Preparation for the Gospel

^A Greeks. Thales’ student was Anaximander, the son of Praxiades, also a Milesian by birth. He was the first to construct gnomons for discerning the solstices, the seasons, the hours, and the equinox. Anaximander’s acquaintance was Anaximenes, the son of Eurystratus, a Milesian; and Anaxagoras, the son of Hegesibulus, a Clazomenian, was the student of this man. He was the first to clearly and explicitly articulate the doctrine of primary principles. For he did not merely discourse on the substance of all things, as those before him, but also on the cause that moves them. “For the world in the beginning,” he says, “was a confused mass; but Intellect, having entered, brought them out of disorder into order.” There were three students of Anaxagoras: Pericles, Archelaus, and Euripides. Now Pericles was foremost among the Athenians, surpassing all his peers in both wealth and nobility. Euripides, having turned to poetry, was even called by some a “theatrical philosopher.” Archelaus, finally, succeeded to Anaxagoras’ school at Lampsacus. Then, upon moving to Athens, he sustained the same office and duty of teaching there, and had very many Athenians as students, among whom was Socrates. ^B During the same time as Anaxagoras, the natural philosophers Xenophanes and Pythagoras flourished. Pythagoras was succeeded by his wife Theano and his sons, Telauges and Mnesarchus. Empedocles became a student of Telauges, in whose time Heraclitus the Obscure was known. It is said that Parmenides succeeded Xenophanes, Melissus succeeded Parmenides, and Zeno the Eleatic succeeded Melissus. It is told of this Zeno that, having been apprehended as the leader and instigator of a conspiracy against the tyrant of that time, when he was being tortured by the tyrant to betray his fellow conspirators, he showed complete contempt for the tyrant’s torments as if they were of no concern to him; he bit through his own tongue and spat it at him, and thus in the midst of his torments died with the greatest constancy. Leucippus was a student of his, Democritus was the student of Leucippus, and Protagoras, in whose time Socrates flourished, was his student. And one can find other natural philosophers scattered about who lived before Socrates; but all of them, beginning from Thales, appear to have flourished after Cyrus, the king of the Persians. ^C It is clear that Cyrus lived long after the captivity of the Jewish nation in Babylon, since the prophets among the Hebrews had already ceased, and their holy metropolis had been besieged; so that you must acknowledge that the philosophies of the Greeks—and especially that of Plato—are much later than Moses and the prophets who came after him. Plato, having first been a student of Socrates, and having subsequently conversed with the Pythagoreans, surpassed everyone before him in discourse, intelligence, and philosophical doctrines. Plato lived toward the end of the Persian empire, a little before Alexander of Macedon, and no less than five hundred years before Augustus the Emperor. If, therefore, Plato and those after him are shown to have philosophized in agreement with the Hebrews, it is time to examine the period in which he lived, and the instruction of the theologians and prophets among the Hebrews. ^D

to measure their age against that of all the Greek philosophers. But since these things have been demonstrated, it is time for us to turn back and look at the Greek sages who became followers of the Hebrew doctrines; so that our detractors might no longer reasonably find fault with us if we ourselves, having learned to love things similar to those of their philosophers, have resolved to honor the oracles of the Hebrews. ^A Since it is established that [Plato] lived after Cyrus, king of the Persians, and it is evident that Cyrus lived many years after the Hebrews were carried away to Babylon, at a time when the prophets had already ceased to exist among the Hebrews and their sacred metropolis had been captured. It remains, therefore, for you to admit that the philosophy of the Greeks, and especially that of Plato—who, having first been a hearer of Socrates and then having applied himself to the Pythagoreans, surpassed all his predecessors by a long interval in eloquence, wisdom, and his method of philosophizing—is much younger than Moses and the prophets who came after him. For he flourished towards the end of the Persian empire, a little before Alexander of Macedon, and not much more than four hundred years before Augustus. If, therefore, it is established that Plato and those who followed him sometimes philosophized in the same way as the Hebrews themselves, then it will be worth the effort to consider the time in which he lived, and thus to compare that antiquity of the Hebrews—whether we call them theologians or prophets—with the age of all the Greek philosophers. But since we have once completed this demonstration, it is indeed time for us to return and look more closely at those Greek sages, the emulators of Hebrew dogmas, so that importunate calumniators may henceforth have nothing by which to blame and reproach us on the grounds that we have decided to embrace and highly value those decrees of the Hebrews which are so akin to the tenets of their philosophers.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL: BOOK ELEVEN

CHAPTERS OF THE ELEVENTH BOOK

1. That the philosophy according to Plato follows that of the Hebrews in the most essential points. 2. On the tripartite philosophy according to Plato, from [Atticus]. 3. On the philosophy according to Plato, from Aristotle. 4. On the moral teaching among the Hebrews. 5. On the philosophy of the Hebrews in discussion. 6. On the correctness of the imposition of names among the Hebrews. 7. On the physiology among the Hebrews. 8. On the physiology of intelligible things. 9. On the Existent, from the doctrine of Moses and Plato. 10. On the same, from Numenius the Pythagorean. 11. From the treatise of Plutarch, entitled, On the EI at Delphi. ^C 12. That the Divine cannot be expressed in words. 13. That God is one alone. 14. On the second cause, of the Hebrews and Plato. 15. From Philo, on the second cause. 16. From Plato, on the second cause. 17. From Plotinus, on the same. 18. From Numenius, on the same. 19. From the theology of Amelius appearing among us, of the evangelist [John]. 20. On the three primary substances. 21. On the essence of the Good. 22. From Numenius, on the Good. 23. On the ideas according to Plato.

24. From Philo, On the ideas according to Moses. 25. From Clement, on the same. 26. On the opposing powers, of the Hebrews and Plato. 27. On the immortality of the soul, of the Hebrews and Plato. 28. From Porphyry, on the same. 29. That the world was created. 30. On the luminaries in the heavens. 31. That all the works of God are good. 32. On the alteration and change of the world. 33. On the resurrection of the dead, from the same. 34. On the end of the world. 35. That Plato also records that the dead have been raised, similarly to the Hebrew accounts. 36. From Plutarch, on the same. 37. On how Plato also discourses on what is called the heavenly earth, ^B similarly to the Hebrews. 38. On how Plato also believes that the judgment after death will be, similarly to the Hebrews.

PROEMIUM TO THE UNDERTAKEN ARGUMENT

The preceding tenth book of the Evangelical Preparation, not now by my own words but by the very testimonies of the Gentiles themselves, made it clear how likely it is that the Greeks, apart from merely their power and elegance in speaking, produced nothing wise or learned from their own resources, but rather stole everything from the barbarians. Indeed, it has shown that they were not even ignorant of the Hebrew oracles, but rather touched upon them at least in part; for even in the works of their own people, written with such great ambition, they could not keep their hands pure and free from all theft. For that they were thieves, as I already said, I demonstrated not by my own voice, but by their own. Furthermore, just how young they are in both intelligence and age, and how widely they are separated from that Hebrew antiquity, we learned in that same book from the comparison of time between them. These were, in fact, the two parts of the previous book. But now, the one we have in hand aims to fulfill the promise we made—a sort of debt—and to reveal the agreement, if not in all, then certainly in some of the doctrinal teachings of the Greek philosophers with the Hebrew oracles. But passing over others as less necessary in this place, it will summon the coryphaeus of all, Plato, whom alone it considers should be used as a rule for the argument in place of all others. Since he alone seems, by his reputation, to have surpassed everyone, we believe he will be sufficient for us to establish the matter under investigation. And if anywhere it should be necessary to illustrate the man’s thought, I will also ^C bring forward the testimonies of those who have adhered to the principles of his own philosophy, producing their very own words for the greater faith and certainty of the proposed argument. But if some things were rightly stated by the man, I would still have it observed and kept in mind, that he did not always philosophize correctly in all things, as the case required. This we will also demonstrate in its own place, not with a spirit of condemning the man, but for the sake of defending our own purpose, in that we confess the barbarian philosophy to be superior to the Greek. ^D

CHAPTER I. That the philosophy according to Plato coincides with that of the Hebrews in the things that are most necessary.

^A Since Plato divides the whole account of philosophy into three parts—the natural, the ethical, and the logical—and again divides the natural into the contemplation of sensible objects and the understanding of incorporeal things; you would find this tripartite division of teaching also among the Hebrews, in that the same things were philosophized by them even before Plato was born. But it is worth hearing [what is said] by Plato first, and then in this way to examine [what is said] by the Hebrews. I shall set forth the tenets of Plato from those who advocate his views, of whom Atticus, an illustrious man among the Platonic philosophers, sets forth the opinions of that man in this way, in the passages where he stands against those who claim to maintain the philosophy of Plato by means of the doctrine of Aristotle.

CHAPTER II. On the tripartite philosophy of Plato, from Atticus.

^B "Since, therefore," he says, "the complete and perfect philosophy is divided into three parts—that is, into the doctrine of manners, of nature, and of discourse; the first of which not only makes each of us good and virtuous, but also fashions whole families to the most chaste way of life, and prepares the entire populace with an excellent form of state and most accurate laws; the second, however, pertains to the knowledge of divine matters, so that it contemplates both those primary and causal factors and all the rest that come into being from them, which Plato has called the history of nature; and the third, finally, is assumed for the more certain discussion and discovery of both of the former—that Plato was the first to gather into one all the parts of philosophy, previously scattered and dispersed, like the limbs of Pentheus, as someone has said, and displayed philosophy as a complete body and a living creature, is manifest to all. ^C For neither are those surrounding Thales, and Anaximenes, and Anaxagoras, and all who have lived in the same time as these, unknown to have spent their time solely on the investigation of the nature of existing things; nor, again, are Pittacus, and Periander, and Solon, and Lycurgus, and those similar to them, unknown to any for having cast their own philosophy into the care of the state; ^D and Zeno, and that entire Eleatic school, surely everyone knows that they applied themselves especially to the art of discourse. But Plato, succeeding these men, a man complete in all parts and respects by nature, and excelling the rest by far—as if sent truly as a gift and present from the gods, in order that through him the complete philosophy might at last be seen—left nothing out, and he brought each point to its own maturity so that he neither omitted anything necessary, nor strayed toward anything useless. Since, therefore, we have said that all these things belong to the Platonic [philosophy]—both that it discourses on nature, and speaks on manners, and engages one in dialectic—come, let us examine each point." These are the words of Atticus.

To these is added the testimony of the Peripatetic Aristocles, who in the seventh book of his work *On Nature* speaks in the following explicit terms:

CHAPTER III. On the Platonic Philosophy, from Aristocles.

"Plato," he says, "possessed a genuine and perfect method of philosophizing, if anyone else ever did. For the followers of Thales spent their time entirely in the study of nature; the Pythagoreans shrouded everything in mystery; while Xenophanes and his disciples, by stirring up eristic arguments, caused a great deal of vertigo among philosophers, but afforded them no help or assistance. Socrates, in particular, added fire to fire, as the saying goes, even as Plato himself insisted. For endowed with a singular genius, and being remarkably adept at raising questions about absolutely anything, he ^A introduced both ethical and political inquiries, and was, furthermore, the first to attempt to define the theory of Forms; yet, as he was raising every sort of argument and inquiring into all things, death overtook him. Others, having cut off certain parts [of philosophy] for themselves, remained occupied with those alone: some pursued medicine, others the mathematical sciences, and some poetry and music. Most, however, were enthralled by the power and faculty of speech, and some of these called themselves rhetoricians, others dialecticians. ^B Yet those who succeeded Socrates became very diverse and even diametrically opposed in their opinions. For some lauded the Cynic and squalid way of life, and a soul simple and void of all sense of disturbance; others, on the contrary, preached pleasures. The former boasted of knowing everything; the latter, absolutely nothing. Some spent their time in the middle of the crowd and before the eyes of all, constantly with the lowest of the rabble; others could be approached or spoken to by no one.

Plato, however, understanding that there is one and the same science of divine and human things, ^C was the first to partition it, assigning one part to the task of explaining the nature of the universe, a second to the handling of human affairs, and a third and final part to the ordering of discourse. He maintained that we could not possibly discern human affairs unless divine things were first perceived and known. For just as physicians, in order to treat certain parts, first apply themselves to the healing of the whole body, so he thought that he who would observe our own condition must first know the nature of the universe; since man is a part of it, and of two goods—of which one pertains to us, the other to the universe—the good of the universe is the primary one, because the other is produced for its sake. ^D And Aristoxenus the musician testifies that this is the doctrine of the Indians; for he says that one of them met Socrates at Athens and inquired of him what he was occupied with in his philosophy, and when Socrates replied that he was inquiring into human life, the Indian laughed, saying that no one could discern human affairs if he were ignorant of things divine. Whether this is true, one cannot assert with absolute certainty. In any case, Plato divided philosophy into the study of the universe, politics, and logic. Such being the

^A Platonic method of philosophy, it is time for us to contemplate the philosophy of the Hebrews as well, who surely, long before Plato was born, possessed a very similar way of philosophizing. For you will find among them a tripartite division of disciplines, corresponding to that of the Platonists, whether related to morals, or to the power of reasoning, or to nature itself, if you wish to consider the matter in this way.

CHAPTER IV. Concerning the discipline of morals among the Hebrews.

^B Now, as for the moral teachings, which were most excellent of all, they were studied by them with great zeal, and much more in practice than in words, as you would learn if you were to examine the lives of those men. Since they held that the end of all goods and the ultimate goal of the blessed life is piety, and that friendship with God is attained and pursued through the perfection of one's morals—not through the pleasure of the body, as Epicurus held, nor the triple classification of goods according to Aristotle, who valued the goods of the body and external things equally with the goods of the soul—nor did they succumb to that ultimate ignorance and lack of learning which some have masked under the more honorable name of "suspension of judgment." ^C Nor did they focus merely on the virtue of the soul itself: for how great could that be among men, or what could it possibly accomplish by itself, if you were to set God aside, in rendering life free from trouble? Wherefore, having suspended all things from the hope in God as from a strong cable, they declared that only the man who is dear to God is happy. For since God is the steward of all good things, the provider of life, and the very source of virtue, as well as the dispenser of all bodily and external goods, He alone suffices for the blessed life to one who has entered into friendship with Him through true and genuine piety. ^D Whence the all-wise Moses, who was the first of all to record in writing the life of those Hebrews who before his time had been partakers of this friendship with God, assumed a historical mode of exposition to set forth not only a form of government, but a form of life. Beginning from general principles, he framed his instruction by positing God as the cause of all things, and describing the creation of the world and the birth of mankind. Then, proceeding from the general to the particular, and by the memory of the ancients urging his readers and hearers to emulate their virtue and piety, he himself, appearing as the authoritative framer of the holy laws which he established, clearly showed how he had provided for the care of a God-loving way of life through the discipline of morals—a point which our discourse has already made manifest in what preceded. It would be a long task to recount here the prophets who followed Moses, those whose words encourage virtue and dissuade from all vice. What if I should bring forward for you the moral teachings of the all-wise Solomon? To whom he dedicated a work of his own words, naming it Proverbs, as a compendium of gnomic...

^A utterances. By this, the Hebrew youth were trained in the moral way from of old, even before the Greeks had learned their first elements, and they shared this same training liberally with all who approached them.

Chapter V. On the dialectical philosophy of the Hebrews.

Now, as for that part of philosophy which concerns the method of dialectic, they did not think it ought to be cultivated by tortuous sophisms and deceptive syllogisms, as is the custom of the Greeks, but rather through a zeal for grasping the truth; ^B to which, indeed, those among them who professed divine wisdom, having their souls illuminated by a more divine light of understanding, happily aspired. In order to sharpen the minds of those whom they undertook to imbue with their teachings so that they might grasp it, they instilled in them from their earliest tender years sacred sentences and histories full of gravity and honesty, along with modulated and alternating songs comprehended by a certain law of numbers, as well as problems and enigmas ^C and certain learned questions wrapped in allegories, combined with elegance of words and a sweetness of diction appropriate to the character of their language. Moreover, they had certain 'seconders' of the primary disciplines (for thus were they accustomed to call the interpreters of their letters), who would open up by a clearer explanation those things shadowed in enigmas, not indeed to the common crowd promiscuously, but to those who were judged fit for their understanding. The most wise Solomon among them clearly followed this, and from this fact he made the beginning of his work of Proverbs, ^D testifying that he was brought to this genre of writing for almost this very reason, when he says in eloquent and set words: "That every man may know wisdom and discipline, and understand the words of prudence: to take up the sophistries of speech, and to understand true justice, and to direct judgment. That he may give to the innocent acuteness, and to the young man sense and intelligence. For the wise person, hearing these things, shall be wiser; and the understanding person shall possess helms, and shall understand the parable, and the dark saying, the words of the wise, and their enigmas." Since the promises of this work are of such a kind: then, too, anyone who would only take the books containing the monuments of his speech and scroll through and read them at leisure will be able to observe the individual propositions of what has been said, and their solutions, and finally that art of dialectic, congruent with the wisdom and language of those men, which exists everywhere in all their prophetic letters. Furthermore, if anyone by chance has an honest desire for the language itself

he will surely acknowledge them to be men most skilled in dialectic among the barbarian race, who yield nothing either to the sophists or the orators in the force and reason of their own language. They also possess their own works composed in verse, such as that great song of Moses, and the hundred and eighteenth Psalm of David, both of which are contained in that style of verse which the Greeks call heroic, since they say both consist of hexameters of sixteen syllables. The other kinds of poems among them consist of trimeters and tetrameters, fashioned according to the propriety of their own tongue. And indeed they have a manner of speech that embodies the force and cleverness of dialectic. For as to those things that pertain to the sense and meaning, it would be wrong to compare them with men: since they embrace the oracles of God and truth itself expressed in those words, as well as divine responses and prophecies, along with disciplines that school one in piety, and precepts that look toward knowing the nature of things. Moreover, one may judge how much they excel in the mature faculty of discourse from the correct imposition of names among them, to which topic Plato also adds his own suffrage, agreeing with the opinion of the Hebrews and consenting to their philosophy openly and clearly, as will be easily understood from the following.

CHAPTER VI

Of the correct imposition of names among the Hebrews.

^A Having said these things, after a great deal more, he again brings up the mention of barbarians, and then he explicitly confesses that many of the names came to the Greeks from the barbarians, saying in these precise terms: "I suspect that the Greeks, especially those who lived under the rule of barbarians, have received many of their names from the barbarians. What then? If anyone were to seek whether these things are situated fittingly according to the Greek language, and not according to that from which the name happens to be derived, you know that he would be at a loss." Quite so. ^B Such are the words of Plato. But Moses anticipates him, being, as he was, an exceedingly wise lawgiver and at the same time a dialectician; hear what he says: "And God formed out of the earth all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the sky, and brought them to Adam to see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called any living soul, this was its name." For by saying, "this was its name," what else does he indicate than that their appellations were established according to nature? For he says that what was just now called by that name was already contained in nature long before, and that this name was present and pre-existed for each of those things named, which the man being depicted here, by a superior power, put upon them. ^C And the very name Adam, which is a Hebrew name, would be, in the account of Moses, a surname for the earth-born man, because among the Hebrews, "Adam" is called "the earth"; whence the first earth-born man was aptly named Adam by Moses. The appellation might also have another meaning, if transferred to "the red" [earth], and representing the nature of the body. But he signified the earthy, and earthen, and earth-born, or the bodily and fleshly man, by the name of Adam. The children of the Hebrews also call man by another name, terming him Enos, whom they say is the rational [element] in us, being different in nature from the earthy Adam. ^D Enos also contains a meaning of its own, which is forgotten when translated into the Greek tongue. Such then is the nature of what is in us. Unless, perhaps, just as the tragedians, whenever they are at a loss, take refuge in the machines by bringing in gods, we too, by saying this, get away by asserting that the gods established the first names. Is this, then, the strongest of the arguments for us? Or is it the one that we have received them from certain barbarians? (But the barbarians are older than us.) Or [that it is the argument] that it is impossible to investigate them because of their antiquity? For these would all be excuses, and very clever ones, for someone who does not wish to provide an account regarding the first names, as to how they are rightly established.

^A For it is possible that there is another rationale for this name, as if it were derived from a "red" color, representing the nature of the body. But regarding man, the Hebrews signify him specifically with the name "Adam," as one who is earthly and fashioned from the earth, or indeed compounded of body and flesh. But when they wish to name man properly, they are accustomed to use the word "Enos," by which that human of ours, endued with reason and separated by nature from the earthly Adam, is expressed. This "Enos" also has a unique quality, in that the Greek language signifies "forgetful." For indeed, this usage applies to that part of us which has reason conjoined to it, on account of its association with what is mortal and devoid of reason. For that which is completely pure, which is without body, which is divine and endowed with reason, embraces not only the memory of things past, but also the knowledge of things to come, on account of its supreme power of contemplation. But that which is immersed in the flesh as in mud, which is compacted of bones and nervures, which is oppressed by the imposition of the body as if by a great weight—inasmuch as the Hebrew understood such a being to labor under much forgetfulness and ignorance, he called him "Enos," a name quite fitting and signifying forgetfulness. And indeed we read in a certain prophet: "What is man, that you are mindful of him? Or the son of man, that you visit him?" At which point the Hebrew tongue has used the word "Enos" for that first naming of man; as if it said more clearly: "What is this forgetful creature, that you, O God, are mindful of him, even though he is forgetful?" But as for what is added, "or the son of man, that you visit him," the Hebrews read: "or the son of Adam." ^B Thus, since either word signifies one and the same person, the bodily man is designated by the name of Adam, while the man endued with reason is designated by "Enos." And in this way they distinguish the etymology of both words according to Hebrew letters.

But indeed, Plato contends that in the Greek tongue, man is named from contemplating: "For man," he says, "as soon as he has seen something—which the Greeks call *opope*—he contemplates that very thing he has seen, and reflects upon it himself, so that he is called *anthropos*, as if contemplating (*anathron*) what he has seen." Furthermore, the Hebrews call a man *is*. This name is derived for them from *es*, by which they signify "fire," so that the man is named from the hot and igneous nature of the male. And the woman, since it is said that she was taken from the man, also shares in that name; for the woman is called *issa* among them, just as the man is called *is*. But Plato, when he defends the view that *aner* (man) is so named from the "upward flow," then adds: "But woman seems to me to be called *gone* (offspring, or fetus)." ^C Again, Moses truly and properly calls the heaven "firmament" in the Hebrew tongue, as it is the first thing after the incorporeal and intellectual substance to be the solid and perceptible body of this world. And Plato says that the name "heaven" (*ouranos*) is rightly bestowed upon it, because it causes one to "look upward" (*ano horan*). Again, the Hebrews hold that the proper name of the most high God is ineffable and unutterable, nor can it be grasped by any phantasy of the mind; but this very thing, according to which we name him God, they call *Elohim*, from *El* ^D (which, as it seems, they interpret as strength and power), so that the name of God among them is calculated from the power and strength surrounding him, by which he is understood to be omnipotent and all-powerful, as having established all things. But Plato says that God and the gods are so called from *theein*, which is "to run," because of the luminaries in the heaven. Such are the things, to speak in summary, that have been distinguished among the Hebrews and among Plato regarding the correctness of names. And Plato also says that the appellations among men were established with a certain understanding; and he renders the account...

of them. For example, he conjectures that Hector was so called for having and holding, because he was king of the Trojans; Agamemnon, because he persisted too much and remained firmly and steadfastly in the plans which he had undertaken against the Trojans. Thus Orestes, because of his mountainous—that is, wild and brutal—habit; Atreus, because he had become of a ruinous character; Pelops, as one who did not see things far removed, but only those which were near; and Tantalus, as the most wretched, because of the magnitude of the miseries by which he was oppressed. These and six hundred other such things you might find said by Plato, in his attempt to teach that names were established by nature, and not by convention for those first men.

But you would not say that the things in Moses were strained, nor were they invented by some sophistical subtlety. For you will recognize that what the Hebrews call Cain signifies "emulation" among the Greeks; and the wicked man was called by this name because he burned with emulation and envy against his brother. And Abel is interpreted as "mourning," having been himself the cause of such an affliction for his parents, who, moved by some more divine instinct and counsel, gave these ^A names to their children.

What if I present to you Abraham? He was a stargazer, and knowledgeable in the theory of the stars and the heavenly sciences of old, while he was still occupied with Chaldean wisdom, and was called Abram; this word in the Greek tongue signifies "sublime parent." But God, leading him away from earthly things toward the manifest and those that are beyond the objects of sight, employed a fitting change of name, saying: "Thy name shall no longer be called Abram, but Abraham shall be thy name, for I have made thee a father of many nations." What this implies in its meaning would be a long discourse. But it suffices to cite Plato as a witness to this argument, who says that some names were established by a more divine power. He says in these very words: "For it is becoming that the imposition of names should be regarded with ^B deep concern here; and perhaps some of them were even brought about by a more divine power than that of men."

This very thing is confirmed by the holy Scripture among the Hebrews through many examples. Moses is the first of all who taught that Abraham, and his son Isaac, and furthermore Israel, were named by a more divine power. For Isaac is interpreted as "Laughter," bringing with it the symbol of virtuous joy, which God has promised to give as a special prize to those who are dear to Him. And his son Israel—he who had previously borne the name of Jacob—God, instead of Jacob, bestows upon him the name of Israel, having transferred him from the ascetic and practical life to the contemplative. For ^C Jacob is interpreted as "Supplanter," as one who struggles in the contest of virtue; but Israel is "Seeing God," such as the gnostic and contemplative mind might be in man.

Why must I now, by means of a thousand other examples, prove from the all-wise Moses or the holy scriptures of the Hebrews the ^D

^A accuracy of the imposition of their proper names, which would require a longer discussion? For the Greeks themselves would be unable to provide the etymologies of the primary elements of grammar; not even Plato himself could declare the reason or logic behind the vowels or consonants. But the children of the Hebrews could tell you the cause of alpha, which they call *alph*, and which signifies "learning"; and of beta, which it is their custom to call *beth*, the word they use for a house, so as to express the meaning "learning of a house," as if one were more clearly saying a certain instruction or learning of household management. And the third letter, gamma, is called by them *gimel*, by which they signify "fullness." Then, since they call tablets *delth*, they gave this same name to the fourth element, signifying together by these two elements that written learning ^B is the fullness of tablets. And if one were to go through the remaining elements of grammar, one would find each of them named by them with a specific reason and logic. For they say that the combination of the seven vowels into one contains the pronunciation of a certain ineffable name, which the children of the Hebrews, denoting it by four letters, arrange as the highest power of God, being something unutterable to the many, a secret received from their fathers. And among the wise men of the Greeks, I know not from where someone learned this and enigmatically hinted at it, when he said in verses: Seven vowels sing the praises of me, the great, immortal God, The letters, the tireless father of all things. I am the immortal lyre of all, or the... [restoring the] Harmony of the revolving sphere. You would find that the remaining elements among the Hebrews each have their specific meaning, if you were to attend to each one. This has already been established for us in the preceding pages, when we proved that the Greeks obtained all things from the barbarians. And one could learn how much accuracy in names is carried among the men of that nation if one were to investigate the Hebrew tongue extensively; for the very common name of the whole nation is derived from... ^C 520 and the accurate propriety of nouns among them, for even the very common name of the whole nation [is derived from...]

The translation continues from the Latin corresponding to the Greek text above, here provided by Migne:

...the fact that the very common name of the whole nation is derived from those who pass through [the crossing], for both the crossing and the one who crosses are called *Heber* in the Hebrew language.

The concept teaches us ^A to cross over and advance from the things here to divine things, and in no way to remain or stand still in the contemplation of visible objects; but from these to pass over to the unseen and invisible [realms] of the theology concerning the Maker and Creator of all things. Thus, indeed, they called those who dedicated themselves solely to the supreme Ruler and Author of all things, and who devoted themselves to a pure and true piety, *Hebrews*—calling such persons, as it were, "passers-through" and those who have crossed over in their minds. But why should I need to lengthen my discourse further, gathering together everything regarding the correctness and precision of Hebrew names, which requires a study proper to the subject? Nevertheless, to speak in summary, I believe I have provided the demonstration, even through what has been said, of the logical instruction among the Hebrews; if, indeed, according to Plato, it was not the work of common or ordinary men, but of some wise and dialectical legislator, to find the nature of names appropriate to things—just as Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews have been shown to us. What, then, follows after the logical [inquiries], if not to examine the natural ones, to see how the sons of the Hebrews fared regarding these also?

CHAPTER VII.

On the Natural Philosophy of the Hebrews.

The third part of this Hebrew philosophy, ^C which is called natural, and which is divided among them both into the contemplation of things perceived by the mind alone and devoid of all body, and into the treatment of those things which are grasped by the senses, the most praiseworthy prophets knew both by themselves and, when the occasion demanded, interwove into their own oracles. Yet they had learned this neither by any conjectures nor by the industry of mortal thought, nor did they boast of the authority of any human teacher, but they attributed all that knowledge to the power of a certain divine, superior authority and to the inspiration of the divine Spirit. Following this ^D indeed, just as they predicted infinite things concerning future events by divine inspiration, so also they disputed about the creation of the universe infinite things, just as nature required; and they discussed infinite things about the very natures of living creatures; to which they also added in their respective prophecies six hundred things about plants. And certainly Moses, who was also very well versed in the powers of stones, did not treat them in a passing or perfunctory manner when he discussed the vestments of the high priest, but was engaged in the consideration of them. But truly Solomon, if anyone else, is attested by the very testimony of divine Scripture to have reached the highest praise in this part of natural philosophy. For thus it says: "And Solomon spoke," it says, "three thousand proverbs, and his songs were five thousand. And he spoke about trees, from the cedar that is in Lebanon even to the hyssop that grows out of the wall. And he spoke about beasts, and about birds, and about reptiles, and about fishes. And all peoples came to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and"

he received gifts from all the kings of the earth who heard of his wisdom. ^A And being moved by this, while attributing that parent of all virtue—Wisdom—to her own benefaction, he spoke in this manner: "For He," he says, "gave me the true knowledge of these things that are, that I might know the constitution of the world and the virtues of the elements, the beginning and the end and the middle of the times, the changes of the turns and the permutations of the seasons, the cycles of the years, and the positions of the stars, the natures of animals and the impulses of wild beasts, the force of the winds and the reasonings of men, the differences of plants and the virtues of roots; whatever is hidden and invisible, I have learned. For the Artificer of all things taught me Wisdom." Again, the same Solomon, reasoning about the fleeting nature of bodies, says in ^B Ecclesiastes: "Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity. What surplus has man in all his labor with which he toils under the sun?" And he adds: "What is that which has been? It is that which will be; and what is that which has been done? It is that which will be done; and there is nothing new under the sun." For these and such things have been philosophized by him concerning physical substance.

You might also find that, if you go through the other Hebrew wise men, they were not lacking in the same knowledge. For, as I said before, they have spoken about plants, and about animals, both those of the land and those in the water, and furthermore about the nature of birds. Nay, ^C even about the stars in the heavens; since there is mentioned in their writings not an occasional mention of the Bear, and the Pleiades, and Orion, and Arcturus, whom the Greeks are accustomed to call Arctophylax and Bootes, as if he were the guardian of the Bear. But also about the constitution of the world, and matters concerning the turning and changing of the whole, and the abundance of the soul, and the nature of all rational things—both the visible and the invisible creation—and of the general providence, and even before these, the matters concerning the First Cause of all things, and the theology of the second, and the others which are grasped by the mind alone; they have encompassed these accounts and theories well and accurately, so that one would not err to say that those among the Greeks who later investigated the nature of these things, being ^D younger, followed in the footsteps of those ancients.

These things, then, concerning the physiology of the universe. Dividing the account of these matters, they did not think it necessary to bring the account of sensible things to a high degree of complexity before the many, nor to teach the masses the causes of things, except to know as much as this: that the whole has not come about by chance, nor has it risen from an aimless motion as it happened, but it is guided by a charioteer—the Word of God—and is governed by the power of an ineffable Wisdom. But concerning the intelligible things, that they exist, and what they are, and how they have their arrangement, power, and difference, this has been spoken of and placed within the sacred books, and handed down for all to hear, as far as it is necessary for those who pursue piety to know.

But they left the deep and hidden account regarding these things to be sought for and learned by those able to remember such things in secret. It would be well, concisely and as it were in summary, to go through the contemplation of these, and to show how Plato, in this matter too, held views friendly to those things declared. ^A

CHAPTER VIII.

On the physiology of spiritual things.

Indeed, that it is evident from his own words that the wondrous Plato, whom all so greatly admire, followed not only the most wise Moses but also other prophets of the Hebrews in this doctrine and method of explaining spiritual and incorporeal things. Whether he received this by report and listening, since it is certain he spent time among the Egyptians at the time when the Hebrews, having been driven a second time from their own land, were dwelling ^B among the Egyptians while the Persians were in power; or whether he grasped it through the nature of things himself; or whether by any other means he was deemed worthy of knowledge by God. "For God," says the Apostle, "manifested it to them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and divinity, so that they are without excuse." You may learn the truth of this matter by considering it thus. ^C

CHAPTER IX.

On Being, according to the doctrine of Moses and Plato.

Moses, in his holy revelations, utters an oracle from the person of God: "I am who I am. Thus shall you say to the sons of Israel: 'He who is' has sent me to you." And thus he declares that God alone truly is of all things, and that this kind of name belongs to him alone properly and fittingly. Similarly, concerning the origin and destruction of things perceived by the senses and endowed with a body, Solomon speaks thus: "What is that which has been? The very thing that shall be. And there is nothing new under the sun. Nor can anyone say: 'Behold, this is new,' for it has already ^D passed in the ages which were before us." Fittingly, they divide all that is into two genera—the spiritual (noetic) and the sensible. And they decree that things spiritual are free from body, but by nature endowed with reason, and are devoid of destruction and death; whereas, on the contrary, things obvious to the senses are considered to exist in flux and corruption, and in the constant mutation of their nature. And as all things are traced back to one beginning and head, and as they dogmatize that one thing is unbegotten, and that which is truly and properly being—remembering all incorporeal things.

as well as the cause of bodies—see how Plato, having transferred to himself not only the thought, but also the very expressions and words of the Hebrew ^A Scripture, appropriates the dogma, explaining it more broadly: "What is that which always is, and has no beginning of coming-to-be? And what is that which is always coming-to-be, but never is? The one, indeed, is graspable by intelligence with reason, always being in the same state; the other is the object of opinion by unreasoning sense, coming-to-be and perishing, but never really being." Does not the admirable man clearly reveal the oracle of Moses, "I am who I am," having transformed it through himself into: "What is that which always is, and has no beginning of coming-to-be?" And this he explained more clearly ^B stating, "That the being is nothing other than that which is not seen by the eyes of the flesh, but is grasped by the mind." Having asked, then, "What is that which is?" he answers himself, saying, "That, indeed, which is graspable by intelligence with reason." And having translated the Solomonic phrase, "What is that which has been? That which is about to be; and what is that which has been made? That which is to be made," in almost the same words, it is clear that he means: "The one is the object of opinion by unreasoning sense, coming-to-be and perishing, but never really being." To these he adds: "For all such things are parts of time, 'was' and ^C 'shall be'; which we mistakenly apply to the eternal substance. For we speak, saying that it was, is, and shall be; but according to the true word, only 'is' properly belongs to it. But 'was' and 'shall be' are proper to be said of that which is in temporal becoming; for they are motions. But that which is always in the same state without motion is not proper to be made older or younger through time; nor to have come-to-be at any time, nor to have come-to-be now, nor to be about to be in the future at all, nor as much as coming-to-be has attached to those things carried along in sense perception; but these are forms of time, mimicking eternity and circling by number, which have come-to-be." And in addition ^D to these, he further says: "That which has become is, that which is becoming is, and that which is about to become is." And so that no one may think we are misinterpreting the words of the philosopher, I shall use commentaries, of those things which...

^A disclose their meaning. For even if many have applied themselves to the theory of these matters, it suffices for me for the present to set forth the words of the illustrious Pythagorean, Numenius, which he explains in this way in his second book, *On the Good*.

CHAPTER X.

From the second book of Numenius the Pythagorean, On the Good.

"Come then," says he, "let us aspire, as much as we are able, toward that which is, and let us pronounce that 'that which is' never was, nor will it ever be, but it exists always in a definite time, in the present only. If anyone wishes to call this present time 'eternity,' I would advise him to do so. As for the past time, we ought to consider that it has already fled, escaped, and slipped away into non-being; and as for the future, it is not yet, but it promises that it is of such a nature that it will come into being. It is therefore not reasonable to think in any way that 'that which is' either is not, or is no longer, or is not yet. Thus, since this is stated in this way, a great absurdity arises in the argument, that it is at once the same thing to be and not to be. And if this is the case, it could scarcely be anything else, since 'that which is' does not exist by its own nature as 'that which is.' For ^C that which is, is eternal, and is fixed, always according to the same, and is the same; and it has not come to be, and then wasted away, nor has it grown, and then diminished; nor has it not yet been, more or less; and moreover, it will not be moved locally either. For it is not right for it to be moved, nor even backward, or forward; neither upward ever, nor downward, nor to the right, nor to the left will 'that which is' ever be transferred; nor will it ever be moved around its own center; but it will rather stand firm, and it will be fixed and standing, being always according to the same and in the same way." And after some other things, he adds in sequence: "So much for me by way of prologue. But as for myself, I shall no longer be circumspect, nor will I say that I am ignorant ^D of the name of the incorporeal; for it runs the risk of being something distinctive to say it now, rather than not to say it. And truly I say that its name is that which has been sought for so long. But let no one laugh if I say that the name of the incorporeal is 'substance' and 'that which is.' The reason for the name 'that which is' is that it has not come into being, nor will it waste away, nor does it admit of any motion, nor of any change, whether for the better or for the worse; but it is simple and unchangeable, and in the same form, and neither departs from its identity voluntarily, nor is it constrained by another. And Plato also said in the *Cratylus* that names are themselves markers resembling the things. Let it then be granted and given that 'that which is' is the incorporeal." And having descended a little further, he adds: "The..."

or to perish: nay, it is not subject to any kind of motion, or mutation, or any degree of change for the better or the worse, but is entirely simple and immutable, and therefore perists for ever in the same state of its own nature, from which it deviates neither of its own accord nor by any foreign force or necessity. And Plato himself in the *Cratylus* teaches that names are imposed from a certain natural likeness to things. Let it remain, therefore, and let it be accepted as a truth, that that which *is* is incorporeal. To this he adds, a little later: "That which is incorporeal, and grasped by the mind alone, they said exists." And these are what I remember were discussed at that time. But for my part, if any one requires that discourse of Plato, I am pleased to alleviate and soften his labor by first warning him that if the things discussed in that place belong less to the dogmas of Plato, they should certainly be assigned to some other person, but a preeminent man, endowed with the highest power of philosophizing, such as you might say Pythagoras was. Thus, therefore, Plato—for we must endeavor to remember the words—says: "What is that," he asks, "which always is, and yet has no birth? And what, on the contrary, is that which is born, and never *is*? The former is indeed perceived by the intelligence alone through reason: the latter, which is born and perishes, and never really *is*, exists only in that opinion which a sense void of all reason produces." Plato asks what that is which *is*, establishing that it is without birth; for he denies that birth has any place in that which *is*, for otherwise it would change; but if it were changed, it would not be eternal. Advancing a little from there, he adds: "If that which is is entirely eternal and immutable, and never at any time deviates from itself by any variety, but remains forever in one and the same state, that must undoubtedly be the one thing which is grasped by intelligence with reason. On the contrary, if a body flows and is swept away by sudden mutation, it fades away, and therefore is not. Wherefore he would not be altogether foolish who said that body cannot be defined, but is of such a kind that, as Plato says, it exists only in opinion, while it is born and perishes simultaneously, and never truly *is*."

^A Thus Numenius, by whom the doctrine of Plato, and long before his time of Moses, is illustrated for the sake of clarity. Justly, indeed, is that saying which is celebrated in this matter circulated: "For what else is Plato, than Moses speaking Attic Greek?" But nevertheless, see, if you will, whether Plutarch, explaining the force of the same opinion more fully, agrees with the cited discourse of the philosophers of old, and at the same time with the theology of the Hebrews explained in various places; while these words are now attributed to God: ^B "For I am the Lord your God, and I change not," and now the Prophet, looking toward Him, pronounces thus: "For all visible things shall pass away and be changed; but Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail." See, I say, whether as if it were a question proposed, with the [teaching] of Him who spoke thus to Moses, "I am who I am," and again, "I am the Lord your God, and I change not," and, "But Thou art the same," Plutarch would appear to interpret the meaning in his *On the E at Delphi*, saying these things word for word.

CHAPTER XI.

"I do not think that this syllable denotes either a number, or an order, or a connective, or any other of the incomplete parts of speech; but it is a self-sufficient address and invocation of God, which at the same time brings to the mind of the speaker a sense and conception of the divine power. For God, as if greeting each of us who approach Him here, addresses us with 'Know Thyself,' which is in no way inferior to 'Hail.' And we, in turn, answering God, say 'Thou art' (EI), ^B as if acknowledging Him as true and unerring, and bestowing upon Him alone the address of 'Thou art'—a name that belongs to Him alone. For in truth, we have no share in being; but every mortal nature, having come into existence between destruction and generation, presents only a shadowy, feeble, and unstable notion of itself. If you wish to fix your mind upon it, in order to grasp it—like one who tries to hold water with a powerful grip, pressing and gathering it into one place—the water flows away and is lost as it slips through the fingers; so too, the mind wanders and is mocked as it pursues the nature of things that are subject to passions and change, because it ^C stumbles partway into that which is coming into being, and partway into that which is perishing, and is unable to grasp anything that remains or that truly is. For just as no one can step twice into the same river, as Heraclitus was accustomed to say, so can no one physically reach a mortal nature in the same state, but rather it is dissipated instantly by the sudden impulse of change, and is gathered again; or rather, not even again or afterwards, but it exists at the same moment that it ceases, and approaches at the same time that it departs. Hence, no part of it reaches the state of 'being,' because its generation never ceases nor stands still; but from the seed it is always changing, forming an embryo, then an infant, then in succession a child, a youth, a man, an elder, and an old man, destroying the first generations and ages by those that succeed them. But we ^D foolishly fear one death, having already died many times and dying many times over. For it is not only, as Heraclitus said, the death of fire that is birth for air, but it is more clearly evident in our own selves. The man in his prime is destroyed by the coming of the old man, the young man was destroyed into the one in his prime, the child into the young man, the infant into the child; he who was yesterday has died into the one of today, and the one of today into the one of tomorrow. No one remains, nor is there any one person, but we become many, around one phantom and common mold of matter being driven about, and...

^A continually slipping away. Indeed, if we remain the same, who are the ones who are now pleased by different things than before, who are led by different things formerly? Who love or hate the opposites, or preach or condemn them? Who, finally, speak or are affected now in one way and then in another, no longer retaining the same appearance, the same countenance, or the same mind? For neither is it likely that one suffers other things without change, nor that one who changes is the same. But if he is not the same, he does not even exist, but, by changing, he becomes another from another; and the sense perception is deceived by ignorance of what truly is, thinking that the phenomenon is what is. What, then, is that which truly is? That which is eternal, unbegotten, and incorruptible, upon which time brings no change; for time is something movable, and being imagined along with the moving matter ^B, and always flowing, and not holding, like a vessel of corruption and generation. From which, the "afterward," and the "before," and that which "will be" is spoken, and that "it has come to be"—here is an admission of what is not. For to say that that which in the order of being has not yet come to be, or has already ceased being, "is," is foolish and absurd. But in that upon which we especially rest our thought of time—that it "stands," and is "present," and we say "now"—this, again, the discourse, being dissolved, destroys; for it is pressed out into the future and the past, being compelled to fly apart ^C like a ray for those wishing to see. And if the nature which is measured suffers the same things as the one measuring, it is not even itself alone, nor is it that which is, but is becoming and perishing according to the distribution in relation to time. Whence there is nothing of such a kind that one can say concerning that which is, that "it was," or "it will be"; for these are certain inclinations, and changes, and shifts of that which is not naturally disposed to remain in being. But God is, if one must say so, and exists not according to any time, but according to the age, which is motionless, and timeless, and unchangeable ^D, and before which nothing is, neither later, nor future, nor