Part Three of the Works: Philosophical

but it does not know why ^A it is immortal—to such an extent that all things which are perceived by sense, and the conclusions of those things which are grasped by the intellect, fall under opinion, and the knowledge of these is opinion. For why the soul is immortal, opinion does not know; for this is the work of the intellect. Wherefore Plato rightly defines opinion in the *Sophist*, calling it the limit of the intellect. For when the intellect has concluded that the soul is immortal, the faculty [of opinion] knows only the conclusion. But it is the work of the intellect to traverse, as it were, a certain path, passing from premises to a conclusion, from which it also derived its name; and this is the work of the intellect. But the work of the mind [nous] is to approach a thing by simple encounter and impression, better than through demonstration, just as sense does—which, if it happens to light upon white or this particular shape, perceives it better than through demonstration; for it has no need of syllogism for this cognition. Indeed, the activity of the mind ^B accrues to those who have attained extreme purification and knowledge, and who have become accustomed to act, through purgative virtues, without image and without sense. For the mind is, as it were, the most perfect habit of the soul. Therefore, the mind is occupied with intelligible things, the intellect with those things which we pursue by thought, and opinion, finally, with those things which fall under supposition. Of these faculties, the mind holds the first place, opinion the last, and the intellect the middle, which is intimately familiar to our mind, inasmuch as it holds the middle place everywhere; and through this—I mean the intellect—our soul is raised to the contemplation of things which are perceived by the mind, which is its completion and perfection. For since our soul is a companion and is connatural to sensible things, it is unable, because of the habituation of the senses, to lift itself to the contemplation of intelligible and incorporeal things. But it thinks those things also to have bodies and magnitudes, and it calls forth and imagines all that pertains to sensible objects; just as Plato also says in the *Phaedo* that this is the most difficult thing in us: that when we have obtained a little rest from the distractions of the body and wish to devote ourselves to the contemplation of divine things, the imagination, falling in upon us, creates turmoil in us, giving us the impression that the divine is a body and has magnitude and shape, and it does not allow us to conceive of God ^C incorporeally and without shape through thought. For this reason, the soul, traveling towards its own perfection, must first act according to the intellect, which occupies itself with things that are, in a way, intermediate. Such, indeed, are the things which we embrace with the intellect, such as our soul and the contemplation of it; then also mathematical things, which are indeed without matter, but do not exist [independently], so that, having become accustomed to them, it may act concerning matter and, by a gradual process, betake itself to those things which can be entirely separated from matter—I mean divine things. Whence also Plotinus says, "Let the young be led through mathematical things toward a habituation to that nature which is without body." But if at any time the intellect reasons about intelligible things, it does not do so of itself, but intertwined with the mind, just as it also reasons about sensible things, intertwined with the imagination. Of this mind, therefore, even if we, the many, do not participate, still some traces and shadows have passed into us. These are the common notions, which ^D

^A we know better, indeed, than by demonstration. These common notions, therefore, passing through all things, are clearly images of the mind. For this reason they call the mind the beginning of knowledge, by which we know intelligible things. Someone might ask if it is not possible to prove the universal from particulars; for not because a horse is bay or white, is it therefore the case that all horses are bay or white.

If, therefore, this is not possible, it is evident that the intellect does not demonstrate the sensible thing, nor the imagination, and the sense much less; for each of these knows something particular. Whence, then, does ^B opinion know the universal of sensible things? We say that the intellect is especially able to reason about the universal in sensible things, just as Aristotle did in the case of the stars. Desiring to show that they are spherical, and having established this by one, the moon, he says: just as in the case of things of the same substance, whatever necessarily belongs to one must belong to all, and all the stars are of the same substance, it is clear that since the moon is shown to be spherical, the others are also demonstrated to be spherical. But even the one who sees smoke infers that there is also fire in that place. Since, he says, there is smoke, and all smoke is from fire, therefore in the place where there is smoke, there is also fire.

Perhaps, then, as we have said, it is possible for the intellect to reason about certain sensible things, even if not about all, the universal. Moreover, the rational soul has the essences of things ^C existing within itself. But because it has sunk into matter, it has been as if buried, like sparks hidden in ashes. Just as, therefore, when one digs up the ashes a little, the spark immediately shines forth—and he who dug up the ashes did not make the spark, but only removed the obstacles—in the same way opinion, being stirred up by sense, brings forth the essences of beings. Thus, they say that teachers do not instill knowledge in us, but bring forth and display that which is within us and, as it were, hidden; for if the essences of beings were not in us, why do we feel it when someone speaks contrary to the nature of things? And again, whence do we prefer of two speaking [the one] who says the better things? For if there were no essence of things in us, which, being stirred up by those speaking, shone forth, we would never be able to perceive that this one speaks more truly than that one, or that he is lying.

Thus, therefore, opinion, where sense has perceived this one and that one to be ^D two-footed, being stirred up by it, is reminded that all those of the same genus are two-footed. But it may be more appropriately said according to nature that these are common notions, and adumbrations and images of the mind. For whatever we know better than by demonstration, we know according to common notion. And as for those things which need demonstration to be known, since the conclusions of these are [known] without demonstration, to know them

is the task of opinion. ^A These, then, are the cognitive faculties of the rational [soul]. Practical [faculties], however, are volition and choice. And volition is solely of the good, whereas choice oscillates between both; and volition pertains to the rational soul in itself, while choice pertains to that which is intertwined with irrationality. For when the soul is outside of generation, it acts by volition alone; for it is only in the good. But when it enters into generation, since the irrational faculties are intertwined with it—for reasons which we shall mention—then it exerts choice through the entanglement of the irrational; because sometimes it occurs before the irrationality, and sometimes before the reason, and it chooses this before that. These, then, are the rational faculties of the soul.

^B Of the irrational [faculties], those that are cognitive are imagination and sensation, which differ from one another in that sensation extends itself towards the external, whereas the imagination keeps its cognition within. And sensation knows only the present thing, and that which it perceives from without; but the imagination, having received the forms of sensible things from sensation, fashions them within itself. Whence Aristotle also calls it the passive intellect: intellect, as having the known thing within, and approaching it with a simple impulse, just like that [intellect]; passive, however, because it [operates] after a form [is received], and not without imaging. It is called *phantasia* (imagination), as being a sort of *phantastasia* (a showing); for *phantasia* is the settling of what has appeared—for it makes the objects that have appeared from without stand still within itself. And each of them extends towards particular things. For this white thing [is known], but not the whole of what is white. They differ, however, in that the one knows what is external, and the other within. And the imagination receives the forms of the five senses; but each of the senses knows only its own sensible object.

Of the appetitive and vital faculties, the one is the irascible, the other the concupiscible. Here someone might inquire why we make the concupiscible and the irascible distinct: for does not the irascible desire to take vengeance on one who has injured it first? Does not the reason also desire disciplines and the contemplation of things? I answer that concupiscence is taken in one way more broadly, and in another way more strictly and properly. Just as, therefore, "disposition" is said both commonly—including [the state of] habit—and properly—as that which is contra-distinguished from habit—similarly concupiscence is said commonly of all the faculties ^C of the soul; but strictly and more precisely, it is that which is opposed to the irascible. These, then, are the faculties of the soul, both those endowed with reason and the irrational. Besides these, however, there are others which are called the vegetative—three, I say: the nutritive, the augmentative, and the generative. They are called vegetative because these alone are seen in plants. We are therefore both humans, and animals, and plants. As humans, we are endowed with the aforementioned rational faculties; as animals, with those which lack reason; and as ensouled beings, with the vegetative; for we call the vegetative [faculties] ensouled. For it is characteristic of ensouled beings to be nourished, and to grow, and to beget things like unto themselves. They are also said to live and to die. Now life and death are presence and absence ^D

^A of the soul. Whatever beings, therefore, possess the superior lives, must of necessity possess the inferior ones as well, but not conversely. For it is not possible to possess those powers which belong to rational beings without previously having possessed the inferior ones. Indeed, it is not possible to share in a superior sense without having shared in an inferior one. Thus, whatever beings partake of sight, these also partake of hearing and of the rest; and whatever partake of hearing, these also partake of smell, taste, and touch. But not all that partake of smell, taste, and touch partake also of sight, just as is the case with the mole. Nor do all that partake of touch partake also of the other senses, such as sponges, which possess touch, but partake of no other sense. Moreover, it is not possible to partake of a superior sense without having partaken of a lesser one. This is not because the superior ones require the inferior ones in order to exist, but the contrary; rather, the body is unable to partake of the superior ones if it has not first received the inferior ones. ^B Since none of the species ought to perish, lest the whole be imperfect—for the world is a completion of all species—and because it was impossible for the same things to remain in number, being both generated and corruptible, they also partake of eternity to the extent that they are able. Therefore, all things seek the eternity of the First as their own principle, and each partakes of this according to its own measure. And this is the most purposeful work of nature: that each of the vegetal things should beget another, such as it is itself. And since we require generation, and the generative power acts within a defined magnitude, for this reason we require growth. And since growth occurs through food, we again require the nutritive power. For this reason, therefore, we and the irrational animals partake of vegetal powers, so that when we act according to these powers, we act as plants; but when we act according to passion and desire, we act as irrational animals; as humans, however, we act only when we use reason. Wherefore Plotinus said very aptly that those who frantically act according ^C to the nutritive powers are in danger of eventually degenerating into trees.

Desire is distinct from the vegetal powers, that is, from the generative and nutritive. For we see it communicating with these two, since it operates both in matters of nourishment and in the generative powers; but it differs in that desire operates with sense perception, whereas the vegetal powers operate without sense perception. Hence, irrational animals, when they have seen a female, are stimulated to lust, so that desire involves a certain kind of knowledge, whereas vegetal actions do not. Thus, for instance, when we are asleep, we often emit seed, without any sense or phantasy having preceded it; it is manifest that this occurs by means of the vegetal powers. Just as, therefore, when reason has ^D been enslaved by irrationality and reduced to servitude, it is carried away entirely by impulse toward pleasure and sexual matters—and yet we do not for that reason say that reason possesses the same nature as the vegetal powers—so too we say the same regarding desire. For it is the property of the vegetal powers simply to desire, and to emit seed without sense perception; but

of desire, the object is this food or this union, and simply the pleasant. What, then, is one and the same resulting effect of the two powers, of desire and the vegetal? Is it clear that it is not one? Rather, for the one it is simply nourishment or procreation; for desire, it is pleasure, so that by this appetition we might preserve our own lot and the succession of the race. But when reason serves desire, I say that this action has no proper end of its own, because such an action is contrary to their nature. And things that are contrary to nature contribute nothing to the end; for as a servant, it does not look to its own end, but to the end of desire, which is pleasure. ^B Let no one interrupt with that ignorant question: "Do we therefore have three souls, and are we governed by three souls?" I answer that, just as the soul, being united to this body, appears to perform one thing, though in reality it is not one thing, so too, being joined with the irrational and the vegetal, it makes a certain single continuity because of the connection. For the irrational depends directly on the rational, and the vegetal on the irrational; and because they undergo the same things on account of that coherence, we say they are one, because the rational soul uses the others as instruments.

Of these powers, I mean those that lack reason and the vegetal ones, some approach the rational soul more and some less. The irrational ones approach it more because they are naturally disposed to listen to reason. Wherefore, when we rebuke desires, we make them more gentle.

*With hand upon his breast, he chid his heart;* *And, "Endure, my heart; you have endured worse than this,"*

and very many things of this kind. But why do I speak of ourselves? Many of the wild beasts become gentler through words. But the vegetal ones, as they do not listen to words, are further removed from the rational soul. For it is impossible to prescribe by command to the nutritive power how far it should nourish, or to the augmentative how much it should increase, or to the generative; clearly, we do not suppress the power itself, but the desire. For the power remains no less, even if it is not active. These, then, are the powers of the soul: the rational, the irrational, and the vegetal. ^C Some say the soul is incorporeal, while others say it is a body. Among those who say it is a body, some say it is simple, and others say it is composite. And among those who say it is composite, some say it is made of connected bodies, others of unconnected ones. Among those who have said the soul is a simple body, some have understood it to be ethereal, that is to say celestial, as did Heraclides of Pontus. Others have said it is fire, as did Heraclitus, because he called fire the principle of existing things, and the soul fire-like because of its agility. Others have said it is air, as did Anaximenes and some of the Stoics; others, that it is water, as did Thales of Miletus and Hippo, surnamed the Atheist. For because they saw that seed was of a moist substance, for that reason they posited water as the principle of all things.

^A These, then, are they who have declared that the soul is a simple body. But among those who have assumed the soul to be a composite body, some claim it is from unconnected elements, as Democritus and Leucippus, and simply those who introduced such things; for they said that the principles of existing things were atoms and the void. Therefore, they said the soul was composed of spherical atoms because of its mobility. Others have said it was from connected elements, as Critias, one of the Thirty, for he said that blood was the soul. Of those who deemed it to be incorporeal, some held it to be separable from bodies, others inseparable. And among those who considered it inseparable, some held that it is the definition of the tempering, as if, for instance, double the fire were mixed with water, or sesquialter, and that this makes the soul. For he says the double or sesquialter definition is not the soul itself. Others said it was the tempering itself; others, entelechy. But entelechy is the perfection and form of the subject. ^B The definition of tempering differs in that the definition is considered in the quantity itself—in the sesquialter, or double, or some other. But the tempering is a quality produced out of the mixture of qualities, just as from the hot and the cold a certain tempering, lukewarm, is produced; or from white and black, dark. But entelechy is the perfection of the subject, that is, the form which accrues to matter from such a conjunction of elements. Of those who thought the soul to be separable from the body, some said that the whole soul is separable—the rational, the irrational, and the vegetative—like Numenius, who was deceived by certain phrases of Plato, who said in the *Phaedrus*, "Every soul is immortal," where he is clearly speaking about the human soul. For it is plain in his own dialogues that he acknowledged the soul of irrational creatures to be mortal. ^C Others declared the whole [soul] to be inseparable, and for that reason mortal; among whom is Alexander of Aphrodisias, who also tries to draw Aristotle into his own opinion. Others say that the rational soul is separable, but the irrational and vegetative are inseparable. Of these, some say both are inseparable from this coarse body; others [say] that the vegetative alone is inseparable from this; but that the irrational [part] is separable from this, though not, however, inseparable from any body—I mean, the pneumatic—which both Plato and Aristotle advocated. That Aristotle is also of this opinion, and knows the soul to be both separable and inseparable, he made clear at the end of the treatise *On the Parts of Animals*; for he said that each of the parts of animals is characterized by some vital activity, such as the heart, and the liver, and the brain, and the rest. Then he says, "Whether this activity should be called soul, or a part of the soul, or not without the soul, must be investigated." Thus he knows a great breadth—or rather, depth—of souls. "And whether," he says, "it is for the natural philosopher to discuss every soul, or [if it is not for him to discuss] every [soul] of a different kind, without matter." So he knows the soul to be separable from matter. And again, in the same treatise *On the Parts of Animals*, he says, "The intellect seems to enter from without, and to be divine." For its activity has no communion with the activities of the body. And again, in the second book, ^D

^A "Of the mind," he says, "and the faculty of contemplation, it is not yet certain; but the soul seems to be of another kind, and alone capable of being separated, like the eternal from the corruptible." And in the third book he puts forward the same, declaring the mind to be impassible, eternal, and immortal; and he records many things of this kind in the same treatise. But also from other books of Aristotle, it is easily understood that to Aristotle the rational soul appears immortal, and separable from every body.

But that Plato also considered the rational soul to be immortal is unnecessary to prove; but that he also knew the irrational part to be mortal, the *Timaeus* sufficiently teaches. For he says ^B that the irrational soul, being woven together with the rational, is effectively mortal; but that which is the governing, divine, and immortal part, as far as it exists in mortal beings and animals, is the rational part. But that it is impossible for any soul to be a body, whether simple or composite, is evident from hence: for every body by its own nature is scattered and divisible to infinity; wherefore it requires that which holds it together. Does, then, that which holds it together consist of body or something incorporeal? If it is body, it will again require something to hold it together, and this ad infinitum. Therefore it is necessary ^C that the power and force which holds bodies together be incorporeal. But in living beings, the soul holds the bodies together; therefore it is incorporeal. Further, the outermost of the soul's faculties of cognition, I mean sense, is incorporeal; therefore the superior faculties are much more so. That sense is incorporeal, Aristotle shows in this way: "No body," he says, "can receive contraries at the same time and according to the same part." For a finger cannot, at the same time, be entirely white and entirely black; nor can it at the same time and in the same part be heated and cooled. But sense receives contraries in the same time, and knows that this is the first and that the second, judging black from white, and then again white from black. Therefore, if it receives them according to the same thing indivisibly, it is incorporeal; but if you say it receives them according to a different part, as if one thing were "I" and one "you," it follows—for that which judges must always be one and the same, and what is judged must be received according to the same—yet a body cannot, in the same time ^D and according to the same part, act upon contraries, or simply upon other things; but sense in the same time acts upon both white and black; therefore it acts indivisibly, and thus is without body. For if it received black and white according to one part and then another, it would never have been able to distinguish white from black; for it does not distinguish what is seen by itself from what is seen by another.

That the imagination also is incorporeal and indivisible is clear from the fact that subsequent species do not efface those that pre-exist; which, if it were a body, would happen.

But the vegetal soul also, even though it is inferior to sense-perception, it—I say, the vegetal reasonings—is demonstrated quite clearly to be without parts, and for this reason incorporeal. For in every particle of the seed, the same natural reasonings exist indivisibly, just as in the whole seed the nutritive, augmentative, and formative reasonings exist. For just as all the seed that has been sown, if it is received by the womb, creates a perfect animal, so too, even if not the whole but a part [is received], it will create one no less. If, therefore, the natural reasonings of the animal were a body, those of the head, feet, and all the parts could not exist together in the same particle. But as it is, they are present; as they are all in this particle, so are they all in another. Therefore, they all exist indivisibly in each particle; therefore, they are incorporeal; for what is without parts is also without body. ^C Just, therefore, as in the whole tree there is the nutritive, augmentative, and reproductive power, so too in the branch, in the shoot, and in the grain itself.

But perhaps someone might ask, whence then do monsters arise? Is it not because the seed abounds in some part? But again, why, if a particle of grain is cut away, does the remainder not germinate? And why does the bark, or a leaf, or something of that sort not germinate, even though these are also parts of the tree? I say, therefore, regarding monsters, that matter is the cause; for there is need of the suitability of the matter both in quantity and in quality. Now, the matter of animals is the menstrual fluid. This, therefore, if it abounds, or is deficient, or is contrary to nature, is the cause of monsters. And I say in general ^D that these powers, even though they are incorporeal, nevertheless have their existence in a subject body, and in order to exist they require a subject that is suited to them in both quality and quantity. For example, a circle also demonstrates itself to be simple—in itself it is without quantity or magnitude, and is plainly incorporeal—but it cannot exist unless it has obtained a subject suited to it in magnitude and quality; for a circle cannot exist in a small and meager body, nor in a fluid that is flowing.

Thus, therefore, in the present matter I say that, even though the reasonings are indivisible in themselves, yet since they have their existence in a subject body—and not just any body, or one that has been formed by chance, can receive these reasonings—because of this, there is need also of the suitability of the subject. And if the powers that are in the whole tree are found in certain parts all and without lack, it is clear that this is for no other reason than that they are in themselves without parts. For if they were bodies, they would not be whole in the severed branch, and the tree would be maimed and mutilated. But if someone should answer that one could say they are bodies of "similar parts," extending through the whole—and of things that consist of similar parts the form in a part is the same as in the whole, as in the case of flesh the similarity of parts holds—but we respond: if those powers were bodies of similar parts, they would never [be] whole through the whole...

and as they are much more incorporeal, much more is the rational [soul] superior. For that it too is incorporeal has been demonstrated even by the common arguments. But we also state what is proper to it as follows: None of the bodies knows itself, nor does it turn toward itself. For the hand does not know itself, nor anything else of the bodies; nor do the irrational powers, although they are incorporeal, know themselves. For the sight does not know itself, or the hearing, or simply sensation, nor does it inquire of what nature it is; but it is reason that inquires about them. The rational soul, however, knows itself; it is at any rate the one inquiring, it is the one being inquired about, it is the one finding, it is the one being found, the one knowing and being known; it is therefore clearly proven to be incorporeal. Furthermore, the powers that are in the subject body grow strong and fade away along with the body. Such, then, are the senses, the irascible [passion], and the concupiscible. But the rational soul [behaves] the contrary: as the body withers, it itself thrives and flourishes. It is not, therefore, in the body as in a subject. ^B

Furthermore, nothing strives to destroy what acts as a subject for it: for all things desire to exist. But the rational soul holds the body in contempt; by subduing it with labors for the sake of virtue, it often completely casts it off. Therefore, it does not have its being in the body as in a subject. Furthermore, it must be demonstrated that the rational soul has a substance segregated from every body, while the others have their being in a body: the irrational in the [spirituous] pneuma, and the vegetative in this [the body]. That Aristotle delivers a rule in his *On the Soul* that is agreeable both to all others and to those who think it mortal. This is the rule. One must, he says, judge substances from their activities; since every substance has an activity corresponding to it. How then, he says, could a substance that has no activity separable from the body necessarily have a substance separable from the body? For if, while it has an inseparable substance, it has no activity without a body; once it has been separated from the body, it will have nothing upon which to act, and thus it will be in vain. It is therefore not possible for a separable substance to have no activity without a body. ^C

This is the other rule. Every substance that has an activity separable from the body must of necessity be itself separable from the body. But if it were not separable, it would follow that the effect is nobler than its cause, and the inferior [thing] more excellent than the more excellent—which is absurd. For the cause must always be more excellent than the effect, and that which is by nature prior; it is therefore impossible for an activity separable from the body not to proceed from a substance, and one that is itself separable. Of the rules mentioned, the latter will be useful to you for the argument concerning the rational soul; the former for the argument concerning the rest. The one concerning the rational soul is this: If no substance inseparable from the body has an activity separable [from it], we shall show, regarding the

the body, then of necessity it must be that this [substance], too, is separable. When, therefore, the soul contemplates the intelligible [objects] and turns its attention to the concepts concerning God, it is manifest that it has an activity separable from every body. Likewise, when it examines itself, for in these cases it neither makes use of the body as a co-worker, nor does it act through the body; thus its activity of this kind is entirely separated from the body, and even from the imagination itself. And if the activity is separable, then by necessity its substance will also be separable. And if its substance is separable, then by every necessity it is also eternal; for this is something all agree upon in common, that every substance separable from the body is also separable and eternal. Consider, then, if a separable substance is not eternal, but is generated and corruptible, it must have been able to be generated, or not able, before it came to be. If, then, it were not able, it would not have come to be; for that which is impossible could not come to be. But if it were able, it ^B was entirely material; for this is what it means to be able to exist and not to exist. But if [the separable things] are immaterial, they will not be from [the state of] potentiality into [the state of] actuality; rather, they will always be in actuality. Moreover, everything that is corrupted is corrupted in two ways: either by the resolution of bodies into elements, or, if the form of those things [that exist] in the body is extinguished, by the dissolution and disturbance of the subject in which it has its being. Yet according to neither of the stated ways is it possible for the rational soul to be corrupted; for it is incorporeal, and, as has been shown, does not have its being in a subject body. Thus, the rational soul is eternal. That the irrational [soul], and the vegetative [soul], are inseparable from the body in which they are, is manifest from the remaining canon. For all their activities are in the body and concern the body. Indeed, both the nutritive, the augmentative, and the generative are in the body, and they act through the body, and concerning bodies; ^C thus they are inseparable from bodies. Furthermore, there is also anger and desire; for the one moves the blood around the heart, and the other affects the liver in one way or another. Therefore, these also are in the body, and [act] through the body, and concern bodies. For desire is the appetite for foods, or for riches, or simply for bodily things; and anger is the [impulse] to take vengeance upon one who has harmed us in any of these things. Thus, the activities of these cannot exist without the body; for when separated, toward what would they act? What would they nourish, or cause to grow, or generate? Whom would they avenge? Furthermore, desire would not even be able to attain any of the pleasant things that move it toward appetite; thus they would be in vain, which is impossible. Therefore, the substance from which such activities proceed is inseparable from bodies. But if the vegetative [principle] is inseparable from the gross body ^D and is corrupted together with it—and this is clear from those [beings] in which these powers exist, even in plants, in which a spiritual body is not observed. Yet they are also shown to remain for a brief time in this body after the departure of the soul; for the nails and hair of a dead body continue to grow. But perhaps this argument is not true; for they say that these things do not grow, but that as the flesh around them wastes away and diminishes, they seem rather to be bared, and for this reason appear larger and grown. But indeed...

concerning these matters, one must inquire in a particular way. If some trace of the growing faculty remains in the body after death—as also of the nutritive faculty, for it is on account of growth that nourishment is taken—it is here evident that these faculties have their being in the body. And if these, then also the generative faculty; for it is of the same genus and order. ^A Regarding these things, one must consider them separately. However, if there is a trace of this in a dead body, one might see the animals that arise from it: I mean wasps, bees, worms, and the like. The irrational soul, they say, no longer has its being in the body; for it remains even after its departure, having as its subject the pneumatic body. Which is itself also composed of these elements, but is called "pneumatic" from that which exceeds in it, namely from the air; just as the dense, earthen body is similarly named from the earth which exceeds in it. But ^B this opinion belongs more to Greek mythology than to truth. And if they attempt to prove that the irrational soul necessarily possesses this pneumatic body, they say that, after its departure from this body, the soul arrives at Hades and there pays penalties for those things not rightly lived. For Providence does not care only that we exist, but that we exist well. Wherefore the soul is not neglected, even if it has fallen away from the law of its nature, but is administered with fitting care. And since it sinned through pleasure and excessive gaiety, it will necessarily be purified through pain. But being incorporeal, it could not feel pain nor be punished in those subterranean dungeons and torments. It is therefore necessary for it to be attached to a body, which, being immoderately separated or ^C constrained by an immoderate burning or scorching, torments the soul, because it suffers along with it. But one may respond to that argument: If the soul, separated from the dense body, is accustomed to suffer and be tormented through the pneumatic body, nothing prevents it from suffering even when abstracted from it; since it has faculties born for suffering, through which it is accustomed to suffer by the pneumatic body. For just as the sufferings in Hades lay hold of this airy body, and through it, the soul, so too, even if no intermediate body were assumed, nothing would be an obstacle to the sufferings laying hold of the soul. For if they were to posit it as incorporeal, it would easily lay hold of the soul. And if it were corporeal, the soul would suffer through the body; for the union does not make the soul any more ^D capable of suffering. But these matters are too diffuse for an epitome. But they believe that they also prove by these things that there is a pneumatic body, and that the rational soul is inseparable from it even after death. And they say that the irascible and the concupiscible are in it as in a subject, and that they happen to be inseparable from it; for even after death, the irascible and concupiscible remain in the subject, having their being in the pneumatic body. For if the soul were freed from these passions at the same time as the departure from the body, it would be entirely pure and freed from generation. But being freed also from the passions and from generation

^A, it would not be delivered over to the punishments beneath the earth. For the punishments turn the soul toward itself, that finally, condemning itself, it may be purified by its own impulse. For these punishments do not raise it up, but they purify it; and as it is purified, it is turned back, and it itself sustains itself ^B, having been released from generation. Then, therefore, it puts aside both anger and desire along with this vehicle—I mean the spiritual body—so that there might be after this some other body eternally attached to it, a celestial one, and for that reason eternal, and, as they say, light-like or star-like. For being one of the world's constituents, it must by all means have some lot that it administers as part of the world, and if it is always immovable, and it must act, it must also have some body eternally attached to it. But these are Greek and Platonic fables.

^C That, they say, anger and desire are inseparable from the spiritual body. It is also clear that just as the vital and nutritive [powers] of the irrational faculty are seated in the spirit, so too are the cognitive ones. For if those that are inferior to them are separable from this thick body, much more so the superior ones; and the cognitive ones—I mean phantasy and sense—are superior. But even if the irrational powers of the soul have their existence in that [spiritual body], nevertheless traces from it flow down even to the thick body, just as we said they flow from the mind towards all common notions. For that even up to this body, flashes of the irrational life flow, is clear. For anger moves the blood around the heart and causes a certain boiling of it; while desire affects the liver in such and such a way ^D toward its own movements. And all the senses are illuminated in the brain; for from it, the sensory power is supplied to the sensory organs through the nerves; and when it [the organ] has suffered something—as physicians demonstrate. For when the protective covering called the *meninx* is placed [over it], if something happens to the *meninx*, the animal becomes senseless and immovable. Now the *meninx* is a certain skin covering the brain, and if the posterior part has suffered, the anterior part retains sense, but the lower part loses it, because the sensory power is no longer supplied from the brain, since the organ, I mean the nerve, has suffered. And if a nerve be tied again, the lower part becomes senseless, but the upper remains sensory. It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, that there is a spiritual body and that anger and desire are inseparable from it.

That, they say, *eideis* (notion) is threefold; for knowledge is called *eideis*, as Plato says in the *Phaedo*. For this is what it is to know: to have received knowledge and not to have lost it; or it is the more comprehensive cognition, or simply that which is more common and contains both of these, as Aristotle writes in his *Physics*, since "to know" and "to understand" pertain to all sciences. For by "to know," he signifies comprehensive cognition; and by "to understand," precise

^A cognition, both here and in his treatment of higher philosophy.

Aristotle, in his *Analytics*, affirms that one science is judged to be more certain and more accurate than another in two ways: first, when one demonstrates and proves the principles of another. Thus, physics is more certain than medicine, and geometry than mechanics. For this reason, arithmetic is more certain than harmonics. Second, a science is more certain than another when it contemplates a non-material object, such as geometry, the science of numbers, and theology, compared to those that dwell on material things. For this reason, Aristotle affirms in his *Metaphysics* that the contemplation of things perceived by the intellect is both the easiest and the most difficult: the easiest, because it is concerned with fixed and stable things that always exist in the same way. It is most evident that the substance, power, and action of God and divine things are immovable. Thus, it is the easiest. Yet it is hedged and difficult on account of our own weakness. For ^B because we are in a body and subject to perturbations, we cannot attend to the light of divine things, just as owls cannot look at the sun.

Plato, when calling the soul immortal, implies that it is only synonymous with immortal things; because that which is truly immortal is immutable in both substance and action; yet he recognizes that the soul is immortal as to substance, but not as to action. In this way you might say that celestial things, or the heavens, are only immortal in name, for they are changed, though not in substance, yet in place. ^C

The most truthful knowledge of the soul contributes greatly to all philosophy, I mean to moral discipline, and to theology—or primary philosophy—and to physics. To moral doctrine, I say, because no one can conform his own character or institute it rightly unless he has understood the faculties of the soul. To theology, because we seek concerning the mind that is within us, and we determine that it is itself immortal; and because the mind is of things intellectual, it is the mind of things which are relative. Now, he who knows one of those things that are related, will also know the other; it is clear, therefore, that the consideration of our own mind contributes greatly to theology. It also contributes to physics, if indeed it is the task of physics to discourse about bodies, and about their forms and their faculties. For of all the forms that are in bodies, ^D the soul is the most beautiful.

Therefore, as we must ask concerning other things, so too concerning the soul, to what genus it should be referred. For some reduce it to substance, others to quantity, as does Xenocrates. For, he says, the soul is a number moving itself. Others reduce it to quality, as do the physicians, who say that we are a soul. To be numbered among these are those who think that it is itself an *entelechy* of such a kind. Others say it is the ratio of the elements.

^A seeing that they reduce it to the category of relation. For the double or the half are among relative terms. Its genus is therefore for the time being doubtful. But when we have discovered that it is a substance, it will be necessary to enquire again whether it is a body or incorporeal, and if a body, whether it is simple or composite; and if incorporeal, whether it is separable or inseparable. And whether there is one soul in each individual, or many; and if one, whether it is of one form or of many powers; and what is the difference between these powers, and if there be many, whether they are many numerically, or also by species; whether they are also many by genus, or not. For things that differ by species do not altogether differ by genus, as man and horse. But things that differ by genus necessarily differ also by species, as stone and animal. These points, and more than these, must be investigated in order to arrive at the definition of the soul.

That Aristotle, dividing the discourse regarding the soul, says that it is either by potentiality or by entelechy, using 'potentiality' for body and 'entelechy' for the incorporeal; for of bodies, some are in generation and decay, and are by potentiality, both in substance and in quality, and in change from place to place: for we are men by potentiality in the seed and in the menses; and being children by potentiality, we possess the magnitude of a man. Likewise also regarding quality: being cold by potentiality, we are warm, and we move by potentiality when we are sitting. But the heavenly bodies have 'potentiality' only in local movement. For the sun, while rising, is by potentiality at midheaven; and while at midheaven, is by potentiality setting; and regarding its other motions and those of the other stars, likewise in local change, 'by potentiality' is to be observed. But why is it that, having used 'by potentiality' for body, he did not say 'by entelechy' in the dative case for the incorporeal, but rather 'entelechy' in the nominative? We say, then, that 'power' is one thing, and 'by potentiality' is another, and 'entelechy' is one thing, and 'by entelechy' is another. ^B For matter alone is by potentiality all things, but it is nothing by actuality. But form is only act; and that which is from matter and form, being also by potentiality, that is by actuality. For all these things run together at once, and whatever is by potentiality, that is also by actuality. For all forms are by potentiality in the matter, which becomes now this, now that by actuality. For now, since a man is by potentiality, at another time he becomes a man by actuality; or rather, he possesses both the potential and the actual at once. For since it is never devoid of form, when it has received this form, it is by actuality indeed this, while by potentiality it is another. Since therefore in those things in which there is potentiality, in these there is also actuality, as has been said concerning material bodies; but in divine and incorporeal things there is no potentiality, since there is no matter; and for this reason there is neither actuality: for they are not by actuality some such thing. But they are themselves acts, pure of all matter. For this reason, when he distinguishes the immaterial and incorporeal nature from matter and composite nature, he signifies the former by 'by potentiality', and the latter by the word 'entelechy'. ^D That he says it is possible to speak of one soul in man and of several: of several, because they differ among themselves by species;

^A in plant-life, in the irrational, and in the rational, and they remain distinct from one another. But he speaks of one soul on account of their mutual harmony and sympathy. For indeed, the operations descend from the rational down to the vegetative, and the movements and lives of these, as it were, dispose the rational principle within themselves. Therefore, it is also one.

That those who say there is one soul in species in all animals suppose it to be a temperament; for they posit that it varies according to the quality of the temperament in each one; from which many absurdities follow: first, that they make the effects nobler than their causes; for they make an inanimate body the cause of the soul. Second, that what has life should be excelled by the non-living, the unmoved by the moving, the irrational by the rational, and other such inconveniences would follow.

That Aristotle judges the souls of different animals to differ in species, ^B because, he says, there is no common genus of souls, wherefore neither can a common definition be given for them, just as there is one for "animal." But there is no common genus, because "prior" and "posterior" are discerned in them, which cannot be the case in things contained under the same genus. For the vegetative is prior by nature, the others are posterior; and when the former is removed, the others are removed with it, but it is not removed along with them; and when they are introduced, it is introduced with them, but it does not introduce them—which is a property of that which is prior by nature. For where the rational is, there the irrational and the vegetative are also; but not where the vegetative is, are the others present; or where the irrational is, there the rational is; wherefore the irrational is by nature prior to the rational; and when the vegetative is taken away, the others are taken away from the subject along with it. Thus, there is among them that which is prior by nature and that which is posterior. And for this reason, that which is commonly predicated of them—namely, "soul"—is not a genus, but they agree only in name, as things which are referred from one and to one.

That since there are three things in physical matters—form, matter, and the cause by which the form ^C is in the matter—five methods of instruction pertain to these: physics, particular craft, dialectic, mathematics, and first philosophy. Now it is the duty of physics to discuss all these things mentioned: I mean matter, and physical objects, and form, and cause: for instance, that the matter of the heavens is not the four elements, but some fifth body. Then, what the form is, namely, that they are orbicular, and why this is their shape. Because it is the most capacious of shapes; on a plane, the circle, and in solids, the sphere; as Plato, too, in the *Timaeus*, for this reason surrendered that the heaven was made spherical. Aristotle also provides ^D a physical cause for the shape of the heaven, for he speaks of it as being destined for eternal motion, and to this motion a corresponding shape was suitable. But Plotinus also offers a reason for the thing from the affection and habit of those things that precede it. For immediately above the heavens are the intelligible substances; and it is necessary that the effect, for the most part, be assimilated to its neighboring cause, and bear its image and imitation. For this reason, he says, the heaven is moved in a circle...

the heaven revolves in a circle, he says, because it ^A imitates the mind, for it is the property of the mind to look back upon itself and to turn toward itself. For it is itself that which sees, and itself that which is seen. For while seeing the forms, it sees itself, and while seeing itself, it has looked upon the forms. For it is the plenitude of forms and the form of forms. The heaven, therefore, possesses a spherical shape because of its motion in a circle, and this it has because of its imitation of the mind. In another way also, it imitates the mind, which is indivisibly everywhere; for the celestial body is everywhere. And so, insofar as it is everywhere, it imitates that which is everywhere. For the perfection of inferior things is their turning toward and assimilation to things superior. In this way, the natural scientist will reveal both the form, and the matter, and the cause of all natural things, and because of this, the definition, and indeed from the matter, the form, and the cause. But the particular craftsman also occupies himself with the same things. He differs, however, from the natural scientist in that he occupies himself with some particular thing; for example, the physician with human bodies in the process of curing, and the builder with stones and wood. Yet he too will reveal the definition, having assumed the form, the matter, and the cause.

^B The true interpretation of Aristotle concerning the three signifiables of the mind, which Ammonius also approves, is as follows. The first signifiable, then, is the mind that knows things potentially, just as is the case in children. The second signifiable is the mind that knows things by habit, as is the case in adults, who indeed know things but remain at rest and do not act according to them. The third signifiable is the mind, not that which comes in from the outside as some think, but that which is simultaneously in habit and in action, such as the mind of those who are perfect, who know things, bring forth their knowledge, and act ^C in accordance with it. These are the signifiables of the mind according to Aristotle. Regarding Plato saying that the soul is the place of forms, Aristotle in one way accepts this doctrine, but in another way he assails it. He accepts it insofar as he said that the soul receives the forms of intelligible things and thus acts; and it is for this reason that Plato calls it the place of forms. But he finds fault with him on two counts. First, because Plato calls every soul a place of forms, and not only the rational one; although he alone called the rational soul a place of forms and [the principle of] soul, while the others were contained within the soul. Second, because he says the forms are in the soul in actuality, and not in potentiality. For Aristotle likens it to an unwritten ^D tablet, and strictly speaking, calls [the acquisition of knowledge] learning. But Plato, [likening it] to a written tablet, calls learning recollection. Since our knowledge is twofold—the one irrational, such as sense-perception, and the other rational, such as the mind—the things known are also twofold: some are material and perceptible, others are immaterial. Aristotle therefore inquires through these points whether each faculty of knowledge knows its own proper object, such as the irrational [faculty] knowing the material [only], and the rational [knowing] the immaterial only; or whether the irrational knows only the material, while the rational, being superior, knows not only the immaterial, but also the material. And as this is the nature of the difficulty, he decides [the matter] by saying that the rational

^A knows not only immaterial things but also material ones; for, being acquainted with the superior, he sees the inferior as well. He will certainly [(5)] consider things even inferior to the immaterial: which are the material things. For if the mind is rational knowledge, and knows only immaterial things but does not know material ones, the mind will be, in a sense, mindless; for not knowing the material things, it will be mindless with respect to them; but it is absurd for the mind to be in any way mindless. Therefore, it does not know only the immaterial, but also the material. And thus much for Aristotle.

That the mind also knows material things, one may behold from the following: for if it did not understand material things, how would it correct [the reports of] sense, seeing the oar in the water as broken, and the sun as a foot wide? Moreover, we have a rule that one who knows the difference between things knows those things themselves even more so; [(6)] therefore, since it knows the difference between immaterial and material things, it surely knows the material as well. But perhaps you will say that it is absurd for the mind to know external things; for it is the function of sense to know material and particular things; the mind, for its part, knows only the universal; while it is the function of sense to know particulars, which are, in some cases, material.

To this it can be said that the mind is one in subject, but different in definition (logos). For the mind either operates by itself alone, and then it knows only the universal—or it operates with sense, using it as an instrument, and then it knows material and particular things. For just as the straight line ^B is itself in subject, but differs in definition—for the line that is now straight can be bent and become curved—so also the mind is the same in subject; at one time it acts as a straight line, when it acts by itself and knows immaterial things, and at another time as a bent line, [(7)] when it bends toward the sense and uses it as an instrument, at which time it also knows material things. This, then, is the first problem and its solution.

The second problem, from which a premise is also taken, is as follows: that that which passes from potential to actual is necessarily changed, and change is a passion. These things having been thus assumed, he proposes the remaining difficulty. If the mind knows material things, it suffers something from them, [passing] from knowledge that was in potentiality to knowledge brought into actuality. But that which is led from potentiality to actuality is changed. And that which is changed, suffers. Therefore, the mind suffers from material things; and since it cannot suffer from anything that is not of the same material, it is clear ^C therefore that the mind is of the same material as material things. And it is itself also material and incorruptible.

This is the problem, which, in resolving, we say has been ill-taken, that wherever there is an agent, there is also that which suffers: for this notion is false. For then the agent suffers in turn, because it would be of the same material as that which suffers. Since, therefore, the mind is not of the same material as material things, there is no necessity for it to suffer from material things when it knows them. For the Creator also acts, benefiting us, and yet He does not suffer in turn from us; so that only those agents suffer in return that are of the same material as those that suffer. ^D

^A For it is the property of the mind to act by its essence; for the one who knows is neither knowledge alone nor soul alone, but a temperament arising from both. For it is composed of soul and knowledge, and it corresponds to the material that the soul is, and to the form that knowledge is. And since in every thing the form is more of an essence than the material—if the form is more of an essence than the material—and the Greeks declare God to be the principle of all things, as well as the material, acknowledging God as form, they therefore say that God is more of an essence than the material is, and that the forms themselves are God, if indeed there is no material in things that is without form—which dogma is to be rejected as impious. The essence, therefore, of the one who knows is knowledge. And if the one who knows operates according to knowledge, it has been shown that this is the essence of the one who knows. Therefore, it is said that it operates by its essence, because the essence of the one who knows is knowledge. For it is not according to that high and exalted proposition, as in the case of God, that the substance itself is act; for in souls and substances separated from material, besides the First Cause, there is both essence, and potency, and action. Essence, therefore, is said to act because knowledge is, as it were, called the essence of the soul. From the nobler part, therefore, he named the mind; for since the mind operates by act or efficacy, and since it is act, it operates, whereas action and substance excel in all things; ^B for this reason, when he wished to signify that the mind acts by act, he said "by essence," designating the whole from the nobler, as if from a more excellent genus, as in "Teucer, dear head." This, therefore, befits the human mind, which is act. For since it is act, it understands; but the mind which is from without is act, and the third thing also befits it, namely, that the mind always understands, not as Plotinus thinks, that it always, in all things, and in every way itself understands. For it is not that the one of the numbers, which is called mind, always thinks; but because the human mind, which is in the whole world, always understands. For even if I do not think, another nevertheless thinks, and by succession and in turns, thought happens through eternal intellection, so that the splendor of God among us might not fail, who is said always to understand, because He always has the power to understand; for he who is endowed with mind or intellect understands at any hour. This, therefore, is inherent in the human mind; ^C for the mind which is from without is one in number and singular, and it understands all things. But of these, so much. In one man, by natural potency, the potential is prior to the active; but not in the whole world; for in the whole world, as some say, one thing is not posterior to another, nor prior; nor that which is in potency to that which is in act; nor that which is in act to that which is in potency. For if the world is eternal according to Aristotle, one thing is not prior to another, but they are contemporaneous. However, when the mind is separated and becomes in act, then it becomes what it is, that is to say, strictly mind. And this alone is impossible and eternal. But the irrational soul and the vegetative soul are indeed immortal, ^D yet not eternal. And it is called immortal—even if it is deemed corruptible and not eternal—because it is not in so far as it is soul that it is corrupted, but in so far as it is in the body. Wherefore also Plato says that every soul is immortal, saying this both regarding the vegetative and the irrational. But the material is the reverse: it is eternal, yet not immortal; for which reason

the mind is called eternal, as is also eternity. He also says that phantasy differs from sensation and Intellect, inasmuch as it is the middle ground between them, while the others are at the extremes; for phantasy begins from sensation—since sensation gives the starting points to phantasy—and it [phantasy] gives the starting points to the intellect. For without phantasy the intellect cannot function. And in this way phantasy differs from sensation and intellect. ^B Furthermore, he states the differences between opinion and phantasy: that we are able to form a phantasy whenever we wish. For we can imagine a man of three or twenty cubits, and we are able to form it, as well as a goat-stag and a centaur; but we are not absolutely able to form an opinion as we wish. For we can say that twice two is ten, but we cannot opine it, so that phantasy is in our power, but opinion is not in our power. But if we must tell the truth, not even phantasy is in our power; for that which occurs in sleep is not in our power. For we do not imagine in our sleep what we wish; and why speak of during sleep? Indeed, not even the whole of it is in our power when we are awake. For when we imagine things that are as they are, we cannot imagine them otherwise than they are. For instance, if I set myself to imagine Socrates, we cannot imagine him as handsome, white, and with long hair, but absolutely as bald, dark, and with a protruding belly; so this is the precise difference.

^C Regarding how he says that Aristotle maintains that everything that moves exists in a place: he admits that the heaven of the fixed stars moves, yet he denies that it exists in a place. Or [he means] that even if the whole is not in a place as a whole, its parts are in a place; not because they are inherently such as to not be contained, but because there is no body beyond it for the whole to be encompassed within. But in the case of the soul, there is nothing of the sort; rather, its nature is to not be circumscribed by a place.

That the soul in itself is unmoved; but it might be said to move itself accidentally, and then only in respect of local motion. For since it moves the body, and it [the soul] exists within that which is moved, when the body is moved, it will be moved along with it; so it moves itself accidentally because of the body in which it is. But in itself, and according to substance, it is neither moved nor exists in a place. Thus, the soul may be said to move itself accidentally—and in respect of local motion only—but in no other way. For it is neither altered when the body is altered, nor is it increased or diminished.

^D That Aristotle often calls the soul [that which encompasses] both the irrational and the vegetative, gathering them with the rational. Frequently, however, he calls only the rational [soul] the soul; and sometimes he even names the mind itself the soul, and again...

^A specifically designates it as the irrational and vegetative soul. Since, therefore, the soul is taken by Aristotle in a manifold sense, it is necessary to define and attribute to each meaning what is proper to it, and not to mix up, through the homonymy of the word and the things, that which is distinct and unconfused. For just as weaving, for example, belongs to the animal according to the body, so also thinking belongs to the animal through the soul. Wherefore, when the animal is corrupted, the soul will possess none of those things which, from its conjunction with the body, accrued to it; hence it does not even remember. For in this state its knowledge is flowing and requires memory for the retention of things known. But after [it is separated from] the body, inasmuch as it possesses its knowledge firmly ^B and applies it to the things themselves, it is in no need of memory; for memory is [of] things formerly known.

Aristotle says that when the mind does not rule, but the human being conducts himself contrary to nature, at that point, the order being reversed, the powers of the soul follow the temperaments of the body. But when the mind rules, then, as the human being is in a state according to nature, the powers of the soul no longer follow the temperaments of the body, but the body follows the soul.

He refutes the opinion of Thales of Miletus, who alleged that the soul was mixed into every ^C body so that it might be a living body. For, he says, first of all, why, if there is a soul in every body, are some things animals and others not? Furthermore, why is none of the elements an animal? And yet these ought more reasonably to be such. For if it were in fire or in air, being in bodies more pure and more subtle, the soul would be better [off] in these than in composite things; whence also its actions ought to have shown forth more clearly. He connects to these other, many more absurdities which follow from the opinion of Thales.

Since there are many and different actions of the soul, Aristotle asks whether, the soul being one and indivisible ^D according to substance, these different powers and actions proceed from it, so that it is one and the same in substance and number—the nutritive, the augmentative, the generative, the logical, the irascible, and the concupiscible; and just as the substance of fire is one and the same, from which the power and action of burning and drying and illuminating proceed; or whether the soul is divisible, and each of these operations occurs according to a different part of it. Aristotle says, not assenting to that doctrine, but blaming the *Timaeus* for dividing the soul according to the parts of the body. For he himself does not wish the soul to be one substance, but rather to be composed of different substances, which are yet so united to one another and coherent that a single sympathy arises from them. For something passes from the reason into the passions, and from those into the reason. For sometimes it happens that the passions, so that they may be subjected and yield to reason, do so from the apprehension of reason; at other times it happens that reason is impeded in its own operations by the habit of these [passions] and by their nexus with the perturbations. Thus, therefore, the soul is one substance, such that the whole human being...

^A is said to be of one substance, and simply, the [beings] which consist of matter and form; since it is evident that not even the irrational soul in its entirety is of one substance, as the passions—I mean anger and concupiscence—often contend with one another; but none of these [passions themselves] fights [against itself]. Often, therefore, anger is more allied to reason, being more akin to it because of the love of honor. But concupiscence pulls in the opposite direction. He says that the soul is divided into parts of like nature only incidentally; for because it is divided within the body, it is itself divided along with it, as is the case in plants and insects.

^B The irrational soul, and the vegetative, may be called the entelechy of the body, as form is in matter, and as it perfects the subject in substance, continuing inseparable from it. For whose perfection would the vegetative soul be if it were separated from the body? The rational soul also may be called an entelechy, not as perfecting the subject in substance, but in operation. And just as the pilot perfects and directs the ship, for this reason he is also separable from it. Yet, in a certain way, the rational soul can also be said to be inseparable from the body, insofar as it is an entelechy. For it possesses those operations by which it perfects the animal, moving it in this or that way, inseparably from the body. For once it has departed from it, it will no longer exercise these; for it had them from the relationship it possessed with the body. So, in this way, insofar as it is an entelechy—I mean according to these operations—it cannot be separated from the body; just as the pilot’s ^C operations, as pilot, are inseparable from the ship, and the human being is indeed separated. Yet, as a pilot, while he is in operation, he is at once separated from the ship, and possesses such operations as corrupted.

They say that of all the powers of the vegetative soul, the most noble is the generative force, the second is the augmentative, and the third is the nutritive; for it is the work of the nutritive to preserve the species: for we live only as long as we are nourished. But it is the function of the augmentative [power] to lead [each thing] to a perfect and natural measure, to which when animals and plants have attained, they arrive at the most excellent end of nature—I mean, the generative power. For this is the final and most perfect goal of nature, because of the desire for eternity and immortality in generated animals, which is attained by succession. Thus the augmentative [power] holds the relation of matter to the generative, and the nutritive to the augmentative.

^D According to Aristotle, the intellect might be called the entelechy of the body, and in this respect it is inseparable from the body, not in substance, nor in all its operations, but only in those which it possesses from the habit and affection it has toward the body. Among these, the principal ones are the practical [operations], and these operations cannot be separated from the body; for as soon as the body is corrupted, these operations of the intellect, which it had from the conjunction of the body, also perish together with it. And just as the pilot, who is the entelechy of the ship, because he is not only a pilot but also a human being, and insofar as he is a human being, remaining an act or mo-

motion of the soul, in this way our own mind, which is the soul’s motion, is likewise unable to exist without the body ^A. But because it has certain actions separable from the body—I mean those concerning the intelligible objects, to which the body does not contribute, but rather even prevents—it is manifest that the substance of the mind will be separable, being and being called mind then, but no longer soul, except potentially; just as when it is in the body, it is not mind potentially.

Animals, he says, possess the power of nutrition and sensation, and through the power of sensation, also that of appetite. He proves this as follows: because wherever one sense exists, there of necessity appetite and desire must be. Wherefore all animals have sensation; for in all of them there is, at the very least, touch, even if there be no other sense. But sensation perceives the pleasant and the painful: and where there is the pleasant, there must certainly be desire and appetite; for desire is the appetite for the pleasant. Hence, even those animals having only the sense of touch are seen to expand when pleasant things approach, but to contract ^B if anything painful draws near. He defines appetite as desire, anger, and will; for each of these is a kind of appetite. It is clear, however, that simple appetite appears to belong to the sensory faculty simply. But not all appetite belongs to every sensory faculty; for in those having only touch, there exists an appetite according to desire; but in those possessing all the senses, there is also the appetite according to anger. For such animals are seen to be capable of defense. But will belongs only to reason, so that appetite, and likewise desire, are used equivocally. For appetite is spoken of commonly, as applying to anger ^C and desire and reason; for we say that we desire divine things, and we desire knowledge. But appetite is also spoken of more specifically, regarding natural movements, in opposition to reason. And likewise concerning desire: one kind is common, the other is that which is contrasted with anger and with reason.

They do not call light a body; but since some say that light is a body, they assert that a certain sphere of light proceeds from the sun. Since the sun is spherical, and the air is also spherical, it is absolutely necessary that the sphere of light proceeding toward us either pushes aside the sphere of the air, and thus, having occupied its place, illuminates the region around us. If it occupies it, the illuminated hemisphere will be devoid of air, which is impossible. But if it does not push it aside, it does not illuminate it, so it would not reach us; and if it moves through it, one body will be passing through another, which is impossible. But if some should say that one body ^D can pass through another body, such a claim is absolutely absurd. For thus the heavens could be contained within a grain of millet. Furthermore, if because it is immaterial it can pass through a body, it would have passed through not only the air, but anything else whatever. For what kind of distinction would there be in an immaterial body passing through a body, and why would it not pass through everything? So that light ought also to pass through solid bodies; I mean through earth and similar things. Why then, when the sun is beneath

or if it is beneath the earth, we see it above the earth, because light also penetrates the earth? Furthermore, if light is a body, and a body penetrates the air, it ought to become denser and thicker, contrary to what we experience: for the air becomes thinner when illuminated, just as if earth were to take in water, the space made from both would become larger, and it would be absolutely necessary for the body made from both to become denser. Thus, it is necessary for the air also to become thicker when light is added to it; yet now the opposite happens, and it becomes thinner. ^A

THAT THE MOTIONS OF THE SOUL ARE SIMILAR TO CELESTIAL MOTIONS

^B Of the prototype motions of the heaven And of the affections congenial to it You will find hidden images among us. For our mind, like a brilliant morning star, Representing the sun in a very wise way; And the soul is the image of the moon. For the one, as most beautiful, as a great light-bearer, Is entirely translucent and lightning-flashing; But the soul, having fallen into the nature of the body, Shines only in half measure. For that which is suitably brought up into the mind, Has partaken of light, as if from the primary radiance; But that which has fallen down to sensation, Is lacking in light and full of darkness. For the one has listened to the words from above, And blooms with a clear, cognitive brightness; ^B But the other, sitting near the shadow itself, Has from there darkened its nature; And somehow dark, filled with mist, Running beneath the intelligible light-bearer, It has held back its translucent lamps. And there indeed are the earth, the moon, the splendor, But here, the soul and the flesh and the mind likewise. Compare therefore one to the other in some way, though reasonably: Mind corresponds to the sun, body suitably to the earth, And the psychic substance to the moon; For the one is through-and-through the substance of light; The body is deprived of splendor; But the soul, happening to be in the middle of the two, Has obtained light, as being near to the mind, But has not obtained it [fully], being near to the bodies. ^C

MICHAEL PSELLUS, COMMENTARY ON THE PSYCHOGONIA OF PLATO

ARGUMENT OF THE BOOK

COMMENTARY ON THE PSYCHOGONIA OF PLATO

^A 1. It is said, indeed, not without cause, that the discovery of the subsequent arguments has been devised by us for the sake of the discussion concerning relation to something.

^A And it is shown that equality is the element of the entire multitude of relations in numbers, because from it all relations are generated and into it, as the ultimate, they are resolved—which is the definition of elements. But it also serves us for a practical and truly philosophical theory. You ask, what are those things to which the present theory is useful to us? It is useful both for Plato’s doctrine of the production of the soul and for harmonic intervals.

An harmonic interval is the transition of the impact from note to note, as from the lower to the higher, or conversely. For a note is a certain resonance of a single string. The transition from one note to the next, which differs from it in lowness or highness by a diesis, semitone, or tone ratio, is called an interval; ^B the same is also called melody. From melodies comes the system: from three [notes] the *dia tessaron*, and from four the *dia pente*; the *dia tessaron* consists of a sesquitertian ratio, and the *dia pente* of a sesquialter ratio, which are also called the first and simple consonances by musicians. From the *dia tessaron* and *dia pente* the *dia pason* is composed, viewed in a double ratio. This is also called unison and a unisonant system; it is a system of intervals having the most perfect melody. And so on for the remaining systems, so that I may not go through everything, since it is not my purpose now to speak about these things, but only to indicate what has been mentioned.

^C 2. Therefore, the diatonic genus (since there are three kinds of modulations: enharmonic, chromatic, and diatonic) is divided into a semitone (the so-called semitone is not truly a semitone, but a *limma*) and tones—that is, the diatonic genus is divided into a semitone and two successive tones. The tone consists of a sesquioctave ratio, and for this reason it is not called a *limma* (which is the smaller part of the tone) and an *apotome* (which is the larger part). In the enharmonic genus, the ratio is described as a diesis, a diesis, and a ditone; in the chromatic, it is divided into a semitone, a semitone, and three semitones combined.

^A 3. The method of finding the subsequent superparticular ratios contributes to these harmonic intervals—I say intervals, not systems—so that it may declare the most elementary relationship of the harmonic ratios and those from which other relationships are composed. Therefore, as has been said, this contributes to these and to Plato’s theory of the soul's creation (psychogony). For Plato, in the dialogue titled the *Timaeus*, determines that the soul was produced by that mind which is the artificer and creator of things, simply and not in time, but according to essence; for in the dialogue *Phaedrus* (4) he shows it to be unbegotten and imperishable, so that he calls the procession of the soul from intelligible causes its generation according to essence. (5) For of beings, some are intelligible and unbegotten, some are sensible and begotten, and others between these are both intelligible and begotten. For some are wholly incomposite and indivisible, and on that account unbegotten; others are composite and divisible, and on that account begotten; and those in the middle are intelligible and begotten, being both indivisible and divisible, and simple and composite in a different way. Therefore, the generation of the soul is one thing, and the generation of the body another: the former is prior and older, as it is closer to the Creator of all; the latter is posterior and younger, as it is further from the one Cause. For Plato knows that generation has a place not only in bodies but also in souls, insofar as these also participate in time; just as he says in the *Phaedrus* that they behold Being through time. For every transitive motion, even if its operation is in the nature of incorporeal essences, has time joined with it; for the soul thinks its boundaries transitionally, and in its operations has a participation in time, but according to its ^B essence, it is conjoined to eternity. For in the soul are discerned essence, power, and operation; and it is composed from the genera of Being: Essence, Same, and Other.

^C 4. But Plato sees the essence of the soul as three-fold. For its existence is one thing, and the harmony that is in it is another, by which its essential multitude is held together; since it is neither one essence, like the mind, nor does it proceed into the infinite, like the body that follows it, but into several essential parts from which it is composed, which are finite in number, and it is impossible for there to be more parts of the soul, since they are no longer divisible into others.

^A for if it knows the superior [things], it is by much more true that it sees the inferior [ones], being the immaterial. It will assuredly 5 examine also the inferior things among the immaterial ones; which are the material things. For if the intellect—if it is rational knowledge—knows only the immaterial [things], and does not also know the material ones, the intellect will be in some way non-intellect; for not knowing the material things, it will be non-intellect with respect to them; but it is absurd for the intellect to be in any way non-intellect. Therefore, it does not know only the immaterial things, but also the material ones. And these things are from Aristotle. That the intellect knows also the material things, from this it is possible to perceive. For if it did not understand material things, how would it correct the sense, which sees the oar in the water as broken, and the sun as a foot in diameter? Furthermore, we have a rule, that what knows the difference of things, by much more knows those things themselves; 6 it knows therefore the difference of the immaterial things compared to the material, and so it knows also the material things. But perhaps you will say, that it is absurd for the intellect to know things outside [itself]; for it is the function of sense to know material and particular things; for the intellect knows only the universal; but it is of the sense to know particulars, which are material. It is possible to respond to this, that the intellect is one in subject, but different in definition. For the intellect, either by itself it acts alone, and then it knows only the universal; or it acts with sense, having used it as an instrument, and then it knows material and particular things. Just as the same straight line, by subject is the same, but by definition different. For the straight line by now is able to be broken and become bent; so also the intellect is the same by subject; ^A at another time corresponds to the straight line, which acts by itself and knows the immaterial things, but not only does it know the immaterial, but also the material. ^C And at another time it is a broken straight line, 7 inclining towards the sense, and having used it as an instrument, when it knows also the material things. This then is the first problem and its solution. The second problem, which is also assumed as a lemma, is of such a kind, that what comes from potentiality into actuality, is entirely altered, and alteration is an affection. This being presupposed, the problem proceeds henceforth. If the intellect knows material things, it is clear that it suffers from them, passing from potential knowledge into actual knowledge 8. But what is led from potentiality to actuality is altered. And what is altered, suffers. The intellect therefore suffers from material things; and since nothing suffers from that which is dissimilar, it is clear therefore that the intellect is of the same material as the material things. And it is itself also material and incorruptible. This is the difficulty, which we say, in resolving, has been badly taken, that wherever there is agent and patient; this argument is false. For then the agent suffers in return, when it is of the same material as that which receives the action. Since therefore the intellect is not of the same material as the material things, there is no necessity for it to suffer from the material things when it knows them. For the Creator also acts, doing us good; and yet He does not suffer in return from us; so that those alone of the agents suffer in return, as many as are of the same material as those which suffer. That it is a property to [the] remaining.

^B not only know things material, but also immaterial. And in a matter not a little involved, he establishes thus: the rational [part] not only knows the things which are separated from matter, but also material things. For he who knows the more excellent [things], knows the worse [ones] by much more. But it knows immaterial things. Plainly therefore it will consider also the more ignoble of these, that is, material things. For if the mind, which is cognition with reason, knows only immaterial things, and yet not material things, the mind will be in a way no-mind. For what it will not understand as material, it will be in those things no-mind. But it is absurd for the mind to be in any way mindless: therefore it does not know only immaterial things, but also the things immersed in matter. These things [are] Aristotle's. And so it is permitted to perceive from this that the mind knows material things: for if it did not know from the concrete matter, how would it correct the sense, which sees the oar in the water broken, [and the sun of a foot's size? Although also another rule is supplied to us, because that which knows the difference of things, [knows] the things themselves by much more. But it knows the distinction of those which are without matter, with material things: therefore also material things. But perhaps you will say, that it is said less aptly, that the mind knows external things; for that is the sense, to know material and particular things: for the mind knows only general [things], and which are universal: but it is of the sense to know particulars, and what are material. But it can be answered to this, that the mind is one in subject, but different in definition. For the mind either acts per se only and ^C, which are universal, it alone knows; or they work with sense, having used it as an instrument, and thus it knows material and particular things. For just as the straight line itself, is the same in subject, but different in definition; for what is now straight, can be curved and bent: so also the mind is the same in subject. The straight line in turn represents the mind: which acts per se, and knows immaterial things: at times the straight line is bent; and the mind is bent towards the sense, and uses that as an instrument, when it knows material things. This is the first node, and its solution. The second difficulty is proposed with this assumption: that what is by potentiality, it is entirely changed in act: but change is an affection. These things being thus presupposed, he introduces the remaining difficulty. If the mind knows material things, it suffers something from them by the cognition, which had been in potentiality, towards the knowledge reduced into act. But what is led from potentiality to act, is changed. And what is changed, suffers. Therefore the mind suffers from material things, and because nothing can suffer from that which is of a dissimilar material; it is plain therefore, that the mind is of the same material as the material things, and is the same material and incorruptible. That is the difficulty, which we, dissolving, say that it was wrongly assumed, wherever there is an agent, there is also that which suffers: for that argument is false... of such a kind. ^D

^A For then an agent suffers in return when it is of the same matter as that which suffers. When, therefore, the intellect is not of the same matter as the objects of intellect, there is no necessity for it to suffer from the objects of intellect when it knows them; for God, being the Creator, acts when He confers benefits upon us, yet suffers nothing from us in turn. Therefore, only those agents suffer in turn which are of the same matter as the things that suffer. It is also proper to the intellect to act by its essence; for he who is knowledgeable is neither merely knowledge nor merely soul, but a mixture of both. For it is composed of soul and knowledge, and the soul corresponds to matter, while knowledge corresponds to form. And since in every thing the form is more of a substance than the matter—if indeed the form is more of a substance than the matter—and the Greeks declare God and matter to be the principle of all things, acknowledging God as form, they therefore say that God is more of a substance than matter is, and that the forms themselves are God, if indeed no matter in existing things is without form. This dogma is to be rejected as highly impious. Knowledge, therefore, is the essence of the one who is knowledgeable. And if the knowledgeable one acts according to knowledge, this has been demonstrated to be the essence of the knowledgeable person. It is said, therefore, to act by essence because knowledge is the essence of the knowledgeable person. For it is not according to that high and lofty proposition, as in the case of God, that essence is the same as operation; for in the case of souls and immaterial substances, apart from the first Cause, there is both essence, and power, and operation. Therefore, it is said to act by essence, because knowledge is, as it were, called the essence of the soul. He named the intellect, therefore, from the better part; for since the intellect acts by operation, and being an operation, it acts, and operation and essence are better in all things, for this reason, wishing to say that it acts by operation, he said "by essence," as if from the better part, signifying the whole as if from a more honorable genus, as: "O Teucer, dear head." This, therefore, is appropriate to the intellect of man, which is an operation. For being an operation, it understands; but the intellect that is from without, is itself an operation, and the third point also fits it, that the intellect always understands, not as Plotinus thinks, that the same intellect always and at all times understands. For it does not mean that the one called intellect among the numbers always understands, but that the human intellect which is in the whole world always understands. For even if I do not understand, yet another does, and by succession it becomes eternal, so that the illumination of God toward us may not fail; or it is said to understand always because it is always able to understand. For he who possesses the intellect, at whatever hour he wishes, understands. This, therefore, belongs to the human intellect: the intellect from without, being one in number, understands all things. But so much for these matters. In one man, by nature that which is in potentiality is prior to that which is in actuality; but not in the whole world. For in the whole world, as some say, one thing is not secondary or prior to another, neither that which is in potentiality to that which is in actuality, nor that which is in actuality to that which is in potentiality. ^B If the world is eternal according to Aristotle, one thing is not prior to another, but they are simultaneous in time. When, however, the intellect is separated and becomes in actuality, then it becomes what it is, that is to say, intellect properly so called. And this alone is impossible and eternal. The irrational soul and the vegetative soul are immortal, but not eternal. It is called immortal, even if it is thought to be perishable and not eternal, because it does not perish insofar as it is soul, but insofar as it is in a body. For this reason Plato also says that every soul is immortal, saying this both in regard to the vegetative and the irrational. Matter is the opposite, for it is eternal, but not immortal; wherefore...

the mind is called eternal, as is immortality. ^A He says further that phantasy differs from sensation and from intellection, in that it is intermediate between them, while they are at either extreme. For phantasy has its beginning from sensation; sensation gives principles to phantasy, while phantasy gives principles to the intellect. For without phantasy the intellect cannot act. And in this way phantasy differs from sensation and from intellection. Beside this, he speaks of the differences between opinion and phantasy: that we have the power to imagine [things] whenever we wish. For we can imagine and fashion a man of three cubits or twenty cubits, and a goat-stag, and a hippocentaur; but we cannot opine just anything we wish. For we can say that twice two is ten, but we cannot opine it, so that phantasy is in our power, while opinion is not in our power. But if one must speak the truth, even phantasy is not in our power; for that which occurs during sleep is not in our power. For we do not imagine in our dreams what we wish; and why do I say [in our dreams]? But not even while we are awake is every phantasy in our power. For when we imagine things that are, as they are, we cannot imagine them otherwise than as they are. For example, if we imagine Socrates, we cannot imagine him as graceful, white-skinned, and long-haired, but [we must imagine him] as he is entirely: bald, dark-skinned, and pot-bellied, so that this is the accurate distinction. The mind is said to be eternal, as being both everlasting and immortal.

^B That Aristotle, saying that everything which is moved is in a place, concedes that the fixed sphere is moved, but denies that it is in a place; or [he says it is in a place] not because the whole, as a whole, is [in a place], but because its parts are in a place; not because they are by nature such as not to be contained, but because there is no body beyond it, that the whole might be contained within it. But in the case of the soul, there is nothing of the sort, but its nature is not to be circumscribed by a place.

That the soul is unmoved of itself; but it might be said to move itself by accident, and then only [by] locomotion. For since it moves the body, and the things that are moved are in the body, when the body is moved, it [the soul] will be moved with it; so that it moves itself by accident through the body in which it is; but of itself and according to its substance, it is neither moved nor is it in a place. Therefore, the soul might be said to move itself, by accident, only with respect to locomotion, and by no other way. For it is not altered when the body is altered, nor is it increased or diminished.

That Aristotle often calls the soul [that which is] irrational and vegetative as well, including it with the rational [soul]. He often calls only the rational soul [by that name]; and at times he even names the mind itself as soul, and he designates

^A in a special way the irrational and vegetative soul. Since Aristotle accepts the term "soul" in many significations, it is necessary to define and attribute to each signification what is proper to it, and not to commingle what is distinct and unconfused through the homonymy of the word and the things themselves. For just as weaving, for example, belongs to the animal according to the body, so also intellectual activity belongs to the animal according to the soul. Therefore, when the animal is corrupted, the soul will possess none of these things which accrued to it from the conjunction with the body; so that it does not even remember. For here, its knowledge is transient and needs memory for the retention of what has been known. But after the body, as it possesses knowledge that is stable and reaches actual things, it has no need of memory; for memory is [the recollection] of things previously known. ^B That Aristotle says: when the mind does not command, but the human being is in a state contrary to nature, then, with the order inverted, the powers of the soul follow the temperaments of the body. But when the mind commands, then, with the human being in a state according to nature, the powers of the soul no longer follow the temperaments of the body, but the body follows the soul. That he overturns the opinion of Thales concerning the soul, who said that the soul is mixed into every body as if to make it an ensouled body. First, he says, why, when there is a soul in every body, are some things animals and others not? Then, why is none of the simple elements an animal? And yet these ought more reasonably to be animals. For if the soul were in fire and in air, as being cleaner and more subtle bodies, it would have been better—as ^C in these, rather than in composite bodies—whence its operations also ought to have shone forth more clearly. And he connects many other absurdities to this hypothesis, which follow from it. That since the operations of the soul are many and different, Aristotle asks whether, while the soul is one and indivisible according to substance, these different powers and operations proceed from it—so that it is the same in substance, and one in number, even while being nutritive, growth-producing, generative, rational, irascible, and desiring. And just as the substance of fire is one and the same, out of which the power and operation of burning, drying, and illuminating proceed; or whether it is some other power of the soul, or the soul is divisible, ^D and each of these operations occurs according to a different part of it. Aristotle says this, not because he is satisfied with the doctrine, but because he rebukes the *Timaeus* for dividing the soul according to the parts of the body. For he himself does not wish there to be one substance of the soul, but [believes it] to be composed of different substances, yet united and coherent with one another in such a way that there becomes one affection of them. For something passes from the reason into the passions, and from those into the reason. For at that time, it comes about that the passions are subjected and yield to reason, from the apprehension of the reason from above. [At other times], it happens that the reason is impeded in its proper operations from the habit of these [passions] and their connection with them. Thus, therefore, the soul is one substance, as also is the whole man

^A and it is hindered by the passions, though it is not by nature composite in such a way as to be separable, but rather it is an organic power. ^B Indeed, in the tripes between 6 and 18, ^C the first triple has a harmonic mean of 8 and an arithmetic mean of 12; between the second triples of 18 and 54, the harmonic mean is 24 and the arithmetic mean is 36; between the third triples of 54 and 162, the harmonic mean is 72 and the arithmetic mean is 108. The intervals are therefore distinguished by these means, so that the following are the terms in sequence: 6, 8, 9, 12, 16, 18, 24, 32, 36, 48, 54, 81, 108, 162. But if it were possible to distribute the sesquitertian ratios in these terms that have been set forth into sesquioctave ratios and ^D limmas, we would stop here. Since this cannot be done, another course of counsel is needed. Therefore, if the intention is to fulfill the double ratio with those means that have been mentioned and the sesquioctaves, it will be necessary to keep the ratio of the double between the two sesquioctaves and the sesquitertian.

11. But let the third number from unity be taken in the octuple ratio, which is 64. From this, it is possible to set aside two sesquioctaves, for every multiple ratio is said to have as many superparticular ratios named after itself as it is distant from unity; however, it does not have the sesquitertian ratio. Therefore, having tripled the number 64, I make 192, of which the sesquitertian is 256, the sesquioctave is 216, and the sesquioctave of this is 243. Therefore, the ratio of the limma is that which remains after the subtraction of the two sesquioctaves from 243 to 256.

(10) This note says: The octuple ratio 8 is from 1, and 64 is from 8; the sesquioctaves are 72 from 64, and 81 from 72. LINDER.

arithmetic mean, is placed between 192 and 384, making a double ratio to 192 and a sesquitertial to 288. If, therefore, it were possible to remove two sesquioctaves from 288, we would have condensed this sesquitertial with the sesquioctaves and the limma. But now it is not possible; for the sesquioctave of 288 has no eighth part; wherefore to make a sesquioctave ratio toward it is not possible for those wishing to keep the unit undivided, for the eighth part of it is a fraction. Having therefore doubled them, so that we may make the half a whole and be able to take a sesquioctave of it as well, we shall be forced because of this to double all those before it and those after it. There will be, therefore, instead of 192, 384; instead of 216, 432; instead of 243, 486; instead of 256, 512; instead of 288, 576, and its sesquioctave is 648, and the sesquioctave of this is 729; then 768, being the double of 384, having the ratio of the limma to 729. And thus indeed the double interval is completed by the sesquialter and sesquitertial and sesquioctave ratios in these numbers: 384, 432, 486, 512, 576, 648, 729, 768. If, therefore, we wish to complete the whole diagram, setting forth in order, instead of the first part, 384; instead of the second, 768; instead of the third part, the triple of the first and the sesquialter of the second, 1152; instead of the fourth, the double of the second, 1536; instead of the fifth, the triple of the third, 3456; instead of the sixth, which is the octuple of the first, 3072; instead of the seventh, which is twenty-seven times the first, 10368; if, therefore, we wish to condense these with harmonic and arithmetic means, which, when placed alongside, will create the sesquialter and sesquitertial intervals, there will be between 384 and 768 of the double, both 512, making the harmonic mean, and 576, ^B making the arithmetic mean. If, however, we take the means of the triple interval, I mean of 384 and 1152, 576 holds the harmonic mean, as it fulfilled the arithmetic mean in the double, and 768 holds the arithmetic, which was the greater extreme of the double. Again, if we wish to take the same means for the second double, there will be between 768 and 1536, 1024 as the harmonic mean, and 1152 as the arithmetic. If even a second ^C triple interval, whose terms are 1152 and 3456, we wish to complete for us, the harmonic mean will be 1728, and the arithmetic 2304.

^D For 512 makes the sesquitertial ratio to 384, and the sesquialter to 768, from which the double is composed, and 512 exceeds 384 by its third part, but is exceeded by 768 by the third part of 768. And 576 makes the sesquialter ratio to 384, and to 768 the sesquitertial inversely, and it both exceeds and is exceeded by each of the extremes by 192 units. LINDER.

^A And if we should wish to condense the triple ratio, whose terms are 1728 and 5184, the number 2592 will provide the harmonic mean toward them, and 3456 the arithmetic. And again, if we should condense the third double (interval), which is in the terms 1536 and 3072, the number 2048 will hold the harmonic mean toward them, and 2304 the arithmetic. Moreover, if we should fill in the third triple (interval)—I mean that of the 6 and 7 parts—with similar means, the extremes will be 5184 and 6750, and the means will be, the harmonic 5832, and the arithmetic 5967. If further we should fill in each of the sesquitertials and sesquialters that have appeared from these means with sesquioctaves and the limma, the whole diagram will appear in the terms that follow, containing 24 sesquioctave ratios and 6 limmata.

(12) Behold the diagram; one must understand it as continuous.

^B (12) That this diagram was not first invented by Psellus, but already set forth by Proclus himself, seems likely for two reasons. For first, Proclus says in *Timaeus* 495: "We shall have, in the terms placed following after the whole explanation, the whole diagram having 24 sesquioctaves and 9 limmata." Then indeed in the diagram the medieties of the fourth double ratio are mentioned, even if in those things which are recounted above by Psellus, no mention of a fourth double ratio is made. By Proclus, however, that ratio is touched upon. Which is apparent from those things which, as above etc., are cited as taken from Proclus. — Cf. Tim. Locr. (Ed. C. F. Herm. 1853. Vol. IV, p. 419. — Orell.-Bait.-Winkelm. Turic. 1839. p. 956, b.) Theon. Smyrn. pp. 97–98. In arranging this diagram it seems necessary to note that the items which are found enclosed in brackets [ ] have been added by us. It seems that they were omitted by the carelessness of the copyists. Certainly they pertain as necessarily to the illustration of the matter which was mentioned earlier as anything could, wherefore I think it could scarcely have happened that they were omitted by Psellus. LINDER.

(13) ^A The first part indicates that the intellect understands indivisibly in the first place, and secondly, according to it, the soul understands, and in a uniform and perfectly complete manner, and altogether it perceives the whole of that which is known. For if it perceived in a divided way, the forms of knowledge would be thrown into confusion, and the soul would not be able to preserve them immutable; and furthermore, because knowledge would have to be divided according to the knower, and so would eventually be exhausted if the division were circumscribed, or—if the division were into infinity—to act in part an infinite number of times, and at the same time, again and again, in another division of knowledge. And if this were so, in order that not even the whole entirely or exclusively [should be] each thing in each division of knowledge—and if this were so, either it would be necessary for the soul, bearing all things within itself, to understand everything, or of necessity [it would mean] that in some things—or rather, in all things—it would cause some parts of the soul to act, while others would remain ineffective, than which nothing is more absurd, since the soul is able not to act but to have its power in vain. Wherefore, ^B the soul understands and knows indivisibly and uniformly and at the same time, and because of this not even the [forms of known things are obscured, subsisting wholly in the soul.]

13. The second part, being double the first, indicates that even if the soul is united in itself and is the same and is unmoved and uniform, it nevertheless proceeds and is diversified according to the things that are known. These are the things that are in generation and pertain to the nature of the other. For this is what the double (interval) indicates. For just as in the One there is the same (for even if it is not the same to another, yet it is by all means the same to itself), so in the two there is that which is different (the other). This is not indeed different from itself, but different from the other, so that, even if it does not discord with itself, it stands apart from another.

14. The third part, having relations to both the first and the second, and being triple the first and sesquialteral to the second, reveals the knowledge pertaining entirely to ^B things that are sensible, which, even if they are increased by subsistences (to use this expression, for three is the beginning of multitude), are nevertheless united by the simple and sincere power of knowledge and by that which is called universal, and are gathered into many (a multitude) from particulars. And these things are indeed many and diverse, but that knowledge is simple and not diverse. And besides, it has a sesquialteral ratio to the second part, and as I think, reason indicates that that very thing which is increased and multiplied, even if it is yoked into the universal and simple (as if reduced to some oneness), is nevertheless collected from the simple into a multitude: for from many such things one is made, and from one, often these many (a multitude). Therefore, regarding the sensible, which the second part points out, it adds a multitude, which the third points out, but both depend on that which is properly called one. If these are judged (and estimated) in their comparison ^C to that one, that simple sensible is closer to that which is properly called one than is that which is increased and multiplied, just as a double number is closer to one than a triple is. For that which is greater in these carries with it a certain prolixity and alienation. But compared among themselves, they are seen (found) to be closer one to another; for just as in the sesquialteral (ratio), so both fall under the senses.

15. The fourth part, which is double the second and positioned against that one, has a quadrilateral plane and reveals the knowledge that is in breadth. On this account, it recedes from the one, but is compared with length, or rather with duality. For all knowledge, having progressed to the greatest length, although it depends on the one, just as every number depends on the unit, and for this reason is more adapted to the one, yet it does not surely grow in length while it depends on the unit. But as if dismissed from that ^D

^A it bends and slants, and as it were becomes double, first in relation to the multitude and then truly to the breadth. And indeed, the thing that knows makes itself as a plane in accommodation to the plane of the thing known, which the fourth part, situated against the second and that single [one], here points out.

16. The fifth part, multiplying the third, and being posited neither against the second nor against the first, signifies the multitude of cognitions. For the foundation of the many is three. But many times many are nine, hence the poets are accustomed to say the nine Muses, as if [saying] many times many. Yet the many have no comparison to the one, just as a plane or a solid does not to a point, nor indeed to the binary number, just as a house [does not] to its foundation, nor a ship to its keel, nor the universe to its principle; for no principle is cognate with its extremes, ^B although the principle of the multitude—but not the multitude itself—is the dyad; but the many have a relationship among themselves. Whence the nine is examined against the three, multitude against multitude, and it makes manifest the triple [ratio] as it is multiplied many times.

17. The sixth part, being eightfold the first, and having no relation to any other, signifies the cognition of things progressing toward the third dimension, ^C that is to say, toward depth or thickness or height. But because it has no relation to the others, it is joined to the first, because it is a cube, as is the one next following, and it is made from the binary and the quaternary number, and yet it maintains neither the quadruple ratio to the former nor the double ratio to the latter, but rather [maintains] that [ratio] which is eightfold to the first, which contains those others as well. And the reason turns back the extremes to the firsts, so that they might not be entirely severed from the first, but so that knowledge might grasp the object of knowledge as a whole, even if it be varied; for its solid number is the first, and is the first equably equal and equably equal. And for this reason, as the first, it is joined to the one—that is to say, to the first part—from which it possesses its constitution.

18. The seventh part, being twenty-seven times the first and [being] the second solid cube, ^D is affected in the same manner as the one before it, and brings forward both the multitude of cognitions and the approach into three dimensions. But this one also exceeds the three and the nine, surpassing the one by nine parts and the other by three; of which the triple [ratio] was already present in the others, but the one that is greater by nine parts is itself also led back from the number nine to the one. Wherefore the proposed reason [links] that which is further on, and joins the seven-fold solid with the one, and having bypassed the means, raises the perfections of the soul to the summit.

^B 8, and the arithmetic mean is 9. Between 12 and 24, the double, the harmonic mean is 16, and the arithmetic mean is 18. Between the third double, 24 and 48, the harmonic mean is 32, and the arithmetic mean is 36. And in the triples, between 6 and 18, the harmonic mean is 9, and the arithmetic mean is 12. And let these terms be set out in order: 6, 8, 9, 12, 16, 18, 24, 32, 36, 48, 54, 81, 108, 164. But if it were possible within these terms set out for us to divide the epitritic ratios into both epogdoic ratios and leimmas, we would have stopped at these. But now, since it is not possible, we must learn by another method.

^A 1. You have asked me in part about the Platonic diagram of the soul, about which one must learn the hidden intent of the philosopher. It is necessary first to state the whole mathematical scope of the account, and thus to explain to you the sense of what has been said. Plato, then, says concerning the Demiurge thus: "He took one portion from the whole, and after this he took away a double of this, and again a third, a hemiolear of the second, and a triple of the first. The fourth was a double of the second; the fifth a triple of the third; the sixth an eight-fold of the first; the seventh a twenty-seven-fold of the first." After these, he filled up both the double and triple intervals, cutting a portion from them and placing it into the space between them, so that in each interval there are two means, the one exceeding and being exceeded by the same part of its extremes, the other exceeding and being exceeded by the same *number*, with hemiolear, epitritic, and epogdoic proportions arising from these bonds... in the previous intervals with the interval of the epogdoic. All the epitritic [intervals] were filled, leaving [one] portion of each. And the dimension of this portion having been taken, of number to number, having terms 256 to 243—and indeed also the mixture from which he cut these parts had now fully exhausted everything. This, then, is the exposition of Plato according to the letter. But that we may proceed in order, let us first take among the numbers starting from unity those called by Plato the first ratios. Let there be set out unity, and its double, the dyad; then the triad, hemiolear to the dyad and triple to unity; then the tetrad, quadruple to unity; then the ennead, triple to the triad; then the octad, which is eight-fold to unity. For since Plato instructs us to connect the double and triple intervals with harmonic and arithmetic means, and it is impossible to find these means between unity and the dyad, we must take a certain first number which, being the least, will have both a half and a third. Let 6 be taken, then, and let this be the portion taken by the Demiurge from the whole; after 6, the twelfth, being double of 6; then 18, hemiolear to 12 and triple to 6; then 24, being double of the third term, 12. Then 54, being triple of the third term, I mean 18; then 48, being eight-fold of the first term, I mean 6. And so, between 6 and 12, there will fall the harmonic mean 8, and the arithmetic mean 9, between... ^D

^B 2. Let it be proposed, then, from the beginning, to condense the double ratio with the aforementioned means and the epogdoics. It will be necessary, therefore, to take the counterpart of the double in such a way that they are both two epogdoics and another epitritic. Let there be taken, therefore, first the third from unity according to the eight-fold ratio, 64; from this it is possible to remove two epogdoics; for every multiple leads as many epimoric ratios as there are in its name, distant from unity; but it is not epitritic. Having tripled it, therefore, I make 192, of which the epitritic is 256, and the epogdoic is 216, and the epogdoic of this is 243; therefore, the ratio of the leimma is that which is left over after the removal of the two epogdoics, 243 to 216; for from every epitritic, two epogdoics having been removed, the ratio of the leimma is left. But the epogdoic of 216 is 288, which preserves the harmonic mean, being situated between 192 and 384, making a double ratio to 192. And we would have condensed this epitritic also to 216 with the epogdoics and the leimma. But now it is not possible; for its epogdoic, 324, does not have an eighth part; therefore it is not possible for an epogdoic ratio to be made to it for those desiring always to keep unity indivisible; for its eighth part... Doubling it, therefore, that we might make the half whole, we shall be able to take its epogdoic; we will be forced by this to multiply also all those before it and those after it. There will be, therefore, instead of 192, 384; instead of 216, 432; instead of 243, 486; instead of 256, 512; instead of 288, 576; and the epogdoic of this, 648; and the epogdoic of this, 729; then 1536, being double of 384, and having the ratio of the leimma to the whole 729. And thus, truly, the double interval is filled with the hemiolear, epitritic, and epogdoic [parts] in these numbers: 384, 432, 486, 512, 576, 648, 729, 1536. If, therefore, I should wish...

^A to condense these with harmonic and arithmetic means, the interspersed hemiolear and epitritic gaps will create [them]; there will be, to name one mean, between 384 and 768, 512, creating the harmonic mean, and 576, the arithmetic [mean]. Know this also, that no superparticular ratio can be divided into equal parts; therefore, the semitone cannot be taken in numbers, but will be found in the middle of the 17:16 and 16:15 ratios; and the 256:243 is greater than the so-called leimma, which was smaller than the exact semitone. This, then, is another, hidden explanation of the Platonic soul-generation; and this is the mathematical one.

III. Further narration of the doctrine from Plato's Timaeus.

1. Insatiably you desire the fountain of Plato. For still being full of the flow and overflowing with that wisdom, you again wish to drink from it; for you ask, what on earth these things might be? Concerning the Creator of the universe, Plato says: ^B "He divided this whole conjunction, fitting middle to middle, in the form of the Greek letter Chi, and from that motion, which was always in the same place and moved in the same way, He encompassed them from every side: and He made one circle exterior, another interior. He said the exterior orb was of the 'Same' nature, but the interior [was of the nature] of the 'Other,' and its side he turned toward the right, the other from the middle line to the left. He gave the principate to the revolution of the Same and the equal; for He left that one undivided. But the interior [orb] He divided six times into seven unequal circles, according to double and triple intervals (for there are three intervals on either side), and He ordered the circles to move in contrary courses to one another; and three [to move] quickly, but with reason and number, moving themselves." These are indeed the words of Plato.

2. And the explanation is this: Let straight lines be bent ^C in such a way that they connect again at their extremities. And thus two circles are formed, and of these, let one have been interior and the other exterior, positioned obliquely relative to each other. Therefore, one is called the circle of the 'Same', and the other of the 'Other'; and the circle of the 'Same' is along the equator, and the one of the 'Other' is along the zodiac [that is, the one which is called the other]. For the equinoctial circle does not cut the zodiac at right angles. To pursue the matter briefly, therefore, these are roughly the things which can be said by mathematicians concerning ^D the form of the soul. But in regard to the soul's substance,

^A it anticipates, in essence, all scientific knowledge: geometry in its entirety, in its form, and in its lines; arithmetic in its multiplicity and the essential units within it; harmonics in the ratios of numbers; and spherical science in its twofold rotations.

3. The division of the soul along its length, therefore, indicates the procession flowing from above from the Creator, from which two souls arise after the one, each of which possesses the same ratios, and they are joined together and distinguished from one another, and cohere at their own centers. For this is what is signified by the phrase ^B "and joining middle to middle." And the Creator bent them into a circle, and wrapped them in the motion which is always the same and in the same state, having made them intellectual and bestowed upon them divine intellect, and thus He placed the duality of the souls into a dual nature that is intellectual in its essence, and superior. Or rather, because the life of the soul is twofold—the one being noetic (or intellective), the other being opinion-based (or doxastic)—two straight lines emerge and are bent into two circles. And the phrase "middle to middle" perhaps means that the conjunction of the soul took place at the primary centers. For it is the extreme of the noetic [faculty] and the summit of the doxastic [faculty], together with the entire constitution of the soul. ^C But the figure that is produced from this intersection, namely the chi (X), as the aforementioned Porphyry records, has great affinity with the soul. For he says that such a character existed among the Egyptians, bearing the symbol of the world-soul, surrounded by a circle: for by the straight lines was signified the dual-natured power of the soul, but by the circle, the uniform life and the noetic reversion according to the circle. And the motion which is carried around in the same way and in the same state is the noetic rotation; for this encompasses the soul. And the one part is uniform, the other is dual-natured. And that which is outside ^D the circles is the noetic part, while that which is inside is the doxastic. And as for the naming, do not suppose it to be a mere imposition of a name, but a communication of powers. For the Creator assigned the power of "Same" to the noetic part, and the power of "Other" to the doxastic. And furthermore, the Creator bestows the better and more divine things upon the better powers: to the "Same," the flexion to the right, and to the "Other," the flexion to the left; the latter by lateral motion, the former by central motion.

4. Similarly, in the universe, the unwandering [sphere] is the cause for all things remaining the same, while the wandering [spheres] are the cause of that which is at other times

Otherwise. The right and the left arise from the soul; ^A they are its essential properties and images: that which is inerrant is to the right, that which is wandering is to the left, or rather the former is the image of the intellect, the latter of the soul. From the soul itself comes the right, which is turned toward intelligible things, and the left, which is turned toward the care of sensible things. Just as in the world it revolves the inerrant one along the side, and the wandering one along the diameter, so also in the soul, it revolves the circle of the Same along the side, and the circle of the Other along the diameter. The properties of the diameter are that it is oblique, irrational, contained, and a divisor of angles; but of the side, that it is not oblique, rational, encompassing, and cohesive. Reasonably, therefore, the one that is termed the superior part of the soul is said to revolve along the side, ^B and the one that revolves along the diameter is said to delight in progression and multiplication. The remaining parts of the passage are easy to understand and set forth regarding the circles moving in the heavens, but regarding those of the soul, they require a profound mind; for the soul possesses both the uniform power and the multiform, and this circle of it contains the causes of all things, yet it is indivisible, because the entire multitude is held together by the bond of Same-ness. And if a single letter is unable to take up all the arguments, even if it be brief and compendious, one should not marvel; for neither could the Atlantic Ocean ever be contained in a ladle, nor the secrets of the boundless Platonic thought in the measure of a letter. Therefore, one must be content if we have been able to catch a glimpse of anything of the inner sanctuaries hidden within him. ^C

Δ'

IV.

Further exposition of the same limma.

1. What is a limma and how it is less than a semitone, you have asked. Let there be taken for you the number 1536; its sesquioctave becomes 1728; the sesquioctave of this is 1944, which it is clear has a ratio of two tones to 1536. And there is also the sesquitertian [gap in text] tone... [Image: A circle labeled "tonos", inside which are smaller circles labeled "tonos", "tonos", "diatesaron" and "ditone"] ...of 1536 is that of 2048. Therefore, the limma is in the ratio of 2048 to 1944. But if we also take the sesquioctave of 1944, we shall have the number 2187; and the ratio of 2187 to 2048 is greater than the ratio ^D of 2048 to 1944. For of the...

2187, the 2048 exceeds by a greater amount than its fourteenth part, but by less than its fourteenth; and the 2048 of the 1944 exceeds by its nineteenth part, but by less than the eighteenth. Therefore the smaller segment of the third tone is contained within the diatessaron interval, so that the size of the limma can be concluded to be less than a semitone, and the whole diatessaron to be less than two and a half tones. And the ratio of 2048 to 1944 is the same as that of 256 to 243. But neither the sesquioctave nor any other of the superparticular ratios can be divided into two equal ratios. Those which make a ratio nearest to the sesquioctave are the sesqui-18th and the sesqui-17th. Therefore, there exists in the ratio somewhat between these [two] the semitone, that is to say, greater than the 16th, and less than the sesqui-16th. And 15 of 243 is a greater part than a seventeenth, and less than an eleventh, so that when they are composed, the 243 and the 15, the semitone becomes in ratio nearly that of 256 to 243. And the ratio of the limma ^B was demonstrated to be that of 256 to 243, and thus the semitone will differ from the limma by the ratio of 258 to 256, which is 108/107.

2. You have, therefore, from this what the limma is, and how much less than a semitone it is, and by how much it differs from the semitone itself; and (you have it known) that neither the sesquioctave nor any other superparticular ratio can be divided into two equal ratios. As to what you objected to me in the letter you sent, that we omitted some things which would have assisted in explaining the Platonic Cosmogony, I shall now pay them to you as if they were a debt. For when Plato says that the scission of those seven orbs was made by each distance of the double and triple interval—because there are three distances on each side—it is ^C indeed, if we look to the words, somewhat difficult to explain; yet it signifies that the scission was made by each distance of the double and triple intervals, which are indeed three (for in four terms there are three distances), which is the same as if it were said to be made according to length, so that in each of those seven orbs all the distances and all the orbs might be contained: for by the number of the double and triple interval distances, which are six, he cut the orbs six times. With these precepts in mind, we establish that the soul of the universe of things, holding the ratios, and before these (ratios) and all the parts of the world, I mean both the inerrant and the errant, usurps the essence of all those (gods) moving in the world; wherefore the orb of that which is called the other, in itself held the primary generative causes of the seven orbs. But if no orb has been made proper to the essence also, just as there is one of the same nature (identity) and of the different (diversity), we shall defend, if anyone wishes to hear, that there is an opposition of these, but that the essence of the universal soul is common. That the division of the soul into six (parts) is most familiar is the Pythagorean view, ^D assigning the monad to a point, the duad to a line, the triad to a plane, the tetrad to a body, the pentad to that which is endowed with quality, and to that which is ensouled

the hexad, and to that which is intellectual, the heptad. The ^A *limma* (remainder), however, has been demonstrated to you mathematically above in the letter; and it is the same everywhere in the universe.

3. For from each of the spheres, certain effluxes descend into the regions under the earth, and some sediments, mixed with the elements themselves, though they possess much that is turbulent, dark, and material, nevertheless contribute to the whole constitution and harmony of the world. Plato, placing the cause of these in the universal soul, has called it the *limma*, which is indeed significant of the ultimate nature. And the ^B ratio of souls to daemonic animals bears the ratio of the *limma*, while the heroic souls to the daemonic ones have the ratio of a sesquioctave [9:8], by reason of the unpolluted species of their life; but those of the many have toward them the ratio of the *limma*. Moreover, the soul is the first "even-odd" [number], for it is the medium between the indivisible and the divisible, to which the odd is familiar, and to which the even. And to say that all the sesquitertia [4:3 ratios] were completed by the interval of the sesquioctave [9:8] together with the *limma*, is to ^C signify that the terminations of the ratios ended in more partial distances. And there are seven terms. Because the soul has obtained the middle place between the indivisible and the divisible, it imitates the former by the triad of terms, and has anticipated the latter by the tetrad, since the soul, whole through its whole self, is heptadic. For if unity is the demiurgic mind, and the soul proceeds primarily from mind, it holds the ratio of the heptad toward it; for the heptad is paternal and motherless. And since the means are three, the geometric one connects the essential part of souls in a certain way, the harmonic connects their identity, and the arithmetic their ^D diversity; and the geometric is the image of good order, the harmonic of justice, and the arithmetic of peace. You have, therefore, sufficiently from us, O friend—if one might not also say abundantly and lavishly—the explanation of those things you inquired about.

[index: entries preserved]

EXPOSITION OF MICHAEL PSELLUS ON THE CHALDEAN ORACLES

MAGICAL ORACLES WHICH PROCEED FROM ZOROASTER

Seek thou the soul’s outlet, whence, or in what order, ^A By serving the body, thou mayest once more ascend to that order from which thou didst flow, Joining the work to the sacred discourse. And look not downward: a precipice lies beneath the earth.

NOTES OF JOANNES OPSOPOEUS

(1) Cicero, in book I *De divinatione*, writes that no one could be king of the Persians who had not first learned the discipline and knowledge of the Magi: in such great honor and admiration were the magical precepts held. What, however, the magic of the ancients was, and who the Magi were, one may read in Plato, Xenophon, Strabo, Plutarch, Lucian, Cicero, and countless others. To speak briefly, they treated theology along with physiology among the Persians, Sacae, and Medes, just as the Brahmans and Gymnosophists among the Indians, the Chaldeans among the Assyrians, the Hierogrammateis among the Egyptians, the Levites among the Hebrews, the Eteobutadae among the Athenians, the Etruscans among the Romans, and the Druids among the Gauls and the Germans. Therefore, let no one think that the precepts of a portentous and juggling art are taught here. These are doctrines of piety and divine worship, more secret, whether of the Magi, or the Egyptians, or the Chaldeans, and not altogether alien to the orthodox faith, as Psellus teaches, and before him Synesius, ^B Bishop of Cyrene, in whose book it is evident that only the remnants of those sacred oracles have reached us, and they are so mutilated and confused that one might deservedly call them a patch-work quilt sewn together from the writings of the ancients. For the verses he cites are in part very different, and in part are not found in these. These, lest you might justly feel anything is missing, reader, I have thought fit to indicate briefly.

In these texts of ours, there do not exist the things that are read in the cited booklet: ^C if anyone thinks the guidance is grand, but is incredulous regarding the vision, and fears that he might never attain the blessed communion according to it, let him hear what the sacred oracles say concerning the different ways. And after the whole catalogue of the encouragements from above for the ascent, according to which it is permitted to increase the inner seed. To these (he says) He gave an observable sign of light to be grasped. He also made fruitful for those sleeping the strength of that power. ^D You see: he distinguished the good fortune of learnings; the one, he says, is taught while awake, the other while dreaming. But a person is awake to such an extent that he has been led astray, so that he does not know whence he came, and he errs so much that he knows not where he came from.

(2) "Whence," etc. See the Synesius passage, same page, most elegantly written, page 409: Id est, "Let another say what the Lethean or cup of oblivion is, which is customary to be given to departing souls. Certainly, the cup of oblivion exhibited to a soul that has entered into this life is nothing else than the sweetness and pleasure of this life. For since the soul descends willingly to this life as a hireling, in place of work, for the sake of the wages to be bargained for, it submits to a servile yoke."

(3) "By serving," etc. From this he took [it] from Synesius, who wrote most elegantly in the same place, page 409: Id est, "Let another say that the Lethean or cup of oblivion is that which is customary to be given to departing souls. The cup of oblivion presented to a soul that has entered this life is nothing other than the sweetness and pleasure of this life. For since it descends willingly to this life like a hireling, instead of work, for the sake of the wages to be hired out, it submits to a servile yoke."

(4) "And look not," etc. Synesius’s verses are different from ours. For he has it thus on page 108: Id est, "Do not incline downward to the black world and [full of] darkness, To which a deep abyss, ever treacherous, lies beneath, [and an under-] World, murky, squalid, delighting in specters, [and devoid of mind]." See the entire passage of Synesius. For it will contribute to the understanding of what follows and what precedes.

EXPOSITION OF THE CHALDEAN ORACLES

^A ...drifting down along the seven-fold steps, beneath which is the throne of terrible Necessity. For the wild beasts of the earth shall inhabit thy vessel. Thou, 6 do not increase fate; for naught incomplete slips forth from the paternal beginning. But the paternal Intellect does not receive her willing, until she has emerged from oblivion, and has spoken the word, keeping in memory the holy paternal symbol. Thou must hasten to the light and to the rays of the Father, from whence a soul was sent to thee, clothed with much intellect.

^A The earth laments for them until the children. The rescuers of the soul, breathing, are dissoluble. In the left flanks of the bed, the source of virtue abides, staying wholly within, not casting off the virginal 9. The soul 10 of mortals will draw God somehow into herself, having nothing mortal, she is wholly inebriated from God; for she boasts of a harmony, under which the mortal body exists. For the soul 11, being a radiant fire by the power of the Father, ^B remains immortal 12, and is mistress of life, and possesses 13 many fillings of the bosom of the world. Seek for paradise.

JOANNES OPSOPOEUS' NOTES

(10) *Soul.* Marsilius explains these verses in a few words, lib. XIII, cap. 4, writing thus: "He who wishes the phantasy to be silent, and being inflamed with the desire of the supreme Deity, does not trust in the accustomed discourses of natural reason, lives by the intellect alone, becomes an angel, and takes God into his whole breast." This Zoroaster signifies: "The soul of men will draw God," etc., when, retaining nothing mortal, she is totally inebriated by divine draughts. Then she also exults in the harmony of the body.

(11) *For the soul.* The same book arranges some of the following verses translated hither: "For the soul, being a radiant fire by the power of the Father, let the immortal depth of the soul lead, and take all thy eyes upward. Do not even leave the material body itself upon the precipice. Spread all things upward." That is, by his interpretation: "Since the soul, by the power of the Father, becomes a radiant fire, let the immortal depth of the soul rule in thee, and lift all thine eyes at once on high. Then do not even leave the material body itself in the precipice." He calls the fire the light itself, by which God abounds through Himself, and the soul through the power of the Father, turned toward the Father, abounds. And because God is the very unity above intellect and the center of essences above essence, therefore he is not united to Him through the intellect properly, but through the unity of the soul, which is the head of the intellect, and the center of the whole soul; wherefore Zoroaster says: "Let the immortal depth of the soul lead thee," that is, the unity itself, which God once imprinted upon the soul as a character of divine unity, from which and to which all other powers of the soul depend, just as all circular lines depend from a center and to a center.

(12) *Immortal.* Marsilius lib. V, *De immortalitate animorum*, cap. XIV: "It remains immortal, and is mistress of life; q. d. it remains immortal for the reason that it has life as its attendant, just as the sun has light, and the sun has hair." See the passage. For he teaches there that the soul departs, but upon the arrival of death, it is not destroyed.

(13) *And possesses.* The same book, lib. IV, the last chapter: "Truly the soul itself is in a way all things, of which Zoroaster says: It comprehends the many fillings of the worldly bosoms."

^A Do not defile the spirit, nor deepen the level surface. There is also a portion for the eidolon in a place shining on all sides. Do not leave the refuse of matter upon the precipice. Do not lead it forth, lest in going out it might possess something. If you extend the fiery mind to a work of divine worship, You will preserve even the flowing body. For truly from the ends of the earth leap forth earthly dogs, Never showing a true sign to the mortal man. Nature persuades that demons are holy, And the sprouts of evil matter are useful and good. The avenging Furies constrain mortals. Let the immortal depth of the soul lead; and expand your eyes Altogether upward. O daring contrivance ^B of human nature! Often what you shall speak to me, you will see it is entirely utterable. For neither does the heavenly glorious bulk then appear; Stars do not shine, the light of the moon is covered, Earth does not stand still, but all things are seen as lightning. Do not call the creature an object of self-evident divine image. From all sides, O soul unformed, extending the reins of fire. When you see a fire without form, more subtle Than the soul...

NOTES OF JOANNIS OPSOPOEUS

(14) ^A *Do not defile the spirit.* Item, lib. XVIII, *On the Immortality of the Soul*, ch. 6: "Do not defile the spirit, nor expand in the depth what is level." He calls the spirit itself a vehicle, not because it is not a body and deep, but because on account of its very thin and splendid purity it is as if it were not a body. He commands, therefore, that you do not, on account of an excessive affection for the elemental body, compel it even after this life to be sordid and heavy through the addition of elemental darkness.

(15) ^A *There is also for the eidolon.* That is, the place in the perspicuous region. Because, obviously, it will return to the sky together with the vehicle and the rational soul. ^C Ficinus joined the following verse with the previous one, the beginning of which is... (16) ^A *Do not lead forth.* Plotinus the philosopher explains this in the book *On the Departure of the Soul*.

(17) ^A *If you extend.* Marsilius thus translates in lib. XIII, *On the Immortality of the Soul*, ch. 4: "If you direct a burning mind to a work of piety, you will preserve the labile body."

(18) ^A *The avenging Furies.* The beautiful clarification of this oracle can be sought from Synesius’ book *On Dreams*, p. 109, where he thus speaks: "...The misadventures called undeserved contribute a great part toward dissolving the relationship we have toward things here below; for the avenging Furies then and for that reason are set in motion against those who have revolted ^D against her laws." And a little later: "This is, Indeed punishments even beyond the necessity of fate are set in motion against the ferocious and those who shake off the reins of the laws, and these are indeed the miseries and famous labors which the sacred writings declare Hercules to have sustained."

(19) ^B *Let the depth lead.* Marsil. lib. XIII, *On the Immortality of the Soul*, ch. IV, as I indicated above. (20) ^B *O daring contrivance.* The same, lib. XIV, ch. 1: O man, contrivance of most daring nature. (21) ^B *You will see.* In the royal codex, it is written "you will see everything," and the penultimate line "lightning." (22) ^B *From all sides.* This order of verses for this page in the royal codex is: the first is "from all sides," the second "how the world has," the third "when," the fourth "shining," the fifth "leapingly," the sixth "throughout the depths of the world," the seventh "hear," the eighth "the voice of fire," the ninth "the Father is not fear," the tenth "the Father himself," the eleventh "nor in," the twelfth "is... and something," the thirteenth "and everything," the fourteenth "learn that," and the fifth in the order of this page, "contemplated," "counsels," "symbols," etc., is plainly omitted.

EXPOSITION OF THE CHALDEAN ORACLES

Shining with leaping motion through the depths of the whole world, Hear me, sound of the fire. The paternal Mind has sown symbols (22) in souls. Learn (23) the intelligible, since it exists outside of the mind. For there is (24) indeed some intelligible, which you must perceive with the flower of the mind. All things (25) are begotten of one fire: For the Father accomplished (26) all things, and delivered them to the second ^A, whom nations of men call the first (27). The intelligible Iynges themselves also perceive from the Father, Moved by unspeakable counsels (28) so as to perceive. O how the world has intellectual, unbending sustainers (29)! The Father snatched up Himself; Neither did He shut up His own fire into His own intellectual power. The Father (30) does not introduce fear, but infuses persuasion.

***

If you have often spoken to me, you will see me as a marvel; for then the heavenly and curved and convex mass does not appear to you. The stars do not shine, the moon's light is concealed, the earth does not stand; but all things appear as flashes of lightning. Do not call the image of the nature of God itself visible. Stretch the reins of fire on every side with a simple cord. When you see the sacred fire shining without form, leaping through the depths of the whole world, hear the sound of the fire. The Mind of God itself has implanted paternal signs in the souls of men. Perceive that which can be perceived by the intellect: for it is outside the mind. There is truly something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the mind. All things are produced from one fire: for the Father accomplished all things, and delivered them to the second mind, whom nations of men call the first. The species which are perceived by the mind are perceived by the paternal mind and they themselves also understand, moved by the silent counsels of it ^B so that they may understand. O how this world has rulers endowed with the power of understanding who are not bent! The supreme parent God withdrew Himself from all the rest: nor did He enclose His own fire within His own intellectual power. The Father does not introduce fear, but infuses compliance.

NOTES OF JOANNIS OPSOPOES

(23) "Learn." Marsilius, *On the Soul*, lib. 1, cap. 6: "One thing is mind, another is truth. Which Zoroaster thus opens: Know that the intelligible itself is outside the mind." ...some intelligible which you must understand with the flower of the mind. Zoroaster calls the flower of the mind the center of the soul itself, which Plato calls the head of the mind. (25) "All things." Idem, lib. 2, cap. 7: "Being itself is common to all things. Being, therefore, wherever it is, depends on God. Which Zoroaster touched mystically: All things are begotten from one fire." (26) "For the Father accomplished." Ficinous, lib. 4, cap. 1: "The essence of the angels is in a way formless at the beginning, and is exposed as a kind of passive subject to the act of understanding, and to receive the decoration of forms and ideas. Concerning which Zoroaster says: The father accomplished all things, and delivered them to the second mind." Moreover correct and write... For thus the poets produce the syllable in this word, not by the mutation of a short vowel into a long one... and that also Ranconetus had corrected. But the poem will labor, unless you assist it in this way... The received reading, however, is not to be condemned, (28) "Moved." Marsil. Ficinus, lib. 1, *On the Soul*, cap. 5: "Angels move, they are not moved; of whom Zoroaster [says], The world has immobile intellectual rulers." (29) "Sustainers." Idem, lib. 4, cap. 1: "It exceeds the soul in one way, because it remains: it yields to one God, as it is multiple. God, however, by this one, passes beyond all things to the infinite. Which Zoroaster sang thus: The Father snatched up through Himself, nor did He enclose his proper fire in the mind which follows Him; that is, it has no comparison with the others." (30) "The Father, etc." Idem, lib. 3, ult.: "If it pulsates the soul, because they are freely voluble up and down for it, it pulsates, and freely, so that it may allure; it does not drag, it does not compel, but persuade; which Zoroaster thus testifies: The Father does not incur fear, but introduces persuasion." ^C

OF THE MOST WISE PSELLUS, EXPOSITION ON THE CHALDEAN ORACLES

"And there is also for the image a portion in a place shining on all sides." ^A Idols or simulacra are called by the philosophers those things which are indeed connatural to superior beings, yet are subordinate and inferior to them; for example, the mind is connatural to God, and the rational soul to the mind, and the irrational soul to the rational soul, and nature to the irrational soul, and the body to nature, and matter to the body [or, matter to the body, and the body to nature, and nature to the irrational soul, and the irrational to the rational, and the rational to the mind, and the mind to God]. ^B Here, however, the Chaldean oracle calls the irrational soul the "image" or simulacrum of the rational soul, because it is connatural to it, but is of an inferior condition: and it says that to this image a portion is attributed in a region shining on all sides. By this, it signifies that the soul devoid of reason, which represents the image of the soul endowed with reason, being purified by virtue while it dwells in this life, after the completion of the course of human life returns to the region which is above the moon, and is allotted a place that is everywhere luminous, that is, shining around and on every side with splendor. ^C For the place which is beneath the moon is dark on all sides, that is, shadowed on all sides. But the lunar realm is mutable, or rather, it is darkened; that is, it is illuminated by one half, while the other half is full of darkness. For the moon itself is such, being illuminated in one half and unillumination in the other. But the place above the moon is "shining on all sides," that is, entirely illuminated. The oracle says, therefore, that not only is the rational soul allotted a place in the region above the moon that is shining on all sides, but that a portion is also given to its image, that is, to the irrational soul, to be allotted to that shining place, whenever it departs from the body clear and pure. ^D For the Greek doctrine, while positing that the irrational soul of man is also immortal, carries it only as far as the elements beneath the moon; but the Chaldean doctrine...

once it has been purified ^A and made of one mind with the rational soul, restores it to that region beyond the moon which is luminous on all sides. Such are the dogmas of the Chaldeans. The teachers of piety, however, and the interpreters and heralds of the Christian dogmas nowhere lead the irrational soul to higher places, but openly define it as subject to corruption. Let it be granted, moreover, that the irrational soul consists of wrath and desire, which craves generation. And thus, by expounding it, Gregory of Nyssa hands it down in his discourse *On the Soul*.

Do not leave the dregs of the matter in the precipice.

The oracle calls the human body "the dregs of matter," it being composed of the four elements; and as if in a discourse of instruction and exhortation, it says to the one being taught: Do not only elevate your soul to God and make it ^B overcome the turbulences of this life, but, if it is possible, do not even leave behind in the terrestrial world the body itself—which you are clothed in, and which is the dregs of matter, that is to say, a thing cast aside and held in contempt, and a plaything of matter. For the oracle calls this place here "the precipice." For from the exalted place of heaven, our nature is here cast down. It advises, therefore, that we either consume with divine fire the body itself, which it implies by "dregs of matter," and purge it, or, having stripped it like bark, elevate it into the ether, or be transferred by God into a place devoid of matter—or into a body, yet an ethereal or heavenly one, such as the Tishbite Elijah attained, and Enoch before him, having been translated from life here and restored to a more divine state, without leaving behind the dregs of matter, that is to say, their own body, in the precipice. And the precipice, as we have said, is the terrestrial region. And such a dogma, even if it is admirable and supernatural, does not put the glorification of the body and its translation to a more divine place in our own will, but the whole matter depends ^C on divine grace, that it may burn up with ineffable fire the matter of the body and elevate the heavy and earthy nature by a fiery vehicle into heaven.

Do not demand the soul, lest it be endangered by having something upon departing.

Plotinus also mentions this oracle in his book *On the procession of the irrational soul*. But this is an exhortation, lofty and proud. For he says that man should not busy himself at all about the departure of the soul, nor be anxious about how it might exit from the body, but rather yield the business to the natural law of dissolution. For the very fact of being anxious about the loosening of the body, and the soul’s departure from it, turns the mind away from better things and occupies it with such care; whence the soul is not ^D purified most perfectly. If, therefore, while we are occupied with the dissolution, death should come to us at that moment, the soul does not go forth entirely free, but retaining something of the affected life...

For the Chaldean defines an "affection" as the human concern regarding death. For it is necessary, he says, to have no concern for any other thing, ^A save for the superior illuminations—or rather, not even to be concerned about these, but, having surrendered oneself to the angelic or more divine powers that raise us up, and having closed the sensory faculties of the body, and I should say also those of the soul, to follow the calling God without meddlesomeness and without intellectual activity.

Some have explained the oracle more simply: "Do not lead forth," they say, meaning "that you may not depart carrying something with you"—that is, do not bring about your own end before the natural death, even if you have philosophized entirely; for you have not yet attained the most perfect purification. Hence, even the soul fleeing ^B from the body through such a departure, possesses something of the mortal-like life as it goes out. For if we humans are in the body as in a prison and a post, as indeed Plato has said, having learned this glory from above in mysterious discourses, yet no one ought to kill himself until God sends the necessity. And this explanation is better than the former, and is consistent with Christian doctrine:

Do not cast vast measures of the earth into your mind; For there is no plant of truth upon the earth. Do not measure the measures of the sun ^C, having collected Rules: by the eternal counsel of the Father it is moved, not for your sake; Leave the rush of the moon: it runs forever by the force of necessity. The forward marching of the stars was not established for your sake; The wide rowing of birds in the air is never truthful, And the cuttings of victims and of entrails; all these are toys, Supports of the merchant of error. Flee these, If you wish to open the sacred garden of piety, Where virtue, wisdom, and equity are gathered together.

The Chaldean distracts the student from all Greek wisdom and teaches him to adhere to God alone. "Do not," he says, "grasp with your mind the infinite measure ^D of the earth: for there is no plant of truth on the earth"; that is, do not meddle with the great measures of the earth in your mind, as geographers are accustomed to do by measuring the earth; for the seed of truth is not in the earth. "Nor measure the measures of the sun, having collected rules; it is moved by the eternal counsel of the Father, not for your sake"—that is, do not occupy yourself with astronomy; for it is not moved for the sake of your life, but is moved eternally according to the will of God. "Leave the rush of the moon, it runs forever..."

JOANNES OPSOPOUS' NOTES. (4) "Do not cast vast measures of the earth into your mind." This verse is expressed in the third book of the Sibylline Oracles. (5) "Sun measures." This is not observed very curiously in the magical oracles. (6) "By the eternal counsel." Marsilio Ficino, in his book *On the Immortality of the Soul*, the last chapter, acknowledges this verse. (7) "And the cuttings of victims and of entrails." The same occurs in Synesius, in his book *On Dreams*, p. 102, varying somewhat. His words are: "But let this be taken as illustrative of the dignity concerning the life in phantasy, in relation to those who reject it and the lesser things, since it is no wonder to know such things for those who are stuck by excessive wisdom to those things denounced by the oracles." He says, "Not the cuttings of victims and of entrails; all these are toys." And he exhorts to flee them.

^A "By the work of necessity," that is, do not anxiously scrutinize the revolving motion of the moon; for it does not run for your sake, but is driven by a stronger necessity. "The progression of stars was not made for your sake," that is, the leaders and prefects of the stars, whether fixed or wandering, did not obtain their essence or substance for your sake. "The airy sole of birds, broad, which is not true," that is, the art exercised through birds flying in the air, which they also call augury, is not true, being a curious investigation of their flights, cries, and perches. He calls the "broad sole" the wide base of their feet, being broad on account of the extension of the toes, separated by the skin between them. "And the cuttings of victims and of entrails, all these are toys," that is, the so-called sacrificial art—namely, that which seeks foreknowledge through future victims, and through the cutting of the entrails of slaughtered animals—are clearly toys. "The supports of mercantile deception," that is, fraudulent occasions for gain. Do not, therefore (he says), curiousty investigate these things while being instructed by me, if you intend to open the holy paradise of piety. Now, the holy paradise of piety according to the Chaldeans is not that which the book of ^B Moses proclaims, but a meadow of the most sublime contemplations, where there are various trees of virtues, and the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil," that is, discerning prudence, which separates the better from the worse; and the "tree of life," that is, the plant of divine illumination, which produces in the soul the fruit of a holier and better life. In this paradise, therefore, virtue, wisdom, and equity are brought forth. ^C Virtue is one in genus, but many as divided into species. Wisdom, however, is the comprehensive grasp of all these, which the divine mind puts forth as its only ineffable element. Now, of such Chaldean exhortations, most are in some way manifest to our own instructions, but some have been rejected. For while our doctrine explicitly declares that the entire visible creation came into being for the sake of man, the Chaldean does not accept this word at all, but holds that the celestial bodies are moved forever by the force of necessity, not for our sake.

"Scrutinize the channel of the soul, whence or in what order Having served the body, you shall raise it up toward the order, ^D ... having united the work to the sacred reason."

That is, seek the origin of the soul, whence it was produced and served the body, and how one, having recovered and raised it up through the ritual works, might lead it back to where it came from, having united it to the sacred reason; and this is to be understood as follows. The "sacred reason" in us is the life endowed with intellect, or rather the higher faculty of the soul, which the oracle elsewhere calls the "flower of the mind." However, this sacred reason is unable by its own power to reach the higher ascent and the comprehension of divine things. And the reason of piety guides this toward God through illuminations from above, but the Chaldean [guides it] through the ritual science. For "ritual science" is that which as it were perfects the

soul through the power of the things on earth. To this sacred reason, he says, when you have joined the work, that is, when you have linked the work of the rite—or rather the superior power—to the sacred reason of the soul. Now, Gregory the Theologian, who is of our own, raises the soul to divine things by reason and contemplation: by reason, which holds the primacy in us and is endowed with intellect; by contemplation, which is an illumination coming from above. Plato, for his part, maintains that the essence devoid of generation and lacking a beginning can be grasped by us through reason and intellect. But the Chaldean says that we cannot be led to God otherwise than by strengthening the vehicle of the soul through material rites; for he believes that the soul is purified by woods, herbs, and incantations, and is rendered more agile for the ascent. ^B *Lest thou incline downward, a precipitous place lies beneath the earth, drawing from the seven-pathed, beneath which is the throne of Necessity.* The Oracle admonishes the soul that is nearest to God to apply its mind to Him alone, and not to let its inclination be directed downward; for great is the precipice from God toward the earth, dragging souls along through the seven-pathed grade. The "seven-pathed grade" is the spheres of the seven planets. For when the soul has inclined from above, it is borne toward the earth through these seven spheres. The descent through the seven circles, as if by steps, leads to the throne of Necessity; having reached which, the soul is forced to long for the earthly world.

*Never thou change the barbarous names.* That is, each nation has certain names divinely transmitted, which possess an ineffable power in the rites. Do not, therefore, change or translate them into the Greek tongue; such as the name Seraphim, and Cherubim, and Michael, and Gabriel. For when they are spoken thus according to the Hebrew dialect, they have an ineffable efficacy in the administration of sacred rites, but when changed into Greek names, they are altogether weak. As for me, I do not at all approve of the Chaldean rites, nor do I assent to their doctrine. I have, however, with difficulty revealed the obscurity of the oracle to you.

*How the world possesses intelligible sustainers, firm and immovable.* The Chaldeans posit powers in the world, which they have named leaders or rulers of the world, because they direct the world with providential movements. Therefore, the Oracle calls these powers or faculties "sustainers," because they sustain the whole world. And by "immobility" their firm and stable force is declared, while by "sustenance" the care of keeping and conservation is expressed. These faculties are defined by them through the sole causes of the worlds and their immobility. There are also other powers called by them "implacable," such as... [alt-version omitted] ^D

^B as those which are powerful and fixed, never yielding to these lower things, and are the reason why souls are not at all softened by the allurements of the passions.

Operate around the Hecatin circular device. The Hecatin circular device is a golden sphere, enclosing a sapphire in the middle, turned by a bull's-hide strap, possessing characters over its entire surface; those who turned it used it to perform invocations. ^C And they are accustomed to call such things "yunges," whether they had a spherical, triangular, or any other shape. And while shaking them, they would utter inarticulate or beast-like sounds, laughing, and whipping the air. He teaches, therefore, how to perform the operation, that is, the movement of such a circular device, as it possesses hidden power. It is called Hecatin because it is dedicated to Hecate; and Hecate is a goddess among the Chaldeans, having on her right side the source of the virtues. But the whole thing is nonsense.

If you often speak to me, you will see a lion everywhere. For the celestial, vaulted mass does not appear then, the stars do not shine, the moon's light is hidden, the earth does not stand firm; but all things are seen [full of lightning-bolts.

The lion is one of the twelve animals in the sky called the Zodiac; it is also called the house of the sun, whose source, that is, the cause of the lion-like composition of the stars, the Chaldean calls "leon-holder." ^D He says, therefore, that if during the sacred rites you invoke this source by its name, you will see nothing else in the sky but a lion-like phantom. For neither will the vaulted mass of the heavens—or rather, its circular shape—appear to you, nor will the stars shine; but even the moon is hidden, and all things are shaken by earthquakes. Such a leonine source does not remove their essence, but the ruling principle of their own existence obscures the viewing of them.

Extend the reins of fire on all sides to the formless soul. He calls the soul "formless"—or the reason—that which is without shape and without outline, or the most simple and most pure; but the "reins of fire" of such a soul are the liberated energy of the theurgic life, extending the fiery intellect toward the divine light itself. Extend, therefore, the reins of fire to the formless soul; that is, apply yourself to this and labor, so that in accordance with each power, it may receive the divine illuminations—that is, those powers consisting in the intellect, and in reasoning, and in opinion, so that they may receive illuminations conforming and corresponding to each. For this is what he means by "extend the reins of fire." But nature is prone to falter, and is held by the pursuit of another, inferior life.

^A O daring work of nature, O man. For man is a work, in that he was fashioned by an ineffable art of God; but the Oracle called him a "daring nature," as one who busies himself with higher things, both measuring the course of the stars and scrutinizing the orders of supernatural powers, observing even the regions far outside the celestial sphere, and contending to discourse even of God. For these attacks of the mind belong to a daring nature. It does not disparage boldness here, but has posited the urge of nature.

In the left flanks of Hecate lies the fountain of virtue, Remaining wholly within, not abandoning its virginity.

The Chaldeans define Hecate as a goddess holding the middle rank, and as it were the center of all powers. And in her right parts they place the fountain of souls; in the left, the fountain of goods or virtues. And they say that while the fountain of souls is prone to generation, the fountain of virtues remains within the limits of its own essence, incorrupt like an untouched virgin; and that it has obtained this firmness and immobility from the power of the implacable ones, and is girt with a virginal belt.

When you see a holy fire without form, Shining, leaping, through the whole depths of the world, Hear the voice of fire.

^B The Oracle treats of the divine fire seen by many men, and warns that if anyone sees such a light represented in any certain form or figure, he should not place further faith in it, nor accept the voice emitted from it as most true. Conversely, if it is offered to the sight free from all form and figure, you will not be deceived; but whatever you ask of it will certainly be true. This fire is called "holy," because it is seen with decorum by holy men, and leaping here and there, it appeared through the depths of the world as a manifest sign of great joy and grace.

Do not call the image of nature visible by itself.

^D An "inspection" is said to occur when he who is initiated into the sacred rites sees the divine lights. But if he sees nothing, and he who arranges and disposes the rites looks upon some spectrum by himself, it is called "super-inspection" with respect to the initiate. It must be noted that the image accustomed to being invoked in sacred rites must be perceivable by the mind, and entirely separable from any body. But the form or image of nature is not in every respect perceivable by the mind, because nature is for the most part an administrative power of bodies. "Do not therefore," he says, "invite in sacred ceremonies an image of nature visible by its own power." For it will bring to you nothing with it except a heap of the four natural elements.

JOANNIS OPSOPÆI NOTÆ. (13) *παρθένιον* ("virginity"). The verse requires *παρθένιον* in the neuter gender, as above, which you may find elsewhere.

^A Nature persuades us to believe that there are holy spirits, and the offshoots of evil matter, both useful and good.

It is not that nature itself persuades us of this, but rather that when it is invoked, before its arrival, a great throng of demons flows in, and various types of demoniacal shapes appear, generated in part from all the elements, and in part composed and divided from all the parts of the lunar orbit. Often appearing cheerful and gracious, they feign the appearance of some goodness toward the initiate.

The soul of men shall draw God into itself, Possessing nothing mortal, it is wholly inebriated. For boast in the harmony, beneath which exists the vital body.

He says that the soul constrains the divine fire into itself—for this is what "to draw" means—by way of immortality and purity. For then it is entirely inebriated—that is, it is filled with a more excellent life and illumination—and, as it were, moves outside of itself. Then the oracle addresses the soul, saying: "Boast in the harmony"—that is, glory in the obscure and intelligible union by which you are bound together through arithmetic and musical proportions. For under this intelligible harmony, even the vital and composite body has been joined together, having its constitution supplied from thence.

^B Let the immortal depth of the soul hold the principal place; and extend all the eyes upward to the height.

The "depth of the soul" refers to its triple powers: the intellectual, the cogitative, and the opinionative. The "eyes" are their triple cognitive energies. For the eye is the symbol of knowledge, while life is the symbol of appetite. He says, therefore, that the immortal depth of the soul must be opened, and you must extend all your cognitive powers upward to the height, and indeed extend your whole self, to use our own words, unto the Lord.

Do not defile the spirit, nor deepen the surface.

The Chaldaeans drape the soul in two tunics: one they call spiritual, woven for it from the sensible world; the other, light-like, thin, and intangible, which is here called "the surface." Therefore, he says, do not defile the spiritual tunic of the soul with the impurity of the passions, nor deepen its surface with certain material additions; rather, keep both as they are by nature: the one pure, the other uncolored. ^C

Seek paradise.

The entire chorus of divine powers surrounding the Father, and the fiery beauties of the creative fountains, is called "paradise" by the Chaldaeans. Its opening, which comes about through piety, is the enjoyment of good things; but the flaming sword is the power that is implacable to those who approach unworthily. And to these it is closed because of the ^D

lack of aptitude, ^A but to the pious it lies open. Toward this garden strive all the virtues that render men like unto God.

*Thy vessel shall the beasts of the earth inhabit.* ^B A "vessel" is the composite temperament of the soul; "beasts of the earth" are the demons who wander about the earth. Therefore, such beasts will inhabit our life when it has become full of passions. For these kinds are materialized in their passions, and they possess their seat and their order in the material realm; wherefore those who are given over to the passions are joined and glued to the demons, for like attracts like, having gained the power to move and the faculty from the passions themselves.

*If thou extendest the fiery mind to the work of piety, Thou shalt preserve even the fluid body.* ^B That is to say, if thou extendest the mind that has been illuminated from above, and having become a work of the divine fire, unto the works of piety (and works of piety among the Chaldeans are the methods of the rites), thou shalt not only render the soul insuperable to the passions, but also thy body more healthy. For this also is very often a work of divine illuminations: to consume the matter of the body, and to render the nature healthy, so that it may be seized by neither passions nor any diseases.

*But from the ends of the earth leap forth the terrestrial dogs, Showing no true sign to man.* ^C The discourse is concerning material demons; and he calls them "dogs" because they are the executioners of souls; "terrestrial," because they have fallen from heaven and roll about the earth. These, he says, being placed very far from the blessedness of the divine life, and being destitute of intellectual contemplation, are unable to foretell the future. Whence it happens that all which they say or show is false and unsupported by any certainty. For they know beings through their forms. But that which is endowed with the faculty of knowing the future individually and, so to speak, in particulars, employs individual and formless intelligences.

*For the Father perfected all things, and delivered them to the Second Mind, whom every race of men calls first.* ^D When the first Father of the Trinity had created the whole of creation, he delivered it to the Mind; which Mind the whole race of men, being ignorant of the paternal preeminence, calls the first God. Yet our doctrine holds the contrary: that this very first Mind, I mean the Son of the great Father, created all creation and perfected it by working. For in the Mosaic writings, the Father indicates to the Son the form, or idea, of the production of creatures; but the Son is the actual executor and creator of the created work.

JOANNES OPSOPÆUS’ NOTES. (14) *Thy vessel, etc.* Nicephorus inserted this exposition of the oracle word-for-word into his commentary on Synesius, page 814. (15) *Terrestrial.* See the scholia of Nicephorus, page 117.

^A *Pœnæ vincula sunt homines constringentia.* For the anagogic angels lead up the souls, drawing them to themselves from generation. But the punishments—that is, the vindictive powers of the given natures, which are also envious of human souls—bind these to material passions and, as it were, strangle them; and they torment not only those who are filled with passions, but also those who have turned to the immaterial essence. For even these, having come into matter and generation, have need of such purification. Indeed, we see many even of those who have lived holily and purely falling into unexpected calamities.

*Signa insevit animabus mens paterna.*

^B *Vi corpus relinquentium animæ sunt purissimæ.* If anyone listens to this saying with an open mind, he will not find it contrary to our doctrines. For the crowned martyrs, having left the body during a time of affliction with torture, made their own souls clean and pure. But the Chaldean does not mean this, nor does he praise every violent death; rather, he says that the soul, having left the body with difficulty, abhors the life here, hates its return to this life, and rejoices as it departs to the things above. But those who leave life in sickness through the dissolution of the vital body do not at all chafe at the inclination and turn toward it.

^C *Quia anima ignis est lucidus potentia patris,* *Immortalisque manet, et vitæ domina est,* *Et habet multa complementa sinuum.* The soul, being immaterial and an incorporeal fire, separated from all compound things and from the wholistic body, is immortal. For no material or dark thing is commingled with it; nor is it composite, so that it could be dissolved into the things of which it was constituted. Moreover, it is the mistress of life, illuminating the dead with the rays of life. It also has "many complements of its folds"—that is, it possesses powers capable of receiving the entire administration; for according to their diverse virtues, they are able to dwell in the different zones of the heavens.

^D *Deus non injicit metum, sed obsequium infundit.* That is, the divine nature is not raging or prone to anger, but sweet and tranquil; whence it does not inspire fear in the subject natures, but draws all things to itself through persuasion and grace. For if it were fearful

and threatening, the whole order of beings would have been dissolved, since no one could sustain His power. This dogma, however, is in part true among us. For God is both light and fire consuming those who are evil. But the threat and fear of God is a suspension of His benevolence toward us on account of the perverse administration of things.

*The Father caught Himself away,* *Nor did He enclose His own fire in His intellectual power.*

The sense of the oracle is this: the supreme God of all, who is also called Father, makes Himself incomprehensible and imperceptible, not only to the first and second natures and to our souls, but even to His own power. But the power of the Father is the Son. For He says: *The Father caught Himself away* from every nature. But this dogma is not orthodox. For among us, the Father is taught to be in the Son, just as the Son is in the Father. And the Son is the limit of the Father, and the divine Word transcends the powers of nature.

*There is something intelligible, which must be perceived by the flower of the mind.*

The soul has a power appropriate to each thing perceived by the mind: for sensible things, sensation; for cogitable things, cognition; for intelligible things, the mind. The Chaldean therefore says that although God is intelligible, He cannot be comprehended by the mind, but only by the flower of the mind. The flower of the mind, however, is the singular and individual power of the soul. Since, therefore, God is strictly One, do not attempt to comprehend Him through the mind, but through that singular power. For ^C that which is primarily One can be comprehended only by that which is one within us, and neither by cognition nor by the mind.

*The expulsors of the soul, making it to breathe, are easily unbound.*

Lest someone should say, "I wish to set the soul free from the body, but I am unable," the oracle says that the faculties which draw the soul out of the corporeal nature, and cause it, as it were, to breathe away from the toil and wickedness in the body, are easily unbound—that is, those very faculties are free and not constrained by any nature, and they possess the power, with great nobility, to expedite and liberate the soul from its bodily fetters.

*You must hasten to the light and to the rays of the Father,* *Whence the soul was sent to you, clothed with much mind.*

Since ^D the soul did not derive its subsistence from seeds, nor consist in corporeal temperaments, but obtained its essence from above from God, therefore it ought to turn back and look toward Him, and make its ascent toward the divine light. For it came into these lower regions clothed with much mind—that is, it was girded and instructed by the Father and Creator with the reminders of things more divine.

^A of a lower condition, since it desires to return from here to that place, so that it may rightly be stirred by these same warnings to hasten back there from here.

*All things are produced from one fire.* The dogma is true and consonant with our religion. ^B For all things that are, whether perceptible by mind or by sense, have received their essence from God alone, and have been turned towards God alone: those that exist only, essentially; those that both exist and live, essentially and vitally; and those that exist, live, and understand, essentially, vitally, and intellectually. Therefore, the bringing back of all things is from the One. And this oracle is devoid of any error, and is full of our teaching.

*What the mind speaks, it speaks by understanding.* When, he says, you hear an articulate voice thundering down from heaven, do not think that the angel or God who uttered this voice gave it substance by means of spoken language. ^B But that being, according to its own nature, has conceived those things which you have heard only without division, in its mind alone; whereas you, according to the ability you possess, have perceived the thoughts of the mind as if they were syllables and words uttered by mouth. For just as God hears our voices without the articulation of words, so also man receives the conceptions of the divine mind as if expressed in speech, each according to the ratio and capacity of his own nature.

*Perpetually the earth beneath moans for these even to their children.* The discourse is about the impious, that God extends their punishment even to their descendants. For the oracle, indicating the punishments which are to be undergone under the earth, says that *it moans beneath for them*—that is, the subterranean place groans against them and bellows as it were with a leonine roar. ^C Wherefore Proclus also says: The constitution of kindred souls is congenerous, or similar; and those which have not yet been released from the bonds of nature are held fast, entangled in similar affections. It is therefore necessary that these also should fulfill every punishment, and when, by reason of their natural kinship, they have become infected and filled with pollutions, that they should be purified from them anew.

*Do not increase the fate.* The wiser among the Greeks call Nature *Fate*, or rather the fulfillment of the illuminations which the nature of beings receives. ^D Providence, indeed, is the immediate benefaction of God; but Fate is that which governs earthly things through the connection and series of all things. We are subject to providence when we act intellectually; but to fate when we act also corporeally. Do not, therefore (he says), wish to increase your own fate, and to overcome it, but commit yourself to the will and moderation of God alone.

*For nothing imperfect rolls forth from the paternal principle.* The Father, he says, leads forth all things perfect and in all respects

and produces each thing in its own order and dignity: but the weakness and slackening of engendered things sometimes suggests defect and imperfection. But the Father again recalls the defect to perfection, and converts it to his own self-sufficiency. Of such a kind is that which the Apostle James, the brother of the Lord, proclaimed in the beginning of his Epistle with a loud voice: "Every perfect gift is from above, descending from the Father of lights" (Jas. 1:17). For nothing imperfect proceeds from the perfect, especially when we are prompt and ready to receive immediately that which is poured forth primarily from Him.

But the ^A paternal mind does not admit that, until [it has gone forth].

The paternal mind does not admit the impulses of the soul's will, until it has cast out the forgetfulness of the riches received from the most bountiful Father, and has recalled to memory the holy tokens it had from Him, and has sent forth a voice betokening sincerity, joined with a firm memory of the symbols of its generating Father. For the soul is composed of sacred words and divine symbols; of which the former proceed from the sacred forms, but the latter from the divine unities. And we are indeed images of the sacred essences, but likenesses of the unknown tokens. It is also worthy to know this, that every soul differs from every other soul in its species, and there are as many species of souls as there are souls. ^B

When you see a terrestrial spirit approaching, Sacrifice the *muizurim* stone, invoking [it].

The terrestrial demons are by nature liars, inasmuch as they are far removed from divine knowledge and filled with dark matter. But if you desire to hear some true word from one of them, prepare an altar and sacrifice the *muizurim* stone. For this stone has the power of invoking a greater demon, who, by an occult method, being applied to the material spirit, whispers the truth of the matters inquired after, which that spirit then brings forward to the man who is questioning it. ^C It indicates the very name to be used in the invocation, together with the sacrifice of the stone. Now the Chaldeans maintain that some demons are good and others are evil; but our doctrine of piety pronounces them all to be evil, as they have exchanged goodness for vice and malignity through a deliberate defection.

Learn that the intelligible is outside the mind.

For although all things are comprehended by the mind, yet God, the first intelligible, exists outside the mind. But do not measure that "outside" by the distance of intervals, nor conceive of it according to an intellectual difference, but only according to the intelligible ^D excess and the property of subsistence—an excess existing beyond all mind, by which the super-essential is shown. For the

that essence, the intellect which is primarily intelligible, beyond which exists the self-intelligible, except for God, who is beyond both the intelligible and the self-intelligible. And we do not say that that Divine Being is intelligible, nor that it is self-intelligible. For it is superior to every word and every thought, being altogether unthinkable and inexpressible, and to be honored by silence rather than by marvelous voices. For it is higher than being honored, and than being uttered, and than being conceived ^A.

The *iunges* (intelligences) conceive from the Father; and these are moved by unspoken counsels to conceive.

The *iunges* are certain powers after the Paternal depth, composed of three triads; which are conceived according to the Paternal intellect, which has established the cause of them within itself in a unified manner. But the counsels of the Father, on account of their intelligible excellence, are unspoken. And the marks of those things which are separated are intellectual, even if they are conceived by the secondary beings, for they are conceived as unspoken, and as separated from the intelligible processions. For as the conceptions of souls, even if they conceive of the intelligible orders, conceive of them as immutable, so also the intellectual operations, when conceiving of the intellectual marks, conceive of them as unspoken, existing in unknown substances ^B.

JOANNIS OPSOPÆI NOTES. (21) The *iunges*. I have retained the Greek term *iunges* in the translation, because the poet Lælius used it in these verses as found in Apuleius: *Philtra omnia undique eruunt:* *Antipathes illud quæritur,* *Trochili, iunges, tæniæ* Roots, herbs, sprigs, etc. See the reason for the name and its meaning in the commentators on Pindar and Theocritus, and likewise in Suidas and Nicephorus regarding these words of Synesius, p. 96 ^C.

SUMMARIA ET BREVIS DOGMATUM CHALDAICORUM EXPOSITIO

A SUMMARY AND BRIEF EXPOSITION OF CHALDEAN DOGMAS BY THE SAME PSELLUS

They say there are seven corporeal worlds, one being fiery and the first, and after it three ethereal, then three material; of which the last is called earthly and light-hating, which is the place under the moon, containing within itself also the matter which they call the "depth." They believe in one principle of all things, and they strip it naked, calling it one and good. Then they worship a certain Paternal depth, composed of three triads. And each triad has a father, a power, and an intellect. Then there is the intelligible *iunx*; and after this, the continuous beings, the fiery, the ethereal ^D

^A and the material. After these continuous beings, the rites' leaders exist; and after these, the fontal fathers, who are also called world-leaders; of whom the first is he who is once beyond; after whom is Hecate; then he who is twice beyond; after whom are the three implacable ones; and last is the succinctor. They also venerate a fontal trinity of faith, truth, and love. They also posit a solar emperor, and from the material source, an archangelic source, a source of sensation, a fontal judgment, a fulmineous source, a source of mirrors, a source of characters incumbent upon unknown signs and symbols, and fontal summits of Apollo, Osiris, and Hermes. They say the material sources are of the centers, the elements, and the zone of dreams, and a fontal soul. ^B After the sources, they say there are the principles. For the sources are more princely than the principles; and of the life-giving principles, the summit is called Hecate. The middle is the fontal soul. The extremity is the fontal virtue. They also have among them *azonoi* Hecates, such as the Chaldean triple-manifesting one, the *komai*, and the *ekklustikē*. The *azonikoi* gods among them are: Sarapis, and Dionysus, and the series of Osiris, and that of Apollo. They are called *azonoi* because they readily exercise their power in the zones, and are established above the visible gods. The *zonaioi* are those who revolve absolutely around the zones in heaven and govern the things therein. For there is a *zonaion* divine genus among them, which apportions the parts of the sensible world and girds the distributions around the material place. After the zones is the non-wandering or fixed circle, containing the seven spheres in which the stars are. And there is for them another solar world, serving the ethereal abyss; and another, the *Zonaion*, being one of the seven. For human souls, they posit two fontal causes emanating from the perennial source: the paternal mind, and the fontal soul. Moreover, the particular soul proceeds, as they will, from the fontal one according to the will of the Father; and it has an essence generated by itself and animated. For it is not moved by another source. ^C For if, as it is stated in the oracle, it is a part of the divine fire and a luminous fire and a paternal conception, it is truly a form void of matter and subsisting by itself. For all those things participate in the divine nature, of which the soul is a particle. They say that all things are within each soul, but also that for each individual there exists an inexplicable and unknown symbol of speakable and unspeakable tokens; and they often make the soul descend into the world for many causes: either through a shedding of wings, or through the paternal will. They believe the world to be eternal, as well as the revolutions of the stars; and they partition Hades in many ways. For at one time they call it a god, the leader of the subcelestial lot; at another time they say it is the place under the moon; and at another time ^D [the place] most middle of the ethereal world and the material, and now the irrational soul, and...

the meanest part of the ethereal world and the material, and now the irrational soul; and they place the rational soul within it, not essentially, but relatively, when it is in sympathy with it and puts forth a particular reason. They deem the Ideas, now as the thoughts of the Father, now as universal reasons—natural, psychical, and intelligible—and now as the existences ^A removed from sensible things. They establish the reasons for magical practices from the highest powers and from terrestrial materials. They declare that the things above are in sympathy with the things below, especially those beneath the moon. They restore souls after the so-called death, according to the measures of their proper purifications, into all parts of the world. Some they raise even above the world, and define them as situated between the indivisible and divisible natures. Most of these doctrines were accepted by Aristotle and Plato; but those around Plotinus and Iamblichus, Porphyry and Proclus followed them in every way, and accepted these things as divine utterances without ^B any reasoning.

BY PSELLUS ON THE PIMANDRUM OF HERMES TRISMEGISTUS

It seems that this sorcerer has not been occupied with divine Scripture ^C just in passing; and starting from it, he undertakes to discuss the creation of the world, not hesitating at times to write down the Mosaic words themselves quite plainly. As, for instance, in the statement before us: for the phrase, "God said, Increase and multiply," is clearly from the Mosaic account of creation. Yet he did not remain entirely in the simplicity, clarity, straightforwardness, sincerity, and divine nature of Scripture, but slipped into the habit customary to the wise men of the Greeks; he turned aside from the straight and unerring path into allegories, errors, and portents, or was perhaps driven by the Poimandres. It is not unknown who this "Poimandres" of the Greeks was, who is called among us the "ruler of the world," or one of his ministers. For the devil is a thief, he says, and steals our words ^D not so that his disciples might unlearn their impiety, but so that, by adorning their own impiety with the words and thoughts of truth, they might make it more persuasive