7 ORIGEN: another brings about, in that it is brought about, 14 must be prior. The things that are older than the formation are thought to be predicted. Indeed, those who profess this art maintain that things which are prior in such a position are considered to predict human affairs. For they themselves take this upon themselves, that once they have determined in a certain way the singular hour of any one person, they immediately have it explored, [to learn] how to place it at the perpendicular of the wandering stars, in this or that part of the sign, and in the minutes of the parts; and at the same time which star of the zodiac was on the eastern horizon, which on the western; what things likewise occupied the middle of either hemisphere of heaven in an opposing position. And when they have set those stars, whose configuration and placement they think they have formed in their own minds, in this or that position under someone’s rising; then they, from that very time in which he for whose birth they are searching was brought into the light, infer not only the future but also the past, and whatever preceded his birth and his sowing; what kind he has for a father; whether rich or poor; of whole body or maimed; of good or bad morals; of ample or narrow means; what manner of life he has embraced, and they inquire into similar things concerning the mother, as well as the brothers, if there are any. We, however, even if we should grant for the time being (which we shall nevertheless later prove to be false) that they can exquisitely hold that whole system of the stars and of the place; let us however ask of those who think that power is exerted on human affairs by the stars, how in the world can this present position of things be the cause of what occurred in superior time? For as if it is in no way possible, it is indeed, while nothing of truth is found concerning these matters, clearly consequent that this present movement of the stars in the sky could not have brought about those things which happened already before they obtained such a position. But if this is so, perhaps he who will concede the truth to them in this kind of matter, pondering those things which are said about future events, will answer that the truth is predicted by them only in that the stars signify that something is to be, not that they bring it about. But if another man [should say] that things past are not brought about by the stars... [the text here continues with the argument regarding the impossibility of the stars governing the past based on current celestial configurations] ...For indeed they also predict the fortunes of parents from the generation of the children; what kind the conditions of the children will be, and what chances they will encounter [in turn] from those same parents, regarding those who are not yet born. And from the nativities of brothers [they predict] the deaths of brothers; and from women those things which pertain to men; and conversely from these [they predict] those. How, therefore, does the habit of each one [person] make toward the stars those things which he is said to be about to have already from his parents? Either those prior things will have the power of bringing about; or if those do not have it, neither do these. Eadem hæc Origenis repetunt Procopius in Genes. 1, 13, et Philoponus lib. Περὶ κοσμοποιίας, cap. 18. HuETIUS.
OF THE FIRST VOLUME OF THE COMMENTARIES ON GENESIS
A For God did not begin to be a Father, prevented, as those...
V. Regarding the time when Origen delivered these homilies, one thing is certain: they were given after the two hundred and forty-fifth year. For Origen was already over sixty when he allowed the homilies he gave to the people to be taken down by shorthand writers, having never allowed this to be done before, says Eusebius in his *Ecclesiastical History*, Book VI, chapter 56. VI. The Merlin edition attributed the Latin translation of these to Jerome; however, those who have studied the matter argue that it belongs to Rufinus, and that, moreover, the homilies are mutilated in a good part of their substance. You see this for yourself.
FROM THE PREFACE OF ORIGEN'S BOOKS ON GENESIS
A If we were not entirely sluggish and slothful in coming to ask of our Lord and Savior when He urges us to this, we would certainly draw back, considering that we are very far from that height of spiritual intelligence which requires such a great investigation of the intellect. B And a little later: If, however, in the discussion something profound should occur, it must be said that it is not to be debated with all temerity, nor by one who has lost the sense of human infirmity and has forgotten himself; or certainly not by one who is confident that he has learned from the Lord Jesus Himself—that is, from the Word of Truth and from Wisdom Herself, through whom all things were made—or who believes he has entered the storm and the darkness where God Himself is, which even Moses could scarcely enter or understand, as much as he was able to bring forth. But we, for the sole reason that it is moderately permitted, believe that we are disciples of the Lord Jesus, and we glory in this, yet we do not dare to say that we have received the understanding of those things which are recounted in the divine books face to face from Him: for these are certain matters which not even the world can grasp in view of its virtue and majesty. For which reason, though apostles could not [grasp them], we do not dare; yet we give thanks in this, that while many, knowing their own ignorance, and because their movements are uncomposed and disorderly, sometimes even inept and fabulous, pronounce with all intent as it seems to them as if by most certain assertion, we are not ignorant of our own ignorance regarding those things which are above us.
BOOK I OF THE COMMENTARIES ON GENESIS
For God did not begin to be Father, hindered, as men who become fathers are, by not being able to be fathers yet. For if God is always perfect, and the power to be a father is present with Him, and it is good for Him to be the Father of such a Son, why does He delay, and deprive Himself of the good, and, as one might say, from the moment He can be Father of a Son? The same, however, must also be said concerning the Holy Spirit.
FROM ORIGEN ON GENESIS: But if it offends anyone, on account of human craftsmen, that God cannot create things that exist without an unbegotten matter being laid out beneath, since neither a sculptor can make his own work without bronze, nor a carpenter without wood, nor a builder without stones: one must inquire of him regarding the power of God, whether God is able to bring into existence what He wishes, once He has willed to do so, without His will being wanting or lacking in strength.
A For if He wishes, He can bring into existence everything that He desires, His will being sufficient and not lacking in power. For the Word, by His own reason, establishes non-existent qualities for the configuration of the universe, bringing them into existence as he wishes—for his power is ineffable and his will is sufficient to bring into being whatever he needs—but he brings them into existence for the ornamentation of the whole, from his infinite power and wisdom. We shall argue against those who wish it so, that if they do not hold that God found the unbegotten substance that, had it not been placed before Him as unbegotten, would have meant God was capable of nothing, then He would be neither creator, nor father, nor benefactor, nor good, nor anything else that is reasonably spoken of regarding God. And how is it that the measuring out of the underlying substance is of such a size and is divided by the constitution of such a great universe; as if B by hypothesis we accepted that matter is unbegotten, we shall say this to those who desire this: that if, without Providence placing the substance before God, it came to be in such a state, if Providence were present, what more would It have accomplished than what happened by chance? And if He Himself, when there was no matter, wished to construct it, what more would His wisdom and divinity have accomplished than what would have come into being from the unbegotten? For if it is found that the same result would have occurred through Providence as that which came into existence without Providence, why shall we not also abolish the Creator and the craftsman regarding the world? For just as it is absurd to say regarding the world, which is so artfully constructed, that it came to be self-fashioned without a wise craftsman, so too is it equally unreasonable that matter, being so vast and of such a nature and so receptive to the craftsman’s word of God, should have existed unbegotten. However, we must say to those who draw comparisons, in that no craftsman creates without matter, that they draw their comparisons unfairly. For Providence provides the material for every craftsman, coming as it does from a prior art, whether human or divine. This, then, will suffice for the present against those who, because it is said...
of these things will then be logically proven to have occurred. And if one were to look at the consequences of what they dogmatize, the faith itself would become vain, as would the advent of Christ, which would achieve nothing, as would the entire economy through the Law and the Prophets, and the toils of the Apostles in establishing the Churches of God through Christ; unless, perhaps, even Christ—according to those who dare such things—having been born under the necessity of the motion of the stars to assume human nature, did and suffered all things not because the God and Father of all granted Him these paradoxical powers, but because of the stars. To these godless and impious doctrines follows the assertion that those who believe in God are led to do so by the stars. We would ask them: what was God's intention in making such a world, that some men within it should suffer the things of women, having in no way been the cause of their own profligacy, while others, having received the nature of wild beasts, because the motion of the universe has made them so—since God so ordered the whole—give themselves over to the most savage and inhuman deeds, to murders and acts of piracy?
If they reply that they are outside the laws of the creator of the astral influences, so that the statement made by them may not be without proof, let them try to bring us to a more necessary conclusion, distinguishing a certain mind subject to generation and fate, and another body free from these; for it is clear to those who know such people that when they are required to give a reason for them, they will be able to do so in no way at all. Furthermore, in addition to what has been said, prayers are offered in vain; for if certain things are forced to happen, and the stars bring them about, and nothing can come to be beyond the configuration of these stars with one another, we irrationally ask God to grant us certain things. And why is there need to prolong the argument, setting forth the impiety of the position regarding fate that has been accepted without examination by the many? For what has been said is sufficient for an outline. From what source, however, while examining the text, "Let the luminaries be for signs," we arrived at these matters, let us remind ourselves.
A Or perhaps one should not suppose that the book itself is the cause, but rather the one who first wrote it, or the one who brought it about—namely, God. Just as with the things prophesied concerning Judas, the words themselves, when examined, show that God was not the author of Judas’s betrayal, but only that He had foreknown what would be done through his malice, apart from His own causality; in the same way, if one were to delve into the reasoning of God’s foreknowledge of everything, and into those things in which He, as it were, imprinted the words of His own foreknowledge, one would understand that neither is the One who foreknew [it] the cause of the things foreknown, nor [are] those things which received the forms of the words of the foreknowledge of the One who foreknew [it]. That God knows long before [they happen] that each of the things that will be shall come to pass, is manifest—even apart from Scripture—from the very concept of God, to anyone who understands the dignity of the power of the mind of God. If it is necessary also to demonstrate this from the Scriptures, the prophecies are full of such examples; and the events concerning Susanna, with God knowing all things before they came to be, speak thus: B
Behold the altar is rent, and the fat upon it shall be poured out. And after a few words it is shown that the altar was indeed rent, and the fat was poured out from the altar according to the sign which the man gave in the word of the Lord. And in Isaiah, who lived long before the captivity in Babylon—after which captivity Cyrus, king of the Persians, would eventually come to pass, having cooperated in the building of the temple which took place in the times of Ezra—these things are prophesied about Cyrus by name: Thus says the Lord God to my anointed, Cyrus, whose right hand I have taken hold of, that nations might listen before him, and I will break the strength of kings; I will open doors before him, and the gates shall not be shut; I will go before you, and make the mountains level; I will shatter bronze doors, and break iron bars in pieces. And I will give you hidden, secret, invisible treasures, that you may know that I, the Lord God, who call you by your name, am the God of Israel.
And I saw him coming as far as the ram, and he was enraged against him, and he struck the ram, and broke both his horns; and there was no strength in the ram to stand before him, and he cast him to the ground, and trampled upon him: and there was none to deliver the ram out of his hand. And the he-goat of the goats waxed very great; and when he was strong, his great horn was broken; and there came up other four horns under it toward the four winds of heaven. And out of one of them came forth one strong horn, which grew exceeding great, toward the south, and toward the west. But why is it necessary to mention the prophecies concerning Christ, such as the place of his birth, Bethlehem, and the place of his upbringing, Nazareth, and his withdrawal into Egypt, and the wonders which he performed, and in what manner he was betrayed by Judas, who had been called to the apostleship? For all these things are signs of the foreknowledge of God. But also the Savior himself says: "When you see Jerusalem surrounded by armies, then know that its desolation has come near." For he foretold the end that was to happen later, the complete demolition of Jerusalem.
A And the dread and the fear of you shall be upon all the beasts of the earth, and so forth. Some insist upon the literal meaning, saying that every animal fears to see a man, even the beasts in the wilderness. But perhaps it is better to understand the evil powers as the wild beasts of the earth, and that the other species suffer fear from the righteous, and that the trembling is over such things. For evil powers fear the righteous man.
But you shall not eat in the blood of the soul; for I will surely require your blood of your souls. Out of the hand of all beasts will I require it. Since the literal meaning is inconsistent, it must be said that these "beasts" are the opposing powers, from whose hand the death of the sinner—who dies because the soul that sins, it shall die—will be strictly required. It is also possible to understand this in relation to the cattle, from which he commanded the goring bull to be stoned.
For in the image of God I made man. God says, "In the image of God I made man"; and the image of the invisible God is the Savior. Therefore, according to Scripture, the Savior is God.
And the sons of Noah who went out from the ark were Shem, Ham, and Japheth. And Ham was the father of Chanaan. B Why then, after the Scripture said, "And the sons of Noah who went out from the ark were Shem, Ham, and Japheth," did it add, "And Ham was the father of Chanaan"? For if it were necessary to mention the sons, it would have been necessary to mention all of them, and not Chanaan alone; for Chanaan himself also became wicked, as the history declares. C The Spirit, therefore, wishing to show the affinity between the father and the son, in a way separates him from the piety of his brothers by the addition, "Ham was the father of Chanaan." For while all were sons of Noah by birth, this one alone was not a son in his character, but [was] the father of a similar child. Wherefore it is stated emphatically, "He was the father of Chanaan."
The Hebrew man who said these things also brought forward such a tradition, adding proof to the tradition: that Chanaan was the first to see the nakedness of his grandfather and reported it to his father alone, mocking the old man as though he were just an aged one. D Cham, meanwhile, when he should not have approached his father impiously like the brothers, but should have rebuked the one who first saw it and was mocking, was himself persuaded, and he entered, and he saw, and he reported it to his brothers. But these things would seem to be a fable, if what follows did not have the force of proof: "And Noah awoke," it says, "from his wine, and knew what his younger son had done to him." Now Ham was not his younger son, but the second. For it says, "Shem, and Ham, and Japheth." If he had wished to point out the youngest, he would have mentioned Japheth. Since, however, grandfathers always call their grandchildren "sons," and those who are descendants from afar...
A query concerning lip and voice, we shall say that the voice pertains to the language, but perhaps the lip to the thought, or conversely. "Come, and let us go down and confuse their language there, so that they may not hear, each one, the voice of his neighbor." A mark of wickedness [(66)] is that the tongues should be confused; a mark of virtue is when the heart and soul of all believers was one. And thus, by observing the Scripture, you will find that wherever there is a multitude of number, wherever there is schism, division, and discord, and other such things, these are marks of wickedness; but where there is unity, concord, and great power in words, these are marks of virtue. "And Tharra lived seventy years, and he begat Abram, and Nachor, and Arram." B Tharra, being seventy years old, begat the father of the nation that celebrates the week. I suspect, however, whether he begat the three as triplets; for otherwise, being seventy years old, he could not have been the father of three from one [wife]. But, also, more wives of his are not mentioned. "And Abram went down into Egypt to sojourn there, because the famine had grown strong upon the land." Abraham did not dwell in Egypt, but he sojourned, because the famine had grown strong upon the land. "The Canaanites and the Pherezites were then dwelling in the land." As being evil, the Canaanites were dwelling, and were not sojourning in the land. Thus, the evil dwell, they do not sojourn in the land. "If thou to the left, I to the right; if thou to the right, I to the left," and what follows. C Even if the choice was made by being conceded by the kindness of Abraham to Lot, it is to be observed that he who chose does not enjoy his own choice, whereas he who yielded possesses blessedly what was left behind. "And God said to Abram, after Lot was separated from him: Look up with your eyes, and see from the place where you now are, toward the north and south, and east and west, for all the land which you see, to you I will give it." Consolation from God follows those who practice virtue. After he ceded the choosing to his brother, and he [Lot] chose the most beautiful and fertile region, God appeared to Abraham, cheering his soul with words of consolation and good promises, saying as it were: You have despised this land, the smallest and the sensible one; D I will give to you, of the meek, the land which is in the region of the living. For "Look up with the eyes of the mind, and see from the place where you are now." The place of the just is virtue, from which he looks forward to things in hope, and waits for those things laid up in the heavens. For unless the matter stood so, how much may it be verisimilar that he himself with physical eyes
A and it is impossible for [man] to do anything other than that which God has known. But if it is impossible for him to do anything else, and no one is blameworthy for not doing what is impossible, we blame the unjust in vain. And from the unjust man and his injustices, they proceed also to other sins; then, from the opposite, to considered virtuous deeds; and they say that it follows, from the fact that God has foreknown future events, that those things dependent upon us cannot be preserved. B And C if it is necessary to speak, concerning considered virtuous deeds... D [The original-language column contains a fragment on causality and foreknowledge; see facsimile.]
To these, one must reply that God, applying Himself at the beginning of the creation of the world to the fact that nothing happens without a cause, inspects with His mind each of the things that will come to be—seeing that, since this fact has occurred, this consequence follows; and if this consequent thing happens, this too follows, and if that should come to pass, then this will be. And thus, having traversed the sequence of matters to the very end, He knows what will be, without being in any way the cause of each of the things known happening. For just as if someone, seeing a man who, through ignorance, is rash, and, through that rashness, is unreasonably stepping onto a slippery path, and perceiving that he will fall once he has slipped, does not himself become the cause of the slipping to that man; so must it be understood that God, having foreseen what kind of person each one will be, and having observed the causes for why he will be in such a state, and that he will commit these specific sins—not that He makes the foreknowledge the cause of the things that come to be (for the foreknowledge does not touch the one who is to commit the sin).
Celsus, indeed, thinks that because something was foretold by some foreknowledge, it happens because it was foretold; but we, not granting this, say that the one who foretold it is not the cause of the future event, simply because he announced it would happen; rather, the future event—which would have happened even if no one had predicted it—has provided the cause for the foreknower to predict it.
A known, being seen by Him either as things to be done wickedly or well. And to speak freely what is the truth, not only is the foreknowledge of God not the cause of things (for He does not, as it were, lead by the hand to sin the one whom He foresees will sin, while he is in the very act of sinning), but—and this is perhaps more remote from common sense, yet nonetheless true—that very thing which is to be is the cause of such foreknowledge. For a thing does not happen because it is known to be future; rather, because it is to be future, it is known to be future.
In this matter, however, there is need of distinction. For if one understands "it will absolutely be" in such a way as to mean that there is a necessity for the foreknown thing to come to pass, we do not grant it to him; for we shall not say, since it was foreknown that Judas would become a traitor, that there was an absolute necessity for Judas to become a traitor. At any rate, in the prophecies concerning Judas, there are recorded rebukes and accusations against Judas, intended to show everyone his blameworthy character. But no censure would have attached to him if he had been a traitor by necessity, and if it were not possible for him to have become like the other apostles. Consider, then, if this is not shown by the following scriptural passages, which we shall quote: "May there be no one to show mercy to his orphans, because he did not remember to show mercy, but pursued the poor and needy man, B and the one pricked in heart, to put him to death. And he loved cursing, and it shall come to him; and he did not desire blessing, and it shall be far from him."
If, however, one interprets "it will absolutely be" according to the meaning that it signifies—saying that while such-and-such things will indeed come to pass, it was nevertheless possible for them to have come to pass otherwise—this we admit as true. For while God cannot lie or be deceived, yet for those things which are equally capable of happening and not happening, He can equally know them as things to be or not to be. We shall state this more clearly as follows: If it is possible for Judas to be an apostle just like Peter, it is possible for God to know concerning Judas that he will remain C an apostle just like Peter. If it is possible for Judas to become a traitor, it is possible for God to think concerning him that he will be a traitor. And if Judas is actually to be a traitor, God, who of the two aforementioned options, both of which are possible, foreknows the truth, will foreknow that Judas will become a traitor; yet that which is the object of this knowledge could have come to pass otherwise. And the knowledge of God might say: "It is possible for this man to do this, but also the contrary; yet since both are possible, I know that he will do this." For not as God might say, "It is not possible for this man to fly," so does He D speak of this.
For although a man A possesses no capacity at all for flying, yet it is within his power to live either temperately or intemperately. Thus, since he has both capacities, he who neglects exhortations and the precepts of doctrine gives himself over to the worse; but he who is set on the study of life regulated by the norm of truth, and is occupied in the investigation of it, joins himself to the better. Furthermore, the fact that one man labours less in investigating the truth occurs because of his desire for pleasure; the other, however, because he is greatly possessed by the study of truth, is led to it partly by common understanding and sense, and partly by exhortation. Moreover, one man does not embrace pleasure because he is unable to withstand it, but because he is unwilling to fight and struggle against it; the other treads it underfoot, as he cannot endure the baseness that for the most part accompanies it. And that divine foreknowledge imposes no necessity whatsoever upon the things it foresees is established not only by the preceding arguments, but furthermore by this: that throughout the sacred Scriptures, the prophets B are commanded to urge men to repentance, and this as though God were ignorant of whether those who hear would repent or would continue in their sins. Just as it is said in Jeremiah: "Peradventure they will hearken, and repent." For it is not because God does not know whether they will hearken or not that He says, "Peradventure they will hearken, and repent," but as if to show from what is said that the balance of the capacities is maintained; lest His foretold foreknowledge should make the hearers collapse, presenting the illusion of necessity, as if it were not in their power to turn back, and in a way itself becoming the cause of their sins. Or again, [lest] foreknowledge should become to those able in the struggle—and able to resist wickedness and live in virtue, but who, through not knowing what has been foreknown, might be weakened—the cause of their falling away; not that the person [foreknown] would necessarily be established against sin as one who would absolutely become what was foretold. For in this way, C indeed, foreknowledge of a future good could become an obstacle. God, therefore, as One who wisely disposes all things in the world, has reasonably blinded us as to future events. For knowledge of them would have relaxed our effort to struggle against wickedness, and would have turned us back, since, thinking that the end was already fixed, we would not have struggled against sin, but would have become its subjects more quickly. At the same time, it would also have been a struggle against a man's becoming good and noble, if the foreknowledge had come for a certain individual that he would absolutely be good; for in addition to the things we have, there is need of intensity and greater exertion in order to become good and noble; but if the knowledge is grasped in advance, the assurance that he will absolutely become good and noble would weaken the exercise. Therefore, we D profitably do not know whether we will be good or evil.
B 8. But since we have said that God has blinded us regarding future events, see if we can explain in this way a certain text from Exodus: "Who has made the slow of speech, and the deaf, and the seeing, and the blind? Is it not I, the Lord God?" C so that He may be said to have made the same person both blind and seeing: seeing, indeed, with regard to present things, but blind with regard to future things. For to discuss the account and distinction of the slow of speech and the deaf is not the purpose of this passage. That, however, many things not in our power are the causes of many things that are in our power, we also will acknowledge. For if the former—that is, the things not in our power—did not occur, these certain things that are in our power would not have been done; but certain things that are in our power are done as a consequence of those preceding events, although they are not in our power, it being possible for other things also to be D done, given the same preceding events, beyond what we do. But if someone seeks that what is in our power should be completely detached from the universe, so that we should not choose these things because of those certain things that have happened to us, he has forgotten that he is a part of the world and is contained within the communion of men and the state of the surrounding air. And to me, indeed, according to the reason of this passage, it seems I have moderately and as it were in summary demonstrated that by the divine foreknowledge no necessity is brought upon the things He has foreseen.
9. Furthermore, let us strive C also regarding the stars, that they are by no means the causes of things among men, but only signs. For it is clear that, even if this or that configuration of the stars were thought to be causative of certain events occurring to a man (for let the argument currently be about this), the configuration that occurs today, for example, regarding this person, cannot be understood to have caused the things that have already passed away regarding another person or persons. For everything that causes is older than what is caused. And as far as concerns the teachings of those who profess such things, D whether they be causative, or effective, or merely significant, that position is as if a certain speech were predicting the future, not acting (for this was no mean opinion among learned men). Mathematicians do not usually speak in such a way that, for example, Mars so positioned signifies a murderer, but "makes" a murderer, etc. But Procopius in Genesis 1, 14 refutes this more grandly and sharply.
A Furthermore, we confirm the narrative, and likewise find the same thing in the case of Herod, when the daughter of Herodias danced, and the head of John was cut off; and nowhere does a righteous man appear who celebrates a birthday. "And it came to pass after two years of days, Pharaoh dreamed." He thought he was standing upon the river, and what follows. He who trusted in fluid and unstable things thought he was standing upon the river, from which things that seem to be prosperous arise, when its cows are fat; but these are altogether devoured by the inferior ones. As to the word "thought," you may compare it with: "I thought you were binding sheaves." And in the second dream: "As," he says, "the sun and the moon and the stars were bowing down to me." And again, the chief cupbearer: "In my sleep," he says, "there was a vine," and what follows; and the chief baker: "I thought I was carrying three baskets of wheaten cakes upon my head," and what follows. By the same author. The historical person of the Scripture says: "He thought he was standing upon the river," not "beside the bank of the river," but Pharaoh says: "I thought I was standing beside the bank of the river," not "upon the river." However, worldly affairs in Egypt begin from better things, of which plenty is the symbol, but end in more bitter things, of which plenty and famine are the types. It is similar to consider this in the account of the rich man. For it was as if the seven years of plenty were his, as he received his good things in his life, being clothed in purple and fine linen, and feasting sumptuously every day; but they end for him in the contrary, receiving B evil things after his departure from here. Similar things you might see also in those who walk the broad and spacious way, whose end is destruction; but for those to whom the beginning is strait and narrow, the end is life. Wherefore, woe to those who are filled, for they shall hunger; and to those who laugh, for they shall weep. Blessed are they who mourn and weep, for they shall be comforted. "And behold, as if from the river there were coming up seven cows," and what follows. The dreams of Pharaoh were cows and ears of grain. For by those things through which the earth is cultivated and what it brings forth, signs were given to the king predicting both plenty and famine. Pharaoh awoke, and dreamed a second time: "And behold, seven ears of grain were coming up on one stalk, choice and beautiful." Joseph did not see ears of grain, but sheaves; the Egyptian, however, not sheaves, but ears of grain. And again, the chief cupbearer sees the three branches signifying three days; but the king, the seven ears on one stalk, in which the seven years are linked together; and thus the interpretation of the one word "stalk" is various. If, therefore, someone interprets Scripture otherwise, do not think that he is doing violence to it. C That also must be observed: that in the case of the D
genesis of any such person, one should point out the difference, and A be able to show that these things originate from the stars as causes, while those things are merely signified by them. But if they have no way of pointing out the difference, let them yield gracefully; they should not attribute to the stars things that happen to men, but, as we have said, consider them to be signs only. For if they were not receiving from the stars both past and future events, but rather through some prophetic word—just as we have already demonstrated that it does not hurt us to know what God has ordained for each individual—then neither do the signs that God has set for the purpose of signifying 93 hinder our free will. Rather, in a way similar to a book containing future events, the entire heaven is able, as though it were a book of God, to contain the things that will come to pass. Hence, in the prayer of Joseph 94, one might understand what is said by Jacob: "I have read B in the tablets of heaven all that shall befall you and your sons." Perhaps that too, "The heaven shall be rolled up like a scroll," refers to the fact that the words contained within it, which are indicative of things to come, are seen to be fulfilled—or, if I may put it this way, completed—just as prophecies are said to be fulfilled once they have occurred. And thus the stars will have been made for signs, according to those who say, "Let there be signs." And Jeremiah, turning us toward ourselves and taking away fear regarding the things supposed to be signified, perhaps also—assuming they do happen—says: "Be not afraid of the signs of heaven." C
Come now, let us look at a second argument: how can the stars not be causative, but only indicative? For out of the many thousands of nativities, it is possible for one to gain knowledge of what a man will suffer; and we say this by way of hypothesis, granting that their science can be mastered by men. For let us suppose, for example, that it is foretold that a certain person will suffer such-and-such, and will die by falling among robbers and being killed: they say it is possible to derive this from his own nativity, and if he happens to have several brothers, from each of theirs as well. For they imagine that the nativity of each D contains a brother killed by robbers, just as it does that of the father, the mother, the spouse, his own children, his servants, his closest friends, and perhaps even the killers themselves. How is it possible, therefore, for someone—even if we grant this to them—to be included in so many nativities, to be brought about by the configuration of the stars, in this nativity rather than those? For it is implausible to assert that the configuration in this person’s own nativity has caused these things, while the configuration in these others' nativities has not caused them, but merely signified them. For it is foolish to say that everyone’s nativity contained, for each individual case, the efficient cause of this person being killed, so that within fifty nativities—I say this by way of hypothesis—there is included the killing of this one person.
A I do not know how they can stand their ground: that there is almost one configuration for all the Jews at their nativity, such that they receive circumcision on the eighth day, being mutilated and dragged about, and falling into inflammation and wounds, and at the same time needing physicians upon their entry into life? But those among the Ishmaelites B who inhabit Arabia are all circumcised at thirteen years of age; for this is what is recorded about them, and again of some in Ethiopia, who have their knees removed, and of the Amazons who have others removed from their breasts. How, then, do the stars cause these things for these nations? C But as for the commonness of these matters, let this suffice for the destruction of the opinion that the stars are the makers of human affairs. However, that which we have granted—for it did not hinder the argument—that men are able to grasp the heavenly configurations and the signs, and [the things] of which they are signs, let us now examine whether it is true. Those who are clever about these matters say, therefore, that he who is to grasp the truth concerning genethlialogy must know not only in which dodecatemorion the so-called star is, but also in which degree of the dodecatemorion, and in which sixtieth; and the more precise ones, even in which sixtieth of a sixtieth. And they say that this must be done for each of the wandering stars, examining the relation D toward the fixed stars. Moreover, if it is known, in order that we might let it be granted that it is known, and it comes about from where the knowledge is taken, why should what happens be from the stars rather than from omens? And why from omens rather than from the entrails of sacrifices or from shooting stars? For the present, these things will be sufficient to refute that the stars are the makers of human affairs. Whether it is true, strictly speaking, that a configuration is the sign of these things, or whether it is not, we shall examine, God willing, in what follows.
A There is a theory circulating which proves that the zodiacal circle, like the planets, moves from west to east at a rate of one degree per hundred years, and that this, over a long period of time, alters the position of the twelve signs—the intelligible sign being one thing, and the so-called formal sign derived from the intelligible zodiac being another, which it is not at all easy to apprehend. But let this even be granted, that the intelligible sign is apprehended, or that the true sign can be grasped from the perceptible sign; yet the "mixture," as they call it, of those things found in these configurations—they themselves would acknowledge that they are unable to maintain it in every respect, since the thing signified is obscured, for instance, by a lesser [sign] because it is observed by this greater one, and is obscured to such or such an extent; often, again, the obscuring of the lesser by the observation of the greater is hindered by the fact that another [sign], being so configured, is indicative of lesser things.
And indeed, I believe that some people have D determined it by shorter intervals; but one person attributes 25,760 years to it, since it covers one degree in 66 years; this opinion, moreover, has been confirmed by Tycho, who notes that it approaches the truth extremely closely, for within 67 years it has been observed to advance one degree into the following [signs], and to complete that entire course in 24,120 years. But now, so that we may return to Origen, it is clear that he held to the movement established by Ptolemy.
Volume II: Commentaries on Genesis
A We shall defend ourselves by saying that those who are wise among us, having made use of a Spirit greater than [that of] human nature, are taught these hidden things not in a human way, but divinely; just as Paul says: "I heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter." For they know the changes of turnings, and the alterations of seasons, the cycles of years, and the positions of the stars, not from men, nor through men, but with the Spirit revealing [them] to them, and clearly proclaiming the divine things as God wills. And in another way, too, Jacob was greater than a man—he who supplanted his brother, and confesses in this very book from which we have cited the passage: "I have read upon the tablets of heaven that I am the chief captain of the power of the Lord, and possess the name 'Israel' of old." This he recognizes while performing his service in the body, as the archangel Uriel reminds him. After these things, it remains to examine and demonstrate to those who believe that the luminaries of the heaven are set for signs; and you shall be questioned by those who are carried along by a more curious [inquiry] into these matters, as to what is the cause of God having made these signs in the heaven.
"For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I might show my power in you, and that my name might be proclaimed in all the earth." If Pharaoh was preserved for the demonstration of the power of God and the proclamation of His name in all the earth, consider how great a demonstration of the power of God the heavenly signs contain, with all things from the beginning of the age until the end inscribed in the worthy book of God, the heaven.
Secondly, I conjecture that the signs are incumbent upon the powers that govern human affairs, so that they may know some things merely, but others they may perform; just as in the books among us, some things are written so that we may know them, such as the things concerning the creation of the world and other mysteries; but others so that, knowing them, we may perform them, such as the things concerning the commandments and the ordinances of God.
It is possible, then, that the heavenly letters, which angels and divine powers are able to read well, contain some things to be read by the angels and ministers of God, so that they may rejoice in knowing them, and others which they perform as if receiving commandments. And we shall not be wrong in saying that the heaven and the stars correspond to those things in the Law.
A If, however, there are worse things, and other virtues which men do, marked by what is foreknown and set forth in the heavens, it is by no means necessary that they should make them do what they intend. But just as men, doing injury and not knowing that God has foreknown this, do not do the injury as though He were affected by it—but because of their own wickedness they do the injury—so the powers opposed to God, discerning the malice of men, perform their own most base will. But the holy angels, the ministering spirits, sent for service, receive the written commands from the Law B truly and in order, and perform the better things when and how and as much as is needed. For it is absurd that they, who are divine, should come to someone neither at random nor in a settled manner; or that they should free Abraham and Isaac and Jacob from danger, or be present for the sake of the spirit of this or that Prophet. They read, therefore, the book of God so that they do not perform by chance what is in the commands. We, however, as we said before, do what we do by our own will, and likewise the opposing powers, which are at work in us; C acting in a disorderly way when we sin, but in a disciplined way—not without the angels, nor without divine scriptures, nor without holy ministers—when we do what is well-pleasing to God. Clement of Rome also, student of Peter the Apostle, in agreement with these things regarding the present problem, speaking to the father in Laodicea in the *Periods*, says something very necessary at the end of such discourses concerning the things that seem to have come from genesis, in the fourteenth book: "And the father said: Forgive me, my child; for your words yesterday, being true, persuaded me to agree with you. But my conscience, like a remnant of a fever, tortures me a little with unbelief; for I know in myself that all the things of genesis were fulfilled for me. D And I answered: Consider with me, O father, what kind of nature the study has, from that which I advise. Having met with a mathematician, say to him first: 'Such bad things have happened to me at this time; from which of the stars, then, have they happened to me?' I wished to learn."
He will say that a malefic planet—either Saturn or Mars—was in dominion at that time, or that one of these was retrograde, or that some such planet oversaw this year from a quartile, or a diameter, or in conjunction, or in the center, or was outside the sect. And he has thousands of other things B of this kind to say besides; such as that a benefic star was not in agreement with a malefic one, or was not visible, or was in a specific configuration, or outside the sect, or was in an eclipse, or was not configured, or was in dim stars. And yet, since there are many such pretexts, he has arguments to provide for whatever he has heard. After this mathematician, then, approach another and say the opposite: "Such a good thing happened to me at this time," using the very same time when you had said the bad things happened; then ask from which configuration of your birth this event came. Notwithstanding this, as I was saying, because you are deceiving him, he will find one out of many configurations and positions, and then a second, and a third, and many others, as if those were what brought it about, from which he will tell you that the good things had happened. For it is impossible in every nativity of men, and in every hour, that some of the stars are not positioned well and others badly; for the circle is uniform and various, having infinite C pretexts, for which each person can say whatever he wishes. For just as with complex and doubtful dreams we understand nothing, but when they have come to pass we are accustomed to provide a very apt interpretation, so the discipline of the mathematicians can declare nothing clearly to us before anything has happened; but when the thing has happened, then the cause of the outcome appears obvious. Therefore, those who predict are often mistaken and, after the event, reproach themselves, saying: "This was what caused it, and we did not know." That error and mistake, therefore, even of those who are most expert, comes from the fact that they are ignorant, as I said yesterday, of what are altogether the causes of the nativity, and what are not altogether, and what we desire to do altogether, but do not do altogether. This cause, however, is clear to us who have learned the mystery, D because, since we have a free faculty of reasoning, we have sometimes mastered it by deciding to hold back. But the astrologers, not knowing this very mystery, and making pronouncements about every choice of will from
have, when we have decided to restrain it at times, we are victorious. Astrologers, however, to whom this mystery is unknown, pronouncing immediately upon the entire scope of free will, have often slipped and invented climacterics, and have placed human free will in uncertainty, as we demonstrated yesterday. But if you have something to say in response to these things, proceed. And [he] swore, and answered: "There is nothing truer than what you have said." A
FROM VOLUME III OF THE COMMENTARIES ON GENESIS.
B
FROM VOLUME III OF THE COMMENTARIES ON GENESIS.
Ad caput I, vers. 16 et seq.
"And God made two great luminaries, the great luminary into the rule of the day, and the lesser luminary into the rule of the night, and the stars. And God placed them in the firmament of the heaven, so that they might shine upon the earth, and to rule over the day and the night." It must be asked whether "into the rule of the day" is the same as "to rule over the day," and whether "into the rule of the night" is the same as "to rule over the night." For Aquila preserved the analogy, and for these words, "into the rule," he put "into the power," and for those, "to rule" (or "to be in charge"), he translated "to have power." C Furthermore, those who have investigated the things signified with greater diligence maintain that in those passages where there is a conjunction of appellations and predicates, those which enjoy appellations come first, while the predicates follow. And they say that the appellation which has a predicate is, for example, "intelligence," while the predicate is "to understand." Similarly, the appellation is "temperance," the predicate is "to be temperate"; and they say that "intelligence" pre-exists, and the predicate "to understand" is derived from "intelligence." Even if we appear to some to be doing things beyond the intent of Scripture, we have observed these matters because God, who makes the luminaries, makes the great one "into the rule of the day" and the lesser one "into the rule of the night," but He places them in the firmament of heaven—not "into the rule of the day and of the night," but "to rule over the day and the night." For the fact that the appellations are set down first in that passage in an orderly and coherent manner according to the sentence of one who teaches the logical art, and then the predicates are adjoined, moved us to inquire whether the matter is so
A even according to the servant [of God], seeing that even he who most earnestly strove to interpret most properly, Aquila, has placed nothing other than the name and the predicate. Let him who has difficulty in accepting these things consider whether it is possible for a moral, physical, or theological problem to be rightly established without an accurate understanding of the things signified and of those matters which are clarified by dialectical topics. For what is absurd in investigating the properties of words in individual languages, and in listening and diligently adhering to the things signified? B For it is in some cases because of an ignorance of logical discipline that we fall gravely into error, because we do not judge between equivocal terms, ambiguous expressions, proper and improper usages, and distinctions; just as, by reason of the ignorance of the equivocation which exists in the name "world," they have slipped into unspeakable opinions concerning the Creator, not discerning in reference to what that [passage] was set down: *"The world lies in the evil one,"* which John used in that place regarding earthly and human things. For having thought that by this word "world" the system of the heaven and earth and the things in them is signified, they pronounce most boldly and most wickedly regarding God; since they cannot in deed demonstrate how the sun and moon and stars, which move in such an orderly fashion, are situated in the evil one. Then, if we bring forth to them from the passage, *"Behold the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world,"* C to prove to them that the world is spoken of according to these ways of speaking as that where sin abounds—that is, regarding earthly places—those who are of a candid mind will admit what is being said, but the contentious, conducting themselves foolishly and ineptly, will persist in clinging to the things which they have once judged to be evil because of their ignorance of equivocation. Again, if it be said, *"God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself,"* they will no longer be able to demonstrate what they had taken regarding the universal world—that is, regarding those things which are in the whole world—especially according to their own hypotheses; for it is necessary to examine the word as an equivocal term. And there are countless examples to be found, if one is zealous, regarding the ambiguity of wicked interpretations D and the distinction of punctuation, and other such things. But we have bypassed these matters in order that we might show that it is most necessary for us also, who wish not to stumble concerning the truth in understanding the divine Scriptures, to know the logical [rules] that fall into use; of which we have now had need in order to find the difference between what is said to have been done "for the beginning of the night" and "to rule the day and the night."