usual variety in narrating events, Nearchus is put in the place of Dionysius by most writers. He was the tyrant of the Eleans, of which Zeno was a native. In truth, the times do not cohere well regarding Dionysius; for Zeno was some years older than him. Others, however, name Diomedon, others Demylus; one, Ammianus Marcellinus, introduces Nicocreon; but this is a manifest error, looking, to be sure, to the exploit of Anaxarchus, which follows immediately. And it is no wonder. For these two histories are accustomed to proceed together among almost all writers like twins.

*Ibid. Origen*. This fall of Origen seems clearly miserable, because he fell through a new kind of wickedness, through a zeal for chastity and continence: and he who, in the persecution of Decius, endured every form of hardship unconquered—bonds and tortures according to the body, and those things endured under an iron collar and in the corners of a dungeon of torment—for many days having his feet extended across four spaces of the instrument of torture and being racked, the threats of fire, etc. (Eusebius, bk. 6, chap. 89)—could not endure a previously unheard-of torment, soft embraces and harlot-like blandishments; but if it is permitted to speak the truth, it is altogether right to believe that these things, however much they are also held to be in Epiphanius, *Heresy* 64, were imputed to Origen by calumny. Baronius, in the year of Christ 253, provides reasons that are by no means to be despised.

Page 126. *Having endured from the beginning*. Ecclesiastical histories abound with these examples. Indeed, there are also many canons in distinguishing between those who have transgressed through force and those who have transgressed without necessity, so that they may determine the degree of penance according to the variety of the offense. Let the first nine canons (above the rest) of the Council of Ancyra be consulted, as also all, except the last, of Peter of Alexandria.

Page 127. *We do many things through ignorance*. A crime not yet perpetrated has not the guilt of a deed, and it anticipates births with the laws of fate, by a vital birth, however abortive; but also, moreover, things done well and innocently, which have ceased to be done, acknowledge a recurrence, and are turned into a crime by a certain law of postliminy, a mark not only to themselves but also to the virtue that survives. Namely, we do all that which it pleases us to do, and the wrong is ours, whatever we choose.

*Ibid. For he who is drunk*. He who in drunkenness has harmed another is no more to be excused than he who has wounded someone with a javelin or a thrown stone, and who therefore asks for pardon because, once thrown, he could not revoke it or hold it back any longer. Pittacus of Mitylene used to punish the man who had perpetrated anything while sodden with wine twice as severely as if he had done the same thing while sober. Among the Lacedaemonians, it was permitted to everyone to assault a drunken man; and deservedly so: for it did not stand by him that he himself did not make an attack upon anyone first. Among the Indians, says Strabo, a woman who has killed a drunken king receives the honor of being joined with him who succeeded him (bk. 15). Perhaps they wished to be cautious against a double evil—not only from wine, but also from lust. Lycurgus was especially careful about those things which are committed through anger, since it pertains to prudent lawmakers to restrain not so much the crimes as the causes. Certainly, however much those voluntary furies of anger and drunkenness alleviate the crime in the estimation of the deed, they weigh heavily in the conjecture about the author; and that excuse is most base which is owed to another vice. Solon wished drunkenness in a magistrate to be punished with capital punishment, Romulus in a wife.

Page 137. *Not only to common notions*. It will certainly be able to seem a wonder that a matter which, if any, is placed beyond the uncertainty of question, and offered to men a perpetual subject for discussion above all others, this madness has permeated all past ages, this rage of all religions, heathens, Jews, and Christians. But Zeno, above the rest, who abolished motion and denied that living creatures could move, rightly and deservedly asserted that nothing is in our power. Against him, not only other philosophers—especially Plutarch, Ammonius, Lucian, Aphrodisaeus, and Cicero—but also most of the holy Fathers of the Church were armed, as if ready-made: Justin Martyr, *Apology* 1; Irenaeus, bk. 2, and elsewhere throughout; Tertullian in *Apology*; Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel*, bk. 6; Epiphanius, *Heresy* 5; Gregory of Nyssa, *Book against Fate*; Chrysostom also throughout, not to mention others. ^B

Page 138. *But those saying that also that which depends upon us*. Alexander of Aphrodisias discusses these things acutely in his book *On Fate*, paragraph 13, etc., who also proposes the opinion like this: Abolishing that man has power of choice and action over things that are contrary, they say that what happens is even through us. Recently some Christian Stoics, who have transferred the Church into the Porch, think that the human will is sufficiently provided for if compulsion is absent from the external act; as if that mastery which intrudes itself upon the will itself were not most troublesome, so far from providing an opportunity for not resisting, that it does not even grant the power of disagreeing; driving one to such a state of calamity that they are not only heard as unhappy, wretched men, but they neither desire, nor wish, nor consequently can, have anything better. It is indeed no wonder if we find men in whose minds this opinion dwells, rushing headlong into every wickedness, casting the crime upon God, "I am not responsible; but Zeus and Fate and the air-walking Fury."

Page 140. *Of the destiny of the stars*. Regarding the art itself, Cornelius Tacitus once said rightly that it will always be forbidden, and always be retained; one might add, it will be perpetually refuted, yet will perpetually find faith. The Jews accumulated the habit of trifling which is familiar to them with this madness, whence they say the proverb: [alt-version omitted]. They claim, indeed, that those who are born under the sun will be handsome and splendid; under Venus, wealthy and libidinous; under Mercury, strong in memory and wise; under the moon, sickly and inconstant; under Saturn, unhappy; under Jupiter, just; under Mars, prosperous. Concerning the devotions of the gentiles, the matter is too well known for anything to be added: hence an excuse taken for any crimes whatsoever. Eusebius, book 6 of *Preparation for the Gospel*, speaking words about the horoscope, cites an oracle of Apollo, whence an apology is instituted for barbarian and inhuman customs: "He has a swift Ares as his birthday star, who rouses him." But Augustine, *Tractate on Psalm XL*, says: "In my deeds, in my sins, I do not accuse fortune. I do not say, 'Fate did this to me,' I do not say, 'Venus made me an adulterer, and Mars made me a thief,' etc." Thus Tertullian in *Apology*: "They blame the impulses of a bad mind either upon fate or upon the stars. For they do not want that which they acknowledge to be evil to be their own." See Julius Firmicus, book 1 of *Astronomy*, and Boethius in his *Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione*.

Page 143. *Fate is a certain chain*. In the words of Cicero: "The order and series of causes, when the chain of cause and cause brings forth the thing from itself."

Page 145. *The cause of the chooser*. Clement of Alexandria sheds light on these things in *Stromata* 5: "Plato indicates free will through these words: 'Virtue is not lordless, which each one will have more or less according as he honors or dishonors it. The cause is in the chooser; God is blameless,' etc." The very words are found in Plato's *Republic*, book 10, not far from the end of the whole work.

Page 146. *For we say not according to*. Ammonius in his *Commentary on the 11th book of Aristotle's De Interpretatione*, describing the knowledge of God, says that divine beings "know contingencies in a superior way, the parts of things indivisibly and at once, things full of multiplicity in a unified way, things in time eternally, and things generated without generation," etc., whence their foreknowledge brings no necessity to events. Wherefore, in speaking on this subject, Eusebius in *Preparation for the Gospel* [cites] from Origen regarding Judas the...

^A traitor, saying: "Blame would not attach to him, if he were of necessity a traitor, and if it were not possible for him to become like the rest of the apostles." And this, indeed, notwithstanding the things which the Lord had predicted.

Pag. 147. "Once truly He made such a day." The comparison is rightly instituted by some between the counsel of God Almighty in the performing of certain miracles, and the use of the supreme and exceptional power of princes, which is called their prerogative, namely, that both may be exerted sparingly and only for grave reasons.

Ibid. "But the Stoics." The conflagration of the Stoics is celebrated in almost all the books of writers; nor less so in the mouths of men is the great year of Plato, by which, when all things in the same points are restored, the scene of all events will be unrolled again.

Pag. 149. "Fortune [is] a coincidence." See Arist. *Phys*. lib. II, cap. 4, 5, 6; and also Tully *De divinatione*, lib. I.

Pag. 150. "But in our power are the operations according to virtue." Arist. *Eth*. ad Nicomach. lib. II; *Magna Moralia* lib. I, and passim elsewhere; Basil in *Hom. That God is not the author of evil*, "That which is in our power is the principle and root of sin—free will."

Pag. 151. "Cretes." Minos, son of Jupiter (called *Legifer*—Lawgiver—by Ovid), attributed the laws which he gave to Crete to his father, that he might procure authority for them. Indeed, he acted as though he were Jupiter himself. See Suidas under the word *Minos*, and Vossius *De idololatra*, lib. I. Regarding Lycurgus, the fact is well known: he, to use the words of Cicero, confirmed his laws by the authority of the Delphic Apollo.

Pag. 152. "These are the things in our power that are equally contingent." Ammonius in *lib. De interpretatione*: "There are also things in our power; since we are masters of certain actions, and it is in our power to choose or not to choose certain things, and to do or not to do them, we say that those things are both praiseworthy and blameworthy, as well as the preferences and the actions." Thus Anastasius Sinaita in *Odege*: "The free will of the rational soul is the unhindered inclination and movement of our appetitive faculty toward virtue or vice; and where the approach of vice and virtue does not occur, there the free will of the soul cannot be recognized."

Pag. 155. "To the rational [nature] free will accompanies." It is to be noted in this place that Nemesius writes concerning moral actions, and by no means instituting a discourse on those which, under the auspices of divine grace and by its mere benevolence, merit the reward of eternal life. But since Bellarmine says that those things which follow savor of Pelagianism, and we have undertaken the patronage of Nemesius, let it be permitted, if not to defend our author, at least to excuse him to such an extent as to show that he spoke no otherwise than all the Fathers of the Church spoke before the unhappy heresy of Pelagius. ^D Irenaeus, lib. V, cap. 71: "Man [was] made free, having his own power, just as his own soul"; he also says: "God gave the good, just as the Apostle also testifies in the same Epistle; and they who perform it, indeed, will receive glory and honor, because they have done the good while they could have not done it. But those who do not perform it will receive the just judgment of God, because they have not performed the good while they could have done it." And cap. 70, to the objection, why God made angels and men such that they could transgress, he replied: "But so it would neither be sweet to them that it was good, nor would the communication of God be precious, nor would the good be greatly to be desired, which had come without its own proper movement and care and study; but it would be spontaneously and idly implanted, so that they would be of no moment for good, for the reason that they had existed such by nature rather than by will, and had the good spontaneously, but not according to choice." Tertull. lib. [against] Marcion, cap. 6: "I find man instituted by God [with freedom] and of his own power, [and] I find no image and likeness of God more in him than this state; [the creator] was even confirming the law then set by God; for the law would not be placed upon him who did not have the obedience due to the law in his own power, nor again would the threatening of death be ascribed to transgression, if the contempt of the law were not imputed to the freedom of the will in man." Thus also you will find in later laws of the creator [Him] proposing good and evil before man, etc. Clem. Alex. lib. II *Stromata*, after he had proposed the opinion of Basilides and Valentinus, concerning faith coming naturally and necessarily, he says: "Faith is therefore no longer an achievement of choice, if it is an advantage of nature, and it will not attain a just reward, the one who did not believe being free from blame, and the one who did believe having no merit; but all the quality and difference of faith and unbelief would fall under neither praise nor blame, to those who reason rightly, having as a priority the natural necessity occurring from the One who is all-powerful; rather we are jerked about, like inanimate objects," etc. Hilary in *Ps. 11* and *5*: "He permitted to each of us the freedom of life and perception, not attaching necessity to the one or the other," etc. Eusebius *advers. Hieroc.*, last book: "The definition of the human soul confirms it as self-governing, a judge, leader, and master of itself." And in *Praepar. evang.*, lib. VI, many things to this intent. Epiphan. *haeres.* 16: "Since by the ability to sin and not to sin, the one is required to pay the penalty for sins, and the other is expected to receive praise for having done well." He adds: "So that to everyone it is clear and indubitable that God provided free will, having said through Himself, 'If you wish' and 'if you do not wish'." Furthermore, *haeres.* 64: "For it lies in our power to believe and not to believe," etc. Macarius *homil.* 15: "You are of free will, and even if you wish to be lost, you are of a mutable nature." *Homil.* 17: "To the one who is able to be turned to both sides, the law is given, to the one who has free will, to make war against the contrary power. For the law does not lie against nature." Chrysost. *hom.* 14 *in 1 ad Corinth.*: "We are masters of this and that, both of falling into hell and of attaining the kingdom, since God has so wished. For behold, he says, fire and water," etc., and so passim thereafter. Basil. Seleuc. *orat.* 3: "Giving the law, God does not add necessity to the doing," etc. Cyrill. *cont. Jul.*: "Every rational and intellectual creature has an elective impulse toward whatever of doable things it might choose, and an inclination regarding each thing free from necessity," as also passim afterward. Nyssen. *Orat.* 5, *in orat. dom.*: "The overseer of the all made [man] of free will and free from all necessity, equal in both," etc. Basil. Magn. *hom. in ps. LXII*: "We distinguish the things of life that are to be chosen by the free will of the soul." Max. Martyr: "Our mind is in the middle of two things."

Pag. 157. "But as many as by the excellence of nature." He is clearly ungrateful to the God of nature who values good character as nothing; but our author judges that those noble gifts of theirs, not without the understanding of God, will proceed to anything, so that we may enjoy beatitude.

Pag. 158. "As many as having swerved." The nature of sin is established in this most especially, that it is an aversion from God and a conversion to creatures. There is, therefore, no need for Bignaeus’s caution, by which we might hold our author excused, as if he had thought [like] Josephus *lib. 1 Ant.*, Justin Mart., and Athenagoras in *Apol.*, Clement Alex. *lib. II* and *V Stromat.*, Lactantius *lib. II Instit.*, Cyprian *lib. De discipl. et hab. Virg.*, Euseb. *lib. V Prep. evang.*, and finally Tertull. *De idol.*, *De habitu et cultu fem.*, *De velandis virgin.*, and *lib. adv. Marc.*, that the angels had fallen, captivated by the love of women. Although with such authorities it would not have been very disgraceful to have come into the society of the error.

Pag. 160. "But the Jew." That the Jews truly acknowledge providence, it cannot be unknown, says our author, but they admit it as intended only for their own advantages. For, flattering themselves, they believed that they were placed under providence, and that all others were subject to fate. To which seem to look those things which in Theodoti

^A Epitome, appended to the Works of Clement of Alexandria, we read: “For this reason a strange and new star rose, destroying the ancient star-worship with a new light, not shining with a worldly light, turning to new and saving paths, the Lord himself, the guide of men, who came down to earth, that he might translate those who have believed in Christ, from fate to His providence.” See More Nevochim, Part II, sect. 10.

Page 161. “16vxor.” Plutarch recounts the history in his book *On Futile Loquacity*, and Cicero in *Tusculan Disputations*, Book IV, that I may pass over others.

Page 163. “Πολλαὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς χρείαις.” Let the reader consult what Tertullian has compiled most copiously concerning this matter from all history in his book *On the Soul*; against whom, for liberating the Godhead from business, and dissolving the order of things, and scattering all things into passivity, he promises that he will exact shame.

Page 164. “Τὰς μορφὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.” This seems a light matter; but it is no light evidence of Providence, to which so many advantages, and of such supreme moment, succeed.

Page 166. “Κορῶναι καὶ κόρακες.” Shepherds accustomed to sheep know them individually, however much there may appear to be no distinction to others who observe them curiously and diligently. Indeed, it is said in a Proverb, “None more similar”; yet Pliny, Book X, chapter 42, makes mention of a certain knowledgeable poultry-keeper, who knew them by each one. Something similar is reported regarding a recent king of the Gauls.

Page 167. “Πλάτων μὲν οὖν.” Plato teaches that providence reaches to individual things in the *Theaetetus* and the *Philebus* and Book X of the *Laws*, from which our author has taken many things. See also Cicero, Book II, *On the Nature of the Gods*.

Page 168. “Ἀριστοτέλης.” Our author says these things are subjoined in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*; they are spoken truly with great pomp and as if in favor of the divine in the book *On the Universe*, chapter 6 (if indeed that book be Aristotle’s), namely, that he wishes the world of lands to be administered in the same way that the Persian empire is, so that all inferior duties are performed by satraps, commanders, and chamberlains. Certainly, the prophet Daniel seems to describe the celestial hierarchy in hardly any other way. But the Holy Scriptures forbid us to be ignorant that God’s own care descends to sparrows, nay, to hairs, and the number of them.

Page 169. “Οὔτε αὐτὰ πράγματα ἔχει.” Among the dogmas of Epicurus, this is the chief one. Laertius explains the matter thus: “Occupations, and cares, and anger, and gifts do not harmonize with blessedness, but these things happen because of weakness and fear and the need for neighbors.”

Page 171. “Κατὰ περιγραφήν.” This passage, previously disjointed, is restored with aids. Favorinus explains *perigraphē* so that it is “the body that encompasses the whole itself,” and indeed it properly signifies a primary and ruder delineation, where the lineaments of the entire body are exactly exhibited, but *skiagraphia* (shading) and the varied shadowing of colors are lacking. Happiness indeed, according to Aristotle, is such a supreme good that it cannot be increased (Book I *Ethics*, chapter 7, and *Magna Moralia*, chapter 2), yet it can be adorned and illustrated.

Page 172. “Εἰδὼς γὰρ ὁ Θεός.” The satirist is excellent in this cause: “Permit the gods themselves to weigh what is Fitting for us, and useful for our affairs; Dearer is man to them than to himself,” etc. Indeed, see also Plutarch, *On the Delayed Vengeance of the Divine*.

Page 176. “Καὶ γὰρ μέλισσαι.” To this poorly mutilated passage we have provided a remedy from the manuscript. Ibid. “Ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης συσχεθέντες.” Tertullian uses the same argument in his book *On the Testimony of the Soul* against the Gentiles, almost throughout.

Page 178. “Φαμὲν γοῦν.” There are very many Fathers for establishing apologies for divine providence. Consult Irenaeus, Book III *Against Heresies*, chapter 5; fragments of the same in Demetrius the deacon in his sermon *On Fire*; Justin in his *Dialogue with Trypho*; Tertullian, Book I *Against Marcion*; Basil the Great, *That God is not the Cause of Evils*; Chrysostom, Homily 23 on chapter VI of Matthew; Hesychius on Leviticus, Book V; Theophilus of Antioch, Book I *To Autolycus*; Augustine, *Confessions*, Book VII, chapter 4; same author, *On the Spirit and the Letter*, chapter 12; Tractate 106 on John; Book VIII *On the City of God*, chapter 6, and Sermon 55 *On the Words of the Lord*; Lactantius, Book I, chapter 3, etc. But above all, in the fewest words, the author of the book of Wisdom most happily expressed the whole nature of Providence, chapter VIII, verse 1: “It reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things graciously,” whose most benign guidance, that we may follow through all things, may the good God grant.

ADDENDA. ANONYMOUS HENDECASYLLABLES TO THE READER.

Before all things, those things must be rendered here which David Christoph Seybold, professor at Tübingen, a most famous and learned man, gave, partly in the German journal at Leipzig, the index of which is *Allgemeiner Litterarischer Anzeiger* (No. 6, p. 54, 55, 1801), partly in a note transmitted to me through Rochius, a bookseller of Leipzig, on 23 March 1801.

Hither, hither, you who love physical (a) labors, And try to know the fabric of Nature, Here is the booklet that teaches optimally, Learned, pellucid, brief, and eloquent. And, as in the new spring, pleasant gardens flourish, And the earth with the color of flowers, So is depicted with varied art, Arguments false with an elegant style. Therefore, you who desire to lead a happy life And to see the supreme God (b), Now (c) I exhort you to read and reread the book (d). A.D. MDLXVI. V Nov. Esslingen.

(a) Physical labor can be said of the sun and moon eclipsing. But the anonymous author undoubtedly wished to signify the Greek *pragmateias*. I would prefer, therefore, *libellos* (booklets). The most celebrated Seybold, however, explains this: *Naturhistorische Arbeiten schätzen und lieben* (To esteem and love natural history works). (b) Indeed, I took this for a Hebraism. Therefore I preferred, “You seek to be approved by God.” The most learned Seybold vindicates it from Hebraism, explaining: *Gott in seinen Werken schauen und bewundern* (To see and admire God in his works). Therefore he accepted *contemplari* (to contemplate) for the place. (c) I preferred *Hunc* (this). But in clear letters in the autograph it is *Nunc* (now), as Seybold notes. The author therefore seems to have accepted *age ēdē*, *age ēdē* for the place. (d) I had suspected that there was an error in the numbers, and had believed it should be written 1656, so that these

^A lines might be referred to Caspar Barthius, who was greatly delighted with Nemesius, and who exhibited similar lines in his edition of Aeneas of Gaza and Zechariah of Mytilene, and who finally made an index of the authors who are cited by Nemesius, which Fabricius exhibits in *Bibliotheca Graeca* vol. X, at the beginning, folio 3. But that this suspicion of mine was vain, the most learned Seybold showed me; he affirms that it was written in 1566, and teaches that the first owner of that little book was a certain person from Esslingen. The second owner was a doctor from Ulm, by the name of Lorenz Walther Kuichel. Barthius, however, so that I may mention this as well, Fabricius reports as deceased on September 17, 1658, at Leipzig. See *Bibl. Gr.* vol. XIII, p. 807.

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES AND AUTHORS WHO ARE CITED BY NEMESIUS

*The numbers designate the pages of the Antwerp edition, which are indicated in the text of this edition.*

Aegyptiorum sapientes (Wise men of the Egyptians) 140. Ammonius 29, 56. Anaxagoras 165. Anaxarchus 125. Anaximenes 74. Apollinarius, bishop of Laodicea 9, 47, 73. Apollo, legislator of the Cretans 151. Aristoteles 9, 12, 28, 29, 40, 45 bis, 61, 65, 65, 69 bis, 72, 79 (in place of Origen, 91), 96, 97, 105, 114, 150, 168, 169 bis, 170. Christiani 148, 160. Chrysippus 32, 138. Cleanthes 32 bis. Cretenses (Cretans) 151. Critias 28. Cronius 50. Daniel 26. Democritus 28 bis, 114, 168. Dinarchus (should be corrected to Dicaearchus) 28, 29, 35. Elias, the prophet 147. Enoch 147. Epicurei (Epicureans) 79. Epicurus 28, 104, 168, 169. Eunomiani (Eunomians) 61. Eunomius 45. Euripides 169. Galenus 36, 53, 54, 79, 94, 108, 114. Hebraei (Hebrews) 15, 21, 73, 91. Heraclitus 28, 74, 168. Hiob (Job). See Jobus. Hipparchus (should be corrected to Hippasus) 74, 78. Hippocrates 37, 63, 74, 108. Hippon 28. Jamblichus 51. Ibycus 161. Jobus (Job) 154, 178. Joseph, son of Jacob 123. Jupiter, legislator of the Cretans 151. Lacedaemonii (Lacedaemonians) 151. Lazarus 179. Manichaei (Manichaeans) 29, 47. Menander 169, 179. Moses 13, 16, 45, 46, 73. Numenius 29. Origenes (Origen) 62 (perhaps Aristotle, 91), 125. Panaetius 96. Paulus apostolus (Paul the Apostle) 14, 26, 178, 179. Philopator 138, 140.

CONCORDANCE OF THE ANTWERP AND OXONIAN EDITIONS

Plato 10, 28, 32, 35, 45, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 70, 71, 72, 77, 79, 91, 92 bis, 103, 144, 148, 167, 168. Platonici 52, 50. Plotinus 9, 29, 56. Porphyrius 51, 60, 80. Stoici 28 bis, 29, 45, 72, 76, 143, 147, 168. Susanna 125, 161. Thales 28, 74. Theodorus Platonicus 51. Thucydides 108. Pythagoras 28, 44. Pythagorei 91. Simmias 35. Socrates 55, 148, 180. Xenocrates 31, 44. Zeno Eleates 125. Zeno Stoicus 96.

PAGE NUMBERS OF THE ANTWERP AND OXONIAN EDITIONS

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CIRCA ANNUM DOMINI CD. B. HIERONYMUS THEOLOGUS GRAECUS. NOTITIA HISTORICA.

(GALLAND., Veterum Patrum Biblioth., t. VII, Proleg., p. 18.)

I. There is very little to be said about Hieronymus, the Greek theologian. Among ancient writers, only John of Damascus mentions him, calling him a presbyter of Jerusalem (a). This title, indeed, is attributed to our author by the membranous codex LXXX of the Coislinian library at Montfaucon (b); this codex, among other things, includes Theodoret’s interpretation of the 150 Psalms, with marginal scholia from various Fathers, among whom is Hieronymus, presbyter of Jerusalem. However, Cave (c) conjectures that the writer we are discussing is the same person as Hieronymus the presbyter and monk, a Dalmatian by birth, who is said to have written the history of the Egyptian monks, according to Du Cange in codex MCCXII of the Colbertine library, where it reads as follows (d): "Another history of the lives of the holy monks of Egypt, composed by Hieronymus, monk and presbyter, from Dalmatia." The same history also exists in the codex LXXX of the Coislinian library which we mentioned just now, inscribed a little differently (e): "The History of Hieronymus concerning Egypt." Furthermore, if we admit such a conjecture—which does not seem far from the truth—the author was writing then during the reign of Theodosius the Great, as he himself testifies in the *Life of Abbot John*. From this we understand that Fabricius (f) had arrived at a different opinion concerning this writer of the history of the Egyptian monks.

II. But leaving these matters aside, our Hieronymus wrote the *Dialogue on the Holy Trinity between a Jew and a Christian*; and it was first brought to light in Paris in the year 1612 by Federicus Morellus, who had previously, fourteen years earlier, published in that same place the same author’s *Commentary on the Effect of Baptism and on the Marks of a Christian*. Subsequently, however, both small works were seen by few, and were known to scarcely one in a thousand—to use the words of Barthius—until Christian Daumius reissued them in Zwickau: the former in the year 1677, and the latter in 1680. Finally, Joannes Albertus Fabricius (g) presented them in a more corrected state, in many places with the aid of the membranous codex of the Hamburg library, for which reason we have delivered his edition to the press, having compared it with the Daumian one. But that Morellus did not publish the whole of this *Dialogue on the Trinity* by Hieronymus, we know from John of Damascus, who recites a fragment from that same Dialogue which does not appear anywhere in the printed editions; and we have therefore appended it to both works after Fabricius. Moreover, in his dedication, Morellus the translator calls Hieronymus the Greek author "most theological" and "not exactly modern," and describes his Dialogue as pious and written in a sufficiently learned style. Barthius (h), however, calls it "golden" and altogether excellent, sharp, and wonderfully vigorous, which, if lost, should be retrieved at any price. Nor do Cave and Fabricius think otherwise, although Lequien (i) considers it to have been composed by a rather dull Minerva.

OF THE BLESSED HIERONYMUS: DIALOGUE ON THE HOLY TRINITY, A QUESTION OF A JEW TO A CHRISTIAN.

^B HIERONYMI DIALOGUE ON THE HOLY TRINITY, BETWEEN A JEW AND A CHRISTIAN.

Jew. Since God says, "See, see that I am, and there is no God besides me," how do you believe in and worship the Father, whom we confess as God, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit? For, like idolaters, since you teach that there are three gods, you do injury to the author of this Law, who says, "There is no God besides me."

Christian. God is a fearful and incomprehensible mystery; therefore, it is not right that we should use one and the same defense against everyone, but rather we ought to answer each questioner appropriately and becomingly. Therefore, to you, O Jew, and to those circumcised ones with you who worship the monarchy, we say this: Do you confess, O Jew, one God, the maker of heaven and earth?

Jew. Certainly.

Christian. And what kind of God is this whom you worship, whence is he, and where is he, and how does he sit or move, and how does he speak and live and see and touch, and how is his power comprehended?

Jew. God is absolutely incomprehensible, unviewable, and ineffable, and so are his wisdom, his power, his Word, and his Spirit. ^B

Christian. And how, O foolish man, do you demand of me to tell you how the generation of God takes place, and how God has a Son, and when and how he begat him, and how the Trinity is a Trinity? Tell me yourself, if you can, the location, breadth, and length of God, and I will tell you in turn when and how God begat. Tell me yourself what kind of Word God has, and how God speaks it, and I will tell you by what reason he begat the Son from his womb before the morning star. But if the Word and the Spirit and the place and the height and the depth and the throne and the time of God are incomprehensible, it is evident that his generation also cannot be expressed or explained in words. But to ask you again, O stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart, Jew: how is our word brought forth? And if you tell me this, I will ask you in turn

does God, according to your opinion, have bodily lips, a tongue, and a throat? So that, furthermore, he himself is also corporeal, and in a place, and visible, and circumscribed; and if these things are so, then he is also created; for everything that is corporeal and circumscribed is clearly also created. Tell me then, you bold man, who created and made God? ^A O your wretched and most foolish blindness! For when you are asked by me how the Word of God exists, or what the Spirit of God is, or where the place or the throne of God is, you say: "I am at a loss, because I do not know." And yet you exact and force me to say how the place and the Son of God exist. You are troubled and indignant because I say that God has a Son who is pre-eternal, most holy, uncreated, incomprehensible, most immaculate, all-wise, above the world, and supremely good. And how should I not be troubled, O shameless Jew, when you call yourself a son of God, saying that Israel is the firstborn son of God? You, the foolish and not wise, the ungrateful, the murmurer, the disobedient, the hateful to God, the dispersed of God, and the adversary of God, call yourself a son of God, and yet when I call the Son of God good, a benefactor, a Savior, and righteous, you are indignant, you complain, and you blaspheme, and you call me an idolater? Why do you grow hot, O senseless one, and why are you disturbed when you hear of the Son of God? You do not wish to confess one Son of God; and yet how does divine Scripture and David, or rather the Holy Spirit Himself, say: It is I who have said: You are gods, and all of you sons of the Most High? If God allowed mere, corruptible, and mortal men to be called sons of God and gods, how can you—who believe yourself to be more righteous and more accurate than all others—not deign to confess one Son of God who is immaculate and most holy? ^B

Jew. It is not as you say, that the Son of God is pre-eternal and uncreated; thus God says that Israel is his son, nor does he say so of other men, about whom he said: "I said: You are gods and all of you sons of the Most High."

Christian. What kind of gods and sons of the Most High, then, does God call these men?

Jew. He calls certain men who are corruptible and mortal by the name of sons.

Christian. How much better is it, then, O foolish and blinded in heart, to confess that God has a Son who is incorruptible, immortal, holy, without sin, eternal, immutable, and impassible, than to call material, corruptible, changeable, and mortal men sons of God? ^C For to say that God has a Son who is incorruptible, immortal, and without sin is worthy of God, and it is an honor to God, rather than saying that Israel is the firstborn son of God—that foolish, sinful, lawless, and impious people. For this offers a handle for blasphemy against God from the side of the unbelieving Gentiles; for they can say: "How is it that he is the true God, if he is the Father of a foolish son?" ^D

Judaeus. If God has a Son, tell me how and when He begot him?

Christian. I cannot help but confess that God has a Son, since Holy Scripture, speaking openly from the person of God and the Father to the Son, says: *From the womb before the morning star I have begotten thee*; and the Son, in turn, says of Himself from the person of the Parent: *The Lord said to me: Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee*. Nor can I help but confess that God has a Spirit, when God Himself says: *I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh*. Yet I will ask of you, Jew, and you answer me: What kind of spirit do you say God has? Is it of such a kind as that of a man, coming forth from the mouth and nostrils, breathed out and poured forth, which can be seen and separated? ^A

Judaeus. Far be that! But I mean a Spirit invisible, a Spirit holy, a Spirit divine, a Spirit true, a Spirit a leader, a Spirit inseparable from God.

Christian. And when did God make or bring forth this Spirit, or how and when did He cause it to exist?

Judaeus. The Spirit of God is uncreated, without beginning and incomprehensible, just as God Himself. ^B

Christian. Behold, you too are clearly convicted of adoring a duality—namely, God and the Spirit of God. Just as, therefore, you cannot explain whence or when or how the Spirit of God is with God, but only, taught by the holy Scriptures, confess and believe that God has a Spirit; so I, a Christian, without over-curious investigation, profess the Son and Word of God. But if you desire me to say when, or whence, and how God has a Son, tell me first when and whence and how God has a Spirit, and I will also explain to you how God begot the Son before every beginning. For just as you ^C do not call God and the Spirit of God two gods, so neither do I call the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit three gods—far from it! But just as the sun and its heat and the power of its rays proceeding from it are three names, yet there is one substance of the sun; and as the soul and the reason and the body of a man are not three men; and as the nail of the finger with the bone and flesh are not three fingers; and just as the root and branch and leaf of a tree are not three trees; and as the eye and the pupil and the light ^D of the eye do not make three eyes; and as the fountain and the river and the stream flowing from the river are not three waters; and as the arm, the wrist, and the palm are not three hands; and just as in the burning bush of Moses there was speech and flame and He who spoke; and just as in the furnace of the three children there was a hymn and flame and dew, yet it was one furnace; and just as in a coin there is the gold and the image and the inscription of the emperor, so in the all-holy Trinity the union is unconfused in the one essence and divinity of the three persons.

DIALOGUE ON THE HOLY TRINITY

^A Jew. Even if I confess Christ to be God, I still do not dare to affirm him to be consubstantial with the Father.

Christian. If you altogether accept him in such a way as to confess him to be God, you will know accurately and without doubt that he himself illuminates you through the divine Scriptures and the prophets, that the Son is God, eternal, not by relation as are other men, but by nature, as light from light, and God from God. For neither are we saying that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three men divided from one another, as are Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; nor as three separated lamps, or three distinct columns; nor are the Father and the Son separated from each other as Michael and Gabriel are; nor did God beget the Son as Adam begat Abel, so that it proceeded and flowed forth, in a seminal and bodily manner—far from it! For it is not the case that as I am prior to my son and greater than him, so too the Father and God pre-exists the Son. But the Father is simultaneous with the Son, just as the light is simultaneous with the day. And just as the day, the sun, and the light are simultaneous, so the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are simultaneous. And do not say, “How are these things?” for these things are above the “how.” Do not say, “By what mode?” for the birth of God is above mode. Do not say, “By what reason?” for the Word is above reason. Do not seek, “At what time?” for the timeless One is above time. Do not say, “In what place?” for he is above place. Do not seek, “From what principle?” for the beginningless Beginning is above principle. Adore God, do not scrutinize God. Confess the Father, but do not search into the mystery of the divine nature. Believe in the Son, not attempting to grasp the mode of his beginningless generation with your hands. Hymn the Spirit, not being overly curious about the matter of his procession. For a mystery that is grasped no longer remains a mystery; and whatever is not a mystery is no longer a thing to be marveled at. The more, therefore, God is scrutinized, the more he is ignored and hidden; and the more he is pursued and searched out, the more he is not grasped and is not manifested; and the more he is felt, the less he is reached and found. All those who have scrutinized God have endeavored to grasp a shadow; and all those who have thought to learn of God have wanted to enclose winds in their bosom; and as many as count themselves to grasp the divinity are embracing a dream and a fantasy; and those who have seemed to themselves to have penetrated into the depths of God’s nature have fallen into heresies; and those who say they have reached God have not grasped even a drop from the whole abyss, but pursuing a shadow, they are far from the truth.

For this reason, faith is so called because everyone who believes does not scrutinize God, as the faithless do. And what do I say of God? Not even the works created by God are easily understood by men. For tell me, you who wish to scrutinize and learn the nature of God, where are the angels? And what kind are they? And when were they created? And from what do they consist? And why are they not seen? And what is their nature? And what is their form, and their voice, and their motion? I do not ask you only about the angels, but also about the heaven. Tell me, what is its nature, and its extension in breadth? And how

^A much its height? But why do I speak of heavenly things? Let us come down then ^B to these earthly things, in which we live and move and are. Who has clearly known the peculiar constitution of his own soul, what it is, and how it accompanies the body, and what it is in form and species, where and whence it consists, and how it is separated from the body? Then again, concerning the body, one must inquire: how does it consist? how is it dissolved? how indeed is it resurrected? and in what manner is it gathered at the resurrection? and how or whence does it arrive, and how is it restored again into one with the soul? And not only is the constitution of man incomprehensible to us, but also that of animals, of birds, and of fishes. For tell me, you who search into divine things, how did the nature of irrational creatures come to be? How do these die if they do not possess a rational soul? What is it that is separated from them at the time of death? If you say to me, they did not possess a substantial soul, but blood: yet most animals die without any blood flowing out. How, again, can fish breathe in the waters? how does the nature of water not choke them as it does other animals? Whence is it that an irrational animal, if it has traveled along the way with a man who was created after the image of God, is found, upon returning, to know the way without error better than one who rejoices in reason? Whence, again, do birds and fishes and wild beasts, which have neither speech nor reason, nor intellect nor judgment, understand and leap over nets and snares and the traps of hunters?

And that you may henceforth recognize more fully your own lowliness and ignorance and wretchedness, I will ask you also this: Tell me, you who profess to know and curiously to search out the incomprehensible Creator and God, tell me first, what is the substance of a flea? And what is the substance of its soul? And what is its soul like? And how does it exist spontaneously without seed? And how, when it knows neither reason nor wisdom, does it see a man, and fearing death, flee? Whence does it know that it is subject to death? By what reasonings does it deliberate? Whence did it learn that man is an enemy to it? Where is its mnemonic intellect stored away? Who taught it to hide itself in the seams and folds of garments? And by what name ought we to call the flea, we who wish to be searchers of the Divinity? Shall we call it a quadruped? ^C But it is not a quadruped. A biped, then? It is not. Is it a reptile, then? It is not, but an animal. Therefore I exhort everyone who wishes to discourse on the nature of God, to explain to us, before God, the constitution and state and composition and origin of the tiniest flea, and its soul, sensation, and intellect; and when he has well and unerringly grasped this, and tells us what is the species and genus of the psychical substance of the flea, then we shall henceforth have faith in him, that he is also able to reach and explain the things of the incomprehensible God. And even if you, O foolish man, say to me that the soul of the flea—and of every irrational creature—is its blood,

I shall reply: How is it that we see, as I said before, many irrational creatures dying without the shedding of blood? Tell us, then, you who know God, what is that which issues from an animal at its death without blood? For man alone possesses a substantial soul. But if an animal has a soul, it would not differ from man; for even man, when deprived of his own blood, dies in the same way as a brute creature. Where, then, is the difference between man, who was made according to the image and likeness of God, and the irrational beast? I have shown, therefore, that both man and the flea die when they are deprived of their own blood. These things were not said by me here in vain, but because I wished to restrain you—and many others, O God-slaying Jew—from ^B searching into things concerning God that are incomprehensible, and to persuade and show you that not only the Creator, but even creation itself cannot be comprehended by men.

Jew. Where are we taught about the Trinity in the Old Testament? And where have we learned of it in the New?

Christian. In the Old [Testament], to be sure, in the first book of Moses; for in the description of the creation of the world, he says: "And God said, Let us make man after our image and likeness." It is evident that the Father spoke this to the Son and the Holy Spirit. And again: "And God said, Behold, Adam has become as one of us." The statement, "as one of us," certainly indicates two or three, in order to show, furthermore, by the words, "as one of us," the distinction of the three hypostases. And again, ^C the same lawgiver says: "And God created man; according to the image of God He created him," so as to show the oneness of the Godhead. For He did not say that gods created man, but the One God who is worshipped in the Trinity. When, therefore, you hear God saying, "Behold, Adam has become as one of us," think of it as a three-hypostasized utterance. But when, on the other hand, you hear that "in the image of God God created man," you acknowledge the one essence and Deity. Therefore, we are taught the mystery of the holy and consubstantial Trinity not only from this, but from many other places in divine Scripture, and we find especially clear and manifest testimonies concerning the Father and the Son. For the saying, "The Lord rained fire from the Lord upon Sodom and Gomorrah," what else does it present but the Father and the Son, and the Lord from the Lord—that is, born of the Father? And again, the saying in the one hundred and ninth Psalm, ^D "The Lord said to my Lord, Sit at my right hand," clearly revealed to us the Father and the Son sitting at His right hand. And God does not sit as people sit on earthly thrones or seats, nor as men sit on the right or left side—God forbid! But just as the Word of God was born of God before the ages in a divine manner beyond reason, and just as He is incorporeal, without form, and uncircumscribed, so too must you understand for me the seat, and the throne, and the right hand of God. And that which stands written in Isaiah itself, clearly

thus also understand for me the seat, the throne, and the right hand of God. And that which is said by Isaiah concerning Him clearly teaches us the mystery of the Father and the Son. For he says ^A that "a Child is born to us, a Son is given to us" (Isa. IX, 6): clearly to the nations from God. "And his name shall be called, the Angel of Great Counsel, a wonderful counselor, the mighty God, the ruler, the prince of peace, the Father of the age to come." But David, by the name of God in three persons, hinted to us the holy Trinity as if for the grace of a blessing, saying: "Let God bless us, our God; let God bless us" (Psal. LXVI, 6). To Him be glory unto the ages. Amen.

BY THE SAME BLESSED HIERONYMUS: A TREATISE USEFUL TO EVERY CHRISTIAN

^B

Question. Why are you a Christian? Answer. Because I believe in Christ the Son of God. Correction of the answer. You have answered ignorantly and inconsiderately; for I do not ask why you are called a Christian, but this very thing, for what cause you have become one. For if I had asked why you are called a Christian, you would have answered well: "Because I believe in Christ"; but I seek the cause for which you have become a Christian. And this question seems small and slight, but few are they who, when asked, answer fittingly. For if he who is asked says that "God willed that I be a Christian," he has not answered correctly. And if he says, "Because I willed to be a Christian," he does not speak well; but he would speak more correctly if he said: "Because God willed it, I for my part acquiesced to the will of God." Question. Did you become a Christian willingly and of your own accord, or unwillingly? Answer. If I say "willingly," I lie; and if I say "unwillingly," I do not speak the truth. For being an infant then, I neither resisted nor consented. Question. Come now, whence do you know that you were baptized at all? I would like to learn from you; for perhaps you were cast out by the way by your parents, who were secretly Gentiles, and in no way saw to it that you were baptized. For many such things have happened, and occur to this day. ^D Answer. I know it as it were by the effect, as Isaiah says:

^A "For your fear, O Lord, we have conceived in the womb and brought forth the Spirit of salvation," signifying that we who have been enlightened through baptism have received the Holy Spirit. For God says again through the prophet concerning those who are being baptized: "I will dwell in them, and walk amongst them," and, "I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh." All those who have received the divine Spirit within their womb in holy baptism are, deep within their own heart, through the stirrings, pricks, exultations, and operations—and, so to speak, the leapings—of His grace, fully assured in their own heart that they are baptized. For no unbaptized man on earth possesses such grace or effect, nor does he ever perceive it, even if he performs all the commandments and works of righteousness of God, unless they are those who, by water and the Spirit, have received it in the womb and keep it pure and undefiled. For just as a woman who is pregnant feels the movements ^B of the fetus within her, so also do they, from the joy, gladness, and exultation that arises in their hearts, know that the Spirit of God dwells in them, which they received in baptism. For concerning this grace of holy baptism, Christ said, "The kingdom of heaven is within you," and again, "I came to cast fire upon the earth, and I wish that it were already kindled."

Question. And does every man, simple or wise, know through this proof alone that he has been baptized, and not through any other way?

Answer. This is the true and unerring demonstration of the Christian; and listen to Paul, who complains to some and says, "Do you not recognize that Jesus Christ dwells in you? unless indeed you are disqualified." For, as I said, just as a woman who bears in the womb knows accurately that she has conceived, not from words, ^C but from the facts themselves and the movements of the fetus, so also the true Christian, not from the hearsay of parents who baptized him, nor by any other means, but from his own heart, ought to have the assurance that he has received holy baptism and has been made worthy of the Holy Spirit. For this reason the same Paul said to some, "Do not quench the Spirit," that is, do not drive Him away; and, "Do not grieve the Holy Spirit, by whom you were sealed for the day of redemption"; and again, "For you did not receive the spirit of slavery, but of freedom." Having lost this grace through adultery, David entreated God, saying: "Restore to me the joy of your salvation, and renew a right Spirit in my inward parts." You see that the ^D Holy Spirit dwells within the believer. For in as much as each one keeps the house of his own heart pure,

the human person is illuminated, and perceives the divine fire dwelling within him through tears, through joy, through exultation and consolation and gladness; and especially at the time of festivals and sacred synaxes and illuminations, as the Holy Spirit is present and his grace, which dwells in the soul of man, leaps for joy. From this the human person is fully assured that he is truly a Christian and has received holy baptism.

And do not let the prophets who slept with women, and who were situated in the midst of life and men and business, seem to you strange and burdensome, nor those things being said. For because they were involved in both men and affairs, they had this grace of the Holy Spirit; and not only men, but also women prophesied. For the Holy Spirit does not avoid ^B nor abominate the fellowship of honorable marriage. Hence, many of those who lead a common life experience effects of such grace of the Holy Spirit—I mean those who stand at the holy altar, and those who approach to receive the mysteries of Christ; for suddenly and instantaneously they are filled with tears and joy and gladness. From this the Christian is assured that he is receiving not mere bread and wine, but truly the body and blood of the Son of God, sanctified by the Holy Spirit. For we never feel anything of the sort, or such grace and operation, or sweetness or compunction, when we eat and drink simple bread and wine at our own table, even if this bread were purer than that bread, and the wine were older and better than the wine that is brought forth and offered ^C at the altar.

These things contribute to recognizing whether one is a Christian; for there is nothing in our whole faith, and in the whole Church, and in the whole of Holy Scripture more necessary than this matter or similar to it. For from this the human person understands thoroughly that God is in him and with him; from this he knows that in truth there is no other faith on earth except only that of the Christians. For although the nations also have Scriptures and churches and sacrifices and teachers and books and a partial knowledge of God, and certain good actions and feast days and changes of garments and prayers and vigils and priests and very many other things; yet this grace and operation of the Holy Spirit, hidden in the heart of the Christian, no one on earth receives, ^D except only those who are rightly baptized in faith in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Concerning these riches of ours, the Lord says that the kingdom of heaven is like a treasure hidden in a field, that is to say, the Holy Spirit who is hidden within us on the day of divine baptism. Concerning this also Paul says: "We have this treasure in earthen vessels," that is to say, in our clay bodies; and again: "Do you not know that your bodies are the temple of God, and

"Do you not know that your bodies are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?" These things have necessarily come before us, so that a Christian might know whence he received holy baptism and that he is a true Christian. For it is not entering into the church that is the sign of a true Christian; for many unworthy people enter together with us. Nor is arming oneself with the sign of the cross, nor partaking of the body of Christ, the sign of a true Christian; for perhaps some unbelievers and heretics partake, and they do all the things that we do. But, as I said before, the sign of the true Christian ^B, which God bestowed upon the Christian, He did not give from anywhere externally, nor in tables of stone, but in tables of fleshly hearts.

Therefore, let us search within ourselves, if we have the sign, and gift, and grace, and treasure, which God bestowed upon us in baptism. For the Gospels, and the prophets, and the teachers, and the apostles instruct us in the verbal faith of God from hearing; but God, not through verbal hearing, but through actions that dwell in the soul, teaches man what a Christian is. For this reason, Paul says that "Faith is from hearing," and, "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." Thus, behold, we have learned what the sign of the Christian is, which no other faith on earth possesses. But blessed are those who have received and possess this, and depart from this life with it; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

Apud S. Joannem Damascenum, lib. III De Imagin., opp. tom. I, pag. 385.

HIERONYMUS THE PRESBYTER OF JERUSALEM

Question. Since your Scripture nowhere permits you to worship the cross, for what reason do you worship it? Tell us, Jews and Greeks, and all the nations who ask you this question.

Answer. For this reason, O foolish and shameless in heart, perhaps God allowed every nation that worships God to worship something on the earth, by all means, which is a work of man's hand, so that they might no longer be able to blame the Christians regarding the cross and the worship of icons. Just as, therefore, the Jew worshipped the ark of the covenant, and the two cherubim which were cast and of gold, and the two tablets which Moses carved, never having been permitted by God to worship or kiss these things: so we Christians do not worship the cross as God, but as showing the sincerity of our soul's disposition towards the One who was crucified. ^D