(in the same way as they invented that introductory treatise for the deception of the simpler or more foolish sort), so that the thoughts are not scattered by length of speech, just as water is not held in by a conduit, but is poured over a field and lost. B II. To proceed, then, to our subject: there are three most ancient opinions concerning God—anarchy, polyarchy, and monarchy. The first two were mere playthings of the Greeks, and let them remain as such. For that which is governed by no authority is confused and disordered; and that which is administered by many masters and princes is subject to factions and dissensions, and therefore is governed by no one, nor is it contained by any order or discipline. Both of these lead to the same end: the perturbation of order, and the latter to dissolution—for perturbation is the apprenticeship of dissolution. But we worship the monarchy; yet I do not mean the monarchy which a single person circumscribes (for it is possible for that which is one, if it is at variance with itself and disagrees with itself, to become many), but that which an equality of nature constitutes, and a harmony of will, and an identity of motion, and a convergence towards the One of those things that are from Him (which is impossible for a begotten nature), so that, even if they differ in number, they are not divided in essence. Therefore, the Monad, having moved from the beginning into a Dyad, rested in the Trinity. And this for us is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; the former is the Begetter and the Producer—speaking, however, impassibly, and timelessly, and incorporeally—and of the latter, the one is the Begotten, and the other the Proceeding, or by whatever terms one might call these things, I do not know, as I entirely abstract them from things that fall under sight. For we shall not dare to speak of a "superfusion of goodness" (though one C of those who flourished in philosophy among the Greeks did not hesitate to use this term when he discoursed on the first and second cause, speaking clearly in this way: "As a cup overflowed"), lest we introduce a forced generation, and a kind of natural superfluity that cannot be restrained, which is in no way congruent with divinity. Therefore, keeping ourselves within our own boundaries, we introduce the Unbegotten, and the Begotten, and that which proceeds from the Father, as God and the Word Himself has somewhere stated.
A
III. But when, you ask, did these things happen? It is above the "when." Yet, if one must say something even more daring, they were when the Father was. And when was the Father? He never was not. The same is readily said of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. If you ask me again, I will again answer you: When was the Son begotten? When the Father was not begotten. When did the Spirit proceed? When the Son did not proceed, but was begotten timelessly and beyond speech; although we cannot represent anything beyond time while wishing to avoid the impression of time. For the words "when," and "before this," and "after this," and "from the beginning" are not timeless, however much we may force them; unless we take the interval that extends along with eternal things, which is not divided or measured by any movement or by the course of the sun, which is what B time is. How, then, are they not co-beginning-less, if they are co-eternal? Because they are from Him, though not after Him. For that which is without beginning is also eternal, but that which is eternal is not altogether without beginning, so long as it is referred back to the Father as its principle. They are not, therefore, without beginning in respect of their cause; for the cause is clearly not altogether older than the things of which it is the cause; for the sun is not older than the light. And in a way they are without beginning in respect of time, even if you do frighten the simpler-minded; for the things from which time itself has its origin are not subject to time.
C IV. How, then, is the generation impassible? Because it is incorporeal. For if corporeal generation has passion joined with it, the incorporeal manner of generation will surely be free from passion. And I, in turn, shall ask you: How is He God, if He is a creature? For that which is created cannot be God; not to mention that here, too, there would be passion, if it were conceived in a corporeal manner—such as time, desire, formation, concern, hope, grief, danger, failure, correction—all of which, and more than these, it is evident to everyone, apply to the creature. I am astonished, moreover, that you do not dare to imagine even this, and certain conjunctions, D and times of gestation, and dangers of miscarriage, as if the Father could not have begotten in any other way unless He had begotten in this way; or again, by enumerating the births of certain birds, and land animals, and water creatures, [implied: you attempt] to reduce the divine and ineffable generation to one of these; or even to subtract the Son from your new hypothesis. And cannot you even grasp this, that to the one for whom the birth according to the flesh is different...
since you have known among men the Virgin who bore God—to that one the spiritual generation is also different; or rather, that for whom the being is not the same, for him the begetting is also different? A
V. Who then is the Father who is without beginning? He, surely, whose origin of being can in no way be found. But he who at some time began to be, he also had a beginning of his fatherhood. The Father, therefore, did not exist subsequently, since he did not even begin to be, and he is Father properly, because he is not also Son; just as the Son is properly Son, because he is not also Father. For as far as we are concerned, we cannot be properly called by either name, since we are both; and not one more so than the other. We are born not from one, but from both parents, and consequently we are divided, and little by little we become men; nay, perhaps not even men, but such as we would not be, now dismissing and now dismissed, so that only the relations are left, bereft of the things themselves. B But, you will say, does not "He begot" and "He is begotten" introduce a principle of generation? But I answer thus: What if we do not even say this, but say that "He was begotten from the beginning," so that we may easily escape your curious objections—objections that are friends of time? Will you bring a charge against us, as if we were adulterating some part of Scripture and the truth? Is it not clear to anyone, especially in the usage of Scripture, that many things that are spoken of in temporal terms are uttered in an inverted order of time, and this happens most of all in the custom C of Holy Scripture—not only regarding things that are of past time or present, but also regarding those that have the signification of the future? Of this kind is the saying: *Why did the nations rage?* (For they had not yet raged.) And, *They shall pass through the river on foot*—which means, they have already passed over. It would be too long to recount all such expressions, which have been observed by those who are diligent.
VI. And the objection of these people is of this sort. But what of their other objection, so very contentious and shameless? "He begot the Son," they say, "either willing or unwilling." Then they bind their adversaries—as they think—on both sides with knots that are not strong, but even very weak. D For if unwilling, they say, then violence was brought to bear upon him. And who is it that offered violence? And again, how is he God who has been forced? But if willing, the Son is a Son of will; how then is he from the Father? And a new...
mother, a will, is invented in place of the father. A In this argument, the first thing that is witty and clever is that they depart from that passion which they pressed so hard, and take refuge in "will," for will is not passion. Next, let us see, I implore you, what force there is in what they say. It would be best, however, first to engage with them more closely. Tell me yourself, whoever you are, who rashly spout whatever your whim suggests: were you procreated from a willing father, or an unwilling one? If from an unwilling one, then violence was offered to him. What an unworthy crime! And who, pray, offered him violence? You will not, surely, say "nature," for he possesses self-control in that regard as well. If, however, it was from a willing father, the father has perished for you for the sake of a few syllables: for you have become a son of will, and not of the father. But I will proceed to God and the creatures, and I will bring your own question to your wisdom: Did God create B all things willingly, or was he forced? If forced, here too is tyranny, and who was it that offered the violence? But if willing, he is deprived of God, as are the creatures, and you before all others, who invent such reasonings and such quibbles of words. For creatures, separated by an intervening will, are distanced from the Creator. But another thing, I suppose, is the "willing" and the "will," the "begetting" and the "generation," the "speaking" and the "word," unless we are drunk. The former is the one who moves, the latter is as it were the motion itself. Therefore the "willed" is not of the will (for it does not necessarily follow), nor the "begotten" of the generation, nor the "heard" of the utterance, but of the one willing, and begetting, and speaking. And the things of God, being even above all these, possess as perhaps their generation the very will to beget; yet there is nothing intermediate, if indeed we admit this C at all, and do not rather establish that this generation is higher and more excellent than will.
VII. Do you wish me to play a little with the Father as well? For you provide me the handle for daring such things. God the Father, then, is either willing or unwilling. And see how you might escape your own clever and sharp argument. If willing, when did he begin to will? For not before he existed. Nor was there anything prior. Or was part of him that which willed, and part that which fell into the will? He will be divisible, then. And what could be brought forward, but that, according to your method of arguing, he himself is also the offspring of will? But if unwilling, who compelled him to be? And in what way is he God, if he has been forced, and that to be nothing else than the very fact of being God? How then, he says, has he been begotten? How has he been created, if indeed he has been created according to you? For this too belongs to the same difficulty. D
A You will perhaps say: by will and by word. But you do not yet tell the whole. For how had the will and the word the power of an act? It still remains to be said. For man is not so fashioned.
VIII. How then, you ask, has he been begotten? This generation would not be anything great if it could be grasped by you, who do not even understand your own generation, or have grasped only a small part of it—as much as you would be ashamed to tell—and yet you think you know everything! You would have much to labor at first, before you found the reasons for how you were constituted, formed, and manifested, by which also the soul is bound to the body, the mind to the soul, and the discourse B to the mind, as if by certain links; and again, how the body is moved and increased, and nourishment is assimilated to it; and in addition to these, what is the principle of the senses, of memory, of recollection, and of the other things of which you consist; and furthermore, which things belong to both together—soul and body—and which are divided, and which they receive from one another. For those things whose perfection follows in the progress of time, their principles certainly existed simultaneously with the generation itself. I would like you to tell me what these principles are; but do not even then treat of the generation of God. For that is not without danger. For if you know your own, it does not immediately follow that the generation of God is also known and explored by you. But if your own is unknown to you, by what means then will the generation of God be known to you? For by how much God is more difficult to comprehend C than man, by so much more difficult is it to perceive that supernal and divine generation than your own. But if, because you cannot attain it by knowledge, you therefore contend that he has not even been begotten, it is time for you to erase and obliterate from the nature of things many things which you have by no means perceived, and above all God himself. For you cannot explain what he is, however bold you may be, and strenuous and magnanimous in superfluous matters. Cast away your flowings, and divisions, and sections, and cease to dispute about that incorporeal nature as if it were corporeal; and perhaps then you might be able to conceive in your mind something worthy of the divine generation. How has he been begotten? For I repeat the same thing with indignation. Let the generation of God be honored with silence. It is an abundantly great thing for you to know that he has been begotten. But how he has been begotten, I will not grant that even the angels understand, much less you. D Do you wish me to declare how? As the Father who begat knows, and the Son who has been begotten. What is above these things is veiled by a cloud, and escapes your dullness of sight.
IX. But they proceed to quibble. Did the Father beget one who was existing, or one who was not existing? O futile trifles! For these things are appropriate for me and for you, who in part we were—like that Levi in the loins of Abraham—and in part we have been brought into being.
We are partially from existing things, and partially from non-existing things: contrary to what happens in that primeval matter, which beyond all doubt was created from non-being, however much some may falsely imagine it to be eternal. Here, however, A generation concurs with the essence itself, and has existed from the beginning. Where, then, will you place that two-edged argument of yours, which is dangerous on both sides? For what could be older than that which was from the beginning, so that we might place time there—whether that in which the Son was, or that in which He was not? For in either case, that expression "from the beginning" will be dissolved and overturned, unless it be that the Father also, when we question you again, be in danger of being twofold—partly pre-existing, partly existing—as to whether He is from existing things or from non-existing things; or else, because of your playful questions and houses built from sand which cannot withstand even a light breeze, the same thing should happen to Him as to the Son, namely, that He is from non-being.
I, for one, admit neither of these, and I say that this question of yours has much absurdity and no difficulty. But if you think, according to your dialectical opinions, that in every argument one of the disjunctions must be true, accept a small interrogation from me: Is time in time, or not? If it is in time, in what time? And what exists beyond this time, and how does it contain it? If, however, it is not in time, what is this extraordinary wisdom that introduces time as being without time? Furthermore, concerning the phrase "Now I lie," give me one of the two: that it be either true alone or false alone; for we will not grant both. But this cannot happen in any way. B For either the liar will be speaking the truth, or the truth-teller will be lying; it is a matter of absolute necessity. What is surprising, then, if, just as contrary things concur here, so also in that case both sides deviate from the truth, and thus your clever and erudite argument appears foolish and inept? And I would like for you to solve this riddle for me also: Were you present to yourself when you were being born? Are you present to yourself even now? Or is it neither? For if you were present, and are present, who are you, and to whom? And how have you become two effects in one? But if it is neither of the things we have spoken of, how are you separated from yourself? And what is the cause of this separation? But you will say, "It is inept to inquire too curiously when debating about one person, whether he is present to himself or not." For these things are said about others, not about one's self. It is more inept, believe me, to call into question whether that which was from the beginning existed before its generation or not. For such a dispute is fitting only for those things that can be divided by time.
C Ⅹ. But, they say, that which is unbegotten and that which is begotten are not the same; and therefore, neither is the Son the same as the Father. What need is there to say how clearly this argument casts the Son out of the Godhead, or the Father? For if the unbegotten is the essence of God, the begotten is not the essence; and if this is so, that is not. What argument can contradict this? Choose, therefore, ...
which of the two wicked impieties you wish, O novel A theologian, since you have set your heart on being impious.
Next, how do you say that the unbegotten and the begotten are not the same? If by these words you mean nothing other than the uncreated and the created, I myself also am of the same opinion; for that which lacks a beginning and that which is created are not the same in nature. But if you claim that that which has begotten and that which has been begotten are not the same, it is not rightly spoken. For it is of absolute necessity that they be the same; for such is the nature of the begetter and the begotten, that the offspring is the same in nature as the one who has begotten. B Or let us proceed again in this way: What do you understand by "unbegotten" and "begotten"? If you mean the property itself of the unbegotten and the begotten, they are not the same. But if you mean those things in which these properties reside, what prevents them from being the same? For since "unwise" and "wise" are not the same thing in themselves, yet they are considered in the same man, they do not divide the substances, but are defined around the same substance. Or are immortality, innocence, and immutability the essence of God? If so, then there will be many essences of God, and not one; or else the Divine is composed of these—for these cannot exist without composition if they are essences.
XI. These things, indeed, they do not say, for such attributes are common to others also. But that which belongs to God alone and is properly His very own, that is His essence. Now, those who introduce matter and form as unbegotten would by no means concede that being unbegotten belongs to God alone. Let us cast even C further away the darkness of the Manichaeans. But let it be granted that being unbegotten belongs to God alone. What of Adam? Is he not the one and only creature of God? Most certainly, you will say. Is he therefore the only man? By no means. Why so? Because the creation is not [the same as] humanity; for that which has been begotten is also a man. In the same way, being unbegotten is also not exclusively God, even if it is exclusively the Father's. But admit that the begotten is also God; for it is from God, even if you are overly fond of the unbegotten.
Furthermore, how do you define the essence of God not by the position of what is, but by the subtraction of what D is not? For the term "unbegotten" signifies that He is indeed exempt from generation, but it does not declare what that which lacks generation is by its nature. What, then, is the essence of God? It is for your insanity to define this, you who anxiously investigate even generation itself; but for us it is a great thing if, at some later time, we might learn of this, once the gloom and the density have been dispelled for us, as is the promise of Him who cannot lie. This, then, let it be understood and hoped for by those who are of this mind.
We, however, shall dare to say this much: if it is a great thing for the Father to have originated from no one, it is no less great for the Son to have proceeded from such a Father. For besides the fact that He participates in the glory of the One who has no cause—because He is from the Uncaused—there is also added the dignity of the generation itself, a matter so great and so venerable to those who are not altogether A groveling or coarse-minded.
XII. But if the Son, they say, is the same as the Father in essence, yet the Father is unbegotten, then the Son must also be unbegotten. Justly so, if "unbegotten" were the essence of God, so that there would be a new kind of mixture, "begotten-unbegotten." But if the distinction is about the essence, why do you bring this forward as something strong? Are you also the father of your father, so that you are in nothing surpassed by your father, since you are the same as he in essence? Or is it clear that, while the property remains unmoved, we shall inquire what the essence of God is, if indeed we are to inquire at all? That "unbegotten" and "God" are not the same, you may learn from this: if they were the same, it would necessarily follow, since God is the God of some, that the "unbegotten" is also the unbegotten of some; or, since the "unbegotten" is of no one, that God is also the God of no one; for things that are entirely the same are also expressed in the same way. But, in fact, the "unbegotten" is not of some—for of whom would it be?—whereas God is the God of some—for He is the God of all. How, then, can God and "unbegotten" be the same? And again, since the "unbegotten" and the "begotten" are opposed to each other as habit and privation, it would be necessary for essences to be introduced that are opposed to each other, which is not conceded. Or, since habits are prior to privations and privations destroy the habits themselves, B not only would the essence of the Son [according to your hypotheses] be older than that of the Father, but it would also be destroyed by the Father and removed from the midst.
XIII. What other argument is left to them of those they deem inescapable? Perhaps they will flee to that final one: "If God has not ceased from begetting, the generation is imperfect. And when will He cease? But if He has ceased, He must certainly have begun." Again, the corporeal-minded bring forward corporeal things. As for me, whether it is an eternal thing for Him to be begotten or not, I do not yet say, until I have examined more accurately that passage of Scripture: "Before all the hills He begets me." However, I do not see how this argument of theirs is necessary. For if, as they themselves say, that which is to have an end has had a beginning, then that which is not to have an end has not had a beginning. What then will they declare regarding the soul, or the angelic nature? If it has had a beginning, it will also have an end; but if it will not have an end, it is clear that, according to them, it has not had a beginning either. C But it has indeed had a beginning, and we shall dare [to say that it will also have an end, if it is by nature subject to change].
A And it will not cease. Therefore, according to them, the discourse has not begun, and it will not cease. Our discourse, however, is this: Just as there is one definition for the horse, and the ox, and the man, and for each of those that fall under the same species; and whatever participates in the definition is also properly called by that name, while that which does not participate is either not called by it at all, or not called by it properly; B so also there is one essence and nature and appellation of God, even if, through certain distinct conceptions, the names also are distinguished together. Whatever is called "God" properly, that is also God; and whatever is this by nature, that is also truly named, if indeed truth resides for us not in names, but in things. But they, as if fearing that they might leave nothing undisturbed against the truth, acknowledge that the Son is God when they are constrained by the discourse and the testimonies, but they contend that He is called God equivocally, and that He is a participant only of the name.
XIV. But when we raise this objection to them: "What then? Is the Son not properly God, just as that which is painted is not [properly] an animal? How then is He God, if He is not properly God?" C They respond, "What prevents these things from being equivocal, and both being pronounced properly?" And they will bring before us the dog—the land-dog and the sea-dog—which, although they have a different signification under the same name, are nevertheless said [to be dogs] properly. (For there is indeed a certain species of this kind among equivocal things: if something else uses the same appellation, and participates in it equally, while differing in nature.) But, my good sir, when you place two natures under the same appellation there, you do not introduce one as more excellent than the other, nor one as prior and the other as posterior, nor, finally, one that is "more" and the other "less" of that which it is said to be. For nothing is conjoined that brings this necessity upon them. For neither is this dog "more" of a dog than that dog, that is, the sea-dog more than the land-dog, or conversely, the land-dog more than the sea-dog; for why, or by what reason? D But in things that are indeed different, yet endowed with equal honor, the appellation is common. But here, when you join the venerable—that which is above every essence and nature, the nature which is of God alone and, so to speak, the nature of divinity—to God, then you assign this to the Father, but you deprive the Son and subject Him, and you assign to Him the second place of honor and worship, even if you grant a likeness in the syllables; by the reality, you cut away the divinity, and you pass craftily from the equivocation which contains an equality, to that which links things that are not equal. So that the one written by you—and even the living man—approaches the divinity more than the dogs of your example.
A Otherwise, bestow upon both, as a common name, an equal dignity of nature, even if you introduce them as different; and thus you will have destroyed those dogs of yours which you devised to prove the inequality of the Father and the Son. For what is the fruit of homonymy, if those whom you divide are equal in dignity? For you did not take refuge in homonymy in order to show them to be equal, but in order to show them to be unequal, and to use the dogs. How could one be more thoroughly convicted of fighting against himself and against the Godhead?
B XV. Now if, when we say that the Father is greater than the Son in regard to the cause, they assume this proposition: "But the cause is by nature," and then append this conclusion: "Therefore the greater is by nature," I do not know whether they deceive themselves more or those with whom they are debating. For not everything that is said of something is also said absolutely of that which is subject to it; but it is clear of whom, and what, is being said. Otherwise, what prevents me from also adopting this proposition: "The Father is greater by nature," and then assuming another: "But that which is by nature is not entirely greater, nor is the Father," and from thence concluding: "The greater is not entirely greater; the Father is not entirely Father"? Or if you prefer, let me proceed in this manner: "God is essence: Essence is not entirely God"—conclude the rest yourself: C "Therefore God is not entirely God." But I think—if I am not mistaken—this argument proceeds captiously from that which is said according to a certain aspect, to that which is said absolutely, which is customary and familiar to those who study this art. For when we attribute the word "greater" to the nature of the cause, they themselves infer that the cause is greater by nature. Which is just as if, when we were to say, "This is a dead man," they were to infer: "Therefore, a man."
XVI. How, moreover, are we to pass over that which is certainly worthy of no less admiration than what has been said above? "Father," they say, "is a name either of essence or of action," for thus they think to bind us on both sides, so that we have no way to escape their shackles. For if we say that it is a name of essence, we shall agree, as they think, that the Son has an essence different from the Father: D inasmuch as the essence of God is one, which the Father, as they claim, has preempted. But if we say it is a name of action, we shall clearly be admitting that he is a product and not a generation; for where the agent is, there of necessity is that which is acted upon. And how can that which is made be the same as the maker—wonder—
if A you were to say this! I would have strongly delighted in your distinction myself, if it were necessary to accept one of the two, and not rather to escape both and say a third thing, which is truer: that the name "Father," O most wise, is neither of substance nor of action, but indicates the relation which the Father has toward the Son, or the Son toward the Father. For just as with us these designations recognize the genuine and the familiar, so there too they signify the consubstantiality of the begotten with the begetter. But let "Father" be, for your sake, a name of substance; it will simultaneously introduce the Son, and will not remove him or alienate him, according to common notions and the force and capacity of these names. Let it be, if you see fit, of action; not even thus will you gain your cause. For in the same way we shall say that the Father has acted to make the Son consubstantial with himself; although otherwise such an opinion of action is not without its absurdity. Do you see B how, even though you wish to quibble, we escape your traps? But since we have known your strength in reasonings and arguments to be invincible, let us see what power you have in the divine oracles, if you do not find it burdensome to try to persuade us of your dogma from these sources as well.
XVII. For we, indeed, have perceived and proclaim the divinity of the Son from great and exalted words. From which ones, pray? From these, of course: God, Word, that C was in the beginning, and with the beginning, and [is] the beginning; as in these places: *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God* 16; and, *With thee is the beginning* 17; and, *Who calls it from the generations, a beginning* 18. Furthermore, the Son is called the only-begotten: *The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him* 19. Way, Truth, Life, Light: *I am the way, and the truth, and the life* 20; and, *I am the light of the world* 21. Wisdom, Power: *Christ, the power of God, and the wisdom of God* 22. Radiance, Character, Image, Seal, as in these words: *Who being the radiance of his glory* 23; and, *The character of his substance* 24; and, *The image of his goodness* 25; and in another place: *Him hath God the Father sealed* 26. Lord, King, He who is, the Almighty: *The Lord rained fire from the Lord* 27; and, *A rod of uprightness is the rod of thy kingdom* 28; and, *Who is, and who was, and who is to come, D the Almighty* 29. These things are clearly said concerning the Son, as are many others which have the same force, of which
A nothing is adventitious, nor did it accrue to the Son or the Spirit later on, just as it did not to the Father himself; for perfection is not derived from addition. For there was never a time when He was without the Word, nor a time when He was not the Father; and finally, there was never a time when He lacked truth, wisdom, power, life, splendor, or goodness.
XVIII. B Reckon up for me, in opposition to this, those utterances of your ingratitude: "My God and your God," "greater," "he created," "he made," "he sanctified." If you wish, add also "servant" and "obedient"; "he gave," "he learned," "he was commanded," "he was sent," and that "he cannot do, or speak, or judge, or bestow, or will anything of himself." Add furthermore: ignorance, subjection, prayer, questioning, progress, perfection. Add, if you please, things even more humble than these: sleeping, hungering, weariness, weeping, agonizing, C putting on a garment. Perhaps you would even reproach him with the cross and the death. As for the resurrection and the ascension, you seem to me likely to pass them over, since something of our own nature is found in these as well. You might prattle on with many other such things, if you were willing to put together your own homonymous God, who is to you a finite God, but to us the true God, equal in honor to the Father. For it is not difficult to explain each of these D to you, going through them one by one, in a most pious sense, and to remove the stumbling-block that exists in the writings, if indeed you stumble in truth and do not rather act maliciously on purpose. But in a word: attribute the higher things to the Godhead, and to the nature that is superior to passions and body; but attribute the more humble things to the composite being, to him who for your sake was emptied, and became flesh, and—it is not worse to say—became man, and was then exalted; so that, by destroying the carnal and groveling nature of your doctrines, you may learn to be higher, to ascend with the Godhead, and not to remain caught in what is visible, but to be lifted up together with what is understood, and to know what is the account of the nature, and what is the account of the dispensation.
XIX. A For this one, whom you now despise, was once even above you; he who is now man, was without composition. What he was, he remained; what he was not, he assumed. In the beginning he was without cause 35; for what cause can be brought forward for God? But later he was born for a cause. And this was, that you, insolent and impudent one, might obtain salvation, you who despise the Deity for this reason, that he took upon himself your density, having communed with flesh through the intermediary of the mind, and becoming the lower man 36, God, since he was mingled with God, and became one 37, the superior part prevailing, so that I also might become... He was born, indeed, but he was also begotten; of a woman, indeed, but also of a virgin. That is human, this is divine. Without a father on this side, but also without a mother on that side. This is all of the Deity. He was conceived in the womb, indeed, but he was known by the prophet, and while still in the womb he leapt for joy at the Word, by whom he was created. He was wrapped in swaddling clothes, indeed, but he casts off the bandages of the grave by rising again. He was laid in a manger, indeed, but he was glorified by angels, and pointed out by a star, and worshipped by the Magi. Why do you stumble at what is seen, without looking at what is understood? He was driven into Egypt, indeed, but he put the errors of the Egyptians to flight. He had no form nor comeliness among the Jews; B but to David he was “fairer in beauty than the children of men,” and on the mountain he shines like lightning, and becomes brighter than the sun, adumbrating the future splendor.
XX. 538 He was baptized, indeed, as man, but he took away sins as God; not that he himself had need of purification, but that he might sanctify the waters. He was tempted as man, but he conquered as God; yet he commands us to have confidence, as one who has conquered the world. He hungered, indeed, but he fed thousands, and he is the living and heavenly bread. He thirsted, indeed, but he cried out: “If any man thirst, let him come unto me, and drink”: and he promised that he would even make those who believe in him to gush forth as fountains. He was weary, indeed 38, but he is the rest of those who are weary and heavy-laden. He was burdened 40 with sleep, indeed, but he is lightened upon the sea, and he rebukes the winds, and he sustains Peter as he is being baptized.
He pays the tax, but he is the Lord of those who exact it. He is called a Samaritan and a demoniac, yet he saves the man who descended from Jerusalem and fell among robbers, and he is recognized by the demons, and he casts out demons, and he plunges legions [(41)] of spirits into the sea, and he sees as lightning the prince of the demons falling. He is stoned, but he is not caught. He prays, but he hears; he weeps, but he puts an end to weeping; he asks where Lazarus has been laid, for he was man; but he raises Lazarus, for he was God. He is sold, and very cheaply, for thirty pieces of silver; but he redeems the world [(42)], and at a great price, for it was his own blood. As a sheep he is led to the slaughter, but he pastures Israel, and now also the entire inhabited world. As a lamb he is silent, but he is the Word, proclaimed by the voice of one crying in the wilderness. He is ill-treated and wounded, but he heals every disease and every infirmity. He is led up to the wood, he is nailed fast; but he restores us by the tree of life, and he saves the thief crucified with him, and he darkens all that is seen. He is given vinegar to drink, he tastes bile; who is this? He who turned water into wine, the destroyer of the bitter taste, the sweetness and all desire. He gives up his spirit, but he has the power to take it again; the veil is torn (for the things above are shown), rocks are split, and the dead are raised [(44)]. He dies, but he gives life, and in death he destroys death. He is buried, but he rises again. He descends into hell, but he leads souls up, and he goes up into heaven, and he will come to judge the living and the dead, and to examine such arguments as these. If these things give you occasion for error, let those things of his destroy your error.
XXI. ON THE RIDDLERS
XXI. Let these things be said by us to those who are fond of riddles [(46)], not indeed willingly (for prattling and the opposition of arguments are not pleasant to the faithful; for one adversary is more than enough [(47)]), but necessarily, because of those who fall into these things, since medicines are provided even for diseases, so that they may know that they are not all-wise, nor invincible in superfluous matters, which also empty the Gospel of its power. For when the power of the word B...