Against the Jacobites

ON THE TRACT AGAINST THE JACOBITES: ADMONITION

396 Henricus Canisius published in Latin the treatise of Saint John of Damascus against the Acephali, or rather the Jacobites, in volume IV of his *Antiquæ lectiones*, based on the translation by Franciscus Turrianus, but with the beginning in a largely mutilated state. The most illustrious abbot D. Julius Imperialis, vice-legate of the Supreme Pontiff at Ferrara, out of his extraordinary devotion to the cause of literature and a no less inclination to promote my own studies, obtained a transcript of the same work—though in a more complete form—from the Vatican Greek codex no. 493, and very kindly transmitted it to me. Since, however, the Vatican codex was also found to be mutilated, with one leaf lost, I have in some measure repaired the loss from an Arabic translation of the same treatise, which the Reverend Father Lelong—a most kind and learned priest of the Paris Oratory—communicated to me, it having been translated by a man most skilled in Oriental languages and matters. But even that codex contributed not a little to discerning the author’s meaning and clarifying the obscure and doubtful passages of the Greek exemplar.

The author, as far as can be conjectured, wrote this work while he was still dwelling in Damascus, before he had set off for Palestine and committed himself to the monastic life. We know from the History of Theophanes that Peter, the metropolitan who had laid this task upon him, was a man who rendered excellent service to the Christian religion. Yet it is not easy to discover who that Jacobite bishop was, for whose sake this book was written for the purpose of recalling him to the Catholic Church. In the beginning, it is stated that he is of the same race and of the same name, "assailed by shame and [a sense of] longing for one of his own race and of the same name"; these words seem to indicate a man of the Damascene region, or perhaps one joined by affinity to the metropolitan Peter, or to John himself, and named Peter or John; indeed, rather a namesake of Peter than of John, since the dissertation appeared under the name not of our John, but of Peter. Otherwise, I would have conjectured that he was called Elias, on account of the little book, or profession of faith, which, as we were saying just above, our John wrote at the command of his metropolitan Peter, to be recited by Bishop Elias of the Maronite fold.

There is no more certain knowledge of *Toubapala, Tudaræa*, a city, but the town of *Darea*, or *Daras*, is known, which is situated six miles from Damascus. Perhaps it should be read in the title of this dissertation *πρὸς τὸν ἐπίσκοπον τοῦ Δαραίας*, or *τῆς Δαραίας*, "to the Bishop of Darea."

I shall add nothing here in commendation of this treatise, than which it would be difficult to find another more accurate or telling argument against the Monophysites, not even among the works of Leontius; although Turrianus, in his preface to this book, wrote that the Damascene had watered his own rivulets from the fountains of Leontius. I do not deny that our author borrowed several things from the books of Leontius, but there occur in the work which we here present more numerous and indeed more powerful arguments than those which are found in Leontius. This treatise of the Damascene is cited in the *Collectanea* against the Severians, which were likewise published in Latin by Henricus Canisius in the same volume IV of the *Antiquæ lectiones*. At the end of the dissertation, various authorities of the Fathers are subjoined by way of an appendix, by which the two natures in Christ are proven; I shall examine several of these in their proper places. But since the very last one cited is the letter to the monk Cæsarius, inscribed with the name of Saint John Chrysostom, I shall discuss in a separate dissertation in the Prolegomena what considerations move me to adjudge that work unworthy of such a great doctor. EDIT.

JOHN, HOLY MONK OF DAMASCUS: A TREATISE, AS THOUGH FROM THE PERSON OF PETER, MOST HOLY BISHOP OF DAMASCUS, TO THE JACOBITE BISHOP OF DARA

^A 1. It is a wise saying of the wise that not even a good thing is good if it is not done properly. Divine Scripture itself bears witness to this regarding the children of the Hebrews, that they have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge; and it offers this testimony not to praise them, but rather to rebuke them. Zeal for piety is good, but it must be tempered with charity. Wickedness is a hateful thing, but he who is caught in it is truly worthy of pity. I loathe the gangrene, yet I cherish the limb as long as it is not rendered entirely useless and corrupted. Therefore, I pull out all the stops, as they say; I explore every art and devise every healing medicine, calling upon God as my co-worker, moved by reverence and love for one who is a fellow member of my race and shares my name, as I strive to drive away the vice that has afflicted him from without. If, therefore, I succeed in restoring him to health, thanks must be given to Him who granted this; but if I do not—alas for the evils!—I entrust that which I uniquely loved to the knife; not, indeed, without sorrow, yet I hand it over, avoiding his company lest the evil spread further and the corrupted parts increase in number. And yet, I will not shower him with insults, but with groans I flee with the prophet, saying: "We have treated Babylon, and she is not healed." ^B And he adds the reason for this: "Because she would not." The disease is voluntary, and so is the acceptance of the remedy. These things have spurred me to write, not a lust for contention, not envy, not caviling, not a desire to win, not a yearning for ostentation, and finally not any hatred, but compassion, which is born from the love of God and neighbor. For, "If you draw back," says Scripture, "my soul shall have no pleasure in you." For God has placed us here for this purpose: to exhort, to admonish, to convert, to cultivate, to dig, to put dung around, to cure the sin. By "unfruitfulness" and "evil fruit" we mean—like a silent tragedian—that which is poorly voiced. "For woe to me if I do not preach the gospel," and if I bury my talent, becoming a useless and wicked servant because of my sloth, I shall be sent away ^C from the joy of my Lord. Accept, therefore, a word…

^A of medicine, confirmed by the grace of the Spirit, that God may be delighted and that you may make the Church a partaker of his joy. For the cross of the Lord has made this one, consisting of heavenly and earthly things.

2. Since our entire discourse has been struck out concerning nature, we say this: in the case of the holy and superessential Godhead, that is, the monarchical and consubstantial Trinity, Arius and Eunomius, and their polytheistic—or rather, atheistic—faction, have clearly babbled that there are three substances, dividing the nature by the hypostases, because they understood badly and conceived in their minds that nature and hypostasis are the same ^B thing. Sabellius of Africa [(1)] foolishly asserted that there is one hypostasis, and he confused the Trinity, contracted by a most evil conjunction, in order to maintain the unity of substance in a single hypostasis. But as regards the salutary dispensation (or incarnation) of the Savior, who in the Trinity is the Word of God, the only-begotten Son of the Father, the most wicked and lost Nestorius, an anthropolater, and Diodorus, and Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia, also were rebels, confessing two natures and dividing the hypostasis, so that in their opinion there were two persons according to the number of the natures. They divided, therefore, the one Lord Jesus Christ, and constituted two hypostases; because they supposed that hypostasis and nature were one and the same thing. But Dioscorus and Severus, and the multi-headed mob of their followers, also asserted for themselves one hypostasis, defining that there is at the same time one nature, because they knew not what they were saying, nor understood what they affirmed. The disease, or error, of their mind was precisely this, that they considered nature and hypostasis to be one and the same. Yet they did not stop there. For they said that in the holy Trinity there are three particular natures and substances, and one common knowledge or notion. Yet they had nothing solid, which was born apt for confirming the matter.

3. But the preachers of the orthodox religion and of truth were not of this opinion; but following the divine law, and directing their course toward the heavenly light, they walked straight along the royal road, ^C which is in the middle, declining neither to the left—that of pride and ignorance—nor to the right—that of fantastic imagination. Nor did they set out to emend follies with contrary follies; but they arrived at their proposed goal between the extremes of evil, containing themselves within the limits of truth, so that by inclining to neither side they might not deflect from it. And so they confessed one substance in the Trinity, and, acknowledging three hypostases of the same, they willingly preached them. Again, however, they acknowledged that distinction in the mystery of the incarnation, as Gregory the Theologian says, two natures, and two substances, and one hypostasis, and they comprised nature and substance under the same definition: they likewise defined person and hypostasis in the same way; since they knew that the difference which is between nature, or substance, and hypostasis, or person, is of such a kind as is the distinction between the common and the singular.

4. First, therefore, we must inquire about nature and hypostasis, so that we may have a perfect understanding of the significance of both terms: then it will be evident to us whether we ought to assert two natures in Christ, or only one. For the standard of our inquiry demands that this be defined. Nor shall we expose the truth to contention, but we shall investigate it amicably, since such is the nature of truth that it becomes manifest to him who seeks it with that care which Scripture thus expresses: "Draw near to me, and I will draw near to you." And elsewhere: "Where two or three are gathered in my name, I am in the midst of them." Again it also says: "You ask, and do not receive, because you do not ask as you ought." And: "When there is among you jealousy and contention and division, are you not carnal, and do you not walk according to the flesh?" And likewise: "You cannot believe in me, who seek the glory of men."

^A 5. Now, therefore, the beginning of our discourse is led by these words of Saint Basil, which he wrote in his letter to Amphilochius, namely that "the difference between substance and hypostasis is the same as that which exists between that which is common to many and that which is particular to each individual." And, a few words being interjected, he says in the same letter: "The name of substance directs us to understand some indefinite thing. For the mind does not find wherein it consists, from that common notion which it signifies. But the name of hypostasis signifies that which is common in some one thing; and this (the mind) defines from the manifest properties appearing in it." Whoever, furthermore, does not recognize the difference between nature and hypostasis is so applying himself to the investigation of truth that there is no distinction between the sect of which we have spoken and himself. For if these things are distinguished, why do they assert concerning Christ that he has one nature, as he has one person? Again, if substance and hypostasis are the same thing, the Son, since he is of one substance with the Father, will also be one hypostasis with him. And, conversely, if the hypostasis is different, there will also be, in like manner, a different nature; and as he is of the same substance as the Father, he will also be of the same hypostasis with him: and if he is different in hypostasis, he will also be different in substance, which is very impious. So, likewise, concerning humanity. For if that which has subsistence is a hypostasis, humanity which has subsistence, and whose nature is one, will be in like manner one hypostasis. Just as humanity taken universally is one nature, so also it will be one person.

6. But if you say it should be spoken of differently regarding the holy divinity and differently regarding the mystery of the incarnation, which the Lord dispensed for our sake, answer us who ask you: Are nature and hypostasis one and the same? If you say that Christ is of two natures, do you not understand that you are compelled by that response to assert that he is also of two hypostases? For even if you do not state that about Christ, you are nonetheless compelled by those things which you have premised to affirm two natures as well. For if nature and hypostasis are the same, and you assert that the divinity of Christ is a nature, and his body is a nature, you are saying at the same time that the hypostasis of his divinity is one and that the hypostasis of his humanity is another.

7. But if hypostasis and nature are the same, Christ, since he is consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us, will also be of the same hypostasis as the Father and us: and then, in turn, the hypostases of divinity and humanity would become one hypostasis. For if hypostasis and nature are one and the same, and you constitute a distinction of natures in Christ, but not ^B truly of hypostases or persons, then nature and hypostasis will not be the same. The demonstration of this argument, however, is most clear to anyone, unless he be blinded in mind.

8. And certainly, by the name of *hypostasis*, there is signified something singular according to itself. For the name *hypostasis* has various significations; one of them is that it designates something subsisting by itself; another is that which does not exist in another, or does not have subsistence in another besides itself, and is not an accident. When the Fathers use this name regarding singular substance, it generally signifies that which is not in a subject, and which is not a privation; often, on the other hand, it signifies the subject of which certain things are predicated.

9. You, therefore (O Monophysites), having abandoned these trifles, ^C correctly handle the word of truth; for you do not say, as the holy doctors have said, that nature and hypostasis are the same; but rather you confess a particular nature as a hypostasis existing by itself. But that it is not fitting to speak of "particular natures," we shall understand from this: ...therefore, lay aside the crookedness, and "rightly handle the word of truth." For you do not say, as the holy Fathers have said, that nature and hypostasis are the same; but rather you confess the nature to be particular, just as you confess the hypostasis according to it. And that one ought not to speak of particular natures, we shall learn from this:

10. If you confess particular natures in the holy Trinity, you deem it to be of a different substance, and Arius is again raised up. But if you give to each of the divinely sovereign hypostases of the holy Trinity its own proper substance, yet confess them to be consubstantial according to a common substance; but if substance and hypostasis are the same, there will be, according to your opinion, a quaternity of hypostases—three indeed particular, but one common—and in like manner a quaternity of substances. And each of the hypostases will be of two natures and hypostases, one indeed common and one particular, and they will be at once consubstantial and of a different substance, and of the same hypostasis and of different hypostases. And who would not laugh, or rather, who would not weep for the immoderate madness of these men? Does this not constitute nothing but babble and the figment of a devil-inspired mind, a dark discovery of demons, and a ^D product of Greek imposture? Who of the God-bearing men has ever said this? Unless perhaps the one who...

you would introduce to us your holy Aristotle as a thirteenth apostle, and prefer the idolater to those who spoke by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. But let us return to the proposed subject.

^A 11. For even if nature is not without subsistence, nor is substance without a person; nor again, on the other hand, is subsistence and person without substance (for assuredly it is not so), yet substance and subsistence are not the same thing, nor are nature and person. For substance and that which is in substance are not the same thing, nor are subsistence and the enhypostaton (that is to say, that which exists in the subsistence). For that which is in something is one thing, and that in which something is, is another. For that is "in substance" which is considered in the substance, namely, the collection of accidents which denotes the subsistence, not the substance itself. But the enhypostaton is not the subsistence, but that which is viewed in the subsistence. Now substance or essence is that which exists in any way whatsoever, whether by itself, or with another, or in another: by itself, as the substance of fire; with others, as soul and body, for these exist in each other; in another, as fire in a lamp, and as the flesh of the Lord in His eternal subsistence. For the subsistence denotes someone, or this particular thing ^B which is pointed out by the stretching forth of a finger; but the enhypostaton denotes the substance. And the subsistence defines a person by the characteristic properties by which it is sealed; the enhypostaton, however, defines that it is not an accident, which has its existence in another. For if that which is "in something" were the same as that "in which something is," it would be time for you to say that virtue and the virtuous person are the same, and, by reasonable conversion, that malice and that in which malice is are the same. And according to your view, the devil himself will be malice, and his creator, the creator of malice. And since the accident is in the substance, the accident will be substance, and substance will be accident. And the body, I mean the human body, will be, according to you, soul; and who could bear the madness of this confusion?

^C 12. That there is no substance without subsistence, we know clearly, but we do not say that the enhypostaton and the subsistence are the same thing, nor yet substance and that which is in substance. Rather, we call the subsistence that which is in substance, and the substance the enhypostaton. For we know that the substance of the holy Divinity is an enhypostaton; for it exists in three subsistences. And likewise, each of the subsistences is "in substance." For these subsist in the substance of the holy Divinity; and in the case of the ineffable economy of the Lord, which surpasses all mind, we say ^D that the subsistence is "in substance," as existing in the substances from which it is also composed, and that each of His substances is an enhypostaton; for they have in common His one subsistence, His Divinity, eternally, just as also that of the Father and of the Spirit.

^A His flesh, however, which is animate and rational—or, which is the same thing, His very humanity—subsists newly in Him, and has acquired that subsistence for itself. Thus, it comes to pass that neither of Christ's natures lacks a subsistence, nor does each of them subsist by itself, but both have one and the same subsistence.

13. Since these things have been thus predetermined, let us come to the question: it is asked, therefore, whether Christ is of two natures and in two natures, or only one, as you prodigiously fancy. Therefore, it is worth the effort for one debating to construct the principles or premises from common and true notions. By common, I mean those accepted by both sides. For thus the syllogism would be formed, and not a fallacy; the conclusion would be true, and not absurd.

14. It is confessed, therefore, by all the holy Fathers that the union was made from divinity and humanity, and that Christ is perfect in divinity, and the same one perfect in humanity, lacking no part of Himself. Tell us, therefore: do these things also please you? I think you will frankly confess them. But what is divinity? And what, again, is humanity? Is it a substance or an accident? Is it a nature or a subsistence? I believe you will say it is a substance and a nature. For it is manifest to everyone that neither is an accident. But that it is not a subsistence has been sufficiently shown previously. ^B For if the name of divinity and the name of humanity signified a subsistence, you could say there are three divinities because of the three subsistences, and infinite humanities because of the infinite number of subsistences, or that a subsistence exists within subsistences. But who—I will not say a wise man, but even one of very dull mind—would ever dare to blurt out such a thing? Therefore, both the name of divinity and the name of humanity signify a nature. Is divinity, then, and humanity one nature—I do not say in Christ, but absolutely? No one, unless he be insane, would say they are one. For a creature is by no means the same thing as the uncreated and the Creator, nor is a body the same as the incorporeal, nor that which has begun as that which is without beginning. ^C Therefore, the nature of divinity is one thing, and that of humanity is another, and they are two natures. Since, therefore, Christ consists of divinity and humanity, He is from two natures. Wherefore, if you profess that Christ is from divinity and humanity, I would like you to tell us: do these two, namely divinity and humanity, exist in Christ, or not? You will entirely concede this, unless you wish to be utterly impious. Why, then, do you not say there are two natures in Christ? For if, by affirming that Christ consists of divinity and humanity, you confess Him to be from two natures, and if "from divinity and humanity" has the same force among you as "from two natures," how can you ^D not declare Christ to be of two natures?

and in two natures?

15. If divinity and humanity are not the same thing, according to their natural quality, but one is one thing and another is another, different and different, let anyone of sound mind observe whether, if one thing is one thing by nature and another is another, they are one in essence and not two; but if they are two—and not one—then they are two natures, for "another" signifies nature, as those expert in these matters have defined. But is nature and nature one, or two? Clearly two. For one and one, as even children know, are two.

16. But if you say that those things which are united are one, hear that those things which are united are not one in all respects, but insofar as they are united. For if those things which are united were one in all respects, since man is composed of dissimilar natures, it would be necessary to say that soul and body are one in all respects, and the incorporeal would be body, and the body incorporeal; and since divinity and humanity are united, they would be one according to substantial difference, and either the divine would be created, or the human uncreated.

17. If those things which are united ^C are one in all respects, and the body is composed of contrary qualities, we would have to say that heat and cold are the same thing, and dryness and humidity likewise the same; furthermore, that Peter and John, since they are united by nature, are also one in hypostasis, and not two. But this does not seem so to those who are of sound mind and to the truth; rather, those things which are united are one insofar as they are united: for example, Peter and John, since they are united by nature, being consubstantial, are one by nature; but soul and body, since they are united according to hypostasis, are one according to hypostasis. For no one of sober mind would say that soul and body are one by nature.

18. If the union has come to pass from two natures, were there two before the union, or in the union, or after the union? And if they subsisted before the union, why do we accuse Nestorius? And if the flesh subsisted even after the union, why do you reproach us? But if you say they were in the union, and the union remains, then even now and forever there are and shall be two. But if you say that at the time of the Word's incarnation they were one on account of the union, were they two before they were united, or were they united? For if both existed before the union, it is necessary to say that the union resulted from two hypostases; but if you say there are two in the union, and number in your opinion necessarily induces division, then the cause of division is the union, and in the union itself you divide the union.

^A 19. If each of those from which Christ exists preserves its own definition and account of substance or essence, even in the union, and the definition of Christ’s divinity is one thing and the definition of his humanity is another, how is it that you say there is one nature and not two, when they are not placed under one and the same definition?

20. If the flesh of the Word of God, as your opinion holds, is of the same substance as his uncreated divinity, you labor under a depraved notion of consubstantiality. And why does what you have long been laboring to produce not come forth? But if it is not of the same substance, in what way will those which are not of the same substance be of one nature? Or how are those which are of one nature not of the same substance? Unless consubstantiality is defined as having the same substance or essence.

21. If Christ is consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us according to the same nature, then we are entirely consubstantial with the Father; for those things which are consubstantial with the same thing according to the same nature are also consubstantial with each other. But if he is consubstantial with the Father according to divinity, and with us according to humanity, tell me, is divinity and humanity one nature? But if it is not one, then Christ is necessarily two and consists in two natures. And if it is one, how do they differ? For things that differ, either differ substantially or accidentally; but if they differ accidentally, they would be hypostases and not natures; ^B but if they differ substantially, they are natures. For things that differ are at the very least two; for the one, as one, does not admit of difference. Indeed, difference necessarily brings number with it.

22. Things that are consubstantial receive the same account. If, therefore, Christ is one incarnate nature, and this is the definition of his essence, while he is otherwise consubstantial with the Father and with us, then the Father and we will be one incarnate nature of divinity.

23. Difference introduces at least two things that differ, whether they be natures, or hypostases, or one hypostasis differing from itself; and if they are natures, they differ substantially; if they are hypostases, they differ according to that which is an adjunct to the essence; if it is one hypostasis which is diverse from itself, they differ through variation and mutation according to a separable accident: choose, therefore, one of these, and either say that Christ is two hypostases after the union, or that his divinity differs from his humanity according to a separable accident: and thus the uncreated, beginningless, impassible, omnipotent, and the like, and likewise the created, had a beginning, ^C passible, and similar things, of which Christ consists, will be accidents, and indeed separable, mutable, and variable: or else join us, as truth suggests, in proclaiming that Christ is two natures, the difference of which you acknowledge. For by speaking of a difference of substances, you will be compelled to say that there are substances, and that they are preserved. For if a thing does not exist, there cannot even be a difference. For how can those things differ

that do not exist preserved? But if they are preserved, then they are also numbered. ^A

24. But if you say that one composite nature has resulted from two natures, tell us, I pray you, how things that are not naturally composite are composed? For one composite nature is constituted out of distinct natures when, the natures being united, something else is produced beyond the things united, so that it is understood and called neither this strictly, nor that, but something different: just as if a body were to be constituted from four elements—I mean fire, and air, and earth, and water—the four being united and blended together. And that which is produced is neither fire, nor is it so called, nor air, nor water, nor earth, but something else ^B from these and beyond these. Similarly, a mule is distinguished from horse and ass, and it is not, neither in reality nor in name, a horse, nor is it an ass, but something third constituted from them. But our Lord Jesus Christ, because He consists of divinity and humanity, is perfect in divinity and in humanity, and is both God and man and is so called, and is wholly God and wholly man; which indeed cannot be found in a composite nature. For the entire body is not fire, nor is the whole man a soul, nor is the whole mule a horse. For this reason Christ is not one composite nature, but one composite ^C hypostasis; not something different from different things, but the same things from different things; for from divinity and humanity, He is both God and man perfect: yet there are two natures in one composite hypostasis, and one composite hypostasis in two natures.

25. If Christ is of the same nature and consubstantial with the Father, who is of a simple nature, but also possesses a composite nature, He will have two natures, one simple and one composite.

26. If Christ’s divinity is uncreated and without beginning, ^D but His humanity is created and has a beginning, how shall that which is without beginning and that which has a beginning be of one nature?

27. If Christ is one composite nature, but the simple and the composite are not consubstantial, and the Father is of a simple nature, then Christ is not consubstantial with the Father.

28. If Christ is one composite nature from divinity and humanity, but His Mother does not consist of divinity and humanity, then He is not even of the same substance as His Mother; and you have moved the ancient landmarks [(cf. Prov. 22:28)] which our Fathers set, by proclaiming Christ to be consubstantial with the Father according to the divinity, and consubstantial with the Mother according to the humanity.

29. But if you speak of the natures of Christ by way of mental conception and contemplation, tell us, O you who... [alt-version omitted]

are the inventors and speculators ^A of these things, is "mental conception" (epinoia) of things that are true and existent, such as that it may perceive and discern those things which appear simple to the senses? Just as, for instance, it recognizes in man the soul, which does not fall under the gaze, together with the body, which is born to be seen; or is it a figment of the mind, from the complication of sense and imagination, composing and fashioning out of things that are, those that are not at all, as the myth-making of the hippocentaurs and goat-stags, which signifies no thing; or is it merely a naked word devoid of signification, such as *scindapsus* and *blitiri*? If you say the second, then the mystery of the Economy will be a mere imagination and illusion. If, however, the first, since you consider the two natures by mental conception, and consideration is of things that are, why do you not number those which are? ^B Since the holy Fathers have stated that not the natures, but the *distance* between them, is understood by mental conception? For where, he says, are the natures divided by mental conceptions? If, therefore, the natures are divided by mental conception, it is manifest that they do not differ in actuality or in existence; for if what is viewed by mental conception exists, and the Father says that mental conception produces the distance of the natures, he would indeed be saying that the distance exists in actuality and existence, which is impossible. You, therefore, when you speak of divinity and humanity in Christ after the union by mental conception, do not confess them in actuality or in reality; consequently, according to you, he will be neither God in reality and truth, nor man, but something else besides these.

30. Again, if by contemplation you speak of the two natures of Christ—since contemplation is of things that are, as those skilled in these matters have defined—the natures of Christ are entirely necessary ^C existing things. And if they exist, why do you flee from the number [two] as if it were some hobgoblin?

31. But if you say that he who speaks of two natures divides the mystery of the Economy, and utters two Christs: he, therefore, who speaks of the union from two natures will accordingly utter the union from two Christs.

32. If speaking of two natures divides Christ, but you assert two natures in the union, then in the union you divide the union, and according to your opinion, the union will be a division.

33. Nature and nature will never be called one nature, but perhaps one hypostasis: nor will hypostasis and hypostasis be called one hypostasis, but one nature. Therefore, you who affirm that those things from which Christ consists are of one nature, you ought to confess that these are hypostases, and not natures. If, however, preferring falsehood to truth, you say that those things from which Christ is, after the union, ^D are of one hypostasis, then confess that these are natures.

34. If you acknowledge the difference of the natures even after the union, how can you not refer to the natures in the plural number

^A For if, according to you, there is one composite nature after the union, you ought to speak not of a difference of natures, but of a difference of one nature from itself; which is something for you to say and think, not for us. For the same nature will never have an essential difference from itself.

35. If there is one nature of Christ, tell us its name. For that which exists must also be named, and named appropriately, just as the nature of God is called deity, and the nature of man, humanity. By what name, then, shall we call the nature of Christ? "Christ-ity?" But none of those who spoke by divine inspiration have said this; or "deity-humanity?" But not even this. Why do you bring in for us a nameless nature? If you say that natures are being innovated, and that something strange is becoming of the strangeness of the mystery, yet nothing is more incomprehensible or sublime than the nature of God, and nevertheless that one and only thing which cannot be comprehended willed to be named by us. Either tell us, then, that the nature you have introduced is higher and better than the deity—and that will suffice for us—or reveal its name, or else, with the heralds of the truth, declare that deity and humanity are the natures of Christ, and not "the nature." For deity and humanity are not one nature. ^B

36. If out of deity and humanity there is one nature of Christ, then the deity in Christ is a portion of a nature, and not a perfect nature, and likewise also the humanity.

37. If your composite nature is not at all consubstantial with the Father, nor with the Mother, and the whole is what Christ is, Christ, in as much as He is Christ, is consubstantial with no one. And if this is the case, whenever He is consubstantial with someone, He is not Christ; and so, in as much as He is consubstantial with the Father, He is not Christ. It is necessary, therefore, that one of two things be the case: either that the one who is consubstantial with the Father is not Christ, or that the one who is Christ is not consubstantial with the Father.

38. Things that are composed are composed from contraries, but according to those who study nature, there is no contrary in substance. Therefore, it is impossible for a substance to be composite from substances. ^C

39. The natures, or rather the substances, are constituted by essential differences; if, therefore, one nature has been composed out of deity and humanity, deity and humanity will not be natures, but essential differences.

40. Those things which are of one substance are in every respect of different hypostases; and those which are of one hypostasis are of different substances. Therefore, you who speak of the deity and the humanity of Christ as being of one substance, say that they are of different hypostases, or, since you speak of one hypostasis, acknowledge two natures, not one. ^D For where there is diversity of substance, there is not one nature. Therefore, either say that the flesh is consubstantial with the deity of the Word, or, declaring them to be of different substances, confess two natures.

^A 41. You who say that there is one nature of the deity of Christ and of his flesh, tell us: by what nature did Christ suffer? You will clearly answer, "By the composite nature." For by saying "one," you must of necessity also attribute passion to it, and so, according to you, both the divinity and the humanity of Christ would be subject to passion.

42. Philosophers are accustomed to treat of quantity before quality, and they add as the reason for this that wherever there is quality, there quantity must also be considered. For a difference is a difference of things that differ. How, then, when you maintain a difference between essential qualities, do you not acknowledge the number of those things that differ essentially?

43. If there is one composite nature in Christ, it will be either only passible, or only impassible, or both passible and impassible at the same time and in the same respect; or it will be mutable, and at one time passible and at another time impassible again; or, finally, one part of it will be capable of suffering, while the other part is immune to passions: therefore, choose whichever of these impieties you prefer. For if it is only passible, Christ is not God; if it is only impassible, he is not man; if it is sometimes passible and sometimes impassible, ^B he is neither by nature, but rather by accident. For that which is implanted by nature does not change. But if one part of it is capable of suffering and the other is incapable, and each is what it is by nature, they will not be parts of the same nature, and thus Christ will be two natures; for he is not one nature, but one hypostasis composite of two natures, and in two natures, and two natures. For it is impossible for the same nature to be at once passible and impassible; for one and the same nature cannot receive contrary essential differences.

44. In every union, things that are united, even if they are blended, even if they are commingled, remain without departing from their own nature. For even if wine is mixed with water, there are two natures in that mixture; and wax and pitch, even if they are fused, neither abandons its own nature, but in the mixture the two natures persist. Even if they are united, and each does not retain its own property pure and intact because of the confusion and commingling with that to which it is united, nevertheless each one is what it was before, ^C and thus they are judged as two natures, not one, by those who know how to judge such things. For who is ignorant that in the mixture of wine and water there are two natures? If, therefore, these things are so, why do you, who know the difference and acknowledge the properties of the natures, proclaim one and not two? And why do you not concede to things that are not confused in any way even those things that pertain to things that are confused? But it is manifest that you are bringing forth transformation, extinction, and consubstantiation, but you do not wish to bring them into the open, fearing the mark of impiety.

45. Those things which are united become one by the union, not by

the extinction of the things that exist; and as long as they persevere in the union, and the union remains intact, they are one, in so far as they are united. How, then, is it that you, who speak of two natures in the union, arrogantly assert that after the union a single nature has come to be, taking the blessed Cyril’s phrase "after the union" in place of "in the union"? For when did the union, once having come to pass, cease? Or what has brought it to an end, so that you should suspect a result of it to have followed after it—a result other than the things of which it consists, and not existing within it? For the union is not a nature, like those things which come to be and then no longer exist, such as time, dancing, and the like.

^B 46. If something else has occurred after the union, distinct from the union, it is clearly a confusion, and not a union.

47. If confusion makes the two natures into one, and yet for you the "unconfused" also accomplishes the same thing, tell me, what is the difference for you between the unconfused and the confused?

48. If Christ is called "other" (aliud) and "other" (aliud) as visible and invisible, mortal and immortal, tangible and intangible—and not "one" (alius) and "one" (alius)—seeing that "other" (aliud) signifies essence or substance, why do you not declare that there are two substances?

49. According to logical rules, "other" (aliud) is indicative of substance, but "one" (alius) pertains to hypostasis. If, therefore, by calling Christ "other" and "other" you are not forced to speak of two natures, then say "one" (alius) and "one" (alius) as well; for by this you will signify two hypostases.

^C 50. But if you say that the number two introduces division, learn, and be well instructed, how number is defined by the philosopher: not as a division, but as a heap of units, or a flowing together of units. Thus, it signifies union rather than division. For a division of a unit is "half and half," but the number two is an addition of a unit. For to say that the two are "one and one" pertains rather to division; but to gather "one" and "one" under a single number and to call them "two," belongs to conjunction and union. If, therefore, number gathers, then it certainly does not divide. ^D Since the cleavage of the unit is the binary, and since that which is cleaved is cleaved into two, the number should be a cleavage and not an addition. If this is so, just as the unit, when cleaved, makes the binary, in the same way the number two, when cleaved, should have made the four. And whence comes the three? For only the even numbers should be counted, with the odd ones excluded. Or rather, it is truer to say that "number" is used in two ways: one is considered in itself, as the very nature of number, and the other is considered in relation to a subject, just as white, or whiteness, and the thing made white. This nature of number, therefore, neither divides nor conjoins.

but receives both: for instance, if you consider the dual in terms of the units from which it consists, it is divided into them. For two is divided into one and one. If, however, you consider the group of these, it is rather conjoined from them; for one and one are two, two and two are four. And again, number is not division, but a sign indicating the quantity of the things proposed, whether they are joined or divided, being a matter of another argument, and not that the number itself divides or conjoins these. For when we say ten cubits of this wood, for example, which is continuous, we do not thereby divide the unity of the ten-cubit piece of wood; and again, when we say ten palms, we know them to be divided; and likewise when we say one modius, for example of wheat or dates, we know that the grains contained in the modius are divided. Wherefore, if a number is predicated of natures, it does not principally indicate their quantity, but a difference of kind. For when we speak of two natures of an ox, for example, and a horse, we do not signal a division according to quantity, but a difference in species. But by saying three horses or men—Peter, for instance, Jacob, and John—we signal rather their division, and that they are this many, not that they are of such a kind. ^B Indeed, in the holy and consubstantial Trinity, we so preach three hypostases that we confess one nature and substance of them. Therefore, in the salutary incarnation, when we set forth two natures, we signify their diversity, not their separation; so that just as in that case we exclude a number of substances, although no hypostasis lacks substance, in the same way we rightly exclude a number of hypostases here, although no nature exists without a hypostasis.

51. If the dual always introduces division, and for this reason you avoid the number of natures, why do you not shun the number of properties? ^C

52. You confess one nature of God the Word incarnate, and this sentiment is common to you and to us; for this is the saying of the Fathers. But if you wish by this to declare two natures, your war against the truth is vain. If, however, you set this forth as if it were simply indicating one nature, opposing the truth by speaking against the two natures, the intervening word, "incarnate," does not succeed for you. But if it represents neither one absolutely, nor two unitedly, whatever part is assumed as added between one and two, this will be declared by "incarnate"—whether it be a double part, or a half, the quantity will be at your discretion; whereas the blessed Athanasius and Cyril here, in a transferred sense, ^D [know one nature of God the Word, but] were taught that the flesh is of another nature. For one is the nature of the Word of God that was incarnated, and another is the nature of the flesh which, when the nature of the Word of God had assumed it, he was incarnated. Regarding the authority of Athanasius, it shall be spoken of in a separate dissertation.

^A For the blessed Athanasius and Cyril indicated the hypostasis by the name of nature, but not properly, [doing so] as if by a more universal term. For things that are more universal are predicated of particular things, and the one is not altogether the other. For the hypostasis is not nature; for the hypostasis is not universal; yet it receives both the name and the definition of the universal, but it does not reciprocate. For the hypostasis, that is to say the individual of a nature, is a nature, but not only a nature, but [a nature] with a property. But nature is not hypostasis, that is to say, an individual; thus abusively and not properly did they signify the hypostasis by the name of nature, so that the expression meant [what is traditionally phrased] "one incarnate hypostasis of God the Word." For it is not the nature of God the Word that is incarnated, but the hypostasis. And the divine evangelist is a witness [to this], crying out clearly: "The Word became flesh." And the Word is not nature, as has been shown above, but hypostasis. But the God-bearing Cyril himself also says elsewhere: "The nature of the Word, that is to say the hypostasis, which is the Word himself." For if the nature of the Word, that is to say the divinity, were incarnated—for the Word had no other nature beside the divinity, and the Word is of the same nature as the Father and the Spirit, and all things are common to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, except for the mode of existence—[then] the Father and the Spirit would also be incarnated. We therefore confess a union of nature according to hypostasis, and the incarnation of the Word, and the deification of the flesh. For incarnation is the partaking and assumption of flesh. Therefore, the essential hypostasis of God the Word, that is to say God the Word, is incarnated, and becomes dense, and becomes a hypostasis for the flesh; and he who was previously God, becomes later flesh, that is to say man, and is called one composite hypostasis of two natures, with both natures, divinity and humanity, united in Him through the incarnation and interpenetrating each other; and the interpenetration occurs from the divinity. For this [divinity] imparts to the flesh its own glory and splendor, while not partaking of the passions of the flesh. For this reason the nature of the flesh is deified, but it does not deify the nature of the Word; it deifies what was assumed, but it is not incarnated. For the inferior is benefited by the superior, but the superior is not harmed by the inferior. For just as the iron is ignited, but the fire is not ironized; and as the flesh is animated, but the soul does not become flesh; so the divine nature deifies the flesh, but it itself is not incarnated. For the divine nature is not capable of any addition or subtraction; and it is communicative, but not participant. Therefore no composite nature has come to be. It is the same thing, therefore, to say the essential hypostasis and the nature of God the Word; for as it has been said, the blessed Athanasius and Cyril indicated the hypostasis by the name of nature. For the hypostasis is also nature; but the nature is not also hypostasis. For it does not reciprocate; for the universals are predicated of the particulars, but the particulars are not asserted of the universals. But if, when some iron is ignited, the nature of the iron is said to be ignited

^A one must know that this is because nature is receptive to heat, and that ignition is a work of nature. But in the case of the incarnation of the Word, the incarnation is not a work of nature, but a mode of economic condescension. It is not possible, therefore, to say that one of the hypostases of the Godhead possesses something that all the hypostases do not possess, except for the mode of existence. And the incarnation is, by its nature, a mode of secondary existence, fitting to the Only-begotten Son and Word alone, so that the property remains immutable.

53. But perhaps you will say: Why then do we say that the nature of the flesh has been deified and has suffered, without asserting this of all the hypostases of humanity; yet, in saying that the nature of the Word has been incarnate, ^B we refer the incarnation to the Father and the Spirit? Because the whole human nature is receptive to things that are according to nature, and contrary to nature, and above nature, without alteration of nature. But the divine nature is immune to every alteration and every accretion. Not only this, but also because that flesh was the first-fruits of our mass, and it did not become a self-subsisting hypostasis, but a nature subsisting in a hypostasis, ^C filling out the composite hypostasis of Christ; and it was united to the Word of God not for its own sake, but for the common salvation of the nature. We say, therefore, that the nature of the Godhead has been united to the nature of humanity, but it is the hypostasis of the Word that has been incarnate. For incarnation is the assumption of flesh, and the becoming a hypostasis for the flesh. But union is the concurrence and coming together of two things into one and the same.

54. The example of man, if you take it in terms of species and nature, will have no place in Christ. ^D For we have never heard of a species of Christs; hence Christ is not a nature, but a hypostasis. For, according to the blessed Cyril, the name "Christ" has neither the force of a definition nor does it declare the essence of anything. But if you take it in terms of some particular man, since he is a hypostasis, it is not absurd. It should be known, however, that examples need not be strictly similar in all respects to the things being demonstrated; rather, they must differ in some part, otherwise it would not be an example. Therefore, Justin the philosopher and martyr says in his *Exposition of the Right Confession*: "Some, conceiving that union as that of soul to body, have explained it thus; and the example is appropriate, even if not in every respect. In some respect, at least; for as man is one, he has two natures," etc.

55. Consider also that he did not say that man is out of two natures, but that he has two natures, so that he declared that man has two natures even after the union of the two natures. "For as he is one," he says, "he is man, but he has two natures in him, which are distinct,

and in one respect it reasons, while in another it executes what it has reasoned: for by the intellectual soul it reasons, if, for instance, of the construction of a ship, and by the hands it brings the thought to its finish; ^A so the Son, being one, and [having] two natures, in one respect works the divine signs, and in another admits the lowly things. For insofar as He is from the Father and God, He works the miracles; but insofar as He is from the Virgin and man, He naturally and willingly endured the cross, and the suffering, and similar things. To whom do you consider the example to bear witness? To those who dare to say there is one nature in Christ, or to those who rightly proclaim two, unconfusedly and indivisibly? The theologian Gregory says the following: “Natures indeed are two, God and man, since it is soul and body; but the sons are not two, nor are the gods.” ^B

56. And that this is highly incongruous, we shall know from the following. From what do you say that man is composed? From soul and body, of course. Why, then, do you not confess Christ to be composed of God and man? Or for what reason do you not declare man to be composed of animality and corporality, just as [you declare] Christ to be from divinity and humanity? Why should man not be called “wholly soul” and “wholly body,” as Christ is “wholly God” and “wholly man”? And “wholly perfect in animality” and “wholly perfect in corporality,” as Christ is “wholly perfect in divinity” and “wholly perfect in humanity”? And “wholly soul together with the body,” and “wholly body together with the soul,” as Christ is “wholly God together with His flesh,” and “wholly man together with His own beginningless divinity”? For man, coming to be from soul and body, has become something else beyond these, ^C namely man; but Christ, from different [realities, remains] the same: from divinity and humanity, He is both God and man. But if it has similarity in all respects, it would have been necessary for your compound nature also to be called “Christity,” just as the nature of men is and is called “humanity.”

57. Furthermore, the soul is preoccupied by the passions of the body, and often suffers before the body, and suffers with it continuously. For it often feels anguish at the cutting of the body, and suffers and is altered even before the body suffers; and after the cutting, it nevertheless receives the sensations of pain passionately. Which, on the divinity of the Lord, no one of sound mind would ever say has happened. ^D If, therefore, man is said to be of one nature, it is as a species, not as a hypostasis. For when man is compared with man, they are said to be of one nature as consubstantial, and as arranged under one species; but when man is being physiologically analyzed, two natures are observed in him, I mean of soul and of body. For in the comparison of the soul to the body, who is so senseless as to say there is one nature for both?

^A But there is no species of Christs; for there are not many Christs composed of deity and humanity, so that all, being placed under the same species, might be proclaimed as of one nature; but Christ is one, recognized as of two and in two natures.

58. ^B And note that the blessed Cyril describes him by means of two goats, but he brings forward the example not with regard to the hypostases, but with regard to the difference between the living and the sacrificed. And this we say, that it is perhaps not impossible for one nature to come to be from two created things, but for one nature to be made from a created and an uncreated thing is impossible, whether it be a participant of both, or some other thing besides these, according to the Theologian Gregory. For how could the same thing have begun to be and not have begun to be?

59. If it is the same thing to say "from deity and humanity" and "from two natures," you who do not say two natures in Christ after the union do not even confess deity and humanity in him after the union.

60. Things that are of one substance will have the same differences without omission. ^C For neither, because man is rational and the angel is rational, will the nature of angel and man be called one. For the angel is immortal, but man is mortal, and it does not have likeness in all respects. And man is indeed mortal, and the dog is also mortal; but man is rational, while the dog is devoid of reason, and they are not of one nature. It is necessary, therefore, that those which are of one essence should have the same essential differences without omission. If, therefore, there is one essence of the deity of the Word of God and of his flesh, the same differences will belong to both without omission.

61. If the things from which Christ is are not in him, either they have perished, or they are in another; tell us where.

62. If, in the case of those of the same substance or essence, while "one nature" is said, the unity of nature is declared and not of hypostasis, how will "two natures," in the case of those that have different essences, signify not the distinction of substances, but a division of hypostases?

63. Things that are relative are together, and are always together; ^D and the union and the things united are of the things which are spoken of as relative. Therefore, the union and the things united are together. Either, then, proclaim that which is united, or stop the union. And what then will be the cause of the division?

64. "Another and another" are pronouns of hypostases; but "a different thing and a different thing" are of natures, according to the Theologian Gregory. If, therefore, "another and another," where divine matters are concerned, signifies the hypostases, then also "a different thing..."

and a different thing," where matters of substance are concerned, signifies one and the same thing according to substance, and a difference according to hypostasis; while on the contrary, to be of diverse substances signifies that they are indeed one according to hypostasis, but that the nature of the united things is different.

80. Thus, Christ is not "another and another," lest we serve a quaternity; nor is he "a different thing and a different thing," lest we attribute suffering to the Godhead. For if He is another and another, we boast in vain that the deification of our nature has come to pass through the incarnation of the Word. Indeed, if the indwelling of one in another is incarnation, God has endured many incarnations. "For I will dwell in you," He says, "and I will walk among you." And: "Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?" But if He is not a different thing and a different thing, then the flesh and the Godhead are the same by nature, and all things are confused and commingled. If, therefore, He is not another and another, Christ is one, and there is one hypostasis—for the hypostasis is "another." If, however, He is a different thing and a different thing, it is clearly not one according to nature. And if it is not one, it is clear to everyone that it is two. Therefore, He is one according to hypostasis, identified with Himself, yet distinguished by the characteristic properties of the extremes. For although His holy flesh was not devoid of the characteristic properties, nevertheless, the sum of these, and the subsistence and conformation of the flesh, did not exist by itself, but came to be in the hypostasis of the Word, and it did not possess a hypostasis of its own. Thus, it was neither without a hypostasis, nor did it possess its own hypostasis; but there are two natures, being, by the consubstantiality of the extremes and the difference of the parts, both united and distinguished.

81. While saying that there are two natures, we do not divide the union, but we flee from change and confusion. For we know that these are numbered by reason and by the mode of difference. For in the same manner as we flee from confusion, so also do we reject separation, both in the case of the holy and divine Trinity and in the case of the economy of one of the holy Trinity. For just as there we confess three hypostases, while proclaiming one substance and nature—not knowing any one of the hypostases to be without substance, but yet not attributing a substance to each one separately, nor announcing a defined number of substances in terms of quantity, lest we introduce a diversity of natures and substances—so also here, when we pronounce two natures, we do not divide the hypostatic union, nor do we introduce a number of hypostases, even though these natures might not be without subsistence; rather, we declare a difference of natures or essences. For just as there the number of the hypostases does not harm the unity of the substance, nor does it introduce a division of nature into the hypostases, but rather, while signifying the hypostases, it does not cut the unity of the substance; so here, the quantity of the natures does not divide the identity and unity of the hypostases, but [the nature of the united things is different].

^A Why then do you not proclaim the one Christ, who is God and man, not as one composite hypostasis as [he is] Christ, but as God and man as two natures? ^B 71. Even if the union is made from perfect things, yet with regard to the whole, that is, to the result produced by the union, the things that have come together for the union are called parts—just as, for example, a brick is made from earth, straw, and water, of which each one is perfect in itself, but is reckoned as a part in relation to the brick. Therefore, the two natures are the parts of Christ, for he exists from divinity and humanity. How then are the parts not in the whole, and the whole not in the parts? For either it is in itself, or elsewhere, or it itself also will be destroyed, or it is in things other than these, or nowhere at all.

72. If his flesh is of the same nature as the divinity of the Word, how has the Trinity not passed into a quaternity? For things that are consubstantial are of a different hypostasis. But if [the flesh] is of a different substance, how is Christ not two natures?

73. If God the Word and the Father are two in some respect, but the flesh and God the Word are in no respect two, God the Word is more united to the flesh than to the Father. But if not more, at least they are two in some respect, God the Word and the flesh. And if they are two in some respect, it is by nature; for it is not by hypostasis.

74. The one Christ, the composite hypostasis, is in nature identified with the Father and the Spirit, and with the Mother, and with us; for you are consubstantial with the Father and with us, yet he differs by hypostasis. If, therefore, you grant him one composite nature, you will say that the Father and the Holy Spirit are of a composite nature, and ^C you would say that the Trinity and all mankind are of one nature. But if [he is] one hypostasis known in two natures, he will be consubstantial with the Father in one respect, and with us in another.

75. The divinity is predicated of the three hypostases of the life-originating Trinity, and in a similar way the humanity is predicated of the infinite hypostases of human nature. If therefore you call the divinity and humanity one nature, according to your opinion, one nature in Christ has come to be of the three hypostases of the holy Trinity.

76. If you assert that the particular and individual essence of the Word is the same as the nature and hypostasis, show us which of the holy Fathers has said there are three natures or essences in the holy Trinity, and we shall be silent, putting our hand over our mouth. But if you cannot show it, why do you rage in vain, speaking from your heart and not from God? ^D

^A The quantity of things is not only represented by a definite number, but also by an indefinite one, as for example with "many" and "few," "more" and "fewer." And analogy also knows how to produce the same thing, just as "greater," "equal," and "lesser," but also the demonstrative expression—I mean this, and that, and these, and another, and different. Also the order, as "before this," and "after that," and "from the beginning," and "later," and other modes as well. If, therefore, you say that all the modes expressive of the quantity of things are divisive, the refutation is near at hand; for you speak of one and one nature, and other and other, and another and another, and natures indefinitely, and qualities, and greater and lesser, and prior and posterior. But if you assume that only the definite number, and especially that of the dyad, is divisive, then that is your privilege; for what is the allotment of the truth having it otherwise? For the dyad, and the two things counted together, they represent by a comprehensive power, or else the disintegrated number of your one and one, considered by itself.

^B 78. Above all these things, announce this to us: Does Christ have a divine nature even after the union? Yes, you will say. Does He have a human nature also? And this you will acknowledge, unless you wish to show impiety with a bare head. Therefore, is the divine nature and the human nature one nature, or are they two? But if you say "one," the Father will be consubstantial with us. But if they are two and not one, why, having cast away vanity far from you along with its begetter, do you not acknowledge with us one Christ, one Son, one Lord, one hypostasis out of two natures, and two natures, and in two natures after the union? For if you never say that Christ is of two natures, why do you vainly speak of Him as of one nature after the union? But if, while acknowledging Him to be of two natures before the union, you acknowledge Him to be of one after the union, you are fighting directly against the truth. For before the union, or rather the divine incarnation, there was not even a Christ, since one hypostasis was not yet fulfilling ^C as one nature, simple, that is to say, the divine one. Either, therefore, you will completely deny the two natures in Christ, or you will say that Christ was of two natures before the incarnation from the Virgin, not enduring, after the union, to grant Him the two natures which are truly His. For we, standing in the harbor of piety ^D and warding off every heretical wickedness like a gale by the breezes of the Spirit, acknowledge in the holy and hyper-praised Trinity one essence and nature of deity, but three perfect hypostases, admitting no difference among them; but we receive the divine names commonly, and identically, and simply, and indivisibly, and totally upon the whole Godhead—either the essence of the three hypostases, or nature, dominion, holiness, kingdom, power, energy, will, authority; but distinctly the Father, the Son, and the [Spirit]...

we recognize. I say the ingenerate, and the generate, and the proceeding; recognizing only the Father as ingenerate, only the Son as generate, and only the Holy Spirit as proceeding, without the property of each being changed or moved. For we know these are not accidents (since nothing happens to God), but properties with which each hypostasis is sealed: God perfect the Father, God perfect the Son, God perfect the Holy Spirit; God and God and God, yet the three are one God, simultaneously understood and known, not contracted into one person or one hypostasis—God forbid!—but related to one principle, the Father, by the Son and the Spirit. For there is one God, since there is one Godhead; not three gods, as there are three men. For they are not divided by substance, nor separated by power, ^B by place, by operation, or by will, having an indivisible indwelling and circuminsession in themselves. For where will they be, if they do not permeate one another? Otherwise, each person would be circumscribed. One, therefore, is God from three perfect hypostases, so that nature may not be thought of as composite from imperfect parts, but one from three perfect [entities], simple and without composition, supra-perfect and pre-perfect.

79. On the saving dispensation, which transcends all understanding, we confess that the one of the holy Trinity, the only-begotten Son and Word of God, by the good pleasure of the Father, was incarnate of the Holy Spirit and of Mary, the holy, ever-virgin Theotokos. And we venerate His two births: one before the ages and eternal, ^C without cause, from the Father without a mother; and one from the Virgin mother, without a father, for the sake of our salvation. We do not say that the Father was incarnate and born, nor the Holy Spirit; for the property of sonship is immovable. Being therefore Son, He became Son again. For He who was Son of God and the Father became son of man, out of two natures a composite hypostasis. For being an existing hypostasis, He assumed an enhypostatic nature, the first-fruits of our clay. We say "enhypostatic," not as having had its own hypostasis, but as having come to exist in the hypostasis of the Word. For at once there is flesh, at once flesh of the Word of God; at once flesh ensouled ^D and rational, at once flesh of the Word of God ensouled and rational, in no way removed of the difference of the natures because of the union. For the elements of which Christ and Lord consists have remained unchangeable and immutable, but having come together into one composite hypostasis without confusion and without separation. For we dogmatize the union according to hypostasis. And the union according to hypostasis preserves both the difference of the substances that have come together and knows how to keep the unity of the person. For if the Word is not consubstantial with the flesh, neither is He separated from the one with whom He co-exists, nor is it permissible to speak of one nature in Him, nor of two hypostases. For these things make the hypostases; for "consubstantial" signifies one and the same according to substance, but "according to hypostasis" signifies that, on the contrary, it is different.

^A Likewise, "of different substance" brings forward one thing according to hypostasis, but a different nature of the things united.

80. ^B By this means it is brought about that Christ is not "one and another," lest we serve a quaternity; nor "one thing and another," lest we ascribe passion to the divinity. For if he were one and another, we would vainly and fruitlessly boast that the deification of our nature had been brought about through the incarnation of the Word. For if the indwelling of one in another is incarnation, God underwent very many incarnations. "For I will dwell in you," He says, "and I will walk among you," and, "Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?" But if he is not one thing and another, flesh and divinity are the same by nature, and all things are confused and commingled. If, therefore, he is not one and another, Christ is one, and there is one hypostasis; for the hypostasis is "another." But if he is one thing and another—and "the other" refers to nature—then he is clearly not one according to nature. ^C And if he is not one, it is clear to everyone that he is two. He is therefore one according to hypostasis, becoming identified with himself, yet distinguished by the characteristic properties of the extremes. For even if his holy flesh was not devoid of the properties by which it is marked, nonetheless, the collection of these, and the existence and constitution of the flesh, did not subsist by itself, but in the hypostasis of the Word, so that it did not have its own hypostasis but the hypostasis of the Word. Wherefore it happened that it did not exist without a hypostasis, nor was it endowed with its own. Moreover, there are two natures, which, by the consubstantiality of the extremes and the diversity of the parts, are both united and distinguished.

81. ^D Saying there are two natures, we do not divide the union; rather, we avoid [page 1478] change and confusion. For we recognize that these are numbered by reason and by the mode of difference. For in the same manner as we avoid confusion, so also do we shun division, both in the case of the holy and god-like Trinity, and in the case of the economy of the one of the holy Trinity. For just as there we confess three hypostases and proclaim one substance and nature—not acknowledging any one of those three hypostases as lacking substance, nor indeed assigning substance to each one specially, nor declaring a definite number of the quantity of substances, lest we introduce a different kind and a different substance—so also here, saying there are two natures, we do not divide the union according to hypostasis, nor do we introduce a number of hypostases, even if they are not without subsistence; rather, we declare the difference of the natures or essences. For just as there, the number of the hypostases does not damage the unity of the substance, nor does it induce a diversity of nature into the hypostases; rather, by signifying the hypostases, it does not sever the unity of the substance; so here, the quantity of the natures does not divide the identity and the unity of the hypostases, the

^A the difference as in physical quality, and the collection of those things which have come together, it signifies. ^B Wherefore, saying that the union has been brought about from two perfect natures, we do not speak of it as being by commixture, or confusion, or change, or blending; nor, again, as personal, or relative, or by way of merit, or sameness of service, or sameness of name, or equality of honor, as the God-hated Nestorius said; but we proclaim it rather as substantial and according to hypostasis, in an orthodox manner; not as though the two substances had formed one composite substance, but as having been truly united to one another into one composite hypostasis of the Son of God, we define that their substantial difference is preserved. For that which was created remained created, and that which was not created, uncreated; that which was mortal, mortal, and that which was immortal, immortal; and the one shines forth with miracles, while the other is subject to outrages. For even if He who suffers these things and performs those other things wonderfully is one, and both are common to the one, yet it is one thing from which those things of outrage are common, and another from which those things that are pre-eminent are common. Yet one is one thing and another another, in reason and mode of difference, but both are common to either by the mode of exchange, on account of the interpenetration of the parts into one another, and on account of the hypostatic union. For each form performs with the communion of the other that which it has as its own; ^C wherefore also the Lord of glory is said to have been crucified, that is, not in His deity, but in the flesh which subsists with it; and the Son of Man is written to have ascended where He was before; not where He was as man before, but where He existed as God, and was indivisible from the Father. For we do not proclaim the deity to be passible, or that it suffered in the flesh, nor do we confess the flesh, or humanity, to have existed before the ages; but concerning Him who has both, this and that—at one time we name Him Christ from both, and at another time from one of the parts, and from the deity, God, but again from the humanity, man. And we speak of God as passible, not as God, but as He is also man; and of a child as before the ages, not as a child, but as He is also God. ^D For He is one, this and that, God and man; God perfect and man perfect, bearing in Himself all the properties of the deity: the deity, the unoriginate, the immortal, the lordship, the omnipotent will and energy, and bearing wholly the substance of the flesh, soul and body, mind, and the natural and blameless passions and properties of these, the self-determining will and energy, hunger, thirst, tears, sorrow, anguish, death. “For my Lord and God,” says Thomas. And “The Word was God, and the Word became flesh,” the Theologian said in the Spirit. And “In the beginning was the Word.” And “I will, be thou cleansed.” And “They would not have crucified the Lord of glory.” These and suchlike, and

the power of the miracles, ^A proclaim his divine nature and operation.

82. Further he says, “I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it again.” And, “Handle me and see, for a spirit has not flesh and bones as you see me to have.” And, “But we have the mind of Christ.” And, “Having entered into the house, he would have no man know it, but he could not escape notice.” And, “Father, not my will, but thine be done.” The breaking of ^B bread, walking, the stretching out of hands upon the cross, understanding, vital energy, the power of nourishing, growing, and feeling, attest the human act. And that again: “Afterwards he hungered”; and that for the sake of Lazarus, tears; and this: “I thirst.” And, “Now is my soul troubled.” And, “My soul is sorrowful even unto death”; and to this: “He began to be amazed and distressed and sorrowful.” Finally, “Father, ^C into thy hands I commend my spirit, and having said this, he expired.” Do not these plainly testify to his divinity, just as the former ones do to his humanity, and [testify to] the distinction of the two natures and their unconfused union? For who will say that these and those are of one nature?

83. God, therefore, is perfect, and man is perfect. God is perfect in nature, and man is perfect in nature, and there is no defect in his humanity. For even if he became man in accordance with the dispensation, yet he became man in nature; he is perfect God even with his flesh, and whole man with his supersubstantial ^D Deity. But we further add that Gregory the Theologian has said this: “From which [natures] the one has deified, but the other has been deified; and I would even venture to say, it has become God at the same time.” For, just as we know the Incarnation without any change or mutation of the Word, so also we know the deification. For the Word himself became flesh, spring being born indeed from the Virgin, but proceeding as God with the assumed flesh, which from the very first moment it began to exist, was already deified by him. Whence it happens that three things occurred at once: the assumption, the existence, and the deification of the humanity. The assumption and the existence were brought about prodigiously at the same time, the Word indeed assuming, and the flesh co-existing in the Word himself, the work of the Mother of God herself, who in a way more sublime than nature surpassed limits, that the Creator might be fashioned, and man might become God and creator of the universe, from whom the assumed nature

^A of Christ is also above us and according to us. For it did not happen that being first according to us, it later became above us; but rather it existed as both from the very first beginning, because from the summit of the conception it had its existence in the Word Himself. Human, therefore, it is according to its own nature, but of God and divine, supernaturally.

84. Furthermore, we proclaim the holy Virgin as properly and truly Theotokos; for just as the God who was born of her is true God, so she is truly Theotokos, since she gave birth to God made flesh from her. We say that God was born from her, not as if she had given Him the eternal existence of the Godhead, but because He was incarnated from her without change and became man, and was born as one Christ, one Son, one Lord, one hypostasis, the same being both God and man, not introducing another person into the Trinity. ^B

85. Therefore, we also judge the addition made to the Trisagion to be blasphemous, as it introduces a fourth person into the Trinity, and sets apart the subsistent power of God, and sets apart Him who was crucified, as if He were someone else other than the Strong One, or as if it praises the holy Trinity as passible, and crucifies the Father and the Holy Spirit along with the Son, or finally, shows the holy and immortal Spirit as passible. For this Trisagion hymn was formerly revealed by the Holy Spirit through His ministering spirits, the Seraphim, to the God-seer Isaiah, mystically showing the three hypostases of the Godhead ^C and the one lordship and nature. For Isaiah himself said he saw God and the Father; John the Theologian says the Son was revealed to him; and the divine apostle Paul, the Holy Spirit. Hence the entire assembly of the holy Fathers have understood this Trisagion hymn to refer to the holy Trinity. Thus the Theologian Gregory says: "In this way, therefore, the Holy of Holies, which is veiled by the Seraphim and celebrated with three acclamations of holiness, unify into one lordship and Godhead; a matter which another before us has philosophized upon most excellently and most sublimely, and indeed from divine revelation." ^D

86. The historical books relate that during the time of Proclus, patriarch of Constantinople, when the people there were supplicating on account of some divine threat, a boy was snatched from the crowd, and learned this hymn from the teaching of some angelic mystagogy: "Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal, have mercy on us," and was commanded to sing it. The event confirmed the revelation; for as soon as they sang it, the wrath ceased. We say that this is the power of the hymn

"Holy God," the Father, from whom is God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit; "Holy Strong," the Son, the wisdom and power of the Father; "Holy Immortal," the Holy Spirit; for the Spirit is that which makes alive, and is the "law of the Spirit of life." ^A And the ancestor of God, David, says: "My soul thirsted for God, the strong, the living." We say these things not to limit the divinity to the Father alone, nor the power to the Son alone, nor the immortality to the Spirit alone; but we receive all the divine names simply and unitedly in each of the hypostases, imitating the divine Apostle who says: "But to us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things, and we [exist] in Him; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we [exist] through Him; and one Holy Spirit, in whom are all things, and we [exist] in Him." Indeed, we also admire Gregory the Theologian speaking thus: "But to us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things; and one Holy Spirit, in whom are all things." ^B The "from whom," "through whom," and "in whom" do not divide the natures, but characterize the properties of one and unconfused nature.

87. It is truly laughable and a mockery that the Trisagion hymn, which was taught by angels in times past and recently, and which was confirmed by the cessation of the plague, and which was corroborated by the testimony of the holy Fathers as declarative of the one tri-hypostatic Divinity, should be trampled upon by the insane arrogance of Peter the Fuller in such a way. For he, thinking to cleanse this sacred hymn like a garment and to make it more splendid—as if he were more excellent than the Seraphim—inserted an addition to the Trisagion, as if legislating ^C against the Holy Spirit. Oh, what arrogance, not to say madness! But we, even if the demons split asunder from it, say: "Holy God, holy Strong, holy Immortal, have mercy on us."

88. Furthermore, for the confirmation of what has been said, we submit the citations of the holy Fathers, whose mouth has become the mouth of God, so that, struck with reverence for them, you may with us and with the truth proclaim one God, and one nature in three hypostases, and the one of the holy Trinity, the only-begotten Son of God, and after the incarnation one Christ, one Son, one Lord, and one hypostasis in two ^D natures, in an unconfused and undivided manner, by an orthodox and sincere faith.

CITATIONS OF THE HOLY FATHERS

splendid, adorned within by the Word, and guarded without by the Spirit, so that from both the excellence of the natures might be manifest." ^A

*From the third book of the holy Justin, philosopher and martyr, concerning the Trinity, ch. 5.*

"Coming further into her womb, as into a divine seed-bed, he fashions for himself a perfect temple, having received a certain particle of her nature, and forming it into the shape of a temple, he made it his own substance, and having clothed himself in this through the highest union, the Son of God proceeded in both ways." ^B

*From the same, from the same work, ch. 17.*

"Just as man is indeed one, yet has within himself two diverse natures, and by one he reasons, but by another he executes what he has conceived by reason—for with his intelligent soul he reasons, for instance, of the structure of a ship, yet with his hands he brings what was conceived to completion—so the Son, being one yet having two natures, performed divine miracles by one, while by the other he accepted humble things." ^C

*From the holy Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria, from his sermon against heresies.*

"Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant." You have two forms: hold fast to these, do not corrupt either. For neither did the Son of God, being man and God, destroy the divine form, nor, being God, did he reject the human

form. For although we have two forms, I mean the masterly and the servile—the one by nature divine, the other by nature human; the one before the ages, the other from later times; the one from the Father, the other from the Virgin; the one from Him alone, the other from her alone—since these two realities exist, they are one. We do not divide God from the body, nor do we know of two sons, and Christ; but the Son of God before the ages, in later times having become man from the same womb of the Virgin, perfect. For just as the Father who begat him begat a perfect Son, so the same is also one Christ; and the Word of the Father, desiring to save the man who was perishing, became perfect man ^B so that he might not leave the one outside of himself, that is to say the one pre-ordained. For he did not by assuming flesh put aside his soul, but he took on both soul and mind.

Of the holy Methodius, bishop of Patara and martyr, from his word on the 'Meeting of the Lord' [Hypapante]. « He who is invisible while seen, he who cannot be grasped while grasped, he who is exceedingly great in smallness, he who is both temple and in the highest, he who is upon the throne of the Virgin, and upon the Cherubic chariot, he who is below and above without separation, he who is in the form of a servant and in the form of God the Father, the obedient one, and the King of all. »

Of the holy bishop Basil of Caesarea in Cappadocia, from his first book against Eunomius. — That substance and form are the same. ^C « For my saying "to exist in the form of God," being equal to existing in the substance of God, I mean—just as for the form of a servant to be taken, in the substance of humanity, signifies that the Lord has become—so is this saying, "to exist in the form of God," expresses the property of the divine substance. »

Of the same, from his discussion against Aetius the Arian. « For you will never be able, neither you nor anyone else, to set forth or prove in truth the aforementioned holy Fathers of ours, or ^D any of the eminent Fathers, to have taught of the holy catholic and apostolic Church, or having taught in writing or unwritten, what you say regarding Christ our God, that there is one composite and uniform nature, or one will and one operation, or that it is something rejected from the catholic and apostolic Church. For we do not destroy what you have destroyed, but we build it up again, according to the divine Apostle, [establishing] ourselves as transgressors. Quite the contrary, we have preached twofold existence in all things of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in one hypostasis, without A outputting now from previous page; continue: unutterable word; not mixed within him, or divested of flesh, but keeping safe within himself the properties of both natures, which are of different substance, without confusion. For the natures were surely not mixed in that ineffable and unconfused union, but were united by an ineffable and unspeakable word, and they are beyond all mind, according to the thrice-blessed and truly ecumenical teacher of the orthodox faith, and our archbishop Athanasius, who shone forth in the great council of Nicaea among the three hundred and eighteen bishops, saying: "A conjunction has taken place of two things dissimilar and unequal by nature—not a mixture—of God, who cannot be expressed in words, and a mortal body; not by way of disappearance or denudation of flesh, but by an ineffable, unutterable, and indescribable union; of two natures of different substance, which in one Christ, the Son of God, are kept safe, and are neither confused, nor destroyed, nor divided." ^B Scholium: You see how the holy Fathers, equally avoiding both confusion and division, say that the two natures are kept safe in one Christ, that is, in one hypostasis.

Of the same, from his discourse 'On the Faith.' « For he never departed from his own divinity, even if he emptied himself, having taken the form of a servant for our sake, not having lost the divine form, so that, as you say, he might readily be deified, as a man; far from it! But rather, having fashioned for himself an ensouled and perfect temple in the holy Virgin womb, and having put it on, and having been united to it by an ineffable word, with both natures kept safe, and not mixed, he came forth, appearing indeed as man, but understood as God, Jesus Christ. »

Of the same, from his epistle to John of Antioch. « We know that men learned in divine things, when speaking the evangelical and apostolic words ^C about the Lord, sometimes make them common, as for one person, while at other times they divide them, as for two natures; and [they attribute] some, which befit God, to the divinity of Christ, and others, which are humble, to his humanity. » Scholium: If there is truly one person in Christ after the union, then there are absolutely two natures as well.

Of the same, from his epistle to Acacius, bishop of Melitene. « But perhaps the adversaries might say this: Look, those who make the confession of the right faith clearly name two natures, but they contend that the words of the theologians are divided according to the difference of the natures themselves. Then how are these not contrary to your assertions? For surely you cannot distribute the words to two persons, that is, to two hypostases; but, O best of men, I would say, we have written in the chapters: "If anyone ^D

^A should introduce any division or confusion." For to say one nature, and will, and operation in the same Lord of ours, Jesus Christ, and not two, is the doctrine and opinion of men of perverse mind and blasphemers, and of those who think as you do.

*Saint Athanasius, from the epistle to Epictetus.*

«If the Word is of the same substance as the body which has its nature from the earth, and the Word is of the same substance as the Father, according to the confession of the Fathers, then the Father himself is also of the same substance as the body that was produced from the earth. And why then do they still blame the Arians for saying that the Son is a creature, when they themselves say that the Father is of the same substance as the creatures?»

And a little later: «What hell ^B vomited forth this saying, that the body from Mary is of the same substance as the divinity of the Word?»

*Saint Gregory the Theologian, from the second epistle to Cledonius.*

«For there are indeed two natures, God and man, since there are soul and body; but not two sons, nor two gods. For there are not two men here, even if Paul spoke of the man who is outside and the man who is inside.»

*Of the same, from the Apologeticus.*

«This is what the law as schoolmaster wishes for us: this is what those positioned between Christ and the law bear witness to: this is Christ, the perfection and end of the spiritual law: this is the divinity emptied: this is the flesh assumed: this is the new mixture, God and man, one out of both, and both through one.»

*Of the same, from the second sermon on the Son.*

«But this is the sign: when natures differ in thought, the names are divided at the same time. Listen to Paul saying: "That the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory." God of Christ, but Father of glory. For if both are one, it is not by nature, but by union.» ^C

*Of the same, the remaining part of the authority quoted a little before from the Epistle to Cledonius.*

«But if it must be said briefly, the things from which the Savior is are "one thing and another," since the invisible is not the same as the visible, and the timeless is not the same as that which is subject to time: but he is not "one person and another," far be it! For both are one by the tempering, God having been made man, and man having been made God, or however one might wish to name it. I say "one thing and another," however, contrary to how it is in the Holy Trinity. For there, indeed, one person is one thing and another is another, so that we may not confuse the hypostases: but it is not "one thing and another." For the three are one, and the same in Deity.»

*Scholium.* If it is not "one thing and another," because the nature is one, then "one thing and another" is not one nature. And ^D

if, "contrary to what holds in the Trinity"—where there are three hypostases because there is "one and another," yet one nature because there is not "one thing and another"—here, then, there are two natures because there is "one thing and another," and one hypostasis because there is not "one person and another."

By the same, *from the second discourse on the Son.*

«This is what leads heretics into error: the conjunction of names, when the names are interchanged on account of the commingling. The proof is that, when the natures are separated in thought, the names are also divided. Listen to Paul saying: ^B "That the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory." God of Christ, but Father of glory. For if the combined whole is one, it is not by nature, but by union. What could be more evident than this?»

*Scholium.* Things that are not one by nature are altogether two. But if the union is according to hypostasis, then the Godhead of Christ and His humanity are two indeed in nature, but one in hypostasis.

By the same, *from the verses.*

«God and mortal came, gathering two natures into one, The one hidden, the other manifest to men.»

By Saint Ambrose of Milan, *from the book On the Incarnation, or Against Apollinarius.*

«But while we are refuting these men, others have arisen, saying that the body of the Lord and His divinity are of one nature. ^C Which hell vomited forth such blasphemy? The Arians are by now more tolerable, among whom the strength of this contention and of their faithlessness grows, so that they assert with greater vehemence that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not of one substance, because these men have attempted to say that the Godhead of the Lord and His flesh are of one substance.»

By the same, *from the book to the Emperor Gratian.*

This authority Cyril brought forward in the Council of Ephesus.

«Let us preserve the distinction of divinity and flesh; for one is the Son of God, who accomplishes both, since in the same one both natures exist.»

By the same, *from the interpretation of the divine Symbol.*

«But those who say that Christ is a mere man, or that the Word of God is passible, or that He was turned into flesh, or that the body was consubstantiated [made of the same substance] with the Word, or that it was from heaven... ^D

or that it was a phantom, or those who say that the Word of God is mortal, or that He needed the resurrection from the Father, or that He assumed a soulless body or a mind-less man, or that the two substances of Christ, having been mingled by a mixture, became one substance, and who do not confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is two substances, unmingled, but one person, according to which He is one Christ, one Son—these the catholic and apostolic Church anathematizes.

From the letter of the holy Amphilochius, bishop of Iconium, to Seleucus: "Thus I confess Christ to be God and man, the Son of God, one Son of two natures, both passible and impassible, mortal and immortal." And after a few words: "I say, therefore, that there is one Son of two natures, unmingled, unchanged, undivided. Christ, the Son of God, therefore, suffers, not in His divinity, but in His humanity."

From the same, from the same letter: "The nature that was assumed suffers, but that which assumed it remains impassible." ^A And the human [nature] of Christ is both for our sake and according to us. For He did not first become according to us and later become for our sake; but always, even from His first existence, He was both, because from the very beginning of His conception, He had His existence in the Word Himself. Human, therefore, it is according to its own nature, but of God and divine, [it is] above nature.

§ 84.

§ 85.

§ 86.

For the mixture works the destruction of the natures, but the ineffable union, which is confessed by those who think rightly, preserves both natures without confusion and constitutes one Christ from both, who was seen, being at once God and man, the same person, and not two Christs, but rather one who was united and not mixed. For if the two natures are mixed into one compound, being different in essence, neither is preserved, but both, being confused, have vanished. And after a little: And the temple is indeed dissolved at the time of the three-day burial, by his own will; and he raised it up again, and he was united to it by an ineffable and unspeakable Word, not as being mixed in it or stripped of flesh, but keeping within himself the properties of the two disparate natures without confusion. For the natures were ^A certainly not mixed in the ineffable and unconfused union, but were united by an ineffable and unspeakable Word, and they are beyond all mind, according to the thrice-blessed and truly ecumenical teacher of the orthodox faith and our archbishop, Athanasius, who shone forth in the great council of Nicaea among the three hundred and eighteen bishops, saying: A coming together of two things unlike and unequal by nature has occurred, not a mixture, of an unspeakable God and a mortal body, not by concealment or stripping of flesh, but by an ineffable and inexpressible and indescribable union of two disparate natures, which are in one Christ, the Son of God, being saved, and neither confused, nor destroyed, nor divided.

Scholium

Of the same, from the discourse on the faith. «For he never departed from his own godhead, even if he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant for our sake, not having lost the divine form, so that, according to you, he might be readily deified as a man—far be it. But rather, having prepared for himself an ensouled ^B and perfect temple in the holy Virgin womb, and having put it on, and having been united to it by the ineffable Word, with both natures being saved, and not being mixed, he came forth, appearing indeed as man, but being understood as God, Jesus Christ.»

Of the same, from the letter to John of Antioch. «We know that, regarding the Lord, the theological men make the evangelical and apostolic utterances, some common, as of one person, others dividing, as of two natures, and some as godfitting according to the godhead of Christ, others as lowly according to his humanity.»

Scholium

Of the same, from the letter to Acacius, bishop of Melitene. «But perhaps those who are of the opposite view might say: Behold clearly those who make the confession of the right faith, while they name two natures, contend that the utterances of the God-speakers are divided according to their difference. Then how are these not contrary to yours? For you possess no way to divide the utterances into two persons, that is, hypostases; but, O best of men, I would say, we have written in the chapters: «If anyone...

distributes the utterances to two persons, that is, hypostases, and assigns some as to a man, understood separately from the Word which is from God, and others, as befitting God, to the Word alone who is from God the Father, let him be anathema. Yet we have by no means denied a difference in the utterances.»

Scholium: You see how he does not hesitate to speak of two natures, but refuses to confess that they exist by themselves and separately.

From the same, from the *Glaphyra* on Leviticus.

«For He commands that two birds be taken, clean and living, so that through the living birds you might understand the heavenly man at once as God, divided into two natures, insofar as pertains to the account appropriate to each. For the Word was shining forth from God the Father in the flesh from the Virgin, yet without separation. For Christ is one out of both.»

From the same, from the books *On the Trinity*.

«Christ is as it were a certain boundary of divinity and humanity, having the concurrence of both as if in one, and the meeting of things different in nature into identity through union and interweaving.»

From the same, from the *Epistle to Succensus*.

«Therefore, while we are considering, as I was saying, the manner of the dispensation, we see that two natures have come together with one another in an inseparable union, without conversion and without change; for the flesh is flesh and not divinity, even if it has become the flesh of God; and similarly the Word is God and not flesh, even if He made the flesh His own by a dispensatory plan. When, therefore, we consider this, we do no injury to that concurrence which has passed into unity; by saying that He is from two natures, after the union, of course, we do not divide the natures from one another, nor do we split the one and indivisible into two sons, but we declare one Son, and, as the Fathers have said, one incarnate nature of the Word of God. Therefore, insofar as it falls into understanding, and into viewing only with the eyes of the soul in what manner the Only-begotten has become man, we affirm there are two natures, but we confess one Son, and Christ, and Lord, the Word of God who has become man and incarnate.»

Scholium: Let anyone who is not blind in his mind consider the sense of this Father. For he did not say, “After the union we do not confess the natures,” but, «We do not divide.» For he says there are two natures, «but one Son, and Christ, and Lord.» And after he said, «we declare one Son,» he adds, «and one incarnate nature of the Word,» naming the subsistence as nature here. For the Son is not a nature or substance, but a subsistence. For if the Son were a nature, since the Father is not the Son, the Father would not be of the same nature as the Son; nevertheless, [he] also indicates the [nature] of the flesh...

writing to the same Successus; so that if here he calls nature what you call substance, he also introduces the nature of the flesh by saying, "incarnate." He writes therefore as follows: ^A

Of the same, from the second epistle to Successus.

"For if, having said one nature of the Word, we had kept silent, not adding 'incarnate,' but as it were putting the dispensation aside, perhaps their argument, in which they pretend to ask, might be not implausible: 'If the whole is one nature, where is the perfection in humanity, or how does our substance subsist?' Since, however, the perfection in humanity and the declaration of our substance have been brought in by [his] saying 'incarnate,' let them cease from leaning upon themselves as upon a reed staff." ^B

Scholium.

Cease, therefore, O you men, from leaning upon yourselves as upon a reed staff, obeying the teacher. For behold, he has clearly said that by "incarnate" he intended to signify the perfection in humanity, and that the declaration of our substance has been brought in, and that the whole is not one nature; and if it is not one, it is clear to everyone, I suppose, that there are two.

Of Saint John Chrysostom, from the sermon on Lazarus (9).

"Tin partakes of lead and of silver: of silver in appearance, of lead in nature. So also Christ, being God and man, ^C preserves the two natures within himself; so also he himself is in them, not existing as something other than them."

427 Scholium (10).

It is not necessary for an example to reflect similarity in every respect to that with which it is compared. For tin indeed appears to be silver, but it is not; Christ, however, is truly man.

Of the same, from the epistle to Cæsarius the monk.

"So also here, the divine nature having taken up its abode in him, it constituted one Son, one person, the composite of both; known, however, by an undivided and unconfused reason; not in one nature alone, but in two perfect ones. For if in one, where is the unconfused? Where the undivided? ^D Where could 'union' be spoken of? For it is impossible for [a being] to be united to itself or divided. What hell belched forth [the command] to speak of one nature in Christ after the union? For either, holding the divine nature, they deny the human—I mean our salvation—or, holding the human, they make a denial of the divine nature; since let them say, what has lost its own property? For if the union is still intact, it is by all means necessary that the properties also be preserved with the union. Otherwise, this would not be a union, but a confusion and destruction of the natures."