A a different essence, falling short of the common nature of the Godhead. And the great Athanasius, in his *Against the Arians*, says: And for this reason, there is nothing terrible in saying that the Holy Spirit is from the Father alone; since the act of proceeding, just like the act of begetting, pertains to the Father alone, or to the Unbegotten and God-begetter and Source, and whatever else is similar. For the Trinity is not the cause, within the Godhead, clearly, as if it were a single creator of the creation; for this reason, the Father is the sole cause; for he is not acting in conjunction, according to the Theologian Gregory, but this man [Argyropulus] is certainly moving in the opposite direction to the saints.
ARGYROPULUS: For it is not from the Father alone, so that the Son might not be thought unlike him, not having the same perfections as the Father. And for this reason, not even consubstantial, which in no way differs from the heresy of Arius, which alienates the Son from the divine nature of the Father.
AGALLIANUS: But, my good man, Arius did not alienate only the Son from the divine nature, B but also the Holy Spirit. Macedonius is no less of a heretic than Arius, being diseased with this same opinion regarding the Spirit alone. If, therefore, we are Arians, and [if we are] granting to the Son the perfections of the Father—which you perhaps believe to be natural—then you certainly have no argument left with which you will escape the madness of Macedonius. But for us who provide reasonable accounts regarding this, confirmed by the saints, it is easy to dissolve the accusation. You, however, entrenched in such a position, and thinking that things are as you propose the arguments, will never be able to escape Macedonianism. For he himself declared earlier that if powers are different, then those things themselves would be different in essence. If, therefore, you really think it necessary for the powers and perfections of the Father to belong to the Son, it is absolutely necessary that they also belong to the Spirit. Then the Son will be generative and procreative. Similarly, the Spirit will also be generative and procreative, even if neither is begetting and proceeding in vain. C But if the Son acts according to the one, and the Spirit according to neither, and the Father according to both, and if their energies are different, then they themselves would be different in their essences, and much more so as [they are] of the powers, given that the energies exist: consider to what this matter will lead. So that you have appeared not only as a Macedonian, but also as an Arian himself, and no argument will deliver you from this disaster.
We, however, say that to beget and to proceed are hypostatic perfections of the paternal person, as not co-existing with the essence of the Father, but, insofar as it is in the Father, we hear from the theologians that this is his property: the Source, and the God-begetter, and the Fruit-bearing, in which are [the acts of] begetting and proceeding; and for this reason, it is necessary that neither of these—or at least, begetting and proceeding—should be shared with another of the persons from him, but belong to him alone. For all things befitting God exist in the whole Godhead, concerning which Gregory is in agreement, calling it common to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit that they are unbegun and... D Come then, let us see, he says, the things of the Father, so that we may recognize the image if it is his. Is the Father eternal? Immortal, King, Powerful, Light, Almighty, God, Lord, Creator, and Maker. These must be in the image, so that he who has truly seen the Son has seen the Father. If, therefore, the saints had known that it was without danger to believe the Son was a cause or a co-cause with the Father, and that from this his equality and consubstantiality with the Father was acquired, in what other struggles would they have used this? Or from where else in the discourses against Nestorius would they have attempted it, earlier and more nobly, than from this? But nowhere among such discourses, though there are many, is such a thing found, as if it had been overlooked because it was weak, or as if it were a matter of secondary importance. For if it were true, it would be the most powerful and important of all.
But one will find countless other things in the writings of the saints that establish the consubstantiality in the super-essential Trinity from common attributes befitting God, but never from the hypostatic perfections and properties; for they are not of the nature to be shared. Rather, this has seemed to the saints a source of heresies and blasphemy, from which all retreated as from fire. If, therefore, the Father is the sole source of the super-essential Godhead, and it is his property to be the source and cause of the Godhead contemplated in the Son and the Spirit, and he is proclaimed as the sole cause, and from him is the Spirit and from no other—for we do not say the Spirit is from the Son—there is no reasonable cause why anyone should not be considered an Arian, saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. For how [could one be an Arian], if what is said is most pious and in agreement with the theology of the teachers? But he who fears so much and turns away from the unlikeness of essence, has fallen into such an abyss by the very things you have devised.
ARGYROPULUS: For this reason, the teachers of the Church and the Seventh Ecumenical Council declared that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, not as if the Son were a cause, nor simply a source and producer of the manifestation of the Spirit, but as a co-cause and source, and from a source.
AGALLIANUS: And these things have been said in calumny of the teachers and of the Seventh Council; for since neither the origin nor the co-cause of the Holy Spirit did the Son contemplate, nor did any of the saints say it, as has in fact been demonstrated by the stated points, how would it have been possible in the phrase "through the Son" to conceive of the Son as a co-cause with the Father of the Holy Spirit? But that some of the teachers, theologizing about the eternal existence of the Spirit, used the phrase "through the Son," and what their pious mind was, others before us have explained; it would have been graceful if the Latins had called the Son a cause and source simply, so as to have been more impious than all heretics. For this...
1043 THEODORI AGALLIANI 1044 just as when I say "begetter," I conceive of the generator beforehand; the things of the one projecting, thus also when I say "projector," I conceive beforehand of the one who projects the one generating. And at the same time the Father is begetter and projector, as we have already shown by going through the saints. It is not an invention, but thinking of the Son as a co-cause and an origin from an origin is what they are wrongly convicted of, and of holding this view. For the statement of Gregory, "the origin from the origin," does not help them at all, as he himself explains and says, "the origin of all things," A which is confirmed by his other statement, "All things that the Father has, belong to the Son, except for causality." Neither he nor any other of the theologians has called the Son an "origin from an origin" of the Spirit. And since the Father is not as Father, but as projector, projecting, just as when it is said, "proceeds from the Father," I conceive of the projector beforehand, but I am not compelled on this account to also posit the Spirit as Father of the Son, the generative power being shared with Him by the Father; so neither is there any necessity here, because of the prior conception of the Son, for a projector, or to consider Him a co-origin or co-cause. For if the Son were acknowledged to be an origin of the Spirit, He would be an origin from an origin and a co-cause; but since He is never called an origin, nor cause, nor anything else of this kind—for all such things must be fitted to the Father alone, while the Son is Son only, and only and entirely Son—therefore He is not a co-cause nor an origin from an origin within the godhead. For the Father is the sole cause, B and the Son is the origin of creation according to the theologian Gregory. ARGYROPULUS. Nor is it as if the Father were not able alone to bring forth the holy Spirit; for otherwise the Father would not have been able to beget the Son without some other person, to whom belongs the same perfection and power of those brought forth. For the Father sufficiently begets the Son, and projects the holy Spirit. AGALLIANUS. You have relieved us of problems by saying these things, man; for if the Father sufficiently begets and projects, then it is superfluous to speak of the Son as projecting. And there is nothing redundant in divine matters, especially where one ought not to posit anything in natural matters without reason. If you offer the argument from the example of creation, saying that the Father creates sufficiently, yet "creating" is said also of each of the other persons, you will hear in reply: "The Father, as He is God, has in Himself both the Son and the holy Spirit; and just as He is alone one and perfect God, so also with the Son and the Spirit He is one and perfect God." And this same thing is believed indistinguishably also of each of the others. By their properties they are distinguished, but in godhead they are one. C For if the one being conceived of as cause belongs to this, then the communion of power will follow. If some saints say the power to project is common, the Son will immediately appear to be the cause of the Spirit, or a co-cause with the Father. But being conceived of beforehand is not sufficient for this; for even if the Father is conceived of before the Son and Spirit by the order of causality, it is not necessary that the Son should also be conceived of before the Spirit in this way, until such time as neither any of the theologians states this clearly, and a reason for such a prior conception is provided by us, separated from the reference according to causality. For as long as we are not unable to provide a reason, and you do not demonstrate it as necessary, we are winning. For if that is not a necessity, but this is possible, and all the hypotheses of the faith and the writings of the saints and the councils struggle along with our argument, this is indeed true. ARGYROPULUS. Wherefore also he says the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father "origin-wise" and "primarily," and I would say "pre-originatively" and "properly," but from the Son not so, even if He is brought forth from Him by the same power and projection. AGALLIANUS. Behold, he has dug another pit and has fallen into it, the Psalmic one, with uncovered head, having surrendered the duality of the origin. And first, how he corrupts the hearings of some of the saints: D "Each of the three persons, as He is God," having combined them, he placed first "properly" and "originally," and [as] creator, unitedly and inseparably with the others, and because of this "sufficiently"; because the whole godhead is what is creating, which is perfectly in each. The Father projects, not as God—for it is not the whole Trinity—but as He is a person that is originative and god-generating. If therefore He does not project alone, but with some other person, He is not "sufficiently" alone; or if He is sufficient, the rest is superfluous; and it is clear that He alone sufficiently begets the Son, even according to you. What then is the fulfillment that He "alone" projects the Spirit? But if you speak of the other hypotheses, that is, the priorizations and prior conceptions, those are stale, and a new fabrication, and have been proven to be the roots of heresies. Rather, I say that if it is permitted to say [He proceeds] "pre-originatively" and "origin-wise" from the Father, then he added, "but from the Son not so." But those who said these things, O best of men, did not dogmatize that the Son is cause, nor origin, nor co-cause, nor projector of the holy Spirit. So these adverbs, spoken differently by some of the saints, are for the one [adverb] "alone." And it might mean the same for "properly from the Father He proceeds" as for "having existence from the Father alone [is] the holy Spirit." For at any rate by such adverbs they disinherit the Son of such causality, holding the procession of the holy Spirit from Him to be only toward creation, which you might call a temporal mission with the
A adverb: they disinherit the Son of such causality, holding the procession of the holy Spirit from Him to be only toward creation, which you might call a temporal mission with the adverb of the holy ones. But the political law also says: "He is a heretic and subject to the laws of heretics, who deviates even a little from the right faith."
ARGYROPULUS. Thomas. But you, unfolding their condensed theology according to your own opinion, have confirmed a dogma—bareheaded, as it were, and separating it from the whole of the Godhead—that is unknown to them and contrary to the words of Orthodoxy. For how could those most divine men have held this, when they had received it neither from the divine tradition, nor from the apostolic teaching, nor from the Church herself; but, on the contrary, had received a definition confirmed by countless bonds and penalties, that the holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and is co-worshipped and co-glorified with the Father and the Son, and thus to believe and preach? And the implication that you brought in seems to me very bold, namely, when you said: "From the Son, but not in this way." For from this, the duality of the cause is manifest. For if the Father is the cause of the holy Spirit in one way, and the Son in another, and the "in another and another" introduces a difference, and you believe it this way, you have surely fallen into ditheism. For how could there be one and the same cause, given that the persons are distinct, while they proceed—not as they are in the essence—and the modes of the progression are different? And the notion of "by the same power and by procession" seems to me to be the same as saying that two carpenters, coming together by the one power of the same craft residing in them, produce one bed. How much blasphemy is in that, it is not difficult for the wise to understand.
ARGYROPULUS. Because if anywhere he [the author] says the Son is a cause and origin of the Spirit’s subsistence, just as it is written in the definition of the sacred eighth ecumenical council at Florence, he does not wish for Him to be an origin or cause simply, but an "origin from an origin" and "cause as a co-cause."
AGALLIANUS. How graceful this council would have been—if this is what it must be called—if one were to heed what this man added, instead of the exact opposite, as if he brought forth this blasphemy along with the others.
ARGYROPULUS. By dogmatizing the Son as "origin and caused"; for in this way he would have surpassed every heresy in impiety!
AGALLIANUS. If he makes the "cause" and "co-cause" two causes, and through the mediation of the divine substance the holy Spirit subsists [as decreed] from the Father, then by understanding it as "proceeding through the Son," he ranks the Spirit with the things of which the Son is an "origin from an origin." But perhaps these things result in the absurdity of those people. And yet, if two blasphemies are poured forth, one greater and one lesser, the lesser is not to be chosen simply because the other is vehemently forbidden, if indeed in sacred theology there must be degrees of such things. Since by power, all of it equally destroys the whole, according to the Theologian Gregory, who states in the first of his *Peace* [orations]: "To cut off anything from the Three, or to alienate it, is for us the same as to destroy the whole." For it would fall into contradiction if it were B thus in things, while proclaiming the Spirit from the Son.
AGALLIANUS. And indeed, it falls into the very same contradiction now, by confessing the Spirit to be God and yet making it a creature—because it deprives it of essential and natural power, and for that reason, of the power of procession common to the Father and the Son; and furthermore, by handing down a difference of origins, calling the Father an "unoriginate origin" and the Son an "origin from an origin," which difference clearly introduces ditheism.
ARGYROPULUS. He says that one origin of the holy Spirit is venerated.
AGALLIANUS. But the Theologian Gregory does not hand it down this way, nor does he call the Father an "unoriginate origin" so that this new theology might have room, as if the Son were an origin from an "unoriginate" within the Godhead; but rather he understands the "unoriginate" and the "origin" as the property of the Father’s person, saying: "The properties of the Father are that He is conceived as unoriginate and as an origin, while the Son is called Son; but the Son is nowhere unoriginate, though He is the origin of all." Then how does he not make two origins, by referring the Spirit—who is one person—to two persons, hypostatically and personally? For the relations inside are of persons, not of essence and power.
ARGYROPULUS. But if, these things having been said by us, someone should ask, firstly, why the Son does not beget, just as He proceeds, partaking of the same generating power as the Father? Or how the holy Spirit neither proceeds nor begets, if the powers are different in Him as they are in the Father and the Son?
AGALLIANUS. Now, with bared head, he has let out the absurdity: that the Son has the generating power of the Father along with the processing one, and likewise the Spirit. And look at what forced him to this. Realizing that if the Son has the processing power, the Spirit must also have the generating one—and indeed the processing one as well, as is always said by us to follow as absurdities. If the Son were a producer and he had no way to escape, he does not grant these as not being absurd; and in order to show that these things are not absurd, he assigns to the divine persons impotence rather than powers, and deprivations, and such like. Thus, having proposed two questions, as it were, so that by his solutions he might confirm the absurdities, he brings in treatments and solutions—which seem