not understanding this deviation, and that too when these things have been spoken by us so clearly, you are indeed an exceedingly senseless man. But if now, having understood, you nevertheless cloak your impiety with your fragile sophistries—upon which you also pride yourself out of ignorance—out of extreme affection for your way of thinking, it is right to cite that passage A for you, which is not without merit:
"Whoever, while associating with the base, takes pleasure, I have never asked, knowing that such a man Is of the same sort as those with whom he takes pleasure."
But let our writing extend only this far; a few small things, indeed, in response to your long ones, for they have come to us—for they have not even come in their entirety. Yet these suffice for us to reveal both your ignorance and the baseness of your intellect simultaneously. As for the rest, regarding the twofold sense of movement, we say nothing, but leave it to others, and to the mocking of your position there. For you, indeed, through extreme incapacity, have failed to defend Aristotle regarding the Forms, while we, on the other hand, out of supreme contempt, have left that matter for ourselves. If, therefore, you have derived any benefit from these words of ours—for we did not write these for your harm, but so that you might perhaps cast off some of your excessive vanity and become better in your soul—then B it would be well. But if that pride still possesses you, and it seems good to you—whether out of concern for Aristotle or out of your envy toward us—to write back against these things of ours, then write back indeed most boldly, as we shall not write back anything at all in response to those things of yours. For we know that the more you write, the more you will show yourself to be unseemly. And if you think you are saying anything, you will appear so only to the ignorant and the foolish, and we know very well that we do not care much for the opinion of men like that. You will not have a shortage of words; for if you had scrutinized what was said, it would have been very difficult for you to contradict us; but since you are neither able to scrutinize it, nor perhaps do you care much about it, and you are satisfied with whatever happens to come to mind randomly, there will be no lack of such things for you. Furthermore, slander whatever you wish, and be full of blasphemies, just as you threatened not to spare such things, even though you have not spared them even now. For whatever you may blaspheme will not touch us; for you will not say things that apply to us, but you will babble in vain and shame only yourself, showing your perversity all the more. As for us, your such words have been judged, and shall again be judged, as equal to the yelping of some Melitean puppy.
MATTHEUS CAMARIOTA. NOTICE.
(Henr. Wharton in Cave, *De Script. eccles.*, ad an. 1453.)Matthaeus Camariota, by birth a Constantinopolitan, according to others a Thessalonian, son of a certain Greek priest who fell at the ruin of Constantinople; an eminent philosopher and rhetorician; he flourished at Constantinople in the year 1453, at which time he was present at the capture of the city. There exists a long and notable portion of an *Epistle on the Capture of Constantinople* (transcribed by Theodorus Zygomalas in his own epistle on the dangers and disasters of the Constantinopolitans), in Greek and Latin, in Crusius, *Turco-Graecia*, lib. 1, p. 76. Jos. Simlerus, in his *Bibliotheca Tigurina*, p. 491, mentions that his *Epitome of Hermogenes* and a book on *Rhetoric* exist in manuscript. His *Synopsis of Rhetoric* is held in manuscript in the Bibliotheca Augustana. He also wrote *Commentaries on the Epistles of Synesius*, which were once in the possession of Joannes Zygomalas, as attested by Crusius, *Turco-Graecia*, p. 187. An *Encomium on the Three Hierarchs, Basil, Gregory, and Chrysostom*, is held in the library of the King of France, and perhaps elsewhere. There seem to be two other treatises belonging to our Matthaeus, which exist in manuscript in the Bibliotheca Augustana, inscribed with these titles: *Matthaeus, monk and priest of Thessalonica, on divine grace and light against those who said it was a creature*; and *The same, A treatise on those who teach what is spurious and alien in the Churches*. The former, and perhaps the latter, attacked the Barlaamites, who denied that the Taborite light was anything uncreated.
MATTHAEUS CAMARIOTA SYNOPSIS OF RHETORIC
(Published in Greek and Latin by Johannes Scheffer in *Miscellanea*, Upsala, 1697).
A Compendious doctrine of rhetoric by an uncertain author.
There are three genres of rhetorical speech: judicial, deliberative, and panegyrical. Each of these is divided into two certain species, and has an end to which it looks. The judicial is divided into accusation and defense; its end is the just. The deliberative is divided into exhortation and dehortation; its end is the useful. The panegyrical, finally, into praise and blame; it looks to the honorable. To these genres are referred the rhetorical *progymnasmata*, which Hermogenes of Tarsus set forth in twelve [books] before: later, however... B
A (1) *Uncertain*. Hoeschel, who first brought this author to light, names him Matthæus Camariota in the title. But perhaps he did this following Maximus Margunius, bishop of Cythera, from whom he received this work of ours. Yet even he says that he does not know if he is that Matthæus, but that he seems to himself to be the author of this little work; "I think," he says, "the composition is by Matthæus Camariota," in the letter with which he sends this to Hoeschel. Meanwhile, Gesner records that Camariota wrote an epitome of Hermogenes, and says that a copy of it exists in the Memmian library. But I think that one is different from this of ours, since our author not only follows Hermogenes, but others as well, such as Tiberius and Phoebammon in their figures, and indeed in some places he criticizes Hermogenes; then, too, because in the manuscripts of the Oxford library there is an epitome of Hermogenes made by Matthæus Camariota, but with a far different beginning, namely: *Ρητορική ἐστι δύναμις τεχνική*, etc. Unless perhaps that copy, which Hoeschel used, lacked a legitimate beginning, and should be supplemented from that one in the Oxford library; those who can have access to it will see more. But if the author of this little book were that Matthæus, his age would not be obscure, since he lived in the time of the capture of Constantinople, which is gathered from his letter about that occupation, which Gretser cites in his notes on Cantacuzenus.
(2) *Rhetorical*. In distinction to dialectical oratory. Cassiodorus, in his *Compendium of Rhetoric*: There are two kinds of oratory: for the one is perennial, which is called rhetorical, the other is concise, which is called dialectical.
(3) *Three kinds*. They are called *hypotheses*; the Latins for the most part call them the *genera* of cases. However, Hermogenes seems to make only these two, when he says in Book 1 of *On Invention*: "In civil questions we either judge or deliberate." He omits the third kind, which is concerned with praise. Nor does mention of it occur elsewhere in him. Which fact again causes me not to think this is an epitome of Hermogenes.
B ...concerning civil questions we either judge or deliberate." He omits the third kind, which is concerned with praise. Nor does mention of it occur elsewhere in him. Which fact again causes me not to think this is an epitome of Hermogenes.
(4) *Panegyrical*. Which is encomiastic, or demonstrative; it is called otherwise by others. But it would seem more correct to be so named whenever it is contrasted with the judicial and deliberative. For just as those are named by those before whom they are usually proposed, so too should this one be. And thus just as it is called *judicial* because it is held before the judges, and *deliberative* because it is before the council, so it should be *panegyrical* because it is held at a general assembly (*panegyris*). On the other hand, it is more correctly called *encomiastic* whenever it is contrasted with the accusatory and exhortatory; for as it is the task of these to exhort or to accuse, so it would be the task of that one to praise; and thus, with respect to the intent, all things would be said in a similar way.
(5) *The just*. Aristotle adds also the contrasting terms, and makes the end of the judicial [be] the just and the unjust, of the demonstrative the honorable and the base, of the deliberative the useful and the harmful. Truly, because each genus has two certain quasi-species, and from these each has its own end. But our author commemorates only those three, either because the contrary ends are also understood from these, or because these three are the principal ones and are more considered. For he who blames does so for this reason, that having omitted the base we might follow the honorable; and he who accuses does so in order that, having omitted the unjust, we might follow the equal and the just; and he who dissuades does so in order that, having omitted the useless, we might follow the useful and the healthy. So that thus the principal and, as it were, ultimate ends of the opposite genera are those which are commemorated by our author.
(6) *Before, the Tarsian Hermogenes*. Therefore, Hermogenes proposed the rhetorical *progymnasmata*, according to this author. Suidas, although he commemorates other things of Hermogenes, makes no mention of these. Nor do I believe that it has been handed down by others regarding this matter.
A Aphthonius the Antiochian extended these to fourteen. For since Hermogenes included refutation and confirmation in one precept, and likewise eulogy and vituperation as another, he himself, by dividing these two, made them appear to be fourteen. Therefore, all these species of the progymnasmata of Hermogenes, and their parts, just as the species of the status, which are thirteen, and all their parts, are referred back to these three genera. It must be known, however, that the progymnasmata, when placed by themselves, receive all the following elements, which are also customarily called *kephalaia* (headers) abusively. But in perfect orations, either none of these consequent elements are found, or only a few are received. There are, therefore, three genera of rhetorical oration, to which both the progymnasmata and the status, as I have said, are referred.
B comparativus, remotionis, relationis, purgationis, deprecationis, scripti, ratiocinationis, contrariarum legum, ambigui, definitionis legalis, translationis.
It has, [in the way] that the absolute is divided into simple and double, and this again into double by conjunction or division. (See Voss. I.1, Inst.) Although perhaps we understand more correctly by the "particular [status]" the parts of the status, as Hermogenes calls it, or "kephalaia," that is, the topics which we use according to the teaching of Hermogenes in the treatment of the status. They are fifteen in number: proposition, person, cause, probability, intent, faculty, frequency of conjunctions, common quality, quantity, common topic, sentiment, the four ends of causes, events, consequences, testimonies. These kephalaia also have their own parts, and they are employed in one way or another, in a greater or lesser number, according to the diversity of the status, as Hermogenes teaches at length in his *Partitiones*.
C by this word he understands, namely, what is [used] in the progymnasma, but as our author notes, it is called *kephalaion* abusively.
Such are called rhetoricians, in which the matter of contention consists, or the incidental questions by which the status is fortified. The Latins also call them controversies. I think they are Cassiodorus’s "firmaments." Nor are they anything other than loci, from whence orators draw their *epicheiremata* or *enthymemata*. Such, which are called *kephalaia* among the Greeks by way of preeminence.
D he means. For he opposes "perfect speeches," by which he understands nothing other than perfect, public, and serious orations. Naturally, in them there is no status properly so-called, and therefore no *kephalaion* properly so-called, which would come as a support to the status, but rather a locus from which an argument proceeds. And I think this is what he wished to convey.
In the way in which they are accustomed to be proposed and treated in the progymnasmata. Naturally, that series of topics, as it is handed down by the sophists, would be superfluous and nugatory in just orations, because it is poorly accommodated to the cause or the proposed business. Nor on that account is it to be rejected, since not even the sophists propose it to that end, as if it ought always to be used in that way, but as a treasury, from which, if someone happens upon something of that sort, say a eulogy, a confirmation, or a description, he might be able to derive material for writing. Or if our author meant this, I do not understand the passage. Certainly, I do not see how that *ouden* could be defended in another way.
whence it is manifest that he means "just orations" by this name. Naturally, as I said before, the status. Furthermore, it is to be noted.
A Every perfect oration is referred to one of these three ideas, just as each of the statuses is composed of four parts: exordium, narration, contention, and conclusion. Some say these are five, not naming "contention," but instead of contention, "objections and solutions" 19; others say "proofs and solutions," and others say something else. The panegyric 20 and perfect exordium is composed of four parts or members: starting from a proposition 22, from a construction 23, from a claim or a rendering 24, or from both together, and from a fourth, the base. The species of exordia are four: from the opinion of persons and things 25, from subdivision 26, from abundance 27, and finally from the occasion 28. Persons and things 29 are divided into four: glorious, inglorious 30, ambiguous, and B—
On the definition of the exordium and its species
The argument concerning the statuses shows that it pertains not only to the judicial genus, but to the others as well. For he says [Greek: "τὸ δ' ... ὅτι"], which refers to all three genera. Not a few others disagree, but our author is more correct. See Voss, *Inst. orat.*, lib. 1, c. 6 & 7.
16 *oiou dē tinos*: A faulty reading: I think it should be written "of some sort."
17 *tōn staseōn*: Here, "status" must be understood again.
18 *ek tessarōn*: Cicero mentions this at the beginning of *Partitiones*, lib. IV, and others. Fortunatianus, lib. II: "The parts of an oration are four: exordium, narration, argumentation, peroration." Sulpicius Victor: "The parts of an oration are four: exordium, narration, argumentation, peroration or conclusion." All omit the proposition, as if it were not necessary, which however Aristotle, along with faith (the proofs), wishes to be the only necessary part. But indeed, all, in my opinion, include it under argumentation, as a kind of beginning for it. See Fabius, 1. v, c. 43. Moreover, it should also be observed that when our author makes four parts to an oration, he seems in that to recede again from Hermogenes. For his opinion is that an oration is composed of more—namely, six or seven—the names of which are: *prooimion* (exordium), *prokatastasis* or *prodiēgēsis*, *diēgēsis* (narration), *prokataskeuē*, *kataskeuē*, *lysis* (solution), *epilogos* (peroration). Let him who wishes consult Sturmius on Hermogenes' *De Inventione*. Unless we think he wished to hand down only the most general parts, having omitted the others.
19 *Antitheseis kai lyseis*. Naturally, because these parts are of the agōnes, or contentions.
20 *Panēgyrikon*. He does not mean that which only has value in the third genus of causes, which is different from the deliberative and judicial, but that which is used in all, and is called *teleion*; that is, perfect and absolute in all numbers, which we are able to use in a public assembly of the whole city or in a most splendid order. He opposes this, however, to the *politikon prooimion*, because in the latter, clarity alone suffices, whereas in the former, dignity, amplitude, and ornament are also required; the first is used in private causes, the second in public and most serious ones. See more in Sturm on Hermogenes, lib. 1.
21 *Ek tessarōn*. This whole matter is from Hermogenes, whom see in lib. 1, last chapter. Add Vossius, lib. II, *Inst. orat.*, cap. 2, § 5.
22 *Ek protaseōs*. The exordium is taken from the matter, from which it starts, *hypolēpsis*, for example, or some suspicion, or *hypodiairesis* or subdivision, and so on.
23 *Kataskeuēs*. To which is usually joined *lysis*, that is, the refutation of those things which are said by the adversary, or seem as if they could be said; also *ergasia*, the confirmation and amplification of the causes and arguments through various reasonings, which is more illustrious.
24 *Axiōseōs ē apodōseōs*. Hermogenes seems to perceive them as the same: for he says the exordium consists both of other things and of *apodōsis*, which is a claim, or *assumptio*, which is the orator's petition. I think, however, that Hermogenes only wishes to indicate that in the *apodōsis* a claim is especially treated—that is, some request for attention, favor, and the like—whereas our author, through *apodōsis*, indicates the *prosēkon*, as they call it, which occurs when the orator reminds the judge of his duty.
25 *Tēs hypolēpseōs*. Which has connection with the person or thing about which one is dealing: honorable, if good; shameful, if bad; and which generally generates joy, gratitude, envy, anger, or some other emotion in the one before whom the case is brought, or in the one who is bringing it, from which the exordium is afterwards formed. See Hermogenes, lib. 1, *part.*, cap. 1. For Fabius, this is the exordium by *occupatio*, for other Greeks, *prooimion kata tēn prolēpsin*. An example of this is in the oration of Tullius for Milo, Cluentius, Roscius, and others.
26 *Tēs hypodiaireseōs*. When that which was one and simple is divided by the genius of the orator into more, and it is shown that all must be spoken of, contrary to what seemed at first glance.
27 *Ek periousias*. When one says in accusation: "I could treat of a greater crime, but I will be content with this." In defense: "I thought a reward would be prepared for me, now I see myself accused."
28 *Apo kairou*. When it is shown through some notable event or thing, or in those before whom we are speaking, that what we seek is to be approved, and so it is right that we deal with it and obtain our petition. Hermogenes deals with all these species with care in his entire first book of *Partitiones*.
29 *Ta prosōpa kai ta pragmata*. By which the exordium is especially to be instituted, because it is *prosēkon*, although the observation of these is necessary not only in exordia, but in the other parts of orations. Common authors only treat of the division of causes or things, omitting the division of persons, but wrongly. See Voss, *Inst. orat. 3*, cap. 2, § 2.
30 *Endoxa, adoxa*. Fabius, I. XIV, c. 1, renders these as honorable, humble, doubtful or ambiguous, admirable, where he also explains the nature and reason of each. In the same way, Curius Fortunatianus speaks in lib. 1, and Sulpicius Victor in *Inst. orat.* Augustinus, in his work on this matter, calls them "Themata," that is, figures of controversies: *endoxon*, which we can call that of "good opinion" from which we can speak well; *amphidoxon*, which we can call that of "opinion from both good and evil" which we cannot clearly state; *paradoxon*, which we can call that of "bad opinion."
A Likewise, there are four kinds of introductions, as there are three modes of narration—the simple, the elaborate, and the complex—which some also call characters, as well as the loose, the dense, and the middle.
The loose and simple character, which is without elaboration, fits the panegyric. For the panegyric is an expression of praise or blame concerning things that are universally agreed to be good or evil.
That which is clear and generally accepted does not require proof. But the elaborate and intense character, which uses denser proofs, is fitting and terminates in the judicial, or forensic, kind. For it is necessary that a political and judicial discourse have credibility and not be without argument.
The middle mode and character is that which is complex, using proofs in a moderate and not excessive way, neither speaking things that are entirely without proof, nor yet relying on them too continuously; rather, it uses the elaborate and demonstrative style in some places, and the complex style with expressive phrasing in others. Because it is fitting for all three kinds, it is rightly called "middle." It is more adapted than the others to the deliberative discourse, and to those who compose history. For those who write history at times narrate simply; at other times they provide proof for things that are far from credible; and at other times they describe persons, things, times, and places, and the forms of every kind of animal. Such is the interpretation of narrations. B
On the three modes of narration.
There are three modes of narration: simple, elaborate, and complex, which some C also call characters—loose, dense, and middle (for the loose and simple character, without elaborate construction, is adapted to the panegyric). For the panegyric consists of praise or blame concerning things admitted to be good or evil. That which is manifest and agreed upon requires no proofs; but the dense and intense character, which is the elaborate one, utilizes denser proofs and is pertinent, terminating in the judicial kind. For it is necessary that the political or judicial discourse possess credibility, and not be without proof.
The middle mode and character is the complex one, which uses proofs in a middle and not excessive way, neither speaking things entirely without proof, nor yet using them too continuously; but at times it proceeds elaborately and demonstratively, at other times complexly and with careful phrasing. It is therefore called "middle" because it is fitting for all three kinds. Indeed, it is more relaxed than the others in its application to deliberative discourse, and to the composition of history. For those who write history at times narrate simply, at other times provide proof for matters that are difficult to believe, at other times describe persons, things, seasons, and places, and the forms of every kind of animal. Such is the explanation of the narrations. D
[alt-version omitted]
A Four, then, are the species of prooemia, just as we have mentioned three modes; and there are three modes of narrations, which are also called characters, appropriate to the kinds we have mentioned. Homer, however, B added a fourth, the allegorical, which is itself suitable for the panegyric kind, and can most suitably be used whenever we wish to raise the thinness of a speech to volume and magnitude. Contentions are divided into objections and solutions. Objections and solutions consist of capitula, epicheiremata, tractationes, enthymemata, and sometimes epenthymemata and fictions. A speaker ought to introduce his own proper capitulum positively, then use epicheiremata, tractationes, and the rest. The capitulum of an opponent, however, must be solved first by a proposition, subsumption, contrary proposition, and solution. Then, it is necessary to use there as well the epicheirema and the rest, just as we have said. We have already spoken of the capitulum and of what it is composed; the epicheirema, however, is constructed from circumstances, either all at once or from some of them. The tractatio is derived from likeness, example, the greater, the lesser, the equal, and from the contrary, or from all, or from some of these. The enthymema is a comparison and conclusion of the epicheirema.
C D [alt-version omitted]
C But the secondary enthymema is A the enthymema; and the fiction (plastē) is everything that has not happened but is posited as a hypothesis. A proposition (protasis), now, is a discourse in which an objection (hypophora) is expected. An objection (hypophora) is the adversary's argument. A counter-proposition (antipro-tasis) is the promise of a resolution (lysis). And resolution (lysis) comes about through an exception (enstasis), or through a counter-position (antiparastasis), or through violence (biaion). These things concern the contentions. The epilogue (epilogos) is divided into the amplification of goods, or into a final destruction and overturning, and into a recapitulation of the main points, which is also called secondary discourse (deuterologia).
But these are the things regarding the four parts of an oration: proems, narrations, contentions, and epilogues. Since every rhetorical oration, of whatever sort of the three kinds it may be, is accustomed to being composed according to certain appropriate ideas, come, let us also outline to you the number of ideas. There are seven B ideas of speech.
(51) Regarding the epicheirema and the expolition. For both are confirmed by an enthymema. Expolition (ergasia) acts first and immediately, the epicheirema follows. For as Hermogenes says: the expolition (ergasia) confirms the epicheirema, just as the enthymema confirms the expolition.
(52) The secondary enthymema. Since for the sake of greater confirmation or expolition, it is joined to the first enthymema or proof, and to its conclusion, and it becomes as it were a continuous conclusion. Concerning which, and its kinds, Sturmius has much to say in *Ad Hermog.* lib. III, *de Inv.* c. 7.
(53) Fiction (plastē). Supple: “of this epicheirema,” for Hermogenes treats it in the aforementioned book, ch. 16, entirely. Indeed, because it holds the chief place after the preparation [of the argument] of the epicheirema. For instance, the epicheirema is: “One must not obey the enemy when he demands something.” Then follows the *ergasia*, or expolition, by example: “For not even our ancestors obeyed Xerxes when he demanded earth and water.” Now the *plastē*, or fiction, is joined: “But if anyone had then persuaded them that Xerxes ought to be obeyed, would not everyone have overwhelmed him with stones?”
(54) Proposition (protasis). Concerning these and the following ones, he made mention above, where he treats of the parts pertaining to the *kephalaion* or head. He explains what must be understood by each. He has this also from the aforementioned Hermogenes, lib. II, ch. 2. He gives an example of this kind: someone persuades, upon seeing the enemy approaching, that the Isthmus should be dug through, and the *protasis* or proposition is: “We must dig through the Isthmus.” Then the *hypophora* or subsumption follows, and contains that which the adversary could say: “But this perchance seems difficult.” This is met by the *antiprotasis*, by which we deny it. We have at hand what we should answer, by which we also show this to be false. Then the whole thing is closed by the *lysis* or solution: “For what? Is the matter not easy to dig?” Here later it is amplified and illustrated by its reasons and causes.
(55) *Lysis*. What the Latins call *confutatio* or *reprehensio*. See Hermogenes, lib. IV, *Invent.* c. 5, entirely.
(56) *Enstasis*. He discourses here on the triple method of refutation, according to the manner of Hermogenes. Regarding *enstasis* add Vossius, *Inst. orat.* c. 5, § 9.
(57) *Antiparastasis*. Through this is understood the reasoning which aids the primary depulsion, and confirms it, and is as it were a subsidiary depulsion, as, “I am immune from rendering accounts,” [to answer] the words of the adversary, which have in themselves a *kephalaion*. These are refuted first by *enstasis*, and by a denial: “You are not immune.” Then through *antiparastasis*, that is, the reason by which an exception is aided; even though you were immune, not for that reason was it done to harm the fatherland.
(58) Regarding violence (*biaion*). Of which Hermogenes, ch. [quoted in margin]; and Vossius in the aforementioned passage. But Hermogenes makes it double, in one way as it were a counter-turning, when what the adversary said is inverted and twisted against him, as, “You killed, because you stood by the slain man.” The defense of this is done through *biaion*, indeed, because “I stood by, I did not kill; for if I had killed, I would have betaken myself to flight.” The other [way], when the consequent of the adversary is denied, and the contrary is proved.
(59) The epilogue. Of which I do not think Hermogenes provides a tradition. For that which is in the partitions, this does not pertain here.
(60) Into amplification. When we cast down the adversary, for this is the prior part of the epilogue, and contains in itself the leading of the adversary, or something similar. See Curius Fortunatianus, lib. II, *Rhet.*
(61) Recapitulation. Which in Greek, as said above, are *kephalaia*, are repeated. Cassiodorus says that by some of the Latins it is called a renumeration.
(62) Regarding the secondary discourse. This is the second demonstration, or the expolition. For after the thing has been demonstrated by many arguments, signs, and examples, then all these are repeated, and gathered together into one place, so that they might appear to have been treated more copiously. And thus it is nothing other than *anakephalaiōsis*. This Sturmius [notes] in *Part. Hermog.*, where mention is made of this matter.
(63) Regarding ideas. Of which Hermogenes treats in two entire books. But *ideæ* are, by Platonic imitation, nothing other than certain forms or figures of speech, which cannot be seen as much as they can be thought by the mind. Aristotle calls them *eidē logou*; others, as Cicero testifies, *charaktēras*. Although these do not differ much from *ideais*, even according to the opinion of our author, who says these things were composed through certain *ideai*. Hence it is certain that those are in error who think Hermogenes overthrew the learning of the ancients regarding characters, and opposed his own doctrine of ideas to it. For rather, what had been expounded by them more generally, he explained more distinctly. And so Vossius, whom see lib. IV, *Inst.* cap. 6, § 11, where he also shows that ideas are strictly nothing else than certain affections, as it were, of the three characters. Add Sturmius, lib. III, *de Elocut.* c. 6.
(64) Seven. As Hermogenes wills; see him, lib. I, *de Id.* But why seven, and not more,
nor fewer? The interpreters of Hermogenes explain this thus: because, first, every speech must possess perspicuity, since without it it is not understood; second, due magnitude, to fill the ears; third, beauty, that it may also please, which is corrupted unless, fourth, nobility be added, by which it flows, as it were. Furthermore, that this flow may be decent, fifth, there is need of soul, temperament, and morals, which, sixth, truth alone commends. Finally, that these may behave according to just reason and law in accordance with the diversity of arguments, there is need, seventh, of a certain power of eloquence to set them forth. Add Sturmius *de Elocut.* lib. III, c. 6 seq.; Voss. *Inst.* lib. V, c. 6, 13.
(63) *Perspicuity.* Sturmius renders it as an open genus of speech; Scaliger thinks that Fabius called it *Perspicuitatem*, but Cicero *evidentiam*. Lib. IV *Poet.* c. 1. Vossius also retains the word *Perspicuitas* in the designation of this virtue; and Sturmius himself also not infrequently uses it. Hermogenes treats of this in lib. I *de Id.* cap 1.
(66) *Magnitude.* Sturmius renders this sometimes as amplitude, sometimes as magnitude. Almost all the others retain the latter word. Hermogenes treats of it in the said book, c. 4.
(68) *Quickness.* Trapezuntius [renders this as] velocity. But Scaliger notes in the aforementioned place that the Greek signifies more. Vossius very rightly thinks it should be called an incited or accelerated genus of speech.
(69) *Character.* Trapezuntius translates this as affection; Scaliger’s judgment is appropriate. The others preferred to render it as "moral" speech.
(71) *Efficacy.* With the added "occult gravity" in Hermogenes’ special booklet on this virtue. But in II *de Ideis*, where it is treated of equally, he translates it as "apt figure of speech." Scaliger says it is called *vis* (force) or *acrimonia* (sharpness) by Fabius and others, and he prefers that to the rest, whence Vossius also explains it as *vis dicendi* (force of speech), rejecting the interpretation of Nunnesius, who interpreted it as prudence.
(72) *For truth.* Not only in our judgment, but by the authority of Hermogenes himself, who in the chapter on morals subjects this genus to it. "Character," he says, "therefore creates, in speeches, equity, and safety, and in addition to these, the truth appearing in accordance with them." Our author doubtless had these words in mind when he wrote these things, since the remaining ones are not divided.
(74) *Eukrineia (Clearness).* Sturmius rendered it as perspicuity. Ger. Vossius preferred to call it *distinctio*. Although *distinctio* might rather seem to be that from which *eukrineia* arises; for when all things are proposed and expounded distinctly, then *eukrineia*—which is nothing other than ease and promptness of judging through the removal of every obstacle—can arise even in pure speech.
(75) *And purity.* Our author recedes from the Hermogenian order. For Hermogenes placed this species before the other, and deservedly, because it is, as it were, the guardian of the latter. Furthermore, this virtue is called *puritas* by Sturmius, and *simplicitas* by Vossius, which is thought to be nothing other than *oratio akataskeuos* (unadorned speech). Hermogenes explains its nature in lib. I *Idear.* cap. 2.
(76) *Gravity (Semnōtēs).* With Aristotle, witnessed by Scaliger, it is *metria barutēs* (moderate weight), not simply *barutēs*. Otherwise it is that virtue in which there is authority and dignity. V. Hermog. ib. c. 5.
(77) *Peribolē (Addition).* Trapezuntius translates it as circumlocution, which Scaliger censures and says should be called *complexio*. Vossius seems to prefer *cumulatio* (accumulation), because he calls speech instructed with this virtue "accumulated." But to Sturmius it is *exaggerata* (exaggerated) speech, so that it might also be called *exaggeratio*, just as Hermogenes sometimes calls it in his commentaries (dict. lib. c. 18), where he shows that it is a virtue by which speech, with various circumstances added, is no longer bare, but becomes ample and great.
(78) *Asperity (Trachutēs).* It is produced by the bitterness and acerbity of speech, when it becomes disagreeable to the ears and mind on account of reproaches. See Hermog. in the said place, cap. 6.
(79) *Splendor (Lamprotēs).* All render it as splendor. Scaliger, however, [calls it] an illustrious or brilliant genus; Vossius thinks it can be called *festivum*. It is, however, that virtue by which we commemorate great things, or things notably done by us, so that we may give a greater indication of credibility. V. Herm. d. I, c. 8.
(80) *Acme (Akme).* Scaliger translates it as *vigor of speech*, which I think is more correct, since *vis* signifies something more, and thus *deinotēs* is also explained. By this word Hermogenes understands that virtue by whose benefit all things are valid and "sinewy," and have strength and forces. See him in the said book, cap. 9.
(81) *Vehemence (Sphodrotēs).* Sturmius calls it a figure. Trapezuntius and others call it *vehementia*. But it is asperity toward those who are inferior or equal. V. Herm. cap. 7.
(82) *Equity (Epieikeia).* Trapezuntius calls it *modestia*; Scaliger and Vossius think it is more correctly translated as *æquanimitas* from Terence, since *modestia* extends more widely. To Sturmius it is *moderatio* and *mitigatio*, when the orator not only remits from his own right, but even compares himself with the common people, even if he is not of the number of the common people. See Hermogenes lib. II, cap. 6, where Sturmius sometimes also calls it *æquabilitas*.
(83) *Simplicity (Apheleia).* That by which we take away all things which, in our case, are significations of vices, and in the adversary are significations of virtues, and thus we present ourselves and the adversary to the judge without craftiness. They commonly render it *simplicitas*. Scaliger calls it the virtue of daily speech, not only among the common people, but of learned citizens, such as M. Tullius attributes to the mother of the Gracchi. Hermogenes treats of this in lib. II, c. 3, of *Id.* cap. 2, and it is a virtue by which we signify the nature of morals.
A And weightiness (85), which is viewed in itself (86), is not considered, but consists of artlessness and kindness (87). Each of the specific ideas consists of eight elements: topic (88), method (89), words (90), figures (91), members (92), composition (93), pause (94), and rhythm (95).
And the rest of all the parts of the ideas which have been enumerated are known. But as for figures, Hermogenes has transmitted a few agonistic ones (96), B consisting of simplicity and candor, with true pleasantness and modesty, and also prudence and urbanity. Immanent discourse.
(85) *Weightiness*. Vossius calls it gravity in one word. But this expression is ambiguous, and is generally used for that genre which is the opposite of thinness. Therefore, when Sturmius interprets it by adding weight in chiding and expostulating, it is because this, and not that, is the workshop of this virtue. To Scaliger, it is "incendiary oratory." See Hermogenes, lib. I, c. 8. Sturmius makes this distinction between *semnotēs*, *barytēs*, and *deinotēs*: *semnotēs* is gravity by which the nature of things is considered, such as divine and celestial things, and then human ones in which the majesty of the republic consists; *deinotēs* is gravity on account of the decorum observed by the Orator in persons, places, and times; *barytēs*, however, is gravity on account of the annoyance of the listener, and on account of the authority of the one chiding and reproaching.
(86) *Which is viewed in itself*. He has this from Hermogenes, lib. II, *de Id.* c. 2, the words of which are these: "Gravity indeed (i.e., *barytēs*) falls upon this moral genre of speech, yet it does not complete, nor constitute it, as simplicity, and moderation, and truth, and the expressed morals of persons do." Nor can it be considered by itself, as those forms are considered singly: but it has need of simplicity, or moderation, or some other form of the moral genre. In Greek it is: "But indeed simplicity or kindness, or one of the other moral qualities must also be present." Whence it is evident that that *kai* between "simplicity" and "kindness" is not to be understood as purely conjunctive, but rather disjunctively, and that Hermogenes is not speaking of these two virtues only, but of others as well.
(87) *Consists of*. Not simply: for it has two properties, sentiments, and the method of treating them, which Hermogenes teaches what are required here; but in respect of words, members, composition, etc. Of which Hermogenes himself says: "But the genus of words, or even the other parts of speech which follow the words, there is none of them which is peculiar to gravity." I would dare to say, however, that those parts which used to be suitable for the parts of the moral genre of speech correspond more than the other forms of speech, that is, in simplicity and an equable form of speech or a modest one, and furthermore those that are in affected speech and as it were expressed from the soul. And our author has looked to these.
*Of the eight*. What Scaliger thinks of these, it is worth the cost to see his book IV, *de Poet.* c. 1, and at the same time to add Vossius, lib. VI, *Inst. Or.* cap. 7, § 12.
(88) *Topic*. It is incorrectly edited here as *ennoias*; it should be read as *ennoias* (sententia), from Hermogenes himself, who discourses at length on these and the following in lib. I, *de Ideis*, cap. 1. He understands, however, by "sententia" not what is vulgarly just called such, and which in Greek are otherwise *gnōmai*, but in a universal sense all utterances, which are otherwise *noemata* and *ennoemata*. See Sturmius, lib. I, *de universa ratione elocutionis*, c. 6. He begins, furthermore, from sentiments, not as others do in the consideration of these matters from words, because no one can rightly think of words unless he has first thought of the sentiment to be formed by words.
(89) *Method*. Thus he calls the treatment, C elocution, which consists in the apt and convenient disposition of the aforementioned sentiments, in amplification, comparison, and the like. For *methodos* is nothing else to Hermogenes than "figure of thought," as Sturmius teaches in the aforementioned book in many chapters, c. 15, and Vossius confirms, *Instit.* VI, c. 6, § 12. This is the certain and thought-out conformation of a sentiment, by a suitable habit and adornment of elocution. Nor did he himself first use this word thus, but he received it from Theodectes, who discourses thus concerning the end of rhetoric in *Compendio Rhetor*, Hermogenes: "The end of rhetoric is not simply to persuade, but by persuasive methods." Scaliger thinks it can be called instruction.
(90) *Of words*. He understands words, which require conformation for the constitution of the aforementioned or the method, concerning which Sturmius [says] much, lib. II, cap. 1 et seq. of the said work.
(91) *Figures*. Which pertain to words, of which he treats next, not to disposition, which is contained by method. For words must have propriety either by their nature, or by treatment, when they are added to others for explanation, or by power, so that they sound better, and signify more. That propriety or habit, or quality and mode, becomes suitable by the conformation of all, that is, it effects a "figure," which is nothing other than a word placed in a certain and apt way, and it is somewhat more extensive than what is called a figure by the Latins.
(92) *Members*. Everyone renders it as a member or part of a period, which is also called a *komma* by the Greeks, and not only that, but a *kōlon*, whence the oration becomes either *kommatikos* or *kōlikos*. See Sturmius concerning these in lib. II of the said work, cap. 1, and the following, dealing with it accurately.
(93) *Composition*. For so it is called by Hermogenes himself, lib. I, *de ideis*, cap. 1. Which *syntheken* he soon after [mentions]. Trapezuntius and Scaliger distinguish it, and call *metron* indeed "composition," and *synethesin* indeed "collocation." And composition, to Scaliger, is the order of parts cohering among themselves, of elements, of syllables, of words; but collocation is the numerous placement of elements and words, not just any kind, as composition is.
(94) *Pause*. Which is not only in the conclusion, but in all parts of the oration, and sometimes several times in one part. For "pause" does this, lest members run on too much, and be enormous; and also lest the oration fall or rush anywhere, but end decently.
(95) *Rhythm*. Which arises from that decent composition and pause, and from these it is viewed, as Hermogenes himself teaches. Scaliger is a little different: "Rhythm is the sound suitable to the sentiment from the composition and disposition of the parts"; he omits "pause" or "clausula." But perhaps he is quibbling without cause.
(96) *Agonistic*. He understands these to pertain to *agōnas*, that is, contentions. Hermogenes proposed those which our author hints at in the whole of lib. IV, *De invent.*, where he calls them *logou schemata*, that is, as Sturmius most correctly explains, *logou epicheirematikou, ergastikou, enthymematikou*, or as our author puts it in one word, *agōnistikou*, which
he mentions, A along with other figures; but we shall also clarify for you the number of these, as Phœbamon the Sophist, Minucianus the technician, and other rhetoricians see it. Let us begin by stating the definition of the figure according to Phœbamon, and then according to Tiberius. A figure is an alteration of thought or diction for the better, occurring without a trope. Tiberius states it thus: A figure is that which expresses the mind naturally, yet not directly, but rather turning and altering the thought for the sake of some fashioned ornament or necessity. A figure of diction is an alteration of what is customary, for the sake of some fashioning of ornament, or providing some utility to the discourse. But since we have provided the definition, come, let us also clarify the figures by name. All figures of thought and of diction come about in four ways, or causes: by deficiency B (a), by surplus (b), by transposition (c), and by alteration (d). And we must begin from the figures of...
[The following portion is a translation of the text provided in the Latin column, reconciling the Greek where possible, and maintaining the scholarly apparatus.]
The rest of the rhetoric, he also made mention of other figures. We, however, will set forth for you the number of these, according to the opinion of Phœbamon the Sophist, and Minucianus, who wrote on the Art, and the rest of the rhetoricians. We shall begin, however, to speak according to Phœbamon from the definition of a figure, then according to Tiberius. Figura is an alteration of the mind’s sententia or of diction for the better, made without a trope. Tiberius thus: Figura is that which—while indeed it expresses the mind naturally—does not do so directly, but turning and changing the sententia for the sake of some fictitious ornament or utility. The figura of diction is its alteration, exhibited in words as is customary for the sake of ornament or convenience. But since we have given the definition B, come, let us also divide the figures according to their names. All figures of sententia and of diction arise in four modes or causes: either because of deficiency, or because of abundance, or by transposition, or by alteration. One must begin, however, with the figures of diction. Deficiency, therefore, of oration, and others; but he does not show his age, and relates nothing about this part, so that I doubt whether he is the same as ours. But the manuscript book of Tiberius on figures or schemata, in Venice with Diego Hurtado, is praised by Simlerus in his *Epitome Gesneriana*, which I consider more likely to be ours. C ...the explanation of whose definition see in Vossius, lib. v, *Inst.* c. 1, § 2. Observe, however, that here... [instead of] *logou*, he writes *tropon*, for this seems more correct. ...something is missing, and it must be written; for it follows after: Furthermore, from these words of ours, I think that which is read without sense in the aforesaid Alexander Rhetor in these words must be corrected and supplemented: What then is this? It must be written without doubt so that the sense is, just as that other... Consider and see, you who are instructed by better books; for to us, except for the old Aldine edition of the year 1508, no other edition is at hand. D ...this invention of Scaliger, dividing schemata into four classes—by reason of essence, quantity, quality, and position—lib. *ut Poet.* c. 32, and perhaps he drew from this or a similar, then little-known, source. It is the least false that he asserts that no one before had reduced figures to certain species. Consult also the *Scholia Anonymi* on Figures. ...according to essence, which are figured by substance, lib. v, *Inst.* c. 2, where see other things pertaining to this. ...of quantity with Vossius, from the aforesaid place. ...of position. ...of quality. However, I know not what author of Greek Scholia on figures, edited by Aldus with other rhetoricians, has this very thing, but in a corrupt state, whom we therefore shall have to correct from ours.
species are three: asyndeton, precision, ellipsis. A Abundance has eleven species: tautology, diplosis, epanaphora, epanadosis, epanalepsis, periphrasis, epiphrasis, paronomasia, epexegesis, epimone, epitasis. Transposition has four species: hyperbaton, anastrophe, prolepsis of cause, proepizeuxis. Immutation has eight species: heterogenes, heterarithmon, heteroptoton, heteroschematiston, heterochronon, heteroprosopon, apostrophe of person, and antistrophe. Among the figures of thought, aposiopesis and epitrochasmus are figures of deficiency; while there are six figures of abundance: prodiorthosis, epidiorthosis, procatalepsis, paralepsis, diatyposis, epimone.
That all figures befall according to four [causes]: that is, cause, deficiency, abundance, transposition, B or according to four modes, as the divine apostle says: "From the common" (ἀπὸ κοινοῦ) is when a word is spoken once but understood and construed many times.
(10) *From the common.* [The author] defines this figure, and the rest, with these words: "'From the common' is a word spoken once, but understood and construed many times." When a single word is placed, but it ought more often to be sub-understood and repeated from what precedes. Regarding this, as it seems, Caesar replies: "supply whatever seems to be understood." Grammarians treat this figure.
(11) *Diplosis.* Commonly [called] *anadiplosis*. For we do not understand another [definition], but we find also by the definition given by the said author that which he calls *diplosis*, the same as *anadiplosis*. "Reduplication" is the Latin [term] for it.
(12) *Epanadosis.* This is the same [figure] as that which is commonly called *anodos*—a conclusion drawn from the aforementioned arguments.
(13) *Epiphrasis.* This is a genus of periphrasis. The anonymous author [says]: "Periphrasis is a discourse uttered exceptionally to someone or some people," and it happens in two ways. For, when the name is placed first, it is called [periphrasis] by eminence—as if I were to say: "So-and-so the scholar came, and the whole tax." But when the name is placed after, it is purely *epiphrasis*—as, "The whole tax came, and so-and-so the scholar." Therefore, the whole difference between paraphrase and epiphrasis lies in the fact that in the former the figure is placed before, while in the latter it is placed after the non-figured expression, just as this author intends.
(14) *Epitasis.* I believe he means the genus which is called in Greek *epitheton*, and in Latin *appositum* (apposite), or "added to the name." The aforementioned author defines it thus: "Epitasis is a species of epimone, which, however, does not explain the matter or thing equally, but raises it to a greater degree, containing an *exallage*." As if one, speaking of a heavy-set and tall man, should call him, on account of his height, a column, or a mountain. Indeed, it differs little or nothing.
(15) *Prolepsis of cause.* The praised Scholiast—whether he is Tiberius himself or someone else, we make no pronouncement—plainly calls it by this name. He defines the interpolation of the pretense: "of which we shall speak, in the middle of the beginning of the discourse, [that is, extracted] from the beginning of the discourse," as, "Friend, you have everything: wheat, wine, oil; do not steal, lest you be condemned." It is clear that this is something other than what is commonly called *prolepsis* and, in Latin, *occupatio*.
(16) *Proepizeuxis.* This is another figure, which is commonly called *epizeuxis*, and it occurs when a verb is inserted between two or more nouns, which otherwise is wont to be reserved for the end. Consult the aforementioned author, who provides this example of this figure: "So-and-so did [it]; and so-and-so, or so-and-so, or so-and-so, are noble, and so-and-so." "So-and-so did [it], and so-and-so, or so-and-so..." "The things by the sea are fearsome, being deserts." "The children are playing, and [they are] falling." "He plays and falls."
(17) *Heterogenes.* This occurs when we pass from one gender to another, and it is not unlike the figure they call *enallage* of gender, although it is rather an ellipsis of a noun, which is sub-understood, responding in a different gender to the applied adjective. The stated author gives an example of this kind: "The things by the sea are fearsome." It is a grammatical figure.
(18) *Heterarithmon.* When a singular is placed for a plural. Grammarians are wont to call this *enallage* of number. In the Anonymous [writer], the example of this figure is of this kind: "The children are playing and falling." I see nothing here to fit this figure. Perhaps it should be written that some are wont to call it [a figure] of cases.
(19) *Heteroptoton.* Some call it *alloptosis* or *enallage* of cases. The example offered is of this kind: "He rules the city," instead of "He rules to the city" (*imperat urbi*). This figure also pertains to grammatical doctrine.
(20) *Heteroschematiston.* When a verb is changed into a participle. The anonymous author gives an example of this sort: "Instead of saying, 'Since so-and-so was running, this happened,' I say, 'Running, this happened.'" (This is how it should be read, not as it is in the Aldine). See [the text] itself, and this is also among the grammatical figures.
(21) *Heterochronon.* When one tense is changed into another.
(22) *Heteroprosopon.* When we introduce another person speaking, of whom we ourselves are the authors. The Anonymous [writer] proposes these examples: "All the Egyptians say this about you; the Thebans, having found [them] disordered, said this and that." I.e., "All the Egyptians say this about you," namely, the things which should be subjoined, and here must be sub-understood.
(23) *Apostrophe of person.* That this is referred to among the figures of diction by our author, and also by the Anonymous, is to be noted. Vossius thought that Hermogenes did this alone. But the reason why it is referred to this genus is because what to others could have been said in the third [person] is thus said in the second person. See Sturmius, cap. 22, *De elocut.* Also, that should not be entirely passed over here, which, while our [author] and the Scholiast in [their] exposition call *apostrophe of person*, the same Scholiast entirely omits in [his] enumeration of the figures, so that, consequently, its name would seem to need being restored in those places.
(24) *Antistrophe.* When the diction and the usage are inverted. The Scholiast gives such an example.
A And the *epitrochasmos* (25) are of deficiency. Now, there are six figures of *pleonasm* (excess): *prodiorthosis* (26), *epidiorthosis* (27), *prokatalepsis* (28), *paralepsis* (29), *diatyposis* (30), and *epimone*.
It should be noted that of these figures of thought, none of those belonging to *pleonasm* fall into those of diction, except for that which is called *pleonasm*, that is, tautology; and of those belonging to deficiency, only one species falls in, which is *ellipsis*. Now, by transposition, there are again six figures of thought: *prosopopoeia*, *ethopoeia* (33), *micton* (34), *erotesis*, *peusis* (35), and *apocrisis* (36). By change, there are four figures of thought: irony, *diaporisis* (37), *diasyrmos*, and apostrophe. So much, then, for rhetorical figures.
Since it is the case that one desiring to be a rhetorician must know how to use the method of excellence (38)—that is, the disposition of technical propriety—and to write everything fittingly and appropriately, not to talk nonsense and confuse discourses, knowing how to teach excellence accurately, but not like Hermogenes, who promised to teach but was unable, never walking in the path of his promise, but pretending to have fallen ill with lethargy (39). The method of excellence is to know how to use it for everything.
B Note must be taken that, of these figures of thought which are for abundance, none falls into those which are of diction, except the one that is called pleonasm, or tautology. Of those also which are for deficiency, only one species falls in, namely ellipsis. By transposition, there are again six figures of thought: prosopopoeia, ethopoeia, micton, erotesis, peusis, apocrisis. By immutation, finally, there are four figures of thought of intent: irony, diaporisis, diasyrmos, and apostrophe. And so much for rhetorical figures.
After this, whoever desires to deliver eloquence must know how to use the method of the faculty and the structure of suitable art, and to write everything decently and conveniently, neither talking nonsense nor using base speech, so that he may know how to teach the faculty accurately, and not be able, according to Hermogenes, to merely promise instruction, yet never fulfill what was promised, by feigning the disease of oblivion.
The method of the faculty is to know how to use [everything]—a list that to some Latins [is called] a collection. See Sturmius, *De elocut.*, ch. 34.
(31) *Of these figures.* He has this often called the Scholiast, so that there is scarcely any doubt that it is either Tiberius or Phabamon. But in his own text it is read with the article omitted, and by a fault of the typographer, or whether he himself wrote it so, I would not say.
(32) *...conjunctim [together].* With a contrary spirit, which therefore must be corrected from our [manuscript].
(33) *Prosopopoeia, ethopoeia.* As to both figures and the difference of one from the other, see Aquila Romanus, besides other rhetoricians.
(34) *Micton.* I understand the kind no otherwise, nor from the Scholiast, who in this part is not only badly corrupted, but also mangled in many places. I think that this is when both preceding figures are joined, and one is mixed with the other. Such is the double speech—one of the mind accusing the body, the other of the body accusing the mind of Gregory Palamas, Archbishop of Thessaloniki—which for that reason I consider to have been written as a mixed [figure].
(35) *Peusis.* Rhetoricians have this figure [distinguished] from the preceding. But our author distinguishes, which is to be observed. The Scholiast: *They differ from interrogation and from peusis* (thus it should be written, not as the Aldine edition has it)... The rest is missing. Therefore, I do not clearly see what he means: perhaps this, that in interrogation a response is necessarily to be substituted, but in [peusis] it is not.
(36) *Apocrisis.* In the same [text] it is *apopoiesis*; but I think it should be corrected from our [manuscript].
(37) *Diaporisis.* In the said author and with a geminated letter *diaporresis* is found. Aquila Romanus defines it as *dubitationem* (doubt), consult him. It is also called *aporia*. See Vossius in his *Institutiones Oratoriae*.
(38) *Method of excellence.* Our author returns to Hermogenes, whose separate book exists under this title.
(39) *...fell ill with lethargy.* He inveighs against Hermogenes, as if he had promised more than he could provide when he undertook to write of excellence; and therefore [he acts] as under a more specious excuse.
A And what is needed in proems, narrations, contentions, and conclusions, in what ideas, in what kind of speech, and in what thoughts, methods, expressions, figures, and likewise in what person and subject. For it is necessary to know the differences of these, and to introduce the speeches suited to them. He who truly knows how to teach these things [knows] when, and where, and how, and what kind of proem should be set, and until when it should be broadened, and where one, and where two (40), and where more proems should be used, and where by no means, and where it is fitting to use a pre-arrangement (41), and a narration, and where not only [one ought] not to construct, B but not even to narrate (43); but to pass by with full omission and silence, even if the geometer (44) [who wrote] of the things he writes against the Sardians appears not to have known this, and another band of such-named rhetoricians [remains]. Besides these, [it is necessary to know] where it is not necessary to contend, and how, and until what point, and where by no means (46), and where it is not [necessary] to conclude, and in what figures and in what species and part of an oration one should use [them], knowing accurately due to the false rhetoricians—I will not now speak of the refuse of the forum (47)—those insolent and disgusting [men], who think themselves superior even to the ether (48), while by the young (49) they are ridiculously mouthed about. But since from the C introductory exercises (50) up to the method of faculty we have proposed the whole of the rhetorical art, come, let us also deliver to you some definitions of these, adding at the same time a few [things] regarding Grammatici, ‘Attici Philologi’, the ‘Polyhistor’ Solinus, who wrote of the city or people of the Sardians, unknown to us today? I would incline more to this. For he also praises John the Geometer, author of certain Hymns to Mary, [as listed in] Simler from the Vatican Library Catalogue. D (45) And another band. All these are very obscure, I do not know if they are not useless; I myself elicit nothing from these which satisfies me. Perhaps others will act, who will be equipped with better books. (46) And where by no means. Namely, he understands not just any kind of confirmation, but the contention specifically so called, which consists in a certain fight with an adversary. This is not necessary in all causes and kinds. (47) The refuse of the forum. He calls both orators, and causidics and shysters, the dregs of the forum, and opposes to these declaimers or Sophists who are inept in the schools. (48) And of the ether. Since they, with all the things that have been said, use [them] indiscriminately, as those who think not so much what ought to be said, as what can be [said], so that they think the oration is better from that, the more it abounds in figures, thoughts, and acutely said things, whether they be useful and necessary or not. (49) By the young. Who obtained their precepts from suitable masters. (50) From the introductory exercises. Namely, nothing else is performed in the introductory exercises than that the method of treating each part in a complete oration is learned. For to this pertain narrations, confirmations, refutations, laudations, amplifications, comparisons, and the like. In the same way, in the following [parts], the rhetorical ‘progymnasma’ [is] nothing else than an exercise through the individual parts of an oration, of which the definitions are there proposed. Which appears even from the definitions themselves.
A Since we have said enough to those who wish to pursue eloquence according to art, we shall now bring to an end the account of the rhetorical pro-exercises. But what are the definitions of rhetoric, both in general and of the rhetorical exercise? A *status* (issue) is a rational controversy, characterized by a single phrase B or statement, of those things which are in a civil question, according to which the division of the chapters—those brought forward to create belief—is instituted. *Invention* is the excogitation of notions suitable to the subject matter. And otherwise: it is the comprehensive grasp of a store of notions and epicheiremata (arguments) congruent to the subject matter. *Idea* is a quality of discourse suitable to the subjects involved—both persons and things—according to the thought, the diction, and the entire weaving together of the harmony. C *Method* is the management and a certain sort of shaping, especially regarding the thought, and the rest; or [it is] a well-ordered arrangement marshaled toward the appropriate benefit. And otherwise, method is a technical mode of how one must elicit notions: by what cases, inflections, dispositions, figures, persons, and the like; whether to begin from what is remote or from what is near, or openly; by what movement of the soul, by what habits, and according to what modes nature requires the voice. A *prologue* is a discourse preparing the hearer for the reception of the subject matter and appropriately disposing the underlying discourse. D *Narrative* is an exposition of the things in the cause, or the matter itself, from which the cause consists. *Contention* is...
A the proof and demonstration of one's own arguments, and the refutation of those of the adversary, made through epicheiremata,, tractations, and enthymemes. A *Head* is a part of the discourse containing the demonstration of the proposed matter, composed from noemata and epicheiremata. An *Epicheirema* is an invention that prepares the proposed question, or a discursive argument taken from outside for the probation of those things with which we are occupied. A *Tractation* is a comparison of some matter to the subject epicheirema. An *Enthymeme* is a rhetorical, twisted, and imperfect syllogism; and otherwise, the conclusion of the preceding epicheirema. An *Epenthymeme* is a double comparative intensification in one and the same problem, bestowing an additional sharpness upon the enthymeme. An *Epilogue* is a discourse following the aforementioned demonstrations, a collection of things, characters, and emotions, containing the augmentation and power of the arguments. And in ten thousand other ways the aforementioned are all defined. But one must leave out what is superfluous. B
(63) *The matter itself:* How is narrative the affair itself, and not rather its exposition or declaration? Or do we understand by "the matter itself" the naked [fact], through an oblique exposition, which by some is called a *state*? Or does it rather refer to those species of orations in which a narrative is not proposed, but the fact is understood as known per se, and thus serves in the place of a narrative?
(64) *Head:* This which is spoken of absolutely and by way of excellence is not the most generic head. It is the same as state.
(65) *Of the proposed matter:* That regarding which there is a question between us and the adversary, and which he tries to confirm or refute for his own use and we for ours. Therefore Sopater also defines a *head* as that which contains the proper argumentation and confirmation of the same proposition, distinct from others. See Hermogenes, *On Invention*, book III, c. 2, and Sturm there.
(66) *Noemata:* What is the difference here between noemata and epicheiremata? Indeed, epicheiremata consist of noemata, or sententiae and propositions, for I do not think one should understand here by noemata ethical or political maxims brought forward under specific persons. I believe he means propositions or questions which are either confirmed or refuted by epicheiremata; for example, "Pericles is guilty of treason," because he did not devastate the property of Archidamus. In this controversy, a *head* will be on the part of Pericles: "It is necessary that the betrayal of the fatherland be convicted by some testimony." That this is from the mind of our author will be clear from two things: first, from the *noema*, which will be nothing other than a simple proposition, which is declared by the reason why it is necessary, because in every matter about which there is controversy, one must produce witnesses. Then, from the *epicheirema*, by which this is proven from its circumstances, because it is just, because it is equitable in the person of such a great man, and so on. Unless someone thinks that by *noema* one must understand that very primary proposition in every head, which is perhaps better, because the other is often omitted and the arguments are brought forward immediately, and thus the epicheirema is introduced. Certainly, it is nothing other than a thing of this kind to be understood in this place, or it teaches that what follows immediately after the definition is that which is intended. C
(67) *Taken from outside:* By the six circumstances, namely: person, thing, place, time, manner, cause, about which Hermogenes [treats in] *On Invention*, book III, c. 3, and our author below in the examples, which instruct an argument of this kind most broadly, whence an epicheirema is also called a broader ratiocination. Cassiodorus: "An epicheirema is an excursion descending from a ratiocinative rhetorical syllogism, distant in breadth and production of speech from dialectical syllogisms." Nor did Hermogenes intend anything else in the aforementioned book, ch. 6, when he says *peristasis*, than what our author says.
(68) *Comparison:* Because it consists in the bringing forward of examples and comparisons with other things. See Hermogenes, *On Invention*, and our author below in the examples.
(69) *Twisted:* Because of the force that is in it. This definition pertains to every species of rhetorical argument, which is more effective and more robust. Juvenal also [alludes to] this with respect to Satire 6. D .....with a rolling speech twists his short enthymeme....
(70) *Imperfect:* Because one or the other premise is lacking.
(71) *Conclusion:* Hermogenes uses it in this sense. For first he commands the *proposition* of the head to be posited, which we have said above is called the proposition of the argument, for the sake of teaching; then the *epicheirema* pertaining to the confirmation; soon the *tractation* or expolition for illustration and gentle rousing; finally the *enthymeme* for force, because it contains sharpness in itself. See the same book, *On Invention*, ch. 7.
(72) *Epenthymeme:* Hermogenes in the aforementioned place defines it thus: "An epenthymeme is, strictly, an enthymeme brought upon a preceding enthymeme, another enthymeme newly invented by thought." See what I noted above.
(73) *Epilogue:* It is the very definition of the Scholiast on Aphthonius, which Vossius explains, *Inst.* book III, ch. 6, § 1. Our author has most of his definitions from that author.
A These things we have set forth more concisely according to the technical system of Hermogenes, which contains all rhetorical power, adding a few things and the definitions. Come now, according to Theodectes of Phaselis [(74)], and the technical writer Minucianus [(75)], whom the Sophist Hermogenes derides [(76)]—although he has appropriated the entire power of rhetoric [(77)] from this man and from Apsines [(78)], and yet has not brought it to perfection [(79)], but has feigned a case of lethargy [(80)] so that, by not writing on the method of power (*de methode deinotetos*), he might not appear clearly as Apsines—in a figure of speech of passing over, we shall again summarize these things more briefly. Minucianus, that writer of an art [(81)] who, as he said, partook of a divine nature, just as Theodectes did before him, in very few words encompassed all rhetorical power, saying that the duties of an orator are invention, order, disposition, memory, pronunciation, and elocution. For an orator must, out of the three... B C D
A kinds of rhetoric, find the subject matter—whether it be the whole or a part 84, the status 85, or the preparatory exercises—and then find what is appropriate and consequent 86 for each of these: prooemia, narrations, 87 heads (or contests), and after them, epilogues. He must maintain order in these, and economically, properly, and decorously bring forth all these things with mind and 88 reason, [considering] with what characters, what kinds of ideas, what modes, expressions, figures, and other things each of the parts and kinds must be handled 89. And he must know where one should use the four parts of the prooemium, and where one should not use all, but only some; and where in the discourse one should use the four parts, and how, and to what extent one should set these forth. And he must not overlook any of these things: where [to place] the prooemium, or elsewhere the narration, in another place the contests, and in others the epilogue.
Furthermore, the orator should not deliver the discourse without imitation, but should express through his speech the manners and passions of the proposed [subjects], both in speech and in figures, as the divine Homer does, and interpret everything decorously, so that his speech shapes all manners, passions, and things that are to be said or expressed. The B virtues of elocution or diction in a discourse are four, excluding, I say, figurative and enigmatic discourses, and those written by way of imitation of certain persons who write obscurely and ambitiously—for the virtue in these is a vice of discourse.
The four virtues of oratorical elocution, especially in demonstrative and historical discourse C, are these: perspicuity, brevity, probability, and gravity, just as [they are found] in Isocrates, Empedocles, and the others 96.
A96, and to Dionysius 98, Philostratus 99, Iamblichus 1, and all the ancients, and the wiser of the moderns, and to Hermogenes in his *Ideas*, he appears [excellent]. For the "Hellenism" of words is a modern thing 2, just as perspicuity 3 arises from a multitude of expressions 4 and clarification 5. It is a matter of beauty 6 and grace 7. Brevity is the work of a noble nature in an orator 8, and probability proceeds from art 9. And majesty 10 consists in a store of learning. And the seven 11 ideas of Hermogenes signify nothing else than that the rhetorical discourse must possess these four things, as well as a proficiency or a manipulation and management appropriate to each. For perspicuity and the beauty of rhetorical discourse 12...
97 *Empedocles*. I am surprised that he is placed after others. For he was indeed more ancient; rather, he is said to be the author of the art of rhetoric, and the first to have comprised it in writing. See Laertius.
98 *Dionysius*. I presume [he means] of Halicarnassus.
99 *Philostratus*. It is certain that he also wrote on the art of Rhetoric in this passage. But I judge that the elder is intended, whose *Questions to the Orators*, if he praises rhetorical subjects, Suidas mentions. He lived in the times of Nero, as we learn from the same author.
1 *Iamblichus*. He also wrote some things on rhetoric, in respect of which he is praised among the orators. But neither Eunapius nor Suidas mentions this, so it should be the more carefully noted. He lived in the time of Constantine, and I do not know why he was among the ancients referred to by our author.
2 *The "Hellenism" is a modern thing*. Although some praised it as a singular virtue of elocution, and others called it purity and clarity. Furthermore, I do not see how our author calls "Hellenism" something new, when Aristotle used it (Rhetoric, Book III, ch. 5). Perhaps his passage did not occur to him, or in our author’s age that part was more strictly required by some, on account of the barbarisms with which the Greek language then teemed.
3 *Perspicuity*. He explains the four preceding virtues, and how it also contains those which other orators require, just as Hermogenes himself shows—how well, he shall see for himself. Indeed, it was not Hermogenes' intention in his *Ideas* to show those four virtues, or to amplify them into seven ideas, and thus to increase their number, much less to oppose them to those [four]; but rather, besides those four which are required in every speech, to show seven—not contrary to those four, but indeed diverse—which are found in speeches, sometimes more, sometimes fewer, according to the reason of the argument and the matter which is being treated.
4 *A multitude of expressions*. He refers to things which are used as a multitude, as in Pollux, Book Vi, ch. 53: *Myriolekton* from Xenophon is the same as *polythrylleton*, well-known, clear. It is, therefore, the same as clear, unadorned, simple, and known to all.
5 *Clarification*. I do not see how this is another part that is required for perspicuity; for perspicuity with Hermogenes is brought about from purity of speech, or as our author says, from "a multitude of expressions" and "clarification." And what is it—is perspicuity from the clear or from clarification? It smacks of a tautology. But perhaps by this term, our author refers to the treatment, and he requires not only clear and pure words for perspicuity, but also the collocation of words and the treatment of the whole speech—not intricate, but plain and simple, and consistent with nature itself.
6 *It is a matter of beauty*. He shows whence the aforesaid virtue arises, just as he does in the following virtues.
7 *Beauty and grace*. I think it must be added here from what follows: "the work of the orator." He wishes to show what is required in an orator, so that he may be able to adorn his speech with virtues of this kind. And to the first indeed, that is, to perspicuity, he says two things are necessary: beauty and grace. What he signifies by these two, I do not sufficiently grasp, unless we wish to refer [it] to the mind, just as he presently deduces brevity from there as well. And in this way indeed, beauty appears to be able to be opposed to obscurity or darkness; grace [is opposed] to negligence, laziness, tumult, and foulness—as if to say that it is required for the virtue of perspicuity to be expressed in a speech, that the orator should have an intellect that is first open, then cultivated and patient of labor, or what at other times is wont to be called "elegant" by one efficacious word.
8 *Brevity of a noble nature*. That is, [the orator] should use [speech] not prolix, but brief and certain. Hence, in Tacitus, "Imperatorial brevity," [is used] for that which becomes emperors and grave men. See him in Book I, *Hist.*, ch. 18. Therefore, just as an elegant intellect is required in an orator, so a great mind is required.
9 *Art*. [It refers to] saying everything conveniently according to persons, times, and places, all of which the art of rhetoric teaches. And this is the third thing that is necessary in the orator—besides a great mind and an elegant and open intellect—namely, the art by which he knows how to bring these things forward suitably and decently, and to make his speech credible.
10 *Majesty of a store of learning*. The fourth thing which is necessary in an orator is varied erudition, such as [knowledge] of the gods, of natural things, of the republic and its manifold administration, of war and peace, of laws and rights, and what other things are of this kind. For these are the things which render a speech grave, as often as they are mingled with it.
11 *And the seven ideas of Hermogenes*. I said about these things, both in what preceded and in what follows, that it appears [the case], as they say, with a twisted neck that some of these ideas are referred to the preceding virtues.
12 *And the beauty of rhetorical discourse*. Two [ideas] Hermogenes lists here, under one virtue: perspicuity. Of the former [perspicuity], it is certain; of the latter [beauty], less so. Truly, in every beauty which [Hermogenes calls] *kallos*, or grace, there is perspicuity; yet it is not the case that conversely, whatever is perspicuous is immediately beautiful and adorned. Nor indeed do I think it true what follows, that there is no perspicuity in a plebeian and inornate speech, or that plebeian and inornate discourse lacks perspicuity. For Hermogenes seems to feel the contrary, as one who in perspicuity requires most of all thoughts known to all, common and vulgar voices, and a decent, straight, and simple conformation of speech, all of which are in...
A effect what they exhibit as perspicuity, yet not of a private person, nor unrefined. But *gorgotēs* (speed/vehemence) is certainly brevity [(13)]. Character and truth [(14)] make a persuasive speech. For if one should not aptly imitate the characters and use with the force of true speech the situational elements, and gentle thoughts, and hesitating figures, but rather express these contrarily, you would not seem a persuasive orator. That magnitude [(15)] is the same as magnificence, no one denies. But *deinotēs* (skill/power) [(16)], as we have said, is the using of all these things toward what is needed. There are therefore four virtues of rhetorical speech: perspicuity, brevity, persuasiveness, magnificence; and above these, *deinotēs*, the acme [(17)] of the art. Let everyone who wishes see [this] in the book of the partial chronicle [(18)], primarily, whether it possesses the four rhetorical virtues of narrative, and then together with them writers who compose *deinotēs* according to the orator, through B the Hermetic caverns [(19)], of which Orpheus speaks of having run through, and through those rugged paths—which Isocrates, and Lysias, and Demosthenes, and the contemporaries of these, and some few orators after them, have run through, but not according to the refuse of the market, which [he describes] as *atta*, and as those things of the Syrian orator [(21)], and in what others [he terms] the Syr...
[alt-version omitted]
C ...compared with the second virtue, and he calls it the same. I for my part think it differs much. For *syntomia* is such brevity in speech, when all things that make for amplification, illustration, and circumduction are cut away, and those things are brought forward only which are simply necessary, without the addition of circumstances, causes, and the like, even if in the speech itself, with respect to words and formulas, everything is full. Such was approximately the brevity of the Laconians, even in daily conversation. But *gorgotēs* differs far from this, which often has a place when not only necessary [things], but almost superfluous [things] are brought forward, and it consists in the very brevity of sentences, words, and formulas, as: "What then shall I do? Not go? Not even now, when I am summoned freely? He has shut me out, he calls me back, shall I return? No, even if he should beg me." And such is frequent in Sallust, for which cause not a few call him brief.
...compared with the third virtue. ...of which four virtues, though he does not make it different, since it is nothing other than the suitable use of those virtues. See what he himself has to say about it in the preceding [section], and what we said before. ...absent this, all remaining virtues achieve nothing, nor do they attain their end.
...to indicate is not easy to define: for there is no one, as far as we know, who has published a book on a rhetorical subject under this title. Since, however, it follows, I am led to think that the partitions of Hermogenes are meant. But it stands in the way that he praises him as an orator in the following [section], whereas he is wont to disparage Hermogenes. For it can hardly be said [he could have] forgotten so quickly. Therefore it is more [likely] that we should think some work of Theodectes or rather of Minucianus is here being praised, because he calls this very Minucianus in the preceding [section] D ... (since those words must be absolutely distinguished from the preceding and referred to Minucianus). Now, moreover, that [remark] fits best with him, which follows concerning the cave of Mercury. Indeed, our [author] seems to do nothing else with these words than to lead us back to that very author from whom he drew these things which he passed on concerning the virtues of speech. That [author], however, is not Hermogenes, but, as he himself states in the preceding [section], is Minucianus. But even if he himself had not said it, it could nevertheless be established from the fact that it is another, not Hermogenes, who is signified here, since he speaks expressly of the four virtues of speech, concerning which Hermogenes wrote nothing, but [wrote] rather of the seven Ideas, which in a greater or lesser number are detected in these virtues.
[(19)] *The Hermetic caverns*. Alludes to the myth of Orpheus, who is said to have received the lyre from Apollo, who had originally received it from Mercury, its inventor, in Cyllene, a mountain of Arcadia. See Hyginus, lib. II, Fab. Or it refers to another fable about Mercury guarding some heap or other of goods in a cave, from whence Orpheus said he had taken his erudition. The fable is in Tzetzes and Orpheus himself in the book on gems. Add Junius, *Adagiorum Cent. VII*, to 86.
[(21)] *The Syrian orator*. Who is this Syrian rhetor? Does this belong to his own name? Or is it rather taken from his fatherland? Certainly I know of no orator with "Syrus" as a proper name. But [I know of] some from Syria, among whom is Andromachus the Syrian, who lived in the times of the emperors Tacitus and Aurelian, as we learn from Eunapius, *Life of Porphyry*. Also Sopater the Syrian, from the same author, who lived after the times of Constantine. But also his master Jamblichus was a Syrian, born in Chalcis, [in that part of] Syria which is called Coele, a very well-known city. And perhaps no other is indicated in this place, since he is also named in the preceding [section].
A
SYNOPSIS OF RHETORIC
We grasp [(22)]. But those who wish to be correct [(24)] must not examine every point of law [(23)] so as to be harmed, but rather by making use also of equity, they must be saved.
Arguments [(26)] are taken from the six circumstances:
Person: The Byzantines are great workers, and they need to dig the Isthmus. Res (The Matter): Besides, digging is in many ways considered a part of education. Place: And this, especially since the land is porous and soft, and not rocky and impenetrable. Time: Nor does the winter hinder us, by contracting the hands of those who dig, but it is spring. Mode: Furthermore, we shall use iron tools for timely service. Cause: So that the enemies, passing through that Isthmus, may not plunder our possessions.
Treatments are taken from these:
Example: For Xerxes, too, long ago dared such a task, whence he even dug through Athos. Simile: See how both terrestrial animals and winged creatures perform digging. For birds indeed excavate trees. Contrary: A mouse, however, digs up the earth, as does an ant. B Greater: For if it is a great work, yet we are not cleaving the sky, nor are we farming the air, which would be beyond human power. Equal: But it is consistent with our proportion. Lesser: The Milesians are smaller [than us], but nevertheless they also dared such a work, and brought it to an end.
Enthymemes from the six circumstances:
Person: As for Xerxes and the Persians, they were not great workers, nor innovators, like the Byzantines. Matter: Then, the work itself is also cheap and base, as it stands among men. Cause: Although he, the Persian, was overcome by vainglory, we [act] so that we may ward off the approach of the enemies. Mode: And he [used] not tools C
...signify those who always retain the old and go over the same string, and finally, to apply it to our proposition, they think there is always need of an exordium, always of a narrative, and they judge that one must speak in the same mode before the people as in the senate, in a favorable case as in an odious one. [(23)]...that sound which children frequently emit when they first begin to speak, as also Grammarians observe; but as they call not only their parents, but anyone else they meet, by this same word, and indeed keep repeating this one thing continually. And hence arose the occasion of the proverb regarding those who, after the manner of little children, repeat the same things always and everywhere without judgment. Furthermore, for *catta* it seems that *catta* with a doubled letter should be written, for so the logic of the proverb itself seems to demand. Whereby that same sound is always censured. I think these are the very words of that Syrian, with which he used to plague the inept orators of his own time. Whoever their author may be, he seems to be initiated into these, who used to address such people with this very word. For so in book 1, *On Ideas*, chap. 5: "You will not find an examples of this in Demosthenes, for there is none: but among those 'wooden' D sophists of yours you might find many." There are, however, among Hermogenes, "rude and thick," as I shall show more fully later. This word is suspect to me; for what are "factions" doing here?
Enthymemes also are taken from the six circumstances. Person: And Xerxes indeed and the Persians never undertook such great or new works as the Byzantines. Matter: But the work itself requires neither such expense nor is it so difficult. Cause: Furthermore, he indeed approached it from a desire for novelty, but we, in order that we may shut off the path to the enemy. Mode: Then, he [used] tools that were not very strong, we [use] also many aids.
[(25)] ...to demand justice, and to elicit and propose all its inmost parts. Whence it happens that a good cause is often lost, nor can it sometimes profit the defendant more than the excessive vehemence of the adversary. Add Tacitus, II, *Hist.*, cap. 10.
[(26)] The argument shows the treatment of Rhetorical arguments. They are taken from Hermogenes, book III, and others *On Invention*; whoever wishes, let him read there.
A perhaps by strong men, we on the other hand by a multitude of hands and iron tools. Time: Moreover, he dug in the winter, and with war perhaps impending, whereas we do it in the spring. Place: He dug in rocky hills, we in sandy ground.
The *epenthemata* are likewise from the six circumstances. Person: He, though occupied with great wars, yet because of his greed undertook work of little utility. We, for the sake of nothing else but that no damage should be brought upon our affairs, will undertake this labor. Matter: Then he undertook a greater work; why shall we not dare at least a small one? Mode: Since he was covetous of money, he quickly abandoned it; we, being generous, will readily carry it to the end. Place: He was situated far from all necessary things, while we are as it were at home. Time: He, because of the winter, could not carry his work to its end; we, beginning in the spring, will easily finish it. Cause: Since he did it and imposed checks on others, while we do it so that we may guard our own.
B
LAMENTABLE NARRATION OF MATTHEW CAMARIOTA ON THE CAPTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE
(Turco-Graecia, p. 76.)I will not mourn my father. For I both consider and declare him blessed in that he is dead. I would have mourned him, and with good reason, if, after the fatherland had been taken by storm, he had remained C alive and fallen into the hands of the Barbarians, and, oppressed by hard servitude, had been dragged away like the rest of the citizens. Certainly then, he would have been forced to see and endure those things—which, who is there who would not, even if he had a heart of stone, prefer to undergo countless and most harsh deaths rather than live so ignominiously and miserably? For even if he fell slaughtered by a hostile sword, and lay among the heaps of the slain, that is not yet excessively horrible; but this would have been most horrible, if he had been forced to lead such a life, as would certainly have been the case: that ever-increasing misery should be added to his previous and continuous calamities and sicknesses, D which would increase the grief of his soul; so that former evils, with new ones repeatedly supervening, would become more grievous. Nor indeed this would come to pass merely by the recollection of lost former happiness, or of the previous miseries which had happened then to him and his own, but also by the sight of those things which were happening to others everywhere every day, right before his own eyes
A acerbissima. For he was certainly going to see those things which happened to others, and which he himself would have had to endure, had he been suddenly precipitated into such a change of life: evils which were not merely to reach his soul, but to afflict his body as well, and subject it to countless miseries, day and night. I do not, therefore, lament, I say, my father, because he was captured together with his country and saw the day of slavery, to speak poetically, and at the same time, by his perception of that unexpected and most grievous slavery, departed from life by a hostile hand before experiencing the many and great evils that followed. Nay, I even use this very fact as a subject of consolation, considering the extent of the calamities that engulfed us. But if to anyone it seems bitter to depart from this life by a violent death, seeing enemies with drawn swords, breathing slaughter with savage eyes, and inflicting wounds—and those upon vital parts of the body, where, once struck, swift death follows; or upon other less dangerous parts, so that a lingering sense of pain brings a more bitter death—such a thought is indeed human, and I praise him who is of this mind, because he is touched by sympathy for human nature. Nevertheless, because such a death is not without its reward and gain, I am led not so much to lament as to bear these things moderately, while I weigh within myself the condition: that it is probable that he who left life in this way has departed for a better state; especially if, devoted to the pursuit of virtue, he made it his guide through the whole course of his life. Such was my father, B who was an inseparable follower of virtue and died to this world. Thus, he gave many proofs of praiseworthy deeds: all things known to those who knew him. Nor is it necessary for me to enumerate what he distributed to the poor, or did kindly in receiving guests and those in need of mercy, or those things by which a man is recognized as good and merciful. For I fear lest I seem to be admiring my own, if I recount my father's praises at great length. And more will be added in the same letter to the praise of that man: that he was a priest worthy of God. To this place it was added that some, not being worthy, had forced themselves into the dignity of the priesthood and celebrated the sacred rites. Where he added: "This also, besides other absurdities which were then many and great, no less than those, nay much more, provoked and brandished the iron rod over us like a lightning bolt; as God irately sent an unwise nation against us, and visited our iniquities with scourges, because we had burned with our desires, and had fallen away from Him who alone could save us." Having said these things thus about his father, and others added besides, he infers: "Such, therefore, being my father: if he perished slaughtered, if he was cast out unburied, if he lacked rightful funeral rites, if he was not lamented according to custom, what do these things, which men occupied with small matters and endowed with a petty soul are accustomed to reckon, matter to that height of a divine soul? Wherefore neither has my voice been heard by anyone, nor will it be heard, lamenting such a man and one who endured such a manner of death. Nay rather, in all these things I both consider and call him blessed, and deem him worthy of a martyr's C memory, thus having departed for the sake of piety
A and the Christian life. I lament rather for myself, who have not been his companion in death, nor deemed worthy to depart from life in a like manner, so that this mode of death might not have been without reward for me, being severed from the burden of the passions, and freed from the pains which I have suffered up to this point, and which I shall suffer hereafter in such times. For there is no hope left for us to attain anything better. So greatly does the Christian cause languish, that those who bear the name of Christians have utterly denied the power of the name, all daring those things which stir God to indignation, so that they might acknowledge the wrath of Him exacting just punishments for the sins from which they were unwilling to turn away by doing penance, even though they did not recognize B His benefits and manifold grace of healing. Yet He does not, even while punishing, turn His fatherly heart away from our benefit; which is surely the general purpose of every rod that God wields: either to prune away vices, or to correct and convert the sinner. Although not even when lashed do the majority wish to return to a better mind, being entirely given over to their vices, so that they are incurable. What wonder, then, if we are daily subjected to such and so great evils? Therefore, I rightly lament for myself because of these things; but as for my father, I include him in the number of those who have left this life through martyrdom, not only because of the kind of death, but also because of the innocence of his life and his long preparation of soul for it. By this thought, therefore, I occupy his memory and I honor that day which saw him perish by the sword: C by the sword, which freed him from intolerable evils, which enrolled him among the holy martyrs, which, as it is fitting to believe, placed upon him an eternal crown, and led the priest and victim to the one and only High Priest, Christ our God; whom he desired and breathed, for whom he lived, for whom he died; to whom he departed as if from an inn, with whom he dwells: the same being before a priest, and at the last a victim.
For him, indeed, such a man, it is well that he has passed to the heavenly goods; but for us who are left in most miserable slavery, all things in every way are in an evil state. And indeed, to recount and lament at present those things which we have all and each suffered in common is superfluous. But if I turn my mourning to my own personal and private losses, these too turn out to be the common complaint of all, because no one has been excluded from the communion of this grief. All our defenses and D our ornaments have been snatched away together in one assault. The fatherland has been captured: a city in the world, like to no other, but of such a kind that it could not have been built by human hand. The same, preeminent in magnitude and beauty, shining in its site and charm: which I would dare to affirm to be the greatest and most beautiful of all cities anywhere, which alone everyone hoped and believed would remain forever unassailable by all, to which, after God, all entrusted their salvation: which if one called the eye of the world, or its heart, one would not stray from the truth, about which
A it was permitted to no one not to boast to have been enrolled as a citizen; it provided no small argument for commendation and glory. That such and so great a fatherland of ours has therefore been captured: the empire of the Romans has been removed; the glory of the empire, venerable in both fact and name, has been taken away. The divine and sublime form of the Church has been cast down; the hymn that was sent up from earth to God, vying with the angelic life and song, has been silenced. The divine temples have been overturned, the altars profaned, the holy things trampled underfoot. Old age has been despised, youth has been destroyed. Of those in the prime of life, the greater part—alas!—have fallen by the sword, while others endure disgraceful slavery. Matrons have been dishonored. Of their children, not only the female, but even the male, have been abandoned to the lust of the barbarians. And this, too, has been pitifully B turned toward impiety. All things are in destruction, honored things are in dishonor. There is no one to help. The whole world is full of those begging from our city, and the calamities are before the eyes of us all. All mourn, pitying our disasters; yet no one is able to offer consolation. The barbarians exult in our destruction; they make a sport of our calamities; they boast in their own impiety; they stand against our piety; they insult our solemn things. The name of God, because of our wickedness, is blasphemed. They cry out against our religion. In the places where we used to perform true worship to the true God, there now stands the abomination of desolation to be seen. The city of the Christians is already the city of the impious; it is no longer great in good things, but greatest in calamities. By how much it was more brilliant, by so much is it now rendered more C wretched. Nothing was more blessed than it before, and nothing is more wretched now; one might have compared it to heaven, since, like the sun and moon and stars, it displayed the varied beauties and grandeurs of its temples and other remarkable buildings, surpassing all others beyond any chance of comparison. But now I know not what one might say of it so as not to stray from the truth. For all things concerning it have henceforth shifted to the worse. It would have been better if fire had consumed it, or water had submerged it, or an earthquake had leveled it to the ground—together with its citizens and all those things that were precious and solemn—than that it should still be surviving and seen upon the earth, stripped of the precious and beautiful things it possessed. It is a great reproach to Christians, by as much as it was formerly a great source of pride. Those who besieged it hope to overrun the entire world, and logically so. D For if they deemed it alone to have been invincible throughout the ages, as being superior to all cities on earth which human hands have raised, if this is now captured and plundered by them contrary to every expectation, what henceforth is there among all things that is beyond hope? Hence they also conceive great, haughty spirits, and advance against all men with great pride and an irresistible momentum. This collapse of the city has cast down the courage of all; and all henceforth fear for themselves. No longer does anyone trust in his own freedom; all expect the barbarian to overrun them. Hence some pay him tribute for fear, not even then having any great confidence; while others are ready to do this, if they are not snatched away from the earth first. As the rush of fire, and much fuel and
A material encountered in its path, spreads everywhere, so can no one restrain the barbarian’s attack upon all. The barbarian always directs his thoughts to greater things; he extends his craving to the very ends of the earth, and no boundary stops him from rushing upon all with blind force. On the other hand, all are prostrated by fear, and each is anxious only for himself, waiting for the future to see how things will turn out; they remain languid, when on the contrary they ought to have conspired together as one, to drive off the enemy with common resources and arms, and to exact from him the penalty for the crimes which he has boastfully inflicted and continues daily to inflict upon Christians and the name of Christ. But this is currently no one’s concern, nor will it be hereafter, unless God wills it, when we have become worthy through our deeds. For each man consoles himself with this: that he will be the last to be reserved for calamities, deceiving himself with his own self-interest and with the ruin B of others—or even by fancying that the terrors will never reach him at all; or, if he does think to be roused and to defend himself, it is only when the barbarian comes upon him as well. But before that happens, he does not even calculate for anyone the danger of being snatched away beforehand, before he has even received any almost immediate sense of these terrors. This is caused for everyone by all the other sloth in which they live, and by the fact that through it the love of the many has grown cold and the zeal for the faith has vanished. Yet if each one, abhorring evil deeds and the crimes, were to consider the sufferings with which individual Christians are afflicted by the impious race as his own, and had taken up a zeal for Christ’s name that was worthy, not accusing others of things for which it is not right—not only would they themselves not have feared the barbarian now, but we ourselves would not have fallen into such a calamity, and the barbarian would long ago have paid the penalty he deserved. But now, because no one wanted to do what was fitting, and we have abandoned divine providence, having voluntarily cut ourselves off from it, and because of the great scarcity of those who would prevent the enemy, or at least resist him, it has come to pass that the barbarian has overturned our city—or rather, the common fatherland of all Christians—and has inflicted all sorts of most terrible examples upon us who have been captured, and with great boldness he effrenately invades the rest. For these reasons I weep and cry, and I will not stop weeping so long as I see the prosperous successes of the impious against Christians. My pain is also increased by what has happened regarding D my domestics and kinsmen. For one has been scattered here, another there, I know not to what parts of the earth, each having been dispersed. Some also have renounced the true religion and defected to impiety. And indeed, I cannot tell of the fortune of all the rest, of each one individually; but of the four sons of my brother, three of them—alas, alas for me!—have miserably apostatized, with the
A fragility of youth in this calamity, and have been carried off, one here and one there, so that hardly one remains to me, to be ransomed for money, and with great difficulty; a thing which perhaps would not have happened if their father, and my brother, were still alive. For he would have quickly searched for them and saved them, acting as the partner of my labor. But now, as they have been taken from the land of the living, and I alone am not sufficient for every task—especially since I have spent my life in great ease and scholarly pursuits (by reason of which I have happened to be inexperienced in all toil and action, except for my studies)—this condition has become the cause of such a change for them. For it was not easy to find where on earth they might be, nor any other of my kinsmen, since all had been wretchedly separated from one another by the barbarians, and one had been carried off to one place and another to another; and whenever I found any one of them with much labor, it took great effort to claim him. First, therefore, I encountered my sister, then my mother in another place, and later my nephew; and for them, with God as my helper, I secured their freedom, B myself performing every service and collecting with the greatest difficulty the price of their ransom: for this we obtained solely by the mercy of God, for which the divine kindness will repay a thousandfold in return to those who have contributed to our needs. Now I am alone, with many kinsmen scattered in different places, and not even two found together anywhere, in great destitution and misery. This is what greatly torments me, this is what makes me despair of life; this calamity holds out no basis for consolation. There remains to me one sole consolation, if I might see my brother's sons reclaimed and returned to their ancestral piety. Would that this might come to pass! For no greater reason for consolation can be given to me. Or surely, if it should happen that I depart from this life, I might at least be freed from the sickness of the soul. But I fear that, if this should happen, I might fall into even greater sorrows than the pains I feel from my present evils, subjected to endless punishments for the defilement of my soul. But oh that I might be delivered both from my present miseries and from the punishments of the future life, with God looking upon me with propitious eyes, and that I might enjoy the company of my father and brother, even if I do not possess the same purity that they have. I pray, however, for the grace of Christ, that it may deliver me—inclined as I am by repentance toward good deeds—from the torments of the underworld, having no regard for the swarm of vile affections and sins by which I am surrounded. I shall live, therefore, as long as it is granted to me to live, in grief and tears, unless something better should unexpectedly appear from somewhere of a improved fortune, reckoning all the honor of this D age as nothing, since it is not in our power, nor does it concern me in the least; even if some hold the opposite opinion, and for that reason are ready to condemn me as one suffering from extreme madness because I do not agree with them in this regard.