On the Procession of the Holy Spirit

OF GEORGE OF TREBIZOND TO JOHN THE CUBOCLESIUS ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

^A I was previously hesitant to write to you, knowing as I did your zeal for divine matters and my own preoccupation with earthly things. But now my father, sailing here, has roused and stimulated me, stating many things, and among others that you would straightway write to me concerning the dissension of the Churches if I were the first to initiate this. Furthermore, he said it seemed to him that if I were to converse with you very often by letter, I would come to know the truth, than which nothing is more precious to me. Therefore, I gave a sworn oath to my father in set words, and I now swear it to you, calling upon Christ Jesus as my witness: if you can demonstrate by the arguments in which you are well-versed that the dogmas of the Greek Church possess the truth, you will seize George together with you, and will restore him to the Greek Church, from which I was separated, having believed that I was doing well, and having believed so until this day. Do not hesitate, therefore, to write and to call me back to the truth which you deem it to be. For we already wrote to you first, and we invite you with all charity, conducting our discourse without stubbornness, without ambition, putting aside—as much as possible—the magnitude of the argument and its complexity. For we ^B truly thought we ought to write to you, not that we might appear clever orators, or that our arguments might be numerous, but solely that either we might learn the truth, or that you might acknowledge it even now. May the one come to pass, O Christ King, and may that which is pleasing to you come to pass. But so that I do not spend too much time in preliminaries, I shall now begin, having invoked the all-holy Spirit himself, about whom the discourse is, to my assistance.

2. Acknowledging the unchangeable nature of the divine essence, and the identity of the substance, three hypostases, and three persons

^A all in all, not dividing them, nor confusing them, we recognize them. We distinguish one as lacking a principle, another by generation, and a third by progression; and we assert that the Son is ineffably and eternally begotten of the Father, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son; the preposition indicating neither an instrumental relation, nor a local one, nor a ministerial one, nor any other that anyone might invent, nor is it uttered rashly or to signify a mere relation, but it points to the sole natural and essential one, which is, to wit, according to cause, and through which the one Spirit of the divine Triad proceeds so as to exist in his own proper hypostasis. Let there be, therefore, between me and you—and shared among all others—a discussion concerning these things ^B which we have spoken of in the latter place, as if they were certain established subjects. And in order to demonstrate this correctly, before all else, the order in divine things is to be considered by us; next, the sayings of the saints that lead to this; then, finally, the absurdities that arise from either viewpoint.

3.

That there is an order in divine things is clear to anyone who has a mind, even if the Greeks should burst ^C with anger.

4. But if they should say that the Son has a relation toward the Spirit by consubstantiality, the argument is not necessary;

^A for a relation will not come to be simply by things being consubstantial. For it exists also in all men who are of the same nature. On the contrary, it follows that for those who are consubstantial, a natural relation is present. But it is known to everyone somewhere that in divine matters, the Persons are united by essence, but are distinguished by relations. Therefore, the relation according to similitude and the sameness of essence does not produce a distinction, but a union. But the name of the Trinity, and the fact that the hypostases are held one by the other, requires a relation that distinguishes them. Therefore, the relation of the Son and Spirit according to consubstantiality does not preserve the Trinity. On the contrary, it confuses everything as if it were uniting them, not distinguishing them. Moreover, the relation introduces not an order, but rather a confusion of that sameness. For we do not have from it, inasmuch as it is sameness, any way to determine what we set before what. ^B Therefore, we shall either grant confusion in the Trinity, and thus there will not even be a Trinity, or, following the saints, we shall acknowledge the order in the relation of the Son and the Father.

5. But if they should bring forward the great Gregory to us, saying how he maintains these matters, both of relation and of order, and that he allows the knowledge of it to the Trinity alone, and to those who have been purified, to whom the Trinity itself has revealed it, let them know even now at length that they speak in vain. For if the saint’s discourse is concerning the subject at hand, and has not been spoken ^C economically; just as he does not give his assent to knowing this relation and order, so neither does he deny that it exists. Nay, he rather clearly lays out the economy which he used. For since many of the Pneumatomachi wished for the Spirit to be inferior in nature to the Son, the saint, in order not to give them an opportunity, by stating the order according to which the Son is the principle of the Spirit, used his discourse in this way, wishing both to save them, and to teach us this order and relation through other men. For he grants that those who have been purified are able to see this. And by this he clearly means that there is something which is according to consubstantiality. For he cries out about this, saying, "O you, confess the Trinity to be of one nature." By what reasoning, then, do the Greeks totally deny that which he concedes has at some time been revealed to the ^D purified? But if he himself does not express this, nevertheless that greatest Basil, in his letter to the canonesses, maintains it fightingly and most sharply for them: "But the Holy Spirit is numbered with the Father and the Son, because He also is above every creature. And He is set third, as we have been taught in the Gospels, the Lord saying: 'Go, baptize them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.'" But he who sets the Son before the Father, or says the Son is older, this man resists the ordinance of God, and wanders as an alien from the sound faith, while he does not preserve the inviolate order of glorification. And in his letter to Eustathius the physician: "Those who change the succession which the Lord handed down to us must be avoided, as those who openly oppose piety, and who set the Son before the Father, and the Holy Spirit before the Son." Do you hear that those who set the Holy Spirit before the Son must be avoided as impious? The third

is therefore that the Spirit, being from the Father, is ^A of necessity second to the Son.

6. And those new theologians of the Greeks ^B—oh, the ignorance!—admit this, but they say that the discourse of the Saint concerns the order of expression. But that this is impious and impossible is not difficult to show. However, one must first recognize that there is a double order: one which does not exist in the thing itself, but is fabricated by the thought of the one deliberating; ^C and another which is real and most true, not fabricated by anyone, but contemplated in the things themselves. That it is regarding this latter that the Saint speaks is evident. First, because the order by stipulation can even be changed piously, since it is a product of human intellect. But that other order, about which the Theologian speaks, does not admit of any change whatsoever. For those who change it are to be avoided, as they are openly fighting against piety. Furthermore, the mystery of the Trinity does not have its being in mere words and naked relations, but is Trinity in reality, that is, truly Trinity. ^D Nor is it Trinity because we believe in the Trinity; rather, because it is Trinity, we have believed in the Trinity and have been baptized. Therefore, one must not believe that the order in the Trinity is according to our stipulation. For it would be the most absurd thing of all to believe in the inventions of our own thought. But because order exists within the Trinity, for this reason it must be posited and believed at the same time; and as the Greeks would say, the order in the Father and the Son is to be regarded not for the sake of the relation of names, but for the truth of the things, with the cause being naturally fore-observed. And again: just as we believe there is a relation of the Father toward the Spirit, even though the names are not related to one another, so must there be entirely a relation of the Son toward the Spirit. If this is not so, the Spirit will not truly be third, but will only be placed by the positioning of names. For if we should call the Father a "producer"—as Nilus says, who abrogates the Trinity, and the theologian of the Greeks [does]—the Son as one from the producer through a product; but if [we call] the Father [a producer], the Spirit will be third, as being from the Father through the Son. Do you see how he wishes there to be no relation between the Son and the Spirit? In this way, these two hypostases are confused by him, while he openly fights against piety. There is, therefore, an order among the hypostases in nature, not present by stipulation, and the Son is not second to the Spirit. For he would be third from the Father, and would be said to depend upon the Spirit, and the Son would be named the Spirit's Son, a thing which not even the demons would assert. For the exact opposite is affirmed and believed: that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, and adheres to Him, and depends upon Him, and sits thus as the word of the Son, and [is] proceeding from Him.

7. Since these things are thus, it is of absolute necessity that the Holy Spirit has existence from the Father and the Son, or through the Son. For there is no other mode able to be devised which is fitting and appropriate to the divine persons, by which we may both preserve the order present in the things themselves and follow the sayings of the teachers, who [teach that He is] from the Father through...

the Son naturally and essentially. But before all, let the saying of the revealer of secrets, Basil, be brought forward, by which he proves that there is a double order, so that you may perceive from it the royal mind refuting in every way the impiety of the Greeks. For thus he calls those who reject the order. In his first oration against Eunomius he says: "Verily this order is natural, that one in fact is artificial," and having added a few things: "When Eunomius had hidden the first of these, he made mention of the second order; and he says that one ought not to speak of an order in God, since an order is posterior to the one ordering." But that fact he either does not recognize, or wittingly and prudently concealed, namely, that there is a kind of order not constituted by our arrangement, but consequent to the power of nature itself, such as that of fire and the light which is from it. For in these we say the cause is prior, and that which is from it is posterior, not separating these from one another by an interval, but by thought understanding the cause prior to the effect. ^B While that divine man proclaims these and similar things, and accepts no other order than that which follows from effect and cause, and calls impious those who do not believe that the Spirit is third, and is placed after the Son, by what reasoning do the Greeks dare to pronounce that the Spirit is not from the Son?

8. Be it so. But do the words "being poured out," and "bursting forth," and "proceeding," and "appearing" from the Father through the Son, not sound as though the Spirit is from the Son? You yourself know full well that these things are held by most Fathers, and that is why those who assert them do not need to be brought forward. Wherefore let us consider whether the Greeks understand these [things] as is fitting, which will be enough for you. ^C To be poured out, they say, and to burst forth, and to proceed, and to appear from both, or from the Father through the Son, signifies a second procession, according to which the Spirit is granted to the creature, who is exhibited to us not from the Father alone, but also from the Son. This progress, therefore, since it is a distribution of gifts, and occurs in time and in relation to something else, is from both: but that eternal [procession] by which the Spirit has His subsistence is from the Father alone. By asserting these things, while they preserve no order—which has been demonstrated to be impious—they do not revere the divine Cyril, who writes thus in his discourse to Nestorius: "Although the Spirit is in His special hypostasis, and is now understood in Himself, as He is the Spirit and not the Son, yet He is not alien from the Son; for He is called the Spirit of truth, and Christ is the truth, ^D and He is poured out from Him in the same way as He is poured out from God and the Father." Here the Greeks, though they may be clever in acumen and most prompt in discovering things, will never affirm that "is poured out" refers to that, "Although the Spirit is in His special hypostasis." Therefore the Spirit is from the Son just as He is from the Father. But if you contend that when he wished to show that the Spirit is through the Son, he fell into that [notion], so as to say that He is from the Son: restrain yourself a little. A little later we will examine the distinction of the prepositions. But that is also foolish which some relate, that the word "just as" indicates a likeness...

^A to the opinion of the Latins, who assert that the Spirit is from the Father, as from a primary principle and origin, and not in the same mode from the Son. For the similitude in this place, so that I may say also what is said by others, is not taken toward the mode of [His] being, but toward [the source] from whence He is derived. And if it is also taken toward the mode, this too is correctly said. For He proceeds from the Father through the Son, and the similitude [is directed] toward that mode of existence in a pre-initiatory manner, not [implying] that there is a difference, but [affirming] one and the same [reality]. For this alone is what "pre-initiatory" intends, that since there is one productive power in the Father and the Son, the Son has received this from the Father, from whom He also has His being. And just as if someone were to say that the divine nature is conceived in the Father in a pre-initiatory and archetypal manner, he states a matter that is entirely necessary—for from Him both the Son and the Spirit have it—so it is impossible to conceive a difference of nature because of this; on the contrary, it is entirely a unity, because the Father gives to the Son the nature which He Himself possesses. Thus, the Spirit being said to proceed from the Father in a pre-initiatory manner, but not so from the Son, does not provide any ground to conceive a difference in the mode of existence through that term "pre-initiatory," but on the contrary [affirms] a unity, so that He is the same in every way. For if the Father gives the productive power to the Son without beginning, possessing it Himself, which is what is signified by "pre-initiatory," it is evident that He will give that same power in number, from which the Spirit proceeds from Him. Therefore, he who says that the Spirit is from the Son just as He is from the Father is not liable to any absurdity, ^B since the mode of existence is not divided, but is united by the [term] pre-initiatory. That this is true is also evident from the contradiction. For if we were to grant this "pre-initiatory" to the Son as well, He would possess it without beginning and not from the Father. Therefore, it would not be the same thing that the Father has. It would therefore be different. But the pre-initiatory is granted to the Father alone. Therefore, being a partaker of all the Father’s goods, the Son possesses the same thing and is not different. Therefore, the procession of the Spirit from the Son signifies not the gifts, but that His hypostasis is from there, as it is also from the Father.

9. The great Basil ^D also asserted clearly and openly that the Spirit is from God: "The Apostle," he says, "in calling the Spirit [the One] who is from God, and making it clear that He has appeared through the Son, named Him the Spirit of the Son." And that he is also speaking here concerning the Spirit as He is in hypostasis is evident from the fact that no one among the teachers, up to this day, has called the gifts of the Spirit, or the second procession that is toward us in time, the Spirit of the Son. For the Spirit is eternally the Spirit of the Son. For this reason, that golden tongue, in her homily on the Holy Spirit, [says]: "She, he says, signifies the hypostasis of the Spirit when He is called the Spirit of the Son, or of Truth, or of Christ." That to which we must pay very careful attention is that the Apostle, as he says, called Him the Spirit of the Son for this reason—

that He has appeared from the Son. If, then, the hypostasis of the Spirit is called "Spirit of the Son," and if for this reason the Spirit, who is in His own proper hypostasis, and who is one of the Trinity, has appeared through the Son—if, however, some say that the Spirit appearing means that He was revealed to us through the Son, let them be ashamed, because the Son has rather been revealed through the Spirit. For He says, "He will teach you all things, and will guide you into all truth." The Father also is revealed through the Son: "I have manifested thy name," He says, "to men." But neither is the Father said to appear through the Son, nor the Son through the Spirit; the exact opposite is the case, and furthermore, this revelation occurs in time. But the Spirit has eternally appeared through the Son, since He is also eternally the Spirit of the Son. ^A Therefore, it is not the temporal manifestation, but rather that by which He has eternally appeared through the Son in order to be in His own self-subsistence, that He wishes to signify by "appearing." And these are their arguments. The divine Athanasius, in the *Disputation of an Orthodox person and a Macedonian*, says the following: "If, therefore, it is shown that the Spirit, who was poured forth from the Father Himself through the Son, is of the same divinity as the Son and the Father, He will also be proved to be worthy of adoration and worship." Behold, here again that which is "poured forth" is referred to the hypostasis of the Spirit. First, because the gifts are in no way said to be of the same divinity as the Father and the Son, even though they are thought by men to be uncreated; for you speak of the operation as something other than the divine essence. Second, because no one who has any sense speaks of an operation that is worthy of adoration and worship as being different from the essence. ^B But having arrived at this point in the argument, I lose control of myself, overcome by emotion. Woe to me, the wretched one! Woe to me! Because my nation, which once followed the orthodox faith most perfectly and loved Christ, has fallen into such impiety that it has synodically embraced the tenets of Palamas, and every year delivers the Trinity and its worshippers to the anathema; you have gone so mad against the truth that, in order to avoid the insoluble arguments of the truth, you have dared to preach that the operations of God are infinite, and are uncreated, and differ infinitely from the essence, and to believe that there is something uncreated outside the Trinity, and to expel from the Church those who do not think like this. Come, come to the Church of Christ, or of the ancient Rome. Ask, and you shall learn. Knock, and it will be opened to you. Follow your teachers, Athanasius the Great, ^C Basil, Cyril, the one from Nyssa, and the rest. Cast out Palamas with an anathema—he who, in order to escape the belief of Rome—or, rather, the truth itself—has cast the entire Church of the Greeks into a polytheism much more pernicious than that of the pagans themselves. What tragedian will lament these things as they ought to be lamented? Who will weep sufficiently? As for me, for the truth must be told, when these things come to my mind, just as with a woman prone to tears, it comes upon me to tear my cheeks with my nails, to pluck out my hair with my hands, and to strike my knees with my palms, as I recall the destruction of my race. But this is not the time for such lamentations. For I know that you, who are a Greek by opinion,

^A will mock me as a fool. But just as I speak the truth, so may Christ spare me on the day of judgment. Let the matters concerning this polytheism, or atheism, be set aside for now, and let divine Cyril lead us back again to the primary point: "Therefore," he says in the second book of the *Treasury*, "the Holy Spirit, coming to be in us, demonstrates that we are made conformable to God. He proceeds also from the Father and the Son." It is clearly evident that He is of the divine essence, proceeding essentially in it and from it. And that the aim of the saint here is also regarding the hypostasis is clear from his use of the article: "the Holy Spirit." For the gifts are not spoken of in this way, nor does "proceeding from the Father and the Son" apply to the gifts, as if the gifts were proceeding. Furthermore, you do not claim the gifts to be of the divine essence. But the Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son, is of the divine essence. From all these things, then, it must be believed truly that "to be poured forth," "to have appeared," "to proceed," and whatever else is said in this way regarding the Spirit, applies to His hypostasis. And if indeed it is said anywhere regarding the gifts, one must not be deceived by the homonymy, but rather examine, through what comes before and after the word, the subject of the discourse. Let this, then, be proven to us, that the one Spirit of the Trinity proceeds and is poured forth from the Father and the Son. And that these and such things signify the procession of the Spirit into being, it is not difficult to discern even from what has been said. For in what ^C other way could we conceive the Spirit, who exists in a particular hypostasis, to be poured forth from the Father and the Son, or through the Son?

10. Let this be explained more broadly. If the term "hypostasis" implies substantiating, that is, subsisting, then that which proceeds or is poured forth into hypostasis, proceeds in such a way that it is substantiated. The Spirit, therefore, proceeds and is poured forth from the Father through the Son, so that He might be substantiated, which signifies being in a particular hypostasis. This is what it means to proceed. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, or through the Son, so as to have His being from both. And that this is also the opinion of the teachers, hear Cyril from his work on the Gospel according to John. Let the statement be repeated from a little higher up, ^D so that you may know that those things which appear to be against us, as the Greeks would say, are actually in our favor: "The Spirit is the property of God and the Father," he writes, "but He is no less the property of the Son also, not as one thing and another, or as being perceived and subsisting dividedly in each. But since the Son is by nature from the Father and in the Father, being the true fruit of His essence, the Spirit who is proper to the Father by nature is brought forth, being poured from the Father, and through the Son Himself bestowed upon the creation, not in any servile manner, that is, in the way of ministry, but, as I just said, issuing from the very essence of God and the Father, and being poured out upon those worthy to accept Him through the Son who is consubstantial, and appearing from Him, specifically through this appearance into being, according to Himself, and remaining and dwelling in Him perpetually, attached simultaneously and distinctly." Do you see, first of all, how the Spirit is just as much of the Son as He is of the Father?

For He would be less His own, or rather, not His own at all, were He not from Him. For if the Spirit who is in the hypostasis is the Son’s own—a proposition which I know you and the Greeks acknowledge—He is His own either by nature or by acquisition. I call that "acquired" which is given to someone afterward, and appropriated, and which does not belong to his nature from birth, which is not strictly "his own." But that this is impious, Cyril demonstrates in many places, and no less so in the passage cited. For since the Son possesses all that is the Father’s, as He is by nature Son, He brings with Him the Spirit who is the Father's own, by nature and not as something added or from without. For it is manic to think thus, as he says elsewhere. And if the Spirit is naturally the Son’s own, as being naturally brought with Him from the Father at the very moment He is begotten, it is necessary that He have His being from Him. For it is not because He is of the same substance that He is "His own"; for in that case the hypostasis of the Son would also be something "proper" to the Spirit. But no one has ever said that the Spirit naturally brings the Word with Him from the Father, nor that at the moment of His procession the Son is naturally given to Him; nor that because the Spirit has all that belongs to the One who produces Him, for this reason He also has the Son as His own. On the contrary, you know that the entire doctrine is established by the Holy Fathers. Why? Because they knew the Spirit to be also from the Son, but they did not know the Son to be from the Spirit. For consider: if someone were to say that at the moment the Spirit proceeds from the Father, He naturally brings the Son with Him, and that the Son is the Spirit’s own—would you accept this? I know well that you would cast him out from the assembly of Christians, and you would immediately grasp that he who says such things thinks that the Son is from the Spirit. Therefore, the Spirit is not the Son’s own because of the consubstantiality, but because He has shone forth from Him according to an manifestation toward existing in and of Himself—that is to say, toward existing in a specific hypostasis—and because He is His own, for that reason He is also consubstantial. ^B That "one's own" is understood in this way, and that this is its power, see clearly where Cyril says in his discourse *Against Nestorius*: "For just as the offspring that is from man—and indeed from each of the other living creatures—according to nature, so his 'own' would be understood and called that which is from his essence." Do you hear that the term "one's own" is used not only of God, but also of men and other living creatures, to signify that which is from someone? But Athanasius also, in his discourse *Against the Arians*, says: "For since the Word is His own by nature to the divine essence, He is from Him and in Him." Behold, again, it is shown from this that the Son is from the Father, because His Word is called His own. And the divine Cyril again, on the verse, "And I will ask the Father," notes the following: ^C "For since the Son is a partaker of the natural and essential goods of God and the Father, He has the Spirit in the same way in which the Father is understood to have Him, not as something added or from without. For it is simple-minded, or rather, it is madness to think such things; but rather just as each of us holds his own breath/spirit within himself, and pours it out from his inmost bowels to the outside." Do you see the resemblance? Are you persuaded by what has been said, or do we still need witnesses? Therefore, it is His own...

^A Spirit of the Son, because He is from Him, just as our own spirit is from us. For if He were not from Him, He would not be His own; but since He is His own, He is therefore from Him—not a gift, not an operation, but one from the Trinity. For He has appeared from Him by an manifestation that leads into existence by itself. And this is what it means to proceed. Therefore, He proceeds also from the Son, or rather through the Son, just as the divine Maximus says ^B as he interprets what the golden lampstand means in the prophet Zechariah. For the Holy Spirit, he says, just as He is by nature according to essence of God and the Father, so also He is of the Son according to essence, as proceeding in an ineffable way from the Father, who is essentially begotten through the Son. Behold again, the Spirit is shown to be the Son’s according to essence, by the fact that He proceeds through Him.

11. But if you say: the statement that He is essentially from Him—if it were to signify that He is from the essence of the Son, but were to abolish that He is from the hypostasis, which some of the ^C Greeks have suspected, and wish to indicate consubstantiality from this, not seeing that if this were granted, the Father would also be piously called to be from the essence of the Spirit, a phrase which no one has uttered to this day—you will easily detect the fraud hidden in the claim. For the most wise Maximus would speak most absurdly if he were proving the same thing from the same thing; just as if someone, wishing to show that essence is man, were to say: "Man is essence, because man is essence." For if he wishes for the Spirit to be of the Son according to essence for this reason—because He is essentially from Him, or from His essence, as the Greeks ^D imagine—the argument would be completely ridiculous, showing nothing, but saying that the Spirit is of the Son for this reason, that He is of the same essence. Do you see to what ridiculous arguments those of the Greeks turn themselves? Consider, moreover, the impiety. Whatever is begotten and proceeds into existence is either from the hypostasis alone as it is hypostasis, or from essence and nature alone without considering the hypostasis, or from both—namely, from the nature or essence which is in the hypostasis and is conceived in the hypostasis. The Greeks themselves would not say the second; for it seems they think it absurd, because the conclusion follows that the Trinity, being of the same nature, would be confused, so that each of the three would have its being from itself and from the others; and for this reason they think that what proceeds and is begotten is from the hypostasis as it is hypostasis. Alas for the madness! For if the hypostasis, as it is hypostasis, generates and produces, then the hypostasis will be from the hypostasis according to the same thing, and thus these things will not be of nature, but of hypostasis. And that this is impossible is evident to everyone who rightly considers the common opinions of Christians, the sayings of all the teachers, and the very nature of things. You will say that it is found explicitly stated that the Son is generated from the hypostasis of the Father. And I add that it is found much more explicitly stated that He is from nature and essence, and is naturally generated therefrom. But if it is stated that it is from the hypostasis naturally, it is certainly from the enhypostatic essence. But how can you conceive of a hypostasis,

^A tell me, pray, if you do not consider it in the essence? For we can understand essence and nature, in a certain more universal way, without hypostasis—wherefore it seems to some that it subsists universally—but to conceive of a hypostasis, and to speak of it while not also considering the essence and the nature, is entirely impossible. Wherefore, even when we speak of the unbegotten and the proceeding as hypostatic properties, we understand the essence that is considered in the specific hypostasis of the unbegotten, the begotten, and the proceeding. ^B For we do not believe in bare properties, nor do we confess that these set the essences apart, but that they are set apart *about* the essence, according to the voice of the Theologian. For when we say that the Father is not the Son, we do not only signify this—that the paternal property is not also the Son’s—but that the nature and essence considered in the hypostasis of the Father does not have the filial property. For we do not believe there to be certain bare properties of the essence, contemplated without a subject, but we believe the properties to be in the nature, and not all in all. For it would follow that the Father is the Son and the Spirit, and the reverse—which simply smacks of Sabellianism. ^C But just as, according to the divine Dionysius, the light flashing forth from three lamps together is the whole light, and is light in the nature, and is united inconfusedly and divided indivisibly—for the light of each lamp is its own, which resides in it—so, or even more transcendentally (for God surpasses all things), there is one nature to the Three, but it is divided indivisibly by the properties and united inconfusedly by nature. And this is what we mean when we say that the One is a Trinity, and the Trinity is One. Therefore, that which is begotten and proceeding is not from the hypostasis, as it is a hypostasis. ^D For it is impossible for a hypostasis to be conceived by itself without nature; nor, indeed, is it from the essence, as it is essence. For if the nature of the Father and the Son were one, the Son would also be from Himself, which is absurd. It remains, then, the third option: thus, both to beget and to proceed is confessed to be the work of nature—yet not of just any, but of that in which the property of begetting or proceeding is considered. And this is from the enhypostatic essence; which also accords with the nature and has been stated by the Saints. For they do not say the Son or the Spirit is from the essence of God absolutely, but the one from the essence of God and the Father, and the other from the essence of the Father and the Son; and neither overlooking the nature nor [failing to] set forth the hypostasis, they teach most clearly that just as the Son, being begotten from the enhypostatic nature and essence of the Father, is for this reason Son and consubstantial to the One who begat Him, so also the all-holy Spirit, having His existence processionally from the enhypostatic nature of the Father through the enhypostatic essence of the Son, is for these reasons consubstantial to the Father and the Son. And let these things be said thus.

XVII. Since some say the Spirit is from the Father through the Son, while others say also from the Son, [let us] first [examine] what the difference is between the preposition *from* and the preposition *through*, with respect to what is proposed,

and then let any objection to the previously recited saying of the divine Cyril be fittingly refuted. The preposition *through* often indicates mediation in place, as if one were to say: "He was brought to the island of Crete *through* Corcyra"; it often also indicates the instrumental. But what need is there to enumerate these things to someone who is trying to show that it sometimes denotes natural relationship and mediation? Come then, when we say: "The fruit from the root *through* the branch," do we not say that the fruit is by nature from the branch? Or in what other sense would it be understood? Furthermore, when we say: "Light *through* the ray from the sun," do we not say that it is by nature from the ray? But there never was, nor will there be, a ray without light. If it is impossible for a ray to exist without light, neither will solar light exist ^B without the ray, just as the Spirit does not exist without the Son; therefore, it is by nature and not by participation or transmission. For everything that is by nature is not adventitious. Everything that is not natural is adventitious. Thus, the light [is] *through* the ray, and the Spirit *through* the Son. Therefore, the *through* indicates to us a natural relationship. And what this is, other than that of cause, it is impossible to find. And in this way, that the Spirit proceeds *from* the Son follows clearly for you from the words of the holy teachers; or rather, it has been clearly stated.

13. If you say that John the Syrian forbids this: "For we do not say," he says, "the Spirit *from* the Son"; but add what immediately follows: "But we call Him the Spirit of the Son." And furthermore, in the thirteenth chapter: "He [the Father] ^C is the abyss of the Word, the begetter of the Word, and through the Word the producer of the revealing Spirit." And again: "The Holy Spirit, the revealing faculty of the Father, is from the Father, proceeding *through* the Son." And in the epistle to the Jordan: "The Spirit," he says, "*through* the Son, not *from* the Son, as the spirit of the mouth of God." It is also found that the Father is the one cause of the Son and of the Spirit. If, therefore, you allege these things, observe closely that those who wish to write in a more Attic style have attributed *from* and the [notion of] cause to the primary causes, and *through* to the secondary causes. For you will not find among those who desire to use the Greek language correctly the *through* attributed to primary causes, nor yet the *from*, unless perhaps the secondary cause be spoken of alone, attributed to secondary causes. And for this reason, by the saints who use the formulas of the Greek language, but approved ones, and who strive for proper diction, the Spirit is not said to be *from* the Son, but *through* the Son. For that Greek locution would not be pure—"fruit *from* the root and the branch," and "light *from* the sun and the ray"—but rather "light *from* the sun *through* the ray," not because solar light is not naturally *from* the ray, but because, since the ray is a secondary cause, it does not claim the cause for itself ^D primarily, so that the light should be from it. In the same way, the one who says the Spirit is *from* the Father and the Son speaks truly, yet he does not perfectly express the matter as it is; but he who says *through* the Son has avoided every danger, since by that [term] he signifies that the Spirit is not without a principle from the Son. On account of all these things, therefore, just as in creatures, so also in the Holy Spirit, the Greek teachers have used *through* rather. Nevertheless, it is also found attributed *from the Son*, and most especially by Epiphanius in

^A *Ancoratus*: "The Holy Spirit," he says, "is third, from the Father and from the Son." Yet, many are found to use the term *from* as equivalent to *through*. For almost everyone says the Spirit is from the Father and the Son, and Cyril says that He is from both. And lest anyone should suppose that He is from the Son as a primary beginning, he adds, by way of clarification, "or from the Father through the Son." Do you see how, from every quarter, the teachers of the Greeks anciently professed nothing else than what the Church of Rome now professes? And yet, I know that the Greeks deride her, as if she were introducing a second cause in the Trinity, not understanding that because of this, it has been said by some of ours that it was not easy to explain such things in any other way. For in divine matters, by asserting that the Son is a second cause ^B in order to exhibit the force of the preposition *through*, we do not conceive of Him as cut off from the Father, nor as a secondary being in time, or place, or anything else one might imagine, but that whatever He has, He has from the Father, and His very being as well. If, therefore, the Spirit is from Him, He nevertheless has this having received it from the Father; and for this reason we attribute *from* properly to the Father, and *through* to Him, so that the first cause may be made known, that He is from the Son may not be passed over in silence, and that the Spirit being brought forth by the Son from the Father may not be suppressed. Do you see how *through* declares the Son as cause, and *from the Father* does not conceal that He is brought forth?

14. For this reason, we also say that the Father is the one cause and one fountain; and just as if one were to say that the sun is the one and only fountain of the ray and of the light, we would not refute him as a liar, nor would we conclude from this that light is not from the ray; but because the ray, ^C being from the sun, is brought forth from there, and the light proceeds through it, for this reason we properly understand the sun as the fountain and cause. But we will not deny that the light naturally pours forth through the ray. In the same way, we must philosophize concerning the Trinity; if one asserts that the Father is the one fountain and one cause of the Son and of the Spirit, he will not in the least destroy the fact that the Spirit is from the Son. And learn that these things are so from the greatest Basil: "So too," he says, "‘No one knows the day of the end except the Father alone,’" and we should believe that this was said with the Son referring the primary knowledge of things both present and future to the Father, ^D and through all things indicating the primary cause to men. And again, similar is that: "No one knows the Son except the Father." For the Son does not there impute ignorance to the Spirit, but testifies that knowledge of His own nature resides primarily in the Father. Therefore, by these things, consider attentively that even if anyone should say that only the Father is the cause of the Spirit, he will not destroy that He is also from the Son: for "only," he says, indicates the primary cause. How then, with the Spirit said to be from both, and from the Father through the Son, and the Spirit of the Son, will anyone at all—if he does not lack wisdom—doubt that the Spirit is also from the Son? For this reason, also the divine Cyril says: The Spirit issues from the essence of God and the Father, but is poured out to those who are worthy to receive Him, through the Word, being of the same nature as He. The Spirit, therefore, from the Father's

would be the very subsistent nature of the Spirit. He is poured out and supplied to creation from the Son, or, to speak more precisely, through the Son, just as the light of the sun is supplied to us through the ray, or indeed from the ray, not in a manner of service—that is, as if supplied to us through it in the way of a duty—but the ray, coming forth naturally from the sun, carries the light naturally from thence, the ray not having been a ray before it received it; for that is impossible, nor is the light that was in the sun before it, received simultaneously with its being emitted, but simultaneously the ray is from the sun, and simultaneously the light is from the sun through the ray. Much more sublime than these, however, are the Father, the Son, and the Spirit at once; and the Spirit proceeds indeed from the Father, but through the Son naturally and at the same time eternally. And that this is the opinion of the holy Fathers, learn from Cyril saying: "For proceeding through Him naturally, as His own, He is said to receive perfectly all things that He has with Him"; and in the pericope already brought forward: "From Him," he says, "the Son, He has appeared according to manifestation into existence according to Himself." And from the divine Maximus, that this was the ancient, true opinion of the Roman Church, not recent or new, as some imagine, nor an addition, but an exposition of the Nicene Creed: "The synodical letter of the present most holy Pope Martin," he says, "the inhabitants of the imperial city did not criminate in so many things, as you signified, but in two only: that he said the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son." And to this, he says, they brought forward the concordant authorities of the Roman holy Fathers. Do you hear that this was the ancient opinion of the Roman Church? And furthermore, [learn it] from Cyril of Alexandria in the sacred Commentary written by him on the Evangelist John, by which they have demonstrated that they do not make the Son the cause of the Spirit: for they know one cause of the Son and of the Spirit, the Father—of the former according to generation, of the latter according to procession—but [they use this language] in order that they might signify the progression of the Spirit through Him, and thereby establish the conjunction of essence and perfect likeness; [thus] it is to be believed that the Spirit proceeds through the Son.

15. Then, from this, silence also your Nilus, who says: "For this reason it is said by the saints 'through the Son,' because having mentioned the Father, we have understood the Son." For to believe Him to be [the cause] through bare relations stripped of subjects, both contradicts the saint and does not establish the conjunction ^D of the essence and its unchangeableness. Third, see the saint agreeing with what we said a little before, assigning the cause of this grace to the Father, and designating it from the preposition: because He does not receive the productive faculty from another, but possesses it without beginning; in which sense no one, unless distracted by madness, would say that the Son is the cause of the Spirit. But "through" is adapted to the Son for the reason that He draws the productive faculty together with Himself from the Father, from whom He also derives His divinity. Or how would anyone connect at the same time, and the cau-

cause being the Father alone, and for this reason the Spirit being of the same nature as the Son, because He proceeds through Him, without taking this to signify something regarding the cause? ^A Fourth, note this, that from eternity, absolutely and beyond all cause, the Spirit is through the Son. For if the Spirit is eternally of the same nature as the Son, and is of the same nature, because He is through Him, then He is through Him eternally, and not according to circumstance, as Nilus blathers. Beyond all these, let this not escape you, which the blessed Maximus adds in continuing his discourse: "And these men, indeed, say these things, regarding which they were unjustly accused." Do you hear what judgment he renders against the Greeks? "Unjustly," he says, "did the citizens of Constantinople accuse the Romans regarding these matters," and not only the saint, but those themselves who had accused were persuaded by the Romans. For not long after, the schism of the divine Maximus arose. The Romans further say that to this day they understand nothing other than what they did at that time, nor in any other way now than they understood the matter then. Unjustly, therefore, by the judgment of the divine Maximus, are they accused by you and yours, both by those living in that age and by those living now. ^B

16. But if Nilus says that the "to us" [πρὸς ἡμῖν], attached to the pouring forth of the Spirit from the Son, signifies the second procession: let it first be known that it has been said by many of the saints that the Spirit is poured forth and proceeds through the Son without any circumstance—I mean, of person, or time, or cause, and such things. But if to some the "to us" is proposed, it is not because the Son causes the Spirit to flow to us that He does not for that reason produce Him, but because He produces Him, for that reason He causes Him to flow to us. Hear also Cyril, writing in his Oration to the Emperor Theodosius: "He anoints," he says, "with His own Spirit, which He Himself sends forth as the Word of God the Father, and causes it to flow to us from his own nature." But for the Spirit to flow from the nature of the Son, as has already been demonstrated, is nothing else than for Him to flow from His nature in ^C hypostasis. If this is so, then from there He absolutely has that He is. From which it is clear, unless someone is willingly blind, that the Son causes the Spirit, and the gifts of the Spirit, to flow to us, because the Spirit is in a special hypostasis naturally from Him. For it does not follow, as has been said, if the gifts of the Spirit flow from the Son—which Nilus calls a second procession—that the Spirit is not poured forth, that is, does not proceed from Him. On the contrary, the whole opposite is true; since the Spirit proceeds from Him, the gifts are supplied from Him; and therefore, to be supplied naturally from Him is to be supplied eternally, and not to some, or according to cause, as he opines; but just as if one were to posit the sun to be eternal and before the creation, its light would have been ^D through its ray absolutely, and not to us; but when we were created, it would have shined upon us also. So also must one reason concerning the true Sun. The Son eternally sends forth the Spirit as His own, but when creation has come to be, He causes it to flow also to the creation. For from Him, or through Him, the intellectual light illuminates us. And thus a second

^A procession, we call the illumination that comes to the worthy from the Father, whether it be something created or uncreated, and whether one thinks of this illumination as the divine essence itself or something else proceeding from it. For I am not provoking a controversy at present, lest I aim wide of the mark. But that when something of this sort is spoken of, the discourse of the saints is not about this operation, but about one person of the Trinity, learn this also in addition to what we have said: that since this illumination is common to the whole Trinity, they would never have said that it is poured forth or proceeds from the Father through the Son, but simply from the divine essence, or simply from God, or from the holy Trinity. That this is true, the Damascene, while theologizing and chanting at the same time, teaches you: "You have provided for us, and we shall not be ashamed, an intercessor—her who bore You, O Christ; by her entreaties, grant that the Spirit, the communicator of goodness, proceeding from the Father through You, be propitious to us." ^B "From the Father," he says, "through You," with the pronoun taken solely of the divinity of the Son, without the hypostasis. And by saying "through You," he showed that Nilus falsely handles divine matters, he who asserts that "when we say the Father, we understand the Son." For no one pronounces that "You" to denote a relation; rather, he has indicated the Spirit, the one of the Trinity, not an operation. For the operation and the grace are goodness, of which the communicator, the Spirit, would not be an operation. For there would be a [grace] communicative of grace, and an operation of an operation, which is most foolish even to conceive. Furthermore, "propitious," "gentle," "well-disposed," and such like are predicated of those who possess will. But an operation is devoid of will; therefore, one does not supplicate that an operation be rendered propitious to him. For it would be ^C the act of a madman to attribute "willing" to those who have no will, and that, too, while theologizing. But he is both holy and wise. But if you believe that the operation possesses will, if it does not differ from the essence, then let it be the same as the Paraclete. And then the Paraclete will be from the Father through the Son; and this is the point at issue. But if it is something else, and uncreated, and endowed with the power of willing, if it wills by another will, and not the same one by which the Trinity is said to will, then behold, another God and another uncreated nature. For different wills constitute different natures. But if it be by the same one, how is it other? For things constrained by one will are contained by one nature. But if you were to say it is not another [nature], but another [person] having the same will as the operation, it ^D would be a fourth hypostasis. The operation, therefore, is not endowed with will, but "propitious" is said concerning those who in every way excel in will. Thus, the One whom the saint prays to be rendered propitious to us as the communicator of goodness is one of the Trinity, and proceeds, or goes forth, from the Father through the Son—the preposition "through" signifying the natural relation, as has already been demonstrated. Nyssen explains this more clearly, saying: "Of that which is from a Cause, we understand another distinction again. For the one is directly from the First, and the other is through that which is directly from the First." I bless your voice, O holy man, because by distinguishing the persons, you clearly showed that he who does not divide the caused [Spirit] into a oneness [of nature] brings in [a plurality], and that you did not use the customary terms, so that they might not say that "through the Son" is therefore...

Spirit. For when we say Father, we have conceived of one Son. How then, in truth, shall we conceive of this other, unless the Spirit is from the Son? For either He is from the Father and does not differ in the hypostasis of the Son—which not even you say—or He differs only in the mode of being. If he intends this, why does he abandon this most clear point and elevate the discourse to higher things, saying "immediately" of the one, and of the other "through that which is immediate"?

^C 17. But if Nilus objects, as having spoken of a different distinction, not the one according to cause—for he had already stated that—we shall reply that we call the horse and the dog "this and that animal," which differ not in genus, but in species. He therefore declares a different distinction, differing not in genus but in species, noting the cause itself as well. And he posits "[that which is] from the cause" as a genus, or if you will, as a species; but he subdivides [it], as if into species, or into those that differ by number, because one is [from the first] immediately, and the other is from the first through the [part] immediately. If, then, all the things being subdivided preserve the reasons and names of the things above, how do you conceive of a distinction other than that according to cause? And if you say that there are no genera or species there, but the division is as in these cases—how can things being subdivided altogether escape the distinction according to cause and effect? Is "to be immediately from the first" not indicative of the cause? Therefore, declare another distinction which also notes the cause. For this is what "[is] from the first" signifies. He added, as if reducing into species, "immediately" and "through that which is immediate." And when he indicates [the one] from the cause, he will also indicate [the other] through it, so that the Son may be a mediator in a manner becoming to Deity. For otherwise the Spirit will be through Him as through a pipe, in the manner of a ministerial role, ^D which is most impious, and "immediately" will not differ from "through that which is immediate" in distinguishing—and it is the saint's intention that these should be distinguishing [terms]. For by these he distinguishes the hypostases of the Son and the Spirit. Therefore, he introduces the cause by that which is "immediately." For it is not possible to find anything of the distinguishing features which escapes the definition according to cause both by position and by privation. And this the same [Saint Basil] makes clearer in his first oration against Eunomius, saying: "The Spirit is joined to the Father according to the uncreated, [yet] again is separated from Him by being not the Father, just as He [the Son] is separated. But he is joined to the Son according to the uncreated, and since he has the cause of his existence from the God of all, he is separated again by the property that he did not subsist as the Only-Begotten from the Father, and that he has appeared through the Son." Again, when creation had subsisted through the Only-Begotten, lest the Spirit be thought to have any communion with it because he appeared through the Son, the Spirit is distinguished from creation by the constant and unchanging [nature] of his goodness, which [appertains to] another.

^A O your wisdom! Holy one. Hail to the theologian! Who would not admire the clarity of your speech and its immunity from all equivocation? The Spirit, he says, is separated from the Son by property, because he does not subsist as the Only-Begotten from the Father, and because he appeared through the Son himself. But since it is a property of the Spirit to appear through the Son, just as it is also [the property] of the Only-Begotten not to be from the Father, how could the Spirit be said to have appeared through the Son in a second procession, which is novel and occurs in time? Or how could he be said to be "through the Son," for when we say "Father," we conceive of the Son? For the property of the Son does not change. If anyone calls the progenitor "the first," you yourself confess that the sophism falls back upon you. How, then, do you dare altogether to say that the [Spirit's existence] "through the Son" is not a property of the Spirit, if it is by this as by a property that he is distinguished from him? Do you see that Nilus is acting impiously in writing these things?

^B 18. But attend also to what follows: Through whom the Spirit, through whom also the creature. Is the Spirit therefore a creature? No, says the Saint. What then is the difference? Is it because "through" in the case of the creature signifies the Son, who receives from the Father that he is the cause, whereas in the case of the Spirit this is not so? Not because of this, he says. What then? Because, he says, the Spirit is constant and unchanging, while the creature is inconstant and changeable. And the cause is that the Spirit is naturally through the Son, while the creature is through the mode of creation. For this reason, just as it is rarer—for we use it improperly—that the creature is said to subsist "from the Son," but it is more frequent and more customary among us, as being more properly said, that it is ^C created "through the Son"; so also it is rarer that the Spirit is "from the Son," but "through the Son" is more customary, since [this expression] refers us back to the primary cause and does not deprive the Son of being a cause. For this reason, when Eunomius said that the Spirit is from the Son alone by the mode of creation, the interpreter of divine mysteries, directing his discourse solely to that point, did not absolutely deny that he is from the Son, even though he might have dispatched the answer very briefly and clearly; but he took it ill that he [Eunomius] did not refer all things to one principle. And whatever is said to be done by the Son, he said was to be referred to the primary cause; so that he might avoid [the error of] two principles and yet not deny that the Spirit is from the Son. Hence also to the question: Why is the Spirit not also the Son of the Son? the same one, meeting the objection, did not answer that he is ^D in no way from the Son, but he said that he is not [the Son of the Son], because he is from God through the Son. Do you see how he confirmed that he is from the Son? But [he said this] lest the Trinity be thought to be an infinite multitude, with sons of sons, as is wont to happen among men, falling under suspicion. This man truly knows that the Spirit is from the Son, not by way of generation, nor by way of creation, but by way of procession, conjecturing this from the sacred oracles, which call the Spirit the image of the Son, and the Word. This he also demonstrates elsewhere by means of a skilled division, saying that whatever is "from something" is either by way of creation, or by way of generation, or by nature; just as our operation is from us, or the splendor of the sun is from it. From the Son...

however, is the Spirit, or rather "through the Son," but not by way of creation. For he differs from creatures in that he is incorruptible and unchangeable. But neither is it by way of generation, for he is not the son of the Son. Therefore, he is from him or through him by nature. And you know that this is expressly stated by many of the ^A saints. Therefore, he is "through him," just as splendor is from the sun.

19. But note for me, and hold securely, in how many ways "what is from something" is spoken of. For from this a lethal wound is inflicted by the Greeks on both heresies: first, that to be "from something" naturally is from it, not by way of generation, but by another mode of existence; second, that the operation is from the divine essence, and not by way of generation—for he is not the Son, nor is he nature (since the Spirit is not) nor creation. Therefore, if the essence is something other than the operation, either Basil, the teacher of heavenly mysteries, has not rightly or sufficiently set forth in how many ways it is said in divine matters to be from something. But let this be kept for another time. Now, let us first consider this: if you do not wish to be impious regarding matters of order, and to declare void and ineffective the words of the saints—who, hearing [the] "Spirit of truth" and "Spirit of the Son," and that he receives "from the Son," recognized the Spirit to be the property of the Son, just as he is of the Father—then it must be absolutely confessed that he proceeds both from him and through him, just as he does from the Father. But if you bring forward the statement of the Nyssen, who says, "For the sake of this, David said, 'Spirit of his mouth,'" as if he were establishing that the property of ^B proceeding belongs to the Father alone: but first it is unjust not to follow the majority of the testimonies and those that are clearer; and then, it is foolish not to understand, even from the rest of the theological statements of the same Father, that the passage has been corrupted. For in the word *prin* (before) while reading [it], the *rho* was changed into *nu*, and the word "Spirit" occupied the place of "Father," with a minimal inversion. And it is manifest that no one of the Fathers is found attributing the property of procession to the Father, but very many do so to the Spirit. For the verb "to proceed," not being like "to produce" and "to be produced"—so that the one is pronounced actively and the other passively—is adapted in the former way to the Father, but in the latter way to the Spirit, so that the Spirit alone expresses [this] property. Furthermore, the [terms] "by way of proceeding" and "processionally" were derived from the same single verb and are appropriate only to the Spirit. Therefore, the passage has been corrupted by the Greeks. Furthermore, if he had said it belonged to the Father alone, his discourse would have been in vain. But it is not in vain. For the Nyssen is wise, if anyone is, and holy. Therefore, he did not [attribute it] to the Father, but to the Spirit. ^C For thus the discourse rightly proceeds for him, and he does not contradict himself. And this will become clearer if we set down that David said: "And the word of the mouth." For again, the property of proceeding, indicated by this word, would have belonged only to the Father. For if the Holy Spirit proceeds from God and the Father, and the Word is also the "word of the mouth"—that is, proceeding from God and the Father—the propositions becoming two, there would conversely be only one producer, and to him alone would the property of procession belong. Therefore, the discourse is vain for the Nyssen... ^D

^A when he writes: “Therefore David did not say ‘word of the mouth,’ so that he might establish the property of ‘proceeding from himself’ in the Father alone.” For even if you say “word of the mouth,” again the power of procession, or rather of “projecting,” will belong only to the Father. But the “being projected” will not belong to the Spirit alone. For he who says “word of the mouth” names one producer, but two things produced, which the Nyssen ^B, destroying his own position, says that David did not say, “Word of the mouth,” in order to establish the property of procession as belonging to the Spirit alone. And for this reason, proceeding further as if explaining what is left silent by the sophists of malice, he adds: “In order that through the ‘Word’ we might receive the most dispassionate and ineffable generation of the Son as from God and Father, but through the saying of ‘Spirit of the mouth’ we might understand the sanctifying and essential power and vivifying hypostasis of the Spirit, obviously characterized by the name of the property of procession.” Do you see that the property of procession of the Spirit is what destroys all things, sparing not even one? ^C You, who destroy everything and spare nothing, do you see the property of procession?

20. Yet I, from this very passage, also perceive that the Spirit is from the Son. For the Son of God is called in the Holy Scriptures the “mouth of the Father.” Therefore, it cannot be admitted that what proceeds from the mouth of God does not proceed from the Son. How, then, are they unable to discern even from those things written against Eunomius in the *Antirrhetics* the doctrine of the saint, or rather of the Church, in which he says: “Just as the hypostasis of the Father is observed prior to the hypostasis of the Son by the argument of cause, the same argument applies also to the Spirit, having the difference only in the order according to cause and what is caused.” For just as the Son is joined to the Father, and having his being from Him, he does not lag behind in existence, so again the Holy Spirit is joined to the Only-Begotten, by logical conception only, the hypostasis of the Spirit being observed prior according to the argument of cause. Do you know that by a conception of cause the Son is observed prior to the Spirit? Have you understood the vanity, and from this very text the argument—or opinion, or rather impiety—of Nilus? “By the argument of cause,” he says, “the Only-Begotten is observed prior to the Spirit,” which he has towards the Father, not towards the Spirit. Therefore, if you call the Father the “projector,” the Spirit will be observed prior to the Only-Begotten by the argument of cause, which he has towards the projector. This man truly wishes the mystery of the Trinity to consist in mere relations and a certain order of names, and starving for the truth, he does not see that the saint says: ^D “Just as the hypostasis of the Father is observed prior to the hypostasis of the Son, the same argument applies also to the Spirit.” He did not say “Father of the Son,” so that Nilus’s heresy might have no place, but “hypostasis of hypostasis.”

^A And furthermore, regarding the relation of hypostases, through which names are also referred to one another. For we do not say that because names are related thus, the things themselves are related to one another by relation; but that relation which exists in the things, we express by names. And if the things that truly underlie them are the cause of the truth of the names that signify them, while for fictitious names, under which no things underlie, the things are imagined, Nilus hands down to the Greeks an imaginary Trinity, not a true one, conceiving the order from the meaning of the names, not from the truth of the things themselves: and therefore he sometimes sets the Son before the Spirit, and sometimes the Spirit before the Son.

21. Furthermore, where did Nilus ever find the Spirit to act as an intermediary in the generation of the Only-Begotten? Or how is the mediation that exists in the things changed, if not all attribute this to the Son? ^B Straightway, the great Athanasius in his third discourse against the Arians says: “It is not the Spirit that joins the Word to the Father, but rather the Spirit receives this from the Word.” Do you hear that the Word is the bond of the Father and the Spirit, as mediating, and not the Spirit the bond of the Father and the Word? But mediation consisting in bare references also provides this to the Spirit, though it does not in fact reside in the Spirit. Mediation, then, in reality belongs to the Son alone. The same author says elsewhere: “That the Spirit who is in the Word, is in God through Him,” and that “the Spirit has the same unity toward the Son as the Son has toward the Father.” Basil also intends this in those passages where he says that the knowledge of God proceeds from the one Spirit through the one Son to the one Father, and that holiness, conversely, reaches from the Father through the Son to the Spirit. And Damascene says that “through the Son the Spirit is joined to the Father.” And what need is there to enumerate other things to you, who understand these matters so well? ^C Therefore, to one who believes that the property of being the source of procession belongs to the Father alone, how will the Son truly act as an intermediary? How will He be a bond? But if you say that He is sometimes called a “midst,” and that there is another hypostasis in the Trinity besides the Son’s, as the words of Damascene sound: “God the Holy Spirit is a midst between the unbegotten and the begotten,” look at what follows: “joined to the Father through the Son.” So that here too he intends the Son alone to be the bond. Then he did not say “midst” absolutely, but “midst between the unbegotten and the begotten.” For a “midst” is either a midst by some natural order, and thus the extremes are joined, which the Father attributes to the Son; or by participation in the extremes, just as gray is a midst between white and black; or by privation, ^D and in this way the Syrian indicated that the Spirit is a midst, and he himself clarified this by saying, “midst between the unbegotten and the begotten.” For these things are said according to state and privation, so that the Spirit is a midst in such a way that He is neither without generation or without beginning, nor by way of generation as the Son is, but by way of procession, so that He may also be by way of generation, if “by way of generation” implies “not without beginning,” and yet “without generation”—for He is not the Son; and for this reason He is a midst between the unbegotten and the begotten. And these matters stand thus.

^A 22. Furthermore, that you may learn how the Greeks are accustomed to twist statements, and not only to have corrupted those of Nyssa, consider that passage of Basil in his *Antirrhetics against Eunomius*, in which he writes: “to transmit the definition of piety which assigns the Spirit a secondary place in dignity to the Son.” Those who add the word “perhaps” to this accuse the saint of great ignorance, as if he did not know, but were casting doubt upon, the tradition of piety, which even those of passing acquaintance ought to know. Moreover, the phrase “If we even concede” makes the corruption entirely manifest. For he immediately denies what he had, a little before, placed in doubt. One might say that to twist and confuse all things in this way is the act not of one who is theologizing, but of one who is puerilely jesting. How do they not perceive that it is the same power to have the Son as a “midst,” as we have already said, and to have Him understood as prior to the Spirit? And on what grounds did he express with doubt what Athanasius, before him, had asserted too confidently in his first oration against the Arians? ^B He says: “The Lord, showing to his disciples His divinity and majesty, was not showing Himself to be less than the Spirit, but greater, and was exhibiting the Spirit as equal, and was saying: ‘I shall send Him.’” For the discourse does not tend toward a second procession, since you say that the divine persons infinitely exceed the operation. The Son is not only greater than the Spirit, but also equal. It remains, therefore, that the hypostasis of the Spirit be understood. For the Son is equal to Him in divinity, and greater by reason of the cause. For since nothing greater than [the others] can be said in the Trinity regarding essence, it is necessary for this to be attributed to those things that differentiate. ^C Only by cause and effect are the divine persons distinguished. Therefore, the Son is greater than the Spirit solely by cause. From all these things, therefore, it is manifest that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, or rather, through the Son. For in this way the order is preserved, the Son appears in reality to be a mediator, it is acknowledged that the Spirit is the Son’s own, and all other things which have been stated by the saints are safe and sound—which, at present, one gathers into one place. For you yourself know these things better than I, and the time demands neither that I compile them, nor does necessity hold you to [the need for] knowledge.

23. When, however, as was possible, the order was briefly apparent to us, and it was shown from the Fathers that the Spirit is said to be from God, let us now examine what things appear to the Greeks to follow as absurdities from the opinion of the Roman Church, not gathering everything, but especially the principal points, so that we may not appear either to make an empty show or to omit what is necessary in this our discourse. If the Spirit is from the Son, they say, either these things common to the two will not be common to the three, or the Spirit Himself will be a participant in the procession, and by this reasoning He would even be from Himself. ^D Which no one but a madman or a maniac would say. But the first is false. For whatever is common to the Father and the Son, the theologians say, is common to the Holy Spirit. Therefore the second follows, which is maniacal. Thus, that from which it follows is false. This, however, is the thesis of the Italians. Furthermore, if not only the Father, but also the Son, is the cause of deity, either the Spirit will also be [a cause], or He will be deficient, and—if one must express it so—unproductive within the Trinity, which is absurd. In addition to this, if the Spirit is also from the Son, there is not one principle, but two.

And it follows: for since the Spirit is said to be from the Father and the Son, He will be from them, either as from one, or as from two. But if indeed as from one, He will also be from Himself. For the Father and the Son are one in divinity, in which the Spirit is also one with them. Therefore, as from two. And thus a duality of principles is maintained by the Italians. ^A

24. To the first point, let the Greeks tell us: who among the holy Fathers, while discoursing on the distinguishing properties, ever said that what is common to two is common to three? But they could not. But if they say, as the divine Gregory desires, that the things which belong to the Father and the Son also exist in the Spirit, let them learn that the discourse of the saint is regarding the divinity, for it was against those who were raging against the Spirit. Those men, however, were not raging about the distinguishing properties, but against the divinity of the Spirit. ^B That the first proposition is false is clear from many things: first, because the Spirit is common to the Father and the Son. "For to those to whom the Spirit is common, to them also those things which are of the essence are not separated," says Cyril. The Spirit is indeed called the Spirit of the Father, and so also of the Son. Yet the Spirit is not called the Spirit of the Spirit. For he who would speak in this way would introduce two Spirits, not being able to speak of the one and of Himself. Therefore, the Spirit is common to the two; therefore, the proposition is false. Furthermore, in the blessed Trinity, three conjunctions are considered, and in each, ^C something common to the two is found. This will be manifest if we first define the word, lest we be disturbed by the homonymy. "Ingenitum" (unbegotten) is said in two ways: both when it is without a beginning, as when we say "the Father is ingenitum," and when it is not by way of generation, just as the Son—as the Spirit is ingenitum. Likewise for "genitum" (begotten): both that which has a beginning, and that which exists naturally, that is, by way of procession; and conversely, that which has no beginning, and that which does not exist by way of procession. Since these things are so, "ingenitum" in its second meaning is common to the Father and the Spirit; for in neither of them is being by way of generation. But "genitum" in its first meaning is common to the Son and the Spirit; for both are from a cause. And not to exist by way of procession, ^D again, in the second manner, is common to the Father and the Son; for in neither of them does being exist in such a way. How then, say the Greeks, are all things common to two also common to the three? If they say all things that proceed by nature, such as sanctification, power, and the like, we shall agree; but if they mean the distinguishing properties of the hypostases, by no means. For since these are considered in two ways, according to beginning and end, and then according to opposition, the first, if one takes it commonly, is present to the two according to both—that is, according to the beginning and according to the end. For of all things taken according to divine distinction, more generally, and as it were universally, that which is according to cause—this we call the cause regarding the beginning, and the caused regarding the end. And just as it is not absurd for the caused to be in two, but is truly present in the Son and the Spirit, so it is not absurd, but rather necessary, for the cause to be considered in two, so that the mean may come to be in the matter.

^A And thus, if one takes this commonly, and both according to beginning and end, it is not absurd that the distinguishing factor should be considered commonly in two. But if, according to opposition, the part of the opposition is indeed observed in two—thus, also, the begotten and the unbegotten, and the proceeding and non-proceeding, appeared common to two. For since God in reality is a Trinity, if any one of the hypostases is distinguished from the two, this, taken by way of opposition, must necessarily belong to two. For that anyone—even children and women—would admit that subtracting one from three leaves two, is clear. But look you, for the sake of, the precision of these words: the being "unbegotten," or without beginning, distinguishes the Father from the Son and the Spirit; therefore, it is common to the Son and the Spirit in terms of the "begotten" or "from the beginning" state. And the being "begotten" constitutes the person of the Son, distinguishing him from the two, and for this reason, that which is opposed to this belongs to the Father and the Spirit. Likewise, the being "proceeding" separates the Spirit from the Father and the Son, and therefore, the "not proceeding," which is opposed to that, is necessarily common to the Son and the Father. By all means, therefore, regarding all differential—that is, hypostatic—factors, if you take the property of a hypostasis by which it is distinguished from the two, and this, taken by way of opposition, is observed in the other two hypostases of the Trinity, then it is the property of the one of whom it is spoken; but if not, such a property has been poorly assigned. For this reason, since the unbegotten, or beginningless, is the property of the Father, and the being by generation is of the Son, and the being by procession is of the Holy Spirit, the begotten, the unbegotten, and the non-proceeding are common to the two remaining, according to the signification inferred from opposition.

25.

^A communion which exists in these two we observe, by which each is distinguished from the Son. But when, conversely, we say that this is proper to the Father or to the Spirit, we mean to indicate that each of them is thereby distinguished from the Son, or rather, to say it better, that by the opposite the Son is distinguished from both. It does not follow, therefore, that everything common to two is also common to all three. For many things have appeared to us common to the two, which it is not absurd to call the property of those two. For that in which not all participate is the property of those who do participate. And this is the case not only in the Trinity, but in all other things as well. For example, the faculty of laughing is proper to human nature and is common to all men who participate in it equally; but it is also proper to each individual man when compared with other animals.

That these things also seemed so to the saints—for they are necessary—learn from the Nyssen, who says, "But just as 'to be without cause,' being proper to the Father alone, cannot be applied to the Son and the Spirit, so, conversely, 'to be from a cause,' which is proper to the Son and the Spirit, has no nature to be attributed to the Father." ^B Now, since it is common to the Son and the Spirit not to be unbegotten, so that no confusion might be contemplated regarding the subject, it is again necessary to find the unmixed difference which exists in their properties, so that the common may be preserved and the proper not be confounded. For the only-begotten Son is called "from the Father" by the holy Scriptures, and up to this point the discourse establishes his property. But the Holy Spirit is said to be from the Father, and is confirmed to be the Son's. "For if anyone," he says, "does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not his." Therefore, the Spirit, who is from God, is also the Spirit of Christ; but the Son, existing from God, is not, nor is he called, the spirit of the Spirit. Nor does this relative order turn the other way.

Give careful and accurate attention, first of all—for it is for this reason that I have gladly lingered on this statement—to the fact that the saint says the property of the Spirit is not to be only from the Father, as is the Son, but to be also of the Son himself, and that this relationship is not reversible. How, then, will anyone think it is said on account of the same nature? ^C And next, that he asserts in the very words that it is common to the Son and the Spirit not to be unbegotten—that is, not to be without beginning—but that it is also their property to be from a cause. And these things are for the first part, from which it further follows that the Spirit is also from the Son. For just as that which is unbegotten has a necessity to beget, if it is not predetermined before his own hypostasis, so also that which is not without procession has a necessity to produce, if it is not predetermined before its own hypostasis. But the Son is predetermined before the Spirit, as the saints say. ^D Therefore, his generation is also predetermined before the production. And if this is so, then the Son is also predetermined before he produces, and has his being not by way of procession. He produces, therefore. But if he does not produce, it is either because he does not have his own being in a productive manner, and therefore does not produce, or because he is not predetermined before the hypostasis of the Spirit. But neither of these is true; rather, both are impossible and impious. He produces, therefore.

But these things will perhaps become clearer from what follows.

26. As to the second point, I wonder how those who say that "if there were something not present in one, it would cause something to be lacking in the one in whom it is not present" do not perceive that, by this reasoning, not only the Spirit but also the Father and the Son would be imperfect. For many things have appeared to us to be present in two which are not present in one; from which no one would say—unless he were following the theology of the Greeks—that any one of the divine Persons is imperfect. ^B For we consider “imperfect” and “perfect” not in relation to the distinguishing characteristics, but in relation to the natural properties. For those things which must necessarily be present in the nature, if they are absent, make the nature imperfect in the one in whom they are not present; but these hypostatic and distinguishing characteristics would never make the nature imperfect, as they do not divide natures, but are distinguished around the nature, according to the theological expression. Now, "to produce" is among the distinguishing characteristics; therefore, no lacking element will be present in the nature of the Spirit because He does not produce, nor even in His hypostasis. For He is distinguished sufficiently from the Son and the Father by not producing, rather than if He were distinguished by not being produced from the Son.

27. But these things would have been sufficient ^C for one writing to someone else; but I will not hide from you a higher matter. The Father truly begets the Son, and in begetting He gives Him everything He has, except for those things which bring about confusion, and those which are understood as prior and posterior to the hypostasis, and which are contrary to the definition of the hypostasis. But whatever things are understood, and are not contrary, are not only free from all confusion but also establish order. Since, therefore, the divine nature was once found to be without beginning in the hypostasis of the Father, it was impossible for this to be communicated to the Son. For it is understood beforehand, and is contrary to the definition of the Son. For the Son is He who has a beginning—not, I say, one measured by time, but one ^D which is from the Father. Nor is it possible that the power of begetting should be communicated to Him, lest, as Basil says, the Trinity should result for us in an infinite multitude, begetting sons from sons. The cause of this, moreover, is that generation is understood according to a beginning and an end. By “end” I mean that in which the procession terminates, and by “beginning” that from which it starts—not with any interval of time, but by the mere conception of the procession itself, which exists as a beginning in the begetter, but as an end in the begotten. Generation, therefore, considered as a beginning, as it is in the Father, is understood before the end that is in it; and for this reason, being previously considered to the hypostasis of the Son, it cannot be present in Him. For nothing of those things which are present in the persons in the divine Trinity is understood before the hypostasis in which it exists; lest of the two, one of two things should follow: either one and the same thing is understood as both before and after, and is from itself, or we should have a multitude of sons. The Son, therefore, does not beget. And the argument likewise proceeds accordingly as follows. The Father produces the Spirit,

^A and in producing, He communicates to Him everything which is not pre-understood in His own hypostasis; and for this reason, it is not possible to communicate to Him the producing or the begetting, just as neither is begetting communicated to the Son. For these are pre-understood in the Father. But neither will being begotten, which was said to be the limit of generation, belong to the Spirit. For the hypostasis of the Son is pre-understood to that of the Spirit. Producing, however, is not pre-understood to the hypostasis of the Son, nor does it oppose the hypostasis by any argument. For neither is the Father on account of these things the Son, or a product, nor does the Son lapse into the Father, nor does the Spirit depart from His own proper characteristics. Since, therefore, producing introduces no confusion—but on the contrary, if it exists in the Son, it both preserves the order and the incommunicable relation of the Trinity—the Father will by all means communicate this to the Son. And thus the Spirit will also be of the Son, and the Spirit will not be imperfect by not producing, just as the Son is not [imperfect] by not begetting. For it would rather be imperfect if it did produce. For it would either have produced itself, ^B which is impossible, or another, and thus our argument would extend to infinity, which you yourself would not say is a state of perfection.

28. But if you say that the cause is pre-understood to the caused, and the Son is caused, and producing is of the cause, it is therefore pre-understood to the hypostasis of the Son. The Father will not, therefore, communicate this to the Son, since it is pre-understood to the Son and introduces confusion if it were communicated to Him. This argument is from the storehouse of the sophists. For the Father is pre-understood to the Son by way of cause, not by way of procession. This is another mode of existence. But by way of the cause according to procession and production, the Father is not even pre-understood to the Son. For neither of these is toward the other as a beginning or a limit of this progression, so that the one might not otherwise be the Spirit of both. However, being produced is pre-understood to both. For both are pre-understood ^C to the hypostasis of the Spirit, as Nyssenus asserts, and for this reason the Spirit is from both. If, however, He is not from both, then both are not pre-understood. But they are pre-understood, therefore [He is] from both. If, on the other hand, you say that the divinity which is in the Father is pre-understood to that which is in the Son and in the Spirit, and yet the Father communicates this to those who are from Him, you will seem perhaps to say something to the uninitiated, but you bring forward nothing that is solid for the truth. For the divinity that is in the Father, as divinity, is not pre-understood to that which is in the Son, since it is the same in all respects, and no relation is seen to be interposed between them. But the divinity in the Father is indeed pre-understood, as it begets, and it is considered as ^D present in the Son, as it is begotten. If you should add that no one of the theologians has spoken these things, and that [these] propositions must be taken either explicitly from the theological writings or follow as conclusions from those who reason, I wonder how you do not see that these things are taken from the teachers. For all, so to speak, say that the hypostasis of the Son is pre-understood to that of the Spirit. But I know that you will grant this even against your will. And the proposition that says that the things pre-understood...

to some hypostasis are not present in the hypostasis that is understood subsequently, will you deny this, companion? But we would fall away from the Trinity if the contrary were granted. Therefore, nothing is lacking to the Spirit, being from the Son—which, indeed, Nyssenus also proclaims in many places. And not least in the discourse against the Macedonians. ^A For in those things, he says, in which the operation according to goodness has no diminution or mutation, how is it reasonable to think that the order which arises from number is a sign of some diminution or of a mutation according to nature? Just as if someone, seeing a flame divided among three lamps, were to suppose the first flame to be the cause of the third light, having ignited the extremity by transmission through the middle, and then were to establish that in the first flame there is heat, while in the next one it has subsided and has the mutation toward a lesser degree, and the third should no longer even be called fire, even though it burns and shines in an equal manner and does everything that fire does. Do you hear that he is a fool who thinks that anything is lacking to the Spirit on account of these things? But you, among these things, also note this: that he calls the first flame, which ignited the extremity by transmission through the middle, the cause of the third. ^B But this transmission is not as if through a conduit, nor is it local; nay, not even with your naked relations will your Nilus be able to invent a place. Therefore, the Spirit is by nature through the Son; for through the middle, that is, through the hypostasis of the Son, the Father produces the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit is not therefore lacking in anything. Let the Greeks, therefore, believe the Church of God, and let them not listen to Nilus saying, "The Son is pre-understood to the Spirit if you name the Father first, and again the Spirit to the Son if you first name the producer." O man, if this were so, it would not be impious to interchange the order of the Son and the Spirit, and Basil would be a liar, nor did he attach the third flame through the middle to the first by transmission. ^C But you, by asserting such things, confuse everything and are impious. And these things, indeed, are sufficient regarding this; and you will yourself elicit many things from these principles.

29. From where, however, did it come to the Greeks to argue that the Italians preach a dyarchy? For "through the Son," says Basil, has its reference to the first cause. How, then, are there two principles of the Spirit? But since we say that all things were created through the Son, and also in the Spirit, let us also say similar things to the Greeks: were all things created as if from three, or as if from one? As if from one God, they say. In the same way I say to you, that it is as if from one God: the Father and the Son are the Holy Spirit. ^D But you might say, "Then the Spirit will also be God from himself." What then? Is not the Son generated from the Father as from one God, being God himself also? He is generated, therefore, as your argument seems to dictate, also from himself. You will by no means say this, I know well. For what reason? Because the divinity in the Father, not

^A qua divinity is the Father, is what generates, but insofar as he generates he is the Father. Likewise, the Father and the Son, not insofar as they are God do they produce, so that the Spirit would produce himself as he is God; rather, if he produces, he is a producer. Let this be stated more clearly. The Spirit is distinguished from the Father and the Son by the fact of being by way of procession. He has his existence from the Father through the Son, as has been theologized by the holy Fathers—the preposition "through" signifying, as it does in creation, the cause, and referring back to the first principle, as has been said. Yet he differs from the spirit of the creature in that the latter is mutable and alterable; and nevertheless, there are not two principles of the Spirit, both because whatever belongs to the Only-Begotten is referred to the Father, and because the Father and the Son are not distinguished by the procession. There are not, therefore, two in producing, but one; from which, in turn, it follows that the Spirit is also from the Son. For those things in the Trinity by which something is not distinguished are, provided one does not introduce confusion, common to those not distinguished. But the Father and the Son are not distinguished by the procession. Therefore, the procession is common to the Father and the Son, acting as a principle, provided it does not introduce confusion. But it does not introduce it; rather, it is even conservative of order. Therefore, it is common. And the propositions are true; for in the divine nature, there is considered a unity superior to all, which it is not lawful to distinguish, unless they be those to whom it is given to distinguish the hypostases. The Father, therefore, and the Son are one in all things—in divinity, in power, in sanctification, and whatever else you might say. They are distinguished, however, in that the one is unbegotten and generates the Son, while the other is begotten by the Father. But by the procession—that is, the mode by which the Spirit has his being—no one has ever said that they are distinguished. Nor indeed is it lawful to say that by this same procession the Father is distinguished from the Son, or the Son from the Father. For those things by which one is not distinguished in the Trinity, in those things one is united. It is, therefore, entirely necessary that, when they produce, the Father and the Son be one, and thus there is one producer, and consequently one production and one producer, and the Holy Spirit is produced from both as if from one, by a single production, who, while one in divinity with the Father and the Son, does not produce himself by the distinction of production. For it is impossible that that by which one is distinguished from another should be the very thing by which he is one with him. For it is gathered from contradiction. Nor, moreover, does he produce another Spirit, with the projection being predetermined in the Father and the Son. Therefore, there is not a diarchy, nor again is a polyarchy championed by the Italians, nor does this follow from their arguments; on the contrary, the whole is warded off, and whatever absurdity is brought against the reasonings of the Greeks is refuted.

30. Therefore, we follow the holy Fathers, who believe that there is order in the Trinity, and that the Son is the bond of the Father and the Spirit, and that through Him is the Spirit; but you—alas for the loss!—strip the Trinity of this order; and at one time you deem the Son the bond of the Father and the Spirit, and at another you deem the Spirit the bond of the Father and the Son, so that at one time the Spirit is

^A produced from the Father through the Son, and at another time the Son is produced from the producer through the product, confounding and mixing all things, and believing in mere relations; and the human mind, which fabricates an order far alien to the nature of things by bare thought, sets this upon the Trinity; and you are not ashamed, thinking that divine things are moved by the order of utterance, and not rather that the utterance ought to follow the things themselves; and then, dividing God—who is in one nature—into cause and caused, you do not subdivide him in the reality itself. Consider, furthermore, that every divine hypostasis is first of all separated from the other two together by some property which, through opposition and commonly, inheres in the two, as has already been said, and is distinguished from the others by some relation, not being content to be distinguished commonly, so that to avoid entirely any confusion in the Trinity, it may be the case that for each one of the ^B persons there is a property other than that which is in the two, and other than that which is in the individuals, the latter being necessary in those things which have relation. For first the Father, because He is without beginning, is distinguished from the two that are from the Principle; and as begetting the Son and producing the Spirit, He is distinguished by the relation of the Son’s generation and by the production of the Spirit. In like manner also the Son, because He is begotten, differs from the two who do not exist by generation, and from the Father by the relation of the generation by which He is begotten of Him; and the Holy Spirit is distinguished from both the Son and the Father by being from the Procession. For this reason, that of being "un-proceeded from" appeared as common to the Son and the Father. But by the procession ^C by which He proceeds from the Father, He differs from the Father. Since these things are so, the relation of the Father to those who are from Him, and of those who are from Him to the Father, is held safe even among the Greeks; but no relation between the Son and the Spirit is found, so that all things are perturbed by them. For just as the Unbegotten, and the Begotten, and the Proceeding, since each is proper to each of the two, distinguishes it from the other two; so when the relation of the Father toward those who are from Him is found, and also that of those who are from Him toward the Father, there must also necessarily be assigned a relation for those who are from the cause, so that the Trinity may be equally bound together on every side, and the proportion be kept. ^D Knowing this most excellently, the Nyssen assigns yet another difference to that which is from the cause, saying that the one is immediate, and the other is through the immediate, and another such as that, so that there may be a cause in both, lest we suffer a loss and damage to the order, and so that one principle may be preserved, and all things be retained safe and intact for the Trinity, everywhere indivisibly divided by relations, and conjoined by nature, to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen.