AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK II
OF THE SON
1. Having paved the way A in the discourses on the God of the universe insofar as he was able, with blasphemies against the Son of God, he now lets loose his tongue against the Only-begotten God Himself. For what does he say?
EUN. And one Son. For, regarding the Only-begotten, if we had set forth the voices of the saints, through which they proclaim Him Son and begotten and creature, showing the difference of substance through the difference of names, we could have been free from cares and occupations. But because of those who think of a corporeal generation, and to whom ambiguous words are an offense, it might perhaps be necessary to say a few words about these things, too.
BAS. These are the words B of Eunomius. But I, if one must think of this whole discourse as a fiction, such as is set forth in the schools of vanity for the exercise of young men, so that there may be a semblance of truth in falsehood (since, as happens to them, so here all things are like shadow-boxing: a struggle, namely, against accusers who do not exist; an apology and response to an accusation not previously stated; and an address to judges who appear nowhere); if, I say, one must listen to these things in such a way, I myself cease from the examination, and I exhort everyone to busy themselves with none of the things that have been said. But if the undertaking is C of greater importance, and for many a suspicion has arisen that there is some concern for the truth in him, it is absolutely necessary to refute each of the things said, to the best of my ability. For what mode of examination would be more just than to compare the discourse with the evidence given to us by the Spirit, and whatever we find in harmony with them, to accept it, but what goes against them, by no means to believe, and to avoid as an enemy?
2. First, therefore, let him show which of the saints D
called Christ a generation and a creature; what words of the Scriptures he has for proof? For if he relies on the voice of the blessed Peter which is written in the Acts of the Apostles, where he says: A *Let all the house of Israel know, that God has made that same Lord and Christ, this Jesus, whom you have crucified*; first of all, the testimony has no relevance to the question at hand. For having professed that he would show that the Son was called a creature by the saints, he produces a testimony concerning God and the Father, that He made [Him]. For surely he would not say that it is permitted to him, when a discussion is being instituted concerning such great matters, to devise certain derivations and variations of terms. B For if we shall give an account for even an idle word on the day of judgment; much less, if we innovate anything in such great matters, will it be remitted to us without punishment. For perhaps we have been taught by the divine Scripture that the one [expression] is said as appropriate concerning God and the Father: but the Holy Spirit has shown by silence that the latter does not befit the Only-Begotten. How, therefore, would it have been safe, transforming the word *made*, to call the creator of all things a creature? For if an appellation of this kind had been appropriate to Him, it would certainly not have been passed over in silence by the Spirit. In creatures, indeed, we find that the appellation of *creature* has been taken from the word *made*: but in the Son of God, not so. For *in the beginning God made heaven and earth*. And again: *I meditated on the works of thy hands*. And, *For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, are clearly seen*. Thus, in those cases where the name is useful, Scripture employing it, C as not befitting the majesty of his glory, it was silent concerning our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. But yet, it is not ashamed to call the Lord of glory an axe, and a corner-stone, and a stone of stumbling, and a rock of scandal, and other names of this kind, in which there does not seem to be much praise to those who do not follow the significance of the names; but nowhere at all has it named him a creature. Yet he says that he has received this name from the very saints, so that he may involve in his calumnies not only his own equals, but also the saints who lived in olden times. 3. Moreover, besides that it is not permitted to dare such things, nor to transform the Lord’s names by one's own authority: D furthermore, not even does the very sentiment of the Apostle present to us that pre-eternal hypostasis of the Only-Begotten
A with regard to which our discourse is at present. For he does not speak concerning the substance itself of the Word of God, who in the beginning was with God, but clearly and perspicuously discourses concerning Him who emptied Himself in the form of a servant, and was made conformable to the body of our humility, and was crucified through weakness. And this is known to everyone who has even slightly applied his mind to the meaning of the Apostolic expression, that he does not deliver to us a mode of theology, but declares the reasons of the dispensation. For "the Lord," he says, "and Christ, God has made this Jesus whom you crucified"; by this demonstrative word, he is, as it were, clearly pointing to His humanity and to that which was subject to the eyes of all. B But this person transfers the word "made" to that generation of the Only-Begotten which was from the beginning. And not even this puts him to shame, that the word "Lord" is not the name of a substance, but of authority. Wherefore, he who said that God made Him Lord and Christ speaks of the primacy and dominion over all that was entrusted to Him by the Father, and does not narrate the transition of Him to being. And these things indeed we shall demonstrate a little later, when we refute him for bringing forward the testimonies of Scripture contrary to the will of the Spirit: but now let us proceed to the words that follow. What then does this name mean for him? And why on earth does he attempt to call the Creator of all a creature? C Deceiving himself with a spurious sophism, he thinks that together with the difference of names, a variation of substance is also shown. 4. But who of sound mind would agree to this opinion, that it is necessary that those whose names are diverse should also have diverse substances? For the appellations of Peter and Paul, and of all men in general, are indeed diverse, but yet the substance of all is one. Wherefore, in most respects we are the same to one another; but by sole properties which are considered in each, we differ one from another. Whence also, names are not significant of substances, but of the properties by which each is designated. Therefore, when we hear Peter, we do not D by this name understand his substance (but by substance I now mean the material subject, which is in no way signified by the name), but we impress in our thought the properties which are considered concerning him. For immediately by this word we understand the son of Jonah, him from Bethsaida, the brother
of Andrew, who was called from being a fisherman to the office of the apostleship, who, because he excelled in faith, received into himself the building up of the Church: none of which is essence, if essence is understood as substance. Wherefore the name indeed marks out for us the character of Peter, but it by no means exhibits the essence itself. A Again, when we hear "Paul," we understand a concurrence of other properties: the Tarsian, the Hebrew, the Pharisee according to the law, the disciple of Gamaliel, the persecutor of the Churches of God by zeal, who was led to the recognition of the truth by a terrible vision, the apostle of the Gentiles. For all these things are circumscribed by one name, "Paul." And yet, if it were true that those whose names are different have essences that are in the contrary case, then surely both Paul and Peter and, in a word, all men, ought to be of essences different from one another. But since no one is so ignorant and so uninstructed in the common nature that he is led in mind to say this—for "Out of clay," he says, "you were fashioned, just as I am"—where Scripture signifies nothing else than that the essence of all is the same, he who feigns that a diversity of essence follows from a diversity of names is a liar. For the nature of things does not follow names, but names were invented after things. For if that were true, it would be necessary that those who have the same appellations should also be of one and the same essence. Therefore, since those who are perfect in virtue are held worthy of the appellation of God, men would be coessential with the God of all. But just as to say this is manifest madness, B so too that argument savors of a not dissimilar dementia.
5. It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, that names do not signify the essence in the Father and the Son, but are indicative of properties; so that there is no room for an argument which, from the diversity of names, introduces a contrariety of essences. But by this very way he overthrows himself before all else. For if "creature" and "begotten" differ from each other, the essences of the Only-Begotten will be diverse, following the diversity of names. But if to say this is the part of the insane, it is no more the part of those who are in possession of their senses. C And he even pretends to have innumerable proofs that the Son has been called a "creature" by the saints; but as if hastening to some other more important matters, he postpones the mention of them for the present. And this is also an artificial and crafty malice: to prefer silence when he is destitute of words. For if he had even a shadow of testimony,
A from the Scriptures to confirm his own argument, he would then at last have come to the correction of the weaker ones, and would have assuaged the harm arising from ambiguous terms, if indeed any such harm has ever happened or will happen to anyone. For who is so entirely carnal 27 in mind, and so ignorant of divine words, as, upon hearing of a divine generation, to be carried away to bodily fantasies, where there is the union of male and female, conception in the womb, formation, shape, and, at the proper times, progress into the light? Who is so beast-like, that, upon hearing that God the Word proceeded from God, and hearing that Wisdom was begotten of God, he should fall away in his thoughts to fleshly passions?
6. But this also B is a form of argument devised by him along with others, so that for the sake of compassion towards the simpler of his brethren, he might appear to have taken upon himself the labor of teaching. And while he corrects, forsooth, the bodily suspicions that arise from this appellation, he does not avoid the harms that are born from the Lord being called a "facture." Yet if anyone 31 imagines a bodily generation, that same person would also be led to the material modes of facture. For surely the weak-minded man will not understand a certain division, and migration, and flux of the generating substance from the word "begetting" C, and not be led to conceive of matter brought in from without, from non-existence, into the, as you say, substance of the facture? Why, then, does he heal the ailments of the brethren's reasoning only by half, and while taking care of those who imagine a bodily generation, does he overlook those who stumble at the denomination of "facture"? Because he knows that to be "begotten" is hostile to his own dogmas, since the begotten must necessarily be related and unchangeable in relation to the begetter; but to be "made" is a friend and ally to his own hypotheses, because it presents D the conception of something foreign, and entirely alien, and in every way estranged from the one who made it. Then...
he adds to these things, saying:
EUN. We call the Son a "Genitura" [Offspring/Begotten One], according to the doctrine of the Scriptures; not by understanding the substance as one thing, and the thing signified as another thing besides it, but that it is the very hypostasis which the name signifies, as the appellation corresponds truly to the substance.
BAS. B Even in these things, he openly opposes the truth, yet he speaks in a way consistent with himself. For just as in the previous arguments he determined that the "Ingenerate" is significant of His substance in the God of all, so here too he claims that the "Genitura" signifies the substance of the Son: so that, by the opposition of the begotten to the ingenerate, he might show the Only-Begotten to be in a contrary state to the Father according to His very substance. For these reasons, he prescribes words outside the usage of the divine Spirit, by calling the Son a "Genitura." Whence did he receive these? From what doctrine? From what prophet? From what apostle who attributed this surname to him? For I, indeed, find this word expressed thus in no place of Scripture.
C 7. And yet he boasts of having taken these appellations from the doctrine of the Spirit. For it was a small thing for him to give trouble to men, if he did not also behave insolently toward the Spirit Himself. We have learned in many places that the Father has begotten: but that the Son is a "Genitura," we have not heard to this day. For a child, he says, is born to us: a son is given to us; and his name is called, not "Genitura," but the Angel of Great Counsel. And yet, if "Genitura" were significant of substance, the Spirit would surely have taught us no other name than that which would clearly declare His substance. And again, Peter, who was deemed worthy of those beatitudes because of his recognition of the truth, did not say, "You are the Genitura"; but, "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God." And Paul, even though he filled all his writings with the appellation of the Son, will nowhere be found to have made mention of a "genitura": a name which this man produces with great confidence, as if he had received it from a divine document. D For not even here is it permitted to him that, by changing and transforming the word "begat," which is said of the Father, he should call the Son of God a "Genitura." For it is not fitting that he who is educated in divine fear should easily leap to that which appears from the sequence of words, but that...
he should be content with the names situated in the Scripture and remain in them, and through them, as befits God, perform glorification. For if those who from the beginning translated the Hebrew language into the Greek tongue did not dare to translate certain names, but retained the Hebrew word itself, such as Sabaoth, Adonai, Eloi, and whatever else of that kind, showing this reverence not only in divine names but also in many others, how much fear does it behoove us to have concerning the names of the Lord? And yet, when would they have dared to fashion certain names from themselves, they who did not even venture to interpret some, lest they should weaken the clarity of the expression by an inappropriate meaning? B
8. But if, he says, God begat, why is it not necessary to address the one begotten as "Genitura"? Because it is dreadful for us to address with our own names him to whom God has granted the name which is above every name. "You are my Son," he says, "I have this day begotten you." And yet, according to the reasoning of these men, it would have been more consistent, because he is begotten, to be called "Genitura" and not Son; but it is not said. Therefore, he who has the judgment of Christ before his eyes and knows how great a risk it is to take away or to add anything to what has been passed down by the Spirit, must not strive to innovate from himself, but to be content with those things which have been previously announced by the saints. Therefore, to dare what neither common custom nor the usage of the Scriptures has admitted, is this not the height of madness? For what father or mother, if they are disposed benevolently and gently towards one who is from them, would, omitting the name of son or child, call him "Genitura"? "Child (nate)," for he says, "go into the vineyard." And elsewhere: "God will see for himself a sheep for a victim, child (nate)." And again Isaac: "Who are you, child (nate)?" And, "Son (fili), do not neglect the discipline of the Lord." And, "A wise son gladdens his father." And anything else of that kind. But no one is shown to have ever called one who is from himself "Genitura." C And the cause is clear: that son and child are names of living beings, while "Genitura" is not necessarily so. For even that which is cast out in abortions before it has been formed can be called "Genitura," yet such a thing is not worthy of the appellation of child (nati). Furthermore, the fruits of the earth are called "Geniturae," but children (nati) not so. "For I will not drink," he says, "of the genimine (fruit/genitura) of this vine." We rarely find this appellation applied to living beings. And certainly where it is used D
A it is seen to be taken from an animal that is reviled and assumed to be an image of wickedness. "For you are," he says, "broods of vipers." For this reason, I think, common usage has shunned this appellation, and divine Scripture appears to avoid it, most especially in the case of the only-begotten Son of God. But it also did not accept the appellation of "born," as having much of human character. The Apostle shows this, while he calls the Lord "Son" over and over, and honors Him with other various names, calling Him "firstborn," and "image," and "radiance," but avoids the appellation of "geniture" (having been born). But if this man, or anyone else of those who are at the head of this doctrine, says otherwise, let him show it, and we will grant them to strike out all these things. But he would by no means be able, unless, imitating the impious Marcion, he should remove some things from the divine oracles B and falsely interject others. Thus, then, the word "geniture" has been demonstrated to be alien both to common usage and to the usage of the Scriptures.
Let us see, however, now if it be possible that this name be used of the very substance of the Son. For he says himself: EUN. It is by no means possible to conceive of the substance as one thing, and the thing signified as another thing besides it; but it is the hypostasis (subsistence) itself that the name signifies, since this appellation truly denotes the substance. BAS. These dogmas of yours are truly worthy of the judges you have fabricated. For as in a market of dreams C or an assembly of drunkards, where no one hears or understands what is being said, you legislate with great license, thinking it enough for all proof that you have said it yourself. For who does not know that those nouns which are uttered absolutely and by themselves signify the things subject to them, but those which are spoken in respect to others indicate only the habit which they have toward the things of which they are spoken? For example, "man" and "horse" and "ox" indicate each one of the things that are named. But "son," or "servant," or "friend" signify only the affinity which they have with D the name joined to them. Therefore, he who hears "geniture" is not carried in his mind to conceive of some substance, but understands it to be joined with something else. For a "geniture" is called the "geniture" of someone. But that which does not produce the notion of any substance, but only [refers] to something else...
A that designates a relation, to define this as a substance, is this not the height of madness? And yet, a little before, it was demonstrated by us that even absolute nouns, even if they seem most strongly to signify some subject, do not exhibit the substance itself, but designate certain properties around it.
10. But that most wise man, who has consumed his whole life in vain arts, does not blush to say that "geniture" signifies the very substance of the Only-Begotten. Peruse how much absurdity this contains. For if the substance is a geniture, and conversely, if whatever is a geniture, this is a substance, all genitures will be consubstantial with one another. From this, then, what will follow according to his argument? The Artificer of all things will be found to have the same substance as all those who have partaken of generation. For he will certainly not say that "geniture" signifies substance in the case of the Son, but no longer retains the same notion in the case of the rest who partake of generation. Unless he can state some clear and irrefutable reason why the same appellation cannot have the B same force equally in all cases. But he could not. For whatever account of "geniture" he might devise, it will apply equally to all begotten things. The greatest proof of the truth of this argument is the very mind of each one of the hearers. For let everyone ask himself, when he hears, "This is the geniture of that person," what notion he forms. Is it that the begotten is the substance of the begetter? Or is that ridiculous, while this is true, that it was brought into being by him in a begotten manner? This, then, will be fitting to be said in the same way both of the Only-Begotten and of any of those who have been begotten. And let no one, because it is a common relation, think that the dignity of the Only-Begotten is destroyed. For the Son does not differ from others in that C he is related to something in a certain way, but the preeminence of God over mortal things is manifest in the property of the substance. Consider, however, to what absurdity the doctrine of these men leads. If a geniture is called the geniture of another, as common usage confirms, and no one contradicts it, but this same geniture, according to their doctrine, signifies substance in the case of the Son, it will be the substance of him whose geniture it is called. From this consequence, therefore, it will be brought about that the appellation of "geniture" no longer signifies the substance of the Only-Begotten, which is what they are straining to prove, but [the substance] of the God of all things. For if it is not possible for you to conceive D of a substance as one thing, and something else—
aside from it—as a generation, then to speak of substance and to speak of generation is the same thing. But since the Son is the generation of God, then the Son will be the substance of God, if "generation" denotes "substance." And thus, according to his argument, the generation will appear to be the substance of the Unbegotten. But if the conclusion is ridiculous, let God inherit the premises of the shame. For the argument seems to be of such a nature that, once it has wandered away from the truth, it is carried off into many dangerous absurdities by the sequence of its own error. A
11. But these are, as it were, prologues and preparations for blasphemy; but he brings in the main point of the evil in what follows, saying:
EUN. That the substance of the Son was indeed born when it was not before its own constitution, but was born before all things by the will of the Father.
BAS. He still persists in the same artifices. He discourses to us about the substance of the Son, as if he were speaking of something other than the Son himself, B and by this means he prepares/soothes the hearing for blasphemy; for he does not openly say that the Son was born from nothing, but that his substance was born when it was not. Tell me, before what things was it not? Do you see his cavil? He compares substance with itself, so that it may seem to all that he is saying something acceptable, not saying that it did not exist before the ages, nor simply that it did not exist, but that it did not exist before its own constitution. But tell me, do you say that the substance of the Father is older than its own constitution? C For if the substance of the Son is not subject to times, nor is the term "before" understood in this way in his argument, then his statement is empty and vain, and therefore not even worthy of an answer. Yet it will be no less true of the God of all things for those who wish to carry over this vanity. For to say that God did not exist before his own constitution, and to say that he existed before himself, is of the same madness. But if he accepts "before" temporally regarding the substance of the Son, D and will say that his substance is born from non-existence, then he might as well say regarding God—but let us see what the sequence of his logic produces now.
A First, he posits time—or, if you wish, ages—prior to the Creator of the ages. Then, following his own blasphemies, he will go on to say that the Father himself, when he was not Father from the beginning, eventually became so.
12. Yet, if it is honest and proper for the blessedness of God to be Father, how is it that what was proper did not belong to him from the beginning? For they will certainly categorize this deficiency as either ignorance of the better, or as weakness: as ignorance, if he discovered the better only later; as weakness, if he knew and understood it, but could not attain what was best. But if (which it is not right to say) it is not good for him to be Father, why out of mutation would he choose the worse? But may the blasphemy recoil upon its authors; for the God of all is Father from eternity, and never began to be Father. B For he was not hindered by a lack of power from fulfilling his will, nor did he wait for the passing of certain ages, so that—as is the case with men and other animals—the power to beget might come to him upon the completion of his maturity, C and he might then achieve what he desired (for it is the hallmark of madmen even to think and say such things). Rather, he possesses a fatherhood extended, so to speak, in common with his own eternity. Therefore, just as the Son is before the ages and is always, he never at any time began to be; but from the moment the Father exists, the Son exists, and immediately with the notion of the Father, the notion of the Son also enters the mind. For the Father is, of course, the Father of a Son. There is no origin for the Father, but the Father is the origin of the Son; there is nothing intermediate between them. How then was he not from the beginning—for this is what is meant by that expression, "before his own constitution," which is asserted in their sophistries—he who has nothing conceived to exist before himself except the one from whom he has his being, being advanced not by an interval, but by the dignity of cause? If, therefore, the union of the Son with God and the Father is shown to be eternal, with our thought moving from the Son to the Father without any vacuum, D but rather binding the Son inseparably to the Father, then he who is separated by no intermediary, what opening does he still leave for the wicked blasphemy of those who say that he was brought into being from non-existence?
13. Furthermore, one must also marvel at the madness of these men...
A for they do not understand that by saying the Son is from non-existence, they not only declare him to be younger than the Father, but also younger than that by which they separate the Only-Begotten from the Father. For if there is something between the Father and the Son, it must necessarily be older than the existence of the Son. What, then, could this be? What else but an age or time? For whoever considers the life of the Father to be older than the life of the Only-Begotten, by what other standard would he measure it in order to say that he has found a remainder, if not by the interval of some ages or times? But if this is true, the Scripture which says that the ages were made through him is false, as is that which teaches that all things were made through him, since the ages are obviously included among all things.
If, however, they are going to say that they do not deny the Son was begotten before the ages, let them not fail B to notice that what they concede in words, they in truth take away. For we shall ask those who produce the substance of the Only-Begotten from non-existence: "When he did not exist, as you say, what was that interval? What name will you invent for it?" For common usage subjects every interval either to times or to ages; since what time is in sensible things, this the nature of an age is in things superior to the world. But if they, in their wisdom, can invent a third thing, let them speak. But as long as they are silent, let them not fail to notice that they are establishing the substance of the Only-Begotten as being subsequent to the ages. For if there were any interval older than the Son, which obviously extended as far as the life of the Father, it would certainly be one of these. But there is not, nor shall there be, any thought older than the existence of the Only-Begotten. For the existence of the Word of God, which was in the beginning with God, will be found to be C prior to everything that can be thought of in the order of seniority. Even if the mind, deceiving itself with countless imaginations and occupying itself with the fictions of non-existent things, should conceive of things that do not exist, it will still find no contrivance whatever by which it could extend itself beyond the beginning of the Only-Begotten, or leave the life of him who is Life in itself inferior to its own movement, or by its own thought transcend the origin of the Word of God, or imagine for itself ages bereft of the God of the ages.
A
14. But when he has taken away the glory due to the Only-begotten, notice with what words he decks him out.
EUN. The substance of the Son, he says, is generated before all things, by the will of God and the Father.
BAS. He attributes this great thing to the Son, that he is older than the creation, and that he pre-exists his own works, thinking it sufficient for the glory of the Creator of all things if he is placed before his own creatures. For having, as far as in him lay, alienated him from the communion which he has with God and the Father, he grants him glory in this, that he prefers him to the creatures. Then, giving vent to blasphemy with the utmost impudence, he encompasses us with what he considers the inescapable force of syllogisms.
EUN. For either God generated the Son, he says, when he was existing, or when he was not existing. But if when he was not existing, let no one, he says, accuse me of rashness; but if when he was existing, the account entails not only absurdity and blasphemy, but the height of all B folly; for he who exists has no need of generation.
BAS. This, then, is that much-bruited sophism, discovered long ago by others, but now absolutely and perfectly wrought out by these men with their shameless and impudent tongues. But we shall first remind the hearers that this is a case where, because many through ignorance understand the generation of the Son in a human manner, necessity has forced us into these arguments; that this is a case of one drawing back untutored souls from corporeal notions to spiritual contemplation; who, because animals, while not existing previously, are then generated, and because he who is born today did not exist yesterday, transfers this very notion to the hypostasis of the Only-begotten. And because he is generated, he says, he did not exist before the generation. So magnificently does this theologian explain to us the generation of the Only-begotten, and with such words C does he cure the infirmities of our brethren—worthy, if anyone is, of hearing the proverb: "Physician, heal thyself." Yet what remedy shall we bring him for this absurd disease of the mind, if not the words which the Holy Spirit has spoken to us through the blessed John: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God"? By these two phrases the evangelist has shut out this disease of the soul, D as we can neither transcend the one nor overtake the other. For it is not possible that anything
can be thought of as older than the "beginning"; for it would no longer be a beginning, if it had something outside itself; nor is it possible for those who in their reasoning have passed beyond the "Was" to go over into a "when it was not." For to think that it was not is to destroy the word "Was." For if the beginning were of those things which are referred to another, as "the beginning of wisdom," and "the beginning of a good path," and "In the beginning God created," it might perhaps have been possible for those who consist of such a beginning, through contemplation, to transcend the generation; but since the meaning of this "beginning," as being absolute and having no relation to anything else, denotes the highest nature, how is he not ridiculous who imagines anything beyond this, or attempts with his reasonings to transcend it? B Furthermore, the "Was" extends itself together with that which is insuperable in this beginning. For the "Was" does not indicate an existence from time, as in, "There was a man in the land of Ausitis"; and, "There was a man from Armathaim"; and, "The earth was invisible"; but the evangelist himself in another discourse showed us the meaning of this word "Was," by saying: "Who is, and who was, and" the Almighty. For such as the "is," such also is the "was," eternal likewise and timeless. But to say that he who is in the beginning is not existing, is neither for one who preserves the notion of the beginning, nor for one who joins to it the existence of the Only-begotten. For while the "older than" the beginning is C unthinkable, the being of the Word of God is inseparable from it. So that, however much you may wish to go back with the curious disquisitions of your mind, you will not be able to pass beyond the "was," and to fare forth with your reasonings outside of it.
15. Let it be asked of us in turn: Was the Word of God in the beginning with God, or did he come to be later? If he was, "Refrain your tongue from evil," from that blasphemy, namely, with which you say, "He was not": but if—which it is not even lawful to say— D
A I shall use words more appropriate to you, for this discourse surpasses the limit not only of blasphemy but of folly, that men should demand an accounting of the words of the Spirit, and profess themselves disciples of the Gospel, and yet rise up against the Gospel itself. For observe how diligently, how clearly the divine voices bear witness to the generation of the Son, which was before the ages. For since Matthew became the interpreter of the generation according to the flesh, as he himself says: "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David" (Matt. 1. 1.); and Mark made the preaching of John the beginning of the Gospel, saying: "The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, as it is written in Isaiah the prophet: The voice of one crying in the wilderness" (Mark 1. 1; Isa. 40. 3.); and Luke also approached the theology through corporal beginnings; necessarily the evangelist John, having come last to the writing, having raised his mind above everything sensible, and the time that follows such things, nay rather, having been raised by the power of the Spirit, approached Him who is beyond all things, all but testifying himself, that "even if we have known Christ according to the flesh, yet now we know him so no longer" (II Cor. 5. 16). For having taken hold of the very beginning, and having left all bodily and temporal notions below his own theology, he surpassed the preceding preachings by the magnificence of his knowledge. It is not from Mary, he says, that the beginning is, nor from these times. But what? "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (John 1. 1). Eternal existence, generation free from passion, the union with the Father, the majesty B of nature—all this he encompassed in a few words, and by the addition of "was" he led [the thought] back to the beginning, as if stopping the mouths of those who blaspheme by saying, "He was not," and cutting off from afar the entrances for such sophistries. Then, through the theology, having impressed as it were a clear description of the nature of the Only-Begotten, as if to those who already know, he points it out with the voice, saying: "This was in the beginning with God" (John 1. 2). Again here, by the addition of "was," he connects the generation of the Only-Begotten to the eternity of the Father. And again: "The life was, and the life was the light of men, and the light was the true light" (John 1. 4, 9). But even though the doctrine is thus fortified on all sides by additions of eternity, C yet all the testimonies of the Spirit are rejected, and as if he did not even seem to hear John so frequently crying out the word "Was": [they suggest] he did not exist—
A existing, he says, he was begotten. Therefore he was begotten later, by way of an addition. But if this was not so in the beginning, as you say, what clearer battle against the voices of the Gospels in which we have believed could anyone demonstrate?
16. And indeed, to one who is an equitable judge of things, will it not be proved that, just as the eye, having departed from illuminated places, necessarily ceases from its action on account of the deprivation of light; so too the mind, if it is forced externally by imaginings away from that which is, with the truth failing like a certain light, becomes confused and, laboring in stupidity, ceases to understand? Therefore, neither can the eye use vision outside of light, nor can the soul, having been carried away from the concept of the Only-Begotten, have the use of understanding. For to fall away from the truth is a certain deprivation of vision and blindness of mind. Wherefore, vain is the mind, and blinded, and completely destitute of understanding, that thinks it has apprehended things older than the Only-Begotten, not otherwise than if anyone should testify to the acuteness of vision in an eye that fixes its gaze into darkness. For "In thy light," he says, "we shall see light" (Ps. xxxv, 10). But he who claims to have understood when the light did not yet exist is similar to those who, in a frantic emotion of the mind, seem to themselves to see things that are not present. For those things which are beyond the Son are not understood: since what visible light is to the eye, this God the Word is to the mind. "For he was," he says, "the true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" (Joan. 1, 9). Wherefore, a soul which is not enlightened is incapable of understanding. How then could anything beyond the generation of the light be comprehended? It was fitting, I think, for those who had even the slightest care for the truth, once they had abandoned corporeal likenesses and had ceased to soil the concepts of God through material imaginations, then at last to follow the theology handed down to us by the holy Spirit, and instead of those questions—which differ in nothing from riddles, and the adoption of which on either side is dangerous—to understand a generation worthy of God, impassible, impartible, indivisible, timeless, [being led] toward the divine generation, likening it to a ray shining forth from a light; and to conceive of the image of the invisible God, not according to artificial
later fashioned after the archetype, A but co-existing and having come into existence with the one who established the archetype—in that it is the archetype, being—not imprinted through imitation, as if in some seal of the entire nature of the Father having been marked upon the Son. And if you wish, such as the substance of the arts which, from those who teach, passes in its entirety to those being taught; with nothing lacking for those who teach, and the perfection being added to those who are learning. Or this, indeed, is not accurate for the sake of comparison, on account of the passing of time. But it is more appropriate to say that it is as the nature of thoughts, co-existing without time with the movements of the mind.
17. And let no one calumniate my statement to me, if anything in the examples does not entirely correspond to the matters at hand. For it is not possible for small and base things to be fitted with precision to divine and eternal things, but only so far as is sufficient to refute the dissimulation of those who are not able to grasp an impassible generation in their mind. The Son is said to be—and is—an image generated, and He is the radiance of the glory of God, and wisdom, and power, and the righteousness of God; not as a habit, nor as an aptitude, but a living and active substance, and He is the radiance of the glory of God. B Wherefore He also shows the Father in Himself in His entirety, shining forth from His entire majesty. Is it not, then, the height of absurdity to say that the glory of God does not have radiance, or that the wisdom of God was not at some time together with God? But if He was, he says, He is not begotten. Let us answer, then, that because He is begotten, He was; not having His existence as unbegotten, but being always and co-existing with the Father, from whom He also has the cause of His existence. When, then, was He brought forth into being by the Father? From when the Father is. But the Father is from eternity, he says; therefore, the Son is also from eternity, conjoined by generation to the unbegotten nature of the Father. C That this is not our own wording, we shall place before their eyes the very voices of the Holy Spirit. D
Let us take from the Gospel that which says: *In the beginning was the Word*; A and let us take from the Psalm, as if spoken in the person of the Father: *From the womb, before the daystar, I have begotten thee*; and by putting both together, let us say that he both was and has been begotten. But the word "I have begotten" signifies the cause from which he has the principle of his existence; the word "was," however, indicates his existence as devoid of time and as sempiternal. But Eunomius, contending for his own deceit, thinks that he is leading the argument to an absurdity.
EUN. For if, he says, the Son was before his own generation, he was unbegotten.
BAS. But this "before the generation," O vain man, is either entirely non-existent, or it is a figment of the mind resting upon no underlying reality. But what is the point of contradicting the senseless? For this is much the same as if we were to contend with someone who had lost the use of his reason through phrenitis. Or if it refers to any of the things that exist, it will also lead to the notion of the ages. But if all the ages are understood as being below the generation of the Only-begotten, being His own creatures, he who seeks for something older than the Son’s substance is vain. For he seeks nothing more alien than if he were to ask even concerning the Father, whether He existed before His own constitution or not. For just as there, the question is foolish—namely, to seek for something superior in Him who is devoid of a principle and is unbegotten—so too here, regarding Him who is with the Father from eternity, and who has nothing intermediate between Himself and His Begetter, B to raise questions of time regarding the Prior is truly a mark of equal dementia. For it will be just as if someone were to ask what would be after the death of Him who is immortal, and to inquire what existed before the generation of the Sempiternal. But they, because the absence of a principle in the Father is called eternity, conclude that the absence of a principle is the same thing as eternity, and because the Son is not unbegotten, they do not admit that He is even eternal. However, these differ greatly in their meaning. For "unbegotten" is said of that which has no principle of its own self, nor any cause of its existence; whereas "eternal" is used of that which is older in being than all time and every age. Whence the Son is both not unbegotten and is eternal. But some already deem even the ages worthy of the appellation of "eternal," as if they had obtained this name from the fact that they are "always." But we consider it to be of the same madness both to provide the testimony of eternity to the creatures and to deprive the Lord of the creatures of this confession. C
18. But as for the argument leading to Eunomius’s impudence, what does he say?
EUN. We, however, remaining in those things which have been demonstrated both long ago by the saints and now by us,—with
neither the substance of God admitting generation, nor yet any other thing being subject to the generation of the Son, we say that the Son was generated while not existing. A
BAS. Who has been so ambitious in piety? Who has so prided himself on being a lover of Christ, as these men do in their words of insult and dishonor, taking pleasure in those things that overthrow the glory of the Only-Begotten? Will you not cease, O impious man, to call Him who truly exists—the fountain of life, the dispenser of existence to all things that exist—"non-existent"? He who found for Himself an appellation proper and suitable to His own eternity in the discourse with His own servant Moses, naming Himself as the one who is; for "I am," He says, "He who is." And no one will gainsay that these things were spoken from the person of the Lord, unless, that is, he has the Jewish veil laid upon his own heart B at the reading of Moses.
For it is written, that the angel of the Lord appeared to Moses in the bush in a flame of fire. Therefore, having placed the angel first in the narrative, the Scripture subjoins the voice of God. For He said, it says, to Moses: "I am the God of your father Abraham," and after a few words again: "I am He who is." Who, then, is the same being both angel and God? Is it not He of whom we have learned that His name is called the Angel of the Great Counsel? I, for my part, do not think there is need of more for a demonstration; but to those who are lovers of Christ, even this reminder is sufficient, while for those who are incurably ill, no benefit will come from the multitude of things being said. C For even if later He became the "Angel of the Great Counsel," yet He did not disdain the name of angel even before that.
For not only here will we find our Lord named by the Scripture as both angel and God, but Jacob also, recounting the vision to the women, says: "And the angel of God said to me." And after a few words from the same: "I am the God who appeared to you in the place where you anointed a pillar for me." And yet there, upon the pillar, it was said to Jacob: "I am the Lord God of Abraham your father, and the God of Isaac." The one, therefore, who is called an angel here, is the same one who says there that He had been manifested D to Jacob. Wherefore it is discovered to be altogether in a flame of fire.
And it is manifest to all, that where B both angel and God are addressed as the same, it is the Only-Begotten who is signified, manifesting Himself according to generation to human beings, and announcing the will of the Father to His own saints. Wherefore, even in the case of Moses, one who called himself He who is, could be understood as none other than God the Word, who was C in the beginning with God.
19. But they feared not to call the Son not-existing. And while the fool said in his heart, "There is no God," these did not merely think so, but even spoke in wickedness, and did not decline to commit it to writing for future time, having dared to call God not-existing. And since they see that not even the demons themselves deny that God exists, these men, returning in their argument to a later time, there fulfill their own impious desire, blaspheming that the Son at some time was not, as if He were not by His own nature, but had been brought into existence by God by grace. Then, too, there is that utterance which Paul let forth regarding idols, saying: "You served those which by nature are not gods"; and Jeremiah: "And they swore by those which are not gods"; and the most wise Esther: "Do not deliver, O Lord, Thy scepter to those which are not." If these men say this regarding the true God, how could they any longer justly claim for themselves the appellation D of Christians? For indeed elsewhere that same Apostle, who spoke in the Spirit of God, calls the nations "not-existing" because they were deprived of the knowledge of God, saying that "God chose the things which are not." Since, therefore, God is both truth and life, those who are not united to God who is, according to faith, but are addicted to the non-existing falsehood through the wandering around idols, they have justly, I think, been called "not-existing" on account of the deprivation of truth and the alienation from life. But even when writing to the Ephesians, as to those who were genuinely united to Him who is by knowledge, he named them "existing" in a special way, saying: "To the saints who are, and to the faithful in Christ Jesus." For so did those who were before us pass it down, and we have found it in ancient copies.»
A And he did not even deign to count as worthy of the title of "the servants of Christ" those whom he calls "non-existent," nor did he endure to call our God by that name, but rather called the one who brought creation from non-being into being, "non-existent." One might perceive his contempt even more clearly from the things by which he pretends, forsooth, to honor the Lord.
EUM. We do not, he says, make the essence of the Only-Begotten common with those things that have come to be from non-being, since that which is not is not an essence; but we assign to Him such preeminence as it is necessary for the Creator to have over His own handiwork.
BAS. Having led the argument to this point through his constructions, he acts with pretended benevolence in his choice of words, and says that he does not make the essence of the Only-Begotten common with those that are from non-being. Yet, if the God of the universe, because He is unbegotten, must necessarily differ from the begotten, and if all begotten things have a common subsistence B from non-being, how are these not necessarily joined together according to their nature? For just as there the "inaccessible" separates the natures, so here "equal honor" brings them into one and the same identity. For by saying that the Son and those things which were made by Him are from non-being, and by making their nature common in this respect, they do not say that they give Him an essence similar to that of things from non-being. And furthermore, even in this, as if he himself were the Lord, dispensing to the Only-Begotten as much dignity as he wishes, he frames his speech thus: "We assign," he says, "to Him such preeminence as it is necessary for the Creator to surpass His own handiwork." He did not say, "We conceive" or "We opine," as was fitting to say regarding God; but, "We assign," as if he himself were the master of the measure of distribution. And how much preeminence does he give? "As much," he says, "as it is necessary for the Creator to surpass His own handiwork." This does not yet provide testimony of a difference in essence. For C men, indeed, surpass their own works by their craft, yet they are of the same essence as them; as the potter with the clay, and the shipwright with the wood. For both are likewise bodies, and likewise sensible, and earthly.
20. Having granted such a difference between the Son and creation, he now acts maliciously regarding the very concept of the Only-Begotten.
EUM. For this reason, he says, He is the Only-Begotten, because, begotten and created by the power of the Unbegotten alone, by the only one, He has become the most perfect minister. D
A Basilius. I do not know what I ought to find more annoying in the things he has said: whether the craftiness which he has wickedly devised regarding the name of the Only-Begotten, interpreting His meaning both contrary to the custom of men and contrary to the pious tradition of the Scriptures (for "Only-Begotten" is not used in common speech for one who is made by the Only One, but for the one who alone is begotten); or the blasphemy regarding the "creature," which he has deliberately joined to the word "begotten," so as to show that the Lord possesses the designation of having been begotten in no way differently from created things. Just as the expressions, "I have begotten and exalted sons," and "Israel is my firstborn son," were used, so too, he claims, the Lord was named Son, not possessing the name that is above every name, but as being judged worthy of this designation on an equal footing with others. B But they take refuge in the saying of Solomon, and from there, as if from a fortress, they attack the faith. For because it was said from the person of Wisdom, "The Lord created me," they have supposed that it is allowable for them to call the Lord a creature. But I, though I have much to say regarding this word—first, that it is used only once in all the Scriptures; and second, that it is used in a book which holds much of its meaning concealed and proceeds for the most part through proverbs, parables, and dark sayings and riddles, so that nothing certain or clear can be derived from it—I omit saying these things, so as not to prolong my speech with unnecessary diversions, especially since the inquiry into those things which have been misunderstood by them has been deferred by us to its own proper place, in which this part also, God granting, will be examined. And I think, indeed—and let it be said with God—that a much more consistent meaning of the text in question will appear upon examination, and one that brings no danger. In the meantime, however, let us not leave even that unremarked: that there are still C others among the interpreters, who, having attained a more accurate understanding of the Hebrew words, have rendered it, "The Lord possessed me," instead of "created me." We know this from the Hexapla, and it would not be tiresome to write down their interpretation here. Aquila, therefore: "The Lord possessed me as the head of his ways, from the beginning of his works." Symmachus: "The Lord possessed me as the beginning of his ways, before his operation." Theodotion: "The Lord possessed me as the beginning of his way before his operation from of old." It is well known that the Seventy interpreters wrote "created me" instead of "possessed me," which reading the Eunomians followed as being most suited to establishing their own impious dogma. But Basilius did not speak in vain when he said that those interpreters who had attained the meaning of the Hebrew words D more accurately and truthfully had rendered it not "created me," but "possessed me." For thus the Hebrew is translated word for word in the Hexapla: "The Lord possessed me as the beginning of his way before his works from of old." It is read a little differently in the Vulgate, namely in this manner: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning." Gregory, wishing to confirm the opinion of our dearest brother Basilius, treated this same passage in Book III against Eunomius.
A They have attained understanding of the meaning of the Hebrew, having published "Possessed me" instead of "Created." This will be a very great obstacle to them regarding the blasphemy of the creature. For he who said, "I have possessed a man through God," it is clear used this expression not because he created Cain, but because he begat him.
EUN. For this reason, he says, he is "Only-Begotten," because, having been begotten and created by the One alone, he has become a most perfect minister.
BAS. If, therefore, he is called Only-Begotten not because he is the only one begotten, but because he is from the One alone, and if to be created is the same as to be begotten according to you; why do you not also call him "Unicreated," you who so easily both conceive and utter everything? But, as I see it, no man is "only-begotten" according to our argument, because birth exists for all from a union. Nor was Sarah the mother of an "only-begotten" son, because she did not beget him alone, but together with Abraham. And if your position holds, it is necessary to relearn the whole life, B so that the name indicates not a solitude lacking brothers, but an emptiness of those who beget together. But now the creation, too, is lessened in dignity compared with the cause of God the Word, to such an extent that it itself fails to be "only-begotten," just as much as the Son participated with the Father in creation; and yet even this is not conceded by them. For they call him a most perfect minister. How then, according to you, was the creation not also effected by the One alone, when you attach God the Word to the Father like some inanimate instrument? Unless one shall also deny that a shipwright made the ship alone, because he used instruments for its construction! Consequently, the creation is "only-begotten," as are its parts; not only the invisible powers, but even sensible bodies, and the basest of these, gnats, and locusts, and frogs. For "He spoke, and they were made" (Ps. CXLVIII, 5). C For what ministry could he need who creates by will alone, with the creation subsisting together with the command? But what then? How, even according to us, are all things through the Son? Because the divine will, having set forth from the first cause as if from a certain fountain, through its own image D
A of God the Word, proceeds unto operation. But he who called the only-begotten Son a minister, attributing this as a great thing to him—that he is fit for the service of the things commanded—does so for the following reason: if he possesses his majesty not in the fact that he is God perfect, but in the fact that he is a diligent minister, in what will he differ from the ministering spirits who perform the work of ministry in an irreproachable manner? For these reasons, he has yoked "begotten" with "created," so that from this, too, he might show there to be no difference between the Son and a creature.
22. But it is worth hearing also the exhortation.
Eunomius says: We ought not, when we hear the appellation of Father and Son, to understand his generation as human, nor, being led astray by the generations among men, to subject God to the names and passions of participation.
Basilius: He advises B that we must not understand the similarity of the Son to the Father according to substance. For this is what that denial of participation aims at for him, as though the substance of the Father could have no communion with the substance of the Only-Begotten. For these reasons those noble distinctions of names—the host of which we have passed over—are used; for it is not the case that, for whoever the enunciations are the same, the things signified are also the same; he does this to deny that the God who is Father of the Son is the Father, on account of those on earth who are called fathers. But I, while there are many things that C distinguish Christianity from Gentile error and Jewish ignorance, consider no dogma in the Gospel of our salvation to be more essential or greater than the faith in the Father and the Son. For even those who are divided by any error whatsoever confess that God is the creator and maker. But he who declares him to be a falsely-called Father, and only by a bare appellation a Son, and thinks there is no difference whether one confesses him as Father or as creator, and whether one calls him Son or creature—where shall he be placed by us? Or in what sect shall he be numbered? That of the Jews or that of the Greeks? For he will not join himself to Christians, he who denies the power of piety and what is as it were the character of our religion. D For we have not believed in a maker and a creature, but we have been sealed into the Father and the Son through the grace of baptism. Wherefore, he who dares to reject these words makes the whole power of the Gospels at once void, since he proclaims neither the generating Father nor the begotten Son. But I say these things, he says, so that the understanding of passion
born from the voice of the Father might be avoided. Yet surely it behooved one who had decided to act piously, if there indeed existed an incongruous meaning in these terms, to reject that, but not to reject the entire voice simultaneously; nor, under the pretext of impropriety, to cast out also whatever is useful from it. Instead, one ought to be pure of humble and carnal thoughts in the dogmas concerning God, and to conceive of generation as becoming to the holiness and apothetical nature of God; passing over the manner in which God begat, as ineffable and incomprehensible, but being led to the similarity according to essence by the naming of "begetting." And yet, to one who considers it, it is clear that these names—the Father, I say, and the Son—do not by nature B commonly and primarily produce an understanding of bodily passions; but when spoken by themselves, they signify only the mutual relation. For the Father is he who has provided to another the beginning of existence according to a nature similar to his own; and the Son is he who has obtained the beginning of being from another through generation.
23. When we hear that a man (69) is a father, we receive the notion of passion; but when we hear that God is Father, we resort in our thoughts to the impassible cause. But he, being accustomed to this naming in the context of a nature subject to passions, denies as impossible that which surpasses the grasp of his own logic. For since he attends to the passion of corruptible things, it is not proper for him to disbelieve in the impassibility of God, nor to compare the immutable and unalterable essence to a fluid nature subject to myriads of changes (70). Nor, because mortal animals beget through passion, ought one to think the same of God; rather, one is led from this all the more to the truth: that since corruptible things are so, the Incorruptible is the contrary. Yet he would not say that these names, which are applied properly and primarily to men, we apply to God C improperly (71). For our Lord Jesus Christ, leading us back to the source of all things and the true cause of beings, says, "Do not call anyone your father on earth; for one is your Father (72) who is in heaven." How then does he deem these voices worthy of being dismissed by us as if they were primarily indicative of carnal passions—voices which the Lord (73), as if they were befitting the impassibility of God, transfers (74) from men to Himself? And if... D
He is called Father of creatures, this does not in any way conflict with our argument. For He who brought forth the A clods of dew, according to the word of Job, did not beget the clods and the Son in the same manner. But if they shall dare to say this, so as to name the substance of the dew a son in the same order, they will release us from all further argument with them, by having advanced their blasphemy to the most manifest impudence. For when God is called the Father of us all, He is not the Father of us and of the Only-Begotten in the same way. But if the fact that the Lord has been called the first-born of all creation, and first-born among many brethren (77), instructs them toward impiety, let them learn from the Gospel that the Lord addresses even those who have become His own through the works of virtue as His mother and brethren. For who is My mother, He says, and who are My brethren, B if not those who do the will of My Father who is in heaven? Therefore, God is named our Father, not by abuse of language nor by metaphor, but properly, and primarily, and truly; for He brought us into being from nothing through our corporeal parents, and He is closely united to us by His providence toward us. But if we say that God is truly called the Father of us who have been deemed worthy of the adoption of sons through grace, what reason will prevent Him—the One who is Son by nature and proceeds from His substance—from being rightly and deservedly called Father?
Eun. It is not necessary, he says, to understand the generation of the Lord as human, because of the appellation of Father and Son.
Bas. I say the same thing. But what hinders these pious men (82) from believing it to be divine and void of passion? Yet, I suppose, he does not use these words to show that God has begotten C without passion, but to show that He has not begotten at all. How then, O excellent one, did you declare in the preceding arguments that the substance of the Only-Begotten is a generated thing? For if He is not generated, from where, according to your own opinion, could the 'generated thing' (83) belong to Him? But it is on account of the contrariety which subsists between the generated and the ungenerated that He (the generated)
sought to show A that the substance was a matter of contention; yet now, once again, seeing that the claim for the substance is signified by this word, he seeks to subtract the state of having been generated from the 'generated thing' (85). And yet, if he rejects this on the grounds that it indicates a passion, what forbids him from also, for the same reasons, refusing to accept that He is the Creator? For to all bodily operations, there is necessarily joined either a greater or a lesser labor, in proportion to the power of the one acting and the difference in the size of the things being acted upon. But to say that the divine and blessed nature is constrained by labor is no less impious than to subject it to the most base passions. If, however, He creates without passion, then acknowledge that the generation is also devoid of passion.
21. B Concerning the fact that God is invoked as Father, and that this is not a name of passion but of a relationship—whether that which occurs by grace, as in the case of men, or that which is according to nature, as in the case of the Only-Begotten—enough has already been said. But let us grant that it is tropical, and that it is spoken by way of metaphor (86), just as countless other words are. Therefore, just as when we hear that God is angry, or sleeping, or flying, and other such things that present, according to the literal mind, improper notions, we neither erase the words of the Spirit nor do we understand the things said in a bodily way; for what reason, then, when this word is so frequently used by the Spirit (87), do we not also investigate the notions of it that are worthy of God? Or shall we delete this one alone from Scripture (88), slandering it on the basis of human usage? Let us consider the matter thus. Since two things are signified by the terminology of "generating" according to human custom—namely, the passion of the one generating and the relationship with the thing generated—when it is said by the Father to the Only-Begotten, "From the womb, before the daystar, have I begotten thee" (Ps. cix, 3) and "Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee" (Ps. ii, 7), which of these two meanings shall we say is represented by the word? The passion of those who generate, or the relationship of nature? I, for my part, say it is the latter; and I do not think that even these men would ever have contradicted it, had they not fallen into a manifest disease of black bile (89). Therefore, if the word is proper to God, why do you despise it as alien? But if it has been transferred from human affairs, having chosen the healthy meaning, flee from the worse of the things signified. For it is surely possible, in a word of many meanings, once one has been led by the word to the correct notion, to pass over the humble and the base in the implication. And do not say to me: What, then, is this generation, and of what kind, and how could it take place? Not D
B because the mode is entirely ineffable and incomprehensible, shall we therefore cast away the firm and stable faith in the Father and the Son. For if we intend to measure everything by our comprehension, and to assume that what cannot be grasped by the mind does not exist at all, the reward of faith will perish, the reward of hope will perish. For how could we any longer be worthy of the beatitudes, which are deposited in the faith of things not seen, if we have faith only in those things which are evident to reason? Whence have the nations become vain, and their senseless heart been darkened 21? Is it not because, while they follow those things which seem plausible to reason, they do not give credence to the preaching of the Spirit? And whom does Isaiah lament as lost? Woe to those who are wise in their own eyes, and prudent in their own sight 22. Does he not mean such as these? C Therefore, having passed over many of the intermediate points—as well as those wherein he overtly maintained that the Son was not generated, as also those which he artfully devised in order to obtain this, namely, that the Only-Begotten is a creature and a product—I shall turn to the principal heads of his impiety, having only noted regarding those things that were omitted what he has in fact premeditated: he desired to cover with a word the blasphemy he had constructed, and to soften the impudence of his discourse, when he said he did not make the Only-Begotten common with the creatures, forgetting his own dogmas, which in his previous discourses he set forth in a clear and open voice. From which he has again fallen into an impudent and most manifest contradiction. He writes thus:
EUN. Let no one, hearing that the Son is a product, be troubled, as if by the community of names the substance were made common.
BAS. How then, O wisest one, if the diversity of substances necessitates a diversity of names (for we remember that you discussed these things in the earlier discourses), does not now the community of names imply a community of substance? For he is not found to have used these words only once, nor in passing. Then, even now, as if he had repented of what he said—that the communication of names does not also make the substances common—he again, a little further on, bringing his own adversaries to task, introduces these same claims.
A EUN. "It would have been necessary," he says, "if they had any concern for the truth, that since the names are different, they should also confess the substances to be different." BAS. How could anyone more easily use words? For one who, in a short space, turns himself to the opposite, now saying that the difference of names necessarily indicates the variation of substances, and now again that the communication [of names] does not make the substances common? But I think we act much like those who accuse a murderer of insults, or a blow, or some other such sins. B 25. Let us proceed, therefore, to the head of his evils. For he, having seen that a common preconception exists in all Christians alike (that is, in those who are truly worthy of this title) regarding the Son being begotten light, shining forth from the unbegotten light, and being life in itself and goodness in itself, coming forth from the life-giving source of paternal goodness; and then having reflected that, if he did not unsettle these concepts of ours, nothing would remain for him but sophisms (for he who confesses the Father to be light, and the Son also to be light, since the concept of light is one and the same, will naturally be led to confess a union according to substance: for between light and light, according to the very definition of light, there is no difference, neither in utterance nor in the significance itself): C in order, therefore, to take this away from us, he surrounds the doctrine of faith with the nets of his artifices, teaching that these have no comparison nor communion at all with one another, and saying that the opposition of the unbegotten to the begotten is also that between light and light, or forcing us, while fleeing from this, to confess that God is composite. But let us rather hear his very own words. EUN. "Does the word 'light'," he says, "signify something else in the unbegotten than in the begotten, or is it the same for both? For if it is one thing and another, it is clear that what consists of one thing and another is also composite; but what is composite is not unbegotten. But if it is the same, as much as the begotten is different from the unbegotten, by so much is it necessary that light should be different from light, and life from life, D and power from power." BAS. Behold and understand the horror of this impiety. "As much," he says, "as the unbegotten differs from the begotten, so much..."
must light differ from light, and life from life, and power from power." Let us therefore ask him: By what measure is the unbegotten distinguished from the begotten? Is it by some small interval, and such that they might at some point come together into the same state? Or is this absolutely A impossible, and more impossible even than for the same person to be living and dead at the same time, or healthy and sick, or waking and sleeping simultaneously? For such are all things that stand against one another in total opposition, so that the presence of the one necessitates the absence of the other; things so compared that they can neither coexist nor be reconciled with one another.
26. Therefore, when he sets the begotten in opposition to the unbegotten in this manner—he who calls the Father light, and likewise the Son light, and who says that this light differs from that light as much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten—does he not, even though he pretends a certain gentleness by the use of the word, by calling the Son "light," nonetheless clearly lead the meaning of his statements toward the contrary via the force of his words? For consider what is opposed to the unbegotten: another unbegotten, or the begotten? It is the begotten, clearly. And what is opposed to light? Another light, or darkness? It is darkness, B certainly. If, then, it is necessary that light differ from light as much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten, to whom is the impiety not obvious, seeing that by introducing under the name of "light" that which is opposed to light, he implies that the substance of the Only-Begotten is contrary to the nature of light? Or let him show us a light that is opposed to light, and which possesses that same measure of opposition that exists between the begotten and the unbegotten. But if this neither exists, nor could he himself ever conceive of it, let not the artifice by which he profoundly adorns his blasphemy go unrecognized. For because he thinks the begotten stands in opposition to the unbegotten, he applies the same opposition to light in relation to light, so that he may demonstrate that the Father’s substance C is in every way contrary and hostile to the substance of the Only-Begotten. For this reason comes this new formulation of doctrines, where he says: "As much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten, so much is it necessary that light should differ from light." Yet while there is for the unbegotten in relation to the begotten a certain opposition in the arrangement of the words, though not in the nature of the things—which is what these people fabricate—in the case of light in relation to light, no contrariety can be conceived, either in utterance or in meaning. But he seems to deceive himself with specious cavils. For he thinks that the things which follow from contraries possess the same conflict among themselves as the principal contraries themselves possess, and that when one of the contraries is present, D the contrary must necessarily follow from the other. As,
if light follows sight, darkness follows blindness; if sensation follows life, insensibility follows death. That this observation is weak and fallacious is manifest to anyone who gives it but a little attention. For just because life follows waking, it does not necessarily follow that death follows sleep. Nor does the begotten stand in a contrary relation to the unbegotten. For if they were contraries and destructive of each other—which would turn back upon the heads of the blasphemers—yet they are neither opposed by nature, nor do the things which follow them necessarily possess the same distance that the primary terms were shown to have.
B 27. Therefore, either strike out your words or do not deny your impiety. For it is your own blasphemy, B claiming: “By as much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten, by so much must the light necessarily differ from the light.” Consequently, just as the begotten will never partake of unbegottenness, so you will never make him a partaker of the light. According to your opinion, the substance of the Only-Begotten will be just as far from being unbegotten as it is from being considered and named light. Yet John, with the great voice of the Spirit, cries out to you, saying: *“He was the true light.”* But you have neither ears to hear nor a heart to understand; rather, with your sophistries, you drive the substance of the Only-Begotten toward a contrary nature, one that cannot exist with the light. For you will surely not say that it is a valid argument that you have not stripped the name of "light" from the Only-Begotten. For piety consists not in the sound of the air, but in the power of the things signified. C But he did not stop there; he adds both life and power to the same measure of distance toward the contrary, saying: “By as much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten, by so much must the light necessarily differ from the light, and life from life, and power from power.” Therefore, according to you, the Only-Begotten is neither life nor power. But you set aside the Lord Himself who says: *“I am the life”*; you set aside Paul, who said: *“Christ is the power of God.”* For whatever was demonstrated in the preceding points will apply also to these. For no one would say that life or power is opposed to life and power, but rather that death and impotence fulfill the most perfect opposition. Which this man, concealing his deceit through the versatility of his words, D
B craftily and under a veil constructs the horror of impiety, and by the artifices of his discourse, having distanced the nature of the Only-Begotten from the contrary nature of the Father, he leaves behind only the commendation of the names. What then shall we do? How, while confessing both the unbegotten Father and the begotten Son, may we escape the contradiction [(20)] regarding their very being? What are we to say? That as from a good Father comes a good Son; so from the unbegotten light has shone forth the eternal light, and from the true life has proceeded the life-giving fountain, and from the power itself has emerged the power of God [(21)]. But darkness, and death, and weakness are assembled together with the prince of this world and the princes of darkness, and with the spiritual hosts of wickedness, and with every power inimical to the divine nature; yet not even these have received an opposition to the good according to their very substance (for so the blame would recoil upon the Creator), but by their own will they have fallen into vice through the privation of the good. Yet the tongue that opposes God has attempted to bring the nature of the Only-Begotten into this same order. For it cannot even say this, that while it considers the substance of the Father to be light, excelling in both glory and splendor, it also considers the substance of the Only-Begotten to be light, yet somehow more obscure and, as it were, darkened [(23)]. For not even these things belong to a pious mind, since the likeness of the image is destroyed by such obscurity. Yet it would be desirable that we were able to accuse him of these things. For there would be no need for a great struggle for his correction.
C 28. Now, the difference in the begotten and the unbegotten is not one of degree, as between a lesser and a greater light, but it is as great as the distance between things that cannot in any way exist together. For it is impossible that that toward which the other exists should ever pass over into the opposite [(25)] via transmutation, so that either the begotten becomes unbegotten, or conversely, that the begotten should be transmuted into the unbegotten. Therefore, for him who has once proclaimed that the light must differ from the light as much as the begotten differs from the unbegotten, not even this argument [(26)] is left for his escape. For truly, light that is pure, compared to light that is as it were fading and more obscure, being of the same genus, differs only in intensity; but the unbegotten is not an intensification of the begotten, nor is the begotten...
nor is the unbegotten an intensification of the begotten; nor, indeed, is the A begotten a certain subjection of the unbegotten; but the distance between them is, as it were, diametrically opposed. To those, therefore, who posit the begotten and the unbegotten as substances, these and even more absurdities than these will follow. For the opposite will have been begotten from the opposite, and in place of a natural kinship, a certain necessary dissension will appear to them even within the substance itself. This, however, carries with it more ignorance than impiety—to call a substance contrary to the substance of any one of all things, since it has long been agreed, even among those outside the faith (whom these men despise as men of no account when they do not find them contending for their blasphemies), that it is impossible for contrariety to exist within substance. But if B any one, as is the truth, were to accept that the begotten and the unbegotten are certain distinguishing properties contemplated in the substance, which lead us as by the hand to a clear and unconfused notion of the Father and the Son, he will both escape the danger of impiety and preserve the logical consistency of his reasoning. For indeed, the properties, as it were certain characters and forms contemplated in the substance, distinguish the common by peculiar traits, but they do not cut asunder the homogeneity of the substance. For instance, the deity is common, but Fatherhood and Sonship are certain properties; and from the combination of each—both the common and the particular—the comprehension of the truth arises for us. Thus, when we hear "unbegotten light," we understand the Father; but when we hear "begotten light," we receive the notion of the Son. Insofar, indeed, as they are light and light, there is no contrariety in them; but C insofar as they are begotten and unbegotten, there appears an opposition. For this is the nature of properties: to show something else within the identity of the substance, and although the properties themselves are often divided over against one another, tending toward the contrary, they do not tear asunder the unity of the substance; just as it is with the winged and the walking, the aquatic and the terrestrial, the rational and the irrational. For since one substance is subject to all, these properties do not make the substance different, nor do they persuade it, so to speak, to rebel against itself; but by the force of the distinguishing signs, as if instilling a certain light into our souls, they guide us toward the understanding that D the mind can grasp. But this man, transferring the opposition of the properties to the substance, from this source seizes the occasion for impiety, terrifying us like children with the masks of his sophisms; for if there were anything else that was "light" besides the unbegotten, it would...
necessarily be demonstrated to us that God is composite A (34).
29. But what do I say? If the light were something other than the unbegotten, it could no longer be called the Son, just as the unbegotten itself could not. One might also learn from this the difference between the meanings signified by these terms. God is said to inhabit light, and to be clothed with light, but never that He inhabits His own unbegottenness, nor that He has it wrapped around Him from without (for such things are laughable). "Begotten" and "unbegotten" are certain distinguishing properties. For if there were nothing to characterize the substance, it would in no way be accessible to our understanding. For since the Godhead is one, it is impossible to obtain a distinguishing B notion of the Father or the Son unless the mind is structured by the addition of properties (36). But if anyone says that God will appear composite unless light and the unbegotten are taken to be the same, we can say this: if we were to take the "unbegotten" as a part of the substance, there would be room for the argument that claims a thing is composite if it consists of distinct elements. But if we posit light, or life, or goodness as the substance of God—so that God is entirely whatever He is, life, and entirely light, and entirely good—and yet life has the unbegotten attached to it, how can He who is simple according to substance not be uncomposite? For the means of pointing out His property will not violate the rationale of simplicity C (39); otherwise, in this way everything that is said about God will demonstrate to us that God is composite.
And, as it seems, if we intend to preserve the notion of the simple and indivisible (40), we will either say nothing about God except "unbegotten," and we will refuse to call Him invisible, incorruptible, unalterable, creator, judge, and everything else we now use for doxology—or, if we accept these names, what shall we do? Shall we refer them all to the substance? In that case, we will demonstrate Him not only to be composite, but composed of dissimilar parts, since a different thing is signified by each of these names (41); or shall we extract them from the substance? Therefore, whatever account one might devise for each of these D points: if we posit [God] as a whole, whatever He is, as life—and again if we think of God as a whole, whatever He is, as life—from which it can be gathered, first, that these two terms must be referred to the word understood: then, that the punctuation which is noted in the Colbert codex must be retained. Nor will it irk me to record the old interpretation from which this passage can perhaps be more easily understood. Thus, therefore, Trapezuntius had translated: "But if one opines the substance of God to be light, or life, or good, the whole of what it is, life, total light, total good: but life follows: how, etc."
A let them demonstrate this even in the title of the Unbegotten. Having grown arrogant over all who have ever busied themselves with the knowledge of God, as if he himself had cut a new and recent path leading to God, which none of his predecessors had discovered, he finally adds, as though taught by that very path, his blasphemy against the Son concerning the substance of God.
EUN. That [the substance] which is above kingship B and altogether incapable of generation—teaching the mind which approaches with goodwill to these [notions]—commands [it] to repel, as far as possible, by the law of nature, comparison with another.
BAS. Does he not clearly indicate that he himself was deemed worthy of an apocalypse of secret things, upon bringing his mind to God with goodwill? And for this reason he removes the Only-Begotten as far as possible from the communion of the Father, C not even deigning to admit him into comparison; but he even says that by the law of nature the substance of the Only-Begotten is separated from that of the Father. What does he mean by saying this? That the God of the universe, even if He had wished, could not have admitted the Only-Begotten into a kinship of substance, being prevented from admitting him by the law of nature of the connection with Him, not being, as it seems, lord of Himself, but subject to the terms of necessity. For such are the things D that are constrained by the law of nature, being driven without choice to that which seems good to nature. For just as it is in the nature of fire to heat, not by choice, and it is necessarily incapable of coldness, being deprived of communion with it by the law of nature; so he wishes the God and Father also to have, by the law of nature, a substance alienated from the Son. And now indeed the laws of nature do not [presuppose] a mutual distance between the Father and the Son, but
create a necessary and inexpressible communion. For if he said that the God of all had fashioned the non-communion with Himself by an act of will, not even thus would the argument of the goodness of God allow one to be considered trustworthy who says that the Father is incommunicable toward Him who is from Himself; yet the things said would at least have some coherence. But to say that the alienation exists by a law of nature is not even the act of one who has examined the nature of sensible things—by which it is not the nature of things to be produced by each [parent] as alien or contrary, but rather as akin and appropriate.
31. Again, therefore, he failed to discern the mutual repugnance of what he said here as well. For in what follows, B being vexed at those who say the Only-Begotten is similar to the Father according to substance, he wrote thus:
EUN. In the beginning, they seem to me to have dared to compare a substance that is subject to no lordship, superior to every cause, and free from all laws, with a substance that is begotten and enslaved to paternal laws—those who have either not examined at all the nature of the whole, or who have not made judgments about these matters with a pure mind.
BAS. How, then, did the substance that is subject to no lordship and free from all laws appear now to have its incomparable nature not from free choice, but to be forestalled by a law of nature, and involuntarily to repel the Begotten from communion with Itself, so that for this reason it is inaccessible even to the Only-Begotten himself? So great, then, is the inconsistency in his statements; but how great is the impiety? C He declares the substance of the Father to be subject to no lordship and free (if, then, that substance which is subject to the law of nature is subject to no lordship!), but he declares the substance of the Only-Begotten to be, by contrast, servile, and from this he removes his equal honor of nature. For since there are two things—creation and deity—and the creation is ordered in servitude and obedience, but the deity is in primacy and lordship, he who removes the dignity of lordship and casts down the Son to the humility of servitude, is he not clearly caught showing that he ranks Him also, by this very fact, with the whole creation? For it is surely not glorious for Him if He excels His fellow-servants. But unless we confess Him to be King and Lord, such that He embraces obedience not by the submission of nature but by the goodness of His will—this is grave, this is horrific, this brings destruction to those who deny it. But he adds:
EUN. Because the substance of God, following the laws of nature, neither admits comparison with another, and grants to us that we might understand His operation [worthy...]
of its own dignity. BAS. This was said by him to provide proof of the alienation of the Only-Begotten from the Father; but it confirms our own argument. For if the substance of God grants us to understand an operation that is consistent and becoming to its own dignity—and if, according to Eunomius, unbegottenness is a dignity, and according to their argument the same thing is also a substance, and the Only-Begotten is the operation of God, or the image of that operation—this is also according to their own argument. Therefore, to contradict these things would be useless, since they have nothing to say against them. How much I would value it if they would deny this blasphemy! However, since they have said these things, let us conclude from their own statements that, if unbegottenness is a dignity of God, and it is the same thing as substance, and the operation is that which follows and is fitting to the dignity of God, B and this—according to their assumption—is Christ, then He is naturally connected and fitting to the substance of God. And none of these things is our own; for we are composing our proof from the very words they have put together. The substance, he says, is followed by the divine dignity; the operation has a proportion to that dignity; the Only-Begotten is the image of the operation; and conversely, if the Only-Begotten is the image of the operation, and the operation is that of the dignity, and the dignity is that of the substance, then the Only-Begotten will be the image of the substance. Thus, even the architects of lies are often forced by the clarity of the facts to bear witness to the truth, even against their will. For even the demons were not doing the work of evangelists, C but, being unable to gaze upon the light of the truth, they cried out: "We know who you are, the Holy One of God" (Mark 1, 24). 32. Let us also look at what follows. EUN. For if anyone, he says, considering a thing from the created works, were to be led from these to the substances,
A in discovering the Son to be a creature of the Unbegotten, and the Paraclete to be a creature of the Only-Begotten, and by believing in the superiority of the Only-Begotten the diversity of operation, he receives a most certain proof of the difference also in accordance with substance.
BAS. First of all, then, how it is possible to reckon substances from created things, I for my part do not see. For it is power, and wisdom, and art—but not the substance itself—that the created works indicate. And they do not necessarily even demonstrate the whole power of the Creator, since it is sometimes possible for an artisan not to exert all his strength in acting, but often to employ slacker efforts in the works of art. But if he were to transfer his entire power into the work, this is the only way it would come about that we might measure his strength through the works, yet it certainly would not follow that we would understand the substance, whatever it might be. But if, because the divine nature is simple and uncompounded, one should suppose that the substance concurs with the power, and because of the goodness inherent in God, one should say that the whole power of the Father was moved toward the generation of the Son, and again, the whole power of the Only-Begotten toward the coming-into-being of the Holy Spirit, so that from the Spirit the power of the Only-Begotten is contemplated, and at the same time the substance as well, and from the Only-Begotten, in turn, the power and substance of the Father are grasped—consider what is gathered from this. For from those premises upon which he attempted to establish the dissimilarity of the substance, he is seen to be constructing its similarity. For if power has nothing in common with substance, how was he led to the comprehension of the latter from the created works, which are the results of power? But if substance and power are the same, that which characterizes the power will surely characterize the substance as well. Therefore the B created works, as you say, do not lead to the dissimilarity of the substance, but rather to the accuracy of its similarity. Furthermore, this endeavor of his confirms our position rather than his own. For he either has no source from which to prove what he has said, or, if he borrows examples from human affairs, he will find that it is not from the works of an artisan that we come to a comprehension of his substance, but that it is from the begotten that we learn the nature of the begetter. For it is not possible to grasp the substance of a builder from his house; yet it is easy to understand the nature of the begetter from his offspring. Therefore, if the Only-Begotten is a creature, he does not exhibit to us the substance of the Father; but if he makes the Father known to us through C himself, he is not a creature, but the true Son, and the image of God, and the character of his substance. And these matters are of this sort. D
A 33. But how great is this access of blasphemy? Having despised the threat in the Gospels which the Lord most fearfully denounced against those who blaspheme the Holy Spirit, he calls the Holy Spirit a created thing; he even goes so far as to deny that it is an animal, as for the most part that designation is applied to inanimate things. For it is not the case that because he anticipated the Lord with this blasphemy, we should on that account remit anything that is due to our indignation. For this is no mitigation of his impiety, but an addition to his condemnation. Since even the Lord, out of his goodness, forgave the blasphemy spoken against himself, but declared that the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is inevitable for those who have dared it. Therefore, he is the first of those who, since the proclamation of piety was first announced, have assaulted the truth, who has dared to utter this statement concerning the Spirit. For we have heard of no one until this day who has called the Holy Spirit a creation, nor have we found this designation in the writings left by them. Then he says:
EUN. If anyone, from things created, should be carried upward to the comprehension of essence, he will find the Son to be a creation of the Unbegotten, and the Paraclete to be a creation of the Only-Begotten.
BAS. B This is another mode of impiety: to blaspheme doubly in a single word—to take the disparagement of the Holy Spirit as something acknowledged, and to start from there to demonstrate the diminution of the Only-Begotten. And, as it seems, *The heavens declare the glory of God*, but the Holy Spirit declares the diminution of the glory of the Only-Begotten. And the Lord indeed, speaking of the Paraclete, says, *He shall glorify me*; but that slanderous tongue declares that the Son is hindered C by him, so that he cannot be compared with the Father. For since, he says, the Son is the maker of the Spirit (may you, O Lord, be merciful to us regarding the things being spoken), and this is of such a sort that it adds no dignity to the one who made it, for that reason he is not worthy to be compared with the Father, having been stripped of the equality of dignity by the baseness of those things which he made.
34. Has anyone ever heard of worse blasphemies? Has anyone so clearly fallen into the inevitable judgment D for blasphemy against the Holy Spirit? For having despised...
A the Spirit, treating Him with humble names, and debasing His nature so much that he claims disgrace is smeared upon the Maker. Rather, that man would have avoided speaking in a humble way 65 regarding the Spirit, so as not to bring down his own pride. But regarding this, we shall speak at our leisure 66. But to whom of all men is it not clear that no operation of the Son is severed from the Father, nor is there anything in things that exist which, being of the Son, is alienated from the Father? For all things, He says, are Mine, and Yours are Mine. How, then, does he attribute the cause of the Spirit to the Only-Begotten alone, and consider this creation to be an accusation against His nature 67? If, indeed, by proposing two principles opposed B to each other, he says these things, he shall be crushed together with Mani and Marcion; but if he assumes that all things depend from one source, then that which is said to have been made by the Son is referred to the first cause. Therefore, even if we believe that all things were brought into being through God the Word, we do not deny that the God of all is the cause of all. Yet how is it not clearly dangerous to separate the Spirit from God, when the Apostle hands Him down to us in conjunction, now calling Him the Spirit of Christ, now of God, where he writes: "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His"; and again: "But you have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God"; and when the Lord calls Him the Spirit of truth 68, since He Himself is the truth, and He proceeds from the Father? But this man, to the destruction of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ, just as he removes the Spirit from the Father, so he attributes Him uniquely to the Only-Begotten for the overturning of His glory, insulting Him, as he thinks 72, expecting no retribution for his wicked dogmas 73 in the day of judgment.