BOOK ON DEFINITIONS
In the Colbert manuscript 4753, there is a work with this title: *Certain chapters that those must know who, as far as the capacity of the human mind allows, wish to know the mystery of the Incarnation of the Word.* Therein are many things which are also read in these Definitions, and which we have A noted in their proper places.
OF THE SAME, CONCERNING DEFINITIONS
1. Various definitions according to the tradition and faith of the Catholic Church, collected from Clement and other holy men and blessed Fathers: which, before all other disciplines, he who, with God’s help, wishes to preside over the word of truth ought to approach and embrace in his mind; as also anyone who holds an orthodox opinion and possesses a sincere faith toward God.
2. Moreover, for a more accurate tradition, it is fitting to know that every question or inquiry whatsoever has three questions and examinations: namely, what this thing is, why this thing is so called, and (in how many ways) this name is understood. When we ask, "What is this?" it is clear that we are seeking the definition of the thing. But when we say, "Why is this so called?" we are requesting the etymology of the name. When we ask, "In how many ways is this name understood?" it is clear that we are asking how many meanings the name has. Therefore, whoever presumes to teach without a knowledge of definitions differs in no way from a blind traveler B wandering hither and thither. Thus, it must be said that inquiry ought to be conducted in these three ways.
3. The definition of definitions is that which defines all things, but is itself defined by nothing; so that God alone is the definition of definitions. A definition is a brief statement explaining the nature of the subject matter. Definitions are also so called as if they were visions and eyes of things, and because they briefly define the power of an intelligible thing. For man is a substance consisting of flesh, soul, reason, blood, elements, and many other things. We, however, circumscribe these, and say briefly by means of a definition: "Man is a rational, mortal animal, capable of mind and knowledge." The full name of man is also said to be one who walks erect. Those who assigned names to things abbreviated the prolixity of the word, and called him man for the sake of brevity. Man is said to walk erect because brute animals, when they walk, with head bent downward, look toward the ground; but man, while he walks, C looks at and contemplates the things above. By syncopation, he is called man. Man is also said to be so called because his face looks upward, that is, because with the focus of our eyes we look upward. For the eye and the mind always look upward. And for this reason it is called a definition, because it defines and abbreviates the multitude of words, and shortens the prolixity of speech.
4. There are indeed many and innumerable definitions for every thing. But from many, a few and D the principal definitions of each thing.
we collect, on account of the sloth of men. But this must be known and believed, that he who diligently provides definitions of things will be able easily to repress rhetoricians and eloquent orators in disputations. A For if, when asked what a definition is, why it is called a definition, and in how many ways a definition is understood, the adversary hesitates, he will be affected by shame as if he knew nothing.
5. There are three things unknown and undefined to men: God, angel, and soul, which are by their substance known only to God.
What is that which is defined, what is infinite, what is difficult, and what is easy to define? That is defined which does not exceed its own limits, as the heaven, the earth, and the sea, which do not transcend their own limits. B Infinite is that alone which is uncreated, namely God. Difficult to define is that which is created and undefined, of the kind which is an angel, a soul, a demon; or that is difficult to define which is not known in its totality, but only in part, such as the tree of life. Easy to define is that which is handled and seen, as bread and similar things.
6. What is God? and in how many ways is God understood? God is a substance without cause, the cause of every substance, supersubstantial. He is said to be *Deus* (God) from *theein*, that is, running. But that running is not to be understood as a transition from some place to another place, but as the providence and operation of God which pervades all things. Or, from *aithein*, that is, to burn; or from *theōrein* (to see), because he views all things; for nothing in the nature of things has the power to escape his power of viewing. But the appellation "God" is used in two ways in Divine Scripture, namely by nature and by grace. C God indeed is God by nature and substance; but the just are also called gods by grace and by adoption. For the Scripture says: "I have said: You are gods, and sons of the Most High." He is called Father, either as guarding all things, or as guarding and strengthening his own children as a father. But he is called Son, as if you were to say: As is the Father in substance, such is the Son; whether from the uncreated [he is] uncreated, or from a mortal [he is] mortal. *Pneuma* (spirit) is said as if one were to say *pan neuma*, that is, a movement directed toward everything, for it is swiftly moved in every direction. Furthermore, *pneuma* is said in the Divine Scripture in four ways: the Holy Spirit, the spirit that is an angel, the spirit that is the soul, the spirit that is the wind; and sometimes the mind also is called spirit. D
7. That is sempiternal which always remains. And what is eternal is not immediately said to be without beginning; but what is without beginning is called eternal. And that is said to be without beginning which has no principle. But this is God. Wherefore he is called both without beginning and sempiternal, that is to say, without end. But angels and souls are not said to be without beginning; for they received a beginning and were created by God. But they are called eternal, because they are destined to live immortal lives.
A A "property" is said to be that which exists properly in a nature, and exists in no other substance; just as the faculty of laughing in man. For there is no laughter in any other nature whatsoever.
8. What is "nature" called? Nature is called that which is born and exists, as though existing and known in truth. Nature is also termed so from the word for "bringing forth" and "sprouting." Nature, substance, genus, and form are one and the same. Persona, character, hypostasis, individual, and particular are also one and the same. For nature is one thing, and hypostasis is another. If, therefore, someone should say to you: "How many natures do you confess in the Godhead?" say: "One, but three hypostases." If he should say to you: "In the economy of the incarnate flesh, how many natures do you confess?" say: "Two, but one hypostasis." For Christ had two substances and natures, unchangeable and unconfused—the Godhead and the humanity—in one hypostasis, being known as perfect God and perfect man. And for this reason, we confess two natures in the one hypostasis of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ and God.
In regard to theology, we confess one nature of the holy Trinity, but three hypostases. For there is one nature of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, B and one substance, one authority, one kingdom, and one power; but three hypostases, three characters, and three persons; that is, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. One Godhead is known in three persons.
It is necessary, therefore, to speak more generally about what substance is, and what hypostasis is. Substance, genus, nature, and form, as has been said, are one; while person, character, hypostasis, individual, and particular are one. For nature can have within itself multiple hypostases. For we humans, all consisting of one body and one soul, are of one nature and substance, yet the hypostases are many. And that is why it is called a "hypostasis" (subsistence), from the fact that it subsists in the essence.
Nature and essence are called universal, while hypostasis is particular. "Universal" is that which includes and contains everything whatsoever; "particular" is that which has a certain part of the essence. For example, if you say "Man," you have spoken of all men; for this is universal and essential, and all are called men and are of the same essence. But if you say "Petrus" or "Paulus" or "Joannes," then you have indicated C one man, because this is particular. For the common term is when you say "Man," because all men are named from it. But the particular is the name of each one. It is fitting for anyone who wishes to know the nature of things to know what is particular and what is universal. For this is to be found not only in men, but in every single thing, celestial and terrestrial. And let us speak more clearly; for these things are necessary for those who are about to investigate. We speak thus: If you say, "Angel," you have indicated the whole essence of the angels; for this word is common to the angels and is essential. D
A and all are called angels. But if you say Michael, Gabriel, you have spoken one hypostasis, that is to say, one angel. For nature is called the "angel-hood," but hypostasis is the designation of each individual angel. For there is one common nature, humanity, but the hypostases are Peter, Paul, and Thomas, and the remaining persons and characters. Nature, therefore, is the mistress and generator of the hypostases. And for this reason we shall say again: if you say, "The angel is a good nature," you have indicated their whole essence. But if you say, "Gabriel is great," you have spoken of one hypostasis out of all. And if you say, "The winged creature," behold you have declared the whole essence of winged creatures; but if you say, "The dove, the turtledove, the nightingale, the peacock, and the swan," behold these are hypostases. And this same rule of definitions is valid not only for intelligible, rational, and ensouled things, but also for every inanimate, insensible, and immobile nature; for example, I say, if you say that God made the light, behold you have indicated the whole essence of the luminaries. This essence, therefore, is divided into its hypostases; for it is portioned into the sun, into the moon, and into the stars, into lamps, into candles, and into other various things. Likewise also concerning the winds; if you say, "Spirit" or "wind," you have indicated the whole nature of the winds. But if you say, "The South wind, or the North wind, or the euroclydon," these are hypostases. Again, if you say, "The tree," you have indicated the whole essence of trees; but if you say, "The fig tree, the walnut tree, the chestnut tree, the almond tree," you have spoken one hypostasis of the trees. C Again, if you say, "Water," you have spoken the whole nature of waters; but if you say, "The sea, the lake, the well, the spring," you have spoken one hypostasis of the waters. Again, if you say, "The river," you have spoken of all rivers; but if you say, "The Maeander, the Euphrates, the Nile," then you have spoken of one hypostasis of the rivers. And in the rest it is likewise necessary in all things to investigate, and in the manner in which they were written to understand and to discern, what is nature and what is hypostasis. For nature is the root and the source of things; but hypostasis is a part of nature. For these things are necessary to those who wish to know and to investigate accurately the things in the world.
II. Concerning will, and property, and operation, and concerning union and consubstantiality.
What is will? Will is the appetite of an intelligent and rational substance toward that which is desired. D For everything that is endowed with intellect—it is manifest—is also capable of will; for will (θέλημα) is so called according to "running intently" (θέειν λίαν), or from the "taking hold" (λήμμα) of the desired object, or as a "holding" (κράτημα). The will is considered in three ways: divine, angelic, and psychic (that of the soul); since these three natures alone are capable of will. And we find in Scripture the will being spoken of in three ways: divine, natural or intermediate, and thirdly, carnal, which signifies the diabolical. The divine will are the commandments of God. The natural will is the operation of the divine will. The carnal will is the transgression of the divine law. These three wills are in man. And there is also another natural will, which is called common to all men. This is the
love of life. For all men love life and desire to see the light. Behold, this is the common will. There are also other wills in us, which are called personal [or "arbitrary"]. For one man wishes to live a private life, another to be a farmer; one wishes to sail, another to enjoy rest, another to travel, another to keep watch, and another to sleep; and the others likewise. We men possess many personal wills. But we all have one natural will: to love life, that is, the immortality which we received from the beginning.
III. What is called a "Propriety" (Idioma)
B An *idioma*, or propriety, is so called because they are proper at the same time; for the properties of natures and substances are inseparable from them. A propriety is that which is known properly in a certain nature and is not found in another. For example: In God exists that which is before the eternity of times, the uncreated, the incomprehensible, which do not exist in any other substance whatsoever. It is a propriety for the angels to be free from passions, and immortal, hymn-singing, and unceasing. The propriety of man is strictly that he is compounded of a mortal and immortal nature, which is not found in any other substance. And these are indeed natural properties. There are others that are subordinate, such as whiteness, blackness, tallness, shortness, grey or piercing eyes, slowness, and the like, which are not found in all men. For not all men have piercing eyes, nor are they all fair-haired. But natural properties are found equally and in every individual of the species; for all men are equally mortal, rational, possessing broad nails, and walking upright. There are also others which are not properly called "properties" (idiomata), but accidents. These come and go; for example, infancy, health, sickness, heat, cold; and simply, whatever is capable of changing is called an accident.
IV. On the faculty of acting (energeia)
C *Energeia* (the faculty of acting), as the holy Gregory of Nyssa says, is the natural potentiality and movement of each thing. For every essential being has its own active power: thus intellectual beings have intellection, sensible beings have sensation, mobile things have movement, winged things have flight, swimming things have swimming, plants have growth, creeping things have creeping, luminous things have radiance, and generative things have generation. Furthermore, when the faculty of acting is taken away, the nature of the thing itself is also taken away and perishes. D For when burning is taken away, fire is extinguished; when the movement of an animal is taken away, the animal perishes; when intellection is taken away, the intellect and reason of the soul perish. But the amazing thing is that some different natures, when deprived of their natural faculties, produce other faculties. For example, a stone when burned loses its natural faculty and becomes lime, and it retains the power of burning. In the same way, a cedar, having lost the power of growing, possesses the efficacy of healing.
for its cedar-resin is destructive to worms. A It is therefore necessary for prudent men to observe the appellations of things and to inquire, that they may be able to discover how many appellations of every kind of substance they possess—active ones, not natural ones—having received and holding and being called by them from their own operations. For, indeed, as we have said before, just as God is named from considering all things, and an angel from his angelic operation and service, and man from looking at things above; so it is with the rest. For the virgin is so called from mortifying the inflammation of the flesh; a dove is so called because it flies firmly; a deer is so called because it destroys serpents; B a swallow is so called because it moves its lips in chattering; a serpent, that is, the one who speaker—that is, the one who spoke to Eve once upon a time; a gazelle, from its keenness of sight; a turtle-dove, from keeping its seed—that is, its own kind; a nightingale, because it is always singing, both in summer and in winter; a vulture, because of its soaring flight in circles; a horse, because it rides on its feet; an eagle, because it is many times renewed and lives for many years; a bird, because it extends its wing; a river, as having a drinkable operation; a torrent, because it flows in winter; nature, from producing hypostases; an herb, C because it extends upward, just as also man, from looking upward; a soul, having this name from its own power. For *psychien* (to cool) is the same as to vivify; therefore it is called *psyche* (soul) from its faculty of vivifying, for it vivifies the body. There are also six hundred other things, which we pass over voluntarily, lest we should mention everything by its own names.
V. Concerning Union
What is union, and in how many ways is it understood? Union is a common concurrence of distant things. It is called union because things become one, that is, because they come together and are mixed. Moreover, union is said to be in five ways: commixtive, divisive, habitual, D positional, and the holy union of Christ, which, beyond these, is called according to hypostasis. And a union is indeed called commixtive, such as that of wine and water; divisive, such as that of man to man; habitual, such as that of gold to gold. But the union of Christ is declared to be above these, according to hypostasis. And union according to hypostasis is the self-subsistent concurrence of two natures in the womb of the holy Theotokos Virgin. For neither does the body exist there before the Word of God, nor the soul; but flesh at the same time, and God the Word at the same time. Animated rational flesh existed in Him, just as, it seems to me, in our own conception as well, the soul, subsisting by itself, concurs simultaneously with the body. For neither does the body subsist of
A itself, nor does the soul exist before the body, which is a certain image of the union of the Lord.
VI. On the Consubstantial.
What is consubstantial, and in accordance with what is it called consubstantial, and in how many ways is consubstantial used? It is called consubstantial which exists of the same substance and efficacy without distinction. For it is called consubstantial precisely because it possesses the same substance and power. It is said to be consubstantial in five B ways: as consubstantial, co-generated, congeneric, co-substantial, and co-phyletic. That is consubstantial which exists in the same substance, yet possesses some difference; for example, a porous stone and a hard stone: these are consubstantial, that is, they are of one substance. So also palm wood and ebony wood, and likewise the flesh of a camel and the flesh of a fish. These are called consubstantial because they are of the same substance. Just as all men are of one substance, yet have differences in their being—one is tall and another is short, one is strong and another is wretched—nevertheless, they are of one substance, I mean in respect of soul and body.
But it is called heterousion (of another substance) that which exists of a different substance and is not at all akin to the other, but is entirely alien and in every way unlike it, such as water and fire; for the substance of fire is one thing, and the substance of water is another. And therefore it is called heterousion because it is of a different nature and is of a different C kind; such as man and God, and angel, and clay, and sun, and grass. For these are in every way unlike one another, and for this reason they are called of different substances, as if because one does not share in the substance of the other; but one is of this kind, and the other is of another, as has been said.
VII. On the Soul and the Mind.
The soul is spoken of in two ways: one is the irrational soul, which belongs to beasts; the other is the rational soul, which belongs to men. And that of the beasts received its creation from the earth according to the command of God, as the divine Scripture says: "And God said, Let the earth bring forth creeping things of living souls." Thus the animals received their soul from the earth. For this reason they have an inclination and all their appetite toward earthly things only, and they do not contemplate the things above. Let us explain D how their soul was made from the earth. The earth, according to the command of God, gave flesh to the beasts; and the flesh produced blood. The blood became a bestial soul for the animal, so that when the animal dies, the blood hardens and changes into flesh. And the flesh, having corrupted and decomposed, becomes earth again. And for this reason they are ignorant, and do not contemplate the things above. But man received his soul from the divine inspiration, and for this reason he recognizes divine things, pursues what is above, understands heavenly things, and exists as a rational and intellectual being. But let no one suppose that the spirit which God breathed into man became a soul; far be it; rather, that spirit created the soul. For
B if that spirit within man were the soul, the soul would undoubtedly be of the essence of God. If, therefore, the soul were of the essence of God, why would it not be eternally unalterable and immutable, as God is? For He himself says: "I am who I am, and I do not change." But the soul is sometimes foolish, sometimes wise; sometimes sinful, sometimes just; at one time faithful, and at another time faithless; sometimes ignorant, sometimes knowledgeable; sometimes eager, and sometimes sluggish. Since the soul possesses these qualities, how can it be said to be of the essence of God? That is by no means possible. But this inspiration fashioned the soul in man as a rational and intelligent being. For this reason the soul also contemplates the things above through its intellect, and seeks, hungers for, and desires the things that are there, because it has its creation from there. The soul of irrational creatures is not so; but because it is earthly, it seeks only earthly things, and therefore it dies along with the body. But the soul of man exists eternally and has no end.
The soul has three parts: the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible. And by the rational part it loves God; by the irascible part it is angered against the demons, acting courageously against them; and by the concupiscible part it desires eternal goods. Man also possesses five bodily senses and five spiritual senses. Indeed, the bodily ones are these: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. In sight, white and black are perceived; in hearing, the sharp and the grave; in smell, pleasant odor and foul stench; in taste, sweet and bitter; in touch, hard and soft, hot and cold. The senses of the soul, however, are these: mind, intelligence, opinion, phantasia, and sensation. And the organ of each sense is called a sensorium, because it preserves the sense of the sensitive animal. C It is also worth knowing that while every flesh is called a body, not every body is called flesh. Indeed, the stars are called celestial bodies, yet they are not called celestial flesh. A body is said to be of two kinds: a material body and a subtle body. A material body is that which can be grasped by the hand, and which is subject to corruption and death; but a subtle body is that which cannot be grasped or touched, such as the sun, the moon, and the stars. The dense and material body, which is called flesh, consists of four elements—of blood, phlegm, humors, and bile—or rather, of air, earth, fire, and water; that is to say, of hot, cold, moist, and dry. The sun is the hot and vital element; the air, the hot and moist; the earth, the dry; the waters produce the moist element. These are the things of which man, or rather the flesh of man, consists; therefore, after death, it is resolved back into them.
VIII. On the corruptible.
What is corruptible, whence is it so called, and in how many ways is it spoken of?
A It is said to be corruptible in two ways: corporally and spiritually. Spiritually, a person is said to be corrupt when they have sinned, as the Scripture says: "They are corrupt, and become abominable in iniquities" (Ps. XIII, 1). Corporally, however, it is said to be corruptible in three ways: *interitus* (destruction), *corruptio* (corruption), and *consumptio* (consumption). *Interitus* is said to be solely the separation of the soul from the body, and death. *Corruptio* exists when the body is eaten by worms, and only the bones are left behind. *Consumptio* is named when those very bones also rot and are consumed, and pass away, no longer existing. This is what we say regarding our Lord Jesus Christ, that He received only *interitus*, that is to say, death. But His all-holy body did not at all undergo *corruptio* or *consumptio*; rather, He rose on the third day, having become the firstborn from the dead.
IX. Why is He called the firstborn? Because He rose first from Hades, just as we also are going to rise at the second coming. And since Lazarus, the daughter of Jairus, and many others rose before Him, why was none of them called the firstborn? Because those who rose from the dead died again. But Christ, having risen, died no more. And whatever shall occur to us in the resurrection, this has already happened to Him. For He was the first to rise from B the dead with that resurrection which is in incorruptibility, of which we also hope to be partakers in the future, a resurrection which no death shall follow.
X. What is the Word, and in how many ways is the Word spoken of? The Word is said to be spoken of in three ways: the substantial Word, which is God the Word; the internal word, which is of the angels, and that which we speak in our own mind; and the enuntiative word, which is uttered through the tongue, and is also called the messenger of the mind. The Word (*logos*) is so named from speaking (*legein*).
XI. What is a Christian? A Christian is a true rational house of Christ, built up through good works and right dogmas. A heretic is a slanderer and accuser of the truth. Heresy is the false assumption of that which is not. Immutable is that which always remains the same. Natural is that which is situated in nature, or that which is truly recognized as true. Contrary to nature is that which God did not make in this way, or that which He did not make at all, such as sin and death. There are three things that are spoken of regarding humanity: that which is according to nature, that which is contrary to nature, and that which is above nature. And according C to nature is marriage; D contrary to nature is fornication;
A above nature is virginity. And again, according to nature is wealth justly acquired; contrary to nature is greed; above nature is the renunciation of possessions. Similarly, according to nature is temperance in food; contrary to nature is gluttony; above nature is fasting. Likewise again, according to nature is peace; contrary to nature is tumult; above nature is love toward those who show enmity. And in the other things, similarly.
Etymology is the correctness of the force of a name, interpreted from the sense itself; for example: Why is "peace" [εἰρήνη] so called? Because it causes the mind to be tranquil [ἠρεμεῖν]. Just as, again, "tumult" [ταραχή] is so called because it is easily confused [ῥᾷον χεῖσθαι]; and "error" [πλάνη] because it makes the mind stray [πλαγιάζειν]. "Temperance" [σωφροσύνη] is either from "thinking soundly" [σῶα φρονεῖν] or from "guarding the body [σῶμα φρουρεῖν] from filth." "Fornication" [πορνεία] is so called either because it inflames [πυροῦν] youth, or because it maims [πηροῦν], or because it blinds [ἐκτυφλοῦν] the mind, or because it inclines one towards things that are far off B. And in the other things, similarly.
The body, having its composition from the elements, admits of dissolution and vanishes. For this reason, the bodies of both men and animals turn out to be corruptible and mortal, consisting of four elements: I mean earth, water, fire, and air. For those things which consist of these are always being generated and always perishing, through the dissolution of the composition of the elements, and each one resolving into its own proper place. But the elements themselves, being simple and incomposite, retain their own stability and are indissoluble until the end.
XII. Concerning the Soul
C Concerning the soul we say that there are five affections in it, which are called psychic affections. These are: anger, sorrow, fear, distress, and envy. He, therefore, who possesses a prudent mind is able to master these. The soul is by itself hot, like a burning fire. As, therefore, fire cooks what is cast into a pot, so the fiery soul breaks down and consumes the food sent into the stomach. For the soul is not called "soul" [ψυχή] because its substance is cold, as some of the more simple-minded have supposed, but because, due to its great heat, it dries up the humors; as can be confirmed also from the operation of the sun. For being hot and fiery, it dries up mud and draws up every humor. That the soul is hot by nature is confirmed also by the dying. For when the soul departs and leaves the body, all the limbs are found cold and icy, no less than winter frost. For as long as the soul has food in abundance, the body flourishes and is strong; but when it lacks food, it consumes and destroys the body itself. For the body cannot withstand the heat of the soul without food, just as neither can a copper vessel, placed on a furnace, bear the intensity of the fire without water; for it is dried out D and dissolves completely. Thus, therefore, the pot of the body, not having food,
being dissolved by the fiery soul, A it perishes utterly.
If at any time someone should dispute with you about the soul, ask him: "Tell me, does the soul of man reside in the whole body, or in one specific place?" And if he replies that it is in the whole body, say to him: "How is it, then, that when one's hand or foot is cut off, the soul is not also cut off, and yet the man still lives and does not die?" But if he says to you: "It resides in one part," respond again: "And how can the other parts of the man exist without a soul, and how can a man have a lifeless limb? And how is it possible to live without a soul? For everything that has no soul is dead; and you do not know what you are saying. But I will tell you in what place, and in what manner, and where the soul rests." B It is established in three places of the body, and just as the sun’s ray occupies one specific place and penetrates into a house, yet illuminates the entire house, so too the soul, resident in these three parts of the body, gives life to the whole house, the body. The soul has its seat in the heart, and in the rear part of the head, which is called the cavity, and in the basilica veins. In these three parts, therefore, the soul dwells. For this reason, in whatever hour the heart is wounded, or much blood flows from the basilica vein, or the head is struck and severed by a sword, the soul immediately departs from the body, and the body is found dead. Yet, while the soul dwells in these three parts, it distributes its own vital power to the whole body.
NOTICE REGARDING THE WORKS THAT FOLLOW [DEDICATED] TO ANTIOCHUS THE DUKE
I. It is clear from the epistle to John and Antiochus (printed in Vol. I [now Vol. II], p. 763) that a certain Antiochus existed in the age of Athanasius, who was familiar to Athanasius himself. He was also a presbyter, just as this Antiochus is mentioned later as having been ordained a presbyter. Thus, that Antiochus the presbyter was perhaps the occasion for various works being published under the name of Athanasius, dedicated to Antiochus. But whether they were written on that occasion or another, it is clear that they are not by any means Athanasian; rather, they are the work of another writer, later than Athanasius and far inferior in talent.
II. Of these three treatises inscribed to Antiochus, the first two, namely the *Doctrina ad Antiochum* and the *Opusculum ad Antiochum*, had not yet been published. Whether those three latter opuscula are by the same writer is not at all certain; the style of the discourse, however, is not very different. Moreover, they are all ancient, for we have borrowed the first two from ancient manuscripts; but the *Questions to Antiochus* are cited by an Anonymous Ravennas of the seventh, or as others think, a later century—published by D. Placidus Porcheron—at the place to be noted below. We place those *Questions to Antiochus* in the final position, so as not to separate them from the other questions which are not inscribed to Antiochus. We must treat certain points regarding each of these.
III. The *Doctrina ad Antiochum*, a product of an idle man, as anyone can see, is nevertheless precious and commendable for the reason that it presents to us in Greek a great part of the book of the *Shepherd* [of Hermas], whose Greek originals have long since perished; and indeed it does so in a version so pure, and so consonant with the Latin *Shepherd of Hermas*, that it is evident it was for the most part transcribed from it word for word. For, in the first place, this writer represents Antiochus as approaching St. Athanasius on account of bodily infirmity: so that he might alleviate his illness with his prayers and pave the way to penitence with his admonitions. To him, once his health had been restored, Athanasius delivers twelve commandments: which are nothing other than those twelve commandments of the *Shepherd of Hermas*, which constitute its second book. Yet this is done in such a way that he does not always present them whole, but with some portions omitted. Then, many other things from the same book are stitched together here and there: and finally...