Dialectic (Philosophical Chapters)

DIALECTIC. FOUNTAIN OF KNOWLEDGE. PROLOGUE.

To the most holy and God-honored Father Cosmas, most holy bishop of Majuma, John, the least of monks and presbyters, sends greetings in the Lord.

I hesitated, O blessed one, conscious of the limitations of my intellect and the difficulty of speech, to set my hand to tasks that exceeded my powers, and, like some overconfident and rash person, to penetrate the inner recesses of the sanctuary; for I feared the danger that hangs over those who dare attempt such things. ^A For if that divine legislator Moses, who withdrew from every sight of human affairs, leaving behind the surging worldly fruit, and having cleansed the eye of his mind from every corporeal impression, had become fit to attain the vision of God himself; if he, I say, who had achieved this, so as to behold the most kind condescension of the Word of God all the way to us, and his incarnation—surpassing the powers of nature—in the burning bush and in a fire devoid of corporeal fuel, by which the bush was ignited ^B and changed into His brilliance, yet was not consumed by the burning, nor did it depart from its own nature; if he, finally, who was the first to be taught the name of Him who is, and who is truly higher than essence, and who had accepted from God the leadership of his kin, nevertheless complained of a speech impediment and a slower tongue, so that he was unable to be a minister of the divine will and to proclaim it openly, and to become a mediator between God and men: who am I, stained and ^C defiled by every spot of sin, and carrying within myself the turbulent swell of passions, and

possessing neither a mind nor a consciousness purified so that I might become a mirror of God and His divine impressions, nor having a discourse sufficient to explain to those who understand the divine and ineffable things which transcend every grasp of rational creation? ^B Reflecting on these things, I hesitated to speak, and I feared the command—for I will say what is the case—lest I should expose myself to being laughed at on two counts: namely, for ignorance, and, what is most serious, for rashness and folly. For the fault of ignorance deserves pardon when it springs from a source other than sloth; but to hold the opinion of knowledge while having ignorance, this is truly serious and worthy of reproach rather than pardon; nay, it is an argument of a deeper, not to say extreme, ignorance. However, the fruit of disobedience is death, but whoever cultivates humility and obedience, showing himself a follower of Christ even to the end, is carried up on high, receives from God the grace that ministers light, and with his mouth opened, he is filled with the Spirit, is purified in heart, and is enlightened in mind; he receives speech at the opening of his mouth, and, not premeditating what he ought to say, he exists instead as an instrument of the Spirit speaking within him. Therefore, through you obedient to Christ, who exercises the high-priestly office among you, I submit to your commands, and relying on your prayers, I open my mouth, hoping that it may be filled with the Spirit, and that I may then utter those words which are not the fruits of my own mind, but of the Spirit, who makes the blind wise. So that I may receive what He is about to give, and may repeat the same.

Tripartite Work: 1. Dialectics. 2. Book of Heresies. 3. Book of the Orthodox Faith.

First, therefore, of those who have been distinguished among the Gentiles for the praise of wisdom, I shall set forth all that is best, since I have established that whatever is good has been granted to mortals by the benefit of God; ‹for every best gift and every perfect benefit is from above, descending from the Father of lights› (1). But whatever is contrary to the truth is a dark invention of Satanic error and a fiction of a lost mind, just as the most excellent Gregory in Theology said. Wherefore, like a bee, I shall gather and compose those things which are akin to the truth, and I shall receive salvation from the very enemies themselves. But whatever is evil and joined to so-called knowledge, I shall reject. Presently, in another volume ^D I shall weave together the elegies of the heresies hateful to God, so that, the falsity being known, the truth may...

^A be more closely adhered to. And thus at last, I shall set forth the truth, the destroyer of error and the expeller of falsehood, adorned and decorated like golden fringes with the discourses of the prophets inspired by God, as well as of those instructed by God, the fishermen, and also of the divine shepherds and teachers, with God and His grace inspiring me; so that its glory, shining from within, may illuminate with its own rays those who approach it with souls purified, as is right, and with turbulent thoughts cast aside. I shall bring forward nothing, as I was just saying, that is my own; but I shall gather into one those things which have been elaborated by all the most approved masters, and I shall set them forth, as far as it is permitted to me, in a brief and compendious discourse, obeying in all things ^B your command. Therefore, I beseech you, venerable Fathers in Christ, that you grant pardon to me who have complied with your precepts, and that you be favorably disposed, and that in return for the obedience which he shows you, you may repay with your prayers. ^C

PHILOSOPHICAL CHAPTERS

Accurate index of the chapters of this volume. 1. On knowledge. 2. What is the aim? 3. On philosophy. 4. On being, substance, and accident. 5. On the voice. 6. On division. 7. On that which is prior by nature. 8. On definition. 9. On genus. 10. On species. 11. On the individual. 12. On difference. 13. On accident. 14. On proper. 15. On things predicated. 16. On synonymous and homonymous predication. 17. On things predicated in terms of what it is, and of what sort it is. ^D 18. On the communion and difference of the five voices. 19. On the communion and difference of genus and difference. 20. On the communion and difference of genus and species. 21. On the communion and difference of genus and proper. 22. On the communion and difference of genus and accident. 23. On the communion and difference of difference and species. 24. On the communion and difference of difference and proper. 25. On the communion and difference of difference and accident. 26. On the communion and difference of species and proper.

27. On in what species and accidents agree and differ. 28. On in what proper and inseparable accident both agree and differ. 29. On hypostasis, and enhypostaton and anhypostaton. 30. On substance, and nature, and form; and not of individual, and person and hypostasis. 31. On equivocally. 32. On univocally. 33. On polyonymy. ^A 34. On others and heteronyms. 35. On denominatives. 36. On the ten supreme genera. 37. On homogenerates, and homoeideis, and heterogeneis, and heteroideis and those differing in number. 38. On in what. 39. On substance. 40. On nature. 41. On form. 42. On hypostasis. 43. On person. 44. On enhypostaton. 45. On anhypostaton. 46. Division of being. 47. Division of substance. 48. On homogenerates, and homoeideis, and heterogeneis and heteroideis, and homohypostatis, and those differing in number. 49. On quantity and muchness. 50. On relatives. 51. On quality and sort. 52. On doing and suffering. 53. On position. 54. On where. 55. On when. 56. On having. ^B 57. On opposites. 58. On habit and privation. 59. On prior and posterior. 60. On together. 61. On motion. 62. On having. 63. On enunciation, affirmation, and negation. 64. On term, and proposition, and syllogism. 65. On union. 66. On hypostatic union. 67. The definitions of philosophy are six. 68. On the four dialectic methods.

We have presented the chapters of the Damascene’s Dialectica in the order in which they are found in the Basilian edition and in the five royal codices, in which a more extensive logic is contained. But, in order that the reader may perceive the distinctions of both editions, it is our pleasure to provide another index taken from the codices of the more concise logic.

1. On being, substance, and accident. 2. On genus, both the most general and the most specific, and the subalterns. 3. On the individual. 4. On difference. 5. On accident. 6. On the proper. ^C 7. On predicates. 8. On the synonym and equivocal predicate. 9. On the category of what it is, and of what sort it is. 10. On hypostasis and enhypostaton, and anhypostaton. 11. On substance, and nature, and form, and individual, and person, and hypostasis. 12. On division. 13. On that which is prior by nature. 14. On definition. 15. On equivocally.

The remaining chapters follow in the same order as in the former index. ^D

CHAPTER I. On Knowledge.

^A Nothing is more precious than knowledge; for knowledge is light for the rational soul; the opposite, ignorance, is darkness. Just as the privation of light is darkness, so too is the privation of knowledge darkness for the intellect. For ignorance is proper to irrational creatures, but knowledge to rational ones. Consequently, he to whom knowledge is absent, being by nature capable of knowledge and scientific understanding, he is, by reason of the carelessness and sloth of his soul, worse than the irrational creatures. By knowledge, I mean the true awareness of things that are. For the sciences deal with things that are; wherefore a false knowledge, as being an awareness of that which is not, is ignorance rather than knowledge. For falsehood is nothing other than that which is not. Since, therefore, we do not live by the soul alone, but our soul, covered as if by a garment with flesh, possess the mind like an eye that sees and is capable of knowing, and is receptive to the knowledge of things and of science, yet does not possess knowledge and science by itself or from its own resources, but stands in need of the one who teaches—let us approach the unerring teacher of truth; Christ is the subsistent wisdom and truth, in whom are all the ^B hidden treasures of knowledge, and who exists as the wisdom and power of God and the Father, so that we may hear his voice through the help of the divine Scriptures, and learn the true knowledge of all things. Let us approach with care and sincerity, lest we cause the intellectual eye of our soul to be dimmed by passions; for it would be difficult for anyone with a most pure and transparent eye to gaze clearly upon the truth. ^C If the light that is in us, that is to say, the mind, is darkness, how great will the darkness be? Let us approach with all our soul and mind. For just as it is impossible for an eye that is constantly moving and being turned around to gaze clearly at what is seen—for the eye must be directed toward that which is perceived—so too, by shaking off every storm of thoughts, it is fitting for us to approach the truth, having left behind the dregs of matter; yet it is not enough for us to have reached the doors, but let us knock vigorously, so that, the door of the bridal chamber being opened, we may perceive its internal beauty. For the letter is indeed the door; but the one within the bridal chamber ^D is that which is hidden by it, the beauty of the thoughts, or rather the Spirit of truth. Let us knock vigorously, let us read once, twice, many times, and by so digging, we shall find the treasure of knowledge and shall take delight in its wealth. Let us ask, let us search, let us examine, let us inquire. For everyone who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it shall be opened. And, "Ask your father, and he will tell you."

^A Therefore, if we are lovers of learning, we shall also be lovers of wisdom. For all things are by nature capable of being acquired by diligence and toil, and before all things, and after all things, by the grace of God who gives. Since the divine Apostle says, "Test all things; hold fast what is good," [*] let us examine also the words of outside sages. Perhaps we shall find among them something useful, and shall reap something beneficial to the soul. For every craftsman needs certain instruments for the construction of his works. It is fitting, too, that certain handmaidens should serve the queen. Let us, therefore, take on the arguments that are servants of the truth, and let us cast off the impiety that has tyranny over them; and let us not make bad use of what is good; let us not employ the art of logic for the deception of the simpler-minded, but even if the truth does not need various sophistries, let us nevertheless make use of them against those who stir up unholy war, ^B and for the overthrow of that which is falsely called knowledge.

What the purpose of studies ought to be.

Therefore, let us make our beginning from these, as from elements, and for those who still have need of milk, let us take the beginning of our discourse, having invoked the aid and assistance of Christ, who is the subsistent Word of God, from whom "every good gift and every perfect gift is given." [*] The goal for those who encounter these things shall be to moor the mind to the blessed end. This is to be led through the senses to that which is above every sense and comprehension—who is the cause, maker, and creator of all. For "from the beauty of created things, the Creator is proportionately contemplated," [*] and "His invisible things are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made." [*] Wherefore, if we strive for knowledge with an undistracted and humble mind, we shall attain what we desire. "For how can you believe," said Christ, who is the Truth, "when you receive glory from men?" [*] And, "Everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and he who humbles himself will be exalted." [*] ^D

CAPUT II.

What the purpose is.

Since everyone who begins a matter without a purpose... [alt-version omitted]

walks as if in darkness—for he who labors without a purpose is in total want—let us first state the purpose of the proposed discourse, so that what is said may be easily grasped. Our purpose, therefore, is to undertake philosophy and, as much as possible, to record in the present book, in summarized form, knowledge of every kind. Let it be called THE FOUNTAIN OF KNOWLEDGE. I shall therefore say nothing of my own; but I shall gather and set forth in summary the things spoken sporadically by holy and wise men. It is better, therefore, first to know precisely what philosophy is. ^A

CAPUT III. Concerning Philosophy.

Philosophy is the knowledge of what is, ^B as it is—that is, the knowledge of the nature of things. And again: Philosophy is the knowledge of divine and human things—that is, of things that are visible and invisible. Philosophy is, furthermore, the study of death—both the voluntary and the natural. For life is twofold: the natural, according to which we live, and the voluntary, according to which we exert ourselves in attachment to the present life. Death is also twofold: the natural, which is the separation of the soul from the body, and the voluntary, according to which we despise the present life and hasten toward the future.

Philosophy is, moreover, becoming like God. We become like God through wisdom, that is, through true knowledge of the good; and through justice, which is the distribution of equality and is impartial in judgment; and through holiness, which is superior to justice, that is, goodness, or doing good to those who wrong us. ^C Philosophy is the art of arts and the science of sciences. For philosophy is the beginning of every art. Through it, every art and every science has been found. Now, an art is that which is liable to error in some things, according to some. A science, however, is that which is in no way liable to error; and philosophy alone does not err. According to others, an art is that which is performed by the hands; but a science is every logical art—grammar, rhetoric, and such like. Philosophy is, again, the love of wisdom. True wisdom is God; therefore, love toward God is true philosophy.

Philosophy is divided into the theoretical and the practical; the theoretical into theology, physiology, and mathematics; the practical into ethics, economics, and politics. ^D The theoretical, therefore, is that which adorns the intellect. Theology, then, is the contemplation of things incorporeal and immaterial—first, God, who is truly immaterial; then, angels and souls. Physiology is the contemplation of material things and those readily available [to us],

such as animals, plants, stones, and similar things. ^A Mathematics, on the other hand, is the knowledge of things which, although in themselves lacking body, are nevertheless considered within a body; I mean numbers, the harmony of sounds, furthermore, shapes, and the movement of the stars. The study which deals with numbers constitutes the science of arithmetic; that which deals with sounds, music; that which deals with shapes, geometry; and that which deals with the stars, astronomy. These hold a middle place between bodies and incorporeal things. For a number, in itself, is not corporeal, but it is considered in matter—for example, in wheat, or wine, or some other such thing. The active [part] of philosophy, however, is concerned with virtues. For it refines character and teaches how life ought to be ordered; and if it prescribes laws for a single individual, it is called ethics; if for an entire household, economics; and lastly, politics, if for cities and regions.

Some have attempted to remove philosophy from the midst, denying that it, or any science or perception, exists. ^B We shall refute them in this way: How can you say that philosophy, and knowledge, and comprehension do not exist? Have you reached knowledge and comprehension, or have you reached neither? If you have reached them, then behold, there is knowledge and comprehension. But if you have not reached them, no one will believe you when you argue about a matter, the knowledge of which you have not reached.

Since, therefore, philosophy is the knowledge of the things that are, let us speak about being. It must be known that we begin from that part of philosophy which is occupied with reasoning, which is rather an instrument of philosophy than a part; for it is used for every demonstration. We shall, therefore, speak first about simple and unadorned terms, through the simple notion of which simple things are declared, and thus we shall subsequently treat of reasoning.

CAP. IV.

Regarding being, substance, and accident.

"Being" is the common name of all things that are; this is divided into substance and accident. Substance, indeed, is the more primary [thing], as [existing] in itself, and not ^C

^A needing another for its existence. An accident, however, is that which cannot exist in itself, but is beheld in substance. ^B For substance is, as it were, a substrate, the material of things, while an accident is that which is beheld in a substrate; for example, bronze and wax are substances, while figure, form, and color are accidents. Moreover, a body is a substance, but color is an accident. A body is not in color, but color is in a body. Neither is the soul in knowledge, but knowledge is in the soul. Nor are bronze and wax in figure, but figure is in the wax and in the bronze. Furthermore, one does not speak of the body of the color, but the color of the body; nor of the soul of the knowledge, but the knowledge of the soul; nor of the wax of the figure, but the figure of the wax. And color, knowledge, and figure are subject to change, while the body, the soul, and the wax remain the same, since substance is not at all subject to change. And the substance and material of a body is one, but there are many colors. In the same way, in all other things, the substrate is substance, while that which is beheld in the substrate—namely, the accident—is the accident.

Definitions of substance and accident.

They define substance thus: Substance is a self-subsisting thing, not needing another for its existence. An accident, however, is that which cannot exist in itself, but has its existence in another. Therefore, God and every created thing are substances—even though God ^C is supersubstantial. There are also substantial qualities, of which we shall speak.

On being, substance, and accident.

"Being" is the common name of all things that are. For this reason, it is divided into substance and accident. Substance, indeed, is a self-subsisting thing not needing another for its constitution—that is, that which exists in itself and does not have its existence in another. An accident, however, is that which cannot exist in itself, but has its existence in another. For substance, just like the material of things, has the nature of a substrate. But an accident is that ^D which is beheld in substance/substrate, such as the body and the color.

^A For it is not the body that is in the color, but the color that is in the body. Therefore, the body is substance, while the color is an accident. Similarly with the soul and prudence. For the soul is not in prudence, but prudence is in the soul. Hence, it is not said that the body belongs to the color, but the color to the body; nor the soul to prudence, but prudence to the soul. Therefore, the soul is substance, while prudence is an accident. For if the soul is removed, it is necessary that prudence be removed as well. For if the soul does not exist, in what will prudence exist? But if prudence is removed, the soul is not necessarily removed; for it is possible for the soul to exist apart from prudence. In the same way, regarding all things that exist, that which is in itself, and not in another, ^B is substance; but that which is not able to exist by itself, but has its existence in another, is an accident.

Cap. V. On Voice.

^B Since our purpose is to discuss every philosophical voice, we must first recognize about which sort of voice philosophy is concerned. Taking the inception of our discourse from voice itself, we say: voice either lacks signification or has the power of signifying. That which lacks signification is that by which nothing is signified; that which has the power of signifying is that by which something is signified. Again, that voice which signifies nothing is either articulated or not articulated. Non-articulated is that which can in no way be written; articulated, however, is that which can be written. Therefore, the non-articulated voice, which is void of signification, is that which is produced by a stone, for example, or by a piece of wood. For it is neither ^C engraved in letters, nor does it signify anything. The voice that is void of signification, and yet is articulated, is like *scindapsus*. For this is written, but it signifies nothing. For there never was, nor will there ever be, a *scindapsus*. Therefore, about the voice that lacks signification, whether it be articulated or non-articulated, philosophy has no concern.

Again, the voice that signifies is either articulated or non-articulated. A voice that is not articulated, but has the power of signifying, is like the barking of dogs. For by this the dog is designated, because it is the voice of a dog. Moreover, it designates that someone is present. But it is not articulated; for it cannot be written. Wherefore, neither does philosophy concern itself with this. But that which is significant and articulated is either universal or particular. Universal, as "man"; particular, as "Peter" or "Paul." But not even the particular voice has a place in philosophy, but [only that which is] significant, articulated, and universal.

^D Essential or accidental voice. — This, in turn, is either substantial or accidental to substance. Substantial, or essential, is that which [signifies] the essence,

^A that is, it declares the nature of things; accidental indicates accidents. For example: man is a rational, mortal animal. All these things are essential. For if you take away any of these from man, he will cease to be man. If you say he is not an animal, he is no longer man. If you say he is not endowed with reason, he is not man. In like manner, if you deny that he is mortal, he will no longer be man. For every man is an animal, and endowed with reason, and mortal. For this reason, such terms are called substantial, because they complete the nature, and it is impossible for man to subsist if they are removed. In the same way, in every thing, those things which constitute the nature are called substantial. Those, however, which are adventitious are accidents, as those which can be or can not be in the subject, suppose in a man or horse or some other such thing, for example, whiteness. For whether anyone is white or black, he is nonetheless a man. Therefore, these and things similar to them are adjectitious, or accidents; things which, both they themselves and their opposites, can be present in us.

^B The signification of the substantial voice. — Now, indeed, the substantial voice either signifies what a thing is, or what kind of thing it is. Thus, if someone from among us asks what man is, we answer: an animal. Then if he asks what kind of animal he is, we say: a rational, mortal one. Wherefore, a substantial voice that indicates what kind of thing a thing is, is called a difference. But that which declares what it is, either expresses many species, and then it makes a genus; or ^C many who differ in number, but not in species, and then it makes a species. The first is, indeed, genus, as is substance. For "substance" signifies both man, and horse, and ox, of which each one is termed and is a substance, yet each one is a species. But each species is one thing and another. The second, however, is species, as is "man." For it signifies many, that is, all and individual men, who indeed differ among themselves in number: for Peter is one thing and Paul is another, and they are not one, but two; yet they do not differ in species, that is, in nature. For all are called men, and in reality are.

^D Particulars differ in number. — Therefore, that which is more special and particular differs in number, as Peter, an individual, and a person, and a hypostasis; which indeed signifies one individual thing. For when someone of us asks who this is, we answer: Peter. The same voice, moreover, signifies "another." For Peter is one thing, and Paul is another; likewise, "himself," and "this," and "that." These and others of this kind, which subsist by themselves, are spoken of the individual. Furthermore, that which embraces the individuals is called species, and is broader than the individual, inasmuch as it comprises many individuals,

^A much as genus contains many species; for example, the animal. For it contains man, ox, horse, and is broader than the species. But the holy Fathers called nature, and form, and substance, the genus as well. And it makes the species, that is, the nature, and the substance, and the form, not another thing, nor a different thing, but other. For we say man is one thing by nature, and the horse is another, not another thing, and another. It is said, therefore, concerning the species, this, and itself, and that, and such, which is predicated in the "what it is." But a difference makes a thing different. For an animal is one thing that is rational, and another that is irrational; and such is the "what," and the "what sort." The essential voice either exists in one, or in many. And if it is in one, it is called peculiar, as the "laughable," existing in man alone, and the "neighing" in the horse alone. If it exists in many species, it causes an accident; for example, whiteness. For this exists in man, and in horse, and in dog, and in many other species. And these are the five voices, to which every philosophical voice is reduced. Wherefore we must know what each signifies, in what they have communion with one another, and in what they differ: and these are genus, species, difference, property, and accident.

A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THESE VOICES

Genus is that which is predicated in the "what it is" of many things differing in species; that is to say, it is spoken and named. For to be predicated is the same as to be said of something. Species is that which is predicated in the "what it is" of many things differing in number. Difference is that which is predicated in the "what sort" of many things differing in species, and is assumed in the definition as substantial. For this is that which cannot in the same species ^D equally either be or not be; but it is absolutely necessary that it be in that species whose difference it is; which also, when it is present, preserves, and when it is absent, destroys. Nor can it happen that it itself, and its contrary, be in the same species: e.g., it cannot be that reason is not in man. For what lacks reason is nowhere man. This, when present, constitutes the nature of man, and when absent, it destroys it. For that which is devoid of reason does not possess the capacity of man. It must be known, therefore, that this is called substantial, and natural, and constituting, and dividing, and specific difference, and substantial quality and natural property; which among philosophers is most properly called difference, as that which is most

^A special, and makes the nature in which it resides manifest. “Property”

[Proprium]

[Accidens]

[proprietas]

CAP. VI. Of Division.

“Division”

[Divisio]

[Superdivisio]

[Subdivisio]

The modes of division are eight, for this reason. For whatever is divided, is divided either ^D according to itself, or by accident. And if according to itself, either as a thing or as a word; and if as a thing, either as genus into species, as when you divide animal into rational and irrational; or as species into individuals, as when human is divided into Peter and Paul and the rest.

^A Or as a whole into parts. And this in two ways: either into parts that are similar, or into those that are dissimilar. ^B It is of similar parts when the segments receive both the name and the definition of the whole, and of the parts themselves; for example, flesh is divided into many pieces of flesh, and each part of the flesh is called flesh, and accepts the definition of flesh. It is of dissimilar parts, conversely, when the thing divided does not receive either the name, or the definition, of the whole, or even of the parts, in common with one another; as if you were to divide Socrates into hands, feet, and head. For neither is the foot cut off from Socrates called Socrates, nor the head; nor does it receive the definition of Socrates or of the head.

Or as an equivocal term into various meanings; and this again in two ways. For either the whole is signified by the term, or a part. As a whole, for example, the word "dog." For it is used of the land dog, the celestial dog, and the sea dog, which are indeed whole things, and not merely parts of an animal. But it is as a part when the word "tongue" is used of the extremity of a shoe and a part of the leg, and also of that part of living creatures in which the faculty of tasting is situated; which are indeed only parts, and not a whole of any kind. ^C And in this way, that which is the subject of division is divided in itself. But per accidens, either as substance into accidents; as when I say, "Of men, some are white, others black." For men are substances; but whiteness and blackness are accidents. Or as accident into substances; as when I say, "Of the white, some are animate, some inanimate." For white is an accident; but animate and inanimate are substances. Or as accident into accidents; as when I say, "Of cold things, some are white and dry; others are black and humid." For cold, and white, and black, and humid are all accidents.

Division from one, and to one.

Eight modes of division are enumerated. Not all approve of the division of species into individuals.

multitude is distributed: for the multitude of individual men is infinite.

It is worth knowing that in no way of division is that which is by nature prior and posterior considered in the parts, nor that which is more and less; yet in those things which are divided from one, or for the sake of order to one, both that which is prior and posterior by nature is considered, and that which is more and less; whence also the denomination arises.

On Division

^A Division is the first cutting of a thing: for example, animal is divided into rational and irrational. Subdivision is the cutting of one part into two other parts, as when the animal having been divided into rational and irrational, we divide one part, namely the rational, into mortal and immortal. Superdivision, however, is when, having made a division of a thing, we make another division of the same thing. For example, man is divided into male and female; behold the division. And again, man is divided into soul and body; behold the superdivision. But division and superdivision do not always occur, but when everything is not contained under the first division. Behold, for instance, in the male and in the female, soul and body are considered.

^C 17. What are contradistinctive elements. It must be known that those are called contradistinctive which are two species cut from one and the same genus: for example, animal is divided into rational and irrational. Therefore the rational and irrational are called contradistinctive.

There are eight modes of division. For something is divided, or as a genus into its species, as animal is divided into rational and irrational; or as a species into individuals, as man is divided into Peter, and Paul, and the remaining individual men; or as a whole into parts, and this in two ways: either they are similar or dissimilar. Similar parts are those which receive the name and definition of the whole and of each other, as when we cut flesh into many fleshes, each part is called flesh, and receives the name and definition of flesh. ^D Dissimilar parts, on the other hand, are those which neither receive the name nor the definition of the whole, nor of the parts; as when we divide Socrates into head, hands, and feet. For neither the head, nor the hands, nor the feet receive the name and definition of Socrates, nor of each other. Or as an equivocal word [is divided] into different meanings, and this in two ways: namely, as a whole or as a part. As a whole, as this word "dog." For it is said of the terrestrial dog, the celestial, and the marine, which are a certain whole, not a part of an animal. As a part, when the name "tongue" is said of the extremity of a shoe, of the extremity of a pipe, and of the member by which animals have the faculty of tasting; which indeed are parts and not

^A wholes, as when I say, of men, some are white, others black. Or as accidents into substances, as when I say: of white things, some are animate, others inanimate. Or as accident into accidents: as if I were to say, of cold things, these are dry, those are indeed moist. Or as those things which are from one, and those which are directed toward one. From one, as from medicine, "medical book," "medical instrument" derive their name. Toward one, however, as "salubrious remedy," "salubrious food"; for they look to one thing, namely, health. According to this method, therefore, being is divided into substance and accident.

It is necessary to know that in no mode of division is what is naturally prior and posterior, nor what is more and less, considered among the divided parts, unless in those things which are from one and directed to one.

CAP. VII. Concerning that which is naturally prior.

^BNature, therefore, that is prior which is brought in at the same time, but does not bring it in along with itself; which also removes it along with itself, but is not removed at the same time. E.g., animal is naturally prior to man. For when animal is removed and does not exist, it is necessary that man also not be. For man is an animal. And if animal is not existing, necessarily neither will man be; for man is indeed an animal. Conversely, when man is removed, it is possible for animal to be. For there will be horse, dog, and the like; which indeed are animals. Again, when man is posited, animal also is brought in: for man is an animal. But from the bringing in of animal, it is not necessary that man be brought in; but perhaps a horse, or a dog, or something similar. ^C For these themselves are also animals. Therefore, neither is Peter naturally prior to Paul, nor animal rationale to irrational animal. For when Peter is removed and does not exist, Paul will be; and when Paul is posited, Peter is not at the same time brought in: and neither, when Peter is brought in, does Paul follow at the same time. But neither is Peter more, that is to say, more man or animal, than Paul; nor Paul than Peter. But one medicine is found to be more salubrious than another medicine, and one medical book is found to be more suitable for healing than another.

CAP. VIII. Concerning definition.

^DWhat is definition? Definition is a compendious speech declaring the nature of the subject, or a speech signifying the nature of the subject in few words. As, man is an animal participating in reason, mortal, capable of intelligence and science. And many indeed have had long and ample discourses concerning the nature of man: but because they are by no means brief and compendious, therefore they are not definitions. Again, there are certain brief sayings, such as apophthegms, but because they do not explain the nature of the thing, consequently they are not definitions either. Indeed

often denotes the nature of the subject matter ^A but it is not a definition. For a name is one word, but a definition is a phrase; and a phrase consists of at least two words, and those different ones. [Thus "terminating-word" is a name, because it is explicit; but "terminating-word" is not in a conjunction.]

Definition from genus and constituent or substantial differences. As in the case of the definition of an animal: for animal is an ensouled, sensitive substance. Behold, substance is the genus; and the ensouled and sensitive parts are the constituent differences. It is taken also from matter and form; for instance, a statue is that which is made of bronze, representing the appearance of a man. For bronze ^B is the matter; but representing the appearance of a man is the form of the statue. Furthermore, the matter corresponds to the genus, the form to the difference. In addition to this, it is taken from subject and end; as, medicine is the art that is occupied with human bodies and secures health. Behold, the subjects of medicine are human bodies; and its end is health.

19 A description is made from accidents. [Descriptive.] But a description is composed from those things which are adventitious, that is, from proper and accidental qualities; for instance: "Man is a rational, risible animal, walking with an upright body, having broad nails." For all these things are adventitious to the essence. Wherefore it is also called a description, as if adumbrating, ^C not declaring the essential state of the thing, but only those things which attend it. Furthermore, a definition is mixed from substantial and accidental qualities; for example: "Man is a rational animal, walking upright, having broad nails."

Definition, that is to say, is named by a metaphor drawn from the borders of land. For just as a boundary separates what is proper to each from that which is alien, so too does a definition distinguish the nature of each thing from the nature of another.

The excellence of a definition. An entire definition of a man. The soundness, or excellence, of a definition consists in this: that it neither falls short in words nor is redundant. But for men, both words may be missing or may be redundant. That definition ^D is perfect which is convertible with the thing defined; but that which is not convertible is imperfect. Therefore, neither that which falls short in words,

VARIAE LECTIONES. * Those things which follow up to "Consists of," etc., are absent in the manuscripts of the second class, or the shorter logic; instead of this it is read: "and so they can be rendered in Latin, and therefore a definition requires two words to be composed, to be brief, and to declare the nature of the thing defined: which seems more appropriate to the text than others. For why here concern the 'terminating-word,' and the definition of the 'terminating-word' as if by inference; concerning which the author had premised nothing, for without doubt he signifies the 'terminating-word,' not the definition. For here he says that a name is; but he says a definition consists of a name. From these things, however, whether they be genuine or added, it is gathered that a 'terminating-word' is not a simple name, but an explicit name; so that the definition consisting of it may be clear, not ambiguous nor obscure. He adds [the] name that 'terminating-word' becomes in conjunction; because, as the logicians say, a name outside of a proposition is not a 'terminating-word'." * Two royal [manuscripts]. Edita [are edited] as [it is].

NOTES. (10) Ammon. Proleg. in Isag. Porphyrii. (11) Ammonius, loc. cit.

^A nor that which is redundant, when it is converted with the defined thing. For when it abounds in words, it is deficient in things; but when it is deficient in words, it abounds in things. Therefore, nature has devised a wondrous artifice; namely, an opulent poverty, and opulence simulating poverty.] For instance, the perfect definition of a man is "an animal, rational, mortal." Behold, it is converted. For every rational, mortal animal is a man, and every man is a rational, mortal animal. If, therefore, some one word is missing from this, it abounds in things: such as, "an animal, rational." For you see that it is deficient by one word (for I did not say "mortal") and abounds in things: for not man alone is an animal endowed with ^B reason, but an angel also; and it is not converted with the defined thing. Again, if I should say, "an animal, rational, mortal, grammatical," not even thus is it converted. For it is redundant by one word, in that I have said "grammatical": but it is deficient in things. For it has not defined every man, but grammarians only. For an animal that uses every reason, mortal, grammatical—[this is not the case for all]. For not every man is a grammatical man; but yet not every man is a grammatical [man].

Therefore, perfect definitions are those which are converted with the defined object. But since "the proper" is also ^C converted with that of which it is the proper (for whatever is a man, that is also capable of laughter, and whatever is capable of laughter, that also is a man), we must, on account of the distinction, add and say that perfect definitions are those finally which are taken from the genus and the constitutive differences, and which neither are deficient in words, nor redundant, and finally are converted with the defined object. Likewise also, those which are taken from both, that is, from the subject and the end, are perfect; and those [taken] from the composite of both, from the matter and the form. There is also a time when even those [taken] only from the subject, when [the subject] is clearly known, ^D suffice.

VARIOUS READINGS. These [words] up to the words "οἷον, ὁ τέλειος ὁρισμός" [for instance, the perfect definition] are not read in the manuscripts of the second class, nor [do they indicate] what I might suspect to be spurious and transferred from the margin. * Published as "μία λέξει." Likewise two royal codices of the "Fulsior Logica," or of the first class. Some Royal and Colbertine [manuscripts] [read] "πλὴν μόνους." Another: "ἀλλὰ μόνους." In the codex of St. Hilary, it is amended above the line, "ἀλλὰ μόνον."

NOTES. (12) "Ζῶόν ἐστι λογικὸν θνητόν." It is an animal, rational, mortal. For, he says, not only man is an animal endowed with reason, but an angel also. Undoubtedly, in his Dialectics, he has collected what the philosophers taught, with no one among the Fathers contradicting. But after Plato, Nazianzen, in his 57th oration, near the middle, and others defined man as "an animal, rational, mortal": Aristotle favors this, who in book 1 of the *Prior Analytics*, c. 51, divides animal into mortal and immortal; into mortal, for instance, man; into immortal, or angel. I believe the reason for this definition and division is to be sought from that opinion of the Platonists, which Plotinus recounts in *Enneads* 3, book v, chap. 6, regarding the essence of a demon (thus they called angels of the lowest order) *καθ' ὅσον δαίμων* [insofar as it is a demon], that it exists together with a certain body, either airy or fiery. Marsilio Ficino discusses this doctrine in his study of this book of Plotinus, chap. 5, where he posits five genres of rational animals according to the Platonists; some merely fiery, others of fire and air, others of air and subtle water, others watery, others of water and subtle earth. These, he says, are the five [kinds] of human bodies, as it were, of the lowest demons. Furthermore, he took these not only from Orpheus, but also from Apuleius, Iamblichus, Porphyry, and other Platonists, as he testifies in chap. 6.

We have explained the bodies of demons above, with a certain freer reasoning, by which we might depart by far from the Platonists. But yet, according to these, they had defined a man as an animal, rational, mortal. Which definition our author would certainly not have admitted, had it not appeared quite frequently in the books of the Fathers. For it is completely opposed to his own sentiment regarding the non-corporeality of angels, which he asseverates in his theological works. But the Greek Fathers, while they were receiving the words or opinions of the ancients, often wrote contradictory things. For the division of the rational animal into mortal and immortal, and that definition of a man as "rational, mortal," can in no way be made to accord with the common division among the Damascene into corporeal and incorporeal, or angel. From which it can be inferred that this holy Doctor, in the place we are examining, took the words "animal" and "rational" in a broader sense, and admitted the difference of "mortal" in the definition of a man, that the nature of a man might be distinguished in every way from the angelic, especially because *τὸ λογικόν* signifies in Greek "rational," [possessing] the power of reasoning, whether conjoined with sense or devoid of sense; from which they decided the mortal difference should be added.

^A That subject is not subject to another art, as glass is to the art of glassmaking; and [sometimes it is defined] from the end alone, when that end cannot be the end of another art, as in the art of shipbuilding. Wherefore, from all these things it must be understood that the perfection of a definition lies in this, that it may be convertible with the thing defined.

Difference exists between a definition and a term, in that the latter is more universal and the former more particular. For a term is more universal than a definition; and indeed, a term denotes a boundary. It also denotes a negation, as when we say, "The king has decreed." It also denotes that into which a proposition is resolved, as, with God's help, we shall learn hereafter. It also denotes a definition. But a definition denotes only the brief discourse which declares the nature of the subject matter.

It must be known that a definition is taken only of substance and its species; and we cannot construct a definition for individuals or for accidents, ^B but only a description; for a definition is composed of a genus and constituent differences, whereas a description is composed of accidental qualities.

CHAPTER IX. Concerning Genus.

It should be known that in the case of equivocal terms, three things must be sought: first, whether the term itself is equivocal; how many meanings it has; and of which of them the discourse speaks. Therefore, we must state first what is equivocal. Equivocal terms exist when two or more things have the same name, but each of them signifies something different and pertains to a different substance—that is, it receives a different definition; just as is the case now with genus. For genus is among the number of equivocal terms. For genus is said first to be taken from country and parents; and each of these in a twofold manner, to wit, proximately or remotely. From a proximate country, ^C as from Jerusalem ("Hierosolyma") a person is called a Hierosolymitan; from a remote one, as from the province of Palestine, a Palestinian. In the same way, from a proximate parent, as when Achilles, being the son of Peleus, is called a Peleid. From a remote one, as when the same person is called an Eacides from his grandfather Eacus. For Eacus was the father of Peleus. Genus is also said to be the relationship of one toward many who have their origin from him, as when all who have their station from Israel are called Israelites. But concerning these two significations of genus, there is no discussion for philosophers. ^D

^A Genus is again defined as that to which a species is subordinate; for instance, man, horse, and other species are subordinate to animal: therefore, animal is a genus. ^B It is of this genus that philosophers speak; and defining it, we say: A genus is that which is predicated in the "what is it" of many things that differ in species. For example, animal, being a genus, is predicated of man, horse, ox, and many others in the "what is it," which indeed differ from one another in species. For the species of man is one thing, that of a horse another, and that of an ox another; and it is in the "what is it" that it is predicated. For when we are asked, "What is man?" we say, "Animal"; and similarly for a horse—when we are asked, "What is it?" we say, "Animal." Thus, a genus is that to which a species is subordinate. [And again, a genus is that which is divided into species.] For a genus is divided into species, and it is more universal than the species, and it contains the species, and is above them.

For it is necessary to know that what is more universal is called "above," and what is subordinate to predication, the more particular, is called "below." For there is a subject for existence, as for instance substance; for it underlies an accident in order for it to exist, since the accident subsists in it. And there is a subject for predication, which is indeed the particular. For just as the genus is predicated of the species, so the species is predicated of individuals. It is clear, however, that the genus is more general than the species, and the species than the individuals. Concerning these, we shall discourse more accurately below, God willing. But now, having spoken about the genus, let us speak also about the species.

CAP. X. Of the species.

^C Why the species is also among the equivocal terms; it is spoken of in a twofold way. For "species" is said of the form and shape of each thing, for example, the species of a statue; in accordance with which it has also been said (14): "The first species, worthy of imperial rule." There is, again, a species that is substantial, which is placed under the genus. And again, a species is that of which the genus is predicated in the "what is it." And again, a species is that which is predicated in the "what is it" of many things that differ in number. ^D But the first two definitions differ only in respect of relation, as an ascent and a descent, and they apply to every species. But the third and last definition applies only to the most specific species, which is the one immediately above the individuals and covers the instances, as we say, the species of man.

We have therefore said that the genus is spoken of in a triple way: namely, from the progenitor, and from the fatherland; and...

according to a third way, to which is subordinated the species. And the species is also spoken of in a twofold way, in the manner of the form of each thing, according to one way. According to the second way, that which is predicated by the genus, and that which is under the genus, as being divided from it. Concerning these [matters] of the genus and of the species among the philosophers. ^A

Since [we were] discoursing concerning the genus, we made mention of the species, saying: Genus is that which is divided into species; and again, discoursing concerning the species, we made mention of the genus, saying: Species is that which is divided from the genus; it is necessary to know that just as, when we speak of a father, we necessarily also make mention of the son—for that man is a father who has a son—and when discoursing of the son, we necessarily also make mention of the father—for that man is a son who has a father—so also here, it is impossible to discuss the genus without the species, or the species without the genus. For the genus must by all means be divided into species, and that which does not have species divided from it, is not a genus. And likewise, species are divided from the genus, and those which lack a genus are not species. ^B

Declaration of the matters of genus, supreme genus, and intermediate and lowest species.

As the first parent, Adam, since he lacked a father, is not called a son, but is called a father, as he who had children; and Seth is called both a son of him who begat him—for he had a father, Adam—and is called a father of him who was begotten of him; for he begot Enos; but Abel is called indeed a son, because he had Adam as father, but he is not called a father because he had no son; in the same way also, regarding the genus and the species, the first genus, which is not divided from another genus, and has no genus prior to it, is only a genus, and not also a species, and is called the generalissimum genus; the definition of which is: generalissimum genus is that which, while it is a genus, is not nevertheless a species, because it has no genus superior to it. Those which are divided from it, if they have other species below them which are divided from them, are then species of the former, that is, of the superior [genera] from which they are cut; and they are genera of those which are divided from them, that is, of the inferior [things]; and they are called subaltern genera and species. The extreme and lowest species, which do not have other species below them—that is, which do not contain species, but only individuals, that is, hypostases or supposita—are not called genera, but species ^C only: for this very reason, as I was saying, that they do not possess any species subjected [to them] which are divided from them. For neither can that be called a genus which contains no species; nor does it have any [species] which are divided from it. Wherefore that which contains no species, but only individuals, is called the specialissima species, because it is a species [but] not a genus; just as, on the contrary, the genus, which is not also a species, is called the generalissimum genus, as it were the highest. ^D All the superior things are predicated of the inferior: but the species is not predicated of the species. — Substantia generalissimum

genus ^A is the first and most generic. For although substance and accident are divided from being, nevertheless "being" is not their genus. For they receive the name of "being," but they do not receive its definition. For they define "being" in this way: "Being" is that which either subsists by itself and has no need of another thing in order to exist; or it is that which cannot be by itself, but has its existence in another. Substance, however, is only that which exists by itself and has no need of another thing in order to subsist. Lo, substance did not receive the whole definition of being. Thus, "being" is not the genus of substance, nor is substance the genus of being. For the species receives the whole definition of its genus without any omission. But neither is an accident a species of "being." For it does not receive the whole definition thereof, but only half. For an accident is a thing which cannot exist by itself, but has its existence only in another. Lo, neither substance receives the whole definition of being, nor an accident either. But substance receives one half, and the accident the other half. So, although "being" is divided into substance and accident, it is not their genus. ^B Substance, however, is divided into body and incorporeal. Now, body and incorporeal are species of substance, since each of these receives both the name and the complete definition of substance. It is established, therefore, that substance is not a species, since it does not have a genus above itself; but it is the first and most generic genus. Again, body, which is a species of substance, is the genus of the animate and the inanimate. Animate, again, is divided into sensible and insensible. Sensible animate is the animal, which has life and sensation; insensible is the plant, for it does not have sensation. Yet the plant is called animate because it has the power of nourishment, growth, and reproduction. The animal is again divided into rational and irrational. The rational into mortal and immortal; the mortal into man, horse, ox, and such like, which are no longer divided into other ^C species, but into individuals, that is, hypostases. For man is divided into Peter, Paul, John, and the other individual men, who are not species, but hypostases. For species, as we said, do not receive the definition of one another; for example, a body does not receive the definition of the incorporeal; nor does man receive the definition of a horse. But Peter, and Paul, and John receive one and the same definition; and likewise the other individual men do not admit the definition of others; for example, the body does not receive the definition of the incorporeal; nor does man receive the definition of a horse. But Peter, and Paul, and John receive the same individual definition; likewise the others, individual men, are not species of ^D man, but atoms, that is to say, hypostases.

^A Furthermore, when a species is divided, it imparts its name and definition to those things that are inferior to it. But truly, when Peter is divided into soul and body, he imparts his name and definition neither to the soul nor to the body. For neither is the soul alone Peter, nor the body alone, but the combination of both.

^B A genus is divided into few species.

What is a most specific species.

^D

Differences that divide and constitute.

and I take the animal, the non-sentient, and the mortal; I add terrestrial and I construct a horse, a dog, and suchlike. Again I take the animal, the non-sentient, and the mortal; I add the aquatic, and I construct a fish. These differences are called substantial and natural, because they determine the difference of one species from another; so that species differs from species, and nature from nature.

Of the most generic genus, and of the most specific species, and of the subalterns.

The name of "genus" is taken in three ways. First, from the progenitor, just as those who are born of Israel are called Israelites. In another way, from the fatherland, just as those from Jerusalem have the name Hierosolymites, and those from Palestine, Palestinians. Finally, in a third way, genus is called that which is divided into species; this is the subject of the discourse among philosophers, who define it as follows: Genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species in respect of their essence.

Similarly, the term "species" has a double significance. For species is called figure and form; as the species of a human statue. Again, species is called that which is subordinated to a genus, that is, that which is divided from the genus; and it is of this acceptation of species that philosophers treat.

Since, however, in having a discourse about genus we mention species, by saying: "Genus is that which is divided into species," it is worth our while to know that, just as when we speak of a father we necessarily make mention of a son also (for he is indeed a father who has a son); similarly, when we speak of a son, we necessarily remember the father also (for he is indeed a son who has a father). Thus, even now, it is impossible to treat of genus while omitting species, or of species while silently passing over the mention of genus. For genus is entirely divided into species; and that which lacks species divided from it is not a genus. Therefore, species are divided from a genus; and those things which do not acknowledge a genus are by no means species. In the same way, indeed, as the first man, or Adam, is not called a son; yet he is called a father (for he had children); but Seth, in truth, is called the son of his parent (for Adam was the father of this one, and the father of the one born from him, for he begot a son). But Abel is indeed called a son, since he had Adam as a father; but he is not called a father, because he did not have a son. By the same reasoning we must discourse concerning genus and species.

The first genus, which is not divided from any other genus—

^A nor does it recognize any other genus above itself, is simply genus, not species, and is called the most general genus. They define it thus: “The most general genus is that which, while being a genus, does not admit the character of a species, because it has no genus above it.” But those species which are divided from it, if they have other species divided from themselves, are indeed species of those genera from which they are cut, but they are genera of those which are divided from them, that is, of the subordinates. And genera and species of this kind are called subaltern. But the lowest species, which do not have other species beneath them, are by no means called genera, but only species, for the reason that no other species are divided from them. For it is impossible for that to be called a genus which does not have species divided from itself. Therefore, that which is not a species is called the most special species.

It is necessary to know that species must necessarily receive the name and definition of their genus; this also applies to that genus which is derived from another, superior one, until you arrive at the most general genus. Species, however, cannot reciprocally admit each other’s definition. To make this clear, let us consider the matter in this way: The first and most general genus is substance. For even if substance and accident are divided from being (ens), nonetheless "being" is not their genus, since although both receive the name of "being," they do not receive the definition of "being." For "being" is thus commonly defined: "Being is a thing, either self-subsistent and not ^B needing another for its constitution, or one not able to exist by itself but having its existence in another." But substance is that which only exists by itself and needs no other thing in order to be. But accident, on the other hand, is only that thing which cannot exist by itself but has its existence in another. Behold how neither substance has received the whole definition of "being," nor yet has accident. But substance is one half, and accident is the other half; whereas species and name and the whole definition of the genus wish to be received. Therefore, although "being" is divided into substance and accident, it is not their genus; nor yet is substance a species, since it has no genus above it, but is itself the first and most general genus.

Substance itself is divided into ^C corporeal and incorporeal. Therefore, the corporeal and the incorporeal are species of substance. Again, the body (corporeal) is divided into animate and inanimate. Behold, therefore, the body is a species of substance, but a genus of the animate and inanimate. The animate or living is again divided into the sensitive and the insensible. Therefore, the sensitive is the animal, which is endowed with life and sense. But the insensible is the plant; for it lacks sense. However, a plant is called living because it is endowed with the power of nourishing, growing, and generating. The animal is again divided into rational and irrational. The rational into mortal and immortal. The mortal into man ^D and... [index: entries preserved]

^A rational and irrational creatures, such as the horse, the dog, and the like, which are no longer divided into other species, but into individuals, that is, hypostases or supposita. For man is divided into Peter, and Paul, and John, and the other individual men, who are not species: for species, as we have already said, do not admit the definitions of one another; for example, a body does not admit the definition of the incorporeal, nor does man the definition of a horse. But Peter, and Paul, and John receive one definition, that of man, to be sure; likewise also the other individual men. Therefore, they are not species of man, but individuals, that is to say, hypostases and persons.

Again, a species, when divided, imparts both its name and its definition to its inferiors; but Peter, when divided into soul and body, does not communicate his name and definition to the soul, nor to the body. [For neither is the soul alone Peter, nor the body alone, but the composite.]

^B Furthermore, every division of a genus into species proceeds to two or three, and rarely to four. For it is impossible for a genus to be divided into five species or more. And yet man is divided into all individual men, who are infinite in number. Therefore, some say that the division of a species into individuals should not be called a division, but rather an enumeration. It is evident, therefore, that Peter, and Paul, and John are not species, but individuals, that is to say, hypostases; and consequently, man is not the genus of Peter and the remaining persons, but a species. Whence it follows that man is the most specific species. For it is a species with respect to the superior, and a species with respect to the inferiors. In the same way, the horse, and the dog, and the like, are species, but not genera; from which it happens that they are the most specific species. Those, however, which occupy the middle position between the most general genus and the most specific species, are simultaneously both genera and subordinate species; inasmuch as they are species of those above them, but genera of those below them.

^C And these are the very substantial and natural differences and qualities which are said to divide the superior things and to constitute the inferior ones. For "corporeal" and "incorporeal" divide substance; just as "animated" and "inanimate" divide the body. In the same way, "sensible" and "insensible," "living" or "animated," divide that which makes up the animal. For I take animated, sensible substance, and I make an animal; for an animal is an animated, sensible substance. Again, I take inanimate, insensible substance, and I make a stone. Again, I take animated, insensible substance, and I make a plant; again, "rational" and "irrational" divide the animal; ^D "mortal" and "immortal" divide the rational. Therefore, I take the animal, which is the genus, and the rational, and the mortal, and I constitute man. For man is a rational, mortal animal; and I take the animal, and the irrational, and the mortal, and

^A I constitute the horse, for instance, or the dog, and such like. ^B Substantial and natural differences are so called because it is by them that one species differs from another in nature and substance, and from another nature and substance.

CAP. XI. On the Individual.

The individual is accepted in four ways. For that is called an individual which cannot be cut, nor even divided into parts, as a point, the "now," and the unit; which are also called non-quantitative, that is, lacking quantity. That is also called an individual—to wit, the difficult to cut—as the adamant stone, and such like. That is also called an individual which can no longer be cut into other species, i.e., the most specific species, as man, horse, and such like. Finally, that is properly called an individual, which is indeed ^B cut, but after the division does not preserve the primary species. For instance, Peter is divided into soul and body; but neither is the soul by itself a perfect man, nor Peter, nor likewise the body. Concerning this [individual], philosophers speak; which indeed in substance signifies the hypostasis, and the suppositum, or person.

CAP. XII. On Difference.

Difference, quality, and property are the same in subject. But in their action, they are one thing and another. For rationality is called a quality of man, and a property, and a difference; but in a different way. For insofar as it affects and, as it were, forms the substance, it is called quality. Then, becoming a property of this substance, it is called property. Finally, in comparison ^C with the irrational, as with an ox, or a mule, or a dog, it is called a difference. For by it man differs from the irrational.

This is said in three ways, commonly, properly, and most properly. For it is impossible to find two things that do not differ from one another in some respect. For in some cases a species differs from a species, in others a hypostasis from hypostases of the same species and substance, and in others a hypostasis from itself. For the species of man differs from the species of the horse in terms of the rational and the irrational. And the rational and the irrational are called a substantial difference. Similarly, everything by which a species differs from a species is a natural, substantial, constitutive, and specific difference, ^D and is called a quality, and a natural property, which exists in every species unchangeably, which is also...

commonly called by philosophers the most specific difference, as being most peculiar and declarative of nature. ^A Again, by this name, one man differs from another, or one horse from another, or one dog from another [this is, an individual differs from an individual of the same species]: because one is large, another small; one old, another young; [one snub-nosed, another hook-nosed]; one prudent, another foolish. All these are called adventitious differences and qualities; this is what is an accident, of which we shall speak next.

CHAPTER XIII. On accident.

Accident is that which comes and goes without the destruction of the subject. ^B And again, an accident is that which can both exist and not exist in the same thing. For it can happen that a man is white or not white: in the same way, regarding tall stature, or being prudent, or being snub-nosed [this neither preserves the species, for it is not taken into its definition, nor does it destroy it when it is absent. For even if an Ethiopian lacks whiteness, he will not at all be harmed as to being a man. Therefore, it comes and goes, and does not harm the underlying substance. We said that substance is the place and matter for the accident.]

29. This accident is divided into two: namely, into that which is commonly called a difference, and into that which is so property. ^C A difference commonly so called is a separable accident, for example, someone is sitting, and another is standing. For it can happen that when he who was sitting rises, and he who was standing sits, their difference is separated, and each takes the other in turn. Indeed, one is even said to differ from oneself by reason of a separable accident. For while he sits and rises; while he flourishes in age and grows old; while he labors under ill health and is healthy; and in other such things, anyone differs from himself. There is also a proper difference, which is that accident which cannot be separated. For if anyone is snub-nosed, this snub-nosedness cannot be separated from him. ^D In the same way regarding blue eyes and the like. Therefore, by these inseparable accidents, one individual differs from another—that is, one hypostasis differs from another. Nevertheless, no one ever differs from himself. Moreover, these contribute nothing to the definition. For a man can be snub-nosed and not be, and when the blueness of the eyes recedes, the man will nonetheless remain a man.

Chapter XIV. Concerning the proper.

Common and proper difference. — Property is said in four ways. First, that which resides only in a species, but not in all, as for a man to be a geometer; for only a man is a geometer, but not every human is a geometer. Second, that which...

resides in all, ^A but not only in the species; as to be bipedal; for every man is bipedal, but not only man is bipedal, but also the dove, and things of that kind. Third, things which belong to all and to the species alone, but not always; as for a man to grow grey. For this belongs to all men and to man alone, but not always, but only in old age. Fourth, that which arises from the coming together of the first three; that is, which belongs to all, and to the species alone, and always; which also converts; as the risible belongs to man, the neighing to the horse, and things of that kind. For only man has the risible, and every man has it, and always; even if he does not always use it. [For if he is a man, he is necessarily risible; and if he is risible, he is absolutely a man. This is what it means to convert. ^B Concerning this signifier, the philosophers speak.] And speaking of it, we say: "A property is that which belongs to all and to the species alone and always." They divide this in three ways: from internal organization, [that is, from the structure of the body], as it belongs to man to have broad nails and to walk with an erect body; from the act, as it is for fire to move upward; from the power, as there is in fire a heating power that far surpasses the heat of other bodies. But the property is called what is adjectitious to the substance, or following the essence.

CAP. XV. Of those things which are predicated.

Every predicate is either more extensive or equal. ^C But never less extensive. And it is more extensive when the more universal are predicated of the less universal. Therefore, the higher things are more universal; the lower, less universal. And the most universal of all is Being, which is predicated of all things. For both substance is called Being, and accident is called Being. But we cannot say that Being is substance. For Being is not only substance, but also accident. In the same way, genera are predicated of species, as they are broader. Conversely, species are by no means predicated of their genera, because the species are not as broad. Wherefore, substance is predicated of animal, ^D and animal of man; for animal is a substance, and man is an animal, but not conversely. Indeed, every man is an animal, but not every animal is a man. For both the horse and the dog are animals. In the same way, every animal is a substance, but not likewise every substance is an animal. For both stone and wood are substances, but they are not therefore animals. So also the species, as it is more extensive, is predicated of...

^A individuals, that is, of the hypostases that are contained under it; but the individual, that is, the hypostasis, is not predicated of the species, because the hypostasis, or singular existing thing, is less extensive than the species. Thus, both Peter is a man and Paul is a man; yet not every man is Peter or Paul, for there are also other hypostases under the species of man. Moreover, the differences are predicated of the species in which they exist, and of their individuals; for the differences are more extensive than the species. For "rational" is more extensive than the species "man." For while not every man is rational—no, rather, not every rational being is a man. For even the angel, while being rational, is not a man. And this is the more extensive predication. ^B The equal predication is that which reverts. For properties are predicated of the species of which they are properties, and species are predicated of their own properties. For every man is risible, and every risible being is a man. For although an ape is also said to laugh, it does not laugh from (a rational) mind, but only by gesture; for it is an imitative animal. Therefore, the predication of genera over species, and of differences over species, and of species over individuals, is called "more extensive"; but that of properties, "equal." Those things which are of equal predication are said to be convertible and reciprocated predicates.

CHAP. XVI. On univocal and equivocal predication.

What is univocal predication and equivocal? Univocal predication is when the subject receives both the name and the definition of that name; ^C as "animal" is predicated of "man," and man receives both the name and the definition of animal. For an animal is a living, sensible substance, and man likewise receives this definition. For man is also a living, sensible substance.

Equivocal predication, however, is when the subject receives the name indeed, but not the definition: for instance, an image of a man receives the name of man, but does not admit the definition. For the definition of man is this: an animal, rational, mortal, capable of intellect and science. But the image is neither an animal (for it is not living), nor a participant in reason, nor capable of intellect and science.

A rule concerning the antepredicaments taught by Aristotle. ^D You must know that as many things as are predicated of something, the subject...

of that which is predicated of them is itself also predicated, as if as a subject; for example, animal is predicated ^A of man as a subject, and man is predicated of Peter. For Peter is also a subject to man. Therefore, animal is also predicated of Peter; for Peter is also an animal.

Concerning the subject: The subject is spoken of in two ways: either with respect to existence, or with respect to predication. With respect to existence, as the substance is a subject to accidents; for they have their being in it, and they do not subsist when it is removed. But the subject with respect to predication is the particular; for the particular is subjected to the more universal for the sake of predication. For the more universal is predicated of the more particular, as animal is predicated of man. Therefore, that which is as a subject is called that which is in a subject; but that which is more particular is the subject with respect to predication. Furthermore, an accident is said to be in a substance as in a subject; but the substance is a subject with respect ^B to existence.

CHAPTER XVII. Concerning predications in "what it is" and in "what sort of thing it is."

There is one kind of predication in "what it is," and another in "what sort of thing it is." In "what it is" is as when, to one who asks "what is man?", we answer "animal." In "what sort of thing it is" is as when, to one who asks "what sort of thing is animal?", we answer "rational, mortal." Thus, genus and species are predicated in "what it is"; ^C but difference, both substantial and accidental—that is, an accident and a property—are predicated in "what sort of thing it is." But a hypostasis indicates neither "what it is" nor "what sort of thing it is," but "who it is." For if someone should ask us "who is this?", we say "Peter." Then, if he proceeds to ask "what is Peter?", we say "man"; and if he asks again "what sort of man?", we say, for example, "tall" or "short."

You must know ^D that things which naturally differ are called "one thing" and "another." For we say, "one thing is man, and another is horse"—another in respect to nature. For the species of man is one thing, and that of the horse is another. [alt-version omitted]

^A And those things which differ in number, that is, the hypostases, are called "another" and "another." For we say, "another is Peter, and another is Paul." But we cannot say, "one thing is Peter, and one thing is Paul," since we would be speaking falsely. For in nature they are one, but they are not one in number.

It is also worth noting that the substance, as well as the substantial differences, are called "one thing." But the accident is called "another thing" (as if to say, of another quality), because substantial differences are considered about the species itself, that is, about the nature itself, and constitute it; but the accident is about the individual. For accidents constitute the hypostasis. ^B Therefore, "one thing" is man, and "one thing" is horse; but "another" and "another" is Peter, and "another" and "another" is Paul. Indeed, every difference, both substantial and accidental, makes for "another." For "another" signifies that which is diverse in quality. And nature, indeed, signifies *what* a thing is, but the hypostasis signifies *this certain one*, and *this something*; while every difference signifies *what sort* it is.

CHAPTER XVIII.

In which the five simple terms agree with one another, and in which they differ.

It is worth knowing that the five terms agree in this, that all are predicated of many. But they differ from one another in that genus is predicated of many things differing in species in the *what it is*; the species, likewise, is predicated in the *what it is* of many things differing in number; ^C but the difference and the accident are predicated in the *what sort it is* of many things differing in species; the property, finally, is also predicated in the *what sort it is* of many things differing in number, that is, of one species and the individuals subject to it. Furthermore, this is the difference between difference and accident: that the difference is substantial or essential, that is, it is a part of the substance or essence of the subject; but the accident is not as a part of the substance, but is adventitious.

CHAPTER XIX.

In which genus and difference agree with one another, and in which they differ.

Between genus and difference, this is common: ^D that both comprehend species, and that both are predicated univocally of species and individuals. But it is useful to know that whatever things are predicated of any thing as of a subject, that is, univocally, and whichever comprehend species—

will be predicated of it univocally: it will in no wise be predicated equivocally. The specific properties of the genus in relation to the difference are: that ^A the genus is more extensive than the differences beneath it and the other three terms; that the genus contains the differences potentially; that by nature the genus precedes the differences; that the genus is predicated in the "what is it," while the difference is predicated in the "what kind of thing it is"; that the proximate genus is one, but the differences are many; that finally, the genus corresponds to matter, but the difference corresponds to form.

CAP. XX. In what respects genus and species agree and differ.

That which is common to genus and species, and to many things, is the being predicated in the "what is it"; that they are by nature prior to ^B those things which are beneath them; that both are a certain whole. The peculiarities of genus and species are: that the genus is more universal than the species; that the species abounds in differences beyond the genus; that the genus is predicated univocally of the species, but the species is not so of the genus; that neither is any genus most special, nor is any species most general; nor can the most special species be a genus.

CAP. XXI. In what respects genus and property agree and differ.

Genus and property agree in this, that both follow the species, that is, are predicated of them; that both are predicated equally of those things of which they are predicated; that they are predicated univocally. ^C But this is the difference between the two: that the genus is by nature prior to the property; that the genus is predicated of many species, but the property of one; that the property is convertible with the species, but the genus is not; that the property inheres only in the species, but the genus does not.

CAP. XXII. In what respects genus and accident agree and differ.

That which is common to genus and accident is the being predicated of many things. The peculiarities of genus and accident are: that the genus exists prior to the species in which the accidents inhere, but accidents are posterior to the species; that the participation ^D of the genus is equal, but that of accidents is not; that the accident inheres first in individuals, and thus subsequently in species; but the genus conversely; that finally, genera are predicated in the "what is it," but accidents in the "what kind of thing" or "in what state" it is.

CAP. XXIII. In what respects difference and species agree and differ.

Difference and species agree in that they are participated in equally; that they are always present to those things by which they are participated. The peculiarities as between the two are: that the difference is in the "what kind of thing it is," while the species is predicated in the "what is it"; that the difference...

contains many species, while the property contains only one; that the difference does not convert with the species, whereas the property does. ^B

CAP. XXIV. In what ways difference and property agree and differ.

Between difference and property this is common: that they are predicated equally of those things in which they are present, and that they are always and in every case present in the species. But these things are peculiar to them: that the difference embraces many species, whereas the property embraces only one; that the difference does not convert with the species, whereas the property does.

CAP. XXV. In what ways difference and accident agree and differ.

This is common between difference and accident: that both are predicated of many things in the "what kind of thing it is." Also, because the difference and the inseparable accident are always present in those things of which they are predicated. These things, however, are peculiar to them: that differences contain, but are not contained, whereas accidents are contained. For although both ^C embrace species, in that they are predicated of many species, yet the difference is not contained, because the same species does not receive contrary differences; but the accident, on the contrary, is contained, because the same species and the same individual receive many accidents, frequently even ones that are contrary to each other. To this is added that the difference does not admit of "more" or "less," but the accident does. Furthermore, because contrary differences cannot be mixed with one another, whereas contrary accidents can be mixed.

CAP. XXVI. In what ways species and property agree and differ.

Between species and property this is common: that they are predicated of each other in turn, or convert; that they are participated in equally, such that they do not impart to those individuals sharing in them more to one and less to another. But between them there is this point of distinction: that species is substantial, ^D whereas the property is adventitious and accidental; that species is always in act, whereas the property is always in potentiality, even if not in act; and that those things which have different definitions, they themselves also certainly exist as different.

CAP. XXVII. In what ways species and accident agree and differ.

Between species and accident this is common: that which is predicated of many things.

However, this is the distinction: species is predicated in the "what it is," while accident is predicated in the "what kind of thing it is." Also, participation in a species is of one kind, whereas one may participate in many accidents. Furthermore, species is by nature prior to accidents; and species is participated in equally, while accidents admit of more and less. ^A

CAP. XXVIII. In what respects the proper and the inseparable accident agree and differ.

Between the proper and the inseparable accident, this is common: namely, that those things in which they reside cannot exist without them; and that both are always present. The difference between the proper and the accident is that the proper exists in one species, while the accident exists in more; that the proper converts with the species, while the accident does not. Finally, the accident admits of more and less, while the proper does not. ^B

CAP. XXIX. Of hypostasis, enhypostaton, and anhypostaton.

The word "hypostasis" has two meanings. For when it is used absolutely, it signifies that which simply exists; but the hypostasis that is "per se" signifies the individual and the particular person. In the same way, the word "enhypostaton" has a double meaning. For it signifies that which is absolutely, in which sense we call not only the substance that is absolutely, but also an accident, "enhypostaton." It also designates that which is "per se" hypostasis, that is, the individual. ^C And "anhypostaton" also is used in two ways. For that which is nowhere and in no way is called anhypostaton; but again, the accident itself is also called anhypostaton, because the accident does not have its own peculiar existence, but exists in substance.

CAP. XXX. Of substance, nature, and form, and of the individual, person, and hypostasis.

The philosophers from without, according to the aforementioned account, have stated the difference between substance and nature. They called substance that which is absolutely; but nature (they called) substance ^D specificated by essential differences.

^A And along with the fact that it simply is, it also possesses being such as this, whether rational or irrational; whether mortal or immortal—that is, they refer to it, as we say, as the unchangeable and immutable principle, and cause, and power, which was placed by the Creator into each species for movement: to the angels, for the purpose of thinking and of communicating thoughts to one another without the help of a vocal word; to humans, for the purpose of thinking and reasoning and of communicating the thoughts in their hearts to one another through the aid of a vocal word; to irrational animals, the movement of living, and sensing, and breathing; to plants, the nourishing, and growing, and generative power; to stones, the power of being heated, and being cooled, and shifting from place to place by an imparted motion—that is, an inanimate one. This they called nature; that is, the most specific types: for instance, angel, human, horse, dog, ox, and such like, ^B as being more general and comprehensive of the hypostases, and existing similarly and without defect in each of the hypostases contained under them. Consequently, that which is more particular ^C they called hypostasis; but that which is more general and contains the hypostases, they called nature; and simple existence, they called substance.

On the Saints Fathers

Notes

^A ...making it a common thing, and saying it of many; this they called the most specific species, substance, and nature, and form, such as angel, man, horse, dog, and the like. For *ousia* is derived from *einai* (to be), and *physis* (nature) from *pephykenai* (to have been born/produced); and to be and to be produced are the same. Also, form and species have the same meaning as nature. But the particular they called an individual, and a person, and a *hypostasis*, such as Peter or Paul. Now, a *hypostasis* 23 requires substance with accidents, ^B and ... ^C ... and ^D *hypostasis* essentially requires accidents. Our author calls these accidents elsewhere personal differences, qualities, and also characteristic properties, by which substance is sealed, as it were; and he grants this to accidents that are said to be inseparable. One man, however, Theodore Abucaras, seems to contradict this common doctrine of the philosophers in an unpublished short work, which Combefisius transcribed from a Tilman manuscript, and which, because it is very short, I shall cite here:

On the most proper difference

^A And it requires the essence as subsisting by itself with its accidents, and also that it be considered as existing to the sense, that is, in act. And it is not possible that two hypostases should not differ from each other by reason of accidents, and be distinguished from each other by number. It must finally be known that characteristic properties are accidents, by which, as if by certain marks, the hypostasis is expressed.

Capita Aristotelis: If it is, what it is, of what sort it is, why it is.

CHAPTER XXXI.

On Equivocals.

What are equivocals? Equivocals are those which agree with one another in name, but differ in definition or description. For instance, the name "dog" is an equivocal one; for it signifies both the land-dog and the sea-dog. The land-dog has one definition, and the sea-dog another, since the nature of each is different. Thus they define equivocals: Equivocals are those whose name alone is common, but the account of the substance which is signified by the name is different. Here, by the word "account" is understood the definition and description. By the words "according to the name," this is indicated: that there is a different definition of the name itself, by reason of which they are ^B equivocals. For example, the land-dog and the sea-dog are equivocal under the name of dog. For if anyone wishes to provide the definition of the land-dog and of the sea-dog, according to which each of them is called a dog, he will assign one definition to the land-dog, and a different one to the sea-dog. But it is possible that they might agree with each other both in definition and in name: for both are called animals, and receive the definition of animal. But by reason of this name "animal," they are not equivocal, but rather univocal. Furthermore, three things must be investigated in equivocals: namely, whether they are equivocal, then of how many things they are said, and finally, concerning which meaning the inquiry has been made.

NOTES

And the begotten property is the hypostatic [property] of the Son, and the proceeding [property] is the hypostatic [property] of the Spirit. ^D In our own case, the having of a soul—this is the constitutive [element]; but being hooked-nosed, or fair, or whatever inseparable accidents there may be, these are not strictly hypostatic, but are so called by abuse of language. For when all these are removed in thought, the hypostasis remains. But the hypostasis ought not to remain, were these things removed, if they were hypostatic, because the hypostasis could not exist without them; by the same logic, separable accidents would also be hypostatic, which is impossible. For the hypostasis cannot exist without motion, or rest, or without being seated, or standing, or being positioned in some way. But neither motion, nor rest, nor position, nor any of the separable accidents whatsoever is hypostatic. Consequently, for this reason, not even the inseparable accidents are hypostatic.

On Similitude

^A Similitude, even if it seems to the ancients to occur in four ways according to quality alone, yet it seemed to the moderns that it occurs, first of all, in a general sense both according to substance and according to quality. It occurs according to substance, just as we call men similar to angels—meaning equal to them—even though they differ from one another entirely in their qualities; and likewise [we speak of] horses, swans, and the rest. But since this similitude sometimes appears unchanged, and at other times changed in some respect, the heretics, undermining the Son, said He was similar to the Father through the middle ground of what is signified, snatching at the ambiguous meaning to draw the simpler sort toward the worse view. Wherefore also the great Basil says: "If," he says, "the word 'unchanged' is added, I also accept it." But in this way [it is similar] according to substance; yet according to quality, it is not this or that [specific quality], but all—that is to say, figure, form, color, craft, virtue, and whatever else the scope of quality extends to.

^B This quality is divided in four ways. For either they join together in one species and one quality, just as we say those of the same species are similar to one another—for instance, the Ethiopians are similar to one another in their blackness, and the swans again in their whiteness—so that they are the same in a double sense, both similar to one another according to substance and according to appearance (that is, color). Or, [they are similar] also insofar as, even though they differ in species, one and the same quality is inherent in them; as white pepper, for example, and black are similar to one another according to quality. Or [they are similar] in those of the same species, but differing in qualities; as the ringdove is similar to the pigeon according to the white, and the dusky, and the black, and perhaps other connections.

^A The fourth similarity is the species that is found in the image and the paradigm, such as that which exists between the painted man and the living one; by this reasoning we are said to be similar to God, although to one who investigates the matter more diligently an immense difference at once appears. For the former participate only in the name and the figure, but man in reality participates in God—in His goodness, I mean, and wisdom and virtue, although not in the same manner. For God has these by His own nature, but we by God’s concession; and further, one differs from another in another way, so that there is not only an immense disparity between God and men, but also between men themselves, according to proportion. Similarity ^B therefore greatly approaches those things which are named from one or on account of their order toward one.

CHAPTER XXXII. On univocals.

Univocals are those which agree with one another both in the name and in the definition or description of that same name: as, for instance, the term "animal" signifies both man and horse, and according to this name of animal, they are univocals. For each of these receives both the name and the definition of animal. And thus univocals are described: univocals are those whose name is common, and the definition of substance signified by the name is the same.

CHAPTER XXXIII. On polyonyms.

Polyonyms are those which agree with one another in definition but differ in name; that is, when the same thing is called by diverse names, as *gladius*, *ensis*, *mucro* (sword, blade, point). For all these names receive one and the same definition; namely, double-edged iron, that is, iron sharpened on both sides. And thus polyonyms are described: polyonyms are many names which are said of one and the same thing.

CHAPTER XXXIV. On *altera* and heteronyms.

But those which differ from one another in both ways, that is, in name and definition; either they have one subject, and then they are called heteronyms, as "ascent" and "descent" (for these have one subject, the ladder to be sure); or they do not have the same subject, and then they are called *altera* (others), as substance and accident. ^D For these have both a different name and a different description, and they do not have one subject. And the description of both these, that is, of both the heteronyms and the *altera*, is this: those of which the name and the definition are different.

Chapter XXXV. De denominativis.

^A There are certain things that hold a middle place between univocals and equivocals; they partly agree and partly differ both in name and in definition. These are called "denominatives," as for example "grammarian" from "grammar." For they agree in name, but differ in the termination of the name—that is, the final syllable. And again, they both agree and differ in definition; for grammar is a kind of knowledge, while the grammarian is the substance in which that knowledge resides. Denominatives, then, are those which have an appellation derived from something else, differing in case—that is, in the inflection of the name.

^B It must be known that neither grammar, nor music, nor justice are denominatives, but rather the grammarian, the musician, and the just person. For the grammarian is denominated from grammar, the musician from music, and the just person from justice.

It must also be known that denominatives contain the things from which they are denominated, as the grammarian contains grammar, and the just person justice. But things which are said from one [common source] do not; for the medical instrument does not contain [the science of] medicine.

CHAPTER XXXVI. On the ten most general categories.

Of things said, some are said simply and without combination, such as substance, accident, and the like; others with combination, such as "a horse runs" or "Socrates philosophizes." Of those that are said simply and without combination: 1° one signifies substance, as man or horse; 2° another signifies quantity, as two, three, two-cubits, three-cubits. ^C 3° Another signifies relative, as father, son. 4° Another signifies quality, as white, black. 5° Another signifies where, as in a temple, in a market-place. 6° Another when, as last year, yesterday, today. 7° Another signifies being situated, as to stand or to sit. 8° Another signifies having, as to be clothed or to be shod. 9° Another signifies acting, as to burn or to cut. 10° Another signifies being acted upon, as to be burned or to be cut. These ten are called "categories," from the fact that they are "predicated" of something. For to "spoke" (agoreuein) is the same as to "predicate" (legein).

^D It should be known that each one of these ten categories is a most general genus. Of these ten categories, then, and most general genera, substance is one, while the other nine are accidents. These are: 1. substance; 2. quantity; 3. relative; 4. quality; 5. when; 6. where; 7. being situated; 8. having; 9. acting; 10. being acted upon.

CHAPTER XXXVII. On the homogeneous and homoideous; and on the heterogeneous and heteroideous, and those differing in number.

Homogeneous things are those which are under the same category

^A (as man and horse). Heterogeneous things, on the contrary, are those which are under different categories (such as animal and science): for these differ in genus. Again, "homoidean" (of the same species) things are those which are counted under the same species and agree with one another in the definition of their substance, as Peter and Paul. "Heteroidean" (of different species) things, on the contrary, are those which differ from each other in species, that is, those which differ between themselves in the definition of their substance, as man and horse. Those differ in "number," however, which, by means of a collection of accidents, possess a distinct and separate property of their own hypostasis, and have acquired a peculiar and self-subsistent existence—that is, individuals, as Peter, and Paul, and each one of individual men.

Rule of the antepredicaments.

Accidents also have their own differences, etc.

On the One.

CAP. XXXVII. On being in something.

CAP. XXXIX. On substance again.

CAP. XL. On nature.

CAP. XLI. De forma (On Form)

Form is an essence, ^A as it were informed and specified by essential differences; and this indeed signifies the most specific species: for example, a substance which is formed and specified by an animate and sentient body completes an animal, and again, having assumed the rational and mortal, it accomplishes the species of man. This most specific species is called form, as being, so to speak, formed substance.

The holy Fathers, therefore, assign the name of substance, and nature, and form to the most specific species, and they say that essence, and nature, and form—that is, the most specific species—are the same; and they call those things that are constituted under the same most specific species ^B consubstantial, and connatural, and of the same species, and of the same genus, and conformable. Those, however, that are of a different essence, and of a different nature, and of a different species, and of different forms, are the most specific species.

NOTE

(26) *Form is essence, etc.* Thus the Fathers taught on account of that saying of the Apostle, Phil. ii, 6: "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery," etc., "but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant," etc., where form is taken to signify nature. But that rogue who attributed to Dionysius of Alexandria an epistle written *as if* to Paul of Samosata, everywhere in it inculcates nothing so much as that by "the form of God" is signified a perfect nature, self-subsistent and a person; but by "the form of a servant" and of man, a mere species without consistency; just as the speech, virtue, and wisdom of a man are devoid of consistency; nay, he says, it is merely a *schema*, that is, a certain external figure. That man was a Monophysite, not a Catholic, who would recognize no other nature in Christ except the divine: and thus, however much he might read that He was born, suffered, wounded, and handled, he would judge Him to be God by nature, not man by nature. I will add no more to show that these things reveal the incorruptibility of the author, so that one wonders why very learned men did not perceive the fraud.

(27) *And consubstantial. And thus of the same essence.* It was familiar to the philosophers to call those things which are of the same nature co-essential or consubstantial. In this sense, man is consubstantial with man. Paul of Samosata ^C had tainted another acceptation of "consubstantial" in the first synod which was celebrated against him, so that according to the doctrine of the Catholics, the Son might be consubstantial with the Father, because both had been born from a certain prior substance. To avoid such cavils, it was then ordained that "consubstantial" should be passed over. But Athanasius, in his book *On the Decrees of the Nicene Synod*, observes that for one thing to be consubstantial with another, it is not necessary that both should originate from a third party, but only that one be begotten of the other: and thus the Word is consubstantial with the Father, from whom He is begotten; but the sense of Samosatenus is unworthy of God, to whom he attributes the affections of bodies. He recites a third notion of the same word, namely, that not only is one begotten from the other, but neither is disjoined from the other, and they remain in one another, and thus they are one in substance. He asserts that this was the mind of the Nicene Fathers. Since, he says, not only is the Son similar, but He cannot be severed from the Father's substance, and as He Himself says, He and the Father are one, and the Word is always in the Father, and the Father in the Word, just as splendor is related to light. For the word itself ^D also signifies this. Understanding this well, the synod wrote that He is consubstantial. Marcellus of Ancyra is said not to have perceived the sense of the Synod, but through a Sabellian error, he defended "consubstantial" in such a way as to take away the Trinity of persons. But the author of the dissertation on the followers of Sabellius, which exists among the works of Athanasius, warns that the power of the name "consubstantial" is such that it sets forth the consortium of many according to substance, and therefore that the Sabellians had sub-asserted it because it signifies one substance. The particle *homo*, "one," "together," says Epiphanius in his *Hæreses* 69, does not signify one, but two perfect things. Yet the Ancyran heresy seems to have been the cause why Orientals objected to the Arians the "consubstantial" handed down by the philosophers to Basil the Great as if it alone were the true one. Indeed, that holy doctor, especially in epistle 45 to his brother Gregory, established that Paul, Timothy, Silvanus, and Andrew are consubstantial because they agree in definition. This was approved by the Synod of Alexandria, over which Athanasius presided, provided that no partition or division followed among the divine persons, but the substance of God was believed to be truly and physically one. According to the same sense, the Synod of Chalcedon, with the same words used that Athanasius and Cyril had used before, defined Christ to be not only consubstantial with the Father according to His divinity, but also consubstantial with us according to His humanity.

^A and different in form, they declare the most specific species to be of a different essence, and nature, and species, and genus, and form. For it is impossible that a species, when compared with another species, or nature with another nature, or essence with another essence, or form with another form, should not be judged to be entirely different in essence, nature, and form.

It is necessary to know that it is impossible for one composite nature to be formed from two essences, that is to say, natures. For it is impossible for the constituent differences in one and the same thing to exist in a divided and opposite manner. But there is nothing to prevent one composite hypostasis from being formed from different natures; just as man is composed of soul and body. So, when it is said that there is one nature of men, it is not said because there is one nature of the individual, but because of the common nature; for in the same way, whenever that of which it is composed is reckoned, and we name the soul and consider the body, we do not deny that they are of different natures, and that the things proper to these essences remain even after the union. For if the body and the soul were of the same essence, since the same reasoning applies to things that are co-essential—yet the body is subject to corruption—it would absolutely follow that the soul is also corruptible; and the assertion that the soul is immortal would be proven false by your senseless babbling.

^B

NOTES

Although nature is sometimes called essence, and is viewed in many things, as has been shown, it is not called such in the same way. If, therefore, they affirm that one nature is constituted from both, they will have other consorts of the same essence as Emmanuel, which is not true. Nor have these sycophants—however much they may wage war against God—reached such a pitch of madness as to assert this too. And with some things interspersed: "We say that humanity, because it is composed of different things, is of one essence; not indeed having regard to the soul and body, but rather to that which is common; since it is considered commonly in all things that are of the same species. For this is the definition of essence which Basil handed down, saying: 'As the common relates to the particular, so does essence relate to the hypostasis.' Therefore, by reason of this community, we say that humanity, which is beheld in men, is of one essence: because it applies equally to all and to each individual man to be a rational animal, capable of intelligence and discipline. For this is the definition of humanity. When, however, we weigh the things of which it consists, and name the soul and consider the body, we by no means deny that each is of a different nature, and that the things which are proper to these essences remain even after the union. For if the body and the soul are of the same essence, since the same ratio belongs to things that are co-essential (otherwise, indeed, the body is subject to corruption), it follows entirely that the soul is corruptible, and because of your insane triflings, that which is asserted—that the soul is immortal—will be proven false."

^A Each. For the one nature of men is called composite, because all the composite hypostases of men are reduced under one species. But the individual man is not said to be of one nature, because every hypostasis of men consists of two natures—I mean of soul and body—and keeps these within itself without confusion; and the separation that occurs at death is a witness to this.

CAP. XLII. Concerning Hypostasis.

The name of hypostasis has a double significance. ^B Sometimes it signifies simple existence (29), in which sense substance and hypostasis are the same thing. Whence some of the holy Fathers have spoken of “natures,” that is, “hypostases.” Sometimes it signifies that existence which is of itself and subsists separately; in which sense it signifies the individual—that thing, I say, which differs in number, such as Peter and Paul, or a certain horse.

It is necessary to know that neither substance, lacking form and species, subsists by itself, nor a substantial difference, nor species, nor accident; but only hypostases and individuals, in which both substances and substantial differences, species, and accidents are considered. ^C And indeed simple substance is considered equally in all hypostases—that is, as much in inanimate things as in animate; as much in rational as in irrational; and finally, as much in mortal as in immortal. But substantial differences are different in inanimate things, and other ones in animate things; others in rational things, and other ones in irrational; in the same way, others in mortal things, and other ones in immortal—and simply put, in the hypostases of each most-specific species, the same ones connect ^D them, that is, the certain one, Peter, or this horse.

VARIAE LECTIONES. ª R. duo, Reg. duo, Colb. and N., connect.

NOTES. (29) Sometimes it signifies simple existence. It is not a naked species, but the very truth of the thing. Ammonius the philosopher, in enumerating the various acceptations of the term, teaches that sometimes it denotes every thing that exists, and therefore accidents are also called substances, because they subsist. But the Damascene follows Leontius here, whose fragment is read in the manuscript *Collectanea against the Severians*, cap. 27: “Hypostasis has two significations. For it signifies, both that which is endowed with existence simply, when it is in the first place abstracted from the properties by which it is sealed, and the person who subsists according to itself.” Whence holy Cyril sometimes usurps the name of hypostasis for that which is simply, when he says, “the hypostases have remained without confusion,” indeed affirming the essences. But also Athanasius in the epistle to the Africans says: “Hypostasis, he says, is essence, nor is anything else signified by it except essence, or being.” Conversely, at another time, the same Cyril, taking hypostasis for a person which subsists separately and in itself, said: “If anyone distributes the words of the Gospel into two persons, that is, hypostases, let him be anathema.” Similar things are held in Leontius’s book *On Sects*, art. 7. One must recall here what we said in the annotation to cap. 30. Cf. Cyril in the scholium *On the Incarnation*.

^A Likewise, the accidents in them, that is, in the hypostases, are also considered, which distinguish each hypostasis from those of the same species. For this reason, the individual has properly acquired the name of hypostasis; for in it the essence exists in action, having taken on the accidents.

CAP. XLIII. On person.

A person is that which, through its own operations and properties, provides for us a clear description, distinct from those that are of the same nature as it; for example, Gabriel, when conversing with the holy Theotokos, since he was one of the angels, was the only one present there talking, and he was distinguished from the other angels of the same nature by that local presence and the conversation he was holding. ^B And Paul also, while he was making a speech on the steps, being one of the humans, was distinguished from the rest of the humans by his properties and actions.

We must know that the holy Fathers have used the terms hypostasis, individual, and person for the same thing; namely, for that which exists by itself and in its own subsistence, consists of essence and accidents, and subsists ^C and differs in number, and signifies a certain someone, such as Peter, Paul, or a certain horse. Moreover, hypostasis is named from the fact of subsisting.

NOTE.

(30) "A person is." The name [of] person is used in the same way by both the Latins and the Greeks. For it is often taken for mere representation, as an ambassador acts in the person of a prince, or for an external appearance, such as are presented in theaters. But theologians signify by it hypostasis, which is known through its own operations. Cyril, in the fourth anathema against Nestorius, in order to avoid the ambiguity of this word, used these words: "If anyone, in two persons, or hypostases, uses the evangelical voices..." Athanasius, in his book *On the Salutary Advent of Christ*, seems to take "person" to mean nature, where he says that the persons in Christ are not divided, "not in two persons." I have discovered no one else who has used this word to signify nature or essence. ^D The great Basil, indeed, in book five against Eunomius, p. 152, admits that the sacred writers, knowing the unity of the deity, while preaching three [persons] in one person, nevertheless, because they do not say there is "one person of the divinity," but "one person," assert only this, that whatever the Scriptures, especially those of the Old [Testament], designate as one divine nature, such as the Father, they designate [those] as different persons. But so far is he from using the word "person" to signify substance or nature, that rather, a few lines before, he says that the Apostle does not permit us to suspect that the one person is the deity. Nor let anyone object that Chrysostom, in his fifth homily on the Epistle to the Hebrews, said there are two persons in Christ so as to signify two natures... he strikes the Jews, showing two persons, and [that He is] not [both] God and man. For his genuine meaning is this: that through this verse of Psalm XLIV, *Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee*, he confutes the Jews by showing that there are several divine persons, and even that the Messiah, or Christ, is God and man at the same time. Therefore, a few lines later, he adds that the Apostle, against Marcellus and others who, just like the Jews, were compressing the Trinity into one person, proves that the Father and the Son are truly and altogether distinct persons, and therefore clearly he receives ["person"] not for nature or essence, but for the person that subsists by itself. For who indeed would concede that either Basil or Chrysostom, those fervent defenders of Meletius of Antioch, were using the terms "essence" and "person" indiscriminately to express essence, substance, or nature, when all the Melitians regarded as Sabellians those who did not accept *ousia* for nature and essence, and *hypostasis* and *person* for the subsisting individual? But it has been said above that the epistle of Basil to Gregory of Nyssa, concerning *ousia* and *hypostasis*, was accepted by the Orientals as a certain and irrefutable rule by which the sense of those words might be defined.

Chapter XLIV.

*Enhypostaton* also sometimes signifies simple existence; in which sense we call not only substance *enhypostaton* absolutely, but also accident, although the latter is strictly not *enhypostaton*, but *heterohypostaton* (that is, having existence in another). Sometimes, however, it signifies a separate hypostasis, or individual; although neither is that strictly *enhypostaton*, but is and is called *hypostasis*. Strictly, however, *enhypostaton* is that which does not subsist by itself and separately, but is considered in hypostases: as, for example, the species, or nature, of men is not considered in its own hypostasis, but in Peter and Paul and the remaining hypostases of individual men; ^B or that which is combined with something else, differing in substance, for the generation of some whole, and makes one composite hypostasis: as, for instance, man is composed of soul and body, and neither is the soul alone called a *hypostasis*, nor is the body, but both are called *enhypostata*. Yet that which arises from both is called the *hypostasis* of both. For *hypostasis* is strictly that which subsists by itself—possessing its own subsistence—and is so called.

47. Christ's flesh as humanity *enhypostaton*.—Again, that nature is called *enhypostaton* which, being assumed by another ^C hypostasis, has obtained its existence in it. Whence also the flesh of the Lord, since it did not exist by itself and separately even for a moment, is therefore not a *hypostasis*, but rather *enhypostaton*. For it subsisted in the hypostasis of the Word of God, having been assumed.

of it, and has it, and possesses a ^A hypostasis, by which it was assumed and had, and still has, a hypostasis.

CAP. XLV. On the Anhypostaton.

The anhypostaton is spoken of in two ways. Sometimes it signifies that which is nowhere at all, that is to say, the non-existent. But at other times, it signifies that which does not have its subsistence in itself, but possesses it in another, that is to say, an accident.

CAP. XLVI. Division of Being.

Being is divided into substance and accident; not as a genus into species, but as an equivocal term, or as things that are from one and to one. ^B

CAP. XLVII. Division of Substance.

Substance is the most general genus. It is divided into body and incorporeal. ^C

(53) *Sometimes that which is not in itself,* etc. The author of the Epistle to Paul of Samosata recognizes this second kind of anhypostaton—which bears the name of Dionysius the Alexandrian—where he shows what an immense difference there is between the Word of God and the word of man, in their wisdom, power, and form. We have noted that this epistle was composed by some incorrupticola Monophysite. Leontius of Byzantium concedes that it can be called anhypostaton, because, although it belongs according to genus to substance, yet it lacks its own subsistence, as does human nature in Christ. He solves the Severian objection in this way: that there is no nature that is anhypostaton, or that subsists without subsistence or hypostasis, and so there would be two hypostases or two natures, or if it were one hypostasis, it must be said to be one nature. Eulogius of Alexandria agrees with Leontius in the defenses, a segment of which I shall bring forward in the notes to the book *On the Orthodox Faith*. Rufinus does not hesitate to call what the Greeks call *anhypostaton*, insubstantial.

(54) *Being is divided into substance,* etc. The author proves this affection with this argument. Being is either that which subsists by itself and needs nothing in which it may exist, or that which cannot be by itself, but exists in another. Furthermore, substance does not receive the definition of being, nor does accident; but substance receives the middle part of the definition, and accident the other: although, when it is calculated in this way, that the species [are meant], they receive both the name and the definition. But that definition does not create a certain and express notion of being, which is said to be from being, or as to esse. Ammonius in his manuscript commentary on the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, in the chapter *On Species*, contends better. Being, he says, is not divided into the ten categories, nor as a genus into species, nor as a whole into parts; therefore it is an equivocal term (or as I would say, by analogy) into diverse significations.

The genus which is divided into species is found equally in all those species; nor is one species considered prior and another posterior, as far as the participation of the genus is concerned. For man is not more of an animal than a horse. Again, if one species is removed, it is not necessary that the other species should perish at once. For if man is removed, the animal is not removed, nor the other species, such as the horse, and dog, and the rest. Therefore, if being were divided into the ten categories, as a genus into species, there should undoubtedly be no first or second among them, nor should the one participate more in being, and the other less. But now there is a first and a posterior. For we call substance the first, and the rest in order, ^D from the removal of which the accidents are also removed. Whence we say that it participates more in being, if substance gives being to accidents. For they subsist in it, and it does not need the accidents for its being; but the accidents would not be, if it were not there to which they had happened. Therefore, being is not divided into the ten categories as a genus is divided into species. The Greeks do not argue about analogous terms, which they do not sufficiently distinguish from equivocal ones.

Corpus, into animate, or living, and inanimate: A into sensible, and insensible: Living, zoophyte, Sensible, into rational, and irrational: Rationale, into mortal, and immortal: Mortale, into human, ox, horse, and the like: Homo, into Peter, Paul, and individual men, who are indeed individuals, and hypostases, and persons.

The body is a species of substance, and a genus of the animate; the animate is a species of body, and a genus of the sensible; the sensible, or animal, is a species of the animate, and a genus of the rational; the rational is a species of the animal, and a genus of the mortal; the mortal is a species of the rational, and a genus of the human; finally, man is the most specific species; for he is a species of the mortal; and also a species of Peter and Paul; which indeed is nature and form and substance, according to what the holy Fathers held. ^B

Things which hold a middle place between the most general genus, that is, substance, and the most specific species, such as man, ox, etc., are subaltern genera and subaltern species. But these are called essential and natural differences and qualities, which, of course, divide those above, and constitute those below, and form the most specific species; certainly by constituting them, and by dividing nature from nature. Furthermore, nature is spoken of concerning the most specific species: and indeed what essence, and nature, and form are, has been stated: likewise what hypostasis, and individual, and person are: what also enhypostaton and anhypostaton: what, besides, is the difference between substance and accident: and that substance is more excellent than accidents, since the latter have their being within the former. ^C Furthermore, it has been stated concerning its own division, and what the difference is between substance and substantial differences, so that substance, informed by them, might complete a certain species, and contract a certain quality. It has also been stated what nature is, what form, what hypostasis, what person, what individual: and how, while profane authors have held views concerning them, the holy Fathers, the disciples of the truth and of true philosophy, and likewise its teachers, have rightly held and taught. Come, therefore, now let us set forth what are the properties of substance. ^D

^A It is a property of substance not to be in a subject. For it is the subject, rather, to which accidents are joined in order that they may exist, and it does not itself obtain its existence in something else. And this property pertains also to substantial differences. For that which is in a subject neither preserves it when it is present, nor destroys it when it is absent; hence it is not taken into a definition (for it is essentially an accident). But substantial differences are by no means accidents; rather, they both preserve the subject when they are present, and destroy it when they are absent; for which reason they are taken into a definition.

That which is also a property of substance is that it is predicated univocally, that is, it imparts both name and definition. Likewise, that it has no contrary. For to a stone, that is, to the substance of the stone, there is nothing contrary. Furthermore, that it does not admit of “more” or “less”; which is also a property of substantial differences. For a man is not more a substance, or an animal, than a horse; nor, conversely, is a horse more so than a man. Finally, that it is capable of contraries, and that separately, not according to the same thing, but through a change of itself. ^B By contraries, however, I mean accidents; for it is not capable of substantial ones. For that which is a participant of reason does not admit that which lacks reason; but the body grows warm and becomes cold through change; and the soul sometimes admits of virtue, and sometimes of vice.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Homogeneous things are those that are classed under the same category, for example, all things that are contained under substance; and in the same way with the other nine categories. For one must know that there are ten categories in all, that is, the most universal genera to which every simple word is referred. These are: 1. Substance, as a stone; 2. Quantity, as two, three; 3. Relation, as father, son; 4. Quality, as white, black; 5. Where, as in Damascus ^C (this is indicative of place); 6. When, as yesterday, tomorrow (this is indicative of time); 7. To have, as to wear a garment; 8. To be situated, as to stand, to sit; 9. To act, as to burn; 10. To be acted upon, as to be burned.

Heterogeneous things, however, are those that are contained under one category and another. And homogeneous indeed are man and horse, for both are under substance; heterogeneous, however, are man and knowledge: for man is under substance, but knowledge is under quality.

Homoideous things, again, are those that are placed under the same species and agree with one another in the definition of their essence, as Peter and Paul. For both are under the same species of man. Heteroideous things, however, are those which differ in ^D species.

But the holy Fathers take "homogeneous" and "homoideous" to mean the same thing, that is, those that are consubstantial—specifically, the hypostases that fall under the same species. ^A

Things are considered "homohypostate" when two natures are united in one hypostasis and form one composite hypostasis and one person, as, for example, soul and body. But things are "heterohypostate" and numerically different when they have distinguished the property of their own hypostasis through the combination of accidents; that is, those things which differ from one another by reason of accidents, and which possess an existence separately and by themselves, as for instance, individuals, such as Peter and Paul. For this one is someone else, and that one is someone else. ^B

CAP. XLIX. Concerning quantity and quantum.

Quantity is a collection of units. For no one calls a unit a quantity, but rather the principle of quantity. Therefore, when a unit and a unit come together into one, they become two. From this it is clear that quantity is not division, but a collection and connection of units. For to divide two into one separately—this is properly division; but to call one and one "two"—this has more the character of connection.

It must be known, however, that quantity itself is measure and number (measure being that which measures, and number that which numbers), but "quanta" are those things that are subject to number and measure; that is, those things that fall into number and measure. Furthermore, of quanta, some are discrete, others continuous. A thing is continuous when the thing being measured is one; for example, one encounters a certain piece of wood two or three cubits in length, or a stone, or something of that kind. Since this is one, we measure it, and it is called continuous. Discrete things, on the other hand, are those which are separated from one another; as in the case of ten stones or ten palm-trees; for these are separated from one another. Such things are said to be numbered, unless, on account of the smallness and multitude of the individual items, we measure them with a bushel or something similar, as in the case of wheat or something of that kind. ^C

Things are defined as continuous, the parts of which join together at some common boundary. For when a piece of wood is two cubits long, that is, has two cubits, the end of one cubit and the beginning of the other cubit are one. For they cohere and are joined together, and they are not divided from one another. But discrete things are those whose parts do not join together at any common boundary, as in the case of ten stones. For if you count five and five, you will find no common boundary that joins them. For if you were to add something to be placed in the middle between the five and the five, they become eleven, not ten; and the name itself declares as much regarding the continuous and the discrete. ^D

^C But the continuous quantities are five: body, surface, line, place, and time. One must know that a point is an unqualified thing. For it is neither measured nor numbered, as it possesses no dimension. But a line has one dimension: for it is length without breadth. It is therefore reduced to continuous quantity. For since it is one, it falls under measurement, and its parts have a common term connecting them to each other, namely the intermediate point. A surface is the exterior part of a body, called *epiphaneia* [surface] from the fact that it is apparent. It has two dimensions, length and breadth. This also, being one, is measurable, and its parts have a common term connecting them, namely the intermediate line. One must know that an even and equal surface is called a plane surface, but an uneven and oblique one is called simply a surface. Now a body consists of three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth—that is, thickness; and since it is one, it is measured, and its parts have a common term connecting them, namely the surface. Even place is the surface of the air. For place is a surface—that is, the limit of the encompassing air—and as a surface, it is reduced to continuous quantity. And time is measured into the past and into the future; and its parts have a common term connecting them, namely the "now." The "now" is an unqualified thing. ^D Lo then, there are three unqualified things: the unit, the point, and the "now." And strictly speaking, these seven are called quantities: 1) number, 2) speech, 3) time, 4) place, 5) line, 6) surface, 7) body.

We also call those things quantities by accident which are considered in these things, such as action, motion, color, and such like: for instance, if an action and a motion take place in a large amount of time, we say "much action" and "much motion"; conversely, if in a small amount of time, "small." Likewise, if there is whiteness in many parts of a body, we say "much white"; but if in a few, "little."

Of quantity, one kind is finite, and the other is infinite, or indefinite.

^A Finite is that which we can measure and number; infinite is that which, on account of its extreme magnitude, exceeds every measure and every number. It is termed "great" and "much" indefinitely, as when we speak of the "great mercy of God" or the "great mystery of the incarnation of the Word of God."

It is important to know that Aristotle posits "the great and the small," "the much and the little," "the greater and the lesser," "the more and the fewer," "the double and the half," and other things of this kind, under the category of "relative." We say, therefore, that it is possible for the same thing, according to different viewpoints, to be referred to different categories. For the things previously mentioned, insofar as they indicate number and measure, are referred to quantity; but insofar as they possess a relation to one another and are spoken of in relation to each other, they are referred to the relative. For "great" is called great in relation to "small," and "the double" in relation to "the half"; and the others in the same way. A body, insofar as it is physical, is referred to substance; but insofar as it is mathematical—that is, falling under measurement—it is reduced to quantity. Furthermore, quantity consists partly of magnitude and partly of multitude. Magnitude is measured, while multitude is numbered. Magnitude follows "how much," while multitude follows "how many."

The properties of quantity are three, which are called its concomitants. First, that it has no contrary in itself. For a body has no contrary in itself. But insofar as it is, for example, white, it has a contrary, namely, black. ^B It must also be understood that for the number two, no other number is contrary; for if there were, there would necessarily be many. For all the other numbers would be contraries, and nature would be found to be unjust, having set many contraries against one. For it is not possible for many things to be contrary to one. Second, that it does not admit of "more" or "less." For two palms are not "more" two than two men. Moreover, that which has no contrary does not admit of "more" or "less." Third, that which belongs to every quantity alone, namely, being "equal" and "unequal." For one line is equal or unequal to another.

CAP. L.

Concerning Relative Things

^C Relative things are those which, being what they are, are said to be of others, or in some other way are referred to another. They are said to be of others—such as "father of a son" (for a father is always called the father of a son). They are referred to another, such as "great to small" and "much to little." For it is not said "much of a little," but "much to a little."

It is worth knowing, however, that when something is considered in itself, it is not "relative"; but when it has a relation to ^D some other thing, then it is called "relative." Thus, this is what "relative" is, and this is their definition...

to be spoken of in relation to another, that is, to have a relation to another. For the relation to one another is what makes ^B them "relative."

Of things which are "relative," some are designated by the same name, as friend is the friend of friend; enemy, the enemy of enemy. Others are designated by a different name, as father is the father of son; master is the master of disciple.

Again, of things which are relative, some are so by way of preeminence, as the greater is greater than the smaller. Others are by way of the judge and the judged, as knowledge is the knowledge of that which is knowable. For knowledge judges that which is knowable; that is, the cognition judges that which is compared to be known. So too is the sense the sense of the sensible thing; position is the position of that which is positioned; standing is the standing of that which stands; reclining is the reclining of that which reclines, and so on. Others are by way of power and lack of power. Power, as the thing heating and the thing heated; lack of power, that which is by way of the privation of power; as when we say that the eye has the lack of power to look at the starry sphere. Still others are by way of the cause and that which is from a cause, as father is ^C the father of son.

The property of relative things is to be spoken of in terms of convertibility. For friend is the friend of friend, and friend is the friend of friend; master is the master of disciple, and disciple is the disciple of master. Also, that they are simultaneous by nature. To be simultaneous by nature is to involve one another, and to be involved by one another, to remove one another and to be removed by one another. For if there is a father, there will certainly be a son, and if there is no son, there will be no father; for whose son will he be if the father does not exist? And if there is no son, there will not be a father. For he who does not have a son will not be a father; so the son is removed together with the father, and the father together with the son. But what is removed is not his substance, ^D but the relation. If the son remains, but does not remain a "son"—for not having a father, how could he be a son?—even if we speak of the son of one who has died, we do not speak properly, but abusively; or as though the father had not perished, and had not passed into nothingness, because of the immortality of the soul.

One must know that each category is a most generic genus and possesses both genera and subaltern species, and the differentiating factors of the genera, and the constitutive factors of the species, and the most specific species, and individuals.

^A Nor are constitutive differences called substantial, except of substance alone, nor are individuals called hypostases, except of substance alone.

Nor should it be ignored that substance itself, inasmuch as it is a genus and has a relation to another, is referred to the things which are "relative" [ad aliquid]. For the genus is the genus of species, and the species are the species of the genus, and they belong to the number of those things which are called relative.

54 Another explanation of the basis of relations. — Furthermore, things that are relative and reciprocal either have their relation in self-subsisting things—that is, in substances—or not in self-subsisting things, namely, in accidents. If they are in self-subsisting things, their relation is either natural, as of father and son, or not natural. If it is by no means natural, it is either from fortune, as slave and master, or from art, as pupil and teacher, or from ^B choice, as friend and friend, enemy and enemy. But if they are in things which are not self-subsisting, namely, in accidents, it is either natural, as double and half, or not natural [as great and small; for this is a matter of fortune rather than nature. Yet fortune and choice have no place in things which are not self-subsisting, unless something should appear to have a reference to another thing that is self-subsisting, and perhaps be said to be relative by accident].

Relations are founded in other categories. — For it is necessary that things which are called relative be first reduced to another category, as being considered in themselves, and then finally, as having a respect to another, be referred to things which are relative. For it is necessary that something be considered first in itself, and then ^C its relation to something else be considered. Relation, or [Greek: σχέσις], is called the affection of one thing toward another, or a disposition, that is, an appropriation, of those things which are predicated either of substance or of those things which affect substance. And these are constituted either by nature, or by fortune, or by art, or by choice.

CAP. LI. On the qualified and quality.

Quality is that by which certain people are called qualified. And again, quality is that by which those who are affected by it are called by denomination. For from wisdom the "wise" is named, he who possesses wisdom, and he is called "warm" who participates ^D in heat.

Concretes are broader than abstracts. — It must be known that the qualified is more universal...

^A than quality. For "qualified" signifies both quality and that which participates in it, namely, of the quality: as "warm" [signifies] heat and that which has heat. For such are they who have quality: as those who have heat are called "warm." And thus they are the warm [ones], while the heat is the quality. And often even this quality itself is called "qualified": likewise also in the case of quantity and quality.

The four species of quality

Furthermore, of qualities, some reside in animate and rational bodies, such as sciences and virtues, diseases and healths; and these are called habits and dispositions. Others, moreover, are in both animate and inanimate things, ^B such as heat and cold, form and shape, power and impotence. And these exist partly by potentiality, partly by act. If they exist by potentiality, they produce power and impotence. If, however, they exist by act, they either pervade to the depths, as heat pervades the whole of fire, and whiteness the whole of milk and snow; and then they produce passion and passable quality, or they are on the surface only, and then they produce shape and form. There are, therefore, four species of quality: habit and disposition, power and impotence, passion and passable quality, shape and form.

Furthermore, habit differs from disposition in that habit is difficult to change ^C and is more long-lasting; for example, prudence. For a person is not quickly changed from prudence to imprudence. Likewise also with knowledge, when someone understands accurately, their cognition is difficult to change in them; it is a habit. So too are courage, temperance, and justice. Dispositions, however, are those things that are easily moved and quickly changed; such as heat, cold, disease, health, and things of that kind. For man is disposed and affected according to these, and he is also quickly changed: for instance, from being hot he becomes cold, and from being sick he becomes healthy. And these very things, such as disease, health, and the like, if they are lasting and difficult to change, ^D pass into a habit. Moreover, disposition is broader. For both are indeed called dispositions: for by them man is disposed and affected in a certain way; but that disposition which is difficult to undergo change is called a habit, while that which is easily changed is called only a disposition and affection.

The second species of quality is power and impotence, which indeed do not exist by act, but possess a natural aptitude and power, or an inaptitude. As we say that a boy is potentially musical (for although he does not have music by act, he is nonetheless naturally constituted so that he can receive music), but we call a brute animal "unmusical," inasmuch as it has music neither by act nor can it receive it. Likewise, the hard also has the power not to be easily divided.

^A The third species of quality is the patible quality and passion, such as heat, coldness, whiteness, blackness, and the like. Now, a passion is easily cast off, as is a disposition; for instance, when someone blushes from shame or turns pale from fear. A patible quality, however, is moved and changed with difficulty. Of patible qualities, some do not take their origin from a passion—that is, they do not come from elsewhere, but exist by essence; as heat exists in fire, and sweetness in honey. For heat is not adventitious to fire, nor is sweetness to honey; these did not exist as something else before subsequently acquiring heat and sweetness. Yet, with regard to human sense perception, they do produce the same passion. For fire, being hot, affects us with heat; and honey, being sweet, produces sweetness in us. But some are generated from a certain passion, that is, from a temperament, and sometimes produce a passion in our sense perception; yet this is not a passion, but the same quality they possess, such as colors. For white, being generated from a certain passion and temperament, produces a passion regarding the vision—that is, the discrimination, expansion, and illumination—but it does not whiten us. Therefore, a patible quality which is not adventitious ^B exists either in the whole species, as heat exists in all fire, or not in all, as blackness does in Ethiopians. For not all men are black. And these things are considered not only in the body, but also in the soul.

The fourth species of quality is figure and form. Now, figure refers both to animate and inanimate things; but form refers only to animate things. If "form" or "well-formed" is said of inanimate things, it is said not properly, but abusively. Therefore, figure has a wider extension. For form is also called figure; but, conversely, the figure of inanimate things is not called form. Furthermore, rectitude and curvature pertain to quality.

It is to be known that qualified things are, for the most part, named denominatively from their qualities; for example, "hot" from heat. Some, however, are named equivocally, such as "music" the science, and "the musical woman," who possesses the musical science. Some, though rarely, are named by a different name; for example, "studious" from virtue. For he who is endowed with virtue is also called studious. ^D

Passio in facto esse (passion in the state of having been acted upon) is a quality. Nor is it to be ignored that passion is twofold. For it is said either by the fact that something has already been acted upon, and then it is referred to quality—just as a garment that has already been whitened is called white—or by the fact that it is currently undergoing an action, and then it pertains to the category of "being acted upon," as with that which is not yet whitened, but is now being whitened.

It is also useful to know that qualities are not bodies, but are devoid of body. For if they were bodies, they would be referred to the category of substance. Moreover, all accidents lack body and do not exist by themselves, unless they are considered within a substance.

Qualities are twofold: substantial and accidental. But it must also be observed that substantial qualities are subordinated to substance. For their parts are divided.

and to this genus the whole and its parts are referred. Heavy and light are considered ^A in bulk, as in weighed objects, and are referred to quantity; or they are in substance, as in the elements, namely fire and earth, and are referred to substance as substantial differences. In the same way it holds for dense and rare, that is, rarefied. For things are substantial 37 in the elements and are referred to substance, or they are adventitious, as in garments, and are referred to the category of position; for they are positions.

^B There are three properties or consectaries of quality. First, that it receives contrariety. For hot is contrary to cold, and white to black. Second, that it admits of more and less. For where there is contrariety, there also more and less are found. "More" signifies intension, and "less" signifies remission. It is possible, therefore, to say that this species is whiter than that, and less cold. Third, that which is a consectary of quality and most proper to it, is being similar and ^C dissimilar. But it must be known that a figure has no contrary.

It must be known that not all privations are said by way of negation; but there are some that are expressed by affirmation, such as blindness and deafness. Furthermore, not every species is expressed by way of affirmation, but also by way of negation; as intemperance, which though it is a species, was not named by the mode of affirmation but by negation. For a position is called an affirmation; as, "He is beautiful." But a negation is a denial; as, "He is not beautiful." For when we say "iniquitous" [ἄνομος], the syllable [α] signifies a negation, just as the word "not" does.

But if this white is said to be equal to that white, it is not said to be ^D equal in so far as it is a quality, but...

in so far as it partakes of quantity. ^A

Caput LII. Regarding acting and suffering.

It must be known that action and passion—that is, the power of acting and of suffering—are contained under quality. The agent and the patient, however, are a certain substance operating or suffering in a certain way. To act, therefore, is to have the cause of the action in oneself; to suffer, however, is to have the cause of the suffering in oneself and in another, as is the case with the maker and that which is made. For the maker has the cause of the making in himself. The thing being made, however, has the beginning of the making in the maker, but has in itself the aptitude for suffering. By the "maker" in this place we understand the artisan, for instance, a carpenter; by the "work," the material subject to the artisan, such as wood. For indeed the material of the wood is subject to the carpenter. ^B

Furthermore, of those things to which acting and suffering belong, some are said to act simply, as in the productive arts, such as carpentry, smithing, and the like, in which the work remains even after the maker has ceased from the work. For after the architect has finished building, what he has built remains. Other things, however, are said to act in such a way that that which is acted upon does not remain when the one who acts ceases. For when the flute player has finished playing, the song of the flute does not remain, but perishes. Finally, some things are said to "contemplate," such as practicing astronomy or geometry, understanding, and similar things. There are, moreover, other species which are considered in inanimate things, such as fire, stone, wood, and the like. Therefore, the former have a place in those things that use reason; the latter, however, in those things that lack soul and reason. For it does not act by that reason by which it is animate, but by which a body is moved toward a body. ^C

There is a twofold property of this category: first, that it admits contrariety. For to heat and to cool are at variance with one another. Second, that it admits of "more" and "less." For it happens that one may heat more or cool less; likewise, one may be heated more or cooled less. ^D

Therefore, in all the categories, acting and suffering are considered: namely, in substance, to beget and to be begotten; in quantity, to number and to be numbered; in those things that are relative, to double and to be doubled; in quality, to whiten and to be whitened; in position, to place and to be placed; in having, to wear and to be worn; in where, to contain and to be contained; likewise in when, to contain and to be contained, specifically in the present, the past, and future time.

Chapter LIII. De situ.

Of the things that are situated, some are situated in a natural way, as the elements are in their proper places—for example, earth, water, air, fire, and the like; others are situated by position and art, ^B such as a statue, a column, and things of that kind. There is also, moreover, another division, namely that among the things that are situated, some are firm and unmoved, like the earth, while others are moved, like the celestial bodies. Furthermore, among the things that are situated, some are situated potentially—that is, they can be moved—while others are situated in act, wherever they may be situated.

CHAPTER LIV. De ubi.

Chapter LV. De quando.

CHAPTER LVI. De habitu.

in the way it is used for many other things equivocally, of which we shall speak more fully later on.

Chapter LVII. On opposites.

Opposite of statement is the opposition of contradiction. ^A The opposition of things is threefold: relative, contrary, and privative. Whatever is opposed, is opposed either as a thing or as a statement. If it is as statement to statement, it produces affirmation and negation. Affirmation is when we say that something is in a subject, for example, "He is beautiful"; negation is when we say that something is not in a subject, for example, "He is not beautiful." Both, furthermore, are called an enunciation. If, however, they are opposed as things, they are either said as those in which there is conversion, and these produce the relatives, which both introduce and destroy one another, or they are not related as those in which there is conversion and they do not have a relation. And these latter either migrate into one another, while at the same time being consistent with nature; and these produce contraries, such as heat and cold: or one migrates into the other, but the other does not migrate into it; and the one of these is natural, while the other is contrary to nature, ^B and then they produce things that are opposed by way of privation and habit, such as sight and blindness. For sight is a habit, as being from "having"; but blindness is the privation of a habit, namely, of sight.

On contraries without a medium and with a medium.

Of contraries, some are without a medium, while others have a medium. Those are without a medium, of which it is necessary that one or the other exist in that which is their subject, among those things of which they are predicated: as disease and health in the subject of an animal's body. For it is absolutely necessary that either disease or health of such a kind be in the body. By disease, moreover, we understand every distraction of nature. Those, however, have a medium, of which it is not necessary that one or the other be in the subject, or in those of which they are predicated, such as white and black. ^C For these are contraries, and yet it is not on that account necessary for either one of them to be in a body. For not every body is necessarily either white or black (for there are brown and red bodies), unless by chance one of the contraries is inhereing in something determined by nature, as heat in fire, and cold in snow. Furthermore, of those contraries which admit a medium, some have names: for example, what is the medium between white and black is called brown; others are without names. For that which is interposed as a medium between the just and the unjust does not have a name; but such a medium is signified by the negation of either extremity; for example, "neither just nor unjust."

On the fourfold property of contraries.

Furthermore, four properties accompany contraries. The first is that, for what is good, evil is the contrary; but for what is evil, ^D sometimes good, sometimes another evil is the contrary. For intemperance is the contrary of temperance; but to intemperance, sometimes temperance is the contrary, and sometimes stupidity.

For stupidity exists ^A when the affections of the soul are neither moved nor excited. Wherefore intemperance is a defect of temperance, while stupidity is an excess. Furthermore, a defect contends with an excess. The second property is that it is impossible for contraries to exist simultaneously in individuals according to the same thing. For Socrates cannot simultaneously be well and ill; nor can the same member be at once heated and cooled. The third is that they be in the same subject, either in genus, or in species, or in number. In genus, as white and black in a simple body; in species, as health and disease in the body of a living creature: for concerning number it is manifest. For the same body is capable of contraries through its own mutation. The fourth, finally, is the property that contraries are either under the same genus, as white and black under color; or under contrary genera, as justice and injustice under good and evil, which are indeed contrary. Or else they are the contrary genera themselves, as good and evil are contrary genera. ^B

Caput LVIII. On habit and privation.

The ways in which "habit" is spoken of are various. Habit is said to be the act of having and of the possessor: for example, of arms and the armed person, or of one clothing himself and one clothed. Second, the adventitious acts that are durable, whether they be natural or relate to the soul. Natural, indeed, as heat in things that are heated; of the soul, however, as knowledge. Third, that which does not yet have it, but is so disposed that it can have it: which is indeed the first signification of that which is "in potentiality." Fourth, a natural quality, that is, a natural habit: as the heat of fire, ^C or the sight of one sleeping; which indeed is the second signification of that which is "in potentiality" (for although fire can burn, it does not burn in act); but the first is that which is "in act." Fifth, as the perfect act: as sight in the act of vision, and heat, which is already heating.

Privation, likewise, is the following. Privation, strictly, is a negation. Privation, however, is the casting off of a habit. Therefore, it is opposed to the first signification of habit, the privation of arms or of clothing. Second, the casting off of adventitious habits; as when that which has been heated cools down. Third, that which the genus of a thing is in no way disposed to have; as we say an infant is by nature disposed toward music, but a fig tree is not. The fig tree is therefore deprived, because that genus of plants is not apt to receive music: which ^D also has a place when the genus of a thing indeed has an aptitude, but a certain species does not; for example, an animal is apt to see; yet the mole, which is a species of animal, lacks the aptitude for seeing. Fourth, the casting off of the power which is according to habit. Fifth, the casting off of the final and perfecting act: which truly we have called above the contrary opposition that occurs through privation and habit; that is, of the potentiality, as much of the agent as of the patient. This, moreover, is distinguished by these three marks: that it be that which by nature is disposed

to have the habit of sight. Also, we do not say that a newly born dog is blind; nor that a newly born infant is toothless, since they are not by nature disposed to have them at that time. Likewise, we do not say that a foot is blind, since the animal is not by nature disposed to have the habit of sight in its foot. When, therefore, it is by nature disposed to have these three things, yet does not have them, it is called privation. ^A We do not say that a stone is blind; for it is not by nature disposed to have the habit of sight.

CAP. LIX. On Priors and Posteriors.

The meanings of prior and posterior are fourfold. The first and most primary is that which precedes in time. Strictly speaking, in animate beings it is called the "elder," but in inanimate things, the "older," although improperly they are often used interchangeably.

Second, it signifies that which is prior by nature, which is such that it is removed along with the other, but does not itself remove it; and it is co-removed and not co-removed; as the animal is prior to the human. For when the animal is removed, the human will not exist (for the human is an animal); conversely, if the human is removed, the animal will nevertheless exist. For both the horse and the dog are animals. And again, if there is a human, there will simultaneously be an animal (for the human is an animal); but, conversely, if there is an animal, it is not necessary that there be a human; but perhaps there is ^B a horse, a dog, and things of that sort, for these are animals.

Third, that which is prior in order; as we say that the letter alpha is first, the beta second, then syllables, and after that, words.

Fourth, that which excels in dignity; as we say, first the bishop, then the presbyter. However, some reject this mode, because it can happen that one who is prior in order may be posterior in dignity and merit.

Fifth, as we say an effect and its cause; just as Socrates is prior to his own image, because he is the cause of his own image. And the father is prior and greater than the son, for the father is the cause of the son; for the son is begotten of the father. And it is in this sense that the blessed Gregory ^C understood what was said by our Lord in the holy Gospels: "The Father is greater than I."

Others add that which is prior in thought and intention, such as the wall being prior to the foundations. But this is reduced to the fourth mode, that by which something is prior in dignity. For that which is prior in thought is posterior in reality.

and that which is prior, so likewise is that which is posterior. And the prior and the posterior, the greater and the less, are not classed among things named equivocally, but among those which are from one thing.

CAPUT LIX. Of the simultaneous.

^A Modi quibus aliqua sunt simul. Modes by which some things are simultaneous. Those things are strictly said to be simultaneous whose origin is in the same time, as when two certain beings are born at the same point of time. And this first mode of meanings is opposed to the first of the [meanings of the] prior. Secondly, those things are said to be simultaneous which coexist with one another, yet in such a way that neither is the cause of the other, nor does one receive its being from the other; as the double and the half. For they coexist, and mutually imply one another, and are likewise destroyed together. ^B This mode, moreover, is opposed to the second and the fifth mode of the prior. For in the second, they neither imply one another nor are they destroyed together; whereas in the fifth, one is the cause, and the other is derived from the cause. Thirdly, those things are said to be simultaneous which are species descending from an opposing genus; that is, which come down from the same partition, such as the rational and the irrational from the living. This mode, moreover, is opposed to the first and the second, and nearly to the three others.

CAPUT LX. Of motion.

^C Quid motus. In quibus praedicamentis sit. Sex motus quoad locum. Motion is the act of that which is in potentiality, insofar as it is in potentiality; just as brass is a statue in potentiality. For the brass can receive the form of a statue. Therefore, the brass, which is potentially a statue, has in it that act by which it is dissolved, shaped, and polished; all of which are motions. In all the predicaments, therefore, in which that which is by potentiality is considered, in them also motion will be considered. On the contrary, in those in which that which is by potentiality is not considered, neither will motion be considered. It is considered, therefore, in substance, in quantity, in quality, and in the predicament of place. ^D In substance, indeed, [it is] generation and corruption; in quantity, increase and decrease; in quality, alteration; in the predicament of place, that which is moved in a circle (which is called circumaction), and also [that which is] moved in a straight line, which is called straight motion. Moreover, of that motion which is in a straight line, there are six modes: upward, downward, inward, outward, toward the right, and toward the left. Wherefore, with the addition of circulation, there are seven local motions. For whatever is changed, either is changed of itself, or by something within it, or by something concerning it; and [if it is changed] of itself, it produces generation and corruption. But if it is changed by something within it, or according to quantity, it produces

^A accretion and decretion: or according to quality, it produces alteration. If, finally, it is changed by something that is about it, it produces mutation according to place; for place is neither that which is moved, nor anything of those things that are in it, but it follows those which are moved, and is about the things moved.

But there is a difference between generation and corruption. Generation is the progression from not-being to being; for that which was not before, this comes to be. Corruption is the contrary, and is a mutation from being to not-being. Growth and diminution: growth is a motion toward the greater, but diminution [is motion] toward the smaller. Again, in alteration, there are opposite affections: for instance, heating is opposed to refrigeration, and blackness to whiteness. ^B Therefore, corruption is opposed to generation, and diminution to growth; but to alteration, the thing opposed [is also opposed], and rest. For example, to heating, refrigeration and rest are opposed: for when the thing being heated has reached its limit, and has come to the extreme of heat, it rests and ceases to be heated. Similarly, to mutation according to place, contrary motion is opposed, and rest. For instance, upward motion is opposed to downward; and rest [is also opposed], for if one throws a clod upward, it will not be moved downward before some rest has intervened. But to the celestial motion, there is no contrary motion. It seems, however, that alteration follows the other motions. For both that which is generated, and that which perishes, and that which grows, and that which diminishes, and that which is moved according to place, ^C is entirely altered. However, in natural motions, although we find that alteration accompanies the other motions, it is nevertheless possible for a thing to be changed by alteration, and yet not be moved by any other motion, as happens in the case of a stone. For this is affected by heat and cold, yet it does not grow or diminish. And so it is, finally, with the other motions. Wherefore, although alteration accompanies the other motions, yet it can be considered in itself: and hence the distinction between them is discovered.

Mutation, not motion strictly so called. — But Aristotle by no means calls mutation motion. For in the fifth book of the *Physics*, he proved that generation and corruption are indeed mutations, but not motions; ^D because motion is so produced that the thing meanwhile remains safe and sound. But if we have said that there are two contraries to alteration and local mutation, namely, contrary motion and rest; it certainly must be known that it is possible for two things to be contrary to one, for other and various reasons.

[Note]: — Aristotle had numbered six species of motions from the Philosopher, and especially generation and corruption. However, he warns, following Ammonius, that Aristotle, in book V of the *Physics*, distinguished mutation from motion for this reason, that he denied generation and corruption to be motions strictly so called. Ammonius explains the mind of the Philosopher, that mutation is a certain genus, of which there are three species: motion, generation, corruption; and thus that all motion is a certain mutation; but not conversely. Furthermore, that generation and corruption are not motions properly so called, our Author proves by the same reasons as Ammonius.

^A Quies, indeed, is contrary, as habit and privation; but the opposite motion is properly contrary, as refrigeration is to calefaction.

CAP. LXII. On having.

It is clear, however, that "to have" must be reckoned among equivocal terms. Some, moreover, say that there are as many differences of "to have" as there are of "to act" and "to be acted upon." For as the things that act and are acted upon are either animate or inanimate, in the same way here also, that which has and is had is either animate or inanimate. By what reasoning, therefore, will the differences of different genera be the same? But it can be answered that "to have" is either about the whole body or about a part. And this ^C again is either adapted to that which is to have, or to that which is about the whole body to repel injuries, or for adornment.

CAP. LXIII. On enunciation, affirmation, and negation.

Affirmation and negation. The one of contradictories is true. One must know that both affirmation and negation are called an enunciation. Affirmation, then, is that which signifies what pertains to something; that is, what something is; for example, "Socrates is wise," "Socrates walks." Negation, however, is that which declares what does not pertain to something, that is, what is not; for example, "so-and-so is not wise," "so-and-so does not walk." And since a negation is opposed to every affirmation, and an affirmation to every negation; that negation which is opposed ^D to an affirmation, and the affirmation which is opposed to a negation, is called a contradiction. Moreover, it is necessary that one be false and the other true.

CAP. LXIV. On term, and proposition, and syllogism.

One must know that the logical task has as its aim...

^A to treat of demonstration. Now, demonstration is a syllogism; and a syllogism consists of two true propositions and the conclusion. For example, wishing to demonstrate that the soul is immortal, I say: "Whatever is moved by perpetual motion is immortal." This is a proposition. I then add a second proposition and say: "The soul is moved by perpetual motion." Then follows the conclusion: "The soul therefore is immortal." For each word of the proposition is called a term. A term is that into which a proposition is resolved; for instance, the proposition says: "Whatever is moved by perpetual motion is immortal." "Whatever" is called a term, as a part of the proposition; and "is moved by perpetual motion" is likewise called a term; and "immortal" is called a term; and "is" is called a term.

It is necessary to know that all the propositions must be true, and the conclusion must follow from the propositions. For if any one of the propositions or the conclusion is found to be false, it is a paralogism, that is, a captious argument, and not a syllogism. ^B Furthermore,

on simple expression, noun, verb, statement, and term

What is a verb to the dialecticians?

It should also be known that ^C there is no difference between these five things, namely, between an enunciation, a proposition, a problem, an objection, and in a negation, as well as in an affirmation; even if it is a noun or a verb, it is called a "verb" by the philosophers, in that it is predicated.

^A For when I speak simply, saying "the soul is immortal," this is called an *enunciation*. But when it is taken as part of a syllogism, then it is a *proposition*, as in the saying: "The soul is immortal." When someone objects to the proposition, saying, "Whence is it evident that the soul is immortal?" then this is called an *objection*. But when we again propose it for investigation: "Is the soul immortal?" it is called a *problem*. But when something is gathered from the propositions, it is called a *conclusion*; for example: "The soul is ever-moving; that which is ever-moving is immortal; therefore, from these propositions it is gathered: So the soul is immortal." This is the conclusion.

Chapter LXV. Various Definitions.

A proposition is an oration ^B declaring something of something, which is a negation, as "Socrates does not laugh," or something of something, which has the character of an affirmation, as "Socrates laughs." A *term* is that into which a proposition is resolved. A *syllogism* is an oration in which, certain things having been posited (that is, conceded), something else necessarily follows from the things that were posited, by virtue of the things that were posited. For because of the posited propositions, a conclusion is made, having no need of any other external confirmation. An *investigation* (quæstio) is an inquiry proposed to the intellect tending toward election or avoidance; that is, toward denial or consent. A *percontation* is an interrogation demanding a diffuse and prolix response. For this differs from a simple *interrogation* in that a rapid response (that is, conceived in few words) follows an interrogation, but a prolix response in many words follows ^C a percontation. A *dialogical character* is said to be that which consists in questioning and answering. An *objection* is that which overturns an oration from its very beginning. An *antiparastasis*, that is, a "repulsion," is that which admits what is said by the adversary as being true indeed, but shows that it brings no detriment to the matter proposed. A *lemma*, that is, an "assumption," is that which is assumed as certain and indubitable for the proof of something. A *heresy* is a sentence or opinion of many men who indeed consent among themselves, but differ from others. A *common notion* is that ^D which is agreed upon by all; for example, that the sun exists. A *thesis* is an opinion of some man distinguished by wisdom and erudition that is alien to common estimation; that is, something new and unusual: as that saying of Parmenides, that the existent is one; and likewise that of Heraclitus, that all things are moved.

That which is *common* is that which is considered in many things, or that which is predicated of many things. But "common" is said in four ways: namely, either that which can be divided into parts, as land which is distributed among many heirs. Or that which is used in common without division; yet not at one and the same time, as one slave or one horse of two masters, now obeying the command of this one, now of that one; or that which is assumed in advance as one's own, and is sent back to the commonality, as the place in a theater or in a bath; or that which is indivisible into

a common and same understanding, as the voice of a herald. In this way that which is said must be accepted regarding equivocals and univocals, whose name is common. That which is *per se* is that which belongs to something primarily and by essence, and not by accident, as being rational belongs to man. Universal is that which signifies many things, as man, animal, substance. *Per accidens* is that which can belong to something, and can also not belong, as for a man to be sick or to be healthy. To "make" (*poiein*) is said of the productive arts, in which the thing created remains; as in carpentry and the like; for after the making, the bed remains. To "act" (*prattein*) is said of those arts in which the work, that is to say the result, does not remain; as in flute-playing and dancing. To "contemplate" (*theorein*) is said of thinking, of studying astronomy, ^B geometry, and such things.

On Subtile Consideration

True reason declares subtile consideration, or the *epinoia* (that which we commonly call a creature of reason), to be twofold. For the one is, as it were, a certain *epinoia* and secondary thought, which unfolds and clarifies the general and unstructured contemplation and knowledge of things; as when that which appeared simple to the senses appears as varied and manifold upon long and curious investigation of the mind: as, for example, man, who seems simple, is understood by subtile thought to be twofold, concrete from body and soul. The other is a figment of the mind's thought, which, through the combination ^C of the senses and the faculty of imagination, composes and imagines out of things that are, things that are not; of this kind is the fabulous fiction of hippocentaurs, sirens, and tragelaphs. For by taking the parts of wholes, and composing something else out of the parts according to its own will and pleasure, it has fashioned in the mind's thought and in reasonings things that are by no means seen in the nature of things or understood to exist; and subsequently, when shaped in materials, it has formed idols and images. And this is called "simple *epinoia*."

Garrulity (*adolexia*) is when someone predicates those things that are contained in something of that which contains them; for example, the animal and the biped are contained in man, and the white and musical in Socrates. If, therefore, someone predicates these of man or of Socrates, saying, "The man is a biped animal," "Socrates is musical, white," he is ^D trifling and garrulous, repeating the same thing many times. For these things are garrulity. Because

^A Migne’s text states: "For since this includes man and Socrates, so he who affirms these things is judged to have declared those ones at the same time."

Of Habituation

Of Union

Union by composition and hypostatically. But truly [there is union] ^D according to composition, which is into another...

^A part without the destruction of the parts; such as in the soul and body, which union some have called a tempering, or rather a natural union. It must be known that some of the Fathers did not accept the name of "tempering" for the mystery concerning Christ, [but] all [accept] that according to composition; and this is the union according to hypostasis, that is, according to composition. For "according to hypostasis," it is a thing existing from different natures; and again, it is "according to hypostasis," that which is known from two things, but in one person. And that union according to hypostasis is a nature adhering to another hypostasis. ^B Tempering is the placement of bodies, and the interpenetration of qualities. And again, tempering is the conjunction of bodies intermingling their qualities with one another. Tempering is the concurrence of substances different from one another, and the incursion of the qualities that are within them. There is also a union which is by juxtaposition; and it is like that which is by arrangement. Personal union is also spoken of, when one, taking on the person of another, speaks the words on his behalf instead of him; and there is relative union, as of a friend to a friend. But Nestorius devised other unions, I mean according to dignity, and equality of honor, and sameness of will, and good pleasure, and community of name. ^C It must be known that in the union according to hypostasis, the intelligible things are also united to those capable of receiving them, as things joined together.

NOTES

^D [This section regarding union and tempering in the Church Fathers, including Leontius, Theodoret, and Anastasius, and discussions of Nestorius's error, is provided in the facsimile.]

^A can they receive, and they are united such that they both corrupt and perish together: whereas unity remains unconfused, exempt from corruption, and undergoing no change ^B in accordance with its qualities, just as those things which are adjacent to it do. For such is the nature of spiritual things.

CHAPTER LXVI

Further on union according to hypostasis

It must be known that union according to hypostasis makes the union of the things joined into one composite hypostasis, while keeping the natures that have come together for the union, as well as their distinction and natural properties, free from all confusion and change within itself; yet it possesses no hypostatic difference with respect to itself. For the characteristic distinctions of each of those things that have come together for the union are its own, through which each is separated from those things that are of the same species and nature, as is the case with soul and body. For one composite hypostasis is produced from both, for example that of Peter, or that of Paul; yet it keeps within itself both perfect natures, that of the soul and of the body, and their distinction unmingled, and their properties unconfused. And it has within itself the characteristic properties of each: of the soul, those which separate it from the rest of souls, and of the body, those which separate it from the rest of bodies, in no way separating the soul— ^C [The remainder of this column and the subsequent text are notes discussing ^D the interpretation of Cyrilline and Nestorian terminology, as well as arguments regarding the nature of union against Gnostics and Eunomians, citing authors such as Irenaeus, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Nemesius.]

they separate them ^A, nor do they separate the soul from the body in any way; but they unite and join them, and together separate one composite hypostasis of both from the other hypostases of the same species. For since the natures have once received union with one another according to hypostasis, they remain indivisible forever. For even though the soul is separated from the body at death, the hypostasis of both is one and the same. For hypostasis is the distinct constitution of each individual, existing in itself at the beginning of its being. Therefore, both the body and the soul remain, always having one source of their being and hypostasis, even if they are separated from one another.

^B It must be known that it is possible for natures to be united with one another according to hypostasis, as in man; and it is possible for a nature to be assumed by the hypostasis and to subsist within it; both of which are observed in Christ. For in Him the natures, both divine and human, were united, and His ensouled flesh subsisted in the pre-existing hypostasis of the Word of God, and possessed that as its hypostasis.

[alt-version omitted]

NOTE

^C ...illustrious men, if I may be allowed to conjecture, I would name Diodorus of Tarsus, from whom the Nestorian poison originated. Nyssenus also speaks of these things in his letter to Theophilus against Apollinaris, a fragment of which is cited in the third collection of the synod. Moreover, the Theologian and Nemesius imitated the Fathers of that ancient council of Antioch, on whose synodal fragments, according to Leontius (Book Against the Nestorians), we read that Paul of Samosata was condemned because he denied that the Word or the eternal wisdom of the Father was united substantially to human nature; that is, as a substance made substantial in the body. They teach that God was made consubstantial with humanity in the womb of the Virgin, from which it appears where Apollinaris received the concept of consubstantiation, which, because he understood it in a twisted sense, he fashioned as a single nature in Christ, with the human part curtailed.

The union according to hypostasis was approved not only by the Ephesian, but also by the Chalcedonian synod, and subsequently, with the stricter sense of Cyril being omitted, it was understood to mean nothing other than the concurrence of several ^D natures into one hypostasis or person, or the addition of an alien nature to a hypostasis already existing, says Damascene. This latter acceptance is solely and most properly applicable to the incarnation of the Word, insofar as, says Maximus, cited in the Collection against the Severians, ch. 21: The one and same hypostasis of the Word, now and previously existing, without an efficient cause of itself, simple, and in no part composite, finally having assumed intelligent and ensouled flesh, became truly composite without mutation of itself. These things clearly have no place in the example of the union of body and soul, which is frequent among the ancients, for the soul is not anterior to the body. But Eulogius of Alexandria observed another and indeed grave distinction between those unions, whose words I shall relate from the same collection, ch. 19: “Again we grant that man consists of soul and body, yet we do not say that he is body and soul properly. That this is clear follows from the fact that we cannot attribute the definition of soul and body to that which is compounded of both. Therefore, when we say that man is from two natures (for the things that come together there are of different and not the same nature), we reckon that there is one nature of the composite. Indeed, if we speak properly, we would not at all call man soul and body: although, by the license which it has received from the Holy Spirit, it is familiar for Scripture to denote the whole from the part, as it is one which has been exempt from the yoke of dialectical vanity. But in Christ the union is ineffable and unspeakable, and it is impossible for the human mind to find any similar example: since we do not only say that He is from divinity and humanity, but we also attribute to Him the names of the simple elements. For we call Christ God, and we call the same one man, which we do not have in the same way to say properly of those others.” More willingly, as it appears, the Fathers were prepared to concede that one nature is made from soul and body than from the divinity of the Word and humanity.

^A A nature composed of two hypostases, or that one hypostasis should be made from two hypostases, is absolutely impossible: because opposite substantial differences cannot exist together in one and the same nature. Since it is their function to separate the natures in which they reside. And again, it cannot be that those things which have once existed separately and per se, should have another principle of subsistence and hypostasis. For this is nothing other than existence per se and separately. It must be known, moreover, in the holy Trinity, that hypostasis is a mode of existence without beginning, of each eternal existence.

It is necessary, however, to know that when a composite nature is formed, the parts must be simultaneous in time, and something else must be perfected from others, so that it does not preserve, but rather changes and converts into something else those things from which it is composed. ^B Just as when a body is made from the four elements, something different arises from different things; and neither fire is perfect, nor is any other element, nor is it so called. And just as a mule is begotten from a horse and an ass. For the mule is neither a horse, nor is it called an ass; but something different from others, not retaining either, but being something unconfused and invariable, distinct from those things of which it was concreted and coalesced.

I subjoin the definitions of philosophy which pertain to the shorter logic, as they lie, both in the published versions and in the manuscripts, except for Reg. 2927, in which a fuller logic is described.

CHAPTER LXVII. Six definitions of philosophy.

Philosophy is the knowledge of the things which are, according to what they are; that is, of their nature. ^C Philosophy is the knowledge of things divine and human. Philosophy is care for and meditation upon death, both that which falls under choice and that which is natural. Philosophy is assimilation to God, according to what is possible for man. But we become like God by means of justice, holiness, and goodness. Justice, indeed, consists in equitable distribution; that is, that no one should commit injury, nor should anyone show partiality in judgment, but should render to each according to his works. Holiness, however, which combines with goodness, rises above justice, and consists in this: that whoever has been injured should bear it patiently, and forgive those by whom he has been injured; indeed, even that he should treat them with goods. Philosophy is the art of arts, and the science of sciences. ^D For philosophy is the beginning of every art; since through it every art has been discovered. Philosophy is the love of wisdom. But true wisdom is God. Therefore, love toward God, this is true philosophy.

Philosophy is divided into the contemplative and the active. The contemplative, into theology, mathematics, and physiology; the mathematical, into arith-

arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. ^A The active, again, into ethics, economics, and politics.

To the contemplative part belongs the consideration of things devoid of body and matter, namely God, who is before all things and is properly incorporeal and immaterial, and then the angels, demons, and souls. These things, as far as the body is concerned, are called immaterial; but if they are compared with that which is properly immaterial—that is, the Divine—they are considered material. This, then, is theology.

It belongs to physiology to contemplate the nature of things joined with matter, such as animals, plants, stones, and the like.

It belongs to mathematics to contemplate those things that hold a middle place, which are sometimes considered within matter and sometimes outside of matter, and which occupy a middle position between the immaterial and the material. For instance, number is immaterial in itself; yet it is perceived within matter, as in grain or wine—for we say "ten measures of wheat" and "ten sextarii of wine." The same is true regarding the other species of mathematics.

The active part cultivates morals and teaches how one ought to live. If it instructs a single person, it is called ethics; if a whole household, economics; if a whole city, politics. ^B

CHAPTER LXVIII. On the four dialectical methods.

It is to be known that there are four dialectical, that is, logical, methods: division, which divides a genus into species through the intervening differences; definition, which defines the subject from the genus and the differences, as separated by the aforementioned division; resolution, which resolves more composite things into simpler ones—that is, a body into its humors, the humors into fruits, the fruits into the four elements, and finally, the elements into matter and form; and demonstration, which proves the subject in question through some medium. For example, it is proposed to me to demonstrate that the soul is immortal: I take some medium, namely, being moved by perpetual motion, and I argue in this way: "The soul is moved by perpetual motion; but what is moved by perpetual motion is immortal; therefore, the soul is immortal."

^C Triplex resolution. — It should be known that syllogisms belong to the demonstrative part. Nor should it be ignored that resolution is threefold. One is natural, such as the one about which we have spoken; another is logical, as when we resolve a syllogism into its proper figure; the third is mathematical, when we take that which is being queried as if it were certain and conceded, and arrive at something regarding which there is no doubt, whence that which was proposed ^D is gathered. For example, let this question be proposed: "Is the soul immortal?" I take that which is sought as if it were certain and indubitable and say: "Since the soul is immortal, there is certainly a reward established for both good and evil actions. But if a reward is established, there is certainly someone to undergo judgment and someone to act as judge. And if there is one to undergo judgment and one to act as judge, there is a Provider and providence." We have thus arrived at providence, which is acknowledged by all. Henceforth, therefore, according to composition

Since there is providence and a judge, there are also rewards and punishments. And since there are rewards and punishments, there is also that which is judged. But if there is that which is judged, the soul is therefore immortal. ^A

Explanation of Terms

expressed in the mirror due to the condensation of the air. A parhelion is a round, dense cloud, not unlike the sun; or it is a representation of the sun in a dense cloud, flat on every side. A thunderbolt is a breath in the form of a vortex, pressing down a fiery motion, driven down from kindled fire, and burning everything around it. A typhoon is a vortical motion of murky air, sent down onto the earth. A prester is a vortical motion of bright air carried downwards. A sceptus is a thunderbolt apart from the clouds. Hail is water thoroughly frozen, thickened above the earth. Ice is water frozen on the earth. Snow is water half-frozen, brought down from the clouds to the earth. Hoarfrost is water frozen by cold, thickened on the earth through other moist matter. A downpour is water falling copiously from the clouds. Rain is a collection of dew. Dew is the moisture of many drops: a mist ^A is the opacity preceding a cloud. Vapor is an abundance of exhalations around the earth. A lake is much sweet water, gathered together, invading hollow and sloping places. The sea is salty and bitter water, filling the hollow and deep bays of the lowest earth. A spring is the emerging beginning of a fountain, or water generated and emerging from the overturning of the earth. An earthquake is a violent motion of air entering under the earth, and forcing it to shake. A pyrocrater ^B is an opening, or hole, and a vent through which subterranean fire erupts to the outside. A lyre is an instrument furnished with strings.

The End, with the help of God, of the philosophical works of the most holy John of Damascus.

ADMONITION ON THE BOOK OF HERESIES

In the Royal codex no. 2926, at the end of the Logic of John of Damascus, the scribe provides the reason and cause why, after the dialectical work of this holy doctor, he omitted his book *On Heresies* and immediately wrote down the theological chapters: he says, "Although this holy man (Damascene) promised in his letter (to Cosmas of Maiuma) that, once he had explained what the pagan philosophers had handed down, he would immediately narrate the tenets of the heretics and then the dogmas of the truth (or Christian theology), nevertheless we have followed a different path, placing the doctrine of the truth before the things that pertain to heresies after the philosophical [works]; not indeed that we might seem to oppose this holy man (far be it!), but because we prefer to learn diligently what pertains to the knowledge of the truth rather than the novalties of the heretics. That is without doubt the reason why those who in later centuries copied the philosophical and theological [works] of John of Damascus refrained from drafting his treatise *On Heresies*. We, however, thought it a matter of religion not to desert the order which the author himself established; and all the more because, as he himself reminds us, once error and falsehood are detected, the love and study of the truth strike deeper roots; [which] was formerly the intention of Theodoret, when he was the first of all to attempt to recall and arrange the entire theology of the Christian faith into certain chapters: just as he himself declares in the preface to Sporacius, and in the prologue to the *Epitome of Divine Dogmas*. It was fitting, therefore, that our [author], intending to imitate the design of Theodoret, and intending to pursue divine matters in the same series as he, should not deviate from the illustrious rule which that supreme man had established, and that it should be manifest to everyone that John of Damascus had followed in the footsteps of the ancient Fathers even in the order of the matters he treated.

No one, I think, will deny that our Damascene was the compiler of this catalogue of heresies, otherwise the treatise *On Heresies* which he himself had woven together would have perished. Indeed, Lambecius recounts that in a very ancient Imperial Greek codex, no. 251, which contains Ascetical works, there is a book