OF THE SAME GREGORY, BISHOP OF NYSSA, ON THE PYTHONESS: A LETTER TO BISHOP THEODOSIUS
He who said to his own disciples, *Seek and ye shall find* (Matt. 7:7), will certainly grant also the power of discovery to those who diligently search according to the Lord's commandment and investigate the hidden mysteries. For He who promised is not a liar, but bestows beyond what is asked with the magnificent bounty of His gifts. Therefore, attend to the reading, my son Timothy; for it is fitting, I think, to use the words of the great Paul to address your goodness, and may the Lord give you understanding in all things, so that you may be enriched in every word and in every knowledge. Now, however, concerning those things which you commanded, I deemed it worthwhile, as the Lord may suggest, to comply with your desire in a few words, so that from these things you might learn that we ought to serve one another in love, while fulfilling each other's wishes.
First, therefore, since the sought-after meaning concerning Samuel was set forth among the other headings, I shall set it forth in a few words, as far as it lies within me, God granting. It has pleased some before us to think that the evocation of souls by that trickster in the case of Samuel was real, and they bring forward a certain argument of this kind in defense of their opinion: that because Samuel was afflicted with grief over the rejection of Saul, and because he always set before God the fact that Saul—as he wished—had purged from the people the witchcraft brought about by ventriloquists, through which men were being lured into deception; and because the prophet was therefore vexed that the Lord would not be reconciled to the one who had been rejected, they say that God permitted the soul of the prophet to be brought up through this kind of sorcery, so that Samuel might know that he had falsely alleged in his own defense to God, saying that he (Saul) was an enemy A unto and a foe to the ventriloquists, B when he (Saul) had (in fact) purged from the people the sorcery that occurs by means of ventriloquists for the deception of men. C
A And he who at that time, while consulting the oracle, had been the one to seek the ascent of his soul through their sorcery. But I, looking toward that Gospel chasm [b] which is fixed between the evil and the good, as the patriarch—or rather, the Lord of the patriarch—says, that it is impossible for those who are condemned to ascend to the rest of the righteous, or for the saints to cross over to the company of the wicked; I do not accept that such notions are true, having been taught to believe that only the Gospel is true.
Since, therefore, Samuel was great among the saints, and sorcery is an evil possession, I am not persuaded that Samuel, being established in such great repose of his own, crossed over that impassable chasm toward the ungodly, neither willingly nor against his will. For had he been against his will, he would not have endured being unable—that the demon could cross the chasm and, having come into the choir of the holy ones, move the saint from his place. And willingly he would not have done this, since he neither wished to be mingled with the wicked, nor was he able; for in one who is in good things, there is no change to those things that are contrary. But if one should grant that he even wished it, the nature of the chasm would not permit the passage. B
What, then, is it that we think regarding these things? The enemy of human nature is the common foe of all, to whom every device and endeavor is directed toward wounding man in those points that are vital. And what other such vital wound could be inflicted upon men, than to be cast off from God who gives life, and to desert voluntarily to the destruction of death? Since, therefore, there is a certain eagerness in the life of those who are lovers of the body to have some knowledge of future things—by which they hope either for the avoidance of evils or for guidance toward what they desire—it is for this reason that, so that men might not look toward God, the deceptive nature of the demons has devised many ways of foreknowledge: augury, divination by symbols, oracles, inspection of livers (haruspicy), necromancy, frenzies, obsessions, inspirations, and many other such things. C And whatever kind of foreknowledge any person might deem to be true due to some deception, that deceptive demon appears to confirm the deceived person's deluded opinion. Thus, the demon also arranges for the flight of an eagle to coincide with the hope of the one watching, and the fluttering of the liver, and the disturbance of the membranes caused by inflation, and the rolling of the eyes, and every observation noted according to the deception—the craftiness of the demon shows these to those who are being deceived, so that men, having departed from God, give heed to the care of the demons, by whom they believe such things are brought to pass.
Therefore, the way of the ventriloquists was also a kind of deception, whose sorcery was believed to be able to draw the souls of the departed back again to the life above. Saul, therefore, having fallen into despair of his salvation, because every foreigner had been moved against him with their entire host, and having come upon this idea of having Samuel suggest to him some way of salvation—the fact that... D
the demon A lurking within the ventriloquist, by whom the woman was customarily deceived, was fashioning shadow-like shapes in various forms before the woman’s eyes, while nothing of what the woman saw appeared to Saul. For as soon as she began her incantation and the phantoms and specters were already moving before the woman’s eyes, the demon schemed to gain belief for its apparitions, declaring the person of him who was hidden in the guise of his appearance, through which Saul was all the more astonished, neither the woman nor the sorcerous power being any longer perceived as false by him in the common guise. Since she said she saw gods ascending and a man standing upright in a mantle, how shall those who are servants B of the letter take their stand on the history? For if he who appeared was truly Samuel, then the gods seen by the sorceress were also truly gods; but Scripture calls demons gods: "For all the gods of the gentiles are demons." Is, then, the soul of Samuel among the demons? God forbid! Rather, the demon that was always obedient to the sorceress did indeed take along other spirits to deceive her and the woman, and Saul who was deceived through her; and it brought it about that the demons were considered gods by the ventriloquist, while it itself was fashioned into the desired form and mimicked his voice, and, as far as was possible by plausible conjecture from the circumstances, it pronounced an utterance that was expected as the outcome, as if in the form of a prophecy. C But the demon also convicted itself, against its will, by telling the truth when it said, "Tomorrow you and Jonathan [shall be] with me." For if it was truly Samuel, how could it be that he who was convicted of all wickedness would be with him? But it is clear that in place of Samuel, that wicked demon appeared, and when it said Saul would be with it, it did not lie. Yet if Scripture says, "And Samuel said," let not such words disturb the expert reader; but let him consider it an addition, [referring to] him who was thought to be Samuel. For we discover this custom in Scripture, in many places to describe what appears in place of the reality; as in the history of Balaam, now when he says, "I will hear what God says in me," and then after that, D when Balaam knew that it was pleasing to God that the Israelites should not be cursed, he no longer went as was his custom to meet the omens. For someone who is inconsiderate will think that even there the true God is speaking to Balaam. But the addition shows that Scripture thus named the god thought of by Balaam, not the God who is truly God. So therefore here too, the one who seemed to be Samuel mimicked the words of the true Samuel, with the demon ingeniously imitating prophecy from what was likely to happen. However, the matter concerning Elijah requires more contemplation, though not in the present question. For since he was ordered to drink water from the torrent, he was secretly being counseled by God, so that the pronouncement of the drought against the Israelites, uttered by the prophet, might be undone again through him. For he was given [command] to drink from the torrent alone, not [to partake] of the customary...
εἰκὸς A in the droughts drying up, and no other consolation for his thirst being found for the prophet, because he was forbidden to drink from elsewhere, it was necessary for him to ask for rain so that the water might not fail in the torrent. And the ministry of the things necessary for life is performed for the prophet by the ravens, God showing through these things to the prophet that there are many who have remained in the true worship of God, from which source the food was supplied to the prophet through the ravens; for they would not have brought bread defiled for him, or meat sacrificed to idols. So that through these things Elijah was led to slacken somewhat his anger against the impious, having learned through what was happening that there are many who look to God, whom it is not just to condemn together with the guilty. And the bread is served to him in the morning, and in the evening the meat. Perhaps what is happening holds through an enigma a zeal for a virtuous life, because it is necessary for those beginning to have the solid food of the more perfect, according to the voice of Paul, who says that solid food is for the perfect, for those who have their senses trained by practice. You will not be ignorant of what the veil of Moses looks toward if you converse with the Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians. B And as for the things you asked about the sacrifices, you will do well to examine the whole of Leviticus more diligently, and with greater constancy to consider generally the law therein. For thus a part will be understood along with the whole; for by itself this alone could not be clarified before the study of the whole. And in those questions concerning the opposing power, the solution is manifest: that the one who became a deserter was not simply an angel, but was stationed among the archangels. It is clear, therefore, that with the authority, the subordinate rank is indicated as well, so that the question as to how he was one and is yet with a multitude is resolved; for by his subordinate army deserting with him, the thing sought is made clear. The final chapter of the questions asked, I mean how the Spirit arrives before baptism, being in need of a broader examination and consideration, we shall, having encompassed it in a separate discourse, God granting, send to your reverence.
OF THE HOLY GREGORY, BISHOP OF NYSSA, THAT THERE ARE NOT THREE GODS; TO ABLABIUS.
A It is right for you, who in your inner man are vigorous with all strength, to struggle against the adversaries of the truth and not to shrink from labors, so that we, the fathers, might take delight in the noble sweats of our children (for such is what the law of nature suggests). But since, reversing the order, you send toward us the attacks of the darts with which those who oppose the truth strike, and ask that we, in our old age, should extinguish with the shield of faith these "coals of the waste" and the arrows sharpened by false knowledge, we accept the task. In doing so, we become an example of obedience to you, so that you yourself might offer us in return an equal recompense for similar commands, should we ever stir you up to such contests, O noble soldier of Christ, Ablabius.
This question that you have proposed to us is not small, nor is it of such a kind that, if it is not treated and examined fittingly and worthily, it will not bring with it no small harm. For it is inevitable, by the force of the theorem, according to the understanding that presents itself at first glance, that one must fall into one of two entirely disparate errors: either to say that there are three Gods (which is unlawful), B or else, by our testimony, not to bear witness to the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit—which is both impious and
A absurd. Furthermore, what is said by you is of this sort: Peter, and James, and John, since they are in one human nature, are called three men. And it is in no way absurd that those who are joined together according to nature, if they are many, should be enumerated in the plural from the name of the nature. If, therefore, custom permits this there, and no one forbids calling two "two," and those who are more than two "three," how is it that, when we acknowledge the three hypostases in mystical tenets, and conceive of no difference in nature among them, we are in a certain way at odds with our confession, declaring one divinity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, while forbidding the calling of them three gods? The argument, then, as I said before, is very difficult to handle. But for us, if we could find something by which the ambiguity of our mind might be bolstered, and our doubts no longer waver and hang upon an absurd dilemma, it would be a fine thing. If, however, our discourse should be shown to be too weak for the problem, we shall keep B the tradition that we received from the fathers through succession, firm and unshaken forever. But we shall seek from the Lord a discourse that defends the faith, and if it is discovered by any of those who are endowed with grace, we shall give thanks to him who has granted the grace; but if that does not fall to us, we shall nonetheless retain a stable and firm faith in those things that have been decreed and established.
Why, then, in our custom, when we have enumerated one by one those who are shown to exist in one and the same nature, do we use a plural name, saying "so many men," and not "all [are] one," whereas in the divine nature the logic C of the dogma excludes a multitude of gods, and while enumerating the hypostases, does not admit a plural signification? And indeed, it might seem to say something, if one were to tell the simpler sort what is ready to hand: that the logic of the dogma, avoiding the likeness of the multitude of gods celebrated by the Greeks, has refused to enumerate many gods, lest there be thought to be some community of dogmas [between us and them], if the Divine were to be numbered not singularly, but also plurally by us, following the likeness of the custom prevailing among them. And this—if it is said to the more sincere and simple—might perhaps seem to say something. But among others, who desire the other [side] of the proposition to remain firm and stable for themselves—either not to confess the divinity in the three, or to absolutely name them three who are participants and sharers of the same divinity—what we have said is not yet such D as to be able to generate and introduce any solution to the question.
Therefore, it is necessary to respond at greater length, as best we can by investigating the truth of the matter. For the question is not about something trivial or common. We say, therefore, that this is first of all a certain abuse of custom, that those who are not divided in nature are named and called in the plural by the very name of the nature, [saying] "Many men"; to which it is similar to say that there are "many human natures." And that these things are so, it is clear
A to us from hence. For when we call someone, we do not name him by his nature, lest the community of the name might cause some error, with each of those who hear thinking that it is he himself who has been called, because the naming is done not by a distinguishing appellation, but from the common name of nature. Rather, by uttering the proper name imposed upon him (I mean the one significative of the subject), we thus separate him from the multitude. So that although many have obtained the same nature—for example, disciples, or apostles, or martyrs—one is the man in them all. Since, as it has been said, "man" is not of the individual, but of the commonality of nature. For Luke is a man, or Stephen is a man; yet it is not the case that if anyone is a man, he is necessarily Luke or Stephen. But the account of the hypostases, on account of the properties considered in each one, admits of division, and is considered in number according to composition. B But nature is one, itself united with itself, and is an indivisible, strictly speaking, monad; it is not increased by addition, nor diminished by subtraction, but that which is, being one and one remaining, even if it appears to be in a multitude, is without division, continuous, whole, and perfect, and is not divided along with the individuals who are participants in it. And just as plebs, people, army, and assembly are all spoken of in the singular, yet each of these is understood to be in a multitude; so, according to the more exact and refined reasoning, man could also properly be called one, even if those who are exhibited in the same nature be a multitude. So that it would be much more correct to correct the erroneous custom among us and no longer extend the name of nature to a multitude, than, by serving custom, to transfer the error which lies hidden here even to divine dogma. But since the correction of custom is difficult (for who could be persuaded not to call them "many men" who are exhibited in the same nature? For in every matter custom is difficult to change), regarding this inner nature, if we do not oppose the prevailing custom, we shall not have sinned so greatly, since no harm exists from the incorrect use of names. C But regarding divine dogma, the indiscriminate and indifferent use of names is no longer equally safe and free from danger. For here, that which is "a little" is not a small thing.
Therefore, one God must be confessed by us according to the testimony of Scripture: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord," D even if the word of the Godhead permeates the holy Trinity. But I say this according to the account rendered regarding human nature: in which we have learned that we ought not to extend the appellation of nature with a plural character. But we must examine the very name of the Godhead more exactly, so that through the signification inherent in the word, some help might come to us for the declaration of the proposed question. Therefore, the word of the Godhead, while to the common people ...
A it seems to be applied to nature as a name particularly assigned to it, just as the heaven, or the sun, or anything else of the elements of the world is denoted by peculiar words signifying the subjects: so they say that in the supreme and divine nature also, the name "Godhead" is applied to the one who is declared by it as a kind of proper name. But we, following the instructions of the Scripture, have learned that it is unnameable and inexpressible; and we say that every name, whether it has been invented by human nature or handed down by the Scriptures, has the power of signifying something of those things which are understood concerning the divine nature, but does not contain the signification of the nature itself. And that these things are so, can be demonstrated without great difficulty. For as for the rest of the names which have been imposed upon creatures, one might find that they are applied to the subjects casually, without any original notation (which we call etymology), since we are content to signify the things by any words imposed upon them whatsoever, lest the knowledge of the things signified be confused for us. But of those things which have been put forth to lead us to the knowledge of God, each one contains in itself a peculiar meaning comprehended within, and you would not find any word among the more divine names that is devoid of some intellectual content. B From this, therefore, it is demonstrated that the divine nature itself is not denoted by any of those names, but that something of the things which are about it is indicated by what is said. For we say, for example, if the case requires, that the Godhead is incorruptible, or powerful, or whatever else it is the custom to say. But we find for each name a peculiar significance, which it is fitting to understand and to say concerning the divine nature, yet this significance does not signify that which the nature is according to essence. For whatever it is, it is incorruptible; but the notion and understanding of "incorruptible" is this: that what is, is not brought to corruption. Accordingly, when we have said "incorruptible," we have said what the nature does not suffer; but what that is which does not suffer corruption, we have not presented. In the same way, if we say "life-giving," when we have signified by the appellation that which it effects, we have not by that word indicated the [nature of the] producer itself, and the nature which causes the effect. C And in all other cases, for the same reason, from the signification which is inherent in the more august words, we find either things that forbid us to think of the divine nature what ought not to be thought, or things that teach us what it is fitting to think, but not things that contain the signification of the nature itself. Since, therefore, perceiving the various operations of the supreme power, from each of the operations known to us we adapt the appellations; and since we have supposed that this operation also is one, the supervisory and visual, and, as one might say, the contemplative, by which it observes all things and oversees all things, seeing the thoughts and penetrating with a contemplative power even to things that cannot be looked upon: D we [have supposed] that it is named "Godhead" [theotēs] from "seeing" [thea], and that our God is addressed as "viewer" [theatēs] both by custom and by the teaching of the Scriptures. But if it grants...
that A to look [theasasthai] is the same as to see [blepein], and that God, who oversees all things, is and is called the overseer [ephoron] of all, let one consider this activity, whether it belongs to one of the persons believed in the Holy Trinity, or whether this power pertains to all three. For if the interpretation of "Godhead" is true, and that visible things are "seeable" [theata], and that which sees [theōmenon] is called "God," then it could no longer reasonably be answered that any one of the persons in the Trinity is separated from such an appellation due to the signification inherent in the word. For Scripture by its own testimony attributes "seeing" equally to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. "Our protector, look, O God," says David. From this we learn the aspect of God, insofar as God is understood, to have the peculiar activity of seeing, from the fact that he said, "Look, O God." But Jesus also sees the thoughts of those who condemn him because he forgives the sins of men by his own authority. For, he says, "Jesus, seeing their thoughts." And concerning the Spirit, Peter says to Ananias: "Why has Satan filled your heart so that you should lie to the Holy Spirit?"—showing that the Holy Spirit was a truthful witness and arbiter of the things that Ananias had dared in secret, through whom even the things that were hidden were made manifest to Peter. For that man indeed became a thief, hiding from everyone, as he thought, and concealing his sin. But the Holy Spirit was at once in Peter, and perceived that man's mind, which was dragged toward greed, and through himself gave to Peter the ability to see the hidden things—which he evidently would not have done if he were sightless regarding secret things.
C But someone might say that the argument does not yet look toward what is being asked. For even if it were granted that the term "Godhead" is a common designation of nature, it would not follow that it is thereby proven that one ought not to say "gods"; on the contrary, from these very things we are actually forced to say "gods." For we find in human custom that not only those who have the same common nature, but even those who are of the same pursuit and office are not mentioned in the singular when the many are referred to. For this reason we call many people orators, and geometers, and farmers, and cobblers, and everything else in the same way. And if "Godhead" were a name of nature, it would be more fitting and appropriate, according to the reason previously given, to encompass the three hypostases in the singular and to call them one God, since nature is such that it cannot be cut or divided into parts. But since it has been affirmed by the things that have been said that the name of "Godhead" signifies an office and an activity, and not nature, the argument is turned in a way to the contrary sense from what is being asserted, so that for this reason it would be more necessary to say three gods, those considered under the same activity, just as they say three philosophers, or orators, or whatever else [one may choose].
when many are participants in the same thing. I have worked these things out more laboriously, introducing A the argument of the opponents, so that the doctrine might be more firmly fixed in us, being strengthened by the more strenuous objections. Therefore, the argument must be taken up again. Since it has been moderately demonstrated by us from the construction of the case that the term of divinity refers not to nature, but to activity, perhaps someone might reasonably suggest this as the cause why, among men, those who share the same activities are counted and named in the plural, while the divine is referred to in the singular as one God and one divinity, even if the three B hypostases are not distinguished by the meaning apparent in the divinity. For although among men there may be several of the same activity, each one works his assigned task by himself, sharing nothing in his individual activity with those who pursue the same goal. For even if they be many orators, the pursuit is one, and the same name is applied to the many; but those who practice it work each by himself: one orator speaks individually, and another speaks individually.
Therefore, among men, since the activity of each in the same pursuits is distinct, they are properly named as many, as each one of them is cut off from the others into his own limitation C according to the idiosyncrasy of his activity. But in regard to the divine nature, we have not learned that the Father does anything by himself, in which the Son does not also participate with him; or again, that the Son works anything peculiarly without the Spirit. But every activity that extends from God toward creation, and is named according to various concepts, originates from the Father, proceeds through the Son, and is completed in the Holy Spirit. For this reason, the name of the activity is not split among a multitude of agents, because the concern for some matter is not assigned to each and individualized; but whatever is done, whether reach- D ing to our providence, or toward the administration and constitution of the universe, is performed by the three, yet the things that are done are not three. Let us understand what is said by means of one specific thing: I mean by that very source of benefits, life, which all have obtained who have participated in this grace. Searching, therefore, for the source from which such a good has come to us, we find through the guidance of the Scriptures that it is from the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But because we posit three persons and names, we do not think that three lives have been given us, one provided separately by each of them; rather, the same life is energized by the Father, prepared by the Son, and depends on the will of the Spirit. Since, therefore, according to the likeness of what has been said, every activity is not performed divisibly according to the number of...
A the Hypostases, the Holy Trinity acts in every operation; but there is one movement and disposition of the good will, which is conducted and directed from the Father, through the Son, to the Spirit. For just as we do not call them three life-givers, those who provide one life, nor three good ones, those who are contemplated in the same goodness, nor do we declare all other things in the plural, so neither can we name them three Gods, those who exercise this divine—that is, B the inspectorial—virtue and activity, both in us and in every creature, jointly and inseparably through one another. For as we have learned from Scripture, which says concerning the God of all things that He judges all the earth, we declare Him the judge of all things through the Son. And again, having heard that the Father judges no one, we do not suppose that Scripture conflicts with itself. For He who judges the whole earth through the Son, to whom He has given all judgment, does this; and whatever is done through the Only-Begotten has its reference to the Father, so that He is both judge of all things and judges no one, because—as it has been said—He has given all judgment to the Son, and all the judgment of the Son is not alien to the Father’s will. And no one could reasonably say that there are two judges, or that one is deprived and despoiled of the virtue and power of judging; so also in the reasoning of the Godhead, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God. And the inspectorial and C spectatorial virtue, which we surely call the Godhead or Divinity, the Father exercises through the Only-Begotten, while the Son perfects every virtue in the Holy Spirit, and judges, as Isaiah says, in a spirit of judgment and a spirit of burning, and works according to the voice of the Gospel which He uttered toward the Jews. For He says: "If I, however, cast out demons by the Spirit of God,"—comprehending the whole kind of benefit by a part, through the unity concerning the efficacy. For in those who work through one another, the one name of the efficacy cannot be distributed and divided among many. For since the principle of the inspectorial and spectatorial power is one in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, as has been said previously, and proceeds—as it were—from a fountain from the Father, is exercised by the Son, and in the power of the Spirit perfects the grace; and no efficacy is divided according to the Hypostases, so as to be performed D peculiarly and separately by each Hypostasis without that which is considered one—but all providence and care, and the governance of all things, both those concerning the sensible creation and those concerning the supramundane nature, and that power which both preserves things, corrects faults, and teaches what is rightly done, is one and not three, which is indeed performed by the Holy Trinity, yet not divided in a threefold manner according to the number of the persons which are considered in the faith, so that each of the operations is considered to be of itself, or of the Father alone, or of the
Unigenite especially, or A separately through the Holy Spirit; yet the Spirit distributes blessings to each individually, as the Apostle says, "one and the same Spirit." Nor is the impulse of the good from the Spirit without a principle, but we find that the power which is previously conceived of this, or who the Unigenite God is, does all things, without whom nothing of things that exist comes into being; but even He Himself, again, the fountain of good things, takes His starting point from the Father’s will.
If, therefore, every good thing and name, depending on the power and counsel which is without beginning, is brought to completion and fulfillment in the power of the Spirit through the Unigenite God without distinction and without interval of time, nor is any delay in the movement of the divine purpose and destination from the Father through the Son to the Spirit occurring or conceived; and among good names and concepts is also the Deity; the name would not reasonably be diffused into a multitude, since the unity according to the operation forbids the plural enumeration. And just as one Savior of all men, especially of the faithful, has been named by the Apostle, and no one from this phrase says either that the Son does not save those who believe, or that salvation comes to those who partake without the Spirit; but the God who is over all becomes the Savior of all, the Son working salvation by the grace of the Spirit, and for this reason they are none the more called three Saviors by Scripture, even if salvation is acknowledged from the Holy Trinity: in the same way, neither are there three gods according to the rendered meaning of Deity, even if such a title applies to the Holy Trinity. C But to contend with those who object that one ought not to conceive of Deity as an operation does not seem to me to be entirely necessary, as far as the present argument is concerned. For we, believing the divine nature to be unlimited and incomprehensible, think of no limitation of it, but we maintain that the nature is to be conceived in every way in infinity. Now, that which is altogether infinite is not limited by one thing and not by another; but infinity escapes limitation in every respect. Therefore, that which is outside of a definition is not defined even by a name at all. So that if the concept of the unlimited remains regarding the divine nature, we say that the divine is above every name, and the Deity is one of the names. Therefore, it cannot be that the same thing is both a name and is considered to be above every name.
Nevertheless, if this should please the adversaries, that D the meaning is not of operation but of nature, we shall return to the argument which we posited at the beginning, that custom wrongly leads the name of nature to the meaning of a multitude, nor, according to the true account, does any increase or decrease accrue to the nature, when it is in more or fewer [persons].
A For only those things are counted by composition which are considered by their own circumscription; and circumscription is grasped by the surface of a body, by magnitude, place, and the difference in figure and color. But that which is considered outside of these escapes the circumscription that is produced by such things. That which is not circumscribed is not numbered, and that which is not numbered cannot be considered as a multitude. For example, even if we say that gold is divided into many forms and figures, we affirm that it is one and is called one; yet we name many coins and many staters, finding no redundancy in the nature of gold in the multitude of staters. Hence, "much gold" is also said when it is viewed as having greater weight, either in vessels or in coins, but they are not called "many golds" on account of the multitude of the matter—unless someone speaks this way, "many golden [coins]," such as Darics or staters, in which it is not the material but the coin and the currency that admit the signification of a multitude. For, properly speaking, it is not "golds," but "golden [pieces]" that it is fitting to say. Therefore, just as there are many golden staters but one gold, so also B there are many individuals shown in the human nature—such as Peter, James, and John—yet there is one man in them. And if Scripture broadens and extends the name to a plural signification when it says, "Men swear by the greater" (Heb. vi, 16), and "Sons of men" (Ps. iv, 3), and other things of this sort, we must know that it is using the convention of the prevailing language, which we call dialect, and is not laying down a law that it is necessary to use words in this way rather than in another; nor is it establishing some technical doctrine regarding words when it says these things, but it makes use of language according to the prevailing convention, looking only to this: that the discourse might be useful to those receiving it, without being at all precise about the diction, in those places where no harm to the meaning arises from the words.
C It would be a long task to collect from Scripture for the proof of what has been said those constructions that have the appearance of a solecism; but where there is danger that some part of the truth might suffer detriment, there the indiscriminate and indifferent usage, nor the negligence of discussing and examining, is found in the words of Scripture. For this reason, it allows "men" to be named in the plural, since no one, because of such a figure of speech, would slide into suspicion of a multitude of humanities or think that many human natures are signified because the name of the nature is expressed in the plural. But the word "God" it expresses with caution and observation through a singular figure, D taking care and avoiding this, that diverse natures might not be surreptitiously introduced into the divine essence through the plural signification of "gods." Therefore, it says, "The Lord God, the Lord is one" (Deut. vi, 4). But it also proclaims the Only-begotten God by the voice of deity, and does not dissolve the One into a dual signification, as if to name the Father and the Son two gods; even if e
A For God is proclaimed by the saints as one; yet the Father is God, and the Son is God. But the God is one in the same proclamation, because no difference of nature or operation is contemplated in the Godhead. For if the nature in the Holy Trinity were changed, according to the suspicious misconceptions of some who have been led astray, the number would consequently be extended into a multitude of gods, being divided along with the difference of the essence of the subjects. But since the divine, simple, and unchangeable nature rejects all difference of essence, as it is one, it does not admit into itself the meaning of a multitude. And just as the nature is called one, so also are all other things named in the singular: God, good, holy, Savior, just, judge, and whatever other of the titles proper to God is conceived, whether one says it looks to the nature or to the operation, we shall not dispute.
B But if anyone should slander our argument, as though by not admitting a difference of nature it constructs a certain commingling and confusion of the hypostases, we shall respond to such an accusation thus: that while we acknowledge the unchangeability of the nature, we do not deny the difference concerning the cause and what is caused, in which alone we perceive that one is distinguished from another, namely, that we believe the one to be the cause, and the other to be from the cause. And regarding that which is from the cause, we conceive of a further difference: for the one is immediately from the First, and the other is through that which is immediately from the First, so that the Begotten remains beyond doubt in the Son, and it is not doubted that the Spirit is from the Father—the intercession of the Son both preserving the property of the Only-Begotten for Him, and not excluding the Spirit from the natural relation to the Father. C Yet in saying "cause" and "what is from the cause," we do not signify nature by these names. For no one could offer the same account of cause and of nature, but we indicate the difference regarding *how* something is. For by stating that the one is from a cause and the other is without cause, we did not separate the nature by the account, but only demonstrated that the Son is not unbegotten, nor is the Father through generation. It is necessary first for us to believe *that* a thing is, and then to examine *how* that which is believed exists. Therefore, the account of *what a thing is* is one thing, and the account of *how it is* is another. Consequently, to say that something is unbegotten explains *how* it is, but what it is is not indicated by this word at the same time. D For if you had asked a farmer about a certain tree, whether it were planted or grew spontaneously, and he replied that the tree was either not planted or grew from planting, did he indicate its nature by the answer? By no means. But by saying how it is, he left the account of the nature uncertain and unexplained. Thus, even here, having learned that one is unbegotten, we have been taught how it is fitting to conceive of him, but we have not heard by the word *what* he is. Therefore, declaring such a difference in the Holy Trinity—that one is believed to be the cause and the other from the cause—we would no longer be accused of confounding the account of the hypostases in the commonality of the nature. Since, therefore, the hypostases of the Holy Trinity...