go to the marketplace, until the master of the house comes and takes you into his vineyard. If there were concern in your hearts regarding that meeting, you would not have had cause to mention these things. The prophet forgot to eat his bread; and had we not been extravagant and indifferent, we would not have fallen into these things because of them. God does not demand these things of you, but rather sanctification, purification, silence, and humility. But because I do not wish to leave you with these thoughts, and I have prayed to God that He might certify me regarding this matter—and suffered distress from both sides—I chose rather to embrace the affliction, that I might relieve you from it, remembering the saying: Bear one another's burdens. And hear what I received from God, three days before you wrote your question. May all the Fathers who have pleased God, the saints and righteous and true servants of God, pray for me. Do not think, however, that even if they are saints, they have been able to truly comprehend all the depths of God. For the Apostle says: We know in part, and we prophesy in part; and again: To one is given through the Spirit this and that, and not all things to the one man; but to one in this way, to another in that. But one and the same Spirit works all things. Knowing that the things of God are incomprehensible, the Apostle cried out, saying: O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who... A B
THE EPISTLE OF EUSTATHIUS THE MONK TO TIMOTHEUS SCHOLASTICUS ON THE TWO NATURES, AGAINST SEVERUS
C What we were inquiring about in our recent conversations, I have not hesitated to discuss with you also through letters, since you yourself, most truth-loving Timotheus, ordered it. Those who have fabricated stories that Christ walked this life incorporeal, being lovers of phantasy, have logically taught that He had one nature, and neither... C
remained sound concerning the divinity itself, except in naming Christ. They have vilified those who say that the Word of God came in the flesh, as though they were confessing two natures. And let Manes persuade you, writing to Addas: "When the Galileans contended that Christ has two natures, we raised a great laugh, as they did not know that the substance of light is not mixed with other matter, but is most pure, and incapable of union with any alien substance, even if it seems to adhere to it. The name ‘Christ’ is used incorrectly; it designates neither form nor substance. But the highest light, consorting with its own, presented itself as a body among crude bodies, one nature through all things." And to Scythianus he has similar things: "The Son of the light itself revealed His own substance on the mountain; not having two natures, but one, in the visible and in the invisible." B Such things also Marcion and Valentinus wrote; following in their footsteps, Timothy, surnamed the Cat [Aelurus], says in the eighth chapter: "The nature of Christ is one, only divinity, even if it has been incarnated without change." And in his writings against Leo, the Roman patriarch, he says: "For the substance of Christ, or his nature, is not flesh, but a rite of dispensation [incarnation] well established for our salvation." And again: "But if the Word accomplishes what is His own, as it seems to the new Nestorius, it would be alien to the divine and simplest nature to fall under sight and touch, but rather it is proper to human nature." And again: "Let the Diphysites show us the distinction of the two natures, as they say." C The Severians do not communicate with him, nor with the heretics who until today favor him, calling them Acephali. Severus himself, however, accepts Timothy, who had professed such things. For he writes to the Niciote in his synodical letters: "I revere and hold in high esteem the struggles of Dioscorus and Timothy, soldiers of the truth, who with immovable foot leaned upon the rock, and although they were tossed more violently by the surging waves of their adversaries, they were not carried away." Pay attention to whom this so-called orthodox one defends: moved by hatred against the holy synod [(1)], he favors the Phantasianists, and expresses our thoughts with their words, after the pattern of men who bestow splendid garments upon idols and decorate unsightly faces with colors. Do you see from whom and for what reason "one nature" was invented? That the orthodox Fathers contend there are two natures in Christ, Severus himself bears witness; for he has this in the treatise which is entitled *Exposition of the Faith*: "To say ‘two natures’ in Christ is full of every crime, even if it has been said by many holy Fathers." And a little later: "And do not say to me again that some of the Fathers..."
used this expression A without blame; for they did use it, as we have said, without any crime: but in the time of the blessed Cyril, when the Nestorian plague and novelty were devouring the Churches, this term was for the most part rejected. And again: "The sayings of the Fathers who used this term without blame cannot be brought forward, even if the sayings were those of Cyril himself." Any dogmatic term can almost be abused by heretics, but we do not therefore always or everywhere reject it, but by considering the mind of the speaker, we either retain it according to the meaning of the word B or we explode it.
Following, therefore, in the footsteps of the Fathers who used this term without blame, we assert two natures in Christ, even if to Severus it seems to be full of danger; and the adversary wishes at the same time to be an advocate when he brings forward the voices of the Fathers. It is enough for us that Severus himself testifies that this term of "two natures" belongs to the holy Fathers, and to most of the Fathers, not just to one or two. He does not speak the truth, therefore, who slanders [us] by saying that heretics invented the term; but he speaks more truthfully who says that the saints used it against the heretics. But to reject the voices of many saints is arrogant and at the same time insane. C Let not Severus make the excuse that this term was rejected because of Nestorius; for it was rejected by him and his followers. For the blessed Cyril, writing an epistle to Eulogium after Nestorius, defended in it the Orientals who asserted two natures.
Severus says also elsewhere: "Many formulas of speech of the ancient Fathers, used without any reprehension of anyone, appeared no longer safe after Nestorius." If then we also should say: "Many voices used by the Fathers without crime appeared no longer safe after Eutyches," what follows from this? Because of Nestorius, the term "two natures" shall be excluded; because of Eutyches, D the term "one nature." But if we remove the voices of the holy Fathers because heretics abuse them wickedly, many things also must be taken away from the holy Scriptures, because heretics similarly use them wickedly. The saints used the term "two natures" before the heretics, but the term "one nature" was invented by heretics before the Fathers used it, as is written above, and it spread especially through the work of Apollinaris. But if, because of heretics, the voices of the orthodox are to be rejected, and not rather used by turns against the heretics, then the term "consubstantial" would be rejected because of Sabellius, and the term "Theotokos" because of Apollinaris, Eunomius, and Arius. And thus, constantly through inept consequences, Christians will be occupied in thinking up new terms. Thus, it behooves us, serving the authority of the holy Fathers, to spurn the whims of our opponents. Sometimes, however, it happens that, conquered by the force of the truth, they themselves confess the same things which they had longed to deny and so-
A exerted themselves and legislated; for when in the book against the Grammarian Severus says: “Lo, to consider two things is granted only to the imagination of the mind, distinguishing the difference, as in a physical quality.” And again in the same book: “How are those men, full of all impudence, saying two natures, when they assert they do not say two hypostases and persons? Since even in the conception of natures, or rather hypostases, that are divided, the persons are co-conceived; for one being divided from the other, immediately a proper person is inscribed. But in the compositions in which the natures subsist, from which the one Christ is, and which make one hypostasis and nature of the Only-begotten Word, incarnate and made man, the binary number conceived in thought of hypostases and persons ceases at the same time, concurring into one, into one hypostasis from both, and consequently being inscribed as person. For it is among the impossible things that two should not appear in two persons.” B Does it not seem to you that after the composition, or union, he both recognizes and calls the natures in Christ two, and these indeed subsisting? Which he distinguishes when he wishes into two, and again gathers into one, as if he had the power of both saying and doing what he pleases. He who in all things contradicts himself, he who destroys for the sake of construction. He who by the things through which he wishes to establish one nature, proves two natures; and leads to that very doctrine which he refuses to defend. To him alone and to no other, because of his worldly-wise prudence, was this grace given, that whenever he wishes, one nature may vanish and two may appear, and when two are seen, they may again coalesce and contract into one. C He therefore is the first of all full of impudence who also confesses two natures. For he did not say: “When nature is distinguished by thought,” but, “When the natures are distinguished”; and in the composition, not, “When the nature subsists,” but, “When the natures subsist”; and not only considering and saying these things, but also sketching them in writing; and this eighty and more years after Nestorius. While he forbids others to say two natures, he himself is unable to deny them entirely; and those which he had hinted at in a confused and enigmatic manner in the brought-forward words, in another place of the same treatise he proclaims in a loud voice: “Let no one write that the Chalcedonian synod said two natures; far be it, but that it forbade saying the hypostatic union and the expression from two.” D And in the book to Sergius, he speaks thus: “Proceed therefore with the same mind, forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forward to the things that are before, and forgetful of that lost opinion, which leads into one those things from which Christ consists without confusion. For he who now contends to distinguish the property of the natures from which Christ is without confusion, but now joins and confuses all into one substance and person, is seen to bring from his confession a sheaf not having the strength to make meal (Osee VIII, 7).” Nature
and substance, even according to Severus, are the same thing. A Does he who finds fault with those who unite into one substance, or nature, the things from which Christ is, not clearly approve of those who confess two [natures] even after the union?
He says further, in his second discourse to the same Sergius (this man was a Eutychianist grammarian): “Is it not ridiculous to speak of two properties or two operations? For they are many, and not just two, of each nature; for instance, it is the property of humanity to fall under touch and sight, to be subject to death, and to hunger and thirst, and the like; and of the divine nature there are many properties, such as the invisible, the intangible, the eternal, the uncircumscribed. Similarly, the operations are many and various; and there are as many as one might mention of divine and human actions.” B Behold, he knows and says that each nature remains [as such] even after the union; yet each nature is not said to exist in one nature, but in two. And he who speaks of a divine nature in Christ indicates that he also knows the human nature that is distinguished from it. Yet he speaks of the properties and operations of these, he who in many of his treatises anathema-tizes those who speak of properties and operations in Christ. He is a disciple of all doctrines—by reason of his great wisdom—and fights against everything, each thing being opposed to the other.
For against the Eutychianists, that is to say, the Phantasianists, he would stand against the doctrines of the Church, while speaking of nature as nature, and of each (both divine and human) and their properties and operations. But when he fights against the Church, he condemns the very things he had defended against the advocates of phantoms; and he borrows weapons from those very same people against the truth, so that he may be truly a destroyer of dogma, fighting both against himself and all the holy Fathers. For how could he who said in his Exposition of Faith that the holy Fathers acknowledged two natures not be fighting against the Fathers, when in his synodical letter to the man from Nicia he anathematizes them, writing: C “We therefore anathematize those who, after the ineffable union, say or have said that our one Lord Jesus Christ has two natures”? By the word “have said,” he anathematizes the holy Fathers who, on his own testimony, used the term “two natures” without any crime; for he does not distinguish, nor does he say, “Those who have used this term wickedly,” but absolutely, “Those who have said two natures.” And by the word “say,” he damns himself; for he himself has also confessed two natures, as we have demonstrated above.
He is also to be admired when he declares: D “For it is among the impossibilities that two should not appear in two persons.” To grant everything, while he says that he perceives two natures everywhere in Christ, he altogether asserts two persons in Him, according to this statement. If he admits only imaginary natures in Christ, he will certainly also confess imaginary persons; but if he confesses substantial and true natures, he also truly confesses subsistent persons. Since, therefore, he confesses two natures
in Christ A and two persons, how does he not also speak of two Christs? Just as he speaks of Christ as being from two natures, so also does he expressly speak of him as being from two persons in his book against John the Grammarian, and as he thinks, by an irrefutable argument. This, moreover, is made clear by his frequent assertion that there is no nature that lacks a person. But we, having set aside this statement of his, say that Christ is from two natures, just as one body is from many members and parts, but not from two persons. Far be it! Since B they never existed as hypostatically independent, they would not claim an individual person, as Severus himself thinks. When we say Christ is from two natures, and that there are two natures, we also say he exists in two natures, preserving the Word immune from all confusion and diminution. For if the natures constitute one person, whence is it said to be "from two," if not from the very things that produce it? These are the things of which that which is produced consists; if it were not so, then one would be as something foreign in another. Observe how many inept and absurd things arise from this. While he anathematizes those who say that Christ is in two natures, does he not anathematize himself? For where he thinks, speaks, and writes of two natures in Christ, he is C compelled to confess him to be in two natures; and not only in two natures, but also in two persons, according to his own novelty; for he declared that it is impossible for two things not to appear in two [persons]. If, however, the adversary is in agreement with the truth in his sermon on the Nativity when he said: "For that which is joined together from two certain things does not contain the things of which it consists," and he denied that the binary element remains entire, by what reasoning does he again think of two natures in Christ subsisting in the composition, and so two, that he distinguishes them by mind, and thought, and intellect, and speech? Let him tell us whether he discerns one nature or two? Things that are, or things that are not? Substantial things, or things that are not substantial? But one or the other is true: either the binary element remains entire, which he thinks of; or if it vanishes, he thinks of nothing, and lies when he asserts that he thinks of things that are not: he himself indeed lies, but each thing remains what it is by nature. But he himself asserts in his book against the Grammarian: D "The things of which Christ consists remain without any diminution and change, in the composition of subsistence." But if the two natures have made one, why does he think of two after the union and not one? And as he speaks concerning one, why does he not put forward those things which pertain to each, namely the natures, the nature of the flesh, and the nature of divinity, and humanity, and divinity? With which his writings abound. If two natures, namely divinity and humanity, have made one nature, let him say by what name he calls it? For there must be one thing that designates one nature. For he cannot speak of one nature and call it by the names of both, lest he again
resolve the one into those of which it consists, which is an absurdity. Or do the names alone of the constituent natures remain, while the result itself is anonymous; or whatever name he might devise, by this same name shall also the Virgin who bore him be honored?
I am not unaware that his proponents say for this very reason that Christ, as he is Christ, is consubstantial with no one, and is neither God nor man. But if this be true, Christ is neither God nor is the Virgin the Theotokos, but, as they say, Christotokos according to Nestorius, concerning whom they hold far worse opinions. Yet not even everything that is composed of two things preserves them without confusion; for wine and water when brought together are mixed; likewise gold and silver in the furnace. Nor will that which is from two ever be known to be from two, unless it is after the union and retains the effects. As to how that multiform Severus differs regarding operations and properties, sometimes condemning those who speak of them, at other times confessing them himself, those who read his writings with a desire for the truth know. B Since you know how he says that the Fathers used the expression of "two natures" without reproach and without blame, I do not know whom I should deride more, him or his followers; for while foolishly attacking the expression, he rebukes the Fathers because they confessed the very same things that they themselves did.
John the Grammarian had brought forward a passage from blessed Amphilochius, taken from his discourse on the text, "The Father who sent me is greater than I," which reads thus: C “Distinguish, therefore, the natures, the divine and the human; for neither was he made man from God by a diminution of dignity, nor God from man by an accession of dignity.” Saying that he is God and man, when you attribute passions to the flesh and miracles to God, you must, even if unwilling, ascribe the humble words to the man born of Mary, but the sublime and divine ones to the Word who was in the beginning. He himself thinks he is interpreting this by accusing John of having wrongly understood the passage, and says: “We have already proved, in the prologue, that all the teachers of piety, when speaking against the impious Arians—who, spurning the truth, endeavored to refer the humble words befitting the incarnation and voluntary poverty to the eternal essence of the Only-Begotten, to the naked and fleshless divinity—have D charged this impiety against them. They piously distinguished the times, into those before the incarnation and those after the incarnation, showing that passions and humble words never befit God the Word, if considered apart from the flesh; but that indeed miracles belong to Him as being by nature God and incarnate. They taught that the natures were to be distinguished by the difference of time, and thus they defined what was the nature of God deprived of flesh, and what the nature of God who, through the dispensation, was made man without any change.”
A Oh, the madness and perfidy of this wise man! For either he did not understand what he was saying, or he wished to deceive his hearers; he acted no differently than hares which, when they perceive that they are about to be caught by their pursuers while fleeing, by stirring up the dust on the ground and filling the surrounding air with a cloud of dust, retrace their own steps—hoping by this trick to blind the eyes of those tracking them and attain safety. But skilled hunters are not deceived by such a trick; by following the tracks, they quickly overtake the fugitives. The discourse of truth is simple. Why, O man, do you resort through so many detours to riddles and absurdities, confusing and disturbing everything, so that by casting your hearers into dizziness, you may escape through your strange interpretations, avoiding the truth itself by means of words about the truth?
When the Saint attributes sufferings to the flesh and miracles to God, without any circumlocution he indicates two natures, of flesh and of divinity, and says that they are distinguished, namely by thought; he does not distinguish by times, nor does he divide your one nature into two natures by the difference B of time, as if they were natures devoid of any substance. For you speak of your one nature as substantial and subsistent. But when you number it as binary, you do not add to the nature of the divinity the nature of the flesh which God the Word assumed, and on account of which He is said to consist of two natures (and thus be two natures); rather, you distinguish that one divine substance, or nature, into two parts by reason of time. But if by this reasoning Christ is one nature with you (lest truth should say so among the Fathers), then truly he who consists of two natures is not from divinity and humanity, that is, from a nature lacking flesh and again from that same nature incarnate, with the flesh adding nothing that can be called a nature; but on account of the difference of time, one divine nature can come to be and be called two natures.
Furthermore, O most wise man, if you call the divinity when it is devoid of flesh one nature, why do you again call one nature that which is instructed with the nature of the flesh? If that [the flesh] remains, as you yourself imagine—where you assert that the nature of the flesh and the nature of humanity was assumed—then in the union two subsistent C natures must be admitted, not only one nature. If the assumed human nature has retained all other things, so that it is named humanity, soul, body, flesh, yet has lost only this one thing, that it should be called a nature—alas, for the absurd condition, invented by the supporters of the Docetists! But we contend that just as all other things are retained and named in the assumption, and do not put aside their proper names on account of the union, so the nature itself is spoken of, being neither contracted nor destroyed on account of the union. For each nature remains, not only as it is by the force of nature, but also retaining that which has the name of nature, as even to you, Severus, it seems when you speak of each separately; for you generally refuse to speak of two natures taken together, lest you offend the Docetists in every way. The one nature of God the Word, therefore, and the assumed flesh D
are two natures and are so called. But you keep silent A about the one nature—that of the flesh—not reckoning it together with the divinity, but rather dragging it along and pulling it, unless perhaps you speak of them separately, as I said. By naming only the nature of the divinity, and even this, as you say, distinguishing it by time, you concoct for us a new physiology, or rather a foolish babble, calling the one nature two natures. If you had spoken more clearly what you meant—"the first and the second"—are you not ashamed to call the one nature two, while you are unwilling to confess the two natures of Christ? Yet, having wandered much, you have been unable to escape the truth entirely. For by saying that the Arians refer the humble words fitting for the incarnation to the divinity, you have shown, even against your will, that these do not fit the one nature—that is, the divine, which alone you labor to call "nature" here, following in the footsteps of Aelurus—but clearly belong to another: that of the humanity, which is substantially B united to God the Word. For what else is the incarnation of God the Word than his becoming in humanity? If the passions and humble words do not befit God the Word according to nature, they surely befit his humanity according to nature, and to God the Word himself according to the economy of appropriation—he who by substance united to himself the humanity, which we call flesh animated by a rational soul, and united to it according to substance. Thus, Christ is impassible in his divinity, and passible in the flesh substantially united to him.
Why then do you slander the Arians? For they did not say that the passions of the flesh, that is, the cross, the scourging, the piercing by nails, and death, were received by the divinity before the incarnation, nor even after the incarnation; but rather those things which befit the soul by nature, such as grief and agony, and other things of this kind. C It is against these that Amphilochius turns, assigning the passions and the humble words to the nature of the flesh—or rather, of the humanity—and the miracles to the nature of the divinity. He said that he was distinguishing these natures; Amphilochius did not conceive of the natures as being one nature, nor did any other of the orthodox Fathers. Yet Severus says he distinguishes by time, and by this means also distinguishes and divides the one nature into two natures. But you alone do this, Severus, and your followers—who overturn the true faith for your own sake, and teach your sleight-of-hand physiology, or rather prodigy of doctrine, to those who wish to be led away from the truth.
Returning to the point, we say: If D because of the distinction of time the one nature is called two, and not because of the union of the divine and human nature, then Christ is not two natures, nor is Christ from two natures. Rather, if he is from one, but is said to be from two, although he is not, because the distinction of time causes the one nature to be called two, according to the multiform wisdom of Severus—if, then, the distinction of time has made the one nature to be called two, and this distinction has come about because of the descent from heaven,
and the visitation to us of the one nature, then, if it also visited the spirits in prison, the one nature will be called three natures. And again, having ascended above all the heavens to appear before the countenance of God, it will be four natures. And for this reason, we shall ask not only what is the nature of the bodiless God, and what of the incarnate, but also what is the nature of the God who is merely ensouled—for he went down to those in Hades without flesh—and what is the nature of the God who is incarnate, yet with incorruptible and immortal flesh; for the monstrous doctrines of Severus lead us into this nonsense.
B Nor should this be omitted, which is said in the book inscribed *Lover of Truth*: "It is vain to ask concerning Christ of what nature [he is]; for this is nothing else than to expressly dissolve the union." Here he himself instructs us, as Pope Leo did (5), by saying "what and what," that we should ask what nature hung on the wood of the cross. They who wish will ask: Who is it that died, the God bereft of flesh, or the incarnate God? And who is it that went to preach to those in Hades, the incarnate God, or the ensouled one? And who appeared to the angels? Through all these mentioned points, Severus is found not only fighting against the Fathers, but also inconsistent with himself. For when he wishes, he divides the one nature, and both makes and speaks of two natures; but when it pleases him, because of the union, he makes the two into one and calls them so: and this nearly six hundred years after the union, while he confesses that he contemplates two natures in Christ, and these as subsisting. And yet again he anathematizes those who say "two" after the union. But if the two natures made one after the union, how does he himself, so many years after the union, contemplate two natures in Christ? And what he thinks and says and writes, how does he deny it again? Just as jugglers simultaneously show and hide their counters, so he himself almost simultaneously confesses two, and simultaneously denies them, contracting the two into one. Away with this unstable mind! Do not confess what you deny, or deny what you confess.
C I shall also produce other passages from his various treatises, by which the folly and depravity of the man may be more accurately recognized, as he fights against the truth willingly and by design. He writes in the book *Against the Grammarian*: "Distinction of all things is conjoined to difference." Then, contradicting himself in another place of the same book, he has these words: "For since the Word was not a body, nor did the body from Mary become the Word; for this reason, indeed, a complete D distinction follows from the difference of substance." And again in the same book he says: "We, saying Emmanuel is of two natures, do not mean substances, natures which provide mutual communion and comprehend many hypostases, but the one hypostasis of the Word, and the flesh animated by an intelligent soul, by which [the Word] is brought into one and composed without any change." There is also one nature and hypostasis—
of the Word incarnate; but we are not constrained by this to say that the union is also from two persons. First, we will say this: "one and one" does not make one, but two; for as long as you behold and speak of one and one, you behold and speak of two. But if, according to your definition, there is no nature that lacks a person, how is it that, since Christ is of two natures, you do not also call him [a being] of two persons?
In the same tract you also said: "But if someone should seek to consider those things from which he is, and by the mere imagination of the mind and subtle contemplation and conception should divide them, he will perceive the concurrence of two natures, or rather hypostases, and will in a way imagine that he grasps the person of each by conception." But when the power of the union enters also into the thought, and shows the one hypostasis out of both, it does not allow the two, which the thought had meditated upon as two in hypostasis, to remain. For after the notion of the union, the one nature of the Word, B having become incarnate, appearing, the conception of the two imagined persons or natures or hypostases vanishes. To these words you append the testimony of someone, which has many lines, ending thus: "We say that it is necessary that the union of the persons themselves be perfected by the concurrence of the hypostases unto unity." You ought not to have confirmed a union of persons; but having confirmed it, why do you deny it? For if a union of persons has taken place, the man first subsisted, and then was united to the pre-existing God the Word. But not even Nestorius dared to speak of a union of persons, but only of one person.
I marvel at you, for when the union has taken place and the one nature has been made manifest, how you yourself are able to divide it again and dissolve it into the things from which it is, and to observe the one as two not only natures, but also persons. Or C perhaps you have the power both to dissolve the union and to bring it together, and when you wish, you behold the natures, and when you will, they vanish? But if they have vanished and become invisible, neither two nor one exist or are beheld, as the effect vanishes along with its causes. But if, when the one is manifest, the conception alone vanishes, it is not permitted for you to conceive any further. Know, however, that that which is "by conception" is sometimes said in contrast to that which is "by act." By act, then, and as one might say, "in reality," we do not divide the natures; but by conception they are distinguished. But if conception and act are the same, then you will say that the one nature also has come to be by conception, or you will argue that the two natures also exist by act and substantially after the union. But if you pursue the natures by conception alone, you D fashion them as lacking essence and substance, or as confused and invisible: which you indeed imply rather than profess. For you say not only that you distinguish by conception, but also that you contemplate the natures, which you now confess do not even remain in existence, while you yourself have often taught that they remain even in the composition, because of the instability inherent in you. But that from natures that are divided it is necessary to say
A that the union [is formed], we shall refute you out of your own words, you teacher of the two-person theory. You said: “Where there is division, there is also a duality; and where there is a duality, there a division follows.” If with the word "two" a division necessarily follows, then with the word "from two" it will necessarily follow that the union has been formed from things that are divided and pre-existing; and therefore, one should not refuse to speak of "from two persons." But the matter will be proven even more clearly and plainly. In his very book against the Grammarian he says: “You might rightly think, therefore, that perfect hypostases, subsisting distinctly, are also divided into two persons, each being inscribed with its own person, as subsisting in its own individual existence.” And again: “Not two Lords, not two Sons, not two Christs, because the substances or hypostases or natures do not subsist by their own individual existence, and separately, and partially.” And again: “Where natures or hypostases are distinguished in thought, at the same time persons are also conceived; for when one is distinguished from the other, immediately it is inscribed with its own person.” If those that subsist by their own individual existence are inscribed with their own persons, and those that subsist distinctly and separately and partially are divided into persons—and Christ B is not only from two natures according to Severus, but also from two persons—then the natures first existed distinctly, and separately, and partially, and with their own individual existence, in order that each might be inscribed with its own person; and then they were united, and thus Severus’s Christ was perfected from two natures and from two persons. And if this is the case, it would be not only more Nestorian than Nestorius, but more insane than Severus himself. Let us, therefore, flee from the two-personed serpent.
In his sermon on the Nativity, the beginning of which is, "As the light of the day rising," he says: C “Of whose nature, then, shall we say that walking upon the water is the proper operation? Let those who after the union feign two natures answer me. Of the divine? But how is it proper to deity to move with bodily feet? Or of the human? But how is it not foreign to a human to walk upon the liquid substance? You see, you who seek after two natures, if you will attribute such an operation [to them]; for it has escaped your natures, as you see. But it is certain, and subject to no doubt, unless we voluntarily play the madman, that to God the Word who was incarnate for our sake, being one and indivisible, there also belongs an indivisible operation; and it was his own property to walk upon the water, having at the same time D the divine-befitting and the human.” When Severus was arguing these things, I believe that he was hallucinating and mocking his audience. For if walking upon the water was neither of the divine nor of the human nature, it was either an illusion, or an act not perfected by the integral nature of divinity or humanity, but a nature mixed from these, and completed through confusion. Whence neither will be preserved pure; but the walking upon the water must be attributed to one nature, whatever it may be, so that the operation may remain one and indivisible. Come then, was walking upon the earth of the divine nature, or of the human? Nothing worthy of God is discerned when the feet tread the earth according to the laws of human nature; truly, one nature is so divided, and
humanity, separated from the divine, displayed its own operation by itself. A But it is manifest, and in no way doubtful—unless we are willingly mad and deride serious things—that all the humble words and acts must be referred to the body of the Lord, but the illustrious ones to the divinity of the Word itself. For if He hungered after He had fasted (Matt. iv, 2), the body certainly failed; but when He satisfied five thousand men, besides women, from five loaves, and twelve baskets of fragments remained over (Matt. xiv, 20 and 21), this is the work of the divinity of the Word. When He sleeps on the cushion in B the boat (Mark iv, 35 sqq.), it is the work of bodily rest; but when, walking upon the sea, He threatened the waves and the winds, He straightway heard those who were in the boat confessing with an oath: Truly You are the Son of God (Matt. xiv, 33). For it was fitting that He, having taken up a body, should show the things proper to the body, lest the phantom of the impious Manichæan prevail. It was also fitting, again, that He who came bodily should not hide the things of the divinity; but He did not display all things at once, but conveniently and appropriately according to each time and matter. Therefore, the walking was of the feet of the body; but the walking upon the waters was the work of the divine power. For just as the properties of the flesh can no longer be thought of as belonging to the Word existing in the beginning, so also the properties of the divinity are not to be perceived in the nature of the flesh. But recognizing the property of each, C and seeing that both are performed from one, we rightly believe.
Again, in his writing which is entitled *Lover of Truth*, he writes: "If the Word performs the things of the Word, and the flesh executes the things of the flesh, and the one shines forth with miracles while the other is subject to injuries, the communion of forms is something merely superficial and established by thought, as the demented Nestorius asserted. But if, which is true, the Word made the flesh a participant in His own glory and operation, how then, according to the Tome of Leo, shall we say: 'Each nature preserves its own property without defect'? For the Word is often seen not having allowed His own flesh to serve the laws of the flesh; for in what way would it be proper to a body to walk upon water, or, when the breath has D departed and it is wounded by a sword, to pour forth a fountain of blood and water?"
O the wickedness of the slanderer and caviller! He cannot interpret the words of Pope Leo according to the mind of the writer and according to the truth, but he understands and explains everything to accuse him. The blessed Athanasius in his letter to Epictetus has these words: "Rather, an immense assistance came to the human body from its communion and coadunation with the Word." The captious fault-finding regarding the communion of forms is therefore vain. Blessed Cyril in the letter to Succen-
Succensus writes: "Each remains and is understood in the property belonging to its nature." A Thus also Pope Leo said: "For each nature preserves its own property without defect." By property of the human body, as even seems to Severus in the writings to Sergius, he meant the gross part, the tangible, the visible, the circumscribed. For he demonstrates this through the whole volume, aiming against Eutyches, who was sick with fantasy and for this reason denied that the Lord had assumed a true body. Wherefore he also rejected the phrase "from two natures" and only admitted it unwillingly, as the synod held at Constantinople under Flavian proves.
Since therefore Pope Leo wished to demonstrate that God the Word assumed not only the form of a body but a true body, and so true that it B also preserved the property by which it could suffer, he said: "In the whole, therefore, and true and perfect nature of true man, true God was born, whole in his own, whole in ours." Then he continues: "For each nature preserves its property without defect." And so that we may understand what "without defect" means, he appends: "And just as the form of God does not take away the form of the slave, so the form of the slave does not diminish the form of God." The phrases "whole in ours" and "without defect" are thus used alongside [the idea of] diminution and imperfection. For he says that not only has there been a union of substances, or natures, but that they have remained unconfused and undiminished, both they [the natures] and their properties which are observed in them. C Therefore each nature kept its own property without defect even after the union. And according to the blessed Ambrose: "As nothing was lacking to God, so nothing was lacking to the perfection of humanity, so that he might be perfect in each nature." But if the things that are proper to the nature of flesh are attributed to God the Word, it happens not by nature, but by the reason of the dispensation (incarnation).
But if Severus contends that because of the walking upon the waters the natural property of the body is lacking, we shall urge back again. In the walking upon the earth, is the natural property of God the Word lacking? For in no way is it worthy of God for feet to tread the earth. Just so, when he was hungry as a man after having fasted, because he did not change the stones into loaves; D and when he was fatigued from the journey (John iv, 6), with muscles and nerves strained; and when he was mournful (Matt. xxvi, 27) and sorrowful and anxious, because in these things nothing appears which might indicate a superior divine power; and also when he was seized by the Jews, not even then wishing to fly invisible from their midst, did not the divine nature retain its property without defect? Away with the human-pleasing wisdom of Severus! For God the Word did not forbid his own flesh to walk upon the water according to the laws of flesh, as the walking of the feet proves; but to walk upon the water, fiteamur, sicut in Dei forma nihil ei defuit divinæ naturæ, sic in illa forma hominis, nihil ei defuisse, quo imperfectus homo judicaretur.
A nor does it remove the property of the body, but is perfected by the addition of the divine operation to the human one. The body, therefore, was performing the functions of the body, and the Word was working the works of the Word, as the miracle clearly declares.
This multiform sophist acknowledges the same things in his sermon on the Nativity: "Take courage, it is I, do not be afraid" (Matt. xiv, 27). This "It is I" demonstrates the truth and excludes every illusion. "For it is I," he says, "who neither change nor am converted, but remain God," as the miracle declares; "and the same one, in truth, both became and was seen as man, as the walking of the feet demonstrates." B And in his letter to Julian, of which the beginning is, "I have received the letter written to me by you," he says: "Just as his death occurred naturally, as he willed it, while the divine miracle of the resurrection surpassed the powers of nature, so the matter took place: when the side of the dead body, as the Evangelist John narrates (xix, 34), was naturally wounded by a lance—for it belongs to the body, even if it were inanimate, to be cut—yet it was a divine work and the greatest of miracles, the wondrous flow of divine blood mixed with vivifying water." And again: "Lo, everywhere concerning the flesh which feels and suffers, as a living body is capable of feeling and suffering from passions, the operation is in truth." And after a few lines: "Insofar as he was God, he was impassible, in no way moved by the pains of the flesh; for the passions are naturally of the flesh and the soul, but because the Word is incarnate, these things are also said to be proper for him to suffer [in] the flesh that is intellectually ensouled." C
If there is one nature of the Word and the flesh, do not make a distinction; but as you say the passions of the flesh and the soul are natural, clearly say they are also proper to the Word. But if you do not dare to do this, O you who dare everything, then in another way the passions are proper to the Word, and not naturally. How then is Christ not two natures? For if something befalls a single nature naturally, this is said to be proper to it according to nature; but if something happens above nature, it is through the operation of another nature. But he who calls the operation indivisible, in order to set forth one nature, distinguished the wounding of the side, saying that it was wounded naturally, and that this was proper to the body, not to the divinity; but the flow of blood and water was a divine operation, not bodily. D The body, therefore, being wounded, and being by nature prone to pain and capable of passions, Pope Leo well said is subject to passions and insults, but the divinity shines forth in the miracles, lifting up its own body above nature. If the flesh has a nature capable of passions, and the divinity has a nature accomplishing those things which exceed the powers of the body, then it is rightly said that there are two natures in Christ, and that the properties of these are preserved, which Severus himself confesses to know in his books against the Grammarian, saying thus: "For we know and confess, as has already been said, of the natures from which Christ has been ineffably conjoined, both the property and the difference and the distinctiveness as in a physical quality, and the diversity distinguishing the natures from one another."
A And again, that the physical otherness and distinction is not extinguished, due to the inconfusible nature of the union. Note that he says they are distinguished, and not the nature, but the natures.
B He, however, who acknowledges here both the property and the otherness of the natures, in many of his writings anathematizes those who profess these things. And the one who says that the passions of the flesh and of the soul are according to nature, and that the body is naturally subjected to death, but that the divinity is impassible, and the resurrection divine, in his same sermon on the Trisagion, the beginning of which is: *You perhaps think that I rejoice*, he did not hesitate to declare: "If, however, after the union it is recognized in two natures, the union is dissolved, divided by the binary number; the mystery will be divided, and we shall assign immortality to the divine nature and death to the human." He who plays with everything and stands on nothing, has confounded everything that is naturally proper to divinity and what is proper to humanity, confusing those things which are proper according to nature with those which are proper according to the economy; so that each nature no longer keeps its own properties. C But we shall remind him of the statement recorded by Gregory of Nyssa in the fourth [or rather fifth] sermon against Eunomius: "For if he accuses those who attribute the passion to the human nature, he wishes by all means to subject the divinity itself to the passion." Perhaps, being shamed, his followers will rather bring forward the words which he published against Julian: "We do not say that he attributes the passions to the impassible substance of the divinity." Thus this disturber of doctrines confuses everything; when he opposes the Docetists, he casts the properties of the natures against those who honor the properties of the natures, attacking those things which are said regarding one and from one person, as if they were understood regarding one and from one nature. For there are times when he does not recognize the difference between nature and person, that he may have the freedom always to fight with everyone, as someone who is a lover of turmoil and a lover of mockery; if, however, there is no longer a difference between nature and person, whenever he says "natures" in the plural, or "nature and nature," he intends "persons."
In his sermon on the Ordination, the beginning of which is: *To one setting out towards the middle of the rivers*, he says: "When he shall have appeared to the eyes of men and shall have of his own will emptied himself for our sake, he himself shall become a ladder for us, leading those lying on the ground because of sin and the fall of Adam up to heaven, and a bright heavenly gate, revealing to us the Father and himself, and the Holy Spirit, and the Lordship in the holy Trinity." D These things he said while adhering to the holy synod which had established the same thing; for it teaches the perfection of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and presents the inhumanation to those who receive it faithfully. But if the synod confessed a quaternary number, Severus admitted a senary in his sermon on the text: *My Lord*, the beginning of which is: *Certain of those who divide, perhaps*: "Nevertheless, not as I will, but as you will" (Matt. xxvi, 39). These things, he says, were spoken not out of fear, but for the sake of teaching us; for that it was for the sake of teaching, and not of fear, the Scripture of the Evangelists will clearly bear witness; for how was he to be expected to fear death, he who with the utmost desire...
of the Gospels surely testify; for in what way could he have feared death, he who approached it with the utmost desire, and said: *With desire I have desired to eat this Pascha* (Luke xxii. 15)? Then, according to his custom, fighting against himself in his second discourse to Sergius, he writes: “For Emmanuel, in as much as he was God, A suffered in appearance; but in as much as he was man, in truth.” And in his second book against John the Grammarian, he says: “As for the same one, in as much as he was God, he did not fear death; but in as much as he was man, he appropriated the non-willing to die, and voluntarily yielded to the flesh to accept the natural passion.” I have set forth a few things from many, wishing to show that the man is inconsistent with himself; and that he anathematizes those who say there are two natures—or rather, himself—while saying that the natural properties of the flesh are different from the natural properties of the divinity. For he himself knows two natures in Christ, and that they possess subsistence B and abide; and yet again, I know not how, he blends them into one, and again condemns those who bring them into one and blend them, as has been shown beforehand. But if Christ is one nature, it is superfluous to speak of “in as much as” and “in as much as,” and of the nature of the flesh and the nature of the divinity, and of that which is prone to suffer and that which is not prone to suffer; for these things are spoken of with respect to two natures.
Since then the sophist would speak of that which is superfluous, let him say whether anything is natural or created without a nature, if he who says there is one nature of God the Word, incarnate and animated by a rational and intellectual soul, and does not confess two natures, is like a man who would C call a thing a pound and a half, or six-eighths, but being in a company would refuse to say “two.” When Severus says in his writings against Julian: “The body bore the passions, which God the Word willingly and without any reproach sustained according to the laws of nature; but the miracles he performed and worked through that same body were above the laws of nature.” For those signs and wonders, which are above this one nature that is capable of passions—those things beyond this nature—how or from where did they come to pass? And he will be compelled, I think, to say either that they happened by mere phantasm, or by another nature. Severus, therefore, as his treatises show, speaks of two natures and one: the two, indeed, being overcome by the truth, but the one, devoted to his masters the Phantasiastae, Timotheus the Weasel, D and Dioscorus. And the doctrine of Timotheus has been previously revealed, but the opinions of Dioscorus, those who are ignorant of them shall know from his letter which he wrote from Gangra, in which he writes these things: “The only-begotten Son of God the Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, having become man without sin and change, has shared in human passions, not by nature, but by grace.” And again: “If the blood of Christ is not by nature of God, and not of man, in what does it differ from the blood of goats and calves and the ashes of a heifer? For this is earthy and corruptible, and the blood of those who are men by nature is also earthy and corruptible. Let not those who are men by nature, then, wish to say that the blood of Christ is consubstantial with us!”
A This Dioscorus and Timotheus are the teachers of Severus of this kind, from whom he received the "one nature," though he was displeased with some of their notions and clothed his own notions with it, adorning the harlot's body with modest garments. And while he keeps the term "the one" as a paternal inheritance, he wraps it in meanings that are appropriate only to two natures. In reality, he affirms two natures, while for the most part rejecting the term "two." Whence it comes that he possesses no consistency in his interpretations; for not wishing to walk the royal road, he wanders up and down and is tossed about, dragging his followers with him; and as one doing nothing consistent, he anathematizes Eutyches, yet accepts Dioscorus, and honors and embraces the struggles which he carried out on behalf of Eutyches even unto deposition, anathema, and exile. B
But if anyone should say that Eutyches delivered corrected libelli to Dioscorus, and for this reason he defended him, he lies. For the libellus delivered to him by that man does not contain repentance, but a rebuke against the blessed Flavian for having deposed and anathematized him, although he had been an orthodox man from his tenderest years. But let it be granted that the libellus of Eutyches had been corrected. If he repented of his error, for what cause did he slaughter Flavian, who had anathematized Eutyches while he was still erring? And why does Severus anathematize the one whom Dioscorus received as having repented? And since Dioscorus, while denying that the blood of Christ is consubstantial with men by nature, clearly does not even consider the body of Christ to be one nature, does he not declare that? Likewise, Timotheus also acknowledges only the divine nature of Christ, and calls the flesh neither nature nor substance; so that for them there is only the name of flesh. Therefore, both, indulging their own devices, taught one nature and persecuted those who had anathematized Eutyches. C
But Severus, while professing that the body of Christ is consubstantial with us—a view contrary to his teachers—and naming two natures in Christ, and maintaining these as different, distinct, and without confusion even after the union, and thinking that the soul had departed at the moment of death, that is, that the whole had been divided (for the soul departed from the body only; the divinity was substantially united to each)—while he teaches such things, let a fair judge discern whether he rightly defends "one nature" and condemns those who confess two natures. And yet, in the books *Against the Grammarian*, to his greater shame and judgment, he says: "So the two from which there is union, once the union is accomplished, are distinguished from each other only in the mind and by agreement; for they have never ceased to constitute two hypostases." D Let the sane man hear the raving one; for what he perceived in his mind, he declared with his mouth: "Two hypostases have not ceased—even after the union—but they are two." Furthermore, confirming that these things are so, he says in the same book: "One hypostasis of God the Word, distinguished only in theory..."
and in the hypostasis of the flesh that is intellectually ensouled, and that taken from the Theotokos, as being considered in the union as immutable and remaining what they are." But if he says that the things distinguished by theory exist only in theory, he regards everything as a phantom; but if the hypostases are substantial, and he says that Christ has two substances, why does he struggle with so many sophistries, having nothing more ancient than to attack men who confess two natures—as he himself does—and who do not divide them really, but only by mental conception?
I find, however, that Severus knows Christ as two natures according to existence, but says they are one in phantasy alone, for the ruin of those who are persuaded by him. For if in the union the hypostases remained what they are—and they are two, and have in no way changed so as not to be two—and they are viewed as two by the hypostases and by the mind, it is evident that this is according to the union. For so it is in the union, and they exist according to B existence, and are viewed as what they are, and are named, according to Severus himself; but the so-called "one nature" is said to exist, but is nothing, being said only by mental conception, or, to speak more truly, by human conjecture and fabrication. For it is not possible that two accounts concerning the same thing, contrary to one another, should both be true.
If, however, someone were to say that they are both two and one, as parts of a whole, and as the constituent elements of a result, they are two; for it is not possible for the result to be, unless its constituent elements remain; nor for the whole to be a whole, unless the parts remain; but as a whole and as a result, it is one nature. Let such a one hear that this is not what the double-tongued serpents mean, for that would be bearable. But C it is for the sake of doing away with the two that they devised and put forward the one. And this is why they anathematize those who speak of two natures after the union, even though they themselves are frequently forced by the sequence of facts to speak of two natures, as has been proven.
But as the blessed Gregory of Nyssa said to Apollinaris: "How then are two natures one?" For Apollinaris himself had said in his book *Against the Chapters*, which is the one that most strongly reinforces this expression: "That which is simple is one, but that which is composite cannot be one." If, therefore, that which is composite cannot be one, since it is no longer composite [if it truly were one], that which is composed of two, and has the two in itself, and those things of which it is composed, how can it be and be called one, unless it be by person? D Therefore the Fathers have well said that Christ is two natures, because he consists and is composed of them, and is these things. But that which is composite itself, not in so far as it is composite, but in so far as it is a result, is one person. So that they do not abolish the things from which he is, but as they remain according to existence, they name them, and they acknowledge their concourse into unity, that is, into one person. For it is necessary that the parts of a whole be called parts, and that the whole not be called a part, but a whole.
If the two natures have become one, then this one is of a different kind, as the blessed Cyril said in his book *Against*
the Sinusiastae*. A If, according to them, it is of a different kind from those of which it consists—that is, from the divinity and the humanity—and if, as has also been said above, it is undeniably neither God is Christ, nor man, nor one of the Trinity, nor the Theotokos the Virgin, nor is the Trinity the Trinity, but rather a duality; for if the Son having been incarnate, and for this reason having become a nature of a different kind from that of the Father and the Holy Spirit, how shall He be numbered with those to whom He is not consubstantial? Let the absurdities of these truly Acephalous ones be cast into the pit of oblivion!
We, therefore, following in the footsteps of the holy Fathers who speak the truth, B will profess that Christ is of two natures and one person. For to confess two natures in Christ is nothing other than what Severus himself, that two-tongued serpent, asserts—namely, that they have by no means changed, so as to not be two even in the hypostases; and that after the union they both remain and are regarded as what they are, that is, natures. And what else is it to say that Christ is in two natures, if not what Severus—that two-headed fox—also contends against the blessed Cyril: that He is perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity? And that it is impossible for two things not to be seen as two—not in persons, to be sure, for Christ is not two persons.
C "But," he says, "the blessed Cyril said: *So that those two are no longer two, but both are made into one animal.*" Let those who corrupt the best things listen; the master did not say that both are made into one nature, but one animal, which is the same as asserting that one person is made. Then, how does that statement, *Each remains what it is by nature*, accord with the truth? How will the dictum of Severus stand: *In the conjunction they remained what they are, that is, natures, and not one nature*? The saint therefore taught that two does not make two animals. Wherefore he also added: *One animal is made*. Let the liars, therefore, cease to lean upon a reed; for as they themselves confess, once one nature is made, two natures can no longer exist or be spoken of: for these are mutually contradictory.
We shall therefore say that the arguments of our adversaries recoil upon their own heads. D If there are two natures that are two, they cannot be spoken of as one. But that there are two natures of Christ, Severus not only confessed with his mouth, but also wrote. And if Severus did not say that two are one, the natures either remain and are preserved, or they perish. If, therefore, they perish, there are neither two nor one. But if they remain, which is truer, they are also named; for otherwise how would we know that they remain, or how would the term *remain* be spoken? There is, therefore, no ability granted to anyone to make or to speak as one that which is two; for the very word *composition* indicates a concurrence of two things. Whoever reflects upon a composite, thinks of the two things from which the composite consists, which it embraces, and which it is itself, as long as the composite is, according to the structure of the composite one, is the substance—that is, the nature.
A If, therefore, Christ is composite, he has not only been brought together from two natures, but he also possesses these within himself, as being composed of them; and these things are so that he may not be as one thing in others; and the definition of the composite is also preserved. Therefore, he who wishes to walk after the truth in simplicity of heart has the truth guiding him and separating him from deception.
But you, O man of God, established in the truth of the faith, out of the very words of Severus, the enemy of the Church, silence those who are unwilling to confess the two natures of Christ even after the union, and who wrongly interpret the expression of the "one nature of God the Word incarnate," and not according to the blessed Cyril, who used this expression against the relative union of Nestorius. For he did not use it for the destruction of the two natures, as these B liars and deceivers babble, but rather for their establishment and for a union of them according to substance—unconfused, unchangeable, and undiminished—as his writings testify, and especially his letter to Eulogius the apocrisiarius, and his Address, the beginning of which is: "I do not admit a mixture."