words Allatius repeats (Contra Hotting. p. 466, 467) along with these: Πρᾶγμα μεγάλης εὐλαβείας τε καὶ σοφίας, ὅμοιον εἴ τις ἔλεγε μὴ δεῖν παρρησιάζεσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν. "A matter of great devotion and wisdom, indeed! As if he were to say that the truth ought not to be proclaimed publicly." We cannot deny, however, that this dispute was most appropriate for Greek readers and very useful for the subject itself. The work is deservedly called by Mai A a dense work, overflowing with sharpness of intellect, abundance of words, and not without charm, in which this dogmatic controversy is developed and ventilated with the greatest vigor—a matter which was finally defined by ecumenical decrees.
IV. Furthermore, nothing beyond what Allatius (Contra Hotting. p. 467 et seq.) had alleged from the sixth dialogue, and what he had provided from Nicephorus Blemmida (Gr. orth. I, p. 6 et seq.), has been published since; Allatius himself also treated of the author in his Diatriba de Nicetis § x (Mai, Nov. bibl. PP. t. VI, p. 11, p. 12 et seq.; De consens. Eccl. Occid. et Orient. 1734, t. I, p. 46) and Le Quien (Dissert. I in opp. Joan. Damasc. § 43, p. 24; Panoplia adversus schisma Græcorum, p. 323 et seq.). Finally, the Eminent Mai published the Prologue together with a Latin version (Nov. Bibl. PP., t. VI, p. 11, p. 443, 446). We saw these dialogues both in Florence in the Laurentian codex, xxxvii, n. 2, plut. xxxi (see Bandini's Catal. t. II, p. 114) and in Rome in the Vatican codex 1115, where on f. 58v the prologue published by Mai is found, which in the Laurentian codex is placed before the first dialogue. But we were unable to transcribe either copy in its entirety, as we were occupied with other works and hindered by a shortage of time; B however, we have collected several fragments from them, augmented by the notes of a certain friend residing in Rome, which, even though they do not present even an third part of the long work, we have nevertheless thought fit to communicate to the learned reader, who can thereby gain a more accurate view of the whole work. These, if I am not mistaken, could also provide some assistance to a future editor of these dialogues, although we ourselves have not been able to expend upon them the labor that was our desire.
V. We conclude briefly by describing the argument of the dialogues, even though it is already sketched out in the Prologue of Nicetas. In the first three dialogues, therefore, the Greek puts forward his objections against the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son, which the Latin for the most part refutes solidly and copiously. In the fourth, the images used by the Fathers are explained by the Latin, and the equivalence of the prepositions EX and PER in this matter is treated. In the fifth, the Latin sets forth his arguments more fully and moves to the testimonies of the Fathers, which are reported more fully in the sixth dialogue. The conclusion, at length, is that the Latins are right to believe that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, but were wrong to add the word Filioque to the Creed.
OF THE MOST BLESSED METROPOLITAN OF THESSALONICA, NICETAS OF MARONEIA, VARIOUS DISCOURSES CONSTRUCTED IN THE FORM OF A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. THE PERSONAE: GREEK AND LATIN.
PROEMIUM
A The scope of this discourse is an investigation and joint examination regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit, and the resolution of the ambiguity that exists between us and the Latins concerning such an issue, aiming at the removal of the schism that has arisen between both parties from this. The character of the discourse is dialogical, being most suited to the precision of matters requiring a more accurate consideration—and especially most appropriate for the joint examination of ecclesiastical dogmas—and most useful and necessary for the discovery of truth for those who do not wish to wrangle; and for this reason, some of the great teachers have made use of this kind of discourse. As for the persons of the dialogue, they are the Latin and the Greek. The speech of each of these is fashioned to be of equal weight and equal power, partly because of the underlying subject matter, as the topic has not yet been previously examined and decided upon synodically, and thus it possesses no small force from both sides B and because—
A it is of the Latin character not to endure appearing to have the weaker argument, but to contend as if to win, and in matters where it is not easy for him to win, to hold his head high as though priding himself in his argument; and that he is excessive in being ambitious to show off in discourse so as not to appear to be left behind in wisdom by the Greek. The Greek, on the other hand, in order to provide a specimen of his own modesty, willingly concedes many things and moderates his discourse with a milder mind and judgment, showing clearly that he is led not by the desire to contend, but by the desire for the truth. He imitates those skilled in the wrestling grounds, who, by pretending to sink to their knees and by appearing on the point of falling, have often defeated their adversaries, and by feigning to be entangled have instead entangled those others and cast them down. B But primarily each one sets forth his own principles; the Greek, indeed, attempts to drive the Latin’s argument to an absurdity, and through the appearance of many absurdities, he endeavors to demonstrate that his opinion is absurd; but the latter hastens to resolve these absurdities and shows that either they are not absurd, as is alleged, or that they do not follow from his own dogma. Then both transition to the illustration of examples, for this, too, is a customary mode of discourse for theologians. The Latin, for his part, insinuates the things pertaining to the procession of the Spirit from the analogy of images; but the Greek partly finds fault with these images, and partly brings against them other, allegedly more suitable, ones, forcing them back the other way. In turn, the Latin imitates the Greek, rejecting his images and demonstrating his own to be more apt. Afterwards, they institute a discussion that is quite questioning, and they doubt one another, while unable to resolve the difficulties; yet they say and show that the controversy consists on both sides not because of some absurdity of the problem, or because it is implausible or impossible—for otherwise they would never have reached an agreement—but because of the transcendent nature of the subject of the theology. C Finally, they contend among themselves through testimonies, and the Latin, as well as the Greek, sets up against himself other, allegedly conflicting ones, and they declare that the contrary sayings of the holy teachers are the cause of the rivalry and division between the two parties. Thereafter, they compare and reconcile the testimonies; and thus they themselves, as though thinking the same thing, finally converge in harmony: the one having learned from the holy Fathers that he must necessarily no longer pronounce the words "from the Son" in the holy Symbol; the other having been persuaded no longer to call him a person of different opinion, since the preposition *Ex* among the Latins and the preposition *Per* among us (the Greeks) have no difference D as far as the Son is concerned.
FIRST DIALOGUE
A GR. Come then, O Latin, let us cast far from ourselves the spirit of contention and strife—as being obstacles to the finding of the truth—and let us, with the help of the Holy Spirit, examine together the question concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, about which we differ. For if we wish to be true worshippers and adorers of the Holy Spirit, we ought, both in all other matters and especially in our discourses concerning Him, to invoke the Holy Spirit Himself to be our guide in finding and understanding the truth; for the difficulty is greater in questions that concern God. Now, God is true, and the Holy Spirit is worshipped together with the Father and the Son, as being of the same nature and glorified together; and since He knows His own things—and indeed He alone, with the Father and the Son, searches the deep things of God—He knows how to reveal them to whom, and when, and how much is fitting. But this will not be the case for those who wish to contradict out of a spirit of contention; for the illumination and enlightenment of the Spirit is far from contentious disputations.
LAT. Come, O Greek, out of love for the truth, or—which is the same thing—out of love for God (for God is veracious, and God is truth, and truth comes to all from God). For I desire the disquisition upon this matter, and for a long time now I have yearned with vehement desire for this debate. May the Paraclete, the Spirit of truth, come to us and direct our discourse well, turning the crooked things into straight, as a right Spirit, being renewed in the inward parts of the faithful B and filling up the deficient valleys of our knowledge, and making the rough ways plain for us.
GR. The prayer of both of us is now common, and our goal one and the same: namely, the inquiry and finding of the truth concerning the proposed question. Let us, therefore, begin the task.
LAT. But first, let us set forth and weigh a few small points concerning what is dogmatized and stated by us regarding the Holy Trinity, as a prelude to our debate; for perhaps these will have no small weight in directing it well and appropriately, especially if they are granted by us here by common consent. For it will be more easily discerned by this method, in what follows, both what is in harmony with our common confessions and what is at variance with them. For we must make what is said agree with the starting points, and what is in agreement—this...
A genuine—is to be judged as such, while what is discordant is to be rejected as spurious and repugnant. GR. You speak rightly. For this becomes an excellent order and contributes not a little to the discernment of the truth. For what follows from true principles and premises is itself entirely true; conversely, what is opposed and repugnant to them will be false; and so it must be done. 2. LAT. Tell me then: do you say there are certain things in the Trinity that are essential and natural? GR. I do. For it is certain that it possesses both essence and nature, even if its being is above essence and above nature. LAT. Do you posit essence and nature as being the same, or different? GR. Altogether the same. For thus do the holy Fathers teach B. LAT. What then? Do you not also say that certain things that are hypostatic and personal exist in the Trinity? GR. I affirm this too. For there are in it hypostases and persons, even if the holy Trinity is nameless and above every name. For the existence of the superdivine Divinity is above every thing and thought and denomination—above every existing thing—or, to speak more properly, a superexistence; yet the Divinity of the holy Trinity is preached as one and the same and indifferent essence and nature, and again, the Father and the Son and the Spirit are the hypostases and persons of the Divinity. LAT. Do you say that these and those are the same, or do you say they are different? GR. Which ones do you mean? Explain. LAT. Is essence the same as hypostasis, or something else? And is nature the same as person, or not the same? GR. Nature is one thing, distinct from person, and essence is one thing, distinct from hypostasis. For thus it has seemed good—even if sometimes among some people, essence or nature and hypostasis, which are different names, are taken for one another, that is, for one and the same thing. But hypostasis and person are the same, just as likewise essence and nature are the same. Consequently, in accordance with these, the things that are called essential and natural are the same, while those that are hypostatic and personal are different from these, although they also are the same among themselves. C For essential and natural are one thing, and hypostatic and personal are another, even though neither the essential and natural exist without the hypostatic and personal, nor these without those. For essence and nature are something else, as I said, than hypostasis and person; but neither is without the other. For neither is the essence insubsistent, nor is the subsistence devoid of essence D.
A
LAT. Then what do you maintain these to be, namely, essence and nature, or essential and natural properties, and what are the others, hypostasis and person, or hypostatic and personal properties? GR. That which is common and one and the same to the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, this I call essence and nature; and those things which belong to them in common, unitedly, and identically, these I call essential and natural. But each of the three I call a hypostasis and a person, and whatever is proper to each one, that I call hypostatic and personal.
LAT. Perhaps you speak correctly; but explain what you have said further, and by examples.
GR. We are accustomed to call the supernatural and super-essential Deity the nature of the holy Trinity, one and the same, and an essence simple and devoid of difference, B having itself the same way in the Father, and in the Son, and in the holy Spirit. As for those things which are natural and essential, although they are properly called such when they belong to certain things according to their essence, yet now in the Trinity we use the term in a broad sense for those things which are considered *about* the essence, common and identically and indivisibly; since those things which are *according* to essence are entirely hidden and incomprehensible, devoid of a name, and are more sublime than any name. For all our knowledge and appellation of God, every name and every thought, comes to us not from those things which are *according* to Him, but from those things which are *about* Him. Therefore, we call natural and essential in the holy Trinity the most perfect goodness and that which transcends all good, the most potent power and that which is elevated above power, the most wise wisdom and that which is eminent above all things, the omnipotent, creative, fashioning, governing, and sustaining force of all creation, that which is eternal, timeless and beyond time, everlasting and beyond eternity, that which as to time has no beginning, the uncreated, the unbegotten (written with one 'n'), the unending, the incomprehensible, the illimitable, the uncircumscribed, the invisible, C the infinite, that which transcends all sense and thought; in a word, all things whatsoever that are common and the same to the Father, the Son, and the holy Spirit, we call essential and natural, not properly, as if they existed in them according to essence, but in a broad sense, as being considered about the essence in common and identically and indivisibly. We call each of the three, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, a hypostasis and a person; but we call those things hypostatic and personal which exist in each of these in an individual way: paternity, sonship, and the property of the holy Spirit, according to which the Spirit is called proceeding; the unbegotten (written with two 'n's), the begotten, and likewise the proceeding; and the unbegottenness, the generation, and the procession; and we maintain that these do not shift, but that each one of them remains a characteristic property and mark D of each hypostasis, immovable and unchangeable; the unbegottenness of the Father, because He is not from anyone, and it belongs neither to the Son nor to the Spirit; the generation of the Son, and it belongs neither to the Father nor to the Spirit; for He alone is begotten from the Father, which is why He is also alone—
He is the Only-Begotten; the procession of the Spirit, which belongs neither to the Father nor to the Son, for the Holy Spirit alone is proceeding.
3. LAT. What then? Since the Father is unbegotten, because He is from no one, and this is His own property, will nothing therefore be from Him? B GR. On the contrary, the Father is indeed unbegotten and from no one; but it is from Him that both the Son and the Spirit have come forth.
LAT. What then? Since there is a certain progression from Him, is this uniform and without any difference?
GR. Not at all. For the manner of progression is diverse and manifests diverse persons. For one is the manner of progression according to which the Son is from Him—and this is called generation—and another is the manner according to which the Spirit is said to come forth from Him; and this is called procession. Both are according to substance—not because they present a difference of substance (heaven forbid!), but because both the Son, though by generation, and the Spirit, though by procession, are from the substance of the Father, and not from without, not from nothing, as are creatures. And the Father is said to beget the Son, while the Spirit is said to be produced or emitted—I do not know how I might say it more aptly or fittingly. Each manner has obtained its own proper name, which the Holy Spirit bestowed; but to us it is unknown and incomprehensible. However, that one is one and the other is another, we know from the things which are said differently about each. Who and what each one is, and what their difference is, is known to the Trinity alone; for nothing more regarding these things has been revealed to us from the divine oracles. Do you not say the same?
LAT. I do. In these matters I agree with you and think the same. Now let us enter into the very C question and controversy, and let us weigh that in which the dispute between us lies and in which we are divided from one another. Let it therefore be inquired whether one ought to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, or also from the Son.
GR. That, indeed, the Holy Spirit Himself has revealed through the divinely inspired Scriptures, and holy Fathers and the teachers of the Church, initiated through the Holy Spirit, have handed down the dogmas of the evangelical and apostolic faith in their divinely inspired instructions; and nothing is in any way opposed to a right and pious sentiment, nor does any absurdity follow from it.
LAT. Name one or two of them, so that I also may know. D
A GR. (13) If the Spirit, proceeding from the Father, proceeds also from the Son, the properties are confused, either as though passing from one hypostasis into another, or as though the same hypostasis were receiving a property from yet another; a notion which is not far from the opinion of Sabellius. For if the Father and the Son are one and the same according to Sabellius, it follows necessarily that the Spirit, proceeding from the Father, must also proceed from the Son; and perhaps it would even proceed from Himself.
LAT. But among us the opinion of Sabellius has no place. For we do not confuse the hypostases and the persons, nor do we transpose the properties, nor do we transfer one and the same hypostasis into another and different property. Neither do we deem those three to be one person or one tripersonal hypostasis; but we declare that there are three hypostases of the Godhead, and we preserve each hypostasis in its unmoved property. For we posit that the property of the Father is to be unbegotten, that of the Son to be begotten, and that of the Holy Spirit to be proceeding. But just as we attribute to the Father not only being unbegotten, but also generative and productive—or "emissive," if one must use that term—so too do we attribute to the Son not only being begotten, but also the power to produce; and to the Spirit, to proceed—yet not simply. Rather, [it proceeds] from the Father, but also from the Son; that is to say, it proceeds immediately from the Son, and mediately from the Father, because it proceeds from the Father through the Son, but from the Son through nothing else. For since the Father is unbegotten, He begets the Son; B and in begetting the Son, through the mediation of the Son, He forth-breathes the Spirit at the same time. The Son, being begotten, also forth-breathes the Spirit. And the Spirit, again, proceeding mediately from the Father, inasmuch as the Son mediates in the procession, proceeds at the same time from the Son, no longer through any other intermediate. Thus, we posit as the Father's own property that He is unbegotten, generative, and mediately productive: unbegotten, because He is from no one; generative, because He begets the Son; and mediately productive, because through the mediation of the Son He also forth-breathes the Spirit. And for the Son, [the property is] to be begotten and to produce immediately: begotten, because He Himself is begotten by the Father; and immediately productive, because He immediately emits the Spirit from Himself, being Himself a medium between the Father and the Spirit. And for the Holy Spirit, the property is to proceed mediately from the Father and to proceed immediately from the Son, since the Son is considered as lying between the Father and the Spirit, while between the Son and the Spirit, as far as the procession is concerned, there is no one. And these we say are the properties of each of the three persons, which remain unmoved and entire without any change or alternation. C Just as, therefore, there is no confusion of properties, which the Latin [author] refutes very aptly. D
A For just as the Father is not begotten, and for that reason neither begets nor brings forth [the Spirit], but is both these and those things, being unbegotten, yet is also Begetter and Source—the former immediately from Himself, the latter mediately through the Son—so too the Son, because He is begotten, is not for that reason excluded from the procession [of the Spirit]. And the Spirit, because He proceeds from the Father, is not for that reason excluded from proceeding from the Son; rather, His procession is immediate from the Son, and mediate from the Father. The property of each Person is thus kept unmoved and unconfused; in this way, there is a Trinity in the Monad and an indivisible Monad in the Trinity. For the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are a Monad and a Trinity: a Monad in accordance with the nature of the Godhead, which is one and the same, indivisible and unalterable; a Trinity in accordance with the properties, which remain unmoved, as we have said before. B But since the properties are kept unmoved for each, it cannot be said that the Spirit proceeds from Himself, because this is not the property of the Spirit; but as He proceeds from the Father through the Son, He proceeds also from the Son, and not through any other. And where, then, is the confusion of Sabellius? For if, in agreement with him, we asserted that the Father and the Son, or even the Holy Spirit, were one hypostasis or person, while saying that He proceeds from the Father and proceeds from the Son, we would be in accord with Sabellius, or at any rate semi-Sabellians, as some others are semi-Arians. For if we set forth the Three as one hypostasis, we would be following Sabellius, and we would make the Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son no more than from Himself; indeed, we would make the Father both begetting and begotten and proceeding, and each of these no more from another than from Himself; and the Son not only begotten, but also proceeding, and furthermore begetting; and the Spirit again not only proceeding, but also begetting and begotten. Such are the trifles of Sabellius, who attributes different names and different properties to one and the same person. C But if we were to say that the Father and the Son alone are one person, and from this one person taught that the Spirit proceeds, we would even then be semi-Sabellians, asserting that He who proceeds does so from the Father and the Son. But now, we, holding the Father to be one person of the Godhead, and the Son another—of the same nature, of course—and likewise the Spirit another, and then positing that He who proceeds from the Father also proceeds from the Son, we speak in a different way. Those, however, who say that the Father and the Son are one person, and then affirm that the Spirit is processive from the Father and from the Son, have an absurd consequence following them; not because they simply say "from the Father and the Son," but because they posit them as one from both, and because they treat the Father and the Son as one, not according to the force of the Lord's word, but otherwise than He says: "I and the Father are one." D But we, when we say that the Spirit is from the Father and from the Son, do not say so as from one, but as from two consubstantial persons the consubstantial [Spirit] proceeds...
A after a certain unknown and ineffable manner. To say, then, that the Spirit is from both as from one is impious, because it is Sabellian; but to say that the Spirit is from both, without them having a difference in essence or a distinction in the duality of names, but [rather] in hypostatic properties, is far from Sabellian impiety. Wherefore, since this dogma is different from the opinion of Sabellius, do not deem it Sabellian and to be rejected. But you should demonstrate that it is absurd from some other angle.
5. GR. Be these things so, and let it not be Sabellian to say that the procession of the most holy Spirit is from the Father and from the Son; yet that [other point] is absurd B. For if [it is] from both, the property of [the Spirit's] hypostasis is henceforth composite for him, and the hypostasis is not simple but composite, because he proceeds both immediately and mediately, the one from the Father, the other from the Son; and thus also the property of the Son is found to be composite, having not only to be begotten from the Father, but also to produce the Spirit from himself immediately as a middle [term].
LAT. According to this reasoning, there would be composition also concerning the Father, and much more so, because he is not only unbegotten, but also begetting and spirating. But if these things on the part of the Father do not introduce composition, neither will those on the part of the Son and Spirit introduce composition. Or what kind of partition and distribution is this, that the Father is not composite from innascibility, generation, and [active] spiration, but the Son is composite on account of passive generation and active spiration, and the Spirit is composite because he proceeds from a double cause and in a double way, namely from the Father and from the Son, mediately and immediately? Although, even if we grant a simple property to each C according to your speech, even so, as you say, a duality will be introduced, and composition will follow, and each will be composite. For in the Father there is both the essence of the Godhead and the property of begetting, and in the Son, along with the essence, is the property of being begotten, and in the Spirit, along with the same essence, is the property of procession. But there is no composition there, but simplicity above all simplicity, because these are not parts of the Godhead (for it is indivisible, above all indivisibility), but properties D considered about the one essence and the hypostases of this one essence, and each distinguishing each person and marking it with its own character. Therefore, not even when I say that the Spirit has procession immediately and mediately, or that the Son is begotten from the Father and produces the Spirit, do I introduce a certain duality and composition; just as, since there is a different procession from the Father, as you yourselves say, it shows his distinct relation; [the argument proceeds]...
Son as Father, and another regarding the Spirit A as the One who sends forth in a proper manner, it does not show the Father’s hypostasis to be composite. Just so, neither does the Spirit’s proceeding from the Father and from the Son provide any reason to conceive of composition either in the Son or in the Spirit. Although in the Father begetting and sending forth are not the same nor in the same way, while in the Spirit the proceeding is one and the same—even if here it is mediately, that is, from the Father through the Son, and here immediately, because it is from the Son and no longer through anyone else—the Son is not therefore composite because he is not only begotten, but also sends forth the Spirit; nor is the Spirit [composite] because he proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son. For neither is the Father [composite] because he is not only unbegotten, but is also the Begetter of the Son, nor because he is not only the Begetter, but also the Sender-forth of the Spirit. For neither, according to the common belief of both us and you, is the Son and the Spirit composite because each of them possesses, along with the essence, that which is proper to the hypostasis—the Son, indeed, only that which is begotten, and the Spirit, that which proceeds from the Father. For if each hypostasis (16) were composite because of its own properties, the essence of the three hypostases would also be composite because of the properties common to the three that surround it—I mean goodness, wisdom, power, the productive force, the efficient and creative power, providence, conservation, the comprehension and containment of all things, aseity, the lack of a beginning, immortality, the lack of an end, infinity, eternity, and existence outside or above time, and whatever other things of this kind are spoken of regarding God, whether by affirmation or by negation, whether by causality or by eminence and excellence. But these are not the essence; rather, they are contemplated around the essence, even if they are called in a certain way essential and natural, nor are they parts of the essence, since the Godhead is entirely without parts. In this way, there are inherent in fire B various powers: lightness and upward movement, the illuminating force, and the consuming force; these are different powers, but fire is not therefore composite, but simple, as far as simplicity can exist in natural and elemental bodies at the ultimate level—to put it this way—of a representation of simplicity. Yet, while these are natural and essential to fire here, there, some things are contemplated around the essence, while others are contemplated around each individual hypostasis. For this reason, the simplicity of both the essence and of each hypostasis will suffer no detriment at all. Nor, indeed, is composition immediately introduced in all things in which some variety and C distinction is contemplated. For every essence possesses both power and operation, even if it be simple; nor would we on that account say that the simple thing is necessarily composite. For it is necessary that either the simple thing be composite—and thus nothing at all will be simple—or that the simple thing exist without operation and power, which is manifestly false. For neither is operation without the power from which it proceeds, nor is power without the essence, nor indeed is the essence without the power to operate. But if these things are impossible, and even the most simple essence exists simply with the power that is in it
then A it will also possess the operation proceeding from this power, and therefore no composition arises around it from the fact that regarding one and the same substance, power is one thing and operation is another, or that one and the same thing consists of essence, power, and operation, if it is right to speak thus, and that power is distinguished from substance by reason, and operation from power. For in this way too, it is one simple substance. Yet how would anyone dare to say, regarding a nature that is truly simple and exempt from all composition, or regarding each of the hypostases of the supreme and transcendent Godhead, that composition is introduced from natural or hypostatic properties? B What is simpler in numbers than the monad? And yet, for it, to be is one thing, power is another, and operation is yet another. For it identifies all things—it shows all things to be the same—and keeps them unchanged; yet it undergoes almost infinite relations: receiving addition and subtraction, and generating all types of numbers; now becoming half and a sub-double, now a third and a sub-triple, now a fourth and a sub-quadruple, and at other times something else, yet all remain the same, and this proceeds to infinity; now it is conceived as formless and without figure, now formed and figured, sometimes triangular, sometimes quadrangular, sometimes pentagonal, and now one thing and now another, and yet all at once, and this to infinity; now it is a surface, now a solid body, now without relation, now having relations, and indeed manifold ones; and although it appears varied because of its powers and operations, yet it is most simple, and this variety does not inflict damage upon the simplicity of the essence—I speak of the essence which is according to it. For what it is for each to be, this is also its substance. If, therefore, in created things and our own affairs, those things which are observed in any simple thing do not introduce duality and composition, much more so does no duality or C composition enter in among the divinely ruling hypostases from the connection of some of their properties. Neither, then, is the Son composite, if he is not only begotten of the Father, but is also the producer of the Spirit; nor is the Spirit composite, if he proceeds not from the Father alone, but also from the Son. For indeed, the Father is not composite, being unbegotten, the begetter of the Son, and the producer of the Spirit. For just as the unbegotten, the begotten, and the proceeding, when considered simply, are indeed distinct hypostatic properties—each being marked out for each of the three persons—but do not divide their one nature, so, even if there were more properties concerning each of the three hypostases, they would not in this way tear apart or divide any one of their hypostases, nor do they show any of them to be composite. And just as the Father is not divisible because the Son and the Spirit are from him (for these are not parts of the Father, D nor is the progress of each understood according to some cutting or flow), so neither is the Spirit divisible because he is from the Father and the Son; nor does he have one thing from the Father and another from the Son, but he is the simple unit that he is, from the Father and from the Son; he is a partless one from partless ones, and a simple one from simple ones. And if you say "How?", the mode is ineffable
and unutterable, as it is above all mode. A Or tell me, how does the Father beget the Son, how does the Spirit proceed from the Father, what is the difference between these? And I will tell you how he proceeds from the Father and from the Son. If you wish, learn that he does not proceed from the Father as he does from the Son, nor from the Son as he does from the Father. For from the Father the procession is mediate (for it is through the Son), but from the Son it is immediate, because it is no longer through any other. Thus, therefore, there is no composition either around the Son or around the Spirit, even if the Spirit, proceeding from the Father, also proceeds from the Son; and not even this is absurd, as you yourself said, following the dogma.
6. GR. B "But if," as you say, "he proceeds from the Father and from the Son, his procession will be double. If the procession is double, the one proceeding is also double. Now that which is double is not simple; therefore, according to you, the Spirit is not simple; but that which is not simple is composite and divisible; and that which is such is not God. But the Spirit is God. Therefore he is not double; and if he is not double, he is neither composite, nor is the procession double. If the procession is not double, it will not be one part from the Father and another from the Son, but either from the Father or from the Son. C Since he is from the Father (for this is what both the Fathers and the Gospel say), it remains that he is not from the Son."
LAT. Neither does your reasoning, O most wise Greek, compel one to agree in this way. For, in the first place, we do not say the procession is double, but one and the same and simple, since the Spirit also is simple as being God; for there is no duplicity or composition in God. For it is not because he is from two that the procession is double, but because (the Spirit) is simple, therefore the procession is simple, having one and the same relation in itself, yet appearing one way and another, being mediate as from the Father, but immediate as from the Son. For just as the effulgence of light in the air, proceeding from the sun and from the sun's rays—immediate, indeed, from the rays, but mediate from the sun (namely, through the rays)—nevertheless does not have any duplicity according to its own existence (for the light in the air is simple and uncompounded. For what is its composition? And of what, tell me, is the light composed? But not even the
A progression of it is double, even though there are two things from which the progression comes, the sun and the ray; and so the procession from the Father and from the Son is simple in itself, even though there are two persons from whom the procession is made, and the Spirit Himself is simple. B Furthermore, if any composition were perceived in the Father and the Son, from whom the procession is, then that which proceeds from them would also be double and composite, and there would be a doubleness also concerning the procession. But since the Father and the Son, being one according to essence and existing in one another according to the words of Christ, "I in the Father and the Father in me" (22), are understood to have no composition toward each other (for their unity is above every composition), the conjunction and association of the Father and the Son is not a composition (for otherwise the conjunction of the whole Trinity would be a composition), nor is the procession of the Spirit from both, which is asserted by us, composite, nor will the Spirit have any composition from this. In the same way, the operation of simple created substances is not therefore composite, because it proceeds from the essence and from its own (23) power, nor is the progression of the operation from both composite. For neither is the co-existence of essence and power a composition, "For there would be no simple essence if it were not without power; for nothing at all of the things that exist is without power" (24), according to the wise Dionysius. But if in things after God the progression from two is not itself composite, nor does it show that which proceeds to be composite, how much more is this the case in God! But if you wish, let us grant that we assert the procession is double, and one from the Father, the other from the Son, the former mediate and the latter immediate, yet not even thus will there be a doubleness concerning the Spirit, nor will the procession of the Spirit be composite on account of this. For these things are concerning the essence, not according to the essence—innascibility, generation, and procession—and they are distinctive of the hypostases, not divisive of the nature; and it is no absurdity for a simple being to have two properties. For even the Father is both Father and Spiration-giver, and there is no composition in Him. And furthermore, the mediate and the immediate are certain relations; but a different relation does not cause composition. For if three monads are placed side by side, one after another, that which is between the two extremes, being the middle, will have a second rank in relation to the first, and a first in relation to the third; and it is not therefore composite, because it is the same, both first and second; and in relation to the first it is perhaps understood as holding the right part, and in relation to the second the left part; and because it is the same, both right and left, it does not for that reason lose its own simplicity. Again, each of the three monads is not simply a monad, but also has a rank; whence the one monad might be called first, the middle one, and the last one; but composition is not said to exist concerning any of them. For if C composition is judged from the things considered concerning the essence, even the simple essence that is conceived even without the operation according to it and the inherent power, whatever it may be, would appear to be composite, because [one might say] it is an essence and that it is simple; but it is not composite. For D...
simplicity is not an essence for simple things, just as composition is not for composite things, but rather these pertain to the essence; and the things which pertain to the essence, even if they are many of one, do not by any means render the essence composite. Wherefore, A whether the procession is simple or not simple, the Spirit is simple and that which proceeds (the property of proceeding) is not a composite thing, for the property of proceeding is not the essence, but is a procession about the essence, a proper character of the hypostasis.
7. GR. Then, B if you say that He proceeds from the Father, but also proceeds from the Son, and for this reason that there is one procession from the Father and another from the Son, how is it that both are not imperfect, or one of them superfluous? For either the procession from the Father is perfect, and then the one from the Son is useless; or the procession from the Son is perfect, and then the one from the Father is useless. For if either one of the two is perfect, what is the necessity for the other? Or else each will be imperfect if viewed without the other. But in this way the Father Himself, considered by Himself, would be imperfect. But in truth, each person is perfect and brings forth a perfect operation, both when considered by Himself and in Himself, and when considered along with the other who is consubstantial. But if one is perfect and the other imperfect, which would you say is perfect and which is imperfect? First, that one person is imperfect from whom the procession is imperfect; then, what need does the perfect one have of the imperfect one? But if the procession is simple, if it is perfect from the Father, why also from the Son? And if it is perfect from the Son, why also from the Father? For in this way it seems superfluous for the Spirit to proceed from the other as well. C
LAT. But perhaps someone says that the procession is not one and then another, one from the Father and one from the Son, but one and the same and simple procession from the Father and from the Son, as if the Father were spirating the Spirit through the Son as a medium. For the Son is from the Father, and the Spirit is from the Son, and therefore [is] from the Father, so that the same procession is immediate from the Son, but mediate from the Father. But I say "mediate," not as if some time were intervening (for the Father does not first beget the Son and afterwards emit the Spirit through the Son), but because, in begetting the Son, He D produces the Spirit through him, and the Spirit is not without the Son.
A
GR. According to this reasoning, one might say that the Father also begets the Son through the Spirit who proceeds, and that the generation of the Son is not without the procession of the Spirit, and that the Son himself might be begotten from the Father and from the Spirit.
LAT. But there is also an order in the Trinity which we must preserve, not indeed changing nature, but indicating the distinction of persons and exhibiting the unalterable property of each individual hypostasis. The Father, therefore, in begetting the Son, emits the Spirit also through him; the Son, however, begotten of the Father, emits the Spirit also from himself; and the Spirit, proceeding from the Father, proceeds also as through the Son from the Son; but he is also said to proceed from the Father—as from the Son—as one immediately proceeding from the begotten of the Father. And therefore, the one and same procession for the Spirit is indeed mediate from the Father, but immediate from the Son, as we have often said. B However, whether you wish to call it simple or not, it is perfect on both sides, or from both, or from the Father through the Son; for it is both from perfect beings and is itself perfect and perfectly [wrought], and there is nothing superfluous in the perfect Trinity. If, indeed, you ask for what reason the Spirit, proceeding from the Father, proceeds also from the Son, and what this necessity is, I also will ask of you: what necessity is there for the Father to beget the Son or to emit the Spirit, and why does He not either beget both or emit both, and what is the reason for the generation of the Word or the procession of the Spirit? For there was no word more sublime than the Word, nor than the Spirit. Therefore, neither do I tell you what is the reason for the procession from the Father and from the Son, nor why or how the procession is from both. For the existence of the holy Trinity is elevated above every mode and reason and above such questions. And just as the generation is not imperfect because it is not without the procession, although it is distinct from it by the difference of mode, nor is the procession imperfect because it is not without the generation, but each is perfect, and each is of the other, and neither is without the other—just as the Father does not first beget the Son and then the Spirit proceed from the Father, as you say, but both [occur] always at the same time, both the generation and the procession, and each is perfect both in itself and with the other—so too, the proceeding from the Father and from the Son, although it may not be called one and the same and simple [act], but one and then another, C is nevertheless, each one, perfect both in itself and with the other, and not without the other. For it is not because the heat and the light are always in the same fire that one of them is imperfect, but because each is with the other, and therefore is perfect. For the perfect D
fire is perfect, both as perfectly illuminating and as perfectly heating or burning; for it possesses each in a supreme degree. It is perfect, moreover, because it operates both at once and in every way; for the perfect is twofold, one according to either property, and the other according to the conjunction with the other. So also in the Trinity. For the Triad is perfect, both because it is a Triad, not a personal monad or dyad, and it is perfect because each hypostasis, considered in itself—even if they are not separated from one another—possesses the perfect and super-perfect in its entirety. A Following these same principles, the procession is also perfect, both from the Father and from the Son, and perfect from both and from each, and is beyond the reason of either, even if you do not call it simple, nor one and the same. And in such a way your difficulty is resolved and no absurdity follows this doctrine. But if you call it one, nothing at all stands against it; for just as if someone were to ask: Why does the Father beget? Why is the Son begotten? Why does the Spirit proceed? We would have nothing else to reply, except that each of these is the property of each of the divine hypostases; so even if you yourself ask: For what reason does the Father indeed beget the Son and produce the Spirit with the Son mediating, but the Son is himself begotten of the Father and produces the Spirit with no other mediating, and the Spirit finally proceeds from the Father and from the Son, and from the former mediately but from the latter immediately? You will hear no other answer B except that this is how the properties stand related. You see that the things you assert to follow my doctrine as absurd are shown either not to follow or not to be real, but only apparently absurd.
8. GR. And yet I see another absurdity following upon the procession of the Spirit from the Father and from the Son. C
LAT. Expound that, too. Perhaps I shall be able to provide a fitting argument against this as well, if the Holy Spirit grants it.
GR. (s) If the Spirit were from the Son, then the Son would be the father of the Spirit, and the Spirit would be the son of the Son, and the grandson of the Father, and the Father would be the grandfather of the Spirit. But these things are ridiculous and far removed from truth and piety.
LAT. It is permitted to respond against this reasoning, that the deduction of ridiculous and impious propositions does not hold against our dogma. For one could say—since he would not fear to utter in discourses about God whatever comes to his mouth, and things which the divinely inspired oracles do not supply, as you yourself say—one could, I say, D say: If the Spirit is also from the Father, then he will be the son of the Father and the brother of the Son... [and] if the Spirit is from the Son, the Spirit will be the son of the Son, and the Son the father of the Spirit, etc.
[Hucusque cod. Vat. Vaticani verba (f. usque ad f. 8, a); Latinus deinde præter alia (ibidem f. 8, b) adducit Athanasii ad Serapionem locum, quem etiam profert Beccus Epigr. XIII (Gr. orthod. II, p. 639). Finis dialogi f. 9, b, med. legitur hoc pacto:]
A GR. What has been said, let it be said, just as it has been said, and we shall oppose nothing to those points. But we shall demonstrate not a few other absurdities that follow from your dogma. However, because of the length of the discourse, and to avoid wearying our ears and causing fatigue, let us conclude the conversation here for now, and later, taking up the discourse again as if from another beginning, we shall discover those things for the sake of the truth.
DIALOGUE SECOND
B 1. LAT. You promised not long ago, O Greek, to demonstrate the many absurdities that accompany our dogma regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit... GR. I would not deny the promise; indeed, behold, I am ready to add what still remains. You, however, O Latin, do not flag in opposing me, if you have anything noble and firm. LAT. Declare these things. GR. If the Son is from the Father by generation, and the Spirit from the Son by procession, but from the Spirit there is nothing, neither by generation nor by procession, then both the Father and the Son will be greater than the Spirit, and a diminution will follow for the Spirit, because the Son is immediately from the Father, but the Spirit is not immediately from the Father, and because the Spirit produces nothing else from himself, while the Father and the Son possess the power to produce another person. And there will be room, moreover, for Eunomius, Macedonius, and Apollinarius, who falsely asserted that the Spirit is less than the Father and the Son. C LAT. But not according to essence, O good sir, are the Father and the Son greater than the Spirit, but only according to property; because the Spirit is from the Father and from the Son, but not the Father or the Son from the Spirit, and because the property of the Spirit is not to beget or to project, but to proceed. And in this way, the Father has greatness over the Son; for the Father is greater than the Son, as the Lord himself says: "My Father is greater than I" (John XIV, 28); but this is by that same or some other reason, not by essence.
A Therefore, according to your argument, the Father has obtained the "greater" in both respects; and you have brought this absurdity not so much upon us as upon yourselves, if indeed you call it an absurdity that the "greater" exists according to property. But if this is not an absurdity to you, then do not tell us that it is an absurdity.
2. GREEK: What then? Do you not make two principles, if you say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son?
LATIN: Indeed I do not think so. For to speak of two principles is absurd, just as the children of the heretics assert—those who posit one good and one evil, the one being the fountain of all good, the other the cause of all evil, principles contrary to each other and to the nature of things.
GREEK: But it is far more absurd, than to speak of contrary principles for contrary things and to assign two principles to two things, each to each, to posit two for one and the same thing. For it is more reasonable to posit one principle for two, than two for one.
LATIN: But, my good man, we do not say there are two principles; for since we say there is one from two, we again refer the one of the two to the other, so that in this way there is one principle for the two, and the one... B
Having demonstrated these things more fully, the Latin says:
Tell me therefore if you have another absurdity following our dogma; for what has been said has been shown to be either not absurd, or not consequent. It is sophistical to call things that are not consequent, "consequent," and to palm off things that are not absurd as "absurd."
3. GREEK: But if the Spirit proceeds from the Father, and proceeds also from the Son, and the Father is a producer of the Spirit, and the Son is also a producer, what is the difference between producer and producer, between the procession from the Father and the procession from the Son?
LATIN: Tell me first yourself, what is the difference between generation and procession, and I will tell you what the difference is between the procession from the Father and the procession from the Son. For the present, I will only say this: that no time divides the procession from the Father and the procession from the Son. C For the Spirit does not proceed from the Father first, and later from the Son, D nor...
conversely; but it proceeds from the Father through the Son, and it proceeds from the Son as through the medium of the Son, and from the Father as from the source of the Son. And there is no difference in this procession, unless perhaps someone wishes to speak of mediated and immediate, and on this basis wishes to double the procession, since according to anything else no difference in it can be conceived. B GREGORY. If, therefore, the Father, by producing the Spirit through the medium of the Son, produces Him mediately, and the Son, because He is not through some other, emits the same immediately, then the Son would be the proximate cause of the Spirit, and the Father would not be the proximate cause. And thus the Father will be the first cause, and the Son after Him, and in this way again, inferiority will follow concerning the Son in relation to the Father, and concerning the Spirit in relation to the Son; and thus Arius and Eunomius and Macedonius and Apollinarius will have room.
LATIN. But take heart, O good man; neither Arius nor Eunomius nor Macedonius nor Apollinarius will have room among us. For all these either cut up the Godhead into different godheads, and set one as greater, another as lesser, and another as holding a middle position, or they alienate the Son and the Spirit from the uncreated nature of the Father, and, if I may so speak, set the Son and the Spirit as subalternate natures, and place one as a creature of the other and this one of that, or they completely demote the Spirit into the order of creatures. Among them, "first" is not pious, and "proximate" is impious, and "middle" is similar [only in part], and "greater" and "lesser," and the order itself simply, and "one before another" and "another after another," and other names of this kind are devised according to their own impiety. But among us, order, if it is mentioned, C is accepted according to pious reflections in the Holy Trinity, and "first" and "prior"...
Inter plura alia Athanasii et Gregorii Nazianzeni testimoniis utitur Latinus f. 13, 14. Atque deinde latius explicat, quid sit ordo, primum secundum, etc.
But in order that the argument may be more thoroughly examined, beginning again from another point, we shall speak about each of the aforementioned terms, in how many ways it is said, and how it is accepted in the Holy Trinity; and first, concerning order.
5. Order, therefore, is considered either in substances, or in quantities, or in qualities, or in relations, or in matters said to act or be acted upon, or in place, or in time, or in having and being had, or in all these things in relation to one another. In all things, I say, as substance, quantity, quality, relation, and the rest; for substance is understood as that which underlies all other things at once, then quantity is considered, D after this quality, and subsequently relation and the rest. In substances, for instance, as God, mind, souls, bodies. In quantities, and those which are continuous, as a point, a line, a surface, a body; but in...
discrete things, indeed in number as unity, the binary, the ternary, et cetera; in speech, however, as letters, syllables, nouns, verbs, and sentences. In qualities, such as passion, affection, habit; and in figures, as circle, triangle, quadrangle, and the rest; and in those things which are A susceptible to qualities and are considered according to more and less, such as less white and more white, and still more white and most white; and less hot and more hot, and still hotter and most hot, and similar things; whence even the disciples of physicians call some medicines of the first order, others of the second, others of the third, and indeed others of the fourth. Likewise also in acting and being acted upon: for more and less, just as most, has a place in these. So also in place, for above or below, to the right or to the left, before and behind or around or in the middle have a certain order. So also in time, yesterday, today, tomorrow, before, now, and after relate to order. Item, and in relations; for whether before and B after, or together, are found in them, these also are of order. In the same way also in all things, and universally in any of those which are considered individually and in themselves, there will not be order; but where a certain number or relation to another is perceived, there also is order, whether the thing is subject to corporeal cognition, or belongs to reason, or is considered mathematically, or even is appropriate to theology. For example: the monad, when it is considered in itself, without relation, is both alone and above order; but when it is considered in relation to the binary and ternary and the following C numbers, it is not simply called a monad, but also the first and the principle of numbers. Likewise the element, such as earth, water, and the rest, while they are considered and spoken of thus in themselves, yet relative to the whole universe and those things which consist of them, they are elements and principles. The twenty-four letters in themselves are letters, but they are elements as the beginnings of syllables and of those things which follow. The same is true of day; for one day in itself is one, but the first in relation to the days which are after it; whence perhaps Moses also, considering the first day in itself, as the subsequent days were not yet made, called it "one," but when the following D days had succeeded, it is permitted to call it the first in relation to them. And I do not ignore the causes for which the saints said that day to be and to be named "one," nor do I refuse or disclaim them as my own while knowing them; nay, I both know them and embrace them with my whole mind. Again, God is both one and alone; but when He is considered in relation to mind, soul, and bodies, then He is and is called the first according to order as the principle of all things. But also in the divine nature, the Trinity that is above number is a number, and in the nature of an angel and in the nature of man there is a suitable number; for there are many angels and many men; then also order is considered in these, but not according to substance, but according to certain properties; and one as it were is a kind of principle, another possesses a different order. Thus some ruler exists among angels and archangels and earth-born
in mankind; therefore in the Trinity, too, the Father is the principle. But do not conclude to me, from the fact that there are many angels and many men, that there are also many Gods. (Away with that pagan foolishness!) Rather, in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit there is an order, even if it is superior to every order. For just as the nature B of the Trinity excels all natures (for it is above nature and supernatural), so too this order is superior to every order (for it is above order and more sublime than order). And the Father is a principle above principle. Nor, in turn, from the fact that among men Adam is the principle of the race and Michael is the leader of the heavenly hosts—the prince of the angels, so to speak—should you infer that the archangel is a kind of father and begetter of the multitude of the angels, just as we said Adam or those from Adam are [the father] of the multitude of men. Just as there is fatherhood on earth, so too is there in the heavens; but each fatherhood is appropriate to the nature and befitting the nature. There is, therefore, a certain order also in the Trinity; but it is not one that introduces a division of nature (for the nature is one and unchanged in the three), nor a local position (for the Trinity is uncircumscribed and above every place), nor a notion of temporal motion or any other of the things that are observed in those things which are after God (for both ages and times are after God), but rather [an order] according to the differences of the properties of each divine hypostasis, and because the Father is without principle and the principle of the Son, and the Son is a principle and not without principle, in that He has the Father as His principle, although according to time He is also without principle; and the Spirit is finally a principle and is Himself with the principle. For there is a principle and a principle and a principle—but not three principles, but one, and thus there is one principle, since both the Son and, through the Son, the Holy Spirit C are referred to one principle. Thus also God and God and God, but not three Gods, but one God. If therefore there is an order also in the Trinity, as the saints have also said, and order is [the notion of] first and prior or second and simultaneous (for in those things in which there is order, there is also some one of these), it is necessary that in the Trinity also there be discerned either the simultaneous, or the first and the prior and the second, or both.
Dialogus Tertius
LAT. Let these things be as seem good to you; and let the present discussion have its end here.
THIRD DIALOGUE
AGR. We again set forth this same starting point for the discussion we are having with you regarding the Holy Spirit: how is it not absurd to say that He proceeds not from the Father alone, but also from the Son? For it is necessary that He should be proceeding either from the essence of the Father or from the property. But if from the essence, since the essence is common and the same to the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, the Spirit would proceed not only from the Father and the Son, but also from Himself, which cannot be. If, however, it is from the property, and the property is not essence, but is *about* the essence, how will that which is in itself—namely, the Spirit—be proceeding from that which is not in itself, but is *about* something else, that is to say, from the property? Therefore, He is either not proceeding at all, or if He is proceeding, since He proceeds from the Father and from the Son, He will also be proceeding from Himself, which can never be.
LAT. This line of reasoning shows not that He does not proceed from the Son, but that He does not proceed from the Father either, and that He is not proceeding at all...
BGR. Proof and demonstration consist either of artificial reasoning proceeding from true principles, or of examples, or of testimonies, or of consequences derived from testimonies and written opinions, so that he who introduces anything without these seems to say nothing plausible or founded on reason, not to mention anything true or pious; indeed, he seems even to introduce paradoxical, not to say heterodox, ideas, devoid of testimonies and proof.
LAT. I shall certainly do this, but tomorrow; for the present, let us hold our tongues here.
FOURTH DIALOGUE
DGR. Come now, let us see, O Latin, if you also have any images or examples, either thought up by yourself or taken from elsewhere, for a clearer demonstration.
A of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, as you assert, and to illuminate that sentiment clearly with figures and adumbrations, if it is possible at all to understand how one and the same thing can have this and that as its cause, a principle and a principle, and not two principles nor two causes, so that one, in granting that the cause and principle of the Spirit is not the Father alone, but also the Son, may not appear to be introducing two principles or two causes, but may, even in this way, preserve the dogma of the monarchy.
LAT. But in truth, O Greek, it is not possible to find an evident example that expresses the habit or order of the Holy Trinity. There are, however, many things that can reflect what is said under an obscure image, some of which are gathered from the Scriptures, while others are found from the very nature of things and concepts.
GR. Bring these forth for me, then, and let us consider them together; for perhaps we too shall propose other examples that are more suitable.
LAT. I say, then—and you, listen attentively—does not every essence have a virtue connate to itself and a natural operation? B
GR. I say so.
LAT. Consider, then, this example for me: there is the essence of fire, and its combustive virtue, and the operation of this virtue—which is combustion—and the result is the charcoal or ash. So, too, the Father...
LAT. A point, a line, and a surface: these three are one, being the principle of what are called the mathematical bodies; just as there, the essence, the virtue, and the operation are the one principle of the things produced; or, if you like, a monad, a dyad, a triad—this numerical triad is the principle, cause, and fountainhead of all number... Consider for me a finger and the whole hand from which the finger depends, and the whole man of which the hand and finger are a part... You know of the eye, and the fountain, and the river... C Again, another example, and this one from the same (St. Gregory Nazianzen), taken from the Holy Scripture: Adam, Eve, Seth... Yet I will tell you another example, which has no such passion in it.
GR. What is that?
LAT. The example of the sun, and the ray, and the light, for illustrating the dogma. D
That the preposition "by" (per) is used promiscuously in Scripture for "from" (ex).
Recapitulation of the proposed examples.
FIFTH DIALOGUE. FIFTH DIALOGUE.
GR. Furthermore, if you have another line of reasoning for this dogma, O Latin, explain it; for us, the evangelical saying, which clearly declares that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, is sufficient. A LAT. Restrain yourself, O Greek, and let us reserve the discussion based on testimonies for this final place, and let us both undertake it. But now tell me: if the generation and the procession are simultaneous, how is it that the proceeding one is not also from the begotten one? If the Son and the Spirit are simultaneously from the Father, how is it that the Holy Spirit is not also from the Son? B GR. I will tell you in turn: if the Father and the Son are simultaneous, how is it that the Son is from the Father, and the Father is not also from the Son? If the Spirit and the Son are simultaneously from the Father, how is it that the Spirit is from the Son, and not also the Son from the Spirit, and the begotten from the proceeding? C LAT. I say, therefore, that "to proceed," wherever it is found used, signifies motion of some kind, yet one proper and appropriate to the matter at hand... D I feel that I am now compelled to come to the scriptural testimonies. Nevertheless, having finished this discussion here, and making another beginning from this point, I shall make mention of the testimonies and of the structure derived from the doctrines of the Fathers. For when it comes to the demonstration of supernatural things, reason fashioned by art is weak, as is even that which perhaps concludes directly or leads to an absurdity; and, simply put, every syllogism, and every induction from images and examples, is dim and powerless. For if demonstrations belong to things that exist, those things which are beyond existence are altogether beyond demonstration.
SIXTH DIALOGUE. SIXTH DIALOGUE.
GR. I, too, say these very things. But now it is time to declare, O Latin, what the testimonies from both the Scriptures and the writings of the Fathers might be, by which it might be...
A evident that it is not contrary to the teachings of the Apostles and the traditions of the Fathers and to the ecclesiastical and orthodox dogmas from of old, to say that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son. For this is to us a wonder and beyond our expectation.
Then the Latin brings forward many testimonies for his opinion, most of which are commonly known and used elsewhere. Afterwards the Greek continues in this way, rejecting only the addition in the Creed, and no longer the doctrine itself.
B GR. Therefore, by pronouncing in the Creed that it also is "from the Son," you both seem to us to hold contrary opinions and to be at variance with our studies, and you will never be able to come to the same conclusions as we have, and you will always be considered to speak things contrary to the wise John. For although he is one, yet he is a disciple of Cyril and Athanasius and the other Fathers, and before the Fathers, a disciple of Christ. In addition to this, by pronouncing in the Creed that which the Saints did not say, you will be thought not to follow them all, but to speak things alien to them. For it is necessary to preserve the exposition of the faith unoffended and entire, not only according to the dogmas and the thoughts, but according to the very words themselves. See, therefore, how many synods have been held after the exposition of the Creed of faith, and how many questions concerning dogma have been disputed; but not one of the synods after the second, which explained the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit, either removed or added one single word, nor did it change any of the things that had been defined; but rather the majority of the doubts were dissolved, C indeed, by the words of the holy Creed itself, and their confession removed all suspicion and all doubt, as was fitting, far away. And although it might be understood in one way by some and in another by others, the words of the Creed were not changed in any way; but the genuine meaning of the doubt was published through other expositions and definitions, and the spurious was rejected. Thus it was done in the third synod, thus in the fourth, thus in the rest; but the holy Creed of the religion was preserved as it had been handed down from the beginning. For if it were granted, on account of arising doubts, to make other and other additions, or removals, or changes of some things, we would gradually transcend the boundaries of the Fathers unawares. For even while the same Fathers who had published the exposition of the faith were still living, many doubts subsequently arose concerning the "homousion," which is only one word of the Creed D and is it possible that someone might say that the majority are perhaps more trustworthy than the one, especially since he prides himself on following them and on acknowledging them as his own fathers and teachers? For who does not know how Damascene prides himself on being a disciple of Basil and Gregory and Athanasius and Cyril and the other Fathers?
A (For many who held opinions contrary to the Fathers employed the very word for the sake of concealing their own impiety, while they harbored a different sentiment within themselves), nevertheless the Fathers did not wish to add to the Creed any specification that would explain the pious intent or exclude the impious interpretation; but each one privately, and for themselves, struggled over the word and its meaning, and they wrote and published an exposition that was clear and pious, manifesting the orthodox meaning and refuting the heretical one, just as even the great Athanasius did; yet they did not attempt any addition B or removal or change of the word. That, therefore, in the Creed the Fathers said "who proceeds from the Father" and nothing more, is clearly proclaimed by the acts of the individual synods and the synodical volumes themselves, namely those which contain their Acts; for everywhere they are circulated in one way, and they contain neither "from the Son" nor "not from the Son" nor "through the Son" added. You, therefore, O Latin, thinking that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, if indeed you say that He proceeds from the Son in such a way as from a first principle, and not as through the Son, but as also from the Father, you altogether make two principles and you destroy the generation of the Son, and you say things contrary to Damascene and Athanasius and Cyril and all the other Fathers, and to us, for whom it is a glory to follow the holy Fathers; but if you say "from the Son" in the same way as from the Father through the Son, and thus "from the Father" as from the Son who is from the Father, you agree with Damascene John and Athanasius and Cyril and the other God-bearing Fathers, and you are like-minded with us also according to the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit, and you are friends and of one mind with us. C It behooved you, therefore, following in the footsteps of the Fathers and maintaining friendship, to declare in the Creed that which "proceeds from the Father," as is the ancient tradition of the Fathers, but to inculcate that He "proceeds through the Son" by other writings which explain the pious meaning of these words, whether you wish to assert the procession "through the Son" or "from the Son" according to the same meaning, and not to introduce a common scandal into the midst, which is the cause of such great schism and division—that which even the great Athanasius and the wise Cyril, not understanding the procession from the Father in any other way in their own commentaries, D and altogether destroying the generation of the Son, you say things contrary to Damascene, Athanasius, Cyril, and all other Fathers and to us, for whom to follow the holy Fathers is a glory. If, however, you say "from the Son" as from the Father through the Son, you agree with Damascene, John, Athanasius, Cyril, and other Theophoric Fathers, and according to the dogma of the procession of the Holy Spirit you will be friends and consenting to us: this Hugh Etherianus has already brought forward, who often commemorates this writer in his book *Contra Graecos*, II, c. 6; III, 11, 18, 19.
the cause of the division, because the great Athanasius himself and the wise Cyril, while understanding the procession from the Father in this way, clarified the procession of the Spirit in their own writings, but added nothing to the Creed; the Damascene likewise did the same. For in the exposition of the faith, he designates "that which is from the Father, not proceeding from the Son" privately, inasmuch as the Spirit is not said to be from the Son, that is, as from a first principle and as from the Father. Following the teachings of these men, we too, while pronouncing that which "proceeds from the Father," understand the procession from the Father as from a first principle, yet through the Son, who is proximately from the Father; B yet we do not say in the Creed "which proceeds from the Father through the Son," although it would be more reasonable to say this, if indeed it holds that which is indubitable both for us and for you, as it is accepted by both sides and removes every ambiguity. But because the Fathers did not do [this], lest an opportunity be given by arising doubts to devise additions, subtractions, or changes to the Creed of the faith, and thus the exposition be innovated—wishing to preserve this, we judge that it is not right to add either the "through the Son," or the "from the Son," or the "not from the Son." Be silent, therefore, concerning the addition of this phrase, and no longer pronounce in the Creed "who proceeds from the Father and from the Son," but according to the Fathers, say with us "who proceeds from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is worshipped and glorified." It will suffice for you and for us, in the unanimity of both, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, since we agree with one another in saying that the procession of the Spirit is from the Father through the Son.