Athenagoras the Athenian, Christian Philosopher

ATHENAGORAS THE ATHENIAN, CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHER: EMBASSY FOR THE CHRISTIANS

To the Emperors Marcus Aurelius Antoninus and Lucius Aurelius Commodus, conquerors of Armenia and Sarmatia, and, which is most important, philosophers:

^A 1. Christian piety cannot obtain the same legal rights as impious superstitions. Your world, greatest kings, uses different customs and laws in different places; and no one is prevented by law or fear of judgment from cherishing ancestral practices, even if they should be ridiculous. But the man of Ilium calls Hector a god, and Helen Adrastia ^B. The Lacedaemonian Aga- ^C

Agamemnon calls Zeus a god, and venerates Phylonoe, the daughter of Tyndarus, and Tenes. The Athenian offers sacrifice to Erechtheus, Poseidon; and the Athenians perform ceremonies and mysteries to Agraulus and Pandrosus, who indeed did not escape the reputation of impiety for having opened the chest. And, in a word, among all nations and peoples, men bring about sacrifices and mysteries according to whatever they please. ^B But the Egyptians consider cats, crocodiles, serpents, asps, and dogs to be gods. And you and the laws permit all of these, judging that it is altogether impious and profane to consider no god at all, but necessary to worship as gods those whom each person wishes, so that by fear of the divine they might abstain from wrongdoing. But our name (do not, I beg you, be offended by the mere sound of it, as the vulgar are) — why is it hated? For names are not worthy of hatred, but the evil deed is worthy of judicial punishment. Therefore, admiring your gentleness and kindness and your peaceful and philanthropic demeanor toward all, individuals live in equality, and cities, according to their own dignity, receive fair honor, and the whole world enjoys deep peace through your wisdom. We, however, who are called Christians—since you have not taken thought for us, but permit us, though we do wrong to no one, but rather (as will be shown as the discourse proceeds) are most piously and justly disposed toward both the divine and your empire—to be driven ^C and

[Notes on the text]

...as if they were Adrastia, knowing they adore. But these things seem to be able to be explained from those things which are read below n. 14: That we do not choose as gods the same beings whom they themselves acknowledge. Among Eusebius, Hist. vii, 11, thus Aemilianus addresses Dionysius: That therefore [he] seems to be the same as acknowledging. Clement Alex., Protrept, p. 24, and among Lycophron, verse 85, where Tzetzes observes that kings were accustomed to be called [this] of old. The same is observed by Eustathius in the Iliad, p. 166. Often other names of gods are attributed to men. Shortly after, Athenagoras calls Erechtheus Neptune, Agesilaus Pluto. Lactantius, lib. 1, cap. 11. Clement of Alexandria observes in Protrept. p. 36, that not only kings arrogated to themselves the names of gods, like the Dionysii, or ^D the Ptolemy the fourth and Mithridates, but even private individuals dared the same, such as Menecrates the physician, and Nicagoras, of whom the former was called Jupiter, the latter Mercury. Hence also Aristarchus is Jupiter among Athenaeus lib. III, cap. 20. See lib. vi, and lib. vii, and lib. [others].

...[words and conjectures omitted]...

...and Phylonoe among the Greeks is said to be, as the Latins think, the same as Hecate, and [is derived] [alt-version omitted] from "impelling," because she has her caduceus like Mercury; and she leads the dead to the underworld. The same Suffridus adds that Phylonoe is the same as Proserpina the caduceatrix, and he removes "kai" before... Gesner thinks it should be read "Tenem in Tenedos" [as] most holy God, and that they founded their city. Furthermore, whether you write "Tennem" or "Tenem," it is the same. Conon among Photius, cod. 18, writes with a double v. Langus reads and interprets it as the compital Proserpina; Meursius prefers [it as] Diana, and declares her to be named thus. lib. I, cap. 2, Miscell. Laconic. [from] the first hand. ...[notes on reading of codices]... ...[notes on text emendations regarding "Hemon de"... "...tis apechthainesthe"...] ...[notes on variants in Reg. 1 and others].

^A to be dragged and pursued, by the name alone, ^B by the many who war against us, we have dared to declare our circumstances (for you will be instructed by the discourse that we are suffering things beyond justice and contrary to all law and reason), and we entreat you to consider also regarding our situation, so that we may at last cease being slaughtered by sycophants. For the loss of money at the hands of the prosecutors is not the issue, nor the disgrace of public ignominy, nor any other damage to greater things (for these we despise, even if they seem important to the many; having learned not only not to strike back, nor to bring legal action against those who bear us off and rob us, but to those who, even if they strike us on the cheek, offer the other part of our head to be struck; and to those who take away our tunic, to offer our cloak as well), but they aim at our bodies and souls, once we have abandoned our money, showering us with a mass of charges—things which do not even reach the point of suspicion for us, but which cling to those who babble them and to their kind.

2. If anyone has evidence that we commit even small or greater crimes, we do not refuse to be punished, but we think it right to undergo the most bitter and merciless ^C penalty. But if the accusation rests on the name alone (for such is the rumor that is common and unexamined among men regarding us up to the present day, and no Christian has been convicted of any wrongdoing), it is already your task, as you are the greatest and most philanthropic and most scholarly of kings, to ward off the injury from us by law; so that, just as the whole world and every individual and city shares in your benefits, we too may have gratitude toward you, glorying that we have ceased to be slandered. For it is not in accordance with your justice that others, when they have been charged with misdeeds, should not be punished before they are convicted; while in our case the name should have more power than the proofs in court; the judges not inquiring ^D whether the accused has committed any evil, but treating the name itself as a crime. But no name is considered good or bad in and of itself; it is rather because of the evil or good actions underlying them that they appear either base or good. You know these things more clearly, as those who have been trained in all philosophy and learning. For this reason, those who are judged before you, even if they are in danger on the most serious charges, have confidence, knowing that you will examine...

their life, and that you will not be moved by the empty names of the accusations, if they should be false; for with equal fairness ^A they receive the vote, whether it condemns or absolves. Therefore, we also demand for all this same equality, that we not be hated and punished simply because we are called Christians (for what does the name contribute to our wickedness?), but that we be judged on whatever grounds one may bring a charge, and that we either be released by refuting the accusations, or punished if we are caught in wickedness; but not because of the name (for no Christian is wicked unless he is only making a pretense of the teaching), but because of the crime. We see that the same judgment is brought against those ^B who are from philosophy. No one among them, before trial, is deemed by the judge to be good or wicked because of his knowledge or art; but if he is shown to be unjust, he is punished, having brought no crime upon philosophy (for that man is wicked who does not live as philosophy enjoins, whereas the knowledge itself is blameless), and if he clears himself of the slanders, he is released. Let there be, therefore, the same fairness for us: let the life of those who are judged be examined; but let the name be immune from every charge. It is necessary for me, as I begin to make my defense, to entreat you, most great emperors, to be impartial listeners, and not to be swept away by common and irrational rumor, and thus be forestalled, but to grant your love of learning and love of truth to our cause as well. For you yourselves will not err through ignorance, and we, having stripped away ^C what the uncritical rumor of the many charges against us, shall cease to be warred upon.

3. *The three crimes imputed to Christians.* — Three crimes they impute to us: atheism, Thyestean feasts, and Oedipean intercourse. But if these things are true, spare no race; proceed against the crimes: kill us, root and branch, with our wives and children, if any man lives after the manner of wild beasts. Although even wild beasts do not touch those of their own kind, and by the law of nature they do not couple indiscriminately, but only at the time for procreation, and they recognize those by whom they are benefited. If, therefore, any man is more savage than the wild beasts, what punishment, then, will he be thought to have rendered proportioned to such great crimes? But if these are merely tales and empty slanders, arising because vice is naturally opposed to virtue, ^D and because opposites war against one another, who compels a philosopher to sacrifice or to swear oaths or to bring forward empty lamps at midday? Rather, they even openly destroy your gods, and with your approval condemn your superstitions in their writings. [alt-version omitted]

^A And by a certain divine law to do none of these things, you are witnesses, by ordering that there be ^B no harmony—on your part, it remains to make an examination of our life, our doctrines, and of our zeal and obedience toward you, your house, and your empire, and thus at length to grant us no more than to those who persecute us. For we shall overcome them, since we even willingly lay down our lives for the sake of the truth.

4. That we are not atheists (for I shall answer each of the accusations, so that it might not be ridiculous for those who make these statements not to refute them)—now the Athenians ^B rightly accused Diagoras of atheism, not only because he brought the Orphic words into the public in the middle, and divulged the mysteries of Eleusis and the Cabiri, and cut up the statue of Hercules in order to boil his turnips, but also because he openly and plainly declared that a God does not exist at all. But as for us, who separate God from matter, and demonstrate that matter is one thing and God another, ^C and that there is a great interval between the two—for we say that the Divine is unbegotten and eternal, and perceived only by mind and word, while matter is created and corruptible—is it not without cause that they fasten the name of atheism upon us? For if we thought the same as Diagoras, having such and so great pledges of the worship of God—the orderly arrangement, the perpetual harmony, the magnitude, the color, the ^D figure, the layout of the world—the reputation for not worshipping God and the cause for being persecuted would rightly be leveled against us. But since our discourse leads to one God, the Maker of this whole universe,

Himself unbegotten (for that which is does not come into being, but that which is not), and having made all things by the Word from Him, we are unreasonably treated in both respects, and are ill-spoken of and persecuted.

5. Testimonies of the poets concerning one God.

*If Jove his dwelling in the heavens hath,* *His justice fails if he o'erlooketh truth.*

But regarding Him who is perceived by knowledge, as he himself defines and asserts:

*Seest thou on high this infinite ether,* *And earth embraced in its moist arms?* *Hold this for Jove, and deem this God.*

For he saw that neither the essences, to which the names happen to be attributed, were underlying (for who Jove is, I know not save by report), nor that the names were attributed to the subjects of the things; for where the essences do not underlie, what is more to them than the names? But he understood that the Invisible One ^B is to be seen from His works—the manifestations of ether, air, and earth. Whose works therefore exist, and by whose Spirit all things are governed, Him he understood to be God (Sophocles also agreeing with him):

*There is in truth, there is but one only God,* *Who made the heaven and the wide earth.*

As he who sees all things, but is not himself seen, fills the beauty of the divine nature with His own. ^{C D}

6. Philolaus, too, regarding all things as if in a prison, being contained by God, demonstrates both that He is one and that He is above matter. Lysis and Opsimus define God, the one as a number that cannot be expressed, the other as that by which the greatest number exceeds that which is nearest to it. If the greatest number, according to the Pythagoreans, is ten—being the tetrad, and containing within itself all arithmetic and harmonic ratios—and the number nine lies nearest to this, then the monad is God, which is to say, one. For the greatest number exceeds the one nearest to it—the smallest—by one. I shall also set forth the opinion of Plato and Aristotle—not as though I were setting out to demonstrate the doctrines of the philosophers with exactitude, for I am well aware that, just as you surpass all men in wisdom and in the power of your rule, so too do you surpass everyone in the exact investigation of all learning, so conversant are you in each part of knowledge, as not even those who devote themselves to a single portion of it are. But since it is impossible to demonstrate that we are not the only ones to shut God up into a monad without bringing forward names, I have turned to their opinions. Plato, therefore, says: *To find the maker and father of this universe is a task, and having found him, to tell of him to all is impossible,* conceiving of one unbegotten and eternal God. But if he knows of others, such as the sun and moon and stars, he knows them as created: *Gods of gods, of whom I am the maker, and the father of works, which are indissoluble if I am not willing. But whatever has been bound can be dissolved.* If, therefore, Plato is not an atheist, conceiving of one unbegotten God as the creator of all things, neither are we atheists, who acknowledge and hold to this God, by whom all things were created through the Word and are held together by His spirit. Aristotle and his followers, while acknowledging one God, describe him as a kind of composite being, consisting of soul and body, considering his body to be the ether, and the wandering stars, and the sphere of the fixed stars moving in circular rotation, and his soul to be the reason presiding over the motion of the body.

^A The Stoics, although they multiply God by names according to the changes of matter through which they say the Spirit of God permeates, in reality posit only one God. For if God is a creative fire moving according to a path toward the generations of the world, and containing within himself all the seminal reasons according to which all things happen by fate; if his Spirit pervades the whole world; then, according to them, God is one, being called Jupiter because of the fervent part of matter, Juno because of the air, and being designated by other names according to each part of matter through which he has passed. ^B

7. *Christian doctrine is far superior to that of the poets and philosophers.* — Since, therefore, nearly everyone, even if unwilling, confesses that there is one God when they come to the principles of the universe; and since we confirm that He by whom this whole universe was adorned is God; what reason is there why it should be permitted for them with impunity to say and write whatever they please about God, while a law is laid upon us, who are able to demonstrate by signs of truth and by reasons that what we understand and rightly believe is that there is one God? For poets and philosophers, just as with other matters, so also with this, have reached out by conjecture, spurred on—by a certain kinship of divine inspiration—from their own mind, to attempt ^C whether they might be able to discover and understand the truth. But only such capacity was found in them as not to attain the object by investigation, because they imagined that they had to learn about God not from God himself, but each one from himself: whence one man defined differently from another about God, and about matter, and about forms, and about the world. But we have as witnesses of those things which we understand and believe, the prophets, who have spoken by the divine Spirit about God and the things of God. You yourselves might also say, excelling others in wisdom and piety toward the truly divine, that it is irrational to forsake the Holy Spirit who moved the tongues of the prophets as if they were instruments, in order to pay attention to human opinions. ^D

8. *The disadvantages consequent upon a plurality of gods.* — Consider, therefore, in this way, that there is one creator God of this universe from the beginning, so that you may also perceive the reasoning of our faith. If there were two or more gods from the beginning, they were either in one and the same, or each one was by himself. Now, to be in one and the same is not

possible. For if they are gods, they cannot be similar; but because they are unbegotten, they are not similar. For things that are begotten are similar to their patterns, but unbegotten things are dissimilar, since they are neither begotten from another nor for another. But if, just as hand, eye, and foot exist around one body, and while they complete its parts, they form one entity out of themselves, so God is one; ^A truth is that Socrates, insofar as he is begotten and subject to corruption, is composite and divided into parts, but God, being unbegotten and exempt from suffering and division, does not consist of parts. But if each of them exists separately, since the creator of the world is above the things that have been made and attends to the things he made and arranged, where will the other or the rest be? For if the world, ^B being spherical, is enclosed by the cycles of the heavens, and the creator of the world, residing above the things that have been made, holds onto it by his providence, what is the place of the other god or the rest? For he is not in the world, because it belongs to another; nor is he around the world, for the creator of the world, God, is above this. But if he is neither in the world nor around the world (for all that circuit is occupied by this one), where is he? Above the world and God? In another world, or around another? But if he is in another and around another, he is no longer concerned with us. For he neither rules the world, nor is he great in power, since he is in a circumscribed place. But if he is ^C not in another world (for all things are filled by him), nor around another (for all things are held by him), he simply does not exist, as there is nothing in which he can exist. Or what will he do, if the world is held by another, while he himself is above the creator of the world, and yet does not exist in the world or around the world? But is there something in which he can stand? But what will this place be, when the things above the world are filled by the creator? Does he even provide for anything? For nothing is made by him unless he provides. But if he neither makes nor provides, and there is no other place in which he exists, then this one, from the beginning, is the only God and creator of the world.

9. If we relied only upon such reasoning, some might consider our doctrine human. But since ^D the voices of the prophets confirm our arguments (for I consider that you, being most learned and most knowledgeable, are not unacquainted with the writings of Moses, or of Isaiah and Jeremiah, and the rest of the prophets, who, having been moved by the Divine Spirit, spoke the...

things ^A which they were moved to utter, the Spirit using them as a flute-player blows a flute. What then are they? "The Lord our God: no other shall be reckoned against Him." And again: "I am God the first and after these, and besides Me there is no God." "There was no other God before Me, and after Me there shall not be. I am God, and there is none besides Me." And concerning His greatness: "Heaven is My throne, and the earth is the footstool of My feet. What house will you build for Me, or what is the place of My rest?" I leave it to you, by resorting to the very books themselves, to examine their oracles with greater care, so that, with proper reflection, you may rid yourselves of the unfounded accusation brought against us.

10. ^B Christians worship the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. — It has been sufficiently demonstrated by me that we are not atheists, since we hold God to be one, unbegotten, eternal, invisible, and impassible, who can neither be grasped nor comprehended, who is known only by mind and reason, surrounded by light, beauty, spirit, and ineffable power, and by whom everything has been created, adorned, and is conserved through His own Word. For we also acknowledge the Son of God. And let no one think it ridiculous that there should be a Son for God. For we do not entertain thoughts about God the Father or about the Son according to the myths of poets, who depict their gods as being no better than men. But the Son of God is the Word of the Father in idea and in operation; for ^C of Him and through Him all things were made, the Father and the Son being one. And since the Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son, by the unity and power of the Spirit, the Son of God is the mind and word of the Father.

And if, in your surpassing intelligence, it occurs to you to inquire what the Son means, I shall state briefly that He is the first offspring of the Father, not as having been created (for from the beginning, God, being an eternal mind, had the Word in Himself, being from eternity rational), but as having come forth to be the idea and energy for all material things, which originally lay in a state of formless matter and inert earth, with the heavier parts commingled with the lighter. The Holy Spirit Himself confirms this too. For, He says, "The Lord created me as the beginning of His ways for His works."* And we say that the Holy Spirit Himself, who operates in those who speak prophetically, is an effluence of God, flowing forth and returning again like a ray of the sun. ^B Who therefore would not be astonished to hear those called atheists who maintain God the Father, and God the Son, and the Holy Spirit, demonstrating both their power in unity and their distinction in order? Nor does the rationale of our theology stop here, but we also acknowledge a multitude of angels and ministers, whom the Creator and Maker of the world, God, distributed and appointed through the Word who is from Him, to be concerned with the elements, the heavens, the world, and what is therein, and their orderly arrangement.

^A

11. The Christian doctrine rejects the accusation of immorality.

They do not rehearse speeches, but exhibit good deeds: when struck, they do not strike back; when robbed, they do not go to law; they give to those who ask, and love their neighbors as themselves.

12. The life of Christians leaves no room for the charge of atheism. For would we live so purely and innocently if we did not believe that God presides over the human race? That is ^A certainly not to be said. But because we are persuaded that we shall have to render an account of our whole life here to the God who created both us and the world, we choose a moderate, philanthropic, and contemptuous life—thinking that we shall suffer no evil here, even if some take away our lives, compared to what we shall receive back there from the great Judge for our gentle, philanthropic, and equitable life. Plato, indeed, said that Minos and Rhadamanthus would judge and punish the wicked; but we say that even if someone is Minos or Rhadamanthus, or even their father, not even he shall escape the judgment of God. ^B Furthermore, those who think of this life as, "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die" (Isa. XXII, 13), and who consider death to be a deep sleep and forgetfulness (sleep and death being twins), are believed to be pious. But we, who consider the life here to be worth little and of slight value, and who are conducted by this alone—to know God and the Word from Him, what is the unity of the Son with the Father, what is the communion of the Father with the Son, what is the Spirit, what is the unity of these and the distinction of those who are united, the Spirit, the Son, the Father—and who know that the life which ^C we await is far better than can be expressed in words, if we are conducted to it pure from every injustice; and up to this point are so philanthropic that we do not love our friends only — "For if you love," He says,

"those who love you, and lend to those who lend to you, what reward will you have?" ^A Being such as this, and living such a life, that we may escape judgment, are we deemed not to live piously? These things, then, are little from the great, and few from the many, so that we may not weary you further; for those who test honey and whey, by a small part of the whole, judge whether the whole is good.

13.

Why Christians do not offer bloody sacrifices.

Atque illos victimis et precibus mœstis, Nec non libamine et nidore placant homines Orantes, si quis transgressus fuerit et peccaverit.

What need have I of burnt offerings, of which God has no need? Although it is necessary to offer an unbloody sacrifice, and to bring the reasonable service.

14.

That impious Christians do not worship the gods; the same charge will cling to all cities.

promote Menelaus, and offer him sacrifices and hold festivals for him; the Ilienses, however, though they do not even hear his name, celebrate Hector; the Chians ^A honor Aristaeus, whom they believe to be the same as Zeus and Apollo; the Thasians honor Theagenes, by whom even a murder was committed at the Olympics; the Samians honor Lysander, after so many slaughters and so many evils; Alcman and Hesiod honor Medea, and the Cilicians honor Niobe; the Sicilians honor Philip, son of Butacides, the Amathusians honor Onesilaus, and the Carthaginians honor Hamilcar. The day will fail me if I recount the multitude. Since, therefore, they disagree among themselves about their gods, why do they charge us with failure to agree? Further, is not that which concerns the Egyptians ridiculous? For they beat their breasts ^B in the temples during the festivals as if for the dead, and yet they sacrifice to them as gods. And there is nothing to be marvelled at, since they even consider beasts to be gods, and shave their heads when they die, and bury them in temples, and raise public lamentations. If, therefore, we are impious because we do not worship the gods in the same way as they do, then all cities and all nations are impious; for not all men worship the same gods. But truly, the Cadusians worship Medea, just as the Cilicians do Niobe.

^A 15. But let it be that they worship the same ones—what then? Since the many are unable to distinguish what is matter and what is God, and how great is the interval between them, they approach the idols made from matter. For that reason, are we—who do distinguish and separate the unbegotten from the begotten, existence from non-existence, the intelligible from the sensible, and who assign to each of them its appropriate name—to approach and worship these statues? For if matter and God were the same thing, two names for one thing, we would be impious for not considering stones and wood, gold and silver, to be gods. But if they differ as widely from one another as the craftsman differs from the provision for his craft, why are we blamed? For just as the potter and the clay (the clay being the matter, the potter the craftsman), so too God is the maker, and matter is that which obeys His craft. But just as clay cannot by itself become vessels without craft, ^B so too the all-receptive matter could not have received distinction, form, and order without the Creator. And just as we do not hold the pottery to be more precious than the one who fashioned it, nor the bowls and gold ornaments more precious than the smith—but if there is anything elegant about them by craft, we praise the craftsman, and he is the one who reaps the glory for the vessels—so too, regarding matter and God, the glory and honor of the world’s ordering does not justly befit matter itself, but its Creator, God. Thus, if we were to consider the forms of matter to be gods, we would seem to be devoid of any sense of the true God, equating things subject to dissolution and corruption with the Eternal. ^C 16. Neither the world, nor the parts of the world, are to be worshipped, nor the works of men. The world is indeed magnificent, both in its size, as it encompasses all things, and in the arrangement of those things in the oblique circle and those around the North, and in its spherical shape; but not it, rather its craftsman, is to be worshipped. For those who come to you as subjects do not, while ignoring you, their princes and masters from whom they might obtain what they need, take refuge in the majesty of your residence; rather, they observe the royal house in passing, admire it as beautifully adorned, but pursue you with all honor. And you, indeed, O kings, adorn the royal residences for yourselves; ^D but the world was not made because God needed it. For God is all things to Himself, an inaccessible light, a perfect world, spirit, power, and word. If, therefore, the world is a well-tuned instrument and moving [in rhythm, He who attuned and struck the strings, and...]

performs the harmonious melody, is He whom I worship, not the instrument. Neither, in the games, do the heralds leave the cithara-players aside to crown their citharae. Whether ^A (as Plato says) it is the art of God, I admire its beauty and approach the artist; or whether it is substance and body (as the Peripatetics say), since we do not neglect to worship God, the author of the body’s movement, we do not fall away to poor and weak elements, worshipping—according to them—the passive matter through the air, which is immune to suffering. Or whether one considers the parts of the world to be the powers of God, we do not approach the powers for the sake of worship, but their Creator and Master. I do not ask of matter what it does not possess, nor, leaving God, do I worship the elements which have no more power than that which they were commanded. For even if they are fair to look upon by the art of the Creator, they are themselves of the nature of matter. ^B Plato himself bears witness to this account; for he says that the heaven and the world, though they have shared in many blessings from the Father, yet partook of body; hence it is impossible for it to be exempt from change. If, therefore, admiring the art of the heaven and the elements, I do not worship them as gods, knowing the account of their dissolution—the authors of which I know to be men—how should I call these gods? But consider [this] for me in a few words.

17. ^C It is necessary for one making a defense to supply arguments more accurately, both concerning the names, that they are recent, and concerning the images, that they were made but yesterday and the day before, so to speak. But you yourselves know these things more worthily, as those who have associated with all learned men and, beyond all others, have been occupied with ancient writers. I say, therefore, that it was Orpheus and Homer and Hesiod who gave the generations and names to those whom they call gods. Herodotus ^D also bears witness to this; “For I think,” he says, “that Hesiod and Homer were four hundred years older than I, and not more, who gave both the generations and the names [to them].” These are they who created the theogony for the Greeks, and ascribed titles to the gods.

^A and distributed honors and arts, and designated their forms and figures. But as for images, so long as plastic art and painting and statuary did not exist, they were not even conceived of, ^B until Saurius the Samian, and Craton of Sicyon, and Cleanthes of Corinth, and the Corinthian maiden Core appeared. Outline-drawing was invented by Saurius, who traced a horse in the sun; painting, by Craton, who brushed the shadows of a man and a woman onto a whitewashed tablet; while coroplastic (the art of modeling in clay) was discovered by Core. For she, being taken with love for someone, traced the shadow of him sleeping on the wall; then her father, delighted by the very exact likeness (for he was a potter), cut out the outline and filled it with clay. ^C This figure is still preserved in Corinth. After these, Daedalus and Theodorus of Miletus invented plastic art and statuary. The time, therefore, since the appearance of images and the apparatus of idols is so short that we can name the craftsman of each god. For we can name the craftsman of the Artemis at Ephesus, and that of Minerva—or rather, Athela (for it is called Athela by those who hand down the matter more secretly, for so is that ancient image made of olive-wood), and the sitting Minerva produced by Endoeus, a pupil of Daedalus; and the Pythius, a work of Theodorus and Telecles; and the Delius and Artemis, an art of Idectaeus ^D and Angelion. The Samian Juno and the Argive are the handiwork of Smilis; the Phidian works are others.

The Venus in Cnidus is a harlot, the art of Praxiteles; the Asclepius in Epidaurus is the work of Phidias. To speak generally, not one of them has escaped being made by human hands. If, therefore, they are gods, why were they not in existence from the beginning? Why, moreover, are they younger than those who made them? What need had they of men and art in order to come into being? These things are earth and stones and matter and over-curious art.

^B 18. Since, therefore, some say that these are images, but that they are gods whose images they are; and that the manner of supplication which they pay to the images, and the sacrifices which they offer to them, are referred to the gods and are made to them, and that there is no other way of approaching the gods (for it is difficult for gods to be seen clearly and openly), and because they provide as proof of why this matter is so, the efficacy of some images; come, let us examine the power of their names. But I will ask you, greatest ^C of emperors, before the discourse, to grant pardon to one who presents true reasonings. For it is not my purpose to refute the images, but by dissolving the accusations brought against us, I present the rationale of our choice. You may examine for yourselves the heavenly kingdom; for as all things have been subjected to you, father and son, who have received the kingdom from above (for "the king's heart," says the prophetic Spirit, "is in the hand of God"), so also to the one God and His Word, ^D the Son, whom we understand as inseparable from Him, all things are subjected.

Consider this, therefore, before all else. They were not, as they say, gods from the beginning; but each of them has come into being just as we are born; and in this they all agree. For Homer indeed says:

*Ocean, the origin of gods, and mother Tethys.*

Orpheus, moreover (who was the first to discover their names, and described their births, and how many deeds each performed), also sang of their births.

and how he established their first generation from water:

^A Oceanus, who is the genesis of all things.

For according to him, water was the beginning of all things; from the water, mud was formed; and from both combined, a living creature was begotten—a dragon having a lion’s head attached, and in the middle of them ^B the face of a god, named Hercules and Chronus. This Hercules begat an egg of immense size, which, when it was full, was disrupted into two parts by the force of the progenitor. That which was on top became the sky, and that which was beneath became the earth. And the goddess Earth came forth, endowed with a body. Now, when the sky was joined to the earth, he begat females, namely Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos; and males, the hundred-handed ones—Cottus, Gyges, and Briareus—and the Cyclopes, Brontes, Steropes, and Arges. These, having bound, he cast down into Tartarus, for he had learned that he would be cast out of his sovereignty by his sons. Therefore Earth, being angered, brought forth the Titans:

The venerable Tellus brought forth heavenly sons, Whom they call by the name of Titans, Because they punished the great starry heaven.

^C 19. Philosophers agree with the poets concerning the gods. — This was the beginning of the origin, both of these whom they deem to be gods, and of the universe. What, then, is this? For each of the things spoken of as theological is held to be the beginning.

^A For if they have come into being, not having existed before—as those who theologize about them say—they do not exist. For either something is unbegotten and eternal, or it is begotten and corruptible. And I do not say this of myself, but the philosophers hold it differently. What is that which always exists, but has no genesis, or what is that which indeed comes to be, but at no time actually is? Discoursing on the intellectual and the sensible, Plato teaches that that which always is—the intelligible—is unbegotten, but that which is not—the sensible—is begotten, having a beginning and an end. For this reason, the Stoics also say that all things will be consumed by fire and will again exist, with the world receiving another beginning. But if, ^B although there are, according to them, two causes—the one active and beginning, which is providence; the other passive and mutable, which is matter—it is impossible for the world, having been begotten, to remain the same even while governed by providence, how can the constitution of these gods remain, since they do not exist by nature, but have been made? And in what way are the gods superior to matter, if they have their constitution from water? But not even according to them is water the beginning of all things; for what could be constituted out of simple and uniform elements? Moreover, there is need both of an artificer for the matter, and of matter for the artificer; for how could forms be expressed without matter or an artificer? Nor is it consistent with reason that matter should be older than God; for it is necessary that the efficient cause should exist and command before those things which come to be.

20. ^C If their theology were contained within these bounds, by saying that the gods were begotten and constituted from water, I would have proceeded to the remaining accusations, having demonstrated that nothing that is begotten is not also subject to dissolution. But now they describe their bodies, as when they speak of the god Hercules as a coiling serpent, or speak of the hundred-handed ones; or as when they describe the daughter of Zeus, whom he begot from his own mother, Rhea—or Demeter, or her mother—as having two eyes according to nature, and two on her forehead, and a face on the back of her neck, and as being equipped with horns; for which reason Rhea, frightened by the monster of a child, fled and did not offer her the breast, ^D whence she is mystically called Athela, but commonly Persephone and Kore.

But ^A they have unfolded their deeds—as they think—with precision. For instance, Saturn, how he cut off his father’s genitals and cast him from his chariot; and how he practiced infanticide by swallowing his male children. And Zeus, that he bound his father and cast him into Tartarus, just as Uranus did to his sons; and that he fought against the Titans for the throne; and that he pursued his mother Rhea when she fled his marriage; and when she turned into a serpent, he himself changed into a serpent, and knotting her with what they call the Herculean knot, he mated with her—the rod of Hermes being a symbol of the imagery of that union. Then, that he mated with his daughter Persephone, violating her also in the form of a serpent, from whom the boy Dionysus was born to him. ^B There is a necessity, at least, to speak of such things. What is honorable or useful in such a history, that we should believe Saturn, Zeus, Kore, and the rest to be gods? Is it the descriptions of their bodies? And what man possessed of judgment and experienced in contemplation could believe that a viper was born of God? For thus says Orpheus:

“But Phanes another offspring brought forth, terrible, From sacred womb, a viper fearful to behold, Whose hair was from the head, and lovely face To see, but the other parts a fearful dragon’s, From the neck downwards.”

Or who could accept that Phanes himself—the god who is first-born (for he is the one who poured forth from the egg)—could have the body or form of a dragon, or that he could have been swallowed ^C by Zeus, so that Zeus might become all-encompassing? For if they do not differ from the vilest beasts—for it is clear that one must distinguish the divine from earthly things and those separated from matter—then they are not gods. Why, then, do we approach those who are born like beasts and are beast-like and deformed in appearance? ^D 21. For if they were to say that they have only flesh, and blood, and seed, and the maladies of anger and desire—not even these—

such an account ^A should avoid opinions and ridicule. For neither anger, nor desire, nor seed for procreation fall into God. Let them, therefore, consist of flesh, but let them be superior to anger and rage, so that Minerva may not be seen ^B angered at Father Jove, nor a fierce wrath grip her; nor let Juno appear in this state: *Nor did her breast contain Juno’s wrath, but it spoke out.* Let them be superior to pain: *Alas! I see with my eyes a dear man being pursued around the wall; my heart is pained!* For I say that even men are ignorant and base if they yield to anger and pain; but if the father of men and gods should lament his son, ^C *Alas, that it is fated for Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, to be subdued by Patroclus, son of Menoetius!* and yet, while lamenting, he cannot rescue him from danger—Sarpedon, son of Jove; and he does not even help his own son—who would not censure the ignorance of those who, with such fables, show themselves to be worshippers of gods, or rather atheists? Let them have flesh, but let not Venus be wounded in her body by Diomedes: *The proud son of Tydeus, Diomedes, wounded me,* nor in her spirit by Mars: *Since Jove’s daughter, Venus, always dishonors me, who am lame, but loves the ^D destructive Mars,* *and she tore his beautiful skin.* Does that one, terrible in wars and the ally of Jove against the Titans, appear weaker than Diomedes? *He raged as when Mars, brandisher of the spear.* Be silent, Homer: God does not rage. But do you describe to me the god as both stained with slaughter and a destroyer of men (*Mars, Mars, destroyer of men, stained with slaughter*), and tell of his adultery and his bonds? *They, having gone to bed, slept; and the skillfully wrought bonds of crafty Vulcan were cast about them, and they could move their limbs in no way.* Do they not cast aside this great amount of impious nonsense?

^A For about the gods—heaven is mutilated, Cronus is bound and cast into Tartarus, the Titans rise up, Styx dies in the battle. Now they also make them mortals: they love one another, they love human beings. *Aeneas, whom divine Venus bore under the heights of Ida, a goddess mated with a mortal.* Do they not love? Do they not suffer? For insofar as they are gods, does desire touch them? Even if a god, by divine dispensation, takes on flesh, is he therefore a slave to desire? *For never did the love of a goddess or a woman so surround and conquer the spirit within my breast,* *Neither when I was taken with love for Ixion’s wife,* *Nor when for the fair-ankled daughter of Acrisius, Danaë,* *Nor when for the renowned daughter of Phoenix,* *Nor when for Semele, nor for Alcmene in Thebes,* *Nor when for Demeter, the fair-tressed queen,* *Nor when for the glorious Leto, nor for thee thyself.* He is begotten, he is subject to corruption, he possesses nothing of God. Moreover, they even serve men: *O house of Admetus, in which I endured to praise the table of slaves, though I was a god.* And they tend cattle: *Having come to this land, I fed the kine for my host, and I preserved this house.* Admetus, therefore, is better than the god. O prophet and wise one, and one who foretells to others things that are to come, did you not prophesy the slaughter of your beloved, but did you even kill your friend with your own hands? ^C *The heavenly mouth of Phoebus, knowing no lie,* *I believed to be full of the arts of augury.* (How Aeschylus taunts Apollo as a false prophet): *He himself who sings, he who is present at the feast,* *He who said these things, he himself is the one who killed my son.* 22. But these are perhaps only poetic fictions; yet there is, in addition to these, a certain natural reasoning of this kind, *Zeus the swift (as Empedocles says), and Juno who gives life, and Pluto,* *And Nestis, who bedews with tears the human springs.* If, therefore, Zeus is fire, and Juno is earth, and Pluto is air, and Nestis is water, and these—fire, water, air—are elements; none of them is a god, neither Zeus, nor Juno, nor Pluto: for their constitution and generation are from matter separated by God. ^D

^A And friendship with them, which cannot endure without friendship, being confounded by discord. How, then, could anyone say that these are gods? Friendship, according to Empedocles, is the ruling principle; the things compounded are that which is ruled; and that which is ruling holds the dominion. If, then, we postulate that the power of that which is ruled and that of the ruler are one and the same, we shall, without realizing it, make matter—which is corruptible, fluid, and changeable—equal to the unbegotten, eternal, and ever-consistent God. Zeus is the boiling essence according to the Stoics; Juno is the air, and even in her name, if it be added to itself, it is sounded as one. Neptune is the drinkable. Others, however, explain this naturally in different ways: some say that the air is twofold, and that Zeus is male-female; others say that he is the season that turns time to a temperate state; for this reason he alone escaped Saturn. ^B But as for those from the Stoa, it is possible to say: if you recognize one supreme God, eternal and unbegotten, but acknowledge that there are as many bodies compounded as there are changes in matter, and that the Spirit of God, which pervades matter, receives different names according to its various mutations; then the species of matter will become the body of God, and, as the elements perish during the conflagration, it is necessary that the names should perish along with the species, while only the Spirit of God remains. Since, therefore, the change of these bodies according to matter is corruption, who would believe that they are gods? As for those who say that Saturn is time, and Rhea is the earth; that she conceives and gives birth from Saturn (whence she is also considered the mother of all), and that he begets and devours what is begotten; ^C and that the cutting off of the virile members is nothing other than the intercourse of a man with a woman, by which, as if cut off from the male body, the seed is sent into the womb, and man, in whom desire—which is Venus—is implanted, is generated; and that the madness of Saturn is nothing other than the change of time corrupting animate and inanimate things; and that the chains and Tartarus are time, which is changed by the seasons and vanishes—to these, therefore, we say: Whether Saturn is time, he changes; or if he is a season, he turns; or if he is darkness, or ice, or a fluid substance, none of these remains; but the Divine is immortal, immovable, and unchangeable. Therefore, neither is Saturn, nor the idol corresponding to him, a god. As for Zeus, if indeed he is air born from Saturn, of which the masculine ^D part [is] discord desiring...

termed Jupiter, while the feminine part is Juno (so called because she is both sister and wife), ^A he is changed; and if it be season, he is turned. But the Divine neither changes nor falls. Why is there a need [(98)] to trouble you further by speaking, or to show you what you know better, concerning the masters of physical speculation in their respective schools? Or what the writers have understood concerning nature? Or what they think in regards to Athena, whom they call the intelligence spread through all things? Or concerning Isis, whom they speak of as the nature of the aeon, from whom all things grew, and by whom all things are? Or concerning Osiris, whom, having been slain by his brother Typhon, Isis sought the members of, and having found them, adorned them for burial; the burial place of which is called the Osiriac ^B tomb to this day? For, wandering up and down amidst the forms of matter, they fall away in their reasoning [(3)] from the contemplation of God; and they deify the elements and their parts, giving them different names at different times: calling the sowing of grain 'Osiris' (whence, they say, in the mysteries, upon the discovery of the members or the fruits, the cry is raised to Isis: "We have found, we rejoice together"); and the fruit of the vine 'Dionysus'; and the vine itself 'Semele'; and the thunderbolt, the heat of the sun. But why [(4)] do those who deify myths do anything other than construct a theology, not knowing that the very things by which they offer an apology for the gods, only confirm the stories told about them? [(5)] What are Europa, the Bull, the Swan, and Leda in relation to earth and air, that the vile intercourse of Zeus must be directed toward these, [(6)] or of earth and air? But falling away [(7)] from the magnitude of God, and unable to look up [(8)] with their reason (for they have no affinity for the heavenly sphere), they have melted down into the forms of matter, [(9)] and collapsing, they deify the changes of the elements: it is as if someone were to take a ship, in which he sailed, in place of the pilot. ^C But even if no more is meant than a ship, even if it is perfectly equipped, if it does not have—

a pilot, it is of no use; nor are the elements of any use, though they be arranged in order, without the providence of God. For as the ship will not sail of itself, so the elements will not move without the Artificer. ^A

23. By what argument, then, do some of the idols work, if the gods for whom we set up the images do not exist? For it is not reasonable that lifeless and motionless images should have power of themselves, without one who moves them. That in various places, cities, and nations certain effects occur in the name of idols, we do not deny—but if some have been helped and others injured, we do not therefore count as gods those who have worked in either case. ^B But we have accurately investigated, by what argument you think the idols have power, and who those are who work in them, arrogating their names to themselves. Now, as I intend to show who those are that work in the idols, and that they are not gods, it is necessary for me to call also upon certain witnesses from philosophy. First, Thales makes a division (as those who classify his teachings accurately record) into God, demons, and heroes. And he considers God to be the mind of the world, but demons to be spiritual essences, and heroes to be the separated souls of men—the good ones being the good, and the base ones the bad. ^C Plato, while leaving the rest, also divides them into the unbegotten God, and those who were brought into the heaven by the unbegotten, ^D and...

those errant and fixed stars, and divides them also into demons. ^A Regarding these demons, he himself refuses to speak, but thinks it right to pay attention to those who have spoken about them. But to speak about the other demons and to know their generation, he says, is a greater task than we can handle. Yet we must believe those who have spoken before, being descendants of gods, as they themselves claimed, and clearly appearing to know their own ancestors. It is impossible, therefore, not to believe the children of gods, even if they speak without probable and necessary proofs; but, as they profess to narrate their own family history, we must follow the law and believe them. Thus, then, let us hold and speak about the generation of these gods according to them. From Earth and Heaven were born children, Oceanus and Tethys; ^B from these, Phorcys, and Saturn, and Rhea, and all who are with them; and from Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter, and Juno, and all whom we know to be called their brothers; and furthermore, other children born from these. Did he then, who had contemplated the eternal mind and the God that is known by reason, and had explained what belongs to Him—namely, that which truly is, which is uniform, the good flowing from Him, which is truth; and concerning the first power; and how all things are around the King of all, and all things are for His sake, and He is the cause of all; and concerning the two and the three, the second concerning the second things, and the third concerning the third things—did he, I ask, think it a task surpassing his own powers to learn the truth about those who are said to be born from things which fall under the senses, heaven and earth? Or is it impossible to say so? But because he understood that it was impossible for gods to beget and be begotten, seeing as that which is begotten must have an end, and that it is even more difficult to persuade the multitude who have accepted these myths without examination; for these reasons he said it was a task greater than his own powers to know and speak about the generation of the other demons, since they were ^C neither able to learn nor to speak of gods being born. And that which was said by him, "The great leader in heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot, advances first, ordering all things and caring for them; and there follows him a host of gods and demons," was not spoken of that Jupiter who is said to have sprung from Saturn. For in this the name is given to the Maker of all; and Plato himself shows this, as he had no other significant name to call Him by, and so used the common name, not as if it were the proper name of God, ^D but for the sake of clarity, because it is not possible...

for God to be discussed by all men according to His power, he used that term, adding the name "great," so as to distinguish the heavenly from the earthly, the unbegotten from the begotten, who is posterior to heaven and earth, and posterior even to the Cretans themselves, by whom he was stolen away, lest he be put to death by his father. ^B

24. Of angels and giants. — But it is necessary among you, who are versed in every doctrine, either to call to mind the poets, or to inquire into other opinions, since I can say in a few words: If philosophers and poets did not recognize that there is one God, nor hold such views concerning these gods—that some say they are demons, others matter, and others that they were men—there would not be lacking a cause for us to be driven out, who distinguish between God and matter, and the natures of each. For even as we say that there is God, and His Son the Word, and the Holy Spirit, united ^C as to power, the Father, the Son, the Spirit, because the Mind, the Word, the Wisdom, the Son of the Father, and the Spirit are an emanation, as light from fire; so too we have learned that there are other powers that have to do with matter and operate through it: one indeed that is opposed to God—not because anything is doctrinally contrary to God, as Strife is to Friendship according to Empedocles, or Night to Day according to appearances (for if anything were to stand against God, it would cease to be, dissolved by the power and strength of God), but because it is contrary to the good of God, and it is to Him an accident, ^D and co-existent, as color to a body, without which it [the body] does not exist (not as though it were a part of it, but as a necessary attendant and concomitant inseparably united and dyed-in, just as it is for fire to be yellow, and for the ether to be blue): so is the spirit that occupies itself with matter, having been made by God, just as the others were made by Him, the author and father of this whole universe, to find whom is a difficult task, and to disclose Him to all is impossible.

^A For this purpose God created the angels, providing for the things created by Him, so that God Himself might hold the universal and general care of all things, while the angels, who were assigned to this task, might sustain the care of those parts to which they were appointed.

Just as it is with men, who possess the freedom to choose virtue or vice (for you would not reward the good or punish the wicked if virtue and vice were not within their power, and since some are found to be honest regarding what is entrusted to them by you, while others are found to be unfaithful), so too is the situation with the angels. For some, being truly free, remained as they were created by God, keeping to the purposes for which they were created and to those things which God entrusted to them; but others abused both the substance of their nature and the office committed to them—namely, this prince of matter and of the forms within it, and others who were stationed around this first firmament (for you know that we say nothing without witnesses, but set forth those things which have been proclaimed by the prophets). These last, having fallen into desire for virgins and being overcome by the love of flesh, while the former, through negligence and wickedness in the administration of the things entrusted to him... ^B From these lovers of virgins, then, were born those who are called giants. And if the poets have also spoken in some part about the giants, do not wonder, since divine wisdom differs as much from worldly wisdom as truth differs from probability, and the one is heavenly while the other is earthly. And according to the prince of matter:

*We know how to speak many falsehoods that resemble realities.*

^C 25. These angels, therefore, who have fallen from the heavens and wander about the air and the earth, no longer being able to rise above the heavenly things, and the souls of the giants, which are the demons wandering about the world, excite motions, the former indeed [being those who brought about the ^D] composition of the demons, the latter... [alt-version omitted]

Embassy for the Christians

^A demons, in accordance with the nature and constitution which they received; these, however—namely, the angels—act in accordance with the lusts which they have experienced. But the prince of matter, as one may see from the very things that come to pass, exercises an administration and management contrary to the goodness of God.

Incerta sæpe cura mentem agitat meam, Casus gubernet, an Deus mortalia. Spem nempe præter, jusque præter, hos quidem Domo excidentes, omnibus nudos bonis: Illos fruentes rebus usque prosperis.

These unexpected and unjust successes and adversities brought Euripides to such a state of perplexity that he could not say to whom the administration of earthly things should be ascribed, of which one might say: ^B

Ergo hæc videntes quomodo deûm genus Dicamus esse, aut obsequamur legibus?

This also led Aristotle to say that the things below the heavens are not governed by providence, although the eternal providence of God is equally extended to us.

(Coacta terra, seu velit, seu non velit, Producit herbas, et pecus pascit meum),

but that which pertains to individuals proceeds according to truth, not according to opinion, and in accordance with the merits of each; while other things are governed by the law of reason according to the common constitution of nature. But because the demonic motions and operations which proceed from the contrary spirit excite these inordinate impulses, and move men differently—some in one way, some in another, individually and collectively, privately and publicly—in accordance with the nature of matter and their affinity with divine things, inwardly and outwardly; for this reason, some whose reputation is not slight have thought that this whole universe does not consist by any order, but is driven and carried along by blind chance. They failed to see that of those things which pertain to the constitution of the whole world, nothing is inordinate or neglected, but each thing exists by reason; hence they do not transgress the order prescribed for them. Man, however, insofar as he is viewed in relation to Him by whom he was made, is orderly, both by the nature of his generation, which retains one common reason, and by the disposition of the body which is fashioned, which does not transgress the law proper to it, and by the end of his life, which remains equal and common; but according to the particular reason of each, and the operation of the dominant prince and the accompanying demons, he is driven and moved in various ways, although ^D a common faculty of reasoning exists in all.

26. ^A And those who draw them toward idols are the aforementioned, those who have been corrupted.

As we have already said, they are demons who are attached to the blood of victims and lick it up. But those gods that please the multitude, and to whom names are given upon statues, were—as one can see from their history—human beings. And that it is demons who take upon themselves these names is proven by the individual action of each of them. For some emasculate themselves, as those around Rhea; others cut or gash themselves, as those around Artemis. And she in Tauris kills strangers. For I pass over those who torment themselves with knives and dice, and how many species of demons there are. For it is not the act of God to impel toward things contrary to nature. ^B Whenever a demon prepares evils for a man, he harms the mind first. But God, being perfectly good, is eternally beneficent. That there are others who act and others for whom the statues are erected is a very great proof, [provided by] Troas and Parium; of which cities one possesses the statues of Neryllinus, who lived in our own age, while Parium has those of Alexander and Proteus. For Alexander, there is still his tomb and his image in the forum. And while the other statues of Neryllinus are a public ornament (if indeed a city is ornamented by these), one of them is considered to deliver oracles and to heal the sick: and on account of this the Troadenses perform sacrifices, cover it with gold, and crown the statue. And as regards the statues of Alexander and Proteus (the latter of whom you are not ignorant threw himself into the fire near Olympia), this one too is said to deliver oracles; but to the statues of Alexander (O wretched Paris, fairest in form, mad for women) public sacrifices and festivals are conducted at public expense, as to a god who hears [prayers]. Whether, therefore, are Neryllinus and Proteus and Alexander the ones who perform these things concerning the statues, or is it the nature of the material? But the material is bronze; and what can bronze do by itself? Since it is permitted to reshape it into another form, as [Amasis did with] the wash-basin in Herodotus. ^C But Neryllinus and Proteus and Alexander, what more can they provide to the sick? For that which the statue is now said to perform, it performed even while Neryllinus was living and sick.

27. What then is to be said? First, that the illogical and fantastic motions of the soul regarding opinions, at one time draw these images from matter, and at another time fashion and bring them forth for themselves. The soul suffers this most of all when it takes to itself and becomes commingled with the material spirit, not looking toward the heavenly things and their Maker, but downward toward earthly things, looking generally toward the earth, as being only blood and flesh, and no longer becoming a pure spirit. These illogical and dreamy movements of the soul produce phantasies that bear images. ^D

^A When a soul is tender and yielding, untrained and inexperienced in powerful reason, and fails to contemplate the truth or to conceive of the Father and Maker of all things, it becomes imprinted and branded with false opinions about itself. Then the demons, who hover about matter, licking up the incense and the blood of sacrifices and deceiving men, take hold of these false movements of the soul belonging to the masses, and, by entering into their thoughts, cause phantasies to flow into them as if from statues and images. And all that the soul does by itself, as an immortal being, moving in a rational way, whether it foretells the future or heals present ills, the demons harvest the glory for themselves. ^B

28. It is necessary, therefore, to speak a few words about these names as we previously promised. Herodotus and Alexander, the son of Philip, in his letter to his mother (both of whom are said to have entered into discussions with the priests at Heliopolis, Memphis, and Thebes), say that they learned from them that those [gods] were men. Herodotus speaks thus: "As for those whose images they were, they demonstrated that they had been such, though they were far removed from being gods. But before these men, gods reigned in Egypt, not being present with those men; and of these, one was always the ruler. ^C Later, there reigned in Egypt Horus, the son of Osiris, whom the Greeks call Apollo. He, having overthrown Typhon, was the last to reign in Egypt. Osiris, in the Greek tongue, is Dionysus." Since therefore the other kings, and the last king of Egypt (from whom the names of the gods came down to the Greeks), namely Apollo, the son of Dionysus and Isis (as the same Herodotus says: "They say that Apollo and Artemis were the children of Dionysus and Isis, and that Leto was their nurse and protectress"), all this leads to the conclusion that statues can do nothing of their own accord; Neryllinus, Proteus, and Alexander are no more effective; therefore, it is with an empty appearance that demons mock mankind. ^D Tatian, relying on the authority of Justin, denies that demons heal; Minucius and Cyprian reduce the machinations of demons to mere appearance, so that they might seem to have healed. "They can do nothing except harm," says Lactantius (lib. II, cap. 15). From this we can assert that the early Christians placed absolutely no faith in Cornelius Tacitus, when he narrates (Hist. lib. IV) that a blind man in Alexandria and another man suffering with his hand, at the prompting of Serapis, fled to Vespasian, and when one begged that he would deign to moisten his cheeks and the balls of his eyes with the spittle of his mouth, and the other that he might be trodden on by the foot of Caesar, that the emperor obeyed Serapis and both were immediately healed. Soon Gesner, who had been reading, imitates this passage just cited above, as if he had read it.

^A whom they had as their first kings, born of heavenly origin, the Egyptians, partly out of ignorance of true religion regarding the Divine, and partly out of gratitude for their reign, imagined them to be gods along with their wives. And, indeed, all the Egyptians sacrifice clean bulls and male calves; but it is not lawful for them to sacrifice females, ^B for these are sacred to Isis, whose image is in the form of a woman with ox-horns, just as the Greeks depict Io. Who, however, would be more worthy of belief when recounting these things than those who, through the succession of their race, from father to son, have received the history just as they received the priesthood? For it is not likely that the temple-wardens, who commend these idols with such great honor, would have lied when they said that they were human beings. But if Herodotus alone were saying that the gods of the Egyptians are spoken of in histories as if they were men, then one might perhaps have to conclude that Herodotus was a writer of fables—especially since he himself says: "Regarding the divine matters of which I have heard, I am not eager to relate them, except for their names alone," which are very minimal ^C indeed. But since Alexander and Mercurius, who is called Trismegistus, and countless others—not to recount them one by one—conjoin their race to the gods as eternal, no reason for doubting remains but that, while they were kings, they were held to be gods. The most learned of the Egyptians also demonstrate that they were men, who, while calling the air, the earth, the sun, and the moon gods, hold that the others are mortal men, and that their temples are their tombs. Apollodorus also teaches the same in his book *On the Gods*. Moreover, Herodotus calls their sufferings mysteries: "In the city of Busiris, as I have already mentioned, they celebrate the festival of Isis. After the sacrifice, all of them, men and women, many thousands of people, beat themselves. But in what manner they beat themselves, it is not lawful for me to say. If they are gods, they are immortal; but if they are beaten, and if these sufferings are mysteries, then they are humans," just as Herodotus himself testifies: "And there are also her tombs, the name of which, if I were to pronounce it in this matter, I would not be acting piously, in the city of Sais, in the temple of Minerva, behind the entire shrine, adjacent to the wall of Minerva." ^D There is also a lake attached, adorned with a stone base and well-wrought on all sides, equal in size, as it seems to me, to that which is...

in Delos, called the Trochoides. ^A In this lake, the Egyptians perform by night the representations of his sufferings, which they call mysteries. And not only is the tomb of Osiris shown, but the preparation of the body as well. When the corpse is brought to them, they show those who brought it wooden models of the dead, fashioned with paint, and they say that the most important of these—whose name I do not deem it holy to mention in such a matter—is one.

29. But even those of the Greeks who are wise in poetry and history teach the same things. Concerning Heracles, for instance:

Wretched man, who did not revere the retribution of the gods, nor the table ^B Which he had set before him; then he even slew Iphitus himself.

Being such as this, it was reasonable that he should fall into madness; and reasonably, too, he kindled a pyre and burned himself. Concerning Asclepius, Hesiod says:

The father of men and gods, When he was enraged, and having hurled an incandescent thunderbolt from Olympus, Slew the beloved son of Leto, stirring up his wrath.

And Pindar:

But wisdom itself is bound by gain. Gold appeared in his hands, having corrupted even him with the bribe Of a great recompense. And so the son of Cronus with his hands, Having hurled [his bolt] at both, took away the breath ^C From their chests; and a blazing thunderbolt brought upon them death.

If, therefore, they were gods, they were neither subject to the love of gold:

O gold, the greatest gift to mortals, Than which neither mother has such sweetness, Nor children.

For the Divine is in need of nothing and is superior to desire, nor did they die; or, if they were men who became [gods], they were wicked through ignorance and inferior to wealth. Why need I say much, or mention Castor or Polydeuces, or Amphiaraus, who, to speak figuratively, yesterday and the day before were men born of men and are considered gods; whereas Ino, even after her madness and the sufferings that followed ^D upon her madness, they consider to have become a goddess:

The sea-wanderer, known as Leucothea. And her child— Semnus Palaemon shall be called upon by sailors.

30. For if those who were detestable and hated by God held the reputation of being gods; and if the daughter of Derceto, Semiramis, a lascivious and bloodthirsty woman, was considered the Syrian goddess, and because of Derceto and the...

^A Syrians worship the dove and ^A Semiramis (for the woman could not be transformed into a dove, as the myth according to Ctesias holds)—what wonder is it if some have been called gods by those of their own time on account of their rule and tyranny? (The Sibyl, and Plato also, makes mention of her:

The Sibylline Verses

^B Others [have been called gods] on account of power, as Hercules and Perseus; others on account of art, as Asclepius. Those to whom either the subjects themselves or the rulers themselves accorded honor—some through fear, others through reverence—partook of the name. And Antinous, through the benevolence ^B of your ancestors toward their subjects, happened to be considered a god. And those who came after them accepted this without investigation.

Cretans are always liars; for even a tomb, O King, The Cretans fashioned for you; yet you did not die.

You believe, Callimachus, in the births of Zeus, yet you disbelieve in his tomb; and when you hope to cast darkness over the truth, you proclaim the dead man even to those who are ignorant of it. And if you see the cave, you are reminded of the birth of Rhea; ^C but if you see the sarcophagus, you cast darkness upon the dead man, not knowing that the unbegotten God alone is eternal. For either the myths told by the multitude and the poets concerning the gods are untrustworthy, and the piety toward them is superfluous (for those of whom the accounts are false do not exist); or, if their births, desires, murders, thefts, mutilations, and thunderbolts are true, then they do not exist, having ceased to be; since, as they were born, they were not [always] existing. For what reason is there to believe in some and to disbelieve in others, ^D when [the accounts] are equally ^D fabulous?

^A For if those by whom they were thought to be gods had believed them to be such, they would not have invented these histories, nor would they have lied about their sufferings. That we are not atheists, therefore, seeing that we acknowledge God the Maker of this universe and the Word that proceeds from Him, I have shown to the best of my ability, though not in proportion to the dignity of the subject.

31. ^B Other charges are now brought against our Christian doctrine. They accuse us of abominable feasts and illicit unions, both so that they may appear to hate us with reason, and because they think that by such threats they may either turn us aside from our steadfastness in our way of life, or make the rulers harsh and inexorable toward us on account of the magnitude of the crimes. But they are making sport of men who have long known that this practice has prevailed from of old, not only in our time, but according to a certain divine law and reason, that vice wars against virtue. ^C Thus, Pythagoras was burned with three hundred others; Heraclitus and Democritus—the one was banished by the city of the Ephesians, and the other, the Abderites, was accused of madness—and the Athenians condemned Socrates to death. But just as those men were not one whit the worse in regard to virtue because of the opinion of the many, so also the unexamined blasphemy of some does not darken our holiness of life. For we are in good standing with God. Nevertheless, I shall answer these charges as well. As for you, I know well that I have defended myself through what I have said. For you, who surpass all others in intelligence—whose lives are regulated by God as if by a plumb line, so that each of us may be blameless and irreproachable before Him—you are well aware that such men would not even come to have the thought of committing the slightest sin. For if we believed that we were to live only this life, one might indeed suspect that we would commit sin by serving flesh and blood, or by being overcome by covetousness or desire. ^D But since we know that God is present to our thoughts, to our words, and to everything we say, both by night and by day, and that, being Himself all light, He sees even what is in our hearts, we are persuaded that when we are released from this present life, we shall live another life, better than the present one, and heavenly, not earthly (so that we may, with God and in God, immovable and free from passion, [continue to exist].

^A even if we possess flesh, we shall remain as heavenly spirit)—or, falling away with the rest to something worse and through fire (for God did not create us like sheep or beasts of burden, as a mere side-product, that we should perish and vanish), it is not likely that we would willingly act wickedly in these matters, or hand ourselves over to be punished by the great Judge.

32. Now, it is no wonder [for them] to make up stories about us similar to what they say about their own gods, ^B and demonstrate their passions as mysteries. Yet they ought, if they meant to judge that to have intercourse licentiously and promiscuously is a great impiety, either to have hated Zeus—who had children by his mother Rhea and his daughter Kore, and used his own sister as a wife—or the inventor of these things, Orpheus, who made Zeus more wicked and more polluted than Thyestes. For he too, according to an oracle, defiled his daughter, wanting to reign and be avenged. ^C But we are so far from promiscuous vice that it is not even permitted for us to look with a view to desiring. For he who looks, he says, at a woman to desire her, has already committed adultery in his heart. Since, therefore, the use of our eyes is limited to the end for which God fashioned eyes—namely, that they should be light for us—and since for those for whom looking with pleasure is adultery, it is those who have turned their eyes to other uses who shall be judged even to the intensity of their thought, how could these men be disbelieved when they claim to be self-controlled? ^D For our discourse is not directed toward human laws, which a wicked man might evade (and at the beginning, Sovereigns, I demonstrated to you that our doctrine is God-taught); but we have a law that has made justice the measure of our eternal life. We judge it by ourselves and our neighbors; hence, according to their age, we consider some to be sons and daughters, others we have as brothers and sisters, and to those who have advanced in years we assign the honor of fathers and mothers. Those, therefore, whom we consider brothers and sisters and by the other names of kinship, it is our greatest care that their bodies remain undefiled and incorrupt. To this is added that scripture: "If anyone repeats a kiss because he takes pleasure in it." It then adds: "With the utmost caution, therefore, must the kiss be used, or rather the salutation, for if it be slightly defiled in thought, it excludes us from eternal life."

^A Since we have the hope of eternal life, we despise the things that are in this life, even to the pleasures of the soul. Each of us considers the wife whom he has taken according to the laws set down by you, as a wife only for the purpose of procreation. For just as the farmer, having cast seeds into the ground, awaits the harvest, and does not sow more upon it; so for us, the measure of desire is the procreation of children. You would find many among us, both men and women, who grow old unmarried, in the hope of being more closely united with God. And if remaining in virginity and in the state of a eunuch ^B brings us closer to God, while the arrival even at thoughts and desires leads us away, we avoid the thoughts, and much more do we reject the deeds. For our way of life is not based on the study of words, but on the demonstration and teaching of deeds: either to remain as one was born, or in a single marriage. For the second [marriage] is a decent adultery. For whoever puts away his wife, he says, and marries another—he commits adultery. ^C

As for the intention of each person—both of him who has made himself a eunuch, and of him who has joined himself in marriage for the sake of procreation—they ought to remain steadfastly in the lesser [state if that is their calling]. For if one is able to extend [vigorous] life, he will gain for himself greater worth before God, having practiced self-control purely and rationally; but if, having exceeded the standard he chose for greater glory, he then falls away, how will he still have the hope? For marriage, just as the state of a eunuch, has its own proper functions and ministries that are approved by the Lord. ^D

^A nor does he permit one to put away her whose virginity he has brought to an end, nor to take another. For he who separates himself from his former wife, even if she be dead, is an adulterer in disguise, transgressing the hand of God; for in the beginning God fashioned one man and one woman; and he dissolves the flesh-to-flesh union ^B for the commingling of the race.

34. How great is the discrepancy in conduct between the Christians and their accusers! But since we are such (why should I bring forth things that ought to be kept silent?), we hear said that saying of the proverb: The harlot reproaches the chaste. For those who have set up markets for prostitution, and established unlawful resorts for the young for every kind of foul pleasure, and who do not even spare the males, with males committing horrible acts, abusing in every way bodies that are more honorable and beautiful, and insulting the beauty created by God (for beauty on earth does not spring forth of its own accord, but is sent by the hand and counsel of God)—these men, ^C who are conscious of these things in themselves and call their own [actions] gods, and who praise these same things as honorable and as belonging to the gods, revile us with them. The adulterers and sodomites blame those who are eunuchs and those who have married only once; they live like fish (for these also devour whoever falls in their way, the stronger chasing the weaker; and this is to touch human flesh, to exert force and violence against the written laws that you and your ancestors have established for all justice), ^D so that even the governors of the provinces sent by you can barely bear the burden of judging cases; these men, I say, who live such lives rail against those to whom it is not permitted, even when struck, not to hand themselves over, and to those who speak ill of us, not to return a blessing. For it is not sufficient to be just (for justice is to return equal for equal), but it is also proposed to us to be good and patient of evils.

35. Who then, being of sound mind, could say that we are murderers; for it is not possible to feed on human flesh without first having killed someone. Therefore, they lie in the first place; in the second, even if someone were to ask them if they have seen what they keep saying, no one is so shameless as to say he has seen. Although they also have our slaves, to some of whom...

they cannot remain hidden, yet not one of them has ever fabricated such great charges against us. For who would accuse those whom they know do not even endure to see a man justly put to death of either murder 12 or cannibalism? Who of those who take pleasure in the strife of weapons and wild beasts, and especially in those which you oversee, holds this view? But we, thinking that to see a man killed is almost the same as killing him, have turned away from such spectacles. How then, not even watching them so as not to smear ourselves with defilement and pollution, could we be capable of murder? And those who useabortifacients, we say they are murderers and will account to God for the abortion; how, then, could we murder a man? For it is not the same thing to think that the fetus in the womb is a living being and therefore an object of God's care, and then to kill it once it has been brought into the light; nor not to expose a newborn, as they who expose them are child-slayers, and then to kill what has been nourished and raised. But we are always and in all things the same and equal, serving reason and not ruling 14 over it. ^B

56. Who, then, believing in a resurrection, would offer his own body as a tomb for those who are to be resurrected? For it is not the same thing to be persuaded that our bodies will rise again, and yet to eat them as though they would not, and to think that the earth will return its own dead, but that those which one has buried in oneself will not be demanded back. On the contrary, it is reasonable to think that those who neither account for their life here, whether good or evil, nor believe in any resurrection, but think that the soul perishes with the body and is, as it were, extinguished, would refrain from no daring act. But as for those who are persuaded that nothing will pass unexamined before God, and that the body which served the irrational impulses of the soul and its desires will also be punished along with it, there is no reason for them to commit even the slightest sin. And if to anyone it seems like much nonsense that the body, which has rotted and been dissolved and vanished, should be reconstituted, we should not, at any rate, be held in ill repute because of those who do not believe, but rather be considered pious. ^{C D}

For we wrong no one by the arguments with which we deceive ourselves. That, however, it is not only we who maintain that bodies will rise again, but many of the philosophers as well, it is superfluous to demonstrate at the present time, lest we should seem to be introducing irrelevant arguments into the subject before us, whether we speak of the intelligible and the sensible [things] and their constitution, or that incorporeal things are older than bodies, and that the intelligible [things] precede the sensible, even if we happen upon the sensible first, since bodies consist of the incorporeal through the accumulation of the insensible, and sensible [things] consist of those which are perceived by the mind. For according to Pythagoras and Plato, nothing prevents that, when the dissolution of bodies has taken place, they should be reconstituted again from the very same elements from which they were first composed. But let the discussion concerning the resurrection be set aside.

^B 37. You, however, O emperors, being by both nature and education altogether good, moderate, humane, and worthy of your empire, now that I have dissolved the accusations and demonstrated our piety towards God, our gentleness, and the restraint of our souls, grant me this with a nod of your royal heads. For who are more worthy to obtain what they ask than those who pray for your empire, that a son may, most justly, receive the kingdom from his father, and that your empire may be increased by additions and growth, with all [things] being subject to your rule? And this is indeed also in our interest, so that we may lead a peaceful and quiet life, and ourselves serve all that is commanded with alacrity.

^{C D}

973

ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK OF ATHENAGORAS ON THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD

314 Athenagoras divides this book into two parts, in the first of which he uproots preconceived opinions from the mind and refutes the objections of adversaries; in the second, he confirms Christian doctrine with arguments.

He observes (n. 1) that this method is often useful and appropriate for this discussion concerning the resurrection. He therefore establishes (n. 2) that those who say the resurrection is impossible must demonstrate that their dogma, if they ascribe the cause of things to God, is contradictory, either because God cannot call the dead back to life, or because He does not will it. For God to be said to be unable to effect the resurrection, one must deny Him either knowledge or power. Athenagoras proves that God is not ignorant of how bodies may be recalled to life, as He was not ignorant of how they were formed in the first generation, nor is the power to effect the resurrection lacking to Him (n. 3), just as the power to effect generation was not lacking.

The unbelievers chiefly object to this (n. 4): that human bodies, after having fed wild beasts, pass into other men, indeed that men are sometimes devoured by men. To respond to this argument derived from such cases, Athenagoras demonstrates (n. 5) that suitable food is provided by God for every animal, and that only this [food] serves to nourish parts and limbs, while whatever is contrary to this is expelled in various ways, or at least never reaches those parts which alone are necessary for the resurrecting body (n. 7). Therefore, nothing can be achieved by the adversaries (n. 8) unless they demonstrate that human flesh is the natural food for man. ^A Athenagoras does not wish to linger (n. 9) on refuting the argument drawn from craftsmen and potters, who cannot restore their own works. Nor can it even be said (n. 10) that God does not wish to call the dead back to life. For He would not want this either because it is unjust, or because it is unworthy of God: but neither can be said at all.

These points having been completed, Athenagoras discourses somewhat on the utility of the method he has adopted (n. 11), and comes to the second part of the work, promising that he will prove the resurrection from a triple moment: from the cause according to which and on account of which man was created, from his nature, and from the judgment of God. Man was not created for the use of another (n. 12), but that he might exist and contemplate God; wherefore he cannot perish, but the resurrection is demonstrated from the plan of God in creating such a nature (n. 13). Nature follows the cause (n. 14), and those who derive the entire cause of the resurrection solely from judgment do not reason accurately. This nature, however, is placed in this (n. 15), that man should consist of soul and body; and since the end is one and the same for the animal composed of soul and body, the permanence and therefore the resurrection is necessary (n. 16). And although this conjunction of soul and body is interrupted by death, the resurrection is not to be despaired of; but as the present life, even if interrupted by sleep and various mutations, is nevertheless called the same life, so one must reason concerning the permanence of man in his own nature, and the resurrection (n. 17), as the last of all mutations, is to be expected, as is proved from the various mutations which supervene upon man. The judgment of God (n. 18), since it is just, must be directed toward the soul and body, that is, toward man composed of both. And Athenagoras establishes this against those who agree concerning first principles. Against others he demonstrates (n. 19) either that there is no providence, or that the reward for deeds done rightly and wrongly must be distributed by God; a thing which indeed is not manifest as happening in this life; nor can it happen after death, if either the soul and body perish, or only the body (n. 20). For it is inequitable (n. 21) that the soul alone be rewarded or punished, when the body has been a participant in deeds done rightly or wrongly: indeed, virtue (n. 22) and vice cannot even be conceived of and understood in the soul alone; nor are laws imposed upon the soul alone (n. 23), but upon the whole man. ^B To these three promised arguments Athenagoras adds a fourth, repeated from the end for which man was created. He teaches (n. 24) that this end is placed neither in indolence, nor in bodily pleasures, nor even in the soul separated from the body; whence he concludes (n. 25) that the resurrection is necessary.

OF ATHENAGORAS THE ATHENIAN, PHILOSOPHER AND CHRISTIAN, ON THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD

1. To every dogma and doctrine, which indeed is in agreement with the truth of things, a certain falsehood is wont to grow alongside it. But it grows alongside it not from any underlying principle according to nature. 315 1. He renders the reason why he thinks one should discourse about the truth [itself] before [disputing] concerning the truth. — [It is necessary that every] opinion and doctrine, which indeed is in agreement with the truth of things, consist of [sound] principles, and he opposes this to those things which he presently pronounces about a lie, namely that it relies upon no underlying principle, and is contained by no natural cause.

^A But it arises from those who, for the sake of the corruption of the truth, have purposefully valued a lawless sowing. This can be discovered, first of all, from those who in times past have been occupied with concerns about these matters, and from the dissension that arose among themselves, both with their elders and their contemporaries; and not least from the very confusion of the things now in question. For such men have left no part of the truth without slander, neither the essence of God, nor His knowledge, nor His operation, nor the things that follow from these in a sequence, and the account that outlines piety for us; but some utterly and entirely despair of the truth concerning these things, while others twist it to fit their own opinions, and others take pains to doubt even things that are manifest. ^B Whence I think there must be two kinds of discourse for those who labor on these matters: those *for* the truth, and those *concerning* the truth. And the ones *for* the truth are against those who disbelieve or doubt; the ones *concerning* the truth are for those who are fair-minded and receive the truth with goodwill. Wherefore, those who wish to inquire concerning these matters ought to observe what is expedient at each time, and to measure their arguments accordingly, and to adapt the order of their disputation to what is fitting, and not, by seeming always to preserve the same starting point, neglect what is appropriate and the place suitable for each. For as far as demonstration and natural order are concerned, the discourses *concerning* the truth always take precedence over those *for* the truth; but as far as greater utility is concerned, the latter take precedence over the former, by a reversed method. ^C For neither could a farmer properly cast seeds into the ground unless he had first rooted out the wild matter that is harmful to the good seeds being sown, nor could a physician give a healing medicine to a body in need of treatment unless he had first purged away the sickness dwelling within, or checked that which is flowing into it. Nor, indeed, could one who wishes to teach the truth, while speaking *concerning* the truth, persuade anyone if some false opinion were lurking in the mind of the hearers and resisting his words. Wherefore we too, looking to what is more useful, sometimes place the discourses *for* the truth before those *concerning* the truth. And to do this now in this treatise on the resurrection does not seem useless to those who consider what is fitting. For even in this matter we find some who disbelieve entirely, some ^D who doubt, and even some of those who have accepted the first assumptions

^A regarding the beginning of human life, who disbelieve just as irrationally and causelessly as those who doubt. But ^B the most absurd thing of all is that they suffer this, having no handle for disbelief from the facts themselves, nor being able to find any reasonable cause for which they disbelieve or doubt.

2. Let us consider the matter as follows: If any disbelief does not arise ^C lightly and from some unexamined opinion, but with some strong cause and with the security of truth (for then it preserves the reasonable argument, when the thing itself about which they disbelieve appears to be incredible; for it is the work of people not using sound judgment regarding the truth to disbelieve things that are not [in themselves] incredible); then those who disbelieve or doubt concerning the resurrection ought not to offer their opinion about it in accordance with what seems to them without examination or what is merely pleasing to the intemperate. Rather, they must either refer the origin of men to no cause at all (which is also highly refutable), or, if they ascribe the cause of existing things to God, they must look to the premise of this dogma, and through this demonstrate that the resurrection has nowhere any credibility. This they will do, if they are able to show that it is either impossible for God or contrary to His will to reunite and gather together the dead, and even wholly dissolved, ^D bodies toward the constitution of the same human beings. But if they cannot do this, let them cease from this godless disbelief, and from blaspheming things which it is not right [to blaspheme]. For that those who say it is impossible are not telling the truth, and [that those who say] it is against His will [are not telling the truth], will be made clear from what is to be said. For that which is impossible to someone is known to be such, in truth, either from not knowing what is to be done, or from not having sufficient power to perform well what is known. For whoever does not know any of the things that must come to be would neither attempt nor be able to do at all what he is ignorant of; and one who knows well what is to be done, and whence it might come to be, and how, but has no power at all to do what is known, or does not have sufficient [power], would not attempt it from the beginning, if he were sensible, and would consider his own power. Having attempted it rashly, he would not bring to fulfillment what he had imagined. But it is not possible for God to be ignorant of the nature of the bodies that are to be raised, both in their total part and in their specific member, nor, indeed, whither each of the dissolved parts goes, and what sort of…

^A part of the elements has received that which is dissolved, and whither it has gone, or which part of the element has reunited naturally with the whole. For it was not unknown to Him, before the constitution of each thing, either what is the nature of the elements from which the human bodies are made, or what are the parts of these from which it was to take what seemed appropriate for the constitution of the human body. It is manifest, therefore, that even after the whole has been ^B dissolved, it will not be unknown to Him whither each of those things has migrated, which He had taken for the completion of each. For in proportion to the order of things now prevailing among us, and the judgment usually passed on other matters, it is a greater thing to know beforehand what does not yet exist; but as far as the majesty of God and His wisdom are concerned, both are in accordance with nature, and it is no more difficult to know things that do not yet exist than to know things that have been dissolved.

4. The power to recall to life is not wanting to Him who was able to create. And that His power is not unequal to exciting bodies to life is proven by their very generation. For if He made the bodies of men when they did not exist, and their principles in the first creation, He will also, with the same ^C ease, raise them up when they have been dissolved, in whatever manner that may have happened; for this is equally possible to Him. Nor is anything detracted from this reasoning, whether some suppose the first principles [to be derived] from primal matter, or from the elements as first principles, [to form] human bodies, or from seeds. For the same power that can shape that which is "formless" (as they think) and—to take what is devoid of appearance and order—adorn it with many and varied figures, and gather the parts of the elements into one, and divide the seed—which is one and simple—into many, and shape and compose what is rude and uncompounded, and impart life to that which is devoid of it: the same power is also able to reunite things that have been dissolved, and to rouse those that lie prone, and to recall the dead to life, and to transform the corruptible into a state free from corruption. And it would be the work of the same Author and of the same power and ^D wisdom to distinguish from the multitude of all kinds of animals—which are accustomed to approach such bodies and satisfy their hunger from them—what has been rent asunder, and to reunite it again to its proper parts and members, even if

it has migrated into one of these animals, or into many, or from there into others, or even if, having been dissolved together with them, it has been carried back to the first principles in accordance with natural dissolution. This is a matter which has seemed to disturb some people, even those admired for their wisdom, who for some reason have considered these questions—which are bandied about by the common crowd—to be powerful arguments.

^B 4. These people say that many human bodies, which have perished miserably in shipwrecks and rivers, have become food for fish, and many of those who have died in wars, or through some other harsher cause and circumstance, have been deprived of funeral rites and have lain as prey for whatever animals happened by. Therefore, regarding bodies consumed in this way, and the parts and members that compose them, which are rent asunder into a multitude of animals and, through food, are united to the bodies of those things being fed—they say first that the separation of these is impossible; and in addition to this, a second point which is more difficult. For regarding the bodies of men that have been fed upon by animals, in as much as those animals are suitable for human food, passing through the stomachs of the latter and becoming united with the bodies of those who have partaken of them, it is necessary, they say, that all the parts of the first men, in as much as they became food for the animals that partook of them, should pass over into other human bodies, the animals that fed upon them acting as carriers of the food, from which they were fed, to those other men for whom they became food. Then they proceed to relate with tragic drama the cases of child-eating perpetrated during famines and fits of madness, and children eaten because of the plots of their parents' ^C enemies, and that "Median feast," and the tragic banquets of Thyestes, and they string together various such calamities contrived among Greeks and barbarians. From these they construct an argument, as they imagine, that the resurrection is impossible, since the same parts cannot rise again with different and different bodies; but that either the bodies of the former cannot be reconstituted, because the parts composing them have moved over to others, or, if these parts are given back to the former, those of the latter will be left lacking and incomplete.

5. To me, however, such men seem first to be ignorant of the power and wisdom of the Creator and Governor of this universe, ^D who has adapted and harmonized for each animal's nature and kind a food that is appropriate and suitable, and who has neither willed that every nature should be able to unite or mix with every body, nor experiences any difficulty in separating those things that have been united; but instead, he grants to the nature of each individual thing that it may do or suffer what it is naturally disposed to do, sometimes also restraining it, and allowing or changing everything according to his own will. Furthermore, in addition to what has been said, they [do not understand...]

seem to have considered the power and nature of each of those things that nourish or are nourished. For had they perceived it, they would surely have realized that not everything a person consumes to satisfy an external necessity is food suited to the animal. Rather, some things are naturally intended to perish as soon as they come into contact with the parts that surround the stomach, being vomited, excreted, or dispersed in another way, so that they do not even for a moment undergo the first and natural digestion, let alone mix with the parts that are nourished. In the same way, not everything that has been digested and has received its first transformation always reaches the parts that are nourished; for some things lose their nutritive power within the stomach itself, while others are separated during the second transformation and the digestion that occurs in the liver, and they move on to something else, which has exceeded the power of nourishing. And indeed, the ^B in the liver—the transformation that occurs—does not entirely yield food for human beings, but is separated into customary superfluities; and what remains of the food in those very members and parts of members that are nourished is sometimes turned into something else, according as that which is redundant and luxuriant dominates, and is accustomed to corrupt or turn into itself whatever it touches.

6. Whatever is contrary to nature is ejected in various ways. Since, therefore, there is much variety of nature in all animals, and the food suited to the nature of the animal and the body that is nourished is transformed according to the [specific] kind; and since there is a triple ^C purification and secretion of food for every animal, it is necessary that whatever is alien to the animal's nutrition—since it cannot coalesce—must be entirely destroyed and removed where it is appropriate, or changed into something else. But that which is congruent and according to nature to the powers of the animal that is nourished is the force of the body that nourishes, and this, having passed through its natural channels and having been accurately purified by natural cleansers, becomes the most sincere intake for substance. Indeed, this ^D alone—if one were to give things their true names—would one call food, as it casts off everything alien and harmful to the constitution of the body being nourished, as well as that great bulk introduced to fill the stomach and satisfy the desire of hunger. But this food, no one would doubt, coalesces with the body that is nourished, being intertwined 49 and glued to all its parts and members; while that which is otherwise and is alien to nature destroys [the part that is] unnatural.

It ^B is quickly corrupted, if it encounters greater forces, and it easily corrupts [the body] if it prevails, being converted into depraved juices and poisonous qualities, seeing that it brings nothing kindred or friendly to the body being nourished. The greatest proof of this is that in many animals pain, or danger, or death follows from such foods, if from a sharper appetite they have drawn into the food something poisonous and alien to nature; which indeed brings total ruin to the body which is being nourished, since things which are nourished are nourished by things that are kindred and accommodated to nature, but are corrupted by contraries. Therefore, if according to the varied nature of animals there are varied kinds of congruent foods, and not whatever has been taken by an animal from these very foods coalesces wholly with the body that is nourished—no, not even any part of it, but only that which has been purged by every digestion and ^C transformed purely for the union with a certain body, and which is well-adjusted to the parts being nourished—it is clear that nothing that is contrary to nature could ever be united with these things, for which it is not an apt and suitable nourishment; but it is either cast out through the belly itself, before it generates some other juice, raw and corrupted, or if it remains for too long, it begets a defect and a disease which is not easily healed, and which corrupts the food congruent to nature or the very flesh that is in need of nourishment. But even if it is sometimes expelled, either by certain medicines, or by better foods, or by being overcome by natural faculties, it does not depart without great ^D damage, since it brings nothing that is peaceful to things that are according to nature, because it cannot coalesce with nature.

7. Whatever is contrary to nature has no passage to the feeding of those parts which alone are necessary for the one rising again. 7. Moreover, even if someone should concede that the nourishment introduced from such things (for so let it be called for the sake of custom) is separated and changed into something moist or dry, or warm or cold, not even in this way, these things being conceded, will they promote anything; because bodies that are rising again will consist once more of their own proper parts, and none of the things we have spoken of is either a part, or occupies the appearance and place of a part; nay, it does not even always remain in the parts receiving the nourishment, nor will it rise again with those who are rising again; nothing then contributing to life regarding blood, or phlegm, or bile, or spirit. For neither will the bodies, when they are [risen], be in need of those things of which they once stood in need when they were being nourished, the need of those things from which they were nourished perishing together with the indigence and corruption of him who was being nourished. Then, that even if one were to suppose that the change from such food reaches as far as the flesh,

^A nor even then will there be any necessity for the flesh, which has just been changed from such food, to move toward the body of another man, and again to serve as part for his completion, since the flesh that receives it neither always keeps what it has received, nor is the flesh that has been united with it permanent, but remains in the place to which it was added; rather, it receives many and varying changes, being sometimes dissolved by labors or anxieties, at other times melted away by sorrows, or toils, or diseases, and by the bad states of the body that arise from heat or cold, when the flesh and the fat of the people do not change in sympathy while remaining what they are, even though they receive food. And since such sufferings ^B occur in the flesh, one would find that the flesh which is nourished by incongruous foods undergoes these things even much more so: now swelling and growing fat from the things it has received, then again spitting them out in whatever way it happens, and being diminished by one or more of the causes previously mentioned; but only those parts remain which by nature are accustomed to hold together, contain, or warm, which nature has selected and which have grown fast to those parts with which it has fulfilled a life according to nature and the toils in that life. But indeed, neither when those things which we have just investigated are judged as is fitting, nor when those things which have been argued in opposition are approved by ^C concession, is it possible to demonstrate that what is said by them is true; nor would the bodies of men ever coalesce with others of the same nature, whether they taste of such a body unawares, through the fraud of another stealing away their perception, or whether through lack or insanity they defile themselves with bodies of a similar nature. For it does not escape our notice that there are some beasts in human form, or that they have a nature composed of men and beasts, such as the more daring poets are accustomed to fashion.

8. And what need is there to speak regarding no animal ^D being allotted for food to bodies, but rather having been allotted only the burial in the earth for the honor of nature? Since the Creator has not assigned any of the animals as food to animals of the same species, even if in some other cases food from different species is according to nature. If, therefore, they are able to demonstrate that the flesh of men has been allotted to men for food, nothing will prevent cannibalism from being according to nature, just as

any other thing ^A that is permitted by nature. Those who dare to say such things should be delighted to feast upon the bodies of their most beloved ones, as being more akin to them, or even serve their most well-disposed friends as a meal! But if this is not even holy to utter, and for men to partake of the flesh of men is most hateful and utterly polluted, and more accursed than any lawless or unnatural food or deed—and that which is against nature could never pass into nutrition for the parts and members that require it—and that which does not go into nutrition would neither be united with them nor is it naturally fitted to nourish them; then the bodies of men could never be united with bodies like their own, for which it is against nature to serve as food, ^B even if it frequently passes through their stomach by some most bitter calamity.

Departing from the nutritive power and being scattered back to those things from which they first had their constitution, they are united with these for as long as each happens to endure. From there, having been separated again by the wisdom and power of Him who combined the entire nature of each animal together with its own proper faculties, each is fitted again to its own: even if it be burned by fire, or rotted by water, or consumed by wild beasts or any other animals that happen by, or though it be cut off from the whole body and dissolved before the other parts. ^C When united again to one another, they occupy the same place for the harmony and constitution of the same body, and for the resurrection and life of that which had died or was even wholly dissolved.

It is not expedient, however, to dwell on these things at greater length, for they have an admitted judgment, at least among those who are not half-beasts.

9. The argument derived from potters is refuted

9. Since there are many things more useful for the proposed question, I do not wish, for the present, to hear those who take refuge in the works of men and in men themselves as creators—who are unable to renew their ^D works if they are shattered, worn by time, or otherwise destroyed—and then attempt to demonstrate from the similarity to potters and builders that God is neither willing, nor, if willing, able to raise up a body that has died or even been dissolved. They do not calculate that by these things they are offering the most serious insult to God, while they compare...

^A the stable powers, or rather the natures of those who use these substances and the artificial with the natural. To be studious about these matters, therefore, does not lack reproach. For it is truly foolish to refute trivial and empty things. But it is much more probable, and indeed by far the most true of all, that what cannot be done among men is possible to God. And if the account demonstrates, through these very things as probable and through those which we investigated above, that the matter is possible, it is clear that it is not alien to the power of God. Indeed, it is not alien to His will.

10. For that which is unwilled is so either as being unjust, or as being unworthy. And again, the injustice is considered either in relation to the person who is to rise again, or in relation to someone else other than him. ^B But that no one else externally, nor of those numbered among existing things, is injured, is evident. For neither would the intellectual natures be injured by the resurrection of men (nor is the resurrection of men an impediment to them toward being, nor a harm, nor an insult); nor the nature of irrational creatures, nor of inanimate things; for indeed, they will not exist after the resurrection; and concerning that which does not exist, there is no injustice. But if one were to suppose that they exist throughout, they would not be injured by the human bodies being renewed. For if, even now, yielding to the nature of men and to the needs of those who are needy, and brought under the yoke and every kind of servitude, they suffer no injustice; ^C much more, when they have become incorruptible and lacking nothing, and no longer in need of their service, and liberated from all servitude, they will not be injured. For not even if they were endowed with a voice would they accuse the Creator for being placed, undeservedly, below men, not having obtained the same resurrection as them. For of those whose nature is not equal, the just One does not assign an equal end. Apart from these things, among those for whom there is no judgment of justice, there is no complaint of injustice. Nor again is it possible to say that any injustice regarding the man who is rising again is observed. For this being consists of soul and body; and it receives injustice in neither soul nor body. For no one who is sensible ^D will say that the soul is injured, for in that case the imprudent person would, along with the resurrection, exclude the present life as well. For if, now, dwelling in a corruptible and passible body, it suffers no injustice, much more, living with an incorruptible and impassible one, it will not be injured. But neither is the body injured in any way. For if now, being corruptible and joined to what is corruptible, it is not injured, it is clear that it will not be injured when it is incorruptible and joined to what is incorruptible. Nor indeed could someone say that it is an unworthy work of God to raise up and gather together the body that was dissolved. For if it is not unworthy to make the lesser—that is, the corruptible and passible body—much more, now being corruptible and joined to what is corruptible, it will not be injured by that which is incorruptible, I mean that which is incorruptible and impassible.

the greater is not unworthy, which is incorruptible and impassible. ^A

11. The method employed. A threefold argument for the resurrection. But if it has been demonstrated, both by those things which are first by nature and by those which follow from them, that everything which has come into question is both possible and desirable and worthy of the Creator, it is manifest that the resurrection of bodies that have been dissolved is a work of such a kind as God can perform and desire, and which is worthy of Him. For by these things the falsehood of the contrary opinion and the absurd reasoning of the incredulous have been convicted. ^B For what need is there to speak of the conversion of one thing into another and their mutual coherence? If indeed one must speak of coherence, as if they differ by some dissimilarity, and not rather that what God can do, He can be said to desire, and what He can desire, He can do, and that this is worthy of Him. And that the discourse concerning the truth is one thing, and that on behalf of the truth is another, and in what the distinction consists between them, and in what places and among whom their utility lies, we have already sufficiently demonstrated. ^C Nothing, however, prevents us, for the sake of common security and for the coherence of what we have said with what is to be said, from taking our start again from these very things and their accompaniments. And it is fitting for the one by nature to hold the primacy, while for the other to attend the first as a satellite, to pave the way, and to remove whatever is obstructive and rugged before it. For the discourse concerning the truth, being necessary to all men for security and salvation, holds the first place in nature, in order, and in utility: in nature, as providing knowledge of things; in order, as existing in these and at the same time with these, of which it is the index and pointer; in utility, as becoming the purveyor of security and salvation to those who know it. But the one undertaken on behalf of the truth is by nature and power inferior. For it is less to refute falsehood than to confirm the truth. It is also later in order; for it draws its force against those who are held by false opinions. And false opinion arises from superinduced seed and corruption. ^D But yet, although matters are thus, it is often placed before, and sometimes becomes more useful; inasmuch as it uproots and cleanses beforehand the incredulity that disturbs some, and the doubt or false opinion held by those who are newly approaching. And toward one end each is referred (for both the one refuting falsehood and the one confirming the truth have their reference toward piety), but they are not therefore definitively one; rather, the one is necessary, as I have said, to all who believe, and to those of the truth.

who take care of their own salvation; the other is sometimes more useful for some people and against some people. And let these things be said by us in summary by way of reminding you of what has already been said. Now we must proceed to the subject at hand and demonstrate that the doctrine concerning the resurrection is true, considering both the very cause according to which and for the sake of which the first man was created, as well as those after him (even if they were not created in the same way), and also from the common nature of all men, insofar as they are men; and further from the judgment of the Creator concerning them, relative to the whole time of their life and the laws by which they lived; which no one would dispute is just. ^A

Let us consider whether man was made simply and in vain, or for some purpose; and if for some purpose, whether he was made for this very thing, that he should live and remain in the nature in which he was created, or for the benefit of something else. And if for a benefit, whether it is for the benefit of the Creator himself, or of some other of those beings that pertain to him and are judged worthy of greater care. Which, when we consider more commonly, we find that everyone who is of sound mind and is moved by rational judgment to do something, does nothing of those things which he performs by design in vain; but he does them either for his own use, or for the sake of another whose care he has undertaken; or for the sake of the thing being made itself, moved by a certain natural attraction and affection toward its generation. For example (for let us speak by way of a comparison, so that what is proposed may become clear), a man builds a house for his own ^B use, but he makes suitable shelter for oxen and camels or the other animals of which he has need, not for his own use according to the appearance, but according to the end for this reason, and according to the immediate purpose for the care of those for whom he has taken thought. And he begets children, neither for his own need, nor for any other of those things which pertain to him, but in order that they who are born of him may exist and remain as long as is possible, by the succession of children and grandchildren providing comfort for his own death, and in this way thinking to render immortal that which is mortal. But these things are so with men. God, however, would neither have made man in vain (for He is wise; and no work of wisdom is vain), nor for His own need; for He is ^C in need of nothing; and to Him who is in need of nothing at all, none of the things created by Him could contribute to His own need. But He did not make man for the sake of any of the works created by Himself. For no one of those things which use reason and judgment, whether of the greater or of the lesser, has been made or is made for the need of another, but for the own life and remaining of the things that have been made. Nor is the ^D

^A reason found for why there should be any need of human generation, since those who are immortal stand in no need of anything, and in no way require any assistance from men for their existence. As for irrational creatures, they are by nature subject, and provide for men the uses for which each was fashioned, but are not themselves fitted to use men. For it is not, nor was it ever, right that what rules and holds the primacy should be brought down to the service of the lesser, or that that which possesses reason should be subordinated to irrational creatures, which are unfit to rule.

Therefore, if man was not made without cause and in vain (for nothing that has been made by God is vain, at least according to the intention of the Maker), nor for the sake of the Maker himself, nor for the sake of any other ^B of the things made by God, it is clear that, according to the first and more general principle, God made man for His own sake and for the sake of the goodness and wisdom perceived in the whole of creation; but according to the more immediate principle regarding the things fashioned, He made him for the sake of the life of the things themselves—a life not destined to be kindled for a little while and then utterly extinguished. ^C For to reptiles, I think, and to birds, and to fish, or to speak more generally, to all irrational creatures, God has allotted just such a life. But to those who carry the Maker as an image within themselves, and who are endowed with mind and partake of rational judgment, the Maker has assigned an eternal existence, so that, knowing their own Maker and His power and wisdom, and following after law and justice, they may dwell eternally without toil in those things to which they clung in their previous life, even though they were in corruptible and earthly bodies.

For as many things as were created for the sake of another, when those things for whose sake they were created have ceased to exist, they too will reasonably cease to be, and will not continue in vain (since there is no room for vanity among the things made by God). But those things which have been created for the sake of existence and life itself, in accordance with their nature—as being comprised by the very principle of ^D essence and perceived solely in themselves for their existence—could never admit any cause that would utterly destroy their existence.

[alt-version omitted]

For there is nothing that God cannot do; therefore, man, whom God has created, is a being to be desired for his own sake. But if man had been created for the sake of others, God would have no other reason for making him, unless perhaps he could not have been created otherwise, so that God, as a good Artificer, might exist, and they might arrive at the knowledge of God. For God would not have created that for whose sake man was made, if man had not been created.

^A For this very reason they were created that they might exist, and lead a life convenient to themselves, since this cause is bound up with nature, and placed in the reason of existence alone, so that nothing can ever happen to them for which they should altogether cease to be. But since that cause for which they were created is always regarded with respect to the reason of existence, it is necessary that an animal so created should be preserved for perpetuity, acting as agent and patient in matters that befit its own nature, both those parts of which it consists bringing forth their own share: so that the soul may exist and endure equably in the nature in which it was created, and may administer the office befitting it (and its proper office is to govern the appetites of the body, and to judge and measure whatever may happen with suitable judgments and measures); and the body may be moved according to nature toward those things that befit it, and may receive the changes destined for it, and along with other things that pertain to age, or form, or magnitude, it may also receive resurrection. For resurrection is a species of change, and the last of all, and a change for the better for those who at that time shall still survive.

13. ^B 13. Relying on these contentions, therefore, and contemplating the things that have already come to pass, and our own nature, we cherish the life which is subject to want and corruption as befitting the present age, and we firmly hope for a perpetuity immune to corruption. This hope we do not dream up from the inventions of men, deluding ourselves with false expectations, but we believe in the most certain warrant—the counsel of Him who created us. In accordance with this counsel, He made man of an immortal soul and a body, and joined to him a mind and an innate law for the preservation and keeping of those things which were given by Him, and which are congruent to a wise life and a participant of reason; for we well know that He would not have fashioned such an animal, and adorned it with all things for perpetuity, if He had not intended the creature to endure. Therefore, if the Artificer of the universe created man to be a participant of a wise life, and to become a spectator of His own magnificence and of the wisdom that shines forth in all things, [that man] might ever remain in the contemplation of these, according to the counsel of the Author and the nature received from Him: the cause of birth creates belief in perpetuity, and perpetuity [creates belief] in the resurrection, without which man could not endure. From the things we have said, it is manifest that the resurrection is clearly demonstrated from the cause of birth and the counsel of the Author. Since, therefore, such a cause existed for why man was introduced into the world, it is consistent that we should consider what things follow from these by nature or by order. ^C If the order of investigation is regarded, there follows the cause of the birth of created men, then the nature of men, then the just judgment of the Creator concerning them; and all these [lead to] the end of life. These things which hold the first place having been investigated, next the nature of man must be considered.

14. ^D [The cause of the resurrection is not from judgment alone.]

^A The demonstration of the truth of dogmas or of any matter proposed for investigation—which confirms what is said by indisputable arguments—is not derived from anywhere without, nor from things that only seem so to some people or have been commonly opined, but from common and natural understanding, or from the sequence of secondary things following upon the first. For it is either a matter concerning primary principles, and there is need only of a reminder to awaken one’s natural intuition; or it is a matter of those things which naturally follow from the first, and of the natural order. In these cases, there is need to apply an order, demonstrating what truly coheres with the first and primary principles, so that neither the truth nor the secure demonstration of truth be neglected, nor things that are naturally ordered and distinct be confounded, nor the natural sequence be disrupted. ^B Whence I think it necessary that those who apply a fair study to the proposed question and wish to judge prudently whether or not the resurrection of human bodies is to occur, should first attentively consider what force those things have which contribute to the demonstration of this matter, and what place each holds, what is first among them, what second, what third, and what finally is last.

Having arranged these things, one must first set down the cause of the generation of men—that is, the intention of Him who created, according to which He made man. To this, one must appropriately append the nature of created men, not as being posterior in order, but because the two cannot be judged at the same time, even though they exist together to the highest degree and provide equal weight to the proposed question. ^C Through these things—as being primary and clearly demonstrating the resurrection, having its beginning from the creation—nonetheless it is also possible to grasp the faith concerning this through the arguments from providence; I mean through the honor or punishment due to each of the men according to a just judgment, and the end of human life. For many who discuss the account of the resurrection have attributed the entire cause to the third point only, thinking the cause of the resurrection to be for the sake of judgment.

But this is clearly shown to be false from the fact that all men who die rise again, yet not all who rise again are judged. For if the justice of judgment were the sole cause of the resurrection, it would surely be necessary that those who have done wrong or right in nothing—that is, very young infants—should not even rise. But since it is conceded that all rise, both others and specifically those who died in the first stage of life, they themselves are an argument that the resurrection does not come to pass primarily for the sake of judgment, if the primary cause

^A of all things is to be looked at, but rather on account of the purpose of the Creator and the nature of the things created.

15. Since the cause observed in the generation of men ^A is sufficient to demonstrate, by natural sequence, the resurrection following the dissolution of bodies, it is perhaps right not to shrink from any of the points set forth, but, in accordance with what has been said, to demonstrate to those who cannot see for themselves what follows from each point—especially the nature of the men who have been generated, which leads to the same notion and provides equal grounds for belief in the resurrection. For if the nature of all men in common consists of an immortal soul and the body which in generation was fitted to it, and God did not assign such a generation or life or the whole course of existence to the nature of the soul by itself, nor to the nature of the body separately, but to men composed of both, so that from the things of which they consist when they are generated and live, they might, after passing through life, arrive at one and the same ^B common end—it is absolutely necessary, since the animal that suffers both the passions of the soul and the functions of the body, and that acts according to the judgment of sense or reason, is one, that the whole sequence of these things should be referred to one end; so that all things and through all things may concur toward one harmony and the same sympathy of man: the generation of man, the nature of man, the life of man, his actions and passions, his existence, and the end befitting his nature.

If there is one harmony and sympathy of the whole animal, both of the things springing from the soul and those brought about through the body, there must also be one end for all these things. And there will truly be one end for the same animal ^C existing according to its own constitution, of which the end is the goal. This same animal will exist in its pure state, consisting of the very same things from which, as parts, the animal is composed; and these same things, through their proper union, will exist when those that were dissolved coalesce again for the constitution of the animal. The constitution of these same human beings necessarily demonstrates the resurrection of the dead and dissolved bodies. For without this, the same parts could neither be united according to nature, nor could the nature of these same men subsist.

But if mind and reason have been given to men for the discernment ^D of intelligible things, and not only of substances but also of the goodness, wisdom, and justice of Him who gave them, it is necessary that, while those things for whose sake the rational faculty was granted remain, the faculty granted for discerning these things should also remain. However, it is impossible for this to remain unless the nature that received it and in which it exists also remains. The one who has received mind and reason is man, not a soul by itself. It is therefore necessary that the man, who is composed of both, should exist forever. But it is impossible for him to exist

^A without a resurrection; for if there is no resurrection, the nature of men, as men, would not persist. And if the nature of men does not persist, in vain has the soul been united to the indigence of the body and to its sufferings; in vain is the body fettered so that it may attain what it desires, yielding to and being bridled by the reins of the soul; vain is the mind, vain is prudence, and the observance of justice, and the exercise of every virtue, and the setting and ordering of laws, and, to speak generally, everything that is noble in men and for men—or rather, the very creation and nature of men itself. But if in all of God’s works and the gifts granted by Him there is no place for anything vain, it is entirely necessary that the eternal duration of the soul should correspond to the eternal duration of the body according to its own nature.

^B 16. Let no one be surprised that we call a life interrupted by death and corruption a "duration," considering that the word does not have one meaning, nor is there one measure of duration, because the nature of those things that endure is not one. For if each of those things that endure has its duration according to its own proper nature, no one would find an equal duration among those who are purely incorruptible and immortal, because the superior substances are not matched with those that are inferior; nor is it right to seek that uniform and unchangeable duration in men, since those who were created immortal from the beginning endure solely by the will of their Creator; whereas men, from their very birth, possess an unchangeable duration according to their soul, but acquire incorruption for the body through a transformation. This is what the reasoning regarding the resurrection ^C intends; keeping our eyes on this, we anticipate the dissolution of the body—as it follows upon a life subject to want and corruption—and after this, we hope for a duration free from corruption. We do not make our death equivalent to the death of irrational creatures, nor do we make the duration of men equivalent to the duration of the immortal beings, lest, by doing so, we might inadvertently equate the nature and life of men with things to which they are not alike. It is not, therefore, a cause for vexation in this matter if some inequality is perceived in the duration of men, nor should the resurrection be despaired of because the departure of the soul from the parts and members of the body interrupts the continuous life. For even though the natural lapses of the senses and the physical faculties that occur during sleep ^D seem to interrupt the life situated in the senses, we do not refuse to call it the same life as the men sleep for equal intervals of time and in a certain manner as it were come to life again. For which reason,

I think, some call sleep the brother of death, not because they are begotten of the same ancestors or fathers ^A, but because those who are dead and those who are asleep undergo similar things, so far as concerns repose and oblivion of surrounding things and events, or rather oblivion of their own existence and life. If, then, we do not refuse to call the life of men, which is so full of inequality from birth until dissolution and is interrupted by all the things we mentioned, the same life, we ought not to despair of the life that follows dissolution, which brings with it the resurrection, even if it is for a time interrupted by the departure of the soul from the body.

17. For this nature of man, having received from the Creator and from the beginning an unequal lot by His will, has an unequal life and duration, interrupted now by sleep, now by death, and by the changes of every age, while those things which supervene upon what precedes are not clearly apparent. For who would believe, were he not taught by experience, that in the similar and soft seed there are deposited so many and so great faculties, or the difference of the structures that arise and are compacted together from it—I mean bones, and nerves, and cartilages, and further, muscles, and flesh, and viscera, and the other parts of the body? ^B For it is not possible to see anything of these in the still moist seeds, nor does anything of those things which supervene upon the perfect appear in infants, nor does that which belongs to those who have passed the age of youth appear in these, nor does the appearance of the aged appear in them. Although, however, some of the things mentioned do not exhibit the natural sequence and the changes that supervene upon human nature in any way at all, while others exhibit them only obscurely, yet all who are not blinded by wickedness or sloth in judging these matters know that, first, there must be the sowing of the seeds, and when these have been developed into each part and member, and the fetuses have been brought to the light, there supervenes the growth of the first age, then perfection from growth, then from perfection the remission of natural faculties unto old age, and finally ^C the dissolution of the bodies as they waste away. As, therefore, in this matter, although neither the seed of itself presents the life and form of men, nor life the dissolution into its first principles, the series of natural events creates faith in those things the arguments for which are not delivered to be viewed by the eyes; much more does reason, investigating the truth from the natural sequence, create faith in the resurrection, being safer and better than experience for the confirmation of the truth.

18. Of the things previously proposed for our examination and for the demonstration of the resurrection, all ^D that of the former statements to us.

^A are of the same kind, as having sprung from the same origin (for the principle to them is the generation of the first humans from creation); but some of them are strengthened by that very first origin from which they sprang, while others, following the nature and life of men, receive their faith from God’s providence concerning us (for the cause according to which and for which men were born, being bound up with human nature, derives its strength from creation; but the discourse of justice, according to which God judges men who have lived well or badly 14, derives from their end). For they are born from the former, but they depend more upon providence. When the former have been demonstrated to us as far as possible, it would be well to show the matter proposed also through the latter; I mean through the reward or punishment owed to each of the human beings ^B according to a just judgment, and through the end corresponding to human life; and to place before these very things that which takes the lead according to nature; and first indeed to examine the discourse concerning the judgment, only premising this much for the care of the principle and order becoming to the matters proposed: that those who acknowledge God as the maker of this whole universe must, if they wish to remain in their own principles, assign to His wisdom and justice the guardianship and providence of all things that have come into existence, and, holding such views concerning these things, should consider that nothing at all, neither of the things on earth nor of the things in heaven, is ungoverned or without providence, but rather that a care from Him who made them extends to everything alike, hidden and manifest, small and great. For all things that have come to be 15 have need of the care of the maker, and each one individually according to what it is by nature, and for what it is 16. For I do not think it is a matter of vainglory ^C to bring down 17, or to divide things now, or to wish to enumerate what is profitable to each nature. Man indeed, concerning whom it is now proposed to speak, as he is needy, stands in need of food; as he is mortal, of succession; as he is rational, of justice. If then each of the things mentioned is in man according to nature, and he needs food for his life, and needs succession for the permanence of his race, and needs justice on account of the lawfulness of food and succession, it is necessary, I suppose, that since food and succession are borne toward the composite whole, toward this the man consisting of soul and body ^D must also be borne; and that such a man must be held accountable for all his deeds, and must receive for these either reward or punishment. But if the just judgment brings the penalty for what has been done against the composite whole, and it is right that the soul should not alone receive the rewards of deeds done with the body (for it is not moved by itself regarding those transgressions which come about concerning bodily pleasures or food and care), nor that the body alone should—for this is by itself [...]

^A devoid of law and justice—but the human being composed of both should be called to judgment for each one of his actions. Since reason finds that this does not occur in this life (for the condition according to merit is not preserved in the present life, because many who are atheists and devoted to every iniquity and wickedness remain free from evils until death; whereas, on the contrary, those who demonstrate their own life directed toward every virtue live in pains, insults, slanders, tortures, and calamities of every kind), nor yet after death (for the two are no longer together, the soul being separated from the body, and the body itself being dissolved into the elements from which it was composed, and preserving nothing of its former nature and form, much less the memory of deeds done), it is manifest to everyone that what remains—according to the Apostle—is that this corruptible and dissipatable [part] must put on incorruption ^B, in order that, those things which were dead being enlivened by the resurrection, and those things which were separated, or even entirely dissolved, being again united, each may justly receive what he did through the body, whether good or evil.

19. *Life of men is worse than that of beasts, if the reward which cannot be bestowed in this life, is not bestowed in the other.*

Therefore, against those who confess providence and accept the same principles as we do, but then, I know not how, fall away from their own hypotheses, one might use these arguments, and many more besides, if one wished to expand what has been spoken briefly and in summary. But against those who differ about the principles, it would perhaps be best to posit another principle before these, doubting with them about the very things they opine, and discussing in this manner: Is the life of humans and the entire course of living utterly and altogether despised, and a certain thick darkness poured over the earth, covering by ignorance and silence both the humans themselves and their deeds? Or is it much safer to opine that the Creator stands over His own works, being the overseer of all things that exist or come to be, and the judge of deeds and counsels? For if no judgment at all of things done by humans were to occur, humans would have nothing more than irrational animals; nay, they would act more miserably than them, as those who enslave the passions and are concerned for piety and justice and the other virtues. And the life of beasts and wild animals would be the best; but virtue would be folly; the threat of judgment a loud laugh; and to indulge in every pleasure the greatest good. And the common ^C decree and one law of all these would be that maxim friendly to the intemperate and lascivious: "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die." For the end of such a life is not even pleasure, as some opine, but a complete absence of all sensation. But if there is any care for His own works on the part of the One who created humans, and there is preserved somewhere the distinction ^D of those who have lived well or even

^A poorly, whether in the present life, while those who have practiced virtue or vice are still living, or after death, while they are in a state of separation and dissolution. But in neither case can a preserved equity of judgment be found. For neither do the good receive in the present life the rewards of virtue, nor do the wicked those of vice. For I pass over saying that if the nature in which we now exist is preserved, the mortal nature is not able to endure the proportionate penalty for many or more severe transgressions. For he who, as a robber, a ruler, or a tyrant, has killed countless thousands unjustly, would not surely by one death discharge the penalty for these crimes. And he who has held no true opinion about God, but has lived in all abuse and blasphemy, has despised divine things, ^B has broken laws, has forced vice upon boys and women alike, has unjustly razed cities, and has burned homes along with their inhabitants, and has laid waste a region, and together with these has extinguished peoples and nations, or even an entire race—how would he, in a body subject to corruption, be able to pay a penalty proportionate to these things, when death anticipates the fitting recompense, and the mortal nature is not sufficient even for one of the things that have been committed? Therefore, neither in the present life is the judgment shown to be according to merit, nor after death.

20. Either death is the complete extinction of life, as the soul is dissolved and destroyed together with the body; or the soul remains in itself indissoluble, unscattered, and incorruptible, but the body is destroyed and dissolved, preserving no longer any memory of the things that have been done, nor any sensibility of the sufferings ^C it endured on its own account. For if the life of humans is extinguished completely, no care will appear for humans who no longer exist, nor will there be any judgment for those who have lived according to virtue or vice; but the swarm of the difficulties of the lawless life and of the absurdities following from this will roll back again, along with the head of this lawlessness, which is atheism. But if the body is destroyed and each of its parts goes toward its kin among the dissolved elements, yet the soul remains in itself as incorruptible, not even so will the judgment of it have a place, since justice is not present; because it is not right to suppose ^D that any judgment comes from God or by God to which justice is not joined; and justice is absent from a judgment when the one who practiced the justice or the lawlessness is not preserved. For the one who performed each of the things in life, regarding which the judgment is instituted, was a human, not a soul by itself. And to say it in a word, this account keeps no part of justice.

21. For as for achievements being rewarded, unjust is...

it will be clearly an injury to the body, in that it was a participator in the labors undertaken in noble actions, yet is not a participator in the reward for those right deeds; and whereas the soul may often obtain pardon for certain transgressions on account of the body’s indigence and need, the body itself would lose its share in the fruits of those noble actions for which it bore the labors in this life. Furthermore, when transgressions are judged, justice for the soul is not maintained, if it alone is to pay the penalty for things in which, with the body clamoring and dragging it toward its own appetites and motions, it has transgressed—at one time snatched away, as if abducted by theft, at another drawn more violently, and at other times by a sort of concurrence, in the way of favor and care for the preservation of this [the body]. ^B Or how is it not unjust for the soul to be judged by itself concerning those things for which, according to its own nature, it has no appetite, no motion, and no impulse whatsoever—such as lusts, or acts of violence, or avarice, or injustice, and the transgressions arising from these? For if the majority of such evils arise from the fact that men do not master the passions that disturb them, and they are disturbed because of the body’s indigence and need, and the zeal and care for [the body] (for it is for the sake of these that all possessions exist, and before possessions, their use; and furthermore, marriage, and all the activities of life, in which and concerning which what is vicious and what is not is observed), where is the justice in this: that in those things where the body feels the initial impulse and drags the soul into a mutual sympathy and partnership in the activities it requires, the soul alone should be judged? And that the appetites and pleasures, as well as the fears and sorrows—by which all that is immoderate is held liable—should have their motion from the body, ^C but the sins resulting from these and the punishments for those sins should be brought against the soul alone, which neither needs anything of the sort, nor desires, nor fears, nor suffers anything such as a human is accustomed to suffer?

Although we may posit that these movements of the mind belong not to the body alone, but to the human as a whole (which we do correctly, since his life is one, composed of the two), we shall not, however, say that these properly belong to the soul if we contemplate its own nature purely. For if it is altogether in need of no nourishment, it will surely never desire the things it does not need in order to exist, nor will it be carried toward any of those things it is not at all naturally equipped to use; nor, indeed, would it be grieved by a lack of money or possessions, as they are things that pertain nothing to it. ^D And if it is also superior to corruption, it fears nothing at all that could bring it destruction; it does not fear hunger, nor disease, nor the amputation of members, nor a disfiguring mark, nor fire, nor iron—since it can suffer nothing harmful or painful from these, as neither the bodies nor bodily powers touch it at all. If, then, it is absurd to attribute these passions to souls distinctively, [it is also absurd to attribute] the sins arising from them and [the judgments] upon these...

^A to souls alone, as it is most iniquitous and unworthy of the judgment of God.

22. Furthermore, if it is absurd for virtue and vice not to be even conceived of apart from the soul (for we know that it is man’s virtues that are virtues, just as it is also the vice opposed to them, and not as if they were a soul separated from the body and existing by itself), how is it that the reward or punishment for these should be carried out upon the soul alone? Or how could anyone conceive in the soul alone of fortitude or endurance, which has no fear of death, nor of wounds, nor of the mutilation of limbs, nor of loss, nor of injury, nor of the pains resulting from these, or of the suffering arising from them? And how [could one conceive of] continence and temperance, when no desire draws it towards food, or intercourse, or other pleasures and delights, and when there is nothing else either troubling it from within or stimulating it from without? And how [could one conceive of] prudence, when there are no actions ^B set before it to be done or not done, to be chosen or avoided—or rather, when there is no movement at all in it, nor any natural impulse towards any of the things to be done? And where, generally, is justice between souls, or towards anything else of the same or different kind, when they have neither the source, nor the means, nor the method by which they might distribute what is equal according to merit or proportion, except for the reverence and observance due to God? Nor ^C do they have otherwise any impulse or movement towards the use of their own things, or towards abstinence from what belongs to others; for the use of things according to nature, or abstinence [from them], is observed in those who are naturally constituted to use them—but the soul neither needs anything, nor is it naturally constituted to use anything, and for this reason, neither can that which is called the proper functioning of the parts be found in a soul so constituted.

23. And furthermore, that which is most unreasonable of all is to apply the ordained laws to humans, yet to turn the punishment for things done lawfully or unlawfully to souls alone. ^D For if it is he who received the laws who would justly receive also the punishment for wrongdoing, and it is man who received the laws, not a soul by itself, then it is man who must also suffer the punishment for sins, not a soul by itself. For God did not command souls to abstain from things that do not at all pertain to them, such as adultery, murder, theft, robbery, the dishonoring of those who begat them, and every desire universally that results in injury and harm to one's neighbor. For neither is that commandment, *Honor thy father and thy mother*, suitable for souls alone, since such names do not apply to them; for it is not souls [that beget] souls, bringing forth the

^A appellation of father or mother, but men [who beget] men. Therefore, neither could the commandment, *Thou shalt not commit adultery*, be fittingly spoken or understood with regard to souls, since there is no distinction among them of male and female, nor any aptitude or appetite for union. Where there is no such appetite, neither can there be any union. And among those where there is no union at all, there is no lawful union—which is marriage. And since there is no lawful union, neither can there be any unlawful desire or union with another man's wife; for this is what adultery is. Furthermore, the prohibition of theft or the desire for more is not applicable to souls; for they have no need of those things, which those who are in need are accustomed to steal or seize by force on account of their natural want or necessity—such as gold, or silver, or an animal, or anything else serviceable for food, clothing, or use. For everything that those who are in need desire as if it were useful is useless to an immortal nature. But let a fuller discussion of these matters be left to those who wish to examine each point more diligently, or to contend more vehemently with ^B their opponents. For us, since what has just been said and what is in agreement with it to confirm the resurrection is sufficient, it is no longer timely to dwell any longer upon them. For it is not our intention to omit nothing of what could be said, but rather to indicate summarily to those present what should be thought concerning the resurrection, and to adapt to the capacity of the hearers the arguments upon which this dogma rests.

24. The proper end for man cannot be placed in indolence or in pleasures. Having thus far examined the points proposed, it now remains for us to consider the argument derived from the end. This is already apparent and shining forth from what has been said, requiring only as much examination and addition as is necessary, so that we may not appear to leave anything unmentioned ^C from those things just discussed, or to injure the subject matter or the division established from the beginning. For their sake, therefore, and for the sake of those who are occupied with these matters, it would be excellent to note just this: that there must be a proper end for each thing, whether of those things which exist by nature or those which come to be by art. This, indeed, the common notion of all men teaches us, and the things placed before our eyes testify. For do we not see that one end is proposed for farmers, another for physicians, and again another for those things which ^D are produced from the earth, and another for animals nourished upon it, and those generated according to a certain natural sequence? If then one—

^A considers it manifest, and that it is absolutely necessary that for natural or artificial powers, and the acts proceeding from these, there should follow an end in accordance with nature, it is then also absolutely necessary that the end of man, as belonging to a distinct nature, should be separated from the commonality of others. For it is not even permissible to premise the same end for those things which lack rational judgment as for those which act according to an innate law and reason, and which employ a temperate life and justice. Neither, then, could a painless state be the peculiar end for these (for this would be shared also by those who are completely without sensation); nor indeed the enjoyment of those things which nourish or delight the body, and a multitude of pleasures; for then the brutish life would necessarily take first place, and that which is in accordance with virtue would be imperfect. For I consider this to be the end proper to cattle and grazing animals, not to men who possess an immortal soul and employ rational judgment.

^B 25. The peculiar end of man is not that of the soul or of the body, but of the man consisting of both. Whence resurrection necessarily follows. For we do not consider the life or end of either one of these from which man consists, but of him who consists of both. For such is every man who has obtained this life, and there must be some end proper to his life. But if the end is that of both together, and this (as has been often stated) can neither be found while they are still living in this life, due to the causes already mentioned, nor indeed when the soul is in a state of separation—because such a man does not exist, the body being dissolved or even entirely dispersed, even if the soul remains by itself—it is absolutely necessary that the end of man be found in another ^C condition and constitution of the same living being. And since this follows of necessity, there must absolutely be a resurrection of the bodies that have been dead or even entirely dissolved, and those same men must exist again; since the law of nature establishes the end not simply, nor for any men whatever, but for those very ones who have passed through the previous life. But the same men cannot exist again unless the same bodies are restored to the same souls. And the same soul can receive the same body in no other way than by resurrection. For when this has occurred, the end suitable to the nature of men follows. ^D And one would not err in saying that the end of an intelligent life and rational judgment is to abide without distraction in those things to which natural reason is most especially and primarily adapted, and to delight unceasingly in the contemplation of Him who is, and of His law; although most men, being more passionately and vehemently affected by earthly things, continue to miss this. For it does not invalidate the common summons of—