Appendix to St. Justin, Tatian, and Theophilus

APPENDIX COMPLECTING Spurious works of Justin, the Acts of his martyrdom, and also fragments from the lost works of Justin, Tatian, and Theophilus. PART ONE ST. JUSTIN'S SPURIOUS WORKS ADMONITION CONCERNING THE EPISTLE TO ZENA AND SERENUS

^A 407 Scultetus numbers the Epistle to Zena and Serenus among the works of Justin as being not in the least doubtful. Grabius (Spicileg. Vol. II, p. 166) confesses that the doubts raised against this epistle are rather light and have been discussed at length by Tentzel. To these, he says, I have scarcely anything to oppose or add. Halloix (Vit. Justini, p. 284) and Tillemont (Vol. II, p. 699) disavow this work entirely for the holy martyr and conjecture that it could be attributed to a certain Justin who, under Heraclius, governed the monastery of St. Anastasius near Jerusalem. Whether that abbot truly wrote this epistle, or another author must be sought for us, the whole matter remains in the realm of conjecture. But this stands on certain arguments: that this monument is not by Justin the martyr, and that it was written to men living in a monastery.

Ancient writers who have enumerated the works of the holy martyr are entirely silent concerning the Epistle to Zena and Serenus. No more known to them was the Epistle to Papa and another to those who preside, which the author of the Epistle to Zena and Serenus testifies he had written. Therefore, all these should have been attributed to Justin the martyr if one among them was to be attributed to him.

If we seek the internal criteria for judgment, the Epistle to Zena and Serenus has nothing that squares with the style of Justin, or with those times. It reeks entirely of monastic institutions, which relate to the care of children—who, as everyone knows, were accustomed to being educated in monasteries—and especially to what is read in no. 19 concerning the fostering of the sick and the labor of hands. "The care of children," the author of the epistle says, happens "because of such is the kingdom of heaven." The sick are not to be neglected, nor should one say: "I have not learned how to minister." Who does not recognize the ancient custom of the monasteries, when the brothers showed one another in sickness those services which were accustomed to be shown by servants? Concerning the labor of hands: "It is a vicious shame to fear, lest perhaps, because we work with our hands, one might think us miserable and destitute of help." He marks the vicious cenobite, no. 14, where he speaks thus: "Who is not such, runs outside the rule prescribed to him, and because he has not kept the order, he lacks the reward. And even if he should have received aid from generous athletes with great labor, and has been a participant in food and drink and clothing, he shall not be crowned any the more."

Tillemont, one of the most outstanding men who flourished in the seventeenth century, observes that he had detected certain remains of Semipelagianism in this Epistle to Zena and Serenus. This seems surprising to me, as the more intently I read the epistle, the less I observe traces of error. Not present there, clearly, are the magnificent testimonies concerning the grace of Christ such as are in Justin and in the Epistle to Diognetus; but you would certainly find nothing from which the author of the epistle could be seen to have thought, just as the Semipelagians did, that the beginning of faith is not a gratuitous gift of God. This closing of the epistle declares eternal blessedness to be a gift of divine liberality: "May the Lord of glory grant you all to be participants of honor and rest with all the elect. May His grace also be with you all." A little before he had said: "It must be prayed for daily that we may be rich in discourse and powerful in work." At the beginning he urges Zena and Serenus "that they be friends of the truth, and receiving the perfection of celestial virtue, do what is consistent with the will of the Father of ages ^B 408." And in no. 4: "For we are flesh entirely, and nothing good dwells in us. Therefore, the physician must be called upon to heal." More does not seem to be required for the suspicion, which of its own accord lacks arguments, to be repelled by this very writer.

Having commemorated two epistles written previously, the first of which was to Papa, the second to those who preside; he discusses briefly (no. 1) what is proposed for himself in this third. He urges (no. 2) the flight of anger, the pursuit of peace, and gentleness in rebuking. Tranquility is most maintained by the enduring of the vices of others and by a mind prompt toward reconciliation (no. 3). Great cautions are to be applied in speaking (no. 4). Moderation is to be maintained in all food and apparel, and nothing very lowly is to be sought, nor, in turn, is magnificence to be desired (no. 5). Those who think that they are always being slighted and stir up discords are censured (no. 6). Propriety is to be maintained in all things (no. 7). One must converse cautiously with women (no. 8). No one is to be harmed; admonitions are to be accepted willingly; boasting is to be fled (no. 9). By what indicators open arrogance and feigned gentleness and other such vices are known by those who are skilled (no. 10). Walkings and conversations ought not aim at this (no. 11), that counsels pernicious to others be entered upon; at times the sins of others must be dissimulated, as those who rebuke these more angrily often condemn themselves. Drunkenness and gluttony are to be fled (no. 12, 13). Poverty is to be preferred to riches (no. 14). How cautiously one must act with women is demonstrated by their artifices (no. 15). How the wife of a neighbor is to be understood (no. 16). The care of infants and the infirm, the labor of hands, a mind prepared for every event and intent only upon virtue are commended (no. 17, 18, 19).

APPENDIX. — PART I. ST. JUSTIN'S SPURIOUS WORKS.

EPISTLE TO ZENAS AND SERENUS.

Justinus to his brothers Zenas and Serenus, greeting.

1. ^A Concerning certain irrational schooling and useless instruction, inherited by tradition from men who think and act like the Pharisees, I have set forth with all precision in my epistle to Papas. But in order that I might not appear to be overly censorious, and so that I might provide salutary opportunities ^B to those who wish to do well, I have — in the epistle I wrote to the rulers, and which I have composed most carefully, as I believe — not shrunk from writing also to you, for the sake of your knowing the childish ways of life of certain people. For to know the conduct of those who do not live according to reason is a discipline for those who are striving not to fall into the same faults. You, for your part, are to be praised for cultivating virtue with a prompt and prepared mind. But because our mind is disturbed by the vicissitudes of this present age as we are drawn toward it, on which account the Savior, when He says that both He and we are not of the world, turns us away from communion with it, counseling us to become friends of the truth, and, receiving the effect of the power that is in the heavens, to fulfill everything according to the will of the Father of the ages, ^C and to keep far from worldly strife and emulation.

409 2.

On the flight from wrath, the pursuit of peace, and gentleness in reproof.

^A saying, "I am disposed in this way," pleading Adam and boasting in the action of Eve—for to live still according to nature belongs to one not yet a believer; whereas to be jealous out of envy belongs to one standing far from the truth. Everyone, therefore, must be admonished peacefully, yet in such a way that the admonition is not done with deliberation. Now we know some who have made progress according to the flesh, and who drag the Gospel toward their own anger, and wish to adapt the oracles of our Savior to their own dogmatic failings; to whom, if it had fallen that they possessed the power to deliver some to Gehenna, the whole world would indeed have been consumed by them; but yet, as far as lies in them, they both condemn and open the furnaces of fire. For this reason, let us not be such persons. And furthermore, I give you a suggestion: to look at what is proper to observe, and to educate one's neighbor, as it is necessary for him first to have practiced many times what is suspected, lest perchance he be holding a false opinion; and if he should seem to think rightly, then to admonish him until he is either persuaded by the advice or makes himself manifest.

^B It can provide us with much tranquility not to strive to enjoy preeminence, nor, if some wish to be such, to be grieved; but to yield to those who rank themselves for things to which the Savior has not called the faithful. One must keep silent toward a shouter, and we must laugh at one who considers himself to have conquered another, lest, led by vain vainglory because of those present and listening, we also confirm the rebellion with equal zeal in our replies of words. For let the one who declares well reason that "he has done an injustice, and I did not wish, or did not dare, to contradict. May joy and rest be present to me because of a good conscience." Moreover, he who does injustice ^C must not be proud, but be willing to appease his brother; and he who is being admonished must not be angry, but must himself entreat his kin. For it is proper for two people to meet one another, hastening to be reconciled to peace; since even the father is seen to have come to meet the son who was repenting, and he did not wait, but brought himself to meet the repentance of that one. For the kindness that is according to faith works peace for both; and the one who did the injustice persuades his friend on account of the sin, and the one who suffered the injustice will also repent himself, because he became angry at his kin. Therefore, the faithful must be outside of every carnal desire and appetite; for he who is not such acts as a robber, and commits sacrilege against the temple of God, and, ^D that we may speak more boldly, he casts God out from himself; and on account of his conscience he has become callous, and toward those who admonish him he is indifferent.

^A And he holds up Adam as a precedent, and prides himself on the action of Eve, when he ought to be dying with Christ.

4. *How we ought to speak.* — We must ourselves consider many things with one another, so that we give no place for reproach in our conversations, and let us not speak for the sake of idle chatter, but being silent for the most part, let us answer with moderation those whom it is absolutely necessary not to deprive of an answer. Vile suspicions are to be avoided, and what we ourselves suspect must be examined; we must be of a tranquil mind, showing patience and not being angry in the least. But we must not envy anyone who is courting goodwill; nor is officious zeal to be feigned, nor is one to serve as if under a prejudice, drinking down bitterness, as they say, against one’s will. Whatever is consonant with the faith must be performed by a straight rule. For whoever is not such a person, and walks as if on a tightrope, will presently fall, even if he seems most admirable to those who, due to their own sloth, gape at the boastfulness of others. We must know, therefore, what is that which is feigned for the sake of glory, and what is that which is truly from the heart.

And for this reason one’s own ship must be steered, so that one neither falsely disparages the art of steering nor fears the tempests; but whatever adversity happens, one should not be unprepared for it. For we are altogether flesh, and nothing good dwells in us. Therefore, the Physician must be called in to heal; for he who is thus disposed in his soul will be cured and will escape the disease. We must strive neither to seem ignorant in speech nor to abuse an unbridled mouth. For the one is the mark of a sluggish or faithless man, the other the mark of a hunter of those things which seem splendid to the world. ^B

5. *Moderation is to be observed in all food and lifestyle.* — Food should be used, not for pleasure, but because we wish to live for some useful purpose. And if at any time we should be overtaken by want, let us be content in poverty; and if you wish to hear, in brief, what an untroubled mind is, be content in all things; and you will neither fall if you become rich on account of pride, nor will sorrow cast you down living in want, as your mind always preserves the same countenance, as reason, consonant with virtue, demands. Furthermore, the whole world is to be considered alien to us, and nothing is to be considered as our own, except faith. Neither, therefore, is anything very lowly to be sought, nor, on the other hand, the magnificence which the foolish proclaim as blessed, in the size of a city, and the profusion of things; of which one should not even be desirous. For we are not of this age, unless we wish to be of this world. In a word, ^C he who wishes to live well...

let him not behold many things, nor make it his study to hear them; and if he does hear or see, let him not imagine that he is seeing or hearing. For the state of tranquility takes its beginning from this. He who busies himself with many things wrongs himself, and is a cause why his neighbor, through the spirit of contention with him, sins even against his will. Often, therefore, one must consider the matter which has fallen under study, and then with difficulty must one be separated from him who has been unable to escape the disease by either cauteries or scalpels. Nothing worldly should be treated in conversations, but that which fits us for virtue. For if this is not done, it produces much scurrilous talk for us, and he who is fond of contention takes occasion from this. ^A

6. Now, we know some who, by the determination of their own will, as far as it is in their power, turn day into night, and because of their warped ^B imagination, disbelieve the achievements of some, are pained at these things, and at the same time, upon hearing something evil, believe the liar all the more. For what need is there for me to speak of those who, because of a guilty conscience, draw onto themselves the conversations of their neighbors, and because someone else speaks at length about anything at all, imagine that what is said pertains to them, and reconstruct a drama and a scene according to their own suppositions? To whom suspicion is enough to speak and to write of. I would laugh also at those who, in a hidden place, join together with any of their neighbors matters of discourse, and conversations which have nothing fitting in them, but which stir up fights and wars through whisperings, and who walk about the stage up and down. Just as he who, with a very loud voice, acts the part of Orestes, is thought by the foolish to be terrible and great because of his wooden feet, his padded belly, his absurd vestment, and his monstrous mask: so too those who profess to have zeal and practice a kind of plain-spokenness, because they wish to win, cloak themselves in every appearance of pretended liberty, the contentious having devoured the ^C zealous; just as the Bacchae, under a peaceful appearance, carry about spears in their thyrsi.

7. Moreover, this too must be guarded against: not to come forward now with a serene face, and now with a morose one; and if one must tell the truth, one must reject that entire daily drama of twelve acts. I would say, then, what I think: that everyone who is worldly in mind and apart from the right rule is self-condemned, knowing what he does by design, and knowing the war within himself, but not drawing to himself peace within his own bowels. All friends are to be honored; and reproof is not only to be administered, but also to be listened to. And one ^D must use wine, when we are no longer at leisure for our readings. For such a person, as...

^A he is a wine-bibber and unstable in his judgment, is also perpetually heated. When one's neighbor is speaking, one must neither mock nor hinder him, but allow him time until he desists, shamed by the silence. We should offer advice that is beneficial and common to all through one person. The one who errs is to be rebuked, but not publicly, unless it be necessary for him on account of his arrogance.

9. We must converse cautiously with women: conversation ^B is to be drawn from the Scriptures, but not without caution. For one must deal with women cautiously and with consideration, on account of their haughtiness. For as long as a woman presents herself for display, and priding herself on being a woman, pursues leisure, she is feminine, and on account of such a state of mind, she is not to be trusted. Let us not, therefore, pursue them, but neither let us flatter them; but what is of love, let us do without danger. For the machinations of evil are manifold. On this account we must be vigilant, dedicating ourselves to the oracles of the Savior, saying or hearing nothing evil about anyone. For the mind contracts a scab and is filled with much corrupt humor from other conversations. Therefore, only those things that are useful are to be heard, and one must act according to the Gospel. Those things, however, that in any way trip up the mind are to be shunned. Questions concerning the divine oracles are to be put forward; which will be excellent if done intelligently; but if not, at least as is fitting for a layman. For to a foolish man who asks for wisdom, wisdom shall be imputed. But for him who seems in his own vain opinion to be wise, much ignominy shall be ascribed. A person is called foolish by the Spirit who, through lack of learning, is carried away in his perception, such that that which is unlearned is considered foolish, just as is that which is simple. ^C And Paul also writes: "Who has known the mind of the Lord, that he might instruct him?" And again: "But we have the mind of Christ." For he who says or does what is not fitting through thoughtlessness, he, though seeming to be wise, shall be accounted a fool.

8. No one is to be insulted: exhortations are to be listened to: pretension is to be shunned. We must humble ourselves, not in word only, but also in deeds, so that we may not be deceivers and sycophants, but gentle and not at all flatterers. And it is also proper for one who lives his life rightly to be quiet and untroubled, not being angry, nor remaining silent for the sake of a quarrel, but considering everything that is necessary, whether it can be correctly spoken, and only then, with difficulty, giving voice. Hymns and psalms and canticles and praises are to be uttered; but he is not to be approved who, as if for the sake of condemning an adversary, touches upon certain things obscurely, and pricks his neighbor through psalmody, so that he may not seem to be differing, and thinking he knows ^D that person as if by an art.

^A One must also listen to the one giving advice, not merely instruct him. And one must be persuaded in like manner, by wishing to agree with one's neighbor. We must presume that others are prudent, and not attribute wisdom to oneself alone. One must not imperil oneself through the opinion held of these things; but one should neither despise the instructor, but rather, if he thinks not rightly, one should teach him concerning the matters that pertain to him; or if he speaks the truth, one must be persuaded by him and follow him. For a contentious man doubles the offense; and when he ought to change his mind, he strives, as the fable says, for a Cadmean victory. The cause is that he may be vainglorious, as if he had not even sinned, and may rest in the opinion of his own dangerous disposition. For ridiculous are those who cry out daily because they believe they are masters of some matter; ^B whom strife, having cast the apple among them—when they believe they are at peace—disturbs, as they busily occupy themselves with speaking of those things in the world that are thought to be different. And some are mimetic and miserable who say they are inexperienced in nothing; but claim that this is carpentry, that is leather-working, and that they know every craft proposed to them according to the season, and bear hatred toward the one who holds their nonsense in check. Vain, too, are those who undertake the care of their neighbors for the sake of praise from men.

10. Great is the danger for those ^C who call upon the day of the Lord. For it is necessary either to believe, so as to escape the judgment, or even to forgive one's neighbor, for the sake that the remission of sins might also be granted to oneself by God; but they, by the outburst of their anger, bind contracts against themselves. One must also avoid the arrogance of certain people, who, when they ought to correct themselves by obeying those who give counsel, very foolishly say: "I will not even offer you an apology; hold whatever opinion you have about me." For what shall I say of those who are self-complacent, if someone wishes to admonish them, and who, in a manner entirely worldly, say: "You do not save me, nor are you able to condemn me." And I know many who, because of an evil conscience and a mind not pure, rejoice in the sins of their neighbors. One must also condemn those who lie that they are not angry; and those who pretend to speak gently, but are betrayed by their complexion and their eyes, and by the hidden movement, whether of the head, or of the eyebrows, or by the clatter of their hands. For it is impossible for a man not to become his own accuser. And every believer, when he thinks he is being mocked by someone, ^D either arrogant; or feignedly gentle and mild. These and other such vices reveal themselves by certain signs. — It is a great danger also to those who call upon the day of the Lord. For when they ought to believe, so as to escape condemnation, or to forgive their neighbor also, so that to them also forgiveness of sins might be granted by God: they themselves, by the violence of their anger, gather up contracts against themselves. One must also flee the arrogance of some, who, when they ought to amend themselves by obeying those who give counsel, very foolishly say, "I will not even clear myself to you; hold the opinion you have of me." For what shall I say of those who, pleasing themselves, if anyone wishes to admonish them, reply in a manner entirely worldly, "You do not save me, nor can you condemn me?" I know not a few who, because of an evil conscience and a mind not pure, rejoice in the sins of their neighbor. Those are also to be condemned who lie that they are not angry, and who strive indeed to speak gently, but are betrayed by their color and eyes, and by the hidden movement of the head or eyebrows, or by the noise of their hands.

^A For it is not possible that a man should not betray himself. Whoever, however, is faithful, when he senses that he is being played by someone, in accordance with the prudence of the man so disposed toward him, and by perceiving the perverse effect of his malice, he in turn plays him. To speak briefly, whoever judges himself will be outside of every transgression. But of those who cry out, no one is prudent. He who is now pale, and then blushing, being varied by the composition of his body, wanders about like chameleons in the heat and in the desert. The affections of the soul of some are also to be recognized from their manner of reading. For as soon as someone reads, the manner of his prudence becomes manifest to those who are skilled in judging. The qualities of souls are also known from their life; for through the manner of their conduct, the foundations of these things which do not appear are known. ^B One must also avoid the disputatious man who by artifice delivers himself over to be overcome, offering no contradiction; for whom it is better, lest he undergo danger in trying to win, to neglect those things which pertain to right reason.

11. It is a crime to harm others; sometimes faults must be overlooked. Nor should one be angry, nor should one blame others if he himself is not free from blame. Conversations of such a kind should be held as are conscious of no evil to themselves. Walks should also be employed for the sake of the little body, not by preparing to construct any business or violent contracts against one's neighbor. It would not be absurd for you to brush away with urbanity and jokes the moroseness of those who are wise beyond measure. For, as to those places which are secret for this purpose, so that attention may be given to the necessity of nature, it is the custom for some to pretend to withdraw, and to resolve a thought conceived against others in the latrines. ^C Just as the comic father says that the profligate son is being carried by him; and although he smells the ointment, he denies that he smells it, attempting to cover over his sin with this dullness of smell: so I also advise the more prudent to show to those who are overly hardened that they neither understand what they do, nor know what they say. But he who considers himself prudent in his own estimation resists exhortations, and disputes, and becomes an adversary to the one who gives counsel, and meditates within himself that which is pleasing to human nature and an incredulous soul. Therefore, let us show ourselves to be irreproachable, not doing only what seems right to us, but also what seems right to the many, in order that they may be saved. ^D One must be angry, if it is never possible to be otherwise—for such a form is of madness—but if ever it does press upon one, it must be used together with anger for the healing of one's neighbor. For he who manages it against reason hates first of all him

himself, then also his neighbor; he perturbs himself, while inflicting pain upon the other. For it is written: “Whoever is angry with his brother without cause shall be liable to judgment.” ^A Regarding that movement, anyone who reflects upon himself can perceive it. We know some who, by giving counsel to their neighbor, condemn themselves. For what a man teaches another, he ought to do himself first, lest perhaps, unwittingly, he pass judgment upon himself through the neighbor. Therefore, the wise man, when he has noticed his mind tending toward the sins of others, must say to himself: “Might I not, perhaps, be like this myself?”

12.

Drunkenness is to be avoided.

13.

Gluttony is to be avoided.

[14.]

How poverty is to be praised and wealth not to be praised.

[15.]

How one ought to converse with women.

^A that are crazed with lust, nor neigh at the wife of our neighbor.

16. ^B *What is the wife of a neighbor.* Every woman is a sister; but the "neighbor's wife" is said to be—that is, the wife of Jesus Christ our Savior (whom indeed, according to the debt of love we owe to God and the Father of all, because He is our neighbor, we ought to honor and love); as Paul says, "I have betrothed you all to one man, to present you as a chaste virgin to Christ." Moreover, the neighbor's wife is also the flesh within us, at which we must not neigh. He neighs even if he has not yet fulfilled the desire, if his passion is effervescent within him, even if it is not brought to completion.

17. *Of children, the infirm, and manual labor.* We must care for children, because of such is the kingdom of heaven. The sick are not to be neglected, nor should it be said, "I have not learned how to serve." For he who parades his own delicacy and his unfamiliarity with service should know that he himself will suffer the same things; and when something of the sort happens to him, let him blame his own judgment, which he himself cannot fail to condemn, since those things happen to him which he himself thought ought to be done to others. Therefore, neither is he to be neglected who neglects others; for God is the one who judges; and whoever wishes well to be done to himself, let him by doing good lay up a treasure of kindness for himself from his neighbor. It is not right to feel a false shame, lest someone on account of our manual labor should consider us miserable and destitute of help; only one must be careful that no one should blame those who profess to know God on account of wickedness and a profligate life.

18. ^C *To conclude, the sorrow of the world works death to those whom it has overcome; but the sorrow which is according to God brings forth a mind of life.* Before all things, let us know that sickness is laid up in our flesh, and loss, and need, and that he who is to give thanks is near. And for this reason, one must premeditate what is about to happen, so that when it occurs, it may not bring wonder and astonishment to our hearts. For such a person will say to the event that has come to pass: "I knew that you would come; I was not disappointed in my expectation, I foresaw your assault." If such a person exists, he will stand and not fall. But to be troubled by a sudden event, or to cry out, and often to lament, is of a very miserable mind.

19. ^D *We must be intent upon virtue alone.* We must be intent upon virtue alone, and approach those who discourse about it. But to those with whom there is not present a manner of acting consistent with their words, to them let us say farewell because of the snares lying hidden among them, and let us seek those who will endure the warfare with us. For he who decides to say, "I am not a prince, nor a judge," while doing no good thing, he, as if held under many tyrants, unknowingly serves sin, and flees from those who hasten on the way. Blessed therefore is he who is pure in heart; for by him the world is seen.

is in the heart, for by Him alone can God be seen. A faithful man must keep far removed from envy and malice. We must pray daily to be rich in word and powerful in deed; for we are members one of another. Therefore, let us suffer together with him who suffers, and rejoice together with him who is glorified, keeping ourselves from those who are not related to the law of Christ. In exhorting you, brethren, to do these things, I have urged you also to lead others through yourselves to do the will of God. May the Lord of glory, who is for ever, grant to all of you to be partakers of the honor and rest with the elect! And may His grace be with you all.

ADMONITION TO THE EXPOSITION OF THE RIGHT CONFESSION

This Nestorian exposition of the faith is far removed from the age of Justin, but much further still from the spirit of the holy Martyr. It consists of two parts; the first of which is on the Trinity, the second on the Incarnation. And concerning the Trinity, the author of the *Exposition* shows quite skillfully (n. 1) that God is one in three persons; that is to say (n. 2), three hypostases, designated by the terms Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceeding, refer to one essence of the Godhead. He proves one essence in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, first (n. 3) because the Son and the Holy Spirit, since they are alien to created nature, necessarily pertain to the divine, between which and the created there is nothing third; second, because three persons are numbered together in baptism, and work together in the sanctification of minds and in creation (n. 4, 5). He establishes (n. 6) that an identity of essence follows from this order. He forbids (n. 7) curious investigation of the mystery, and judges it enough to construct the eternal generation, and to remove the suspicion of suffering from it, if the Word is said to be begotten of the Father, as light from light (n. 8).

But after he comes to the Incarnation, which treatment seems to have been his principal purpose; then indeed he pours forth impious trifles, partly subtly and craftily, partly audaciously. He declares that the Word came to us not by a corporeal descent (n. 9), but by the will of divine operation, and fashioned for Himself a human being perfect in the Virgin's womb, to which He was joined by a supreme union. Whence he concludes that He is God and man: as man, while He lived free from blame and underwent an unmerited death, he had blotted out sin by a perfect life, and by an unmerited death had warded off from us the death we owed; as God, the dead body had recalled to life. He commends this double nature again and again, both so that a disagreement of terms might be avoided, and that one Son, both eternal and recent, might be preached as is proper. If anyone requires the manner of the union, he confesses (n. 10) that he neither knows it nor can explain it. The example of the union of the soul with the body, brought forward by some, he partly approves and partly rejects. He approves it in that, just as man has two natures, and according to one he reasons, and according to the other he does those things which he has perceived by reason, so the Son, although He is one and has two natures, works miracles through one, and receives lowly things through the other. In this, however, he rejects this example, that man is not soul and body, but consists of soul and body; whereas Christ is God and man; then also because the soul feels the motions of the body, which cannot be said of the Word without insanity. He himself seeks another example from the sun (n. 11), in which light, previously diffused everywhere, was contracted and gathered as if into a certain body. Therefore, as light is not separated from the sun, but although there are two natures, yet light is not called separate, nor is the sun separate, so he supposes the Son to be one, though there are two natures.

His works having been completed, he feigns that he is being called back by those who object thus: "How is the Word (n. 13) everywhere according to essence, and how in His own temple? For if He is everywhere, so also is He there, and He will have no temple preeminent above all others." The author of the *Exposition* tries to evade this difficult question, which strikes at the jugular of the Nestorian cause (n. 14, 15, 16), with various arts and captious questions; but at last, emerging from the covering of dissimulation, he answers (n. 17): "The Word is inseparable in His own temple, and dwells there as if it were the fullness of the Godhead, and is present to all things according to essence, but not in the same way. For the sordid body does not grasp the rays of the Godhead." He seems to himself able to illustrate this by this example: "The sun, common to us," he says, "is set before all every day, and it does not pour forth less light to one and more to another, but it imparts its common efficacy equally to all. But if anyone has strong eyes, he receives more of its ray, not because of the sun, as if it were expanded to him more than to the rest, but because of the power of his own eyes. But he who is weak in eyes, even he will not be able to gaze upon the splendor of the light itself. Thus, imagine for me the sun of righteousness as being present to all equally according to essence, since He is God; but we all, as if our eyes were weak and bleary with the filth of sins, cannot sustain the presence of the light; but His own proper temple is as the purest eye, and one that receives the splendor of the entire light, being shaped by the Holy Spirit and entirely removed from sin."

So manifest an impiety has deservedly persuaded the most erudite man, Michael Lequien, that the author of this writing is a genuine Nestorian, lurking under the name of Justin, so that he might more easily insinuate the poison of heresy. For what he says, that the Word dwells in man as in a temple, and that He atoned for our sins by an innocent and perfect life,

^A even if it smacks of the Nestorian heresy, could nevertheless have been kindly excused. But this comparison of the sun with the Word can be softened or excused by no interpretation at all—a comparison which the impious writer carries to such a point that he does not hesitate to observe that he who receives more of the sun’s rays does not receive more because the sun applies itself more to him than to others, but because of the excellence of his own sight. Having settled these things, the Nestorian exults as if a victor and decrees a triumph for himself, or rather, shows that those who claim the Nestorian heresy was a controversy of words, not of the greatest matters, are laboring in vain to purge the Nestorians, just as if they were washing Ethiopians.

Regarding the time at which this work was written: the learned editor of the works of S. John of Damascus thinks it is more recent than the Eutychian heresy, not merely the Nestorian; but I cannot agree with him. For this writer seems to be numbered among those who architected the Nestorian heresy and who nurtured and fostered it in the shadows before it was preached in the most brilliant light of the Church of Constantinople. 1. The author of the *Exposition* does not attack Eutychians or heretics similar to the Eutychians, as appeared to the aforementioned editor, but the whole of his bitterness erupts against the Catholics themselves. For these words: "Now you say the Word was made flesh, now that the flesh passed into the substance of the Word," n. 13, do not attack Eutychians, but they affix perverse meanings to Catholic doctrine in the Nestorian manner. See similar perfidy in the author of the *Confutation of Certain Propositions*, chap. 14, Append. to the Works of S. Athanasius, p. 565. The author of the *Exposition* certainly does not try to ensnare Eutychians there, but Catholics, with this interrogation: "If He remained what He was, how did that which was not come to be? And if that which was not came to be, how did He remain what He was?"

2. The work was written in the peace of the Church, before the movements arose which the Nestorians and Eutychians incited. The gall of this man’s liver would have inflamed him far otherwise if, like the author of the *Confutation of Certain Propositions*, he had been able to bemoan "bonds, prisons, fines, scourges, insults, the wretched spectacles of slaughter," and to invent many priests as the authors of such a tragedy. Gather that the peace of the Church was not yet disturbed from these words: "If anything of these seems to you to approach closer to the truth, praise him who gave the measure of knowledge. If you have learned anything more pious from another, again praise the same as a curator... When we have explained the right confession according to our strength, having said farewell to the sons of the Church, and having given thanks to Him who provided the abundance of speech, we shall pass the rest of life in tranquil discourse," n. 12.

3. The hope of softly insinuating error into unwary minds, which shines forth in this work, also smacks of quiet times for the Church. For it is common to this writer with other Nestorians that he wraps himself in the language of "the temple," "the fullness of union," and "the ineffable mystery." But he seems to have done that, in the private judgment of ^B some, so that, although he was desirous of hiding, he might nevertheless openly establish that the Word is more in the temple than in us, because the temple is the purest eye, while we are eyes bleared with the filth of sins. The Nestorians spoke more cautiously after their heresy was known and removed the hope of hiding in such open impiety, and excited zeal for suppressing the error and care for watching over it. Add to this that the author of the *Right Confession* ^C nowhere inveighs against the "one incarnate nature of the Word," which, defended by S. Cyril, inflamed the Nestorians with anger and fury. It does not seem, therefore, that this writer can be considered more recent than the Council of Ephesus.

Grabius, *Spicileg.* tom. II, p. 163, denies that the exposition of faith, as we now have it, was known to Leontius, but contends that another work is cited by him. He is led by these reasons: 1. Because the work cited by Leontius consisted of three books; ours, however, is contained in only one book, and that a very brief one. But the words of Leontius have deceived the learned man, for they are thus: *Toû ἁγίου Ἰουστίνου τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ μάρτυρος εἰς τὸ τρίτον βιβλίον τοῦ περὶ τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος συντάγματος κεφάλαιον γ'*. Grabius interprets this passage as if Leontius were citing the third book of a treatise on the Trinity. But the comma should be placed after βίβλιον, and it should be translated thus: "From the third book of S. Justin, of the treatise on the Trinity, chap. 3." The author of the *Exposition of Faith* declares that he has already written two books, the one against the Jews, the other against the gentiles. For he begins thus: "When we have sufficiently refuted the Jews and the Greeks, it is consequent that we should also explain the sane reason of the faith." Leontius therefore cites the third book of Justin, in which the Trinity is treated; but he by no means says that this treatise on the Trinity consists of three books.

That Leontius is to be explained thus is clear from another testimony, which Leontius proposes thus: *Toû αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ια' κεφάλαιον τοῦ αὐτοῦ συντάγματος*. "Of the same (Justin) from chapter 17 of the same treatise." Leontius therefore calls the *syntagma* a single book on the Trinity, and consequently he was not citing *τὸ τρίτον βιβλίον τοῦ περὶ τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος συντάγματος*, "the third book of the treatise on the Trinity." I shall not, however, conceal that this work is so cited in the Lateran Council under Martin I, act. v: *Ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Τριάδος γ' βιβλίου κεφ. ιζ'*. But perhaps he who cited these testimonies thought that those two books, which are mentioned in the beginning of the work, were written about the Trinity. Perhaps also we could interpret it thus: "From the third book, which is about the Trinity, chap. 17."

Grabius adds another reason. The two earlier testimonies, which are cited by Leontius, occur in n. 10. In the Bodleian codex the first is said to be taken from chap. 3 of Justin, the other from chap. 17. Whence he concludes that the *Exposition of Faith* does not exist today as it was in the hands of Leontius; since these two testimonies, which once were separated by such an interval, are now almost joined. I wonder that the learned man would rather suspect lacunae in a work complete in its own numbers, than investigate a copyist's error which strikes the eyes. For who does not see that in the ms. codex of Leontius, for *κεφάλαιον γ'*, chapter 3, one must read *κεφάλαιον ιγ'*, chapter 13? In the Claromontane codex this *Exposition of the Right Confession* is divided into minute chapters, and the first testimony ^D cited by Leontius is read partly in chapter 14, partly in the fifteenth; but the second is read in the sixteenth. The division of chapters in the codex which Leontius used was not very different.

Whether pseudo-Justin, before he set his hand to this work, published two other writings, namely against the Jews and the gentiles, or whether he attributed this praise to himself, so that he might be believed to be Justin, whose lucubrations in this genre were known, I for my part cannot determine. This I do not fear to assert, that no one can be cited who testifies that those two books came into his hands.

EXPOSITION OF THE RIGHT CONFESSION

^A 1. The author of the work has already defended the truth at length: now he explains what should be believed about it. Since we have sufficiently pursued the refutation of the Jews and the Greeks, it follows again that we should set forth a sound account of the faith. For it is surely right that, after the demonstration of the truth, we should go further and discern how one ought to think about it. For it is not a simple glorification of the Father and the Son that procures salvation for us, but the right confession of the Trinity that bestows the enjoyment of the good things laid up for the pious; since one might hear even those of a different persuasion praising the Father and the Son, but not offering worship according to a right understanding. Wherefore, this exposition was necessarily undertaken by us in this writing, leading those who encounter it into a sincere understanding of the truth.

2. There is nought, from the beginning, outside of God. ^B Both the divine Scriptures teach us to worship one God, and the instructions of the Fathers train us. For there must be one primary cause of all things, lest anything from without, intervening, should injure the things that have been brought into existence. For if there were anything from the beginning outside of God, it would be absolutely necessary either to confess that it too is God, or to call it some other power, whatever it may be. But if one were to call it God, he would erase the divine voices that openly cry out: "I am the first God, and I am hereafter, and besides me there is no God." But if he should not call it God, he will evidently say that it is angels or powers. But even so, he will destroy the divine Scriptures, which say that these also were made by God: Praise God from the heavens, praise Him in the highest. Praise Him, all His angels; praise Him...

all His powers. And a little further on: For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that nothing coexisted from the beginning with the God of all, since it has been shown that all things were brought forth by Him. ^A There is, then, in very truth one God of all, who is known in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For since the Father begat the Son from His own essence, and brought forth the Spirit from the same, it is with good reason that there is attributed to them, as partakers of the one and same essence, one and the same divinity.

3. How then, one might say, if the generator is different from the begotten, and that which proceeds is different from that from which it proceeds (for the Father is unbegotten, from whom also the Son has been begotten and the Spirit has gone forth), are the Son and the Holy Spirit the same as the Father? Because "Unbegotten," "Begotten," and "Proceeding" are not names of the essence, but modes of existence; and the mode of existence is characterized by these names, ^B whereas the declaration of the essence is signified by the name of God; so that the difference between the Father and the Son and the Spirit is according to the mode of existence, while the identity is according to the principle of the essence. For insofar as the one has being unbegottenly, and the other begottenly, and the Spirit proceedingly, it is natural for the differences to be considered; but if the being according to essence of His hypostasis is also signified, it is indicated by the common name of divinity. ^C But what I am saying will become clearer. He who considers the existence of Adam, how he was brought into being, will find him not begotten; for he was not generated from any other human, but molded by the divine hand. But the molding signifies the mode of existence; for it signifies how he came to be. Likewise, in turn, the mode of existence denotes the molding; for it similarly declares that he existed by being molded. But if you were to seek the essence itself, by which he is joined in communion to those who are from him, you will find humanity to be the subject. Just as, therefore, the molding signifies the mode of existence, and the mode of existence characterizes the molding, ^D and the principle of the essence indicates humanity as the subject, so we shall find this to be the case in God and the Father. For if you were to seek the mode of His existence, seeing Him begotten of no other, you will rightly call Him unbegotten; but if you were to speak of the unbegotten...

^A and the mode of existence, they are tokens of one another; but the word "God" is declarative of the essence. For just as Adam, although he did not receive generation, is nevertheless linked to those begotten of him into communion by the identity of essence, so no argument will be able to tear apart the commonness of the essence of the Father with regard to the Son and the Spirit because of the "unbegotten." Therefore, "Unbegotten," "Begotten," and "Proceeding" do not declare the essence, but indicate the hypostases; for they are sufficient for us to distinguish the persons, and they show the hypostasis of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, each in a particular way. For just as when "Unbegotten" is spoken to us, it is as a certain seal that immediately marks off the hypostasis of the Father; and again, as if by some sign, when we hear the appellation "Begotten," we take up the notion of the Son; and likewise, through the signification of "Proceeding," we are instructed concerning the particular person of the Spirit. And these things indeed suffice to prove that the essence itself is not meant by "Unbegotten," "Begotten," and "Proceeding," but that they are distinguishing marks of the hypostases, besides the fact that they also denote the mode of existence.

4.

One essence, because the Son and the Spirit are never numbered with created things.

^A a hymn to the God of all things composed from the entirety of created things, then discussing all things in heaven, and enumerating all the powers within it; and likewise having made his account concerning the earth and all things in it, he does not include in this doxology the Son and the Spirit, as being—manifestly—joined with the divine nature. For if he had known them to be of created substance, he would not have left these alone unnamed, of which he would reasonably have made mention first and foremost above all other powers.

In like manner also the blessed Paul, being seized by divine fire, and displaying his burning love for God, and testifying to the persistence of his affection, speaks thus: ^B "For I am persuaded that neither life, nor world, nor death, nor angels, nor powers [principalities], nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." For just as he also enumerated clearly both the world, and life, and death, and angels, and principalities and powers, and furthermore things present and to come, height and depth, because he found nothing remaining in the created nature, and yet was held by an ardor to cry out and testify, by using a certain exaggeration and introducing "any other creature," he completed his ^C argument.

Does then he who, by the hyperbole of his words, testified to the immobility of his love for God, if he had known the Son and the Spirit to be of created essence, not have mentioned them along with the others? But it is from these and such things that it is to be known that the Son and the Spirit are not joined to the created nature. It would have been possible to adduce also some other such abundant testimonies; but since the discourse is to the sons of the Church, and our purpose is to speak briefly, I consider what has been said to be sufficient.

5. It remains to show that the Son and the Spirit ^D are conjoined with the divine nature. And first, indeed, I shall mention that which is of the greatest importance. Our Lord Jesus Christ, after his resurrection from the dead, being about to make his ascent into heaven, and the instruction of the nations, and the teaching of baptism, instructed the apostles saying:

^A Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. And writing to the Corinthians, blessed Paul, at the end of the Epistle, as if placing a certain seal upon the doctrine, adds: The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit, be with you all. And again, to the Ephesians he speaks thus: Jesus Christ himself being the head corner stone; in whom all the building fitly framed together groweth unto an holy temple in the Lord: in whom ye also are builded together for an habitation of God through the Spirit. See how, in teaching the building which is in Christ—by which we become the temple of Christ according to that which is written: I will dwell in them, and walk in them; and I will be their God—he brings together the three persons to us ^B at once. For when he mentions the head corner stone, he speaks of Jesus Christ himself, and immediately adds: In whom ye also are builded together for an habitation of God through the Spirit. For he teaches by this kind of doctrine that Christ, God, and the Spirit—which is to say, one divinity—dwell within us according to an operation in those of us accounted worthy of grace. And this is clearer still from what he says in another place: For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named, that he would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man, that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith. Behold, for again Paul, making mention of divine indwelling, is found to encompass ^C the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit together; and everywhere in his teaching he appears to place the three persons in one order. For writing to the Corinthians in the second Epistle, he says thus: Now he which stablisheth us with you in Christ, and hath anointed us, is God, who hath also sealed us, and given the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts; clearly indeed, here too, he has joined Father God, and Christ the Son, and the Holy Spirit in his teaching; and again to the Galatians: But because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father; in the same way again he delivers to us the notion of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit conjointly. And observe ^D in what manner he proposes the evidences of this supreme connection; for he does not say simply: God hath sent...

the Spirit, but *of his Son*; at one time conjoining him to the Son, at another time attributing him to the Father, in those words where he says: *But ye have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God and the Father*; and again, while he calls him the Spirit of his Son, because he himself is the Truth; and again, when he teaches that he is of the Father: *For he proceedeth from the Father*. And in all things whatsoever the divine Scripture confirms our minds, that we may hold an undivided conception concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

6. Neither, indeed, in the creation of this universe ^B did the divine oracle teach us that the operation of the Son and of the Holy Spirit was separate from the Father. Let David be your teacher in this matter, speaking thus: *Thou, O Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands*. For he has comprised by the naming of the Lord, both the Father and the Son and the Spirit; and nevertheless, on account of the ungrateful, he has even used the distinction of persons, when he says: *By the Word of the Lord were the heavens established, and all the power of them by the Spirit of his mouth*. Moreover, we have learned from the divine Scripture that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not inferior to the power of the Father; and how this is so, hear the text: *But our God*, it says, *is in heaven and in earth: he hath done all things whatsoever he willed*. This David uttered concerning the Father. The Son, however, showing this power in the leper, says: *I will; be thou clean*. Blessed Paul, attributing this same to the Holy Spirit by his testimony, writes such things: *But all these things worketh that one and the same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he wills*. If, therefore, in the instruction of the world, and in the doctrine of baptism, and furthermore in the reason of creation, and in the power of authority, the one name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is handed down to us conjointly, what argument will take away from the Son and the Holy Spirit that they exist of the divine and blessed essence? ^C

7. And let no one rise up against us, as if we promised one thing, but set forth another, because, having undertaken to demonstrate the identity of essence, we prove by our testimonies that the Son and the Holy Spirit are numbered with the Father. For the logic of the same order demonstrates nothing else but the identity of the essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. And whosoever contradicts, let him resume the division instituted by me and consider it accurately; for he will find there the reason of the essence fulfilled in the order of the conjunction. From above, therefore, we have divided the things that are into two, into the uncreated and the created nature; and the proofs of the uncreated have been confessed by us, ^D

^A that it is dominant and free from all necessity, and furthermore that it does and can do whatever it wishes by its own power; but concerning the created, that on the contrary it is servile, obedient to masterly laws, and can only perform and does perform the ministry received from God. Since the division is thus established, and it is confirmed that there is nothing intermediate between deity and a created thing, whatever is alien to created nature is evidently not alien to divine nature. If, therefore, it has been demonstrated by us through many arguments that the Son and the Spirit are distant from created nature, since they are numbered with no created thing, but are everywhere conjoined with the Father, how would it not be of extreme madness not to consider them to be of uncreated nature? For of the two, one must necessarily be rejected. For it is necessary either that one who shows them to be of created nature must separate them from the uncreated, or one who demonstrates that they possess uncreated nature must necessarily separate them from the created. But it has appeared manifest that they are separated from created nature and conjoined with the divine; and it has been confessed that there is nothing intermediate between these. It remains, therefore, that they are partakers of that nature to which they are always conjoined. For if, as has been said (for it is worth the effort to repeat it for a fuller demonstration), in the institution of the world delivered by Christ, in the doctrine of holy baptism, and further still in the divine doctrine and the creation of the universe, and finally in the authority of supreme power, similar and the same things are handed down ^B concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, who is so perverse as to call into doubt their communion of essence? It is fitting, therefore, to confess one God, known in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Spirit; so that in so far as they are Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, we recognize the hypostases of the one divinity; but in so far as He is God, we understand a common essence of the hypostases. For Unity is understood in Trinity, and Trinity is recognized in unity.

8. Extreme rashness is it to scrutinize this mystery.—And I, indeed, for my part, would neither wish to inquire about it from others, nor could I persuade myself that I might dare to speak of these secret things with a tongue of clay and stained with flesh. For even if a pure mind is implanted in us, through which we often grasp by reason the things that are above us, nevertheless, being weighed down by the partner flesh, it grows weak in the clear coverage ^C of the greater things.

^A For the earthly tabernacle weighs down the mind that is burdened with many cares. In no way, therefore, is it possible for us, being human, to attain to that first and blessed essence. And why do I say the divine essence? Indeed, not even to those things which are mystically performed around it. For nothing of divine matters is clear to men, as a certain wise man of the Greeks once uttered; and I accept his statement as true. For when I hear Paul, that vessel of election, who has stepped upward to the third heaven, who has heard words unutterable which it is not permitted for human tongues to relate, who had within himself the One who supplies the words, testifying to the partial knowledge within himself and saying: "Now I know in part, but then I shall know just as I have been known"; and again: "We know in part, and we prophesy in part"; how should I believe that the perfect knowledge of divine things exists in those who are human? ^B For if to those who have reached the stature of Paul, a dim and partial knowledge has come (for that which is "through a glass and in an enigma" signifies the dim), who is so bold toward folly as to claim for himself a perfect knowledge of divine things? But we, immediately knowing the impenetrable nature of the ineffable, will exclaim with David to the God of all: "Thy knowledge has become wonderful from me; it has been strengthened, I shall not be able to attain to it." Indeed, it is holy both to say these things andholier to believe them; for to yield to divine matters is the mark of a pious and prudent man.

9. Filius ut lumen de lumine generatus. ^C But as for upright worship, we understand it in a manner worthy of God (for just because the divine is altogether incomprehensible, it is not therefore right that one should not inquire about it at all, and so spend the time of this life in sloth; but rather, according to the measure of knowledge granted by the Lord to each, one ought to engage in a laborious investigation, so that while we are accurately persuaded that God cannot be comprehended, yet, in so far as we are capable, we may join ourselves to Him through contemplation). Thus, therefore, we understand the Son to have been begotten of the Father, as light shining forth from light. ^D For the image is sufficient to show both the co-eternity, and the identity of essence, and the passionless nature of the generation. For if it shone forth, it co-existed out of time with the One who caused it to shine forth. For by what interval of time could the shining forth of light be interrupted? And if it is light from light, it would indicate that which is the same as that from which it has been generated. And if

it is light and generated, the generation will be free from passion. For the shining forth of light does not come about by division, or flow, or interval, but proceeds from the very essence without passion. We hold the same knowledge concerning the Holy Spirit, that just as the Son is from the Father, so also is the Spirit; except that He will differ in the mode of existence. For the one, light, shone forth from light; but the other, being also light from light, went forth not by generation, but by procession; thus He is co-eternal with the Father, thus the same in essence, thus He has gone forth from thence ^A without passion. Thus we conceive the Monad in the Trinity, and in the Monad we recognize the Trinity. Having separated these, and having received this measure of knowledge from the Lord, we set forth to the sons of the Church what has been understood, exhorting them ^B so to think, until they receive a more perfect splendor of knowledge; since it is prudent to pay attention with diligence to the things set forth by us. For we have not conceived anything elegant, or inflated, or having the appearance of boasting; but rather, gathering according to our strength whatever is pious and becoming to divine knowledge, we have set forth the knowledge of the one Godhead in three perfect hypostases. And having thus glorified the blessed and divine Trinity, let us pass ^C to that which comes to us from the Incarnation of the Word. For the doctrine of the Incarnation is ineffable. But this too must be examined by us by the same reason as above.

10. The Word formed for Himself a temple in the womb of the Virgin. The union between the Word and man is most high.

10. When the Word saw that it was necessary for the restoration of His own creatures to take place, and for the debt of the penalty, which Adam incurred by transgressing, to be paid, then indeed, without departing from the heavens, He descended to us. For the descent was not of a body, but the will of a divine operation. And using as a medium the Virgin, who traced her lineage from David because of the promises made to her, for the need of the ^D economy, and entering her womb as if it were a divine seed, He fashions for Himself a temple, the perfect man, having taken some part of her nature and having knit it together for the formation of the temple. And having clothed Himself with it by a supreme union, and having emerged as God and man together, thus He fulfilled the economy among us. Since Adam, by sinning, subjected his race to death, and bound the entire nature with the debt, the Son, being both God and man, repairs the fall of Adam; and insofar as He is man, He lives without sin, and accepts a voluntary death.

But insofar as He is God, He rises again, and completely dissolves death itself. He is, therefore, one Son, both He who was dissolved and He who raised up that which was dissolved. For insofar as He was man, He was dissolved; but insofar as He is God, He raised it up. When, therefore, you hear contradictory expressions regarding the one Son, distinguish appropriately what is said according to the natures: if it be something great and divine, attribute it to the divine nature; if it be something small and human, calculate it as belonging to the human nature. For thus you will escape the discrepancy of the words, since each nature receives that which is appropriate to it, and you will acknowledge the one Son both to have existed before all ages and to be recent, according to the divine Scriptures.

11. The mystery of the union is difficult to explain. The example of the soul and body is partly convenient, partly faulty.

But you might understand more clearly what I say here: we build a house out of various materials, but no one would say that the house is the same as the materials from which it consists; for the stones, and the wood, and the rest, are not simply "the house." For if this were so, one might justly call those materials "a house" before the building was constructed. But it is the specific joining of those materials to one another that is designed to produce the house for us. Indeed, when the house is taken apart, the materials remain in the same way, retaining their own nature, but we say that ^B the house, which a certain joining of the materials had produced, has perished. So too with man. For although he consists of soul and body, he is not the same as those of which he consists, but is something else; so that man is a third thing, which is produced from the very union of soul and body. And this is evident from the fact that, when a disjunction of these occurs, the body remains, preserving its own nature—for it has triple dimensions, even if it is dead—and the soul again likewise remains, being rational, even if it is separated; but the man whom the union of both had produced has perished. ^C But Christ was not made Christ out of divinity and humanity, being something other than the two; rather, He remains both: He is both God and man. God, indeed, as He is understood through the working of miracles; man, as He is shown through the susceptibility to suffering of His nature. But in many cases the soul is also preoccupied by the sufferings of the body, and often suffers before the body; and it is immediately apparent that it suffers along with the body, often fearing the cutting of the body, and being altered even before the suffering of the body, and experiencing the pains after the cutting no less. This, regarding the divinity of Christ, no one of those who are accustomed to think rightly would dare to say or admit, unless he were completely deranged. Wherefore the example of man is to be adopted in some respects, ^D but in the rest it is to be avoided.

12. The example of the sun and the light. — We have indeed formerly confessed that we do not attain a clear perception of this truth, and now, nevertheless, with a right mind we profess the knowledge granted to us according to our measure, and according to a clear argument, which...

^A we strive to bring back to a worthy example, and we are not willing to compare this union to some small and contemptible image, but to a great one, and one that is fitting for the generation from the Father. For since the Word has come into the world as light, having shone forth from light that has no cause, I wish this light to be the example of the union. Therefore, let the Word be considered to be the primordial light, which was made by the first voice of God through the Word himself; and the solar body is to be considered the human body, to which the Word was united in an ineffable way. And do not think that the sun is any other light than that which existed before. For it is not as if the first light were lacking for the illumination of the universe that the sun was made, to supply what was missing. For the Creator is not such that he would neither foresee what is perfect, nor establish light ^B fittingly for the utility which is perceived from it. There is, therefore, but one primordial light; and the sun was fashioned as a body for it, upon which the light, which had been diffused everywhere at the beginning, is gathered and carried. This also fills for us the course of the hours of the day through the body, without reproach. For if it had not been bound to a body, but had been diffused wholly in the whole of the air, it would neither have defined for us the measures of the day, nor would it have shown a regular motion and the one who made it. But if you say to me that even before the creation of the sun there was day and night, you will first similarly confess that the nature of the light sufficed to illuminate all things; and then, consequently, seeking the cause for the creation of the sun, you will find it to be none other than that which has just now been stated by us. For formerly, the light, being diffused through the whole of the air, ^C did not traverse a steady motion, nor did it define the measures of the day, but being contracted, it gave way to the night, so that it is most true that the light is one thing, and the solar body which has received it is another. Since the light stands thus in relation to the solar body, do you now diligently weigh what I say. For just as after the union of the primordial light with the solar body, no one would separate them from one another, nor would he call the sun one thing specifically, and the light separately another, but the light together with the body is called one sun: so in the case of the true light and the most holy ^D body, no one after the union would say separately that the Son is the divine Word, and the Son is the man; but he would say that both are one and the same, just as the light which has been received and the body which has received it are one light and one sun. Again, just as

there is one light and one sun, yet two natures—the one of light, the other of the solar body—so likewise here, the Son, the Lord, the Christ, and the Only-Begotten is one, yet the natures are two: the one above us, the other our own. And again, just as in the case of light no one would separate the energy ^A from the body that receives it, but if he were to distinguish them by reason, he would recognize the nature to which the energy belongs as its own, so in the case of the one Only-Begotten Son of God, no one could separate any energy from the one sonship, but by reason he would recognize the nature to which that which is being produced is proper. In this way, we have fashioned the example of the divine union, so that we might take refuge in a more pious concept, and if we have not altogether attained the truth itself, we have at least gathered an image sufficient for a pious inquiry. If anything from these seems to you to approach the truth more closely, praise Him who gave the measure of knowledge; but if you have learned something more pious from another, praise that guardian in turn, for He who was from the beginning has Himself worked in the other. Since we have sufficiently set forth the right confession to the best of our ability, we bid the sons of the Church farewell, and having given thanks to Him who provided the abundance of speech, we shall pass the rest of our life in the quiet conduct of a silenced discourse. ^B

13. It is asked how the Word is more in the temple than in other things.

How the Word is in the Temple and in all things

14. This question is refuted by another question, as being a clear refutation of unbelief

A clear refutation of unbelief

^A Inextricable. A manifest argument of incredulity is that regarding how one speaks about God. For how is He the creator of heaven, how of earth and sea, and of air and plants and all animals, and of yourself, who seek everything concerning God with such precision? But you will surely say that by the abundance of His power He brought all things into being. Was the power of God, then, present to the things that came into being by accident or by essence? If it were by accident, as existing [previously], even before they were made—since an accident is not formed by itself, but exists in certain pre-existing things—if that is ridiculous, it remains that the power was present to all things by essence. Since, therefore, the power was present to all created things by essence, did the so-called temple have anything more than them? ^B This argument is impossible, as is that one, and faith is the solution to both. Have you seen how the leaping discussion has laid low infidelity? See the tongues that wage war against God stopped.

15. Tell me, you who simulate a defense of Christianity, who both seek and propose such things for the destruction of the two natures, who craft such questions—dealing with mixtures and confusions and the transmutation of the body into divinity ^C and such like—you who sometimes say that the Word became flesh, and sometimes that the flesh was transmuted into the substance of the Word, and because of such wanderings of your mind you show yourselves to be clearly thinking absolutely nothing. Tell us, then, how the Word, having become flesh, did not abandon the heavens. You will surely say that, remaining God, He thus became so. Tell us again, then, how, remaining, He became so. For if He remained what He was, how did He become what He was not? And if He became what He was not, how did He remain what He was? Are you at a loss for the solution? Be at a loss also concerning the mode of the union. But if you believe that, remaining, He became so, believe also that the Word is present everywhere by essence, ^D and exists in a special way in His own temple. We will ask again, how, after the union, was the body deified? Was it changed into the substance of divinity, or did it remain...

immortal through the union of the Word? ^A If it is the former, the body remains a body—since God is not a body—but it has partaken of divine dignity, not by nature, but by the good pleasure of the Word. But if the Word, through the union, changed the body into His own substance, we must ask again: how was the body changed into the substance of the Word? Was it, having been changed into the substance of the Word, an addition to that substance? In that case, it must have been imperfect before, since it received an addition. But it received nothing from Him. What then was changed would be nothing at all; and how can that which is nothing be changed into the divine substance? But they will say that the Word did not dissolve the body into His own substance, but changed it into a divine one. Therefore, let them answer us again: is this divine substance different from His own, or the same as His own? For if it is the same as His, we shall proclaim two divine substances of the Word: one which He had as begotten from the Father, and another according to which He made the very body itself. But if they say it is different from His, yet not divine, they will inevitably say it is created. For between divinity and creation there can be no middle ground. And what need is there for the body to undergo change, if it is being transformed into a created substance again? ^B

16. Mysteries where strength fails ^C are to be adored rather than investigated.—You labor with dizziness in such doubts, and perhaps you even fear that some of the things that have been said might dissolve the reason for our faith. But I, when I am perplexed in my search, proclaim the miracle of the mystery of the Christians, because our concerns are above the mind, above reason, and above the comprehension of created nature. When such doubt befalls you also, as you inquire into such things, bring forward faith as the ready answer to your questions, and consider this: where God is, even if something of what is said is unknown, whether because of the excellence of the nature or because of the mode of the Incarnation, no harm comes to those who are ignorant of it. ^D How, moreover, do you not fear the crime of audacity, you who attempt to emend divine things? Have you not heard the divine words, which, to deter you from such attempts, propose to us the image of the clay and the potter? In which they teach that we should not be curious or inquirers into divine things, but yield to the divine will, as the clay to the potter. Fear, therefore, at long last, and with a very modest mind, lull your own reasonings to sleep, and those that are in

^A you, let faith alone resolve; and tremble at the divine words, as it is written, so that, having become worthy of the divine rest, you may hear those blessed words from the God of all: "To whom shall I look, but to the humble and quiet and him who trembles at my words?" ^B When the tongues of those who fight against God are obstructed by these, the discourse, hurrying toward the distinction, runs on. But you, sons of the Church, who propose the question piously, and who bring forward inquiries concerning doubtful matters not with the intent of tempting, but of learning if possible, now turn your attention to me. The form of divine doctrine is indeed manifold, but it is gathered together in summary as in a head into the learning of the commandments and their observance, and into divine knowledge and adoration. Those, therefore, who are lovers of piety will attempt in no way to be ignorant of the observance and learning of the commandments, and before these, indeed, divine adoration. As for the knowledge of divine things, they will indeed wish to trace it out to the best of their ability; but where their strength fails, let them adore what they cannot attain, so that our faith may not be made void. Having understood this—what things must be sought out, and what things must be believed—let us, by setting the discourse onto the contests ^C of the race, hasten to show it a victor. Now, discourse, enter into the contests. 17. We confess that we are ignorant of the manifest knowledge of the truth, since this is in many ways a part of the victory. Yet, examining as much as is attainable by human nature, I shall piously resolve for you what is sought. For how, he says, is the Word in his own temple according to essence, and in all things that exist in like manner, and what more will the temple possess than all things? Let us hear the Word saying, "Who is in the bosom of the Father," according to essence, and is present to all things indivisibly; and we do not say that he is in the Father just as he is in other things, not because his substance is contracted ^D when it comes to be in other things, but on account of the measure of those who receive it, who cannot sustain the divine entrance; and thus, in saying that he is inseparable in his own temple, and that he dwells there as it were the fullness of the Godhead, we also say that he is present to all things according to essence, and not in the same way. For a defiled body does not receive the rays of the Godhead; and learn what is said by an example. For I would not have been held back from the...

^A magnitude of the question when discussing piously with the children of the Church. The sun is set before us all daily in common, and it does not shine less on one and more on another, but sends forth its efficacy in common to all equally. But if anyone has strong eyes, he receives more of its ray, not because the sun is shed more upon him than upon the others, but because of the power of his own vision. But he who is weak in his eyes will not be able to look at the splendor of the light, due to the weakness of his eyes. Think of the Sun of Righteousness in the same way, that He is present to all equally according to His essence, since He is God; but we all, as if having eyes weak and bleary from the filth of sins, cannot bear the presence of the light. But His own temple is as a most pure eye, and therefore it receives the splendor of the entire light, inasmuch as it was formed by the Holy Spirit and is altogether separated from sin. ^B For just as the sun, shining equally upon all according to its efficacy, is not received by all in the same way, so the Word, being present to all according to His essence, is not present to all in the same way as He is to His own temple.

18.

The Epinikion is sung.

^D

QUÆSTIONES ET RESPONSIONES AD ORTHODOXOS.

ADMONITION ON THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO THE ORTHODOX.

^A That Justin is not the author of this work is today so generally agreed that it is not only unnecessary to prove it, but even idle. It is more a matter for wonder that such a monument—in which Irenaeus and Origen are praised, the Manichaeans are mentioned, and histories of the lives of the ancient anchorites are commended—should have been attributed to him. Labbaeus, in *Script. eccles.* p. 669, thinks in vain that this work was composed first from the words of Justin, and then augmented and amplified by another. For such a collection of Questions ought not to appear accidental; rather, it bespeaks the industry of a single writer whose principles are mutually linked and continuous, such that he sometimes refers the reader to earlier Responses, as in Question 104 to Question 97.

^B This book seems to have been known to no one among the ancients, not even to Photius, who, while attributing to Justin "concise solutions to doubts against piety," does not indicate the work that is now in our hands, as some have supposed, but another one appended below, in which questions proposed under the name of the Gentiles are briefly answered.

How easy and simple it is to strip this book from Justin, yet how difficult and profound it is to conjecture—not to establish—to whom it should be attributed. That the writer lived in the fifth century, and indeed in Syria, is judged by clear indications. That he is no older is proven by these words from Quæst. 110: "Whence, then," he says, "did wealthy men and women, by contributing their wealth, seek out anchorites in desert places and supply their need, as we have understood from the histories of the ancient holy men; if the Lord Christ did not bring His promise to pass?"

Nor is he more recent than that same fifth century. For from the fact that Christ, whom he sets as having been born in the sixth millennium of the world—that is, according to the Seventy interpreters, around the year 5500—is said to have been born "in the last days and when the fullness of time had come," he infers that the world will not endure beyond six thousand years (Quæst. 71). This is indeed an argument that this writer lived before the emptiness of such conjectures had been exposed by the event itself.

Why I conjecture that this author is a Syrian is suggested by these signs: first, because he sometimes follows the interpretation of Scripture customary among the Syrians, as in Quæst. 20, and even cites it by name in Quæst. 63; second, because he reckons the beginning of the day in Quæst. 65 not from midnight, but from the early morning hours, a custom we observe to have flourished among the Syrians from St. John Chrysostom, *Homil. 5 in Genes.*

From these conjectures, another suspicion could arise: whether or perhaps Theodore of Mopsuestia, that great light of Syria, should not be considered the parent of this work, as some have supposed, according to the learned Dupin. But there is a great discrepancy between Theodoret and this writer. To the question of why Moses married a foreign wife, Theodoret (Quæst. 4 in Exod.) replies that she was a type of Christ the Lord, who, born of the Jews according to the flesh, called the Church of the Gentiles His bride. Our author, however (Quæst. 90), says that Moses had no reason to fear being led away by his wife to the worship of idols, which was the chief cause why the patriarchs warned their sons against these marriages. To the question of where the Egyptian sorcerers drew water if everything had been turned into blood by Moses, Theodoret replies that the water of the sea had not been turned into blood; our author, however (Quæst. 26), says that all waters that are upon the earth had been turned into blood, but that the sorcerers dug wells near the river from which they could draw water. But that this work cannot be attributed to Theodoret without the greatest injustice will be clear from what will be said shortly.

^C For another kind of argument brings light, which I indeed introduce unwillingly—not because it is dishonorable to this writer, but because I am compelled by many things I have detected in this writing to propose it to the learned for examination. Truly, in these Questions, some things cry out the Pelagian heresy, and they are marked by those signs of the time when the consensus of all in the ancient faith was crumbling, and the defection seemed to be the tares sown by the Pelagians.

That passage of Scripture, "Who is clean from filth? No one, even if his life on earth be but a single day," he denies to be applicable to an infant, "because 'life' is said in respect of the institution of life, but for an infant there is neither an institution of life, nor is there life." This interpretation, so far-fetched and absurd, of a testimony that overturns the Pelagian heresy, reveals great efforts to evade everything that could not consist with this error. The occasion for declaring his sentiment gave this question to our writer, which is the eighty-eighth: "If Christ, who was begotten, did not commit sin, how does Scripture again truly say, which cries out not without an oath: 'There is no one born who has not sinned'?" This question is accommodated to the genius of the Pelagians, who, from the Catholic doctrine of the corruption of nature, inferred that the Catholics themselves attributed corruption to Christ. Whence, in the booklet sent to the Apostolic See, they said: "But we also similarly curse that the Savior was forced by the necessity of the flesh to lie, and that because of the impediment of the flesh He could not do all that He wished" (*apud Augustinum*, tom. X; Append. p. 112). Theodore of Mopsuestia, in Photius, cod. 117, attributes this blasphemy to the Catholics: "That not even Christ and our God, as one who had assumed a sinful nature, was pure from sin."

Nothing pressed the Pelagians more than baptism for the remission of sins, which in the judgment of all Catholics is necessary even for infants. They confessed that baptism was to be celebrated in infants with the same sacramental words as in adults; but yet they did not wish to acknowledge the sin of Adam in infants: some said that their own sins were in them, as is perceived from *lib. I. De peccat. meritis*, nn. 17 and 35, so that they could not be led to confess another's sin. Wondrous is the cunning of our writer in explaining this matter. To this question, which is the fifty-sixth: "If dying infants have neither praise nor blame from their works, what difference will there be in the resurrection between those who, having been baptized by others, did nothing, and those who were not baptized and likewise did nothing?" he replies thus: "This difference is between the baptized and the unbaptized: that the baptized obtain good things through baptism, the unbaptized do not." This response seems to be that of a man who grants the kingdom of heaven to baptized infants, but to unbaptized ones, eternal life.

Yet he does not dare to bring forth his own inventions into the light of a Church that believes and teaches otherwise. He certainly could not deny eternal life to unbaptized infants, for he believed them to be pure and innocent of all sin and defilement. Furthermore, in the Response to Q. 13, he speaks as follows regarding the resurrection of all infants in general: "Whoever believes this to be true: 'It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power,' ^A can and ought to believe also in the resurrection of infants. For He who grants them incorruptibility is also able to confer the faculty by which they may perceive present goods."

No one would surely criticize the fact that the same writer in Q. 8 and 9 says that the knowledge of good and evil and the faculty of fulfilling both were implanted in our nature by God: no one, I say, would criticize this if he admitted that free will was so weakened by the sin of the first parent that we could not be truly free unless the Son had set us free. But in this work, I do not find even that which Pelagius nevertheless admitted, when he said: "We so confess free will that we say we always stand in need of God's aid." Likewise Julian: "But even if anyone says that men can avoid sins without God's grace or assistance, we likewise detest it." Our writer shows less pretense. He understands that saying of Christ: "And I, when I am lifted up, will draw all people to myself," ^B as referring to the final judgment, when Christ "shall have destroyed all rule and every authority and power." He thinks that the Father draws to the Son because He gave the Son power and virtue, "so that He might draw all to Himself" (Resp. to Q. 39). He says in the Resp. to Q. 97: "An adequate physician of sinners has been appointed by God in the world, namely, repentance, which can heal even those who have fallen seventy-seven times, if only they are willing to use the will of repentance." The Pelagians used to say: "If we do not will it, we do not sin, nor would God command a man what would be impossible to human will" (cf. Aug. lib. II *De peccat. mer.*, n. 3). So also this author teaches that we are the ones who choose our masters, and that the faculties of acting are submitted to the power of free will, and he denies that God is the cause of why we are good just as why we are evil (Resp. to Q. 8 and 9).

The Pelagians had become detestable to the Catholic Church (as Augustine says, *Op. Imp.*, lib. 1, n. 53). But yet, that the assembled people in all Churches defended the Catholic faith and hated Pelagian inventions—this, out of supreme stupidity, the Pelagians considered to be to their own honor. "To us," said Julian (lib. II, n. 3), "this hinders us among the people, because we refuse to be an accession to error; to the people, I say, who, weighing the merit of an opinion by its prosperity, deems that opinion truer which they see pleasing the many." The author of the *Questions and Answers to the Orthodox* does not depart in the slightest from Pelagian points. ^C To this question: "How have the tares been multiplied, while the wheat has almost failed?" he replies in Q. 22 by arguing that this very scarcity is a mark of the wheat. "The wheat," he says, "is that which has failed, and the evidence for this is that prediction of Christ: 'Because iniquity has abounded, the love of many will grow cold.'" Who in the fifth century could utter such things unless he were a Pelagian or from the flock of Nestorius or Eutyches? You could not infer from any trace whatsoever that these two latter heresies had already emerged when this work was written. The work of this most absurd response is therefore dedicated to the Pelagians.

In the first Question, it is established as a certain and explored fact that "the Orthodox, who alone are pleasing to God, are not only not equal in number to the Greeks, Jews, and all heretics, but are even far fewer." It is asked, therefore, whether the abrogation of the Jewish cult was not useless, since much seduction still holds the world. How will our writer extricate himself from this difficulty? A number of Orthodox so small does not disturb him in the least; he concedes the fact not unwillingly. But he takes refuge in the point that this, too, was predicted regarding the paucity of the Orthodox when Christ said: "Many are called, but few are chosen." ^D He did not mean by "the Orthodox," therefore, those who, in the Catholic Church extending beyond the borders of the Roman Empire, professed the apostolic doctrine with one mouth and one mind (for he would have admired their multitude; and he would have judged that the pagans, Jews, and heretics combined could not be compared to them); but it is necessary that he should have considered the number of the Orthodox to have receded to that small band of Pelagians, which considered the unanimous consensus of so many nations in asserting and defending the greatest matters to be an argument for error. See what we have observed regarding Question four.

In question 100, it is asked why, after the Orthodox deserted the churches that had been occupied by heretics, miracles did not depart along with the Orthodox. We certainly do not know of any others in that age who were ejected from their churches, except for the Pelagian bishops.

He teaches quite clearly in Q. 23 that the prayer of Christ could not have been in vain, and that the devil entered into Judas before Christ prayed for the disciples. But since the Pelagians said that Jacob was elected based on future works, which God foreknew he would perform (Aug. lib. II, *contra 2 ep. Pelag.*, n. 15), this distinction between Judas and the other disciples does not seem to rest on any other foundation in our writer, who does not even think that the years of our life are appointed and defined by God (Q. 33).

I will not conceal that he speaks as follows in the Resp. to Q. 102: "We too are circumcised by the circumcision of Christ through baptism, stripping off Adam, through whom we were made sinners and had died, and putting on Christ, through whom we, having been justified, rise from the dead." But these things do not seem of such account that I should consider this man purified and approved. For that text: "Through one man sin entered into the world," 437 the Pelagians contended was said on account of imitation, not on account of carnal birth, as Augustine says (1 *contra Jul.*, n. 28).

Regarding the ignorance of the divine law, what our writer thinks, and how aptly he agrees with the Pelagians, can be assessed from Questions 108 and 140. It is more difficult to reconcile with the Pelagians what he says in the Resp. to Q. 32, that "death entered into the world through man's disobedience; and if God is not the author of disobedience, neither can He be the author of death." These things appear at first sight to clash with the Pelagians, who taught "that Adam was created mortal, who, whether he sinned or not, would have died" (Apud Aug. *De gest. Pelagii*, p. 207). But as error is not wont to be consistent with itself, the same Pelagians used to say that death came to us through Adam, not crimes (lib. VI, *contra 2 ep. Pelag.*, n. 6). "That nothing evil passed from Adam through the others, except death, which is not always an evil" (ibid., n. 2). The Pelagians were betraying their own cause by deriving death from Adam's fall. But, hemmed into a corner, they seem to have preferred to confess this than either to invent sins of their own for infants—which Augustine testifies some of them liked (lib. 1 *De peccat. mer.*)—or, with Theodore of Mopsuestia, to pronounce boldly that Adam was created mortal from the beginning; but that God provided the signification only in appearance, so that we might hate sin, as if death had been imposed on him in place of a penalty for sin (apud Photium, cod. 177). I am led by these things to believe that the author of the *Questions and Answers* was from that number of Syrians whom ...

Marius Mercator testifies in his *Commonitorium* that they were associated with Theodore of Mopsuestia. "A question," he says, "contrary to the Catholic faith, having been raised some time ago among certain Syrians, and especially in Cilicia, by Theodore, formerly bishop of the city of Mopsuestia, is still now being chewed over by a few of them, and is not brought forth openly, but is meanwhile kept within the Churches by those very people who are tainted by it, as if they were Catholics." So fervent is this writer of ours, a defender of the Pelagian view; so boldly does he pronounce that the wheat has failed and the Orthodox are very few, that he seems not only to have secretly cherished the remnants of error, but to have written in the very heat of the contention. Furthermore, as is gathered from Question 100, the wound of his grief, which the wretched status of the Pelagian prelates ejected from their churches had branded upon his mind, was still fresh. Therefore, this work can be placed within that time which flowed from the ejection of the Pelagian bishops until the disturbances of the Nestorian heresy.

INDEX OF QUESTIONS

QUEST. I. Why are the Orthodox fewer, not only than the Jews and Greeks, but even than all the heretics? II. If the prophets of the heathens foretold future things, how are ours more excellent than their oracles? III. If those who knew the will of God and yet did not do it will be punished more severely, what gain is there for a Christian over a non-Christian, and for an Orthodox over a non-Orthodox? IV. If heretics have striven with all their might to know the truth, and have not been able, are they not punished undeservedly? V. If miracles occur in the churches of heretics, will this not confirm them in their error? VI. If there will be pain for sinners after the resurrection and joy for the just, how is this state devoid of suffering? VII. How then are the wicked immutable while they consider the rest of the just, and the just while they consider the punishments of the wicked? VIII. How is God not the cause of good and evil, since He gave the knowledge of both and the faculty to fulfill them? IX. If God granted these, how does He justly crown or punish? X. If what the poets said about the gods and what the prophets said about God have an allegorical sense, is it not shown that both are a fable? XI. If that which contains is greater according to substance than that which is contained, but less in dignity, how will God, who contains the universe, not be less than the universe in dignity? XII. How does God, who preserves all things, not also preserve evil? XIII. How do infants not rise in vain? XIV. Why are those coming from heresy not baptized, and their ordination even considered valid, if they received it in heresy? XV. Whether Job was heard or not, when he cursed the day? XVI. If in divine matters, as among men, the Son is consubstantial to the begetter, why does He not exist after the Father for the same reason? XVII. Why are three hypostases said to exist, if they cannot be separated from one another? XVIII. If God is the name of the substance, and Father of the person, why is it the same to say Son of God as Son of the Father? XIX. If the observation of palpitations is forbidden, why does it happen to the pious even against their will? XX. If fish are caught by fishermen for the purpose of killing them, why did the Lord promise that He would make the apostles fishers of men? XXI. Why do monks suffer involuntary things in their sleep? By what means should this war be repelled? Whether he who has been attacked ought to abstain from communion? Whether he ought to approach washed or purified by some other thing? XXII. If the Lord commanded that tares should grow with the wheat, why have the tares multiplied, while the wheat has almost failed? XXIII. If the Lord prayed for the disciples before His passion, why did Judas perish? XXIV. Why do the effects of Apollonius still obtain their force and strength? XXV. In what sense is Moses said to have been learned in all wisdom of the Egyptians and powerful in works and words? XXVI. If all waters were turned into blood by Moses, how could the enchanters of the Egyptians do the same? XXVII. Why did Moses carry away the bones of Joseph, yet avoids one who touches a dead person as unclean? XXVIII. Why did Christ touch the bier of the widow's sons and the hand of Jairus's daughter, if He Himself likened the Pharisees to whitewashed sepulchers, and in the Law he who had touched the dead was unclean? XXIX. When the paralytic was let down through the roof, how was the crowd that was in the house not injured when the roof was broken? XXX. If a guardian angel was given to every man, when the number of men was diminished, as in the flood, what ministry did the angel fulfill then? XXXI. Why are hail and rain brought forth by incantations? XXXII. If God made mortal man, how is it said that He did not make death? XXXIII. If the days of our life are not defined, how were years added to Hezekiah? XXXIV. If the flood was not in every place, how was the water raised above the highest mountains? XXXV. If God is the creator of all those devoid of reason, why is there a distinction of clean and unclean in cattle, fish, and birds? XXXVI. If God is immutable, why did He repent of the anointing of Saul, and change His counsel concerning the overthrow of Nineveh? XXXVII. If the baptism of John was not according to the law, how was it not against the law? XXXVIII. Why did John inquire of Christ through his disciples? XXXIX. If Christ said He would draw all men to Himself, why did not all run to the faith? XL. If demons remain perpetually in demoniacs, how do they harm others? XLI. How do demons provide strength to the bodies of demoniacs? XLII. Why did demons inflict punishments on humans for scorned oracles, and provide benefits for the worship of idols? XLIII. Whether there were only seven or fourteen clean animals in the ark? XLIV. Since the vision of the many-eyed animals was offered to Isaiah and Ezekiel, did one thing reveal something to both, or one thing to one and another to the other? But what did this vision signify? XLV. Why was Ezekiel called "son of man" in the oracle? Was a general resurrection shown to him? Or did the bones truly rise? XLVI. If all things that are in this life are good, why are those who abstain from them praised, and those who embrace them blamed? XLVII. Why does Moses call heaven and earth as witnesses, and Isaiah bids heaven and earth to hear? XLVIII. Why did the Lord say to Mary: "Do not touch me," etc.? XLIX. How can it be proven that only two beasts and cattle were produced by God in the creation of the world? L. What do Hosanna and Alleluia signify? LI. If God is immutable, why does He often repay fitting rewards both to those who blaspheme Him and to those who praise Him? LII. Why did Saul seek a prediction from the ventriloquist? And did she even truly bring up Samuel? LIII. Will men rise again with the distinction of genitals? And is that not superfluous? LV. Why did Moses predict the punishments to be inflicted upon the people in a song? LV. If medicine is a huge good, why was it invented by strangers? LVI. What will be the difference between baptized infants and unbaptized ones? LVII. Why are heavens sometimes reckoned as more than two in Scripture? LVIII. How is Christ not the author of the betrayal of Judas

and of Peter’s denial, he who foresaw these things and did not prevent them? ^A LIX. If the sun is hidden at night, how shall the heavens not be deemed a sphere? LX. Whether we shall rise again in the same differentiation of forms? LXI. If God alone is immortal, how is that statement true: We shall not all sleep? LXII. How do the three days which preceded the creation of the luminaries not make uncertain the number of days which followed them? LXIII. What is the meaning of: He has set His tabernacle in the sun? LXIV. How did Jonah, who was not dead, exist as a figure of Christ truly dead? LXV. Whether the Lord was handed over on the fourth day? LXVI. Why does Christ call Himself the Son of man using the masculine article, and not the feminine? LXVII. That saying, Who shall declare His generation, whether is it to be understood of His divinity or of His flesh? LXVIII. How is it proven that the soul is distinct in the body by creation and is invisible? LXIX. Why is the number seven of such great importance in natural things and in the Scriptures? LXX. If it is forbidden to rejoice and boast in gifts, will they not then be useless? ^B 439 LXXI. Is it true, as some have said, that the world will endure for only six millennia? LXXII. Is God not envious, who, since He could make all men gods, did not do so? LXXIII. If the world is good, and that which is not the world is evil—that is, what existed before the world—are they not both from God? LXXIV. Why does Hellenism, having been overcome by Christianity, have no hope of restoration, when the true religion, having been overcome in ancient times by Hellenism, has now been restored in its entirety? LXXV. In what state is the soul until the resurrection? LXXVI. If the reward for works does not exist before the resurrection, what did it profit the thief to be introduced into paradise? ^C LXXVII. How does the soul not lack sense when separated from the body? LXXVIII. If God declared David to be a man after His own heart, why did he afterwards commit murder and adultery; and why did He will for the lineage of the prophet, of God, and of Christ to be derived from an adulteress? LXXIX. Why did Josiah, whose piety was so great, lose his life to a hostile sword, and why were his sons brought to Babylon? LXXX. Why did Elisha punish with death the mockery of his words by children lacking malice? LXXXI. Why do demons still speak through ventriloquists? And if they do this in the bodies of Christians, does this not redound to the disgrace of the religion? LXXXII. Whence was the name Beelzebub known to the Jews? LXXXIII. If God does not delight in victims, why did He prescribe them before the Law? But if He does delight in them, why did they cease after the Law? ^D LXXXIV. If Elisha obtained a double portion of the grace that was in Elijah, why did he perform neither simple nor double miracles? LXXXV. Regarding those who rose again after the Lord’s passion, why does Scripture mention only the resurrection of their bodies? Did inanimate things rise again? Did they survive, or did they die immediately, or do they remain in immortality? LXXXVI. What is the interpretation of these words: Mina, Ephi, etc.? LXXXVII. If Christ’s miracles were known before the slaughter of John, why were they attributed to Him after John’s slaughter, as if he had come to life again? LXXXVIII. How is that statement true: There is no one who has been born who has not sinned? LXXXIX. If the vessel offered to Peter contained all animals, as Scripture says, must not Peter be declared to have rejected clean and unclean alike? XC. Why did Joseph take an Egyptian wife, and Moses a Midianite, against the custom of their ancestors? XCI. How did Adam fear death, which he had never known by any example? XCII. What do judgments and justification, testimonies and law, precepts and commandments signify? XCIII. If the backs of the heavens are burdened by waters, how can this be said to have been done lest the fire of the luminaries harm the sky, when the stars are moved not in the sky, but under the sky? But if they are in the sky, how can they move in an immobile sky? Or if they move with the sky, how will the sky not be a sphere? But if they are under the sky, what benefit will the waters above the sky provide? XCIV. If the sky shall be rolled up like a book, and the stars shall fall like leaves, how will the firmament not perish completely? XCV. If the air and the sea remain incorruptible, will they not be utterly useless? XCVI. What reward do those infants have who were slain for Christ's sake, or those who praised Him, as He was seated on a beast of burden, not by their own design, but by divine grace? XCVII. How is grace kinder and more humane than the Law, when the Law expiates sins with daily lustrations, while grace grants only a single baptism? XCVIII. Why does the Lord prescribe fear to the apostles, which He elsewhere teaches is not necessary? XCIX. If God prescribed the sacrifices of irrational animals so that He might be worshipped by men, did not those who offered things using reason worship Him better, as these were much more excellent? C. Why do miracles still persist in churches which the orthodox have abandoned because they were occupied by heretics? CI. Why do we learn the greater before the lesser, the Gospel before the Law, when the lesser are accustomed to be set before the greater? CII. If there is nothing useless in our body, why was circumcision prescribed? Or if it was useful to those who were before the coming of the Lord, why do we not also employ it? CIII. How can God, by commanding things which are beyond our strength—namely, that we should not sin—subject the sinner to torments, when man cannot fulfill the Law? CIV. If the Law does not grant pardon for crimes, why was it granted to David? CV. Why is Christ narrated in Scripture to have prayed more frequently than the apostles? CVI. If the nature of both flesh and soul is the same for all men, how are some slow of wit, and others more sharp? CVII. If poems invented by infidels for seduction were allowed under the Law because of the infancy of the mind, why are they employed in churches? CVIII. If involuntary ignorance grants pardon, why did the Jews, who crucified Christ in ignorance, pay such grave penalties? CIX. If all are to rise again, how is Christ called the judge of the living and the dead? CX. If the Lord promised a hundredfold to those who renounce everything, does this include a hundred wives? CXI. How will those who are cut into pieces or burned rise again? CXII. Why, when the apostles thought the kingdom of Israel was glory and delights, is their ignorance confirmed by Christ? CXIII. Did not God, when He created the world, receive this accession, that He became a creator? CXIV. Did not something less inhere in God, when He was creator only in potentiality, and not in actuality? CXV. Why are knees not bent on the Lord's days and from Pascha until Pentecost? CXVI. If the Lord left his burial linens in the tomb when He rose, why does Scripture not say either that He was naked or that He had received clothes from elsewhere? 440 CXVII. How did the Lord enter to the disciples after the resurrection while the doors were shut? CXVIII. Why do Christians turn toward the sun when they pray? CXIX. If before the flood men lived neither on the fruits of the earth nor on meat, how did Abel offer victims from the fat of the sheep which he was herding, and Cain from the fruits of the earth which he was cultivating, to God? CXX. If the kingdom of God is resurrection and it awaits both the just and sinners, how does Paul declare those who do forbidden things to be disinherited? CXXI. Why is it said that Peter began to anathematize, and what is the distinction between anathema and catathema? CXXII. If our affairs are not contained by hours and days, why did Christ say: My hour has not yet come? CXXIII. If it is an evil to be miserable, is man not the most wretched, who alone is immersed in miseries? CXXIV. Why did God not place the souls of the pious in strong bodies? Or at least why are all the pious not immersed in the same miseries? CXXV. Why did Paul invoke evil upon the high priest Alexander? CXXVI. If God rewarded the pious with prosperous things, like Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, whence were the same things provided to the Greeks who worship idols? Why, when the worship of idols once flourished, were cities and fields abounding in complete fertility, but now are destitute of homes, inhabitants, and abundance? CXXVII. If many animals set snares for themselves and for men, how is God to be thought to have made all things good and very good? CXXVIII. How is it that irrational animals do not follow ways that are evil solely through the depravity of their nature?

CXXIX. How is God, who consists of three hypostases, said to be uncompounded, one, and uncircumscribed? CXXX. If it follows, because the heaven according to the Greeks is a sphere and moves, that it exists in a place, does the same not follow from the fact that according to Scripture it is compact as a vault and stretched out like a skin? CXXXI. Does not Luke conflict with Matthew, who assigns more progenitors to Christ in His Gospel according to the law than according to nature? CXXXII. In the Mosaic Law, did the brother of one who died without children take his brother’s wife, even if he himself had a wife? Did he also marry one who was sterile? CXXXIII. Why does Matthew record the progenitors of Christ according to nature before and after David, but Luke [records] those who were after David according to the law? And if the names of both after the captivity do not exist in the Scriptures, how shall they be authenticated? CXXXIV. Why is the Law often not called "Law," but Moses the legislator? CXXXV. How will the Lord be considered the true Christ, who nowhere received the aforementioned appellation of Emmanuel? CXXXVI. Why did Christ rebuke his mother, and [why] is he considered by some to have spoken with insult toward his mother? CXXXVII. If Christ was first anointed with oil and later suffered, why do we in baptism first celebrate the mysteries of his passion and resurrection, and then get anointed with ointment? CXXXVIII. How is God just, who kills so many on account of the lapses of others, namely those of Jonathan and David? CXXXIX. How is God one, when the Father begets, yet the Son does not beget; the Son is begotten, yet the Father is not begotten? CXL. If the Jews killed Christ as an heir, how do Christ and Paul attribute ignorance to them in this crime? CXLI. If only Christ fulfilled the Law, how are Zacharias and Elizabeth said to have been blameless in the Law, and how does Paul take the same praise for himself? CXLII. If men are called gods in Scripture, why shall we not also call the angels gods? CXLIII. How is man not falsely called a god? CXLIV. If God has an existing hypostasis and a non-existent volition, and the Son subsisting, how is he called simple, being composed of so many things? CXLV. If flesh consists by that through which blood also consists, why does God permit the eating of the flesh of animals, but forbid the use of the flesh together with the blood? CXLVI. If God predicted future events even through the prophets of the Greeks, how is it that the Greeks, fighting against Greeks, were delivered from the evils mentioned in the first interrogation, by the command of an oracle through some act forbidden in the Scriptures?

RESPONSES TO THE ORTHODOX

^A 441 QUESTION ONE. If God removed the ancient worship as not pleasing to him, and in its place introduced the Christian [worship] as pleasing to himself, and yet the Orthodox—who alone please God—are not equal in number to the Greeks, Jews, and all the heretics, but are even fewer: what proof is there that it is not due to a lack of power that the one who preferred this worship to that allowed the seduction to remain uneradicated? Furthermore, how is the abrogation of that former worship not useless, while much seduction still holds the world?

RESPONSE, OR SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION. When God had abrogated the ancient worship and intended to introduce the new ^B through the Old Testament, in introducing this religion in its place—which was preached by words confirmed by the testimony of divine powers—he first destroyed Judaism and Hellenism; and later, by works likewise performed through divine powers, he brought about the eradication of all error in humans and demons; and along with this, he shall abrogate the worship of all the wicked heresies in the world, and

^A if not all those who have received true worship keep and hold the same opinion about the same things, but some understand them rightly and others not rightly, this is by no means to be imputed to God as a lack of power—as if what they have believed was not rightly understood by them because of their own negligence or some other weakness—but it must be attributed to their own neglect. Indeed, it has been said in the religion which has been introduced regarding the paucity of the Orthodox, at one time: *Many are called, but few are chosen*; at another time: *For narrow and strait is the way that leads to life, and few are they who find it*. Similarly also regarding the heresies, which the Lord in his parables calls tares and rotten fish. If, therefore, there is nothing false in the Christian religion, as the truth of the facts bears witness, which by the things that have preceded creates faith in things to come, there is absolutely no room left for an excuse to slander God on the grounds of a lack of power, or to say that the worship substituted for worship is useless; for it is currently the destroyer of Judaism and Hellenism, and later it will also destroy the heresies. ^B

QUESTION II. If future events, such as triumphs in war, incursions of enemies, and the ruin of cities by those who attacked them, were predicted by the prophets and apostles, and if the responses of the oracles among the Greeks also predicted them, whence can it be recognized that our oracles are superior to those of outsiders, since the prediction of future events has been made on both sides?

^C RESPONSE. All these things belong to the same God, both the prediction by words and the outcome of the events—He who both announced through the prophets and apostles what He was about to do, and likewise signified through those who are alien to the true religion what He was about to do. For just as through the seer Balaam He blessed Israel, but cursed his enemies, and brought about both things through the prediction of future events, so also through a prophecy to the king of Babylon, Nebuchadnezzar, He signaled the capture of Jerusalem, just as the prophet Ezekiel says: *And the king of Babylon shall stand at the ancient way, at the head of two ways, to divine a divination, and to shake his rod and consult the idols, and to look at his right hand. And it came upon Jerusalem*, and what follows. So also, through the seers of the Greeks, He Himself foretold whatever has truly been brought to pass. But there is a very great distinction between the prophets and the seers. First, indeed, that in whose name each one prophesies...

namely, the God whom ^A the prophets and apostles worshipped, they possessed the knowledge of him, and the faith, and the worship; and all things that the prophets foretold concerning both the destruction of the Greek gods and their oracles, and the establishment of Christian matters, received their fulfillment; but, next, none of the things which the seers foretold, either against the God of truth and those who worship him, or in favor of the establishment of Greek matters, received its fulfillment. And a witness to these is the destruction of the Assyrians, who, setting out from their own divination, said that they had not ascended against this land to desolate it without the Lord; [saying,] "The Lord said to me: Ascend, and desolate it." And when he had ascended, he was desolated, contrary to the divination.

QUESTION III. If in the resurrection all indeed ^B who have sinned are punished, but more severely those who have known the will of God and have not done it, what is the distinction, what is the profit of the Christian and the Greek, of the baptized and the unbaptized, of the Orthodox and the non-Orthodox?

ANSWER. If, according to the apostle Paul, the believer who does not provide for his own has denied the faith and is worse than the unbelievers, then he who does not join to his knowledge, faith, and baptism the life which is the mark and proof of the discipline of Christ, but has the form of godliness while denying its power ^C is worse than the unbelievers. Thus, it is as much worse to sin with knowledge than without knowledge, as a sin that is inexcusable is graver than a sin that has an excuse.

QUESTION IV. If the heretics have striven with all their might to know and to keep the truth of the dogmas, and have not been able, how is it not unjust to subject them to punishments as having swerved from the truth?

ANSWER. The heretics have so little sought the truth with all their might that they have not even deigned to hear or accept it when demonstrated to them by those who have found it. And if this were a true excuse, they ought to have forgiven one another for falling, as though out of weakness of power ^D and not from malice of mind, the [original-script column: see facsimile] heresies having been established, fighting against both themselves and the truth...

Now, since they condemn one another by reason of ^A different tenets, it is manifest that all heresies have had the causes of their formation from the ambition or mutual hatreds of their originators; for which cause the leaders of the heresies were called by the Apostle "grievous wolves." And that it is impossible for one who seeks the truth with his whole heart and power not to attain the discovery of it, the Lord Himself bears witness, saying: "Everyone that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened."

QUESTION V.

ANSWER.

QUESTION VI.

ANSWER. We say that they will rise free from passion, because we shall not receive change regarding those things which we are by nature, neither into opposites according to existence and non-existence, nor into ^D contraries according to more and less; for example, we shall not be turned from joy into sorrow, nor shall we rejoice in the same good, sometimes more and sometimes less, even if we rejoice more in a greater good,

but in this way, according to the proportion of goods, the measure of joy remains immutable. And this is so for those who rise to life; the same principle applies to those who rise to judgment, when they depart, as it were, from death to judgment. For in one way or another ^A of those who rise, some rise to life, and others to judgment.

QUESTION VII. If it is a sign of change to consider both good and evil things in one's mind, how are those who are punished immutable, when they consider the rest of the just, or, on the other hand, those who are in rest and consider the punishment of sinners? For then each state gives a greater perception of the other when the comparison of opposites takes place.

ANSWER. In the world to come, the scope of perception—both of reward and of punishment—is set in measure, and it is not possible for that perception to be increased or diminished by the comparison of opposites. For all things there are immutable, as in quality, so also in quantity.

QUESTION VIII. If we have received the knowledge of good and evil, and our very existence, from God, how is He not the cause of both, since He has implanted in our nature both the knowledge of both and the power to fulfill them?

ANSWER. God has given us not only the power to exist and to know and to do both good and evil, but He has also bestowed upon us free will; and of the things we know, He has made us lords to choose by preference that which seems good to us. He has not placed the *being* ^B good or bad in the knowledge of the things known, but in the choice of those who choose. Therefore, God is not the cause of our being good or evil, but our own moral choice (prohairesis) is. For just as one who sees a woman who is a prostitute, and knows her to be a prostitute, is not a fornicator by virtue of that knowledge; nor, even if the knowledge should awaken the passion of desire, is he a fornicator even then; but if the moral choice assents to the passion, then he is a fornicator, either in act or in affection of the mind—so too, for good and evil men, knowledge is not the cause of their being good or evil, but the moral choice which, by preference, has chosen what seemed best to it.

QUESTION IX. If God has given those things aforementioned, and crowns and punishes each man according to his deeds, how does He do both justly, when a man has received both *abilities* from Him?

ANSWER. That which is "in us" and that which is "up to us" differ from one another. We are males or females—that is "in us"; but to be chaste ^C or ^D fornicators is "up to us." We are crowned...

^A or punished therefore according to that which is within our power; for according to that to which our choice leads us, for that we are either crowned or punished. For God has indeed given us faculties for acting, but He has subjected these to the authority of our choice, and God exercises judgment upon our choice, which governs ^B the faculties within us, and not upon our nature. For we received from God the faculty of acting and of not acting—of acting justly, and of not acting unjustly. When, therefore, we act and do not act in this way, we are justly crowned; but if we transfer the acting and the not acting to their opposites, we are justly punished.

QUESTION X. If corporeal things, which are spoken of the gods by the poets among the Greeks, and of God by the prophets, have a different meaning according to allegory, how is it shown that both are not myth?

ANSWER. Those things which were spoken allegorically by the prophets concerning God were spoken by a translation from things that exist by nature to that which does not exist by nature; as for example: "The Lord smelled a scent of sweetness." Among men, he smelled according to nature, but concerning God it is said catachrestically and not according to nature. But those things which are spoken mythically by the poets concerning the gods are not said by a translation from things that exist by nature to that which exists not by nature. For a man does not swallow a man according to nature, so that we might understand by translation that Jupiter was also swallowed by Saturn. This myth ^C about Jupiter being swallowed has nothing in it except falsehood.

QUESTION XI. If that which contains is greater according to substance than that which is contained, but less according to dignity—as heaven and earth are to angels and men, a house to those living in it, or a body to a soul—and God contains all things, how is He not less than the universe by the argument of dignity?

ANSWER. This line of reasoning is not general, and therefore the questioning does not hold correctly. For when the contrary can be found through the very same premises, such [premises] do not have necessary consistency, nor do they produce belief. For there are some things contained that are less than those that contain them, both in substance and in dignity, as the seeds (pips) of fruits. Furthermore, those things which are called "containing" contain ^D that which is contained by their substance; but God alone contains the universe by His will. And other containing things themselves need another to contain them; but God does not need another by whom He might be contained. And indeed, for other things that are contained, their being and enduring do not come from those by which they are contained; but for the universe, both are provided by God. And those things called "containing" exist on account of the things contained; but God does not exist on account of the universe. Therefore, He is greater

as regards substance, so also in dignity.

^A QUES. XII. If that which contains is for the custody and preservation of that which is contained, how is it that God, who contains the universe, does not contain the universe for the custody and conservation of evil? For evil is perceived in a part of the universe.

RESP. The universe is the work of God; and while God preserves the universe, He preserves His own work. And just as God has made nothing that is evil by nature, so too He preserves nothing that is evil by nature.

QUES. XIII. If the resurrection happens on account of the recompense for the life led by everyone, how is it that infants, or even those who have died in the mother's womb, do not rise in vain, since they neither receive the reward for works, nor, on account of their immature age, are they able to perceive the sense of rest or affliction?

RESP. He who believes it to be true ^B that "It is sown in infirmity, it is raised in power" (1 Cor. xv, 42), is able and ought to believe also in the resurrection of infants. For He who grants them immortality is able also to grant them the faculty of perceiving the good things that are present. For if there is no resurrection of these, God will be found to have fashioned them in vain. But if God does nothing in vain, it is necessary, indeed, that infants also be brought into existence through the resurrection. Furthermore, how would it not be absurd to condemn Herod on account of the vengeance for the slaughter of the infants, if the infants, who are to be vindicated, do not exist? To these things, the leaping for joy of John the Baptist in his mother's womb, and the hymn of the infants and sucklings, bear witness.

QUES. XIV. If the baptism which is given by heretics is false and vain, why do the orthodox, when a heretic flees to the assembly of the orthodox, not baptize him, but leave him in that spurious baptism as if it were valid? But if by chance he has received ordination from them, they receive even that as firm and stable. How therefore are both the one who is admitted and those who admit him without reproach?

RESP. The error of the heretic coming to the orthodox ^C assembly is corrected: the error of his perverse opinion by the change of his mind; that of his baptism by the anointing of the holy chrism; that of his ordination by the laying on of hands; and nothing remains of his previous state that has not been absolved.

QUES. XV. If Job did not sin when he cursed the day, it is clear that as a just man he was heard. But if he was heard, God overturned His own law, and it is necessary to seek in divine Scripture for the destruction of that day. But if he was not heard, how must it not be said that he was not heard because he was a sinner? For God will perform ^D the will of those who fear Him. Concerning

those who are sinners, however, it is said: "If you multiply prayer, I will not hear you."

^A RESPOND. The intention of Job in the curse proposed was as if he were to say: "Would that that day in which I was born had been cursed according to this curse!" Why? "In order that I," he says, "might not have been born." For it is not possible for anyone to be born on such a day, in a day thus cursed. Therefore, that curse is not to be understood as if it were awaiting an outcome. For if the curse had been made in such a way as to await an outcome, he would have called back his own words once he had been freed from his afflictions and had begun to enjoy more prosperous things. These words, therefore, he uttered from his heart because of the greatness of his affliction; when that was removed from him, he evidently no longer felt the same way concerning the same day.

QUESTION XVI. If, according to our nature, whatever is begotten is consubstantial with the begetter, how is it that, according to this same nature, whatever is begotten does not exist after the begetter? But if we cannot understand the second, neither will the first be understood by us in the same way regarding the divine generation.

RESPOND. We, who have an existence prior to generation, beget after our existence. But God at once exists and begets. Therefore, there is no "post-existence" of the begotten one in God, because there is no pre-existence of generation.

QUESTION XVII. If the conjunction of the divine hypostases cannot be severed, how can there be three hypostases and three named persons, and not rather one hypostasis in three names and three persons?

^C RESPOND. The unity of the essence of the divine hypostases does not admit distinction; but their trinity takes in distinction. Wherefore the three hypostases are three by individual names, and the hypostasis which we call Father we no longer call also the hypostasis of the Son, but another. For we say the trinity of names belongs to the trinity of hypostases, not to the unity of them. And so, God is one, as the unity of the essence does not admit of distinction; but the persons are three, by the distinction of the hypostases.

QUESTION XVIII. If "God" designates the substance, but "Father" designates the person, how is it the same thing to say "Son of God" and "Son of the Father"?

^D RESPOND. If we speak of the Son disjunctively, we say now "Son of the Father," now "Son of God"; but we never think of Him disjunctively. Therefore, the Son of the Father is the Son of Him who is God according to essence. It is the same thing, however, to say "Son of the Father" and "Son of God," because if anything pertains to the person, that also pertains to the essence of the person.

^A QUEST. XIX. If the observation of palpitations is among those things forbidden by the pious, why can the pious, though they wish to repel it with all their might, not do so, whether it indicates something joyful or something sad? And if this thing is evil, how does it come about against our will? But if it is good, which I indeed do not think, why is it forbidden?

RESP. The foreknowledge of future things belongs to the soul illuminated by the divine Spirit for the knowledge of things that are hidden, and not to the involuntary movement of the body. A palpitation is a bodily affection arising from the flow of the natural spirit which resides in the bodies of all animals. Therefore, the saints judged it unworthy for such a bodily movement to be a criterion of future things; and just as the sneezing of the nose and the ringing of the ears happen against our intention, so too does a palpitation. Furthermore, for those who have received the hope of the future state, and who have set before themselves one goal—that of looking always toward it in readiness—it is superfluous to foreknow here, through palpitations, whether things are joyful or sad. And if the same palpitation which foretells riches happens to a secular man and to an ascetic, how is that foretelling of riches through a palpitation not false, since the ascetic’s resolve does not admit of the acquisition of things not present, nor even the possession of things that are present?

^B QUEST. XX. If fishermen take fish out of the waters unto death and destruction, how did the Lord Christ, being about to lead men into eternal life through the apostles, promise that He would make them fishers of men?

RESP. Since it was necessary for men caught by the apostles with the net of the kingdom to die to their previous life in sins, for this reason the Lord likened the catching of men to the catching of fish. And He added "unto life," adding what was missing from the analogy to that which was being taught.

^C QUEST. XXI. If monks, led by a chaste mind, have rejected conjugal pleasures, why do they suffer involuntary things in the images they receive during sleep, and think in their imagination that they are having intercourse not only with anyone at all, but sometimes even with mothers and sisters? What things, then, must be used for the deliverance from such a battle? And is one who has been attacked required to abstain from the mysteries; and if it is ^D necessary to approach them...

^A after having washed or having used some other such thing, so as not to be cleansed in a Jewish manner, instruct us, since there is much investigation into this among them also.

RESP. Since those who are consecrated to God have a watchful adversary, who in all ways possible to him contrives to cast reproach upon the pious, for this reason they suffer involuntary things in their sleep. ^B Indeed, although the adversary knows that we are neither praised for those things which are not in our power, nor blamed for shameful things (for praises and reproaches belong to those things which are done by us with the assent of the mind), and that dreams are among those things not in our power, nevertheless he moves in us, through dreams, the actions of both, the honorable and the shameful, having hopes in this, lest perhaps, by rousing us [(55)] to the performance of honorable things, he might stir us to vain boasting of things not practiced by us, or, by the performance of shameful things, he might be able to find us delighting in an unlawful act. But while it is not in our power to see such dreams, it is in our power to be delighted or saddened by such involuntary action. Therefore, if he finds us rejoicing in the involuntary action, the adversary boasts as a victor; but if he finds us saddened, he is rendered vain, being defeated by our will. It is therefore sufficient for deliverance from the evil machination to be saddened by what has happened involuntarily, and to wash away with tears the defilement of the phantasies that arise in us in such an involuntary manner. As for those who suffer such involuntary things, it is not at all right for them to abstain ^C from the communion of the divine mysteries; were it otherwise, we would thereby destroy the distinction between voluntary and involuntary evils.

449 QUEST. XXII. If the Master Christ declared that the tares were to grow along with the wheat, how is it that the tares have multiplied, while the wheat has almost failed; and what is the proof that what has failed is the wheat; and how is the prophecy that they would grow together not proven false?

RESP. The proof that the wheat is what has failed is this prediction of Christ, which says: "Because iniquity hath abounded, the charity of many shall grow cold." [21. Matt. xxiv. 12.]

And again: "In the last times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to spirits of error and doctrines of men." And again: "They shall turn away their ears from the truth and shall be turned unto fables." And again: "There shall come to you ravening wolves, not sparing the flock, to draw away disciples after them." That the wheat does not fail until the consummation of the age, the Lord declares, saying: "But for the sake of the elect whom the Father hath chosen, those days shall be shortened." But if anything has happened to the wheat that was not predicted concerning its growth and failure, it is clear that the prediction regarding it has been proven false. But if all that was to befall it from the beginning of the preaching until the consummation of the age was given through prophecies, it is manifest that the word concerning it is in no way false. Moreover, if there are tares, it is necessary that there be wheat also; for by the comparison of one with the other, the wheat is known for what it is, and likewise the tares; and if one does not exist, neither is the other known for what it is.

^A QUEST. XXIII. If before the passion the Lord prayed that the disciples might be sanctified by the Father, but afterwards Judas perished, how does the prayer offered for them appear to have been accepted? And how is that saying shown to be true: "I know that thou hearest me always"?

RESP. The perdition of Judas occurred from the time that Christ, having taken the morsel and dipped it, gave it to him; and when Judas had taken the morsel, Satan entered into him, and going out, he separated himself from the other disciples. Now the prayer for the disciples was made after the departure of Judas; and this is shown by the prayer itself, when the Lord, in praying, said: "Those whom thou hast given me I have kept, and none of them hath perished, except the son of perdition, that the Scripture might be fulfilled." ^B Therefore, first came the perdition of Judas, then the prayer for the disciples, and finally the passion of the Saviour.

QUEST. XXIV. If God is the Creator and Lord of the creation, how do the deeds of Apollonius obtain power in parts of the creation? For they check the assaults of the sea, the force of the winds, and the incursions of mice and wild beasts, as we see. And if the miracles performed by the Lord are reported only in narration, whereas those by him are for the most part shown in the things themselves, how do they not deceive the beholders? And if this happened by divine permission, how was such a permission not a guide to Greek superstition? If not, how were these things not done by the power of demons? Again, if God, as being pleased with what was being done as if it were good, ^C was a helper in its accomplishment, why were not such things performed through prophets or apostles? But if it displeased Him because it was evil, why did He not restrain the evil immediately, or after a little while abolish it, but as it

^A stands, did not abolish it, but permitted it to remain until the age of the days of creation?

RESP. Apollonius, as a man skilled in the powers of nature and in the sympathies and antipathies inherent in them, produced his effects according to this science, not by divine authority. Wherefore, in all his operations, he required the acquisition of suitable materials to assist him in the accomplishment of what was being performed. But our Savior Christ, performing miracles by His own divine authority, in no way required material, but His command and prediction were followed by the events, as they still follow. And as for the effects brought about by Apollonius, since they were produced according to the science of natural forces for the bodily use of men, the Lord did not destroy them; but He stopped the mouth of the demon himself who sat in his statue and deceived men through divinations so that they would worship and revere Apollonius as God, and He suppressed his divinations. At the same time, along with him, He also removed the power of the other demons whom the Greeks worshipped under the name of gods, as is evident from the facts themselves. Having, therefore, in these matters the proofs of Christ's divine power, it is not ^B right to say that Christ's miracles consist merely in a bare narrative.

QUESTION XXV. If Moses was instructed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, and was mighty in deeds and words, as the divine Scripture says, why did the same blessed prophet not pursue astronomy, geometry, astrology, and the subjects that follow from these? For the wisdom of the Egyptians at that time taught doctrines of error. Why, then, is he admired by the Scripture for such words or deeds?

RESP. The divine Scripture admires the prophet for the excellence of his words and deeds, not because of the words and deeds in themselves; for in themselves those things were unworthy to adorn the prophet with praises. But because the prophet was conspicuous to the Egyptians in both—in the learning of ^C letters and in the splendor of worldly life—and because he placed piety towards God above both, for this reason the divine Scripture admires him. Now, astronomy, astrology, and geometry were at that time considered among the Egyptians to be common, pedestrian, and vulgar disciplines. But the sciences called hieroglyphic were held in value; these were not imparted to just anyone, but to select men in the inner sanctuaries. While the prophet possessed the knowledge of these, he did not possess their use, inasmuch as it was contrary to the manner of worshipping God of the Hebrews, for the sake of which he scorned all royal power in Egypt and chose to suffer affliction with the people of God. ^D

^A

QUESTION XXVI. If all the waters were made blood by Moses, how does Scripture add, "And the enchanters of the Egyptians did likewise"? For it is either false that all the waters were made blood by Moses, or again that the enchanters did likewise. And the same argument applies to the rest of their miracles.

ANSWER. When all the waters upon the earth had become blood, the Egyptians were compelled to dig wells around the river and draw water, and to give it to themselves, their animals, and their cattle to drink. From this water drawn from the wells, the enchanters made blood; and thus the statement is in no way false. And the miracles performed by Moses, inasmuch as they were performed by divine power, occurred by a change in the nature of the object before the eyes into the nature of that which was being produced; but the things done by the enchanters occurred through the operation of demons, who deceived the eyes of the spectators, so that they saw what was not a serpent as a serpent, and what was not blood as blood, and what were not frogs as frogs. ^B

QUESTION XXVII. Did Moses not teach things contrary to himself, when he carried the bones of Joseph, but loathed as unclean anyone who touched a dead body? And if there was some reasonable cause for this, let us now learn it. And for what reason did Scripture not say for what cause Moses did those things while teaching these things?

ANSWER. Since Joseph, when he was dying, adjured the sons of Israel to carry out his bones, and both things were set before Moses to be observed—namely, not to transgress the oath and not to touch a dead body—for this reason, by breaking the law which says not to touch a dead body, he kept the oath inviolate. ^C For it was impossible for him to keep both inviolate, both the law and the oath. By the greater observance of the oath, therefore, he dissolved the lighter observance of the law. For everywhere the lesser evil is to be preferred to the greater. And many such things are found in Holy Scripture, which God does not count as sin for those who transgress them on account of the necessity that has befallen them, such as the eight-day circumcision, and the seven-day circuit of Jericho, and the offering of sacrifices on the Sabbath, which carry with them the breaking of the Sabbath. ^D Furthermore, if the prophet commanded that those who in succession carried the bones of Joseph should remain unclean for seven days, through the observation of this number in purifications...

he did nothing contrary to what he said. To ask, however, why the prophet did not state the cause of these things is the same as asking why not all the Scriptures were handed down with an added interpretation by those who published them, if indeed the rationale for understanding the matter is significantly contained within the narrative of the thing itself. Therefore, Scripture did not judge it necessary to declare this with an explanation. ^A

QUESTION XXVIII. If the Lord, reproving the feigned piety of the Pharisees, said that they were like whitewashed sepulchers, full of dead men’s bones and all uncleanness; and if in the Law he who touched a dead body was considered unclean, as though he had committed a sin; and if we ourselves also avert our eyes from the dead and their sepulchers, since in both the Old and New Testaments a corpse is called unclean: how did the Lord, in acting otherwise, not act contrary to both, when, in raising the widow’s son, he touched the bier, and when he took the hand of the daughter of Jairus? For although both were later resurrected, yet the dead bodies received his touch. ^B

RESPONSE. We avert our eyes from the dead bodies of men and their sepulchers because of the heavy stench adhering to them, and not because of their mortality. For if we averted our eyes from the bodies of the dead solely because of their mortality, we certainly ought not to use parts from the bodies of dead animals for the use of the living, such as skins, horns, hair, bile, fat, and flesh, which no reason can exempt from the mortality inherent in them. But if these things are dead, and yet we do not avert our eyes from them because of the utility we derive from them, how is it not most absurd to consider these things pure because of the utility they provide, while the bodies and sepulchers of the holy martyrs, which have the power of guarding against the snares of demons and of healing diseases incurable by the medical art, are an abomination to the Greeks? ^C Moreover, the Lord compared the feigned piety of the Pharisees to whitewashed sepulchers, because just as the mind of the living turns away from the stench and uncleanness of dead bodies, so the mind of the pious turns away from their iniquity, since their souls are a mortality, a stench, and an uncleanness. For just as, when the soul has departed from the body, the body is dead and foul-smelling and unclean, so, when the fear of God has departed from the soul, the soul is dead and foul-smelling and unclean. ^D Now, the Lord did nothing contrary to either the Old or the New

Testament. For He was not under the Law when He raised those of whom the question speaks. For the Lord began the evangelical way of life from His baptism, which is free and loosed from the observance of the Law. Therefore, by touching the dead man, He was not defiled. In the New Testament, moreover, only those things defile men which are the evils that proceed from the heart; but to touch a dead body does not defile a man. ^B

QUESTION XXIX. If the house in which the Lord was when He was about to heal the paralytic was full, and for that reason those who were carrying him were compelled to break up the roof and lower the infirm man through it, how is it that the crowds gathered in the house were not struck when the roof was being dismantled?

ANSWER. Those who were in the house, perceiving that the roof was about to be uncovered, certainly moved away. For those who were removing the roof were not so thoughtless as not to shout a warning to those in the house to move away, so that they would not be struck. For there was no need for the whole roof to be uncovered, but only as much as was sufficient to lower the paralytic.

QUESTION XXX. If an angel follows each person as a guardian, as the divine Scripture says, and if men sometimes undergo increase, and sometimes decrease—as in the time of the flood and other calamities—because of their own deeds, what ministry were those angels then performing, since they are incapable of increase or decrease and each of the angels has received a ministry from God from the beginning? ^C

ANSWER. All the angels, both those who govern and those who are governed, fulfill a ministry useful to the heavens and to the things that were made for the sake of man. But those who have received the task of following and guarding men always increase, and are never diminished. For they follow either the composite being—I mean soul and body together—or they follow the soul after its departure from the body, until the time of the renewal of the world. But before they are commanded to follow men and guard them, they serve their own superiors in other ministries on behalf of man.

QUESTION XXXI. If by the divine will the clouds send down rain upon the earth, why do those called "cloud-movers" ^D bring it about by certain incantations that the clouds, wherever they wish, cast down hail and immense rains?

ANSWER. Since you testify, according to the holy Scriptures, that it is unbelievable for rains to proceed from incantations, [it follows that your premise is false]. For even you, who have asked this question on this subject, have not formulated the question from things you have seen taking place, but from things you have heard.

QUESTION XXXII. If God created our nature mortal, how do you say that God did not create death?

ANSWER. If something is mortal by nature, it does not necessarily have to die. The proof of this is that Enoch and Elijah, although mortal by nature, still continue in immortality, having risen above that word, "You are earth and into earth you shall go." It is therefore true that God created our nature mortal, and that death entered the world through man's disobedience. For if, just as God created the nature mortal, He had also created death, then death would not have come about through disobedience; and if God is not the author of disobedience, then He is not, therefore, the author of death either. ^A

QUESTION XXXIII. If the nature of men, in so far as it is mortal, recognizes its own end, but the time of each one's life is not determined by any limit—that which those outside call fate—how were years added to Hezekiah? For what is added is clearly taken to be an addition to a predetermined number. From where, then, is the indefinite nature of time for those who are dying demonstrated?

ANSWER. That the time of each one's life is not ^B fixed is demonstrated from the words of Scripture thus: "If," it says, "a man finds in a field a young woman who is betrothed, and forcing her, lies with her, you shall kill the man, but you shall not kill the young woman. In the same way that a man has struck his neighbor, and while he was striking him there was no one to bring help, so this deed happened; and the young woman cried out, and there was no one to help her." The divine Scripture would not have compared a forced lying with a forced murder if death were determined. For what is determined by God is neither subject to force nor to be transgressed. But if this is the case, clearly years of life were not added to the predetermined life of Hezekiah, but to those years of his which had preceded indefinitely, the end of which was at hand due to a lethal malady, had God not ^C healed his malady and restored him to life. ^D

^A QUAESTION XXXIV. If, as some say, the flood did not occur in every place on earth, but only in those where the men of that time dwelt, how is it true that the water was raised fifteen cubits above all the highest mountains? ANSWER. It does not seem true that the flood did not occur in every part of the world, unless perhaps the places where the flood occurred were lower than the other places of the earth.

^A QUESTION XXXV. If God is the creator of all beings endowed with reason, why did He declare that that which has a cloven hoof and chews the cud is clean? And again, why is that which chews the cud indeed, like the camel, but does not have a cloven hoof, numbered among the evil; and that which does indeed have a cloven hoof but does not chew the cud, like the pig, counted among the unclean? And as to fishes, why are those that lack scales unclean? And why are birds distinguished, even though some of the clean ones, if permitted, eat and do the same things as the unclean? ANSWER. By nature all animals are clean, and were made good by God from the beginning, according to the saying: "And God saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was very good," and they received the divine blessing, God saying: "Increase and multiply." But because God wished, in all matters, including food, to subject the Jews under the yoke of the slavery of the Law, for this reason He called some animals, birds, and fishes clean, the slaughter and eating of which He permitted to the Jews; and others He called unclean, from the eating of which He prohibited them. These are therefore called clean and unclean: clean because of their nature; unclean, however, because of the Law. And again, they are called clean and unclean for this reason: since in Egypt at that time all animals, except the pig, were deified, for this reason He called some of the animals clean and others unclean; and those that were clean He permitted them to sacrifice, and the others He forbade them to eat as being unclean, by each means ^B showing them to be unworthy of the title and honor of God, both by their being sacrificed and eaten, and again by their being called unclean.

^C QUESTION XXXVI. If the Divine is not susceptible to change, why does it speak of repenting concerning the anointing of Saul, and concerning the destruction of Nineveh that it changed its mind? ANSWER. The Lord God is immutable, both in His being and in His doing those things that are appropriate to Him. But in providing for those things which are subject to change, he turns affairs for the benefit of those for whom he provides; wherefore He is immutable both in forgiving and in not forgiving. For He forgives immutably those who correct their own failings; but as for those who persist in ^D evils without amendment, He immutably

^A refuses forgiveness. The statement, therefore, that "He felt remorse," manifests His immutability in the matter of not forgiving. But the statement, "The Lord repented," signifies His immutability in the matter of forgiving. For God is immutable, and He always remains in that which is fitting for Himself; He never at any time admits a change toward doing those things which are not fitting for Him.

QUEST. XXXVII. If the baptism of John was not according to the Law, as indeed it was not, how was it not contrary to the Law, and how was it received by those who were bound by the Law? And how were those who were under the Law not transgressors of the Law, who, while they were under the Law, received that baptism which was against the Law? If, however, the baptism of grace was under the Law, and yet is said to have been neither according to the Law, nor above the Law, nor contrary to the Law, in what manner, then, will it be found to have existed?

RESP. The baptism of John was a prelude to the Gospel of grace; wherefore it was also above the Law. For it was not permitted to those who had sinned against the Law ^B to receive forgiveness in that baptism through repentance and faith in Christ.

QUEST. XXXVIII. If John wished to persuade his disciples concerning Christ, that He is the Christ, when he sent them to Him (for some have said this), why did he not declare it to them in plain words, but rather brought an interrogation to Christ through them? But if, because he had been cast into prison, he was led by various opinions to be doubtful and uncertain about Him (for others have said this), why does he ask Him as if he did not know that He had yet come? For that saying, "Are you he who is coming, or are we to expect another?" ^C brings with it the idea that Christ had not yet arrived, but was expected to come. For if this had been what John believed, he would not have asked it in such a way: "Are you the Christ, or is there someone else besides Him?"

RESP. Since various rumors regarding the miracles performed by Jesus were circulating, with some saying, "It is Elijah who is doing these things," and others, "It is Jeremiah," and others, "It is some other one of the prophets," John, hearing these rumors in prison, sends his disciples to ascertain if the one who was performing the miracles ^D is the same one to whom he had borne witness, or someone else rumored among the multitude. Jesus, however, knowing the intention of John, performed many miracles in the presence of his disciples, persuading them, and through them John, that He Himself was the one who had performed the miracles that were also being rumored under the names of others, He to whom John had borne testimony.

^A QUESTION XXXIX. If the Lord Christ promised that after His own exaltation He would draw all men to Himself, why have not all run to faith in Him? And how does He, while promising to draw them to Himself, not contradict these words, "No one comes to Me unless My Father draws him"?

ANSWER. Every saying is to be judged by its own end; and the end of drawing all men to Himself is when He shall have abolished all rule and authority and power. It is not right, therefore, to demand the things of the end before the end. The Father draws to the Son by giving to the Son also the power and ability to be able to draw all men to Himself. The Father does not draw to the Son at one time, and the Son draw to Himself at another; therefore, there is no contradiction in the words.

^B QUESTION XL. If demons dwell continuously in those who are possessed [by them], how do they contrive harm for others? And if they do this by departing from the sufferers for a short time, how is it that when they are driven out of them by an invisible power, they no longer show traces of their presence in them?

ANSWER. It is impossible for one possessed by demons to do anything when the demon is absent. If he does any evil, the presence of the demon who is present causes it; when he is cast out, no traces of him remain, for the invisible power that drives him out strikes fear into him, so that he does not approach the one who has been healed again.

QUESTION XLI. If it is the prerogative of God alone to give life and strength to bodies, how do demons do this, strengthening the bodies of those possessed so as to break bonds and chains? For he was bound with chains and fetters, and breaking the bonds he was driven by the demon into the desert.

ANSWER. The demon did not grant the strength to the body so that it could break and snap the bonds and chains, but the demon himself was breaking and snapping the bonds and chains, although divine Scripture attributes the works of the demon to the one who is possessed by the demon.

^D QUESTION XLII. If demons have no power over the parts of the world, why did they inflict punishments upon the Greeks when their oracles were disregarded; and why, when worship was offered to the idols, did they cease from these, and in place of punishments grant them benefits?

RESP. It was the custom of demons, for the seduction of men, to arrogate to themselves the name of God, and likewise his power. But that there is in demons no power to punish those who do not obey them, nor to assist those who are obedient, is demonstrated by the destruction which the religion of the Greeks suffered at the hands of the Christian religion. For it was clearly seen that the Greek religion did not employ any power against the Christian other than that which is exercised by the hand of men and by swords. For if the Greek religion had abounded with divine power defending it as it perished, it would in no way have used human power to save itself from destruction—having waited in vain for its gods—which is the greatest proof of the weakness of demons, and that they are never able to perform divine works, either to punish those who do not obey, or to benefit those who do. Furthermore, if all worship belongs to living and sentient beings, how is that statement not manifestly false: 'By the worship offered to the images they restrained punishments'? To images, I say, which neither live nor feel, but as they are without sense for worship, so also are they without sense for the contempt of oracles.

QUEST. XLIII. If in the time of the flood the Scripture says that two by two and seven by seven were brought into the ark, without calculating the sum, and yet not four and fourteen, from among the clean and unclean animals—for some have said this; while others have said two unclean only—which, therefore, is the truer account?

RESP. He who said four and fourteen spoke more truly than he who said two and seven; for Scripture said "two by two" for two males and two females, and "seven by seven" for seven males and seven females, but for the unclean, "two by two."

QUEST. XLIV. Since the vision of animals having many eyes was presented to Isaiah and Ezekiel, was one and the same thing revealed to both, or was one thing shown to one and another to the other? And what did that which was shown indicate?

RESP. The vision presented to the prophet Isaiah declared the mystery of Christ, sitting upon the throne of glory, and purifying, through the eating of His holy flesh, the sins of impious men, who in all the earth, on account of the magnitude of the divine gifts, glorify the holy

^A and equal-in-honor Trinity, in whose name they were baptized and justified, having received the hope of participation in heavenly and eternal goods. For the coal which the prophet saw brought to his impure lips, for the cleansing of iniquities and sins, was a sign of the Lord’s flesh, which cleanses the conscience of those who eat it from all impiety. And through the vision given to the prophet Ezekiel, those things which were about to befall Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, were revealed, being a source of consolation to the Israelites who were captives in Babylon. The prophet saw living creatures with four faces, having the likeness of a man, a lion, a calf, and an eagle. The prophet Daniel also speaks concerning Nebuchadnezzar, ^B saying that his nails grew like those of an eagle, his hair like a lion’s, that he was fed with grass like a calf, and that the heart of a man was given to him. By this vision, he instills a certain consolation in the Israelites, who were looking upon the powerful and very strong dominion of the Babylonians and were in despair, believing it impossible to obtain freedom from such captivity. In order, therefore, that God might move the Israelites away from this despair and prepare them to look toward His own power, He shows the prophet the conjunction of a tame and a wild animal, and the joining of a heavy-bodied and a winged one. For man is a tame animal, but the lion is wild; and the calf is a heavy-bodied animal, but the eagle is a winged and light one. In the former, he reveals the change of the kingdom from wildness to gentleness, ^C and in the latter, the change from the heaviness of slavery to freedom. For the calf is subject to the yoke, but the eagle is free from the yoke. He also shows the prophet a wheel within a wheel, indicating by these the abduction of the Jews into captivity and their return to their own land.

QUESTION XLV. Why does the divine oracle use the title "son of man" in the case of Ezekiel, which it did not do in the case of the other prophets? And did the same prophet see the universal resurrection of the whole world in the dry bones, and did the bones in reality rise up and become perfect men, as the book of that same prophet teaches?

ANSWER. Because the prophet Ezekiel was to depict by vision the resurrection of the dead, which the Son ^D of man is to accomplish in reality, according to these words: "The hour is coming, and now is, when all who are in the graves will hear the voice of the Son of man, and those who hear will live"; for this reason, he is called by the name of the Son of man. Just as Joshua, the son of Nun, when he was about to command the sun and moon powerfully that they should stand still,

receives the name of Jesus, which the creation, by obeying the command, honored; so too, Ezekiel receives the name of the Son of man, and through the vision, raises the dead by the power of the utterance. Everything in the case of Ezekiel was a vision, both the bones and their resurrection. God reveals this vision to the prophet, primarily in order to manifest through it the general resurrection of all from the dead that would occur through Christ, and subsequently, for the consolation of those Israelites who, on account of their servitude, were despairing that they would ever be free from the dominion of the Babylonians. For just as dead bodies lying in tombs, having no hope of rising, were regarded as such by them in Babylon, without any hope of return; the same prophet declares this in the passages where he says, "And the Lord spoke to me saying: Son of man, these bones are the whole house of Israel. They themselves say: Our bones have dried up, our hope is lost," and the things that follow.

QUESTION XLVI. If all things in this life are good, why are those who abstain from them praised in the Scriptures, and those who embrace them blamed? But if they are evil, why are evils conjoined to our life, and that too, when the Creator is good?

ANSWER. It is not absolutely laudable to abstain from the good things of life, nor is it absolutely reprehensible to embrace them; but both, if done with reasonable judgment—both to abstain and to embrace them—merit praise. But if they are done contrary to reason, both are worthy of blame. However, ^B divine Scripture declares that nothing evil by essence is conjoined to our life, ^C while it praises the creation of created things with these words: "And God saw all things that He had made, and behold, they were very good." But since we voluntarily pervert the good things, they become evil. For there is nothing evil in health, if the good things that are in it are not perverted. Therefore, there is nothing evil, except through the perversion of the good. Thus, there is nothing evil conjoined to our life. For whatever things are evil, they are evil because of a use alien to reason, not by nature; but to use them well or ill is placed within free will.

QUESTION XLVII. If physical elements have no perception, why does Moses produce heaven and earth as witnesses to the people; and why does Isaiah, while accusing the same people, command them to hear?

ANSWER. Things said to heaven and earth are said to those endowed with reason who are in heaven and on earth, just as things said to a city are said to its citizens; as is that saying: "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, who kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to you." ^D

^A QUÆST. XLVIII. Why did the Lord say to Mary after the resurrection: "Do not touch me; for I have not yet ascended to my Father"? If indeed before the ascension it was permitted to no one to touch him, why shortly after did he permit the disciples and Thomas to do so? And if it was permitted, why did he forbid Mary to do it, when he was shortly about to permit it to many?

RESP. The words "Do not touch me" were said to Mary by the Savior with this meaning: Do not attach yourself to me so as to be with me continuously, in the manner of the habitual association I had before my cross. For he wished to accustom the disciples little by little to be without the sight and presence of his body; and for this reason, he did not appear to the disciples ^B continuously in the days he spent upon the earth after the resurrection, nor did he make himself entirely invisible to them, but he did both things at intervals, both that he might be seen by them and that he might not be seen.

QUÆST. XLIX. What is the proof that only two wild beasts and cattle, male and female, were produced in the creation of the world? For some of the pious have said this to argue that the leather tunics were not given to the first humans by God from the skins of irrational animals.

RESP. If in every species there are certain generators, and the generators are the works of God, while those beneath the generators are works of nature existing through seed ^C and generation, it is clear that in each species, besides the one male and female pair, God created nothing else. But God made the leather tunics not by human art, but in the manner of a creator. For he did not slaughter animals and sew their skins together to make tunics, but he created the leather tunics themselves. But perhaps someone will say, "If God created the leather tunics after the seven days of creation, how does divine Scripture say that God rested on the seventh day from all his works which he had begun to do?" He ceased from creation—that is, from creating things that were not. But the skins which he now creates, or rather, the skins of which he does not begin to create now—for they were already created ^D long ago in the creation of the animals. In accordance with this, also the passage: "And the Lord God further formed from the earth all the cattle and the wild beasts of the earth; and he brought them to Adam," and what follows; for the word "further" signifies the second creation of these.

^A QUEST. L. Since formerly children, but now we also, while we sing hymns, use the words *Osanna* and *Alleluia*, what is the interpretation of these? RESP. The interpretation of the word *Alleluia* is, "Praise with song that which is"; and of *Osanna*, "supreme greatness."

QUEST. LI. If God is immutable, how, when He is blasphemed and praised, does He often repay the reward worthy of the actions of each of them? RESP. God, remaining immutably in His own sense and justice, renders to each according to his merits; yet He does not do this by change, as if He had found [a reason to change], but since He has always possessed it, He retains immutability in these things; and holding them in an equal order, He regards both the blasphemers and those who are held by insensibility or injustice, which are indeed alien sins.

QUEST. LII. If Saul, moved by a zeal for piety, destroyed the ventriloquists, what impelled him to seek a prediction from a ventriloquist? And did she in truth bring up Samuel? For Scripture narrates this, and it is manifest that while it speaks the truth, the act itself is impious. RESP. He who does something with divine zeal does not fight against God. But Saul, having conceived a suspicion regarding David—that God had transferred his kingdom to him—worked in every way for the death of David, ^B so that the divine decree might not reach its fulfillment in him. He destroyed the ventriloquists, hoping by this act to be reconciled to God, so that He might reverse the decree that had rejected him from the kingdom—not because he hated the impiety of the ventriloquists, but because he loved the kingdom. ^C And because God did not approve of his purpose, He left him to seek those things which he had not destroyed with a good intent. But all other things done by the ventriloquist came to pass through the operation of the demon, who by illusions deceived the eyes of those seeing Samuel, who was not Samuel. But the truth of the words came from God, who gave the demon the power to appear to the ventriloquist in the likeness of Samuel, and to show him the revelation of what was to come. ^D And because Saul did not heed Samuel, who had told him of the removal of the kingdom, but even after the divine decree which deposed him from the kingdom, still claimed the kingdom for himself, God therefore judged him unworthy to have the things that were to befall him announced to him by men devoted to Him, just as He did for Ahab, king of Israel, who withheld faith from the prophets of truth and gave it to false prophets; whence He sent him a lying spirit, as the book of Kings says.

and Ahab, having believed and been led astray, went off into the desert and did not return alive.

^A QUES. LIII. If male and female were created for the procreation of children, when the resurrection occurs, shall men rise again with the distinction of genital members? And if such is the case, is it not pointless for members deprived of their function to be brought along? ANS. Even if the genital members are not useful for the procreation of children after the resurrection, they are certainly useful so that men may be reminded that it was through such members that they received life, growth, and endurance. For we are led by them to an understanding of the immense wisdom of Christ, who created these things ^B to preserve our race in immortality, through the succession of those being born, as the number of men increases even from death itself.

QUES. LIV. If Moses prophesied that this punishment was to be inflicted upon the people because of the transgression of the commandment, why did he declare these things by means of a song, since songs are wont to soften men’s minds rather than to help them? ANS. According to the accounts contained in the songs, the rhythms of the melodies were adaptably fashioned, leading souls to the disposition appropriate to the things being sung; for [it is done] sorrowfully [when…].

QUES. LV. Has the invention of such a good thing come from the enemies of the faith? ^C ANS. Many remedies for bodily ailments have been discovered by the pious, and certainly by King Solomon III Reg. iv, 33. But none of those who are strangers to piety possessed the knowledge of healing souls.

QUES. LVI. If infants who die have neither praise nor blame for their deeds, what difference is there in the resurrection between those who were baptized by others and did nothing, and those who were not baptized and likewise did nothing? ANS. This is the difference between those who are baptized and those who are not: those who are baptized attain the goods attached to baptism, while those who are not baptized do not. But they attain the goods attached to baptism through the faith of those who offer them for baptism. ^D

^A QUESTION LVII. If Moses expounded to us the creation of a twofold heaven, how does Scripture teach us that there are more? Now it says: "The heavens of the heavens"; at other times: "The heavens were opened to him"; and: "I see the heavens opened"; and: "He was caught up to the third heaven," and it did not say: "To the third part of the heaven," but absolutely: "To the third heaven." And you will find many similar things in the Scriptures. How, then, do they not speak things contradictory to themselves, and yet in both ways speak the truth?

ANSWER. Moses indeed spoke of "the heavens," but he did not assign a number, neither one, nor two, nor more. Furthermore, it is the custom of divine Scripture to call the regions lying in the upper part "heavens," such as: "The birds of the heaven," and: "The eagle from the heaven," and: "The stars of the heaven." Therefore, from the sequence of the terms employed, we understand the heavens to be two in substance, but more [than two] in their regions. And if we understand the heavens in this way, no contradiction will be perceived in the words.

^B QUESTION LVIII. If it is impious to ascribe ignorance to Christ, it is evident that He possesses perfect knowledge of all things. How, then, is He not the cause of the betrayal of Judas and the denial of Peter with an oath, since He foreknew these things, yet did not prevent them? And the same reasoning would apply concerning the defection of the devil and the first-formed man from God.

ANSWER. If it were necessary for Christ to be betrayed by one of His disciples so that the Scripture might be fulfilled, it is evident that Christ is the cause of the fulfillment of the Scripture, but not the cause of the betrayal by Judas. For Judas himself was the cause of this crime, which God, foreknowing as about to happen, foretold through Scripture. And foreknowledge is not the cause of the future event, but the future event is the cause of the foreknowledge. For a thing does not occur because it was foreknown, but it is foreknown because it is going to be; nor is he who foreknows it at all the cause of the future event. ^C Wherefore Christ was not the cause of the betrayal, but the betrayal was the cause of the Lord's foreknowledge. And the same reasoning holds for the devil and the first-formed man.

QUESTION LIX. If the sun is hidden at night, how is it not proven that the heaven is a sphere? For an admirable man among the philosophers said that the sun is hidden from us in its aspect in the heaven, not in its body. This, therefore, is what overhangs the earth; and the former, on account of its lightness, tends upward; while the latter, because of its weight, inclines downward. Thus, on account of their equal ^D and contrary effort, they are being held in place by others. If this is true, the whole celestial cycle—

^A serving for the illumination of this whole universe, to the end that the luminaries might exist and shine always, how then are they hidden?

RESPONSE. If there are undeniably many other things which, though they are on the same and equal plane, escape the sight of the eyes because of the distance of the interval—just as ships at sea are not seen by one another, because the breadth of the surface of the waters restricts the vision from extending any further than the horizon—what wonder is it if the concealment of the luminaries occurs for the same reason? And as regards the fact that the heaven and earth stand still because of the counter-effort ^B of the heaven and the earth, one may conjecture this in the case of the first heaven and the earth, because they were created at the same time. But in the case of the firmament and the earth, it is no longer possible for this to be thought. For the earth stood before the firmament, supporting the entire liquid substance without any counter-effort of the firmament; for the firmament was created after the earth.

QUESTION LX.

RESPONSE. There are many reasons why those who rise must rise in their own form. First, in order that the great ^D and divine knowledge of God may be demonstrated, in that He is able, in such a countless multitude of those rising, to preserve for each one his own form. Then, so that He might not be thought to be creating new men and not raising up those who had died; for this reason it is necessary that each of those rising have his own form. For if the forms of both the one who did the injury and the one who suffered it are unknown, the equity of the judgment perishes. Furthermore, if the difference of forms, once the needs for which that difference was necessary have been done away with, is found to be superfluous and useless, then the difference of names will also be superfluous and useless. How, then, does the rich man call Abraham and Lazarus by name, if the persons are not recognized by the difference of their names? Now, that account regarding Lazarus and the rich man is neither a parable nor a history. For a parable is speech containing a likeness of a fact to a future event; whereas a history is speech

containing an account of a fact that has already taken place. For neither does retribution for the way each person has lived occur before the resurrection, nor after the resurrection is it true that "They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them." ^A But the narrative concerning Lazarus and the rich man is a depiction of teaching, having the intent that men cannot, after the departure of the soul from the body, attain to any help by means of any providence or effort.

QUESTION LXI. If God alone is immortal according to the Apostle, how is the statement of the same Apostle true: "We shall not all sleep"?

RESPONSE. God is spoken of as alone having immortality because He does not possess it by the will of another, as do all other immortals, but from His own essence. ^B

QUESTION LXII. If the luminaries were created on the fourth day, and the number of days is constituted from them, how does it happen that the three days which preceded the creation of the luminaries do not make the number of days, which followed the creation of the luminaries, uncertain?

RESPONSE. From the creation of light, the separation of light and darkness came into being, and from the separation of light and darkness, day and night were constituted. But before the luminaries were made, the reign of light, defined by God, produced the day, and the reign of darkness produced the night. But when the luminaries were made, they were appointed to rule, the one over the light and the day, the other over the darkness and the night. For the Creator assigned the light, along with its defined reign, to the greater of the luminaries; and just as the light now produces days along with the luminary, such also did it produce before the creation of the luminaries, ^C according to the ordinance of God, who had defined its reign as twelve hours. That same law impresses upon the sun the movement defined from the beginning as twelve hours.

QUESTION LXIII. Since some have interpreted that passage, "In the sun He has set His tabernacle," differently and unclearly, teach us its clear meaning.

RESPONSE. We have said above that divine Scripture is accustomed to call the heavens either those that are such by substance, such as the first heaven and the firmament, or the spaces of the air. Therefore, "In the sun He has set His tabernacle" is the same as "He has set the heavens as the tabernacle of the sun." For the translation of this saying from the Hebrew language into the Syrian language is as follows: "In them He has set the tabernacle of the sun." ^D Moreover, the prophet David shows the same thing through another psalm, and says: "Who stretches out the heaven like a curtain" (for the stretching out of skins makes a tabernacle), demonstrating by the variety of substances and the difference in their uses that they are created.

For the unbegotten nature has no difference in nature from the unbegotten nature. And the fact that it is of such or such a kind on account of necessity is foreign to the unbegotten nature. ^A

QUESTION LXIV.

^B

ANSWER.

QUESTION LXV.

ANSWER.

^A called the Pavement, but in Hebrew, Gabbatha. And it was the Preparation of the Passover, and about the sixth hour. If, therefore, He was delivered up by night, and judged by the high priests, and condemned, and in the morning was delivered to Pilate, and at the sixth hour of the Preparation was crucified, it is clear that the delivery took place on the fifth day.

QUESTION LXVI. Since the Lord constantly calls Himself the Son of man, using the masculine article and not the feminine, for this reason the unbelievers attempt to demonstrate that the Lord’s birth occurred through conjugal intercourse; for they say that the name “of man” (τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) is not of a female, but of a male; what arguments, therefore, shall we use to refute such an empty reproach?

ANSWER. If the Lord’s birth had come from conjugal intercourse, the Scripture would not have said: "As was supposed, the son of Joseph." ^B For the expression, "as was supposed," cannot be said of those who are born from conjugal intercourse. But to endeavor to overturn, by means of a single word that is neither clear nor absolute in its meaning, all those passages which manifestly declare that Christ was born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, is most absurd. To overturn their empty argumentation, we use the following reasonings. If, because Christ did not call Himself the son of the woman (τῆς ἀνθρώπου), He is therefore not the son of a woman, then in truth, because He did not say that He was the son of any man, He is not the son of any man. But if Christ is not the son of any man, then of necessity He is not the son of man at all. Furthermore, if Joseph was called the son of Eli according to the law ^C without conjugal intercourse, God having willed in this way to give Joseph as a son to Eli, what is absurd about giving a son to Joseph in like manner without conjugal intercourse? For this reason, Divine Grace provided for the Virgin to be betrothed to a man who had two fathers: one according to nature from conjugal intercourse, and another according to the law without conjugal intercourse; in his generation, it foreshadowed the generation of Christ, who was born indeed of the Holy Spirit as Son to God, but born of the wife of Joseph as son to Joseph. "The Holy Spirit," it says, "shall come upon you, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow you; therefore also that which is born of you shall be called holy, the Son of God." ^D But if that which was born of the wife of Eli is the son of Eli according to the law of God, much more is that which was born of the wife of Joseph, according to the divine good pleasure, the son of Joseph without conjugal intercourse.

QUESTION LXVII. Since Isaiah, prophesying concerning the Lord Christ, says: "Who shall recount His generation?" is this to be understood of a generation that is hardly recountable or of one that is…

nce Isaiah, prophesying concerning the Lord Christ, says: "Who shall recount His generation?" is this to be understood of a generation that is hardly recountable or of one that is ^A entirely unrecountable?

ANSWER. The generation of Christ according to the flesh is recorded by genealogy, and the mode of it is declared in the scriptural narrative; for it is from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary. But His generation according to His divinity is without genealogy; wherefore it is also unrecountable. The prophetic utterance therefore indicates the unrecountable, or perhaps the difficult-to-recount, nature of His generation.

QUESTION LXVIII. If the blood of man is not the soul, because when it is shed the animal perishes, by what arguments and examples is it demonstrated that the soul is something in the body that is, in its creation, distinct and invisible?

ANSWER. Since we possess the words of the Creator of the universe, which distinguish the soul from the body, we ought not to require examples more worthy of belief than these to demonstrate the truth of the matter being inquired into. For the fact that the devil was given power over the whole bodily constitution of Job to strike it as he pleased, and yet was forbidden to touch his soul, proves ^B that the incorporeal soul is something other than his wounded flesh. Likewise, this saying: "Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul" (Matt. x, 28), shows that there is something in the slain man that remains in immortality even after the death of the body. Hence it is absurd to say that the blood, which is shed and corrupted, is the soul. It is manifest, therefore, that the soul is invisible to men according to its own nature.

QUESTION LXIX. Why does the number seven admit of change? For on the Sabbath the air frequently changes; and the progress of man in age receives an increment in this number: teeth are born in the seventh month and changed in the seventh year; when these years are doubled, the seminal power is acquired; and to speak briefly, the number seven effects the growth and decline of humans, provides markers for the diagnosis of diseases, and in the Law is held in greater veneration than other numbers.

ANSWER. The works of nature are perfected by the power of nature, ^C and not by a defined space of time of seven months or years. Wherefore, nature often brings the works mentioned in the question to their proper perfection faster or slower than the number seven; which would not happen if nature followed the number seven, rather than the number seven following nature. The number seven, therefore, is not the cause for the completion of the works of nature; but

^A the power of nature is the cause, according to which it receives the ability in its nature to accomplish its proper works. Likewise, concerning other numbers of months and years by which the work of nature is fulfilled in other animals and plants, the power of nature is the cause for a time equal, longer, or shorter. But the number seven is more venerable in Divine Scripture than other numbers, because it contains all the time both of the creation of the world and of the rest of the Creator; six for the creation, and one for the rest. Therefore, in order that the memory of the creation of the world might be kept among men, for this reason Divine Scripture ordered that the number seven be held as more excellent than the others.

QUEST. LXX. If to rejoice and glory in gifts is forbidden, as a thing productive of pride, while humility and modesty are commended by Divine Scripture to those who have received these, are not these gifts useless to them, since they cannot provide them with a sense of their own good in the present life?

RESP. It forbids rejoicing in gifts with arrogance, because that thing destroys legitimate joy; but it does not forbid rejoicing in gifts with modesty; on the contrary, it even encourages such joy, at one time the Savior saying: "Rejoice because your names are written in heaven"; at another time the Apostle, who says: "Brothers, rejoice in the Lord always. Again I say: Rejoice. Let your modesty be known to all men"; ^C by the repetition of the word "Rejoice," expressing the intensity of the joy. Therefore, neither does joy destroy modesty, nor does modesty destroy the sense of joy, but each is preserved by the other.

QUEST. LXXI. Since some, conjecturing about the duration of the world, have said that it will last for only six thousand years, let us learn whether this is shown to be true by manifest examples, whether from Divine Scripture, and whether it is uncertain.

RESP. Those who say that six thousand years is the time of the present constitution of the world are saying what is true, although it may be conjectured from many sayings of Scripture, which now says: "In these last days he has spoken to us by his Son"; now: "Upon whom the ends of the ages have come"; now: "When the fullness of time had come." All these things were pronounced in the sixth millennium. ^D

QUEST. LXXII. If each person is found to be free from envy when, whatever he knows or is able to do well, he bestows it upon his neighbor, how is God not envious, who, being able to make all men gods, for a good thing

made, since God is good? But if he is not envious, yet having some inability, he did not do this—two things: necessity ^A dictates one or the other.

RESPONSE. God is not like men, who do favors to those near them, whatever they are able or know how to do well. For that which is near to God has no need of God for the receiving of a benefit; for it possesses equality with Him in all respects. Furthermore, if God had made only gods, he would not have made the world. For the world necessarily has need of parts which are distinguished from one another by a higher or lower degree of station. Furthermore, if nothing comes from the impossible, and it is impossible for God to be made (for God is uncreated and unbegotten); how then is it not irrational to call God envious because He did not do the impossible? Furthermore, God is good because He is uncreated and a creator; but nothing of created things can become uncreated by essence, that is to say, God. This question seems similar to this reasoning: The eye is excellent and more precious than the feet; but if God is not envious, why did He not make the feet eyes? For this ^B argument also gathers the same irrational absurdity, namely, that God did not make the feet eyes either out of envy or out of inability.

QUESTION 73. If the good appears good when it is compared with the evil, and the world is good, it is manifest that the non-world, that is, that which was before the world, is evil. And if both are from God, that is, that which is before the world and the world, how are both—that is, the good and the bad—not from Him? But if one is from Him, but the other is not from Him, how is that which is ^C not from Him not fortuitous and not under Him? And how is he who says: "From Him are all things" speaking the truth? For in all things are contained both those things which formerly were not, and those which now are.

RESPONSE. Evil is nothing else than a depravation of the good; wherefore evil is posterior to the good, for it is a depravation of the good. But it is manifest that the good does not appear good from the comparison with evil, but from its own nature. But that which was before the world, not being at all, was neither good nor evil; wherefore nothing is compared with that which is so not-being. Furthermore, that which is absolutely not-being is neither from God, nor from another, ^D nor is it fortuitous. Before the world, therefore, there was nothing else except God; since therefore the comparison of things that are is made with things that are, the world is by no means compared with the non-world, nor is the non-world contained in the world. For the non-world is nothing; for that which is contained is something. And when we say from the not-

-being that God has made the things that are, we do not attribute a position to non-being, but the complete destruction of non-being. ^A

QUESTION LXXIV. If, because Hellenism has been defeated by Christianity, Hellenism has no hope of restoration, how is it that the true worship of God, having been defeated long ago by Hellenism, has now received its restoration? For the divine Scriptures bear witness that the truth prevailed before the error, showing that Adam and many after him did not worship idols, but God, even if some of them were found in shameful deeds.

ANSWER. If the end of the present state is the judgment of the ungodly by fire, as the Scriptures of the prophets and the apostles, and even also the Sibyl, say, as the blessed Clement ^B says in his epistle to the Corinthians; and this judgment comes to pass through Jesus Christ, who was crucified by the Jews and possesses the eternal kingdom of the Christians, which was given to Him according to the prophet Daniel; therefore, Hellenism has no hope of restoration. Furthermore, if the people of God, having had some dominion, never recovered it once it was dissolved, is it not in vain that Hellenism now expects the restoration of its former power? And for what reason does Hellenism expect the restoration of its former power? Entirely to compel Christians by tortures to depart from the worship of and faith in the Son of God, and to follow and submit to the religion of demons. But those tortures, which Hellenism also used previously, ^C hoping by their means to keep itself invincible, actually abolished Hellenism and established Christianity more firmly.

QUESTION LXXV. If the soul does not receive the rewards of the life it has led until the resurrection of the bodies, is it subject to any examination after it has departed from the body, up until the resurrection itself?

ANSWER. The state which souls have here, until the resurrection of the bodies, the soul, having changed from the body, does not receive the rewards; is it then in the meantime subject to... ^D

^A the state which they have even after their departure hence from the body? For here, indeed, all things pertaining to the union are common to both the just and the unjust, and there is no difference between them in this regard; such as being born and dying, and being healthy and being sick, and being rich and being poor, and other things similar to these. But after the departure from the body, there is immediately a separation of the just and the unjust. For they are led by the angels into places suitable for them; the souls of the just into paradise, where there is companionship and ^B the sight of angels and archangels, and through a vision, of the Saviour Christ as well, according to that which is said: "Being away from the body and present with the Lord"; but the souls of the unjust into the places in Hades, according to that which is said concerning Nabuchodonosor, king of Babylon: "Hades from beneath was stirred up to meet thee," and the rest; and they are guarded in their deserving places until the day of resurrection and retribution.

QUESTION LXXVI. If before the resurrection there is no rewarding of works, what benefit has come to the thief by his soul having been introduced into paradise, especially since paradise falls under the senses, while the substance of the soul does not?

ANSWER. It was a benefit to the thief, having entered into paradise, to learn by works the usefulness of faith, through which he was deemed worthy of the gathering of the ^C saints, in which he is guarded until the day of resurrection and retribution. And he possesses a perception of paradise according to that faculty of feeling which is called "perceptive," by which souls see both themselves and the things beneath them; and furthermore, also the angels and the demons. For a soul does not understand or see a soul, nor an angel an angel, nor a demon a demon, but according to the said perceptive faculty they see themselves and one another, and furthermore also all corporeal things.

QUESTION LXXVII. If the soul receives perception of sensible things by the aid of the senses of the body, and good and evil things happen to be sensible; how is it that the soul does not lack perception when separated from the body? And if it lacks perception, it is evident that it is dead; for the difference between the dead and the living is determined by perception and lack of perception.

ANSWER. All created and rational substances possess two faculties of comprehension, the ^D perceptive and the intellectual; and the perceptive, by which they perceive themselves and one another, and the intellectual, by which they receive the knowledge of that which is above them. Therefore, without the aid of the body, souls...

perceive things that fall under sense, but it is the soul itself that provides sense by its presence, and makes the animal have the power of sensation; and as far as the animal is concerned, it is sensitive, but as far as it itself is concerned, it is perceptive 14; and the soul never becomes dead. For death belongs to the ensouled being, and not to the soul. The ensouled being and ensoulment, therefore, require the cooperation of the body for the apprehension of sensible things, not the soul [14′]; and one thing is that which exists by participation, and another is that which exists in essence.

QUESTION LXXVIII

RESPONSE

QUESTION LXXIX

^A RESP. The time for the reward of those who have cultivated piety and virtue is not the present life, but the future, in which the rewards that cannot be taken away will always await those who expect them. Josiah, however, received a painful end to his life because he disobeyed the command of Jeremiah, who had told him by God’s command not to go out to meet the king of Egypt for war, as Jeremiah says. Therefore, in order that the Lord God might take him from this life pure of sins, He allowed him to pay the penalty for this disobedience by an infidel’s sword, for a lesson to posterity not to refuse to obey the prophets, and also that what is written might be confirmed: *If the righteous is scarcely saved, where will the sinner and the ungodly appear?* But if the sons of Josiah, having remained in the piety of their father, had been taken captive, then there would have been room for the argument of the infidels. But if they departed from the piety of their father and embraced the worship of idols, and were taken captive while worshipping idols, the argument of the infidels is manifestly false. ^B

QUESTION LXXX. If Scripture teaches us to show patience to all, how did Elisha not sin by delivering to death through a curse the boys who had insulted him, and especially by bearing a grudge against infants inexperienced in evil, and by bringing death upon them through wild beasts for a slight injury done to himself?

RESP. When the patience of those who are insulted does not result in correction, then the severity of patience is more useful for those who cannot be corrected. One must not, therefore, blame the prophet for his severity. For when he found that patience did not provide the wrongdoers with a sense of the sin, and since, moreover, the boys had learned from their parents—who always held the prophets in hatred—those expressions which they used as an insult against the prophet (for the words, *“Go up, you baldhead,”* they said for the mockery of Elijah’s assumption, as if saying: “Let the spirit take you up also and cast you onto an inaccessible mountain, just as it cast him, ^C so that, just as we have been freed and released from him, so we may also be freed and released from you”), for this reason he chastised the parents by the killing of the boys, so that they might learn not to insult the prophets, and through them, God.

QUESTION LXXXI. If all deception has been done away with by the presence of Christ, how do demons speak through those who are called ventriloquists? And how do they not make the Christian religion vile and worthy of contempt, when in the bodies of Christians the works of deception are displayed and the oracles of divination are uttered?

RESP. If, according to the dictum of Scripture, *all things are not yet subject to him*, until he shall have abolished every rule and authority, it is manifest that not yet

has the whole seduction of the demons been abolished; but in those who have believed in Christ, all seduction of the demons has been abolished. But in those who do not yet believe in Christ, the demons work their seduction. And the phantasms which ventriloquists use to speak and to perform the words and deeds of divination are not true bodies, but the demons deceive the eyes of spectators so that they see as bodies items which are not bodies.

^B QUÆST. LXXXII. If Scripture nowhere showed the names of demons to men, how did the Jews in the time of the Lord call the name of Beelzebul as if it were known, saying that by him he cast out demons? And how did the Lord Himself, as if the appellation of the demon were known to the disciples, say: *If they have called the master of the house Beelzebul*? What, moreover, is the interpretation of such a name?

RESP. Just as men learned from the demons themselves that demons exist, so were they taught their names by them as well. For first, men sacrificed to the demons, and afterwards the divine Scripture said: *They sacrificed to demons, and not to God*. And just as Scripture, though it does not seem to have said that demons exist, yet says: *They sacrificed to demons, and not to God*; so also, although it said nothing about their appellation, it puts forward the names of demons, both Beelzebul and Beliar. *What concord*, he says, *hath Christ with Beliar?* For the names which enchanters used for the works they set before themselves, they necessarily learned from the demons themselves. ^C For according to the manner of the therapy, so also did they name the designation of their invocation. The interpretation of these names has been stated by Origen in his *Interpretation of Hebrew Names*.

QUÆST. LXXXIII. If God did not take pleasure in victims lacking reason, as some have said, and as the state of present things declares, why did He command Noah before the Law to sacrifice, especially when as yet at that time victims were not being offered to idols? And if He did take pleasure in them, why did the use of them cease after the Law?

RESP. None of those who sacrificed animals lacking reason before the Law did so by a divine command, although God seems to have accepted them, demonstrating by that acceptance that the one who sacrificed was acceptable to Him. But regarding what He commanded Abraham—to take three-year-old animals, and likewise the ram which he offered in place of Isaac to be sacrificed—this was not done because He was pleased with the victims of Abraham, but for the sake of a prophetic necessity for the things to come. ^D As for Noah, it nowhere appears that God commanded him to offer up to Him a sacrifice of irrational animals.

QUÆST. LXXXIV. If the grace which was in Elijah

^A was doubled, as it was heard that Elisha requested, how is it that he performed neither simple nor double miracles? Such as restraining rain, pressing the earth with famine, the descent of celestial fire upon the sacrifices [(20)], the slaughter of the iniquitous priests, the burning of the captains of fifty [(21)], and the rest? Whence, then, shall Elisha be shown to have obtained both his own petition and the promise of Elijah?

RESP. Elisha did not ask for a double gift of spirit in order to perform the same works twice, but that he might be able ^B simply to accomplish whatever work needed to be done by him with a more abundant power of authority. That he did not fail in his petition is testified to by the wondrous deeds performed through him; some of which he accomplished as double, others as simple. For the fact that he raised two dead men, one while he was still alive and one after he had died, declared the double power of the grace of the divine Spirit that was in him, which he could have applied in other miracles, had he so willed. And in the time of Elijah, the increase of the oil was ^C for necessary use, but in the case of Elisha, it was beyond necessity. And Elijah brought down fire from heaven for the defense against enemies, but Elisha brought down horses and charioteers of fire from heaven for the aid of Israel.

QUÆST. LXXXV. If that is a perfect resurrection, when a perfect man rises again, how does Scripture say, after the Lord's Passion, that many bodies of the sleeping saints were raised? This it did not say concerning others whom the Lord raised, such as Lazarus ^D and the son of the widow, or concerning the daughter of Jairus, but said absolutely that this one or that one was raised. How, then, does it make mention of the resurrection of bodies only in these cases, and add that they appeared to many? This, for the most part, gives rise to a suspicion of a phantom. And if they rose as truly inanimate [(22)] bodies, and if they lived on, or immediately died, or remain in immortality, and where, and what profit has come to those who came after them from the things that happened to them, teach me.

RESP. If we call that the perfect resurrection of men rising again, when souls are introduced again into the bodies of those rising, it is clear ^C that all, both those who have risen and those who are to rise by the Lord, rose in perfection [(23)]. For it is impossible for a resurrection of the dead to happen unless the soul is introduced into its own body. When, therefore, holy Scripture says that such a one rose from the dead, or that bodies rose from the dead, we must understand by both expressions the perfect resurrection, which the soul restored to the body brings about; and just as when holy Scripture says: "He who raised our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead shall also quicken our souls and our bodies" [Rom. viii, 11], it does not say an imperfect...

resurrection, nor does it give a suspicion of a phantom, but it makes a perfect faith in the resurrection; so also when it says: "Many bodies of the saints which slept were raised from the dead," it speaks of a perfect resurrection. Now the resurrection of these ^A saints served as a proof for both those living in this life and for all the souls in Hades, that the death of Christ was the ransom for the death of all men. Wherefore they did not die again, but remain in immortality, like Enoch and Elijah, and are with them in paradise, awaiting that already eternal resurrection of Jesus Christ which comes to pass through an immutation, according to which, as the divine Apostle says, "We shall all be changed." For there has not yet been, for anyone, a resurrection unto eternal and incorruptible life, except for the Savior Christ; wherefore He is also proclaimed "the firstborn of the dead" and "the firstfruits of them that slept."

QUESTION LXXXVI. What is the interpretation of these terms: mina, ephi, nebel, gomor, siclus, basilicum, sanctum, stater, drachma, quadrans, monile, didrachma, talentum, assis, seraphim, bezel, sabaoth, Adonai, ephod? Knowledge of both is necessary for us, for both are contained in the Scriptures.

ANSWER. The interpretation of all the Hebrew names and measures mentioned in the holy Scriptures has been set forth by Origen, a man skilled in the Hebrew language. If you consult it, you will find in it the explanation of all the things about which you have asked.

QUESTION LXXXVII. If before the death of the Baptist, the Lord shone forth by working miracles, as Matthew says, and the report ^B concerning this reached all who were in Judea, how is it that after the slaughter of the Forerunner, hearing of the miracles being performed by Christ, Herod, with the Jews, said that it was John who had returned to life and was performing these signs? For this is what the blessed Mark narrates to us.

ANSWER. That not all those who heard of the miracles performed by the Savior heard of them at the same time, but some earlier and others later, is testified to by the words of those who said that John was the author of the miracles performed by the Savior after the slaughter of John; for they would not have said this if they had heard of the miracles performed by the Savior before the ^C slaughter of John. It is not, therefore, surprising if even Herod, after John had been put away, heard of the works of the disciples ^D of Jesus, which were performed in the name of Jesus; for it was then that Herod, concerning

heard the name of Jesus, when Jesus sent his disciples into the villages and cities to preach repentance and to heal diseases, as says Mark the evangelist. For even John himself, before the resurrection of the widow’s son, had not heard all that Jesus did in Galilee and in Jerusalem, although many miracles had already been performed by the Saviour, both before John was cast into prison and after he had been cast into prison. For it was then that John sent his disciples to Jesus to learn, "Art thou he that should come?" as says Luke the evangelist. ^A

QUESTION LXXXVIII. If, as the divine Scripture teaches, and we believe, Christ, who was begotten, did no sin, how does the Scripture, on the other hand, speak the truth when it cries out with an oath that no one has been begotten who has not sinned, nor born who has not done iniquity? And how could an infant—which has received the end synonymous with its birth, or has obtained a brief portion of life—commit sin and iniquity, or do the things contrary to these?

REPLY. The words, "No one has been begotten who has not sinned, nor born who has not done iniquity," do not prove false that which was said of Christ, "He did no sin." For this statement was made regarding him who was begotten of a man and a woman; but Christ was begotten of the Holy Spirit and the holy Virgin. The saying is understood thus: "No one who is ^B naturally disposed to sin or do iniquity is such that he has not sinned or done iniquity." He is naturally disposed to sin who, by his own voluntary inclination, leads himself to do what he wills, whether good or evil. But an infant, inasmuch as it does not yet possess such a power, is clearly not naturally disposed to sin. And as to the text, "For who shall be clean from filth? Nay, not one, even if his life upon the earth be but one day," this in no way applies to an infant, for "life" is used here to mean "manner of life" (politeia); and just as an infant has no manner of life, so it has no "life" in this sense.

QUESTION LXXXIX. If the vessel which Peter saw in the vision contained all clean and unclean animals, ^C as the Scripture delivers to us... The word "all" is a comprehensive voice for both of the aforementioned as it stands; then, to sacrifice and eat of the— ^D

^A things shown to him, the same Apostle refused without distinction, saying, "By no means, Lord, I have never eaten anything common or unclean." How does it not appear from such words that he rejects everything void of reason as unclean, and blames the One who gave the command to eat them, as if He were commanding him to taste of unclean food?

RESP. From Peter's answer we learn what kind of animals were in the sheet, namely, the unclean ones alone; and the word "all" does not necessarily comprehend the clean ones as well. For it is possible for "all quadrupeds and birds of the earth" to be mentioned, and yet refer to the unclean ones. But the "By no means, Lord, I have never eaten anything common or unclean," was his response to the sight of all that had been shown to him in the sheet, and not regarding any ones in particular. The vessel, therefore, in which all the birds and quadrupeds were shown, is said ^B to contain all, by the omission of the word "unclean," as if it were said that it contained all the unclean birds and all the quadrupeds of the earth. And just as when the divine Scripture says, "The head of every man is Christ," the word "every" does not include both the believing and the unbelieving man, but the believer only—for the faithful man is the body of Christ, and Christ is called the head of the faithful man—so neither does the word "all" comprehend both the clean and unclean, but the unclean ones alone, by which the reception of the unclean Gentiles was pre-announced to Peter, whose hearts God purified through faith in Christ.

QUESTION XC. If the patriarchs, moved by a pious reason, took wives for themselves and their children from their own kindred, how is it that Joseph and Moses did not act against the pious purpose of their forefathers by taking, the one an Egyptian, and the other a Midianite woman, as wife?

RESP. If the patriarchs, fearing lest their sons might be turned away from piety, did not permit them at all to take wives from the Gentiles, while Moses and Joseph were superior to such fear, then Moses and Joseph did nothing contrary to the purpose of their fathers by taking Gentile wives. For not only did their wives not turn them away from piety, but they themselves even brought their own wives over to their own piety.

QUESTION XCI. If Adam, before the transgression, had seen the death of neither anything endowed with reason nor anything devoid of it, how did he fear death—as if he had seen it—when it was threatened, a thing he had not seen? And how did God threaten him with it, as if it were known to him, when it was unknown?

RESP. If we call him endowed with reason who ^D understands [things], if anything is missing, it can easily be filled in from the Acts of the Apostles, where in addition to quadrupeds, wild beasts and reptiles are also enumerated. If, however, anything is lacking, it is easy to complete it from the Acts of the Apostles, where in addition to quadrupeds, wild beasts and reptiles are also enumerated. The sense is full and by no means curtailed.

^A Since it is known that Adam, being endowed with reason, had within himself the concepts of the things signified by the words, it is clear that Adam, being endowed with reason, had within himself the notion of death. And just as Adam, even if he had not seen anyone endowed with reason who was ashamed of his own nakedness, nevertheless, once naked, was suffused with shame, since he had within himself both the name and the notion of shame, so he had in himself also the notion of death, even though he had not yet seen the reality in another. Therefore he duly feared death, knowing from its very notion that it was contrary to life. ^B

QUESTION XCII. Since Scripture speaks of judgments and justifications, and testimonies and law, and commands and precepts, teach me whether these are all the same as one another, or whether each has a distinct sense.

RESPONSE. Scripture calls *judgments* the words which distinguish what is to be done from what is to be avoided, and establish the reward for obedience; it calls *justifications* the equity of the judgments, which rewards each according to his merits. It calls *law* the written summary of the entire Jewish worship and governance; it calls *testimony* the reward, proposed to those who have received the law, for the merit of their actions—the reward by way of blessing or by way of curse—which Moses, calling heaven and earth to witness, said would befall the Jews according to whether they obeyed or disobeyed. ^C It calls *commands and precepts* those words of the law which are uttered as a command or an order, according to the weight of that divine authority which commanded and ordained these things.

QUESTION XCIII. If the back of the heaven is burdened with waters, as Scripture says—which some have said was done on account of the igneous substance of the luminaries, so that the heaven, irrigated by the waters cast upon it, would remain invincible and intact from the flame of the luminaries beneath it—how can those who allege these things speak the truth, when the stars do not hold their course in the heaven, but beneath the heaven? If we say that they are in the heaven, how do they possess moving energy, since the body of the heaven is immobile? If the stars receive their motion together with the heaven, how is the myth ^D which calls the heaven a sphere not true? But if this does not square, and it is logical to understand that which was said about the luminaries: how is that supernal power of waters not useless? And what will that also be in the consummation, when the just, in the heavens, and sinners, in the depths, will receive the reward for their deeds?

RESPONSE. Even though the luminaries are beneath the heaven, the impetus of the agitation, which stirs up the igneous substances, acts [on them].

They have given a plausible reason, those who have stated that for the preservation of the firmament the back of the heaven is burdened with waters. Nor is this the only reason the waters are on the back of the heaven—that it remains invulnerable to the underlying flame of the luminaries—but also that it is weighed down toward the bottom by the multitude of waters on its back, so that it is not shaken by the violent onrush of the winds, and so that the extreme cold is sent down from them, by the mixing of which with the extreme heat of the sun, the temperateness of the air is brought about for the preservation of the animals and plants that are on the earth. ^B Yet at the consummation, it is not in the heaven that now is and the earth that now is that men shall receive the reward for their deeds, but in the new heaven and the new earth, according to that which was said: *The new heaven and the new earth, which I make, remain before me forever.* And again: *In the beginning you, Lord, founded the earth, and the heavens are the works of your hands; they shall indeed perish, but you remain; and all shall grow old like a garment, and like a mantle you shall fold them up, and they shall be changed.* And again: *Yet once more I shake not only the earth, but also the heaven.* Now that which is said to be shaken indicates its transformation, so that those things which are not shaken may remain immovable.

QUESTION XCIV. If the Lord predicts that the heaven shall be rolled up like a book, and the stars shall fall to the earth like leaves, and the prophet has foretold things consistent with these; why is the complete destruction of the firmament not indicated by those words? What, then, is the meaning of such words, and how can the incorruptibility of the elements be sustained?

^C RESPONSE. Just as the holy scriptures have figuratively likened the creation of the firmament, at times to the extension of a skin, saying: *Stretching out the heaven like a skin*; at other times to solidified smoke: *The heaven*, he says, *was solidified like smoke*; at other times to the roundness of a vaulted chamber: *Stretching out*, he says, *the heaven like a chamber*; so too they have figuratively likened its dissolution, at times to a book being rolled up, at other times to an element being dissolved by fire, as the apostle Peter says in his second catholic ^D Epistle; and at other times to a garment growing old. For through the introduction of a better heaven, newly made, it is necessary that the firmament be removed, as being of no use for that state, so that by its destruction, those who have feigned the vanity of the heaven's being unbegotten and incorruptible may, at least then, understand, who

^A have foolishly declared it to be unbegotten and eternal.

QUESTION XCV.

RESPONSE.

QUESTION XCVI.

RESPONSE.

^A *as says the apostle Paul, "to recompense to God tribulation to those who afflict you, and to you who are afflicted, rest with us in his kingdom."* (II Thess. 1, 6).

QUESTION XCVII. If grace is called grace because it is readier and more prepared to grant pardon to those who sin, how is it that things befitting grace are found more in the law? For the law absolves those who sin daily from blame by certain lustration rituals, sacrifices of irrational animals, and various baptisms; whereas grace grants only one baptism. If we sinned only once, we would need the remission of sin only once; but since we sin often, it is clear that we also often need pardon, which it is evident that not grace, but the law, provides through the aforementioned ^B lustration rituals and other things we have mentioned. How, then, can grace be shown to be more benevolent regarding those who sin than the law, if matters stand as has been stated?

RESPONSE. The law grants the remission of such sins through baptism and sacrifice as do not in any way harm the social order or human life—such as touching a dead body, or a leper, or someone of that sort. But for other sins which harm the social order or human life, it does not grant pardon, neither through baptism nor through the sacrifices of irrational animals, but it pays back to those who have sinned a just and deserved recompense through the equality of retaliation. "Life," it says, ^C *for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth* (Exod. xxi, 23; Matt. v, 38). But where equality of repayment would be unbecoming, there it inflicts death upon those who have fallen by fire, or stones, or the sword. For it consumes the priest’s daughter who has fornicated with fire, the daughter of a layman with stones, and that of the married woman with the sword (Levit. xxi, 9; Deut. xxii, 21). And nowhere in the law is there power to save any of such persons out of benevolence through baptisms and sacrifices. But great is the power of grace toward those who have sinned. ^D For even while the law was in force, if grace had not overtaken King David, who had fallen into two deadly sins, by opening to him the door of repentance, he would never have found in the law a benevolence capable of saving sinners. It is grace that established in the world a proven physician of sinners, repentance, a physician capable of healing even those who have fallen seventy times seven, if only they are willing to make use of the purpose of repentance.

QUESTION XCVIII. If the Lord asserts that fear is unnecessary, by what He says, *He who fears is not perfected in love* (I John iv, 18), how then again does the Lord

^A Himself teach the disciples, saying, *Fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell*?

RESPONSE. What the Lord said, *He who fears is not perfected in love*, was not spoken—even if he who said this spoke according to the Lord—to abolish perfect love. But the words, *Fear rather him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell*, were not said to abolish perfect love. For he who by the greater fear of God dispels the lesser fear of men, does this by the love of God; so that the greater fear of God exists for the sake of not falling away from those things that are beloved. For the more precious a thing is that is trusted to one, the more it is loved; and the more it is loved, the more the one who loves fears its loss, as long as he is in the struggle on behalf of the beloved. But when the struggle is finished, the fear of losing the beloved things is also dissolved along with it. Thus, until that time, the fear of God is necessary; for it is not as hatred, which is destructive of love (since it is impossible for the same person to both love and hate), but fear is not [destructive of love]; for it is possible for the same person to both love and fear.

QUESTION XCIX. If God commanded the sacrifices of irrational animals to be made in the Law, so that men might thereby demonstrate their zeal for honoring Him, how are the Greeks accused of the greatest impiety for sacrificing human beings? For they say the ancients did this so that they might render more honor to the god who is thought by them ^B to be greater, by honoring him with a sacrifice of rational beings. For as much as a rational being is more precious than an irrational one, by so much is the sacrifice of the former more noble than the latter. And this is demonstrated more clearly from the events concerning Jephthah, who, having offered his own daughter as a sacrifice, is mentioned by the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews in the list of the pious.

RESPONSE. In the sacrifice offered to God according to the Law, one must not consider that it is the blood of irrational animals, but rather how God accepted it when it was offered to Him. For if He accepted the offered blood of irrational animals in such a way as if the one who was offering it were offering his own soul, it is clear that the sacrifice acquired a supreme value and God a supreme honor from the will of the one who accepted it. ^C That he who offered the blood of irrational animals to God, offered it as his own soul, the divine Scripture testifies, saying: *For the soul of those who offer, the blood of their sacrifices is offered into the Holy of Holies.* One must not, therefore, judge the order of the sacrifice from the nature of the thing offered, but from the intention of the one who accepts it, and [judge] the honor of God, who, because He spared the human race, did not wish to consume men brought daily as sacrifices and to destroy the race, but [willed] for men indeed to grow and remain, and for their...

^A sacrifices to have the greatest order. Now, the gods worshipped among the Greeks, being wicked demons who hated mankind, delighted in sacrifices that diminished and destroyed the human race; which is the greatest proof of the bestial inhumanity of the Greek gods, and of the godlessness of the Greeks, who, in the destruction of the human race, endeavored, as they say, to honor their own gods even more, or rather to do so in the most shameful way.

The reason, however, why Jephthah was numbered in the catalogue of the pious is this: Jephthah asked for victory over his enemies; and for this victory he vowed an indefinite vow of gratitude, namely, that he would offer as a sacrifice whatever came out of his house to meet him on his return from the war as a victor. But the devil, ^B receiving the indefiniteness of the vow, contrived from it to lay a trap of transgression for Jephthah, and stirred his daughter, who was an only child, to go out from the house with a harp to meet him, so that Jephthah, sparing his daughter, might be forced to commit a violation of his vow. But although the devil had laid a trap, he did not attain his prey, because Jephthah counted the fulfillment of the vow more precious than the life of his daughter. Yet God permitted her to be offered in the place of a victim, not because He took pleasure in the shedding of human blood, but to teach future men never to vow indefinitely to God. For many absurdities occurring in an indefinite vow of this kind would instill ^C religious dread; and in order to avert these, God permitted the daughter of Jephthah to become the victim, which was not the original intention either of God or of Jephthah, but came about somehow through the indefinite nature of the vow. Since, therefore, Jephthah was shown to be the most observant of piety toward God by the immolation of his daughter, for this reason his memory was made in the catalogue of the just.

QUESTION C.

ANSWER. If divine grace worked miracles through heretics, whether living or dead, what occurs would have a legitimate cause for doubting. But if those who perform divine miracles in the Churches are holy apostles, prophets, and martyrs, through whom God bears witness to the world that these are His Churches, it is through these ^A that miracles are performed—that is, the Churches of the orthodox.

QUESTION CI. If every rational person acquires knowledge through study, and the law of knowledge is to set the lesser before the greater—which is demonstrated more clearly in the case of the Jews, who received the disciplines of the Law first and the Gospel afterward—how is it that we do not learn in an inverted order, being taught the greater things before the lesser? By the things of the Law, I mean the lesser, and by those of the Gospel, the greater. Since our nature is the same as theirs, the method of instruction should also have been the same; especially since, in studies, if the inferior ones do not precede, the more excellent ones are hindered.

ANSWER. If the necessity that exists in those disciplines—in which the greater are hindered unless the instruction of the lesser precedes them—were also present in our own institutions, our institutions likewise could not be learned in an inverted order. But since our institutions can be learned even in an inverted order, it is evident that they are free from that necessity. What is free from necessity cannot be blamed for an inverted order, no matter how it is done. And this serves to solve the sophism of the question; but to the question itself, we reply that we are not taught in an inverted order either, but, just as the apostles learned—first the things of the Law, and later the Gospels—so too ^B did they teach us. Their own voices, in which they announced the Gospel, bear witness to this. For everywhere, by preaching Christ from the Law, they preached the later from the former, and the greater from the lesser. For the words: *The Lord your God will raise up for you a prophet from among your brothers, like me*; also: *The Lord said to my Lord: Sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies your footstool*; and: *You did not abandon my soul to Hades, nor did my flesh see corruption*—these are voices of the Law foretelling Christ in them; the Apostle used these same words when he preached the Gospel to the Jews. And as for the manner of learning, the Gospels do not differ from the Law; but as for the promise and ^C fulfillment, they do differ. For what is the Law? The Gospel foretold. And what is the Gospel? The Law fulfilled ^D.

^A

QUESTION CII.

ANSWER.

QUESTION CIII.

ANSWER.

^A Apostle Paul concerning himself, that according to the righteousness that is from the Law, he had become blameless. And the blessed Luke the Evangelist, concerning Zacharias and his wife Elizabeth, that they were both righteous before God, walking in all the commandments and justifications of the Lord, blameless. But what is the "whole righteousness according to the Law"? It is to love God above oneself, and one's neighbor as oneself; which is not impossible for men who are willing. Thus, the statement "by works of the Law no flesh shall be justified" does not mean that we are unable to do things that are impossible, but rather that we are unwilling to do things that are possible. For we use our own will toward things that are possible, not toward things that are impossible. For it is regarding things that are possible and within our own power that praise or blame is assigned when they are done or not done. ^B And the fact that we men sin because we do not choose to—and not because we are unable—is proven by the fact that not all men fall into all kinds of sin, but some fall into this type of sin, others into that; some into more, others into fewer, and some into none at all, as with the righteous ones mentioned above. This would not happen to humans—that one person would commit one type of sin and another would never sin at all—if men sinned because of a weakness of nature and not by the lack of will in their own free choice.

QUESTION CIV.

ANSWER.

And the phrase: "I desire not the death of the sinner, but that he should return and live," are voices of divine grace calling sinners to the benefit of the Law, that through repentance they may obtain forgiveness for what they have sinned before. Forgiveness is indeed a good thing and a gift of divine grace, yet it is neither according to the law, nor against the law, but ^A above the law and for the law: above the law, because it is grace; for the law, because it leads sinners through repentance to the benefit of the law, just as it did David.

QUESTION CV.

ANSWER.

QUESTION CVI.

ANSWER.

^A or its dullness is attributed by some to the elements from which our bodies are composed, to their harmony or lack of harmony, and to the symmetry of the organic parts, and they seem to have rightly assigned the causes of these things. For there are some who in youth are productive and receptive of sharp ideas, but in old age, changing to the contrary, become sluggish in their thinking. And there is for this ^B further indication that harmony and lack of harmony are the cause of such an endowment. Likewise, also those who have excessively large heads, often called "heavy-headed," because they do not maintain a symmetrical proportion with the other parts of the body due to an excess of smallness or greatness, they too are ill-fitted to be able to be productive and receptive of concepts. But there are also others who are sharp and ready for the apprehension of things that exist by nature, and this also from divine grace, as it is written: *The Lord gave Solomon largeness of heart even as the sand that is by the sea shore*; and as it is written: *To some is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to others the word of knowledge*. ^C

QUESTION CVII. If chants were discovered by unbelievers for the purpose of deception, and were permitted to those under the Law on account of the childishness of their minds, why do those who are under grace and have received perfect teachings, alien to the ways I have mentioned, use chants in the Churches according to those who were children under the Law?

ANSWER. It is not singing simply that is appropriate for children, but singing with inanimate instruments, and with dancing and cymbals; wherefore in the Churches the use of such instruments and other things appropriate for children is ^D cut away from the chants, and simple singing is left. For it sweetens the soul toward a fervent desire for that which is celebrated in the chants; it calms the vicious passions rising up from the flesh; it repels the evil thoughts cast upon us by invisible enemies; it irrigates the soul toward the fruitfulness of divine goods; it makes the contenders of piety brave for endurance under dire circumstances; it becomes a medicine for all the discomforts in life for the pious. This Paul calls *the sword of the Spirit*, with which he arms the soldiers of piety against invisible enemies. For it is the word of God, which, when it is pondered, sung, and heard, has the power of driving away demons, and [all] that which to the soul in the proper virtues of piety

^A occurs, by means of ecclesiastical chants for the pious.

QUESTION CVIII.

ANSWER.

^A For if the Jews crucified Christ with this hope, that His teaching might not prevail and that Judaism might not be destroyed, does not the outcome contrary to both these hopes leave no ground for the involuntary ignorance of the Jews concerning Christ? But the saying: "Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they do," was spoken with this intended meaning: "Because they will recognize that they crucified Me through ignorance, and will ask for the redemption of their offenses, grant it to them." For no forgiveness is given to one who considers his own sin not to be a sin, but justice. And the words spoken to Paul, "I bear them witness that they have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge," were said mercifully through a certain accommodation of speech. ^B Being made weak to the weak, so that according to what is said, he might save the weak.

QUESTION CIX

RESPONSE

QUESTION CX

RESPONSE

^A promised a multiplied remuneration, had itself brought that remuneration to effect? And whence did rich men and women, bringing their own possessions into the desert, seek out the anchorites living there, and supply their needs—a thing which we learn from the history of ancient holy men—if not because the Lord Christ brought His own promise to fulfillment through them?

QUÆST. CXI. If, for the purpose of asserting the resurrection of bodies, the Apostle in the Epistle to the Corinthians used the example of seeds as apt and convenient, how shall those who are cut into pieces or burned rise again, since seeds, after cutting or burning, do not germinate, but perish entirely?

RESP. Since nature so perfects things that arise from seeds, as having received from the Creator a measured faculty, it is necessary that seeds be fit for producing the things that grow from them. Therefore, if seeds are burned or cut up, they become useless to nature for the production of the things that grow from them. God, however, does not possess a merely measured power; wherefore there is nothing unfit for Him for the effecting of all things that He wills, nor is He prevented by the dissection or burning of bodies from bringing forth their resurrection. For God does not operate by the law and measure of nature, but by the supreme power of His will, which no difficulty hinders in the things that He wills to effect. The Apostle used the example of seeds to support the cause of the resurrection of the dead, so that by comparison he might make the doctrine of the resurrection credible; for just as we do not in the least doubt that the seed will germinate, although we see that it is dead in the earth and has lost the nature of a seed, so we ought not to reject with disbelief the resurrection of the dead. For God, who has given to nature that it should produce a sprout by means of a seed, can much more Himself raise the dead from death. ^C

QUÆST. CXII. If the apostles considered the kingdom of Israel to be worldly glory, luxury, and ease, as some have said, why did the Lord, when questioned by them on this matter, not only not rebuke them, but even tighten their ignorance, when He said to them: *It is not for you to know the times or moments, which the Father has put in his own power*? This very response confirms their interrogation.

RESP. And this very thing is one of those [topics] which, before the advent of the Holy Spirit, they were unable to know, ^D

according to what was said: "I have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now; but when that Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all truth." ^A Having been taught by the Spirit that "God will abolish both the belly and the foods," they were led away from the Jewish opinion to the concept appropriate to the state of those rising from the dead, in which there is neither food, nor drink, nor marriage, but the sons of the resurrection will be "like the angels of God." Therefore, the statement "It is not for you to know times or seasons which the Father has established in His own authority" does not have the character of confirming those who, led by opinion, had asked out of ignorance, but [the character of] posing an impasse to both: to the opinion of the inquirers regarding both the time and the mode. The apostle Paul also declares the mode of that state, when he says: "The kingdom of God is not food and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit."

QUEST. CXIII.

QUEST. CXIV.

^A subject to this disability, so that one might speak of Him as having been less? RESP. Those whose power of operating consists in some natural necessity, their power is less than their act. But he whose power of operating consists not in natural necessity, but in his own will, upon him the concept of being "less" does not fall. He has thought, it is said, and all things are present to you. QUEST. CXV. If to bow the knee in prayers ^B more commends those who pray to God than to pray standing, and more draws down divine compassion, why is it that on the Lord's days, and from Pascha until Pentecost, those who pray do not bend the knee? And whence did such a custom enter into the churches? RESP. Because we ought always to remember both our fall into sins and the grace of our Christ, through which we have risen from the fall; for this reason, the bowing of the knee during our six days is a symbol of our fall into sins; but not bowing the knee on the Lord's day is a symbol of the resurrection, through which, by the grace of Christ, we have been freed from both ^C our sins and the death that was put to death upon them (91). This kind of custom took its beginning from the apostolic times, just as the blessed Irenæus, martyr and bishop of Lyons, says in his discourse On Pascha (92), in which he also makes mention of Pentecost, in which we do not bend the knee, because it is of the same importance as [index: entries preserved] the Lord's day, according to the rule of the Holy Scriptures. But not only is the dispute about the day itself, but also about the form of the fast. For some think they ought to fast for one day, others for two, others for more; while others count their day as forty hours, both of day and night. And such a variety among those who observe these things did not arise in our time, but much earlier among those who were before us, who—as is likely, holding to the custom with simplicity and ignorance, while neglecting the precise—made it part of the tradition for those who came after. I shall endeavor to correct and explain this passage, which is both corrupted of its own accord and vexed by various interpretations. One thing which is clear and obvious is that concerning the fast immediately preceding the Sunday resurrection, something was prescribed by the apostles, which ceased to be observed in some ^D churches due to the negligence of those who were in charge. Moreover, that constant day of forty hours, night and day, is entirely inconsistent. But if for forty hours we read twenty-four, both the context will shine forth and we will easily investigate which custom Irenæus takes it ill to see violated by some. There was in the ancient Church an apostolic custom that the day of Holy Saturday should be passed without any food at all, and that nothing should be tasted before the cockcrow after midnight. It is commanded in the Apostolic Constitutions, book v, chapter 19: that on the remaining days before the Parasceve, each should eat at the ninth hour or at evening, or as each is able; but on Saturday they should remain until cockcrow. Theophilus of Alexandria, in his Paschal epistle as quoted in Jerome, vol. IV, p. 716: “According to the apostolic traditions, let us finish our fasts at deep night on the eighteenth day of the aforementioned month Pharmuthi, and on the next day, which is the symbol of the Lord’s resurrection, that is, on the nineteenth day of the same month, let us truly celebrate Pascha.” Jerome, in chapter xxv of Matthew, testifies that the apostolic tradition remained, that on the day of the Paschal vigils it is not permitted to dismiss the people before midnight. See Methodius in the Convivium Virginum quoted in Combefis, p. 85, and Palladius in the Life of St. John Chrysostom, p. 84, where the same apostolic custom is lauded. But yet, although it had been transmitted by the apostles, it did not possess the same authority everywhere. For, as we read in the canon of St. Dionysius of Alexandria, the Roman Christians judged that the fast on Holy Saturday was to be broken at cockcrow: there were not lacking churches in which it seemed that this should be done in the evening. Dionysius of Alexandria, being consulted on this matter, reproved as negligent and intemperate those who are too hasty and break the fast before midnight. Irenæus’s complaints do not seem to pertain to anything else. For he would not have reproached those who spent the whole day of Saturday fasting; for the apostles prescribed nothing more.

^A

QUESTION CXVI. If the Lord, rising from the monument, left the burial linens in the tomb, why did Scripture not narrate that he either appeared naked after the resurrection, or that he procured garments from elsewhere? But if he neither took garments from elsewhere, nor appeared naked to those who saw him then, how is it true that he left his garments in the tomb?

RESP. The Savior’s garments were divided by the soldiers after they crucified him; but those which were brought in with him to the tomb were not suitable for the use of one living. But the garments which the Lord wore after his resurrection he either created, or took from elsewhere, just as he took the foal upon which he sat. For he was able to do both: both to create and to take from elsewhere. Now since many things have been said about the Lord whose history divine Scripture does not contain, it is necessary that Christ's garments also be placed in this number, and it is not right, out of so many things that were not narrated, to seek the reason why this one was not narrated: nor should a doubt be raised about the Lord's garments due to the fact that it was not narrated, but faith regarding the Lord’s garments should be derived from his power. ^B

QUESTION CXVII. If a dense body is prevented from entering by closed doors, how did the Lord come to the disciples after his resurrection while the doors were closed? But if it is true that the body seen within while the doors were closed was a body, how was the stone placed upon the Lord’s monument rolled back by the angel because of the resurrection of his own body? But if it is true what Scripture says, that the doors were closed, it is manifest that it was not a body, but a spirit that entered. But if the body was at one time a body, and at another time became a spirit, how did it not undergo a change in the essence of its body?

RESP. Just as the Lord did not walk upon the sea by a change of body into spirit, but by his divine power made the sea, which was impassable for walking, passable not only for his own body, but also for Peter’s body: so too, by his divine power, he exited from the monument while the stone was placed upon the monument, and came to the disciples while the doors were closed. For the removal of the stone from the monument did not happen because of his own resurrection, but in order that the service might be made known to those who saw ^C it... ^D

And not to see him in the tomb, but to see only the garments of his burial, became a most clear proof of his resurrection. We must understand that things which are of equal weight possess the same credibility whether they are accepted or denied. It is equally significant to walk upon the sea in an immutable ^A body as it is to enter to the apostles in an immutable body while the doors were closed. And because it is impossible to demonstrate by the reasoning of nature that those things which happen above nature by divine power are within nature, the disciples were terrified at such an entrance; therefore he permitted them to touch the places of his body that had suffered, so that they might see that he had not made his entrance to them by a change of his body into spirit, but in a solid body, his divine virtue working those things which are above nature.

QUESTION CXVIII.

ANSWER.

QUESTION CXIX.

as some of the Fathers have taught, how did Abel offer of the fat of the sheep which he tended, and Cain of the fruits of the earth which he cultivated, in like manner? And it is clear that each of them, preferring the Divine to his own nourishment, employed such a sacrifice. But if they offered to God things that were useless to themselves, how did they not insult the Ever-Existent with such an offering? For each of them was presenting to Him a gift that was worthless and mocking. How then did the sacrifice of Cain become rejected, while the gifts of Abel became acceptable? ^B RESPONSE. The blessed Apostle, the father of fathers and teacher of piety, says: "Who plants a vineyard and does not eat of its fruit? Who tends a flock and does not eat of the milk of the flock?" that is, no one. But if no one, it is clear then that neither did Abel tend the flock so as not to eat of the milk of his flock, nor did Cain cultivate the earth so as not to eat of its fruits. Furthermore, if the fruits of the earth were useless to Cain, why did he honor God with inferior things, while for himself he preferred the better things to God (on which account his sacrifice was rejected), if he did not need the fruits of the earth? But if Abel preferred God to his own need, while Cain preferred his own need to God, it is clear then that each of them was in need of that healing which comes from their own labors. ^C QUESTION CXX. If some have supposed the kingdom of God to be the resurrection, and it is believed that both the just and the sinners are to be deemed worthy of this, how does Paul declare those who have committed forbidden things to be disinherited, saying that neither fornicators, nor adulterers, and those who follow, "shall inherit the kingdom of God"? RESPONSE. The divine Scripture is accustomed to call the kingdom of God not simply the resurrection, but that restoration which is to be after the resurrection, in which the separation of those who are to be punished and those who are to be glorified takes place, with God being acknowledged beyond doubt by all, He who works glory in those who are being glorified and punishment in those who are being punished. "They shall hear," he says, "the voice of the Son of God, who are in the graves; and they shall come forth, those who have done good unto the resurrection of life, and those who have done evil unto the resurrection of judgment." The resurrection is therefore divided into life and judgment according to the differences between the just and the unjust. For the resurrection is more extensive than the kingdom of God; for the resurrection includes both the just and the unjust, ^D but the kingdom of God includes only the just. QUESTION CXXI. If both the Old and New Testament apply the "anathematism" only to abominable things, why did the blessed Peter, in the Passion, deny the Lord?

^A And if he did so, when he began to deny, did he begin to anathematize? And what is the difference between the two, that is, between anathematism and catathematism, and what is signified by each?

RESP. Anathema is said of that which is consecrated and set apart for God, and is no longer taken for common use, or that which is estranged from God on account of wickedness; but catathema is to agree with those who anathematize.

QUESTION CXXII. If our affairs are not constrained by hours and days, why did the Lord at the wedding say, *Mine hour is not yet come*? And why does the evangelist say of Him, *No man laid hands on him, because his hour was not yet come*?

RESP. Although our affairs are not constrained by hours and days, ^B nevertheless, of the things that are done by us or happen to us, some occur at an opportune time, and others at an inopportune time. Therefore, the divine Scripture calls the time opportune for what is being done the "presence of the hour," and the inopportune time the "absence of the hour." And because the Lord considered the time after the making of the wine as the opportune time for departing from the wedding, for that reason, before He had made the wine, the Lord said, *Mine hour is not yet come*. And again, because it was necessary that the Lord be seized and suffer what He suffered at the time of the Jewish Passover, for that reason it was said of Him before the Passover: *No man laid hands on him, because his hour was not yet come*, not because the necessity of the hour prevented Him from being seized, but by the providence of God. For if the seizure of the Lord had been prevented by the necessity of the hour, the divine Scripture would not have attributed it to a geographical region. *Jesus*, it says, *departed into Galilee*. For He did not wish to walk in Judæa, because the Jews were seeking to kill Him; ^C but neither would He have departed into Egypt before this, if the necessity of the hour had been sufficient to protect Him from being seized.

QUESTION CXXIII. If what is good is the most excellent of all things, and that which is afflicted is the worst of all things; and God is indeed good, but man is afflicted, is man then the worst of all? For no other of the things that exist—I mean heaven, and earth, the air, the luminaries, and others of that kind—can be in affliction.

RESP. If the other things that have been named are for the sake of man, and things that exist for the sake of another are lesser than that one, then man is indeed the most excellent, for he is superior to the things that exist for his own sake. And if even the afflictions themselves contribute something toward the improvement of man, then man is most excellent, and for this reason he is healed by divine Providence through the afflictions ^D that arise from his own will.

It is necessary, however, that he who wishes to understand the good man ^A must look toward the end which is laid up for man after his passing away. For that is the fruit of the present life, namely, endless happiness in place of a short-lived and wearying life.

QUESTION CXXIV. If the Lord is the foreknower of the manner of life of each individual, why did He not establish the souls of the pious in vigorous bodies? And if, in storing up for them the rewards in the things to come, He permits them to be afflicted in the present, why are not all the pious tested in afflictions in the same way, so that from this it might be manifest what is good and what is evil? But if both are found in the case of both, how is he who chooses the better way not hidden? And how do all things, being carried as chance has it, not show that the things in the world are devoid of Providence, there being no distinction between the pious and the impious? ^B

ANSWER. God did not wish to reward with present things those who are devoted to Him on account of virtue. For the things that pertain to the mortal life of the pious are not the wages of virtue; and just as it is said that the pious are not of the world, so too their glory and their riches are not earthly. When, therefore, we see present with the pious those things which are also present with the impious, let us conclude from this that present things are not worthy of the labors of virtue. And if God appears to men to have at times exalted certain of those devoted to Him, such as Joseph and David, nevertheless, He was not rewarding their virtues with these things, but through Joseph He provided for the increase of the Israelite race, and through David He established the kingdom of the Spirit. ^C The pious do not differ from the impious at all in material and bodily things; for all things, both pleasant and painful, are present to both. They differ from one another, however, primarily by the hope of future things and by the sufferings undertaken for the sake of piety, and thereafter also by the divine aids, by which God often made His own people conspicuous, at times dissolving the power of the Egyptians, at times subjecting the Canaanites to the Israelites, at times calming the ferocity of the Assyrians, at times overturning the empire of the Babylonians, and at times commanding the sun in its course and station ^D beyond its nature. In these respects, the providence of God is displayed, and in those others, He prepares the pious to look toward another life, in which the distinction between the just and the unjust takes place according to glory and ignominy.

QUESTION CXXV. If the apostle Paul forbade rendering evil for evil or reviling for reviling, how did he act contrary to what he said, by cursing at one time the high priest and at another time Alexander the coppersmith?

ANSWER. If Paul had struck back at the high priest who struck him, or had answered with evil the one who had treated him badly,

^A one might say that he was acting contrary to what he taught. But to utter the things that were going to happen to each person from God—to the high priest, "God will strike you, you whitewashed wall," and to Alexander, "The Lord will repay him in that day"—is neither a curse nor an insult, but predictions proper to an apostolic man, who does not avenge himself, but gives place to wrath.

QUESTION CXXVI. If God rewards the pious with the splendor of this life, as [He did] Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and their descendants with wealth, and numerous offspring, and abundance of crops, from whence were the same things provided to the Greeks when they were worshipping idols everywhere? And how is Hellenism not shown to be holier, since as long as it held the cities, all the cities and fields enjoyed prosperity and plenty, and that even while they were more frequently waging war; but since the Christian preaching occupied them, they have been left destitute of homes and inhabitants and the rest of their former abundance, and they barely retain the remains of the structures once built by the Greeks to demonstrate that they were once cities, putting forward no other cause for the ancient prosperity and the recent desolation than their respective religions?

ANSWER. By the Lord God, who makes his sun to rise on the wicked and good, and rains on the just and unjust, bodily splendor in this present life is supplied to both (for the world is governed by the same Providence by which it was created); so that the just, while seeing themselves enduring much indeed for the sake of piety, yet being equal to the impious in those things which pertain to this life, might expect another life, in which there is a distinction of honor and punishment, and a division of the just and unjust, as it has been said. Moreover, that the destruction of cities and fields occurred while the Greek ^B cult was flourishing is witnessed by the desolation of the Babylonians and Assyrians, and of Nineveh, and of many other nations. But what city, while the Christian religion flourished in its cities and fields, has been reduced to desolation? It cannot be shown. From prosperity and the abundance of things, and from the frequency or desolation of cities and fields, one cannot estimate the holiness of those who are better, since the Lord God supplies such things for the benefit of all men, and [also] takes them away. But the holiness of the better sort is judged from the noble deeds which are freely performed by them. For that men were offered to demons in sacrifice ("They sacrificed," he says, "their sons and their daughters to demons"), and that worship worthy of God was offered to inanimate objects, happened while the Greeks were in power. But such impious Greek rites were forbidden when the Christians held the first place; therefore, it is from such things that the holiness of Christians is to be judged, and not at all from

^A the prosperity and density of cities and fields. The Christian religion excels in these matters just as much as the world is less agitated by wars when it is strong than when the worship of the Greeks is strong.

QUESTION 127. If that which is killed is destroyed by the killer, and that which kills works the deeds of destruction through malice; and since very many such things are found among all living things devoid of reason, and it is possible to see in them not only those plotting against one another, but also those extending their plots against human beings: how does he who said that God made all things good and very good speak the truth? And if he does speak the truth, yet good and evil things exist in creation, how is it that the good things are not recognized as belonging to a good creator and the evil things to an evil one, and thus two opposing principles are shown to exist, according to the Manichaeans? And if the destruction of those who are killed comes about for some good purpose, as some have supposed, why was it not better for their creation to have been prevented from the beginning?

ANSWER. He who makes an inquiry about the Creator based on the creation of living things, whether rational or irrational, ought to look to their nature, which, according to the law of God, leads all mortal things as much toward birth ^B as toward corruption and destruction. If, in these matters, there is no distinction regarding the reason of an animal, and the same Creator made things that are indifferent, and if they suffer destruction because of their mutual plotting, this has been permitted to happen to them by divine Providence; for if, although they are subject to corruption and destruction both by nature and by plotting, some people have not hesitated to deify them, how much more would they have deified them if they had remained forever free from harm and destruction? Therefore, so that they might be known for what they are—that is, unworthy of divine honor and title—for this reason they suffer destruction, both by nature and by plotting. ^C Irrational animals were made partly for the service of man, partly for food, and partly for instruction, as in: "I will send upon them the teeth of wild beasts, with the fury of those dragging them upon the earth." But if it is a good thing for man to be nourished by irrational animals, to be served by them, and to be instructed by them, then the coming of these animals into existence—and the fact that they are not to be blamed for the malice of their nature or the necessity derived from them—is good. If this is so, it is clear that all irrational animals are the handiwork of one good Creator.

QUESTION 128. If the enemy, out of envy for human salvation, works the aforementioned malice in men, and by this artifice plots to subject them ^D to future punishments, while those things devoid of reason neither

κολάσεσι· πῶς οὐ μόνῃ φαυλότητι φύσεως τὰ φαῦλα μετέρχονται; Α τὰ ἄλογα δὲ μήτε σωτηρίαν μήτε τιμωρίαν ἐν τοῖς μέλλουσι κολάζεσθαι μέλλοντα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπλέμητον ἔχοντα τὴν κατάστασιν. ^A

ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ. Τὸ ἐπὶ φαυλότητι πράξεως διαβάλλειν τῶν ἀλόγων τὰς φύσεις οὐκ ἔστιν εὔλογον. Τῶν γὰρ λόγου μετεχόντων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθῶς ἢ φαύλως διαπράξασθαι, οὐχὶ τῶν λόγου ἀμετόχων· καὶ ἐπειδὴ διὰ τὴν προλεχθεῖσαν χρείαν γέγονε τῶν ἀλόγων ἡ φύσις, διὰ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι, ἀγαθῆς οὔσης τῆς χρείας, ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ φύσις.

ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ ΡΚΘ'.

ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ. Τὸ ἰῶτα καὶ πῖ κατ' οὐσίαν ἀλλήλων οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. Γραμμὴ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἑκάτερον. Γραμμὴ δὲ γραμμῆς, ᾗ γραμμή, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἰῶτα τοῦ πῖ τῇ τοιᾷδε θέσει, καθ' ἣν τοῦτο μὲν ἰῶτα, τοῦτο δὲ πῖ ὑπάρχει· καὶ τὸ μὲν πῖ, ᾗ γραμμή ἐστιν, ἓν ἐστιν, ᾗ δὲ πῖ ἐστι, τριάς ἐστι, καὶ σύνθετον καὶ γενητόν. Κατὰ μέρος γὰρ καὶ χρονικῇ παρατάσει, τὸ εἶναι πῖ ὑπέστη ὑπὸ τοῦ συμβεβληκότος καὶ πεποιηκότος αὐτό. Χρὴ οὖν τὸν κατά τινα φυσικὴν ἀναλογίαν θεωρεῖν τὸν ὑπὲρ φύσιν ὄντα, ἐκεῖνα μόνα λαβεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἀναλογίας τὰ ἁρμόττοντα τῷ τῆς ἀναλογίας θεωρουμένῳ· οἷον τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ τρεῖς πρόσεστι τῷ πῖ καὶ τῷ Θεῷ· ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πῖ γενητῶς καὶ συνθέτως, τῷ δὲ Θεῷ ἀγενήτως τε καὶ ἀσυνθέτως. Ὁ γὰρ μὴ ἔχων τὸν πεποιηκότα καὶ συντεθεικότα οὔτε γενητός ἐστιν οὔτε σύνθετος. Διὸ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν ἀΐδιον λέγομεν συνύπαρξιν, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ σύνθεσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πῖ τὴν σύνθεσιν διὰ τὴν κατὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ γένεσιν. Εἷς τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός, ἡ Τριὰς τῇ μονάδι τῆς οὐσίας χωρὶς πάσης ἐν μὲν τῇ ἁγίᾳ Τριάδι κατὰ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς τῶν ὑποστάσεων ὑπάρξεως, ἐν δὲ τῷ πῖ κατὰ τὴν ποιὰν θέσιν τῆς γραμμῆς. ^{C D}

ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ ΡΑ'.

τόπῳ, ^A πῶς διὰ τὸ ὡς καμάραν πεπῆχθαι, ἢ ὡς δέριν κατὰ τὴν Γραφὴν ἐκτετάσθαι, ὁ οὐρανὸς οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ ἐστίν; Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον, οὕτως καὶ τὸ πηγνύμενον, ἐν τόπῳ ἀνάγκη νομίζεσθαι. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πῶς τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ περιγραφῇ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ παρ' ἀλλήλων κατάγνωσιν δικαίαν οὐχ ἕξομεν; Εἰ δ’ ὁ οὐρανὸς κατ' ἀμφοτέρους ἐν τόπῳ, καὶ ἑκατέροις ἡ τοῦ τόπου ποιότης καὶ ποσότης καθέστηκεν ἄγνωστος, τί πλέον θάτεροι θατέρων κατεγνῶσθαι δυνάμεθα, τῆς περὶ τῶν προλελεγμένων καταγνώσεως καὶ ἀγνοίας ἑκατέρους ἐπίσης κατεχούσης;

ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον οἱ Χριστιανοὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν μὴ εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ, καθάπερ λέγουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἴση ἂν ἔμελλεν εἶναι ἡ παρ' ἀλλήλων κατάγνωσις, λεγόντων μὲν μὴ εἶναι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐν τόπῳ, ^B φωναῖς καὶ σημαντικαῖς τοῦ ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι τὸν οὐρανὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρησαμένων· εἰ δὲ τοῦ μὲν σφαῖραν εἶναι τὸν οὐρανὸν, καὶ σφαιρικῶς κινεῖσθαι ἀδυνάτου ὄντος, τοῦ δὲ ὡς καμάραν εἶναι αὐτὸν δυνατοῦ δεικνυμένου· οὐδεμία ἄρα ἡ τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ κατάγνωσις. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ τόπου ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς στοχαζόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ὥσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν, ὅταν ᾖ περιφερές τι σῶμα ὁμαλόν τε καὶ κοῖλον, πανταχόθεν ἰσοπεριμέτρητον, ἐὰν πωμασθῇ ἐπὶ τὰ ὕδατα, βαστάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν ὑδάτων· τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ βαστάζεται ὁ οὐρανὸς ὑπὸ τῶν ὑδάτων· «Ὁ τανύσας,» φησί, «τὸν οὐρανὸν ὡς καμάραν.» Τῷ τῆς καμάρας ὀνόματι τὸ περιφερὲς ἐδήλωσε τοῦ σώματος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. Βαστάζει οὖν τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν τὰ ὕδατα, τὰ δὲ ὕδατα ἡ γῆ, τὴν δὲ γῆν, τὸ θεῖον πρόσταγμα· «Ὁ κρεμάσας,» φησί, ^C «τὴν γῆν ἐπ' οὐδενός.»

ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ ΡΛΑ'

εὑρίσκεται; If in the nomenclature of the lineage they mention things that are inconsistent with themselves and with each other, how will they be able to obtain credibility in the remaining doctrines concerning the Savior, rousing from the very prefaces to contradiction one who wishes to join our religion with certain reason? ^A

RESPONSE. In the genealogy according to Luke, Eli alone is the father of Joseph according to the law. But from Eli down to Nathan, all who are listed are sons by nature of those who precede them, who indeed, on account of the relationship which Eli has with Joseph, are reckoned as grandfathers, Joseph being the only one according to the law, while all the rest are according to nature. If this is understood in this way, every calumny of the evangelists regarding the inconsistency of their statements is removed; a calumny which those who do not understand the matter sufficiently, through a perverse understanding, suppose to exist in their writings. ^B

QUESTION CXXXII.

RESPONSE. Since the law did not forbid the Israelites from taking a wife if they wished—not only a kinswoman, but even a captive or a concubine—therefore there is nothing absurd, nor is there any harm, if the brother of the deceased took a wife in addition to his own wife, provided the law was not violated. For whatever is absurd is positioned in the transgression of the law. Even if it had happened that such a woman was sterile, yet that may have been uncertain for the woman. But where there is uncertainty, the law is not despised. This law, however, was established so that what death took away from the deceased—that is, paternity and an heir—these things might be provided to him by the providence of the law. For if men approach marriage for the sake of a memorial and an inheritance, it is clear that in whatever way God deems it worthy to provide these things to men, it is not a useless matter. Moreover, there is another advantage in this law, that by this addition of nuptials the heir may remain in the same tribe and not pass over to another tribe; and because once the woman has been joined to the first husband she has become one body, for this reason there is no [absurdity in identifying him as the father of the offspring, for he is not the father of another's offspring, but of that which was generated from his own body]. ^D

Just as one who is born from such a union is named after the deceased, so too is the woman named the wife of that same man.

[PB] ^B QUÆSTION CXXXIII. If the aforementioned law was ordained for the Israelites before the time of David, how is it that the evangelist Matthew makes mention of the natural fathers before and after David, while Luke makes mention of the natural fathers before David, but of those who are fathers by law after David? And if the names of the natural fathers and those by law are not found written down in the divine Scriptures after the transmigration to Babylon, but were written according to an oral pronouncement, how can those things written by such pronouncement be proven to those who inquire more accurately? ^C

RESPONSE. Luke himself mentions the natural fathers of Eli, both those before David and those after David. But Eli alone was the father of Joseph according to the law, who is traced back to Nathan by the same relationship, by reason of the sonship which the law granted him. Now, that the Lord Christ should be called the son of Joseph, having two fathers—one by law and one by nature—this divine grace arranged with moderation, so that when we hear that Christ is the son of Joseph, yet not begotten from him by nature, we may not be astonished. Just as Joseph himself was called the son of Eli, though not begotten of him, because it seemed good ^D to the divine law to grant a son to Eli from the wife of Eli, so it seemed good to God to grant a son to Joseph from the wife of Joseph, though not begotten of him by nature. "Joseph," He says, "son of David, do not fear to take Mary your wife" (Matt. 1, 20); for that which is born from a woman without unchastity or fornication is of necessity the son of the husband and the wife, in whatever manner God wills to bestow a son upon a man, whether by conjugal union or without conjugal union. The evangelists did not compile the account of those named in the genealogies by relying on oral pronouncement, but on written histories. For the holy evangelists who recorded the genealogies were Hebrews derived from Hebrews, among whom there existed a great concern to record in public registers the genealogy of the royal and Israelite tribe. Indeed, after the return from Babylon, Esdras (Esdr. 1, 3) removed from the priestly ministry those whom he did not find listed in the catalogue of priests. And this is evident from the Book of Chronicles.

QUÆSTION CXXXIV. If God sent the law to the Israelites through Moses, how is it that in many places of the divine Scripture, Moses is called "the law," and not "the lawgiver"?

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RESPOSITION. It is the custom not only among men, but also in divine Scripture, to name a discourse by the name of the author who said or wrote it, so that it may be indicated whose it is; as in the passage: *The eunuch was sitting upon the chariot, and was reading the prophet Isaiah*, and that passage: *The abomination of desolation, which was spoken of by Daniel the prophet*. Indeed, we ourselves are also accustomed to say: "I possess the prophet Jeremiah," or "the apostle."

^A QUAESTION CXXXV. If he is the true Christ who possesses an action and calling in agreement with divine Scripture, and divine Scripture predicted that Christ would be called Emmanuel, how shall the Lord be considered the true Christ, he who, from the time he was born, never received the name of Emmanuel? For after Christ had come, no one addressed him by the name of Emmanuel.

RESPOSITION. If the fulfillment of divine predictions concerning Christ is contained in the evangelical narratives, and the blessed Matthew has taught us that He is the very one whom the divine prediction established would be called by the name of Emmanuel, how is He not called by the name of Emmanuel? Yet the holy Church of God, being instructed by the discipline of the holy Gospel, has not ceased to call the Lord Emmanuel. ^B We have, moreover, in the title of "Christ," all the other titles of Christ contained within it, even if we do not always use all of them. For it is not because He is called so that He is Emmanuel, but because He is [Emmanuel], that He is called so.

QUAESTION CXXXVI. If divine Scripture forbids the rejection of parents, and one who does forbidden things is called a sinner, how is the Lord Christ, who in various places rejected His own parents, shown to be without sin? For at the wedding, in saying: *What to me and to thee, woman?*, ^C He rebuked His mother; and when His mother wished to see Him, He called those who do the will of God His mother and brothers. And again, when the womb that bore Him and the breasts which He suckled were called blessed, He Himself called those who do the will of God blessed; which things are all thought by some to be spoken by Him in insult to His mother, because when His mother had been named and proclaimed blessed, He Himself set against her others whom He proclaimed blessed. But this manner of opposing, as is manifest, is understood in relation to contrary matters. Furthermore, if He chose the holy Virgin for the ministry of so great a dispensation, ^D how is the Virgin considered unworthy of being called blessed on account of the things that were said? And if the things that were said are in opposition to one another, how do the things which are in opposition to one another not destroy one another?

^A RESPONSE. The phrase, "What have I to do with thee, woman?" [Joan. II, 4] was not spoken by the Savior as an rebuke to his mother, but to show, as he says, that we are not those who have taken upon themselves the care of the wine being consumed at the wedding; nevertheless, out of singular charity, if you wish that their wine should not fail, tell the servants to do what I say to them, and you will see that the wine will not fail them—which is what also happened. He would not, therefore, have rebuked the mother whom he honored by his actions. In other sayings, he does not deprive his mother of the honor due to her, but he shows on account of what kind of motherhood the Virgin is to be proclaimed blessed. For if he who hears the word of God and keeps it is himself the brother of God, and sister, and mother, and both were intrinsic to his mother, it is manifest that on account of this notion of motherhood, his mother ought to be proclaimed blessed. For to hear the word of God and to keep it, is a mark of virtue and of a pure soul, which is entirely intent upon God. And because God did not choose just any woman to become the mother of Christ, but her who surpassed all women in virtues, for this reason Christ also willed that his mother be proclaimed blessed for this very virtue, through which she was deemed worthy to become a virgin mother. That Christ did not in any way appear to have done anything to the dishonor or disobedience of his parents, the evangelist Luke testifies, saying concerning him that he went down with Joseph and Mary from Jerusalem, and was subject to them [Luc. II, 51].

QUESTION CXXXVII. If Mary anointed the Lord with ointment before his entombment [Marc. XIV, 8], and we celebrate the symbols of his passion and resurrection in baptism, why are we first anointed with oil, and then, after we have celebrated the previously mentioned symbols in the laver, are we finally anointed with ointment? How does it not appear to us that we are doing contrary to what was done regarding the Lord, if the Lord was indeed first anointed with ointment and then suffered? And how, furthermore, is the unction of oil not uselessly applied to those about to be baptized, if the Lord was anointed with only the ointment at the time of his passion?

^C RESPONSE. Since what the Church does for burial, she does after the death of him who has been buried, but blessed Mary anointed the Lord before his death (as it is written: "What she has done," he says, "she has done for my burial; for she has anticipated in order to anoint my body." For "she has anticipated" is equivalent to: "she anointed my body before the proper time"), therefore nothing is being done in opposition; rather, what happened in the case of the Lord before the time, happens in the case of those being baptized at the proper time. We are anointed with ^D the old oil in order that we may become christs [i.e., anointed ones], but with the ointment in remembrance of the fact that the

^A anointing with ointment is regarded as the burial of Himself; and it is a type for the present, but in truth for the future, He called us into the communion of His own sufferings and of the glory of our Savior Christ.

QUESTION CXXXVIII. If he who punishes the wrongdoer for the offenses which he has committed is just, how is God just, who handed over such a multitude to death for the sins of others? I speak of those who stumbled, Jonathan and David—the one because, out of ignorance, he broke his fast by tasting honey, and the other because he rashly numbered the people. But if anyone says that the death of subjects was the punishment of the rulers, how is He not unjust who subjects the innocent to penalties? How does this not stand in opposition to Scripture, which says, *The soul that sinneth, it shall die* (Ezek. xviii, 4)?

ANSWER. That the punishment of the people is the bitterest punishment for sinful kings, the blessed David himself makes clear, praying to God to transfer the plague from the people onto himself and his house. For the diminution of those who are ruled is the ruin of the kingdom. Similarly, Saul also was about to kill his son Jonathan, so that by his slaughter he might heal the plague of the people, had not the people forestalled him and sworn that they would not allow Jonathan to be killed. And just as man consists of soul and body, so also the kingdom consists of the ruler and the subjects. And just as if a man has committed a sin with his hand and is beaten upon his back, he who beats him is not unjust, so also God is not unjust when He punishes the people for the offenses of kings. For the plague of the people is the punishment of the kingdom. ^B Greatly indeed does the plague of the people know how to afflict kings.

QUESTION CXXXIX. If God is one, it is clear that He possesses in all things the character of being one: for example, [being] simple or composite, mortal or immortal, begotten or unbegotten, begetting or not begetting. How, then, since the Father begets and the Son does not beget, and the Son is begotten and the Father is not begotten, can the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit be called one God, when this very thing—to be begotten or not to be begotten, to beget or not to beget—is thought to imply a contradiction in the being of God? ^C

ANSWER. There is one God by the co-existence of the three divine substances, which differ from one another not in essence, but in the modes of their existence. The difference of the modes of existence does not divide the unity of the essence. And just as in the case of Adam, and Eve, ^D and Seth, the principle of the essence is one—for they are a rational soul and mortal body—yet...

the modes of existence are distinct: for Adam was made from the earth, and Eve from his side, and Seth from seed; and in the diverse modes of existence, the principle of the essence remains one, indivisible and unchangeable. So also in the case of God, by the identity of the essence of the persons, one God is believed, ^A both Father and Son and Holy Spirit. For the mode of existence contributes nothing to the principle of essence. Therefore, understand the unity of nature in those things that are said ^B of the three divine hypostases in the same way and without any distinction; but those things that are not said in the same way, understand them according to the mode of existence of the persons.

QUESTION CXL.

RESPONSE.

QUESTION CXLI.

RESPONSE.

^A is not necessarily also free from sin. For he who commits a sin against the law [that is] pardonable, upon the bringing of sacrifices and the confession of the fault, having received forgiveness, becomes pure and blameless according to the justice that is from the law. But Christ, as being free from sin, and in no way having transgressed the law, neither did anything that required correction; but he also received John the Baptist, and was baptized by him, that he might fulfill all righteousness; which Paul, before he believed in Christ, had not yet received; for he would not have persecuted the Church. Therefore, Christ alone is said to have existed free from sin.

QUEST. CXLII. If an angel is more excellent than a man, and the Holy Scriptures call men gods, why is it not fitting that angels also be named gods by us?

RESP. As many of the angels as have been seen in the place of God, or have spoken to men, have obtained also themselves the title of God, as he who spoke to Jacob and Moses. But men also were called gods. To both, however, on account of the ministry committed to them, it was given to hold the place and title of God; but when the ministry has been completed, those who received the name of God on account of some ministry cease to be called gods. For when He entrusted to an angel ^B the stewardship of the people, He said to Moses concerning him: "Do not be disobedient to him, for my name is set upon him." But when He entrusted the judgment of the people to the magistrates, He said to them: "Judge a just judgment, for the judgment is God's." And again: "I have said, You are gods, and all of you are sons of the Most High." He called them gods, as if to say: "I have given to you my honor and place and title; as therefore I judge, so judge the people."

QUEST. CXLIII. If God is far superior, but man is inferior, is it not contrary to what is right that man should be called God?

RESP. This question suits neither a Christian nor a pagan. For according to both, the title of a superior is transferred to inferiors, according to the glory of each. But one must not institute a doubt about things acknowledged, but about things that are uncertain.

QUEST. CXLIV. If God has a subsistent existence, and a will existing within him, and a Son existing, how, being composed of so many ways, is He called simple?

RESP. Just as God is whole everywhere, and whole in each one, and whole in Himself ^C, and [as] we have faith in this, so also His simplicity is all Son, and is all having the Son; and is all will, and is all having the will. For God is not according to the created nature, so that that which He is, and that which He has, should be understood through composition, as [is ^D created nature;] but as being in His nature, so also the

possession is above composition.

QUESTION CXLV. If it is through the same things that flesh and blood consist, why does God permit the eating of the flesh of animals, but forbid the partaking of it in the blood? Except, He says, that you shall not eat the flesh in its blood.

RESPONSE. That in this matter also God might separate us from the likeness of wild beasts, which, along with the eating of flesh, also lap up the blood of those whose flesh they devour.

QUESTION CXLVI. If God has foretold the future even through the prophets of the Greeks in cases where matters have truly been brought to completion, why, when Greeks were fighting with Greeks, were they ^B often delivered from the calamities posited in the second consultation after they had done something—following an oracle’s warning—that is forbidden by divine law? For example, in war, as when those seven captains against Thebes were about to utterly destroy the aforementioned city; and because Tiresias had given a response, Menoeceus, complying with the oracle, willingly slaughtered himself, and thus, according to the prophecy of the oracle, the city was saved and the enemies were slaughtered by those in the city. And we have brought forward this one example of a victory obtained in war out of many.

RESPONSE. He who undertakes the solution of ^C questions must first set down the admitted facts, and then from these complete the solution of the matters in question. Now, one of the admitted facts is that there is one God, the creator and governor of the whole world, whom the divine Scriptures of the Christians announce, confirmed by words of divine power, from whom is both the prophecy and the outcome of future events. But the Scriptures which announce this One reject the gods of the Greeks. If nations change their gods, He says, yet they are not gods. But if those gods are not gods, their prophets are not prophets of truth, nor does their prophecy have an inevitable and true outcome. For just as they are far from true deity, so too are they from the foreknowledge of future events. And that, even in the battle of Greeks against Greeks—who in many ways, ^D especially in their wars, have used oracles—the God of the Christians established His own will, is witnessed by the battle of Alexander and Darius, whose prophecies He confirmed for one, but overthrew for the other; it is witnessed also by the battle of the Assyrian with many other strong nations, whom God called the rod of His wrath and a saw, sometimes saying: Behold the Assyrian, he is the rod of my wrath; I will send him against a sinful nation; and at another time saying of him: Shall the saw be exalted without him who draws it? Certainly, the fact that the Assyrian, through the success of the responses...

which he received from his gods through the seers, cuts and rends the miserable nations—nations which, likewise trusting in oracles, engaged in war with him and failed, having been deceived in the hope they placed in their oracles—happened by God’s permission; so that while the oracles responded to the desires of the Assyrian, the nations were deceived by their own divinations. Of these God speaks through the prophet Isaiah: I have relaxed my hand, and they are withered. But the Assyrian says: Have the gods of the nations delivered their land from my hand, that the Lord should deliver Jerusalem from my hand? According to the oracles which the Assyrian received from the seers, he spoke such words against both the nations and Jerusalem. And with God permitting it, the Assyrian was successful in the oracles against the nations; but against Jerusalem he failed in the oracles, because God did not permit it. How, then, did those seven ^A leaders at Thebes fail in the divination to destroy the city utterly? For the failure of the divination becomes a proof of the weakness of the god who foretold by divination things that did not come to pass. And if, according to the unerring word of the Saviour, not even a sparrow falls to the ground without God, much more so would an entire nation or an entire city not perish unless God permitted it. That every Greek nation destroyed by another Greek nation is destroyed by the rod and saw of the wrath of God is made manifest by what has been said concerning the Assyrian. Furthermore, if the things related by the Greeks concerning the seer Tiresias are thoroughly ridiculous, how is it possible that the things said by him should be true? For they say concerning him that he was both man and woman, and possessed the forms of both, and that because he had resolved many disputes among the gods, for this reason Juno, being enraged at him, struck him with blindness; but Jove, to comfort him for his blindness, gifted him with divination. Moreover, since the things told fabulously about him are incredible, how can the things which he himself recounted be true? Finally, if, ^B as the Greeks say, the things spun upon the spindles of the Fates cannot be unwound, how are the oracles not useless to those who use them, when the Fates necessarily bring those things which were spun on their spindles to an ineluctable end? If these things are so, how are the Fates and the divinations—being destroyed by one another—not false? And how is it that Menoeceus did not kill himself in vain according to the opinion of the oracle, since the cause for why the enemies were to be killed and the city saved was not from the demon who uttered the response through the seer, but from the Lord, the true God, who permitted it? ^{C D}

ADMONITION

On the following Questions of Christians to Greeks and of Greeks to Christians.

It is agreed among all scholars that the *Questions of Christians to Greeks and of Greeks to Christians* are not the work of St. Justin Martyr; and some have already remarked—nor is it difficult to surmise—that they are the offspring of the same parent as the *Confutation of Certain Aristotelian Dogmas*, which we shall join to them, since there is a great similarity of style between both works. But we must inquire to whom the whole mass of this discourse is to be attributed. Indeed, the more carefully I compare these questions with those which are *To the Orthodox*, the more I am led to the opinion that both are to be adjudged to one and the same author: the similarity of style, among many other things, attests to this, especially the use of the nominative (or accusative) case in place of the genitive absolute in both sets of questions. See *Question* 100 *to the Orthodox* and the *Response to Question* 113. You will find the same manner of speaking below in the *Confutation*, in the response to the *Questions of the Greeks*, no. 3, n. 3, and in the *Responses on the Resurrection*, no. 11 and 45. It is to be observed in *Question* 37 and 131 *to the Orthodox* that the preposition *kata* is used differently than by other authors. Thus also we read below *kata koinou*—"in the common manner"—in the *Confutation*, in the response to the *Questions of the Greeks*, no. 3, n. 3.

In the *Response to Question* 114 *to the Orthodox*, it is written as though from Scripture: "You have thought and they have been present to you," which indeed seems to be taken from the words of Job, ch. XXIII, v. 14, or some other similar place. The same sentiment is cited below in the *Responses on the Resurrection*, no. 4. Nor is the same material usually treated in the *Questions to the Orthodox* as in those which are *to the Greeks*; but if it occurs that the same things are proposed for resolution, it will not be difficult to perceive a consensus of principles. The response to *Question* 113 *to the Orthodox* is very similar to those points which are maintained against the eternity of the world in the *Confutation*, in the response to the *Questions of the Greeks*, no. 4. In the *Confutation*, in the response to the *Questions of the Greeks*, no. 1, n. 5, we have the same words concerning the future restitution of all things as in the *Response to Question* 1 *to the Orthodox*.

The *Questions of Christians to Greeks* in the edition of Robert Estienne are separated from those which are of the *Greeks to Christians*; but in the Greco-Latin editions, the latter were subjoined to the former. The former, which contain more prolix responses, do not seem to have been known to Photius. For he records only 507 "brief solutions of questions against piety." I think no one will deny that all these things must be attributed to one and the same author.

Grabius skilfully observes in *Spicilegium*, tom. II, p. 156, that there is a great similarity between these *Questions of Christians to Greeks* and the disputations that once took place between Justin and Crescens. For as Justin used to put questions to this Cynic and then refute his answers, so it is in these questions. Hence a suspicion entered the mind of Grabius: "that some impostor had taken the occasion from the words of Justin to feign such *Interrogations, Responses, and Confutations of Responses*." The conjecture of the learned man would be probable, if many moments of reasoning did not persuade us that all those questions—whether *to the Orthodox*, or the *Christians to Greeks*, or the *Greeks to Christians*—are the work of one and the same author, who was indeed too acute and learned to mention the Manichaeans and set down many other things by no means convenient to the age of St. Justin Martyr, if he had wished to hide under the name of the holy Martyr.

CHRISTIAN QUESTIONS TO THE GREEKS.

^A

QUESTION I.

GREEK RESPONSE.

evil, another principle will be found contrary to God; which the Manichaeans, in speaking wrongly, do assert. For it is absurd that God should not encompass all things, and that He should not cause the light of His own goodness to shine upon all. Therefore, there is no greatest evil; for ignorance is often given to men for their benefit; for we see in many cases that it often happens that men despise things known ^B more than things unknown. Furthermore, the soul suffers ignorance of the truly existing God not from any other source than from its own forgetfulness. But the knowledge of God also reaches the souls here; just as we see that men here know God. And if one wishes to speak the truth, there is no ignorance at all concerning God; for all, by a common notion, confess that God exists. That men, even while living here, are able to know God, the faith of the orthodox clearly declares, stating that God Himself has descended and has become known to men. If, therefore, it is possible for men to know God even while living here, no greatest evil happens to them from being here. ^C For to those who are ignorant, as has been said, ignorance of God happens by a failing of their unbelieving nature. But if one were even to concede—which is absurd—that these present things are the greatest evil, and that it were better not to be than to be here: if he says that the Creator made these things here evil out of weakness, he is talking nonsense, asserting that God’s power does not grasp all things. But if, being able to make these things here good, He permitted others to do evil, this also will be an accusation against God. For he who is able to prevent, yet overlooks, is in truth himself the producer. But if it is God Himself who made these things, it is clear that ^D since the same God remains, the same things will be in the future and always. For what He could do formerly, He can also do now. But if He can now do something more than before, such power of His will be temporal; which is absurd, for that which is temporal is corruptible. But if, being able also of old to prevent this greatest evil, He did not prevent it, He would be envious; which it is impious even to imagine. Therefore, it is necessary that He who remains the same should do the same things.

Refutation of the incorrectly formulated response.

1. It is sufficient to argue that this reasoning is not consistent with itself. For since he says at the beginning of the argument that there is no greatest evil, but at the end of the argument that it is impious, and based solely on imagination, to think things unworthy of God, how is that greatest evil which was thoughtlessly rejected by the responder not introduced in a considered manner? But if, to this impiety which is based on imagination alone, there be added the saying of it in words, a greater impiety is committed. But if it be not only spoken, but also written, the impiety will exceed every degree of malice. And if these things are so, and in those things which are spoken and written unworthily concerning God, it is kept hidden.

^A Since it has pleased your piety that the inconsistency of the argument be demonstrated by us also in writing, for this reason I have written down what follows, and that briefly. For to refute a manifest lie at greater length brings weariness both to the writer and to the reader.

2. The respondent placed in his own response two species of the supreme evil, and three species of the ignorance of God: those indeed according to the opinion of the Manichæans, but these according to the respondent himself. And of the two species of supreme evil, one he called by substance, the other by operation of that which is evil by substance. And of the three species of the ignorance of God, he said one proceeds from forgetfulness, the second from an incredulous nature, and the third from a useful benefit. ^B Yet, briefly overturning both the opinion of the Manichæans and his own, he says, at one time refuting the opinion of the Manichæans, "There is no supreme evil. But if anyone were to posit a supreme evil, another principle antagonistic to God would be found, which the Manichæans wrongly assert"; at another time, when he says, "The soul suffers not from anything else, but from its own forgetfulness, the ignorance of the truly (51) existing God"; in the former, refuting the supreme evil by substance, but in the latter, that by operation. And refuting also the species of the ignorance of God, the same man put forward, saying, "There is no ignorance at all concerning God; for all, by a common notion, confess that God exists." ^C If, therefore, there is no ignorance at all concerning God, it is evident that it is false that ignorance of God happens to men either by forgetfulness, or by an incredulous nature, or by a useful benefit. But if he says the common notion of all is that which is overturned by the specific notion of each perverse heresy, not even thus will the knowledge of God be in all. We, however, did not set in the question either the supreme evil according to the Manichæans, nor the ignorance of God according to the respondent; but we say the supreme evil is in the mind, a false opinion concerning God; and the ignorance of God is that which utters such a false opinion, which indeed is the third species of the supreme evil, happening to men from voluntary disobedience and unbelief. ^D When the respondent intended to abolish them, he did indeed abolish the two species of supreme evil according to the Manichæans, but he did not abolish ours. Wherefore we must say one of two things concerning the respondent: either that he was ignorant of our third species of supreme evil, or that he lacked a just cause for contradiction which might abolish that species. But that the supreme evil, as we call it, happens to men from the ignorance of God is demonstrated thus: The supreme evil, which is not by substance, men have posited in their own dogmas to exist through the ignorance of God; and the respondent himself testifies to this, which indeed is not lacking in the response itself. By these words, "The soul suffers the ignorance of God not from anything else than from its own forgetfulness," the opinion of the Manichæans is refuted, namely that evil which comes to pass through the operation of an evil substance, with free choice being removed.

^A This the respondent himself also says when he claims: "There is no greatest evil; and if one were to suppose a greatest evil, another principle antagonistic to God would be found, which the Manichæans incorrectly assert." For it is absurd that God should not encompass all things, nor diffuse the light of His goodness upon all. "Therefore, there is no greatest evil." In these words, the greatest evil in respect of substance is indeed abolished, but that which is supposed in opinions, and which we have set forth in our question, is left behind. But since the respondent, intent on overturning that which we call the "greatest evil," said, "There is no greatest evil," it is therefore clear that the respondent either did not understand what was meant by the "greatest evil" as we spoke of it, or that he was destitute of any just cause for contradiction. But if this is the case, it is evident that there is a greatest evil among men, if only by hypothesis and as a belief. For if, he says, God is the greatest of goods, it is indeed a true and pious voice which declares God to be the greatest of goods; but because some men, out of ignorance of God, defraud the truly existing God of His just names and honors and transfer them to those who are not gods, does it not seem to the respondent that there is a double impiety, than which there is none greater: to be ignorant of the truly existing God, and to adorn him who is not God with the titles and honors belonging to the former? How, then, can his opinion stand—which denies that there is any greatest evil among men—when there is among them the greatest impiety? Unless, perhaps, he does not consider the greatest impiety to be the greatest evil. ^C "If one," he says, "were to suppose a greatest evil, another principle antagonistic to God would be found, which the Manichæans incorrectly assert; for it is absurd that God should not encompass all things, nor diffuse the light of His goodness upon all. Therefore, there is no greatest evil." If there is no greatest evil among men, how do you accuse the Manichæans of speaking ill of the things they say? For if the Manichæans speak ill of what they say, surely that which is spoken by them is an evil. For whoever speaks ill-ly, speaks of an evil in an ill-ly manner. Furthermore, the evil of the Manichæans is of such a kind that there is none greater than it. And if this is true, then truly there is a great evil among men; if not in substance, at least by hypothesis and opinion.

3. For ignorance, he says, is often given to men in the form of a benefit: whence we see that it often happens to many that they despise things that are better known than those that are unknown. ^D Moreover, ignorance of the true God does not spring from any other source than from the soul's own forgetfulness, for knowledge of God also arrives to souls here; just as, indeed, we see men also in this life knowing God. And if anyone wishes to speak the truth, there is no ignorance at all concerning God. For all men, by a common inward perception, confess that God exists. That men, while here, are also able to know God, the faith of the orthodox clearly declares, which proclaims that God Himself descended and was known by mortals. He said that ignorance was many times given to men in the place of a benefit. But if he speaks of that ignorance of which we are now discoursing, it is manifest

that it is absurd to say that ignorance of God is given to the ignorant as a benefit. For by this line of reasoning, all religions that are ignorant of God would be ignorant of God for their own benefit; but the religion that knows God would not be for its own benefit. ^A But if he speaks of a different ignorance, about which it was not our purpose to speak, the introduction of it is inopportune, obtruding as it does an unqueried ignorance in place of the one being queried. He said that the soul suffers from ignorance of God through its own forgetfulness; he said that even here a knowledge of God comes to souls; he said that even here we see those who know God; he said that there is no ignorance of God at all; for all, he says, confess that God exists by common consent. He said that even here men are able to know God, and for proof of this he brought forward the faith of the orthodox, which asserts that God himself has descended and been known to men. But if it is true that the soul suffers from ignorance of God through its own forgetfulness, then clearly that which says "there is no ignorance of God at all, for all confess by common consent that God exists" is false. And what need was there for a knowledge of God to come to souls here, if all already know God and confess Him by common consent? But this part, "And here we see men who know God," concerning what men does he say this? If it is concerning those who have known God after He descended and presented Himself to be known to them ^B according to the faith of the orthodox, his argument is true, for we do indeed see them. But how can one who used the coming of God to men as an argument to prove that it is possible for men to know God even here, himself lack faith in what was said by Him concerning the restoration of the world? For a faithless demonstration does not establish faith in the matter for the sake of which it was produced. But if he does not mean those who have known God through the doctrine of the God who has descended to us from heaven, then this statement will be false: "We see men who here know God." For I do not see these. And if there is no ignorance of God at all, for all confess Him by common consent, what knowledge of God comes to mortals in this life, if not that special knowledge by which all religions that are on the earth differ from the one that professes the truth, not merely by the falsehood, but by the distinction of the falsehood from ^C one another? But if this is so, then according to the reasoning of the respondent, it is not knowledge of God that comes to souls here, but rather ignorance, since religions do not differ from one another by the general knowledge of God implanted in them, but rather by that which comes to them here for each one individually.

4. If, therefore, it is possible for mortals, being here, to know God, then no supreme evil comes to them from the fact that they exist here,

^A for to those who are ignorant—as has been said—it is from their own unbelieving nature that ignorance of God ensues. The respondent has entangled two statements that are mutually destructive, having placed in his own answer: "If it is possible for people who are here to know God, no supreme evil happens to them," and also: "To those who are ignorant, it is from their own unbelieving nature that ignorance of God ensues." And the supreme evil which he cast out by the first statement, he introduced by the second; for if it is a supreme evil to be impious towards the truly existing God by a double impiety—both by depriving Him of the glory that belongs to His essence and by falsely honoring those who are not gods with His glory—a thing which leaves no excess of wickedness behind it; then the assertion that because it is possible for people being here to know God, no supreme evil happens to them, is not a removal of the supreme evil, but an intensification. For even when it is possible, people are unable to do so on account of their own voluntary unbelief, and although they could act piously according to the simple piety that saves men, they prefer to it this double impiety. Not to call this a supreme evil is among the most absurd of things.

5. But if anyone grants that—which is absurd—that it is a supreme evil for the things here to exist, and that it is better for things here not to exist than to exist: if he says that the things here were made evil by the Creator on account of weakness, he is raving, claiming that the power of God does not include all things. ^B But if, being able to make things here good, He permitted others to do evil, this too is an accusation against God. For he who has the power to stop it, yet overlooks it, is more truly the doer of it himself. If, as was said above, it befalls those who are ignorant of God that they do not know God due to their own unbelieving nature, which we have certainly confessed to be a supreme evil, how does the respondent now concede this as an absurdity? But if it is not this, but some other supreme evil that he concedes as an absurdity, that is not a supreme evil according to our judgment, but according to the opinion of the Manichaeans. ^C For according to us, all things here are good, as having the greatest of all goods as their creator and author; and there is no supreme evil in them according to substance, nor according to the operation of that which is evil by substance, but rather it is the free will of men which prefers the lie to the truth, according to the aforementioned double impiety. The Creator and God of the world, in correcting this, has appointed the day in which He will do away with all the evils in the world that have arisen from the unbelief and disobedience toward God, according to the faith of the orthodox who have here known God and the testimony of the respondent. The respondent should not, therefore, while the discussion is about the supreme evil according to us, have turned himself to the supreme evil according to the Manichaeans; for this is a sign of ignorance and of ^D

^A proving a lack of resources, as has been said. God permits us to do the evils we choose voluntarily, not on account of the weakness of His power, but so that the freedom of our will and His own patience may be demonstrated: without which neither could we be human beings, nor could He Himself be good in the present state of things.

6. If it is the same God ^B Who creates these things, it is clear that, the same God remaining, these things will be so both hereafter and always. For what He was able to do long ago, He is also able to do now; but if now He were able to do something more than before, such power of His would be temporal; which is absurd, for what is temporal is corruptible. Of these matters it is said, "He has made," and of the same things it is also said, "He has made," and "He will make"; and the use of these terms is free, as they are of equal power to one another. By natural necessity, however, the word "has made" precedes the word "will make," which words are markers of the two extremities of time. Moreover, he who possesses the two extremities of time, that is to say the past and the future, must also possess that which is between the extremities of time, that is to say the present. And since the word "has made" possesses a temporal implication, God, by necessity, having made these things here according to the voice of the respondent, has made them in time. But God, having made the things here, made both the incorruptible and the corruptible; for these are parts of the things here. Therefore, it is clear that the respondent ^C reasonably posited "has made" in regard to God, but unreasonably distinguished the corruptible from the incorruptible within the temporal; for they are not distinguished from one another by the word "has made," since He made both the corruptible and the incorruptible. If, therefore, he who speaks of God "will make" is speaking of the restoration as coming about by the accession of temporal power, then he who speaks of Him as "has made" is also speaking by the accession of temporal power, if it is true that "has made" everywhere precedes "will make." But if He did not make by the accession of temporal power when He "has made," then neither will He make by the accession of temporal power.

7. But if, being able to prevent this supreme evil, He did not prevent it, He would be envious; which it is impious even to imagine. It is necessary, therefore, to hold that He remains the same, doing the same things. That men, on account of ignorance of God, are impious in many ways, if they do not know the truly existing ^D God, we have shown in what was said above. For they either abolish God, depriving Him of His own glory, and falsely honor those who are not gods with His names and realities; or they suppose the creation and providence of the world to be the work of creators fighting against one another; or they designate parts of the world by the name of the "Unbegotten," which is appropriate only to the Architect of the world, God, and without any work they cast upon God the name of "Creator"; to say nothing of the other species of supreme evils in men, which have an equal or even greater impiety than imagining God to be envious. But if these and other such things are the greatest evils in men, and that which is preached by the Christians

as the restoration—in which occurs the removal of all the evils in men, both in soul and in body—is disbelieved by the respondent, how is God not, according to him, envious? For being able to prevent the greatest evils in men, he does not prevent them, but permits those who are impious toward Him and toward one another to remain ^A always in the same state? And for what reason does the respondent disbelieve in the restoration of the world? Is it because of the inability of the Maker, or because of the unworthiness of the work? But if it is because of the inability of the Maker, then God will not be a maker at all; for those things for which God does not have the power of transformation, of those things he does not have the power of making either—for these things are logical consequences of one another, being established or overturned together. But if it is because of the unworthiness of the work, then the better work will be unworthy of God; which is absurd, to say that it is fitting for Him to make men corruptible, but not fitting for Him to make them incorruptible.

CHRISTIAN QUESTION TO THE GREEKS, SECOND

If it is impossible for there to be a God who has made nothing, ^B how is there a God if the world is unbegotten, as it seems to some?

GREEK RESPONSE TO THE CHRISTIANS

To say that it is impossible for there to be a God who has made nothing is absurd. For here, too, the same reasoning applies, that nothing is temporal in the sight of God. But if nothing temporal exists in the sight of God, it is clear that it is not fitting to apply the past tense to God. But if this is not fitting, then it is not fitting to say that God has made anything whatsoever. What then? Would you say that we err by calling God inactive? But we do not say this; rather, we say that God has not made, nor is He making, nor will He make anything in time. For He has not made anything more than He is currently making, nor is He making anything more than He will make. But the past is present to God, and the future is already contained in the past; ^C for God has nothing transient, but always does the same things, because of His perfect and immutable power and act. Therefore, in the very fact that He is, He produces the world, while supplying it with perpetual motion, and causing it to shine forth through every age. Therefore, He has indeed made nothing, nor will He make anything. But the same God, remaining the same, is always making, having no beginning to His making, lest it also have an end; for if His acts have a beginning and an end, God will be corruptible in His acting; which is absurd. For then His power would also be mutable, as if He used different activities at different times; and His substance would be shaken, at one time generating other powers, and not remaining in the same ones. Therefore, if these arguments apply to all things, it is clear that God would be mutable in substance, power, and act; which is absurd. Therefore, He who remains the same has nothing temporal ^D that he causes to come to pass.

^A

Confutation of the improperly instituted response.

1. To say that God, having made nothing, is impossible, is absurd. For here too the same reasoning applies, namely that nothing is temporal in the sight of God. If, because there is nothing temporal in the sight of God, it is absurd to say of Him that He has made, it is of the same absurdity to say that He makes, which is just as temporal as "has made." How, then, does the respondent say that "has made" is not appropriate for God, but "makes" is appropriate? And if "having made" corresponds to "has made" ^B and likewise "making" to "makes"—and the interchange of terms having the same value is permitted—how in his first response did the respondent use "having made" and "making" regarding God, but now removes both from Him? Indeed, he placed "having made" regarding God in this way: "It is the same God, he says, who has made these things." And he placed "making" in this way: "It is necessary, therefore, he says, for the same God, while remaining in the same, to make the same things." But in the second response, abolishing what was set down in the first, he says: "It is absurd to say that it is impossible for God to have made nothing." And again: "God neither has made, nor makes, nor will make in time." Perhaps he fell into speaking against himself through his own forgetfulness, something which, as he said, is the cause of ignorance in men. Let us, however, examine what follows. ^C

2. Nothing, he says, is temporal in the sight of God. It is clear that not even past time is fitting to attribute to God. But if this is not fitting, then it is not fitting to say that God has made anything at all. The respondent, having posited the absurdity that there is nothing temporal in the sight of God, necessarily deduces things that follow from that absurdity as if they were logical; namely, that if there is nothing temporal in the sight of God, it is clear that it is not fitting to attribute past time to God; and if this is not fitting, then it is not fitting to say that God has made anything at all. But that he posited absurdly that there is nothing temporal in the sight of God (a principle he used to prove the things following), the respondent refutes himself, in that he said in the first response: "If it is ^D the same God who has made these things, it is evident that as the same God remains, the same things will be both hereafter and always; for what He was able to do long ago, He is also able to do now." If, therefore, there is nothing temporal in the sight of God, it is clear that neither "having made," nor "makes," nor "before and after," nor "long ago and now," nor "could and can," applies to Him. For "having made," and "before," and "long ago," and "could," are significations of past time; and "makes," and

"after," and "now," and "can," are significations of the present and future time. If these, when applied to God, signify and posit that all the works of God are temporal in Him, it is clear that it was absurd for him to posit that there is nothing temporal in Him. And if this, having been posited ^A absurdly, is removed, then of necessity the claim that "He has made" does not befit God is simultaneously removed. For if this is removed, its contrary must of necessity be posited, namely, that "He has made" does befit God. For in any matter whatsoever, it is necessary that either the affirmation be true or the negation. Furthermore, if you posit that "He has made" befits God, you cannot say that God has made nothing. For this follows from that.

3. What then? Shall you say that we accuse God of sinning? We do not say this, but that God has not made anything, nor does He make, nor will He make in time. For He has no more made than He makes, nor again does He make more than He will make; but both the past is in the present with God, and the future is in what has already come to pass. ^B For God has nothing in flux, but He always does the same things, because of His perfect and immutable power and act. But to flee from the sin of calling God idle, while affirming of Him that He has neither made, nor is making, nor will make in time—this is to fall into the same sin. For if you were wishing to sin and to call God idle, what more could you say than what you have already said, not wishing to sin and to call God idle, namely, that God has neither made, nor is making, nor will make? For if the verbs that signify and contain a temporal emphasis are removed from the operation of God, God will be found idle, and consequently not a creator.

4. If there is nothing temporal in God, neither past time, nor present, nor future, is with Him. How then does the respondent, ^C while removing temporal things from God, posit temporal things in God, and say: "True, but the past is with God in the present, and the future in the past"? This signifies two things in a certain way: either that that which is not is in God in that which is not, or that that which is not is in God in that which is. If the first, it is impossible; for to be or not to be in something pertains to that which is. If the second, then that which is not is in God in that which is—that is, past time in present time. This being posited, it proves that the statement that "there is nothing temporal in God" was not rightly said, as that past in the present, and future in the past, are indeed temporal; and although he has changed the mode ^D of how the parts of time are with God, he nevertheless concedes that past, present, and future time are with Him, even if He does not "have made" more than He "makes," nor again "makes" more than He "will make." For indeed, what need was there to remove that "more" from

the operations differing among themselves according to the words—"has made," "makes," and "will make"—unless the operations are such that they do not differ from one another according to "more" or "less"? For even the denial that He has made "more" than He "is making" is not a denial of the having-made; it is rather a positing of the "has made." But clearly, whatever the responder removed from God in the preamble of the second reply as "temporal," these same things he left to Him here, on the grounds that God has nothing ^A fluid, but always does the same things because of His perfect and immutable power and act. He who removes temporal things does not posit temporal things. How then, if according to the responder there is nothing temporal before God, does God "do" the same things? For "to do" cannot be conceived outside the present time. And how does God have perfect power and operation if He is endlessly doing the same things? For if motion is called an "imperfect" operation because it is continuously moving, and God likewise acts in imitation of this, His operation will be imperfect and not absolute. For absolute operation is perceived in a perfected work, not in an unperfected one. But if, due to the imperfection of the operation and the highly imperfect reasoning, the responder asserts that God has made nothing, he will not speak the truth, asserting the operation of God to be perfect when it has perfected nothing, neither in the whole nor in the part. But if, the work not being finished, it is impossible for the operation of the maker to be perfect, it is clear that God does not have a perfect operation, since He is always "doing" that which is being made.

5. Therefore, He makes the world in ^C this very thing which it is, providing constant motion to it, as He makes it shine throughout the age. If God fashions the world by the provision of motion, it is evident that He fashions the world as something temporal; for the motion provided to the world by God for its movement is not without time. If, therefore, "to do" belongs to the present time, and motion is temporal, how is it not false to say, "There is nothing temporal before God"? And how is it possible for the world to be moved, which has not yet come into being, but [is] if it is in the state of being made, [i.e.,] that God makes it without time, but the world is made in time? For it is necessary that just as the maker makes, so also the thing being made must be made without time. But if God makes the world by the administration of motion, and it is not fitting for the expression "He has made the world" to be applied to Him, then it is not fitting for the world even to be moved. If that which is moved is one thing, and the motion is another—as, for instance, let the sun be that which is moved, and its motion be its transition by displacement from place to place—and the motion does not provide the sun its substance, but provides it the capacity to be moved by displacement, it is clear that the sun has two makings: one of its substance, another ^D of its motion. For the sun is an ether-like condensation in substance, brilliant in appearance, spherical in shape; none of which things the sun gains through motion. But if the sun possesses none of these through motion, it is clear that it does not possess them through the making of God either. But if, by the provision of perpetual motion, the sun...

is made ^A by God, being a part of the world, just as He makes the whole world, and it is necessary that the moveable thing exists first and the motion later, then either the sun is uncreated in its substance, or He made its substance by one instance of making, and its motion by another; and having first made its substance, He later granted it motion. But if He makes it to be in motion always, but does not make its substance always, it is clear that after the making of its substance He provides it with ^B ceaseless motion, and the end of the making of its substance is the beginning of its motion. If these things are so, it is clear that nothing is timeless before God; for a making that succeeds a making is not timeless.

6. That which is the same always produces the same, not having a beginning of its making, or else it would have an end. Since it has been shown that another making of the sun belongs to its substance, and another to that which is through motion, which the responder called ceaseless, and that the making of its substance precedes that which is through motion, how is it not absurd to say that the making of the sun which is through motion is without beginning, ^C when the sun, before that ceaseless making through motion, possessed another making, namely of its substance, which ceased? Either therefore God is not the creator of the substance of the sun, or the making of the sun through motion is not without beginning. But if the former, if God is not the creator of the substance of the sun, then He is not its creator through motion either; for from whom it has its substance, from him it must also have its motion. But if the latter, God will be corruptible in His operation; for if, according to the responder, upon the ceasing of the operation of God, God is corrupted in His operation. But if God is the creator of the substance of the sun, and He does not always make it—He made it, indeed, before it was moved—then there is no creature before God that is without time.

7. For if its operations have a beginning and an end, ^D God will be corruptible in His operation, which is absurd. His power will also be mutable, now producing one set of operations, then another. But if the power is mutable, using different operations at different times, the substance will also change, at one time generating one set of powers, and at another remaining not in the same. Wherefore, if these points apply to all things, it is clear that God would be mutable in substance, power, and operation, which is absurd. Just as God Himself has no beginning and end, so neither do His operation and His works (for His operations are in His works); so that, just as He Himself does not need one who makes, neither do His so-called works. It will also be a falsehood to call God the maker of that which belongs to Him, when they are without beginning and without end. But if [alt-version omitted] the Creator is distinguished in every way by the difference between prior and posterior existence from the created thing, then removing from...

^A God and his works this distinction defrauds both: God of the title of Creator, and the works of the title of created things. And if the power of God is infinite, as indeed it is, while his works are finite, how, according to the judgment of the respondent, is God not corruptible in his operation regarding those powers which he indeed possesses, but by which he does not operate? But if he is not corruptible regarding the powers which he possesses but by which he does not operate, then neither is God corrupted by his operation when the operation that produced the world ceases. He operates as much as he wills, but not as much as he is able; and the contraction of the operation does not make God corruptible. ^B Nor, therefore, when he contracts the operation, does he contract the power through a change. But the power of God is always immutable, while he uses his operations as much as he wills. For God does not operate as those operate which have their being in operating, and which, when the operation ceases, themselves cease to be, such as fire and snow. For if God operated in this way, he would not operate for the sake of the things being made, but rather for the sake of his own being; since, if he were to cease to operate, he would also cease to be. But if this is absurd, then it is also absurd to say that the power of God is changed by the contraction of the operation, or that his substance is shaken by being extended at different times into different and varied operations. And just as God creates us—first as infants, then as adolescents, then as old men—he does this not by a change of power, ^C nor by a corruption of operation, nor by a shaking of his own substance, changing our ages, which differ from one another by the variety of times according to prior or posterior, but by the extending and contracting of the operation; so too his operation has a beginning and an end, not because the power is changed, but because it is extended and contracted. For if, when the operation were contracted, God could no longer use the operation that had ceased, it would justly be called a corruption of the operation; but if he is always able to bring forth the same operation whenever he wills, then the operation of God is not corrupted by being contracted. For if the power is not corrupted, it is impossible for the operation to be corrupted. For the corruption of an operation is one thing, and the contraction is another; for if the operation that ^D made the world were not contracted, there would be infinite numbers of worlds because of the incessant operation. But now, since one single world has been made, it is demonstrated from the fact that the work is finite that the operation which made the world is finite.

8. Therefore, he who remains the same has nothing temporal. He makes the world, therefore, by always ordering it; and the world, insofar as it is always being guarded, is generated; insofar as it always is, it is the same and unbegotten. If God has nothing temporal, then he does not have "making," for "making" is temporal. And if God makes the world...

by producing its substance, he does not create the world; for the world is not a world without substance. But if the world possesses substance, it is of necessity uncreated ^A and unpreserved. For that which has no need of anything for its coming into being according to substance, has no need of anything for its preservation. For an unbegotten nature is not receptive of anything outside itself. And if in every case one must employ either affirmation or negation as true, how did the respondent set down both regarding the generation of the world—both affirmation and negation—by saying that it is both generated and unbegotten?

Furthermore, if, as he said in the third response, God, being unbegotten, unbegottenly makes all things—not things that come to be, but things that coexist—but since every thing that coexists is preserved by the salvation of that with which it coexists, needing no other preservation except its salvation (for when that one is preserved, it too is preserved); therefore, if there is a need for preservation for the sake of salvation, it is that which needs preservation, ^B not any other protection apart from its salvation; and that upon which things that coexist depend, is what causes the coexistence, not the things that coexist themselves. But if these things are so, the world that coexists with God does not, therefore, require preservation, but God himself, with whom the world coexists. But if this is absurd, it is also absurd to say the world coexists with God. It must be said, therefore, that the world subsists by the will of God, and by the will of God it remains the same, even if not always. Likewise, things that coexist with something that subsists, remain by its perseverance, not their own; just as angles coexist through the composition of lines, and while the composition remains, the angles remain; and when the composition is removed, the angles are removed; and if it is necessary for the angles to remain, there is a necessity to provide preservation for the composition of the lines, ^C not for the angles in themselves, but preservation for the composition of the lines is, per accidens, for the angles, but per se for the composition of the lines. According to these things, the world must be understood, if it coexists unbegottenly with God, as the respondent says.

THIRD CHRISTIAN QUESTION TO THE GREEKS

If God acts because He is, and not because He wills—just as fire heats because it is fire—how, when He is simple and of one form, is He the creator of diverse substances?

GREEK RESPONSE TO THE CHRISTIANS

It must not be thought that, as with us, "to be" is one thing and "to will" is another, so it is also in God; but in God, "to be" and "to will" are absolutely the same thing. For what He is, He also wills; and what He wills, He is; and there is no division in God, because God is His own cause ^D of being. Therefore, the distinction between essence and will in God is to be rejected. Yet it must not be thought that God, because...

He does not do so, makes things in the same way as fire heats. For fire, even if substantially, nonetheless possesses heat as an accident; but in God, nothing happens either substantially or accidentally. Since, therefore, nothing happens to Him, and being ^A and willing are the same in God, He is simple and of one form, the ingenerate maker of things that are. For just as we see that generated things—for instance, a certain man, having been generated, being himself generated, makes generated things; and in general, generated things, having been generated in a generated way, make generated things, and make them from themselves—in the same way also God, since He is unbegotten, makes all things unbegottenly; they are not things that come into being, but things that exist concurrently; and through the infinity of His power, He makes things that are diverse. Let us not consider God in a human way; for it is not as we are—initially in one state, and later, having changed into another, are said to act—that God acts; but because of His ineffable and excelling power, ^B making all things timelessly, He perfects all things; and at the same time that He is, He makes the things that are, having no need, as we do, to be generated first and to be perfected, and thus to act afterwards, because there is nothing in Him that is "before" or "after." We see, therefore, nature itself making by the very fact that it is, and always producing change instantaneously; just as in the curdling of milk we see the curdling happen to the milk instantaneously. Therefore, we must think all the more that God makes all things instantaneously and timelessly, while He Himself is one, but produces diverse things through the infinity of His power, and these things are entirely self-produced.

REFUTATION OF THE ANSWER WHICH WAS NOT RIGHTLY MADE.

1. It is not to be thought, he says, that as in us being is one thing, and willing another, so it is also in God. For what He is, He also wills; and what He wills, is; and there is no division in God, because God is self-caused. Therefore, the division of being from willing in God is to be rejected. Since God has essence for existence, but will for making, anyone who rejects the difference between essence and will rejects both the existence of God and His making—the existence of His own self, and the making of things that were not. That the essence of ^D God is one thing and His will another, is shown also from the expression of the one who provided the answer, when he says: "For what He is, He also wills; and what He wills, is." He inverted the will with the essence, and the essence with the will. But an inversion can in no way take place unless the things being inverted are one thing and another, either in definition or in number. Nothing prevents that which is one in number from being one thing and another in definition; as, for instance, a straight line is one in number in its subsistence, but in the definition of straightness and of the line, it is one thing and another.

^A According to this mode, the nature of God is not divided 75 by the distinction of substance and will. If being is one thing, and existing-in-another is another; and if the essence of God exists, but the will exists in the essence; then the essence of God is one thing, and the will is another. If the will of God is from the essence, but the essence is not from the will, then the essence of God is one thing, and the will is another. The essence of God does not admit of not being essence; but the will of God admits of not willing. For example, God willed to make one sun, but He did not will to make a second sun, because, just as it was useful to existing things that the sun be one, so it was not useful to existing things that a second sun should come to be; and He willed what was useful, but did not will what was not useful. But if this is so, the essence of God is surely one thing and the will another. If what God is, that is also what He wills, it is clear that it is a willed object, and not the will. How then is the will the same as the essence, since the willed object and the will are one thing and another, just like the sensible object and the sense? If God is without beginning and eternal, He is neither self-produced nor produced by another; for he who is absolutely self-produced is in no way eternal and without beginning. The respondent, in other words, removes the difference between the essence of God and the will, but in other words he establishes it. For he removes it when he says: "One must not think that, as in us to be is one thing and to will is another, so also it is in God." But establishing the difference, he says: "But it is strictly the same." And again: "But being and willing are the same in God." For just as that which is different is different to another, so also that which is the same is, to another, strictly the same; and likewise, that which is strictly different is different to another. But if the essence of God and the will are the same, let it be strictly one thing and another; otherwise, if the "one thing and another" is removed, the identity of the essence of God and the will, and also that very [identity] 76, will necessarily be removed. Just as being moved is the operation of motion, so willing is the operation of the will; and whatever difference the power has with respect to the act, that difference the will has with respect to willing. But it is impossible for willing to have a difference with respect to the will, but not to have it with respect to the one who wills. But if in no way is it possible for willing and the will and the one who wills to be the same, it is clear that he who rejects the "one thing and another" regarding God and willing, rejects the difference between the agent and the act; which is absurd. If that which subsists is one thing, and that which does not subsist is another, and the former is God, while the latter is the will: evidently, he who rejects the "one thing and another" concerning God and the will, rejects either the subsistent or the non-subsistent. If, as it pleases the adversary, what God is, that He wills, and what He wills, that He is 77, it is clear that if God did not will His operation not to perish,

^A His will is not destroyed, but His [own] will [is not destroyed]. Therefore, God is not what He wills. If *to act* belongs to the will of God, it is clear that just as *to act* differs simply from *what* things are produced, *how many*, and *when* one acts, so *to be* differs from *to will*.

2. Yet it must not be supposed that God produces by being, in the way that fire produces heat. For fire, even if substantially, nevertheless possesses heat as an accident. But in God nothing happens either substantially or accidentally. Since, therefore, nothing happens to Him, and *to be* and *to will* exist as the same thing for God, He is simple and of one form, producing existing things without generation. How heat happens to fire, let the respondent say what he wishes to mean. For it is not the question now how heat happens to Him, but concerning the involuntary operation by which He operates by virtue of His being. ^B Will is either substance, or it is present to the substance. But if it is substance, He is not the one who wills; but if it is present to the substance, it is necessarily one thing and then another; for what is and what is present are not the same. If God wills many things, but many things are not, then *to be* and *to will* are not the same for God. If God, as many things as He wills to produce, is able to produce, yet not as many things as He is able to produce does He will to produce, then *to be* and *to will* are not the same for Him. If God is one, simple, and of one form, but He wills many things and does not will many others—for example, He wills the things that are to exist in great variety, but He does not will them to be infinite in number—then *to be* and *to will* are not the same for Him. If God, in that He exists, does not produce, but He produces what He wills, and He wills to produce the world, then *to be* and *to will* are not the same for Him. If things without generation do not come to be by generation, then neither does God produce things without generation by generation. For it is impossible for a thing produced to be without generation. ^C Just as teaching is the operation of the teacher in the one learning, so production is the operation of the producer in the thing produced. Therefore, he who removes generation from the thing produced also removes the operation of the producer from the production. In vain does God perform the production if there is nothing that comes into being. If God does not produce without production, then neither does He produce without generation. *God produces* is an affirmation of production; but *He produces without production* is a certain negation of the affirmation. The terms *unbegotten* and *produced* are contradictory. If *unbegotten* is that which is through production, then that which is not through production will not be unbegotten. It makes no difference whether one says, "He who made, made, but the thing produced did not come to be," or one says, "God produces things without generation." If it is reasonable to say, "God produces things without generation in a manner without generation," then it is also reasonable to say, "The things without generation come to be in a manner without generation." For *coming to be* follows *producing* by natural necessity. But if the second is absurd, then the first is also absurd. If *to come to be* is temporal, then *to be produced* is also temporal; for they are equivalent. For it is impossible in *producing* for the producer not to have the thing produced come to be. If nothing comes to be without generation, then neither is anything produced without generation. For *to come to be* and *to be produced* are not the same in words, but in reality they are the same. If God, because He is, produces, He produces by necessity; but if He produces because He wills, He produces by His own volition. But he who produces by his own volition produces whatsoever he wills, and as he wills, and when he wills.

^A If God produces because He is, it is of no use to Him to will, a faculty which He is in no way able to employ. The respondent posits two contradictory things concerning God: he calls Him the maker of things that exist, and attributes to Him that He produces ingenerately. For if He Himself indeed produces ingenerately, but that which is produced is not begotten at all—being neither the manner of the begotten nor the unbegotten, nor of the made nor the unmade—then, just as that which is produced does not come to be, so neither does the maker make.

3. Just as, he says, we see that man, since he is born begotten and capable of begetting, creates begotten things, and in general since begotten things are produced in a begotten manner, he also creates things from them—so too God, being unbegotten, produces all things ingenerately, not as things that come to be, but as things that coexist; and by the infinity of His power He produces diverse things. Who, then, is the one who made man, who according to the respondent’s words is begotten in a begotten manner, and who, being himself begotten, produces begotten things in a begotten manner? ^B But if it is God, how did the respondent not lie when he said: "God, being unbegotten, produces unbegotten things ingenerately"? But if it is not God, how does God not provide for things that are not His own, since He provides for humans of whom He is not the maker? But if it is absurd to say that God is not the maker of man, it is therefore also absurd to say that God produces unbegotten things ingenerately. For behold, He has made man who is naturally begotten. If the part is begotten, of necessity the whole is also begotten; but man is a part of the world, having been born in a begotten manner according to the words of the respondent; the world, therefore, is also begotten. If God is unbegotten, and He produces unbegotten things, how does He not bear the name of "unbegotten" in the common sense, distinguishing Him from no one? ^C God does not produce that which He is; for that is impossible. But He produces things which He is not; He produces things that are begotten, therefore, while He Himself is unbegotten. We do not ask first how God produces, but what He produces. For when what He produces is found, it is also discovered how He produces. If God, being unbegotten, creates unbegotten things ingenerately, then, since He lacks a master, He also produces things that lack a master, without a master. And if the second is absurd, the first is therefore also absurd. Things which coexist with one another with no interval interposed cannot have one as the maker of the other; if they did, they would be the makers of one another. ^D If this is absurd, it is certainly also absurd to say that God is the maker of things which coexist with Him without any interval. If God can indeed produce infinite things, it is by willing; but God cannot be diverse, for He is one, and simple, and of one form; yet He wills diverse things; therefore He does not produce because He is, but because He wills. If, just as angles coexist with the composition of lines, so also the world with God, then God produces the world necessarily and unwillingly, accidentally and not of Himself; for the angles coexist necessarily and accidentally with the position of the lines.

He who produces makes that which is not; for that which is does not require a producer. But if this is so, then God is not the producer of those things that coexist with Him, as the answerer says. God did not build a house, but He made man, and gave him the power to be able to build a house. Therefore, nothing of these things ^B is ingenerate with God, neither the creation of man nor the gift of power. The answerer has laid down two rules: one concerning the production of things that are ingenerate and that act ingenerately; and another concerning the production of things that are generate and that act generately. And he says that the works of the ingenerate coexist ingenerately with their own producers, but the works of the generate are temporal. Since none of the ingenerate, therefore, produce in time, it is evident that generate things were neither made by the ingenerate nor can they come into being.

4. But let us not take "producing" ^C according to a human manner, nor as we, who are said to produce by later changing from one state to another what was formerly different; God does not act this way. Rather, by an ineffable and transcendent power, He produces and perfects all things without time, and at the same time that He is, He also produces the things that are. He has no need, as we do, to be born and perfected first, and then to act, since there is nothing of "before" and "after" in Him. We indeed change the "before" to the "after" by the discovery of something better; but God is not so. Rather, as is fitting, He acts from the beginning, not changing the former things into later ones. For if He had proposed from the beginning to change the former into the later, and did not do so, it would be considered either a weakness of power, or that He discovered something better than what was proposed; none of which applies to God, neither weakness of power nor the discovery of a later thing that is better than the former. If God produces all things, not as things that come to be, but as things that coexist, it was superfluous to produce them as things which are with Him at the same time. For just as it is ^D superfluous, when the composition of lines exists, to produce the angles, so it is superfluous, when God is together with the world, to produce the world, if indeed it, as the answerer says, coexists with God. If immediately when God is, the world is also—but the world is always in motion, and motion is in time—then God is in time with the world. If God, being ingenerate, produces ingenerate things ingenerately, not things that come to be, but things that coexist with Him, then man, who is a part of the world, is also ingenerate. How then does the answerer call him generate? And if God, being ingenerate, produces ingenerate things ingenerately, surely, being simple, He also produces all simple things that coexist with Him. But if this is true, then the world does not coexist with God, because it is composite, both in the whole and in its parts. If God is one, and what coexists with Him is not one, then generate things do not coexist with a God who is ingenerate. If God is [the principle] of intelligible...

^A and sensible things, and He does not produce works that are beyond intelligible and sensible things, then, being ingenerate, He does not produce ingenerate things. If it is impossible to coexist with what is beyond itself, how did the world coexist with God, who is beyond it? If it is impossible for composite things to be ingenerate, how are the heaven and the sun and the world (83) ingenerate, being composite and possessing their matter from one source and their form from another?

5. Therefore, we discern that nature, by the very fact that it exists, acts, and always works universal change; just as in the coagulation of milk, we observe the coagulation coming upon the milk all at once. Much more, therefore, must we think that God makes all things at once and timelessly: since He is indeed One, yet in the infinity of His power He brings forth diverse things, and these are entirely self-produced. Nature, indeed, effects universal change, not towards the manufacture of substance, but towards the manufacture of an affection. For coagulation in milk is an affection of the milk; but nature by no means produces substance all at once. How, then, is the respondent not ^B making use of an inappropriate example, the operation of nature, to prove that God operates without time, since He is the Maker of many and diverse substances, which even if He creates instantaneously, yet are not created without time? For the instantaneous is an indivisible moment of time. The will of God does not dominate things that are self-produced. But the will of God dominates those things which it itself produces. But if the will of God dominates all things, there is surely nothing that is self-produced. The respondent calls both God and the world self-produced. But if the world is self-produced, as one which coexists with the cause of its subsistence, then it is necessary for God also, being self-produced, to coexist with the cause of His subsistence. ^C But if this is absurd, it is surely also absurd to say that both God and the world are self-produced and coexist with one another without interval. If God is self-produced per se, but the world is so merely accidentally, not coexisting (84) with Him, how is that statement not false: "Nothing happens to God," if indeed, with God being produced self-producedly, the world also coexisted with Him, being self-produced? If those things that happen to someone by natural necessity happen to him without his will, how, if the world coexists with God by natural necessity, does it not coexist with Him accidentally and without His will? If for God to be and to will are the same, ^D evidently in those things which God does not will, He does not exist. How, then, when He does not exist [in them], does the world coexist with Him? For the world coexists with Him without His will. If the Ingenerate produces ingenerate things in an ingenerate manner, it is evident that the Incomposite also produces incomposite things in an incomposite manner. But if the latter is not true, then the former is not true either. For the world is composite. If God does not produce gods in a divine manner, how does the Ingenerate produce ingenerate things in an ingenerate manner? For He is not Himself

^A consubsistent with Himself, but is another. God is one thing, the Ingenerate another; the former exists, but the latter is separated from things that are generated. And God exists while creating; He creates, yet He is not separated. But if He also creates by that through which He is separated, yet by accident and not by His own nature, how does nothing happen to God when He creates by accident? If, just as the concave and the convex subsist together with the sphere, so the world subsists together with God, then indeed God is the cause of the world, and the world is the cause of God, just as those things are. If no one does by will what he would do even if he were unwilling, how then did God create the world by will, ^B which He would necessarily create even if He were unwilling to create it? If God is one in essence but infinite in power, and the things that subsist with Him are neither one in terms of His essence nor infinite in terms of His power, then they do not subsist with Him at all. God is always perfect, He is always powerful; and in Him there is nothing that is prior or posterior, but both are in His works. If His works are composite, and everything composite is composed of simple things, it is impossible for the simple to exist simultaneously with the composite; for simple things are first, and composite things later. Just as God cannot be blamed for weakness of power because, not having created many worlds, He created one world and ceased from creation, so God cannot be blamed for imperfection of power because He did not create the world as soon as He Himself existed, but when He willed. There is no difference between what is self-produced and what is self-generated. But if God is self-produced and the world is self-produced, both God and the world will be self-generated. If, just as we see ^C the curdling suddenly appearing in milk, so the existence of the world appears suddenly, then the world is generated and mutable, changing from non-existence into substance; for "appearing" signifies coming into being. If God is self-produced and the world is self-produced, the self-origination of each will be the principle of the existence of each. How then are God and the world without beginning and eternal, having their own self-originations as the principles of their existence? The term "self-produced" has the meaning of something being produced from itself. But since everything that is produced is produced either by presence, by way of movement from place to place, or by substance, by way of creation leading from non-existence into existence—and none of these applies to God—it is manifest that the respondent did not rightly call Him "self-produced." For "self-produced" does not differ at all from "produced by another" for that which is entirely self-produced. If it is impossible for the Ingenerate to be uncreated, it is also impossible for the world to be ingenerate, and for the God who made it also to be so. If the world differs from God in being "made," it must ^D necessarily also differ in being "generated"; for the world is made, but God is unmade. If that which is consubsistent with the Ingenerate by physical necessity is unmade, how then is it not false that: "God created a made world, which was unmade and ingenerate according to itself"? If it is made...

^A and self-produced, ^B there is no difference between what is self-produced and what is self-generated and self-made; but if both God and the world are self-produced, they will be self-generated and self-made. But if this is absurd, it is therefore also absurd to say that the God who is both without beginning and eternal is self-produced, while the created world is ingenerate and self-produced. If the world is self-produced, it is not God-produced; and if it is not God-produced, God did not bring it forth. How then is the respondent, when he says that God brings things forth while the world is self-produced, not speaking falsehoods and contradictions? By far, therefore, he says, one must think that God makes all things at once and timelessly, being Himself one, but bringing forth through the infinity of His power the various things, and these themselves being entirely self-produced. And if "to make" [ποιεῖν] is equivalent to "to be about to make" [ποιήσειν], how does he, who takes away from God "to be about to make"—as this holds the implication of future time—set down in its place "to make" for Him, which has the same implication of time? And if "to make" holds the implication of future time and also that of the past, how is it that all parts of time are not present in the activity of God? ^C

THE FOURTH CHRISTIAN QUESTION TO THE GREEKS

GREEK RESPONSE TO THE CHRISTIANS

the creation is also ingenerate. If anyone should wish to say that the Creator was prior, and the creation came to be afterward, he will also fall into another absurdity. For he will be found saying that the Creator exists in potentiality, and not in actuality—which is nothing other than calling God imperfect—and, besides this, that the creation nonetheless subsists with the Creator, being also in potentiality just as the Creator, since in every case those things which are relative subsist equally. If, therefore, the Creator is in potentiality, the creation is also in potentiality; but if the Creator is in actuality and perfect, then the creation is likewise. It is therefore clearly evident to everyone that, as long as He is Creator, the creation subsists simultaneously with the Creator.

Refutation of the improperly instituted response.

1. As he who is responding showed in his other responses that the world is ingenerate, so too in this present response he promises to demonstrate that the world is ingenerate; and yet, in his other responses, he did not establish the ingeneracy of the world either from those things of the world that are manifest and known, nor did he effect this through demonstration, but merely pronounced what seemed good to him according to his own authority. But coming to this present response, in which he attempts to demonstrate the world to be ingenerate, he first makes mention of the ancients who said that the world was generated; these he declared worthy of just blame for having said the world was generated, if they had not overturned their own words—which say that the world was generated—with other words of theirs. But this is not a warding off of just censure, but rather a matter for great and just censure, to set forth both an affirmation and a negation concerning the generation of the world, and to fight against oneself with one's own words. And let these things be said by way of refutation of the fact that the respondent has undeservedly used words that fight against each other to demonstrate that the world is ingenerate. We, however, shall examine the words of those ancients in which they clearly pronounce the world to be ingenerate, as the respondent says.

2. But that the world is proven to be ingenerate from this argument as well, that too is manifest to anyone. But if anyone should wish to say, as some of the ancients call the world generated, if they pay heed to the words superficially, they would be justly blamed—unjustly...

^A to those who say this. But if they carefully consider the depth of what has been said, they will find that they clearly and accurately declare the world to be ungenerated. For the ancients themselves, by calling the paradigmatic and the productive cause ungenerated, clearly declare—since the world is a product of these—that it too is clearly ungenerated. If it is established among the ancients that the world is generated, and if the statement remains immutable when understood superficially, yet shifts into its opposite when understood deeply (89), why does the respondent not use the same shift of attention—from the superficial to the deep (90)—which he used for the opposite, to transform the "generated world" that was established by the ancients into an "ungenerated world," so as to relieve those who said this of just blame? But if it is absurd to do this, then one must understand the words of the ancients according to the natures of things, and not by shifting the established points into their opposites through different attentions. If the paradigm is one thing and that which is according to the paradigm is another—for the paradigm is simple, but that which is according to the paradigm is composite—and if that which is thus ^B different is of necessity different at different times, and that which is at different times is prior and posterior, it cannot exist by nature at the same time. Therefore, the paradigm and that which is according to the paradigm do not exist by nature at the same time. The respondent at one time calls the world a common product of both the paradigmatic and the productive cause, and says: "It is clear that the world is a product of these"; yet at another time he calls it a product of the productive cause, but an image of the paradigmatic. And it is clear from this that the world is not related to the maker insofar as it is an image, nor to the paradigm insofar as it is a product. But if this is so, it is therefore not true that the world is their product. If the maker fashions the world according to a paradigm, he fashions it while willing. But if he fashions it because he is what he is, the paradigm is superfluous, since it is sufficient for God to exist for that which is to come to be; and there is no room for will. For things that would happen even if the one who makes them did not wish it are not voluntary. Such is the work of those who act because they exist. God himself is indeed ungenerated, but he generated the paradigm from his own mind, and ^C he fashioned the world from matter according to the paradigm. But if, according to the respondent, because the world is a product of the ungenerated maker, it is for this reason itself also ungenerated, then the paradigm will also be ungenerated, since it is a product of the ungenerated. And if it is absurd to call the product ungenerated, then it is also absurd to call the thing generated ungenerated. If, because the maker is ungenerated, it is necessary that the product also be ungenerated, it is clear that in this way it is also necessary that the product be unmade—for the maker is unmade. But if this is absurd, then it is also ^D absurd to call the product ungenerated. What is "made" differs from what is "generated" only in word, but does not differ in reality; wherefore they are interchangeable with one another, because they are equivalents. For if anything is generated, it is necessarily also made; and if anything is made, it is necessarily also generated. But since it is impossible for the world to be ungenerated and generated (for in every case there is either an affirmation or a negation), how can the world be ungenerated and made

^A What is twice the same in another [thing] is necessarily at one time one thing and at another another: for example, the exemplar is in God and in matter; in God it is ungenerated, [but] it is made in matter; in God it is not the world, but the exemplar of the world, [whereas] in matter it is the world. But if it is at one time one thing and at another another, and in one way one thing and in another way another, then there is necessarily a prior and a posterior. And if there is a prior and a posterior, it is clear that it is not coeternal.

^B 3. The ancients have demonstrated that those things which are called relatives exist together by nature. Since, therefore, both the image is referred to the exemplar and the exemplar to the image, and the product to the maker and the maker to the image [of the] product, such things exist together by nature. If, therefore, the maker is ungenerated and the exemplar is ungenerated, the world—which is the image of the exemplar and the product of the maker—is also ungenerated. The ancients, who demonstrated that relatives exist together by nature, also provided the account of the image. An image, he says, is that whose generation occurs through imitation. But if, as the respondent holds, the world is ungenerated, the world clearly has lost the name of "image," and the name along with the thing itself. For in the notion of the ungenerated, the world cannot preserve the definition of an image. Whoever calls a product ungenerated, because its maker is ungenerated, must also call the product unmade, because its maker ^C is unmade; for these are necessarily consequent to one another: to the ungenerated, the unmade, and to the unmade, the ungenerated. But if this is absurd, then it is also absurd to call a product ungenerated. If relatives exist together by nature, and for this reason the product must necessarily be co-ungenerated with the maker, as it seems to the respondent, then by the same logic it is necessary to call the generated ^D co-ungenerated with the ungenerated; for these also are relatives, since the ungenerated is relative to the generated, and the generated to the ungenerated. But if, when the generated does not exist, the ungenerated is ungenerated in potentiality, and when the generated does exist, the ungenerated is ungenerated in actuality, it is necessary to think of this in the same way regarding the maker, and the product, and the exemplar, and the image; and no absurdity results. For whatever nature the relative has in the case of the maker and the product, it has the same nature in the case of the generated and the ungenerated. And "prior" and "posterior" are among the relatives. For the posterior is referred to the prior, and the prior to the posterior, and they exist together by nature in potentiality, or by nature in actuality. But if, as it pleases the respondent, the product is co-ungenerated with the ungenerated maker, since they are indeed relatives and exist together by nature, then by this reasoning the generated will also be co-ungenerated with the ungenerated God. For God is prior, and that which is generated is posterior, and as relatives, they are together by nature, being prior and posterior. But if they cannot (the [text] above/below being absent, he thinks they were produced from elsewhere than the negligence of copyists. [alt-version omitted]).

prior and posterior to be simultaneously by nature; hence the creation is not co-eternal with the Creator, nor is the image with the archetype.

^B 4. That it exists simultaneously as a relative is clearly proven and acknowledged by all, and it is easy to recognize from that fact itself. For the "right" and "left" are among those things which are relative. As, therefore, it is not possible for the right to exist if the left does not exist, nor the left apart from the right, so it is not possible for a creator to exist without a creation, or a creation without a creator. If the creator is unbegotten, the creation is also unbegotten. For if, as the right and the left exist in the whole and in the part in relation to each other according to the same essence, so the creator and the creation existed in the whole and in the part in relation to each other according to the same essence, the analogy ^C used by the respondent in attempting to show that the creation is co-unbegotten with the Creator would have had a place; but if, while the right and the left are in relation to each other in the whole and in the part according to the same essence, the creator and the creation are not of this kind, it is evident that the respondent used an inappropriate analogy, bearing no proportion to the nature of the thing intended to be demonstrated.

Of things relative, some are called by names that correspond to one another: for instance, the father is called the father of the son, and the son is called the son of the father. Others are not called by names that correspond to one another, as for example the straight and the curved; but it is common to these that one is sometimes called by its name potentially and sometimes actually, whereas both are always either potentially or actually, as for instance the concave and the convex, or they are always actually, as for instance above and below. Since these are the divisions of relative things, whenever we wish to resolve the difficulty of some problem by means of a relative, we must first determine to which division of relatives the question belongs; then, according to the nature of that division, construct the proportion which the analogy bears to the subject being demonstrated; otherwise, the analogy will be found inappropriate and the difficulty unresolved. If the creator and the creation belong to those relative things which are named in correspondence with one another (for the creation is the creation of the creator, and the creator is of the creation), but the respondent, wishing to demonstrate by analogy that the begotten is co-unbegotten with the Unbegotten, took for this demonstration a relative from among those which are not named in correspondence—(for ^D the right is not called the right of the left, nor is the left the left of the right)—it is clear that he used an analogy inappropriate to the nature of the thing demonstrated, possessing no proportion capable of resolving the difficulty of the matter in relation to what was being demonstrated.

5. If anyone wishes to say that the Creator existed first, and the creation afterwards, he will become involved in another absurdity. For he will be found saying that the Creator exists potentially, but not in act (which is nothing else than to call God imperfect); and besides this, the creation nonetheless subsists with the Creator, potentially just as the Creator does, in all cases where things exist in a relative manner. If, therefore, the Creator is potential, the creation is also potential; if the Creator is in act and perfect, the creation is likewise [in act and perfect]. Therefore, it is clearly evident to everyone that the creation subsists with the Creator, insofar as He is Creator. If God has the same relative relation to the creation as Creator, as He has to the begotten as unbegotten, and to the later things as first, He possesses nothing imperfect either in His unbegottenness or in His priority. For by no argument is it possible to call God an imperfect unbegotten or an imperfect first, due to his having been at some time potentially both, unbegotten and first. Thus, it is not possible for God to be imperfect, having been potentially the Creator beforehand. But if, because He was first potentially the Creator and afterwards in act, He is accused of imperfection, then by necessity He must also be accused of imperfection because He was first potentially unbegotten and first, and afterwards [so] in act. And if it is absurd to blame God as if He were an imperfect unbegotten and first, it is surely absurd to blame Him for the imperfection of His creative power, because He did not make the world immediately, but later, when it pleased Him. For it is not possible that one who is imperfect in one certain relative connection should not also be imperfect in all other relative connections. ^B

FIFTH CHRISTIAN QUESTION TO THE GREEKS

GREEK RESPONSE TO THE CHRISTIANS

order; the artifact, however, in the better order. Furthermore, whatever is contained is in a place; but whatever is in a place is a body: and therefore God, if He is in a place, will be a body. How, then, will a smaller body, in so far as it is contained, contain a greater body? It is absurd to say so. That which dwells in a place is contained by its dwelling is manifest to anyone, even if one were to pretend blindness. Why, then, you might ask, does Homer call the heaven the dwelling of the Maker? Because, beholding everywhere the splendor of God around the world, he called the world the dwelling of God, as it is the receptacle of all the operation and action of God; but especially do they name the heaven, because all acknowledge the heaven to be the highest part of the whole world.

Refutation of the incorrectly instituted response.

1. To call God the maker, but to call the world unmade; for "unmade" has the same force as "unbegotten," and among those things which have the same force, substitution is free; and to say that the unmade God makes unmade things, which is the same as saying that the unbegotten God begets unbegotten things in an unbegotten manner; and to say that God is eternal but the world co-eternal, and that God and the world, when they were not, were produced into being by themselves—for that phrase, "produced by itself," when said of God and the world, has the same signification; and to call the world produced by itself and protected by another—for it is clear that what is protected by God is protected by another, for the world is one thing and God, who protects the world, is another, whereas it was necessary to say that what is produced by itself is also protected by itself; and to call God and the world unbegotten and self-begotten—for the phrase "produced by itself," when said of God and the world, signifies "self-begotten"; and to say that God made these things, and again that He did not make them, for that which is "made" is temporal, just as the word "made" itself; and to say that the world exists co-eternally with God without any interval, though it received existence from the Maker out of matter and form through composition; and to call the world both incorruptible and corruptible—incorruptible, indeed, in its essence, but corruptible because it is protected; and to say that "a world comes into being," but that which is begotten is temporal, and that which is temporal is corruptible; and to say that the world is the receptacle of all of God's operation and action, and that God is not the maker of corruptible things; for God, according to the respondent, makes nothing temporal; but all begotten and temporal things are, according to him, always corruptible. These and similar things do not belong to men who, having perceived the nature of things, demonstrate with diligence those matters relating to God and the world, but to reckless men who impudently declare what seems to them to be true about God and the world.

2. But to blame that which we say, that God is in the heaven

^A habitation, as being unbecoming to God, belongs to men who do not understand what is meant by an absurd statement. For a base expression contains a base meaning. We, however, did not pose in the question the manner of God’s dwelling in heaven, which the responder criticized; but rather [the point was]: if the heaven is unbegotten, it is not God’s; and those who say that God dwells in it speak to the insult of God, by saying that God dwells in a heaven that is not His own. We call the heaven the house and throne of God, not because He needs it for dwelling, since He is uncircumscribed and entirely in need of nothing; but so that we might not, by observing the magnitude of its subsistence and the incorruptibility of its substance, suppose it to be God, or equal in honor to God. For this reason, we name it the house and throne of God, by these titles excluding it from any communion with God according to substance or the designations of substance. ^B For just as the house and the throne are posterior to the one who made them, so also the heaven is posterior to God, as the begotten to the unbegotten. And if we presently call the heaven incorruptible, we do not call it incorruptible in the same way as God. For God has incorruptibility uncreatedly from His own essence and eternally; but the heaven has incorruptibility createdly from the will of God for the use of the present state, and when that use is fulfilled, it is transferred to another mode of incorruptibility. For God, who gave it a bodily magnitude—as great as He willed, not as great as He could (for He could have made it much larger than it is)—has now Himself ordained that it should remain in incorruptibility, circumscribed within its own limits, until the time of the transformation of existing things for the better, according to the faith of the orthodox, who from the teaching of the One known to them, have known God, ^C and according to the testimony of the responder.

AGAINST THE GREEKS

1. That nature which produces natural things, if it is not primarily brought about by that which does not act according to nature, neither exists nor acts.

2. That not every thing that is begotten and corruptible possesses in its generation a quadripartite time—beginning, growth, summit, and decline—but only that which comes into being by nature or by art.

3. If God is called by our names whenever He is called anything, there is no necessity that everything which accompanies our name should follow God because of the name. God is called both truth and good; and the false is opposed to truth, and evil to the good; but to God nothing is opposed. Because Plato did not understand this, he dogmatized that there was something contrary to God—a necessary and eternal evil.

^A 4. There is nothing that is, without being some particular thing; as, for instance, there is no body that is not a particular body ^B. But if matter does not have the capacity to be a particular thing, it does not have the capacity to be at all; for that which is a particular thing cannot be separated from being.

5. Nature and art produce what they do from substances; as, for instance, nature produces a man from seed, and seed from a man; and both the seed and the man are substances. Similarly, the arts produce a statue from bronze, and a house from bricks; and both the bronze and the bricks are substances. Therefore, if matter is not a substance, who is it that makes from it the things which are produced from it, since nature and art cannot make anything from that which is not a substance?

6. If, as Aristotle says, there is a body that is neither heavy nor light, nor one of the four elements, nor composed of the four elements; ^B evidently, if this is true, it will be a body that is neither hot nor cold, either by nature or by impression. For whatever is hot or cold by nature or by impression is either one of the four elements or is composed of the four elements. But if the body is not hot or cold either by nature or by impression, then it is not a body that is either heavy or light, nor one of the four elements, nor composed of the four elements. How then does he say that the ether is hot because of the motion of the celestial body and the bodies moving within it? ^C For bodies that heat other bodies by their motions are themselves heated before the bodies that receive heat from them; and if they are heated, it is clearly by impression that they are heated. And if by impression, clearly also by alteration; and if by alteration, clearly also by change; and if by change, clearly it is changed from one contrary to the other. Now the contrary to cold is heat; therefore, it is changed from cold into heat. But because there is no body that is changed by impression from cold to heat, and which is yet neither one of the four elements nor composed of the four elements, therefore the celestial body is not a different element from the four elements; for it is heated by impression while being changed from cold into heat.

7. If bodies that are heated by motion are heated more by greater motion, how is it—if, according to Aristotle, the sun is a body not hot by nature but by motion—that it is not heated more and does not heat more by greater motion, ^D but always retains an equal heat despite the inequality of the motion?

^A 8. If, according to Aristotle, the definition of substance is that which is capable of contraries in alternation, how does the same Aristotle say again that matter is not a substance, when it is capable of contraries in alternation, namely, of privation and habit? If one who is deprived of being this thing also lacks existence itself, how does Aristotle say that it is impossible for anything to come into being from that which is in every way non-existent, when according to him matter is deprived of both—of existence and of being this specific thing?

9. If nothing comes into being from that which is in every way non-existent, it is clear that something comes into being from that which exists. But since matter is this, how does Aristotle speak the truth in declaring that matter is not an existent?

10. If matter is not changed, it is impossible for anything to come into being from it. But if everything that changes ^B changes from one thing into another, and matter is not a "thing" (in that sense), then it does not change; and therefore nothing comes into being from it.

11. If change does not occur from any random thing into any random thing, but into its opposite within the same genus—for instance, in quality, change does not occur from white into large, but into black—by what, then, is matter changed in the generation of substances that come from it, when it has nothing in it capable of being changed?

12. If, just as in animals there is an animate being, and in colored things there is color, so also in material things there is matter—how is it that when the animate is removed, the living being is also removed; and when the colored is removed, the color is also removed; but when the material things are removed, ^C matter is not also removed? And if matter is removed together with the material things, how does matter exist prior to the material things?

13. If to be distant and to participate belong to things that exist, it is clear that that which is in every way non-existent neither is distant from anything nor participates in anything. How, then, does matter participate in privation, and yet not be among things that exist?

14. If it is impossible for one and the same thing to be moved by both motions at once, that which is according to nature and that which is contrary to nature, how is the sun moved by nature from the east to the west, but contrary to nature from the west to the east, due to the sphere? For it is not ^D possible for the same thing to be moved by contrary motions according to nature at the same time.

15. If the sun did not exist, the eye would be superfluous; and if the eye did not exist, the sun would be superfluous. But since each is necessary for the other, then each must be generated. For that which is unbegotten exists for the sake of nothing, but for itself alone—or rather, not even for itself. For that which is without cause is beyond having a cause.

16. If it cannot be that [a thing] which is generated is generated indeed according to cause, but not according to time: how do the Greeks say that the world was generated according to cause, and not according to time?

17. If it is impossible for the world to exist without a year, how is the world eternal and unbegotten, when the year itself is not eternal but consists of the revolution of many days? ^B

18. If the year is generated, how are the things that are in the year unbegotten and eternal?

GREEK QUESTIONS TO THE CHRISTIANS

Concerning the incorporeal, and concerning God, and concerning the resurrection of the dead.

1. Whence is it evident whether anything is incorporeal, and if there is such a thing as an incorporeal?

2. Whence is it evident that it is able to exist of itself outside of a body, and if it is itself incorporeal of itself?

3. Whence is it evident whether the incorporeal is more beautiful than the corporeal, and if the incorporeal is not more beautiful than the corporeal?

4. What is the incorporeal? Is it a soul, or something better than a soul, such as God?

5. And in what does the soul differ from God?

6. And whence is it evident whether there is a God at all?

7. And if there is a God, it must be sought whether He acts, or whether He has acted at some time, or whether He is also going to act in some way at some time.

8. And whether He has acted, or is acting, or will act.

9. And what He acts, and how He acts, whether with will or ^C even without will.

10. And if with will, using an instrument, or without an instrument?

11. And if without will, does He act irrationally, without mind and deliberation, or with some judgment?

12. And if with judgment, what lack of judgment does He stand in need of? But if without judgment, by what reasoning is it to be investigated?

13. And if we should grant that something is brought into being by Him, whether is that which is brought into being incorruptible or corruptible? And if indeed corruptible, we are at a loss whether that which is altogether generated can be incorruptible, and by what reasoning. And if it perishes, in what way do the works of the immortal Being differ from human works?

^A 14. And if what is generated by God perishes, through whose wickedness does it perish—the Creator’s, or that which is generated, or some external power that has become an adversary to the Creator? Whichever of these we suppose, it is clear that the wickedness belongs to the Creator. For if what is generated must perish because of some innate wickedness of its own, the Creator is to blame, in that He made it in such a way that some evil would remain in it. Or, if there is something external that is adverse to the Creator, and thus it is the wickedness of the Maker, because He was unable to overcome those things that are contrary—or if the wickedness is from the Creator—it is very clear that He Himself is the wicked one. These things, then, for the moment, are a few from many on this subject; for if we wished, we would also have to inquire what the body is, and from what things the body is composed, and the difficulties that arise concerning these things. But for now, we leave these aside as containing ^B nothing of the difficult, for there is something else among matters more noble and worthy of wonder from the discourses concerning the resurrection. For this is also one of the trivial difficulties that are raised by those of stony heart. For if, he says, the dead must rise again whole, how, if it happens that a man dies at sea, and is then devoured by fish, and again becomes food for other men who have eaten those fish, how can he recover the flesh that has been consumed by other men? For he must necessarily either rise again without the flesh which other men, through the eating of fish, as has often been said, have eaten; or those men must yield up the parts of their flesh that have been reclaimed, and become maimed, so that they may make up what is lacking in those who were unjustly devoured by them. And these things those of stony heart say in mockery. I, however, pray to learn a reasoned argument for the resurrection that is beyond doubt, one demonstrating by necessity that a resurrection must exist, through certain demonstrative and true arguments. For if the proofs are fortified with the truth, ^C know that I shall hold no reasoning from these difficulties; for it is absurd and contentious to wish to wrangle against a firm demonstration.

CHRISTIAN RESPONSIONS to the proposed questions, taken from the natural reasonings of piety.

537 These discourses are not objections sought out from reason, but unskilled interrogations. For the discourse that constructs logical objections brings together ^D the absurd in things that are somehow consistent; for example, "Man alone is a laughing creature; every laughing creature is an animal; therefore, man alone constitutes an animal."

But in the propositions before us, nothing absurd is gathered through logical consequence; therefore, they have been unreasonably called "difficulties."

If it is impossible for the same person to both ignore and know the same things (for in every case there must be a true affirmation or a denial), how does someone who does not know whether an incorporeal being exists, know volition and judgment, reflection and deliberation, mind and reason, which are the operations of the incorporeal? For to be in ignorance of the existence of the incorporeal, yet to know the operations of the incorporeal, is the mark of those who do not know what they are saying. To frame a difficulty and to solve a difficulty is not a matter of the senses, nor is it of the body. But that which is not of the body, must of necessity be of the incorporeal. ^B Why do we seek a demonstration for the existence of the incorporeal? For if to inquire about something—whether it exists or not—is an act of reason, and reason is an operation belonging to the rational being, and the body in itself is irrational, it is clear that there exists an incorporeal being, to which it is proper both to inquire and to judge.

Another. For one who does not admit that there is any incorporeal being, it is not fitting to inquire and judge by reason whether there is any incorporeal being. For it is contrary to reason to use the operations of the incorporeal while being ignorant of the existence of the incorporeal.

Another. There are in us two faculties for comprehending things: sense perception and intelligence. Their operations differ from one another to the extent that the things apprehended by one cannot be apprehended by the other. ^C But since all faculties are faculties of essences, it is necessary that there are two essences: the one of which senses are proper, and the other of which intelligence is proper. And if this is so, there will certainly be a certain incorporeal essence, to which understanding is proper, just as sensing is proper to the body.

Another. If some thing is animate, of necessity it must have a soul; for it is by participation in the soul that an animate thing is animate. If knowledge does not exist in itself, but in the soul, it is necessary, then, that the soul exist in itself, in which knowledge resides.

Another. If the body requires the soul in order to live and to sense, but the soul does not require the body in order to live or to understand, then the soul is surely something other than the body. ^D

Another. If the soul commands the body, and the body serves the commands of the soul, then the soul is surely something other than the body.

Another. If the soul is in the likeness of an artisan, and the body in that of an instrument, and an instrument is not the same as the artisan, then the body is not the same as the soul.

Another. If reason is primary, and that which is made according to reason is secondary (for reason is in the soul, whereas that which is made according to reason is in matter), then matter is surely something other than the soul.

And that which is other than matter, is also other than the body.

^A Another. If that which is not body is not even essence, how is essence divided into body and incorporeal, since that which is divided must necessarily exist in those things into which it is divided?

QUESTION II. If there is something incorporeal, how is it manifest that it is able to exist of itself?

RESPONSE. That by whose presence the body, which exists by itself, becomes a participant in life, sense, and reason (24), and by whose absence it becomes in turn dead, senseless, and irrational—this thing must exist of itself, as being by its own nature incorruptible.

Another. To construct logical difficulties scientifically, and to solve them likewise scientifically, is not the work of sense. For it is agreed that sense is not able to attain to the knowledge of essence and truth. But if this is so, and if it is the task of science to attain to the knowledge of essence and truth, but not that of sense; and if that which is not of sense is also not of the body; it is therefore necessary that there be something incorporeal of itself, in which science resides.

Another. If essence must be of itself, and if essence is divided in the first division into body and incorporeal, how is the incorporeal not an essence existing of itself?

^C Another. Whatever can separate itself from the affections which are perceived with the body, and yet not perish, can also be separated from the body and not perish; wherefore it is more beautiful and more precious than the body, since its presence is the cause why the body is beautiful. Such a thing we say is the rational soul, being a spirit, intelligent, vital, full of notions, and self-moving; to which we say the angels and demons are consubstantial. And to speak generally, every essence that has subsisted and cannot (26) be held, is a body to that which holds it. And we say that the Divine is incorporeal, not because it is incorporeal (for God is in His essence beyond body, and likewise beyond the incorporeal, as being the creator of both; for God did not make those things which He is Himself), but just as we are accustomed to honor the Divine through the material things which are more precious among us, so too do we act with names—not that God is in need of them, but that we might declare our conception of God through them. In this way, therefore, we call Him incorporeal, ^D although we know Him to be beyond the incorporeal, as its creator. Let this also remain altogether fixed in the discussion, as being demonstrative of the fact that there is something incorporeal. For if there were nothing incorporeal in existing things, neither would there be body. But since there is something incorporeal, just as there is something body, it lives and perceives and thinks.

^A For this reason, it is necessary to distinguish opposite things from one another by opposite names. For we call God "uncreated," distinguishing Him from created things by the name of "uncreated." And if created things did not exist, neither would God be distinguished from them by the term "uncreated." By this distinction, which relies on the name of "uncreated," God is shown to exist beyond both bodies and incorporeal things. For if the name "created" collectively encompasses all bodies and incorporeal things, it is evident that He who is distinguished from created things by this name is necessarily separated from both bodies and incorporeal things. And that which applies to other incorporeal things—namely, not to be held by bodies—this also applies to God, not indeed as to an incorporeal thing, but as to something beyond the incorporeal. And because not to have a creator and master is more excellent than to have a creator and master, for this reason we call God "uncreated." For that which is uncreated can have neither a creator nor a master. Likewise, because not to be held by anyone is more honorable than to be held, for this reason we call Him "incorporeal." ^B

QUÆST. III. 6. Whence is it evident whether God exists at all? RESP. From the constitution and perseverance of existing things. For the things that exist would not exist unless God had pre-existed them, He who usefully established all parts of creation for the benefit of the whole creation, and who is known to us through the prediction and teaching of the prophets and of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, and through the preaching of His apostles, which has been confirmed by the testimony of divine virtues. ^C

QUÆST. IV. 7, 8, 9. Does God create, has He created, or will He create, by will or without will? RESP. God has created, and creates, and will create by His own will. For He created the creature, which did not exist before, by His own will; He sustains it in existence by His own providence, which is the act of creating; He is also about to restore it and will lead it to a better state by means of that restoration, which is the act of creating in the future; so that He may cleanse it from all defilement which the folly of those who use reason has cast upon it. He does this by no means because He later discovered what is better through judgment and reflection, but it was ordained for Him to do so from the beginning and before the creation of the world. For nothing can be added to God in terms of knowledge or power which He did not have before. But the fact that God created the world by will is evidenced by this: that although He could have created many suns, He did not create many, but only one. For he who cannot create many suns can also not create one, and he who can create one, of necessity can also create many. How, then, did God not create many suns, which He was able to create, if not because He did not will to create many? ^D

If however the suns which He did not create, He did not create by will, it is manifest then that also that which He did create, He created by will. And just as with the sun, so also with all the remaining parts of creation, both the incorruptible and the corruptible, they hold from the will of God both their existence and their existing as such. ^A

QUESTION. Is that which is incorporeal more beautiful than the body?

ANSWER. If the body becomes alive and intelligent, not by the presence of another body, but of the incorporeal, how is the incorporeal not more beautiful than the body?

Another. If all corporeal substance consists of matter and form, and the form does not derive from the matter, but arrives at the matter from elsewhere, how is the incorporeal—from which the form arrives at the matter—not more beautiful than the matter? ^B

Another. If the equal cannot be known while the unequal is unknown, how can a body be known if the incorporeal is unknown?

Another. If all corporeal things exist in a body as in an image, while the soul exists according to reason, how is the soul not incorporeal?

Another. If it is possible for the soul to act according to mind; and the soul acts according to mind when it separates itself from all sensation, how is the soul not independent of itself?

QUESTION. In what way does God differ from the soul?

ANSWER. He differs as the Creator and Lord differs from that which has a creator and lord; and in the way that which is above being differs from that which is being. ^C

QUESTION. If God creates by will, does He use an instrument or act without an instrument?

ANSWER. God is in need of nothing that is external to His own nature; and just as He wills without an instrument, so too He acts without an instrument. For if, as soon as He wills something to come to be, it exists because He willed it, how is the use of instruments in things that are produced not superfluous?

QUESTION. If God creates without will, does He create irrationally, without thought and consideration, or with some judgment? And if He creates with judgment, what lack of judgment makes Him need judgment? But if He acts without judgment, by what reason does He act?

ANSWER. If His works are known to God, and those things which are known are known by reason, how does God not know what He creates through reason? But to do something with thought, consideration, and judgment is the characteristic of those among us who are craftsmen, who by these things attain the better end of the things they produce; but God, since He neither acquires knowledge nor loses knowledge, has no need of any of these things. ^D

QUESTION. If that which is entirely generated can be incorruptible, by what reason?

ANSWER. Of those things whose incorruptibility is [dependent] from the will of another...

dependent upon the will, they cannot be unbegottenly incorruptible; wherefore we say that God alone has immortality, because this belongs to Him from His own nature, and not from the will of another.

Another. If God is above incorruptible things, as their maker, He is not however above what is unbegotten; for He is not the maker of things unbegotten; therefore, it does not follow that the unbegotten belongs to the incorruptible.

Another. If God is incorruptible by His own nature, and the soul is also incorruptible by the will of the Creator: how, within such a difference of incorruptibility, does it follow according to you that the unbegotten belongs to the incorruptible?

Another. ^B If, therefore, anything contributes to the constitution of corruptible things, why do incorruptible things not serve corruptible things, since the cause of their incorruptibility leads them to such a ministry? But if it is so, it is clear that it is possible for someone to be incorruptible for the sake of some utility, but by no means unbegotten; for that which is unbegotten ought to be unbegotten without any cause of utility whatsoever.

Another. If the first body is an element, and the second body is that which is composed of elements, and that body which is from elements cannot be unbegotten; for nothing unbegotten can be posterior to what is begotten: how, if those bodies which are from elements are incorruptible, will not those that are begotten be incorruptible?

Another. If all elements are begotten, how is it not nonsensical to call those things which are from elements unbegotten? For if matter of itself is neither an element nor a substance, but having received quality and quantity, it becomes an element and a substance: how can those things which are perfected from such elements be also unbegotten, if it happens to them to be incorruptible?

Another. ^C If body is one thing, and incorruptible body is another, and corruptible body another; and body is divided into incorruptible and corruptible body by reason of the difference of incorruptibility and corruptibility: how is it not necessary that it be a property of the body that is divided, that it either be begotten or unbegotten? But if neither of these is a property of the body that is divided, will not the body which is divided be neither begotten nor unbegotten? But if this is impossible, that the body which is divided be neither of these, it will surely be necessary for the body which is divided to be posited as being the incorruptible body and the corruptible body; for into these is the body which is divided, divided.

QUESTION 14. If that which has been made by God perishes, by whose wickedness does it perish; the maker's, or that which was made, or some external agent who is an adversary to the maker? ^D ANSWER. Neither by the wickedness of the Creator, nor of the adversary

^A but by the prescribed order of the Maker, who brings about decay in the particulars, but incorruptibility in the whole. For if those things that perish were to perish by the wickedness of any of the things mentioned, the entire genus would perish, both the individual and the universal. For if we were to grant that corruption arises from some wickedness, the genus of things created would not be preserved as incorruptible in those things that perish, since that wickedness would lord it over the whole just as it does over the particular. But if it is impossible for the whole to be corrupted by the wickedness of any being, then neither is the individual corrupted by the wickedness of any being, but by the decree of God. For if there is no wickedness in existing things capable of hindering generation, then neither is there any wickedness in existing things that destroys the genus.

ANSWERS REGARDING THE RESURRECTION

1. That a man should be or become food for a fish, or a fish food for a man, does not resolve the man into a fish nor the fish into a man; but the resolution of each takes place into the elements from which they were originally composed. Even if the manner of the resolution of others ^B takes place through their eating one another, the end of all resolution, in whatever way it occurs, is for the things being resolved to pass into the elements. There is no need, therefore, because of the refined, sophistical problem of man and fish eating one another, to construct a difficulty that would destroy the resurrection; but one ought to look to the power of God, who not only promises to perform the resurrection of the dead, but has also provided for us a firm faith in this through the resurrection of our Savior Christ, which has already taken place. Moreover, if the elements are subject to the creation of things that are born and to the restoration of those that have perished, how—if the restoration of those that have perished is considered incredible and impossible—will the creation of things that come into being at the beginning ^C not also be incredible and impossible? Which is absurd.

2. The Greeks do not believe in the creation of the world nor in its restoration. But if they are right in the first, it would be made clear in this way. For they say that time is eternal. But if time is eternal, it is necessary that the parts of time also be eternal, that is, the hours, and the days, and the months, and the year. But if these are not eternal, because in them there are some things that are prior and some that are posterior, then neither can the world, which is in time, be unbegotten.

3. For two reasons one ought to be skeptical of the resurrection of the dead: either because God is unable to raise the dead, or because it is not beneficial ^D to those who are being raised to be incorruptible. But the former of these is impious, the latter ridiculous.

And if this is the case, how does the argument of those who do not believe in the resurrection of the dead not consist of impiety and ^A mockery?

4. Whatever God creates, He creates through His own agency and of His own will: and the existence of those things which are created by Him is coeval with the command of God. "You have considered," it is said, "and brought forth." But if this is appropriately said of God, how does he who does not believe in the resurrection not also refuse to believe that God possesses such power? For those who rise from the dead are in need of nothing else but the command of God.

5. If it is true that God finds a way for things beyond expectation, as indeed it is true, how does he not prove his argument false who does not believe in the resurrection of the dead?

6. If, upon the restoration of the world taking place, all disagreement among men concerning the Creator and His works is necessarily removed, how will the restoration of the world not be more beautiful than the creation of the world? For, because of the restoration, the creation itself is also beautiful. But if that [restoration] is rejected as impossible, how will the creation of the world not be most wretched?

7. One thing is impossible in every respect, another is impossible to some. ^B It is impossible in every respect for a diagonal to be commensurate with the side of the same square. It is impossible to some, as it is for nature to produce an animal without seed. To which of these impossibilities do those who do not believe in the resurrection relegate it? If to the first, the argument is false; for the commensurability of the diagonal with the side does not result from restoration; but those who rise, rise by restoration. If to the latter, yet to God all things are possible that are impossible to some.

8. If in the present life the pious differs from the impious only by hope, how does he who takes away the hope of future things not also take away the difference between the pious and the impious?

9. If without the particular it is impossible for the universal to exist, how, if the particular is created, ^C will the universal not also be created? And if this is the case, how is it not false that man and the remaining parts of creation are coeternal with God? For instance, if Plato is created, how is man not created?

10. How have the Greeks, when they supposed the world to be eternal, dogmatized those things which necessarily follow from this presupposition? But if, as they wish, the world is eternal...

one would reasonably say that it would have no restoration. For the restoration belongs to a created world, not to an uncreated one. ^A That the world is not eternal is evident from the fact that man is not coeternal with God. For if the whole were coeternal with God, then, of necessity, the parts would be as well; but if the parts are not, neither is the whole.

11. To transfer all men once and for all through the restoration into a state where they are incorruptible is much more divine and fitting than to bring them into this mortal state in which we now exist. ^B Indeed, He reserved for us for the time to come that which is fitting and more divine, inasmuch as the end of our constitution is placed therein; if we were deprived of this, according to those who do not believe in the resurrection, how much better would it be for us not to be, than to be? For everything is useless when it is deprived of its proper end.

12. If it is possible for anyone to value death above his own life for the sake of a thing that does not exist, how—if, as you hold, the doctrine concerning the resurrection is not true—did the martyrs prefer their own death to their own life for its sake? ^C And what other religion has had its doctrine confirmed by various tortures and deaths, I mean specifically the Christians’ doctrine concerning the resurrection of the dead?

13. If those things which the Greeks do not believe do not exist nor will exist, then the existence of things lies in the knowledge of the Greeks. How then do they appear, in most of their principal dogmas, at odds both with themselves and with one another? For such a conflict does not allow for the existence of things to be placed in the knowledge of the Greeks.

14. If they do not believe the tradition of those who saw the author of the resurrection resurrected from the dead to immortal life, they are certainly unable to refute the dogma of the resurrection by any irrefutable demonstration. ^D For the fact that man becomes food for fish presents a question, but it provides no disproof. For it is impossible that the same thing should both fall under the eyes as an accomplished fact and be shown to be unbelievable. But once the thing has been demonstrated as possible by the fact that it has occurred, no reasoning can overturn it.

15. When the sun is above the earth, it is not beneath the earth; and when it is beneath the earth, it is not above the earth. How then is it eternal, according to you, when it does not possess its state of being above the earth or beneath the earth eternally? But if those whom...

are ignorant that the sun, by its own nature, is a generated being, are nevertheless ^A trusted, how is it not absurd for these same people not to believe in the resurrection of the dead, for whom the Author of the resurrection has already become the firstborn by his own resurrection?

17. When the power of the one who makes is strong, then the matter is also suitable for the creation of what is being made. But if any dead person is suitable for God for the purpose of rising again, then necessarily every one is; and if not every one, then no one at all. But the works of God ought not to be measured by our own thoughts. For the works of God are above mind, and sense, and reason; among which it is even the case that the dead man who has been devoured by fish ^B must necessarily return to existence, even if it happened that he was destroyed by something.

18. How is it true that the Lord rules over the living and the dead, when, according to your view, he does not have the power to transform one into the other?

19. If God is the creator of inferior things, but not of superior ones, how is this not a sign of God's weakness? Which is truly impious to say. But if the power of God is equal for the creation of both, why do you not believe in the resurrection of the dead, who rise to incorruptibility?

20. If it is not impossible for God to create, and it is beneficial for us to receive the state of being, that he lead us from this calamitous and corruptible life to a blessed and incorruptible state through the resurrection, rather than leading those Greeks who philosophize out of the laborious life of philosophers into the wretched labor of ants through metempsychosis—what is more ridiculous than not to believe in that which has indeed been confirmed by testimonies, and yet to embrace this other thing with faith, though it cannot stand, and to decree that Plato, who once philosophized in Athens, finally became an ant?

21. If, according to the Greeks, God makes human beings because he is, and not because he wills: how is it that Plato is sometimes a rational animal and a human, and sometimes an irrational animal and an ant through metempsychosis? If it follows from his being God that Plato becomes a human, it will be necessary that, as Plato is transformed from a human into an ant, God also be changed from that which he is. But if Plato is indeed transformed, while God is not changed from what he is, how is it that God makes human beings because he is, and not because he wills?

22. If the work of God is not destroyed, but man is destroyed, then man is not the work of God, according to the opinion of those who say this.

23. If our race is brought into existence through generation, and is led out of existence through corruption, how is it possible that God does not...

exist as the cause, not by a wish, but by the fact that He himself is? ^A

24. If those things existing from the elements become elements again, what is absurd or impossible in appearing that those things which are from the elements should be again?

25. If God is not under the definition, but is Master of every definition, how is it that God is Master of men becoming and corrupting, but is not Master of us becoming and not corrupting?

26. If God, in restoring us to incorruptibility, does this out of repentance, as you claim, how is it not more likely that He allowed us to exist forever out of repentance? ^B

27. If the gifts of God are without repentance, and He graced us with the fact of our existence, how does God not fulfill the purpose regarding us from the beginning by restoring us to incorruptibility?

28. According to those who believe in the resurrection of the dead, we both die and are revived by the righteous judgment of God: the former through man's disobedience, the latter through man's obedience. Therefore, to those for whom the cause of death is unknown, the Creator of human nature is also unknown. And since they are ignorant of the cause of death and the Creator of human nature, how is it not to be attributed to their ignorance that they say there is no resurrection of the dead? ^C

29. It is one thing to have no existence at all, and another for such as it is not to exist; for instance, it is one thing for a human never to have been created at all, and another for him to be corrupted after he has been created. And since to God no work is more laborious than another, how is it not irrational to trust in God for the creation of things that once had no existence at all, but to distrust Him regarding the restoration of things that have been corrupted?

30. If, just as before a human was created, man was potentially in the elements from which he was made, so also after he is corrupted, he is potentially in the elements, why do the Greeks distrust God, who has promised to resurrect the dead, as if it were an impossible thing, when man is potentially in the elements, just as he was when being created in the past, and so also now when being recreated? ^D

31. If God was unable from the beginning to make men incorruptible, it is clear that He is unable even now. But if He possessed the power from the beginning to make us incorruptible, and did not cast this away, how is it not irrational to distrust God—as if it were an impossible thing—when He promises that, in the likeness of Him who was raised by Him from the dead to incorruptible life, He will make the rest of mankind incorruptible as well?

32. A living being is potentially in the seed by nature; a bed is potentially in the wood by art; those who are rising are potentially in the elements by God. But if this is true, how is it not absurd to believe in nature regarding things...

natural, and in art regarding artificial things, but to disbelieve in God regarding things divine?

^A 33. To divine authority nothing is disobedient. If the sea and the earth long ago gave up at the divine command what they had not received, how shall they not now all the more give up what they have received, when God commands it?

34. If, just as nature cannot produce a living being from corrupt seed, and art cannot make a bed from corrupt wood, so neither can God make an incorruptible man from a corrupt man, then the power of God will be measured just as that of nature and art. But if it is absurd to say this, it is therefore also absurd to disbelieve that God can make an incorruptible man from a corrupt man.

^B 35. If, just as the resurrection appears impossible to unbelieving men, so it is impossible for God to bring about the resurrection, then God in this respect differs not at all from man. But if He differs infinitely, as indeed He does, how is it not absurd to disbelieve that God has the power to bring about those things for which He has the power to act?

36. If God has the power for actions beyond nature, how is it not absurd to disbelieve that He has the power for transformation beyond nature?

37. If the production of that which does not come about according to nature must be deemed unbelievable and impossible, how will the production of the first-created man not also be unbelievable and impossible, who was not born according to nature? For it is impossible for a man to be born from a man according to nature, unless the first man was born beyond nature.

^C 38. If I am not to become again what I was, how shall I receive the rewards of virtue or of vice, which I did not obtain in the present life? For if there is no resurrection of the dead, how will they not be equal to one another—both those who endured the struggles of martyrdom and those who caused them? But if this is unjust, how is it not unjust that there should be no resurrection of the dead, in which alone the distinction can occur for those who have done wrong and those who have suffered, according to the difference of honor and punishment?

39. If what man was and is somehow did not escape the knowledge of God when he died, it does not contradict that he may be again what he was. ^D For the works of God are known to Him and possible; and if they were not possible to Him, they would not even be known to Him.

40. If it is good for us to be mortal in the present life, but more excellent for us to be immortal in the future, how is it not absurd to say that God is able to produce the good, but unable to produce the more excellent?

41. If it is impossible for God to make the mortal body immortal, how will death not be stronger than God, if He cannot snatch from death those whom it has subjected to itself?

42. If God has the life-giving power for the de

dead, how are those who are rising not suitable for the resurrection? And since God is able to raise the dead, and those who are rising are suitable to be raised, what room is there for the unbelief of those who do not believe in the resurrection?

[μγ'] 43. If God is Lord of our being and our not-being, how will it not also be within His same lordship that we become immortal? But if our becoming immortal were situated outside the lordship of God, how would He not, in being Lord of our not-being, be God?

[μδ'] 44. If the nature which immortal and mortal things possess they have from the will of God, how is it impossible that the dead should become immortal, if God so wills?

[με'] 45. The stability of those things whose opposing forces are weak is firm. But if the Greeks, having used every mode of opposition to destroy the doctrine of the resurrection, have not been able to destroy it, because the doctrine is preserved in its various modes of opposition by the power of the God who works the resurrection: why then is the resurrection of the dead incredible, when the doctrine which asserts it has been shaken neither by hands nor by tongue?

[μς'] 46. If it is the greatest proof of God’s unconquerable and infinite power that He knows the forms and the deeds, good and bad, of all men, both living and dead; how is the resurrection of the dead not a demonstration of God’s infinite power and knowledge, by which He restores men again to being? But if this is so, how is he who deprives the dead of the resurrection not depriving God of such a demonstration?

[μζ'] 47. If the Greeks, having hoped to destroy the doctrine regarding the resurrection through their own opposition, failed in their hope, how will they not again fail in their hope, while hoping again that there will be no resurrection of the dead?

[μη'] 48. It was incumbent upon the Greeks, having fought against the doctrine of the resurrection, either not to be defeated in the battle, or, having been defeated, not to disbelieve the resurrection. If not, the vain toil of their first attempt will be a proof of their irrational unbelief.

ADMONITION

Upon the Confutation of Certain Dogmas of Aristotle

It does not require a long discourse for this work to be adjudged to the same writer to whom we have attributed the previous questions, both those to the Orthodox and those of the Christians to the Greeks, and the Greeks to the Christians. The style is entirely the same, as are the nominatives or absolute accusatives, as can be seen in nos. 2, 28, 45, 57, and at the beginning of the Preface; the method of disputation in all these writings is the same, and the opinions are the same. In the Preface, which is prefixed to the confutation of the Aristotelian dogmas, miracles are called "divine works," as they are in the *Response to the Orthodox Questions*. What is said there concerning the principles of each genus is similar to that which we have in the *Response to the Orthodox Questions*. He teaches in the same [work] that heaven and celestial things are incorruptible.

[...in the sense in which the same thing is asserted in the Confutation. Response of the Greeks, no. 2. In this very work, so many reasonings occur, entirely twin to those we noted in the previous Questions, that anyone who has read through that threefold work can easily recognize the offspring of one and the same parent.

This work is inscribed to Paul the presbyter, whom this writer declares to be inflamed with the zeal of defending religion, and that he himself willingly undertook the task of this writing to comply with his wish. Perhaps he is the same one who also was the author for our writer, that he might refute the responses of the Greeks, above, col. 1403, and in the name of the Greeks, above, col. 1466, n. 14, he speaks in referring to those things which the Greeks were wont to thrust forward against the resurrection. For he who performs this duty professes himself to be a Christian, and calls those who, being incredulous, hate the doctrine of the resurrection, stony-hearted.

It is commemorated by Photius, cod. 125, "Justin's treatise against the first and second book of the Physics (of Aristotle) or against Matter and Form and Privation, of epicheirematic and valid and very useful disputations, as well as against that fifth body and eternal motion, which Aristotle produced by force of reasoning." But because not only the two former books of the Physics, but also several others are opposed by this writer, some deny that the work mentioned by Photius exists. But it is much better, with Grabe, to suspect a mutilated codex of Photius. For thence, as he also observes, the occasion for error could have been born to the copyists, because when, under no. 12, some things are cited from the books *On the Heavens*, which are appended under the distinct numbers 13, 14, 15, the copyist, doing something else, could have leaped to those things which, under no. 46, are repeated from the books *On the Heavens*, omitting those things which are excerpted from books 3, 4, 5 of the Physics. Perhaps also Photius himself was deceived, by scrolling through this book quickly rather than reading it accurately; and when he saw those things which are sought from the books *On the Heavens* being cited under nos. 13, 14, 15, he thought the remaining disputation was concerned with refuting the books *On the Heavens*.]

REFUTATION OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS

^A Of all the fine things which are done by men according to human zeal for the worship of God, nothing is so acceptable to God as striving, according to one's power, to make men better. Since this zeal burns strongly within you, honored presbyter Paul, and since you instructed me to briefly extract selected chapters of the Greeks' dogmas concerning God and creation, I willingly undertook to carry this out, not so that you might learn any truth from them (for how could you, who have received the teaching concerning these things from above, through the prophets, from God Himself, the Creator of the universe?), but that you might know that the Greeks, by the constant scientific demonstration from which they profess to dispute concerning God and creation, have by no means achieved this, but define what pleases them by conjecture. Of those who have argued about God and creation, some received the doctrine concerning God and creation from God Himself, the Creator of the universe, through the prophets, God's ministers for this matter, whom He first demonstrated to be worthy of belief ^B by the divine deeds which happened through them, and then in this way provided the doctrine concerning things hidden from those who were being taught by them. But others, incredulous of the words of the prophets, committed the discovery of the knowledge of God to their own reasonings. And among those who, having been taught, knew the difference between God and the created thing, there is one God, unbegotten in both senses, having neither gods nor a god before or after Him, nor any co-eternal, nor any subject, nor adversary; of whom neither

^A His essence can be corrupted, nor His operation interrupted; the Artificer of the whole world, who has the will of the same as the cause why He exists, and why He is such as He is, and why He remains such. For the parts of the world remain either in incorruption, as the heaven and the heavenly bodies, and the invisible powers; or in generation and corruption, as animals and plants on earth. And just as what was made would not have been made had He not commanded, ‘Let it be,’ so also it would not endure had He not established the commandment, for those that are incorruptible that they should stand for ever and ever, but for those in generation and corruption, ‘Increase and multiply, and replenish the earth.’ But for the demonstration of His divine power, and that He Himself is not enslaved to the laws of nature, but acts according to the authority of His will whatever He pleases, He created some of those that are in generation and corruption from the earth and the waters, commanding: ‘Let the earth bring forth a living soul according to its kind, and plants having in themselves their seed, and wood bearing fruit.’ And again: ‘Let the waters bring forth a living soul according to its kind’; but those generated from the progenitors, He ordained should be born from the sowing of seed. And concerning these, all the prophets sent by God to all men continued to hold the same view, and there was no dissension among them. But ^B among those who, having rejected the words of the prophets, defined whatever they pleased concerning God and created things by their own conjecture, there is much dissension among themselves and with their own selves concerning things and their principles according to substance, and number, and motion, and end, just as is shown from the first book of Aristotle’s *Physics*, besides the fact that he speaks nothing true concerning the things which he undertook to define.

From the first book of Aristotle’s Physics.

«For there is always something which is the subject, from which that which comes into being is generated: for instance, plants and animals from seed. But the things that come into being simply, come into being in some cases by transformation, as ^C a statue; in others by addition, as things that grow; in others by subtraction, as Hermes from the stone; in others by composition, as a house; in others by alteration, as things that change according to their matter. And it is manifest that all things that come into being in this way come into being from subjects. And this is twofold: for it is either the subject or the opposite. And by ‘opposite’ I mean the non-musical, but by ‘subject’ I mean the man.»

If the seed that sows is first, and later that which comes into being from the seed, and both are generated: ^D from the generation of that which is produced from seed, the seed is the subject, and from the NEXT PAGE BEGINS: "Α τῇ μὲν γενέσει τοῦ κειμένου ἐκ σπέρματος γιγνομέ νου ὑπόκειται τὸ σπέρμα, τῇ δ…"

generation of that which has sown, it is not possible for the seed to be subject. Therefore, animals and plants are not always produced by sowing. Furthermore, if each is a generated animal, both that which sows and that which is generated from seed, and each is not from the same subject, but one is from seed and the other is not from seed, how is it not false to say that animals are always produced by sowing? The same reasoning applies to plants. ^B Item, if the principle of that which is produced by sowing is the sower; and yet in the treatise of Aristotle’s *Physics*, this is unknown and undefined: for what reason was this treatise composed, when the principle of the first animal and plant is ignored? For ignorance of the principle follows from ignorance of those things that are from the principle. If an animal that is produced from seed is produced according to nature, it is clear that the same animal, if it were produced but not from seed, would not be produced according to nature. Let the Aristotelians, then, say according to what it is produced, if the animal is not produced according to nature. Then, if a different mode of birth is assigned to the animal—namely, of that which is from seed and is according to nature, and that which is not from seed nor is produced according to nature—it is necessary that the generation be finite: how, therefore, do the Greeks say that animals and plants which are made according to nature are, like God, without a principle, when they cannot even be equal to the first animal and plant? ^C Furthermore, if everything that is produced is always composite, how do you distinguish the mode by which those things made through composition are produced, by a specific difference in mode from the other modes of generation? For if everything that is generated is composite, it must needs be generated through composition. But if the mode of generation through composition belongs to every generation, it is in vain that it is separated from the other modes of generation by a proper distinction. Item, if the subjects for the aforementioned generations are substances, and in them the duality of the subject is considered—that is, the subject and the opposite—and yet matter is not a substance: how can the mode of generation of those things that are generated from substances square with the mode of generation of those things that are not generated from substances? It is necessary, therefore, that either matter is a substance, or those things which are generated from matter are generated in another mode than the aforementioned modes of generation. ^D But since in the treatise of the *Physics* matter is defined as not being a substance, and the mode of generation of those things produced from it is not explained, is that treatise not useless, in which nothing clear is found? Further, even if, as it is necessary for nature and art to produce not just anything from anything, but definite and certain things from certain and definite things, so too there exists a necessity for God to produce certain and definite things from certain and definite things: who is it that imposed this law upon God? And it is manifest that this law was imposed upon nature and art by God. But if God is not subject to the law, but produces any things from any things, with no necessity of law preventing Him from producing whatever He wills: how is He not also freed and liberated from the law of producing of necessity from subjects?

^A The subject is in number indeed one, but in form two. For man, and gold, and matter in general, is countable; for a "this particular thing" comes to be from it, and that which is generated does not come to be from it by accident. But deprivation and contrariety are accidents. The form is one, such as order, or music, or anything else of those which are predicated in such a way; through which it must be said that there are in one way two principles, and in another way three. And there is a sense in which they are opposites, such as if one were to say the musical and the non-musical, or the hot and the cold, or the ordered and the unordered; and there is a sense in which they are not. For it is impossible for opposites to be affected by one another. This is also resolved by the fact that the subject is something else; for this is not an opposite. Thus, the principles are not more than the opposites in a certain way, but two, so to speak, in number; nor again are they absolutely two, because a different essence is proper to them, but three.

^B If the subject is in number one, but in form two, from which it is necessary to be subject in the one, how is the subject not subject to itself? But if this is impossible, how is it not false that the subject is two in form?

Further, if it is necessary that something of those things which are generated always be a subject, and this is matter, how is matter not always generated? For it is always subject to one of the opposites. For it is subject either to privation or to form, which is opposite to privation; and by form it becomes formed, and by privation formless. How, then, is matter not a generated substance, which always holds the being generated?

Further, if privation is nothing other than the abolition of every existing thing, and this belongs to matter, how has not also the being matter been abolished from it?

Further, if, when the form is absent from matter, there is also absent from it the being a substance, and a "this particular thing," and an existent, then matter is nowhere when the form is absent from it.

Further, if matter is numerable, but the opposites that belong to it are not numerable, how are there three principles, matter and those things which belong to it?

If nothing of those things which are seen in the constitution of generated natures is from matter—neither quality nor quantity—how do the things that are generated from it come to be by themselves?

If it is impossible for something to be that is neither a thing nor a "this particular thing," how, because of privation, does matter, not being a "this particular thing," have being?

If privation and form happen to matter, and matter is not a substance, how do opposites happen to it? For accidents happen to substance.

If, as order is in those things which are ordered, so is form in matter, how do those things which lack order have being as a "this particular thing" before order? For matter, not having the being-a-this-thing before the form, the proportion of order towards the form is preserved in the matter.

If, in the composition of those things which are generated, only two principles are contemplated—matter and form—but apart from the composition there are three principles—matter, and privation, and form—then it is evident that...

if that which is produced does not exist, three principles are posited; but if it does exist, not three, but two. How then is the generated thing not the principle of the destruction of the one principle, which, if it had not perished, the generated thing would not have come into being? If, just as the human is affected by the musician and the non-musician, and the body by the cold and the hot, and the voice by consonance and dissonance, so matter is affected by form and privation: let matter be a substance, as a human and a body, or an accident, as a voice, so that the ratio of analogy may be preserved. But if matter is neither substance nor accident, then it is certainly not affected by contraries. ^B

3. Of the same, from the same book, p. 191. “How many are the principles of natural things, which are generated, and how, has been stated. And it is manifest that it is necessary that something be subjected to contraries, and that there be two contraries. But in some other way, this is not necessary. For one of the contraries is sufficient to effect change by its presence or absence: but the underlying nature falls under knowledge according to analogy. For as bronze is to the statue, or wood to the bed, or as matter and the unformed thing are to anything else that has form before it receives the form, so this relates to substance, and to a ‘this-something,’ and to what is. One then is this principle; not, however, one in such a way that it is a ‘this-something,’ but one in that it is a rational concept. And the opposite to this is privation. Whether form or the underlying subject is substance, it is not yet clear.”

If form by its presence gives form to matter, and by its absence makes it unformed, and there are two principles, the form and the unformed, and privation also effects these same things by its presence and its absence; ^C then the principles will generate and destroy one another, and they will not be eternal. For that which is eternal does not require any presence or absence in order to be. If change of the principles occurs by the presence and absence of contraries, it is evident that the change occurs from the fact that they are principles. How then can they remain principles, if they have ceased to be principles? If a principle that has a principle is not a principle, how can matter, which for its being has form as a principle, and for its non-being has privation, be a principle? To call that which is subject to privation a nature, which is neither substance, nor a ‘this-something,’ nor being, how is it not superfluous? If the principles are neither from others nor from one another; but privation is from the absence of form, and form is from the absence of privation; ^D how are form and privation not principles from one another? For by their absence from one another they are productive of one another. If the bronze has a certain ratio to the statue that is to be produced from it, matter has this same ratio to...

the form and to the "certain something" and to being. For how can bronze, if it is not a substance, a "certain something," and being, have a ratio to the statue? And how can matter, if it is not a substance, nor a "certain something," nor being, have a ratio to the bronze? If all things considered in the constitutions of natural things are known by sense perception, how is matter, from which perceived things are derived, known by analogy and not by sense perception? Or how is it possible at all for things perceived by sense to come into being from that which is not perceived by sense? If to be a "certain something" is identical to being one principle, how does matter have the property of being one principle, but lack the property of being a "certain something"? And if for a "certain something" to be and not to be is what constitutes a substance, how is it that matter is a "certain something" not-being, yet is not a substance? And how can someone exclude matter from being "one" if he divides it into two species: into that which is subject to what comes into being, and into that which is contrary? ^B If it is not yet clear from what has been said whether the form or the subject is the substance, how has he spoken assertively about matter, that it is not a substance, nor a "certain something," nor being? For he called the subject matter. Now to say that it is not a substance, nor a "certain something," nor being, and at another time that it is unclear whether it is a substance—how is this not characteristic of men who do not know what they are saying?

^C The first among the philosophers who sought after the truth and the nature of existing things went astray, having been pushed, as it were, into another path through ignorance, and they say that nothing of the things that are comes into being or is destroyed, because it is necessary that what comes into being should come into being either from what is or from what is not; and that it is impossible for it to occur from either of these: for that which is cannot come into being, since it already is; and from what is not, nothing can come into being, for there must be something subject to it. And thus, extending the consequences of this, they assert that there are not many things, but only that which is itself.

These things are sufficient to bear witness to the truth of what we have said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, namely, that they did not frame their accounts concerning existing things according to demonstrative science, but defined what seemed right to them by conjecture.

^D We say, however, that for something to come into being from what is or what is not, or for what is not or what is to do or suffer something, or for anything whatsoever to come into being as a "certain something," makes no difference at all, in the same way as if one were to say that a doctor does or suffers something, or that something is or comes into being from a doctor. Since, therefore, this is said in two or many ways, it is clear that it is so also of "out of what is," and "that which is," and "to do" or "to suffer." The doctor, therefore, builds, not as a doctor, but as a builder; and he becomes white, not as a doctor, but as a dark man. And he heals by means of matter.

^A And he who is not a healer becomes a healer; since we say especially that the doctor, strictly speaking, does something or suffers something, or comes to be from a doctor, if the doctor does or suffers these things. Clearly, it means that this comes to be "from not-being"—that is, insofar as it is not. Because they did not distinguish this, those men stood apart; and because of this ignorance, they were so blinded that they thought that nothing else was being generated or existing, but rather they abolished all generation. We ourselves, however, say that nothing comes to be absolutely from what is not; nevertheless, it does come to be from what is not, for instance, accidentally. For from privation, which is in itself a non-entity, and is not inherent, something comes to be. This, however, is considered wonderful, and it seems impossible that something should come to be from what is not. Likewise, neither from what is does that which is come to be, except accidentally. And this, too, comes to be in the same way, for instance, if an animal were to come to be from an animal, and if from a certain animal a certain animal were to come to be, for example, if a dog were to come to be from a horse; for it would come to be ^B not only from a certain animal, the dog, but also from an animal, yet not insofar as it is an animal; for this already exists. But if any animal is about to come to be, not accidentally, it will not be from an animal; and if something is, it is not from what is, nor from what is not. For it has been said by us what the expression "from what is not" signifies—that is, insofar as it is not; furthermore, we do not abolish everything that exists, nor the fact of its not existing.

If it is impossible for anything to come to be either from what is absolutely, or from what is absolutely not, this is common to those who, through inexperience and ignorance, abolish generation, and to him who corrects those who are erring ^C: how then is generation not abolished by the corrector, just as it is abolished by those who are erring? If nothing can come to be accidentally from what is and from what is not, unless the generation of that which comes to be *per se* is first understood; for instance, it is impossible for the doctor to become white unless that which is dark becomes white, and it is impossible for the doctor to build unless the builder is building, if the doctor is a dark man and a builder; how does something come to be accidentally from what exists and from what does not exist, without anything being generated primarily *per se*? If first there is the animal, and afterwards animal from animal, and a certain animal from a certain animal; and for the generation of an animal from an animal, the seed is underlying, which is an animal in capacity, but not in act; but for the generation of that which is simply an animal, ^D there was no seed underlying: how then is the animal not generated from a non-animal contrary to nature? If, before that which comes to be was made, there was matter, but that which was made from it did not exist, what was the matter? For example, if there was matter for a horse before the horse was made, and if all the things that are perceived in the substance of the horse are generated, how was the matter from which the horse was made ungenerated? If in itself neither the privation is that of a non-animal.

But since these things are separate, it is impossible for anything to be generated from either of them, nor is it possible for anything to be generated from these things [even] when they are combined; just as it is impossible for anything to be generated from that which is simply, so likewise [it is impossible to be generated] from that which is simply not, that we may use the very words of Aristotle. How have both become possible, both that which is generated from 'being' and that which is generated from 'non-being'? If the subject from which that which is generated comes to be must be subject to contraries, therefore nothing is generated from privation by accident, as the contraries are not subject to it. ^B How then can he who does not take away the whole, neither [the concept of] being nor non-being, but concedes that the whole is and is not, speak the truth when he says that matter is neither a substance, nor a "certain this," nor a being? If that which is generated is generated, but not from that which is simply non-being, nor from that which is simply being, but from both, then it is generated also from matter [taken] as being and non-being, and as from that which is a "certain this" being, and a "certain this" non-being. But if these things are so, then what was said about matter—that it is neither a substance, nor a "certain this," nor a being—is false. Just as matter is formless, so also is the form immaterial. But if matter and its formlessness are two principles, then the form and its immateriality will also be two principles. How then, when the principles are four, were only three principles posited?

6. From the same book.

« ^C For we say that matter and privation are different, and that one of these is non-being by accident, namely matter, but privation [is such] in itself; and the former is near and in some way a substance, but the latter is not at all. Others say that "non-being" is that which is "the great and the small," equally being one [when taken] together, or each separately. Wherefore this mode of the trinity is entirely different from the other. »

If it is not a being by accident for matter, it is evident that by accident, matter is neither matter nor a principle. For it is [the nature] of being to be matter and to be a principle. And if it is a non-being by accident for matter on account of privation, it is evident that it is a being by accident on account of form. Therefore, matter will ^D itself never be a being; but by accident, it will always be now a non-being, and now a being. How then is it not absurd to call that which is never in itself a being, a substance, and in some way a substance? If to be matter is one thing, and to be the matter of something is another; and if matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but is not deprived of itself being matter; then matter will be a being and a non-being; a being indeed because it is matter, but a non-being because it is not the matter of someone. But if matter is the matter of nothing, then matter is not even of formlessness. And if matter is of formlessness, not even of matter.

^A Was then matter ever matter, strictly as matter? No, it is always the matter of some thing, at one time of formlessness, at another time of form. ^B That formlessness is something is evident from the fact that it was posited as a principle of things that come into being. But if these things are so, then matter is never non-existent; but if it is existent, at one time it is formless, and at another time it is fashioned; wherefore it is also always generated. If matter is able to cast off its co-eternal formlessness, it is able therefore also to cast off its co-eternal ungeneratedness. But if [it cannot do] the second, then neither [can it do] the first. How then does that which comes into being come to be from matter, if matter does not cast off its co-eternal formlessness? If, as the manner of composition according to Aristotle is different from the manner of composition according to Plato, so the composition itself is different; why is the hexad ^C not the principle of things that come into being, but rather the triad? And if the triad is not different, how is its manner different?

7. *From the same book, ibid.*

«For the matter which remains is, together with the form, the cause of things that come into being, just as a mother; but the other part, that of contrariety, would often be thought by one who fixes his mind on its harmful character to not even exist at all. For while there exists something divine and good and desirable, we say that one thing is contrary to it, and another is so constituted as to desire and yearn for it according to its own nature. But for these things it happens that they desire their own destruction; and yet it is neither possible for the form to desire itself, for it is not in need, nor for the contrary; for contraries are destructive of ^D one another; but that which desires is the matter, just as if a female were to desire a male, or an ugly thing were to desire what is beautiful: yet it is not ugly in itself, but by accident, nor is it female [by nature], but by accident: it is destroyed and generated, in one sense, but in another it is not. For in so far as it is that in which, it is destroyed in itself; for the thing being destroyed in this is the privation: but as regards power and potentiality, it must of necessity be indestructible and ungenerated. For if anything is generated, it is necessary that something be first underlying, from which, being inherent, it is generated; and this is nature itself; wherefore it will exist before it comes into being. For I mean by matter the first underlying subject for each thing from which, being inherent, generation comes to be, not by accident. If anything is destroyed, it will arrive at this as its final point. Wherefore it will be destroyed before it is destroyed.»

If, as matter and form are the principle of things that come into being, so too is privation: why is matter together with form the cause of things that come into being, while privation is not simultaneously a cause? If form is the principle of things that come into being because from it comes being for the thing that comes into being, then clearly privation too...

is a principle, because through it comes non-being to the thing that comes into being. ^A How then is privation termed a principle of things that come into being? If, when form is present, then privation does not remain, it is clear that when form is not present, privation does remain. How then is it not absurd to say that what remains has no being? For it is the property of being to remain. If privation is the other part of a contrary pair, and the thing that harms it is form, how is form not both good and bad? Good indeed for matter, since it provides for matter the state of being a substance, but bad for privation, since it destroys it. If there is some divine thing that is both good and desirable, and it has a contrary, which is neither good nor desirable, then the divine will be both good and not good, desirable and not desirable; and therefore both divine and not divine. ^B But if this is absurd, then the divine, which is good and desirable, has no contrary. For that which is simply good is good for all, not for some only. If that which is contrary to the good does not desire the good—for it desires the corruption of its own nature if it desires the good—and if form does not desire itself, for form is in no way needy; and if the divine is desirable and an object of desire; to whom then is it desirable and an object of desire, if not to matter? Therefore matter is animate. For it is characteristic of an animate thing to desire and to covet. But if matter is animate, how is it not false that matter does not have being by accident? For a soul is a being, and that which possesses a soul is a being. If, just as a female desires a male, and as the ugly desires the beautiful, matter desires the good, and matter is not by itself female and ugly, but by accident, ^C then clearly it does not by itself desire the good, but by accident. Therefore the divine, too, will not be good, desirable, and an object of desire by itself, but by accident; which is absurd to say. If matter is generated because of form, and corruptible because of privation, but ungenerated by itself and incorruptible, then matter will always be corruptible and generated, but never incorruptible and ungenerated. For it is always subject either to the privation that is corrupted within it or to the form that is generated within it. In generated things, "ungenerated" signifies the privation of a generation that could come to be, but in eternal things it signifies the negation of all generation, ^D both that which has occurred in the past and that which is to occur in the future. For example, bronze, which is about to become a statue, before it becomes a statue, is said to be ungenerated according to privation, because it is possible for it to become a statue. But in God, "ungenerated" signifies the negation of all generation according to substance, both past and future. Since there are, therefore, two modes of being ungenerated, in which way is matter ungenerated? If it is according to privation, then matter is ungenerated, just as the bronze is. If matter is ungenerated according to negation, then nothing at all becomes matter; and matter cannot have the same relationship to substance that the bronze has to the statue, as Aristotle said. If matter is ungenerated in the way God is, and God is able to make something from the ungenerated, it is clear that God is also able to make something from that which is absolutely non-existent. For it has the incapacity of non-being toward the non-coming-to-be of something out of

^A it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make something from that which is eternally unbegotten, but unable to do so from that which is absolutely non-existent? But clearly, the unbelief that denies that God can make anything out of nothing impelled the first philosophers to deny the generation of all things out of matter, and impelled Aristotle, the corrector of this error, to deny the generation of matter itself. If there is that which is coming into being, and this is something that is coming into being, as was stated above, then matter is none of these things, if it is unbegotten and incorruptible. If matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, it is necessarily unbegotten in both modes of unbegottenness; therefore, nothing comes into being from it, nor is anything corrupted within it. How then is privation corrupted in that which is incorruptible? If matter is one, but the things that come from it are many and diverse, how can it be necessary for matter to remain unbegotten, since its always-divisible nature cannot remain indivisible? If matter is one in number but two in form, and it is unbegotten and incorruptible, then either the whole of matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, or half of it is. But if the whole of matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, then clearly its half is also of such a nature; but if half of it is unbegotten and incorruptible, and half of it is not so, then there will be a true affirmation and negation regarding the same thing, which is impossible. If the thing that receives the form either becomes that form or comes from it, how can matter be unbegotten while receiving a form? If the attribute of being unbegotten and incorruptible belongs to existing things, how is it that matter is both not an existing thing and yet is unbegotten and incorruptible? If that which is unbegottenly in the unbegotten is also itself unbegotten, how does the privation that is in the unbegotten matter come into being and pass away? If, as has been said, one of the opposites is sufficient by its own presence and absence to effect change, what is it that changes in matter, which is unbegotten and incorruptible? If the unbegotten and incorruptible state is viewed in relation to the substance of that which is unbegotten and incorruptible, where is the unbegotten and incorruptible nature of matter, when matter is not a substance? If bronze had not been generated according to its prior generation, neither would a statue have been made. How then is matter, or anything from matter, generated, unless it was previously generated? If bronze did not pass away, then neither would that which is made of bronze pass away. How then does the material thing pass away, when matter is incorruptible? If a body is not perfected from incorporeal things, how has a body been made from matter and form, which are themselves incorporeal? If by natural necessity the indivisible and the immutable follow upon the unbegotten and incorruptible, how is it that in the genera divided according to form there is unbegotten and incorruptible matter, and how do things that change according to matter come into being through alteration, as he defined above in his exposition of the modes of generation?

^A 8. From the second book of Aristotle’s *Physics*. “In one way, then, nature is said to be the primary matter underlying each thing, for those things which have in themselves the origin of motion and change; in another way, it is the form and the species which is according to the account. For just as art is said of that which is according to art and artificial, so nature is said of that which is according to nature and natural.”

What then should we call that which is according to matter and material, if not matter? Say, what else? But if we call this matter, then matter will be matter when that which is according to matter and material [exists]. For nature is also nature when that which is according to nature and natural [exists]; and likewise with art. For those things which are expressed in the same way have the same relation to one another. But if matter exists only then, when that which is according to matter and material exists, then matter is not unbegotten.

9. From the same book, ibid. “So that in another way nature would be, of those things which have in themselves an origin of motion, the form and the species, which is not separable, except by account and thought. But that which is from these is not nature, but according to nature, such as man.”

If man is according to nature, and is some natural animal, how is man not nature? For having defined it, he said: “Nature is said of that which is according to nature and natural.”

10. From the same book, ibid. ^B “In those things which are made by art, we ourselves make the matter for the sake of the work, but in natural things it exists.”

Since there is another work which is neither according to nature nor according to art, where is the matter of this work to be placed? For an animal is generated from an animal, and if there were no animal first, there would be no animal from an animal. And an animal is generated from an animal according to nature, but the animal is not according to nature, strictly speaking. But if in those things which are according to art the matter is from without, while in those things which are according to nature the matter is in the natural things, then clearly in those works which are neither according to art nor according to nature, the matter exists differently. If he who treats of natural things does not provide the definition of this, he renders unstable even those things which were already defined. ^C For if we think we know each thing only when we know the first causes and the first principles, how could anyone know the animal from an animal, if he were ignorant of the animal from a non-animal? For the latter is the beginning and cause of the former.

11. From the same book, ibid. “Since chance and fortune are the cause of those things of which mind might be the cause, or nature, when some cause of these very things happens by accident, and nothing that is by accident is prior to those things which are by themselves, it is clear that neither is the cause by accident prior to that which is by itself. Therefore chance and ^D fortune are posterior to mind and nature.

^A In these remarks, he has not only failed to preserve the order of primary and secondary causes, but he has also ^B subjected the heavens—which he himself, in the second book of the *Physics* (Auscultatio Naturalis), had removed in the preceding sections from fortuitous generation—to a generation that is not merely fortuitous, but even to that which occurs through mind and nature. This is clearly absurd: that a thing which has received its generation according to substance through mind and nature, which are the primary causes, should again receive that same generation through secondary causes. Moreover, how is it not most absurd to remove the same thing now from fortuitous generation, now to subject it to it; and at one time to call it unbegotten, at another time begotten by nature? I shall set forth the words in which he acts in this way, so that from a mutual comparison of them, the falsehood contained therein may be understood.

^C 12. *From the same book, ibid., c. 4, p. 196.* « There are, however, those who attribute the cause both of these heavens and of all things that the world contains to chance; for they say that from a fortuitous occurrence came the vortex and the motion which separated and established the universe in this order. And indeed, when they say this, they are very worthy of our astonishment: because they say that animals and plants neither exist nor are made by chance, but have as their cause mind or nature or something else of that sort (for it is not the case that just anything comes from any seed whatever, but from this the olive, from that the human); yet that those things which are diviner among the visible existences are made by fortuitous chance, and have no cause of such a kind as have the elements and plants. And if this is indeed the case, this very fact would be a subject for inquiry, and it is well to say something about this very thing. For besides the fact that what they say is otherwise alien to reason, it is even more absurd to say these things when we see that in the heavens nothing happens by chance, while in those things which do not depend on chance, many things occur by chance: whereas it was to be expected that the opposite would happen. »

^D That he asserts the heavens were generated by chance, and yet again not by chance, is shown by the words which we have taken and proposed from the second book of the *Physics*, in the two chapters, the eleventh and twelfth. I shall also bring forward the words by which he proclaims them to be unbegotten and, again, begotten by nature. [alt-version omitted]

^A 13. *From the second book of Aristotle, On the Heavens, lib. II, cap. 1, p. 283.* « That the whole heaven has not been begotten, nor is it possible for it to perish, as some say, but that it is one and eternal, having neither beginning nor end of all time, and having and containing within itself infinite time, these things are sufficient to provide proof of what has been said. » Having said these things concerning the unbegotten nature of the heavens, see what Aristotle says again concerning its generation in his first book *On the Heavens*.

[14. From the first book *On the Heavens*, lib. I, cap. 12.] « And nature seems rightly to have exempted from contraries that which is to be hereafter unbegotten and incorruptible; for generation and destruction occur among contraries. » If among impossible things naught exists or can exist, and it is among impossible things that that which is to be hereafter should be unbegotten, ^B lacking beginning and end, having and containing within itself infinite time, then the one who says these things will be ignorant of the difference between the possible and the impossible.

[15. From the first book *On the Heavens* of Aristotle, at the end of the book.] « For nothing that happens by chance can be incorruptible or unbegotten. » How then could someone believe him who says both things about the heaven? For in the eleventh chapter he says that a chance accident is the cause of the heaven, but in the thirteenth chapter he says the heaven is without beginning and unbegotten.

16. *From the second book of Aristotle, On the Physics, lib. I, cap. 1, p. 283.* « There are two principles that move naturally; of which one is not natural, for it does not have the principle of motion within itself. ^C Such is that which moves something while not being moved itself, as being altogether immovable and the first of all things. » How then can the principle move naturally, which is neither natural nor moves according to nature? For to the only natural principle, which moves according to nature, it is consistent to move naturally. If the principle that is not natural does not have within itself the principle of motion, it is evident that the natural principle has within itself the principle of motion. But the principle that has a principle is not a principle. If among things that are eternally unbegotten nothing can be prior or posterior to another, how is the principle, which is immovable or not moved, yet moving, the first of all things, or a principle at all? ^D

17. *From the third book of the same treatise, lib. III, cap. 4, p. 203.* « They also gain proof that it is infinite from time; for this is infinite; furthermore, by this means only, generation and destruction would not fail if it were infinite, from which that which comes to be through generation is extracted. » If time always has being in that which is being generated, but that which is being generated did not exist before it was generated, how is the

^A non-existence that precedes its forever-existence? For what is not yet present is about to be, and what is about to be is about to pass away, and what has passed away was about to come to be. If, because generation and corruption do not cease, it is necessary for generation and corruption to be infinite, then generation and corruption will also be without beginning, just like the unbegotten and the incorruptible. But if this is impossible, then generation and corruption are not infinite.

18. From the same book, book III, c. 5, p. 204. «And not even a number [is infinite] in such a way, as if it were separate and infinite. For number is subject to enumeration, or that which contains the number. If, therefore, that which is subject to enumeration can be enumerated, it might also be possible for the infinite to be traversed.» ^B If of that which can be enumerated, and of that which has a number, the number is not infinite; but past time can be enumerated; therefore, past time is finite.

19. From the same book, ibid., c. 6, p. 206. «That if there is no infinite [being], many impossibilities follow, is clear. For there will be some beginning and end of time, and magnitudes will not be divisible into magnitude, and number will not be infinite.» If of the infinite, one part is in act and another in potency; but it is impossible that what is now infinite in act was not previously in potency; it is therefore impossible that the infinite should always be half in act and half in potency; but [if] it is first in potency and later in act. If, just as time lacks an end regarding the future, so it also lacks a beginning regarding the past; time will therefore be, as unbegotten regarding the future, so too regarding the past. ^C If this is impossible—for time to be unbegotten regarding the future—inasmuch as it has not yet come to be, and yet it has come to be regarding the past—time therefore does not lack a beginning. For that which lacks a beginning has no generation, but time does have it. If nothing can be infinite in act, then the divisions of magnitude already made are not infinite, nor is the already taken number. For both are in act. But if they are not infinite, they are therefore finite; and if they are finite, they also have a beginning: the magnitude, that of its division; the number, that of its enumeration.

20. From the same book, ibid. «The infinite is indeed by addition, and it is also by ^D subtraction. That magnitude is not infinite in act, has been said: but it is [infinite] in division. It remains, therefore, that the infinite is in potency. But one ought not to take that which is in potency as if, just as this can be a statue, and this will be a statue, so too with the infinite that will be in act. But because being is used in many senses—just as the day and the contest consist in always having one thing coming to be after another—so too is the infinite. For in these cases, it is both in potency and in act. For, in general, to be in this way,

^A that is, by always having one thing after another being taken, while that which is taken is always finite, but always different and different. If there is nothing infinite in act, clearly all that is in act is always finite; and being finite, it must of necessity have a beginning; and having a beginning, it is necessarily generated; and being generated, there was therefore a time when it was not. This is said of every infinite by addition and subtraction, by potentiality and division.

« 21. From the same book. Nor if there is something outside, is that infinite; but that which receives what comes from without becomes greater than it was before receiving what came from without. But that which becomes greater than itself by the addition of that which comes from without is always finite. »

If the infinite is always in addition and subtraction, then the infinite is always in generation. How, then, is that which always has its being in coming to be without beginning? For a generated thing is not without beginning.

« 22. From the same book. Infinite are the divisions of magnitude; so that in potentiality it is infinite, but in act it is not; but that which is taken always exceeds every determined multitude; but this number is not [truly] determined, nor does the infinity remain, but it comes to be, just as does time and the number of time. »

If the infinity does not remain, but comes to be, just as does time and the number of time, then there is no infinite ^B that lacks a beginning. But if every infinite is generated, then all other things are also generated in which the infinite is said to be. If that which happens to the infinite necessarily happens also to those things in which the infinity is; and it happens to the infinite to be generated and to be initiated; then time is generated and initiated; and likewise also motion, of which time is the number.

23. From the fourth book of the same work.

How, then, is matter, being nothing—neither substance nor being, nor some certain thing?

24. From the same book.

Since it is right that space should exist first for things that are, because of the opinion, as many hold, that all things are somewhere and in a place. ^D But if it is such, the power of place would be something marvelous, and prior to all things. For since without it none of the other things is, it is necessary that it be prior to the other things. »

^A If, therefore, place is first, and the things that are in place are posterior by a natural necessity, as Hesiod said, to whom Aristotle also offered testimony of the correctness of his reasoning, how is it not one of the impossibilities to say that the heaven which is in place is ungenerated? For this is the same as saying that the generated exists before the ungenerated.

25. *From the same book, lib. IV, c. 4, p. 211.* « First, then, it must be considered that place would by no means be sought, if there were no motion in place. For this is the reason why we think the heaven is especially in place, because it is always in motion. » If it is impossible for the ungenerated to need the generated in order both to exist and to be moved, it is therefore impossible for the heaven to be ungenerated. For it needs place ^B both for its existence and for its being moved.

26. *From the same book, cf. Ibid.* « Place has magnitude, but it has no body. » If place has finite intervals and magnitude, then place is generated; but if infinite, they are so either potentially or actually. But if potentially, then place is generated, just like time and the number of time; if actually, then the argument which says that nothing can be infinite in actuality is false. If place is what it is by the providence of some being, and has what it has, then place is generated and posterior to providence. But if place is what it is and has what it has in an ungenerated and beginningless manner, then place is ungenerated, and is the first of all things that are in place, among which is the heaven and the things that appear in the heaven. For since nothing ^C exists apart from other things, that which is first must necessarily be prior to the other things.

27. *From the same book, ibid., c. 4, p. 211.* « For just as if something is changed, that which is now white was formerly black, whence we say that matter is something; so also place seems to exist through a fantasy of this sort; save that in the former case, because what was air is now water; but in the case of place, because where the air was, there is now water. » If place has the same relation to the things in it that matter has to the things in it, through a similar fantasy; but place is incomprehensible, and so is matter; therefore matter is none of the things that are changed and generated in it, and it is not a substance. How then was it said that the matter of things that are generated absolutely is a substance? ^D

28. *From the same book, ibid., c. 5, p. 212.* « Every body, which is moved either by change of place or by growth, is of itself somewhere. But the heaven, as has been said, is not wholly somewhere, nor is it in any place, if it is surrounded by no body. » If that which is moved by change of place is of itself somewhere, and the heaven is moved by change of place, it is therefore also necessarily the case that the heaven is of itself somewhere. But if the latter is not the case, neither is the former; for they are inseparable from one another.

^A If the heaven is not in a place by its own nature, how is it, while it is borne in a circular motion, that its parts which are above come to be below, and those which are below come to be above? And since it is above and below in its own parts, how is it not false to say that the heaven is not in a place?

29. From the same treatise. « The point has no place. » Therefore the point is not "somewhere," just as that which is not [is not somewhere]. But if this is false, then the point is an entity, and it is "somewhere." And if it is somewhere, it must necessarily also have a place. ^B

30. From the same treatise. « And the place is also "somewhere," not as in a place, however, but as a limit in that which is limited. For the entity is not in a place, but the movable body is. » If everything that is in a place is somewhere, and not everything that is somewhere is in a place, then "somewhere" certainly extends more widely than "in a place." How, then, are "somewhere" and "in a place" said to belong to one category, since they differ so much from each other that the place is even said to be "somewhere," yet not in a place? And if the limit of a limited thing is the place of one limited thing, but the limit of another, how is it not necessary that a place always be both a place and a limit? ^C And if the place is before the things that are in a place, how is the necessity not dissolved that the place must always be a place for one thing and a limit for another? And if that which in no way exists is not in a place—for it would be somewhere, as he said—how is "somewhere" not the same as "in a place"? And if not everything that is exists in a place, how will some of the things that exist not be the same as that which is not, since the quality of not being in a place is common to both? And if only a movable body is in a place, how is the heaven, being a movable body, not in a place?

31. From the same treatise, On Time. « That it either does not exist at all, or only with difficulty and dimly, one might suspect from the following. For a part of it has occurred and is not, and a part is future and is not yet; and yet from these the infinite and the eternally taken time is composed. ^D But that which is composed of things that do not exist would seem impossible to partake of substance. For of every divisible thing, if it exists, it is necessary, when it exists, that some or all of its parts exist. But of time, some parts have occurred and others are future, and none exist. For the present is not a part. For it is necessary that a part should measure, and that the whole should be composed from the parts; but time does not seem to be composed of "nows." » If everything that comes to be did not exist before it came to be, then time is not eternal and without beginning; wherefore neither is motion eternal and without beginning, of which time is the number. For if the future part of time is not yet,

^A and the past part of time existed before it came to be, then there was a time when the past part of time was not. And if that which is infinite must be without beginning, then time is not infinite, having the change of the future as the beginning of its existence. And if the past part of time is time in actuality, and the future is in potentiality, and in things which exist there are act and potentiality; then time, consisting of the past and the future, does not consist of things that are not. And if time does not partake of substance, yet it sits beside substances, so that even from this it is manifest that time is of the things which are. And if the past part of time is viewed in the past parts of a divisible thing, how is no part of it time, when it is divisible? And if the "now" is not ^B the smallest part of time, what is that which is called instantaneous, and indivisible, and a point of time? How is it possible for the change to take place from the future to the now, and from the now to the past, if the now is not a part of time? For all things are a part of time: first, future, posterior, now, then, past.

32.

From the same fourth book of the same work.

« That, therefore, time is neither motion nor without motion is manifest. »

But that time is generated and not eternal, having begun and not being without beginning, finite and not infinite, this also is manifest. And if time is such, then necessarily so is motion, of which time is the number.

« For as is the motion, so also time is always thought to have come to be. »

To those to whom it pertains to be generated and to have come to be, from them necessarily the eternal and that which has no beginning and is infinite is absent.

33.

From the same book. Ibid.

« Such as is the motion, such also time ever appears to be. » ^C

34.

From the same book. Ibid.

« We say that time exists then, when we perceive the sense of the prior and the posterior in motion. We define it by assuming one thing and another to be, ^D and that which is between them to be different. For when we conceive the extremes and the middle to be different, and the mind utters two "nows," the one prior and the other posterior, then we say that this also is time. For that which is defined by the "now" seems to be time. For time is the number of motion according to the prior and posterior. Therefore time is not motion, but motion has a number. The evidence of this is that we judge the more and the less by number, but motion as more or less by time. »

He who defines the generation of time by that which is prior and posterior in motion, eternal and without beginning

^A and infinite, says that neither time nor motion is so. For if it has been generated, it is neither eternal nor without beginning; and if it is bounded by its own proper extremes, it is not infinite.

35. From the same book. ^B «But the present measures time by what is prior and posterior, and motion follows upon magnitude, and time upon this.» If the 'now' is not a part of time, as he said in the thirty-third chapter, how does it measure time? For either the 'now' does not measure time, or it must be a part of time; and if motion follows upon magnitude, and time upon this, then magnitude is generated, just as motion and time, which follow upon it.

36. From the same book. «The minimum number of a line is in multitude two or one, but in magnitude it is not a minimum; for the minimum is one or two according to number, but according to magnitude there is no minimum.» If it is not a minimum part, in the line it is a point, and in time it is the 'now'; what else then is a point in a line, and the 'now' in time? And if it is not a minimum part, but a limit, how then is it impossible for a limit to exist without a limited thing, yet possible for a point to exist without a line? And if in those things in which there is no minimum, there is also no maximum, how does the remaining difference of the parts consist, when the difference between maximum and minimum is taken away?

37. From the same book. «Therefore it is clear that things which eternally are, or things which eternally are not, are not in time; for time does not encompass them, nor does time measure their being.» How then have you said that motion is eternal, and time is its number? For those things from which time cannot be separated, cannot but be in time.

38. From the same book. «Whatever things neither move nor are at rest, are not in time; for to be in time is to be measured by time; and time is the measure of motion and rest.» ^C If that which is in time moves and rests; and, as he who said this pleases, the heaven moves and the earth is at rest: then the heaven and the earth are in time, and their motion and rest as well. And if time has been generated, then ^D of necessity both the heaven and the earth have been generated.

39. From the fifth book of the same treatise. «Therefore, there must needs be, from what has been said, three changes, the one from subject to non-subject.»

and the one from non-subject to subject. For that which is from non-subject to non-subject is no longer a change, because it is not by way of opposition; for it is neither contrary nor contradictory. The change, therefore, from non-subject to subject, by way of contradiction, is generation; but that from subject to non-subject is destruction.» ^A Nowhere, clearly, is the matter, which you said above was subject to those things which are generated and perish, one as it were from which, and the other as it were in which.

40. From the same book, ibid., c. 4, p. 271. «For that which is not white or not good, nevertheless can be moved accidentally; for let a man be not white. But that which is altogether not a certain thing, is in no way. For it cannot happen that what is not, is moved.» If it is impossible that from that which is not moved, a substance is generated, nor is that moved which is altogether not a certain thing (for it is impossible that what is not, is moved); how is it that from matter, which is not a certain thing, a substance has been made at all?

41. From the ninth book of the same commentary. Lib. VIII, c. 1, p. 251. «If it is impossible for time to be or to be understood without the present, and the present is a certain middle, having a beginning and an end, being the beginning of future time, and the end of past time; it is necessary that time always be. For the end of the last taken time is the present. For it is possible to apprehend nothing in time except the present. Therefore, because it is a beginning and an end, it is necessary that there is time on both sides; but if there is time, it is also necessary that there is motion, since time is an affection ^B of motion.» By these arguments, Aristotle asserts the heaven to be eternal. For if it is a certain middle, and has a beginning and an end, and always has time on both sides, which being posited, it follows necessarily that time is eternal; and if time is eternal, then motion is necessarily eternal, of which time is the number; and if motion is eternal, then of necessity the body which is moved is eternal. But he absurdly posits this to be co-eternal; which is indeed argued as follows. For in whatever way the future time is to be, so also the past time has been. But future time, as it will have a beginning, so also the past time had a beginning; and just as nothing of past time is in the future, so none of the future is in the present. But if that which is now present is a being and is present, but the future is not yet, nor is it a being, nor is it present; therefore that which is now present is not the beginning of future time, ^C but that which is to be future has its beginning, just as the past one did. ^D

^A And yet, one and the same "now" serves as an beginning for the future and an end for the past, though "now" constitutes the beginning of one thing and the end of another, and likewise the same "now" at a different time becomes the beginning or the end of time itself. But if it is impossible for "now" to be "now" unless it were previously future and non-existent, it is therefore impossible for "now" to be coeternal. For if everything that was previously non-existent, but subsequently existed, is generated, and such is "now," then "now" is generated. But if "now" is generated, then of necessity all time is generated, of which "now" is the beginning and the end; and if time is generated, then of necessity motion is generated, of which time is the number; and if motion is generated, then of necessity the body that is moved is generated.

42. ^B *From the same discourse.*

Altogether, to think that this is a sufficient principle—that because a thing always exists or comes to be in such a way, it is therefore correctly assumed—is not a sound opinion; Democritus refers the causes of natural things to this, because it happened thus in the past as well. But he does not deem it worthy to seek a cause for what is "always," speaking rightly in regard to some things, but not rightly in regard to all. For a triangle always has its angles equal to two right angles; yet there is some other eternal cause for this eternity; however, there is not another cause for the principles of these things, since they are eternal.

^C If, therefore, one cannot correctly assume that the manner in which it comes to be "now" is the same as the way it came to be in the past, in order to account for those things that are always generated according to nature, then it is of necessity correct to assume that the principle of things generated according to nature is that which did not come to be as it now comes to be, but in another way; wherefore it is just to seek the principle even of that which is always generated. An animal is generated from an animal in one way, and an animal has been generated from a non-animal in another way. And the animal from a non-animal occurred neither according to nature nor does it always occur; but the animal from an animal comes to be both always and according to nature, from the point when it received the beginning of being generated from an animal, that which was not from an animal. And this applies to all things that are always generated according to nature, not to some only; for it is impossible that things generated from generated principles should have the same generation as the principles themselves. Eternity cannot exist without a beginning in things that are generated. ^D For a triangle always has its three angles equal to two right angles, having as a generated principle the straight line, whose definition is a line extended to the utmost. For this is the cause why a triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles; and if this is absent, it is not possible for there to be a triangle; but if the triangle does not exist, it is possible for the straight line to exist. The principles of things that are always generated according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they possess this nature, they communicate it to those that are generated from them; but this [nature] is generated; therefore, the nature of the principles is also generated, even if the mode of generation is changed and is different from that found in the things that have arisen from these principles.

^A It is necessary that something should be one and eternal, which is the primary mover; for it has been demonstrated that it is necessary for motion always to exist. But if it always exists, it is necessary for it also to be continuous; for that which exists always is continuous, whereas that which is successive is not continuous. A continuous motion is one; and it is one if it is by one mover and one thing moved. For if one thing moves this and another thing moves that, the whole motion is not continuous, but successive. If the primary mover effects local motion, and local motion is that of the heavens, and the heaven is a natural body, and a natural body has within itself naturally the principle of its natural motion, then it is to no purpose that the heaven is moved by the primary mover with a local motion, which, ^B even if the primary mover did not effect it, it would nonetheless perform by itself, because it is the fifth element, having neither weight to depress it downward, nor lightness to raise it upward, but another unnamed force that moves it around the center. If the primary mover, which moves the heaven with local motion, neither moves it according to nature—for it is superfluous to move it thus—nor contrary to nature—for motion contrary to nature is secondary to motion according to nature—then it does not move the heaven at all. If every motion, just as it happens now, was also happening before, and yet now it happens according to the change of that which is to be, and that which is to be did not exist before it came to be, then all that which was not before, but afterwards comes to be, is generatedly; but that which is generated cannot be without a beginning and eternal. Therefore, motion is not eternal and without a beginning.

44. ^C *From the same book, ibid., c. 7, p. 260 seq.* It is clear that locomotion is first. For “first,” just as in other matters, so also in the case of motion, is spoken of in many ways. That is called prior, in the absence of which the others will not exist, while it itself exists without the others; and that which is prior in time and that which is prior in substance. It is necessary that local motion be first. For there is no necessity that what is moved locally should grow, or be altered, or even be generated or corrupted. But none of these motions can exist without that continuous motion which the primary mover effects. Locomotion is also first in time; for it can belong to those things which are eternal. ^D Yet in each of those things which have generation, local motion must be the last of the motions. For after generation, the first thing to occur is growth and alteration; but locomotion is the motion of things that are already perfect. But it is necessary that another thing be moved locally beforehand, which shall also be the cause of generation for those things which are coming to be, without itself being generated, just as that which begets is prior to that which is begotten; since it would seem that generation is the first of motions, for the reason that the thing must exist before…

^A it is brought into being. And regarding any one of the things that come to be, this holds true; but it is necessary that something else prior to the things that come to be should be in motion—something which itself [(23)] is not coming into being, and prior to this, something else [(24)]. »

If that which increases is generated, and local motion increases in the quantity of its motion, this motion is not eternal. For the body that is carried has different places, in which, stretching the translation of its own parts, as it is carried it produces the increase of local motion. If, therefore, it has in itself the increase of local motion by the quantity of the motion, how is the motion of that which is according to increase said to be the first? If it is impossible for that which has not begun and is finite to receive an increase by addition, ^B then local motion is not without beginning, since it was always becoming greater in the quantity of its motion. If motion has its being in the coming to be and the perishing, then motion is not eternal, for non-existence always precedes its existence. For every motion occurs through a change of that which does not yet exist, but is about to exist. If every local motion is finite in its past [duration], and everything finite is of necessity also that which has a beginning, and everything that has a beginning is generated, then local motion is generated. And if the motion of the body being carried is not prior [(25)], then the body being carried is also generated.

If, among eternal things, one thing only moves and another only is moved by local motion, how is it not absurd ^C that that which lacks a beginning should be moved by a motion that has a beginning? If that without which none of the others can exist is prior to the others in substance and time, how is it not ungenerated? For it was posited that the prime mover is first of all and ungenerated; and further, that the heaven and the things appearing and moving in the heaven are all ungenerated—which is absurd to say, that there is something ungenerated prior to another eternal thing among eternal things. If the prime mover produces continuous motion, and produces neither that which is according to nature nor that which is contrary to nature—the former as being redundant, as it was said, and the latter as being secondary to natural motion—then there is nothing that produces continuous motion. If, among those things that are moved ^D eternally, neither is the motion prior to those things being moved, nor are the things being moved prior to the motion, and every motion exists by a change of that which does not yet exist but is about to exist, then all things being moved will be from a change of that which does not yet exist.

^A If the local motion is the last of the motions for one of the things being generated, yet it is necessary ^B that something else exists prior to it which is moved by local motion, and since it is unbegotten, it is the cause of generation: how can the same thing be the cause of both the generation which is according to nature and that which is beyond nature? For he who primarily generated was not generated. And yet the thing moved prior was moved in this way in the generation of the one who was first made, just as it was moved later in the generation of those things which were generated from him. Therefore, either that which is moved in this way is not the cause of all generation unbegottenly; or the first mover does not produce every motion, since a different generation appears in those things which are being generated, so that some are made beyond nature, and others according to nature. If the prior and the posterior is unbegotten, then there will be a time when the unbegotten is not unbegotten; which is absurd, for the unbegotten never to be. ^B

45. From the same book, ibid., c. 8, p. 263. ‹ In the continuous there are infinite halves, not however in actuality, but in potentiality. › If nothing is infinite in actuality, evidently neither motion nor time is infinite. Since motion and time, together with the past, are finite, they are necessarily begun; and since they are begun, they are necessarily generated. But if motion and time are generated, the body that is in the state of being moved, which always has its being in being moved, is of necessity also generated. And if it is always allowed to take the halves of a chosen time from the future and add them to the past, yet not even in this way can time ever be infinite in actuality in its past part.

46. Aristotle, from the first book *On the Heavens*, ibid., c. 2, p. 269. ‹ It is necessary that there be some simple body, so constituted that it is naturally carried in a circular motion. › What need is there, therefore, for a primary mover to move such a body, which is naturally moved in a circular motion by its own nature?

47. From the same book, ibid. ‹ It is clear that there is some substance of a body different from those which are constituted here, ^C more divine and prior to them all. › If this body is moved eternally and without beginning around the earth, which is the substance constituted here, how can it be prior to the earth, without which it would not be moved in circular motion? And if that which is eternal and without beginning and useful for the constitution of those things which occur here exists in such a body, just as it actually exists in the earth, why is that body more excellent and prior to the earth?

48. From the same book, ibid., c. 3, p. 269. ‹ It is impossible for a body which is moved in a circle to have weight or lightness. ›

› ^A If that which has no weight or lightness is not tangible—for that which is tangible is among those things which have weight and lightness—how does it possess that which it cannot exist without, yet not possess these? And how does it, by its own motion, produce a certain heating power in the air, just as earthly bodies which have weight and lightness, which perform heating operations by their own motions?

49. From the same book. ‹ The opposition of motions is according to the opposition of places. For if they were equal, there would be no motion of them; if the one motion prevailed, the other would not exist. Therefore, if both existed, ^B the other body would be in vain, not being moved in its own motion. For we call that a shoe in vain which does not have a thong. But God and nature do nothing in vain. ›

If there were contrary motions of bodies in local motion—either equal, hindering each other's motions through mutual opposition, or unequal, so that due to the dominance of the one, the other became immobile, overcome by the violence of the dominant one, and not performing its own natural course—those things which were thus hindered in their own and natural motions would have been made in vain, and these would certainly not be the works of God, nor of nature. If God is not the creator of those things which are done in vain, nor is nature; then God is the creator of those things which are not done in vain, but which perform their natural courses without hindrance, and so is nature. How then is it not most absurd to call those things unbegotten, eternal, and without beginning, of which God and nature is the creator? And if we call those shoes the works of a craftsman which have a thong, why do we not also call those bodies, which perform their proper courses according to nature, the inventions of God and of nature?

50. From the same book, ibid., c. 9, p. 278. ‹ Therefore, that there is one form of reason without matter, and another in matter, is rightly said, and let this truth remain. But nevertheless, there is no necessity on this account for there to be more worlds, nor is it possible for there to be more, ^C since this one is made of all the matter, as it is. ›

If the difference between reason and reason consists in being immaterial and material, it is evident that the material reason is subsequent to the immaterial reason. How then is the world unbegotten, having gained its constitution from the subsequent reason? If matter is without form and without substance, and is deprived of being "this something" before it receives the form and becomes a substance and "this something," how is the world unbegotten, having come to be from such matter? ^D If he who possessed the reason or idea of one world, could he also have [the idea] of more worlds—

but did not produce the creation according to his own will because the matter was pleasing to him, but rather because of the supply of matter he was able to make one world, and because of its lack he was unable to make more worlds—how does it not seem that he possessed the reasons for more worlds in vain, since he was unable to produce them due to the lack of matter? If it is impossible for an unbegotten thing to come from an unbegotten thing, how, if matter is unbegotten and the world is unbegotten, does the latter come to be from the former? If he did not make matter as he made things from matter, then God does not do whatever he wills, but whatever he is able. But if he has a power equal to his will in all things, then God is the creator of matter, just as he is of the things made from matter. If matter, being subject to God for the creation of things from it, while being formless, insubstantial, and devoid of quality and size, was changed by the power of God into all these things and became endowed with quality and size; how was it not increased by the same power of God, which worked such great changes in it, to such a degree that more worlds could come to be from it, but instead, being consumed in the birth of one world, it forced God against his will to stop making more worlds?

^B • The heaven is indeed among the things that are individual and among those made from matter. Yet if it is not made from a part of it, but from the whole, that which belongs to the heaven itself, and to this heaven, is something else; yet neither could there be another, nor would it be possible for more to come to be, because this one has encompassed all matter. »

If the heaven is one of the individual things, and one of those made from matter and form, so that the essence of the heaven itself is one thing, and the essence of the immaterial idea is another, how is the heaven not generated, having as the beginning of its own substance the conjunction of matter and form of which it consists? If matter by itself possesses neither weight nor lightness (for these are affections of bodies that come to be from it); if the heaven was made from all such matter, which has neither weight nor lightness, whence were all other things made, since all matter was consumed in the creation of the heaven? If before matter was formed with the form of this heaven, it had neither weight nor lightness, just as it does not have them now after it has received the form; how was it not moved before the form was received, just as it is moved now that the form has been received? If being moved pertains to substance, and not having weight or lightness pertains to matter and not to substance, and yet the heaven is moved with circular motion because it has no weight or lightness; it is clear that the heaven is moved in this way on account of matter, and not on account of the form. How, then, is matter, before the form, ^D motionless with respect to circular motion, though it has neither weight nor lightness?

52. From the second book *On the Heaven*. • Everything that pertains to the things we have is for the sake of the work. But the activity of God is immortality; this is eternal life: wherefore it is necessary for God (38) to possess eternal motion.

s to the things we have is for the sake of the work. But the activity of God is immortality; this is eternal life: wherefore it is necessary for God (38) to possess eternal motion. ^A Since the heaven is of such a kind—for it is a certain divine body—therefore it has a circular 39 body, which by nature moves in a circle always.

If there is no cause for existing for that which is unbegotten and eternal, but things of which there is a work, these exist for the sake of the work 40; then those things, the works of which are the causes of their existing, are not eternal. If it is characteristic of inanimate things merely by their presence to perform natural operations, but of rational beings to do so by will, how is the heaven God, which does not perform immortality by will, but by motion and the displacement of its own parts? If the unbegotten does not need anything, neither for existence nor for acting, nor [needs] any of those things outside of its operation, how is the heaven unbegotten, which needs the earth around which it moves both for the sake of its own existence as a movable thing, and for its acting, [needs] the sun and moon and the remaining stars? If there is no plan of the unbegotten in the maker, how, if the heaven is unbegotten, does it have one plan in the maker and an in-matter plan in the matter, for which reason the being of the heaven is different from the being of this [particular] heaven? If the heaven cannot do by will what it does by motion, how is this God eternal, performing eternal life without will? If in those things which are eternal the heaven does not perform eternal life—for they possess this from their own nature—but generated and corruptible things do not live eternally, where is the eternal life which the heaven performs? If the motion of the heaven is useful not only for the generation of things that come to be, but also for ^B the corruption of those that perish, how is the heaven God, and its operation eternal life, through which corruptible things are corrupted? If it is not possible for that which is from matter to be unbegotten together with the matter, how is the heaven unbegotten, it being from matter? If that which is from both is posterior to both, how is the heaven, being from matter and form, co-eternal with both? If the form is not from the matter, but from the maker, how is the heaven, having the matter from one place and the form from another, unbegotten? If the heaven is a material body and has a spherical shape, and is unbegotten, how does it not receive both from the matter, both the being what it is and the having what it possesses? If matter is that which primarily underlies and is inherent in the things that come to be from it by themselves, how, being unbegotten, does the heaven have matter as underlying and inherent, just as generated things do?

55. From the same discourse. ^C Since the heaven is a certain divine body, for this reason it has a circular body, [which] by nature moves in a circle always. Why, then, is not the whole body of the heaven of such a kind? Because it is necessary for something of the body that is carried in a circle to remain, [namely] that which is in the middle 41; but of this, it is not possible for any part to remain, neither in general nor in the middle. For if it were, its natural motion would be toward the middle—but it moves by nature in a circle—for the motion would not be eternal. Nothing regarding corruption.

that is contrary to nature is eternal. And that which is contrary to nature is posterior to that which is according to nature. And that which is contrary to nature is a certain aberration in generation from that which is according to nature. Therefore, it is necessary that there be earth; for this rests in the middle. But if there is earth, it is necessary that there also be fire. For of things that are contrary to one another, if one is of such a nature, it is necessary that the other also be of such a nature (if it be a contrary), and that it have some nature of its own. For the material itself is prior to contrary things and to privation, just as heat is prior to cold. But if there is fire and earth, it is necessary that there also be bodies intermediate between them. For each of the elements has a contrariety to each of the others; and since these things exist, it is clear that generation must necessarily exist, because none of these things can be eternal. For contrary things both suffer from and act upon one another, and are destructive of one another. Furthermore, it is not reasonable that anything movable should be eternal, if its motion cannot be eternal according to nature. Yet such is their motion. That generation must necessarily exist is clear from these things; and if generation, then it is necessary that there be also another corruption, either one or several. For in the same way that the whole body is maintained, so also must the elements of the bodies be related to one another. For the present, it is clear enough why there are several round bodies: because it is necessary that generation exist; but if generation exists, if there is fire, if there is this and other things, if there is earth—this, moreover, because it is necessary that something always stands firm, just as it is necessary that something always moves.

^C If the body of heaven, because it has neither weight nor lightness, is a body that is always moved around the center, then the whole body of heaven must necessarily be moved around the center. But if the heaven possesses such a body, yet does not have such a motion, it is evident that it moves contrary to nature. If the body of heaven moves around the center, but not the whole of it according to the motion of the element of which the body is said to be composed, but rather in a circle by the displacement of its parts, how does the motion which occurs in a circle not overcome the motion of the element? And yet, for bodies that consist of elements, motion does not by any means exist according to form, but according to the elements of which they consist. How, then, has the necessity of motion been changed from the body of heaven? For a body that has neither weight nor lightness, it is necessary to have a motionless stability rather than an unstable motion. For if it is not carried downward by weight, nor upward by lightness, it is necessary that it remain motionless. If a stone were fashioned into the shape of a sphere and placed in the air so as to be carried downward to its own place, it would certainly not be carried downward by rolling in a circle because of its shape, but would be carried straight downward due to its weight. How, then, does the fifth element ^D

from which the heaven is produced, and which is naturally inclined to move around the center because it possesses neither weight nor lightness—not move as a whole, together with its parts, around the center according to its own nature, but instead move spherically by the migration of the parts resisting one another, a movement which does not belong to the nature of the element, but to its spherical form? ^A If there is nothing contrary to nature, nothing superfluous, and nothing in vain among eternal things, how is it that the heaven is not moving contrary to nature, and that it does not possess in vain the nature of the element by which it does not move, and that it is not moved superfluously by the prime mover (who itself is unmoved) with a motion by which it could have been moved even without that mover? If that which is at rest were not always at rest at the center, that which is in motion would not always have been moved around the center; how, then, is it not false that the heaven is always moved according to its own nature? ^B If the earth did not have the nature and the position it has, and likewise if the heaven did not have the nature and the position it has, then that which is in motion would not be moving, nor would that which is at rest be resting. How, then, are these things eternal and unbegotten, for which the "to be" and the "how to be" of each depends upon the other—which is a property peculiar to generated things? If in eternal things there occurs nothing according to providence, nor by chance (for those things which are according to providence are secondary to providence; and what is by chance is either contrary to nature or accidental—it occurs in things that come to pass through free choice; yet that which is contrary to nature is secondary to that which is according to nature, for that which is contrary to nature comes about through a deviation from that which is according to nature; and that which happens in things occurring by free choice is secondary to free choice), how then does the existence of this [entity] because of the existence of that [entity] exist ^C among eternal things? For example, because the heaven exists, it is necessary that the earth also exist; and if [there is] earth, there is heaven. But this is the work of Providence, which made the whole out of parts different in substance and in function. Either, then, the heaven and the earth and all things in them are not eternal—those things which contribute to one another for existing, acting, and being acted upon—or, if they are eternal, it is not necessary that this must be because that is. Aristotle, by positing one eternal necessity, has hung many other eternal necessities from the one he posited. There is, he says, an eternal motion; and if there is motion, there must also be an eternal time, for time is the number of motion. If motion is eternal, it must be continuous. If motion is continuous, there must be a simple body, distinct from the bodies here, possessing ^D neither weight nor lightness. For heavy and light bodies, because they move in a straight line, cannot be moved continuously; but if a body is moved continuously, it must have a spherical shape, for it is by this shape alone that continuous motion is possible. And if it moves spherically, the earth must always be at rest in the center, so that the motion of the sphere may take place around it. And if the earth [exists], the bodies between the earth and the fire must also [exist]; and if these exist, generation must also exist. But if these [exist]...

eternal; therefore the things mentioned are not eternal and unbegotten. If, however, these are eternal and unbegotten, then this does not exist because of that, nor that because of this. Since, if the earth exists, fire and the bodies between them must also exist, how is it—if the earth is unbegotten and eternal—that fire is not eternal, seeing that it is light and rises upward? For if, as he says, of two contraries one exists by nature, ^B the other must also exist by nature; how is it not absurd that the earth should be eternal and unbegotten, while the fire is not eternal? Or that the fire is not eternal, but the earth is, when they exist for one another? If, because of generation, other circular bodies must exist, how is it that generation is not the cause of the eternal things? For the circular bodies are eternal, and generation occurs according to their motion. But if this is absurd, then the circular bodies are not unbegotten. For if their existence is due to the generation of other things, then these are generated and not eternal. If it is possible for that which exists in generated things to exist also in eternal things, [and] it must needs be that this exists, since this is this, then unbegotten things differ in no way from generated things. For he says that in eternal things, what "can be" differs in no way from "being."

54. From the same book, ibid., ch. 4, p. 287. ^C Since there can be a twofold motion in a circle, and these are not contraries, but if nothing can exist in eternal things rashly or by chance, and the heaven is eternal and moves in a circle; for what reason, then, is it carried in one direction rather than the other? For it must needs be that this, too, has a principle, or is itself a principle. For if nature always does what is best among things that are possible—and just as, among motions in a straight line, that which moves toward the higher place is more honorable (for the upper place is more divine than the lower), so in the same way that which moves forward is superior to that which moves backward, just as the right excels the left—the proposed question declares that because the former is so, the latter is also so. ^D For this very cause resolves the doubt. For if it is as well-ordered as possible, this will also be the cause of what was said. For it is best to be moved by a simple and perpetual motion, and that toward the more honorable side.

^A If nature, which always does what is best from among the things that can happen, made the heaven to move forward and not backward, how is the heaven eternal and its motion [too], having been produced by nature and having the fittest motion to be moved? If there is a difference between the upper place and the lower, the motion toward the front has this [same] difference in relation to the motion toward the back, according to what is more honorable, more divine, and better; how then are these motions not opposite, differing so much from one another? If the motion of simple bodies is simple, not according to what can happen, but according to necessity, how is the heaven able to be moved in two ways, having a simple body, and [yet] is moved according to what can happen? If the heaven is equal to itself from everywhere, and has parts equal to parts, ^B and as it may be moved, it preserves a spherical and circular motion, it is therefore able to be moved also from the south to the north, and from the north to the south, just as it is able to be moved from the east to the west and from the west to the east. How then does nature not put into the body of the heaven the powers of so many motions in vain, if it has the powers in four ways, but is moved in one way?

55. *From the same book.*

Regarding the so-called stars, it would follow to say from what they consist and which are their motions. It is most reasonable and consistent with what has been said that each of the stars should be made of this body in which it happens to have its motion, ^C since we said that there is something that is naturally suited to be moved in a circle. Just as those who say they are fiery say so for this reason, that they say the upper body is fire, as it is reasonable that each thing should consist of those things in which it is, likewise we also say [this]. But heat and light come from them because the air is rubbed through by their motion. For motion is naturally suited to set fire to stones, and wood, and iron. It is therefore more reasonable that [the thing] nearer to the fire [is ignited]; the air is nearer, as is the case even with arrows that are discharged: for these ^D are set on fire in such a way that the leaden [bullets] melt; and since these themselves are set on fire, it is necessary that the air around them suffer the same. These things themselves are therefore heated because they are carried in the air, which becomes fire through the impact of the motion. But each one of those that are above is carried in a sphere, so that they themselves are not set on fire; but the air that is under the sphere of the circular body must necessarily be heated while that [sphere] is moving, especially that one to which the sun happens to be attached; wherefore, while it approaches and rises and is above us, heat is produced. That, therefore, they are neither fiery nor are they moved in fire, let these things have been said by us concerning them.

If the stars are from the same matter from which the heaven is, how is it not false,

to the stars: how is that statement not false, "Out of all matter was the heaven made," and, "It embraced all matter"? If that which is moved, and which by its motion becomes capable of heating another, cannot become capable of heating another unless it be first heated by its own motion, how do the sphere and the stars within it heat the air by their own motion, when they themselves are not heated? If that which exerts a heating power by its own motion must necessarily possess either weight or lightness, how do the heaven and the stars within it, possessing neither weight nor lightness, exert heating ^A powers? If those things that possess the same mobile substance must necessarily be moved by the same motion in and of themselves, and not by accident, how is it that the sun is not moved by accident, if it is bound to the sphere? The same reasoning applies to the other stars, if they are not moved by themselves with their natural motion, but by the spheres to which they are bound. If the sun is from the same matter from which the heaven is—which has neither weight nor lightness—and has a spherical shape, just as the heaven has, why do both not move in the same way, or, like the sun, by the contrary resistance of their parts? If there is nothing contrary to nature in those things which are eternal, how is it not contrary to nature that a motion which someone possesses according to nature should not be moved by oneself, but by another? For both the sun and the stars are moved, not by themselves, but by the spheres to which they are bound. Just as generated things are according to reason what they were made, so too are ungenerated things according to reason what they are; therefore, the latter are ungenerated according to reason. But if this is impossible, then they are by no means ungenerated according to reason. If, however, they are not according to reason, how is each of them usefully what it is, and has what it has, and does what it does? For those things which exist usefully are the works of reason and providence. If it is an attribute of generated things to be out of reason and ^B matter, then ungenerated things are not out of reason and matter. How then are the heaven and all things in it ungenerated, and yet from reason and matter? If, as Aristotle said, there is nothing in vain nor contrary to nature in eternal things, how do both of these outcomes—that which is in vain and that which is contrary to nature—happen to the sun from what he said regarding its motion? For if the sun, not bound to the sphere that moves it, were moved with the same natural motion as it is now moved, how is it not in vain that it was bound to the sphere? But if it were not moved with this motion according to nature, but with another different in quantity or quality, how is it not now moved contrary to nature? "The orbs indeed move, but the stars are at rest, and are carried bound to the orbs." If the stars are at rest in the orbs by nature, they are bound to the orbs in vain; but if they are at rest contrary to nature, it is clear that they are at rest by force. But in eternal things there is nothing either in vain or contrary to nature. Therefore, Aristotle did not discover the reason for the motion of the stars. ^{C D}

^A For he says that the stars are eternal. And in the things that he said regarding their motion, both appear: that it is in vain, and that it is contrary to nature. If the stars are eternal, and the heaven in which the stars are fastened is also eternal, and each of them is called a god, how are they not gods being dragged by gods? For things that are fastened to that which is moving are moved by being dragged. If the composition of a substance (for it is out of matter and form) is one thing, and the composition out of parts that possess substance is another, how are these called eternal, which possess both compositions? For the heaven, having the sun and the stars as fastened parts, is composite out of them; for the heaven is [the heaven] by having these within itself.

57. From the same book.

«Besides these, it is irrational that nature should have given them no instrument for motion. For nature does nothing in vain, nor does it seem to have taken care of living creatures while neglecting things so excellent, but rather it seems as if it purposely removed everything by which they might be able to proceed by themselves.»

If there is no maker of eternal and unbegotten things, nor are they what they are because of anyone’s care, nor do they possess what they possess by nature, how—if the heaven is unbegotten and the things that appear in the heaven exist as co-begotten with it—does it have nature as a maker and caretaker of the things that are accomplished for their constitution? If it was fitting for one who is discoursing about the motion of eternal things to say that nature does nothing in vain, how is it not clear that the heaven, and the things that appear in the heaven, are works of nature, which took away from them the instruments of motion?

58. From the same book.

«Since therefore it is necessary for the heaven to be moved by its own motion, but for the other stars not to proceed by themselves, it would reasonably follow that both are spherical. For in this way, most of all, the one will be moved and the other will be at rest.»

If that which is at rest is called [that] which is able to be moved by the motion from which it rests, how do the stars rest, not possessing an own motion according to which they ought to be moved? But if they possess the power to be moved, but are prevented because they are fastened to the sphere, how is it not contrary to nature that they are moved always? If the spherical shape was given to those that are always moving as being suitable, how is it that, of those that have the spherical shape, the one is always moving, as the heaven, and the other is always at rest, as the stars?

59. From the same book.

«So since this does not appear to be happening always, none of them would be carried by either an animate or a forceful motion, just as if nature were foreseeing what is about to happen, that it not be the case [that they be] in this way...»

^A with regard to the place here. How, then, are things eternal and ingenerate, which have received from the providence of nature to be such, and to move in such a way? For things that are [the result] of providence are subsequent to providence, but eternal things are subsequent to nothing. If that which was to be had no existence before it was, how is it possible that both things be true regarding the heaven, and the stars, and their motion—that they were to be, and [yet] are eternal and ingenerate? For that which is to be is not yet, while that which is eternal and ingenerate is always present. If, for the sake of the things around this place having to remain as they are, nature did provide for the said manner of the motion of the heaven, how are these things eternal and ingenerate if they are as they are for the sake of generated things, and move as they move?

60. ^B *From the same book, ibid., c. 11, p. 291.*

«Since it has been demonstrated that the stars are not by nature designed to move by themselves, and nature does nothing irrationally or in vain, it is clear that it has assigned such a shape to immobile things, which is the least mobile. And a sphere is the least mobile, because it has no instrument for motion. Therefore, clearly, the mass of the stars would be spherical.»

If nature gave to those things which are perpetually moving a round shape, suitable for the ease of motion, how is it not the case that the stars have received such a shape in vain, being bound to the spheres, and unable to complete their natural course? If the stars are not designed to move by themselves, then they do not possess their eternal motion by nature. How, then, are they from the same element as the heaven, which has neither weight nor lightness? If the heaven, because it is composed of such an element and has a round shape, is naturally designed to move perpetually around the center by itself, but the stars—being from the same element and having the same shape—are not designed to move by themselves; then, it seems, nature has given them essence and a shape suitable for perpetual motion in vain, if they possess an immobile station. That the stars should have an essence and a shape for perpetual motion, and yet have an immobile station, how is this not a sign of an irrational and vain creation, which—contrary to nature—has caused the stars to be at rest? If the essences of ungenerated and eternal things are above all creation, whether according to reason or contrary to reason, how, if the heaven and the stars are ungenerated, are they what they are and do they have what they have by the providence of nature, which does nothing irrationally or in vain? If the stars were not supposed to move, why are they moved at all by others? But if they were supposed to move, why do they not move by themselves, but by others, when nature could have caused them to move by themselves with the motion with which they are now moved by

others, in that most easily moved substance of theirs, having made them motionless in themselves? If in eternal things nothing is against nature, but it is against nature to have a substance and form that is perpetually moving, yet to have a stability that is motionless; then either those things in which there is something against nature are not eternal, or that which says "in eternal things there is nothing against nature" is false. If nothing of the unbegotten things has or does not have what it has or does not have by the providence of someone; how, if the heaven and the stars are unbegotten, do they not have by the providence of nature an instrument of motion, but have instead of an instrument a spherical form, ^A which is more suitable for continuous motion than the instruments suited for walking?

61. From the same book, ibid., ch. 12, p. 294 et seq. "The first sphere indeed, being one, moves many of the divine bodies; but the others, being many, move each only one. For any one of the wandering stars is moved by many motions. Thus, therefore, nature balances, and creates a certain order, by assigning to one motion many bodies, and to one body many motions. For one sphere is borne attached to many spheres; and each sphere happens to be a body."

If there is no creator of the unbegotten and eternal substances, how are these things eternal and unbegotten, of which nature is the creator of their order, by assigning to one motion many bodies, and to one body many motions, equalizing the quantity of the motions of the one body to the quantity of the bodies? If these things are unbegotten and unmade, how is it possible for a natural order to have been created in the unbegotten? A sphere attached to a sphere, having the same ^B substance as the sphere to which it is attached; how is it not seen to have a double absurdity, not occurring in eternal things: that of having in vain a movable substance according to which it is not moved, and that of being moved against nature by accident?

62. From the third book, On the Heaven. "Of things that exist by nature, some are substances, and others are their works and affections. I call substances the simple bodies, such as fire, and earth, and the elements coordinate with these, and things derived from these, such as the whole heaven, and its parts, and again animals, and plants, and their parts."

He who said that the heaven is from a certain simple element ^C different from the elements here, and that it is not possible for another heaven to come into being because this one has encompassed all matter; how does he now say that the heaven is from the same elements from which animals and plants are also? But if he says that another heaven is made from other elements, how does he not lie when he says, "It is not possible for there to be another heaven besides one"? But if he says it is the same heaven, ^D and...

sometimes it is from a heaven more divine than the elements here, and sometimes from the same elements, how does he not lie in either case? ^A 63. *From the same discourse.* Concerning the first of the elements, it has been said what its nature is, and that it is incorruptible and unbegotten. If an element is that from which the thing being generated comes into existence while it is inherent in it, how can the same thing be both an element and unbegotten? If the element is prior, and that which is from the element is subsequent, how is the element from which the heaven comes unbegotten, while the heaven is co-unbegotten with it? If the element is unbegotten for this reason, because it is not from an element, how is the heaven unbegotten, being as it is from an element? ^B It is impossible for them to be eternal; for we see both fire and water, and each of the simple bodies, being dissolved; so it is necessary that the elements of bodies be generated and corruptible. If earth is also one of the elements of bodies, how have you called the earth co-eternal and co-unbegotten with the heaven, but the other elements generated and corruptible? ^C 65. *From the same discourse. On the generation of the elements from one another.* How are the elements generated from one another, when their first generation is not from one another? For it is necessary that this generation precede that process of generation. For when they exist, they are transformed into one another, and are generated from one another. ^D if, after being scourged, you were to be beheaded,

ADMONITION TO PART II OF THE APPENDIX

I have thought it right that the first place of this second part should be assigned to the Acts of the martyrdom of St. Justin, since I am unwilling for so outstanding a monument to be absent from this edition, and the things that Justin constantly answered when interrogated by the prefect of the city can be fittingly placed before many of the martyr's celebrated sayings that are fragments of lost works.

These Acts do not appear in Greek now for the first time, yet they have been accurately transcribed from the Vatican Codex by the hand of a learned associate, the late Peter Maloet, formerly procurator of our Congregation at the Roman Curia. The monument is indeed the more precious because there are some errors in the Acts of St. Justin that have been published in Latin, which are corrected by the aid of the Greek. To offer one example: for what is read in Greek, "if, after being scourged, you were to be beheaded," we have in Latin, "if you have been scourged with lashes from head to body." Add to this the statements of the prefect in the Greek—as they were uttered from his mouth, they are recorded accurately, but in the Latin, more freely.

As regards the fragments of lost works, the one that leads the procession and is said to be an excerpt from St. Justin on the resurrection, since it is almost an entire treatise rather than a fragment, invites care in investigation and provides notes for judgment as to whether it should be attributed to Justin or not. The learned Grabe, who first published this distinguished fragment in *Spicilegium*, Vol. II, in Greek—when it existed only in Latin among the *Parallels* of St. John of Damascus, translated by Billius—does not seem to doubt that it is the genuine offspring of St. Justin; nor has the most learned editor of the works of St. John of Damascus, Michael Lequien, dissented from him in this matter. That it is certain and explored that Justin discoursed much on the resurrection, especially in the books which he wrote against Marcion and other detractors of the resurrection, is true. Without a doubt, the testimony cited below by St. Methodius was taken from one of these. But the ancients do not mention any book of Justin whatsoever that was written specifically on the resurrection. Yet one might suspect that the fragment preserved among the *Parallels* was extracted from St. Justin's books against heresies, if it were truly a fragment and not rather a complete short work. But it is so complete in its parts that it lacks neither an introduction nor a conclusion. We read "and after a few things" only once or twice, by which words we are warned that very few things have been omitted. Hence, the holy martyr cannot be thought of as the parent of those things which are attributed to him in the *Parallels*, unless he composed some work on the resurrection; which, indeed, all the ancients pass over in silence.

Furthermore, there are some things in this writing, which is bandied about under Justin's name, that smack neither of Justin's doctrine nor of his age. The author of the short work, no. 7, thinks that the human flesh was fashioned by God after His own image; which, although it can be taken in a favorable sense, and that the human form is a sort of image of the divine...

it cannot however be attributed to Justin, who altogether rejects this notion of the divine image, *Cohort.* n. 34.

Nor does the opinion of the heretics—who say, n. 8, “The soul is incorrupt, being a part of God and His breath”—square any better with Justin’s teaching. If that opinion is approved, even if less truly and from the heart, it is at least dismissed unchastised, not to mention that it is refuted with that zeal with which anyone who has examined his teaching on the soul from the beginning of the *Dialogue with Trypho* will admit that Justin would have refuted it.

At the time this little work was composed, the heresies that denied to Christ a flesh similar to our own seem to have almost withered away, as is manifest from these words, n. 2: “There are, however, some who say that Jesus himself came only in a spiritual sense, and not in the flesh, but exhibited the appearance of flesh.” That, indeed, could only be said when such heresies had become obsolete and reduced to a few. But in Justin’s century, Marcion of Pontus had branded this error into every sort of man, as Justin testifies, *Apol.* 1, n. 26, and many other sects paraded the same impiety.

585 If I may be granted the indulgence of conjecturing, I would willingly attribute this work to the author of the *Exposition of the Faith*, which we have published in the first part of the Appendix. It is not improbable that many writings by the same man have appeared under Justin’s name. In both works, I believe I observe the same style and the same vivid impulses of the spirit. The author of the *Exposition of the Faith* often declares that he labored on this work for the children of the Church; so too the author of the little work on the *Resurrection* asks for forgiveness from the children of the Church if he uses arguments that seem strange and worldly, n. 5. The very age of both writings corresponds wonderfully. For the arguments I have brought forward from the little work on the *Resurrection* to show it should be assigned to the second century, I can use to show it should not be removed from the fifth, which is indeed the most certain age of the *Exposition of the Faith*. For the impious heresies that flourished in the second century had for the most part withered away by the fifth.

Two things seem to have helped in the awarding of the honor of this work to Justin: first, that it contains most illustrious arguments for the resurrection; second, that some things are expressed in imitation of Justin, especially those arguments for the resurrection which are derived from the formation of man in the womb and the miracles of Christ performed to heal the flesh. Perhaps they are also drawn from the same sources as the testimonies of Irenaeus and Tertullian, which are similar; for both translated many things from Justin into their own lucubrations.

Concerning the shorter fragments that follow the little work on the *Resurrection*, I shall not discourse here, thinking it better to observe in the *Notes* if anything occurs that the reader seems to need to be warned about.

APPENDIX PART II Containing the Acts of the Martyrdom of S. Justin, and also fragments of Works that have perished, both of Justin himself and also of Tatian and Theophilus of Antioch.

THE MARTYRDOM OF THE HOLY MARTYRS JUSTIN, CHARITON, CHARITUS, PAEON, AND LIBERIANUS, WHO SUFFERED AT ROME.

1. In the time of the impious fighting against the piety and religion of those observing the Christian faith, impious edicts were published in every city and region, so that they were compelled to pour libations to vain idols. Therefore, the holy men having been seized, they were led before the prefect of Rome named Rus-

Rusticus. Upon being brought before the tribunal, the prefect Rusticus said to Justin: "Come, be obedient to the gods themselves, and to the edicts of the emperors." Justin answered them: "No one can ever be blamed or condemned for having obeyed the precepts of our Savior Jesus Christ." Then the prefect Rusticus said: "In what sort of learning and disciplines are you versed?" Justin replied: "I have endeavored to learn every kind of discipline, and have gained experience in all erudition. Finally, I have adhered to the true discipline of the Christians, although it does not please those who are led by the error of false opinion." Then Rusticus said: "Are you delighted by that learning, you wretched man?" "Indeed," said Justin, "because I follow the Christians with the right dogma." But the prefect asked: "What is this dogma?" Justin answered: "The right dogma which we Christians piously observe, which is this: that we believe in one God, the maker and creator of all things that are seen and that are not discerned by bodily eyes; and we confess the Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who was long ago foretold by the prophets, who is also to come as a judge of the human race, a herald and teacher of salvation to those who have learned well from Him. I, indeed, being a man, am weak and far too small to be able to say anything great concerning His infinite Deity; I confess that this is the task of the prophets. For they divinely foretold, many ages before, the coming into the world of this very one whom I have said is the Son of God."

II. The prefect asked in what place the Christians met. To whom Justin replied that each one met where he wished and was able. "Do you imagine," he said, "that we all are accustomed to meet in the same place?" "The matter is not so," he continued, "for the God of the Christians is not circumscribed by place; but being invisible, He fills heaven and earth, and is worshipped and glorified everywhere by the faithful." Then the prefect said: "Come, tell me where you meet, or into what place you assemble your disciples." Justin answered: "I have until now stayed near the house of a certain Martin, by the bath known as the Timiotinum. I have come to the city of Rome for the second time, and I know no other place than the one I have mentioned. And if anyone wished to come to me, I have shared with him the doctrine of truth." "Are you therefore a Christian?" asked Rusticus. But Justin ^D replied: "Yes, I am a Christian."

III. Then the prefect said to Chariton: "And are you..."

a Christian?" Chariton said: "I am a Christian ^A by the command of God." The prefect Rusticus said to Charito: "What do you say, Charito?" Charito said: "I am a Christian by the gift of God." Rusticus said to Evelpistus: "And who are you?" Evelpistus, a servant of Caesar, answered: "I too am a Christian, having been set free by Christ, and I participate by the grace of Christ in the same hope." The prefect Rusticus said to Hierax: "And are you a Christian?" Hierax said: "Yes, I am a Christian, for I serve and adore the same God." The prefect Rusticus said: "Did Justin make you Christians?" Hierax said: "I was a Christian, and I shall be." Then Paeon stood up and said: "I too am a Christian." The prefect Rusticus said: "Who taught you?" Paeon said: "From our parents we received this good confession." Evelpistus said: "I heard the words of Justin with pleasure. But from my parents I also learned to be a Christian." The prefect Rusticus said: "Where are your parents?" Evelpistus said: "In Cappadocia." The prefect ^B said to Hierax: "Where are your parents?" And he answered saying: "Our true father is Christ, and our mother is the faith in him; but my earthly parents are dead. And I, having been dragged from Iconium of Phrygia, have come hither." The prefect Rusticus said to Liberianus: "What, do you too say that you are a Christian? And are you not pious?" Liberianus said: "I too am a Christian; for I am pious and I adore the only true God."

IV. The prefect said to Justin: "Listen, you who are called a learned man, and think that you know true doctrines; if you are scourged and beheaded, are you persuaded that you will ascend into heaven?" Justin said: "I hope to possess his doctrines, if I endure these things. For I know that for all who have lived thus there remains the divine favor until the consummation of the whole world." ^C The prefect Rusticus said: "Then you suppose that you will ascend into the heavens to receive some recompense?" Justin said: "I do not suppose it, but I know and am fully persuaded." The prefect Rusticus said: "Let us come, then, to the matter at hand which is urgent. Assemble together with one accord and sacrifice to the gods." Justin said: "No one who is ^D of sound mind falls from piety into impiety."