Works of Gennadius

A SHORT AND WISE DISCOURSE BY THE MOST REVEREND PATRIARCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE, GENNADIUS SCHOLARIUS, ON SOME ARTICLES OF OUR FAITH, ABOUT WHICH HE DISPUTED WITH AMERA MACHUMETIS, WHICH IS ALSO ENTITLED: ON THE WAY OF HUMAN SALVATION

The Turk asks, the Patriarch answers.

^A T. What is God? P. God is an invisible, intelligible, and intelligent substance, and is ineffable. God is an immaterial spirit, a sleepless eye, an ever-active mind; God is the cause of all visible and invisible creatures.

T. Whence is He called God [Theos]? P. He is called God [Theos] from "to contemplate" [theōrein], because He contemplates all things as a spectator and overseer of all. It is said, furthermore, that "God" [Theos] comes from "to run" [theein] and "to traverse" [apotrekhein] all things intelligibly and timelessly; for God is always and everywhere present.

T. And how many gods are there? P. There is one God of gods and Lord of lords, and besides Him there is no other. Men are called gods by a certain participation, as it is written: "I said, Ye are gods, and all of you are children of the Most High; but ye shall die like men, and fall as one of the princes." ^B

T. If therefore there is one God, why do you say that He, the one God, is three-personed—to wit, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit?

^A And from this, know that just as the sun is three-personed, so there is one God, tri-hypostatic. For the solar disc is a type of the Father, the ray is a type of the Son, and the light is a type of the all-holy Spirit. And since in the case of the sun there is the disc, the ray, and the light, and it is one sun and not three, likewise also in the case of God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God and not three gods. And again, say it thus: since the disc of the sun is inseparable, and the ray and the light are not divided from one another, for this reason it is called one sun and not three, because their persons are not divided from one another. And just as the solar disc begetteth the ray, and from the sun and the rays the light proceedeth, so God and Father begetteth His Son and Word, and from the Father and the Son proceedeth the Holy Spirit.

Hearken wisely, ^B and you shall understand the mystery of the holy Trinity, as much as a human mind can comprehend—or as it seems to me; nevertheless, I will describe it according to our capacity. Know well that for this reason God is called "ineffable," because we cannot grasp His nature, nor is He like us, a single person. For if He were, we would know Him just as we know one another. But God is one, while the persons of this same divinity are three—and observe from now on what is said. Just as the sun is one, but the sun has a ray and light, and there are in the sun, as it were, three persons: the disc, the ray, and the light. The disc is the body of the sun, the ray is that which descends like a lamp and strikes the earth, and the light is that which illuminates and enters into dark places without the ray. Behold then, almost three persons: disc, ray, and light. We do not say three suns, but one only, nor do we say one person, but three persons. ^C For if you are asked, "How many suns are in the heaven?" you will say, "There is one sun." But if you are asked, "How many are the persons of the sun?" say, "Three: disc, ray, and light." So also understand it concerning God. God is one, but the persons of the one God are three: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Look wisely: just as the ray of the sun descends from heaven to earth and is not separated from the solar disc, and is neither absent from the heaven nor from the earth, but is in the solar disc, and in the heaven, and upon the earth, and everywhere, and the ray is lacking neither from the things above nor from the things below; so also the Son, the Word of God, descended to the earth, and was absent neither from the Father, nor from the heavens, nor from the earth, but was and is always in the bosom of the Father, inseparable, and above, and below, and everywhere, and is missing from nowhere. And just as the solar light is in the solar disc, and in the ray, and in the heaven, and on the earth, ^D and enters into houses and illuminates everywhere; so also the Holy Spirit is everywhere, and with the Father and with the Son is above and below, and illuminates all men and...

^A never fails anywhere. For the Holy Spirit, says the great Paul, searches everything, even the deep things of God. Behold, then, just as if we had never known Elijah the Tishbite, that prophet, we would not know what sort of man he was; but when we see his image, then we perceive in small measure the character of that prophet Elijah, even if it is not of equal honor; so also one must think in the case of God. For no one has ever seen God; and since we have not seen God, nor do we know what he is; yet since God is light, we find sensible light as an image of the invisible God. If we say, how is the sun visible, and it is one, and it has three persons in itself, and these three are inseparable, therefore the sun is an image of the intelligible sun, namely of God, since there are three distinct things in the one sun, and since this is so, it is to be so understood and believed.

If, however, this example does not at all satisfy you for the knowledge of the three persons of the Godhead, observe ^B another image of God. It is the soul of man. For when God intended to create man, he said: “Let us make man according to our image and likeness.” Behold, therefore, man himself is an image of God, namely the soul of man. For the soul of man is indeed one, and yet, as it were, of three persons; for the soul has three powers, as if they were three persons; and observe how. The soul is one person, but the soul produces the word [sermo], and behold the word is another person; the soul produces the breath [spiratio], and behold the breath is another person; there are therefore, as it were, three persons: the soul, the word, and the breath. These persons belong to the soul and not to the body, because since the soul flies away from the body, neither the word nor the breath remains in the body; but the body lies without speech and without breath, whereas the word and the breath are in the soul; and this is indeed evident, because the word and the breath are persons from the soul: and behold, therefore, the soul is a person, and the breath is another. The soul is ^C as it were threefold in persons, although the soul is one and not three. If, however, you were asked, how many souls man has, you will answer one; but if you were asked how many persons there are of the one soul, it is appropriate to say that there are three, since the soul and the word and the breath are one soul and three persons. And the soul indeed is in the likeness of the Father, and the word of the soul is in the likeness of the Son and Word of God, and the breath of the soul is in the likeness of the most holy Spirit. For just as the soul is unbegotten, so also God the Father is unbegotten; and just as the word of the soul is begotten from it, so also the Word of God is begotten from the Father; and just as the breath is breathed forth from the soul, so also the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. And say thus: Soul, word, ^D and breath are one soul and not three; so also the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit are one God and not three. The soul is inseparable, and the word and the breath are one soul and not three, inseparable.

^A The Father and the Word and the Holy Spirit: the soul is invisible, and God is invisible. And when you waver in your mind and say, "How can God be one and yet three-personed?" consider your soul and say: "Just as my soul is one, yet three-personed—soul, word, and breath—so too God is one, yet three-personed: Father, Word, and Holy Spirit." And say to your mind: "If the soul, which is a creature of God, and likewise the sun, is three-personed, while their nature is one, how much more then is it not the case that God, the Creator of all these, is one and three-personed?" Yes, truly, the soul, the word, and the breath are three persons, yet in this way also [there is] one God and not three; and if you reason in this way always, you will not blaspheme against the Holy Trinity.

Behold, fire is one, yet it is three-personed; for the fire itself, which serves as the substrate, is one person, and its heating power is another person, and its illuminating power is another. Thus, there are three persons of the one fire—namely, fire, heating [power], and illuminating [power]—but the nature of the fire is one. Similarly also with God: for the Father is the fire, the Son is the heating power, and the Holy Spirit is the illuminating power; and just as we say of the fire that the fire, the heating [power], and the illuminating [power] are one and not three, so too we say there are three persons in God, but we say God is one and not three gods; and regarding the knowledge of the Holy Trinity, it suffices for the believer to believe these things.

^C The word of man clearly has a double generation; for it is produced by two utterances, one from the soul and another from the lips. For the word is generated from the soul when someone thinks to say something; for the thought becomes the first generation of the word, since he thinks of the word to say it; but he does not speak it through the lips, rather the soul keeps the word in its own bosom; and that thought is the first generation of the word from the soul. Nevertheless, even if the word is generated, it has a first generation when the soul thinks of it, but the soul does not make it manifest. But when it wishes to make the word manifest, then it generates it also a second time from the lips; and this is the second generation from the lips. Then all hear the word, and it makes it manifest to all, and ^D the word is no longer called hidden, but manifest. When the word is generated—that is, when it is spoken through the lips—this generation through the lips is called the second generation of the word; so that there are two generations of our word: one from the soul, when it thinks of the word, which is also called the first generation, and another from the lips, which makes the word manifest to all men, and is called the second generation. Behold, then, just as the word of man has two generations, one from the soul and one from the lips, so too the Word of God has two generations: one from God the Father, which is also called the first generation, and one from the flesh, which is also called the second generation. And just as our word, even if it is generated, has its first origin from the soul, yet it is not clear nor manifest, but again after its formation it remains

^A in the bosom of the soul; so also the Word of God, even though He was born before the ages from God and the Father, was not manifested to men, but was in the paternal bosom. And just as our word, when we wish, is born from our lips and becomes manifest to all who are near us; so also the Word of God, when it pleased Him, was born, as has been said before, from the lips of the prophets, from the all-holy Mary, and then He became manifest in the whole world. For just as our word is manifested when it is born from our lips, so indeed the Word of God, born from the flesh of the holy Virgin, was manifested to all creation, and those who believe in Him are saved. And just as our word, when it is born from the lips, neither fails from the soul, nor from our lips, nor from the ears of those who hear, but is in the soul and in our lips and in the ears of those who hear, and is not lacking anywhere, even if a thousand thousands hear the word, the word is not diminished, but our word always remains most full; so also the Word of God was born from the Virgin Mary, as has been said before from the prophetic lips; yet He was not lacking from the Father, nor from the flesh, nor from all men, nor from the whole creation, but was present everywhere and was not diminished, but was most full. Thus understand also regarding the Word of God, that He has a twofold generation: one from God the Father before the ages, and one from the flesh in the last days; just as our word is first generated from the soul, and the second from the lips. And these are the things concerning the two generations of the Word of God.

T. What is common to the Holy Trinity? ^C P. Common is the substance, lacking beginning, power, goodness, and justice; and the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have all these equally, except for their own properties. T. What is proper to the Father? P. The unbegotten. T. What is proper to the Son? P. The begotten. T. What is proper to the Holy Spirit? P. The proceeding. T. In God, how many natures do you confess? P. In God we speak of one nature, one form, one genus, one glory, one dignity, one lordship. T. And how many hypostases do you confess in God? ^D P. In God we speak of three persons, three individuals, and three characters. T. And why is the Father called Father? P. God is called Father, and Father from the fact that He preserves all things. T. And the Son, i.e., the Filius, why is He called Son? P. Son, i.e., Filius, is called from this name>

"o" changing to "u" in Greek; as, "such is the Father, such is the Son." For the Son is like to the Father.

T. And why is the Holy Spirit called Spirit (Pneuma)? P. It is called Pneuma from *noein*, that is, to understand; for He truly and acutely understands all things, that is, He considers every thought quickly; for the Holy Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God.

T. How many causes are there in God? P. I say there is one cause in God, and this is the Father; He Himself begets the Son and proceeds the Holy Spirit. Know that the Father alone is the cause, but the Son is not a cause, but is caused, and the Holy Spirit likewise is not a cause, but is caused; so that the cause is one, the Father, but the caused are two, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Father is called the cause because He begets and is not begotten, He proceeds [the Spirit] and is not proceeded; He begets the Son, and proceeds the Holy Spirit; and for this reason the Father is called the cause.

T. And how many are caused? P. Two are caused, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Son does not beget, but is begotten, and for this reason He is called caused; similarly, the Holy Spirit does not proceed [as a cause], but is proceeded, and for this reason He is called caused. Therefore, if someone asks you, "How many causes do you name in God?" say: "One." "Which is this?" "The Father."

T. And why is He called the cause? P. Because He begets the Son and proceeds the Holy Spirit.

T. In the Holy Trinity, who is first among the three, the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit? P. In the Holy Trinity, there is no one first, no one is last, but the Father is together, the Son is together, and the Holy Spirit is together; and for this reason they are also called co-beginningless, being before the beginning. But God does not have a beginning, but is before the beginning, and for this reason He is called without beginning. The Father, then, is without beginning, the Son is without beginning, and the Holy Spirit is without beginning; and behold, they are co-beginningless, and there is no first and no last in the Holy Trinity.

T. And how does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father? P. It does not behoove you to ask about this, and this is truly inexplicable. Nevertheless, learn also regarding this, that just as the breath of a human proceeds from the soul, so also the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father.

T. Is God contained in one place or not? P. Collect your mind and understand, that God is light, invisible and uncontainable; therefore, God is neither seen, nor is He contained in the whole, where He is about to reach and dwell; so it is clear that He is not contained in one place, but God is present in everything and everywhere. You have heard all things regarding the Holy Trinity, that one person is the Father, and another is called the Holy Spirit,

^A and yet another person is called the Son and the Word. Behold, therefore, know that this Son and Word was clothed with human flesh and walked upon the earth; and after He put on flesh and walked upon the earth with flesh, He was named and called Christ. Therefore, Christ, the Son and Word of God, is incarnate, having the form of man.

T. By what necessity was the Son and Word of God led to be incarnate, so that He might walk as a man in the world?

P. Since you have asked to learn for what cause God was incarnate, hear the cause. God was in no need of being incarnate, but human nature was in need of healing. For after God made heaven and earth and all that is in them, and created man and placed him in the midst of Paradise, ^B and ordained him to rule over all created things and to dwell in Paradise as a god; the devil, beholding him, envied the dignity of man and counseled him, the man, not to obey the commandments of God. But man, being inexperienced in the wickedness of the Evil One, listened to the counsel of the devil and disobeyed God. And from that time he received the death of sin; and likewise all men born from that man, having taken sin as if from ancestors, held onto it, and sin reigned over them. Because of man, God sent forth prophets, teachers into the world, that they might teach men, so that they might turn from sin. But the prophets were not able to correct them. And for this reason, God said within Himself: "I will descend ^C and will put on flesh, and I will become man-like and will teach my creation, and they will turn from the counsel of the devil, and every man will be as a God, not according to nature, but according to1 participation." And this, God the Father willing, by the good pleasure of the Father and the cooperation of the Holy Spirit, the Son and Word of God descended and entered into a pure and holy, chaste Virgin, and taking on flesh, He became man. And again having come forth from the Virgin, He walked in the world with men. And then He was named Christ and taught men the way of truth. And this is Christ, the Son and Word of God, bearing flesh; to Him be the glory unto the ages of ages. Amen.

LATER CONFESSION OF FAITH

OF THE MOST HOLY PATRIARCH AND PHILOSOPHER GENNADIUS, A HOMILY REGARDING THE RIGHT AND TRUE FAITH OF THE CHRISTIANS, DELIVERED BEFORE THE PERSIAN WISE MEN OF THE AGARENI, AT THE EXHORTATION OF THE GREAT SULTAN AND IN HIS PRESENCE

Being asked by him, "What do you Christians believe?" he answered in this manner:

^A CAPUT I.

SCHOLARIUS. We believe that there is a God, the Creator of all things that exist, from non-existence; that He is neither a body, nor is He clothed in a body, but He lives by an act of understanding; and He is a mind, most excellent and most perfect, and most wise, uncompounded, beginningless, and endless. He is in the world, and above the world. He is not in any one place, and yet He is in every place. These are the properties of God, by which He is distinguished from the things He has created, and there are others similar to these.

This confession was translated into the Turco-Arabic language by Achmat, the governor of Berrhœa, who was the father of Machumut Zelebi, the scribe. ^B

Achmat’s translation: [original-script column: see facsimile]

^A ... ^B

CHAPTER II.

Achmat: Since He is wise and good, the Source and the Creator of all creatures, it is necessary for all these to exist in Him. For He is the Giver of all things; and if we do not see them, it is because He is Himself the Source of wisdom, and so wisdom exists in the creature. He is wise, and from Him comes wisdom in the creature; He is truthful, and from Him comes truth in the creature—and all other virtues similarly. And this is the reason why, though He bestows these virtues upon the creatures, He remains the One who is truly perfect.

CHAPTER III.

Achmat: Since it is His nature to be the Principle, there are three properties which are the source and foundation of all others. By these three properties He is eternally active and vital, and through these He created all things in the world, and by these He governs the world. And we name these three properties three hypostases, that is, three persons. And because these properties do not divide the one and simple essence of God, He remains one God and not three gods, as some wrongly say.

CHAPTER IV.

the Spirit, natural energies of God, since God is mind, as has been said before. And these three—Mind, Word, and Spirit—are one God, just as in the one soul of man there is mind, and the intelligible word, and the intelligible will, and yet these three are one soul according to essence. Again, we call the Word of God the wisdom of God, and power, and His Son, because it is a product of His nature; just as we call the product of the nature of man the son of man, and just as the thought of man is the product of his soul. And again, we call the will of God the Spirit of God, and love. But the mind itself we call the Father, because He is unbegotten and without cause, but the cause of the Son and of the Spirit. Since, therefore, God not only understands the things created by Him, but much more understands and knows Himself, and for this reason possesses word and wisdom, through which He understands Himself specifically; likewise, God does not only will and love the things He has made, but wills and loves Himself much more. For this reason the Word and His Spirit proceed eternally from God; and they are eternally in Him, and these two, together with God, are one God. Achmat. [Note: the preceding Turkish text in Greek script is a verbatim rendering of the Latin/Greek argument above; [original-script column: see facsimile]]

CAPUT V.

governs, and moves all of His creation in the world toward the good, according to the order of each nature. And for this reason we believe that when God willed, by His mercy alone, to turn men back from the deception of demons and the worship of idols—because, except for the narrow region of the Jews, in which one God was worshipped and believed in, according to the law of Moses, the rest of the entire inhabited world was worshipping the creatures of God, and, instead of the one and only true God, were worshipping many gods that are not gods—and every individual was living according to his own desires, not according to any law of God.

Achmat. ^B [Turkish text provided in the facsimile].

CAPUT VI.

Son, and Holy Spirit, as our Lord Jesus Christ taught. And, because He is truthful, we believe Him to be Truth itself. His disciples also taught us this more fully. Thus we understand it also by the power of wisdom. ^A

Achmates. [The Turkish text in Latin characters is omitted here.] ^B

CHAPTER VII.

SCHOL. We believe that the Word of God, and the man with whom the Word of God was clothed, is Christ. Indeed, the life of Christ, which He led in His flesh, was the life of a man more than holy. But the power of His wisdom and His works was the power of God. ^C

Achmates. [The Turkish text in Latin characters is omitted here.] ^D

CHAPTER VIII.

SCHOL. We believe that, just as the soul and the body of one man constitute one man, so the Word of God, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the soul and the body, are always two natures, perfectly divided in one man. Thus also the humanity and the divinity are in one Christ, natures perfectly divided, joined only by hypostasis and personally. And neither was the Word of God changed into the flesh or the soul of Christ, nor was the flesh of Christ, or His soul, transformed into the Word of God, but was, and is, in

Christ, after that ^A most admirable dispensation of His, the Word of God being the Word, and the humanity being the humanity. And that the humanity of Christ did not assume divinity, but the divinity of the Word of God assumed human nature, being joined in the very act of assumption. Everything which is in God, and from God, is naturally God; because there is no accident in God. And for this reason, we name and believe that which falls under the intelligence to be the Word of God, God. And because this Word of God was in Christ, for this reason we confess Christ to be God and man: man, indeed, on account of the soul and the body, but God, on account of the Word of God which is in Him.

Achmat. ^B [Turkish/Ottoman text in Latin script: translation provided by the following Greek/Latin context].

CAPUT IX.

Achmat. ^D [Turkish/Ottoman text in Latin script: translation provided by the following Greek/Latin context].

CAPUT X.

^A when the Word of God Himself, who is God, descends with all His power into Jesus; whereas when He sent a grace or two to the prophets, he sent it to some of them indeed, but to others a lesser or greater measure.

*Achmat.* This is the article [of faith] on this subject, that the goodness of God, which is perfect and complete, and His grace toward the created beings, did not display itself in such a measure of perfection at the time when He sent singular graces to the prophets; for the knowledge and the perfection of the divine goodness displayed itself more abundantly toward the human race in the mission of Christ, than it had shown itself in the various degrees and grades of the prophets who came before.

CAPUT XI.

*Schol.* We believe that Christ was crucified and died by His own will, for many and great benefits—which would require a long discourse to explain—and all this happened according to His human nature; for the Word of God is neither crucified, nor does He die, nor does He rise again, but rather He Himself raised the dead, just as He also raised the flesh which He bore. We believe that Christ, having risen, was taken up into the heavens, and that He is to come again with glory, ^C to judge the world.

*Achmat.* This is the article on this subject, that He was crucified and died. He did this by His own will for many kinds of benefits, as we have said, that is, [He did this] not because He was compelled, but [that He might give] life; that just as He raised the dead when He was in this world, and as He raised His own body, He will likewise return in glory to judge the world.

Chapter XII.

*Schol.* We believe that human souls are immortal; that the bodies of the saints will rise again, incorruptible, luminous, light, and in no need of food, nor of drink, nor of clothing, nor ^D of other bodily pleasures. We believe also that the souls and bodies of those who have lived well will go into paradise, but the impenitent, the wicked, and the infidels will go to the torments of hell. We believe that the paradise of the saints and their blessedness are in heaven, but the punishment of the wicked is upon the earth. Furthermore, we believe that the blessedness of the saints is nothing other than that such souls shall be perfected in their knowledge. Then they shall see the mysteries of God which they do not now know, except through faith in Jesus Christ.

*Achmat.* This is the article on this subject, that the spirits of men are immortal, since their bodies will again find life, and this life will be eternal, free from toil, and light. Through the vision of God they shall be [next page begins: 0160_346.jpg continues...]

^A fulfilled.

CHAPTER XIII.

SCHOL. Why it was necessary for the Word of God, being God, to be clothed in flesh, is a matter of necessary and many reasons. And when there is need, we are prepared to give them. Moreover, besides those reasons, these seven things further confirm the certainty and truth of our faith.

Achmat. Since the tongue is [as it were] a messenger of the heart ^B and the soul, being [as it were] a balance for testing; if it is upright, it brings forth truth, and with great desire it offers up to God that which is found within to be true.

CHAPTER XIV.

SCHOL. First, that the prophets of the Jews (whose prophecies we also approve) foretold of Jesus, and of the things done by Him, and what things came to pass under Him, and what things his disciples later accomplished by His power and mandate. Likewise, the oracles of the Greeks also foretold these things, by the permission of God, as did the astronomers of the Persians and Greeks; and all these things [were said] ^C with the illustrious praise and proclamation of Jesus. And we can demonstrate that all these prophecies and predictions were true, and in no way adulterated.

Achmat. Since indeed the prophets of Israel, whom we also justly believe, made manifest many signs and testimonies as it is written, which all the people witnessed, and by these [signs] their prophecies and predictions were made known to be true, and are found to be unshakable in every way.

CAPUT XV.

SCHOL. Next, that all the books and Scriptures of our religion in all respects agree among themselves. And it is no wonder. For those who wrote them had one and the same teacher, the grace of God itself. Otherwise ^D it would certainly have come to pass that they would have disagreed in some things.

Achmat. Since the second argument [is] that our books of religion, which we read, are in no wise mutually contradictory; for the reason that they had one source, the grace of God, which, had it not been so, would have caused them to be mutually contradictory.

CHAPTER XVI.

SCHOL. In the third place, that men everywhere received this faith—though it was new and contrary to common opinion, and wondrous—with great zeal and many perils. And not only the uneducated and those lacking in

wisdom, but also those who were considered prudent and wise. From this point on, the deception and guile of the demons were utterly dissolved. ^A

Achmat. The seventeenth point is this: that this faith implies nothing impossible, nor anything inconsistent, nor anything corporal, but all things are spiritual. And it is a path that leads the souls of men to the love of God and of the life eternal to come. ^B

CHAPTER XVII

SCHOL. Fourth, that this faith contains nothing impossible, nothing inconsistent; nothing corporal, but all things spiritual. And it is a path that leads men's souls to the love of God and to the life eternal to come.

Achmat. The eighteenth point is this: that as many as received this faith, and lived virtuously according to the law and ordinances of Jesus, were adorned with greater gifts from God, and powerfully performed many miracles in the name and by the permission of Jesus himself; which, in truth, would not have occurred if this faith had been contrary to the truth. ^C

CHAPTER XVIII

SCHOL. Fifth, that as many as received this faith, and lived virtuously according to the law and institutions of Jesus, these were more adorned with gifts from God, and they performed many miracles powerfully, in the name and by the permission of Jesus himself; which, in truth, would not have followed if this faith were opposed to the truth.

Achmat. The nineteenth point is this: that whatever is brought forward by some against this faith, we are able to refute easily and consistently with the truth.

CHAPTER XIX

SCHOL. Sixth, that whatever is brought by some against this faith, we can resolve it both easily and in a way consistent with the truth.

Achmat. The twentieth point is this: that in former times kings and their governors in the inhabited world, being polytheists and idolaters, fought against this faith with many punishments and murders—and for eight years—and achieved nothing, but the faith prevailed and remains unto this present day. And when the Lord comes, he will find it. And if this faith had not been [founded] by the will of God, it would have been easily dissolved back then. To this our Lord Jesus Christ, glory. Amen. ^D

CHAPTER XX

SCHOL. Lastly, kings and their governors persecuted this faith formerly with many torments and slaughters throughout the circuit of the earth for 518 years; so that they might protect the multitude of their gods, to whose worship they were given, and their idols; and they achieved nothing at all, but the faith struggled and won, remaining until this present day. But even the Lord, when he comes, will find it. Which, had this faith not been founded in the will of God, would have easily vanished then like mist dissolved. To this same Lord of ours Jesus Christ be glory. Amen.

Achmat. The twenty-first point occurs [regarding] the three hundred and eighteen [fathers?]... [original-script column: see facsimile]

Ineger alachun rhidasiocle olmagiagiti bile olumasti. ^A SCHOL. These things we say briefly concerning our faith. Achmat. Giani eile tiris birtinibus babinde ichtisar itipen. Temet tamam olati. That is, he completed.

GENNADIUS' HOMILY ON THE SACRAMENTAL BODY OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST

^A Since, by the abstinence of these holy days and by our discourses concerning it, you have been prepared for the sacred table, O listeners, with God's help, and since you are to receive the sacrament of the Eucharist six days from now, and to partake of the body and blood of our Lord: I deemed it necessary ^B to speak also concerning this sacrament, as much as the Lord would grant, to exhort you to bring such a spirit as might approach it without doubt and with utmost faith, even if it stands struck by the magnitude of the matter. For since consideration of the body of Christ is varied and manifold—that is, as natural, as glorious, as glorified, as mystical—and each aspect admits of its own different and multiple discussion according to the diversity of the subject, I shall pass over the others for now, and turn my entire discourse immediately to the mystical. But since one can dispute about it according to a threefold method—namely, concerning the existence of the sacrament, concerning its worthy reception, and concerning its careful preservation—I shall speak to you today first about the existence ^C of the sacrament, setting forth the truth for you and manifesting it with examples by which the objections of the infidels are refuted. For if any of the things which were miraculously done by Christ is often a stumbling block to the infidels, it is this one, which, being the most worthy of admiration above all others, is the more denied—so much so that to those who first heard it, the word seemed harsh, and became a pretext for scandal. Everything, indeed, had gone well for our Lord, and the way of his secret and entire ser-

economy ^A had proceeded, as he taught and performed miracles, sowing the seeds of truth, both those that concerned dogmas and those that pertained to morals. He displayed that heavenly and divine legislation, not obscurely, pointing it out in word to those who were then able to attend, and through those by whom, as time progressed, he was to establish his own laws throughout the world. He confirmed the word of truth by showing his personal works and by miracles, the last and greatest of which was the calling back of Lazarus to this life. What followed all those things was the madness of the Jews against him, and the cross, and the trophy through the cross. Foreseeing these things, and being about to endure them, and predicting them, and hastening events toward their outcome, he did this even though the words and works which should have deservedly gained for him goodwill and honor had instead kindled hatred, or rather envy, in the souls of desperate men. He hastened, ^B therefore, toward the cross and death as the primary heads of the dispensation, and as the expiation for our common sin and the punishment owed for it, which he had come to release benignly and justly at once. For all that had preceded were, in a sense, catechisms of the conduct of the faithful in this grace, and laws able to regulate human life. Thus, then, being disposed in this way, and knowing within himself that he was about to leave his disciples, he gave himself to them, and to us through them, in a certain mystical way. For "do not think," he says, "that you will ever be separated from me bodily, or that you will be deprived of those life-giving words with which I, being present, nourished you; but I now offer my body in a new and mystical manner, and ^C my blood, which is about to be shed for you and for the whole world a little later. I also hand down to you the form of such a miracle, and I grant you the power to perform it. For the efficacy of my words will transmute all bread and all wine into my body and blood, whenever you shall desire to make a memorial of me, and to have me as co-existing, present, and strengthening you toward every good. For what greater conjunction could there be than to eat and to drink?" Thus, then, eating my body and drinking my blood, as it is right that these be eaten and drunk, you shall have eternal life, being conformed to me and, so to speak, made fellow-members of my body, and becoming good travelers toward that life through me, ^D since I myself became a traveler for you, being both the way and the final end. Nor will there be any fear of going astray for those who are deemed worthy to partake of such flesh and such blood. For no one traveling will be in danger when he is with me and uses me as a guide. But he who communicates in this way will not have a guide from without, but one suggesting what is necessary from within; for he will be mingled with me, and he himself will remain in me, and I in him. Nor should the word of communion seem burdensome and hard to you; for you will not be deterred, eating human flesh and drinking blood, under this disposition which

^A they now possess and are in me; but as in bread and wine you are about to eat and drink, so the appearing truth of the bread and wine shall contain the hidden truth of the body and blood, the substance having been changed so that the mystery may work within you, while the outward disposition remains the same, so that no Glings ^B or fear may take hold of you and turn you away from the participation. Doing these things, therefore, not for the sake of friendship only, but also for the sake of profit, and remembering my words and life, you shall surely progress in the spiritual life, and in due time you shall be deemed worthy of that future life for which I have already sufficiently prepared you. Such, hearers, is the goal of this mystery, as far as one may speak in a few words about the greatest and most divine sacrament. And now the mystery works in those who participate the progress of the life in Christ, which works bodily that which its appearance does; ^C this it accomplishes mystically and invisibly within. For the body of Christ feeds and restores our soul, just as bread produces this for the body. And just as we are regenerated and baptized, we receive the being of grace, and take hold of the being of sin—anointed, however, with the chrism—we are confirmed, and signed as a gift of regeneration, and strengthened for the spiritual struggles which it is absolutely necessary for those who are spiritually born to undergo; so, too, we must be nourished, having been made stronger, and receive perseverance and increase in the same grace through the sacrament of communion. For just as the natural ^D heat of the body would consume its innate moisture, if it were not sustained by the addition of food, and for this reason the vital parts within, on which our nature consists, are best preserved by food and drink, and what is corrupted by heat is repaired and preserved, and it is impossible for human life to be sustained in any other way; so also the heat of malice, consuming the soul from within and emaciating the good habit of piety, would cause it to fail entirely, if the soul did not receive this spiritual food, standing against the corrupting power of malice, and confirming and activating in us the spiritual gifts of God.

The body of Christ is nourishing by reason of body, but by reason of purity, through union with the divine nature, it purifies and sanctifies, sufficiently providing us with spiritual nourishment. Thus, being so well nourished, we are brought back to that spiritual purity and health from which the eating of the forbidden fruit had once cast us down. For it was necessary that we, who had lost that innocence and health by a certain corporeal food, should restore it by a certain corporeal food, so that like might be cured by like, and opposites by opposites, in an appropriate manner; just as those foods, both corporeal—both that which was previously a cause of destruction and that which is now a cause of salvation—are health and spiritual life, that which now saves and that which once corrupted. But that food God had forbidden, whereas this one He now both commands to be used and provides; that one the evil one suggested, but of this one the Son of God…

becomes not only a counselor, but a minister; that one was snatched, but to this one we are openly invited; in that one the serpent of transgression lay in wait, but in this one is hidden an infinite treasury of good things. For the most holy body of Christ, when eaten as is fitting, as the divine Gregory says, is armor for those who are fighting, a return for those who are traveling, it strengthens the weak, gladdens the robust, heals diseases, [and] preserves health; through it we become milder for correction, more patient in labors, warmer for love, sharper for knowledge, more ready for obedience, quicker for the operation of the gifts, the opposites of which follow for those who do not partake ^B rightly. The table becomes for them a pit, and a retribution, and a scandal, and all those other things which, in prophesying, David enumerates as happening to such people concerning this sacred table. O mystery most holy of all mysteries, and surpassing the very sacrament of baptism! For through that one the Lord communicates Himself to us only according to power, but through this one according to substance. O miracle surpassing every miracle! O Transubstantiation, truly marvelous and stupendous, and most pleasing to those who are enlightened by faith! For it is certainly not difficult nor incredible that the primary cause of all things should be able to effect something beyond the order established by Himself in things, whenever He wills, which indeed we call a miracle, as often as it happens that nature itself performs or undergoes some such thing in itself. For every natural change, whether generation, or increase, or alteration, is either according to nature or contrary to nature, as it seems to the philosopher: as is the state of those things which grow into their just size in a fixed period of time, or those that grow untimely; just as also in critical days, certain diseases are healed, either before them or afterwards: of which those that occur according to nature excite no admiration in us, but those that are contrary to nature are alone accustomed to be matter for admiration. ^C But although many miracles are done and have been done by God, this one is certainly the greatest. For this mystery, containing a certain transposition of substance into substance, which happens in a moment while the accidents remain unchanged, is far more excellent than any natural or supernatural transmutation. But now, skipping the natural transmutations, which are closely followed by those that occur contrary to nature, although they are accustomed to happen more rarely, let us consider the divine operations of miracles. For God does indeed deliver from fever and other diseases without medicine, just as He healed Peter’s mother-in-law, and the centurion’s boy, and many others; and He condenses the air into rain, with no natural cause of rains preceding, as He did before through Samuel and Elijah; but in all such things He changes only the order and the manner of nature, while He achieves a thing which can happen daily, even if not by the same path. Again, He raises the dead, as He did Lazarus, and opens the eyes ^D

^A of the blind. But in such cases, He introduces the order of nature, not so much in regard to what is done, as in regard to that in which these things are done—that is, the underlying subject. For nature itself produces life, but not in the dead, and bestows sight, but not on one whose eyes are once and for all destroyed. Again, He stays the sun through Joshua the son of Nun; and He glorifies the human body through Himself, and causes a body to pass through another body—things which indeed hold the greatest and most preeminent place among the miracles of God, inasmuch as they could in no way be produced by nature. But the miracle set before us transcends even these. For there, He merely stays the sun, but He does not at the same time cause it to move, nor at the same time to be and not to be. But here, He indeed makes the bread into a body, yet He guards the body without the the accidents appropriate to it, and the accidents of the bread without the substance appropriate to them; and He joins a substance that has naturally grown together with other accidents to accidents belonging to another substance. O miracle most great and transcending every word! I will say it again. But I have another miracle to compare to this, that God joined ^B human nature to the divine person, not as He joins body to soul, where each retains its own proper name separately. For neither is the soul called body, nor the body soul; but so He unites them personally, that God is man, and the man is God. But the mystery is more marvelous even than this. For there, neither nature was changed into the other; but in the person of Christ, both the divinity and the human nature are found unconfusedly. Here, however, the creature is transformed into the Creator through the medium of the body, and the pre-existing substance of the bread becomes the body of God, while it is being made a body. Assuredly, then, the Transubstantiation of the bread into the Lord’s body is the greatest of all the miracles of God because of these considerations, but to one who contemplates the divine power, it will not be judged impossible. For one should not think that God cannot act beyond the natural order of things, to whom both nature and order are subject; much more so when it is permitted to see nature itself sometimes ^C overstepping its own boundaries. Nor should one concede to God certain miracles as if they were easy and obvious, while attributing to the one who has infinite power—and power circumscribed by no limits other than His own will—an inability to perform greater and more difficult ones. For if He transgresses the order of nature as the cause superior to all, in the diversity of subjects, why would He not also transgress this same order in the same thing, if He so wills? And if He who is the creator of the order of nature is not a servant to it, why would He not also transform nature itself just as He Himself might will? For just as to some created power miracles, even those of the final sort, are altogether impossible, so it follows with the amplitude of infinite power that, when He wills, He can design and effect the greatest possible miracle, and is not hindered as if stopping at any degree of sublimity. But how can it be difficult for Him who established all things to ^D

order some partial nature as He wills? For this reason God dispels fever through medicine and the way of nature; for by Him both art and nature achieve their effect, since the faculty of each entirely originates from Him. He also dispels fever not using the natural way nor art. By the same power He breathes life into the dead, which nature gives only to the living. ^A Furthermore, He frees the body, which by nature is heavy and earthly, from natural weight and mortality, leads it through closed doors, and, lifting it up, transfers it into the heavenly space, establishing corporeality and spirituality in the same thing, so that it is at once the true body of a man and yet a spiritual body, such as might pass through solid objects, yielding to the divine power, just as some simple bodies pass through solid bodies, when the force of human hands brings this about.

Regarding divine miracles, it is enough to have said as much as the plan of our present undertaking required. ^B But dwelling now only upon the proposed mystery, and resuming our discourse, we say that to the divine power this is absolutely in no way impossible. And as for every one of the difficulties by which some are led to disbelief concerning this mystery, it is easy for human reason to oppose them; although this mystery ought to be apprehended and held by faith alone.

But immediately, the hesitation concerning the momentary transmutation is met by the infinity of the divine power: for an infinite power can move the greatest bodies in a moment of time, as it seems to the philosopher, so that even to transmute them in a moment of time does not exceed the power ^C of the creative force of all things. To the one who is struck with amazement at the transmutation of substances, divine Scripture provides many likenesses, and nature herself provides many more. For there is a nature of waters in which wood thrown into it is not long in being transformed into the nature of stone. And in the belly and stomach of an animal, every day the purer part of the food, after digestion and mutation, is passed to the liver and the veins, and through it becomes an addition to the substance of the creature being nourished. What then? Do not these things also seem wondrous to the unbelieving? ^D Yet they do not disbelieve that bread becomes flesh within themselves, but they raise their unbelief against this mystery alone. And if even Satan said when tempting: *Say that these stones become bread, if you are the Son of God* (Matt. IV, 3), knowing that the divine power is surely capable of doing this in a moment, if it wills; how does he who says that God cannot transmute the bread into human flesh, which nature does in a determined space of time, not lie worse than the tempter himself, who is the father of lies?

The same power that now works that miracle, which once suddenly transformed the wife of Lot into a pillar of salt, calls back to a sounder mind those who do not wish to have faith in God who commands; it is she, indeed, [that transformed] the rod of Moses into a serpent, and from a serpent back into a rod.

She, moreover, later made water into wine in Cana; she makes the fruit of an animal into flesh within a certain space of time, and adds growth to the flesh from that same fruit through transmutation. ^B But since they concede that transubstantiation in this sacrament is not entirely impossible, they attack it again from the issue of quantity. For since the substance of the bread is transmuted into that of the body, the accidents of the bread remain without a subject; though this is above nature, it does not, however, exceed what can be conceived by the mind. Indeed, it is impossible for accidents not to exist in a subject, for this is established by the very reason and definition of accidents themselves. Yet we can conceive of such a thing in our mind, and separate an accident from a subject through the power of the mind: by this method we gather the universal concept into one, separating it from individual things. But what is done by the power of our mind would certainly be effected by the power of the greatest and first mind, which at once understands it and in reality performs it. But they say that there is something else in this sacrament which exceeds not only nature but also the power of our mind: namely, that the whole Christ is believed to be in the small quantity of the bread that appears. But this miracle, too, is not lacking in reasoning by which the difficulty may be met. For in this holy sacrifice the body of Christ is not present naturally, but only sacramentally; for that reason, he is not in it as if veiled in a tabernacle in a certain place, nor [is he present] under the dimensions proper to a true body, but only under the dimensions of the bread. Whence, since the substance ^C in itself and insofar as it is substance, neither occupies nor requires a place, except insofar as it is under the dimensions of the body, it follows that in this sacrament the body of Christ does not require or occupy a larger place than that which the dimensions of the bread require and occupy, under which the substance of the body is covered. Moreover, one ought not to deny faith to these things, since there are many other things in the nature of things which provide almost immediately the same cause for doubting. For the human soul is entirely in the whole body, and entirely in every one of the parts of the body, and it has the same nature both in a part and in the rest of the body; and it has an equal magnitude in the body of an infant as in that of a giant. For if one must imagine any magnitude for the soul, it suffers neither accretion nor diminution nor any resection through the accretion or diminution of the body or the resection of any member. Although this is most true, and has appeared so to all the wise men of the Greeks and to all the holy doctors, it nevertheless does not fall into the mind as clearly and perspicuously as other manifest and obvious intelligible things. For how do we measure by sight the magnitude of a tower or a mountain, ^D carrying as we do in a tiny eye the impression of the species of such a magnitude? For there is in the soul, in an intelligible way, the species of the tower, and as it is material in itself, so it is spiritual in the eye, and through this spiritual species we make a comparison of the exterior magnitude. What reason can be rendered for such a thing?

Even in a small mirror, we behold the images of the greatest things, and we can scarcely give a reason for that thing. ^B Furthermore, those who do not have faith in the sacrament say it is impossible for the mystical body of Christ, when divided into parts, to remain whole, and for each of the parts to be the whole and perfect body of Christ. But our faith proclaims also this—a miracle indeed not unlike other paradoxes occurring in this sacrament, confirmed by many similitudes, and above all by the reason of the sacrament itself. For that division and cutting does not touch Christ's body, but occurs only in the dimensions of quantity, under which, after that transmutation, the body of Christ lies hidden. Just as if a mirror is broken, the species of the body represented in it is not broken, but one may behold the same species in each fragment. Even insect animals, when they are divided, the sensitive soul remains in the individual segments, as it seems to the philosopher. And the human soul is indeed whole in each part of the body, and it is not cut along with any part being cut; and likewise, in each part of the sensitive flesh, the existence of the same flesh is preserved, and every part of the bread is bread. So too, each part of Christ's body is the whole body of Christ, which that which is lacking in such similitudes is supplied by the divine power in the sacrament. I say this, provided that the particle of bread is of such a size that the reason of bread can be preserved in it; otherwise it would not be transmuted into the substance of flesh: for if it were divided into very minute parts, the reason of the body is no longer preserved, just as the reason of bread would perish.

Est autem Christi corpus et in cœlo et in terra et in omni altari unum et idem numero. ^C And since very many miracles occur in this sacrament, as has been said, this surpasses all admiration, and is full of multifarious difficulty. For in a different respect, it is possible for the same thing to be in various places, such as our soul, which indeed according to the being of nature is in the same place in which we are bodily, inasmuch as it is the form and actuality of the body; but according to the being of love and affection, it is where it loves, as it is said, "For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also" (Matt. vi, 21), and again, as the divine Apostle says, "Our conversation is in heaven" (Philipp. iii, 20). If, therefore, the body of Christ were said to be found in different places in this way, it would perhaps not be so difficult to understand. But now we believe that the same body in number, according to one and the same existence, exists in different places, which seems to be altogether impossible according to the law of nature; yet we believe that the thing is so, indubitably, having followed the doctrine of those divinely inspired, and their examples, ^D and also by reasons, the mind [labors] with such a difficulty...

^A For every body, while it is in a place, is itself measured whole for whole by the place, and its parts are assigned to the parts of the place, and it is in the place through the mediation of its own quantity. For the property of being in a place belongs strictly to quantity, and consequently to substance, since quantity is such. From this it follows that a body exists only there, where its quantity and dimensions are found. For it is impossible for the same quantity to be measured by many places at once. But regarding the body of Christ, it is not so; for it exists in a place through the mediation of the quantity that was previously in the bread. And if the proper quantity of the most holy body coexists with it inseparably, it does so consequently through the mediation of the substance, which cannot subsist without its own quantity. Since, therefore, nothing prevents many quantities of bread from existing on many altars, it follows that the body of Christ, being one in number, is found in many places through the mediation of those quantities, which are not its own.

One may confirm this with examples: like our soul, which, because it does not possess quantity by itself by which it would be measured by the body that contains it, is whole in the whole and in every particle ^B of the body. And further, by the example of the word, which is itself one in number, and can exist internally, and be spoken, and heard, and written; and the spoken word, even though it is one, is grasped by the ears of many at once. Furthermore, [consider] the example of the sun, whose light illuminates outside and inside a house, and shining through a glass, lights up the inside of the house, being the same at once, and separated neither from itself nor from the sun. But the species also is in all its individual instances, wherever they may be, yet it is one in number.

We can dispel the doubt that has arisen in the mind with many such examples; but it is sufficient to believe so with indubitable faith, and being confirmed by this alone, to attend to the rest in a perfunctory manner. For what human reason can be given for this ^C sacrament, which is supernatural and a prodigy, and which surpasses all other things by a long interval, or what example taken from natural things can be appropriately adapted to it? "But I," you will say, "cannot be persuaded; for examples and reasons presuppose faith; but I am in need of demonstration: I cannot believe." But you can, I say, believe if you wish; for faith is a voluntary consent of the mind. But if you do not wish, the case will stand otherwise, even if you do not want it so. You do not believe the one who asserts that iron is made from the earth, perhaps being far removed from such a craft, and ignorant of it; nor that glass is made from some ashen material, because perhaps you have never attended such operations, nor perceived these things with the senses of the body, and so on with other things. But I will show you that you believe many things which you cannot see. You believe that your body ^D consists of four elements, but you do not see it being composed of them; you believe that your great-grandfather and great-great-grandfather were such-and-such, but you did not see them; you believe the

ocean surrounds the earth; you believe the one who says the sun will suffer a total or partial eclipse after so many days and hours, yet you have not seen these things, nor have you ever beheld them with your own eyes. If you grant credence to those who report these things, how much more is God worthy of trust above men who relate such things, when He says, "This is My body," and, "This is My blood"? ^A But you say, "I doubt the veracity of Him who spoke, and His divinity." O man, you are truly blind, wavering about manifest truths, when the prophecies of the holy prophets, the oracles, the Sibyls, the sages, and all the seers bear witness to the veracity and divinity of the Speaker more clearly than the sun! These prophecies, having long since announced that greatest and saving innovation for the improvement of our nature, were thus ordained by God so that your unbelief might be condemned without excuse. ^B There are the miracles that preceded His birth and manifestation; His life, which transcends the condition of man; His most sublime, heavenly, and truly divine legislation; all His predictions which have been fulfilled in their outcome; those supernatural prodigies; His voluntary death; the wonders that occurred at His death; and all the splendors that followed it. The unchangeable steadfastness of the disciples was indeed a great testimony to their faith, and a great proof of the truth concerning Christ which was acknowledged by them; but it was greater if it was to be attributed to His grace, when He was no longer present bodily, as before, but was invisibly instilling it from the heavens. Consider the contests of the apostles for Him; their life, having nothing discordant with the excellent doctrines and examples of the Master; their dangers endured with such zeal for the truth and the salvation of the world; the miracles that were performed through them and by which they were preserved. ^C Consider the blood of the martyrs and their miracles; the radiant conversion of all the climates of the earth from error to the true faith in God; the destruction of that age-old superstition, which had so many tyrants and potentates as its protectors and defenders; finally, the establishment of the holy Church, in which everything august, precious, and spiritual is found in abundance, and which is fashioned after the image of that glorious order established in heaven. And who could enumerate the most evident proofs concerning the divinity of Christ, which are infinite in number and greatest in power? Wherefore, let us leave all doubts concerning this mystery, as well as the other holy and divine mysteries, and concerning the faith itself, to the infidels and heretics; ^D but let us rather pray that they, too, may be illuminated by the radiance of the truth. As for us, let us moor ourselves in the good harbor—to the Lord, I say, our Master, who is life, light, truth, and the way to salvation—and, giving thanks for all the benefits He has bestowed upon us, let us now render to Him, along with the thanksgiving for this spiritual nourishment, by which the warmth of grace remaining in us is increased with much addition, though by wickedness...

^A it grows defective, He rekindles it, and awakens and strengthens what is becoming dull. And let us believe firmly and without doubt whatever the Church of Christ, our mother, teaches concerning this sacrament; that is to say, that in this mystical body Christ Himself is covered under the appearances of bread, and that He is whole and entire, the very same Who was born of the blessed Virgin, and who was once upon the cross, and is now in heaven. Let us strive that we may be continuously nourished by this truly heavenly bread, which the manna well typified, and may be nourished in such a way that it may nourish us, not that it may burn us; for it is truly a fire that burns those who partake unworthily, and to them it is a food of condemnation rather than of justification, according to the divine Apostle. Into Judas, after he had received this food, Satan entered; and Uzziah, offering a sacrifice which it was not lawful for him to offer, became leprous; and Uzzah was struck down by God because he had dared to touch the Ark; and the wood from which the first man ate and died was a tree of life, but because of disobedience it became a cause of death to him who tasted it. The sacred remedy of Galen is indeed useful when given [properly], but it does not avail the dead; and he who does not need the benefit of it might even be harmed by it.

Concerning this most sacred mystery, what has been said up to this point is sufficient. But let us also approach the miracle of Lazarus, not only as observers of a miracle that took place, but also as witnesses ^C of the power of Him who performed the miracle, and of the meaning hidden within that miracle. For we shall see Jesus our Lord standing at the tomb of His friend, who indeed had been buried four days earlier and was stinking; [we shall see] Mary, called by her sister to go to meet the Lord, meeting Him and weeping miserably, and falling at His feet; Jesus weeping moderately and groaning, either sympathizing humanely with the wretchedness of nature, or as our Lawgiver setting limits to tears, even in the mourning of the dead, and shortly after raising Lazarus with prayer and a voice calling with authority—the former to show the usefulness of prayer, the latter to show the power of His divinity. We shall see Lazarus rising at the sound of the voice, bound with grave-clothes, his face covered, and stinking, and then being joined to those who were reclining at table with Jesus; and the Jews troubled by the miracle, and considering this a fatal blow to themselves. For it was being demonstrated clearly by the magnitude of the miracle that He was God; and when they ought to have believed, they hastened to remove the Giver of life, and in reward for the resurrection of others, they decided to inflict death upon Him. And since they could not accomplish this without slander, they instill into the people the suspicion of pretended tyranny, they strike fear of the Romans, and they bid them beware of the desolation of the city, intending thereby to steal the vote of the people. We shall see our Jesus hastening to the long-meditated

^A passion, not without the most brilliant demonstrations of His divinity; and immediately withdrawing, so that the Passion might not anticipate that royal procession, and the meeting with palms, and the voices of the children—all of which were to happen to Him as He entered the city, since the prophets had foretold these things. And so that that holy Supper, concerning which we have just now spoken to you, might not be hindered, that miraculous basin—the teacher of humility and charity—and the final exhortation to the disciples, and all that was necessary to be fulfilled before His death, which brought great assurance to His own glory, or rather, to our own glory and salvation.

Lest, therefore, all these things should be interrupted, for the evil council had been provoked to a more bitter ferocity by the greater boldness of Christ, and was thinking more shamelessly how to bring death upon Him, we see Him ^B no longer walking with boldness, but remaining near the desert with His disciples. Who, then, O hearers, having such a Lord, will despair of salvation? Who, being dead—not as the daughter of Jairus, nor as the widow's son, who died just recently, but being four days dead, that is to say, long dead, and having a death and wickedness confirmed by the four seasons of time, and having his hands and feet bound by many sins, that is, being hindered in the powers that produce good works, and detained by evil acts and habits, having his intellectual vision blinded by a voluntary ignorance of his duty, and breathing out the stench of malice—who, then, even if he be such as this, will despair of salvation, considering all these things?

For our Lord does not only loose bodily diseases, but He remits sins much more readily; just as He did with the spiritual disease of the paralytic, before He insisted upon the healing of the body. For He said first, "Thy sins are forgiven thee," and then, "Take up thy bed, and walk." Let us therefore hasten, exercising virtue, to recall its contemplation to action, as Martha did Mary there. Let us meet our Lord, who is hastening to our resurrection with the greatest benevolence, if only we be prepared and anticipate His face in confession and weeping, so that we may draw forth the mercy of the Lord and Physician. And if we do so, He Himself will raise our Lazarus—that is to say, the mind that is dead and breathing out stench—and will make him one of those reclining and dining with Him; and, what is more, He will impart to him ^D His holy body and blood, and will make him progress toward the spiritual life, not only delivering him from the guilt of sins, but also adding grace to grace. Glory be to His mercy unto the ages of ages. Amen.

ANOTHER BRIEF HOMILY OF THE SAME BY THE SAME ON THE BODY AND BLOOD OF THE LORD Reported by Meletius Syrigos, hieromonk of Crete, in his Refutation of the Confession of Cyril Lucaris, Patriarch of Constantinople.

Since we previously responded to your inquiry regarding the sacramental Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ in an off-the-cuff manner, we shall now respond more extensively, feeling it necessary to convey to you the true knowledge of the mystery, as to most holy souls who love according to God, and are no less loved.

First, therefore, you must know that the most holy Body of our Lord, being always one, admits of diverse ways of being considered. For it is considered by us in one way as natural, that is, immediately from the very conception up to its manifestation ^A through miracles: in another way as glorious, that is, from the manifestation up to the passion and burial: in another way still as glorified, that is, from the resurrection and thenceforth forever: and finally in another way as mystical, that is, as it is presented most wondrously day by day upon the various altars of Orthodox Christians. These various ways of consideration, however, do not divide the Body of Christ, which remains one according to all these concepts.

Second, you must also know that of all the miracles performed by God above nature, none is more supernatural than this sacrament; wherefore none is more ignored by the unlearned, nor in any other is human and divine wisdom more exercised, nor is there anything else in our holy faith to which ^B infidels and heretics contradict more than this. For this reason, we ourselves once spoke in the unhappy palace on the Friday of Lazarus concerning the mystical Body of the Lord Christ, before the emperor, the senate, and the notables of the city, who at that time rendered many thanks to the Lord, and to us, His humble servants. Now, however, we speak briefly and clearly concerning the same.

Know, then, that those miracles take the first rank among the miracles of God in which only the order and manner of nature is altered, and that thing is brought about which can happen daily, but by another path; just as our Lord healed many infirm people ^C without medicine, such as the mother-in-law of Peter and the centurion's servant. And in the Old Testament, through Samuel and Elijah, He condensed the air to send down rain, without any other natural cause that would produce rain. ^D

^A They hold the second rank: the resurrection of Lazarus, and the restoration of sight to the blind man; for in these cases, what is done is according to nature, but with regard to the subject in which it is done, it is beyond nature. For nature itself produces life, but not in a dead person; and nature gives sight, but not in eyes that are deprived of it. ^B They hold the third rank: to stay the sun in its proper course, which was done through Joshua the son of Nun; and for a body to pass through a body, as our Lord passed through closed doors; for these things in no way can be brought about by nature. But far above all these wonders, there are two greatest miracles, which surpass all reason: one which was accomplished once, when God united human nature to the divine person; and another, greater than that, which is accomplished daily, when Christ at once transmutes the substance of bread into the substance of His own body, and the substance of wine into the substance of His own blood. For in the first miracle, neither nature was transmuted into the other; but in the person of Christ, both divinity and humanity exist unconfusedly. But in this mystery, the creature is transformed into the Creator, by means of the body, and the pre-existing substance of the bread becomes the body of Christ. And the substance of the bread is indeed transmuted, in order that the mystery may work within us, and make us of one body with Christ. But the outward appearance of the bread remains nevertheless the same, covering the substance of the body, so that no dizziness may take hold of us and draw us away from the communion. Therefore, this mystery is the greatest of all God’s miracles; and so, as we said before, many objections are put forward against it: on one side by unbelievers, on another by heretics, and on yet another by the unlearned, who do not have the power to discern the reason of the mystery; which objections we solved at that time in that homily.

^B For some of them are at a loss as to how, in an instant, the substance of the bread and wine is transmuted into the substance of the body. And others are at a loss how it is possible, when the substance of the bread has been changed into the substance of the body, for the accidents of the bread to remain—namely, its length, its weight, its breadth, its color, its odor, and the quality in its taste—so that the accidents of the bread exist without the substance of the bread, and the true substance of the body lies hidden in the accidents of another substance. Others are at a loss how it is possible for the whole Christ to be in the very small quantity of what is seen. Still others doubt how Christ’s mystical body, even when divided, remains whole and entire, ^C and each of the parts is itself the whole and perfect body of Christ. Others raise an objection, which also has the greatest difficulty, as to how the same and one body of Christ is in heaven, and at the same time upon many altars on earth. But these objections we indeed solved at that time, and we are able to solve them, by the grace of Christ illuminating us; or rather, the most wise doctors of the Church solve them, by the grace

of the grace and zeal that are in us.

Georgii Scholarii Orationes in synodo Florentina habitae

As to George, a certain Scholarius, he departed from these parts, and Mark entrusted to him the defense of his own opinion against the holy synod. And he, as we have already said, wrote a book concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, in many divided chapters, ^A stitching together a great many things, entirely and surely gratifying the wishes of Mark. That there is a very great difference between these two Georges is manifest of itself; for the one, while the synod at Florence was being assembled, both spoke and wrote much pointing toward union, both when asked and when not asked; but the other, the friend of Mark, writing after the synod in the prologue to his own work, says that he then broke his silence, because his opinion against the divine union would be more mature and more beneficial. And at the end of the book he says in these very words: "I accuse myself before all, and I mourn for us all, as many as ^B were entangled in those matters, either willingly or unwillingly, and either as a whole or in part; who, although able to speak, nonetheless held back, suppressing our words." How, therefore, could he who fell silent and suppressed himself, and he who said very many things and suppressed nothing, be one and the same George? Furthermore, if he is the same George who sang a palinode, why, in the book he composed, does he not explicitly correct what was previously in error? Why does he make no mention at all of the things formerly written by him? And why does he not solve those terrible arguments by which he exhorted the Greeks toward union, praising the Latins, ^C and shouting that they sinned in nothing regarding the faith? And yet, what was written before and what is contained afterward in the book stand in diametrical opposition. Furthermore, this friend of Mark says regarding himself that many were in doubt until that time as to whether he held the opposite views, wandering, he says, sometimes because of the silence he kept at the time, and sometimes misinterpreting his prudent accommodation in words or in things, and in some matters even slandering him. Therefore, he says, it was necessary for him to write a book in order to correct those who were not altogether beyond recovery, so as to end the ^D doubts and slanders held by many against him. For no one will doubt from now on, nor will he be led to slander, since his opinion has been made manifest. Yet how could these things apply to our own Scholarius, whose opinion was manifest to all from the beginning, as he himself says in his address to the emperor? For in his prologue he says: "Best and most powerful emperor, the opinion I held and still hold regarding the proposed matter of union is declared by the discourse I hastily composed and sent to this holy synod in our midst; and the two books which I previously composed and now place in the hands of the present synod also bear witness." And generally, one searching would find not a few differences between these two Georges; by which they are distinguished from each other, the one being justly called an advocate and champion of the holy ecumenical synod and of orthodoxy, as one indeed who followed the true Fathers of the Church to the end; but the other, carried away by the zeal with which he pursued Mark, must deservedly be called the assertor of the opinion which was first introduced by Nestorius and sanc...

GENNADIUS SCHOLARIUS' REFUTATION OF THE BOOK OF MARK OF EPHESUS AGAINST THE LATINS

Here, in our Conspectus of the Works of Gennadius, there was a place for the as-yet unpublished books On Providence and Predestination, which we undertook to transcribe from the Royal Parisian codices, the autographs of Gennadius; but since our transcribers, delaying, have not yet finished the labor, we are forced to alter the order of the materials slightly.

ORATIONS OF GEORGIUS SCHOLARIUS

To the reader.

^A as Mark entrusted the defense of his own opinion against the holy council to a certain George, one of the Scholarii, ^B he, having compiled a book—as we have said before—about the procession of the Holy Spirit, divided into many chapters, patched together a great many things, fully conforming himself to the will and sense of Mark. That there is a very great difference between these two Georges is evident from the start. For the one, while the Council of Florence was being celebrated, both spoke and wrote much, both when asked and when not asked; but the other, a friend of Mark, writing after the council in the preface of his own work, admits that he only then cast off his silence, when his opinion against the holy union would be, as he says, more mature and fruitful. And at the end of the book he has these words in the very same terms: "I accuse myself before all, and mourn for us all, as many as participated in those matters, either willingly or by force, ^C in whole or in part; who, although we could speak, yet remained silent, and repressed our speech from fear." How then will he who kept silent, and repressed his speech from fear, and he who said much and spoke most freely, be one and the same person? Add to this: if this one George is he who performed a recantation, why in that book which he composed does he not retract what was said by him before? Nor does he make any mention of his previous errors, nor does he solve those most strong arguments by which he exhorted the Greeks to union, praising the Latins, and crying out that they sinned in nothing in the faith? For the things which are read as written previously, and those which that book later contains, are diametrically opposed and conflict most strongly with one another. ^D Regarding this, Scholarius, devoted to Mark, says concerning himself that many people until that day were ignorant of whether he felt the contrary; they were mistaken, he says, both because he had opportunely kept silence, and because they wrongly interpreted his prudent dissimulation, and would even slander him. Wherefore, he says, it was necessary to write this book to correct those whose salvation was not despaired of, to free many from doubt, and to repel slanders, so that his own opinion would be known to all. How can these things apply to our Scholarius, whose opinion was known to everyone from the beginning? For when he had been asked by the emperor, he says in the preface of his discourse: "Most invincible emperor, that I was and am still of the same opinion regarding the proposed subject of the union, the discourse drafted and sent by me to this holy council of ours makes clear; and two books, which I composed previously and now present to the present council, also bear witness." And generally, one seeking could find not a few differences between these two Georges; by which, being distinguished from one another, the one is justly to be heard as a defender of the Holy Ecumenical Council and of the Orthodoxy, insofar as he was of one mind and a follower of the true Fathers of the Eastern Church to the end; but the other, by the zeal with which he pursued Mark, deserves to be called an adherent of the one who was the first to bring in, after Nestorius,

(continuation of the previous page) and faithful until the end; being another in his affection for Mark, a defender of that glory which, having taken its origin from Nestorius, was often condemned by holy Fathers and ecumenical councils.

OF THE MOST WISE GEORGE SCHOLARIUS, AN EXHORTATION CONCERNING PEACE AND THE PROVIDING OF AID TO THE FATHERLAND, ADDRESSED TO THE EASTERN SYNOD IN FLORENCE

^B To the holy and sacred synod of our holy Church, to the best and most venerable Fathers, George Scholarius [offers] due reverence.

The common precept of all wise men says that no one should offer counsel until he is called; but I am emboldened to do this even without being called, and I send this present discourse to you, knowing that it is an exhortation rather than a counsel. I am concerned for public affairs as a whole, but I am also concerned in part for myself, my parents, and my relatives; and at the same time, knowing your philanthropy and being persuaded that, even if what is said by me should not please you, you would not be angry with me, but would rather feel gratitude for my earnestness. For knowing you to be lovers of justice in all other matters, I hope now all the more that you will maintain that same disposition. You must also consider my goodwill toward you, on account of which I appear to have given offense to no one, nor to all of you together; rather, I have endured in silence many difficult things, which God knows, and which another would not easily have endured; for it was not fitting to be a nuisance to anyone, or a disturber of public affairs. Looking therefore to this goodwill of mine, and attributing my present boldness to the necessity in which things stand, so desire to judge my words, my masters and Fathers, you who are and will be the leaders of all good things together, both now and for all time.

^D I do not think that one ought any longer to keep silent, my lords and venerable Fathers, now that the impending evils persuade us to dare even more than this, nor do I think that the present state of affairs requires many words, when we are at the height

^A of danger, and it is with difficulty that even after much thought we can act, while we must speak even less, if we are to be saved. The study of arranging speech appropriately, and elegance of language, and the art of oratory, have been for the most part snatched away from me by the current evils and the sorrow by which I am oppressed on their account; but I do not see how one might use what remains at this time: especially since it is necessary that the speech which I have for you all be simple and easy for everyone to grasp. May God be the guide of my discourse, whom I would not be ashamed to call as witness to the benevolence I bear toward you, and to my fatherland, and to the entire race; and may He be for you the path toward choosing what is useful and setting out to accomplish those things.

That there are some among you, therefore, who thought that they would be able to overcome the learning of the Latins, and would persuade them to remain within those boundaries of antiquity, I myself know; and it has truly moved me to great wonder that men who are otherwise learned have erred so much in this part; and this, even while they know that neither they themselves nor others are well-instructed in the ability to persuade; not only if someone were to press and call into doubt the most important matters, but if even one were to wish to deny that the number two is the first of the equal numbers, or that a human being consists of soul and body, and other such things. ^B Yet they knew well that the Latins are most highly exercised in all human reach of dialectic and in every science, and have examined and practiced the most high theology of all. But even if the majority of you were not ignorant of the learning of the Latins, and that many arguments would not be wanting to them to show that they hold the truth, yet many of you thought—and they themselves as well—that union with the Latins was a thing to be valued most highly, and besides, most easy; and they induced both their own minds and those of others to come to it with pleasure. But let us suppose that all felt the same, and had come with the hope that they might convict the Latins of ignorance and perverse opinion, and would persuade them to depart from their judgment either of their own accord or against their will, and thus accomplish their union. ^C If indeed these things had succeeded according to their intention, perhaps it would be better; and God, by whom we were all to be joined through the recognition of the truth and mutual charity, would not have bestowed greater favor upon either of the parties; but He would have crowned both those who had taught the truth and those who had learned it with an equal mind, and would have joined them to Himself equally. Thus we might have been seen to occupy the place of teachers, and might have been delighted by fame, which it does not befit you, who seek spiritual things and have promised to be free for God, to desire. But you all see how the Latins have contended singularly for their own judgment, so that no one can rebuke them, if he wishes to be a just judge. Our common Master and Lord says that every word must be established in the mouth of two or three witnesses, and the civil law so prescribes; but they ^D have produced as witnesses of their own judgment six of the most outstanding of the common teachers of the Church, in dignity and doctrine, and in labors undertaken for piety—for I pass over others—each of whom is to be considered as equal in faith to all other men combined:

^A and they have brought them forward not merely or cursorily, but speaking as distinctly and clearly as if they were judges of our present doubt; and with those very words expressing what is sought, adding also the causes, as befits teachers, and the portions of Divine Scripture from which they have necessarily derived this opinion, just as they have gathered others from other parts. Against teachers so numerous and so great, and who so clearly introduce this opinion, we could not, even if we wished, behave shamelessly. In addition to these, they have brought forward others from our common teachers—I mean those from the East—endowed with equal wisdom and dignity; not, indeed, quite as clearly as the former, yet asserting the same things as they do, if one wishes to weigh their words with truth and science. Nor did they bring forward anything sophistic or affected, but all things plain, and consonant with Holy Scripture and the teachers for the demonstration of their opinion. ^B Nor has there been any objection raised by us to which they have not learnedly and spiritedly replied in accordance with the truth. Furthermore, we have no one among the saints who openly contradicts them; and if there were any, it would be necessary to join him also by some way and reason to the many, being certainly more equitable and convenient than to drag such a multitude of teachers by force to one. They plainly testify that they neither perceive nor necessarily follow those drawbacks into which we think they fall; but they say they believe the same as we do, and are carried toward the same sense, though they explain it better with added words, nor are they compelled to slander any of the saints or elevate his authority; ^C nay, they reconcile the teachers among themselves, and they think they demonstrate sufficiently by a most powerful argument that they rightly think and believe, in that they make no doctor fight with another or say contrary things; but among them everything, through this opinion, is tranquil and consistent. To these things they treat with us as if we were their masters or judges; and they ask that we accept them, and not wish, for a small cause, to be separated from men who think so similarly to us, and who are so congruent with our common teachers. Nor, indeed, do they require from us a profession of the truth; but they leave this to us, if we should wish to believe perfectly, and do not think that the hope of salvation brings shame upon us: ^D "For it is necessary," he says, "for salvation to confess faith also with the lips." [Rom. x, 10.] They, however, think it sufficient for peace if we make an end of accusing them, after so many demonstrations by which they proved themselves neither to speak falsely nor to think wrongly: so that it may be whole for us both to make peace in another way, and, by this popular and apparent splendor and rumor, not to fear the defection of the nations joined to us, since the confession of faith will be made by them and by us no otherwise than it was done before.

^A And the Latins indeed show these things, and say these things, and so fervently desire union with us that they wish nothing to be done by us which could bring glory to them and ignominy or detriment to us. For our part, to all these things words will perhaps not be lacking, but they will not be of much strength or decorum, nor such as are worthy of our virtue and wisdom, nor such as men who wish to preserve the appearance and dignity of the Fathers who were in the ancient councils, and who examined everything with truth and mutual charity, should put forward. And indeed, the struggle we face is not about a matter of little weight, but it concerns the truth of the faith, through which we hope to be saved, and which to attack contentiously is not only base but most perilous. For it is not permitted either to deny the teachers, whom we are wont to use as intercessors with God for our sins, and to whom the universal Church has rendered the greatest thanks for the struggles undertaken for the truth and for their labors in teaching, to say nothing of the other aspects of sanctity for which we honor them next to God. Nor shall we say that the teachers fight against one another; for this is to confound all things and to deny the entire faith. But furthermore, to wish that the Latins have corrupted the faith and adulterated the theology of all the teachers—who is so stupid as to believe this? Or who, by asserting this against the Latins, would not be met with laughter? For no charge can be refuted by more numerous, stronger, and truer arguments than a charge of falsity. ^B But we object the apparent dissension of the doctors; yet they will dissolve it with no effort, or rather, they have already dissolved it. But it is no longer even decorous to seek these things from the Latins; for we ourselves are able to reconcile the teachers among ourselves. I, who am the least of you all, whenever you command, am prepared to perform this both privately and publicly, and to show to all quite openly that the teachers of the Church, throughout all their works, hold the same opinion regarding the matters proposed. And I will not show this with many words, but the space of two hours will be sufficient to persuade you all never again to doubt the consensus of the teachers, so that you may neither have doubts yourselves further, nor cause trouble for the Latins by committing the examination of these matters to a common synod. ^C But even if it were permitted to waste time, as if sitting at leisure and oppressed by no necessity to think about our return, it would not be meet to pour out empty and vain words about divine matters, and to bring forward arguments for the sake of disputation alone, and to look only toward victory, and to say many things in which it is likely to mix some error; and that, too, by those not very able to contend with the Latins in the knowledge of theology and philosophy—a situation brought about by the unhappy state of our affairs, because of which those who hold the first places among us touch upon theology and philosophy only so as not to seem ^D altogether unlearned, since the schools have fallen away,

and the ambitious pursuit of disciplines and literature has died out, leaving all to concern themselves only with necessity and the straits of domestic affairs. ^A Indeed, I am certain that such endless chatter does not greatly please the Spirit either; rather, He will deem us to be testing Him if, when so many aids to our proposed goal are provided to us from the divine Scripture and from the consensus of the teachers, we nevertheless sit idle, despising all these things and weaving discourse upon discourse, either imagining that we shall find in our own words something better than what the Scripture provides, or seeking from the Spirit something clearer than what has been so brightly defined by Him. For I know that by using these arguments and this path, you are driven—and will be driven even more—into dissension and strife rather than into consensus.

Since these things are so, it will be pleasing to God and agreeable to the teachers of the Church, and it is ^B both decorous for us and, besides, easily accomplished, to let go of many arguments, to embrace the union, and to return home with it. Nor will there be anything at all to hinder us from doing that for the desire of which we have come hither, since the opinion of the Latins is supported by so many witnesses and is in every way worthy of belief, and it is permitted to us to be united with them without any innovation being made in the Symbol. ^C And you know well, all of you, that it is the union of the Church of Christ which—although even for many other and more just reasons it should be sought by everyone—was primarily made the object of our longing and striving through many means by the fear of the impious and by our affairs being brought to the utmost misery (I pass over everything that lies between), and specifically [that it was our desire] to bring it to a close, as much as possible. Therefore, since it is possible and decorous, we must hold to our purpose and bring this to a conclusion. Otherwise, we should appear the most thoughtless of all men if, having endured much for its sake and being moved by the hope of many good things, ^D and while all believe that the evils will increase for us if the schism is confirmed—if, as if forgetful of all these things, we were to return with empty hands, as they say, with the matter unfinished, and this when the act is so decorous and easy, and there is nothing that reasonably stands in our way to prevent it from being completed. Nor must we listen to those who say that no good will come to us from this union, and who think they have sufficient pretext for this, in that the nations of the Latins are worn away by mutual wars and are occupied by their own calamities, and that the Pope's affairs have not yet attained status and stability, but are infirm and still open to the plots of many. For, to say nothing of all other benefits which both the Pope himself and the other Latin nations will afford us, even in such a state of affairs (for our own contribution, as even you know, being not great, will not cause them much trouble; they know, indeed, that we are in need of this one thing at present: that our affairs may be in safety and that we may not fear our enemies; a thing which they can provide without great expense and with only a few ships).

^A For there will no longer be reason for us to fear that they will attack us, knowing that our allies shall be near at hand. If they have often helped us when we were not yet reconciled, now they will be all the more willing and eager to do so, and indeed they will consider it a kind of debt to pay, a fellowship in war. For neither among the Latins nor among the Barbarians is there anyone who does not know that the primary cause of the union is the hope of assistance, and that no other way of salvation remains for us. Conversely, if our aversion and hatred toward the Latins should increase, and they depart from here empty-handed and with nothing achieved—a fact that will immediately be known to all, since our return is without any preparation or splendor and with meager forces—I believe there will remain for us no further hope of salvation, and it will be advantageous for our enemies to attack us, even if they were otherwise unwilling.

Comprehend ^B truly in your minds what is of the greatest importance: how great is the magnitude of the present danger in which we find ourselves. For you hear that the Barbarian, having gathered vast forces by land and sea, is preparing to wage war against our city; perhaps even before certain news is brought to us, he is besieging it or will besiege it as soon as possible. Moreover, you all know that if outside help is not present, it will not even be able to withstand the first assault of the enemy; rather, there is a danger that, terrified at the mere sight of them, it may fall into the hands of the enemy as a godsend, seized without a battle just as it is offered. But even if it should endure a siege for a while, it will ^C not be possible for it to avoid danger entirely without loss; rather, it must necessarily succumb. For you remember that when we were once besieged by these same Barbarians by land, and the part of the wall facing the sea—which is twice as large as the rest—had no guard (for no one attacked from there), to what fear and to what straits our affairs came. But now, all the wall necessarily requires guarding, yet the present military force and the remaining population of the city combined are not even half of those there were at that time. Those who then guarded a third part of the wall and fought in its defense did not seem sufficient against so great a multitude and such great preparation of the enemies. For the plague which has pressed upon us for so many years has dreadfully consumed everyone. And I speak of half, even with us being present there ^D and being counted. But now the emperor is away, who, being one man, is worth the most for all things; you too are away, and so many of you, and so outstanding in virtue, that you could take the place of the greatest auxiliaries if you were to join us suddenly. As for the mercenary archers, except for twenty-five, all have fled; one ought to be silent about the causes, although perhaps they too, equally with others, have hitherto harbored the same designs for their own sake. What hope is there, then, in such a scarcity of men, of repelling such a terrifying war? Therefore, even if the cause of our departure were not to bring about the union,

^A nor were we looking to this precisely to dispel dangers and fears, but were considering matters for some other reason and cause—it would nonetheless have been our duty, after that bitter report, to cast aside everything else at hand and, putting aside all other business for which we came, to inquire whether we are able to receive the Latins and be well united with them, that is, in a manner consonant with Sacred Scripture and the doctors of the Church. And having found this to be so, we should immediately renew our friendship with them; then, having prepared ships—some provided by them, some purchased by us, even if it meant selling our own bodies to do so—we should neither choose to take food nor to take sleep, but day and night, without intermission, hasten to bring aid to our city. For if we had arrived with a suitable fleet, we could have both defended it and, having broken the enemy’s effort, repelled and driven them away, and if need be, joined battle with them and done all such things. How much more, then, is it necessary to do these things, when we all confess that we have come seeking nothing else but the union, and that we have not embarked upon this journey for the sake of any other thing!

^B The union, since it is so easy and becoming, and destined to be pleasing to God and to all men, must be effected now. There must be no delay, and the matter must not be postponed; rather, the union must be accomplished, and aid must be brought as quickly as possible. For each of us needs to call to mind our own wives and children, and simply our kinsmen and fellow citizens, who are being miserably besieged and are helpless and mourning; and the slaughters, and chains, and blows, and outrages, and famine, and thirst, and the most wretched exile, and inconsolable slavery, and the snatching away of infants, and the slaughter of the elderly, and the most pitiful separation from one another, and the desecration of sacred things, and blasphemy being raised on high against God; and how some willingly, and others by force, are casting away Jesus, the true God ^C and only teacher and lawgiver, and are attaching themselves to the nonsense and rituals of Mahomet, and how impiety will increase, while the faith will be oppressed by persecutions. Let them imagine all these things, and, above all, that these people are calling upon us and upbraiding us for our negligence—people by whom they never expected to be so despised, whom they regarded and honored in the rank of masters, fathers, and teachers, and whose protection and salvation they trusted would be placed before all else, for whose sake they themselves believed, and you openly declared, this pilgrimage was undertaken. Those people, then, imagining only their own evils, will mourn and will call upon us with tears; and by hopes that we will come today or tomorrow, they will revive their spirits. Would that we might all die before these things happen to them; for nothing will be more pitiable, or altogether more shameful, ^D or more detestable to God and men, than if it falls to them to suffer these things. But it behooves us to extend our reasoning to other Christians as well, and what they fear for themselves, we must contemplate on behalf of them, of the other Christians, and of ourselves. For it is absolutely necessary that these same things happen to those living anywhere

on earth and under the sway of the Barbarians, ^A and that the worship of Christ be everywhere extinguished. For my part, I believe that this flood will overwhelm all Christians within a few years, that impiety will depopulate all things, and that the Barbarians will bring everything under their own power. But we must, if nothing else, at least be filled with shame when these Latins accuse us: who, even after grievous reports and the fear cast into us, see us still sitting confident, wasting time in vain, and as if playing where there should be no playing, and caring nothing for the evils approaching, they call us stony, senseless, and traitors to our own affairs; and they assert that there is absolutely no human feeling in us, because they see that we are not at all solicitous about our own things, nor is there any diligence in us. ^B What kind of people, then, do you think they will show themselves to be toward us, when we hold these men, who are indeed holy, in no regard, and reject them; and when we call these opinions adulterated, and do not accept those others so simply; and when we are always contriving sophistries and dissenting among ourselves; and when we deem that ignorance is sufficient for judging dogmas, or say that this is denied by many or by such a man, while we exclude knowledge, intelligence, and erudition, even while the Latins endure these things? For their situation is not in peril if, while these things are done by us, some evil report is brought—which may you, O Lord and Master, avert, and show yourself to us not as a just judge, but rather a benign father and master. No speech will be able to express with what ignominy we shall then be branded; or rather, it cannot even describe the present situation. Then, indeed, they will not lend an ear to us even if we concede something more, but because of this they will burn with hatred against us forever, and will foully call us traitors to our own people and enemies of Christ.

If, however, someone says that we must indeed sit here, and hope that God will punish the enemies and preserve our city for us, ^C he deceives both himself and, in every respect, makes false claims about God. For He is not accustomed to help anyone who acts sluggishly, but [only one who] labors as much as he can, yet still requires His assistance, without which we can accomplish nothing. ^D For I say that, even if we were to contribute all our strength for the defense against the enemies, I would not say that this is enough; but even if we were to take all our money and all our ships and go from here, this situation would be of no benefit to us unless aid from above were also present; which will come necessarily to those who hope well and believe, but not to those of us who, in idleness and sloth—on which all things there depend—are wasting away; it is not right to expect any help from God. It is evident, therefore, that beyond all other things for which we must accomplish something and bring the present business to some end, the threat of the enemies now looming over us is sufficient; for this has an evident and unavoidable necessity. Therefore, concerning the losses and benefits that will follow, if it is concluded...

or not, or if we unite or do not unite with the Latins, there is no need for us to speak, since the necessity itself is sufficient for persuasion.

I myself have lightly touched upon those matters which it is necessary to consider regarding the present exigency; but for you, these things will be sufficient to stir up your mind, that you may diligently weigh them, since indeed all things almost clearly offer themselves to our eyes—those things not appearing openly to some persons only because someone is hindered by the darkness of his own private affection from perceiving even the most manifest things; and furthermore, because no one can comprehend by mind or speech how many goods and how many evils will follow from either side, and it is inevitable that the one or the other will come to pass. I therefore counsel and beseech you all to apply your efforts, in support of our need, our honor, and our necessity, and further, in accordance with our proposal, that withdrawing from words, you may set upon the work itself, setting before yourselves in all things that end, that we may always defend—but now most especially—our fatherland, our nation, our sacred sites, and our ancestral tombs. ^B And I say that the Latins must be received and their communion embraced, since they err in nothing in regard to the faith; if indeed the leaders of our faith, and the Spirit Himself by whom they were inspired, did not err. And further, they affirm that they hold the same views as we do, and they [are willing to] reconcile among themselves those teachers who, because of our opposing opinion, happen rather to speak in contradiction; which you yourselves know full well, and I am prepared to make manifest to all whenever you may order it; and especially because they subject to anathema those things which we used to attribute to them based on this opinion, and not only do they do this, but they also show how those things are very far from following from their own opinion, inasmuch as they are widely divergent from it. These, therefore, I say must be received, and the Creed ^C must be recited as we are accustomed; for this seems sufficient both for the decrees which we say we fear, and to conduce to the goal that this peace may be pleasing to all the nations that are under our Church.

Let as many ships as possible be prepared. In the meantime, let those things that are necessary be arranged—both those things which concern bringing aid in the future, and those which concern the confirmation of the peace, and certain other matters—doing some ourselves as far as is now possible, and committing others to three or four persons whom it is necessary to leave behind at the present synod, the best and wisest of the rest. Then we ourselves shall go to Venice, and there, having settled all things that are necessary and useful, we shall sail straight to our city, ^D both returning ourselves and bringing allies along. And all these things must be done with the speed that must be applied in all matters. For we are able to complete what needs to be done here, even if we are the slowest of all, in the space of fifteen days; and having counted these toward the fortieth day, we ourselves may board the ships, however many they may be, and we will be able to take on more during the voyage itself, as all will join themselves to us, both out of good will and by the command of their own princes.

^A And for the union to be brought about, and for asking for the aid, and for choosing and sending an envoy to the Barbarian, and for equipping the fleet, so that we may be relieved of this from here. And thus, when these days are numbered—up to seventy in all, or a little more—we shall be able to arrive at the harbor of our city. But if you think it sufficient to send only the adequate aid, and thus to bring about the union, it must be done as quickly as possible; for otherwise it is impossible to aid sufficiently. That we shall indeed send, while we, for our part, will afterwards, with all matters better settled at our leisure and our own position now placed in safety, sail through the Hellespont in the early autumn with a smaller number of ships.

But if you, by any means, do not wish to make peace with the Latins (may God avert such a thought from your mind), you know—to pass over the rest of the evils in silence—that all, except for a few, will no longer be of the same previously averse mind toward the faith of the Latins; but you will consider them to believe piously and to think rightly. And thus, union will indeed exist in the souls of men, but we shall be deprived of all those goods which we hoped to enjoy through the union, and for the sake of which we were particularly led to desire it. But if you intend to altogether follow this opinion, you must immediately resolve and confirm this, and take thought for your return, taking what the Pope, prompted by his humanity or fulfilling his promises, may desire to give, and spending from your own resources, and, furthermore, borrowing more by pledging public and private property.

In any case, we must either set out ourselves or send the aid that is sufficient. ^B For I think this will be advantageous both for the present and for the future, and useful for any fortune hereafter. Nor should it be said that we, or those who are sent, will arrive after the time of need has passed; for perhaps it will not have passed completely. And even if we knew this for certain, it is neither just nor reasonable for us to neglect anything of what we can do in the meantime. Therefore, I say we must do one of these two things: either return having been united with the Latins, or send after the union; or, having altogether despaired of peace with them, not remain idle, but carry aid to our people with all our might, even if we know we are going to face a thousand dangers. For any other plan we might adopt, we shall in no way escape the charge of betraying our people, or at the very least appearing as such to our own people and to all men. ^C But even if we disregard this disgrace, and God, contrary to all hope, extends His hand in His kindness, and our fatherland, whether we approach it or not, remains free from the harm of the enemy, I am still convinced that procrastination will not be profitable to us in any matter; for because of it, all things will fall into a worse state, which has happened until now from past neglect. I have spoken; I am prepared to bear [the truth...

everything for the sake of truth and honesty, and for that which will be useful to all of you, and to me and my own; and besides, I consider it enough for any fortune that I have not suppressed what seemed right to me. But you, choose what is advantageous, with God as the leader of your counsel, word, ^A and deed; and if there is anyone who wishes for the worse things to prevail, let the majority, who are wiser and most excellent in prudence, act for the better: for this is the law of the synod, and of any republic, and of every assembly, and, to use a single word, of mankind.

ORATION I BY THE SAME

To the Ecumenical Council of Florence, regarding peace.

That dogmatic union must be made, and not a peace which is for the present state of affairs, as some wish; and what this [union] is.

I do not see why it is necessary to exhort you to peace, since you ^B yourselves have long been inclined toward it, and have shown in very deed how much zeal you have for it; especially since many have spoken in discourse about it, declaring what benefits they know it to abound in, and for those who embrace it, what great utilities it provides. But if someone, rising up, proposes means by which we might attain it, and of what kind it should be brought about, and other things of this sort, he, I think, will rightly appear to be speaking what is congruent to the time and what will surely please you. This, therefore, if it be your pleasure, I shall perform. I am not unaware, however, that since this subject is multifaceted and holds many difficulties, it is necessary that many words be expended upon it, and that opinions be brought forth by others coming into our midst—perhaps better ones than these of mine. But since I hear everyone speaking of peace, and, as it seems, trying to persuade those who are already persuaded—for all have gathered knowing that peace is a good thing, and ^C no one has come to be taught whether peace is a good and honorable thing—yet I see no one progressing further; and you all allow the opportune times to slip away, in which it is proper that something memorable be accomplished, I wish to divert the discourse from that and turn it to another argument, and to initiate, as if it were a certain principle and exhortation, [something] for those who wish to reach it. Moreover, to ask you, as is the custom, to both hear the oration and receive it with benevolence, if ever at other times, is now, I think, superfluous; for none of us has gathered for some private good, that we might confer together and speak words, such that it is necessary to prepare the minds of the auditors, and to take counsel so that the discourse may be ^D listened to attentively and believed; but the tongues of all are moved by common

^A desire for the public good, which previously had no less excited their souls; and no one will bring home from this, as a private gain, anything other than the peace desired by all. Therefore, it is necessary for all to speak; and for you, as if listening to things spoken in a manner conformable to truth, to apply your mind, to choose what is said, and to give thanks to the Giver even for these things. For where else is it likely that God would inspire the minds of men, if not where inquiry is made about Him and zeal is applied to this? But as for those who hold different views, and who do not put them forward with any wicked intent—since these are faults of understanding, not of will—let no one direct blame against them. To these matters, add also this: if there is any poor opinion among you regarding those who are speaking, you ought not to hold their words in contempt, if by chance they be better; for even in human affairs, this must be avoided by those who seek what is useful from every source, since for men of humble fortune, it is much more fitting to hope for glory in a proposed matter from good counsel. For from them, too, there can sometimes proceed some work of virtue, with God’s providence so disposing things, that no one should unreflectingly attribute to human art and sagacious counsel the outcome of the greatest and, of all human memory, most difficult of undertakings. Therefore, on this account, I have avoided that part of my speech, and I wish you to listen attentively to the things which are now to be said. ^B Indeed, that which gathered this sacred synod from almost the entire world, and persuaded all to hasten here willingly, setting aside all other considerations, is the concord of all Christians and the knowledge of truth; than which nothing can be more pleasant to men who know how to love, desire, and apply themselves to what is good. For truth is clearly the light of the rational nature, without which it must necessarily roll in darkness, and perceive nothing of the dignity and the gift bestowed upon it; and grasping this continuously, while it searches for what is unknown, it becomes itself more brilliant, and approaches as closely as it is permitted to God, the first truth. But of peace and the concord in what is good, nature has nothing greater; concord which begins in the soul and its thoughts, and uses outward things as if they were certain signs, through which it is made manifest to all. It is likely indeed that some are led by other thoughts, and, revolving certain bodily goods in their minds which they hope will be born of this concord, have appeared more eager for the present business. But to me, even if to any other it also seems that this will be the cause of many and great goods for Christians, if they embrace the same opinion concerning those matters which they were previously debating; nevertheless, I do not believe that any wise man should be moved by their desire, nor are the goods ^C which are counted in the last place, and which one would most easily despise, to be set as the end of the greatest and most divine work; but that the knowledge of truth is of itself sufficient in place of all else, for the sake of peace

and of the peace of all things, we ought to forego most of our possessions. Since, therefore, of these two things for the sake of which we have endured so many labors, we have already successfully achieved the one—namely, the knowledge of the truth—it is absolutely necessary that the other should follow as well. ^A For once the truth concerning the disputed matters is recognized, there will be nothing else left that could divide our minds again, or in the same way distract the entire world; for we shall not sit as judges of the boundaries of land, or of money, or of the recovery of islands and cities—nor have we come for this purpose in the first place—nor is it possible for there to be a quarrel among all people concerning these things. But if we make peace with one another without also reaching an absolute agreement on the doctrines, and without the same opinion, concerning which we are here to inquire, prevailing among all, we shall not only fail to preserve a lasting peace, being founded upon something shaky, but we shall also appear to value something else above the truth, which alone could be an end worthy of so many expenses and labors. ^B And the pretext for our gathering here will indeed appear to be the investigation of the doctrines, but the truth will be that we are each concerned with securing some benefit for ourselves, and with arranging a more comfortable life accordingly. These things, however, I believe you will entirely avoid, as it becomes those who are led by the Spirit rather than by men, and who value the truth above all else.

Therefore, it is upon that first and foremost matter that we must focus our attention, and if that is brought to its proper end, the remaining things will immediately be expected to be prosperous as well. ^C For if we wish to seek the truth by every means, and to seize and hold it once it has appeared, the beauty of concord will shine forth, and the cloud of schism will be dispersed; and we shall no longer be cut off from our brothers through wicked additions or irrational contentions. With hatred and bitterness thus removed, we shall share our goods with one another, and we shall treat each other as family and kin; and there will be no good thing at all that will not immediately follow. I would even go so far as to say that even if we were destined to lose all our possessions, and to wander the earth indigent and inglorious because of the greatest concern and serious inquiry into the truth, we ought not for that reason to slacken our zeal for seeking it in the slightest, ^D nor consider anything other than this to be our good or human happiness. Since, therefore, the rest will accrue to us because of this—as the nature of things demands, and as God is willing to reward us for the most beautiful and divine work—why should we not, for this very reason, be most concerned about this matter, and strive with all our might to attain it? For it is clear that if peace is made in any other way, we will not be able to enjoy it securely; rather, on account of some minor unpleasant thing that, as is wont to happen, may occur by chance, we will use as a pretext for war and battle the disagreement concerning the doctrines, and again reproaches and writings against one another will have their place, and all this change of affairs will seem vain: and I, indeed, can demonstrate this, although it is not difficult.

^A Yet the facts themselves bear witness, if anyone who has read them knows how often we have come together in this way, and besides gaining nothing, we have inadvertently increased the mischief. I remain silent about the times, the events, and those by whom they were done, for most people know them and recall them; and I am cautious, lest I seem to malign any persons.

If, therefore, it were not known from many events of past times what sort of outcome this method of peace is accustomed to have, but we were making trial of it now for the first time, perhaps someone might forgive us for erring from what is fitting in the obscurity of affairs. But since there are so many examples by which we can be persuaded to reject it, I believe we would be most justly blamed by all if, choosing this method, we happen to stumble and suffer the very same things as those I mentioned before, which is necessarily bound to happen. This, then, is one thing, and the first and greatest: wherefore all effort must be put forth toward the discovery of the truth, so that by it we may accomplish those things for which we have come together and enjoy, God willing, ^B a peace that will be brought about to last forever; or, to speak more truly, that this may be the head of our study. For when this is accomplished, all other things will go well; but if it is neglected, not even those things will be of such account to those who partake of reason, nor would they be destined to result in the most beautiful and beneficial outcome.

The second thing is that to be at peace is pleasant to all men, and most pleasant of all; for with it goes the fact that one is not forced to suffer harm, and that one essentially possesses the joy of using what one has and living in gentleness, which is above all the hallmark of human life. In general, weapons, battles, battle-arrays, garrisons in cities, and all the preparations for war are for the sake of peace, and come into being in order that it may be possible to live with it. Those may safely be said to have peace who either contend about nothing at all, or who resolve their controversies by certain conditions, and embrace what is just with equal will, deeming themselves neither to suffer injury nor to inflict it. But as for those who lay aside their enmities while ^C their complaints are not yet extinguished, one might say that they do not dismiss war, but merely give it a respite, and that it is a truce, not peace or an end of war, that is taking place. For even if minds seem to be reconciled, yet there is no inner will concordant so long as each knows that he has suffered and inflicted injury by the other; unless, out of great sloth, one should wish to show gratitude to plotters not for what they seize, but for what they leave behind.

Thus, therefore, the matter stands here as well: if by the force of disputations and by the help from above we remove the causes of the long war, and once and for all take away our mutual complaints from the midst, and all come to one judgment and one opinion, this it is permitted to call true peace, and an indissoluble bond of souls, and a brotherly conspiracy, and a spiritual union, and the cutting off of every scandal ^D by the root, or whatever else of this sort one may name. And returning with such a peace, both we ourselves

^A shall truly rejoice, and we shall persuade those who receive us to rejoice. But should anything else occur, all will call it a shadow of peace, a semblance of reconciliation, a disagreement of dogmas, and the beginning of scandals, a second voyage, and a pact of necessity. And to the simpler sort, perhaps, we shall seem to have accomplished something, and we shall persuade them, for the sake of the name of peace, to be satisfied and to seek nothing else; but we shall be justly liable to the reproaches of those who have understanding, who will cast in our teeth the noble name of peace, and the unrealized hopes, and the reconciliation that is merely apparent; unless they also call us betrayers of the common happiness of all, because, when it was close at hand, and as it were standing with extended hands and calling out to us, we refused to take hold of it, turning instead to something else that was easier. And even apart from these reproaches, we shall not be able to persuade ourselves that we have duly used the opportunities that were offered, and that we have chosen the better part of those things which were in our power, and that we have performed ^B the work of God with God. I pass over the doubts that will emerge later, of which we shall seem to have been the cause, having left behind the seeds of scandals, and not having been willing to tear up the evil by the root, when this was situated within our own will. And indeed, it was possible to achieve this celebrated union by many other more expeditious and easier means; yet, having put all those aside, we took the counsel to celebrate a general synod and to entrust the whole matter to it; for only in this way would what was decided remain valid, with no one daring to contradict what such a synod might pronounce. And everywhere, among the agreements concerning the union, it is possible to see this title ^C constantly; and you surely remember the envoys on both sides, who, in their speeches and in their writings, kept turning this name up and down, and at that time became a nuisance to their hearers.

Now, that this holy synod is ecumenical is not in doubt, in that some have come from all, or at any rate from most parts of the inhabited world, who will be participants in its discussions and actions, and will use one mind regarding the matters as a whole. But it is necessary that in other respects also it should perfectly preserve the form of the ecumenical synods; one of which is to consider specifically those things that are daily being investigated, and the causes of the schism, and after many ^D struggles and speeches held on either side, to discover truth, and on the other hand its opposite; and the one to proclaim, while declaring the falsehood to be excommunicated; and that those who obey are henceforth to be considered orthodox, while those who still contend (refragantur) are to be subjected to the censures of heretics, so that the entire inhabited world may thereafter be able to hold a simple opinion regarding matters previously disputed, and to reject those who say otherwise. This is before all else; and after this, to provide for the rest of the good order of the churches, and to regulate the life of men by canons and laws which tend to this purpose; and if there are any who desire their private dispute to be settled, even these are not to be despised. If, therefore, this also, setting for itself the example of so many synods, from these same

^A beginnings should set out, and regarding these matters should be willing to show equal care—not to say more—and subsequently should consider the same manner for all other matters that require providence, no one would contradict that this too is ecumenical and holds the same dignity as the others. Nor would anyone have a place to flee to in order to look down upon whatever this synod might decree, thinking it to be the same to scorn this as to scorn those celebrated before it, fearing both the curses of men and the punishments to be inflicted from above; ^B otherwise, there will be many who will plot against it. And now, perhaps, no one will contradict, lest he seem to be an impediment to the good of harmony, and at the same time knowing how difficult it is to prevail over so many, if he were to attempt to persuade those whose minds do not incline that way with words. But, as time goes on, not a few will desire to unravel your decrees, stripping you of this venerable title. And they will strip you of it, claiming that you have preserved the form of general councils only in the multitude, but that in the most necessary matters you have embarked on a path plainly contrary to them, as if you had held this gathering for some other reason rather than for the sake of the truth of the dogmas. And thus we perhaps alone shall enjoy peace, but to our posterity we shall immediately leave a war worse than the former; and thus all this effort concerning the title will be without fruit for us. ^C Lest this happen, the dignity of the general councils must be adapted here also through an exact imitation of them, and provision must be made so that no danger threatens it from dissimilarity. For even if these pretexts will not disturb the minds of men of godly intent, nor will there be anyone who, pursuing what is honorable, brings war upon the council, yet you know well that against the greatest and most beneficial works, not only do the most wicked men, but also our adversaries from the beginning, the demons, plot—using the works and help of men who are like them for this purpose. But to the demons, nothing is more unpleasant than the peace of the Churches, from which the whole circle of blessings depends, and which the Savior, ascending, left behind for men, since it was ^D equal to bestowing this, as if granting all good things at once which He could provide while present with us. Just as, therefore, the enemies of peace will set in motion every machine for its overthrow and will seize every opportunity, so we too, looking ahead to what is to come, must block every path of malice for them, and from every side make the good of peace secure, so that the wicked are of necessity forced either to keep quiet or, if they attack, to be powerless, and by experience to learn that they have set out to strike heaven with their head. Furthermore, this must be considered: the wicked men of the future will not only be troublesome to our judgments and will bring back the same controversies and fights more abundantly if they find any opportunity to accuse us, but they will also provoke many other wars, and will overwhelm the true faith with much confusion. And even now the multitude of Christians is divided into the Eastern and Western Church, [index: entries preserved]

^A but then it will no longer even be possible to number the fragments, as each person divides himself further and stirs up sedition, and sowing motives for contentious disputes one against another. For if, while this synod was still expected—which was to have united the greatest parts of the inhabited world, and then, having diligently examined the innovations that had arisen in various places, was to have brought forth a true and firm decree for all—those who were previously united were divided, and the side that had prevailed by whatever means cursed the defeated and deemed them worse than the unbelievers, and—calling them by the names of those who began that strife from the earliest times—a new schism was made within the old one, smaller indeed, but far surpassing the other in the nature of the questions and in mutual hatred (for they would most willingly have devoured even one another’s flesh); what must one expect when there is no hope of an ecumenical synod, whose judgments everyone would have had to fear, because [before it met] it was uncertain according to what standards it would decree? ^B Indeed, what person of sound mind will ever hope for such a synod, if he sees that this one, meditated upon for so long a time and convened with such great difficulty on both sides, has been rendered void because they were unable to preserve even the very name of the synod?

Since, therefore, time always brings about something new, and men, whether through ignorance or a desire for contention, cling to falsehood, and differences in dogma sometimes serve as the pretexts for the wars that they wage against one another, ^C if there is no one—nor is there any expectation of anyone—to whom those who stand for the truth might flee, and whose judgment it would be fitting for all to respect, then it is necessary that all should violently fall upon one another. And as each one becomes his own teacher of the truth, they will pass judgment on those who think differently, and—what is the worst of all—call them heretics and unbelievers, rather than—as is the case now—merely calling those who differ from them schismatics and other such things, all while shrinking away from conciliar decrees. And what could be worse than this? For neither will any of the simpler folk know what they ought to think or whom they should follow, nor will any choice that someone makes be free from danger, the truth having been divided into many parts; and the greatest thing for salvation, faith, will gradually depart from among men. ^D And even now, hearing that heresies that arose at the beginning exist somewhere, we think it a marvel if men, discordant with such a great diversity of opinions and with so many, various, and contrary views, can live together; but then this evil will fill the whole world. And if someone from among the Gentiles should wish to turn to the true faith, he will not clearly know whom he should use as guides and teachers for his desire, but rather, seeing such great incompatibility, would not even wish to. We, seeing these things together with all else, and considering that that is the time in which, as if in a close-quarters night battle, all are in confusion and fall upon one another and perish together—moved by compassion for those who are perishing, but also by the evil that is feeding upon the Church, and offering the necessary foresight—must cut away the unique cause of all these things. For toward this, not

^A separate effort is needed, nor other labors, nor a waste of time. Nor, when things present are well managed, will there be a need to sit and deliberate again about these matters; rather, what must be chosen for the present will also be a remedy for you for the future. For if you accomplish the holding of what is truly considered an ecumenical synod, from which it will also follow that what has been decreed by you shall be firm, no one—calling into doubt things already defined—will ever wish to be the author of schism, knowing that the Church will take note of this and fearing the punishments established by an ecumenical synod, which it is more reasonable to expect then, when the whole world is in agreement, than now.

And we say that this synod is gathered no less by the Spirit than concerning the Spirit, ^B and that it will vote upon what is pleasing to Him. But how could this be demonstrated in the very reality of the proceedings in any other way, except if we were to hold other things in low regard, but examine with every method the truth concerning His procession, and were not even willing to depart from there without this? Or, how could we render something more pleasing to Him—from whom alone, as He is and is called Love, it is fitting to hope for the good of concord—than if we were to investigate sound and pious sentiments concerning Him, and to wish to find and preserve a pure and sincere faith in Him? For since He is the Spirit of Truth, He indeed wishes us to be eager for every truth, and offers Himself as the guide of the way to it for us, since without Him we cannot walk it without danger. ^C But He is pleased most especially with those who wish to inquire what ought to be thought concerning Him and the persons consubstantial with Him, because they desire to attain the greatest and primary truth; and He does not allow them to be entangled in the snares of falsehood in such thoughts. And if there is any doubt, He gathers from everywhere those who seek the true sentiment with their whole soul, and who embrace it without contention; and He brings it about that they find the sought-for truth, provided they are not arrogant seekers of it, and do not entrust the whole matter to their own power. For why else did the Spirit gather you, if not to confer some true benefit upon the whole world, from which you were gathered? For surely it was not ^D to increase your wealth and acquire power for you—concerning which some perhaps might have something to complain about, even regarding the management of existing resources—nor to restore those illustrious titles and wordy inscriptions that were rightly abolished due to the schism, which rather carry the demonstration of the swelling and pride of men who oppose the Spirit. But these things are like appendages to the goods that are truly such, which will come to us from the Spirit, and are certain prizes for the labors undertaken for the sake of the truth, to provide consolation to our narrow and small minds; things which I think will be objects of contempt for not a few wise men, so as not to be accepted even if they were given, because they are content with the knowledge of truth alone, and judge it to be a reward equivalent to all things for men who contend for it.

^A If there were some other reward to be expected—the future happiness and the then-purer knowledge of the truth—they believe that to be it. For we all know that these things are a great obstacle to a genuine human life; for which reason we love those who long for that life and who pay the least attention to the acquisition of these things. Since these things have such a nature, it would not be becoming for us to seek anything else, or to think that the Spirit divided himself in order to bring us together here to share those goods primarily; but rather, it is not unreasonable that he stands over the people for whose sake he has gathered us, becoming a mediator of these things, and gathers us for these purposes, and generously grants these things to those choosing to receive them, whenever it is clear that it leads to the glory of God and the true benefit of those receiving them. ^B Accordingly, he has gathered us here, to teach us the truth—without which it is impossible to be saved—and to establish peace among us, which cannot abide among men if the truth is ignored, and which necessarily returns when the truth is known; and to deliver the Church from the scandals which the sower of tares has habitually sown in her, making her poor and barren, but to show her again thriving, and gathering her children and feeding them to satiety. It is not, therefore, consistent to think that we have been gathered by the Spirit, while we leave behind the things for whose sake he is to be thought to have gathered us, and act in any other way as if we were enjoying leisure; for this would be tempting the Spirit and acting in opposition to ourselves. ^C I pass over the fact that the good of concord, through which we are joined to the Spirit, cannot exist if each man holds to his own opinion and we do not choose the one that is true, which all must wish to defend. Indeed, we must make every effort for the sake of peace: if it is true and perfect, and pleasing to God, and worthy of us and our labors, no one is ignorant that there is an element of three-fold reconciliation in that one peace, reconciling us in three ways. For apart from the exterior reconciliation, by which it happens that we cease from now on to pray for every worst thing for one another, and do not arm hand and tongue against each other, ^D we must have peace with God by holding true opinions about Him: since to wander from the truth is necessarily to be at enmity with God; it is also necessary for each man to preserve the good of peace toward himself, providing that the outer words he utters be in agreement with the inner thoughts of his soul, and leaving not even a trace of doubt in himself concerning the matters set before him. For it is necessary that peace toward others be established within us first; otherwise we shall merely pretend to have peace, and under the guise of friendship we shall secretly conceal the hostilities within. For we were surely not disputing among ourselves about matters which, if conceded to the plunderers, or if justly reclaimed, it would be reasonable that there should be no more war among us, and that there is nothing to prevent peace from being held as perfect: but the struggle and the war were about opinions which touch the very head of our faith: of which, those who follow the one cannot at all [accept the other].

^A For there are many arguments on each side, some taken from the Scriptures, some discovered by human study, which make it appear difficult for all to pass judgment upon them. And these opinions were previously the subject of controversy among us; and this simultaneously troubled us, fearing lest we should err from the truth, and estimating it the greatest calamity if it should happen to anyone fighting with his brother also to be warring against God, and to stray from the truth for which the war was undertaken. These things, however, I say regarding those who are possessed of understanding; for as for the headstrong and contentious—those who hold as truth only that to which they have once clung, and who close their ears to contrary arguments—I pass them by; of whom one might say that they believe not because they know their perceived opinions to be true, or of such a sort that they cannot be refuted, but because, having once been conceived, these things commend themselves to them. ^B

These things, therefore, being so, if it were the case that, once the war between us was extinguished, we would immediately have peace and the favor of God would be present with those who think well of Him—whether because by some more prosperous fortune we had chanced upon the truer opinion, or because for some other reason we feared nothing, and dreaded no danger or loss from falling away from the truth—if we had not attained to that will, it would suffice for us in place of everything to practice peace; and this, however it was brought about, would leave no need to be studiously intent upon other things. But because, once the apparent contention has been put aside, other worse wars will remain for us, and the good of peace will be lacking just as it was before, we shall appear to be treating of something other than the business of peace, or to be utterly ignorant of how we ought to become masters of our desire, if, with our affairs only being well-composed on both sides, we shall consider the whole work finished by us. ^C But if, on the contrary, beginning from the dogmas and studiously seeking the peace that is with God, all other things shall immediately yield, and there will be great tranquility from every side, and a pleasure that no one can express, with all being in agreement with one another—those without, those within, those toward one another, and those toward God—and nothing will be able in any way to obscure or shake such a stable and firm, and thus illustrious, unity, then it is clear, surely, that it is from there that we must begin; or rather, it is not correct to call that the beginning of peace, but peace itself, true and perfect, and embracing everything that anyone might say is required for it. For who would be so shameless and enemies of their own salvation as, even after such peace, to devise some other pretext to tear themselves away from the communion of their brothers? ^D Nay, I do not even see any pretext left for those who wish to act maliciously. Indeed, whom do you consider so demented, that after the sentence you have passed upon the proposed subjects—or rather, that which God will bring forth in you—he would still be wavering and tormented? Since, therefore, there are three things which [are necessary] for the most absolute re—

reach of truth, with the help of God, and ^A to be rightly united to Him, ^B the other two follow along with it. That, therefore, must be eagerly sought by those who desire true peace; and it is necessary that they should desire it, and consider all things inferior to so great a good, [even] those who excel all others in virtue and the excellence of their reason, and have endured dangers and labors—things which such a man would wish to undergo only for the sake of the greatest achievements. And it is necessary to emulate the Fathers and teachers of ancient times, who labored greatly for the salvation of their brethren, though each of them could have sought his own affairs and avoided labors; but they took away from the midst [of things] those matters which were then disturbing the souls of men, and, having separated the false from the true with the sword of the Spirit, left behind a sincere peace for those who came after them, which a long period of time did not disturb, nor the contentions of wicked men. And they could not endure to arrange peace in any other way; for they knew that it neither befitted them, nor was it worthy of the Spirit who moved them to these things; and they thought they would rather be liable to punishment if they neglected things they could accomplish with labor, than [expect] to receive any rewards for matters performed in such an easy and cursory fashion. But as for you, even if no such synod had existed, to which you ought to have looked in order to act rightly, it would have been fitting for you to find out for yourselves what was appropriate, and to stand as an example and model for others who might perhaps come after you, ^C since you have no less knowledge than any of [those earlier ones], and are not much inferior to each of them in virtue, while in number you far surpass [all of them] together. But now, since so many and such illustrious examples are available to us, we cannot, even if we wished, act sluggishly, while we deem it fit for us to take care not to incur the reproaches of God and man. For we shall not judge it to be at all worthy [of us] to propose that all others should emulate those who have excelled in the things they do—and we shall praise them if they emulate them as best as they possibly can—but [think that] we ourselves, having neglected such great matters, shall be free from blame; for the power of imitation in all honest things has equal force, and there is no reason that can liberate those from just accusation who do not apply it in the most serious matters, in which there is even a greater ^D risk of sinning. Nor can it be said that by that blessed assembly of Fathers anything else was agitated than the truth, or that they left behind for posterity any trace of doubt regarding the things called into controversy; for it is manifest from the records and commentaries of the events how much effort they contributed to the truth. And indeed, the heresies that arose then were so turned away from by men, that while the many neither know nor have [any reason] to complain of anything, they nevertheless honor the Fathers who contended against them as champions of the truth; but those who know accurately, consider those who stood in the vanguard of those heretics to be even worse than the infidels. Thus, among all men, the judgments of those men have prevailed. Therefore, we ought to emulate them, as I said, and [honor them] not only with other honors, but also, as far as is possible, by imitating [them], and consider them the best advisors and guides in such matters, the

reverence ^A due to them must be shown; and what one ought to think about the Spirit must be examined with the Spirit; and the anxiety and disturbance of men's souls must be calmed, and the Church must be set free from useless strife and many other trifles, to which long contention and the lack of concern for the brothers by either party have given place. After these things, however, it will also be opportune to consider the rest, and no one shall accuse us that we are taking up the task of sharing mutual honor and the utility to be brought from one side to the other, or of that long-celebrated felicity. For as to those hopes against the infidels, by which some say they are led, and which they contend are the sum of our efforts, if they are for the sake of being able to live ^B safely and not fearing the evils of servitude, or even of exacting justice from them for the insolence towards us, to which they have been led because of their excessive audacity—if indeed we nourish hopes against them for these reasons, I judge these to be a vain thing, and neither of much value, even if they could somehow turn out successfully, nor able to be accomplished without God, and to say the same thing, not having any God-pleasing purpose leading them. But if you pursue these hopes being concerned for the salvation of human souls, and striving to remove the defilement of falsehood from the midst, and for the sake of such things as these, I indeed approve of them for these reasons, ^C but I believe they are secondary matters, and that it is not reasonable to occupy oneself with these before the union of those who are called by Christ in the one opinion of the truth is accomplished. For whether falsehood ought to be hated and cast as far as possible from the Church, this has the greatest place in our matter, since it is truly established that we maintain opposing opinions, and whichever side draws the greatest part of men with it; or whether it is necessary to provide for the salvation of the brothers, since this is an indication of charity towards them, which we owe them even to the point of willingly laying down our soul for them—those who, having rightly recognized and turned away from this falsehood, are delivered from unbelief, will owe us no less gratitude for their salvation than [those who] had delivered [them] from infidels; [for it is] impossible for those who have lived by falsehood ^D to obtain [salvation], however much it may be, and against whatever truth of the faith it may fight. Therefore, to make peace in the way I propose is to take up the care of the brothers' salvation, and to expel falsehood, and to increase the glory of the Church by the addition of those who are being saved. If anyone, therefore, having been persuaded of that, turns his care to other things, he will appear to be moved vainly under the pretext of the brothers and falsehood, when in reality he is moved by the hope of bodily prosperity. For since the utility is equal on both sides, and one could perform both in order, why, having completely disregarded one, will he set his mind on only the remaining one, and, having feared the easiest, attempt that which has great difficulty? For who does not know that for wars against the infidels there is need of both weapons and money, and land and naval forces, and commanders, and

^A occasions, and time, that is equal to the magnitude of the matter? But in order to define the truth regarding the matters proposed, and that all might embrace one opinion concerning them, is it sufficient to merely wish, and that God from above guide the will toward the goal, and bring the praiseworthy desire to its end? Therefore, if thoughts concerning the infidels are to be held in second place, and ought to follow the labors devoted to the dogmas, in what place shall we put honors and the increase of revenues and the sharing of possessions and all other things, which ought to be called the effects of peace rather than peace itself? From these, one cannot learn that the salvation of the brethren, or the exaltation of the true faith, or the overturning of falsehood will arise; for neither can these things result from them, nor is it to be expected that they will be of benefit to all Christians, but only to the few who need them, and for whom it is appropriate to seek such things.

But furthermore, in regard to all that has been said, I see that our entire preparation is worthy of an ecumenical council, and abundantly sufficient for the judgment of the dogmas, lacking nothing that would make ^B this easy. But if some desire to bring about peace, it is far from requiring a work of such great preparation; for it was possible to accomplish this through legates, freeing them from affairs. There was no need for such expenditures, which caused difficulty for those who gave them, and for those who had nothing of their own and were in need of others—to speak the truth—brought shame along with suspicion. Nor was there need for such labors and dangers for those gathered from everywhere; or rather, it is better to say that the difficulties on both sides, which the desire for peace, having found God as a collaborator, overcame—all of which, though grievous, it nevertheless disregarded.

I do not know, therefore, what you will answer to those who complain about you, if you show that such and so great a preparation has existed in vain, and that you have fashioned a peace that is merely a name and completely empty reputation. For only the desire remains, while everything else, as is evident, is readied better than one could pray for. ^C But I marvel if you think that no one will justly accuse you, with matters in Italy settled in this way. For just as it is a sign of madness to attempt the greatest things without fitting preparation, so, if one who is sufficiently prepared for the greatest things uses such preparation for lesser works, and extends his zeal to those—I, for my part, do not wish to say it, but those who make such a choice certainly render themselves liable to many charges.

For no one who is wise considers a general of an army to be wise when, having sufficient equipment in quantity, virtue, arms, and everything else, he sets out on an expedition against the enemy, and after much time and long searching and many difficulties of travel, finally comes upon them, finds them few and terrified, not bearing to join battle, and then considers it sufficient for victory merely to turn them to flight, when he could have completely destroyed them, being able partly to slaughter them and partly take them prisoner. Nor will you be able to avoid the reproaches of wise men if, with such a preparation applied to the unity of the Churches, as you have already gathered here all

^A that needs to be brought to a conclusion, you should then set aside ^B or throw away as useless material certain treaties and a shadow of peace, acting like a load of empty weight and worthless matter. Not that you do not have any regard for your own reputation and fame. But even if you were ^C to receive reproaches, it would be necessary for you, having come here, to attempt this; nor was it reasonable for you to pay attention to others, from whom you turned away when you were seeking the truth of peace. If you are gripped by the desire for these things, you ought much more to desire the glory that comes from that source, and to do what is worthy of the immortal name that you hold, and which rightly attracts the praise of all men toward your commendation; ^D and for this reason you must altogether guard against those reproaches from everyone. For if nothing else, even for the sake of those who wish to refute us, we ought to be ashamed of the words that befit the testimony against us.

You clearly remember, both of you, how in words and writings you exhort others to the salvation of their brothers, persuading them to do everything for this, and to care for nothing else. When asked, however, what benefit belongs to those who are pressured by such perils and labors for the sake of what you incite them, you reply: the glory of the Church and the return to the acknowledgement of the truth by those who contentiously abhor it. Driven by these, the more prudent ones among them—some bring money, others travel to the very ends of the earth with pleasure, such that words cannot express, arriving here, putting asice everything else, having such high hopes. And it is not as if the authority of the Roman emperor might be for the future a means of changing one’s life, or that no attack of enemies might be feared, or that the revenues of Constantinople might be increased for all; the Iberians, and the Russians, and other nations called to you, some of whom desire to see the Romans in a more humble station; so far is it that some good might accrue to them, such that they would willingly undertake labors and perils. So also I judge the Gauls and the Celts, and the nations beyond the Alps, to care very little about the state of Italian affairs, nor are they very anxious that the Pope might inhabit Rome or another city in prosperity; therefore they would even gladly provide money, and in this way they run with such great alacrity, as if they were being called to the defense of the Empire. But if reason advises, and nothing is more pleasant to sound-minded men, nor is it more necessary for the soul of the brothers, who fear the judgements of God, nor is there any thing for which they might more willingly spend their very lives than to see the Church joined and enjoying perfect peace. Having promised these things, and having persuaded them to approach the most arduous task with pleasure, you rightly expect these

^A promises; and finding nothing of the sort, they will think they have been deceived, and they will cry out that they have suffered an injustice. And if even by some artifice you persuade those who have arrived here to offer no contradiction, I do not see, however, how you can cause the princes, by whom they were sent, to willingly ignore the promises, and to feel gratitude toward you for what has been done, and to commend their own envoys for the way these matters have been handled, and to honor them upon their return. Therefore, such a fine and noble preparation must not be underestimated, nor should we allow those promises to become a pretext for accusations; on the contrary, they must be preserved in such a way that they can be held up against those who might perhaps intend to contradict. For if it was for the sake of true peace and the salvation of brothers that we both issued the call and they heeded it, it is not fair to be vexed that things are turning out according to our intentions, nor—if both sides wished to save their brothers by teaching the true doctrine—[is it fair] for them to reject their own salvation ^B while wishing to appear as if they receive no benefit from their brothers; and that which they would have blamed in others, who clearly oppose the truth once shown, they themselves must endure and suffer. Moreover, to speak the truth plainly, if only we were seen from the very beginning to have undertaken the care of the truth, and if, with God as our helper, we should find it, with all thoughts that favor falsehood being overturned, I do not think that anyone would arrive at such a state of senselessness as to set out to contradict the judgments of God and your own, and the light of demonstration, by attempting things that cannot be achieved, nor that you would have any need of words to persuade such a person, making use of the rod of ecumenical synods, which even they have wielded against those who are stubborn in this way. Yet some might say, “We see that this union cannot come about, and it is better to maintain peace in whatever way possible than, while we are unable to find a perfect reconciliation, to neglect that which can be done, and to depart empty-handed with absolutely nothing accomplished.” ^C For my part, I do not think it right to declare any of these things impossible or arduous before one has put them to the test, having done everything that is fitting; for this would be a sign of a small mind, and of a will that is unwilling to pursue great tasks that involve difficulty. I hear you indeed speaking many things daily that are worthy of note and that clearly redolent of knowledge and virtue, yet I have not known to this day anyone who has actually touched upon the way to achieve this kind of peace, so that it would be permissible to despair of it as altogether impossible. For a plan of reconciliation in appearance, and a desire to cover everything under the name of peace, indeed turn you away from thinking about the real issues. I pass over the fact that if this is truly impossible, there is a danger that all the proverbs by which impossible things are denoted might be applied to us: for we shall all appear to have desired impossibilities, if what was being sung of regarding this admirable peace was not, in fact, a pretext and a simulation. Furthermore, even if this were altogether impossible, and we were to depart from here without anything of this kind being accomplished, I do not see what utility would arise, if we do not honor it in the name of union. For if [it were] ^D either for the sake of friendship alone, or for the sake of communion, or

for the provision of money, or for help against enemies, or for the confirmation of matters that were previously trembling, or for any such designation, it would be reasonable to desire to enjoy these things, and for those who have missed the greatest blessings—those who have not attained peace—to console the grief felt therefrom by the benefits of other things. But if we name these things the union and peace of the Churches, just as if someone, while it is cold and he is being pelted with snow and rain, were to say that he is being warmed because someone gives him money, I do not know who would wish to sacrifice a victim for such peace, and take the name of peace for the sake of cheering his spirit, and think he will obtain something of what he hoped for, not seeing that matters remain in their former controversy and inflict sorrow. Wherefore, if nothing else at all was considered, it contains only the joined disgrace of desiring things that can in no way be accomplished; but if we return bringing a union in which there is nothing more than what was contained in the previous difference, and we are carried away with common joys on account of its mere name, this will be the crime of a second and worse fraud, that we are first deceived by ourselves, and wish to delude others. But I, for one, who think that [this] alone will be sufficient to refute those who object in that manner—forgoing all other things—intend ^B to say this:

It is impossible, impossible, venerable Fathers, that that peace is impossible, if no one calls "impossible" that which has often come to pass. Such a union has already been accomplished seven times, and you are in no way inferior to any of the synods that accomplished it so many times. I would not deny that it is very difficult, but [I would say it is] also the greatest and most desirable, and one that conquers everything that one might pray against, and one that will cause you many crowns, and for the sake of which long journeys, and labors, and dangers, and money, and all such things have been held as nothing. For even to other councils it seemed equally difficult, and yet they did not on that account desist from desiring it and bringing it to pass through the help of God. But if someone calls "impossible" those things which possess great difficulty, he should not be heard. That it is not only not impossible, but, if ever it was so, even now easy ^C to define one certain and true opinion concerning the proposed subject, and to free the Church of God from such great ambiguity and internal schism, is self-evident to those who judge without being preoccupied by any passion. For if we were not able to bring forward many things from among those which are accepted for this present disquisition, but it were necessary for us to become inventors of things hitherto unknown, inquiring as if by conjectures after the truth which surpasses the powers of nature; or if this controversy could only be resolved to our own detriment, not even then would it be altogether difficult to choose that which most accords with the faith and in no way conflicts with it; ^D

to adhere to that which is truer. Yet there might perhaps be some who would doubt and would not trust sufficiently to the judgment of human thoughts, or who might not be willing to agree with others, each remaining content with his own opinions. ^A Since, however, the Holy Scripture is full of testimonies regarding this matter, and the books of the saints abound with them, and one can see many speaking so plainly about these things, as if they were sitting as judges of our controversies by design; and since it is not easy to count how many things both Greeks and Latins have collected from them and bring forward in defense of their own opinion; who would say it is difficult to interpret the sayings of Scripture as is just and fitting, or rather, to acquiesce in their best interpreters, and to reconcile the saints with one another, and to add the fewer to the greater, and those who have said nothing to those who have expressed the matter, and those who are later in time to the more ancient, and those who have shrouded the matter in obscurity to those who have spoken clearly? This is what laws even in civil questions command to be done, ^B and this, I think, the saints themselves would do among themselves if it were possible to meet in one place and examine one another's opinions, and so we too might come to one mind and cease to transfer our own war onto the teachers of peace. For as long as we have contrary opinions, each bringing forward their sayings in our defense, it is impossible that we should not, as far as it lies in us, make them participants in this conflict. These things have no difficulty, except only for those who have the will to contend, and who keep their own preconceived opinions while admitting absolutely nothing of those things through which it is possible to attain the truth; it is right for those who desire the truth to despise such men. But even if these things were ^C plainly difficult, and never before us had either been zealously sought or brought to a conclusion by others, it is surely contrary to reason to despair of the aid of the Spirit, by whose power even those things which are truly impossible for us are far surpassed; but we must believe that He, moved to compassion by the labors and dangers you have endured, and approving of the vehement desire for the truth within you, will provide sufficient impulses of His own favor. For if, on the contrary, things were not most readily available, it is from Him that one should hope for the faculty of conducting the matter excellently, without whom nothing can be accomplished. ^D Let it be His work, therefore, that you should both choose what is most beneficial and accomplish the same with the least amount of exertion.

THE SAME: SECOND ORATION, in which the impediments to such peace are removed.

^A First, venerable Fathers, I give thanks to God, both for your zeal in honest matters, which makes you in no way begrudge listening to those who say something good—considering not who says it, but what force the things said possess—and for His own kindness toward me, from which it has come about that I have attained my desire and have in no way been displeasing to such great Fathers. For it is not right to think that anything other than Divine impulse was the cause why you have agreed on honest matters, and have preferred the utility and peace, for the sake of which we have set out to deliberate, to all thoughts whatsoever, and why one man, while giving counsel on such great matters, has appeared to all to speak justly. ^B Furthermore, since lately I promised not only that I would show you what I consider to be the more useful mode of peace, but also the way in which it might be attained, and having already performed the one, I now approach to pay the remaining part of the debt. And indeed I know that I am undertaking a most difficult subject, and that no small danger threatens one who is to treat of this matter, if it should happen that the things I am about to say are pleasing neither to either party, or to only one: yet I believe that to dare to say something about it will be seen by all not so much as a proof of impudence and forwardness as of good hope—which, having received it from previous events, it is consistent to preserve even in the present, and having proposed it, to set out to speak once again. But regarding the tempering of offense, ^C if the things I say should please neither party, or if it should happen that they are burdensome to only one, I consider it to be sufficient, first, if you endure it for the sake of truth and the apparent good; and then also this, that I shall accede to the opinion that will eventually please you, and that my having thought something else about these things before will be no impediment to my following your judgment. Therefore I think that you, doing what is just, will either not be at all displeased if I appear to say something that does not please you, looking rather to my intention, or will afterwards set aside the offense, and grant pardon to one unwilling to disagree, and not refusing to follow the decrees, and not preferring this my opinion to the common judgment. ^D Opposing these reasons to the difficulty of the subject, and having before my eyes above all your benevolence, by which I must be emboldened to incur some risk, and which it is fitting to preserve...

^A when attempting the most difficult things, I shall endeavor to pay the second portion of my promises, without which there would be no benefit from the former, if I do not speak these things or persuade you of them. Many things, then, are by nature apt to show this wondrous peace as easy and simple for us, if only we are willing; but it is also possible to see that it is full of not a few contradictions to those who do not examine the matter clearly. I think it is right to speak of the obstacles first, and to banish these as far as possible from your souls. For you yourselves would rejoice to see your thoughts, which are fiercely besieged by those who plot against the good, being driven away, and you would proceed more easily toward the things which bring this about, just as when the difficulties in a road are removed from it. But bear with me, I pray, as I begin the matter a little further back.

The achievement of a kind of economic and apparent union, while matters of dispute remain just as they were ^B before, we have shown to be neither profitable nor seemly, but rather unworthy of our virtue and far from the titles we bear; and it is least pleasing to the Spirit, by whom we say we have been gathered, while it would bring upon us no few reproaches from men. In addition to these points, it does not correspond to the good hopes by which we were moved at the beginning, nor does it befit the overarching preparation, nor would it have sufficed for anything greater, if such a thing existed, than the present business; and it would have initiated a worse war and battle for Christians afterward.

But the discovery and investigation of truth, and the separation of it from falsehood, I define as the only true and perfect union, one ^C free from all defects, abounding in every good thing, and above all pleasing to God—which ought to be the primary aim in all things done by us. This would come about either if the Latins were to dishonor the addition and cease to confess the faith with it, or if the Greeks also were to add it as necessary. Or, rather, to speak more correctly, the confession ought to follow, but the faith of the heart ought to precede, in which first of all the knowledge of the truth must be established, and through it the union of all. Therefore, it will be necessary either for the Latins to be altogether ignorant of the affirmation that they were defending ^D and to believe that the Spirit is from the Father alone, or for the Greeks to believe that He is also from the Son; for no other way remains for those who wish to make peace with one another in truth. Since now the faith is positioned in a contradiction of these, between which it is impossible to find anything, it is necessary that both sides cast away one part of it and that both hold to only the other; then, bringing the faith from the heart to the lips, they should confess it through these things for salvation, and in this way all should come together into one catholic Church, which wishes to signify the unity of true confession and belief. This I define as being the true union, which I myself proposed some time ago, yet I would not say that I persuaded you of it, since you had long ago been persuaded of it by yourselves, or rather, you had learned from the Spirit that this is the beautiful and...

just thing. But the shame of such a change makes most people struggle against ^A accepting it. I hear the Latins themselves saying that it would be a terrible thing, after holding this doctrine for so many years, and believing it themselves, and affirming it in the Symbol of faith, and eagerly teaching others, and having defended it in their writings as one of the most necessary things for salvation and demonstrated it by arguments, now to condemn their own views, like children who have been taught the truth by others; and to suffer the terrible thing first themselves, and then to pass on the shame to those who come after, and to make all those before us participants in the charge of ignorance and blindness—among whom many attained the reputation of holiness—and, by having branded the Roman Church with such an infamy, to think they have achieved some great deed. And what is most serious of all, it is unclear whether one ought to pray for our ancestors as for those who are Orthodox, and to pay them the honors owed to them, or to despise them as heretics and men who embraced a lie throughout their whole lives, ^B despairing of their salvation, and to renounce one's own connection to them. For if we only believed that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son, but the confession of the voice had not been added, it might have been tolerable to leave one opinion and follow another. For it is possible for both sides to have followed a non-rectified opinion after the schism, and now to depart from it, while they exchange mutual help, with no ignominy following from the change, because neither side had established that they must defend it as something fixed and necessary for salvation; a sign of which is that, among other things of this kind, it had not been placed in the confession of faith. But since it has been added by us into the number of the immovable dogmas of the faith, and has been proclaimed for such a long time without any hesitation, so that we cannot even know with certainty almost who added it or, moved by what cause they did so, but others tell different stories—who would endure to move this, unless he were willing first to accept extreme ignominy and to be a laughingstock to all? For there would be no greater ignominy than if we ourselves were witnesses of our own error and of our long-standing profession of a lie; and this even though, because of our learning and exact ability to discuss, we might be to others teachers of the truth. ^C These things, indeed, I hear the Latins saying. But as for the Greeks, I believe that they too, attributing to themselves the praise of wisdom, are very wary lest they should appear to have affected altercation, and judge it to be base to seem to have been babbling for so much time, and to have pursued the most true opinion, and to have averted the communion of the brethren; from which it has come to pass that they suffer many evils, namely that they are compelled to wage war alone against the incoming flood of infidelity ^D without allies. But I think that both sides equally avoid the ignominy from defeat, which they think to be conjoined with the learning of the truth and the unlearning of a lie. For both sides, as it is possible to see, have come together with the hope that they might rather teach others and lead them over to their own opinion. But I would say

^A that the Greeks ought not to be concerned about this apparent ignominy, namely that the opinion which they did not receive when it was first introduced, although it happened to be true, was opposed; for it is more shameful to believe a falsehood, and the contentiousness of confessing a falsehood is of less account in the reckoning of sin. Now the Greeks, for their own security, may have recourse to the Symbol [of the Creed] and put forward their common confession as a shield; if nothing else, they would say they wish to respect and preserve it, even to the point of contention. But as for the Latins, the charge of innovation lies against them, and the fact that they trusted in themselves alone to handle matters concerning the common faith makes their error the worse. And in many other ways I consider the fear of ignominy to be of less account in the changing of the Greeks' minds, so that one might not even call this ignominy at all. For where is it shameful to adhere precisely to the truth, and, while remaining in what has been commonly decreed, to commit the judgment on those things that have pleased some individuals privately to a common synod of all? And, without their consent, to wish to have faith in such things neither for themselves nor for others?

But what, one might say, is so terrible about fearing what is to be feared? For they themselves were afraid to approve a voice not yet approved by all, and to proclaim it before it had been tested; and this fear is not alien to reason. For it is fitting to approach those things which we think concerning God with safe caution, since many dangers, and the greatest one of all, namely losing one's salvation entirely, follow upon rashness. For if this were not the case, but they had utterly condemned the opinion, they would have had no need to hold any discourse with you; just as they would not endure to discuss even one of the incurable errors with others who hold them. But, indeed, it is not shameful for either side, if they are ignorant, to learn; unless we wish to reject knowledge entirely, which cannot be possessed without first casting off the opposing ignorance, and to condemn those who are experts in any branch of knowledge, because they did not wish to cultivate ignorance forever for fear of the disgrace that follows, while they appear to be learning. For on the contrary, it is rather shameful, while thinking that we know everything and wishing to show no gratitude to anyone for the sake of the benefit received, to depart from this life with ignorance. Moreover, since our struggles are on behalf of the truth, it is certainly pleasant to win the victory with her; but it is in no way shameful to appear to surrender once she has been discovered. For those who yield readily to the weapons of truth, and offer their necks to it even if it only appears so, are not to be said to be defeated by any person—to whom it is indeed shameful to seem inferior—but by truth itself, by which all men pray to be defeated. And one might very justly say that they defeat falsehood, since they approach the falsehood, which they had previously served, with the help of the truth. And furthermore, there is no shame in changing one's opinion prudently, and in general in moving from the worse to the better; for it is not the change from evil, but the keeping of evil, that is shameful, as someone said. Therefore, for these reasons, I say that the Greeks ought to think that no ignominy falls upon them, if

^A they believe the Latins when they speak the truth, and make this manifest in every way; and that they should not be willing on that account to reject a true opinion, which, by acknowledging and believing, and by this means becoming united through both of these, they must necessarily expect the rewards of concord and truth from God without doubt.

As for the Latins, although I see that their arguments regarding some of the aforementioned points can be shown to be weak, and that their fear of shame is not entirely irrational—and that they are naturally disturbed by these things more than others—it is just to consider that they will bring no injury upon their ancestors if they themselves embrace the truth; nay, rather they will bring utility, since holding, perhaps, a pure and uncorrupted opinion, they themselves will pray for those deceived by falsehood and who have suffered something human, and in place of a reward, asking of God for the sake of the struggles undertaken for the truth, He grants them mercy; and they will even be able to gradually cover over their reproaches, which would rather increase if they followed the error received from them, and nourished the evil for themselves. ^B But if, not from a desire for glory or a wish to hold the first place among the brethren and to define for all what is true and just, but [rather] by a certain necessity which did not abhor reason, and overcome by thoughts which they could not despise, they introduced this opinion, it is right for us even to be silent and [to trust] that they have obtained mercy and found God propitious; for He shows Himself a humane judge even of the most grievous crimes, if they do not proceed from a similar will—something which I myself am persuaded has rather been the case with those men.

For God would not have seen fit to crown with the rewards with which He gifts those dear to Him, and to enroll in the assembly of the blessed, men who were pre-eminent in the holiness of their life and who loved Him above all things, unless He had first forgiven them the penalties to be paid for their error, which, by ^C trapping those taken by falsehood, cut them off forever from the lot of the blessed. And that God has testified to the holiness of many, both while they lived and after they had departed this life, both the Church of the Latins shows by bestowing cult and honor upon them, and the Greeks themselves would by no means contradict, nor would anyone say that this was done in error, as though you were bestowing the glory of holiness upon them in vain, recognizing nothing in them of those things which are required for holiness.

Wherefore there is an altogether certain hope that the addition made to the Creed will in no way harm their salvation, since they were moved only by a certain necessity and by arguments proving it to be devoid of danger; nor will there be need for your prayers for them; and much more ^D if your own [error] is not added to theirs, but having recognized the truth, you act so that they alone have contracted harm from the falsehood: for the account to be rendered will be from them for themselves alone, and not for your souls as well, which it is right should not be demanded of them if they have spread the stain of perverse opinion among fewer people. But if the amendment of their descendants has not brought them complete liberation from punishment, it will at least have brought them some refreshment and consolation.

^A Neither then will we make your amendment a subject of shame for them, as I said, and much less for those who come after. For how could they be ashamed because of us, whom we shall deliver, together with you, from the ugliness of falsehood, and to whom, if they are of good mind, they will gladly owe immortal thanks for the benefit received? For they will neither rejoice in being freed from falsehood while hating those who brought this about for them, nor will they endure the punishment of unjust and wicked men. Nor will there be anyone to reproach them for your change toward the better and for your recognition of the truth, unless someone wicked or senseless should attack them too as if they were addicted to error, blaming those things worthy of crowns and thinking that those who, for the sake of truth, abandon their own salvation out of pride are in possession of their senses. ^B But I believe they will be much more the heirs of your accolades, and will boast of your labors which you are undertaking for the truth. In general, I do not think that you should even consider the transmitting of shame to those who follow, as long as you yourselves are not first worthy of being ashamed. For it is not shameful to speak, and truth is accustomed rather to render those who possess it more honorable and illustrious. And even if it were to happen that we fixed upon men of both times reproaches and dishonor, because we ourselves acknowledged the truth—being neither the authors of the falsehood they believe, nor unable to be teachers of sound doctrine to them—it would not behoove us, while caring for the honor of others, to despise our own or to cast away the glory that comes from the truth. ^C And if we knew that every arrow of blame was to be hurled against us, we should have to face them all together, considering nothing more preferable than to be disgraced and to die, if necessary, for the truth. And we should account the boldness and the glory in heaven, which the reproaches of men would be destined to increase for us as a debt for our labors for the truth, while we also consider how we, by being corrected in life and faith, may be both saved and glorified—having accepted every form of ignominy upon ourselves. In general, I do not see who those people will be who will reproach you, and whose complaints you would greatly fear. For those who come after you must, of necessity, even tremble at your decrees, led by the observance of your dignity, which you will display before them, both through other things and if you have applied serious care to the truth; for they will think it reckless to attack such a synod, nay rather, they will embrace your decrees, honoring them and setting great store by them, and for that reason will-give you thanks, adorning you in the way they are accustomed to bestow honors upon the blessed who have shone forth in the splendor of similar contests. ^D But if there should be any who openly approve these things, yet wish to reproach you for having accepted this dishonor by being overcome by others, for you it will certainly be sufficient from the

^A knowledge of the truth to be saved yourselves, and to save others who are willing to come to you. And indeed, no one of those who now live will blame you; for neither will the Greeks, for whom you will seem to merit the greatest praise, and among whom you will attain immortal memory, whether by wealth, personal exertion, wisdom, and finally, humility, and by certain more divine thoughts, having alone of almost all people brought about the matter of peace: nor will you blame yourselves, nor will any of those who follow your cause. For all will seize your decisions as if they had heard them from God, this both because the entire Church is gathered together, which it is impossible should err, and also because it is the cause of peace, which all desire to see; hoping by this to be delivered from all the terrible evils, of which the schism between both parties has been the source. But if it should happen that you are not praised by everyone, nor does your opinion please everyone, but there should be some one whom you might better please by contending and overturning everything, so that it might not seem that in time past they did not know what ought to be believed: you ought not therefore to exchange the praises of the few, and those vicious ones, for the displeasure of the many and the best, and that which is understood for the sake of the best thing; since even if all should think wrongly together, and take this matter grievously, you nevertheless ought to care for nothing, but to be solely solicitous for what is honest and true; knowing that every complaint and every opposition will be frivolous, if only what you do is ratified. For if the truth must be said by me, with all suspicion of offending anyone removed, you have only to despise vain glory, and all will be well; and if you propose this to your minds for certain, that you will never be ashamed of yourselves, nor be disturbed by a change of opinion, there is nothing for you to fear from others. But for ^C you it is neither just nor consistent to prefer anything else to the truth, and for the sake of a shameful desire for contention and human affection, to be unwilling to embrace concord, which alone can bring salvation to bodies and souls, when you do not hold it only in your hand, and it remains only to grasp it. For this is not worthy of Fathers, doctors, those endowed with knowledge, decorated with every kind of virtue, nor of God’s proctors, the successors of the apostles, nor finally of men gathered for the sake of the truth, and moreover a gathering so numerous. Nor can it be said that those good hopes are betrayed from either side, which you came having pursued. For after you have fought for the opinion of each of your own [sides], and have made trial of the hopes, when the end of the war becomes manifest; then you will proceed to that which remains for your council, and will deliberate on peace, how it should be brought about, and will take care how the lie may be utterly vanquished by the truth. For you have not all come to this with the mind that you should vanquish the others; for this is also to wish to give victory to the lie, since the truth has not been determined regarding the disputed matters; and while the truth is still unknown, it is necessary that there be at both sides room for some suspicion of a lie. But you have come first to contend regarding the things you have thought concerning one another, and to accomplish this prize first; then

^A you will all be crowned and embrace one another; from which both reconciliation and the main points of the things hoped for will shine forth to you in abundance. No one, therefore, will justly accuse you for having accomplished that for the sake of which you have come together, and for having gained this victory, which will be sufficient. ^B Above all these things, it is not even reasonable that those who have changed their minds should owe more grace to those who persuaded them than those who remained in their former opinion owe to those who were persuaded; so that one might avoid any shame ^C from the appearance of having received a benefit or learned anything. For both sides will be equally benefited and honored by one another; first, by becoming sharers in the pleasure arising from victory; since the end of the zeal of all, and of the common struggles and discourses, will be the demonstration and victory of truth. And for the other party—whichever one might choose to name it—in not cooperating with the search for truth, and in having this demonstrated and in prevailing over the lie, it is naturally impossible for that to happen. Then, also, the secure possession of their own reputation will exist entirely from those who have been persuaded ^D to the ones who persuaded; if these were to contradict, they themselves would certainly be going to doubt, as they also suffered before.

That, therefore, to neither of you does the open change of opinion hold any shame, nor, if there is any, is it fitting to be concerned about it, but it is necessary that all equally profess the manifest truth in the Symbol of faith, neither hesitating to add what is pleasing to all, nor being ashamed to strike out where something offends; and thus, having proclaimed to all the true and certain peace, to return with joy—this I consider to be sufficiently clear from what has been said, and that it is not worth paying attention to those who stir up other sorts of disturbances, nor for you yourselves to be troubled by such thoughts. Now, however, we must proceed to the remaining obstacles.

They will say, therefore, from both sides, I know, even many, that the manner of peace must not only be pleasing to us who are gathered here, but also to all the nations that are subject to the rites of both Churches; and that we must consider not only how we may agree with one another, but also how they too will be persuaded by our votes; otherwise, we shall unknowingly be stirring up a battle instead of peace, and by joining ourselves to those who are far away, we shall be wrongly separated from those who are close to us; which, for those who are to suffer it, will bring greater grief and disturbance of soul than the former evil. We know, however, that all, except a few, take the change with difficulty, and consider it to be the height of impiety if they seem to admit any innovation. Some of them even desire an ecumenical council and the things done through it only so that they may become teachers of the truth to others; nor do they say it is possible for anything better than what they themselves believe to be seen even by God himself. How, therefore, having such an opinion, will they endure for us to add or subtract anything at all? Or will it be just to abandon our allies, with whom we bear the enmity toward one another, and to prefer those who are difficult to us…

… ^A nor to act in such a way that the peace might be realized just as they themselves might gladly consent and agree? What defense, then, shall there be also toward these, or rather, what at all do I have to counsel you regarding these matters, if you would attend to one now wishing to speak?

It is not by measures of earth, most equitable Fathers, that it is right to judge those who are far and those who are near, but by similarity of character and customs, and conversely, and by language where it is possible; and, greatest of all, by goodwill, by communion, and by helping one another in matters where there might be need and cooperation. By using this rule, therefore, we may deliberate on the matters proposed in a manner entirely contrary to what they demand. For who does not know that, as soon as the word is turned toward the Greeks, there is the most perfect affinity existing between the most well-known Latin nations and them, in all the things I have just mentioned? And yet some of these are separated from us by vast distances of earth. Who, furthermore, is ignorant that many of those who for the time being hold the same faith as we do, though they are settled nearby, differ from us in customs and habits to such a degree that it can scarcely be expressed, and do not care at all about the calamities with which we are daily afflicted? We even know that some of them plot against us and envy us; while those who wish to present themselves as our friends are just as able ^B as those who do not wish it, being themselves oppressed by similar and even more serious miseries, so that they cannot even bring aid to themselves.

I pass over the fact that, except for the Gauls and the Spaniards, the rest of the Latin nations are less distant in place from us than some of those—for I do not wish to mention them by name—to whom we are vehemently attached. Nay, we even have them as neighbors, joined most closely to some colonies and islands subject to them; and with some we have shared everything of ours, so that we treat them as kinsmen and fellow citizens. To recount one by one the timely assistance brought to us, and the recompense rendered by us, and also the fact that we delight more in each other’s customs than our own, and that our learning, disciplines, and precise knowledge of dogmas and other ties by which we are coupled are common—I think this is very difficult. If, therefore, all intend to take part in the peace with the Latins, this would be the height of happiness, and a brilliant victory of truth over falsehood, and a broad peace encompassing all things. But if there is a danger that, ^C by clinging to one party, we may lose the other, it will be the mark of prudent men to prefer those who are most closely related over the others: those, clearly, by whose preference we shall both confess the truth and establish a stable peace. For you know that even now the majority of them are independent of these others, and neither communicate with us in any way, nor do they listen to our Church; but no loss arises to us from this. Therefore, they will not be able to inflict any inconvenience, being entirely cut off from us. And if they could even inflict some harm, a perfect union with the Latins would certainly be sufficient and more than enough, with its great abundance, to remove the annoyance resulting from that, so that we would not even feel the loss of those previously joined to us. Nor, indeed, will any injury be done to them by us, with God as judge, and men who are wise. ^D

^A On the contrary, they themselves will be inflicting injury both upon the Church of God and upon themselves. For they will no longer be opposing only us—whom they previously knew to be a part of the Catholic Church—but they will enter into contention against the entire Church together, and will be cut off from everything. For when the Church in Constantinople is united with the other three to Rome, no part of the Catholic Church remains outside it, by separating themselves from which, and by rejecting its decrees, I do not see what could befall them worse than this. Nor could anyone say that we ought to give way to them, to the extent of despising the truth, rejecting the good of peace, and causing damage to ourselves, in order to appease them—a thing that is seen as highly absurd to concede even to masters.

^B Furthermore, it is not something strange or now happening for the first time that there are some who do not accept an ecumenical synod and its decrees, so that one might have something to accuse our management of, on the grounds that we were unable to make everyone compliant. For many nations and whole cities have spoken against the decisions of previous synods, thinking that those decisions were prone to human weakness and had pronounced as truth what merely seemed so to them; until the power of the truth, penetrating the souls of all, showed that all were persuaded, and that they heard the words of those men as if they were the words of God. And the examiners of the truth knew this precisely. But surely, fearing this—and thinking they had to appease the impudence or the unbelief of some—they did not therefore leave the souls of the well-disposed to drift, nor did they look on while the truth was being warred against by falsehood, and the Church of God was suffering the worst, while themselves seeming to be responsible for all these things. ^C But, being especially concerned with these matters, and regarding them as paramount, they would for a time be heedless of the others; then they would attend to those people with prayers and other forms of care, and would turn them toward the knowledge of what is good and just. Therefore, it does not behoove us now to be anxious about this or that person, lest they should become worse when they might be made better, but having done what is necessary, we must leave it to those who have understanding to choose and to embrace this—for it is natural that these are the faithful and most tried among our own; as for those who may perhaps wish to contradict, you will assign the time that follows for healing, nor will you consider their conversion to be wholly desperate. ^D For there are, there are many among us who will persuade them to put aside their contentions by speaking that which is true and just. For men will say that these people are not only warring against the Church of Constantinople, but as it seems, they wish to dishonor the Catholic Church; which is also to despise the truth, and to cast off the reverence owed to God, upon which our hopes of salvation rest. For the whole Church of Christians now has decided on the same opinion concerning the matters previously in dispute; and except for you, everyone honors the decrees of this ecumenical synod.

^A They maintain that it is impossible for it to have erred; and even if this were possible, they think it better to risk all together—sufficient evidence of their abhorrence of falsehood, declaring through their obedience and their consensus with all—than for them alone, as if holding to a safer opinion, trusting in themselves and deeming themselves wiser than all others, to fall, should it happen that they err, and thus to be deprived of the hopes of their judgment and to leave themselves without any defense. For they will surely not claim that, being warned by heavenly oracles, which ought to be preferred to all things, they know the ecumenical synod to have been deceived and that it is not to be believed. But if you are so rashly pleased to think contrary to what all believe, and to despise the ecumenical synod, having no regard for truth, ^B or for praise, or for future security, or for the labors undertaken for peace—of which you yourselves were in part participants—then no counsel is to be offered at all; there is need only for prayers, which the universal Church will certainly not hesitate to pour forth, eagerly desiring your salvation, yet seeing you in such danger that you might not attain it, and therefore sorrowing; and furthermore, because there is no hope that you can be led by words or counsels. If, however, you wish to persevere entirely in your ancient confession, thinking yourselves to be in safety, but not being able yourselves to discern whether the addition made by the synod is true and necessary for salvation, nor trusting much in others in this matter, but thinking it possible that everyone has been hallucinating, and thus you do not dare to accept it: ^C know that you fear things that are not to be feared. For to mention only those things that can free you from this fear, omitting for the present many demonstrations of no less importance: that a certain part of the Church of God has perhaps served falsehood is neither absurd nor is it something that has not frequently occurred. For since men are of the nature they are formed to be, and they act voluntarily, but opine by choice, it cannot be that many do not also err in acting and opining alike, believing false things in their opinions and committing reprehensible actions: the very nature of things bringing this about, and God permitting it, who knows how to cure the damage arising from this with heavenly medicine; for He uses that part of the Church that is not laboring under any disease ^D for the correction of the part that is laboring. And anyone who looks for it will find the Church of God has suffered many such things, through which she not only did not suffer any harm—the falsehood being cut off almost before it could arise, and the tumults arising therefrom being settled—but she appeared even more illustrious, having attained, through the wars then brought upon her, a greater tranquility afterward. But for the whole Church together to err and to be bereft of the light of truth is impossible. For to pass over other things, who would believe that all Christians alike either desire to embrace falsehood or are ignorant of the truth, seeing that they are so many, who offer themselves as guides to it, and have bestowed such great care upon it? For you are the only ones left, who in opposition to us, for that which we are in

favor of, seem indeed very many, yet in order and number it cannot be said how small a part of the whole you are. For what hope would hereafter remain for recognizing the truth, if no one were left to offer himself as a guide to others toward it? For you will not be able to achieve this alone; and even if you yourselves are wise, you will not persuade others to be wise. It is as if someone, being merely a fingernail, wished to rule the whole body, and to move it, and to heal it, and to give counsel on what brings good health. Furthermore, you ought to consider that our Master has built the Church on such safe ground that the gates of hell shall never prevail against it; that includes, clearly, the heresies that rise up against the truth and drag those who are persuaded by them down into the pit of hell. ^B For He has bestowed this upon it as a special gift, without which the mystery of the dispensation would not be a great thing, if it were going to happen that, even after it was finished, it would labor under an incurable disease, and, oppressed by falsehood, would lie either entirely neglected or in need of more potent medicines. He permits it to be troubled by untruth, but He says that He will not permit it to be utterly overcome, or to become a slave to deception. Now, that the Church of God consists of the five patriarchal sees and those subject to them is declared by the canons of the synods, by its long-standing custom, and by the very nature of things. For if any rulers anywhere on earth, led by lack of reason and tyranny, refuse to be subject to the pastoral government of all these sees together, and prefer to be fed by themselves, and to be a law unto themselves—this is certainly not with the approval or common consent of the Church; rather, she tolerates such boldness so that nothing worse might follow. ^C Those who would now even wish to contradict this, one might say, are led neither by any reason nor by any timely fear, but have long since learned to be shameless, and do not even now abandon that habit.

Since these things are, therefore, undoubtedly so, and since the Church of Christ both cherishes this judgment—which she once chose—and acknowledges it forever, and since He promised that falsehood would never prevail over it, it is impossible that you should not appear to be speaking empty words if, given the promises—or rather, the benefits bestowed—you deny the power of the truth by your opinion, imagining that the truth has been conquered by falsehood, or thinking that, while those promises remain valid, this has already happened. For it is necessary that either the word of truth has proved false, the Church having been seduced by falsehood, or, if it is impossible for it to pass away, then she must also be entirely free from all suspicion of evils. ^D If the former is blasphemy, or rather clear madness, it remains that this must be approved and received by pious ears and minds. Although, even setting aside divine oracles and the certainty flowing from them, there would be no reason to doubt that the Church of God is to be preserved forever without any error, and that [...]

^A truth itself cannot exist or stand at all without it, nor is the birth of human beings in vain and among things that have no reason, since no one bereft of the truth can attain salvation and depart from here to lead a life in the heavens, which we know to be the end of human nature. But if you, having cut yourselves off from the Catholic Church, think that you alone think the truth and safely hope for salvation—a claim which you might say is sufficient both for the preservation of truth and for nature not to fall short of its end—such thoughts certainly do not commend themselves to us. For, beyond the fact that you are of almost no account and that truth does not delight in being preserved only among you, nor nature in attaining its end in you, you yourselves will not enjoy that happiness until the end, being the only ones to take up the war against falsehood, and often likely to turn your backs, being destitute of the help of allies and fighting with invalid arms. For if the universal Church of Christians, gathered from everywhere with such great strength, has not been able—as you yourselves would say—to overcome falsehood, how can you be believed to be able to resist, you who are in many parts fewer by far than they? And while she, having been led astray by this one error, might perhaps form a better plan for what is to follow, you, on the other hand, will dwell as if in darkness, not even knowing what is to be done in the matters which fate may present: for you have never been examiners and judges of such things; but you were well-advised to follow those who know and are able to judge these matters. ^B Many events will arise that will give the enemy of truth an opportunity to attack you when you are destitute of all protection: and thus this state of yours, which you think is safe, will become an occasion of dangers. For those who are now despised will not care for you, nor will you have enough strength for all things. But if, having at last and with difficulty come to your senses, you flee to the Catholic Church, and promise that you will reverence and accept all things whatsoever she has commanded, having greatly loathed your formerly refractory and contumacious sentiments, she will indeed certainly receive you, but for you the repentance will not be without shame, one which it is better to avoid by not wishing to contend from the beginning.

Do not, therefore, turn away from the communion of the brethren, ^C and while you grieve them, you also provoke the Spirit of charity; and by casting false reproaches—to your own certain harm—at the Catholic Church, which cannot err from the truth, you fill your lives hereafter with many perplexities. Using these words with them, they will be persuaded, I know, to contradict nothing: and although they may not discern these things for themselves, hearing the things that shall have been defined here, they will willingly admit them: for although they may not possess much knowledge, yet it is enough for me to believe that they will regard these things as sincere and just. I would say, therefore, that the Greeks ought not to be moved if there are any who happen to contradict; nor should they, for the sake of such men, deprive themselves of the confession of the truth and of peace with the Latins, ^D since both to help themselves and to persuade those others, if they have anything to say,—

^A they might move them from their opinion. But as for the Church of the Latins, it is not even permitted to her to feign such suspicions. For first, there is no race of Latins that does not obey her commands; rather, there is none that would endure to be surpassed by others in the honor and observance due to her. Such great honor does she enjoy from all, and so far is she from any desire to command in matters where she might wish to do so, that to suspect any resistance or contention arising against her is impossible. For beyond the absolute authority of the spiritual lord, by which he tempers severity with gentle kindness, and does not permit any of those subject to him to exalt himself against his orders, or to conceive anything insolent against their mistress and mother, the Latins also, all of them, moved by their own will—with no one compelling them—are carried toward observing her, since they are distinguished by wisdom and prudence more than others, and are taught in the constant sermons of their teachers how much reverence is owed to her. Thus, by the reverence and faith they have toward her, they have conceded many things even to her protectors; which things, being proofs of the gratitude of those who gave them, are accustomed to become a source of reproach and scandal to those who do not know how to use them well. Therefore, when she legislates something new, all will pay heed without any curiosity; and now they will show ^B no less reverence, when they think that obedience will be profitable to them if ever it was, and that if they resist, they will pay harsher penalties than usual. And then, even if they wished to contend, they would have no pretext; for no new opinion would be introduced, but an added one would be removed, which is the same thing as returning to the ancient and suspicion-free confession. It would be absurd, therefore, to obey while she is innovating, but to withdraw when she is holding fast to the ancient traditions and confirming them; and to suspect nothing while she acts alone in such matters, but when she finds what is necessary together with her brethren, to doubt, and to hold in contempt what is honored by others while they were warring against it, now using as allies those who were previously hostile. For if formerly, having cast aside reverence, they were about to attempt something stubborn and rash, adding to the faith without their brethren and trusting so much in themselves, it would be reasonable. But since then all yielded, setting aside every thought in their reverence ^C toward him, it is not likely that they would wish to contradict even now. But if some, having disregarded all justice and reason, and also having held your wrath in contempt, shall choose not to pay heed to what has been defined by us, but shall wish to persist in the original terms, I think that what I have already said to the Greeks regarding those who contradict them will be sufficient for you also in dealing with such men. And just as the Church of the Greeks, so it behoves yours also not to cease to provide good things for the wise through fear of the contention of the foolish—which there is surely hope will not occur, but if it does, it must be either duly removed or justly punished. I pass over the fact that you will more easily persuade those among you who might contend, since they are not unlearned ^D and use the same language, and can [alt-version omitted]

^A be reached by your own voice, and to whom you will not deem it ^B of little account to make use of those who are opposed, since there will be many for you, exceeding any number, who will show obedience—just as others show disobedience—and whom you will use as partners in the peace reconciled with the Greeks. For no one can say that all, or even the majority, will take up arms against their own heads and drive the sword into themselves.

Thus, this suspicion—which did not seem to be unworthy of consideration—also is of no consequence, nor can it, if one accurately considers its nature, draw those who pay proper attention to their own nature away from the stated purpose, as the discourse has already shown, and as you will see better yourselves when you have applied your mind to it. Let those, therefore, cease who hold the defection of some over us as a kind of bogeyman, and who, further, foster the insolence and audacity of the wicked; ^C vainly affirming that pious men and those eager for honest things have desired these things, and claiming—I know not why—that we have returned more sluggish and more frivolous, not to mention other disgraces to which you will rightly be subject. For it was necessary to explain those thoughts first, or rather to offer these scarecrows for the purpose of striking terror, so that each party might wish to remain within their own borders, and not approach the path of peace as if it were useless on account of these very things, and such that it could by no means come to pass; and [not] to exhort all to peace at all times, by saying everything and doing everything that could move them toward peace, ^D and by declaring it more easily attainable, asserting that it would come about by that one assembly alone, but now to recount difficulties and inspire fears: for while it was permissible to occupy oneself with these at the beginning, it is certainly not permissible now for those who have reached the very times for action. For if such obstacles were never going to have a place among men who know how to use good counsel, who would concede that this is the time to deal with such matters? Or by what reasoning does it happen that those who say such things now do not necessarily cover themselves with shame, and that those who are led to that opinion—which God forbid—do not later cover themselves with shame? Nor is the responsibility or culpability the same for the authors of such counsel and for those who assent to it, while they were still deliberating on such great matters, to be struck by a fear devoid of reason and fail to perceive what should be done honorably and usefully, and to extinguish their zeal once they have embarked upon the matter.

ORATIO II AD SYNODUM.

^A It is free from such accusations; and to him no danger is attached, whereas for the other, there is a necessity of being in danger even regarding the things he possesses. Since, therefore, both these impediments have been clearly refuted by reason, it seems right to pay no heed at all to the rest, whose worthlessness anyone who wishes may perceive from afar. For who is unaware, in the first place, that those oft-repeated decrees—namely, that it is permitted to neither add to nor take away from the Creed—are, according to the sense of those who object to them, mere calumnies, devised to cover up the shame of contention? For if there were something that could persuade the Greeks to reject the opinion of the Latins and to refrain from adding it to the Creed, that would be another matter, and no one who understands that decree of the Synod correctly would blame them. For it was originally issued against those who corrupt the faith through certain subtractions and additions and who introduce an adulterated theology; and all would affirm that the Fathers who issued it rightly reverenced it, and that they themselves would not dare such a thing, nor permit those who did dare to be admitted to communion.

But if, on the contrary, one is persuaded that this opinion is most true, and that it is in high agreement with the foundations of the faith and approved by the Saints, then the recourse to those canons is in vain; for they say nothing by perversely understanding the decree of the Fathers, since they issued it to close the path to falsehood, ^B not to eliminate true opinions. They issue threats against those who write down a different faith, and they take away the opportunity from those who wish to overturn the accepted faith by adding something contrary or by craftily taking away something. Wherefore, if the decree is understood as it ought to be, the Latins are not to be blamed if they added what is true, nor is it to be said that the Greeks are in error if they agree; otherwise, it remains that by saying something else, they are certainly constructing calumnies.

Furthermore, if it is not permitted for the Latins alone, or for the Greeks without the Latins, to add anything they please, nevertheless, no one will be able to deny this prerogative to an Oecumenical Synod; for we know that other Synods have also declared the true faith through certain additions; and the canon that condemns the addition excludes that which one might make as an individual and publish as his own opinion, not what a whole Synod might wish to add—for there is no mention of a Synod in that canon, but it says "let it be permitted to no one." ^C And indeed, what it forbids to be believed, that it also does not permit to be added to the Creed of the faith; these are things that are contrary to the truth and do not harmonize with what has been established after many struggles. But what one is permitted to believe, that one is also permitted to confess; for that which made the confession of the Creed necessary is that those who are corrupted in the faith should not remain hidden, which no one should justly be thought to harm while he makes it harmonize with those things that are believed without danger. Otherwise, we shall call the Creed of the faith by a false name, and we shall recite it in vain, since the security that comes from it has already been trodden underfoot. For neither will the Creed be anymore ^D

the soul, if it does not reveal the whole ^A opinion it has fixed upon regarding the articles of faith: nor is it impossible for some who hold false views to lie hidden, who stand with us in confession but are separated in faith, if this is conceded at all. Furthermore, how will we present the full account of the faith intact, which we accept as consisting in confession, if we avoid announcing it through our very tongues? Or what hope of salvation will there be for us through things that must necessarily be believed, if, while we hear that we must profess it for the sake of salvation, we ourselves think it a disgrace—if we even profess the truth with our lips? For just as things that deviate from the rule of truth are by no means to be believed, so too is it necessary ^B that an outward confession accompany what is rightly believed. Therefore, either the opinion of the Latins must be shown to be entirely alien to the truth, or, if you cannot do this, it must be honored and accepted as true, and the faith declared in the Creed. For the Latins, when we accept their opinion and judge it to be valid, will perhaps not contend greatly regarding the confession; for it is enough for them to show that they have thought correctly, and to make us cease from quarreling and pursuing the truth as if it were a lie. But for us, the faith of the heart alone will not suffice for salvation, unless it is also joined to an outward confession. Indeed, the decrees that some shrink from ^C should rather be considered—and understood in the way that those who established them wished them to be understood for themselves and others—as an excellent addition for our benefit. For they did not wish to deprive themselves or others endowed with equal dignity of the capacity to clearly define matters pertaining to the faith: otherwise, they would have inconsiderately shown these decrees to be of no consequence, and capable of being disregarded; for they too are a kind of addition, and an opinion on the faith brought forth then for the first time, not approved by any of the preceding synods; for all of them, as is evident, were making additions. But neither will the Latins, if they do not consider that synod to be œcumenical, nor ^D at all of such a nature that its mandates may not be transgressed, fear its decrees, while disapproving of the addition and wanting to strike it out; for things not defined with a very certain rationale can be changed by those who possess greater authority. If, however, they deem it œcumenical, and that its decrees must remain valid in perpetuity, just as the statutes of other general synods, there is no doubt that they too will certainly put forth the decrees, and will say to the Greeks that the difficulty they have in inserting it [the article] is something they themselves wish to remove. As for me, I leave it to the Latins themselves to consider whether that synod ought to be held as œcumenical or not; but I would counsel them first to consider it better to observe those decrees by standing in agreement with those earlier synods, rather than by setting aside all of them and adhering to the one most recent of all: then, that they should have no controversy with the Greeks regarding that synod, but let this matter pass. For I

know that the Greeks will by no means allow that synod ^A to be numbered among the ecumenical ones, but will rather fight against this than anything else: for they know that if they were to admit these things, it would inevitably cause them damage in every way, and they would be held to be in a worse position. Because of these things, that synod must be left alone, however either party may wish a such-like thing to be regarded; but if the cause of the schism—the addition ^B—should appear to be harmful in any way, it should not be a hesitation for the Latins to cast it out. Nor, if they judge it just that all Greeks should obey the synod that makes the addition, should they themselves think that they are suffering an injustice if those who obey take it away; for both alike are permitted to those to whom it is permitted, and prohibited equally. Therefore, let not the one true and solid peace be cast aside because of those decrees, which have more to do with anything else than with our present matter; nor is it reasonable to bear ill-will toward a change on account of having anticipated this or that opinion. For I hear that these are the ^C thoughts of some, who deem it unworthy to change a judgment held for so long a time. For these things are not to be judged like theatrical spectacles, nor because of the passage of time are they to be believed—which causes even worse things to appear craftily devised, nor does it blush to bring support to a lie against the truth—as I have often seen important matters attacked by things worthy of blame, and worse things already received and believed often sought after with fiercer war by better things. There is nothing absurd, then, in the error having lain hidden even for so long a time, or in a lie having assumed the image of truth and being preached under it, or in the same lie adapting its image to the truth, and thus striving to drive it out. In general, the matters we have before us, since they are by far the greatest, and—before this great schism had arrived—seemed incredible to almost all who were conscious of the many difficulties, it is right that many more obstacles than have been mentioned should now present themselves to you, and that you should often be held back by these when you are most close to accomplishing this excellent work. For if one must speak the truth, no matter has been or will be involved in more and greater difficulties ^D than this most honest and useful peace. I, indeed, have given you such counsel, and let no one be angry. It would be far better not to approach the matter at all, but, as if having come here for the sake of visiting the places, to have met and, after holding conversations and having obtained mutual knowledge of one another, to return, than to have started eagerly and then to lose heart, and to succumb to a small or great difficulty. For if you were fewer in number, or less prepared than the matter requires, or a provincial synod not representing the whole Church of God, or gathered for the sake of some other not useless business, but intending to treat the business of peace only incidentally later on—if, having started the greatest of matters, you were to despair, this would earn for you the name of men of great spirit; but because, both in multitude, and in virtue, and in science, and in every equipment, if ever any other of those before you...

^A you are equipped with every preparation, if ever any of the ecumenical councils that have existed before were equipped; they overcame difficulties of equal magnitude with similar strength. There is present, moreover, a vehement desire for peace, and since you have set out to contend for no other reason, it is shameful, venerable Fathers, it is shameful not to correspond to the character you bear and the order of the title, and to depart having obtained lesser glory than others who have brought similar contests proposed to them to a happy outcome. For no one will listen to you if you bring forward impediments and difficulties by way of excuse, since he knows with what full equipment you have come, stronger than any other matter, but betrayed only by sloth. Furthermore, you cannot fail to be vexed by other reproaches, which a stalled peace brings with it: for this brings the crime of pride, that the censure of timidity, another the vice of contention; and thus one disgrace is joined to another, to which that you may not justly be subject, it is your duty to take care, both as individuals and all together: for all of these things equally are very far removed from your virtue and from the hope that is placed in you.

But the head of all that has been said is this: all other men will certainly enjoy these manifest and clear goods which proceed from peace, of which the most beautiful will be the knowledge of the truth and the salvation of their own souls; but you, as the first to perceive the utility of these goods, and being distinguished by the title that it was through you as authors that they flowed into everyone, will also receive the rewards of the utility perceived by others. Besides these, God is also present as the spectator and judge ^B of the movements of your souls, whom no one can escape if he acts sluggishly or flows with softness or mingles carnal and transient thoughts with His works. Therefore, having Him always before your eyes, and the utility and glory that will follow if you conduct the matter excellently, you will show all that opposes it to be frivolous and vain; and you will sanction the desired peace with your decree as most quickly and most useful.

ORATION III

These are the things which I thought would seem the greatest and most difficult impediments to this peace, which, however, I think you, upon considering them, will deem as nothing, but rather, as they say, with both hands and strentuously, you will embrace peace, omitting nothing that can be done by you: ^{C D}

^A these are the matters, since three or four of the many obstacles have been removed together; and as to those that remained against these, there was much that could be said, most of which has been left to those who wish to examine each point; for to me, in sketching out their nature, this seemed sufficient. Having reached the main head of my discourse, I shall proceed, by the grace of God, to remind you of the things that will effect this peace for you—recalling them to your memory, so to speak, and touching upon them only as I come to demonstrate them. For this guarantee is the one that remains, and it possesses greater power. I do not think that for wise men, filled with the Spirit and governed by prudence, there will be any need for longer speeches on each point, nor do I myself believe that, were I to use more words than the matter requires, I should escape being considered tiresome.

^B For I, venerable Fathers, when I contemplate it, find that our division, which began long ago and has lasted until this, our own time, is a cause of no small damage, but also of no less potential benefit; our ancestors having participated in the damage, while we, if only we wish it, will be the first to enjoy the benefit. For since we have been waging implacable wars against one another for such a long time, and each side holds a reputation for wisdom and dignity in all things, and for this reason wishes to win a victory by sheer weight of numbers, it is impossible to count how many writings we have composed against each other over time, in which we have not hesitated to overwhelm one another with the most grievous evils ^C and to demonstrate that we were suffering from a disease worse than that of all other men. Yet all these things are but calumnies arising from the necessity of the fight and from the excess of words, as is wont to happen in every conflict; by which, no doubt, the simpler folk have been convinced, extending their enmity even to matters outside these and apparent, disparaging and hating even certain customs and observances concerning religion in which they formerly took pleasure without any scrutiny. But this very thing has also come to be most profitable for the present need and a great aid toward peace. For having searched through the entire Scripture and applied their minds to the consideration ^D of it, they have found out everything that could plead for their own opinion, as much as has come into their reasonings and whatever they have brought forward from the Scriptures as an alliance, so that there is absolutely nothing left for those who come after to contribute or to discover anew, by which you might be able with less labor to become accurate judges of the truth; nor will there be a need to turn over volumes and from them pull what is relevant, or for you to devise some learned argument consistent with the writings to examine both opinions, but it will suffice to employ what has been discovered by others, and by weighing each point, to deliver a true and just verdict. I think, moreover, that God himself, seeing that the judgment regarding the matters proposed would be difficult for those who first began to dispute about them—and much more so for those who succeeded to the dispute, some of whom were troubled by the opposing voices, others by the arguments by which those [voices] are proven, and which the former always found to be more numerous and stronger—has brought [the matter] of peace even to you.

^A For neither will the ambition of the contentions take away your peaceable thoughts, nor, being troubled by the apparent difference, and suspecting the difficulties and dangers on either side, will you consider it reckless to pronounce something on these matters. So that, from such benefits of time, the condition of judges comes to you quite pure, since others have zealously assumed the toils and await, so to speak, only your vote, and it will not cause you any great labor to declare your judgment. It is necessary, therefore, that you yourselves refrain from insults and railing and arguments leading to absurdities, and from all the other things which long-standing discord has brought; and as for those who first discovered them, ^B you should not reproach them, but rather, granting them pardon out of philanthropy, make use only of the benefit of time, and for this reason alone give thanks to those men, as many as on either side underwent this struggle, nor attribute to them any more authority than is fitting for those who are parties in a dispute. For they have not become the arbiters and judges of the truth for the common race of men, as you have—on account of which the greatest honor must be given to you, and what you say must be held as valid—but each one stood for his own side, and to the best of his ability defended it, leaving the judgment about these matters to those who were to decide them as I have described.

As for the things spoken well, and all that will be useful to you for the discovery of the truth, you should both be grateful for them and confidently make use of them; but as for those things put forward out of a spirit of contention, which would have been better passed over in silence, one must utterly reject them. ^C Indeed, I think it is altogether superfluous for you to read the writings of those men, since they can bring no utility to the present business. For they do not show you a way to peace, or how it might contribute most to both sides, but they have either entirely omitted this part or demand things most difficult, being concerned throughout only with how they might carry off a victory over the other side; but for you, the goal is to seek peace and the knowledge of the truth.

Since, therefore, you are able to understand the nature of the matter in question both from what others have struggled over and from what you have yourselves grasped—having already known not only your own views, but also those of the others on both sides—you must once and for all disregard these squabbles and immediately set about those things through which alone it is possible to attain peace. ^D To me, as I consider it, these appear to be the following: first, to run back to the foundations of the faith and the principles of true theology, and to bring each opinion to these and see which one most accords with them; further, to examine how the teachers of the Church have interpreted the pronouncements of Scripture which seem to relate to this subject; and in addition to this, [to examine] what each one has theologized regarding this inquiry. And indeed, from the first thing I mentioned, I believe many difficulties arise.

^A For there are likely to be many differences regarding the principles of the faith, from which the contrariety of conclusions is inferred; and it is not proper to negate them, for we will inadvertently multiply the evil and be broken apart from one another for many reasons, among which there will be something even more grievous than the present difference. Nor is it likely that one should concede to the others, for this would be the same thing as confessing defeat, or [to yield] to one another; for in this way we shall be incompatible to the end, concluding things that seem to be mutually opposed from opposed principles, and each side transferring the other’s opinion to themselves. It is profitable, therefore, to select the principles most favored by both and to attempt to argue from these; but if it is possible to demonstrate that all other things also agree, to consider them after this; unless one thinks it superfluous, for those who have been able to agree upon the conclusion, to examine the principles from which the prior battle was joined. ^B Regarding the remaining two, I would say there is no difficulty; for I think the expositions of the teachers are an easy matter, at least for those who are particularly more skilled in accurately discerning such things, as to how many [expositions] they have assigned to the places of Scripture; but if there are some among you who understand these differently, victory must be assigned to the wiser and the majority; for this is both just and fitting. And to reconcile the opinions of the saints concerning the matters proposed, and to bring them all to one judgment, even where they seem to have differed, I consider both fitting and easy. For one must not listen if someone should want to condemn any of those whom the common [consent] of the Church has honored, or, on the grounds that his theology has been corrupted by his own [followers], refuse to accept the testimonies from him; unless one is clearly corrupted, and you both agree on this, and the books of both sides provide evidence as being free from this taint, and preserving the genuine [text] for themselves. In general, therefore, you will be led to the knowledge of the truth by these three: by the authority of Scripture, clearly, by their expositions, and by the particular opinions of the teachers, which they scattered in their own discourses when there was need to make mention of the procession of the Spirit. ^C But that you may perform these things most excellently and most easily, anticipated opinions and contentious objections must be removed, as well as the flimsy avoidances that can be easily refuted, and one must everywhere proceed with fairness; for we are not sitting here as judges of one another regarding these disputed matters so much as we are finders and advocates of the necessary consensus for the divine Scripture and its interpreters and teachers. Wherefore, if we do not handle the proposed business rightly, we shall be liable to many and various charges. ^D Since, therefore, contention can bring us further into very grievous evils, it must be cast off entirely, and we must assume as our aid both mutual benevolence toward one another and the will to strive so that all things may be brought forth with the truth. And first, indeed, [it is necessary] not to want to say everything in explicit words from Scripture

for we know that many of the heretics have also used this as a pretext; but if anything is consistent with what is thus stated, this too should be deemed worthy of equal honor. Likewise, if anything appears to be contrary to what is true and indisputable, no one should accept it in any way. Then, for things that are not clearly stated, one must take Scripture itself as teacher, from those parts where it discusses [matters] more clearly elsewhere. In addition to these points, one must attempt to resolve any apparent discrepancy by explaining it, taking into account the times, the needs, the different senses [of words], and other such things. For it is not at all credible that any inconsistency or instability exists in the teaching of the Spirit. And we are able to infer and understand how we ought to interpret such things, not only by the example of our common teachers and those [methods] they chose to use in similar situations, but also by their specific admonitions concerning this, since they wished us not to be devoid of help in this area as well. For, to pass over Cyril and Chrysostom and Augustine and the rest of the theologians—for it would be a long task to enumerate the examples of everyone who made it their care, if anything else, to demonstrate that the Scriptures are in harmony with themselves—I wish to remind you ^B of the words of the blessed Father of Nyssa; for in this way I think that both to the Scriptures that reverence which is owed by all will be rightly paid, and I shall show that the holy Fathers were pious and learned listeners to the Scriptures. His purpose, therefore, is to celebrate the blessed Stephen with praises; but among other things he recounted that which Stephen said he saw; and on that occasion he attacks the heretics quite cleverly, because they made Stephen's vision a pretext for their own empty chatter and falsehood. I shall set forth his words almost as they are. For because those who were raging against the Spirit thought that they were being supported by that vision, saying: "If the Spirit is by all means to be numbered with the Father and the Son, why was He not seen by Stephen along with the Son and the Spirit?" he refutes them from the very words by which the vision is narrated, connecting the consequences with what precedes, and he shows that the Holy Spirit is indeed numbered there, but that they, as if blinded by wickedness, pass Him over. For if by like, he says, like things are seen, and light cannot be seen except in the light, it is indeed clear that Stephen himself, having been previously illumined by the glory of the Spirit, was in a state to perceive the glory of the Father and the Son. "For Stephen," he says, "being full of the Holy Spirit, saw the glory of God and the Only-Begotten of God." For what Scripture passed over in silence in the enumeration of what was seen, this it had placed first, declaring that the elevation and that vision of the martyr was an act of the grace of the Spirit, and that the achievement was of divine power, not of human artifice. So that one must collect the truth from every side like industrious bees; for this is why we are also commanded to search the Scriptures

as truth does not easily offer itself in them, but can be found by zeal and labor. But the adversaries of the Spirit, by attending only to a part of what is said, maliciously passed over the rest, through which they could have reached the knowledge of what was sought. But the blessed Nyssen not only joins together the parts of this contemplation well, but also shows them to be in agreement with other Scriptures, both that of the Gospel: *No man hath seen God at any time* *, and that of the Apostle: *Which no man of men hath seen, nor can see* ⁕. For if, he says, the glory of the Father and of the Son could be grasped by the powers of human nature, both would be entirely false; but it is necessary that those should not be false, and that the history not be a lie. Therefore, that by which it happens that God is seen, he himself is plainly God. ^B To the Arians, who maliciously from the same contemplation infer that the Son is less because he is said to stand at the glory of the Father, he replies with equal wisdom and grace; and he brings forward the Apostle along with David, who defines this, that to sit at the right hand of the Father is a sign of equality of honor. Then he says: "Either, therefore, let those magnificent testimonies be erased, by which the sublimity of his dignity is indicated, or let this also be interpreted piously; for one teacher of each of the things said is the grace of the Spirit. But if, he says, there is one teacher, the Spirit of truth, by whom men moved by divine inspiration are led, who would suspect any discrepancy among the dogmas?" Therefore, the diversity of sitting and standing ^C must be reserved for bodies according to the common sense; but since an incorporeal nature admits nothing at all of those things from which the difference of these names is introduced, it remains that through each expression we should piously understand a state firm and immutable in the good. For he who says that God stands and he who says that he sits do not differ in the mind through any variety of words; the one dogmatizing his firmness in the good, the other his unchangeable collocation of the divine.

How, then, could one better explain how the Scriptures ought to be understood, and how to resolve the discrepancies that appear in them? Or rather, what better demonstration could there be, by which it is proved that it is the work of wicked men and the perversity of heretics to tear the Scriptures apart and wish them to be in conflict with one another; whereas it is pleasing to God and of the highest value to reduce them to harmony? ^D Since, therefore, this one man would suffice for us, pronouncing on this matter in the clearest words, and being in dignity no less than any of the teachers of the Church, who, I ask, having despised this man and all others who hold the same opinion with him, while wishing to interpret the sayings of Scripture in some other way, could seem to be doing something worthy of a sensible man? Nor indeed did each of the saints behave thus toward Scripture, both finding what is necessary for himself, and...

^A aspiring to emulate those who had already anticipated him, but all of them together rendered their judgment ^B by discovering the opinion that was in harmony with the whole of Scripture, which was to posit the Son as equal to the Father and as true God. For since the equality of the divine persons was being endangered, it might have seemed that what was said more humbly regarding Christ’s humanity was being preserved, yet for those who testify to [His] divinity, it would have resulted in that testimony having been abolished in vain. But with that [equality] remaining immovable, both of these could be preserved. They therefore chose this position over the one that was stirring up the war, and they did not desist until they had granted victory to this [position], and returned to Scripture the agreement and harmony that is derived through it. Those who succeeded them in the struggles and the zeal undertaken for piety were also the first to become emulators of the method of applying this [principle] to these matters. For they also brought the same precise diligence to the matters then brought into controversy, taking care lest Scripture be undermined in any part, and they rendered their sentence. And every synod thereafter examined with the same mind the questions that had been agitated in different ways at different times, so that from them all there might be fashioned one golden chain, as it were, and truly so, adorned with equal beauty in every way, and most excellently joined and fitted together in explaining the sense of Scripture. For even if they could not each find the good and the just by themselves, the examples of the ^C predecessors were available for those who came after. And if they were at a loss even for these, they were still able to succeed of themselves, aided by the Spirit, so that not only did each of the saints separately, but all of them together, perform everything while preserving the harmony of the Scriptures; and they did not hold the same opinion about the same things only individually, but also collectively as a group. Nor did they think that they should keep the harmony of the Scriptures in view while teaching their own people, but that a different method should be employed when fighting against adversaries; on the contrary, the former were to them a necessity for the sake of the latter. And so that no one, by attending only to what is apparent and not digging up the hidden treasure, should become a cause of error for himself, or think that he is using a light as a guide to precipices, they smoothed over even those rough parts of the path—that is, the passages which seem to assert contradictory things—and demonstrated that the same sense subsists through all of them. Thus, as if by a signal, both publicly and privately, everywhere and for every need, they were most concerned for this, as being the principal head of their ^D intention, as well as the desire to emulate those who had already attained it; indeed, all of them together reached the same judgment whenever need gathered them for the struggles on behalf of the truth. For immediately the Fathers who first gathered at Nicaea, when the equality of the Only-Begotten with the Father was in danger of being cast out, stood firm in this manner: for they did not deem it worthy to attend simply to the claims of Scripture forced by those aiming at the proof of their falsehood; but seeing one opinion warring against another, and this war even crossing over to the Scripture [itself], which seemed to favor the opposing opinions, they thought it impossible that the teacher of truth should fall into contradiction with itself; nor did they deem it worthy to prefer some of its parts to others, but they discovered the opinion which was in harmony with the whole of Scripture, namely, that the Son is equal to the Father and true God. For if the equality of the divine persons was being removed, what was said more humbly and humanly regarding Christ might have seemed to be preserved, but it would have resulted in the testimony for His divinity having been destroyed in vain. But that being kept immovable, it was possible for both of these to hold firm. They therefore preferred this [position] to the one causing the conflict, and they did not desist until they had bestowed the victory upon this, and had restored to Scripture the consequence and harmony that is formed through it. Others, welcoming the struggles and the zeal of these men for piety, were themselves the first to become followers of the method concerning these things; for to those [questions] sought at that time, and to those [who sought them] with the same accuracy and the guarding of Scripture from every side so as to be unshakeable, they gave their judgment. And every synod thereafter deliberated in the same spirit concerning matters sought in different ways at different times, so that through all of them a single chain, one might truly say golden, was completed, equal in all its good parts, and moreover most excellently fitted and joined to the judgment concerning the Scriptures. For even if they were not able to find the good and the just by themselves, yet the examples of the predecessors were provided for the followers. And if they were at a loss even for these, they were able to succeed of themselves, aided by the Spirit, so that not only each of the saints separately, but all of them together, accomplished everything with the harmony of the Scriptures; and neither did they form the same judgment regarding the same things merely as individuals, but also as a group. Nor did they think it right that while teaching their own they should behold the harmony of the Scriptures everywhere, but when struggling against opponents they should adopt some other way; on the contrary, the former were to them rather a necessity for the sake of the latter. And so that no one, by attending only to what is apparent and failing to dig up the treasure lying beneath, should become a cause of error to himself, or think he is using a light as a guide to the precipices, they removed the apparent contradictions, and demonstrated that the same mind is preserved throughout. Thus, as if by a signal, both in common and privately, and everywhere, and for every need, they were especially concerned with this, as being the head of their

labor. For they knew that the same struggle for this, for the truth, and for their own salvation, was set before them, and that with this they would accomplish the rest, but if they neglected this one thing, they considered that they would surely lose everything else.

^B These things, therefore, being so—and no one, not even one excessively contentious, would ever say that they are otherwise—it is necessary that you also be of the same mind regarding the matter proposed, and that you set aside all else for the sake of the harmony of the Scriptures. For whether it is necessary to examine what each saint did—and you, being so great in number, ought the more justly to desire and achieve this—or whether one should consider them all together, it is worth the effort for you, being bound by the same necessity after them, to wish to follow in their footsteps; and those who walk the opposite way will not escape blame. Although to them, if not to all, then certainly to the first among them, the Scriptures alone were before their eyes, which, though difficult, they were nevertheless able to bring into one agreement; yet for you, there is no small addition of assistance, but indeed it is worth almost the whole thing itself: the explanations of the teachers on the Scriptures and their other struggles, which they undertook for the refutation of those who oppose the truth and for the confirmation of their own, listening to the writings of those, naturally. Since so many bear witness to one another in this harmony, it is as ready as it is just to take them as a certain infallible guide for investigating the truth that is sought.

But of the agreement of the teachers, [we will speak] later; first, we must join the testimonies of the Scriptures. ^C For it is thus: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father is stated explicitly in the Scripture, and is confessed by all of us, and this stands no more for the Greeks than for the Latins, nor is the dispute resolved by this; for with this stated, it is neither necessary nor impossible that the Spirit also proceed from the Son. For this affirmation neither posits nor removes the other affirmation; rather, it is possible for Him to proceed from the Son, and it is possible for Him not to proceed from the Son, so far as the proposition itself is concerned. Just as if someone were to say that man is an animal, he neither posits that he must necessarily be rational, nor does he deny this. Although, if we look to the manner of the procession of the divine Persons, and to the order which the holy Fathers assigned to them, the affirmation much more posits the affirmation. For whatever the Father has, the Son must also share, unless something prevents it; ^D and that which proceeds essentially from something through something has as its cause that also through which it proceeds; just as if one were to say that heat proceeds from the sun, the statement does not posit that it proceeds also from the ray, nor does it deny it—so far, at least, as the statement itself is concerned. Yet it posits it more, if one were to consider the manner of the procession and the order that the intermediate thing has toward each; for then one would surely say that what proceeds naturally through the ray also proceeds from it as from the proximate cause, because it emanates naturally through it. However, meanwhile, while considering only the statement, we do not declare either as necessary. Thus, therefore, is it also in the case of...

^A the matter? By no means. For that it proceeds from the Son, and again that it does not proceed, is absolutely impossible. It remains, therefore, that one of these must be true. But neither of these can be taken from Scripture in plain words. Therefore, it must be concluded from certain other things clearly said therein. It is just, therefore, to consider these things: and if all the passages of Scripture support the affirmation of the Latins, this is to be embraced; but if they support the negation of the Greeks, the affirmation is to be rejected. For instance: if it is sent by the Father and the Son; if it is called the Spirit of both, not only of the Father, evidently, but in one respect of the Truth, and in another of Christ and the Son; if all that the Father has belongs also to the Son; if it receives from the Son and announces it; if the Spirit is given to the disciples by a bodily insufflation; if the Son sends it from the Father, just as the Father sends it in the name of the Son; if that which is sent from the Son glorifies Him, just as the Son, being sent from the Father, glorifies Him who sent Him: if all such things are consonant with the affirmation, it must be held as true and certain. And again, if there are any clear sayings of Scripture ^B that support the proposition asserting that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son, one must adhere to the negation. But if all of them, except for some one point, [support one view], it is not fitting to seize upon that one, perhaps depending on something else, or which could be explained by many others, and through this to confirm either opinion, while despising the others which are able to confirm the opposite opinion; and if one thinks that which seems contrary is acceptable and makes for our side, they do not deduce anything minimal. Therefore, it is not fitting to carp at these things, but rather to interpret all things in such a way that they cohere and agree among themselves, judging the fewer and more obscure points by those which are more numerous and clearer; and then at last to pronounce most safely upon the opinions, and indeed to embrace that which makes Scripture not fight against itself in any part, and to reject that which behaves otherwise, and to this end especially to apply arguments that lead to absurdities, while guarding against that one entirely ^C absurd thing: that we should not cause the passages of Scripture to collide, and follow an opinion that stirs up war and strife among the sentences of Scripture. For otherwise I judge such deductions to the impossible in the matter we are discussing to be invalid, and, to say it in one word, insidious (nor is it difficult to lead each other to inconveniences, but it is easier to dodge everything); although even if no danger followed from these, it would rightly not be fitting to admit them. For concerning those things of which it is not permitted to take pronouncements from Scripture, but we must use conjectures to deliver an opinion, to these it is not a crime to apply even deductions to the impossible, and any other argumentation which might lead us to attain that which seems more true. But now, when so many pronouncements are available to us, some of which can be sufficient for us, as they tend directly to what is sought, and from others it is permitted to infer the truth, the use of such ^D arguments is an empty and superfluous thing, and is nothing other than vain

^A demonstration. I know, indeed, even you, Greeks, to be wary of trusting in demonstrations in matters of this kind, and to hold them suspicious and full of danger; how much more, then, will you yourselves refrain from syllogisms leading to the impossible, and beware of those who employ them. And these things are thus.

Furthermore, there is no need to reconcile the pronouncements of Scripture with one another—as is most necessary—while we resolve ^B to separate the interpreters of these [Scriptures] in instances where, while shedding light upon these things, or even when arguing about such matters, they speak in opposing senses; but equal benevolence must be bestowed upon them as well, and that respect which is due to all must be denied to none. For if we choose to cherish and honor some, while considering others to be rejected, thinking they are at odds with one another; first, we shall be unable to enjoy any of that reverence with which we honor the Scriptures, inasmuch as the peace of the Scriptures, which they produced for us, is again thrown into confusion by the apparent conflict of the teachers; and the reward due to us, which it is fitting should be the manifestation of the truth, perishes on account of the calumny brought against the saints. Then a double evil confronts us: for either we shall deprive some of them of the glory of holiness, so that falsehood might justly be attributed to them and they might rightly be despised; or, on the other hand, we shall reluctantly transfer the crime of dissension from them to the Scriptures, and ascribe it to the Holy Spirit, from whom the Scriptures flowed; and we will assume that they, indeed, examined all things correctly and prudently, but that the Scripture gave them the causes for conflict. ^C But in addition to these things, we will show ourselves to be wiser and holier than them, if we indeed are able to attain the truth of the Scriptures and to concord with the other teachers, while they have attained neither, have held opinions which they should not have, and have initiated a perpetual war with their brothers. Or rather, no one would deem these things to be claimed on our behalf, nor is it right for us to think them of ourselves; but we shall show ourselves to be truly inept students of them, and that we attend to anything rather than the words of the teachers, if—when they have well instructed us on how it is fitting to approach those things spoken by the Spirit, and have confirmed that teaching with sufficient examples—we ourselves wish to use them in an entirely contrary manner. Nor, indeed, is it at all fair that they, while presenting themselves as interpreters of others, should have bestowed harmony upon them as a certain extraordinary thing, while we, on the other hand, interpreting their writings, should in some way envy them such a fortune, and deny them those good things with which they themselves enriched others. ^D But if they shall be angry with us for no other reason, they will certainly bear it most painfully that their knowledge and virtue are falsely accused by us, and this when we have been affected by the greatest benefits from them, for which we ought to render all gratitude to them. For they will not appear to be either holy or learned who have thought and written things which are foreign to the truth; indeed, they will even appear worthy to pay severe penalties on account of those who have been deceived. Moreover, neither will those teachers, to whom we defer honor, feel gratitude, rather than

justly reproach and blame us, in that they themselves—as participants in the dishonor of their brethren and thinking that, even if they themselves seem to hold the same views, yet if they are considered to have been deceived and to have dignified those held fast by error through the honors given to teachers—are deprived of their own. For no one is ignorant of how many things they have commemorated with eulogies, having honored one another both privately and publicly. For these reasons, therefore, and for many others like them—for I do not think I should wear down your ears by listing every single one—I say that you ought to honor all the teachers of the Church, and that you should not think any of them to have fallen into error, nor allow even a trace of conflict to be suspected among them; but rather, assuming that the concord so craved by you was deeply cherished by them, and having considered the matter more thoroughly, one must first lay it down as certain that they ^B held views that were both the same and consistent with one another; and then that which is pleasing to all of them, you yourself should also confidently embrace. Although this would be entirely difficult, it would be easily achievable for you through the zeal and work of the doctors themselves. But it is in fact very easy and requires no labor, but only a ready will. For if the saints seemed to be fighting among themselves, or certainly using opposing language concerning the matters proposed, it would not even then be difficult to reconcile them and to remove the conflict of words through a concurrence of meaning: for there would not be lacking to us for this purpose certain paths and excellent discoveries, which the abundance of philosophy provides, if we wished to dissolve apparent oppositions with the assistance of the truth; yet someone might shrink from this, knowing it to be a work of much business and labor. But now we all see that the writings of the saints are not such; rather, there is much tranquility in them, and they send forth to us from afar rays of concord. And if something is mixed into them that is discordant, it is on the surface and only in appearance. For either many speak differently about the same things, which can in no way disturb learned men, though it might disturb simpler ones at first glance; or they differ among themselves in speaking and silence, which is consistent for them to happen. For we ourselves, ^C indeed, feeling and speaking differently about the same things from day to day, are nonetheless united, and we do not on that account fight among ourselves, and with good reason: for since many things are considered in each matter, and one person conceives it in his mind in one way and another in another, it is necessary that these things be expressed either in various ways, or with the same words, but received in various ways, while we wish the very words to correspond to the nature of things, which is to be true; since the truth of speech follows the being of things, as all know. But if by saying things differently about the same matters we were fighting, we would also be opposing the truth itself, since the nature of things is such that it wants them to consist of many and various ways. And therefore it is not necessary to be at odds in these matters, nor to fail to express the thing, or to pass over such things in silence with the claim that one is thereby helping to reconcile peace ^D with those who truly think and write; and besides these things, many [penalties]...

^A dentur, when civil laws also take silence for assent; for no one, if he is wise, quarrels with one who agrees.

If, therefore, there is any other method handed down to us by the teachers of the Church, by which the controversies that arise through them might be resolved, and by which we might be able to reconcile them to one another where they appear to dissent, let us set aside these methods which we know and are accustomed to use among ourselves, and employ that one instead. But if it is not possible to find such a method—for they could not, since their discourse was directed to men possessing our own nature, and they seem to grant us this advice through these customary ^B methods of reconciliation which they themselves used for composing passages of Scripture, [so] that we should not seek better ones by which it would be fitting, when there is need, to prove the mutual consistency of the teachers themselves—then surely we must not abandon their peace, on which our own concord depends. Nor is it difficult to declare their consistency and agreement by the same signs as those by which we might signify our own concord. Nor is it to be thought that there is any danger at all in this matter; for to me, on the contrary, it seems that nothing safer could befall men who realize that they will have to give an account of their life as well as their opinion. For even if it were to come about that we were to stray from the truth, we would still have a sufficient excuse before God, in that we desired to have peace after long dissensions, and having laid aside controversies, to go into one opinion: since we did not trust in ourselves, we had recourse to the Scriptures and the teachers; but having seen even in them a certain discrepancy, we had considered that there could not be any trace ^C of strife and error in those who were taught by the inspiration of the Spirit; and wishing to preserve the reputation for holiness in all equally, we sat [in judgment] as conciliators rather than as their judges; and they indeed, as far as it was possible, were brought by us into one concord, and then we ourselves were also united, and we chose this way of peace as safer, as the others contain many and manifest dangers linked to them. I believe that the most merciful Judge will judge this to be fair and equitable, and will abundantly grant pardon to men who were indeed moved by a desire for the greatest things, and were also willing to incur some danger for them; but from the dangers, they recognized and chose the lightest one. For as for those to whom, even when they have arranged all things rightly and in order, the desired attainment of the truth has not occurred, the unhappy outcome should not be ascribed to their evil will, but to the difficulty of the investigation of the truth. That, therefore, it is to be understood that theologians who do not agree with the majority are in no way opposing them, but wish to signify something else that is necessary, while actually holding the same opinion as they do regarding the matters explained by them, can be gathered from many other similar

^A causes and from the use of terms, and above all from the Nyssen himself? But Cyril denies that these should be used. Does he say this out of opposition to the others, or, looking to the same purpose, has he come to a contrary opinion, such that one must conclude that the truth lies either with the others, excluding him, or with him alone? And how could it be reasonable to suppose that the others, being so many, failed to see what was necessary, or that he alone was so misled, and that too after coming after so many who had used these terms? Or, rather, are not both he and they all alike removed from any suspicion of falsehood due to their reputation for holiness? Therefore, they are not contradicting one another, and both are saying what is true; for it is likely that, by looking to different meanings of these terms, the ones used them, while the latter avoided them. For the others, surely, looked to the processions, while he looked to the Aristotelian methodology; so that the former, if one had asked them the reasons for their language and his silence, would have been on their guard, and he, when he learned them, would have been emboldened. ^B

What, moreover, is more pious, or more frequently customary in theology, than the order of the divine persons? Yet some of the saints inveigh even against this term; but neither side is lying. For it is possible to hold that there is a certain order by necessity in God, and again to reject another from there, as befitting created nature. Furthermore, Augustine and the rest of the Western group assert that the Son alone is the image of the Father, and they say that the name of "image" is proper to the hypostasis of the Son; but the teachers of the East all confidently call the Spirit the image of the Son, and indeed of the Father as well. But these latter, looking to the identity of essence, claim this, and they use the name of "image" in place of perfect similarity; whereas the former were aiming at the similarity according to species—which is indeed contained in the account of the Son, for by procession it goes forth and ^C is defined particularly—and similarity ^D of species to that from which it proceeds.

Basil also does not allow the Son of God to be called a "product" (*gennema*), although others call him so fearlessly. Shall we say, then, that he disagrees with them, or rather shall we join him with all the others? For we shall say that the former, moved by the notion of "product" which is rightly spoken of the Son, used the word, whereas he, looking to the use of the term—for Scripture took it in a bad sense, calling the Jews "products of vipers," and assigned it to the imperfect—avoided it himself and counseled all the others to avoid it. And, what is greater, one might see that the teachers themselves were affected by this very thing; so that if anyone were simply to peruse their writings and pay attention only to the appearances, he would say that they were rather playing with words. Thus, in many places and many times, they have used contradictory expressions, moved by the diversity of their meanings.

^A And what is surprising, when this same thing happens to the sacred Scriptures? Since they sometimes clearly assert that the Father is greater than the Son, and sometimes they manifestly express the equality between them; and the teachers understand these things not only regarding the double nature in Christ, but some of them allow both regarding His divine nature as well—saying He is greater by cause, but not greater by nature—and they affirm opposite things about the same subject, though each of them refers to a different aspect. And who could enumerate the things in the divine Scriptures that seem to conflict, whereas some things point to one truth and others to another, and all are truly spoken? And some are understood in a manner appropriate and fitting to the Savior's divinity, while others are understood more humbly and in a more human way? Shall we, therefore, set all these things in opposition to each other, and either believe the contradictions, or, choosing those that please us, place our faith in them, while we despise the rest as not pleasing to us? But I fear that we might sooner be condemned for having despised the latter, than receive thanks for having shown reverence toward the former; nay rather, we shall pay penalties for having done both poorly; for it does not befit us to be judges of these matters, certainly no more than to be masters. Therefore, holding all things equally for the truth, and assigning a cause for each—although even without this it would be necessary to give them our faith simply and without any examination—yet since there is no one among those things spoken concerning which, if one were to inquire, a cause could not be brought forward, it behooves us to free both ourselves from mutual conflict and them from an impossible dissension ^C which must by no means be admitted.

That it is also not difficult to show that those who have spoken on the subjects at hand are in harmony with those who have kept silence, I do not believe there is even need of reasoning to prove. For, to pass over the power of speaking and keeping silent, and to explain what is the nature of each: first, no one would claim that those who were silent did so because they condemned the dogma. For, since we do not think we should praise those who speak simply because they speak, unless they are among the best men, and those whose words must necessarily harmonize with the dogmas, how would anyone easily grant that those who were silent are condemned? For either they were silent about matters of which no one has spoken, and we shall judge many other true things as well as condemned—and thus, in so judging, we would circumscribe all truth within the sermons of the doctors, and say that nothing remains even for God Himself, which He might add to the truth of the faith by revealing it to men—or they were silent about things that have been treated by others; if, indeed, when they did not know what seemed right to others, they granted them honor, then it was not for the sake of virtue and as a reward for sound opinion, but for the sake of benevolence, and entirely at their own discretion; and, as can be seen, they were breaking the laws of such matters, not examining what each one had performed before the rewards, and how much he had contended before gaining the crowns. But if they knew, as indeed they did know, it was not right to publicly praise those who had discoursed, and to mention them with praise, and to become the unquestionable witnesses of those who took the first prizes for virtue, and to those who were unwilling to be persuaded and to those who had—

^A threatened to dishonor the Holy Scriptures. For neither is the dogma a trivial thing, such that it might be despised, nor ought one to think that they, by reason of their reverence for their brethren, would have wished to disregard an opinion that was so highly displeasing to them, and to appear as the authors of the corruption of all who came after them. But if they hoped only by keeping silent to prevail over those who spoke, and to persuade everyone to stand apart from their opinion, this would be neither the act of wise men nor of teachers; for they were looking for the impossible to happen, and indeed it has not happened; rather, the greatest and best part of the world now is with those who have spoken. And I would say that it is the work of teachers not only to speak what is right and to suppress what is evil, but also to bring these things into the open and to exhort everyone to flee from them; and this is so all the more when these very things are praised by others, and are esteemed by men who are themselves learned and capable of persuasion. Or if they thought they would achieve this at all by silence, they ought certainly to have abstained from public acclaims and to have refrained from the highest heap of honors while they were crowning with praises those who disputed about this dogma, knowing that a sermon of honor ^B would be of no more value than silence. For it was necessary to say nothing at all and to be content if the sayings of those who made mention of the dogma were contrary to the words of Holy Scripture, or if through them it happened that something of the confessed faith was manifestly overturned. But now, when there is nothing of the sort, nothing can support their silence, which indeed carries with it the appearance of assent rather than of flight and denial. But let it be assumed that they said nothing, disapproving of the opinion indeed, but considering the honor of their brethren and not wanting to stir up strife and contention, and so they wrapped the matter in silence and hid the disagreement in the depths of their hearts. But this, lacking suspicion neither of cowardice nor of wickedness, was not going to bring all others to them any more than it was going to lead them openly to withdraw. For before all things they ought to have been concerned for the truth, and there would have been nothing more pleasant than the struggles from which both they and all men might have benefited; by avoiding these to the end, they showed themselves neither confident in themselves nor willing to labor for the salvation of all. But to ascribe any of all these things to those blessed men ^C is not at all pious or just; on the contrary, we should most justly honor them with the honors of the Fathers and teachers, having arrived, by providence and wisdom and by their zeal for the truth, at all that has come to pass; and we ought to give them just thanks for all things, both for what they said and for what they chose to keep silent about, as they chose both for our sake, and very wisely at that. Therefore, they did not keep silent because perforce they condemned it, nor does silence carry with it any argument of necessity for those who use it against the word. And if anyone should say that one ought not even to assert the contrary, as if they were strengthening the glory by their silence and showing that they accepted it, this too is mostly something one might say, that if even if it was not of those who altogether precisely accepted it, it at least has the proof of something more than agreement, or of hatred and contempt; but I think that they neither altogether dishonored it nor were they strongly ^D confident in that opinion. I entreat you, O Greeks, concerning what I am about to say; for I am not declaring—

nor desiring to maintain these things, nor do I set forth my own opinion about these matters ^A that lie before us, more than about everything else upon which they have kept silent. For you see me, even in what was said previously, cautiously avoiding what might offend you as far as I could; although it is not fitting for those who examine the truth, whether they be speaking or listening, to be concerned about this.

I, therefore, as I said, believe that the saints ^B by expressing nothing openly concerning what others were saying—neither strongly supporting it, if one must say it that way, nor altogether opposing it—did not do so because this was far from their virtue and wisdom, nor because it had any reason, as if they had all agreed together to choose to bring forth such a lifeless support to a dogma confessed by many. But I think that they either were in doubt about the opinion and used silence as a safe course, or they stood in their own minds with those who had spoken, but refrained from making it public, having some other purpose in view; and each of these things is a proof of the caution and providence that befits saints. For whether they decided to pass over in silence what they were not altogether bold to speak, yet knew not to be incurable, and to avoid the suspicions derived from testifying and from pursuing the matter, they are marvelous in the caution ^C for which it is right that all should follow them without any hesitation regarding what is said by them; or whether, from seeing ahead that something not better would follow from making the opinion manifest, they thought to keep it within themselves, they are to be praised for their providence.

For if, as they have the rank of teachers and Fathers, the utility of the people subject to them was to be the end of their words, they ought not to have added that which would be harmful; but they set forth the true and common Teacher even there, who, knowing that the apostles were not yet able to bear many things worthy of knowledge, kept them back. For what is the profit of a higher truth to those who are still wavering and unsettled on lower things? That each of these has much reason, and—much more than asserting that the teachers are in conflict with one another, such that no comparison can be made between them—that it is not at all difficult to connect them, as has been said, or to see which of these might prevail, I believe to be manifest to all of its own accord. ^D For if caution in matters of this kind seems to everyone a good thing and worthy of much praise, how ought it not to be attributed to the best of men? But if it is otherwise, and all men say all things, not with equal doctrine and heavenly grace—but there is among them, even as there is of holiness and of the labors undertaken for piety, so also of wisdom, eloquence, and divine grace, through which all these things are given and c

are strengthened, there is a certain order and degree: what harm would there be, if, when one man has spoken many things with boldness, we should consider that another, having become cautious, has deemed it right to remain silent? For I, to dwell a little longer upon this discourse, think that the affairs of holy men are ordered in this way. God does not give all things to all men, but He adorns one with this gift, and honors another with a different one among His blessings; and to one He has granted one endowment, while to another He adds more. And just as the gifts themselves differ from one another, so also is each one recognized to have more or less of perfection and piety. The reason why they differ or are more numerous is indeed ^A the grace of the Giver according to a certain ineffable predestination and foreknowledge, but it is also the disposition of each of those who receive them, so that we may not, according to the opinion of Paul, be led to think that any good thing has proceeded from ourselves; and that punishments may be rendered for the actions of some, and rewards for others. Now, how the Giver of good things deals with those who are ungrateful for the gifts they have received is a matter for another discussion. But to those who make good use of them, and desire to contribute only this much from themselves, He becomes not only a benefactor, but also a guardian of that which has been given, and He Himself leads them to the goal of each one, and removes difficulties, and brings it about that they make progress in it, and He grants a second grace when this also seems good; and finally, He adds happiness as a reward, ^B not so much for what they themselves have done, as for that of which He Himself was the author so that they might be done through them: so that the willing is from us, but the accomplishing is from Him; and the running is ours, but the attaining of what we desire is of the divine clemency alone; or rather, that the straying from what is honorable is the result of our counsel only, but to draw near to the good and in a certain way to cleave to it comes from divine grace. And since the will and zeal for good things are not equal in all, nor does nature favor all in the same way; and furthermore, the moments of time do not present themselves equally to all; hence it comes about that the acquisition of these things responds differently to different people. For the nature of truth and the good is circumscribed by no limits; of which the former ^C is set before us for contemplation, and the latter for action. Hence arise the differences of the mansions, and the varied and manifold possession of the ultimate happiness. Thus, therefore, the teachers of the Church, having been graced with the gift of knowledge and speech, united virtue to it; and in this way they first showed themselves not unworthy of the gift, and then they enjoyed the knowledge of the truth, which is the sole science and the worthy end of the labors undertaken to acquire it: and it was God who provided these things, and drew them to it. But not all approached the knowledge with the same preparation, nor did they examine the truth with equal science. Therefore, all were indeed learned, but they differed among themselves in the mode of doctrine; and while all attained the truth, this one did not apprehend as much of the truth as that one. For in whatever matters each person thought it safe to speak, he spoke aptly and fittingly, yet one dared ^D more than another; and to dare some-

something ^A was a matter of each person’s wisdom, but not to stray from the truth was a matter of God’s grace, which took pity on the intention with which they were seeking, and on their eagerness and labor. And God was not one to censure those more cautious, but one who well provided for the safety of those who spoke with confidence. Therefore, we too ought to praise the caution of the former and admire the frankness of the latter; and we should consider as true what has been acknowledged by all in common, but as for that to which some have advanced further—relying on greater wisdom and the assistance of the Spirit—we should neither despise these things nor consider those who spoke them to be rash, nor should we think that those who remained silent are being deprived of anything due to the honor given to others, nor that their reputation for holiness is being diminished, even if we consider something else to be true beyond what they themselves dared to state. For if the reputation for holiness and the crowns they obtained thereby were not equal for all, although all were equally dear to God and appeared as genuine worshippers of Him, and they do not think that any injustice is done to them because they differ in certain degrees, nor do the humbler ones envy those who are higher, then surely they will not contend regarding the knowledge of the truth being equal for the sake of their holiness, nor will they be distressed if someone determines a difference in them regarding the knowledge of the truth. But if all affirm that the vision of God is the future blessedness—which is without doubt the first and purest truth—and yet there are believed to be many differences and degrees of this vision, just as there are of blessedness, how then could the light of truth not also have shone upon them differently here, as it was a precursor and symbol of that light? Or how should they not be angry with us if we say something else, as if we were making false claims about them; for while we wish to appear as respecting some, we are setting a limit to the truth of divine matters, which the spectators of it will not be able to grasp even in the life to come; and are we not also dishonoring the study of other saints, the grace bestowed upon them, and the truth they attained through these things? Besides, if we are to suspect everything that was not acknowledged in common and, as it were, by everyone with one voice, that would be a different matter—though perhaps we might well resolve these difficulties and be free from such troubles, yet we would clearly condemn some and exclude them from the assembly of teachers, to whom, however, all the councils of the Fathers have assigned the place of leaders. For those things which they added to the words of others are nearly what I have stated; to such a degree did they advance to the deepest matters through the sharpness of their intellect and the grace of the Spirit. All those things, therefore, will seem to be nonsense, and those who dare to say such things will truly be prattling. But if we admire all those other things, why is it just not to accept these alone? For this opinion ought either to prevail regarding all similar cases, or it should not be valid for any one of them. That silence, therefore, ^B is a sign not of those who are in opposition, but of those who are cautious in this matter, is, I think, clear from what has been said, and that they are not overly confident in this regard. The writings of the saints also testify ^D to my argument.

^A For it is seen that some are more confident than others, according to the measure of knowledge or grace each possessed; nor do the Latins differ from the Greeks in this respect any more than the Greeks differ among themselves. But it is neither impossible, nor does it seem less consistent with their position, to assert that while these men, without any hesitation, held the same views as the others, they nevertheless feared that an open confession of the matter might be dangerous for the simpler folk. For who, in order that no one might suffer any harm from what was said, would not openly oppose those who spoke, and forbid the belief in and the expression of things which, for others, were even as familiar as the very act of breathing? Yet, while it was most certain to them that those things were true, why should they not be considered to have preferred, for this very reason, to remain silent? For it was clearly milder to have kept silent than to have appeared to contradict.

Perhaps, indeed, to those who heard that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and who did not fully grasp the saying, many other absurd ideas came to mind, and these very things into which they lead the Latins—those who have published long volumes against them—and which they say follow necessarily from the dogma: such as, for instance, imagining two principles, and that the Spirit is inferior to the other divine persons, and the rest of this kind. For if the Latins, when answering these points and showing that they neither think in such a way nor that those absurdities necessarily follow, have not even to this day been able to persuade the Greeks, but rather the latter believe absolutely anything rather than that the Latin view is free from these inconveniences—so differently do they feel about the addition than they who assert it desire—what do we imagine men would have done, if all the saints had affirmed that the Spirit is from the Son, and had simply, as is their custom, brought forward this dogma, without adding any of those things that have now been invented by the Latins for the sake of defending the dogma and escaping these inconveniences? For I believe that they would have thought these absurdities followed; but with no one contradicting, and no one warning them to beware of those things, they would have embraced the dogma as one which in itself brought forward no such thing ^B and they would have easily assented to these inconveniences as if they were true. It is natural to suppose that the doctors foresaw all these things, and therefore abstained from bringing forward the expression, and remained silent about what could have caused much harm.

For since they, being greatly solicitous for the security of their disciples, exhort them everywhere ^C to follow only the words of Scripture and to investigate nothing else curiously—on account of which they also explain many passages of Scripture contrary to what all, and even they themselves, might think, and do not blush to appear as plain interpreters of such sentences, not penetrating into the depths, for the sole purpose of being able to persuade others to keep themselves within bounds and avoid the dangers of rashness—what wonder is it if, following these thoughts, they also kept silent about these very things, just as one might find them to have kept silent about many other things which could have been said without danger? For it was fitting not only to warn in words what ought to be done, but also to make it manifest by deed, and to provide themselves as an example of the caution to be exercised. For they knew indeed that this ^D is the mark of true teachers. But since also the truth [is to be sought] from the wiser and...

concealed by those who are wiser—otherwise, while they wished to consult the interests of the weaker, they would have been unjust to those who were better prepared, by abandoning the imperfect and not wishing to provide them too with the word of doctrine—in another way they proposed the true opinion to them [as well], which would be sufficient for the wise. Just as they themselves did not seek the truth in the Scriptures from the literal words alone, but considered it sufficient for the discovery thereof that what they found possessed equal power to the things expressly stated, and what agreed with the accepted concepts concerning divine things. ^B The other teachers also chose this path in the things they taught. Let no one consider, then, that they spoke this opinion while it was silenced for others, but rather that they too kept to themselves many things which they were able to say; things which perhaps would have brought a greater danger to more people, in proportion as a deeper mind is needed for the things spoken by them, and an even much sharper one for the things passed over in silence. But by another certain device they made those who were able to follow what they thought participants in their own mind; and this is something one can perceive if he reads their books more attentively. ^C That what is fair has happened to each of the teachers in those whom they were instructing, this, having been provided long before by the Spirit of truth in His whole Church, is not discordant with a certain admirable Providence that surpasses all power of speech. For He provided for both orders of men, forming teachers appropriate to them: for the more imperfect, He set over them those who used caution, but to those endowed with a more eminent intellect, He permitted those who spoke more confidently. And He teaches the necessary truth equally through all, by which faith imbues those who are to be saved; but if anyone is more theoretical and above the suspicion of danger, He leads him to the initiations of greater things, and satisfies his desire through those He specially prepared as ministers for these things. Wherefore, if we shall praise some of the saints and blame others for their silence or their speaking, and approve some while rejecting others as useless to us, ^D let it be permitted to dare the same things against the Spirit Himself, not only because He was the author—why some were silent, and others spoke, whereby it happens that necessarily He Himself shares in the honors and the insults—but also because the use of individuals and of their works, these things He Himself kept silent, but those things He expressed through the teachers into whom He infused the word of truth. But if He is one, and is believed to be the Spirit of truth, and benefits men equally in all things, then the affairs of the teachers must not be thought to be otherwise. But that I may not be tiresome to you by saying much, I return to where I began these words. If indeed the teachers of the Church were seen to be openly contradicting one another, and divided into two parts—those indeed denying that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and those affirming it in the way they do now—it would be necessary, for those who judge the contradiction and the battle to be in the words, while supposing these men to be in fact most profoundly united in their concepts, to attempt, in the phraseology

^A of both parties—or rather, by selecting from all [the options] that which would most likely unite us—to bring these matters to a conclusion; for there were many ways in which this could be achieved. But to err in this, to grieve because one cannot attain the mind of the doctors, yet to embrace both sides simply ^B and to rehearse our own views, is in this way to be reconciled both to the doctors and to ourselves. Not only the doctors, but we ourselves should not contradict one another in discourse, even if in the Symbol of faith some confess the affirmation, and others the negation; which, had it happened, would have seemed most grievous, and this the greatest of differences. Yet, even so, it would not have been difficult for those who are divided in this way to agree in one meaning, since the subject matter itself demands it, and the facts would very easily support it. For I suppose—and let no one be angry with me, for I do not have a contentious spirit regarding those things held in common by all of you, nor do I wish to change ^C my own opinion, but rather, I say these things by way of counsel, and testing my own judgment, and wishing, if anything else, that we might also be at peace, and that the honor of all the doctors might be preserved intact—I suppose, I say, that these propositions, which appear to contradict, can both be taken in a good sense, and again neither of them in a good sense, so that the defenders of each, if they avoid the combined difficulties, might be able to save the truth and agree among themselves. And I am ready to provide the proofs for this, whenever you wish; for I do not believe that the present discussion is the place for that inquiry, and you yourselves are not unaware of what would be said, since you have a much better knowledge of such matters than I. It would therefore be possible ^D for us also to avoid contentions by resolving the battle of words through, so to speak, the agreement of concepts. But as it is, holy and learned men, and indeed many, proclaim the affirmation as though by the voice of a herald—so firmly did they believe it to be true—while no one has stated the negation, but all pass it over in silence, yet they speak in such a way that they appear to favor both the negation and the affirmation. Why, then, they were silent can be attributed to their nature, which required caution, or the custom observed in speaking, which the perpetual imitation of their predecessors had transmitted to their successors; from which it has come about that they were silent not only on this point, but also regarding many things that were acknowledged—the older ones because they were not explicitly contained in Scripture, and those who came after them because they wished to be imitators of their caution. It is permitted, therefore, to think that these were also causes of the silence; and also, perhaps, the fear of some danger, into which they thought the simpler ones would fall if the truth had been openly signified, and which they, in their concern for the simple, wished to protect; but that silence, while opposing those who speak and knowing the falsehood in their opinion, was shown to have no logic. But if someone also [turns to] the negation

posit a negation, he seems to give witness to Scripture and to the other party of the doctors, whose works he reads, rather than clearly to deny; although, even if a negation were openly posited, it could without difficulty be reconciled with those who affirm, just as many others might have done, had they favored the negation.

Since these things are so, we shall [D omitted in source text, likely 517D] repeat our complaints in vain, rending and confounding things that have been woven together, contrary to the proverb; and we shall neglect a reconciliation that is so easy, just as if we were content to engage in mutual wars, and that over matters of this kind, for the sake of honor; and we shall disjoin from common concord the doctors whom the matters themselves conjoin before their own words do. But just as it is not possible for us to be truly at peace unless the matters in dispute are resolved by judgment and one thing is defined that pleases all; so neither can we attain to the truth unless the consensus of the saints leads us to it. Our entire endeavor, furthermore, is occupied with these two things. But by God, I beseech you, what cause will you bring forward, why you do not equally admit all the doctors, when they seek this of you in the common judgment? For I do not think that those who have been neglected will pass over such a great injury in silence; nay, but those who seem to be honored will take this very thing as heavily and no less than those others. Will you hold up the authority of those who were silent? But others certainly are ^B not inferior to them in holiness, and some are even far superior in erudition. Will you produce a multitude, you say? But they win in this respect as well. If you speak of the honors bestowed by councils, they will show an even greater heap of honors for themselves. Will you say that it seems hard to you to receive an opinion that is not approved by all? But this is not consistent with reason: for when no one contradicts with open words, it is sufficient that the opinion be supported by two witnesses, even though they possess such an abundance of patrons. Otherwise, let us pass over even the miracle of Lazarus and the colloquy held with the Samaritan woman, because he who narrates these things does not have all the evangelists as attestants. Then other men will object to us, and with right good reason: Why have you prescribed some other mode for disputes in courts of law? For in those you never preferred silence to speech for the giving of testimony; nay, rather, if silence is conjoined with speech, you have assigned it the use of speech; and having brought forward three suitable witnesses concerning the matters that are in controversy, you have caused no more trouble for yourselves or for those by whom they were produced, without seeking that all men be brought as witnesses. Perhaps you will object to the axioms of other doctors, from which something contrary to the affirmation of those who have spoken on this dogma is gathered. But they will respond ^C that this is neither just nor in accordance with the laws, that things which are ambiguous should be followed while things that are manifest are neglected; for, on the contrary, from the most manifest things

^A they were altogether admitting those who spoke in favor of the affirmation; not only this, but also many other passages from the teachers did those who preside over your decision employ; whence, from such things, it is not proper to defer to the silence of others rather than to our arguments. Moreover, you will not take refuge in ignorance, as you yourselves know all these things, and many others bear witness to you, and, besides, the very failure to wish [to understand them] is a restraint. But if, indeed, reproaches were to be put forward by other saints—to whom we are supposedly willing to pay heed—and if [men should] claim that it is just to accuse the brothers, but that we are clearly being treated unjustly, and they themselves, under the pretext of honor, claim to have been wronged and cast out along with them, having passed over the facts; for they will not, I think, be at variance with one another and vote contraries concerning us. What refuge, then, will remain for us? And what is greater, when the Lord demands from us peace and the knowledge of the truth—of which the one ought to have been kept as a kind of inheritance, and the other ought to have been carried away from the life here, as it is through it alone that one will be saved—what, out of all things, could we say without appearing also more shameless and deserving of worse punishments? ^B For we shall neither allege the obscurity of the Scriptures, for which He has seated so many interpreters for us, nor shall we call the teachers as our advocates, who have already long ago condemned us. And if they were to come forward, some of them remaining silent again, and others openly testifying to the contrary, they will not even allow the judge to spend much time deliberating about the votes. But we shall not even dare to say that we ourselves understand the things of the Scriptures better than all of them; nor shall we insist that we desired peace, but could not attain it—for with what face could we say this, when we have even wished to set the teachers at variance with one another, whose concord ought to have been the resolution of the scandals among us? Indeed, it will be better to be silent when we have nothing to bring forward in our defense; instead of an admission of the crimes, our silence will be sufficient for the judge. In this way, for us to divide the teachers of the Church by our opinions, or [to suggest that they were] warring with one another, or disagreeing bitterly, brings inescapable ^C blame from every quarter; but to unite them, as has been said before, is sufficient for any turn of fortune. For if, even so, the things of the truth should not fall to us, there will be many things that will rightly act to secure forgiveness; and by the awe which, joined to many good things, we shall show toward the teachers, we shall purchase release from the responsibilities of the world beyond. But it is not among the possibilities to fall short of the truth while we are under the peace of the teachers, no more than it is possible for them to suffer this under the guidance of the Spirit. This, therefore, is the path that must be chosen, as it is the true one, and ready, and, in addition to these, full of safety. But if there is any other way than that which I have described, one more excellent, we are not masters of it, ^D and for this reason we shall not be held accountable for the truth, yet there will be many things for which we might justly deserve pardon; and the reverence which we use towards the teachers, since it brings with it the examination of many good things, will also accomplish this, that we have no account to render to the future Judge. But it is impossible that, with peace confirmed among the teachers, we should wander from the truth; just as it is equally impossible that they should have been deluded, since they had the Spirit as their leader. This path, therefore, must be used, which is true and direct, and also in every respect most safe. But if there is another way more excellent than the one I have described, it is my prayer that I might be able to...

^A find it—though I would not myself claim that this is the only best way of all. But I do say that it is necessary to show them in agreement and consistent through everything, and that this must be laid down as the foundation of our unity, for without this, that unity will not be established well or indeed at all. It is for you to discover the way in which this might be done. For what I have said seems to point to this, and I present it not so much as a method I am teaching, but rather as an image and model for the reconciliation of the doctors. If, however, I held these same views sincerely in my own mind, and judged this method to be the most advantageous, there would be nothing to wonder at. For let it be permitted both to me and to each of the others to think whatever we might about these matters, until you choose the better things, and those which without doubt are destined to hold sway.

This connection must be attributed ^B not only to the saints but also to the authority of Scripture, as I said before; and all the more so when we have need of those things for the present business. For I would say that we have the least need of the axioms of Scripture, since the opinions of the doctors who have well examined it and derived their statements from it are sufficient for us; so that if anyone were to ask them to set forth proofs for their words, they would immediately have recourse to Scripture—which many are often seen to do even without anyone demanding it. But if at any time it should be necessary to use that, we must not do so focusing more on the conclusion than on reconciling the doctors; in the meantime, we must render to Scripture the honor that comes from such agreement, without which it will profit neither those who honor it nor those who cite it. And in general, lest from the matters in which we are about to make peace, we should fall away into the contentions ^C that are natural to men—lest we somehow wander from these [subjects] and carry the opinion of contradiction as far away as possible—we must first establish that they agree, and do this with wisdom and with every care, that we might not unwittingly, instead of joining to one another the things of Scripture and of the doctors, divide both of them from the truth in common, and divide ourselves away along with them.

These things, venerable Fathers, I judge will suffice you for the peace that is sought in place of all else; and if there are many other useful things besides these to be pondered, yet these seem to be like a beginning and a head for them. Having started from here, it is likely that you—needing one another—will add these things [to the discussion] and bring the requested task to completion; for without these, none of the better outcomes could happen. Therefore, having reminded you of these things alone, that I might both fulfill my promises ^D and demonstrate my great desire for what is honorable, I deem that I have already said more than enough. I add, however, one thing: I beseech you, if God, looking upon us graciously, should grant us the true understanding of the agreement between Scripture and the doctors, which would immediately be our own union and that of the entire Church, that you would be willing to make it manifest, whatever it may be, in the Symbol of faith, so that you might be able to express it also in outer words

^A and to be united through all things. But if not, it would be a matter of prayer to be joined at least in intention; for this, even if it does not contain the precision of the faith, will at least contain the peace of the teachers toward one another and our thinking of what is true. But if you also add something else to the Symbol, which—being commonly acknowledged by all the saints—assists the affirmation and does not introduce a negation, and which those saints might seem to have used for the things they kept silent about, while others use it as having the same power as those things they did speak—this will be a form of union to be numbered in the third place: wherefore, this also will not be foreign to the consensus of the doctors nor to our discourses ^B concerning it. So that, from every side, the harmony of the Scripture and the doctors may remain with us.

But since I have decided to keep silent, for I fear that the length of my words might weary you, I wish to enumerate the main points of my advice and to recall them to your memory. I have given the counsel that you should not even admit into your mind that apparent unity which some are considering as likely to be useful to the present state of affairs, but that you should realize a true union and conjunction of opinions, which I have said consists in this: that you should all think the same about the debated points, and express this also in the Symbol of faith, either by adding or subtracting something, whichever the grace of God may suggest. In addition to these points, I have shown that the difficulties by which some were troubled, ^C and because of which they were ready to despair of this peace, are entirely weak, and could be anything other than a rightful impediment to you. Then, I have briefly set forth through what means peace must be fashioned—not insisting, but covering a great deal—which, to say it in a word, is nothing other than the harmony of the Holy Scriptures and the doctors of the Church. I have exhorted you to all these things, if not with the due reverence, then at least with as much as can be employed in such discourses. These things, indeed, have been mine: in which, if they have been well said, I acknowledge the benefit of fortune more than the strength of knowledge or eloquence; but if badly, I see that they deserve much pardon, because for the sake of what is good and honest I have gladly undertaken this labor. It remains that you do not now act sluggishly, but that you either carry out these very things, if I seem to be saying anything, or certainly seek better ones, having God as your guide for both.

MORNING, MIDDAY, AND EVENING PRAYER OF GEORGE SCHOLARIUS TO OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST

^A Master Lord Jesus Christ, true God, King on high; all-holy, all-good, compassionate, eternal Word of the beginningless God and Father, Artificer of all creation, and Renovator of human nature through your supreme love for mankind, through which you partook of flesh and blood with us, and underwent that ineffable and supernatural economy immaculately. If the holy and supercelestial powers never have had, nor shall have, enough, but with ceaseless intelligible voices praise the greatness and the splendor of your Divinity, why should we, your humble and earthly servants, bought with your precious blood, be satisfied with praising you in mind and mouth? And if your love for mankind and your grace acts in us insatiably from morning until evening, and from evening until the next morning, why do we not give thanks to you, our Benefactor, in designated intervals? But spare us, Christ, good Judge, for the sequence of this temporal life, and the necessities of nature, and this order in which you have willed us to be set, divide us and do not allow us to attend to you ceaselessly, and to praise you with the tongue without silence. And for this ^B reason, we bring to you our morning, midday, and evening worship as a kind of first-fruits of our daily thoughts and words.

I adore you, therefore, my Creator and Father, together with your beginningless Father and your life-creating and all-holy Spirit. I bend the knee of my heart and body with fear and trembling before you, my omnipotent and awesome and all-good Master; I give thanks for all that you have done and are doing for me. With your hand you fashioned me, with your breath you gave me life; with your providence you nurtured me; by your hand you made known the true faith; you have instructed me in the mysteries of your holy Church. You have adorned me also with these temporal goods of human well-being; you have delivered me from dangers, raised me up from illnesses; you have invisibly led me toward what is profitable; you govern and cherish me as your fledgling, as the handiwork of your love.

But why do I even dare to recount your benefits? They are an inexhaustible sea, an incomprehensible depth, an invisible ^D height. I do not arrive at giving thanks for those things that have already occurred, before a series of new benefits overtakes me. And this very thing, being able to give thanks, how great a gift is it? Oh, my lowliness; oh, your goodness…

that what I alone have to offer you in place of all else—thanksgiving and praise—this too is your own gift. Oh, the superabundance of your love, that you have poured out upon me the entire wealth of your good things! I know of only one genuine thanksgiving: the fulfillment of your will. But if the spirit is prompt, the flesh is weak. You, Lord, said this; but the promptness of the spirit is extinguished by the thoughts of the fleeting moment. ^B But you, Lord, are alone powerful both to kindle the will and to strengthen the flesh. Thus I shall give thanks legitimately, if my will is joined together with your will, and if my whole heart is glued to your love. And thus, Christ the King, Son of the love of God, and God most good, count me worthy to give thanks to you. But what shall I say to you regarding this day? Or what regarding tomorrow? What good can I desire for myself that you do not desire even before I do? And who sees my good more than you? You alone know and truly will my good, which you alone are capable of performing. And so, even while I am silent, you shall bring about my good. But if there is also need of prayer to your goodness, the mystery of your dispensation intercedes for me, as does the cross that received you fixed upon it, and the most holy, most immaculate Virgin and your Mother, who served the mystery in a supernatural way, and those who have become genuine zealots of your heavenly discipline and way of life even unto death.

With so many interceding for me, ^C you shall open your hand today, as is your custom, and you will fill me with good will, and your right hand shall uphold me. But if my sins impede the fountain of your love for mankind, nevertheless wipe them out, overlook, spare; let them be sent into the depth of forgetfulness. It is your constant work, Christ the King, to grant the remission of sins, for the mind of us men runs swifter than light, and the word is slippery, and works are earthy and of this dark density; and for this reason, no flesh will boast before you. But you alone, Lord, being pure and sinless, are alone able to forgive our sins. Protect, my sweetest Jesus, the long life of pious Christians—in happiness and without pain—and especially the genuine servants of your goodness. And after the present life, ^D which you will determine by measures and boundaries such as you yourself know, bring them into that eternal life and kingdom, not set free by our own worthiness, but by your goodness. May it be so, Lord, merciful King, for to you is fitting all glory, honor, and adoration, and to your unoriginate Father, with whom, in the unity of the Holy Spirit, you live and reign through all ages of ages. Amen.

529 ET MARCI EPHESI TESTIMONIA MUTUA 530

EUSEBIUS RENAUDOT'S NOTICE

It seemed worthwhile to add to the previous dissertation these fragments, which the Royal Codex, no. 2963, provided to us, since they greatly illustrate the history of Gennadius and resolve the question—unless we are greatly mistaken—regarding whether there was one Gennadius or several; and furthermore, because we do not think they exist elsewhere. They are the words of Mark of Ephesus concerning Scholarius, spoken to him in the presence of many Greeks distinguished by their rank and far removed from "Latinism," by which he entrusts to him the care of defending the Church—the very one which, even after the Union of Florence had taken place, was most alien to the communion of the Latins. Subjoined to these is the Response of Scholarius, in which he promises that, in the place of Mark of Ephesus, he will fight for the ancestral faith even to the final dangers of death. These cannot fit anyone other than Gennadius, namely the man who was named patriarch after the fall of Constantinople; for the praises of outstanding learning and eloquence cannot fall upon any other, nor the dignity of the ^A *archontes* [lord/official], that is, a leading man such as Scholarius was, being a judge in the imperial court. That he also suffered something human in the matter of the faith, and did not manifestly defend the views of the Greeks, identifies him sufficiently; and to this point pertains the letter which Emericus Bigotius communicated to Allatius, and which another Royal codex presents, in which Mark of Ephesus strongly rebukes Scholarius 1 for not rejecting the means and compromises by which a union could be achieved, but rather approving them. For that Scholarius came to Florence with that intention is testified not only by his letter to Ambrose the Camaldulensian and the Greek Acts, but by Syropulus himself, when he reports the formula drafted by him, according to which the controversy concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit might be settled. From the words of Gennadius, by which he replied to Mark and promised all his effort to the defense of the Greek Church, it is sufficiently apparent that no one was less addicted to the Latins than he who kept the faith given to his friend most accurately. Moreover, since many of the works of Gennadius, or Scholarius, are written in the same codex—which is demonstrated to be his by the most certain testimonies of history, and which cannot be attributed to any other than him who sailed with John Palaiologos to Italy—and since some of them exist in our Brundusium codex, which presents the Homily on the Eucharist, no dispute can be raised concerning its authenticity, except by supreme slander. To these we add the final words of Mark of Ephesus, full of hatred and venom against the Latins and the Union renewed through the work of Cardinal Isidore, the apostolic legate, to which Patriarch Gregory had consented and to which Gennadius had opposed himself above others, as Ducas accurately wrote. They are written in the aforementioned Royal codex, not by the same hand as the codex itself, but by another—a learned hand indeed, but inelegant, as is often the case with learned men. There follows an Excerpt from a letter of Gennadius to Maximus Sophianus and the ascetics of Mount Sinai, in which he forbids the Eucharist to be given to Latins who come for the sake of religion, but permits the *antidoron*, or blessed bread, to be given; from which it is clear how little he agreed with the Roman Church.

TO SCHOLARIUS OF EPHESUS. THE DYING WORDS OF MARK OF EPHESUS TO GEORGIUS SCHOLARIUS.

I say and declare concerning the *archon* Scholarius, that I have known him from his youth, and I hold a disposition and love toward him, and I cherish him as my own son and friend:

and whatever else one might think of that is a stimulus to relationship and love. Having conversed with him up to the time of my death, which I feel is imminent, I have the most exact perception of what manner of prudence, wisdom, and power of speech he possesses. And from these things I believe that he alone among those who survive at this time is able to offer a helping hand to the right faith, which is so greatly tossed by the violence of those who have corrupted the accuracy of its dogmas, so that with the help of God he may straighten up the Church and strengthen Orthodoxy, provided only that he himself is not unwilling to act—for the work—and to hide his lamp under a modius. But I trust that he will not be so disposed, nor will he fail his own conscience to such a degree that, seeing the Church tossed by various storms and the ^B faith wavering—I speak humanly—and knowing that it is in his power to help it, he would not work for its defense with all zeal and readiness. For, being a wise man, he is in no way ignorant that the subversion of the Catholic faith is a common ruin for all things. Perhaps, in the past, judging the help of certain others—and especially that rendered by me—to be sufficient, he did not appear to be clearly defending the truth, perhaps hindered by certain human considerations. But I myself previously contributed nothing, or very little indeed, to the defense of the faith, since neither my strength nor my zeal, as the matter demanded, were sufficient. And now I am already reduced to nothing, and what could be more nothing than what is nothing? If, therefore, from those things ^C which I designed, it was perhaps commonly thought that we could accomplish something in this matter, everyone ought to understand from those same things what others might be able to do, and what he himself might be able to undertake. But now, since I must soon depart from here, I see no other person who, in the nature of things, is able to fulfill my role in defense of the Church, the faith, and the dogmas of Orthodoxy. Therefore, I ask him that, as the time now not only invites but even urges, he uncover the spark of piety hidden within himself and fight for the Church and for the sound dogmas, so that what I was not able to accomplish myself, he may bring to completion with the help ^D of God. For he can do this by the grace of God, from his natural prudence and his power of speech, if only he be willing to use these when the matter demands it. And he surely owes this to God and to the faith, for which he will fight faithfully and sincerely. I truly entrust to him this labor of fighting, that he may be in my place a defender of the Church, an interpreter of sound doctrine, and a champion of the orthodox dogmas and of the truth, trusting in the help of God and in the truth itself, for the sake of which these struggles are undertaken, as one who shares with the holy Doctors, the God-bearing Fathers, and the great theologians, expecting rewards from the righteous Judge, who proclaims as victors all who struggle for piety. Thus he also ought, as much as in him lies, to apply all zeal toward the establishing of the right dogmas of the Church, as one who will render an account for them in the hour of judgment, and to me who have entrusted these things to him, trusting that he will perhaps bear fruit.

my words more than a hundredfold, as if they were cast into good ground. Regarding this, I would like him to respond to me, that I may receive full assurance as I depart from the present life, and not pass away in anguish as one who has despaired of the reformation of the Church. ^A

THE RESPONSE OF SCHOLARIUS

I, my holy master, first of all, give thanks to your great holiness for the praises which you have bestowed upon me, in that, desiring to favor me, you have testified to me things which I do not possess ^B and know not that I possess. But this proceeds from the extreme kindness, virtue, and wisdom of your great holiness, which I myself, knowing and admiring from the beginning, have never ceased until now to honor, rendering to your great holiness whatever is owed to a father, teacher, and guide, using your judgment as a rule, and simply agreeing with those things regarding the accurate exposition of dogmas and the correctness of language which you yourself would approve. And as for whatever was not according to your opinion, turning away from these without doubt, ^C I have never failed to maintain the rank of a son and pupil toward your great holiness, calling your great holiness as my witness to these things. You know how I always approached you in this way, and, revealing the deeper things of my own mind, I placed such pledges before you. And regarding the fact that in some seasons I did not openly emerge for the struggles for which your great holiness was fighting, but passed over those matters in silence, no one knows the reasons better than your great holiness, since those things which I had in my mind at that time, I disclosed confidently to you, and having made my excuse, I received pardon from you. But now, by the help of God, I have disregarded all these things, and have set myself up as a manifest and ^D public defender of the truth, so as to proclaim consistently the dogmas of my fathers and the accuracy of orthodoxy according to the goal of your great holiness. I say these things not as having seen that your great holiness is departing from here; for we have not yet cast away our final hopes; indeed, we trust that by God’s grace you will recover from this sickness and be with us, and together we will carry out all these things. But if, by the judgments known to God, it happens that you depart from here to the place of rest which you have prepared for yourself, I affirm most certainly before God and the holy angels who now invisibly assist us, and the most holy men who stand here, that I will be in your place and, as if with your own mouth, whatever you used to approve and teach, I will embrace and defend, and I will be in no way among those who...

[...continuing the translation of the preceding page:]

^A ...not to overlook, but to contend for them even to the last perils of blood and death. And although my own experience and strength in these matters are altogether meager, I trust nonetheless that your great holiness will compensate for my shortcomings, being preserved by your most perfect expertise in handling such affairs, and, if you are to depart, by your most acceptable prayers to God.

APOLOGY OF THE MOST HOLY METROPOLITAN OF EPHESUS, LORD MARK EUGENICUS,

^B I wish to explain my opinion more fully, if ever, now that I am approaching my end, so that I may be consistent with myself from beginning to end, and so that it might not seem to some that I said one thing while hiding another in my mind, which is something that would likely be detected at this, the hour of my dissolution. I speak of the Patriarch, lest perhaps under the pretext of an appearance of honor towards the funeral of this humble body of mine, or towards my memorial services, the thought might occur to him to send some of his bishops, or his clergy, or generally any of those who communicate with him, to join in the prayers or in conducting the funeral with the priests of our side, and thereby someone might think that I in any way, even in secret, admit his communion. ^C And so that my silence may not provide an occasion for suspecting some compromise to those who do not know my purpose fully and deeply, I declare and testify before the many distinguished men present that I neither accept nor receive his communion or that of those who follow him, absolutely and entirely, neither while I am alive nor after my death; just as I do not accept the Union that has been brought about, nor the Latin dogmas which he and those who adhere to him have accepted, for the sake of defending which he procured this primacy for himself, to the subversion of the right dogmas of the Church. For I hold most certainly that as much as I stand far from him and his kind, so much the more I draw near to God ^D and to all the faithful and the holy Fathers; and just as I separate myself from them, so do I unite myself to the truth and to the holy Fathers, the theologians of the Church; just as, conversely, I am convinced that those who agree with him stand far removed from the truth and from the blessed teachers of the Church. And for this reason I say

Just as I have been separated from them during my entire life, so do I declare that it shall be in the time of my departure and even after my death; and, adjuring them, I command that none of them shall approach my funeral or the offices of my obsequies, nor shall any other person from that side attempt to insert himself with our own people, either to conduct the funeral or to celebrate the Liturgy together. For this would be to join things which cannot be joined. For it is necessary that those people be entirely separated from us, until God grants the glorious reformation and peace of His Church. ^A

FROM THE EPISTLE OF GENNADIUS TO LORD MAXIMUS, CALLED SOPHIANUS IN THE WORLD, AND TO ALL THE MOST HOLY HIEROMONKS AND MONKS ASCETICIZING IN THE HOLY MONASTERY OF SINAI

The monks also asked: Is it permitted for you to give the most holy communion to the Armenians or Latins who come to worship? But we say that you should give them the ^B *antidoron*, or blessed bread; for they are Christians, and for this reason they come from such great distances to the veneration of the Lord’s Sepulchre. Furthermore, if they are divided from us by schism on account of certain questions concerning the faith, and are heterodox, yet as Christians they seek sanctification from us with faith and piety, and we ought to give it. For that saying, "Do not give what is holy to dogs," and what follows, is understood concerning the infidels, namely Jews and Saracens, Gentiles, Manichaeans, and others who simulate Christianity while not being Christians. Hence it follows: "lest having turned, they trample them underfoot and attack us." Therefore, those who trample them underfoot are dogs and swine. But those who seek the holy things with faith and piety, and receive them, are not such. Hear also the Lord saying that "He who is not against us is for us," and, "Him who comes to me I will not cast out." Only do not give the great mystery of communion to them. ^C If, however, any of them wishes to remain there, or falls into illness, he shall first abjure his ancestral opinion and shall confess that which the Catholic Church teaches, and then you shall deem him worthy of such communion; for this is the custom of the Catholic Church of the Christians.

For this reason, the most holy Patriarchs, whenever they celebrated the Liturgy on feast days, the Armenians and... ^D

and the Latins with great modesty to the Liturgy, nor did they repel them; nay, even when they were departing with the orthodox, and worshipping, and kissing the patriarchal hand, ^A they gave them a blessing and the *antidoron*: for as disciples of Christ, they did not cast out those who came to Him. It is sufficient, therefore, that you do not seek nor receive holy communion from them, because they are heterodox and separated. But if they seek that communion from you, you ought not, as we have said, to repel them.

BY THE MOST WISE GENNADIUS SCHOLARIUS, PATRIARCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE, TO THE MOST HONORABLE AND HOLY AMONG MONKS, JOSEPH OF THESSALONICA, ON PREDESTINATION.

EPISTLE OF THE MOST WISE GENNADIUS SCHOLARIUS, PATRIARCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE, TO THE ILLUSTRIOUS AND VENERABLE MONK OF THESSALONICA, THE NOBLE JOSEPH, ON PREDESTINATION.

(Edited in Greek by Hoeschelius, Augsburg, 1606, in 4°; in Latin by Fed. Morellus, Paris, 1618, in 12.)

Decumbent in bed, I received your letter; and now, having at length ^B somewhat recovered from my sickness, I had determined to—[Note: The Greek text begins here]—lying in bed, I received your letter, and now, ^B lately having somewhat recovered from the disease, I had wished indeed to—in the other writings, I was very much occupied, yet I did not wish to fail, not even tacitly, the entreaty of a man so fond of virtue and fond of learning. MORELLUS.

^A Indeed, I had nothing to answer regarding the things you were asking about; instead, by a familiar and customary style of writing, I sought to discharge the debt of benevolence and satisfy you. For the opportune time for our discussions has passed, or rather, the occasion for any good thing—when it is better in every matter to sit in some corner, to mourn in silence the extreme deformity of our race, and to pray for an escape from such a life, whenever the Divine grants its consent. But the reverence I hold for the great Basil compelled me to reply. Therefore, to him you may attribute the thanks for this apology, not to us.

For the great doctor of the Church says somewhere, “Deaths are brought on once the terms of life are completed, which the just judgment of God has fixed for each one, looking from afar at what is advantageous for us.” ^B Yet, most holy and most dear friend, you say that you hear many who, with many arguments, do not wish to accept this, nor do they agree to it. Thus, you say that some of them even fault the great Basil for this, saying that he spoke in this way in passing, for the benefit of those who were hearing him at that time. That there are many who say such things is not at all surprising. For divine and lofty things, which are filled with philosophy, have escaped the masses. Hence, there is no need to make any argument toward them. ^C But you, for the sake of benevolence, we reconcile to the great Father, and to the Spirit who illuminated his holy soul. Be it granted, as they say, that some one of the true theologians, worthy of such a name, might speak about God and divine matters with relaxed license. But it is an impiety, when one is speaking about God, to utter falsehoods in theological discourse, whether he does so intentionally and professionally, or remissly and out of self-indulgence. Was it ever going to be the case that he, who is the canon of all attention and exact diligence, would argue about God beyond what is right—and that regarding a decree of such great importance, which is related to the second article of the faith—and would set forth false dogmas for the convenience of his listeners? ^D And would there be an advantage for the listeners, so that by being reformed in their character, they should hold false opinions about God and divine things? And would a doctor, while helping others in small matters, willingly harm himself in the greatest ones by lying about divine things, especially when he was not addressing the populace, but speaking privately to certain learned men who were capable of following his logic—for even to anyone who is reasoning, although the goal is the conclusion, the premises are not taken in passing. Rather, according to logic, and the truth which is in accordance with it, these are even more essential, as without them it is impossible to reach a conclusion. But would the teacher of truth make the proof from divine oracles in passing and perfunctorily? If he were to make it from untruths, aiming only at persuading, would he still be a teacher of truth, or would he rather be counted among the sophists? If, therefore, regarding the heavenly pre-constitution of human life and death, according to its time and manner, the great man wished to persuade, so that one might bear death with patient thanksgiving, or rather to constrain them, as they were otherwise going to act impiously, either by being ignorant of the divine predestination, or by knowing it and not caring out of a love for their own life and that of their own kin

^A was not the discourse on divine predestination most useful for him, who wished to persuade with the truth? Or would it not also have been most useful for those who were being taught, if they had decided to obey, since they would have been persuaded by this most of all? Consequently, it is clearly absurd to expostulate in this way against someone who is entirely free from blame. But a more prudent complaint would be to say: "Not as a learned, wise, and godly man, but as a human being, he was ignorant in this respect, and could not reach the true and wise opinion and discernment." But not even this holds water. For we, although we know that the great Basil surpassed all not only in wisdom but also shone with the illuminations received from God, yet we do not attribute more to him than to Athanasius, and Gregory the Theologian, and the one of Nyssa himself, and Augustine, with all of whom the great Basil here agrees, and all of them with him. And how is it possible that such great teachers together went astray on this point? And that he says these same things in many places, and with great elaboration, as if he were framing his argument on these matters for their utility, and for the benefit of those able to follow him in the truth of his opinion—attend to what he says elsewhere; and with this diligent application you will discover that this should by no means be called a fortuitous occurrence of things that happen to men, ^B as if no moderator and ruler governed this world—by suggesting perverse opinions to yourself, provided only that you take care not to fall outside the bounds of piety. "For God, who fashioned and enlivened us, gave to each soul its own state of life to spend, and set for some one limit and for others another for their departure. For he ordained that one should wait longer in the presence of the flesh, while he ordered another to be released more quickly from the bonds of the body, according to the reasons of his ineffable wisdom and justice. Just as, therefore, those who are thrown into prisons, some are locked up for a longer time by the harshness of their confinement, while others find a quicker release from their suffering: so also souls, some are detained for a long time enjoying the benefit of this life, while others for a shorter interval, according to the reason and proportion of each one's merit, as the One who created us looks forward in a way so high and wise (to the point that the human mind cannot reach it) to the things pertaining to each mortal. Do you not hear David singing: 'Bring my soul out of prison'? Have you not heard about the saint, that his soul was released? And what of Symeon, when he embraced our Lord? What voice did he send forth? Was it not this, 'Now let your servant depart, O Master'? For to one hastening toward the life above, ^C companionship with the body is heavier than any punishment and any prison." These things he says in one discourse. From this, therefore, he dogmatizes on both the paternal and lordly providence regarding human life and departure; and he demonstrates the divine predestination in men to be absolute, showing it with great diligence through examples and written proofs. ^D Yet, if he were making his argument against those who contradict, you would have seen him adducing the whole of Holy Scripture. But also in every part of his own discourses, he calls the end of life in each instance "predestined"; and whenever

inequalities and unlikenesses occur to men regarding the ends of life, according to the diverse and to us inconceivable economies of the Divine regarding each person, they are unequal indeed in point of time, and unlike in the manner. These are his own words. That, therefore, he did not speak those former things by chance, but with purpose, and as thinking in this way, let these things suffice for you. But also, in a manner worthy of his all-encompassing wisdom and greatness of mind, and of the Spirit that enlightened him, did that God-inspired luminary of the world think and teach. For he knew that in human affairs, the divine predestination works most wisely and most benevolently—which is the eternal order in God for leading man to the blessed life—even though it occurs in time, with God sending him to that limit, just as an archer sends an arrow toward the mark, and sending him because he is unable of himself alone, even if he has been born for this. And for this reason, He heals and cures our infirmities and shortcomings with His various dispensations regarding life and death through an excess of mercy. "For not by works of righteousness which we have done," says the divine Apostle, "but according to His own mercy did He save us." From then and now, and as long as the generation of men shall exist, as He once opened the way of life to us by His own mercy alone. For God, who provides for all His creations reasonably, according to the dignity and order of each in the universe, bestows a providence most proper to rational nature by the gifts with which He adorned it, and has appointed as its end, for which it has been and exists, the blessed life, which consists in the sincere and immediate knowledge of God and of divine things. "For this," He says, "is eternal life, that they may know You, the only true God, and whom You sent, Jesus Christ," that is, the mysteries of theology and the economy, which believers now see in a mirror and in a riddle; He Himself appoints for it that limit, and the end, and the goal—with no one of those things that are, nor all of them together being able to do this—He Himself also determines it toward that goal. For even if its limit is such as it has seemed good to God, yet it is supernatural, and He defines it by moving it, and because it is moved from within itself. For He gave to it the power of choice, so that it might even be moved from within toward Him along with the guidance from above, leading it toward this, urging it on, loosening difficulties, bringing others, and if there be need for exercise, allowing it to retreat for its own benefit, immediately leading those who turn back again, calling, and pressing, whenever even this may be beneficial—some things invisibly, others even openly to those who attend to these matters; and some things immediately through Himself

as often as He infuses grace by sending it forth, and other things through the guardian angels, each of whom is assigned and prescribed to each of men, moves them toward the good, and delivers them from the snare of the demons—which they secretly construct on this path, as David ^A says, by which we journey—not only regarding our souls, but even our lives, as much as they are able; and He strengthens the weakness of human reasoning, to speak simply. For it is neither right, nor is it fitting to boldly assault those things which can neither be investigated nor comprehended by number; while He so governs their whole life in these matters toward that which is best, that in no way does the divine goodness withdraw from the paternal providence toward His children, as many as love that life, concerning the present life caring but little, and only according to the law. And by sending them the end of life, and permitting them to be prepared for it according to the time and manner which might harmonize with His other providences, so that it may be well ordained ^B once and for all, even by the pursuits and zeal of those who contend for their own salvation, appropriately. Therefore, God is said to provide for all things that have been made by Him, and the good of divine providence reaches to all things that are in any way capable of existence; but it is considered that He predestines only the rational nature, that is, man. So that in man exclusively, the providence of God and predestination are the same; for by both, the plan of the order of approaching one's own end is declared; yet altogether and absolutely they are not the same, but predestination is a part taken out of providence. For all other things are ordered toward an end ^C congruent to their own nature, and are led only as it is appointed for them to be led; they do not lead themselves. But man, since he is determined by God toward an excellent end, is both led from within and at the same time is helped by a guardian angel. Therefore, just as He alone knows those to be predestined, so after they have also brought to bear from themselves everything that has flowed from the excellent and divine beneficence toward them, and since He knows how they are to be determined even before they are destined—and not only before they are predestined and have attained the end, but even before they were born and exist—He is said to predestine. And these, again, are called predestined. And He predestined that those who are saved should be saved, just as He also saves; ^D and He saves as He predestined they should be saved. Just as those who once and for all turn aside from the path leading to the goal, or intentionally swerve to this side or that, and by rendering void the zeal of God toward them—which they demonstrate in every way, so that they might be destined and predestined—justly fall away from the boundary, they are rejected on account of themselves, when the time arrives for them to know by experience the failure of the end. And they are found to be rejected by God even before they exist, not as if He wills to reject them unto eternity, but as knowing that they will be rejected unto eternity, and because they have rendered void all the providence of God and the Father toward them, and the zeal toward attaining the end. But these matters require a separate and great treatment. We must now proceed to the matter at hand. For we do not wish to discourse on divine predestination, but to show what moved the great light.

^A Jam super his pulchre se res habet. Now, let the contrary also be considered at the same time, for the greater confirmation of the truth: if human life and death were abandoned once and for all to the choice of men, and to nature and chance, or restricted only to the common and temporary providence which cares for all living things, then the attainment of the end set for men would vanish. Since that end utterly transcends nature, no one can be led to it except by Him who has established and defined it, leading men to it by solving the many difficulties therein through the many and various ways already mentioned. And in vain would Moses and the pedagogical law established through him—ordained toward a greater and more perfect law—exist; in vain would all care and concern for the salvation of men be, to speak concisely. For it is not necessary to relate everything in detail. ^B In that case, there would no longer be a divine predestination, since there would be no one to lead men to the limit and the goal at the proper time, nor would there be one who had led them from afar, even before they were born. Likewise, divine providence would be destroyed, not only concerning human affairs, but about almost everything. For our faith makes the most diverse and prudent administration of human affairs the end and fruit of the simpler governance of the universe. Since God is even said to have subordinated all things to man under his feet, as one set over the works of His hands, and a little lower than the angels, ^C therefore, when the lineage of man ceases, the very motion of the heavenly bodies will also come to a halt, as the divine oracles say, as if it were established to serve this end. But let us pass over these and other things. As for men, what then will be the providence of the heavenly Father? If their end and reward is to attain the blessed life, the life lived here is the path; and those who travel it well arrive at the goal. But no one can travel that path well or obtain that end without God. Now, if He were to take no care or thought for their journey—that is, for the life they live here—in its beginning, its progression, and its completion, so that by it they might be guided to the goal, overcoming all the difficulties met in countless ways, ^D and if He were not to manage His children with a father’s care, but left them only to be carried along by the frailty of nature, the inconstancy of choice, and the senselessness of chance—through which it is impossible to attain that transcendent end—and if He were to care for His children only in the same measure as for oxen, and not in a most special way? But the blessed Paul, in his Epistle to the Corinthians, states that God does not care for oxen: not that He casts off all care for oxen and the like, but because the providence concerning them has almost no comparison to the providence concerning men. For this alone can and should truly be called providence and the care of the divine [Father] for the sake of all that is just and rational. But if these things were destroyed, as has been said, Job would be praised in vain

^A when he says: "The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away; as it seemed good to the Lord, so it has come to pass." And in vain would David be extolled with praises daily in the churches, who in almost all his psalms celebrates and proclaims the divine predestination, saying it not only of each individual man, as in "He shall give his angels charge concerning you," and what follows, but even of whole nations, families, and cities. ^B These harmonize with the prophecies of Isaiah and Amos; for the former says: "Who makes peace and creates evils," and the latter: "Is there evil in a city, which the Lord has not done?" And again it is written in Isaiah: "Thou hast wrought all our works in us, O Lord." In vain, too, would be the ministrations of the angelic orders, through whose service these things are accomplished according to the divine decrees.

But when our Lord Jesus says that "Without the divine will, not even a hair falls from your head," and what follows; and when He speaks of Himself, saying: "Thus it is written, and thus it was necessary for Christ to suffer," and the rest; and "Nevertheless not as I will, but as Thou wilt"; and, "Without Me you can do nothing"; and many such things which confirm the divine predestination regarding the life and death of each person—since He Himself spoke these things of Himself as a man, and as one suffering these things according to humanity, where shall we place all these things that are so earnestly and appropriately defined by God?

But let us come to the apostles. ^C Peter gives counsel to all the brothers that they should strive eagerly through good works to make their calling and election firm, by which they were chosen; and regarding himself, he says that he knows the putting off of his tabernacle is at hand, and that the Lord Jesus Christ had revealed this to him. Paul, calling himself predestined unto the Gospel of God, which He promised afore by the prophets in the holy Scriptures, and what follows, ^D confirms this through Moses, bringing forward: "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion," and concluding: "So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy"; and, "Whom He foreknew and predestinated, these He also called." And again, calling some "vessels of wrath fitted for destruction," and others "vessels of mercy prepared and called unto glory"; and again saying: "No man lives to himself, and no man dies to himself."

And again, speaking to the Ephesians, he says: "God chose us in Himself before the foundation of the world, having predestinated us unto the adoption of children," etc. In the same way, regarding those rejected from eternal life, he speaks in that which he wrote to the Romans: "But if God, willing to show His wrath (that is, I might say, the retribution of justice) and to make known His power, endured" (that is, condemned) "with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He prepared unto glory." And everywhere in his Epistles, thus confirming the divine predestination—that is to say, the particular providence regarding men and all that follows from this regarding human affairs—does he speak these things in vain, or rather, do they speak in vain? May it be far from us!

^A Do you see how, when the contrary opinion is posited as a hypothesis, so many truths are overturned? Or rather, almost nothing is left remaining. For the things brought forward now from Holy Scripture are each full of a different mystery—yet all of them, together with those, are contained within the one subject matter proposed to us, which is most broad. If that is shaken, nothing of them remains thereafter. If divine predestination, being the greatest part of divine Providence, holds sway over all necessities, and is a dogma of the faith that cannot be gainsaid, and is like a bond of the whole faith, then while some men are predestined to eternal life—with whom let those who are granted mercy be counted now—others are rejected by it with good reason. And the matters concerning the life and death of each person are fittingly arranged according to the attainment or failure of the end, as for the most part both the wickedness or virtue of each one, and their prudence or imprudence, cooperate in turn with such a divine arrangement. Yet there are times when, even apart from the immediate resolve and zeal of each side, He who governs manages what is appropriate to their habits and merits, both in their living and in their dying, so that through varied and manifold methods—and others judged in various ways according to His most broad and all-wise administration—the divine predestination concerning them may be accomplished, namely, the attainment or failure of the boundary and the end.

Let predestination now be taken commonly, as a genus of predestination and reprobation; when human life, which each one might choose for himself at home, either brings him to the end with the help of cooperation from above, or leads him away from the end with the abandonment that comes from the same source. ^B Reasonably, then, the transition from such a life is also concordant and harmonious with the path toward the end—that is, with the present life—and with the appropriate attainment or failure of the end after it, being as it were a boundary between both lives, and a link between the way and the end. For there are times when, even if the death is plain to all, it also relates to the miserable or blessed life that is immediately to take hold of the person, as in the case of those who choose to die openly for the sake of justice or piety, not without God and the inspiration that comes from above—which is fitting for martyrs and for all who die with and for the sake of virtue, even if they are not led openly to martyrdom but are violently removed from life while being attacked by snares and calumnies; or in the case of those who have fled the world and lived a life appropriate to the cross, and have encountered a death similar to that life, lacking consolation, and some even enduring it unjustly; or, conversely, in the case of those who, in their unjust and wicked ^C attempts, and in their whole life which is of a piece with them, undergo the appropriate violent departure.

And not only to the judgment of men is such a death clear as to where it leads, but for those who choose to die for the sake of virtue and piety, a bright and varied heavenly witness appears, ^D and to the eyes of their acquaintances...

^A and souls it brings astonishment. There are times, indeed, when the end of life escapes most people, except for those who are undergoing it; and sometimes it is not even seen by them while they are in the body, and if the destruction wrought by death is violent, it is decreed by divine philanthropy that this is sufficient for those who meet it to be purified so as to attain a blessed end, and—if it benefits others—to serve as a prelude to the wretchedness that exists there, and to the wickedness exercised here, and as an indication of the retribution for it; or, when it is brought about violently, it serves as an addition to the wretchedness that exists there for the wicked, if it is painless; or, as a compensation for some justice done here, just as if their other wickedness were to receive there what is due and appropriate; so that the justice shown here to the living and the dying is not altogether defrauded of its reward. Sometimes, however, the Divine grants this in accordance with the prayers of certain people—for it does not grant everything to everyone, nor does it yield to every petition—and it decides upon their different exit from life. For some pray that the end of life may be painless and peaceful for them, while others pray that it be rather valiant, providing them with material for the study of wisdom and for good hope. For to depart from life in such a way is certain to be either an addition of crowns for those who have lived honorably, uprightly, and piously, or a perfect purification and release from every liability for those who have fallen. ^B The Divine, in its judgment concerning each person, is served by the diverse status of life, the order and purpose in each individual, and again the communion of choice and will in many, and the communion of order, in order to define a different end of life in individuals, or the same end in many. And what mind would have sufficient strength and sharpness to investigate the infinite dispensation of God in such matters, gathering it from the divine Scriptures and the divine works? Therefore, just as the divine economy is most varied and all-wise concerning the manner of death, according to the arrangement of His Providence for each of mankind, so also one may see a different and varied divine economy concerning the time of departure. For some are snatched from this life while still in their youth, because the addition of time would not have increased their virtue and intelligence, but would have changed them for the worse. Others are allowed to live, using the extension of life to make great progress in good and to benefit others by their own example; or, conversely, because they were going to become participants in the sin of their parents and, in their wickedness, to pay the penalties for them here. Others, hindered by weakness and bodily illnesses, suffer and die—many to whom death is granted before their time—so that their lighter transgressions may be pardoned by their death. And some indeed live longer for the public good, while others on the contrary live to the public detriment, both being worthy, the former to provide, and the latter to enjoy the divine favor or the divine turning away. ^C Some, moreover, depart from life sooner for their own benefit, but to the loss of those for whom their life was a benefit, once they are judged unworthy of it. ^D And as for those who live for themselves alone and for God, and for others for other reasons—to them, life is lengthened or shortened

and this is often heralded to many of them, and to others it is heralded about them. ^A And thus, in this manner, the time of their departure agrees with God’s all-wise will concerning them, so that sometimes it is able to be seen even by those who examine things well, and especially when God reveals it; but for the most part it is known to God, while it remains hidden from all men.

Of all these things, sacred histories are full. The judgments of the holy Fathers, not written in vain, nor read in vain, are for those who, along with the truth, are concerned for their own salvation. But what is greater than all these is that the divine Scripture is full of such things, confirming with explicit words what has now been written, even if, for the sake of brevity, we have omitted ^B the testimonies from it concerning each of these matters. Nor does Scripture itself record every case, for that is impossible; but it records a few of them, so that from them, even regarding those things that are unknown—as if passed over in silence—we might have a firm faith concerning Providence, which it applies not only to us who are born and live, but also to those who depart from here, as is fitting for the divine dignity, goodness, and wisdom. Indeed, it is the same thing, to provide for us who are living, and not to overlook what the end of life will be, or when it will come. This is the boundary of the life lived here, and the limit, and the judgment, and the seal; and everyone who lives is concerned about this: both those who loathe for death to approach and those who desire it to be near—though they do so in different ways; sometimes, indeed, they are moved by the same reasons, for they listen to ^C this: "In the state in which I find you, therein I will judge you." For what reason is there for God to provide so paternally for the life of men, but to take no account of their departure? For the life lived here is a certain journey toward the proposed end; and death brings this life to a limit. And all of everyone’s endeavors, and every gift granted by God, cease at once.

There are many things that bring about death; so that those things which end this life are the sole material of God’s manifold providence concerning us, through which we are destined for Him. For He Himself is our end, and He does not destine us for any other end than Himself. Therefore, shall such great providence of God concerning us be a mere accessory to the varied and manifold causes of death—and of fortune and chance, and of things said to be by accident, and of all that exists in any way at all—existing according to Providence? Or rather, is it that (God) does not care when and in what manner death expels life and its fruit, to those who live honestly and virtuously? And will He be entirely unconcerned about how each will live, and what they will accomplish while living? But if this is a falsehood and impossible, and if it is only by God that those who have been predestined are led successfully to the end, however much they may have hastened by their own nature and industry—being those who indeed love virtue—then even to reason ^D

^A strongly from the last to the last is God, who in Wisdom is called: "And two sparrows are sold for a farthing, and one of them shall not fall on the ground without my Father," and the things that follow, our Lord himself says. That not all are zealous, nor predestined to eternal life, is nothing to the matter; for it suffices for us, with the great Father Basil, that for those predestined, the limits of life have been fixed by God, and are extended or contracted toward their eternal good, just as the gold and silver vessels for honor [are used], according to Paul, which indeed are numberless; and for this reason, human generation serves for the replenishment of the angels who fell from the heavens. And they are known to God alone, and some of them are manifested by Him, whom He might will to be manifested even here, and whom it is not right to remain hidden.

Then, just as He provides for all men in life, but differently and according to the merit and dignity of each, so also it is reasonable that in the divine judgment there should be a varied order and consideration regarding their end. For indeed He sets an angel over all men, but the faithful does not enjoy the same guardianship of an angel as the infidel, nor does the base [man] as the good, even if both are faithful; so here too, it is absolutely necessary that our life and the end of all of us be defined. Furthermore, the different judgment concerning these matters, according to the differences of those who live, is known to God alone, since few things have been revealed to us, both from the divine Scriptures and from the sacred histories, as we have already clearly set forth. And it is not right for us, because we are unable to grasp the incomprehensible and ungiven things, to depart from those which are ^B confessed and given to us to know. Nevertheless, the divine Scripture teaches that the lives of those rejected or those who have found mercy are subject to the divine yoke, and that these too undergo an extraction from life according to His pleasure.

Violent deaths induced upon peoples and princes with the burning zeal of the ministering angels and of the prophets also demonstrate this, not without the divine will. The ruins and depopulations which the prophets had threatened to cities and nations also declare this—cessations of slaughter occurred either by the repentance of those who had fled to God, or those who remained hardened in impenitence [perished]. Additions to life [vouchsafed] to certain ones who had repented, after they had despaired of life, [were] made manifest by death declared from God and by signs and portents obvious to all. Ananias and Sapphira were struck dead, not by the power of Peter, but by the power of God, whom he invoked; and even had Peter not been present to expose the lie, they would have expired, such being the will of God. And how many men, while senselessly violating the law, are violently taken from the living, one suffering one kind of violence and another another, while men—who observe the visible effect of the violence—remain ignorant, not at all grasping the heavenly influence toward that movement? But let these visible and unnatural departures from life, which in no way differ from the resurrection from the dead, be passed over in this part, as occurring in the order of those predestined, at that time

when God delivers them in an incredible manner, because it is advantageous for them to be thus, and it accords with his own will; or at another time, when God permits them to depart from this life by both, either through nature providing, or through tyrannical violence forcing. These things are therefore sufficient for elucidating our scope, no less for the commendation of the truth than for defending the sentiment of the Teacher. ^A If it is said in Wisdom, "God did not make death," this is understood according to the cause of death. For he does not primarily will the death of men, nor does he cause it, just as he does not cause its source, sin; but insofar as he altogether wills the order of justice, whose duty it is to inflict punishment upon those who sin, by a consequent will he wills it and acts; even if, by an excess of mercy and kindness towards men, he also dispenses death to his children in countless ways for the better and for beneficence, in the common punishment of the race, and indulges those whom he would, and as is fitting, with a fatherly affection. And on this account, it is said in the first book of Kings: "The Lord kills and makes alive," not as if he were primarily doing only one or the other—which is the same as saying he wills both to happen, because he himself has the power of life and death—but as if, in killing, he often makes alive, and regulates and ordains the time and manner of death for that which is expedient, and for the life predestined for many. ^B And again, if it is said in Ecclesiastes, "God left man in the counsel of his hand," even if this could be understood ^C primarily concerning the reprobate, nevertheless it fully attests to the freedom of choice for all: for he does not drag them unwillingly toward the good. But he is the inspector and distributor of those things which they, choosing for themselves, would do, and of those things which square with each one. These things, on account of free will, are not removed from divine Providence, neither for the better nor for the worse for them, but altogether in a good and just way.

To these and such-like considerations the great Basil was led, in order to teach his children those things regarding the ends of life, and to lead them thence to the divine will; indeed, he practiced counseling by discoursing about God, and consequently he usefully referred his discourses to morals, in which all teachers concentrate their study and effort. ^D And if he could have perceived such things from nowhere else, at the very least he listened to the prophet David saying daily: nor would he have been able to reject that which was inspired by the divinity; I say, he heard the royal prophet saying: "Make known to me, O Lord, the way in which I shall walk; and make known to me my end, and what is the number of my days." Wherefore, he sought to learn from Him who knew, so that he might also learn from Him who determined, and he desired to learn what was destined. And so that no one can say that God indeed knew, and therefore could reveal it if he would, but yet did not have the means to act in such things through nature and other causes, just as when these were permitted, elsewhere he again says: "Bring my soul out of prison." And he was not simply seeking to die, or to be released—for this, even if he did not ask, was destined at some time

^A to happen, but to be led forth by divine will, and that before reaching old age. And for this reason he says in another place: "Do not take me away in the midst of my days." He was not seeking what was foreign to divine providence, being such as he was, and knowing from the Spirit what one ought to ask. God, therefore, leads the soul of man out of this life when he wills—whether in the middle, or in some part of the measure common to all who persist in life—and he both adds and cuts short, as has been said before, either judging this himself or granting it to those who pray, a thing known to Him alone, as if it were a limit and boundary which in the end of works comes to pass.

Since, however, some, as you say, are accusing the great Basil and for that reason not accepting him, and are raising further objections—you now, most holy man, have grasped both the accusation and the objection well, in how much sense and truth it carries; and you have learned that he does not treat these things theologically in a perfunctory way, but purposely, and by naming these things the boundaries and heads of piety, from which you have heard from us that it is not right for anyone to deviate, and since he is in agreement with all teachers who are his equals—or rather, is in concord with the divine works and laws—^B accept these things or whatever else out of the many we have now set forth for you, insofar as to hint at the agreement of the teacher with the divine canons. But whenever you send us the arguments to the contrary, which you say you have heard from many, we shall also send you their solutions.

Since, however, this pronouncement of the Great Basil pertains to the divine predestination, you have our extensive and eloquent treatise on the providence of God and predestination, written by us at that time, to the point, and with great diligence. O common misfortune! O my most sorrowful life! ^C There you will find almost every question solved, not only those by which some are unsettled. For those who are in doubt whether it is possible for human free choice to be effective in matters of choice, or to be crowned or punished when the divine predestination is prevailing; and whether it is possible for prayers poured out to God to still be useful, and regarding things said to come about by chance and fortune; those having these and similar doubts, which they could not solve, undermine the divine predestination as being the cause of questions and doubts. There you will see all these things cured with the medicine of the truth. ^D There you will also find John Damascene very well reconciled with the master, and as the divine John himself would have wished, and he is grateful to those who bring [the teachings] into agreement. There, not crippling divine Providence, nor—before confessing it—destroying it, as many do through ignorance, but just as he himself wills, he [makes] them effective, and as...

he—prompted, I say, by the divine Spirit—himself indeed desired it to be revealed to those children in whom he was well pleased, having first given them a preparation consonant with philosophy. Wherefore, since that treatise of his sufficed for you in all things, we make no further comment on that matter now. ^A For you, dearest friend, concerning the limits of human life, let the authority of Basil alone be enough against your opponents, unless you are able to overcome them with other arguments and resolve the questions; for to do this in such matters is the mark of prudent men, and it is at the same time established and prescribed by the leaders of the Church as a rule. Concerning divine predestination, let the authority of Saint Paul be sufficient for you, not to mention the whole of Holy Scripture. As an added benefit, and to establish you well in this knowledge of the truth, I set before ^B you the great Maximus as a seal upon the seal of the holy and wise theologians, which is the same as adding to him all those who preceded him. For that man set forth several Centuries of chapters, which he entitled Gnostic and Theological, with each chapter defining a subject entirely different [from the others]; for he composed these as pronouncements and definitions, just as Hippocrates once did his famous Aphorisms, and Ptolemy his Fruit. ^C The twentieth chapter of his fourth Century is thus defined: "In what way God, who before all ages defines the life of each [person], wishes to lead each one to his own proper end of life, whether just or unjust." And this alone is treated throughout the whole of chapter twenty. Therefore, positing what is confessed and already conceded by all, namely that the life of each person is determined and prescribed according to its time and end, he consequently hands over [to God] also the manner of death; so that the manner of death was predestined before the ages together with the measure of life, and each man might be led to the end of his life as it might seem proper to God for the life that is lived here ^D and for the state that will follow after it; and to die justly or unjustly, just as those living justly or iniquitously, pertains solely to the manifold and most wise judgment of God. We have discussed these matters more broadly, not from our own ingenuity, but following the Holy Scriptures. But this greatest doctor of the Church, worthy of such a name, adds only the conclusion, as if laying down a law. You, dearest friend, receive this word from us, produced in our leisure; or rather, the great Basil receives it, and He who enlightened that mind, to whom is the glory for all ages. Amen.

Georgii Scholarii, or Gennadii Patriarcha, Regarding our God, the One in Trinity, and all things that exist; and against the Atheists, that is, the Automatists, and against the Polytheists.

^ATo opine that there is no God is of the highest insanity, as the divine David says: *The fool has said in his heart: There is no God* (Ps. XIII, 1). Indeed, if any wickedness exists in men, it is the work of insanity; so that it is, in a sense, the same thing to be good and to be sound of mind, and it is of the highest wickedness to think such things. For some, having once been attached to the senses and the pleasure inherent in them, breed this evil insanity within themselves, and from holding such opinions, in turn, wishing to live not as men, they rush with their whole weight into a beast-like life. But there are very few who dare to undertake the defense of their own depravity, because all men, both good and wicked, the unlearned and the wise alike, are thoroughly convinced that God exists; they hold and believe Him to be the cause of good things for themselves, while they consider themselves to be the authors of their own wickedness and the disasters that flow from it. Whether, for this very reason, they might at some point return to a more approved state of mind, or whether, in persistent wickedness, they do not deny their own voluntary folly. A very few, therefore, in order to commend their error to those whom they might happen to know

^A to be rushing toward the same precipice as themselves, pretend to be pious before everyone, and while with their tongue they confess along with all others that God exists, in their heart they conceal the poison of their madness; and therefore they remain incurable. Nor do they even collect this thought of impiety in their mind, for such a birth is alien to the mind; but in their heart they generate atheism, conceived, of course, from that most senseless impulse toward sensible and earthly things. For if they were able to use their mind and reason—which they could certainly easily do, provided they had any desire at all for God to exist—divine truth and all the dogmas that proceed thence unto piety would shine upon them more clearly than light itself. Furthermore, those works of God that illuminate the minds of the learned, but are inaccessible to the eyes of the common people, let us pass over for now; for indeed, those which are recorded in their books may be searched out by anyone who is able and willing, from which it is demonstrated further that it is absolutely necessary for God to exist, and that it is beyond all impossibility that He should not exist. ^B But we also pass over the common opinion of all mankind, which has great weight for the truth, if indeed there is nothing truer than the principles known by nature to all; for except for a very few of the most senseless, as has been said, everyone has held and does hold that God exists, so that even when they desired to seek into what He is and how He is, pressed by the difficulty of these things, as is natural for those speculating about God, they were divided into various opinions; yet they have not hitherto departed from the prior and more common insight. And yet they delight in wonder and dwell upon it: for since these things before-mentioned regarding God cannot be understood by reason given by nature, nor are they kindred to things naturally known, hence they provide for themselves a not insignificant argument that God exists: for once it is posited that He exists, it is a very apposite and genuine consequence that His essence can neither be comprehended by the intellect nor declared by speech. Nor shall I bring forward at present the divine revelations regarding the truth of the same God; for to confound those who are so demented, reason ^C is most aptly put forward, while I shall bring those forward for another purpose. But since, once God is cast aside, they at the same time do away with the Creator of beings and the Providence of the Creator that permeates all these things, it is consistent, from the system they have introduced regarding all these things, that they should think that what exists and what comes to be exist and come to be by chance, and every other swarm of error follows from this. Therefore, it will be sufficient for the present purpose to propose to one of them certain very simple and brief interrogations concerning this alone, and to set forth himself as an argument for his own folly, from ^D a very few and most evident phenomena that pertain to him.

Mi homo, you are clearly superior in nature to other earthly things and to the earth itself: you surpass the earth and stone in all the inner gifts of nature, being joined to them only by corporeality (for you too are clothed in a body); or even, if you please, by the very being that belongs to all beings whatsoever. But from a plant

you also participate in a greater and more perfect share of life, by which the plant itself is separated from the earth, stone, and everything inanimate; while ^A in relation to zoophytes, you possess in common the power of locomotion, by which they too have an advantage over growing things. With animals, you are linked even further, for in addition to all the aforesaid, you possess sensation, by which animals also excel all others; yet to you alone remains the faculty of reasoning, by which you are surpassingly exalted above all others. Whence, then, is this orderly distinction which you possess, both in relation to other things and as they have it in relation to one another, traversing the whole infinity of individuals in every species? Does it come from the things themselves? And if a stone could have been a plant, would it have chosen the lower degree? Certainly not any more than you would choose to be a doorkeeper of the palace rather than to stand by the royal bedchamber, were the choice given to you. And would a plant, of its own accord, have been inferior to an animal? And would a horse, if it were in its own power, not have claimed for itself the nature of a man? ^B "Not at all," one says, "that distinction did not come from them, but it was made fortuitously and by chance." But if any such thing rarely appears in those things which are made by a set and defined order, it is, as nature and reason demand, diametrically opposed to them. Thus, if these things did not exist, that other would never occur, just as disease does not supervene except upon preceding health. But let it be, for the sake of argument, that this is the reason why things happen by chance; it does not therefore follow that the same holds true for all other things. Furthermore, with no moving cause, nothing would ever come to be; and certainly, anything prodigious that occurs once over many periods of time is a corruption of the natural order arising from a certain malady of nature.

Moreover, do you not attempt everything, as one who possesses reason, so that you might choose what things should be done? Why, then, have you not long since practiced flight, although you have perhaps often said, "Would that I could now fly!"? It is evident from this that, since you were not born to fly, it is not possible for a man to exist simultaneously as a winged creature. ^C Why, indeed, do you not traverse the depths of the sea, so that you might avoid so many toils and methods by which one must fish from above? Is it not manifest that you are not by nature able to live in the waters, just as a fish could not do so on land? Whence, although you may covet the mode of life of other creatures by your own choice, your nature restricts you in most matters, and since you were not born to perform everything at will, you are in fact altogether powerless regarding most things.

These differences, therefore, existing according to each genus and extending even to the individuals of the genus, in such a way that they can possess neither more nor less of the good than nature has assigned to each—how could they be by chance or spontaneously, ^D if indeed chance and spontaneity are diametrically opposed to that which is ordered and defined, being so distinguished that they are mutually exclusive and could not coalesce? But those things which are disposed by order, whether this is done by nature or by human choice, how could they turn out that way without anyone to dispose them? Or, if they were not ordered by themselves, from where, pray, would they be ordered? If, therefore, you grant to me that these things occur with a certain order by higher and more common causes, first of all, that "chance and spontaneity" of yours vanishes, and then, regarding those things...

^A that are in like manner diverse from one another in nature and order—for even those things do not possess from themselves the power to act and arrange in such a way among things inferior to them, nor the superiority and inferiority they have toward one another. For if it were granted to the moon, it would rather choose to be the sun and to do in those things below it what the sun does, things that are more and better than what it is able to do itself; and the sun, in relation to the bodies above it, would be of a similar sort, and there would be a kind of conflict instead of order. Therefore, even for those higher ^B things, there is a certain kind of necessary order; whence also comes its constant and immutability, and since such order is natural in them and possesses its own source of nature, they would possess the same cause, of course, both for being produced in this way and for being so arranged and for doing such things in the things below them. But I ask you again: if you happen to be a builder, why are you not also a shipwright? And if you are that too, why do you not also have a third, the shoemaking craft? And to summarize, why do you not preside over every craft just as you do one? Is it not clear that it is because you are not able to pursue them all at the same time? For it is necessary ^C to learn many things for each craft, and more to have practiced them, and thus to obtain the habit through experience; and these things would require more time; indeed, even the life of each individual would not suffice merely to acquire more of them, and before one had properly learned them all, death would arrive and he would not be able to apply himself to even one. But suppose that for the sake of being able to apply them, men strive to acquire them; but whence do you have the ability to know one or two crafts? From yourself? And yet, the mere wishing would have sufficed for learning, and thus in a short time you could have known them all; but for the aforementioned progress, one also needs more time for each. Therefore, it is from elsewhere that you possess the ability to learn, ^D which is placed in nature like a spark; and just as you did not come into existence by wishing—for you did not exist before you were born—so neither did you possess this spark by willing it, nor the ability to engage in some, but not all, nor the inability to be equally disposed toward all. Nor did you get it by chance; for if you had, either you alone or you with a few others would have it, while the rest would be destitute of the skill, just as things which are termed "fortuitous" are almost nothing compared to things that happen naturally. But now all men possess the power of learning, initially indefinite toward all crafts before they begin to learn, but after this, it is limited to one craft, whichever one a person might begin to learn; and if someone is more naturally gifted, toward two or three, but these at any rate not toward most, and certainly not toward all at once. And such an aptitude of nature toward learning more things you have from elsewhere, from which indeed you also have the ability to learn even simply; so that signs of such cleverness, just as the opposite sign of not being naturally disposed toward more, are seen in the constitution of the body revealing the inner disposition, which has been well examined by those skilled in such matters.

^A But why are not the same materials subject to all arts, and why is one sought for one profession and another for another? For you would certainly not fashion a shoe and a house from the same material, even if you knew both how to cobble and how to build; nor would you labor unnecessarily if you could prepare both from the same substance. Whence, then, this discretion regarding materials among craftsmen? It is not that they display this performance of their own accord; even if it were permitted for you to use all things alike for your construction, you could not therefore succeed. Do you see that such an arrangement, although in arts and crafts it seems per se subject to art, in truth presides over all things that naturally exist, while to you the power has been instilled of discovering what material is appropriate for any given art? It is, in short, the very reason that also governs the exercise of the skill that serves it.

Furthermore, why, when you are building, do you begin from the foundation, then join the walls together, afterward lay the planks, and raise the walls again, then finally place the roof, and at last decorate the interior of the house; but you never perform these things in reverse? Is it not evident that even if you wished otherwise, you could not therefore accomplish it? Or would you actually walk with your feet leaning on your head, if you were able, as certain showmen miraculously perform? But these last do not even stand on their heads instead of their feet—for that is impossible—but with their heads raised up by their hands, they play upon the ground, using their hands instead of their feet. Moreover, why do you not build in the sea, nor is a sailor accustomed to navigate on land, except that navigation cannot take place across fields, nor can building ^B ever fulfill its function in the sea? In a word, you have learned to build by art, but you use nature and natural things.

Or if you were a physician, you would surely employ herbs and stones for this art. But one herb is naturally born for one thing and another for another, and not only for healing diseases, but even by introducing them—to those who use them, or even to those who do not know how to use them correctly—some, in fact, utterly destroy, let alone preserve or restore health. And stones work in the same way, nor could their nature ever be changed by any industry. They are only prevented from hindering, while pursuing their own proper end, other powers contrary to them or more efficacious, and likewise from hindering the remaining methods of the art ^C which are by nature contrary and act by different methods.

Therefore, from the more sublime works of God and the orderly distinction of the natures and powers implanted in them, and from the most manifest and stupendous administration of this whole universe, over which such great order presides, and lastly from many other things of this kind by which all have been necessarily compelled to the knowledge of the Divine, you could also discover, if you wish, that there is nothing that is or comes to be that happens or exists outside of order, and that all beings are linked together and at the same time distinguished by a kind of wonderful chain, of which they themselves would not have been the authors. Nor would so many and such dissimilar natures have been joined together from the beginning for the constitution of one world, with no one then joining them and supplying them with the power of perpetually coexisting, which He Himself could ^D dissolve at a nod. Furthermore, to join these things in an orderly fashion is the same as and

to make, and to dissolve them is the same as to destroy. But if you also join different natures when you build, it is not as you would wish, but as they might be joined; and the application of your art follows the joining of the natures. Hence you only join them, and do not make them. But He who joins the natural properties in existing things is surely their maker; for He both makes and establishes them in such a way that they might be able to be joined for the constitution of this whole, which was useful to Him; and for this sake He both made and joined the parts of the universe.

^B If you are not moved by any such examples, you ought at least to have recognized the creator from yourself, from your own nature, and from your works, from whom you have obtained both your existence and your order regarding other things. This path, therefore, I now propose from an abundance of evidence, having neglected many other and wiser paths, not only to refute your folly, but also to assist you, if at least you should wish from this starting point to perceive God, who made you and all things.

You say that you are the maker of a house, and quite rightly, and you confess as the cause of the art of building within you the one who taught it to you; which things were not present in you immediately when you were born, but came after your second age, when you had been well prepared by all natural faculties to be able to learn and to work. And you do not say that the house came into being spontaneously—for you would not have asked for payment for it—nor that the art came to you spontaneously; for it would not have been necessary for you to attend upon a teacher, nor to promise and pay wages to one capable of showing you.

But as for the fact that you consist of a soul and a body, and that the soul is provided with such and so many powers, and the body is composed of so many elements, which are in a way akin to the elements of this world around us; and that it is divided and yet joined together in so many parts and particles, composed of similar and dissimilar, internal and external things, which are ordered among themselves by a rationale of cause and effect; and furthermore that the soul can be perfected in virtue and wisdom, using the body rightly, or failing in both if it uses it poorly, and coming into the contrary disposition; and, to speak simply, regarding the most varied and most paradoxical thing that is in you—and not only in you, but also in countless others who have participated in your same nature—you do not wish there to be a maker, and you wish to be so much inferior to your own works!

^C And you, indeed, if you were the builder and the master of the house at the same time, take care not only of how it might come into being at the beginning, but also of how it might be maintained, attending to all things that contribute to this; yet for yourself and your life you believe that there is no one who cares or provides! And you might sometimes ask for help from a man for these things, who is not even able to help himself; and yet you do not perceive the only one able to help and who is helping, and you do not wish to pay attention to that helper, nor to confess your gratitude! ^D And you praise a house as being well made, and unceasingly proclaim its builder; but this stupendous and excellent architecture which is in you, you bring into disrepute, of which you so impudently deny the builder! And whereas anyone asserting that your house consists by chance...

you ridicule, yet you deny that anyone is the cause and maker of those elements—so much more precious in that they surpass the beauty of your work in the rationality of their matter, and whose exquisite harmony and the manner in which the subject matter is preeminently fashioned—and, which is the height of madness, you deny that there is any maker of yourself and of the good things within you! What wonder is it, then, if you are ignorant of how all other things exist and from whence they come, seeing that you first establish such great darkness within yourself? But, as we have already promised, because you have determined to live crookedly and shamefully, you have fallen into this madness, and again, by acting insanely in this way, you securely heap evils upon evils, and having once turned away from human life, you lead it backward.

^B This, therefore, we have said briefly and quickly against those who, due to great foolishness, rave in their hearts that there is no God; and perchance those who say there are many gods are less insane than those who altogether deny the divine nature. Yet, because they make it manifold, they too sin gravely against the one God. For so much does the harmony and diligence of the phenomena of this sort escape them, that they have presumed to divide the divine nature into as many parts, when rather—with reason as their guide—they ought to have approached the principle of all things. For it escaped them that whatever seems causal in these things is in the place of an instrument and an aid, and is fitting for servants and creatures, not for gods and lords; and that such an accuracy in so many and various natures does not inhere in them from themselves—for that is impossible—but that this good is implanted in them by a certain more sublime and first creator of them and supreme Lord. ^C Those who, being more curious than the rest, posited incorporeal substances and, with the addition of the name of God, separated them from one another not only in dignity and order, but also in nature and inclination toward both good and evil things, have themselves found nothing better than the others who erred from the truth. For if they were gods, they would not be distributed in this way, nor would they be gods if they were thus distributed. But if they are called so homonymously, this appellation is empty, and from thence many impossibilities and absurdities follow in crowds. For whether they changed men into gods—some on account of virtue or useful inventions in the arts, others on account of contrary and worse merits—or whether they were changed into gods—most of which were still possessing life, while others were reconciling such madness to themselves and to the living and the dead—the limit of all impiety had been reached, until God, who alone could, put an end to so great an error, by which almost the entire human race was held for ages. But now the whole world believes in one God, being no more concerned about the stupidity of the atheists—about which it had never before cared—than about the impiety of the polytheists under the guise of piety. For if recently some one person has existed who wished to restore Gentile polytheism, that man raved due to the dullness of his mind. And those who would be even duller, if there be any who...

having attached themselves to him, were to choose that outlawed error instead of the truest and commonest opinion of men. We too have written many things against his lack of judgment, not out of any concern for the things he chattered against the holy truth, but on account of the ignorance of the majority of that generation, formerly and not so long ago deemed most wise, because of which even one of the simpler sort might be in danger of being seduced, persuaded by the false report of his wisdom. For he possessed only the superficiality of learning, and nothing else worthy of mention had he gained, nor did he derive anything from the very wisdom that is the ornament of such learning. He applied himself well to ancient eloquence, but in a most impious and foolish writing, which for this reason the Latin proverb appropriately celebrates among those who have diligently and solely cultivated it—among whom, therefore, it might perhaps be permitted to praise him. But he was so utterly devoid of the ability to distinguish the true from the false, and so nearly indistinguishable from the common herd, that even a child could have refuted him, nor could he have contradicted a child lying as a trial. Wherefore he also harbored this error; and I refuted his book on the "Best Legislation"—for so it was inscribed and written out by his own hand—in a public disputation, and on account of the penalty itself, it was committed to the fire. ^A Yet the love and fear of the Son of God, who for our sake assumed our nature, and of His best legislation, compelled me; to satisfy these, it was not appropriate for me to proceed otherwise.

^B It is not, therefore, the season now to refute the error of the polytheists, since it has been sufficiently refuted by God Himself and by those who have understanding of divine things, especially since there are now only a very few, perhaps, who dream of many gods, and that in corners and in secret; for they would not dare to behave insolently against the truth that is everywhere prevalent, since, as it has been said, the whole world now thinks that there is a God and that this God is one. But since those who posit the one God in different ways are split into many heresies, it is enough for us and for everyone who is governed by the divine laws of our Savior Jesus to set forth Him and His disciples and their successors, and to think of the one God and preach Him to our own people in the faith, just as we have been taught from that source. But for the sake of those who differ, something must be added regarding this as well. That, therefore, the one God in essence is at once a Trinity of properties distinguished by operation—or, to say the same thing, of hypostases—many proofs can be brought forward, both from the Old and from the New Scripture; but for those who do not hold the same principles concerning divine things as we do, our arguments must begin from certain more common principles. Since, therefore, the Jews and others with them, while openly denying the Trinity in God, do not, even if not quite in the same way, assent to Mosaic teaching (for the Jews ^C are entirely contained by it as if given by God, even if they... ^D

^A willfully deaf to the divine dispensation, either pass it by or interpret it perversely), it suffices for us at present to demonstrate to them, as from a foundation most common to all, the Trinity in God, against those who dispute with us concerning it. Furthermore, I have explained this most clear truth of our faith not only in public debates, but in entire books. Therefore, one thing, which is now at hand, and which I wish to add for them from the very mouth of Moses. Moses, moved from above, introduces God, while He was so disposing and distributing this entire universe, saying to Himself: "Let us make man according to our image and likeness." If, therefore, Moses is truthful—and by their own admission God spoke thus to Himself, and these are divine words—then it is manifestly evident to us from that discourse that God is one (for he says, "God said"), and that a certain plurality and number is recognized in the one God (for God said to Himself, "Let us make," as if in a certain way He also partook of plurality within Himself), and that man is made and consists according to the image of God, since He says, "according to our image." And indeed, this was most aptly said, not only because man was to be honored with free will, whence he was to be the master of all created things and immediately next to God, but also because he was to partake of the divine unity and plurality. Indeed, he became a partaker of it in a certain way, since he is one, and yet he is composed of a plurality of faculties with respect to his soul. This divine number was revealed to us by Jesus, who Moses had prophesied would come. For this reason, also arriving for the rest of our perfection, and announced long ago as the one who would return, He commanded those who would believe in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit to be baptized; to these three, though they be three, there is one name, and in common it pertains to them to have one deity, and for these three to be one God. Moreover, even before Jesus had come, David had clearly declared this Trinity in God, saying, "By the word of the Lord were the heavens ^B established, and by the Spirit of his mouth all their power." And our adversaries cannot dare to contradict David. Thus, the same dogma of which we now speak is gathered from the remaining prophets, which corresponds perfectly with their own predictions concerning the divine dispensation.

However, although I have premised that man was made in the image of God, I shall show ^C that this can be established not so much from Moses and the fact that he introduces God speaking, but from the evident truth concerning man himself and from reason alone. For indeed, any work is in some way similar to the operative intellect; for it is made according to the species impressed upon the mind of the maker, and the immaterial image of the work that is in this is communicated to the matter in a way proper to it; whence the similarity is tenuous. For just as we know from his footprints that a man who walked ^D passed by, so seeing a house we know it to be the work of a mason, and together the work of the builder-

and his skill and power we grasp in our minds; for by the difference of the things made we measure ^A in our reasoning the different skill of those who made them, and this likeness is and is called the likeness of a footprint. If therefore this is true for those who make things in part, how much more so for the One who makes things as a whole? But these things are in a way congruent with the things made, since all things are created in their genus; but the first cause of all things transcends its own works infinitely and beyond measure. Wherefore the likeness in them is extremely faint, the overpowering power in the Maker causing such weakness of likeness in the things that come to be; yet it is so weak and faint, and yet true, that it is impossible for it to be otherwise. All the works of God, therefore, are in a way like Him according to this principle, as they manifest in themselves the wisdom and power of Him who made them. For there is nothing, even if it be the smallest thing, which one would not admire strangely, because instead of the flaws of magnitude, there is wisdom and strange methods implanted in them from God. Moreover, there is in them an effectiveness and utility in many ways, ^B and all these things turn conveniently to the protection of human life. Yet none of these is called the image of God; for heaven and the heavenly bodies do not exist without matter, and they are merely bodies without souls; but man alone is immaterial and incorporeal by the part of the soul, as has been said, and therefore alone intellectual, if even all those things have one most common likeness to their own cause in respect to being; for both they exist and God is, even if the divine being infinitely and beyond measure transcends the being of all of them. Some of the things below have a greater likeness in regard to living, but the likeness in regard to intellection is peculiar and above all these, so that it is not even possible to compare it, being peculiar to man alone among these phenomena. Angels, indeed, being pure intellects, share in such a likeness superior to us from the very beginning; but in other terms this also fits those among men who have ^C striven for the angels. Therefore, man alone among all things seen is and is called the image of God; and most reasonably. For he is called man especially according to his soul, while the body is joined to it as an instrument; and the soul of man is in itself incorporeal and immaterial and intellectual. These are divine excellences and perfections of God, even if they differ by an infinite excellence compared to how they exist in God or how they exist in man; for incorporeity and immateriality, being a negation of matter and body, are considered simply in man, but intellectuality, being a nature placed in it and a power of nature, is not considered simply in all respects, but with a certain necessary distinction. ^D Man, therefore, being an intellect, possesses intellection according to the soul, for the act of intellect is to think, just as [it is the act] of heat to heat. And such an act is directed toward a certain end; and this would be the intelligible, as an end proposed to the one who thinks. Intellection indeed mediates as a certain common handle joining both, which

^A proceeds from the intellect and belongs to the intelligible, and is delimited by it; so that the terms of intellection are, as it were, both the intellect and the intelligible. And the intelligible must be a species and a likeness of the one who thinks, specifically the intellect that is intelligible, just as the principle of intellection is the intellect that thinks. I say, therefore, that when the intellect thinks of itself, its work existed before it came to be. For the species taken in the abstract is above all a likeness of the external object, insofar as the object is known through it; but it is also a likeness of the intellect, as an intelligible, and becomes similar to the intellect; and the intelligible species is in the intellect whenever the intellect wills to remain within itself, not being such, but when it wills and is brought forth ^B externally, either manifested by a spoken word or placed externally into matter, if it is such. We say, so long as it wills, because the human intellect consists and lives by two operations: namely, intellection and will; since the intelligent power is the will, just as the intellect is, which for different respects are ordered to different things in the intellect. For intellection primarily precedes reason, and the will follows; but sometimes the will precedes intellection. For the human intellect does not always will what it knows, but in a certain way it knows what it wills. This would require more words to expound; but having now addressed the more important points, let us arrive at the intended subject. The human intellect, therefore, knows the things that are above itself—obscurely, to be sure, while it is in the body, but truly, and as if in a certain image of the reality regarding them—if it follows the proper and genuine principles of this intuition; ^C which is the privilege only of those pious ones regarding divine matters who are governed by true wisdom and prudence. But using now more human discourse, I pass over those notions gathered by the saints from divine revelation. But those things that are connatural to it, it knows readily, whether provided by instruction or by discovery, once the spark of knowledge implanted within it is ignited. Furthermore, it knows these things more perfectly as they are associated with its own faculty, and by how much more readily, by that much more perfectly. It knows its own acts even more perfectly, not merely knowing them as things already done, but also knowing what they will be like before they exist; and therefore establishing them further, because it had known beforehand how they were to exist. Truly, in the human intellect, the intelligible species—which is the principle of its intellection—not as it is a species, but insofar ^D as it thinks through the species, whether the intellection remains only within, by which it becomes wise and contemplative only, or whether it also proceeds externally, by which it is and becomes practical—all this intelligible species is the intelligible word of man, through which, so to speak, the human intellect converses with itself, being indeed the offspring of the intellect through the act of intellection, and its perfection, and, one might say, its wisdom and truth. Now, truly, the intelligent will forms the spirit in man, regarding which it is said that no one knows the things of man except the spirit of man that is within him; and this is the intelligent

will, extending also towards the intellect itself. For the intellect wills itself, just as it indeed knows itself, and it wills its own proper good, since the will is moved toward the voluntary, just as cognition is moved toward the intelligible; and as there the intelligible is the true, so here the voluntary is the good. ^A Since, therefore, the intellect, while willing its own proper good, also knows, and while willing, as has been said, knows its own cognition to be its perfection: the intelligent will of man extends indeed toward the intellect itself that is knowing, but it extends especially toward its own deeds and works, and in these it operates most of all, and in these it is most of all manifest.

Thus, the human matter may be summed up in this way; for these things, if considered knowledgeably, possess great breadth, and such is the human intellect: it attains its own perfection through the intellect, the intelligible reason, and the intelligent will—or rather, the intelligible love—and is intelligibly shaped by these three properties. ^B Now, it is the same thing to speak of the human intellect and the human soul—the former being an explicit account of the intellect, the latter a collective account of the soul. Likewise, to speak of the human soul and to speak of man is properly the same thing, as has been said before. But indeed, man possesses all these things from the first Cause and Creator, God; so that, according to what was proposed from the beginning, these things are in God much more invisibly and congenitally, and in an infinitely more sublime mode, as has been said and shall be shown still more presently. Hence it is that man is said to have been born in the image and likeness of God, because God fashioned him according to the Trinity that is in Him; and for this reason, it is right to transfer ^C what has been said about the image to the exemplar, as these things are theology, more clearly and appropriately, as is proclaimed daily by the teachers of the Church. For the one and most simple God in nature, and the sole Creator of this entire world, according to the teaching of the divine oracles, is a Trinity of properties and persons: a

Trinity of Intellect

Word (or Reason) is the cause of every intellect and of every object of intellect in existing things, and of every substance and nature whatsoever. For the natural likeness is not only of the producing intellect, but also of the works that are known through it, extending outwardly. Whence it is called the innate likeness of the generating and ever-generating intellect, but the idea of created things; and it is said to be both with God and of God, and that all things were made through it. But the cause of every good for those things ^A that exist is divine love, that is, the Holy Spirit, for it holds all things together and turns them toward the good. And for this reason, the one God and creator, the Father of all things that are, is with them, and all things from the first to the very last are works and servants of the one God and of the Trinity concreate in Him.

Therefore, the blessed and divine Trinity itself is the cause of the human trinity; but to our human knowledge, the trinity within us is in a way the cause of our being able to know that other Trinity as far as possible, since this is the first thing we enjoy—the image of that higher Trinity within us—that through it we are able to know the true and first Trinity, which is the cause of all things. We say this concerning those who still understand imperfectly, or are as it were just being initiated; but for those who strive to know more perfectly, or who have received divine gifts—which is far greater—the Trinity within us is understood from that source more accurately. Hence it is no wonder if many are ignorant of the divine Trinity, since they neither know nor are able to know their own nature. Nor ^B is it to be wondered at regarding other differences between the exemplar and the image of the trinity. For, as we have already said, that man is like God, reason demands, and Moses confirms, and countless other things agree on this point; man is like the trinity in his internal acts, through which he exists and lives according to his soul, and surpasses the other creatures of God. Furthermore, in God, the Trinity must be supernatural, harmonious with the Creator, and altogether worthy of God; in man, however, it is inferior, as befits a creature. For, primarily, the divine intellect is always in act, as becomes the eternal and infinite; the human intellect, on the contrary, created by God, exists at first potentially—being ordained in all people equally toward the things that can be understood and toward being perfected by them—and it becomes in act afterward through the knowledge of them, with the forms collected in it one after another, ^C indeed by way of abstraction. Again, human reason in each individual is completed by being formed by many species, which, as has been said, come together in each person according to the mode of their habit. But the divine Reason is one and the most simple species of the most simple intelligence in the first object of intelligence. For the divine intellect, the Father, that is, knows all things eternally by one and the same intelligence, and, by understanding Himself, He sets before Himself His own intelligible species, namely the Word. And He knows the Word, and He knows Himself at the same time. But He also knows things outside Himself, as one who eternally ^D understands them as things to come by the abundance of His power, with the intelligence moving itself toward the future as if to the present; and also according to the

^A divine will, insofar as He is also bountiful to others. For while He always willed that the world should exist, He did not will that it should always exist; for it would not have been possible for it to be or to exist always, for of these alternatives, one leads to the fact that it would never come to be, and the other to the fact that it has existence even though it was never created. This eternal intelligence is therefore one and absolute in the primary intellect, discrete only by signs from the intelligence. Furthermore, in the human intellect, it is one thing to understand a thing, and another to understand the understanding itself, when the intellect turns toward its own operation; whence there are some knowledges of things, and others of the understandings of things. But in God these do not differ. Moreover, reason and will in man are not truly distinguished from the intellect that knows and wills. But the divine Word and the Holy Spirit are really distinguished from the Father. For there, it is necessary that ^B there be the highest unity of nature, as befits God, and also a true and effective distinction, though in no way hindering the unity of nature. For the indivisible and personal distinction which in creatures has matter as its cause, clearly divides nature by numbers of this kind. But in the most simple and most intelligent God, since it has its cause only from an intelligible relation, it does not divide the unity of nature. Nor does the uncreated Trinity in God differ from the created trinity in man by any unimportant differences. But however many these differences may be, the assimilation of properties or persons in the Trinity does not cease. It remains, indeed, according to their procession and order, and the manner of that procession and order, and also according to the unity of substance in plurality, and at last in one word, ^C intelligibility. And if, though there is great preeminence there, and here it is more imperfect, yet again a great difference is seen in the creature from the image, which is indeed given to all men as a common gift, a principle of greater communication, namely in the future life for those who have made right use of the present: yet not all enjoy it equally; but some fashion that most noble provision of nature by their own will and striving, and kindle its beauty and extol it even to the heavens; others, on the contrary, as if it were something inert and formless, overwhelm it by ignorance or malice, and leave it unformed, covered by ignorance and wickedness.

And these things, then, have all been said and should be said about the divine Trinity to those who are outside, as from a certain principle common to us and to them, namely the teaching of Moses. But for us, ^D the divine Word Himself has implanted faith concerning these things beyond all reasoning. For this reason, taking upon Himself our nature, truly but in a manner befitting God, He adorned us with true opinions concerning the only God and the only Author of all things that exist, and with laws for living correctly, [removing] from the previous disorder which the father of lies had heaped upon us, [which] he would not have been able to inflict [upon us] if we had stood steadfastly by the laws. Glory, therefore, to the Word of God and the Son who has bestowed upon us such great good things.

^A For He has shown Himself to us humans not only through all His existing things and works, but even beyond all of them; and this, moreover, is continuous, and not only common to all, but to each one individually. For He held us and the whole universe within Himself intellectually from eternity, and He brought it forth temporally to the outside, having at the same time made time itself a work of the paternal and His own wise goodness. He also spiritually restored us through a mode of dispensation that is marvelous and, by a single method, healed our long-standing and varied disease from the same goodness, as an excellent physician and at the same time Father and Master. He formed us both in life and in faith, having taught us and beautifully unfolded for us the mystery of the heavenly Trinity, by which alone the one God can be worshiped rightly and genuinely. And He has become our guide, not by teachings alone, but also by His own example. Yet He did not force us toward either of these two things (for He had to avoid destroying [us] while wishing to save [us]); rather, He unexpectedly dissolved the barrier to eternal life—that corruption passing down from the seed of our lineage—for which He emptied Himself, and for which He suffered, and He paid the penalty owed to us in a flesh that had sinned not at all. But as for the volition of the children, He set before them both believing and living righteously, yet not without His own assistance, because of the difficulty that opposes both [believing and living righteously] in many ways; and He Himself, having been manifested in every way by the Father, manifested the God and Father to us. ^B He also revealed the Holy Spirit to us, for a greater manifestation of Himself, even though He had been revealed beforehand according to the opportuneness of the times, and finally as the seal of the benefits bestowed upon us. He also directs the life of each of the children who are formed by faith and volition; for it is necessary that the better things be chosen by the whole inclination of the mind, and grace immediately meets those who have thus chosen. Why is it necessary to enumerate the gifts of manifest benevolence that surpass all speech in number and magnitude, and yet remain unseen and unknown only to those whose souls' eyes are blinded? For although these things might perhaps be referred more particularly to the divine Word, our Jesus, yet the beneficence of the divine dispensation was one, from the Father and the Son in the Spirit, from one common loving-kindness; and therefore, the remedies of all kinds of happiness and salvation have always flowed forth to us indivisibly from that source. It is the same thing to praise the divine Word as it is to celebrate the whole Trinity, or rather, the one God in the Trinity of persons. To Him be glory unto the ages. Amen. ^{C D}

Letter to Plethon. Letter of Scholarios, later Patriarch Gennadios, to Plethon. On his book against the Latins concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit. Argument.

Pletho Gemistus had published a book entitled, *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit against the Latins*, in which, under the guise of propounding the opinion of the Greeks, he had outlined his own pagan system. This did not escape Gennadius; therefore, without delay, he prepared himself for a refutation and directed a response to Pletho himself. This letter, although overly prolix, denotes great shrewdness in the author. For Gennadius was in a difficult position: he needed to praise Pletho for defending the orthodox side, yet rebuke him for defending it poorly; to congratulate him on his orthodoxy while ensuring he understood it was held in doubt; to flatter him as a man of whom one must be wary, yet strike fear into him so that he would know he was perceived and that the mask under which he lay hidden was about to be torn away; yet in such a way that the words would correspond with the exterior appearance of a friendship not yet interrupted. The opening is as follows: “I have received, O best and most learned of friends, the letter which is a testimony to your friendship and benevolence toward me. You say that you have transmitted to the emperor the work which you wrote against my own discourse on Aristotle; meanwhile, however, you have published a treatise against the Latins, concerning which you are entirely silent, which seems to signify a certain rancor. It has come into my hands by chance; however, as for your response in the case of Aristotle, the emperor did not judge it in my interest that it be communicated to me; in which, if I may be permitted to say so, he acted more out of jealousy than for the sake of your glory. This writing, for which I harbor a desire, perhaps someone will transmit, not for the sake of causing gratification or annoyance.” Gennadius then recalls Pletho’s sentiments to an examination, supporting them with stronger arguments or refuting them under the guise of friendly assent. For he congratulates Pletho on the fact that he did not give his assent to the doctrines of the pagan philosophers which he brought forward in his work on the Holy Spirit. “If there were,” he says, “men so bereft of their senses as to wish to restore those ancient errors, their blindness would be utterly unworthy of indulgence.... For from the time the Word Himself came into the world to teach the dogma of divine unity, of how great a crime would he be guilty who would wish to introduce multiple gods, to stir up the ashes of polytheism extinguished for so many centuries, to devise a new Olympus, which the very brains of the poets had not dreamed of, to devise a new cult at last, a ‘simpler religion,’ as some call it, by which the republic and laws should be refashioned according to the doctrines of Zoroaster, Plato, and the Stoics: if such impieties were committed to writing and published, I profess myself ready to refute them, which another indeed could achieve with no less success: but I ask that the honor of the contest be reserved for me. I will combat the book not by fire, but by reason and truth; it is authors that are to be committed to the flames.” Pletho fell silent; but soon he released into the public sphere a *Diatribe* which he had written against Gennadius’s *Apology for Aristotle*, full of bitterness and rancor. Yet it must be admitted that in the *Apology* Gennadius had treated Pletho no less harshly. Let us listen to Minoides Mynas, the editor of this *Apology*: “It is entitled,” he says, “the present book, *Against the Aporiai of Pletho Concerning Aristotle*, but it ought to have been entitled otherwise: for in the following parts of the book, Pletho is not exposed as one who presents difficulties, but as one who lies, and is a slanderer, and a madman.” On both sides, philosophical pride turned the *controversy* into mutual vituperation.

BY SCHOLARIUS, LATTERLY GENNADIUS: TO PLETHON ON HIS REPLY TO THE BOOK CONCERNING THE LATINS, OR AGAINST THE GREEKS

I have received your letter, best and most wise of friends, and it was a pleasure to receive it, both because it was reciprocated, and because I shall admire you for the way you chose to defend yourself more aggressively. For I am always marveling at you, among other things, for whatever you achieve in wisdom and in the art of discourse. For to attain the truth in opinions regarding all things is difficult both for you and for me, and for anyone whatever, as long as we remain in this body; but to demonstrate what seems to be the case, as far as possible, by using arguments, and to be capable of saying something in response to those who understand the matters being discussed—in this especially we believe we differ. And if there was anything in the forewords of that book, or in one of your letters, which was a threat, I shall refrain from it now; not because I imagine you could never justly speak against my book—for I knew this even before—but I was intending to reply to your arguments, or to examine such matters in another way that would have been useful to both of us as philosophers, and to you, indeed, more than to the other. Therefore, for this reason, or because I had to treat your replies—which were neither according to rule nor released with due care—with neglect (for I do not wish to grieve you by saying such things), but rather [was motivated by] the greater gratitude I owe you for what you wrote against the Latin book, or [by the realization] that if I were to defend myself in other matters, even if I had to argue, I will not argue; and if silence is rather what I ought to maintain, being content with those former things, I shall for this reason especially keep silent, and I shall refrain from these second difficulties of yours once and for all. For whether, because of you, Plato might appear better than Aristotle—to whom he did not previously seem equal in all respects—or whether through me, Aristotle might now be preserved in the opinion he has long held among the majority and the wiser ones, does not concern me much. And whether we both might seem to speak in a way that is possible regarding the matters we champion in external arguments, or whether neither of us might effectively aid the other, but these things might seem merely to be a display for the judges, even this does not concern me so much at the present; for the truth... ^{B C D}

^A with regard to such matters, we would not ourselves become judges of one another, regarding things about which we have already disagreed, nor would we trust others to judge, since they are involved in the same passion, and some are attached to one, others to the other of the two philosophers, and neither party could be a credible arbiter of the other's position. But as for insults and such unseemliness, who would be slow or hesitant [to avoid] any part of them? For not even in the case of one's enemies would a sensible and upright man pray that they should have the upper hand, let alone in his own case, unless perhaps some more divine and invincible cause forced him at some point to begin. As for these and such like, I for my part say that I have no concern at all right now. But that we keep our ancestral piety—while pleasing both God ^B and all prudent men—and do not, by setting aside our true opinions for other things, fall into impiety, this, as you know, has long been and shall be—God willing—my concern, so that such "second-best" results may not befall many. For we do not fear such a thing for our own sakes, God be my witness. For the sake of those things for which we were thought enviable by the many, there is nothing we have not gladly set aside. For it was not possible, it seems, to enjoy those things properly and yet persuade others, by both word and deed, to be sensible. Yet there are at this time not a few such people among us, whom you yourself said you feared; but as to how the Latins might never become superior to us and to our arguments, do not fear. So far were we from exchanging piety and human honor, which some do not hesitate to babble about, their deeds sounding ^C in opposition to them—truly displaying the intent and power of little dogs, that they vomit up their anger in insults as those do with barking, failing far more in necessary things than they exceed in the excesses of the superfluous and worse. And if they grow angry for the sake of some honor, we will not hesitate to compare them to greater things—to foxes and to Actaeon’s hounds. You, however, have always been friendly to the nation and the Church in these matters under dispute, and never in any way burdensome, and now you have shown this by the greatest evidence; so if some, being of such a character, had previously escaped notice, it would no longer be possible for them, either to themselves or to those who attempt slander, to demonstrate the positions of those who are ignorant or willfully evil regarding you. How then would anyone who is attempting to contradict or is envious be able to prevail against one who fights for the most important and most intimate things, such a ^D useful man? For if you were exonerating me from two lawsuits, defending me in the greatest one, and I were prevailing in all my existing claims; yet you were plotting against me where I ought not to have been harmed at all, either by prosecuting or by siding with the prosecutor—would it be reasonable that I, having granted you thanks for the benefits you were eager to provide, should bear a grudge for a very small injustice and attempt to retaliate in return? Very far from it. And if also for the sake of justice, and for many other things which concern you no less than they concern ourselves, these things also ought to have compelled us, disregarding our own interests, to reward him who benefits the common good, even if we had reason to reproach him privately, while letting go, and—when it was in our power to cross-examine—not cross-examining him. Therefore, for this reason, I shall not reply in writing to those arguments, whatever they may seem to be when they are eventually seen, but I shall allow you to enjoy those points which you have improvised against Aristotle and me, as those who have seen them say, whether to defend yourself or to make a display, as if this were for you a diversion [and] for those who would most gladly see you struggling with anger and shouting, even though you have been nearly thrown three times; for it would not seem so to us, just as they say of the Cumaeans. And what is more, I could even concede to you that Plato and Aristotle are talking nonsense alike. For what gain would there be, whichever of the two were more highly esteemed? Those who were not able, or were not considered worthy, to attain the most gainful truth—which has been the cause for themselves and for others of missing the mark in the case of other things which happen to be lower in the order of being—have fallen into error in one way or another. But if they were able to be at all useful to those who use them, this can also be obtained from others, by a choice which is not easier for the many, but by less intense labor. These few, however, are those who, illuminated by the light of sacred instruction, having set up this as a kind of pedagogue by the wisdom from those others, have themselves become far better than Aristotle and Plato and their like, and make those who associate with their books such people as well. And many have indeed become such through them, that they far surpass not only those mentioned, but even Hermes himself and Apollo and the Muses, and all to whom Greek wisdom refers. For the works of those among the Greeks who were first in wisdom were, for the most part, worse than those of the most worthless laypeople, in that their preoccupation with all things sensible could not lead man to the participation in the higher and to the hunting of the Good of being, even if one were to revolve around them theoretically without being in the least in contact with them by sense; for concerning the intelligible realm, nothing was clear to them concerning which any hope might be firm, even as it was known by them; but they exercised their practice concerning divine things just as they would any other of the sciences, and much worse, in that it was with less certainty; that indeed some of them considered certain of the perceptible things to be much better, and such as each one himself supposed them to be, from certain myths or their own preconceptions and principles, from which he was spurred on, thinking it to be at times more true than the others. Nor did it escape even those men themselves that they held nothing certain concerning them, unless in so far as they made use of the deception of the laypeople, paying attention to oracles and to the sources from them, by which they were not deceived.

^A For indeed it was not without reason that they all, having displayed works almost entirely inconsistent with their profession of life, gained nothing from their rough cloaks and their idle talk in the porches or the promenades; so that, if some men were to enter the bodies of asses and other animals along with that same philosophy and those fine doctrines—if the transmigrations and the discourses about them were true—they would be these very people.

But those who were leaders of our holy faith, straightway from the start of that providence of the Greater One, and for a very long time, not only lived better than their own discourse, but also lived better than all discourse, ^B as was likely for those who, for the sake of the wisdom of God—which deigned to become related to men—followed after it. Of lines and numbers and the observation of the heavens, and of natural science, some indeed understood not even the beginning; for as they cared little for the enjoyment of these things, they considered the knowledge of them, and the passions that pertain to them, to be nothing worthy of respect, and in this they did very well. For if the knowing of such things were to lead to the despising of them—to those at least who possess understanding—and to becoming enamored of the beauty which is above all these, being still hidden, why would they need to labor concerning such knowledge, when they could achieve it by a path that is easiest and most just, and by sure experience, along with the Beloved himself, in so far as it is possible?

And those who knew these things used them no more than those who were ignorant of them, except perhaps when it was necessary to refute those who took pride only in this empty pursuit and to show that the things that seemed to oppose our holy faith from that source were what they needed to be shown to be, and to show that they could not boast, or to show how, through the ignorance of others who were aiming at better things, they mock the true philosophers, while they themselves are fastened to the knowledge of visible things.

All, however, found true wisdom with such zeal, not without guidance from it, and when found, they honored it so much that they were willing to die for it and its laws and to be dead throughout their life—which is indeed the definition of living according to it accurately—much more than those who merely claim philosophy is the practice of death, or who practice it in the absence of death and the evils of the body, which are much worse than death, but struggle in deed; ^C but rather, having demonstrated their intent to all, not through words but through deeds, they did not just philosophize this way as individuals and make others do the same, but they did so in numbers that it is difficult to count; for entire cities and nations embraced this highest sect and practiced it, not in a long time, but immediately, casting aside every obstacle, and the allurements in this life, so that, never having been delighted by them, they straightway forgot them for the drink of true life.

And I believe that not only of men of all time, but of all those who ever existed from eternity, as the Greeks supposed, ^D there would be seen so many having philosophized in deed and having shown their intention, as many as one ruler in one city in one day saw philosophizing (not having been able by the cruelty of his cookery, by which he approached their bodies, to hope to turn the blessed ones away from right thinking and the certain hope they had in Him), or one who might have brought the blessed ones into the commonwealth in the heavens, in the space of one generation anywhere, and if it happened, under one guide, having philosophized genuinely.

But as for the whole multitude of those captured by the truth, from the time it began to turn men toward itself through itself, who would not be struck with awe upon grasping it? So far is the philosophy according to Christ from being comparable to that of any men, and—all together with the multitude of those who were made better—so quickly was it perfected, to such an extent that this cosmos (whose end of constitution many hold to be man, and if not of the whole, at least of as many of the things that come into being as are principles of the things in it) ran the risk of having come into being in vain, and the generations and lives and desires of men having been added to all time in vain, had God not thus willed the manifestation of the supernatural truth, [D (corrected position)] so that even when it was revealed, and yet remained hidden to the more dull-witted, and while it seemed to turn them away from the supernatural nature of the teachings no less than from the mode of instruction, it nevertheless drew everyone to itself through the things strangely operative again, and such a swarm of men was led swiftly to the knowledge of the truth, and to the whole virtue through it, and to the communion of the divine in a well-ordered way. Thus it was that the most necessary and best end to which human affairs—and all things that are and come into being for the sake of man—should arrive was not neglected, the end toward which the will of the Maker aimed from the beginning, as was likely. Therefore, since the school opened according to Christ had to be opened at some time, the natural and earthly speculations concerning supernatural things receded, and the holy dogmas were planted in men, and these were consistent with the deeds of those who believed. And the power of the demons was no longer anywhere; but the name of Jesus, who broke this, prevailed over them and over all the nature of infirmities, and the friendship with these near-earthly ones, which had long held sway over men, was dissolved, and the path leading to heaven for those ascending to God grew day by day, with myriads from all the inhabited earth, some from the struggle for Christ, others from the laborious study of His laws, resolving with many open promises and foretastes of the future blessed life. And all that fought against this best innovation was refuted, attempting it in vain; but the power of Christ was miraculously perfected in the natural weakness of those who believed in Him. And nature was refuted by the miracles...

^A of some, and others were made to rejoice in them; and in time, all things that were hidden will be made manifest.

But you have gladdened us not a little, by exposing the rubbish of the Hellenes—and not, perhaps, in a perfunctory way—so that if any were deceived by some into being unaware of it, they might learn and condemn it. And you have shown that the Latins—who, as you said, started from the same premise in the letter they sent you—either accuse the Hellenes in vain, or are themselves caught in the very same ignorance. For there is no longer any room for those who slander your soul and insist that you think [what they claim], things which clearly you despise; nor will any who know these things that you have written to the Latins believe them. And I, by the holy truth, thought that I was hearing Plato himself and Aristotle, both complaining and crying out that they had been most grievously wronged by you, having learned their solemn teachings, only to later abandon them; which, indeed, all of us who have been illuminated by the truth would have blamed, had they been present. Nay, rather, they themselves would have praised us for thus disparaging their own [teachings], having learned by experience that their transgression against the Divine nature profited them nothing, nor did it deliver them from that fortunate deification [of the Christians]. But the zealots of their teachings today, out of their ignorance, would have become even more harsh toward you, if it were possible, ^B casting aside all shame concerning the most base of matters, and crying out in public that you had acted unjustly. For your judgment does not have the power to ^C—for the establishment of the truth, the truth itself and its works are sufficient, as is the multitude of those who have been established in it through reason and virtue—any one of whom, if he despises it and wishes to believe in himself rather than in them, such a one could rightly be thought to be suffering the things of the mad: that he dares to revive falsehood, and to be trampled and suffocated, whereas he would have fared well through that [truth] which nothing escapes, in whose sight that [false] opinion is headstrong. But you, as if giving an injunction, will say that one should honor Aristotle where it is necessary, and Plato, but condemn them where they speak against the law; for it is precisely in these matters that they have been caught having suffered defeat. Or how could it be reasonable not to distinguish ^D the essence of God from His energy, not even in the slightest truth, when the nature itself is fundamentally different, and that "what it is to be" is something distinct even within God Himself? If one intends not to babble these names in vain, and is to enjoy neither the unity of them—as they might say—nor the distinction, he is not to say that some are children of God produced from His essence—if indeed the energy is the same as the nature completely—and then not deem God equal by nature? But all others are beings of a different substance, and are brought forth as far inferior. For...

^A one ought not say that any being has been produced from the substance of God—if one must express the energy in terms of them—but rather that God is utterly childless and sterile. And yet, if this were so, He himself would most certainly be one, and a single monad, as they say, which would be far better than dividing the Godhead into many. But the creation would not have come to be from God; rather, it would have been from spontaneity, or it would not have existed at all—not only because it would have been impossible, given that those children of His who co-create and co-govern it did not exist (for they would both need to exist for them), but also because His own energy is sterile, being the same as His substance completely. Therefore, they ought either to decree things after this fashion, or else, saying that children have been begotten from the substance of God—and many of them at that—they should deem them to be of the same substance, all consubstantial, and simply possessed of equal power, both in this universe and in its parts. And yet, this way, they would need to be only of that nature, and none of them would be created things; for God would hardly be about to bring forth other things by His energy, lest those too be gods, having been brought forth by the same principle, given that it would ^B necessarily be the same energy and substance altogether. Or, if they were as well, all beings would be gods, whether they were begotten from God by substance in like manner, or were from the children of God, just as they themselves happen to be brought forth from Him. For no human argument could be given for why God would bring forth all beings from His substance—or from His energy—yet not all be gods, if some of them are gods for this very reason, that they proceeded from His substance; or why those who are children of God, having come forth from His substance, would not bring forth gods, inasmuch as they would bring them forth from their own substance. But that one should proceed from the substance of God and not have the substance of God is equally as absurd as it is to say that all things that have come from God have in some way partaken of His substance. For just as there, the things which ought to be far different from Him and not worth comparing to Him will be equal to God, so here, things will be unlike Him which ought not to have differed in any way. But if, being a law and a producer of many, he brings into being things other than himself (the concern of how things coming from His substance would be such was raised earlier), while remaining in himself and in his own unity without any change, and will be one, as one absolutely indivisible, and truly like a monad, why then would His works not be far better? For some of these do not become causes of things by energy alone, but even by nature, and they do not create by art alone, but also bring forth by nature. To these, it would be far better to share the form of the nature even with the lesser beings, than to bring forth many things similar only to the will, not only in the permanence of the form, but simply so. And that it is better to possess, in addition to those bringing forth things only by nature, things which also create by art, everyone would say. But if it were possible, as in a hypothesis, to examine things divided differently, those that create things by art alone would live less happily than those causing things to be by both nature and art. Even now, among human beings, one lives much more famously and more happily from the two ^C than from the frequent making of so many beds, or whatever one might say of things made by art, which are indeed unlike in nature but are in some way made assimilated to the inner form through choice. And if cares regarding the rearing of children, standing in the way of contemplation, did not persuade those who are very much in love with contemplation to wish to be childless, and at the same time all other things connected to child-rearing, both before and after, were not difficult, then he who avoids this because he thinks that bringing forth some products of art is sufficient for his own happiness would be most wretched, and a stranger to true pleasure; especially since we know that these things are done for the sake of man and are valued for their utility, not for themselves. Therefore, as a man is better than a bed or a stool, so much better would it be to beget a man than to create any of those. And by as much as that for the sake of which something is produced is more precious than that which is produced for the sake of the other, by so much is it natural for begetting a man to be more precious than making a house for a man, if one were to prize them for their true value and not exchange them for some utility. But they, wishing to bring forth nothing from God according to the likeness of nature, but only things other than Himself, absolutely declare Him to be sterile and limping in the most beautiful part of the production—to which they also make His own happiness and blessedness fade away together. For how could He be ranked in the height of blessedness if He did not possess a self-sufficient life, acting in Himself and toward Himself and for the sake of Himself, but needed things much baser than Himself—whether brought forth at some time, as the holy Word teaches, or from all eternity, as they wished? If He were acting upon them and upon things related to them, and turning these toward Himself, would He thus possess His energy and His substance in an active state, and would His blessedness and perfection be hung upon things baser than Himself? For God must be prior in nature to such things as His creations, just as, at any rate, that of which there is a trace must be prior in nature to that trace; for they say that beings are as it were traces of God. In that prior being, then, the divine will be ^D mindless and unloved—according to them—or, to speak simply, not active in any way. For it is not sufficient to foresee beings, as things going to be immediately, nor the idea of the world having been produced before the world; for even this they set as inferior to God as those who say so, since it was not even produced from the necessity of nature. For either now God will not know Himself alone, being mind, or [He will know Himself] by knowing other things; and what would be more absurd than this, if these things are inconsistent indeed, while God is what He is, both good and true, in the extreme and purity of both substance and goodness and truth? For even the more approved of the Greeks themselves thought fit to reverse these. And the holy Word deems God Himself to be the Truth, and that no one is good except one, God; and that all things and "the Being" itself exist under Him, and that He is the best and most prudent Mind—not only we, but these same Greeks themselves say so. For to Himself indeed...

God would be for no other reason than that which is the primary and most principal of all. Being Mind, He might surely conceive of Himself, if indeed He must conceive the truth, and He Himself is that truth. ^A And He might be enamored of the Good; for surely the Good will not be alone, not rejoicing in the Good. And He will be enamored of Himself, if indeed He must rejoice and delight in that which is best, and He Himself is the Good. That very intelligible, by which He conceives Himself, and the intellection, have been revealed as the divine Word, being a likeness of Him and a kind of innate idea and truth itself; and not only in God does He exist as God Himself, but also toward God, as the scriptures intend. But that Love, by which God is turned toward Himself and is enamored of Himself, being the Good, has been revealed as the divine Spirit, being good and holy, and Goodness itself, and Holiness itself, and Sanctification itself by nature. And thus God exists in Himself threefold, and there are three substances in Him, in extreme unity of nature. For surely one should not say that the divine Word, who is ^B the abyss of all divine intellections, is not existing as God. Or how could there be a true idea of God, as a kind of natural likeness of Him, and image, and "character," and innate effulgence, and again an idea as a kind of transcendent archetype of the things created according to the likeness of the will of Him who begets and of Himself, who is God by nature, unless there stood composed a God-Mind relative to God Himself, who is the same by nature, though relative in conception and set in opposition? And there would be that which is innate to the divine mind and an equal likeness, even if less than the divine mind, not also similar by virtue of its existence; whereas the idea and the word in God, being far inferior to the works of God, would not exist, although supereminent over all things infinitely. But what more would the divine word have than the word in us, at least in that which pertains to the nature of the word—I mean, to be comprised in the mind as a kind of form, in some way made like to the intelligible and to the thinker? For the word in us is not a separate substance, but exists rather in the substance of the mind, being existentially distinguished from it—for it is not simply, but [only] insofar as it is intelligible. It was necessary, therefore, that the divine Word be adorned by the identity of divinity through the simplicity of the divine nature, but by the property of substance be worthy of the One who conceived Him, and just as He is truly [in the act of] thinking, so is He strictly conceived. ^C And the same argument applies also concerning the divine Spirit, if one should wish to apply the things previously said to Him as well, according to the traditions delivered concerning Him while preserving the difference in the persons. ^D At the same time, that it is not necessary to extend to more than these the divine substances is clear to those who scrutinize the matter both reasonably and piously. For there is nothing of the things said about God that could not be well referred to these substances and their processions, whether it be goodness or anything of that kind. So that it is not necessary, by any necessity, that there should be more internal and natural fruitfulness than the number of substances we know and believe to be, [except for that which is] productive; nor that the divine Word should be compelled to beget or to proceed—conceiving Himself, and being enamored of Himself and of the Begetter and of the connatural Spirit—or that the Spirit should [be compelled] to proceed and beget, for the sake of intellection and love, which must also appertain to Him. For each of these two conceives and loves, insofar as it is proceeding from God, and proceeding thus, but not as God and Father, from whom both have come forth, and insofar as it is receiving, and receiving with another, not in the same way the same thing, but not insofar as it is able to communicate with another, which would be the same as communicating in divine things with the Father, which is a necessity. For by having been brought forth, and in a way not the same, even if connatural, they are distinguished only by the mode of the One who brought them forth, and from one another. And therefore, this alone being preserved, one must scrutinize and posit the communion in other things; and it would be preserved, while the fruitlessness of both the intellection and the love that are present is taken away—as God, the intelligible and begotten, the Word; and as God, the Beloved and the One brought forth, the Spirit—so that there is the principle of these, conceiving it and loving it, which is the same as solely being [one] that conceives and loves fruitfully (for everyone has deemed that which is strictly equal there as being equivalent to [the ability to act] at once); but as for the two, let the intellection itself be the intelligible and the other, the Word of God, and the love itself and the Beloved be the Holy Spirit; which would be the same as conceiving fruitlessly and loving. And just as God and Father is conceived by both and is loved likewise, but is not brought forth by both—so too these [are to be understood as] conceiving and loving one another and the Father, neither the Father being brought forth again, nor being brought forth by one another. And since the divine nature is in all [of them], being both conceived and loved, and it [being] also the case that conceiving and seeing are the one thing there, even if in a different way, in truth and in reality and not by mere conception, as some have ranted, they are distinct, [yet] one in nature, one Mind and God, the three substances being and being believed by those of sound mind; for the [fact of] intellection there and love has distinguished [them] by the fruitful and the fruitless, and has established only the Sole Cause and the sole caused [ones], from the references and properties of which the three substances must necessarily follow.

The Word of God Himself is more trustworthy than us and our argument, testifying to Himself and to the divine Spirit, as having proceeded from God according to substance, and being in Him by nature no less, and in one another. The holy theology of the Jews is also clear, pre-delineating and announcing in advance the truth about divine things that was to shine forth later, proposing in the word of the Lord the

^A frame and constitution of beings, and metaphorically—by the Spirit of His mouth—attributing to Him their preservation and their persistence in being, and designating that things exist and that they exist well, in so far as this concerns their personal specificity (for since God is one, all things are His works, containing within themselves both existence and existence well). And further, he posits the Word as the efficient cause of the truth of things, in as much as it is that which makes them like the idea of the divine will; and the Spirit as that which turns them back toward the Good, to which each thing must, according to its own nature, both yearn and reach out. But both would belong to the divine and greatest power, since without God nothing of beings, whatever it might be, would be able to exist, or to have true existence, or to have turned back toward God.

^C But indeed, some of those who have honored the teachings of the Greeks, having said that the Good, the Intellect, and the Soul are the primordial substances, and that they are three sustaining causes of beings, and [having proposed] a triple ordering of gods—what else are they doing but sounding in harmony with the Trinity venerated by us? In what way have they differed from the truth according to Christ, as was indeed to be expected? For it was necessary for the precision of the heavenly dogma to be revealed through the truth itself; but for the testimonies to it to be provided—because of the weakness and contentiousness of men—partly from the less perfect and, one might say, introductory theology, and partly from that which is entirely alien and a bastard deification, if one were to be careful to pay close attention, having at the same time received this something [valuable] from God. I leave aside all those things which the sons of the Greeks, while elevating the Trinity, call counsel, and prudence, and piety, and harmony, and concord, and virtue, and perfection, and all the most solemn of names, as they extend wondrously through numbers, and magnitudes, and the nature of this universe with much power and beauty. They would not have distinguished all things so, unless it were innate to the cause of all—as is fitting for the highest of both sensible and intelligible things—and from there it adorned its own works with a proportionate likeness as it descended, so that, just as the things here participate in existence from God, so also from harmony, and perfection, and every beautiful thing, through the image of the transcendent Trinity that they enjoy, they might be in the best possible state and most like the One who made them, as much as is possible. And such is the theology according to Christ; but as for that of the Greeks, you will say, no sound, no solemn, thing exists in it, O men. For in the multitude of their divinities and gods they have made use of nothing that is necessary; for while ostensibly placing the one God above all, in reality they have raised up for Him so many sharers and partners in the entirety of His power and authority, and by lowering the most solemn title into so many degrees, they have done injustice to the first and to all those after Him, and have acted insolently toward the very nature which they honor with this title. For how can they be gods, those who have limited power, with one ordered after another by nature, down to the last one, whom ^D some final divinity has adorned, and who has been appointed to the constitution of this whole universe, not according to the proportion of nature, so as to serve not only the greater one, but also one another? And if God did not produce them by one power extending in various ways over all things, but if we go looking for many powers distributed to each thing—these ones which we shall be led to call gods, and not only to call them so, but also to venerate, as being certain natures existing alongside God, and performing His work, and governing this whole—how did He produce these gods, being possessed of different powers, and greater and lesser, by one power extending in various ways over all things? For, in the same way, we would also be led to seek other gods prior to those more familiar to the Greeks, and causes of them, and before those others by the same reasoning, and this unto infinity; since the infinite superiority of God in nature over His works allows us to always take others before those already taken, because it is not right, they say, for God to be engaged immediately in the creation of the inferior, if not through some better nature; and thus it is necessary for them to have infinite gods, whom they wrong by circumscribing them with a certain number. And yet it would have been more reasonable to posit these as infinite, since they have already fragmented the divine nature into many pieces, as if the infinite were [fittingly] attributed to it from every side; unless they would say that the multitude is a demonstration of some weakness. And in this way they would also war with themselves, as we have already said. For it was not necessary to posit more gods, attaching weakness to the divine nature. So, on both counts they err, either by placing them in a certain number when they should be infinite in multitude, or by declaring them weak, as if by some infinite difference they are striking off the inferior gods from the divine power and dignity; for the status of Apollo would be nothing, let alone that of Hermes and those even below him, there being so many gods before them who are higher, through whom the divinity has descended by a certain degree onto them. And to deify the very bodies that are moved by them—how is this not impious? For these things indeed, on account of their size, and strength, and beauty, and permanence, one should indeed admire greatly. But it is necessary to send the admiration for them directly to the Creator, just as spectators who have a mind [would do with] a most beautiful building; so too should we, while admiring them as the works of God, but being struck by, and reverencing, and venerating the art and the craftsman before them. Just as one who has a mind would not say that some house is the work of a man who has worked most excellently, if it just happened to be so, so also one ought not to address and worship the sun and moon as gods, perceiving that they are works of God, and so beautiful in themselves, and of this entire universe a cosmos, and for the inferior...

^A parts as well, it would have been necessary to extend one’s reverence, as they possess much that is worthy of admiration and are from God. There is no work of God, even if it be the smallest thing, which one would not admire strangely. And the wonder is much greater in the smallest things, God having implanted in them, instead of the defects of great size, a certain wisdom and strange methods, as a demonstration of His power. Hence, that curiosity, which has tripped up many of the wiser ones—what they suffered regarding the greater phenomena in the world, being struck with awe by them, and this led them to deify and worship them—is something that neither side has reasonably done; but it is more reasonable for the many, seeing that, whereas it was necessary for their leaders to transfer divine reverence to the works of God, they themselves did not grudge such honor to any of the works, inasmuch as a certain transcendent wisdom of God is manifest to all, and they are able to lead those who seemed to be inferior in quantity toward a greater wonder, and there is nothing among them in which there is not a causal quality of some kind, and something useful. But what of the trodden-down Demeter, and the quenching Hephaestus, and the bitter and destructive Poseidon? And what of the masculine and feminine among the gods? And what of the fact that some are set over the good, and others over the worse, both among those who exist in nature and those who have been created by men themselves? And they even deify certain men, and others they place among the stars, and there is nothing of the absurd that they do not fabricate, as if they were deliberately wishing to drive out the perfection, simplicity, independence, infinity, impassibility, omnipotence, and providence of God. Through which they pull themselves down into such shames and passions, differing greatly from the best and most venerable designation and reality. Although truly it is very reasonable to posit certain separable substances—not, however, as creators of the things that are, in any way, nor as sharing the beginning of the universe with God, believing that the power, by its infinity, extends to all things and brings forth the natures of existing things—but we believe that those separable substances serve God’s providence toward us, not as the Greeks fabricate; and that there are certain demons who are harmful through envy and spite, and are the authors of wanderings and myriads of evils for men—those who are most easily led by their lack of refinement to the plots of those beings—these, we know, were not such in their beginning nor were they created by God as such, but turned to such things by boldness, willfulness, and a worse choice, and were abandoned by God; and we know them and turn away from them thus, and we keep ourselves impassible to them through the oversight of the ministers of God’s goods. But how could we say that any of the godhead belongs to them, when we do not even grant this to the good? And it is necessary for certain ones among men to become blessed, but as blessed men. And that things are governed by others, to the ^B point of the fulfillment of God’s providence and government, is true. For it was necessary that there be something good and beneficial for the governed things themselves, and that each of these should exist; for thus the authority of Him who remains the governor of existing things would shine more brightly, with many things serving Him, and all things in due order, where one is wonderfully linked to another, as in the order of nature, so indeed also of the ministry. But as far as concerns the reason of government, we believe that all things are governed directly by God, through divine wisdom and power; for they apply in the principle of infinity, which extends even to the last things. For it was not possible for God to have constructed the world through Himself, but not to manage this through Himself, nor to have imposed the calculation of order upon those things that have come to be by Him—both then and now—unless it were through a lack of strength or reason, of which, moreover, nothing of the sort is appropriate for God. Nor could He have an account that is capable and knowing, yet look down upon them, thinking that He is diminished by the providence of these particular and lowly things. For if He will not be in any way inferior by working in them, but is indeed working all things in all, and since the bringing of the ability to act flows appropriately from Him to all, then it would hardly damage His worth to care for the order within them, which would demonstrate His transcendent power no less than the former.

These things, then, you might say to them, most excellent of men, and other things far better than these, but similar in aim, showing how great is the difference between Greek superstition and our theology. And in addition to these, that they ought not to condemn the Church of any ignorance, if she did not accept the Greek claim. For without her being convinced by a greater claim that she ought to despise this and everything else, she often found in the struggles against the heretics things by which it is not necessary, by reason of this proposition, to posit either the Son of God or the Holy Spirit as of a different substance from the Father; for all those of the party of Arius, naturally sick with the Greek illness, used this very proposition of theirs as a certain principle of the falsehood against the divine hypostases; but having found it, she showed it clearly to all, and rendered such a verdict. And God bore witness to the verdict from above, revealing many signs that those who, instead of the Church’s claim, contentiously insisted on the Greek claim, and did not depart from it after the Church’s confession in the better and more accurate parts, are hated by God. For indeed, that which exists for the sake of something else differs somewhere from that which exists for the sake of that other, but it is not at all necessary that they differ by nature. For otherwise, everything that exists from something would have differed by nature from that from which it is. But there is also something ^D that exists for the sake of another, which is by nature the same as that for which it is. For Peter, on the one hand, exists for the sake of Zebedee...

and he himself, in relation to the word, does not differ. For ^A in that which is for the sake of another, the Zebedee exists—in that way, Peter is from him; for at the same time the Zebedee would have been from the same father, and Peter from the Zebedee. But if it be posited that the Zebedee himself is not from another, if he should bring forth Peter, as he now does by his own nature, he would have brought forth him by his own nature. And the hypothesis is not impossible; for sacred teaching intends that a certain man was first. But if he also exists on account of God, we should not examine this here; for the cause is not of the same kind. But in the case of God, it is altogether true—that he exists for the sake of nothing else, but entirely for the sake of himself. If, therefore, nothing prevents a certain individual generated from another from also bringing forth another according to the species of nature, what prevents us from believing that God also brings forth an individual from himself in the species of nature? For if not even the Zebedee would have been hindered—if it were possible for him to have been the first man—from bringing forth Peter, this very thing of being generated from nothing, provided that he were such and could perform such things, how could the state of being from nothing hinder God from bringing forth something from himself, provided that he is omnipotent, and by nature and will most perfect and best? Let this, then, be included among the things that God is able to do: to be able to beget a Son equal to himself; and it would be a mark of powerlessness, on the other hand, *not* to be able. Thus, therefore, there is no necessity that everything which exists for the sake of another must be by nature distinguished from that for which it is, any more than there is a necessity that nothing at all can be in any way from that which is from nowhere; nor is there a necessity that the Son of God be, by nature, something other than he who begat him, as the followers of Arius wished—who, if he were not such, would not even be from God at all, as the Greek and their axiom seemed to demand. But altogether, if that which is from nothing, but is unbegotten and causeless, ought to be the only thing that exists, and since it is not from something in any way, nor could anything else have proceeded from it in any way—not even if those so-called gods and sons of God were such, nor could anything else of existing things have come to be from him. But if this is indeed not a necessity—for many things have been produced and come to exist from the Unbegotten in any way whatsoever—what is the necessity that the Unbegotten should not also beget univocally? For he will certainly not be unable to beget things that are unlike, while being unable to beget things that are like—which has already been proven—as though one of the fertile beings could beget what is degenerate, but could not bring forth what is genuine. Nor will he be a beginning of some things according to will, but of none according to nature; for they are not the same in both respects, to whom the "what is" is not the same; nor will he be fertile in one way and barren in another. Nor, if he should have the nature the same as the acting entirely, will he be a cause of some things according to the nature of those same things which he also brings forth by action, and nothing will result from this, in that he is also brought forth by nature. But if nature and essence were in some way shown to have truly differed in him, he will bring forth by action and not by nature. Nor will he do other things while exercising intelligence, but not exercise intelligence in making other things, so that what is contained in ^B his own thought and Word is not of God, and his own image. Nor will other things of God, because he himself is from nothing, be from him, while his Word, for this very reason, will *not* be, or the Holy Spirit. But so long as there is not one single necessity that God be barren because he is unbegotten, or that nothing be because of him because he is because of himself, the argument of the Greeks and the Arians will have no force; but there will be that which is because of itself, and that which is because of another, not in the same way; yet they will not differ by the same distinction in every respect, but by number, if something is from him because of his nature, and by species and essence, if it is because of his will. And the difference of powers is not the greatest in all respects, but if something ^C were unbegotten, and both by nature and by will most perfect and best, it might create, having willed, as things made by craft, and by power it would most of all differ from those things that have come to be by him in a physical way; rather, they will differ from him; but things that have proceeded from him in a physical way, by the Unbegotten alone and by the being from the Unbegotten, and altogether by the difference in number, they will be separated, while the nature itself is entirely the same; and thus [it is] more the same than in the case of Zebedee and Peter, inasmuch as there, because of matter, the species of nature in both differed by number; but here, because of immateriality and infinity, the nature—or to say the same thing, the divinity—is by nature one, and exists for the sake of itself and those brought forth from it in this way. And if it is necessary to be more precise, God is simply because of himself, and because of nothing else; whereas the creation is judged to have the greatest difference of powers, as they themselves say, having come to be and existing for the sake of other things, clearly for the sake of God. But the divine Word is not because of something else, nor is the Spirit, nor did the Word and the God who brought him forth differ by the being for the sake of something else and the being for the sake of itself; for how could they, having the same nature by number? But rather by the "because of himself" and the "because of another," so that the difference might not seem to reach toward the hypostases themselves, but not toward the nature. In those things in which the unity according to nature is so bright, the state of being because of himself and because of him does not introduce any difference of powers; ^D or rather, it makes a great difference, because in this alone they have differed, saving their distinctness unmixed, and just as they would not themselves take on the property of that which is because of itself, so it would never move toward the state of the caused; yet an individual and personal difference, or that of nature, could not harm the unity, nor perform works in the Father that are inferior or weaker in any of the things coming into the essence. For if, by not being able to pass into the properties of one another, they also differ by nature, they will in no way be inferior to the Father by nature, because each is not also Father, even though what the Father is, they are too, or the Father himself will suffer this very thing, by not being able to be them, even though he is what they are. But he will not have any less power in them at all because of such incommunicability, nor will he be better or worse in essence; for such a thing is rather a matter of power than of weakness.

^A And in this respect they would be more similar to the preceding [principle] in essence and power, or if it were possible for them to lapse back into their own property, while that one remains immutable with respect to its own properties. For it is not the case that the former was brought to a worse state, and the latter to a better, if one considers that being brought forth from God co-naturally is of no less glory to the one bringing forth; and if it is necessary in the Godhead for there to be something bringing forth, and things being brought forth, and for the one God within himself and towards himself to possess a certain distinction of this kind, such as we have already spoken of.

These things, then, you will say at some time to those who will raise objections, and you will say more besides. But now, as for the theology of the Greeks, being such as it is, it is well studied by you; for which I am now and shall always be grateful to you, especially regarding the struggle against the Latins. And the Latins themselves would justly be grateful to you, being able to profit so much from those fine words, and they might scorn that dignity through which one might even risk bringing in some Arian and Hellenic theology from a long sojourn [abroad], having set it out naively for himself. But if they were neither profited nor complained—but rather enjoyed what resulted from the premise upon which you said they now attempt to base the entire strength of their dogma—for having struggled to support it with many other things before, much weaker than the one in question, since, as it seems, they found those things clearly refuted, they thought they discovered something wise in this ^B—a premise with which they hoped to lead us astray through sophistry. How, then, will they not be persuaded by all those things, positing this as necessary? For they should not any more call the Son the pro-biller of the Spirit, because he would have to share in the power of billing with the Father, or [else one must say] that the Father is not a pro-biller or begetter, nor is there any Son of God or Holy Spirit, because they would have to be, if they existed, inferior in essence, neither being generative of others nor producing. For as long as they are placed in that dignity, and yet believe in the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, they admit the Son and Spirit to have a lesser divinity, as being inferior in power to the Father, since he alone is unbegotten, while they are produced by him and produce nothing else. And we indeed thought they used to struggle only regarding the Spirit, depriving him of a certain productive power, which they legislate to have become common to the Father and the Son alone. But these men, as you have shown, began to do the terrible thing from the divine Word himself—or if not they themselves, at least their argument does. And what is more astonishing is that, becoming aware that they are being carried toward such [conclusions] themselves, they try to avoid the terrible thing more quickly with a much worse mechanism which leads to the very same [place]; for they posit the paternal powers, as they themselves say, to be common to both of those who proceed from him, and then, whether in the Son the one remains without activity ^C as it seems to them, so that they might have what is proposed, or [if they are] different, as we indeed think, they seem absurd to themselves, or by an eternal power (but one common to the Trinity), or by the work of this power, which is temporal, they claim to construct an eternal order of one divine person towards another. From there, then, in no way, but in other ways we ourselves, and all those before us, grasp the necessity of the order, to whom neither with the foundations of the faith, nor with the teachers of the Church, does any inconsistent thing occur, as happens in the Latins’ entanglement of the divine.

But as for this, that is enough; for ^D they do not allow this in the Spirit, but they judge that neither activity belongs to him; putting forward also that these are inactive. Knowing how much those who posit this will depart from Christianity, even if they had hoped to act without being noticed—they did not do so because they themselves believe this, but because they valued the union to win us over above all else. But there would be no greater absurdity than this; for the Son of God to be set up by them as the pro-biller of the Spirit from powers that are given and then taken away again, or given for a greater diminution, while power is at the same time given for action, is something they expect us not to perceive, as it is neither reasonable nor far from the sacred [teachings], and thus they command them to follow them: just as if it were possible for something to be in God at random, which they would not even grant to nature and to her works; or for any power to be the perfection of anything at all, unless there is also some activity of its own that accompanies it; or for God to have some power of activity without those things that follow from his being by nature, not by will, or whatever other bad things follow to their doctrine from this principle here. These things, therefore, you have sufficiently refuted, and by discourse you have demonstrated the faith that is ancestral to us. This is what I most rejoice in of what can be said to the Latins. For it is not possible that they should all be freed at once from all the worse [ideas] to which their position leads; but it is necessary that they should be entangled in one of these things, by the path of such an argument, which would befit the foundation of the faith, which they might choose from all. And that there must be some order in the blessed Trinity, through which you also concede the Son to be numbered before the Spirit—for there is great necessity—but what the Latins posit, you disapprove. For many dishonorable things follow from theirs; whereas as we say the divine persons are ordered, by which indeed it is also ordered by the logia, nothing discordant happens; for neither does our view and the tradition of the saving baptism correlate less, just as all other things are correctly held, than theirs seems to agree with it, being otherwise corrupted. And while the Son might not persuasively seem to be set before the Holy Spirit as the one sending him, and for that reason also having some dignity, to those who examine such things closely—even if I know not how this escaped your wisdom—the argument will provide no small handle to our opponents. Or because the sending and the procession are the same,

^A it leaves it to those who will listen according to the need of the words. For it does not even say such things itself, but draws the term of "procession" toward those twofold implications, of which some regard the existence of the Spirit, and others the mission. And this is nothing wonderful; since Cyril also, in some place, said that the Son proceeds from the Father, having taken the term instead of "being begotten," from which, even if someone—constrained by the Latins—should interpret the word of Augustine as "to proceed" [exire/processionem], not even so is there a necessity for the Spirit to subsist from the Son because of Augustine’s word. For it is much more appropriate to transfer the word to the remaining procession, and [since one that is] becoming to the Spirit in both (for He is breathed eternally from the Father according to hypostasis, receiving His being from the Father, and He is breathed to the faithful from both Father and Son, that is, according to the spiritual energies He is given and participated in), rather than dragging it to the generation, of which the Spirit has no share at all; which Cyril has ventured quite nobly, as he understood the word most piously and comprehensively, when indeed he was ^B rightfully conjoining only the homonymy of "proceeding" with the homonymy of the Spirit in his discourses concerning the Spirit, if the things of the Western Fathers were interpreted so forcefully, using the canon of Cyril, when he once innovated, having used "to proceed" for two hypostases and regarding different species of processions. And yet, in all other cases, if "to proceed" is a homonym, nothing prevents "to proceed" from being such; but in the case of sacred theology, we find that all signify only the existence of the Spirit by "to proceed," but they have used "to proceed" abusively for both this and the mission, of which custom it is just for us also to follow. But to call the Son a "co-cause," and to call the Father the "archetypal cause," while doing well, he does not praise; for without dividing [the notion of] the co-cause, they themselves in fact call both hypostases one principle, so that it remains for them to contradict themselves; even if it were possible for there to be one principle [not] insofar as they are one, but insofar as they are two, they would have been induced, if it did induce, where did they find the word "co-cause" lying in the divine? But do they not rather innovate this? Where has "archetypally" ^C been found true and in agreement with those who first spoke, asked any of the blessed? But it happens rather "principially." But [as for those who] leap from this meaning to that, it falls to us to be considered—and to seem to be—sophists; but there is no need for the leaders of the words, with whom we try to agree, to share in the reproach; for they carefully distinguished the words according to the needs of each occasion, not applying the same names in the same way. And Cyril [did] thus; but Augustine has not the ability to signify the duality of the processions through the narrowness of [one] language; but whether he wishes to signify the existence of the Spirit elsewhere, or the energy and the grace, he used the one word "to proceed" [proire] or "to advance" [procedere] for both concepts; but to those who graciously would say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, [wishing to signify] that this does not proceed from the Son "principially," but rather "missionally" and "communicatively"—in the way that it might be said to proceed even from Himself, and be His gift—and by the addition of this adverb, having distinguished the indeterminate [nature] of the word of "proceeding" and of the "procession," they shall bring relief. For they knew no small difference, ^D either as beginning from the hypostasis of Him, from somewhere, to have proceeded [from] the divine persons, that is, from the productive and unbegotten cause of these, or to have started from somewhere toward the beneficence of the creation according to the energy, that is, from the will which is common to the three persons. Or was it necessary for the Son to be begotten being sent from the

^A Father? And they think that Scripture and all the Fathers speak in harmony. And with reason. For the Father did not send the Son into the flesh and for the manifestation therein alone, but so too did the Spirit, consenting with them in that dispensation, as if it were a single work of the whole Trinity acting in concert in the person of the Son. But as the Holy Spirit has the Father alone as his principle clearly, yet is also sent into the creation always from the divine Word, in such a way that it is impossible for the latter ever to exist well and rightly if not governed by the divine Spirit; and at one time it is sent more obscurely, at another time more fully and clearly, not because the Son is sending it more than it is being sent by him—since the grace of the Spirit is common, and the three persons are conjoined, from which grace being given and received by the saints, and by means of it men are taken up into communion with God—therefore [the Spirit] is said to be sent, even as it is permitted. To call the Father ^B the cause of the Spirit in an essential way, and the Son a joint-cause, they agree with them, but in the worse sense; for all joint-causes have the rank of instrumental causes with respect to those things which act in an essential way; and only these do they who are well-versed in these matters rightly designate with the term of joint-causes. Wherefore, knowing that it is not alien to the Arian opinion to call the Son a joint-cause with the Father of created things, the theologians refrained from calling him so, unless perhaps someone out of necessity of argument might have misused the word, but rather they call both, and the whole Trinity, one cause and one principle, as in that they are both and all one God, in this way [it is] from them that the creation has come to be; for it is neither possible for there to be anything in the Father and the Son which is not also in the Spirit, nor, if anything were not fitting for the Spirit for any reason, could this be the case for the Father, and pass over into the Son communally.

All those things, then, you have spoken of wisely and truly, so that I might not deem it superfluous to repeat them one by one. But for the things for which I am most grateful to your wisdom, I will speak, for which reason I wished to convey these things in thought. In this city, those who stand at the head of the movement toward the Latins trouble and agitate the simpler ones with two arguments. And I term all those who remain hidden in this way; for these are even worse than the most manifest [advocates]. And first, they say that there is no harm in our being united with the Latins in doctrine; for even if there is something unusual in what is said by them, yet it is possible that it is true, with no absurdity resulting from it, and that the Latins, being convinced that nothing of the sort follows, thus rejoice that the doctrine is true. And if you wish, he says, rising up they would proclaim openly those who were at one time condemned for those absurdities in doctrine, and against themselves, if they were hiding while positing such things, surely bringing such a vote and [showing] how they do not yield to any of the evils suspected from this doctrine, and in words and writings [would give] ^C to them, as being caught in them, to lay blame. But as long as they maintain the principle of those absurdities in their opinions and discourse, they will not seem to say anything, even if they were to deny those things a myriad times; although indeed to excise from the common confession that phrase which has so troubled the Churches, or to have given to it the true meaning, which is known to all, in the very utterance of it, would be to leave the difference, about which not even one who has understanding would any longer dispute (but concerning the other differences another would be the argument), [this] would be very easy for those wishing it, and at the same time the dignity would attach to the matter. But desiring to become free from so many absurdities following therefrom, they seem to be defending themselves as if accused of the most shameful things, while in danger of being caught hidden in others (for to every lie more absurdities follow; and truth is defined everywhere, but a lie sprouts many more heads than those told of in the myth of the Hydra; and it is likely therefore that another evil is coupled with this position in addition to those examined up to the present), [this] carries great difficulty for both sides. Furthermore, it is not even permitted for us in matters of the doctrines of the Church not to follow the pattern of the Church, which for so many years has prevailed among its leaders, even if it were possible that someone, having been deceived by ignorance, might have admitted the principle of the most manifest lie, proclaiming that he says he is fighting with us for the coupled lie. For the Fathers in the ecumenical councils (and let no one be troubled by the word and the example) used to push away such things, the heretics in each one being monster-mongers; for few of the heresies fought against the faith immediately, and struggled with its articles; but by some period [of time], the majority armed themselves against the truth, and these it was necessary to be most wary of, as by these the simpler ones would be more harmed. Thus, then, those around Eutyches became deniers of all the absurdities following from them; for they confessed that they did not attribute suffering to the divinity of our Master Christ, nor that he had become man according to a phantasy, nor did they acknowledge that they thought any such thing, but [claimed] that the two natures had come together into one in Christ.

And they shouted that it was not their intention to allow any of the absurdities that were being brought against them. But those wise Fathers ordered that the position be rejected instead, and that the more extreme enemies of the economy be denied the one nature, and that the recent ones should instead posit two wills—not one—in Christ, the guide of human salvation, if they intended not to be driven far from the sacred things, just as they were indeed being driven by the judgment of the Church, not having been persuaded.

And therefore it is necessary for us to follow those Fathers, and not to wish to solve a newfangled doctrine with a worse newfangled doctrine; and rather to confirm the other newfangled doctrine under the pretext of a solution, and to innovate together with them—those who for so long have reasonably resisted it in defense of their ancestral traditions—unless someone would say that the Church has also often erred, having judged in this way; which is a statement that could never fall upon pious ears! And so, in this way, the Latins themselves do not accept our exposition (that is, that the Holy Spirit does not also proceed, or derive existence, from the Son)—even though we, in our daily confession and in every way, deny the Arian and Nestorian heresy with which they lash out at us. Yet, while [our position] is the safest, because it is the most widely known, and because—from fear of the threats of the Third Synod and reverence for the four that followed it, which confirmed the laws of the Third—we did not even insert it into the Creed. But it would be far more just for them themselves to agree with us ^B regarding the decision [to reject the filioque] because of our denials, than, as is enough for us to deny those [heresies] ourselves, for them to force toward an affirmation [of their addition to the Creed] their own [position], which is not entirely in harmony with the common beginnings and was added, which was not lawful.

And if we ourselves were to simply commit ourselves to the opinion of the Latins, we would be sinning worse than they. For they themselves, even while supposing that none of the foul consequences follow from these things, would not be willing [to accept] what the position creates. But we, as we firmly judge that some evil is conjoined in this from many [sources], must be held liable as having all of them, if we behave with neglect as if it made no difference. Whence it should not be more censurable for us, but rather [the situation] must be dealt with, if they could persuade; or if we are not able to perceive it—following at once both many who are wiser than us and Latins who are more persuasive than us—with the forgiveness for what is not easy to follow, and the pious safety [of our position], it should be praised, as long as they do not wish to [force us] onto the only path which is ^C just. ^A And those who were the ones who struck are actually trying to solve the connection of those absurdities to the original premise; but they are so far from solving it that, because of these very things, they seem more burdensome to those who know, positing things far more disreputable than the original ones, only so that they might be able to seem to say something, and that they might seem to solve it while not solving it.

But we, together with our Fathers, demonstrate the sequence of those absurdities from the premises of the faith in such a way that it would seem to follow to some other person according to the laws of reason. Therefore, we reject the original premise no less than the consequences, believing that to be equal to them—both to be displeasing and to be contrary to that which is in accordance with the truth.

Therefore, having said these things many times to those who were once our own, and having set them down in lengthy books—not from a love of writing many books, but from a zeal for the common good and a desire for their own salvation, as we thought—we have no longer persuaded the men to be sensible. But perhaps now your vote will constrain them, if they did not ask for it in vain. But regarding the fact that ^D this pious act could never be replaced for us by this single act of impiety, that we drive God from our own origin by what we do, [the origin] by which all other cities are saved—disregarding all these things, and practicing none of the human observances in which the Divinity is accustomed to take pleasure, but [relying] only on rites, and incense, and the lifting up of voices, and certain vain shadows of piety instead of deeds, and hypocrisies of virtues, thinking to serve God; and then, also, the betrayal of a certain glory, which we have received and possess regarding the Divine and from the Divine himself, purchasing our salvation from the enemies, from those who are neither able nor perhaps willing to provide it, but who beguile our small-mindedness with mere letters instead of deeds and with vain hopes.

And if they were able to help, and were so disposed, [it would be] something much greater that would be able to come from them toward the opposite—I mean our ruin—from the neglect of the Divine, for which there could be no greater proof than [the fact that they are] prepared to provoke [us] not only to the other things, but also to the denial of the dogmas that have come to us from then. If someone said that this is the voice of God, he would not miss the truth. For the voices of such things are truly God's, lying within the books of the prophets, and having been brought into action many times, to which it had also been foretold. And probability also testifies to them, and human justice, which is a pattern of the Divine, and the things common to those who have a mind [that allows them] to hold opinions about divine matters. But we have also been disliked by the many for these things, in saying these things to them, and in addition to these [saying] that if those who have condemned the things of the faith are so cold regarding their own [traditions] as to even grant certain things which they perhaps had not previously seen, [they do so] not for the sake of the [salvation] hoped for from them...

but as if they thought ^A this to be divine; for they ought rather to be praised for pretending to be of their party, or for renouncing the faith once and for all, because not only do they buy their freedom in this way, but most of them are also promoted to the highest offices. But to overlook good fortune when it is close at hand—how would that not be clear folly, if it were possible, while benefiting so greatly in life through the pretense of impiety, to be at the same time God-beloved, as before? But this is not so, it is not; nor does it seem so to the commonality of men. And let no one think that I place any of those who worship Christ on an equal footing with these unbelievers; may I not be so mad. But in exposing those wicked counselors, I say these things; for they are truly wicked, introducing a wicked doctrine into life—a doctrine that would have profited only those who, looking toward how they might change their allegiance to us, alone would possess the ^B good rock, and whom God has ordained to stand as a standard for other men. But if we ourselves have experienced this base fortune late in other matters, that is another argument. It was, indeed, impossible for our affairs to be otherwise, having been diseased for many long years, since there was no true council among us at all, but everything was managed by the phantom of a council; and because autonomy, and conceit, and the [tendency] to neglect one's own affairs while attempting things beyond one’s power, and such similar passions had struck long before into the souls of the leaders; and no free speech was granted to those who were able to speak and do what is best, while everything was entrusted to flatterers and the arrogant and the greedy, and to their impulses; and virtue was envied in those who practiced it, while vice enjoyed the other things befitting the good; and oaths were trodden underfoot, and—what is worse—not perhaps out of any necessity, but by design; and sacred things were being sold, and for the protection of human souls those who were able to give a large amount of gold were being summoned, not those who were able to be of any benefit; and laws and justice were honored only in name; and divine providence and judgment and such matters were thought to be otherwise; and those who had succumbed to the Hellenic impiety were allowed to live and be honored and corrupt those associated with them, when it was necessary to direct them to the lowest depths—it is much worse that they should ^C even have something to say about the sacred dogmas, ^D just as those who are uninitiated dance around the fire out of boldness. For I would not trust anyone from the heavens who claimed that it is possible for such persons to attain a better fortune. Nor did those who handed down the faith to us forewarn and advise us that we would be saved and experience a favorable God by holding only to this, while neglecting other things; but, on the contrary, that one must have both a sound faith and excellent character along with piety.

^A For those who know the things from above, we know that nothing differs from a shadow; and this is the most terrible thing, and that which escapes the many—that by following what these men advise us, it will result that we endure both the shame and the loss in critical matters, while missing out on all that is expected hereafter, and further provoking our enemies, who view the union with suspicion. It was necessary to seek to be united with the Latins and with all men in the most righteous ways, even if we were masters of the whole earth; but regarding God and the Fathers, [it was necessary] not to betray reverence—neither for the sake of the Latins, nor for the sake of our own kin—if one were to be at the point of preserving that [union] while treating all men and one’s own flesh with hostility.

^B But some, seeing none of these things, what do they not say and what do they not do that is capable of troubling the souls of the moderate? And as for those who say that it makes no difference, both what the Latins now say and what seemed right to our own Fathers and teachers in the beginning—and it seems the same to us regarding those things about which we dispute with the Latins—as if someone were to say that it makes no difference whether one expresses the affirmation or the opposing negation regarding whatever matter, there is no need to worry about such things, being as they are. But those who are more terrible than these, saying things that are little of the sacred and public school, but rather of some illicit other training, and most of it not even tolerable for the establishing of the dogma, make us marvel if even the Church of the Romans ^C submits to those principles, concluding the problem. For there is much more dispute among them regarding the principles, in as much as there is also a greater danger within them; for they are not at all better than the vilest. But the ways for peace that some have found—denials of things no one accuses, and concessions of things no one demands, and affirmations of dogma under the pretext of a solution—are barely able to deceive some base laborers and usurers, or some of those who had been snatched away even before this (and there is little regard even for these); but rather, trying to lead the simpler ones astray with those other artifices, these are indeed the ones who, as I have already said, are the worst, even among those who openly oppose [the truth].

^D To all these things, noble friend, you have set your wisdom in opposition, having always done so even before, but now, if ever, it is timely, and you have struck at them with much effort, employing arguments that possess an indestructible strength, which this has provided to you more from the skill you possess than from the subject matter of the arguments; for, to one struggling in defense of the truth and of God, it was appropriate that some spirit be breathed into him from above. Therefore, many others shall owe you very great thanks, and because of me, and I before all others shall prize you and yours much more than before, not only because of what was said at the beginning, but because your emissaries did not show us that book about the Latins, [trying] to snatch your vote in its favor before it appeared to us.

thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking thinking [GREEK COLUMN] 629 EI ISTOLA AD UN ETHIONEM. ...thinking. If, whether formerly or subsequently, anyone among them demonstrated such things to us, there would have been no need for us to discuss him or converse with him, through any contempt for him or for those who had written. For as regards those who have not been overcome by us—not that it should be so, but rather that judgment must come from God—the situation was different. But to him, as in a defense of the Latins, who possessed a certain skill of speech, the matter was not something completely unworked, unless ^A (for indeed to no man have I ever appeared burdensome in word or deed for any reason), and for which, in Tithoneum, you were brought neither to act in a youthful manner due to old age, nor to drop a hint; for it is sufficient to say thus, and you yourself would forgive one speaking such things in return for the many things of yours which were said from every side. And if it were possible, I would have prayed that I had troubled your friendship in vain; for you would not have been the worse, and for us the consciousness that we were moved by no base motive would have sufficed before the laws of philosophy and friendship, being judged before God and all men. But you have taken even this hope from us, ^B by intentionally keeping silent at the end of the book. For no one would be easily persuaded that the entirety of your work concerning the differences between Plato and Aristotle has reached me merely from your epilogues. And I take up a second argument with God; for there are not a few who are present, and they say they will not allow me to choose to overlook this; whence you will forgive those who are forced, if we are not persuaded by your order to keep silent, albeit late, as having nothing sound to say about anything. And as for you, and the things you have written in reply, I shall least of all attack them, as has been said in the prologue, because of the things said there, and because they are far removed ^C from inciting me to anger, as if I had been harmed by them in any way; but to be moved to indignation at times for those who differ from Aristotle is just, to say nothing of those things which are incomparably greater; and to bear patiently the things directed against me is, I have learned, no less the practice of Socrates, of whose famous trait you are aware; and besides, I am not merely asserting for the first time now that I know nothing, but I have long been convinced of it myself, and am persuaded of it more each day. Seeing then that these second struggles of yours are put forth in such a character, and as you yourself—as they say—disparage the nature of my own arguments, it is time for me to be concerned; neither to join in defense of those earlier arguments of mine, for I have done so, as you yourself declare, by contending ^D and throwing out your previous writing, so that it even needs other arguments to try to rouse it up, while at the same time, as a sort of refuge for the fact that you did not exert yourself at all to write, and were unconcerned, I would not have approached them, I suppose, if they were in need of no alliance, having finished well what they proposed for themselves. But from those things which I shall say concerning the two philosophers, the appropriate response will meet both of them with sober praise.

GENNADIUS THE PATRIARCH, EPISTLE TO JOSEPH THE EXARCH

^A[He announces that he has consigned the book of Plethon to the fire, and he explains the reasons that moved him to act with such severity.]

This epistle was first published by the most noble V. D. Alexander in the Appendix to the fragments which remain of Plethon’s book *On the Laws*, from the autograph manuscripts of Gennadius in Paris, 1289 and 1294. In the former, the following are added to the title: "Written on Mount Menoikion, near Ferae," which is a city of Macedonia. The subject of the epistle is evident from the title; nevertheless, we have thought it worthwhile to exhibit here its analysis or compendium, with the most learned editor leading the way, and making use of the author’s own words. ^B "When Plethon had finished with fate," says Gennadius, "his book came into the hands of those who then governed the Peloponnese; which, having been unrolled, they took care to transmit to me, meanwhile forbidding everyone to transcribe it." He continues by saying with how much sorrow he was seized, when the book was opened; then he writes out a list of topics that accords entirely with what remains. He hesitated in doubt whether he should condemn the whole book, once the index of chapters had been read, stopping his inquiry there; but lest he appear to render judgment without the cause being fully known, he unrolled the entire work; "in which," he says, "I spent four hours and found the text to correspond to the titles. Then, agitated in various ways, I now laughed at the absurdity, now mourned the lost soul, formerly Christian, precipitated into the abyss of error by the malice of demons; then I cursed the foolish impiety which the world had served for so many centuries, giving thanks to God that He had deigned to liberate us from it. I lamented the calamities, the disgrace, and the ignominy of our people, to which this heap of woes had been added! ... Finally, weighing everything with myself, tearful, as if Plethon himself were standing before me, about to hear the sentence, I addressed him: 'O fool,' I said, 'there is only one law of human society, one unique norm, which is the holy doctrine; you, however, having abandoned it, embrace an impious system and exalt yourself as a legislator! But whom were you hoping to deceive?'" etc. ^C Gennadius soon arranged for the book to be sent to the princess, the wife of the Despot Demetrios, ordering it to be consigned to the fire: "But she," he says, "sent it back to me, saying that it was for me to carry out the sentence I had decreed. I had decided to spare certain parts of the work, which concerned physics, logic, or similar things; but after the work was recalled to a new examination, I recognized that nothing was free from censure, everything being corrupted by the pagan system and error." Here Gennadius sets forth certain opinions that deviate from moral truth or are entirely hostile to Christianity, which were unfolded throughout the entire work and some of which are still read in the surviving fragments. Therefore, he consigned everything to the fire, with only a few leaves excepted. These words of Gennadius, which are read towards the end, demonstrate that this was an encyclical epistle: "When, however, an exemplar of this work perhaps exists anywhere, transcribed by the author’s students, whether he be alive or has finished with fate, in the name of the Lord we command all and each, in whatever way and place the aforesaid book has come into their hands, that without delay, if they can, it be cast into the fire; and whoever shall be convicted of keeping it with him, after the first and second admonition, if he refuses or procrastinates in destroying it by fire, let him be an outcast from the communion of the faithful." ^D We have left only the lists of topics remaining bound to the boards, and the hymns which Plethon had labored over at the end in honor of his gods, so that, these being preserved, no one may ever have the power to lie about our judgment; but all the rest was torn away and handed over to the fire, and these things happened in the presence of many. I preserved the list of topics adhering to the covers at the beginning of the book, and at the end the hymns which Plethon had labored over in honor of his gods, so that my judgment might be supported by these remnants. All the rest was torn up and, as many witnesses attest, consigned to the fire.

OF PATRIARCH GENNADIUS ON THE BOOK OF GEMISTUS, AND AGAINST GREEK POLYTHEISM

Gennadius Scholarius, and the rest, by the grace of God, to the most honorable and in all things excellent lord Joseph the Exarch, greeting. ^A We always praise your diligence regarding better things—a zeal which you display, neglecting nothing that is at hand, and advising others as well. Using your own characteristic way, you have now felt the need to remind us concerning the book of Gemistus. Your advice arrived while we were already prepared regarding that very matter. Thus, though we are grateful to you, we make these things clear; at the same time, we add what it would be fitting for us not to pass over in silence, and which would not be an unpleasant diversion for you. That man, therefore, had long been known to us, and we knew that he had been writing such a book for many years, with many people interpreting it worthy of belief, and with us having provided many and clear proofs, first in the Peloponnese, then in Italy. And this was the cause of my writing against him on behalf of Aristotle at that time; for he attacked the philosopher rather boldly, having much knowledge from his own philosophy and from the things by which he opposed Plato, adding support to the opinion of the truth. ^B And we, not contending for Plato, nor caring about Aristotle privately, but being vexed at the intent of Gemistus out of zeal for the faith, chose an otherwise superfluous labor. For we wished to point him out in this way to those who did not know the man, so that no one henceforth might be harmed by being deceived—as not a few had previously suffered, who became a cause of grievous pain to us; but it is not necessary to name them. That we should look toward these things, and not toward any other ambition, is shown very well by the beginning and the end of our book, which is preserved in many places, and—let it be said with God—happens to be not dissonant with our manner. He himself was writing against both Aristotle and us, having—as he supposed—engaged in a struggle to support that man. But our country’s calamity prevented us from writing back, except only in so far as we seized upon another not inopportune excuse at that time, and we attacked his unseasonable themes, with restraint and more weightily. And having bid farewell from then on to Aristotle and Plato alike, we undertook no mean task against Greek superstition: he himself openly battling against our pious goal and no longer deeming it necessary to be hidden. ^C When this came to his sight, they say it pained the man much, as he had recognized the [power] of those living—we who could ^D nullify it by fire or by writing, whichever might seem best; for we were threatening this very thing in the second of our writings against him. Thus, matters regarding him stood for us: those in defense of the faith and the benefit of the brethren, or the non-occurrence of harm, were burdensome; but the others, not grievous. Some, however, neither wishing to pay attention to the facts and to those who have knowledge and bear witness with us, nor slandering our character—which was sufficiently demonstrated in the writings not only against him, but also against all those who at any time fell in with us throughout our whole life—calumniated us out of envy. But we call God to witness for you, dearest friend—whom it is not permitted to call upon in vain by any necessity—that we never falsely slandered anyone for the worse out of envy; but to many, for their own benefit, and to another, for his harm, we showed favor to a falsehood, out of philanthropy or because we had been deceived; but they themselves exposed their own falsehoods. For we used to show them to be good men or friends to the multitude, and we used to treat them as such, of course; but they themselves were the opposite in their actions. And what cause for such passion could we have had toward the man? For from all that God had given to us, we were better than to envy any of the things belonging to him. With difficulty would it even have behooved the basest character to trouble one who was professing piety and virtue, while doing no wrong to anyone, and being inferior to none of his colleagues, let alone to be liable to the penalty of such lawlessness, rather than to be judged no worse than anyone else by men, as the truth was revealed late. Of such men, though they were few, one might say that one should pay attention neither to those who praise nor to those who blame, knowing them. But at the same time, this human [behavior] happened [to come] from the baser sort, of course; for it is necessary for some pain and affliction to meet those who do some good, if it is to be borne, [a process] which is very much to one’s profit. But those who have understanding and are friends of the truth, whose judgment is not to be overlooked by those who truly have understanding, not only have set up the most brilliant proclamations of our other works and words throughout the earth; but also of those which were examined regarding Gemistus as much with love of truth as with love of the common good, they were always praising and expressing gratitude, and they grieved with us at the old man’s unseasonableness, and, if it were possible, they prayed that he might change, both they themselves knowing him to be such, and to us...

having such confidence as not to be able to disbelieve. Do you see, beloved, how great a grace from God, concerning the common good, is constantly met with in men, when we have always determined that every personal advantage should be secondary to it? But if many have smitten on the cheek of God, who stands before us in every part of our life, we—having near us the conscience of Him who received the blow without having spoken any evil—have a righteous hope in such things, and at once a source of consolation, provided we do not run entirely at random.

But since everything had to be revealed in time, and the book of the deceased Gemistus was in the hands of the rulers of the Peloponnese (and there being two of them, I mean the ones who were more pious and greater), and since they knew well the absurdity of what was written within it, they were indeed planning to send it to us at once, and, though many demanded to have it copied, they did not deem it worthy to give it; yet, being prevented by the times, they themselves brought it to us unexpectedly, and their voyage brought us grief—grief, on the one hand, for them, as they were enjoying the common calamity from which others who had planned more rashly had profited, ^B and on the other hand, because of the book. For as soon as it was opened, what encounter could have seemed more unpleasant to us?

It ^C was divided into three parts. The subjects of each were listed in many ways, like a table, possessing no order in relation to one another; and it is the mark of a wise man to order them. And the first subject of the first section was on the difference of the opinions held by men regarding the greatest things. The second, on the leaders of the best arguments. The third, on the two opposing arguments—that of Protagoras and that of Pyrrho. The fourth, a prayer to the intellectual gods. The fifth, common doctrines concerning the gods. The sixth, on Zeus the king. The seventh, on the gods who are above the heavens. The eighth, on the gods who are within the heavens. The ninth, on the eternity of all the gods. The tenth, on the generation of Poseidon and the other gods above the heavens. The eleventh, on the generation of the immortals within this heaven. Then, having woven in ethics, economics, and politics, he added a twenty-first on the worship of the gods. Upon this, one on the priests and their life; after which, one on purifications. Then, having connected subjects that are more fitting for logical inquiry, he added a thirty-first, on the names of the most ancient gods; and this was the final subject of the first book. ^D Next, the first of the second book was on the criterion for the consideration of the matters laid before us. The second, a preconception of common notions. The third, that gods exist. The fourth, on the providence of the gods. The fifth, that the gods are not the cause of evils. The sixth, on fate. The seventh, on the plurality of gods. The eighth, on the difference of the kinds of gods. The ninth, on the theology according to the Kouretes. The tenth, on the gods of the seven most ancient gods, and of the other gods above the heavens. The eleventh, on the generation of the gods within the heavens. Then, on the soul and the stars, and the soul of the stars, and on demons, and other things—such as that they are not wicked—and a refutation of the slanders against demons, and on the senses, and on wild beasts, and having added such things, he added a twenty-seventh, on the eternity of the universe; and this was the final subject of the second book. The subjects of the third were, first, a resumption of the argument on fate. Following this was one on the soul. Then, on the end of life. Then, on prudence. Then, on the upbringing of children. Then, on the form of the state. Then, on courage, and having added other such things in succession, he added a fourteenth, on the non-intercourse of parents with offspring. Then, on the generation of gods. Then, on the marriage of a man to several women. Then, on the common use of women. Besides these, having brought in things regarding the consumption of meat and other such things, he makes the twenty-second subject on Zeus, that there is no distinction of any kind in him even in theory. Having attached to this some moral subjects, and others suitable for a state, he adds a thirty-second, on the names of the gods, to which the heads of the subjects and the most useful purpose of this legislation were immediately attached. For the thirty-third subject was on prayer. After this, invocations to the gods. Then, hymns to the gods. Then, the arrangement of the use of invocations and hymns. Then, to which gods what must be sacrificed. Then, on which actions, and to which of the gods, and how it must be sacrificed. Then, how one must partake of the sacrifices. Then, on the precision of things toward the gods. Then, against whom one ought to pray to the gods. Above all, on divinations. And the Epinomis was the final subject, being the forty-third of the third book. In each of the books was inscribed, “First Book of Plethon’s Law-Writing,” and so on for the others. The beginning of the whole book was as follows: “These things have been written concerning laws and the best state, by which thinking men, and whatever they might pursue and practice both privately and publicly, as far as it is possible for a man, might live most beautifully and most excellently, and as far as is possible, most happily.”

The book is full of such calamities. But having known this from those very first inscriptions and subjects, we wished to not even look at them further. But since there was a necessity that everything of such a kind should be destroyed, it seemed to us to be just, as if he were present, to grant the author the favor of not rendering judgment on the book in his absence, but to set the word of God within us and the conscience of the truth as judges, both of the man’s purpose and of his zeal, and to follow wherever they might lead, and whatever they might decree in our actions.

^A It is perhaps likely that, having appeared to others, he might have been persuaded to find a better defense of religion, and to have encountered words at once newer and more worthy, which one ought not to overlook; for at least it would not be far from forgiveness to have yielded to stronger arguments, not yet examined by the teachers of the Church, but which he had firmly grasped and had no power to refute. And yet, we were aware of the wicked prejudice he had held from the beginning. However, it behooved him to seat the tribunal dispassionately; and for us, we should not have escaped [censure], neither if the things found were the same as or worse than those of others, nor if what had hunted his soul were better and newer. For as for sacred theology, about which we have cared most throughout our whole life, and for which we would yield to none of those who now exist anywhere to know as much as we, as for the Greek books and discourses to which he refers himself, nothing has been overlooked by us, when we were well able to judge them to be such as they are, not only before coming to such a state, but also when he was sophistically imagining he could not evade our notice.

By such arguments, in four whole hours—the smallest fraction of a day—we went through the whole book, and we saw clearly with what kind of words he fulfilled the promises of his contentions. ^B Here, indeed, we were swept along by many and varying emotions. We were mocking the simplicity of the man. We were lamenting the destruction of his soul. We were cursing the wicked demons by whose power, deprived of heavenly grace, he was seized and joined to the lie. We were condemning the waywardness of men, which he had served in the time before. We were offering thanks to Him who freely and belatedly opened the gates of truth to the nature of men, and had armed it with marvelous preparations, so that those who cared might lay hold of it. We were glorifying Him, as much as was possible, because He had granted this grace even to us. We were lamenting the calamity of our race, the shame, the ignominy. For it was necessary that this too be added to our woes, that at the last, one of the good things of Greek learning was left for an old man, and he abused this zeal for his own mental corruption; for he would not have innovated such things if he had been in his right mind. We were grieving over the labors of the old man, which he wasted, having spent his ambition for diction and composition upon the lowest contentions; just as if someone, amidst meaner or decaying materials, were to display his art of sculpting, when he could have used better and more appropriate ones. What need is there to recount how many passions we experienced? But since it seemed good to us to fix our gaze upon the inscriptions and the prefaces of the book, ^C there, filled with tears and having sighed from the depths (for we seemed to see Gemistus himself, or rather, as he himself says, Pletho, and having extended his zeal for Hellenism to such a degree that, after having heard the true law of our Jesus and those things added to it, or the legislations of those who have reigned piously, one would be more benefited by traversing these in their own respective places and encountering the breadth of their original texts; for by abridging them in a connection, you would be useless to no one—no, these things which you seem to add of your own are the most useless of all). And as for your impiety and religion and such things, and much worse, if you expected them to prevail anywhere on earth, neither any wise man, nor any common person, would be willing or able to imitate them. But let us leave aside the hopes for the praises from men which you expected for these laws. But as you set forth the varied differences of men in their opinions and lives, you are indeed truthful; for these things are clear to all who know even a little, but ^D you are ignorant of the things that stand against your first contentions. For how could your dogmas concerning gods be common, which not all men, nor even according to you, set down, not only now, but for all time? Or rather, at present no one sets them down; but, as is likely, while they disagree on other things, they agree on this: that God is one, not "the highest" in a multitude of inferior ones, but simply one and alone. But in order to show yourself, under such disagreement among men, to be one who has set out for the search of the truth, not content with those things [taught] by your...

^A ancestors or judged very well. To hold that one must not trust in anything at all, even in the smallest matters, using such a criterion, every argument demands. But, calling sophists the leaders of the truth, you speak of opinion, and you attack your own poets. Yet they themselves, through the polytheism [which they taught] to your leaders—whom you have chosen instead of the true and genuine ones—have become the cause; those who philosophized later, having changed things to a greater extent, as it seemed to them, devised a certain seemliness for the argument among them, by means of the poetic monstrosities concerning your gods. It makes no difference whether one constructs such things in this way or that, provided that one constructs them either poetically or philosophically; yet it is more shameful to do so poetically. And we, indeed, being persuaded by true arguments concerning what we think, then you, having in the very prefaces, without any need, poured forth the variety of the path concerning humanity's end, while at the same time adhering to your own purpose, as I have already said. And you say, indeed, that he who judges the best concerning all things will opine and live ^B well; but if he knew how to judge, you have kept yourself not a little away from it. By making falsehoods for yourself more fixed than the truest things, you have been the wretchedest of men, and in your judgment, to be sure. Or how would you have apportioned yourself to Zoroaster, whom you say stands above all others, having departed from the most wise and inspired? Who is ignorant of Zoroaster, who became renowned among the Persians for astronomy, and for nothing else, by which he was himself led astray, while in other things he showed a disposition in agreement with his origin? For he was the son of Ninus, who married his own mother Semiramis; from which it was thought by the Persians that he practiced matricide. This man was made known to you, though previously unknown, by the one who seemed to be a Jew, but was a polytheist, Elisha; who, having great power then at the court of the barbarians, lived as a parasite, having fled his homeland so that you might learn the fine doctrines from him. Being such, he met his end in fire, just as your Zoroaster also did. Of this Zoroaster, then, and of Minos, and Eumolpus, and Lycurgus, and Polyidus, and Tiresias, and the others whom you number, you have not even encountered books, from which you could have taken this legislation; except that many others have recorded some things about them here and there, whence knowledge about them has come not more to you than to all diligent people. But from those who came later you have gathered everything together, those who set Pythagoras and even more so Plato before the rest, who wrote in many-lined books most things not even held by Plato himself concerning the polytheistic error, and after most of them, and above all those who are preeminent among them, Proclus, from whose many books you have gossiped about these brief things. And yet you say that you agree with Plutarch, and Plotinus, and Iamblichus, and Porphyry; but you keep silent about Proclus, who was the most responsible for your views, while you behave wisely by claiming for yourself the reputation of having been the first to discover most things. But those who have read Proclus, and who have at the same time condemned him, are witnesses with me to the source of these arguments. Then you accuse those who are in possession of the truth, those who are in all things the most unerring guides of it, of sophistry and innovation, and such things, and because of this you suggest they would ^C never be placed [in your esteem]. Having abandoned these things from your youth, and having been placed with those fine teachers of yours, with whom you claim to agree, he was not even able to know their teachings at all, and whether they themselves truly innovate, or are rather standing on the opinion concerning the one God naturally sown in men, and destroyed the polytheism that was innovated from the corruption of human lives and opinions, having been enlightened and having received strength from God and the Word. And for this very reason, you have set your own [opinion] against the criterion of your Fathers, which is so accurate and divine, not only having corrupted it, but even in that he does not know any of the holy things, nor has he ever wished to learn. It is for the sake of the pious thirst of those who attend to him accurately that we anchor the faith that is produced in us from the arguments. But you, slandering the provision from God, and having neither the argument nor having studied to acquire it, but having attended to poets, and then more so to philosophers, as you call them, some of whom you yourself seem to disparage, while others have been refuted by the arguments of many noble true philosophers, and have persuaded everyone to despise them as trifles—where do you now establish your hope concerning the thinking of existing things, after such ^D a death or flight from polytheism, you yourself alone having chosen the path of that [way]? It is said to you very well that one must examine and learn concerning divine things, as this is proper to the rational nature, but those who examine must attach themselves to the truer things, which those who have participated sufficiently in wisdom of all kinds could well do with the divine, being filled with dialectical power, and possessing not only a theoretical mind, but also a practical one. For without these, anyone will neither be able to know well what principles they might use, nor what to say to find them out unerringly, but rather by positing the principles where they should not, or even attaching worse things, they would not even thus be joined, and they lead themselves and many more others astray from the truth; which also happened to you, who set out for the search of the truth without the proper preparation. For you did not examine and learn the Christian argument first, and then having changed the opinions of the other men, which you found to be more in agreement with the truer principles of the argument or more common to them, you did not run to this; but you are of those holding to the ancestral opinion, and with an argument, you slander and accuse us, having been pre-empted, you say, you suffered this toward the nation, before you could acquire the habit from art and nature to be able to judge concerning such things. Such a one did those who know you well recount you to be; and we have known it, having often met with you, that concerning the truth of the Christian argument you had nothing more than the utterly uneducated, either to say it yourself, or to understand others who said it. Whence, regarding the zeal for the search of the truth, you contend very justly, but the method of it, from your own perversion and divine abandonment,

^A you have not been deemed worthy to find. Wherefore, neither have you yourself derived any benefit from other labors, and from those which you have expended upon this writing of yours, nor will you be of any service to any of the others; you might indeed unsettle some, perhaps, through ignorance or some other wickedness, having used them as your guides. So that for you, everything now is prayed for in vain; or rather, not even in vain, but following upon your such prayers, the result is the success concerning your arguments and the benefit of those who encounter them. For at once, the opinion regarding your gods has become not one held in common by all, nor by certain divine men, as you say when beginning after your prayer, but one belonging to absurd men. For that the divine nature exists, and that it is the cause of all things that are, has become an opinion almost common to all. But to divide such a nature into a multitude so great and so distinguished in this way, was the work of few, whom you have chosen as guides rather than the most and the best. And there was a time for many [others]; but you say that you do not attach yourselves to the common people, nor to poets, nor to sophists, although you claim nothing newer than they, but only coloring over the unreasonableness of the position with a certain propriety of words. For they too used to prattle about Poseidon, and Cronus, and Hera, and Artemis, and celestial ones, and those of Tartarus, and chthonic ones, and Titans, and demons, and both male and female, and legitimate and bastard, and such like, more absurdly indeed and more shamefully than those who later reshape them. But those who have truly become divine—I omit the others—that great Moses, regarding whom in the first of his histories Diodorus says, "After the ancient state of the Egyptian life, which is said to have occurred in the time of gods and heroes, they say that Moses was the first to persuade men to live by written laws, a man who is recorded as great in soul and most capable in his life." For we pass over now the other testimonies regarding him from God and from men. This one, therefore, says in the second book of the laws, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one Lord." And in the book of Exodus, "There shall not be to you," he says, "other gods besides me," as if laying down this law from God. And the blessed Paul in the Epistle to the Ephesians, "One," he says, "Lord, one faith." Following these is an uncountable swarm of divine and most wise men, confirming this heavenly truth with the discernment of reason; and to these now, the whole multitude of men follows. ^D For if in the name of God something ultimate is understood, and according to superiority, that God must be one. For one, not many, is that which is according to superiority and is ultimate. But if God must also be the most perfect, it is necessary that this one happen to be one; for it is not possible for perfect things to be many, if it is impossible for the multitude of gods, being perfect, to be distinguished, since nothing is lacking to them. And if the distinction and order and governance of beings occurs sufficiently through one who is the first doing it, all things being shown by his power, it would be superfluous and at the same time not better that they should occur through many. And if the nature signified by this name is indivisible in itself, it is impossible for it to suit another, ^B or for it to be possible for it to be common; that the divine nature is not indivisible in itself according to some other thing, it is not possible, so that it might not thus also be composite. And they show this dogma by many other arguments and proofs, of which the most sufficient of all is that of the other things said about God, each one, signifying a certain perfection, would be attributed in some way also to the creatures, from whom the perfection is from above, such as goodness, wisdom, power, unity, and suchlike; but "Divinity" is the name set for all perfections, which it is impossible to attach all to anything, except to the first and only cause of all things. Nor does the name of Divinity only collect the perfections, but it also joins the manner in which it is necessary for these to be gathered into one; for to him to whom all the perfections belong, it is necessary that they also belong unbegottenly and infinitely and supernaturally, and above all mind and reason, and most perfectly, and solely; and because of this, it is good to say that any of the creatures is good, and wise, to whom this belongs, and another, powerful, while speaking the truth; for these things belong also to the works of God analogically, with the truth in the things themselves, so too the names; but it is not possible to call any other "God" except that nature which is most full of all perfection, and in all reasonings and ways infinitely, ^C infinitely surpassing every being of any kind. And God himself would not be able, even if he wished, to share this superiority with many natures, even though he alone produces every nature, greater and lesser, just as he would not be able not to be God, or not to be at all what he is. But those who introduce the multitude of gods lay down these things only simply, referring the later ones to the former, not so much themselves priding themselves on the connection to them as sharing with them the disgrace, or rather, even showing themselves to be much worse, as being the most responsible for the error for them. For you, too, here, while giving no argument about the multitude, merely beget, and name, and arrange, and distinguish, and settle again an untold multitude of gods. That there would be no argument for you against these things is clear from this shortly. For how is it possible, being separated by an infinite distance from the first cause, that those you call gods are not creatures of God and subjects? But being creatures of God, it is not possible for them to be gods, and creators of other gods. For these things are contradictions, if the exactness of the name of God is being guarded as it should be. Nor would it be reasonable that those who are distinguished by such and so great superiorities and lowerings from one another should be gods and be called so. If, therefore, they were themselves works of God, and without the divine power neither having been born, nor having produced others, nor having been able to do anything at all in this universe, so that the first cause is, and is alone, truly, the active power as if through instruments of all things from him even to the lowest, what use was there for you and your guides for such labors, so as to weave together with no necessity things full of much absurdity? For we

^A who stand before the true and divine Word, hold that God produces all existing things immediately, and that He governs and provides for them immediately from thence, as befits the First Agent. Yet we attribute the ministry of divine governance, as to servants, to the creatures themselves, to whom this belongs—as it also belongs to the divine dignity, well knowing that it contributes to the unity of the whole, and to the order of the parts within it, and to the superiorities and subordinations of each to the other, which are not given by God in vain. Whence, to speak briefly, over the intelligible essences that are altogether separated from bodies, we set the Creator immediately, as they are related to Him by an extraordinary order and are enlightened with divine orders concerning the administration of the whole—which order of theirs, revealed by God through them, we know as well as it is possible to know. But over the heavenly bodies we set some beings, whom we call powers of the heavens, which are not the causes of their natures nor of the fact that they are naturally moved in this way, but are coworkers in the continuity of their motion, conceived of in ways that are pious and wise. And of generated things, to some, like the heaven and every body beneath it, one differently than another—not only in their differences but also in what they contribute to the same ends—in order that they may both be what they are and continue to be for as long as they are. But as for humans, for the earthly part, these very things [take place] not without the involvement of the incorporeal, whenever the providence through them is worthy, by reason of the dignity of the joined ^B and the need for it. But over the better, immortal, and separate essence we set the incorporeal essences alone, not without God (for this is the work of God alone), but so that it may be able to live better, as they provide care. But we do not deem any of them worthy of a name or work in no way befitting them, nor do we transgress against the one God by defiling the highest title by bringing down one [God] who is neither true nor holy, and by sharing the communion of the title and the honors due to God with the servants, and making them creators of one another and fathers, and creators of this whole [universe], and attributing to the divine nature ^C divisions of genera, intercourses, abductions, unions, and other such frivolities, which, along with the others, you yourself would not even know how to repeat, much less legislate. But you might say that even our Scripture concedes to the multitude of gods, saying, "God of gods, the Lord has spoken," and, "There is none like unto thee among the gods, O Lord," and, "I have said, Ye are gods." But it is far from [the case that we should] admit these things. It drives [the meaning] everywhere, and we attend to it as it drives; yet we understand those things as they ought, of course, to be well understood, knowing how to distinguish between doctrine and the economy of terms, or custom, or need, which grants [us leeway]. For we use homonymous and metaphorical terms in many places, when the need calls for it; just as if one were to call the sun, which excels in the human life by virtue and advantages and has become useful to many, another sun, or a second sun; but no one with any sense, ^D deriving from this, would invent many suns, sharing in that nature, and again differing, so as to fulfill the worse will of his own, and not even appear to be fighting against things that are manifest and for the most part true. For it would be more like those who are playing, and one ought not to play in things that are non-perishable. And if one is philosophizing genuinely about every subject, one ought to be on guard against such things; how could it be right to debase theology, so that people not only utter falsehoods about divine things, snatching at the words like the sophists, but also, from this, proceed to many blasphemies and many impieties, founding the rest upon a foundation of falsehood? Now the Holy Scripture, condescending at times to the weakness of the many, and in the case of creatures, makes use of this term, whenever it excels others in some way, either in the administration of the subordinate according to the will of the first Cause, or in the communion of divine blessedness, or in the superiority of wisdom and other goods in this life; and through this title it raises the understanding of those who hear toward the care of life according to reason and law, by which, as far as is possible for human nature, they will arrive at the divine communion. But what is this common [view] to the blasphemies of the places you have encountered? Let us see your wisdom yet further. You say that it is a common opinion that there are many gods. But it is clear that such an opinion is not common. You would have been expected, then, to demonstrate it; but you do not demonstrate it. But this is the thing long sought by men, since it—the common opinion—does not introduce again that it is not common, while setting forth the differences regarding the divine. Then you decree, as if legislating, that there are many gods, yet not the same in divinity. But just as if they were not gods in divinity, they would not be gods, so, if all are in the same [divinity], by which it would follow that they themselves are gods, identified by the same divinity, it is impossible for one to differ from the others in nature and to differ in an impassable way, as you say; then also for others to be distinguished from one another in this way; for those who share in one form it is impossible for such a difference to exist in them, but [they] must be called by that name univocally. But if they do not differ in nature from one another, they will not differ at all, or they will differ by accidents, to the one of which it follows that there is not even a plurality, or one; while to the other many other such things follow. But if not by the same divinity, it is clear that they are called so homonymously. Either, then, all are called so homonymously, and no one is strictly and truly God; and either the true divinity is somewhere else, not in them all together, or they are called so in vain, and neither in them nor anywhere else is there a true divinity. Or, if these things are impossible, one is the being to whom this name solely and strictly belongs, and he himself is the only God, and there is no other. For of deity, not only will there not be another the same in divinity, but he will be the same in his own divinity, for in God the subject and the nature or form must be the same, so that He is not composite.

^B And what you continue to string together regarding your gods, calling some of them children of Zeus, and deeds, of which Poseidon is the first, and others children of children, and deeds, and some male and some female, both illegitimate and legitimate, and assigning names to them, and ranks both above the heaven themselves and in this universe, and actions—these, besides the fact that none of them conform to the reasonings befitting God, and are otherwise impossible and unsubstantial, are furthermore set forth without any pretext of proof, but just as one would hear someone recounting myths or dreams. Whence, if anyone wished to refute them one by one, he would be doing the same as one wishing to contend against myths or dreams. But you are building upon foundations of this sort and similar ones throughout your whole ^C work, of which the last things are worse than the first, and are not even bearable to the ears of the pious. Yet, your wise guides had a certain refuge; for since the divine light had not yet shone upon the human nature at that time, attempting the truth, they erred, some against their will, and some willingly. We say willingly, because they immediately set forth the opinions of the common people, not being the first to find for themselves what it is necessary to think about the divine. And first, honor was given in this way to the elements, then to the stars by others, then to the heaven, then as they progressed, to souls, which they connected to those bodies—I mean to the heaven and to the celestial things—then to other natures of bodies entirely separated; but those who came later, mixing everything, set up one God on high in word and in opinion, being compelled by the truth, but they order all the aforementioned things with Him, and make them partners of his divinity and creation and every divine dignity, and then they connect other absurdities; for they could not separate these from the others, from which those had received their beginning. Those men, then, thought thus. But you, what has come over you, man, that having the true theology as your ancestral heritage, you have rushed instead into ^D unsubstantial prattle, and have devoted your whole effort to this? Why, when the truth has illuminated the whole earth, have you yourself chosen the darkness? Why have you adhered to rotten and fugitive dogmas, convicted from many sources, and having no strength left in human souls, as if the Greek books were preserved for you alone? Ah, for the sake of the voice, and of the fact that the wickedness of them remains to be refuted, while the purity of the theology according to Christ shines forth, our Fathers preserved them, knowing very well that no one will be so very simple as to embrace rather than condemn them. What? Will a defense be yours before the judge of truth and all justice that partakes of truth and intellect, you who have deserted from the midst of salvation to the pit, and then expected that you alone would raise up again the polytheism that had been dead for so many years, and all that you expected against your own soul? For where, if you were able, would you not have imitated the violence of those terrible tyrants, and again have sent Christians to that path of martyrdom? Or rather, you have done everything in your power; for in one of the latest of your sub-

-^Apositions, you legislate the killing of those willing to contradict these laws, and not only this, imitating the one [(1)] who seized the order of the prophets and lawgivers by the permission of God, but also in your arguments concerning marriages, military service, sacrifices, foods, drinks, prayers, and many other things, and indeed in the very aim of the entire undertaking. And yet he surpasses you in two of the most important aspects: he teaches the unity of God, and does not battle so thoroughly against our other dogmas; moreover, he had the beginning of authority to aid his daring, and he possessed the power of the sword and the capability to first accomplish what he desired, and so he hoped to achieve his goals—so in this respect, he was even wiser than you. You, then, are worthy of tears to all who know and love you, among whom we are numbered, God being our witness, for whose sake only have we reverently disagreed with you, while in other respects praising and honoring you. But as for this book, it should be destroyed, lest it possibly become a pretext for others to mourn and for the author to gain everlasting shame, should it fall into the hands of those who know.

Having said these things to him, as if he were present, and having folded the book again, I sent it back to the admirable Queen, having directed her in a letter to commit it to the flames. But when she sent it back to us, she said that it was rather for us to carry out the penalty for writings against the apostates from many points of view. We certainly wished, therefore, to preserve some parts of the book immediately, such as pertain to natural and logical matters and the like; yet even after running through it a second time for this reason, we found not a single one of the theses devoid of evil; not only because it refers everything purposefully to polytheism, but also because some falsehood had been mingled into the arguments concerning everything. For while speaking of the immortality of the soul, he attempts, as best he can, to confirm the returns of souls into the body and into life at fixed intervals of time, as many say is the case with transmigration, and he does not deign to have these ever ascend to the heavenly place, and he adds other worse things. And further, in treating of the "economy," he deems it worthy for one man to be joined to and to live with several wives. And there is nothing of baseness that he does not introduce into human life. Wherever he perceives that any of our customs or laws contradict his own, he accuses those who are wise rhetoricians and sorcerers and fools, and those who attend to them. And he filled all the theses of the book with much bitterness against the Christians, slandering our affairs, not arguing against them, nor putting them forward as his own, nor proving them. Hence, no part of the book seemed to me later to be left for the eyes of the pious, as it was unable to afford any profit, but only to sow scandal in their souls. Yet, that apart from these absurd digressions, there was nothing in those theses suitable for wise ears, but that everything was the offspring of a very dull mind, so that the destruction of this book would not bring on any deprivation of any good thing for men—it is not right to say this, out of mercy for the senseless. For these reasons, therefore, and because he was not such by birth, but an apostate, and because a most terrible rudeness now possesses our generation, we have caused the book to be given to the flames, not for the sake of its destruction alone, but especially for the sake of the penalty. And indeed, the whole thing was in his own handwriting. But since it is also very likely that the same exists somewhere else, copied by one of his students, whether living or dead, we exhort all as if from God: if at any time and anywhere the whole book or a part of it should be found copied in the possession of any of the Christians, the owner should destroy it with fire; and if he is caught in the act of hiding it, after a first and second warning, if he does not wish to burn it openly, he is to be excluded from all communion with Christians.

To that poor man, then, we have released a flood of tears, and we have many times cursed the day on which the book came to us. For what need had we now of such turmoil? So, on account of the excessive gratitude that God has given, we have prayed to Him with humility, for he whom the poor man insulted, that—if it were possible—the penalties of the blasphemy against Him might be forgiven him. But to you, O pious and learned soul, and worthy of the highest regard to us, giving thanks, as you have moved us to speak on behalf of these things—even though we are gripped by many illnesses and anxieties—we pray for a good life for you here from God, and happiness hereafter, toward which you wisely direct your whole life. And do you also pray for us for a most speedy release from the evils of this life, and with virtue. Amen. Farewell.

(This is the first page of the work.)

NOTICE.

The following minor works: *Against the Acindyniasta*, *An Exposition of the Faith concerning the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, *On the Addition made by the Latins to the Symbol*, *Against the Simoniacal Heresy*, *Against the Sabbitine Fast*, were published by Dositheus in his *Tomos Agapes* (Book of Love), in Jassy, 1698. The minor work *Against Simony* is mentioned by Fabricius and Renaudot, col. 290; the book *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* by Renaudot, col. 504; we have found no mention of the others among them or elsewhere. From where Dositheus obtained them, he did not communicate to the reader.

OF GENNADIUS, OR GEORGE SCHOLARIUS, TO ONE OF HIS FRIENDS WHO ASKED CONCERNING THE SAYING OF THE BLESSED THEODORE THE BRANDED, WHICH THE ACINDYNIASTAE ARE DISTURBING; AND FURTHER, CONCERNING THOSE THINGS WHICH THEY THEMSELVES ARE SOPHISTICATING REGARDING THE HOLY SPIRIT.

^A Great thanks to you for the goodwill toward us, most excellent of friends, which you show by many true proofs, and especially by the fact that you trust us regarding the greatest matters; this you demonstrate. Such are the things pertaining to the holy faith, regarding which you have been able to show yourself—even if not among the highly learned—to be one who has been under constant study and diligence. Since there are not many among us who are truly learned—a common misfortune, I would say, which has taken this away from us along with other things—you have seemed to be among those who are sufficiently educated. And there are indeed many among us who have the skill to demonstrate this, who indeed have taken up the fitting zeal and stand bravely against the recklessness of the adversaries: on the one hand, to judge accurately regarding the things they innovate, because they are very well educated, just as is indeed the opinion of Aristotle; and on the other hand, neither to give way, nor to undergo anything against the ancestral glory, being brought to this by a sincere love for God; and also, concerning those who oppose, to judge that they say and do nothing sound, not only being firmly persuaded by what they themselves accomplish, but also by the errors that the others make. For they know all those who are on the side of this "new theology," by which words they are persuaded, and which they must first cast aside. Being ignorant of both—and not even able to judge themselves—what they invent from their own resources is not even equal to the poetic myths, if I should not say something worse, which old women invent at the loom; and concerning the insolence against their own ancestors ^B and the faith, they are far from forgiveness, those who, by making dogma and faith a secondary matter for human honor, drive forward all impiety, as even they themselves might say, together with those who choose such things and those who allow them.

These things the learned among us know and cry out, and they are good descendants of our best ancestors, and for these reasons they grieve. Moreover, they endure the resentment and retributions of those who lead the other party. For they know that, just as a certain prize has been selected for those who are with the truth immediately from Christ, the truth itself is examined in such persecutions. Which would not be the case if those who have chosen the worse path did not possess the power to harm; and because of this, they satisfy their own ambition through wickedness and the power of others, while assuming a frame of mind becoming to men and Christians. But those who trust in violence to change the opinions of men are truly impious, trying to enslave that—which is almost the only thing God left free among men—to certain wretched compulsions and bugbears. And in addition to these, they prove their own instability, in that they belong to those who are capable of being acted upon ignobly and by force, and of abandoning the opinion in their soul due to fear or some hope. As for me, even if I have left the study of such things to others from a distance, shunning the appearance of desiring such matters—especially since there is no longer a need for me to speak, and besides, I am conscious to myself among the learned...

^A that you would not blame me for this, even if I were to say something less than what the subject matter and your expectations might require, nor that I would undergo any risk in order to gratify you with things that are necessary, as if I were fulfilling a debt you might demand. I have, therefore, no means of escape; willingly or unwillingly, I take up this task for you. To those who are displeased by the word and by everything it contains, if it should concern them to pursue and harm us for these reasons, then—while we are in no way concerned with what they might intend to do—we are supremely concerned that everything that ought to be done be done, even if some risk attends it.

For one must proclaim things in the light and upon the housetops, things which we were taught quietly and mystically, fearing nothing from those who maltreat the body but have no power to touch the soul. Our Master teaches this, and Paul urges it by his own example, he who testified that the Spirit said that chains and tribulations awaited him in every city, yet he considered all these things light; for he says, "I make no account of them." Therefore, let it not seem burdensome to any of our enemies that we wish to obey our Master and the chief of the Apostles, for we have little concern for them.

You have asked two things: the first is how we ought to answer these "Acindynianists"—or more accurately, these followers of Acindynus—when they present to us the statement of the blessed Theodore the Studite, in which he seems to think that the distinction between essence and energy in God should be cast upon the heretics, as if he himself thought these were one and the same; and the second is that you said these same men raise questions concerning the All-Holy Spirit, asking why, if the Holy Spirit is one and the same—and from the Father and the Son, as Scripture teaches—we confess that It originates from the Father, but deny that It has its cause from the Son. For it seems that if It is one and the same in both and in the same way, It must also proceed or originate from both. Having spoken first more briefly concerning the second point, we shall turn the greater part of our discourse to the first, which is more useful.

For the salvation of a pious soul, it is sufficient to solve this question that Scripture proclaims the Spirit from the Father, but nowhere from the Son—but only calls It the "Spirit of the Son" and the "Spirit of Christ"—not dividing the Spirit, nor teaching that It is less in the Son but rather more in the Father, but, by [saying It is] from the Father, revealing Its hypostasis from there alongside the unity of essence; while by calling It only [the Spirit] of the Son, it signifies solely a natural kinship, for which reason the Holy Spirit is called the "Spirit of God," and the "Spirit from God," and the "Spirit from the Father"; but it nowhere says "from the Son," but only "the Spirit of the Son."

^B The great Basil says, "It is of a pious mind to fear to add to the Holy Spirit what has been passed over in the Scriptures." And again, the same man: "For he—Eunomius, clearly—could not say that it is permitted for him to devise certain fabricated forms of names in debates concerning such great matters. For if we shall render an account for an idle word in the day of judgment, how much less shall it be forgiven us to innovate concerning such matters? For perhaps we have been taught by divine discourse that one thing is fitting to be said of God and the Father, while this other, not being fitting for the Only-Begotten, was indicated by those things about which the Holy Spirit was silent."

The great Athanasius says to him: "We exhort you, as we exhort ourselves, to keep the faith that has been passed down, and to turn away from profane novelties. For he who seeks things above himself is in danger, but he who remains in what has been passed down is without danger." These three witnesses are sufficient to show that, even with no teacher to unfold for us this, the scriptural distinction, we ought to proclaim what Scripture says, to be silent where it has been silent, and to be at peace with those things which it has defined; that is, to confess the Holy Spirit of the Father and from the Father, but not to say from the Son, but only of the Son. For so did it define.

But now, what is greater: this great Basil, this middle one of the fine witnesses, in his letter to his brother, appears to touch upon this distinction of Scripture, like a good and kind man, as if he foresaw the boldness of some and was removing it from afar; for he says thus: ^D "And he who said only 'Spirit' took into the confession both the One whose Spirit it is—for it is Christ's—and the One from whom It is, for it is from God, as the Apostle says." And Chrysostom says, "Spirit of God, and Spirit that is from God." And so that we might not, upon hearing 'Spirit of God,' think it is meant by way of kinship, the Scripture introduces the Holy Spirit and adds to 'of God' the [phrase] 'from God.' But 'of God' is one thing, and 'from God' is another. In agreement with these, the holy John Damascene says: "We do not say the Spirit from the Son, but we name It the Spirit of the Son."

^A If, then, they exhort us to hold simply and everywhere to the terms of the Scriptures, and to avoid profane innovations, and they themselves claim to do so, yet do not act thus even in the matter at hand—and if, much more clearly, they keep the law they set for themselves, and distinguish for our sake between "from God" and "of God," which are both spoken of the Spirit, so that "Spirit of the Son" and "Spirit from the Son" differ (of which the one is said, while the other is not said, because it simply does not exist)—"For if such an appellation were proper for It," says Basil, "it would not have been passed over by the Spirit." To what end will he who wishes to be pious bring in certain human reasonings, so as to wrongly join and connect that which the Divine Scripture has most rightly distinguished, ^B or why does he think to blame those who do not wish to attend to him? Or who, when raising such difficulties where the authority of Scripture is established for those who wish to be pious, will not appear to despise it?

^C But this is true regarding none of them; rather, the opposite is true: that although they are the same in both, and unchangeably so, nevertheless the Father alone is the cause of all these for the Son, while the Son is the cause of none of these for Himself; according to these [principles], therefore, He is not the cause even of His own Spirit. For this reason, then, the Father is called by Dionysius the sole fountain of the superessential Godhead, as gushing forth from that hypostasis the other divine hypostases, as well as all things that belong to them—each of them, however, being recognized as coming from a cause—and all the same things [belonging] to the Father, the one [hypostasis] possessing them by way of generation, the other in another manner, which He possesses without cause and as the fountain. Observe this also: The same Spirit is both of the Father and of the Son, and is one in both. But they themselves say that the Son is the cause of It. Therefore, according to them, the Son is the cause of the paternal Spirit, if It is one, as has been said before; and It is no more of the One in Him than of the One in the Father. But whatever is the cause of something existing in one of the simple [hypostases], is also the cause of that in which this exists. Such is the Father, for He is simple, and simply simple. Therefore, the Son will in this way be the cause of the Father, being the cause of the Spirit in Him. But this must not be feared regarding the Father. It is necessary, then, to believe that being the cause of the Spirit which is in the Son, He is also the cause of the Son Himself. Do you see into what precipices that sequence casts those who are not cautious about it? Do you see how dangerous it is to claim to believe that the holy Spirit is also from the Son, because It is said to be the Spirit of the Son? These things, therefore, as it seems, the teachers of the Church, being cautious, say it is of the Son, but do not say it is from the Son, and before them the Divine Scripture, as we said before.

For God's sake, and whence do we have that the Spirit is from the Father, and is of the Father? Is it from human reasonings? Whence have we believed that It is also of the Son? Is it from having trusted in natural arguments? Not at all; but the teaching of the Spirit, being more persuasive than all things, daily preaches these dogmas to us. This [teaching], therefore, would not have spared even this, if it were true. But since it clearly distinguishes in this way—and says It is the Spirit of the Son, but does not say It is from the Son—we also must not be overly curious, nor, by looking at what follows from the argument, imagine that we are doing something pious and just. For if we are to trust the guidance of the argument in this matter, why should we not trust it in others, to the point that we would risk everything regarding the faith? This is what necessity compels all those who trust entirely in natural reason to suffer; indeed, even the fact that the Spirit is from the Father, and that God is Father and Son and Spirit—all these things will become empty [notions] for us and will be scattered by human reasonings, as if having yielded to the winds. For there is nothing in common between these things and what faith adds to us. We, therefore, neither believe nor say that the Spirit has subsistence from the Son; for Scripture does not teach this; but we say [It is] of the Son as being appropriated to Him by nature. This is because it seems right to both Scripture and Basil, and we consider the answer from Scripture and the afore-mentioned to be sufficient against opponents.

In order that they may not appear to say something solemn through the things by which they are perplexed, examine the absurdity of their argument. Since, they say, the holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, and is one, and is likewise in both, because it is essentially, clearly—why is the Son not also a cause of It, just as the Father is? For they seem to follow some such combination: The holy Spirit is one and is the same of the Father and of the Son, and is essentially in them; therefore both provide this, or both are causes of it. What, then, prevents one from claiming that this follows in the case of many others? ^D Hear also regarding what follows from the blessed Theodore’s statement, about which you particularly and urgently ask. But first we must set forth the statement itself for you. He says, therefore: "Not by some prophetic foreknowledge and grace—far be it—did the Lord do such things, and foretell to the disciples, as if seeing things in the future; but as God present to all, not even by a bare energy, according to some of the revilers of old, [did He act] to empty the heavens of His own hypostasis during the times of the divine incarnation, and to be only essentially in us, but [also] by energy and dignity towards God and the Father—for they set [the distinction] between essence and energy, as in the case of those who are viewed bodily. Thus, they also applied this to the divine Word, which has been forbidden to the pious. For they know that in the case of the simple and incorporeal, it differs in nothing. For these must not be distinguished from one another, lest that which is above all simplicity be conceived as composite. For neither would the divine essence ever be without energy, nor is the energy without essence. For My Father, He says, works until now..."

^A And I also work.” Forasmuch as it shows Him truly to be supersubstantial, and to be always identically and immutably established in His own permanence and foundation; and it sets forth the providential and ineffable dispensations toward those that exist, according to which, proceeding without departing from His own simplicity, He performs the providence working for all things. But if, even while having consorted with men as truly man, He did not depart from the paternal bosoms, and the Father was in Him, and He Himself was in the Father—this is the utterance.

But how one must interpret these and the other utterances of the teachers—for this must be established before all others—our great Athanasius declares most excellently in his first work against the Arians. For he says: “It is necessary, as is appropriate in the case of all Holy Scripture and as is necessary, so also here, that one receive faithfully the time, the person, and the example for which the Apostle wrote, so that he who reads not knowing those things, or receiving them based on something else, might not fall outside the true meaning. For when one has the knowledge of such things rightly, he has the understanding of the faith straight and healthful; but if one receives them based on something else, he immediately falls into heresy.” And Cyril likewise in his *Thesaurus* says: “He who goes forth into the investigation of divine Scriptures must observe the time at which that which is indicated is said, and the person by whom, or about whom, or through whom it is said. For thus the mind might be kept unerring for those wishing to understand rightly.” The same is also commonly asserted by all the teachers. ^B Following this canon, the Church of Christ, appropriately receiving the utterances of certain teachers according to the times and the other existing circumstances, even if by the sound of the words they might seem to some to provide some sort of support to these tempters and innovators, yet gathering the intention of the truth from the common groundings of the faith and from the common and concordant opinion of all the teachers, teaches us to conceive of the divine essence and its energies as being distinguished substantially—that is, from the nature of the thing, not by mental conception only; and as for those who distinguish them by mental conception only, that we should neither pay attention to them as parricides and ignoramuses, nor contend with them. And following this opinion and instruction of our holy Mother the Church, that blessed Prelate of the Ephesians, Mark, in his work against Kalekas, interprets the proposal of the blessed Theodore most justly and wisely, and as if the very one who had composed it in the beginning; and there is almost no need of any addition to what that admirable Father defined.

Those, then, who were about Barlaam and Akindynos distinguished the divine essence from its energies and perfections by reason/concept—that is, by mental conception—claiming that it is impossible to distinguish them substantially. For they supposed that in this way more things would exist in God, and that He would be in danger of being composite, as if ^C containing more things united in Himself; fleeing, therefore, regarding the divine as composite, they thought these things to be distinguished by mental conception. For they were, it seems, ignorant of what the distinction of mental conception truly is. That it is of definitions in the soul and made or fashioned by it; and that to be distinguished substantially is, on the one hand, for things to be truly distinguished, as subsisting, and whole, and individual; and, on the other hand, for one thing to be so, and another to be something of the thing, and in the thing, and both to be something of the thing; whence it follows that they feared those things which were to be feared regarding composition; for it is not true that things attributed to God are attributed substantially and not by our mental conception. There is, therefore, composition of these and from these in God. For they were, it seems, ignorant, among other things, of this also: that from whence those things which are being sought for assembling are absent, it is necessary that the composition also be absent from there, even where they are present. For one must believe each of the constituent elements to be finite, whereas we all believe the divine essence to be infinite. And again, each of these must be able to be a part of something, whereas the divine is altogether impartible, and can be a part of nothing, and this is our mind. And those who are clever about these matters are accustomed to inquire about many other things regarding composition. But it suffices that these things also, spoken for the sake of an example, in which all even the thing which is of the constituent elements is contained, should also be appropriate. But in God, both the essence and the energy are something of the thing, and in the thing—I mean energy, whether that which is inside, or that which is outside. ^D For things truly are essentially in God the three subsistences of that blessed Triad, believed to be beyond reason and mind. Those, then, who, fleeing the truth, denied [the energies], it would have been possible for them to have been rid of these, and to have stood with the truth; for neither is the divine essence necessarily composite because of the three subsistences, nor because of the things truly existing and contemplated in Him, insofar as the remainder of those things sought for regarding composition is absent on both sides. But in that they erred by being content with the distinction of mental conception, this escaped them because of much conceit. For because of them and their wise thesis, we would be in danger of vainly composing those many propositions about God; if indeed to each of the things said about God nothing corresponded in the thing, but these were certain definitions fashioned by our soul; and God would be essence only, without energy, because there is neither energy there as energy, nor is the essence present [as energy] before our understanding, nor can it be added by our mental conception. But this is clearly false and impossible; for the ugliness from this redounds upon the Holy Scripture, which is the first to compose these propositions for us: by saying that God is good, and that He is true, and that He is just, and that He loved justice, and all such things, surely not aiming at and paving the way for our mental conceptions, but teaching us to believe that there is in God

^A justice, if indeed anywhere else, and goodness, and truth, and the rest likewise. And yet they were in danger of holding an opinion contrary to the holy Scripture—that which prevails in these matters—and of introducing compositions and a plurality of gods, but rather [they should think] that these things are in the object and are distinguished by the nature of the object.

Strictly speaking, however, a distinction belongs to the reason, which pertains only to the subject and the predicate, or things of that sort. For this [distinction] exists only in the mind, and in no way in the object, because predication is, of course, a work of the mind. For Peter is not in Peter as an object [is] in an object. For Peter is one in number and indivisible, but nevertheless we are able to form such a proposition, even a true one: that Peter is Peter. In which the one is the subject, the other its predicate; and in this way, they are somehow distinguished.

Consider, then, if God is thus truly just, as Peter is Peter—[is the person] distracted? He would not claim this, for as to those terms in which the distinction of reason revolves, there might at some time be an opportunity for our mind, when it is being stripped away, or it is able to form such terms, so that even in the same distinctions, the essence of God and the energy—and whether in these there is a difference, and [it being stripped] from every mind and from the whole—[these] will be. For it does not oppose the divine energy, whether inside or outside, for it to be or to exist or to be brought forth, even if it should happen that every mind is destroyed which predicates these things of the divine energy; nor is it anything at all on account of such a predication that the divine goodness is in God, or that it exists there absolutely, but [not] a generation and a bringing forth [only] relatively, and fatherhood and sonship. But even if these things are not understood, they are none the less and will be so in the nature of the object. But Peter will be a subject to himself, and will be predicated of himself, and in this way will be distinguished, in no way whatsoever departing from the mind that is naturally accustomed to do these things.

Neither, therefore, did the followers of Barlaam and Acindynus deem these things to be in accordance with divine Scripture or with reason, and at the same time they were fighting against all the teachers, whose utterances you shall find in the book of the blessed Palamas, in which, setting forth certain modes of distinction of the essence of God and His energy, he brings forward the utterances of the teachers that confirm ^B these very things, most aptly. But for now, what has been said is sufficient to set before you the opinion of the Acindynians, and how absurd it was. But the Church of Christ, having set the holy theologian Gregory over its own dogmas, to protect them in many ways on his behalf, judged it to be far from the pious conception that God should be embellished by human mental conceptions, as if no holiness belonged to Him in reality; but [it proclaimed] that there is a certain order and distinction that is both true and objective of the divine essence and His energy, as they are both in truth and in reality, each in its own proper manner openly proclaimed; not saying, as they do, that the divine essence and the divine energy—as each is subsistent and— ^C

Who, then, is ignorant of this distinction, which is far elevated above that distinction to which the followers of Barlaam and Acindynus directed their attention, that is, which revolves around terms created by the mind, which is what we formally call the distinction of reason, but which is more feeble than that real [distinction] by which the divine persons are distinguished? But those murderers did not know how to distinguish these things, because they could not distinguish the divine energy from the divine essence, as they saw the hypostases [as distinguished] from one another, very well; seeing this in the distinction of reason, they were immediately cast down, having escaped one precipice, but having fallen into another, which brings an equal destruction; not even having reflected on that [statement] of the holy Basil in his letter to Eustathius: "Therefore," he says, "from some essence, whether creative or energetic, the appellation indicated, it bears [witness] to the divinity, clearly; but the divine nature, in all the names that are conceived, as it is, remains indifferent [indescribable], as our reason [holds]. For once we learned [that He is] Benefactor and Judge, good and just, and all other such things, we were taught differences of energies. But we are no more able to know the nature that is acting through the knowledge of the energies. For when one gives an account of each of these names, and [of the] nature itself about which the names [are], he will not give the same account for both. But if the reason is different, the nature of these is also different. Therefore, the essence is one thing, of which the reason has not yet been revealed, and another is the meaning of the names about it, which are named from some energy or worth."

Behold clearly the Teacher reveals to them, if they were willing to observe, how the essence of God and the energy are distinguished from the nature of the object, and yet more specifically, as one might say. "For another," he says, "is the account of the intelligible essence, and another that of the energy." And since the reason is different, the nature of these is also different. The nature, therefore, of the divine essence and of the divine energy is not the same, calling 'nature' that which is naturally signified by the reason, that which 'what it was to be' says—the property of the thing defined, for which it exists, or acts, or has [being], just as it naturally is, in which way, I suppose, [is] the [distinction] by nature versus by convention and by mental conception. Thus also the Teacher in those [writings] against Eunomius, and others of the teachers in their own discriminating treatises. For it suffices thus that the name of nature be unfolded to you for the present need. To delve into it also according to higher methods is too curious. If, therefore, according to the great Basil, both the essence of God and His energy are distinguished from the nature of the object, and are [distinguished] by the reasons that indicate the 'what it is to be'—how is it not manifest that those who according to ^D

^A their own thought distinguish these things, but rather also rid themselves of the fear of composition, [distinguish] this very teacher himself, if they wished another, and the holy Maximus? For the one, in the second of the works against Eunomius, accusing him of composition, because he did not posit the unbegotten as the divine essence itself, but around it, says: "For the modes that indicate his property will not disturb the mode of simplicity." And Maximus, in the thirteenth chapter of the conversation with Pyrrhus: "You see," he says, "that from this you are led astray, from being completely ignorant that the compositions of things that exist in substance, and not those viewed in another, are [compositions of substance]—and this is a common opinion of all, both of, external philosophers and of the God-taught mystagogues of the Church—[and by] calling those existing in substance 'good.' Which, as a whole, all return under their own names, as the primary substances possess [them], and the parts of these substances, or the underlying [subject] and the common accident and such like." But the holy Theologian Gregory did not say that the goodness of God and the wisdom are in substance apart, and the justice and the truth, as it is possible to say of Peter and Paul, or of the soul and the body, or of the hand and the head; but as the mind and the will in man, which can neither be separated, and yet one of them is neither a definition of the other, nor a part of a definition, and they naturally exist in man, as certain perfections of him, without which he would not even be a man; thus, also holding them, they are surely [something] real to him, according to the more comprehensive of the things signified by the object. Such, then, is the difference between both opinions.

For I pass over the other differences of those insults of theirs, in which it was [the case] that they even posited that the light which flashed around our Lord on Tabor was a created thing, or one taken from solar light, or one produced for the moment for the sake of the need and again ceasing to be. Of which, one is unworthy of Christ and of that true working of miracles of His, and the other is neither necessary, and at the same time impossible; for what need is there to create a foreign light, and not to reveal one's own? ^B Indeed, it was not for Him to grant such things to His own flesh, since He himself was the One who was later to glorify this, and to transform it into the impassible and lightness and subtlety; or perhaps since the eyes of the apostles had somehow been repaired immediately [to see it]; for it was neither unlikely, and this to have come together with the need of the miracle, and at the same time befitting. Who are the leaders of this opinion? The Theologian Gregory, the Great Basil, Chrysostom, the Damascene, and many others.

I return to the snippet of Theodore the Studite. First, it occurs to me to marvel at their perversity; for grasping at the things of Theodore, they do not examine the Great Basil, who, in the discourse to Amphilochius, adds such things: "Let them not ask if we know the essence of God; but let them ask if we know God [to be] fearful, or just, or philanthropic; these we confess we know. If they say the essence is something else, let them not deceive us through [the concept of] simplicity; for they themselves confessed that the essence and each of the enumerated [qualities] are one thing and another, but the energies are various, while the essence is simple. We, however, say that we know God from the energies; but we do not promise to approach His essence. For His energies descend to us; but His essence remains unapproachable." Do you see how the Great Basil refutes the Anomoeans? ^C

Let the word of the Studite now be examined, for [in it] we shall only need from us the method of explanation of Maximus. Therefore, he says in the *Theory on the Lamp*: "Not always and in all things do those that have the same utterance be understood in one and the same way; but each of the things said [must be understood] in relation to the underlying [subject], obviously [the one] in the place of Holy Scripture, if we intend to rightly conjecture the purpose of the things said." And thus, indeed, the words of the teachers, as also [those] of the Holy Scriptures, must be explained, and with the same skill for both, even if greater reverence is to be paid to the Scriptures. I say, then, according to Saint Maximus, that to say one thing and another is [to say] this and that; and again, that the same thing is this and that [even if] it has the same utterance; ^D and we should not understand every identity in the same things, nor every difference in others, but in each case its own [type]. The modes of differences and distinctions in things are not few, some of which are also applied analogically to divine things. Likewise, it is said that the same thing is this and that in many ways. If, therefore, it were our intention to speak about every distinction and union, we would have had to divide everything precisely; but now, this not being what is proposed to us, and at the same time the exact discussion of these things far exceeding the measure of the present need, we deem it sufficient to show the Acindynists explaining the saint basely. For it is not as they themselves wish—that he simply throws away that the essence and the energy of God are one thing and another—as if one [could apply] all the modes of otherness.

^A For he divides and distinguishes them with the concepts that signify what it is to be for each, and he renders a peculiar definition of each of them. But if the concept is different, and the nature is distinct, these things differ from the nature of the thing [itself], not from our own conceptual setting, and not because they are only distinguished by us in thought. Thus, this divine man will agree with the great teacher, clearly accepting that the essence is one thing and the energy another. For neither did he distinguish according to the ancient heretics, whom Theodore refutes very well, nor did Theodore himself wish to unify [them] as those matricides do—that is, to unify [them] in all ways, as if he himself in some other way were suffering from the same sickness as those heretics, by calling God either energy without essence, or essence without energy, which follows ^B from the distinction of the concept clearly.

That the "not one thing and another" of Theodore, and the "one thing and another" of Basil come together, and that not all things and at all times that have the same articulation must be understood in the same way, but each [must be understood] according to the power underlying the concept at that time, ^C is something that greatly disturbs the opponents, because they do not observe these things well. For he himself said in what was recently stated, that when one gives an account of each of those things pertaining to God, and of his nature to which these things pertain, one will not give the same account. So he said that the account of the essence and of the energy in God is not the same. Elsewhere he says that in the case of the simple and incorporeal nature, the energy admits the same account as the essence. If then the identity of the concept will be understood in the same way in each occurrence, the other of the statements will be rejected as false. For it is impossible for the account of the essence of God and of the energy to be the same, and not be the same, ^D if the account of the latter is understood in the same way, unless all things were to become one. But since it is impossible for the great teacher to contradict himself, one must understand each according to the need and power underlying each concept, as Maximus says. For where he claims a different account for the essence of God and a different one for his energy, he is obviously denoting the definition or the nature of the thing. But where he says that the energy admits the same account as the essence in God—that is, the mode of existence—he is saying that for both [the account] is the same for every principle pertaining to the essence, and that it passes over to the energy; for as is the nature, so indeed is the energy of God—that is, that nature being infinite, uncreated, and eternal, so too is the energy. For there it must be matching to the nature, not as in the case of all other things. However, each thing itself is an essence, whereas its energy, even if it be essential, stands in the category of the accidental. And this would be clear from the following: the essence of God is infinite in respect of its form; but his energy is not infinite in respect of its form, for it is not...

from the account of the energy that the goodness of God is infinite, but through the essence. To the essence of God, however, this belongs of itself and through itself. But because the divine simplicity forces the mode of existence to be the same, ^A both are infinite, and there is one God, without specific distinction, nor is it able to produce a division of things or a composition there, as it is founded upon one substrate and one most simple divine nature. Therefore, in saying that the energy of God admits the same account as the essence—that is, all the holy things of that supernatural essence—and that it extends toward its energy, the teacher has not failed himself in having said somewhere that the account of the essence is one thing, and that of the energy is another. Nor must we, in holding to that account, reject it or make all things equal at once. For who with a mind would say that the infinite and the finite have been distinguished by intellectual conception? Things which have not been made by the soul, but are above it, and by which they are distinguished, and which are greater, are in a way contradictory. So that neither the divine essence and the divine energy, nor the essence as essence and the energy as energy, will be distinguished by logic, in which the one is infinite and the other finite, as they pertain to such things; but they will be distinguished, clearly, by species and by the nature of the thing. And in some other way they will be, and most simply, by existence, even if there is no example of this among beings.

These things are for these Akindynists and "Latin-minded" ones, for both are afflicted with the same disease, let it be said more simply and more justly. And if I must speak the truth, it is according to need and the usage of the many—at least of those who will read them—that we have rendered for you the power of the solutions in a way befitting them. For even if what is ours is much lower than this subject, it was possible in a way to be lifted up even above the present arguments; but this would not have been profitable otherwise. For my Jesus also, it is said, lifting the crowds up a little from the land, taught them, exhorting us by his deed where there is a need for benefit and for simplicity, and that it is never the time for depth and display. But do not hate the flight of these men from the truth so much as the mutability of their intention and the harshness of their conscience. For just as if exacting justice for some great evils from the Church and our forefathers, they hate and turn away from the dogmas that have prevailed among us until now, ^B while they take pleasure in all the foreign innovations, so that if it were possible for them, they would have reshaped our things, just as it would be easy to move the boundaries of the Fathers, and this in such times, in which it is sufficient for us for piety to both discern and follow their footsteps. But what they themselves do, anyone who knows how to judge would say is a matter of either indifference or of great initiation. And yet, by not being able to change these things, they turn back and pretend to hold to the ancestral ways. But they escape no one who has intelligence, even in their pretending. For they are the ones who called us Nestorians in the public theater, because we believe the Son of God is not the cause of the all-holy Spirit—a dogma true in all necessities, and defended by the words ^C and blood of our own Fathers and teachers, against the apostates who once fought against it, whom he also subjected to eternal punishments. And [they are the ones] against whose dogma the Arian is opposed because of the dual principle, and the Eunomian because of the subordination of the Spirit, and the Apollinarian because of the degrees of the divine persons. And these things which they ill-fashion are disorder rather than order, and confusion rather than distinction, and they seem to fall into many other absurdities. They themselves are those who have called their own mother Nestorian, who have been the cause of many human temptations to many pious people, who have written against every orthodox writing, and who try to persuade the Christians in all the earth of this innovation. How then will they escape deceiving the simpler ones with these forced and opportune pretenses? If they wish to be believed, let them endure to act in accordance with what seems right to the laws of the Church. Hate them all, therefore, for as long as they are such, and [hate] those who are their leaders, those who have been excommunicated, whose sophistries they followed out of an inability to judge, as they are the causes of so great an evil. I shall rightly curse those things which our mother, the Church of Christ, also curses annually; for we must agree with our mother, unless we wish to deny our relationship to her. But as for those who now deify their impieties, as long as they are still alive, pray that they may become better, and that they may feel some repentance, and ^D that they may show this canonically. But those which our mother, the Catholic Church of the Christians, has thought from the beginning and still thinks, and [those that] all the sons of this Church thought together until the abduction that occurred yesterday—of these I hold firmly, convinced that neither Latins, nor all men, nor the angels themselves—if I should speak according to Paul—could remove anything, having been persuaded of [what is] better and more true.

EPISTLE OF GEORGIUS SCHOLARIOS TO JOANNES COMNENUS, EMPEROR OF TREBIZOND. Prior to the book on the procession of the Holy Spirit against the Latins.

To the most high lord emperor of Trebizond, John the Great Comnenus, Georgius Scholarios [wishes] happiness, with most reverent goodwill. (From the Vindob. theol. Gr. codex no. 275, apud Lambec. Comment. lib. V.)

^A The first book was composed by us during the struggles against that bishop, at the time of our studies, concerning which we have discoursed almost in the presence of the emperor himself, and of the entire senate here, and of all those who were of the same opinion as him. For although he was a wise man, he appeared inferior not to us, but to the truth. And now a second [book] has been written for your sake, most pious emperor, as you desire to receive something of the sort from us. For in addition to the other graces with which you have adorned your imperial soul, and through it the power entrusted to you by God, you also love discourses, and those which are most divine; and you show yourself always favorable and merciful to those interested in these things, choosing the best of human pursuits.

But may your steadiness in the faith, for the sake of which you love and honor our insignificance, even more than the value [of our work], be exalted above all your other advantages, [which you do] because you think that we, too, play a part in the consistency of the correct and ancestral dogmas. You, therefore, most powerful emperor, having learned about the former book, demanded that it be sent to you by us; but we, knowing that it had been prepared more ambitiously and that it attacked many of those who hold the opposite view to us, have released it only in a limited number [of copies] to those in this city; for we know that there will be another time in which it will be necessary to appear before all. We intended to send it to your majesty, who commanded it, quite willingly; but having considered that artisans do not offer to emperors the same things they might prepare for whomever they happen upon, but instead intentionally create other things for them, and because we ourselves had long been studying a second treatise containing much that had been omitted in the former, we have, on the pretext of your royal exhortation, justly produced this second treatise, which is much more concise and clearer, and better armed with the pronouncements of the teachers, and of the kind that is fitting for one ^B who wishes to have clever and brief information.

Therefore, do not desire to blame us for not having sent you that one with so many lines; but rather, knowing that we have undertaken labor for your sake and have determined to adorn the book with the name of your majesty, use this [book] as one of the many other proofs of our goodwill toward your divine majesty, and of our faith. And let this book not be common to all whom it might chance upon, but let it be a treasure for you, to be opened, displayed, and spoken only in your presence, and to be hidden again. For there are many things in the treatise which need to be hidden from those who differ with us, should they ever wish to engage in discourse with us again; and we have a commandment, as you know, not to give our glory to others, or to alienate things that are advantageous to us, and it is possible to achieve this by doing everything at the right time. ^C Now, however, it is necessary not only to be on guard against those of the other language, but also against those of our own [people] who have scorned the ancestral faith; for they condemn many of our own forefathers for ignorance, having been won over by the sophisms of certain people born of inexperience, and they blather these things back and forth as if they possessed some dignity, to the shame of our forefathers, or rather of themselves; for it would have been a wondrous thing if they alone had been sown with the yearning for union, while we were all enemies of peace who do not obey them. But they wish to establish the treaties at Florence as a monument written against our Church—treaties which we all know how they came about, with those who perpetrated them [themselves] refuting them—and they wish these treaties to remain and to be believed, which brings upon us shame unjustly and ignorantly, calling us Nestorians because we do not believe [that] the Spirit [receives] the existence from the Son.

^A For we are sufficient to defend ourselves; for what has been set down in both books, these things and more than these we discuss daily with those who hold contrary opinions; but they, not having [anything] to answer reasonably, do something else that seems advantageous to them; yet, when we are dead, these books will speak. And if anyone shall say something against them, it is impossible for that person to say [something] true about true things; but he will pay the penalty for his sophistries to those who have understanding, before he renders [an account] to the just Judge of all. For there will be many, by the grace of Christ, just as there are now, who embrace the truth with suffering, and who do not gape at sophistries and the deception of temporal things; with these, therefore, the judgment of our arguments will lie, and those by whom others will be instructed. I, however, will submit myself to the laws and votes of another judge. For this reason, let this composition be given to none of the enemies, as long as you hear that we are among the living, or until you learn that it is given by us willingly to others. ^B

EXPOSITION OF THE CORRECT DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE HYPOSTASIS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT: AND OF THE ANCIENT AND CONFESSED MIND OF THE CHURCH, AS IT WERE A PLACE OF CONFESSION

PROLOGUE

Georgios Scholarios, the most lowly creature of God, ^C enlightened by the grace of God, has received [the faith] by the definitions and words of the Fathers, and I shall hold it, and until my last breath I shall set it forth to all, both those who think the same and to the heterodox. And whether or not a synod should take place—either only from those who hold the same opinion with us, when we seek to have an inquiry concerning those who hold contrary opinions and to correct their affairs if they should so wish, and thus to bring together the children of our mother the Church, or even from the heterodox, as some desire, for the overthrow of the true and ancestral doctrine, and for the confirmation of those things which were previously rashly conceded in Florence, or from both and in any manner—and whether I shall be present [while] living, or whether I should die, or whether living I shall not be present; and whatever might be concluded, whether it be our ancestral mind or something else, I ^D offer to God and the angels, and to all the saints, the profession of my faith, with this prerequisite: the Symbol of the faith that is in Constantinople, that is to say [the one] in Nicaea, and the definitions concerning it in the Third Synod, concerning not adding anything, nor taking away from it, either in intent or in word—which definitions the subsequent ecumenical synods also reiterate and have kept in practice—and with the prerequisites of the conclusions

^A of the ecumenical synods, to all of which I subscribe as to divine decrees; and furthermore, the latest synods established in Constantinople, as well as the great and catholic synod [convened] from all the orthodox against Beccus, and whatever that synod discusses and defines, and [also] the synods against Barlaam and Akindynos, who were excommunicated—to the decrees of these synods I also pledge myself with my whole soul and intent; and furthermore, regarding all that has been acknowledged beforehand, and what the catholic Church of Constantinople believes and thought before, together about the holy mysteries of the Church, through which the life of those who believe rightly in Christ, hidden with love, is brought to perfection, concerning the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, about which we have been disputing with the Latins for nearly five hundred years: thus I believe and thus I confess.

PART ONE

In which the positions and sayings of the heterodox are dissolved in accordance with the sayings of the saints, which they most of all drag by force to their own defense.

CHAPTER I

That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, not from the Son, just as the Son is not begotten from the Spirit, but from the Father only.

That God and Father, as He brings forth His own Word into His own hypostasis, so too He brings forth His all-holy Spirit into His own hypostasis, which, as they proceed ^B from Him both naturally and in the immediate sense—the one, the Son, begetting-ly, and the Spirit in another, certain way, ineffable to us and incomprehensible. Through the being ^C caused to proceed, as signified to us by the Truth, they are referred back to the Father Himself as to one cause, in the same unity of essence; not as it is in the case of humans, among whom all do not possess being from the same person in the immediate sense, and for this reason they are multiplied, as are the caused [things], so too [are] the causes. The present purpose is not about the divine Word, but about the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit proceeds, then, that is to say, He is hypostasized, from the paternal hypostasis, which is like a prototypical light, out of which each of the co-eternal and co-essential lights possesses the cause of its being and hypostasis—that is, the Son of God, of course, and the Holy Spirit—on account of the manifestation of super-essential fertility, which is ^D a hypostasis unbegotten, and causelessly hypostasizing in itself the unity of essence, supernaturally and beyond the reason of its own Word and Spirit, as a root, and as a fountain, and as the fountain-like God-begetting Divinity, and as the Father of lights, because these belong to Him alone, and neither to the Son nor to the Spirit. And thus we hold that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone by cause and by hypostasis, saying that this [Spirit] proceeds and is hypostasized from the Father alone of all [the saints], as from the cause and as from the fountain, and not at all from the Son in this way; thus it is from those saints whom we know. Nor does any one of those known to the Church, whose books we have and whose voices we have heard, escape our notice.

CHAPTER II

That He proceeds from the Son temporally, that is, He is given and shared; or rather, that He is also said to proceed from the Son, because He is given by Him and through Him temporally.

He is indeed said at times to proceed from the Son, but is believed to proceed *properly* from the Father, because He is said to proceed from the Father, that is to say, to be hypostasized from Him and to receive being; for by this word was it strictly ordained that the existence of the Spirit be signified, according to the tradition in the Gospels. He is said also to proceed from the Son, and from both from the Father through the Son, just as He is said to be sent and *channeled* [χορηγεῖσθαι], and given, and breathed, and poured out, but into the hypostasis and formation of the creature, not into His own hypostasis; it is one thing for this, and another for that, as the logic requires. For the Holy Spirit also gives Himself in that procession and manifestation understood through those words, and He breathes Himself and sends [Himself] and channels [Himself]; but in the eternal procession He does not proceed from Himself, if indeed He does not even hypostasize Himself. And in the eternal [procession] He receives, but in the temporal He gives; and in the former case [He proceeds] absolutely, but in the latter case for a cause; and there [He is] unto Himself, but here [He is] unto us and in us. Therefore, for these reasons, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father eternally, that is, He is hypostasized; but through both and from both He proceeds temporally, that is, he is sent forth, and channeled, and given, and shared; He is not the only one shared, but through Him, by the spiritual grace, the Son also and the Father are shared simultaneously, as far as human nature allows, that is, [we are] brought up to the accessible communion of the whole Divinity, by its common grace, which is uplifting and illuminating to us.

CHAPTER III

That being said to shine forth through the Son does not mean to be hypostasized through Him causally.

Proceeding, therefore—that is to say, being hypostasized—

from the Father, it is nonetheless said to have appeared and to appear through the Son, with the concept of "appearing" being understood by us in two ways, and also by those who have spoken of it. First and foremost, it is known through the Son, that is to say, it is known through the Son being the one who makes it known. For the property of the divine person, which is signified by His name, distinguishes it from the other divine person; and by distinguishing, it clearly reveals both itself and that from which it is distinguished, ^A manifesting this through its own operation, just as a certain light, in relation to the revelation that arises in us concerning the understanding of the divine hypostases, illuminates and guides the natural darkness of our intellect. And for this reason, the hypostasis of the Son, having been recognized from the property of being named directly in relation to the Father, more clearly presents to us the property of the Spirit, by which it is distinguished from the only-begotten Son. As, therefore, the concept concerning the Spirit gives us an understanding of the Son’s pre-conception and pre-production in the Word, it is just as correctly said that the Spirit has appeared through Him, according to the very mode of its being known to us and believed—and not as proceeding begottenly from the Father, in, ineffable and incomprehensible fashion, and with the mode of its procession thus being preserved; since, for these reasons, the Spirit is more known and apprehended by us after the Son, through whom the Spirit is correctly said to have appeared. Otherwise, it exists with the Son and comes forth with Him from the Father, just as ^B the Son is begotten from the Father; thus it also is projected from the Father.

CHAPTER IV

The mediation of the Son—for thus we confess Him in the divine washing, and we are baptized into such an arrangement of the divine names—demonstrates Him to be the only-begotten, but it does not prevent the Spirit from its natural relation to the Father, that is, its immediate reference to the Cause. For it has not been said, nor can it be said, that the Spirit exists immediately from the Son, just as the heretics thought ^C who, babbling that it is third in nature and dignity, and that it is brought forth from the Son and creatively, even if it is third in our arrangement by names alone, and according to the sequence of names for the sake of not confusing the properties, and in status of nature and dignity, having believed [it to be third] as if separated by the Son as by some middle thing, and for this reason [thinking it] exists proximately from Him; or according to some, even from Him alone, in accordance with the pre-active and creative power by which the Spirit might be brought forth, with all [power] being emptied and consumed from the Father into the Son. For so they babbled quickly about the Son’s mediation and the Spirit’s third naming, no less maliciously conceiving it, as in the case of some third things arranged by distance of time, or distance of place, or succession of birth, or activity of power, or nobility of rank, or by some such thing ^D that there is something else among them in terms of mediation. For they did not see, nor was it necessary to see, those who intended to preserve the immutable dogmas of the faith. For the Son of God and the Spirit are from God, just as a twin ray from the sun, or a river flowing from one source, or plants grown from one root, or two blossoms, or whatever might contribute to show that the Spirit and the Son co-arise and, by the consideration of the common Cause from which the secondary things co-arise, are carried only as caused, and not according to any other thing of all; thus [they are] understood as proceeding from the God and Father. But neither does our intellect or reason serve us by acting transitionally to understand and speak of both those things at once, nor are we able, even in understanding and speaking of Him, to think and also to bring forth one thing from another, since they are two according to the hypostases. Nor is there room for the Spirit to have been placed before the Son in the sequence of the enumeration of the divine persons. For if one were to understand that there is a Father, and the Son were not believed to be only-begotten, that is, begotten from the only one and uniquely, then the mediation of the Spirit, thus innovated, would have led into a greater absurdity, since the true mediation of God became a stumbling block to those who do not understand well, and it is still happening in another way. And hence it is that the Son is not said to be of the Spirit, as the Spirit is said to be of the Son, nor is the Son said to proceed through the Spirit, nor even eternally, even though they are in one another; so that even if these things are said through one another, it would not hinder it, insofar as they are distinguished only by sonship and birth, with the Spirit Himself being proceeding; but these are distinguished by the Cause and the producer, and not chronologically, even though the Son of God was sent by the Father and the Spirit; so that one might also say He was sent from the Father through the Spirit and appropriately. But due to the things said, and to the avoidance of the absurdities that would follow from them, it is not said [so], but rather [it is said that] the Son is pre-considered and pre-produced, so that the properties and all the immutable dogmas of the faith are preserved together. For the Son is pre-considered to the Spirit not by the way of the definition of nature, but by the way of the account of the cause, which distinguished the divine hypostases in the same unity of essence. I mean by the way of the account of the cause both the being without cause, and the being causally, and the being somehow causally, and all that pertains to the paronymous [naming] of the cause. For all these things are separated from the definition of nature. Nor as cause, but rather as being somehow causally, as Son, clearly, because the designation of the Son and of the Father does not permit anything in between due to the things said. And the Father is pre-understood to the Son by the account of the cause as cause, because the Son has existence from Him. And likewise also for the Spirit, because the Father is the cause of Him, He is pre-contemplated as projecting. But the Son is pre-understood to the Spirit in that the Spirit is not causally and hypostatically from the Father as He Himself is, but in some other way, which might be signified by not being confessed after the Father immed-

immediately as either cause or third, while only the Father is called the cause, ^A the first, and the source of the Divinity of all things. For just as He is with the Son and the Spirit the cause of all things as God, so is He the sole cause of the Son and the Spirit by His Fatherhood, or rather by His fruitfulness.

Let us say, then, in this regard, that the Holy Spirit, existing from the Father, proceeds through the Son; this is what is meant by "proceeding from the Father through the Son," on account of the supreme unity of the essence, as though He were not outside the Son, but proceeding in Him from the Father—that is to say, existing in Him from the Father, and abiding in Him, and passing through Him from the Father. And by being understood as proceeding through the Son, it is divinely grasped that He both passes through and goes forth, since there is no other way to manifest the supreme communion of nature, ^B and, as one might say, the permeation of the Son’s hypostasis without confusion. For if the Son of God were the cause of the Spirit, this alone would suffice to declare the communion of nature—that is, that He is understood to have His hypostatic existence from Him; just as, indeed, the fact that the Son has been begotten from Him demonstrates the unity of the Father and the Son, and the fact that it proceeds from Him demonstrates the natural unity of the Spirit with the Father. But since the Spirit is not said to proceed from the Son—that is, to have His hypostatic existence [from Him]—for it is otherwise, as has been said, that He is said to go forth, since neither to proceed from the Son, nor to exist from the Son, nor to have the cause of His hypostasis from the Son, nor for the Son to be His producer, nor His principle, nor His cause, nor for the Spirit to be His proceeder, nor His outcome, nor anything of that sort (all of which are accustomed to be spoken of between the Father and the Spirit); since, therefore, neither the Scripture nor any of the ancient teachers has spoken any of such things, the more recent of the teachers, in saying that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, signify the coherence of the essence and its unchangeable nature. And we, following their thoughts, thus speak and understand what has been said by them. ^C For understanding that as the Son has been begotten from the Father, so also the Spirit is proceeding, both at the same time and in the same order toward their principle, and applied to each according to its own cause—to speak thus—yet not as separated from the Son, we understand this according to the likeness of those examples which were mentioned before, in which the things that proceed are united to the principle rather than to themselves. But they are not united to each other, unless in the principle; for two branches are not united to each other, unless in the trunk, nor two rays, unless in the sun, and the same applies to the others. So that the Spirit might not be thought of as separated from the Son in this way, in relation to both having proceeded from the Father in a connatural way, the aforementioned examples suffice. But, in that the things which proceed are not sufficient to explain that they are connatural with each other through their whole being, those who said that He proceeds from the Father added "through the Son," and we think in the same way, that as in Him ^D

^A His existence is received from the Father, not only with Him, and toward His own hypostasis by the power of the primal cause—that is, from Whom He is, not in Whom He is, for this is defined above nature—so also the Spirit does not receive existence from the Son, or to say the same thing, through the Son, nor is the Son conceived beforehand as a cause for Him along with the Father, for the Father is conceived as the beginning of both alike. For never did any of the blessed ones say, nor can it be true, whether as one God they proceed, or as two hypostases, or by one power, or in any way whatever. For in every way precisely the monarchy is poorly honored if it is either dissolved or the divinity is curtailed, so that I may set aside that small point of the great Gregory. For if there were any mechanism for this to be preserved, and all indeed—both the truth in relation to the Word and in relation to the peoples of the Church, for whom it is not necessary to proclaim doctrines that are hazardous—the blessed ones would not have shrunk back from this doctrine as from some other terrible thing, but rather it [the Spirit] receives its existence and all things, the Spirit, from the Father. But because in receiving existence from the Father it proceeds through the Son, as receiving it in number the same with its existence, and being considered as connatural absolutely, except for the personal distinction, and not as through a vessel or in any corporeal way, but rather in a manner befitting God, insofar as it is possible for our mind to imagine that immaterial passage and connection, and without any interval of time, for this reason it is said to receive from the things of the Son, the things of the Son indeed, but from the Father; for from the Son there is nothing causative, but only from God and the Father, whence also the Son receives His existence as a divine hypostasis, and all things that He has.

And as it seems, as not a few authoritative teachers say, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, but remains in the Son, or abides, or rests, or indwells, or accompanies—this is intended in different places by different authors and by the same ones—that it proceeds from the Father through the Son, differing only in the contracted and extended expression; just as also of the gift or mission of the Spirit, sometimes they say that it comes forth from the Father and comes through the Son, and sometimes they say that it comes or is dispensed from the Father through the Son, or rather, using the word in a more conjoined way. The Holy Spirit is joined therefore to the Son by the formula of consubstantiality, but ^B not by that of cause. And this connection, and the sameness in numerical identity of the unity according to nature being understood, is what some signify by interposing "through Him," in addition to "proceeding from the Father," as has been said. But it is joined to the Father also by the formula of cause, wherefore it is also said and believed to proceed from the Father.

Chapter III.

If indeed it is also understood as being suspended from the Son ^C and is expressed in such a way, wherefore it is also called the Spirit of the Son, yet it is suspended from the Son in another manner, and from the Father in another; from the Son, as being received together with Him, and known through Him and after Him, as has also been said before, but from the Father, as having its existence tethered to the paternal cause. For to be said to be from one another through one another is known because of a certain likeness existing in them, and because the one is from the other in addition to this. For brother is suspended from brother as equal from equal, because they are known through one another, and this is what belongs to those who are relative; but the Father and the Son, among men, are not suspended from each other only in this way, but further, one is the cause of existence for the other. With all of which the divine Apostle also agrees, saying that the Spirit is of God, and from God, yet that He is the Spirit of the Son and of Christ, following the Guide of our sacred truth, having said indeed that He is the Spirit of truth, but that He proceeds from the Father; and after Paul, having thus divided the references of those led by that Spirit, calling the Holy Spirit Himself the Spirit of the Son, as being proper by nature, as its own, as not foreign according to the formula of substance, as consubstantial with the Son and co-divine, and in a word, because of the natural kinship of the divinity; but [calling it] the Spirit of the Father, as subsisting and receiving existence from the Father naturally, to which indeed the unity of substance follows. Therefore, because of the unity of substance, we insert [the phrase] toward the Holy Spirit, ^D while agreeing with those who have spoken and thought thus among the teachers, following them in both word and meaning, not however as having existence from the Son; for the Father alone is the cause. But the Son is not the cause of the procession of the Holy Spirit, but has all things of the Father except for the cause, that is, except for bringing forth a divine hypostasis; for He is otherwise a beginning of existing things as cause and creator. For how could He have the cause of the divinity, He who is entirely Son and only a begetting? The Father is only Father, that is, only begetter and producer; for to Him alone befits what belongs to a source, cause, and begetter; because this is a mark of the paternal hypostasis, the bringing forth of the connatural fruits in Him through the fertility in Him, with no one who has a mind being disturbed, lest the Son might appear [to be] according to the nature of the Father inappropriately, due to this mark of the Father's hypostasis not being present [in the Son], and the property with all things indeed that befit God.

It would have been possible also with many examples to set forth how it is possible for the Spirit to be said to come forth from the Father through the Son, how it could be understood and said; but it suffices to use the examples of the holy ones. As therefore the radiance of the sun comes forth through the ray, that is, together with it and in it, and having passed through it clearly, for which reason it also reaches to us, and as it accompanies that [ray], it is imparted to us through that; or as light from the sun through the shine.

So too the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, and also through the Son is in the Father; that is to say, not separated from the Son, nor is He himself apart from Him, but while being in Him, He nonetheless proceeds along with Him and subsists from the Father; because He receives from the Father the same nature and essence as the Son in another way, and thus He is both united to Him and clearly distinguished by the unity that is according to nature. ^A

CHAPTER VII

I set these things before those who have stated them so as to persuade them; for we shall not say that the Son is the cause of the Spirit who is in God the Father because it is said that He is in the Father through the Son, as some ignorantly force this preposition "through" in place of the "from," and of the cause alone, everywhere, just as the greedy and the violent do with money, and as the sophists do with the laws. Confessing, therefore, the eternal ^B manifestation, or subsistence, of the all-holy Spirit from God the Father—while assigning the other things, the unity of the essence, to the Son and the Spirit—whether it be considered concerning the eternal existence or concerning the spiritual grace, I reject the "cause-of-a-cause" in the blessed Trinity, this common mixture into one person; I reject the "greatest," and the "greater," and the "great," in the Trinity, that Apollinarian ladder; I disapprove of the one subsisting God being the Father and the Son, from whom the Holy Spirit has proceeded, and the duality following thence in the Godhead; I do not cherish the [idea] of the Spirit subsisting from two subsisting persons, such that He is referred to each of them as a cause going forth, ^C and the dyarchy following thence; I do not accept the [idea of] thinking of God first, then willing, the rejected pairing of Ptolemy and Valentinus, by being wrongly placed before or placed after; nor the first and second actualities in God for inward things, and various signs of thoughts, or as non-existent and empty sounds introducing no doctrine or thing, or if they have truth and existence accompanying the argument, as nothing different from those absurd positions which were long ago rightly slapped away from the Church; I also renounce the distinction of the hypostatic forms in the divine hypostases, and those being observed as attached to or following upon the hypostases themselves; I am not pleased by the [notion] that the Son and the Spirit cannot be distinguished ^D unless one proceeds from the other; I disapprove of the primacies, and secondarinesses, and third-rankings, and extremes, and middle-statuses, which constitute the Son of God as the cause of the all-holy Spirit, and [I reject] those who use them irreverently and perversely; for such positions are unheard of and strange, and lead to nothing sound, but are devised only for the construction of a doctrine praised from prejudice by those who cherish it now rather than according to the sequence of the argument of sound faith; and they persuade only those who, due to simplicity, or [due to] inexperience, have set these [falsities] before themselves, instead of the approved and ancient and primary way of thinking; I hate the misinterpretations which some give to the sayings of the holy fathers—things which they said in their struggles against the heretics by framing them appropriately to the need of the argument—and make these into a dogma, and faith.

CHAPTER VIII

I am persuaded by the great Basil, in his discourse on faith, where he speaks regarding himself and consequently describes the others, the holy fathers: "For as long as," he says, "it was necessary to fight against the heresies arising at the time, I thought it consistent, following those who preceded me, to prevent or even overthrow the blasphemies being introduced by the difference in the counter-arguments to the impiety sown broadcast by the devil, at different times with different words, as the need of those suffering forced [me], and often with words that were unwritten, yet not alienated from the pious mindset according to Scripture; just as the Apostle often did, not-refusing to use Greek turns of phrase for his own purpose. But now, for our common purpose—yours and mine—I have reasoned in the simplicity of the sound faith to fulfill the command of your love in Christ, and to say what I was taught by the divinely-inspired Scripture, sparing both the names and those terms which, while the words themselves are not contained in divine Scripture, yet maintain that very meaning which is contained in Scripture; but as for those things which, besides the strangeness of the terminology, introduce to us also a mind [that is] strange, and which it is not possible to find preached by the holy fathers, these, as strange and alien to the pious faith, I altogether reject." And after a little: "Thus we all now also have determined to avoid every word and thought alien to the teaching of Christ; and the purpose, as I said before, of what is now set before us and you, differs much from those hypotheses by which, at other times, we were led to write or say something in one way or another; for then the refutation and overthrow of the heresy and of the devil's methodology was being busied over, but now the confession and simple manifestation of the sound faith is set before us; therefore, neither the character of the discourse that is the same suits us then and now. For as a man would not take in his hands the same tools while fighting and while farming; for other are the tools of those living in peace, and others are the suits of armor of those arrayed in war; so the one exhorting in the sound teaching would not say the same things as the one refuting those who object. For one is the kind of discourse that is refutatory, and another is the kind of discourse that is exhortatory; other is the simplicity of those in peace confessing the piety, and other the sweats of those against the counter-arguments of the...

^A false-named knowledge standing their ground. So, in this manner, we too, managing our words, shall use them with judgment everywhere, consistently for the guarding or building up of the faith; sometimes resisting more combatively those who, in the craftiness of the devil, attempt to destroy it; and at other times, explaining it more simply and familiarly to those who wish to be built up in it, and doing nothing else than what was spoken by the Apostle, to know how we ought to answer each one.

I know, therefore, that this great Basil himself granted to Eunomius that he was third in rank, so that by this means he might overturn the impious one, and by superfluity overthrow the falsehood. I know also that the Theologian Gregory, regarding the "greater" in his discourses against the Arians, speaks thus: "Or it is clear that the greater belongs to the cause, the equal to the nature, and this we concede out of great benevolence, yielding, of course, to the argument, so that we may even thus confute you." Then he adds: "These things, then, are against those who boast of the 'greater.'" And one might find the great Athanasius also in many places yielding to the necessity of the struggles. Coming upon these, those who have disputed against us and the ancestral truth, like flies clinging to [the] weaker flesh, and having added a small color of misinterpretation, and then having fashioned some natural argument for the emptying of the mystery concerning us, they thought they had everything from that source; and having captured many through ignorance of such things, they led them as captives, having made it a work of sophists, not of theologians.

^B But the great Dionysius says: "It is characteristic of those not wishing to mind divine things to pay attention not to the power of the intent, but to the words." And the great Athanasius in his third [book] against the Arians says: "It is necessary, as is appropriate to do for all of divine Scripture, and it is necessary also here, according to that which the Apostle said, [to consider] the time, the person, and the place; wherefore he wrote to receive it faithfully, so that not beyond these, or owing to some other of these which he does not know, the reader might fall outside the true meaning." And after a little: "When, therefore, one has the knowledge of such things well, he has also the understanding of the faith straight and sound; but if one receives them otherwise, he immediately falls into heresy." Cyril, and Maximus, and Chrysostom advise this same thing.

CHAPTER 9

Although something may be clearly said by one of the saints, if it does not also accord with the common notions, if we are not able to ^D bring this to the true rule, we must receive this along with the honor belonging to the one who spoke it. For even Augustine, in his letter to Fortunatus, advises well: "Neither are we bound to hold the discourses of anyone whomsoever," he says, "even if they are some men who are catholic and renowned, as we do the canonical Scriptures, so that it would not be permitted to us, while keeping the honor due to them, to disapprove and reject something in their writings, if we ever caught them thinking otherwise than the truth has [it], by the help of God, or [what was] perceived by others or by us." I, at least, am such in the matters concerning the writings of the saints, as I wish those to be who follow our own [works].

Therefore, even Thomas, since he found Augustine saying that the soul of man was created after the angels before the body, and after that, by its own will, turned toward the body to minister to the will—although he seems to think this regarding all souls from many proofs—yet Thomas attempts to reform the opinion toward the better. Thus, therefore, I find that he, having thought [so], is placed with the other saints who held the true opinion. Likewise, also concerning the heavenly bodies, finding that Jerome and Augustine had not assumed correctly (Thomas), for they had thought them to be ensouled, and Jerome more so, he is placed rather with the opinion of our own Basil and Damascene, knowing [them] to be the opinion of the Catholic Church as well. For it escaped him not that by the Fifth Synod both the pre-existence of human souls, and that the heavenly bodies are ensouled, and the Ideas, and the false dogmas of Origen—or rather of the Manichaeans and Plato—were subjected to anathema. And Gregory of Nyssa also, agreeing with the blessed Augustine in his apology *On the Six Days*, says: "Let our own [words], as if handled speculatively in some practice for those who encounter them, be set forth, with no harm coming to anyone because of this, if something should be found in what is said [that is] contrary to the common notion. For we do not make the argument a dogma, so as to give an occasion to those who slander; and we confess [we are] only exercising our own understanding on the themes set forth, not intending to deposit an interpretive instruction for posterity." Because of this benevolence, then, Augustine and Nyssa are honored with the honors of the blessed, even if some of their opinions are disapproved. But they would not have had this reward if they had contentiously held fast to their own judgment.

Following this rule, therefore, we too, examining both the persons, and the times, and the need of what was said by the saints, and—with God let it be said—we do not fall from the truth; whence also those sayings of the teachers which some reinterpret sophistically, or ignorantly, we bring well and undeviatingly into the scope of the truth and into the obedience of Christ.

And at the same time, we have also compiled the sayings of the teachers which clearly proclaim the opposite of the misinterpretations of some, so that from every side in the present matter of our faith, just as in a logical legal trial or dispute, everything may be well-arranged, with the foreign opinions thrust away and our own being added, as in a single chain of proof that has been done through the saints for either need. And with God, nothing of our own has been said, but all things are the steps and dogmas of the teachers.

CHAPTER V. That the Fathers of ours, after the Latins had schismed, thought according to the things aforementioned, and these are their judgments.

And there is something even greater for the assurance of my conscience: I do not walk by my own opinion in receiving the sayings of the ancient teachers in this way, but [I follow] many great teachers before me during such a long time of the schism—those who, accepting the sayings of the teachers in this way, deemed the addition to the Creed to be an abomination. And they showed this in their own writings, securing those who are of the faith as if anticipating the future ignorance or indifference regarding the faith of future men, from both of which many nowadays have been led to either not know or to scorn cruelly our ancestral dogma. I speak of Joseph the teacher, Nilus of Rhodes, the vessel of election, the most wise and most Christian emperor Manuel, Macarius Nilus of Thessalonica, Nilus of Constantinople, the patriarch Callistus, the patriarch Philotheus, Theophanes of Nicaea, the patriarch Gregory—a man in no way inferior to the most ancient ones—the holy synod in his time, composed of over seventy learned men, which now rejected what is praised by some of ours: the blessed Gregory of Thessalonica, the patriarch Germanus, and the one elected in his time and by him (I keep silent about the testimony from the enemies, Barlaam), Eustratius of Nicaea. I pass over John of Russia, named for his goodness, Leo of Bulgaria, Theophylact of the same, Nicolaus of Methone, Nicetas called the ecumenical teacher, Psellus the high philosopher, ^A and others without number, even up to the most wise emperor Leo and the blessed Photius, all of them standing fast in every rank and every form. All these, by many and noble books that are preserved even now, refute those who proclaim the Son of God as the source or cause of the Holy Spirit ^B waiting in the Creed, and those who believe the things formerly decreed in Florence. Yet of such writings, some came to be after the city was delivered from the Italian slavery—most of ours—and some, having escaped the hands of the Latins, were preserved from the more ancient ones. But how many are likely to have been work consumed by fire by the Latins, who held the city at that time for over sixty years? For they were not about to spare them, criticizing them with much sharpness. And as for those who did not write, who could count them, it not having occurred to them how they might ever be ambitious for such labors? I do not mean the more ancient ones of great lineage and having great power at that time, but those shortly before us and those in our own time: Nicolaus Cabasilas, a man equal in spirit and wisdom to the most ancient, the patriarch Euthymius, Balsamon the chartophylax, who had become a guide of all wisdom among the foremost, Melitiniotes the teacher of teachers, Isidore of Thessalonica, or indeed Symeon, and ten thousand others, to whom we who are now are offal. We shall be ridiculous, therefore, as Plato said in the *Theaetetus*, thinking we say something while being base, and having rejected men of old and all-wise. But we shall not go into such danger! And if one should name Cydones and Calecas, it is no wonder if, in the spiritual field of the Church, both darnel and thorns and other evil seeds should sprout. Such also was the sprout of Beccus; but over seventy learned men of the Church, ^C by his own word, despise the dogmas whose vote, preserved, convicts those who are now and those after them who are unruly, being as like to those others as statues are to the living, if one must not even say worse, since they have eluded even themselves in being such.

Leaving aside the ears of corn, then, let us pay attention to the darnel; leaving aside the flowery meadow of Christ, which for so many years has offered continuous flowers in succession, breathing forth a marvelous scent, shall we be satisfied with two or three who have been cut off and trampled? Although Cydones and his student Calecas were made familiar to the Latins and to their dogmas concerning the procession—because of being driven from the Acyndinian heresy and on account of that of Barlaam, having nowhere else to take refuge. For they were finding that the Latins also were receiving that heresy favorably; ^D nay, rather, Cydones became a more vehement lover of it than the Latins of Thomas, whom the Romans honor with the honors of the blessed, equal to the ancient teachers. But before this, they said that the dogmas of the Romans concerning the procession had nothing sound. Therefore, those things from our own guides have such strength.

^A And it proceeds in time. For if it is sent to the creation from both, yet it is sent as something coming, no less authoritatively, but proceeds from the Father into its own hypostasis; then, by not having dared to sing alongside His disciples—who are genuine even until now regarding the eternal procession of the Spirit and the temporal mission—by what other canons and rules did they dare to hand it down to us? For this reason, therefore, they did not dare; but they all sing in harmony with the head, for they knew that if they claimed something else, they would fall away from the truth. For Gregory of Nyssa, in his work against Eunomius, says: “Our Lord Jesus Christ appeared on earth and lived with men, so that men might no longer think about Being according to their own opinions, making a dogma of the suspicions arising in them from certain conjectures, but, being persuaded that God truly appeared in the flesh, we might believe that to be the only true mystery of piety which was handed down to us by Him, the Word and God, who spoke to the apostles in His own person.” And observe their agreement, whoever has understanding and knows how to be pious. The blessed apostle Paul says that the Holy Spirit is of God ^B and from God, namely from the Father, but he never says from the Son; he says only "Spirit of the Son" and "of Christ." Regarding the meaning of this, the holy Chrysostom, well perceiving, says: “In one sense, to be called ‘of God’ denotes only belonging; but ‘from God’ denotes also the cause. Therefore, ‘of God’ is one thing, and ‘from God’ is another.” Since God has given us a certain power of criticism, and since, exercising this as much as is possible—that is, according to those who have actually lived—we find our own Fathers after the schism of the Latins not only in agreement with the teachers, but also with the holy Scriptures and synods, and suggesting nothing redundant to us. Whence we are led not only by the reverence toward the Fathers and the high regard for their wisdom and virtue—as indeed the more prudent among the laity ought to be disposed—but also because, after the schism of the Latins, they have judged this dogma well, and having purged the opinion concerning the procession of the All-Holy Spirit from every chaff that troubles it, and having sufficiently handed down to us ready food, ^C they are thought to be toward the truth and the salvation therein by those who are unable to judge for themselves, but also by those daring to judge something concerning them, by the power sent down to us from God, small in one way, but greater than our other intent. We find them, by the grace of Christ, to have trodden the truly royal road, upon which our King and Master and Teacher Jesus, the guardian of the truth, and His sub-commanders and shield-bearers, led by His Spirit, have walked; and thus they have received the sayings of the ancient and first teachers, as it is fitting for the canonical Scriptures, for the apostles, for the synods, and for the teachers of the faith who have shone forth in them.

For immediately, Jesus—who is the teacher of the truth, the first and only and best and most capable interpreter to us of the procession of the Spirit—said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, but is sent by the Father through Him. For this is what He meant: “Whom I will send to you from the Father.” For He says: “The Paraclete will come, being sent from me by the Father,” that is, from the Father through me; for He is the Spirit of the truth, that is, of me, and He will accomplish the common work of the Trinity by the testimony to be given through Him concerning me, those who believe being led to the knowledge of the Trinity. This Spirit, however, proceeds from the Father, whence also I went forth. For I went forth eternally from the Father. ^D

In the *Travels* of the holy Andrew, it is said: “Peace to us and to all who believe in one God the Father, and in His one Son, the Lord Jesus Christ, and in one Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and remaining in the Son.” Gregory Thaumaturgus: “One Holy Spirit having existence from God, and having appeared through the Son, namely to men.” The first synod: “Accept one divinity of the Father, who begot the Son ineffably, and of the Son, who was begotten from Him, and of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from Him, the Father, but is of the Son, as the Apostle says: ‘If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not of Him.’” The great Athanasius, in harmony with it in his letter to Serapion concerning the Spirit: “Therefore, those who think wrongly concerning the Holy Spirit do not think rightly concerning the Son either; for if they thought correctly concerning the Word, they would think soundly also concerning the Spirit, who is from…

^A the Father proceeding, and being the Spirit’s own, is given by Him to the disciples, and to all those who believe in Him. This is the sound dogma concerning the Spirit, if this is truly the teaching of Christ.

The same [Gregory], in the *Dialogue against the Orthodox and the Montanist*, says: “Just as there is nothing, he says, between the mind and the word and the breath, so there is nothing between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.” But one must understand the Spirit as perfect in perfect hypostasis, proceeding from the Father. The same [Gregory], in another dialogue: “Nothing pre-exists the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but the Son is begotten from the Father, and the Spirit proceeds.” And again: “For He was not associating an angel with the Divinity, nor was He joining a creature to Him and to the Father, but the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and receives from Him and is given.” The same [Gregory], in the discourse whose beginning is: *We believe in one God*, [says]: “But the Holy Spirit, a proceeding from ^B the Father, is always in the hands of the Father who sends and the Son who bears.” The same [Gregory], in the 46th chapter of those concerning the equality by nature of the three divine persons: “What is God? The beginning of all things, according to the Apostle who says, *One God the Father, of whom are all things*; for indeed the Word is from Him begettingly, and the Spirit from Him proceedingly. Then all creation was fashioned by the Word in the Spirit creatively.”

The second synod against Macedonius, who says the Spirit is from the Son alone creatively, says: “And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver of Life, who proceeds from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is worshipped and glorified together.” The same [is done] also by the others as far as the seventh, which added nothing concerning the Spirit. For it was developed sufficiently, as much with regard to the essence of the Spirit as with regard to the cause from which He is, just as also nothing concerning things sought in each [was added]; but all those after the third remained in the definitions of the third concerning not needing to add anything to the Creed, and in deed having kept it, and in words each likewise to the third having declared it. But the third most clearly showed that it believed the Spirit to proceed from the Father alone, because the Nestorian Creed having been read, in which it is said that the Spirit does not have ^C existence through the Son, it did not contradict anything in this dogma concerning the Spirit; but as for the things added concerning the dispensation, it left only the rebuttal to them.

Gregory the Theologian, having been present and participating in that second synod, [says]: “Where, tell me, will you place the proceeding [Spirit]? Once it has appeared in the midst of your division, and being introduced by one better than you—the Theologian of our Savior—unless you have removed that voice from the Gospels because of your third testament: *The Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father*. Insofar as He proceeds thence, He is not a creature; insofar as He is not begotten, He is not the Son; insofar as He is the medium of the Unbegotten and the Begotten, He is God.” The same [Gregory]: “Therefore, regarding the things of our [orthodoxy], we introduce the unbegotten, and the proceeding from the Father, as the God-Word Himself somewhere says.”

Great Basil, in the letter to his brother: “Since therefore the Holy Spirit, from whom all the supply of goods flows upon creation, is dependent upon the Son, with whom He is inseparably conjoined, [but] has His being hung upon the Father as the cause, whence He also proceeds—this has as a distinguishing sign of the property according to hypostasis, that He is recognized after the Son and with Him, and has His subsistence from the Father. But the Son, recognizing the Spirit who proceeds from the Father through Himself and with Himself, having alone shone forth in a unique manner from the unbegotten light, has no communion toward the Father or toward the Holy Spirit according to that which is peculiar to the properties, but is recognized only by the mentioned signs.” The same [Basil]: “Properly, the Son proceeds from God, from God, since the Son came forth from the Father; and the Spirit proceeds from God; but the Son from the Father begettingly, and the Spirit ineffably from God.” The same [Basil]: “We ought to believe as we were baptized; and we were baptized into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. But the Father is unbegotten, and the Son is begotten, as light from the sun, and the word from the mind; but the Holy Spirit is a proceeding from the Father. It is the property of the Father to be unbegotten and to be called Father; it is the property of the Son to be called Son, and to be begotten from the Father; it is the property of the Spirit to be called Holy Spirit, and to proceed from the ^D Father.” The same [Basil]: “And he who said the Spirit alone, included in this confession also Him whose the Spirit is—for He is Christ’s—and Him from whom He is; for [it is] from God, as the Apostle says, *The Spirit who proceeds from the paternal hypostasis*.” And again: “Shining forth through Him indeed, but having the cause of [His] hypostasis from the prototype light.” And again: “[Having] from the God of all things also the cause of His being, whence also the Only-Begotten is light, but having shone forth through the true light.”

Maximus, in the interpretation of the divine Dionysius: “Of his own effulgence having come into existence, and of the all-holy Spirit worshipfully and super-eternally proceeding from the Father, as the Lord initiates into the mysteries.” The same [Maximus], in the same: “That is, of the Son the inexpressible effulgence from the Father, and of the Holy Spirit the unthinkable procession from the Father.” The same [Maximus] in the discourse to the Macedonian: “But the Son is begotten from the hypostasis of the Father, for this reason [He is the] only-begotten Son; but the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father.” The same [Maximus] in the *Dialogue against the Orthodox and the Manichaean*: “And the Spirit proceeds from the hypostasis of the Father.” John Chrysostom: “As the Son subjoined to Himself, *I came forth from the Father and have come*, this He also grants to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father.”

^A For it is not permitted to think otherwise than what is written. Cyril, in his work *Against Julian*: “The Spirit proceeds ineffably from the Father; but He is granted to the creation through the Son.” The same author, in his *Explanations of Luke*: “But this we say: the Word was not baptized naked and by Himself, and He was a partaker of the Holy Spirit. For we know that He is both God and incorporeal, and the Holy of Holies; for all of us confess that we have received from His fullness. For the Holy Spirit proceeds from God and the Father, but He is also the property of the Son. And indeed, the Spirit of Christ has been called in many places the Spirit proceeding from God and the Father; and Paul will bear witness, saying at one time: *But you are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you; but if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, this one is not His*; and again: *Because you are sons, God has sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father.* Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds, as I said, from God and the Father, but the Son, being by nature and truly the only-begotten Word of God, and excelling in the dignities of the Father, grants Him to the creation and gives Him to the worthy.” ^B The same author, in his explanation of the words, *When He comes*: “Therefore, the truth and the doctrines derived from the truth are dear to us, and we do not follow those same men, but tracing the faith of the holy Fathers, we say that the Paraclete, that is, the Holy Spirit, belongs to the Son, and is not introduced from without, nor is He an acquired attainment in Him, as is the case in those capable of holiness, whose origin is from things that are not; but He is consubstantial with Him, just as, indeed, He is with the Father. For in this way the power of ecclesiastical dogmas will not escape into a polytheistic mythology for us, but the Holy Trinity is bound together into one notion of divinity.” In the same place, therefore, both demonstrating the unity of the essence—for he says that the Paraclete, the Spirit of the truth, is surely His own and that of God and the Father—he says that He proceeds from the Father, and clearly and indubitably refutes the Christ-fighter as an utter fighter against God. For he who has dared to act wantonly at all against the Son, would rightly be understood to have sinned also against Him from whom He originates. *When therefore the Paraclete comes, the Spirit of the truth, that is, My own, who proceeds from the Father, He will bear witness concerning Me.* ^C The same author, in his first *Resolution of the censure [brought by] Theodoret*: “For the Holy Spirit proceeds indeed from God and the Father according to the voice of the Savior, but He is not alien to the Son; for He has all things with the Father.” And again, in the letters *To Hermias*: “The Father sends forth from His own nature, but the Son Himself also grants [Him] to the worthy.” The same author, in his epistle *To John of Antioch*: “In no way do we tolerate that the faith defined, that is, the Symbol of the faith [given] by our holy Fathers who gathered in Nicaea from time to time, be disturbed by anyone, nor, indeed, that anyone should change a single syllable of those things lying there, remembering him who says: *Do not remove the eternal boundaries which your Fathers set*; for it was not they who were speaking, but the Spirit of God and the Father Himself, who proceeds indeed from Him, but is not alien to the Son according to the notion of the essence.” But those who misinterpret other sayings of Cyril and force them to their own opinion, in which he campaigns with every device against Nestorius, suffer what Athanasius says those suffer who do not consider the persons, nor the times, nor the causes in the interpretations of the Scriptures. Reproving these, Cyril himself says in the same discourse: “When some of those who are accustomed to distort the straight paths turn my words to what seems good to them, let not your holiness be astonished, knowing that even those from the heresy of [error] gather from the God-inspired Scripture the pretexts for their own deceit, corrupting the things rightly said through the Holy Spirit to their own evil intentions, and pouring out upon their own heads the unquenchable flame.” ^D Regarding these, blessed Damascene says: “This we worship, he says: the Father, the begetter of the Son, unbegotten—for He is not from anyone—the Son, the offspring of the Father, as having been begotten by Him; the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of God and the Father, as proceeding from Him. Which is also said of the Son, as being manifested through Him and granted to the creation, but not having His existence from Him.” I pass over His other statements which are most clear. Blessed Andrew of Crete: “For it is not possible for the Father to be contemplated in the Son, or the Son in the Father, or the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father, to dwell in one, or to rest in the Son, otherwise than as being consubstantial and co-throned and co-equal with both.” I pass over the sayings of blessed Theodore the Studite and of the holy patriarch Nicephorus; but instead of all these, it shall suffice to take the Seventh Council, as though placing a seal upon them. For in its own definition, having set forth the Symbol of the faith, it says in conclusion: “We follow the ancient legislation of the Catholic Church; we keep the decrees of the Fathers; we anathematize those who add anything to or subtract anything from the Catholic Church; these are of our Master and His disciples and the ecumenical councils, and the Fathers who shone in them, in which they both confessed [the faith] in common, and in which they separately delivered the common faith to the disciples, traversing and teaching us in the manner of history.” Therefore, our Fathers well showed, through great diligence over such long periods, in words and in writings and in blood, that they did not accept the addition made after the Symbol, as it did not carry the same meaning as that held by the aforementioned. Now the sayings which those who defend the addition forced [to their side], I shall piously [set] against this common and

assuredly, indubitably, unfeignedly, and in writing, as things said by none of the saints, nor in ecumenical councils, nor in the holy Scriptures—and indeed, even the evil misinterpretation of the "through" (διὰ) ^B—then he who would concede to me that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as from the arche and cause existing therein connatural[ly]; and where it is ever said that he also proceeds from the Father *through* the Son, he should understand this by reason of the cohesion of the essence and its unity, as receiving its existence with the Son and in the Son, and receiving one essence along with the Son, from the Father at once in the distinctness of the hypostases—with this person I shall be united, so far as concerns the question regarding the Spirit: for concerning other things, there would be another account.

As in a summary, therefore, I have set down our opinion, or rather that of all the saints and of our Fathers; because I perceived that some were ignorant of our ancestral dogma. Whatever, then, may be the case as to how this happens to them, moved by the love of the truth and by the love of the benefit of one's neighbor, I felt that I must not overlook them, lest we be held to account for their sake. Although for the more studious, what has been elaborately set forth in two volumes is sufficient, and before these, the many noble books of our teachers suffice, which clearly reveal the ancestral dogma. But it was necessary to take thought also for those who are not like this, so that through all things our position might be brought to a good conclusion, God willing, so that I might myself be able to say: "What ought I to have done ^C and have not done for the glory of the truth and the honor of the Fathers? What ought I to have instructed the children of those men, and for what human purpose did I refrain from the guidance, placed as I am by the providence of God in the last of these last times in the order of those able to say something concerning the faith?" And may it be for the benefit of him, of myself, and of those who agree.

What then was left, but that what has happened should occur? For it suffices thus to say: thus I also think by the grace of Christ, seeking and praying for peace with all men, yet not abandoning the ancestral truth, and desiring to be united in it with all men, if they should be willing; but otherwise keeping myself from those who do not think the same, knowing thus that the laws of the Church command it, and to say the whole thing, with all those things presupposed as in the beginning of the present confession, I believe in soul, and with tongue I confess, that the God and Father, ineffably, begets from His own essence His own Word, and produces from His same essence the Holy Spirit in a way above all words, co-eternal and consubstantial and co-divine persons, distinct indeed from one another hypostatically, by the begetting and the procession—that is, by the different mode of existence from the Father—but existing in one another according to nature, as receiving the same essence by number from the Father, and at the same time with the same reference and order toward the cause. As for what I distinguish in the enumeration of the persons by the preposition, when I say that I believe in the Father and the Son from Him, and the Spirit from the Father *through* the Son, it is either because the Word is regarded as not begotten [but] foreknown and pre-proclaimed, or because in the Son [He is] on account of the unity of the essence. I know the hypostasis of the Father alone to be the arche and cause of the Son and of the Spirit, and of each separately, if anyone insults the Word, and of both together and the sole cause, that is, unbegotten and uncaused; whereas the Son of God and the Holy Spirit are caused only as from the Father as the arche; but never is either of these a cause ^D within the deity, nor giving being to the other, but being together with the Father, one arche of all things: for all things are from the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit.

But that the Son of God is the cause of the all-holy Spirit, or the arche, or the producer, I cannot think, neither fearing the Spirit as God, nor revering the monarchy as [I do] the Son, and the paternal property which is in the theogonic and fruit-bearing and fertile [nature]; nor because of the unity that is sought, which is also unheard of, that the productive power returns to the same things, and strikes the same awe from both sides; nor will I ever commune with those who think thus, but if anyone [holds] the things defined at Florence concerning [the idea that] the Son of God [is] arche and cause and producer of the Spirit, and [the view that] the existence and outcome...

It will be that it is impossible for those who prefer the evangelical voice to human sophistries to be tempted by any going astray or danger. Having done this, therefore, I now keep silent, leaving it to God to oversee the dogmas of the truth, and His Church as He Himself may know to be better, exhorting all, and praying for all that they do not handle or contemplate such things negligently, or in a worldly way, or faithlessly, nor to agree with those who are led by one of these passions, or even by all of them. And no one, if he is a Greek, will dare to say anything against this confession of ours, unless he is a patricide and a matricide, and [instead of] in the place of the genuine sons of this [Church] who have piously campaigned on her behalf, placing himself with those sophists from among us who have devastated the Church, the mother, not having restrained themselves as they ought, or [unless he is] some simpleton in other respects, and has paid heed to childish babblings instead of the filled-in mind of our holy Fathers. Concerning those who are not of our Church, I say nothing at any time. For neither are we subject to their laws, nor are they subject to our laws, since [the time] they [adopted] the idiosyncrasy

^A of our faith. This is the confession of my faith. Thus I believe the procession of the All-Holy Spirit from God and the Father, or [if you will] the hypostasis. But as for ecclesiastical correction, that would be another matter. The Lord Himself shall correct the things pertaining to it, as He has the will, and we pray, even if we are not [ourselves] able, for to Him belongs glory unto the ages. Amen.

Chapter II

Since the Latins, and those who think the same as they do concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, procure some help—as they say—from the Western saints, and especially from Augustine, and have placed him as the foundation ^B of that evil union in Florence, bringing forward the agreement of the teachers—as has been reported—of the Asians and those from the West, as it is set down in the Florentine decree of the Latins; it is necessary for us to fully inform all clearly and in few words of the true and just judgment, since the matter has been dealt with more broadly in our two books concerning them. As far as our own consciences are concerned, we who are genuine sons of the Catholic Church—and wish to be—and true successors of the piety of our Fathers, that testimony of those Westerners amounts to nothing, nor is it necessary for us to trouble ourselves about them, as far as the present subject is concerned. First, because we do not have our faith from those saints, but from the Orientals, whose books we possess and whose voice we hear, and it is sufficient for us to agree concerning the procession of the Spirit with those with whom we agree and follow in the universal faith; and especially because these teachers of Asia are more authoritative, having campaigned against the heresies and having been present at the ecumenical councils, having—as if they were some legislators—transmitted both the faith and its Symbol to the entire Church of the Christians at different times in accordance with the seasons. Second, because this talk about the Western saints was always bandied about by the Latins after their addition to the Symbol for the sake of their own cause, and it never troubled our Fathers, nor did it seem to them that it held a better opinion concerning the Latin innovation. For all our Fathers, in their own writings against the Latins, have set forth defenses ^C and [spoke] concerning the testimonies of the Westerners, which the Latins bring forward, in such a way that they were always being brought forward by them. Therefore, the judgment of our Fathers over so many and so great [saints] in nearly five hundred years ought to be sufficient for us. And if we do not have the judgment of those Fathers concerning those testimonies from their writings, we have it sufficiently from the deed itself—that is, from their persistence in opposing the innovation—to which their conscience did not give way.

But since, out of an abundance of caution, one must have something to reply to those who bring forward these things, even the blessed Augustine and his sayings—although the majority neither know Augustine, nor grasp his meaning, but rather, having caught onto the voice of the Latins, [claim] that even the Western saints bear witness to them, they become burdensome to us through the shallowness or infidelity regarding the truth, as they are ready to believe any word and to be swayed by what is apparent—we divide the defense for those testimonies into three parts.

The first is that we have nothing reliable concerning the authenticity of the testimonies, and for this reason, one who possesses intelligence ought not to abandon the known and certain to join himself to the ambiguous. For the matter of those testimonies holds much suspicion, and there are not a few things that confirm this suspicion for us. First, that this has not been found in the canonical Scriptures, and for that reason those saints would not have said this, nor does it follow of necessity from the Scriptures; for otherwise it would have led the Asian saints to this. Second, because it is precipitous and dangerous, and for that reason all the teachers of the East flee from it; those [saints] would not have dared to say it. For Jerome says that in the name of "hypostasis," as it were, poison is hidden in honey. For it is possible for the simpler ones, having been deceived by this name, to confess multiple essences, just as [they confess] multiple hypostases, because "hypostasis" could be understood as "being under" the accidents—for the sake of which it is placed at the beginning—which signifies "essence" in the strict sense. How, then, would Jerome himself, or Augustine after him, who feared the name of "hypostasis" so that they might not provide to the peoples a pretext for confusion, have themselves given honey in which much was hidden, and grievous poisons?

For what evil does not follow from this, if it were set down, but dyarchy? If they produce [the Spirit] divided by personal power, the Son and the Father, the Spirit who is [the] bringer, [then there is] the mixing [of] the Father and the Son. If they produce [Him] by one personal power, [then there is] the abatement of the Spirit. If they produce this by essential power ^D that is uncommunicated to the Spirit, [then there is] a quaternity of divine hypostases, and if you wish, also infinity. If they produce this by essential power that is communicable to the Spirit, either the Spirit is the first principle in the Godhead, or rather, there is no hypostasis that is the cause in the strict sense, the [process of] theogony among them being reciprocal; other such things follow, which it is not suitable for the present need of the discourse to recount; yet they have been dealt with in the aforementioned books. But that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone contains nothing absurd. The whole truth of the faith, therefore, is confirmed by this dogma. For even if some talk nonsense, saying that it would follow from this that the Son is not the true God, since He does not also project the Spirit, these ought not even to be deemed worthy of an answer. But so that they might not disturb some of the simpler ones by saying these things, let Cyril come forward, ridding all men of this fear. "No one," he says, "who has sense would say that the Son appears unlike the Father; since He Himself did not beget, nor did He, of the Son’s begetting...

appear, but rather for this very reason, he will see in the Son a certain wonderful and most accurate image of the Father. For just as the Father is immutable and unchangeable, and ever remains Father, and does not change into the Son, so the Word who has come forth from Him as Son remains what He is, the immutability of the Father, and for this reason, showing in Himself that He is like the Father in this regard.

"Therefore it is foolish to say that the Son would be unlike the Father, because He is not Himself the cause of the Spirit. He is, however, like [the Father] because of this, by remaining in His own proper character, and not seizing the paternal character, which is the unbegottenness, or rather the cause of those who are from Him. But if not, why do these men not tremble, lest the Spirit also be unlike, whom they deprive of begetting and of 'sending forth'—depriving Him wrongfully, if indeed they also ascribe the 'sending forth' to the Son? For if 'to send forth' is opposite to 'being sent forth'—for so they answer when they play the sophist, as will be shown—then 'to beget' is not opposite to 'being sent forth.' Thus, just as according to them the Son is also a 'sender,' because 'to send forth' is not opposite to 'to beget,' so the Spirit at least would be a 'begetter,' because 'to beget' is not opposite to 'being sent forth,' no less than those things which, according to them, are not opposite in the Son. How then do they not obviously fight against the Spirit, while they think they are honoring the Son badly, and dissolve the rationale of equality in the divine Persons?

"Returning therefore, I say that Augustine and Jerome would not have offered honey containing such poisons. They ought to have feared much more to say what none of the teachers in the East, whom they had as an example, said, or what all of them said regarding the hypostasis." that it was read by that archbishop in a corrupted form. Sixth, that even if the books had not been corrupted before the addition to the Creed, it is highly likely that they suffered this afterward, and if anything else is likely, this is as well. For those who copy the books of the teachers among the Latins, being for the most part uneducated, wherever they find something concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, they change it according to the confession of their teaching, and not as they find it written, thinking it to be in error, using as a rule the Creed sung in the churches; and thus all the books were remodeled according to the pattern of the addition. Many other such things produce in us suspicion concerning those passages.

Second, I posit that all the books among them did not receive any change, neither from any malice, nor from the ignorance of those copying them, which would project the custom of their confession. I say that if Augustine also says that the Spirit proceeds also from the Son, there is no necessity that the Church as a whole, having changed because of Augustine, should think so. For she sets the laws of the faith for Augustine, and for each of the other saints, and she herself ought not to be judged according to him; nor is there any necessity, because Augustine said so, that it should be so. For that privilege is reserved only for the canonical Scriptures and the ecumenical synods. And from these it is not permitted for any orthodox person to depart, but it is permissible to piously reject some saint, or even two, in matters where he does not agree with the common belief, whether through the necessity of speaking against heretics, or however this may have happened to him, provided it be without contention against the Church. For if he has contended, he would not even be a saint. And this is how to distinguish heretics and orthodox teachers: not by those who have said nothing wrong and are called saints, while those led into falsehood are called heretics, but they are divided by whether they have contended. Many have thought many things contrary to the common belief without contention against the Church, to whom we do not adhere; and yet we praise them as saints and teachers because they have not contended against the Church. Having them for this reason as saints, we are not however compelled to think those things, as each one of them said, rather than as the majority of the saints, or as the synods, or as the more mature reflection of those examining these things informs us. Thus, the great Gregory the Wonderworker said in his exposition of the faith that the Father and the Son are two in concept, but one in hypostasis. And the great Basil finds fault with him in his *Ascetica*, saying he did not say this dogmatically, but agonistically. The same Basil also says regarding Dionysius of Alexandria and martyr, that "we do not admire everything in the man; but there is [something] which even entirely we write off; for this is almost of this now-blabbered impiety, I mean that of the Anomoeans; he is, as far as we know, the first among men..."

providing seeds for this. The cause, I believe, is not his wickedness, but rather the fact that for me it is not about contradicting the truth, but about a vehement desire to contend against Sabellius. And again, regarding the holy Gregory the Wonderworker, the same man says that “One could find many statements there, or as in the writings of Gregory, which provide the present heretics with the greatest strength, such as ‘the creature’ and ‘the thing made’ and whatever else is similar.” And Gregory of Nyssa appears to clearly hold views regarding the restitution and the end of punishment, even if the holy Maximus, doing well, attempts by certain contrivances to adjust the harsh sounding of his expression toward a pious meaning. And Augustine himself opines that the soul of the first man, Adam, was clearly created before the body, and by its own will inclined toward the body so as to minister to generation. And Jerome is with him, saying, “The heavenly bodies are ensouled.” These views, being those of Origen, the Manichaeans, and Plato, were cast out of the Church at the Fifth Synod, which indeed took place long after these saints. ^B Therefore, also Thomas, the teacher of the Latins, wherever he finds the blessed Augustine and Jerome disagreeing with the common doctrine of the Church, stands by Basil, Damascene, and Gregory the Great, who are our own, and follows them much more, doing very well. This is what we, too, ought at least to imitate, if we knew nothing else of a Latin, so as not to set one man above all others, and to prefer the others who are more accurate, even in the matter of the procession.

That it is possible for some teacher to err in some point of accuracy without heresy, if he had not been contentious, his opinion having been judged in the common assembly, Augustine the holy man himself is a witness and also counsels us not to receive any of his own views in which he might appear to disagree with the many or with the common rule. For apart from the letters sent to him by Fortunatus, a part of which we have inserted into our confession, speaking toward Jerome he says, “I have learned to render this honor only to those books of the Scriptures which are called canonical, so that I believe most firmly that none of their authors has erred in writing; but the others I read in such a way that, even if they have excelled in holiness and learning, I do not for that reason think it true because they have so written or thought.” And again the same man in the letter to the same Jerome: “I have learned to render this fear and this honor only to those writers who are now called canonical, that I do not dare believe that any of them has erred in writing. And if I meet with anything in their writings that seems contrary to the truth, I assume nothing else but that the volume is either falsely ascribed, or that the interpreter has not grasped what was said, or that I myself fail to understand—I do not doubt that at all. But the others I read in such a way that, even if they shine with any holiness or learning, I will not for that reason assume it is true because they have so thought.” ^C And they were not able to prove [it] by other writers or by canonical and demonstrative arguments. And again the same man in the letter to Victor of the Victors: “Do not wish, brother, to raise slanders against the divine testimonies, so many, so brilliant, so indisputable, from the writings of our own or of the bishops, such as Hilary, or Cyprian, and Agrippinus before the schism of Donatus. First, because this class of writings is distinguished from the venerableness of the canonical Scriptures; for they are not read in such a way that testimonies from them are brought forward and it is not permitted to think the contrary where they perhaps think otherwise than the truth demands. And because the blessed Augustine says many things without asserting them, but rather leaves them in doubt, either because the evidence still lies before him and he is not solely following the tradition of the faith, or because he does not yet seem to have settled anything in the common mind of the Church, as he came to the true faith late in life from the Manichaean—or, to say the same, almost Platonic—heresy, having been catechized by Ambrose, if indeed those of the Latins who record these things for us speak the truth.” Thomas himself is clear and in his theological books does so in many places, saying in the very word: “But this, clearly that which sounds harsh, is what Augustine says not as asserting, but as leaving in doubt.” The book of Retractations also provides no less proof, in which he corrects many things previously stated and written by him, when it was naturally not yet possible for him to be accurate in everything, because he had started to depart from the faith late. ^D These things have happened to none of our teachers. But for this reason, these men assert that each one in all things they say [is correct], at least according to their own opinion and mind, knowing that the others also so think, unless something proceeded from their own mind alone, which no one had yet come to tell him about; for then they rightly excuse the listeners, which Augustine is also shown to have done.

Therefore, to conclude this second chapter, there is no necessity, because Augustine thought so alone—or another thought so with him, guessing as best he could—for this reason to make him and his doctrine [equal] to all the most manifest teachers and utterances, and, what is more, to the Synods and the Scriptures, [even] where his views seem to us to be confessed by them, whether seeming well or not, it seems so however. Nor, if one judges this about Augustine so, does he leave behind anything irreverent against him—far be it—but rather that which he himself wishes and counsels, as has been shown. And what we demand against Augustine regarding both Gregory and Dionysius, he himself says he uses for those before him, and thinks he is not sinning. He would therefore think that he is sinning in the greater matters if he were not so doing.

697 Therefore, no one of sound mind could blame us for proceeding cautiously in the matter at hand regarding the holy Augustine, preferring other, more just and greater authorities instead of him, yet still reserving for him his due honor. ^A I say, thirdly, that we are able to cherish the statements of the Western saints as genuine, and to demonstrate their harmony with the Asian theologians in what they say regarding the Spirit. For both of these tasks, we have used the blessed Maximus as our guide. For in his letter to Marinus, Maximus appears both as a witness to the Roman Fathers regarding the phrase "and from the Son," and as one who reconciles it and joins it to the convictions of the Asian teachers. If the Latins accept this letter as genuine, let its words reconcile us; but if they say it is spurious, they are casting out the only testimony they claim for the authenticity of the statements, so that it remains for us — in the first and second chapters — to persist in what has been said: that either Augustine did not say "and from the Son," for the reasons stated in the previous section, or if he did, he must be interpreted with caution for the sake of the latter elements. But we are so far from engaging in contentiousness over such matters that, even though the letter was not particularly well known to us before, we treat it as a godsend for our own argument, as it is able to reconcile us piously. For we do not doubt in the least that it is genuine, having examined it through many other proofs in both books, and most importantly by this one: that even if it is not by Maximus, a letter such as this *should* have been by Maximus, or by another of his peers. For it accords with the convictions of all our teachers. And even if [the letter] concedes to the statements of the Roman Fathers [on matters] far removed from our own knowledge, the fact that the Roman Fathers said something of the sort regarding the Spirit—with this being accepted—demonstrates them to be in harmony with our brothers by a simple, true, and clever method, beyond which there is nothing sound to think or say.

Since, therefore, the letter seems to us most authentic in this respect, and since we have already dealt with it in other irrefutable ways in the first and second of our books, we do not struggle much with those who doubt it; and we seek the harmony of the teachers even without its assistance, and without its testimony we believe in the phrases of the Roman Fathers. We offer these [phrases] to the Latins, granting them more than they deserve by our debating in vain, when it is possible not to differ, if they were willing. They themselves grant us [this] by wishing to adopt the testimony and harmony [found] in this letter. Accepting, therefore, the authenticity of those statements without witness, as they are phrased in the Latin idiom for the sake of a desire for peace, we nonetheless insist that they be shown to be consonant with the Eastern saints in a just manner. It would be right, therefore, always to draw the less clear toward the clearer, ^B and to use the more proximate or similar [authorities] to set the standard for the first, if one does not wish to be a sophist.

It is clear that the statements of our own teachers regarding the procession of the Spirit are clearer than those of the Latins, for three reasons which provide them with greater clarity. First, because the Greek language is much more spacious and clearer than the Latin, and also because it is, as it were, the source of that [Latin] one. Augustine himself admits this in *On the Trinity*, and Athanasius and Gregory the Theologian [also] speak of it; they blame the narrowness of the Latin language for the schism that occurred at that time regarding the question of hypostasis and person, and for the sake of brevity, the quotations from the saints were omitted here; but they are obvious to all. A second reason why the teachers from Asia spoke more clearly is that it was their war against the heretics; and they were compelled to speak with precision and clarity for the sake of the manifestation of the truth, and because they feared the pretexts of the heretics, who would cling to the lack of definition in words. A third [reason is] that the Latin idiom prevailed in discussions, because they use more universal and general terms to signify divine matters, their language being what it is; just as they use the term "principle" (*archē*) for divine matters instead of "cause" (*aitia*), as a more common term, thinking—perhaps rightly—that through such terms divine matters are signified more fittingly and familiarly. But for the safety of the listeners, or for the silencing of those who oppose the truth, [it is] less adequate. The teachers of our own tradition, whether judging it better in this way, or following the idiom of the language, have used more specific terms, and just as they did for other matters, so too did they speak of divine things using the terms that best correspond to each subject. Therefore, the [sayings] of the Europeans must be drawn toward those of the Asians, ^C and through the latter, the former must be explained, as they are undoubtedly clearer. And since the [teachings] of our teachers are also more similar to the first authorities—that is, the canonical Scriptures—one must judge those others by these, holding [the latter] as a kind of rule by which to judge the others. Let us leave aside the fact that those who theologized in Asia also seem to be of greater precision, not trusting very much in external arguments in their study of divine things, nor granting much to human wisdom, which Augustine utilized for reasons demonstrated to us in the first of our books—praiseworthy at the time, but not [to be used] to make a dogma out of what he had labored to achieve reasonably for those reasons—[our fathers] having left aside that of carefully attending to the common rule of the faith, and [leaving] whatever clings to it—which it is not permitted to treat with excessive speculation, nor [to leave] to human curiousness. These are the teachers of our Church. And lest these remarks about Augustine seem cold to anyone—although he is blessed and

^A praiseworthy for such ambition, he would justly be censured if he were not to be interpreted as he himself desired by those who use his works, and if anyone does not think and call Augustine blessed and holy, [let him be] anathema—yet, as has been said, guarding against uneducated or malicious ears and souls for their sake, and because our lack of education touches no one until we are, together with the truth itself and the saints on both sides, upright and unadulterated and regulated, and having many foundations in the diet and discernment of what appear to be differences between them. For these reasons, therefore, one must not pit the Westerners against the Asian teachers, but rather say that all of them, Western and Asian teachers alike, must be applied to the canon of the faith, and that is how it should be done.

The teachers from Asia, therefore, say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and no one has said that He proceeds from the Father and the Son. But all say that He is given, and sent, and dispensed from the Father through the Son, and such like, in which no cause is understood moving from person to person, but rather a cause from both toward the outward effect. And for this reason, they say not only "from the Father through the Son," but also "from the Father and the Son" simply, without adding that the Holy Spirit is sent or given from the Father, just as they say that things that exist are produced through the Son, at the time when it is believed that He Himself is also giving and sending the Holy Spirit. These things also accurately agree with the common canon of the faith, as has been well shown in the previously set forth confession.

Following, therefore, this canon of the faith, with which the type of the Asian teachers also well agrees, where it is said by the Western Fathers that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son—for their "proceeds" means to them what "comes forth" means to us—let us unfold their such proposition thus: He proceeds from the Father and the Son, but as subsisting from the Father, or proceeding, and from the Son—which is the same thing as saying from both—that is, dispensed or given from the Father through the Son, because He is naturally in Him, and is consubstantial with Him; and thus both portions of the saints agree in the canon of truth, and in no other way. For they do not agree in regarding the Son as the cause or principle of the Spirit. For all the Easterners deny that the Son is the cause, or principle, or producer of the Spirit, and they assign all such things to the Father alone. But if some interpret the utterances of the Western Fathers otherwise, they interpret them ill; but correctly and genuinely interpreted, they can agree with those of the other saints according to what has been said before. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit exists from the Father, but is consubstantial with the Son, and thus it is that the Son and the Spirit are in each other, just as the subject of the faith says that the Father and the Son are in each other. Following this canon, therefore, the saints among us sometimes say that He proceeds from the Father through the Son. ^B

These things they say, not thereby thinking the Son to be the cause or principle of the Spirit, or a co-cause with the Father—for they also openly deny these things as clearly absurd, false, impossible, and groundless—but manifesting the connection of the essence and [that He is] unchangeable. If, therefore, even according to the faulty interpretation of some, the utterances of the Western Fathers should be interpreted thus, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, so that "from the Son" stands instead of "through the Son," and "through the Son" signifies not the cause and the giving of existence, but the connection and the being of the same nature, and thus the teachers from the West will join with the Asians, and all together [will agree] with the canon of the faith. Otherwise, if anyone thinks to reconcile them, he is suffering from ignorance of the word, both the general and the theological, or from malice. For otherwise it is impossible for them to come together with each other and with the faith, even if all the angels were to say it—if indeed it were possible for angels to say what is not, and not to agree with the very teaching of the Spirit. In this way, also, our own Fathers and leaders reconciled them, being far more worthy than those who now dare to legislate against them, if anyone is indeed such a one. For the reconciliation at Florence, which came about through the definition there, and which is an ancient discovery of the Latins, since they added the insertion to the Symbol of the Faith—for they surely had such things in mind when they made the addition—[having been] signed by our own, [in terms of] the forsaking of God, by the holy truth, demonstrates all our ancestors to be Nestorians, as the Latins themselves say that the protest and opinion of our ancestors and the Asian teachers is Nestorian, which is [something] more. But the things beyond these evils I do not speak of, forbearing. We, therefore, even if we forbear from saying how much our conscience brings against us regarding that disagreement of the teachers—for so it is better to say than agreement—yet we say this simple thing: that it is not an agreement, nor can they otherwise agree, or as it has now been said by us, and before us by those far better than us, and in addition to this, more divine.

But if anyone should say that, "But this agreement is violent," he lies. For it would be far more certain to explain the more obscure through the clear, and to regulate the lesser by the more accurate [ones] of such things, however that may be. But those things that agree with the canonical Scriptures and the councils of the Christians are surely more accurate, such as those of the Asian teachers, either from the idiom of the language, or from greater diligence, or from other causes not obstructing the piety and holiness of the other teachers. But even if there were no device to draw [together] the things of the Western teachers

^A toward the common confession of the faith, supported as it is by such scriptures, councils, and teachers as we and our Fathers esteem, we would rather have chosen with reverence to ask the others—and that, too, [when dealing with those who are] foreign in type and language—than to sever all at once [ourselves] from one another and from the Sacred Scripture. For I was led on to say what I spared myself from saying, and this would have been to adhere to the second of the answers.

But if this seems burdensome to anyone, even though an apology has been made beforehand, we would have adhered to the first of the answers, and clearly no one would have accused us of audacity or boldness or contentiousness, since we rely on the canonical Scriptures, the ecumenical councils, and the better-known teachers whose books we possess and whose voices we understand, and to whom we give thanks above all for the faith, because we have used these alone as our guides, so to speak, and have neither added anything to all these things nor subtracted anything, but have left aside curiosity about the rest, because the expectation of gain secretly harbors much danger in an ambiguous matter. No one, then, would have accused those who are in such a state. But if, for the sake of the good of ecclesiastical peace, we dare something beyond this with safety, making it a daring act to accept a theology or a testimony [that is] unverified—and that, too, when their only testimony is being rejected by those who disagree, I mean the letter of Maximus—yet [also] making it a safe act to accept such sayings according to the model of the catholic faith and the model of the teachers among us: if, then, because of the good of ecclesiastical peace, and the glory of Christ which increases with the increase of ecclesiastical peace, we have been led thus far, we and our Fathers in their writings, beyond which it is impious to proceed—that is, contrary to our good conscience, and as if—having closed the eyes of the soul—we were to accept an unheard-of opinion ^B under the pretense of the agreement of the saints, which is unjust and impossible, and to declare the whole thing to be sophisticated—what our own state and that of our ancestors is and was, God sees, and the more just among men.

There are, of course, also many among the Latins themselves who will justify us in their inner consciences, even if they do not dare to do so openly, respecting the laws of their mother, a fact which, alas, some of our own people do not consider, becoming an addition to our misfortune in these most difficult and most wretched times. At the same time, it is clear from the contrary that the Latin position is such that they have done us wrong and still do us wrong, and [wrong] the peace of the Church. For they added [the clause] alone, without the other patriarchs—and among us, the four patriarchs did not add [it] in return, though we were able to do this and it would have been more just, both because we are more numerous and because they would have added what is true—but for the sake of peace, and fearing the decrees of the Fathers, they did not do this. They say that when necessity presses, one must add, and [that] now when there is a necessity, one must cast out, [yet] they do not cast out. They offer testimony without martyrs, and [they offer testimony] against which many and great suspicions might justly be judged, not against the saints—far be it from that—but against the sayings which they ascribe ^C to the saints, and [which] we ourselves believe for the sake of the good of peace. They malign the only testimony concerning them, the letter of Maximus, because of the teacher’s guidance attached to it against their misinterpretation, and we endure it. It would have behooved us no longer to care about them, but to take refuge in the common rules of the faith, to seat as interpreter of the sayings—if they are truly of the saints—our Jesus, the blessed Paul, and to make them the reconcilers of our strife, and along with them the ecumenical councils; but they pay no heed at all, but demand that we pay them even the last farthing. And when they resolve this question not by the undeniable voices of Scriptures and saints, but by the peculiar discoveries of the moderns, they demand that [we] bow our heads, and they are vexed with those who do not bow, as if they were serving a law, but not with knowledge and conscience, ^D or [they are] not paying attention to their own mother, whom they ought rather to serve in accordance with the laws, and the hedges which she set concerning these matters, not to transgress.

But may there be, O King God, both to the Roman Church a movement toward the peace of the Church that is more just, so that we may also grant her the former reverence. For now, what needed to be said concerning the Western teachers and Fathers to those who belong to our mother, the Eastern Church, and concerning her glory and teaching, so that they might not be disturbed by such sayings being brandished before them—of many things, a few have been said with God, to whom be glory and praise to the ages. Amen.

CHAPTER III

That according to the premises of the faith it is impossible for the Son of God to be a producer and a cause of the all-holy Spirit, has been shown by many syllogisms in the first and second of our books, but it might be succinctly shown in this argument in particular. If the Son produces the Holy Spirit hypostatically with the Father—as a cause of it, clearly, or as a principle, as is declared in the definition of Florence—then [He produces it] either insofar as the Father and the Son are one God, [or] they produce it, or insofar as they are two hypostases. Because in the Father and the Son, both the unity of the essence and the distinction of the hypostases are certain foundations of all that belongs to them, whether they are held in common or not in common, and beyond these two there is nothing else. But as they are one in essence, the Holy Spirit...

^A cannot be conceived or spoken of as one person in the Father and the Son, so that this answer is untenable.

Others say that the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit, not because they are absolutely one, nor because they are absolutely two, but because they are two-as-one; for the productive power pertains to them both as they are two, and as they are one, for they signify a nature with a ^B property. And insofar as they signify a property, there is nothing impossible in it belonging to two subjects, since they possess a single nature; but insofar as they signify nature, those who possess such a nature are one. But this answer, which is almost the same as the previous one, is monstrous, referring to a certain Alexander, and in no way is "the Father and the Son" the same thing as "two and one," or, as they prefer to say, "two-as-one." Otherwise, all the possessions of Sabellius would be mixed in there, so that it is not even, as they say, according to a single productive power. Furthermore, how can this one power, signifying for them a nature with a property, exist in two subjects while remaining one? For it should rather be twofold like the subjects, if it were a personal property and not of the nature. Or if it were one and ^C personal, it would surely belong to one person, being immutably defined within him; yet that is how it is. For such properties must be immutable. Or how would properties remain if they were moving and shifting, according to the theologian Gregory? But if the power is twofold according to the number of subjects to whom they give the power, then there will be two principles of the Spirit for those who produce through a twofold power. For just as it is impossible for there to be one power in two divine persons, unless it be essential and natural, so too is it [impossible] for there to be two powers unless they are contrary or different in species, neither of which is appropriate for the one power, as they call it, in the Father and the Son; for how would more than one exist? But if it is necessary that there be two of such a kind, how could there be anything in them that is one according to them? Yet each ^D is a principle, as they say, because of the power of producing, which it is impossible to be one in both, so that for them to be a single principle is, in the act of producing, impossible, if both are producing.

To this argument, the more refined ones reply that the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit neither because they are one in essence, nor because they are absolutely distinct, for they seem to fear the introduction of those absurdities, but because they are one in productive power. But this answer is, firstly, undemonstrated; for that there is one productive power or energy in the Father and the Son is nowhere stated in the Scriptures or by the holy men. Secondly, it is sophistical; for it attempts to resolve the question with the very thing sought—this being the very thing in question, whether the Son also has the same productive power as the Father. Third, it circles back to the same and greater doubts. For we ask: whence does this one productive power, which is in the Father and the Son, possess its unity? Does it come from the unity of the person—for every power in divine things is either essential, that is, of the essence, or hypostatic, that is, of the person? If indeed it arises from the unity of the essence and follows from this, just as also the power to create, then either the Spirit will produce himself, being in the same unity of belief, and for this reason have the same power; or, if he does not produce himself, he will be a creature, and not in the same unity of essence, being deprived of such power. But if it follows from personal unity, and is personal, as the power to beget, then the Father and the Son will be one person, and the Spirit will produce as one person. But by no means...

Since there is a necessity for there to be one principle, if they are both producing, it is then impossible for them both to produce, while saying that there is nothing absurd in one property belonging to two subjects, [because] they have one nature and are one in number. If by this argument they encompass also the natural properties—that is, the godlike and common ones—they speak the truth, but they do not prove their point. For the productive power, not belonging to the Spirit, is not of this kind. But if they mean a personal property in their argument, they seem to be legislating. For they will not show any personal property that is one in number in two subjects, unless they would call it—by way of ridicule—the productive one. Nor will they speak of the power to send the Spirit, for it is common, since the Spirit is also said to send himself and to give himself. For the person of the sender is not conceived of necessity as the cause of the one being sent, but rather as [proceeding] from both. No...

^A even to attribute the generative power as common to the Father and the Son, unless it be also common to the Spirit, since Dionysius, Basil, and all the saints consider that what is common to the Father and the Son must also be common to the Spirit; for such things are becoming to God and are properties of the divine nature, and for this reason, the Spirit must necessarily participate in them. Or else, they would not be common to two, but would be delimited to one person alone; for if everything does not invite the divine nature, or if it [has] divided the three hypostases to belong to one person alone, and not to go beyond, nor to pass over to another, unless indeed the duality is that which is worshipped by us. But to say that both the unbegotten and the caused are properties of two persons does not, according to the argument, make that transcendent Monad and Triad into a duality; for those things do not resemble "sending." For the caused is only a predicate insofar as it is common; but insofar as it is in act in the Son and the Spirit, it is begotten and proceeding, being two things and differing in form. But the Latins say that the "sending" is one thing in the Father and the Son, and one energy in form and in number. And there is a much greater difference between the opposite and the proceeding, to which a certain thing is common, but it is not imposed by some as a name in the way of synonyms, as if one were to call both a stone and a horse "irrational"—the one because it possesses the difference opposed to the [rational] argument, but the other because it is entirely separated from the genus; and as one might say, the one [is meant] privatively, the other negatively. Consequently, since it is a personal property, it will belong to the one paternal person, but being a nature-property, it will belong to the one divine nature. But the second is impossible for the sake of the Spirit; therefore the first is true.

The logical sequence is confirmed not only by the argument of the faith and by the teachers who maintain it, but even the Latins themselves bear witness to it; unless, or what else, could it be given to the logical sequence to say that "sending" would have belonged also to the Spirit, if the property of the Spirit did not prevent it? But it makes no difference to us whether it is prevented by this cause or by another, and it is impossible as long as it is such a thing, in order to show that [the thing] is impossible to which this [consequence] follows. But if the Latins say that the saints did not concede [it] except for the "sending," the suspicion is false; for on the contrary, they call the Father alone the source and alone the cause, and [they say] that the Son has all that the Father has, except the causality, and many other such things through which they demonstrate that they do not wish for the "sending" to be common to the Father and the Son. But they did not wish [it], because they knew that this would necessarily have to be attributed by them also to the Spirit, because every energy in the divine realm does not stop at one person, but extends [further], reaching toward the whole divine nature, and is common to the three hypostases. And again, if they should say that [the fact that the Spirit] is the Father's and is the Son's is common indeed to the Father and the Son, but not also to the Spirit—for the Spirit is not his own—even this they say in vain. For if they speak of that [Spirit] in such a way as proceeding from both, they are again begging the question and misinterpreting those who said that. But if He is called the Spirit of the Son in the Scripture, as being identical to the Son in nature and consubstantial—for so do all the holy ones interpret—and they say [He is] of the Father, as proceeding from the Father, then it could not also be common to the Spirit, if it is indeed different in them, because He is said to be of the Father as from Him, and of the Son as being appropriated to Him by nature. If someone were to wish that [the expression] "being of the Father" also signifies the unity of nature of the Cause with the one ^D from the Father, we concede that it is common for the Spirit to be attributed to the Father and to the Son, and [yet] they say that the cause of this is [the Father]. But even though this is so, they do not say that "sending" will [also] reside in the Son with the Father; that is to say, they do not refute the logical sequence—for how could they, pinning it on the arguments of the saints, who say: if anything is common to the Father and the Son, this is also common to the Spirit? But that it is absurd for this to belong also to the Spirit, and for what reason—as if contending along with us, they say [it], not knowing that just as it does not belong to the Spirit because it is not at all consistent with the argument of the Spirit, although it would have belonged [to Him] without this, so neither does it belong to the Son because of the necessity that it would have had to belong also to the Spirit if it belonged to the Son, and this is impossible. [And] the fact that the Spirit is said to be of the Father and of the Son, we will grant [as well] that He is his own [Spirit]. For just as He is identical to them in nature, so also is He identical to His own self in nature and according to hypostasis, being one even in the ultimate of immutability. Since, therefore, the things which the Latins answer to our argument are simply and willfully evasions of the truth, because of their serving [the cause] and wishing [to maintain] the opinion by which they were previously overcome, and they contain nothing sound or clear, it is therefore reasonably shown, [even] through the most manifest principles of the faith—and at the same time by the quickest way—that it is impossible and absurd for the Son also to be the cause or the sender of the Holy Spirit together with the Father, given the many absurd and impossible consequences resulting from the separation.

Even while there are many who have followed this dogma with further absurdities—and there are almost no others like it—as has been shown by many others before us, and by us in the two aforementioned books, it seemed sufficient to us to bring the argument to these points, at least one of which must be rejected as it reinforces the Latin position. One might be held fast by one of these [points], due to the necessity of this line of reasoning and the weakness—as has been said—of the counter-arguments against it; for they attempt to solve it with sophistries. ^A Well then, we rightly reject such a position and wish to communicate with none of those who posit it, following ecclesiastical laws which command that we stand apart from those who think otherwise concerning the Divine.

But falsehood is a difficult thing, and it must be guarded against and not mingled with those who hold it—not only when it fights against the truth of the faith openly and as a primary matter, as when someone says that God is not one or that the Word of God was not incarnate, but also when, though something is posited, something contrary to the faith follows from it. And that what pertains to the Latin opinion regarding the procession of the Spirit is one of the things contrary to the faith, our ancestors and teachers demonstrate individually, and declare synodically, and confirm in deed by their words—not contentiously, but from a good conscience—having broken away from the Latins for nearly five hundred years on account of this opinion of theirs, and having used Jerome himself as a counselor to flee from this opinion, such as it truly is. For he says: “Even if we attribute something to the Father by way of the principle of origin, we attribute nothing to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, that concerns subordination or diminution in any way, so as to guard against the opportunities for heresies.” ^B In the same way, Hilary says in the eighth book of *De Trinitate*: “By the dignity of prayer, the Father is greater, but the Son is no less, to whom it is given to be one and the same.” They also used all their closer teachers—I mean the Asians—as guides for what one ought to think and do. For all of them never posited this Latin pretext, but leaped away from it as from some manifest precipice, and rather theologized the opposite of it clearly, by all of which things they showed that they considered it base. Using these, then, as counselors, we too guard against this opinion as an opportunity for heresies, and we do not wish to give to the people honey in which much poison is hidden, to say it again after Jerome himself.

If they subject all those heresies to anathema, they do not satisfy us; for it is the custom of those who always innovate to do so, and it is the custom of those who contend for the truth not to pay heed to those who so act. ^C For in those reductions to the absurd, those who conflict with the truth, since they could not solve the logical consequence, tried by the denial of the absurdity to release themselves from the charges and to confirm their starting point. These seemed to those who thought correctly not to be acceptable, unless they denied the starting point from which that absurdity follows by a sound logical consequence. For example, those around Pyrrhus, who posited a single will and a single energy in Christ, since they were reproached by the orthodox for positing also a single nature, if they spoke in this way in our Master, [it was] out of such a consequence: that with the unity of the energy, the unity of the nature would also follow, because according to the number of the natures would the number of the energies according to nature also be. ^D At the present time, however, we are not struggling to posit these things precisely, but only as a sketch for the sake of example; therefore, those, not being able to solve the consequence, fled to the denial of the absurdity. Yet, though they had the means to solve it, and though they said many things, they were dismissed as if using sophistries. No one of those who thought correctly accepted this denial of theirs, but rather demanded of them the denial of the single energy that had been posited—if indeed the absurdity admitted by them, the unity of the nature in Christ, followed. And neither the denying of what followed put them outside the charge, nor does it seem that they were moved to that opinion by any piety; for they wished from this to show the human will and energy in Christ to be subordinated to the divine order, so unchangeably that they even became the same. But they were ignorant—and, even when instructed, were unwilling to learn—that that which is "simply" and that which is "according to order" differ. And the second they would only grudgingly admit, but by positing the first, or seeming to posit it, they also introduce the unity of the nature. Those who posited one nature in Christ did not say that they were attributing suffering to the divinity of Christ, nor that he had suffered in appearance, or that he had become a mere man—things for which they heard that they were carrying their position—but these they also subjected to anathema. And their motivation indeed had a certain appearance [of truth]; for they did not deny the true concurrence of the two natures in Christ, nor did they believe so clearly that after the union all were confused and blended into one nature; but calling substance and form "nature," they could not endure to posit two natures in Christ. For they thought it impossible that in two forms—and these so distinguished both wholly and in every way—there could be one hypostasis, that of Christ, in divinity, clearly, and in humanity; on the contrary, they thought it more true that more hypostases participate in the same nature according to form. Since, however, the God-man was unique, and no one shared with him in the God-manhood—nor is it possible in the whole of time for anyone to share in or concur with it—they said of him both the nature and the hypostasis, and that he himself is the God-man, and his God-manhood; just as, for example's sake, sun and sun-ness, the sun being one, as also in the case of other unique things. And they held the God-manhood to be the nature, the God-man to be the hypostasis, and thus two natures in Christ, the divinity and the human

^A nature, to have come together into one nature, just as soul and body come together for a man into humanity.

But those who stand with the truth, and who have become custodians of it from God for the Christian peoples, neither paid heed to the denial of those absurdities, but rather demanded the denial of the one nature—which, being posited, creates the absurdities confessed by them—nor did they consider whether anything of seemliness existed in the mover of these things, although this too is full of much delusion, if one examines it well, having the appearance of some painted-over truth. But even if it were entirely right, we considered this honey to be hiding many poisons in truth, and to be the beginning of many and great heresies, and for this reason they did not wish, by conceding to it, to allow those heresies to ^B revive, which it had taken much sweat for the Church to root out. For those around Eutyches were ignorant, or did not wish to learn when taught, that it is possible for natures to come together into one nature, provided they are imperfect and do not have a completed form, just as the human form—evidently soul and body—comes together into a human, for which neither form has been completed, such that it would not even be nature and substance properly so-called, but only as principles of nature, and parts having such a definition of form and matter; but for perfect natures to come together into one, as the divine and the human are, it is impossible unless one or both are indeed destroyed, and for them to deny these things—yet they did deny them. He did not persuade the pious to accept the origin of these absurdities, but rather demanded they deny it itself; that is, to deny that one nature has come to be in our Master after the union of the two natures, and to confess that two natures did indeed come together in Christ, and two remained after the union, having come together unchangingly and unconfusedly into one person and one hypostasis.

The same has happened to all those who, for any reason, have departed from the truth and the common faith by a longer and greater distance; and all those holding to the ancient dogmas have treated them in the same way as those mentioned. Therefore, those who call the Son an cause of the Spirit along with the Father cannot persuade us, nor can we accept their opinion, or commune with them as long as we differ, even if they proclaimed the absurdities that we think their dogma brings ten thousand times over; neither did they persuade our Fathers, who by the very times of the addition so challenged them and demanded back their communion; nor does that which is their greatest mover, the pure natural likeness of the Son toward the Father, the believed consubstantiality, persuade us, even by the grace of Christ, to accept this innovation, as if it were necessarily connected to it. For we believe the Son is consubstantial with the Father, but we are taught, both by Him and by His own, to distinguish Him from the paternal dignity. ^C This is the very thing, as they themselves say, wherein the principle and the cause of the divine Persons, of the Word and of the Spirit, who proceed naturally from the Father Himself, consists.

And we, in the Creed, say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and adding nothing to this, we confess that the Son of God is consubstantial with the Father, and that the Spirit is co-worshipped and co-glorified with the Father and the Son; so that no one could circumscribe us. But those who add that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son do not confess with us at the same time the avoidance of all those absurdities, such that they might make the preaching safe for those nurtured with them, whose followers, as it seems, are driven off—even if they might have seemed to be only not such things. But as it is, many things follow from the opinion, rather than from anything else, for those who posit this, at least the minimum which befits the foundation of the opinion, which they would choose out of all; but they are ignorant, and, not being taught, refuse to learn, that for something to be from someone, and for something to be of someone, does not necessarily come together, but there is where they are separated. For example, they come together when we refer the Spirit to the Father, not as being able to be the same—"For it is one thing," says Chrysostom, "to be of God, and another to be from God," concerning the Spirit, when he makes his discourse—but so as to hold true together. But they are separated when we refer the Spirit to the Son; whence the Fathers of the second council who completed the Creed—and for which reason the other councils remained silent, as having no need—position the Son as consubstantial with the Father and that the Spirit is to be worshipped and co-glorified with both, but do not say that He proceeds from the Son, but say from the Father alone. And the Word of God Himself, and His blessed disciple John, calls Him the Spirit of truth, even of the Word himself, yet He decreed that He proceeds from the Father Himself. And Paul, the mouth of Christ, while saying the Spirit is of God and the Spirit of God, indicating on one hand the cause, and on the other the natural kinship of the divinity, yet in no way saying [He proceeds] from the Son, but only Spirit of the Son and Spirit of Christ; and in general, that which is consubstantial with some other does not necessarily introduce that one is the cause of the other; wherefore it does not injure the unity of the essence in the Father and Son and Spirit, that the Spirit does not also exist from the Son, or proceed as caused, being consubstantial to Him, as receiving the substance—one in number with Him—proceeding from the Father, which the Son receives being begotten; for this reason He is called the Spirit of the Son, and is not an issue or procession of Him. But that [He] exists from the Son injures many truths, as has now been said, and in other places has been proved by more and clearer arguments, from which it is necessary, on account of what is being destroyed, that we do not overlook ^D this. For the Latins would have cared, if they were not slaves to preoccupation instead of accuracy and just [...]

^A peace of the Churches of Christ. But we, believing the Son to be consubstantial with the Father, and the Spirit to be consubstantial with the Son, and believing the Spirit of the Son to be the Spirit of the Father, and likewise—regarding that which pertains to the unity of nature—distinctly, or rather personally, attributing what is becoming to the paternal hypostasis, we piously exclude both the Spirit and the Son, attributing to each that which is incommunicable and idiomatic to them. Showing the true Trinity, and deeply revering their most pure unity—as, being such, the Trinity could not be saved did the unmixed presence of the idioms not distinguish them.

These things are in the Father: to beget the Word, and to proceed the Spirit, and, to speak concisely, [to be] either the principle, or the fountain, or the cause, or the fruit-bearing, or the generative. For these in the matter before us all mean the same thing, and since they mean the same thing, the teachers are accustomed to attribute these explicitly to the Father alone; and we do not believe that it is permissible for the Son to be a producer, nor for the Spirit to be a begetter, as long as the Father is Father alone, that is, begetter and producer. For the Father communicates to His own Son His own goods, [but] not the idiom of Him who is in them, which He possesses by being the principle and source of all these things to those who have come forth from Him connatural and co-eternal, as indeed [He does] to the Spirit. Neither, then, does He communicate [the production] of the Spirit to the Son; and as the Holy Spirit is in the Father connatural and transcendently, although believed to proceed from Him ineffably and to be distinguished, so also the Son receives this [being] generated from the Father in nature co-existing, in that He has the same nature by number, but He does not receive from the Father the [power] to produce the Spirit and to establish it; for to receive this would be to receive the paternal idiom; nor does He receive [the Spirit] as having been produced. For all things are there co-eternally, and the teachers who think rightly understood that for the Son to receive anything from the Father is to have that which is being generated, or to have been generated. And that the Father has [the Spirit] is in no way prior to the Son’s having [it]; for the order of the prior does not exist in those who are co-eternal and connatural, but only the order of the cause, and it is an order because of the cause; that is to say, either the bringing forth and having come forth, or the having come forth differently; of which one pertains to the Father in relation to those from Him, and the other pertains to those from the Father in relation to each other.

Just as, therefore, the Son has being from the Father and all things with Him, but is not the cause of these for Himself at all—for in this alone He is distinguished from the Father, since by having all things and likewise such things [as the Father], how else would He be distinguished?—so also the Spirit having from the Father unchangeably as the Father, connatural and co-extending with Him from the Father, none the less is not the cause of the Spirit, neither of Himself, nor at all. And if He were the cause of the Spirit at all, what then would prevent Him ^B from being in this way also the cause of the Father? For it is not possible for them to say that being a cause of something that is in the Father, He will not also be the cause of the Father Himself, the absolute simplicity of the Father preventing them; nor can they say that the Holy Spirit in the Father and the Son is not the same, nor do they believe, surely, that they do not produce the Spirit in one and the same way, as they even insist on this, that there is one source of the Spirit for both. Therefore it is necessary that the Son also be the cause of the Father, being the cause of the Spirit that is in the Father, as has been said. But one must not fear this regarding the Father in relation to the Son. To think thus is a total necessity, that being the cause of the Spirit that is in the Son, He is also the cause of the Son Himself, as if for no other reason, for this reason alone: one ought not think the Son of God is the cause of the Spirit, lest the matters of the theology risk being reversed. And to claim completely that the Son proceeds together with the Father, [who is] the Holy Spirit, who naturally and co-eternally proceeds from the Father, what propriety will that have? For as in all things in which there is that which is prior in time, to hold to the order of the cause is impossible and inconsistent; so no less, even in things where the order according to cause exists without chronological precedence, a subversion of such an order could occur for those able to reason rightly, [namely,] to make the caused co-exist with its own cause, and to make the co-caused a co-cause with the co-cause to the common cause, while it proceeds eternally and is ordered immediately to the common cause—at least so far as it comes to the power of the latter; for the Latins also grant these things. So many things therefore following the position of the Latins—for one must conclude through smaller things, as we proposed from the beginning—either they must excommunicate all these things in the Creed, concerning which they have also made their innovation. And yet perhaps some of the absurdities will pass by unmentioned, which might be found by us and them with greater care; for to falsehood follow more absurd things, ^C or [it is] to remove the source of them from the middle. And yet the former is not enough, even if it were possible for it to happen, on account of the things said and many others; therefore the second would need to be done.

But to excommunicate the Sabellian liquefaction ^D and the duality of the principle and such things, and while preaching that the Spirit is produced from the Son, and [that] the Son is according to them the source of the Spirit, and the cause, as the Greeks might say, they themselves say, and that the Spirit has from the Son the [power] to exist or to have [its] subsistence, even if they profess to heal these things, sophistically and deceiving those who are eager to be with them, irrationally and irreverently, just as indeed they also misinterpret with sophistry the teachers who say the contrary to these, on whom we rely, a matter accustomed to all those who have suffered similarly—this, therefore, will draw no one of those having sense and bred in the ecclesiastical dogmas and matters to have a better opinion about them, than that which our Fathers had regarding them...

and for restraint, let him be silent. But the books ^A proclaim [the procession] to the Son and to the Father, to the blessed Trinity in unity of substance, now and forever, and unto the ages of ages. Amen.

BY THE SAME GEORGE SCHOLARIOS, AGAINST THE ADDITION WHICH THE LATINS ADDED TO THE SYMBOL OF FAITH.

^B Whence and how the Latins were moved to the addition in the Creed is a matter of a different inquiry to examine and observe; but how they added a dogma, not small and requiring no small investigation, to the Creed of faith, is what they added. For it is not small, whether the Word of God brings forward another divine hypostasis, as that they themselves bring forward from God a hypostasis and divine, or not; and on account of this, the entire devotion of Asia refrained from the communion of the Latins; not immediately, nor altogether, but after many letters and embassies, having attempted over many years to set things right, they grew weary and despaired of the cure. And yet, for other reasons too, our Fathers had previously accused them, such as is also the innovation concerning unleavened bread. But as a final point, and that for which they were no longer tolerable in their innovations, the addition made in the Creed compelled the separation more justly.

^C Three such evils seemed to the patriarchs in Asia to be present in the Latins, having made the addition: that they were adding to the Creed of faith a matter kept by four ecumenical synods after the third, and [in accordance with] the definitions of that [third] synod; and that they alone dared this; and that they were adding an opinion that was not at all known. Up to this point, therefore, is the fault of the Latins. And the innovators are responsible for the cause of the schism without the greater part of the Church, not those who were unwilling to join in the innovation and join in the danger. And that the Latins themselves at that time were conscious of having done wrong to themselves is a clear proof that they immediately ordained phantoms of four patriarchs, while others held the true Thrones, flourishing in power and in the abundance of wisdom and all other good things. For if the one of Rome could innovate alone, what was the need for the patriarchal phantoms? And if he alone is able to convene an ecumenical synod, and to define matters concerning faith, what was the need for this fabrication? And if, despairing of the cooperation and communion of the true patriarchs, he creates patriarchs, as if he would not otherwise have ecumenical power, then he was indeed making the addition basely, performing it ecumenically. For if he had first ^D fashioned them and then added, he might have had an ecumenical form for the addition; but now, after the addition and the division, by ordaining patriarchs, if he does not do this in vain, he is condemned by the fact that the addition was made unjustly. And let everyone who has sense consider how much the very fact of ordaining patriarchs is proof of contentiousness. For where was it permitted for the high priest of Rome to ordain patriarchs? Nowhere, surely, nor would it be reasonable for him to do what is not permitted, even if the other patriarchs do not agree with him, whether justly or basely. For he would sooner have been ecumenical patriarch, if it happened that all the others were holding wrong opinions, as he himself says, if he alone were pastoring the orthodox, and alone were patriarch among them, or if he held the fabricated ones as numbered among them; for in some other way the one who wishes to fabricate things that do not exist will sin and will fall away from the truth.

But in response to the contentiousness or thoughtlessness of the Pope, the patriarchs of the East, and the Emperor with them, displayed truth and magnanimity at least in this part. For being able to fabricate them much more easily and justly than he did the four, they neither did this, nor were they convening a synod without him, by which they would have been casting votes against his views, although they were entirely able to do so; but rather they sought to examine the addition by common consent, with leisure having been granted to it beforehand, as was fitting and just. But the others, as long as they knew the catholic Church to be strong in wisdom and all other things, did not dare the judgment; but when they saw us having almost cast everything away, and ourselves having grown in all things, and thinking we would hold heaven in our hand whenever we wished, then they desired to confirm the addition by means of a mask of a tribunal and ecumenical words, so that they might cease being bitterly reproved by their own consciences. For neither did they wish to remove the addition—if we were able to disparage it—nor did they ever think that we would be able to fight bravely for our own opinion, but they wished only to remove the disgrace of that innovation being held up to them by all, and because of this they wanted to both with our concessions and...

^A treat the innovation as certain, and consider that this, like the Nestorian [tenet]—unless one were also to call fire cold—would remain blameless for the future for them and the others.

Thus it was that they brought about the council at Lyons. And it remained for our ambassadors who arrived there to give way entirely to justice. For the Emperor, having deceived the Church, as though he would bring about union through them—Michael, the first of the emperors of the Palaiologoi to follow—having chosen these ambassadors, knowing the depth of his intent, they returned having suggested the manifest Latinization and concession of all things which the Latins thought worthy, in place of the intended economy, being both favored by the one who had sent them, and strengthened by the honors and gifts [received] from there. But the Emperor—for it is necessary to add this too—dreading the reprisals of the Latins, for he feared they might be resentful because the city had been stripped of the betrayal of the truth at that time, wished to secure his own [throne] and his children’s from the beginning. Wherefore, with a more divine zeal, for the Church having been united after his death, the act at Lyons was rightly overturned by a great and brilliant council, whose vote, remaining, would refute those who did not wish to be of sound mind even after that, and the ancestral dogmas were again proclaimed, until the need for assistance, and the dread of the enemies—not to say the abandonment of divine help—pressed us; and for Eugenius, the hope of his return to the throne, and the [hope] of dissolving the council that had been organized against him in the city of Basel and was devising all things against him, drove them toward the Italian council.

The matters concerning that council, how it began, through what means, and where it ended, are clear to those with good consciences, and to those wishing to examine each thing, not, in truth, by long speeches, but by books of many lines; but in brief we rely on our defense before God concerning our not wishing to be united with the Latins now. We know who were the causes of that schism from the beginning, not our ancestors, and for this reason we wish to abide with those who were ^B wronged and treated anti-canonically, not with those who did the wrong. We know that even now the Latins are the causes of the schism. For why do they not take away the addition, whenever it was made, so that they might be able to bind the Church together? And if the Pope alone was able to add, why will he not be able to take it away together with everyone else? And if he made the addition, with necessity pressing, as they say, why does he not now take away what has been added, that necessity having ceased, and another, and greater one, compelling [it]?

That they are also lying about the necessity of which they speak, it would require another occasion to demonstrate; for they were adding it against the Orthodox, against those who were speaking against them, the innovators—but are we, who honor and cherish the common traditions, they? They say [we] have become Nestorians, and others [say] Arians, calumniating us and them. For where is it that one who is called an Arian might be believed? Even against us and those of like mind with us at that time, having made the addition among themselves, they accuse a certain necessity of having pressed them to commit such impudence against us, and they seem to be saying something to the foolish. But this, as has been said, would be a matter of greater discourse, to observe accurately and to demonstrate; for if the Pope of the Latins reveres the races and does not wish to cause scandal, lest they say that those who died with the addition perhaps believed wrongly, and thus are in a state of perdition—why shall we not rather fear God, and respect our ancestors, instead of casting such blame upon the innocent, so that they seem to have perished for so many years fighting against a true addition, and having died in a most grievous heresy concerning the article of the Spirit? And if length of time has established that innovation, why ought not the length of time much more confirm for us the praiseworthy resistance before God? But if it is true, as they say, that it is an "explication" and not an "addition"—"from the Son"—they will not, of course, make an omission from the creed, but even if that word were removed, the creed would remain intact again, and in no way wronged, or [else] they want to deceive us by saying it happens to be an explication and not an addition. If they have no strength even to remove an "explication" for the sake of peace, as they themselves might say, how shall we ourselves dare to make an addition to the faith, as we ourselves say and are convinced that it is an addition of theirs? ^C If anyone were to think that that synodical definition remains and is believed by us, it would have to be believed, of course, until nothing were composed among us that would nullify it, and that we, in being united to the Latins on such terms, could do something else than to confess the addition in the creed while remaining silent; and if anyone were to think that those who communicate in any way with those who have made the additions [are exempt] from the accusation of not communicating in the guilt, he is simply naive. And if anyone were to say that the reference of the names in divine [matters] is not a perfect union and communion, or a proof of the harmony of the dogmas—unless it were to be practiced for the benefit of the truth, and with the proclamation of the orthodox dogmas pre-established, as seems best to Eulogius and Cyril—this man seems to attend to the laws of a different religion, or is introducing a newer Christianity.

If they say that the Latins also praise our faith—the one that leads astray many of those who hear our own [people]—they say that our faith is the one proceeding ^D from the Father, which we confess at every [liturgy] in the Creed of Faith, it is therefore clear that they believe this, and to such an extent that they even add "and from the Son." But we, explicating it, as they themselves say they explicate it, we say and believe [it] and not "from the Son," as they themselves say "and from the Son," differing to such an extent, that they indeed explicate within the creed and say...

^A that they have attributed to those places the teaching of the first council, in which it is clearly manifest that the Holy Spirit has His existence from the Father alone; [and] the explication of the second council, when the matter concerning the Spirit was sought out, was both opportunely and most adequately defined, as much regarding the essence of the Spirit, as regarding the cause from which He is, [and] the confirmations of the truth by the other councils, and the clear decisions of all our teachers, and in addition to these, arguments sufficient and noble, taken from the foundational principles of the faith. It is not right, therefore, to abandon all these and accept an opinion which has strength neither from the canonical scriptures, nor from the antiquity of time, nor from the teachers among us whose books we possess, and whose language we understand, nor witnessed by arguments—unless one uses sophistry—and not proceeding from common principles, but from certain ones whose origin we do not know.

But they say that the blessed Augustine says this. But we believe in the Church, which the canonical scriptures ^B constitute, and the common councils of the faithful represent as the Church of Christ—[we believe] not in Augustine, not in Damascene, and we would not have heeded Damascene himself in this matter, if he did not hold the common opinion, just as he is held in all other things. But would God be a just judge of us, [if we were to be punished for] not wishing to abandon the common and confessed faith and to be added to the judgment of one of the teachers, without [cause]? And if we are to be punished for this truly, because we do not heed Gregory of Nyssa, who dogmatized [at the] end of punishment—he being a man of authority—and this [even though he is] witnessed by councils; and we shall suffer penalties again because we do not reject the councils and the Scriptures, but [because] we do not heed Dionysius of Alexandria, the martyr, and Gregory of Neocaesarea, the great wonderworker and teacher of the faith, who happen to sound in their own writings certain heretical dogmas under the necessity of the arguments, as the great Basil accuses them?

And the blessed Augustine himself clearly hands down to us such a rule, ^C and commands us to use his writings and those of each of the other teachers in this way. Nor would we appear heavy ^D to Augustine himself in the choir of the saints in that life, if we keep the rule he gave us; and we shall show that these things are so, not only to those among us who are in doubt, but also to the Latins themselves and to all men, even though we are convinced that Augustine himself is in harmony with our teachers. The things which the Latins copy out from his utterances and show, they themselves also copy—as they say—and interpret as it suits them, and they explain them as they wish. What then will be our defense before God, if we reject the common and customary things, [claiming] that a certain Latin offers to us the utterances of the blessed...

^A Augustine to one who presents them, [and] to believe without examination? If he wishes that he himself and the Latin possess the book, and not we, and that he himself expounds upon it and evaluates the interpretation, while the facts themselves do not all support him, but are indeed in opposition, let everyone who wishes to judge rightly consider the argument.

Therefore, if we all truly wished to lay the foundations for union with the Latins, what argument would have exempted us from seeming to be matricides and worthless guardians to those after us, and to those who now pay heed to us, regarding the faith passed on to us? Seeing that if even some mortal man had mismanaged property, we would have been liable to the laws concerning these matters, and to the judgment of sensible people. Furthermore, if such questions were only now beginning to be raised, it would have been well for us to ^B examine what seems best to the ancient teachers concerning these matters; but now, with the schism having existed for nearly five hundred years, the Fathers and teachers of our own times of so many years have thoroughly examined these things, whose judgments are testified to by their deeds, and whose blood many have poured out in defense of the Latin [error in original text implication: likely correction "Orthodox" or "our" position, but following text]—no, rather, in defense of the *doctrine*, for countless books, writings, and teachings demonstrate this. Therefore, it is not for us to become expositors of the ancient teachers, but rather to be good students and grateful children of our own Fathers, who correctly understood the dogmas of the more ancient ones. For if the wisdom and virtue of us who are now present were altogether equal to that of our Fathers... in time, it would be a bold thing even so to interpret the Scriptures otherwise, and the more ancient Fathers—I mean those before ^C the schism—than as our Fathers after the schism interpret them, they themselves not being the cause of the schism; for the addition of time, while manifesting many teachers, would also reveal their virtue and wisdom as greater, in proportion as those who are ten times more numerous are of greater worth, since time also possesses a certain power to discover what is best. For if we see those who have deliberated often about the same things finding what is necessary better than those who have deliberated only once, how much more is it possible to extend that discovery over a longer period? But now, as many generations have passed by since the schism of the Latins up to the present, and in each one there have arisen myriads of virtuous and wise men in our own great race, which then possessed great power and zeal for what is good, we who are now present—even daring to judge these matters, being forced to do so—are not even a tiny fraction in power and number compared to those in this very last preceding generation, whom we have seen and with whom we have conversed. How then would it not be of the ^D utmost arrogance and folly, in discovery and judgment, to contend against so much time, and for us to attempt to judge anything contrary to those things in which we have been reared, which have been judged in such a time by so many Fathers? And if we were to wish, having such meager knowledge about all things, to take these matters into our own hands, how would they not consider us, the sons of our Church, to be babblers and matricides? And how would all the generations not condemn us at the coming judgment, for remaining in error, and for shaking those who are of the truth, as some wish and are compelling? But we do not base our position on the separate judgment of each one of our Fathers, but also on that which they made when they had gathered together many times. We pass over the eighth ecumenical council in the time of Photius, which confirmed the seventh according to the custom of ecumenical councils, and restored the blessed Photius himself, and condemned every addition, whether in mind or in word, and condemned those then who would some day dare to make [such an addition] to the Creed, with the legates of the Pope present—of which council some canons exist in the books of the sacred canons, cherished by the entire Church of the Orthodox. We pass over the things spoken and done in the time of the Comneni, and in the time of Laskaris and Germanus, when the Latins once held this city. But in the time of the second Andronikos of the Palaiologoi, an ecumenical council was assembled against the innovation which the Father [the Pope] contrived, and strove to establish in many ways, but could not, God having manifested the truth through many signs and deeds. That council, therefore, assembled by a sufficient number of Fathers, what stone-like soul would it not move to refrain from the union that has recently occurred among some? What godly reasoning, knowing how to preserve the institutions of the Fathers, will allow one to pay heed to those who gathered at Florence?

If someone should claim that that council was particular: if this person is from the Latins, he will be caught by his own wings. For how do the Latins deem and call the councils that occurred among them after the schism—those in Toledo, and Lyon, and other cities—to be ecumenical, being superior in number? And even though the four patriarchs were not present, nor concurring with the Pope, would he say that because we were cut off, the remaining part of the Church was ecumenical and catholic? For the omission of schismatics does not remove the ecumenical nature. Therefore, well then, since the ones who are missing, namely the Latins, are indeed schismatics, the title of 'ecumenical' is not earned for this very same reason. It is more just for us to judge these things according to the things said from the beginning. But if the Pope, holding the icons of the patriarchs, snatches the title of 'ecumenical,' why do we not deem and name our councils ecumenical, in which the truth of the patriarchs was present in all things? But if it is one of our own who says these things, he is caught as being much worse than the Latins, depriving the mother herself of those things which they attribute to themselves; although the Latins generally claim what is good, they do not apply the saying to themselves in a good way. For only those who think rightly concerning all these things are the Church of Christ, even if those who hold these views are however many...

^A in bearing witness; are we not to read those things in the crossroads and in the marketplaces, if we were intending through them to strangle the men, and to put them to shame as ones who have transgressed, and thus to conquer, and to have the entire multitude of the Latins as allies? But we granted to them to present nothing of those things in public, and with the multitude being excluded, it was read in vain ^B before a few of them, these causes of the terrible things, under their breath. Just as if someone were to grant to enemies seeking it, after casting away the strength of their weapons, the opportunity to give them their bare body to the blows, so also we were given as ready food to the bishops of the Latins, by having kept silent when they requested the excommunications of the councils. But not even thus did they obtain the victory; on the contrary, rather, the one of blessed memory of Ephesus struggled valiantly and well, and all the things Sophistically embellished by them were refuted. And everyone of the council thought this to be so.

How then, with reason and lawfully, do they vote for the addition to have taken place? Or rather, would they not have voted this way, having already added it, and now being masters of the vote? For with them having agreed to the vote as it pleased them, our champions were summoned to the signatures, persuaded by unspeakable stratagems. And whoever might find the Son of God to be the cause and origin of the Spirit, and all the other things that are added there; where in Scripture or in the teachers have these things been found written? For it was not necessary to decree such things out of hand, or rather, as they say, according to the Greeks, for the Son of God to be the cause of the Spirit. If, therefore, they wish to cite the teachers of the Greeks, let them show them to them, and they will immediately have us persuaded; but if any of the Greeks now existing, whether present at the council, or even after these things, dogmatize these things out of their own selves, the foundation of this theology is unworthy of an ecumenical council.

Where and when does an examination concerning these things even appear to have happened in the council of Florence? Or rather, the decree of the pope? For he himself is the one legislating, not the council, he who even before, alone, was making the addition. Where does it agree with the Acts of the council? How is it gathered from those contests, either those earlier in Ferrara, or those that happened afterwards in Florence, unless they also altered those records as seemed good to them, as if ^D to escape blame? And the vote itself, when did they come together synodically to cast it? But rather, having conspired in a corner, they persuaded each one separately to sign, as has been said, by ways which it is not decent to mention, with our own people acting as ministers to the drama. For if one is to speak the truth, the whole of the terrible deed was being perpetrated among ourselves, and for the Latins, the necessity of the circumstances and the confusion of our own champions sufficed; and some to endure the "cap of Hades," not so much from a lack of words as from fear of appearing to be the causes of the schism of the majority who had been handed down, and others to surrender everything to the Latins at once, having not even suspected what was to come, but having hoped

^A that even if they should add something else to the universal faith alongside the Latins, everyone would accept it without examination. For the hopes of requital did not allow them to examine their duty from every side, things for which, even if acting in good faith, they wrapped the form of an Ecumenical Council around their vote, and made it appear unworthy. For what Ecumenical vote begins in such a way, and ends in such a way? Which of the Ecumenical decisions does not put forward the Creed of faith, or does not confirm the council that preceded it? But this one now under consideration, which of the councils did it confirm? The seventh? And now, does it vote in the same way as that one? Quite the contrary, in every respect. But I shall leave that for now; is it not confirming that one, but rather the truly eighth, the one under Photius, which is ecumenical? And yet, it has legislated the exact opposite of that one. But I shall leave that for now; does it therefore confirm the one at Lyons, the Latin one? ^B Indeed, it was the great and true council led against Beccus that invalidated it, which a pious judgment showed to be ecumenical, and will be able to show much more clearly as necessity demands. But if one were to read clearly the vote of the council itself, he would know what kind of form those who were about to judge on matters of faith took upon themselves from it, and to whom they pass on the form, in order that those choosing might pay attention to them; but let us leave this aside too. What conciliar definition has a certain pope or patriarch defining the faith, as this one does, and not the whole council? But let one consider how great is the difference between the council at Florence and the one which took place in Constantinople against Beccus. That one perfectly agrees in faith with the Ecumenical Councils, both with the others and with the eighth. This one disagrees with all of them, and with that one as well. Present at that one was the Pope of Alexandria, and the other patriarchs, and they were in agreement, and welcomed the vote as having happened piously and lawfully. But at this one, there were representatives of the patriarchs, but they were bound by their letters and oaths, either affirming that they would allow a union only upon the ancient terms, while holding fast to the Latin addition, or allowing nothing to be conceded. ^C And having done what seemed good to themselves, not what pleased those who had sent them, the patriarchs remained in that former judgment of theirs, and to their good deputies they rendered the rewards worthy of the ancestral dogma, and they never cease paying them even until now.

All remained in the votes of that council in Constantinople, both those who had themselves delivered the vote and all those who followed; but the vote of the council at Florence, those who had made it invalidated it; for except for three or four, who even now remain stubborn or seem to be so, all have long ago repented and have immediately returned to the ancestral belief; or rather, in their opinions and souls they never departed from it, but yielded to the time—having suffered this, not without forgiveness once for all, to whom we owed grace as well. For if, ashamed that they seemed to have changed their minds, they allowed the involuntary departure from the ^D truth to be hidden and unexamined until the end, and to bring about against the ancestral glory—even if the affairs of that assembly seemed to proceed according to the laws, and except for those who knew it, and those who were aware, the nature of what had happened remained hidden. And if indeed, being honored and procuring wealth for themselves, they had done away with those things that had been done, there would have been no little suspicion of that change; but now, being dishonored and suffering evils, they flee from the things permitted to them as evils, preferring this rather than by the silence of truth to harm themselves and corrupt others as well. Perhaps it is not right to consider the whole matter merely by the virtue of these men. On the contrary, the whole matter belongs to the good providence of God, not deeming us worthy to have been torn away from the truth and from the choir of the Fathers, and for this reason, having moved these men toward this. Yet, there is something of praise for these men because of their inclination of the will toward better things. But if one says that they departed from the union as if in ignorance, then, as having been done under absolutely nothing known, one ought not to pay attention to those treaties, and all who pay attention to them necessarily wander, following the vote of those who knew nothing. For they themselves were the ones who had done all those things, or who else in those votes declared the Son of God to be the cause of the Spirit? For we will not call the Latins a council without these, our own men; for they, even before the council at Florence, were praising their own addition, and were pelting those who criticized it with countless taunts.

But not even those three or four, who are the cause of all and who even now persist in the votes, should be considered a council together with the Latins. For these also acted in everything against the opinion of the patriarchs, whose representatives they were. And no law allows one to pay attention to them in this regard, even if in other things they are noble and worthy of much respect, but on these matters, it suffices to be silent. And the majority even call that council the eighth. It should have been justly called the first; for it is another beginning of councils and of those that were perhaps to happen for harm, and it is cut off from that serial number. And as it seems, because the appellation of "Ecumenical" does not fittingly belong to it, they did not even properly discover how to count and call it. For how is it the eighth, and the one after the eighth? And how is the one that is hostile to the eighth the ninth? They did not call it the ninth, nor is it reasonably one; they call it the eighth, indeed, but it is not such. But enough of this, too. And we see no necessity, regarding the things which some have done poorly, and regarding which regret has possessed them, that we should cherish them, and they themselves should act prudently by repenting of those things, while we should not even be instructed by their repentance, having the true opinion regarding the things they have done, and of which those who have done them are themselves the heralds. For not even in human and temporary affairs should one have sought after what is expedient in such a way, let alone in divine matters, where we would appear to be pious by using such a calculation. But not even those who have perpetrated the terrible

deeds are we subjected to the votes of the Church, ^A and having received a standing, let it judge, and let it not deem us worthy of the humanity established by the canons. For the freedom of the Church, which we have preserved, will suffice for our happiness and the hope of God's forgiveness regarding our transgression. But those who did not participate in those works, we ourselves at least keep hold of the ancestral glory unalterably, having been brought to our senses by the example of others. For it is not because many councils brought forth an incorrect vote concerning the matters inquired into in them, that there was any necessity for those who voted to be always led astray and never to return to the truth, or for others to bear ill-will toward those returning, because they do not wish a fall to lie forever, and for themselves and others ruinous—those themselves returned to the truth rejoicing, and made others rejoice at the change of the deceived, and to benefit greatly. And as this often occurring and being able to occur, the Church established laws concerning those who might suffer such things and has kept them in practice. And of these, the histories are full, and the words of the teachers, and before all, the great Gregory, praising the great Athanasius, recounts many such things.

The council, then, forces no necessity upon us to be united with the Latins. In this way, of those proceeding according to it, the name is almost only for the simpler ones, ^B only throwing fear into them when it is brandished, but it is not able to terrify any of those who possess a sound understanding. For how many gatherings of men will be able to convince those who have intellect that fire is not hot? Or how many synods of believers will be able to convince those who know how to pay proper attention, either that the Father descended upon the Son of God, the Spirit having descended upon Him like a dove; or that the breath breathed upon the apostles had the nature of the Spirit hypostatically joined to it; or that He instilled two souls into the disciples, the divine breath having been accustomed to do this from afar; or anything of the sort? Although it is likely that strong arguments can be found regarding these, and some be persuaded by them. But of those who have intellect, no one, having abandoned the evangelical teaching, and the super-natural doctrines taught, and having rejected the words of Christ, and the purpose proper to these, would divert the greed of human arguments toward other things, persuaded by what seem to be plausible logical consequences. But if in those councils there is not enough evidence of the truth even from other matters, who will confidently pay heed to them? Such was also the case of this council both ways; for it legislated from its own authority, and it is clearly confounded to all the others.

^C Although, even if the question had been moved recently, there would not have been as much need to be confident because of ignorance, as there was to be cautious because of this very thing and to guard against deception. But one ought, upon the faith common to us and the Latins—which stands securely—to wish to cast the danger from this error and schism, and the doubt from the innovation, onto those responsible, and not desire to share in a glory which we are no longer able to judge, our ability to judge in such matters having left us. With such guidance pre-existing for us from the Fathers, what excuse shall we have, having entrusted the judgment of so great a matter to our own limited learning, so as to judge something else regarding it than what seemed right to all our ancestors and teachers?

^D But if we are to be persuaded by those who are wiser than us in every matter, having rejected the reference to those at once more familiar and wiser; look also to being transferred to the opinion of the Armenians, or if you wish, also that of the Persians. For the Church of the Armenians, as we know precisely, possesses more than seventy teachers, having practiced Aristotelian philosophy so well that none of them lacks anything that those among the Latins know very well in these matters. And among the Persians there are more than these, who have occupied themselves with physical and mathematical wisdom under the logical methods very well. It will be necessary, then, to transfer to those who are wiser than us, if it should happen to some of them to discuss with us, and to yield to the knots of their arguments. This is a necessity to suffer, should this happen, and no one who has an intellect and knows how to believe would say this. Just as, therefore, with regard to those pious beliefs, being content with the judgment of the Fathers, whom we have known to be most wise—

and who have stood ^A with such nobility, why should we not maintain the same approach regarding every other difference, whether greater or lesser? Concerning this, we know that our Fathers and teachers, after much investigation, judged the realities and formed an opinion regarding the Latins—which they once held and were anxious to leave to us in their writings—so that we might be in agreement with them and not sing any note discordant with their faith. But are we not even more obliged to be grateful to those who established these ramparts for us, by which we are protected, rather than to those who imposed the battlements of piety and intended to subject to punishment those who would wish to exceed them? For the former did everything for the sake of the freedom of their descendants; and the latter, seeing how great the error and deception existing in the words of men was, were anxious to deliver us in an uncorrupted state from them. Therefore, just as we would be the most senseless of all to tear down these walls which give us security and freedom, so we would be all the more so to betray these spiritual walls, especially since the danger is greater, and the end—or rather, the transformation—of this world is near, as is clear from the facts. Even if it is not the entire world, our race, at least, and this fatherland are almost at their final gasp, unless the divine should reach out a hand. We do not wish, therefore, to be found as runaway cowards at the end, and more cowardly than our ancestors. It is necessary, indeed, to be, and to appear, more courageous, ^C even if they were to pray for us to have such examples set before us, and to preserve the faith in the same way in the face of much greater difficulties. And if anyone were to say that of two evils set before us, one must choose the lesser, since the difficulty of the situation is persuasive, and because of fear of unbelief, he expects one to deviate even slightly from the right faith—he who holds this is clearly indifferent to everything, for such is the judgment of such people. But we know that he who deviates even slightly from the right faith, the whole law desires that he be a heretic, as it is evident to those who have experience in these matters; and that while truth is one, both in the opinion concerning the Divine and in all things, it has come to be that the errors concerning each subject are numberless, separated from the truth by a certain degree and order. It is necessary, together with the truth, to enter into eternal life; for "the unclean," he says, "shall not pass through it," whether in mind or in will, if it holds on to filth and impurity. But if he who deviates even slightly from the right opinion is to attain eternal life, then he who comes immediately after him will, by the same logic, attain it, since there is an equal distance toward him who is judged to be with the filth of this [deviation], and he who comes after him likewise. And so those who are wandering in any error whatsoever will attain eternal life, all of them equally, despite differences in magnitude and smallness. But if this is impossible, then it is among the impossible things for one who voluntarily deviates even slightly from the truth to be saved. We, therefore, in the safest place...

^B If any of us should inquire, just as many are accustomed to do, whether we consider the Latins to be heretics, we say: It is not for us, in such poverty and weakness of affairs, to impose such designations on a Church that holds such power, and which does not deign to submit to our laws, just as neither do we to hers now; but it is sufficient for us to hold fast to our ancestral teachings and laws, and to dispute with none of the others. What they are, both God and the day that is to come know and will reveal, and whether it is even possible for them to stand with the truth having added [the addition] to the faith. But not even our own position will deserve blame before God, the Judge, as we obey so many just principles. But if it should come to pass that their opinion is far from the truth, as it is indeed suspected by us, how great is the danger to those who commune with us, the casting aside of the more truthful, common, and ancestral opinion, and this done without reason? For what reason has been discovered by the Latins of the present day? Has it persuaded some of our own to join them? But those ancient things, which are always being sung by the Latins, are what they themselves bring forth into the midst, and they claim to be persuaded by them. But these have been well refuted by our Fathers and teachers. First of all, then, as has been said, we believe that to have fallen away even slightly from the truth voluntarily is ^D the same thing; if the case for both is the same, there is a necessity of falling away from the true life. Next, God will take thought for the faith; for it is not our task to take thought for it, but it is for each of us to take care of his own salvation. And if we are expected to take care of the faith by our deeds so that it may be preserved for others, let anyone who wishes show us—and we are ready to face swords, precipices, and whatever else—and he will see our zeal, if only we can see clearly that by our bodily dangers this city will be delivered from the yoke of the enemies. Or have we ever hesitated when the guardians of this city have planned for its salvation, and are we not, even more than all others, found ready for the need? But to betray some part of the faith for the sake of having [this city], so that this city and, through it, the common faith might be saved—let him who wishes praise this. Rather, we pray that even those who now praise this may change their minds and adopt the correct opinion. But if these also remain in the same position, we, at least, will never hold such an opinion, nor will we wish to benefit the whole world, if that were possible, by ourselves clashing mortally with God and the truth, and bringing upon our souls eternal punishment. Furthermore, we see our entire city sharing in this opinion with us, except for a few full of impudence. For they say that they would endure anything rather than deny the ancestral opinion, and the fear of the enemy...

seems ^A to them to coincide with the faith. For if they were not able to observe what those who have understanding and know how to believe soundly ought to consider, at least they would not want to appear worse than all other men in this respect. For what nation has ever been enslaved, when it has to exchange its entire faith and religion at once, just to find aid from foreigners? Having condemned their own faith, they transferred to the true one, choosing this even with danger and slaughter, and giving up everything easily to obtain the truth. But rather, if one must speak the truth, who—in any kind [of situation]—when faced with such a problem, would not immediately succumb to fire and stones? Therefore, we very much fear lest this should become, from God, the cause of many troubles for us; and that the divinity, having become angry, might inflict upon us the punishment that those who were wise among those able to rectify these things should have inflicted. But the fact that those who speak boldly about these things are very few, while the greater part of the city is temperate and holds to the faith with reverence, and is ready to betray everything for it, this offers us good hopes again. But do we not also observe what sort of lasting and ever-present help from the Latins could come to us, if we were to appear worse than all nations in these matters, exchanging the eternal for the temporal? Let someone show us this clearly, and not speak of shadows and dreams. For to be persuaded wrongly might perhaps even happen to us once, with God abandoning us; but to be confident about the help hoped for from there, which even those who say these things believe, or pretend to believe, in order to deceive others—this would have been impossible for us, who know all their affairs well and calculate the help, how much it could be, sufficient for the fear that constantly presses upon us. ^B Wherefore, even if there were nothing else to fear, let no one undergo the terrible thing and miss the good—even if what is obtained ungodlily were to be good—which happens to all who do not the things of God with God. And observe the help which the Pope provided us after our bishops bowed the knee there, even if not from himself, but from those things that once belonged to us, which he ought to have returned immediately upon the dissolution of the schism, as he had hopes of doing, and even if he did not persuade the others to return to us the islands and the cities in Hellas, and he himself paid back the ecclesiastical revenues, having expelled the pastors sent by him. And yet it is clear that if he were doing nothing else, by doing just this he could have helped in the greatest way, by returning all the revenues of the churches of Corcyra, of Sicily, of Crete, and of the other islands which he had seized from us, just as others have done with the rule of the islands. But he did nothing of the sort, and he was very resentful that the city of Patras was taken back for us. And those in charge of the city, attempting to heal his anger, perhaps even granted things that were not proper, up until God handed over that city to the hands of the barbarians, and blunted his anger, and, as I believe, instilled [sense] into those who were healing their minds wrongly, so that one should rather fear and appease God than the threats of men, if they were to happen against all justice.

Therefore, the reasoning regarding the help we hope for from the Latins is foolish. ^C But if we are to be delivered from slavery, we must guard the faith which we have received, and appease the divinity with other works; we must use many prudent men as advisors regarding all matters, we must begin to govern common affairs with equality and justice and with every reason, we must enjoy what is necessary and just in each of these, and we must provide equally for common needs, and we must take care of those able to save us, remaining vigilant for the discovery and execution of these things. But before all things, a council must be formed, which will deliberate well with God about everything. With these things presupposed, we must negotiate peace with the Latins, and if it is possible, with all people and nations, not in such a way that we act unjustly with them, or join in breaking the law, or altogether shift toward the worse, but rather by drawing others toward the pious and just things that are with us, if they wish to be persuaded; and if they are unwilling, we must leave them to the judgment of God. And let us ourselves stand together with one another justly and well, bound by the laws of the Fathers, and let us not do to each other what the Latins once did. ^D For when we sought to lay aside the addition, they did not want to allow us to be judged, but having seized upon our weakness, they made themselves masters, as if by their own laws. But once we have become a body, under one head, Christ, in which up until yesterday we all worshipped in the same way, and—unless someone wishes to contend against the manifest facts—having departed from those things that did not occur well, all of us together, and having given such assurance to one another as is necessary to give it, openly and not in shadows, truly and not hypocritically—for this is how the members of the Church wish it—then indeed we shall also consider the just things regarding the Latins; and all together we shall undertake the defense before them, as befits Christians ending up under one mother. And everything good will thus come to us from God, both among ourselves and toward those outside; for it is sufficient to say just this much. But since someone might encounter us with the arguments of each, and [ask] how each thing might be arranged well with God, we are also ready to give account, both privately and openly, and to persuade with God all those who know how to calculate about all these things rightly and according to God.

These things we have often reported to the Emperor, and he, we know well, what he thought about what was done by him in Florence, and how he rejoiced at our answers, and how he neither compelled us, and wanted us to preserve the ancestral dogma well, and praised those who did this, and hated those who were otherwise disposed. We are witnesses of these things.

all, knowing everything from his voice and tongue. But fearing for the beginning—a harmless kind of fear, and not wishing to appear hateful to the Latins, while—alas!—sacrificing the safety of his soul by the abandonment of the wicked oaths, he could not endure to work out a manifest healing for his soul and to save many who were for the moment perishing under the pretext of the Emperor. Great thanks, therefore, are due to him, in that he did not overlook the conviction of his conscience, as many of the rulers do, but made this his priority over every necessity; although not as openly as was perhaps required, and as the laws of the Church command, yet in other ways he showed that he was distressed by what had been done and that he did not approve of anything good in them; we omit here other proofs of his repentance. ^A But wishing to heal that fall, at least moderately, for both himself and others who had subscribed themselves to those who had colluded in Florence, he gave us permission to meet frequently in the palace called that of Xylalas, and to provide an answer regarding the objection of the legate who was present and pressing with great necessity for the union. And when we had given him the answer maturely and deliberately, he ordered that that document, or the confession of faith, be subscribed; and having received it subscribed, he spoke nothing, nor did he say that, "I have perceived a great burden of my conscience cast off." For instead of those wicked subscriptions, I caused these holy men to subscribe to the dogma of the truth; and if I could not in any better or stronger way heal that wound of the soul, this way at least, being appropriate to the time, will, I think, be deemed sufficient by the divine philanthropy. He said everything, but wishing to benefit the Church no further, in that very pretext of Latinism he cast off both his rule and his life together. And he was justly deprived of the honors of the Church, of which he had not taken thought to any purpose; but whether there will be anything more for him from the divine philanthropy because of his gentleness toward us, and his inward repentances for the things wickedly innovated by him, God may know. ^B Thus, therefore, for us, from that time even until now, that document suffices for the overthrow of the things previously established, in agreement with the vote of that holy and catholic council, which was assembled after Beccos and deposed him canonically, so that God might grant some other manifestation of the truth for all. To Him be the glory unto the ages. Amen.

BY THE SAME GENNADIUS SCHOLARIUS AGAINST THE SIMONIACAL HERESY OR UNBELIEF

The disasters that have come upon us from these godless barbarians, and those which we fear for the future, with the hope that we might be able to bear them having vanished from every side, others try to attribute to one cause or another. And those who consider them to be more powerful than any such investigation do not look at the causes—for they do not think they can easily find them—but they grieve for the things of those who have despaired, nor do they hope for any shelter from their miseries, nor from God, except that they cry out to the divine in vain; for it was necessary to be angry at those who commit sin, and to see what they might do that is favorable, and having first discovered such things, only then to ask for help from that source. ^C But now it has not escaped their notice that they run to God in vain. Having often reflected on these things to myself—for it is not possible, given that I was in such an excess of disasters, to remain at peace in heart, and memory, and sight, and in the expectations that were gathering—I believe that I neither miss the sole cause of these things, nor do I deem their correction impossible. ^D I, therefore, have thought that the Simoniaca is an evil—the misfortune into which I have judged we have fallen—to be an impiety. For the other of our sins, some extending their harm to one's neighbor, others transgressing against nature, consequently make God our enemy, who justly oversees our brethren and our nature, as is fitting for a common Father and Guide of all. And what is even more of an incitement to provocation in these things is that, although laws have been laid down for us by Him concerning each of the worse and better actions—some promising with many exhortations the happiness which is our end, others threatening with the ultimate consequences those who do not deign to pay attention—we exchange these corrupt and fleeting things for the eternal and universal goods. It happens, therefore, by consequence, that we seem to neglect the Lawgiver, whose desire and fear it was fitting that we should have been more prudent regarding the choices of our own. But the stain of Simoniaca directly makes us fight against God. For as we were about to be pious, then concerning the petition for forgiveness for the things committed...

^A by those who so think is altogether lacking in reverence; for they exhibit their intent and action toward the one God. Therefore, it is more a matter of sin against religion than against doctrine. For it is the part of religion to tender to God the reverence owed Him, as to the one and only cause of all things. "For if I am," He says, "a Father, where is my honor?" And this is a principle of orthodox faith, to worship the one God reverently and orthodoxly. "One God, one faith," says Paul. But he who, in gain and action, unreverently degrades the dignity of spiritual things toward God, this is what it means to be sick with Simoniaca. But if religion is an active operation of faith, and such a man is wicked regarding this, what remains but to say he sins against faith itself, and is enclosed within the definitions of heretics and those who act with impiety? This, therefore, will be made clearer in what follows.

The matter of such wickedness becomes all things spiritual and holy, whose freedom is shamelessly betrayed by those who make marketable the things that have a nature transcending all gain and sale; for the former are of the earth, but wisdom, and the soul, and whatever spiritual good and perfect gift there is, descends from above. No one among men has mastery over spiritual things, so that there should be need of money to dispose of them as ^B of things of which we are lords. Those who sell these things no one calls to account to us, but they are only stewards in charge of the spiritual things; for thus says Paul: "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God." There is no small difference between ministry and dominion. Nor does it accord with the authority of spiritual graces to exchange them for money. Wherefore Augustine says that a grace not given freely is not even grace. And our Master says: "Freely ye have received, freely give." Thus it follows that as one has received freely, so one should give freely. But those who dare to sell holy and spiritual goods, and who measure the priceless matter—which no man can possess with piety—by earthly payments and subject it to their own authority, what are they doing but suffering from the impiety of Judas, or even, one might say, something worse and more insane? For [they do this] even after many laws have been laid down concerning these matters, and after such a manifest proof of the truth, and in times when accuracy is inexorably demanded. ^C Such a man is not only made equal to Judas, but to the disposition of Simon Magus, of which this God-hated passion is the fruit, and from whom those who are enslaved to this passion have their source and their name, being lovers of a good thing, but having become so through a distorted mind. For he did not hope [to attain it] through virtue and faith, but, being destitute of these, he wished to purchase the grace of heavenly things through earthly metals. The disciples of Christ would have been less [at fault] if they had consented to the mind of Simon in these things. But it was not so; for they saw those divine powers inherent in him through divine love. ^D

^A For this reason, the leader said, "Your silver perish with you, for you have thought that the gift of God may be obtained with money." For [he says this] primarily because here he condemned the very root of Simon’s wickedness, the silver, since the souls of those who give money for sacred things are miserably destroyed along with it. For they receive, in exchange for things that perish, temporal honors and benefits and all those things that are destroyed along with this life. And the punishment owed to them for their impiety toward God assigns them to the lot of those who are perishing. These are they who undergo the punishments in Hades, not being released from their substance, but suffering the loss of well-being and of true life.

Others, then, ^B make a pretext of their own goodness, as if they were rejoicing in the destruction of others, or mixing some mockery with the purity of the proclamation, and as if they were pretending to be dispensers of benefits and honors from men, which they knew could not be given in such a manner; or they think that by spending such wickedly collected money they will perform a better deed—but they will not, rather they will go toward God, but [only] at the end, and they will be abandoned by God. For this reason, then, they also withdrew as if from some precipice. Afterwards, wishing to show that it does not suffice to ask merely [for money], but [that one must act] with piety, he says, "There is no portion," not prophetically, so to speak, as if sensing the ineffable impieties. For this reason, those men and their successors were not negligent in standing more courageously against this heresy. For they knew that the enemy of the truth would raise up many [in the style of] Simon, who would fill Christian affairs with confusion. "If," he says, "a bishop, priest, or deacon should obtain this dignity by means of money, let him be deposed, both he and the one who ordained him, and let him be cut off and [excluded] from communion entirely, as Simon the Magus was by me, Peter." And again, "If any bishop, having used secular rulers, should through them obtain [a position in] the Church, let him be deposed and excommunicated, and all who communicate with him." But the things which have been decreed by all the synods directed by the canons of the apostles are difficult to enumerate. Some of these clearly subject [such people] to anathemas. "Let no one," he says, "who ordains [another] for money deceive the matter by not accepting [the money] beforehand or at the same time, but by accepting it afterwards." For to accept is for whatever reason to receive [it]; and this is avarice, and that is idolatry. Therefore, let not idols be preferred to Christ, nor imitate Judas, betraying for a fee the One who was once crucified for us. Since both the lands and the hands of those receiving these fruits will be called Akeldama, that is to say, the price of blood. The one presiding at the seventh synod, Tarasius, writing to Hadrian of Rome, calls those who give the high priesthood for money more impious than Macedonius and those around him, the Pneumatomachians, and places them in the same category as Judas the traitor.

^C Since the filth of wickedness is transferred from the givers to the receivers, it is reasonable that the receivers also perish along with them and are bound by eternal bonds after the price—which is the destruction of souls—just as those [the givers] destroy souls with money, not even gaining the sought-after favor, through having impiously hoped that they could receive it, and having cast away whatever [grace] might have been in them before. "For love," he says, "does not rejoice in iniquity," and in addition to this, they are miserably written in the lower torments and in the book of the perishing. And what is greater is that not [only] the giving and receiving, but even the mere desiring and being set in motion toward the buying or selling, receives the charge of Simony. This [charge] attaches to all sins of the heart, which have their substance merely by being conceived, just as it completes the form for those of the word and of the deed. For behold, Simon hopes to have accomplished the whole of wickedness by the hope of this impious trade, and he has sinned mortally; for this is what it means to be destroyed along with such money. For if it were possible to acquire the favor by giving gold, it would not have sufficed merely to desire it in order to form the wickedness, but it would have been necessary for the one who received the price and bestowed the favor to be present; but since it is impossible for [the favor] to be produced by money, neither with God, who is able to give nothing except gratuitously, because He has no need of anything that He might receive, or [as if] those who believe [in Him] could [buy] the holiest grace with the [filth] of sin, nor with a man who has received this grace from God [being able] to give it to any who wish to buy it—for it does not remain with him thenceforth, but after the consent ^D to the sale, it has departed having left him empty. Whence he would have no grace to impart, neither one that was his own. So even the mere desiring is a sin. "For," he says, "you did not acquire the gift, but because you thought..." then the silver is cursed along with the intent. The one who has followed [in this] is equally defiled. Therefore, the disciples of Christ did well, detesting both the silver and the intent. For even if they did not communicate and he did not receive the grace, they would still have seemed to participate in his doctrine and in the blasphemy against the Spirit, had they accepted the money. For those things that are taken gratuitously [are not for] the instruments of... and the freedom of the mind [is] little...

For my part, I especially place Simony as a form of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, according to the words of the wise, for this reason: that it is not forgiven either in this age or in the future. For those who attribute the works of the Spirit to the prince of demons did not endure [only] the blasphemy against the Spirit; nor did those who attributed the grace of the flight from Egypt to an idol instead of to God—whom God punished sufficiently here, three thousand falling on that day—but for the future He threatened them with a more precise punishment: "But in the day," he says, "of vengeance I shall visit the sin."

of their own; and yet they appear none the less impious and wicked to me regarding the Divine, those who believe the Spirit to be a thing of money. Thus, by the measure of the silver, the measure of the gift is also fulfilled. Wherefore, both here and there, they pay the uttermost penalties.

That it is difficult for this malady to be healed, or even to obtain forgiveness, is evident to one who wishes to consider it. For they perish in it, and neither do those who have taken the money surrender it, nor do those who have given it renounce it, but, being unholy and deceiving those who approach them under the weight of the canons—under the canon of justice—they drag them to the same precipice. And they commit sacrilege with things that were ill-gotten and wickedly spent, gathering them up again more wickedly and worse, increasing the eternal consequences for themselves and for those who share in this hatred. Would God, therefore, have neglected us, so long as He— ^A regarding those who violate the divine law, ^B cut through them with the swords of the sacred canons; the entirety of the remainder was temperate, and was righteous before God and the divine laws. And how could it have been otherwise? It would not have been overlooked. Nay, our rulers governed the greater part of the world; and the things of the Church were administered with great solemnity. But if it was not so, was it not then necessary for God to be the avenger of His own laws? For the scourges from the divine judgment on high are sufficient for pain and grief and tears for those who perceive the more terrible things; or He will visit our iniquities with a rod and with stripes. Whence, even as He foretold, so has He fulfilled in deed; thus He has visited us in haste and, as they say, even to the bones and the marrow, so that our race has become a paradigm of misery to the world, and a subject for those who look on from afar with all the venerable things within it and with tears.

BY THE SAME GENNADIUS SCHOLARIUS AGAINST THE FASTING OF THE LATINS ON SATURDAY. And concerning that IT IS NOT PERMISSABLE FOR THERE TO BE A PERFECT MYSTAGOGIA DURING THE FORTY DAYS, as the proof from the divine canons naturally demonstrates. AND FURTHER CONCERNING THE MARRIAGE OF PRIESTS.

The love towards one’s neighbor, as the Apostle says, teaches us to be patient; ^C since it also makes those who embrace it kind, not reckoning any evil, but rejoices with those who are likeminded in justice and truth. Therefore, no one ought to be puffed up or to be incited against the divine Scriptures, but ought to hold unshakably to those things which were rightly and justly established by the Apostles and the divine Father-theologians. The Church of the Greeks holds many things in a manner pleasing to God, as has already been said, and which are also written in your holy books, O Latin men, even if they are disorderly censured by some of those among you and decried as apocryphal. And in your Roman books, which the aforementioned cardinal was bringing to Constantinople, I myself, having often pored over them, found there, along with other things, the canons of the divine Apostles and Fathers, which you ^D label as apocryphal in the decrees recently issued; and as we have also learned these things. But they forbade fasting on the Sabbaths, except for the one and only; nor, indeed, to offer the divine bread during the holy Great Fast, except on Saturday and Sunday.

And first, that one ought not to fast on the Sabbath. Apostolic Canon: "If any cleric or layman be found fasting on the Lord’s Day, or the Sabbath, except for the one Sabbath, if he be a cleric, let him be deposed, if a layman, let him be excommunicated." That these canons belong to the Apostles, it is possible to learn both from the divine Fathers and from the holy ecumenical councils, as they conform appropriately to these, and whose dogmas concerning these matters we here set forth. And first, the divine Basil, in one of his discourses, the beginning of which is, “Exhort, O priests,” clearly shows that one must not fast on the Sabbaths, and he says: “Prepare yourself now, therefore, for the most solemn fast; do not destroy tomorrow’s temperance with today’s drunkenness. Evil is the deliberation, wicked the desire. Since a five-day fast has been proclaimed for us, let us not drown ourselves in drunkenness today. No one planning to be joined to a chaste woman by lawful marriage takes in concubines and harlots beforehand; for the law does not tolerate living together with those who are corrupted.” And the divine Chrysostom in the eleventh homily of the Hexaemeron

thus says: “To those who have received the course of the fast like stations, and inns, and shores, and roadsteads, and harbors, the Master has granted these two days of the week, the Saturday and the Sunday, to rest a little, so that even by relaxing the body slightly from the labors of the fast, and comforting the soul, they may, once these two days have passed, set out again with eagerness on the same path, those who are making this good and profitable journey.” And the divine Paulinus: “So that we may demonstrate these things from your own great men, hear what he says in the treatise of the great Ambrose, which he himself composed: ‘The most reverend Bishop Ambrose, full of every temperance, kept watch often, and labored, having worn out his body with the daily fast, except on Saturday and Sunday, and when it was the birthday of illustrious martyrs.’ And who is any other greater, decorated with fasting and temperance and every virtue, of those of today or of that time, than this divine man?”

The Council in the Trullo of the imperial palace, and especially blaming those who do this against the divine canons in canon 56, says: “Since we have learned that those in the city of the Romans, during the most holy fasts of the Lenten season, fast on the Saturdays thereof, contrary to the handed-down ecclesiastical order, it has seemed good to the holy Council that the canon shall be held firm and unshaken even in the Church of the Romans, which says: ‘If any cleric be found fasting on the holy Sunday, or on the Saturday except one.’ This is apostolic, having been confirmed by the Council.” ^A But that one should fast on Saturday—as it is a cessation of creation, but that one should only fast on that day, [by the will of] the Creator—is under [the authority]. That the aforementioned canon is of the apostles is clear both from the Sixth Council and from your own [witnesses] it is demonstrative. And who are these? Jerome, your wise man, and the divine Augustine, who did not prefer to fast on Saturday, but on Wednesday and Friday, according to the apostolic tradition. And of the divine Jerome he says: “Wednesday and Friday, then, ought not to be broken by fasting without great necessity, because on the former Judas conspired in the betrayal of the Lord, and on Friday the Lord was crucified.” And Augustine: “We hold what has been handed down,” he says, “from the Fathers, that we should abstain from the eating of meat on Wednesday and Friday. Because on the fourth day Judas sold the Lord, and on the same day received the price from the Jews. And on Friday the Jews placed the Lord upon the cross.” ^B But also blessed Benedict, in the rules of his monastic life, and especially in the 41st canon, expressly says: “They shall fast on Wednesday and Friday until the ninth hour; but on the other days, let the brethren dine at the sixth hour.” See that they agree with the canons of the apostles, and we have received that we should fast on no Saturday except for the two days [Wednesday and Friday] they mention. Who then is he who has appeared superior to the apostles, superior to the common Fathers, that he has dogmatized that you should fast on Saturday? But enough on this point.

Concerning the necessity not to celebrate the liturgy daily during Lent.

Where did you receive [permission] to perform the perfect Sacrifice on the holy days of the fast every day, except on Saturday and Sunday? Latin: Is it not good? And especially in the holy Lenten season, when we are even more penitent? Greek: Not entirely is everything good, good. For what is more precious than the all-holy body of Christ? But to receive the communion of the Eucharist every day, your Augustine says, I neither praise nor blame. For I do not praise him who celebrates the divine things simply and contrary to the canon. For the days of the holy ^C Lent are days of mourning and compunction and the mortification of our bodies, so that by becoming conformed to the likeness of the death of Christ, we shall also be of his resurrection, not of the joyful Paschal [resurrection] which is celebrated perfectly in the Divine Liturgy. But if you also wish to partake of the Eucharist every day, it is permitted to you to use the Pre-Sanctified [Liturgy] during the forty-day period, just as you do on the holy and great Friday, and not to act against the councils, which forbid this. For the Fathers of the Council of Laodicea, in canon 49/51, state that one should not celebrate the birthday [commemoration] of martyrs during Lent, but should make a commemoration of the holy martyrs on the Saturdays and Sundays; and again, that one should not offer bread during the forty days, except on Saturday.

And so, we, having received this, celebrate the Liturgy on Saturday and on Sunday at the third hour of the day, when the Holy Spirit descended upon the divine apostles; and therefore, by bringing [the offerings] forward during these, we sanctify the gifts, from which we have sufficiently for the whole week; and having completed in God all the hymnody at the conclusion of the evening service, having said the prayers set down by the great Basil, we elevate the Holy Things, saying: "The pre-sanctified Holy Things for the holy." And thus the order of the divine sacred rites is performed, with the apostolic constitutions and the sacred canons of the holy councils being preserved, offering nothing that is discordant with the Church.

Concerning the marriage of priests

^B Yet it is no wonder if you deviate from the orthodox dogmas of the Church and attempt to place upon the neck of this good fulfillment a yoke, that of transgression, which neither your Fathers nor ours—to whom the heart-knowing God bore witness by giving them the Holy Spirit—could bear; such is the act of depriving those of the priestly register of honored marriage and the undefiled bed, ^C which the blessed Paul and all the divine apostles legislated, and the divine Fathers in the councils confirmed. From which, and those things which you have added, and others which you remove, you do not fear the penalty of those men.

We do not know wherefore you tolerate doing this. For while the third canon of the council in Nicaea forbids one who is in the priesthood from having a "subintroducta" woman, saying that no one should have one, unless it be a mother or a sister, or such persons concerning whom every suspicion is escaped—and these things you accept as occurring illegally, but those things which were justly legislated are reckoned by you as abominable. And hear what these things are. The divine apostles, they say, in their 5th canon: "Let not a bishop, or presbyter, or deacon cast off his own wife under the pretext of piety; but if he does cast her off, let him be excommunicated; and if he persists, let him be deposed." And what manner of person the wife of the ordained ought to be, the same men again decree in their 18th canon, saying: "He who has taken a widow, or one cast off, or a harlot, or a servant, or an actress, cannot be a bishop, or presbyter, or deacon, or in any way of the priestly register." And Urban, the bishop of Rome, writing to Bido, the bishop of Tullia, says thus: "Those who are digamists, or men who have taken widows, we remove from the sacred ranks by the authority of our office, according to the common custom of the Church." ^D But also the divine Apostle, writing to Timothy, says: "A bishop therefore must be blameless, the husband of one wife." And again: "Let the deacons be husbands of one wife, ruling their children and their own houses well." And to Titus again: "For this cause, he says, I left thee in Crete, that thou shouldst set in order the things that are wanting, and ordain elders in every city, as I had appointed thee: if any be blameless, the husband of one wife, having faithful children."

But perhaps you will say that the apostles are speaking of the Church. But it is not so; for if not, they would not have said, "If any man casts away his own wife under the pretext of piety"—that is, his spouse. But what will you say regarding the sixth council, which says: "Thus we have determined that it is handed down in the Roman Church in the order of the canon, that those who are about to be deemed worthy of ordination as deacons or presbyters of the Church, confess that they are no longer joined to their own wives? We, following the ancient canon of apostolic accuracy and order, desire that the marriages of priestly men according to law remain in force from now on, in no way dissolving their union with their spouses, or depriving them of the association with each other at the proper time." And after a little: "If therefore anyone dares, moving against the apostolic canons, to deprive any of the ordained presbyters, we say, or deacons, of the union and communion with his lawful wife, let him be deposed. Likewise even if any presbyter or deacon cast off his own wife under the pretext of piety, let him be excommunicated, and if he persists, let him be deposed."

What do you say to these things? How do you dare to tamper with the boundaries of the Fathers, fearing nothing of the danger of the penalty? But also the council in Gangra: "If any one distinguishes," it says, "against a married presbyter, as if it were not right for him to perform the liturgy, so as not to partake of the offering, let him be anathema." And St. Augustine again: "We command," he says, "that no one make illegal ordinations, neither of a digamist, nor of one who has betrothed one who is not a virgin, nor of an illiterate man."

Do you not know also this, that many of those who have shone in the throne of Rome had their origin from the marriages of priests? For Felix, the most holy pope, being by birth a Roman, was from the father Felix, a priest. Agapetus, by birth a Roman, had the source [of his life] from his father Gordianus, a presbyter. Gelasius again, by birth an African, was born from his father Valerius, a bishop. As very many others have been found, who, being born from a priest, shone in the apostolic throne. Look, therefore, to what you ought, Latins, and hold fast to the justice. Let the ancient customs prevail, as the councils have ordained and dogmatized. See lest the utterance of Paul, which he writes to Timothy, be fulfilled in you; and especially the Holy Spirit saying thus, that "in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to spirits of error."

and teachings of demons, in hypocrisy of liars whose own conscience is seared, forbidding to marry, and so forth. Let us therefore abide by the words of the faith and the good teaching of the apostles, which we have followed from the beginning, both we and our Fathers in the councils. For their word is faithful and worthy of all acceptance. ^A For we are obligated to labor for this and to carry out their dogmas, subtracting nothing of what they have decreed; for this is the decree of the Fathers who were gathered at Nicaea, the second, over which Adrian of Rome also presided through the priest Peter and the hegumen of Saint Sabas, in which, in their first canon, they say thus: "We embrace with joy the divine canons both of the holy apostles and of the ecumenical and local councils, and also those of our holy Fathers, as being inspired by one and the same holy Spirit; and those whom they anathematized, we anathematize." And after a little: "Adding or subtracting nothing of what was set forth and defined by the holy apostles and the God-bearing Fathers." ^B

On beards. From the first book of the Apostolic Constitutions, chapter 3, which forbids it: "It is not fitting," it says, "for the faithful to destroy the hair of a beard, and to alter the form of a man against nature. For the law," it says, "shall not shave your beards; for this is becoming for women. But God, who created it, did not deem it suitable for men. And you, doing these things for the sake of pleasing others, by opposing the law, will be an abomination before God who created you in his own image. If therefore you wish to please God, abstain from all that He himself hates. But if you say that the Church of Rome received this, because we do this in honor of the apostle Peter, as what the impious did in insult to him by plucking his beard, just as we also do in shaving the heads of priests in a circle—but we have taken this from the crown of thorns—and because the command that males should not grow hair is from the Old and New Scripture, just as the command to shave the beard—who is this that has dogmatized thus against the apostolic tradition, even if without… we know, [and] we say not why." ^C

Under what yoke of excommunication does he fall, who attempts to add or subtract anything of what has been set forth by them? Say it yourselves, and become the judges of all these things, having embraced those which are better and conducive to salvation. But if you do not wish to judge these things, God, who is over all, says most specifically through Paul: "For there will be a time when they will not endure sound doctrine, but according to their own desires they will heap up for themselves teachers, itching in their ears; and they will turn their ears away from the truth. But let it not befall us to turn to another teaching, but rather to that of the orthodox holy Fathers in Christ Jesus."

OF SCHOLARIUS,

WHO WAS LATER PATRIARCH GENNADIUS

EPISTLE TO MARK, METROPOLITAN OF EPHESUS

I send you the book which has now been written by me concerning Aristotle. And I send the reason for the book, of which those who wish to accuse me may hear; but as for me, even very ^D

that we should be concerned about this. Nor was it a display of wisdom and ignorance, more his own than not; for I will not say there is any suitable occasion for this, unless one were intending to play with children—and those among the listeners who are no different from them—while you have been attending to your own affairs and those of God, and have long since condemned our past games. Nor did I wish to restrain that wise man; for I have never felt envy toward any of the good, but I blame myself whenever I perceive that I have erred in many ways against what is proper; and I am deeply pained by the foolishness of those like him. But those in whom I recognize some virtue, I rejoice, God knows, as if I were myself being edified by it. Neither would I have ever bothered Gemistus, had not my conscience been pricking me from within. You know how one ought to be disposed toward such matters, unless we are to suffer the confusion of Anaxagoras. And yet some say that he is pious in his opinion concerning God, and that he neither teaches nor writes any new legislation in which our own doctrines are disparaged, but rather that we, out of envy, stir up such a reputation for him; those whom time shall prove to be greatly deceived. Otherwise the man is useful, and in our language, which is most noble by descent, he would be inferior to no one—a language which we know Cicero and many others from abroad took pains to master at Athens; and yet, filled with the native Muse, they knew how to sing something quite beautiful. He has also collected much other wisdom. As for his character, he might even serve as an example to the younger generation, who truly care for some virtue. You know the man better than I. For these reasons, therefore, I would have refrained from him and from what he has written against Aristotle. Moreover, it is not very praiseworthy to blame the idiosyncrasies of each individual; rather, one ought to demonstrate the truth, and for those wishing to demonstrate it, philosophy offers countless materials in which one can gain approval without clashing with any of one's friends. For my part, I have never chosen to pain anyone willingly. And if he possesses the least amount of dialectical method—which, indeed, became the cause of error for him and many others—yet of such things there has long been a scarcity in these [times] ^A or it is a common ailment of the race. Therefore, because they proceed toward the hunt for truth without the only instrument for it, they depart full of ignorance and error. But I have unintentionally turned to someone whom I should not. For who knows my intent better than you? I suppose my parents, who rejoiced in everything I did, would have learned it from you at some point. For what they sowed in me as the seeds of nature, you have cultivated for a long time in my discourse and character. They were the farmers, but you have been the one tilling us for a long time; ^B so that you might recognize your own, by recognizing these images of them within me. For this reason, then, one ought to excuse what deserved to be excused. Many of those among us were aware of this book; but the report also reached the friends in the city, who, always rejoicing in our discourses, hope that they will find us better here than before, as we have begun with no base subject; and because of this, they keep asking for it to be sent to them. I, however, decided that it was necessary to submit it first to the canon of your skill, and thus to appear before all others. For even if there were many like you capable of such things, I had to bring it to you before all others, both for the sake of good will and for the kinship of discourse that I mentioned, as you would take the best care of it; for now you excel all those among us, even for the sake of technique. What, then, could be more precious than such a standard, by which it is possible neither to remain ignorant of nor to conceal the irregularities in discourse? Having gone through all of this well, strike out what does not seem to you to have been said well, and give it to the fire. ^C As for two friends, I myself would not even consider it. And yet, I know very well that you are considered to be attached to Aristotle, admiring only as much of Plato’s work as one ought. But if it must be sent to friends, or given to the fire: let them, as it seems to each, cast their vote concerning the truth of the discourses; for to me, your vote will suffice instead of all others.

OF THE SAME: FROM THE OBJECTIONS IN DEFENSE OF ARISTOTLE

Since the book of insults against Aristotle ^D and philosophy as much as he [Pletho] did... even for dance... As many as in the evening have genuinely cared for the doctrines of philosophy do not judge such things similarly; and those who are such—of whom I myself have met not a few—are almost greater in number... So that if not for Aristotle, the human race would not have participated in natural philosophy... In this argument some, hinting at us Christians, as having received this opinion beforehand from Moses, is perhaps consistent with the Christian faith and he himself...

... [as Aristotle] ... who attacks enthusiasms and revelations, and calls them errors, and says that the truth is to be found only through philosophy and demonstrated in another writing of his own, etc.

GENNADIUS AND LUCAS NOTARAS: EXCHANGES OF LETTERS.

^A I. The most illustrious *Mesazon* and son-in-law of the Emperor, on behalf of his son, the Lord Nicholas Notaras, to the Lord Theodore the Carystian, who is in Italy with the Emperor, conducting the synodal affairs at that time.

"We have many horses here, because they are useful. Of these, I received three for the sake of your father, which I might use for hunting; of which one, which you yourself brought, is very good for rough, impassable, mountainous, deep, and marshy places, and suchlike, where huntsmen happen to go most often. However, it also has a fault, in that..." ^{B C D}

(a) John Moschus narrates in his Epitaph the miserable fate of Lucas Notaras and his sons, executed by order of Mahomet II:

"But when the executioner, already present, sought to carry out the order of the barbarian tyrant, and was holding the sword in his hand, and was ready to slay both him and his sons, he rejoiced and exulted, about to live that eternal life in exchange for this fleeting one. But when he saw one of them shrinking from death, and held by fear, as is natural, he said to the executioner: 'O most noble soul, O most steadfast spirit, worthy of ten thousand praises and wonders!' — 'Hold,' he said, 'for a little.' And to the hesitant and fearful son: 'Where is your sense of shame toward your father, my dearest? Where is your affection and disposition? Where are the many promises you made me to die willingly on my behalf? Where is your love; where do you place the testimony of those who heard you say these things? Or do you suppose that only men have heard those things, and that God has not seen them, nor will He seek from you the promise which you often made to me, on the day of His fearful presence? Where is your fatherland, child? Where is the splendor of your lineage? Where is the Empire of the Romans? Where is the propriety of morals, and gravity, and good order? Do you not see that all has perished? Therefore, take up a steadfast and noble spirit, befitting you, and appear as one who scorns death. The common Master is near. He will reward you with good gifts for fulfilling the promises you made to me, your father.' Having spoken thus, and having rendered the spirit of the young man youthful and intrepid, 'These,'..."

' he said to the executioner, 'slaughter first, and afterwards perform the same upon me.' ^D O that divine and magnificent soul! O nobility! O love for one's children! O paternal disposition! He preferred to see his children dead rather than leave them living, fearing, as it seems, lest he might appear in the very end of his life to neglect their care. Therefore, when the executioner had first slaughtered them, while he watched, 'Glory to You,' he said, rejoicing, 'O Christ the King,' and spreading his hands with tears, 'Receive,' he said, 'my soul, and grant me Your great mercy, and show me an heir of Your goods, and a partaker of that blessed life.' Then, nodding to the executioner, he received his blessed end. ^A ...is lean in the loin, and for this reason the blanket upon him is not steady. To me, however, being young and short in body and not heavy, he is useful, because he is well-proportioned, and he also... I was delighted also by the rumor about him, that I heard everyone say he surpassed all in speed. But a lie, often being spread as truth, prevails over the opinion of those who hear it, and then later is proven to be a lie. Wherefore I also was nourished by empty hopes, because what was sung of him was not true. For when, at the will of my father, racing horses were brought into the Hippodrome, both the one colored by nature—light bay, as is the custom for the wool of monks to be dyed in the husks of green nuts (and from this the common parlance is accustomed to call the horse [1] 'nut-dyed')—and with him three newly purchased ones, and my own, and it came to pass that they ran, this my own, in whom I took delight, not only did the aforementioned one run past him by far, but also the newly purchased ones, leaving their hoofs behind, offered themselves for him to see. What then do you think I suffered at this? I became full of dejection; and I think that you, having learned this, will experience the same; for you did not think the horse was such as that. For this reason I was asking my father that he might grant me, for the time being, one of the three horses mentioned. But he did not agree, because they were not trained for rough and difficult ground, and for running up heights and running down slopes, and for leaping over a small wall and jumping over a trench, and for crossing a ravine, and for jumping down from banks, and whatever occurs in hunting. ^C It remains, therefore, that you, the best among many and especially in hunting, return. Come then, and do not delay, so that from those mentioned you might tame one, and then mediate for me that my father grant me this one, and the others to my peers and associates, and that you might possess a horse swifter than those from theirs.

^B The same again to the same, as from the person of his son, at the same time.

Hephaestus suddenly cast fire upon the mountains, which, spreading in the glens and forests, scorched all the thickets and made the land bare where the beasts had their lairs; and those things that were previously difficult to hunt now became easy for the hunters to hunt. But it befalls us as a hardship that we go out to hunt frequently, on account of the father's attention to necessary matters and his struggling in such difficulties on behalf of his own [interests] and the common ones, so that he does not even have the best time at his leisure. It remains, therefore, for us to implore the Divine, that He may be pleased that the Emperor quickly return strengthened and as is his wish, since, besides the other advantages granted to him by God, there is also the [benefit of] training the young in hunting, by going out to this frequently, which has not only pleasure and grace, but is also naturally introductory to almost all of military education and experience. Therefore, it seems to me that the Emperor is also zealous in these things. May it come to pass, then, that he return quickly, and you with him, the good and longed-for one, and first among friends, and first among hunters, so that you might also teach us, as does the father, whatever the occasion may allow, concerning the hunting of wild boars and bears, and fawns and deer, and hares and the other beasts, so that from this the beasts might become easily hunted by us; and further, that you might tell us, concerning the wild boar especially, how he deepens the earth with his snout, and sharpens his teeth, and mows down the crops, and tears up the trees, and bristles his mane, and looks sideways with his eyes, and stares with a fiery gaze.

^A and grinds his teeth in opposition, and like fire from his eyes he flashes; and as with foam he is surrounded, and as he is rough in anger; untamable in his spirit, hard to fight, hard to capture, hard to overcome; pushing forward, breaking through, falling upon, overturning, cutting with his teeth, tearing asunder, rushing with force, advancing with deep murmurs, and as with his onslaught; and slow to move ^B, and as he might shatter the nets and overturn the stakes and uproot the trees. Still, how he is exceedingly passionate, quick to anger, fiery, short of breath, and in his sideways teeth he ignites the hair of the dogs, so that even if one were to bring hairs to the dead and biting [boar], how they draw together as if from fire; so great is the fiery nature that is present from the beast’s rage. But the hunter, such as you are, how he encourages the dogs, signals to them, urges them on, calls them, directs them, stirs them up; how he comes to be running together, pursuing, working along with them, sharing their eagerness, searching with them. For I am convinced that you know these things well, having spent a long time in the Peloponnese with the Illyrians, who are suited for the rousing and training of dogs. And you will have me accompanying you and cooperating, not only now as regards the boar, but also as regards other beasts. Strive, therefore, so that you may have the one who gave birth to you also thankful to you, as one who taught the unlearned son the skills of the hunt, and for me—giving throughout all of life the due respect and honor to the teacher.

But as for my own affairs, how could I describe them? For even if I were to enumerate all human relationships, I find the one of yours toward me to be greater and more ardent than them all. Hence, let the father be silent, let the mother be set aside, the relatives, and all such things as these; let that which is most fitting be spoken: that because you wish to preserve in me an image and model of the most high Providence, as far as is possible, what is it that you do not say, what is it that you do not do for me, and from what do you shrink when you have the power to give? Of these things, toward the account of goodwill, I myself would say that I am worthy to obtain them from you. But on account of other merit, I am truly ashamed of myself, being so greatly honored. And so, for your kindness toward us, since we are unable to requite you, except with prayers and confessions of gratitude, and with the fact that I would joyfully offer my life for you, you shall have the fitting rewards from above—some in the present, and others are reserved for you after these things. Whence, wishing ^C to add to the honors and the favors, do not consider our base condition, nor allow yourself to be restrained by this, but knowing that there is One who will requite, use your own nature; or rather, surpass yourself toward others and toward me.

The horse also reaches you, and with it many confessions of gratitude; for I no longer have need of it, and I have nothing [else] to do, and I wish to rest my body, which is very exhausted by the disease. Perhaps, when the king returns, and it is necessary for me to greet him (for it is just), then, if God wills, I shall have need of this; at which time you will also persuade the altogether excellent king, that which you yourself first, being persuaded by us, would have reasonably encouraged. I think that he, too, will not reject the gift, now that he has finally received clear proof of my goodwill toward him, and [knows] that we are sharing in the knowledge of this—both the just things and those most readily asked for. But these things are for later. Now, however, know that we are feeling the first-fruits of the tranquility, and are rejoicing much in the change of place, and are hoping that the change of state—or rather, of character—God granting, will please us even more. We are troubled by one thing only: the intemperance of the body, for which there is no miraculous means of being delivered. Be well and thrive with all your house, best and most brilliant of men. ^D

^A

The most brilliant mediator and son-in-law of the Emperor to Scholarius regarding these things.

The ease of speaking and writing sensibly and decorously is a cause of good wisdom, which he himself, having trained to the highest degree, excels better than others, and things of ours which are small and worthless, you are able to express as if they were great. We realize that we ourselves are far inferior to those things written. It follows, therefore, that the praise of the letter belongs more to the sender than to whom it was sent; for these present letters are but a monument. We confess thanks to you, and we even rejoice, having been the cause of these things being written, and of showing how grateful friends praise great gifts for small matters, since we do not know anything worthy of your friendship and love to boast of.

Since, for the purpose we proposed, nothing else of value from us will appear worthy of your God-beloved mind, we await the request from you that is proportional to the time. Request then, whenever you wish, even about what you want, having the desire to fulfill whatever is possible for us, as much as is dear to the son.

I rejoice and hear you rejoicing as you receive the change, and as you take pleasure with much zeal in the work, even if it is a grief to me to be separated from our dear conversation for a short time. May God, the dispenser and giver of all good things, bring the work to completion as He wills, and may He strengthen you in His will, so that the zeal, as it is in you now, may be preserved.

Farewell, my most beloved and dearest son.

^B

To the same mediator and son-in-law of the Emperor, Scholarius, in response to these things.

What has happened to you, most admirable of men? For you reject praises, and by saying that we acquire these things from nature and from the skill that is in us, and not from your own excellences, you bestow upon us what does not belong to us, and by connecting other things—those that are tokens of true wisdom, and which Hesiod prefers along with all the wise, and of understanding and magnanimity and plain friendship—you have forgotten the endurance of Socrates, and having shown yourself to be that man in reality, whom we stood up in our letters, or rather, we who desired to touch upon good things in a moderate way, have fallen far short of what is fitting. You are an apprentice and companion of Socrates, and so well fulfilling his counsels in your works, that if he had been able to make even one of those who mingled with him in Athens such as you, he would not have died while speaking what was advantageous. That man, then, was wise by the judgment of Apollo, even though he denied this entirely; and you are common to all and a firm pillar of the city, as Homer says, and full of every good by the votes of God and all men. But none of those who are altogether of the argument will pay heed to you when you deny this, nor, having let go of the testimony from the facts, will any add to your modesty, even if he does not have this alone as a sufficient proof of your virtue.

I was pleased (how could you think otherwise?) by your letters; and, often going over them, I admired the nature and the mind of the sender—one who could not bear at all to be deprived of the glory that comes from speeches, but who obeyed immediately; you held it softer than wax toward every good. So if I had been making a speech then about all the good qualities present in you, I would have grieved at having said nothing about wisdom and the art of rhetoric; but now, whether I wanted to or not, having passed over the most of it, I consider it no terrible thing if these things were also kept silent.

^C But if you speak of solecisms and such faults, I am not a strict examiner of these in the letters of friends, even if they are among those very secure and haughty ones, nor, for your part, make much of a case, nor think that you have been deprived of anything great by being short of experience in these matters; rather rejoice all the more that you have been set free from this trifling. For I have seen few who would not be caught by these things, and those who have been well trained in these things for the most part have their brains in their heels, or I know not where.

But for you, let it be enough to say all things in due time, and to persuade all to what is just, and to arrange words, to speak so, for the persons and topics fittingly, and to begin from where one must, and to work out and conclude well and gracefully, and to distinguish accurately, and to render all with order, which is the greatest part of rhetoric, and for all of which, being adorned, we will enroll you in the choruses of the orators, even if you do not want it. To these, the company of Themistocles [(1)] also yielded, and it held sway by these. The rest belong to the Sophists and grammarians, who concern themselves with the gates of the mighty, as someone said [(2)], and who, disputing with one another over a single accent, thus escape the notice of their whole life, shooting off their arrows, doing nothing more, ^D nor knowing—for which reason the honest grammarian is considered by the Latin proverb to honor nothing but the letter.

Speak, therefore, so well, and send letters to friends, as many as have understanding, who will admire the depth of the thought and the order of the ideas and the natural beauty, and not be busybodies about the outward appearance and the writing of the characters; since you are so successful even in these things that someone would say, having looked at the letters, that you had just risen from the muses and from the study of these things, falling short in some places, but in the greatest…

^A part, that no education would have received them for a long time, nor is it likely that one immediately having touched upon affairs, and having held practices there for such a length of time, could possess such skill. I, for my part, shall never cease being grateful to you for those letters, since they have provided me with many causes for rejoicing. The greatest of all these is that you have gone through every part of my letter, which I myself, who have made such things my art, could hardly have been able to do. For where could I place that goodwill which shines through everything, and that nobility of soul so clearly appearing in the letters? But if you command us to report with confidence regarding whatever we may need, you grant us something great and customary, though otherwise superfluous; for you already anticipate our necessities and preempt the request. You sent us a physician even before knowing anything clearly from us, who seemed to us to be more than enough, so that we no longer need to have worries taking care of other matters.

May that house, therefore, which pours forth every good thing and fulfills the good desires of all, be preserved for ages, Christ the King! And may the children of its father and master be equal to him in virtue, though better in fortune, and may they undertake the care of common affairs and the providence of each person, when you translate him, having arrived at a happy and prosperous old age, to the better life.

3. The Mediator to Scholarius.

Those skilled in the art of the perfumer, putting together a suitable composition from various aromatics, found the incense to be fragrant for life, which we men desire to offer to the Lord as the most beautiful thing, and to use it rather than others, as being better than the rest. This, being fragrant by nature in itself, is closer to those smelling it when it takes fire, and no longer keeps the fragrance to itself, but shares it even with those at a distance. Something of this sort happens also in us; for what the fire is to that which he has, the letters are to us in place of the fire. Whenever we stimulate your honey-flowing tongue, all enjoy the fragrance of the discourse, being benefited both sensibly and intellectually, and even more than those [who enjoy] the fragrance of those aromatics. But we are afraid of one of two things: either that we become a burden to you by being in the way, or that the aspect of what we write may not be worthy at all. And perhaps you yourself will not write according to the wisdom inherent in you (so that the power of speech inherent in you may not be shown from this—for you have answered worthily), if you were writing and answering back, and now in this life, [you were] like the sophist Libanius was to the great Basil. ^D

Since, however, the letters sent by you were beyond our power, and better than to receive praise from us according to their merit, we showed them to the better of the learned men among us, so that they themselves might deservedly wonder at the composition of your thoughts and at the beauty of the words. For what would I myself say about the excellent letter you have sent me even now? The many will praise it rather than the one, although I know that they, too, will almost deprive it of its due value.

7. Another to the same.

While I was still young and attending teachers, I had heard from them that the Greeks used five languages. But the instability of affairs, and that some change places at one time and others at another, did not allow me to learn them, even slightly; [they allowed me] only one, the common [tongue], which we all use in the exercise of speech to express our thoughts. To this, it has come about that I use it for writing as well; for I have not learned to Atticize or Ionicize. Indeed, I see the same thing happening to me that often happens to the women among us by necessity. For, being at a loss at times for silk and Egyptian linen, they use whatever wool they happen to have, and this common linen, which the richness of the land that fell to our lot provides. For if we had borrowed from some other place, perhaps the garment would have been thin and Egyptian.

8. The sophist Lucian, wishing to show the power of the word, published also a praise of flies. One might see this also in your case, as you praise the small bits of writing sent to you by us a short time ago. For, compared to those who know how to write, we are outright flies and mosquitoes compared to elephants. We shall cease, therefore, from now on, so as not to cause you labor, lest there happen to us what that Asan* thought, being deceived by those praising him out of ignorance, or rather foolishness, not knowing the implied meaning hidden in the letters of the orators or philosophers; for they showed themselves more than the one who was writing to whom they were praising. But he, thinking he was such a person, mingled himself with the philosophers. We are satisfied, therefore, as much as we have been the cause of the earlier letters to you, in which you showed clearly what you are toward friends and what radiations come from the wisdom within you, always holding your magnanimity in wonder.

9. And this is to the same at the same time and for the three besides.

The letter arrived recently, both graceful and wondrous. One would say it was of Demosthenes or Plato; but those initiated in your [writings], O good and noble Scholarius, will say it is of the…

^A Muses’ grace itself. Therefore, it was necessary to write back to you worthily with something similar; but there is no one who can. Consequently, to the best of our ability, we ourselves are paying the debt of requital, writing back to you three letters instead of one—if, indeed, it is right to call these "letters," for they are surely ^B proofs of my own weakness, yet they are also offerings dedicated to my longing for you. And it is possible to see here the same phenomenon occurring for me that one might also see on a balance scale. For if someone, having first taken the other side of the scale, were to place into it something heavier and at the same time more precious (these would certainly be the purest gold, and the most translucent of stones and pearls), what else could anyone put on the other side as a counterweight to that weight and ^C value, given that the scale is already occupied by your pearls and golden words? We know, therefore, ourselves, that even if we were to send three times, we would not drag the scale down in any way. Add, therefore, if you wish, even the present [letter]; for even if it will achieve nothing in terms of weight, at any rate, it will add some volume.

[---]

^D The golden letters—most truly so—that remain with us will bring forth another at our leisure, no longer like the first ones, but greater and better. For do not hope to overcome us with the number of the letters; but just as you yourself contrived the number, sending three instead of one, so I will contrive the magnitude, not wishing to cease, but harvesting the greatest pleasure from such contests, since I do not have the face-to-face conversation which I preferred above all.

Be well and prosper with all your house, best of lords.

11. The same man, a mediator and son-in-law of the Emperor, and Grand Duke, to the most holy among monks, most wise, most learned, holy teacher, Lord Gennadius, formerly Scholarius

My holy lord, you have gladdened us in every way. By your letters you have consoled the longing which the memory of your face and conversation—constantly settling in my soul—increases every day, yet heals in a way, having obtained at least some symbols of it, and those of such a kind; but with the sweets—for I do not care now for the Greeks—you console us for many days, though we have few, and if we are able to have them, we are accustomed rather to rejoice in simplicity. But it is blameless to make use of what a friend, or rather a benefactor, has sent. If you soften us with meats, and those from the hunt, we shall eat them gladly, but we shall depart from them unhappily; for all such things, except for partridges that are rich and easy to digest, trouble the stomach with indigestion and weakness.

Do not worry, then, about meats; but love us just as you love us, and pray that we may be entirely relieved of [worldly] affairs (for we are still troubled by concerns, having many things from home and private matters to straighten out), and that, having found the long-desired leisure, we may thus please both God and friends. But if you also wish to console us, console us with such simple gifts as these when the occasion arises, and with more modest ones. By what concerns I say we are I wanted to write to you also before—for my concern is with public matters—in order that I might use you as a counselor, so that you too might give the help that comes from the word; for I would have paid money, and even beyond the two hundred gold pieces. But your epistolary writing stings my heart, seeing you pained, even if not for yourself, but for the common good. For this also pains me—the suffering of the motherland because of being poorly governed; nevertheless, endure. For the great storms crown the best helmsman when he is above the waves. But for these things, if I find relief from the pain, I shall collaborate with you in what is possible and fitting, and I shall exhort you to lay aside the grief and look toward the storm-tossed ship. We shall say more when we have arrived there, by the grace of your prayers. But I, if I had a plan, I am holding to it again. For since the wise man says, "To a friend, nothing is unknown," because of this I also wish for the present and better matters to be ratified by your counsel. For I used only the sovereign for these matters, having been moved by him to this subject, and now I address your holiness. These are the letters written by me to the lords of the Turks; if they contain anything deeper, you will find it somehow dimly [hinted at] in the one; but the majority was spoken by word of mouth to the bearer, which we shall report to your reverence when God wills. The good Theodore is carrying these. And if any further good or useful thing appears to be added to these, entrust it to the one carrying [the letter] to you. Do not look at the barbarisms; for you know that I have not learned even how many parts of speech there are. Repentance, and pray for us.

^A To the most magnificent and most praiseworthy monastic pillar of the race, the Great Duke, my lord, may you be fortunate, from the least Gennadius: salvation of soul along with every kind of well-being.

What shall I list first, what last, and what between the good things in the letter of your magnificence (1)? So that I may render thanks for the things said out of goodwill, and that I may properly admire those things so recently dictated, and if I have not been persuaded by the things regarding which you counsel so beautifully, to ask for forgiveness, as if driven not so much by stubbornness as by forceful reasonings. And when it was necessary to send back the most beautiful suggestions of those subjects in the letter of the embassy as quickly as possible, it was not even possible for us to attempt the contest. Therefore, those things will be celebrated by us another time; and the most beautiful and precious writing remaining with us will collect interest on the countersign at every opportunity, and will not let me rest until I have paid off the debt to you. But as for those things written to those rulers, whom the evil fortune of the Greeks has made so terrible and necessary to us, I was astonished upon seeing them, and I admired the nature and the choice of one most dear to me, and I considered it better than admiration. And a man could scarcely have added to them had he come from a more divine school and from conversation with a superior; but our own [contribution], being sincerely human and [the product] of this worldly occupation until almost yesterday, falls so far short of being compared to your wisdom and experience, as we seem to be more clever than those who are in no way accustomed to these things; so that we might change [that of] Theocritus (2) and say, and most justly: for he, chiding the scarcity of the poet ^B who was asked what might be the things well said, said, "What you left out," — but we say that those things are left out which it would not have been necessary to say.

But send them confidently, most prudent of men, under God as leader, who day by day moves your intellect and mind toward things that will be of benefit to the race, and for this reason has prepared you for this need, being suitable from every side, so that you alone suffice, intending things that it will not even be allowed for others who are being taught to do, and doing things that it is difficult even for those who think they have foresight to calculate, and doing as many things as one might hesitate to do among those appointed to ministries, and in the scarcity of money, instead of a common public treasury for the city, opening up [your] household treasuries (3), and as for the things that bring glory to the city, they are manifestations of greatness of soul everywhere, not in things past or present, but also in those mentioned most beautifully. And if you have us in the moments of crisis, as you said, regarding the things being done, this will surely be of your philanthropy; but you shall receive nothing from us, except praise and admiration. We also rejoice in your efforts for the common good, that you are able to achieve such things for it, and that one may enjoy such good things from you, equal to our own salvation. Let those things from the envious not disturb you at all; for they are blows of infants, [which] do not obscure, but rather brighten, [and] are able [to do nothing else]; for you yourself are superior to envy. And they declare a sign of wickedness rather than of envy to those who dare to find fault with any of your works. For there is nothing existing for one to contend with you regarding the good things you possess, nor do you seize the business of the common [welfare], but rather you often wish to remain at peace, as if [these things were] abandoned like something desolate of soul, [they] forced themselves upon you with a cry. And you yourself are persuaded by circumstances, and by all of us who entreat you for their own salvation, and before these things, you follow God (4) who commands; whence you hope that the rewards for the guardianship of the race will come; for what you think to have from the race as a return for virtue, these things happen to be more of a favor from you toward it.

Live, then, our ornament and common image, and pray that we, having finished the remainder of our life with individual industry, which we chose with God after those fruitless tumults, will not be slandered, not having helped others, nor willing [to be] ourselves, but that we will be better ourselves, always considering the things toward God—scarcely able to do this—[and] that we might be able to cast off the poverty according to Christ, with Him extending a hand. Repentance (5), O most brilliant one.

XIII. To the same Great Duke, from the same.

The letter which I promised to send to you, and which will be sent even if you do not ask (and you will be very pleased having received it), [which] has been made from divine material, and concerning which you are most concerned and about which you make the most discourse—much praise is gathered on earth, and more reward in the heavens. But now you have provoked us to write in return to the most beautiful letters, not being able to endure passing over in silence the grace and wisdom distinguished in those letters. For Hesiod (6) says that he who knows many things by nature is wise; but you, by nature, surpass those who even pride themselves on this with art, and [you make] this brighter through instruction.

^A You have shown yourself such that, even when speaking always about the circumstances as they happen, and if ever there should be a need for writing, you would be surpassed by few within the chorus of the learned, while many more would be defeated by the sharpness of your concepts, to the extent that they (the learned) seem to excel in the more polished style. But if there were a contest of true rhetoric or of the establishment of states, all those who possess wealth would immediately follow in your footsteps.

I do not marvel at this at all, although it is so great; rather [I marvel] that you still have the ability to do so many things, since you wished to donate yourself as a portion of discourse, not appearing more sluggish in actions because of your words, nor more dull toward words because of doing so many things, so that you prove us to be more unrefined, we who have spent our whole life occupied with these words. ^B We do not strive more to know more, than that you, who are close to us by your actions, should be judged by us, and we are considered, by every means, less than you; and because of this we have been terribly envious, if indeed we were to be judged from an equal fortune.

Now, we judge your virtue to be our own good fortune, so that we would have wished—if it were at all possible—to become even wiser than ourselves. For whether those possessing words must hope for some good from you, when would you favor them more than when you share with them in the best of pursuits, from equal standing—and there is a point where you even surpass [us]? Or whether we are to be saved by being governed by the Word, we would pray that you, who are at the pinnacle of affairs, might surpass the ruled in wisdom, so that you might know how to save them even more. But if you alone, from those who are set over affairs, have become a partisan of the Word, and with the Word you guide our ship in such a great storm, and if we also have anything to contribute (and you know this well), while others, as they say, do not even cast a javelin-throw, must you then be allotted the ambition regarding words? Or must we rather posit this as a common good fortune, and an ornament to the fatherland, when someone who has come from elsewhere, having marveled at your education, departs, and an advantage besides the common one exists even for us, who would have thought we were living among barbarians, had not you been sent by God to give and receive the Word, and to know well how many things differ from the uneducated, [as] men raised on books and words with prudence, for a city intended to be saved?

I know some men who have increased innate wickedness by the power of words, and others who, through great folly, have involved those living with them in evils no better than those from a shipwreck, and others who have embellished natural ugliness with the beauties of words. But you, most excellent of men, with but a few, even before being raised by books ^C to give [this] to [the] common [good], you were most perfect, being young in years, and [able] to counsel, to act as strategos, and to act as ambassador, appearing second to none of those who have grown old in affairs and in those things—not considered second to them in their opinions—but as for those things in which it is necessary for those who exercise themselves for greater things to toil, in these you surpassed everyone from a lesser amount of training, since indeed these things were in accord with you; and with time as your good qualities grew—not by quantity (for they were always present in your nature), but only in magnitude and beauty—you hid those who are currently the best among us with excess; and as they have departed, not with many others, but you, almost alone, are preeminent in the governance of the city, so that the same things seem correct to you and to the most excellent Emperor now and to his brother before him, and they seem to others to be naught but what would seem correct to you first, but, as if following laws, they counsel and serve, not having anything better to suggest than what you might find, nor attempting [to act] from the beginning; for they have once and for all agreed with themselves that they are inferior in two things, even if they seem to excel others, and it is natural that they also excel [in the others]. I do not say [this] as one blaming the others; for this would not be your praise, of course, but I am showing you to be far better than those who are very good.

Since you were also seeking the adornment from words (for this was lacking in the greatness of your nature), in a short time you collected the most beautiful things, having pored over books, or heeding others reading, whom the modesty of your virtue, and for some, need, assembled daily into your house. And now, if there is a need to seek what is advantageous, you perform with composition and sharpness the words concerning it, just as if one had come from the exercises in Athens; and if any other matter of words is proposed, everyone who hears [you] would immediately say that the best of the ancients has flowed into your soul. For whose opinion of the wise, or what deed worthy of memory of those who have governed the earth rightly, does not your word decorate, being remembered firmly? And others also try to collect [this] material, but they are like those wishing to weave a cord out of wood and flax; so do the things they record fit the need—and [those] who record [these things] say: but of you, if one were to say such a thing at any time, everyone would say ^D that it was not at all said for this need from the beginning, nor should any other paradigm be brought into the words.

But I do not yet wish to praise you purely concerning sacred dogmas; for there is a fear lest, having grasped the vote, you might someday become burdensome to us, bringing into the middle that which has often been said, that the Pope must be proclaimed among us, “rightly teaching the word of the truth” when we worship before God, and that we are thus orthodox, even if we believe things clearly contrary to the Pope, and are unable to believe otherwise; these things [are]—not to present you as a man approved by God, correctly teaching the word of truth.

^A and as to Gabriel admonishing from the heavens, or from such a name, if you brought each one before you, you would have passed them by reverently, as though he were employing persuasion at random; for if these things could stand [together], this would be an enigma and beyond every enigma.

We do not, therefore, wish—as you are attempting to persuade us again concerning these things—to step in more softly, as though we were bound by the vote which we might now give you concerning the doctrines. But if this fear were not present, we would even have surrendered to you the majority of our leaders, who would be persuaded of everything you might wish; for since they are unable to speak against [you], and at the same time are unsettled by shadows—instead of realities—concerning certain things, they will concede everything. Because of which, even when I was with you, you often exerted yourself to persuade the poor first of things you had not even persuaded yourself of, and then to shift their opinions once more to the opposite; for you yourself did not want falsehood to prevail at that time, but were investigating the habit of men. And I, at first, was terribly disturbed and spoke against [it]; but when I perceived that the affair was a waste of time, I listened, annoyed and yet rejoicing. I do not indeed fear that you will ever be led to deceive the men willingly, but [I do fear] that you yourself might rather be carried away, knowing well how much those things differ, but having decided that there is some necessity stronger than the truth—which is what the majority suffer—and having judged the immediate ease ^B to be more preferable than the rewards laid up for those who think and act rightly; and having hoped to procure for us a release from some human fears, God being angered, and for this reason you might wish to persuade others of things that you would need to be persuaded of yourself first, having yielded to the greater of two compulsions, doing well, but having judged the greater poorly. Whenever, therefore, leaving all those things aside, you shall help to procure for us the freedom of our ancestral [customs], and allow the Latins to speak against us, and to persuade us, if they could, with the truth—which they could never do, as long as they wish to persuade [us] concerning things that do not exist and cannot exist—then we shall give you the fitting vote concerning these matters. But as for the rest of [your] skill in words, if one were to speak confidently and at greater length than what has been said concerning these things, he would not miss the truth.

Each of those who have shared the same lot, you would not have anyone among your existing [virtues] by which to know him better; and because of this, that you should be adorned beyond measure in all things has prevailed as a hallmark. For having spoken of discernment earlier, I pass over it now; for it would not have been possible for those things to coincide in your soul without supreme discernment. Nor do I speak of temperance, which everyone knows you to possess far more than those who have promised and kept it, employing [it] most accurately in pleasures and pains according to the canon of reason. But nobility, magnanimity, justice, providence, concord toward friends, benevolence toward strangers, ^C mercy—if someone should wish to see all these things in you clearly, he will thirst. For it carries with it the whole and perfected idea, just as if it were bent toward one single thing of these, namely your life; which, I think, happens to most people, to whom it is desirable to have attained barely one of the good things, even if they show a faint image of a second. But the concern for the salvation of all in common, shown to you not without many dangers—for your account is lesser than the expenditures—is neither possible for our times to carry, nor for the present speeches to celebrate; but the time which is our own has brought a certain strange wave, testing those who might attempt to imitate in works, and wish to celebrate in words, the impossible.

But these things have been enumerated incidentally; now, although ^D this is a daily and necessary task for us and for all, the subject of which we have now undertaken to write is that of those letters. You have no concern for sending us either [kind of] food; for if, as you said, the burden from the three [kinds] weighs upon the energies of the mind, both [kinds] will work the same harm for us—some troubling us through their quality, others damaging us through their quantity; for it is not easy to handle them with restraint, for having seemed to be easily consumed, in addition to being pleasant to the taste, they were [sent], and even though these were being sent abundantly, it is hard to rise from the table satiated. Or rather, you have no concern at all, but earth and sea send to you things easily provided by God, in return for which you are staying awake for their sake to pay this very smallest favor. We, however, neglect what belongs to us, caring that we might enjoy your gifts; it behooves us, in return for these...

^A things, to be like those who everywhere are sober-minded; for some luxuriate, as if they will be saved without effort, trusting in certain shadows and foreign myths 5, of which the most profitable—or rather, the hope after the betrayal of the truth—is from Papal funds, or the belief that they might remain unassailed by the enemy while still appearing to be joined to the Latins. And such small-mindedness and distrust, with the heavenly alliance being driven away by both hands—without which we could not be saved even with a great abundance of possessions—would have had to change everything towards the character of a true polis, advising, persuading, and constraining; whereas now we are in no way different from those in the tents, if we are not even in a worse condition than they, since there is not even any danger present to these pretenses. For if anyone were to stretch the eyes of the soul over all the affairs of the city, he would find them to be not so much weak due to scarcity 6, as they are impossible to be saved due to sloth and confusion, and besides this, even if they could be saved for a long time, they possess nothing venerable, but, as in a deep darkness, just as it happens, they come upon each other and are entangled at random, and are not even a relic of what once flourished, nor are they able to delight a soul, nor can [the soul] delight in the virtue and beauty of souls and of a government that saves some trace of those things that are sung or whatever is now praised.

I wished for you to make use of me for these things (for I pass over the rest), both as someone who perceives what is sick, and who might guide you with words and cooperate with deeds; for perhaps something better might have come to pass in these matters after such zeal. But the time in the previous state 7 held us very idle, even if sometimes, by stealth or by force, we benefited the common good, with almost no one perceiving it or showing favor; but now, hindered also by [my] state 8, perhaps you will not be able to wish to make use of me. For it behooves us to be occupied with other things, enslaved to other matters and to another master, since even as regards the monastery, as you know, I indeed loved the care of it at the beginning, moved by more divine reasonings, but now, those who gave it and begged me to take it up were absolutely not in agreement with my goals, and having received this heavenly sign concerning the need to rather practice private duty 9 and to cleanse the soul, and to try to lead it up by the unerring illuminations from God and the guidebooks of those ancients, I have faultlessly avoided that little boldness. And if you should most speedily make an account of God and the faith being insulted, and of our...

of the church, if you remove the confusion, or at least a certain idolatrous neglect of divine things, by bestowing and bringing back to us that former state of order—which, through some diligence and in time, we might perhaps little by little be more fully assured—some corner might conceal ^A us, attending as we do to God and to the Word in the midst of our fatherland, and concerned for no imported world. For He who is given to us from God, as He has willed, is even more precious than the empire itself, if indeed one must obey Solomon, ^B who judges so well concerning both—the wise man and the king at once. But if we intend to anger God further, then the holy Athos will not long from now receive me. There are others with us, who, cooperating with those of your company, will surely enjoy your grace. These things I have already said twice to the most excellent emperor. May God also give to us a bellows and a furnace—that is to say, may He make both him, the greatest emperor, ^C and you after him, to be takers-up of His own cause and of all things; so that we may not labor in silver-smithing in vain, and still seem to be mad, or, worse, be slandered while we hold firm to our hopes of heavenly philanthropy, by those who are unable to look upon the proofs or who turn to slander [in order] to be corrected.

EXPOSITION OF THE WRITINGS THAT WERE IN THE SEPULCHRE OF CONSTANTINE THE GREAT

(Apud Anselmum Bandurium in *Imperio Orientali*, tom. I, p. 184.)

Concerning the relics of Constantine the Great

When the son of Constantine the Great, Constantius, was reigning, he brought the relic of his father from Nicomedia with all imperial honor to Constantinople. ^D [alt-version omitted]

In the ancient Greek Paraphrase of the Oracles of Leo, the term *Xanthoi* (flame(-colored) ones) is likewise used. Thus far Lambecius in the aforementioned place. Indeed, not without reason; since they are called *Franks* or *Alemanni* by the Greeks. Thus Pachymeres, book 1, chapter 18: "the *Xanthoi*, a flame-colored and warlike race." Daniel’s Visions from the Royal codex 1845, etc. In the *Enigmata* of Leo the Wise, with an explanation in the vulgar Greek language in the Colbertine codex 5104: "The King of Alamannia comes to the New Rome, a pavilion in the vineyard at the Rufianae. They say [he comes] to the aid of the race of the *Xanthos* race of Rome, when the *Xanthos* race has plundered the world." See Maurice’s *Strategicon*, book 3, cap. 5; lib. 4, cap. 1; lib. 11, cap. 4. Truly, they are called *Franks* by the Greeks, *Alemanni* and other northern peoples, due to the color of their hair. Priscus the Rhetor writes in his *Legationes*, p. 40, that he saw at Rome the son of the King of the Franks coming on an embassy...

^A from the honor of Nicomedia translated him to Constantinople, and buried him in the temple of the Holy Apostles with the greatest magnificence and imperial honor; and on the cover of the Porphyry tomb of that most pious and first Christian emperor, certain most wise and holy men, who lived at that time and foresaw the future, inscribed the letters that are below. These letters did not express in detail what they meant, but only exhibited the first letters of each word. They really announced the empire of the Turks and its end, and are called Oracles. These were expounded by the most wise patriarch Lord Gennadius, who was at the time of the reign of Lord John Palaiologos, who held the eighth synod in Florence, and when he expounded them he was a layman and a judge of the imperial court. The letters are represented below in the way they were written on the imperial tomb.

...hanging down upon his shoulders due to their size. ^B And these same peoples are called *Flavi* by Latin writers. Claudian in *In Rufinum*, Book II, regarding the Gauls: *Then the fierce Gauls, with yellow hair, accompany them.* The same Claudian in *De Bello Getico*, regarding the Sicambri: *Even the troops stationed against the yellow-haired Sicambri.* The author of the book *De Disciplina Scholarium*, ch. 2, calls the Britons yellow-haired. Saint Jerome also, in Epistle 7, to Laeta, called the Goth rutilant and yellow. However, regarding the truth of this epitaph or vaticinium, there is no learned person who does not regard it as a figment of the more recent Greeks: yet, whatever that vaticinium may be, it is nevertheless found in various libraries in handwriting, ^C together with the exposition of Gennadius Scholarius, Patriarch of Constantinople, although not always under the same title; for in the Casanatense library, book V, it is held under this title: *Oracles of Solomon and other wise men*. These letters were found on the marble stone of the tomb of Constantine the Great; and this was expounded by the great patriarch Scholarius: *Mohammed, members of the reign of Ishmael, he who is called [the] Dane, [in the] first Indiction, [in the] eighth [year], shall overturn the race of the Palaiologoi; the Seven-Hilled [City] shall take [it], etc.* [This is] the oracle which was found in Constantinople on a marble column, written in letters, which he cleared up. Others say that these same letters were found marked on the marble of the tomb of Constantine the Great, ^D and that these were expounded by the patriarch in the saints, Scholarius. Leo Allatius also mentions this vaticinium and the Gennadian exposition in his *Diatriba de Georgiis*, p. 404, when he teaches that this same vaticinium is found in the Vatican library, the royal Scorialensis VII, 1, the Bavarian codex 193, and in the library of Antonius Augustinus, codex [unnumbered]. The same Allatius writes of this vaticinium in the cited place: *This is: An Oracle of Byzantium found inscribed in mosaic on a marble column, which he explained.* Others say that the aforementioned letters were carved in the sepulchral marble of Constantine the Great, and that the holy patriarch Scholarius expounded them. Then the same Allatius adds: *I first connected this vaticinium in the first volume of Variorum antiquorum, in the supplement to the Antiquities of Constantinople, quoted by me with others of the same, those of Leo, Methodius of Patara, Theophilus the Roman, Daniel the monk, and others.* But this work of Allatius, which is titled *Varia Antiqua*, was never published, nor indeed is it found in the Allatian catalog of unpublished books; therefore, I think that a man who deserved so well of literary matters was anticipated by death before he had completed this work.

THE WRITINGS WHICH WERE INSCRIBED UPON THE TOMB OF THE GREAT CONSTANTINE, AND THE EXPLANATION OF THEM.

^A In the first indiction, the kingdom of Ishmael, [a ruler] who shall be called Moameth, shall subvert the race of the Palaiologoi. He shall take the city of the seven hills; he shall reign in it; he shall rule over many nations; he shall devastate the islands as far as the Euxine Sea; he shall lay waste the inhabitants of the Danube. ^B In the eighth indiction, he shall subdue the Peloponnese. In the ninth indiction, he shall bring war against the northern parts. In the tenth indiction, he shall defeat the Dalmatians. Again, at another time, he shall stir up a great war against the Dalmatians, and shall partially destroy them. ^C And the multitudes of the Western nations, having gathered together, shall bring war against Ishmael by sea and by land, and shall overcome him. His descendants shall reign for a short and petty span of time. The fair-haired race, together with the first possessors, shall seize the whole of Ishmael; they shall take the city of the seven hills with its dominion. ^D Then they shall stir up a civil war, which shall last until the fifth hour; and a voice shall cry three times: "Stand, stand, with fear; make haste eagerly to the right-hand parts, and you shall find a man, noble, wonderful, and of exceeding strength; him you shall have as Lord; for he is my friend, and by accepting him, you shall fulfill my will."