Preparation for the Gospel

^A he calls the firmament, and before the dry land of our world, and before our day and night, teaching that a light distinct from that of the sun, as well as day and night and the rest, were made by God, the universal governor and cause of all things. But the sons of the Hebrews who came after Moses also define a certain incorporeal sun, not visible to all nor subject to mortal eyes, as the prophet says in the person of God: "But unto you that fear me shall the sun of righteousness arise." And another Hebrew prophet, speaking of God, knew this righteousness itself—not as some quality in men, but as its very idea—when he said: "Who has raised up righteousness from the east? He has called it to his face, and it shall go as it were before the nations." ^B And our shared discourse also recently presented, from the earlier parts of the Hebrew Scriptures, the divine Word, incorporeal and essential. Concerning this Word, the following is also said among them: "Who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption." It is also called life, it is called wisdom, it is called truth; and the Hebrew discourses teach that all things that exist and subsist according to essence—if, indeed, the Hebrews, as well as the apostles and disciples of our Savior, who are numbered among the Hebrews, are to be trusted—[likewise teach of] ten thousand other incorporeal powers, both beyond the heaven and all material and flowing substance, whose images they say have been stamped upon sensible things. ^C Wherefore they have already taken up the name of "image;" for they say distinctly that man is an image of the intelligible exemplar, and that the whole life of man passes through in an image. Moses says: "And God made man, in the image of God made he him." And again, another Hebrew, philosophizing according to the ancestral rite, says: "Nevertheless, man passes through entirely in an image." And now, hear how the interpreters of the sacred laws make clear the meaning in the writings of Moses. The Hebrew Philo, interpreting the ancestral rites, says in these very words:

CHAPTER XXIV. On Mosaic ideas, from Philo.

^A If any one, he says, wishes to use plainer words, he would say that the intelligible world is nothing other than the Word of God for one already busied in creating the world. For the intelligible city is nothing other than the reason of the architect who is already pondering how to build the city that he has formed in his mind. And this doctrine is Moses', not mine. For when he describes the creation of man, ^B proceeding a little further, he confesses explicitly that he was fashioned after the image of God. If a part of the world is an image of an image, it is evident that the whole species, this entire sensible world, if it be greater than man, is in turn an imitation of the divine image; and the archetypal seal, which we call the intelligible world, would itself be the pattern, the archetypal idea of ideas, the Word of God. He says that in the beginning God made heaven and earth; taking "beginning" not, as some think, in the sense of time—for time did not exist before the world, but either came into being with it or after it—for since time is an interval of the world's motion, and there could be no motion prior to that which is moved, ^C but it must necessarily follow or exist simultaneously with it, therefore time must necessarily have come into being either equal in age to the world or more recent than it; for to assert that it is older is to speak like a man unversed in philosophy. If then "beginning" is not here taken as having to do with time, it is likely that it signifies "in number," so that "in the beginning he made" is equivalent to "first he made heaven." Then he says immediately after: Therefore the Creator, God, being without body, first created heaven, and invisible earth, and the idea of air and void. One of these he called darkness, because air is dark by nature; the other, the abyss—for the void ^D is deep and vast; and then the bodiless substance of water and spirit; and above all, the seventh, light, which was again bodiless, and an intelligible archetype of the sun, and of all those light-bearing stars that were to be established in heaven. And the spirit and the light were deemed worthy of privilege; for he termed the spirit God's, because spirit is most vital, and God is the cause of life; and the light, because it is surpassingly beautiful. For the intelligible is so much brighter and more luminous than the visible, as the sun, I think, is brighter than darkness, and day than night; and the criteria of the whole soul is the mind, the ruler, [index: entries preserved]

^A the exemplar of those stars which were to be produced thereafter. For he desired the Spirit and the light to be something exceptional and preeminent: for the former he named the Spirit of God, because the Spirit most especially fosters life, of which God is the author; and the latter, the light, because it is conspicuous for its excellent beauty. For that light which is perceived by the mind is certainly as much more illustrious and splendid than this visible light, as the darkness of the sun or the night of the day, or the power and faculty of sensation, is surpassed by the splendor of the mind, the ruler of the whole soul, or indeed by that of the body of the eyes. Furthermore, that light, perceived by the mind alone and not by sight, expressed the image of the divine Word, the interpreter of its own origin, a star higher than the heaven and a fountain of visible stars, which you might rightly and significantly call the universality of light, from whence the sun, the moon, and the other stars, both fixed and wandering, draw a fitting splendor according to the strength of each, while that pure and simple radiance gradually grows dim, when it has begun to change from this spiritual state into the visible one. For nothing which falls under the senses is pure. » And after a few words he adds: « But when the light had come into existence, and the darkness had withdrawn and given way, and boundaries had been fixed and established in the intervening spaces, namely evening and morning, as the necessary measure of time demanded, that which was perfected was immediately called by him day; and not the first day, but one day, and that on account of the solitude of that spiritual world, which has a unity annexed to it by nature. And now that incorporeal ^B world had attained its own perfection, established in the divine Word, when this visible world was finished according to the exemplar of it. Of this, the Architect fashioned the heaven as the best part of all, and its prince, which he truly and properly called the firmament, inasmuch as it is endowed with a body. For a body is by its nature firm, and likewise capable of three-fold division. For what other notion of the firm and of a body is there, than that of a thing which you can divide from every part? Therefore, with good reason, contrasting this visible and corporeal one with the spiritual and incorporeal one, he called it firm. » Thus far Philo. And Clement, in his sixth [Stromata], pursues what is plainly akin and similar to him in this manner.

CHAPTER XXV. Of the same, from Clement.

^A Well then, does Plato seem to you to follow this, while, in the world which the mind alone conceives, he leaves behind the ideas of living creatures, and struggles on behalf of the variety of spiritual genera? Yet, Moses justly proclaims this body—which by Plato is called a terrestrial tabernacle—to have been fashioned from the earth; but he recounts that the soul, endowed with reason, was breathed from above by God into the face. For there, they say, the ruling faculty is established, interpreting the entry of the soul into the first-formed man as an arrival by way of the senses; hence also it is said that man was made according to the image and likeness. For the image of God is the divine and kingly Word, man exempt from suffering; but the image of the image is the human mind. But let us hear what follows.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Concerning contrary natures, according to the doctrine of the Hebrews and Plato.

Furthermore, Plato, having followed the doctrine of the Hebrews, posits not only non-corporeal and benign natures, but also others that are hostile and destructive, writing in the tenth book of the *Laws* in this manner: ^B “Must we not necessarily admit that the soul which governs all things, and dwells in all things that are moved everywhere, also governs the heaven itself? What then? Shall we posit one or several? Several, I shall answer in your place. Let us at any rate not posit fewer than two: one that is beneficent and benign, and the other endowed with a contrary power and capacity.” Then, progressing further, he says: “For since it has now been agreed among us that the heaven is full of many good things, but also of contrary things, yet with which no other kind is mixed, it is certain that this contest is immortal and requires unique caution. But even as gods and demons assist us, so in turn we are a kind of possession of the gods and demons.” ^C Whence these thoughts came into Plato’s mind, I cannot for my part say; but this I can truly pronounce, that six hundred years before Plato was born, the Hebrews had already professed this same kind of doctrine. Indeed, in their sacred writings it is thus recorded: “And it was the day that the angels of God arrived, that they might stand before God, and the devil also arrived in their midst, when he had circled the earth and walked about it.” In which place, by the name of the devil, that hostile nature is designated, while by the name of the angels of God, other, beneficent natures are signified. These better natures they call divine spirits and ministers of God, while they say, “Who makest thy angels spirits, and thy ministers a flaming fire.” ^D But [the Apostle] also sets forth the conflict of these contraries, saying: “Our struggle is not against blood and flesh, but against authorities, against the world-rulers of the darkness of this age, against the spiritual forces of wickedness.”

^A Indeed, it seems that Plato clearly interprets the saying of Moses, which states, “When the Most High divided the nations, when He scattered the sons of Adam, He set the boundaries of the nations according to the number of the angels of God,” through whom He determined that the entire race of men should be the possession of gods and demons.

CHAPTER XXVII.

On the immortality of the soul, according to the doctrine of the Hebrews and Plato.

Now, regarding the immortality of the soul, Plato does not differ in opinion from Moses. For the latter did not simply fix the soul in man as an immortal substance, but taught that it exists as an image of God, or rather, that it was made according to the image of God. For he says, “God said, Let us make man according to our image and likeness. And God made man; according to the image of God He made him.” And subsequently, dividing the composite being in his discourse into both the visible body and that which is understood by the soul, he adds: ^B “And God took dust from the earth, and fashioned man, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.” Moreover, he says that he was also made the ruler and king of all things upon the earth. He says, therefore: “And let them rule over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the sky, and over the cattle of all the earth. And God made man; according to the image of God He made him.”

But how else could the image and likeness of God be conceived, if not by the imitation of the divine faculties and the likeness of virtue? In these matters, Plato, as if he had been a disciple of Moses, philosophizes thus in the ^C *Alcibiades*: “Can we then say that there is anything in the soul more divine than that in which intelligence and wisdom reside? We cannot. That part of it, therefore, is like the divine; and anyone looking into this, and knowing all that is divine—God and wisdom—would thus also know himself most perfectly. For it appears that, just as mirrors are much clearer and purer and brighter than the reflection in the eye, so God is purer and brighter than that which is best in our own soul.” “It is so, Socrates.” “Looking then to God, we would use Him as the most beautiful mirror, and to the virtue of the soul in human affairs; and thus we would most clearly see ^D and know ourselves.” “Yes.” These things are indeed in [the *Alcibiades*].

But in the dialogue *On the Soul*, treating this topic more fully and at greater length, he speaks as follows: “Shall we assume, tell me,” he said, “two kinds of things: the visible and the invisible?” ^B “Let us assume it,” he said. “And the invisible as always remaining the same, while the visible never remains the same?” “Let us assume this too,” he said. “Come now,” he said, “is there any other part of us that is body, and another that is soul?” “Nothing else,” he said. “To which kind, then, would we say the body is more similar and related?” “To everyone,” he said, “this is clear: that it is to the visible.” “And what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?” “Not to human beings, Socrates,” he said. “But we were speaking of things visible and invisible according to human nature, or do you think otherwise?” “According to human nature.” “What then? Do we say the soul is visible or invisible?” “Not visible.” “Invisible, then?” “Yes.” “Therefore, the soul is more similar to the invisible, and the body to the visible?” “This is absolutely necessary, Socrates.” “And did we not also say this: that the soul, when it uses the body to examine something, either through seeing, or hearing, or some other sense (for this is what it means to examine something through the body, that is, through the senses), is then dragged by the body into the realm of things that never remain the same; and it itself wanders and is confused and becomes dizzy, as if it were drunk, because it is in contact with such things?” “Exactly.” “But when it ^C examines something by itself, it departs to that realm which is pure, and always existing, and immortal, and unchanging; and as it is related to it, it is always with it, whenever it happens to be by itself, and it is permitted to do so. And it ceases from its wandering, and with respect to those things, it is always the same and unchanging, since it is in contact with such things. And this state of the soul is called wisdom.” “You speak, Socrates, absolutely well and truly.” “To which kind, then, does it seem to you, both from what was said before and what is being said now, that the soul is more similar and related?” “Everyone, even the dullest, I think, would agree, Socrates, from this method of reasoning, that the soul is in every respect more similar to that which is always the same than to that which is not.” “And what of the body?” “To the other.” “Consider this also: that when soul and body are together, nature commands the one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. And according to this, which of the two seems to you similar to the divine, and which to the mortal? Or does it not seem to you that the divine is innately suited to rule and lead, while the mortal is suited to be ruled and to serve?” “It does indeed.” “To which, then, does the soul appear similar?” “Clearly, Socrates, the soul to the divine, and the body to the mortal.” “Consider, then,” he said, “Cebes, if it results for us from everything that has been said: that the soul is most similar to the divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and uniform, and indissoluble, and that which is always the same and remains the same as itself; while the human, and mortal, and unintelligent, and multiform, and dissoluble, and that which never remains the same as itself, is most similar ^D

to the latter. Can we say anything to the contrary in this, my dear Cebes, or do you think otherwise? We do not. What then? Since these things are so, does it not become the body to be quickly dissolved, and the soul to be absolutely indissoluble, or something very near to it? How could it be otherwise? Consider then, he said: when a man dies, his visible part—the body—which is laid in a visible place, which we call a corpse, which is subject to dissolution and falling apart and breathing away—does it not immediately suffer these things, but rather remains for a considerable time? And if someone dies while their body is in a fair state, or in that season, even for a very long time. For the body, when it has collapsed and been embalmed, as those embalmed in Egypt, remains almost whole for an unimaginable length of time. Or even some parts of the body, should it decay—such as bones and sinews and all such things—are they, so to speak, immortal, or not? Indeed. ^B But the soul, then—that invisible thing which is departing into another place such as this, noble, and pure, and invisible, into Hades, truly, to the good and wise God, to whom, if God wills, my soul also must go forthwith—is this, then, which is of such a nature and so constituted, immediately upon being released from the body, dispersed and lost, as most men say? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias. But it is much rather the case as follows: If it departs pure from the body, dragging nothing with it, as it did not willingly participate with it in life, but fled from it and collected itself into itself, inasmuch as it was always practicing this—(and this is nothing else but truly philosophizing and easily practicing how to die; or would this not be a practice of death? —Most certainly)—then, being in such a state, it departs to that which is its own, the invisible, the divine, the immortal, and the wise; having arrived at which, it falls to its lot to be happy, freed from wandering, and folly, and fears, and wild loves, and the other evils of humanity. As is said of the initiated, it truly spends the remaining time with the gods. Shall we say this, Cebes, or otherwise? So it is, by Zeus, said Cebes. ^C But if, I suppose, it departs polluted and impure, as it was always with the body, and serving it, and loving it, and enchanted by it—by its desires and pleasures—so that it thinks nothing else to be true except that which is corporeal, which one could touch, and see, and drink, and eat, and use for carnal pleasures; and that which is for the eyes dark, and invisible, and intelligible, and which philosophy chooses, this it has become accustomed to hate, and to shudder at, and to flee: do you think a soul in such a state will depart unto itself pure and unalloyed? Not in the least, he said. These are Plato's words. Porphyry unfolds the thought, writing in the first of his works *Against Boethus On the Soul* in this manner.

CHAPTER XXVIII. On the same matter, from Porphyry.

^A To defend the immortality of the soul, he says, that argument seemed prompt and firm to Plato which is derived from the principle of similarity. For if the divine nature, which is both immortal and cannot be seen, or dissipated, or dissolved, but holds its essence established in integrity itself, is akin to the soul; why should the soul not be of that same kind, which imitates its own archetype? For when, where two supreme things are found to be opposed to one another—such as that which is endowed with reason and that which is devoid of reason—there is doubt about some third thing as to in whose class and number it should be placed: then that method of demonstration is also wont to be employed, by which it is shown to which of the two it is similar. For thus, even though the first age of the human race labors under a lack of reason and judgment, and many besides, even unto old age, stumble in many things through imprudence and rashness: yet because the human race is conjoined through the society of many similarities to that nature whose reason is integral and sincere, it is believed to have been possessed of reason from the very beginning. ^B Since, therefore, that divine assembly of the gods, as is agreed, can never suffer any detriment, while on the contrary, the terrestrial race is seen by everyone to be subject to corruption: in that doubt, truly, in which some hesitate as to whether they ought to join the soul to [the divine] genus, Plato judged that the truth should rightly be investigated from similarity. ^C And since it has no affinity with that nature which can be dissolved, which lacks both mind and life, and which, being accustomed to be perceived by touch and the other senses, is born and extinguished at the same time: but it has very much in common with that which is divine and immortal, which is perceived not by sight but by the mind, which is a participant in life and akin to truth, and furnished with the other gifts which the philosopher recognizes in the soul: he could never be induced to concede that other similarities of God were to be found in it, while denying the conjunction and affinity of essence, for the sake of which alone it is called into the communion of the other endowments.

For just as those things that are dissimilar to God in their operations were at once widely separated in the constitution of their essence, so it is consequent that those things which are partakers of the same operations should attain to a similarity of essence as well. For because of a certain kind of essence, the operations also are of a certain kind, as if flowing from it and being its own blossoms. Boethus, therefore, attempting to remove the force of this argument—hearken to his words, written at the very beginning of his discourse: «If the soul is immortal, and is a nature superior to every destruction, it is necessary that it should have awaited many and should have searched...»

≫ ^A for arguments to demonstrate this. However, that there is nothing in our experience more similar to God than the soul, one might believe without much difficulty; not only because of the continuous and unceasing motion which it imparts to us, but also because of the intellect that belongs to it. Regarding this, the natural philosopher of Croton (83) also looked, saying that it is immortal and by nature shuns all stillness, just like the divine bodies. And indeed, if one considers the whole idea of the soul, and especially the intellect that governs us—how immense are the plans and what kind of impulses it often stirs up—a great likeness to God will appear to the observer. ^B And subsequently he adds: «For if the soul is shown to be most similar to the divine of all things, what further need is there for other arguments to prove its immortality, in the way of a preface, and not to count this one among the many, which is enough to overturn the well-disposed? For it surely would not have shared in the activities similar to the divine, were it not itself divine? For if, even though it is buried in the mortal, corruptible, and mindless body—which is in itself a corpse, always perishing and flowing away into the change of destruction—it still acts and holds it together, and reveals its own divine substance, even though it is obstructed and hindered by the thoroughly destructive form of the body placed before it; how much more, if it were separated by reason, like gold from the surrounding mud, would it not then immediately reveal its own form, not only as similar to God, but also, because it partakes of Him and preserves the likenesses in its activities, and because it is not dissolved in its mortal state (as it is when it is imprisoned in the mortal), because it is of a nature devoid of corruption?» And descending, he says: ^C «It is also reasonably seen as divine from its likeness to the indivisible; and mortal from what it approaches in the mortal nature, and it descends, and ascends, and is mortal-like, and similar to the immortal. For man is both he who gluttonously stuffs himself and strives to be sated, like the cattle; and yet man is also he who, through science, is able to save the ship in the dangers of the sea, and to save it in sickness; and he who finds truth, and devises methods for the grasping of knowledge, and for the discovery of fire and the observation of horoscopes, and for the fashioning of imitations of the Creator's works. For man has devised ^D on earth the creation of the cycles of the seven planets with their movements, imitating by machines those in the heavens. And what has he not devised, demonstrating the divine intellect within him that is rendered equal to God? From these, displaying the feats of the Olympian and divine, and by no means mortal [intellect], he has persuaded the many—who, because of their own selfish inclination toward earthly things, are unable to see it—to think of it as mortal-like, similar to themselves, based on external appearances; this being the one way that comfort is sought from vice: that by comparing their own wretchedness with the things appearing externally, they persuade themselves that all men are inwardly the same as they are outwardly.»

(83) The natural philosopher of Croton: Pythagoras, it is believed. For Pythagoras is said to have been the school of Italian philosophy in Croton above all others.

^A Moses, it has turned out, was the teacher of all these things, who, in setting forth the first generation of man according to the aforementioned expressions, confirmed the arguments concerning the immortality of the soul through likeness to the Divine. But since the account concerning the incorporeal and invisible substance is consistent and in agreement between Moses and Plato, it is time to examine the remaining parts of the philosophy of Plato, and to show that the man was, in all respects, a lover of the Hebrews; unless perhaps, having been led astray, he was moved to utter some argument more human than true. Immediately, as many of the things said by the man as have been spoken successfully would harmonize with the doctrines of Moses; while as many as he supposed that were not pleasing to Moses and the prophets could not have a consistent argument. This, however, we shall demonstrate in its proper time. For the present, since it has been discovered that what has been posited in the contemplation of intelligible things is consistent and in agreement, it is time, having moved on again to the natural philosophy of sensible things, to run over briefly the agreement of the man with the Hebrews.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Moses having declared that this whole was created by God; for beginning his own writing, he says: «In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.» And again, after the individual parts, he adds: «This is the book of the generation of heaven and earth, when the day was made in which God created the heaven and the earth.» Hear now how Plato does not deviate from that sentiment, writing in this manner himself also: «Everything that comes to be must necessarily come to be by the agency of some cause; for it is entirely impossible for anything to have a coming-to-be without a cause.» And he adds: «Let this, then, be the name for the whole heaven and world (85), or whatever other name it might most especially accept.» We must consider concerning it, therefore, first, which is the thing that must be considered at the beginning regarding everything: whether it was always, having no beginning of generation, or whether it has come to be, having started from some beginning; for it is visible and tangible and has a body. And all such things are sensible; but sensible things are by opinion

and perceptible phenomena which have come to be. Hence, we say that whatever has come to be must necessarily have done so by some cause. Now, to find the maker and father of this universe is a task, and having found him, it is impossible to speak of him to all." And again, he proceeds: "Thus, then, according to the likely account, we must state that this world has come to be a living creature, endowed with soul and intelligence, in truth by the providence of God."

Chapter XXX. On the lights of heaven.

Moses, furthermore, assigned the origin of the heavenly luminaries to God with these words: "And God said: Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven, to shine upon the earth, and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years. And God made the two great lights, and the stars; and he set them in the firmament of the heaven." ^B In which sentiment Plato says: "By the reason, therefore, and divine mind, the course of time was invented for the origin of the sun and moon and the other five stars, which are called wanderers, for the distinguishing and preserving of the numbers of time. And when God had made the bodies of each of them, he placed them in their revolutions." Observe here, then, whether what Plato said—"by the reason and divine mind"—might be very similar to what is said among the Hebrews: "By the word of the Lord were the heavens established, and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth." Moreover, when Moses said: "And he set them in the firmament of the heaven," Plato also employs a similar expression, for he says: "And when God had made the bodies of each of them, he set them in their revolutions." ^C

CHAPTER XXXI. That all the works of God are good.

And since the Hebrew Scripture, at each of the works of creation, declares: "And God saw that it was good," and when it summarizes everything, stating: "And God saw all things, and behold, they were very good," hear also Plato speaking: "If then this world is good, and its Artificer is good, it is manifest that he looked to the eternal." And again: "For it is the most beautiful of generated things, and he is the best of causes."

CHAPTER XXXII. On the alteration and mutation of the world.

^D The whole Hebrew Scripture testifies to the alteration and change of the world, as when it says: "And the heaven shall be rolled up like a book" (Isa. xxxiv, 4); and again, when it adds: "And there shall be a new heaven and a new earth, which I make to remain before me, saith the Lord" (Isa. lxv, 17); and yet again elsewhere: "For the figure of the world passeth away."

^A And hear how Plato establishes this doctrine concerning these things, saying in the Timaeus: "From this conjunction, he says, the heaven was fashioned, visible and tangible; and for this reason, from these things and from the four elements, the body of the world was brought into being, having attained harmony through proportion; and it possessed friendship therefrom, so that, having been joined together in itself, it should be indissoluble by any other, except by Him who bound it together." Then he proceeds to say: "Time, therefore, came into being together with the heaven, so that, having been born at the same time, they might also be dissolved at the same time, if any dissolution should ever come to pass for them." And again, having said, "Ye gods of gods, of whom I am the creator, and the father of works, which, having been fashioned by me, are indissoluble because I so will it," he adds the following: "Whatever has been bound is indeed dissoluble; but to wish to dissolve that which has been beautifully joined and is well-ordered is the act of a wicked being. Therefore, since ye have been born, you are not immortal, nor entirely indissoluble. ^B Yet you shall not be dissolved, nor meet with the fate of death, having obtained a bond and a more sovereign principle than those with which you were bound when you were brought into being." And in the *Statesman* the same author says: "For this entire universe, at one time God himself guides it, going along with it and revolving it; and at another time he leaves it alone, when the periods have already fulfilled the measure of time proper to it; and then again it is turned back of its own accord in the opposite direction, being a living creature, and having received wisdom from Him who originally fashioned it. And why does it need to go back again in this way? For what reason? - Because to remain doing the same things and in the same way, and to be the same, belongs only to the most divine things of all; but the nature of a body is ^C not of this order. Which heaven and world that we have named has indeed shared in many and blessed gifts from its Maker; but nevertheless, because it has also shared in a body, it is impossible for it to be completely exempt from change for all time. Yet, according to its ability, it moves in the same way and by the same path as much as possible, because it has obtained a rotation with the smallest possible deviation from its own motion. But for it to revolve itself eternally is not possible for anyone, except for Him who leads all things that are moved. But to move it at one time in one way, and again in the opposite way, is not fitting. Therefore, from all these things, the world should not be declared to be always revolving itself, nor to be turned about by God in two opposite rotations; nor again that there are two gods, thinking opposite things, who turn it. But as was just said, only one thing remains: at one time to be guided by another divine cause, once again gaining life, and receiving immortality, and being repaired [as it were]."

^A And to go by its own path when it has been released at the proper time, so as to travel back for many myriads of periods, because, "being the greatest and most perfectly balanced, it travels upon the smallest possible pivot." It clearly appears, then, and that most reasonably, that everything you have gone through has been well said.

"But having considered the matter, let us understand the effect from what has now been said, which we claimed to be the cause of all these marvels. For it is indeed this very thing."

What is it?

"That the rotation of the universe should at one time be carried in the direction in which it now revolves, and at another time in the opposite direction."

How so?

"This change must be considered the greatest and most perfect change of all the shifts occurring in the heavens."

It certainly seems so.

"Therefore, we must consider that the greatest changes occur at that time to those of us dwelling within it." ^B That is probable.

"And are we not aware that the nature of living creatures puts up with neither many, nor great, nor varied shifts occurring at once?"

How could we not be?

"Therefore, of necessity, the greatest disasters befall the other living creatures at that time, and the human race itself is left behind only in small number. And along with these, many other strange and marvelous calamities occur; but the greatest, and one that follows upon the reversal of the universe, is when the shift occurs that is contrary to the one now established."

Having paved the way with all this, he connects it in sequence to the resurrection of the dead, being moved in a manner similar to the beliefs of the Hebrews, and adds these words.

CHAPTER XXXIII. Of the resurrection of the dead, from the same.

"But then, my friend," he says, "what was the origin of living creatures, and in what manner were they generated from one another?"

"It is clear, Socrates, that in that state of nature, none were generated from one another; but that the species called 'earth-born,' which is said to have existed formerly, was that which was then, at that time, ^C reverting back again from the earth."

"And this was recorded by our first ancestors, they who were neighbors to the time immediately following the final revolution, and who were born at the beginnings of this current age. For they were the heralds of these accounts to us, which are now..."

CHAPTER XXXII. De resurrectione mortuorum, ex eodem.

"Tum vero, mi hospes, inquit, animantium ortus qui tandem erat? aut quemadmodum ex aliis alii gignebantur? Enimvero liquet, Socrates, eo naturæ statu, alia ex aliis genita fuisse nulla; sed tum illud fuisse genus, quod ex terræ sinu rursus effusum ^D esse perhibetur. Quod quidem principes illi majores nostri commemorarunt; qui cum sub conversionis hujus initia sati essent, tempore proxime postremam illam excipiente vixerunt. Quippe huius illos famæ..."

famæ, ^A of which many are today too rashly and lightly disbelieved, we have had as heralds. For what follows from this, I think, we ought primarily to consider. For it is logically consistent that, since old men return to the nature of children, and conversely those who have died and been buried in the earth are once again gathered together and come to life there, they should follow the cycle, as the process of generation revolves in the opposite direction. And those who are earth-born of necessity in this manner, and thus have their name and their account, remain as many as God has not transferred to another lot. This, then, follows entirely from what has been said before. ^B And further, proceeding in order, he discusses the end of the world in a way similar to the doctrine of the Hebrews, as follows.

CHAPTER XXXIV. Of the supreme end of the world.

For when the time for all these things was completed, and a change had to occur, and the whole earthly race had already been exhausted—since every soul had rendered its entire generation, and each had cast into the earth as many seeds as had been assigned to it—then the Governor of the universe, as if letting go of the tiller of a rudder, withdrew to his own watchtower; and the world began to be turned back again by destiny and innate desire. ^C Then all the gods who rule with the greatest divinity in each of their regions, observing what was happening, released the parts of the world from their care. But the world, reversing itself and colliding, and driven by an impulse contrary to its beginning and its end, caused a great earthquake within itself, and brought about another destruction of all kinds of living creatures. But after this, when a sufficient amount of time had passed, and it was already ceasing from commotion and confusion and those earthquakes, it became calm, and it immediately returned to its accustomed course, taking up for itself the administration and control of the things within itself and of itself. And after a few words he again says: ^D "Wherefore, then, the God who had ordered it from the beginning, seeing it in difficulties, and caring for it so that, tempest-tossed, it might not be dissolved by confusion and sink into the infinite region of unlikeness, again taking hold of the rudders, turns and arranges the parts that had become diseased and loose in the period assigned to it, and coming back, renders it immortal and ageless." And this is said to be the end of all things.

CHAPTER XXXV. That Plato writes that certain dead have come to life again, agreeing in this respect also with the Hebrews.

"These things, then," said I, "are not in number or..."

...of the magnitude, if they are compared with those things which remain for each after death. And it will be profitable to hear these things, so that both may accurately perceive whatever is fruitful in this narrative. "You," he said, "may relate these things, not as if they were many future events, but as if one were listening gladly." Indeed, I said, I will not tell you the tale of Alcinous, ^A but of Alcimus, that is, of the brave man Er, the son of Armenius, of Pamphilian descent. For when he had fallen in battle, and the corpses of the rest, already corrupted, had been carried off after the tenth day, he was taken up whole. And being brought home, when he was about to be buried on the twelfth day, lying upon the pyre, he came back to life. Having revived, he told what he had seen there. He said that when his soul had departed, it traveled with many others, and they arrived at a certain divine place, in which there were two chasms in the earth, close to one another, and opposite these, two others in the heaven above. Between these, judges were seated; and when they had finished judging, they ordered the righteous to proceed to the right and upward through the heaven, having bound to them the signs of what they had been judged; ^B but the unjust to take the way to the left and downward, and they also carried in their back signs of all that they had done. When he approached, they told him that he must become a messenger to men of the things there, and they ordered him to listen to and to see all that was in that place. This is what Plato says; and Plutarch reports things akin to this in the first book of his *On the Soul*, in this manner.

CHAPTER XXXVI

From Plutarch, on a similar matter

"We were present with Antyllus," he says; "but let us tell the story to Sositeles and Heracleon. When he was sick a short time ago, he seemed to the physicians to retain no further trace of life. But when he had recovered a little from sleep, and that not a very heavy one, he did nothing and said nothing at all that was proof of insanity; he only confirmed that he was indeed dead, but that ^C he was released again, and would not die at all from that illness." ^D

^A And he had heard it badly from those who brought him at the Lord's command. For those who had been sent to Nicandas were bringing him to come in (the other's) place. Now this Nicandas was a shoemaker, but otherwise one of those in the wrestling school, and to many a common acquaintance and well known. Whence the young men, approaching, mocked him as having run away and corrupted the servants from there. He himself, however, was clearly immediately troubled and annoyed; and finally, a fever having fallen upon him, he suddenly died on the third day. But this man came back to life, and he survives, doing well, a most pleasant guest for us. ^B I wished to relate these things because even in the Hebrew Scriptures survivals of the dead are recorded. And since they also contain promises that a certain land will be given exclusively to those who love God, according to the saying, "The meek shall inherit the earth," and the discourse says this earth is heavenly, as the (Scripture) says, "The Jerusalem which is above is free, which is our mother," ^C the prophet indicates in a way of allegory that this same land is composed of precious and valuable stones, saying: "Behold, I will prepare thy stone as a carbuncle, and I will lay thy battlements with jasper, and thy foundations with sapphire, and thy circumference with choice stones." See how even Plato, in the *Phaedo*, confesses that these very things, or things similar to them, are true, ascribing the discourse to Socrates in some such way.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

"But yet, O Simmias, it does not seem to me to be the art of Glaucus to explain what kind of thing it is, and to demonstrate how these very things are true; it seems to me to be a more difficult thing than the art of Glaucus. And at the same time, I myself, perhaps, might not be capable of it; ^D and at the same time, even if I were capable, I do not believe that, for the magnitude of the subject, enough of my life remains. Yet, nothing prevents me from telling of the appearance of that earth, as I am persuaded it is, and its regions." "But," said Simmias, "this also suffices." "I am persuaded, then," he said, "I, first of all, that if it is in the middle of the heavens, being spherical, it requires nothing to prevent it from falling, neither air, nor any other such necessity; but that it is sufficient to maintain itself by the uniformity of the heaven itself in every way, and the equilibrium of the earth. For an object in equilibrium, placed in the middle of something similar, will have no tendency to incline more or less in any direction; and being balanced, it remains motionless. First of all, then," he said, "I am persuaded of this." "And rightly so," said Simmias. "Furthermore," he said, "I am persuaded that it [the earth] is something very great, and that we, who dwell from the Pillars of Hercules to the Phasis, occupy a small portion of it, like ants or frogs dwelling around a marsh by the sea, and that many others dwell elsewhere in many such places."

^A For there are everywhere around the earth many hollows, diverse in both form and size, into which water, mist, and air have converged. But the earth itself, pure, lies in the pure heaven in which the stars are, which is what most of those accustomed to speak of such things call the ether, of which these are the dregs, always flowing into the hollows of the earth. We, therefore, who dwell in its hollows, are unaware of this, and think that we are living above on the earth; just as if someone, living in the middle of the bottom of the sea, might think that he was living on the surface of the sea, and, seeing through the water the sun and the other stars, might consider the sea to be heaven; but because of sluggishness and weakness, he had never once reached the boundaries of the sea, nor had he emerged and looked up from the sea into this place here—how much purer and more beautiful it is than the place among them—nor had he heard from another who had seen it. ^B This same thing has happened to us; for we dwell in some hollow of the earth, and yet we think that we dwell above it, and we call the air "heaven," as if the stars traveled through this heaven. But the fact that we are unable to reach the farthest air is due to our weakness and sluggishness; for if someone were to come to its boundaries, or, having become winged, were to ascend, he would see—if he looked up—just as fish here in the sea, when they look up, see the things there, so would someone here also see those things. And if nature were capable of enduring the sight, he would know that that is the true heaven, the true light, and the true earth. ^C For this earth of ours, and the stones, and the entire place here are corrupted and eaten away, just as things in the sea are by the brine; and nothing worthy of mention grows in the sea, nor is there anything, so to speak, that is perfect; but there are only crags and sand and mud beyond measure, and filth, wherever there is earth, and they are not even remotely worthy for comparison with the beauties among us. But those things there, in turn, would appear to differ even more from ours. For if it is worthwhile to tell a myth, it is worth hearing, Simmias, what manner of things happen to be on the earth beneath the heaven. ^D "Indeed, Socrates," said Simmias, "we would gladly hear this myth." "It is said, then, my friend," he replied, "first, that the earth itself, if one were to view it from above, is such as the balls made of twelve pieces of leather, variegated, marked out with colors, of which the colors here are, as it were, samples that painters utilize; but there, the whole earth is made of such things, and of colors far more brilliant and pure than these. For one part is purple and of wonderful beauty, another is golden, and another is white—whiter than gypsum or snow—and it is composed similarly of other colors, and of more and more beautiful ones than those we have ever seen. For even these very hollows of the earth, being filled with water and air, present a certain appearance of color, glistening in the variety of the other colors; so that there is seen a consistent whole, colorful and diverse.

^A And in that land, being such as it is, it is natural that trees and flowers should grow in proportion, bearing fruits; and likewise that the mountains and hills ^B should possess, according to the same principle, perfection, transparency, and more beautiful colors. And that our little stones here, which we so desire—the sardius, the jasper, the emerald, and all such—are but particles of those; but there, everything is of such a kind, and even more beautiful than these. The cause of this is that those stones are pure, and not eaten through or corrupted, as those here are by rot, salt, and the things flowing together hither, which bring shame and disease to stones, earth, and other living things and plants alike. And that the earth itself is adorned with all these things, and further with gold and silver and other such things. For they appear to be have been born with brilliancy, of which there are many ^C multitudes and they are large, throughout many places of the earth, so that it must be a sight for blessed spectators.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

That Plato also believes that the judgment after death will be, in like manner to the Hebrews.

Finally, since the writings of the Hebrews foretell that souls, after they have migrated from the body, will receive a divine tribunal and judgment—among six hundred other places, also in this: "The judgment," he says, "was set, and the books were opened, and the Ancient of days sat. A river of fire flowed forth before him: ten thousand times ten thousand ministered to him, and thousands of thousands stood before him." Hear now Plato, how he makes mention by name both of the divine judgment and of the river of fire, and describes, in accordance with the sense and doctrine of the Hebrews, the many dwelling-places of the pious and the various punishments of the impious. For he speaks thus in his dialogue *On the Soul*: "The third river," he says, "bursts forth from the midst of these, and near its outlet flows into a certain vast place, burning with much fire, and makes a marsh larger than our sea, seething with water and mud. Thence it is carried around, ^D turbid and muddy, and winding about the earth, it arrives among other places at the edge of the Acherusian marsh, not mingling with its water; but after it has been coiled many times under the earth, it discharges deeper into Tartarus. This is the one which men also call the Pyriphlegethon, from which even the streams throw off fragments..."

wherever they happen to be on the earth. ^A Opposite this one, the fourth falls out into a place that is first described as terrible and wild, and which has a color all its own, like azure, which men call the Stygian [river]. It creates the lake into which the river discharges, the Styx; for the one who falls in here, having taken on terrible powers in the water, sinks under the earth and, coiling around, proceeds opposite to the Pyriphlegethon, and meets it at the Acherusian lake from the opposite side. And his water does not mix with any other, but he too, having traveled in a circle, discharges into Tartarus opposite to the Pyriphlegethon. The name of this one, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

Since these things are naturally so, when the dead arrive at the place to which the daemon brings each one, first of all, those who have lived well and piously and justly, and those who have not, are judged. And if they seem to have lived a middling life, they journey to the Acheron, and having boarded the ^B vessels that are theirs, as it were, they arrive in these at the lake. And there they dwell, and being purified, and paying the penalties for their misdeeds, they are released if anyone has committed any wrong; and they receive the honors for their good deeds, each according to his merit. But those who appear to be incurable because of the magnitude of their sins, or who have committed many great sacrileges, or many unjust and illegal murders, or any other such things, the fitting portion casts these into Tartarus, from where they never emerge. But those who appear to have committed sins that are great, yet curable—such as those who, in a fit of anger, have done some violent act against ^C father or mother and then live the rest of their lives in repentance, or those who have become murderers in some other such way—it is necessary for these to fall into Tartarus; but once they have fallen, and have been there for a year, the wave casts them out, the murderers by way of the Cocytus, and the parricides and matricides by way of the Pyriphlegethon. And when, as they are being carried along, they arrive at the Acherusian lake, they shout and call out, some to those they have killed, others to those they have insulted; and having called them, they entreat them and beg them to allow them to step out into the lake and to receive them. And if they persuade them, they emerge and end their sufferings; but if not, they are carried back to Tartarus, and from there again into the rivers, and they do not cease suffering these things until they have persuaded those they have wronged. For this is the penalty imposed upon them by the judges.

But those who appear to have excelled specifically in living piously, ^D these are they who are liberated and released from these places in the earth, as from prisons, and arriving above at the pure dwelling, they make their home upon the earth. And of these, those who have been sufficiently purified by philosophy live forever entirely without toils, and arrive at dwellings even more beautiful than these, which it is neither easy to describe, nor does the time [allow]...

and having been transported to some purer abode and dwelling, they live above the earth. Furthermore, from among their number, those who have been purified by the works of philosophy depart entirely, living not only without troubles for an eternal age, but also arriving at dwellings far more noble still, which it is neither easy to describe in words, nor is there time for me now to recount. But we must see to it, my Simmias, that being persuaded by the things I have recounted, we strive with all our effort to attain virtue and prudence in this life. For the reward is worthy, and a great hope is set before us.” Thus far Plato. ^A But you, indeed, may compare with those words of his— “they arrive at dwellings far more noble still, which it is neither easy to describe in words, nor is there time for me now to recount”—our own text: “Because eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, the things which God has prepared for those who love him”; and along with those many dwellings mentioned, that which is in the Gospel: “There are many mansions prepared with the Father” for those who love God. And along with the things said concerning the Pyriphlegethon, ^B consider the eternal fire announced to the impious, according to the Hebrew prophet who says to them: “Who shall announce to you that fire is burning? Who shall announce to you the eternal place?” And again: “Their worm shall not die, and the fire shall not be extinguished, and they shall be for a vision to all flesh.” And observe how Plato, too, agreeing with these things, after saying that the impious will go into Tartarus, adds, “From whence they never emerge.” And again, having said that the pious will live in blessed places, he adds, saying, “Absolutely, and for the time to come.” But also that which is said by him, “Without labors,” ^C would be similar to, “Pain and sorrow and sighing have fled away.” And in stating that those journeying to Acheron do not arrive there simply, but first mount what are indeed for them vehicles, what on earth does he wish to signify by “vehicles” if not the bodies, into which the souls of the deceased have re-entered, to be tormented together with them, according to the beliefs of the Hebrews? But since this book also has reached its proper size, I shall pass on to the twelfth volume of the *Preparatio Evangelica*.

PRAEPARATIONIS EVANGELICAE LIBER DUODECIMUS

Book Twelve

4. That children’s minds must be informed by the guise of fables, as initial instructions. 5. That fables should not be sung to children if they are harmful, but only those which are useful. 6. That Plato accepted faith not merely in word, but confessed that he believed and was convinced by the very disposition of his soul in those things in which we ourselves believe. 7. That the profound dogmas of the truth should not be brought forth before everyone. ^A 8. What kind of rulers Plato says should be appointed; and that he does not reject unlearned men and those without letters, if only they be adorned with integrity of morals. 9. That magistracies are to be avoided. 10. Concerning justice according to Plato. 11. Concerning the paradise of Moses. 12. That both men and women are to be taught, and that woman is taken from man. 13. Concerning the life of the first men. 14. That they lived even with irrational animals. ^B 15. How they remember the flood. 16. How rightly it is for our teaching to begin with divine things and end in human things. 17. How noble it is to train children from their earliest age in the habits of piety. 18. That discipline is to be considered only that which promotes virtue, and not that which serves for profit or any manner of earning a living. 19. That Plato, in a way similar to the Hebrews, supposed that earthly things are images of more divine things. 20. That young people should be prepared for the acquisition of virtue through the learning of upright hymns and odes. ^C 21. What sort of thoughts the odes should contain. 22. That it is not for everyone to be able to compose upright odes and melodies, but only for God, or a certain divine man. 23. Concerning those who are able to judge odes composed according to God. 24. That odes should also be received in banquets, like certain laws of the feast. 25. That permission to drink wine is not to be granted to all indiscriminately. 26. That Plato was not unaware that the laws he legislated were practiced by certain barbarians in their republics. ^D 27. That our war is against ourselves and the passions within us. 28. That it is not the body, but the soul, that is the cause of the evils committed by us. 29. Concerning one who philosophizes purely and sincerely. 30. Concerning that whole class of sophistry which is wont to be found among men. 31. That one must sometimes use falsehood as a medicine, for the benefit of those who have need of such a manner of speech. 32. That not only men, but also women, and every race of men should be called to the aforementioned discipline. 33. That the whole nation should not be defamed because of those among us who do not live according to reason. 34. How Plato rendered the oracles in Proverbs into Greek, more purely and elegantly. 35. Concerning wealth and poverty. 36. Concerning the honor of parents. 37. Concerning the possession of servants. 38. How he changed, "Remove not the ancient landmarks, which thy fathers have set." 39. Similar to, "Rendering the sins of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation to them that hate me."

40. Concerning thieves. 41. Concerning a thief being put to death. 42. Concerning a beast of burden. 43. That Plato uses the same examples as the Hebrew scripture. 44. Again concerning similar examples. 45. Again concerning the same. 46. Again concerning the same. 47. That Plato also holds that citizens must be divided into twelve tribes, in imitation of the Hebrew nation. 48. Plato legislates that the city be settled in a river place; he describes it as similar in some ways to that in Jerusalem. 49. How Plato rejects the materials of Greek elementary education, as proving harmful. 50. Concerning the opinion of the atheists, from the tenth book of the Laws. 51. How Plato constructs the argument concerning God. 52. How he explains that God provides for the universe.

CHAPTER I

This twelfth book of the *Evangelical Preparation* will render, from this point on, whatever was lacking in our previous discourse concerning the harmony of Plato with the Hebrew oracles, like the well-attuned resonance of a harmonious lyre, taking our beginning from a defense of our faith, which is slandered by the many. And Plato indeed, in the first book of the *Laws*, very conveniently for our purpose, says: "Whether one might rightly rebuke the Lacedaemonian and Cretan state or not, is another question. To me, however, it is perhaps more permitted than to either of you to state what is said by most people. For to you, since the entire system of your laws is constructed in a measured way, these would justly be deemed one of the best. That not one of the youths should be allowed to inquire which of the laws are well or poorly constituted, but rather that all should agree with one voice and from one mouth that everything is well established, as having been laid down by the gods; and if anyone says otherwise, not to endure hearing it at all. But if any of the elders should conceive of anything, he should communicate it only to a magistrate or to his own peers, with no youth listening." ^B "Most correctly, Stranger, do you command this."

It is with good reason, then, that the Hebrew scripture, having anticipated this, puts faith before the understanding and contemplation of divine Scriptures, through the words it says: "If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not understand," and again: "I believed, therefore have I spoken." Hence, even among us, for those who are but newly introduced and as trainees are still imperfect—as if their souls were infants—the reading in divine Scriptures is handed down more simply, with the admonition that they must believe the recorded words as the words of God. But for those who have advanced in practice, and are grey-headed in their understanding, the permission is given to go deep and test the mind of what is being said. And it was customary to call such people "Seconders" among the Hebrew children, as being interpreters and expositors of the meaning of the Scriptures.

CHAPTER II

"We, therefore," says Plato, "would say, Tyrtæus, that those are to be praised and celebrated most of all by you, who have shown a kind of excellent virtue in hostile and foreign war." He would, I think, concede this. And why not? But we, while we acknowledge these to be excellent, yet contend that those who have given outstanding proofs of the highest virtue in the greatest war are far more excellent. And we also have as a witness to this matter the poet Theognis, a citizen of the Megarians in Sicily, whose couplet is this:

Cyrnus, with silver and with gold, one might redeem thee, But in a bitter faction, faith remains.

^B And we say that this man is, in a more serious war, by far superior to the other, by as much as that equity is more excellent which is conjoined with temperance, prudence, and fortitude itself. For he who remains faithful and sound in the midst of dissension must surely possess every virtue. But many mercenaries, as Tyrtæus himself sang, when they have crossed into an enemy territory, fight strenuously and gladly die in war; many of them, however, are bold, injurious, insulting, and, if you except a very few, the most senseless of all men. ^C But where, then, does this kind of discourse end, and what does it wish to make clear and demonstrate by saying these things? Clearly this: that before all else, both the lawgiver here, who is inspired by Zeus, and everyone else who in any way wishes to be of service, will look to nothing else at all when establishing laws than the greatest virtue. This virtue, as Theognis says, is that faithfulness in harsher times, which one would rightly name perfect justice. And these things agree most excellently with the saving Gospel, where our Savior also, joining prudence with faith, commends and approves in His own words the one who is endowed with both: "Who, then, is the faithful and wise steward?" And again: "Well done, good and faithful servant; you have been faithful over a few things, I will set you over many." By these things, indeed, He clearly manifests that the faith He desires is not a thoughtless one, ^D but one conjoined with the greatest virtues, such as are understood by the names of prudence and probity.

CHAPTER III

"For at what time," says Plato, "do we seem to"

^A have established by the previous discussions that the souls of the departed, after they have migrated from the body, undertake a care for human affairs by a certain power of their own? And this is accustomed to be proven by those true indeed, but longer arguments. But in this matter, along with those other rumors on such things—which are so many and most ancient—faith must be held; and also because the legislators have laid down that these things are so, unless indeed you would wish to say that they were entirely out of their minds." So says Plato. And yet, in the Book of Maccabees, Jeremiah the prophet is seen, after he had finished his life, praying for the people ^B as if he were looking out for the salvation of those people still living on earth. Plato declares that these things should be believed.

CHAPTER IV.

That the minds of boys should be informed by the appearance of fables in their first instruction, from the second book of the Republic.

"Furthermore, of accounts," says the same, "there are two kinds, the true and the false. Yes. And the boy must be instructed in both; but first in the false ones. I do not understand, said he, how you mean this. Do you not understand, I said, that we are accustomed first to tell fables to children? And this, to speak in general, contains both falsehoods and truths. But we use fables for children before gymnastics. That is so." Thus Plato. It is similarly a custom among the Hebrews that for those who are still in their infancy in soul, they pass on the histories of the divine Scripture more simply, just like certain fables; but to those whose habit of mind has been made more robust by exercise, they allow ^C the more profound sort of teaching and one full of contemplation to be handled, which they call *deuterosis*, and which is contained in a certain more illustrious explanation of the meanings hidden from the crowd.

CHAPTER V.

That no pernicious fables, but only useful ones, should be sung to boys.

"But you know," says Plato, "that the beginning of every work is of the greatest importance, especially in a young person who is still tender and flexible: for then that form which one wishes to impress upon each one is molded and put on. That is certainly true. Shall we then allow children simply to hear any fables whatsoever invented by anybody, and at the same time to receive into their souls opinions that are, for the most part, contrary to those which we wish them to have when they are more mature? ^D That we shall in no way allow. First, therefore, we must, as I see, carefully look into those makers of fables; and if they construct a good fable, it is to be approved, but if it is not, it is to be rejected. And those that have been approved, we will persuade nurses and parents to tell to their children, and by these fables to mold their souls much more than they mold their bodies with their hands. But those which they now sing to them, most of them must be cast out." And these things were guarded among the Hebrews before Plato. For those who possessed the divine Spirit, being discerning of spirits, judged the

things which were rightly said and written under the teaching of the Holy Spirit by their own authority; but they rejected things that were otherwise, such as the voices of the false prophets. Nay, even parents and nurses were accustomed to sing to ^A their tender children stories from the divine Scriptures, as if they were certain fables, in order to prepare the way for that piety and religion which it would be their duty to profess when they reached manhood.

CAPUT VI. That Plato accepted the faith not by word alone, but acknowledged that he believed with his very soul in those things to which we ourselves also give credence. From the Gorgias.

"Hear then," he says, "a very fine story, which you may deem a fable, as I do, but I hold it to be a story; for what I am about to tell, I will tell as being true." ^B And after a few words: "He who has passed his life justly and holily, when he dies, departs to the islands of the blessed, and dwells in all happiness, free from evils; but he who has lived unjustly and godlessly, goes to the dungeon of recompense and justice, which they call Tartarus." And again after a few words: "Then they must be judged naked of all these things; for it is necessary that they should be judged dead. And the judge himself must be naked and dead, and with his own soul observing the soul of each one immediately after death, ^C destitute of all his kinsfolk, and having left upon earth all that world, so that the judgment may be just." And immediately he adds: "These are the things, O Callicles, which I have heard and believe to be true; and from these arguments I consider that what happens is of this kind: death, as it seems to me, is nothing else than the dissolution of two things, the soul and the body, from one another. But after they are dissolved, each of them holds its own disposition no less than when the man was living: the body, its own nature, and the treatments and the sufferings all manifest. For if any ^D one’s body was large by nature or by food, or both, when living, then, when he dies, the corpse also is large; and if he was fat, the corpse is fat when he has died, and so with the rest. And if again he was in the habit of wearing long hair, the corpse also has long hair; or if one was a slave and had the marks of scourging, scars in the body, either from whips or from other wounds while living, the body is seen to have these things being dead; or if any one’s limbs were broken or twisted when living, these are also visible when dead.

^A In a word, whatever the body was prepared to be while living, these things remain manifest, or at least the greater part of them, for a certain time even when one has finished this life. It seems to me that the same holds true, Callicles, regarding the soul. When it is stripped of the body, all things are manifest in the soul—both the features of its nature and the affections (51) that the man possessed in his soul as a result of the pursuit (52) of each thing.

Therefore, when they arrive before the judge—those from Asia before Rhadamanthus—Rhadamanthus, having set them before him, examines the soul of each, without knowing whose it is. But often, catching hold of the Great King or any other king or potentate, he perceives that there is nothing healthy in the soul, but that it is scourged ^B and full of scars from perjuries and injustices—things which the practice of each has imprinted upon the soul—and that everything is distorted by falsehood and arrogance, and nothing is straight, because it was nourished without truth; and he sees the soul full of power, luxury, insolence, and intemperance of actions, and full of disproportion and shamefulness. Seeing it, he sends it away in disgrace straight to the place of confinement, where, upon arriving, it is destined to suffer its proper torments.

It is fitting that everyone who is under punishment, if they are justly punished by another, should either become better and benefit, or else serve as an example to others, so that others, seeing what they suffer, may become better through fear. ^C Now, those who are benefited—those who pay the penalty at the hands of both gods and men—are those who have committed curable sins (53); yet the benefit comes to them through pains and agonies, both here and in Hades, for it is impossible to be rid of injustice in any other way. But those who have committed the ultimate crimes, and have become incurable because of such crimes, serve as examples (54) from that point on; and they themselves are no longer benefited at all, since they are incurable, but others are benefited who see them suffering the greatest, most painful, and most fearful ^D torments for all time, truly hanging there in the prison in Hades as spectacles and warnings to those who are ever arriving—the unjust. I declare that Archelaus will be one of these, if what Polus says is true, and anyone else who is such a tyrant. I think, indeed, that most of these examples are those who have become tyrants, kings, and potentates, and those who have managed the affairs of cities; for these, by reason of their power, commit the greatest and most unholy sins. Homer also bears witness to this; for he depicts kings and potentates there [as those being punished forever], Tantalus, and Sisyphus, and Tityos.

[alt-version omitted]

(51) Plato, *Gorg.* (52) Plato, *ibid.* (53) *Curable sins.* Synesius draws on this in his epistle, in which he urges that man who was suspected of parricide, that a voluntary penalty might redeem the weight and perpetuity of future punishment. *For I say*, he says, *that when many garments* [are dirty], *the filth adheres so strongly through the depth that it is impossible to cleanse; and it comes to pass that it is corrupted before it returns to its nature, because the affection has become nature to them, either through the length of time or through its magnitude.* So, when a soul is in such a state, it would be well if it were corruptible; but as it is, sins have a ratio to stains that cannot be washed away; but the soul is no longer like that garment, filthy and not holding together; but being immortal, it pays an immortal penalty, when it sins in ways that are hard to dye and impossible to wash away. For in whatever life one has sinned, when paying the penalties, one does not have the affection altogether fused and clinging, but, as one might say, the soul, being freshly dyed, is most quickly washed, *examples*? (54) *Examples are made.* Just as he who, in Virgil, cried out continuously: *Learn justice, being warned, and do not despise the gods.* To whom, however, these *examples*? *To the dead*, who, according to Plato, are to live again.

^A Indeed, concerning those who have been hanging, paying the penalty for all time—Tantalus, and Sisyphus, and Tityus—it is by no means in the power of any person to place Thersites, or any other private individual who might be wicked, among those held by such great punishments as incurable. For, I suppose, he did not have the means; and for this reason he was even happier than those who did. ^B But, Callicles, even among those who have the power, there are men who become exceedingly wicked; nor, however, does this fact prevent good men from arising even among them. And it is indeed highly worthy to admire those who do so; for it is difficult, Callicles, and worthy of much praise, for one who has attained great power to live justly, even while being free to commit injustice. But few are such men; since they have existed both here and elsewhere, and I believe there will be other good men who handle this virtue of acting justly—whatever anyone may entrust to them. And one, too, has become very renowned, even among the other Greeks: Aristides, son of Lysimachus. But the majority, my excellent friend, of those in power become wicked. But as I was saying, whenever that Rhadamanthus takes hold of such a person, he knows nothing else about him at all, neither who he is, nor from what parents he was born, except only that he is a wicked man; and having observed this, he sends him away to Tartarus, having marked him, whether he appears to be curable or incurable. And he, having arrived there, suffers what is fitting. But sometimes, when he catches sight of another soul that has lived piously and with truth—of a private individual or of some other man (most of all, as I say, Callicles, the soul of a philosopher who has done his own tasks and has not been a busybody in his life)—he admires him and sends him off to the islands of the blessed. These same things are done also by Aeacus. Both of these men deliver judgment holding a staff. But Minos sits as overseer, alone ^C holding a golden scepter, as Homer’s Ulysses testifies that he saw him, *Holding a golden scepter, dispensing justice to the dead.* I, therefore, Callicles, am persuaded by these arguments, and I am considering how I might present myself to the judge having a soul that is as healthy as possible. Having thus bid farewell to the honors of the many, I shall strive to cultivate the truth and, in actual fact, to live as the best man I can, and, when the time comes to die, to die as the best man. And I encourage all other men as well, as much as I am able; and indeed I exhort you in turn to this life and to this struggle—the one, which I say is worth more than all the struggles here. And I reproach you ^D because you will not be able to defend yourself when the trial and judgment of which I spoke comes to you; but when you go before that judge, the son of Aegina, and he takes hold of you and drags you up, you will gape and be dizzy there, just as I would be here, and perhaps someone will strike you on the side with impunity and insult you thoroughly. Perhaps these things seem to you to be a fable, like the stories told to children, and you despise them. And it would be no wonder if we despised them if by searching we could find something better and truer. But as it is, you see that you three, who are the wisest of the Greeks at the present day—you, and Polus, and Gorgias—are unable to prove that one should live any other life than this one, which is clearly advantageous even there in the world to come. But among so many arguments, while others are refuted, this one alone remains unshaken: that one should be more afraid of doing injustice than of suffering it, and that one should busy oneself, not with appearing to be a good man, but with being one, both in private and in public.

^A Thus far Plato. And while he declares that Aeacus, Minos, and Rhadamanthus will be the judges of the dead, the divine Word also testifies to us that "We must all be made manifest before the judgment seat of God, that each one may receive according to what he has done in the body, whether it be good or bad." ^B And again: "On the day," it says, "when God shall judge the secrets of men, He will render to each according to his works: to those who by patient continuance in doing good seek glory and honor and immortality, eternal life; but to those who are contentious and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that works evil, of the Jew first and also of the Greek. For there is no respect of persons." ^C And who would you be, having departed from the body, whether by a violent judicial process or in some other way, and then having beheld the soul itself by the soul itself, when you have no tongue left to deny with, but carry the evidence of your deeds branded upon you? Will you not tremble and be at a loss, and be dragged along in silence to the judgment? And I myself—and everyone whom repentance publicly declared has not first purified—will we not all be so? "If any man has become evil in any way, he should be punished." And this is a second good thing, after being righteous: to become so, and by being punished, to make atonement. And every form of flattery, whether toward oneself or toward others, whether toward the few or toward the many, is to be avoided. Therefore, if you are persuaded by me, you will follow me to that place where, having arrived, you will be happy, both while living and when you have died. And permit someone to despise you as a fool and to insult you if he wishes; yes, by Zeus, do you yourself even boldly endure this ignominious blow, for you will suffer no evil if you are truly a good and noble man, practicing virtue. But you must be a man, my noble friend—for you should be noble—and you must despise the pleasures which we pursue when we act unjustly. And you should not be ashamed before men, but you should acknowledge your deed to the Judge, ^D and appease the punishments below by the immediate penalty. For since the greatest good is not to do wrong, the second good is to be justified. But whoever remains unchastened for a long time while doing wrong, this man one must consider the most unfortunate, whom neither God nor man cares for.

Chapter VII. That the weightier dogmas of the truth should not be published to all indiscriminately.

^A "Beware, however," says Plato, "that these things never fall upon the ears of uneducated men; for there is almost, as it seems to me, no kind of discourse which the multitude would more ridicule, or, conversely, one that would seem more admirable and full of divine inspiration to men of excellent disposition. And things of this kind, even though they may be celebrated by many years of frequent preaching and habitual hearing, can yet barely be purified by diligent work and study, just as happens with gold in its use." To which matter, our saving Word also teaches, saying: "Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine" (Matt. vii, 6). And likewise: "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him" (1 Cor. ii, 14).

Chapter VIII. What kind of magistrates and princes Plato wishes to be created: that he does not reject unlearned men and those without literary knowledge, provided they excel in integrity of character. From the third book of the Laws.

^B "And indeed," says Plato, "when the noble discourses existing in the soul of one man accomplish nothing further, but rather the very opposite of these, I would count all these most grievous ignorances of both the state and each individual citizen, but not those of the craftsmen, if you understand what I mean, strangers." ^C "We do, my friend, and we grant what you say." "Let this, then, be set down as agreed upon and declared, that to those of the citizens who are ignorant of these things, nothing whatsoever that is connected with the office of a magistrate is to be entrusted; and further, that those who are such ought to be branded with infamy, just as fools, so that they may be most proficient in the faculty of discourse, and in all those things which either possess some elegance, or in any way pertain to sharpening the swiftness of the mind, they should be studiously and diligently versed. But those who are otherwise disposed in mind, even if (as the saying goes) they neither know letters nor how to swim, yet if they are considered wise, they are to be called wise, and they are to be adorned with magistracies as truly prudent men. ^D For how, O friends, could even the slightest species of prudence exist without a place for consensus? It cannot be. But surely the most beautiful of all, and the highest consensus, would with the best right be named wisdom; with which, as that man endowed...

with it, he who avoids being overly zealous about names, shall appear wealthier in old age in understanding. ^A

CHAPTER IX.

That magisterial offices should be avoided. From the first book of the Republic.

The Hebrew history teaches that Moses, first of all, deprecated the leadership of the people, when he addressed his guide in oracles and counsel: "I pray Thee, Lord, send someone else who is able, whom Thou wilt send." ^B Then it makes Saul also, who sought hiding places so as not to accept the kingdom, and the prophet Jeremiah, who deprecated the task imposed upon him, seem similar. Hear how Plato praises this resolution of deprecating magistracy as being just and honorable: "It is therefore manifest, my Thrasymachus, that no art and no authority provides what is profitable for itself, but rather, as we have said long ago, it both prepares and commands that which is for the subject, considering the interest of the one who is the lesser, and not that of the stronger. For this reason, my dear Thrasymachus, I was saying just now that no one is willing to rule voluntarily and to take the burden of correcting the ills of others, but instead demands a reward, because he who is to act well by his art never acts for his own best interests when ordering according to art, but for the subject’s interest. For which reason, as it seems, a reward must exist for those who are to be willing to rule, either money or honor; or a penalty, if they do not rule." ^C

CHAPTER X.

Concerning the just man, according to the mind of Plato.

We understand from the oracles of the Hebrews that both their prophets, and others also who were preeminent in integrity, endured all the most unworthy outrages and insults, and every peril, with fortitude. In this regard, you will perceive how remarkably Plato agrees with them, from those things which he wrote in the second book of the Republic: "Now therefore," he says, "having established this species of the unjust man, let us compare with him in our discourse the just man; a man simple and noble, who, as Aeschylus says, wishes to be, not to seem, good. But the appearance of a good man must be removed from him. For if he shall seem to be just, there will be honors and ^D rewards for him, because he appears to be such. It will therefore be impossible to know whether he is such for the sake of justice, or for the sake of the rewards and honors. He must therefore be stripped of everything except justice, and his situation must be made the opposite of the former one. For, doing no wrong, let him have the reputation of the greatest injustice, so that he may be tested for justice, in that he is not softened by ill repute and the things which spring from it. But let him be unchangeable

^A until death, seeming indeed to be unjust through his life, while being just. And a little after he adds: « It must be said then. And indeed, even if it be stated rather crudely, do not think, O Socrates, that it is I who say it, but those who praise injustice over justice. They will say the following: That the just man being so disposed will be scourged, will be racked, will be bound, will have his eyes cut out; and in the end, having suffered every evil, will be impaled, and will know that one must desire not to be just, but to seem so. » These things Plato says in words. But in deeds, long before, the righteous and prophets among the Hebrews are recorded to have suffered everything said; they who, being most righteous, were stoned, sawn asunder, died in the slaughter of the sword, went about in sheepskins ^B and goatskins, being destitute, afflicted, tormented, wandering in deserts and mountains and caves, and in the holes of the earth, of whom [Hebr. XI, 37, 38] the world was not worthy. And the apostles of our Savior, pursuing the highest justice and piety, while being invested with the reputation of injustice by the many, it is possible for us to hear what they suffered from their own voices as they say: « We have been made a spectacle to the world, and to angels, and to men. » [I Cor. IV, 9] And, « Even unto this present hour we both hunger, and thirst, and are naked, and are buffeted, and are unstable. Being reviled we bless, being persecuted we suffer, being defamed we entreat: we have been made as the filth of the world. » But even unto this day the valiant martyrs of our Savior, throughout the whole inhabited world, ^C not practicing the seeming, but the being righteous and pious, have suffered all those things which Plato enumerated; since they too were scourged, and endured bonds and racks, and indeed even had their eyes cut out, and at the end, having suffered all terrible things, were impaled. Of whom you would find no one similar among the Greeks; so that one might reasonably say that the philosopher did nothing else through these words than to prophesy concerning those among us who are distinguished in piety and true justice.

CHAPTER XI. Concerning the Paradise according to Moses.

^D Moses, according to certain secret accounts, having said that in the beginning of the constitution of the world, there was a certain paradise of God, and in this man was deceived through the woman by the serpent; Plato having all but transformed the words outright, listen to how he himself, allegorizing, set them down in the Symposium. For what he called the paradise of God, this man called the garden of Jupiter; for the place of the serpent and the deception concocted through him, he introduced Paupertas lying in wait; in place of the first man, whom the counsel and providence of God...

had produced as a kind of newborn son, he substituted a certain Porus, son of Metis, that is, of Counsel; and finally, in order to speak of the cradle of the created world, he preferred to speak of the birth of Venus, that by this type of allegory he might foreshadow the appearance and beauty of the world. Thus, therefore, he speaks verbatim: ^A “When Venus was born,” he says, “the gods feasted, and among them lay Porus, the son of Metis. At the end of the banquet, Paupertas had come to beg, as if for a feast, and was hanging about the doorway. Now Porus, drunk with nectar—for wine did not yet exist—having entered the garden of Zeus, was seized by a deep sleep. Here Paupertas, acting secretly and craftily in order to conceive a child by Porus for the sake of relieving her own poverty, lay down beside him and conceived Love.” These are the sort of things that Plato obscurely shadowed forth, in accordance with Moses. ^B

CHAPTER XII.

That they say woman was taken from man.

Chapter XIII. De prima hominum vita.

^A Moyses writes that the first life of mankind was spent in the paradise of God, where God Himself took care of them without any commerce of wealth or riches; and that all things grew for them without any sowing or cultivation of fields, while in the meantime they were naked of the clothing that followed later. Hear the philosopher, for he explains these very things in Greek in almost the same words. “God,” he says, “pastured them, He Himself presiding over them, just as now humans, having been allotted the nature of a more divine animal, are accustomed to pasture certain other animals of an inferior and lower condition. While He was performing this office, there were no states, nor were wives taken, nor children begotten (for all were reborn from the earth, forgetting all that had gone before); but all such things were absent, and they had abundant fruits from oaks and many other trees, which the earth produced of its own accord ^B without any cultivation. Moreover, they were naked and had no garments, and for the most part lived in the open air, for they enjoyed a sufficiently mild tempering of the seasons; and they had an abundance of soft beds, as the grass grew up from the bowels of the earth. — You have heard, Socrates, the life of men under Saturn; and you have perceived for yourself the present life, as the story is that it is under Jove.”

Chapter XIV. That they lived even with brute animals.

^C Moyses also wrote that the serpent was more clever than all the beasts, and he set forth the words with which the serpent spoke with the woman and the woman with the serpent, and even the very manner of the serpent’s acting. Now hear what Plato wrote in a similar vein. “If, therefore,” he says, “the alumni of Saturn, possessing such great leisure and power, used these for the study of philosophy—not only with men, but also being able to associate with beasts through discourse—and by associating both among themselves and with the beasts themselves, and inquiring from every nature whether it perceived anything different from others by ^D some singular and unique power, they might acquire their own share of wisdom from each one: it is entirely clear that the men of that age surpassed ours by infinite means for living happily. But if, serving their bellies, stuffing themselves with food and drink, they spoke to one another and to the beasts only the fables that are commonly circulated about them in that mutual intercourse with one another and with the beasts, this also, in my opinion, is quite easy to judge, provided that a sufficient supply of an informant is clearly established for us. But let this matter be left aside, until some capable indicator appears to us, as to whether the men of that age were led by any desire for learning or for speaking well and wisely.”

CHAPTER XV. How both make mention of the deluge.

^A Moses, being engaged in the thought of establishing laws for men, considered it necessary at the very beginning to call to mind ancient history. He makes mention of the deluge and of the life of men thereafter; then he expounds the customs of the ancient Hebrews—both those whom God had loved with a special love, and those whom their wickedness had made notorious—thinking this kind of history to be joined in the first place with the laws he had in hand. Plato in a similar way, when he applied his mind to writing laws, emulated the same path and method as Moses. Hear, therefore, how he speaks at the very beginning of his *Laws*: "Do you then, he says, believe those ancient stories to be true? What specifically? That many destructions of men have occurred through deluges and diseases and many other things, in which a small remnant of the human race was left. Truly, this is entirely convincing to everyone. Come then, let us imagine one of these many, the one that happened in the deluge. Of what sort, then, are we to understand it? That those who at that time escaped the destruction would have been almost exclusively mountain shepherds, who had been preserved somewhere on the summits as small seeds of the human race. And these, of course, would necessarily have been inexperienced in other arts, and in the machinations that exist in the cities for the sake of gains, and quarrels, and all the other misdeeds that men devise against one another. That is likely. Let us suppose, then, that the cities in the plains and those dwelling by the sea were utterly destroyed at that time. Therefore, we must say that all implements, and whatever had been ^B diligently discovered in any art, whether political or of any other science, altogether perished and were buried in the same ruin at the same time. Then, after a few things have been interposed: Let it be settled, therefore, he says, that the affairs of men were in such a state through such a disaster; for there was a vast and horrible solitude, and an immense power of the most fertile lands."

Having prefaced these and similar things, he recounts the lives of the men who lived after the deluge. Then, following the example of Moses, who appends the polity of the ancient God-beloved Hebrews to his exposition of the history of things after the deluge, Plato likewise, after the lives of those who lived after the deluge, attempts to relate the *archaeology* of the Greeks, just as that one did for the Hebrews. He makes mention of the events at Troy, and of the first polity in Lacedaemon, and of the Persians and those among them, whether they had lived rightly or not. Then, after the ^C history of these, he begins the exposition of his *Laws*, in this also having followed Moses.

CHAPTER XVI.

^AHow splendidly our doctrine begins with divine things and ends in human affairs. From the first book of Plato’s *Laws*.

Moses, when he wished to suspend the general system of his laws and his polity ^B from the religion of the supreme God, began it from the same Creator of all things; then he taught that all human goods flow from divine ones, and he referred those divine things to that Mind which is the directress of all, that is, to the very God of the universe. Following in his footsteps, see how the philosopher, after having censured the legislators of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, teaches that law established by Moses.

“Do you wish,” he says, “that I should tell you frankly in what way and order I would gladly have heard you instituting this whole kind of discourse?” “Most gladly.” “Such, then, my guest, should your speech have been. Not undeservedly are the laws of the Cretans celebrated by all the Greeks with the highest praise. For they are correctly established in this very respect, that they make those who live by them blessed, as they enrich them with all goods. For there are two kinds of goods: human ones and divine ones. And those others depend upon the divine; and if a city receives the greater ones, it also acquires the lesser; but if not, it is deprived of both. The lesser ones are those led by health; the second is beauty; the third is the strength of the body for running and for all other movements; the fourth is wealth, which will then at last not be blind, but gifted with the sharpest ^C sight, if only it follows the hand of prudence. This prudence is a certain leader even of divine goods; and just as a mind, constant temperance follows it close behind; from these two, joined with fortitude, justice arises; and last of all, fortitude accompanies them. All these excel those human ones in the dignity of their nature. Wherefore this order also must be observed by the legislator. Then, indeed, he shall instruct the citizens in other institutions, which nevertheless should always look to those prior ones; so indeed that human affairs may be referred to divine things, and all divine things to the mind which is their prince. Then, after mutual marriages have been contracted between them, he will studiously provide for the procreation and education of children, and whether they be male or female, whatever is done by them, whether while adolescents or when they are now more mature in age, even up to old age, in their mutual ^D association, whether rightly or wrongly, he will affect the one with honor, and the other with ignominy; at the same time he will also [examine] whatever is to them a cause of pain or pleasure, by which either desires…

may declare them to follow upon temperance and justice, and not upon wealth or love of honor. Thus, O strangers, I wished, and still do wish, to explain how it is that in the laws called those of Zeus, and those of the Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus established, all these things are present, and how 89 having taken order 90 they are manifest to one experienced in laws, in craft, and in certain customs, while to the rest of us 91 they are in no way manifest.” And among us it has been said: “Seek first the kingdom and justice [of God] 92, and all these things shall be added unto you.” But Moses also, long before, having made his beginning from the teaching concerning God, and having subsequently adapted the polity according to him, and the ordinances concerning contracts and those concerning communal life, establishes as rulers and guardians over all those consecrated to God, as the oracles also teach, men who are just, who hate arrogance, some advancing through prudence, others through true glory. Such was his line of reasoning. Nor is it unlike that which is written among us: “Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.” Furthermore, Moses himself, having started long before from that doctrine which proclaimed God himself, when he subsequently arranged the form of his commonwealth—and whatever pertained either to mutual contracts or to the reasons and institutions of communal life—fittingly and consistently according to that principle, he then creates for all, guardians and prefects, men who are themselves consecrated to God, and, as the Scripture testifies, as they are preeminent in equity, so they are entirely alien to all arrogance, and men whom he had known to have entered upon the path of, in part, prudence, and in part, true glory.

CHAPTER XVII.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΖ'.

That it is noble to accustom children from their earliest age to pious and religious habits.

Ὅτι καλὸν ἐξ ἔτι νέας ἡλικίας τοὺς παῖδας τοῖς τῆς θεοσεβείας ἔθεσιν ἐγγυμνάζειν.

“I say, therefore,” 93 Plato says, “and I claim that he who is to be any kind of good man must practice this very thing from childhood, both playing and working seriously in those things which are fitting for each task. For instance, he who is to be a good farmer or builder: the one must play at building some of the childhood structures, the other at farming; and he who is rearing them must provide each with small tools that are imitations of the true ones. Moreover, whatever knowledge is necessary, he must learn beforehand; for instance, the builder to measure or weigh, and the soldier to ride on horseback while playing, or to do some other such thing 94; and he must attempt through these games to turn the pleasures and desires of the children toward that place at which, when they have arrived, they ought to have their goal. And we call education the right nurture, which, by playing, will most of all lead the soul to the love of that which it must…”

being a perfect man regarding the excellence of the matter.” And Moses, anticipating this, legislated stating: “And these words which I command you this day shall be in your heart and in your soul, and you shall instruct them to your children” (Deut. vi, 6, 7). This is what the sons of the Hebrews were accustomed to do, raising all their youth from their tender years in the instructions of piety. And this is observed even until now, according to a certain ancestral custom, among the Jewish nation.

CHAPTER XVIII. That we must consider as education only that which leads to virtue, and not that which aims at money-making or some trade for the sake of livelihood.

^B “Let us not, therefore,” says Plato in the same place, “let the name of education remain something undefined. For now, while blaming and praising the upbringing of each one, we say that one of us is educated, and another uneducated, even though sometimes of the number of the latter are those who are most expert in shopkeeping, or ship-owning, or other similar arts. For the present discourse does not, as it seems, consider these things to be education; but it would call education that training from childhood unto virtue, which makes one desire and strive to become a perfect citizen, knowing how to rule and be ruled with justice. This nourishment, defined by this discourse, as it seems to me, is what it would now wish to call education alone. But that which tends toward money, or strength, or some other wisdom without intelligence and justice, it deems to be vulgar and servile, and not worthy at all to be called education. But let us not dispute with them about the name, but let the discourse which has now been agreed upon by us remain: namely, that those who are rightly educated nearly always become good men. And it is necessary never to despise education, as it is the first of the most beautiful things coming to the best men; and if it ever goes astray, it is possible, according to one's power, to correct it, and this must always be done throughout life according to one's power.” And in the second book of the *Laws*, he adds: “I call education the virtue which is the first to come to children. When pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred are rightly produced in souls, even before they are able to take hold of reason; and when they have taken hold of reason, they agree with reason, having been rightly habituated by the customs of those who are assigned to such duties—this entire agreement is virtue; but the part of it that has been nurtured concerning pleasures and pains, ^{C D} of the children, to which they must attain and have as their end. But we call education the right nourishment, which would lead the soul of those playing toward the love of that for which we are in need...

^A from the beginning to the end, that they might love what ought to be loved, and hate what ought to be hated; by severing this itself through reason, and calling it education, you would, in my opinion at least, rightly term it so.” These are the words of Plato. But David had forestalled him in the Psalms, teaching to hate what ought to be hated, and to love what ought to be loved, saying as follows: “Come, children, listen to me; I will teach you the fear of the Lord. Who is the man that desires life, and loves to see good days? Keep your tongue from evil, and your lips from speaking guile. Turn away from evil, and do good; seek peace, and pursue it.” And Solomon likewise says: “Hear, children, the discipline of a father. For I give you a good gift; do not forsake my law.” And again: “Get wisdom, get understanding, do not forget.” And: “Say that wisdom is your sister, and procure acquaintance with prudence to yourself.” And: “Do not enter the paths of the ungodly, nor covet the ways of the lawless.” And you might find countless other such things in the Hebrew writings, instructive toward piety ^B and the acquisition of virtue, suitable for both the young and those mature in age.

Chapter XIX. That Plato, in a way similar to the Hebrews, supposed that the things here are images of more divine things.

The divine oracle having formerly admonished Moses, saying, “See that you make all things according to the pattern shown to you on the mountain,” and the sacred word having more clearly explained, “Who serve the pattern and shadow of heavenly things,” by which words it clearly teaches that those more divine things, which are contained in the rank and order of spiritual matters, are involved as though in certain symbols and marks in those things which we read in Moses. Truly hear now how Plato philosophizes ^C on things akin and similar to these, while in the sixth book of his *Republic* he writes in this manner: “The philosopher, therefore,” he says, “as he uses the utmost familiarity with God and beauty itself, so he becomes a participant in the divinity and beauty, as much as is permitted to man. But calumny reigns everywhere.” “It is indeed so.” “If, therefore, I said, there should be a necessity for him to exercise ^D into the characters of men what he contemplates there, and to establish it both privately and publicly, and not only to fashion and conform himself; do you think he will be a poor craftsman of temperance, and justice, and of the whole of popular virtue?” “Not in the least,” he said. “But if the many should perceive that we speak the truth about him, will they be harsh toward the philosophers, and will they disbelieve us when we say that a city could never otherwise be happy, unless it is outlined by those painters who use the divine pattern?” — not

^A at all, he replied. “But tell me,” I continued, “what kind of outline do you mean?” ^B “Taking, as I would say, a canvas,” I said, “they would first make the city and the characters of men clean, which is not at all an easy task. But you surely know that in this they would immediately surpass all others, in that they would not be willing to take in hand either an individual or a city, nor to write laws, unless they had first received it clean, or had made it so themselves.” — “And correctly so,” he said. — “And do you not think that after this they would sketch out the form of the state?” — “Why certainly.” — “Then, I suppose, while working at it, they would look often in both directions, both to that which is by nature just and beautiful and temperate and all such things, and to that which they, in turn, might produce in men, mixing and blending from their [human] practices that which is 'man-like'—inferring it from that which Homer himself also called that which is engendered in men, the 'god-like' and divine form.” — “Correct,” he said. — “And, I suppose, they would erase one part and write in another, until they had made human characters, as far as is possible, pleasing to God.” ^C

CHAPTER XX

“It seems to me,” the same speaker says, “that the discourse has come round for a third or fourth time to this same point: that education is nothing other than the guidance and training of children toward the account that has been rightly stated by the law, and confirmed by those who are most upright and most advanced in age by reason of their experience, to be truly correct. ^D In order, therefore, that the soul of the child may not be accustomed to rejoice and suffer in ways contrary to the law and to those things established by the law, but should follow along, rejoicing and suffering at the same things as the old man — for this reason, what we call 'odes' (these are truly 'incantations' for souls, which have come to be for the sake of such harmony as we speak of, and have been studied for that purpose; but because the souls of the young cannot bear [such] seriousness, they are called 'play' and 'odes' and are performed accordingly) — just as those who are sick and have weak bodies, [are given] pleasant foods and drinks...

^A but those that are harmful are mixed with less pleasant things, so that they may become accustomed to loving the one and rightly hating the other. And the same [standard] the upright legislator will also apply to the poet, persuading him—or if not persuading, compelling him—with fair and praiseworthy words to represent the ways of men who are temperate, brave, and in every way virtuous, whether by figures in rhythms ^B or by melodies in harmonies, performing his work correctly. It is, therefore, reasonable that among us, too, our children should become accustomed to practicing the odes and hymns to God composed by the divine prophets.

CHAPTER XXI

Of what sort the sentiment of those odes ought to be.

You impose this necessity upon the poet, says Plato, that he must pronounce the good man, because he cultivates temperance and justice, to be ^C happy and blessed, whether he be tall and strong of body or, on the contrary, short and weak; and likewise whether he abounds in riches or not. But if, even if he should surpass Cinyras himself and Midas in wealth, he is nevertheless unjust, [he must declare] him to be miserable and living a bitter life. Truly (for this is how the poet speaks among you, provided he speaks rightly), I would not even remember such a man, nor would I consider him of any account at all, who does not fulfill and embrace all the duties of honesty and justice. But if he is such, then he bears to fight the enemy ^D toe to toe. But if he be unjust, he would neither dare to look upon bloody slaughter, nor be able to outstrip the Thracian North Wind in swift running; nor should he obtain any other of those things which are called good. For those things which the common herd of men is accustomed to call good, this name is falsely applied to them. For health is indeed proclaimed to be the best of all; in the second place they count beauty; in the third, strength; in the fourth, riches. Although there are infinite other things which the common people call good. For to be endowed with sharp sight and hearing, and to enjoy all the faculties of the senses whole and perfect; and to be able to do, while in supreme power, whatever may please the mind: this is thought to be good. Finally, [they think] the end of all blessedness is to have acquired all these things, and to have become immortal as quickly as possible. But you and I, I imagine, say the following: that all these things are excellent possessions for just and holy men; but for the unjust, they are all most evil, beginning from health. Indeed, and to see, and to hear, and to fail at some time so greatly, that having produced the words [and melodies] of men, one should return the form of women and the melody; and having composed the melody of free men and [their] forms, [one should] fit the rhythms of slaves and the base-born.

^A And, in total, to exist for the entire time as an immortal possessing all so-called goods, yet devoid of justice and every virtue, is the greatest evil; but it is a lesser one if such a person lives for the shortest time possible. I believe you will persuade, and indeed compel, the poets among you to say these very things, and furthermore to adapt the rhythms and harmonies that follow these instructions, so as to educate your youth. For do you see? 23 I, for my part, state clearly that what are called goods are evils for the unjust, but evils for the just; while the good are truly good for the good, but evils for the bad. So, as I asked, are we in agreement, I and you, or how is it?” ^B These statements are not far removed from the Psalms of David, which he, having been inspired by divine Spirit beforehand, composed through odes and hymns, teaching who the truly blessed man is, and who is his opposite. From there, indeed, the book begins for him, when he says: “Blessed is the man who has not walked in the counsel of the ungodly,” and similar things. Plato, having changed these, says that the poets must say that the good man, being temperate and just, is happy and blessed; but if he happens to be rich but unjust, he is miserable. This he himself, David, again set forth in the Psalms in this way, saying: “If wealth flows, do not set your heart upon it,” and again: “Do not fear when a man becomes rich, or when the glory of his house is increased.” At your leisure, you would find each of the things said by the philosopher laid out word for word throughout the entire holy writing of the Psalms.

CHAPTER XXII.

CHAPTER XXIII.

^A many, that music should be judged by pleasure; yet let us not acquiesce in the pleasure of the common people, but let us establish that to be the best muse, which delights those who are the best and sufficiently instructed, and especially that which delights the one man who excels in virtue and education. Therefore, we argue that virtue is necessary in the first place for the judges of such songs, since they ought to be endowed not only with prudence, but also with steadfastness. For it would not be fitting that an impartial and true judge should either bring forth a judgment educated by the theater itself, and stunned partly by the clamor of the multitude and partly by his own ignorance; or even [while] recognizing the truth, should through sloth and fear, with that very mouth with which a little before, when he approached to judge, he called the gods to witness, unworthily pronounce a false and vain opinion. For he does not sit as a disciple, but as a master of the spectators, as is fitting, and as one who will constantly resist them if they show pleasure in an unrestrained manner and in an improper place. In exactly the same way, among the Hebrews of old, it did not belong to the ^B multitude either to judge those who were brought forward as if inspired by the Divine Spirit, or to decree concerning the divine songs themselves; but there were few, inspired themselves by the Divine Spirit—whose proper power that of writing is—to whom alone it was permitted to judge of these things, and to consecrate the very books of the prophets, while rejecting the others as adulterous and spurious.

CHAPTER XXIV. That songs must also be received in banquets, as certain convivial laws.

“Furthermore,” says Plato, “what the discussion we first undertook sought, so that it might bring some aid toward duly instructing the choir of Bacchus, this we have discussed so far according to our ability. Now, therefore, let us see whether the thing has been perfected by us. For it is in a way necessary that a gathering of this kind, while the drinking party grows ever more and more fervent, should become more turbulent; which we also posited from the beginning as happening of necessity in these matters which are now under discussion.” ^C “It is necessary, indeed.” “Then, each man, lighter than usual, indulges himself, and being loosened by joy, speaks more freely and effusively; meanwhile, he hears no one among his neighbors, but rather seems to himself a certain suitable moderator of himself and of all the others.” “Certainly.” “But we said that when these things happen, the minds of the drinkers, after they have conceived [a state] like iron in the fire, become softer and younger, so that, just as when they were still more tender, they offer themselves as more compliant and tractable toward him who is able and knows how to instruct and mold them. Now, we establish as this molder that same person who was also to us a good legislator. This man will also set down convivial laws, by which that petulance of the confident and ^D audacious man, who no longer [observes] any order, nor any [rules] of silence and speaking, nor any of drinking and singing

comes to be checked, and impudence is recalled to the duties of contrary honesty and modesty; and thus against unbridled and gradually increasing insolence, that most honorable fear is opposed, which, joined with equity, we have called shame and reverence, and truly divine fear. Such is the case. Moreover, we have wished that the guardians of these laws, who would devote their efforts to them, be quiet and sober men. So he says. Rightly, therefore, is this custom received among us also in our banquets, to sing odes and hymns composed to the praise of God, in which kind of activity our own leaders also keep watch and provide for honesty and modesty.

CHAPTER XXV. That the drinking of wine is not to be permitted to all indiscriminately.

«If any city,» says Plato, «as is customary in a serious matter, wishes to adopt this practice as the reason of laws and order shall demand, just as if it were using a certain exercise for the sake of acquiring temperance; and if, in like manner, it will not abstain from other pleasures with the same intent, so that it may at length be victorious over them by this art, then in this way I would allow it to use all these things. But if it is all to be a game, and if it is permitted to any person who wishes, and whenever he wishes, and with whomsoever he wishes, to drink in such a way that he may combine with it any other sort of pastime he fancies; I would never be the one to advise that anyone, whether in the commonwealth or as a private individual, be allowed to indulge in more copious draughts. For then I would approve the law of the Carthaginians far more than the custom of the Cretans or Lacedaemonians: that no one should ever taste this beverage while in the army, but should be accustomed to drink only water throughout the whole time of military service; and that at home, neither male nor female slave should ever taste it; nor magistrates during that year in which they govern the state, nor those who are overseers and judges while they are exercising their functions, nor anyone who is about to give their opinion in council on any matter of importance; and indeed, I would grant it to no one at all to use wine during the day, unless the exercise of the body or the condition of some illness requires it; nor at night, whether it be a man or a woman, if they intend to beget children. These things and many others might be brought forward as reasons why those who follow the guidance of mature judgment and right law ought to abstain from wine. From which it surely follows that no city should stand in need of many vineyards, but rather that all other cultivation of the fields, and the whole manner of life, should be included within entirely moderate bounds.» Thus Plato. Whom Moyses had already anticipated, when he forbade wine to the priests at the time they were to perform sacred rites, saying in these words: «And the Lord spoke to Aaron, saying: You shall not drink wine and strong drink, you and your sons with you, when you enter into the tabernacle of testimony, or when you approach the altar, lest you die; it shall be a law forever throughout your generations.» [Levit. x, 9.] The same person, for men and women alike who make vows, declares this law: «A man or a woman, whoever shall make a great vow, to separate themselves to the Lord in purity, he shall abstain from wine and from strong drink; and he shall not drink vinegar from wine, or vinegar from strong drink.» But Solomon also restrains princes and judges from the use of it, saying: «Do everything with counsel; drink wine with counsel. Rulers are prone to anger, let them not drink wine.»

Moreover, the Apostle also permits Timothy to use wine on account of infirmities, saying: «Use a little wine for your stomach’s sake and your frequent infirmities.»

CHAPTER XXVI.

«Whether, therefore,» he says, «there is a necessity for men well-versed in philosophy to organize a republic, either in those last and most ancient times, or even today among some barbarian people, situated far outside the sight and eyes of us, or indeed whether it shall be so sometime in the future: on this matter, we are ready to contend in argument that the aforementioned republic has existed in the past, and even now exists, and certainly will exist when this very Muse gains control of the city. For those things which it is impossible to happen, we also do not say are possible.»

CHAPTER XXVII.

«But concerning oneself,» he says, «ought one to think of oneself as of an enemy, or otherwise? — O Athenian stranger (for I would not wish to address you as an Attic one; for you seem to me worthier of being addressed by a name derived from God), for by correctly leading the discourse back to its beginning, you have made it clearer; so that you will more easily understand how rightly it was said by us a little before, that publicly everyone is an enemy to everyone, and privately and individually each one is an enemy and hostile to himself. What is this speech of yours, most excellent sir? — In this war, my guest, as to conquer oneself is the first and best of all victories, so to be conquered by oneself is the basest and worst of all. For this sort of speech signifies that there is a certain civil war of each of us with himself.»

Then, after many other things have been inserted, he continues: «Do we therefore declare any one of us to be a single individual? — Certainly. — But so single, that he possesses within himself two counselors, opposing and foolish, to whom we give the names of pleasure and pain? — It is so. — And besides these two, again, opinions of things to come, of which the common name is hope, but the special names are fear, which is the hope before pain, and confidence, which is the hope before the contrary. And over all these is reason, ^D which, whatever it may be of them, signifies that the seeds of war and peace are primarily in each soul. And whoever is able to conduct peace toward himself, that man is able also to conduct peace toward external, hostile wars (for what is the benefit of having peace toward the enemy, if one cannot have reconciliation toward oneself?). But for whom reconciliation with himself is impossible, such a man would hardly ever value truces with others. For there is also in each person a barbarian race, very willful and disobedient — I mean anger, and insatiable desires — taking post against reason, just like Romans, Scythians, and Germans, etc.

^A And he says further: “We know that these passions within us, being like nerves or certain cords, pull us and draw us against one another, as they are contrary and lead to contrary actions, where indeed (45) virtue and vice are set. For, says the discourse, there is one of the pulls that we must always join, and never depart from it, each of us drawing with the other cords; and this is the guidance of reason, golden and sacred, called the common law of the city, while the others are hard and iron, and the soft relaxation is golden, and the others are like all manner of forms. And we must always assist the most beautiful guidance of the law; for since the guidance of reason is good, and gentle, and not violent, it needs ministers in order that the golden race in us may overcome the other races. And thus (45) the fable concerning the wonders, assuming we are the subject, would be saved as a fable of virtue, and the manner in which one is superior or inferior to oneself would become in a way clearer to understand. And that both a city and an individual, having received in themselves the true discourse concerning these pulls, ought to live following it, and a city, having received this discourse from some god or from one who has known these things, having established it as law, ought to converse both with itself and with other cities. Thus vice and virtue would be more clearly articulated for us.”

And with us too, the divine Word teaches similar things, saying: ^B “I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind.” And again: “Their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another,” and whatever else is similar to these.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

“But we remember (46) having agreed in what went before, that if the soul should appear to be older than the body, whatever belongs to the soul would also be older than things of the body.” ^C “Very true.” ^D “And we remember that we also agreed that the soul’s impulses, and desires, and reasonings, and habits, if they were prior to the body, then the works/actions of the soul would be prior.” “Certainly.” “So then, the modes and habits, and desires, and reasonings, and true opinions, and diligent cares, would be prior to the things that happen in the body.”

“It is necessary.” “Must we not then allow that it is a necessary consequence that the soul is also the cause of good things and evil, of honorable and base, of just and unjust, and of all contraries, if we are to propose it as the cause of all things?” And let these points be set forth from the tenth book of the Laws. Moses is in agreement with them, having said often in his laws: “And if a soul shall sin and commit iniquity,” and whatever else is said by him in many places to the same effect.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Concerning him who philosophizes sincerely and perfectly. From the Theaetetus.

^B The Hebrew scriptures declare concerning the one who philosophizes seriously and truly: “It is good for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth; he shall sit solitary and keep silence, because he has taken it upon himself.” And it teaches concerning the prophets most dear to God, that in order to aspire to the highest peak of philosophy, they dwelt in deserts, mountains, and caves, ^C having their minds fixed upon the contemplation of the one God. But do you hear how Plato also elevates this manner of life, discoursing in this way concerning him who philosophizes in the highest degree: “Let us speak then, as is fitting, since you think it right, concerning those leaders of philosophy (for why should one speak of those who occupy themselves with philosophy in an inferior way?). These men, to be sure, from their youth do not know the path to the market-place, nor where the court or the senate or any other public council of the city is held; they neither see nor hear laws and decrees, whether spoken or written. ^D As for the pursuit of associations for the sake of obtaining office, and factions, assemblies, dinners, and revelries with flute-players, it does not even enter their mind to take part in such things. Whether anything has been done well or ill in the city, or what evil has happened to anyone from his forefathers, whether from men or from women, escapes him more than the number, as they say, of the sands. And he is so ignorant of all these things that he does not even know that he is ignorant of them. For he does not separate himself from the communion of these things for the sake of winning praise; but in truth, only his body is situated and dwells in the city, while his mind, deeming all these humbler things small and counting them as nothing, flies everywhere, according to Pindar, measuring both what is beneath the earth and what is above the earth, astronomizing those things beyond the heavens, and searching out the whole nature of each of the beings, in every way, never letting itself down to any of the things near at hand.” “How do you mean this, O Socrates?” “Just as it is said, O Theodorus, that when Thales was astronomizing and looking upwards, he fell into a well, and a clever and graceful Thracian maid-servant mocked him, saying that he was eager to know the things in the heavens, but that the things in front of him and by his feet escaped him. The same jest holds for...

all who pass their lives in philosophy. For, in truth, such a man is so little known by his neighbor and his acquaintance—not merely as to what he is doing, but it is almost a question of whether he is a man or some other creature; as to what man is, and what is the nature suitable for such a being to perform or to suffer different from others, he seeks and has much trouble in investigating. You understand me, I suppose, Theodore? — I do; and you speak the truth. — Therefore, my friend, when such a man is in private association with anyone, or in public, as I was saying when I began, when he is compelled in a court of law or elsewhere ^A to carry on a discussion about things before his feet and before his eyes, he provides laughter not only to Thracian maid-servants but to the rest of the mob, falling into wells and every sort of perplexity out of inexperience; and the awkwardness is terrible, producing an impression of stupidity. For in personal abuse, he has nothing of his own to use to abuse anyone else, ^B since he knows no evil of anyone, from never having concerned himself with such things; so, being at a loss, he appears ridiculous. And in praises and the boastings of others, as he laughs not out of pretense, but in truth and openly, he seems to be a fool. For when he hears a tyrant or king being praised, he thinks he is hearing one of the herdsmen—a swineherd, for instance, or a shepherd, or a cowherd—being celebrated as happy, ^C because he spends much time milking—an animal more difficult to manage and more treacherous than those he herds and thinks he milks. And he thinks that the man in question is, by reason of his busy life, no less rustic and uneducated than the herdsmen, having a wall built around his stall in the mountains. And when he hears of ten thousand ^D plethra of land, or even more, which someone possesses as a marvelous hoard, it seems a very small matter to him, who is accustomed to look at the whole earth. And as for the singing of lineages—one who is so noble as to show that he has seven wealthy ancestors—he regards this praise as altogether dull and coming from those who see only a little, because of their poor education, being unable to look ever at the whole, nor to calculate that ancestors and forebears for every man have been numbered by the myriads, in whom there have often been ten thousand of each—wealthy and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks. But to be arrogant about a list of twenty-five ancestors, or to trace them back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, seems absurd to him.

^A Indeed, he considers that the philosopher, who by the nature of things is unaccustomed to such trivial matters, ^B laughs at those who cannot calculate and cannot rid their minds of the vanity of a foolish soul. In all these affairs, such a man is laughed at by the multitude, partly for seeming arrogant, and partly for being ignorant of what lies before his feet and being at a loss in every situation. "You speak of things that truly come to pass, Socrates."

^C If, however, he should draw anyone upward, if someone would be willing to depart from the question, "What wrong have I done you, or you me?" and move into an examination of justice and injustice, what each of them is and how they differ from all other things or from one another; or from the question, "Is the king happy who possesses much gold?" into an examination of kingship and human happiness and wretchedness in general, and what they are, and how it is fitting by nature for a man to obtain the one and avoid the other—whenever that man, small-minded and sharp and litigious of soul, must again render an account of all these things, he in turn provides the opposite response. For, feeling dizzy and hung suspended from a height, looking down into the abyss from above, he is distressed by the truth ^D and is at a loss, and stammers; he does not provoke laughter among the Thracians or any other uneducated person, for they do not perceive his state, but he does provide laughter to those who are the opposite, for he is raised like a slave among them all. This, Theodorus, is the way of each: the one, truly reared in freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher, to whom it seems unexceptionable to appear simple and to be nothing when he falls into servile tasks, such as not knowing how to bundle a bedroll, or cook a meal, or make flattering speeches; the other, in turn, is able to perform all such tasks keenly and sharply, but does not know how to wrap his cloak about himself in a free and noble manner, nor how to

gain the harmony of speech

"If you could persuade all men, Socrates, as you have persuaded me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among men."

But it is not possible for evils to be destroyed, Theodorus (for it is necessary that there always be something contrary to the good), nor is it possible for them to be established among the gods. They necessarily wander about our mortal nature and this sphere of ours. Therefore, one must try to flee from here to there as quickly as possible. And flight is the becoming like God, as far as is possible; and becoming like Him is to become just and holy with wisdom.

But indeed, excellent friend, it is not at all easy to persuade men that the reasons why the many say one must flee wickedness and pursue virtue are not the reasons why one should practice the one and not the other—namely, so that one does not seem evil, but rather good. This is what is called the "old wives' tale," as it appears to me. But the truth we state in this way: God is in no way and in no manner unjust; rather, He is as just as it is possible to be. And there is nothing more like Him than the one among us who becomes as just as possible.

^A Regarding this, there is also the true shrewdness of a man, and his nobility, and his courage. For the knowledge of this is wisdom and true virtue, whereas ignorance is stupidity and manifest vice. The other so-called shrewdnesses and wisdoms, when they arise in political power, are burdensome, and when they arise in the arts, are vulgar. Therefore, for the one who acts unjustly and says or does unholy things, it is by far best not to allow him to be considered shrewd through craftiness. For they delight in the reproach, and they think they are being told that they are not trifles or mere burdens upon the earth, but men such as those who are to be saved in a city. ^B One must therefore speak the truth, that they are so much more what they do not think they are, precisely because they do not think they are. For they are ignorant of the penalty of injustice, which is the very thing they ought least to be ignorant of. For it is not, as they think, stripes and deaths—which they sometimes suffer even while doing no injustice, but which it was impossible to escape. What, then, do you mean? Examples, my friend, that stand in reality: the divine being most happy, and the godless being most miserable. Not seeing that this is how it is, due to their stupidity and extreme nonsense, they go unnoticed, becoming like the former through their unjust actions, and unlike the latter—for which they pay the penalty, living the sort of life that is appropriate to that which they resemble. But if we say that, unless they are rid of their shrewdness, even when they have ended their lives that place which is free from evils will not receive them, but that here they will always have their own likeness of conduct—evildoers together with evildoers—these things will be listened to by some foolish people as if they were indeed the words of shrewd and crafty men. ^C Indeed, Socrates. I know it, my friend. Yet one thing befalls them, when at some point they must render an account and receive one concerning the things for which they are blamed, and they wish to endure it manfully for a long time, and not run away in a cowardly manner. Then, my good sir, in a strange way, when they finish, they are not pleased with themselves regarding what they say, and their rhetoric somehow withers away, so that they seem to be no different from children. ^D There is, therefore, a true shrewdness and a nobility and a courage, just as there is a true lack of nobility and cowardice. For virtue is contrasted with ignorance and vice; concerning this, regarding this, and for this person. Even if the unjust sometimes escape, or rather do not escape—for they are mistaken in thinking they escape—yet the one who acts unjustly pays the penalty. The sense of this is what we have expressed. And Ficinus, having followed this latter interpretation, seems to have read it thus, for he adds, "and the unjust are often avoided." To this reading I am very favorable.

or by death, as they believe, since those often pursue even those who have committed no sin; but that is the final one, which no wicked man can escape. — What punishment do you mean? — Since there are in the nature of things, my Theodore, two patterns, one divine and also most blessed, the other impious and also most wretched: while they do not see that the situation is such, in what stupor and dementia are they, that they do not perceive themselves to become, on the one hand, most like the wicked in their shameful deeds and crimes, and on the other, most unlike the divine? They certainly pay the penalties for this very transgression, in that they live a life most consonant with that to which they are made similar. And if we further threaten them with what is to come, unless they depart from this power of wickedness, so that that place, removed from all contagion of criminals, might not receive them after death, but rather that they might have there forever a manner of life most similar to themselves and their ways, that is, that they might be forced to associate with the wicked as the wicked: this they will hear as nothing other than the dream of certain delirious people, and they will regard them as simpletons and turncoats. — So it is entirely, Socrates. — I know that well, Theodore. But yet this much at least happens to them, that if at any time they ought to weigh the arguments on both sides privately regarding those things which they are wont to despise and ridicule, and to fix their position a little more firmly and steadily in this disputation, they might not wish to flee shamefully: then, indeed, they themselves are not pleased with their own speech, and their rhetoric withers away I know not how; so that they appear to differ in no way from children. ^A

CHAPTER XXX. Of that whole sophistic kind which is wont to be found among men.

In our books, too, many things are said concerning that whole sophistic kind which has occupied the minds of men: For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written: I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the discernment of the prudent I will set aside. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Similarly, by those who wish to profess divine philosophy, we are taught by these words that nothing small or petty should be thought: Considerating not the things which are seen, but the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. And

^A

CHAPTER XXXI.

CHAPTER XXXII.

women called to the sharing of these same studies, even though in all things a woman is far weaker than a man? — Exactly so. — What then? Shall we entrust everything to men and nothing to a woman? — Why indeed should we? — From among women, as we shall say later, you will find some fit for medicine, others not; likewise some prepared by nature for music, while others shrink from it of their own accord. — Truly so. — Others, furthermore, are suited for public exercises and for warfare, while others are unfit for both. — That is my opinion as well. — What moreover of wisdom? Do not some women pursue it with diligence, while others pursue it with hatred? Do not others, in turn, possess a fiercer spirit, while others have a more humble one? — To this also I agree. — There are also some who are fit for guarding, while others are not. — Indeed, have we segregated any nature of men fit for guardianship? — We ^A certainly have. — Therefore the nature of the man and of the woman is the same for the guardianship of the state, except that the one is weaker, and the other is stronger. — It appears so. — Therefore, such women as these are to be chosen by such men to dwell with them and to keep watch with them, since they are capable and are of the same nature as them. — Thus Plato. With justice, therefore, and deservedly do our laws also admit the whole class, as much of women as of men, as much of slaves as of the free, and as much of barbarians as of Greeks, into the communion of divine doctrine and philosophy. ^B

CHAPTER XXXIII. That the whole class is not to be maligned because of those among us who do not live according to the rule of reason.

And let us philosophize in this manner regarding this matter, says Plato. Come, if someone were to praise the raising of goats, and the animal, and likewise the property, as being profitable; while another, on the contrary, having seen goats somewhere feeding without a goatherd and doing harm to certain cultivated fields, were to disparage it; and having seen the whole flock either without a shepherd or with bad shepherds, were to immediately tear the whole thing to pieces; do we suppose that for this reason, in a sane and mature judgment, he would repudiate any other kind of flock? — And why should he? — And after a few words: "What then? Do we suppose that anyone who praises or blames any society, which by its nature ought to have a leader and is very useful when joined with one, but who has never seen it ^C living correctly with its own leader and instead either always lacks any magistrate or is accustomed to bad magistrates—shall we suppose, I ask, that such spectators of such societies can rightly blame or praise anything of the sort?"—How could they? — Therefore, it should not be the case that if any among us should happen to be seen behaving wrongly, either without a leader and director or with wicked magistrates, we should immediately blame this whole class of our schools; but rather, we should admire the religious and pious institution of the state from the conduct of those who conduct themselves rightly and properly within them. ^D

^A

CHAPTER XXXIV. How Plato expressed certain oracles from the Proverbs more purely and elegantly in Greek phrasing.

CHAPTER XXXV. Concerning wealth and poverty.

CHAPTER XXXVI. Concerning the honoring of parents.

CHAPTER XXXVII. Concerning the possession of servants.

^A Plato, in his *Republic*, similarly commands: "Let no Greek possess a Greek slave, neither themselves, nor advise other Greeks to do so." "Certainly," he says. "For thus they would more readily turn their arms against barbarians, and keep away from their own."

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

He says: "Let no one move the boundaries of land, neither of their own citizen-neighbor, nor of any other borderer, even an alien, who possesses land up to the outer limits of his own field; counting it truly the act of one who moves the immovable, as they say, to move these." Then he adds: "If anyone, crossing the fixed boundaries, cultivates the neighbor's field, let him not only make restitution for the damage, but, as a remedy for his impudence and lack of nobility, let him pay double the loss to the person harmed."

CHAPTER XXXIX.

"To sum up the matter in a word," he says, "let neither the infamy nor the punishment of the parents attach to any other of their children, unless it be that a father, and a grandfather, and a great-grandfather, successively incur the penalty."

CHAPTER XL.

The law of Moses says: "If anyone steals a calf or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five calves for the calf, and four sheep for the sheep. But if the theft be found and discovered in his hand, from calf and ass even unto sheep, he shall restore them alive twofold." Hear now how Plato provides similar things, saying: "If a thief, whether he steals a great thing or a small, let one law be set over all, and one penalty of judgment for all: First, that he shall pay double what was taken by theft; whoever is convicted of theft, provided that he has the means from his remaining property to pay above the amount of the lot; but if not, let him be in chains until he shall either pay or obtain pardon from the one by whom he was convicted of theft."

CHAPTER XLI.

Furthermore, when Moses had established: "If a thief be caught digging through a wall, and having received blows, dies, it shall not be reckoned as murder for the other," Plato similarly ordains: "If anyone catches a night-thief entering a house with the intent of stealing money and kills him, let him be pure."

^A

CHAPTER XLII. On a beast of burden.

"If," says Plato, "a beast of burden or any other animal kills someone—unless it should happen that whilst it is being trained for public and solemn games, it does some such thing in the very heat of the contest—let the relatives of the slain proceed against the killer for murder; and let the curators of the fields decide, according to whom and to how many the relative may assign the task. And let them determine, if the beast is found guilty, that those who killed it shall cast it outside the borders of the country." These are the words of Plato. But Moses, anticipating this, says: "If a bull should gore a man or a woman, and he die, the bull shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the bull shall be innocent." ^B

CHAPTER XLIII. That Plato uses the same examples as the Hebrew scripture.

The voice of the prophet is: "Son of man: behold, the house of Israel has become to me all mixed with bronze, and tin, and iron, and lead. In the midst of the furnace they are mixed with silver. Therefore say: Thus says the Lord: Because you have all become one mass, therefore I will gather you, even as silver, and bronze, and iron, and lead, and tin are gathered in the midst of a furnace, that fire may be blown upon them, to smelt them." And listen now to what Plato says in the same manner: "Hear, then, the rest of the story. For we all who are in the city are brothers, as we shall say to them in telling the story. But, as they say, God, when framing those of us who are fit to rule, mixed gold into them at their birth, because they are most precious; but for those who are auxiliaries, he mixed silver; and iron and bronze for the farmers and the other craftsmen. ^C Since, therefore, we are all akin, we would for the most part beget those like ourselves; but it happens at times that from gold a silver descendant might be born, and from silver a golden descendant, and all the rest likewise from one another. To the rulers, therefore, God gives commandment first and most strongly, that they should be as good guardians of nothing, and that they should guard nothing as diligently, as the offspring, because there is something of these mixed into their souls. And if their own offspring should be found to be base-bronze or base-iron, they must have no mercy in any way, but assigning the honor appropriate to their nature, they must rank them either as craftsmen or as farmers. And if again from these anyone should spring up who is gold-tinged or silver-tinged, they shall honor them and promote the former to the guard and the latter to the auxiliary force; as it is useful that the city should perish when it is guarded by an iron or a bronze guardian. Have you, then, any contrivance for how they might be persuaded of this story?" ^D

CHAPTER XLIV.

On the same similar points.

There is another prophecy among the Hebrews, by which the princes of the people are addressed in this way: "O shepherds of Israel, do shepherds not feed themselves? Do the shepherds not feed the sheep? Behold, you eat the milk, and you slaughter the fat, and you clothe yourselves with the wool, but you do not feed my sheep. And that which was lost you did not seek, and that which was broken you did not bind up, and that which had wandered you did not bring back." ^A To which that saying of the saving Gospel also pertains: "The good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep; but the hireling, and he who is not a shepherd, and whose own the sheep are not, leaves them." Now hear Plato, and how he interprets these very things in the first book of *The Republic*:

"But now you see, my Thrasymachus (so that we may repeat those things above), that after you defined the true physician at the beginning, you nevertheless did not wish the true shepherd to be one who diligently and carefully guards the flock, but rather that he should feed his sheep, insofar as he is a shepherd, not looking to the best interest of the sheep, but like some guest-master—and one intending to prepare a feast—is attentively concerned for the banquet; or indeed, just as some hawker might sell them for his own profit, and not as a shepherd. For the pastoral art has no other concern ^B than to provide all that is best for the flocks entrusted and committed to its care. For as far as the art itself is concerned, it is abundantly provided with all the things necessary by its own nature, so that it might be entirely the best and truly pastoral. Thus, then, I thought it necessary for us now to confess that every rule, insofar as it is a rule, is of such a kind that it looks to nothing else—whether it be a public or a private rule—than to the best interest of that which is ruled and cared for. But do you think that those who are truly princes in cities willingly undertake to rule?"

CHAPTER XLV.

On the same matters.

Another voice of a Hebrew prophet is: "From your fear, O Lord, we have conceived in the womb, and we have been in labor, and we have brought forth the spirit of salvation." ^C Plato, however, in the *Theaetetus*, introduces Socrates speaking thus: "Those who associate with me, he says, are like women in labor. For they are in pain and are filled with perplexity for nights and days, even much more than those women are. And my art is able to both arouse and relieve this pain of childbirth."

CHAPTER XLVI. Concerning the same.

^A It is the prophet Ezekiel who says: *And the hand of the Lord was upon me, and I saw, and behold, a stormy wind came from the North*; and a little later: *And in the midst, as it were the likeness of four living creatures. And this was their appearance: there was the likeness of a man upon them, and four faces to one. And the likeness of their faces: the face of a man and the face of a lion on the right to the four, and the face of a calf on the left to the four. And the face of an eagle to the four.* Now hear how similarly Plato speaks:

"Now," I said, "let us discuss, since we have agreed upon what power to commit injustice and to do just acts each possesses."

"How?" he said. ^B

"By creating an image of the soul in speech, so that he who tells those things may know what it was he was talking about."

"What kind?" he said.

"One," I said, "of such kinds as are told in myths to have existed in ancient times—those of the Chimera, or Scylla, or Cerberus, and many other such creatures that are said to be composite, many forms having grown together into one."

"They are indeed told of," he said.

"Fashion, then, one image of a motley and many-headed beast, having all around heads of tame and wild beasts, and being able to change and sprout all these from itself."

"That is the work of a clever shaper," he said; "however, since speech is more malleable than wax and such things, let it be shaped."

"Now, one other image of a lion, and one of a man; but let the first represent the greatest, and the second the second."

"These," he said, "are simpler to shape."

"Now join them into one, making three in total, so that they have ^C grown together with each other."

"They are joined," he said.

"Fashion around them on the outside an image of one, the man, so that to one who is unable to see what is within, but only sees the outer husk, the one creature appears to be a man."

"It has been fashioned around," he said.

"Let us then say to the one who says that it is profitable for this man to commit injustice, while to do just acts is not profitable, that he is saying nothing other than that it is profitable for him to feast the motley beast, and to make the lion and the things around the lion strong; but to starve the man, and to make him weak, so that he is dragged wherever either of those might lead him, and to accustom none of the others to one another, nor to make them friends, but to let them bite each other and devour one another while fighting."

"For truly," he said, "that is what he who praises injustice would say."

"And again, would he who says that just acts are profitable not say that one must do and say these things, from which the man within ^D will be most in control; and he will take care of the many-headed creature, like a farmer, feeding and domesticating the tame parts, and preventing the wild ones from growing, making the nature of the lion an ally..."

*It appears, then, [that the soul is] like the naturally coalescing power of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer.*

But why a mortal and immortal living creature was so called, one must try to say. Every soul takes care of everything that is inanimate, and travels over the whole heaven, at one time becoming...

...taking on other forms. Now, while perfect and winged, it flies aloft and manages the whole world. But that which has lost its wings is borne until it takes hold of something solid; and having settled there, and having taken an earthly body, which seems to move itself because of its power, the whole was called a living creature, soul and body joined.

^A For he says: «Having created the nature of the lion and taking thought for all in common, having made them friendly to each other and to himself, he will so nourish them.» For he who praises justice speaks these things altogether rightly.

CHAPTER XLVII.

That Plato also ordains the citizens into twelve tribes, following the example of the Jewish nation.

The entire nation of the Hebrews had been divided into twelve tribes. Following this example, Plato ordained that the same should be observed in the distribution of his own citizens, speaking thus: «To us, the whole land should be divided into twelve portions, as equal as possible. To each portion, let one tribe be allotted, and let it provide five men annually, as, for instance, surveyors of fields and tribal chiefs.» And again he says that the elected generals should also be created as commanders for them, twelve in number, one commander assigned to each tribe.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Plato ordains that the city be founded in a place having a river; he describes things similar to that which is in Jerusalem.

The Hebrews had long ago founded their royal metropolis in such a place and situation, that while it was far from the sea, being built on mountain ridges, it enjoyed land most fertile in all things. Plato desired that the one he founded in his *Laws* should be similar to this, and wrote as follows: «But I inquire rather, whether that city is to be maritime or inland?» — «Actually, stranger, the city of which we have just been speaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea.» — «And what of harbors? Are there any near it, or is it entirely harborless?» — «It is, in fact, possessed of excellent harbors, as far as is possible, stranger.» — «Good heavens! What sort of thing do you mention? And what of its territory? Is it fertile in all things, or lacking in some?» — ^D Nearly...

^A in its entirety, like the rest of Crete. — «Would you call it rather rugged or level?» — «Indeed, rugged.» — «Then it would not be incurable as regards the acquisition of virtue. For if it were to be maritime and have good harbors, and not be fertile in all things, but rather lacking in many, it would have required some great savior and some divine legislators, lest it should happen to have many and varied and base customs, being of such a nature; but as it is, it has the solace of the eighty stadia. It lies, however, nearer to the sea than it should, as you say that it is rather more provided with harbors; yet even this is tolerable. For the sea is a neighbor to the territory, agreeable indeed from day to day, but in truth a truly salt and bitter neighbor. For by filling itself with trade and profiteering through shopkeeping, it begets treacherous and faithless customs in the souls of men, making the city itself untrustworthy and unfriendly toward itself, and likewise toward other men; but it possesses as a solace ^B against these things that it is fertile in all things. Being rugged, it is clear that it would not be at once very productive and fertile in all things. For if it had this, it would provide a large export, and would in turn be filled with silver and gold coinage again; than which evil, if one is to institute a contention of individual evils, no evil, to speak at once, could be more serious for a city, or more obstructive to the acquisition of noble and just customs.» Thus far Plato. But as for us, since we have sufficiently shown thus far what things he has established as akin to the Hebrews, let us see next how he who so greatly approved the method of Hebrew discipline in the same way rejects the Greek. This you will understand from these words of the tenth book of the Republic.

CHAPTER XLIX.

How Plato rejects that primary instruction of children which was used by the Greeks, as being pernicious.

«As for what is said to you,» says Plato, «(for you will not denounce me to the tragic poets, and all others who occupy themselves in imitation) — all such things seem to be a ^C pestilence to the mind of the hearers, as many as do not have the remedy of knowing them, what kind they happen to be.» — «In what way, pray, do you mean this?» — «I must speak,» said I, «although a certain affection and reverence which I have had from childhood regarding Homer prevents me from speaking. For he seems to have been the first teacher and leader of all these noble tragic poets; but indeed a man should not be held in higher honor than the truth; but ^D I say it must be spoken.» — «Certainly, then,» said he. «Then what follows...»

^A regarding the others, let us not ask Homer, or any other of the poets, whether any of them was a physician, and not merely an imitator of medical discourses. For what man, whether among the ancients or the moderns, is said to have made any one healthy, as Asclepius did? Or what disciples of medicine did he leave behind, as he did his descendants? Let us not, then, ask him about the other arts, but let us pass them by. But concerning the greatest and most beautiful things which Homer attempts to speak about—wars, I mean, and military commands, and the administration of cities, and the education of men—it is surely just to question him, inquiring: ^B "My dear Homer, if you are not third from the truth regarding virtue, a creator of an image—if we have defined you not as an imitator, but as second, and such a one as is able to know what sort of pursuits make men better or worse, both privately and publicly—tell us which of the cities was better governed through you, as Lacedaemon was through Lycurgus, and many other cities, both great and small, through many others? And what city credits you with having been a good legislator, and having benefited them? For Italy and Sicily credit Charondas, and we credit Solon. But what city will anyone be able to name for you?" "I do not think there is one," said Glaucon. "At any rate, not even the Homeridae themselves claim this. But is there any war in Homer's time that is recorded as having been waged successfully under his leadership or counsel?" "None." "But are there any inventions and ingenious devices in the arts or other pursuits that are attributed to him, as the work of a wise man, as is the case with Thales of Miletus, or Anacharsis the Scythian?" "Nothing of the sort at all." "But if not publicly, is Homer said to have been a guide of education in private to some who loved him for his company, and who handed down to posterity a certain Homeric way of life? Just as Pythagoras himself was especially beloved for this, and his followers, even now, by calling their way of life 'Pythagorean,' seem in a way to be distinguished from others?" "No, not even this is said," he replied. "For ^C Creophylus, O Socrates, the companion of Homer, would seem even more ridiculous regarding education, if what is said about Homer is true. For it is said, I suppose, that there was great neglect ^D concerning him while he was alive."

(98) *Others.* Plato, p. 512, F. (99) *Creophylus.* Iliad, B, p. 550, extreme, and Suidas, Creophylus, write, *per v.* Suidas calls him the son of Astycles, native of Chios or Samos; Eustathius calls him a Samian. Having received Homer into his hospitality, he received from him the inscription of the poem which they call *The Capture of Oechalia*; that is, he received as a return-gift from Homer the right not to inscribe the book to himself, but to his friend Creophylus. "I am the work of the Samian, whom divine Homer once received into his home; but I am called a Homeric composition; to Creophylus, O dear Zeus, this is a great [honor]." It is a pentameter, [though] it should have been a hexameter; the third and fourth [feet] are intact. Nothing, however, is detracted from the sense. Eustathius adds that some called this Creophylus the tutor of Homer. But to Plato in this place, he is ridiculous not only in name, but also in instruction, in that he should fall to being Homer's tutor. And it is obscure what he implies, how ridiculous he himself was, [which may] be understood from those things which are handed down about Homer, unless one takes the cause from the fact that he allowed his own name to be inscribed on that poem, whose parent was Homer. (1) *Great neglect.* It is uncertain whether Creophylus was more negligent toward Homer, or Homer toward Creophylus; or, finally, whether Creophylus was neglected by his own [people] even while Homer was alive. He retained in the version the same ambiguity, [implying] that the contempt falls upon Creophylus; this also becomes probable from the fact that he is called ridiculous by Plato. It is not, however, improbable that it fits Homer, whom all his own people, as he signifies a little later, allowed to wander and roam everywhere.

^A It is said, then, I said. But do you think, Glaucon, that if Homer had truly been able to educate human beings and make them better, not merely mimicking these things but able to know about them, he would not have acquired many companions and been honored and loved by them? But Protagoras of Abdera 2, and Prodicus of Ceos, and many others, are able to stand by those of their own time in private meetings—since they would be unable to manage either their own house or city unless they themselves oversaw their education—and they are loved for this wisdom of theirs so intensely that their companions almost carry them around on their heads. But were those of Homer's own time, if he were able to profit human beings in virtue, or Hesiod, going to allow them to go around reciting, and not rather cling to them more than to gold, and compel them to stay at home with them? Or if they could not persuade them, would they not have acted as their attendants wherever they went, until they had partaken sufficiently of their education? —By all means, he said, it seems to me, Socrates, that you speak the truth. —Shall we not, then, positing that beginning from Homer, all the poets are imitators of the images of virtue, and of the other things about which they make poems, but do not touch upon the truth? But, just as we were saying just now, the painter will make a cobbler who seems to be one, himself having no knowledge of cobbling, and to those who have no knowledge, they examine them from colors and shapes? —By all means. ^B —So then, I think, we shall say that the poet also paints with words, as it were, colors of each of the arts, himself having no knowledge, but only mimicking, so that to others like him, who examine them as presented in words, it seems they have spoken well; whether he says something about cobbling in meter, rhythm, and harmony, it seems to be spoken quite well, and the same if it be about generalship, or anything else whatever. So by nature these very things have a certain great allure; but when they are stripped 7 of the colors of music, the works of the poets, when spoken by themselves, I think you know how they appear. For have you seen them, or not? —I have, he said. And ^C these things being so, it seems good to me to go through a few small points from Plato, through which he logically constructs his argument concerning God and providence, standing with the doctrines of the Hebrews even in this. But first let us see how he sets forth the opinions of the atheists.

^D As Pythagoras, when he himself had gained a clearly singular approval of many in this type of life, others also arose thereafter who, professing the Pythagorean manner of life, as they call it, even today appear to excel among the rest. —Not even that. For indeed, Creophilus, Socrates, who is said to have been a companion of Homer, might appear ridiculous, perhaps more in his discipline than by his very name, if what they circulate about Homer is true. For they tell that he, even while he lived, was greatly neglected by his own contemporaries. —They tell it indeed, I said. But do you think, O Glaucon, that if Homer had truly been able to instruct men and make them better, as though living among them in knowledge rather than imitation, he would not have acquired very many friends and companions by whom he would be observed and loved? In truth, when Protagoras of Abdera and that Prodicus of Ceos, and very many others, are able to persuade the contemporaries with whom they familiarly associate that they could never manage their own household or the public affairs unless they were first in their studies and learning, and by the power of such wisdom reconcile to themselves such and so vehement a love of their followers that they almost carry them on their heads: would they, I beseech you, allow Homer or Hesiod, if they could have bestowed labor upon men for the attainment of virtue, to go wandering and roaming everywhere, reciting their poems to the men of their age, and not rather hold them dearer than gold itself, and place them in a part of their own houses, or if they could not obtain this from them, at least be informed by their precepts wherever they might be dwelling, until they had sufficiently profited from their discipline? —Most truly, Socrates, I think that is well said by you. —Let it remain, therefore, that all the poets, with Homer himself leading the train, imitate only images of virtue and of the other things concerning which they sometimes write, and never attain to the truth itself. Videlicet, just as we were saying a little before, a painter, who has never heard anything about the tanning art, yet depicts a tanner in such a way that to those ignorant of the same art, and looking only at the mere appearance of colors and figures, he seems to be a tanner. —Assuredly. —In exactly the same way, I shall say, the poet, being otherwise a guest and a stranger in the arts which he only knows how to imitate, nevertheless introduces names and vocabularies of each thing with certain colors, so that those who attend only to the appearance of the speech think they see the thing itself. Wherefore, whether he sings about the tanner's art, or the general's, or any other matter, in verse, numerously and with modulation, he is thought to have spoken very excellently. Such power does a sweeter harmony have by its own nature to soothe the mind. For the works of the poets, when they are heard by themselves and stripped of those musical colors, are such as they are accustomed to appear.

And having established these things, it is pleasing here to add a few things from Plato, by which he philosophizes much more wisely both about God and about divine Providence, having followed in this instance the doctrine of the Hebrews. And let us first see how he sets forth the opinions of those impious men who utterly exterminate the divinity.

CHAPTER L.

On the opinion of the atheists. From the tenth book of the Laws.

^A "Some people," says Plato, "teach that all things which are currently coming into being, have come into being, or shall come into being, arise partly by nature, partly by art, and partly by chance." — "Well said." — "It is indeed probable that wise men have spoken correctly. Nevertheless, let us, following in their footsteps, see what those who have set out from their school might really have in mind." — "By all means." — "They say, it seems, that the greatest and most beautiful things are produced by nature and chance, while the smaller things are produced by art; which, receiving from nature the generation of the great and primary works, shapes and fashions all the very small things, which we all commonly call 'artificial'." — "What do you mean?" — "Take it more clearly in this way. They claim that fire, water, earth, and air exist all by nature and by chance, and that none of them depends upon art. Similarly, they claim that the things which are listed after those in the second place—that is, the bodies of earthly things, the sun, the moon, and all the stars—have come into existence ^B through these, although they are altogether void of soul; and that each of them is carried along by chance according to the power of each, as it happens to meet, in a manner fitting together warm with cold, dry with moist, and soft with hard, and all such things as are necessarily mixed by the chance combination of contraries. In this way, and by the same method, they claim the whole heaven and all things contained within the heaven have come into existence, and animals as well, and all plants, and the seasons resulting from these—not through reason, they say, nor through some god, nor through art, but, as we were saying, by nature and chance. And they say that art, being itself mortal and born of mortals, arose later from these things, and later brought forth certain trifles which possess very little of the truth, but rather are certain images akin to themselves, such as painting produces, and music, and all the arts that are fellow-workers with these. But if there are any arts that also produce something serious, they claim that these are the ones that have joined their power to nature, ^C such as perhaps medicine, agriculture, and gymnastics. They also say that political science is a small part that shares in nature, but in the greater part shares in art. And thus they assert that all legislation is not from nature, but from art, the positions of which are not true." — "What do you mean?" — "By the gods, my good friend, they say that they, the gods, exist first by art, not by nature, but by certain laws, and these are different ones in different places, according to how each people agreed to legislate for themselves. And indeed, they hold that the 'noble' is one thing by nature and another by law, but that the 'just' does not exist by nature at all."

^A Since this is the case, both nature and art are much more commonly called (a matter of) communion and society. Thus, they believe the whole system of making laws arises from art rather than from nature, the sanctions and principles of which lack truth. — In what sense, my good sir? — They mean, first of all, that these things do not exist by nature, but by art—that is, by certain laws—and therefore they assume different forms among different people, according to how one group or another agrees among themselves by legal institution. In the same way, some things become 'good' by nature, others by law. Thus, they argue that there are no truly just things by nature at all, but that in defining them, men are perpetually at odds with one another and are constantly establishing new things. And whatever they may have decreed to be so, at that moment it begins to hold force, established not at all by nature, but by art and laws. These things, my friends, are celebrated in part by learned men, in part by commoners and poets among the young, whose common voice holds that the most just thing is whatever one has been able to extort by force. ^B Whence it comes about that those young people imbibe impiety, because they do not believe in the kinds of gods that the laws command them to consider; and because of this, they labor under mutual dissensions while they attempt to drag others toward a life that they consider to be in accord with nature—which, in truth, is nothing other than living as master of others, and not serving others by the mandate of law. — O what a thing, my friend, and what a grave pestilence of the youth, grass-fed both publicly in cities and privately at home, you have revealed! — And with a few words interposed: "True," he says, "my Clinia, but answer me this again, for these arguments must be shared with you. Does he who speaks in this way not seem to posit those four things—fire, water, earth, air—as primary above all else, to describe them as nature itself, and then to claim that the soul is formed later from them? Although this does not seem to be the case, yet it is clearly what this way of speaking signifies to us." — "Yes, entirely." — "Have we then discovered a certain fountain, as it were, of the foolish opinion of those men who have never touched upon questions of natural philosophy? Consider the whole argument carefully, for it is no small matter if those who take up such arguments should appear as those who initiate others into impiety, and not even using these arguments well, but rather misusing them." ^C "It seems to me that matters are indeed as you say." — "You speak well, but try to explain it further." — "It seems, then, that I must take up some more unusual arguments." And after a little bit, he adds: "Those people, my friend, are likely to be ignorant of what the soul actually is, and what power it possesses, as well as everything regarding its generation, (they are ignorant that it is) among the primary things, having come into being before all bodies, and that it rules over their every change and rearrangement more than anything else. If these things are so, must it not follow by necessity that the things kindred to the soul are prior to those which pertain to the body, since the soul itself is older than the body?" — "Necessity compels it." — "Then 'opinion,' 'care,' 'mind,' 'art,' and 'law' would be prior to 'hard,' 'soft,' 'heavy,' and 'light.' And indeed, the great and primary works and actions of art would come to be, as they exist among the first things; while things that exist by nature—and 'nature,' which they themselves name incorrectly—would be later than these, and would take their beginning from art and mind." ^D "How so?" — "They wish to correctly call 'nature' the generation of primary things. But if it appears that soul is the first thing—not fire, nor air—but soul as the one having been generated among the first things, it would be most correctly said to be nature, in a preeminent sense."

You speak most truly. ^A And after a few words, he says: "Do you not think, my friend, that the majority of men have been ignorant of what the soul is, and what powers it possesses, and that they have been strangers and wanderers not only regarding other matters proper to it, but even regarding its birth, since they have failed to know that it is in the number of the first principles, and prior to all bodies, and that it is therefore, more than all things else, the cause and fountain of all change and diversity? If this is true, does it not follow immediately that those things which pertain to the nature of the soul must necessarily be held to be prior to all those things which are attributed to the body, since the soul is more ancient than the body?" It follows entirely. "Therefore, opinion, care, mind, art, and law must be prior to hard and soft, heavy and light. Indeed, those great and primary works and similar actions are to be referred to art, as many of them as were reckoned in the class and number of the first things. But those things which are generated by nature, and nature itself—which these people erroneously call by this name—were later than those things, and took some origin from art and mind simultaneously." How, then, is that? "For they do not rightly defend their view that nature is to be called the generation that is occupied with the first things. But if it were established that the soul was born either as the first thing, or certainly among the first things—not fire or air—then it might be said with a preeminent and special right that those things themselves consist by the power of nature, provided you are able to demonstrate that the soul is more ancient than the body; ^B otherwise, never." You speak most truly.

CHAPTER LI

How Plato philosophizes about God.

"Come then," says Plato, "if God is ever to be invoked by us, now certainly this must be done. Therefore, let us implore their aid with every effort for this inquiry, which is entirely about the gods, inasmuch as we undertake to demonstrate that they exist; and at the same time, having grasped this as a certain and secure rope, let us enter upon our proposed discussion. And to me, indeed, this method is highly approved in this kind of inquiry: that, just as if someone were to query me with certain fixed questions, so I should in turn respond to him in this manner. 'Whether, my friend—should someone ask me—do all things thus stand, so that nothing is moved; or is it entirely otherwise? Or do some things move, while others are at rest?' To which I respond, 'Some things move, others are at rest.' 'Do they, therefore, either rest or move in a certain fixed place?' 'Exactly.' 'And some things, indeed, do this in one single place, others in more than one. Do you mean,' I ask, 'that those things which act with the power and system of those standing in the midst move in one place, just as the rotation of those circulations which we say are fixed ^C revolves?' 'Yes.' And he continues: 'Come, let us also say this, and respond again to ourselves. If all things were standing still together, as most of such people dare to say, what, then, is the necessity for the first motion to be generated among those mentioned?' The self-moving one, of course. For it would never be changed beforehand by something else, since there was no change in them beforehand. Therefore, we will say that the beginning of all motions, and the first [motion], which occurs in things resting and is present in things moving—the one that moves itself—is necessarily the most ancient and the most powerful of all changes; but the one changed by another, while it moves other things, is the second." You speak most truly. "Since, therefore, we are at this point in the discourse, let us respond to this." What is that? "If we see such a one generated in the earthy, or the watery, or the fiery [element]." ^D

whether it exists in separation or in mixture, what shall we say is the disposition present in such a one?" ^A — Are you therefore asking me if we shall call it living when it moves itself? Yes, living; for how could we not? — What then? When we see soul in some things, must we not agree that "living" is the same as this? It is not otherwise. — Attend now, by Zeus; would you not be willing to conceive of three things with respect to each? What do you mean? One is the essence, one is the definition of the essence, and one is the name; and indeed, there are two questions concerning everything that exists. — In what way two? Sometimes that each of us, when the name is proposed, demands the definition itself, and sometimes, when the definition is proposed, asks in turn for the name. Is it such a thing as this that we wish to say now? — What is the thing? — It is something, I suppose, ^B that is divided into equal parts, both in other things and in number. Of this thing, according to number, the name is "even," while the definition is "a number divided into two equal parts." — Yes. — This is what I mean; are we not calling the same thing by both names, whether, being asked for the definition, we render the name, or, being asked for the name, we render the definition, calling the same thing that is an even number by name and by definition, divided in two? — Entirely so. — And so, the name is "soul"; what is its definition? Have we any other, besides the one just now stated, the motion that is able to move itself? Do you say that moving oneself has the same definition as the essence that corresponds to the name, which we all call "soul"? — I do indeed. — If this is so, do we still need any more proof that soul is the same thing as the first motion, and the generation of things that exist, and things that have existed, and things that will exist, ^C and all that is contrary to these, since it has appeared as the cause of all change and all motion for all things? — No. — But it has most sufficiently been demonstrated that soul is the oldest of all things, having become the beginning of motion. Is therefore the motion that occurs in another through something else—but which never provides any capacity for itself to be moved by itself—is this not second, and—however many numbers one might wish to count it as being—is it not merely the change of a body that is truly soulless? — Correctly said. — Correctly, then, and properly, and most truthfully and completely, would we have said that soul became prior to body, or not? That body is second and posterior, being moved according to nature by a soul that rules? — Most truthfully, indeed. — And do we recall agreeing previously that if soul were shown to be older than body, then the things of the soul would also be ^D older than those of the body? — Most certainly. — And would not traits, and dispositions, and volitions, and reasonings, and true opinions, and attentions, and memories be prior to the length, breadth, depth, and strength of bodies, if soul is also prior to body? — It is necessary. — Is it therefore necessary to agree to what follows this, that soul is the cause of both good and evil, and of the beautiful and the shameful,

^A and of all their opposites, if we shall indeed posit it as the cause of all things? — For how could it not be? — Now, since soul governs and dwells within all things that are everywhere in motion, is it not also necessary to say that it governs the heavens? — Why should it not? — Are there more than one? — There are more. I shall answer on your behalf. We must certainly posit no fewer than two: one, the benefactor, and the other, the one capable of producing the opposite. — You have spoken very correctly. — ^B Very well. Now, does soul drive all things in heaven, and earth, and sea, with its own motions—to which the names are: to will, to consider, to care for, to deliberate, to opine, whether truly or falsely, to rejoice, to grieve, to take courage, to fear, to hate, to love—and all motions that are akin to these or are primary, taking on in turn the secondary motions of bodies, which lead all things to growth and decay, and to separation and combination, and those which follow these: heat, cold, heaviness, lightness, hard and soft, white and black, ^C harsh and sweet, and bitter, and all things which soul, by employing—when it takes on intellect—God itself, being God—rightly and happily guides all things; but when it joins with folly, it produces all things the opposite to these? Shall we posit that these things are so, or are we still in doubt as to whether it is otherwise? — Not at all. — Therefore, shall we say that the genus of soul is master of heaven and earth and the entire circuit, being wise and full of virtue, or does it possess neither? Would you like us to answer this in the following way? — How? — If, my admirer, we say that the entire path and movement of heaven, and of all things that are therein, ^D has a nature similar to the motion and revolution and calculations of intellect, and proceeds in an orderly manner, it is clear that we must say the best soul takes care of the whole cosmos and leads it in that path of such a kind. — Correct. — But if it proceeds madly and disorderly, then the evil one. — This too is correctly said. What, then, is the nature of the motion of intellect? This is already difficult, O friends, to answer wisely if questioned. Therefore, it is right for me to anticipate the answer for you. — You speak well. — Then, let us not, as if staring at the sun and bringing night upon ourselves at midday, make our answer, as if we will ever be able to grasp and know intellect sufficiently with mortal eyes. But by looking at the image of the thing asked, it is safer to see. — How do you mean? — Does intellect resemble the motion of those ten motions? Let us take the image, which I, having called to mind with you, will together form the answer. — You would speak most excellently. — We remember, then, this much from those former things, that we posited that of all things, some are in motion and others at rest. — Yes. — And of those in motion, some are moved in one place, and others are carried in several. — That is so. — Therefore, of these two motions, that which is always moved in one place...

^A being akin to the motion, conversion, and cogitations of the intellect, establishes a course related to it; it follows necessarily that we must acknowledge that that best soul cares for the whole universe, and conducts it along this very path. — That is indeed correct. — But if it revolves furiously and turbulently, we must attribute this same thing to an evil soul. — And that also is correct. — But now, of what nature do we finally believe the motion of the intellect to be? To this question, friends, it is difficult to answer wisely. Wherefore it will be appropriate in the present instance for me to undertake this task of answering for you. — You speak well. — Let us therefore take care, lest looking at the sun as with an adverse countenance, and bringing on night at midday, we answer as if the intellect itself could ever be perceived and thoroughly known by mortal eyes. It will be safer, therefore, to contemplate it by fixing our gaze upon its image. — How do you understand this? — That we should select the image of whichever of those ten motions the intellect is more akin to; and when I have recalled that to your memory, I will then submit the answer on behalf of all. — You speak excellently. — In the beginning, we at least remember it having been established by us, that of the whole multitude of things, some are moved, others are at rest. — We remember. — Then, of those that are moved, some are moved in one place, others in several. — It is so. — Therefore, of these motions, we see that which is always moved in one place, around some fixed center, being agitated like circles made with a lathe, ^B and it is necessary that it approaches the conversion of the intellect by imitation and likeness as closely as can be. — Explain that more clearly, I pray. — Namely, that we should say that both, I mean the intellect and that motion which is always moved in one place, in the way we are accustomed to see some sphere revolve, are always turned in one and the same manner, in the same place, around the same things, and toward the same things, and in one order; and no one, I think, would deem us to be wrongly fabricating outstanding images in our reasoning. — That is indeed excellent. — Therefore, that other motion, which is never revolved similarly, nor according to the same things, nor in the same place, nor around the same things, nor toward the same things, nor in one place, nor in a fitting and elegant order, nor by a certain reason, must be held to be joined with the utmost madness. — And this also is most true. — Now, therefore, let it be openly declared that, since it is the soul that turns everything, the very conversion of the heaven ^C is also governed by the judgment and guidance of some soul, whether good or contrary. — Truly, my guest, from the things that have just been said, it would be a sin to establish anything other than that one soul, or even several, ^D that possess every virtue, convey all things. — Most excellently, Cleinias, have you listened to the discourses. But listen still further to this. — What is that? — When the sun, and the moon, and the other stars exist, if soul conveys all things, does it not also convey each one individually? — Why should it not? — Let us make our discourses about one, which will also appear to us to be applicable to all the stars. — Of which one? — Every man sees the sun’s body, but no one sees its soul; nor indeed the soul of any other body, either living or dead, of any of the animals. But there is great hope that this genus is altogether imperceptible to all the senses of the body, and is intelligible [note: the text continues after the provided column break...]

^A by the mind and intellect, which is what we add concerning it. ^B What is that? If the soul moves the sun, we shall not, I think, err if we say that it does one of three things. What three do you mean? Certainly, that it either has the soul enclosed within that round body, which we see, and carries it about in every direction, just as we are carried about by our own soul; or that, having clothed itself with a body from elsewhere, either fiery or airy, as some prefer, it drives the body by the force of the body; or finally, that it is itself altogether without a body, yet being furnished with other transcendent powers, it leads the sun in an admirable way. Truly. Since the soul effects one of these things, it is necessary that all things should be controlled and ruled by it. And these things the philosopher set forth in his Laws. Hear now how he maintains his opinion in the Philebus. "All wise men," he says, "who have any right to glory in this name, agree that intellect is the king of heaven and earth." And perhaps indeed he is right. But if you please, let us treat the whole matter more fully and richly. But you, Socrates, as it shall seem best, do not fear any length in this matter, since you will not be troublesome to anyone. Excellent. Let us begin our inquiry in this manner. What, I pray you? Whether, Protarchus, we are to determine that all things and this so-called universe are governed by the power of the irrational and the random, and as chance may have it; or on the contrary, as those before us said, ^C that a mind and a certain wonderful wisdom order and govern them? No such thing, most admirable Socrates. For what you say does not seem to me even pious now to affirm; but to say that mind orders all things, and that this is worthy of the view of the universe, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars, and of all their revolution, is something I would never speak of, nor would I think otherwise. Do you wish, then, that we should agree with those who were previously in accord, that these things are so? And that we should not only think that we must speak of another's views without danger, but even run the risk together, and share in the censure, whenever a clever man says that these things are not so, but are in disorder? How could I not wish it? Go then, and look to the argument that is now coming to us regarding these matters. Speak only. Are we to see in the nature of the bodies of all animals, fire, and water, and breath, and earth, as those who are caught in a storm say, contained within the composition? Very much so. For we are truly in a storm from the difficulty of our present arguments. Come then, take the following regarding each of those things among us. What sort? That each of these is something small among us, and base, and in no way whatsoever pure, and lacking a power worthy of its nature. But if you take one, think the same regarding all; for instance, fire exists, I suppose, among us, and exists in the universe. What then? Is the portion among us small, and weak, and base, while the portion in the universe is wonderful in multitude and beauty, and in all the power that is in fire? Most true is what you say. What then? Does the fire of the universe feed and come into being from this, and is it ruled by the fire among us, or on the contrary, does mine, and yours, and that of the other animals, all receive these things from that? This is not even worthy of being asked, it is a question of judgment. Rightly. For you would say the same, I expect, regarding the earth among the animals here, and that which is in the universe; and thus you would answer regarding the others about which I asked a little earlier. ^D For who, being in his right mind, would ever appear to answer otherwise? Hardly anyone at all; but follow what comes next. Since we have now spoken of all these things, did we not name them a body, having seen them composed into one? What then? Take the same regarding this which we call the universe; for in the same way, one might perhaps call it a body, being composed from the same things. You speak most correctly. Does the body among us then derive from this whole body, or does it derive from that among us, both the nourishment and all the things we have now mentioned about them, which it has received and possesses? This, too, Socrates, is not worthy of being asked. What then? Is it perhaps worthy of being asked? Or how will you speak? Speak what...

τὸ ^A ποῖον. — Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρ᾽ οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν; — Δῆλον, ὅτι φήσομεν. — Πόθεν, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὃν ἐτύγχανε, ταύτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ, καὶ ἔτι πάντη καλλίονα; — Δῆλον, ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες. — Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας, καὶ ἄπειρον, καὶ κοινὸν, καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνὸν, τοῦτ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχήν τε παρέχον, καὶ σωμασκίαν ἐμποιοῦν, καὶ πταίσαντος σώματος ἰατρικὴν, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθὲν καὶ ἀσκούμενον, πᾶσαν καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι· τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐν ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ, καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι καλῶν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτοις δὲ οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν; — Ἀλλ' οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοι. — Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, μετ' ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἂν ἑπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν, ὡς ἔστιν, ἃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἄπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολὺ, καὶ πέρας ἱκανὸν, καί τις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαιότατα ἄν. — Δικαιότατα δῆτα. — Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην. — Οὐ γάρ οὖν. — Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι, διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν· ἐν δὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλὰ, καθότι φίλον ἑκάστοις, λέγεσθαι. — Σείᾳ ^B δὴ καὶ ταύτῃ τυγχάνει ἑπόμενος ὁ λόγος, ὡς οὐκ ἀτάκτως πάντα ῥέει ^C, ἀλλὰ τεταγμένως. — Τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βουλοίμην; — Ἴθι δή. — Τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἁπάντων σώματα συνέστηκε, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, πνεῦμα, γῆ, ταῦτα ἆρα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ συνεστώσει πως ἀναγνωριζόμεθα, καθότι δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν χειμαζομένων ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ βίου ζάλης ἀνθρώπων λέγεται; — Πάνυ γε. — Τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τῆς λέξεως εἴδει τῷ τῆς ἀπορίας καταιγισμῷ δῆθεν ῥιπτούμεθα. — Ἄγε δὴ, καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων ὧν ἔχομεν, τοιοῦτόν τι λάβε. — Ποῖον, αἰτῶ; — Τὸ μικρόν τι καὶ εὐτελὲς ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν μερῶν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι, ὃ μήτε καθαρὸν μήτε εἰλικρινές ἐστιν, μήτε τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως ἀξίαν ἔχει. Ὃ δ' ἂν περὶ ἑνὸς τινος ὁρίσῃ, καὶ περὶ πάντων ὡσαύτως νόει. Πῦρ, οἷον, ὡς ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ παντί ἐστιν. — Πάνυ γε. — Ὅτε τοίνυν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστι, καὶ σφόδρα σμικρὸν, καὶ ἀσθενὲς, καὶ νωθὲν, ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ ὅτε ἐστὶ, ἅμα τῷ πλήθει καὶ τῷ κάλλει, καὶ πᾶσι ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀπαραμίλλοις δυνατοῖς, ἅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἴδια, παντάπασιν ἀξιοθαύμαστόν ἐστιν. — Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. — Τί δέ; ἐφεξῆς τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν, ὡς ὑπὸ τούτου τρεφόμενον, διοικούμενον καὶ βασιλευόμενον οἴει εἶναι, ἢ μᾶλλον ἀπ' ἐκείνου τό γε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων πῦρ, πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν λαμβάνειν; — Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲ ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἡγοῦμαι. — Οὐδὲ μὴν ἄλλως, οἶμαι, καὶ περὶ τῆς γῆς ταύτης, ἣν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ^D ὁρῶμεν τετάχθαι, οὐκ ἀτάκτως, ἀλλὰ τεταγμένως, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως τῆς ἄλλης ἁπάσης ἑτέρας ἑκάστοτε, περὶ ὧν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἐζητοῦμεν, τὸ αὐτὸ πάντως ἀποκρίναι. Τίς γὰρ, εἴπερ σωφρονοίη, ἄλλο ποτέ τι ἀποκρίναιτο; — Οἶμαι, οὐδείς. — Ἀλλ' ἴωμεν ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπά. Μῶν τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, ὅταν ἐν ἑνὶ συνελθόντα συμφυῇ, σῶμα καλοῦμεν; — Ναί. — Τὸ αὐτὸ τοίνυν καὶ περὶ τούτου, ὃ κόσμον καλοῦμεν, ἐννόει. Καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ὡσαύτως σῶμα δεῖ νομίζειν εἶναι, ἅτε ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν συνεστώς. — Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. — Πότερον οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῷ παντὶ σώματος τὸ ἡμέτερον τρέφεται, ἢ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐκεῖνο, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἃ νῦν δὴ προσεθήκαμεν, εἴληχε; — Οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον. — Τί δέ; τὸ τρίτον τοῦτο; ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἔσται, ἢ μή; — Εἰπέ μοι. — Τὸ ἡμέτερον τοῦτο σῶμα ψυχῆς μετέχειν φήσομεν; — Φήσομεν πάντως. — Πόθεν δ' ἂν αὐτὴν ἑλκύσειεν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰ μὴ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ἦν, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οἷς καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον, καὶ πολὺ γε ἀμείνοσι κοσμούμενον; — Δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδαμόθεν. — Ἦ μὴν, οὐχ οἰόμεθα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας, ἄπειρον, τὸ μεικτὸν, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον αἰτίας γένος, ὃ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐνὸν, καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν ἐγχέει, καὶ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, εἴ τι ταλαιπωρεῖ, τὴν θεραπείαν παρέχει, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθέν, ἀνασκευάζοντα ἐπισκευάζει· τοῦτο, φημὶ, ἄξιον εἶναι τῆς ἀκροτάτης καὶ τελείας σοφίας ὀνόματος. Ὃ δὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ εἴδει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ καθαρότητι πλεονεκτοῦν, τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσει κέχρηται. Ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐναντίον πάσης λόγου ἀλλότριον ἦν. Εἰ ἄρα τοῦτο ἀποδοκιμάζομεν, περιλείπεται τῇ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμει χρωμένους, βέλτιον οὕτω τιθέναι, εἶναι δὴ, ὃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, τοῦτο ἐν τῷ παντὶ, ἄπειρόν τε καὶ πέρας ἱκανὸν, αἰτίαν τινὰ οὐ κοινὴν καὶ βέβηλον, ἥτις ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας διατάττει, καὶ κυβερνᾷ, σοφίαν καὶ νοῦν ὀρθότατα προσαγορευτέον. — Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν. — Σοφία δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς χωρισθῆναι οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο. — Οὐδαμῶς. — Κατακλείειν οὖν δεῖ, τῇ τῆς αἰτίας ταύτης δυνάμει, καὶ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς φύσιν, βασιλικὴν ψυχὴν καὶ βασιλικὸν νοῦν κεκτῆσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα, ὅσα τούτων τυγχάνει, ἄξια ὀνόματα, καθότι ἑκάστοις πρέπον ἐστίν. Ἄχρι τούτου Πλάτων.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΝΒ΄.

ὅτι μὲν ἡγῇ θεοὺς ^A συγγένειά τις ἴσως σε θεία πρὸς τὸ ξύμφυτον ἄγει τιμᾶν καὶ νομίζειν εἶναι· κακῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀδίκων τύχαι ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀληθείᾳ μὲν οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι σφόδρα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμμελῶς, ἄγουσί σε πρὸς ἀσέβειαν, ἔν τε μούσαις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμνούμεναι ἅμα καὶ ἐν παντοίοις λόγοις. Ἢ καὶ πρὸς τέλος ἴσως ἀνοσίους ἀνθρώπους ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας γηραιούς, παῖδας παίδων καταλιπόντας ἐν τιμαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις, ταράττῃ τανῦν (45), ὅταν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδὼν, ἢ δι᾽ ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος, ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτῶν τινι αὐτόπτης προστυχών, πολλῶν ἀσεβημάτων καὶ δεινῶν γενομένων τισί, δι᾿ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὁρᾷς ἐκ σμικρῶν εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀφικομένους, τότε διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα δῆλος εἶ μέμφεσθαι μὲν θεοὺς ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας τῶν τοιούτων διὰ ξυγγένειαν οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλων, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπό τε ἀλογίας ἅμα καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος δυσχεραίνειν θεοὺς, εἰς τοῦτο νῦν τὸ πάθος ἐλήλυθας, ὥστ᾽ εἶναι μὲν δοκεῖν αὐτοὺς, τῶν δ' ἀνθρωπίνων καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων. Ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἔλθῃ σοι πάθος πρὸς ἀσέβειαν τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν πως οἷον ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι λόγοις αὐτὸ προσιὸν τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον, ᾧ πρὸς τὸν παράπαν οὐχ ἡγούμενον θεοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διεπερανάμεθα, τούτῳ τανῦν προσχρήσασθαι. Σὺ δ᾽, ὦ Κλεινία τε καὶ Μέγιλλε, ὑπὲρ τοῦ νέου, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ἀποκρινόμενοι διαδέχεσθε. Ἐὰν δέ τι δύσκολον ἐγγίγνηται τοῖς λόγοις, ἐγὼ σφῶν, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ, δεξάμενος, διαβιβῶ τὸν ποταμόν. — Ὀρθῶς λέγεις, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ταῦτα δρᾶ, ποιήσομέν τε ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν, ἃ λέγεις. — Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲν τάχ᾽ ἂν ἴσως εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσι θεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τῷ μεγέθει διαφερόντων. Ἤκουον γάρ που, καὶ παρῆν τοῖς νῦν δὴ λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀγαθοί γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειοτάτην αὐτῶν οὖσαν κέκτηνται. — Καὶ σφόδρα γε ἐπήκουον. — Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν κοινῇ συνεξετάζωμεν, τίνα λέγοντες ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν, ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶνται. Φέρε, τὸ σωφρονεῖν νοῦν τε κεκτῆσθαι, φαμὲν ἀρετῆς τὰ δὲ ἐναντία, κακίας; — Φαμέν. — Τί δαί; ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ κακίας; — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. — Καὶ τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ τούτων, τὰ δὲ καλὰ φήσομεν; — Ἀνάγκη. — Καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ ὁπότα φλαῦρα, θεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἐροῦμεν; — Καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ὁμολογοῖ πᾶς ἄν. — Τί δαί; ἀμέλειάν τε, καὶ ἀργίαν, καὶ τρυφήν, εἰς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς θήσομεν; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; — Καὶ πῶς; ^C — Ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τοὐναντίον; — Ναί. — Τἀναντία ἆρα τούτοις εἰς τοὐναντίον; — Τοὐναντίον. — Τί οὖν; τρυφῶν, καὶ ἀμελής, ἀργός τε, ἂν ὁ ^D

ὁ ^A ποιητὴς (45) κηφῆσι κοθούροισι μάλιστα εἴκελον ἔφασκεν εἶναι, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος (46) πᾶσιν ἡμῖν; — Ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών. Οὐκοῦν τόν γε Θεὸν οὐ ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον, ὅ γέ τοι αὐτὸς μισεῖ· τῷ δέ τι τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι πειρωμένῳ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον. Οὐ μὲν δή· πῶς γὰρ ἄν; — Ὧ ^B δὴ προσήκει μὲν πράττειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διαφερόντως τινός· ὁ δὲ τούτου τοῦ γένους τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖται, τῶν σμικρῶν δὲ ἀμελεῖ, κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἐπαινοῦντες τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον, οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι πλημμελοῖμεν; Σκοπῶμεν δὲ ὧδε. Ἄρ' οὐ κατὰ δύο εἴδη τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττει ὁ πράττων, εἴτε Θεὸς εἴτε ἄνθρωπος; — Ποίῳ δὴ λέγομεν (47); — Ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ, ἀμελουμένων τῶν σμικρῶν, ἡ ῥᾳθυμία καὶ τρυφή, εἰ διαφέρει ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ· ἢ ἔστιν ἄλλως πως γιγνομένη ἀμέλεια; Οὐ γάρ που, ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον ᾖ τῶν πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων, μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ, ὧν ἂν δυνάμει Θεός, ἢ φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐλλιπής, καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται. — Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; — Νῦν δὴ δύο ὄντες τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθωσαν, οἱ θεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι, παραιτητοὺς δὲ ἕτερος, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖς τῶν σμικρῶν. Πρῶτον μὲν θεοὺς ἀμφότεροι φατε γινώσκειν, καὶ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ἀκούειν πάντα, λαθεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι τῶν ὁπόσων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. Ταύτῃ δέ γε λέγετε ἔχειν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς; — Οὕτως. — Τί δαί; δύνασθαι πάντα ὁπόσων αὖ δύναμίς ἐστι θνητοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις; — Πῶς γὰρ οὐ συγχωρήσονται καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; — Καὶ μὴν ἀγαθούς τε καὶ ἀρίστους ὡμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πέντε ὄντες. ^C — Σφόδρα γε. — Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μὲν καὶ τρυφῇ ἀδύνατον αὐτοὺς ὁμολογεῖν πράττειν ὁτιοῦν τὸ παράπαν, ὄντας γε οἵους λέγομεν; Δειλίας γὰρ ἔγγονος ἔν γε ἡμῖν ἀργία, ῥᾳθυμία δὲ ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς. — Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. — Ἀργίᾳ μὲν δὴ καὶ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ οὐδεὶς ἀμελεῖ θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ μέτεστιν αὐτῷ που δειλίας. — Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. — Οὐκοῦν τὸ λοιπὸν, εἴπερ ἀμελοῦσι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων τῶν περὶ τὸ πᾶν, ἢ γινώσκοντες, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, δρῷεν ἂν τοῦτο, ἢ τί τὸ λοιπὸν πλὴν τοῦ γινώσκειν τοὐναντίον; — Οὐδέν. — Πότερον οὖν, ὦ ἄριστε καὶ βέλτιστε, θῶμέν σε λέγοντα, ὡς ἀγνοοῦντάς τε, καὶ, δέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀμελοῦντας, ἢ γινώσκοντας ὅτι δεῖ (καθάπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγονται ποιεῖν, εἰδότες ἄλλα εἶναι βελτίω πράττειν, ὧν δὴ πράττουσι), διά τινας ἥττας ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν οὐ ποιεῖν; — Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; — Οὐκοῦν δὴ τά γε ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα τῆς τε ἐμψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα, καὶ θεοσεβέστατον αὐτό ἐστι πάντων ζώων ἄνθρωπος. — ^D Ἔοικε γοῦν. — Θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμεν εἶναι πάντα ὁπόσα θνητὰ ζῶα ἢ νοερά, ὧνπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.

ὅλον. ^A — Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — Ἤδη τοίνυν ἢ σμικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταῦτα εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς· οὐδ᾽ ἑτέρως γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς ἀμελεῖν ἂν εἴη προσῆκον, ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι καὶ ἀρίστοις. Σκοπῶμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις. — Τὸ ποῖον; — Περί τε αἰσθήσεως καὶ δυνάμεως· ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοιν πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ χαλεπότητα ἔστον πεφυκότε; — Πῶς λέγεις; — Ὁρᾷν μέν που καὶ ἀκούειν τὰ σμικρὰ χαλεπώτερον ἢ τὰ μεγάλα· φέρειν δὲ αὖ, καὶ κρατεῖν, καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων, παντὶ ῥᾷον ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων. — Καὶ πολύ γε. — Ἰατρῷ δὴ προστεταγμένον ὅλον τι θεραπεύειν βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ, τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελὲς ἔσται, τῶν μορίων δὲ καὶ σμικρῶν ἀμελές· εἶθ᾽ ἕξει ποτὲ καλῶς αὐτὸ τὸ πᾶν; — Οὐδαμῶς. — Οὐ μὴν οὐδέ γε κυβερνήταις, οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς, οὐδ᾽ οἰκονόμοις, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τισι πολιτικοῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενὶ χωρὶς τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ σμικρῶν, πολλὰ ἢ μεγάλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι. — Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; — Μὴ τοίνυν τὸν Θεὸν ἀξιώσωμέν ποτε θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἳ τὰ προσήκοντα αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσι, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα μιᾷ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται· τὸν δὲ Θεὸν ὄντα τε σοφώτατον, βουλόμενόν τε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ δυνάμενον, ὧν μὲν ῥᾷον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, σμικρῶν ὄντων, μηδαμῆ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἀργὸν ἢ δειλόν τινα διὰ πόνους ῥᾳθυμοῦντα, τῶν δὲ μεγάλων. — ^B Μηδαμῶς δόξαν τοιαύτην περὶ θεῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἀποδεχώμεθα· οὐδαμῇ γὰρ οὔτε ὅσιον, οὐτ᾽ ἀληθὲς τὸ διανόημα διανοοίμεθ᾽ ἄν. — Δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι νῦν ἤδη καὶ μεγάλα μετρίως διειλέχθαι τῷ φιλαιτίῳ τῆς ἀμελείας πέρι θεῶν; — Ναί. — Τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸν μὴ λέγειν ὀρθῶς. Ἐπιδῶν γε μὴν προσδεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ μύθων ἔτι τινῶν. — Ποίων, ὦ ἀγαθέ; — Πείσωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις, ὡς τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ᾽ ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα, ὧν καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστον τὸ προσῆκον πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. Τούτοις δέ εἰσιν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρότατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως, εἰς μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον τέλος ἀπειργασμένοι· ὧν ἂν καὶ τὸ σὸν, ὦ σχέτλιε, μόριον, εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει βλέπον ἀεὶ, καίπερ πάνσμικρον ὄν. ^C Σὲ δὲ λέληθε περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ, ὡς γένεσις ἕνεκα ἐκείνου γίνεται πᾶσα, ὅπως ᾖ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχουσα εὐδαίμων οὐσία, οὐχ ἕνεκα σοῦ γινομένη, σὺ δ᾽ ἕνεκα ἐκείνου. Πᾶς γὰρ ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημιουργὸς παντὸς μὲν ἕνεκα πάντα ἐργάζεται, πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυντείνων βέλτιστον, μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου, καὶ οὐχὶ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται.

ἀπεργάζεται. ^A You are indignant, unaware of how what concerns you is for the best, happening to the whole and to you according to the capacity of the common generation. And since the soul, always ordered with a body, now with one, now with another, undergoes every kind of change for its own sake or for the sake of another soul, no other work remains for the Player than to shift it—the soul that has become better in character to a better place, and the one that has become worse to a worse one—according to what is fitting for each, so that it may obtain the portion it deserves. — What do you mean? — I think I can explain it in the way that the leisure of the Providence of the God of all things would have it. For if one were to shape things while looking always at the whole, transforming everything (for instance, water from fire, [56] animate things), and not making many things out of one or one out of many, having shared in the first, second, or even third generation, it would be infinitely numerous, ^B of the changing order. But as things are, there is a marvelous ease for the One who cares for the whole. — How do you say it again? — Like this. Since our King saw that all our actions possess soul, and that there is much virtue in them, but also much vice; and that soul and body, if they were to become immortal, but not eternal—as are the gods according to the law (for there would never be a generation of animals if one of these were lost)—and that it is natural for the good to benefit the soul, and for the bad to harm it [58]; having seen all these things, He devised where each of the parts might be laid so that, in the whole, the prevailing virtue and the defeated vice might be exhibited as easily and as excellently as possible. He has indeed devised for all this, to what sort a thing is always becoming, what seat it must take upon settling, and what places; but as for the generation of the "what sort," He has left the causes to the wills of each of us. For in whatever way one desires, and being of such a sort in soul, in that way, and as such, each of us mostly becomes. — That is indeed likely. ^C Everything that is partaker of soul undergoes change, possessing within itself the cause of change; but when they change, they are carried according to the order and law of destiny, changing their characters less, [59] moving according to the plane of the region. But those that become more and more unjust fall into the depths, those places called "the lower," such as Hades and the names associated with them, which they who are living fear greatly and dream of, and when they are dissolved from their bodies. When a soul [60] changes more in vice or virtue, by its own will and by the association that has become strong—when, upon mingling with divine virtue, it becomes remarkably such as these—it changes ^D and is transformed. Our King knows that all actions are ensouled, and that they possess as much vice as they do virtue; likewise, regarding soul and body, that while they have no pestilence from themselves, they nonetheless are lacking in immortality.

^A And so, being transported to a better place, it changes its entire holy station; but when contraries shift to contraries, it changes its life. This, O boy and young man, is the justice of the gods who inhabit Olympus: that one who seems to be neglected by the gods—becoming worse, he goes to worse souls; becoming better, he goes toward those who are better—in life and in every death, is to suffer and to do what is fitting for those who are akin to their likes. Neither you, nor any other who has become unfortunate, will ever pray to prevail over this justice of the gods, which those who ordained it have set above all other judgments, and which it is altogether necessary to avoid. For you will never be neglected by it; you will not be so small that you will sink to the depths of the earth, nor will you be so exalted that you will fly up into heaven; rather, you will pay the fitting penalty to yourself, whether you remain here, or travel to Hades, or be transported to a place even more holy than these. The same argument applies to you also regarding those whom you, having observed them becoming great from small beginnings, having committed impious acts or something similar, have thought to have become happy from wretched ones, and as in a mirror you thought you had seen in their actions the neglect of all the gods, not knowing their final state, nor where it contributes to the whole. But to understand it, O most courageous of all men, you think is for nothing; and if someone does not know it, they would never see a pattern, nor would they be able to contribute an argument regarding life, concerning happiness and unfortunate lot. If these things persuade you, Cleinias, and this entire council of ours, regarding the gods that you do not know what you are saying, may God himself rightfully assist you; but if you are still in need of words, listen to us speaking to the third party, if you have any understanding at all. ^B The deeper meaning of these things, if not the very words, has been laid down in the Hebrew oracles, most concisely and within a few expressions covering the intellect. For the statement: "You will not be so small that you will sink to the depths of the earth, nor will you be so exalted that you will fly up into heaven," is similar to that which is found in David, having this manner: "Where shall I go from your Spirit, and from your face where shall I flee? If I go up to heaven, you are there; if I go down to Hades, you are present. If I take my wings and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there your hand shall lead me." ^C And also this: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the work of his hands." And again in Isaiah: "Lift up your eyes to the heights, and see who has shown all these things." And this: "From the greatness and beauty of created things, the Creator is known proportionately." And this: "For his invisible attributes, from the creation of the world, are perceived and understood by his works, even his eternal power and divinity." ^D And also the passage: "I was jealous..."

seeing the peace of sinners upon the ungodly.” ^A This same thing, you should conclude, must also be determined concerning those whom you considered to have become happy from wretched estates, having seen them emerge from small to great, after some grievous instance of impiety or other crime; and in whose misdeeds you seemed to see, as in a mirror, how all things are neglected by the gods, being ignorant, forsooth, of how or in what part the end and outcome of these people is connected with the reasons of the universe. Furthermore, that person, most noble sir, whom you can knowingly and willingly neglect, is nevertheless such that one who is unprepared in his knowledge can never conceive anything in his mind, nor institute any disputation concerning human life, whether of happiness or misery. If this Clinias here could persuade you of the gods, and this senate of ours, you would receive a singular benefit from God Himself, not knowing yourself what you are saying. But if you have need of a longer speech, come then, and attend to us as we discourse on that third point, if you have any mind at all.” ^B Such is Plato. Their meaning, if not the very words themselves, existed long before in the writings of the Hebrews, but the sentiment was comprised in very brief and few words. For that saying, “Nor shall you become so small that you can withdraw yourself from his eyes into the hidden folds and recesses of the earth; nor, indeed, so sublime that you can fly up into heaven,” is very close to this statement of David: “Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me.” ^C Then follows this from the same prophet: “The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth his handywork.” Likewise that of Isaiah: “Lift up your eyes on high, and behold, who hath created these things.” And this: “For by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionably the maker of them is seen.” And this: “For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.” Finally, this: “I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked.” ^D All these things Plato seems to have interpreted when he says, “This same thing must be determined concerning those whom you considered to have become happy from wretched estates, having seen them emerge from small to great, after some grievous instance of impiety or other crime.” And the rest that are said to the same effect occupied that more extensive explanation of Plato in the monuments of the Hebrews. If you weigh each of these things accurately and diligently, you will find them to agree with the doctrine of the Hebrews. By the name of Hebrew books, I do not understand only the oracles of Moses, but also those of the others who wrote after him, men most beloved of God, whether they were prophets or even the apostles of our Savior, to whom, because of the total agreement of their dogmas, one and the same appellation is justly attributed.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL BOOK THIRTEEN

PREPARATIO EVANGELICA BOOK THIRTEEN

CONTENTS OF BOOK THIRTEEN

1. How Plato refuted the absurdity of Greek theology. From the Timaeus.

^A 2. From the same work, also from the Epinomis concerning the same. 3. From the second book of the Republic, concerning the same, and that God is not the author of evil. 4. That the accounts concerning the Greek gods contain nothing more than shameful myths, because of which the Athenians killed Socrates for not believing them. From the Euthyphro. 5. From Numenius, out of the secret doctrines of Plato, concerning the same. 6. That one should not pay heed to the opinions of the many, nor change one's own chosen course for fear of death. ^B From the Crito. 7. That one must not return injury upon those who have prepared to do us injustice. From the same. 8. That one must not abandon what has once been rightly judged, even if someone imposes death. This will be appropriate for those who renounce their piety in times of persecution. 9. Of what sort one will be in disposition who renounces his own purpose for fear of death. 10. That one must not flee from death on behalf of the truth. From the Apology of Socrates. 11. How one ought to honor the death of those who have departed this life with glory; from Plato. 12. How also Aristobulus the Peripatetic, who lived before us, admits from the philosophy of the Hebrews that the Greeks drew their inspiration. 13. As also Clement similarly shows that the things well spoken by the Greeks happen to be in agreement with the doctrines of the Hebrews. ^C From the fifth Stromateis. 14. That not everything was spoken successfully by Plato; for which reason we have not foolishly abandoned his philosophy, but rather embrace the oracles of the Hebrews. 15. That Plato did not discourse at all rightly concerning intelligible substances, but the Hebrews did. 16. That Plato did not at all think rightly concerning the soul in the same way as the Hebrews. 17. That according to Plato, the nature of the soul is not composed of an impassible and a passible substance. From the work on the soul by Severus the Platonist. 18. Concerning the heaven and the luminaries within it, that Plato did not think at all rightly. From the Epinomis, and the Timaeus, and the tenth book of the Laws. Which things Moses forbids to be worshipped, as also the Hebrew Philo interprets. 19. What sort of ordinances Plato made concerning women, not rightly. 20. What sort of ordinances he himself made in the Phaedrus concerning unrestrained love, to which Moses enacts contrary laws. 21. Concerning the murderous laws of Plato, which are not worthy of his greatness, with which the laws of Moses are to be compared. ^D

PROEMIUM

^A it would be more fitting for us, being Greeks, to follow the Greek than the barbarian. But, hesitating to confront this, out of deference to the philosopher, I defer this discussion to a later time; but I shall first examine those things which I have previously said. Take then and read what sort of opinion Plato held regarding the Greek theologians and poets, and how he rejected all the ancestral beliefs concerning the gods and exposed their absurdity.

CAPUT I.

How Plato exposed the absurdity of Greek theology. From the Timaeus.

^B “But to speak of the other demons, and to know their generation, is a task greater than our power. We must believe those who have spoken before us, who since they were offspring of the gods, as they themselves said, clearly must have known their own ancestors. It is impossible, therefore, to disbelieve the sons of the gods, even though they speak without probable and necessary demonstrations; but since they claim to report their own family affairs, we must follow the law and believe them. Thus, then, let our generation concerning these gods be according to them, and let it be stated thus: Children of Earth and Heaven were Oceanus and Tethys; and of these were Phorcys, Saturn, and Ops, and all who were after them; and from Saturn and Ops, ^C Jupiter, Juno, and all those whom we know as their brothers, and furthermore their other descendants.”

In thus exhorting us to believe the myths concerning the gods, and the poets who composed those myths themselves, as being descendants of the gods, it seems to me that he first mocks the poets by calling them descendants of the gods, implying that the gods were once human and had a nature similar to their descendants. But next, he openly disparages the very theologians whom he had said were descendants of the gods, by the words he adds, saying, “Though they speak without probable and necessary demonstrations,” and by the phrase he adds, “as they said.” And he seems to be playing when he says, “Clearly knowing their own ancestors,” and, “It is impossible to disbelieve the sons of the gods.” And he clearly ^D shows that he is stating these things contrary to his own opinion for the sake of the laws, having admitted that it is necessary to believe them by following the law. But that this was his meaning, listen to how, with a plain and uncovered voice, he disparages all the aforementioned theologians, striking at them in the *Epinomis* with these words...

^A “It is necessary, therefore, for me first to describe the generation of the gods and living beings—a subject on which those before me have theorized poorly—in a better way, according to the latter discourse, having taken up the argument which I have initiated against the impious.”

That he reasonably rejects the theology of the ancients, he teaches in the second book of the *Republic*, where it is worth turning one’s attention to how many and what kind of things he sets forth concerning these same poets and those theologians who have handed down to us from olden times the matters concerning the Greek gods, speaking in these very words:

CHAPTER III.

“In the greater myths,” I said, “we shall perceive the lesser ones also; for there must be one and the same character, and the same power, for both the greater and the lesser, or do you not think so?”

“Yes,” he said; “but I do not understand what you call the greater ones.”

“Those,” said I, “which Hesiod and Homer, and the other poets relate to us. For they, having composed false stories for mankind, both in the past narrated them and do so today.”

“Which, then,” he asked, “and what is it in them that you censure?”

“That which is first and most of all to be censured, especially when someone does not lie correctly.”

“What is that, further?”

^C “When someone represents the nature of the gods and heroes badly in his discourse, just as a painter might do who paints a picture that is in no way like the subject which he had undertaken to express with his brush.”

“These,” he said, “are indeed most worthy of censure; but explain those things more clearly and distinctly, if you please.”

“I will: First, I say, that greatest and most momentous lie regarding the most important matters—the one narrated by Hesiod, about what was done by Heaven, and what vengeance Saturn in turn took upon him—is entirely falsely constructed. Moreover, the deeds which this same Saturn performed, or suffered at the hands of his son, even if they were true, would not seem to me to be such as to be easily and rashly bandied about ^D before foolish men or youths; but rather, they should, in the first place, be kept altogether silent. If there were some necessity to disclose them, they should be heard in secret by the fewest possible people, having sacrificed not a pig, but some great and rare offering, so that the number of those who have heard them might be as small as possible.”

“And indeed,” he said, “these stories are harsh.”

“And they are not, Adeimantus,” I said, “to be told in our city.”

^A Nor should it be told to a young listener that he would be doing nothing strange if he were to commit the most extreme crimes, nor even if he were to punish a father for wrongdoing in every way, but would be doing exactly what the first and greatest of the gods do. “By Zeus,” he said, “this does not seem suitable to me to say, even to myself.” Nor, said I, [should it be said] at all, that gods wage war against gods, and plot, and fight—for it is not even true—if indeed those who are to guard our city for us must consider it the most shameful thing to be easily at odds with one another; and far less should we tell them myth-tales of the battles of giants, or embroider them, and many other diverse enmities of gods and heroes against their own kin and relatives. But if we are in any way to persuade them that no citizen has ever been at enmity with another, and that this is not holy, such things should rather be told to children from the start, and to old men and women, and to those as they become elders, and the poets must be forced to compose poems close to these. But Hera’s bonds by her son, and the casting of Hephaestus by his father when he was about to defend his mother who was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods that Homer has composed, must not be admitted into the city, whether they have been composed with allegories or without allegories. For the young man is not able to judge what is an allegory and what is not; but whatever opinions he takes in his own mind at such an age are wont to become unerasable and unchangeable. On this account, perhaps, we must see to it that the first things they hear, as being most beautifully told, are told with a view toward virtue. ^B “That,” he said, “is reasonable. But if someone should ask us again, what these are, and what the myths are, what should we say?” And I said: “O Adeimantus, you and I are not poets at the present time, but founders of a city. But for founders, it is fitting to know the patterns in which poets must compose their myths, and within the boundaries of which they must not be allowed to deviate; but they themselves do not have to compose the myths.” “Right,” he said; “but this very thing, what would the patterns of theology be?” “Something like these, I said, as to how God happens to be, he must always be represented, whether someone composes him in epic, or in lyric verse, or in tragedy.” “For he is.” “And indeed, God is truly good, and he must be spoken of as such.” “Why should he not be?” “But nothing good is harmful, is it?” “It is not.” “Does that which is not harmful bring harm?” “By no means.” “And does that which does not bring harm do any evil?” “Not that either.” “And that which does no evil could not be the cause of any evil.” “How could it?” “What then? Is the good beneficial?” “Yes.” “It is, therefore, the cause of success.” “Yes.” “It is not, therefore, the cause of all things, but it is the cause of things that go well, but it is the cause of no evil.” “Entirely so,” he said. ^C “Neither then,” said I, “could God, since he is good, be the cause of all things, as most people say; but he is the cause of a few things for men, and the cause of no things for many. For the good things are far fewer for us than the evil ones. And for the good things, no other must be held responsible, but for the evil ones, we must seek for other causes, but not God.” “You seem to me,” he said, “to speak most truly.” “Neither then,” said I, “is this sin to be accepted, whether from Homer or any other poet, of one who foolishly sins and speaks thus about the gods.” ^D