Titus, Bishop of Bostra

and that it should correct and renew the error of idolatry, etc. For it teaches that it is consistent with the New Testament, and alien to it, and that it should be referred to that part of the first book which rebuts the two rootless principles—the two roots, the one good and the other evil, from which all good and evil things emerge—and points out, incidentally, that man is the work of the good and most high God. Furthermore, fragments from this work of Titus which have been preserved for us by the Greeks could have been added to adorn the edition: such as, primarily, those which were transcribed by the author of the *Sacred Parallels*, which are commonly attributed to John of Damascus, and were published from the Rupefucaldin codex by D. Michael Lequien... That some portions in the *Parallels* were transcribed more accurately, I need not mention: a collation of the passages themselves will make the matter manifest, etc.

III

IV

V

VI

THE THREE BOOKS OF TITUS, BISHOP OF BOSTRA, AGAINST THE MANICHAEANS. TRANSLATED BY FRANCISCUS TURRIANUS, S. J. BOOK ONE. CAP. 1. The Origin of Manichaeism.

^A To all those who have made it their study to remove the causes of human sins from God, the intention of such persons is pious and true; for if they did not flee from acknowledging that God provides for our affairs, they would reasonably and truthfully attribute human sins to men themselves. However, having wished to heal a small matter, they have fallen into a greater and more grievous sickness of impiety, by falling away into a denial of the providence of God, which is visible in the entirety of things. But Manichaeus, who draws his name from barbarism and from fury itself, has resorted to a still more harmful remedy against impiety. For, wishing to demonstrate that God is not the author of evil, he set up evil in opposition to Him: unbegotten, as he says, to the unbegotten; living to the living—always rising up and fighting against Him, and never ceasing to cause Him trouble and distress; and, because it is an eternal and complete substance, as though unbegotten, it can in no way be utterly destroyed or perish by Him. ^B Thus, fleeing the smoke, as the proverb has it, he has fallen into the fire. For, so that God might not seem, as Manichaeus imagines, to be the cause of the evils among us, he fashions for himself a fruit drawn from a whole and entire evil. For what, if God handles affairs, as he claims, tolerantly and wisely, yet on account of his opinion will He never be free from war and battle? What could be thought of concerning God that is less fitting for Him?

CAP. 2. The Opinion of the Catholics.

^C That it is indeed pious for men to confess with all their might that God is not the author of injuries and misdeeds is the first doctrine which the Catholic Church has endeavored to profess. But when we ask how we sin while God does not will it, we do not accuse God of greater things, wishing, as he does, to defend Him from lesser things. ^D But since we have the path of truth itself, known from the Holy Scriptures and from common notions, let us proceed firmly to such a question, formulating a pious argument on behalf of God by accusing ourselves out of a love for the truth; for it was not necessary, in order to avoid the accusation in words of those sins which we commit against one another, to be impious toward God, by demanding from Him things that are most insulting of all, and which in no way exist.

^A Furthermore, we who consider the sins among men to be curable, inasmuch as they do not flow upon us from some first principle, but are committed by us in another way (which our discourse will clearly explain in due time), are not only not impious toward God—not daring to conjecture that He is unable, because of the difficulty, to resist an evil which does not reside within Him—but we also strive to cease from those things which are done by us sinfully. We demonstrate to those who observe that things which take their beginning from us in order to exist can also, through us, reach an end of not existing, even if not in everyone; for this is not a general rule for all, but for each of those who have applied themselves (though it is the judgment of all that it is possible for it to be in each individual).

^B However, he who has devised this barbaric impiety, imagining a beginningless evil against God—who is truly beginningless and alone—and has insanely defined this as a second principle, not only places evil on an equal footing with God, as if he intended to honor that which he purportedly hates; but by necessarily affirming that the evils flowing from the beginningless evil are utterly incurable, he craftily causes those who believe him to suppose that injustice among men cannot be corrected. Thus, instead of conversion, despair is presented to them, anticipating the pleasure of sins, as if it were impossible to restrain the impulse of a vice that lacks a principle. Unless someone, through a desire for glory—which, as these men pretend, appears to have more of the good—applies effort so that, as far as possible, he may not sin, thus making it manifest that sin proceeds from nowhere else but from himself. Yet, among these men, he will be considered better because of a mixture of nature—he who uses not nature, but labor and sweat—and he will suppose himself to be praised, even while ^C he is deprived of true praise. For, forsaking the true glory that proceeds from the labor and study of virtue—if indeed he was striving for piety toward God—he falsely considers the necessity of nature to be a kind of robbery, he who applies the utility of industry toward impiety against God; so that a mind given over to sloth and inactivity is not stung when it does evil, provided it ascribes its actions to some other principle: nor is he who uses study held worthy of praise, since he applies his thought to that which is most atrocious of all, namely, to be instructed in impiety against God.

CHAPTER III. Definition of evil according to the Manichaeans.

^D When the Manichaeans did not understand the reason for the creation of the world made by God, they not only examined the irrational actions of men and fell in the way we have mentioned, but they also brought into accusation vast numbers of creatures, and indeed almost all things, which in truth admit of no reproach. These they called evils, in some cases falsely speaking of a mixture of opposites—that is, of good and evil, as they say—and in others rebuking evil as simple and of a single form: as far as lay within them, they confused all things, calling that evil which is not evil at all. For if they had rebuked only the injustice among men as injustice and as evil, it would have been necessary both...

^A to protect the name and the opinion concerning it, as existing and not existing, according to whether it is being acted upon or not acted upon; but they should by no means have introduced the principle itself against God; and yet their error would have been sufficiently circumscribed and limited. But now, since they declare almost all things that have been created to be evil, they have increased the blasphemy against God to an infinite degree, and they bring forward, as if they were certain and proved by reason and judgment, all the beasts and wild animals, not thinking it fitting that these were made by a good being, viewing them not only as useless, but even as most harmful to men—although they could be shown to be more useful and more serviceable than those things which truly seem to benefit men. And they connect many ^B other things to the accusation of created things and of the government of the universe.

CAP. IV. Method of disputing.

^C Diligent effort will be made so that the discussion leaves no part of the things spoken, or of those to be spoken, without demonstration; for by imagining a mixture of two contrary natures in existing things, they distribute the things that are among them as they see fit. From where, they ask, do evils come, if they do not exist from some principle? And if anyone should inquire: What kind? they weave together the sins of men and the creations of God, and they disparage the whole of His all-wise governance; for if anyone were to show that all things have come to be and continue to be well and necessarily, their argument concerning the contrary principle would necessarily fall away and vanish. For because they did not understand how the things below are, they fabricated ideas about the things above; and since they had not understood how the things that are seen are disposed, they slandered that which is not seen; and while appearing to study so that they might know, because they had not understood, they fell into a greater ignorance: for as if seeking in the darkness concerning things that appear, not only did they not find what they seemed to be seeking, but they cast a greater darkness of ignorance upon themselves. We, however—first discussing the two contrary principles which they hypothesize—will arrive at the conclusion of our argument concerning the universe: that all things are good and necessary, especially those regarding which, as I said before, they make their greatest assault, as if they were evil by universal consent; furthermore, regarding the government of all things, and those matters in which they ignorantly condemn the severity of providence, by which the more necessary things are provided for, and not only these, but also regarding the injustices which occur among men, that even because of these it is not fit to imagine a principle of evil against God; for it will be shown that even these demonstrate the goodness of Him who made us, and that they neither occur according to His will by men, nor are they brought upon us from any cause or principle.

CHAPTER V. Whether there are two opposite principles.

Therefore, let us proceed to the root of their mythical impiety, examining whether ^D

^A the concepts of nature admit of two contrary principles of existing things; for if they would not even admit of things that agree, how much less of things that war? That most wretchedly insane man, the Manichæan, writing in this vein, begins everywhere: "There was God and matter, light and darkness, good and evil," in all respects supremely contrary, so that in nothing does one have communion or society with the other, both being unbegotten and living. Therefore, they must either separate themselves, or if they are together, they will appear friendly and by no means contrary. Yet it is evident that he says these things are separated from one another. Therefore, each will be finite and limited with respect to the other in substance, and neither will be uncircumscribed or infinite. But to circumscribe God according to substance, and not to know and confess him to be infinite, how is this not utterly impious? Seeing that not only will the substance of God appear to be circumscribed and terminated, but by evil, as he says, to suffer this. Which is first of all outside of those common notions that suggest to the mind that he is known to be everywhere, and in nature incomprehensible.

CAP. VI. God is finite according to Manichæan tenets.

CAP. VII. What is the space between the two principles?

^A contraries as separated from one another, as though they were in no way contraries. But if they declare that the boundary—which they speak of—exists by the providence of neither, they necessarily admit that they introduce something unbegotten which partakes of the substance of neither, so that by completely dividing, it separates these; and thus it will be found that they postulate a multitude of unbegotten things, whereas they said there were two.

The unbegotten things, however, [require] that which divides and the boundary—whether it be a wall, or an uninhabited land, or whatever else they might wish—[to be defined]: where, then, does it have its base, and where its summit? But it is evident that it has its base below; but where, and how great? And its summit above; but where, and how far? For "above" and "below" are names of creation, belonging to before creation. Yet the boundary must also be deeper and higher than the substance of the things being separated, so that if it fails either from below or from above, it might not provide an opening for the contraries to reach one another. If they compare what they call the boundary to shadow and sun, they will indeed think that shadow has nothing in common with the sun, but they will be harshly refuted, having been deceived by Manes. For a shadow comes to be through the communion and the presence of the sun, with some bulk standing in the middle and transmitting it to the other side; and shadow would be nothing other than an indication of light obstructed by some body placed in the way. For when light is not present at night, not even a partial shadow can exist. Are there then, where there is shadow, light? For the things beyond the shadow are illuminated by light, unless the object casting the shadow exceeds in height the thing illuminating it in every way. And even if the most preposterous wall be posited by such an absurdity, evil will be seen living in light within light. For how could a shadow exist, while the light is universally present throughout the matter, unless something stands in the middle and, by obstructing it, creates it in its entirety? And if nothing is placed in the way—or if it is not of ^B sufficient height—it will be common to evil, and the light [will be] eternally [there].

Again, by assigning the meridian part to evil, they describe a dream of creation; for where was the meridian before the meridian? For in the fabric of creation, one place cannot be less honorable than another; for that which is on the left to one looking toward the west is found to be on the right to one looking toward the east. But the absurdity of this barbarian dogma is most great. For if there be two principles, how could they be, or be called, principles? For a principle is that which is more ancient than all things and holds the sovereignty and rule over all; of which neither could exist in the other. For both are contemporaneous and co-unbegotten, and their being so destroys the reason for their having precedence over one another. But also, regarding their original power, not only are they separated from one another ^C as contraries, but since they are also warring by nature, how could they be thought to have rule in any way? If, therefore, ^D since they are not free from one another in terms of sovereign power, as befits contraries,

^A how can they be called first principles?

CHAPTER VIII. Reason does not admit two principles.

How will natural reasoning admit that there are two opposites according to substance, where in the first place the name of substance is common to both? Therefore, since each is in the first place a substance, it is clear that they are in agreement and not opposites. Furthermore, both are living beings, and moreover, equally unbegotten. But of those for whom the names are the same, and the description the same, how can their substance be contrary or warring? Seeing as names are significant of things—for each is spoken of as what each is, as far as it can be—we therefore recognize that the meaning of names is the things themselves. Since, therefore, both of those things which the Manichaean assumes to be opposites are named as living and unbegotten substances, it is manifest that, because such an error derives its origin from the barbarians, the logical sequence of common notions has been destroyed among them. For the description of each is intact and exactly the same, which not only casts out all suspicion of contrariety, but does not even permit any difference to exist in the things being named.

CAP. IX. The qualities of the principles are contrary. In God there is no quality.

The followers of Manes say that this one is good, and that one, however, is evil, ^C understanding these as qualities, as it were, prior to the substance—for since substance is named in the same way in each (for both are living and unbegotten substance), the contrariety of the so-called quality is henceforth superfluous. For even if it is not fitting to name a quality in God, yet in our thought "to be" in a way precedes "to be such and such"; and "substance" is signified when it is said, "a living and unbegotten substance." Except if they were to say that contraries happen to each of them as properties, which is the most foolish thing of all; for nothing happens to an unbegotten being. For to him to whom "to be" does not happen, to him "to be such and such" does not happen either. That which is not, does not have things happening to it.

It is permitted, therefore, to find contrary qualities in things, but by no means contrary substances; for white and black ^D are contraries, and both are in a body as the same substance; yet they possess these in a way that is partly contrary among themselves, and partly not contrary. For in the first place, they are under one genus, as both are color. Furthermore, even if they seem to be contraries, yet they variously delight the sight; for neither of them offends it by disharmony. Indeed, even virtue and vice in the soul are such; and these, admittedly, are contraries, and are named not only in the same substance, but in one genus, for each is a habit, which as accidents exist in the soul from which they can be absent; and the soul in which these are, at one time or another, is affected and dis-

and it is clear that the account of the substance is defined as one thing, while the account of those things which accrue to it is another.

Although it happens sometimes that white and black cannot be absent from the things in which they reside, yet no one ever named those things in which these exist by these [qualities]; for no one, wishing to signify milk, uses the name of whiteness rather than the name of the substance which is imposed upon the species, lest he should seem to signify many things instead of one, to which the white color belongs. Moreover, we do not declare the raven by the name of black, but by the name of the animal and the species. These, therefore, and suchlike are inseparable qualities; but virtue and vice in the soul are among those qualities which accrue to it; so that it is more fitting that the substance of the human being should not in any way be named from these, but should be signified properly. No one, therefore, would signify what a human being is from the vice that resides in someone, but having first stated the species of the substance, then having mentioned who he is, afterwards he declares the quality in him.

Qualities, therefore, as I said before, one might find in those things that are subordinate, ^B some being separable, and others inseparable; but in God every quality is excluded, since nothing of what is said about Him is something other than Himself; for He is simple and devoid of composition. Nevertheless, by conceptualization, as we said before, "to be" is prior to "to be of such a kind."

Cap. X. Two unbegotten things cannot be contrary

Therefore we say, having taken up the point, that if both of those things which the Manichaean says are contrary, are living and unbegotten substance (for they would not deny this), then they are either both good, in order that one might draw the argument more piously towards a favorable sense because of the truly Good, and the contrary—which is not at all the case—or they are both evil; for what is unbegotten is entirely good. Is God, therefore, being unbegotten, ^C to take this very thing, not to have been begotten, as an evil? Not at all, but clearly as a good. What then is this distribution, that this very thing and name is beautiful and good with God, but with evil, as they say, it is the contrary, namely evil? For in generation one might find a difference, yet a difference and not a contrariness; but of unbegottenness, what difference could one find, or indeed what contrariness? Wherefore it is absolutely impossible for an unbegotten thing to be contrary to an unbegotten thing; for if it were something, then neither of them ought to be or be named contrary to the other, so that there might be no community or society with the contrary in all things. ^D For if a thing is not entirely contrary in that wherein it has communion, it is not contrary; yet "to be" and "not to be" are contrary. Perhaps, however, not even these are contrary, for they do not contend. But what is, is not contrary to what is. But if in some way it is entirely in agreement with that which is, the one and only thing which truly is will be the principle for all things to exist, as the Apostle says: "who calls those things which are not as those things which are" (Rom. iv, 17).

^A They themselves say, moreover, that all things contrary to God must be called matter; for example, if we call God light, let us call its contrary darkness; if good, then that is evil. If, however, we should call God that very Truth itself, it is clear that its contrary must be called falsehood. But how could that which truly is, as they have supposed, be falsehood? For that which is not, if it were said to be, would be a falsehood; but that which is, and truly is, by the very fact of being truth, cannot be falsehood. For if anyone says it is, he speaks the truth; and if he does not say that it is, so as not to speak the truth, he would not say that it is not, so as to lie. But if he says it is not, he lies in his thought. Therefore, it is falsehood itself; for that which is, is truly [what it is]. ^B Next, if they call the good "immortality," they will call evil "destruction." But whose destruction would destruction be? For it cannot be the destruction of the good; but if it be the destruction of itself, it has destroyed itself over many ages, and they imagine it to exist in vain and to no purpose. But how will there be destruction? For destruction carries away something else, not itself; but if it were to carry away itself, it could not have subsisted from the beginning; for it would be seen destroying itself rather than existing; for an immortal destruction cannot be conceived according to common notions. But that which is unbegotten is necessarily free from destruction and eternal, and hence also immortal; for that which is unbegotten is above that which is mortal. If, however, matter possesses this [property], that it has never been made, which is the greater [attribute], how is it that this which is less does not also inhere in it—namely, that it has never undergone destruction? But if it is not destroyed because it is eternal, then it has no destruction of itself, and the substance of destruction will not exist. ^C But those who have gone forth from the school of Manichaeus, when they hear such disputations, ask: "Whence, then," they say, "come the evils? Whence," they say, "is the disorder that is seen in things?" But it has often been said that, on account of their ignorance of divine governance and [of the way] in which things are disposed, they have acquired for themselves a false and impious understanding, on account of their lack of knowledge of things which they thought they knew—things which they came to know in a worse way than if they had been ignorant of them; and, what is more true, having lost what they were seeking even before they sought it. But our argument, when the time comes, will demonstrate and conclude that what they deem the perturbation of the order of things is a good order proceeding from God the Most High; and it will teach that the things they call evils—some placed only in action, and others [existing] according to substance—are not evil at all. ^D

Chapter XII. What the Manichaeans think regarding matter

^A And thus having been increased, it rose up, not knowing the existence of the Good. But when it had been brought up further and saw the earth and the light of the Good, it attempted to set foot upon things that were not its own. The Good, however, sends forth a certain power, to which it gives whatever name it sees fit, intended to guard the boundaries, but which is in truth a bait that would bring matter to an involuntary moderation; which is indeed what happened. For when matter saw the power that had been sent, it was enticed, to put it as if it were enamored; but having received a greater impulse, it swallowed it up; and it was bound in a certain manner, just as a beast. For they use this example, as if by the incantation of the power that was sent, it was lulled to sleep. There occurred, therefore, a mixing and a tempering, they say, in this manner, of the power of the Good that had been swallowed and the matter that had swallowed it; and so from both this whole [universe] was fashioned, by the Good, clearly; for evil would not have provided for the generation of the cosmos. Hence they say that some things are good, while others are evil, appearing so from that tempering and from the union of the two through the contrariety of the things that are here. ^B

Chapter XIII. The soul from a good principle, but the body from an evil one, according to the Manichaeans.

It determines that every soul is of the portion of the Good, but the body and the flesh are of matter, which at one time holds the soul like a prison, and at another time is held like a beast by the incantation. Thus, having tricked matter, the Good, he says, became the creator of the world: not that he had desired to fashion it (for it resists him), but because of the insurrection of evil, which he had intended to discipline; yet it was not possible to remove the poison of evil from the things that are seen, but that this [state] should follow, as they have supposed, from the perturbation of order and from the inequality of the things among us, that this man should be rich and another poor; and one honored, and another unhonored; and all such things. And the goal of the Good is to liberate the soul from evil, and to drain this forth in a certain manner from matter; and this takes place through the moon as it waxes and wanes, as we seem to see; for the truth, he says, is that it is filled like a water jar, and [the soul] is emptied from the substance infused into the kindred Good. ^C For if not in these words, yet these are the things he wishes to say, which have been stated by us much more decorously; for there is much that is absurd and incredible in his narrative. ^D

Chapter XIV. Manes' opinion on the earth and the rains.

Whatever other things, therefore, he speaks of and writes like an old woman, using the Syriac tongue—how the earth is supported, not avoiding a poetic fable; how the rains are formed, and that they are the sweats of the rulers of matter—these and such things, the diversions of his own strivings, it would be superfluous to bring forward for refutation. For one ought not to allow the things which he writes deliriously about each, which are known to all, to expand the book with infinite trifles; since

^A it happened that the account of Providence ^B necessarily embraces this subject, through which it is proper to show that all things are well and divinely ordered, and to proclaim the ineffable wisdom of God; it would be laughable to deem those things which have been proposed worthy of any refutation, since, being heaped together outside of common notions, they carry their own refutation by themselves among those who possess understanding.

Cap. XV. The opinion concerning matter is refuted. Whether Satan is worse than he was.

It was enough, after it had been demonstrated no less that there are by no means two principles, and especially contrary ones, to discourse already concerning man and the rest of the creation; nevertheless, nothing prevents us from considering how the things proposed are incredible. Matter, he says, was once carried in a perturbed order. By what perturbation of order? Was it by itself, or against someone? For all injustice is not injustice by itself, but requires another in whom it may be committed. To whom, therefore, there was no community with another, in whom was it carried with a perturbed order? Or what is the reason for this perturbation itself?

It was generating, he says, first, as wickedness, advancing and growing; therefore it was generating unbegotten things, and there will be no room for saying that an eternal nature attempts anything new; for either it will attempt it by nature, and thus it never ceased from the attempt of new things—if indeed one must call it the attempt of new things, against which the business undertaken by God has by no means a beginning of time; or, if it does this using thought, it has reason and knowledge; and the cause of wickedness lacking reason is overturned. Whether, therefore, using ratiocination or using a movement devoid of reason it stirred up sedition, what reason allows that for infinite ages it was left [to have] to stir up sedition of this sort? ^C For from the time that he says it was restrained and held back, it will be found that a point of time has flowed out, if it be compared with the infinite past ages. For that which begins and ends is finite; but those which are altogether infinite are eternal and unbegotten.

Furthermore, if using ratiocination it was corrupted toward sedition, how was the attack on a thing by which it could not be affected not rather interrupted and cut off? As if it could not make an incursion against invincible wisdom? Whence it happened that they took care not to attribute reason and knowledge to it, so that the figment of sedition against God might have a place; and dragged along by necessity by ignorance and a nature not ratiocinating, it will not wait for infinite ages while it arms itself and surrounds itself with an army, so that it might become more prompt for audacity. For if it was becoming more copious in those whom it generated, ^D nevertheless it did not increase the appetite of nature, nor did the natural motion take on anything of appetite, nor would it have happened to it to grow first, and thus to stir up sedition; for this belongs to a nature using reason, which acts wickedly by design.

^A How could wickedness truly be increased by the addition of offspring? For if it is perfected in wickedness by those whom it begets, then the wickedness was imperfect, and was not at the peak and summit of wickedness; but if it was perfect and supreme according to its own nature, then again it will by no means appear that wickedness is increased through the propagation of those begotten, nor will it become bolder and more confident, since it does not partake of reason, nor will it recruit those whom it begat for its own aid; for otherwise it would appear that, before it procreated, it was imperfect not only as wickedness toward wickedness, but also as to strength and power, which is foreign to a being that is unbegotten.

Chapter XVI. Sedition among the offspring of the evil principle. How it was settled.

Explaining the manner of this sedition that took place, he says: "Those who were born of it pursued and devoured one another, suffering harsh and grievous things; and they did not cease from rising up against one another," he says in the very words, "until they caught sight of the light at long last." For though they were driven from one another, and though they were ignorant, yet they dared even to climb up to the light. And what is more incredible or more mythical ^B than this: that those who subscribe to one mother and are united by the bond of nature should in vain attack one another, and in turn devour each other's limbs, and never cease from doing so? If this were true, it would have been better for them to be consumed by themselves; and the fool inanely calls "disorder" that which is "expedient." For he especially ascribes this "disorder" before the world to this wickedness; which he names thus because he is, as it were, grieved for the matter, that it was not fittingly consumed by itself; and as a certain friend of this [matter], lamenting and deeply grieving that it had harmed itself—[things] which it did ^C usefully against itself—he calls [it] "disorder" in those instances in which they were harming one another; but when they saw the light, they ceased. But he ought rather to have called it the most excellent "arrangement of order," namely, that evil should perish of itself. He, however, says: "They were in a disordered state, and were doing wrong to one another; but when they saw the light, they ceased."

Therefore, the light plotted against what is "expedient," if indeed it rescued the wicked from mutual slaughter, and like a physician's medicine benefited the sick. But it was not proper for the Good to spare the evil, so that it might remain unharmed and not be consumed by itself. For if it prevented this from being consumed by itself, it plainly preserved it itself; and it would be a truer "disorder" ^D—that is, a straying from the good order—this which he says: that the "disorder" had been removed. So, therefore, it is in the book that is among them: "Sedition having arisen among them, they came forth as far as the boundary, and saw the light, a spectacle most beautiful and most decorous; then, moved by the agitation within them, they deliberated concerning the light, what they might do to mingle themselves with that which was superior." But to think this they were not able; rather, because of their desire for the better [thing], thinking it would be their own prey, being many, they mustered an army.

Chapter XVII. Desiderium hominis bonum.

Manichaeus, those things which are the most beautiful and comely of all, by his own testimony unwittingly gives witness to the sons of wickedness. For if the most beautiful and the

most desirable things were seen, and, inflamed with desire, they deemed them to be their own prey, it is clear that their judgment was correct. ^A Thus, those who do not partake of reason take counsel on how they might mingle themselves with the light; and it would then have been out of envy not to allow them to enjoy the good: for the discourse of Manes is not consistent. For if they were mad against one another, it was fitting to leave them to perish by one another’s hands; but if they were held by a desire for the light as something refined, it was even honorable to grant them the ability to enjoy it. For the desire for the good is altogether comely and praiseworthy according to nature, which, although they could not enjoy—as he who wrote the dogmas of Manes says—they nevertheless desired, yet they were not able to corrupt it; for the good is of such a nature that it can neither be consumed nor can those who partake of it plot against it. But how did they all set out together for war, not knowing who it was that resisted and opposed them? For the very writing from which we have adduced these things of Manes says that they did not even know that God dwelt in the light, nor that they were not to escape unpunished if they dared to invade the dwelling-place of God.

Chap. XVIII. Manichaean ignorance is agitated.

If, therefore, they did not know of an opposing ^C obstacle, it is altogether contrary to reason to lead an army against those by whom they did not know they were to be repelled; for it was reasonable that they should be armed, as they themselves say, with fire and darkness, if they had foreseen that they would be restrained by others. But because they were completely ignorant, it is not only incredible, but plainly contradictory to describe an armament and an army when absolutely no one was expected to be present to offer resistance. It is no less contradictory to say, on the one hand, that they had a desire for the light, and on the other, to confess that they used war apparatus; for every enemy covers and fortifies himself with weapons of war against an adversary, not against that which he desires to be the prize of the contest. If, therefore, there was no adversary, inasmuch as they themselves did not know of one, how is it not contradictory to desire and to wage war? And how is that not also greatly repugnant, that those who never were in concord in things which are according to nature should have conspired together to wage war? ^D "Together," he says, "they took counsel against the light." For those who fed upon one another’s limbs, and who never at any time ceased from their madness against each other, how did they agree in things contrary to nature, both in desire and in wrath against the One who is greater?

If, indeed, the sight of the light benefited them, how was it not fitting that they should be led by God to a perfect change of nature, having been provided with a remedy to enjoy the true good itself, that is, God, perfectly? How did the spectacle of the light that appeared benefit those who had set out to war with an army; those to whom this very light did not permit them to exercise their fury against "themselves" any longer, as indeed it was fitting to exercise it, but permitted them to turn it against "Himself" in a manner that was not fitting? But in these fabrications there is much that is nonsensical; and these things might be shown to be otherwise unpardonable. The earth

^A of the Good—what sort of earth was this before the creation? For in their system, the names of things precede their origin. Before confessing that God made the world, that most absurd Manichaean says that what had not yet been made existed. For if the earth had been made, it existed; but if it existed without having been made, it was co-unbegotten with God. And what need had God of earth, if He made no use of earth? He foolishly calls it the earth of God, before saying that it was made; for it was not possible, before the creation, to bear witness to it as something made.

^B Cap. XIX. The evil principle could not see the light.

Then, the light that falls upon the senses was created by God; but God Himself would be intelligible, not sensible, light. "Therefore," he says, "evil saw the light of the Supreme Good." If it was the sensible light, the world did not yet exist, nor was there any origin of the world. How, then, did it see what had not yet been made? For since man, who would have made use of it, did not yet exist, to whom would the light have been useful? For things that are useful are related to the one who uses them; certainly it was not useful to God, who is free from all sensible participation. But if it saw God Himself, who is intelligible light, it saw the like by a similarity of nature; it was therefore necessary that it should have seen the sensible light itself; but to what end would the sensible light have existed, and for what purpose, before the sensible world was created? Otherwise, how do darknesses see light? For if they saw light, the devil was not darkness; for the sense has a great community and conjunction with the sensible. For the mental grasp is natural, on account of the similarity of the sight to the thing appearing; it immediately imprints its character upon itself on account of the legitimate communion of nature; for body sees body. And the like aims its gaze at the like; nor can the eyes of an inferior nature see what is more excellent and higher in nature, much less what is contrary to nature. But if that which is of a more excellent nature, ^C although it is not contrary, except in being incorporeal, cannot be seen at all by the inferior, in that it is corporeal, then a contrary, if it exists, cannot be seen by a contrary. Therefore, those things which, as they say, see one another, are related and friendly, and in no way contrary.

Cap. XX. Matter attempts to ascend from Manes. Matter's love for the offspring of God.

^D But the fabrication is full of barbarian destruction; for he says that matter not only saw, but also schemed to ascend, setting this forth as a sort of zeal to demonstrate that it had communion and society with the light; perhaps those who were born from it repented that, in the infinite ages preceding, they had not experienced the light. And in what way is darkness transformed into light? Or for what reason does it wish to approach it? Is it so that it may change its nature and become light? Or so that it may obtain as food something contrary to its nature in light? But it wished to ascend while in ignorance; and yet, if it had known, there was some reason for it to be changed; but being by nature wickedness and ignorance-

- ^A a total overturning of the premise, not to flee from the contrary.

And that which is even more contrary to reason is the claim that a power was sent from the Good—not now a sensible light, but—as one might say—something viewed as a projection of God; and that it desired it, as if in love, and hastened to swallow it, and distributed it among its own powers. And whereas it was impossible to see what was sent from the nature of the Good, he says that in this way it became possible, and [it was possible] to swallow it. For I shall use this expression all the more, since if it even merely saw that which had been projected from the substance of God, there is no need for any other word to overturn this fabrication. For it saw it absolutely as like sees like. For that which is completely contrary according to nature, and has proceeded to the extreme of contrariety, could neither see its contrary nor approach it; since the principle of contrariety is completely destroyed if it even merely sees it.

CAP. XXI. The invisible God.

^B He adds this to the rest of what he said, something more absurd and vehemently self-contradictory, so that there is no need for anyone else to speak against him. For he says: "It fell in love with the power that appeared, as if it had completely forgotten its own nature." Indeed, not that that [power] which had no being forgot, but rather these men are forgetful of their own fabrications; for they say that before it stirred up this sedition, it did not have the knowledge of the Good, so that they might not honor the nature accused by them with the knowledge of the Good. How is it not madness to think that that which does not have within itself the knowledge that the Good exists could see it, and after having seen it, desire it? For it is incomparably greater to see the substance with one's own eyes than to know that it is. ^C Immediately, not only we, but also the higher angelic powers, know that the Good exists, being nourished for piety toward God by this knowledge alone—the angels, of course, having ascended in knowledge just as much as in nature—but it is granted neither to us nor to them to see God according to his substance. Indeed, so long as we are clothed in a body according to nature, it is not possible for us to see even the angels themselves.

For it is manifest and almost universally acknowledged that whatever feels, sees that which is like itself. If anyone, however, should think that what we say is trivial—for we see the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and furthermore among us stones, gold, and silver, and in short the sea itself and all animals, and we are by no means like these—let him understand that, even if the species of the things enumerated are different, nevertheless the supreme genus of all these is body. For substance is in part invisible, ^D as incorporeal; and in part visible, as body. The first division, therefore, separates and distinguishes all these things as a genus. Therefore, body sees body; and insofar as it is body, the seer is like and related to the seen, even if the species of these are different on account of the variety and adornment of the universe. For it would be ridiculous if, because a flower is most beautiful to the sight, [since...]

it and what is not beautiful, neither one, which is truly what it is, should be called color; for color, even if it is different, each is; for the same sight has intercourse with both alike. Thus, in fact, all bodies are visible, even if they differ in form, he says; but if some bodies are better than other bodies, nothing prevents, except that they are all bodies; whence that which is visible is not to be worshipped by the one who sees it, inasmuch as it is comprehended by him.

Cap. XXII. Matter did not see God. Nor did it absorb light.

If, therefore, matter saw what was from the substance of God, it came to the spectacle [drawn] by great kinship and likeness, and there was no further need to speak against this inconsistent fable; but if it also desired what it saw, the fool testified to it as being the best of all things, so that he seems to have imposed the name of wickedness upon it, but attested that its substance was good. For what could be greater, in proof of excellence, than to desire the good? And if he says that it also apprehended and swallowed, so as to become pregnant with the substance contrary to God, and distributed it among its own powers—O, the mad folly! It not only saw, but also desired; and it not only desired, but also swallowed; and it not only swallowed, but also retains. All these things clearly do not define the contrariety of nature, but rather grant the highest and most exalted kinship to both. ^B For whether it, being resentful—which happens to be a mark of reasoning—or desiring, swallowed what appeared, these things could only arise from a communion of nature; for if it were in the extreme contrary, the two would not have gathered together at all. ^C And the barbarian did not observe, among other things, this either: that the power sent by God, if it were incorporeal, would have accepted no division; so that it could in no way be divided according to substance into contrary powers, nor, for that matter, be swallowed; for in what way would an incorporeal thing be swallowed? But if it were corporeal, every body that is cut and fragmented is, in a way, destroyed, and can no longer live its own life. Therefore, either the power sent by the Good was incorporeal and was in no way swallowed, nor divided into many, and so the ^D fable is completely ended; or it was some corporeal power, and it has been destroyed and perished by wickedness, which is more wicked regarding the insult to the Good, or rather, more powerful for the refutation of the fable; for a body divided and scattered by itself (for the mind is not divided), what power does it have to subject wickedness, having received such great damage and insult to its own nature, so that it appears to have been blotted out and perished? For this is a property of a divided body.

Cap. XXIII. God did not send His own substance. Manes raging against God.

But what is more irrational, if God, wishing to rescue the earth from wickedness, having sent forth from His own nature...

that which was ^A consigned to grievous insult and the destruction of its substance, to dwell and reside for so many ages with wickedness, and to be a participant in it, and to sin together with it? This, for the substance of God to suffer to be subject to wickedness, and to sin together with it, even for one hour or a moment of time, would surpass all madness. And how much better was it for the earth to have been abandoned than for the substance of God to be seized? For if the incursion of the material into the earth was unendurable because it disturbed the order, how much more unendurable was such great servitude and subjection of the divine nature, and that not for a very brief time, but for a whole and measureless age; so that wickedness would not cease to sin, and God would sin together with it through the power sent forth from Himself?

^B Whence it is reasonable that God did not wish to send to wickedness that which was born of His own substance to sin with it, nor for that which was sent to have been persuaded and to have obeyed to arrive at such destruction, so that it might be filled with every iniquity and injustice, and at the same time with impiety, on behalf of the earthly, not for the earth already then captured, but for that about to be captured, as if God could not have presided over this earth in any other way.

See how clearly the Manichaean, raging against God, utters falsehoods regarding the impotence of God, just as one acting as guardian for an orphan whose weakness he is compelled to acknowledge in order to fulfill the role of an advocate. For as, on the contrary, while asserting that wickedness—which does not exist at all—has done everything against God, he says it has risen up and wished to mount His possessions; finally, which is most shameful of all, he says it gained mastery over His substance for the whole age, and divided it into infinite parts, to choke it and stifle it within itself, and to have it as a partner in every evil deed and intemperance; and that God could not in any other way either forcefully snatch back His own domain nor at least remain free from sin, which befitted His nature.

^C For whatever that which is born of Him according to substance sins, together with matter, redounds entirely upon Him who begat it. Thus at last he attributes every power over God to wickedness by his own testimony; and he says that God suffered the harshest things of all; and he dares to add that the power of God which was sent forth lulled matter to sleep like a beast by means of a song—mingling not only things that are utterly contrary in a discourse entirely lacking in probability, and bestowing upon his own invention things that cannot by any means exist according to nature, but also accomplishing exactly the opposite of what he intends; for he says that God fashioned this universe from both of these things. He claims that the body of man is indeed of wickedness, but the soul is of the Good—whether they are of one form or already composed of opposites; neither of which, as we shall teach a little later, can subsist. The body, however, by itself neither thinks of nor sees any of the evils; nor does it kill, nor commit adultery, nor rob, nor any other of the offenses....

for it neither murders, nor commits adultery, nor robs, nor does it perform any other of these injustices when the soul is not present. ^A

CAP. XXIV. The mixture of the soul with the body.

Yet it is for the sake of these and such things that the hypostasis of the contrary principle and the mixture of contraries were devised by Manes, so that the cause of evils might be found. But if the mixture of the soul, which is of God, with the body, which is of the devil, provided to men the occasions and origins of injustices and sins, while the body by itself does not sin—it would have been better that the fashioned power of God not be mixed with a wickedness that does not exist; for no one of the sins committed by men would be practiced in life, nor would it exist at all. For what would murder be, if no one were murdered, if it had not come to pass through the mixture of contraries—according to this ridiculous story—that the world was created? And what adultery would there be, if there were no body, and it did not naturally desire anything in itself, unless the soul from God were sent down? For one of two things must be said: either we must claim that these contraries came together by the provident governance of God, in order that a world might be made as if from a good God, and thus He Himself would be entirely the author of the evils in men, if He willingly made use of wickedness against those who were to be; or that He was forced by ^B wickedness, and wickedness has already reported the victory over the defeated God.

CAP. XXV. Matter could not do evil before creation. On the absurd opinion of Manes concerning the creation of the world.

But I will say again: what murder was there, if there was no man, nor sword, nor any other kind of weapon or instrument for killing, unless the world had been built through the conjunction of contraries? For matter, being by itself and alone, although those born from it might be in sedition against themselves, knew nothing of murder; for it did not have a mortal being to murder. It did not know of adultery, because the betrothals of marriage were not practiced among them; nor was there calumny, for it could not judge at all, being devoid of reason. The love of money—the root of evils—and ambition were not even mentioned; for the love of money exists among men because of need, from which that matter was free; and ambition is a passion of the reasoning faculty, in which it did not share, being irrational. Gluttony, fornication, and the abuse of males ^C had no place in it; and, to speak summarily, matter did not at all possess, before the world was built, all the evils that appear among men. Therefore it was not bound by the mixture, but rather, on the contrary, according to that foolish hypothesis of his, just as a horse having found a plain is carried in a run toward the injustice of the evils of men: for those things which were not evils at all before the world, are practiced in the world from the time the world came to be. For even if one were to posit, according to his teaching, that those born of matter were in a state of sedition, and were driven by fury against one another, and harmed one another with infinite evils, and marched as an army against the Light—not even then would one imagine these to possess that list of human evils ^D which have been enumerated.

^A For it was not even possible for human evils to be committed before man came into being. And where would he be who asserts that evil was disciplined by being bound—evil which, before it was bound, did not even have memory of human evils, but after it was bound, is accused because of them?

For what harm was the Good doing, while evil was disorderly by itself and had no one upon whom to inflict its disorder? For it was in no way able to corrupt the Good; but if it attempted to invade places not its own, it ought to have been restrained from its irrational course in another way. For evil, which formerly showed itself to be harmless regarding itself, now seems to have taken on something else, against which, as a companion, it will show its disorder to be more harmful forthwith. And men, evil-doers by themselves, would indeed wish to do some evil, but having no one upon whom to do it, they would be found idle; yet they would look upon one another benevolently in their concord regarding evil. But the matter did not wish—for being irrational it did not deliberate—nor could it, being alone and by itself. Is it then the case that what is called matter by Manes appears to have taken on, through the soul, a more "true" matter toward the operation of evils which it was ignorant of? For it was accused before the manufacture of the world of a disorder unknown to us and not at all apparent. It learned, however, to work manifest evils and those which are seen. Thus, the incantation stirred up the beast, and did not, as he says, put it to sleep in the least.

If, however, he says that God did not want the world to come into being, it must be asked: And who was it that wished it? Was it evil, which had no cognition? Who is it that made the things that are out of both? Or was it matter? In that case, its operation would not be worthy of wonder. But did God not wish it, yet was forced? If it were so, He would have been more subject than He was a subjector; and it would be superfluous to admire the wisdom of God as having been forced to the harm of those who were to be; for those things which were in no way evil before the conjunction of opposites, nor were even called such, these blossomed after the birth of the world. ^D

CHAPTER XXVI. God as the author of sin according to Manes.

Is it not absurd to say that God wished to remove the disorder of matter—a disorder which cannot be demonstrated to us—and yet became the author of the action of evils which we see and which appear in men, which are devoid of all order and reason? For the disorder of which he condemned matter he could only state in words, but he could not demonstrate it in the very things and deeds themselves; but the evils constructed from that mingling of opposites—an impossible event—the foolish man, seeing with his own eyes, cannot deny. Wherefore, while he wishes to teach that God is not the author of human injustice, he confesses Him to be clearly its greatest author, even more fully than if he were striving only for that.

^A Come, then, let us consider the evils that are brought about by men, and to whom they rightly pertain. For he will perhaps attempt to introduce the mingling of the soul with opposites, as he has surmised; whether the soul itself be simple, that is, of one form, and from the Good, according to him, or whether it be from the composition of opposites from the part that is contrary to the Good, the evils that come to pass will easily be demonstrated according to this impious hypothesis. The soul, therefore, is incorporeal, and in no way admits of a composition according to substance, and least of all of opposites; for those who have thought to compose it out of different things have not introduced a substance that is variegated and differing from itself, but have described its operations from those things that are seen, since they were unable to construct one simple definition by which it might be understood.

Cap. XXVII. Whence the soul proceeds into sin. The ratio is present in vices and virtues.

^C Even if it differs from itself by the varied qualities which it receives at different times and in different ways, yet according to its substance, which is the work of God, it is immutable and is not composed of diverse things; it is, however, so far removed from the commixtures of opposites that it does not even appear to be a body in itself. Let us posit, therefore, as he falsely asserts—if he should indeed attempt to say this—that the soul of man is composed of good and evil; does it not follow that what is in it and is a partaker of reason, according to his opinion, must be attributed to the Good, that is, to God, while that which lacks reason must be attributed to wickedness? It is clear that he could say nothing else.

If, then, desire is stirred up in a slippery fashion, whether from the body alone or from that part of the soul which pertains to wickedness, does the action proceed from it automatically? Does not reflection and counsel, then judgment and the choice of action, precede it in man, and thus is the desire brought to effect? Yet the crime of wickedness is formed from the action, not from the desire; so that if the thought of the desire remains in its place, not progressing to the work through the choice of the reasoning part, first of all it can cease quickly, being at once kindled and extinguished; and then it will by no means be considered a crime, not only in a common sense, but not even if it were judged according to the highest standard of virtue.

It appears, therefore, that sins are reasonably assigned and ascribed to the rational part of the soul, and not to the body, nor to any other part of it. Thus the irrational part is freed from the accusation of the evils which are among us, since it does not even exist, while according to his line of reasoning, these things are in danger of being brought forth from the portion of the Good, if indeed we do not make use of another argument that loves the truth. For if the soul, not discerning the quality of the desire, were to proceed to action without any reasoning, one could assert that those things which are done inconsiderately and beyond reason are brought forth from the irrational part. But if, on the other hand, the reason itself very often chooses the desire, as if willingly yielding to base training, and then again rejects it when some fear restrains it, or perhaps the desire of virtue, which pulls it toward itself, then it is clear that the reason is the only...

thing that assumes and claims the credit for actions done rightly or otherwise. ^A And the examination of those things which have been evilly demonstrated by Manes tends in the opposite direction here; for it appears that there is no sin of matter in our actions, but rather of the soul or its faculty of reason, which, belonging to the portion of the good, would pertain to God after that. ^B Furthermore, if it happened to those who practice chastity that their disposition toward desire were immovable, one might have absolved the reason of those who are licentious from blame, as if desire—which he would say comes from the side of evil—carried desire entirely away from the actions. But if one finds among those who embrace chastity that they cultivate it by this path and reason, that they curb and restrain the desires of nature by reason: it is clearly concluded that it is the reason that commits sin and cultivates virtue, for it knows both virtue and vice. But why the desire for sins is innate in us, we shall say when the opportunity arises, teaching that this pertains most of all to the admiration of the Creator.

Chapter XXVIII. Confirmation of this doctrine.

Now, as to what is being sought—if it has not been sufficiently demonstrated that our offenses are in no way the work of any matter or wickedness, but on the contrary the work of reason alone; it is permitted to confirm what has been said in another way. ^C Can they say that homicide, or evil, or fornication and adultery, or theft and lying are anything else? Clearly, they must be wickedness. What then? If a judge kills one who has committed an injury, is the killing therefore sanctioned by law? Yet the act is the same for him who kills violently and for him who executes by law; but the intent distinguishes the deed. Nay rather, the action of one who has intercourse with his own wife and one who has intercourse with another's is the same; but the intent separates acts that are done similarly. ^D Furthermore, if things that belong to Manes—whether tools or food—are stolen from him, does the work not seem to be the same as committing criminal theft? Yet in reason it is not the same, but entirely different. Then, if a madman demands back the sword that he deposited when he was of sound mind, so that it becomes necessary for the one with whom the deposit was entrusted to lie—saying he did not receive it—in what do these words differ from true treachery, if they are not distinguished by the intent of those asserting them?

From these things, therefore, it is manifest that an action for the most part is not evaluated by itself, but by the mind or thought of the one who undertakes it. The same reasoning can be found in contrary cases. For if one distributes money or food to the needy, not to act kindly toward him, but to hunt for the praise of those who see: is it not manifest that the deed is indeed most beautiful and kind, yet the intent is very base and wicked? If someone prays at length and fasts frequently, displaying religion and endurance to men...

^A it is evident that he should not reasonably be praised for the work, but rather reproved for the mind with which he did these things. Furthermore, if someone else were self-controlled and abstained from many appetites, not from a desire for virtue but to spare his money, is it not sufficiently manifest that such a person, having this disposition, is simply overcoming certain affections by means of others, while adopting that very endurance—which appears good on the surface—for the sake of wickedness in his mind and purpose?

If, therefore, actions that are often thought to be wicked appear, in the mind of the one performing them, to be honorable; or those which are not thought to be wicked, but on the contrary are believed to be honorable and good, are convicted by the will and purpose of the one performing them to be wicked, who can any longer contend that actions are not, for the most part, examined in the light of the truth, and that it is not the mind that is scrutinized in those things which are done? ^B What works, then, shall we ascribe to wickedness? Those which seem to be evil, but which are in fact good when they are performed with a mind toward virtue? Or what shall we assign to the good? Those which seem to be good, but which by reason become evil? Therefore, neither is indiscriminately one or the other; we judge only the rational and most sovereign element of the mind of the one acting, whether he undertook what was done rightly or otherwise. Now that the most sovereign element of human reason pertains to the better part of the soul—as even he [Manes] relates—even if the followers of Manes were to rave a thousand times over, they could not deny.

Consequently, Manes passed an entirely unjust judgment against the matter he himself formulated, ^C assigning to it characteristics that in no way suited it, if indeed it were the cause of what is done among men. On the contrary, it would rather be reasonably thought to pertain to the part of the good, if there are two certain contrary principles, as he insanely teaches.

Cap. XXIX. Whether God received back the power that was absorbed. The blasphemies of Manes against God.

He says, furthermore, that God strove to receive back to Himself the power that had been absorbed—which he calls the soul of all things—so that what was from Himself might not remain bound to matter and in punishment forever, without any end. What, then, led Him in the beginning to act this way, so that it could not even catch its breath for so many ages, ^D and suffered more than it acted? For if the myth contained the idea that God had suffered no outrage to His own substance, and had not even in the slightest been caught in a very base way by matter, but rather some other thing, most alien to His nature, had been caught and immediately snatched away—such that this handling appeared more a matter of form or superficial impression than a yielding—there would have been at least some plausibility in the fiction of the lie. But as it is, an immense age has passed, and they say that this has persisted because it was of the nature of God, such that God Himself appears to be comprehended due to His similarity to that which is held captive, and because that which was held captive was of His own nature; whence He desires with greater zeal to gather it back to Himself, as they say, whereas matter is simple and remains impassible, as being more an agent than a patient.

^A From these things it is surely evident that all the things which the deceiver has constructed, he has constructed to the blasphemy of God, who has done none of these things against Himself. He desires and strives, therefore, he says, to receive back unto Himself that power (11'). And this is what is hoped for among them as salvation and blessedness: that what was His own should be returned to God. ^B Does he, then, await the end for himself, hoping that he will be benefited, if he is to recover from his own nature his freedom—so that he might build up again what he destroyed, and nothing more—and does he sit enduring while nourished by hope, and looking toward the end, so that he might in some manner free himself from wickedness? If it is delayed, and does not happen quickly, he would be the one punished by the delay. ^C For it is clear that the speed of the end is not in his power; for he would have enjoyed this hope long ago; since Manes also tells another ridiculous story, that when those who were of his matter perceived that they would perish miserably as the light was gradually taken away, they contrived in opposition the construction of flesh to bind souls with a great bond. Wherefore, as he relates, it is clear that as long as they provide flesh, so long will the souls of God be attached to matter and remain bound; and it will be in their power that the world should not be limited by time, and the end of it will not be in the power of the Good.

CHAPTER XXX. Manes' contradictions.

^C What else can one say who observes this, except that Manes does not hold a consistent position, but rather, by transferring himself hither and thither, refutes himself? For if he says that God is the creator of the world, how does he say again that those who are children of matter opposed flesh to Him, as if the fabrication of the world were shared between God and them? And in this way violence is done to God, while he grants this to them as a gift, and He does not complete the universe according to His own will. ^D As if he had forgotten his own premise, the deceiver says that the removal and taking away of the power mixed with it—by which he had supposed the primal matter, which was in disorder, to be restrained—will be destructive to matter. For if when it is present it binds wickedness, but when it departs it releases it again, this removal will be a great cause of joy for matter itself. If, therefore, there is hope for it at the end that what was disjointed from God will return to Him, which He decreed from the beginning, and [yet] He forced it to undergo empty labor and evil filth for infinite ages, why should He not place in it the greatest hope and blessedness, if it were to be recovered again? For matter does not appear in any way restrained or repressed; on the contrary, it has rather obtained greater license for devising evil works. But it was necessary, he says, to bind it. When, therefore, the power that is being held is gradually drawn away, what will happen? It is evident that matter will again return to its natural

^A perturbation. The Manichaean denies this, saying: "By no means; for at the end he will overcome it, and will cause it, when it has been reduced to a lump ^B, to be consumed by its own self." Why, therefore, did he not do this from the beginning? Did he not want to, or could he not? For if he did not want to, how will he want to later, led by repentance, judging and choosing that which is better? Was it not for the sake of the good, in any case, not to have abolished evil entirely from the beginning, if he were able? But if he could not, a risk of weakness arises against the Creator; yet how will he be able to do so later on? Is it by having acquired a power which he did not possess, or by having grown or advanced? For if both opposites are unbegotten, neither admits of increase or decrease.

The whole fabrication of the barbarian is therefore baseless. What then? Does the Manichaean say that he has perceived by sense that a greater or lesser portion of the power mixed with matter has been snatched away and removed? Since from the time the moon waxes and wanes, God, he says, gradually recovers what is proper to the moon. And yet, so many ages have passed, and neither the human race has been diminished in the number of the living, nor has any other genus of four-footed animals undergone any diminution; but things that come into being come into being and cease to be in the usual manner, and indeed humanity has increased even more in number. From where, then, does that madman suppose that the power which he feigns to be mixed with wickedness is being gradually taken away? Since the same things subsist in the same way in the world; for the measure of the day is the same, and [that] of the night is the same; and neither has the light become more tenuous, nor have the shadows become greater; for the course of the sun and moon is the same, that is, the same order which was established from the beginning remains ^C.

Cap. XXXI. According to Mane, the substance of God suffers if souls are punished. God fills the abyss with mounds of matter. The progress of the malice of the devils.

We must also ask this: If souls that have sinned and have been entangled in a myriad of evils in this life will pay the penalty for what they have done amiss, or not? If they are to pay it—which he himself confesses when he says that they are to be affixed within the lump alongside the wickedness—God will be found punishing his own nature; than which what could be more absurd or outrageous? But if they are to be unpunished and unrequited, sin will bring with it not only neither pain nor loss, but it might even seem to have more than justice; since in this present age it offers pleasure to him who engages in it, and in the age to come it would be no cause for punishment ^D.

Beyond all these things, there is that which is astounding in him, where he says that, while wickedness is occupied here—that is, bound—God in the meantime fills the abyss with a mound from whence the matter emerged, not understanding in his most severe mental alienation what was being cast into it. If it were from the earth of the good, in what way does it have a place in a format that is yet contrary? But if it is from the parts of wickedness, what is of the part of wickedness and is fitting for it will not, from thence, enclose the matter that has sprung up. But God sits, according to Mane, through the age transferring mounds, and gradually piling up depths

O the mad insanity! to which, in most cases, ^A it is ridiculous even to offer a response.

But if you wish to know that demons themselves are not evil from the root, nor do they possess a root of perversity, but that even they have arrived at this by their own faculty of choice, being not evil by nature, nor inscribed in ignorance, nor being night and darkness by substance, but having become such by state and practice through the pursuit of such things; let us examine the argument: a blind nature will not possess even the smallest and slightest vision; and ignorance itself will not lay claim to even a drop of knowledge for itself, nor will night itself and darkness, being such by nature, be transformed even into a slight gleam. But the demons appear to have known the Savior and to have confessed Him as Lord: "We know," they say, "who You are, the Son of the living God." But ignorance cannot know, and a blind nature cannot see. They know, and they speak the truth in knowing, and they do not speak through calumny; for they speak the truth, even if not with a genuine disposition. They are no longer accused of having a blind nature or ignorance; for if they had seen not even the smallest thing, they would neither have been suppliants, nor would they have yielded to the One spoken of, nor would they have distinguished that the One who appeared was different from the many, and that there was no difference between Him and themselves. ^B For behold, irrational animals do not know how to distinguish between the wise and the unwise, who are wise and who are unwise. But if the demons knew, and being able to distinguish, they were released from that which lacks discernment, having discerned and recognized such a thing; it is proven in this also that it is not nature, but the faculty of choice that governs: for even if the faculty of choice is ailing, even if it errs, yet it has not ceased to be a participant of reason; rather, this is not destroyed in it. Thus also did the demons recognize Him; they besought, they supplicated that He would not command them to depart into the abyss. If they were children of the abyss, if they had a kinship with the abyss, why do they flee what is akin? Why do they reject their own root? For they would rather have embraced it, considering their rest to be placed in kinship, since refreshment is found in one’s kin, whereas in foreigners and strangers there are afflictions. Jesus would have been more to be rejected by them; this place would have been more to be rejected, where the good and upright are; and departure into the abyss would have been to be embraced. But on the contrary, while they refuse and are wary, and decline to go there, nay, for this very reason are suppliants in prayer, they have given sufficient evidence that they have no natural kinship with the place of torments. For nothing ever afflicts itself and harms itself with evil; but everything that is afflicted and harmed with evil is afflicted by another; for it is necessary that that which afflicts ^C not be the affliction and torture of itself, but of another that is naturally suited to be afflicted and harmed with evil. ^D

Chapter XXXII. Prayers of the demons to God. How demons are punished in the lower regions.

does not inundate itself; for it knows how to inundate other things, but it has no capacity to inundate itself. Behold, the air does not know how to cool itself; since everything that acts and does evil, harms and afflicts something else. If, however, the abyss is evil, and the demons are harmed by the abyss, and if the abyss is a place of torment, yet the demons are being twisted—they are no longer being punished by what is like them, but, being something apart, they are being punished by another thing; clearly not by this nature or by this substance, for the abyss has been shown to be of another substance. That the demons are of a different kind and a different substance than the abyss, what has been said is sufficient; and this abyss is indeed a place of torment and chastisement, yet not eternal, nor unbegotten, but created later at some point, made at a late hour as a medicine and a help to those who have sinned. ^B For the scourges are holy, being a medicine for those who have sinned; the wounds are holy, being remedies for those who have stumbled; for the wounds did not come into being so that they might be evil, but the scourges came into being so that they might not be evil; for those who are evil, being pained by the wound, cut off their evils by the scourge. For this reason we do not complain about the abysses; but we know that they have come into being as a place of torment and chastisement, serving as a correction for those who have sinned.

If, however, the abyss is a place of torment and punishment, and the demons are twisted and punished, and they possess a substance susceptible to these torments, and they are able to have pain, and are subject to punishment, and have a perception of these chastisements, how then are they unbegotten? ^C How are they eternal? How did they never have a beginning? How are those who are not impassible—those who are able to suffer and are strong enough to be punished—from themselves? For the unbegotten will never suffer anything, nor will it be punished by anyone; but, having begun from itself, it remains with itself, and having not received its beginning from another, neither does it receive its punishment from another; and because no author is ascribed to it, no one will be ascribed as the judge; and it will not be judged by another, since it did not begin from another; and it will fear no one, having received its existence from no one. For what would it even fear, if it possesses its constitution in perfection? If it has a perfect completion? If it has been completed from itself, and is fitted to itself? For those things which can ^D have a mutable harmony fear the one who is able to alter the harmonies; the one who can suffer fears the one who causes the suffering. If, then, the demons fear and are able to suffer, they are not unbegotten; for the unbegotten is impassible, and cannot suffer, since it exists outside the nature of generated things.

That they supplicate is because they are in possession of their senses and they know what they are; and they know that they are able to suffer; for they have not been ignorant of themselves; they have not considered themselves to be impassible; and for one to know himself and not to have been ignorant of himself is a sign and token of sense perception. If, then, because they were susceptible to suffering they were afraid, and fearing they supplicated, and they supplicated the One who is able to—they did not ignore the One who tracks them.

^A For this, their supplication testifies that they knew the One who tracks them 15, and they did not ignore that they were susceptible to suffering and passible; but that He who was tracking was the Lord and King of all things, they appear, through their supplication, to have known. And we have established these things regarding demons, so that the argument concerning demons might not remain idle.

It is possible to add these things as well, that a nature is similar to itself, and has no difference with respect to itself. For behold, fire in its entirety is similar to itself; it is not less hot than itself, nor more so than itself. It does not possess "more" and "less"; for in natures, "more" and "less" are absent; where there is "more" and "less," it is no longer a nature, but an augmentation of the will. But if it is written concerning demons that he goes and takes seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and an augmentation appears from the account, that the one is wicked, the other more wicked, this is a difference of wickedness. Where is the nature that is similar to itself, if a difference is found in wickedness, and this difference testifies to the will and not to the nature? But enough of such arguments.

Chapter XXXIII. The two unbegotten, separate principles of Manes. The evil Satan, the good God. The apostles sometimes good, sometimes evil.

We shall next attempt to explain the first fiction of those people and to refute it with our counter-arguments. Evil, he says, was, and was unbegotten; but there was also the good God, and separate places of habitation, and each apart by himself, separated from the other. And God was separated from evil; and the prince of evil was likewise separated from God. And each was by himself, and each ruled over his own, and administered as he was naturally disposed: the evil one evilly, and the good one goodly; the evil one doing harm, and harming his own things, and not ceasing to harm his own things; the good one always good and helping, and helping his own things, and never failing to help. For all utility began to proceed from the Good. 16 They fought against the doctrines; they sought the furthest ends; they could not find them, because they did not accept the consequence from the beginning. And these are small things, and not many, but they are sufficient for the inquiry. I have merely set forth the shape of the question; I have not run off to a multitude of testimonies. For the reader will seek out what things have an affinity and kinship with these, and from these he will proceed to read things similar and joined by affinity.

Come now, let us set up and prepare their argument, putting forward their dogmas. The evil one was Satan, and the good one was God; and thus the situation was. I twist the fable so that I may refute the fable; and unless I set forth what they explain, I cannot overturn the fable. The good one was God, he says, and the evil one was Satan; and he was wicked, and he never was not; for he was always, and he was not from anyone; for he was, and he was a root, in

^A truth: he was ^B also Lord, and he himself was; and he was a root; and a good root, and a root of good things; and everything good went forth from him. For there were two roots, and two offshoots came forth, the offshoots corresponding to the roots: from that one, such things; and from this one, such things are gossiped about.

Let us stand at this point; let us now undertake the examination, and let us see the syllogisms, and let us remember the sayings, so that we may both conclude by syllogisms and persuade by the sayings. For we shall say to them: Since God was a root, and a good root, and good fruits were produced from good roots; and Satan was a root, and an evil root, and evil fruits were produced from an evil root; of whom are the apostles the fruits, so that we may know the matter in question from the fruits? I do not take this from the roots; for we shall say: The evil root knows how to bring forth nothing good; nor does the good root know how to bring forth anything evil. But the apostles appear sometimes as good, and sometimes as evil; and lately good, but from the beginning evil, and having undergone a change from the evil ones.

For if we say that the apostles are the fruits of Satan on account of their former transgressions, they will be ashamed because of the apostleship and the perfection of their virtues; but if they are of God, what will they say concerning their ancient sins and their ancient diabolical life? For the Scripture will shame them and will confute their judgment. But if, being at a loss and unable to speak, they ask us in turn, saying that it is difficult to solve the propositions and that the proof is difficult, we shall answer that the apostles are not the fruits of God, but things made and things fashioned; for they were not brought forth as fruits from a root, but as creatures from a Creator and Maker, they have been brought into existence as creatures and things made by Him who made them; not as being of the same substance as the maker, for they were born from the Unbegotten, having at one time not been, but later having been made. They received their being from the Maker, not being substances from a substance, but being brought into existence as hypostases, from the goodness of the Demiurge; and thus made, so that they might have the beginning by their own choice. The Savior, therefore, appears saying: ^C If anyone wishes to come after me; If you wish to be perfect; If you wish to be made whole. If He who made such things speaks, through whom the Father made all things, understand the words of the Maker: He set the laws in the will; He deposits the legal requirements in the will; He knows the will of those who act to be the mistress ^D of their actions.

CAP. XXXIV. Some evil people possess virtues. Pharaoh. Nebuchadnezzar. Manes teaches that light has stolen wickedness.

Indeed, in order to honor us, the Word hung the communion of actions upon the will. If you wish and if you do not wish, if you do not listen to me, the sword shall devour you. It is absurd that even the...

discourse concerning the most wicked should be abandoned, and that the examination of those who behave in a most foul and profligate manner should be omitted, lest our silence should create a most dangerous desperation for them. Do they not vehemently accuse Nebuchadnezzar? Do they not strongly blame Pharaoh? Do they not consider them to have reached the height of depravity? For they boast such things everywhere concerning their way of life. If, therefore, no zeal at all were perceived in their minds, the case would be different. But if, even in such evil persons, some parts of what is good are found—senses, perceptions, intelligence, repentance, and supplications—what, then, will they say? For if this most base person should appear to have some parts of virtue and some suitable dispositions, what will they say? For if they reply that Satan is mixed of virtue and vice, as having brought forth mixed fruits, or that these fruits are not of the devil—for the fruits of the mixed would not be the fruits of him who is unmixed, nor will the unmixed be the root of the mixed—yet these persons appeared at some time to be mixed, and to have received knowledge, and to have been seized by wickedness; for this reason they will appear to be not true persons, but figments of thought. ^B

For behold, Pharaoh, when he is rebuked, gives way and softens; he bends in his mind, and being struck in soul, he does not persist in hardness. Instead, he does two things: he asks for what he desires, and he accuses what has been done. His soul does not appear blinded, but rather looking on and proceeding toward repentance, embracing petition and supplication, and softening through prayers. If he were evil by nature, how would he have had knowledge concerning prayer and repentance? For if repentance is good, and prayer is good, and if his nature is evil, how was evil mixed with good? And how was good brought forth from evil? It is apparent that they do not understand what they are saying, but rather, with an uneducated and untrained mind, they offer forth spittle of words rather than words themselves. ^C

If, moreover, Nebuchadnezzar, although he was savage in his character, and had prepared the furnace and made the image, and was frightening with threats and forcing them to worship the statue—as soon as the holy children were cast inside, and the flame gave way and did not touch their bodies, and the furnace became a congregation, and instead of lamentations, hymns and praises were employed, and there was no longer a lamentation being made as if the flesh were burning in fire, but rather a song was celebrated by a soul rejoicing—straightway, I say, he looked in to see what was happening inside. Being honored by the sight of the angel, he sent forth his voice: “Did we not cast three men into the furnace? Behold, I see four, and the fourth is like the Son of God.” ^D Immediately, therefore, he writes a law concerning this matter, to confess God, to bear witness to the truth; he becomes an interpreter of the vision. Shall we then accuse these interpretations, or shall we praise them?

^A It is a glorious thing to perform an embassy for Christ; or shall we allow this to be taken in a bad sense? If it is glorious to perform an embassy for Divine Scripture and to be a witness of the truth, and Nabuchodonosor performed an embassy, and wrote, and sent it to his whole dominion, then the nature of evil is abolished; for since he knew what was good, he looked towards the doctrine of the good. But if he dulled that doctrine through an affection for baseness, he is accused; for it is one thing not to be able at all to do what is good, and another thing to know what is good but not to be able to do it, becoming overcome by an inclination of the affection and succumbing. ^B And since the fruits of the devil were not found in men, and their manner of life was shameful, and their absurdity was exposed, where then shall we turn? Unless perhaps we go to the demons; unless they say that no man is a fruit of the devil, but that demons alone are his offspring and progeny. And if they say these things, they will be put to shame even in this; but let them hear first: if no man is for the time being released from the One, then there is nothing common between him and Satan and this life, but he has been delivered from all things, has become a stranger to all things, is cast out. ^C And since they are still progressing in error and deceit, and bring forward even more deceitful and roving* words, let us not be silent. For they say that wickedness, moving forward and advancing by itself, was injuring itself and harming itself; but as it arrived at the place of truth, it was astounded; it felt wonder at the sudden light; it forgot its own battle; it attacked what appeared; it snatched the light; it swallowed what was seen. ^D Here, then, there is much laughter and great mockery; here every Greek myth is trodden underfoot, being surpassed by the form of this narrative; for myths are indeed called myths, but are believed as myths; whereas this, if it were said to be a myth and believed as a myth, would have done little harm; but now it surpasses myths, and the foolish believe it as truth. For if, as you say, remaining within itself, it besieged itself, and having come to the borders of light, it saw the light and was astounded, and was freed from its own battle, and attacked the light that was seen, and snatched what it beheld, how will these words not appear impossible and false? For how was wickedness injuring itself? Was it destroying itself? Was it obliterating itself? Was it at one moment swallowing and at another generating, if it was unbegotten? For it was dissolving, destroying itself. And if it had parts of itself being destroyed, what sufficient pledge is there that the whole is not [ *original-script column: see facsimile* ]

destroyed, when its parts are naturally adapted for destruction? But if it was generating itself, and beginning to be; and since it was beginning to be, it was also generated; how then was it unbegotten? ^A

Chapter XXXV. That which is unbegotten cannot be dissolved.

Wherefore, their absurd opinion is to be refuted not by another, but by their own trifles; for they say many things while contradicting themselves, and do not wait for another to make them blush, but they themselves deny this to others, and they themselves are put to shame. For that which can be dissolved, and is dissolved, and can perish, how could it have been unbegotten? How could it have existed from itself? How could it not have derived its origin from another; since the one, indeed, is free from destruction and is impassible, while the other can be removed and perish, since it is not from itself? But if it perishes—as you say, for this you define and decree by your own words, confessing that it is absorbed, and that the captured and absorbed thing has undergone destruction—it can therefore be caught and dissolved, and once dissolved and captured, it will no longer sustain those things which are of the things that do not perish. But when it does not have a nature alien to harm and destruction, it will no longer be considered unbegotten; and if wickedness is not unbegotten, it will appear to lack neither beginning nor end, since at other times it does not exist, but only now seems to make a noise. For what it is, is not a substance, but a certain disease that happens to substances, which can be separated from substances and persons. That the deceiver himself—which is what he is—happened in accordance with a fall and a ruin, and ^C that the fall and the slipping witness to the taking away of those good things that preceded, the prophet Isaiah testifies when he says: *How did Lucifer, who rose in the morning, fall from heaven?* Knowing his state as one that had fallen, but also knowing that his ancient state was divine, most radiant, and most becoming. The Savior also testifies to this in the Gospel, saying: *Behold, I saw Satan falling like lightning from heaven.* But if he had been born thus, and had been thus by nature, he would not be said to have fallen, nor to have slipped; for that which falls, falls from some state; and that which slips, departs from some abundance. ^D If he is numbered among those who have fallen, he was once in a state and stability; if he is accused among those who have slipped, he was not poor, he was not at one time an Irus, since he abounded in goods; being deprived of these because of some disease, he is numbered and held among those who have fallen. Indeed, Scripture confesses his abundance: for if in that which it says, *How did Lucifer fall?* the name of Lucifer was abundance, and he who was Lucifer possessed the very operation, power, abundance, and possession of Lucifer; and when he slipped from this, he became empty of it: he is indeed destitute of that abundance of Lucifer, he wanders as a beggar, and is almost an Irus, and in [his] fall and [his]

^A ruin given, he who was once very abundant. If he is one of their number according to the Gospel, who fall and lie upon the ground, he could say: Our feet were standing in thy courts, O Jerusalem; he could hear that which is said: Stand having girded your loins in truth; and whereas he was able to hear, he did not secure for himself the aforementioned saying: Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall; and having made no security for himself against such a thing, he is today rolled and tumbled in such things. For that which always lies on the ground cannot fall, for it lies on the ground; but that which has fallen and become grounded, falling away from those who are standing and firm, will come to falling. And that which is always in poverty and has never received any abundance will never fall out, for it always has nothing, and cannot fall out, as it has never had anything; but that which has undergone a falling, and has suffered, is from a condition of great abundance and existence. And such is the first refutation.

CAP. XXXVI. The passible God according to the Manichaeans.

But since they say that wickedness, still progressing and straining itself and gathering strength and approaching the light, snatched from it and absorbed it, come, let us not shrink from dissolving the embassy which they have undertaken on behalf of the devil against the truth; for they extol evil with these words while they extenuate the truth, and they give sinews to wickedness, but place the truth without sinews. For if wickedness snatched, and the light was snatched, and that which was to hold sway suffers, and that which suffers is passible, then according to their opinion God is passible, while Satan is devoid ^B of a passible nature; the one is able to suffer, but the other is able to act. For if the light is passible, He Himself must also be passible, not being other than the light. But if He could be affected by evil, and not affected by Himself, but by an enemy and a combatant, ^C and fall away from Himself, and come to be with the worse—how, [I ask], is that separated from its own, which has a unifying nature? For those things which are by nature fitted to be separated from themselves do not exist by nature. But if the light was unbegotten and was united to the Unbegotten, how could it ever be separated; how could it be torn from itself and become something other than it was? For if it ministered to the evil, and being forced by the wickedness, afterwards chose the things of wickedness and performed the things of wickedness; and was ignorant of itself, and no longer recognized itself, but had become forgetful of itself; ^D and thought itself to be such as the evil is—the argument will appear to be fighting itself. For the Unbegotten neither is ignorant of Himself, nor will He be other than He is, but rather continues such as He was; and He will never be separated from Himself, as He never began to be.

Verum, because they speak old wives' tales and myths, not understanding what they say, but by those very things which they say, being refuted and blushing for themselves, let us add this also to what has been said: If the light could be changed and become something other than itself,

to change, and to become something other than what it was, and to be with wickedness and to forget itself, and to do whatever wickedness does; this could have happened to the princes of wickedness, so that they might rather be able to change into good. If, however, change and variation were possible, how was it not better to change from vice to virtue, than from virtue to vice? How did God suffer it, and permit the light to be seized? How did He not forbid the aggression? How did He not preserve His own? How, after they were taken away, did He not wish to have providence and care for them? How did He not first restrain the impulse and the attempt? How did He not rather preserve them from being captured, but instead did not honor with aid what had been seized and plundered? If He did it so that the light, when it was among the evils, might change the evils, as if evils could be changed: then evils are not evils by nature; for those which can be changed, receive ^B a pledge in the mutation itself that they are not naturally evil.

If, however, He knew that they would not change, and that they were not by nature apt to receive a change, how did He in vain allow the good to endure loss, and did not grant profit to the evil? How did He allow the evils themselves not to be changed, while He neglected Himself and His own good things as they were being changed? For this prescription is absurd: that He Himself is mutable because His own things are changed, but that matter is not mutable. And we refute this in such a way as to contract a prolix discourse, passing over in silence those coverings which they allege, those contradictions and fables and battles of giants; so that what has been said about the first principles of things might be considered as a kind of support and might be held as the seed ^C of questions.

BOOK SECOND.

CHAPTER I. The scope of the authors. Nothing evil was created.

The reason for the dispute leads us now next to discuss seriously concerning God. For perhaps those things which have been said thus far for the refutation of that fable differ nothing from a game. Therefore, that we may not move the wise to laughter, by examining more accurately a fiction clearly repugnant to itself; and passing over in silence those things which were devised as more mystical by the Manichaean (which are very many), we shall now set out to teach that wickedness does not exist at all according to substance, nor is any principle of matter underlying that is void of ^D a beginning and contrary to God. But that there is one principle of all things, and one God who created all things, both good and worthy of His own wisdom.

For indeed those from him [the Manichaean], after they have been convicted in a dispute concerning first principles, are led to this doubt as if it were difficult to unravel and as if it offered many snares and captious arguments against whoever is disputing, saying: "Whence then are evils?" But we answer confidently, since there is one God who made all things, that nothing indeed according to substance exists as evil among the things that are,

^A but all things are very good, and differently good, and fashioned for various uses; and nothing of those things that have been made has come into being without reason; but each one of the things that exist, small and great, has within itself the reason of its own existence—those things in heaven and on earth and in the sea; and just as the ineffable wisdom of God has fashioned this whole universe as an even and complete body through the constitution of its parts and members, so that whatever you might take away by reasoning from the things that have been made, as if it were superfluous and alien to any need, the whole body seems to be mutilated; since indeed that which seems in the things that are most contemptible is complementary to the perfection of the body; and there is nothing idle among the things that are, nor made in vain, nor interposed for superfluous ambition.

But the injustice of men who commit sin is alone reasonably and justly and truly iniquity, ^B yet it does not proceed from an unbegun iniquity, which Manes, seeing that it did not exist, imagined as if it were proceeding from that which is unbegun—just as the argument has already sufficiently opened up to those before, and will show more clearly in what follows.

Cap. II. That man is most free. That the sinner is guilty, although he is free. That men can be both good and evil.

Wherefore, since this has been discussed first, we shall proceed in this way and by reason, showing that nothing among existing things is evil according to substance; but rather, whatsoever things God governs and dispenses in the world, He governs and dispenses decorously, as befits His own wisdom, and for the benefit of those for whose sake He does these things. ^C God, therefore, constructed the world; and concerning this, those against whom we dispute do not waver or drift in the storm; for even if they change the world, which is adorned and orderly, into that which is unadorned, yet they agree concerning the mode and the cause of its existence. Regarding man, then, although he is a part of the universe, nevertheless because God has appointed and set him as a citizen partaking of reason, He has reserved to Himself the governing of all other things that relate neither to virtue nor to vice, but has made virtue or vice to be within man's own power, having implanted in his nature the knowledge of each, so that, like an eye, he might apply this, and not only walk through life with perfect knowledge, but might also be the self-worker ^D of the achievements of virtue, and might even be the author of his own duties.

Therefore, a man who acts unjustly is rightly accused of sinning. For if he commits sin while unable to abstain from it, he suffers an unjust reproach; but if, when it is possible not to do it, he does the contrary, he is reasonably accused as one who is committing injustice; and rightly is sin called by such a name as being "contrary to reason" (παρὰ λόγον), to which it is possible to have recourse, although it is practiced everywhere; so that sin is everything that is done contrary to reason, even if it takes its occasion and provision from the things that are according to nature; for the irrational use of what is according to nature creates the sin; but reason is in us to test those things that are according to nature; whence it does not lie hidden when it is practiced.

If, therefore, for the exercise of virtue we train the reason that is in us, just as a body ^A by measured motion, we shall render it sound and robust. If, however, we do not deign to exercise and attend to it, it becomes weaker and dimmer, and finally, through neglect, is blinded. It is in our power, everywhere, to use the reason that is in us; and just as those who practice the art of building use a rule and square to ensure the precision of virtue, so we must cultivate this reason, like seeds scattered in the earth, which, when neglected, perish.

At this point, the ambiguity of the question arises. Why are we subject to such danger, that it is in our power to be good or not to be? That we are not made altogether good, but for the most part—and not only sometimes—evil; a danger that is necessary, not simply useful; otherwise, we would go entirely astray and be completely frustrated. For if God had made us such that we could not sin, we would never have been made good; for he is good among men who is just and temperate; for by abstaining from injustice he becomes just, and by fleeing intemperance he is made temperate. Therefore, by the power over opposites, the possession of opposites ^B is acquired and attained. For if one did not have the power of intemperance, he could not become temperate; for not being able to receive incontinence does not create continence, nor does being weak toward injustice create justice; but being able to do it, and yet by reason abstaining from doing it, this is the virtue of temperance and justice. And not only being able, but being invited and enticed by nature, so that there may be some true praise for having willed not to do it; for this, and no other, can be found as virtue among men. For God is not to be called temperate or brave or things of that sort, since He is above human virtue; even if He is called just, He is called so in a way other than we are. But we are asking how a man, as far as he is a man, may become good. For to each of ^C those things that are created, a measure of nature is decreed and established, which indeed he cannot pass or overcome, but he can fall short of perfect and absolute virtue. What, therefore, is the measure defined for man for virtue, and for becoming good, whether it be temperance and justice, and the rest? For it is impossible for a man to become good beyond these. For if temperance is the holding back of the desires of pleasures, it is necessary to have in our power those things which are contrary to temperance, of which it is called the continence, which is the name and duty and work of temperance. But not being in power over pleasures plainly produces a privation of temperance. A similar reason holds for justice and the other virtues. ^D

Cap. III. Whether man could be impeccable. Virtue is nothing without a struggle. A child has no virtues.

If, however, someone should contend that we ought to have been incapable of receiving things contrary to virtues, as if...

someone ^A seeing an eagle flying high above were to be indignant at the nature of a horse, and bitterly disparage it as not resembling the eagle, when he ought to examine the horse according to the nature of a horse. God has indeed made man, a soul with a body; for he is a corporeal inhabitant of the world. Therefore, if he becomes good, so far as the nature of man admits, he would be found estimable. How, then, could a man become good, we must inquire, if God has made him. Therefore, a man would become good if he were temperate and just; for if it were possible for a man to become good in a better way, the Creator would be to blame for not having made man good according to that way. But if, as far as is in human nature, there is nothing better, man would be in need of temperance and the other virtues. It must be inquired, therefore, how it is again possible for man to be temperate and just; for He who made him wishes him to be such. Therefore, temperance could not exist without the comparison of its opposite; similarly for justice also; otherwise, there would be neither temperance nor justice.

If, however, it is not possible for him to become just and temperate in this way, in no other way would man become just and temperate; and then the Creator would justly be blamed, because He made it impossible for man to become good, I mean temperate and just, by which way alone, and in no other way, he was to be glorious and to be considered worthy of the ^B wisdom of his Maker. But if the objector persists, arguing that man ought to have been temperate by nature and not by labor, he, again, by neglecting what temperance is, deviates into an irrational position; both because he posits that it is impossible to be worthy of the Maker without temperance and justice, and yet is unwilling to examine the way of the acquisition of these; because that which comes to be by a bond of nature would not be temperance, which is recognized in no other way than by the resistance of pleasures. ^C It requires, therefore, those that resist, so that, by fighting and overcoming them, this may be called and become temperance; and similarly for the others also. Thus, indeed, He has constructed man: by nature neither good nor evil; but He has entrusted to reason the choice of the better. But if he is neither good nor evil, the question remains as to what he may be.

We must consider a small child ^D who is known by the removal of both extremes, I mean that he is neither good nor evil; for his substance is good, but he has not yet acquired goodness according to virtue. Thus also gold is by nature beautiful, but by the definition of virtue it is not good, since it is inanimate; and precious stones likewise, and all things that exist, each according to its own beauty in appearance. According to this reasoning, man is also beautiful, and very beautiful in substance and in his very being; but the good which is acquired only through virtue is attained by labor. Therefore, God has made it to be in his own power...

^A If God had given the power but had not set over nature the knowledge of virtue and vice, He would have seemed to place a blind charioteer over a very swift chariot. But if He mingled both together—the power for acquiring what is better, and the knowledge for discerning and strengthening the choice—He further revealed the mind as a skilled charioteer; and it will drive the chariot of nature safely, unless it falls asleep in the stadium and is cast off by pleasures.

CAP. IV. That man is good or evil by his own choice. It is a benefit to man to be able to commit sin.

Substance and nature render a man beautiful, as gold, as a precious stone, as the work of God; but he is good ^B or, on the contrary, evil by his choice; for these things lie before him as things that can be done. Qualities, indeed, arrive and are conjoined according to the institution by which one is led and according to the choice of intent; so that wickedness, which consists only in action, does not exist of itself before the action. Nevertheless, man has the power of wickedness, which he can perform: he has, I say, the power of it, not that he may perform it, but that, by not performing it, he may appear most good. For if the action were not in his power, he would seem to suffer the envy of the Creator, as if he had an obstacle to his proving [himself], and a deprivation of liberty, as one who did not have it in his own power to be good; so that the condition and parts of nature, which seem inferior in man, would truly be superior and more powerful. But now wickedness does not come upon him by force, ^C since it does not exist according to substance; and if man did not have the power of it, it would not be in his power to flee it; for he flees it not as if that which has not existed does exist, but as that which can be done by himself.

For how would one who hates evil obtain that which is most good, if he did not, being able to do such things, voluntarily refuse them? For virtue in men is almost nothing other than the refusal and turning away from vice; for he is temperate who is not intemperate, and he is just who is not unjust, and similarly in other things. For God is good, not because He does not do injury, although He can; but because He is only beneficent; for which reason He alone is good. But in men, good consists first in the flight from evil; the power of which it is necessary for him who wishes to be good to possess, that it may be in his own power not to do evil. ^D For even if, from the perfect, actions are required in addition to the flight of contrary things, yet the flight and turning away from the worse is a greater thing for the proof of virtue. Hence it is that no one is found among men void of sin; since a man is more proven on account of the difficulty of abstaining from sin: since in this way especially is virtue marked; but we find good action even among the very wicked.

It is clear, therefore, that it is a benefit to man to have the power of committing sin; from which, indeed, by abstaining, and not...

^A by necessity, he is honored and approved, and in no other way. Man is therefore honored with free power, having by nature the knowledge of virtue and vice, which can be brought into action, but which, before they are brought into action, do not exist; for where would that which is done be, if there were no one to do it? Hence, wickedness comes into being and ceases to be when it is acted upon, or when it is not. Immediately, also, God, being good and knowing only how to confer benefits, does no evil at all; nor does He abstain from wickedness out of ignorance, nor is He entirely separated from it for lack of power. For how should He who teaches man not to commit it be ignorant of wickedness? Or how is it reasonable to believe that God abstains from wickedness out of inability? For the Good is not good because of an inability to commit injustice, but because of a perfect power in not willing it.

Cap. V. God cannot do injustice. The mutation of man to vice. Whence an impossible conversion arises.

If, however, we say that God cannot do anything unjust, we say well; yet we refer this inability not to weakness, but to the highest perfection of *not willing* what is unjust, and to an immutable declination from the worse; for since He is immutable in His nature, it is immutable for Him not to will to do any evil. Thus, He is able, but He does not do it, because of the immutable nature of His not willing it. And thus there is no wickedness with God, not only because it does not exist in itself, but because it does not exist even in action. But because for men this refusal of wickedness is in a certain way not immutable, even if one has ascended to virtue, it appears to be wickedness only while it is in action; it does not, however, exist before the action. ^C Thus God has honored man, having fashioned him in His own image: so that, just as He himself is good by the freedom of His nature, so also man, by the freedom of his purpose, might be an imitator of God—not abstaining from sin because the nature itself lacked the power, but honoring virtue by the freedom of his purpose.

These things sufficiently and abundantly explain the many changes to virtue and vice which are found in men, in whom neither of these is firmly rooted by long-continued habit. For whatever we do by the necessity of nature, we do not admit the change of these; but whatever we do by the reasoning of purpose and deliberation, these vary in us, and have different relations according to the inclinations which arise in the purpose. It is not, therefore, natural and necessary for men to sin, but wrongdoing is voluntary. Moreover, the labor of virtue indicates that it is voluntary for those who have acquired it; ^D for in those to whom even a little negligence might occur, the possession of virtue is endangered.

If, however, anyone should bring forward against this argument one who wishes at times to abstain from evil things, but yet says that he is not able to do so, let him understand that just as a chronic disease of the body is not easily moved, so also an evil habit of the soul, having been fixed by time, does not have an easy method of being expelled in long-continued habit; a disease is changed, for when the disease is expelled, health succeeds it.

^A For instance, one who has often rushed unrestrainedly into some evil deed, or having seen a man, has purposed to commit adultery with his wife, has been checked by the fear of the reproofs of desire, or being reminded of the laws; another, having purposed to commit robbery, has restrained his desire through fear of punishment. Thus, sins are the works of the passions, not the blossomings of nature. We all who are partakers of equity honor and love the laws that punish wrongdoers without excuse; thus, by common opinion we confirm through our works that men are not compelled by nature to evil deeds, but because they choose them by purpose and deliberation, we declare them worthy of punishment.

Chapter VI. Thoughts are sometimes good, sometimes evil. Action depends on choice.

But because the followers of Manes also attempt in other ways to ^B prove that two contrary natures exist in us, because at one time we think of evil things, and at another of good things, it must be noted that, since the natural knowledge of both resides in us, we are necessarily stirred to the thought of those things which we know, causing no loss or damage, but rather gaining the whole by preferring and choosing what is better. For how could movement toward the better be testified in human beings, if it were not possible for both things to be thought of naturally, namely justice and injustice? For knowledge is necessary for distinction, but thought examines the things known; and purpose inclines toward whichever part it wills. These are not diverse parts of the soul, but as it were its operations; just as it is naturally in our eye to see, if it happens, either bad or good actions, and it might not be the cause of either; for the mind receives the sight, and judges and discerns the things seen; thus also ^C thought, like an eye, is necessarily moved toward those things which can come to pass, not forcing the soul toward them by violence, but attending to these by natural knowledge. Straightway, indeed, if we wish, we think of contrary things at the same time, yet at the same time we cannot perform contrary things.

In this way, action is indeed determined by the choice of purpose; but thought testifies to the natural knowledge of virtue and vice; for if we did not know these beforehand, we would neither have thought of them, nor would we choose what is better; deprived by necessarily choosing what is worse, having been anticipated by depraved habits. Wherefore, ^D more effort and labor must be expended by men on the upbringing of children than by farmers on the growth of trees. Therefore, to interpret our thought as an indication of two contrary natures is the same as if someone were to say that sight is a mixture of all colors, because it directs its gaze upon all these. That man has necessarily received the ability to sin, being so made that he could not otherwise have possessed the ability to live virtuously; which thing God, being good and not envious, wished to be implanted in nature; and that for the time being because of those things which are unjustly among men

there is no need to think that an unoriginated matter and wickedness are arrayed against God; nor, indeed, to think that wickedness exists at all according to substance, but rather that it has its subsistence in action, as has been demonstrated from the things previously said.

Cap. VII. Objections regarding Divine Providence

^B Consequently, one must speak to the best of one's ability regarding the all-wise governance of God and regarding the created things which have been vainly and rashly maligned by Manes in his accusations to assert the existence of wickedness. He complains of a great lack of order in our affairs, and he denounces wealth and poverty, health and sickness, as if there were inequality in them. Furthermore, he complains that the evildoer often escapes the punishment of the laws, while the innocent man is punished, and that sometimes the base seize authority over others. It must be said, therefore, that man was brought into this life by his Creator, to occupy himself with nothing else but only with piety and virtue. For if he has acquired these, he will traverse this life well; but if he neglects them, he will be miserably submerged as he goes astray. God gave him food for the body and clothing and other such shelter not as primary gifts, but as things necessary for the preservation of life here; so that while he has a body, he may both live with the protection of these things, and diligently undertake the labor and acquire what has been mentioned.

^C He also provided him with physical light, suitable for his nature, and air for breathing, and water, and all such other necessary things; for these things, with God as their author, are naturally common to all men; and no one could say that the poor man shares less in the light or in the supply of water, or indeed in the breathing which is most natural for living; and food is necessary, and even if it is not obtained without sweat, yet the mode of the supply for what is necessary to live is common to all. Gold and silver, and precious stones, are also from Him for those who possess them; yet they contribute nothing more to the aforementioned trade, unless they happen even to hinder it all the more. Yet the path set forth by God to men is neither unreachable through poverty, nor easier through wealth; but in both conditions it is possible for the most zealous and industrious to complete the path set before them; for ^D poverty through endurance and generosity, and wealth through modesty and the honoring of Him who gave the goods—whom one prefers above the goods themselves—can accomplish what is striven for, so that neither does the poor man reach the goal without difficulty and labors; but he needs attention, if any carelessness is in him, so that he does not do something ignoble for the sake of his poverty, and by bearing his poverty with an ill-tempered spirit, reveal his own disposition, by honoring the things given by God more than God Himself; nor can one who possesses great wealth be able to procure piety and virtue for himself as if they were a commodity for sale, but rather he should swim through.

^A For it is likely that such a man’s mind is tossed by a greater struggle, since it is divided by care between external things and matters concerning the soul; so that unless he considers wealth to be entirely secondary and solely the friendship with God to be the primary task, he will sink into complete senselessness, not understanding that, having abandoned the first and only good, he serves dead wealth, which he will abandon to others when he departs.

Chap. VIII. The distinction between the poor and the rich. Why the wicked man is rich.

Therefore, the path of virtue is equally free from danger; it is hindered neither for the rich nor for the poor. Between themselves, however, the rich and the poor differ only in the accumulation of external things, which is of no greater value for attaining the intended goal: and indeed divine wisdom has necessarily arranged this. For when the poor man is exercised in acquiring patience, seeing wealth in another, the mind of the rich man is also tested by the deficiency of the one in need; for wealth is useless if poverty is not present alongside it: for to whom will the affluent man perform an act of kindness? And poverty is not observed and approved unless wealth is set against it. In short, neither is being rich ^B blessed, nor is being poor pitiable; since only that person is blessed in whom there is the stable prosperity of the soul according to virtue—whether such a one happens to be rich or poor—for the sake of which a human being has been brought into existence by God: as it is necessary, on the one hand, to receive one’s being from God, and on the other, to receive one’s becoming good from oneself, with God assisting; for God wills that a man, since he is a participant in reason, should have something from himself for ^C glorious confidence.

Therefore, we shall not admire, nor shall we declare blessed, a rich man who commits wickedness; nor shall we be perplexed against the providence of God, that such a one as this abounds in riches. For what more does a wicked rich man possess? And indeed, what does he not possess less of? For there are wakefulness and dangers on account of money, and the sorrows over what has been consumed are greater than the pleasures of what has been acquired; for what is present does not delight as much as what is absent causes torment, and desire is always increased by wealth, so that ^D the mind dwells without intermission with unbridled passion, and the body often withers away along with the mind; and that which seems to be the superior condition of one who possesses an abundance of wealth turns out to be more difficult and troublesome than the condition of the needy one: for the former, using luxuries and the softness of a bed, sometimes falls into various illnesses, while the poor man, through the dryness of his necessary diet, has secured health for his body. Yet who would say that the body is not more excellent and more honored than external goods? But if the condition of the body remains more robust in those who use necessary things temperately, whereas in those who have relaxed themselves to immoderate luxury, the vigor of the body is also brought down; is it not then clear that in this respect and for this reason wealth is inferior to poverty? Except if someone were found who lacks even necessary things, which, however, never happens to one who is studious of virtue. Is the pleasure of sumptuous foods…

enduring for the perception of those who are always using them, or does it become very cheap through long-standing habit? So that such people have nothing more than that which they take for luxury; for what is habitual is always held in contempt. But to the poor man, that which is cheap is most pleasant for the sake of health, and the expensive, if it ever comes to pass, is foreign and most novel for relaxed enjoyment; so that in this regard, he who uses a right sense of reasoning would find the poor man possessing more than the rich. ^B Disease and health are likewise necessary; for health is sometimes for the injustice of the work of virtue, and disease is at times for the overthrowing of sin; for the intellect is often aided by external waves. Besides, the experience of illnesses reminds one of the benefit of being healthy for the sake of piety. And it would even be very contemptible if it remained as a whole by itself, in that it would admit of nothing to hinder it.

Cap. IX. The sick righteous man. Why the wicked are not punished.

If the upright man were to be sick, but the bold man to be healthy, the former is restrained, being aided by the wave, so that his life may be free from blame; but the latter is handed over to wrongdoing as one who is given up for lost. If, on the other hand, the bold and very impious man were to fall into6 sickness, while the upright man is healthy, ^C the one is punished not to be helped by the perception of it, but that he might serve others as an example; while the other, as being able to conduct himself gently without bonds, remains untroubled; even if both are useful everywhere, and pitiable is he who from this denies or maligns Providence; for that is the only deadly disease, which ruins the disposition of the soul for the rejection of virtue. Those, therefore, whose intellect remains innocent, whether or not they be healthy in body, will perceive the utility of each; for if disease does not punish the evildoer in every case, since evildoers sometimes even escape the laws—would the law not be, for this reason, a hindrance to wrongdoing, since it does not proceed through all who are subject to it? Or is the wonder of the wisdom of God hence displayed as being from every side? For if it were absolutely manifest that it is in no way possible for one to escape the retribution ^D of the laws who commits any of those things that are forbidden, the not-acting of sin would be counterfeit and very unproven; for all would abstain from fear of punishment, not out of hatred for the wrongdoing. But the virtuous man ought to hate the doing of it more than the suffering of it, even if it were not to occur justly.

From this, the greater number of evildoers escape the laws, since this is not a punishment of those who are sinning, but only an opinion of retribution; for death according to nature would come even without punishment. Thus, there is, for those who transgress, another unavoidable retribution; but the majority escape that which is among us, so that the possibility of escaping detection may become a trial of human reasoning; and in general, regarding the thief and the liar, and those attempting to commit greater evils, the aforesaid statement extends.

^A But someone might say that the conscience of men would be more tormented if no evildoer were apprehended and punished; yet, on the contrary, it happens that the fact that some evildoers are at times not apprehended by the laws is clearly an inducement to do evil. Hence, both are necessary: that the evildoer should fall into the hands of the laws and be apprehended as an example of avoiding evil, and that he should escape the torment and anguish of thought. For to man, who has been created by God with free will to choose between virtue and vice, there comes from outside, in a certain sense, assistance to the mind, which is, as it were, bolstered by fear and the absence of fear, by exhortations and dissuasions, by sickness and health, by poverty and riches; and, in short, all things which seem contrary to one another tend and look toward one end, that they might exercise the human mind, and that no one should give himself over ^B to sleep, but rather, being struck and aroused from here and there, might keep watch to perform the duty of piety and virtue.

If, however, it should happen that someone is punished who is not only innocent but an admirable man, and if penalties for virtue are demanded of him, what harm could it do to the one who endures it? This certainly convicts those who do it, not the one who endures it, even if the unjust punishment proceeds even to death. Such a man, by the anticipation of death, has meditated upon the things which pertain to the life to come; for to whom nothing of those things which are pleasant to many is sweet, nor anything bitter, is he not dead to this life before death? He who considers the things here that are thought to be plots made against him as a benefit and a favor, by which he expects to obtain after this life greater goods than those he seems to be leaving behind, and is quickly sent on his way to them by his enemies, regards those who have plotted against him as benefactors. ^C

Chap. X. Punishments are proofs of virtue. Manes' blasphemies against the providence of God.

For another reason it is necessary among men that torments and tortures be permitted by God, so that the free choice of virtue might be more clearly seen and proved, if one does not shrink even from meeting death. Now, when we see wicked men and those given over to avarice sometimes holding power and being elected to magistracies, we must know that this is permitted by the providence and government of God. For when those who are under authority abound in sins, the iniquity of those who are in authority is a just punishment—men who avenge the things they do, and punish what they commit—so that it may be most evident that it does not happen that sin is left unpunished. A judge may indeed seem upright because, lest he himself commit any evil, he punishes those who do; but if he who ^D judges begins to admit the very things he punishes in others, and he punishes, and that too more severely, in order to persuade men that he does nothing evil, it is clearly evident that the law is firm and very terrible to fall into the hands of such magistrates to suffer punishments due to the impropriety of one's character. Such divine sentences are, moreover, set forth in the Holy Scriptures against those who transgress.

The most demented Manichæus, however, in order that the dogma of unbegotten wickedness and of blasphemy against God might be firm in his view, leaves no part of the governance of God...

^A unassailed. We often see the just who have sinned being under the command and power of the impious, so that they may be disciplined, just as a high-born son, who does not obey his father, is beaten by a stranger and a foreigner, so that the pain of the blows and the disgrace of being struck by one who is serving may change the wrongdoer. For there is one thing, and one alone, we have said, that is true, and that is what God requires of man in this life: that he should manage by the wisdom of reason not to offend virtue in any part. And if he should attend to this alone, he would be most blessed, even if he possessed nothing else in life. If this, then, is remembered throughout the whole discourse concerning Providence, no suspicion concerning inequality and disorder in the things governed by God would be left. For if one could find that for one person the path of pious and holy virtue was opened ^B while for another it was closed, then in this matter the inequality of goods would seem to bring an accusation of disorder against the governance of God. But if that by which alone any person might become truly blessed is set before all men equally, so that each person may be master of it, what inequality or difference—even if one is prone to blame—could anyone point to, seeing that the abundance of external things is, on the other hand, brought back by reason to equality, in such a way that the poor man is no less, or perhaps even more, delighted by the food that is set before him than the rich man?

It is the same regarding the covering of the body, even if the items are less valuable and the form of the sensation corresponds to what is customarily present, so that no one perceives the greater value, because the sense is dulled through habit; nor does another perceive what is less, because on account of habit he does not notice the deficiency ^C through his sense. Hence it immediately comes to pass that Barbarians, for the most part living with naked bodies, sleeping without covers, and dwelling in meager conditions, could never be brought to abandon their preferred way of life, since because of habit they do not see any deficiency in their lives, or rather, they are not even able to abandon it; and they would sooner abandon their health than abandon their way of life, and would sooner gain the ability to endure cold and the scorching heat of the sun.

CAP. XI. The communion of goods and evils. Why God permits wars.

^D And as for living, and living pleasantly, no one has more than another in life. Common to all are those things by which our nature is refreshed: the resting of the body and sleep. Common are food and its pleasures, if one prudently passes over the distinction [between luxurious and simple food] and experiences and tests the use of them by his senses. Common, no less precisely, are the pains of soul and body; and in these, one would find a greater excess among those who seem to have more in this life. Since these things are so, where would there be inequality in the governance of God, who has placed variety, not inequality, in our affairs? For it is one thing for the variety of wisdom, which has beauty in the world, [to be present], and another for the disorder of governance. But if one were to find that some are by nature impassible...

^A in soul and in body, and others are not; again, some living without food, others sustaining life with food; or others who could not receive wickedness, and others who could: furthermore, some mortal, others immortal: such a person would rightly criticize the inequality of the governance and the disorder of the order, as if God managed our affairs by lot rather than by reason. But if the mode of birth for all is the same, and the upbringing of nature is one and the same, and the supply of the necessities, without which it is impossible to exist, is equally common to all, and the end of all things is one and the same—that is, if equality is seen to the highest degree of precision in all things—then he who accuses the providence of God as being unordered is either completely blind, or he looks at things with hostile and inimical eyes, and for that reason is not worthy of credence. For if disorder exists in variety, such a person criticizes the beauty of variety, which is highly fitting for a wise artisan. Let him also proceed to condemn the variety of colors, and the difference of foods and drinks, which wonderfully delight the senses of those to whom they are provided. ^B Hence have emerged most miserable men, who, in order to defend fate, seem to confirm for themselves the evil of inequality by introducing two principles; yet it has been shown to the prudent that no inequality exists in our affairs. Since, however, they also assign wars to wickedness, in what way do different fates, in their opinion, befall many thousands at one time, or rather, at one hour? Does some single fate join these together under itself? And how is it not entirely ridiculous to suppose this? Whence it follows that the inequality of fate, which is a grave malady of those who err, has no place in reality. But wars take their beginning from avarice, yet they are waged by the permission of God; for the cause of these evils is that very thing, desire, which begets avarice: which evil indeed proceeds from men, not from God, as was made manifest in the things said before.

CHAPTER XII. Death is not evil. Why, indeed, it is feared. The end of the death of the just and the impious, of what sort it is.

^A It must be recognized, I mean the fact that the soul does not depart from the body without some cause and necessity, but waits until its natural dwelling remains indestructible. Yet with this natural and common dwelling there also exists a certain fear, which is necessarily assumed for the suspicion of punishment; not indeed in all men, but in those whose mind is prone and ready to sin, as a means to turn this aside. For the man of sense lives according to virtue, and is freed from offending, and from thinking that death is evil; but the man addicted to sin, from the same folly by which he also offends, fears death. It is necessary, however, that this fear accompanies such folly, so that he who was fearing that in which there was no fear, may truly fear what it is proper to fear—I mean the damage resulting from sin. Since, therefore, the nations abound in sins, one species of which is insatiability, they become for themselves the cause of the apparently existing punishment, which is said to be not truly a punishment, as it is naturally and commonly decreed against all. Yet it benefits both those who fall in war and those who are saved, providing for the former an end to their sinning, and for the latter setting forth an example of fear; and it benefits even if righteous men perish along with the multitude. For just as to the unrighteous death is the end of injustice, so to the righteous it is, in a certain way, the beginning of crowns as if they were victors. ^B Thus it happens, through the all-wise providence of God, as a marvelous thing; for that which seems to punish, acts as a benefit. And it is not that God brings about the things that seem painful, but He permits those things to which men have defected. Therefore, war is not the work of God, but a necessary permission, for the sake of the suspicion of punishment against sin, but in truth, for its end. Where, even if a righteous man falls—though it is unbecoming for a righteous man to go to war—he is benefited the more; for it is a greater thing to enjoy the fruits of the labors of virtue than to cease from sinning, which is what befalls the pious after death. But those who contend against these things, before they have refuted the evil as a whole, blame only a part of it. For if they claim that wars are brought upon us from an evil that exists of itself and from an unoriginated principle, it would have been fitting for them to blame death itself, and that alone; for it is superfluous to examine the pretexts, since that which happens out of necessity does not fall under judgment.

^C How could they be able to call death evil, which—according to the word of the deceiver—liberates the soul from matter? Therefore, by the common opinion of all, death is by no means an evil; for that which necessarily happens to all is not evil. They accuse death in vain, which happens on account of wars, for it brings nothing more than that which is established according to nature. But if any one were to blame the very pretext of wars, whether it be anger, or enmity, or even greed, he would not be mistaken as to what is proper; ^D for it is futile to discuss and inquire into the causes of wars, since that which happens of necessity does not fall under judgment.

Chap. XIII. That death is not evil, is confirmed again.

How, then, can they call death evil, which, as Manichæus fallaciously teaches, liberates the soul from matter? Wherefore, by the common sentiment of all, death is by no means an evil; for what necessarily happens to all is not an evil. But they accuse death in vain, which happens on account of wars; for it brings nothing more than that which is established according to nature. If, however, any one says that the very cause of wars is evil, whether it be anger, or enmity, or even greed, he would not be wrong regarding what is proper; for...

^A one must consider this toward men who are so disposed by the depravity of their intention. That death is by no means an evil might be demonstrated most especially in this way. For if it were not appointed and decreed for everyone, it would happen that the just man would always labor in the stadium of virtue, reaping no fruit other than his own sweat, and the unjust man would live on forever in the pleasures of his sins; and both of these would be very absurd. But death restrains and checks the unjust pleasure of one who commits offenses, and it brings rest to the labor of one who acts justly. For since it is necessary for men to have the ability to sin—which is the cause of their being able to achieve virtue—and since the power given by God for the acquisition of what is noble and good inclines among the majority of men toward the ease of sin, so that virtue is the more admirable for being mingled with difficulty, death is useful to both the just and the unjust: to the former it brings rest from labors, and to the latter, an end to their sins.

If, therefore, death is good, and not only not evil—as has been shown—and does not dissolve the soul from a matter that does not exist, as Manichæus imagines, but rather in the way we have described, why then should we imagine a principle of wickedness in wars, and not rather accuse only the unjust mind and will? For what ensues, which is indeed to be assigned to the providence of God, is just; and it has been concluded and established above that death, not only from war but in whatever way it may happen, is by nature universally good, and not only not evil. Therefore, one must find fault with war, and not with the death that results from it, which is usefully ordained; rather, one must find fault with the mind and intent of those who do not use war justly, of which He who manages our affairs is not the author. ^C

CAP. XIV. Sterility, famine, earthquakes, whether from God. Evils are useful to men.

There is another class of things likewise, which the most demented Manichæus accuses—I mean earthquakes, pestilence, famine resulting from sterility, locusts, and other things of this kind—as if these too proceeded from a contrary principle. But it is known to all that, in times of great joy and prosperity, it is the custom of almost all men, with few exceptions, to let their minds relax and to succumb to their passions, having no memory of virtue or the labors of piety; and this happens in a way that is altogether expected. For when an immoderate satiety of food and drink occurs in men due to great abundance, and their belly becomes fatter, their mind grows dull and their reasoning becomes slack; and the soul, being burdened, is subjected to irrational passions. ^D But if any one of the calamities we have enumerated should occur, men care less for their belly and are less enslaved to pleasures; they pursue temperance and piety as much as they are able, and, as far as possible, they adopt better ways, being more improved by being pressed than by prospering. What then shall we attribute to wickedness according to his argument? Those things which are bitter to the sense, but in their effect are very useful? And what, again, shall we attribute to the good? Those things which are pleasant, but sometimes most harmful?

^A For often those whom prosperity has not changed for the better, grief and calamity have converted; for men do indeed need such reminders from time to time, in order to rouse the mind and be delivered from excessive sloth. For if one could see them, while prospering, at least abstaining from great injustices and committing only moderate transgressions, there might be a reasonable complaint that such things happen without account. But if they take the constant abundance of necessities as a chance to forget the One who provides them, it is necessary that they be roused at times by calamities to the remembrance of God, to whom it is proper to render thanks unceasingly for the providence and care of our affairs.

^B Thus, in admonishing men, God administers such things, not being possessed by any passion of anger, but embracing a concern for the conversion of those who need to be converted. For it would not be of the highest and most precise philanthropy to soothe human infirmities with leniency, and to permit their growth without rebuke; for on the contrary, this would look toward inhumanity, if, wishing not to recede from that leniency which has only the appearance of kindness, He were to insidiously permit men to fall altogether into the dissolution of wickedness. I say, then, that He provides gentle things with reason, and necessarily inflicts those things which are thought to be bitter. For a father who strikes a son who is doing wrong is not inhuman; on the contrary, if he did not bring him to conversion, he would not seem to possess paternal providence and mercy. Nor is a physician inhuman when he cuts and cauterizes a spreading ulcer; rather, the more he applies the principle of his art, the more he introduces pain through harsher remedies so that he may heal the sick man, as though the patient were to perish from his ulcers if he were not helped in this way; but he is to be saved, when incision and cautery are applied.

Cap. XV. The harshness of evils is to be attributed to men, who abuse evils. Manes contradicts himself.

that leaves our appetite entirely free from sloth, lest he should leave the anticipations of the passions without a cure; but he dispenses and moderates both with ineffable wisdom for the benefit of men, knowing the opportune time for each. ^A Statim ut videris terræ motum aut siccitatem aut incursionem locustarum, simul sane omnes fere homines videas ad metum flexos, et ad supplicandum ei qui potest hæc depellere. Immediately you might see an earthquake, or a lack of rain, or an incursion of locusts, by which you see almost all men inclined toward piety, and toward supplication of Him who is able to avert such things. But if things that are usually considered pleasant and agreeable render human reason lax and remiss, while troublesome and bitter things awaken it and turn it toward a more pious state, how could one not say that the former are governed by God for the sake of the body, and the latter for the sake of the soul? Are those things, therefore, that stir up souls to piety and virtue to be called evils? For even if they be troublesome and sad to the sense of those suffering them, they are nonetheless necessarily inflicted for the salvation of men.

^B Manichæus vero demens semper se secum pugnare ignorat. The senseless Manichæus is unaware that he is always fighting against himself. For if the accretion of matter is harmful, who does not perceive that the opposite of what he says happens? For it will increase against men who are always in joyful and prosperous circumstances, and who indulge in pleasures, and serve their bellies and the desires of the flesh; but it will be greatly diminished by famine, pestilence, and the onset of death, which do not permit it to advance toward the injustice of accretion. Wherefore it was consistent that he should call these things good, according to his own foundation and principle, rather than evils; for so he would have seemed to have reached a better argument than if, by again referring pleasant things to other contrary principles, he had called them evils; for both are good in that they are given by God. ^C But he, rejoicing in sin for the establishment and consolidation of the wickedness that he supposes to exist by itself, feels pain at the effective admonitions of God, by which men, having become better, and very often some being completely brought over to virtue, declare his dogma of error to be false.

Ad hæc omnia, si non accideret aliquando, ut quæ Deus communiter omnibus hominibus donat et largitur, prohiberentur, largitionem eorum ac suppeditationem ad vim alicujus naturæ immutabilis homines retulissent; neque cum acciperent, gratias largienti egissent; neque habentes, unquam petiissent. ^D In addition to all this, if it did not happen at times that the things which God commonly gives and bestows upon all men are withheld, men would have attributed the granting and supplying of them to the power of some immutable nature; nor, when receiving them, would they have offered thanks to the Giver, nor, if they possessed them, would they have ever asked. They are deprived, therefore, at times for a short period, in order that they may ask; and they receive again, in order that they may give thanks to Him who gives, acknowledging that He Himself is the one who provides, and that no other nature besides God—who is beyond judgment and immutable—is the one providing. God wills that men should give thanks to Him, so that they may become more worthy to receive His gifts, not that He might reap some fruit for Himself. He wills that they should ask for good things, so that, receiving them, they may perceive Him who provides: He who rejoices

^A in giving from what is His own; but He rejoices even more when He gives to those who are worthy—as if His kindness were in some way dishonored if it were not extended to those who are responsive, and yet it appears most agreeable to reason if those who receive hold in higher esteem than all other goods Him who bestows them.

Chapter XVI. Death is as necessary as birth. It is demonstrated again that evils are profitable.

And if cities fall due to the arising of impiety, as recently happened when that most impious one 38 held sway and revived the error of idolatry, yet sin is destroyed and the error regarding God is diminished; and there occurs nothing further than a death according to nature. ^B And the divine turning back is in no way an evil; on the contrary, it is a good, having the appearance of medicine. But it is evil only to criticize the useful administration of God. For he who disparages childbearing as something that increases matter, and who disparages sudden death 39—could he be thought to possess a human mind, fabricating things that are strongly repugnant to themselves? But neither is childbearing evil, which makes the mortal race ever-living and joins those who are born to the workmanship of the world; nor is death, even if it be brought upon many all at once, something wicked, for it was not established by God for the loss of men, but was ordained for their highest utility, both for the just and for the unjust.

Furthermore, that which happens to each person individually by nature, if it should happen to many all at once, it happens according to nature, and nothing more; yet it indicates a care of the governor that is greater than that which happens individually, ^C in proportion as the latter contains no evidence of judgment against those who sin, whereas the former, by the indignation it creates in those who see it, benefits the dying in the way already spoken of, and converts those who are living.

If, however, someone objects, seeing that many such things occur repeatedly, that human life is nonetheless entangled in the same misdeeds, such a person appears to me to act like someone who, seeing fish in lakes and the sea, might think that the art of fishing is idle and useless because he does not see the fish that are caught, but only sees those swimming in the waters; or it is just as if one were to see many sick persons and think that the physician’s care is nothing. ^D For when many advance toward piety and virtue through these things which God sometimes manages by His terrible judgments, the one who is intent on finding fault denies what is accomplished, and reproaches the contentious spirit of the many who persevere in sin.

And yet, we do not say that such things have a compulsory power over the many, but rather that they serve to dissuade the grateful and well-disposed from sinning; for, being introduced for a short time, they quickly cease, so that they might not exert force, but rather by way of persuasion...

they might change; then they adopt their usual practices, producing proof of their virtuous intent to those who have changed, so that the grateful—even if only by the memory of the examples—might have a prop for their own weakness. It should rather be said that, even if, when such things occur, there are only a few and easily numbered people who change their way of life, how much more would human thought have advanced toward wickedness if no deterrent were offered through these things? But if no one were to derive benefit from this—which is foolish to say—it would be better to blame human beings who do not wish to be helped even in this way, than to shift the blame for the negligence back upon God, as if He no longer used efforts to turn them; for this same line of reasoning must be used against those who do not perceive this. For it is clear to the grateful ^B that fear not only leads some toward improvement, but it also secretly diminishes the impulse and audacity toward injustice in others.

CHAPTER XVII. The creation of night and darkness.

Let us now come to the account of the creation, which this charlatan slanders. And first, let us examine the question of darkness and night, which he, blinded in his mind, especially censures. For Manes imagines that the darkness which appears at night is the same as that darkness which he believes to be an existing entity; he takes it as a sign of that which is not. Seeing nothing at all and understanding nothing, but like a ^C blind man stumbling and bumping into things, he calls it "darkness," and as it were shudders at it, as if he had no need of argument to prove his own false teaching, inasmuch as he takes the name of a thing he slanders by itself. It must be said, then, that while this is called darkness, it does not exist as a substance. For it arrives and departs daily, and is merely a consequence, in the manner of a shadow. For it was not created by itself as a substance, by no means; but once the world was created, there is shadow. For man is born to be of himself, but a shadow follows him according to the mass of his body; and it surely does not seem to have been fashioned along with him, but it supervenes according to the posture of the body and the revolution of the light. ^D Just so, night and darkness—the world being, as it is, corporeal—are merely a consequence, and have not been fashioned as a created substance.

For when the sun completes its daily course and turns to its own recesses, it is necessary for all things within the world to be shadowed, since that which illuminates is outside, God so willing—the reasons for which, we shall recount shortly to the best of our ability. It must be stated immediately that those things which possess corporeal mass cast shadows during the day in the direction opposite to the light; and the shadow is transferred along with the light in the opposite direction; and where the sun is until midday, there the shadow is after midday. But where the shadow is after midday, the sun is behind this. The daytime shadow is indeed shadow, and not entirely darkness; because the surrounding space is everywhere open, and to those shadowed

^A places, it provides a participation of light. If, therefore, you were to close up a house completely, so as not to leave even a narrow entrance for the light itself, you would produce night even at midday. This same thing occurs at night when the sun is in its own regions. Thus, night would be a privation of light. One might learn the matter more clearly if one considers that by night the sun exists and remains somewhere, but by day darkness is nowhere, for it is completely dissolved and vanishes. So, light has become a substance, but darkness has not.

Cap. XVIII. The necessity of night. Utilities flowing from it.

One must consider, however, how necessary night is. First, it is a rest common to all; for daytime sleep manifests the necessity of night all the more, since the length of that time is not sufficient for men to rest their senses. And while access to daytime sleep is not equal for all, that at night is common to all, and is an equal measure of rest for all, having no inequality relative to the advantages of life. This testifies no less to the equality of the Creator, as one who looks out equally for the single genus of men. ^B Next, if day existed continuously without an interval succeeding it, time would not be measured, being uncut into parts. But the division of time throughout the day causes it to be enumerated through these components; and without the discernment of time, life would have become irrational for most men. But what is greater is that there would be no enjoyment of light, with the nocturnal darkness not present in the manner mentioned. For continuous corporeal light would not even be known as light; for it is called light, and is such, because it is distinguished by darkness. It would not, therefore, be anything wonderful, as an obvious created thing, if the position of what seems to be opposite did not demonstrate it. So, for other reasons too, one must offer thanks to the all-wise Creator for the night; ^C especially because it produces the perception and enjoyment of the light, which could not otherwise be discerned for what it is.

But one might be struck by the ineffable wisdom of God, that although so many and even more necessary and useful things exist for men through darkness, yet, since darkness had a name and a reality, He did not create it according to substance, but made it to come and recede; so that it might both provide the things mentioned—and even more—and, by not being a substance, He would in no way be blamed as Creator. Night, therefore, is blameless, nay, even miraculous in every way in its use.

They say that a robber commits evil deeds at night. But what is this against the night? For if it were not possible for those who wish to commit crime to do so ^D during the day, one would have to accuse the timing of the night. But since the one who acts awaits the opportunity for crime, whether it happens by day or by night, it is the intention of the one acting, not the time that is

to be blamed; unless indeed every criminal, if he were persuaded to wait for night, would sleep; for night enjoins this and this alone.

CHAPTER XIX. Comparison of falsehood with darkness.

Furthermore, it must be considered how light and darkness, and truth and falsehood, appear to be mutually contrary in a similar way. For what light is to the body, that is truth to the soul; and what darkness is to the eyes, that is ignorance and falsehood to the mind. For man is nothing other than soul and body; and having from God the supply for each, he enjoys corporeal light through the body, but intellectual truth through the soul. ^B Just as darkness does not exist according to substance, but is only permitted to approach, as has been shown, in the same way falsehood also—not from some substance subsisting and living, but by thought alone—is permitted to exist, and to happen and pass away in a manner similar to darkness, and this very usefully and necessarily. For if the thought of falsehood had not been permitted by the permission of God, the choice of truth would not have been seen and proven among men, and it would be named in vain, if it were not permitted that falsehood should exist in thought. For no one would be a lover of truth, unless he had the power of thinking of falsehood. I do not say that falsehood is joined to truth, but that the choice of truth would not seem to exist, unless the power of lying lay nearby; which indeed benefits the truthful, not the truth. For it behooves him who is truthful, that it should be in his power to lie, and by abstaining from this, he is truthful. ^C The ability to lie, therefore, brings this to men, that they prefer truth to falsehood. Just as the presence of darkness moves and excites the sense of light, yet just as light shines in the darkness (for it dissolves them upon appearing, inasmuch as they do not exist according to substance), so truth, overcoming falsehood, utterly convicts it, for it is not by substance, but by thought, that it slips in by the power of reason into the choice of itself; for how could anyone choose truth, unless he also had the choice of its opposite in his own power?

If, therefore, it could be shown that darkness exists according to substance, and does not merely happen and pass away, as has been said, then a false and lying substance could also be posited. But if neither he nor anyone else can show that this darkness is not dissolvable, being made after the manner of a shadow—so that while light exists even by night, darkness does not exist by day—it is clear that neither has falsehood, which has a similarity to darkness, itself subsisted after the manner of a substance, but is necessarily permitted only to exist by thought, and this for the choice of truth. ^D For if it were possible to show that darkness exists according to substance, and not merely that it happens and passes away as has been said, a false substance would also have to be posited. But if neither he nor anyone else can show that this darkness is not dissolvable, made as it were by way of a shadow, in the same way that light exists even by night, whereas the falsehood which is analogous to it does not exist by day, it is clear that even it does not exist in any way by substance, but it is permitted that it should necessarily come to be only by thought for the choice of truth.

^A Since light exists by substance, one might clearly think that truth also exists by substance, so that the precision of the analogy may be preserved. And what, then, prevents us from thinking and believing that God is Truth itself? For if God is light—an intelligible light, not a visible one—it is clear that he is light as Truth; for intellectual light is nothing else but truth. Yet, being both light and Truth itself, God does not abstain from lying because of a lack of power, but because he never wishes to lie. But if he cannot, it is not absurd to say so, since he never wishes to do so. For those to whom both willing and not willing ^B happen in a different way, to them "power" is reasonably defined. But to God, since it never happens that he "wishes" [alternately], "inability" should not be ascribed; yet this is so because he never wishes it, not because he cannot, in the manner of one whose power is infirm and deficient. For to say that a created thing—I mean physical light—is bound by nature in such a way that its being light does not depend on itself but on its Maker, is not irrational; but to think that the Creator is subject to the necessity of nature is very absurd, as though telling the truth were not in his own power, but he were forced by nature, **[1174]** even though he alone is what he is. However, upon the things he created, he has imposed that they should be what they are by nature and necessity; yet no one has imposed upon God that he should be Truth by the necessity of nature. He who fashioned natures is therefore above nature; furthermore, he is free from the necessity of nature, for thus he will be acknowledged as truly good. ^C Therefore, through the things mentioned, it is clear that a lie does not exist [in itself], but the liar is he who lies; for the lie is named from the one who practices it, not the one who practices it from the non-existent. For a lie cannot exist before the one who conceives it; similarly, darkness has not been created, but has supervened, existing as the shadow of this whole universe; except that, while darkness is permitted not only to supervene, but to do so very usefully, the conception of a lie makes manifest among men the choice regarding truth. But when a lie is preferred to truth, it is most harmful, and this is very logical; for a lie is conceived by men, while physical darkness is placed by God. Therefore, one ought to flee from the former, but not blame the latter, which was necessarily placed by the Creator.

CAP. XX. Of the folly of Manes, who denies that wild beasts were created by God.

The inventor of this unheard-of blasphemy against God finds fault not only with these, but also with those animals which received a savage nature from the Creator, ^D clearly moving like an enemy who finds fault with all things against the works of the Creator. But our discourse will refute the mindless and senseless blasphemy of this deceiver regarding such animals. For all wild beasts and quadrupeds and creeping things—

^A when he finds fault with them, appear to me to act just as if some slave, addicted to sins and most wicked, were to approve of everything else belonging to his master and creator, but should hate and denounce only the whip that is visible; by that very hating, such a person shows how necessary the whip placed there is. For men, being prone ^B to forgetfulness of God, if they had nothing in the fabric of the world that appeared worthy of fear, would proceed even further in mind and will against God; and they would be accused unjustly, since they were not stirred by any of the things that appear. For if indeed there is present in us by nature freedom to choose what is better, we still easily fall into forgetfulness on account of our sloth. There are therefore many things that necessarily stir our reason toward God by fear; just as, again, there are many things that stir it through kindness and the enjoyment of good things toward a confession of gratitude to the Creator; for we are nurtured by both: both by those things which we enjoy as goods, and by those through which we are converted as by fearful things.

[H] Chap. XXI. No malice without cognition and freedom.

What is therefore cruel by nature is horrible, but not evil; for malice and wickedness are an affection of reasoning. But the natural appetite is thus made, and is free ^C of every fault and crime. But God, moved by mercy toward men, brought it about that, through the fear and horror of beasts lacking reason, we might pursue the probity which pertains to the rational part; and there is no evil in such beasts and wild animals; for what does not know what it is, how can it be evil? So that the argument of Manes regarding that wickedness which he has fashioned and calls an unbegotten principle is refuted no less by this logic: for he does not grant it thought and knowledge of wickedness, lest it be found to have a sense of the good; for thus it would be proven not to be wickedness; for the knowledge of good is a testimony of a nature that is not evil. But Manichæus, while he posits that wickedness lacks reason and is deprived of knowledge, also ^D deprives it of the knowledge of what it itself is.

If indeed it senses and knows that it is evil, it will sense the contrary, becoming good. Since an evil is detected by reasoning, by sense, and by the comparison of the good: so that if the evil is manifest, the contrary also becomes manifest; for every contrary is a proof and index of its contrary, yet by means of knowledge and judgment. For without knowledge, neither is a judgment of the other. If, therefore, wickedness is ignorant of itself, and does not receive evil by thought, it will not be wickedness; it would be accused in vain and to no purpose; for wickedness free from reason is like a phrenetic, that is, a madman in a fever or in another case; who does not know what he does, for whom we are all accustomed to make allowances, and are even moved to pity, freeing him from the charge of wickedness, when he strikes without cause, or even kills, if he finds a sword. Thus this is manifest to all; and this judgment is common and in accordance with nature, not to call that evil which does not know what it is doing. If, therefore

^A neither that which knows good were necessarily to be called evil, nor that which is ignorant of itself, it would seem that there could be such a thing as evil. The former is so because it does not even posit itself as such, and the latter because it is misled and defines itself outside of common opinion. Thus, no beast is evil, being deprived of reason; but a malicious man would be evil, acting with reason, of which he is by no means ignorant. For the addition of reason to nature brings the charge of evil, preparing for the fact that what is done is manifest; whereas the deprivation of knowledge is the deprivation of the cause. Thus, a man who knows both, virtue and evil, whatever he may choose—for knowledge precedes choice—is named from that. But before he knows, as long as he is a child, he is called by neither of these extremes. It is clear, therefore, from every side, that we reckon vice and virtue by reason and by the choice made after knowledge. Consequently, beasts that are partakers of no reason would not be evil, nor brought forth from evil; ^B since, even if it were so, it would not be evil.

Chapter XXII. The utility of serpents and diseases.

Furthermore, one may often see that which is most harmful in serpents—I refer to the venom—taken by the most expert physicians for medicine; and when mixed with substances capable of assisting, it sometimes dispels the most severe diseases; and their flesh itself, by a combination with other species and herbs, forms an excellent remedy for bodies. Similarly with other beasts: for certain parts, limbs, and blood, even by themselves, often benefit the sick. How, therefore, can those things which are in part useful and helpful be from evil? These things, therefore, are all to be considered useful only for the sake of men; they should not be called good or evil, for they necessarily instill fear in men only for the sake of turning them toward a better course of life. And the idleness of beasts, and their name (in that they call us) ^C prevents idleness and sloth among men; for they are placed there like a whip appearing in a house, so that servants and attendants may be afraid, if any of them should give himself to idleness, or if any of those in the household should commit a fault. But if it happens that one sees the beasts we have spoken of doing no harm to the wicked, let us marvel at the long-suffering of the Lord toward the wicked. Nevertheless, one must consider the whip that is set before us; on the contrary, if good men encounter them, one must understand that the Lord provides for and watches over the good man who commits a fault, but not for him who is already utterly desperate. For the former sins in things that can be cured, but the latter is reserved for punishment from which he cannot escape; for many such examples may be seen and read in the divine Scriptures. Therefore, God has great care for man, ^D wherefore He has provided in all ways those things which might move and excite him to fear, so that not even his sleep might be free from most frequent disturbance, but that this, too, being hindered by certain creatures, might prick his mind like a goad; and there are indeed many things that aid human infirmity, so that

^A a man must necessarily fall into bodily afflictions, that he may flee from the most grievous and only truly real affliction, which is sin; for that which has no feeling is profligate, and that which sins with impunity is altogether destroyed. For if, even when so many things are present to inspire fear, men for the most part suffer from the malady of fearlessness, how could they have lived in fellowship and society with one another if no fear hung before their eyes? Therefore, sickness softens a harder mind; and often a shipwreck has changed the ways of merchants accustomed to perjury; and again, poverty has humbled the man who was puffed up by riches; and the loss of children has brought to sobriety one who was given to avarice for the sake of his children.

But if it has not brought sobriety, it at least provided an example to those who have feeling; and the children themselves sustained no loss or harm at all; nay rather, they were benefited, having been delivered from the training of wicked parents; and the ways of avarice are refuted.

CAP. XXIII. The loss of children. The absolute reason of the things which God governs, is unsearchable.

Again, others die while they still have parents who are otherwise upright, either because they were destined to become unworthy of those who begat them, lest they should become evil monuments of good parents; or if they are indeed upright, they are benefited—should they be likely to change their ways for the worse if they grew up—by being removed, not remaining in their own evil, while the providence and foreknowledge of God governs all things. ^B And truly, fears are most necessary, and the causes of the things which God dispenses and provides are varied and infinite in their multitude; and the same things often come to pass for various reasons. One falls ill that he may be converted from sin; another, for the sake of virtue, that he may be the more exercised towards martyrdom; another, on account of excessive wickedness, that he may be reproved; and there are various causes for the same event. One loses his riches because he used them ill, God thus providing and taking thought for him; another, that he may exercise himself unto virtue through poverty; another, of his own accord, casts away the heavy burden of riches, that they may not be a hindrance to him in virtue.

Nor can anyone easily perceive the absolute reason of those things which God governs while taking counsel for men. Yet the few things which are understood provide faith in those which are not. For some things He Himself makes clear to men, that they might in a certain way, from the things which they perceive, be able to ascend unto Him. But the greater part He conceals in obscurity, lest He become, against Himself, a teacher of lack of faith; for it was not fitting to demand from God demonstrations of all things that are done individually; ^D indeed, such knowledge becomes more difficult and worse than ignorance, for by this reasoning the mind is persuaded that it is learning; otherwise it would not accept that any of the things which God governs are under a righteous dispensation. But better is faith and love towards God; and although the mind may not discern what is happening, it should nonetheless trust in Him who governs rightly. For in all things to be led by arguments and proofs would be perfidy rather than faith.

^A Indeed, most people do not inquire curiously into true and genuine friends, rendering the friendship legitimate and sincere by the very fact that they associate with their friends without curiosity; as if they would easily incur the charge of perfidy if they never placed their trust in them after having put them to the test. Thus also God, although He desires above all that we be well-disposed toward Him, does not reveal the entire power and efficacy of His own providence—for He wishes us to have faith in Him—yet He does not hide it entirely either, but by certain examples He supports our mind in a certain way.

Those, therefore, who are grateful and most pious in their intention both perceive these things and retain them in their memory forever, like good soil that has received seed, flourishing in the pursuit of virtues. ^B But those who have their minds buried and choked by the great weight of the habit of sins, or by the anticipation of other false notions against God—such as those which Manes brought forth and such as are found among others—have their minds struck, yet they repel the perception and the benefit of these examples.

CAP. XXIV. The providence of God is proclaimed concerning animals useless to man.

^C And let these things be added in general concerning the providence of God over all things. We had a question about all wild beasts, and it has been demonstrated by arguments derived from nature that they are neither evil nor sprung from any evil principle, but that they are very useful to men for the instilling of fear. For if all things that were made in the world were merely pleasant and full of cheer, and there were nothing at all that was even slightly terrifying, it would have seemed difficult for men to be trained not to be fearless.

^D Moreover, these things also possess the beauty of variety, and have comeliness mixed with terror. Beyond these, there are also other animals which are neither fit for feeding men, nor able to provide them with clothing, nor again are they wild and fierce, but they merely complete the variety of the world; and it is manifest that all animals, the tame and the wild, and those that are intermediate, remain by the creation and will of One, and do not perish by consuming one another, being excellently fortified in various ways. For some are gifted with invincible strength, while others protect themselves by their natural speed; others are armed in other ways, and those which seem to lack arms are safe by some other form of fortification; for they have either been allotted the nature of birds, or they lie hidden under the earth. Thus the Creator has provided the ornament of the world through variety, and bringing things that are diverse to an equality, He distributes to all the protection of themselves, so that no genus of these may perish, betrayed by the weakness of its nature. And for the changes of the seasons they are clothed with coverings that have grown naturally—with dense hair and hard skins—capable of warding off the harm of winter and heat, and making their reclining and resting on the ground easier, so that it seems as if an innate bedding were placed under them; and some are born in small numbers, or

^A as difficult to grasp, or as enduring for a long time; but others are easily grasped, and having been handed down for daily use, they persist and are preserved by their fertility.

Chapter XXV. No herbs are deadly

But other animals have other foods, and an abundant supply is set before them all; thus, not even among those herbs that are thought to be deadly is any one by nature destructive; for that which is harmful to one genus is beneficial to another. How could this thing be both deadly and life-saving by nature at the same time? But the difference among the genera that use them requires the diversity of the preparations within them, so that even in irrational creatures a trace of reason might be shown by the law of the One who created them. For none of these ignores what is akin to itself, nor, on account of a wild and irrational nature, does it take what is harmful to itself as if it were suitable for nourishment; ^B but rather, each one yearns for and pursues what is beneficial to it. For if every herb and root were suitable and agreeable to all, the law of the Creator would be less evident, and the fact that it holds sway even in irrational creatures.

But the fact that this same thing is harmful to some, while being life-saving to others, proclaims more clearly the wisdom of God in all things; whereby it has come about that in irrational creatures there is a certain power of nature by which they discern the things set before them. If this were not naturally present in each one, it would be justly and rightly argued that the things that are harmful were produced and have arisen from wickedness. But if a natural power of discernment has preceded [the act of] judgment in the animals, and each one chooses what is suitable for itself, then every herb and root is useful, even if not to all; but the varied things are set before them in varied ways.

Cap. XXVI. Against the lie of Manes regarding iron and fire

In this way, therefore, the accusation of Manichæus, who has eagerly sought to find fault with everything, must be refuted and overturned regarding the plants called deadly. For in this way he also lies against iron and fire, doing in these things the opposite of what he intends; for he who accuses matter, which he imagines to exist in vain, again appears as its defender and patron, ^D being angry at those who consume matter as if they were evil. Yet iron and fire were sown in the earth by the Creator of the world Himself; but they were discovered by the reason of man, with God permitting it. For without these, the life of men would be completely maimed.

For if Manichæus has judged them to be harmful because they consume and destroy bodies subjected to iron and fire, how much more will they appear useful and life-saving on account of their necessary use for everything. But if they were hidden and lying latent in the fabric of the world, and the reason of man discovered these from the beginning, to whom shall we attribute the reason of man that discovered them? Shall we attribute it to the wickedness and the matter that possesses no knowledge, as Manichæus is the author, or to God? But it is clear that wisdom is a good thing of reason, and a gift of the Good. To whom then

did iron ever leap of its own accord—iron which is subject only to the service of reason and serves and ministers to every craft? ^A But man kills with iron, says Manichæus, and the evil craft of the user is added to the instrument. As if iron would not be seen as evil, unless man used iron in this way. For if a murderer wished to kill, and missed with his blow, is it not clear that while his purpose accomplished the act, the iron remained guiltless? Thus, even if he does commit the deed, it is not the iron that is to blame, but he who did not use the iron for cutting according to reason. But if he strikes with wood, or hits with a stone, or strangles with his own hands, Manichæus will again call these things evil; and for Manichæus, everything will be attributed to blame rather than the voluntary thought. ^B For all the things mentioned along with iron are neither good nor evil; they are drawn toward whatever ends the user desires, positioned as instruments, and serving the user. If they had not been given to man, he would neither have accomplished his crafts in this way, nor had the abundant benefits from these crafts; and what is more, he would have practiced for virtue not at all: for by not having an array of instruments capable of being drawn toward the performance of virtue or vice, he would not have the power of preferring virtue to himself; so that he would seem to have suffered the greatest loss and to have fallen from the greatest praise, if he appeared not to commit a shameful deed merely because he had no supply of things to perform it with; for that which does nothing at all is idle and inglorious.

But observe, he might say, the outcome, and nothing more necessary happens; for death was not invented by the murderer, but has been ordained by the Creator. And if anyone is eager to accuse iron, and wood, ^C and stone, and fire and water, and such-like things as maleficent, passing over the principle of the instruments, let him reprove and accuse that which comes from the instruments—I mean death—and let him prove that this was not ordained and established by the Creator according to reason; and only thus, finally, may he call the things that ill-assist death "evil." But if death cannot be shown by anyone to be evil, but on the contrary, as has been shown at length, it is found to be useful; how is it not superfluous to accuse those things from which death happens as if they were evil by nature; things that do not know for what they are to be applied by another to whom they have been entrusted, and are free from all blame and crime? Whereas it is right only to accuse the man who moves them when he ought not, and when it is not fitting.

^D

CHAPTER XXVII. Nothing is evil in the fabric of the world. Human reason alone sometimes sins, but is at the same time reproved.

Thus it has truly been demonstrated and concluded that there is nothing evil in the fabric of the world. That human reason alone, which of necessity receives authority, sometimes sins, and while sinning is reproved only because it has preferred the worse to the better; and that it is not able to innovate against nature, nor...

for him to make what is above, below; but only to act according to nature, even if he is accused of acting against reason.

For example, murder produces the death that is according to nature, doing nothing more than what is according to nature, except for the reproof of the one who committed it; adultery, again, and such things, are accused only by the irrationality of the intellect. But against the nature established by the Creator, nothing at all can innovate; inasmuch as the law of Him who created nature is and remains immutable. And yet, sins revolve within those very things which are according to nature, introducing no novelty, except that they only expose the one acting to be sinning voluntarily; as he could not otherwise have achieved virtue, unless it were in his power also to do the opposite; which he wittingly and willingly declines, in order to acquire virtue. It is therefore of the utmost folly and ignorance to blame iron or wood or other such things for a crime, and not the one who uses them against reason. ^B

If anyone, however, should ask why a human is murdered; it must be said again, as has been said often, why then does a man die at all? Which, if it were shown to be an evil, the cause would rightly recoil upon the one who ordained it. But if death is not an evil, one must only look into the permission of Him who orders our affairs, as to why a man falls into this kind of death, which is not an evil according to nature; and it would be found that it happens from many and varied causes, which it would be tiresome to enumerate. ^C

For the same thing happens to the just and to the unjust for different reasons: not that it may be a loss to the just, nor that it may be a punishment or retribution to the unjust (for that which is according to nature cannot be a punishment), but that it may be an example to others or for the curbing of incurable evils. And there are many other reasons why God permits a man to be murdered: it is evident, however, that nothing beyond what was decreed and established in nature occurs. For although the circumstance may be different—be it fever, or excessive satiety, or on the contrary, exhaustion from hunger, cold, heat, a landslide, stoning, sword, fire, or water—none the less, in all these things there is one thing that results. What then would that be? That which was rightly and fittingly established by the Creator for the entire race. ^D

Chapter XXVIII. The wise governance of the world.

Thus, therefore, and in many other ways, it can be demonstrated that there is nothing evil in the fabric of the world, nor anything in the divine government that can be reproved, but that all things have been made with inexplicable wisdom and are governed by ineffable providence: so that it is not easy to perceive and comprehend the reason for those things that are done by God, whether they seem pleasant or appear sad and troublesome: for it was not right, as it seems, in all things...

^A for the evidences of divine wisdom and the mind of God, which can neither be explained nor comprehended, to be entirely naked and open to men; since even a king or ruler among men often keeps most of his decisions concealed, so that what is done and for what reason it is done remains unknown. It is not, therefore, any wonder if men do not grasp the reason for the whole administration of God—men whom it befits to be subject without curiosity, to be silent, and by no means to speak against the divine administration. For we are often ashamed to inquire curiously into a skilled architect, a master shipbuilder, or an experienced blacksmith when each of them is doing what pertains to his own craft; rather, trusting in their experience, we wait to see the work. And it happens sometimes that we do not even perceive their mistakes.

What, then, shall we say concerning the wisdom of God, which surpasses every mind and intelligence, which it was fitting that those who understand and those who do not understand should wonder at and honor? But if anyone, because he does not grasp the reason for most of the things that come to pass by God, falls into absurd opinions concerning God, such a man is most miserable and very ^B foolish and senseless, using the very blindness of his own mind as a guide, like Manichæus, who devised a most wicked madness indeed against those who believed him; for because he did not understand how God governs our affairs, he fabricated a second, unbegotten beginning of evil, in order that he might fail at the things above and not be permitted to understand the things below, fashioning such things against the God of all—things which, indeed, ought to proclaim His most exalted patience; for he divided the things that are God’s, and attributed most of them to wickedness, which is nothing: in every way blasphemous against the Creator, he says that the good works of God are composed of wickedness.

Chapter XXIX. Necessary Elements.

What, then, would one say concerning the principles of bodies? For there are four of these, which they are accustomed to call the four elements; these are, to be sure, contrary to one another and exactly opposite, yet none of them is able to produce anything by itself. For what would there be, for the generation of a body, in the dry without the moist? Or what would the warm be without the cold? If, therefore, the conjunction of contraries produces a body, which of the four will that man assign to wickedness? Or which to the good? For if the Manichæan imagines in his thoughts a mixture ^D of good and evil in all the elements, it is necessary to divide the four into two, and to separate these, logically, into equal parts, or to separate three against one; but whatever he might assign to the good, it would be found that it could do harm by itself; for none of the four is pure and unmixed, and not dangerous; and immediately that which abounds in the mixture becomes the cause of destruction to the body, as those who are skilled and practiced in these things say. If, therefore, the warm by itself burns, the cold...

^A cools, the dry dries, and the moist produces moisture: which of these will this deceiver attribute to God? For it is likely that the whole body possesses a mixture composed of those things from which it is constituted and consists; but that each of these things should be a mixture of mixtures is impossible.

Wherefore reason does not allow that any single and individual element should be divided into two contrary principles, and that a mixture of each of them should be introduced: for what composition will this deceiver devise in the dry? What mixture in pure and unalloyed fire? Or what combination in the cold, which is altogether cold? Similarly with the moist. For these are clearly of one form and indivisible; so that none of these can exist by itself, but has its being joined with others. ^B

Chapter XXX. The best fire. The delirium of Manes.

What, therefore, in fire will be of God, and what in turn will be of wickedness? ^C Since it admits of no division, nor does it receive any mixture, being pure and unalloyed. For a body is divided at least by thought; but how can a pure element be seen to be composed of contraries? What contrary can anyone conceive of in pure fire?

If, therefore, each thing is entirely perilous, none of them according to the reasoning of Manes will befit the good, but rather all will be referred to evil: furthermore, there will be no bodies composed from another, which is alien to the foundation of Manes.

How, however, will it appear to him in fire that this part is salutary, which is of the good, and this part is deadly and burning, which is of evil, unless he insanely imagines a ^D mixture of elements from the good and from the evil? And if he thinks this, he will be compelled to attribute to God whatever he wishes of the four elements, which are endowed with such a nature as a whole and indivisibly, and he will be seen to confess that what is pure and harmful by itself exists from God. The madman divides the indivisible nature of fire, saying that one thing in fire is salutary and another is burning: the barbarian not understanding that the division is in the use of fire, not in the nature of fire; for the excessive proximity of this is destruction, while a moderate distance brings a secure participation of heat; whereas otherwise the very power of burning alone, which is indeed fire, is necessary: these

things it both softens and melts, as they are necessarily brought to it for use; so that fire is nothing else than its burning power, and the necessary thing is nothing else than this. But he reviles fire in vain, being excessively ungrateful for the benefits provided by the Creator of all things. ^A If, however, one were to suppose that the four elements belong to evil, according to him, how would it appear that these things, being contrary to one another yet from one nature, exist? For if heat is from itself, cold from another, or conversely; and so again with the other conjugation; thus even the mixture of bodies would be unstable according to such a hypothesis. But if by the invention of evil one were to attribute the discovery of building up the mixture of bodies to it, ^B that evil will appear very wise, which otherwise possessed neither knowledge nor understanding; so that it would bring the greatest praise and admiration to the Creator, if indeed it perceived in what manner the mixture of bodies might subsist of itself.

CHAP. XXXI. Manes honors the sun so much, that he compares it to God, and says it is of His substance.

Since he honors the sun, and, as he has supposed, defines it as being unmixed with evil, come, let us also look truthfully at the sun; for it will be seen to be one of the four elements, of a hot substance, I say; for it does not harm those subjects beneath it, but only warms and benefits them, because it is at a very great distance. ^C But to those to whom it approaches closer, it burns and renders such land barren; immediately also at the height of summer, beating down upon the earth at midday, it warms it so much that the ground seems like a furnace to those walking upon it with bare feet. ^D Often, too, men falling into the solar flame have perished by the excessive heat, not finding anything nearby to provide cooling. It blackens bodies and burns them, clearly exerting the power of fire; indeed, it is itself a creator of fire, if someone were to move water in a glass vessel directly toward it. For the intensity of the solar ray, gathered by the clarity of the water and the glass, and transmitted into a narrow space, and meeting with material that easily catches fire, at once gives birth to fire, and clearly persuades one who does not wish to contend that the sun is indeed a form of fire, but the first of the splendid works of creation, since the nature of fire would be found more splendid than all else.

For while all other elements are carried downward, fire alone leaps upon those things which it can consume, and holds its course upward, lightened by its thinness, and proves the air itself to be heavier, in that it surpasses it; so that it appears even thinner than this, by its kinship with the sun. Manes, therefore, in deifying the sun, as though it were of the nature of the Good, is in danger of introduces the Good as a fire-like being, or rather, clearly, as something of this sort. For the sun, while belonging to the hot substance, differs from fire in its position; in its operation it does the same, unless, I say, the distance from the place...

the measure of distance ^A kept off the excessive intensity of his onset. But he would indeed be considered harmful to all living creatures and plants, had not other things been prepared alongside him by the Creator for our succor, through which security from the sun is maintained for us and for others; these are shelters and coverings, and for plants, the supplies of water and the blowing of winds.

Therefore, let those who define the sun as the fifth element, if they are not to dispute contentiously against things that are clear, nor give any credence to the most wicked Manichæan who blasphemes against God—who compares the sun with God and says it is of His substance—behold: for everything that falls under our sight, since it is a body, is by nature opposed to the invisible and incorporeal; it can be His work, and indeed a very wonderful work, but it can have no similarity of nature to Him. ^B

It would be very difficult to enumerate everything impious that this deceiver has inserted into his books; for, vituperating all things as evil, he also slanders the fruits of the earth as providing nourishment to matter; and while he greatly admires the sun, and decides it is from the Good, he is not ashamed to bitterly abuse the things which it warms—I mean plants and seeds—which indeed would not exist at all without the sun, which was created by God. For just as the sun would be of no help if showers did not irrigate the trees and the blowing of useful winds did not stir them, so too would showers and other things be of no help without the sun. ^C

CAP. XXXII. Most useful showers. Concerning the opinion of Manes.

He therefore also fights strongly against himself here, gravely accusing and referring to wickedness the fruits of the earth, which are nevertheless augmented by the sun, which he greatly admires and honors. He says that showers are the superfluitites of the rulers of matter, who toil in love against the powers of the Good: and he defines the way they toil to be their sweat, that which abounds and overflows in them, as he himself thinks.

He strives also to teach that showers are superfluous, flowing into the sea and into desolate places ^D which are not sown; just as if he had arrived at reasoning diligently against God, as if He were consuming the provision of waters in vain and wastefully and prodigally, he who, in his utter madness, does not see what becomes God. Yet if God were in need of water, He would act diligently so that it might flow in accordance with use and necessity. But because He is rich, and so rich that no one can attain it in speech, this very abundant efflux of showers demonstrates that the sea, from which waters are carried into the air, irrigates through the showers. Desolation, furthermore, and the place which does not receive seed, necessarily receives rain to provide for springs, and sometimes for travelers, so that they may find gathered waters. Finally, that the earth devoid of rain should burn by the sun, He has not ordained; for, for the most part, either through rivers or through showers, the whole earth receives dew from God.

^A Since, therefore, the man and those who follow him are prompt to blasphemy if it should not rain, and if it should rain, they do not cease to accuse and blame God in vain; and if they take bread into their hands to eat, the disciples of this blasphemy first revile God with curses, and thus are these ungrateful ones satiated, who, though receiving no less benefit than anyone else from the creation, have sharpened their tongues against it alone, or rather, against its Maker. And as the uttermost enemies of God, they partake of things that are created, while being angry at this very thing, that they have need of those things which belong to the creation.

Cap. XXXIII. Procreation of children is necessary.

^B They insult the procreation of children, wanting unions to take place for them without this, being slaves indeed to the necessary succession ordained by God, but not to pleasure; rather, they are enemies in all respects to true and genuine virtue and piety, as though they were accusing the eternity of the human race, and wishing to stop the natural progress of it somewhere, legislating for God, and being angry at the goodness by which He patiently tolerates their blasphemy.

Although for this reason a certain natural appetite for union has been instilled in bodies—so that animals are led, almost by the necessity of the movements of nature, to the task of succession—it was the infinite wisdom of the Creator that established this; for since the pangs of childbirth are painful for women, and the rearing of children is painful for both men and women, yet succession is very necessary, the appetite moves naturally and in a way exerts force, ^C but reason has holily demonstrated that succession is to be preferred to pleasure; and pleasure of the body is without blame, if it follows the reason and the law of the One who made it.

But those who frequently partake of the pleasure necessarily hate the work that comes from it, and, contrary to instruction, they enjoin those who are joined with them to practice crafts to hinder and prevent conceptions, and not to await the timely births, as if this alone were burdensome and difficult. These people, I say, who are incited as enemies of nature, or rather of the One who created it, and have learned to act insanely against this entire universe, ask: “Why is the desire for the physical joining of bodies present in them?”

^D But how would the beauty of individual temperance have subsisted in humans, if there were not that which naturally provokes, yet is restrained by reason? Or where would there be virginity among women, or celibacy among men, that surpasses common temperance, if reason did not have the love for holiness, which, by struggling against natural things, proves those who rightly repress and subdue the inborn desire to be victors—this not for the insult of nature, but for the exercise of endurance and holiness?

Indeed, we delight in foods and drinks without enjoying them with criminal pleasure; for this is natural, and yet we exercise ourselves through fasts, not practicing what is above nature against nature, but embracing endurance and appeasing God through humiliation; nor would we have undertaken the exercise of fasting if hunger were not present in the body.

Everywhere, therefore, appetite calls for praise both for the moderate use of foods and for abstinence according to one's strength; for the use of things that are according to nature does not beget sin. The moderate use of wine may indeed be wholesome, but the vice of drunkenness is introduced through excess. ^B Similarly, the use of food according to nature in moderation is free from blame, but gluttony is condemned and reproved because it is excessive and against reason. Thus, also, the lawful and measured use of the appetite for sexual union is entirely blameless; but the unlawful and immoderate use brings the charge of incontinence. Manes, therefore, and his followers, observing nothing with reason, have madly insulted all things, as if every desire were evil, whereas its lawful measure and temperament are outside of guilt and crime, and abstinence, when practiced according to one's strength, is the praise of admirable virtue.

For if a person who abstains is praiseworthy before God, that thing is not evil which lies within his power, the abstinence from which is an office of perfect virtue. For the greatest loss would occur if it were not in his power, as though virtue could not be produced through abstinence; for unless the contrary can be done, evil cannot be done; nor again can good be done unless evil is possible, as we have often demonstrated. But Manes dishonors good and virtue when he disparages power and liberty. ^C

CAP. XXXV. On the insanity of Manes regarding inanimate bodies.

Furthermore, he is not ashamed to say that stones are animated, and to introduce all things as animated, and those which are manifestly inanimate, as if that power of the good were contained even in stones; he brings down what is honored by them to such mockery and worthlessness that he says the nature of the good is bound in inanimate stones. To assert that these things which he says are so—what evidence of insanity would one say this is? For if what was sent by the Good is contained in stones, wickedness has already conquered, with the one who came to bind having been bound in return. And he makes the sound in the air of a stone and a rod, as if he had ever heard an articulate voice from them, the evidence for the soul of stones and wood. ^D

But with us, there is both the thought and the discourse of the soul which is not heard at all; for what is heard is heard by the air being struck through a bodily instrument, which indeed can be found to exist without the movement of reason in creatures lacking reason, which do indeed cry out, but not articulately, because they are deprived of reason.

^A It is, however, the property of a body, even if it be inanimate, to produce sound when the air is struck; for that which lacks a body will not emit a voice that can be heard, because it does not strike the air, since it is free from the striking instrument.

For this reason, incorporeal powers will appear inanimate, because nothing that can be perceived by the sense of hearing is borne from them to us. What, therefore, ought to have been taken as a proof of things entirely lacking a soul, in that they necessarily strike the air (for this is a property of the body, and not of the soul), this Manichæus accepted as a sign of animation. Hence it is also that he gravely accuses those who slaughter quadrupeds and birds, whatever animals men employ for eating, as if that same power of *the Good* were animating them and were contained within them. Thus he strives to revile with every kind of contumely the one whom, forsooth, he calls *the Good*. He must, indeed, be asked by whose providence these things were handed over from the beginning to men for eating? Was it by the providence of *wickedness*, as if it were contumelious toward *the Good*? But that *wickedness* was not conscious of so great a matter, being one that possessed no knowledge. For there would be no other creator of the world; nor did God—as he says—create it, and produce power from His own nature for the correction of matter.

CHAPTER XXXVI. Ad hominis utilitatem omnia a Deo creata.

All animals, therefore, arose by the will of the One who created them, both those that are suitable for nourishing men and those that are not. Therefore, no one else provided that these things should be applied to men for food and nourishment, except the One who created them; for universal nature would not have known what was useful to itself, had not He who made it decreed it so. From this it immediately came to pass that these things have been the riches of nature, since their use never fails; and in proportion as some things nourish men, others clothe them, and others are consumed by use, they are the more long-lasting; and some provide other uses, having been made by nature as servants to man by the Creator. Whence even things that are of vast bulk are subject to him, being gently obedient; and things in the air are drawn to us by the artifice of reason, and those that are brought up in the waters are likewise subject, and most of all those that fulfill utility for mankind. ^D Thus it is clear that men did not by force subject the animals lacking reason to themselves against the will of Him who created them; but rather the law of the Creator subjected them to them.

Manichæus also says that it is impious to apply an ox to the tilling of the earth, lest the soul sent by God should appear to be heavily burdened by servitude. And how could agriculture be sustained? How could the enduring race of men persevere? Thus, Manichæus, raging in various ways against the creation, has invented things contrary to common notions. For the tame animals were naturally made servants of man and destined for his use. But the indomitable animals are servants for another reason, beyond that stated, that man might rule by reason over all animals lacking reason, God providing this for various causes; otherwise not only the lion, a most mighty wild beast, or some other animal of this kind,

^A or a serpent, would overcome man, but even a gnat, or some other of the smallest creatures. But the nature of wild beasts is otherwise than has been said, both in appearance, and because it is necessary to men for various reasons based on experience.

CHAPTER XXXVII. In the fabric of the world, the wisdom of the Creator.

But because to answer and counter each point that he trifles and feigns is seen to be the act of one who is delirious, it must be pondered by anyone possessed of understanding, without dispute, how all things have been adapted by the word of one. One law of the Creator rules over all things, and nothing in the things that exist fights, nor does any evidence of war or dissension appear in the creatures; but rather all things (man alone sinning) have peace among themselves, as those which received the statute of peace and quiet from one; from whom they have this very existence which they have from the beginning. For that which is in heaven conspires with the things that are on earth; it rains when time demands, and again it holds back the rain when there is need for heat alone to ripen the fruits. The sun, traversing according to the law of the One who made it, produces the seasons, never changing them, but showing one immutable order for them, and the difference remains in their nature; but one and the same harmony of the things above and the things below is seen to precision. Night, too, has remained throughout all time without inconstancy against the day, not succeeding the day by random motion and lacking reason, ^B but tempered by the wisdom of the author, by additions and subtractions; and not otherwise at one time than another, but the time of accession is manifest and certain; likewise, the time of subduction is manifest and certain. Again, the sun is not burdened by succeeding the night, nor does it deem the law of the Creator an insult; but rather, in the manner of a good servant, having finished the course of the day without any cessation, it withdraws, as the law imposed upon it dictates, diligently hiding itself, so that the night may receive the space measured out for it.

What indeed will you say regarding the earth and the sea, as to how both are circumscribed by limits? One may see the sea raised by waves, yet prohibited from its assault by law, and impelled against the land by the force of winds, yet reflected backward by the fear of the law; although no adamantine wall is of aid to it, lest the sea overflow and inundate the earth, and fail to obey its author. ^C But rather, the word of Him who made it is a sufficient bulwark of the earth against the sea, and the sand holds it back; or rather, the law holds it back, both the violent force of the winds from without, and the flowing of the waters from within, so that the sea-water inundates no part of the earth. And as creatures friendly and as it were sisters among themselves, they truly ascribe and profess one author for themselves. For what historian ever wrote that in heaven a struggle of star against star has occurred, or that on earth animals have fought against another genus, so that they might destroy it, or themselves be destroyed in return? But rather, whatever things ^D collide and invade one another, this has been ordained by the wisdom of the Creator, that those things which abound may be consumed; and both that they exist and that they are consumed is advantageous to men.

^A If anyone were to come with his reason to consider the very principles of bodies, and survey the four elements, yet see how they are blended into harmony by means of their contrariety, he would be the more amazed at the harmony of existing things, seeing that they derive their very being from one single source. For in these cases, contrariety is the cause of friendship, and the strife in their nature is the cause of the highest peace; for although they are four in number, they are one in their coming together and concurrence. Nay rather, they even need one another in order to exist, and by their very contrariety they assist one another, and they are hidden within one another, and appear through one another. To say something small: heat is not cooled by the cold, nor is it extinguished by moisture; nor is the dry consumed by fire, nor dissolved by moisture; for this constitution of things consists in a wondrous way in them, and they dwell together. One might indeed think that there is only fire, yet it does not exist without the moist and the dry, by which, being nourished, it shines. Just as the other elements are within one another, indicating their contrariety only by touch, yet are so friendly to one another that they seem to have no disagreement at all. ^B These things, even in their silence, proclaim the ineffable wisdom of the one Unbegotten, by whom they were also created and blended together. For a body could not come into being from one single and simple element; for a body must consist of a mixture. But what mixture could there be of the dry alone? Or of the moist alone, if it exists by itself?

CHAPTER XXXVIII. Variety in creation is necessary.

^C Therefore, variety is necessary for the blending of a body; and necessary also is the nature of the contraries, which serves to urge the coagmentation of the one unto the admiration of its Author. For these were not first constituted by themselves and then met together; but they received their birth together with one another, and as soon as they were made, they were distinguished by the senses. For when a body has come into existence, both reason and mind distinguish what is conjoined by sense. Thus, the contrariety of these was later detected by the sense of the body that had come into being, which is composed and tempered from them, which do not exist prior to the body itself, but begin to exist simultaneously with it. Who could worthily admire the power of the Creator, and the harmony and concentus of created things, how all things are at peace and without strife, except for the injustice of men?

^D The whole creation, therefore, remains and perseveres, moving in its own orderly motion, yet maintaining the unchangeable law of its Maker. And who, if he possess the healthy senses of the soul, seeing that these things are so, and considering countless other things that surpass all mind, would wish to imagine another principle in his thought, and set it up in opposition to the one only Unbegotten God? For to dream of a concordant and unchanging [second] principle is superfluous, since one is sufficient; but to suspect the existence of a contrary one is altogether the mark of a madman, since all things are in agreement with one another, adorned indeed by variety, in which it is the wisdom of the true Author that health and tranquility [are joined] with austerity.

appearing; for all sweetness that is too absolute is harmful and alien to reason; while severity and harshness alone, being devoid of sweetness, tend toward savagery and inhumanity. But each corrects and delights, exhilarates and deters: it promises sweetness and threatens terror; it holds out the hope of gifts and shows the danger of punishments; so that the mind of those who dwell on earth may neither be submerged by the softness of pleasant things into excessive sloth, nor be rendered blind by being struck with perpetual fear, but rather may be trained on both sides toward the fear of God and toward virtue.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD BOOK

The things which have been said in the preceding books, both from the facts themselves and from common notions, may perhaps be able to fortify the mind of all who are outside the Church, so that they do not admit the blasphemy of the Manichaean against the Author of the universe. But because he has devised another hunt ^B against those who are inside the Church—a grave and dangerous one indeed—twisting certain things said in the holy Scriptures by force to fit his own false doctrine, it is time that we should launch refutations against him from the divine Scriptures, for the protection of those who believe in the holy Scriptures themselves and who are sometimes deceived by him through their absurd and improbable interpretations. For by a various artifice of deception, he strives to strengthen the error which he has devised with the devil as his helper; among the Gentiles, indeed, he does not refute their dogmata, but, exalting what are lesser evils into a greater bulk of impiety, he introduces a more perverse Hellenism.

By these things, being entirely carried about by an opinion of evil and false doctrines, he inserts the addition of his own fictions. But among Christians, naturally attacking the things that are of the Christians, and by the probability of the name of Christ, and ^C the words of Scripture, and the appearance of modesty, he covers the wolf, which he himself is, within, while clothed extrinsically in sheep’s skin; he becomes a false star to the flock; and thus he blinds those who are less prudent, and, forsooth, he sets out to collect the newest impiety of all, both from himself and from others. But in order that no Christian might undertake even to weigh and consider the novelty of the evils he had collected, he labeled himself the Paracletus, using a name that is not only above man, but above an angel, masking and dissembling his fallacy; so that by the probable authority of the title, men otherwise foolish, with no judgment applied, might embrace what he says. Sometimes also, as if he were an apostle of Jesus Christ, he, a barbarian in race, delivers his impiety through letters, being a barbarian in race and in mind alike. ^D But on these matters, later.

As for the Scriptures, those which are of the Old Testament he ascribes to the wickedness, as he calls it—the Law, that is, and the prophets; but the Gospels and the remaining parts of the New Testament

^A he says, were given by the Good, as he thinks. Yet not even these does this inventor of blasphemy assert to be altogether free and pure from that opposing God, as he calls him; but he says that there exist also in these, just as in some mixture, many things from what he calls matter; and that it is necessary, having stripped these away, to leave only those things by themselves which he considers to belong to the portion of the Good. Thus, handling the correction of the holy Scriptures, as he imagines, by himself, and for this reason especially daring to seem the Paraclete, he removes the greater part, leaving but a few things, and those of the New Testament which require agreement and harmony with the related discourses. He thinks, indeed, that he has imposed all the blasphemy upon them, ^B as one who has left only those things which can be dragged toward the monsters which he fashions; yet none the less do these things too clearly convict him of his immeasurable madness, as the argument will show clearly, God assisting, when it occupies itself with these things.

First, therefore, it must be shown how senselessly he carries out his blasphemy against the more ancient holy Scriptures, in this matter having joined himself with men more ancient than himself who were wicked and cast out from the Church, while in impiety surpassing them all. If, therefore, like the Greeks, he disbelieved the histories of the Scriptures entirely, and thus disbelieving said that the things narrated therein did not happen at all as they relate, neither would we be raising any argument against him concerning these matters, nor would he himself undergo a greater refutation through them. ^C But since he attests that the truth of the Being is in them, but says that the cause of these things is the wickedness which is nothing, come, let us now show how he attributes the great works and more wonderful things to the wickedness which he accuses, for he does not understand, since he blinds his own reasoning, the admirable managements and providences of God the Creator of all, which are related in the histories.

He says to this very word—either he himself or some other of his disciples—after he had inscribed the chapter "Concerning the first human formation": "Because the rulers of matter knew that if the portion of light which fell into them were entirely taken away, death would quickly come upon them, they engineered the descent of the soul into bodies: ^D and this they ensured, on the one hand, that the soul should by no means seek to return whence it descended, and on the other, that having returned, it should not be found worthy of the habitation above, as it would be defiled and polluted by the filth of the flesh."

And a little later: "Wherefore each one of them," he says, "of the rulers of matter, in the manner we said before, on account of the movement that occurred, and on account of him who appeared first for the redemption of the soul—the door having first been opened—out of panic sent forth against his will the power which was in him, formed himself into a hunting-snare for the soul, and fashioned a representation of himself upon the earth, and forced the souls, having been bewitched, so that they might be with difficulty abstracted from that representation." And first indeed Adam was formed by them, and

is the instrument of desire and the bait for souls descending from above, and a machine for pushing them into bodies.

^A But we must consider first how much wisdom he attributes by his own opinion to, and testifies in favor of, the magistrates of matter, whom he entirely condemns and vituperates for ignorance, as if they had engineered the descent of the soul through the flesh to them, so that they might not be deprived of the light mixed in with them, and that they might not allow the soul to return back again; but if it should return, it would be declared unworthy of the supernal habitation as if polluted by the filth of the flesh—as though God could not preserve in its integrity a soul created by Himself against the machinations of the magistrates of matter. And concerning these things, is it not even now laughable to speak?

^B But since he says that Adam is the first creature of the magistrates of matter, an instrument of desire and a bait for souls from above, we have learned clearly from this that he says man was formed by the non-existent matter—he who everywhere attributes more to matter and wickedness by a simulation of accusation. And now, he says that it [matter] made man, the most excellent and most kingly of all animals that are in the corporeal world, inasmuch as it is the only one endowed with reason, and admirable both by the reason of its nature and by its institutes and exercises. He poses a question also concerning the universe, why it was made.

But concerning man, while he strives to demonstrate that he is not formed by God, he raises other insane questions: How, he says, did God give a commandment to Adam? For it is necessary that one of two things be the case: either He knew that he would transgress, and thus not only did He give it in vain and uselessly, but He Himself is at fault and guilty of that sin; or if it be said that He was ignorant, it is necessary to say that God is endowed with ignorance: so that the commandment, as he imagines, was given by wickedness for the purpose of waylaying man, and for no other use; but that man had been greatly helped and liberated when he believed the counsel of the serpent, whom he decides to be an angel of the Good. For he was blind, he says. But when he had tasted of what was forbidden, he knew himself, that he was naked, and he used the covering that he found; and he knew good and evil. Thus he received a great benefit, having transgressed the command of him who deceitfully fashioned him.

^C How, he says, is it fitting for God to say: “Behold, Adam has become as one of us, to know good and evil? ^D And now, lest perhaps he stretch forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever?” For if it was possible to recover immortality, he who cast the man out of paradise and excluded him from the participation of the tree of life, by the participation of which he would have been able to have immortality forever, was envious.

BOOK THREE

Chapter I. The Manichaeans slander the Old Testament: they circumcise the Gospels.

^A Having thus spoken briefly concerning the beginning, let us proceed to examine the question of the Law; for they have determined to embrace the Gospel, but have endeavored to reproach the Law and the prophets. They have calumniated the whole of the Old Testament, while they have supposed that they are honoring the Gospels, simulating an honor for the Gospels so that this simulation might serve as a decoy for those whom they deceive. For they do not confess that they honor the Gospels out of an agreement with them, but rather they feign an honor for the Gospels because they honor the name of Jesus. Yet it was incumbent upon them, if they truly honored the Gospels, not to circumcise the Gospels, nor to remove parts from the Gospels, nor to add others, nor to attribute to the Gospels matters of their own phrasing and private opinion. Their tongue does not speak these Gospels, and they pass over their reading; they have added whatever they wished, and have removed whatever they judged, and yet they subsequently style them by the name of Gospel, though they have not preserved the body of the Gospel, but rather have fashioned another body of letters—which reaches only as far as the name of the Gospel—according to their own will. They have dishonored the Gospels more than the heathen; for the heathen do not receive them, and by not receiving them they do not corrupt them, but only reject them, without trampling upon the ^B letters. These men, however, when they appeared to have received them, trampled upon, insulted, and adulterated the letters; and they have done what sorcerers and wicked men do. The others merely did not believe, and regarding those things which they did not believe, they did not endure to discourse; but these men, coming into the open, have attempted to dissolve the harmony, and have dared to destroy the rhythm by means of artificial doctrines, having prepared the name of the Gospel as a pretext for deception. For if they had known the Gospel, they would not have been ignorant of the Law; but if they were ignorant of the Law, how did they receive Jesus? For without the Law, Jesus is not received; for he who desires the end investigates the beginning, but he who is a despiser of the beginning is empty, speaks vainly, and cannot arrive at the end.

CHAPTER 11. The law is necessary for Christians.

^C If, however, Christ is the end of the Law (Rom. X, 4), they labor in vain who flee the Law while professing to have the knowledge of Jesus. Unless the Law speaks, the Lord is not recognized; for the silence of the Law is an ignorance of what is proclaimed, but the knowledge of the Law is the awareness of what is foretold. For if they listened to Moses, they would believe in Him who has come. Certainly, the one who is raised is not believed ^D

^A without the Law and the prophets. For if someone says, “Send Lazarus, so that he may warn my brothers not to come to this place of torment,” and Abraham says in response, “They have Moses and the prophets,” and he replies, “Unless someone should rise from the dead, they will not believe,” he shall hear: “If they did not listen to Moses and the prophets, not even if someone should rise from the dead will they listen.” Amazing! For not even the message of the risen one, without the Law and the prophets... ^A Jesus did not deign to appear even to the apostles without their company; and, being able to be testified to by the Father, he did not dishonor the fellowship of the saints. Rather, wishing to provide the most accurate faith before the eyes of the apostles, as he led them up onto the mountain and was transfigured, he showed Moses and Elijah, so that the fellowship of holiness might be a testimony, and so that he who receives Jesus might not dishonor those who are with him, lest, by belittling his escorts and ministers, he dishonor the King himself.

CAP. III. Christ fulfilled the Law.

^B Therefore, the Savior took such care of the Law and the prophets that he left nothing of the Law unfulfilled, but performed all things that were written, and cried out: “I have not come to abolish the Law, but to fulfill it.” He entered into the temple and cast out the base administrations of the house of God, so that, by restoring the house pure, he might convince them by the very deed that he was undertaking the management of his own and his Father's affairs. For he cries out: “The house of my Father will be called a house of prayer; but you have made it a den of robbers.” And because there are infinite Scriptures by which their absurd opinion can be refuted, we, so as not to extend the work to great length by writing at length, shall permit others to use the analogies of the words; but we, using brevity, shall proceed to those things they say against the Scriptures. Those who receive the Gospel do not receive the Law, because they do not receive the whole and entire Gospel; for they would have accepted the Law if they had held the whole Gospel. But now, having first peddled the Gospel, they consistently do not receive the Law. They are convicted, therefore, of not keeping the Law because of their brigandage regarding the Gospel. But if they bear witness to the Gospel and do not honor the Law, they dishonor the testimony; for this is no longer a matter of dishonoring the Law, but rather of failing to believe the one who testifies. And if only one Gospel were to testify, and another were to be silent, the dishonor might apply only to the one; but ^D the other Gospels would not be silent, regarding the dishonor of the one as a common dishonor.

Book III. Chapter IV. The Law and the Gospel agree concerning Christ.

If, however, Mark says: "The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, as it is written in Isaiah the prophet," ^A and Matthew says: "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham," while the one acknowledges Abraham as the progenitor of the generation according to the flesh and honors David, the other joins the Gospel with the Law and has understood the Law to be the beginning of the Gospel. The Savior speaks the truth when He says: "He who rejects you, rejects Me"; for the dishonor no longer stops at the Law, but ascends to the Savior Himself. And let the Jews hear: "If you heard Moses, you would also hear Me; for he wrote of Me." And let the Manichaeans hear: "If you listened to the Gospel, you would listen to the Law; for the Gospel has been written about the Law." But the Jews, having taken a veil, have neither understood the Law nor recognized the One who was announced. The heretics, however, have eyes that do not see and ears that do not hear; because they have not peered into the Gospels, they have fought against the Law. For behold, John cries out: "There was a man sent from God, whose name was John; he came for a testimony, to bear witness concerning the Light." He knows the witness, and he knows the One being testified to; and he prescribes [the limit for] the witness, saying: "The Law and the prophets were until John." Therefore, John testifies, the Law is a witness, and testimony is borne to the Law.

^C See what an absurdity unbelief regarding the testimonies implies! And when such things have been spoken by them, Luke also does not remain silent; for he uses the same voice and speaks and narrates in harmony with the other evangelists, that Gabriel just appeared to Mary and offered a heavenly salutation, saying: "Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with you." And when she heard, she was troubled at his speech and pondered what this salutation might be. And the angel said to her: "Do not fear, Mary; for you have found grace before God. And behold, you will conceive in your womb and bear a son, and you will call his name Jesus. He will be great and will be called the Son of the Highest; and the Lord will give him the throne of David his father; and he will reign over the house of Jacob forever; and of his kingdom there will be no end." David is honored, he is confessed as the father of the Savior, and the beginning remains; it is delivered to the Lord, and it receives no end, the beginning being glorified in that which is endless. ^D And these are the beginnings of the Gospels: for it was necessary for us to weave our discourse from the beginnings, so that in this way, one walking behind the discourse might understand the sequence and harmony of the words from all the Gospels.

Since the apostolic ministry also preserves an evangelical character, and Paul also knows it, and the...

measure of his own suffering is in part ^A of the Gospel; ^A for he says: "According to my Gospel through Jesus Christ." Let us not pass over the beginnings of the Apostle, but let us come to a remembrance of them, so that, having gone through all the Scriptures and the beginnings of the Scriptures, we may dispense the law with a single voice. Writing therefore to the Hebrews, he says thus: "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds." In this place, he acknowledged the Father of the Son; and acknowledging the Father of the Son, he does not divide the matter, he is not silent about the ancients, he does not ascribe prophets to others, but [speaks of] the God of the prophets and the Father of the Son. ^B And Paul has not divided, nor has he separated; but rather he proclaims one and the same—the one worshipped by those [prophets], and the other born from the womb; of the former he is the Father, and those he used as worshippers and servants. For those whose servants the prophets are, of Him the Son is Christ. But if you honor the Son, yet you accuse and rail against those who supplicate the Father, you express with your mouth what you will; you see that the Son is indignant; He does not suffer the Father to be insulted. For if the Father considers the dishonor of the Son to be His own dishonor, how much more will the Son consider the insult to the Father to be His own indignity?

Chapter V. Various heresies concerning the Law. Three heretics disparage the Law.

[gives] life eternal; but to them who are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath; tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil ^A For these words are set at naught and vanish if the definition of the Just One is not applied and rendered to the Son. But if punishment is established for those who have sinned, and the oversight of the Just One measures out the punishment; while honors and rewards are stored up for those who excel, and the honor is weighed by the judgment of the Just One; how do they not cut off and suppress [this] arrogance? If, however, the Only-Begotten is such, but the Father is not such, then He is no longer begotten as like from like; He is no longer the image of Him who begat Him; no longer the character; no longer the radiance 31; no longer does he who sees the Son see the Father, if the Father does not have whatever the Son has. And the Savior cries out in the Gospel: O righteous Father, the world hath not known thee, but I have known thee 32. What shall we do? Shall we turn our backs on the word of the Savior, so as not to believe the writing? Or shall we hold the word in admiration? For it is the word of truth. Let us station the Valentinians, as insane and demon-possessed, outside the God-fitting and holy assemblies. ^B

But since we incur something indecorous by prolonging our discourse against the heretics, when the business we have undertaken does not draw us to that, let us call back our discourse and proceed to the subject matter at hand; and these things have been considered for the sake of utility, so that this discussion about them may not be entirely passed over by us. For a threefold wickedness has spoken against the Law, using as many ministers and prefects of blasphemy: through Valentinus, indeed, to diminish and extenuate the Law and to separate the Gospel; through Marcion, that the Scripture of the Law is a kind of abortion; through Manichæus, a certain wicked, lightless [being], wholly of darkness. For he does such things, he composes such words; he speaks vain things, leading astray unrefined and unexercised ears by the composition of his words. ^C

Cap. VI. That the advent of the Son of God was known to the demons. The counsels of God were unknown to the angels.

Wherefore, it is necessary to ask: If that wicked one, without splendor, and being wholly and entirely darkness, wrote the Law, how did he know the advent of Jesus? How did he know of His arrival? How, when the events had not yet taken place, did he understand what God had counseled, and announce it beforehand, and declare it in advance? For the Scriptures of the Law are manifest, testifying from above to the arrival of the Son. For if they should say that the Law did not declare it, nor did the prophets signify it beforehand, they will be refuted, as they speak against manifest things; not by our own rebuttals, but by the Gospels themselves speaking clearly, and crying aloud above and below; at one time: That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Isaiah the prophet, and at another: I came not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it 33. If, however, by these they are convicted

what will they answer? For if no man knows the things of God, except the Spirit of God, but he who wrote the law knew what was in God, and understood as much as God willed, and therefore he who wrote it wrote from understanding and knowledge—he was therefore from God, and was God, and was in God—and for this reason he spoke whatever God willed, understanding the things in God and not being ignorant. But if no one knows our heart, but the Creator alone knows it, and our heart is hidden from others, yet it cannot be hidden from God. Now, the things which God willed, wickedness did not ignore, but knew; and while He willed, it perceived. How, then, do they not attribute great magnitude to wickedness, for God could not hide from it His counsels and His will? How do they not disparage God, who could not hide [His] wickedness? And we indeed laugh at men who, when they devise and plot something against enemies, bring the ^B thought they have conceived into the open.

Those who speak such things, and sow such discourse, do not see that they act in such a way that God becomes a laughingstock, on the grounds that God, when warring like a leader of an army against wickedness, did not keep His own counsels hidden, but had them laid open for wickedness to see. But if even the divine and angelic powers are unable to understand what the Father is planning, with only the Son understanding and declaring it: *No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him*; how then did the evil powers know what was in God? For not even the divine powers are able to know these things, unless they learn them by the tradition of teachings through the declaration ^C of the Only-begotten.

For the law itself, anticipating everything concerning His coming, tells it: *Behold, the Virgin shall have in her womb, and shall bear a Son*. And another prophet is not ignorant of the place: *And thou Bethlehem, land of Judah, thou art not the least among the princes of Judah*. Another defines the place where He was laid: *The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib*. And another [tells of] the flight into Egypt and the return from Egypt: *Out of Egypt have I called my Son*. Another tells of the dwelling place in His youthful age: *Land of Zabulon, land of Nephthali, the way of the sea beyond the Jordan; the people that sat in darkness saw a great light*. Another ^D also does not ignore the Forerunner: *The voice of one crying in the desert: Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight*.

In short, if anyone should wish, by gathering the prophecies from the law, to compose the whole Gospel, recording the things done therein in the words of the prophets, he would appear as one who loves learning and loves the Word, explaining His teachings, His doctrines, His baptism, the performance of His signs, the judgment that took place, the betrayal of Judas, the divine dispensation upon the tree, the gall and the vinegar offered to Him in His thirst, the very burial and the monument, the descent into hell, the resurrection itself, and finally the assumption. For then, what remains shall cry out: *Lift up your gates, ye princes, and*

be ye lifted up, ye everlasting doors, and the King of glory shall come in*^A; then he will add that which was written by David: *The Lord said to my Lord, Sit at my right hand, until I make thy enemies thy footstool*[b]. If, therefore, the Law so diligently described the coming of the Son, and in a time long removed before the events came to pass, announced them beforehand, it is no longer to be accused, no longer to be ascribed to another. He who begat, foretold. He who deliberated, anticipated the events with his word. God begat. God says: *You are my Son, today I have begotten you*[c]. God sent me. God spoke through Moses: *The Lord God will raise up to you a Prophet from your brothers; you shall hear him in all things, whatsoever he shall speak to you*[d]. God deliberated on these very things, and when He had deliberated, He was not silent; He announced the counsel and the deliberation, creating faith through the things foretold: *His name is called*, he says, *the Angel of Great Counsel, wonderful, counsellor, prince of peace, father of the world to come*[e]. And such is this refutation.

Cap. VII. The Law commands what is good

^BSince they attribute the Law to the evil one, what will they say if someone asks them: if the evil one counsels evil things—and he cannot but counsel evil things—if he ever counsels good things and gives good advice, will he then give good counsels? For if they say that he is by nature adapted to counsel good things and provide good advice, they again destroy their own definition; for he who does not counsel evil things is no longer evil, and he who gives good advice is no longer evil. But if no good purpose proceeds from the evil one, to what order will they say these exhortations belong: *You shall not commit fornication; you shall not commit adultery; you shall not steal; you shall not bear false witness*[f]? To what order will they say that which is written belongs: *You shall not make to yourself idols, nor the likeness of anything, neither as many things as are in heaven, nor as many as are in earth, nor as many as are in the waters*[g]? Of what party will they say these commands are: *You shall not covet the ox of your brother, or his beast of burden, or his wife, or any of his cattle*? For if they say that such things are honest, divine, and lovely, they will be put to shame by these exhortations, having been ignorant of the greatness of Him who gave the counsel. But if they say that these are base and worthy of blame, and that it is base not to commit fornication, and base not to covet the belongings of others, and that such are the base things: observe what sort of things they consider to be good; observe that they are the procurers of pleasures, the patrons of idols, and the inventors of shameful desires. For those who accuse the Law act as ambassadors for vice.

Those who banish the Law—which removes pleasures, which destroys deception, and which abolishes superstition—what do they do other than bring in pleasures and introduce desires? So that, while pleasure...

^A freely invades their minds, they have cast the law out of their dwellings, lest by using the law they be shamed by the law. But how do they render their ears wide open to desires by having cast out the law? The law is clearly the destroyer of wickedness; yet these men have ignorantly and unlearned a-tempted to slander the law. And while the law hates wickedness, these men hate the law; and while the law abolishes superstition, these men dare to abolish the law. Let us stack the facts against each other. If the law is contrary to wickedness, and these men fight against the law, they are indignant because of wickedness, because the law denounces wickedness; for being unable to bear the denunciation of wickedness, they have denounced the law, so that the denunciation against wickedness might not have any strength, the law having been denounced. If the law removes idols and dissolves the multitude of gods, and these men have turned their weapons against the law, it was consistent that they should proclaim a multitude of gods. In order, therefore, that the multitude of gods might be confirmed, the commandment of the law has been forbidden among them, which says: ^B *Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one Lord;* and, *You shall love the Lord your God;* and, *Lest perhaps when you look to the heaven, and see the sun and the moon, you should adore them.* Against these words they have thrown their weapons; against these commandments, exasperated, they have sharpened their tongue like a sword. For this reason they are driven by demons, and they venerate everything, and know nothing except to adore all things; and they always cast themselves upon the ground, yet they have a haughty mind; and they wander and roam about in their soul; they have turned everything into gods for the sake of their own license. They have surpassed the Gentiles in number and in vanity, being Gentiles born of Gentiles, and by the magnitude of their ^C wickedness they surpass the ignorances of those others.

CHAPTER VIII. Nothing shameful in the law.

But lest someone, having used a most deceitful art, might studiously say: "The law dissembled, and having stolen certain beautiful things, presented them as its own, since it wished to garnish its own wickedness, and inserted parts of goodness with the desire of covering over the shamefulness of other parts"—come, let us first examine whether anything absurd and wicked appears in the law, and thus let their shamefulness be refuted. Second, if by punishing certain parts of vice it has dispelled them, rendering those who believed free from every part of vice, the law will no longer appear dissembled, but rather ^D a foe and enemy of vice and wickedness. Third, if it has scattered some good things, and has not joined every species of virtue with the letter of the law, so that it might appear to have written some things but to have left out more, its refutation of the law may have some force. But if all things that are honest and honorable are set entirely within the letters of the law, let us admire the law, and let us confess it to be the law of God, and let us call it the speech of God; and as for these men, let us reject them, counterfeit

^A in their judgment and having a corrupted opinion. That the law has not a single particle of wickedness sown in it, nor has it taken away a particle of wickedness while sparing another, but rather the law is pure and holy, and the law of God, Paul cries out: "So the law is holy, and the commandment holy and righteous and good." And: "For we know that the law is spiritual." For that which is holy and spiritual and good is delivered from every impropriety and endures no impropriety. It is honored with virtues and converses with God; for conversation with God does not endure to be of any other order, but is regulated by the governance of the Spirit. "For God is Spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth." Because the law is spiritual, it prepares the conversation with God; and if the spiritual man is able to judge all other ^B things, but he himself is judged by no one, how much more is the spiritual law able to judge the discourses of all others, while it itself will be judged by no one?

Cap. IX. The Law Has Taken Away Every Species of Vice.

That it has also taken away every species of vice, and has overlooked not a single particle, but has gone through every species of vice, taking it away and cutting it off, is clear from the definitions concerning vice, there being four species of vice: imprudence, intemperance, cowardice, and injustice. If the law had kept silent about some evil, the law would be imperfect; but if it has gone through and worked upon it, taking away every species of vice beforehand, it follows that vice is curtailed by the law, leaving not even a remnant allowed. Wherever, then, the law is strong and gives strength by its persuasion, ^C it is impossible to find even a moisture of vice; but where it is weak, wickedness goes about, despoiling and devouring, walking in power, having found the power for itself in the unguarded state of the soul. For the law cries out: "If my people had heard me, and Israel had walked in my ways, I would have humbled their enemies in nothing." For when the law persuades, vices become nerveless, lying on the ground and unable even to look back at the soul. For if "thy law is a lamp to my feet and a light to my paths," every stumbling block is taken away, the heart being found illuminated and bright; for even if one should be in that young and slippery age, if he keeps guard over the words, persisting uprightly he will cry out: "In what shall a young man direct his way? In guarding thy words." And having acquired for himself the power of never slipping by hiding the teachings of the law in his mind, he says: ^D "In my heart I have hidden thy words, that I might not sin against thee."

And so, having set the law as a guardian and keeper, he will understand how the law drives away each of the idols of vice; driving away, indeed, imprudence, through the scripture that says: "Be not as the horse and mule, which have no understanding"; casting away—

^A fear by means of the saying that says: "Fear not when a man becomes rich, fear not the reproach of men, and be not overcome by their mockery; and fear God, and you shall be strong; beside Him fear no one else." For having here cast off fear, and having planted strength, and having instilled courage, it cries out: "The righteous ^B is as a lion, confident, as he neither fears nor shrinks from a beast." And having destroyed the two kinds of vice, imprudence and fear, it also destroys intemperance, saying: "Thou shalt not commit fornication, thou shalt not commit adultery." Wherever the passions are restrained, the bridle of temperance is found in the mind; and when the three are destroyed, it destroys also injustice: "Thou shalt not make for thyself weights small and great: let there be weights just and equal for thee." ^C

And thus, with the parts of wickedness destroyed, the malice is dissolved, no longer able to enter into the mind. What species of vice, then, has the Law not yet removed? What parts of pleasure has it not dissolved? What fears, what foolishness has it not pursued to such a degree while removing pleasure, so that it has even taken care of the eyes, and has not spared the hearing, and has not neglected the tongue? "For I set a guard to my eyes, that I may not understand concerning a virgin." The saint reaches even to the eyes, so that pleasure, by tickling the soul, may not lead it to the tripping of desire. Another of the saints cried out: "Look not upon the beauty of another, that pleasure, ^D having not yet attained the eagerness of the soul, may not find hope of entry; but, being driven away from the doors, may despair of its snares." advancing, moreover, to the ears and tongues, he placed watchmen and guards over his members, not yielding his position, but rather crying out: "Set, O Lord, a guard to my mouth, that no improper word, without utility, going forth, may afford a lure of pleasure to him who speaks base things." Being concerned also for the loins, that the mind, shaken hither and thither, might not be bound, he took thought, commanding: "Thus shall you eat the passover, your loins being girded," so that if we have not limbs ungirded, we may not be caught by an easy movement; but, on the contrary, in those thus girded, we may find the best order for doing things and for business.

In this manner, the parts of pleasure being removed, he advanced also against the species of the parts of the mind that are endowed with reason, and against the species of injustice. For if taking what is another's, and taking by force, and taking against the owner's will, is injustice; and for one who takes what is another's to give it to harlots, or to consume it profligately, is a species of injustice—then he is unjust who steals the honor of God, and bestows it upon wood and demons, and consumes that honor, and is profligate in his mind. For not even so profligate is he who consumes riches, as is the unjust man who destroys the great and abundant wealth, the honor of God, from his mind: for as long as the wealth of knowledge remains...

in the soul, the disposition toward God is rendered back. But when it is entirely exhausted and consumed and becomes impoverished, then at last it carries over the honor due to Him into wood and the craft of the painter and sculptor. For this reason, the Apostle, recognizing that injustice is a superstition, said: "And covetousness, which is idolatry." Since, therefore, the most grievous part of injustice is ignorance toward God, and the transgression against men is less, and since injustice is divided into two parts—into ignorance of God and transgression against men—the written law took its beginning from both. And first, indeed, it cries out: "You shall not make for yourself idols or any likeness," lest, being wanton against the honor of Him who made you, you destroy it altogether from the roots. And He was rightly angry with the people when, after the making of the calf, they cried out: "These are your gods, O Israel, who led you out of the land of Egypt." For because they were assigning and attributing the gifts of the benefactor to that which could not move, and it was a most grievous injustice to attribute the wealth of the benefactor's kindness to craft and sculpture, truth was stirred, the law was written, injustice was forbidden, and he who was learning was instructed. And thus, ^B by having first removed the passion of injustice toward God, He also removed the injustice toward man.

And first, He did not wish the love of riches to be born in the soul; for the love of riches begets injustices, and the desire for riches generates covetousness. For the root of all evils is the love of money; and there shall be branches and shoots of the love of money: injustices and covetousness. And since covetousness begins from the love of money, and injustice takes possession, forestalls, and anticipates, it is said: "If wealth should flow, do not set your heart upon it," so that the mind, flowing along with the current of riches, might not be taken captive by fleeting wealth. For if riches flow and have no stability, the mind rightly stands opposed, not allowing its own stability to be corrupted by fleeting wealth. And because at times the love of money causes distress, and at times the love of glory plunders the mind, He has depicted this passion also for the young and flourishing: "I saw the impious man lifted up and exalted as the cedars of Lebanon; and I passed by, and lo, he was not," so that the mind might not sell its own greatness, easily withered, to any glory however great, but rather, rising above all these things, might cling to the love of truth. Therefore, it honors moderation and drives out injustice, and grants and assigns the divine dwelling places to those who have kept moderation. ^C

And thus it cries out: "Lord, who shall dwell in your tabernacle? Or who shall tabernacle in your holy mountain? He who walks without stain and works justice; who speaks truth in his heart"; so that, having banished every form of the love of money, it may leave no place for injustice.

^A For this reason, he who speaks according to the law speaks in favor of the truth; for this reason, the workers of truth are not indignant at the law when it speaks against vice. Sometimes the Savior spoke against avarice; the Jews were exasperated and took it ill, for the love of riches made them harsh and hard toward the One speaking. Certainly, when a tutor discourses to an indolent and lazy boy concerning his sloth, he is hated by the one he is instructing. For everyone who cuts away the movements of adolescence that are turned away from reason is hated because of the love of pleasures; for this reason, the law has come into hatred among the heretics. Because it moved against the passions, walked against sins, and argued against the things that were beloved, they could not bear the matter.

CHAP. X. The law sets forth every species of virtue: prudence, chastity, fortitude, justice.

But so that ^B our discourse and disputation may be most comprehensive, and the wickedness of the heresy, which has unjustly devoted itself to finding fault with the law, may be exposed, let us say not only that the law has removed every species and form of vice, but let us add to our account that the law also sets forth and explains every species of virtue. For if the law had removed all vices but had not introduced all virtues, the law would be deficient, leaving behind the construction of virtues; for it would have banished all vices, but would no longer have betrothed all virtues to the soul. But if it appears in our disputation that all virtues are placed within the Law and the Prophets, is it not necessary to admire and embrace the law of God? For since there are four virtues—prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice—all these virtues are seen to be in the law. For this reason, he who wishes to be temperate has the disciplines in the law; he who is eager to be prudent, having taken the resources of the law, will excel in the deed; he who wishes to be valiant, let him be anointed by its precepts; he who is earnest to grasp justice, let him hold the balance of justice, and he will commit no inequality, doing all things by the plumb line of justice; and he who has become a partaker of prudence, let him say: "The Lord taught me wisdom, and human prudence is not in me," so that, having cast out and repudiated this feigned and straying prudence, he may embrace the best and divine one. ^C But he who seeks by reading will find infinite examples of chastity, fashioning and receiving for himself the ancient examples as a salve of chastity: that young man in the very flower of his age, who was sold by his brothers and bought by the Egyptian; who changed his bodily liberty, but preserved the liberty of his soul immutable; who put off his cloak, lest he should be stripped of chastity; from whom force indeed took away the cloak, but necessity did not snatch away his chastity; who preferred to be afflicted rather than to fall into the custom of pleasure; who preferred to be in chains rather than to be captured by pleasure; ^D who preferred [to suffer] envy [or: to be thought evil] rather than a shameful action; who wished to be thought that which he was not, for he judged it better to be considered shameful than to be [actually] so.

For if he were such and lay hidden, he feared God as a witness; but if he were held to be such, he was content with the deed itself being witnessed by the inspector. And let this be an example of chastity. ^A

There are indeed many other examples of fortitude, but for the present, that of Judith is sufficient, who was a little woman, and was weak, and was not bold, because she was a little woman. Yet she was bold and brave, because she was faithful; because she yielded to fortitude those things that in the expectations of men were impossible;1 because she brought unexpected things to faith and to hope, for fortitude was mingled with faith. For the walls were opened, and the young maiden went out; and she went out with only a maidservant, not trembling at what was suspect in her beauty, not dreading swords, not fearing that she might be in lust, nor that force might be brought to bear upon her chastity; not fearing lest she might suffer some sudden [harm] from the sword. ^B But she conquered the fearful [nature] of the sword with fortitude, while committing her beauty to God; for she considered God to be a guardian of beauty worthy to be trusted; and she considered the swords to be mere brushwood and papyrus, having trampled down cowardice with the spirit of fortitude; and the woman passed through, and what she dared was not judged to be reckless. Nor did it suffer the accusation of harshness: for neither were the things determined upon incomplete, such that it might be accused of harshness; she carried out what she had planned; the things that had been considered were brought to an end. For this reason she is in admiration, because she mingled prudence with fortitude; because she brought every plan that was begun to an exit. ^C

Having taken this example of fortitude, let us also take one of justice. When Abraham, avenging those who had been treated unjustly, fought for them, and after help had been brought, heard from those who had been liberated: "Take the horses [or cavalry] and all [the spoils] for yourself"; while hearing these things, he did not look toward profit, but attended to justice; seeing how, as one conscious that he had received it freely, he ought not to sell a gift: because grace does not suffer itself to be sold; since they are unjust who sell gifts; and it is not just for someone to sell things that are for sale and benefits together. Let a garment or a precious object be sold in the market; but let a benefit remain unsold, to be given of free will by a great-minded spirit to the one in need. We have such an example, that gifts and benefits ought not to be sold for much money, but to preserve the honor of each, and not to be corrupted beforehand by the giving of money. ^D

CAP. XI. Concordance of the Law and the Gospel.

And having pursued these matters thus far, we have proven that both exist in the Law: both the rooting out of vice, and the office and exercise of virtue; and that these things are indeed sufficient so that these men might blush. We render something similar in the Gospel and the Law. For if the Gospel existed, and the Law existed, and the Law had nothing equal to the Gospel, dissimilarity would be given as a crime. But if there is a similarity, why do we differ concerning the similarity, since the similarity does not suffer itself to be differed from? The [Scripture] cries out...

stylus proclaims their kinship: similarity signifies brotherhood. The Law and the Gospels lead the mind to one cause of all other things, but to the Father of the Savior. The Law said: "Hear, O Israel: The Lord your God is one Lord." ^A The Gospel said: "No one is good except God alone." The Apostle Paul cried out: "One God, from whom are all things." Thus, the unbegotten One, without Father, is known from the Law, the Savior, and the Apostle. Yet He who was begotten from the bosom is the Son of Him who begat Him. Again, the Scriptures agree on this. The Law says: "From the womb, before the morning star, I have begotten you." The Gospel says: "The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him." The Gospel speaks of the bosom, the Law of the womb; the legitimate Son, similar to Him who begat Him, is announced through both the womb and the bosom. Indeed, the voice of the Lord bears witness: "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." ^B David also testifies in the Psalm: "You are my Son; today I have begotten you." One voice was sent forth then and now, and it is the One who spoke, who indeed spoke then and now converses with us; He who spoke then does not change. For He who finally sent forth this voice in the latter days is found to have foretold it long before in the Psalms. A proclamation was indeed made to the holy angels to serve the Son and to offer Him the religion of veneration and adoration; for it is written: "And let all the angels of God worship him." Paul has confirmed this proclamation, or rather he revisits it and interprets it; he strives to be the interpreter of that which was said and written before. For when He introduces the firstborn into the world, He says: "And let all the angels of God worship him." ^C You shall see that the Apostle strove to interpret the old things and did not neglect the explanation of the Law. For at one time he says: "He has put all things under his feet," and immediately he explains, saying: "But when he says that all things are put under him, it is manifest that he is excepted who put all things under him; he left nothing not subjected to him, that God may be all in all." And at another time he says: "For this cause a man shall leave his father and mother; this mystery is great, but I speak concerning Christ and the Church."

Chapter XII. Interpreters of the old Law, and apostles.

And the apostles are indeed the interpreters of the old Law, and the old things are in harmony with the new. ^D But those who are not apostles accuse the old things; and since they do not do what the apostles do, but rather fight against what was written by them, they falsely claim the apostleship and have become false prophets. For the explainers of the truth, who have honored the Law, are the same ones who have expounded the Law: these...

however, who have defamed the Law, strike against the Law and against those who have expounded the Law. And the apostles acknowledge an equal similarity between the Gospel and the Law; for when they take up the Law, they look toward the Gospel, and when they look toward the Gospel, they do not abolish the Law. But these men, always deeming similar things to be dissimilar, and professing that things friendly and brotherly to each other are hostile and opposed, do not escape the proof of their own malice; indeed, while they are eager to disjoint and divide things that are similar, they are unable to do so. Since the Law cannot be divided from the Gospel, they have reaped the fruit of their own envy, which is condemnation. For whatever is written in the Law concerning the Father, this also exists in the Gospels; whatever is said concerning the Son, this is spoken of in both; and whatever we shall be able to find concerning the Holy Spirit, this also we shall find in both. For neither Scripture fails to make mention of the Holy Spirit; rather, in the Gospel there is the gift, whereas there is the petition elsewhere. And sometimes David says: "Take not thy Holy Spirit from me," and sometimes the Gospel says: "Receive the Holy Spirit," so that he who possesses it may not have it taken away, and he who grants it, may have it when he has received it. And souls are honored by the companionship of the Holy Spirit, neither being torn away from that companionship nor continuing without that companionship. ^B And anyone will be able, by working through the similarity of the Law and the Gospel regarding angels, archangels, and the other powers, and regarding man (61), and the earth, and the other created things, to perceive it, and thus by tracking it out, to arrive even at the smallest detail. We, however, declining such a great mass, and using only the principle, and challenging those who are fond of learning to take up the line of argument and proceed to all the theorems, shall add to this book only that which the heretics censure with a certain rebuke, so that we may dissolve their accusation and perceive the dispositions of the Law. For if they, reading what they object to against the Scripture, have used their mouths for abuse, we shall refute their madness by [showing] the similarity; and we shall not hesitate to set forth that which they object to in their charge. ^C

CAP. XIII. The harshness of the Law is defended.

They accuse the ancient Law as being harsh and cruel; they accuse, moreover, the ancient ministers as being somewhat austere and falling more toward rebuke, and as being foreign to the affection of mercy, not understanding what is written: "I will sing of mercy and judgment to thee, O Lord"; nor knowing that the perfection of the economy depends upon both mercy and retribution. And for this reason, being dim-sighted, they are silent about the mercies of the Law; rather, they remember the rebukes, and they shout up and down: "Do you not see," it is said, "that

small children mocked Elisha; yet Elisha cursed them, and delivered the children to ^A two bears to be devoured? Do you not see, he says, that when certain soldiers were sent by the king to summon Elijah against his will, he refused to go with them, threw fire, and consumed the men, saying: *If I am a man of God, let fire come down from heaven, and it shall devour you and your fifty*? And since they place such accusations and such rebukes in the order of wickedness and malice, what will they say regarding Paul, who, when he once saw Bar-Jesus the sorcerer, who was with Sergius Paulus the proconsul, arguing and with clever machination of speech perverting the mind of those who had learned the truth, did not permit it, rebuked him, punished him, deprived him of his eyes, and cried out: *O full of deceit and all fraud, you son of the devil, will you not cease to pervert the straight ways of the Lord? And now, behold, ^B the hand of the Lord is upon you, and you shall be blind, not seeing the sun for a time*?

CAP. XIV. God spares in the Old and in the New Testament.

What will they say concerning Peter, when Ananias and Sapphira, having sold a small piece of property, kept back part of the price and brought a part; that he judged and convicted them, showed Ananias dead, and delivered Sapphira to the same tomb? For they lay dead, slain by a word. There, fire was brought and consumed those who had set out to Elijah; here, a word sent forth in the sight of the disciples caused those who had trafficked in the faith to die. There, Elisha gave the bodies of children to beasts; ^C here, Paul took away the sight of the eyes, and made him who was seeing blind; and those who did such things imposed punishments. If, therefore, punishment and vengeance are counted among evils, Paul and Peter are evil; but if they are good because they are apostles, they are good because they exacted punishments. Why do you accuse punishments, and that too when the apostles used the infliction of punishments? But if we approve of the apostles, yet disapprove of the punishments, the laws do not decree or judge regarding facts according to the person; they do not dispute against persons, but they assent to the similarity of the deeds.

CAP. XV. The Gospel, full of mercy. The Law, a shadow of things to come.

But again they say: The Son is merciful; he who wrote the Gospels is merciful; and he who is merciful is the offspring of the merciful. But the Law is hard and harsh, not sparing those who have transgressed; ^D the Gospel, however, contains mercy, inasmuch as it restrains offenses, but proclaims repentance. Behold, they say, Peter denied, and the Savior spared him, and he overlooks him who had committed such a grave sin, and subjected his threats to clemency, so that he might be to all through

throughout his whole life, so that he might present him as an image of his own philanthropy. What, then, of the Law? Does it lack the power of imitation, and does it not have an equal and corresponding image? And while Peter, being a man of zeal, ^A fell, he was honored with pardon and forgiveness; but in the Law, no one who has sinned, even if he has sinned greatly, has secured pardon for himself through repentance. For if they are ignorant, we shall recite what is written: *Have mercy on me, O God, according to your great mercy; and according to the multitude of your mercies blot out my iniquity; wash me thoroughly from my iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin. Against you only have I sinned, and done this evil before you* (Ps. L, 3-6). But if they know this, they keep silent out of malice.

Things are therefore related and the images are similar; ^B here is Peter, and there is the sacred psalmist; so that the falls of great men may be healed by great forgivenesses, and that to those who have sinned greatly, a great mercy should also be granted. If, therefore, they marvel at the Gospels because Peter received mercy, let them also marvel that David has also received mercy. But if they complain that after such great things David was not pardoned, neither will Peter escape the charge on their account; and the accusation will seem to be made against David alone, but in reality, Peter will also be accused by the same indictment. But if they should say that while forgiveness is good, the forgiveness of the old Law reached only to one person, whereas in the Gospel there is a multitude of forgiveness and a sea of pardon, and the voice is crying out: *Come to me, all you who labor and are heavy burdened, and I will give you rest* (Matt. XI, 28) — let them read the old [testament], and let them feel wonder at the things that have been written.

If, because of a lack of practice, they cannot bear to encounter the scriptures, let them be freed from this cause here as well. The Savior says: *Come, all you who labor and are heavy burdened, and I will give you rest*; he omitted no one, left no one behind, but embraced everyone. ^C And the sacred psalmist says: *O all you nations, clap your hands* (Ps. XLVII, 2); and again: *Hear these things, all you nations, all you that dwell in the world, both earthborn and sons of men, both rich and poor together* (Ps. XLIX, 1-2). All have been moved by the Gospel, all have been moved by the Law; the Gospel has left no one behind; the Law has omitted no one. The Gospel cried out: *Repent, for the kingdom of heaven has drawn near* (Matt. III, 2). It directed this discourse to everyone. It spoke to those who were stumbling; it conversed with those who had fallen; it spoke to those already liable to death; it betrothed liberty through its preaching.

Jonah also set out for Nineveh, a city not small, in a nation with a large population. He showed the threat; he did not keep silent about the penalty; he cried out ^D with a stinging word. He saw the men; he led them to a change of heart; he brought it about that they rejected their sin. The previously announced penalty departed; mercy followed in its place; the thing sought

^A came to pass; for it was not the destruction of men that was sought, but the change of their ways that was investigated. And since what was sought came to pass, and the men were changed, the gift of the lover of mankind appeared. The Judge, taking up their defense, cried out; he said to his servant: "If you had pity on the gourd, for which you did not labor, which came up in a night and perished in a night; should I not pity Nineveh, the great city, in which dwell more than one hundred and twenty thousand persons and much cattle?" God was full of pity, and he who spoke was manifest; he who now said these things, and who in another prophet cried out, saying: "I do not desire the death of the sinner, but rather that he should turn and live." He who is hymned by those who know how to sing his praises is called merciful and compassionate, long-suffering and of great mercy; for so vast an ocean of mercies is with God that he does not leave unhonored even the smallest and briefest inclination of the most flagitious ^B toward repentance. For Ahab had proceeded almost to the limit of wickedness, and when he was even a little pricked in conscience, God honored him, showed the matter to his minister, checked and held back the threats, protracting in the meantime the time of punishment. "Do you see," he says, "how Ahab has been pricked in conscience? I will not bring the evils in his days, but in other days," so that God might honor even the smallest drop of repentance with fitting honor.

But let this suffice for now, lest the discussion concerning the law be passed over entirely without being treated and examined. We shall add only this, that the law was a shadow of the good things to come; indeed, a tutor assists a child and the age of childhood until the master, having received him in a more mature state, entrusts him to greater disciplines. For it will be possible for one, having ^C laid this principle as a foundation, to confirm all the more conveniently and aptly how the law was given through Moses, but grace and truth came through Christ.

CAP. XVI. Creation by the devil according to the Manichæans.

We, however, shall touch upon other arguments ^D of this abortion, proposing his other opinion that is dissonant and absurd in the Scriptures; so that, having examined and unfolded it as much as possible, we may be able to rescue minds ensnared by his foolish opinion. For he has extended himself even to the creation of the world; and he desires that this visible creation be created by the devil; and that man be formed by the devil; and that the soul indeed is from God, yet is adjusted to the body by the devil; and that man was made, having received the substance of the body from the substance of the devil, but having received the substance of the soul from God as spoil and booty; so that the soul was indeed taken from God, but the devil drew the spoil from God; and thus man was fabricated from the substance of the devil and from the spoil snatched from God, of soul and body.

^A And that the evil one is not the cause of the soul, nor has he made the substance of the soul, but is only the effective cause of its descent into the body; for having despoiled it, as they say, he forced it into the flesh; but the flesh itself, and the fashioning itself, and the character, and such a form, and the whole substance, are the work and fabrication of the deceiver. Confessing, then, that man was made from contraries, they do not even know the logic of contraries; nor that there are certain contraries which among them [i.e., in their categories] are unmixed, and cannot admit any mixing or communion with each other, but by the supposed communion are causes of their own destruction, being unable to be together; but the one is destroyed due to the prevailing of the other.

Chap. XVII. The body is not from the devil, and the soul from God.

^B For behold, in one little room, day and night could not be found; because light, once found, immediately destroys the darkness. Behold, in one soul, chastity and fornication could not appear; because chastity alone, if it has appeared, causes fornication to get out of the way. Behold, piety and impiety could not exist in one man; for where piety appears, not even a drop of impiety would appear. And the Apostle also judges, and seals what has been said: "What communion has light with darkness? And what concord has Christ with Belial?" (II Cor. vi, 14, 15). For things that are contrary to themselves cannot be friendly to themselves; and things that are separated from their own order could not produce one harmony; for neither from rhythm and non-rhythm is one harmony produced, nor from silence and speech is one composition formed; for it is necessary for only one to exist, since the other cannot bear to exist. If then the body were of the evil one, and the soul of God, how is it assigned to the one harmony of man? ^C How to one disposition and friendship? For behold, it is joined, and has become one man; and by harmony he is one. Behold, the soul is of the body, and loves and cherishes it: "For no man ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it" (Ephes. v, 19). But if the one has a care for the other, and the soul considers the pain of the body as its own pain; and is not divided from the affections, but attaches itself to the wounds, attaches itself to the affections; and when the body suffers on account of wounds, the soul is in sadness and trouble, being unable to be without pain. But when it perceives pleasure, and is tickled by pleasure, the soul also participates in the motions, and is at the same time touched by the irritations; and it ceases likewise, and receives an increase likewise. And when the soul ceases ^D from the motions of the passions, the body also ceases and grows quiet; but when the desire in the soul is rubbed, and the irritations are rubbed, it sweetens and inflames the body; and the irritations perhaps, and perhaps also the removals and cessations of the irritations, come about. But if he were from contraries, and the body indeed were of the evil one, but the soul of God; first of all, he would not have become a composite, nor would that total mixture have been accomplished; second

although one might be received by the other, yet each would have considered what was its own to be peculiar and private, and what belonged to the other, alien; and neither would the pleasure of the body have become the pleasure of the soul, nor the wounds of the body the pains of the soul; but each would have distributed to itself, by itself, both its pleasure and its wounds. How, then, was the devil able to take from thence what was not his own? And how is the soul, not being of him, but of another, and having no mixture with this region, but being of another substance and one altogether alienated from the substance of the evil one, in things alien and foreign? And why does it endure the mixture of the body of the devil as a bond of the evil one, and is bound ^B in what is not its own? And how does it regard the flesh as its own, and make it holy, and prepare it for virtue, so that, as far as possible, it might become like to God? For when the body is chaste and undefiled and unspotted, when it is holy and venerable, when it possesses holy speech, when it has righteous glances, when it possesses divine movements: what is this other than to become like to the Better One? And it is fashioned after the Good, and bears the character of the Superior One. And let these things be said thus far.

CAP. XVIII. Testimonies of Scripture concerning the creation of the body and soul by God.

^C Let us also bring forward a few things from the Scriptures, so that the presentation of the Scriptures may both bring them to shame and procure for us greater accuracy of faith. For the Savior, when in the Gospel He makes mention of the formation of man and woman, referring the formation to His own Father and the Creator of the universe, said: “He who made them from the beginning made them male and female; and said: For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the two shall be one flesh. So what God hath joined, let no man put asunder.” He knew whose the body was and whose the soul was, by confessing the Author of both, and by confessing the Father; and He restrains and holds back human reasonings, desiring that what has been made cannot be sundered, and not allowing that by any human opinion or will it be permitted to separate what has been well joined. But in the Gospel, to those who falsely appeared to be held by the same zeal and care, yet neglected the hidden things and the care of the inner man, He said: “Fools, did not He who made what is on the outside make also what is on the inside?” If, then, what is inside ^D is the soul, and what is outside is the body, and He who made what is inside made the soul, and He who made what is outside made the body, then He who is the Author and Maker of the soul is also the Author and Maker of the body; and God is He who makes both, and fits them together, and joins them, He who has established this most holy harmony. But the Savior Himself, what care He bestows upon the body in His own discourses, when He says: “There are eunuchs, who have eun…

eunuchized themselves for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. He who is able to accept it, let him accept it.” ^A For by rendering this care to the body, and making it holy and impassible and free from pleasure, and by cutting off and subduing every desire to the Word, He demonstrates His care for the body and signifies His providence toward the flesh. And being concerned and mindful, He proclaims the propriety of this providence even as far as the glance of the eye; so that the gaze, not being moved at random, might not be filled with defilement and stain, but rather continue having a controlled movement, harmonized. For He says in the Gospel: “Everyone who looks at a woman to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart.” And He measures the passion in the body with the heart, and taking care of the glance, He makes the care of the heart a common concern; suggesting that the passion of the glance is the passion of the heart, and positing the care of the eyes as the care of the intellect. For the eye will not be harmed in any other way than the mind is harmed; for it is not possible for the eye to be perverted while the soul is not perverted; for if the soul is in equity and sees rightly, the eyes will see fittingly and appropriately. ^B

Chapter XIX. It is Shown that Christ Had a Body.

Here, then, rejecting the base look, He introduces the holy one; so that the eyes may look straight, and the eyelids may look upon just things. For He lifts up the eyes, not allowing them to be bent downward, but causing them to stand upright and awakening them, and making them uplifted. Therefore, taking great care of bodies, He both bore a body and came into a body. If, then, He did not come in a body, what will they say regarding the cross, and the imprint of the nails, and the wound of the lance, and the monument, and the burial? But if, being convicted by these things, they confess that the Savior took a body, what will they say, if they are not to say that He Himself was also fashioned by the wicked one, and that not only the human body is the body of the wicked one, but also the body of our benefactor? They will not refrain or hold themselves back from proceeding even to this thought, and stretching out their tongue against the Savior. For he who practices disputing against those things which pertain to Him, this one, having sharpened his tongue, will dispute against Him. ^C But the Savior was even washed by baptism in the Jordan; He was sprinkled with waters; who was He, and what was He? For if He were not bearing a body and did not have a body, what is common between spirits and rivers? Which of the angels, what virtue, what dominion, what principality, what power has descended into the bath and had experience of waters? But if neither virtue nor power nor throne has descended into the waters, the matter has become beyond question and clear; and that which was sought has become manifest. But He ascended from the waters; He was tempted by the devil; He hungered, He thirsted, He sailed, He slept, He traveled, He grew weary, He walked; hungering, He came to the fig tree; lastly, He was judged, He was crucified. Who

^A proclaimed these things? Who testified to these things? Let tongues be silent; let actions speak. Things have a mouth; no longer let us beat the air and emit sound. The written words have a mouth; and even if we are silent, things are not silent; and even if we do not speak, the [divine] scriptures cannot fail to speak.

Since, therefore, these things are so, and actions have credibility, and the narrative of the actions is true, and the actions themselves cry out by their own power that the Savior possessed a body, and a mortal body, and that He bore a body for the sake of ours—it follows that one must seek what is similar. The Creator of that body, and the Creator of our own, has come for our sake. For if it were something else, He would not have taken thought for other bodies; but if it was made by God, and made for our sake, then it was made for His own, in order that, by saving His own [creation], He might ensure the freedom of all His own through the creation of that body. Thanks, therefore, to Him who made our bodies, to Him who took thought for them and for their sloth, and who sent His own Son in a body, and gave a pledge to our bodies, ^B so that we might no longer be bowed down and look upon the earth, but might be raised up and stand erect through the fellowship of bodies.

Cap. XX. Conclusion.

We must also give heed, in this regard, to those deceivers, because they have made incursions against bodies, and have advanced against the body of the Creator, and have stretched out their tongue against the economy and dispensation of God; and they have not hesitated to speak against our freedom for the use and exercise of their tongue—they being certain vagabonds and charlatans, having collected a heap of words of wickedness. For it is one thing to blame one part, but [another] not to pursue everything in sequence and consider everything useless and alien. Therefore, we too, having descended so far into all their discourses—lest we lend too great a length to the book—let us end with these things said so far, having produced an indication of the others from a few examples, and a refutation of them completed from the things said before. There is need, however, for diligence on the part of the studious, that they might pass beyond all jugglery ^C and keep their ears untouched by wickedness; that they might be the gatekeepers of their own ears, part of the time opening them when the true Word knocks, and part of the time closing them when the false and deceitful one, feigning truth, labors to break into the chamber of the mind. For many, feigned and disguised, knock at the ears, saying: "I am Christ," and they will deceive many. But there is only one Christ, the liberator, the commander of victory, the benefactor, who knocks with a [true] disposition, who provides freedom at the very entrance, who as soon as He enters drives out sins, who at the entrance bestows friendship with the Father, who immediately upon entering sets up trophies within the soul. ^D

SUPPLEMENTS AGAINST THE MANICHAEANS

OF TITUS, BISHOP OF BOSTRA, AGAINST THE MANICHAEANS.

Argument of the first book.

Argument of the second book.

Argument of the third book.

Argument of the fourth book.

SUPPLEMENTA

1. From St. John of Damascus's Sacred Parallels, Works, Vol. II, p. 763, Paris edition, 1712.

Of St. Titus, Bishop of Bostra, from book I against the Manichaeans.

^D “How then,” you say, “shall the body be raised, if flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God? There is, therefore,” they say, “no resurrection of the dead.” They do not turn their mind to those things which were abundantly stated above, but, like certain ones persevering in the most wicked of affairs, they attempt to drag that which is pleasing to themselves into the surmise of their own...

^A monstrous impiety, and not that which is just. For the Apostle says that flesh subject to passions does not rise again, nor does a dense body live again with its infirmities. Therefore he subjoins a clear interpretation of the difficulty: *Behold, I tell you a mystery: we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed* (I Cor. xv, 51); so that we who are to be saved shall undergo a change, our bodies being gifted with a better state and condition. And the body which by that change is given to us shall indeed be a body, but no longer flesh and blood entangled in infirmity. For if something is a body, it does not follow that it is entirely flesh. For the sun, indeed, and the moon, and all the celestial chorus are bodies in every sense, but in no way flesh. Such a form, then, shall the body which rises again possess, so that the souls of the saints will henceforth dwell with a body that ^B no longer needs carnal food, nor falls into pleasures, or annoyances, or pains, but—being in deep agreement with the soul—never ceases to offer up divine worship, since its struggles are finished and the soul has withdrawn into its rest by the decree of God. Moreover, he opens up and elucidates this whole matter and explains the manner of the resurrection by saying: *For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality* (ibid. 53). That statement of his would be true: *Corruption does not inherit incorruption* (ibid. 50). For if anyone were to say that the flesh, rising again together with the passions inherent in it, would live such a life that it would suffer and act *together with* the soul, he would find himself devoid of hope. But if it receives a change into a better and blessed state—which he signifies demonstratively by saying: *For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on ^C immortality*—then the recompense is just, for it is the instrument that shared in the soul's labors, and it is no longer detrimental or painful to it. Rather, in that blessed life, the souls of those who are to be saved must possess the body that is natural to them, yet not a body that is heavy and earthy and full of carnal cupidity, as it was in the beginning when indeed it was necessary that they be tested by it in the struggle of virtue. For it would be unjust if the body which shared the soul's labors in the functions of this life were not endowed with the repayment of its rewards.

II.

Of the Holy Titus, Bishop of Bostra, from his Book II Against the Manichaeans.

We must say, therefore, that man was brought into life by the Creator of all things so that he might trade in nothing else but piety and virtue. For ^D this man was brought into life to trade in nothing other than piety and virtue. These...

^A having gained, he would cross through this life well; but having neglected these, he would unhappily be submerged, wandering astray.

III. *Ibid.*, p. 788.

Saint Titus, from the book On Providence, from the book Against the Manichaeans.

(68) Besides all those things which are accustomed to be given by God in common to all men, if there were no obstacle ^B ever occurring, men would have wished their provision to be by the impulse of some immutable nature, and ^B would not, in receiving these things, have offered thanks to God, nor would they have asked for them, having them. They are deprived therefore at times for a little while, so that they might ask; and they receive them again, so that they might offer thanks to the Provider, knowing that He himself is the one providing, and that no other nature exists besides God—indiscriminate and without regret—which provides. For God wishes thanks to be offered to Him, so that men might become more worthy of receiving from Him, not that He might derive any benefit for Himself. For He wishes them to ask for good things, so that, upon receiving them, they might have a perception of the Provider. For He indeed rejoices in giving what is His own, but He rejoices more in giving to the worthy; as if His kindness were in a way dishonored, if it were not bestowed upon those who are sensitive to it.

IV. *Ibid.*, p. 783.

Saint Titus, from the book On Providence, from the book Against the Manichaeans.

(69) It was not fitting, it seems, for the proofs of God’s ^C counsel to be manifest to everyone, nor for that ineffable and incomprehensible mind to be entirely known to men; ^D seeing that even of a human king and ruler, most of his plans remain hidden, so that it is unclear what is being done, and for what reason it is done. It is not surprising, therefore, if men do not grasp the reason for the governance of God, to whom it is fitting, setting aside curiosity, to yield and to remain silent, and by no means to rise up against the ineffable administration. For often, we do not even presume to investigate the craftsman—whether one experienced in building, or shipbuilding, or metalworking—while he is doing his own work; but having faith in his experience, we wait to see the work. And there are times when we do not even notice him erring. What, then, could I say about the wisdom of God, which surpasses every mind? Which it is right, whether we understand it or not, to stand in awe of and to honor. But if someone, on account of not grasping the reason for most of the things that come to pass from God, should fall into an absurdity regarding the glory of God, (70) most wretched, and again...

...a fool is such a one, as he uses the very blindness of his own understanding as a guide. ^A

V. Ibid. page 785. *Of Saint Titus, Bishop of Bostra, from the fourth book Against the Manichaeans.*

Faith in God is the knowledge of God, which, having been begotten from the visible creation and thoughts of natural things, with goodwill and love toward Him, is most pleasing to God through the knowledge of virtue and vice. ^B

OF TITUS, BISHOP OF BOSTRA: AN ORATION ON PALM SUNDAY

I. As an immense abyss brings forth an abundance of springs of waters, and those springs make flow the rivers that run with a constant current, which, by going about the earth, irrigate it, so that the earth, being irrigated by them, may bring forth bread for food and wine for the joy of men; and as those who have obtained such provisions fulfill the Scripture: *The poor shall eat and be filled, and they shall praise the Lord who seek him* (Ps. XXI, 27); so also the ineffable kindness of our Lord Jesus Christ, from the immense abyss of His goodness and kindness, flows forth as the veins of a fountain for us, into the holy solemnities in which He wrought our salvation. But the grace of the Holy Spirit, being effective in these solemnities, fulfills the *impetus of the river* (Ps. XLV, 5): namely, the God-bearing men who possess doctrine in teaching (Rom. XII, 7); who, traversing the spiritual and rational earth of the human race, gladdens the holy Church, that city of the great King Jesus Christ, according to what is written: *The impetus of the river makes glad the city of God* (Ps. XLV, 5). The Church, therefore, being gladdened and delighted by the fatness of the heart (Isa. LV, 2), praises and glorifies the Lord who reigns within her. Come, then, let us also proclaim today what He Himself foretold concerning Himself through His holy prophets; let us search out, according to our ability, that salvation which our King has wrought for us on this festive light. Come, let us inquire for whose sake not only men, but also the angelic virtues, praised Him as King. ^D

II. The cause, therefore, of such a hymn was, as it appeared, the raising of Lazarus, just as the Gospel says: *But the Jews took counsel that they might kill Lazarus also, because many on his account were going away*

^A from the Jews, and were believing in Jesus. And this is the manifest reason for the praises of the faithful: but the hidden and more profound reason is the resurrection of the whole nature of mankind. And just as the sign of Lazarus and that raising moved the spirits of men to celebrate the Lord with hymns, so too did the sign of the raising of the whole human race move the holy angels to praise. And as much as the resurrection of all of mankind excels the raising of one Lazarus, by that much more will the glory and praise of that time exceed it. Now the conscience of the men who were crying out, stirred by the miracle, moved them to praise; but Divine Providence, not content with men, was covertly inciting even the angels to wonder at Jesus because of the future resurrection of the whole of nature. For they ^B saw, they truly saw, and learned, and were made wise—those heavenly powers—in a wisdom they had not known, which was being manifested through the Church of the faithful from God who created all things, which had been hidden in Him before the ages; I mean the teachings, and promises, and miracles of the Lord Jesus, just as the wondrous Paul says somewhere: *That the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known through the Church to the principalities and authorities.* For the powers above learn what they have not yet seen or heard. For they are creatures; and there is no creature that does not have need to learn. Nor do they know the things that are about to come to pass, except as they are taught by the holy and adorable Trinity. They learned, therefore, and were confirmed in the resurrection of Adam, observing God raising the widow’s son. For the earth became as a widow when its first-fashioned son died. And seeing Him raise the daughter of the synagogue-leader again, they were made wise, that ^C He will also raise Eve with Adam. Then, having raised the boy of the alien centurion, He taught even this, that He would raise the gentile nations also. Behold, three differences among the dead. But by raising Lazarus, the fourth dead man, and on the fourth day from the tomb, him who was being pulled apart by the four elements, who was stinking, who was rotten, who was mastered by worms, it was made known to the principalities and the celestial powers and to men on earth that God would eventually raise the whole humanity composed of four elements, even ^D if it stank in the sin of the transgression; even if it had rotted in the impiety of idolatry; even if, as if by worms, it was mastered by demons and held captive to their own will. Seeing these things, therefore—the angels in a hidden way, and men openly—they were amazed, they were struck with wonder, and began to cry out and say: *Hosanna in the highest.* And they praised Him not only as a sign-bearer, but also as King, because He had taken captive all of the age-old dominion of the devil

^A and the captivity that death had held subject. For these and similar reasons, the divine prophets proclaim Him King.

III. Furthermore, because the aforementioned prophets are the hosts of rational souls, and just as the months of the year nourish the human body in parts, so too do these nourish us in parts, or rather, they nourish the souls of the faithful commonly according to the feast, or even at all times, and they inebriate Christians with divine doctrines, according to what one of them says: *They shall be inebriated with the abundance of your house.* Come, let us listen, and all who love the kingdom of God shall tell us what the great Zechariah, that glorious one among the prophets, prophesies concerning it. Let us understand what the herald of good news brings, running ahead of the kingdom by many ages. Come, and as rational guests, let us enjoy the words proceeding from the mouth of God, through the spiritual host Zechariah; for it fell to him to nourish us at this feast with his banquets, just as the Lord says: *Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth from the mouth of God.* For since men hate sadness but love joy, he begins with joy, crying out and saying: *Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Sion.* ^B *Rejoice greatly,* the prophet cries out to the captivity. *O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God!* Why rejoice? And why greatly delight and rejoice? Because He who converts you has come, just as the Father of the King who converts you once predicted, saying: *When the Lord turned again the captivity of Sion, we became as comforted: then was our mouth filled with joy, and our tongue with exultation.* Rejoice, he says, because you have been returned from the captivity of the demons and from the power of this age to that heavenly Jerusalem which your father Abraham awaited, as the blessed Paul says in a certain place: *But you have approached Mount Sion, and the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels, and to the church of the firstborn who are written in heaven, and to God the Judge of all, and to the spirits of just men made perfect.* Hence pain, sadness, and sighing flee away, where the dwelling of all the joyful just is. Then delight and be glad and rejoice ^C greatly, O daughter—of this Sion, obviously. But why, he says, shall I rejoice greatly, O prophet? Rejoice, because you are no longer to be delivered up to those pains; and "greatly," because your liberator is not like other kings, but is an eternal King, and His kingdom is eternal, just as the angel Gabriel said to His mother and the virgin Mary: *And of His kingdom there shall be no end.* And just as His kingdom is eternal, so your salvation shall be eternal. For this reason, then, *Rejoice greatly*; proclaim it, O daughter of Sion. What shall I proclaim, O prophet? Proclaim

to your King, who has come down from the heights of heaven to save you, thanksgiving, glorification, and songs of praise. Proclaim ^A *Hosanna in the highest*, from whence He has come to save you: *Blessed is He who comes in the name of the Lord*.

And mark for me the evangelist, how he proclaims a twofold Christ. For in saying, *Hosanna in the highest*, he signifies the sublime nature of the Divinity; but in saying, *Blessed is He who comes in the name of the Lord*, he points to the substance of His humanity: I mean that blessed seed, which the blessed Abraham received in blessing, that *in his seed might all the nations of the earth* be blessed. *Blessed*, he says, *is the coming kingdom of our father David*.

IV. Let us resume the former voice, and as it were press the prophetic breasts; for they still have milk. For he says: *Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Sion; proclaim, O daughter of Jerusalem*. And why *daughter of Sion*, and not Sion? And *daughter of Jerusalem*, and not Jerusalem? Heed this wisely, I beseech you. For just as the names of plants, and birds, and four-footed animals, and men, differ according to the difference of their form and power, and thus have received different ^B names, so indeed each iota of the divine utterances possesses its own power and spiritual sense. Let us inquire, then, why the prophet first calls the faithful Jerusalem "daughter of Sion"; and subsequently, "daughter of Jerusalem." For he says: *Rejoice greatly, daughter of Sion; proclaim, daughter of Jerusalem*. Sion is interpreted as "thirsting." Now this is the congregation of the just and the prophets, who existed from the beginning of the world until the coming of Christ; who thirsted to be united with and to be pleasing to the divine and adorable substance of the Divinity, just as the chief of the apostles, Peter, says: *That they might become partakers of the divine nature*. These, I say, seeking and thirsting for Christ, were called Sion, just as one of them said: *My soul thirsted for the strong, living God*. But when they obtained, and drew near, or rather, beheld and gazed upon His face—for so another version has it—they became Jerusalem, "seeing God," and the watchtower of all knowledge.

^C He calls the daughter of this Sion those who thirst through faith, and who, by the performance of the Gospel commandments, seek to find the Lord hidden within them, as the Holy Spirit says: *This is the generation of those who seek the Lord, seeking the face of the God of Jacob*. And when they have succeeded, they are called daughters of the aforementioned Jerusalem, as they behold God and contemplate spiritual knowledge. And the prophet, beseeching God in the Spirit to reveal such a Sion and Jerusalem, says: *Be mindful of your congregation, which you have possessed from the beginning*. Therefore, with your mother, you, O Sion, *Rejoice greatly, O daughter of* the heavenly *Jerusalem*; cry out with that mother of yours: *Hosanna in*

the highest; blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord.* ^A

V. But what does the Gospel say: *And when they drew near to Jerusalem, and were come to Bethphage?* For in order that the faithful might eat Him (the Passover), He came toward the Mount of Olives (which is the faithful Church from among the people) to the upper room. Then the Lord sent two of His disciples; these are the two choirs of the prophets and the apostles. For when the apostles were teaching the nations, they had with them the God-inspired oracles of the prophets, bearing witness to Christ, in the way that Ezekiel, the great one among the prophets, saw them: A wheel, he says, within a wheel, flying and running. ^B Jesus saying to them: *Go into the village that is opposite you;* He sent them into the whole world of the nations, for they were hitherto contrary to the faithful Church of the Jewish people. For at an opportune time He sent them into the village of the nations that was opposite, for it was prepared to receive the aforementioned two choirs of the prophets and the apostles. *And bring the colt to me;* these are the nations, that He might mount and reign over them, as the Psalmist says: *God has reigned over the nations; the Lord sits upon His holy throne,* upon which no man has ever sat. For they had neither God as one mounting and reigning over them, nor Law, nor prophets. *Untie him,* He says, *and bring him to me.* For the apostles untied the nations from darkness—that is, from the ignorance of God, from error, from sin, from the slavery of the alien, from the dominion of darkness, from the prince of this age—and brought them to their Creator and Master, the Lord. ^C And behold, He sits upon them and reigns, just as over the Cherubim, and they cry out saying: *Hosanna in the highest; blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord; peace in heaven, and glory in the highest.* For so says Luke. Why, indeed, does he say, "Peace in heaven"? Did the angels not have peace in heaven? Yes, they certainly had peace in themselves; that peace, indeed, which surpasses all understanding, as the most wise Paul says; they had peace in heaven, but they did not have it with men. Heaven enjoyed peace in itself. But when the angels saw the whole human race being gathered together through the sign of Lazarus, and the nations being released like the colt, and coming to be ruled by their Creator, then heaven also was at peace with men, and they cried out unanimously, saying: *Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord; peace in heaven, and glory in the highest.* ^D And they placed their garments upon the colt; these signify the grace given by Him to them among the nations, and through it they caused Jesus to mount upon them; and not only that, but also through their own virtues, just as the holy Evangelist signifies, saying: *And others were spreading…*

their garments in the way*. By this he hints at their own virtues which they coupled with grace, as the divine Paul clearly says: *Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom also we have access through faith into this grace, wherein we stand, and glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God.* So far, what pertains to grace. *And not only so; but we glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation worketh patience; and patience trial; and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not: because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us.* ^B Now as to the phrase, *they were spreading them in the way*, it was said so that their virtues might be seen openly and in a sensible manner before the nations, just as the Apostle says in another place regarding these things: *The things which you have both learned, and received, and heard, and seen in me, these do ye.* But let us return to our subject.

VI. The crowds that went before and that followed cried out, with praises and branches of olives and palms; which signify the practical working of the outer man: and branches of palms, which signify the spiritual, practical, and contemplative, and pure working of the inner man. They cried out, saying: *Hosanna in the highest.* For in truth, all the crowds of the just and prophets and priests, whom we understand to be those going before and following, cry out in faith, and say: *Hosanna to the son of David: Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord; Hosanna in the highest:* just as the evangelist says: *Now all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, saying: Tell ye the daughter of Sion.* To whom, O prophet, do you say, "Tell"? Behold, you yourself are preaching; behold, you yourself are saying. I, he says, desired to see and hear; and not I only, but many prophets and just men. But I also say to those who are found and discipled, and who see and hear the King of Sion, that they may speak and preach: *Tell ye the daughter of Sion: Behold thy king cometh to thee.* And he did not say simply, "he comes," but *he comes to thee*: that is, to become thine, and to dwell in thee. *Behold thy king cometh to thee, just and salvific.* Salvific, from the slavery of the enemy, to those who believe in him. *Meek, and sitting upon an ass, and a colt the foal of a beast of burden*: that is, humble, and in his humility destroying the chariots of the kingdom of Ephraim; that is, of the devil, who reigned over Israel and over the nations. But he also destroyed, according to the letter, the kingdom of the people of the Jews, and it has ceased. *And the horse from Jerusalem*: that is, all their pride of rule, by his humble colt. Furthermore, Jacob, when he was blessing Judah, and declaring the blessing made to his fathers Abraham and Isaac—which is Christ—said: *Binding his foal to the vine, and his ass, O my son, to the choice vine.* ^{C D}

For he bound all the nations to the vine ^A that was brought out of Egypt, which filled the whole earth with the teaching of its prophets and righteous men. For the foal is unclean under the Law, and so are the nations. *Binding his foal to his vine.* For what purpose? That they might receive from him the Law and the prophets and the knowledge of God in them; that is to say, Christ, who is the blessing and purification of the nations. For he says: *And to the shoot,* and Jacob says to him: *From the shoot, my son, you have grown,*—referring to the foal of his ass. The "shoot" is the growth from the vine, which is Christ, who sprouted from the vine of the synagogue that was brought out of Egypt, just as he himself grew up; and the nations were bound to him indissolubly.

VII. And so, let us too be bound indissolubly to Christ. ^B If we are striving in every way to obtain salvation from his solemnities, he will also raise us up along with Lazarus from our dead works which were done without God. Thus we shall dine with him in Bethany, which is interpreted as "house of obedience." In this way let us fittingly gather our thoughts from the captivity of forgetfulness, along with the senses of the body, crying out and saying: *Hosanna in the highest: Blessed is he that comes in the name of the Lord;* about to enter into his own Jerusalem, not that he may suffer as he did then, but that he may save it, and be glorified by it, ^C just as David calls to it, saying: *Praise the Lord, O Jerusalem; praise your God, O Sion.* He said again: *Praise and praise,* with both soul and body. *For he has strengthened the bars of your gates;* which are faith, hope, love, meditation, long-suffering, and patience. *He has blessed your children within you;* which are the faithful infants who received the Lord with branches, that is to say, with new fruits; the infants, I say, who suck the milk of the teaching of Christ. For believing in him, they immediately give praise, as it is written: *Out of the mouth of infants and sucklings you have perfected praise.* Let us become for him ^D a holy vehicle rather than an unclean foal, so that he may mount upon us. Let us yoke for him the chariot of our thoughts, and he will reign over us forever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end. Let us take up a joyful manner of life like olive branches, to make our faces joyful with oil, as the Psalmist says; and again: *Serve the Lord with gladness.* Let us again lift up in the inner man the divine and spiritual labor, like the branches of palm trees, and let us follow, giving thanks to him; and in place of whiteness, let us take up the straight and undefiled and simple faith; and in place of quickness, the patient hope; the hope, I say, which pierces and slays the cogita—

every thought that exalts itself, to capture us away from the knowledge of God; and in place of the sweetness of the palm, [grant us] that sweet charity which consists of the aforementioned faith, and hope, and the rest, that there may be fulfilled in us what is written: The righteous man shall flourish as the palm tree; he shall be multiplied like the cedar that is in Lebanon. Let us follow him into the holy city; let us enter with him into the temple, that he may overturn ^A in us the tables of the money-changers, and drive from us the demons that sell the doves—namely, those thoughts that flutter in error—together with all who buy and sell within us; and that instead of a den of thieves, he may make us into a holy sacred temple, like that ancient one in which Christ dwells and walks; that he may grant sight to our blind, and make the deaf to hear, and the lame to walk, and awaken the dead with Lazarus. For where life dwells, there is resurrection: that with Lazarus, and the crowds and his disciples, with the infants and the sucklings, and with the holy angels, we may cry out, saying: Hosanna in the highest; Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord—Christ who is our Lord and God, the King of the ages. To him be glory, honor, power, and worship, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, now and always, and unto the ages of ages. Amen.

YEAR OF OUR LORD 314–374. MARCELLUS OF ANCYRA, BISHOP. DISSERTATION. ON THE CASE OF MARCELLUS OF ANCYRA. (MONTFAUCON, New Library of the Fathers, I, 11.) PREFACE AND DIVISION OF THE WORK.

Concerning the doctrine of Marcellus of Ancyra, although it has been debated by distinguished men from the very age of Marcellus up to this present time, the matter nevertheless remains in doubt; for some accuse him of being guilty of a corrupted faith, others defend him as a champion of the true faith, [and] others, deterred by the difficulty of the question, do not dare to pass judgment in either direction. I would hesitantly join the latter, were it not that a new light is shed upon Marcellian matters by the short work that is now published for the first time. With the aid of this work, not without hope of unravelling, at least in many points, a matter hitherto perplexing and intricate, we set our hand to this Diatriba, and divide the whole subject into chapters. A brief narrative of the life of Marcellus precedes; hence, investigation is made into what exactly the error ascribed to Marcellus was; then, whether it could be detected in his book against Asterius; next, whether he handed down that error in the course of his life by word or writing; likewise, whether he was removed from communion by Athanasius; finally, we discuss the embassy of Marcellus and the Church of Ancyra to Athanasius, which we now edit for the first time.