Against Eunomius (5 books)

^A but to be content with the tradition of the Apostles and the simplicity of the faith, we would have had no need of words at this present time; but we would have gladly embraced the silence which we loved from the beginning. However, since the enemy of the truth is always increasing evil with additions, ^B along with the tares which he sowed in the Church of God from the beginning, and now that he has found instruments who receive all his craft at once, is introducing the denial of the divinity of the Only-Begotten under the guise of Christianity, disturbing the pure and simple doctrine of the divine Spirit with this external and vain wisdom, and leading astray the more guileless by persuasive words; we, too, out of necessity, both for the sake of your love—you who gave the command—and for our own ^C security, disregarding our own weakness for the time being—although we are wholly unpracticed in this kind of discussion—have taken it upon ourselves, according to the measure of knowledge granted to us by the Lord, both to stand by the truth and to confute the falsehood. We hold that we shall surely secure one of three good things: either we shall provide this refutation as a remedy for the evil to those already ^D taken captive; or we shall provide a moderate protection for those who are in health; or certainly, provided we ourselves have best consulted for our brethren, we shall obtain the reward for our intent. Now the first person who dared to say and openly teach that the Only-Begotten Son is unlike in essence to God and the Father, as far as we know, is Aetius the Syrian, whom I will not name, nor with what manner of practices he was nurtured from the beginning, (lest I seem to be railing, and so abandon the task of refutation) as he slipped into the Churches of God; but he who succeeded to this impiety and brought it to completion is this Eunomius the Galatian, who, gaining distinction for himself from the most shameful things (for "their glory," it is said, "is in their shame"), having put aside the goods laid up for the pious in favor of the honor he hoped to acquire, were he to write what is wanting in the published works.

^A No other man would have dared, being so elated in spirit, to publish abroad in this splendid work of his the blasphemy which he had hitherto been muttering under his teeth: for he was ambitious to be heralded as the author and architect of the whole heresy. ^B It is our purpose, then, in the present work to refute him. But since the same wickedness resides in both, it is plain that in the perfect disciple his master, who sowed the seeds of impiety, will also be refuted, if only it be granted to us, through your prayers, to receive such power of speech that, after the example of the zealot Phinehas, we may at once pierce both of them, joined together in their impiety, with the single blow of our refutation. Although, therefore, many things are available to me by which I could show that he has been in this book a liar, an ignoramus, a reviler, a caviler, and a blasphemer, I shall pass over the others in brief, but I shall attempt, having stripped away the disguises of his art, to make manifest to all the blasphemy which he has uttered against the greatness of the glory of the Only-begotten.

2. ^B But now I shall proceed to the refutations, taking the beginning from the very inscription of the work. For first of all, that very manner of writing has been devised by him as a piece of craft, in that he has composed his teaching under the guise of an apology, so that he might not seem to be setting forth the doctrines of impiety by his own initiative, but to have been driven to these words by necessity. ^C He did indeed desire, by every means, to propagate that wicked and godless proclamation, and to bring into the open the blasphemy which he had long ago conceived and brought to birth. But he saw that to sit in the seat of a teacher openly would, besides being very burdensome and offensive to his hearers, also render him untrustworthy and suspect to the majority, as one who had been led to innovate by a desire for glory. ^D If, however, he were to speak under the fiction of an apology, he thought that he would both escape the suspicion of innovation and in this way more easily attract his listeners, since all men are, by their own nature, accustomed to favor those who are harassed. For this reason he blames his accusers and callumniators, and to them he ascribes the cause of his writing. And so, that his artifice may be clear to all, it will be better to hear his own language. It is as follows.

^A EUNOMIUS. For to defame and slander others with an unbridled tongue and a thoughtless mind is the work of wicked men who delight in enmity; but on the other hand, for those who are seen to be wicked through calumny, to endeavor with all zeal to repel the falsehood by refutations is the work of men who are upright, and who, regarding their own good counsel, value the safety of the many greatly.

BASILIUS. The style of his discourse is indeed such as would come from one who does nothing simply or without guile. For he cloaks the suspicion of innovation with the pretext of an apology, and seeks to win the goodwill of his hearers, as though he had been led to these remarks by the necessity of calumny. Yet his stage-play regarding the apology is exposed, in that, having no accuser to name for the crime for which he pretends to be struggling, he enters upon the drama of an apology ^B without a person; not that he refrains from mentioning those who have injured him by name out of forbearance (for how could he, who lashes his opponents with such reproaches?), but since he fears the manifest evidence of his lie, he is ashamed to fabricate specific persons of accusers for himself. For if he had been able to name some, he would certainly have spoken and made a noise about it; if not to satisfy his own anger, then at least to manage the safety of the many, whose interests he professes to provide for above all else. For a hidden wickedness is more harmful than one that is publicized. Therefore, if we knew the calumniators, we would more easily have escaped their unbridled tongues and thoughtless minds; for I shall use the words of the most wise concerning them. But since at that time, for whatever reason it may be, he kept silent, let him now be questioned, ^C let him now answer: who were the calumniators who, by anticipating him with slanders, made an apology necessary for him? From what part of the world did they come? Who were the judges before whom he underwent this struggle? In what court did he enter this indictment, and where on land or sea did it assemble? For what indeed could he say? At Seleucia? But they were convicted by their silence, for they—even though they were often invited by those who had gathered to repel the charges brought against them—did not appear; and for this reason they were condemned at that time. For my address is common to the whole body together, which, by reason of the communion of impiety, ^D just as some diseased member from the healthy [body of the Church, has been severed. But...]

in Constantinople? Why, there was no need there for apology or for words. For having made the men of the royal court and the others who held the greatest power their own, they set about these matters with much of an advantage; they themselves being accusers, and judges, and executioners, and everything they wished to be, when they would cast out some bishops, and install others, and hang the threat of death over yet others, they themselves divided up the cities among themselves with great authority. And one man, having been cast out of the cities of Syria, seized Constantinople as if for a tyranny; and this very man, that invincible and terrible speech-writer, carried off Cyzicus as a prize for his impiety; and to Theosebius, after the evidence brought against him for his unspeakable blasphemies, the Church of Sardis was handed over. And I pass over the Bithynians, ^B and the Paphlagonians, and the Cilicians, and all those whom the evil that was carried around in a circle has overtaken. What need for apology, then, was there at that time? But, I think, it was impossible for him to tell a lie even had he wished to. So it is truer than all else that the shape of his discourse is but a contrivance for his deception. And so much for that. But consider, as he progresses a little, what sort of things he writes. For it is perhaps not useless, before we examine his impiety, to bring to light a few things concerning the pride that surrounds him.

3. EUN. Above all, we entreat you, both those who are now listening and those who will read this hereafter, not to wish to judge truth from falsehood by the multitude, assigning the palm to the greater part; nor even to be blinded in mind, ^C as if by the number of those agreeing, to the judgment of the truth, nor to think that what is more numerous is, on that account, more correct.

^A nor indeed to let our intellect be dimmed by dignities, or to assign greater weight to the order of those who came before, so as to close our ears to those who come after.

BAS. What are you saying? Are we to assign no greater weight to our predecessors? Should we have no respect for the multitude of Christians of the present day, and for all who have existed since the Gospel was preached? Should we not consider the dignity of those who were illustrious in every kind of spiritual gift, to all of whom you have innovated this evil and hostile path of impiety? Must we, having simply closed the eyes of our soul and cast the memory of every holy man from our minds, each of us take our own heart, idle and purged, and lay it down subject to your fabrications and sophistries? Great, in truth, would be the power you had seized, if what the devil, with all his manifold craft, has not achieved, it should fall to you to attain by your command alone; that is, if, by your persuasion and leading, we were to postpone the tradition that has prevailed throughout all past time among so many saints, in favor of your impious fiction. But this is not enough for him: he seeks not only to divert the mind of those who now hear him, but also claims that those who are to read his book in time to come should have the same opinion as he. Oh, the arrogance! To think that his argument will suffice for him even in the future, and that his memory will reach forward to be preserved for ages to come! And this is what he now makes bold to utter, he who shortly after uses a certain playful pretense before his audience, as if disregarding all arrogance, speaking thus to the judges he has invented ^B in his drama.

EUN. Beyond these things, do not be angry with us if, disregarding arrogance and fear, and preferring the security for future ages to the grace and safety of the present, and having judged the threat appointed against the ungodly to be more to be feared than any transitory affliction or temporal death, we set forth the truth naked, without any veil.

BAS. What excess of pride does this pomp of words not surpass? And to this irony is added insult against the judges; for, since they can scarcely bear what is good, they can hardly refrain from being angry with a man who neglects arrogance and swelling pride; who prefers the security regarding future things to his own safety in the present; who judges the punishment of the future to be more terrible than temporal death. And what does this mean? "Do not, sirs, be angry with me, who ^C have attained to the very pinnacle of virtue"? ^D

^A upward, and who, having transcended earthly things, have transferred my whole manner of life into heaven? This is a new mode of arrogance. For through those things by which he pretends to neglect pride, he elevates himself to the highest swelling of soul. For if those actions for which he shows himself to be worthy of pardon are the chief points of an evangelical life, he invites us to conjecture of what kind he should be considered in his perfected deeds. These things, as they are as it were a character of his entire intention, many having been passed over in silence, have been stated sufficiently, so that we may recognize the father of lies speaking within him through those things in which he lied; and from his arrogant displays, we may be taught to whom he is condemned, since the Apostle states clearly that he who is puffed up falls into the judgment of the devil. ^B Let us, then, at last proceed to the refutations of impiety.

4. He proposes the faith first as composed of simple and indeterminate words, which some of the Fathers used, not aiming at the underlying questions, but simply reasoning thus by themselves in the simplicity of their heart. And ^C indeed Arius, as they say, while playing the sophist with Alexander, presented this to him (for they say this, too), but at the same time he brings it forward as if it accorded with his own opinion for two reasons: one, that he might escape the suspicion of innovation by accepting the faith of the Fathers as if it were correct; the other, that he might cause all men, having put trust in the simplicity of these words, to fall incautiously into the traps of his own sophisms. But at the same time he also understood that it would eventually be possible for him to introduce his own opinion with a specious reason, if he were to explain the sayings of the Fathers, and that he would thereby most of all conceal his impiety. And if by chance he were caught, he thought he would appear to be free from fault, as if he were saying nothing of his own or from himself, but were merely an interpreter of another's thought. In which matter he did not notice that he had suffered something most laughable. For after having extolled the faith of the Fathers with many and great praises, after a short while he surrounds it with the foulest insults. But that what I say may become clearer, I shall examine the book, having divided it into parts. And first, let us consider the faith which he proposes, with his own words added. ^D EUN. "But," he says, "proposing as a kind of measure and rule the pious tradition which has prevailed from the beginning among the Fathers, let us use this accurate method of judgment, that we may form an opinion concerning the things that are reported."

^A BAS. To these he subjoins the faith, holding it thus:

EUN. We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, from whom are all things; and in one only-begotten Son of God, God the Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things; and in one Holy Spirit, the Paraclete.

BAS. Then he immediately adds:

EUN. The simpler and common faith of all, who desire either to seem or to be Christians—to speak briefly and summarily—is this.

BAS. We shall speak a little later ^B concerning the contradiction in what he has reported and the shameless conflict of his statements with one another. But let us first call to mind that this is the man who, a little above, very arrogantly promised us that he would set forth the truth stripped of all covering. If therefore it had been written here: "We believe ingenerateness to be the essence of the God of all," or "We believe the Only-Begotten to be unlike in essence to the Father," he would have written these things, if indeed, as he promised, he had not shrouded his own opinion with some deceitful veil. But, I think, employing insidious language everywhere, he keeps his own views silent, so as not to strike unaccustomed ears and thereby lose his own credibility and make his ^C opinion difficult for people to accept; instead, he puts forward the faith of the Fathers. This, being composed of indifferent words, was not going to present anything that would conflict with the whole construction of his discourse, and would easily agree with it, if he were to shift his discourse under the guise of an exposition to the things previously mentioned. That these things are true is clear from the following: for as soon as he had set forth the faith of the Fathers, he immediately skipped to an exposition, partly under another pretext, and partly because that [faith] was not at all sufficient for refuting the charge. Why then did you set it forth, instead of coming immediately to those ^D discourses which possessed both sincerity and the ability to clear you of the charges? But now, he proposes it as a safe rule of judgment, yet then immediately corrects it again, as if it contained nothing sound. Furthermore, it is known and clear to all that, as with a hook pulling toward death, he fastens his own opinion—

^A regarding the simplicity of the faith, like some bait, so that the more inexperienced, rushing toward what is apparent, may be carelessly transfixed by the evil of impiety. But so that he might not appear to undertake the amendment of the faith, which he himself has extolled with the highest praises, without necessity—see how, as if forgetful [(98)] of his own words, he disparages it.

EUN. The more simple and common faith of all who desire to appear or to be Christians, to speak summarily and in brief, is this.

BAS. Tell me, is the pious tradition of the Fathers, and the rule—as you yourself have named it—and the plumb line, and the safe [(99)] criterion, now called once again an instrument of deceit, ^B an art of simulation, and things of that sort [(1)]? For if it does not apply to those who are truly Christians, but to those who have valued appearing over being, what else was there to conclude about it than these things? Who then, unless he is completely demented, would say that a rule of straightness is suitable for those who are perverse in soul, or a plumb line of truth for those who are enemies of the truth? For those who have valued being called Christians over being so in truth, putting on this simulation to deceive many, are far removed from all rectitude and truth. Therefore, neither will what is distorted be straightened, as the discourse of Ecclesiastes says [(88)], nor will the criteria of truth be suitable for those who have chosen ^C a lie in their life, as seems to be his view.

5. But by the causes I have mentioned, he falls into such plain contradictions, in order that, by the things with which he praises the faith, he may appear to share in the opinion of the piety of the Fathers, but by those with which he again takes it up, he may open for himself a way to an exposition. For this reason he calls it both a rule and says it stands in need of a more accurate supplement. This same thing, moreover, let it be a sign of extreme ignorance, if anyone should see fit to examine this as well. For the rule, O most wise one, and the plumb line, as long as nothing is lacking for them to be a rule and a plumb line, admit of no supplement for the sake of accuracy. For an addition ^D occurs because of a defect. But if they were imperfect, they would no longer even correctly receive these appellations. And so much for these things. Now let us also examine the statements he puts forth regarding God.

EUN. We therefore, he says, confess one God, both according to natural notion and according to the teaching of the Fathers, neither made by himself nor by another. For either of these is equally impossible,

since in truth that which makes must exist before that which is made, and that which is made must be second to that which makes. Nor can it be that anything is prior or posterior to itself, nor can anything be before God. For otherwise, that which was before the second would have possessed the dignity of divinity. ^A

BAS. Why, then, have I set forth all this statement of his?

it seems largely to correspond to our mode of understanding—since it is nowhere used in Scripture, and is the first element of their impiety, I would judge that it ought justly to be passed over in silence. For the term “Father” signifies the same thing as “unbegotten,” except that it brings with it, in conjunction, the notion of the Son through the relationship. For He who is truly and solely Father is from no other; and that which is “from no other” is identical to “unbegotten.” We ought not, therefore, to be called “unbegotten” more than “Father,” unless we intend to be wiser than the teachings of the Savior, who said: “Go, baptize in the name of the Father,” ^A and not “of the unbegotten.” And so much for these points. But let us examine the items that follow in the discourse. For, progressing a little, and as it were recapitulating to himself what has been said, he writes thus:

EUN. “If, therefore, it has been demonstrated that neither he himself nor anything else precedes him, but he himself precedes all things, it follows that the unbegotten belongs to him; or rather, it itself ^B is the unbegotten substance.”

BAS. Now, in these remarks, it is, I think, quite easy for one who pays even a little attention to discern the fraudulency, though it is not so easy to make it manifest to the many. Nevertheless, one must attempt it, having placed our hope in Him who gives the word to those who preach the gospel, with great power. Having said that, if neither he himself nor anything else precedes him, the unbegotten follows him; he then perceived that, from the sequence of the points laid down, the argument had ^C led him to the opposite—for if the unbegotten follows God, it clearly attends upon Him from without. And that which is outside of God is not His substance. From these points, then, his fraudulent fabrication will slip away and dissipate—but to keep this from happening, what does he do? Caring little for the mockery to which he was going to be exposed for saying inconsistent things, he altered the discourse to what he intended by way of correction, saying: “Or rather, this itself is the unbegotten substance.” But this has no consistency with what ^D preceded; for how could the unbegotten be something that follows after God?

And yet, it ^A is not contained within the definition of substance; nevertheless, he does not allow his sophism to be completely destroyed. For if, after having said that “the unbegotten follows Him,” he had stopped his argument there, he would have no way to claim that the unbegotten is the substance of the God of all, nor to demonstrate that the Only-begotten Son is disparate in substance, since no one could separate the Father and the Son, according to the substance itself, by means of those things which follow externally. But now, by adding, “Or rather, this itself is the unbegotten substance,” he has shown that what God is, is unbegottenness. How much this, as a course pursued for him, always serves to prepare the way for his impious enterprise, I shall demonstrate by advancing a little further in the discussion.

Indeed, what he said at the beginning is manifest according to the truth of things and the consequence of what was granted; but what he added last was thrown in out of the heretical mindset, the orator having most shamelessly of all leaped to the correction of his own discourse. ^B For how can the same thing both follow God and be the same as Him, when it is evident to all that that which follows is different from that whose consequence it is? But he, as if having seized upon a path, proceeds from the line of argument he had furtively preempted, to the construction of the claim that unbegottenness is the substance of the God of all, so that, with this having been demonstrated, he may have it granted that the Only-begotten is, in substance, unlike the Father. Observe, however, what he says: Eunomius: When we say “unbegotten,” we do not think we are merely adorning God with a name according to human conception; rather, we consider that we are rendering to Him that which we most owe to God: namely, the confession of what He is. For things spoken of according to conception, which have their existence only in names and pronunciation, naturally dissolve along with the words.

BAS. He denies that unbegottenness is to be considered according to our conception. ^C When we say “unbegotten,” we do not think we are merely adorning God with a name according to human conception, nor that we are paying Him that which is the most necessary debt of all to God—the confession of what He is. For things spoken of according to conception, which have their existence only in names and pronunciation, are naturally dissolved along with the words. ^D

And he believes that from this, he will easily prove that unbegottenness is the substance of God; and that from this, he will irrefutably show that the Only-begotten Son is unlike the Father in His very substance. Therefore, he clings to the term "conception" ^A, as if it signifies nothing at all, but possesses existence only in pronunciation; and he feigns that it is unworthy of God to honor Him with these conceptions. But as for me, if unbegottenness be something observable by conception or not, I do not yet assert, until we are taught by the investigation of the argument itself.

6. As for this very thing, I would ask him: Does this name signify nothing at all, and is it merely a sound falling from the tongue? But such a thing should not be called a "conception," but rather derangement and babbling. ^B But if he should concede that conception signifies something, but that this thing is entirely false and non-existent—as in the myths of the inventions of centaurs and chimeras—how is it that the thing signified (which is false) vanishes along with the sound of the tongue, while the voice is utterly poured out into the air, but the false thoughts remain in the mind? ^C For whenever the soul, having been filled with completely false and empty inventions—either in the visions of sleep or otherwise in the vain movements of the mind—keeps them in its memory, and then chooses to declare them through speech, the phantasms do not vanish simultaneously with the utterance of the words. For it would be a thing of great value to tell lies, if the nature of the lie perished together with the things spoken; but this thing has no such nature.

It would remain, then, to show how custom uses the term "conception," and in what matters it is used; and how the divine Scriptures accepted its use. We see, therefore, that in common usage, things that appear simple and unique at a sudden impulse of the mind ^D appear, however, varied after careful examination; and these things, being divided by the mind, are said to be divisible by conception alone.

^A Again, things which do not subsist at all, but are fashioned only by a certain painting and imagination of the mind—such as the monsters that poets and painters contrive in their thoughts to excite wonder in those who encounter them—these also are said by custom to be subject to contemplation. Eunomius, without mentioning any of these, whether out of ignorance or out of malice, has discoursed to us only on the perception of non-subsistent things; and he does not even explain the nature of this as it really is. For he does not say that "conception" signifies something, even if it were false, but he says that the name is entirely empty of meaning and has its existence only in the pronunciation. And yet, this name of "conception" is so far from being predicated only of vain and non-existent visions that, after the primary notion impressed upon us by sense perception, we call the more subtle and accurate consideration of the thing a "conception": whence it is called by custom, though improperly, a "ratiocination." 218 For example, a simple understanding of wheat exists in all, which we recognize when it appears; but when we inquire more diligently, then a contemplation of many things and diverse names signifying the understood objects offer themselves to the mind. Truly, we call the same wheat now "fruit," now "seed," and again "food": "fruit," as the end of the past agriculture; "seed," as the beginning of the future one; "food," as something suitable for the growth of the body of the one eating it. Each of these things is considered by reason, and yet it does not vanish with the sound of the mouth; but the notions remain fixed in the mind of the thinker. ^B And in sum, whatever things are known by sense, and which seem indeed to be simple in their subject, but admit of a varied reason through contemplation, all these are said to be contemplated by conception.

7. By this same manner, we are taught the use of perception even by divine Scripture. I shall certainly omit the rest; and although I have much to say, I shall nevertheless make mention of one single, most appropriate instance. Our Lord Jesus Christ, when he was speaking about himself and declaring to men the affection of the Godhead and the grace of the incarnation, signified this use by certain properties which we can contemplate in Him. For He called Himself the door, the way, the bread, ^C the vine, the shepherd, and the light, who nevertheless... ^D and were taught the use of this by the divine Word. I shall omit the other things, though I have much to say, but I will make mention of one single, most important instance. Our Lord Jesus Christ, in the words concerning himself, while declaring to men the philanthropy of the Godhead and the grace from the dispensation, pointed this out by certain properties viewed around Him, calling himself the door, and the way, and the bread, and the vine, and the shepherd, and the light, not...

being endowed with these names; for not all names lead to the same result. For one thing is signified by light, and another by the vine, and another by the way, and another by the shepherd. But since He is one according to the subject, and one simple and uncompounded substance, He calls Himself ^A now one thing, now another, adapting to Himself names that differ from one another according to our conceptions. For according to the difference of His operations, and according to the relation which He has toward those who are affected by His benefits, He imposes upon Himself different names. For He says that He is the light of the world, partly because He signifies by this name the inapproachable majesty of the Godhead, and partly because He illuminates with the splendor of knowledge those who have the eyes of the soul purified. And He calls Himself the vine, because He nourishes those who have taken root in Him through faith with the fertility of good works. And He calls Himself the bread, because He is the most suitable food for the rational nature, inasmuch as He sustains the constitution of the soul and preserves its property, always filling up from Himself what is lacking, and not allowing it to slip into the infirmity which arises from a lack of reason. And thus, if anyone were to run through each of the names, he would be able to find various conceptions for each one of the things that is subject to all by substance. Who, therefore, has a tongue so sharpened for blasphemy ^B as to dare to say that these conceptions perish along with the words? What is there, then, so absurd about also taking certain things according to our conception concerning the God of all, and this very first thing, about which our entire discourse has been stirred up? For we shall find that "ingenerate" is not spoken of in any other way. For we address God, the God of all, as incorruptible and as ingenerate, addressing Him by these names according to various applications. For when we look back toward the past ages, and find the life of God to be surpassing every beginning, we call Him ingenerate; but when we extend our thought to the coming ages, we call Him incorruptible, as one infinite and immense, and not comprehended by any end. As, therefore, the life which is devoid of an end is called incorruptibility, so the same life, as being devoid of a beginning, is called ingeneration, since we contemplate both by our conception. What argument, then, will deny that each of these names is also to be thought of as a confession of that which truly belongs to God? But he, ^C as if these things were at war and altogether incompatible with one another, separates them from each other: both the speaking of anything according to a conception, and the making of a confession to God of that which He truly is. He denies, of course, that anything can be said according to the conception of the mind, and that by this very thing a confession of what God is, is rendered unto Him. ^D

^A

EUNOMIUS: That we should not honor God with the appellation of "Ingenerate" according to a human mental conception, but rather pay Him the debt which is most necessary of all: the acknowledgment of what He is.

BASIL: What words could adequately reach the crookedness of these artifices? He tries to terrify the simpler-minded, as if they were not rendering what is owed to God unless they confessed that the Ingenerate is His substance. And he calls his own impiety a "payment of a debt," so that he might not seem to be saying anything of his own devising, but only fulfilling what is necessarily owed to God. And he indicates to the rest that if they place the "Ingenerate" within the substance ^B they shall be dismissed without penalty and held blameless; but if, on the other hand, they should assume it according to the pious mode, then, as having failed to pay the most ancient and necessary debt of all, they shall incur an implacable wrath. Therefore, I would gladly examine him: does he keep this candor of mind equally among all things that are predicated of God, or in this word alone? For if he contemplates absolutely nothing according to the mode of human conception, so as not to appear to honor God with human appellations, he will have to confess that everything predicated of God is likewise His substance. How, therefore, is it not ridiculous to say that the creative power is substance? Or again, that providence is substance? Or, in the same way, that foreknowledge is substance? And, in a word, to think that every action is substance? ^C But if all these things tend toward a single meaning, it is absolutely necessary that the names be able to signify the same thing as one another, as occurs with those who are called by many names: just as we call the same person Simon, and Peter, and Cephas. Therefore, one who has heard of the "impenetrability" of God will be led to the "Ingenerate"; likewise, one who has heard that He is "indivisible" will be led to the "creative power." And what could be more absurd than this confusion, if one, having removed the proper significance of each of these names, resists both common usage and the teaching of the Spirit? Yet, when we hear concerning God that *He has made all things in wisdom* (Ps. см, 24), we are taught His creative art; but when we hear that *He opens His hand and fills every living thing with favor* (Ps. cXLiv, 16), ^D we learn of the providence that pervades all things; and when we are told that *He made darkness His secret place* (Ps. xvin, 11), we are instructed in the invisibility of His nature. Again, that which is said from the person of God, [is to be understood] according to the pious mode, as is also [what is said of] the prognostic [power].

I am, and I am not changed," we learn of the ever-identical and immutable nature of the Divine. How then is it not manifest madness to say that no proper meaning is assigned to each of these names, but that, contrary to their force, one can define all these names as identical to one another? ^A Furthermore, even if we were to grant this, not even then would they gain anything toward their goal. For if all these terms, when used of God the Father, signify His substance—I mean the immutable, and the invisible, and the incorruptible—then clearly they will signify the same when used of the Only-Begotten Son of God. For we name the Only-Begotten Son invisible, and immutable, and incorruptible, and indivisible, and all such things. And thus their cleverness will turn against them. For they will not be able to prove, by a difference in a single term, that He is unlike in substance, any more than they will be forced by the necessity of the acknowledged facts to confess that He is like on account of their agreement in many other terms.

But if he says that he uses this caution only regarding the word "unbegotten," ^B but is careless regarding the others, we shall ask him again: what is the logic behind this, that among so many things said of God, he shows precision in this one instance alone, and in this one instance alone satisfies the confession of what He is, while not refusing to honor Him with human concepts in countless other instances? For one who owes many things is not considered more grateful for the repayment of one, than he is ungrateful beyond measure for the withholding of the many. Thus, like a wily beast, he is caught by his own artifices, being the more surely convicted by the very means through which he attempts to hide. ^C

^A 9. Consider, for your part, what follows. After he has shown, as he thinks, that it is in no way possible for "ingenerate" to be conceived by the mind, he adds:

EUN. Nor yet according to privation; since privations are privations of those things which are by nature, and are subsequent to their habits.

BAS. That he babbles these things from the wisdom of the world, by which he has been tripped up and led to apply himself to such innovations of language, it would not be hard to demonstrate. For the arguments concerning habit and privation belong to Aristotle, as those who have read his books inscribed *Categories* could testify, where he says that privations are secondary to habits. But for us, it was enough, after showing that he speaks not from the teaching of the Spirit, but from the wisdom of the princes of this age, to declare against him the word of the Psalm: *Transgressors told me pleasantries, but not according to thy law, O Lord* (Ps. CXVIII, 85); and, having learned that what is said is not from the teachings of our Lord Jesus Christ, to be reminded of his voice: *When he speaks a lie, he speaks from his own* (Joan. VIII, 44); and in this way to cut short the many words for ourselves, thereby making it clear to all that we have no communion with them. For *what harmony has Christ with Belial? Or what part has a believer with an unbeliever?* (II Cor. VI, 15). But that we may not seem to take refuge in silence from a lack of refutations, come, let us discuss these matters also for a short while. We see that many of the things said about God, O Eunomius, are expressed in a similar form, such as "incorruptible," "immortal," "invisible." And we judge that this name, "ingenerate," also belongs to the same form. If, then, some term such things "privative," the argument is not with us. For we neither know the technicalities of words, nor do we emulate those who do. But at least this much we shall say: that whatever category the other terms we have enumerated are placed in, we shall say that the designation "ingenerate" belongs to the same. Just as, therefore, "incorruptible" signifies that corruption ^B does not exist in God, and "invisible" signifies that he surpasses all perception through the eyes, and "incorporeal" that he does not exist in…

…assigning to God as possible according to our mode of conception. And, to use Eunomius’s own words, the impious man refused to adorn God through the designation of "ingenerate" based on a human mode of thinking; yet he did not refuse to adorn Him based on our mode of conception through the designations "indivisible," "immutable," etc. From which it is plain and certain that the particle *µή* is by no means redundant, but is indeed most necessary, so that we may interpret it thus: that in the other very many cases, he does not refuse to adorn Him according to human modes of understanding; by which interpretation the mind of Eunomius is best expressed, who, as we have said, refused to attribute one name to the Son in such a way that he did not refuse to give the others to Him. Nor should the little word *µή* be passed over in silence, which is found in the Parisian edition, as well as in the Venetian edition, in the Colbertine, and in the three Royal codices. And I will note that it is read in the first Royal [codex]. I think, however, that *e* was written for *vel* or *aut*, and that the scribe wished to indicate that one of these two words ought to be read: but he did not know ^D which ought to be chosen, and for that reason placed both words, so that each might read according to his own judgment. Let us return to Eunomius, whose entire reasoning returned to this: Although the Son is called invisible, immortal, immutable, just as the Father is, nevertheless He is not truly and properly God. For these names do not affect the divine nature itself, but are attributed to God according to a human mode of conception. But there is another name, which is proper to God, which is the character of divinity, which constitutes the divine nature itself, which is not attributed to God according to our mode of understanding, and yet that name does not befit the Son, but is even most repugnant to Him; from which it follows that the Son is not properly God. Now that name is "ingenerate."

[(60)] Codices *σχοπήσατε*. The edition there reads *Δείξας γάρ*. The word *γάρ* is missing in all MSS.

[(61)] In the fifth Royal [codex] it is *οὐκ ἐκ τῶν θείων καὶ ἀληθινῶν διδαγμάτων*, "not from divine and true teachings." Other six MSS [read] as in the context; nor did the interpreter read otherwise.

^A comprehending all things, and invisible, that he surpasses all sensory perception; and incorporeal, that his substance does not consist in three dimensions; and immortal, that dissolution will never happen to him. In the same way, we say that "unbegotten" also signifies that generation does not exist in him. If, then, none of these names is privative, neither is that one. But if you allow those to be spoken according to privation, but do not admit this for the title of "unbegotten," tell me: what habit preceding it does "incorruptible" indicate as a privation? Or how does it not amount to the same thing as "unbegotten"? Yet he practices sophistry only regarding this word, because from it the occasions for his impiety depend. So that his artifice may become clear, do this: take the arguments that he brings forward regarding the "unbegotten"—that it is not reasonable to speak of God either according to human conceptualization or according to privation—and apply them to some other of the names spoken of God, and examine them. For you will find them fitting each one exactly. ^B And, if you wish, let us say these things concerning "incorruptible," transferring the very words he uses. For when we say "incorruptible," we do not think that God must be decorated according to human conceptualization; but that the most necessary debt of all must be paid to him, namely, the confession by which we confess him to be what he is. But neither [is it] according to privation; for if privations are privations of things that exist by nature, and are subsequent to their habits, why is it more fitting to affirm these things regarding the "unbegotten" than regarding the "incorruptible," and in general regarding any word that is uttered in the same pattern? But nothing else contributes to his impiety. Therefore, he does not even mention the others, even though there are countless things said about God.

10. It is as follows: There is no name which, having encompassed the whole nature of God, is sufficient to proclaim it fully; but many and various [names], each in its proper signification, gather for us an understanding [that is] indeed altogether dim and very small if compared with the whole, but yet sufficient for us. Therefore, ^C among the names said of God, some are indicative of what is present in God, while others, conversely, [are indicative] of what is not present. For from these two, a kind of character of God is imprinted upon us, both from the negation of things that are incongruous and from the confession of things that are present. For instance, when we name him "incorruptible," we are saying in effect, to ourselves or to those who hear, "Do not think that God is subject to corruption"; and when [we name him] "invisible," [we are saying] that you should not suppose him to be grasped by the perception of the eyes. ^D

^A Likewise, when [we name him] "immortal," [we are saying] that you must not think that death can reach God. So too, when [we name him] "unbegotten," [we are saying] that you must not believe that the existence of God depends on any cause or beginning. And in short, from each of these we are taught not to fall into unbecoming thoughts in our conceptions of God. Therefore, in order that we may recognize the distinctive property of God, we forbid one another in our discourses about God from letting our thoughts ^B drift to where they ought not, so that men might never think that God exists among things corruptible, or things visible, or things begotten. Thus, by all these prohibitive names, there is, as it were, a negation of that which is foreign, while our mind is articulated and lays aside conceptions of things that do not belong to Him. Again, we call God good, and just, and creator, and judge, and such things. Just as, therefore, ^C in the former instances these terms signified a certain rejection and prohibition of notions foreign to God, so here they signify the positing and existence of things that are proper to God and are fittingly contemplated in Him. Therefore, from either kind of appellation we are taught, either concerning things that are present, that they are present, or concerning things that are absent, that they are absent. The word "unbegotten," however, is a signifier of things not present; for it indicates that generation does not belong to God. But whether one wishes to call this a privative, or a prohibitive, or a negative term, or anything of the sort, we shall not dispute. That the word "unbegotten" is not a signifier of what belongs to God, I think has been sufficiently declared by what has been said. For essence is not one of the things not present, but ^D is the very being of God, which to count among things that are not is the height of madness. For if essence is to be ranked among things that are not, much less could anything else asserted of God be placed there. But it has been demonstrated that the word "unbegotten" is numbered among things not present; he is therefore a liar who thinks that essence is signified by this word.

11. But Eunomius, bearing it ill that he should be spoken of regarding God by way of privation, as if it were an absurd thing, flees, forsooth, to a more pious opinion, [D (footnote reference)] toward the essence itself.

^A And gathering his discourse into a summary, he thus writes:

EUN. Therefore, if it is neither according to conception, nor according to privation, nor in part (since He is indivisible), nor in Him as something else (for He is simple), nor anything else besides Him (for He is one and the only unbegotten), this very thing must be the unbegotten essence.

BAS. He has led the discourse where he wished, and having dragged the "unbegotten" from every side, he has driven it, as he thought, into the essence itself, saying of the God of the universe that the unbegotten is itself the unbegotten essence. But I, for my part, would also say that the essence of God is unbegotten, but not that "the unbegotten" is the essence. ^B Furthermore, however, it is worth observing that he separates "the indivisible" and "the simple"—which are the same in meaning (for that is indivisible which is not composed of parts, and likewise the simple is that which does not consist of several things)—as if they were different in substrate. Thereafter, he forbids that God should be divided, or that one part of Him should be suspected as unbegotten and another as begotten, nor again that one should imagine ^C the unbegotten to be set in Him as one thing in another. To refute the vanity of these words makes me hesitate. For he who contradicts seems in a way to become similar to him who speaks vanities. Wherefore, I think, the wise Solomon counsels not to answer a fool according to his folly (Prov. xxvi, 4). For those arguments which were never spoken nor even uttered, he has brought under division, so that it might appear that, among those many things enumerated, he alone finds the "unbegotten" spoken of in a proper manner. As for us, perhaps there would have been need of a longer discourse to expose the falsehood and to show that the unbegotten is not the essence of God, if those things he enumerated in his division had not been clearly refuted. For even if his argument had ^D force—that the unbegotten is acquired neither by way of conception nor by way of privation—not even so would what he concludes necessarily follow. For what is the necessity that the "unbegotten" must fall under one of the things enumerated? Nevertheless, since he himself adds this as if it were necessarily connected to the foregoing, "Therefore, if it is neither according to conception, nor according to privation, nor according to any other of the enumerated modes, it must be the unbegotten essence"; we, retorting, say: Therefore, since it is considered according to conception, and the name is privative, the unbegotten is not the essence of God. For as long as it is not

^A refuting what has been said, nor adding strength to its own propositions, that which it gathers will have no place.

12. In summary, to think that one has discovered the very essence of the God who is above all, what pride and arrogance is this! For they almost surpass in boastfulness even him who said: "I will set my throne above the stars" (Isa. xiv, 13): who, of course, do not rise up against the stars or the heaven, but boast that they penetrate the very essence of the God of all. Let us therefore examine him: whence does he say he has attained a conception of it? From common notion? But this warns us that God exists, not what He is. Is it from the teaching of the Spirit? Which one? Or from that which is written? Does not the great David, to whom God manifested the secret and hidden things of His wisdom, openly confess that the knowledge of God is inaccessible, when he says: "Thy knowledge is become wonderful from me; it is strengthened, I cannot attain to it" (Ps. cxxxviii, 6)? ^B And Isaiah, when he was in the vision of the glory of God, what did he declare to us concerning the divine essence? He who, in his prophecy concerning Christ, testifies in these words: "Who shall declare his generation?" (Isa. liii, 8). And what of the vessel of election, Paul, who had Christ speaking in him, who was snatched up even to the third heaven, who heard secret words which it is not permitted for a man to utter; what doctrine did he leave us concerning the essence of God? When he had looked toward the particular reasons of the dispensation, as if suffering from vertigo on account of the insuperable difficulty of contemplation, he sent forth as it were that cry: "O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!" (Rom. xi, 33). ^C And if these things are unattainable for those who have reached the measure of Paul’s knowledge, how great is the pride of those who profess to know the essence of God? Whom I would gladly ask: what do they say concerning the earth upon which they stand and from which they were born? What do they declare to us of its essence? So that—if they discourse with certainty and beyond doubt concerning things that are on the ground and lie beneath our feet—we might then have faith in them also when they pronounce judgment upon things that surpass all intellect. What, therefore, is the ^D essence of the earth? What is the mode of its apprehension? Let them answer us: does reason attain it, or sense? But if they say sense, by what sense can it be comprehended? By sight? But this perceives colors. By touch? But this distinguishes hardness and softness, hot and cold, and other things of this kind: none of which any man, unless he has fallen into the ultimate madness, would call essence. And as for taste and smell, what is it worth to say? The former of which attains to flavors, the latter to vapors.

^A Hearing, moreover, is percipient of sounds and voices, which have no kinship with the earth. It remains, therefore, for them to say that they discovered its essence through discourse. By which one? Where is it set down in Scripture? By which of the saints was it handed down?

13. Certainly he who discourses to us about creation taught us only that, *In the beginning God made heaven and earth*, and that *the earth was invisible and unadorned*; for he thought it sufficient to proclaim the One who made and adorned it, but he put aside the investigation of what its essence might be as vain and useless to the hearers. If, then, its knowledge is confirmed neither by the testimony of the senses nor by the instruction of discourse, whence will they still claim to have attained its comprehension? For whatever in it is perceptible is either color, or bulk, or weight, or lightness, or density, or rarity, or hardness, or softness, or coldness, or heat, or the qualities according to flavors, or the differences according to shape (82)—none of which would these men call essence, even though ^B they are accustomed to affirm everything readily. Again, it has not been perceived by any discourse of the wise and blessed men. What manner of comprehension, therefore, still remains (83)?

Let them answer us, those who despise all things beneath their feet, yet transcend the heavens and all the super-celestial powers, and are joined by their intellect to the very first essence. But pride seems to be the most grievous of all human vices, and those in whom it resides are truly entangled in the charge of the devil (85). Whence also these men, not even knowing the nature of the earth which they tread underfoot, arrogantly assert that they approach the very essence of the God of all (86). And God, to His saints, to Abraham and to Isaac and to Jacob—whom, on account of their attaining full virtue, He ^C preferred, as something exceptional and befitting His own majesty, even to be named God, calling Himself the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob: *For this is my name for ever*, He says, *and my memorial unto generations of generations* (Gen. 1, 1, 2; Exod. III, 15)—even to these, I say, God did not declare His own name, much less did He reveal what His essence is. *For I*, says the Lord, *appeared unto Abraham (88), and Isaac, and Jacob, being their God; and my name did I not declare to them* (Exod. VI, 2, 3); evidently as being too great to be grasped by human hearing. ^D But to Eunomius (89), it appears, He revealed not only His name, but also His very essence.

and this ineffable mystery, which was revealed to no one among the saints, he himself writes down in books, publishes, and blurts out to all men without discernment. And while the things laid up for us in the promises exceed all human knowledge, and the peace of God surpasses all understanding, he does not permit the essence of God itself to be above all understanding and above all human knowledge.

14. I believe that it exceeds the comprehension not only of men, but of every rational nature as well. By "rational," I now mean that which is in creation. For the Father is known only to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit. For "no one knows the Father except the Son" (Matt. XI, 27); and "The Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God. For who among men knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man which is in him? And the things of God no one has known except the Spirit who is from God" (I Cor. II, 10, 11). What excellence, then, will they leave for the knowledge of the Only-begotten or the Holy Spirit, if they themselves possess the comprehension of the essence itself? For surely, having attributed to the Only-begotten the contemplation of the power, goodness, and wisdom of God, they will not think that the understanding of the essence is commensurate with themselves. ^B For, at all events, the contrary is true, as it is likely that the essence itself is invisible to everyone, except insofar as we are led by the operations of God, and, understanding the Creator through the things that are created, we thus perceive His goodness and wisdom. For it is known of God what God has manifested to all men (Rom. I, 19). For those things which appear to be written by theologians concerning the essence of God, carry one to other notions through certain tropologies or even allegories.

Wherefore, if anyone, without examination, insists upon taking the more obvious meaning of the bare letter, he will lapse into Jewish and old-wives’ fables, and will grow old devoid of any notions of God that are worthy. For besides conceiving of the essence of God as some material thing—and in this agreeing with the godless among the Greeks—he will also imagine it to be manifold and composite. For when the prophet relates that God is like amber from the loins up, and that the parts below are fused from fire (Ezech. VIII, 2), whoever does not ascend to a higher understanding through the letter, but remains clinging to bodily descriptions, and having been instructed by Ezekiel that the essence of God is such, will hear in turn from Moses that God is fire (Deut. IV, 24), ^C and will be led ^D to other opinions by the wise Daniel...

and in this way, he will be found gathering not only false but even contradictory imaginings from the Scriptures. ^A Since, therefore, we should abandon as unattainable any anxious inquiry into the essence, we must be persuaded by the simple exhortation of the Apostle, who says: "For it is necessary first to believe that God exists, and that He becomes a rewarder to those who seek Him" (Hebr. XI, 6). For it is not the investigation of *what* He is, but the confession that He *is*, that procures salvation for us. Since, therefore, it has been demonstrated that the essence of God is utterly incomprehensible and ineffable to human nature, it remains to examine regarding His ingeneracy what it is, and how it is contemplated in God, the Lord of all things.

15. We find, then, when we reason, that the notion of the ingenerate does not fall to us through an investigation of what it is, but rather—if I may forcedly express the thought—through an investigation of *how* It is. For our mind, as it examines whether the God over all has any cause superior to Himself, and then, being unable to conceive of any, calls His life (which has no beginning) "ingenerate." ^B For just as in discussions concerning men, when we say, "This person was born from that one," we are not declaring what each is, but from whom he was born; so also in discussions regarding God, the word "ingenerate" does not signify *what* He is, but that He is from nowhere else. And this will be clearer if I speak as follows. The evangelist Luke, when setting forth the genealogy of our God and Savior Jesus Christ according to the flesh, and tracing back from the last to the first, began from Joseph; but having said that this one was of Heli, and that one of Mathan, and thus leading the narrative back in reverse order toward Adam, and then having come to the ones above, ^C and saying that Seth was from Adam, and Adam from God, he concluded the ascent at this point—not declaring in the narrative the essences of those enumerated during the account of each one's birth, but setting forth the immediate origins from which each was generated. Just then as he said that

Adam is from God, so let us question ourselves: but God, from what source? Is it not immediate in everyone’s mind that it is from nothing? And that which is from nothing is clearly without beginning; and that which is without beginning is ^A unbegotten. Therefore, just as in the case of men "from something" is not their essence, so too in the case of the God of all it is not possible to call "the unbegotten" his essence; for this is equal to "from nothing." But he who says that the "without beginning" is the essence acts much like someone who, when asked what the essence of Adam is and what his nature might be, would reply that he was formed not by the union of man and woman, but by the divine hand. "But I am not asking for the mode of his subsistence," someone would say, "but for the very material subject of the man," of which I am far from learning through that answer. This indeed ^B happens to us as well, from the term "unbegotten," as we are taught how God is, rather than what his nature is.

16. In sum, if anyone wishes to learn the truth of the things that are said by us, let him examine himself when he desires to understand something about God, to see if he enters into the meaning of "the unbegotten." For I see indeed that, just as we extend our thought toward the ages that are to come, we call him "endless" who has his life confined by no limit, so too, when we ascend with our reasoning toward the ages above, and, as if peering into a vast sea, toward the infinity of the life of God, being able to grasp no beginning from ^C which he came to be, but always perceiving the life of God as existing beyond and exceeding that which is apprehended—this "without beginning" of his life we have called "unbegotten." For this is the very concept of the unbegotten: not to have from elsewhere the beginning of existence. But he, since the "unbegotten" is contemplated only in the God of all, has most wickedly of all snatched it away for the blasphemy against the Only-Begotten. For what says he, proceeding further?

Eun. Being unbegotten, according to the previous demonstration, he could never admit of generation, so as to communicate his own nature to the begotten, and thus he would escape ^D all comparison and communion with the begotten.

Bas. O the shameless and wicked blasphemy! O the hidden deceit and the manifold craftiness! How accurately he speaks from the very artifice of the devil! For because he desires to make the Only-Begotten Son and God dissimilar to God and Father...

^A he remains silent on the name of the Father and of the Son, and simply discourses about the unbegotten and the begotten. And concealing the names of the saving faith, he hands down the dogmas of the blasphemy in their bare state, so that, the impiety being stripped naked in the very things themselves, and then the transition being made to the persons, he himself might appear to have said nothing blasphemous, but by the sequence of his discourse he might have a blasphemy artfully constructed. "For being unbegotten," he says, "he would escape all comparison and communion with the begotten." He did not say: "Father and Son," but: "Unbegotten and begotten." ^B Such is one piece of his wickedness; but consider what another is. "For being unbegotten," he says, "he would never admit of generation," and he adds, "so as to share his own nature with the begotten." The phrase, "he would never admit of generation," signifies two things: one, that generation does not befit his own nature (for it is impossible for the unbegotten nature to come under generation); the other, that he does not deign himself to beget. Now, he used the expression according to the second meaning; but he ensnares the many by the former sense. For that this is what is being constructed, the following statement clearly shows. For having said that, "He would never admit of generation," he added: "so as to share his own nature with the begotten." For this is the consequence of the ^C second meaning: that he does not deign to become a Father, lest he share his own nature with the begotten. What could be more grievous than this impiety? Who ever spoke such injustice into the heights? Should we, by taking up the blasphemies of others into our own mouth, pollute our own mind, and become participants in their condemnation? But I am comforted by that which is delivered in the Gospels, that the Holy Spirit also did not refrain from handing down to those who came after the blasphemy of the Jews against the Lord, marking their blasphemy for all time, yet not attaching any blasphemy to the undefiled majesty of the Only-Begotten. Accordingly, if he would never admit of generation, so as to share his own nature with the begotten, God is not a Father, and He is not—but it is ^D better for us that he should not appear to do so. That he may not share his own nature with the begotten, he would never admit of generation; but he is not a Son—and Truth itself, our Lord Jesus Christ, is a liar, and Truth itself...

^A indeed did not admit of generation; but the other did not share in the nature of the Begetter. Then he struggles with himself, devising a new mitigation of the blasphemy, not because he says anything that pertains to repentance, but because he attempts to surpass his former arguments with subsequent ones. For what has he dared to utter EUN. He would surely escape all comparison and communication with the begotten.

BAS. But if there is no comparison of the Son with the Father, nor any communication with the Begetter, then the Apostles are liars, the Gospels are lies; yea, Truth itself, our Lord Jesus Christ, is a liar. But I again shudder at the blasphemy, which is easy for anyone to understand. For if he has no comparison with the Father, how did he say to Philip: *Have I been so long a time with you, and have you not known me, Philip?* and, *He that sees me, sees him that sent me?* For how could the Son show in himself him who admits of neither comparison nor any communication with him? For it is not through that which is unlike and foreign that the unknown can be apprehended; but it is the nature of the related to be known by the related. Thus, in the ^B seal, the character of the one who impressed it is observed; and from the image, the knowledge of the archetype is obtained, provided, of course, that we compare the identity that is in both.

18. Wherefore, by this one blasphemy, all the voices that have been handed down by the Holy Spirit for the glorification of the Only-Begotten are rejected. And indeed the Gospel teaches that *him God the Father has sealed,* while the Apostle says: *Who is the image of the invisible God.* An image not inanimate, nor fashioned by hand, nor the work of art and device, but a living image—nay, rather, Life itself—not in the likeness of shape, but in the very substance itself, always preserving its unchangeable nature. ^C For I say that the phrase, *to be in the form of God*, has the same force as *to be in the substance of God*. For as the former, *having taken the form of a servant*, signifies that our Lord was born in the substance of human nature: so also this, *to be in the form of God*, sets forth the divinity of the substance of the Only-Begotten. For just as the *form of a servant* is not a different substance from the human, so the *form of God* is not different from the divine substance. For even if he who becomes like another in appearance is called an image, nevertheless, in the case of the Son, the nature is shown to be one and the same as the Father’s, since he is not something else in his substance than what the Father is. Hence, just as ^D our Lord is not called an image by a resemblance of feature, but because he is in all things the same as the One who begat him, so also he who looks at the Son sees in him the magnitude of the Father’s nature.

^A And the expression, "being in the form of God," surely demonstrates the property of the divine essence. "He who has seen me," he says, "has seen the Father." But Eunomius, by alienating the Only-Begotten from the Father and completely severing him from communion with him, cuts off, as far as lies in his power, the ascent of knowledge that occurs through him. "All that the Father has are mine," says the Lord. Eunomius says there is no communion between the Father and the One who is from him. And, "As the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son also to have life in himself." This we have been taught by the Lord himself; but what from Eunomius? That there is no comparison between the begotten and the begetter. And simply put, by this single word he destroys the concept of the image and denies that he is the radiance and the imprint of the substance. For it is impossible to conceive of an image of that which has no comparison, nor can there be a radiance of that which has no communion according to nature. Again, he persists in the same kind of artifice, saying that there is no comparison between the unbegotten and the begotten—not "between the Father and the One who is from him"—so that he might transfer the opposition which he has exhibited in these words into the very substance of the Father and the Son.

19. But lest, by following his blasphemies and attempting to refute each of the things said, we extend the argument to too great a length, those things which have clear impiety and are immediately manifest to those reading we shall pass by; but those which require some argument for their refutation, these we shall bring forward. For having variably established that the Father’s substance is unsharable with the Son, and having shown, as he supposes, the absurdity from every side, he adds:

EUN. For we would not say that the substance is common to both, but that the one is first and the other second in order and by the priority of time. Since it is necessary that the cause of superiority be present in those which excel; but neither time, nor age, nor order is conjoined to the substance of God. For order is posterior to the one who orders; but nothing of what belongs to God is ordered by another. And time is a certain movement of the stars, pertaining to quality; but the stars have come into being after not only the unbegotten substance and all intellectual creatures, but even after the first bodies. But regarding the ages, what is there to say, when Scripture clearly declares that God is before the ages?

^A BAS. Having posited ^B for himself according to the argument whatever he wished, and having taken the conclusions to his premises, then pushing himself into absurd ways of thinking, from this he thinks he demonstrates that he is necessarily admitting his own dogmas. For he says that we cannot say this, that while the essence of both is common, yet in order and by the prerogatives of time, one is first and the other is second. ^C If, therefore, he meant the commonality of the essence in such a way as to understand a certain distribution and division—like that of pre-existing matter—into those things which come from it, we ourselves could not accept this understanding; God forbid! And we declare those who say such things, if there are any such, to be no less impious than those who claim [the essence] is dissimilar. But if someone understands the commonality of the essence in such a way that one and the same definition of being is contemplated in both—so that, for instance, if by hypothesis the Father is understood as light in the subject, the essence of the Only-Begotten is also confessed to be light, and whatever definition of being one would provide for the Father, the same one also adapts to the Son—if the commonality of the essence is accepted in this way, we admit it and we shall declare it to be our own dogma. For in this way, there will be one Godhead, clearly understood according to the definition of the unity of the essence, so that while in number and in the properties characterizing each there is a difference, in the definition of the Godhead, unity is contemplated.

20. Since it is therefore established how the commonality of the essence ought to be accepted, let us examine what follows and what connection it has with what went before. ^D "In order, however," he says, "and by the prerogatives of time, one is first, the other second." What necessity is there for those things whose essence is common to be subject to order and to be second in time? For it is not possible that the God of the universe, together with His own image which has been illuminated without the addition of time, should not be from eternity, and should not have a connection not only beyond times, but also beyond all the ages. For this reason He is called "radiance," that we may understand the connection, and "stamped character of the substance," that we may learn the consubstantiality. But there is a order that is natural, and another that is by arrangement. Natural, indeed, is that of created things according to the creative reasons ordained, and as the...

^A position of numbers, and as the relation of causes to their effects, it being acknowledged that God is the maker and creator of nature itself. But that order which is devised and artificial is like that which is found in constructions, in disciplines, in dignities, in number, and things of that kind.

Eunomius, therefore, having concealed the former, made mention of the second type of order, and says that one must not speak of order in God, since the order is posterior to the one who orders. But that which he either did not understand, or purposely concealed, is that there is a kind of order that is not constituted by our arrangement, but occurs by the very necessity of nature, just as fire relates to the light which is from it. For in these we say the cause is prior, and the posterior is that which is from it ^B; not separating these from one another by an interval, but by logic conceiving the cause before the effect. How, then, is it reasonable to deny order in those things in which there is a prior and a posterior, not by our arrangement, but from the natural sequence inherent in them? For what reason, then, does he abrogate the taking of order in God? He supposes that if he can demonstrate that "prior" cannot be understood in God in any other way, nothing will remain for him but to show superiority in the substance itself. ^C But we, according to the relation of causes to the things that are from them, say that the Father is placed before the Son; but according to diversity of nature, no longer so, nor according to an excess of time: for otherwise, we would even deny that God is Father, since the alienation that is found in the essence would abolish the natural conjunction.

21. But since the wise man has progressed to defining for us the nature of time, let us here also see how firm and how circumspect his mind is. He says, therefore, that time is a certain motion of the stars; ^D clearly of the sun and the moon and the rest which have the power to be moved by themselves. The interval, therefore, from the generation of heaven and earth to the

^A generation of the stars—what, pray, will this eminent speculator upon sublime matters decide that it is? For he who wrote the account of the world’s creation (45) by the power of the Spirit clearly says that the great luminaries and the rest of the stars were made on the fourth day. Time, therefore, was not, as it seems, in the preceding days; for the stars were not yet moving (46). For how could they have been, since they had not even come into being at the beginning (47)? And again, when Joshua, the son of Nun, was fighting against the Gibeonites, because the sun remained motionless, being bound by the command (48), and the moon stood in its place, was there no time then? What, then, shall we call that interval of the day? What name will you invent for it? For if the nature of time had failed, eternity surely replaced it. But to call eternity a small part of a day—what level of madness ^B does that not surpass? But, such is his great cleverness, he seems to think that day and night occur through some motion of the stars pertaining to quality, and that these are parts of time; whence he declared that time is a certain motion of the stars possessing quality, not understanding even this which he says. For it would have been more appropriate to say, if indeed he was to say anything, not motion possessing quality, but endowed with quantity (50). For who is so much a child in mind as not to know that days, and hours, and months, and years are measures of time, not parts (51)? Time, indeed, is the interval that extends alongside the constitution of the world, by which every motion is measured, whether of stars, or of animals, or of anything whatsoever ^C that is moved, according to which we say that one thing is faster or slower than another: faster is that which traverses more space in less time, and slower is that which moves through less in more time. But Eunomius, since the stars move in time, declares them to be the creators of time (53). Therefore, according to the argument of this wisest man, since even dung-beetles move in time, let us define time as a certain motion of dung-beetles: for what he has said differs nothing from this, except for the dignity of the names. And these things are thus; but consider what follows.

22. Eunomius, he says, "But neither does it exist in the essence, nor is it possible for the Son to exist in the essence, as a form, or as a bulk, etc." ^D (54) "But neither," etc., translating into Latin as "Atqui, inquit," did not sufficiently attend to the force of the word, unless some form, or density, or quantity be in the substance of God. One might perhaps suspect, with the most learned man Combefis, that these things were said elliptically, and that the word "Son" should be understood. In this way: "He says that it is not even possible that the Son should exist in the substance of God as a form, or bulk," etc. I indeed confess that this conjecture seems best, and that it could easily be accommodated to this passage: yet since we find it edited thus in the most learned Fabricius, who recently edited the book of Eunomius, etc., I think it better to follow this text. And certainly, this judgment of ours is not a little aided by the fact that in the Colbertine codex, which itself also contains, among other things, the work of Eunomius, it is written in exactly the same way, except that in it, instead of...

whatever might exist in the substance of God, such as form, or bulk, or quantity, because God is entirely free from composition. But if it is neither right to think, nor ever was possible, that any such thing should be conjoined with the substance of God, what reason will further allow us to compare the generated with the ungenerated substance? For that similarity according to substance, or comparison, or communion, leaves behind no superiority or difference, but clearly produces equality; and along with equality, it declares that He who is assimilated or compared is ungenerated. But no one is so foolish and daring in impiety as to say that the Son is equal to the Father, when the Lord himself said explicitly: *The Father who sent me is greater than I* ^A. And again, a little after. But that God, the maker of all things, is ungenerated and incomparable, and that one is so—since many things have been passed over—I think what has been said is enough for the proof.

BAS. When he is about to touch upon some wicked discourse, he prefaces it with certain things that are conceded by all, so that through the fairness shown in them, he may secure belief for himself in the rest. Nothing, he says, can exist in the substance of God, neither form, nor bulk, nor quantity, because God is entirely free from composition. Up to these words he is fair; but in what follows, he returns to himself. For he adds the blasphemy as if it were necessarily following from the premises, saying: "But if it is neither right to think, nor ever was possible, that any of these and such-like things should be conjoined with the substance, what reason will further allow us to compare the generated with the ungenerated substance?" What consistency do these things have with one another, if God is incomposite, that the Son should be incapable ^B of the similarity to Him? For tell me, will you not also say in like manner that the Son has neither form, nor bulk, nor quantity in Himself, and that He is entirely free from composition?

23. I, for my part, do not think that you would ever dare to say that the Son is anything other than incorporeal and without form and without shape, and all things that you could say of the Father. How then would it not be pious to compare Him who has no form to Him who has none; and Him who has no quantity to Him who has none; and Him who is altogether incomposite to Him who is incomposite? ^{C D}

^A But He who places likeness in kind, and equality in mass—let him explain more aptly what he considers quantity to be, apart from mass.

Eun. Therefore, he says, He is neither equal nor like, since He lacks both quantity and form.

Bas. But I place likeness in this very thing. For just as the Father is free from all composition, so the Son is altogether simple and incomposite. Indeed, I think that likeness is to be perceived not according to identity of form, but according to the very substance itself. For to those upon whom form and shape are laid, likeness exists according to identity of form; but as for a nature that admits neither form nor figure, it remains for it to have likeness in the substance itself, and to possess equality not in the dimension of masses, but in identity of power. Christ, he says, is the power of God and the wisdom of God; ^B clearly with the whole paternal power residing in Him. Whence, whatever He sees the Father doing, these things the Son also does in like manner.

Eun. But, he says, likeness that is according to substance, or comparison, or community—leaving behind no pre-eminence or difference—plainly produces equality.

Bas. How then does it leave no difference, not even that which exists in causes with those things that are from them? Then he adds:

Eun. Who is so foolish, or so bold toward impiety, as to say the Son is equal to the Father?

Bas. Let us say to him in response the words of the prophet: ^C *The face of a harlot became yours; you have lost your shame toward all.* For just as they, living chastely, besmirch those who live with decorum with their own reproaches, so does he too call those who desire to magnify the majesty of the Only-Begotten foolish and bold toward impiety, being offended by the same things by which the Jews were once provoked, saying then: *He makes Himself equal to God.*

24. And surely (let no one wonder at what I say) they seemed in a certain way to look more toward the consequence of things. For they were annoyed that He called God His Father; ^D inferring from this among themselves that by this action He made Himself equal to God; as if it necessarily follows, if He has God as His Father, that He is equal to God. Eunomius, while conceding the former, denies the latter, and brings against us the voice of the Lord saying: *The Father*

^A who sent me is greater than I. But he does not listen to the Apostle who says (69) that *He did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped.* (70) And yet, if according to your argument, "ingeneracy" were a substance, and He wished to demonstrate a superiority according to substance, He would have said: "The Ungenerate is greater than I." But your argument is that the designation of "Father" signifies an operation and not a substance. Therefore, in saying that the Father is greater than the Son, you say that the operation is greater than the work. But surely (71) every operation corresponds in measure to the things that come from it; it is great in relation to great works, and small in relation to smaller ones. Therefore, to confess in this sense that the Father is greater than the Son is nothing else than to posit an operation incommensurate with its work, and to say in vain that God moved toward the magnitude of an operation, without being able ^B to make the end equal to the operation. So it is necessary that one of two things must fail: either that the Father does not signify an operation but a substance, and thus your sophisticated argument concerning similarity (74) will be crossed out, for you posit that the Son is similar to the Father—that is, in operation; for "just as the Father wished," he says, "so He made," which is why they also call him an *image of will* (75); or, if they preserve this, they cannot call the Father greater. For every operation, when nothing external resists it, is commensurate with its own effects. Let these things be said against the dissonance of their doctrines (76).

25. But who among all is unaware of this, that something is said to be greater ^C either according to the principle of cause, or according to an abundance of power, or according to a superiority of dignity, or according to the size of mass? Therefore, as regards mass, it is not taken—and this he himself said previously; and plainly

it is so, since the "greater" in magnitudes is as much as the "lesser," and even more. But as to those things which are not encompassed by magnitude, or rather are without magnitude and entirely without quantity, who could measure them against one another? And where comparison is impossible, in what way could that which excels be recognized in them? To say that Christ, who is the power of God, is inferior in power is most childish, and belongs to those who have not even heard the voice of the Lord, who said: "I and the Father are one." And he who receives this "one" as meaning equality of power, as we shall show from the words of the Gospel themselves. For when he had said concerning those who had believed: "No one shall snatch them out of my hand"; and, "The Father, who has given them to me, is greater than all"; and, "No one is able to snatch them out of my Father's hand," he added: "I and the Father are one," clearly ^B taking "one" to mean equality and identity of power. Furthermore, if the throne of God, as we believe, is a name for dignity, what else does that seat assigned to the Son at the right hand of the Father signify, if not the equality of their dignity? And, indeed, the Lord also promises that he will come in the glory of the Father. It remains, therefore, that the word "greater" must be understood here according to the principle of cause. For since the origin of the Son is from the Father, in this respect the Father is greater, as cause and principle. Hence also the Lord said: "My Father is greater than I," meaning, clearly, insofar as he is Father. But what else does "Father" signify than his being the cause and origin of him who was begotten of him? In any case, one substance is not said to be greater or lesser than another substance, even according to your own wisdom. Therefore, both according to these people and according to the truth itself, the word "greater" ^C which is used does not in any way signify a superiority of substance. Nor would he himself say that God the Father is greater with respect to mass, since he has clearly stated that one should not entertain the idea of size in reference to God. The only remaining mode of "greater," therefore, is the one we have mentioned—I mean that of principle and cause. Such, then, is his blasphemous attempt concerning the word "greater."

26. ^D Now it is a thing worthy of wonder that, having fallen into statements so completely contradictory to one another, he was unable to perceive the conflict of his words, as if his soul's eyes had been struck by a kind of blindness; so that it is plain and conspicuous that he is as much a stranger to the peace of God which our Lord left to those who truly and sincerely believe in him, saying: "Peace I leave with you, my peace I give to you," that he not only fights with others, but also with himself.

For having called God and Father of the Only-begotten Son "greater," and having accused those who say [he is] equal of madness ^A (84), as though he himself possessed indisputable proofs of this, pause a little and consider the sort of things he writes.

EUN. But that the God of all is one, unbegotten and incomparable, many other points being omitted, I think what has been said suffices for a demonstration.

BAS. Let him be asked, therefore: if God is incomparable, from where is his superiority comprehended? For the "greater" is perceived from comparison with the things which are surpassed. How then can the same person be both "greater" and "incomparable"? But in order to show the substance of God to be different from the substance of the Only-begotten, he took the word "greater," used comparatively, to signify difference of substance; yet again, in order to drag the Only-begotten down to the equality of the creature, he legislates that the Father is incomparable—devising a new and truly incomparable way of blasphemy; ^B under the pretense of exalting and elevating God and Father, he diminishes the glory of the Only-begotten Son and God; although the Lord testifies and says: "He who does not honor the Son, does not honor the Father," and: "He who rejects me, does not reject me, but him who sent me." But the enemy of the truth, who moves them to say and write such things, saw that if he blinds them regarding the understanding of the glory of the Only-begotten, he will simultaneously take away the knowledge of God and Father himself; so that, even if they seem to bestow certain prerogatives upon God and Father, they gain no benefit from it, having been deprived of the knowledge of the way that leads to him. Since even the Jews think they glorify God, and one will hear of the Gentiles wanting ^C to say something great about God; but yet no one would say that they magnify God without faith in Christ, through whom is the access to knowledge.

27. He says, therefore, that God is incomparable, to show that the Son is equal to the creature, in that he is left behind in the scale of the glory of the Father; for things that are surpassed by an equal measure are necessarily equal to one another. And the Only-begotten Son is surpassed by God and Father, according to this man's reasoning, by as much as each of the others is. For such is what is incomparable: it is equally inaccessible and unattainable to all. But if he is left behind by the Father equally with the others, he is equal to those with whom he is left behind. What worse than this blasphemy ^D could the Jews express? Or what could be worse to hear from the Gentiles? And are they not ashamed, those who pretend to reverence the Word of God, to propose and advocate teachings that are agreeable to Jews and Greeks? For if he is not compared with God and Father (90)...

^A (90), just as neither the angels, nor the heaven, nor the sun, nor the earth, nor any of the animals or plants in it are compared, how will he have any distinction from his own creatures? And from where would he have his kinship with the One who begat him? "I," he says, "and the Father are one" (Joan. x, 30). Let us again make mention of the same saying. Tell me, is this not a word of someone comparing himself? Why do I say comparing? Nay rather, of one uniting, so to speak, and thereby declaring the most perfect likeness of nature. But he declares God to be incomparable. And the goodness of God and of our Savior Jesus Christ leads men—insofar as we are capable—through the study and exercise of good works, to attain ^B to a likeness with the God of the universe, while he says, "Be perfect, just as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matth. v, 48); yet he strips the Only-Begotten of the kinship with the One who begat him that is natural to him, as far as it lies in him to do so. But this argument will also be turned back against him. For if the Father is incomparable, from where will he provide proofs of the Son’s unlikeness? If, by comparing the essences with one another, he claims to have found the unlikeness, how can such a one be incomparable? And if he is not even compared in the first place (96), how was he able to recognize the difference? Thus, evil seems to be opposed not only to the good, but even to itself (97).

AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK II. CONCERNING THE SON.

AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK II

OF THE SON

1. Having paved the way ^A in the discourses on the God of the universe insofar as he was able, with blasphemies against the Son of God, he now lets loose his tongue against the Only-begotten God Himself. For what does he say?

EUN. And one Son. For, regarding the Only-begotten, if we had set forth the voices of the saints, through which they proclaim Him Son and begotten and creature, showing the difference of substance through the difference of names, we could have been free from cares and occupations. But because of those who think of a corporeal generation, and to whom ambiguous words are an offense, it might perhaps be necessary to say a few words about these things, too.

BAS. These are the words ^B of Eunomius. But I, if one must think of this whole discourse as a fiction, such as is set forth in the schools of vanity for the exercise of young men, so that there may be a semblance of truth in falsehood (since, as happens to them, so here all things are like shadow-boxing: a struggle, namely, against accusers who do not exist; an apology and response to an accusation not previously stated; and an address to judges who appear nowhere); if, I say, one must listen to these things in such a way, I myself cease from the examination, and I exhort everyone to busy themselves with none of the things that have been said. But if the undertaking is ^C of greater importance, and for many a suspicion has arisen that there is some concern for the truth in him, it is absolutely necessary to refute each of the things said, to the best of my ability. For what mode of examination would be more just than to compare the discourse with the evidence given to us by the Spirit, and whatever we find in harmony with them, to accept it, but what goes against them, by no means to believe, and to avoid as an enemy?

2. First, therefore, let him show which of the saints ^D

called Christ a generation and a creature; what words of the Scriptures he has for proof? For if he relies on the voice of the blessed Peter which is written in the Acts of the Apostles, where he says: ^A *Let all the house of Israel know, that God has made that same Lord and Christ, this Jesus, whom you have crucified*; first of all, the testimony has no relevance to the question at hand. For having professed that he would show that the Son was called a creature by the saints, he produces a testimony concerning God and the Father, that He made [Him]. For surely he would not say that it is permitted to him, when a discussion is being instituted concerning such great matters, to devise certain derivations and variations of terms. ^B For if we shall give an account for even an idle word on the day of judgment; much less, if we innovate anything in such great matters, will it be remitted to us without punishment. For perhaps we have been taught by the divine Scripture that the one [expression] is said as appropriate concerning God and the Father: but the Holy Spirit has shown by silence that the latter does not befit the Only-Begotten. How, therefore, would it have been safe, transforming the word *made*, to call the creator of all things a creature? For if an appellation of this kind had been appropriate to Him, it would certainly not have been passed over in silence by the Spirit. In creatures, indeed, we find that the appellation of *creature* has been taken from the word *made*: but in the Son of God, not so. For *in the beginning God made heaven and earth*. And again: *I meditated on the works of thy hands*. And, *For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, are clearly seen*. Thus, in those cases where the name is useful, Scripture employing it, ^C as not befitting the majesty of his glory, it was silent concerning our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. But yet, it is not ashamed to call the Lord of glory an axe, and a corner-stone, and a stone of stumbling, and a rock of scandal, and other names of this kind, in which there does not seem to be much praise to those who do not follow the significance of the names; but nowhere at all has it named him a creature. Yet he says that he has received this name from the very saints, so that he may involve in his calumnies not only his own equals, but also the saints who lived in olden times. 3. Moreover, besides that it is not permitted to dare such things, nor to transform the Lord’s names by one's own authority: ^D furthermore, not even does the very sentiment of the Apostle present to us that pre-eternal hypostasis of the Only-Begotten

^A with regard to which our discourse is at present. For he does not speak concerning the substance itself of the Word of God, who in the beginning was with God, but clearly and perspicuously discourses concerning Him who emptied Himself in the form of a servant, and was made conformable to the body of our humility, and was crucified through weakness. And this is known to everyone who has even slightly applied his mind to the meaning of the Apostolic expression, that he does not deliver to us a mode of theology, but declares the reasons of the dispensation. For "the Lord," he says, "and Christ, God has made this Jesus whom you crucified"; by this demonstrative word, he is, as it were, clearly pointing to His humanity and to that which was subject to the eyes of all. ^B But this person transfers the word "made" to that generation of the Only-Begotten which was from the beginning. And not even this puts him to shame, that the word "Lord" is not the name of a substance, but of authority. Wherefore, he who said that God made Him Lord and Christ speaks of the primacy and dominion over all that was entrusted to Him by the Father, and does not narrate the transition of Him to being. And these things indeed we shall demonstrate a little later, when we refute him for bringing forward the testimonies of Scripture contrary to the will of the Spirit: but now let us proceed to the words that follow. What then does this name mean for him? And why on earth does he attempt to call the Creator of all a creature? ^C Deceiving himself with a spurious sophism, he thinks that together with the difference of names, a variation of substance is also shown. 4. But who of sound mind would agree to this opinion, that it is necessary that those whose names are diverse should also have diverse substances? For the appellations of Peter and Paul, and of all men in general, are indeed diverse, but yet the substance of all is one. Wherefore, in most respects we are the same to one another; but by sole properties which are considered in each, we differ one from another. Whence also, names are not significant of substances, but of the properties by which each is designated. Therefore, when we hear Peter, we do not ^D by this name understand his substance (but by substance I now mean the material subject, which is in no way signified by the name), but we impress in our thought the properties which are considered concerning him. For immediately by this word we understand the son of Jonah, him from Bethsaida, the brother

of Andrew, who was called from being a fisherman to the office of the apostleship, who, because he excelled in faith, received into himself the building up of the Church: none of which is essence, if essence is understood as substance. Wherefore the name indeed marks out for us the character of Peter, but it by no means exhibits the essence itself. ^A Again, when we hear "Paul," we understand a concurrence of other properties: the Tarsian, the Hebrew, the Pharisee according to the law, the disciple of Gamaliel, the persecutor of the Churches of God by zeal, who was led to the recognition of the truth by a terrible vision, the apostle of the Gentiles. For all these things are circumscribed by one name, "Paul." And yet, if it were true that those whose names are different have essences that are in the contrary case, then surely both Paul and Peter and, in a word, all men, ought to be of essences different from one another. But since no one is so ignorant and so uninstructed in the common nature that he is led in mind to say this—for "Out of clay," he says, "you were fashioned, just as I am"—where Scripture signifies nothing else than that the essence of all is the same, he who feigns that a diversity of essence follows from a diversity of names is a liar. For the nature of things does not follow names, but names were invented after things. For if that were true, it would be necessary that those who have the same appellations should also be of one and the same essence. Therefore, since those who are perfect in virtue are held worthy of the appellation of God, men would be coessential with the God of all. But just as to say this is manifest madness, ^B so too that argument savors of a not dissimilar dementia.

5. It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, that names do not signify the essence in the Father and the Son, but are indicative of properties; so that there is no room for an argument which, from the diversity of names, introduces a contrariety of essences. But by this very way he overthrows himself before all else. For if "creature" and "begotten" differ from each other, the essences of the Only-Begotten will be diverse, following the diversity of names. But if to say this is the part of the insane, it is no more the part of those who are in possession of their senses. ^C And he even pretends to have innumerable proofs that the Son has been called a "creature" by the saints; but as if hastening to some other more important matters, he postpones the mention of them for the present. And this is also an artificial and crafty malice: to prefer silence when he is destitute of words. For if he had even a shadow of testimony,

^A from the Scriptures to confirm his own argument, he would then at last have come to the correction of the weaker ones, and would have assuaged the harm arising from ambiguous terms, if indeed any such harm has ever happened or will happen to anyone. For who is so entirely carnal 27 in mind, and so ignorant of divine words, as, upon hearing of a divine generation, to be carried away to bodily fantasies, where there is the union of male and female, conception in the womb, formation, shape, and, at the proper times, progress into the light? Who is so beast-like, that, upon hearing that God the Word proceeded from God, and hearing that Wisdom was begotten of God, he should fall away in his thoughts to fleshly passions?

6. But this also ^B is a form of argument devised by him along with others, so that for the sake of compassion towards the simpler of his brethren, he might appear to have taken upon himself the labor of teaching. And while he corrects, forsooth, the bodily suspicions that arise from this appellation, he does not avoid the harms that are born from the Lord being called a "facture." Yet if anyone 31 imagines a bodily generation, that same person would also be led to the material modes of facture. For surely the weak-minded man will not understand a certain division, and migration, and flux of the generating substance from the word "begetting" ^C, and not be led to conceive of matter brought in from without, from non-existence, into the, as you say, substance of the facture? Why, then, does he heal the ailments of the brethren's reasoning only by half, and while taking care of those who imagine a bodily generation, does he overlook those who stumble at the denomination of "facture"? Because he knows that to be "begotten" is hostile to his own dogmas, since the begotten must necessarily be related and unchangeable in relation to the begetter; but to be "made" is a friend and ally to his own hypotheses, because it presents ^D the conception of something foreign, and entirely alien, and in every way estranged from the one who made it. Then...

he adds to these things, saying:

EUN. We call the Son a "Genitura" [Offspring/Begotten One], according to the doctrine of the Scriptures; not by understanding the substance as one thing, and the thing signified as another thing besides it, but that it is the very hypostasis which the name signifies, as the appellation corresponds truly to the substance.

BAS. ^B Even in these things, he openly opposes the truth, yet he speaks in a way consistent with himself. For just as in the previous arguments he determined that the "Ingenerate" is significant of His substance in the God of all, so here too he claims that the "Genitura" signifies the substance of the Son: so that, by the opposition of the begotten to the ingenerate, he might show the Only-Begotten to be in a contrary state to the Father according to His very substance. For these reasons, he prescribes words outside the usage of the divine Spirit, by calling the Son a "Genitura." Whence did he receive these? From what doctrine? From what prophet? From what apostle who attributed this surname to him? For I, indeed, find this word expressed thus in no place of Scripture.

^C 7. And yet he boasts of having taken these appellations from the doctrine of the Spirit. For it was a small thing for him to give trouble to men, if he did not also behave insolently toward the Spirit Himself. We have learned in many places that the Father has begotten: but that the Son is a "Genitura," we have not heard to this day. For a child, he says, is born to us: a son is given to us; and his name is called, not "Genitura," but the Angel of Great Counsel. And yet, if "Genitura" were significant of substance, the Spirit would surely have taught us no other name than that which would clearly declare His substance. And again, Peter, who was deemed worthy of those beatitudes because of his recognition of the truth, did not say, "You are the Genitura"; but, "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God." And Paul, even though he filled all his writings with the appellation of the Son, will nowhere be found to have made mention of a "genitura": a name which this man produces with great confidence, as if he had received it from a divine document. ^D For not even here is it permitted to him that, by changing and transforming the word "begat," which is said of the Father, he should call the Son of God a "Genitura." For it is not fitting that he who is educated in divine fear should easily leap to that which appears from the sequence of words, but that...

he should be content with the names situated in the Scripture and remain in them, and through them, as befits God, perform glorification. For if those who from the beginning translated the Hebrew language into the Greek tongue did not dare to translate certain names, but retained the Hebrew word itself, such as Sabaoth, Adonai, Eloi, and whatever else of that kind, showing this reverence not only in divine names but also in many others, how much fear does it behoove us to have concerning the names of the Lord? And yet, when would they have dared to fashion certain names from themselves, they who did not even venture to interpret some, lest they should weaken the clarity of the expression by an inappropriate meaning? ^B

8. But if, he says, God begat, why is it not necessary to address the one begotten as "Genitura"? Because it is dreadful for us to address with our own names him to whom God has granted the name which is above every name. "You are my Son," he says, "I have this day begotten you." And yet, according to the reasoning of these men, it would have been more consistent, because he is begotten, to be called "Genitura" and not Son; but it is not said. Therefore, he who has the judgment of Christ before his eyes and knows how great a risk it is to take away or to add anything to what has been passed down by the Spirit, must not strive to innovate from himself, but to be content with those things which have been previously announced by the saints. Therefore, to dare what neither common custom nor the usage of the Scriptures has admitted, is this not the height of madness? For what father or mother, if they are disposed benevolently and gently towards one who is from them, would, omitting the name of son or child, call him "Genitura"? "Child (nate)," for he says, "go into the vineyard." And elsewhere: "God will see for himself a sheep for a victim, child (nate)." And again Isaac: "Who are you, child (nate)?" And, "Son (fili), do not neglect the discipline of the Lord." And, "A wise son gladdens his father." And anything else of that kind. But no one is shown to have ever called one who is from himself "Genitura." ^C And the cause is clear: that son and child are names of living beings, while "Genitura" is not necessarily so. For even that which is cast out in abortions before it has been formed can be called "Genitura," yet such a thing is not worthy of the appellation of child (nati). Furthermore, the fruits of the earth are called "Geniturae," but children (nati) not so. "For I will not drink," he says, "of the genimine (fruit/genitura) of this vine." We rarely find this appellation applied to living beings. And certainly where it is used ^D

^A it is seen to be taken from an animal that is reviled and assumed to be an image of wickedness. "For you are," he says, "broods of vipers." For this reason, I think, common usage has shunned this appellation, and divine Scripture appears to avoid it, most especially in the case of the only-begotten Son of God. But it also did not accept the appellation of "born," as having much of human character. The Apostle shows this, while he calls the Lord "Son" over and over, and honors Him with other various names, calling Him "firstborn," and "image," and "radiance," but avoids the appellation of "geniture" (having been born). But if this man, or anyone else of those who are at the head of this doctrine, says otherwise, let him show it, and we will grant them to strike out all these things. But he would by no means be able, unless, imitating the impious Marcion, he should remove some things from the divine oracles ^B and falsely interject others. Thus, then, the word "geniture" has been demonstrated to be alien both to common usage and to the usage of the Scriptures.

Let us see, however, now if it be possible that this name be used of the very substance of the Son. For he says himself: EUN. It is by no means possible to conceive of the substance as one thing, and the thing signified as another thing besides it; but it is the hypostasis (subsistence) itself that the name signifies, since this appellation truly denotes the substance. BAS. These dogmas of yours are truly worthy of the judges you have fabricated. For as in a market of dreams ^C or an assembly of drunkards, where no one hears or understands what is being said, you legislate with great license, thinking it enough for all proof that you have said it yourself. For who does not know that those nouns which are uttered absolutely and by themselves signify the things subject to them, but those which are spoken in respect to others indicate only the habit which they have toward the things of which they are spoken? For example, "man" and "horse" and "ox" indicate each one of the things that are named. But "son," or "servant," or "friend" signify only the affinity which they have with D the name joined to them. Therefore, he who hears "geniture" is not carried in his mind to conceive of some substance, but understands it to be joined with something else. For a "geniture" is called the "geniture" of someone. But that which does not produce the notion of any substance, but only [refers] to something else...

^A that designates a relation, to define this as a substance, is this not the height of madness? And yet, a little before, it was demonstrated by us that even absolute nouns, even if they seem most strongly to signify some subject, do not exhibit the substance itself, but designate certain properties around it.

10. But that most wise man, who has consumed his whole life in vain arts, does not blush to say that "geniture" signifies the very substance of the Only-Begotten. Peruse how much absurdity this contains. For if the substance is a geniture, and conversely, if whatever is a geniture, this is a substance, all genitures will be consubstantial with one another. From this, then, what will follow according to his argument? The Artificer of all things will be found to have the same substance as all those who have partaken of generation. For he will certainly not say that "geniture" signifies substance in the case of the Son, but no longer retains the same notion in the case of the rest who partake of generation. Unless he can state some clear and irrefutable reason why the same appellation cannot have the ^B same force equally in all cases. But he could not. For whatever account of "geniture" he might devise, it will apply equally to all begotten things. The greatest proof of the truth of this argument is the very mind of each one of the hearers. For let everyone ask himself, when he hears, "This is the geniture of that person," what notion he forms. Is it that the begotten is the substance of the begetter? Or is that ridiculous, while this is true, that it was brought into being by him in a begotten manner? This, then, will be fitting to be said in the same way both of the Only-Begotten and of any of those who have been begotten. And let no one, because it is a common relation, think that the dignity of the Only-Begotten is destroyed. For the Son does not differ from others in that ^C he is related to something in a certain way, but the preeminence of God over mortal things is manifest in the property of the substance. Consider, however, to what absurdity the doctrine of these men leads. If a geniture is called the geniture of another, as common usage confirms, and no one contradicts it, but this same geniture, according to their doctrine, signifies substance in the case of the Son, it will be the substance of him whose geniture it is called. From this consequence, therefore, it will be brought about that the appellation of "geniture" no longer signifies the substance of the Only-Begotten, which is what they are straining to prove, but [the substance] of the God of all things. For if it is not possible for you to conceive ^D of a substance as one thing, and something else—

aside from it—as a generation, then to speak of substance and to speak of generation is the same thing. But since the Son is the generation of God, then the Son will be the substance of God, if "generation" denotes "substance." And thus, according to his argument, the generation will appear to be the substance of the Unbegotten. But if the conclusion is ridiculous, let God inherit the premises of the shame. For the argument seems to be of such a nature that, once it has wandered away from the truth, it is carried off into many dangerous absurdities by the sequence of its own error. ^A

11. But these are, as it were, prologues and preparations for blasphemy; but he brings in the main point of the evil in what follows, saying:

EUN. That the substance of the Son was indeed born when it was not before its own constitution, but was born before all things by the will of the Father.

BAS. He still persists in the same artifices. He discourses to us about the substance of the Son, as if he were speaking of something other than the Son himself, ^B and by this means he prepares/soothes the hearing for blasphemy; for he does not openly say that the Son was born from nothing, but that his substance was born when it was not. Tell me, before what things was it not? Do you see his cavil? He compares substance with itself, so that it may seem to all that he is saying something acceptable, not saying that it did not exist before the ages, nor simply that it did not exist, but that it did not exist before its own constitution. But tell me, do you say that the substance of the Father is older than its own constitution? ^C For if the substance of the Son is not subject to times, nor is the term "before" understood in this way in his argument, then his statement is empty and vain, and therefore not even worthy of an answer. Yet it will be no less true of the God of all things for those who wish to carry over this vanity. For to say that God did not exist before his own constitution, and to say that he existed before himself, is of the same madness. But if he accepts "before" temporally regarding the substance of the Son, ^D and will say that his substance is born from non-existence, then he might as well say regarding God—but let us see what the sequence of his logic produces now.

^A First, he posits time—or, if you wish, ages—prior to the Creator of the ages. Then, following his own blasphemies, he will go on to say that the Father himself, when he was not Father from the beginning, eventually became so.

12. Yet, if it is honest and proper for the blessedness of God to be Father, how is it that what was proper did not belong to him from the beginning? For they will certainly categorize this deficiency as either ignorance of the better, or as weakness: as ignorance, if he discovered the better only later; as weakness, if he knew and understood it, but could not attain what was best. But if (which it is not right to say) it is not good for him to be Father, why out of mutation would he choose the worse? But may the blasphemy recoil upon its authors; for the God of all is Father from eternity, and never began to be Father. ^B For he was not hindered by a lack of power from fulfilling his will, nor did he wait for the passing of certain ages, so that—as is the case with men and other animals—the power to beget might come to him upon the completion of his maturity, ^C and he might then achieve what he desired (for it is the hallmark of madmen even to think and say such things). Rather, he possesses a fatherhood extended, so to speak, in common with his own eternity. Therefore, just as the Son is before the ages and is always, he never at any time began to be; but from the moment the Father exists, the Son exists, and immediately with the notion of the Father, the notion of the Son also enters the mind. For the Father is, of course, the Father of a Son. There is no origin for the Father, but the Father is the origin of the Son; there is nothing intermediate between them. How then was he not from the beginning—for this is what is meant by that expression, "before his own constitution," which is asserted in their sophistries—he who has nothing conceived to exist before himself except the one from whom he has his being, being advanced not by an interval, but by the dignity of cause? If, therefore, the union of the Son with God and the Father is shown to be eternal, with our thought moving from the Son to the Father without any vacuum, ^D but rather binding the Son inseparably to the Father, then he who is separated by no intermediary, what opening does he still leave for the wicked blasphemy of those who say that he was brought into being from non-existence?

13. Furthermore, one must also marvel at the madness of these men...

^A for they do not understand that by saying the Son is from non-existence, they not only declare him to be younger than the Father, but also younger than that by which they separate the Only-Begotten from the Father. For if there is something between the Father and the Son, it must necessarily be older than the existence of the Son. What, then, could this be? What else but an age or time? For whoever considers the life of the Father to be older than the life of the Only-Begotten, by what other standard would he measure it in order to say that he has found a remainder, if not by the interval of some ages or times? But if this is true, the Scripture which says that the ages were made through him is false, as is that which teaches that all things were made through him, since the ages are obviously included among all things.

If, however, they are going to say that they do not deny the Son was begotten before the ages, let them not fail ^B to notice that what they concede in words, they in truth take away. For we shall ask those who produce the substance of the Only-Begotten from non-existence: "When he did not exist, as you say, what was that interval? What name will you invent for it?" For common usage subjects every interval either to times or to ages; since what time is in sensible things, this the nature of an age is in things superior to the world. But if they, in their wisdom, can invent a third thing, let them speak. But as long as they are silent, let them not fail to notice that they are establishing the substance of the Only-Begotten as being subsequent to the ages. For if there were any interval older than the Son, which obviously extended as far as the life of the Father, it would certainly be one of these. But there is not, nor shall there be, any thought older than the existence of the Only-Begotten. For the existence of the Word of God, which was in the beginning with God, will be found to be ^C prior to everything that can be thought of in the order of seniority. Even if the mind, deceiving itself with countless imaginations and occupying itself with the fictions of non-existent things, should conceive of things that do not exist, it will still find no contrivance whatever by which it could extend itself beyond the beginning of the Only-Begotten, or leave the life of him who is Life in itself inferior to its own movement, or by its own thought transcend the origin of the Word of God, or imagine for itself ages bereft of the God of the ages.

^A

14. But when he has taken away the glory due to the Only-begotten, notice with what words he decks him out.

EUN. The substance of the Son, he says, is generated before all things, by the will of God and the Father.

BAS. He attributes this great thing to the Son, that he is older than the creation, and that he pre-exists his own works, thinking it sufficient for the glory of the Creator of all things if he is placed before his own creatures. For having, as far as in him lay, alienated him from the communion which he has with God and the Father, he grants him glory in this, that he prefers him to the creatures. Then, giving vent to blasphemy with the utmost impudence, he encompasses us with what he considers the inescapable force of syllogisms.

EUN. For either God generated the Son, he says, when he was existing, or when he was not existing. But if when he was not existing, let no one, he says, accuse me of rashness; but if when he was existing, the account entails not only absurdity and blasphemy, but the height of all ^B folly; for he who exists has no need of generation.

BAS. This, then, is that much-bruited sophism, discovered long ago by others, but now absolutely and perfectly wrought out by these men with their shameless and impudent tongues. But we shall first remind the hearers that this is a case where, because many through ignorance understand the generation of the Son in a human manner, necessity has forced us into these arguments; that this is a case of one drawing back untutored souls from corporeal notions to spiritual contemplation; who, because animals, while not existing previously, are then generated, and because he who is born today did not exist yesterday, transfers this very notion to the hypostasis of the Only-begotten. And because he is generated, he says, he did not exist before the generation. So magnificently does this theologian explain to us the generation of the Only-begotten, and with such words ^C does he cure the infirmities of our brethren—worthy, if anyone is, of hearing the proverb: "Physician, heal thyself." Yet what remedy shall we bring him for this absurd disease of the mind, if not the words which the Holy Spirit has spoken to us through the blessed John: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God"? By these two phrases the evangelist has shut out this disease of the soul, ^D as we can neither transcend the one nor overtake the other. For it is not possible that anything

can be thought of as older than the "beginning"; for it would no longer be a beginning, if it had something outside itself; nor is it possible for those who in their reasoning have passed beyond the "Was" to go over into a "when it was not." For to think that it was not is to destroy the word "Was." For if the beginning were of those things which are referred to another, as "the beginning of wisdom," and "the beginning of a good path," and "In the beginning God created," it might perhaps have been possible for those who consist of such a beginning, through contemplation, to transcend the generation; but since the meaning of this "beginning," as being absolute and having no relation to anything else, denotes the highest nature, how is he not ridiculous who imagines anything beyond this, or attempts with his reasonings to transcend it? ^B Furthermore, the "Was" extends itself together with that which is insuperable in this beginning. For the "Was" does not indicate an existence from time, as in, "There was a man in the land of Ausitis"; and, "There was a man from Armathaim"; and, "The earth was invisible"; but the evangelist himself in another discourse showed us the meaning of this word "Was," by saying: "Who is, and who was, and" the Almighty. For such as the "is," such also is the "was," eternal likewise and timeless. But to say that he who is in the beginning is not existing, is neither for one who preserves the notion of the beginning, nor for one who joins to it the existence of the Only-begotten. For while the "older than" the beginning is ^C unthinkable, the being of the Word of God is inseparable from it. So that, however much you may wish to go back with the curious disquisitions of your mind, you will not be able to pass beyond the "was," and to fare forth with your reasonings outside of it.

15. Let it be asked of us in turn: Was the Word of God in the beginning with God, or did he come to be later? If he was, "Refrain your tongue from evil," from that blasphemy, namely, with which you say, "He was not": but if—which it is not even lawful to say— ^D

^A I shall use words more appropriate to you, for this discourse surpasses the limit not only of blasphemy but of folly, that men should demand an accounting of the words of the Spirit, and profess themselves disciples of the Gospel, and yet rise up against the Gospel itself. For observe how diligently, how clearly the divine voices bear witness to the generation of the Son, which was before the ages. For since Matthew became the interpreter of the generation according to the flesh, as he himself says: "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David" (Matt. 1. 1.); and Mark made the preaching of John the beginning of the Gospel, saying: "The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, as it is written in Isaiah the prophet: The voice of one crying in the wilderness" (Mark 1. 1; Isa. 40. 3.); and Luke also approached the theology through corporal beginnings; necessarily the evangelist John, having come last to the writing, having raised his mind above everything sensible, and the time that follows such things, nay rather, having been raised by the power of the Spirit, approached Him who is beyond all things, all but testifying himself, that "even if we have known Christ according to the flesh, yet now we know him so no longer" (II Cor. 5. 16). For having taken hold of the very beginning, and having left all bodily and temporal notions below his own theology, he surpassed the preceding preachings by the magnificence of his knowledge. It is not from Mary, he says, that the beginning is, nor from these times. But what? "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (John 1. 1). Eternal existence, generation free from passion, the union with the Father, the majesty ^B of nature—all this he encompassed in a few words, and by the addition of "was" he led [the thought] back to the beginning, as if stopping the mouths of those who blaspheme by saying, "He was not," and cutting off from afar the entrances for such sophistries. Then, through the theology, having impressed as it were a clear description of the nature of the Only-Begotten, as if to those who already know, he points it out with the voice, saying: "This was in the beginning with God" (John 1. 2). Again here, by the addition of "was," he connects the generation of the Only-Begotten to the eternity of the Father. And again: "The life was, and the life was the light of men, and the light was the true light" (John 1. 4, 9). But even though the doctrine is thus fortified on all sides by additions of eternity, ^C yet all the testimonies of the Spirit are rejected, and as if he did not even seem to hear John so frequently crying out the word "Was": [they suggest] he did not exist—

^A existing, he says, he was begotten. Therefore he was begotten later, by way of an addition. But if this was not so in the beginning, as you say, what clearer battle against the voices of the Gospels in which we have believed could anyone demonstrate?

16. And indeed, to one who is an equitable judge of things, will it not be proved that, just as the eye, having departed from illuminated places, necessarily ceases from its action on account of the deprivation of light; so too the mind, if it is forced externally by imaginings away from that which is, with the truth failing like a certain light, becomes confused and, laboring in stupidity, ceases to understand? Therefore, neither can the eye use vision outside of light, nor can the soul, having been carried away from the concept of the Only-Begotten, have the use of understanding. For to fall away from the truth is a certain deprivation of vision and blindness of mind. Wherefore, vain is the mind, and blinded, and completely destitute of understanding, that thinks it has apprehended things older than the Only-Begotten, not otherwise than if anyone should testify to the acuteness of vision in an eye that fixes its gaze into darkness. For "In thy light," he says, "we shall see light" (Ps. xxxv, 10). But he who claims to have understood when the light did not yet exist is similar to those who, in a frantic emotion of the mind, seem to themselves to see things that are not present. For those things which are beyond the Son are not understood: since what visible light is to the eye, this God the Word is to the mind. "For he was," he says, "the true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" (Joan. 1, 9). Wherefore, a soul which is not enlightened is incapable of understanding. How then could anything beyond the generation of the light be comprehended? It was fitting, I think, for those who had even the slightest care for the truth, once they had abandoned corporeal likenesses and had ceased to soil the concepts of God through material imaginations, then at last to follow the theology handed down to us by the holy Spirit, and instead of those questions—which differ in nothing from riddles, and the adoption of which on either side is dangerous—to understand a generation worthy of God, impassible, impartible, indivisible, timeless, [being led] toward the divine generation, likening it to a ray shining forth from a light; and to conceive of the image of the invisible God, not according to artificial

later fashioned after the archetype, ^A but co-existing and having come into existence with the one who established the archetype—in that it is the archetype, being—not imprinted through imitation, as if in some seal of the entire nature of the Father having been marked upon the Son. And if you wish, such as the substance of the arts which, from those who teach, passes in its entirety to those being taught; with nothing lacking for those who teach, and the perfection being added to those who are learning. Or this, indeed, is not accurate for the sake of comparison, on account of the passing of time. But it is more appropriate to say that it is as the nature of thoughts, co-existing without time with the movements of the mind.

17. And let no one calumniate my statement to me, if anything in the examples does not entirely correspond to the matters at hand. For it is not possible for small and base things to be fitted with precision to divine and eternal things, but only so far as is sufficient to refute the dissimulation of those who are not able to grasp an impassible generation in their mind. The Son is said to be—and is—an image generated, and He is the radiance of the glory of God, and wisdom, and power, and the righteousness of God; not as a habit, nor as an aptitude, but a living and active substance, and He is the radiance of the glory of God. ^B Wherefore He also shows the Father in Himself in His entirety, shining forth from His entire majesty. Is it not, then, the height of absurdity to say that the glory of God does not have radiance, or that the wisdom of God was not at some time together with God? But if He was, he says, He is not begotten. Let us answer, then, that because He is begotten, He was; not having His existence as unbegotten, but being always and co-existing with the Father, from whom He also has the cause of His existence. When, then, was He brought forth into being by the Father? From when the Father is. But the Father is from eternity, he says; therefore, the Son is also from eternity, conjoined by generation to the unbegotten nature of the Father. ^C That this is not our own wording, we shall place before their eyes the very voices of the Holy Spirit. ^D

Let us take from the Gospel that which says: *In the beginning was the Word*; ^A and let us take from the Psalm, as if spoken in the person of the Father: *From the womb, before the daystar, I have begotten thee*; and by putting both together, let us say that he both was and has been begotten. But the word "I have begotten" signifies the cause from which he has the principle of his existence; the word "was," however, indicates his existence as devoid of time and as sempiternal. But Eunomius, contending for his own deceit, thinks that he is leading the argument to an absurdity.

EUN. For if, he says, the Son was before his own generation, he was unbegotten.

BAS. But this "before the generation," O vain man, is either entirely non-existent, or it is a figment of the mind resting upon no underlying reality. But what is the point of contradicting the senseless? For this is much the same as if we were to contend with someone who had lost the use of his reason through phrenitis. Or if it refers to any of the things that exist, it will also lead to the notion of the ages. But if all the ages are understood as being below the generation of the Only-begotten, being His own creatures, he who seeks for something older than the Son’s substance is vain. For he seeks nothing more alien than if he were to ask even concerning the Father, whether He existed before His own constitution or not. For just as there, the question is foolish—namely, to seek for something superior in Him who is devoid of a principle and is unbegotten—so too here, regarding Him who is with the Father from eternity, and who has nothing intermediate between Himself and His Begetter, ^B to raise questions of time regarding the Prior is truly a mark of equal dementia. For it will be just as if someone were to ask what would be after the death of Him who is immortal, and to inquire what existed before the generation of the Sempiternal. But they, because the absence of a principle in the Father is called eternity, conclude that the absence of a principle is the same thing as eternity, and because the Son is not unbegotten, they do not admit that He is even eternal. However, these differ greatly in their meaning. For "unbegotten" is said of that which has no principle of its own self, nor any cause of its existence; whereas "eternal" is used of that which is older in being than all time and every age. Whence the Son is both not unbegotten and is eternal. But some already deem even the ages worthy of the appellation of "eternal," as if they had obtained this name from the fact that they are "always." But we consider it to be of the same madness both to provide the testimony of eternity to the creatures and to deprive the Lord of the creatures of this confession. ^C

18. But as for the argument leading to Eunomius’s impudence, what does he say?

EUN. We, however, remaining in those things which have been demonstrated both long ago by the saints and now by us,—with

neither the substance of God admitting generation, nor yet any other thing being subject to the generation of the Son, we say that the Son was generated while not existing. ^A

BAS. Who has been so ambitious in piety? Who has so prided himself on being a lover of Christ, as these men do in their words of insult and dishonor, taking pleasure in those things that overthrow the glory of the Only-Begotten? Will you not cease, O impious man, to call Him who truly exists—the fountain of life, the dispenser of existence to all things that exist—"non-existent"? He who found for Himself an appellation proper and suitable to His own eternity in the discourse with His own servant Moses, naming Himself as the one who is; for "I am," He says, "He who is." And no one will gainsay that these things were spoken from the person of the Lord, unless, that is, he has the Jewish veil laid upon his own heart ^B at the reading of Moses.

For it is written, that the angel of the Lord appeared to Moses in the bush in a flame of fire. Therefore, having placed the angel first in the narrative, the Scripture subjoins the voice of God. For He said, it says, to Moses: "I am the God of your father Abraham," and after a few words again: "I am He who is." Who, then, is the same being both angel and God? Is it not He of whom we have learned that His name is called the Angel of the Great Counsel? I, for my part, do not think there is need of more for a demonstration; but to those who are lovers of Christ, even this reminder is sufficient, while for those who are incurably ill, no benefit will come from the multitude of things being said. ^C For even if later He became the "Angel of the Great Counsel," yet He did not disdain the name of angel even before that.

For not only here will we find our Lord named by the Scripture as both angel and God, but Jacob also, recounting the vision to the women, says: "And the angel of God said to me." And after a few words from the same: "I am the God who appeared to you in the place where you anointed a pillar for me." And yet there, upon the pillar, it was said to Jacob: "I am the Lord God of Abraham your father, and the God of Isaac." The one, therefore, who is called an angel here, is the same one who says there that He had been manifested ^D to Jacob. Wherefore it is discovered to be altogether in a flame of fire.

And it is manifest to all, that where ^B both angel and God are addressed as the same, it is the Only-Begotten who is signified, manifesting Himself according to generation to human beings, and announcing the will of the Father to His own saints. Wherefore, even in the case of Moses, one who called himself He who is, could be understood as none other than God the Word, who was ^C in the beginning with God.

19. But they feared not to call the Son not-existing. And while the fool said in his heart, "There is no God," these did not merely think so, but even spoke in wickedness, and did not decline to commit it to writing for future time, having dared to call God not-existing. And since they see that not even the demons themselves deny that God exists, these men, returning in their argument to a later time, there fulfill their own impious desire, blaspheming that the Son at some time was not, as if He were not by His own nature, but had been brought into existence by God by grace. Then, too, there is that utterance which Paul let forth regarding idols, saying: "You served those which by nature are not gods"; and Jeremiah: "And they swore by those which are not gods"; and the most wise Esther: "Do not deliver, O Lord, Thy scepter to those which are not." If these men say this regarding the true God, how could they any longer justly claim for themselves the appellation ^D of Christians? For indeed elsewhere that same Apostle, who spoke in the Spirit of God, calls the nations "not-existing" because they were deprived of the knowledge of God, saying that "God chose the things which are not." Since, therefore, God is both truth and life, those who are not united to God who is, according to faith, but are addicted to the non-existing falsehood through the wandering around idols, they have justly, I think, been called "not-existing" on account of the deprivation of truth and the alienation from life. But even when writing to the Ephesians, as to those who were genuinely united to Him who is by knowledge, he named them "existing" in a special way, saying: "To the saints who are, and to the faithful in Christ Jesus." For so did those who were before us pass it down, and we have found it in ancient copies.»

^A And he did not even deign to count as worthy of the title of "the servants of Christ" those whom he calls "non-existent," nor did he endure to call our God by that name, but rather called the one who brought creation from non-being into being, "non-existent." One might perceive his contempt even more clearly from the things by which he pretends, forsooth, to honor the Lord.

EUM. We do not, he says, make the essence of the Only-Begotten common with those things that have come to be from non-being, since that which is not is not an essence; but we assign to Him such preeminence as it is necessary for the Creator to have over His own handiwork.

BAS. Having led the argument to this point through his constructions, he acts with pretended benevolence in his choice of words, and says that he does not make the essence of the Only-Begotten common with those that are from non-being. Yet, if the God of the universe, because He is unbegotten, must necessarily differ from the begotten, and if all begotten things have a common subsistence ^B from non-being, how are these not necessarily joined together according to their nature? For just as there the "inaccessible" separates the natures, so here "equal honor" brings them into one and the same identity. For by saying that the Son and those things which were made by Him are from non-being, and by making their nature common in this respect, they do not say that they give Him an essence similar to that of things from non-being. And furthermore, even in this, as if he himself were the Lord, dispensing to the Only-Begotten as much dignity as he wishes, he frames his speech thus: "We assign," he says, "to Him such preeminence as it is necessary for the Creator to surpass His own handiwork." He did not say, "We conceive" or "We opine," as was fitting to say regarding God; but, "We assign," as if he himself were the master of the measure of distribution. And how much preeminence does he give? "As much," he says, "as it is necessary for the Creator to surpass His own handiwork." This does not yet provide testimony of a difference in essence. For ^C men, indeed, surpass their own works by their craft, yet they are of the same essence as them; as the potter with the clay, and the shipwright with the wood. For both are likewise bodies, and likewise sensible, and earthly.

20. Having granted such a difference between the Son and creation, he now acts maliciously regarding the very concept of the Only-Begotten.

EUM. For this reason, he says, He is the Only-Begotten, because, begotten and created by the power of the Unbegotten alone, by the only one, He has become the most perfect minister. ^D

^A Basilius. I do not know what I ought to find more annoying in the things he has said: whether the craftiness which he has wickedly devised regarding the name of the Only-Begotten, interpreting His meaning both contrary to the custom of men and contrary to the pious tradition of the Scriptures (for "Only-Begotten" is not used in common speech for one who is made by the Only One, but for the one who alone is begotten); or the blasphemy regarding the "creature," which he has deliberately joined to the word "begotten," so as to show that the Lord possesses the designation of having been begotten in no way differently from created things. Just as the expressions, "I have begotten and exalted sons," and "Israel is my firstborn son," were used, so too, he claims, the Lord was named Son, not possessing the name that is above every name, but as being judged worthy of this designation on an equal footing with others. ^B But they take refuge in the saying of Solomon, and from there, as if from a fortress, they attack the faith. For because it was said from the person of Wisdom, "The Lord created me," they have supposed that it is allowable for them to call the Lord a creature. But I, though I have much to say regarding this word—first, that it is used only once in all the Scriptures; and second, that it is used in a book which holds much of its meaning concealed and proceeds for the most part through proverbs, parables, and dark sayings and riddles, so that nothing certain or clear can be derived from it—I omit saying these things, so as not to prolong my speech with unnecessary diversions, especially since the inquiry into those things which have been misunderstood by them has been deferred by us to its own proper place, in which this part also, God granting, will be examined. And I think, indeed—and let it be said with God—that a much more consistent meaning of the text in question will appear upon examination, and one that brings no danger. In the meantime, however, let us not leave even that unremarked: that there are still ^C others among the interpreters, who, having attained a more accurate understanding of the Hebrew words, have rendered it, "The Lord possessed me," instead of "created me." We know this from the Hexapla, and it would not be tiresome to write down their interpretation here. Aquila, therefore: "The Lord possessed me as the head of his ways, from the beginning of his works." Symmachus: "The Lord possessed me as the beginning of his ways, before his operation." Theodotion: "The Lord possessed me as the beginning of his way before his operation from of old." It is well known that the Seventy interpreters wrote "created me" instead of "possessed me," which reading the Eunomians followed as being most suited to establishing their own impious dogma. But Basilius did not speak in vain when he said that those interpreters who had attained the meaning of the Hebrew words ^D more accurately and truthfully had rendered it not "created me," but "possessed me." For thus the Hebrew is translated word for word in the Hexapla: "The Lord possessed me as the beginning of his way before his works from of old." It is read a little differently in the Vulgate, namely in this manner: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning." Gregory, wishing to confirm the opinion of our dearest brother Basilius, treated this same passage in Book III against Eunomius.

^A They have attained understanding of the meaning of the Hebrew, having published "Possessed me" instead of "Created." This will be a very great obstacle to them regarding the blasphemy of the creature. For he who said, "I have possessed a man through God," it is clear used this expression not because he created Cain, but because he begat him.

EUN. For this reason, he says, he is "Only-Begotten," because, having been begotten and created by the One alone, he has become a most perfect minister.

BAS. If, therefore, he is called Only-Begotten not because he is the only one begotten, but because he is from the One alone, and if to be created is the same as to be begotten according to you; why do you not also call him "Unicreated," you who so easily both conceive and utter everything? But, as I see it, no man is "only-begotten" according to our argument, because birth exists for all from a union. Nor was Sarah the mother of an "only-begotten" son, because she did not beget him alone, but together with Abraham. And if your position holds, it is necessary to relearn the whole life, ^B so that the name indicates not a solitude lacking brothers, but an emptiness of those who beget together. But now the creation, too, is lessened in dignity compared with the cause of God the Word, to such an extent that it itself fails to be "only-begotten," just as much as the Son participated with the Father in creation; and yet even this is not conceded by them. For they call him a most perfect minister. How then, according to you, was the creation not also effected by the One alone, when you attach God the Word to the Father like some inanimate instrument? Unless one shall also deny that a shipwright made the ship alone, because he used instruments for its construction! Consequently, the creation is "only-begotten," as are its parts; not only the invisible powers, but even sensible bodies, and the basest of these, gnats, and locusts, and frogs. For "He spoke, and they were made" (Ps. CXLVIII, 5). ^C For what ministry could he need who creates by will alone, with the creation subsisting together with the command? But what then? How, even according to us, are all things through the Son? Because the divine will, having set forth from the first cause as if from a certain fountain, through its own image ^D

^A of God the Word, proceeds unto operation. But he who called the only-begotten Son a minister, attributing this as a great thing to him—that he is fit for the service of the things commanded—does so for the following reason: if he possesses his majesty not in the fact that he is God perfect, but in the fact that he is a diligent minister, in what will he differ from the ministering spirits who perform the work of ministry in an irreproachable manner? For these reasons, he has yoked "begotten" with "created," so that from this, too, he might show there to be no difference between the Son and a creature.

22. But it is worth hearing also the exhortation.

Eunomius says: We ought not, when we hear the appellation of Father and Son, to understand his generation as human, nor, being led astray by the generations among men, to subject God to the names and passions of participation.

Basilius: He advises ^B that we must not understand the similarity of the Son to the Father according to substance. For this is what that denial of participation aims at for him, as though the substance of the Father could have no communion with the substance of the Only-Begotten. For these reasons those noble distinctions of names—the host of which we have passed over—are used; for it is not the case that, for whoever the enunciations are the same, the things signified are also the same; he does this to deny that the God who is Father of the Son is the Father, on account of those on earth who are called fathers. But I, while there are many things that ^C distinguish Christianity from Gentile error and Jewish ignorance, consider no dogma in the Gospel of our salvation to be more essential or greater than the faith in the Father and the Son. For even those who are divided by any error whatsoever confess that God is the creator and maker. But he who declares him to be a falsely-called Father, and only by a bare appellation a Son, and thinks there is no difference whether one confesses him as Father or as creator, and whether one calls him Son or creature—where shall he be placed by us? Or in what sect shall he be numbered? That of the Jews or that of the Greeks? For he will not join himself to Christians, he who denies the power of piety and what is as it were the character of our religion. ^D For we have not believed in a maker and a creature, but we have been sealed into the Father and the Son through the grace of baptism. Wherefore, he who dares to reject these words makes the whole power of the Gospels at once void, since he proclaims neither the generating Father nor the begotten Son. But I say these things, he says, so that the understanding of passion

born from the voice of the Father might be avoided. Yet surely it behooved one who had decided to act piously, if there indeed existed an incongruous meaning in these terms, to reject that, but not to reject the entire voice simultaneously; nor, under the pretext of impropriety, to cast out also whatever is useful from it. Instead, one ought to be pure of humble and carnal thoughts in the dogmas concerning God, and to conceive of generation as becoming to the holiness and apothetical nature of God; passing over the manner in which God begat, as ineffable and incomprehensible, but being led to the similarity according to essence by the naming of "begetting." And yet, to one who considers it, it is clear that these names—the Father, I say, and the Son—do not by nature ^B commonly and primarily produce an understanding of bodily passions; but when spoken by themselves, they signify only the mutual relation. For the Father is he who has provided to another the beginning of existence according to a nature similar to his own; and the Son is he who has obtained the beginning of being from another through generation.

23. When we hear that a man (69) is a father, we receive the notion of passion; but when we hear that God is Father, we resort in our thoughts to the impassible cause. But he, being accustomed to this naming in the context of a nature subject to passions, denies as impossible that which surpasses the grasp of his own logic. For since he attends to the passion of corruptible things, it is not proper for him to disbelieve in the impassibility of God, nor to compare the immutable and unalterable essence to a fluid nature subject to myriads of changes (70). Nor, because mortal animals beget through passion, ought one to think the same of God; rather, one is led from this all the more to the truth: that since corruptible things are so, the Incorruptible is the contrary. Yet he would not say that these names, which are applied properly and primarily to men, we apply to God ^C improperly (71). For our Lord Jesus Christ, leading us back to the source of all things and the true cause of beings, says, "Do not call anyone your father on earth; for one is your Father (72) who is in heaven." How then does he deem these voices worthy of being dismissed by us as if they were primarily indicative of carnal passions—voices which the Lord (73), as if they were befitting the impassibility of God, transfers (74) from men to Himself? And if... ^D

He is called Father of creatures, this does not in any way conflict with our argument. For He who brought forth the ^A clods of dew, according to the word of Job, did not beget the clods and the Son in the same manner. But if they shall dare to say this, so as to name the substance of the dew a son in the same order, they will release us from all further argument with them, by having advanced their blasphemy to the most manifest impudence. For when God is called the Father of us all, He is not the Father of us and of the Only-Begotten in the same way. But if the fact that the Lord has been called the first-born of all creation, and first-born among many brethren (77), instructs them toward impiety, let them learn from the Gospel that the Lord addresses even those who have become His own through the works of virtue as His mother and brethren. For who is My mother, He says, and who are My brethren, ^B if not those who do the will of My Father who is in heaven? Therefore, God is named our Father, not by abuse of language nor by metaphor, but properly, and primarily, and truly; for He brought us into being from nothing through our corporeal parents, and He is closely united to us by His providence toward us. But if we say that God is truly called the Father of us who have been deemed worthy of the adoption of sons through grace, what reason will prevent Him—the One who is Son by nature and proceeds from His substance—from being rightly and deservedly called Father?

Eun. It is not necessary, he says, to understand the generation of the Lord as human, because of the appellation of Father and Son.

Bas. I say the same thing. But what hinders these pious men (82) from believing it to be divine and void of passion? Yet, I suppose, he does not use these words to show that God has begotten ^C without passion, but to show that He has not begotten at all. How then, O excellent one, did you declare in the preceding arguments that the substance of the Only-Begotten is a generated thing? For if He is not generated, from where, according to your own opinion, could the 'generated thing' (83) belong to Him? But it is on account of the contrariety which subsists between the generated and the ungenerated that He (the generated)

sought to show ^A that the substance was a matter of contention; yet now, once again, seeing that the claim for the substance is signified by this word, he seeks to subtract the state of having been generated from the 'generated thing' (85). And yet, if he rejects this on the grounds that it indicates a passion, what forbids him from also, for the same reasons, refusing to accept that He is the Creator? For to all bodily operations, there is necessarily joined either a greater or a lesser labor, in proportion to the power of the one acting and the difference in the size of the things being acted upon. But to say that the divine and blessed nature is constrained by labor is no less impious than to subject it to the most base passions. If, however, He creates without passion, then acknowledge that the generation is also devoid of passion.

21. ^B Concerning the fact that God is invoked as Father, and that this is not a name of passion but of a relationship—whether that which occurs by grace, as in the case of men, or that which is according to nature, as in the case of the Only-Begotten—enough has already been said. But let us grant that it is tropical, and that it is spoken by way of metaphor (86), just as countless other words are. Therefore, just as when we hear that God is angry, or sleeping, or flying, and other such things that present, according to the literal mind, improper notions, we neither erase the words of the Spirit nor do we understand the things said in a bodily way; for what reason, then, when this word is so frequently used by the Spirit (87), do we not also investigate the notions of it that are worthy of God? Or shall we delete this one alone from Scripture (88), slandering it on the basis of human usage? Let us consider the matter thus. Since two things are signified by the terminology of "generating" according to human custom—namely, the passion of the one generating and the relationship with the thing generated—when it is said by the Father to the Only-Begotten, "From the womb, before the daystar, have I begotten thee" (Ps. cix, 3) and "Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee" (Ps. ii, 7), which of these two meanings shall we say is represented by the word? The passion of those who generate, or the relationship of nature? I, for my part, say it is the latter; and I do not think that even these men would ever have contradicted it, had they not fallen into a manifest disease of black bile (89). Therefore, if the word is proper to God, why do you despise it as alien? But if it has been transferred from human affairs, having chosen the healthy meaning, flee from the worse of the things signified. For it is surely possible, in a word of many meanings, once one has been led by the word to the correct notion, to pass over the humble and the base in the implication. And do not say to me: What, then, is this generation, and of what kind, and how could it take place? Not ^D

^B because the mode is entirely ineffable and incomprehensible, shall we therefore cast away the firm and stable faith in the Father and the Son. For if we intend to measure everything by our comprehension, and to assume that what cannot be grasped by the mind does not exist at all, the reward of faith will perish, the reward of hope will perish. For how could we any longer be worthy of the beatitudes, which are deposited in the faith of things not seen, if we have faith only in those things which are evident to reason? Whence have the nations become vain, and their senseless heart been darkened 21? Is it not because, while they follow those things which seem plausible to reason, they do not give credence to the preaching of the Spirit? And whom does Isaiah lament as lost? Woe to those who are wise in their own eyes, and prudent in their own sight 22. Does he not mean such as these? ^C Therefore, having passed over many of the intermediate points—as well as those wherein he overtly maintained that the Son was not generated, as also those which he artfully devised in order to obtain this, namely, that the Only-Begotten is a creature and a product—I shall turn to the principal heads of his impiety, having only noted regarding those things that were omitted what he has in fact premeditated: he desired to cover with a word the blasphemy he had constructed, and to soften the impudence of his discourse, when he said he did not make the Only-Begotten common with the creatures, forgetting his own dogmas, which in his previous discourses he set forth in a clear and open voice. From which he has again fallen into an impudent and most manifest contradiction. He writes thus:

EUN. Let no one, hearing that the Son is a product, be troubled, as if by the community of names the substance were made common.

BAS. How then, O wisest one, if the diversity of substances necessitates a diversity of names (for we remember that you discussed these things in the earlier discourses), does not now the community of names imply a community of substance? For he is not found to have used these words only once, nor in passing. Then, even now, as if he had repented of what he said—that the communication of names does not also make the substances common—he again, a little further on, bringing his own adversaries to task, introduces these same claims.

^A EUN. "It would have been necessary," he says, "if they had any concern for the truth, that since the names are different, they should also confess the substances to be different." BAS. How could anyone more easily use words? For one who, in a short space, turns himself to the opposite, now saying that the difference of names necessarily indicates the variation of substances, and now again that the communication [of names] does not make the substances common? But I think we act much like those who accuse a murderer of insults, or a blow, or some other such sins. ^B 25. Let us proceed, therefore, to the head of his evils. For he, having seen that a common preconception exists in all Christians alike (that is, in those who are truly worthy of this title) regarding the Son being begotten light, shining forth from the unbegotten light, and being life in itself and goodness in itself, coming forth from the life-giving source of paternal goodness; and then having reflected that, if he did not unsettle these concepts of ours, nothing would remain for him but sophisms (for he who confesses the Father to be light, and the Son also to be light, since the concept of light is one and the same, will naturally be led to confess a union according to substance: for between light and light, according to the very definition of light, there is no difference, neither in utterance nor in the significance itself): ^C in order, therefore, to take this away from us, he surrounds the doctrine of faith with the nets of his artifices, teaching that these have no comparison nor communion at all with one another, and saying that the opposition of the unbegotten to the begotten is also that between light and light, or forcing us, while fleeing from this, to confess that God is composite. But let us rather hear his very own words. EUN. "Does the word 'light'," he says, "signify something else in the unbegotten than in the begotten, or is it the same for both? For if it is one thing and another, it is clear that what consists of one thing and another is also composite; but what is composite is not unbegotten. But if it is the same, as much as the begotten is different from the unbegotten, by so much is it necessary that light should be different from light, and life from life, ^D and power from power." BAS. Behold and understand the horror of this impiety. "As much," he says, "as the unbegotten differs from the begotten, so much..."

must light differ from light, and life from life, and power from power." Let us therefore ask him: By what measure is the unbegotten distinguished from the begotten? Is it by some small interval, and such that they might at some point come together into the same state? Or is this absolutely ^A impossible, and more impossible even than for the same person to be living and dead at the same time, or healthy and sick, or waking and sleeping simultaneously? For such are all things that stand against one another in total opposition, so that the presence of the one necessitates the absence of the other; things so compared that they can neither coexist nor be reconciled with one another.

26. Therefore, when he sets the begotten in opposition to the unbegotten in this manner—he who calls the Father light, and likewise the Son light, and who says that this light differs from that light as much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten—does he not, even though he pretends a certain gentleness by the use of the word, by calling the Son "light," nonetheless clearly lead the meaning of his statements toward the contrary via the force of his words? For consider what is opposed to the unbegotten: another unbegotten, or the begotten? It is the begotten, clearly. And what is opposed to light? Another light, or darkness? It is darkness, ^B certainly. If, then, it is necessary that light differ from light as much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten, to whom is the impiety not obvious, seeing that by introducing under the name of "light" that which is opposed to light, he implies that the substance of the Only-Begotten is contrary to the nature of light? Or let him show us a light that is opposed to light, and which possesses that same measure of opposition that exists between the begotten and the unbegotten. But if this neither exists, nor could he himself ever conceive of it, let not the artifice by which he profoundly adorns his blasphemy go unrecognized. For because he thinks the begotten stands in opposition to the unbegotten, he applies the same opposition to light in relation to light, so that he may demonstrate that the Father’s substance ^C is in every way contrary and hostile to the substance of the Only-Begotten. For this reason comes this new formulation of doctrines, where he says: "As much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten, so much is it necessary that light should differ from light." Yet while there is for the unbegotten in relation to the begotten a certain opposition in the arrangement of the words, though not in the nature of the things—which is what these people fabricate—in the case of light in relation to light, no contrariety can be conceived, either in utterance or in meaning. But he seems to deceive himself with specious cavils. For he thinks that the things which follow from contraries possess the same conflict among themselves as the principal contraries themselves possess, and that when one of the contraries is present, ^D the contrary must necessarily follow from the other. As,

if light follows sight, darkness follows blindness; if sensation follows life, insensibility follows death. That this observation is weak and fallacious is manifest to anyone who gives it but a little attention. For just because life follows waking, it does not necessarily follow that death follows sleep. Nor does the begotten stand in a contrary relation to the unbegotten. For if they were contraries and destructive of each other—which would turn back upon the heads of the blasphemers—yet they are neither opposed by nature, nor do the things which follow them necessarily possess the same distance that the primary terms were shown to have.

^B 27. Therefore, either strike out your words or do not deny your impiety. For it is your own blasphemy, ^B claiming: “By as much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten, by so much must the light necessarily differ from the light.” Consequently, just as the begotten will never partake of unbegottenness, so you will never make him a partaker of the light. According to your opinion, the substance of the Only-Begotten will be just as far from being unbegotten as it is from being considered and named light. Yet John, with the great voice of the Spirit, cries out to you, saying: *“He was the true light.”* But you have neither ears to hear nor a heart to understand; rather, with your sophistries, you drive the substance of the Only-Begotten toward a contrary nature, one that cannot exist with the light. For you will surely not say that it is a valid argument that you have not stripped the name of "light" from the Only-Begotten. For piety consists not in the sound of the air, but in the power of the things signified. ^C But he did not stop there; he adds both life and power to the same measure of distance toward the contrary, saying: “By as much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten, by so much must the light necessarily differ from the light, and life from life, and power from power.” Therefore, according to you, the Only-Begotten is neither life nor power. But you set aside the Lord Himself who says: *“I am the life”*; you set aside Paul, who said: *“Christ is the power of God.”* For whatever was demonstrated in the preceding points will apply also to these. For no one would say that life or power is opposed to life and power, but rather that death and impotence fulfill the most perfect opposition. Which this man, concealing his deceit through the versatility of his words, ^D

^B craftily and under a veil constructs the horror of impiety, and by the artifices of his discourse, having distanced the nature of the Only-Begotten from the contrary nature of the Father, he leaves behind only the commendation of the names. What then shall we do? How, while confessing both the unbegotten Father and the begotten Son, may we escape the contradiction [(20)] regarding their very being? What are we to say? That as from a good Father comes a good Son; so from the unbegotten light has shone forth the eternal light, and from the true life has proceeded the life-giving fountain, and from the power itself has emerged the power of God [(21)]. But darkness, and death, and weakness are assembled together with the prince of this world and the princes of darkness, and with the spiritual hosts of wickedness, and with every power inimical to the divine nature; yet not even these have received an opposition to the good according to their very substance (for so the blame would recoil upon the Creator), but by their own will they have fallen into vice through the privation of the good. Yet the tongue that opposes God has attempted to bring the nature of the Only-Begotten into this same order. For it cannot even say this, that while it considers the substance of the Father to be light, excelling in both glory and splendor, it also considers the substance of the Only-Begotten to be light, yet somehow more obscure and, as it were, darkened [(23)]. For not even these things belong to a pious mind, since the likeness of the image is destroyed by such obscurity. Yet it would be desirable that we were able to accuse him of these things. For there would be no need for a great struggle for his correction.

^C 28. Now, the difference in the begotten and the unbegotten is not one of degree, as between a lesser and a greater light, but it is as great as the distance between things that cannot in any way exist together. For it is impossible that that toward which the other exists should ever pass over into the opposite [(25)] via transmutation, so that either the begotten becomes unbegotten, or conversely, that the begotten should be transmuted into the unbegotten. Therefore, for him who has once proclaimed that the light must differ from the light as much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten, not even this argument [(26)] is left for his escape. For truly, light that is pure, compared to light that is as it were fading and more obscure, being of the same genus, differs only in intensity; but the unbegotten is not an intensification of the begotten, nor is the begotten...

nor is the unbegotten an intensification of the begotten; nor, indeed, is the ^A begotten a certain subjection of the unbegotten; but the distance between them is, as it were, diametrically opposed. To those, therefore, who posit the begotten and the unbegotten as substances, these and even more absurdities than these will follow. For the opposite will have been begotten from the opposite, and in place of a natural kinship, a certain necessary dissension will appear to them even within the substance itself. This, however, carries with it more ignorance than impiety—to call a substance contrary to the substance of any one of all things, since it has long been agreed, even among those outside the faith (whom these men despise as men of no account when they do not find them contending for their blasphemies), that it is impossible for contrariety to exist within substance. But if ^B any one, as is the truth, were to accept that the begotten and the unbegotten are certain distinguishing properties contemplated in the substance, which lead us as by the hand to a clear and unconfused notion of the Father and the Son, he will both escape the danger of impiety and preserve the logical consistency of his reasoning. For indeed, the properties, as it were certain characters and forms contemplated in the substance, distinguish the common by peculiar traits, but they do not cut asunder the homogeneity of the substance. For instance, the deity is common, but Fatherhood and Sonship are certain properties; and from the combination of each—both the common and the particular—the comprehension of the truth arises for us. Thus, when we hear "unbegotten light," we understand the Father; but when we hear "begotten light," we receive the notion of the Son. Insofar, indeed, as they are light and light, there is no contrariety in them; but ^C insofar as they are begotten and unbegotten, there appears an opposition. For this is the nature of properties: to show something else within the identity of the substance, and although the properties themselves are often divided over against one another, tending toward the contrary, they do not tear asunder the unity of the substance; just as it is with the winged and the walking, the aquatic and the terrestrial, the rational and the irrational. For since one substance is subject to all, these properties do not make the substance different, nor do they persuade it, so to speak, to rebel against itself; but by the force of the distinguishing signs, as if instilling a certain light into our souls, they guide us toward the understanding that ^D the mind can grasp. But this man, transferring the opposition of the properties to the substance, from this source seizes the occasion for impiety, terrifying us like children with the masks of his sophisms; for if there were anything else that was "light" besides the unbegotten, it would...

necessarily be demonstrated to us that God is composite ^A (34).

29. But what do I say? If the light were something other than the unbegotten, it could no longer be called the Son, just as the unbegotten itself could not. One might also learn from this the difference between the meanings signified by these terms. God is said to inhabit light, and to be clothed with light, but never that He inhabits His own unbegottenness, nor that He has it wrapped around Him from without (for such things are laughable). "Begotten" and "unbegotten" are certain distinguishing properties. For if there were nothing to characterize the substance, it would in no way be accessible to our understanding. For since the Godhead is one, it is impossible to obtain a distinguishing ^B notion of the Father or the Son unless the mind is structured by the addition of properties (36). But if anyone says that God will appear composite unless light and the unbegotten are taken to be the same, we can say this: if we were to take the "unbegotten" as a part of the substance, there would be room for the argument that claims a thing is composite if it consists of distinct elements. But if we posit light, or life, or goodness as the substance of God—so that God is entirely whatever He is, life, and entirely light, and entirely good—and yet life has the unbegotten attached to it, how can He who is simple according to substance not be uncomposite? For the means of pointing out His property will not violate the rationale of simplicity ^C (39); otherwise, in this way everything that is said about God will demonstrate to us that God is composite.

And, as it seems, if we intend to preserve the notion of the simple and indivisible (40), we will either say nothing about God except "unbegotten," and we will refuse to call Him invisible, incorruptible, unalterable, creator, judge, and everything else we now use for doxology—or, if we accept these names, what shall we do? Shall we refer them all to the substance? In that case, we will demonstrate Him not only to be composite, but composed of dissimilar parts, since a different thing is signified by each of these names (41); or shall we extract them from the substance? Therefore, whatever account one might devise for each of these ^D points: if we posit [God] as a whole, whatever He is, as life—and again if we think of God as a whole, whatever He is, as life—from which it can be gathered, first, that these two terms must be referred to the word understood: then, that the punctuation which is noted in the Colbert codex must be retained. Nor will it irk me to record the old interpretation from which this passage can perhaps be more easily understood. Thus, therefore, Trapezuntius had translated: "But if one opines the substance of God to be light, or life, or good, the whole of what it is, life, total light, total good: but life follows: how, etc."

^A let them demonstrate this even in the title of the Unbegotten. Having grown arrogant over all who have ever busied themselves with the knowledge of God, as if he himself had cut a new and recent path leading to God, which none of his predecessors had discovered, he finally adds, as though taught by that very path, his blasphemy against the Son concerning the substance of God.

EUN. That [the substance] which is above kingship ^B and altogether incapable of generation—teaching the mind which approaches with goodwill to these [notions]—commands [it] to repel, as far as possible, by the law of nature, comparison with another.

BAS. Does he not clearly indicate that he himself was deemed worthy of an apocalypse of secret things, upon bringing his mind to God with goodwill? And for this reason he removes the Only-Begotten as far as possible from the communion of the Father, ^C not even deigning to admit him into comparison; but he even says that by the law of nature the substance of the Only-Begotten is separated from that of the Father. What does he mean by saying this? That the God of the universe, even if He had wished, could not have admitted the Only-Begotten into a kinship of substance, being prevented from admitting him by the law of nature of the connection with Him, not being, as it seems, lord of Himself, but subject to the terms of necessity. For such are the things ^D that are constrained by the law of nature, being driven without choice to that which seems good to nature. For just as it is in the nature of fire to heat, not by choice, and it is necessarily incapable of coldness, being deprived of communion with it by the law of nature; so he wishes the God and Father also to have, by the law of nature, a substance alienated from the Son. And now indeed the laws of nature do not [presuppose] a mutual distance between the Father and the Son, but

create a necessary and inexpressible communion. For if he said that the God of all had fashioned the non-communion with Himself by an act of will, not even thus would the argument of the goodness of God allow one to be considered trustworthy who says that the Father is incommunicable toward Him who is from Himself; yet the things said would at least have some coherence. But to say that the alienation exists by a law of nature is not even the act of one who has examined the nature of sensible things—by which it is not the nature of things to be produced by each [parent] as alien or contrary, but rather as akin and appropriate.

31. Again, therefore, he failed to discern the mutual repugnance of what he said here as well. For in what follows, ^B being vexed at those who say the Only-Begotten is similar to the Father according to substance, he wrote thus:

EUN. In the beginning, they seem to me to have dared to compare a substance that is subject to no lordship, superior to every cause, and free from all laws, with a substance that is begotten and enslaved to paternal laws—those who have either not examined at all the nature of the whole, or who have not made judgments about these matters with a pure mind.

BAS. How, then, did the substance that is subject to no lordship and free from all laws appear now to have its incomparable nature not from free choice, but to be forestalled by a law of nature, and involuntarily to repel the Begotten from communion with Itself, so that for this reason it is inaccessible even to the Only-Begotten himself? So great, then, is the inconsistency in his statements; but how great is the impiety? ^C He declares the substance of the Father to be subject to no lordship and free (if, then, that substance which is subject to the law of nature is subject to no lordship!), but he declares the substance of the Only-Begotten to be, by contrast, servile, and from this he removes his equal honor of nature. For since there are two things—creation and deity—and the creation is ordered in servitude and obedience, but the deity is in primacy and lordship, he who removes the dignity of lordship and casts down the Son to the humility of servitude, is he not clearly caught showing that he ranks Him also, by this very fact, with the whole creation? For it is surely not glorious for Him if He excels His fellow-servants. But unless we confess Him to be King and Lord, such that He embraces obedience not by the submission of nature but by the goodness of His will—this is grave, this is horrific, this brings destruction to those who deny it. But he adds:

EUN. Because the substance of God, following the laws of nature, neither admits comparison with another, and grants to us that we might understand His operation [worthy...]

of its own dignity. BAS. This was said by him to provide proof of the alienation of the Only-Begotten from the Father; but it confirms our own argument. For if the substance of God grants us to understand an operation that is consistent and becoming to its own dignity—and if, according to Eunomius, unbegottenness is a dignity, and according to their argument the same thing is also a substance, and the Only-Begotten is the operation of God, or the image of that operation—this is also according to their own argument. Therefore, to contradict these things would be useless, since they have nothing to say against them. How much I would value it if they would deny this blasphemy! However, since they have said these things, let us conclude from their own statements that, if unbegottenness is a dignity of God, and it is the same thing as substance, and the operation is that which follows and is fitting to the dignity of God, ^B and this—according to their assumption—is Christ, then He is naturally connected and fitting to the substance of God. And none of these things is our own; for we are composing our proof from the very words they have put together. The substance, he says, is followed by the divine dignity; the operation has a proportion to that dignity; the Only-Begotten is the image of the operation; and conversely, if the Only-Begotten is the image of the operation, and the operation is that of the dignity, and the dignity is that of the substance, then the Only-Begotten will be the image of the substance. Thus, even the architects of lies are often forced by the clarity of the facts to bear witness to the truth, even against their will. For even the demons were not doing the work of evangelists, ^C but, being unable to gaze upon the light of the truth, they cried out: "We know who you are, the Holy One of God" (Mark 1, 24). 32. Let us also look at what follows. EUN. For if anyone, he says, considering a thing from the created works, were to be led from these to the substances,

^A in discovering the Son to be a creature of the Unbegotten, and the Paraclete to be a creature of the Only-Begotten, and by believing in the superiority of the Only-Begotten the diversity of operation, he receives a most certain proof of the difference also in accordance with substance.

BAS. First of all, then, how it is possible to reckon substances from created things, I for my part do not see. For it is power, and wisdom, and art—but not the substance itself—that the created works indicate. And they do not necessarily even demonstrate the whole power of the Creator, since it is sometimes possible for an artisan not to exert all his strength in acting, but often to employ slacker efforts in the works of art. But if he were to transfer his entire power into the work, this is the only way it would come about that we might measure his strength through the works, yet it certainly would not follow that we would understand the substance, whatever it might be. But if, because the divine nature is simple and uncompounded, one should suppose that the substance concurs with the power, and because of the goodness inherent in God, one should say that the whole power of the Father was moved toward the generation of the Son, and again, the whole power of the Only-Begotten toward the coming-into-being of the Holy Spirit, so that from the Spirit the power of the Only-Begotten is contemplated, and at the same time the substance as well, and from the Only-Begotten, in turn, the power and substance of the Father are grasped—consider what is gathered from this. For from those premises upon which he attempted to establish the dissimilarity of the substance, he is seen to be constructing its similarity. For if power has nothing in common with substance, how was he led to the comprehension of the latter from the created works, which are the results of power? But if substance and power are the same, that which characterizes the power will surely characterize the substance as well. Therefore the ^B created works, as you say, do not lead to the dissimilarity of the substance, but rather to the accuracy of its similarity. Furthermore, this endeavor of his confirms our position rather than his own. For he either has no source from which to prove what he has said, or, if he borrows examples from human affairs, he will find that it is not from the works of an artisan that we come to a comprehension of his substance, but that it is from the begotten that we learn the nature of the begetter. For it is not possible to grasp the substance of a builder from his house; yet it is easy to understand the nature of the begetter from his offspring. Therefore, if the Only-Begotten is a creature, he does not exhibit to us the substance of the Father; but if he makes the Father known to us through ^C himself, he is not a creature, but the true Son, and the image of God, and the character of his substance. And these matters are of this sort. ^D

^A 33. But how great is this access of blasphemy? Having despised the threat in the Gospels which the Lord most fearfully denounced against those who blaspheme the Holy Spirit, he calls the Holy Spirit a created thing; he even goes so far as to deny that it is an animal, as for the most part that designation is applied to inanimate things. For it is not the case that because he anticipated the Lord with this blasphemy, we should on that account remit anything that is due to our indignation. For this is no mitigation of his impiety, but an addition to his condemnation. Since even the Lord, out of his goodness, forgave the blasphemy spoken against himself, but declared that the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is inevitable for those who have dared it. Therefore, he is the first of those who, since the proclamation of piety was first announced, have assaulted the truth, who has dared to utter this statement concerning the Spirit. For we have heard of no one until this day who has called the Holy Spirit a creation, nor have we found this designation in the writings left by them. Then he says:

EUN. If anyone, from things created, should be carried upward to the comprehension of essence, he will find the Son to be a creation of the Unbegotten, and the Paraclete to be a creation of the Only-Begotten.

BAS. ^B This is another mode of impiety: to blaspheme doubly in a single word—to take the disparagement of the Holy Spirit as something acknowledged, and to start from there to demonstrate the diminution of the Only-Begotten. And, as it seems, *The heavens declare the glory of God*, but the Holy Spirit declares the diminution of the glory of the Only-Begotten. And the Lord indeed, speaking of the Paraclete, says, *He shall glorify me*; but that slanderous tongue declares that the Son is hindered ^C by him, so that he cannot be compared with the Father. For since, he says, the Son is the maker of the Spirit (may you, O Lord, be merciful to us regarding the things being spoken), and this is of such a sort that it adds no dignity to the one who made it, for that reason he is not worthy to be compared with the Father, having been stripped of the equality of dignity by the baseness of those things which he made.

34. Has anyone ever heard of worse blasphemies? Has anyone so clearly fallen into the inevitable judgment ^D for blasphemy against the Holy Spirit? For having despised...

^A the Spirit, treating Him with humble names, and debasing His nature so much that he claims disgrace is smeared upon the Maker. Rather, that man would have avoided speaking in a humble way 65 regarding the Spirit, so as not to bring down his own pride. But regarding this, we shall speak at our leisure 66. But to whom of all men is it not clear that no operation of the Son is severed from the Father, nor is there anything in things that exist which, being of the Son, is alienated from the Father? For all things, He says, are Mine, and Yours are Mine. How, then, does he attribute the cause of the Spirit to the Only-Begotten alone, and consider this creation to be an accusation against His nature 67? If, indeed, by proposing two principles opposed ^B to each other, he says these things, he shall be crushed together with Mani and Marcion; but if he assumes that all things depend from one source, then that which is said to have been made by the Son is referred to the first cause. Therefore, even if we believe that all things were brought into being through God the Word, we do not deny that the God of all is the cause of all. Yet how is it not clearly dangerous to separate the Spirit from God, when the Apostle hands Him down to us in conjunction, now calling Him the Spirit of Christ, now of God, where he writes: "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His"; and again: "But you have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God"; and when the Lord calls Him the Spirit of truth 68, since He Himself is the truth, and He proceeds from the Father? But this man, to the destruction of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ, just as he removes the Spirit from the Father, so he attributes Him uniquely to the Only-Begotten for the overturning of His glory, insulting Him, as he thinks 72, expecting no retribution for his wicked dogmas 73 in the day of judgment.

AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK III. CONCERNING THE HOLY SPIRIT

^A Bas. Having at length become satiated with the blasphemies against the Only-Begotten, he has passed on to the Holy Spirit, in following out his entire intention and discussing this subject as well, he writes as follows:

EUN. Since, however, these things are sufficient for us concerning the Only-Begotten, it would be consistent that we should now speak also concerning the Paraclete, not following the unexamined opinions of the multitude, but keeping in all things the teaching of the holy ones, from whom, having learned that He is third in dignity and order, we believe that He is also third in nature.

BAS. That he does not think one ought to remain in the simple and unadorned faith of the multitude, but rather, by means of certain technical and sophistic arguments, to twist the truth back to what seems right to himself, he has shown sufficiently from the words he has put forth. For, while despising the opinion of the multitude, by which they glorify the Holy Spirit, he pretends to keep the teaching of the holy ones, yet he remains silent about those who handed it on to him, doing even now the very things which it was shown he had done while he was discoursing on the Only-Begotten. Furthermore, he says that he has learned from the holy ones that He is third in order and dignity, but that he himself believes that He is also ^B third in nature. But who those holy ones are, and in what writings they have set forth this teaching, he is unable to say. Has there ever been such a bold man, one who introduces innovations concerning divine dogmas? For what need is there, if He is third in dignity and in order

^A of the Spirit, to say that He is also third in nature? For the word of piety perhaps transmits that He is second to the Son in dignity, since He has His existence from Him, and receives from Him, and announces to us, and in general is suspended from that cause; but that He should be used as third in nature, we have been taught neither by the Holy Scriptures, nor can it be inferred from what has been said before ^B by any consequence. For just as the Son is indeed second in order to the Father, because He is from Him; and second in dignity, because He is the principle and cause, in that He is His Father, and because through Him is the access and bringing near to God and the Father; but is no longer second in nature, because the divinity in both is one: so clearly the Holy Spirit also, even if He has ranked below the Son both in order and in dignity (so that we may even grant this altogether), it is no longer reasonable that He should be considered of an alien nature, as is evident from the following. For all angels, just as they have one designation, so do they also possess in every way the same nature as one another; but nevertheless, some of them are set over nations, while others are present with each of the faithful. Yet by how much a whole nation is more precious than a single man, by so much is it necessary that the dignity of the angel presiding over a nation be greater than that of the one entrusted with the protection of each single individual. But that there is an angel present with each of the faithful, like a certain tutor and shepherd directing their life, no one will contradict, mindful of the words of the Lord, who says: Do not despise one of these little ones, for their angels always behold the face of My Father who is in heaven.

^A And the Psalmist says: The angel of the Lord shall encamp round about them that fear him; and: The angel who delivered me from my youth; and whatever things are of the same kind. And that there are, moreover, certain angels who are set over entire nations, Moses teaches us through the canticle, saying: When the Most High divided the nations, when He dispersed the sons of Adam, He set the boundaries of the nations according to the number of His angels. And the wise Daniel, in his vision of the angel, heard him saying: The prince of the kingdom of the Persians stood against me; and behold, Michael, one of the first princes, came to help me, and I left him there with the prince of the king of the Persians. And after a little he says: And the prince of the Greeks was coming. But also, a certain commander-in-chief of the army of the Lord is spoken of, he who was manifested to Jesus the son of Nave at the Jordan. And again, certain legions of angels are mentioned, when the Lord said to the disciples: Or do you think that I cannot beseech My Father, and He will provide me here more than twelve legions of angels? He, therefore, who is the commander-in-chief of the angels ranked in the legions is clearly a prince.

2. To what end, then, does this argument lead us? That if anything is second or third in order and dignity, it also has a different nature. For just as among the angels one is a prince and another is a subject, yet all are angels by nature; and in dignity there is a difference, but in nature there is a community (for as ^C star differs from star in glory, yet the nature of all stars is one; and there are many mansions with the Father, that is, diversities of dignities, but the nature of those who are glorified is one): so, clearly, the Holy Spirit also, even if, as they say, He is inferior in dignity and order (for we have received Him, he says, as numbered third from the Father and the Son, since the Lord Himself in the tradition of the saving baptism has handed down the order in these words: Go, baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit); but that He is of a third nature from the Son and the Father, ^D [this we have never learned. For two things being mentioned, deity and creation...]

lordship and servitude, the power that sanctifies and that which is sanctified, that which possesses virtue by nature and that which achieves it through choice, in which category shall we place the Spirit? Among those who are sanctified? But He Himself is sanctification. Among those who have gained virtue through noble deeds? But He is good by nature. Among the ministering ones? But there are other ministering spirits that are sent forth for service. It is not lawful, therefore, for us to call Him our fellow servant, nor to number Him with the creatures, He who is numbered alongside the divine and blessed Trinity.^B For Principalities and Powers and every such creature, which possess sanctification through attention and diligence, cannot rightly be called holy by nature. For they desire the good in such a way that they receive the measure of holiness in proportion to their love for God. And just as iron, placed in the midst of fire, does not cease to be iron, but being ignited by the most intense communion with the fire, takes into itself the whole nature of the fire and passes over into the fire both in color and in efficacy: so also the holy powers, through their communion with Him who is holy by nature, possess a holiness that has already pervaded their entire substance and has coalesced within it. However, they differ from the Holy Spirit in this, that for Him holiness is nature, whereas for them holiness exists by participation. ^C Those in whom the good is imported and granted from elsewhere are of a mutable nature. For Lucifer, who rises in the morning, would not have fallen, nor would he have been crushed upon the earth, if his nature had not been capable of receiving the worse condition. How then is it pious to rank the Spirit among the creatures, He who is separated from the creatures by such an interval? For the creature is so constituted that if it makes some progress and is pleasing to God, it receives sanctification as a reward, inasmuch as it uses free will and can incline in either direction, toward the choice of good or evil; but the Holy Spirit is the fountain of sanctification. And just as the Father is holy by nature, and the Son is holy by nature, so also the Spirit of truth is holy by nature; and on this account, He has been granted the name of "holy," and that in a ^D peculiar and proper sense.

3. If, therefore, holiness is His nature, just as it is for the Father and the Son, how is He of a third and alien nature

^A For this reason, I suppose, it is written that the Seraphim cry out "holy" three times, because the holiness that is by nature is discerned in three hypostases. Nor is this name of holiness common to Him alone with the Father and the Son, but so also is the very title of "Spirit." For God is a Spirit, and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth. And the prophet says: "Christ the Lord is a Spirit before our face, of whom we said: In the shadow of his wings we shall live." ^B And the Apostle transfers the title of "Spirit" to the Lord, saying: "Now the Lord is the Spirit." From these things it is clear to everyone that the communion of names indicates not an alienation of nature, but a conjunction with the Father and the Son. And God is called good, and is good; and the Holy Spirit is also good, possessing goodness not as something superadded, but as something innate to Him by nature. Otherwise, it would be the height of absurdity for anyone to say that He who is holy by nature does not possess goodness by nature, but that it is something consequential and coming to Him from without. Furthermore, when the Lord said: "I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete," He shows that He Himself is our Paraclete. Wherefore, the title of "Paraclete" also contributes not a little to the demonstration of the majesty of the Holy Spirit.

4. ^C Now, names such as these indicate the majesty of the nature; but what of the operations of the Holy Spirit? "By the word of the Lord," he says, "the heavens were established, and all the power of them by the Spirit of his mouth." As, therefore, God the Word is the creator of the heavens, so also the Holy Spirit imparts a stable and firm virtue to the heavenly powers. And again, Job says: "The Spirit of the Lord, who made me"; speaking, I suppose, not of the creation, but of the perfection of human virtue. And Isaiah, speaking in the person of the Lord, according to His humanity of course, says: "The Lord has sent me, and his Spirit." And again, the psalm, declaring that the power of the Spirit has permeated all things, says: "Where shall I go from thy Spirit, and where shall I flee from thy face?" ^D And what and how great are the benefits that come to us from Him? Just as the Lord Himself gave to those who received Him the power to become children of God, so also the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of adoption; and just as the Lord

^A our God is the true teacher, according to what was said: "But do not you be called teacher on earth; for one is your teacher, the Christ"; so also the Holy Spirit is witnessed to by the Lord Himself as teaching all those who have believed in the name of the Lord, when He said: "But the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send, He will teach you all things." And just as the Father is said to distribute the operations to those worthy of receiving the operations, and the Son is said to distribute the ministries to those in the dignities of ministry; so the Holy Spirit is witnessed to as distributing the gifts to those worthy of the reception of the gifts. For there are "distributions of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are distributions of ministries, but the same Lord; and there are distributions of operations, but the same God who works all in all." Do you see how here also the operation of the Holy Spirit is joined to the operation of the Father and the Son? ^B Next, from what follows, the divinity of the nature of the Holy Spirit is further declared. For what does he say? "But all these the one and the same Spirit works, distributing privately to each as He wills." He ascribes to Him nothing other than power joined to authority and dominion. Wherefore in the New Testament the prophets have cried out: "Thus says the Holy Spirit." Whence, however, does the searching of the depths of God come to the Spirit? "As," he says, "no one of men knows the things of a man except the spirit of a man that is in him; so also the things of God no one has known except the Spirit of God." For just as no stranger or foreigner can look into the internal thoughts of the soul, so evidently, if the Spirit shares anything of the mysteries with God, ^C as being neither a stranger nor a foreigner to Him, He is able to search out the depths of the judgments of God. Furthermore, life also is supplied to us from God through Christ in the Holy Spirit. For God gives life, as Paul says: "I charge you before God, who gives life to all things." But Christ bestows life: "My sheep," He says, "hear My voice, and I give eternal life to them." We are likewise given life through the Spirit, as Paul says: "He who raised ^D

Christ from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through His Spirit dwelling in you."

5. But this man, who is bold in all things, and fears not the danger which hangs over those who dare to utter any blasphemous word against the Holy Spirit, declares Him to be devoid of deity, writing thus concerning the Spirit:

EUN. ^B "Third in order and nature, produced by the command of the Father and the operation of the Son, honored in the third place, as the first and greatest of all things, and the only such work of the Only-Begotten, lacking in deity and the power of creating."

BAS. He who says this seems not even to believe that the deity dwells in us, though John says concerning God: "By this we know that He is in us, by the Spirit which He has given us"; and the Apostle: "Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?" and again: "In whom all the building, being fitted together, grows into a holy temple in the Lord, in whom you also are being built together into a dwelling place of God in the Spirit." If, therefore, God is said to dwell in us through the Spirit, is it not manifest impiety to call the Spirit Himself devoid of the deity? And if we call those who are perfect in virtue gods, and perfection is through the Spirit, how can He who makes others gods be Himself destitute of deity? Nor would it be pious to say that the deity, as in men, so also in the Spirit, is honored as something acquired by participation, and not as belonging to Him by nature. For he who is made a god by grace is of a mutable nature, which sometimes, through negligence, falls away from goodness. This, however, clearly fights against the tradition of the saving baptism. "Go," He says, "baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." For ^C baptism is the seal of the faith, and faith is the assent to the deity. For one must believe first, then be sealed by baptism. Now our baptism is according to the tradition of the Lord, into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; no creature, nor any servant, is joined to the Father and the Son, since the deity is completed in the Trinity. For everything outside of these is a fellow-servant, even if some things happen to be preferred to others by reason of an excess of honors.

6. And do not again object to me those clever words:

EUN. If it is not a creature, then it is a generation, or

^A unbegotten. But there is one God without beginning, and unbegotten. Nor is it a generation. It remains, therefore, that it must be called a creature and a work. For it is one. ^B

Bas. For my part, if I judged that all things could be comprehended by our knowledge, I might perhaps be ashamed to confess my ignorance. But now, countless things—not only those which are stored up for us in the age to come, nor those which are now in the heavens—are hidden from us; nay, we do not even clearly and evidently comprehend those things which exist within our own body. For example, regarding sight: whether we perceive objects by receiving images of visible things, and how the image of the greatest mountains, of the immense earth, of the infinite sea, and of the heaven itself is contained in the small measure of our pupil; or whether we emit something from ourselves, and it reaches toward visible things, and thus we have perception of them—what this is, and how large it is, so that it suffices to extend over land and sea, and to penetrate the space intervening between earth and heaven, and indeed to reach the heaven itself, and move with such speed that in the same space of time both the surrounding body and the stars in the heaven are observed. And what need is there to speak of other things? Truly, the very movements of the mind—whether the soul is by nature inclined to create or to generate—who can say with certainty? What wonder, then, if we should also confess our ignorance regarding the Holy Spirit without blushing, yet still render to Him the glorification which is attributed to Him by invincible testimony? For what is handed down to us through the Scriptures sufficiently demonstrates to us that He is above creation, since it is impossible that that which sanctifies and those things which are sanctified, that which teaches and those things which are taught, that which reveals and those which stand in need of revelation, should be of the same nature. But no one is so utterly ^C bereft of reason as to dare to call any other than the God of all things "unbegotten," nor even the Son, because there is only one Only-Begotten. How, then, must he be called? The Holy Spirit, and the Spirit of God, and the Spirit of truth, who is sent by God, and is supplied through the Son: not a servant, but holy, good, sovereign; a life-giving Spirit, a Spirit of adoption, knowing all the things of God. Thus, indeed, in the Trinity, the doctrine of the unity will be preserved, if we confess one Father, and one Son, and one Holy Spirit.

7. Now they bring forward arguments by which they demonstrate that the Holy Spirit has been called a creature: one, indeed, from the prophet ^D who says: *Who strengthens the thunder, and creates the spirit* (Amos iv, 13); and another from the Gospel, that *All things through him*...

came to be (John i, 3). But we are persuaded that the prophetic word refers not to the Holy Spirit, but to this common breath, the spirit of the air. And this is evident from the text. For it did not say, “Who created the spirit,” but, *Who creates the spirit*. For just as thunder is not something that was created once and for all in a certain bodily substance, but is of such a nature that it is always being activated according to the will of God for the fearing of men, and is accustomed to come into being and to dissipate, so too with the spirit: sometimes it happens like a river of flowing air, and again it ceases when that which was previously moved stays still, according to the will of him who manages all things for the salvation and preservation of the whole. Thus, through the entire creation—through thunders, and winds, and the rest of the works—the Creator is heralded. ^B Wherefore, after saying, *Who strengthens the thunder, and creates the spirit*, he says: *And who announces to men his Christ* (Amos iv, 13). For just as the heavens declare the glory of God to those capable of inferring the Creator’s skill from them, so too do the roar of thunder and the movements of the winds proclaim their Creator. Perhaps this might also be a prophecy referring to the incarnation of the Lord: when the voice that came from heaven seemed to those who heard it to be thunder, which God and Father sent forth in order to announce Christ to men through it; and the spirits that were stirred up, and which troubled the sea, and then calmed at the Lord’s command—these also manifestly announced his Christ to men.

But the statement, *All things through him came to be* (John i, 3), in no way demonstrates for us that the Holy Spirit is created, as if the Spirit were numbered among all things. For if the Holy Spirit is one and alone, how can he who is of a unique nature be comprehended together with all things? And let no one imagine that the denial that the Spirit is a creature constitutes the abolition of his hypostasis. For it is the part of a pious mind to treat with reverence those things concerning the Holy Spirit which are passed over in silence in the holy Scriptures, and to believe that his acquaintance and precise comprehension are reserved for us for the age to come, when, having passed beyond the task of seeing the truth through a mirror and in a riddle (1 Cor. xiii, 12), we shall be deemed worthy of that contemplation which is face to face. ^{C D}

MONITUM

We have already said that there are some who call these last two books into doubt; but that they are very few to be found, and that they cannot establish their own opinion with sufficiently firm arguments; and for this reason the contrary opinion has so prevailed that all have embraced it with one consent. It is worth noting again that this argument is treated in the Preface toward the end, with the greatest care that was possible.

OF THE SAME: COUNTER-ARGUMENT

1. If the Son is by nature God, and the Father is God by nature, the Son is not God in one way and the Father in another, but similarly; but if the Son is not God by nature, as those who are falsely called gods are said to be, he is not God at all. If the Son is one Lord by nature, and the Father is also Lord by nature, clearly it is not a different nature. And if the Father is called one God, and the Son is also God, it is not a different nature, but one. If there is one Lord by nature, although many are called sons by adoption, and one Son by nature, although [many] are named by adoption; since the word "adoption" is spoken in imitation of that which is by nature: for nothing can be named by adoption, unless that which is by nature precedes it. Therefore, if we are sons of God by adoption, it is necessary that the Son by nature should pre-exist.

^A 1. If the Son is God by nature, and the Father is God by nature, not otherwise is the Son God, and the Father differently, but similarly; but if the Son is not God by nature, saying so is like those who are falsely called gods, and he is not God. If the Son is one Lord by nature, and the Father is also Lord by nature, it is clear that it is not a different nature. ^B And if then the Father is called one God, and the Son is also God, it is not a different nature, but one. If there is one Lord by nature, while many are called sons by adoption, and there is one Son by nature, while many are named sons by adoption [(52)], then the word "by adoption" is said in imitation of "by nature"; for nothing could be said to be "by adoption" if "by nature" did not precede it. If, therefore, we are sons of God by adoption [(33)], it is necessary that the Son by nature should pre-exist. Then there are also the true names of the essence of which they are names, [and] signs. And the Father is also truly Lord and God.

^A If the "only-begotten" is not of generation, but because of the incomparable, then the Father is also only-begotten, for he is incomparable. But every creature, too, not being like another, is only-begotten; therefore there are many only-begotten, and the Son of God is not one. But if ^B the Son is not simply only-begotten, but is the Son who is only-begotten, and is only-begotten from the Father, the Son is indeed only-begotten, and not an only-begotten creature. If the Son is Creator by participation and the concession of the Father, and not by nature, then nothing of the things created by him exists by nature. For if the creator is not by nature, how could the things created exist by nature? If God acts as no one else, he will also generate as no one else generates; for God is incomparable to everything in everything. ^B That which is made is not from the substance of the maker, but that which is begotten is from the very substance of the begetter; therefore to make and to beget are not the same. If the Son is from God, yet not as from a Father, but as from another—and God is to us also the cause of existence, for from him are all things—then the Father is not in one way Father to the Son and in another way to us, but in the same way. And how is this not absurd? If nothing is like and equal to God except the Son, nothing among the examples will be said without difference; for God is above all. ^C That which is in the form of God is in the substance of God. For the form of God is not one thing and his substance another, lest he be composite. Therefore, whoever is equal according to form is also equal according to substance. If he who is begotten is inferior to him who begat, this is not a fault of the begotten, but a weakness of the begetter. For either through envy he did not make him equal, or through inability he did not beget one like himself. If the Father was before the Son, he was necessarily the father of some other being; for without a son, one could not be called a father. If he who has known the Son according to substance has also known the Father (for "If you had known me, he says, you would have known my Father also"), then the Son is consubstantial with the Father. For nothing incorporeal can be known from a dissimilar substance. If believing that Christ is the Son of God involves the necessity ^D that he pre-exist by nature. [alt-version omitted]

For if their operations are the same, their substance also is one. The operation of the Father and of the Son is one, as it is written: *Let us make man*; and again: *For what things soever the Father doeth, these also the Son doeth likewise*; therefore the substance of the Father and of the Son is also one. If the knowledge of the Father and the Son is eternal life, it is necessary that they be of one substance. For those things which are of diverse substances are not apprehended by one knowledge, nor can they vivify in a like manner. If the Son is truly the image of the Father, and every image is an image of either a substance, or a form, or a shape, or a species, or a color, and God is none of these, but only in substance, then the Son, being the image of the substance, is consubstantial with the Father. If the Father is incomparable in all things toward the Son, and in all things toward the creation as well, it cannot be that he is related one way to the Son and differently to the creation, but rather he is related similarly to both; therefore he is not only dissimilar to the Father, but even similar to the creation. And how is this not absurd? If, while calling the Son a creature, they do not mean it as one of the creatures, why, when we speak of a "begotten one," do they understand him as one of the begotten? If God does not beget, lest he suffer flux, nor create, lest he labor; if he creates without passion, how much more does he beget without passion? If the radiance of any light is begotten indeed from the light, yet not at some time, but without time and co-eternally with it (for there is no light without its radiance), then the Son, being the radiance, shall not be "at some time," but is co-eternal, since God is light, as David says: *In thy light we shall see light*; and Daniel: *And the light is with him*. If according to them the "begotten" is substance, just as the "unbegotten" is, and the Son of God is the begotten, then the Son is also the substance of God. If God begat the Son by will and not by nature: either, having willed once, he afterwards willed not, or he willed again and begat again. But if his will is not one, but diverse, he is no longer simple, ^C nor is he the author of one thing, but as he wills, so he acts. If God does not beget, it is either because he is unable, or because he does not will it. But if he is unable, he is inferior to a generative and perfect nature, and is indeed powerless; if, being able, he did not will it, he possessed it by nature but withheld it by his will. So if he has not yet begotten, then, having willed it, he will beget at some time. ^D If there was a "when" in which the Son was not, that very thing—the "when"—will be after the begetter, but before the begotten. The Son, therefore, is no longer before all things.

^A Since we say that, the Father existing always, it is necessary that the Son also always exists, they say: "Therefore, since the Son is always a creator, and the creation will always be, in this way the creation will also be co-eternal with the Father and the Son." But he who speaks of a creator does not at the same time speak of the creation. For the building does not exist together with the builder, nor does the vessel with the shipwright. For the creation, indeed, is in the creator, but that which is created is after the creator. It is impossible to speak of a Father without the Son existing. And he who speaks of a Father does not speak of a Father simply, but of the Father of someone.

^B "...God, and Lord, and omnipotent, and Sabaoth, and He who is, and Adonai, and Eloi," is what God is called in the Scriptures; but "unbegotten," nowhere. But if anyone were even to concede this, it would be appropriate to apply the name "unbegotten" and the previously mentioned names just as much to Jews as to all others; but to Christians alone, "Father of Christ." If, therefore, that which alone separates us from the rest is false, and not true, if the name is by adoption and not a reality by nature, our faith is false and our hope is vain. For he whose beginning is weak, his end is also feeble. Again they ask: "Was the Son begotten when he existed, or when he did not exist?" Their question is ambiguous and craftily devised. For, fearing to ask "when," and "in time," they say "when he existed." Ask them in return: "Did God beget the Son when he was already Father, or when he was not yet a Father?" For if he was Father when he did so, he, being, begot the existing one; but if he was not, he was made, and is not a Father by nature. ^C But all their contentiousness is excluded by the divine Scriptures, while Moses cries out concerning the Son: "He who is, sent me" (Exod. III, 14); and the evangelist: "In the beginning was the Word" (Joan. I, 1). And he does not say "was" just once, but four times. And again elsewhere: "He who is from God" (Joan. VIII, 42); and: "He who is in the bosom of the Father" (Joan. I, 18); and in other places: "He who is in heaven" (Joan. III, 13); and in the Apocalypse: "He who is, and who was, and who is coming" (Apoc. I, 8); and Paul: "Who being the splendor of the glory" (Hebr. I, 3); and: "Who existing in the form of God" (Phil. II, 6); and again: "Who is God over all, blessed" (Rom. IX, 5). If the Son is true God, and light, and immutable, and good, and holy, and Lord, and the Father also is these things, ^D yet it is not in the same manner, but rather in a greater manner—not by a superiority of essence, but by an overflowing of quality.

≫ ^A For one essence is not said to be "more" than another essence, but [this is said] of quality. For a man is not said to be "more" of a man than another man, but a good man is more than a good man, and a just man more than a just man. The nature of those begotten is the same as that of the begetter, even if the begotten have their being in a different mode. For neither is Abel, who was begotten through intercourse, different from Adam, though Adam was not begotten, but fashioned. If the cause is greater than that which is caused, and differs from it in essence, and every father is a cause, and every son is caused, then fathers are greater than their sons and differ from them in essence, and are not of one essence. But this is not true.

They ask: If the Father, having begotten the Son, ceased from begetting Him? And if they obtain the admission that He ceased, they infer: Therefore He also began to beget. For everything that has an end also has a beginning; therefore the Son was not always. We shall say, then: If that which terminates must have a beginning, then that which has a beginning must also terminate; therefore angels and all incorporeal things ^B having a beginning of their being must, by necessity, also have an end of their being. But this is absurd. It is possible, therefore, that what has begun to be does not end, and what has ended did not have a beginning. If not, then if the Son Himself has a beginning of being, then according to them He also necessarily has an end; since whatever has a beginning, they wish to have an end also. And how is this not blasphemous? Moreover, the foreknowledge of God, while lacking a beginning, has an end after the things it foreknew have come to be. Thus, that which has an end does not necessarily have a beginning.

The "one" in the case of incorporeal things is said either in respect of operation, or will, or essence. When the Savior said, *I and the Father are one*, He said it according to one of those things which we have just written. Therefore, if they say it is according to operation, they must also say it is according to essence; for the operation of those whose essence is different cannot be similar. But if they are one according to will, it is necessary not only that whatever the Father wills, the Son must also will, but ^C also that whatever the Son wills, the Father must also will. Therefore the Son will also command the Father in the things He wills, if indeed He is also commanded. But if He is only commanded, He serves under compulsion and unwillingly. If, however, they are one neither by operation nor by will, it remains, according to them, that they are one according to essence—that is, that the Father and the Son are consubstantial.

That the term "unbegotten" signifies a certain mode of existence, not essence.

^D 1. If "unbegotten" were an essence, and "begotten" were an essence, and for that reason the Father and the Son were not consubstantial, then every thing begotten of necessity would be of one essence; therefore the Father and the Son...

^A are the offspring of the Son of God. And how is this not blasphemy? If the unbegotten, being distinguished against the begotten Son, is an essence, and the uncreated, being distinguished against the creation, is an essence, then the unbegotten will be an essence, and the uncreated will be an essence. God, therefore, is two, and not one essence. Furthermore, every creation will also be one essence. But this is false; for while the creation is one, the essences are different. Thus, His immutability, and His state of being without beginning, and many other things will be essences. If someone, by calling the Father unbegotten and the Son begotten, declared their essences, and wished to state the mode of their existence, how else could he possibly speak than this? Therefore, "unbegotten" is a mode of existence, and not the name of an essence. If things that have a different origin of existence possess a different essence as well, then not even men are consubstantial. For the existence of Adam, who was formed from the earth, is one; another is that of Eve, who came from his rib; another is that of Abel, for he came from union; and still another is that of the One from Mary, from the virgin alone. And likewise also in the case of winged creatures and quadrupeds. If the Father is unbegotten because He was not begotten, and the Son is begotten—because of His having been begotten—then the unbegotten exists after the one who was begotten. For He had nothing against which He might be called unbegotten. For distinctions are of things that exist, not of things that do not exist. If there was a time when God was, but was not Father, having become Father He took upon Himself the name of Father. Thus God is indeed unbegotten, but the Father is begotten; therefore the same entity, being simple, is both begotten and unbegotten.

2. If the impossible is the contrary of the possible, and the foolish of the wise, ^C and all things that are distinguished against one another are contraries to one another, then the unbegotten is also a contrary to the begotten. The Father, therefore, is contrary to the Son according to essence, if at least "unbegotten" is not a mode of existence, but an essence. If the Son is a created thing and not an offspring, and all things that exist are created things, then the Father is called "unbegotten" in vain, since there is no offspring at all in relation to which He is called unbegotten. Therefore, He would more justly be called "uncreated" than "unbegotten." If "unbegotten" is a name, it is not an essence. For names are signifiers of essences, but are not themselves essences. But if "unbegotten" is the essence itself, let them state its name. For we do not know essences from themselves, but from names and operations, and especially the [things]...

^A incorporeal. If "unbegotten" were the name of the essence of God, then either God, while knowing His own essence, remained ignorant of the name of the essence, or, even knowing the name, He deceived those who heard Him. For the Lord says: "Almighty is my name". And when asked by Moses what His name was, He said: "I am who I am." And again: "The God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob; this is my name eternal." And David says: "Lord is the name for you." But this name, "unbegotten," neither did He Himself ascribe to Himself, nor did any of the saints utter it. But if He neither deceived nor was ignorant (for it is impious to say either of these things), then "unbegotten" is not His name. Now, "unbegotten" is either an essence or an accident (for besides these, there could be nothing); but it is not an essence, for it is not even the term ^B contrasted with it—for the Son is begotten, not insofar as He is essence, but insofar as He was begotten. But if it is an accident, it is either naturally inherent, or it can be present and absent. But if it is naturally inherent, it is necessary for God to be both essence and accident. For such things necessarily happen to those to whom they are accidents. But if it is present contingently, there will be a time when He is unbegotten and a time when He is begotten. If they call God "unbegotten" because He was not begotten, they are not saying what His essence is, but what it is not. But no essence is known from what it is not, but from what it is. For "immortal," and "incorruptible," and "unchangeable" ^C signify not His essence, but that He does not die, nor is corrupted, nor changed like created things. Therefore, let them teach what God is, not what He is not. If "unbegotten" is not the name of an essence, but is essence-itself, and the Son is also an essence, then the Son is also unbegotten, and every essence is unbegotten. If "unbegotten" is the essence of God, and "begotten" is the essence of the Son, then the creature or the creation is not His essence. For there is one, and not many, essence: [which is] the Son. When someone says "man," or "stone," or "wood," he indicates a certain essence; but when he says "begotten," he does not signify an essence simply—since every begotten thing is one essence. If, then, the "begotten" is not indicative of any essence, then ^D clearly "unbegotten" is not either. If God is unbegotten because He was not begotten, so too is He incorruptible because He is not corrupted. Just as, therefore, "incorruptible" signifies His endless [nature], so too "unbegotten" signifies His being without beginning. But if He were unbegotten but not incorruptible, He would be without beginning but not without end; which is absurd. "Unbegotten" is not, therefore, an essence, but a declaration that He has not been begotten. If by nature the Father is unbegotten, and by nature the Son is begotten—if, however, He is a "begotten thing" by nature, He is no longer a creature. Since, therefore, [He] is a begotten thing by nature, it is necessary that He who begat be also a [begotten thing].

^A For without a begetter, he could not exist. Let them, therefore, name the begetter, if the Father did not beget. If God is "unbegotten" in substance, and the Son is "begotten" in substance, and the Paraclete is a "creature" in substance, then [it follows that] Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are mere names without substances. Let them, therefore, baptize into an "unbegotten," a "begotten," and a "creature." For things are more powerful than names, and realities are more useful for operation than what is merely spoken. If, they say, the Father is unbegotten, but the Son is begotten, they are not of the same substance. For "unbegotten" and "begotten" cannot be of one substance. But we say that these are not substances, but names by which the existence of each of them is indicated. And nothing prevents one substance from having different names, just as the opposite is also true, that there can be one name for different substances in created things. ^B If the Father is unbegotten, and the Son is begotten, [it leads to the conclusion that] one and the same substance is both unbegotten and begotten. But we do not say the Son is a part of the Father, as if the substance were divided into unbegotten and begotten, but rather that the total [Son] is begotten from the total [Father]—two perfect [realities], and not two parts from some one thing. If the Savior came in the name of the Father, as He Himself says, "I have come in My Father's name," then it is necessary that whatever the Father is called, the Son must also be called. Therefore, He will also be called "unbegotten," if this name also belongs to the Father. And if "unbegotten" is a title of honor for the Father, and if it is necessary to honor the Son in the same way, according to His own voice which says, "That all should honor the Son, just as they honor the Father," then it is necessary also to call the Son "unbegotten," so that one honor for Father and Son may be preserved. ^C If the Son manifested the name of the Father to men, as He Himself says, "I have manifested Your name to men," and "unbegotten" is the name proper to His substance, let them show where the Savior called Himself "unbegotten." If God is greater than all, is He greater in substance, or because He is the cause of all, and has been begotten by no one? For if it is in as much as He is substance, then every substance is greater than all things; but if in as much as He is unbegotten, then substance and unbegotten are not the same thing. If the unbegotten is something, then the immortal, and the endless, and the disease-free, and the ageless ^D will also be "something." Therefore, since the unbegotten is a substance, whether it is so by substance, or by the fact that it is the cause of all; if the "unbegotten" is a reality, then so are the immortal, the endless, and the ageless.

^A For these also are immortal and endless. But if it does not exceed by those things which it is not, but by those which it is (for not even a man is superior to a brute by not being inanimate or senseless—for these are characteristics of the irrational—but by being rational), so also will God be greater, not because He is unbegotten, but because He is the cause of all things. If the unbegotten is distinguished from the begotten by opposition, and yet the unbegotten is a simple substance, then by this fact—that it is immutable, immortal, and devoid of form—it will also be distinguished from the begotten in other respects. For if it is distinguished by some things, but not at all by others, it is composite and not simple. ^B If he who has known that God is unbegotten has accurately known what God truly is, then again, if there is nothing greater than to know God according to His own nature—indeed, if this is eternal life—then he who taught us that God is unbegotten will be found greater than those things which God has prepared for them that love Him. For it is impossible for a man, while he is a man, to know those things which "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have they entered into the heart of man." Yet sinners have also heard the name "unbegotten." Therefore, God has taught sinners the greater thing, either by Himself or through another, while He has reserved the lesser thing—which contributes nothing to eternal life—for the righteous. And how is this not absurd? "Unbegotten" is neither a definition nor a property of God. ^C For these terms are convertible with those of which they are a definition or property. For "man" is a rational, mortal animal, capable of intellect and knowledge; and if any thing is a rational, mortal animal, capable of intellect and knowledge, this is man; and that which is "laughable" is the property of man, and if any thing is laughable, it is a man. But if any one concedes that "unbegotten" is said of God alone, it does not immediately follow that if any thing is also God, this same thing is unbegotten. The Son, therefore, being God, is not unbegotten. Thus, "unbegotten" is neither a definition nor a property; for it is not convertible.

That the Son is not a creature.

1. If the Son is a creature of God, and every creature is a servant to the Creator; then Christ is a servant of God, and not the Son of God. ^D Therefore, He did not take the form of a servant when He was already Lord, but rather He was a servant. The power of the creature is not shared with the Creator: therefore there is nothing common between the Father and the Son, not even creation, if the Son is not a production, but a generation. If the Son is a generation, as one of those things which are born, every generation is a creature; the Son is not a creature; for the Son is not a generation in the way that those things are.

^A If God could not create things less than the one Son, because it was not in his nature, then neither will the Son create diverse things, but only one thing. If lesser things are created by a lesser creator, and greater things by a greater, then there are many creators, since not all things are equal. If God is a creator by nature, he will not be the creator of one thing, but of many. For he does not create one thing from weakness, and another from envy and malice. If the Father’s power created through the Son, then the Father is the creator, not the Son, just as the tool is not the craftsman. It is not, therefore, too lowly a thing for the Father that those things which were made by the Son should be attributed to him. If God was ashamed to perform the creation of the existing world directly by himself, he will not accept its glorification either. For he will not wish to be thought the owner of things which he was ashamed to make when they come to be. If to create and to beget are the same for God, because he is simple, then it is also the same to save and to destroy, and to give life and to kill. ^B If this is the case, then salvation and destruction are the same, as are life and death. If Christ is the power and wisdom of God, and these are uncreated and coeternal with God (for he was never without wisdom or without power), then Christ is uncreated and coeternal with God. But if he is called the power and wisdom of God insofar as he is an operation, then we too might be called the power and wisdom of the Lord no differently than he himself is said to be the power and wisdom of God. But this is absurd. If the Son is not the eternal God, he is necessarily recent; if he is not true, he is false; if he is not such by nature, he is such by adoption. But it belongs to the impious to worship those who are recent, false, and not gods by nature. For, he says, you shall not have a recent God. And Paul says: "But then indeed, not knowing God, you served those who by nature are not gods" (Gal. iv, 8). ^C Either those who worship Christ in this way are impious, or he is God by nature and true, and thus they are pious. If the Son is an operation and not a generation, then neither the one who operated nor the thing operated is himself (for the operation is something different from these), and he is also without subsistence; for no operation has subsistence. But if he is the thing operated, he is a third [entity] from the Father, and not immediate. For the one who operated is first, then the operation, and then the thing operated. If the Son is "only-begotten" because he alone was begotten by the one [Father], he would more properly be called "only-created," being truly a creature according to Eunomius, but falsely called a generation. If the Son is the only creation of the Father, and all other things are of the Son, then when he says, "All mine are thine," it is possible to say so; but by adding, "And thine are mine," according to Euno...

Eunomius, it is no longer correct. For he himself could not be of himself. It is evident, therefore, that he was discussing their similarity and their substance, which is in all respects immutable and like, and that he was not speaking of creatures. ^A

2. If Christ creates and begets in like manner, he is also our creator and Father; for he is God, and has no need of the adoption that comes through the Holy Spirit, just as he had no need for us to be made his creatures through some other person; although many of the creatures do not even have the nature to receive the spirit of adoption, such as the irrational and inanimate things. If we who are creatures become sons through the adoption of the Holy Spirit, let them say if the Son is also a creature, through whom he attained to the adoption of the Father? If all things that the Father has are also the Son's, and the Father has nothing apart from those things that were made through the Son, unless—according to them—he has himself alone; then he ought to have himself also, which is impossible. If the image is totally ^B similar, as the Son is an image; and the creature is in no way similar to the creator, but in all things dissimilar; then, being the image of the Father, the Son cannot be his creature. If the incorporeal, while begetting, necessarily begets as a body, he will also see as a body, and hear as a body; and he will perform every operation as a body. But if these things have it otherwise, he will clearly beget in another way. One cannot bestow upon others what one does not possess oneself; if, therefore, the Son is a creature and a servant, he cannot make others free. That which is by nature a medium between certain things touches upon both extremes; if, therefore, Christ is by nature a mediator between God and us, and not by dispensation, then God and the creature are joined by nature. ^C If the Son is similar to the Father, yet not according to substance, it remains that he is so either according to form or according to operation. But by form it is impossible (for nothing incorporeal is in a form). And if it is according to operation, he would not have performed something alien, but such as he himself is, if indeed he is a workmanship of the Father and not a generation. Moreover, it has been said before that what is similar in operation must necessarily be similar in substance as well.

3. If the works of God are in faith, and not in demonstration, according to David who said: *And all his works are in faith* (Ps. XXXII, 4); how much more is the generation of the Son from the Father before the ages in faith, and not in demonstration? If God made the Son from nothing, and the Son made all things from nothing,

^A they possess the same power and operation, those who are able to create from nothing, and nowhere is any difference in the things created to be discerned. For although the creature is diverse in many ways and by a manifold arrangement, the producers are not diverse; rather, the Son is one, through whom all things were made. If Christ is the first work of God from among those things that came from nothing, and if the Arians, believing thus, worship Him, yet Job calls the devil the first work of God, saying: *This is the first of the beginning of the creation of the Lord* (Job XIV, 14), they are unwittingly worshiping the devil, and not the Son of God. But if they say that he spoke of the first work of the Son, then the Spirit, according to them, is no longer the work of the Lord, or else He will be found to have been made after the devil. If our faith in the Son is the work of God (*For this, he says, is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent* [Joan. VI, 29]), then He Himself cannot be the work of God. For faith in Him and He Himself are not the same thing.

Upon that text: ^B *But when all things shall be subjected to him, then the Son also himself shall be subjected* (1 Cor. XV, 28). If the Son is subjected to the Father divinely, He would have been subjected from the beginning, from the time that He was also God. But if He was not subjected, but will be subjected later, it is humanly, as on our behalf, and not divinely on His own account.

Upon that text: *Therefore God also hath given him a name which is above all names* (Philipp. II, 9). If, after the incarnation, on account of obedience, the Father gave that name which is above all names to the Son, who was God, and every tongue confessed Him Lord; then before the incarnation He neither possessed the name which is above all names, nor did He receive from all the confession that He is Lord. Therefore, He became greater after the incarnation than He was before the incarnation, which is absurd. Such also is this: *All power is given to me in heaven and in earth* (Matth. XXVIII, 18). These things, therefore, must be understood in reference to the incarnation, and not to the divinity.

Upon that text: *My Father is greater than I* (Joan. XIV, 28). That which is greater is said to be so either by magnitude, or by time, or by dignity, or by power, or as a cause. But the Father could not be called greater than the Son in magnitude; ^C for He is incorporeal. Nor yet in time; for the Son is the Creator of times. Nor in dignity; for He did not become what He once was not. Nor yet in power; for all things that the

^A Father does, the Son does likewise. Nor as cause; since He would be greater than Him and than us in the same way, if He were the cause of Him and of us. Therefore, the statement [of the Son] indicates a greater honor which the Son pays to the Father, not a diminution [of substance] on the part of Him who said it. Furthermore, that which is greater is not immediately of a different substance. For man is called greater than man, and horse than horse. Therefore, if the Father is called greater, it is not immediately of a different substance. In general, comparative terms are used of those things which are consubstantial, and not of those which are of different substances. For man is not, strictly speaking, called greater than a brute, nor a brute than an inanimate object; but man [is called greater] than man, and a brute than a brute. Therefore, the Father is consubstantial with the Son, even if He is called greater.

On the text, "But of that day and hour knoweth no man."

If the Son is the Creator of all things, and yet does not know the time of the judgment, then He is ignorant of that which He created. For He did not say that He was ignorant of the judgment, but of the time. And how would this not be absurd?

On the same text.

If the Son does not have the knowledge of all things which the Father has, He lied when He said: "All things that the Father hath are mine"; and, "As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father." But if it is one thing to know the Father, and another to know the things that are the Father’s, and if it is greater to know the Father than to know what is His—inasmuch as everyone is greater than his own possessions—then the Son, having known the greater ^C (for "No one," He says, "knoweth the Father, save the Son"), could not have been ignorant of that which is the lesser; which is impossible. Therefore, because it was not expedient for men to hear it, He kept silent about the time of the judgment. For constant expectation makes [men] more fervent in piety; but the knowledge that a long time would intervene would have made them more negligent in piety, hoping that they could be saved by a change of life later on. For how could He who knows all things up to that hour (for this is what He said) not also know that hour? In vain would the Apostle also have said: "In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."

On the same text.

If the Holy Spirit, who searches the depths of God, can be ignorant of nothing that is of God, and the ^D Son

^A is ignorant; then according to them, the Holy Spirit is greater than the Son, whom they do not even wish to be equal.

On the text: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me." ^B If the Son truly said, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me," he was not only confessing his own fear and weakness, but he even considered that there was something which could not be done by the Father. For the expression, "if it be possible," was that of one doubting, and of one not persuaded that the Father could save him. But how could he who grants life to the dead not much more be able to preserve life for the living? Why then did he who raised Lazarus and many dead persons not provide life for himself, but asked for life from the Father, saying in fear: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me"? And if he were dying against his will, he could no longer be said to have humbled himself, becoming obedient to the Father unto death, nor that he gave himself up, as the Apostle says: "Who gave himself a ransom for our sins." But if he did so willingly, what need was there for the words: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me"? These words, therefore, must be understood as referring to those who were about to sin against him, so that they might not sin, and not as referring to himself; concerning whom, even while being crucified, he said: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." It is not necessary, therefore, to receive things spoken by way of dispensation ^C as if they were spoken simply.

On the text: "And I live because of the Father." If the Son lives because of the Father, he lives because of another, and not because of himself. But he who lives because of another cannot be Life itself. For neither is he who is holy by grace holy in himself. If so, the Son lied when he said: "I am the life"; and again: "So also the Son gives life to whom he wills." Therefore, one must understand what was said as referring to the incarnation, and not to his divinity.

On the text: "Neither can the Son do anything of his own self." If that which has self-determination is better than that which is under the determination of another, and man has self-determination, while the Son of God is under the determination of another, then man is better than the Son; which is absurd. And if he who is under the determination of another cannot make others possess self-determination (for he cannot bestow upon others by his own will what he does not possess himself), then the Savior, in making us possessors of self-determination, cannot be under the determination of anyone. ^D

On the same text. If the Savior could do nothing of his own self, but only when the Father commanded, he is neither good nor bad. For he would be the cause of none of the things that have been made. And how is it not absurd that men should be made to be the causes of both good and evil,

^A or that the Son, who is God, should have no one who, according to his authority, is his Maker?

On the text, "I am the vine."

If the Savior is the vine, they say, and we are the branches, and the Father is the husbandman; and if the branches are of the same nature as the vine, but the vine is not of the same nature as the husbandman; then the Son is indeed of the same nature as us, and we are a part of him, but the Son is not of the same nature as the Father, but rather is in all respects alien. To such people we shall reply that it is not in regard to his divinity, but in regard to his flesh, that he has called us branches, according to the Apostle who said: "For we are Christ's body, and members in part"; and again: "Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ?" And in other places: "As was the man of dust, so also are those who are of dust; and as is the man of heaven, so also are those who are of heaven"; and, "Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall also bear the image of the man of heaven." If Christ is the head of the man, and God is the head of Christ, but man is not consubstantial with God Christ (for he is not God), whereas Christ is consubstantial with God (for ^B he is God), then it is not the case that, as Christ is the head of the man, so God is the head of Christ. For the nature of the creature and the creative deity do not coincide into one and the same thing. Consequently, he is the head of Christ insofar as he is Father, but he is our head insofar as he is Creator.

If it is the will of the Father that we should believe in his Son ("For this is the will of him who sent me, that everyone who sees the Son and believes in him should have eternal life"), the Son does not originate from a will, since our believing in him is found either with him or before him.

On the text, "No one is good."

If the Savior is not good, he is necessarily evil; for he is simple and admits of nothing that is intermediate. And how is it not absurd for the Maker of good things to be evil? Furthermore, if life is a good thing, and the words of the Son ^C are life, as he himself said: "The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and are life"; then how is it that, having heard "Good Teacher" from the Pharisee, he answers: "No one is good except one, God"? For he did not say "No one is good" having heard only "good," but... ^D before he assumed human nature, and for the patriarchs and the ancient Jews, it was necessary to believe in the one who was to come as Christ in order to attain salvation. Therefore, since we must necessarily believe in the Son in every age and time, it follows from this that the Son exists by nature, not by will, nor by adoption. — If it is the will of the Father that we should believe in his Son... the Son does not exist by the will, since our faith in him is found either with him or before him. This subtle reasoning is illustrated by another similar argument, which is found on p. 288: If our faith in the Son is the work of God... he himself cannot be the work of God. For faith in him and he himself are not the same. MARAN. — Some other things...

^A "No one is good; but after he had heard, 'good master.' He answered then as if to one tempting him, as the Gospel says; or as if to one ignorant that God is good, and not simply a good master."

In the passage, "Father, glorify me."

If the Son were asking to be glorified by the Father according to his divinity, and not according to his humanity, he would be asking for what he did not have. But then the Evangelist would be lying when he said, "We have seen his glory"; and the Apostle, "For they would not have crucified the Lord of glory"; and David, "And the king of glory shall enter in." He is not, therefore, asking for an addition of glory, but that there might be a manifestation of the dispensation.

In the same passage.

If he were truly asking from the Father the glory which he had before the world was made, he would be asking for it as one having lost it. For he would not seek to receive what he already had. But if this is the case, he would have lost not only the glory, but also the divinity; for glory cannot be separated from divinity. He was therefore, according to Photinus, a mere man. It is evident, then, that having said such things, he spoke according to the dispensation of his humanity, not according to any deficiency of his divinity.

In the passage, "The firstborn of every creature."

If the Son were not a generation before creation, but a creature, he would be called "first-created" and not "firstborn." ^B If, because he is called "firstborn of creation," he is therefore "first-created," then because he is called "firstborn of the dead," he would be the first who died among those who are dead. But if he is called "firstborn of the dead" because he is the cause of resurrection from the dead, so too is he the "firstborn of creation," because he is the cause of bringing creation from non-existence into being. If the fact of his being called "firstborn of creation" shows that he was created first, the Apostle, having said, "All things were created by him and for him," ought to have said, "And he himself was made before all things." But by saying, "And he himself is before all things," he showed that he indeed always exists, while creation was made. For the word "is" agrees with, "In the beginning was the Word." ^C If, they say, the Son is the firstborn, he is no longer only-begotten, but there must be another, of whom he is said to be the firstborn. And yet, O wise one, even though he was born of Mary the Virgin alone, he is called her firstborn. For it says, "Until she brought forth her firstborn son." Thus, there is no necessity for a brother in order to be called firstborn. It could also be said that he was called firstborn even before ^D every birth; and further, that he is the firstborn of the dead. O wise men.

to be called. It may also be said that he who precedes every generation is called the firstborn; furthermore, with respect to those who by the adoption of the Holy Spirit are born of God, as Paul says: *For whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren* ^A.

On that which is written: The Lord created me

If He who is in the flesh says: *I am the way* and the same: *No one comes to the Father except through me*; He is also the One who said: *The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways*. Now, the terms "creature" and "work" are also used of birth, as in the passage: *I have created a man through God*; and again: *He made sons and daughters*; and David: *Create in me a clean heart, O God*, ^B not asking for something else, but clearly asking that the heart which existed might be cleansed. Moreover, it is also called a "new creature," not because some other creature has been made, but because those who are illuminated are being prepared for better works. If the Father created the Son for works, He did not create Him for His own sake, but for the sake of the works. Whatever is made for the sake of another thing, and not for its own sake, is either a part of that for the sake of which it was made, or is inferior to it. The Savior, therefore, would be either a part of the creature or inferior to the creature. It is therefore necessary to understand this regarding His humanity. Someone might also say that Solomon said these things about that Wisdom of which the Apostle also makes mention, where he said: *For since ^C in the wisdom of God the world did not know God through wisdom.* Furthermore, he who spoke is not a prophet, but a writer of Proverbs. Proverbs are images of other things, not the very things that are spoken of. If it were God the Son who was speaking, "The Lord created me," He would more fittingly have said, "The Father created me." For He never called Him His Lord, but always Father. Therefore, we must accept the term "begat" as applying to God the Son, but "created" as applying to Him who took the form of a servant. Yet in all these things, we do not speak of two—God separately and man separately (for He was one)—but we consider the nature of each by mental abstraction. For ^D neither did Peter understand two when he said: *Since therefore Christ suffered for us in the flesh.* If, they say, the Son is an offspring and not a work, how does Scripture say: *Therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly that God made him both Lord and Christ?* It must therefore be said here also that this was spoken concerning Him who is from Mary according to the flesh: just as also the angel bringing the good news [to the shepherds says that, "there is born to you today a Savior, who is Christ the Lord." The...]

word, "Today," could not be thought of as applying to Him who is before the ages. But what follows shows it more clearly, where he says: ^A "This Jesus whom you crucified." If when the Son was born, then wisdom came into being, false is that saying: "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God." For His wisdom did not come into being, but was always. And this therefore, as being said of the Father by David: "Become for me a God, a protector"; and, "You have become for me for salvation"; and Paul says: "But let God be true, and every man a liar"—so also the Lord is become for us from God wisdom, and sanctification, and redemption. If, therefore, the Father, by becoming a protector and true, is not a creature; then the Son, by becoming wisdom and sanctification, is not a creature. If the saying is true, "One God the Father," it is plainly true also that, "One Lord Jesus Christ the Savior." Therefore, according to them, neither is the Savior God, nor is the Father Lord. And in vain is it said: "The Lord said to my Lord." False also is that which says: "Therefore God, your God, has anointed you"; and that: "The Lord rained from the Lord"; and that: "God made according to the image of God"; and, "Who is God beside the Lord?"; and, "Who is God besides our God?" And John says that, "The Word was God, and the Word was with God"; and Thomas says concerning the Son: "My Lord and my God." ^B Therefore, concerning creatures and those who are called gods falsely and not properly, we must understand the distinctions, not regarding the Father and the Son.

On that text, "That they may know you the only true God."

The "true" is spoken in distinction to those who are called so falsely; but the "incomparable" is he who excels all things in all respects. When Jeremiah, therefore, said regarding the Son, "This is our God," will another be reckoned beside Him, or did he speak of one greater than the Father? But that the Son is also true God, John ^C himself says in the Epistle: "That we may know the only true God; and we are

^A in His true Son Jesus Christ. He is the true God and eternal life. Therefore, we should not [(61)], because of the expression, "No other shall be reckoned to Him," ^B think that the Son is greater than the Father, nor that the Father alone is the true God; rather, both are to be referred to those who are indeed called gods falsely, but who are not gods in reality. Just as it says in Deuteronomy: "The Lord alone led them, and there was no foreign god with them." If God alone is invisible and wise, it does not immediately follow that He is in all things a God greater than all; but for God who is over all, He must by necessity surpass all. Did the Apostle, therefore, when he called the Savior the God over all [(62)], call Him greater than the Father? That is absurd. Likewise, this is also to be understood [(63)]. The great God cannot be less than another God. Did the Apostle, then, when he said of the Son, "We wait for the blessed hope and the appearing of the glory of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ," think that He is greater than the Father? For we wait for the appearing and presence of the Son [(64)], not of the Father. ^C These things, therefore, are read indiscriminately of the Father and the Son, and not with careful distinction. The expression, "To be equal with God," is nothing else than "to be equal to God." If, then, the Son did not think it robbery to be equal with God, how is He unlike and unequal to God? Yet the Jews are more pious than Eunomius. For when the Savior had called Himself the Son of God, as [(66)] is owed to the Son if He is truly the Son, and that He is equal to the Father: "They sought," he says, "to stone Him," not only because He was breaking the Sabbath, but because He was saying that God was His own Father, making Himself equal to God. Therefore, He is equal to the Father both according to the Apostle and according to the voice of the Savior, even if Eunomius does not wish it.

On the text, "It is not mine to give, but to those for whom it is prepared."

If the Son is not the Lord of judgment, so as to grant benefits to some and to punish others, how did He say: "The Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son [(68)]"? And elsewhere: "The Son of man has authority to forgive sins on earth"; and again: "All authority has been given to me in heaven and on earth"; and to Peter: "I will give to you the keys of the kingdom of heaven"; and to the disciples: "Amen I say to you, you who have followed me in the regeneration will sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of...

in the regeneration, shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. The solution is therefore provided through the Scriptures themselves, as the Savior says: "And then I will render to everyone according to his deeds." And elsewhere: "They that have done good shall come forth unto the resurrection of life; but they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment." The Apostle also says: "For we must all be made manifest before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in the body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." It is therefore up to those who receive these things to make themselves worthy to sit at the right or left hand of the Lord, and not up to Him who is able to grant it, even if the request were unjust.

^B In regard to the passage, "Who is God besides the Lord? and who is God besides our God?" it has been sufficiently demonstrated that the Scriptures did not say these things and the like concerning the Son, but rather concerning those who are called gods, though they are not. From these Scriptures we have often demonstrated that the Son is called both God and Lord in the Old and New Testaments. David makes this point clearer, saying: "Who is like unto thee?" and he added: "Among the gods, O Lord." And Moses says: "The Lord alone did lead them, and there was no strange god with them," even though the Savior was with them, as the Apostle says: "For they drank of the spiritual rock that followed them, and the rock was Christ." Jeremiah likewise says: "The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, shall perish from under the heaven." Indeed, the Son is not among these; for He is the creator of all things. Therefore, these things—as well as what was just said: "I am God the first, and I am after these things, and besides me there is no God"; and, "Before me there was no other God formed, neither shall there be after me"; and, "Hear, O Israel: The Lord thy God is one Lord"—and all such things, must be understood as not referring to the Son.

AGAINST EUNOMIUS

BOOK FIVE

ON THE HOLY SPIRIT, THAT HE IS NOT A CREATURE

That the things which are common to creatures have nothing in common with the Holy Spirit, and that those things which ^D are proper to the Spirit have nothing in common with the creature, from which it is inferred that the Spirit is not a creature.

^A That which is common to the Father and to the Son is also common to the Spirit; for in those characters in which God the Father and the Son are described in Scripture, in the same are the Holy Spirit ^B also described, from which it is inferred that the Spirit is of the same divinity as the Father. That which belongs solely to the Father as God, and not as Father, and to the Son as God, and not as Son [(75)], these things belong solely to the Spirit, and no longer to the creature; so that those [(76)] unshared names and things which have nothing in common with the creature belong only to the Trinity, from which it is inferred that the Trinity is consubstantial. Whatever is created [(77)] is susceptible to turning and change, according to the Prophet who says to God:

Thou who makest all things [(78)], and changest them.

God did not spare the angels who sinned [(75)].

All things are Thy slaves [(82)];

for the Spirit cries in our hearts: Abba, Father; wherefore thou art no longer a slave, but a son 77; there ^B fore He is not a creature. No creature is communicable to the rational soul in such a way as to dwell in it essentially. But the Holy Spirit dwells in it, according to him who says: We are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in us. He is not, therefore, a creature. Every rational creature is capable of virtue and vice. But the Spirit is not capable of either of these. Therefore, the Spirit is not a creature. And all things which show one and the same operation of the holy and blessed Trinity prove the same thing.

That the Spirit is Creator.

The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the work of His hands 79; and in another place: And the works of Thy hands are the heavens 80. And as to who those incorporeal hands of the incorporeal God might be, which fashioned the firmament and the heavens, the Prophet himself interprets when he says: By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all their virtue by the Spirit of His mouth 81. But just as the word in God is not a spoken word, but living and subsistent, and active in all things; so in God there is not a spirit that is diffused, nor air that is dissolved, but a sanctifying power, essentially, existentially, and substantially present. Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me 82. And this passage has the same meaning as the one previously cited. For the divine Spirit, says Job, is He who made me 83. And explaining the other hand, Solomon says: O God of my fathers and Lord of Thy mercy, who hast made all things in Thy word, and by Thy wisdom hast constructed man 84. But Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God 85, which, according to the method of tropology, is the creative hand. Furthermore, Scripture attributes our entire nature to the operation of the Spirit, and calls Him the renovator of the creation unto incorruption: Thou shalt take away their spirit, and they will fail, and they will return to their dust; Thou shalt send forth Thy Spirit, and they shall be created, and Thou shalt renew the face of the earth 86. Nor indeed does He send Himself; but he calls the sending a descent for the sake of the work, not a passing from place to place. Since the Spirit of the Lord

has filled the inhabited earth, and that which holds all things has knowledge of the voice 89. And the angel said to Mary: The Spirit of the Lord shall come upon thee; therefore also that which is born is of the Holy Spirit. ^A That which is from someone is either from Him by way of creation, as in the text, "One God the Father, from whom are all things;" or by way of generation, according to the text, "I came forth from the Father;" and "From the womb, before the day-star, I have begotten thee." Not that God has a womb, but because genuine and not spurious offspring are accustomed to be born from the womb of parents, God has spoken of Himself as having a womb in begetting, for the confusion of the impious, so that, even if they consider their own nature, they may learn that the Son is the genuine fruit of the Father, as if coming from His womb. That which is from someone, then, is either by way of creation, or by way of generation, or naturally from Him, as our activity is from us, or like the radiance of the sun from the sun itself. ^B If, therefore, the supermundane 91 body of Christ is from the Holy Spirit, it cannot be His offspring, because "that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." Nor, again, is it from Him as His activity, because in a simple and incorporeal nature, an activity admits of the same definition of substance 92. It remains, therefore, that it is from Him as His creature. But even that finger of God which transformed the dust in Egypt into living creatures, and first displayed the birth of animals, was the Paraclete, the Spirit of truth. For while three evangelists relate that the Lord said to the Jews: "But if I in the Spirit of God cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you" 94; Luke says that He said: "But if I in the finger of God cast out demons, then the kingdom of heaven has come upon you" 95. ^C Therefore, the signs also performed through Moses in Egypt, which were wrought by the finger of God 93, and the wondrous signs of God, were brought to completion with the Spirit. The Spirit is called the finger of God in these signs, both those under Moses and those of the Lord, not because He is some small power dwelling with God, like a finger to a body, but because He is one of those gifts of His that are given by distribution, namely, the gift of signs and ^D

^A of healings, one of them; and not the whole of the gifts of the Spirit, which he calls a finger (94). For to one indeed, through the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another gifts of healings, in the same Spirit (95); to another prophecy; to another the discerning of spirits; to another kinds of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues. And all these the one and the same Spirit works, dividing them severally to each as He wills. One might say (96) that all these, and whatever other gifts of the Spirit there are, happen to be His body, and that each one of the gifts is a finger. And do not overlook this use of the expression (97). For, having said that the Spirit works all these as He wills, he said of God the selfsame thing: "And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God who works all things (98) in all." If God works all things as He wills, and the one and same Spirit works all these things, dividing them severally to each as He wills, how is there a diversity of substance, where an identity of operation is recognized? For if the substances were different, the operations ^B must also have been different, according to the most impious Eunomius. The Savior, however, bearing witness to the same authority and power in the Spirit, said: "The Spirit breathes where He wills" (1).

On the Forgiveness of Sins

It is proper to God to forgive sins, He Himself saying: "I am He who blots out your sins"; and, "If your sins be as scarlet, I will make them white as snow; and if they be red like crimson, I will make them white as wool." Since, then, God the child of God (2) Jesus forgives sins to the paralytic, saying: "Son, your sins are forgiven," for which ^C He was thought by the Jews—who did not know Him to be God—to be blaspheming, saying that, "This man blasphemes; it belongs to no one to forgive sins but to God alone." But the Lord, breathing upon the holy apostles, said: "Receive the Holy Spirit; if you forgive anyone's sins, they are forgiven them" (5). If, therefore, it belongs to no one to forgive sins—as indeed it does not—except to God alone (6), and the Spirit forgives ^D

then the Spirit is God. And He is of the same operation with the Father and the Son. "Teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (Matt. xxviii, 19). He commands that the nations, once they have believed and been taught, be baptized in the name of the Trinity. But Peter, to the Jews who had conspired in the killing of Christ and were being led to repentance, said: "Repent, brothers (7), each one of you, of your wickedness and of your evil way; and be baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus, and you shall be saved" (Act. ii, 38)—as if the Son could perform in the washing of regeneration the same things that the Father and the Spirit perform. But the Lord said to the apostles, "To wait for the promise of the Father, which you heard: for John indeed baptized with water unto repentance; but you shall be baptized in the Holy Spirit" (Act. i, 4, 5). If, therefore, the Holy Spirit is able to perform in the apostles the same things that the name of the Father and of the Son performs in those who have believed from the Gentiles, and the name of the Lord Jesus in those Jews who had repented (for no one would say that the apostles had received less grace through the laver than those from the Gentiles, since they themselves had received the grace in the Holy Spirit (9)), how is the Spirit, who is also of the same operation, not of the same substance with the Father and the Son? ^B

That the power of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is the same.

"Go into Damascus, and it will be told you there" (Act. xxii, 10). The Lord, appearing from heaven to Paul, said this because He had appointed him a herald of the Gospel to the whole world. But as he entered Damascus, Ananias said: "Brother Saul, look up: the God of our fathers has prepared you" (Act. xxii, 13-14). And lest the word be thought to concern Christ, he adds: "That you might do His will and know the Just One, Jesus" (Act. xxii, 14-15). Paul himself, certainly committing this calling and ordination to writing, said: "Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, a called apostle" (Rom. i, 1). ^C Then he says something else besides the calling: "Set apart for the ^D Gospel of God" (Rom. i, 1). Now the Acts of the Apostles have taught us that it is the Spirit who set him apart. For, he says, as the apostles were fasting and praying, "the Holy Spirit said: Set apart for me Paul and Barnabas for the work to which I have called them" (Act. xiii, 2). But if the Lord God of the fathers indeed chooses him whom He had prepared, and the Son indeed calls him, while the Spirit sets the same man apart, using the authority of his nature; how is there a diversity of substance in the Trinity, in which an identity of operation is found?

^A “My words,” says Solomon, “are spoken by God,” and Paul, “by Christ: since,” he says, “you seek proof of Christ speaking in me.” Nothing less, however, does the Spirit speak in the Apostles. For, he says, the Apostles spoke as the Spirit gave them utterance. And, “It is not you who speak,” the Savior said to them, “but the Spirit of the Father, who is in heaven, who speaks in you.” The Spirit also speaks in the prophets. For “Would to God,” Moses said, “that all this people might prophesy, when the Lord gives his Spirit upon them.” And the new prophet of the New Testament, Agabus, cried out, saying: “Thus says the Holy Spirit,” which the prophets of the Old Testament were accustomed to cry out: “Thus says the Lord God.” And Paul, gathering together these things spoken by the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, said: “All Scripture is God-breathed.” ^B But if the Spirit speaks in the Apostles and in the prophets, and all Scripture is God-breathed, tell the impious: How is the Holy Spirit not God, since his Scripture is God-breathed?

That neither vision nor oracle occurs separately from the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

The prophet Isaiah said: “I saw the Lord Sabaoth sitting upon a throne high and lifted up, and the seraphim were standing around him, six wings to one.” And after a few words he says: “And the Lord said to me: Go and say to this people: With hearing you will hear, and will not understand; and seeing you will see, and will not see. For the heart of this people has been ^C thickened,” etc. So far as concerns the very context and series of the prophetic writing, it is the Father who is over all who was seen and gave the oracle to the prophet. However, the son of thunder, having spoken marvelous things, and having said things more terrible than thunder, whose own peculiar expression is not that, “There was not,” but this, “The Word was,” declared the Son to be the one who was seen and who gave the oracle to the prophet. For he says in his own book: “For this reason the Jews could not believe in Jesus, because Isaiah said of them: Their eyes have been blinded, and their heart has been hardened, so that they might not see with their eyes and understand with their heart, and turn, and I heal them.” These things Isaiah said, when he saw his glory. But Paul declared that vision and that prophecy to be of the Spirit, saying: ^D “Rightly did the Holy Spirit speak through the prophet Isaiah to your fathers: With hearing you will hear, and will not understand; and seeing you will see, and will not perceive; for the heart of this people has been thickened.” The prophet introduces the person of the Father, in whom the Jews believed; the evangelist...

that of the Son; and Paul, that of the Spirit; naming them collectively one Lord Sabaoth. The discourse concerning the hypostasis is distinguished by them, while the thought concerning one God remains undivided in them.

That those things which are made according to the image participate in the Creator: and this comes to be through the Spirit.

^B If those who are poorly wise against themselves understood these things and obeyed them well, they would not alienate the Spirit from the Godhead, lest they cut themselves off from the Godhead, and separate the world from God, and displace God from His own creation. For all things that were made by God, and yet fail of the Creator’s glory according to the created nature, would be wretched if they did not participate in the Godhead. But such a discourse concerning God is unworthy, if it be said that He looks upon a creature that is naked and, as it were, empty of Himself. But neither is the creature so wretched, nor is God so powerless, that He should not send down His holy participation upon the works of His hands. Therefore, He willed from the beginning to make man in His own image. Now, the image that is produced, as it is transferred from the archetype, receives the likeness into the matter, and becomes a participant in the character ^C through the conception and hand of the craftsman being impressed upon it. Thus the painter, thus the sculptor, thus he who fashions a golden or bronze statue, takes the matter, looks to the archetype, takes the form of the thing he has contemplated, and imprints this upon the matter. But if men cannot fashion matters into a likeness unless they participate in their idea, how could a creature ascend to the likeness of God unless it were made a participant in the divine character? But the divine character is not like the human, but living, and a truly existing image which brings forth images, and of which as all things become participants, they are constituted images of God. The image of God is Christ, who, he says, “is the image of the invisible God” ^D; but the image of the Son is the Spirit, and those who become participants of Him are made sons conformed to the image, according to that which is written: “For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren.”

^A

That the Holy Spirit is not a possession of God, nor a creature.

How then will the Spirit bear witness with your spirit, according to the Apostle, that you are a son of God, if He Himself is alien to the glory of the Son? How will He cry in you, “Abba, Father,” unless it is truly a participation from the Son, and not His possession, sent forth by Him, like the human spirit or the spirit of the wind, which they are accustomed to say who separate the Spirit from the Godhead, but rather the eternal Spirit of God and of the Son, existing and known in the divine majesty? For your spirit is not Christ, nor is the spirit of the wind the Lord, nor is the unclean spirit (for some have dared even to bring this forward): but the Holy Spirit is named Christ and Lord. Indeed, as we just reminded ourselves, the Apostle says: “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His: but if Christ be in you”: ^B by which words he affirms that the indwelling of the Spirit is the indwelling of Christ; and he says again: “But the Lord is that Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.” Therefore, the Spirit of the Lord is Lord; hence He is not a possession or a creature of the Lord, but an image, as was said before.

That the Spirit is the true and natural image of God and of the Lord.

And He is a true image, not from a divine image, as we are. For this reason, since He expresses the image, He is not therefore expressed by an image, and since He is the ointment, He is not therefore anointed. But the Spirit, as John says, is the ointment in us. And why did I say, in us? For already even in the Lord Himself according to the flesh, “Jesus,” he says, “of Nazareth, how God anointed Him with the Holy Spirit and with power.” Christ, therefore, is so called because of the Spirit and the anointing which takes place in the Spirit. The anointing of the Lord, then, and the name Christ, and those who are called Christians from Him, are not therefore by means of anything alien to the Godhead. For one would truly have to lament if the name of our salvation also began from a creature, and were derived from a creature, and if we had adoption through a servant. A ^C creature does not sanctify a creature, but all things are sanctified by the one Holy One, who says concerning Himself: “I sanctify myself.” And He sanctifies through the Spirit, as has been demonstrated beforehand. The Spirit, therefore, is not a creature, but the character of the holiness of God, and the fountain of sanctification for all. “We were called,” as the Apostle teaches, “in the sanctification of the Spirit.” He renews us, and again makes us images of God, and through the laver of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Spirit ^D

^A we are adopted by God. Man is again a new creation, participating in the Spirit, of which he had been deprived and had grown old. Man is again the image of God, having fallen from the divine likeness and having been compared to irrational beasts and made like them, made like to the irrational creatures in regard to death. For, as it says, “As the death of the one, so is the death of the other.” But it says, “He who raised Christ from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through His Spirit that dwells in you.”

That the Spirit is of divine nature, since He Himself performs the works of God.

He who renews the creature, who transforms corruption into incorruptibility, who makes us a new creature remaining for eternity—who shall separate Him ^B from the creating God and the Son? How can something outside the Godhead recover the creature of the Godhead, rendering it new and incorruptible? Of what other did God stand in need in order to recover His own creature that had fallen away? Let the impious argument be consigned to silence, which affirms that the creature that has grown old and corrupted is the work of God, but contends that that which is no longer growing old or being corrupted is renewed by a creature. Let not a creature be glorified above God. But it is glorified above God if the things that were dissolved by death and corruption, and which God made through the Son, become immortal and incorruptible through a creature. But ^C the Spirit is that divine power which always perfects all things that were made from God through the Son, just as He is of the new creation, concerning which it is said: “If anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation”; so also in the case of the old one, which was from the beginning. Therefore it says: “By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all their power by the Spirit of His mouth.” The Word is living, in whom the heavens were made. This same is the God Word, about whom John cries: “All things were made through Him, and without Him was not anything made.” The Spirit shows the vivifying power to be life, as it is written: “The Spirit is life,” which perfects the heavenly powers; this same One, being glorified with the Father and the Son. For God does not create by the ^D prolationship of words, even if according to human custom the utterances of God are called pronounced words; nor are the heavens adorned by the outpouring of an airy spirit. For the Spirit is joined to the living Word for the purpose of creating; He is a living power and a divine nature, which has shone forth ineffably from the ineffable mouth, in an ineffable manner and by an insufflation sent forth to man, and according to

^A the pattern taught by the Lord, it is again restored by Him through inflation; for the present renewal must concur with the initial newness. He formed it, then, having breathed upon it, not being another than the One who breathed from the beginning, but the very Same, through whom God gave the inflation, then indeed with the soul, but now to the soul. Thus God creates, not by the motion of bodily hands, but by the operation of the living Word and the communication of the life-giving Spirit. And if all things were made in the Spirit from the beginning, and are renewed again in the Spirit, one and the same operation of God through the Son in the Spirit is clearly manifest; nor does the Trinity admit of division, but according to the true teaching of Paul: *There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are diversities of ministries, and the same Lord; and there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God, who worketh all in all.* And after having enumerated all the divine operations, *All these*, he says, *worketh one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as He wills.*

That the Spirit, being glorified together with God, is shown not to be a creature, but of the divine nature. ^B No creature has authority over the works of God, nor does it work regarding them; the action of the Creator is one thing, and the action of creatures is another. Angels behold the face of the Father who is in heaven, as the Savior says, and this is their great glory and blessedness. But they are the works of God, according to the passage: *Who maketh His angels spirits, and His ministers a flame of fire.* God creates them, but does not work through them; rather, He sanctifies them, and works in them, even as in holy men. They also announce the things of God, just as men do. Wherefore we do not glorify angels together with God, any more than we do human beings. For we do not account the benefits conferred through them as their own, but as coming from God, who works in them. But the Spirit ^C is glorified with God and the Son, inasmuch as the divine operation is also completed through Him. *For the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ*, says Paul, *and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all.* And the chief point of our salvation, and the perfect tradition concerning the Godhead, for the sanctification of those who are baptized, is to baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. And that the holy Trinity is glorified in the same divine works ^D is a testimony of one Godhead;

that neither does the Father act without the Son, nor the Son without the Spirit.

That as the Son is to the Father, so is the Spirit to the Son.

For this reason, the Son is the Word of God, and the Spirit is the utterance of the Son. For He says, "upholding all things by the word of His power." And since He is the utterance of the Son, He is therefore of God. "The sword," He says, "of the Spirit, which is the word of God." But the Word of God and the utterance is living and active. Do not fall into human similitudes with me, but everywhere contemplate something greater regarding God, taking the example of the word for the demonstration of a single operation; for even your own mind investigates all things through the word.

Why the Spirit is not also called son of the Son.

Not because He is not from God through the Son, but so that the Trinity might not be thought an infinite multitude, if one were to suspect it, as happens among men, to have sons from sons. But you say: If the Son is the image of God, and the Spirit is the image of the Son, and if the Son is the Word of God, and the Spirit is the utterance of the Son, why is the Spirit not called the son of the Son? For you have used this as a most powerful argument for impiety. For you bid me understand Him as either Son or creature. And because He is not named son, for this reason you blasphemously call the Cause of creation, He who sanctifies and deifies creation, He who is glorified by the name of Lord and God, He who fulfills divine operations, a creature. ^B Since therefore the appellation of son seems to you unworthy, as if He were alien from the Son and the Father, consider how He makes those who are sanctified to be sons. But if you, through the Spirit, are a son of God, how is the Spirit alien to sonship? If you, through the Spirit, are god, how is the Spirit alien to deity? You will surely ask in turn: Why then did He not receive the name of son? For you disdain to attend to the things that have been said, but you demand the reason for that which has not been said, just like the Sadducee who, not accepting the resurrection, but curiously investigating the manner of the resurrection, rejects what has been said because of what has not been said. ^C But if we keep silence, as those who do not wish to curiously investigate the things of God, you think the glory of the divine Spirit is overcome because the appellation of son is not applied to Him, as if the same could not be asked of you. For if you confess that countless sons are made by adoption through the Spirit, why is the Spirit not even by adoption called son, it being better, surely, among those who are made sons by grace through ^D

^A adoption to be called son, especially since he is more excellent than those whom he adopts as sons by his gift, and therefore should rather not be diminished by this appellation? We, however, shall answer this for ourselves as best we can. As for you, since the same question presses upon you as well, it would be enough to be silent. ^B We say, therefore, that if anyone had said "son from Son," he would have brought the Trinity of the Godhead into the suspicion of a multitude among those who heard it. For it was easy to surmise that if a son had been begotten from the Son, then from him again another would have been begotten, and again another, and so on, continuing to a multitude. ^C It is for this very reason that the Apostle clearly proclaimed the Spirit to be from God, saying: "We have received the Spirit which is from God" (I Cor. II, 12). And he made it clear that he appeared through the Son, naming him the Spirit of the Son as well as of God, and calling him the mind of Christ, just as he had also spoken of the Spirit of God, even as [he speaks of] the spirit of a man. But he refrained from naming him the son of the Son, so that God might be one Father, always remaining Father, and being eternally what he is; and one Son, begotten by eternal generation, who is Son, true God, from the Father without beginning, always being what he is, God the Word and Lord; and one Holy Spirit, truly Holy Spirit, according to that which is written, who is glorified together with the Father and the Son, who is also called the Spirit of the mouth by the prophet David (Psal. XXXII, 6), and whom we are taught to be the finger of God, when the Lord says in the Gospel: "But if I by the finger of God cast out demons" (Luc. XI, 20). These things have been said, and are rightly said, just as they are, to those who, without curious investigation, believe in God and the Word and the Spirit, there being one Godhead, which alone is to be worshipped. And let there be no introduction of a multitude anywhere, but let each in the Trinity be recognized as one: one Father, one Son, one Holy Spirit.

That even without the Spirit being called son, it is clear that he exists from God, and how human examples are to be adapted to the Godhead and not rejected, is also evident. For we are not going to have any less understanding that the Spirit exists from God, when we hear him called the Spirit of his mouth. But even this name suffices to declare his existence which is from God. For neither "son" nor "generation" is peculiar to the Godhead, but is brought in from human likeness.

^A Similarly, too, regarding the mention of the Spirit. The divine Scripture makes use of this with respect to the divine Spirit, setting forth that it is from God in a different way, since it was not necessary that this also be indicated by the same likeness, as has been said before. ^B But you, like the faithless, set yourself in opposition to the divine teaching, hastening toward blasphemy. And because the procession of the Spirit from God is not called a generation, for this reason you also do away with the procession of the Spirit from the mouth of God; and because he is not named "son," for this reason you do not even believe that he is the Spirit of God's mouth, but that he is an operation of the hands of God. Despising human analogies, you overturn the divine dogmas which are understood from them, whereas it was necessary to hear the divine utterances with fear, and to receive with piety everything that is said, rather than arguing against piety in the most foolish manner. ^C God generates, not as man; yet he generates truly. And the offspring that is from him, he brings forth—a Word, not human; he truly brings forth a Word from himself. And he sends forth the Spirit via his mouth, not in the human manner, since the mouth of God is not corporeal; rather, the Spirit is from him, and from nowhere else. ^D God works with hands, but not corporeal ones; yet he works, not by bringing forth creatures from himself, but by effectively giving them existence, just as a human who works with his hands does not bring forth the work from himself. Do not shift the boundaries of the divine utterances by calling the Spirit of the Son a creature; nor inquire regarding the Son why he is not called Spirit; nor regarding the Spirit, why he is not called Son; nor speak blasphemy with a cursing mouth by calling the Son or the Spirit a creature. The Son of God is a holy fruit from the Holy One, eternal from the Eternal, the provider of the Holy Spirit for the formation and configuration of the creation. He who overturns the Son has taken away the beginning of the creation of all things. For the Word of God, through whom all things were made, is the beginning of the subsistence of all things. He who removes the Spirit cuts away the perfection of the things that are being made. For the things that are being made [receive their perfection] by the emission and passing—

of the Spirit. That which proceeds from God does not proceed in time, even if it brings forth creatures in time. The Word is always, even before He was shown by Moses—speaking as it were in a human manner ^A in order that the creation which was made through Him might be interpreted according to a human pattern. The Spirit is always, even before Moses described Him as being breathed upon [us] and communicated, describing by a bodily figure the vivification that takes place through Him.

That, if one does not say that the Spirit is from God, neither [does he say] the Word [is].

1. But you are cutting off the signs of intimacy and the interpretations of divine conjunction, namely the names of the Word and of the Spirit; and you admit only those things which signify an external and disparate nature, such as the operation of the hand and the creation of works. For if you do not believe that the Spirit went forth from the mouth of God, neither would you believe the Word. For David also, glorifying the Word and the Spirit together, said that the heavens were made firm ^B by the word of the Lord, and all their power by the Spirit of His mouth. And Moses, when he showed that the works were made by the Word, indicated that they are also vivified by the Spirit in the creation of man according to the image.

How then could those things which are inseparable be separated, the Word of God and the Spirit from God through the Son? And if the Spirit is disbelieved, the Word is also disbelieved. Hear Paul saying that our formation which is according to God is accomplished in the Spirit: "But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord." Therefore, through the Word and in the Spirit is the creature according to the image.

But you say, "God makes the Spirit, and He makes [it] through the Son." And it seems to you that the saying, "All things were made by Him," also embraces the Spirit. Does the Trinity, therefore, appear to you as a duality? For if the Spirit is with all things, how can He be with the Father and the Son? But if the Spirit is not with the Father and the Son, how is the Trinity [a] Trinity? And how is the baptism of the whole world sanctifying, if it is in the Trinity? But you also say that He is numbered with the water, as if He were a creature, just as the water is; for you say that the Lord says, "Except a man be born again of water and of the Spirit." And this is still a small matter. But you also...

^A rank the divine Spirit with the fire of Gehenna, together with the water. What height of impiety did this leave untouched, if you attribute the worth of water to the Holy Spirit, since water is sanctified by the descent of the Spirit? For it seemed right to you to equate that which is sanctified with that which sanctifies, and you do not tremble to count Him with God the Son in the same operation and glory, while you privately divide the one operation and glory. And because He uses water for the purification of bodies, for that reason you have deemed the Spirit worthy of the same honor as the water. And yet, you do not say that the medical art, though it uses materials, is equal in dignity to the materials, but rather that it is the master of those materials; but the divine Spirit, who uses water for the cleansing of the stains of sin, you have cast down to the disgrace and humility of water—of water, which is granted even to the impious for common use; of water, by which all the defilements of the body are washed away. But if you have also considered the nature of fire, what a thing have you dared to imagine? I marvel at such madness, unless you truly do not fear the fire. ^B Christ baptizes the worthy of sanctification in the Spirit; but as for the unworthy, He sends them into the fire, handing over those who are alien to the good to the evil. Because of this, therefore, the good and the bad appear to you to be siblings, coreate, and partners. And although we demonstrate the same operations of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, you do not see the union; and when the Spirit is proclaimed separately in the glory of God, you do not understand the divine glory in Him; for the apostles say: "Thus says the Holy Spirit," just as the prophets used to say, "Thus says the Lord." Moreover, they call the tempting of the Lord the tempting of the Spirit, when Peter says to those who tempted [Him]: "Why has it been agreed among you to tempt the Spirit of the Lord?" and to the same ones: "You have not lied to men, but to God."

2. And when the apostles say: "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us," they do not rank themselves with the power of the Spirit, but subject themselves [to Him], as if they were then instructed by Him, and as if they perceived one knowledge ^C of themselves and of the Spirit, and one authority.

the knowledge and understanding of themselves and of the Spirit, and one power, you exert yourself to bring down the Spirit to the level of a creature; just as if you were to claim that God is made equal to Moses, when you hear: *The people believed the Lord, and Moses his servant.* ^A Yet the difference between the Master and the servant is manifest; which the writer, in showing, said: *Moses his servant.* For God is believed in as Master and as the One who sent Moses; but Moses is believed in as a servant who was sent. So, indeed, the laws given to the Church seemed to come from the Spirit as Master, while those precepts published through the apostles came to them as ministers. But the Spirit is not a servant. For, he says, *The Lord is the Spirit; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.* And Israel, inasmuch as they were trained with fear, is led by the precepts of the Spirit as a servant; but the Church of the Christians, ^B being sanctified by love, is adopted. Therefore Paul says: *For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father.* And one who has received the condition of a servant is not established as a son from a servant, nor does he dare to address God as Father because of the participation of a servant; nor does a servant work whatsoever things are God’s, as he himself wishes. Nor, if the Spirit were a servant and a creature, would the singer of the hymns ^C have said that his presence pervades all things, calling him the face and the hand of God, and saying: *Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy face? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I descend into hell, thou art there. If I take my wings early in the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.* For it is the Spirit that has filled all things, according to what is written: *For the Spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world,* says Solomon. Wherefore also, since the Spirit is known through seven operations, ^D which Isaiah recounted, Zechariah also called the Spirit of the Lord seven eyes, speaking thus: *These are the eyes of the Lord that look upon the earth.* And that which is said: *I fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord,* signifies the fulfilling that is effected through the divine Spirit; just as also through Zechariah [Haggai] God says: *I am with you, and my Spirit standeth in the midst of you.* But other, more numerous things of the same kind have been said before, by which it is clear that it is the Spirit who fills the creation. Who, therefore, does not sense the divine glory of the Spirit when he hears: *Whither shall I go from thy Spirit?* And again: *I fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord.*

I see that the universal presence in all things is ascribed to both God and the Spirit, running together into one and the same reality. But you, when you are unable to conceive or call the Spirit uncreated in such things, you say that God Himself is called spirit. However, God does not dwell in the creature by Himself, nor could anyone accept that God is the Spirit of God, clearly hearing the Apostle writing such things about Him who dwells in us: *For God hath revealed them to us by his Spirit. For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may know the things that are given us by God.* ^B

3. Therefore, if anyone is unable to accept that God is the Spirit of God (even though he sees Him so conjoined with the glory of God, as the spirit of a man is with the man), let him not, by twisting words into an opposite sense, say that God Himself is the Spirit of God. *My Spirit*, he says, *which is upon thee*: he indicated not God, but the Spirit which is from God. *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me: because he hath anointed me.* He has called the Spirit of unction the Spirit of the Lord. The divine Spirit is one; let no one say there are more than one, even if God is called a spirit by the Lord. He has indicated the Father by the name of Spirit, because He is incorporeal. For just as the Spirit is God, according to the saying, *You are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwelleth in you*; so also God is Spirit, with the Trinity not being dissected, nor separated according to nature, ^C so that the names are not separated either. Wherefore, since there is one God, God is also the Son by paternal nature and paternal name; and since there is one Lord, the Son, the Father is Lord, being called by the name of the image, as its prototype and begetter. So also the Spirit is Lord, having the name from the Lord, from whom He is also given; and the Lord is spirit from the image: since God also is called spirit from Him. Yet we must not therefore make three gods, nor three lords, nor three spirits, but recognize the unity of the Trinity in the communion of names. Although you have reached such a point of madness, as to say that the Spirit is separated and disjointed ^D from the Father and the Son.

^A You have reached the point of separating and removing the Spirit from the Father and the Son, so that you even say that eternal life in the Father and the Son was announced without the Spirit, because the Lord says: "And this is eternal life, that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent" (John XVII, 3). If, therefore, the Spirit seems to you to be excluded for this reason, go ahead and confer the baptism of life without the Spirit! But if you inherit life in the Spirit, how can you dream of eternal life without the Spirit? "If anyone," he says, "does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His" (Rom. VIII, 9). How, then, will you live forever, if you are not Christ's? But you would not be Christ's if you did not have His Spirit. ^B But why, you say, did he not add: "That they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent, and the Holy Spirit"? It is not by separating the Spirit from the duality, O you men, but on the contrary by uniting Him and showing the inseparable Spirit in the Father and the Son. For when Paul says: "As many as have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ" (Gal. III, 27), he surely did not introduce sanctification without the Father, but in the Son he also indicated the Father. And when he says: "For God has revealed them to us through His Spirit" (1 Cor. II, 10), he has not excluded the Son, who says: "Neither does anyone know the Father except the Son, and the one to whom the Son wills to reveal Him" (Matth. XI, 27). For if, even without naming the Father, he nevertheless indicates the Begetter along with the name of the Son, and if, without naming the Son, he indicates the Begotten Himself along with the paternal name, so too where the Spirit is not named, He is understood in Him who imparts and confers Him. ^C Or, when the apostles say: "Thus says the Holy Spirit" (Act. XXI, 11), shall we assume that the Holy Spirit alone gives us laws and predicts future things, and that the legislation and prophecy do not originate from the Father through the Son? And when it is said that the holy child was born of the Holy Spirit (Matth. I, 20), shall we assume that the Spirit came to the subsistence of the infant without the Word, even though John says that, "The Word became flesh" (John I, 14)?

^A Indeed, by all things it is clear that the Spirit is in the Word, and the Word is in the Spirit; the union 14 according to the Godhead is not divided. For the enumeration of the three names distinguishes individual subsistences 15, and signifies them, but the declaration according to one name possesses the unity of the Trinity; as it is written: "From him, and through him, and in him are all things" 16; it gathered into one name both the idiom of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. For there is one God, from whom are all things; and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things; and one Holy Spirit, in whom are all things, according to that which is said: "You are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you." So that also the saying, "In God we live, and move, and exist," is clearly a property of the Spirit signified in God. ^B Assuredly, by a creature is a creature not contained, nor does it live and exist, and need itself to be stayed by the power of the Creator; by whose operation in the creature God is glorified, being called himself, "he in whom we live, and move, and exist." But the Spirit is truly divine, sustaining all things that are from God and through the Son in their existence. Wherefore he also bestows the maintenance of existence upon those who participate in him. And we live again in him, we who previously were being corrupted because of our separation from him. Since there are many things which one might say that signify both God in the creature, and the creature in God, which are indicative of the Spirit, we shall be content with what has been said, as with specimens of many others; when we have shown to those who are in error, that their impiety against the Spirit falls back upon God, if indeed they would strive to acknowledge that the glory of the Spirit is the glory of God.

That the identity is not from equivocation, but divine unity is known from nature

^C 1. But the spirit, he says, is also spoken of a man, as that: "You will take away their spirit, and they will fail" 22. It is said also the spirit of God, as that: "My spirit shall not remain among these men" 23. And by the spirit of wind, for example, that: "His spirit shall blow, and waters shall flow" 24; and a man may find many other such things. 1. ^D But the spirit, he says, is also spoken of a man, as that: "You will take away their spirit, and they will fail." And the Spirit of God, as that: "My Spirit shall not remain" 19 among these men. And also that which is of the wind; as that: "His spirit shall blow, and waters shall flow," and many other things.

^A Verily, one might hear this more rightly, if one were to consider the divine thoughts in a pious manner, saying in response to the opposition of the adversaries: if someone were to think that identity is introduced by homonyms, what would he do, when many things are said or called entities? Yet this belongs to the one Lord and true God, saying: "I am who I am" [Exod. iii, 14]. But many are called fathers, and gods, and progenitors, and wise, and powerful, and creators, which by nature belong to God alone forever. And in the same way, those things are called unbegotten which are not yet begotten, but are about to be begotten or to come into being; just as the resurrection of the dead, not yet having happened, is unbegotten ^B and future, or as a ring about to be made from iron is unbegotten in the nature of the iron, or as when fire is made from water or stone, or any other matter, the fire is likewise so created. Again, by "unbegotten" we understand that which in no way and nowhere exists. If one says a thing is non-existent, he has abolished the substance and the existence of the essence. A thing that neither exists nor subsists signifies a nature not existing and which is absolutely not at all. But if one says that something exists and subsists, he has signified an existing substance. But he who says "unbegotten God," or "the unbegotten" with the article, having set "God" before it or having added the same name again, has not abolished the substance, nor the existence of God, but says that this is not begotten; ^C but certainly he does not signify that God’s substance was created. But because he did not abolish the existence of God, it does not immediately follow that he has signified what the substance of God is. I do not say quality or quantity, as those men who utter vain things promise to demonstrate; but this: how the designation of the "unbegotten" voice demonstrates the substance of God. But the "how" of a thing, and that which it is, what kind of thing it is or what it is, happens to be much more obscure, as being something existing beyond the reach of any created nature. For if his judgments are a great abyss, as the Prophet says [Ps. xxxv, 7], and his ways are unsearchable, then by all means they are also ^D inscrutable, according to the Apostle [Rom. xi, 33]; how much more so is he himself, whose judgments and ways are such? And it is no wonder if God himself is such, since the things that are his are such. For if the things which God has prepared for those who love him, eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor have they ascended into the heart of man, as it is written [1 Cor. ii, 9]; how much more would someone say that the nature of God himself, who prepared such things, is more ineffable to those who believe in him piously and simply?

^A Moreover, many words are used of the one eternal Word of God, who is also preached as God in the Gospel, through whom all things were made. And many are called sons of God in Scripture, according to the passage: "I have begotten and exalted sons"; and again: "Israel is my firstborn son." However, being adopted by the true God through a certain character of adoption, these are adoptive sons and not true ones, for things derive their origin from nature and truth. But if he who is generated from him essentially by nature is not a son, according to the rejection of these people who speak of a dissimilar substance, where will those who are sons by adoption be found? ^B But the most ignorant people impiously ascribe to the Deity things that are spoken in a human manner; and, taking the Scriptures—which are expounded in many and various ways—in a single sense, they fall, not allowing themselves to be led aright. For the ways of the Lord are straight, and the just shall walk in them, but the impious will stumble in the smooth ways. And what is wondrous is that the very things from which those who are sound in faith derive benefit, damage those who are diseased concerning idle questions and strifes of words, as the Apostle said. That it is a sickness of the soul to inquire evilly and curiously concerning God, and especially to do so with unbelief, is clear to everyone. For if they do not believe God himself, the most holy, when he tells of things that concern himself, how will they listen to his prophets or apostles when they speak in the divine Scriptures concerning him and those who are to place their hope in him? For he who comes to God must believe that he is. To believe; indeed, not to inquire with incredulous curiosity as to what he is—lest I say what he is not. For that which is, was, and is, and will be forever; and he grants being to all things, as one who is God by nature. Why then do you disbelieve, O man? You do not believe that God has a Son of his own, and you ask how God generated? ^C But if you inquire about the "how" in the case of God, you would altogether also inquire about the "where," as in a place, and the "when," as in time. But if it is absurd to inquire such a thing concerning God, it would be still more absurd not to believe. Perhaps you are not yet ashamed to persist in unbelief. For you seek not that you may find faith, but that you may find a pretext for unbelief. This is true according to that which is written: "Wisdom will not enter into a malevolent soul." But Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned to him for righteousness, and he was called the friend of God. The blessed Abraham was called, and is, the friend of God. He is a friend because of faith, a friend because of obedience to God; but you are an enemy because of unbelief and disobedience to God. Abraham believed God; he believed as he was, and did not disbelieve as you do. Therefore he ^D

himself is a friend, but you are enemies for that very reason. The enemies of the Lord have lied to Him ^A, as it is written, in that they say that He who is by nature the Son of God was made a son by adoption and grace, and call the Creator a creature, and the Maker a thing made, and say that He who is always in the Father was at one time not, and affirm that the Son, who is from God who is, was made out of nothing. And not only do they lie against God and the Son, opposing God and Christ, but they do not cease to oppose the Spirit, refusing to call the Spirit of God Lord, resisting the divine Scriptures with stiff neck and uncircumcised heart. But why do you oppose this noble faith and saving confession: God, Word, Spirit; Father, Son, and Spirit? The Son is not a foreigner, nor is the Spirit of God and the Son alien; They are not divided by places, not encompassed by ages, not measured by intervals. ^B The Son was never lacking to the Father, nor the Spirit to the Son; but the same Trinity is always immutable and unchangeable. The Father is not the Son, but the Father is the Genitor of the Son, as a father to a son, as power to one who is powerful, as the wise One who has begotten Wisdom, as a hypostasis is to its own character. But the Son is always Son, as existing always as the form of God, as the Son is the natural image of God.

3. And the Spirit is called the image of the Son ^C, and the finger of God, and the spirit of God, and the Word and spirit of His mouth, and the good spirit, and the upright (spirit), and the governing (spirit), and the spirit of power; and the Spirit of God is called Lord and God, just as the Word is. For if, together with God and the Word, the Spirit confirms the powers of the heavens, how is He alien? Those who have received Him are the temple of God, and He is called the spirit of the mouth of God, and is shown to be the cause of creation together with the Word; He who accomplishes all things as God, as He wills, as says the Apostle, the Spirit of adoption, the cause of freedom, who breaths divinity where He wills, whom the Lord of all clearly names the Spirit of truth; who descended from heaven upon Him in the form of a dove; who sanctifies the Lord’s flesh with power; who fills the world; who is present to all as God, and is always with God ^D inseparably; who knows all that is of God, just as the spirit in us knows our things, I mean the human spirit that is in us. For thus He says: "And no one knows the things of God, except the Spirit of God." And again the Savior says: "No one recognizes who the Son is, except the Father, nor does anyone recognize the Father, except the Son, and he to whom the Son wishes to reveal Him." This, to them,

^A is equivalent to that. "For God," he says, "has revealed it to us through his Spirit." See, therefore, how at one time the Father reveals the Son, and at another time the Son reveals the Father, and at another time the Spirit reveals the Son and the Father likewise. So the whole of the Godhead is manifest to you, and the invocation is made now in the Father, now indeed in the Son and Spirit. The Apostle clearly solves the prophetic question for you, and does not allow that the Godhead should be supposed to be a single person, on account of the expressions that are thought to indicate this. For even he, although he clearly proclaims the person of the Son everywhere as creative, nevertheless refers all creation back to the person of the Father. For is it not he who says: "One God, the Father, from whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through him"? And since he ^B has likewise clearly spoken of "one and one" here, and has testified that all things happen through the Son, he says "one" to the Romans, and adds that all things happen through him, not only from him. Wherefore the duality indicated in the duality, or even the trinity in the trinity, will be openly testified in the same Apostle just as in the prophets, that they do not abolish the duality; or rather, when they proclaim the Trinity, they are asserting the unity, but, knowing the unity of the Divine Being, they proclaim the three in one person.

4. And from the beginning, indeed, in the creation of the world, it is accepted that God spoke to the Son and the Spirit, since Moses represented him as conversing more after the manner of men and saying: "Let us make man in our image and likeness." ^C For to whom does he say, "Let us make," if not to the Word and only-begotten Son, through whom all things were made, according to the evangelist, and to the Spirit, of whom it is written: "And the divine spirit formed me"? But even if it does not expressly say of whom or to whom he is speaking, yet it is evident that he is not speaking of himself alone, when he says: "Behold, Adam has become as one of us." And again: "Come, let us go down and confuse their tongues," so that you may perceive them being counted together. Nor is it...

indeed permitted for anyone to dare to rank angels ^A in equal honor with the Creator and Lord, nor again is it possible to conceive of one person in God, since it is said: "As one of us," and, "Come, let us descend and confuse them." It is also evident what is said regarding the destruction of Sodom; that which is: "The Lord rained sulfur and fire from the Lord out of heaven," and similarly what is mentioned in the prophets from the person of God: "I overturned them," he says, "as God overturned Sodom and Gomorrah." And elsewhere God speaks more mercifully: "I will save them in the Lord their God," which is not unlike the apostolic expression which says: "May the Lord grant him to find mercy from the Lord in that day." What then of Zorobabel and the wisdom of Zorobabel? Does it not seem to you to indicate ^B the hypostasis and life of the Truth clearly and not obscurely, when he says: "All the earth calls upon the truth, and heaven blesses it, and all works are shaken and tremble"? But what is the Truth, if not the Word of God and the Son, through whom all things exist? "For I," he says, "am the way, and the truth, and the life." Now there is no truth unless it is that which is naturally and eternally begotten from the True One himself. Therefore he adds, saying: "Blessed be the God of the Truth, who is the Father of the Truth, Christ." Christ is the Truth, whom every breath worships and trembles before. Therefore, that the Word is living, and a perfect person, and the Spirit likewise, the points just made are sufficient to teach. Humans describe many other forms ^C regarding God, yet we do not for that reason suppose God to be a human, as for instance if we hear of a face, eyes, ears, hands, and feet. Nor does he mean to say of God that he sits in heaven as if on a throne, nor that the earth is trodden upon corporeally as the footstool of his feet, but rather that it is subject to the divine power. Likewise, if you hear of a womb regarding God, do not be disturbed as though thinking of something corporeal, but by conceiving of something spiritual, you will speak of something better, namely the generative power of God itself being openly revealed to you from him. So, too, when you hear of the hands of God, recognize clearly his power of acting: by the ear, the faculty with which he is endowed for hearing: by the eyes, the power of seeing: ^D by wings, the power of protecting. And all other things individually

preserve their own most accurate understanding of God, especially among those who believe rightly. Names, therefore, are in use among men for the knowledge and distinction of substances, or even of things, and of those things which are conceived of in relation to substances. Therefore, let not "womb" in God cause you to marvel at the novelty of the term, since neither "hand" nor the other things related above cause you to tremble. Likewise let not "generation" in God render you astonished, nor any of those who hear it.

5. But if anyone fears that affection exists in God who begets, he may also fear movement, and labor, and the assumption of matter, and the use of tools in the Creator. For these things are present in men who are creators. But if these things are not present in God, then neither is affection present in begetting. For it is impossible that a nature devoid of affection should fall into affection. Why, then, does one fear a fear where no fear exists? God, when He begets by nature from Himself, is not subject to affection; God forbid! Nor does He labor when He creates something, or the universe, out of nothing; God forbid, nor let it be said! But if you shun the one, you must also shun the whole; if you shun the whole, you must likewise shun the one. If you shun the one in a human manner, shun the whole as well; but if the whole is not shunned in a human manner, then neither is the one. For if God creates those things which are from nothing by His will, He fulfills the whole without labor; and this is not incredible to us. But it will seem more credible to all that God, by a divine nature and in a manner befitting God, has begotten from Himself a genuine Son, equal in honor, equal in glory, a sharer of the same throne, a consiliarius, a co-worker, consubstantial with the Father and God, and not of a different substance, nor alien to His sole divinity. If otherwise, then He is not to be worshiped either. For it is written, "You shall worship no strange god," ^B nor are we commanded to acknowledge any recent god. Therefore, do not say that there is an addition of a deity, nor that the Son was silent among the ancients while He has been revealed to us, if you confess that the Son is the Word, the Creator of all things. For the Fathers knew the Word, they worshiped the Word of God, and with the Word, the Spirit. And do not separate Him from Him who says: "I am God alone, and there is none beside me," lest you be forced to blaspheme the Son, as if He were not God; nor separate Him from Him who says: "I alone stretched out the heaven," ^C lest you also cease to call the Son the Creator; for He who stretched out the heaven is not separated from the glory of the only God. Therefore, in the Son, recognize the Father; in the Father, glorify the Son. Do not divide the indivisible; do not tear asunder that which cannot be torn. For even if you wish to do so, they are not torn apart. Even if heretics are torn asunder, the Trinity is not torn asunder; ^D but It is what It is, even if it does not seem so to others. For the holy Trinity is a bond, and It is to be worshiped in one and eternal glory, holding the same and one sole divinity everywhere.

^A unbroken, insecable, indivisible, filling all things, containing all things, existing in all things, creating, governing, sanctifying, and vivifying. This divine and most admirable bond is not broken, according to that which is written: "A triple cord shall not be broken" (Eccles. IV, 12). With this thought, blessed Paul also, writing to those who believed rightly, said: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all" (II Cor. XIII, 13). For when all things are performed by God through Jesus Christ in the Spirit, I see an inseparable operation of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. And for this reason, all the saints are temples of God, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, in whom dwells one divinity, and one lordship, and one holiness of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, because of the one sanctification of baptism. ^B

Against those who say that it is written often concerning the Son and the Father, but concerning the Spirit only in baptism.

1. If the Father says: "In the last days I will pour out from my Spirit upon all flesh" (Joel II, 28), what shall we say concerning the Son? For it is not written of him here. But if the prophet says: "There the hinds met, and saw the faces of one another; they went past in number, and not one of them was left, because the Lord commanded them, and His Spirit gathered them" (Isa. XXXIV, 15, 16); where is the Son? If he says: "A spirit will go forth from me, and I have made every breath" (Isa. LVII, 16); where is the Son? If David says: "And take not thy Holy Spirit from me" (Psal. L, 13); where is the Son? If the same person says: "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within my inward parts" (Psal. L, 12); where is the Son? If the same person says again: "And thy good Spirit shall lead me in the right land" (Psal. CXLI, 10); where is the Son? If the same says: "And with a princely Spirit establish me" (Psal. L, 14); where is the Son? ^C If Job says: "The divine Spirit which made me" (Job XXXIII, 4); where is the Son? If the same Job says: "There is a spirit in men, but the breath of the Almighty is that which teaches me" (Job XXXII, 8); where is the Son? If David says: "Thou shalt send forth thy Spirit, and they shall be created, and thou shalt renew the face of the earth" (Psal. CIII, 30); where is the Son? If he says: "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, and whither shall I flee from thy face?" (Psal. CXXXVIII, 7); where is the Son? If he says: "Woe to you, rebellious children, thus says the Lord: Ye have taken counsel, not by me, and made covenants, not by my Spirit" (Isa. XXX, 1); where is the Son? If he says: "And a rod shall go forth from the root of Jesse, and a flower shall rise from the root ^D

^A of Jesse, and it shall rest upon him—the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel and strength, the Spirit of knowledge and godliness, and it shall fill him with the Spirit of the fear of God"—how shall I separate the Spirit? Or if he says: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me, he has sent me to preach the gospel to the poor, to preach release to the captives, and recovery of sight to the blind"—how shall I separate the Spirit? And all things that it is possible to find with diligence from the Old ^B and New Testament concerning the Spirit and the Son and the Father. "Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with you; for behold, you shall conceive in your womb, and bring forth a son." And when Mary said: "How shall I know this, since I do not know a man?" the angel says to her: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon you, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow you." And again, the same angel saying to Joseph: "Do not fear to take Mary your wife, for that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit." And again, the evangelist, interpreting what is in the prophet, says: "That it might be fulfilled which was written: Behold ^C my servant whom I have chosen, my beloved in whom my soul is well pleased, I will put my Spirit upon him." And in the Gospel it is written: "The Spirit breathes where he wills, and you hear his voice, but you do not know from where he comes, or where he goes. So is everyone who is born of the Spirit." And likewise in the Gospel: "But if I by the Spirit of God cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you." And again it is written: "All sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven to men, but the blasphemy against the Spirit ^D has no forgiveness." And in the baptism, the Holy Spirit descended and remained upon him; but the angels, having descended, were ministering to him. So that you may know that the angels, having descended, ministered in order to show their service; but the Spirit remained upon him so that, having heard of the dwelling, you might understand the freedom of his nature. And it is written: "The Father, who remains in me, he does the works." And again it is written: "Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit into the desert, for forty days being tempted by the devil." And again: "Receive the Holy Spirit. If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained." And again: "I tell you the truth, it is profitable for you that I go away; for if I do not go away, the Paraclete will not come to you, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father."

^A 2. But if they say: "He will not speak on his own authority, but whatever he hears he will speak," we say to them: Neither does the Son speak on his own authority. But the Father who sent me, he says, has told me what I should say and what I should speak; for all things that the Spirit and the Son speak are oracles of God. And for this reason, *all Scripture is God-breathed and profitable*, having been spoken by the Spirit. For this truly shows that the Spirit is not a creature, since every rational creature sometimes speaks from itself, and sometimes speaks the things of God—as when Paul says: *Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give an opinion as one having obtained mercy from the Lord.* And to those who are married I command, not I, but the Lord. And the prophet says: *O Lord, I will speak judgments to you; why is it that the wicked prosper?* And again: *Woe is me, mother, what kind of person have you born me?* Yet sometimes he says: *Thus says the Lord.* And sometimes Moses says: *I am small of voice and slow of tongue.* Yet at other times the same person says: *Thus says the Lord: Let my people go, that they may serve me.* ^B But the Spirit is not so. For the Spirit does not sometimes speak his own things, and at other times the things of God; for that would be the mark of a creature. But all the words of the Spirit are the oracles of God; similarly, so too are those of the Son. For this reason, neither does the Son speak on his own authority. For the Father who sent me, he says, told me what I should say and what I should speak—not that he was learning (for this would be characteristic of one who is imperfect and ignorant), but because whatever the Father speaks, he speaks through the Son in the Spirit. And again it is written: *For who knows the things of a man, except the spirit of man which is in him? Even so the things of God no one knows, except the Spirit of God.* And again: *For the Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God.* ^C But if they say that he who searches does not know, and for that reason he searches, we will say that God also searches the hearts of men. And through the prophets he says: *I will search Jerusalem with a lamp.* And again it is written: *Do you not know that your bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you, whom you have from God?* And again: *Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?* And again: *But you are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you.* And again it is written: *And such were some of you, but you were washed, but you were sanctified, but you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, ^D

and in the Spirit of our God. ^A And again: *For I will not dare to speak of any of those things which Christ has not wrought by me, by word and deed, in obedience of the nations, in the power of signs and wonders, in the power of the Holy Spirit.* And in the beginning of the Epistles, holy Paul makes mention of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, writing thus: *Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, separated unto the Gospel of God, which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy Scriptures concerning His Son, who was made of the seed of David according to the flesh, who was designated the Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness.* And again: *The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit.* And again: *There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord; and there are diversities of operations, but the same God, who works all in all.* And Job: *The Lord lives, who has so judged me, and the Almighty, who has embittered my soul: the divine Spirit, however, which remains in my nostrils.* And David: *Send out Thy light and Thy truth;* calling the Spirit light, and the Son truth. And elsewhere: *Show us, O Lord, Thy mercy, and grant us Thy salvation.*

On the Spirit

Let every soul that seeks concerning ^C things more divine be filled with joy, if it has such an eye that can seek and see those things which are invisible to the senses, and if, seeking in such a way, it is able, as it is written, to dwell with the One who is sought. For it is written: *If you seek, seek, and dwell with me.* But it dwells then, when it seeks with faith. For even if it happens that it does not find, yet it does not cease to dwell in the faith of the One who is sought, but says according to the blessed David: *Thy knowledge is become wonderful from me; it is strengthened, I shall not be able to attain to it;* and according to the father of the lunatic: *I believe, Lord, help my unbelief.* Having, therefore, this intention, let us seek with faith concerning the nature of the Holy Spirit, requesting from Him the knowledge of the One whom we seek. For He Himself is the one who

^A is sought, and He Himself is the one who provides the knowledge concerning Himself. And as we have learned from the divine Scriptures of Him, it is He who makes the saints holy, and grants divine life to those who seek God from Him. But it is necessary that He who grants be more excellent than those who receive; for they become saints when He visits them, and they perish when He forsakes them. And He is always, being the fountain of eternal life. But what the manner of the imparting of His being is, both in all things and in each one individually, let the mind consider—having become worthy of such consideration, and having been delivered from deceit and heresy and other seductions of bewitching women. Let it approach ^B in a state of tranquility. And let not only the body that encompasses it, and the turbulence of the body, be tranquil for it, but also everything that surrounds us—heaven, earth, sea, and the rational beings who are in them. And let it perceive all things being filled, and the Spirit in every way standing over them, as if flowing in and poured out, and entering from everywhere, and shining within. For "the Spirit of the Lord has filled the world, and that which holds all things together has knowledge of God." And He shines within all those who are worthy. For just as the rays of the sun cause a cloud to be illuminated and to shine, imparting to it a golden appearance, so also the Holy Spirit, having come into the body of a man, gave life, gave immortality, gave holiness, and raised up the one who was fallen. And that which was moved with eternal motion by the Holy Spirit became a holy living being. And man received the dignity of a ^C prophet, an apostle, and an angel of God, from the indwelling of the Spirit, being before this but earth and ashes.

2. The power and nature of the Spirit will become even more manifest and clearer ^D if we consider how He contains and leads the saints and all rational nature according to His own will. For He has given Himself to the whole multitude of heavenly powers and to the multitude of the righteous. And every substance of the righteous, both great and small, and of angels and archangels, has been sanctified. And while the substance of bodies lying about is one thing and another—with one being here and another there—and that of the other powers has something between them that separates them from one another, it is not so with the Spirit, nor does any portion of Him being partitioned out to each one make them live divinely; but all things live by the whole.

And He is present everywhere, being assimilated to God who sends Him forth, both in that He is, and in that He is everywhere and in all things alike. And Gabriel ^A when bringing the joyful message to Mary, and another elsewhere to any of the saints; and each of the prophets when prophesying; and Paul when preaching the Gospel in Rome; and James in Jerusalem; and Mark in Alexandria; and another person in another city—they were all filled with the Spirit, as no interval of space hindered the same grace from being active at the same time. And for this reason, each of the saints is a god. For it has been said to them by God: *I said, You are gods, and all sons of the Most High*; and, *The God of gods*, that is to say, of the saints, *the Lord has spoken*; and, *God shall be seen in Sion*, that is to say, the God of the saints. ^B Now, it is necessary that He who is the cause for the gods to be gods should be the divine Spirit and should be from God. For just as for things that burn, that which is the cause of their being burning must itself be burning, and that which is the cause for the saints to be saints must necessarily be holy; so too, that which is the cause for the gods to be gods must necessarily be God. Since the Spirit is thus a good and divine possession, do not fear to believe in Him, nor to seek after Christ, who is the provider of this Spirit. For *no one can say, Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit*. And the life which the Spirit imparts into another's subsistence does not become separated from Him. But just as heat exists in fire—partly ^C that which is in it, and partly that which it imparts to water or to some other such thing—so too He both has life in Himself, and those who partake of Him live in a manner worthy of God, obtaining a divine and heavenly life. For He contains within Himself all things that are immortal: every mind, every angel, every soul; and since He is in a good state, He does not seek for change, nor for migration, since He has all things in Himself. But He does not seek for increase either, since He is most perfect. Wherefore, all things are also perfect in Him: love, joy, peace, longsuffering, goodness, wisdom, understanding, counsel, steadfastness, piety, knowledge, sanctification, redemption, faith, workings of powers, gifts of healing, and whatever things ^D are similar to these. He has nothing in Himself that is adventitious; but He has all things eternally, as the Spirit of God, and emerging from Him, having Him as the cause and fountain of His own being, and flowing from there. He is himself also a fountain of the good things we have mentioned. But that which flows from God has an independent subsistence; whereas those things which flow from Him are His energies. This Holy Spirit God poured out upon us richly through Jesus Christ; He poured it out, He did not create it; He granted it, He did not make it; He gave it, He did not form it.