BY THE SAME ON INFANTS SNATCHED AWAY PREMATURELY, TO HIERIUS
A All the sophists and writers would, I am sure, O best of men, show off the power of their eloquence to you, as if galloping through the stadium of your miraculous deeds. For indeed, a noble and abundant subject, when set before those capable, knows how to make their discourse more grandiloquent; the discourse is exalted by being lifted up together with the greatness of the deeds. B We, however, like an aged horse remaining outside the stadium of argument, will only prick up our ears at the contests of eloquence concerning you, in case any sound should reach even us, driving the discourse with momentum and tension through the carriage of your wonders. Yet, since it happens that even if a horse stays outside the contests due to age, it is often aroused to eagerness by the noise of those contending, and lifts its head, and looks on as if participating in the struggle—breathing hotly and striking the ground rapidly with its hooves, possessing only the eagerness for the contests, while the power to run has been consumed by time—in the same way our own discourse, remaining outside the contests due to age, and yielding the stadium to those who are in their prime of learning, shows you only the eagerness of a desire to contend on your behalf, if only those now flourishing in eloquence were in their prime. But this demonstration of eagerness I offer is not for the sake of telling any of your deeds. For even a discourse that is vigorous and well-strung could hardly attain to that, so as not to be left far behind the worth of the subject, when interpreting this sublime harmony of character, which is composed of opposites. How, just as nature, by overshadowing the unmixed power of the rays with the screening of the eyelids, brings the light to the eyes tempered, so that the sun may become gentle, being mixed proportionally to the need of the shadow cast by the eyelids; so too, that which is venerable and magnificent in your character, being mixed with measured humility, does not turn away C the
A eyes of those who look upon you, but invites them to look with pleasure, so that neither the radiance of your dignity is obscured, nor the inner disposition despised through humility; rather, each is seen equally in the other—in your loftiness, commonality, and in your humility, conversely, dignity. Let others expound on these things and hymn the multi-eyed nature of the soul. The eyes of the soul are, perhaps, as numerous as the hairs of one’s head, seeing sharply and accurately on all sides alike, so as to foresee from afar and not be ignorant of what is at hand, nor to wait for experience—that teacher of the profitable—but to foresee one thing with the eyes of hope, to perceive another through memory, and to observe yet another in the present all around, the mind distributing and accommodating itself B fittingly to all these operations at once and at the same time without confusion.
Let him who is in our life and knows how to treat such a subject with praise and admiration once again admire the venerable riches of poverty. And perhaps, even if it did not exist before, now, because of you, a longing for poverty will also flourish, and your frugality will be considered more blessed than the massive ingots of Croesus’ gold. For whom have earth and sea, kindly sharing their produce, made as blessed as your life has been rendered by a mind that is a contemner of material possessions and worldly wealth? For as those who scour and scrape the rust from iron make it shining and akin to the beauty of silver, so the radiance of your life has become clearer to you, as it is always diligently purged of the rust of money. Let these things be left to those gifted with eloquence and the power of speech, and to what you beautifully understand—in which matters one can derive more praise and glory from taking and receiving than from abstaining from gain. For allow me, with your kind permission, to say that you do not despise and contemn all gain, but that you have laid hold with both hands upon that which no one of those who came before has yet been able to reach or attain. For instead of some expensive garment, or slaves, or money, you have taken and hold the very souls of men, having deposited them in the treasury of love. Let writers and sophists—for whom it is an ornament to C write beautifully of such things—expound on these; let our aged discourse stir and rouse itself only so far as to pursue, step by step, the problem proposed to us by your wisdom: namely, what one ought to conclude and judge concerning those who are snatched away before their time, in whom birth is joined very nearly to death. And that wise man among the outsiders, Plato, when he had philosophized at length, in the person of one who had returned to life, concerning the judgments that are carried out there in the underworld, left the matter unspoken, as being, clearly, too great to come under human reasoning. If, therefore, there is anything such as this among the things we have examined, as would solve the perplexities of the problem, you will surely accept the discovered argument; but if not, you will certainly grant pardon to old age, for our eagerness alone to provide you with something of what you D desire
A will be accepted. For even that Xerxes, who made almost the whole world under the sun a single camp and moved the entire earth with himself when he campaigned against the Greeks, is said by the story to have received with pleasure the gift of a certain poor man. The gift was water, and this was not carried in an earthen vessel, but was held in the hollow of the palms of his hands. Thus, therefore, you also, according to the greatness of soul that is in you, will surely imitate him to whom the intention was considered a gift, even if our gift is found to be small and watery. Just as in the heavenly wonders, he who looks up at the sky sees the visible beauties equally, whether he happens to be educated or an unlearned man; but he does not contemplate the things concerning them in the same way, because one is starting from philosophy, while the other entrusts the visible only to the senses. For this one either takes pleasure in the rays of the sun, or judges the beauty of the stars to be worthy of wonder, or has observed the number of the lunar course in the month. B But he who is sharp of soul, and through education has been purified for the understanding of heavenly things, leaving behind these things in which the sense of the less rational takes delight, looks to the harmony of the whole; and from the circular motion, he observes the suitability formed from opposites, how the inner circles unroll in the opposite direction to the fixed revolution, and how the stars observed within them are multiformly figured in approaches and distances, and in running-under and eclipses, and in the side-long paths, always working out that ceaseless harmony in the same way and following the same course, for which not even the position of the smallest of the stars is seen as unobserved, but all provide equal concern to those who have moved their minds upwards through wisdom. In the same way, you also, O honored head, looking at the administration of God in things that exist, leaving aside those things about which the mind of the multitude is busy (I mean wealth and arrogance, and the desire for vain glory, which usually dazzles the more irrational like a direct ray of light), you do not leave even those things which seem smaller among the things that exist unexamined, searching out and considering the inequality of human life; not only that which is considered in terms of wealth and poverty, or the differences in status and lineage (for you know that these are nothing, to which being does not belong according to their own substance, but exist in the vain opinion of those who are gaping after things that do not exist as if they were actually existing; if, therefore, one were to remove the initiation from those who are dazzled by the glory of those looking at them, nothing would remain for the one puffed up by that hollow vanity, even if all the matter of riches happened to be buried with him), but it is a matter of concern to you to know both the other things concerning the divine economy, to what each of the things that happen looks, and for the sake of what, to the
one life is prolonged into extreme old age, while another is a participant in life only so far as to draw in air through respiration, and immediately ends his life. For if nothing of those things which are in the world is without God, but all things depend upon the divine will, and the divine nature is wise and providential, there is entirely also some reason behind these things, bearing the B marks of God’s wisdom and providential care. For that which happens at random and irrationally could not be the work of God. For it is proper to God, as the Scripture says, to do all things in wisdom. What then is the wisdom in that case? A man has come forth through birth into life, he has drawn the air, he has begun his life with a wail, he has paid the tear as a gift to nature, he has offered the firstfruits of life in weeping, before having participated in any of the pleasant things in life, before his perception has been braced, while he is still loosened by the harmonies of his limbs, tender and diffused and unarticulated, and to speak generally, before he has become a human being (if indeed the rational grace is the property of man; but he has not yet contained reason within himself), this one, having nothing more than that which is held within the maternal womb, except for having come into the air, being at this age, is dissolved through death—whether exposed, or suffocated, or having ceased from living spontaneously through infirmity—what must one think regarding him? How is one to think regarding those who have died in this way? Shall that soul also see the Judge? Shall it stand with the others at the tribunal? Shall it undergo the judgment of the life lived? Shall it receive the recompense according to merit, being either cleansed by fire, according to the voices of the Gospel, or refreshed by the dew of the blessing? C
EXPLANATION
From this it is clearly manifest that the Father here calls the cleansing fire the torments and tortures by which those of them who have sinned and have not done penance before death, as was worthy and proper, are afflicted in the flame, according to the Gospel parable concerning the rich man and Lazarus. For it is clear that he remembers this parable here by saying, “or cleansed by fire” (this on account of the rich man), “or refreshed by the dew of the blessing” (this on account of Lazarus). But that sentence of the just Judge, “These will go away into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life,” does not yet have a place for these things before the judgment.
But I do not know how one must think these things regarding such a soul. For the name of recompense and remuneration signifies that something must necessarily have been given beforehand, but for one who has not lived at all, the material for giving anything has been taken away. But in cases where there is no giving, neither is there D strictly any recompense.
A For this name promises a reward for things that are understood as belonging to one side or the other; but as for that which is found in neither good nor evil, it is entirely nothing. For the opposition of such a contrast—I mean of good and evil—is without a middle term; and to the one who has not initiated the path of either, neither shall it come to pass. That which is in "nothingness," therefore, one would say is not at all. But if someone says that such a one both exists and is among the good, while God gives good things to such persons but does not *render* them, what cause does he allege for this apportionment? Where will he demonstrate the justice in his argument? And how will he show that the meaning is in harmony with the Evangelical voices? For there, He says that the kingdom accrues to those who are judged worthy as though by a commercial contract. For, "Because ye have done this and that," He says, "it is just that you should receive the kingdom by way of remuneration." But here, since there is neither deed nor intent, by what reason and occasion will one say that it comes to pass for these also from God, that which is hoped for as a result of recompense and compensation? B And if anyone should accept such an opinion without examination, positing that one who has thus departed into life will certainly be among the good, it will appear from this that for life not to participate in life is more blessed; for if the sharing in valid goods is indubitable for that one, even if he chance to have barbarian parents and was not conceived in a lawful marriage, while to the one who has lived the time permitted and ordained by nature, a greater or lesser stain of wickedness is invariably mixed into his life; or, if he is to be entirely free from connection with evil, he needs many sweats and toils for this very thing. For virtue is not attained by those who pursue it without exertion, nor is the alienation from carnal pleasures without labor for men, so that it is necessary that he who has partaken of a longer life be inevitably afflicted by one of two painful things: either he must struggle now in the laborious exercise of virtue, or suffer then, in the retribution for painful things, due to a life spent in wickedness. C But regarding those who die prematurely, there is nothing of the sort. But immediately, if the opinion of those who suspect and believe thus is true, a good lot and condition receives those who are removed from this life at an immature age. Therefore, by consequence, the absence of reason will be shown to be even more excellent and desirable than the exercise of reason, and virtue will appear to be of no value through these things. For if no loss has occurred regarding the participation in good things for the one who has not partaken of virtue, it would be vain and useless to toil for it, since the irrational state would take precedence in the judgment of God.
Considering all these things and the like, you urged me to examine the argument concerning this matter, so that through a consistent inquiry our mind might be established upon some firm concept concerning it. D I myself, looking toward the difficulty of the inquiry set before us, believe that it is fitting also to apply the [Apostolic…].
utterance to the present discourse, which he used in matters difficult, inaccessible to the thought of the mind, and incomprehensible, saying: "O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out! For who has known the mind of the Lord?" Since, however, the Apostle again says that it is proper for the spiritual man to examine all things, and he approves of those who have been enriched by divine grace with all word and all knowledge, I say that it is right not to neglect a diligent examination, nor to leave the subject of our inquiry unsearched and unexamined, lest, by a likeness to the hypothesis of the problem itself, the discourse concerning it should vanish as something incomplete, or even as an infant newly born before it comes to light and grows—perishing, as if by a kind of death, through the sloth and indolence of those who grow weary in the quest for truth. I believe, therefore, that it is well not to engage immediately in rhetorical and argumentative conflict B or to become entangled with oppositions in the manner of those contending in the law courts, but rather to impose a certain order upon the discourse and to advance the contemplation regarding the problem in a logical sequence. What, then, is this order? It is, first, to know whence human nature is, and for what purpose it came into existence. For if we do not miss the mark in these matters, we shall not have missed the mark in the contemplation set before us. Now, that everything which is after God among existing things—both that which is conceived and that which is seen in nature—has its being from God, it would be superfluous to establish with discourse, for no one, I believe, who has even slightly contemplated the truth of things would take a stand against such a conviction. For it is agreed by all that the whole depends upon one Cause, and that none of the things that exist has its being from itself, nor is it the origin and cause of itself, but that there is one nature, uncreated and eternal, always having itself in the same way and manner, superior to every interval-bound concept, without increase or decrease, and beheld as beyond every limit; whose work is both time, and place, and all that follows upon these, and whatever the intellect apprehends before these as intelligible and supramundane. C We say, however, that human nature is also one of the things that have been made, using as a guide in this a certain word of divinely inspired teaching: which says that when all things had been produced for generation by God, man was also brought forth upon the earth, his nature being composed of things of diverse kinds, the divine and intellectual nature having been commingled with that share which was contributed to him from each of the elements; and that he was made by the Creator, so that he might be a living image of the divine and transcendent power. It would be better, however, to set forth the passage itself, which runs thus: "And God," it says, "made man; in the image of God He made him." As for the reason for the construction of this creature, some before us have given this explanation: that since the whole of creation is divided in two, as the Apostle says, into the visible and the invisible—the invisible signifying the intelligible and incorporeal D
B for the visible, that which is sensible and corporeal. Since, therefore, all things are divided into these two, I mean the sensible and that which is contemplated by the mind—and since the angelic and incorporeal nature, which is of the invisible things, has its dwelling in supra-mundane and supercelestial regions, because that abode is suitable and fitting for its nature (for just as the intellectual nature is thin, pure, weightless, and agile, so too is the celestial body thin, light, and always moving)—but the earth, which is the ultimate of sensible things, does not have its state suitably and appropriately for the dwelling of intelligible things within it (for what communion could there be between that which is upward-tending and light, and that which is heavy and burdened?)—lest the earth be left entirely devoid and destitute of intellectual and incorporeal association, for this reason a better providence [ordained] for human creation to be established, with the earthly portion wrapped around the intellectual and divine essence of the soul, so that by the natural affinity of the soul with the heavy and corporeal, it might appropriately live in the element of the earth, as it has something akin and of the same race to the substance of the flesh.
The purpose of created things is this: that in all creation, through the intellectual nature, the Power that presides over all things might be glorified, and that both the celestial and the terrestrial, through the same operation (by which I mean looking toward God), should be joined to one another for the same end. C And this operation of looking toward God is nothing other than a life suitable and fitting for the intellectual nature. For just as bodies, being earthly, are sustained by earthly foods, and we perceive in them a certain corporeal mode of life, which is active in both the irrational and the rational alike—so also we must suppose there is an intelligible life, through which nature is preserved in its being.
For if the nourishment of the flesh, being something flowing in and flowing out, imparts by its passage a certain vital force to those into whom it is ingested, how much more does participation in Him who is truly Being, who always remains and always is the same, preserve in being him who has shared in it! If, therefore, this is the proper and suitable life for the intellectual nature, to participate in God, such participation could not take place through contraries, unless in some way D that which is partaken of were related to the one who desires it. For just as the enjoyment of light comes to the eye because it has a natural brilliance within itself for the perception of its homogeneous [object], and neither the finger nor any other of the members of the body performs the act of sight, because no brilliance is naturally established in any other member—so it is absolutely necessary, also in the case of participation in God, that there be something akin to what is partaken of in the nature of the
one enjoying it. For this reason Scripture says that man was made according to the image of God, in order A that by that which is like, he might, I think, behold what is like. But to behold God is the life of the soul, as has been said in what precedes. And since, in a way, ignorance of the truly good has cast shadows upon the perceptive faculty of the soul like a mist, and the thickened mist has become a cloud, so that through the depth of ignorance the ray of truth cannot penetrate, necessarily, along with the deprivation of light, its life has also failed. For it has been said that the true life of the soul is realized in the participation of the Good, and that the soul which does not participate in God falls away from life because ignorance hinders the divine apprehension.
Let no one, however, compel us to give an account of ignorance, saying whence it is and from whom; but let him understand from the very signification of the name that knowledge and ignorance indicate that the soul is in some way disposed toward something. But nothing of those things which are understood and spoken of as relative to something exhibits a substance. For the principle of the "relative" is one thing, and the principle of substance is another. If, therefore, knowledge is not a substance, but an activity of the mind regarding some thing, it is much more certain and beyond controversy that ignorance is far from being a substance. And that which is not according to substance does not exist at all. It would be vain, therefore, to inquire B curiously about that which is not, as to where it comes from. Since, therefore, the discourse says that the life of the soul is participation in God, and that such participation consists in this, that as much as it is permitted and able, it is endowed with knowledge; and since ignorance is not the substance of anything, but the destruction and cessation of the activity that comes through knowledge; and since it necessarily follows that where participation in God is not exercised, there is deprivation and alienation from life (and this would be the extreme of evils): consequently, the Creator of all good works within us the cure for evil. For the cure is a good thing; but C he who does not look to the Evangelical mystery is entirely ignorant of the manner of the cure. Since, therefore, it has been shown that evil is the being alienated from God, who is life, the cure for such an infirmity was to be joined and reconciled to God again, and to exist in life. Since, therefore, this life is proposed to human nature by way of hope, it cannot properly be said that participation in and use of life is a reward for those who have lived well, and conversely, a punishment. But what is said is similar to the comparison we bring forward regarding the eyes. For we do not say that for him who has purified eyes the perception of visible things is a prize and D an honor, or, conversely, for him who is ailing, that the failure to participate in the faculty of sight is a condemnation and a punishing judgment. But just as seeing necessarily follows for one in a natural state, and for one who has been carried away from nature by an affliction, it follows that he does not exercise the faculty of sight; in the same way, the blessed life is also connatural and appropriate to those who have been purified in their
A souls' senses; but in those in whom the vice of ignorance, like a sort of ophthalmia, hinders participation in the true light, it necessarily follows that they are not participants of that, participation in which we say is the life of the participant.
Since these things have thus been distinguished by us, it is time for the discourse to examine the problem proposed to us. The question put forth was of this kind: If the requital of goods B takes place according to justice, in what condition will he be who finished his life in infancy, having neither wrought any evil in this life, nor any good, so that through these things a retribution according to desert might come to him? Looking to the sequence of those things which have been examined, we reply that the expected good is indeed appropriate to human nature according to nature, but it is also called, according to a certain understanding, a retribution; this meaning will be clarified again by the same example. For let us suppose in our argument C two men who have contracted some ailment of the eyes; let one of them surrender himself more zealously to the cure, enduring everything that is brought forward by medical art, even if it be painful; but let the other be found more intemperate regarding baths and excessive drinking, accepting no counsel from the physician for the health of his eyes. We say, therefore, looking to the end of each, that each receives the fruits worthy of his own choice; the one, the deprivation of light, and the other, the enjoyment of it. For what follows by necessity, D we call retribution and compensation, by an improper use of the term. These things can also be said regarding the questions about infants: that the enjoyment of that life is indeed appropriate to human nature, but since almost all who live in the flesh are seized by the disease of ignorance, he who has purified himself by the appropriate remedies, and has as it were washed away and removed the ignorance—a kind of rheum of the soul’s faculty of vision—having obtained the gain worthy of his zeal, abides in the life which is according to nature; but he who flees the purgations provided through virtue, and by means of deceptive pleasures makes the disease of ignorance difficult to cure for himself, being disposed contrary to nature, is alienated from that which is according to nature, and becomes a non-participant of the life which is our own and appropriate to us. But the innocent infant, with no disease of the eyes of the soul hindering participation in the light, is in that which is according to nature, not needing the health that comes from being purified, because he did not receive the disease into his soul in the first place.
And it seems to me that the present manner of life is, through a certain analogy, appropriately related to the life we expect. For just as the first stage of infants, [text ends at column 178D mid-sentence]
A is nourished by the breast and milk; then another food suitable to the one being fed succeeds, one which is appropriate and fitting for the one being nurtured, until it reaches the perfect age: so I also think that the soul, through things always suitable to it in a certain order and sequence, becomes a participant in the life that is according to nature, receiving a portion of what is proposed in that blessedness, according to what it can grasp and is capable of. Just as we have learned this from Paul, who nourishes the one who has already grown through virtue differently, and the infant—who is more imperfect—differently: for regarding the latter he says, "I gave you milk to drink, not meat; for you were not yet able," but to those who had already filled the measure of that B intellectual age, "It is for the perfect," he says, "to have solid food," for those whose senses have been exercised by habit. Just as, therefore, one cannot say that a man and an infant are in the same condition, even if neither of them is afflicted by any disease (for how could those who are not participants in the same things be in the same state of enjoyment?), yet to be unafflicted by any disease is said of both alike, as long as each is free from suffering. However, the enjoyment of these delights is no longer experienced in the same way by the same people: for the one is able to be delighted by orations, or to preside over affairs, or to hold magistracies with praise and glory, or to become famous by doing good to those in need, or, if circumstances so fall out, to be joined in marriage with a woman who is dear to his heart, and to rule over a household, and to find whatever else is pleasant in this transient life—such as hearings and spectacles, hunting and baths, C gymnasia, symposia, and merriment, and whatever else is of such a kind—whereas for the infant the delight is milk, the nurse’s arms, and the quiet and placid motion that invites and sweetens sleep (for the nature of an imperfect age does not have the capacity to contain the joy that surpasses this). In the same way, those who have nurtured their souls through virtue in this life—and, as the Apostle says, have exercised the instruments of their mind’s senses—if they are translated to that incorporeal life, according to the proportion of the state and power that is within them, they will be participants in the divine delights, each receiving a greater or lesser portion of what is proposed according to their present capacity. But the soul that has not yet tasted virtue, while it remains free from the evils that arise from depravity and wickedness—inasmuch as it has not fallen from the beginning into the disease of malice D—receives in the beginning as much of that life (which the previous discourse defined as the knowledge and participation of God) as that which is being nourished can grasp, until, having been strengthened by the contemplation of Him who truly is, as if by a suitable food, it becomes capable of more, and in the abundance of Him who truly is, it participates according to its capacity. Looking to these things, we say that the soul is likewise free from the evils that exist from depravity and wickedness, just as it is also free from that [evil] which comes through...
A the experience of life. Yet we do not consider the way of life of each of these two to be in the same state. For the one, as the Prophet says, has heard the heavenly narrations through which the glory of God is announced; and through creation he was led to the contemplation of the Lord of creation; and he made use of that truth which is truly wisdom—the wisdom observed and understood in existing things—and by observing the beauty of this light, he considered and understood by analogy the beauty of the true light. Through the solidity of the earth, he learned the immobility and stability of Him who made it; and by observing the immeasurable magnitude of the heaven, he was led to the infinite and boundless power that contains all things. By seeing the rays of the sun extending from such heights even to us, he believed that the efficacy of God’s providence does not fail to descend from the height of the Godhead to each one of us. B For if a single luminary, in a common way, occupies and encompasses all that is subject to it with its illuminating power, and dispensing itself to all who partake of it, is present to each one whole and undivided, how much more does the Creator of that luminary become "all in all," as the Apostle says, and is present to each one, giving Himself to the extent that the subject is capable of receiving Him?
Furthermore, even if one sees an ear of corn upon the earth, or a sprout grown from a plant, or a mature grape, or the beauty of autumn—whether in fruits or in flowers—or the grass that grows of its own accord, or a mountain extending to the ethereal heights from its summit, and the fountains in the lowlands flowing from the sides and openings of the mountain like breasts, and rivers flowing through the hollow places, and the sea receiving the currents C from all sides and remaining within its measure, and the waves bounded at the shores, and the sea not erupting beyond its appointed limits against the continent: if one observes these and similar things, how would he not comprehend by reason everything through which the knowledge of the One who is comes to be, if he had prepared for himself even a small capacity for the participation of that delight? And I omit, for the time being, the disciplines by which the mind is sharpened toward virtue: geometry, astronomy, and the knowledge of truth that comes through number, and every demonstrative method and way of things unknown, and the confirmation of things that have been grasped and understood; and in addition to these, the philosophy of Holy Scripture, which brings perfect purgation to those who through it have been instructed in divine mysteries. D
But he who has attained to the knowledge of none of these things, nor has been led by the hand through the world to the contemplation of those goods which are above the world—being something tender, unpracticed, and uncultivated in his mind, having passed through life—he would not be in the same state in which the argument has shown that the former one will be, so that he would no longer, for this reason, be blessed.
A For the person who has dwelt with wickedness, not only would he who is inexperienced in evil be more blessed, but so too would the one who never even entered into life at the very beginning. For we have learned this even concerning Judas, through the voice of the Gospel, that in such cases, that which is altogether nonexistent is better than that which exists in wickedness. For in the case of the former, because of the depth of the ingrained wickedness, the punishment that comes through purgation is extended infinitely, but how could pain affect that which does not exist?
B But if anyone compares the immature life of infants with that which is lived according to virtue, such a person is truly an infant and unreasonable, using such judgment concerning existing things. You ask, then, for what reason a person is removed from life at that age, and what divine wisdom avoids through this providence? But if you would speak of those things which are proofs of an illegitimate birth, and which are therefore removed from the midst by their parents, it is not right for you to demand an account from God for the works of wickedness, He who brings to judgment those things which have not been done rightly in this regard. If, however, someone—even though he is diligently raised and cared for by his parents, and vows are zealously undertaken for him by the same—is nevertheless not a participant in life, because a disease that prevails until death supervenes (which is doubtless a cause on its own), we make this conjecture concerning such cases: that it is C of perfect providence, not only to heal diseases that have been contracted, but also to provide that no one should even from the beginning engage in forbidden things. For it is probable that He who has known the future as equally as the past, hinders the progress of the infant's life toward perfection, so that the evil foreseen by His foreknowing power in the one who would have lived in such a way might not be fully realized, and that his life might not become a material for wickedness for him who would have lived with such a choice.
And it would be easy to express and represent this understanding with a certain similitude. For let it be, for the sake of example, that all kinds of sumptuous and delicious food are set before a feast, and let one of the guests be in charge, such a one as can accurately know the particular qualities of each person's nature, and what is beneficial for such a constitution, and what is harmful and inappropriate. Let there also be added to him an authoritative power and a certain duty, so that at his own discretion he may permit one person to partake and enjoy what is set out, while forbidding another, and doing all things to this end, that each one might touch only what is suitable and convenient for his own temperment and complexion, so that neither the ailing person might be worn down by adding material for his disease through the food, D nor the more robust person might suffer, falling into a plethoric disgust from unsuitable nourishment. In these things, if someone addicted to drunkenness is led out from the middle of the feast, or when he begins to become intoxicated, or stays until the end of the dinner—the one in charge managing these things so that the table might be elegantly and continuously kept free from the excesses of gluttony and drunkenness and the confusion of evils. Just as, therefore, someone being drawn away from the savor of the delicacies does not—
but condemns A the steward of some injustice, as though he were keeping him away from the things set before him out of some envy and not through providence. Yet if he were to look at those who are still behaving indecently by prolonging their drunkenness, in vomiting and heaviness of head and in blurting out things that ought not to be said, he gives thanks to the one who, before such a passion came upon him, restrained him from that immoderate repletion. If the example has been understood by us, it would be easy to apply the theory that has been grasped in this to the matter at hand. For what was the matter at hand? For what reason does God, when there is much zeal among parents to have a successor of their life preserved for themselves, often allow that which is born to be snatched away prematurely at an immature age? To those who ask such things, we will relate that banquet-like B comparison: that since the table of life has a large and varied preparation of food (understand for me, in accordance with the skill of the culinary art and the craft of seasoning foods, that not all portions of life are sweetened with the honey of pleasure, but that in some places life is seasoned even with more bitter accidents, such as those which the craftsmen of pleasures pertaining to the belly and feast devise and manipulate, stirring up the appetites of the guests with sharper, or salty, or astringent tastes); since, therefore, life is not sweet and pleasant in all its business and duties, but in some matters the food is salted—or there is an astringent, or sour, or biting and sharp quality injected, making the seasoned food of life difficult to consume—and, likewise, the mixing bowls are full of varied mixtures of deception: of which some generate the vice of inflation through the fraud of pride, others summon those who have drunk to rashness and madness, and for others, [the bowls] stir up the vomit of ill-gotten gains through a shameful discharge. So that he who has not used the banquet C as he ought may not linger long in such a preparation of the table, he is led out more quickly from the gathering and assembly of the guests, gaining this: that he is not involved in that trouble and ugliness of which excessive consumption is the cause for gluttons. This is what I say is a work of perfect and absolute providence, not only to cure diseases that have been contracted, but even to prevent them before they are contracted. And we hold this same opinion regarding the death of infants who have just been born, that the One who does all things with reason, moved by humanity, takes away the matter of vice, not giving time for the will—which had been known through His foreknowing power—to be shown through its works in the excellence of wickedness and vice, D as it were, when it has the impulse toward evil. Often, moreover, the One who organizes the banquet of life exposes the sophisticated necessity of covetousness through such things, so that, I think, the malady of covetousness might appear naked of its handsome coverings, not shadowed by any delusive veil. For the many say that they expand themselves for the desires of wealth so that they might make their offspring wealthier; yet their malady is exposed as being their own, and not generated by necessity—that is, the inexcusable greed of the childless. For many, neither having a successor for the many things for which they labored, nor being in the hope of having one, instead of myriads of children, nurture many desires within themselves, not having where [to pour out] the necessity.
- ty of this disease. A And, moreover, many, while living ill in this life, are tyrannical and bitter in their disposition, enslaved to every indulgence, frantic with wrath, sparing none of the incurable evils, robbers and manslayers and traitors to their country, or if there is anything more accursed than these (such as parricides and matricides, and murderers of children, and those raging with illicit unions)—people who, being such as these, grow old in this wickedness; how will anyone say that this happens to those who have been previously examined? For if the one snatched away before his time is removed from this life's banquet by a providential care, so that he may not, according to the similitude of the feast, gluttonize until the end with the passions of this life, why, then, does such a one carouse at the banquet until old age, pouring out for himself and his fellow-revelers a stale cup of evils?
B But you will certainly ask: "Why, then, does [God] providently remove the one from life before his will is perfected through evil, while leaving the other to become such that it would have been better for him not to have been born at all?" To this we shall offer the more reasonable and fair-minded reply: that often C the life of those who have lived well is also a cause of better condition for those born from them. And there are countless testimonies of this in the divinely inspired Scripture, by which we are clearly taught of the care and benefit from God which those who are worthy receive, and that their offspring also share in this. It is no small thing, moreover, to have been an obstacle to wickedness and iniquity for someone who would have lived entirely according to them. But since the argument here relies on conjectures regarding uncertain matters, no one will at all blame us if our conjecture directs the mind into many avenues. For not only might one say that God, in favor to the authors of their lineage, removes from the wicked life the one who was about to live in it, but even if there is nothing of the sort in those D who are snatched away before their time, it is not absurd to think that they would have conducted themselves in a vicious life more atrociously and dangerously than any of those who have become notorious for a wicked and depraved life. For we have learned from many things that nothing happens without God; and, on the other hand, everyone would acknowledge that those things which are administered from God are not fortuitous or lacking in reason, knowing that God is Reason and Wisdom, and all Virtue and Truth; and that which is not virtuous and is outside of the Truth, He would not accept. Whether, therefore, some are snatched away according to the aforementioned reasons, or there is something else beyond what has been said, it is proper to consent that these things happen entirely with a view to the better. And I know of another argument, which I learned from the wisdom of the Apostle, through which some of those who excel in wickedness...
were permitted to live according to their own will. For when he had discussed such a sentiment for some time in the Epistle to the Romans, and had set against it that which was being objected to by logical consequence—namely, that evil could no longer be rightly accused if it has it from God that it should be evil, having not at all come to be if He who governs the universe had not intended it—he meets the argument by resolving the objection through a certain deeper speculation. For he says that God, rendering to everyone that of which he is worthy, at times also gives place to wickedness for a better purpose. A For this reason He allowed the Egyptian tyrant to exist and to come to exist in such a way, that by his scourge that great people of Israel might be instructed, a people numerous and passing beyond all enumeration. For perhaps, since the divine power is known through all things, and is sufficiently capable of bestowing benefits upon those who are worthy; and since it was absolutely necessary that that people be led out of Egypt, lest any communion or contagion of Egyptian evils—as far as the wandering of life is concerned—should occur to them, for this reason that adversary of God, Pharaoh, named and ennobled for every wickedness, both arose and flourished during the life of those to whom He was doing good, that by the double efficiency of God distributed upon both, Israel might receive a just knowledge of both, learning in itself that which was better, while seeing what was more dismal in those who were being scourged on account of wickedness and malice; so that by the preeminence of His wisdom, God knows how to handle and accommodate even evil to the assistance of good. For there is need for the craftsman (if it is necessary that the apostolic word be confirmed also by our words), there is need then for one who is fashioning iron by art into some useful instrument of life, not only for that which easily yields to art by some natural tenderness and softness, but even if the iron be exceedingly resistant, and even if it not easily soften by fire, and, because of its resistance and firmness, cannot be fashioned into some instrument necessary for life, art requires the assistance of this too. For he will use such a one as an anvil, so that by the blows upon it, the iron both active and soft might be fashioned toward some useful thing. B But someone will say that not all in this life have paid the price for their own wickedness; nor, indeed, have those who live according to virtue in this life enjoyed the fruits of the toils of virtue. What, therefore, one says, shall we say is the usefulness in these cases for those who have lived in wickedness without punishment? I will bring before you an argument for this too, one higher than human reasonings. For the great David says somewhere in his prophecy that a certain part of joy belongs also to those endued with virtue, when they compare the destruction of the condemned to their own goods. "For the righteous man shall rejoice," he says, "when he sees the vengeance of the ungodly; he shall wash his hands in C D
B the blood of the sinner." This does not mean he rejoices in the pains of those who are suffering, but that it is then most of all that he recognizes and observes the outcome which comes from virtue to the worthy. For he signifies by the words spoken, that the juxtaposition of opposites acts as an addition and increase of joy to those who are endowed with virtue. For by saying, "He washes his hands in the blood of the sinner," he presents this thought: that the purity of his own life’s activity is demonstrated in the destruction of sinners. For the term "washing" signifies the appearance and image of purity. Yet no one is washed in blood; rather, one is defiled and polluted. Thus, through this, it becomes clear that the juxtaposition of harsher things demonstrates the blessedness of virtue.
We must, therefore, condense the discourse into heads, so that the understandings and concepts we have treated and scrutinized may be easily committed to memory. For the untimely death of infants suggests to us that we should not think that he who has thus ceased to live is in pain and sadness, nor that he is in the same condition and lot as those who have been purified in this life through every virtue, since God’s superior providence prevents the excess of wickedness in those who were about to live in such a way. That some of the wicked live longer does not overturn the stated opinion. For, out of grace toward their parents, wickedness is hindered and checked in them; but for those who had no access to God through their parents, such a kind of benefit is not transmitted to those born from them. Either he who was prevented by death from becoming wicked would have appeared much more severe and atrocious than those who are notable for wickedness, if he had had free, unimpeded, and unobstructed wickedness; or, if some have even advanced to the highest degree of wickedness, the apostolic contemplation consoles the matter we are asking about, in that He who does all things in wisdom knows how to effect even some good through evil. If, however, someone holds the summit and peak even in wickedness and depravity, and according to the simile proposed by us, has been fashioned by the art of God for no use, this exists as an appendix and addition to the joy of those who have lived well, just as the prophecy proposes we understand—which one should not consider a small thing among good things, nor unworthy of the providence of God.