Preparation for the Gospel

EUSEBIUS PAMPHILI, BISHOP OF CAESAREA IN PALESTINE, PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL, FIFTEEN BOOKS. BOOK ONE. TRANSLATED BY FRANÇOIS VIGIER, OF ROUEN, PRIEST OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS.

CONTENTS OF BOOK ONE

1. What is the promise of the evangelical subject matter. 2. What it is customary for those who attempt to slander our position to say against us. 3. That we did not choose to believe the doctrines of the saving word without examination. 4. That faith in the most useful things is accepted at the proper time. 5. That it was not without sober reasoning that we departed from the superstitious error of our ancestors. 6. Concerning the theology of the Phoenicians and Egyptians. 7. What the cosmogony according to the Greeks is said to be. 8. The opinions of the philosophers concerning the constitution of the universe. 9. That the ancients of men worshipped only the heavenly luminaries, knowing nothing of the God of all, nor of the setting up of idols, ^A nor of demons. 10. The theology of the Phoenicians. ^{B C}

CAPUT I. What the promise of the evangelical subject matter is.

^A Having determined to set forth to those who do not know it what Christianity is in this present labor, which promises to contain the evangelical demonstration, I have addressed this work to you, O divine treasure of bishops, Theodotus, beloved of God and holy head, together with my prayers, that I might perhaps obtain some assistance from you, as you cooperate with me in this great task for the sake of the evangelical teaching proposed, by means of your prayers which are pleasing to God, and which are offered on our behalf. But since it is good to set forth first of all what we mean by the term Gospel, let us do so. The Gospel is that which announces to all people the presence of the highest and greatest goods, which had been promised long ago, but which have newly shone forth upon all who are composed of both soul and body, and indeed upon all things exterior. ^B It does not promise the wealth which cannot see, nor the supply of this short and wretched life, nor any of those things bound up with the body and corruption; rather, it promises only those things which relate to and associate with souls endowed with an intelligent nature, on which also things bodily depend, following them like a shadow. The chief point of all these, however, is piety—not that which falsely takes the name, and is involved in infinite errors, but that which, with the truth to support it, defends this title for itself. This is the piety which both raises our senses toward Him whom all truly confess to be the one and only God, and governs the very principles of our life according to His will. From this kind of life is born friendship with God for man; and he is thrice blessed, having been placed in that singular benevolence of God, who, as he is fitted from heaven by the connection of immortal things, so he is governed after their pattern and likeness, and finds his final rest in them. ^C For what could be thought of as more blessed than this happy and all-prosperous friendship with God? Is He not Himself the treasury and dispenser of life, of light, of truth, and of all good things to all? Does He not Himself contain the cause of the existence and life of all things? To him, therefore, who has cultivated this friendship with Him, what could still be lacking? Of what would he be in want who has the Creator of all good things as his own friend? Or of what would he be deprived who has inscribed as his great protector and Sovereign of all, acting as father and guardian, the One who is the Author of all? ^D There is no way to say, for he who approaches God, the Sovereign of all, with such a disposition, and who is deemed worthy of this all-blessed friendship through scientific piety, would indeed be in a happy state. Therefore, this good and saving friendship of men toward God, the God Word, having been sent down from above from the all-good God, like a ray of infinite light, is preached as the Gospel to all people; not from this place or that, nor from elsewhere, but from everywhere, from all nations, urging them to come to the God of all, and to hasten.

^A Indeed, it may be said that anyone who, by the power of love, has approached closer to God, the King of all, and has duly attained from Him the grace of most blessed love—the grace that reconciles one to piety, knowledge, and wisdom—needs nothing further for the sum and crown of his soul’s, body’s, and external well-being. This life-giving and joyous fellowship of mankind with God, then, the Word of God, sent down to us from the supremely good God into the world, has happily announced to all men, like some radiance of immeasurable light. He invites men not from one or two places, but from all the nations of the whole world to the God of all things, strongly urging Greeks and barbarians alike, men along with women and children, the poor as well as the rich, the wise and the simple, to hasten and with all zeal and eagerness of soul to accept the gift offered; nor does He exclude even the slave class from such a fellowship of calling. For He who created all with one and the same substance and nature, being the Father of all, has justly deemed all equal and alike fit for common participation in His bounty, generously sharing the knowledge and love of Himself with all those who willingly wish to obey His call and accept and embrace the benefit of His grace. This love of Christ towards His Father, He came to preach throughout the whole world in His own way. ^B "For God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, not counting their trespasses against them," as the divine Scriptures teach. "And when He came," it says, "He preached peace to those who were far off, and peace to those who were near." These things the children of the Hebrews, inspired by God, long ago foretold to the entire world. One cries out: "All the ends of the earth shall remember and turn to the Lord, and all the families of the nations will worship before Him." And again: "Say among the nations that the Lord has reigned; for He has set aright the world, which shall not be shaken." And another says: "The Lord will appear among them, and He will utterly destroy all the gods of the nations of the earth, and they shall worship Him, each from his own place." These things, once committed to divine oracles of old, have now been revealed ^C to us, through the teaching of our Savior Jesus Christ, as the knowledge of God—which was preached long ago and awaited by all the nations not ignorant of these things—is now, as we might expect, announced to us by the Word recently come down from heaven, which manifests that the results of the works now run in agreement with the voices of the ancients.

But why should I be carried away by the overly impetuous movement of a spirit that is eager, and skip over the proper order of the intervening discussion, when it is necessary to take matters from the beginning and resolve everything that stands in our way? For since some are persuaded that the Christian profession cannot be defended by any reason, and that those who embrace that name are merely confirming what they imagine through an unreasoning, unexamined, and thoughtless assent; ^D and since they claim that those who join this way of life have no clear or certain argument to offer as evidence for the truth of the things that are promised, but that those who approach it do so by faith alone—wherefore they are called "faithful," on account of their indiscriminate and uncritical faith—it is reasonable that I should bring this work of Evangelical Demonstration down to this point, for the preliminary preparation of the whole subject,

^A for I truly think it necessary to preface a few words regarding those matters which might reasonably be called into question by the Greeks, and by those of the circumcision, and by any person who investigates our practices with careful examination. For I think that in this way my discourse will proceed in due order toward the more perfect instruction of the Evangelical Demonstration, and toward the understanding of the graver dogmas, if the preliminary matters serve us by way of preparation, occupying the place of elementary principles and an easier introduction, and being better suited to the grasp of those nations that have recently come to us. But after these, when they have crossed over from these points and have already prepared the habit of their minds for the reception of greater things, we shall deliver the exact knowledge of the mystical ^B economy of our Saviour and Lord Jesus Christ, God over all (5). Let us, therefore, begin the Preparation, setting forth those points which might reasonably be brought against us by the Greeks, and by those of the circumcision, and by anyone who investigates our practices with careful examination.

CHAPTER II

What those who are accustomed to slander our practices usually object against us.

For in the first place, some one might reasonably inquire who we are that have come to this manner of writing—whether we are Greeks or barbarians? Or what could be the mean between these? And what do we claim to be, not indeed by our name—since that is already known to ^C all—but in the manners and principles of our life? For they see that we observe neither the rites of the Greeks nor the sect of the barbarians. What, then, is this novelty of our profession, and what is this new rule of life? Furthermore, who would deny that we are utterly impious and have completely done away with the Divinity, since we have deserted the ancestral customs by which every nation and every city has hitherto been sustained? Moreover, what grounds for hoping for any good can be shown to those men who have declared war against the guardian gods and have rejected those whom they have as authors ^D of so many benefits? For what else can you say this is, than that they are fighting against the gods themselves? And what pardon will they be deemed worthy of, who, after defecting from the worship of those who, from time immemorial, have been celebrated as gods by all Greeks and barbarians alike, both in cities and in the country, with every kind of sacred rites, religions, and mysteries, and with the common approval of all kings, legislators, and philosophers; have then, of their own accord, chosen whatever was impious and hateful to the gods among men? And to what penalties should they not justly be subjected, who, desertors of their ancestral sacred rites, [have become the champions of] foreign and—

^A new, trackless, and desolate ways, observing neither the laws of the Greeks nor those of the Jews? Such objections, then, a Greek—knowing nothing of the truth, whether of his own traditions or of ours—might reasonably raise against us. The sons of the Hebrews might also be angry with us, because, being of another race and another people, we abuse their books which in no way pertain to us; and because we shamelessly, as they themselves would say, and impudently thrust ourselves in, and by force attempt to extrude the domestic and indigenous descendants from their ancestral religion. ^B For whether Christ be proclaimed, it was at any rate the prophets of the Jews who heralded his arrival, and who announced that he would come as a Redeemer and King to the Jews, and not to foreign nations; or if the Scriptures contain other more glorious tidings, these also were proclaimed to the Jews, and it is unreasonable for us to listen to them when we are not acting rightly. And it is utterly absurd to eagerly and greedily snatch at those reproofs delivered against that nation for the sins they committed, while we pass over, or rather forcefully wrest and transfer to ourselves, the promises of good things that were once prophesied to them—plainly satisfying our own greed, and doing nothing more than deceiving ourselves. ^C But the most unreasonable thing of all is that, while we do not even observe the laws in the same way as they do, but openly transgress them, we still claim for ourselves the better rewards promised to those who keep the laws.

CHAPTER III

Since these objections have been reasonably raised against us, come, let us—having first invoked the God of all through our Saviour, the Word himself, as through a High Priest—clear away the first of the points set before us, by demonstrating that those who allege that we have nothing to offer by way of proof, and who proclaim that we are addicted to an irrational faith without any reasoning, are slanderers. We shall expose this ^D from the very beginning, and not from afar, both from the proofs we employ for those who approach us for instruction in our doctrines, and from our replies to those [who stand opposed to us in our more logical inquiries and contradictions].

written form, both privately to each individual who questions us, as well as publicly in discourses to the crowds. Indeed, this is what the books we now hold in our hands provide, as they embrace the entire work of Evangelical Demonstration; for in them, this present discourse acts as a joyful herald, displaying to all mankind the grace flowing from God and the power of celestial munificence, while also confirming that economy regarding our Savior and Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, through a more refined demonstration of highly brilliant arguments. ^B Many before us have indeed labored with great zeal in other manners of disputation: sometimes by composing refutations against the arguments of our adversaries, sometimes by explaining the divinely inspired and holy Scriptures through commentaries and detailed homilies, and sometimes by defending our dogmas with great intensity. Yet, this present argument is treated by us with particular pleasure as something uniquely our own. Although the prince of all, the holy apostle Paul, having rejected deceptive sophistry and false appearances of probability, used certain demonstrations void of all ambiguity, saying somewhere: "And my speech and my preaching were not with enticing words of man’s wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power" [I Cor. II, 4]. To which he adds: "Howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect: yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, that come to nought: but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom" [I Cor. II, 6, 7]. And again: "Our sufficiency is of God; who also hath made us able ministers of the New Testament" [II Cor. III, 5, 6]. Justly, therefore, has the command been given to us at all times to be ready and prepared to offer a defense to everyone who asks us for a reason regarding the hope that is in us. Whence it is possible for anyone to examine and discuss the thousands of extremely wise and manifest demonstrations, with syllogisms, that have been written by the recent authors in support of the doctrine we hold, as well as the not a few commentaries on the holy and inspired Scriptures that demonstrate the truth and unerring nature of those who from the beginning preached the word of piety to us, presenting it with geometric-like proofs. ^C Yet all these words are redundant, for the deeds are manifest and clearer, which the divine and heavenly power of our Savior, in proclaiming the godly and heavenly life to all men, demonstrates clearly even now. For immediately, indeed, He foretold how His teaching would be proclaimed to all mankind, as a testimony to all nations, and that later, by His power, that Church which was to be established from all nations—a Church not yet seen, nor yet existing at the time when He walked among men—would be unconquerable and invincible through divine foreknowledge, never to be defeated by death, but would stand and remain unshaken, as if upon an unshakeable and unbreakable rock, having testified that His power would result in...

an effect beyond all reason. This ought, in all fairness, to stop every insolent mouth of those prepared to act with shamelessness; for who would not acknowledge the truth of the prediction, when the events themselves, as if crying aloud, clearly proclaim that it was the power of God, and not human nature, that foresaw these things in such a way before they happened, prophesied them, and brought them to pass? ^B For the fame of the Gospel according to Him has filled the entire world, as far as the sun beholds, and it has run through all nations; and even now the proclamation concerning Him grows and increases, in accordance with His own words. And His Church, which was foretold by name, stands rooted in the depths, and is lifted up even to the vault of heaven by the prayers of holy and God-beloved men; it is glorified daily, and flashes the intellectual and divine light of the piety preached by Him unto all; it is in no wise defeated or yielding to its enemies, nor does it even succumb to the gates of death, because of that one word which He himself uttered, saying, "Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it."

And having gathered together in their own proper subject ten thousand other things said and predicted by our Saviour, and having shown the outcomes of events to be consistent with His divine foreknowledge, we demonstrate the truth of what is believed concerning Him to be indisputable. ^C Furthermore, in addition to all this, the testimony from the Hebrew Scriptures is no small proof of the truth as we hold it. In these, the prophets among the Hebrews, many myriads of years ago, proclaimed the promise of good things to all mortal life, mentioned by name both the designation of "Christ," and foretold His coming among men. They announced the new manner of His teaching that would run through all the nations, predicting the future unbelief and opposition of the Jewish nation, and the things that would be done against Him by them, and the grim events that would shortly, and not long after, befall them—I refer to the final siege of their royal metropolis, the lavish destruction of their kingdom, their dispersion into all nations, and the [subjection] under... ^D ...fifth [circle], as it were, fills the navel, and is the most beautiful among them, if indeed Greece is in the midst of the whole earth; and Attica is in the midst of Greece; and the city is in the midst of the country; and that which bears the same name is [in the midst] of the city. [alt-version omitted]

^A And it lifts its head, and day by day is increased by new increments of dignity, and shines everywhere with the spiritual and divine brilliance of the piety preached by Him, so that it is not at all weakened even by its own enemies, nor even by the very gates of death. Indeed, all these things must be accepted as due to that one voice once uttered by Him: "Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." Moreover, there are infinite other things of this kind, foretold by our Savior, in which, when they are collected into a proper and unique argument and place, and while we place before our eyes the outcomes of the very events that are congruent and consistent with His divine foreknowledge, we demonstrate that the truth of the things we are persuaded of regarding Him is more certain than any doubt. Neither indeed is the faith, which we summon from the testimony of the Hebrew scriptures, light or to be despised, if it be added to the aforementioned things, for the Hebrew prophets preached to the whole race of mortals the promise of present goods so many years before, and recorded the name of Christ Himself, such that they predicted at once the future arrival of the same among men. Add to this that they also indicated a new and strange kind of doctrine, which would be poured out through all peoples, predicting also the future unbelief of the Jewish nation and their hardened obstinacy in resisting, and everything that was impiously contrived against Him, and all the calamities that oppressed them for that reason—not delayed for long, but following as it were in their tracks: I mean the final siege of their royal metropolis, and the total destruction of the kingdom itself, uprooted, together with their dispersion among all nations, and the servitude they suffer under the domination of enemies and foes. These things certainly come to pass in the sight of all, agreeable to those predictions, after the advent of our same Savior. ^B Indeed, who would not be struck with admiration at those illustrious and clear voices of the same prophets, who happily foretold the fall and repudiation of the Jews, and then the calling of the Gentiles, when Christ had already been withdrawn from human affairs, when these things, likewise by the benefit of our Savior's doctrine, have openly reached an outcome entirely congruent with their prophecies? For through Him it was brought about that an innumerable multitude from every race of men, having rejected the errors of idols, should take up the true knowledge and religion of God, the moderator of all things, and should, in a certain way, provide credit for the other oracles that the men of old uttered, and especially for this prophecy of Jeremiah: "O Lord my God, the nations shall come to Thee from the end of the earth, and shall say, because our fathers possessed false idols, and there was no utility in them. Shall a man make himself gods, and they are not gods?" ^C

CHAPTER IV.

These, therefore, are the things by which the rationale of our institution is confirmed, so that anyone may understand that it was not devised by some human impulse, but foreknown from God, and proclaimed in advance from God through written oracles, and still much more offered from God to all men by our Savior. Furthermore, its strength and firmness have stood clearly by divine power, since, although it has been harassed for so many years—partly by the demons who cannot be seen, and partly by the bitterness of the rulers who reigned differently according to the variety of the times and were seen with the eyes—it is joined with greater adornments and more illustrious splendor day by day, and is increased by a more frequent multitude of men. ^D For all these things confirm the argument concerning our own affairs, as not having been practiced out of human impulse, but foreknown from God, and proclaimed in advance from God throughwritten oracles, and still much more offered from God to all men through our Savior, and again being empowered and sustained by God, in such a way that, while it is driven for such long periods of time both by invisible demons and by visible rulers in every age, it shines forth far more, and is distinguished and grows day by day, and increases by much more; this is clearly the unconquered and invincible power of the aid from above from the God of all things, and the victory against its enemies by the power of—

God, ^A from whom our Savior's teaching and proclamation also proceed. Since this resulted in a good life for all people ^A—not only by his manifest words, but also by what was put forth from an ineffable power—how could it not be a demonstration of his divine power? For it was surely the mark of a divine and ineffable power that, at the same time as his word and the teaching he put forth regarding the monarchy of the one God over all things, the human race should simultaneously be set free from the multiform and demonic activity, and from the polyarchy of the nations. For in ancient times, with myriads of kings and local rulers dominating every nation, city, and land—some living under democracy, others under tyranny, and others under the rule of many—it was to be expected that wars of every kind would arise, nation clashing with nation, ^B constantly rising up against their neighbors, plundering and being plundered, warring against one another with sieges. Consequently, because of this, everyone—those who lived in cities and those who cultivated the fields—was taught the art of war from childhood, and carried swords at all times along the roads, in the villages, and in the fields.

But when Christ appeared (of whom it was long ago proclaimed through the prophets: “Righteousness will rise in his days, and an abundance of peace; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into sickles, and nation shall not take up a sword against nation, nor shall they learn to war anymore,” ^C as the events—in accordance with the prophecies—immediately followed: all polyarchy was removed by the Romans, once Augustus had assumed sole rule at the very time of the advent of our Savior. From then until now, you would not see, as before, cities warring with cities, nor nation struggling against nation, nor life worn down in complete confusion. ^D Yet, how is it no cause for wonder if one considers why it was that, in ancient times, when demons played the tyrant over all nations and men gave them great worship, they were goaded by the gods themselves into mad wars against one another, so that at one time Greeks would war against Greeks, at another Egyptians against Egyptians, Syrians against Syrians, and Romans against Romans, enslaving one another and wearing one another down with sieges, as the histories of those ancient times declare; yet, along with the most pious and peace-filled teaching of our Savior, the eradication of polytheistic error was accomplished, and the cause of the nations’ discord immediately received a cessation of ancient evils? I consider this the greatest proof and evidence of the divine and ineffable power of our Savior. You may see a clear manifestation of the benefit appearing upon the earth from his words, if you consider how never before in all time, nor by any of the famous men of old, but solely through his own words and his teaching disseminated throughout the whole inhabited world, as soon as the most religious and peace-loving...

^A of all the customs of the nations have been laid low—those very customs which were formerly beastly and barbaric. Thus, the Persians who have become his disciples no longer marry their mothers; the Scythians, because the Word of Christ has reached even them, no longer feast on human flesh, nor do other barbaric tribes defile themselves by lawless unions with daughters or sisters. Men are no longer inflamed toward other men, nor do they pursue desires contrary to nature; no longer do they throw their own dead to dogs and birds—those who formerly did this—and no longer do they lay snares for the aged, as had been their previous custom; nor do they feast on the flesh of deceased loved ones according to an ancient custom; nor do they sacrifice human beings to demons as if they were gods, according to ancient ways, nor slaughter their dearest loved ones under the delusion of piety. For these, and ten thousand other practices akin to them, were the things that formerly defiled human life. It is recorded that the Massagetae ^B and the Derbices considered those of their own kin who died a natural death to be the most wretched of all. For this reason, they would forestall the necessity of nature and would slaughter those they loved most dearly when they had become enfeebled by age, not only sacrificing them but also making them the objects of what they considered a most luxurious banquet. The Tibareni, for their part, used to cast headlong those elders who were most closely related to them. The Hyrcanians and the Caspians either threw the living to birds and dogs, or they did so to the dead. The Scythians used to bury the living with the dead, and would slaughter those whom the deceased had loved most at the pyres. The Bactrians ^C, moreover, were accustomed to throwing their elders, while still alive, to be torn apart by dogs. But these things, I say, were prevalent in those former times; now, however, they have ceased entirely, as the savage and inhuman disease of all such evils has been routed by the power of the one saving evangelical law. And the fact that they no longer consider to be gods either the lifeless and deaf statues, or the wicked demons who work through them, or the parts of the visible universe, or the souls of mortals who have departed, or the more harmful among irrational animals; but that in place of all these things, through the one evangelical teaching of our Savior, both Greeks and barbarians—those who truly and not hypocritically attend to his Word—have reached such a pinnacle of philosophy that they revere, hymn, and speak theologically of the one supreme God, he who is beyond all things, the King of all and Lord of heaven and earth, of the sun and the stars, and the Creator ^D of the entire universe; and that they learn to live so accurately that they are disciplined even up to the point of what they see with their eyes, and see nothing lasciviously with lust, and contemplate nothing, but root out every base passion from their very minds—how could all these things not contribute to a blessed life for all? And what of needing no oath at all—let alone committing perjury—because they learn from him not to swear altogether, but to be true and speak the truth in all things, so that for them a "yes" and a "no" are sufficient, as they make their own intention more stable than any oath? And the fact that they do not disregard things even in bare words and common conversations, but are even precise to the point of these, so that they do not utter an untruth, or slander, or anything base or unseemly with their voice, because of his exhortation again, through which he said, "Of every idle word—"

you shall give an account in the day of judgment." And what a degree of philosophic life is contained in this? Furthermore, that he should gather together and persuade whole myriads of men and women and children, servants and free, the obscure and the notable, and furthermore barbarians and Greeks alike, in every place and city and country and among all the nations ^A under the sun, to come to the learning of such lessons as we have just learned, and to lend their ears to the words, is a thing the greatness of which who would not acknowledge? For he persuades them not only to control unbridled actions, but also shameful thoughts in the mind, and to exercise mastery over the belly and the things beneath the belly; and that the whole race should be trained in a godly and pious education, and learn to bear with nobility and deep resolve the insults of those who set upon them, and not to take revenge upon the base with equal treatment; but to become superior to anger and wrath and every frenzied desire; indeed, and even to share their possessions with the poor and needy, and to acknowledge every man as of their own kin, and to recognize the supposed stranger as a most intimate relative and brother by the law of nature. ^B Having brought all these things together at once, how could one not acknowledge that our doctrine has brought the greatest and truly the best tidings to all men, and has provided a way of life that is naturally superior for human well-being? And what a thing does it seem to you for the whole race of mankind, not only Greeks, but even the most savage of barbarians and those dwelling at the ends of the earth, to be restrained from irrational beastliness and prepared to take up philosophic opinions? For instance, to name just one: the teachings concerning the immortality of the soul and the life ^C laid up with God for those whom He loves after their departure from here, for which they practiced despising this transitory life, so that they proved those who were once renowned for philosophy to be as children, and that much-bruited death, which is celebrated by all philosophers, to be a mere plaything; when even women among us and those quite young, and men who are barbarians and of low estimation in appearance, have, by the power and cooperation of our Savior, proven the doctrine of the immortality of the soul in deeds rather than words? And what of this, that altogether all men in all the nations are taught from the Savior’s teachings to think soundly and vigorously regarding God’s providence as overseeing all things? ^D And that every soul is taught the word concerning the judgment seat and the judgment of God, and to live with care, and to be guarded in the habits of wickedness; and that they should be eager not only to quell the petulance of their actions, but even the baseness of those thoughts that dwell in the mind alone, and to subdue all the pleasures that have their seat in the belly and beneath the belly; and that every kind of man should be steeped in the precepts of divine doctrine, so that he is willing to bear with a lofty and great heart the injuries of provoking enemies, and not to avenge himself upon wicked men through mutual and similar acts; and that he should endeavor to rule and restrain the force of wrath, and the impotent and furious surge of every desire, and so much so that he should share his wealth and fortune with the destitute and needy; and that he should embrace any human being in the name of common humanity, and acknowledge him whom the common herd regards as a stranger as one most closely joined by the law of nature and indeed as a brother. Whoever gathers all these things together, how could it be anything but that he must acknowledge the doctrine preached by us to be that which has happily announced the highest and true goods to all mankind, and which has contributed to human life what was by itself the chief and, as it were, the head of living well and happily? What, then, of that which follows? What kind of thing do you suppose it to be, that truly the same race of men...

which was previously ruined by the force and violence of demons, has been liberated ^A by divine power, as if from a most terrifying darkness, and brought over into the spiritual and most brilliant light of true piety toward God, the all-sovereign King of all things? But what point is there in laboring here at greater length, in order to show that we have not betaken ourselves to an unconsidered and rash faith, but to one full of reason and utility, which encompasses the form and discipline of true piety? Indeed, since the sole aim of this entire work is that those who are able to grasp the force and weight of our arguments may apply themselves to discerning the soundness of our proofs, to examining with greater attention and subtlety the demonstrations of our dogmas, and finally to be ready and prepared to offer, to any who demand it, a defense of the hope that is contained in our religion—we exhort them again and again. Yet, since not all possess this faculty and skill, and because the sweetness of the divine Word is such, and so loving to mankind, that it rejects no one at all, ^C but rather applies a healing and appropriate medicine to each one for his cure, and thus invites the ignorant and unlearned to a more moderate manner of treatment: it is with good and just reason that we take those who are being initiated from the ranks of the simpler—such as women and children, and the multitude of common and plebeian folk—and, leading them as it were by the hand to the piety of the Christian life, we initially apply to them the sound and whole faith, like a medicine, and implant in their minds correct thoughts concerning divine providence, the immortality of the soul, and the necessity of conducting one's life according to the norm of virtue. ^D What then? Do we not also see that those who skillfully apply themselves to the healing of bodily ailments, whatever they may judge to be necessary for the finest medicine, ^B or which they know ought to be guarded against, as a master and lord they command with authority; while the patient obeys his physician, trusting that what has been commanded will be for his own benefit? So too...

do disciples receive the doctrines of learning from their teachers, believing that the lesson will be good for them. Indeed, no one would even engage in philosophy without first believing that the profession of it would be for their benefit. And one person has chosen from the start the teachings of Epicurus, another emulates the Cynic life, one philosophizes according to Plato, another according to Aristotle, and yet another has preferred the Stoic dogmas above all others; each, with a better hope and faith in his choice, having cherished what he deemed would be beneficial. In this way, men have also pursued the intermediate arts: some have devoted themselves to the military life, others have preferred to practice commerce, having long ago been persuaded by faith that such an occupation would provide them with a living. And the first unions of marriage, and the mutual conjunctions of those who look toward the hope of procreation, have had their beginning from a sincere and noble faith. Furthermore, who sets out on a voyage, with its uncertain outcome, without having first anchored his own safety in faith and a joyful hope? Another, again, engages in agriculture, and having cast seed into the earth, he sits at home awaiting the turning of the seasons, trusting that what has perished in the ground and been covered by the flooding of rains will, as if from the dead, come to life again. And one making a long journey from his own land to a foreign region similarly takes hope and faith as good guides for himself. For what else do we find than that the entire life of men is hung upon these two things, hope and faith? Why then do you marvel if even the better things pertaining to the soul are imparted through faith to those who have no leisure ^C to learn the details more logically, while to others it is permitted to pursue the arguments themselves and to learn the demonstrations of the things that are being proclaimed? But having spoken these few things by way of a prelude, and not without utility, let us at last return to the first head of the accusation, and reply to those who are accustomed to ask us both who we are and what ways of life we formerly followed. That we are Greeks by race, and hold the opinions of the Greeks, and having been gathered together from every nation like a newly recruited army, have stood as deserters from the ancestral superstition, we would not at any time deny; but also that we are attached to the Hebrew books, ^D and gather most of our argument from the prophecies within them, and no longer deem it desirable to live like those of the circumcision—this too we would confess from the start. It is time, therefore, to provide the explanation for these things. How then could we be thought to have done well in abandoning our ancestral customs, if we did not first place them in the middle of our discourse and bring them before the eyes of our readers? For thus the divine power of the evangelical proof would become manifest, if it were placed before the eyes of all, for what kind and what magnitude of evils it promises healing. And how could the reasonableness of the pursuit of the Hebrew writings appear, if the virtue of these things were not also demonstrated? And by what argument we embrace the scriptures that are among them, while we turn away from the same manner of life, it would be well to set forth; and above all, what the rationale of our evangelical thesis is, and what might properly be called Christianity, being neither Hellenism, nor...

^A Judaism, but a certain new and true Theosophy, which derives its innovation from its very name. Come then, first of all, let us examine the most ancient, and indeed our own ancestral theologies, still celebrated to this day in every city, as well as the solemn opinions of the noble philosophers regarding the constitution of the cosmos and the gods; so that we may know whether we have rightly departed from them or not. I shall not use my own words in setting forth what is declared, but the words of those who have made the piety toward the gods whom they claim a matter of such earnest concern, so that our discourse may be established free from any suspicion of invention on our part.

CHAPTER VI.

Regarding the theology of the Phoenicians and Egyptians first.

^B It is common knowledge that the Phoenicians and Egyptians were the first of all peoples to attribute divinity to the sun, the moon, and the stars, and to assign to them alone the cause of the birth and destruction of all things; and that, subsequently, they introduced to human life those myths of the acts and births of the gods that are bruited about everywhere. Before them, no one—if you except a few individuals among the Hebrews, whose memory is celebrated—had advanced in understanding even the slightest ^C beyond the things that are seen in the heavens. These few, with the purest eyes of the mind, transcending all that is visible, worshipped the Framer of the cosmos and the Creator of all things, standing in great wonder at the wisdom and power of Him whom they perceived through His works. Having once become convinced that He alone was God, they proclaimed Him as the One God, as was fitting, and diligently maintained that true, original, and sole piety which they had received from their fathers and kept. But the rest of the multitude of mankind, having fallen away from the truth of this singular piety, were struck with a childish wonder at the brilliance of the heavenly bodies which they beheld with their bodily eyes; they declared these to be gods, and rendered the cult of sacrifices and adoration to them. Yet, they did not build temples to them, nor did they fashion the forms of mortals into statues and images for them, but ^D looked toward the aether and the heavens themselves, reaching with their souls only as far as what was there to be seen. But the error of polytheism did not stop there for later generations; rather, it drove them into a depth of evils, and wrought a godlessness greater than the previous irreligion, with the Phoenicians and then the Egyptians leading the way in error; from whom, they say,

Orpheus, son of Oeagrus, having transferred what he found among the Egyptians, imparted the mysteries to the Greeks, just as Cadmus brought the Phoenician things to them, along with the knowledge of letters—for the Greeks did not yet know the use of letters at that time.

We shall therefore first examine the subjects of the initial cosmogony, as those mentioned have distributed them; then the matters concerning the first and most ancient superstition of human life; and thirdly, the things of the Phoenicians; and fourthly, those of the Egyptians. After which, fifthly, having divided the Greek matters, we shall first view their ancient and more mythical error; then the more solemn and natural philosophy concerning the gods; and after these, we shall proceed to the discussion of the marvelous oracles; upon which, we shall also examine the solemn points of the noble Greek philosophy.

When these have been clarified by us, we shall pass on to the Hebrews—those who are the first and truly Hebrews, and after them those who later obtained the designation of Jews. ^B And above all these, as if a seal upon the whole, we shall set forth our own. It is necessary that we recount the history of all these, so that through the presentation of what is admired in each place, the proof of the truth may be demonstrated, and that it may be manifest to those who encounter it from what we have departed and what we have chosen.

But let us proceed to the first point. Whence, indeed, shall we confirm our proofs? Not, to be sure, from our own scriptures, lest we seem to be doing favors to the argument. Let there be witnesses before us from the Greeks themselves, those who both profess philosophy and have researched the history of the other nations. Accordingly, Diodorus the Sicilian, a man most familiar to the most learned of the Greeks, writes from the beginning, explaining the ancient theology of the Egyptians, having gathered the entire historical Library into one treatise. ^C From him, I shall first set forth what he has distinguished, beginning his discourse about the cosmogony of the all, the opinions of the ancient historians, in this manner.

Chapter VII. Of what sort the cosmogony of the Greeks is said to be.

^A Regarding the notions which those who first set out to honor the divine had concerning the gods, and regarding the myths told about each of the immortals, we shall endeavor to compose most of these separately, since this subject requires a long discourse; but as many things as appear to us to be in agreement with the histories at hand, we shall set forth here in summary, so that nothing worthy of being heard may be sought in vain. Regarding the race of all mankind, and the deeds done in the known regions of the inhabited world, we shall record with as much accuracy as is possible in such antiquity, beginning from the most ancient times. ^B There have been two opinions among the most reputable of the natural philosophers and historians regarding the first generation of men. For some of them, positing that the world is ungenerated and indestructible, declared that the race of men also has existed from eternity, its procreation never having had a beginning. Others, considering it to be generated and destructible, said that men, in like manner, attained their first generation at specific times. For, according to their account, at the origin of the whole, heaven and earth had one form, their nature being mixed; but after this, when the bodies were separated from one another, the world embraced the entire arrangement visible within it, while the air began to be in constant motion. And the fiery part of it rushed up to the highest regions, such a nature being upward-moving because of its lightness; for which cause the sun itself and the rest of the multitude of stars were caught up in the universal rotation. ^C The muddy and turbid part, along with the mixture of liquids, settled in the same place due to weight; and as it was revolved and continually gathered together within itself, from the moist parts it produced the sea, and from the more solid parts it produced the land, which was muddy and entirely soft. At first, as the fire of the sun shining around it shone down, it took on a hardening; then, as the surface boiled up on account of the heat, some of the moisture swelled up in many places, and putrefactions enclosed in thin membranes were nourished around them. ^D This is still to be seen occurring even now in marshes and stagnant places, whenever, after the land has been chilled, the air suddenly becomes fiery, not having received the change by degrees. As the moist parts were quickened into life by the heat in the manner described, they would immediately take their nourishment at night from the mist falling from the surrounding atmosphere, and by day they would be hardened by the heat. Finally, when those that were being formed had attained their full growth, and the membranes had been scorched

and become torn apart, various types of animals sprang forth. Those of these that had partaken of the greatest heat went off to the higher regions, having become winged creatures; those that held fast to the earthy composition were numbered in the order of reptiles and other land-dwelling creatures; while those that had partaken most of the moist nature rushed together to the place akin to them, and were named swimmers. The earth, constantly becoming more solidified by the heat around the sun and by the winds, was finally able to bring forth none of the larger animals, but henceforth each of the living beings was born from the intermingling of males and females with one another. I do not think that Euripides, who had been a pupil of the natural philosopher Anaxagoras, held a different opinion regarding the origin of this universe than what we have already mentioned. For in his *Menalippe* he writes as follows:

OF THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE

^B Before, the sky and earth were of one form, But when they were parted one from the other, They bring forth all things and gave them to the light: Trees, winged creatures, beasts, and those the salt sea feeds, And the race of mortals.

And so much have we received concerning the first generation of all things. As for those who were the first of humankind to be born, they say that because they lived in a disorderly and brutish manner, they went out sporadically to the pastures and fed on the most tender grass and the fruits that grew spontaneously from the trees. And, being warred upon by the wild beasts, they began to help one another, taught by the utility of the situation; and being gathered together for fear, they gradually came to recognize one another's forms. Since their voice was at first ^C inarticulate and confused, by degrees they articulated their utterances, and by establishing signs among themselves for each of the things that occurred, they made the explanation of all things intelligible to each other. Such groups arising all over the inhabited world, they did not all have the same language, as each had arranged their words by chance; hence, there existed all kinds of characters of dialects, and the first groups that formed became the primordial ancestors of all nations.

Therefore, the first of human beings, as none of the things useful for life had yet been discovered, spent their time in hardship, being naked of clothing, living in unaccustomed ways, and having no conception at all of cultivated food. For indeed, being ignorant of the gathering of wild food, they made no provision of fruits for their needs; and so many of them perished during the winters, due both to the ^D cold and the scarcity of food. From this, little by little, through experience,

they became more cautious, so as to take refuge in caves during the winter and store up such fruits as could be preserved for a longer time. Once fire and the other useful things were discovered, little by little the crafts were also found, as well as the other things capable of benefiting the common life. For in general, need itself became the teacher to men, suggesting the knowledge of each thing in a manner appropriate to an animal that was by nature well-equipped, and which not only used its hands as servants for everything, but was also strong in reason and the sharpness of its soul. And concerning the first generation of men, and their most ancient way of life, we shall be satisfied with what has been said, aiming at moderation. ^A So much from the aforementioned author, who, in recording this creation of the world, does not even mention the name of God, but has introduced a certain accidental and spontaneous arrangement of this universe. You may see that the Greek philosophers have taught this same thing for the most part. I shall, for the present, lay before your eyes their opinions concerning the first principles of things and their mutual disagreements and dissensions, taken from the *Stromata* of Plutarch, which were inspired not by certain and comprehensive knowledge, but by some kind of probability of conjectures. Do not read them idly, but yourself contemplate, with judgment applied, the dissensions of those whom I mention. ^B

CHAPTER VIII. Opinions of the philosophers concerning the constitution of this universe.

• They say that Thales was the first of all to posit water as the principle of all things, for he thought that all things proceeded from it and return into it.

• After him, Anaximander, who had been a companion and intimate friend of Thales, taught that the cause of all things whatsoever must be assigned to the Infinite alone; for from it, he maintained, the celestial orbs as well as worlds that are all infinite and separate were drawn forth. ^C He asserted that corruption, and long before that generation itself, occurred from it, because all those worlds were revolved by a certain immense and perpetual motion. He said that the earth imitates the figure of a cylinder, and that its depth is such that, if it is compared with its width, it constitutes a third part of it. But he declared that the fecund and generative parts of the hot and the cold were set aside from all eternity for the procreation of this world, from which a certain sphere of flame was formed and grew around ^D the air that is about the earth, like the bark around a tree; and when this was broken off and shut into certain circles, the sun and the

moon and the stars were brought into existence. He further says that in the beginning man was born from animals of a different species, because other animals quickly provide their own food, but man alone requires long-continued nursing; therefore, he could not have survived at the beginning had he been like this. Such were the views of Anaximander.

Anaximenes is said to have declared that the air is the principle of all things, and that this air is infinite in its genus, but finite and circumscribed in the qualities associated with it. He says that all things are produced through a certain condensation and again a rarefaction of this air. Furthermore, he asserts that movement has existed from eternity; that as the air was condensed, the earth was the first thing to be brought into existence, and that it is very broad; wherefore, it naturally rests upon the air; and the sun, the moon, and the remaining stars have their origin from the earth. He declares, therefore, that the sun is earth; but that through its swift movement, it has acquired a very intense heat. ^B

Xenophanes of Colophon, following a path of his own that deviates from all those we have mentioned before, allows for neither generation nor corruption, but says that the universe is always the same. For if it should come into being, he says, it must necessarily not have existed before this. But what does not exist cannot come to be, nor could that which does not exist bring anything into being, nor could anything be generated by that which does not exist. He also declares that the senses are false, and he altogether disparages reason along with them. He further maintains that the earth is being carried downwards continuously over time and is gradually passing into the sea; and he says that the sun is gathered together from small and numerous tiny fires. He also declares regarding the gods that there is no rule among them, for it is not right that any of the gods should be subject to a master; nor does any of them require the help of any other at all; and he says that they hear and see as a whole, and not in part. He declares also that the earth is infinite and is not contained by air on all sides; and that all things are produced from the earth, while he says that the sun and the other stars are produced from clouds. ^C

Parmenides of Elea, a companion of Xenophanes, partly adopted his opinions and partly attempted an opposing position. For he declares the universe to be eternal and motionless, and this according to the truth of things; for it is alone, unique, and unshakable, and unbegotten; he rejects generation as pertaining to those things which are thought to exist by false opinion, and he excludes the senses from the truth. He says that if anything exists besides that which is, it is not; and that which is not, does not exist in the whole. Thus he leaves that which is as unbegotten; and he says that the earth was formed from condensed air flowing down. ^D

^A Zeno the Eleatic published nothing particular on this subject, but fluctuated in an almost uncertain tide of doubt.

• Democritus of Abdera posits that the universe is infinite, because it was in no way fashioned by any creator; and he also asserts that it is unchangeable. In general, he explicitly maintains that all things as they are have no first cause for the origin of things now coming into being; but that all things which have been, or now are, or will be hereafter, were long ago bound together by a certain power of necessity over an infinite span of time. He attributes the generation of the sun and moon to a specific process: he says that they were carried along individually, not yet possessing any hot nature, nor indeed any brilliance at all, but on the contrary, having been made similar to the nature of the earth, for each of these two had previously existed during a certain ^B separate subsidence of the world; but later, as the circle around the sun grew in size, the fire was caught up within it, and when the larger circle of the sun itself had emerged ^C.

• Epicurus, son of Neocles, an Athenian, attempts to cast down the emptiness of those arguments which are entertained regarding the gods; at the same time he contends that nothing arises from what is not, because the universe was always such, and will be such; that nothing strange is produced in the universe, beyond the infinite time which has already passed; that everything is body, and not only unchangeable, but also infinite; that the end of goods is pleasure.

• Aristippus of Cyrene also places the end of goods in pleasure, and of evils in pain. He excludes all other natural philosophy, saying that it is useful to investigate only this one thing: What sorrow or joy the cruel lot may stir at home.

• Empedocles of Agrigentum posits four elements: fire, ^D water, air, and earth; and he holds that love and strife are the causes of these. He says that from the first confusion of the elements, the air was separated and poured around in a circle; and after the air, the fire rushed forth, and since it found no other place, it ran upwards, being compressed by the cold of the surrounding air. He further maintains that two hemispheres are carried in circular motion around the earth, one entirely of fire, and the other mixed of air and a little fire, which he thinks is the night; and that the beginning of the motion happened from the fact that it occurred during the gathering, when the fire grew more intense. But the sun is not fire in its nature, but a reflection of fire, similar to that which occurs from water. And he says the moon was formed by itself from the air left behind by the fire; for this was condensed just like hail; and that it derives its light from the sun. He locates the ruling principle, not in the head, nor in the chest, but in the blood; wherefore he thinks that men excel in whichever part of the body that ruling principle has been more diffused.

Metrodorus of Chios ^A asserts that this universe is eternal, for if it were generated, it would have been generated from that which is nowhere. Since it is eternal, it is likewise infinite, as it has neither a beginning from which it started, nor a limit or end. Moreover, the whole cannot even be moved, for it is impossible for it to move without migrating, and it must migrate either into a plenum or into a vacuum. Furthermore, he says that clouds are first created from compressed air, then water, which, flowing down toward the sun, extinguishes its fire, which however is kindled again as the density diminishes. The same sun, as time progresses, grows dense through dryness, and generates stars from clear and shining water, while night and day are produced by that reciprocal extinction and inflammation, and all eclipses whatsoever are completed by the same process.

Diogenes of Apollonia ^B posits air as the element, and maintains that all things are moved, and that there are infinite worlds. But he dreams of their construction in this way: that since the universe was moved in such a way as to become rarer here and denser there, wherever greater density occurred, a certain convolution was produced, and in a similar manner the rest; and that the parts which were the lightest of all, having occupied the upper region, produced the sun.

Such, therefore, was the discourse of the wisest philosophers of Greece, at least those who were called natural philosophers, regarding the constitution of the universe and the first procreation of the world, in which they posited no architect, nor any creator of all things; nay, they did not even make any mention of God at all, but assigned the cause of this universe ^C to a certain rash agitation and a purely fortuitous motion. And such is the dissension of these men among themselves, that they pronounced nothing in agreement on any matter, but filled all things with contention and diversity of opinion. Wherefore also the admirable Socrates exposed all these men as raving, and said they differed in no way from the insane and the furious, if we may hear Xenophon as a witness worthy of belief. For thus he speaks in his *Memorabilia*: "No one ever saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, anything impious or wicked. For he did not discourse about the nature of the universe, as most people do, nor did he inquire how that which is called 'world' by the tribe of sophists ^D exists, or by what forces of fate and necessity the law of each celestial thing is held; but he demonstrated that those who were more curious about this kind of thing were insane." And he adds the following: "It seemed wonderful to him that it was not manifest to them that it is impossible for men to discover these things, since even those who pride themselves most on speaking about these matters do not hold the same opinions as one another, but behave toward each other like those who are insane. For among the insane, some do not fear even things that are dreadful, while others fear things that are not to be feared; and of those who care about the discourse on the nature of all things, some think the existent is only one, others that the multitude is infinite; some that all things are always moved, others that nothing could ever be moved; and some that all things come into being and...

subsequently perish, while others that nothing at all has ever been generated or will ever perish. » Such is what Socrates says, as Xenophon bears witness. Plato also agrees with these in his dialogue, *On the Soul*, representing him ^B as recording it thus: « For I, O Cebes, when I was young, possessed a marvelous longing for that wisdom which they call the investigation of nature; for it seemed to me a sublime thing to know the causes of each thing, why each thing comes into being, and why it perishes, and why it exists. And I often turned myself upside down and inside out, considering first such things as these: whether, when the cold and the hot receive a certain putrefaction, as some have said, then at that point, animals are nurtured together? And whether it is with blood that we think, or with air, or with fire; or whether it is none of these, but the brain that affords the perceptions of hearing and seeing ^C and smelling; and from these, memory and belief might arise, and from memory and belief, when they have received stability, that knowledge might be generated in accordance with these things? And again, while considering the destructions of these same things, and the phenomena occurring both in heaven and on earth, I ended by thinking myself so inept at this inquiry that I was like nothing at all. And I will give you sufficient proof of this. For what I previously clearly knew—or so I and others thought—I was so blinded by this very inquiry that I unlearned even those things which I formerly thought I knew. » This is what that Socrates himself, celebrated by all the Greeks, said. Since, therefore, such seemed to be the opinion of so great a philosopher regarding the physiology of all those we have mentioned before, I rightly think that we too have turned away from the wickedness of their denied Divinity; especially since their error concerning a multitude of gods does not seem to be at all foreign to those things which they dreamed regarding the origin of the universe. But this shall be manifestly shown in its proper place, where we shall demonstrate that Anaxagoras, the foremost of the Greeks, who placed Mind as the architect of this universe, is to be praised. But now, turn your mind to Diodorus, and consider what he recounts regarding the first theology of men.

CHAPTER IX.

« They say that the ancient Egyptians, when they had fixed their eyes upon the contemplation of this world, and were stunned with great wonder at the nature of all things, supposed the sun and the moon to be eternal gods and the rulers of all; one of which...

^A Osiris, and the other Isis, they named from a certain etymological notation of each name. For if we express the significance of those words in the manner of the Greek dialect, Osiris is nothing else than "many-eyed"; and not undeservedly, since he himself, with rays diffused far and wide in every direction, inspects the whole earth and sea as if with many eyes; with which sentiment the poet also agrees: "The Sun, who sees all things from afar, and hears all things throughout the world." Some of the ancient mythologists among the Greeks called the same Osiris "Bacchus," and by a similarity of sound and affinity of name, "Sirius." Of whom Eumolpus in his Bacchic poems sings thus: "Like a star, Bacchus shining with a blazing countenance." Orpheus, however, says: "Therefore they call him Phanes and Bacchus by name." Furthermore, some add that the custom of his wearing a fawn-skin arose from the variety of the stars. And they say that Isis, when interpreted, means "Ancient," a name given to the moon on account of ^B her most ancient and eternal origin. They also attach horns to her, partly moved by the shape which she shows, curved like horns during the accretion and diminution of her light, and partly because the cow is consecrated to her among the Egyptians. They maintain that these twin gods govern the entire world. So much, then, for these matters.

You have also in the Phoenician theology how the first naturalists among the Phoenicians recognized only the sun and the moon, and the remaining wandering stars, and the elements, and the things connected with them, as gods; and how the most ancient men dedicated to these the fruits of the earth, and considered them gods, and worshipped these things, from which they themselves and their successors, and all who were before them, used to subsist, and used to perform libations and pouring-out of offerings. They even consecrated pity, compassion, and mourning to the decaying fruits of the earth, and to the first generation of living things from the earth, and at the same time to their generation from ^C mutual mating, and to death itself, by which they ceased from this life; these were the conceptions of their worship, agreeable to their own weakness, and to the cowardice of their souls. These things are also in the Phoenician writings, as will be shown in what follows.

But even that very man who lived in our memory, and who gains fame and a name for himself by vomiting insults and revilings upon us, in those works of his in which he wrote concerning abstinence from living beings and the antiquity of the ancients, sets forth the memory in this way, using Theophrastus as a witness: "An 'innumerable' time seems to have passed since the most learned race of all, as Theophrastus says, and those inhabiting the most sacred land built by the Nile, began, the first of all, from the hearth ^D to sacrifice to the celestial gods, not with myrrh nor with cassia and frankincense mixed with crocus..."

^A (for the use of these did not exist until many ages had passed, when man, having become an inquisitive searcher after error, offered the first fruits of necessary life to the gods after many labors and drops of tears); not with such things, I say, but with the green herb, the primitive down of which, so to speak, as of a generative nature, he plucked with his hands and offered. For earth brought forth trees before animals, and long before trees, the annual grasses; the leaves and roots of these, and the entire shoots of their nature, those ancients used to burn, thereby showing favor to the visible celestial gods with the sacrifice, and by the fire ^B preserving honors to them that were immortal. For this reason, they also kept the fire immortal in their temples, as it seemed to them most like those gods. From the burning of these things of the earth, they called them "fuming-places" [thymiateria], and "to sacrifice" [thyein], and "sacrificial offering" [thysia]—terms which we, as signifying a later transgression, understand incorrectly, calling the worship that is thought to be carried out through animals "sacrifice." And the ancients were so concerned not to transgress custom that, for those who neglected the old and introduced something else, they directed curses, and called the things burnt "incense." ^C Having said this, he adds after some other things: "But far from the first fruits of sacrifices, as human lawlessness advanced towards the most terrible of sacrifices, the practice of full cruelty was introduced; so that the previously mentioned curses against us seem to have reached their end, with men slaughtering living creatures and blood-staining the altars." So much says Porphyry, no more than Theophrastus. As a seal upon this discussion, there might be for us the words of Plato in the *Cratylus*, regarding what he said previously about the Greeks, where he speaks literally as follows: "It appears to me that the first of the men regarding Greece ^D considered those alone to be gods, whom many of the barbarians now, sun and moon and earth and stars and heaven, as they saw all of them always running in a course and racing; and from this nature of 'running' [theein], they named them gods."

^A That those men who were the first and most ancient of all mankind gave no attention to the building of temples, nor to the setting up of carved images—since at that time the arts of painting, modeling, carving, or statuary had not yet been discovered, nor, indeed, had the art of masonry and architecture been established—this, I think, is plain to anyone who reflects upon it. And that there was no mention in their day of those who were later named gods and heroes—that there was then no Zeus among them, nor Cronus, nor Poseidon, nor Apollo, nor Hera, nor Athena, nor Dionysus, nor any other god, male or female, such as later appeared in countless numbers among both the barbarians and the Greeks; and that not even a good or evil demon was held in awe among men, but only the visible heavenly stars, which obtained the name of gods, as they themselves say, from the verb *theein*, which means to run—and that not even these were worshipped with sacrifices of living animals or with the honors that were devised later: this we prove clearly, not by our own discourse, but by the domestic testimony of the heathens themselves, which provides certain proof from their own explicit words, both those we have cited before and those we shall subsequently set forth in their proper places.

Although the divine scriptures of the Christian religion also teach this very thing, in which it is contained that to all nations in general there was attributed in the beginning ^B the worship of the stars seen under the eyes, while to the Hebrew people alone was granted, as a singular and special gift of grace, the vision of the Creator and Maker of this whole universe, God, and the true piety toward Him. Therefore, there was absolutely no mention of a Greek or barbarian theogony among the most ancient of men, no use of setting up images, and no such vanity of nonsense as now exists in this naming of gods, partly male and partly female. For the names and appellations of that age were not known, which were later contrived and fashioned from the crowd of mortals themselves; indeed, even the evocations of demons and invisible spirits, the strange and absurd mythologies concerning gods and heroes, and the mysteries of secret initiations were not known, nor was there any trace at all of the manifold and foolish superstition of the men who followed.

These are assuredly fictions devised by men, creations of mortal nature, or rather arts of a life corrupted by shameful and licentious conduct, as is confirmed by that divine oracle of ours ^C which says: “The beginning of fornication is the seeking for idols” (Sap. xiv, 12). The polytheistic error of all the nations, therefore, has appeared in long later ages, having begun with the Phoenicians and Egyptians, and having passed from them to the other nations, and even to the Greeks themselves. So that this also, in turn, the history of the most ancient times holds, which it is now time to examine, starting from the Phoenician records. ^D

^A Now, a certain Sanchuniatho, a man most ancient, who is said to have flourished even before the Trojan times, and who is testified to have written the Phoenician history with the greatest diligence and regard for truth, has handed down these matters to memory. These works were all published in the Greek language, after being translated from the Phoenician tongue, by Philo—not that Hebrew one, but the Byblian. The one who, in our own time, pieced together that work against us, woven with lies and deceits, also makes mention of him, while commending this same testimony in his fourth book. "Sanchuniatho of Berytus," he says, "wrote the history pertaining to the Jews with the greatest fidelity; for it agrees in the best manner with their places and names, since he had received the principal chapters of those matters from Hierombalus, a priest of the god Ieuo." This work of his was dedicated to Abibalus, king of the Berytians, and was approved not only by the king, but also by all those among him whose business it was to judge the truthfulness of written accounts. ^B And their age, being more ancient than the Trojan times, approaches closely to Moses himself, as anyone can infer from the series of Phoenician kings. This Sanchuniatho, therefore, who wrote the ancient history in the Phoenician language—having compiled it partly from the records of individual cities and partly from the monuments in the temples—with a singular devotion to truth, lived while Semiramis, who is remembered as having been either older than or contemporary with the Iliac times, reigned among the Assyrians. The works of this same Sanchuniatho were rendered into the Greek language by Philo of Byblos." ^C These are the things he says, by which he has left us testimony both to the truthfulness of that theologian in his writing and to his antiquity. But in the progress of the work he undertook, he does not offer to us as gods the God who governs the universe, nor even the inhabitants of heaven, but certain men and women subject to death—and these not endowed with such decency of character that they deserve to be accepted and approved for their virtue, or with such wisdom as might invite us to imitate them, but rather covered with all manner of shameful acts and crimes—and he affirms at the same time that these very ones are they who happen to be celebrated even now as gods in every town and country. But receive also the proofs of these things, drawn from their own writings. Philo, therefore, who divided the entire work of Sanchuniatho into nine books, prefaces the following to his own first book, word for word, regarding that same author: "These things being so, Sanchuniatho, a man of great learning and diligent inquiry, having devoted himself to the study of many things, and desiring to know the history of all nations from the very first establishment of the universe, applied particular diligence to investigating the matters of Taautus, because he understood well that he was the first of all those who had looked upon this light to have discovered letters and to have been the author of writing commentaries—he whom the Egyptians called Thouth, the Alexandrians Thoth, and the Greeks translated as Hermes." ^D Having said these things, he finds fault with the more recent writers who came after, as if they had constrained and untruly led the myths concerning the gods into allegories and physical accounts and theories. For he says as he proceeds, "But the newest of the sacred chroniclers, those who..."

afterwards emerged, he censures by this name, because they had at the very beginning rejected the truth of the things that had happened, and had devised certain allegories and myths, and by inventing a kinship with the phenomena of the universe, they established mysteries, and involved them in such thick darkness that no one could easily discern the truth of what had actually taken place. He, however, having come upon certain secret volumes of the Ammonians, which had been brought out from the inner sanctuaries of the temples where they had previously lain—and as they were not generally accessible—he sought out the meaning of all of them with diligent meditation, and having successfully attained the end of his labor, with the myths and allegories that met him at the very entrance having been put out of the way, he brought the task he had undertaken to perfection: until the priests who came after him wished to hide it again, and to restore it to the mythical, whence that mystical sense emerged, which had never before occupied the minds of the Greeks.» ^B Following these things, he says: «These things have been told to us, desiring to know the affairs of the Phoenicians carefully, and having searched out much material, not that which is among the Greeks; for this is discordant, and has been composed by some more in a spirit of contention than for the sake of truth.» And after other things: «And that we were persuaded that it is thus, he himself has written, seeing the discord among the Greeks, concerning which I have taken pains to write three books having the title, *On Incredible History*.» And again after other things he adds: «But it is necessary to pre-arrange for the sake of subsequent clarity, and for the discernment of the details, that the most ancient of the barbarians, and especially the Phoenicians and Egyptians, from whom the rest of mankind also received it, considered as the greatest gods those who had discovered things necessary for the life of men, or who had done some good for the nations; and considering these to be benefactors and the cause of many good things, they worshipped them as gods; and having turned the temples, which had already been constructed before, to this use, they consecrated pillars and staves in their name, and honored these greatly, and the Phoenicians established the greatest festivals for them. ^C And especially also from their own kings, they bestowed the names upon the cosmic elements and on some of those who were supposed to be gods; but the natural gods—the sun, and the moon, and the remaining planets, and the stars, and the elements, and those akin to these—they recognized as gods alone, so that there were for them some mortal gods, and others immortal.» Having distinguished these things in his introduction, Philo next begins the interpretation of Sanchuniathon, thus setting forth the Phoenician

Theology of the Phoenicians.

CHAPTER X. Phoenician Theology.

For he says they believed this alone to be the god, the lord of heaven, calling him Beelsamen, which in the language of the Phoenicians is Lord of Heaven, and Zeus among the Greeks. After these things he accuses the Greeks of error, saying: "For we have not vainly made these distinctions in many ways, but rather with an eye to the later interpretations of the names ^B given to the things (56), which the Greeks, not understanding, interpreted differently, led astray by the ambiguity of the translation." Next he says that from Genos of Aion and Protogonos there were born again mortal children, whose names were Light, Fire, and Flame. These, he says, discovered fire by rubbing pieces of wood together, and taught its use. And these begot sons, exceeding in size and stature, whose names were given to the mountains which they occupied, from which they were named Cassius, and Libanon, and Antilibanon, and Brathy. From these, he says, were born Memrumus and Hypsuranius. ^C They were designated by their mothers, he says, women of that time who shamelessly consorted with whomsoever they chanced upon. Then he says that Hypsuranius inhabited Tyre, and devised huts made of reeds, and rushes, and papyrus; and he fell into a feud with his brother Usous, who first discovered a covering for the body from the skins of such wild beasts as he was able to catch. And, as there were violent rains and winds, the trees in Tyre were rubbed together and caught fire, and the wood there was consumed. And Usous took to the tree, and having stripped off its branches, was ^D the first to dare to embark upon the sea; and he consecrated two pillars to fire and wind, and worshiped them, and poured libations to them from the wild beasts he had trapped. When these had passed away, he says that those who were left consecrated rods to them, and worshiped the pillars, and held festivals to them every year. Many years later, from the lineage of Hypsuranius, came Agreus and Halieus, the inventors of hunting and fishing, from whom hunters and fishermen were named. From whom were born two brothers who discovered iron and its working; one of them, who was Chrysor, practiced chants and incantations and divinations; and he is Hephaestus, and he found the hook, and the bait, and the line, and the raft, and was the first of all men to sail. Wherefore he was worshipped as a god after his death. And he is also called Diamichius (37).

^A. Nor are there wanting those who would have it that the method of constructing walls and partitions from bricks was devised by his brothers. From his descendants were born two youths, one of whom was named Artifex (the Craftsman), and the other Autochthon (the Earth-born). These were the originators of mixing stubble with brick-clay, of drying the bricks in the sun, and of discovering roofs. From them came others, of whom one was called Agros (the Field), and the other Agrotes (the Husbandman), whose image is held in great veneration and is carried in a chariot in Phoenicia; and in the books ^B he is called the greatest of the gods. These men devised the addition of courts to houses, and of enclosures and caves. From them sprang husbandmen and hunters. These are also called Aletae and Titans. From them were born Amynus and Magus, who showed the way to manage villages and flocks. From them were born Misor and Sydyc, which means "Easily-solved" and "Just." These discovered the use of salt. From Misor came Taautus, who discovered the writing of the first elements; whom the Egyptians call Thoor, the Alexandrians Thoyth, and the Greeks Hermes. From Sydyc came the Dioscuri, or Cabeiri, or Corybantes, or Samothracians. These, he says, were the first to find a ship. From them have been born others, who also discovered herbs, and the healing of bites, and incantations. ^C In their time there was a certain man called Eliun, which means "the Most High," and a woman named Beruth, who lived about Byblos; from whom was born Epigeius or Autochthon, whom they afterwards called Uranus. From him, in turn, the element above us was called Uranus, because of its surpassing beauty. There was born to him a sister from the aforementioned, who was also called Ge (Earth), and because of her beauty, they named the earth itself after her. Her father, the Most High, died in an encounter with wild beasts and was deified, and ^D his children offered him libations and sacrifices. Uranus, having taken over his father’s sovereignty, took his sister Ge to wife, and had by her four children: Ilus, who is also called Cronus, and Betylus, and Dagon, which means "Corn," and Atlas. And by other wives, Uranus had a large progeny. Wherefore Ge, being angry and jealous of Uranus, reproached him, so that they separated from one another. Uranus, having departed from her, would return with violence whenever he wished, and having approached her, he would depart again. He also attempted to destroy the children he had by her. Ge defended herself many times, having gathered an alliance for herself. When Cronus came to manhood, acting with Hermes Trismegistus as his counselor and helper—for he was his secretary—he defended himself against his father Uranus, avenging his mother. From Cronus were born Persephone and Athena. The former died a virgin, but from Athena...

^A and by the counsel of Hermes, Cronus fashioned a sickle and a spear out of iron. Then Hermes, having conferred with the allies of Cronus in words of magic, ignited in those who were around Uranus a desire for battle on behalf of Earth; and thus Cronus, having engaged Uranus in war, drove him from his rule and succeeded to the kingdom. In this battle, the desirable concubine of Uranus was also captured, being pregnant; Cronus gave her in marriage to Dagon. She gave birth, at his house, to the child she carried from Uranus, and he named him Demarous. After these events, Cronus surrounded his own dwelling with a wall and built the first city in Phoenicia, Byblos. After this, Cronus, having become suspicious of his own brother Atlas, cast him into the depths of the earth and buried him, on the advice of Hermes. At this time, descendants of the Dioscuri having constructed rafts and ships, sailed away and, having been thrown up at Mount Cassius, dedicated a temple there. The allies of Ilus—that is, of Cronus—were called Eloim, as if they were those who are called Cronians under Cronus. Cronus, having a son named Sadidus, destroyed him ^B with his own iron, having become suspicious of him, and bereft of life, he himself slew his own child. Likewise, he cut off the head of his own daughter, so that all the gods were struck with terror at the intent of Cronus. But as time went on, Uranus, while in flight, sent his daughter, the virgin Astarte, along with two of her sisters, Rhea and Dione, to slay Cronus by treachery; but Cronus, having captured them, made them his wedded sisters. Uranus, knowing this, marched against Cronus with Heimarmene and Hora, along with other allies; but Cronus, having won these over, kept them with himself. He says, furthermore, that the god Uranus devised Baetylia, having fashioned living stones. To Cronus were born from Astarte seven daughters, Titanides or Artemides. And again, to the same were born from Rhea seven sons, of whom the youngest was consecrated at his birth; and from Dione were born females, and from Astarte again two males, Pothos and Eros. Dagon, because he found the grain and the plough, was called Zeus Arotrius. To Sydycus, who is called the Just, one of the Titanides came ^C and gave birth to Asclepius. There were also born in Peraea (42) to Cronus three sons: Cronus, namesake of his father, and Zeus Belus, and Apollo. Following these are born Pontus and Typhon, and Nereus, the father of Pontus. From Pontus is born Sidon, who, because of the excess of her melodious voice, was the first to discover the hymn of song, and Poseidon. To Demarous is born Melicarthus, who is also Heracles. Then again Uranus battles Pontus, and having deserted, attaches himself to Demarous. Demarous attacks Pontus, but Pontus defeats him, and Demarous prayed for a sacrifice for his flight. In the thirty-second year of his own rule and kingdom, ^D Ilus, which is Cronus, having ambushed his father Uranus in a certain inland place, and having taken him captive

cut off his privy parts near the fountains and rivers. There Uranus was consecrated, and his spirit was breathed out, and the blood of his privy parts dripped into the fountains and the waters of the rivers; and the place is shown to this day. So much for the affairs of Cronus, and such were the noble traditions of the life in the time of Cronus, as they are heralded among the Greeks—those whom they say were the first golden race of articulate men, of that blessed happiness of the ancients. ^B Again, the author adds to these matters, saying: "Astarte the Greatest, and Zeus Demaroon, and Adodus, king of the gods, reigned over the country by the will of Cronus. And Astarte placed the head of a bull as an emblem of royalty upon her own head; and as she traveled about the world, she found an aeropete star, ^C which she took up and consecrated on the holy island of Tyre. The Phoenicians say that Astarte is Aphrodite. And Cronus, as he wandered about the world, gave the kingdom of Attica to his own daughter, Athena. But when a pestilence and mortality occurred, Cronus offered his own only-begotten son as a burnt-offering to his father Uranus, and circumcised himself, and compelled the allies who were with him to do the same; and not long after, he consecrated another of his sons by Rhea, who had died, named Muth—whom the Phoenicians call death, and also Pluto. And in addition to these things, Cronus gave the city of Byblos to the goddess Baaltis, who is also Dione, and gave Berytus to Poseidon and to the Cabeiroi, the Agrioi, and the Halieis, who also consecrated the remains of Pontus at Berytus. Before these events, the god Taautus, having imitated the heavens, delineated the sacred characters of the elements for the gods, Cronus, Dagon, and the rest. He even devised for Cronus the emblems of royalty: four eyes in front and behind—two quietly closing—and upon his shoulders four wings, two as if flying, and two as if lowered. The symbol represented that Cronus could see while sleeping, and slept while awake; and likewise with the wings, that he rested while flying, and flew while resting. To the other gods, he gave to each two wings upon their shoulders, as if they were flying along with Cronus. And to Cronus himself, he gave two wings upon his head: one upon the most sovereign mind, and one upon the sense. When Cronus came into the southern region, he gave all of Egypt to the god Taautus, so that it might be his kingdom. These things, he says, were first of all recorded by the seven sons of Sydek, the Cabeiroi, and their eighth brother, Asclepius, as the god Taautus commanded them. All these things, the son of Thabion, the first hierophant of the Phoenicians who have existed from the beginning of time, allegorized, and having mingled them with physical and cosmic occurrences, he delivered to those who perform the rites and to the prophets who lead the mysteries. And they, devising means to increase the deception from every side, delivered them to their successors and to those who came after them, one of whom was Isiris, the inventor of the three letters, the brother of Chna, the first to be called Phoenician." Then, immediately afterward, he adds:

The Greeks, excelling all others in natural intelligence, first appropriated most of these things, and variously adorned them with additions, ^A seeking to charm by the pleasures of myths, and embellishing them in every way. Hence Hesiod and the cyclical poets, having echoed theogonies, gigantomachies, and titanomachies, fashioned their own, together with castrations, and being carried along by them, they defeated the truth. Our ears, becoming accustomed to their inventions and being preoccupied for many centuries, keep as a deposit the myth-making that they received, just as I said at the beginning. This, being supported by time, has made its hold on them difficult to escape. So that truth seems like trifles, while the spurious nature of the narrative seems like truth.

These things, taken from the writing of Sanchuniathon, interpreted by Philo of Byblos, and truly tested by the testimony of the philosopher Porphyry, should be set before us. ^B The same man, in his treatise on the Jews, writes these further things about Cronus: "Taautus, whom the Egyptians call Thoth, having surpassed the Phoenicians in wisdom, was the first to order the matters of divine worship from the ignorance of the vulgar into scientific training. After many generations, the god Sourmoubelos, and Thourot, who was renamed Chousarthis, followed him and illuminated the theology of Taautus, which was hidden and shadowed by allegories." And a little later he says: "It was a custom among the ancients, in the face of great catastrophes of dangers, to sacrifice the beloved of their children, in place of the destruction of all, to the punishing demons, as a ransom for those who were masters of the city ^C or nation. And those so given were sacrificed mystically. Cronus, then, whom the Phoenicians call Israel, reigning over the land, and later, after the end of his life, being consecrated to the star of Cronus, having a son from a local nymph named Anobret, whom he called Ieoud for this reason, the name 'Only Begotten' still being called so among the Phoenicians even now, when the country was beset by the greatest dangers of war, adorned his son in royal attire and, having prepared an altar, sacrificed him."

The same author, again, having turned to the elements of the Phoenicians from the history of Sanchuniathon, see what he says about the creeping and venomous beasts, which provide no good use to men, but produce destruction and harm wherever the incurable and grievous venom might touch. He writes these things word for word, speaking thus: "The nature of the dragon and of snakes was deified by Taautus himself, and after him by the Phoenicians and Egyptians. For the animal was handed down by him as being more spiritual than all the creeping things, ^D and fiery, by which he also demonstrates an insurmountable speed through the spirit, without the use of feet, hands, or any other external means, from which the rest of the beasts perform their movements."

It produces the patterns of various shapes, and in its forward motion, it has spiral impulses, and a speed as great as it desires. And it is also very long-lived, not only because it grows young again by casting off its old age, but it is also naturally capable of receiving greater growth. And when it has fulfilled its destined measure, it consumes itself, even as Taautus himself has similarly set it down in the sacred writings. Wherefore this creature has been included in holy and mysterious rites. We have spoken of it more at length in the commentaries inscribed ^A *Ethothia*, in which it is established that it is immortal and resolves back into itself, as has been set forth; for this creature does not die by a natural death, unless it is struck by some violence. The Phoenicians call it a good daemon; the Egyptians do likewise, naming it Cneph; they add to it a hawk’s head, both on account of the hawk’s active nature. And Epheis, the one who was named among them the greatest hierophant and sacred scribe, who was translated into the Greek tongue by Areius of Heracleopolis, says in allegory, word for word, as follows: 'The first divine being is a serpent having the form of a hawk, very graceful, who, if he looks up, fills the whole with light in his primordial abode; but if he closes his eyes, darkness follows.' Epheis gives the explanation that it is also fiery, by saying that it shines through; for it is the property of light to shine through. From the Phoenicians, Pherecydes also took the starting points and theologized about the god called by him Ophioneus, and the Ophionidae, of whom we shall speak further. Moreover, the Egyptians, describing the universe from the same conception, draw a circular, airy, and fiery-looking sphere, and ^B a serpent stretched through the middle, having a hawk’s form; and the whole figure is like the letter Theta among us, indicating by the circle the world, and by the serpent in the middle the sustainer of it, signifying a good daemon. Zoroaster the Magus also says word for word in the sacred collection of Persian [rites]: 'And the god is one having a hawk's head. This is the first, indestructible, eternal, unbegotten, indivisible, most unlike anything else, the charioteer of all that is good, uncorruptible, the most excellent of goods, the wisest of the wise. He is also the father of good order and justice, self-taught, natural, and perfect, and wise, and the sole discoverer of sacred nature.' Ostanes says the same things about him in the work inscribed *Octateuch*. All having taken their starting points from him, they philosophized about nature, as has been set forth; and the first elements, those through serpents, they consecrated by constructing temples, and to these they performed sacrifices, festivals, and orgies, considering them the greatest gods and the authors of all things. So much for the serpents.

^A Such, then, is the character of the Phoenician theology. The saving Word of the Gospel commands us to turn away from it without looking back, and to pursue the cure for the madness of the ancients. That these things are not myths or fictions of poets, concealing some theory within their allegorical meanings, but are rather the true testimonies of the wise and ancient—as they themselves call them, "theologians"—containing matters older than all poets and chroniclers, and that they gain credibility from the names and histories of the gods which still to this day hold sway in the cities and villages of Phoenicia, as well as from the mysteries performed among each of them, should be manifest: so that there is no longer any need to search out forced physical explanations for these things, since the facts themselves carry their own clear refutation. Such, indeed, is the Phoenician theology. It is now time to move on and observe that of the Egyptians.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL, BOOK TWO.

^A 1. An epitome of the theology of the Egyptians, and how it passed from them to the Greeks. 2. An epitome of the myths concerning the gods and heroes among the Greeks. 3. An epitome of the secret rites and hidden mysteries contained in the superstition of the many gods. 4. By what arguments we have been brought to turn away from accepting such opinions concerning the gods. 5. A recapitulation of the matters previously stated. 6. That the things called temples of the gods are tombs of the dead. 7. What Plato thought concerning the theology of the ancients. 8. On the theology of the Romans.

PROEM

Such, then, are the contents of the theology of the Phoenicians. The salutary doctrine of the Gospel commands us to turn away from these irrevocably ^B and to pursue eagerly the cure for the insanity of the ancients. But that these are not myths or fabrications of poets involving some hidden contemplation within their recondite meanings, but rather the genuine testimonies of those whom they themselves call wise and ancient theologians—testimonies which contain matters more ancient than all the poets and prose writers, and which secure their own credibility from the very appellation and history of the gods still prevailing to this day in the cities and villages of Phoenicia, as well as from the mysteries ^C celebrated among them according to ancient rite—any one, I think, may understand from the common agreement of the rest of the authors and even of those who are considered theologians. For it is evident from this that those ancients who first established the matters concerning the gods did not refer them to natural allegories, nor did they allegorize the myths concerning the gods, but kept the histories in their literal sense. For these ^D

very words of theirs, which we have praised, declare this, so that there is no longer any need to search for strained physical explanations of these matters, since they are maintained by the most certain arguments and proofs which they provide of their own accord and by themselves. Let this, then, suffice regarding the theology of the Phoenicians. ^B It is now time for us to pass on to the sacred rites and teachings of the Egyptians, so that it may be clearly understood and perceived by all whether or not we have decided, after diligent and mature deliberation, to depart from them, and that this counsel of ours, based on reasons drawn from the Evangelical Demonstration itself, may be seen to have been successfully and happily applied first to the Egyptians, and then in turn to all others who were united with them in these opinions and views. Now, Manetho the Egyptian explained their entire history at considerable length in the Greek language, and he covered, particularly those things that pertained to their theology, both in his *Sacred Book* and in certain other works. But since Diodorus, whom we mentioned earlier, who collected diverse histories from many sources and grasped the rites of each in as accurate a manner as was possible, a man truly most famous and one who obtained no small reputation for learning among all those devoted to refined literature, thus gathered the whole of ancient history into one body, as it were, aptly connecting what follows with what came before, so that he took the beginning of his entire work from that theology of the Egyptians: I think I would be doing something worthwhile if I were to set forth before the eyes of all, in the light of day, those things taken from the same source which are relevant to the discussion before us, ^C because Greek men are more frequently engaged in the reading of this author. Therefore, he records these things verbatim.

CHAPTER 1

An epitome of the theology of the Egyptians, and how it passed over to the Greeks.

• They say, he says, that the Egyptians [say] that at the beginning of the genesis of the universe, the first men came into being in Egypt, partly ^D because of the singular temperateness of the whole region, and partly because of the nature of the Nile; for this river, because it is extremely fertile and provides food that springs up of its own accord, easily nourishes the living things that are born. And as for the gods themselves, they were originally mortal men, but because of their wisdom and their common beneficence toward the human race, they attained immortality, and some of them became kings. When these are interpreted, some are found to have the same names as the heavenly bodies, while others had their own names proper to themselves—Helios, and Cronus, and Rhea, and besides these, Zeus, who is called Ammon by some; and in addition to these, Hera and Hephaestus, and further, Hestia, and finally Hermes. And first Helios ruled over those in Egypt, being of the same name as the star in the heavens. But some of the priests say that Hephaestus ruled first, having been the discoverer of fire. After this

Saturn ^A succeeded to the empire, and from his sister Ops, whom he had taken as his wife, he begat either Osiris and Isis, as some write, or, as the majority assert, Jove and Juno, who subsequently ruled over the whole world because of their transcendent virtue. They begat five gods: Osiris, and Isis, and Typhon, and Apollo, and Aphrodite. And they say that Osiris is Dionysus, and Isis is Demeter. Having married her, Osiris took over the kingdom, and performed many deeds for the benefit of the common good, and built a city with a hundred gates in the Thebaid, which some call the city of Zeus, and others call Thebes. He also founded a temple to his parents, Zeus and Hera, and golden temples to the other gods, to each of whom he assigned specific honors and appointed the priests who were to care for them. They also say that ^B Osiris was the discoverer of the vine, and that he was the first to use wine and taught the rest of humanity agriculture. Hermes was held by him in the highest honor, as he was gifted with an exceptional nature for devising things that could benefit human life. For he is said to have been the discoverer of letters, to have ordered the sacrifices of the gods, to have invented the lyre, and to have taught the Greeks interpretation—whence he was called Hermes—and he also discovered the plant of the olive. Now when Osiris was traversing the entire inhabited world, he appointed Busiris over Phoenicia, and Antaeus over Ethiopia and Libya. He himself set out on an expedition with his brother Apollo, who is said to have been the discoverer of the laurel plant. His two sons, Anubis and Macedon, also accompanied Osiris on his expedition; and he took with him Pan, whom the Egyptians honor with a special veneration, and in whose name they built the city of Pan. While he was in the region of Taposiris, the race of the Satyrs was brought to him. And since he was a lover of music, he took with him a multitude of musicians, among whom were also nine maidens skilled in singing and no less learned in other branches of knowledge—those whom the Greeks call the Muses, led by Apollo. And since every nation received Osiris as a god on account of his benefits, he left behind monuments to himself everywhere, and founded not a few cities in India. He also went through the other nations in Phrygia, and crossed the Hellespont into Europe, and left his son Macedon as king of Macedonia, while entrusting the cultivation of the fields of the Attic region to Triptolemus; and after these things, having passed from among men to become a god, he received from Isis and Hermes the honors of a temple and the other honors most illustrious among the gods. And he also established mysteries for him, and delivered many things in secret regarding him. He was slain by his brother Typhon, who was a wicked and impious man; who, having divided the body of the murdered man into twenty-six parts, gave a portion to each of those who had conspired with him, wishing for everyone to share in the pollution. Isis, who was the sister of Osiris and his wife, sought to avenge the murder, aided by her son

^A Horus. After she had destroyed Typhon and those who had acted with him, near the village now called Antaeus, she reigned over Egypt. They say that when she found all the parts of his body, except for the private parts of Osiris, she fashioned for each part an image of human form, similar in size to Osiris, out of aromatics and wax, and handed them over to the priests throughout all of Egypt to venerate, and she consecrated one of the animals produced among them, whichever they wished. The sacred bulls, known as Apis and Mnevis, were consecrated to Osiris, and it was established that all Egyptians should revere these as gods. For these [were the ones who] had assisted those who discovered the grain harvest for sowing and for general farming. It is said, moreover, that ^B Isis swore that she would no longer receive the intimacy of any man, and when she herself departed from among men, she obtained immortal honors and was buried at Memphis. Now as for the parts of Osiris that were recovered, they say that they were granted burial in the manner described, but his private parts, which they say were thrown into the river by Typhon, were nevertheless granted by Isis the same divine honors as the others. For she fashioned an image of him in the temples, established honors and rites, and made the sacrifices held for this god worthy of reverence. Hence the Greeks, too, having received from the Egyptians the matters concerning the orgiastic rites and the Dionysiac festivals, revere this member in their mysteries and in the rites and sacrifices of this god, calling it the *phallos*. Those who say that this god was born at Thebes in Boeotia of Semele and Zeus are improvising. For Orpheus, having traveled to Egypt and participated in the ritual, and having been initiated into the Dionysiac mysteries, and being a friend of the Cadmeans ^C and honored by them, transferred the birth of the god to accommodate them. The masses, partly because of ignorance and partly because they wished for the god to be called Greek, received the rites and mysteries with favor. Orpheus had the following motives for the transmutation of the god’s birth and ritual. Cadmus, being from Thebes in Egypt, had fathered, among other children, Semele, and she, having been corrupted by Zeus at that time, became pregnant and gave birth after seven months to an infant, just as those in Egypt believe Osiris to have been. Cadmus, upon the infant's death, gilded the body, performed the customary sacrifices for it, and ascribed the birth to Zeus, honoring Osiris and taking away the stigma from the one who had been corrupted. Hence, the account was spread among the Greeks that Semele, the daughter of Cadmus, had borne Osiris from Zeus. Afterwards, when the mythographers appeared, they filled the theater and engendered a strong and unchangeable belief in those who came after. In general, they say that the Greeks lay claim to the most illustrious heroes and gods of the Egyptians. For they even say that Heracles is Egyptian by race ^D and that he obtained distinct honors from Isis and Mercury, who taught him not only sacrifices and religions, but also devised most of the things involved in his mysteries for his sake. However, they tradition that he was killed by his brother Typhon, a most wicked and impious man, who split his corpse into twenty-six pieces and distributed them among as many accomplices in the murder, desiring that all should be bound by this monstrous crime. Isis, however, because she was both sister and wife to Osiris, with her son Horus assisting her, avenged the parricide, and when she had destroyed Typhon and the rest of the ministers of the crime around the place which is now called the district of Antaeus, she ruled over all Egypt. Furthermore, when she found all the members of his body except for his private parts, she enclosed the individual parts into individual human effigies that resembled Osiris in size, fashioned from aromatics and wax, and delivered them to the priests throughout all Egypt to be worshipped, so that of the animals born among them, they might consecrate whichever they saw fit; the bulls, which are called holy, and those they call Apis and Mnevis, were dedicated by the same. Thus, it was established that all Egyptians should venerate such animals with divine honors, since it was evident that they had been useful above all others to the first inventors of grain, both for committing seed to the earth and for the other labors of agriculture. Moreover, they say that this same Isis confirmed with an oath that she would not admit the intimacy of any man hereafter; and when she had finished her life, she obtained immortal honors and was buried near Memphis. Now when the members of Osiris had been found and consigned to burial in the mode we described a little earlier, they say that Isis nevertheless honored his private parts, which had been cast into the river by Typhon, with divine worship just as the others. For she erected an image of them in the temples and saw to it that rites and ceremonies be celebrated with the highest degree of religious devotion, along with the lawful and solemn sacrifices of this god. For this reason, the Greeks themselves, who received the orgiastic rites along with the festivals of Bacchus from the Egyptians, were accustomed to revere that member by the name of *phallos*, both in their mysteries and in the initiations and sacrifices of that deity. Indeed, those who say that this god was born at Thebes in Boeotia of Jove and Semele express this rashly and lightly. For Orpheus, when he had migrated to Egypt and been initiated into those rites, and had come into the share and society of those very mysteries of Bacchus, on account of the friendship that existed between him and the Cadmeans, and the honors he had received from them, transferred the origin of that deity for their sake; but the multitude, partly through ignorance of the truth, and partly through that ignorance of the true father, would celebrate [the god] as the offspring of Bacchus from Cadmus.

^A For they claim that, because of his bravery, he traveled over much of the inhabited world, and that the Greeks claimed him for their own, even though he was different from the one born later to Alcmene among the Greeks. They say also that Perseus was born in Egypt, and that the origin of Isis was transferred by the Greeks to Argos, as they mythologize that she was Io, who was transformed into the shape of a heifer, and that the same person is considered by some to be Isis, by others Demeter, by others Thesmophoros, by others the Moon, and by others Hera. Osiris, meanwhile, is considered by some to be Sarapis, by others Dionysus, by others Pluto, by others Ammon, by others Zeus, and by others Pan. They say that Isis was the discoverer of many remedies and of the medical art; she also discovered the remedy of immortality, by which she not only restored the soul of her son Horus, who had been plotted against by ^B the Titans and found dead in the water, but also caused him to partake of immortality. Horus, being the last of the gods, reigned over Egypt. They say that by interpretation his name is Apollo, and that having been taught medicine and divination by his mother Isis, he benefits mankind through oracles and healings. It is agreed among most that during the time of Isis, certain giants of immense size, equipped with prodigious armor, waged war against the gods around Zeus and Osiris. They also say that this is the origin of the Egyptian law for men to marry their sisters, because Isis married Osiris, who was her brother. And these things are what they relate concerning these matters.

Regarding the animals consecrated ^C in Egypt, a certain such account prevails among them. Some say that those who were gods from the beginning, being few in number and overpowered by the multitude and the impiety of earth-born men, assumed the likeness of certain irrational animals, and thus escaped; afterwards, in gratitude for their salvation, they consecrated the natures of the animals whose likeness they had assumed. Others say that in battles against their enemies, they fashioned images of the animals which they now honor, and that the leaders wore these on their heads, and that this served as a mark of their authority; and in their victories against their enemies, they deified the animals, as having been the causes [of victory], whose images they had worn. ^D Others bring forward a third cause, asserting that they were honored because of their utility. For the female cow births and plows. Sheep give birth and provide coverings, as well as food through milk and cheese. The dog aids man in hunting and is a guardian. Wherefore the god called Anubis among them is represented as having the head of a dog, indicating that he was the bodyguard of those around Osiris and Isis. Some say that dogs led the way for Isis at the time when she was searching for Osiris, keeping away wild beasts and those they encountered. And they say the cat is useful against asps and other biting reptiles, and the ichneumon against crocodiles, in that it crushes and destroys them.

^A For it rolls itself in mud, and leaping into their gaping mouths, it eats through their insides and leaves them dead. ^B Among birds, the ibis is useful against snakes, locusts, and caterpillars; the hawk against scorpions, cerastes, and small biting beasts, and also because it contributes to divination; the eagle, because it is kingly. They say the goat is deified, just as Priapus is among the Greeks, because of the generative member, for this animal is the most prone of all to sexual intercourse, and that part of the body which is the cause of generation is honored becomingly, as being the principle of the nature of animals. And in general, the genitals are consecrated—not only among the Egyptians, but among many others—in their rites, as being the cause of the generation of animals. And the priests who take up the hereditary priesthoods in Egypt are initiated into this god. They say that the Pans and Satyrs are honored among men for the same reason. This is also why most people set up their images in the temples, erect, and resembling the nature of the goat, for this animal is said to be most energetic in sexual intercourse. The sacred bulls, Apis and Mnevis, are honored in a way similar to the gods, both for the sake of agriculture and because they attribute the discovery of fruits to them. Wolves are honored because of their resemblance in nature to dogs, and because they say that in ancient times, while Isis with her son Horus was about to contend with Typhon, Osiris came from Hades to help his son and wife, having been transformed in appearance into a wolf. Others say that when the Ethiopians campaigned against Egypt, they were driven off by a multitude of wolves, which is why that region was called Lycopolites. And they say the crocodile is revered because those who come as robbers from Arabia and Libya dare not swim across the Nile for fear of the crocodiles. They even say that one of their kings, being pursued by his own dogs, fled into the lake, and was then paradoxically taken up by a crocodile and carried to the other side. ^C Others offer another cause for the honor paid to irrational animals: they say that when the multitude rebelled against the kings in ancient times and were in agreement to no longer be ruled by kings, they devised to provide them with various objects of worship from the animals, so that since each group revered a different animal, and despised what was held sacred by others, they might never be able to reach consensus, and so all the people of Egypt might never revolt. When any of these aforementioned animals dies, they wrap it in linen, and having beaten their breasts with lamentation, they bury it in sacred coffers. Whoever kills one of these animals intentionally is punished by death, unless it is a cat or an ibis that he kills. For if one kills these, whether intentionally or unintentionally, he is invariably punished by death. ^D Moreover, in whichever house a dog is found to have died, all the inhabitants shave their entire bodies and make lamentation.

And even if there should happen to be wine, or grain, or any of the necessities of life stored in the house, they would not endure to use them any longer. ^A They feed the Apis in Memphis and the Mnevis in Heliopolis; they feed the goat in Mendes, and the crocodile in Lake Moeris, and the rest of the beasts in sacred enclosures, offering them fine flour, or boiling groats in milk, and mixing all kinds of cakes with honey, as well as goose meat, some of which they boil and some they roast. To those that eat raw flesh, they throw many birds, and they keep and feed the most beautiful females for each of these animals, whom they call concubines. When the Apis has died and been buried with great magnificence, they look for another that is like him. When one is found, the multitudes are delivered from their fear and mourning; the calf is then led first to the city of the Nile. ^B And at that time alone do the women see him, standing face to face, and showing themselves by lifting up their own genitals. During all the rest of the time, it is forbidden for them to come into the sight of this god. They say that the soul of Osiris migrated into him after his death. Such is the shameful atheism, or rather theology, of the Egyptians, to which even the mere standing in opposition is a disgrace. Having rightly loathed this, we have departed from it, having found no other deliverance and freedom from such evils except through the salvation-bringing and evangelical teaching alone, which has proclaimed to those blind in their understanding the recovery of sight. We shall examine the more solemn speculations and natural philosophies of these same people a little later, after we have also discussed the Hellenic matters. ^C Thus, then, with the mingling of both Egyptian and Phoenician mythology, the superstition of the ancient error has naturally prevailed among most of the nations. But we must also speak of the things of the Greeks. The solemnities of the Egyptian mythology are encompassed in the manner already set forth, but that the Hellenic things are fragments and mishearings of these very same things has been mentioned already many times, and also through the discernment of the authors previously cited. However, it may also become evident from the Greek theology itself, as they introduce in their own accounts of the gods nothing from their own source, but rather from the mythologies they have encountered from outside. For they are shown to use both similar wooden images and the same mysteries, as it is possible to learn from the history concerning these things, which he who collected the libraries into one and the same place—whom I have also mentioned before in the third and fourth books of his aforementioned work—records, having made the beginning of the history from the times of Cadmus. ^D As for Cadmus, the accurate successions of the chronographies show that he was after Moses, as we shall demonstrate in its proper time, so that Moses is shown to predate even the Hellenic gods; if, indeed,1 he is before Cadmus, but the gods appear to have been born in an age later than Cadmus. Hear, then, the words of the author.

CHAPTER II. An epitome of those things which are fabulously invented concerning the gods and heroes of the Greeks.

^A They say that Cadmus, son of Agenor, was sent from Phoenicia by order of the king to search for Europa, whom Jupiter had carried off. Not having found her, he came to Boeotia and founded the city of Thebes there, and having married Harmonia, daughter of Aphrodite, he begat Semele and her sisters by her. And when Jupiter had had intercourse with Semele, she begged that he would practice the same associations with her as he did with Juno. But when he appeared in his divine majesty with thunders and lightnings, Semele, being pregnant, could not endure it; she miscarried the child and was consumed by the fire. Jupiter, they say, took the child and handed him over to Hermes, by whom he was sent off to a cave in Nysa, located between Phoenicia and the Nile. Thus reared by the Nymphs, Dionysus became the inventor of wine and taught men the cultivation of the vine. ^B He also discovered the drink prepared from barley, which is called zythos; and he led about an army composed not only of men, but also of women, and punished the unjust and impious among men, and campaigned in India for a period of three years. Hence the Greeks instituted triennial sacrifices to Dionysus, and believe that the god performs his manifestations among men during this specific time; and that all men worship him, because...

(52) They say that Cadmus, son of Agenor, was sent from Phoenicia by the order of the king for the sake of searching for Europa, whom Jupiter had abducted. Not having found her, he came to Boeotia and built Thebes, located there, and having married Harmonia, the daughter of Aphrodite, they begat Semele and her sisters. To Semele, Jupiter, having consorted with her, was prevailed upon to grant the same associations as he had with Hera. But when he approached in a god-like manner with thunders and lightnings, Semele, being pregnant, could not bear it, and miscarried the fetus, and was herself destroyed by the fire. And Jupiter, having taken the child, handed him over to Hermes; he sent him to the cave that is in Nysa, lying between Phoenicia and the Nile. Being reared in this way by the Nymphs, Dionysus became the discoverer of wine, and taught humans the planting of the vine. He also discovered the drink being prepared from barley, which is called zythos; and he led around an army, not only of men but also of women, and punished the unjust and impious of men, and campaigned into the Indian land for a three-year period. From this, the Greeks established triennial sacrifices to Dionysus, and consider that the god makes his manifestations among men during this time; and that all men revere him, because...

^A of the gift of wine, just as they revere Demeter for the discovery of the sustenance of grain. They say that there was also another Dionysus, who lived long before this one, called by some Sabazius, the son of Zeus and Persephone, whose birth, sacrifices, and nocturnal and secret rites they introduce on account of the shame following the sexual union—he, too, they say, was the first to attempt to yoke oxen, from which circumstance they depict him with horns. ^B They say that the younger one, born of Semele, was delicate in body, excelled in beauty, and was exceedingly prone to erotic pleasures. In his military expeditions, he led about a host of women equipped with spears covered in ivy. They say that the Muses accompanied him, being virgins, and possessed of exceptional learning; through their singing and dancing, they refreshed the god’s spirit; and they assign Silenus to him as a tutor, from whose precepts he derived great assistance toward virtue. They say that he wore a headband (mitra) bound about his head because of the sharp headaches he suffered from the immoderate consumption of wine; and they call him "twice-born" (Bimatris) because, while there was but one father, there were two distinct Dionysuses born of two mothers. They offer him a fennel stalk (narthex) because the ancients, having been driven to frenzy and madness by the persistent use of pure wine, would strike one another with sticks, sometimes leading to deaths; for this reason he showed them how to use the stalk instead of wood. They say he was called Bacchus from the Bacchantes (Bacchai), Lenaeus from the treading of grapes in wine-presses (lenoi), and Bromius from the roaring sound (bromos) that occurred at his birth. They say that he led Satyrs around with him in his dances and tragedies, providing him with delight and pleasure, and that he invented the theater and systems of musical performances. Such are the things said about Dionysus. They say that Priapus is a son of Dionysus and Aphrodite, because those who are intoxicated are naturally aroused to sexual pleasure. Some say that the ancients used the name Priapus mythologically for the male organ. Others say that, because the generative member is the cause of the birth of men, it was for this reason worthy of immortal honor for all time. Just as the Egyptians say that Isis, while searching for the limbs of Osiris, was unable to find his organ, and so commanded that it be honored as a god, and had it set up in the temple in an erect state. ^D But even among the Greeks, this god receives some honor not only in the Dionysiac mysteries, but in all others as well, being introduced into their sacrifices with laughter and play—just as is Hermaphroditus, who is said to have been born of Hermes and Aphrodite, and who received that name. They say this god makes an appearance among men at certain times, and is born having the nature of a body both male and female. Others hold that such creatures are monstrosities, occurring rarely, and being portents sometimes of evils and sometimes of good things. As for the Muses, they are the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne; some say of Uranus and Gaia. Most mythologize them as virgins, and say they received their name from the instruction of men, for this is...

thought to guide them to honest things.

Regarding Heracles, the Greeks say the following: ^A that from Danaë, daughter of Acrisios, and Zeus, Perseus was born; from Perseus and Andromeda, Electryon; and from him was born Alcmene, with whom Zeus lay to beget Heracles. They say that when he lay with her, he made the night three times its length; and that this alone of Zeus’s unions did not take place for the sake of erotic desire, as was the case with other women, but primarily for the sake of begetting offspring. ^B Juno, out of jealousy, hindered Alcmene’s labor and brought Eurystheus into the light before the proper time, because Zeus had foretold that whoever was born on that day would rule over the race of the Perseidae. It is said that when Alcmene gave birth, she exposed the infant out of fear of Juno. But Athena, having admired the infant, persuaded Juno to offer him her breast. When the child pulled at the breast more violently than his age allowed, Juno, feeling pain, threw the child away; but Athena, having taken him up, urged his mother to nurse him. After this, Juno sent two serpents to devour the infant, but the child, not being afraid, gripped the neck of each with his hands and strangled the serpents. ^C When Heracles reached manhood, Eurystheus, who held the kingdom of Argolis, ordered him to complete twelve labors. Having fallen into great helplessness, Juno sent madness upon him; distressed in soul, he fell into a frenzy. As the affliction grew, he lost his senses and attempted to kill his companion and nephew Iolaus; and as the latter fled, he shot his own children, born from Megara, the daughter of King Creon, as if they were enemies. After this, having gradually become calm, he served Eurystheus for the twelve labors. He also destroyed the Centaurs, among whom was Chiron, who was famed for medicine. ^D They say that something peculiar happened in the birth of this god. For Zeus first lay with a mortal woman, Niobe, the daughter of Phoroneus, and lastly with Alcmene, the mother of Heracles. They genealogize her as the sixteenth generation from Niobe. With her, he ended his union with mortal women. But after Heracles had completed his labors, he gave his own wife Megara in marriage to Iolaus, his nephew, because of the tragedy concerning their children. He himself, having asked for Iole, the daughter of Eurytus, in marriage, and having been refused by her father, fell ill and received an oracle that he would be released from his disease if he were first sold into slavery. Having sailed therefore to Phrygia, he was sold by one of his friends and became a slave to Omphale, who was then queen of the Maeonians, now called Lydians. During the time of his slavery, a son, Cleolaus, was born to him by a slave. Having married Omphale, he also had children by her. Returning to Arcadia, he stayed with King Aleus, and having secretly lain with his daughter and made her pregnant, he went away. After this, he again married Deianeira, the daughter of Oeneus, after her death [that is, the previous husband’s death], Augē.

Augē. ^B Having taken as a captive the daughter of Phyleus, he lay with her and begat Tlepolemus. While dining, he became intoxicated and killed with a blow of his fist the server who had made some mistake in his duties. When, as he was traveling, he came to the river Evenus, he encountered the centaur Nessus, who ferried travelers across the river for a fee. Nessus ferried Deianeira across first, and, being enamored of her beauty, he attempted to rape her. As she called out to her husband for help, Hercules shot the centaur with an arrow. While in the midst of the act, and dying immediately because of the severity of the wound, Nessus told Deianeira that he would give her a love charm, so that Hercules would never desire to approach any other woman. He urged her, therefore, to take the seed that had fallen from him, mix it with oil and the blood dripping from his arrowhead, and anoint Hercules’ tunic with it. Deianeira did this and kept the drug in her possession. Again, Hercules took the daughter of Phylas as a captive, and, having lain with her, begat a son, Antiochus. And again, having taken as a captive Astyaneira, the daughter of the king of the Armenii, and having lain with her, he begat a son, Ctesippus. The Athenian Thespius, the son of Erechtheus, having had fifty daughters by various wives, and being extremely desirous that they should conceive children by Hercules, invited Hercules to a sacrifice and, having entertained him sumptuously, sent one of his daughters to him. He slept with all of them in one night and became the father of those called the Thespiads. Having also taken Iole as a captive, and while performing a sacrifice, he sent to his wife Deianeira requesting a tunic and cloak, which he was accustomed to wear for sacrifices. She anointed the tunic with the love charm given by the centaur and sent it. Hercules put on the tunic and fell into the greatest misfortune. For the barb of the arrow, which had been stained by the Hydra’s blood, caused the tunic, by reason of the heat, to consume the flesh of his body. Becoming filled with pain, he killed the person who had served him, and he himself, according to an oracle, gave himself over to the fire. Thus he ended his life. And such are the matters concerning Hercules.

Regarding Asclepius, they say that he was the son of Apollo and Phormyonis, that he zealously pursued the medical art, and that he advanced so far in renown that he miraculously healed many of those who were given up for dead. Consequently, Zeus was angered and struck him dead with a thunderbolt. Apollo, in turn, was angered by the destruction of his son and killed the Cyclopes who had fashioned the thunderbolt for Zeus. Upon their death, Zeus was angered, and he commanded Apollo to serve as a hired laborer for Admetus and to accept this as punishment for his own crime. ^D These things, then, Diodorus has recorded in the fourth book of his *Bibliotheca*. He invites him to some solemn sacrifice and sends him to each one separately.

son of Apollo by Phoronis, and because he cultivated the art of medicine with special zeal, he attained such praise and glory in it that he restored many, whose health was already despaired of, to safety beyond all expectation; this Jupiter took ill, and having struck him with a thunderbolt, deprived him of life. Apollo, indeed, was gravely disturbed by the destruction of his son, and killed the Cyclopes who were the makers of that thunderbolt; for which slaughter Jupiter, being more vehemently embittered, ordered Apollo to perform humble and menial labor for King Admetus, and exacted this penalty from him for his committed crime. And these things Diodorus commemorates in the fourth book of his *Bibliotheca*.

The same author, moreover, teaching that the Greeks gathered the remainder of their theology in like manner from foreign nations, writes thus in the third book of his history: ^B "They say, then, that Coelus [Uranus] first reigned among the Atlantians, and that he begat forty-five children by several wives, of whom they claim that eighteen were born of the mother Titaea. She, because she had flourished with a singular praise of temperance and had merited so well of her own, is said to have attained divinity after her death and to have been called by the new name of Earth. Furthermore, they praise the daughters of Coelus, Basilea and Rhea, who is also called Pandora. And they say that Basilea, because she had brought up her brothers with true maternal benevolence, was titled 'Mother'; and when Coelus had already departed this life, she entered into matrimony with her brother Hyperion, and bore two children, whom she named Sol and Luna. But the brothers of Rhea, fearing for themselves, killed Hyperion first, and then drowned Sol in the waters of the river Eridanus. ^C Luna, however, having received the report of this dire calamity, threw herself headlong from the rooftop; and finally the mother, driven by frenzy, with disheveled hair and showing the divine inspiration and impulse through drums and cymbals, wandered throughout the whole region, until she too vanished from the eyes of all. Therefore the multitude, stunned by the strangeness of this event, transferred Sol and Luna to the twin stars of heaven, and honored their mother in the place of a goddess, having erected altars, and having adopted the similar clatter of drums and cymbals to worship her."

^D "But indeed the Phrygians say that a certain Meon, king of Phrygia, had a daughter named Cybele, who first discovered the pipe, and was called the Mountain Mother; and that Marsyas, a Phrygian by birth, who was an intimate friend of hers, fashioned the flutes and preserved the integrity of his body immune and free from venereal things until the end. They add further that the father of Cybele, when he discovered that she was pregnant from her association with Attis, made away not only with Attis, but also with her very nurses; which destruction of the youth so inflamed the mind of Cybele..." How correct this notation is, let the mythologists determine. See p. 114 A, penultimate.

^A Moreover, that Marsyas, after having spent as much time as possible with her, was subsequently flayed alive by Apollo, who had carried off the victory in the musical contest held between them, is recorded. Furthermore, they say that Apollo, burning with love for Cybele, accompanied her even as far as the Hyperboreans in her wanderings, and that he ordered the body of Attis to be buried and Cybele herself to be worshipped as a goddess. For this reason, the Phrygians even to this day observe this custom, pursuing the death of the youth with tears and lamentation, and, having built altars, they honor both Attis and Cybele with sacrifices. Later on, they built a proud and magnificent temple to him in the Phrygian city of Pessinus, and instituted sacrifices and divine honors for him with the greatest and most splendid pageantry.

Now, after the passing of Hyperion, the sons of Coelus divided the kingdom among themselves, the most famous of whom were Atlas and Saturn. Atlas held the lands near the Ocean, being distinguished by a rare knowledge of astronomy. He is said to have had seven daughters, named the Atlantides, who, having been united with the most noble gods, became the founders of a most numerous race, having brought forth, by reason of their virtue, both gods and heroes. Of these, the eldest, Maia, having been joined to Jupiter, bore Mercury. ^B Saturn, no less famous for his avarice than for his lust and intemperance, took his sister Rhea in marriage, by whom he fathered Jupiter. They further mention another Jupiter, who was the brother of Coelus and had reigned in Crete, whom, however, the later one surpassed by a long interval of dignity and glory. For the latter held sway over the whole world, whereas the former had ruled only over Crete, where he had sired ten sons called the Curetes; and rumors say that his tomb is still shown to this day in Crete. Furthermore, Saturn held Sicily, Libya, and Italy under his sway, whose son Jupiter adopted a manner of life entirely contrary to his father’s. Some claim that he seized the kingdom when his father willingly yielded it; others, that he was chosen by the consent of the peoples who pursued the father with hatred. And when Saturn, relying on the help of the Titans, marched against his son, Jupiter won the battle and subsequently traveled over the entire world. ^C He distinguished himself not only by the strength of his body, but also by the praise of his other virtues, and applied all his care and study to visiting the wicked with deserved punishments, while he heaped benefits upon the good. This is stated to be the reason why, when he was removed from human affairs, they called him "Zena," the parent of life, because he appeared to have been the author of living well to mankind. And these are the heads of the accounts pertaining to the Atlanteans. They say the Greeks also make use of these.

Diodorus says this in the third book of his *Histories*. The same author, in the sixth book, drawing from the writings of Euhemerus of Messene, confirms this same theology, saying word for word: ^D "Regarding the gods, then, the ancients of mankind have handed down to those who came after them two different concepts. For some they say are eternal and incorruptible, such as the sun and moon, and the other stars in the heavens, and in addition to these, the winds and others who have attained a nature similar to these. Each of these, they say, has its birth and persistence as eternal. Others, however, they claim to be terrestrial gods who, on account of their services to mankind, 60 attained..."

honors and glory—such as Heracles, Dionysus, Aristaeus, and others of this kind. ^A Regarding the earthly gods, many and varied traditions are handed down by both historians and mythologizers. Among the historians, Euhemerus, who wrote the *Sacred Record*, has set forth his own account, while among the mythologizers, Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, and others of that sort have invented more monstrous myths about the gods. We, however, shall attempt to traverse briefly what is recorded by both parties, with an eye to due proportion.

Euhemerus, then, having been a friend of King Cassander, and for this reason compelled to discharge certain royal duties and undertake long journeys, says that he was carried southwards into the Ocean. After setting sail from "Happy" Arabia, he relates that he pursued his voyage through the Ocean for many days, until he reached certain remote and outlying islands, the most prominent of which was called Panchaea. ^B There he claims to have seen the Panchaean islanders, who were distinguished for their piety and religion, and who worshipped the gods with the most magnificent sacrificial apparatus and notable votive offerings of silver and gold; indeed, the island itself was sacred to the gods. There were many other things to be admired there, both for their antiquity and for the high level of craftsmanship in their construction, regarding which we have written in detail in the preceding books. He says there was on the island, on an exceptionally high hill, a temple of Zeus Triphylius, set up by Zeus himself at the time when he ruled the entire inhabited world, while he was still living among men. In this temple, there was a golden stele on which the deeds of Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus were summarized in Panchaean characters. ^C Following this, he says that Uranus was the first to reign, being a gentle man, a benefactor, and one knowledgeable in the movements of the stars. He was the first to honor the celestial gods with sacrifices, for which reason he was called Uranus. He had sons by his wife Hestia—Pan and Cronus—as well as daughters, Rhea and Demeter. After Uranus, Cronus reigned, and by marrying Rhea, he begat Zeus, Hera, and Poseidon. Zeus, having succeeded Cronus in the kingdom, married Hera, Demeter, and Themis; from them he had children—the Curetes from the first, Persephone from the second, and Athena from the third. ^D Traveling to Babylon, he was hosted by Belus; and after that, arriving at the island of Panchaea, which lies in the Ocean, he founded an altar to his own ancestor, Uranus. From there he came through Syria to the then-ruler Cassius, from whom Mount Casius derives its name. Having arrived in Cilicia, he defeated the local chieftain in battle. After traversing and visiting many other nations, he was honored by all and proclaimed a god.

Having discussed these and similar matters as if concerning mortal men being treated as gods, he adds: "And as for Euhemerus, who authored the *Sacred Record*, we shall be content with what has been stated. But as for the things mythologized by the Greeks concerning the gods, in accordance with Hesiod, Homer, and Orpheus, we shall attempt to briefly..."

outline them. ^A Since this has been sufficiently set forth from the theology of the Greeks, it is reasonable to append to these matters the rites performed in the shrines of the same gods and their secret mysteries. We must consider whether they truly bear some divine mark of a theology worthy of God, or whether they are set in motion from below by long-standing demonic error—things worthy of laughter, or rather of shame, or indeed of pity for those who are still blinded. The admirable Clement clearly uncovers these in his *Exhortation to the Greeks*, for he was a man who had passed through all things by experience, yet he turned away from error all the more quickly, as if by the saving Word, and was redeemed from these evils through the evangelical teaching. Hear, then, a few words on these matters as well.

CHAPTER III.

An epitome of the secret rites and hidden mysteries contained in the superstition of the many gods.

^C "Do not, I say," he says, "curiously explore the impious and wicked shrines, nor the yawning depths of caves, full of illusions and portents, or the Thesprotean cauldron, or the Cirrhaean tripod, or the brazen gong of Dodona. As for that Gerandryon, once worshipped in desert sands, ^D and the oracle there, withered along with the oak itself, leave it to the fables grown old with time. The Castalian spring, at any rate, has fallen silent, as has the other in Colophon, and all the rest of the prophetic waters have dried up together; and while they were once boisterous, they have at last been exposed as being empty of all truth, having dried up along with their own myths. Tell us also of the other divination, or rather of the divination..."

^A that comes late, and yet is finally exposed after it had poured forth all its fables. Chant for us, if you will, the remaining oracles of divination, or rather of its frantic vanity—Clarian, Pythian, Didymean, Amphiaraus, Apollo, Amphilochus: add, if you like, the interpreters of prodigies, add the augurs and the profane guessers of dreams. Come now, and set them at the same time before the Pythian—those who perform their divinations with flour or barley, and those who are still esteemed by many as ventriloquists. And indeed, let the inner sanctums of the Egyptians and the necromancies of the Etruscans lie in darkness; these are in truth but the sophistries of faithless men for divination, and gambling houses of unadulterated error. ^B Companions in this sorcery are goats trained for divination, and crows taught by men to give oracles to men. What if I were to describe the mysteries to you? I shall not dance them out, as they say Alcibiades did; but I shall strip bare, and very thoroughly, through the discourse of truth, the sorcery hidden within them, and those very gods of yours who are called upon, whose initiations are mystical, and I shall set them as if on a stage of the life of truth before the eyes of the spectators. The Bacchae celebrate Dionysus the Madman with orgies, practicing in their raw-flesh eating a holy madness; and they perform the distribution of the portions of the sacrifices, crowned with serpents, ^C shrilly calling upon that Eve, through whom error followed, and death followed. And the serpent is the established sign of the Bacchic orgies. For immediately, according to the precise Hebrew tongue, the name *Eva* (when aspirated) is interpreted as "female serpent." And Demeter and Kore have already become a mystical drama, and Eleusis holds the torches for their wandering, and their abduction, and their mourning. It also seems to me that the *orgia* and the *mysteria* must be etymologized: the former in relation to the *orgē* (anger) that Demeter felt toward Zeus; the latter ^D from the *mysos* (abomination) that occurred concerning Dionysus. And if one prefers to derive it from a certain Mysus the Athenian, whom Apollodorus says perished in a hunt, there is no jealousy on your part that the mysteries should be glorified with such funeral language and honor. It is possible, moreover, to hunt for the mysteries in another way, by the correspondence of the letters, for others hunt for them, just as there are myths of this kind—the Thracians, those most barbarous of peoples, the Phrygians, the most senseless, and the Greeks, the most superstitious. May the man who began this absurdity for mankind perish—whether it was Dardanus, who taught the mysteries of the Mother of the Gods, or Eteon, who established the orgies and rites of the Samothracians, or that Phrygian Midas, who learned from Odrysus and then handed down a crafty deceit to those under him. For the Cypriot islander Cinyras will never prevail upon me...

^B who, when he vehemently desired to make the famous harlot of his island into a goddess, dared to bring the shameful orgies of Venus out of darkness into the light of day. Others, indeed, claim that Melampus, the son of Amythaon, brought the feasts of Ceres—that mourning, I say, which is wont to be sung with hymns and songs—from Egypt into Greece. I would rightly call these men the authors of impious myths and of a pestilential superstition, the leaders of all evils, since they introduced those mysteries as seeds of wickedness and death into the life of man. ^C But it is time now to demonstrate that your orgies are full of trickery and imposture; and if you have been initiated, you will receive those fables of yours, which are attributed with such great veneration, with laughter and hisses rather than with respect. As for me, I shall bring into the light of all things that are hidden and deeply recondite, nor shall shame hold me back from bringing them to light, things which you yourself are not ashamed to worship with divine honors. Therefore, that offspring of the sea foam, the fruit of Cyprus, the darling of Cinyras—I mean Venus, whom you name "the lover of genitals" (philo-mēdēa), in that she appeared from the genitals, those very ones cut off from ^D Caelus, those lecherous members which, after their excision, forced their way into the waves—that Venus is begotten, a fruit in the rites of this sea-born pleasure, a token of conception; a lump of salt and an effigy of a phallus are customarily handed over to those being initiated into the arts of shameful copulation, and these initiates offer a coin to her just as lovers do to a mistress.

The mysteries of Ceres are nothing else than the incestuous union of Jupiter with his mother Ceres, and the anger of the same—shall I call her mother, or wife?—which was the reason why she is said to be called Brimo, as if fuming and indignant; and the supplications of Jupiter, the drinking of bile, the convulsions of the heart, and other unspeakable ceremonies of that kind. The Phrygians perform such rites in honor of Attis, Cybele, and the Corybantes. It is a story spread abroad that Jupiter tore off the testicles of a ram and threw them into the lap of Ceres, paying a false penalty for his violent union, as if he had castrated himself. The symbols of this initiation, when brought forth in abundance, will, I know, stir up laughter, and if they do not stir you to laugh, they will at least move you to it through your own convictions: "I have eaten from the drum; I have drunk from the cymbal; I have carried the kernos; I have slipped into the bridal chamber." Are these symbols not an outrage? Are the mysteries not a mockery? Why should I add the rest? Ceres is pregnant, the daughter is reared, and Jupiter, who begot her, unites himself in this way with Persephone, his own daughter after her mother Ceres, forgetting his former pollution, and he unites with her having become a serpent, as has been shown. Thus, in the mysteries of Sabazius, the symbol for the initiated is "the god through the bosom"—and this is a serpent swelling through the bosom of the initiated, a proof of the incontinence of Jupiter; and Persephone also conceives a bull-shaped child. Indeed, a certain pagan poet says: "A bull is the father of a serpent, and a serpent the father of a bull, upon the mountain the herdsman hidden with the goad..."

^B meaning, I believe, the shepherd's crook, which the Bacchae turn around with certain boughs. Do you wish that I recount to you also the flower-gathering of Persephone, and her basket, and the abduction by Aidoneus, and the chasm of the earth, and the descent of the swine of Eubouleus, which were swallowed up together with both goddesses? This is the reason why, in the Thesmophoria, they throw pigs out in the Megarian tongue. Women in every city celebrate this entire myth in various ways at their solemn festival—the Thesmophoria, the Scirrhophoria, the Arrhetophoria—and in such diverse and truly tragic ways they commemorate the abduction of Proserpina. For the mysteries of Dionysus are altogether inhuman; for, while he was still a child, and the Curetes were dancing around him with armed motion, the Titans crept up by guile, and having deceived him with childish toys, they—these very Titans—tore him apart while he was still an infant, as the poet of this rite, the Thracian Orpheus, sings:

A top, a wheel, and jointed toys, And golden apples, beautiful, from the clear-voiced Hesperides.

Nor would it be useless to set down here the useless symbols of this sacred secret, so that they may be condemned by the judgment and senses of all. These are: a knucklebone, a ball, a top, apples, a rhombus, a mirror, and a fleece. Now, Minerva, because she had secretly stolen the heart of Dionysus, was called Pallas, from the vibration or palpitation of the heart. But the Titans, by whose hands he had been mangled, cast his limbs into a cauldron placed upon a tripod, and ^C having first cooked them, later skewered them on spits and held them over Hephaestus. Zeus, appearing later (if he were a god, perhaps ^D he would have been able to prevent the murder of the infant), burned the Titans with a thunderbolt, and handed over the limbs of Dionysus to his son Apollo to be buried. But Apollo, carrying them (those fragments of his own brother) to Parnassus, deposited them there. Therefore, the Greeks—not wishing to be ignorant of the place—point out the tomb of Dionysus near the Golden Tripod at Delphi.

^A Let us now consider the orgies of the Corybantes. These people, having killed their third brother, covered the head of the deceased with a purple cloth and crowned it, carrying it upon a bronze shield to the foothills of Olympus. And these—to put it briefly—are the mysteries: murders and tombs. The priests of these rites, whom they call *anactotelestai* (those who perform the rites of the Anactes), increase the monstrosity of this murder by absolutely forbidding celery to be brought to the table, for they believe that celery sprouted from the blood that flowed from the Corybantic murder. Just as, indeed, the women who celebrate the Thesmophoria carefully abstain from eating pomegranate seeds, believing that pomegranates grew from the drops of the blood of Dionysus that had fallen to the ground. ^B They call the Corybantes "Cabiri," and recount a "Cabiric" ritual. For those two fratricides, taking with them the box in which the pudenda of Dionysus had been enclosed, brought it to Tuscany—merchants of a remarkable commodity—where, living as exiles, they enlightened the minds of the Etruscans with a truly brilliant doctrine of piety, handing over the box and the pudenda to them to be worshiped as a new religion. For this reason, some not unreasonably wish for Dionysus to be called Attis, as he was shorn of his pudenda. ^C And what wonder is it if the barbarian Etruscans are initiated into such shameful deeds, when even the Athenians and the rest of the Greek peoples—I am ashamed even to mention it—hold onto that story about Demeter, which is so disgraceful and unworthy? For when Demeter, wandering hither and thither in search of her daughter, Core, came to Eleusis (which is a place in Attica), she became exhausted by her labor and sat down by a well, grieving. This is forbidden to those who are currently being initiated, so that those who have been perfected may not appear to be imitating the one who was mourning. At that time, the indigenous people lived in Eleusis. ^D Their names were Baubo, Dysaules, and Triptolemus, and furthermore Eumolpus and Eubuleus. Triptolemus was a cattle-herdsman, Eumolpus a shepherd, and Eubuleus a swineherd. From them, that hierophantic lineage of the Eumolpidae and the Ceryces flourished.

^A And Baubo—for I shall not refrain from speaking—having received Deo as a guest, offers her a mixture to drink. As she refuses to take it, and will not drink (for she was in mourning), Baubo, deeply hurt—as if she had been treated with contempt—lifts her garments and exposes her private parts to the goddess. Deo is delighted at the sight, and, pleased by the spectacle, finally—though with difficulty—takes the drink. These are the secret mysteries of the Athenians; these too Orpheus records. I will cite the very verses of Orpheus, so that you may have the mystagogue himself as a witness to this shamelessness:

So saying, she drew up her robes and showed ^B The parts of her body that should not be seen: and even the boy Iacchus was there, Whom she cast with a laugh into the folds of Baubo's garment; And then, when she had smiled, the goddess smiled in her heart, And received the variegated vessel in which the mixture was contained.

This is the password ^C of the Eleusinian mysteries: "I have fasted, I have drunk the mixture, I have taken from the basket; having wrought the work, I have deposited it into the chest, and from the chest into the basket." Noble spectacles indeed, and worthy of a goddess! Fitting mysteries, surely, for darkness and fire, and worthy of the proud—or rather, the foolish—mind of the Erechthidae and the rest of the Greeks, for whom, after death, such punishments await as they do not even suspect. And for whom, pray, does Heraclius the Ephesian prophesy? For the nocturnal, the Magi, the Bacchi, the Lenaei, and the Mystae. It is to these that he threatens the punishments that follow death; it is to these that he denounces the fire. For the mysteries established according to human sentiment have profane rites of initiation. Therefore, both the fixed laws of the sacred rites and the common opinion of men, and all these mysteries of the dragon, are nothing but a kind of error, superstitiously revering initiations that have no initiation at all, and worshiping impious rites under the guise of an adulterated piety. But what, and of what kind, are those mystic baskets? For it is necessary to lay bare whatever is considered sacred among them and to declare their ineffable things. Are there not sesame seeds in these, and pyramids, and balls of wool, and cakes with many navels, and grains of salt? And a serpent, the ^D orgion of Dionysus Bassareus? And are there not pomegranates, and besides these...

The principal care of the mysteries for both families.

(86) "This is the password." It is without doubt to be read thus, as it is in Clement. (87) "Heraclius." Read "Heraclitus," as in Clement and Diogenes Laertius. (88) "Profane rites of initiation." Clem., "impious initiations." (89) "Idem Clemens, law and common opinion." (90) "Encouraging." *Protrepomenen*, which seems to be the reading of the codex. But here, in my judgment, the sense of "cultivating" or "reverencing" would be more suitable than "encouraging," which rather suits the *protrepein* [exhorting] than the *prostrepein* [entreating]. What of the fact that it needs a certain preposition, such as *epi* or *pros*, or similar?

^A hearts, fennel stalks, and ivy, and in addition to these, phalluses, and poppy heads? These are their holy things. And furthermore, the secret symbols of Themis: marjoram, a lamp, a sword, and a woman’s comb, which is a euphemism for the mystical female organ. O, what manifest shamelessness! In times past, for those who lived temperately, the covering of desire was the silent night; but now, for those being initiated, the sacred night of debauchery is spoken of openly, and the fire, by acting as a torch, exposes their passions. Extinguish the fire, O hierophant; have reverence, torchbearer, for your own torches. The light exposes your Iacchus; allow the night to hide the mysteries in darkness; let the orgies be respected. The fire does not dissemble; it exposes and demands punishment. These are the mysteries of the atheists. And I rightly call these men atheists, who have ignored the God who ^B truly exists, but are shamelessly worshipping an infant torn apart by Titans, and a wailing woman, and parts of the body which shame does not even allow to be named, being held fast by a twofold atheism: first, in that they are ignorant of God, not acknowledging the God who truly exists; and second, in that by this very error they imagine that things which do not exist possess existence, calling those gods who do not exist—nay, are not even beings—but have merely attained the name. So much for him.

CHAPTER IV.

By what arguments we have been led to refuse to hold similar opinions concerning the gods.

We rightly and deservedly profess ourselves to have been set free from all these things, as we have cast off the calamity of a long-standing and ancient error as if it were some terrible and most grievous disease: first, by the grace and benefit of the almighty God; second, by the ineffable power of the evangelical teaching of our Savior; and third, by a sound and mature judgment in that we have determined it to be unholy and impious to bestow the name of God, which is august and worthy of all veneration, upon mortal men who long ago lay among the dead, and who did not leave behind them even the memory of temperate men, but rather entrusted to posterity ^D monuments of every intemperance, lust, cruelty, and madness for the ruin of souls. For who would not see the extreme folly if those who love holiness and integrity of character were to yield the place of honor to the lustful and flagitious? If the mature and wise were to yield it to men of ruined and abandoned minds? If practitioners of justice and philanthropy were to celebrate with the most august worship those who surpassed all others in cruelty and inhumanity, having stained their wicked hands with the execrable murder of their children and parents? Whose thoughts have they not overcome with impiety, by dragging down to obscene parts of men and women—which it is not even honorable to name—or to an irrational and beastly nature, the venerable and all-holy revelation of God?

And why need we prolong our speech to those who are receiving the good news, both barbarian and Greek, of the freedom from the aforementioned evils, and who have been led into the light of reason away from the apostasy of the false-named gods? For already the majority even of those who were exceedingly superstitious, as if awakening from a deep stupor and opening the eye of their soul from the ancient fog, have perceived the profound nonsense of their ancestral error; and standing upon reflection, they have chosen the other path, having retreated from the old. Of these, some have gone further and spat upon the entire mythology of their ancestors, having openly mocked them; others, while avoiding the reputation of impiety, have neither stood by their former beliefs nor entirely departed from them, but, intending to soothe and remedy their own chosen opinion, they have claimed that the stories current among them regarding the gods are true, asserting that the myths were fabricated by poets, while concealing natural theories within them. Even if they bring forward no evidence of truth, it is nevertheless necessary for us to set them forth, for the sake of contemplating what is considered venerable even among them, so that their retreat from these things might also be demonstrated to us as having been brought about in no other way than through the manifestation of the reasonable truth of the evangelical teaching of our Savior. Come then, let us also take up and examine the argument regarding these matters from the beginning.

Chapter V. A brief summary of what has been said before.

The manner of the Greek theology—I mean the common and somewhat more mythical one, which is much later than that of the Phoenicians and Egyptians and the others whose memory the preceding discourses have contained—has been demonstrated to be such as has been previously disclosed through the quoted words of the Greek authors themselves. And this I have rightly placed at the beginning of the present Evangelical Preparation, for the sake of diagnosis and judgment by those who will delve into it, so that we ourselves, as well as those who are still ignorant of these things, might learn who we were long ago, from what kind of parents we were born, to what great evils we were fettered, and into how much drunkenness of impiety and ignorance of God our souls were buried; and that we might understand how we became worthy of the restoration and freedom from all these things, which was provided for us by no other means than by the single evangelical teaching, through the epiphany of our Savior Jesus Christ, God. He is the one who does not confine His light to a part of the earth, or to the corner of one nation’s territory, but, as a sun of intellectual and rational souls, He has spread the rays of His own light over the whole human world—where the wandering of superstition had specifically prevailed—across the entire human race, barbarian and Greek alike, as if from a terrible fog and a most dark and gloomy...

prevailed, [he] brought us all, as if out of a terrible fog and a most gloomy and unseen night of superstitious error, into the bright and most clear day of the true piety of God, the King of all. The aforementioned words certainly declare openly that [men] taught all the people—those who were frantic with polytheistic error throughout cities and villages ^B—to worship and honor the idols of the dead and the images of men long departed. For because of the excessive bestiality of the life of those men of old, they took no account of God, the Creator of all, nor were they concerned with the divine justice that punishes transgressions, but they threw themselves into every kind of unholy act. For there were not yet any laws established according to which one ought to live, nor had a civilized ^C way of life been ordained among men, but their life was loose, nomadic, and bestial. For some, like senseless cattle, cared for nothing more than filling their stomachs, which is the first way that godlessness creeps in. Others, stirred slightly by natural instincts, thought that there was a God and a power of God, and that it was something saving and good; but desiring to find Him, they stretched their souls up to heaven, and lingering there in their minds, and being struck by the beauty of the celestial bodies ^D that appeared and were visible in the heavens, they declared these to be gods. Others still, casting their minds down to the ground, took those who in their own time were deemed to hold first place in wisdom, or who had overcome the majority by their physical strength and the power of their rule—certain giants, or tyrants, or sorcerers and magicians who, having fallen from things more divine, had devised wicked sorceries—or else those who had been the originators of some common and life-enhancing benefit, and declared them gods, some while they were still living and breathing, and others after they had died. Hence their houses of gods are remembered as being the tombs of the dead, as Clement reports in his *Exhortation to the Greeks*, bringing forward the Greeks themselves as witnesses to the account. And if it pleases you, listen again to him as he writes in this way:

CHAPTER VI.

That the things called their temples are the tombs of the dead.

«It ought not, in truth, seem strange,» he says, «if the error of abominable superstition, once it had received some beginning, should have become a fountain of shameful madness. Indeed, since it was not checked thereafter, but rather grew with new increases day by day, it began in the end to be carried along with great force and at a vehement pace.

^A And so, the architect of manifold demons accomplishes this; he sacrifices hecatombs, institutes solemn assemblies, sets up statues, and builds temples. But what—and I will not pass this over in silence, but rather clearly refute it—are these places, famously named temples, but which were in fact tombs? That is to say, those tombs which have been called temples. Do you, even now at least, cease from this impious superstition, being ashamed of honoring tombs? In the temple of Athena at Larissa, which is seen on the acropolis, is the tomb of Acrisius; and at Athens, on the acropolis itself, is that of Cecrops, as Antiochus relates in the ninth book of his Histories. What of Erichthonius? Has he not been buried in the temple of Polias? Is not Ismarus, the son of Eumolpus and Daeira, buried within the enclosure of the Eleusinion, which was built below the acropolis? And the daughters of Celeus, have they not been buried at Eleusis? Why should I recount to you the women from the Hyperboreans? Two, in truth—the one called Hyperoche, the other Laodice—were buried in the Artemisium at Delos; this is situated in the temple of the Delian Apollo. Leander says that Cleomachus was buried at Miletus in the Didymeum. ^B Here, it is not worth passing over the monument of Leucophryne; according to Zeno the Myndian, she was buried in the temple of Artemis at Magnesia. Nor, indeed, do they omit the altar of Apollo in Telmissus; for they record that this also is a memorial of Telmissus the seer. Ptolemy, the son of Agesarchus, in the first book of his work *On Philopator*, says that Cinyras and the descendants of Cinyras were buried on the island of Paphos in the temple of Venus. But truly, if I were to go on to recount all the tombs you worship, even all time would not suffice for me. If no shame for your bold deeds enters into you, you go about as dead men entirely, trusting in the dead. O wretched people, what is this evil that you suffer? ^C And after a little, he says: « A new god, whom the Roman Emperor has reverently deified in Egypt, and even in Greece itself, is [Antinous], a boy who was by far the most beautiful of his favorites; he consecrated him just as Zeus did Ganymede. For desire is not easily restrained, having no fear, and even now men worship the sacred nights of Antinous, which the lover who kept watch with him knew to be shameful. » He adds: « Now the tomb of the beloved is a temple of Antinous, and a city. For just as, I think, temples are admired, so too are tombs—pyramids, mausoleums, and labyrinths—others are temples of the dead, just as those are tombs of the gods. » And again, after a little: ^D « Come now, let us briefly survey the games and abolish these funeral assemblies likewise: the Isthmian, the Nemean, the Pythian, and following these, the Olympic. At Pytho, indeed, the Pythian dragon is worshipped, and the festival of the serpent is proclaimed as the Pythian games. At the Isthmus, the sea spat forth a wretched corpse, and the Isthmian games lament Melicertes. At Nemea, another child, Archemorus, was buried, and the funeral rites of the boy are termed the Nemean games. Piso, O Panhellenes, is a tomb among you, that of the Phrygian charioteer, and Pelops’ libations—the Olympic games are misappropriated by...

Phidias’ Zeus. ^A So much for him. But do you, taking up the discourse from the beginning concerning this superstitious error, examine the nature of the fall. By nature then, and by self-taught notions—or rather, notions taught by God—it happens that there is something good and beneficial that signifies the very name and essence of God. For all men have anticipated this with common reason, since the Creator of all things has implanted this in every rational and intelligent soul through natural notions; yet they did not make use of the free choice that accords with reason. ^B For one person—or perhaps a second, or a few others, whose memory is preserved in the Hebrew scriptures—having applied the divine notion not to any of the things that are seen, but having, by way of stable and certain mental induction, raised it up from the objects of sight to the Creator of the whole universe and the great Maker of all, discerned with purified eyes of the mind that He alone is God, the Savior of all, and the sole Giver of good things. But the rest, turning about in a manifold and diverse darkness of soul, were swept down into a chasm of impiety to such a degree that, after the manner of wild beasts, they measured ^C the honorable, the useful, and the good by the pleasure of the eyes and the flesh alone. Thus, according to what has been said before, those who were the discoverers of what were deemed the goods and benefits of the body, or certain potentates and tyrants, or even sorcerers and practitioners of magic—men mortal by nature and subject to human misfortunes—they proclaimed as dispensers of goods, saviors, and gods, transferring onto them the venerable notion that naturally existed within them as the source of benefits. Such a stupefaction of mind had surely taken hold of them that they did not account as anything the transgressions committed by those they deified, ^D nor did they blush at the shameful things reported about them; but they wondered at these men on account of the benefits provided by them, or on account of the supremacies and tyrannies then first being established. For the laws, as I said earlier, not yet being in force among men at that time, and there being no penalty suspended over those who sinned, adultery and the corruption of males, illicit and unlawful marriages, murders and patricides, the slaughter of children and brothers, and furthermore wars and seditions perpetrated by their own leaders—whom they considered and called gods—were recounted as if they were parts of great deeds and bravery, leaving behind the memory of these things as noble and valiant for those born later. Such were the affairs of the ancient theology, which some, transitioning and having emerged only yesterday or the day before, while boasting that they philosophize more rationally, introduced a more natural view of the history regarding the gods, inventing more dignified tales for the myths, neither entirely escaping the transgression of their forefathers' impiety, nor again enduring the villainy of the deified that was apparent from the start. That one knows, however, how to heal the myth by recovering the truth, as Alexander elegantly said, where he mentions that some suppose the crown of Medea had been daubed with naphtha, and because of this...

^A they would easily endure the wickedness of their deities, nor would they blush at anything that was most foully reported about them; but rather whatever pertained to them, whether on account of their merits towards the human race, or on account of the empires or tyrannies established at that first time, they would regard with singular approval. Since, therefore, as I said before, the life of men was not yet governed by any laws, and no punishment threatened their crimes; they celebrated adulteries, the cohabitation of males, and likewise nefarious and flagitious marriages, murders, parricides, the slaughter of children and brothers, and finally wars and internal strife of the soul, in which those princes of theirs, whom they imagined and called gods, had truly entangled themselves, just as if these were monuments of things gloriously done by them and of their excellent virtue; and they themselves propagated the memory of these things to posterity, as if they were certain noble deeds and joined with the highest praise for bravery. And of such a kind was the theology of the men of old, which some later men, of recent times, so changed—boasting of I know not what more subtle method of philosophizing—that they introduced an opinion ^B concerning the history of the gods that was closer to the nature of things, and wove onto the myths some more honorable appearance of new interpretations. They followed this goal: that they might not altogether depart from the wicked impiety of their ancestors, yet nevertheless not allow the impropriety of the consecrated deities existing from their religions to be revealed. Therefore, when these men had once decided to manage the ancestral error in any way they could, they transferred the myths to the explanation of natural causes and reasons. And first, they boasted with a new and insolent pride that those things which had the power of nourishing and increasing the body were signified by the myths, just as if they had brought forth some mystery more and more hidden; but later, proceeding further, they placed even the elements of the world in the number of the gods, so that they did not stop even at the sun and moon and the multitude of the other stars, but added also the earth itself, with water, air, fire, and1 consequently with those things which are formed from the tempering and mixing of these. Indeed, they even consecrated the timely fruits of the earth and other sprouts of both drier and moister sustenance—which, because they themselves also preserved the life of our bodies, they consecrated by the names of Ceres, Proserpina, Bacchus, and others of this kind—fashioning for the myths a forced and by no means true face and color. But although these men were late in doing this, because they were ashamed of the theology of their ancestors, and added to the ancient myths of the gods a certain more honorable explanation, just as each one’s own brain fashioned it, no one nevertheless dared to change the ancestral rites, but all rather [decided] that both the customs of the ancients and that accustomed manner of sacred rites and religion which had grown up with them from childhood were to be retained by them with special zeal. Therefore, some, conveniently recalling the myth to the truth, or truly defending it by the thing itself, say this is the medicine of Medea.

^A For when he [Plato] lowers himself to the laws and says that one ought to believe the myths about the gods, as if they contained nothing that could be clarified through hidden meanings, he has already, on another occasion, separated his own theology of the ancient myths, and has discussed separately the heavens, the sun, the moon, the stars, and indeed the entire world and its parts, according to the principles of natural philosophy; he again sets forth his own distinct views on the gods famously genealogized of old, in these very words in the *Timaeus*.

CHAPTER VII. What Plato thought concerning the theology of the ancients.

(98) ^C “As for the other demons, to speak of them and to know their generation is a task greater than our powers. Yet, we must believe those who have spoken before us, since they were children of the gods, as they themselves claimed, and clearly knew their own ancestors. It is impossible, therefore, not to trust the children of the gods, even though they speak without probable and necessary demonstrations; but, since they claim to report on their own family affairs, we must, as the law itself demands, follow and believe them. In accordance with them, therefore, let the generation of these gods be held and told by us in this way: Oceanus and Tethys were born of Earth and Heaven; from these came Phorcys, Saturn, and Rhea, and all who are joined with them; and from Saturn and Rhea came Zeus, Hera, and all those whom we know as their siblings, and furthermore other descendants of these.” These are the things which Plato says must be believed by following the law, although he admits that they were stated without probable and necessary demonstrations. ^D We must observe, as there is nothing

^A recondite contained in this appellation or series of the noble deities, which can be explained by the principles of physiology, as he explicitly pronounces. The same author, elsewhere openly and candidly revealing his own mind, speaks thus: "Then I said, first of all, the greatest and most significant lie told by him who told it—I mean Hesiod—was not well told, whether he attributed to Heaven the deeds he invents, or [he tells] what penalties Saturn exacted from him. For the things that Saturn is said to have perpetrated, or suffered from his son, even if they were true—yet among men of no judgment and those who are young, so that they might be easily and rashly bandied about—I would not approve of, but would much rather wish that they were kept entirely silent. Or if it were necessary for them to be brought forward, at least that they should be heard in secret and by very few, after having sacrificed not a pig, but some great and secret ^B victim, so that it might fall to the lot of very few to hear them." "For indeed," he says, "these tales are grievous." "And they are not to be told," I said, "O Adeimantus, in our city; nor must it be granted to a young person hearing them, that, though he acts with the utmost injustice, he would perform nothing wonderful, nor even [if he were] punishing a father for wrongdoing in every way; but that he would only be doing what the first and greatest ^C of the gods did." Nor indeed does it seem to me to be suitable to relate. "Nor ever at all," I said, "that gods war against gods, and plot against them, and fight; for neither are these things true, if it is necessary for those who are to guard the city to consider it most shameful to be easily at enmity with one another. Much less should we tell them stories of giant-battles, and manifold hatreds and hostilities of every kind of gods and heroes against their own kin and relatives. But if we were to persuade them that no citizen has ever yet been at enmity with another, and that this is not pious, these things should be told to children immediately, and to old men and women, and as they grow older, and the poets should be forced to compose their tales close to these. But the ^D bonds of Hera at the hands of Zeus, and the casting out of Hephaestus by his father when he intended to defend his mother who was being beaten, and the battles of the gods, such as Homer has composed, are not to be admitted into the city, neither composed under allegories, nor without allegories." Clearly by these things the philosopher teaches that even the myths of the ancients concerning the gods, and the physiologies thought to be stated in the myths under allegories, are to be rejected; so that it is no longer unreasonable for us that the teaching of the good news of our Savior is preached, since it has been rejected even by those who were its own. Whence it persuades me to admire also the ancients of the Romans.

^A For it is possible for you to know in what way they, having perceived that all the Greek physiological accounts concerning the gods were absurd and unprofitable—or rather, forced and inconsistent—drew their own boundaries for their theology against the myths themselves. And this you may learn from the Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. For he, in his second book, narrating the events concerning Romulus, the first founder of Rome, recounts his other achievements, and writes among other things about these matters in this way.

CHAPTER VIII. Concerning the Theology of the Romans.

Romulus, therefore, when he clearly understood that a pious, temperate, justice-loving, and warlike city is fashioned by honest laws and the emulation of right pursuits, gave special care and attention to these things, beginning with the religion and worship of the gods and demons. He established shrines, sacred precincts, altars, the placement of images in their proper seats, their forms, their symbols, their powers, and the benefits with which they have blessed our race; he also established festivals—such as it is fitting for each of the gods or demons to receive—and sacrifices by which they take pleasure in being honored by men; and likewise, he instituted truces, public assemblies, respites from toil, and all such things, according to the best of what was practiced by the Greeks. ^C But as for the myths concerning them that were currently circulating, in which there are certain blasphemies or accusations against them, considering them base, useless, and disgraceful, and altogether unworthy not only of the gods but even of good men, he rejected them all and trained men to speak and think in the best way concerning the gods, attributing to them no practice unworthy of the blessed nature. For among the Romans it is neither said that Caelus was mutilated by his own children, nor that Saturn, fearing an attack from his own offspring, destroyed them, ^D nor that Zeus overthrew the dynasty of Cronus,

^A or that he shut his own father in the prison of Tartarus; nor indeed are there any wars, or wounds, or bonds, or servitude of gods among mortal men. No black-garbed or mournful feast is celebrated among them, involving the beating of breasts and the lamentations of women for gods who disappear; such things are practiced by the Greeks regarding the rape of Persephone, the sufferings of Dionysus, and other matters of that kind. Nor could one see among them—not even now that customs have been corrupted—any divine possessions, any Corybantian initiations, any Bacchanalia, or secret rites, or nocturnal vigils in the temples of the gods, with men and women together, or any other such monstrous proceedings. On the contrary, everything said and done concerning the gods is performed with piety, such as is found neither among the Greeks nor the barbarians. And what I have most admired of all is that, although infinite nations have flocked into the city, who are under great necessity to worship their ancestral gods according to their own native customs, the public administration of the city has not been led, as has now happened to many people, to zeal for any foreign practices. But even if, in accordance with oracles, some foreign rites have been introduced, it has adapted them legally to its own customs, rejecting all mythical impostures—just as we see in the rites of the Mother of Ida. For although the praetors perform ^B sacrifices and games annually in her honor according to the public Roman rite, yet the priesthood itself is discharged by a Phrygian man and a Phrygian woman, who go around the entire city, according to their own custom, gathering alms from here and there every month, carrying images attached to their breasts, and beating drums, while a following multitude sings Mother-hymns, modulated to the flute. But not one of the native Romans goes about the city begging for the Mother, nor does he walk about wearing a variegated robe, inspired by the sound of flutes, nor does he celebrate the goddess with orgies ^C or Phrygian revels, according to any law or decree of the senate. So piously does the city behave toward foreign customs concerning the gods, and it turns away from every myth that possesses no decency. And let no one imagine that I am unaware that some Greek myths are useful to men: some demonstrate the workings of nature through pain; others are composed for the sake of consolation in human misfortunes; others again remove disturbances of the soul and represent examples, purifying unhealthy opinions; and others are fashioned for the sake of some other benefit. But although I know these things just as well as anyone, nevertheless I am piously disposed ^D toward them.

and lest anyone think that I am ignorant that some of the fables of the Greeks bring some benefit to men, whether they represent the works of nature through the hidden meaning of their words, or whether they were devised to mitigate the miseries of human calamity, or to lift the perturbations of the soul and assuage fears, or to dispel less sound opinions, or were composed for the sake of any other convenience. But although I know these things just as well as anyone else, yet I am of the opinion that in such fables there is always need of great caution, and for this reason I the more willingly approve of the theology of the Romans, reflecting within myself that the good things contained in the Greek fables are very meager indeed, and can pertain not to the many, but only to those who have diligently and accurately perceived the target at which they are aimed. For indeed, since very few are they to whom access to this philosophy is open, the rude and unskilled multitude is wont to interpret those common discourses about the gods in a worse sense, and falls into one of two things: either it despises the gods, as if they were tossed about by so many and such great waves of misery, or it thinks that no kind of wickedness or crime is to be avoided or shunned by itself, seeing it to have been so very familiar to the gods themselves. We leave these matters to be more diligently weighed by those men who have clung only to that part of philosophy which is placed in contemplation: but I, for my part, thought that these things, which are peculiar to the republic established by Romulus, were also worthy to be handed down for memory. Thus far Dionysius. ^B Such was the judgment not only of the greatest philosophers, but also of the very founders and princes of the Roman empire, concerning the theology of the Greek men: from which we understand that they never wished to approve this new physiology in the unfolding of the fables of the gods: so far is it from being the case that they would open a door to certain sophistic deceptions and to things composed for the appearance of dignity. But since we have once undertaken to refute their vanity also of our own accord, come, let us see what excellence, finally, their interpretations and commentaries bring that is worthy of the divine powers: yet in such a way that we speak nothing with our own mouth, but produce everything conceived in their own very words, and may again be taught their mysteries by them.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL

BOOK THREE

CHAPTERS OF THE THIRD BOOK

^A than the stars appearing in the heavens, and to water, and fire, and the rest of the parts of the universe. 5. That these things also were full of every sort of condemnation. 6. That having reasonably withdrawn themselves from their more natural theory concerning the gods, we have preferred the sole and true theology. 7. That later philosophers wove etiological explanations into the myths concerning the gods. 8. Concerning the ancient construction and establishment of statues, from Plutarch. 9. That the theology of the Greeks and Egyptians is explained by allegories. 10. Refutation and overthrow of the forced interpretation of these things as well. 11. A strong refutation of Greek dogmas here. 12. Of the statue visited at Elephantine. 13. Of the ox which is sacrificed to the sun at Heliopolis. 14. That they refute their own mythical accounts concerning the gods by doing that which is contrary to them. 15. That they confirmed the theories of the philosophers by their oracles, by allegorizing in opposition to the myths concerning them. 16. That it is impossible for the parts of the universe or the divine powers to be drawn down by conjuring necessities, and to prophesy to those who ask through oracles. 17. That all such things are the result of demonic activity.

PROOEMIUM

^B Such, then, was the judgment concerning the theology of the Greeks held by the most excellent of the philosophers, and by the ancient founders and leaders of the Roman empire; from which we understand that they by no means intended to approve of this new physiology for the unfolding of the myths of the gods—far from it—or that they wished to open a door to certain sophistical deceits and appearances of dignity. But since we have once undertaken to refute their vanity of our own accord, come, let us see what sort of excellent things these interpretations and commentaries of theirs bring to the divinities; yet so that we say nothing of our own, but produce everything conceived in their very own words, that we may be taught their recondite mysteries of specious gravity by them. For six hundred others, who profess to be philosophers, have spent much labor and effort on this subject, ^C while each one produces his own conflicting commentaries, and asserts that whatever has pleased his own genius is the pure and absolute truth. For me, however, it shall suffice to draw certain and clear proofs from the most illustrious and widely known philosophers, and those who flourish with an exceptional praise for philosophy among the Greeks. Take then into your hands, first, Plutarch of Chaeronea, and read through the passage of his which is accommodated to our subject, where, with a requested apparatus of diction, he twists and turns the myths into another sense, which he insists are full of arcane theology. Explaining this, he says that Bacchus is drunkenness, and no longer the mortal man revealed by history in the previous book; ^D and that Hera is the nuptial cohabitation of husband and wife. Then, as if he had forgotten his own interpretation, he attaches another history thereafter, and no longer calls Hera what he did before, but names her the earth; and Lethe and Night, and Leto; and again nuptial cohabitation.

^A And he further says concerning the same [goddess], that Hera is Leto. And then, at ^B

CHAPTER I. On the natural theology of the Greeks.

^A For we read that Juno, while still a virgin, was secretly taken by Jupiter while she was being raised in Euboea and lay hidden there, with Mount Cithaeron providing them with a certain shaded cave and a bridal chamber made by nature itself. When Macris (who was Juno’s nurse) had arrived there in her search and wished to investigate the whole place, she was prevented by the same Cithaeron from exploring the hiding places more curiously or approaching them too closely, as if Jupiter were resting there with Latona and enjoying her embrace. After Macris had therefore departed, Juno remained hidden in that place for a time; later, however, wishing to preserve the memory of the favor she had received under the name of Latona, she desired to have a temple and an altar in common with her. From this, the custom of celebrating the *Latonia* (that is, hidden) rites flowed—though others call them nocturnal—so that the name might represent something both hidden and concealed. Nor are there wanting those who would have it that Juno herself, because she had had an affair with Jupiter there away from everyone, was later called the "Nocturnal Latona," until the rumor of the nuptials became widespread, and the intimacy she had first had with Jupiter around Cithaeron and Plataea led them afterward to call her Perfect ^B and Pronuba.

But those who, in investigating the sense of this myth, have had a greater regard for the nature of things and for propriety, have philosophized as follows, making Juno one and the same as Latona. Juno, as we said a little earlier, is the Earth, but Latona is the Night—since she is, for those who give themselves to sleep, a kind of oblivion. Now, the night is nothing other than the shadow of the earth; for when it has inclined toward the setting sun and hidden it, it stretches itself out more widely and diffuses dark gloom through the whole air. And this is the completion of the full moons, which is accompanied by an eclipse, at which time, as the moon revolves, the shadow of the earth touches and obscures its light. That Latona is no other than Juno, one might learn from this: we already call Diana the daughter of Latona, but we also call her Lucina; therefore, Juno and Latona are two appellations for one goddess. Again, Apollo is born of Latona, and Mars of Juno, yet the power of both is one and the same, and he is called Mars as *aregōn* (helper) ^C in the face of violent events and battle, and Apollo as he who wards off (*apallattōn*) and delivers man from the diseases of the body. Wherefore, among the most fiery and combustion-prone stars, the sun is called Apollo, and the fire-like star is named Mars. And it is not inappropriate for the same goddess to be called the goddess of marriage and to be considered the mother of Eilythyia and the Sun. For the end of marriage is generation, and generation is the transit from darkness into sun and light. And well did the poet say... ^D

"After the birth-pangs Lucina, ^B Anxious to lighten the weight, had brought him forth to the light, and he looked on the beams of the sun."

The poet correctly used the preposition itself to elide the union, so as to subject the difficulty of the birth to the eyes, but he set the viewing of the sun as the end of generation. Therefore, the same goddess was also the author of the entering into marriage, in order to open the way for generation. But it would be worth the effort, I think, to recount an even simpler fable here as well. For they say that Jupiter, because he was not in agreement with Juno, and because she sought hiding places for the sake of avoiding congress with him, being in doubt of mind and wandering hither and thither, eventually encountered the native Alalcomenus, from whom he learned how he might finally drive Juno into a trap, if he were to feign a new marriage. Therefore, with Alalcomenus lending his services to Jupiter, in secret they carved out a huge and excellent oak tree, which, having been shaped with art and adorned in the attire of a bride, they called Daedala. And then in this way ^C they sang of the Hymen.

CHAPTER II.

A Nuptial Song.

"And that the Tritonide nymphs brought basins, and the Boeotians provided flutes and exquisite and wanton banquets." While these things were being performed, Juno, because she could not bear the matter any longer, descended from Mount Cithaeron, accompanied by a great crowd of Plataean women, and, agitated by the goads of anger and jealousy, ran to Jupiter. And upon the simulation being revealed, and peace being restored with Jupiter, she led the "new bride" with joy and hilarity—as if she were a kind of matchmaker—and bestowed upon that image of honor the privilege that such a festival should be called Daedala, although, urged on by jealousy, she afterwards burned it, even though it was inanimate. And the fable is indeed told in this way; but its meaning and rationale are as follows. The discord and strife between Juno and Jupiter signify nothing else but the intemperance and disturbance of the ^D elements; when they are no longer measured toward one another according to order, but instead, with irregularity and roughness having been born, they struggle fiercely and dissolve the union, and bring about destruction of the whole. If then Jupiter, that is, the hot and fiery power, provides the cause of the destruction, drought seizes the earth; but if it is around Juno, that is, the moist and pneumatic nature, that some hubris or excess occurs, a stream

of rain is accustomed to wash away and swallow up everything. Therefore, when something of this sort happened in those times, and Boeotia especially was swallowed up by whirlpools of water, as soon as the land emerged and appeared again, and the heat of the flood abated, that adornment and appearance which followed upon the serenity of the surrounding air and the clear sky was called the consensus and reconciliation of the gods. And the first of the plants, the oak, lifted up its head, and men cherished it because it provided sustenance for life and maintained their very salvation: for it is not only to those who practice piety and religion, as Hesiod says, but even to those who have escaped the common calamity that it provides, ^A In its trunk it stores the bees, and at its topmost peak the acorn. So far Plutarch. ^B But we have understood from the words provided by him, that the wonderful and secret physiology of Greek theology contains nothing at all great, nor anything divine or worthy of reverence, and nothing 40 worthy of rising up. For you have heard of Hera being called now the Gamos-goddess, signifying the common life of husband and wife, now being called the earth, and now again the moist nature; of Dionysus being transferred to drunkenness; Leto to the night; the sun to Apollo; and Zeus himself to the hot and fiery power. Therefore, beyond the indecency of the myths, even the interpretation and physiology which seemed more solemn did not lead or elevate the mind to any heavenly, intellectual, and divine powers, nor to rational and incorporeal essences; but on the contrary, it turned downward again into drunken revels, marriages, ^C and human passions, and into fire, earth, sun, and the remaining elements of matter, to the parts of the world, and it ended there, attributing divinity to nothing else. Plato himself also knows this. For he confesses explicitly in the Cratylus that the first of those around Greece knew nothing more of the parts of the world than what is seen; but that they considered only the luminaries in heaven and the rest of the phenomena as gods. Thus he speaks word for word: "The first of the men around Greece seem to me to have considered those alone as gods, which even now many of the barbarians think are gods, the Sun and Moon, the Earth, the Stars, and the Heaven." ^D But such are the Greek accounts; let us also see those that are even more ancient than these. These are the Egyptian ones. They say that Osiris is the sun, and Isis the moon; and that Zeus is the spirit that passes through all things; Hephaestus is fire; the earth they name Demeter; and that Oceanus is considered by the Egyptians to be the moist [substance].

^A And the river Nile, which is among them, they likewise attribute the generations of the gods to it; and the air, they say, they call Athena. These five gods—I mean the Air, the Water, the Fire, the Earth, and the Spirit—they say traverse the entire inhabited world, taking on from time to time the shapes and forms of men and of all kinds of animals; and that mortal men born in Egypt, who happened to have the same names as these, were called Helios, Cronus, Rhea, and also Zeus, Hera, Hephaestus, and Hestia. Manetho writes at greater length concerning these, but Diodorus, in his aforementioned work, summarizes the matter, recording it in these words:

CHAPTER III.

Concerning the allegorical theology of the Egyptians.

^A A Rerum Terra parens, Mater Ceres alma bonorum.

They say that the ancients termed the moist element Ocean, which, if you wish to interpret the word, signifies "mother of nourishment"; and some of the Greeks, they think, have used this same name of Ocean in this sense, regarding whom the poet also sang:

Ocean, who is the origin of the gods, and Tethys their mother.

For the Egyptians believe that Ocean is the river Nile among them, to which they also assign the generations of the gods. For out of all the regions of the world, in Egypt alone are there many cities built by the ancient gods, such as those of Zeus, Helios, Hermes, Apollo, Pan, Eileithyia, and many others.

They say that the air was called Athena by the same people, the meaning of the word being interpreted, and they consider her to be the daughter of Zeus and hold her to be a virgin, both because the air is by nature incorruptible and because it occupies the highest region of the whole world; wherefore it is told in myths that she was born from the head of Zeus. They say she was also called Tritogeneia, from the fact that her nature changes three ^B times a year—in spring, summer, and winter. And she is said to be Glaukopis, not as some of the Greeks have supposed, because she has sea-green eyes—for this would be a simple-minded interpretation—but because the air has a sea-green (glaukos) appearance to those looking at it.

They say that these five gods mentioned go throughout the whole inhabited world, appearing to men sometimes in the guise of sacred animals, sometimes in human form, or changing into some other shape; and they confirm that this is not fabulous, but entirely possible, since they are the ones by whom all things are truly generated. And they say that the poet, having traveled to Egypt and partaken of such discourses from the priests, set forth what was mentioned earlier in his poetry as a fact:

^C For indeed the gods, in the likeness of foreigners, Assuming all sorts of forms, visit the cities Of men, beholding their insolence and good order.

So much, then, do the Egyptians say concerning the gods who are in heaven and have had an eternal generation. They say that others were born from these as terrestrial beings, having been mortal, but having attained immortality through their wisdom and their common beneficence to men, and that some of these have even reigned in Egypt. And when their names are interpreted, some, they say, are identical with those of the heavenly ones, while others have received a distinct appellation—Helios, and Cronus, and Rhea, and also Zeus, who is addressed by some as Ammon; and in addition to these, Hera and Hephaestus, and also Hestia, and lastly ^D that which is equilateral (for they called Athena the "head-born" and "Tritogeneia," because she is divided by the three perpendiculars drawn from the three angles).

^A

It is to him that some have given the cognomen of Ammon; and further, Juno, Vulcan, Vesta, and lastly Mercury, from whom they say the Sun held the primacy of the kingdom of Egypt, having the same name as the celestial star. Thus far the author whom we have been commending. But now let us see what Plutarch, in the little work he wrote *On Isis*, has to say, setting down his words verbatim: "Reaching back," he says, "to the very beginning, let us look first at those who have reasoned the most simply among all who have disputed more subtly and precisely. These are they who say that, just as the Greeks allegorize Saturn as time, Juno as the air, and the generation of Vulcan as the transformation of air into fire, so among the Egyptians the Nile is Osiris, who consorts with Isis—that is, the earth—while Typhon is the sea, into which the Nile flowing falls and vanishes." ^B Having mentioned these and similar things, he again refers the myths concerning the indicated gods back to demons, and again invents other new adjustments of allegories. But I, for my part, would ask them, and with good reason: of which gods, pray, do they claim that the carved images possess the forms that are represented? Is it of demons? Or of fire, air, earth, and water; or of the likenesses of men and women; or of the shapes of irrational animals and wild beasts? For since they themselves concede that certain mortal men were born with the same names as the sun and the general elements of the world, and that these too were subsequently consecrated as gods, whose images, I ask you, would it be proper to call those that we see carved as lifeless simulacra? Is it those of the elements of this universe? Or, as the contrived fashioning of the faces itself plainly shows, those of mortals lying among the dead? ^C Indeed, let them hold their peace if they will; the truth speaks by itself, and as if crying out with a great voice, testifies that those of whom we speak were certain mortal men. Furthermore, Plutarch, in that work which he left written *On Isis and the Egyptian Deities*, voluntarily and deliberately declares the particular bodily form and color of each of them, in these words: "The Egyptians," he says, "relate that Mercury was by nature shorter in the arm, Typhon was of a reddish color, Mars was whiter, and Osiris was in fact quite dark, inasmuch as they had been men by nature." ^D Such is Plutarch. The entire deification of their gods, therefore, was a matter of the dead; whatever is of natural philosophy was invented by them later.

The contradiction of the Greeks regarding their gods

necessity is there to apply transient names to the [universal] natures, while the mysteries of each god, and the hymns and odes, and the secret rites of the initiations, are symbols applied either to the universal elements or to the men of old—mortals who were namesakes of the gods? But as for wanderings and drunken bouts, and amours, and the seductions of women and plots of men, and thousands of such things that are truly mortal and shameful and indecent, how could anyone attribute these to the universal elements, seeing that they were derived directly from the mortal and human-passioned [nature]? ^B So that from all these things, we may convict this marvelous and noble "physiology" of having touched upon the truth in nothing, and of having introduced nothing that truly savors of Divinity, but rather that it has put forward a forced and feigned appearance of a more honorable explanation, borrowed from elsewhere. But now, come, hear further what Porphyry himself also records regarding these matters in the letter which he writes to the Egyptian Anebo.

CHAPTER IV

^C "For Chæremon," he says, "and the others think that there was nothing else prior to those worlds that fall under sight, since they place those who are introduced by the Egyptians at the very beginning of their arguments; nor do they acknowledge any other gods than those which are commonly called wandering stars, and those that fill the zodiac, and as many as rise in their vicinity. To these they add their own divisions into decans, and the horoscopes, and those who are called the mighty leaders, whose names—together with the cures for diseases and calamities, their risings and settings, and the prognostications of future events—are contained in their *Almenichiaca*. ^D For he saw, indeed, that those who said the sun is the architect of the universe referred everything of their sacred fables—not only what pertains to Osiris and Isis, but also everything else—partly to the stars and their aspects, occultations, and risings, partly to the variation of the moon, as it waxes and wanes, and partly to the course of the sun, or to the nocturnal hemisphere, or to the diurnal, or even to the river; and, in short, they interpreted everything as natural phenomena, and nothing as incorporeal and living essences. Wherefore, the majority have also hung the 'that which depends on us' upon the movement of the stars, I know not how, by indissoluble chains—by necessity."

^A Thus, they worship those alone as the liberators from fate, whether in temples, in images, or in other such things." Let these points, taken from the aforementioned letter, stand as a clear declaration that not even the secret theology of the Egyptians heralded any other gods than the stars of heaven—both those called fixed and those called planets—nor did it introduce a Creator of all things, nor any incorporeal being, nor a creative Reason, nor God, nor gods, nor any intellectual and invisible powers; but only the visible sun. Hence, they attributed the cause of all things to the stars alone, binding all things to fate and to the movement and course of the stars; as, indeed, ^B this opinion has held sway among them even to the present day. If, therefore, the Egyptians interpret everything only in terms of the visible elements of the world and nothing in terms of incorporeal and living essences—and seeing that these elements and all visible bodies are, by their own nature, inanimate and irrational, fluid in their being, and perishable—behold into what [depths] their theology has once again fallen, deifying soulless substance and dead, inanimate bodies, especially when nothing among them was referred to incorporeal and intellectual essences, nor to the Mind and creative Reason of the universe. Since it has been admitted by what was said previously that the mysteries of theology were transferred from the Egyptians to the Greeks, it is time for us to group the Greeks into the same category with them and to prove that they had no system of philosophy different from that of the Egyptians, and that they bestowed divinity upon nothing whatsoever except inanimate matter. For such were the venerable deities ^C of the Egyptians, according to the writing of the aforementioned author, who again, in the work he entitled *On Abstinence from Living Creatures*, speaks of them in this manner: "Advancing from this practice and from their closeness to the Divine, they recognized that the Divine did not pass through man alone, nor did the soul dwell upon the earth in man alone, but that the very same soul passed through almost all living creatures. Therefore, they took in all animals for their deification, and similarly, they intermingled wild beasts and men, and again the bodies of birds and men. For it is supposed among them [that a creature] is human-shaped up to the neck, but possesses the face of a bird, or a lion, or of some other animal; and again, [they possess] a human head and parts of other animals, sometimes placed underneath, sometimes placed on top. By these forms, they indicate that, according to the will of the gods, these creatures also have fellowship with one another, and that the wild beasts are our companions and are tame, not without some divine purpose. Hence, the lion is worshipped as a god, and a certain part of Egypt, which they call a *nome*, bears a name derived from it—the Leontopolite—and another [is derived from the] Busirite, and another from the Cynopolite (57). For the power that extends over all things, by means of the..."

associated animals, they were accustomed to worship. And they reverence water and fire, the fairest of the elements, as these are the most principal causes of our salvation. And they demonstrate this in their sacred rites, as for instance even now in the opening of the temple of holy Serapis, the purification is performed by means of fire and water; for the chanter pours out [libations of] water, and holding up fire, while standing upon the threshold (60), he invokes the god in the ancestral Egyptian tongue. These, therefore, they reverence as participants, and they held in even higher honor those which partake more extensively of the sacred things; and all animals are of this kind. For they even worship a man in the village called Anabin, in which, among others, sacrifices are offered, and the sacred offerings are burned upon the altars. And a little later, he eats what has been prepared for him as a man, from his private store. Thus, therefore, just as one must abstain from man, so also one must abstain from the others. Furthermore, out of an excessive wisdom (64) and familiar intercourse with the divine, they concluded that some of the animals were more pleasing to certain of the gods than man—such as those sacred to the sun (65), which possess an entire nature consisting of blood and spirit, and which pity a man, and lament over one who lies dead, and heap earth upon him. And after a little he says: "And regarding the scarab, a man ignorant of divine matters might be disgusted, but the Egyptians held it in reverence as an ensouled image of the sun. For the scarab, being male, and casting the seed into mud, and making it into a spherical shape, rolls it with its hind feet, as the sun rolls the heaven, and it awaits the period of the lunar month (68)." And in this way they philosophize also concerning the ram, and another thing concerning the crocodile, and about the hawk, and the ibis, and generally about each of the animals, as if they had arrived at the worship of animals from intelligence and extreme love of divine wisdom.

CHAPTER V

Such, then, are the things recounted by the writer praised by us regarding the excellent physiology of the polished and elegant Egyptians, by which he has laid open their secrets to us; namely, that they worship water and fire, and that they have judged there to be one single substance of soul, not only for beings endowed with reason but also for those devoid of it, and not just for bodies; so that it seemed reasonable to him that even wild beasts should be proclaimed as gods. Yet how is it not most irrational to take up an irrational and bestial nature for deification, because, as they say, it has a share of the same soul as humans? For if that were the case, one ought to call those wild beasts humans, and share with them human dignity and honor. ^B But those who did not do this—those who became the irrational wild beasts of nature itself, and who have inherited this title, and who were not even deemed worthy of human address—did not see fit to receive them in the same way as humans; rather, they have cast down the highest appellation of the universal King and Creator of all things, God, upon the nature of wild beasts, and have called them gods, whereas even God Himself did not deem them worthy of the title of human. Furthermore, you have heard of the mystical wisdom by which the admirable Egyptians were stirred to worship wolves, dogs, and lions. You have also learned of the wonder of the scarab and the virtue of the hawk. ^C But for the rest, cease to mock these gods; rather, let pity for the wretched race of men, in its great folly and blindness, come upon you. And indeed, look around and contemplate all things: what good things the Lord Christ our God has provided for us, having redeemed us from such a sickness, a long and chronic infirmity, and having redeemed the souls of the Egyptians through His evangelical teaching, so that the majority of those in Egypt have now been delivered from this disease.

CHAPTER VI

Such were the comments of the Egyptians, which

^A are recorded as being far more ancient than all the inventions of the Greeks.

You have, therefore, besides that mythic theology, another one also, more closely connected with natural phenomena, which is common both to the Greeks and to the Egyptians, who long ago established this superstitious cult of so many gods; and you easily perceive that among them nothing at all was known of any truly divine nature, one that is incorporeal and intelligent. But let us grant it, and let it be conceded to these prattlers about celestial matters that they are saying what is true, and that they succeed in their physiology of what is allegorically interpreted; and let the sun be for them at one time Apollo, and again Horus, and again Osiris—the same being—and ^B myriads of other things, as many as they might wish; just as also the moon is Isis, or Artemis, and whatever else one might care to list. For let these not be the names of mortal men, but significant titles for the heavenly luminaries themselves. The sun, then, and the moon, and the stars, and the remaining parts of the world, must be worshipped as gods. In this way, therefore, the noble philosophy of the Greeks is revealed, as if by a machine, raising the profession of logic on high, while turning the mind of the wise downwards, revolving it around the sensible and visible creation of God, and nothing more; but rather, it attributes divinity to nothing else but fire and a warm substance, and the parts of the world, through celestial luminaries. And let it also deify the moist, and the dry, and the mixture of bodies. How then is the Gospel of our Savior Jesus Christ and of God not great and wonderful, which instructs the whole race of men to reverence with proper thoughts worthy of such majesty the God and Lord of the sun and moon, and the Creator of the whole world, that God who is most high and beyond all things? ^C And it teaches us not to worship the elements of bodies, but to hymn Him as the dispenser of life itself, of nourishment, and of every good, and not to be in any way struck with wonder by the seen parts of the world and everything that can be grasped by the sense of the flesh, as if they belonged to a fleeting nature; but rather to stand in awe only of the mind that is invisible within all these things, the Mind that is the Creator of everything in general and in particular, and to theologize about one sole divine power, which is the force that permeates and arranges all things, being of a nature both incorporeal and intelligent, or rather, even to describe it as ineffable and incomprehensible. It is a power that is manifest through all things by which it works, passing through them incorporeally, traversing all things without being entangled, and showing forth the ^D lasting magnificence of divinity through all things—not only through those of heaven, but also those on earth, through the general elements and the particular ones—presiding over all things invisibly and imperceptibly to us, and governing the whole world with indescribable discourses of wisdom.

Since so much has been demonstrated by us to refute this unstable wisdom or theology—both what is called the more mythic and the higher, more natural kind, which the ancient Greeks and Egyptians were shown to revere—it is time to look at the ornaments of the new philosophers, who indeed claim to philosophize among us. For they, as regards the nature of the Creator of all things, and as regards the incorporeal ideas, and the intellectual and rational powers, have, long after the time of Plato, discovered—

those who have busied themselves with ^A ancient theology, [and] have exalted with greater arrogance the profession of myths. Listen, therefore, also to their natural philosophy, and to the arrogance with which it has been set forth by Porphyry.

CHAPTER VII.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ζ'.

Ὁποίας οἱ νεώτεροι τῶν φιλοσόφων τοῖς περὶ θεῶν μύθοις συνέπλεξαν αἰτιολογίας.

^B « Fas quibus est, narrabo: fores claudunto profani; » [(70) Φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστί· θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε, βέβηλοι. ] setting forth the thoughts of divine wisdom, by which men have indicated both God and the powers of God through images akin to sense, having imprinted upon visible things those things which are unseen, in [(71)] figures, [for the sake of] those who have learned to gather the things concerning the gods as if from the books of statues. For it is not to be wondered at if the most ignorant consider statues of wood and stone [to be gods], just as those who are inexperienced in letters see in pillars nothing but stones, in tablets nothing but wood, and in books nothing but woven papyrus. » Having thus prattled in this prolusion, composed for the sake of pride and ostentation, hear next how he proceeds in his discourse word for word. « Now, indeed, because the divine spirit carries with it some form and appearance of light, and dwells in a surrounding sphere of most pure fire, and is ^C unapproachable by any sense occupied with this mortal life, he through shining matter, such as crystal, or Parian marble, or even ivory, led the mind [(72)] to the comprehension of its light; but through the appearance of gold, he impressed a notion of fire and of its own decorum, which bears no stain at all; for gold cannot be defiled by filth. Moreover, many have represented its nature, which never falls under the eyes, by means of a black stone. For [they have represented] the God who is endowed with reason by fashioning the gods in human form; and because he possesses beauty superior to all fate, they fashioned them as excelling in the dignity of their form; and finally, [they rendered them] visible with various appearances and ages, and also with a different manner of sitting or standing, and with dissimilar attire, and thus some as males, others as females, and virgins, and youths, or those who have experienced marriage, so that they might exhibit the difference and distinction between them. Therefore, they assigned all that is white to the heavenly gods, and also the sphere and all spherical things, and especially ^D to the cosmos and the sun and the moon, and sometimes even to fortune and hope; the circle and circular things to eternity and to the motion in heaven, and to the zones and the circles within it; and sections of the circles for the configurations of the moon; and pyramids and obelisks for the essence of fire, and for this reason also to the Olympian gods; just as they assigned the cone to the sun, the cylinder to the earth, and the phallus and the triangular shape to birth and generation, because of the female organ. » These things the wonderful philosopher [writes]; and what could be more disgraceful than those who speak solemnly about shameful things? Or what could be more violent than those who have modeled inanimate materials, gold and the like?

as images of light and of the gods, and claim they are manifestations of the heavenly and ethereal nature? That these are the sophistries of the moderns, which never even in a dream came into the minds of the ancients, you may understand by learning that those statues made of gold and of what is considered more precious matter were rejected by the fathers as things to be cast away. Plutarch speaks to this point word for word. ^A

CHAPTER VIII. On the ancient manner of making and setting up statues.

The making of statues appears to be something ancient and of long standing, if indeed the first image consecrated to Apollo at Delos during the celebratory processions was of wood; and [likewise] the wooden image of the Poliades set up by the autochthones, which the Athenians preserve to this day. The Samians also had a wooden figure of Juno, as Callimachus says: "Not yet was there a carved work as a statue, but rather an ancient custom, O king, thou wert [only] a plank, O goddess; for so did they set up the gods in those times." ^B Indeed, Danaus also set up a smooth image of Athena in Lindos. And Piras is said to be the first to have established a temple to the Argive Juno and to have appointed his own daughter, Callithyia, as priestess, and to have fashioned an elegant and polished image of Juno from a wild pear tree cut from the groves around Tiryns. For they did not wish to carve a stone into the image of a god, seeing it as something harder, less yielding to art, and lifeless; but they considered gold and silver to be the sickly colors of a barren and corrupted soil, and mere filth and stains appearing like weals upon earth scorched by fire. They did, however, sometimes use ^C ivory, but only in jest, and as a kind of variety for the sake of luxury and elegance. These are the words of Plutarch; and Plato, who is far older than he, declares that there is nothing holy or akin to the divine nature in gold, and in stones, and in ivory, and in things fashioned from inanimate matter, as he knows full well; listen to what he decrees in the *Laws*: "The earth is the hearth of our dwelling, sacred to all the gods of all men; therefore, let no one dedicate a second time as sacred to the gods what is held in private in other cities." Gold and silver [are...] ^D

you have an excellent understanding of the sense of these matters, listen to what the ^A *Laws* prescribe in this regard: "Earth," it says, "and the household gods are common possessions for all men; therefore, let no one consecrate second temples to the gods. For gold and silver in other cities, whether in private hands or in the temples themselves, are a source of envy; but ivory, and the body stripped of the soul, is not a holy and pure offering; finally, iron and bronze are instruments of war." I consider these things sufficient to refute the aforementioned natural philosophy; let us now consider the remaining points. Listen then to what he says.

CAPUT IX. Continuation of the theology of the Greeks and Egyptians explained by allegories.

Listen further, he says, to the wisdom of the Greeks, and consider it with yourself. For, since they believed that Jupiter is the mind of this world, which, having embraced the world within itself, brought forth whatever is contained therein, they recorded what follows—taken from the songs of Orpheus—in the books of their theology concerning him:

"Jupiter first, Jupiter last, the bright-thundering, Jupiter the head, Jupiter the middle; from Jupiter all things are made. Jupiter became male; Jupiter became an immortal maiden. Jupiter is the foundation of earth and the starry heaven. Jupiter is king, Jupiter himself is the progenitor of all things. One power, one god, a great ruler of all, One royal body in which all these things are enclosed: Fire and water, earth and ether, night and day, And Intelligence, the first creator, and delightful Love; For all these things lie within the great body of Jupiter. To behold his head ^C and fair face, The shining heaven, around which are the golden Tresses of the glimmering stars in great beauty, And on both sides two golden bull-horns— The rising and the setting, the paths of the heavenly gods. His eyes are the Sun and the counter-running Moon. His mind is the truthful, royal, immortal ether By which he circles and perceives all things; nor is there any voice, Nor sound, nor noise, nor shout That escapes the son ^D of mighty Cronus. Thus he possesses an immortal head and mind; His body is radiant, boundless, unshakeable, Strong, mighty, supreme; such was its form. His shoulders and chest and broad back Are the wide-reaching Air; wings grow upon him With which he flies over all; his sacred and swift Stride is the all-mother Earth and the high mountain peaks; His middle zone is the roaring swell of the sea And the ocean; his lowest base is the roots within the earth, Tartarus, and the furthest ends of the earth. Having hidden all things, he is about to bring forth again from his heart Into the joyous light, the many-colored wonders."

^B Jupiter therefore is the whole world, a living being from living beings, and a god from gods. But Jupiter, in that he is Mind, from which he brings forth all things, creates them by his thoughts. Now, since those who interpret the theology regarding God in this way [concluded] that it was not possible to create such an image as the account has revealed, nor even if one had devised it could a spherical shape have sufficiently demonstrated the vital, intelligent, and providential power, they made the semblance of Jupiter in human form, because he was Mind, according to which he created, and by seminal reasons he brought all things to completion. He is represented seated, implying the stability of his power; he has his upper parts bare, because he is manifest in the intellectual and heavenly parts of the world; but his front parts are covered, because he is hidden, concealed in the lower, inner parts. In his left hand, he holds a scepter, corresponding to that which is the most sovereign and intelligent of the parts of the body, namely the heart; for the creative Mind is the king of the world. With his right hand, he either holds out an eagle—because he rules over the gods of the air, just as the eagle does over the birds that fly on high—or a Victory—because he has himself conquered all things. These are the words of Porphyry ^C to you; and when these things have been set forth in this manner, it would be worth the trouble to contemplate attentively and at leisure what kind of Jupiter these verses tell us of. For my part, I judge him to be nothing else than the visible world, composed of manifold parts—of those things in heaven and the ether, and the stars visible in these regions, which are like those arranged in the head of a great body; and of those things in the air, on earth, in the sea, and things similar to these. The earth, therefore, and mountains and hills are parts of the world; and the sea winds itself in their midst like a belt; and fire and water, night and day, would also be parts of the nature of the same world. I believe these things clearly point to the visible world—unless I am mistaken—and teach that the whole is composed of parts. For he says: ^D For in the great body of Zeus all these things lie, and he clarifies what all these things are: Fire, and water, and earth, and ether, night and day. For you may see his head, and his beautiful face, The radiant Heaven, round which golden tresses Of shimmering stars beautifully hang, and what follows these. In these verses, he adds that the ether is the Mind of Zeus—nothing else, according to the Stoics, who assert that the fiery and hot substance is the sovereign part of the world, and that God is a body, and that the creator himself is nothing other [than this].

than the power of fire. For I think it has also been stated in those verses in exactly the same way: "True mind, and royal ether, proof against decay, Which circles all things and is governed by counsel." By these words, he unmistakably posits that the world is a great living being, and calling it Zeus, he declared its mind to be the ether, and its body to be the remaining parts of the world. Such is the Zeus depicted by these verses. But the commentator on the verses, beginning his work, speaks in accordance with them: "Zeus, therefore, is the entire world, a living being from living beings, and a god from gods." He clearly interprets the Zeus who is the subject of theology as being nothing other than the visible and sensible world, through both the verses and his interpretation. ^B

As for the doctrine of the Egyptians, from whom Orpheus drew his theology, he believed the world was God, composed of many gods as if they were its parts (for we have shown previously that the parts of the world themselves were also ranked by them in the number of the gods); and the verses we cited signify nothing more than this. But the same commentator, after the first interpretation, adds a second from his own mind, maintaining that the God who is the creator of this universe, that creative mind, is the one who is the subject of the theologian’s discourse. But how could the poet of these verses—whether he was the Thracian Orpheus or someone else—have theologized about such a mind, when he did not have even the slightest knowledge of its principle? Especially if whatever theology he possessed was entirely ^C derived from the Egyptians or from the more ancient Greeks, whom we have previously shown to have recognized nothing at all spiritual, nothing that consisted of a nature fleeing from our sight and exempt from a body. Yet, if to anyone Plato seems worthy of credence in this matter, he confesses in his *Cratylus* that those men who were the first to inhabit Greece believed that only those were gods whom many of the barbarians still celebrate—the sun, the moon, the earth, the stars, and the heavens. And Chaeremon also witnessed a little while ago that the Egyptians themselves did not believe there was anything else prior to the visible world, nor any other gods except the planets and the rest of the stars, and that they interpreted everything as referring to the visible parts of the world, and nothing to incorporeal ^D and living substances.

CHAPTER X. The Refutation of the Forced and Violent Interpretation of All These Things.

That poet, therefore, who flowed entirely from these sources, from where at last, or how, or under whose instruction and guidance, could he have posited in his verses that God who transcends all the limits and boundaries of the world, the creator of the sun, the moon, the stars, the heavens themselves, and the whole universe? And from where could he have drawn the knowledge of an incorporeal nature? For in truth, he does not know any of these things at all, for the creative mind of the whole is composed not of many parts...

^A nor can the heaven be its head, nor can its body consist of fire and water and earth; no, nor are the sun and the moon its eyes. And how could the shoulders, and the chest, and the back, and the belly of the God who is the Creator of the whole, be the wide-stretching air, and the earth, and the high peaks of the mountains? Or how could the ether ever be conceived of as the mind of the Creator of the whole, or as the creative mind itself? That these things are mere sophistry on the part of the interpreter of those verses, there is no need to say. I, for my part, declare him to be guilty of the utmost impiety who affirms that the parts of the world are parts of God; and even more so the one who declares God to be the same as the world; and in addition to this, the one who imagines the mind of the world to be the Creator of the whole. For to declare Him to be the maker and savior of the world, being distinct from that which has been made, is pious; but to call Him the mind of the world, just as the soul of a living creature, unified through and through, and clothed with the whole, would no longer be holy to say. And yet, that He is present to the whole, and provides for the world, the sacred oracles among us teach, theologizing in a manner worthy of Him and becoming to God. Through which He says: "Do I not fill heaven and earth? says the Lord." And again: "That God is in heaven above, and on earth below." And again: "For in Him we live and move and have our being," but not as a part of the world, nor as its soul and mind. But if it is necessary to use a more God-becoming and truer illustration, the sacred word has somewhere fittingly declared: "Heaven is my throne," saying, "and the earth the footstool of my feet." For if it were necessary at all to represent Him as a person in more human language, see the difference in the theology. For he who called the heaven a throne, marked out the All-King God as being beyond the throne and above all things, without, however, separating the earth from His providence; for He teaches that the providential powers of His Godhead come down even to things here, wherefore He adds: "And the earth is my footstool." But neither is the footstool, nor indeed is the throne, the body of Him who is seated, nor could they ever be called His parts. But he who, by calling heaven and what is contained in it the head of God, and the ether His mind, and the remaining parts of the world His limbs and body, is convicted of knowing neither the Creator nor God. For He would not be His own creator, nor could He still be called "mind," if the ether were the mind. And what sort of God would He be, of whom the earth and the mountains on the earth, which are senseless masses of matter, were parts? And how is it reasonable to proclaim as God a brother and kinsman of fire, and air, and water, the offspring of senseless and perishable matter? And if the mind of Zeus were nothing other than the aforementioned ether, and ether is the highest and fiery air, having obtained this name, as they say, from *aethesthai*, which means to burn, and both air and ether are bodies, see to where your mind of Zeus has fallen. And who among those of sound mind would still call Him God, to whom belonged a mind that was mindless and irrational; if indeed

^B they are all bodies? That is why, when we discuss God, we must assume the very opposite of what has been said above: that He is neither heaven, nor ether, nor sun, nor moon, nor the whole chorus of stars, nor indeed the entire universe itself. For these are the works of His hands, and they are altogether petty and meager if compared to those incorporeal and intelligent powers; since every body is subject to decay and lacks reason, such being the nature of things that are seen. ^C But those natures that have been elevated above this visible world possess not only reason but also immortality: and just as they attain to a perpetuity of age joined with the blessed eternity of the King of all things, so they must necessarily far excel and surpass all things that are visible. Wherefore, the divine oracles rightly teach us what we ought to think regarding the material parts of the world: *I will behold the heavens, the works of thy fingers, the moon and the stars, which thou hast founded.* 18 And again: *Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast founded the earth*; and: *The heavens are the works of thy hands* 19; and again: *Lift up your eyes on high, and see who hath showed forth all these things.* 20 And let these things be said against the first part of the explanation of those poems.

Come now, let us weigh what follows in order. "Since," it says, "an image of the kind that those poems represent could not be fashioned or configured, they therefore fashioned the image of Zeus in human form, because he was considered to be a mind, in whose view the exemplar for the creation of things was kept, and by whose seminal reasons he perfected all things." If, therefore, such an image cannot be fashioned as is exhibited in the poems of Orpheus, yet the parts of this visible world are exhibited—heaven, and what encompasses heaven itself, air, earth, and what is contained within the embrace of both: if, I say, the parts of this visible world ^D cannot have an image constructed for them, insofar as God was Mind, how could anyone construct an image of Him? And who would have a human body that could be likened to the mind of God? For my part, I do not even think it could be likened to the human mind; for that is incorporeal, uncompounded, and impartible, whereas any work of base men imitates the nature of a mortal body, and depicts a deaf and voiceless image in lifeless and dead matter. A soul that is rational and immortal, and a mind that is impassible in human nature, seems to me rightly said to preserve the image and likeness of God, insofar as it consists of an immaterial and incorporeal, intellectual and rational substance, being capable of virtue and wisdom. If, then, anyone were able to fashion the statue and form of a soul into an image, he could perhaps also fashion something of those higher things. But if the human mind is formless, invisible, and unshaped—not to be comprehended by reason or hearing—who would be so mad as to claim that a wooden image is a form and image of the most high God? For the nature of God appears outside all mortal matter, conceived by souls that have been purified in brilliance and silence. But the shape of the visible Zeus in the figure would be an image of a man of mortal nature, and not even the whole man, [as it] indicates.

brings with it no trace of life and soul. How then could the God who is above all, and the Mind that is the creator of all, be that same Zeus who is in brass or in dead ivory? Moreover, how could that creative Mind of all be that Zeus who was the father of Heracles by Alcmena, and of the rest of the men who are fabled to have sprung from Zeus—men who, having finished their mortal life common to all, left behind them for those who came after them monuments of their own nature that can never be erased? The theologians of the Phoenicians, therefore, as we showed in the first book, recorded Zeus as a mortal son of Cronus, born of a mortal—a man who was a Phoenician by race. The Egyptians, desiring to make the man their own, likewise confessed him to be a mortal, agreeing in this respect with the Phoenicians. The Cretans also, by pointing out the tomb of Zeus among themselves, would be third witnesses to the same thing. And the Atlantians, and all those who have been declared before this, claiming Zeus for themselves according to their own history, all together asserted that he was mortal, and recorded his deeds as mortal and human, and by no means holy or philosophical, but full of every baseness and debauchery. ^B But as for those who profess to turn the tales towards a more solemn meaning, at one time Zeus was a certain hot and fiery power, at another time spirit; but now, I know not how, the Mind that is the creator of all has appeared to them. We must inquire, therefore, who they would say is his father, and the forefather of the father? Since, according to all the theologians, Zeus is acknowledged to be the son of Cronus, and the verses of Orpheus placed before us mention the all-mighty Cronion; and Cronus is the son of Uranus. Let it be granted to them, then, that Zeus is the God who is over all, and the Mind that created all things. Who then is his father? Cronus. Who is the forefather? Uranus. If, ^C indeed, Zeus is the first, as being the creator of all, he ought certainly to be reckoned as second, and those made by him after him. For whether time is something existing which is the offspring of the nature of Uranus, because time came into existence simultaneously with the heavens; or if Uranus himself is the father of Cronus, and time follows after him; yet before these is the Cause of all things, God, the creator of both heaven and time. If this be so, Zeus could not be the third from Uranus. How then, among all the Egyptians and Phoenicians, Greeks and philosophers, is the Mind that is the creator of all generated as third from Uranus? The fabrications of the philosopher have been detected, and will be detected even more by what he adds, saying as follows. ^D

CHAPTER XI.

Furthermore, he says, they imagine Juno to be the wife of Jupiter, because they call the ethereal and aerial force Juno; for the ether is the subtlest and finest air. ^C Indeed, the poems of Orpheus were declaring a little earlier that the ether is the mind of Jupiter: but now the discourse of our interpreter defines what that ether is, while pronouncing it to be the finest air. But air is certainly a body, and still more so is the ether, from which it is manifestly proven that the mind of Jupiter, even if it be the finest thing of all, is nevertheless a body. But who could ever grasp and persuade himself that a body and a mind are one and the same thing, the natures of which are diametrically opposed, as they say? Then I know not how he has forgotten those poems whose explicit and open sense is this:

... The truthful and immortal mind, the ether Ruling, which moves and governs all things by council. No voice, nor sound, nor any clamor at all Can elude this offspring of Jupiter, nor does rumor reach it.

By which it is clearly declared that the ether is the mind of Jupiter. But he, in turn, maintains that the ethereal and aerial force is Juno, and shortly after, ^D using a distinction, he adds thus: “And indeed, the force of the universal air, that is, Juno, is named by a derivation from air; but of the air which is beneath the moon, illuminated and darkened, Latona is the symbol, since she is a certain ‘letho,’ that is, oblivion, partly because oblivion of the divine numen accompanies those souls which happen to be generated beneath the moon. And for this reason she is also said to be the mother of Apollo and Diana, by whom the illumination of the night is derived.” And in these things he says that the air beneath the moon is the mother of the sun and the moon; for he says this is Latona. And how, pray, could the air be the mother of the causes of illumination, becoming affected rather than being the cause? For the sun and the moon produce a varied and manifold mutation and vicissitude in the air. Now indeed [(85)]— [(86)]

^A he proceeds as follows: "That is," he says, "in terrestrial power it is first and primary, and is called Vesta, whose image, in a virginal form, is accustomed to be set up and placed near the hearth: but inasmuch as that power is fecund, they wished for it to be expressed in a feminine form with breasts. And the mountain and rocky-dwelling people called Ops, but those of the level and fertile soil called Ceres, the power of that same soil. For Ceres, while she has almost everything else in common with Ops, differs from her in this, that she herself brings forth Proserpina from Jupiter, that is, she brings forth a fresh and tender branch [or shoot] from the seeds of dry stalks and other brush-like growths of this kind; which is also the reason why her image is crowned with ears of corn and surrounded by poppies, which are symbols of great fecundity." ^B Here, I pray you, see again how this man has cast down that Ops, who is called the mother not only of the other divinities but of Jupiter himself, into the rocks and the earth, and mixing and confounding all things, has made her the same as Ceres, with this only distinction, that Ceres, he says, brings forth Proserpina from Jupiter, just as the level soil of the earth brings forth a fresh and new sprout from the seeds of brushwood and shrubs. Behold here Jupiter transformed even into the seeds of brushwood and shrubs. But let us hear what follows: "And since," he says, "there is a certain power and efficacy in those seeds which are committed to the earth, which the sun, progressing toward the lower hemisphere, brings with him around the winter solstice, Proserpina is indeed that power which preserves the seeds, but Pluto is the sun, who about the time of the winter solstice ^C travels under the earth, and goes around the hidden and unknown world, and the winter turnings; and he is said to have seized Proserpina, whom Ceres pursues with the greatest longing when she is hidden under the earth. But the power of fruits, not only of those which have a shell like wood, but of all those at all which arise from plants, they call Bacchus." And do you contemplate their images for me. For Proserpina indeed bears the symbols of the sprouts existing above the earth from the seed; but Bacchus, to whom the horns are common with that same Proserpina, is depicted with a feminine appearance, so that he may signify that the power which is in the fruits of plants is composed of masculine and feminine elements. Besides, that Pluto who seized Proserpina wears a helmet, which represents the hidden and unknown pole: he also has a truncated and mutilated ^D scepter, by which his rule over the shades and spirits of the dead is denoted: finally, he has a dog, which signifies the procreation of fruits, which is carried out in three parts, as it were, namely, by the sowing, the reception, and the return.

^A For through all these things, the power encompassing the earth is venerated, having been explained according to the circumstances: as a virgin and Hestia, the center-bearer; as a mother, the nursing mother; as Rhea, the rock-maker and mountainous one; as Demeter, the green-bearing one; as Themis, the oracle-giver, with the seminal principle descending to her being typified in Priapus; of which, that which concerns dry fruits is called Kore, while that which concerns moist ones and tree-fruits is called Dionysus; Kore is snatched by Pluto—that is, the Sun going beneath the earth—at the time of sowing; and Dionysus, according to the experiences of that power, begins to sprout beneath the earth, being younger and more prolific, while Attis serves as the symbol of its power during the flowering stage, and Adonis for the cutting during the completion. The spiritual power moving through all things is reshaped as Silenus; and that which leads to ecstasy from them is reshaped as a Bacchant, just as the impulse that stimulates toward venereal desires is represented through the Satyrs. ^B By means of these symbols, then, the earthly power is unveiled.

Such and so many are those things which I have necessarily summarized and set forth, so that we might not be ignorant of the solemn doctrines of the philosophers. Thus, therefore, according to what has been set forth: Kore is the power of the seed-crops, Dionysus is the power of the tree-fruits; Attis is the symbol of the spring flowers, and Adonis the symbol of the ripe fruits. Why, then, is it necessary to deify these things, which were created by the God of all for the nourishment of the bodies of living beings upon the earth? And why is it proper for us, to whom the nature of the soul has been granted by the King of all—God—as rational and immortal, and who have been purified in the eye of our understanding for contemplation, to worship this earthly power? ^C When I hear that Silenus is the spiritual movement and the power extending through all things, now manifesting the heavenly revolution through his head, now the density of the air through the shaggy hair of his chin, how could anyone endure seeing this being deprived of any reverent honor, when he should have been deified before all others, while Adonis and Dionysus—fruits and tree-fruits, clearly—are deified? Who would endure hearing the Satyrs and Bacchantes spoken of in solemn terms—they who represent the shameful and licentious passions in humans—if the Satyrs represent the urges that excite toward venereal desires, and the Bacchantes the transports and alienations that occur regarding these things? ^D And what is the need to refute each point in detail, when one must pass over them so that nothing of the mysteries escapes us, and to summarize the natural theology that follows? This is what the aforementioned writer has set forth, proceeding in this manner: "They called the entire water-producing power Oceanus, naming its symbol Tethys; of the whole, that which is made for drinking is called Achelous by them, while that of the sea is Poseidon, and because she is generative, the sea-producer is Amphitrite. And the partial powers of the fresh waters are called Nymphs, while those of the sea are called Nereids. Further, having called the power of fire Hephaestus, they have made his statue in the form of a man."

and put a blue cap upon him, to signify that celestial revolution where ^A the archetypal and purest part of fire is. But that which was brought down from heaven to earth is more relaxed and needs a prop and foundation upon matter; wherefore it is lame, needing matter for a support. And having supposed the power of the sun to be of this kind, they called it Apollo, from the pulsation of his rays. And nine Muses sing to him, or rather the sublunary sphere, and the seven of the planets, and the one of the fixed stars. They clothed him with laurel leaves, partly because the plant is full of fire, and for this reason hateful to demons, and partly because it makes a noise when burning, to represent the god prophesying. And in that the sun is the averter of evil things from things on earth, they called him Heracles, from his being broken ^B towards the air, when moving from east to west. And they made myths that he labored through twelve tasks, applying the symbol of the zodiacal division of the heaven. And they gave him a club and a lion's skin, the one as a sign of irregularity, the other as an indication of his power according to the sign of the zodiac. And Asclepius is the symbol of his saving power, to whom they gave the staff, for the support and raising up of those who are ill; and the serpent is twined around, bearing a sign of the salvation of both body and soul—(and indeed the natural philosophers, placing the world before us, blamed the crawling animals on the earth for their density and earthy substance;) for the animal is most pneumatic, and casts off the weakness of the body, and it seems also to be most medicinal; for it found the remedy for sharp-sightedness, and it is ^C fabled to know a certain herb of resurrection. But the sun is called Dionysus for the dance and circular motion, according to which the power of fire ripens the fruits, or as the power of fruits that produce moisture, or from the turning, or the sun's completing his revolution through the heaven; and because he patrols about the seasons of the world, and is the creator of times and seasons, the sun is called Horus; and for his agricultural power, according to which are the gifts of wealth, he is the symbol of Pluto. Likewise he also has a destructive power, wherefore they associate Serapis with Pluto; the one representing him as having set beneath ^D the earth, the other as ... and they put a blue cloak about him as a symbol of the heavenly revolution.

light descending beneath the earth, and a scepter mutilated at the top as a symbol of his authority over the spirits of the lower world; and finally, by the specific composition of his hand, they intended to symbolize his withdrawal into the hidden and unseen region. As for Cerberus, three heads are attributed to him, by which the three regions of the sun in the sky are denoted: sunrise, midday, and sunset.

Now, indeed, they called the moon ^A Diana, as if "air-cutter," on account of veneration. Even though a virgin, Diana presides over childbirth, because there is a certain power in the new moon which brings about the faculty of bearing. They made the purple cloak a symbol of the light of the earth, and the mutilated scepter a symbol of the lower power, as is the shape of the hand for moving into the unseen. The dog Cerberus is three-headed, because the regions of the sun above are three: sunrise, midday, and sunset. Regarding the moon, having received it with reverence, they named it Artemis, as if it were an "air-cutter." And Artemis is also called "Lochia" (bringer of labor), although she is a virgin, because the power of the new moon ^B is additive for births. And what Apollo is in the sun, that is Athena in the moon; for she is a symbol of wisdom, being a certain Athena. Again, Hecate is the moon, representing the transformation around it and its power according to its phases. Therefore, the power is triple-formed, bearing at the new moon [a figure] white-robed and gold-sandaled, and with torches lit; but the key, which she bears over the heights, is a symbol of the cultivation of fruits, which she nourishes according to the increase of light; and [the figure] of the full moon is bronze-sandaled. Or one might perceive the fiery element in them from the branch of laurel, and the procreative power from the poppy, ^C and the multitude of souls taking up residence in it, as if in a city, because the poppy is a symbol of a city. She also bears a bow, like Artemis, because of the sharpness of labor pains. Again, the Fates are referred to her powers: Clotho for the procreative, Lachesis for the nourishing, and Atropos for that which is inescapable by God. They also associate with her the procreative power of fruits, which is Demeter, an active force producing for her. And the moon is the cohesive element of Kore. They also associate Dionysus with her, both because of the growth of his horns and because of the place of the clouds which is situated below the lower parts. ^D They perceived the power of Cronus as sluggish, slow, and cold, and on account of the power of time they assigned it to him, and they depict him standing, gray-haired, as an expression of time growing old. The Curetes are symbols of the seasons, tending to Cronus, because time passes through the seasons. Of the Hours, some are the Olympiads of the sun, which also open the gates of the air, while the earthly ones are of Demeter—and they have a basket, the one of flowers as a symbol of spring, the other of ears of grain as a symbol of summer. Having understood the power of Ares as burning, producer of wars, and blood-letting, they made it capable of both harming and helping. Having observed the star of Venus as generative and the cause of desire and birth, they fashioned it as a woman on account of generation, and beautiful, because it is also Hesperus."

^A “Which stands as the most beautiful star in the celestial sphere.” They attached Cupid to her on account of desire. She covers her breasts and more shameful parts, since in them especially is contained the fountain of seed and the capacity and power for nourishing. They tell that she emerged from the sea, because this element, tempered from the moist and the warm, is perpetually agitated by motion, and thus it casts forth foam, by which they wished the seminal power to be shadowed forth. But Mercury exhibits the word (Logos) which accomplishes everything and makes everything clear by explaining it. And he, in his upright and intent bodily posture, represents both the intensity and tension of speech, and also demonstrates the seminal reason that permeates all things. Furthermore, because this thing, whether it be speech or reason, is something composite, they placed Mercury in the sun, Hecate in the moon, and finally in the universe itself they named him Hermopan; because that seminal and creative reason pervades all things. Moreover, he is composed from a double voice and is, as it were, mixed in his Greek lineage; he is the one whom the Egyptians call Hermanubis. And because a certain power of love is inherent in speech, they applied Cupid to represent it. Thus Cupid is the son of Mercury, and is also the child, on account of those sudden impulses that sweep him headlong into various desires. Finally, they established Pan as the symbol of the whole universe, to whom the horns are attributed to represent the sun and moon, while the fawnskin represents either the celestial stars or the variety of this universe. And thus far Porphyry on the explanation of the Greek fables.

On the theology of the Egyptians

Now he relates that the theology of the Egyptians is shadowed forth by the following notes. That creative [power] ^B whom the Egyptians call Kneph.

^A they describe in human form, having a skin of sky-blue shading into black, holding a girdle and a scepter; upon his head he wears a royal crown of feathers, because the divine reason is difficult to find and hidden, and not manifest, and because he is life-giving, and a king, and because he moves intellectually; therefore, the nature of the feather is placed upon the head. They say that this god emitted from his mouth an egg, from which was born a god whom they themselves call Phtha ^B, while the Greeks interpret him as Hephaestus; and by the egg they interpret the world. A ram is consecrated to this god, because the ancients used milk for drink. They fashioned a likeness of the world itself as follows. It is a statue in human form, having its feet joined together, and from the top down to the feet it is covered with a multi-colored garment; upon its head it holds a golden sphere, because it does not move from its place, and because of the varied nature of the stars, ^C and because the world is spherical. By the sun, they signify at one time a man mounted on a ship, resting upon a crocodile. The ship signifies movement in the liquid, while the crocodile signifies the potable water, in which the sun is carried. They intended, therefore, to signify that the sun performs its revolution through liquid and sweet air. The power of the celestial earth and the chthonic earth they called Isis, on account of ^D equality, from which comes justice; and they say that the celestial is the moon, while the chthonic is the fruit-bearing earth in which we dwell. The same thing is also meant by Demeter among the Greeks, and Isis among the Egyptians. And again, Kore and Dionysus among the Greeks are Isis and Osiris among the Egyptians. She, indeed, nourishes and raises up things upon the earth; but Osiris among the Egyptians represents the power that produces fruit, which they seek to appease with lamentations when it disappears into the earth during the sowing, and is consumed by us for food. He is also taken for the power of the river Nile; but when they signify the chthonic earth, Osiris is taken as the fruit-bearing power; but when the celestial, Osiris is the Nile, which they believe to be brought down from heaven; they mourn for this too, seeking to appease the power that is waning and being exhausted. But the Isis in the myths who is united with Osiris is the Egyptian earth; wherefore she is identified with it, and conceives, and produces fruits; for which reason Osiris is said to be the husband of Isis, and also her brother and son.

CHAPTER XII. Of the simulacrum which is visited at Elephantine.

^A At the city of Elephantine, they revere a simulacrum which is sitting, and stained with a sky-blue color. In the trunk of its body it bears a masculine appearance, but it has the head of a ram, and upon it the royal insignia, and goat's horns, upon which rests a disc-shaped circle. It sits with a pottery vessel lying beside it, upon which a human form is being modeled. Now the ram's face and the goat's horns signify the conjunction of the sun and moon in the sign of the Ram; and the sky-blue color represents the power of the moon to gather and elicit waters at that conjunction.

The second light of the moon is consecrated in the city of Apollo, and its symbol is a man with the face of a hawk, subduing Typhon (who is fashioned in the likeness of a hippopotamus) with a javelin. ^B The simulacrum is of a white color, to signify that the moon borrows its light from elsewhere; just as, by the face of the hawk, it is signified that the light itself, together with the spirit, is derived into it from the sun. For they dedicate the hawk to the sun, as a symbol of light and spirit, because it is carried with the swiftest flight, and because it flies into a higher region where there is much light. The hippopotamus, however, denotes the other pole, toward which the setting sun proceeds, because it swallows into itself those that approach near to it with gaping mouth. Moreover, in that very city they worship Horus as god.

Finally, the third light they follow with religious observance in the town of Lucina, ^C whose effigy is like a female vulture in flight, to which wings are attached, made of choice and exceptional stones. By this form of the vulture, they signify that the moon has the power of generating and stirring the winds; and they believe that vultures— which they suppose to be all females—conceive from the wind.

But in the Eleusinian mysteries, the hierophant himself is arrayed in the likeness of the Creator; he who carries the torch represents the sun; he who stands at the altar, the moon; and the sacred herald, Mercury. Furthermore, a human being is also accepted among the Egyptians in their sacred rites. ^D For Anamis is a village of Egypt, in which a human is worshipped, and sacrificed to, and the sacrificial victims are burned upon the altars; and the one who has done this would shortly eat the things prepared as if for the man himself. That they do not consider even the animals to be gods, but made images and symbols of these as representations of the gods, is made clear by the fact that oxen are consecrated to the gods in many places.

CHAPTER XIII.

Of the ox which is sacrificed to the Sun at Heliopolis.

^B “To the Sun and Moon, indeed, they have consecrated oxen; but that one which is dedicated to the Sun at Heliopolis, called Mnevis, exceeds the rest in size, and is of a very black color, especially because the intense and constant heat of the sun is accustomed to bring a blackness upon human bodies. Moreover, it has its tail and the hairs of its whole body turned upward, which is different from the nature of other oxen, just as the sun directs its course opposite to the pole. It has very large testicles, since the desire for sexual union is excited by heat, and the sun itself is said to make nature fruitful. To the Moon, however, they dedicated a bull, which they name Apis, black itself also over and above others, and bearing the signs of the sun and moon, because the moon receives her light from the sun; and the sign of the sun is the blackness of the body, and the beetle which lies under the tongue: but for the moon, it is the symbol of both the half-circle and the gibbous form.”

And let these things from the writings of the aforementioned man, reduced to an epitome, suffice for us, so that nothing of those things which are hidden in the theology of the Greeks or of the Egyptians may escape our notice. Of this theology we freely confess ourselves deserters and refugees, inasmuch as we have rejected these things along with the others, by a clearly corrected and mature judgment. Nor indeed shall that arrogant speech terrify me:

“I shall speak to those to whom it is lawful; close the doors, O ye profane.”

Indeed, we are not the profane, but rather those who have peddled such disgraceful and putrid fables—about beetles and other irrational animals of that kind—as the meaning of divine wisdom; who, as the divine Apostle says, “Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools,” because “they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things” (Rom. I, 22). But since they have moved the secret and more mysterious meaning of these fables into natures devoid of body by a certain metaphorical transference, so that they might seem henceforth not to extend their deification to the visible parts of the world, but rather to certain invisible and incorporeal powers; let us also consider whether it is not, even so, far better to worship and venerate one divine nature, rather than to think that there are several. For if many shapes and parts and limbs are fashioned within one and the same body, one ought not, on that account, to consider that there are so many souls, nor to imagine so many makers and creators of the body; but rather that one soul moves the entire body,

and that one creating power has fashioned the whole living creature. In exactly the same way, one must think of this entire universe. Since there is but one world, composed of one and the same corporeal matter, and although it is divided into a great many parts, it produces a certain single and natural consensus of all things; and besides the tempering and mixing of the elements contained within its compass, and the varied changes of some things into others, it further presents the universe itself as one world, most beautifully arranged with a single harmony of all things. It would have been right, therefore, not to posit many creating powers, but to proclaim as divine only one—the power and wisdom of God, which is God in truth.

^B But he, being so wise, again attempts to transfer the Egyptian myths to these corporeal-less powers, while escaping his own notice. For you have heard in what preceded, how he confessed that Chaeremon and most others acknowledged nothing at all beyond those realms of the world which sense perceives, and thus set the Egyptians down as those who held the principle that all things should be referred to natural causes, and that they interpreted nothing in terms of incorporeal and living essences. If, then, according to their own admission, it was characteristic of the Egyptians to refer nothing to incorporeal and living essences, but to transfer all the myths told about the gods to the natural parts of the world, why then, by starting afresh and inventing, do you ascribe to the Egyptians what is in no way their own, asserting that they based their theology on incorporeal powers? ^C In general, then, these things are to be blamed. And as for the individual cases, I think that the refutation of their forced interpretations needs no long discourse. For if, passing by the Egyptian nonsense and their great heap of prattling foolishness, someone were to move on to the natural philosophy of the cultured Greeks: who, I ask, possessed of a sound mind would not from that fact condemn those who try to misinterpret such things? ^D For let us suppose that Zeus is no longer the fiery and ethereal substance, as was believed by the ancients according to Plutarch, but rather the supreme Mind, the creator of all things, who gives life to all. How then could Saturn, who they say is time, be his father, and Rhea his mother, whom the interpreter said signifies the stony and mountainous power? For I do not know how he calls Juno the air, as well as the ether, and at the same time says she is the sister and wife of the Mind that fashioned the world and gives life to all things. Furthermore, as for Leto, let her be called something like "oblivion" [Lethe] on account of the state of unconsciousness in sleep, as they say, and because oblivion accompanies those souls that have come to be beneath the moon; how then could oblivion be the mother of the sun and the moon, when Apollo and Artemis, the children of Leto, have been transferred into the sun and the moon? And why should one worship Rhea or Demeter as gods, if the one is said to bear the symbols of stony and mountainous earth, and the other those of the plain? And as for Kore, by allegorizing her as "satiety" [koros], by what reasoning do they think she should be honored with the venerable title of a goddess? And why all the more should one worship the power that produces the seed, and the birth of fruits or the flowers that appear in the spring and wither before they can bring things to completion, or the symbols of the cutting of the ripe fruits, naming them Dionysus and Attis and Adonis, as gods? Is not the truth regarding all these...

somnium, which is called oblivion, partly because the power of perception, as they say, does not exist during time of sleep, and partly because oblivion accompanies those souls which result from being created beneath the moon: whose daughter, therefore, can oblivion be, if it is to be attributed to the Sun and the Moon, with Apollo and Diana having been transferred to the sun and moon as children of Latona? And further, why is it necessary to honor as God either Opsis or Ceres, if the one is said to be a symbol of rocky and mountainous ground, and the other of level and open soil? By what reasoning could Proserpina—whom they interpret as satiety—be expected to be called by that honorable name? Why, moreover, do they contend that Bacchus, Attis, and Adonis should be pursued with divine worship, whom they call at one time a seminal power and a symbol of those fruits which have a shell like wood, and at another time a symbol of flowers which, when they shoot forth in early spring, fall before the fruit is intact and ripe, or a symbol of harvested ripe fruits? And why do they not, as would be far truer, place the human race itself above those things which the Creator God of the universe intended only to be ready for man’s use and nourishment, rather than preferring these things in their estimation? From these, if one should wish to descend to the remaining points, whatever survives of their celebrated physiology you will easily refute in a similar manner, and you will rightly accuse of impudence those men who have determined that one and the same Sun—to select this point specifically—is not only Apollo, but also Hercules, and Bacchus, and Esculapius. For how could the same person be both father and son, ^B I mean Apollo and Esculapius? And how could he be transferred to Hercules, when they acknowledge that Hercules was born to them from a mortal woman, Alcmena? And how could the Sun be driven into a state of madness and slaughter his own children? For both actions are certainly attributed to Hercules. But they claim that Hercules, who accomplished those twelve labors, represents the division into twelve living creatures of the Zodiac circle, which they say the Sun traverses in its revolution. Who, then, will they assign to us as Eurystheus, who would command the Sun, just as he did Hercules, to carry out such labors? And how could the fifty daughters of Thestius, and the remaining crowd of captives with whom report says Hercules had relations, be referred to the Sun itself? From all of whom, children conceived by him propagated the series of his lineage for a very long time. And what centaur will they invent for us, by whose blood infected, Dejanira would draw the Sun—if he were Hercules—into that fated calamity? But let us grant to them that the Sun is no longer Hercules; let it be Bacchus. And indeed, ^C anyone could rightly offer not dissimilar objections concerning Bacchus. For first, by what mother will they say Bacchus was born? Whether Luna, or Proserpina, it makes no difference.

For ^A of the human race, for whose use and nourishment God, the creator of all things, established these? But proceeding from these points, you will refute the rest in a similar manner by means of a noble physiology, reasonably blaming those who are shameless, ^D *Phere* (5)—for them to claim that the Sun himself is Apollo, and again Hercules, and thereafter Dionysus, and likewise Esculapius. For how could the same person be both father and son, Esculapius and at the same time Apollo? And how could he again be transferred to Hercules, if indeed it is agreed among them that Hercules is the son of a mortal woman, Alcmena? And how could the Sun become frantic and slaughter his own children? For these things also have been recorded by them in relation to Hercules. But they say that Hercules, in performing his twelve labors, bears the symbol of the division of the zodiacal circle according to the heaven, which they say the sun encircles. Who, then, would be the Eurystheus, who, just as he did to Hercules, would command the Sun to perform the labors? And how could the fifty daughters of Thestius, and the multitude of other captives with whom the story says Hercules had intercourse, be attributed to the Sun? From whom also mortal children were born to him, stretching out the succession of the generations for a very long time. And who would be the centaur, with whose blood Dejanira stained her robe, and as a result involved the Sun—just as she did Hercules—in the aforementioned misfortune? But let the Sun no longer be Hercules to them; let him be Dionysus, and one might say this also reasonably regarding Dionysus; for who was it that brought him forth? Whether one might say a Moon, or a Persephone. But how could Dionysus be both the Sun, and the force that sprouts in the moist fruits and the tree-fruits? And what would become of the multitude of women who campaigned with him? And who would be the Ariadne of the Sun, just as there is one of Dionysus? And why, rather than of wine, would Dionysus not be the provider of wheat and legumes and all fruits from the earth, if he is transferred to the Sun? And if Esculapius should also be for them the Sun, how is he struck by Zeus’s thunderbolt because of base greed, according to the Boeotian poet Pindar who says something like this: ^B [omitted: philological discussion of the word 'phere'] ^{C D} [alt-version omitted]

And upon him ^A a great reward of gold appeared in his hands. But then the son of Cronus, With both hands hurling a flash, Stole the breath from his chest, And the bright lightning sent him to his doom.

Who, then, are the Asclepiads born of the Sun, who, after having propagated their race across many ages, produced a line of mortal men similar in their condition of birth to all other humans? Yet, as if by some device, they flee from the shameful and mythical tales about the gods by shifting their argument back to the Sun, the Moon, and the other parts of the world. For if they claim that Hephaestus is fire and the hot power, Poseidon is the liquid substance, Hera is the air, and again that Earth is Rhea in its mountainous and rocky state, and Demeter in its level and fertile state, with Kore as the power that produces seed, and Dionysus as the power that makes fruit-trees grow; and if the Sun is Apollo along with those already listed, while the Moon is now Artemis, now Athena, and again Hecate and Lucina—does it not stand demonstrated that, by theologizing about the creation instead of the Creator, and about the construction of the universe instead of its Constructor, they fall into a very slippery and dangerous position, to the harm of their own heads?

But if they say they do not deify the visible bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, nor the sensible parts of the world, but rather the invisible powers within them—of the very One who is over all things (for they say that God, being one, fills all things with powers of every kind, pervades all things, and presides over all, and being incorporally and invisibly in all things and pervading all things, it is reasonable to worship Him through the things mentioned)—why, then, do they not reject all the shameful and unbecoming mythologies about the gods as lawless and impious, and, having utterly destroyed the very books containing such impiety and abominations, proclaim the one and only invisible God nakedly and purely, and without any shameful entanglement? ^C For this is what those who had learned the truth ought to have done, rather than dragging down and casting into shameful and passion-filled secret speech the venerable invocation of God; nor should they enclose themselves in little huts and corners of darkness, nor in buildings made by men, as if they would find God inside, nor think to honor the divine powers with ^D idols made from inanimate matter, nor...

even to reconcile God to themselves with the foul vapors of blood and the slaughter of irrational animals, as if by some pleasant duty. It was the duty of those wise men, speaking of nothing but what is lofty and heavenly, and being free from all such bonds of error, to invite the human race without envy into a share and partnership in this contemplation of nature, and, I might almost say with head uncovered, to proclaim to all that they should not look upon the things that are seen, but solely to Him whom no one sees, the architect of all these things, and to worship His incorporeal and invisible powers in an incorporeal and invisible manner; and to think that the Divine Being is not to be worshiped by kindle fires, or by the slaughter of rams and bulls, nor by garlands, statues, and the substructures of temples, but to render Him worship through a purified mind, with sound and true doctrine, with a soul free from perturbations, and finally with their own life, so far as it is permitted to man, fashioned by the aid of virtue to the divine image of Him. Yet no one, whether barbarian or Greek, ever raised a standard of this truth for the human race: this grace is due solely to our Savior, who, having proclaimed to all nations the flight from ancient error, also without envy pointed out to all the straight path and piety leading to the true and only God of all. But those wise men, on the contrary, who boasted with such pride of a certain heavenly prudence in the conduct of their lives, when they had known God (as the divine Apostle says), they did not glorify Him as God, nor gave thanks; but they became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed for ever. ^B

Chapter XIV. That they refute the fabulous tales about the gods by doing the exact opposite.

For after that long and dense discourse of philosophy, and after their specious arguments about celestial or natural matters, they fell as if from the highest mountain peak and thenceforth wallowed on the ground with the common crowd, mingling themselves in the ancient error of polytheism, feigning to approve the same things as the masses by sacrificing and falling down before statues, and further increasing and strengthening the vulgar opinion concerning the fabulous tales about the gods. How then could it not be evident to all, that while they pretended dignity with their physical theories, and adorned the filth of shameful things merely with words by twisting the truth, they were in their very actions confirming the mythical error and the common superstition of all? And this is in no way surprising, since they even record that their own gods were involved in the mythologies about them. Hear, then, how Apollo himself teaches a hymn about himself, which he published in his own honor, admitting that he was born in the island of Delos from Leto.

^A To whom we shall add Asculapius and Mercury, of whom the one declares himself to have been produced from Tricca, the other from Maia. Porphyry also holds these things in his writings, in those which he inscribed *On the Philosophy from Oracles*, where he also made mention of the following oracles:

To all the people a great delight, From the sacred womb of the mother Leaping forth.

To which he adds these lines: ^B

When all the holy labor of childbirth held Leto, While the divine power pressed upon her, And the twin offspring at the same time shook The closed vitals of the holy mother: The earth stood still, the air stood still, The island stood still, and the sea stood still; Then you leaped forth, O Lycian prophet, O Phoebus, archer, presiding over the oracles Of the chattering tripods.

And Asculapius again concerning himself:

From holy Tricca I come to you, a friendly divinity, That Asculapius whom, begotten by Phoebus as father, And king of wisdom, whose power is the knowledge of healing, The nurturing mother brought forth. But why do you inquire?

And Mercury says: ^C

Whom you call with your voice, the son of Zeus and Maia, I, Mercury, have come hither, having left the starry King.

Furthermore, they describe the appearance of their own bodies, just as that Pan himself in his oracles says, teaching thus about himself: "I, being mortal, offer vows to Pan, the native god, distinguished by double horns, double feet, and goat's legs, a lover of pleasure." Such are the things which the praised author recorded in the hidden mysteries of the philosophy of the gods drawn from their responses. No longer, therefore, is Pan the symbol of the universe, but rather a demon, such as he himself described, who uttered that oracle. For the universe, or the whole world, did not utter the things set forth. Wherefore the artists themselves, as many as ^D represented the image not of the universe, but of this demon, imitated the form described a little earlier. And as for Mercury, how could he be considered the creative and interpretive reason of all things, when he himself confesses that he had Maia, the daughter of Atlas, as his mother, since he has confirmed the fable cast about his own birth—not the physiology of these men—by his own testimony and judgment? Finally, how can Asculapius be transferred to the Sun, who claims Tricca as his native land and declares himself to have been born of a mortal mother? Indeed, if he is the Sun himself, how can he be called the son of the Sun? For the physiologists have desired that Phoebus, whom they claim to be his father, be none other than the Sun. And that the Sun should have begotten Asculapius from a mortal woman, to whom would this not seem most ridiculous of all? For how is it likely that the Sun himself, the father of Asculapius—whom they defend as being Apollo—was himself born in the island of Delos from a mortal mother, Leto? Mark here for me, as many as the Greeks have theologized as gods born of mortal women, for a comparison, if ever they attempt to mock the birth of our Savior,

and let us oppose this crowd to them; and furthermore, that it is not the voices of poets that we recite, but the testimonies of the gods themselves.

^A

CHAPTER XV

That the gods themselves confirmed the speculations of the philosophers via their oracles, establishing allegories that conflict with the fables spread about them.

Now, while the poets, as they say, invent fables about the gods, and the philosophers fit the principles of natural philosophy to them, it would surely be reasonable to despise the former, to respect the latter as philosophers, and to embrace the discourse of the excelling men as being closer to the truth than the trifles of the poets. But now, since the gods themselves also descend into contention and conflict with the philosophers, and the gods accurately and clearly teach their own affairs—on which they are surely better informed—through oracles, whereas the philosophers merely shift certain suspicions about these matters, of which they have no clear understanding, into absurd and futile ineptitudes of debate: which side, I ask, does reason suggest we should trust? Or is this not even worth asking? For if the gods are speaking the truth when they confirm the human passions and perturbations attributed to them, then those who reject these things would be false; but if the physiologies of the philosophers are true, then the testimonies of the gods would be false. But, some might say, Apollo himself, when once consulted about who he was, gave this response:

Sun, and Horus, King, Bacchus, Osiris, Apollo, I rule the hours, and the turns of the year, the winds and the rains, And the reins of the starry night, King of the stars at once, and immortal fire.

Therefore, the gods agree with both the fables of the poets and the suspicions of the philosophers, even though they are contradictory and conflicting. For if they claim mortal mothers for themselves and confess that they were born from an earthly fatherland, how could they be such as they are celebrated by the mouths of the physiologists? Let us grant that Apollo is the Sun (for the argument of these men, tossed up and down again, will be forced to return to the same circle); how then could the island of Delos, which we still see standing in the middle of the sea today, be the fatherland of the Sun, and Leto his mother? For the oracles recently confirmed ^B both of these things as true. And how could the Sun be the father of Asclepius, a man endowed with a mortal nature, begotten by a mortal woman? But let us pass over these things.

CHAPTER XVI

That it is impossible for the parts of the world, or divine powers, to be drawn down by the necessity of incantations, and to respond to those consulting them through oracles.

Now, the vanity of this oracle must be refuted in another way as well. For the voices of the poets should begin, as they have no sense if they follow the preceding lines; and those voices signify the responses of the gods brought forward in the previous chapter.

^A For the Sun did not descend from heaven to them, and then, having filled the recipient, deliver the oracle; since it is neither possible, nor is it right that such a luminary should be compelled to submit to the necessities of men. But let them not even claim that the divine and intellectual power within it—since human souls could never be receptive of this—could be drawn down by human necessities. The same argument would apply also to the Moon. For if they claim that it is Hecate herself, and yet that she is compelled by the necessities of men, and delivers oracles through a recipient, and is employed for base and erotic services—for, being the ruler of the evil powers, that is, of the demons, it is likely that Hecate would do these things; a fact which the author himself acknowledges, as we shall show in due time. ^B But how could Pluto and Serapis be interpreted as referring to the Sun, when the same author again declares Serapis to be the prince of the evil demons, and the same as Pluto? And since he records the oracles of Serapis, how could he possibly call them oracles of the Sun? But, in truth, from all these things it remains that we must admit that the declared interpretations of nature contain nothing true, and that they are mere sophistries and empty word-play of sophists.

CHAPTER XVII

That all such things are the result of demonic energy.

As for those who serve the oracles, if one were to speak the truth, they are wicked demons, who for the deceiving of men play upon both sides, sometimes joining in the more mythical views about themselves to bolster the common and public error, and sometimes validating the tricks of the philosophers, so as to bring destruction upon those puffed up with their own deeds and arrogance; so that they are proved by all means to have never spoken anything true. ^C Now, however, after what we have discussed thus far, it is time to advance to the third species of the Greeks’ theology, which they themselves call the political and lawful kind. For they have determined that this is best suited to the wonder and astonishment of the foolish multitude, since it is maintained partly by the spread of prophecies, partly by the healing and curing of ailing bodies through oracles, and partly by the sudden and severe punishments of certain people. ^D And claiming that they have experienced these things to be true, they are very fully persuaded that they themselves are pious and act rightly towards the gods; while we are guilty of the greatest impiety, because we do not honor such manifest and beneficent powers with the appropriate worship. Therefore, taking up a new starting point for our discourse, let us address these matters.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL: BOOK FOUR

CHAPTERS OF THE FOURTH BOOK

1. Proemium regarding the oracles in the cities, and those whose revelations are celebrated above others, with the demons showing themselves in unexpected forms; and for what reason we, moved by this, have despised them also. 2. That it is easy for anyone to show that the promise made regarding the oracles is vanity and the trickery of sorcerous men, and mere imposture. 3. From the writings of Diogenianus, that their art of divination is in no way consistent, but false in many instances, and that their prediction is both useless and destructive. 4. That our Savior’s evangelical instruction has freed us from these most grievous evils. 5. What is the division of the theology according to the Greeks. 6. That we do not confirm the testimonies of our refutations from our own writings, but from those of the Greeks. 7. Concerning the secrets of the oracles, from the Greek compilation; and an oath regarding the oracles, from the writings of Porphyry. 8. That one must not divulge to everyone what is about to be said. 9. How Apollo commands the gods to be served through sacrifices. 10. That those who delight in the sacrifices of animals are not gods. 11. That nothing from the earth should be either offered as incense or sacrificed to the God over all. ^B 12. That it is not fitting to sacrifice or offer incense to divine powers using things from the earth. 13. Further, concerning the fact that one ought not to offer anything from the earth to the God over all. 14. That it is unlawful, harmful, unjust, and impious to sacrifice living creatures to gods, and that it is subject to curses. 15. That the sacrifices offered among them are offered to demons, not to gods. 16. Concerning the ancient custom of human sacrifice, from Porphyry and others. 17. That after the evangelical instruction, the ancient custom of human sacrifice was abolished. 18. That one must not sacrifice to wicked demons. 19. How one ought to be dedicated to the God over all. 20. That Apollo commands sacrificing to an evil demon. ^C 21. That no one else from all time, only our Savior and Lord, has freed the whole human race from the delusion of the demons. 22. What the mode of demonic operation is. 23. Concerning the wicked demons, and who their rulers are; and that the wicked demons approach men by assuming the forms of all animals.

CAPUT I.

On the oracles of various cities, and especially those whose responses are celebrated above others, with demons showing themselves in unexpected forms: and the reason why we have rejected them.

PROOEMIUM.

^A The order of the inquiry we have undertaken demands that in this fourth book of the *Preparation for the Gospel* we refute the third part of that error which introduced the multitude of gods—from which we have been delivered by the power and beneficence of our Redeemer and Savior Jesus Christ. For since they divide the entire system of their theology into three more general types: the mythical, which has been trumpeted about in the verses of poets; the natural, which has been devised by philosophers; and that which is championed by the laws and preserved in each city and region: and since two of these portions have already been unfolded by us in the preceding books—both the historical, which they ^B call mythical, and that which transcends the myths, which they call natural, or contemplative, or by whatever other name they please—it is time now to address the third. This is the one that is established in cities and countries, called by them the "political" type, which is championed most of all by the laws, both as something ancient and ancestral, and as revealing the power of those who are the subjects of their theology. For they boast of certain oracles and responses, cures and healings of all kinds of maladies, and visitations against the impious among them; and claiming to have arrived at these through experience, they have very thoroughly persuaded themselves that while they, in honoring divine things, act justly, we behave most impiously in holding such manifest and beneficent powers for nothing, and in directly transgressing the law; ^C when it is necessary for each person to observe ancestral customs, not to disturb things that are unmoved, and to walk in and follow the piety of their forefathers, rather than to be busybodies with a passion for innovation. Thus, they say, death is justly ordained by the laws as the punishment for those who infringe upon this. Now, the first type of theology, the historical and mythical, let each man leave to the poets as he pleases; and just so, let the second, which is told by philosophers through a more natural allegory of the myths, be left to their deliberations. But as for this third, which is established by the rulers as being both ancient and political, requiring honor and preservation, they say that neither any poet nor any philosopher should disturb it; but that everyone, sticking to the customs ^D that have prevailed from ancient times in both the fields and the cities, should remain and obey the ancestral laws. It is time, therefore, for us to provide our own account, and to offer a defense of the evangelical dispensation of our Savior, which contradicts what has been said and legislates against the laws of all the nations. Accordingly, we must now respond to these claims, so that the evangelical institution, which our Savior has brought...

^A to light, may be revealed to those who are capable of understanding it. That in animate statues are not gods, is evident even to them; and that their mythical theology contains no discourse that is noble or worthy of God was shown in the first book. Likewise, it was shown in the second and third that even their more natural and philosophical interpretation of the myths holds no forced explanation for them.

Come now, let us consider the third point: what should one think of the powers lurking within these statues? Are they noble in character, upright, and truly divine, or are they the complete opposite of all these? Another perhaps, following the argument concerning these things, might maintain that the whole business is a deception, the artifices and trickery of sorcerers, altogether rejecting the common opinion so as to hold that what is bruited about is not from God, nor even from an evil demon. ^B For the poems and the compositions of the oracles are not the work of simple folk, but the fabrications of men who are well-schooled in deception, constructed in a middle and ambiguous way, so as to fit not ineptly either both sides of what is expected from the outcome. The marvels (prodigies) by which the uneducated masses are imposed upon are linked to natural causes. For there exist in the nature of the universe many kinds of roots, herbs, plants, fruits, stones, and other things—both dry and liquid—possessing every manner of power or energy. Some have the power to repel and drive things away, others are naturally capable of drawing and attracting; some can separate and scatter, others can thicken and contract. Others serve to loosen, moisten, and rarefy; some serve again to preserve, others to destroy, and to change the present state of the body completely ^C in one way or the opposite. The efficacy of some is limited to a longer time, that of others to a shorter; and similarly, some spread themselves to more, others to fewer; furthermore, some precede, others follow, and finally some join with others—growing together and perishing together with them. And indeed, that the power of healing should reside in some, and that others create diseases and death, contains nothing alien to the art of medicine.

Moreover, many things happen by a certain natural necessity: they grow and wane together with the moon itself. There are infinite counter-affections of living things, plants, and roots, and many vapors, both soporific and sleep-inducing, and others that create illusions. The places, too, aid in this, and the sites ^D where the events are accomplished; they are instruments and vessels, prepared for them long beforehand, suitable to their art. Many assistants to this sorcery are taken in from outside—men who investigate the visitors and learn the needs of each one who comes to ask for help. Many of the inner sanctums and the hidden recesses of the temples, inaccessible to the multitude, are also concealed. The darkness, too, contributes in no small measure to the theory they advance. And not least is the opinion that has taken hold beforehand, along with the superstition of those who approach them as if they were gods, arising from...

the memory of their ancestors. ^A Let us also add the stupidity of the minds of the many, the sluggishness of their reasoning, and the unexamined nature of the crowd; and, on the other hand, the cleverness and malice of those who busy themselves with this mischievous occupation. There is also the deceitful and crafty character of these men: sometimes they promise beforehand whatever brings pleasure to each person, soothing the present situation with hopeful expectations; at other times, they make conjectures about the future and prophesy into an obscure void, obscuring the sense of the oracles with ambiguity of wording and lack of clarity, so that no one understands what has been uttered, and by the obscurity of what is said, they escape examination. And many things occur with other deceits and prodigies; for to what is done are added certain incantations, accompanied by some unintelligible and barbaric utterance, in order that they may appear to be laboring over these things ^B even when they are doing nothing of the sort. But most of all, they astound the many, including those who are considered to have a share in education, with the very poems of the oracles, which are well-adorned with the composition of words, puffed up with the weight of bombastic speech, and with much pretense of haughtiness, and fashioned with an artificial stamp of divine inspiration; through this ambiguous voice they deceive almost the entire populace.

CAPUT II.

^C Whenever, then, an ambiguity has escaped them in the oracles, it is not because of any foreknowledge of the future, but rather because they have spoken based on some conjecture. Of these, ten thousand—or rather, almost everything—have often been caught having fallen away from the prediction, the end of the events having received a result contrary to what was oracularly spoken. Unless, perhaps, rarely, some one thing out of ten thousand happens to come about by some chance occurrence, or in accordance with the anticipated expectation of the future, and is thought to have verified the oracle. And you may see them proclaiming this most of all, and engraving it on pillars, and shouting it out in all parts of the earth: that, if perchance so many were deceived in their count, they never—not one of them—want to mention it; but that to this one person out of ten thousand some one thing occurred according to what was uttered, this they carry ^D up and down. Just as if someone were to marvel, concerning those casting lots for two out of ten thousand, if by chance it ever happened that they fell to the same result, and he thought that it happened by divination and foreknowledge that the same one result came to both.

^A For the reason for this is that, given that one out of infinite responses from seers—delivered concerning an infinite number of affairs—occurred once by mere chance, he who has grasped this, if his mind possesses nothing solid or firm within, is truly struck with amazement at the certainty of the oracle. Yet it would be far better for him, laying aside such folly, to consider more diligently how many others besides have incurred destruction, or dissensions and wars, through this class of men, and by recalling the memory of ancient histories to his mind, to observe that not even then was any work of divine power demonstrated by them, even when the affairs of Greece were flourishing to the highest degree, and those oracles which are now nothing were formerly of complete authority, and were religiously cultivated by the natives with all zeal and care, as well as with ancestral rites and mysteries. ^B And indeed, it was then especially established that they possessed no power, by reason of the calamities of the wars; in which, because these renowned interpreters of the fates could contribute no help or assistance, they were convicted of having deceived their clients by the ambiguity of their responses, as we shall demonstrate in its proper place, when we lay before the eyes of all in what manner they goaded those who consulted the oracles into mutual war; and that they did not even respond about serious matters and affairs, but rather mocked their consultants with their oracles, yet in such a way that they hid their own ignorance under the darkness of ambiguous signification.

Consider also, reflecting on it yourself by calling to mind ancient examples, how often these men—after promising strength, life, and safety to people of impaired health, and later being trusted as if they were gods, and having collected great rewards from this sort of divine trade—were, after no long time, caught and proved to be impostors and charlatans, and not gods, when the men who had been deceived by them met an ill-fated end. ^C Furthermore, what need is there to say that these renowned seers did not offer any protection or help even to their own fellow-citizens, and the natives of the same city as themselves, when you see infinite numbers of people there laboring under diseases, lame, blind, and often maimed in their whole body? What, indeed, was the cause why they showed certain shadowy and false hopes of better things to strangers coming from a distant region, but not to the citizens and their own people—to whom, as domesticated friends and fellow-citizens, they ought to have shared the good derived from the presence of the gods? Unless it was that they could more easily deceive strangers, who were ignorant of their trickery, but could no longer deceive their acquaintances, who were not ignorant of their craft, and were witnesses to their practiced sport.

^D Thus the whole matter was neither divine nor superior to human contrivance; so much so that even in the greatest calamities—which were suspended from above by God, the King of all, against the impious—their temples endured complete destruction and mass collapses, along with the very dedications and statues. For where is that shrine at Delphi, celebrated by all Greeks for ages, now for you? Where is the Pythian? Where is the Clarian? Where is also the Dodonian?

The Delphic oracle

^A them—it is a constant report that it was burned by the Thracians; and indeed neither was its place of divination able to foresee the future, nor was the Pythian himself able to do anything at all for his own preservation. History reports that the same thing happened to the Roman Capitol around the times of the Ptolemies, during which times it is said that the temple of Vesta in Rome also endured a conflagration. ^B Moreover, in the age of Julius Caesar, that great and Olympic image of the Greeks, which was seen at Olympia, is said to have been struck by lightning from God, and that another temple of Jupiter also, the Capitoline, was burned, and that the Pantheon was destroyed by a thunderbolt, and that the Serapeum at Alexandria was likewise consumed by fire. And testimonies of these things are recorded among the Greeks themselves. But it would be a long story if anyone intended to recount each one in detail, ^C attempting to demonstrate that those wonderful oracle-givers are found to be unable to defend even their own temples; and if they were not even useful to themselves in times of calamity, they could hardly ever have sufficed to help others. But if one were to add one thing to what has been said, he would have grasped the greatest point: that many even of those who were termed "god-bearers"—the very ones most esteemed as high priests, theologians, and prophets by them—not only long ago, but quite recently, even in our own time, being caught in this theosophy ^D and brought to the Roman tribunals, were compelled by the torture of the question to declare this whole class of fraud to be devised for the deceiving of men, and confessed the whole business to be a pretense composed by art. And they recorded in writing, in the statements set down by them in the records, the entire manner of the contrivance and the methods of the evil craft. Thus, paying the just penalty for their destructive deceit, they uncovered the whole matter, confirming for everyone the proof of what was revealed by the deeds themselves. But what kind of men were these? Do not think they were some cast-off and obscure persons. For some of them were counted among those renowned for this wonderful and noble philosophy, those who wore the rough cloak and were puffed up with pride; others were caught from among those holding office in the city of the Antiochians, those indeed who were especially glorified by the persecutions against us in our own time. We also know that a philosopher and prophet who suffered similar things in Miletus was likewise revealed. Whoever gathers these things—and even more than these—might well say that those who are the causes of the oracles in the cities are not gods, nor even demons, but the deceit and trickery of sorcerous men. And in fact there were among the Greeks themselves whole schools, distinguished by philosophy, that presided over this opinion—such as the followers of Aristotle and all those of the Peripatetic school in succession, as well as the Cynics and Epicureans, whom I, for one,

^A I marveled at how those who had been reared in the customs of the Greeks, and who had received from their fathers from the cradle that the gods exist as they are described, had become trapped by no such concepts; but rather, they effectively refuted even the renowned oracles and the divinations pursued by all, showing them to bring forth nothing true, and declaring them to be useless and indeed harmful. Since there are countless numbers of these, and because the destruction of the oracles has been carried out by many, I consider it sufficient for me, by way of testimony for the sake of what has been said, to put forward for the present a single selection from one of these, which counters the arguments constructed by Chrysippus regarding fate based on the prophecies of the oracles. The author writes against him, showing that he incorrectly draws conclusions regarding fate from the oracles; that in most cases the oracles of the Greeks turn out false; that events only rarely coincide for them by chance; and that their prophecy is useless and harmful. Hear, therefore, what is said word for word.

CHAPTER III

“Furthermore,” he says, “Chrysippus brings forward another argument in the aforementioned book. For he denies that the prophecies of the divine seers are true regarding the future, unless all things are held by the necessity of fate. And this is truly no less foolish than the rest. For he assumes this as if it were established that all the things predicted by those whom they call ‘seers’ occur, or rather, as if it had been conceded by someone that all things come to pass by fate, and as if it were not stated as something equally false, whereas on the contrary—I mean the fact that not all things which are predicted by them ^C come to pass—the actual ^D operation (27) proves the point. Thus…”

^A Chrysippus forces upon us his argument, connecting the one premise to the other in turn; for he attempts to prove that all things come to pass by fate from the fact that there is divination, yet he could not prove that divination exists in any other way unless he first assumes that all things come to pass by fate. But what argument could be more wretched or absurd? For the fact that some of the things which the so-called prophets predict occasionally come to pass, is not a sign that divination is a science, but rather that the outcomes happen to coincide with the predictions by chance; this, however, does not reveal any science to us. For we would not call an archer scientific if he hit the mark once by accident but missed it many times; nor a physician one who kills the majority of those he treats, yet manages to save one person on occasion; nor do we call anything at all a science which does not successfully accomplish all, or at least the majority, of its proper tasks. ^B That the so-called prophets fail in most things, the whole life of humanity is a witness, and they themselves are witnesses—they who profess the art of divination, yet do not use it to help themselves in the needs of daily life, but instead employ at times their own judgment, and at times the advice and assistance of those who are considered to have experience in each of these matters. But we shall treat more fully in other places the fact that this thing which we have prefixed as 'divination' has no foundation, laying out also the views of Epicurus on this subject. For now, we add only this much to what has been said: that the fact that those who are called prophets occasionally speak the truth ^C is the work not of science, but of a chance cause. For we have previously defined that it is not the case that a person never succeeds at a given task, but rather that when one does not succeed always, or even for the most part, or not by means of science when one does happen to succeed, such an event is to be called the result of chance, in accordance with the clear concepts that those of us who have distinguished the terms assigned to each name possess.

Furthermore, even if it were true by hypothesis that divination is the study and prediction of all future events, it would indeed follow that all things come to pass by fate; yet its utility and benefit to life—for the sake of which Chrysippus seems especially to praise divination—would never be demonstrated. For what benefit would it be to us to learn beforehand that hardships are absolutely going to happen, which it would not even be possible to prevent? For how could anyone prevent things that are fated to occur? ^D So there is no benefit to us in divination; indeed, it would even become a source of some evil, furnishing to men in vain the pre-grief for hardships that have already been foreseen and are going to happen by necessity. Nor will anyone say that the prediction of future goods provides an equal amount of joy; since it is not the nature of man

^A to rejoice in anticipated goods as he is distressed by evils. Besides, we do not at all expect these things to happen to ourselves before we have heard of them; whereas we all, so to speak, expect goods more readily, by reason of our natural affinity for them. For most people have already hoped for even greater things than can come to pass; from which it happens that the prediction of good things does not greatly increase our joy, because each person, even without such a prediction, expects the better outcome of his own accord, or only slightly increases his joy ^B by the supposed certainty; and often, indeed, he even diminishes his joy when what is heard is less than what was hoped for. But the prediction of evils, both because nature instinctively recoils from them and because they are sometimes predicted contrary to our expectations, brings serious disturbance to the soul. But even if this were not the case, it would be clear to anyone that prediction is useless. For if someone were to say that the utility of divination is preserved because the difficult event is predicted so that we may guard against it, ^C then it will no longer display all things as coming to pass by fate, since it is in our power both to take precautions and not to take them. If someone were to say that this too is constrained, so that fate extends to all existing things, the utility of divination is again destroyed; for if it is fated that we take precautions, we will take them, but it is clear that we will not take them if it is not fated that we should do so, even if all the prophets predict the future to us. For example, regarding Oedipus, and Alexander, the son of Priam, even Chrysippus himself says that, although their parents devised many things to kill them so that they might guard against the evil predicted for them by the prophets, they were unable to do so. Thus, he says, there is no benefit even for them in the prediction of evils, because of the cause arising from fate. And this may suffice, and more than is necessary, to show that divination is not only groundless but also useless. ^D Such, then, is the philosopher's view. But you yourself reflect on how the Greeks, who from their earliest years had imbibed the discipline and customs of the Greeks as if with their very nurse's milk, and who had also examined most accurately their ancestral religions of the gods—I mean all the Aristotelians, the Cynics, the Epicureans, and whoever associated themselves with their opinion—mocked the responses of the prophets that were bandied about among the Greeks themselves. Yet, if they had considered as true the things that are celebrated by everyone concerning the prodigies of those oracles, they ought certainly to have been no less astonished than the others at their power, seeing that they were themselves Greeks, were entirely familiar with their ancestral rites, and would never in any way have neglected anything worthy of knowing. These things and others like them, which [pertain to this kind of argument]

to refute the fame of the oracles, would give a man a great supply. But it does not please me to undertake the dispute we have taken up in this way, but rather by that way which we entered into from the very beginning. For we shall grant that those who assert the faithfulness of the prophecies speak the truth, so that from the very confession of those who defend the truth of these responses, and who maintain that the oracles were uttered by the voices of their own gods, we may draw an integral and accurate explanation and knowledge of those things which are brought forward. ^A

CAPUT IV. That we have been delivered from these greatest evils by the benefit of the evangelical doctrine of our Savior.

I think it is clear to everyone that the examination of the matters before us comprises not a small part—but the greatest and most necessary part—of the evangelical thesis. For if it could be shown that all the Greeks and barbarians everywhere, who lived before the advent of our Savior Jesus Christ, did not know the true God, but either honored as existing those things which did not exist, or were dragged here and there like the blind by certain wicked and God-opposing spirits and by evil and unclean demons, and were drawn down by them into the abyss of wickedness (for what else is this but to be demon-possessed?); how much more clearly would the great mystery of the evangelical ^B economy be seen, in that it has called all men everywhere, by the voice of our Savior, out of their ancestral error and the tyranny of the demons, and has redeemed those living at the ends of the earth from the [error of] deceit that had held all their life from age to age? So that from that time to this, those ancient [temples] and shrines—the foundations of the error of all the nations—have been dissolved and cast down, and truly solemn sanctuaries and schools of piety have been raised to the King of all and Creator of all things, in the midst of both cities and villages, by the power and virtue of our Savior throughout the whole world; and sacrifices worthy of God, through the prayers of holy men, purified from all wickedness, in purity of soul and the acquisition of every virtue, according to the divine and saving teachings, are continuously performed by all the nations every day—the only sacrifices that are, and are pleasant offerings to the God over all. Since these things are so, how would we not have shown at the same time that we have departed from our ancestral superstition not by unreasoning levity, but led by sober calculation, and that with a just and true judgment we have loved the better things and have become lovers of the divine and true piety? But enough of these things; let us now proceed to the matters at hand. ^{C D}

CAPUT V. What is the division of the theology of the Greeks.

Those who have examined the theology of the Greeks precisely, pursuing a different method from those we have recounted before, have divided the whole subject into four kinds. For, indeed, in the first place, they separate the prince of God—the God over all—from the common crowd, and state that He is first and is the God of all, the Father and King; after whom [the first genus]

that of the gods, a third of the demons, and finally a fourth of the heroes. Furthermore, they maintain that everything which falls into the category of that which is best, partakes in part of acting and in part of being acted upon, and they decree that whatever is of this nature, as a participant in light, is called light. Conversely, they assert that evil rules over the inferior nature; and they wish this to be nothing other than the genus of depraved demons, which never maintains a friendly association with that which is good, but nonetheless possesses the primary power over the nature of contrary things, just as God does over the whole genus of good things; and everything of this kind, they say, is called darkness.

With these things thus established and distinguished, they attribute the heaven and the ether up to the moon to the gods; the things around the moon and the air to the demons; and the things around the earth and the subterranean regions to the souls. Having used such a definition, they say that one ought to worship, first of all, the heavenly and ethereal gods; second, the good demons; third, the souls of the heroes; and fourth, to appease the base and wicked demons. While they distinguish all these things in word, in actual practice they confuse everything, worshipping only the evil powers in place of all those mentioned, and surrendering themselves entirely to them, as I shall demonstrate in the progress of this discourse.

It will be your task, from the points that are brought forward by us, to see what kind of powers those, which exert their influence through the statues, ought to be—whether gods or demons; and if demons, whether they are evil or good. ^C For our divine Scriptures are not accustomed to call a demon "good" at all, since they know very well with whom that vocabulary and name is shared—namely, that they are all depraved; just as they do not truly and properly name any other as God, except the One who is the Author of all things. However, they do not deign to call those noble and good powers—because they have the principle of their origin by their own nature, and follow long after that God who is without origin and is their own Creator—either gods or demons; but because they occupy a certain middle rank between God and the demons, they are accustomed to name them with a middle and most apt appellation: sometimes as angels of God and ministering spirits, sometimes as divine powers and archangels, and by other such names that aptly correspond to their functions.

As for the demons—if it is incumbent upon us to explain the etymology of their name—it is not, as it pleases the Greeks, because they are "knowing" ones, but rather ^D because they cause fear, which means to frighten and terrify—it is from this that those spirits have quite appropriately received the name of demons; and it is fitting that the divine and good powers should be held alien to both the character and the designation of the demonic. For it would be most absurd of all to deem those that are similar neither in their purpose nor in the nature of their conduct, worthy of one and the same appellation.

^A

CHAPTER VI. That our arguments and refutations are confirmed not by our own writings, but by those of the Greeks.

Come then, let us examine what the character of these oracles is among them, so that we may learn what sort of power we ought to attribute to them, and whether we have rightly departed from them or not. If I were to put forward the refutations of the matters indicated on my own authority, I know well that I should not be presenting a case free from reproach to captious men. Therefore, not saying anything of my own, I shall again have recourse to the testimonies of outsiders. Since there are countless Greek writers and philosophers, I select as being suited to the matters at hand, before all others, that friend of the demons himself, who, having lived in our time, shines forth in his calumnies against us. ^B For this man, among the philosophers of our time, seems to have had the greatest familiarity with the demons, whom he himself calls gods, and to have acted as an envoy on their behalf, and what is more, to have investigated their affairs with accurate precision. This man, then, in the work he wrote concerning the philosophy derived from oracles, made a collection of the responses of Apollo and the rest of the gods and good demons; selecting those which he himself deemed sufficient for the demonstration of the virtue of those who are called gods, and for the exhortation of that which he loves to call "theosophy." From these collected oracles, therefore, which he deemed worthy of mention, it is well to judge the oracles themselves and to consider exactly what sort of power they happen to possess. But first let us observe how the man in question, at the very beginning of his writing, confirms with an oath that he speaks the truth, saying as follows. ^C

CHAPTER VII. On the secrets concerning oracles from the Greek collections, and an oath regarding the oracles, from the writings of Porphyry.

"He is stable and constant who draws the hope of his salvation from that which is stable alone, of which he shall share without taking anything away. For I call the gods themselves to witness that I have neither added anything to, nor taken anything away from, the thoughts uttered in these oracles; unless perhaps I have corrected a faulty expression here or there, or changed something for the sake of greater clarity, or supplied a missing meter, or deleted something that did not contribute to the purpose, so that the meaning of what was said might remain pure. ^D

I have preserved the meaning of the words entire and sincere everywhere, and indeed more out of fear of future impiety than in anticipation of any sacrilegious crime deserving punishment. ^A Such, then, will be this collection of ours, which, while it will contain an ample wealth of philosophical dogmas—insofar as the gods themselves declared them to be joined with truth—will also touch upon something of the art of divination, insofar as it will seem to contribute partly to contemplation and partly to the proper ordering of life. How much utility it has, those will best understand who, when they were in travail with the truth, sometimes made vows that, should the vision of the gods themselves be granted them, they might rest from all fluctuation of doubt, confirmed by the authority of those who speak as most worthy of all faith.” Having prefaced these things, he adjures and warns beforehand that no one should divulge to the public the things he is about to say. ^B

CHAPTER VIII.

“But you,” he says, “take care, if anything else, not to publish these matters openly, and do not cast them before the eyes of profane men for the sake of glory or gain, or out of any other less religious desire for flattery; for there is danger not only to you, if you despise these precepts, but also to me, who have easily believed you, since I have not been able to keep to myself such great favors. Therefore, only those who have ordered their lives toward the salvation of the soul should be called into the communion of these things.” And with some matters interspersed: “See to it,” he says, “that you hold these things as more arcane and hidden than the flesh itself, for the reason that the gods have declared nothing concerning themselves in a plain and obvious way, but all things are obscure in their oracles.” ^C But come now, since this author warns us of these things in such impressive words, let us see further what we ought to think and judge concerning those virtues which do not fall under sight, and which are reckoned by them in the number of the gods, based on these divinely issued responses. For thus we shall understand that the man is refuted by his own words, as well as by his studies and way of life. For he who, in those books which he wrote on the *Philosophy to be derived from Oracles*, commemorates the responses of Apollo, in which he orders sacrifices to be performed with slain animals, and this not only to demons or to powers closer to the earth, but also to the ethereal and celestial gods; the same man, in another work, acknowledging that all those to whom the Greeks performed sacrifices by the slaughter of irrational animals are not gods but demons, pronounces that it is neither proper nor right to sacrifice living creatures to the gods. Receive, therefore, the words with which he himself first, while expounding the philosophy derived from oracles, relates the ritual by which Apollo taught that the gods should be worshipped. He pursues the whole matter thus.

CHAPTER IX.

“But now, hereafter, I think I shall proceed in order regarding what has been said about piety, if I record next what the gods themselves have declared in their oracles concerning their own worship, even if I have already ^D set forth something of this—partly, at least—in what was said above regarding piety.” The oracle of Apollo is—

while at the same time containing the division of the order of the gods: ^A

1 Come then, friend, having come upon this god-given path, 2 Do not neglect to divide the sacrifices of the blessed ones, 3 Partly to those on earth, partly to those in heaven, and at times to those in the ether. 4 To the kings themselves, and to those moving in the moist air, 5 And to the sea-dwellers, and to all those beneath the earth. 6 For all things are contained in the fullness of nature, 7 Of these. 8 And how it is lawful to carry out the purifications of animals, 9 I shall sing; but carve the oracle upon your tablets. 10 Three to those on earth, three to the heavenly gods; 11 Bright ones to the heavenly, but to the earthly, like in color. 12 Divide the sacrifices of the earthly ones into three parts, 13 Bury those of the nether ones, and spill the blood into a pit. 14 Pour honey to the nymphs, and the gifts of Dionysus, 15 And as for those that are ever flying about the earth, 16 Fill the altar, teeming on all sides with their slaughter, 17 Cast the body into the fire, having sacrificed; of a winged animal, 18 And having mixed honey with barley-meal from there. 19 And throw on the vapors of frankincense and the barley-grains. 20 And whenever you are upon the sands of the sea, having poured the gray salt, 21 Sacrifice from the head, and into the deep wave of the sea 22 Send it whole. And having finished all these things, 23 Go to the broad dance of the aerial sky-dwellers. 24 And then to the starry ones and to all in the ether, 25 The blood from the throats in streams around the offerings 26 Pools; but the limbs for the gods to be labored over in a banquet; 27 Give the choicest parts to Hephaestus, and the rest to be eaten, 28 Having filled all things with sweet vapors, ^B 29 And Hera, flowing; and send up prayers to these.

And after a few words, he explains the oracle, interpreting it thus: “The sacrifices have this manner, rendered according to the aforementioned division of the gods. For since there are gods subterranean and gods on earth, and since some are called subterranean and of the netherworld, and others are called on-earth and of the earth; he orders that four-footed black victims be sacrificed commonly to these; but he tells us that the manner of the sacrifice differs. For instance, he orders those for the on-earth gods to be slaughtered over altars, but those for the subterranean ones over pits; and he even enjoins that, having sacrificed, one should bury the bodies for the latter. That the four-footed animals are common to these, he himself, having been asked, added: ^C

Terrarumque Erebique deis communia solis Quadrupedum agnorum juvenilia corpora sunto. ^D

^A He advises that birds be sacrificed to the aerial deities and be entirely consumed by fire, and that their blood be poured around the altar; but to the marine [deities], that birds be sacrificed, yet set free alive—being black in color—into the waves. For he says: "To these gods birds, but to the marine ones those that are black." ^B Assigning birds to all the gods, if you except the subterranean ones, and black ones solely to the marine gods; therefore, white ones to the others. But to the heavenly and ethereal deities he advises that the topmost parts of the white victims be consecrated, and that the remaining parts be eaten; ^C for it is lawful for you to feed only on this class of victims, and not on any other. Those whom he called "heavenly" in the division, he here calls "stellar." Now, what need is there to explain the symbols of these sacrifices, which are sufficiently known to a prudent man of themselves? For ^D indeed, four-footed animals, and those terrestrial ones, are sacrificed to the terrestrial gods; for like is delighted by like—the four-footed animal is indeed terrestrial, and for this reason dear to Demeter, who also produces the manifestation of the fruits from the earth in the sky together with the sun; and they must be black, because the earth is by nature dark; and three in number, because the number three is a symbol of the bodily and earthy nature. Therefore, to the earthly gods one must sacrifice up upon an altar, for these move about upon the earth; but to the subterranean ones, in a pit and in a grave, where they dwell. But birds are for the others, because all things are divine; for the water of the sea is also ever-moving, and is black; wherefore such victims are appropriate. To the aerial ones, white [victims], for the air is of a transparent nature and is easily illuminated by light. And to the heavenly and ethereal gods the lightest parts of the animals are offered, as being the lightest of all; and humans are invited into communion of sacrifice with them, because they are the authors of good things, while the others are averters of evils. Thus far the excellent initiate of divine wisdom in those things which he wrote in *On the Philosophy of Oracles*.

CHAPTER X.

That those who delight in animal sacrifices are not gods.

^A acceptable to the gods. By saying this, he would clearly be refuting the god he is questioning; for he said just now that the oracle commanded that animal sacrifices be offered not only to the gods beneath the earth, but also to those of the air, the heavens, and the ether. And Apollo gives such commands; but he who calls upon Theophrastus in his testimony, says that the sacrifice of animals is not appropriate for gods, but only for demons; so that according to his own and Theophrastus’ argument, Apollo is a demon, not a god: nay, but all gods who are held to be such among all nations, to whom all, both rulers and subjects, in cities and countrysides, offer animal sacrifices in public: for according to the aforementioned, one ought to consider these to be nothing else than demons. And if they say they are good, how, if the sacrifice of blood is unjust, abominable, and harmful, could those who delight in such things be good? And if ^B they also delight not only in such sacrifices, but—leading in the excess of cruelty and inhumanity—in murders of men and human sacrifices, how would they not be outright murderers, kin to all cruelty and inhumanity, and nothing else but evil demons? Now that we have attained the proof of these points, I consider that the reasonableness of our withdrawal from the things declared has been established. For it would not be holy, nor pious, to cast down the venerable name of God and the highest honor to evil spirits, nor even to bestow upon robbers and grave-robbers the honor that is due to a man of kingly dignity. ^C Whence we, having been taught to worship only the God over all, and to honor according to what is fitting both Him and the god-beloved and blessed powers around Him, do not bring anything earthy or dead, nor gore or blood, nor anything of corruptible and material substance; but with a mind purified from all wickedness, and with a body adorned with the order of purity and temperance—which is more shining than any garment—and with upright and godly doctrines, and above all these, with a genuine disposition, we pray to keep the piety handed down by our Savior even unto death. But since these things have been set forth by us in advance, it is time to move ^D toward the proofs of what has been said. And first of all, it is reasonable to go through the arguments by which the aforementioned author, in those things he wrote under the title *On Abstinence from Living Creatures*, maintains that neither to the God over all, nor to the divine powers beneath Him, should anything earthy be either offered in smoke or sacrificed; for such things are foreign to the worship that is proper to piety.

CHAPTER XI. That nothing of the earth’s produce should be either offered as incense or sacrificed to the God over all.

^A To the God over all, as a certain wise man said, one should offer neither incense nor sacrifice of any of the things perceived by the senses. For there is nothing formed of matter that is not immediately impure to Him who is separate from all matter. Wherefore, not even the speech which is vocal is fitting for Him, nor that which is inward, if it be defiled by some passion of the soul; but we should worship Him through pure silence and pure thoughts conceived concerning Him. It is right, therefore, that we, having been joined and made like unto Him, should offer our own ascent as a holy sacrifice to God, the same being also a hymn and our salvation. This sacrifice, then, is perfected in the dispassion of the soul and the contemplation of God. ^B

CHAPTER XII. That to the divine powers, too, nothing earthly should be sacrificed or offered as incense.

To His offspring, those gods meant to be understood by the mind, we must also add the hymn of reason and language; for the first-fruits of those things, which each of them bestows upon us and by which they nourish and preserve our nature, shall be the most acceptable sacrifice to each. Just as the farmer offers the first-fruits of the sheaves and fruits, so let us offer to them the first-fruits of our thoughts concerning the good things that come from them, thanking them for the contemplation of the things which they have given to us, and because they truly nourish us through the sight of them, being present and appearing, and shining upon our salvation. ^C Such are his words; and related to this, and akin to what is said about the first and great God in the work *On Sacrifices*, is that which is said to be written as follows by that very Apollonius of Tyana, who is admired by many.

^D There are some who have understood "shellfish" to be meant, because they appear to be covered by some kind of shell, like nuts and other things of that kind. One may be permitted, therefore, to name nuts and other similar fruits. Certainly, words did not fail Plutarch by which he might call those fish, if they were indeed fish, or any other [creature]. What is more, if they were fish, he would never have added the genus itself, that is, [the term] fish, nakedly, without that singular form of fish? Therefore, let the proper meaning of this word be retained here also; only, if this new conjunction of "sea" and [fruit] should seem strange to anyone, let him read it with a slight change. Although Amiot indeed rendered it *des pays voisins de la mer*, I would believe, however, that it signifies only that these fruits were brought by sea, from wherever they might be brought. Where this is more clearly expressed on p. 693 by these words, etc. Lo, how elegantly [he expresses], as we commonly say, *la fraîcheur* [the freshness]! etc., which passage may thus be rendered more clearly and significantly, "and at the same time more gratefully, for the very things which we contemplate through their benefit."

CHAPTER XIII

"Equily," he says, "I think that one most truly performs the proper duties of religion, and can possess that Being favorable and propitious to himself beyond the rest of mankind, if he would never sacrifice anything to that God whom we have called the Principle—who is indeed one, and separated by a vast interval from all others, and according to whom it is necessary that all the rest should be known—nor kindle a fire, nor at all name any of the things which are perceived by the senses (since He needs nothing, nor even from those who are superior to us; nor is there anything which the earth produces as a plant, or which it nourishes as an animal, or the air, that is not at all times his by a more excellent reason—I mean that which does not go through the mouth), and from the most beautiful of all beings, through the most beautiful factor within us, should ask for ^B good things. But this is the mind, which requires the service of no instrument. If, therefore, we heed these things, we must certainly offer no sacrifice to that supreme God and governor of all things. Since these things are thus, observe further what kind of things that former writer records concerning the sacrificing of living creatures, as he invokes Theophrastus as a witness to his argument."

CHAPTER XIV

"As the first-fruits of sacrifices to men gradually increased ^C in wickedness," he says, "there was at length introduced a use of most unworthy victims, full of cruelty, so that it seems as if the curses previously discussed by us have now finally reached their end, after men began to slaughter and to stain the altars with blood, from the time when, once compelled by the necessity of famines and wars, they defiled their hands with slaughter. Therefore, the Divinity," as Theophrastus says, "disturbed by the indignity of both these things, seems to have inflicted the fitting punishment; whence some of mankind have become atheists, while others, being more ill-thinking ^D than truly impious toward the gods, since they have judged the nature of the gods to be common and nothing better than our own; from which it has also come about that, while the former have sacrificed no offering at all, the latter have indeed sacrificed, yet as impiously and as those who have touched upon unlawful victims."

To these he adds also the following: "These things being in this state, ^A Theophrastus rightly forbids those who truly wish to be pious to sacrifice living creatures, employing also such other reasons as these." And he adds: "Moreover, we must sacrifice those things which, when we sacrifice them, we harm no one; for an offering ought to be harmless to everyone. If, however, someone says that God has given animals to us for our use no less than fruits, yet even so, the sacrificing of animals brings some harm to them, inasmuch as their life is taken away. Such things, therefore, are not to be sacrificed; for ^B a sacrifice is a holy thing, and the very name implies it. But no one is holy who renders thanks from the things of others—even if he takes fruits or plants—without their consent. For how could it be holy, when those who are deprived suffer injustice? And if one does not even holily sacrifice fruits belonging to others, it is utterly unholy to sacrifice the most precious things of all when we have taken them away from someone; for the atrocity itself becomes even greater. The soul, moreover, is much more precious than things that grow from the earth, and to strip this away from living creatures while sacrificing them is not fitting." And he adds: "We must therefore abstain from living creatures in sacrifices." And again he says: "Therefore, that which is neither holy nor easy to provide must not be sacrificed." And further: "Thus, even if we must consecrate the first-fruits ^C of living creatures to the gods, it must be done for one of these three reasons; for no sacrifice occurs except for one of these reasons. Or would one think that the Divinity considers himself honored, and not rather dishonored by us, if we inflict an injustice upon others even by the very nature of the first-fruits? Yet we acknowledge that we cannot sacrifice those animals by which we have never been harmed without doing them an injustice. Therefore, none of those remaining ought henceforth to be sacrificed under the guise of divine honor. Nor, furthermore, for the sake of giving thanks to the Divinity. For he who, having received...

a benefit, wishes to return thanks, should surely not do so through the injury of another; otherwise he would seem to be returning thanks just as if someone, having despoiled his neighbors of things by force, were then to present them to another as a gift or an honor. Finally, there is no hope of obtaining anything from Him through an evil intention. For whoever covets a benefit through a misdeed, one may deservedly suspect will not feel gratitude even after having received the benefit. Therefore, we should not sacrifice living creatures to the gods in the hope of a favor. For even if you could kill an animal to sacrifice without a human seeing, you could certainly never escape the sight of God. If, therefore, every sacrifice must come from one of these causes, and yet none of them justifies the slaughter of animals, it follows logically that it is never right to immolate any animal to the gods. ^B And again, after a few words interjected: "For with such a kind of sacrifice," he says, "both universal nature and the common sense of the soul of all men were delighted:

And the blood of bulls did not moisten any altar, And all deemed it a crime of the greatest magnitude To eat the limbs after the life had been torn away."

And after other things: "But when a youth learns that the gods delight in great expenditure, and, as they say, in the feasts of oxen and other animals, how could he ever be willing to be frugal and temperate? And if he thinks such victims are acceptable to the gods, how could he persuade his mind that it is not permitted for him to act wickedly, since he sees that he can redeem his misdeeds through sacrifices? But on the contrary, if he is persuaded that the gods have no need of all these things, but rather look upon the character of those who approach them, and that they accept as the greatest sacrifice a correct judgment concerning themselves and the truth of things, how then could he fail to become temperate, just, and holy? For ^C indeed, when a sincere mind and a soul void of all cupidity are the best first-fruits of the gods, it would not be foreign to them to offer other, more modest and easily provided things, if only this is done not for the sake of the gift, but with all zeal and generous will: since these honors of the gods should be considered similar to the ways of presiding, rising, and reclining among good men, and not to the payment of taxes."

From these things it is surely manifest, even by the judgment of the Greeks themselves and those among them who have been philosophers, that nothing living can be rightfully sacrificed to the gods: for the act is, I say, nefarious, pernicious, and next to execrable. Therefore, that prophetic spirit was not a god, nor even a truthful and good demon, who a little before demanded bloody libations... ^D

and the burnt-offering of flesh; and therefore he did not deserve to be called ^A god, but was a fraudulent impostor and an utterly evil demon, who dared to lie openly, to proclaim that those who were not gods were gods, and to command that animal sacrifices be offered not only to terrestrial powers, but also to the celestial and sidereal ones.> But let us learn from the same author, writing in this manner, what we ought to consider all these beings to be, if they are not gods.

CHAPTER XV.

That sacrifices of these are offered to demons, not to gods.

^B “For he who was concerned with piety knew well that no living thing is sacrificed to the gods, but to the demons, or rather to those among them who require such things up to a certain point.” And again, further on, he says: “That it was not to gods, but to demons, that those who had learned the powers existing in the universe brought sacrifices through blood, this is proven by the testimony of the theologians themselves.” But because he said that some of these demons were evil and some were good, and that the good ones would not trouble us—come, let us see, how is it that not even the good demons, but rather all those who are thought to be their gods, are convicted of being evil? You might ^C find the proof of this as follows. The good is beneficial, while its opposite is harmful. If however it should appear that those proclaimed everywhere as gods or demons — those same who are celebrated by everyone and worshipped by all the nations, such as Cronos and Zeus, Hera and Athena, and those similar to them, as well as the invisible powers and the demons who operate through [cultic] statues—rejoice not only in the slaughter and sacrifice of unreasoning animals, but also in murders of men and human sacrifices, and by this means destroy the souls of wretched men, what greater harm than this could you conceive? For if the sacrifice of unreasoning animals has been termed by philosophers to be accursed, evil-sacrificing, ^D abominable, unjust, and impious, and not harmless to those who sacrifice them—and for all these reasons unworthy of gods—what must one think of human slaughter? Or would this not be the most impious and unholy thing of all? How then could it reasonably be said to be pleasing to good demons, and not rather to those all-corrupt and utterly destructive spirits? Come then, let us examine and prove how great the harm of polytheistic error was prevalent in the lives of men before the evangelical teaching of our Savior. For it was loosened and overthrown at no other time than about the age of Hadrian, when the instruction of Christ was already shining forth like light upon every place. To these facts, not we, but the voices of those who do not share our beliefs will bear witness, openly accusing the preceding times of such great wickedness that already...

through the goad of deadly spirits, superstitious men, driven into a truly diabolical frenzy, would overstep even the limits and bounds of nature, concluding that the bloodthirsty powers were to be appeased and satisfied by the blood of their own kin and by other infinite human slaughters. Thus a father would sacrifice his only child, and a mother her dearly loved daughter, to the demons; and those closest to them would slaughter their own relations, just as one does with irrational and alien creatures; and throughout the cities and countrysides they would sacrifice their fellow residents and citizens to the so-called gods, sharpening their naturally benevolent and compassionate hearts into something pitiless and inhuman, and displaying their truly insane and demonic way of life. For if you examine the whole of Greek and barbarian ^B history, you would find how some sacrificed their sons, others their daughters, and others even themselves, to the demons. I produce as a witness for these things, as I did before for those matters in which he denounced the sacrifice of irrational creatures as unholy and most unjust, the same man, who speaks thus to the point.

CHAPTER XVI. On the ancient custom of sacrificing humans, from Porphyry and others.

^C And that we are not saying these things lightly, but with a history full of examples, these facts which I submit will prove. For among the Rhodians, in the month of Metageitnion, on the sixth day before the end of the month, a man was sacrificed to Cronus; but this custom, which had prevailed over a long period, was changed; for they would keep one of those publicly condemned to death until the Cronia. When the festival arrived, after leading the man outside the gates, opposite the temple of Aristobule, they would intoxicate him with wine and slaughter him. And in what is now Salamis, but was previously called Coronea, in the month which the Cyprians call Aphrodisius, a man was sacrificed to Aglaurus, the daughter of Cecrops and the nymph Aglaulis. And the custom continued until the times of Diomedes; then it changed, so that the man was sacrificed to Diomedes. ^D The temple of Athena and that of Aglaurus and Diomedes are within one precinct. The one being sacrificed, led by the ephebes, would run around the altar three times; then the priest would strike him with a spear through the stomach, and in this way they would burn him whole upon the prepared pyre. This custom was abolished by Diphilus, the king of Cyprus, during the times of Seleucus the Theologian.

^A And the daemon accepted the ox in place of the man; such is the worth of the act performed.

Amosis also abolished the law of human sacrifice in Heliopolis of Egypt, as Manetho testifies in his work on antiquity and piety: for they were sacrificed to Hera, and they were examined just as the pure calves sought out for such purposes were examined and sealed. They were sacrificed for three days, in place of whom Amosis commanded that an equal number of waxen images be set up.

They used to sacrifice a man, tearing him apart, to Bacchus Onadius in the islands of Chios and Tenedos, as Euelpis of Carystus reports; since Apollodorus also says that the Lacedaemonians used to sacrifice a man to Ares.

In times of great calamity, whether of wars, or of plagues, or of droughts, the Phoenicians used to sacrifice one of their dearest, whom they chose by vote, to Cronus; and the history of those who sacrificed is full of these, which Sanchuniathón wrote in the Phoenician language, and Philo of Byblos translated into the Greek tongue in eight books.

Ister also, in his volume on the sacrifices of the Cretans, says that the Curetes used to sacrifice children to Cronus in ancient times. ^B But Pallas, who best compiled the mysteries of Mithra, says that the solemn rites of human sacrifice were, for the most part, among almost all peoples completely exterminated under the emperor Hadrian. For previously a virgin was sacrificed every year to Athena in Laodicea in Syria, but now a deer. And indeed, the Carthaginians in Libya also used to perform this sacrifice, which Iphicrates ^C eventually abolished. And the Dumatii of Arabia used to sacrifice a boy every year, whom they would bury under the altar, which they used as an image.

Phylarchus reports that, generally, all the Greeks used to commit human sacrifice before setting out against their enemies. And I pass over the Thracians and Scythians, and how the Athenians slew the daughter of Erechtheus and Praxithea. But who is there even now who does not know that at the Great City, during the festival of Zeus Lasiarius, a human being is slaughtered? And again he says: "From which time until now, not only in Arcadia among the Lycaeans, nor in Carthage to Cronus, do all people commonly sacrifice humans, but at intervals, on account of the laws of the required tithes."

^A These things, then, may stand as recorded from the previously mentioned writings. From the first volume of Philo’s History of the Phoenicians, I shall set forth these accounts:

“It was a custom among the ancients, in times of great crisis or peril, that the rulers of a city or nation, in order to avert the destruction of all, would offer up the most beloved of their children as a sacrifice to the avenging demons, the victims being slaughtered with mysterious rites. Cronus, therefore, whom the Phoenicians call Israel—he who was king of the land and later, upon his passing, was consecrated to the star of Cronus—having by a native nymph named Anobret an only son, whom they therefore called Ieoud (for thus he is called to this day among the Phoenicians), when the country had fallen into the greatest dangers from war, dressed his son in royal attire, built an altar, and sacrificed him.” ^B

These things, then, were carried out in this manner. With good reason, therefore, the admirable Clement, in his Exhortation to the Greeks, reproaching these very same practices, laments the error of men, saying: “Come, then, let us add this also, that your gods are inhuman and hateful to mankind, and not only rejoicing in the insanity of men, but even delighting in the slaughter of human beings. ^C For sometimes they secure for themselves pretexts for pleasure out of the armed rivalries in the stadiums, and at other times out of numberless ambitions in wars, so that they may as much as possible glut themselves shamelessly on human gore. Even already, throughout cities and nations, like plagues, they have descended and demanded cruel libations. Aristomenes the Messenian, for instance, slaughtered three hundred men to Zeus of Ithome, thinking he had thereby made an excellent sacrifice with such and so many hecatombs, ^D among whom was Theopompus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, a noble and illustrious victim. The tribe of the Taurians, too, who dwell about the Tauric Chersonese, whatever strangers they may take among them—those who have been driven to them by the sea—they at once sacrifice to the Tauric Artemis. These are the sacrifices which Euripides brings onto the stage in his tragedies. Mnemon also records in his Collection of Wonders that in Pella of Thessaly a human of Achaean descent was sacrificed to Peleus and Chiron. He declares that the Lyctians in their *Nostoi* slaughter men to Zeus. And the Lesbians offer a similar sacrifice to Dionysus.”

^A Dosidas also mentions this sacrifice. As for the Phocaeans, Pythocles in the third book of his *On Concord* relates that they burned a man as a whole burnt offering to Artemis Tauropolos. Erechtheus the Athenian and Marius ^B the Roman each sacrificed their own daughters; the one to Persephone, as Demaratus records in the first book of his *On Tragedies*, and Marius to the Averrunci, as Dorotheus records in the fourth book of his *Italic History*. How genuinely philanthropic do the demons appear from these accounts! And how are those who are superstitious—who on the one hand entitle them saviors, and on the other seek salvation from those who plot against salvation—not also unholy in proportion? For, supposing they are performing a propitious sacrifice to them, they fail to notice that they are slaughtering human beings. For it is not the place that makes the murder a sacred offering; nor, even if one were to slaughter a man to Artemis or to Zeus, either in a temple or elsewhere—rather than, out of rage and greed, slaughtering a man to other demons of the same kind at altars or at crossroads—would it be a sacred offering just because he called it such. Rather, such a sacrifice is murder and man-slaughter. Why then, O humans, most sapient of all living things, do we avoid ^C wild beasts, and if we should ever encounter a bear or a lion, we immediately turn away, As when one sees a serpent, And jumps back, and trembling seizes his limbs, And he retreats into the mountain's high valley, while you, having perceived that the demons are destructive, pestilential, treacherous, and misanthropic—detestable and malevolent ^D beings that plot against men—do not shrink back? Nor do you turn away? So great is the...

So much for Clement. But I have another witness also to present to you regarding the murderous nature of those godless and inhuman demons: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a man who ^A accurately set forth the entire history of the Romans. He also records that Zeus and Apollo once demanded human sacrifices, and that those of whom they were demanded, although they had offered to the gods a tithe of all their fruits and livestock, nevertheless suffered every kind of calamity because they had spared human beings. It is best to hear the author himself narrating the matter in these words:

“A small remnant of the Pelasgians, however, settled in Italy through the care and concern of the Aborigines. Now, violence and disease first began to ravage the cities during a time when the earth was suffering from an unnatural heat; at that time, no fruit remained on the trees until it reached its proper maturity, ^B but everything would fall off while still bitter; nor did any sown crops—though they had already put forth shoots and showed their blossoms—reach the time necessary for the ripening and hardening of the ear; nor did enough grass grow for the beasts, and the springs and similar waters flowed in a way that was not safe to drink, either failing during the summer or drying up completely after being drawn. A similar pestilence affected the offspring of both cattle and women. For either the fetuses were aborted, or they perished in the very act of birth, and this sometimes resulted in the certain death of the mothers themselves. But if any by chance escaped the danger of birth, they were born deformed, or incomplete, or impaired by some other defect, and for that reason were ^C less capable of being reared. The rest of the multitude, those of proper or flourishing age, suffered under diseases and deaths far more frequent than they had been before. When they had consulted an oracle as to which god or demon they had offended to suffer such things, and by what religious services there was hope that the pressing calamity might be assuaged and mitigated, they received this answer from the god: that although they had attained what they desired, they had not rendered what they had vowed, but were still debtors for that which was of the greatest value. For the Pelasgians, when a scarcity of all goods had occurred in their land, had vowed to Zeus, Apollo, and the Cabiri that they would sacrifice ^D a tithe of all that would subsequently be produced. And when the prayer was fulfilled, they selected a tithe of all their fruits and livestock and sacrificed them to the gods, as if they had vowed only those things.”

These things Myrsilus of Lesbos has recorded, writing in almost the same words as I have just now—except for [the fact that...]

he calls those peoples Tyrrhenians, not Pelasgians, the reason for which shall be brought forward by us hereafter. ^A However, as they could in no way conjecture the mind of the oracle that had been related, with doubting and anxious hearts, one among the elders, having shrewdly grasped it, warned them that they were most gravely mistaken if they thought the gods were unjustly complaining against them. For, indeed, the first-fruits of their goods and fortunes had all been duly and rightfully rendered to the gods, but the lot of the children born during that time—a thing most precious of all to the gods—was still owed. And if they were to provide the rightful portion of these as well, then at last the oracle would have a favorable outcome. To some, these words seemed to be spoken rightly; to others, the discourse seemed to have been composed by artifice. But ^B when some from the crowd soon followed the author, it was decided to consult the divinity again as to whether it also demanded tithes of the human beings. When, after delegates had been sent, it answered that this should be done, a revolt immediately broke out, because they could not agree among themselves regarding the manner of tithing. And at first, it began to be tumultuous among the princes of the cities themselves; soon, the rest of the multitude also began to suspect the princes of ill intent. Thus, they began to be in turmoil with no order, and to change their abodes, being agitated, as was fitting, by the goads and punishments of the gods. The result was that houses were utterly destroyed, while a portion of them moved elsewhere, since the kinsmen of those departing thought it a sin to be torn from their loved ones and to remain with those who were most hostile. ^C First, therefore, all these, having left Italy, were scattered partly into Greece and partly into many barbarian regions; and after these, others in succession suffered the same fate, since this very thing occurred every year. For the administrators of the cities did not cease, from time to time, to exact the choice first-fruits of their youth, both to free themselves from the religion of the gods and because they feared new seditions from those who had fled. Many, also, being driven out by their rivals on account of hatred and factional strife under a specious pretext, were expelled; so that many uprisings occurred, and the Pelasgian race was dispersed over a great part of the earth. And shortly after, he says: “They say ^D that they also perform sacrifices to Cronus, as the ancients did—just as in Carthage for a time the city remained, and among the Celts it happens even to this day—and among others of the nations in the West, they commit human sacrifice. Heracles supposedly put an end to the custom of the sacrifice, wishing to establish the altar upon the Saturnian [hill] (21), and to commence pure sacrifices upon...

it with pure fire. In order that the people might have no residual anxiety, as if they had neglected traditional sacrifices, he taught the local inhabitants how to appease the wrath of the god instead of with the humans whom they ^B used to bind by the hands and feet and cast into the current of the Tiber, by fashioning images of humans, adorned in the same way, to be cast into the river, so that whatever superstition once remained in the souls of all might be removed, while the images of the ancient ordeal still remained. The Romans, he states, continued to do this even to my time, for shortly after the spring equinox, in the month of May, on the days called the Ides—when they wish the moon’s disc to be half-full—on which the so-called Pontifices, who are the most distinguished of the priests, after having performed the legal sacrifices, along with the virgins ^C who guard the immortal fire, the praetors, and the other citizens who are permitted to be present at the rites, cast into the flow of the Tiber thirty images fashioned in the form of men from the sacred bridge, calling them Argei. Thus far, this. Diodorus also relates similar things to these in the twentieth book of his Historical Library, writing word for word as follows about the Carthaginians, who were besieged by Agathocles, the tyrant of Sicily, after the death of Alexander of Macedon, in the time of the first Ptolemy: 'They claimed besides that Saturn was angry with them, because in former times they used to sacrifice the finest of their children to this god, whereas later they secretly bought children and, having reared them, sent them to the sacrifice; and when an inquiry was made, some of those who had been consecrated were found to be supposititious. Having become aware of this, and seeing the enemy encamped at their walls, they were seized with the fear that they had abolished the traditional honors of the gods. Consequently, hurrying to correct their ignorance, they picked out two hundred of the most prominent children and sacrificed them publicly; and others, who were under suspicion, offered themselves voluntarily, no fewer than three hundred. There was among them a bronze image of Saturn, with its hands ^D extended, palms upward and sloping toward the earth, so that the child placed upon them would roll off and fall into a chasm filled with fire.' Such are the things that he too has handed down through his own History. Rightly, then, does the Scripture among the Hebrews also rebuke those among the circumcised who emulate such things as these.

^A “And they sacrificed their sons and their daughters to the demons; and the land was stained with blood, and the land was defiled by their works.” Indeed, I am persuaded that it is clearly demonstrated by these things that the most ancient and primary institution of images—and the entire idol-worship of the nations—originated from demons, and not from those who are called good, but from those who are in every way most wicked and base. Thus is verified the utterance spoken in the prophecies: “All the gods of the nations are demons”; and also the apostolic word, through which he says, “What they sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God.” For if there were any good in them—so as to merit the designation of "good" on that account—it would be expected that they should be beneficial and a savior to all, a friend of justice, and a guardian of men. But if they are such, how could it be that they take pleasure in the slaughter of men for their gratification and delight? Or rather, why did they not deter the human race from such an impious crime by their own oracles? ^B But they are, in fact, necessarily far worse and more depraved than the very men who, by the punishments established by law, have recalled these murderers to a saner mind. For it was not any one of the gods, but a man, through whom it was brought about that this pestilential and long-standing custom of sacrificing humans was abolished. That this was entirely the work of wicked and evil demons, you will understand even more clearly if you reflect upon that unspeakable and unrestrained libidinousness—the sort still practiced today in Heliopolis of Phoenicia and among very many other peoples. For they defend adulteries, corruptions, and other illicit couplings of this kind as if they were some name worthy of inclusion in the worship of their gods, and as such they offer to them their own firstfruits of turpitude, ^C dedicating to them the fruits of that foul and infamous trade as if it were some excellent monument of gratitude; for these things are akin to human sacrifices. If, therefore, it is unseemly for a man of sound mind to delight in murders, lewd talk, and the illicit intermingling of women who sell their charms for a wage, it is far from permissible to say that good gods or demons could accept such things. But if one should say that these are admittedly the works of evil demons, but that there are others—the good ones—whom they especially worship as saviors: one must ask where, then, were these good saviors to them, if they also worshipped these others, such that they did not prevent the wicked ones from doing such things against their suppliants? Where were the good demons, that they did not drive away the harmful ones and align themselves with those who worship them? ^D And why did they overlook and disregard the rational and God-loving race of men, which was being worn away by the cruelty of the wicked demons? Why did they not declare it openly to all to flee headlong and turn away from every being called a god, as being not a god, but an evil one?

^A And if there was formerly in Rhodes someone thought to be a god, who delighted in human sacrifices, would not the true God, if there were any such god, have restrained the practice and proclaimed to all that he was to be considered not a god, but a base demon? Whether it be the one in Salamis, formerly called Coronea, where in the Cyprian month of Aphrodisius a human was sacrificed, would not the true God have declared this one also to be an accursed demon, having put an end to what was being done as impious and unholy? If even in Heliopolis of Egypt, Amosis abolished the law of human slaughter, surely the true God ought to have taught that the human is much better than the god; for it was not God, but again a demon, who was the originator of the human slaughter. And would not the true God have legislated that the demon of Hera also is not to be thought of as anything but ^B filthy, to whom history records that three human beings were sacrificed every day? And what could be more truly demonic than the so-called Omadian Dionysus, to whom they say men in Chios sacrifice by tearing them limb from limb; or the one in Tenedos likewise, whom they also appeased through human sacrifice? The true God would also have forbidden sacrificing a human being even to Ares, the man-slayer and war-loving demon; and would have legislated that one should not slaughter to him the most beloved of one's own or of others. And if, as they say, a virgin was sacrificed every year to Athena in Laodicea in Syria, the true God would not have hesitated to call even her an evil demon; just as also the one in Libya who delights in similar things, and the one in Arabia to whom also they sacrificed a child every year, and even buried it under the altar.

CHAPTER XVII

That after the evangelical teaching, the ancient human sacrifice was abolished.

As for all these, and those who speak obscenely, and those who delight in the unlawful corruption of women and in the other previously mentioned madness, the true and good God—or whatever one might call him—should have commanded that they in no way be considered gods. ^C But no one has ever done this, except the One honored among the Hebrews, who alone is remembered as having acted as the true God. For He alone, through the prophet and theologian Moses, proclaimed to all not to worship as good gods the base demons; but, on the contrary, to turn away and drive them off, as being in fact evil spirits; and moreover, to purge ^D their...

^A temples and their unholy and imperfect *theourgiai*, and to utterly abolish from among men the memory of them as gods, and the honor assigned to them, establishing this by law. For it was not holy for those who had set their minds on what is good to propitiate the base. But whether Philarchus, or whoever it may be, records that all the Greeks, before they set out for wars, used to sacrifice humans, and that they were held fast by this tyranny of the demon—you should not hesitate to include him as a witness to this Greek demonic epilepsy; nor should you overlook those in Africa, or the Thracians and Scythians who did the same things, but assert that they were driven by the same frenzies of demons as even the Athenians, and those in the Great City, if indeed these too sacrificed men during the festivals of Great Zeus. But if you gather together the list of all those mentioned, you would find, one might almost say, that the entire idol-worship of the nations is assigned to these very man-slaying spirits and evil demons. For if in Rhodes, and in Salamis, and in the other islands, and in Heliopolis in Egypt, and in Chios, and Tenedos, and Lacedaemon, and Arcadia, ^B and Phoenicia, and Libya, and in addition to all these in Syria and Arabia—and especially among the Panhellenic Athenians (29), and among their leaders—it has been demonstrated according to Carthage, and Africa, and among the Thracians and Scythians, that the rites of demonic human sacrifice were performed in ancient times, and extended even until the time of our Savior; how can you not reasonably say that all were then enslaved to evil demons, and that human life did not cease from such great evils before the teaching of our Savior shone forth? For indeed, the record of history demonstrates that these things persisted until the times of Hadrian, and that they ceased from that time. This was precisely the time when the saving teaching flourished among all people. And indeed, it is not even possible for them to say that it was to evil demons that they offered sacrifices; for history has revealed that human sacrifices were performed to the greatest gods themselves. ^C For it declared that they were sacrificed to Hera and to Athena, to Cronus and to Ares, and to Dionysus, and to that very Zeus who is over all, and to Phoebus, that most holy and wise of all, Apollo; and yet they proclaim these (30) to be the greatest and good Savior gods, and no others. And yet these would be the evil demons. For if these very beings rejoiced in such human sacrifices and slaughters, how could you not reasonably count them among the blood-guilty spirits? Whether they are said to rejoice in such things themselves, or to allow them and look on while they are done by others. For why was it necessary at all that they, and not others, should be proclaimed the greatest gods, good and Savior? ^D

^A And yet they were, in truth, wicked demons. For if they were to such a degree delighted even by human gore, why is it not equally true to judge that they belong in the same class as the wicked demons stained with blood? Nor does it surely matter whether they themselves took pleasure in this type of sacrifice, or whether they permitted it to be performed to others by that rite. For, in truth, was it fitting, in order to appease nefarious spirits, in any way to permit it? Was it fitting to dissimulate such error in them, so that by worship and obedience men might soothe the wicked? Was it fitting, when they subjected themselves to the tyranny of the impious, to bear it lightly? Should those beings, if they were indeed good and gods, not rather have been required to repel from human society, by a more powerful and divine ^B Power, whatever evil and malice existed? For what then? A father, if he is only good, would never suffer his son to be ill-treated by lost men; a fair and prudent master would never suffer his servant to be vexed or taken away by enemies; a general would never, if he could defend and protect the safety of his own in war, allow them to come into the power of the enemy; a shepherd would not cast his flock to the wolves: and yet will gods and good demons suffer the human race to lie oppressed under the most grievous yoke of the most foul demons? And six hundred...

And the thirty thousand guardians 32 of mortal men, if they are indeed shepherds and saviors, kings and fathers, ^C and masters, will they hand over those whom they should hold most dear to their most hostile enemies and truculent beasts, to be vexed and tortured with every cruelty and savagery? Will they not rather fight in the forefront, shielding their supplicants, and drive away from the flock of men the hostile and wicked demons, far off like some man-eating and wild beasts? And will they not teach every man, in the multitude of myriad gods and good demons reconciled to him, to take heart and be consecrated to gods not only more powerful, but also more numerous and greater, to turn their attention not at all—or rather, not even in the slightest—to the weakness of the wicked demons? ^D Yet, when they did not do this, but on the contrary cooperated with the wicked, by permitting through oracles the aforementioned human sacrifices, and rejoicing in all manner of shameful speech and in the actions that follow from these, it is, in truth, manifest that they themselves did not differ at all from the nature of the wicked demons; or rather, they existed of one and the same inclination and mind. And, to say even more, that there was not at all any god, nor any good demon, of those formerly worshipped by all the nations throughout cities and lands. For how could the evil ever be a friend to the good? Unless one were to say that the mixture of light and darkness could be one. And how much better is the reasoning among men regarding the gods deemed such, not to have recourse to wicked demons...

The demons are, by the counsels of great Zeus, Noble, earthly, guardians of mortal men, Who watch over both justice and wicked deeds. For there is also here a sacred race of heroes, careful of men, And able to benefit both in small things, and the older good.

How could maleficium please? Unless perhaps one might say that light can be joined and mixed with darkness. Yet how much has human reason excelled the fictitious deities, which would not have any sacrifice offered even to wicked demons? For Porphyry himself forbids this in that book in which he teaches that one should abstain from animal sacrifices, where he speaks in this manner.

CHAPTER XVIII. That no sacrifice should be made to wicked demons.

^A "Wherefore," he says, "a just and prudent man will think he must guard against this kind of sacrifice by which he might seek the favor of depraved demons. Rather, he will strive with every reason and effort to purify his own soul, being certain that they never approach a man of pure and sincere mind, because of the dissimilarity of character and nature. But if it happens that it is necessary for cities to appease and propitiate them, that is nothing to us. For to them, indeed, wealth, and things that are external, and those that altogether pertain to the body are accustomed to seem good, and the opposites to be evils; but those who have care and reason for the soul are very few." And he continues thereafter.

CHAPTER XIX. ^B That one ought to be devoted to the one almighty God.

"But we," he says, "must labor with all these strengths, so that we need nothing of those things which they provide; but rather that we strive, both in soul and in all else, towards the imitation and likeness of God, and of those who are nearer to God, as much as is in us (which we shall attain partly by the freedom from passions, partly by a sincere and clear judgment of those things which truly are, and partly by the conformation of our own life to their example); and we must strive to be unlike wicked men or demons, and altogether anyone who loves anything mortal and joined with matter.

^C "But as for the philosopher whom we delineate here—estranged from the commerce and society of external things—we rightly and deservedly pronounce that he will not be troubled by demons, nor will he consult seers or the entrails of animals. For he will have determined that he must voluntarily abstain from those things for which divination was instituted. For he will not cast himself into the bonds of matrimony, that he might pester a soothsayer concerning its success; nor will he engage in merchandising; nor will he consult about servitude, nor about the increase of wealth, nor about the rest of the pride of human life. But concerning the things which he himself seeks to know, neither any soothsayer nor the entrails of animals will reveal anything certain. That one, ^D through himself, as we have said, will advance toward God, who has fixed his seat in his true inward parts, and flowing toward him entirely, he will draw from thence the precepts of eternal life."

By this disputation of Porphyry, then, it is clearly evident to whom at length one ought to assign both oracles and the art of divination, and all those predictions of obscure things which the common people admire. These he calls all vanity and empty show, and as those things which are worked by the art and force of wicked demons, he rejects them.

^A

He continues his discourse on demons, and by asserting that the wise and temperate man will never surrender himself to them, nor win them over to himself through sacrifices, he adds immediately that the philosopher will have no need of divinations, nor of the entrails of animals, and things of that sort, as they all proceed from the fraud and malice of demons. If, therefore, according to these things, the wise and temperate man must take every precaution to avoid using such sacrifices, through which he would draw the demons to himself—and these were the sacrifices made through the shedding of blood and the slaughter of irrational animals—then no one of those who in ancient times sacrificed living creatures to demons, and much less those who sacrificed human beings, could justly be called temperate and wise. But it is manifest that almost all nations, before our Christ revealed Himself to men, appeased the wicked demons with human sacrifices performed in every place ^B throughout the world. None of them, therefore, was wise and temperate. Well then, our common human understanding, following the lead of right reason, clearly declares to every man who is wise and temperate that he should not use sacrifices for the treatment of wicked demons, but that he should strive to purify his soul in every way. For a pure soul is not attacked by them, because of the dissimilarity; but their god, Apollo—for we must compare him again with men, and show how far he falls short of right reason—commands that one sacrifice to a wicked demon, and not for any other reason than that he is a friend to him; for like is friendly to evil. And of this, the same witness as before, in his work which he entitled *Philosophy from Oracles*, bears testimony, recording it word for word thus:

CHAPTER XX. How Apollo commands one to sacrifice to a wicked demon.

^C When the prophet was eager to gaze upon the divine with his own eyes, and was pressing the matter, Apollo said that it was impossible to do so until he had given a ransom to the wicked demon. He speaks as follows:

Give as a ransom to the protector of the earth of the fatherland, First libations, then the pyre, and the black blood Of dark wine, and of sheep, together with white streams.

And more clearly he spoke concerning the same things:

Pouring wine and milk together, and of water a gleaming Form, and casting the fruit of the Jove-born wood, The nuts; having placed them duly on the ground, And wet with fat streams, sacrifice the inwards.

^D Being asked further with what prayer this should be done, he began, though he did not finish, saying thus:

Demon, who hast obtained the crown of erring souls, Below the deep recesses, and above the earthly ones.

^A This is the work of an admirable God, or rather of a manifoldly deceitful demon; but as for the things that are contrary to the dictates of natural reason, ^B it does not prescribe purifying the soul, but rather commands that the evil demons be attracted by sacrifices; for it is contrary to a pure soul to submit itself to them, since they are unlike it. But if a man is rightly judged to be prudent and sober, being pious and not sacrificing to demons, ^C then I leave it for you to consider who, and what sort of person, he who urges the sacrificing to evil demons through an oracle should rightly be considered. From this, if one looks back, it will be evident what sort of nature and character those possessed who delighted in human sacrifices, or those who had long ago enslaved the entire human race to their tyranny. But if anyone says that the practice of human sacrifice is not evil, and that it was performed quite rightly by the ancients, it is time for everyone now to condemn them, for no one piously follows the custom of his fathers in the same way.

CHAPTER XXI

But if, by a sound and mature judgment, the men of our own age have deemed it right to recoil from such monstrous and savage cruelty, then surely none of the ancients was wise who appeased evil demons with the slaughter of men. But indeed, as they say, even a blind man can clearly see that those who were formerly esteemed as gods by all the nations ^D were neither gods nor even good demons; but rather, they were estranged from what is good by a vast gulf, and were of such a nature that you might justly call them enemies of God and, for that reason, impious, who destroyed all human kind and life. And no one at all from all time, except our only champion and Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, has proclaimed to all men the flight and hatred of these, in that He brought the medicine for the ancestral disease to Greeks and barbarians alike through the saving Gospel, and at the same time offered freedom from the most bitter and ancient servitude. To this the argument of the Evangelical Proof urges all to hasten with eager course, crying out in a loud, clear voice that can be heard by everyone: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He hath anointed me; He hath sent me to announce to the meek, to heal the broken-hearted, and to preach release to the captives, and sight to the blind." And again: "To bring those who are bound out of their chains, and those who sit in darkness out of the house of prison." For these divine oracles of the Hebrews, in truth, sang from times of old ^D of a future redemption for those of us who were formerly blind in our souls, and bound by the manifold chains of evil demons. Whence, the eyes of the mind having been enlightened by the saving Word, they become sober, pious, and wise, and, set free from all evils, we will neither sacrifice to, nor serve, the...

^A gods reputed by the nations, who also formerly tyrannized over us. But, having been led and brought by the teaching of our Savior to the one and true God, who is also Lord, nurturer, Savior, and benefactor, and furthermore Maker, Creator, and King of all, we shall consider Him alone to be the true God, and to Him alone we shall render the worship that is due, honoring Him alone, and serving Him alone—not in the manner pleasing to demons, but as it was handed down by the Savior sent by Him for all men through His evangelical teaching. By thus worshipping God, we shall drive away and banish from ourselves—far be it that we should fear them—the evil demons, through purity and a clean way of life, and a sober and virtuous manner of living, ^B which indeed has been defined by our Savior. For it is acknowledged that a soul, because of its dissimilarity, cannot approach the pure one. But neither shall we stand in need of divination and oracles, nor shall we search the entrails of animals, nor shall we busy ourselves with anything that is performed through demonic movement. For the Word of Christ has instructed us to make it our study to stand aloof from those things for the sake of which these practices are pursued by the multitude; and He has exhorted us to desire only those things concerning which no diviner truly ^C nor any entrails of animals will reveal the truth; but the Word of God alone, He who dwells in the true entrails—[the entrails] of those who are able, through extreme purity of soul, to contain Him within themselves. Concerning these, He says somewhere in the Holy Scriptures: "I will dwell in them, and walk among them, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people." ^D These, then, are the refutations from the place concerning sacrifices against the wickedness of the demons. But hear what the author of the treatise on Abstinence from Animal Food relates again concerning the same, expressly acknowledging that the evil demons, fashioning themselves in many guises and characterizing themselves in all sorts of forms, escape notice and deceive most men. "For," he says, "assuming the faces of the good, and associating themselves with the multitudes by inflaming the desires of men, they wish to be considered the highest gods." And he says that they have such power as to deceive even the wisest of the Greeks, both poets and philosophers, whom he also confesses to be the causes of the corruption of the populace; for that from these all sorcery has been constituted, and the things that [D (cont)] contribute to the pleasure of men through their own...

[In the Greek: ...are brought about; and how they wish to be considered gods, though they are evil demons, and how their presiding power seems to be the greatest God. Porphyry records all these things in this manner.]

CAPUT XXII. What is the method of demonic artifice.

^B “Whatever souls,” he says, “do not overcome the spirit that is joined and perpetually attached to them, but are rather in most things overcome by it, these, consequently, whenever the spirit pours forth the heat and impulse of its anger and desires, are wont to be tossed about in a pitiable manner. And souls of this kind are themselves also rightly called demons, and evil-doers; and all of these, as well as those of the opposite power, are invisible and entirely imperceptible to human senses. For they are not clothed with a solid body, nor do they all have one form, but they present several distinct figures among themselves. ^C Furthermore, they appear, now and again vanish, and change their countenance and appearance according to the images expressed by their own spirit with certain definite marks—at least those that are worse. Now, that spirit, insofar as it is corporeal, is subject also to change and corruption; but that it is so bound and constrained to the souls that they therefore retain their appearance for a somewhat longer time, it is not indeed eternal (for it is likely that something is continuously flowing away and changing from it). But just as the spirit of the good is of a certain moderate and just tempering and magnitude, as also their body is, if they should ever appear to us, so the spirit or body of the malignant ones has no proportion. And this class of demons, as in places closer to the earth ^D... for indeed, from the tempering and symmetry [of the spirit], the tempering and symmetry of the bodies also follows.”

Chapter XXII. What is the method of demonic artifice.

“Whatever souls do not master the continuous spirit, but are for the most part mastered by it, for this reason are led and carried away violently, whenever the angers and desires of the spirit take the impulse. And these souls are themselves also demons, and might rightly be called evil-doers; and all of these, as well as those of the contrary power, are invisible and completely beyond the reach of human senses. For they have not been clothed with a solid body, nor do they all have one form, but they are in multiple shapes; and the forms, as they imprint and characterize their spirit, at one time appear, and at another are invisible; and sometimes they even change their forms, at least those that are worse. But the spirit, insofar as it is corporeal, is subject to passion and is corruptible; and that it is thus bound under the souls, so that their form remains for a longer time, it is not, however, eternal (for it is reasonable that something of it should flow away continuously and change). In symmetry, therefore, are the things of the good, just as the bodies of the visible, but those of the evil-doers are asymmetrical. They the more, allotting the nearside realm to the passionate, do not leave anything of evils undone. For having a character that is altogether violent and treacherous, and deprived of the natural blessedness from the better divine power, they produce for the most part intense and sudden attacks, as if by ambush, sometimes attempting to escape notice, and sometimes using force.” And he adds in the next place: “These and such-like things they do, to displace the spirit, [so that it is] deprived of the protection that comes from the better demon.”

^A And it is because they wish to turn us away from the right understanding of the gods and toward themselves. For they rejoice in all who act so inconsistently and incongruously, and, as if putting on the masks of the other gods, they enjoy our lack of prudence, winning over ^B the masses by inflaming the desires of men with loves and the pursuit of wealth, power, and pleasures, and again with vainglory: from which arise seditions, wars, and things akin to these. But what is most terrible of all, they proceed from these things, and persuade [men] to believe the same even concerning the greatest gods, to the point of subjecting even the best God to these same charges; wherefore they say that all things are turned upside down ^C and thrown into confusion. Not only the uneducated have suffered this, but not a few of those who occupy themselves with philosophy. And the cause has occurred through one another. For those of the philosophers who have not departed from the common current have arrived at the same conclusions as the masses. And the masses, for their part, hearing from those who are deemed wise things that accord with their own opinions, were encouraged to think even more about the gods in such a way. For poetry both further inflamed the opinions of men, by employing diction designed for astonishment and sorcery—to induce enchantment and to create belief in the most impossible things—^D when it ought to have been firmly held that neither does the good ever harm, nor does the evil benefit. For it is not of heat, as Plato says, to cool, but of its opposite; nor of cold to warm, but of its opposite; and so, neither is it of the just to harm. The divine is surely by nature the most just of all; otherwise it would not even be divine. Therefore, this power and portion must be severed from the beneficent demons. For that which is by nature suited to harm and willing to do so is the opposite of the beneficent; and opposites could never belong to the same being. And again: “Through opposites, indeed, all sorcery is accomplished; for those who achieve evil through sorceries honor these especially, and their leader. For they are full of every fantasy, and are capable of deceiving through the performance of wonders. Through these means the wicked demons prepare charms and objects of desire; for all debauchery, and the hope of wealth and glory, [come] through these, and especially deception. For falsehood is natural to them; for they desire to be gods, and their governing power to be deemed the greatest God. These are those who rejoice in libations and the savor of sacrifice, by which their spiritual and bodily part is fattened. For this lives on vapors and exhalations, in various ways through various things.”

^A Thus we have heard them confess that it was not only the poets among the Greeks who inflamed the misconceptions of men concerning wicked demons as if they were gods and beneficent beings, but even those who seemed to be earnestly engaged in the study of philosophy—who, themselves fawning not upon gods, but upon wicked demons, led the multitudes and the common people headlong into their own error. The argument has therefore clearly acknowledged that the common people, hearing those who are thought to be wise speaking about the gods in accordance with their own opinions, were yet more confirmed in their view of these wicked demons as gods. And these things are not accused by us, but by those very men who know their own affairs far more accurately than we do. For the same writer, having dealt not cursorily with the superstition that escapes the many, says that the wicked demons wish to be considered gods and to have the reputation of being beneficent, and that the power presiding over them seems to be the greatest God.

What, then, is this presiding power? He himself will again make clear, saying that the rulers of the ^B wicked demons are Serapis and Hecate. The divine Scripture, however, testifies that Beelzebub presides over them all. Hear, moreover, how he discourses upon this very matter in his books concerning the philosophy derived from oracles.

CHAPTER XXIII.

“We do not irrationally suspect,” he says, “that the wicked demons are subject to Serapis; for not only are we led to this opinion by his symbols and insignia, but also because whatever has power to either conciliate them or to avert them is all referred to Pluto, as we showed in the first book. But this very god, who is Pluto, is the same one who most of all commands the demons and provides symbols for their exorcism. This one, therefore, also revealed to those who supplicated him that they approach men ^C whilst assuming the likeness of all kinds of animals.

This is why, among the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and generally among those learned in divine matters or those who divine in the temples, animals are offered before the worship of the gods, for the priests drive these [demons] away by the offering of spirit or the blood of animals and by the striking of the air, so that, once they have departed, the presence of God may occur. Every house, moreover, is full of them, and for this reason they purify and cast them out whenever they invoke God. So too, do they occupy our bodies, for they delight most of all in certain kinds of food. For, while we are eating, they approach and settle upon the body; for this reason, purifications are performed, not primarily for the sake of the gods, but so that these might depart. They delight especially in blood and impurities, and they enjoy these by entering into those who use them. For, in general, the intensity of any desire and the impulse of the spirit of appetite are not intensified from elsewhere than through their presence, who even compel men to fall into indistinct sounds and emissions of breath through the enjoyment they experience with them. For where there is a greater pull of spirit, or the stomach is inflated from luxury, or eagerness exhales into an intensity of pleasure and draws much from the outside, there know that the presence of such spirits is shown to you. Thus far does the nature of man dare to discover the traps set against it; for even God, when He is introduced, is multiplied in the spirit.

These things, then, concerning the evil demons, of whom he says Sarapis is the leader; and the same person teaches that Hecate also rules over them, speaking thus: "Are these perhaps those over whom Sarapis holds power, and through whom the triceps dog is a symbol—that is, the evil demon who dwells in the three elements, water, earth, and air? Whom God, having them under His hand, stops and restrains. Hecate also rules over them, as she holds together the triple-element." And again he says: "Adding one more oracle, which Hecate herself has made, I shall bring the discourse concerning her to an end." ^D

"I am the maiden of many forms, sky-walker, Bull-faced, three-headed, pitiless, golden-speared, Phoebe, unlearned in craft, light-bringer to mortals, Eileithyia; Bearing the three-fold tokens of a three-fold nature; In the ether I appear in fiery images, And in the air I wander in burning chariots."

Concerning Hecate, and the testimony of Hesiod regarding her

(63) And Hecate. The lines of Hesiod pertain here, by which he shows that Hecate was held in special honor by Jove, from verse 411 of the Theogony:

"For she was born of Asteria, and Zeus the son of Cronos Honored her above all, and gave her glorious gifts, To have a share of the earth and the barren sea. She also obtained honor beneath the starry heaven, And is honored most of all by the immortal gods..."

(64) Unlearned in craft. *Verti*, that is, *apeirotechnēs*, which means 'unskilled in art,' though *apeirotechnos* is read; however, both are rare. *Apeirotechne* is much more common. And perhaps *apeiroleches* might be read for *apeirotechnēs*.

"And Earth directs the race of my dark hounds." ^A To which the writer adds clearly who these hounds are: that they are the wicked demons, "about whom we have just now ceased speaking." So much, then, for this. But let us now, with a firm step and at greater length, confirm that those who are regarded as gods by the majority are in truth wicked demons, and bringers of no good whatsoever.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL

BOOK FIVE

^B CONTENTS OF THE FIFTH BOOK

1. That the oracles among most nations were the property of wicked demons; and how all these have been abolished and have vanished since the evangelical teaching of our Savior. 2. What the manner of the demons' operation is. 3. That the superstition among the Greeks concerning gods is manifold and of many names. 4. That the oracles and responses among the nations are of the wicked demons. 5. That the mythical stories contain the hidden histories of the demons as if they were about gods. 6. That the so-called "good demons" are producers of death. 7. That they are also serviced by erotic self-indulgences, and which things each of them enjoys. 8. That they are drawn down by sorceries, and are compelled against their will to serve human wishes. 9. That they cannot even depart of their own accord. ^C 10. By what methods their marvelous gods are subjected to the sorcerers. 11. That the demons, whom they have supposed to be gods, taught men their own curiosities. 12. That they also taught how to construct images using magic. 13. That they themselves pointed out the forms of the cult statues. 14. That they also urge men to practice magic. 15. That they love inanimate materials. 16. That Apollo himself gave responses concerning the oracles that have vanished. 17. Concerning the fact that the demons whom they honor as gods actually die. 18. Concerning the oracles remembered among the ancient Greeks. 19. Regarding Apollo commanding that twice seven boys and maidens be sent to the Cretans to be slaughtered by the Athenians. 20. How Apollo has been the cause of death for many through the ambiguity of his oracles. 21. How he was also the cause of Croesus falling from his own rule through an ambiguous oracle.

22. How they, by whom they were consulted, playing with their oracles, impelled them into fraud. ^A 23. That they were wont to hide their own ignorance under the darkness of ambiguity. 24. That, being able to bring no help in the calamities of wars, they acted cunningly and deceived their clients by ambiguous oracles. 25. An oracle given to the Lacedaemonians. 26. The same to the Cnidians. 27. How they inflamed those who consulted them into wars against one another. 28. That the things recorded concerning Lycurgus, the legislator of the Lacedaemonians, are unworthy of God. 29. That they did not deliver oracles concerning grave matters. 30. That they advised on things to be done by common and human reasoning. 31. That they also gave many counsels without philosophy. 32. That they also shared in the guilt of those who did wrong. 33. That they also lauded the poets, who had shown nothing worthy of a philosophical life, indiscriminately according to the opinions of the many. ^B 34. That they even exhorted men to honor boxers and athletes with honors equal to the gods. 35. That they were also accustomed to flatter tyrants. 36. That they also commanded that inanimate matter be worshipped.

CAPUT I. It is proven again that the oracles and shrines among the nations belonged to wicked demons; and that all these faded and ceased after the evangelical teaching of our Saviour.

Sufficient indeed were the things previously set forth to establish that they who were honored as gods among the nations, city by city and region by region, were not gods, nor even good demons, but entirely the contrary; yet it is not unwelcome out of an abundance of caution to confirm the same subject still more, by more and more copious proofs of the demonstration of these things, revealing to all men the freedom from former evils provided by the evangelical teaching of our Saviour. Hear, therefore, the Greeks themselves confessing that their oracles had ceased, and that at no other time from the beginning had this happened than at the times of the saving and evangelical teaching, when the knowledge of the one God and our Saviour Christ was spread abroad upon the earth, and shone like light to all men. ^C For we shall proceed to show immediately that it was after his advent and death that the demons were reported to have been destroyed, and those wonderful oracles, long cried up, have ceased. And it has already been proven before that the human sacrifices formerly performed among all the nations with cruelty and mercilessness found a cessation no sooner than after the evangelical teaching. To which it is well to add for the present, that not only did the superstition of demon-worship fade from that time, but also the polyarchy of the nations. For in almost every city and village, kings and tyrants, and governors ^D and potentates, were in the old time to be seen, and ethnic chieftaincies and polyarchies, by reason of which…

they were constantly rushing into wars against one another, and were always and continuously engaged in the devastation of regions, the sieges of cities, and the enslavement and captivity of those living in the neighborhood, being goaded by their own familiar demons into such wars and conflicts against one another. In what a confused state of evils and continuous calamities human life was tossed in those days, when things were so, I leave to you to estimate and determine. But since these things, along with the error of polytheism, were all at once swept away by a single stroke after the advent of our Savior among men, who would not with the greatest admiration contemplate this great mystery of the truly saving and evangelical demonstration? Through it, we see everywhere throughout the whole world, in cities and villages, and even in the wildernesses of the barbarian nations, a multitude of houses of prayer and temples dedicated to the King of all, the Creator, and to the only God over all things; and we have an infinite abundance of books, readings, and teachings of every kind, containing precepts for reaching the height of virtue and for conforming one’s life to true piety and religion, handed down for the hearing of men, women, and children alike. ^C And the oracles and divinations of the demons everywhere are dead and have fallen into silence. Furthermore, ever since that divine and evangelical power of our Savior shone like a light upon the whole race of men, no one has been so crazed as to dare to appease those blood-thirsty, blood-loving, and misanthropic demons with the blood of their dearest ones or the sacrifices of slaughtered men—a practice which truly possessed the minds of the wise and kings of old, who were themselves truly demonized. And indeed, that the evil demons have had no power or strength since our Savior entered into the society of men, even Porphyry himself, the great patron of demons in our age, has left testified in that volume which he wrote against us, in these very words: “And now let it be no wonder to anyone,” he says, “if for so many years the city has been afflicted by this disease, since Aesculapius and the other gods have withdrawn their society and intercourse from men? For since Jesus began to be worshipped, no one has perceived any public aid from the gods.” These are his very words. ^D If, therefore, even by his own admission, since they began to worship Jesus, no one has perceived any public aid from the gods, and neither the visitation of Aesculapius nor that of the other gods exists any longer, whence, then, comes the belief that they are gods and heroes? For why does the power of Aesculapius and the gods not prevail rather over the power of Jesus? If, indeed, he is a mortal man, as they would say (and perhaps they would even call him a deceiver), while the others are saviors and gods, why then have all men, all at once, fled from them to him, turning their backs upon the mortal, and have delivered over all humanity, one after another, into the hands of him who, as they themselves would say, is no longer? But he, even after death, is honored every day among all nations, and is shown plainly to those capable of seeing as the manifestation of the life after death, and of divine power. But he, being one, and, as one might suppose, alone, drives away the multitude of gods throughout the whole world, and, setting aside their honors, prevails, so that the gods exist no longer, nor do they act, nor are they in any way…

visible, and they nowhere even lightly appear, nor do they infest the gatherings of cities as they once did, since they are not gods but evil demons. On the contrary, the honor of Christ alone, and of the God of all things who sent him, increases more and more day by day, and with a new accession of dignity, it strikes deeper roots in the minds of all peoples. It behooved those gods, if indeed they had any true care for human affairs, rather to extirpate the error of his birth—if such a thing existed—and to grant from their own aid a liberal and overflowing abundance to all. And yet they attempted this very thing most often, when they inflamed various emperors at various times to oppose the doctrine of our Savior with all their might. But they found the end of their undertaking to be useless and vain, because the divine power of our Savior, which always achieves a glorious victory over all, dissipated the assaults of the wicked demons against his teaching, and drove away those who were truly wicked demons, although they were falsely believed to be gods or good demons. ^C

CHAPTER II. What the nature of the demons' imposture was.

Indeed, since they are beings of the lower air and of the underworld, wandering about in the heavy and dark air near the earth, and condemned to have this dark and earthy dwelling-place for reasons we shall set forth later, they haunt the tombs and monuments of the dead and every foul and unclean material, delighting in blood and gore and the bodies of all kinds of animals, and in the emissions of things being burned and exhaled from the earth. And their princes, being certain aerial or underworld powers, when they realized that the human race was busying itself with the deification of dead men—a practice which they delighted in, especially through sacrifices and the savor of flesh—they were present immediately as close ^D sentinels and partners in this error. They engaged in the evils of men, and by certain movements of the statues—which the ancients had dedicated in honor of the departed—they deceived the foolish and impressionable, leading them into fraud. To these they added the appearance of oracles and the empty pretense of healings, since they themselves would secretly torment the very bodies they were afflicting with their hidden power, only to deliver them from all later vexation once their wicked spells were removed. And these are the things by which they drove men to such precipices, so that they thought them to be at one time heavenly powers,

and at other times the souls of those heroes who had been deified. From this, therefore, the notion of the polytheistic error began to be considered ^B greater and more solemn by the many, since the mind shifted from things seen to the invisible nature of those who lay hidden within the statues, and thereby reinforced the error more strongly. Thus, finally, these terrestrial demons, and those who occupied the air as rulers of the world, and the spiritual hosts of wickedness, and those who above all were the ringleaders 69 of their evil, were considered the greatest of all by everyone; and the memory of those long-dead was deemed worthy of greater worship. The forms of their bodies were thought to be represented by the types of the images consecrated in the cities, while the base demons feigned their souls and divine, incorporeal powers through much sorcery; and those who worshipped and were consecrated to them, always leading the pride born of their imagination to a higher degree and indeed contriving many things through magical evil arts—the instructions for which these same base demons had themselves first provided to their worshippers—became, at least, the causes of the primeval witchcraft for the whole life of mankind, as the previous discourse has already demonstrated.

CHAPTER III. That the superstition of the Greeks concerning the gods was diverse and manifold.

^C Therefore, these wicked demons and dwellers on earth, as well as the airy and subterranean spirits—whom the divine Scriptures call rulers of the world, and spiritual hosts of wickedness, principalities, and powers—since they sometimes feigned the character and countenance of good spirits, sometimes assumed the appearance and form of heavenly gods or even heroes, and at other times plainly displayed the sign of their wickedness through their deeds, it is no wonder if a manifold error insinuated itself into the minds of men more deeply every day; especially since some confessed them to be gods, while others confessed them to be heroes or demons, but by no means gods—and, among the demons themselves, some were called by the specious name of "good," while others were called by the most base 70 names, yet all still claimed that even the wicked ones must be appeased and conciliated on account of the harm they inflicted. Thus, they divided this whole fashioning of their deities into several classes and sects. The first is that of those stars which are seen in the heavens, whom they also declare to be the princes of all the gods, partly from the verb *theein*, which is "to run," and partly from the other, which is to contemplate things ^D that fall under the view, of which...

the authors of such contemplations, as they say, are to be considered the originators. The second class belongs to those who, as they claim, attained this honor through their own merits in the human race, whom they themselves acknowledge to have been born of human blood, while they produce their heroes, as they call them, Hercules, the Tyndaridae, Bacchus, and others of this kind, celebrated by the speech and worship of the barbarians. ^A From this group, having set aside and separated the more shameful things reported about them, they proposed a third kind of deification, calling it the mythical one. Being ashamed of this, although it is true and most ancient, they have shifted it to a more physical sense, as they say, by means of more figurative allegories, having invented certain theories. But even this did not suffice for them to escape their error. For they have even debased the venerable and adorable name of God to their own passions, and have devised a fourth mode of deification, one not even worthy of refutation, since it bears its own shame openly and seems to fix itself in the eyes of all. For they have given the name of certain gods to, I know not what, Love, Venus, and Desire—their shameful and unbridled lusts—and have called ^B discourse Mercury, and reason Minerva, thereby assigning their own theological rationale to these things, and thus fashioning a fifth kind from the events that occur in human life. For they attribute not only warlike activities but also those of common and vulgar crafts to certain gods: to Mars and Minerva the warlike ones, and to Vulcan and certain others the rest. In addition to all these, a sixth and seventh kind was introduced by them, which is the demonic, truly various and multiform, sometimes pretending to be gods, sometimes the souls of the dead, contributing nothing to the virtue of the soul, but always mocking and leading every superstitious person over precipices through deceitful error. ^C This, being entirely evil in itself, they have divided into two, into the harmful and the beneficial, applying to them the names of good and evil beings. Since matters are so, it seems necessary to me that, having set aside those things which fall of themselves, I should pursue the ordered discourse concerning the power and arts of the demons, which I have already partly considered in the previous book, and now finish what is missing. Come then, let us proceed to the proofs themselves. I will first place those taken from the writing of Plutarch, which he composed concerning the oracles that have failed, where he writes in this manner concerning the fact that the oracles and pronouncements among the nations belong to evil demons. ^D

CHAPTER IV. That the pronouncements and oracles among the nations were the work of evil demons.

^A But to me, they seem to resolve more and greater difficulties who place the race of demons in the middle between gods and men, and who have discovered a way to bring our communion into one and bind it together. Whether this account belongs to the Magi around Zoroaster, or is Thracian from Orpheus, or Egyptian, or Phrygian, as we conjecture, seeing in the initiations celebrated on both sides ^B many things mortal and mournful associated with the rites performed and enacted—among the Greeks, Homer appears, using both names indiscriminately, and sometimes even calling the gods demons. Hesiod, however, the chief of all, clearly and distinctly set forth first four kinds of rational beings: gods, then demons, then heroes, and finally men; from which he seems to derive the transformation of the golden race into many good demons, and of those who were demigods into heroes. He next says: "But concerning these things it is not necessary for us to quarrel with Demetrius. For whether the time be longer or shorter, or regulated or irregular, during which the soul of a demon and the life of a hero ^C undergo change, none the less, concerning that which he wishes, it will be demonstrated through wise and ancient witnesses that there are certain natures, as it were in the borderland between gods and men, receiving mortal passions and necessary transformations, whom it is right and in accordance with the law of our ancestors to consider and name demons, and to worship." Having inserted other things, he adds: "That, therefore, it is not gods who preside over the oracles—for it is fitting that they should be removed from things pertaining to the earth—but the servants of the gods, the demons, does not seem to me to be wrongly maintained; but to bring upon these demons—by catching, as it were, at random ^D from the verses of Empedocles—sins, and follies, and heaven-sent wanderings, and finally to posit that they also suffer deaths like those of men, I think is too bold and—

barbarous. ^A To these, furthermore, he adds what follows: "For there are among demons, just as among men, differences of virtue and of the pathetic and irrational. In some, there is but a faint and dim remnant, like a residue, while in others it is abundant and inextinguishable; traces and symbols of which, scattered in many places, sacrifices, initiations, and mythologies preserve and guard." And as for the mysteries, in which it is possible to find the greatest manifestations and disclosures of the truth regarding demons, let my mouth be kept shut, according to Herodotus; but festivals and sacrifices—like unlucky and gloomy days, in which there are raw-feasting, dismemberments, fastings, and wailings, and in many places again, shameful language at sacred rites, and other frenzies roused, tossing the head ^B with turmoil—I would say are performed not for the sake of any god, but for the averting of evil demons, and as appeasements for the human sacrifices formerly committed; which it is plausible that neither gods would demand nor accept, nor would kings and commanders have received them in vain, offering up their own children, and practicing the initial rites and slaughtering them; but they were doing so to appease the wrath and heaviness of cruel and difficult spirits, and to satisfy the frenzied loves of avenging demons, who, being unable or unwilling to consort with bodies or through bodies, behave like this. ^C Just as Heracles besieged Oechalia for the sake of a maiden, so often do powerful and violent demons, craving a human soul contained in a body, bring plagues upon cities and crop failures upon the earth, and stir up wars and seditions until they obtain what they crave. Clearly, by these words, the aforementioned philosopher has proved that the proceedings described were performed in all the cities for the sake of evil demons. If, however, there were among them—as they say—some good by nature and gods, why should it be necessary to propitiate the evil ones, when they ought to be driven away by the good? For if there were such good guardians for them, they ought to have taken heart in them and cared nothing for those who were worse, and through sober speeches and prayers, rather than through shameful language, ought to have warded off the opposing forces. But since they did nothing of the sort, but through a shameful and licentious life, and indecent words, and raw-feasting and dismemberments and human sacrifices, they were supplicating evil demons—how was it possible that, seeing such things and performing what is pleasing to the worthless, they could be reconciled to the God over all, or to the divine powers under Him, or to any good beings at all? ^D But it is manifest to all that he who performs actions dear to the wicked could never become dear to the good. There is, therefore, no connection between gods and these acts.

^A It is for this reason that they have been shown to have been addicted and devoted to demons, and to them alone, when they were thought to be worshiping others. ^B Plutarch confirms this even more strongly, in the passages where he says that the mythical accounts told as if they concerned gods are actually accounts concerning demons, and that the tales among the Greeks concerning giants and titans are demonic stories, meant to suggest a novel idea. Perhaps, then, the accounts in the divine Scripture concerning the giants before the flood were of this nature, along with those concerning their progenitors, of whom it is said: "And the angels of God seeing the daughters of men, that they were fair, took to themselves wives from all whom they chose; from whom were born the giants, the men of renown from of old" (Gen. vi, 2). For one might well say that these were they, and that their spirits were those deified by men in later times, and that their battles, their mutual dissensions, and their wars are what are mythologized as being about the gods. Plutarch himself, in the treatise he composed concerning the things pertaining to Isis and the gods of the Egyptians, speaks in these very words.

CHAPTER V.

That the mythical histories concerning demons are contained in these accounts, no less than those concerning the gods.

^D "It is better," he says, "to believe that the matters recorded concerning Typhon, Osiris, and Isis are neither the passions of gods nor of men, but of great demons, whom Plato, Pythagoras, Xenocrates, and Chrysippus, following the theologians of old, testify to have been far mightier than men, and to have surpassed our nature in many respects. Yet, they do not attribute to them a pure or unmixed divinity, but one that is tempered by the nature of the soul and the perception of the body, capable of partaking in pleasure and pain and whatever other passions arise from these changes. ^D For, just as among men, so also among demons, there are differences of virtue and vice. The mythical tales among the Greeks concerning the giants and titans, and many unholy acts, the oppositions of Python to Apollo, the flights of Dionysus, and the wanderings of Demeter are in no way different from the legends of Osiris and Typhon, which it is permitted to hear told shamelessly by all, just as many things are concealed in mystical rites...

^A and religions, and are kept enclosed in rituals which it is forbidden either to speak of or to look upon; and these, if you refer them to the gods, have explanations that are not dissimilar."

To these points he then adds: "But Empedocles also declares that they pay the penalties for their own crimes and wickedness in these verses:

'For the mighty force of the ether pursues them to the sea; The sea spews them out upon the land, and the earth casts them Into the eddies of the unwearied sun; the sun hurls them into the ^B Whirlpools of the ether. Others receive them from others, and all Abhor them.'

Until, having been punished and exercised by just torments, they regain their natural place and order. Tales regarding Typhon are said to be akin to these and to such things, as he wrought terrible deeds out of envy and ill-will, throwing all things into confusion; and he filled both land and sea entirely with evils, and then paid the penalty."

These things Plutarch, having set forth in the aforementioned work and having developed the argument at greater length, relates ^C in this manner in his work *On the Obsolescence of Oracles*: "He, then, trace the oracular art back to demons, and he held the Delphic account in the highest regard; and he was not unheard of concerning the things said there about Dionysus and the sacred rites performed, but he declared that even those were great sufferings of demons, and indeed these things also regarding the Pythia. And for him who slew [the Python], he said that the exile was neither for nine years, nor did it take place at Tempe, but that having been cast out, he went to another world; and later, after nine periods of the ^D 'great year' had passed from there, having become pure, and having truly returned as Phoebus, he took over the oracle, which had meanwhile been guarded by Themis. And it is in this manner that the Typhonian matters are to be viewed."

^A Nor is the theory regarding those things which are bruited about concerning Typhon and the Titans dissimilar: for these were wars and contentions among demons, which were followed in part by the exiles of those who had been defeated, and in part by the penalties inflicted by God upon those who had bound themselves in some wickedness: of which sort, indeed, were the machinations of Typhon against Osiris, or of Saturn against Caelum; of whom, for that reason, only the most obscure, or rather no traces of religions and observances remain among us, because they had fled to another world. For I hear that the Solymi, neighbors of the Lycians, had once rendered the greatest honors to Saturn, if ever any people did; but that after their leaders Arsalo, Arytus, and Tosibis had been slain, and he had taken flight, whithersoever it was in the world (for they have no certain knowledge of the place), he was neglected by them; but Arsalus and the other two received the name of the Scirian gods, through whose names both the Lycians privately and publicly conceive their solemn and established imprecations. And it is possible to take many things of this kind from the myths of the poets. ^B But as for the fact that certain beings are called by us dæmons by the solemn and proper names of the gods, why, said the stranger, should that seem a matter of wonder? For each one is assigned to a god, and from him whose power he has shared, he is wont to be named; for we ourselves see that one among us is called Jovian, another Minervian, another indeed Apollonian, or Bacchic, or Mercurial. And some have indeed rightly and by merit held this name by a certain chance, but to the majority there has adhered a cognomen of the gods that is altogether alien, and not at all apt or fitting. » These are the words of Plutarch, in those very writings which he composed with great zeal and diligence concerning the exhaustion of the power of the oracles, subjecting even the demons themselves to death, besides other things—a matter which shall be brought forward by us in due time. ^C Meanwhile, let us gather whatever else Porphyry, the creator of the work composed against us, relates concerning the power and activity of the "good" demons, as he calls them, in those things which he published under the title *On the Philosophy from Oracles*. For I will use him, even now as I have often done, as a witness and as an exposure of the error concerning those whom they suppose to be gods, so that they may be shamed by being struck by their own arrows and missiles. For in this way, the proof of the matters set forth would be complete and irrefutable, if we were to examine thoroughly the doctrine concerning their own [deities] even from those who are held to be dear to the gods and pious. The one mentioned writes these things in those works which he titled *On the Philosophy from Oracles*, where he protests against revealing the secrets of the gods, and both himself adjures and commands that they be kept hidden, and that the things to be spoken should not be brought forth to many. ^D But what were those things? He says that Pan is a servant of Dionysus; and that he, being one of the good demons… [Then follows the verse quotation from Homer, and the scholarly apparatus on the Solymi, and the text continues on the next page.]

nysus; and that he, being one of the good demons, showed himself at some time to certain farmers. What else was to be expected from a good being, unless that upon those whom that good god deigned to look upon, some good thing should immediately overflow? Did then some good befall the spectators of this good demon, or did they rather learn at their own peril that they had encountered an evil demon? The excellent witness reports, indeed, that all whom he had deemed worthy of that happy and joyful spectacle perished, one and all, by a sudden death. ^B

CHAPTER VI.

That these so-called good demons are the authors of death.

"And they themselves," he says, "are established as servants in another order of things, such as Pan, whom Apollo in the verses at Branchidae declares to have been a servant of Bacchus. For when they had found nine men carried off by a similar death, and the inhabitants of that same region had consulted the oracle regarding the cause of the matter, Apollo responded in this manner:

Pan, the servant of grim Bacchus, with golden horns Rising upon his forehead, while he wanders the dense mountains, Brandishing his rod in his right hand, and in his left Playing the soft, alluring reeds, he charms both nymphs and men Intent upon cutting wood, with his melody. But lo, the crowd stood with stunned minds, unaware, When they saw the wild limbs of the precipitous God. And the harsh Fate would have carried them all off together, Had not Diana, the huntress, harboring a fierce bile Deep in her breast, long ago checked the wild rage of the rustic. Her, therefore, remember to appease with vows, That she may spontaneously grant you protection in tight straits."

Have you heard what kind of bodily appearance, and what sort of actions, the Apollo at Branchidae attributes to the demon he calls "good"? You see, furthermore, the noble and magnificent deeds performed by those whom mortals, by following them, exchanged the heavenly life for human society. They ought, in truth, to have been the princes and masters of modesty and temperance, and the authors of useful things for the human race, of which, however, they showed not even a trace. But listen to that curious explorer of mine, who, having probed the deepest mysteries, boasts that he is gifted with their understanding. For he asserts that some of these good demons serve certain erotic pleasures; while others, to the sound of drums... ^{C D}

and flutes, and the unseemly clamor of women, and the din of battles and wars, find delight; Artemis in hunting, Demeter in the fruits of the earth, Isis in weeping even now for the fall and death of Osiris, and Apollo in prophesying. Such are the benefits that they say these good demons confer upon mankind. But receive also the proofs of these things. ^A

CHAPTER VII

Nothing among the immortal gods is ever without fear, Nor has Hecate, in the eyes of the wise who are divine spokesmen, Declared anything to be unaccomplished: but descending from the All-powerful mind of the Father, she is ever radiant with truth, And around her, the wisdom, firm and fixed, remains in unbroken oracles. Bind me therefore with chains: for such a goddess art thou leading to me, As I sufficed to animate the highest part of the world.

^B And perhaps it is for this reason that the soul is tripartite and has three forms. And indeed, while it has one power by which it is angry, it has received another, moreover, by which it desires, by whose allurements it is also excited to erotic matters. And these are truly not my words, do not suspect it, but those of the writer whom I have praised, whose also are the following things that come next. “I feel myself,” he says, “vehemently distressed when I ponder with myself how it can be that those whose aid we implore, as if they were more august and divine, yet obey those who are as it were inferior and worse; and that those who themselves desire their clients to cultivate justice, are not ashamed to obey unjust commands: and so, while they reject the vows and prayers of those who have approached them less pure from sexual matters, they nevertheless do not hesitate to drive these very persons, or rather any who happen to be present, into unlawful lust.” ^C He pursues the same theme in a certain letter to Anebo the Egyptian: and citing again the volume *On the Philosophy from Oracles*, he proceeds as follows: “And indeed, what province and what kind of charge is entrusted to each of them has also been made public by some of them, as for instance by the Didymean Apollo, in these verses (it was being asked of him whether an oath should be given to one demanding it):

Rhea, begetter of the blessed and queen of the gods.

^D Rhea, mother of the blessed, of the Titan queen of gods. It seemed to me harsh, certainly, to signify the mother of the Titans promiscuously, or their daughter. What if, according to Orpheus, Rhea is the parent of the Earth, and not the Earth herself? She says, “Mother, of both gods and mortal men, for from thee both Earth and the wide Heaven above...,” etc.

But in the fables there is nothing sound, and beyond impiety or

^A any other sort of concern, because neither temperance nor any other honest pursuit is a matter of care to the aforementioned. As also for Athena, there are scuffles, and fights, and wars, but not peace and the affairs of peace. And to the daughter of Leto, Artemis, let the hounds be a concern, because she is a hunter in the fields and fights against the beasts, as are the others in their separate ways. What, then, do these things contribute to a life that is god-beloved and blessed? Consider, moreover, whether those things that follow seem to you to be of a divine nature, or rather evidence of a most base and wicked character.

CHAPTER VIII

He speaks, therefore, as follows: “Rightly, too, did this Pythagoras of Rhodes maintain that the gods who are called upon for sacrifices are not pleased, but are drawn along by a certain necessity of following, and come; and some more [so], some less. And some, as if having made a habit of their presence, come more easily, especially if they happen to be good by nature; but others, even if they have the habit of appearing, are eager to do some harm, especially if someone appears to be more negligent in the handling of affairs.” For since Pythagoras said these things, I observed from the oracles that what was said is true. For they all say they come by necessity; and not simply, but, if one must say it so, by "persuasive-necessity." Mention was made in the preceding ^C pages of those things concerning Hecate, by which she says she appears:

Leaving the ethereal light and the starry heights of the great heaven, The divine and holy dwelling, I seek the Earth, Whither thy words have called me, and the secret force Of language has drawn me, by which the divine powers ^D ...to the Mother of the gods. Orpheus thus calls her, By the clash of cymbals and drums, and with the trembling of flutes. Drum-beater, lover of the frenzied dance, loud-clashing maiden. Thus he spoke; and to them all he spoke a word that was pleasing.

^A

It pleases me to soothe the mortal. ^A And again: ^A I am present, following the steps of your prayers and voices, ^A Which the nature of men, finding through the teachings of the gods, has brought forth. ^A And again, more clearly: ^B Why do you, always needing me from the ether, invoke me, ^B The goddess Hecate, through divine-constraining necessities? ^B And following this: ^B Some you compel from the heights of the ether with unknown ^B Incantations, though unwilling, to be led down to the divine earth; ^B And others, you insert into the midst of mortals, riding mid-air, ^C Far from divine fire, just as dream-giving ^C Demons, performing unseemly acts. ^C And again: ^C But those, indeed, who are heavenly, suspended on high, ^C Are borne along with the swift Harpies; ^C And quickly, bowing to divine-compelling necessities, ^C They rush down hastily to the earth, ^C For the sake of prophets hastening toward the mortals. ^C And another, constrained by the same necessity, said: ^C Hear me, though I am unwilling, since you have bound me with necessity. ^D Upon these things, the author again says: "For they even surrender themselves and their own name, overcome by necessity, as this response of Apollo issued by him concerning himself by force will clearly demonstrate." For it stands thus: ^D This force is heavy and an imperious power. ^D And he adds: ^D Rush precipitately to these words, ^D Which I bring forth from a high mind in sacred figures. ^D While my right hand presses the chaste fire, ^D And those born without death, ^D To tell, Paean, is the daring of my genius. ^D

^A

And again, Apollo: The stream of Phoebus’ radiance, flowing from on high, Borne on a slender breeze, beneath the pure, clear air, Drawn down by secret songs and voices of enchantment, Where that thin membrane folds the wide-capacity vessel, And being received within, through the overflowing tunic, It boils and, rousing counter-motions through the entrails, Gently breathes forth a pleasant voice from the mortal throat. ^B

To these the author adds: “Nothing could be said more evident than this, nothing more divine or more in accord with nature; for the spirit that descends, an effluence from the heavenly power, having entered into an organic and ensouled body, using the soul as a base, gives forth a voice through the body as through an instrument.” But that they are indeed compelled, these things are sufficient to demonstrate. And that they also seek to be released, as the power of departure does not lie with them, you may learn from the following.

CHAPTER IX.

Loose now the King, for mortal breasts contain the God No longer.

And again: Why do you harshly afflict the mortal for so long with prayer?

And again: Hurry, and come quickly, having saved this man.

And how one must release them, he himself will teach, saying: Stop now the heavy spirit, and set the man at rest, Culling the ancient image, and releasing the entwined Limbs with a firm hand, stripping off the pitiless rags.

And he declared the release: Take up the high-raised wing, Stop the utterance from the cavern.

And regarding what follows these, he adds: “And if they are slow in releasing,” he says, “Unfold the linens, and shake off the cloud that holds me.”

^{C D}

196 The same author elsewhere sets forth this mode of dismissal: *Naiads, O Nymphs, with the Muses, release Phoebus,* *Let the archer Apollo be celebrated by you in song.* And elsewhere: *Remove now the garlands, and with snowy dew* *Sprinkle the tracks: soon may the drawn line clear* *My light steps. Withdraw the laurel from my right hand;* *With twin fingers wipe the twin nostrils,* *And O comrades, send the man forth from the earth at last.*

^A To which the author adds: "He orders the lines, therefore, to be erased, so that he may depart; for these hold him, and indeed the rest of the manner of clothing also, because they bear the images of the gods being invoked." I think it has been clearly demonstrated by these things that there is nothing at all worthy of God, nothing great, nothing truly divine residing in those spirits that have fallen into such a state of humility—that they should be drawn down by men of no account, and be compelled to come forth, not by any pursuit of virtue or wisdom, but only by practicing the arts of curious sorcery. Neither, therefore, the Rhodian Pythagoras, nor he who bestowed this testimony upon him, nor any man at all, could rightly or deservedly call them gods; nor even good demons, who are dragged by mortal men—and these, too, sorcerers—not by their own volition, but by force and necessity, and who do not even possess the power to release ^B themselves from their bonds. For if the Divine Nature is by necessity undisturbed and unconstrained, and higher than all things, being impassible and free, how could they be gods, who are charmed by the trickery of such shapes, lines, and patterns, by garlands and flowers from the earth, and by certain other strange and barbarous sounds and voices, and are overcome by men of no consequence, and enslaved as if by chains, so that they do not even preserve the power of self-determination and free will for themselves? And how could they be called good demons if they are dragged down by force and necessity? For what reason is there that they should offer themselves to those in need of help unwillingly, and not of their own free will? For if they were to come as good beings for the sake of bestowing a benefit, or if any benefit to the soul were to proceed from them, it would surely be necessary that they embrace goodness by choice, anticipating those in need with their kindnesses, rather than awaiting ^C compulsion. But if what is done is neither good nor beneficial, so that it does not even happen according to their inclination, how could they be good, acting in a way that is neither good nor advantageous? And how are they worthy of being admired and honored with the worship of gods, if—even by those who happen to be the most wretched of sorcerers—they are enslaved, and are compelled to act against their will in what is neither good nor beneficial, being led and dragged about, not for the sake of ^D the temperance of men, nor for the sake of virtue, or any [index: entries preserved]

part of philosophy, but by methods forbidden to sorcerers? These the same author, in the letter to the aforementioned Egyptian, as if moved by some prophet of true and secret things, has set forth; the arguments by which they accomplish these things are worth learning from him. He inquires, therefore, being perplexed and saying in this way:

CHAPTER X.

"It greatly disturbs me to consider how it is possible that those whose help we implore as though they were more august and divine should, nevertheless, obey like those who are humbler and inferior; and that though they themselves wish their clients to cultivate justice, they are not ashamed to comply with unjust commands; and while they reject the prayers of those who have not approached them pure from venery, they do not blush to drive whoever they encounter into nefarious lusts. Furthermore, those prophets and interpreters of theirs order them to abstain from living creatures, lest they be defiled by bodily exhalations; yet they are especially enticed by the vapors of sacrifices made from animals, and they decree that it is a sacrilege for the observer to touch a dead body, yet the most of their evocations are performed by means of the slaughtered victims of animals. And what is most absurd of all is that a man, even one from the dregs of the populace, should offer threats to terrify, not just some common demon or the soul of a deceased person, but the king Himself, the Sun, or the Moon, or some one of those who are under the dominion of those in the heavens—and by lying, to force them to tell the truth. For what sort of hyperbole of astonishment is it for one to threaten [the gods] with things he neither has seen nor is capable of, leaving behind for those who dread such things not only empty fear and fabrications, but ^B making them like foolish children? And yet Chaeremon the sacred scribe records these things, as being commonly blabbered among the Egyptians; and they say that these things, and things like them, are most compelling. What reason do these prayers have, speaking of he who appeared from the mud, and sitting upon the lotus, and traveling upon a ship, and changing his forms according to the hour, and transforming himself according to the signs of the zodiac? For so they say..."

(21) *For he says.* This is praised by Iamblichus in his book, *De mysteriis*. Hear him raging with this fury, in Statius, *Thebaid*, on Tiresias: "I call to witness the gods, to whom I have consecrated this fire, And to whom I have given the cups of the earth torn asunder: I can no longer endure the delay. Is it for nothing that I, a priest, Am heard? Or if a Thessalian were to command with rabid chant, Or Colchis, having acted with Scythian frosts, Should she drive, would Tartarus grow pale with trembling motion? Do not despise, I warn you: the power even for us to rave exists." We know, indeed, and whatever you fear to be spoken and known, And to disturb Hecate, etc.

(22) *The secret in Abydos.* This secret lies here. (23) *And will steer the ship.* The *Baris* is a type of Egyptian ship, which, although it had a wider application, especially signified the one which was publicly dedicated to Isis every year. (24) Vigerus notes that this is not to be deleted.

^A ...and, being ignorant of it, they attribute the peculiar passion of their own imagination to Him. But if these things are spoken symbolically, as being symbols of His powers, let them tell us the interpretation of the symbols; for it is manifest that, if the passion were of the sun, as in the eclipses, it would have appeared the same to all who gazed upon him. And why also do they desire meaningless names, and among these, barbarian ones in preference to those appropriate to each? For if the hearer looks to the thing signified, the concept remains the same and is sufficient to declare it, whatever the name may be. For neither, I suppose, was the one called upon an Egyptian by race; or if he were an Egyptian, he was not using the Egyptian language, nor indeed any human language at all. For either these are all the contrivances of sorcerers, and concealments through the passions that happen to us, which are attributed to the Divine, or we are unaware that we possess contrary concepts regarding the Divine, or else it is actually disposed in that way.

Having said these things, he again expresses doubt ^B to the Egyptian, saying: “But if some of the gods are impassible, and others passible, to whom they say that phalli are set up through these rites, and obscene language is uttered, vain will be the invocations of the gods, their predicted calls, and the propitiations of wrath, and the sacrifices, and even more so the so-called necessities imposed upon the gods. For that which is impassible is beyond charm, and beyond force, and beyond necessity.” And again he adds next: “In vain is their wisdom exercised, if they have troubled the Divine Mind in search of a runaway slave, or the purchase of a field, or, if it chance, marriage, or trade. But if He is not present, yet those who are with Him speak the truest things about other matters, but about happiness nothing secure or trustworthy, then they were neither gods nor good demons, but rather that one who is called an impostor.”

So much, then, and from this portion of Porphyry’s writing, let this serve. And indeed, those valiant gods themselves were the first teachers of harmful sorcery. For how could ^C such things have come to men if they had not revealed them, and declared the spells by which they might bind one another? Do not think that this is our own argument, for we profess neither to understand nor to desire any of these things, but rather for the refutation of their madness, and for the defense of us who have withdrawn ourselves from their communion and society, let the same man be produced as our witness, who is held to be wise by his own people, and who not only knows all the reasons of his ancestral religion accurately, but has also expounded them. He, therefore, in the aforementioned collection of oracles, says the following word for word.

CHAPTER XI

«Nor is it only the life they lead and the other things which we have mentioned that they have disclosed, but they have also stated by what things they are pleased, by what they are swayed, and, yes, by what they are compelled. They have told what sacrifices must be offered, and from which days one must abstain; what the form of the statues should be, and how they are to be fashioned; in what shapes they themselves appear, and in what places they dwell. In short, there is nothing at all that men have not learned from them, and so honored them. Since there are many evidences of this, we shall present but a few from among the many, so that we may not leave this argument without attestation.»

CHAPTER XII

«And that the statues themselves, and of what material they should be made, were also decreed by them, will be understood from the following response of Hecate:

"Fashion me a pure image, just as I shall teach you. Make the body sacred to me of wild rue, and adorn it With small, house-dwelling lizards, Having ground up mixtures of myrrh, storax, and Sabean frankincense. With these lizards, combine them and gather them under a waxing moon, Then fulfill the rite, yourself offering this prayer."

^B Then, she gave the prayer and taught how many lizards must be taken:

"As many forms as I have, with just so many lizards Diligently combine them with your right hand; and the branches of a Self-sprung laurel, weave into our house. Having prayed much to that image, you shall behold me in a dream."

And at another time, she gave them another such image.»

CHAPTER XIII

«And regarding the shapes, how they appear, they have themselves revealed them; from which also the statues were later set up. ^C For instance, Sarapis, having seen Pan, says concerning himself:

"A bright light shines around the house of God. For a great god has come, he met me; he saw my Invincible strength, a splendor causing the fire to roar, A lock from the top of my head, with bright eyes Playing around, and the sacred locks of my chin."

And Pan also taught a hymn concerning himself, which goes as follows:

"I pray, a mortal born, to Pan, my kindred god, Two-horned, two-footed, goat-legged, reveler."

And the rest. ^D And Hecate, furthermore, sang of herself in this manner:

"Perform all things for me with your hand, possessing the fruits of the fields"

Let a cast image display the likeness of Ceres. Let a bright white garment go, and let gold surround the feet. Let a sandal accompany it; and around the girdle let many A snake, without spot, lead its coils, and hanging from the Very top of the head, let it bind the furthest footprints With a long descent, and beautifully let it wander around Everywhere with interwoven folds. And she prescribes the material itself, Whether it arise from carved ivory or Parian marble.»

^{A B}

CHAPTER XIV. That they also incite to the magic art.

The gods themselves also very often, while they proclaim what they are saying, portend it meanwhile by certain signs and manifestations, and thus, because they know the singular reason and state of each person’s birth, they declare themselves to be indeed supreme magicians, if it is at all right to speak so, and supreme genethliacs. And again, in the oracles, he testifies that Apollo speaks in this manner:

"Remember to invoke Mercury and the Sun at the same time In the holy light for the sun; then the moon, when her Appointed day arrives, Saturn, and the one born of Dione, With secret voices, which that greatest lord of the Seven-toned ^C masters discovered, he who is also most Well-known to all."

When indeed it was shouted back by those who were present, "You mean Ostanes," Apollo replied: "You shall call each great god, and with a sevenfold voice."

The same person furthermore adds the following. These, he says, are the proper marks of Hecate: wax composed of a triple color, white, black, and red, and bearing the image of Hecate carrying a whip, a lamp, and a sword, around which a serpent is coiled. And the stars of the heaven and the sea, affixed before the doors, represent this. For these things the gods themselves wished to be known and attested by the following verses. For Pan speaks thus:

"Drive these far away; ^D Then let the wax with triple colors Go into the hearth. Let the white approach the black, Let the fiery one blaze at the same time, Just as it flickers from the coal, The terror of the dogs of the underworld. Let the foul form of Hecate be; Let the lamp burn in her hands, And the avenging blade bristle, Let the serpent surrounding it Bind the maiden with wandering coils, And wrap her wild head. Let the movable key be present, And the powerful force of the demons, The very loud sound of the whip."

These are those things, and such as are twin to them, by which the noble philosopher of the Greeks, that marvelous theologian, the initiate of the secret rites, illustrated the philosophy of the oracles as containing the secret responses of the gods, or rather, more truly, openly proclaimed the traps prepared for the race of men by the wicked art and cunning of demons. For indeed, what finally could there be profitable to men for any fruit of this life from wretched craftsmanship and sorcery; and what could [index: entries preserved]

^A a likeness of divine power be, or the shaping of such figures? And why was it not better to advise [men] to philosophize, rather than to practice sorcery and pursue forbidden things, when the way of virtue and philosophy is sufficient for a happy and blessed life? And he, extending his own refutation, adds these things to what has been said.

CHAPTER XV.

That they also take pleasure in inanimate matter.

^B “That they also take pleasure in the symbols of the characters, Hecate, comparing them to what men desire, has revealed through these lines:

‘What mortal is there not pleased to acquire characters In bronze, or in silver, or impressed in gleaming gold? And whom does the character not delight, which from heaven itself, Governing the fates of men, is wont to bind in manifold ways?’

He has declared that not only do these characters please them, but also that, as we have said, they are confined to them, and are contained as in a sacred dwelling by the underlying image. For the earth could not bear ^C and sustain the gods unless it were sacred: and that is sacred which contains a divine image: and once that is taken away, the divinity that it held on earth is immediately dissolved.”

I think it is clearly proven by these points that those whom they held in the place of gods were nothing more than certain earthly and passion-bound demons: and for that reason I consider that I have done well, with mature and sound judgment, to depart from their worship. For you yourself see how they confess that they are held in certain places on earth by the bonds of magical figures and characters of that sort: whereas, if they had anything truly divine in them, they should have chosen no other place for their seat and dwelling than a mind not only purged of all filth and every stain, but also adorned with the ornaments of temperance, justice, and the other virtues. ^D For when these have once occupied the soul of a man as if it were a truly holy place, that divine spirit would deservedly insinuate itself there: and to those minds which have already conformed themselves to an honest and religious way of life and conduct, there would be no further need of the wicked arts of sorcery to receive the divine. Let it remain, therefore, certain and clearly proven by all these testimonies that those about whom we have hitherto disputed are none other than demons, bound to the earth and to desires and the love of bodies. Now, however, attend with me to what the same Porphyry next adds regarding the defection of the oracles themselves, which have been so boasted of by them.

CHAPTER XVI.

Concerning the defection of the oracles, that Apollo himself sang.

“As for the Pythian oracles, and those of Claros, of Phoebus...”

^A My message shall tell of the sacred utterances. Ten thousand wondrous things on the earth’s back Gushed forth, and fountains and eddying breaths. And these the earth itself, gaping wide, received Back into the caverns of the underworld, and the endless age destroyed them. But for the Sun alone, who shines upon mortals, there still remain In the glens of Didyma the inspired Mycaleian water, And beneath the foot of Pytho, under the Parnassian height, And rocky Claros, the harsh mouth of the Phoebean utterance.

The oracle to the Nicaeans said: “Pytho’s speaking voice cannot be restored, For, dimmed by long-lasting time, It has been cast with the keys of unprophetic silence. But perform, as is the custom, the prophetic sacrifices to Phoebus.”

At this point, it is appropriate to add here what Plutarch has in his treatise ^B concerning the decay of the oracles. “When Ammonius had finished speaking, ‘Why do you not,’ said I, ‘tell us something, Cleombrotus, about this oracle? For great indeed was the reputation of the divinity dwelling there in former times, but now it seems to be fading away.’ As Cleombrotus was silent and looked down, Demetrius said, ‘There is no reason why we should inquire about that one alone, or raise a question specifically regarding the failure of the oracles there; rather, seeing that all of them, save one or two, have failed, we should consider in common the reason why these things have so withered away. For what point is there in recounting other things, when even Boeotia itself, which in former times was very resonant because of its oracles, has now been completely drained, just like streams, and a great drought of prophecy has taken over the land? ^C For nowhere else now, except around Lebadeia, does Boeotia provide those who need it with the ability to draw from prophecy; but elsewhere, silence or complete desolation has taken hold of them.’” Furthermore, in addition to this, the same author says the following concerning the actual dying of their demons.

CHAPTER XVII. Concerning the dying also of the demons, whom they indeed worship as gods.

^A “To assert,” he said, “that it is not gods, who ought to be exempt from earthly affairs, but demons, the ministers of the gods, who preside over the oracles, does not seem to me to be wrongly judged; but to bring against these demons—almost as if snatching them violently from the epics of Empedocles—sins, and follies, and God-sent errors, and finally to posit their ends and deaths just as if they were human, I consider to be rather audacious and excessively uncivilized.” Cleombrotus then asked Philip who the young man was, and from where; and having learned his name and city, he said, “We do not escape the notice even of them, Heracleon, having become involved in strange discussions. But it is not possible, when one has made use of great principles concerning great matters, for one to arrive at probability in one's opinion. Yet you do not perceive that you are at once granting and denying the same thing. For you admit that there are demons; but by not deigning to consider them base or mortal, you no longer maintain them to be demons. For in what do they differ from the gods, if they also possess incorruptibility in their essence and, in virtue, an impassive and sinless state?” As Heracleon remained silent, ^B pondering these things to himself, Philip said to him, “But it is not only Empedocles, Heracleon, who left behind the idea of base demons, but also Plato, and Xenocrates, and Chrysippus; and Democritus, praying to obtain favorable idols, was clearly aware that others were perverse and wicked, and possessed certain inclinations and impulses. As for the death of such beings, I have heard a story from a man who was neither foolish nor boastful. For the rhetorician Aemilianus—whom even some of us have heard—had Epitherses as his father, who was my fellow-citizen and a teacher of grammar. He used to say that once, when he was sailing to Italy, he embarked on a merchant ship carrying goods and many passengers. ^C When evening had already set in, the wind died down near the Echinadian Islands, and the ship, drifting, came near to Paxi. Most of the people were awake and drinking, since they had finished dining; but suddenly, a voice was heard from the island of Paxi, calling out ‘Thamus’—who was an Egyptian pilot, not even known to many of those ^D on board—and so they were amazed. For the Egyptian pilot Thamus was not even known by name to many of those on board. Twice he was called, and he was silent, but the third time he answered…

the one calling. And he, raising his voice, said, "When you arrive at Palodes, proclaim that the great Pan is dead."

When they heard this, he said that all were struck with amazement, and they argued among themselves whether it were better to do what was commanded or not to busy themselves with it, but rather to let it be. But Thamus had decided that if there were a wind, he would sail past the place in silence, but if a calm and stillness occurred around the place, he would announce what he had heard. Thus, when they were at Palodes, with neither wind nor waves existing, Thamus, looking from the stern toward the land, said as he had heard, that the great Pan is dead. And it was seen that as soon as he ceased, there arose a great groaning, not of one, but of many, mingled at once with amazement. And since many men were present, the report quickly spread in Rome, and Thamus was summoned by Tiberius Caesar. So much credence did Tiberius give to the account that he inquired and sought into who this Pan was. ^B And the learned men about him, who were numerous, conjectured that it was the one born of Hermes and Penelope.

Philip had some of those who were present as witnesses, who had heard the elder Aemilianus. And Demetrius added that there were many desolate, scattered islands near Britain, some of which were called islands of demons and heroes. He himself, he said, had sailed for the purpose of history and sight-seeing on a mission of the king to the island that lay nearest to the desolate ones, which had not many inhabitants, but was considered sacred and inviolable by all the Britons. And when he had recently arrived there, there was a great disturbance in the air, and many portents, and winds burst forth, and whirlwinds fell. When it subsided, the islanders said that a passing of one of the greater beings had occurred. For as a lamp being lit, he said, has nothing terrible, but being extinguished is distressing to many, so great souls have their shining forth kindly and painless, but their extinctions and destructions, ^C often, as now, breed winds and hailstorms, and often poison the air with pestilential afflictions. There is, however, one island there in which they say Cronus is imprisoned, guarded by Briareus while he sleeps; for deep sleep has been contrived as a bond for him. And there are many demons about him as his companions and servants.

So much from Plutarch. It is worth observing the time in which he says the death of the demon occurred. This was the time of Tiberius, during which our Savior, while spending time among men, is recorded to have been driving every kind of demon from the life of men; so that some demons even fell at His knees and begged not to be delivered to the Tartarus that was awaiting them. You have, therefore, also the time of the overthrow of the demons, a thing which has not been chronicled from any other age; just as also the abolition of the human sacrifices of the nations ^D

that had taken place not at any other time than after the proclamation of the evangelical teaching had gone forth to all men. Let these matters, then, be considered as confuted by us from later history.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Concerning the oracles celebrated by the proclamation of the ancient Greeks.

^B But since the things mentioned are not known to all, it seems good to me to proceed from here to matters that are manifest to all who are learned, and to examine the oracles of the most ancient age, which were on the tongues of all Greeks, and were customarily handed down in the studies of the cities to those who came to be educated. Therefore, taking up the old histories again, consider what the Pythian god decreed to the Athenians when they were oppressed by pestilence because of the death of Androgeos. For all the Athenians suffered from the plague because of the death of one man, and they were seeking to obtain help from the gods. What then does their Savior and God counsel them? Perhaps some will think that he advised them to care for justice and humanity, and for the other virtues from then on, or to repent of their transgression, and to perform some holy and pious acts, ^C as if to appease the gods by these. But there was nothing of the sort in these. For indeed what care had these "wondrous gods," or rather, these wholly wicked demons, for such things? Again, they demand from them things related and akin to themselves—things merciless, cruel, and inhuman—saying, "plague upon plague," and "deaths upon death." For Apollo commands them to send every year seven of their own male youths, and an equal number of female virgins, instead of one man—fourteen innocent and blameless ones—and that not once, but to be sacrificed every year in Crete before Minos. So that even up to the times of Socrates, more than five hundred years later, this terrible and most inhuman tribute kept its memory among the Athenians. And this was, after all, what had caused the delay of Socrates' death. Therefore someone of the young men ^D sets forth and refutes the oracle very well with manly reasoning, having composed in his own work a "Detection of Sorcerers." Do not listen to my words, but to his, for he addresses himself to the oracle in this way:

CHAPTER XIX.

“What then?” he says, “Did the Athenians, the authors of the murder of Androgeos, and those suffering from the pestilence on account of this, not profess to repent? Or, if they did not say it, was it not far more fitting for you to say to them, ‘Repent,’ rather than:

^A‘There shall be an end to the plague and the famine, if from your own Bodies by lot you yield up male and female to Minos; Sending them to the divine sea, a payment For deeds of unrighteousness; so shall the god be gracious.’

For it was to be expected that you would be vehemently stirred by the fact that one man, Androgeos, had died at Athens, while you slumbered concerning the many who are dying daily in every nation. And yet you knew that Minos at that time held sway over the sea, and was possessed of great power, and all Greece honored him; and for this very reason he was considered most righteous, a supreme legislator, and even held and proclaimed by Homer to be the companion of great Zeus and a judge in the underworld. Was it on his account, then, that you thought these penalties must be exacted? But I pass over these things, no less than you yourselves: not only that you disregarded the authors of the murder and sent innocent victims to their certain destruction, but also that you sent them to a man whom you had established as the common judge of all human beings—one, however, who could not even deliver a true verdict in this case. And how many of you, O gods, ^B in exchange for these youths, will the just prove to be, whom you sent to the Athenians, whom you unjustly slew on account of Androgeos?” The same author, having taken up the history regarding the Heraclidae, exposes how many Apollo caused to die through the ambiguity of his oracles, saying as follows:

CHAPTER XX.

“And since I have touched upon this discourse, come, let us also pursue the history of the Heraclidae that concerns this matter. For when they once, attempting to break into the Peloponnese by way of the Isthmus, had failed in their efforts and labor, Aristomachus, the son of Aridaeus—because his father had perished in that same incursion—came to you to consult about the journey; for he was seized by the same desire as his father before him. But this was the answer he received from you:

^C‘The gods show you the palm through the narrow passes.’

But he too, having attempted a similar incursion through the Isthmus, fell in battle. Then the unfortunate Temenus, being his son, the third from a line of unfortunate men, set out, and you promised him the same things you had promised his father, Aristomachus, and ^D

he, too, obeying you, perished in the invasion. But you said: “I do not mean by land the narrow one, but the wide-girthed one.” Because it was difficult to speak of the sea, and he went by the sea, having caused the impression that he was entering by land, and he encamped between the sailor and the infantryman, and he strikes down with a javelin Carnus ^A the Aetolian knight, son of Phylandrus; well, it seems to me, is what you were doing. And when a plague suddenly arose, and Aristodemus had died, they were retreating again, and Temenus, having arrived, was complaining about the failure; and he heard that he had wiped out the penalty for the divine messenger, and [he heard] the poem concerning the vow to Apollo Carneus, which said through the oracle: ^B “Having killed our messenger, you have wiped out the penalty.”

What then, says Temenus, must I do? And how could I appease you? “Devote sacred vows to Carneus, Apollo.”

O most abominable and most shameless prophet! Did you not know that he who heard of the “narrow” path would miss the “narrow” one? But you, knowing nonetheless, give [the oracle], and then look on as he misses the mark. But the “narrow” was ambiguous, so that if he won, you might be the cause of the victory, but if he were defeated, you might be the cause of any defeat, and you might have an escape by way of the “wide-girthed one.” But the man arrived at the “wide-girthed” one, and did not succeed. A way out was found again, by the death of the messenger Carnus. And yet how, O you best of beings, did you who cared so much for Carnus command that others become possessed by him, but not he himself? And when you ought to have saved Carnus, being but one, you overlooked him, and having perished, you cast upon him a Homeric plague ^C upon the multitude, and prescribed prayers for the disease? If he who prayed accomplished nothing, you would have found some other remedy for your sophistry, and you would never have ceased, the ones asking and you sophistizing, so that they might win, and even when defeated you would be [seen as] one who does evil unseen. For the suffering and the desire [for victory] are sufficient to lead astray, so that even if they were slaughtered a thousand times, they would not be made to disbelieve you.

It is fitting to append to these the things concerning Croesus. He was ruling in Lydia, having received the power from ancient times ^D passed down from his ancestors; and then, hoping to achieve something more than his ancestors, he thought to act piously toward the gods; and, having come through experience, he chooses Apollo in Delphi above all, and then, having adorned the sanctuary with craters and gold bricks and a myriad of offerings, he made it in a short time the richest of any on earth, nor did he omit anything that sufficed for sacrifices with great-heartedness. Since, therefore, he had advanced so much to the god, the Lydian, naturally emboldened by his works of piety, plans to march against the Persians, to increase his empire to something great, relying on the alliance of the God. What then...

^A of the wonderful 45 oracle-singer? That very one, the Delphic, the Pythian, the Friend, prepares his suppliant, the pious one, the refugee, not merely to fail to obtain a foreign empire, but even to fall from his own; not intentionally, it seems to me, but rather out of ignorance of what was to happen—for since God does not know the future, nor indeed was he God, nor any power greater than a human being, he wove the oracle sophistically towards both possibilities—and, one might almost say, ^B declaring, "Croesus, having crossed the Halys, will destroy a great empire," thereby overthrowing the empire of Lydia, which had descended in succession from his ancestors to this pious man, and which was great and long-lasting; he repaid this fruit to the friend of God for all his excessive zeal towards him. Regarding these things, the writer expresses his indignation not without reason; listen. ^C

CAPUT XXI. That the same Apollo was the cause of Croesus losing his kingdom through the ambiguity of his response.

"You, of course," he says, "who foresee all things that can be measured by sand, know nothing good; for the scent of a hard-shelled tortoise being cooked coming to your mind is knowledge worth no more than the price of sand. And although that was not even true, it was still fitting for a proud and impudent being, who not only lifted his brow because of these empty insights, but also tried to persuade that Lydian slave, Croesus, not to despise him. For he, having tested the certainty of your response in this manner, was a little later going to ask you whether he should undertake an expedition against the Persians, using you as his counselor for his own madness and greed. You were not ashamed to give him the response: 'That, having crossed the Halys, he will destroy a great empire.' However, doing one thing well—that you did not care for him—^D you were not hesitant to say it. And indeed, what you gave him was not wrongly stated, since both possibilities...

were equally balanced, so that the Lydian might have had a just cause for doubting and seeking further; but that expression of yours, ^A *to overthrow*, is used by the Greeks in only one sense, meaning to overreach and bring under one's own power. For that Cyrus, a half-Mede or half-Persian, or, if you prefer, one of such a kind that if you look at his mother, he was of tyrannical stock, but if at his father, of private origin; he, I say, was shadowed forth in this enigma by the name of a mule. This indicates not only the stupid arrogance and smoke of the Muse, but also a divination devoid of prophetic power, if indeed the prophet was unaware that the meaning of the enigma could not be grasped by him. But if it was not out of ignorance, but out of wantonness and malice ^B that he played his games—oh, what games the gods play! But if it was not even that, but because it had to happen thus—then this is the most unholy of sophistical arguments. But nevertheless, if it had to happen thus, why, you wretch, do you sit in Delphi singing of vain and empty things? What profit is there for us in you? Why are we, who flock to you from all over the world, raving? And why are you so insolent? Such is the frank speech of Oenomaus against the impostures of the sorcerers, not lacking in Cynic bitterness; for he is unwilling to admit that the oracles admired by the Greeks are those of a demon, let alone a god, but rather that they are the delusions and sophistries of sorcerous men, ^C craftily prepared for the deception of the masses. And since we have mentioned them once, it will be useful to hear further refutations, and especially that of this same man, whereby he testifies that he himself was deceived by the Clarian Apollo, writing as follows:

CHAPTER XXII.

"But of course," he says, "it was necessary for us too to be called into this comedy, lest we should please ourselves too much for having been able to avoid this common madness, and to display those wares which we ourselves also, in this trade of wisdom, have brought back ^D from Asia, O Clarian, through your favor. There is a garden of Heracles in the region of Trachis, in which all things flourish everywhere, and which, by the hands of all..."

^A Migne’s Latin rendering continues: ...*nullo non tempore passim Carpatur, tamen haud unquam decrescere visus, Æternis augetur aquis.*

I, therefore, having heard this, being at once foolish and senseless, was myself also puffed up by a vain hope from Heracles, and because of the name of Trachis, I began to dream in my mind of some Hesiodic sweat of the Herculean garden sprouting on all sides, and of an easy and unrestrained life by reason of the mention of the flowering garden. Then, as I further inquired whether the gods were about to bring me aid, one of the common people confirmed it to me even with an oath, saying that he had heard that this same thing had been granted to a certain Callistratus, a merchant from Pontus. When I heard this, how heavily do you think I took it, imagining myself to have been anticipated and surpassed in this possession of virtue by him? But yet, even in this feeling of annoyance, I began to investigate that merchant, to see whether he too had been treated somewhat more gently and pleasantly by Heracles: I discovered him to be ^B troubled by no small toil, led by a greed for gain, and hoping for some pleasant life from that gain. When, therefore, I saw that the merchant’s circumstances were identical to my own, I no longer accepted the oracle, nor Heracles, but I considered it unworthy to share in the same fate as those men, whose present labors I saw, but whose table I saw only in hope. For truly, there is neither a robber, nor a soldier, nor a lover, nor a mistress, nor flatterer, nor rhetorician, nor sycophant, who does not have some oracle of his own. For as each one has a desire, so he either deems something laborious for himself, or expects some pleasure. Having recounted these things, he proceeds to show subsequently that having consulted the excellent seers a second and a third time, he discovered them to know nothing of all things, but only to be concealing their own ignorance with the darkness of ambiguity. He speaks, then, as follows:

CHAPTER XXIII.

That they are accustomed to conceal their own ignorance with the shadows of, and with, ambiguous speech.

"Since," he says, "my mercantile affairs were already underway, and only a man was needed to lead me by the hand as a guest toward wisdom, and nowhere was an easy supply of such a person ^C available to me, I begged of you that you might also indicate someone of this kind. But you... What are you saying? If I wished to become a sculptor or a painter, and were seeking masters of those arts, would your directive have been enough for me to hear? Would I not rather say that the one who answered me in such a way was raving? But perhaps you are not able to grasp this ^D and that of the beasts, and whatever else is of such a kind."

^A Oh, the excessive obscurity of human custom! You could not go to Colophon, for it would have been better; nor was the god himself-in this matter-so blind. "Using a whirling sling," he says, "skillfully strike down the geese, the immense, grass-eating creatures." But who will explain to me what these "immense, grass-eating geese" that they talk about mean? And who will explain the "whirling sling"? Is it Amphilochus, or some Dodonaean, or perhaps you yourself in Delphi, if I were there? Why do you not, in your misery, go and break your own throat with this whirling sling of yours, along with that incomprehensible poem? But come now, having pre-empted the refutation of these things, let us recall from memory the most ancient of the Delphic oracles—those which are celebrated to the point of wonder, especially in Greek histories—and let us see how they are refuted in the same way. A massive Persian army was in arms against the Athenians. Since they saw no other hope of salvation left to them except in one god, whom they did not know well, they invoked him nonetheless as their guardian and ancestral defender. This was, of course, the Delphic Apollo. ^B What then did this "wondrous" divinity do? Did he fight for the salvation of his own people? Did he remember the libations and the savors of offerings, and the things that they habitually paid to him in sacrifice, according to the custom and institution of their ancestors, in the form of hecatombs? Not at all. What then does he say? He tells them to flee: and to flee in such a way that they would use a "wooden wall" (for that is what he called their fleet) for their flight; and he declared that this was the only way for them to find salvation, once the city had already been set on fire. What grand assistance from a god! Then he even pretends to foretell the destruction not only of other buildings in the city, but even of those which were sacred to the gods. Yet that could have been sufficiently expected even from the very pressure of the enemies, without any oracle. And so, our author rightly mocks this error of the Greeks again, wittily and facetiously with these words:

CHAPTER XXIV

^D (Hence follows the fifth: it is missing; but it is glorious, for he strikes it down, correctly, and not as here. The fourth, sixth in Herodotus, has it better than the fifth; the seventh in Herodotus: "Many fair towers will he destroy, and not yours alone, Trembling with fear: for on the highest roofs Black blood has been poured; and he foresees the necessities of misery. But go from the sanctuary, and spread courage over your evils.")

Sterne, agens Mavors, atque altas funditus arces Eruet, ac superum templis incendia mittet, Qui nunc fortassis magno terrore subacti Expresso sudore fluunt.

Behold, what the oracle has poured forth for the Athenians: is there in it even the slightest trace of divination? Indeed, you might say—someone could argue—that you dare to carp at and censure this oracle, if there were nothing else. But if you were to add what it attached for those imploring aid, then what kind of thing it truly is will be understood. Let us add, therefore:

Jam magnum placare Jovem Jove nata Minerva Haud precibus votisque potest. Quod tamen indomita cognovi ex Virgine, pandam. At reliquis victor poliatur, Lignea securo consistere mænia vallo, Optatamque tibi sobolique afferre salutem Juppiter indulsit natæ. Tu, ne pedes hostis Neve eques hic stantem inveniat, dare terga memento: Namque infesta tibi trahet obvius agmina ductor. Divina o, Salamis, matrum tu pignora perdes, Sive Ceres dispersa ierit, seu venerit ipsa.

By Hercules, you fashion for us a Jupiter worthy of Jupiter, O son of Jove; ^B a Minerva worthy of Minerva, O brother of Minerva. And this conflict of wills and pursuits is indeed fitting for father and daughter, or rather for gods altogether. And this "Olympius" of yours, who unless he brought an infinite army from Susa could not be equal to capturing a single city—he is, forsooth, some great personage, one in whose hands rests the power of the whole universe! For how is it credible that one who lacked the strength to overthrow a single city in Europe could have been able to incite and drive such a force of peoples from Asia into Europe? But you, O bold one (those men might say, to whom Minerva cannot prevail upon the Olympian Jupiter), who are accustomed to be so headlong in undertaking dangers even when there is no cause, do you not groan at this event? Or was Jupiter really angry at stones and wood, and not at men, so that you indeed saved the men, while he scorched the buildings with a strange fire? For he had no thunderbolt at that time. Or are we perhaps rather the ones who are bold and foolhardy, not allowing you to drivel on in this way? How, ^C O...

^A prophet (62), did you know that the divine Salamis would destroy the children of women; but whether this was at the time of the scattering or the gathering of Demeter’s grain, did you not know that? And how did you not even know this: that by the "children of women" one might say were meant both one’s own people and the enemy, if one perceived the trickery? But one must wait for the outcome; for it must needs be that one of these things will result. For the divine Salamis would not have been fitting even for the defeated, if it were invoked for pity in such a way. And the battle of ships that was to take place, whether at the time of the scattering or the gathering of Demeter’s grain, was forged with poetic solemnity, so that the prophecy might be impenetrable to sophistry and not immediately obvious, since a naval battle is not fought in winter. And now, the tragedy is not obscure, nor are the gods who surround it ^B (65), the one entreating and the other not to be swayed; they are useful for the future, and for the paradoxical turn of the war, the one for those being saved, and the other for those being destroyed. For if they were to be saved, behold the prayers of Pallas are foretold, sufficient to bend the anger of Zeus; and if not, not even this is left unprovided for by the prophet; for Pallas cannot appease Zeus. And the craftsman blended the oracle to suit the half-evil fortunes, as if Zeus were on one hand fulfilling his own intent, and on the other not disregarding the plea of his daughter. And that she would destroy many towers—if they had attacked with fennel stalks, and not with iron and fire, perhaps it would have been a lie, since even with fennel stalks men like that would surely have achieved something. "But I," he says, "have found ^C the wooden wall, the only one that cannot be sacked." It is your counsel, indeed, but not a prophecy, and not unlike this: "To flee and not to stay, and not to beg" is a base thing [to do]. That man, therefore, who solved that riddle (66) was no less capable than you of seeing that the city of the Athenians was the pretext for the Persian’s journey, and the whole attack was directed first and foremost against it. Since even I, who am no prophet, perceiving this, would counsel not only the Lydian (67), but also the Athenian, to flee with his back turned. And truly, for him who solves your riddle, it is no less evident than it was to you that the Athenians drove the Persian to madness, and that the entire weight ^D of the war rested upon that city as being the chief and most famous of all. For I myself, who can do nothing by way of divination, once I had perceived the matter, would certainly advise not only the Lydian, but also the Athenian, to flee with his back turned. For truly, [flee, break off delays, and let not sloth be blamed.]

^A And again, "He will yet be against you, for there is a great force of cavalry and he is approaching on foot." That one should rely on ships and not on the mainland, for it would have been ridiculous, possessing a navy and living by the sea, not to have gathered all their vessels and, after loading all the provisions they had, to save themselves, having abandoned the land to those who wished for it. These things, then, concern the Athenians; but those concerning the Lacedaemonians are extremely weak and worthy of laughter. ^B For he says that either the whole city will be besieged, or it will mourn for the king who has perished. Now it was entirely probable for anyone to conjecture that one of these two things would happen; but it certainly was not the oracle of a god to equivocate in such a way because of ignorance of the future, when it was necessary to give aid and at the right moment show himself to be a savior of the Greeks, and rather to procure a victory for the Greeks against their enemies and the barbarians, as if they were kindred friends. But if he were not able to do this, he should at least have ensured that they would not suffer anything, nor fall into the power of the enemy. But he does not even do this; nay, he does not even know how the outcome of this adverse war will turn out for them. Hear, then, what the Refutation says against this oracle as well.

CHAPTER XXV.

The Response Given to the Lacedaemonians.

^C "But," you will say, "it was not right to be the author of the same counsel to the Lacedaemonians." You speak the truth. For you did not know, O sophist, whether the danger to Sparta would be the same as that to Attica. Therefore, you were afraid that if you had counseled them to flee, they might indeed flee, but the Persians might not attack. Since, therefore, it was necessary to say something, this is the response you gave to the Lacedaemonians:

O ye inhabitants of spacious Sparta, ^D Either your glorious city will be utterly overturned by the arms of the Persians: Or if that should stand, the fields of Lacedaemon will mourn For their king, born of the race of great Heracles, now deceased.

Again, that most divinatory conjunction! But let us leave it alone, so that by attacking the same point twice regarding you, we may not seem both tiresome and lacking in resources. Let us examine the rest. Everyone was looking toward you in such great danger; they were consulting you alone both as an interpreter of future things and as an adviser for action. But clearly, while they thought you most worthy of trust, you understood them all to be blockheads and fools; and you understood that the state of affairs was such that people, being improvident and foolish, could easily be driven not only into the workshops of Delphic and Dodonaean trickery and sophistry, but even into auguries, into divinations expressed by flour, and into the trifles of those who are called ventriloquists. For at that time, not only were the gods trusted, but also weasels, and crows, and the vain images of dreams. Now it is clear that they would not by any means have preferred both to one, nor the greater to the lesser; for it is a lesser thing for one king to fall than for all to perish. For if the city were to fall, there would be no escape even for him; but if he himself...

were sent away to some other place, something might well happen beyond their expectations. It remained, therefore, that with these things in mind, they should send off the king to wage war, while they themselves remained at home, far from danger, awaiting the outcome of the entire affair. Everyone saw that for the king, who was about to engage an infinite multitude of enemies, certain death was imminent, while Sparta enjoyed a reprieve from fear in the meantime, and sustained itself with the hope of some unexpected outcome. ^B Indeed, whether the same was captured or escaped the hands of the enemy, the duplicity of the fallacy remained concealed. But why? For not even in the case of the king perishing, did he say that the city would be safe, but only that either one king would perish, or the entire city. And this utterance, in either event—whether he alone perished or not—would always stand as true. And this, finally, is the fruit of vanity and folly. So much then for the Lacedaemonians. Now, it would not be irrelevant to add what response he gave to the Cnidians, who were also imploring his aid.

CHAPTER XXVI.

The response given to the Cnidians.

o different, said he, was the fortune and condition of the Cnidians when Harpagus was marching against them. For they had undertaken to cut through and sever the isthmus that was there at the time, and to make their city an island; and although the work had at first gone well, when they saw that it was not proceeding according to their wishes, in their despondency they consulted the oracle. But you said to them: ^C “Do not fortify the isthmus, nor dig it; for if Jupiter had wished it to be an island, he would have made it one.” And the foolish and simple men believed you and, deterred from their plan, surrendered themselves to Harpagus. But what a piece of trickery! For since you saw that even if they had not dug the isthmus they would have had no sure refuge, you hindered the work; and at the same time, not being in any way the author of its completion, you held out some hope of escape. Yet you did not promise a happier outcome if they refrained from digging: you only brought forward this one thing, that it did not please Jupiter for the city to be an island. ^D Naturally, it occurred to you that if you dissuaded them, the force of the response would be equal in either direction, but if you encouraged them, it would imply a clear indication of impending salvation. Therefore, to dissuade them was the safest and most secure course for a sophist. And in this way, by answering nothing of that for which they had come to you, you dismissed those miserable men, who nevertheless thought they had gained something. I think that by these things, both the weakness of those who gave the answers and those who sought them, and how all these oracles are empty of divine power, are abundantly refuted. Now, as for the malevolent and fraudulent arts, whether of evil demons...

^A or of men who put on the mask of the divine, you may easily understand from this: that those who ought to have been the conciliators and interpreters of peace and friendship, these very beings would most often incite those by whom they were consulted to mutual wars. In one way the Delphic Apollo stirs up the Lacedaemonians—as though they were domestic friends—against the Messenians; in another, the same god promises all happiness to the Messenians against the Lacedaemonians, if only they would appease the demons once more with a human victim. Receive, in this regard, what follows.

CHAPTER XXVII.

That he incited those by whom he was consulted to mutual wars more vehemently.

But certainly, the wisdom that governs divination will examine all these things, nor will it allow it to blurt out whatever happens to occur to it, since it possesses the balanced and fitting reasons of all things within itself, and, as an arbiter, attributes to each its own proper value and degree of dignity. Indeed, it will not permit that Pythian [god], because of his vanity, to deliver a response to these men or to the Lacedaemonians regarding the Messenians and that land which the Messenians themselves had occupied by overcoming the Lacedaemonians through fraud:

Phoebus commands you not to wage war by arms alone; Another holds the Messenian lands by guile. But each will suffer in the end the very arts he wove.

He commands them rather to remember peace and temperance, and to be content with their own lot. ^B For men who had been regulated toward equity by the laws of Lycurgus were spurred on by the goad of immoderate greed and empty glory to consult the oracle, that they might not appear, to those who maintained they were educated under the laws of endurance as masters, to have yielded to the Messenians in battle. But if they were truly shaping their lives according to the laws of endurance as masters, it would have surely behooved them to be content with little and to abstain from conflict, arms, and other madnesses of that sort. But these were the things you responded to the Lacedaemonians against the Messenians; but now, consider what follows for the Messenians against the Lacedaemonians. For you promised responses in turn for both sides against one another:

^C The dark fates demand a maiden from the line of Aepytus; If you provide her, you shall preserve dear Ithome.

For as to what you bring forward—that the sacrifice was not pure and sincere from the line of Aepytus, and that for this reason it was not accepted from the Messenians—away with these fabrications! For no one is more capable than you of inciting turmoil. And such are the examples of ancient history. ^D There are countless such instances that could be brought forward from ancient times even down to our own age, regarding those who have held authority through the ages, who sometimes, by means of such oracles, have driven men to pointless wars.

Sometimes they were misled by the ambiguity of the responses, and at other times they were led astray by the inherent fraud of the oracles themselves. For what need is there to mention how many times, in their greatest calamities—whether in pitched battles against enemies or in the dangers of bodily sicknesses—they received absolutely no assistance or remedy from those who were commonly esteemed gods? Such are the things that always and at all times emerge for them from the oracles, just as ancient history confirms. ^A But since among the Pythian oracles most loudly buzzed about by the Greeks, one is that which they say the Pythia delivered to Lycurgus when he consulted her, a response comprehended in these lines:

Thou goest to my fat temple, Lycurgus, Beloved of Zeus and of all who hold the Olympian halls; I hesitate whether to call thee a god or a man, But I incline, Lycurgus, rather to a god; Thou comest seeking good laws; but I will Give them to thee.

And what follows this. Come then, let us see what the aforementioned critic thought about this as well. He writes as follows:

CHAPTER XXVIII. That the things told about Lycurgus, the lawgiver of the Lacedaemonians, are unworthy of a god.

“But you,” he said, “who are the leader and guide of the way, when Lycurgus once came to you, you said he had come ^B out of cavernous Lacedaemon, beloved of Zeus and all who hold the Olympian halls; and you were in doubt whether to declare him by oracle a god or a man; but you incline rather to a god, because he came seeking good laws. Now how was it, if you were a god, that the friend of Zeus and of all the Olympians did not know a political law? But since perhaps these things are not found without God—which have been demonstrated to the most divine man by the voice of God—come, let us look at the divine voice and what it taught Lycurgus.”

Thou comest seeking good laws; but I will Give them to thee.

“I would say, ‘Give!’ For you had never promised such a gift to anyone before. ^C Until you, as the oracles command, the promises and faith Strengthened in the name of the gods, and common bonds of justice To citizens and strangers you give, Purely and cleanly honoring the elder-born, And regarding the Tyndaridae, Menelaus, And the other deathless heroes, who in Lacedaemon ... So then may far-seeing Zeus spare your city.” ^D

^A O doctrine, Apollo, and divine exhortation! These precepts of yours certainly did not require a long sea voyage; nor was there need to go from the Peloponnese to Delphi, nor even to the Hyperboreans themselves—from whom they say the settlers

Of fragrant Delos and its priests

I think that this Lycurgus of yours never had a nurse, nor did he ever sit in a council of elders, from whom and from which he could have heard things much better and wiser than these. And perhaps you might add something, if Lycurgus were to entreat you to say something clear: if some were to lead well, and others were to follow. Furthermore, I shall say that this belongs to the same council, and I shall deem Lycurgus worthy—if he could derive any political precept from you—not to grow weary before departing for Sparta. ^B

The two paths

224 You command us to be on our guard very diligently. You wish fortitude to be the primary recommendation for the citizens: why, this is a thing we hear echoed very often even by the fearful themselves. You add concord of souls: this is truly inculcated not only by the wise, but even by those who are driven by mutual dissensions. Wherefore, as for the reason for this precept, you may rest easy regarding us. Is it really so? You who proclaim yourself a prophet, do you not even understand how often many have cast this very thing at us, who nonetheless have neither eaten the laurel, nor drunk of the Castalian spring, nor ever raised their eyebrows because of some name of wisdom? But why not discourse on fortitude, on liberty, on concord—on how these safeguards are acquired for cities? Cease imposing this upon us, that we should lead the peoples on a path we ourselves do not know. Lead the way yourself; for that path is indeed straight, but to us it is obscure and fearsome. ^C To these things he subsequently adds: ^D

CHAPTER XXIX. That they did not provide oracles concerning serious matters.

"But you are also ready to speak concerning marriage: 'Take the sea-green foal of horse-rearing Argos.' And concerning children: 'Eetion, no one renders you worthy honors; Labda bears in her womb, destined to bring forth a cursed burden.' And concerning a colony: 'Send dense companies of settlers to a golden nation, Bearing bronze on your shoulders, and remembering to bring iron in your hands.' And concerning empty glory: 'The Pelasgic soil surpasses all the earth; Thracian are the horses, Lacedaemonian the women, And the men who drink the water of fair Arethusa.'

^B And to me you seem no better than those who are called interpreters of prodigies, nor indeed than the crowd of other swindlers and sophists. But as for them, I am not at all amazed if they act the sycophant for pay; but that you, being a god, should do so for pay, and act the sycophant toward men—this I marvel at vehemently. Yet that good Socrates of old, when asked whether he should marry or not, answered in neither direction; but he said that whichever one did, he would repent. To another who desired children, he said he would not be acting well, since, having neglected to consider how he might best treat the children if they were to be born, he made no account of this, but kept ^C his mind solely on how they might be born to him. And to another who had decided to go abroad because he was faring ill at home, he said he was not counseling rightly; for he would depart from his fatherland leaving it there, but would take his ignorance with him, which would make him dissatisfied with those there, just as he was with those here. And he did this not only when asked, but also by going unbidden to such gatherings."

CHAPTER XXX.

• Twenty days before, and twenty after, the glowing Sirius has stood, Let a medicinal Bacchus be in the shaded house. Thus he sang to the Athenians who were suffering from extreme heat, acting as a physician, not a prophet.

O prince, born of the blood of Clymenus, son of Presbon, Too late, Erginus, have you come hither to seek offspring; But to the old yoke, attach a new garland.

Very well. And yet, that a man of advanced age should marry a younger wife if he desires children, is not the advice of a prophet, but of anyone who is not ignorant of the nature of things. But truly, desire drives foolish men off course.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Wherefore, if you follow my advice, you would take a rod against these senseless men, unless they allow themselves—having cast aside these putrid questions—to be led to ask something worthy of a divine school; or rather, to say to Antiochus of Paros, who had squandered his fortune on civic trifles and came to you in great distress:

Antiochus, go to Thasos, and dwell in that glorious island;

^C when he would have heard from you something of much greater benefit:

Antiochus, come to your senses, and do not let base poverty break you.

What, furthermore, of the legation of the Cretans?

You who inhabit Phaestus and Tarrha, and Dium, surrounded By sea waves, I bid you perform the Pythian purification of Phoebus, Living piously, so that you may dwell in Crete, Revering not wealth with ancestral laws, but Zeus, For whom it would have been better to hear this: You who inhabit wealth and madness, and with it much arrogance, I bid you perform a purification of your own foolishness, Living piously, so that you may dwell in wisdom, Revering not wealth with ancestral laws, but with divine laws.

See to it that you do not have more need of purification than Crete, imagining for yourself ^D I know not what Orphic or Epimenidean purifications.

^A

CHAPTER XXXII.

That they also associated themselves with the unjust.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

That indiscriminately, like the masses, they praised even those poets who have displayed nothing worthy of a philosophical life.

^A envy others this path to heaven. What is it that you require of us? I think it is that we should walk in the footsteps of Archilochus, if we wish to seem worthy of your abode. We must, forsooth, lacerate with bitter reproaches the women who have refused to marry us, and we must also attack the catamites, since they are far more wicked than all other wicked men; and this must not be done without meter, for this is the language of the gods, as it is also of divine men, such as Archilochus was. And perhaps this is nothing wonderful; for it is through excellence in these matters that the house is well managed, the private life well ordered, and cities and nations alike are maintained in harmony and under good laws. ^B It is not, therefore, without reason that you thought him a minister of the Muses, and deemed his slayer unworthy of your own divine company and voice, seeing that he had killed a man so renowned for his song. The threat against Archias was therefore not unjust, nor was the Pythia ill-timed in taking vengeance on behalf of Archilochus, though he had long been dead, and in ordering the profane man to depart from the temple; for he had slain a minister of the Muses. Therefore, in coming to the defense of the poet, you did not appear to me to be acting indecorously; for I also remembered the other poet, and the sacred crowns of Euripides; although I am at a loss, and desire to hear, not simply ^C that he was crowned, but how those crowns were sacred; nor why his glory was "thundering," but how that glory was excellent. I know that he was applauded by the crowds, and that he pleased tyrants, and I know this as well; and he practiced an art by which not only he himself, the beloved, was admired, but even the city of the Athenians, because it alone had produced tragedians. If then, applause or a table set on the Acropolis are competent judges in this matter, I say no more, seeing Euripides dining on the Acropolis, and the people of the Athenians and the Macedonians together applauding him. But if, besides these things, there is some verdict of the gods, one that is authoritative in itself, and no less significant than the opinion of tyrants ^D or of the multitudes, come then, tell us on what basis you have brought forth the verdict of the gods in favor of Euripides: so that when we hasten to...

and follow the heaven in the footsteps of your praises. For surely it is not the case that even now there are no Sabians and Lycambes ready to be mocked in comedy. And as for being made the subject of tragedy, neither Thyestes, nor Oedipus, nor that famous Phineus would now stand in the way; nor, I think, would they envy any man who desires the friendship of the divine. ^A Indeed, I believe that those very people, if they had known that there would be a certain Euripides—a man who became beloved of God for having set them in order—would have neglected those evils of theirs, and would not have set their minds on better things, but would have turned to composing verse. And if they heard the names of former men who were full of pride, they would have used them for their journey to heaven, so that, having arrived, they might sit in Olympus with the boxers ^B in the court of Zeus. For this is what the poet at Delphi says. Come, let us also look at the inquiry of the blessed Homer, which he put to the God—for there was some heavenly and sufficient inquiry to call forth the God. For the God would not have so easily pronounced him blessed, and then assigned to the blessed one the following utterance:

Seek your motherland; for you have a mother-city, but no father-city. Neither near, nor yet far from the Minoan land, In that soil is it fated for you to end your life, When from children’s mouths you learn the riddle Spoken in many words.

^C For it seemed absurd, O wisest of men, or rather of gods, that he should not know either where on earth he had sprung from his mother’s womb, or where he would lie with eyes closed in death. But I thought it was equal, Homer being a man approaching God on these matters, and one of the dung-beetles, and that God would not have discoursed on such ignorances to Homer any more than to a dung-beetle. For if a certain dung-beetle ^D were born and did not live or grow old in that certain dung-heap, but encountered a hostile wind, and a harsh, beetle-tormenting demon who, having lifted him up into the air by force, carried him away to some other land and another dung-heap; and then, having come to Delphi, he asked which indeed had been his paternal dung-heap, and what land would receive him when he died.

So much, then, for the poets.

CHAPTER XXXIV. That they also exhorted men to worship boxers and athletes with divine honors.

And since this excellent God did not only place poets, but also boxers and athletes, among the gods through His own oracles, it seems to me that our esteemed writer rightly refutes even this with the following words:

^A

You who know the number of the sand and the measures of the sea, And understand the mute and hear the one who does not speak.

Would that you were ignorant of all such things, but knew this one thing: that boxing differs in nothing from kicking, so that you might either grant immortality even to donkeys, or not even honor Cleomedes the boxer of Astypalaea with this distich:

^B

The last of the heroes, Cleomedes of Astypalaea, May he now receive from you, as one no longer mortal, sacred honor.

For why, O interpreter of the religion of the Greeks—for so Plato calls you—did you deify this man? Was it because in the Olympic contest he not only struck his opponent with one blow, but, having laid open his side, reached in his hand and pulled out his lung? A deed truly worthy of a God, O Apollo! Or was it, furthermore, because he could not digest the four-talent fine imposed upon him for that reason, but, moved by the force of grief and anger, he vented his stomach’s bile upon the children who were at that time in the schoolhouse, shaking and pulling down the column that supported the roof? Are these the reasons, O creator of gods, for which we ought to honor Cleomedes? Or will you add this other proof of his valor and piety, that, having climbed into a sacred chest ^C and pulled the lid over himself, he became invisible to his pursuers, who labored in vain to pull him out when they tried? O Cleomedes, is a hero then not a mortal man? What kind of contrivances you invented for the sake of immortality! The gods, at any rate, perceived his benevolence at once and snatched you away, just as those of Homer snatched up Ganymede; except that he pleased them by his form and appearance, while you pleased them by your strength and the remarkable use of that strength. I wish, therefore, O prophet, as I said before, that you had let the sand and the brine alone, and instead had learned how much boxing is worth, so that you might have considered boxing-donkeys to be gods, and the wild asses to be the best of the gods! And there might have been some appropriate oracle for a dead wild ass, rather than for your boxer. ^D

^A "A magnificent wild ass among the immortals, not Cleomedes, whom you honor with sacrifices as if he were no longer mortal." Do not be amazed if even a wild ass should claim immortality for itself, having been sufficiently prepared by divine things, and upon hearing the oracle, not enduring it, but threatening and even striking Cleomedes himself to cast him into the pit, and not allowing him to ascend into heaven; for it considered itself more worthy of these divine gifts than he, seeing that it was ready to struggle not only against him, even if he used iron thongs, but against the pugilist of Thasos ^B both at the same time—the one for whose statue the gods grew angry and made the land of the Thasians barren. We believe this account not from a human source, but from the same one (the god). From this I have also completely understood that pugilism was truly a divine exercise, which had escaped the notice of the masses, even those who were thought to be wise, so that instead of becoming good and noble, they practiced the things of the Thasian pugilist—to whom the gods did not indeed grant immortality (as they did to Cleomedes), but whom they loved greatly.

Thus, his bronze statue also showed something beyond the images of other men, having fallen upon the enemy who was whipping it, following some divine concern, as it seems. But the foolish Thasians, being strangers to divine matters, became angry, accused the statue of a crime, exacted penalty, and dared to sink it into the sea. Yet the Thasians did not escape; rather, the gods taught them how great an evil had been dared by them, sending them famine, the minister of divine justice, which taught them—though with difficulty—the will of the gods, when you, the most philanthropic of the gods, sent them aid in your own way, saying: ^C "Bringing back the exiles to their homeland, you shall reap from Demeter."

But the witless ones again thought that the mortals who were fleeing were the ones who had to be recalled; they knew poorly. For what indeed do the most philanthropic gods care about mortals being recalled, as much as about statues? Naturally, the land was not improved by this, nor did it cease to suffer, unless someone of the wise, who understood the divine mind, perceived that the "exile" was the sunken statue. And so it was. For as soon as it was set up, the land immediately brought forth fruit, and they finally reveled for Demeter. How then are these not clear proofs of the divinely-favored nature of athletics, that it is honored by the gods? For the gods also showed their anger regarding the statue of a quinquertionist that had been insulted, and the Locrians suffered hunger because of this, just as the Thasians did, until your oracle healed them, which went as follows: ^D "Honoring the one who was dishonored, then you shall plow the earth." For the Locrians did not perceive the divine intention before, [cont. 398] ^D that it was not merely men they had to recall from exile, but that they were dealing with the statue. How clumsy: for why would the most savage gods care so much about men being recalled from exile as they do about statues being restored? Therefore, they did not benefit from better soil, nor did the trouble subside at any point, until someone more clever, conjecturing more sharply about the mind of the gods, declared that the sunken statue was to be understood by the name of "the exile." And in truth, as soon as it was restored to its place, the earth began to bloom immediately, and the Thasians grew prosperous and luxuriant from the fertility of their fields thereafter. Who, furthermore, would not take these as the most certain proofs of how justly and deservedly divine honors are owed to the divine power and industry of athletes? For the gods also flared up over another quinquertionist's statue being violated, and the Locrians labored no less under famine on account of this than the Thasians, until you relieved their calamity with this response: "Restore honor to the one injured; an ample crop shall follow the plow." For the divine counsel did not enter their minds before.

rather, you were the cause of this for them. They had cast Euthycles ^A the pentathlete 37 into prison, accusing him of having received gifts from the enemies of the fatherland; and not only this, but even when he was dead, they were insulting his likenesses, until the gods, not bearing what was happening, sent upon them the most severe famine; and they would have perished by famine, had not the help from you come, saying that they must honor men who have been brought to the manger [treated as beasts], whom the gods love no less than those whom the porridge-makers fatten as oxen. By means of whom ^B men sometimes persuade you by sacrificing; though perhaps not less, but rather much more, do fat men delight you than fat oxen, such that sometimes you are angered at a whole city and a whole nation on account of one or two men who have wronged these "flocks." Oh, how I wish, O prophet, that you had become a trainer for us instead of a prophet, or both a prophet and a trainer at once, so that there might be a Delphic gymnasium just as there is a Delphic oracle! For indeed it would not have been discordant for a Pythian gymnasium to exist alongside ^C the Pythian contest. But I shall opportunely subjoin these things to the foregoing, by which the same man convicts the gods—those of whom we are still speaking—of being accustomed to being flattered by tyrants. Thus, therefore, concerning Cypselus.

CHAPTER XXXV.

That the gods were accustomed to being flattered even by tyrants themselves.

*Happy is this man, who enters our dwelling,* *Cypselus, descendant of Aeacus, king of famous Corinth.*

"Therefore, the tyrants themselves too, and not only the plotters against tyrants, are 'happy and blessed' to you, ^D Cypselus, who indeed will bring many woes to Corinth, and that Melanippus 38, who brought many good things to the city of the Geloans 39. But how, if Cypselus is 'happy,' O wicked demon, is Phalaris not also 'happy,' being a man of the same character as Cypselus? So that it would be better for you to speak in this way:

*And Phalaris was happy, and Melanippus,* *Whom divine discord once made leaders.*

And indeed, I remember that I once heard from you a soft and loose oracle concerning Phalaris, in which you praised and honored the man because, having seized certain plotters against him, he did indeed scourge them 41, but then, admiring their endurance, he let them go. Loxias, that is, and father Zeus, decreed a reprieve from death for Phalaris, in return for their being kindly disposed to Chariton and Melanippus. But—well... and scarcely *Happy is Chariton, and Melanippus, who brought-forth* *The heralds of divine friendship to mortals.*

death, you have nevertheless described them admirably, while by this act you have proven that life is something exceptional.” To all these things let us add this last point.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

For cities everywhere offer sacrifices and hold festivals, not only to the heads of Bacchus made of wood, but also to those of stone, bronze, and gold. ^B Indeed, not only to the heads of Bacchus, but also to many other gods who are celebrated in the fables of Hesiod. For there are in truth thirty thousand lords of the human race upon the grain-giving earth—not immortal, but stone and wooden ones. If they looked upon the insolence and the good order of men, such nonsense would not have been raised up, so that the evil has now reached even to you, having progressed further even into Olympus, where, they say, there is the ever-secure seat of the gods. And yet, if it were secure, it would not have been accessible to nonsense, ^C nor would any of the Olympians have reached such a point of madness as to deify an olive log—one which the Methymneans pulled up, entangled in the meshes of their fishing net, and once, if you please, and twice, and many times more, the men cast their nets in the same place, and then carried it off into the Libyan sea, and did not throw it out on the land. For if they had done so, by Bacchus, it would no longer have clung to those same meshes. But for a log shaped into the likeness of a head at the top ^D (O Apollo, what a monstrous contrivance!), what on earth was it doing in the sea? Someone might wonder. For what else but remaining there? By Zeus, waiting until insane men (for I will not call them gods) might encounter it and—not deeming it a gift from Zeus, but from Poseidon—take it to their city as if it were some good fortune, though it was truly an evil thing, not fortune, but a bane. Or was it not enough for them that it was already destroying them from within, but they even added to it and increased it with god-struck madness, an appendage, so to speak, sent for from Delphi? Such things also Oenomaus. But after what has been said, turn again and apply your mind and thought to the philosophy of the oracles written by that slanderer of our affairs, and read some of those responses which he records that the Pythian god delivered concerning fate; and see if, as you are estranged from divine power, this whole argument concerning the long-disputed oracles might not also, in your estimation, be considered, even more than the previous ones, destitute of all divine virtue.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL — BOOK SIX

CONTENTS OF THE SIXTH BOOK

^A 1. That even the things which the demons appear to divine in their oracles from the motion of the stars they conjecture in the same way as human beings. 2. That they also destroy our free will, claiming that our choices are moved by the necessity of fate. 3. That they were unable to provide aid even to those who were consecrated to them and were struck by lightning. 4. That they say the decrees of fate can be undone by magical arts. 5. That they also lie when they divine. 6. A refutation of the discourse concerning fate. 7. How the philosophers refuted the opinions of the gods themselves concerning fate with sounder arguments, from Oenomaus. 8. Further on the same, from the writings of Diogenianus against Chrysippus. 9. Further on the same, from the writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias. 10. How the theory concerning fate is also refuted by mathematical science, from the writings of Bardesanes. 11. How it is also refuted by the explanation and testimony of the divine Scriptures, from the writings of Origen.

PROEMIUM TO THE WHOLE SUBJECT

Since the manner of the oracles has been sufficiently refuted by us in the preceding books, and the divine power of our Savior, which manifests itself through his evangelical doctrine, has been proven well enough to possess both worthiness towards God and fruitfulness for human life—for it is by his power alone, and no other, that the human race has been liberated from the phantasms of demons, ^B by which they had oppressed all of life throughout every age with darkness and pestilence—let us now, by examining those points which have falsely been established and sanctioned by them concerning fate, proceed directly and with certainty in our discussion of these matters. We do so that we may show not only the wickedness of the manner they maintained in their prophesying, but also, through the depravity and vanity of the things they decreed, how powerless and feeble those demons were, by whose movement and impulse the oracles were thought to be governed. ^C See then for yourself if this entire discussion about them strikes you as being devoid of all divine virtue, both from the arguments I shall present to refute their dogmas concerning fate, and from the very rite which they themselves are said to observe in their divinations. For they do not claim to have grasped the foreknowledge of future events by any superior power; rather, they guess at future events in the same way as men, from observing the motion of the stars. In this way, they are unable to do anything, neither to benefit, nor to accomplish anything at all, unless it is in accordance with fate.

And let that very author be ^A our witness and defender against these demons. For in the work he inscribed *On the Philosophy from Oracles*, he speaks word for word as follows:

Chapter I. That the things they seem to divine, they infer in the same way as men do, from the motion of the stars.

"But indeed," he says, "whatever the gods establish and announce, if ever they happen to declare things destined to occur by the force of fate, there is hardly any of the gods to whom truth is pleasing who does not openly admit that these same things are predicted by them from the motion and revolution of the stars." ^B Then he proceeds: "Apollo, when consulted as to what kind of offspring a woman would bring forth, said it would be a female; for he had understood this from the time of the sowing and conception, by the alignment and reasoning of the stars." Therefore, he sang in this manner:

"There springs from the earth, through which the thirsty meadows drink up all the moisture of their mother, ^C just at the time the belly is stirred. But it shall be a female, not a male fetus for him; for indeed the chaste Phoebe, observing Cypris, then drew near, whose [influence] urged a female offspring for you, my friend."

Behold, how, from the time of the sowing, because the moon was moving toward Venus, he said a female would be born. And furthermore, they predict diseases by the same method. Listen therefore:

"A malignant plague shall destroy him, deep in his breast, from which foul pains well up from the diseased lung," and what follows. He adds immediately: "This disease the fates create for you: their sure and immovable will remains ^D to consume [him] with livid decay; for a star now enters the baleful path of Saturn." And with some things omitted: "But Mars, hastening to meet the baleful star of Saturn, Mars, the plague of men, compels [him] to break off the vital light, and overturns the foundations of the shaken mind. For this reason the sacred mind of the divine parent had ordered you to withdraw your life from the hostile Mars."

From these [examples], you surely understand that they do not prophesy by any divine power of their own, but by the observation of the stars, executed according to the laws and precepts of the mathematicians.

^A And nor is there any work superior or of a more divine nature to be displayed. Observe how they even destroy that which is within our power, assigning to the revolution of the stars not only external things and those which are not within our power, but our very choices themselves.

CHAPTER II

That they also destroy that which is in our power, asserting that even our choices are moved by the necessity of fate.

Thus also Apollo, regarding someone, while at the same time explaining the eagerness for military service, whence it happened to him, said: "Mars stands by his birth, and stirs the rushing man; Nor shall he press the tomb; for certain is the will of Jove, That he should suddenly bear away the distinguished honor of Mars in arms." And again concerning another: "Saturn lay upon his thick hair, and drove the bloody goads Into the sad dawn of the unhappy boy." To such an extent do the noble gods stand in awe of fate, that they confess they are unable to defend even their own shrines when struck by lightning. What great hope, therefore, could remain for men praying to obtain help from those who are unable to bring aid even to themselves? For what end, then, should piety be practiced thereafter, and honor, veneration, and obedience be owed to gods who are, in and of themselves, unable to accomplish anything at all? But hear, then, what the oracle says.

CHAPTER III

That they were not even able to defend the temples consecrated to them from lightning.

"There are indeed," says Porphyry, "fates also for temples and shrines: nay, it was even in the fates that the temple of Apollo itself should be consumed by lightning." For he sang of this in the following manner:

Come hither, offspring of a divine parent, Erichthonius, You who await our voice requested at the threshold, After the summits of the radiant temple lie overturned, Receive the divine oracle from the caves chosen by the laurel. When the heavenly flame, while the air murmurs against it, Is shaken and mingles its threats and opposing battles; While, bereft of winds, a great cold stands in the world, And the ether, pressed, finds no free vents, The fiery torch strikes the humble earth with blind impulse; This the trembling cattle on the highest mountains dread, And they enter into deep pits, nor can they bear to behold With opposing gaze the spear of Jove driven from heaven. The temples of this god, and the oaks which rise with high crest, And the lofty, steep summits of the mountain, And ships in the middle of the sea perish with flaming wings. Even the wife of Neptune herself, struck by this, Often turns back her wandering steps, the resounding Amphitrite. You, therefore, though worn in your hearts with immense grief, Bear the immobile counsel of the Fates in your minds: To whose will the lofty neck of ethereal Jove has bowed;

^A And since the temples of the venerated gods, as well as their sacred shrines, are vanquished by the falling fires of the sky [B 1] — if they obey the spindles of the Fates — what hope then remains for wretched mortals of escaping their predestined lot? And if there is no help forthcoming from the gods, and it is entirely necessary to [B 2] bear the immobile fate of the Fates with an equable mind, why, one might ask, is this devotion toward the gods so futile? Why offer libations and incense, or why indeed render any honor to them, if they can help us in nothing? For one ought not even to consider them the givers of good things, but rather, as they themselves confessed, the cause of evil things as well. For if it is fated that something should happen to men, whether good or the contrary, it will come to pass by necessity, and it will be present whether the gods will it or not. Therefore, one must cultivate Necessity alone, and take little, or rather no, heed of the gods, who are capable of neither injuring nor benefiting us. But if, indeed, God, the moderator of all things, is superior to the Fates, and He alone holds supreme command over them: For to them, he says, the lofty neck of Jove has bowed, ^C that whatever he spins under his thumb may remain fixed and immovable. Why, then, do you not set aside everything else and acknowledge the King of all, the only God, to be the master of destiny, the sole giver of good things, and the Savior? Since it is easy for Him alone to turn aside and change the immovable counsel of the Fates, which you speak of; so that he who is dedicated to the King of all, God, and worships Him only, may be bound neither by necessity nor by fate, but, as one free and released from every chain, may follow unimpeded after the divine and salvific arrangements. But while the true doctrine reveals such things, look with me at the arts through which the same philosopher claims the force of fate may be loosed.

CHAPTER IV.

^A From which it is clearly demonstrated that the magic art, which is concerned with dissolving the necessity of fate, was given by the gods to humankind as a divine gift, so that they might in some way circumvent it. These are Porphyry's words to you, not mine. But if the author who encouraged a man to use magic arts to dissolve the force and law of fate were himself God, why could he not have prevented his own temple from burning down by a stroke of fate's lightning? Indeed, as for the one who urges men not to follow philosophy but the study of magic, how could his character remain obscure? And what of the fact that he admits in these words that the gods themselves lie?

CAPUT V.

That the seers also lie.

^B "But since," he says, "an accurate and precise knowledge of the motion of the stars, and consequently of the future dependent upon them, is not attainable by men, nor even by most of the demons, it happens that they often lie when consulted on many matters." Soon he adds: "They say that the surrounding atmosphere is the cause why false oracles are uttered, and that the gods who are present do not weave in falsehoods of their own accord. Often, therefore, they announce beforehand that they will speak falsely. Yet these others persist, and in their folly they compel them to respond against their will. Indeed, Apollo himself, when the situation was such, at a time of stormy weather, chanted in this manner:

'Force me no further with your prayers; for I shall utter falsehoods.'

And that nothing is fabricated by us, the oracles themselves will provide proof. For thus one of those called gods responded:

'Today it is not permitted to speak the path of the stars, nor to tell of their station; for the power of prophecy is now constrained in the stars.'

He concludes then: 'He shows, of course, the source from which falsehood often arises.'"

CAPUT VI.

By what arguments the whole theory of fate is refuted.

^C I trust you understand, clearly and beyond any doubt, how empty of all divinity the oracles of the gods have been. For how could it be that a divine being, which by its very nature is separated from all vanity—if such a divine being exists—should ever lie? Or how could a good spirit lead those by whom it is consulted into deception through lies? Furthermore, who would judge that which is bound by the motion of the stars to be anything greater than man? For a man, even though mortal, if he has dedicated himself to the pursuit of virtue, can never be induced by any force to lie, because he has determined that truth is to be valued above all conditions: nor would he cloak his own vanity ^D with the necessity of fate or the motion of the stars; but even if you were to apply fire or iron to his body, he would exclaim with a free and constant voice:

"Let the fire come, let the sword come: cut, Burn the body; satisfy the thirst [that burns] with blood,"

in order to force a truthful tongue; he will stand against it,

^A

Restrain the stars to the earth first Let the earth invade the quarter of the stars, Before any lying voice escapes our mouth to you.

But that deceiver of the nations and artificer of frauds, the demon, has cunningly devised this, that he might more easily impose upon senseless men; and where matters result otherwise than foretold by him, he might immediately provide a refuge and retreat for himself in fate. But now, when he suspends all things by his oracles upon the necessity of fate, and destroys even that which is done by the movement and power of our own free choice, and enslaves this also to necessity, see into what abyss of doctrines he has cast those who obey him. For if not only external things, but even the impulses according to reason must be attributed to the stars and fate, and some inexorable necessity forces human judgment, philosophy will be gone for you, ^B piety also will be gone; nor would there be any praise of virtue for the studious, nor any love of God, nor any reward worthy of the efforts in asceticism, when necessity and fate have undertaken the cause of all things. It is therefore not fitting to reproach those who err in their life, nor yet the impious and most detestable; but neither [is it fitting] to admire the studious. By this, as I said, the great glory of philosophy is destroyed, since it depends not on voluntary practice and exercise, but on the necessity of the stars.

Consider therefore into what abyss [(51)] of doctrines the wonderful gods have cast [men], and see how this doctrine—which brings about an overturning of the whole life at once—urges and incites men to wantonness and injustice, and countless other evils. For if anyone were to believe immediately in the wonderful oracles of the gods, that speaking the truth and lying were not our own work, but that of inexorable fate, and the will to set out for war, or to set out for something else that must be done, and the will not to do such things: how would he not wish to be careless and slothful in all things that cannot be accomplished without labors and toils and our own eagerness? For if he thinks that this or that will come to pass from fate, whether we ourselves toil about it and are diligent, or whether we do not, how would one not wish to choose what is easier, casting aside himself and being careless, as if what is to be done will happen from fate and necessity? ^C Hence one may also hear the many saying, "This will happen, if it is fated for me; and why must I give myself troubles?" For if he who rushes to war was not doing this from his own voluntary choice, but being driven by an external necessity, clearly also [in the case of] robbery [(54)] and grave-robbing, and other such impious deeds and intemperance, or orderly and sober practices—for this would follow from the argument regarding fate. How then will he who thinks that these things do not originate from himself, but from external necessity, ever pay attention to one who admonishes him and teaches him not to surrender himself to [those things], being one who cares for us?

^A For he might say to the one admonishing him, as it has been said to some before our time: "Why, O man, do you admonish me? For these things [presumably referring to the preceding context] are surely not in my power, to change my resolve, for fate has already taken hold of it." Why then must I be set to tasks that I shall not even have the inclination to perform, unless this too has been fated for me? Yet I shall be inclined, if it is fated, and without your teaching, led by fate. Why then do you trouble yourself in vain? But if you say that even the act of admonishing and teaching is accomplished by necessity, [intended] to admonish and persuade me of such things, then in this, too, what effort is required? For admonition is idle and useless. For if it is fated for me, I shall labor; but if it is not fated, it will turn out that the effort is in vain for both of us. ^B And how, rather, abandoning himself to indolence, would he not say to himself, the one who holds this opinion: "Come, let me not labor at all, nor trouble myself in vain; for what is fated will come to pass by necessity." And as for the one who is zealous about something, or teaching, or exhorting himself or another—both [the act of] being persuaded and not being persuaded, and committing sin or not, and rebuking those who sin and praising those who succeed—how is it not openly manifest that he is doing nothing more than abandoning the work of our own free will, while attaching to it merely the name of fate? Just as if someone were to call the nature of good, by whose presence the living being is governed in the best way, by the name of evil. For since we clearly perceive for ourselves that we are not being forced by any other cause when educating our children, or whipping servants who sin, or wanting—or not wanting—a certain thing, but that we arrive at such impulses of our own accord out of our own power, the one who says these things happen according to fate would be straying, in addition to loosening ^C our own zeal and the exhortations and admonitions made to others, from which we see especially that human affairs are brought to a successful conclusion. Furthermore, this argument would overturn the laws which are established for the sake of human benefit. For why should one command or forbid those who are held fast by another necessity? Nor would it be necessary to punish those who sin, not having sinned through the same cause, nor to bestow honors upon those who do the finest things, of which each has provided a great cause for the restraint of injustice and readiness for good deeds. But this opinion would also overturn piety toward the Divine, if God, and indeed the oracles themselves, contribute nothing to us whether we pray or are pious, being bound by the necessities of fate. And to say that we move like inanimate objects, being pulled by strings by some power from the outside, here and there, ^D is to find yourself in a position of necessity.

^A which surely would be most brazen and most shameless? Since we clearly perceive in our own selves that we strive for certain things by our own impulse and motion, and again, that we take hold of ourselves, and by reason of this we succeed or fail, and are not forced by any other; but some things we choose with our own free will, while others we eschew and reject of our own choice. So manifest then was the notion of self-determination, that just as we perceive through activity—not through syllogism—that we are in pain, that we are eating, that we see this thing or hear that thing, so ^B we are aware of ourselves moving from our own selves and our own will, choosing some things and turning away from others; so that from every point of view, freedom and self-determination are justly acknowledged to be in our rational and intelligent nature. But if, even beyond our choice, countless things happen to us that disturb most people, we must divide the nature of the things in which we exist, and consider the reason according to which these things that are not in our power take place. For in this way, the cause of these will not be taken by anyone as irrational fate, but as another reason, dependent on the providence that governs all things. Come then, let us carefully examine the problem.

Everything is stated by the decrees of true piety ^C to be and to be governed by the providence of God; yet, specifically, each of the things that happen occurs—some by habit, others by nature, others by impulse and imagination, others by reason and our own judgment and choice; and some things happen according to a primary reason, while others occur as consequences of those that have happened previously—the Creator of all having distributed to each kind of existing thing a peculiar and distinct constitution of nature, whereby He has fashioned the varied and manifold decoration of the universe. It would be difficult for one to set forth the reason for all things by way of a general discourse, but the account concerning self-determination may be learned in this way ^D. Since man is not a unique entity, nor does he consist of one nature, but has received a union of two opposites, body and soul—the one, in accordance with the incidentally perceived...

^A nature, the other of an intellectual substance standing upon its primary principle; the one irrational, the other rational; the one again corruptible, the other incorruptible; and the one mortal, the other immortal. Thus it is that we bear in our body a kinship with irrational beasts, while our soul is akin to the rational and immortal nature. In this way, it is fitting that this dual shoot, having partaken of a twofold nature, should direct its life in a twofold and different manner, at times serving the nature of the body, and at times embracing its own proper freedom in the divine portion, so that the same person is both slave and free, having received from God—for reasons that He alone knows—such a commingling of soul and body.

If, therefore, anyone, using the name “fate,” should relegate the natural states of the body or the soul to the cause of necessity, he would miss the mark of its proper designation. For if there were such a thing as a force of fate that could not be thwarted, yet many things pertaining to the body and soul according to nature are hindered, and countless other things occur from without, contrary to nature, following upon both soul and body by way of coincidence, how could fate and nature be the same thing? For if they say that fate is unchangeable and that nothing can happen apart from it (since it is an inescapable necessity), but many things, as I said, happen ^B to both soul and body contrary to nature, then one would not be speaking correctly to call fate and nature the same.

What occurs in us may therefore be divided: some things happen according to our own reason and free choice, such as those things belonging to the nature of the soul; others according to the nature of the body; and others incident to these—I mean to soul and body—but accomplished according to the nature of other things. Yet one would not justly deprive God of being the cause, neither of that which is in our own power, nor of that which is according to nature, nor of that which is according to coincidence. For He Himself, the Maker of all things, is celebrated as the Creator of the things in our power, those according to nature, and those according to coincidence. For, in general, one must hear the divine Scripture concerning all things, which declares: *He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created* (Ps. XXXII, 9).

If, therefore, when we desire certain things, others happen contrary to our will, we must remind ourselves that this is that very twofold and heterogeneous nature of our union—I mean that of soul and body; by reason of which the essence of the soul, being intellectual and rational by nature, ^C when joined to a body that is by nature infantile, partakes itself of a realm of irrationality contrary to nature; and the mind, which is the property of wisdom, often acts foolishly through a certain coincidence, being turned aside by, for example, overwhelming illnesses of the body. Often, too, old age, coming upon the body according to nature, deprives the intellect of the accomplishments of its prime, dulling the rational capacity of the intellectual soul contrary to nature. Furthermore, injuries and pains of the body, and mutilations occurring contrary to nature, ^D have overcome the self-determination of the soul contrary to the coincidence, the soul yielding to the pains on account of its union with the body; just as

^A a nature might be reckoned among the number of those lacking reason: and the mind, whose own proper prudence it is that often wanders in some chance disaster, while graver diseases of the body move it from its seat. Old age itself also, after it has invaded the body in the order of nature, is accustomed to rob the mind of those faculties of skill and strength by which it stood forth in its prime, while it was yet flourishing through an entire age; and to blunt the edge of reason, which belongs entirely to the spiritual soul, contrary to nature. Furthermore, the strokes and pains of the body, and the debilitations of the members which befall it contrary to nature, by the very chance of the event for the most part storm the liberty of the soul, while it, overcome by the company of the body, yields also to troubles and pains: so that it is held as certain and demonstrated that that free faculty of the mind is hindered and kept bound by a certain chain, as it were, which cannot be avoided, partly by the nature of the body, and partly by those things which happen from without. Although the virtue and strength of our own faculty of choice is truly often such that, in most things, it dares to oppose and strive against both the nature of the body and the mishaps occurring from elsewhere. ^B For indeed the nature of the body draws a man toward the appetite for sexual matters; but the soul, having followed the guidance and counsel of temperance, once the bridle has been cast upon desire, breaks the nature and impulse of the body. By the same token, while hunger, thirst, cold, or other inconveniences of that kind urge and press it, the body rouses the man to seek out remedies convenient to nature and to satisfy his belly. The will, on the other hand, brought to more severe reasonings and to certain religious exhortations assumed of its own accord, overcomes that native desire of the body with the abstinence and endurance of many days, moved thereto by the power of reasoning and by its own instinct and counsel. Similarly, the body of its own nature takes delight in every kind of pleasure, and in the light and soft agitation of bodies. But the will, impelled by the study of virtue, snatches at a difficult and harsh manner of life. Now indeed there arise also at some time some who, having slipped into a worse and baser state, exchange the natural use for that which nature abhors, males indulging in most foul lust with males. Thus ^C reason does not always yield to nature, but in most things conquers it, and sometimes is itself conquered, and is now drawing, and now in turn being drawn: so much so that if at any time it should deem life to be pernicious, men themselves sometimes attempt to free themselves from the shackles of the body with their own hands before the time. Although, if it were only necessary for it to struggle with the proper nature of the body, that contest would certainly be a moderate one. But now, since God has linked the ratios of human life with many other things, as with wild beasts and venomous serpents, ^D and has caused it to make its abode among the differing and varied natures in all these things, it is reasonable that its battle and resistance are not only against the proper and conjoined autonomous nature of the body, but also against the myriad things that have befallen it from without, in the midst of which he who conducts a mortal life lives, so that he might stoutly withstand even these. For indeed there are many natures of such foods, and such mixtures of the surrounding air, and onsets of frost, and kindlings of flames, and very many other things which, though they move naturally according to certain proper reasons, befall us contingently; they have caused no small disturbance to the self-determination that is in us by reason of our entanglement with the body; since the nature of our bodies does not endure the onsets of things from without, but is mastered and conquered by those things which are accomplished from without according to their own nature. And again, furthermore, since we make our abode with the greatest number of men—and these, too, obtained the same substance as we—that which is in us of our own power is to be demonstrated on its own account, and to be chosen by reason, when it is reproved by necessity.

^A They are distanced from their own authority, and by using an independent choice, they themselves reasonably submit to the opinions of others, when that same free will of ours, in relation to the body or the soul, is exercised in such a way. For just as the nature of our body is often overcome by the things that fall upon it from without, so it is sometimes the case that the choice, being troubled by myriad external impulses and persuaded by an independent disposition, yields itself to these external things; and at one time it becomes better, at another time worse. For it knows how to be corrupted by bad company, just as, conversely, it knows how to be made better by the company of the good. "Evil communications corrupt good manners" (63); just as, on the other hand, the company of good men saves and improves. And while the rational power of the soul is thus affected by external occurrences, yet again the virtue proper to its rational essence exerts its strength and manifests a truly divine and godlike power, when it withstands all external things and, overcoming all things with a free mind, without yielding any part of its own virtue, prepares itself to philosophize. ^B Indeed, in whatever it disregards, it is shaped for the worse by the worse, just as it is improved when it obtains the discipline that comes from within. What is the need to say, in addition to these things, that even the movements and failures of such souls and bodies, being fulfilled in accordance with a certain happening congruous to the administration of the universe, and being well and rightly disposed toward the whole, have produced a great abundance of movement of every kind, and indeed also of that which is in our own power, for the individual parts? But over all things that exist, both those that happen in our sphere—and beyond our causation—and those that come upon us from without as by accident, and those that are naturally motivated, there presides the one all-powerful and omnipotent providence of God, which travels through all things and manages the whole with gentle control, through ineffable reasons often arranging the many things that are according to nature for the appropriate times, and acting as a fellow-worker with those things that are in our own power, and assigning to those things that happen from without their due order. ^C Since these are divided into three types—those in our power, those that happen according to nature, and those that occur by accident—and since all are gathered together into one reason which is the will of God, the argument concerning fate will find no place. But that source of wickedness which is a problem to the many might be found by us, having no place in any of the things that are according to nature—neither in bodies nor in spiritual essences—and, it goes without saying (65), least of all in those things that happen from without by accident; it would be found only in the self-determining movement of the soul, and in this, not when it walks the straight path according to nature, but when, having departed from the royal way, it turns by its own disposition to that which is against nature. ^D

^C Established as its own mistress, when it has received this preeminent gift from God, it becomes free and self-governing, having appointed the judgment of its own impulse unto itself. But the divine law, joined to it by nature, like a torch and a lamp, calls out from within, sounding in its ears and saying: "You shall walk in the royal way; you shall not turn aside to the right, nor to the left," teaching that the royal way is the path according to right reason. For the Creator of all things established this natural law for every soul as a helper and ally in its duties: by the law, pointing out to it the straight path, and by the freedom of self-governance granted to it, showing the choice of better things to be worthy of praise and acceptance—as well as the rewards, both honorary and greater, for those achieved—because it performed them not by compulsion, but by its own self-governing will, having the power to choose the opposite. Just as, conversely, the one that chooses the worst is worthy of blame and punishment, inasmuch as, by its own movement, it has neglected the law according to nature, has given birth to the beginning and source of evil, and has used itself badly, no longer by any necessity from without, but from free will and judgment.

Therefore, God is blameless for the one who chooses evil. For God did not fashion an evil nature, nor the substance of the soul. For it is not fitting for the Good to create anything except good things. And everything that is according to nature is good; and for every rational soul, the self-governing good is present according to nature, and this was created for the choice of good things. But when it acts badly, one must not blame nature; for it is not according to nature, but against nature that evil comes to be for it, being a work of ^D choice, and not of nature. For since the power for the choice of the good was present, the fact that it did not choose this, but willingly turned away from the better, being changed into the worse—what place of escape would be left for him who has become the author of his own disease, having neglected the innate law, which is, as it were, a savior and a physician?

He who makes no account of all these things, and hangs everything upon necessity and the course of the stars, and claims that the absurdity of the transgressions committed by men does not have its causes from us, but from the power that moves all things—how would he not be introducing an unholy and impious thought? For whether he should assert that the course of the universe is automatic and without providence, he would be convicted as an atheist from the start, in addition to being blind to the all-wise harmony and the arrangement of the whole, well and orderly revolving through the ages; or if he should agree that the providence of God leads and carries all things, and presides over all, and administers them with all-wise reason, not even so does he escape the impiety of the absurdity; since he absolves those who transgress among men from their offenses, as though they had done none of these absurd things by their own will, and traces the cause of evils to the general providence, calling it necessity and fate, and saying that it is the cause of all the indecency, unspeakable deeds, cruelty, and murder that occur among men.

^A What other impiety could be greater than this, for one to introduce the God who is the maker and creator of this whole universe, and force Him—the one who does not wish to act impiously—to do this, and to be godless by necessity, and to be a blasphemer against Himself? And this other one, whom He Himself established by nature as male, to suffer things against nature, against the female sex, not by choice, but forced by Him? And another one to become a murderer, not according to his own will, but driven by the necessity of God? ^B So that not even justly can those who commit these sins be blamed; but rather one must consider these things not to be sins at all, or else declare God to be the producer of all evils. For whether He Himself, being present to all things, and seeing all things, and hearing all things, forces these things to occur, or whether He himself established the motion of the universe and the movement of the stars—the one who set up such an instrument and devised the trap for those caught—He would be the very cause of those caught. Whether then He Himself by Himself, or again by some other necessity devised by Him, casts those who do not wish it into these evils, He Himself would be—and no other—the producer of all evils; and not even with justice would a man be called sinful, but rather the God who is his maker. And what other doctrine could there be more impious than this? ^C For the one who introduces fate directly pushes out God and the providence of God; just as he who sets God over all things would do away with the doctrine concerning fate. For either God and fate would be the same thing, or the one would be distinct from the other. Now that they are the same thing, it could in no way come to pass. For if one introduces fate as a certain chain of causes, ^D and... [original-script column: see facsimile] ...He who introduces fate directly pushes out God and the providence of God; just as he who sets God over all things would do away with the doctrine concerning fate. For either God and fate would be the same thing, or the one would be distinct from the other. Now that they are the same thing, it could in no way come to pass. For if one introduces fate as a certain chain of causes,

^A a sequence dependent fixedly and immutably upon the rotation of the heavenly stars from the beginning of time, how would the material elements, from which even the heavenly bodies are composed, not be prior to fate—elements of which one might reasonably call fate a certain accessory accident? And how could that which is an accident of the elements be the same as God, who is over all? For if the elements are considered according to their own nature as inanimate and irrational, while God is beyond bodies, being life itself and wisdom, dispensing the enjoyment of his creation both to the elements in part and to the ordering of the whole—then God and fate are not the same. But if indeed they are different, which is the better? But nothing is more beautiful than God, nor anything more powerful. Therefore, he will prevail and overcome that which is inferior. Or, if he were to yield to fate, which is the architect of evils, he himself would bear the entire blame, for although he was able to restrain the evil-doing necessity, he did not do so, but left it unhindered to the ruin and destruction of all things; or rather, he himself would have brought this about, if indeed he were introduced as the maker and creator of all things, and of fate itself as well. But if he has no concern for the ordering of the universe, then the voice of the godless would arise again, to which one must stop one’s ears, since divine providence ^B and power clearly manifest themselves both from the all-wise and artful works of the whole, and from those things within us that unequivocally demonstrate the free and self-determining power of the rational soul. In accordance with this power, even though myriad obstacles from without—whether from the nature of the body or from impulses directed toward us by choice—fall upon it as a matter of accident, the soul’s free will nevertheless holds out against all of them, showing that the choice of good things, which is in our own power, is invincible and unconquerable.

This, moreover, the present time of our Savior’s evangelical teaching has demonstrated by its very works. For, so that you might not think these are mere clatter and empty words, it is possible for you to look upon the struggle of the God-fearing and to grasp those who, by their own free choice, have undertaken the labors of the prizes for piety—which, throughout the whole inhabited world, myriad multitudes of Greeks and barbarians have embraced. They willingly endured all the tortures against the body, went through every kind of torment with a cheerful countenance, and in the end, in various forms, gladly accepted the release of the soul from the body.

And indeed, no argument here would allow one to blame fate. For where, from long ages past, has the rotation of the stars ever brought forth such athletes of piety? Or when, before the teaching of our Savior was cast among all men, has such a struggle been set forth throughout the entire inhabited world of men? And where in all time has the whole age [of human history] brought forth for all men, Greeks and barbarians alike, a school of such words, destructive of superstitious error and instructive of the knowledge of the one God over all? And which of the ancient, long-famed sages, barbarian or Greek, was ever deemed worthy of such a fate, so as to make the word set forth by him manifest to the whole world, ^C making known— ^D

^A—to those who have devoted themselves to Him, the glory of God? If these things did not exist from eternity, nor have they come to pass, nor been heard by the ears of men, then there was no concatenation of causes, nor was necessity the cause of them. For long ago, through the same revolution and turning of the stars, there would have been no reason why others should not have attained the same birth and fate. And by what fate, pray, has our Saviour God, appearing throughout the whole world, been proclaimed, while the gods long held in honor among both Greeks and barbarians have been overthrown? And have they been overthrown in any other way than through the teaching of the new God? What fate of theirs could have announced to all men that God is the Creator of all things, while at the same time compelling one to say that fate does not exist? And how could fate have forced itself to be said and to think that it does not exist? What of those who, for the sake of the godly teaching of our Saviour, ^B have long ago endured all kinds of struggles, and who even to this day continue to struggle? Have they all attained one and the same lot, so as to be enslaved to one word and teaching, to have shown one mind and purpose, and one virtue of soul, to have embraced one and the same life, and to have loved the same word, and to have lovingly endured all things for the sake of steadfastness in piety? And what sound reason could admit this: that young men and old men together, every age, the races of both males and females, the natures of barbarian men, both home-bred and free, both the learned and those unskilled in learning—not in some corner of the earth, nor born under these particular stars, but throughout the whole world of men—should be compelled by the necessity of fate to prefer this one doctrine above all their ancestral traditions, and to choose death for the sake of piety toward one God over all, and to be instructed in the most correct dogmas concerning the immortality of the soul, and to profess a philosophy shown by deeds rather than shadowed in words? ^C For these things would be clear even to a blind man, since they are not subject to any necessity, but are the proper result of learning and teaching, and are manifest examples of voluntary resolve and free choice. Many other things could provide evidence for this problem; omitting most of which, I shall be content with what has been said. What remains, it pleases me to leave to you, as being your own, for you and those wise philosophers of yours to read and contemplate, so that you may understand how much a man—not only in wisdom but also in integrity—excelled your god-singing oracles; for he, while exposing those remarkable prophecies as falsehood and vanity, also upbraided the Pythian himself for the things he uttered concerning fate. ^D Hear then again the work of the one who named the movement of the impostors [sorcerers] for what it is, and see how, with a very youthful spirit, he corrects the error of the many, and indeed of Apollo himself, through that which he writes, exactly as follows:

CHAPTER VII. How the philosophers of the Greeks themselves refuted the opinions of their own gods concerning fate with more sound arguments, from the writings of Oenomaus.

^A “You are, therefore, compelled to sit at Delphi; nor, even if you wished, could you keep silent.” But Apollo, the son of Zeus, now wills this, not because he actually wills it, but because he is bound by necessity to will it. It seems to me, having passed over all else—since I have, I know not how, fallen into this discourse—that I ought to examine a matter both proper to this place and worthy of inquiry. For that power of our life, which we might call a rudder, or a foundation, or a base—that power which we deemed to be the master of our most necessary actions—has perished from human life, at least according to the wise. For Democritus ^B (68), if I am not mistaken, and Chrysippus—the one conceiving of it as a slave, the other as a half-slave—have sought to demonstrate the most excellent of human things. But as much as can be said by a man to men on these matters has been said. If, however, the divine now also wars against us—alas! what shall we suffer? But it is not probable, nor even right, for us to judge from these things at least:

“Hateful to neighbors, but dear to the immortal gods, Keeping your spear within, remain protected.”

^C Why, says the Argive, if I should wish it, is it permitted to me, and am I able, if I so decide, to sit and be protected? You would say, “It is permitted, and you are able; or else how could I have commanded this of you?”

(68) *Democritus, etc.* Here pertain the words of Tullius, in his *De Fato*: “Democritus, says he, the author of atoms, preferred to accept that all things happen by necessity, rather than to remove natural motions from individual bodies.” The same author, with more intervening, speaks thus of both: “And it seems to me,” he says, “when there were two opinions among the ancients: one of those who thought that all things happened by fate, in such a way that fate brought with it the force of necessity—in which opinion were Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle—the other of those to whom it seemed that there were voluntary motions of minds without any fate, that Chrysippus, as an honorary arbiter, wished to take a middle course. But he applies himself rather to those who wished for the motions of minds to be liberated from necessity. But while he uses his own words, he falls into such difficulties that he confirms the necessity of fate against his will.” In this passage of Cicero, learned men, following Victorius in his *Variae* 17, prefer to read *medium ferire* [to strike the middle] rather than *medium se ferre* [to present oneself as a middle], as Plato had said. But I fear that the Latin language itself would hardly bear such a way of speaking, let alone the oration of a most eloquent man. To "cut a path" pleased the poets, even Virgil. But to "strike the middle" in this sense—what orator, what poet has said it? To Cicero, indeed, "to hold the middle" is most familiar. ^D And it is "to hold the middle." In which, however, if anything were to be changed, I would substitute "to sit" rather than "to strike." For "to sit" belongs to the will.

(69) *Hateful to neighbors.* Herodotus I, 67, adds a third line to this oracle: “And cover your head; the body will save itself.” Xerxes was threatening Greece; the Argives were suffering from the hostile Lacedaemonians; they consult the Delphic oracle as to what ought to be done; the oracle orders them to remain quiet. "Hateful... to the neighbors," that is, to the Lacedaemonians, who a little before had killed six thousand of the Argives.

(70) *Keeping your spear within.* The interpreter of Herodotus, having an internal protection. I preferred "keeping your spear within," as Camerarius also understood it, awaiting both the attacking enemy, if it should happen, as one would a wild beast, with spear pressed and intent, in the manner of a hunter. For "protected" I suppose is not unlike "in a state of vigilance." Valla follows: "remain safe." It is of vigilance and solicitude, not of impunity. Because in the last line he warns to cover the head, he understands Argos, I believe, as the primary city and metropolis.

The Oracle of Apollo concerning the colony of Thasos

^A "Offspring of great Chiron, Caristus, Leave the Pelian mountain, and reach the height of Euboea, There it is fated for you to build a sacred land. But go, do not delay."

Are you speaking seriously? Is anything, Apollo, truly in the power of a man? Is it permitted for me to wish to leave Pelion at my own discretion? And yet, I have heard from many wise men that if it were my fate to come to the promontory of Euboea and to raise a sacred dwelling there, I would certainly come and raise it, whether you spoke or not, and whether I wished it or not. But if it is necessary for me also to wish for what necessity extorts from me, even if I am unwilling—why then, Apollo, you are the more worthy to be trusted. I am likely, therefore, to heed you more.

^B "Go, Telesicles, and advise the Parians, by my divine power, That you are commanded to build a city famous for its beauty on the island of Aeria."

I shall announce it, by Zeus (some arrogant person, or perhaps one refuting you, might say), even if you do not command it; for it is fated. Now, the island of Aeria is Thasos; and the Parians will arrive there, since Archilochus, my son, has declared that this island was formerly called Aeria. You, therefore, being harsh and severe in your vengeance, would never, I suppose, tolerate a man so ungrateful and bold—a man who, had you not deigned to admonish him regarding the matter, would never have made the announcement himself, nor would Archilochus, his son, have led the colony of the Parians thither, nor would the Parians have inhabited Thasos. I do not know, then, if you say these things, but do not understand what you say.

^C But since we seem to have leisure, and to discuss at length—and the discourse is not trivial—tell me this (perhaps a few words from many may suffice): Are I and you something? You would say that we are. But how do we know this? Or by what argument have we persuaded ourselves that we know it? Do you not admit that this is established by nothing so much as by our own sense and perception? And how have we discovered that we are living creatures? And how is it that among living creatures, as I would say, there are men; and among men, one is a juggler and the other a refuter of jugglers—but as you might put it, one is a man and the other a god, and one a prophet and the other a sycophant? And let it be so for you, if I am defeated.

^D But by what reasoning do we know that we are having this discussion at the present moment? What do you say? Have we not correctly judged our own perception by the thing that is most proximate to us of all? Clearly. For there was nothing else higher than it, nor older, nor more trustworthy. For if it were not so, let no one hereafter come to Delphi to you, by the name of Alcmaeon, having killed his mother and being driven from his home, and desiring to return home—it [is not possible].

^A know, neither if he is anything at all, nor if he is driven from some place, nor if he desires his home. But if Alcmaeon is mad and suspects things that do not exist, the Pythian is not mad; do not say either:

"You urge a return to your ancestral land, Towards Arcadia."

For you do not even know how, if someone asks you about Arcadia, whether you are the one being asked, and having the ability to speak about the things one asks. Nor let Chrysippus, ^B who introduces half-servitude, whatever in the world this itself is, come to the Stoa, nor let him think that those dullards are coming to hear "Outis" [Noman] himself; nor let him keep contending about nothing, standing firm against Arcesilaus—if he were present—and against Epicurus, who is not present; for what Arcesilaus is, or what Epicurus is, or what the Stoa is, or who the young men are, or who "Outis" is, he neither knows nor is he able to know; for much sooner, he does not even know if he himself is anything. But neither you nor Democritus would endure it if someone were to say these things; for you would say there is no more trustworthy measure than what I say; and if other things seem to exist, they might be equated to this; or if they could be equated, they could certainly not surpass it. Now then, someone might say, Democritus, and you O Chrysippus, and you O prophet, since you are indignant if someone should wish to take away your own perception—for there are no longer those many books—come, let us also be indignant. Why indeed? Where it seems good to you, this shall be both most trustworthy and most ancient; but where it does not seem so, ^C an unknown fate or destiny shall hold sway, having a difference for each one of you—to one, from God; to another, from those tiny bodies of his that are carried downward and leap upward, and entwine themselves, and dissolve, and stand apart, and are placed side by side by necessity. For see, in the same way we grasp ourselves, we also grasp those things within us that are voluntary and those that are forced. And it has not escaped us how great the interval is between walking and being led, nor between choosing and being forced. But for what reason did I bring these things into the argument? Because it has escaped you, O prophet, the things of which we are masters, and though you know all things, you would not know these things, the moorings of which are tied to our own will. But this seemed to be the beginning of not a few matters. But if the beginning, which was the cause of the things that follow after it, has escaped, how could this man know the things after the beginning? Shameless, clearly, is the one who prophesies to Laius that his son will kill him. For the son was presumably about to be master of his own will; and neither any Apollo nor anyone superior to him is capable of reaching [it], nor by any power, for which there is neither origin nor necessity of generation. ^D

^A That thing, indeed, is the most ridiculous of all, the mixture, and the gathering, and that there is something [fixed] for men, and that there is nonetheless a chain of events. For it resembles, as the wiser say, the utterance of Euripides. For they say that Laius wished to beget [a child] and that Laius was master of this, and by this [act] he avoided the Apollonian vision; but to him who had begotten, there followed an unavoidable necessity to perish by the one who had been begotten by him. Thus, then, [the prophet] provided, for what was to happen, the necessity of the foreknowledge of the future event. And yet, the one begotten was also, I suppose, master of his own will, just as the one who begat him was; and just as that one was master of begetting or not, so this one [was master] of killing or not. Such are all your divinations; and the Euripidean Apollo 76 was exactly what he said: "that thing."

^B "And your whole house shall go through blood." How will there be the self-inflicted blinding of the one who was begotten, upon the marriage with his mother, and the tyranny which he received upon the solving of the enigma; and the fratricidal slaughters of his children—resulting from the one’s exile from the throne, and the other’s greed and marriage of the exile in Argos, and the ridiculous military expedition of the seven generals, and the battle? Where, as these were divided into many commands and powers, how could it be possible for you to know, or for the chain of events to connect them? For if, again 77, Oedipus had not wished to be a tyrant, or having wished and done this, he had not chosen to marry Jocasta; or having married her, he had not been blinded, nor been discouraged and resentful, how would the individual things have been done? And how would he have laid hands upon his eyes? And how would he have cursed his children with the curse of Euripides and your own? And what manner of things would have followed thereafter, with no prior causes occurring? Or what could you have said about the things about to happen? And again, if the children had reigned at the same time, or if they had remained, agreeing to rule in turns, according to the agreement; or if the one who had been driven out had known [not to return]—since there are many things, of which he [man] is in one instance the master...

^A or plucked out his own eyes, or himself imprecated those curses of Euripides and your own upon his children? Finally, where the preceding causes were absent, how could the rest have possibly come to pass? What would you yourselves have had to pronounce concerning the future? Furthermore, if it had pleased the children of Oedipus either to reign with united hearts or, having entered into a mutual compact of succession, to abide by it; or if the one who was driven out had decided not to move to Argos, but rather to Libya or among the Perrhaebians; or if, having come to Argos, he had decided to work as a salt-fish merchant, and thus to take to wife not some wealthy and opulent woman, but some poor, wretched creature, and to earn his living by the labor of his hands; or if Adrastus had denied him his daughter; or if he had indeed given her, but the other had cast off his longing for his country, or—stirred though he were—had overcome himself and his own spirit; or if Adrastus had either repelled him when he implored for aid, or neither Amphiaraus nor Tydeus nor any other of the leaders had wished to join himself to Adrastus as a companion and ally; or if, having obtained their alliance and returned to his country, he had not joined battle with his brother, but rather had come to an agreement with him for a partnership in the kingdom, or had voluntarily yielded to him even when he resisted, in obedience to Euripides, who warns in this manner:

^B "You come, a madman, to destroy your fatherland";

or if not he, but rather his brother had abdicated the kingdom, cast under the spell of those other sophistical tricks of the same poet:

^C "If sun and night serve men, Can you, then, not endure to have an equal in your house?"

How then would both of them have joined battle, and how would the entire house of Laius have perished, overwhelmed in blood? Yet you say these things have all actually occurred. Granted. But I ask now, by what path have you been able to aspire to a foreknowledge of these events? Do you not see how often the power that truly fills the story in us interrupts the whole tale? For my part, whatever argument you might choose, I shall cut through this chain of yours with the same ease and convince you that it cannot stand in any way. You will say that the final outcomes of an argument are explored and perceived by you: but the entire argument is fitted together from the interrupted force of this very chain. ^D Do you, perhaps, understand what I mean? Indeed, my good sir, there exist in every argument certain beginnings, sometimes fewer, sometimes more numerous, originating from the living creatures themselves. But when these sever the connection and sequence of the things pertaining to them, they also change the reasons and nature of the things themselves. Furthermore, they can proceed only so far as no other beginning from elsewhere shall intrude, which commands things to follow along with itself rather than with what came before. Let us imagine, then, that there is an initiation of this kind, such as an ass, a dog, or a flea; for, by Apollo, you would not deprive even a flea of its faculty and instinct: it, too, will be borne along by its own proper impulse, and thus, occasionally becoming entangled in human affairs, it will establish itself as the leader and beginning of some way. Yet you do not understand that this kind of animal does not take counsel from you either.

^A

*Locre, Herculeam ferro Trichina ruisti :* *Juppiter ipse graves ultra pro crimine pœnas*

What are you saying? Was it not decreed by fate from you that it should be destroyed? And why are we to blame, and not rather that necessity of yours? You do not act justly, O Apollo, nor do you rightly reproach us who have done no wrong. And this Zeus, the necessity of your necessity—why does He punish us, and not rather Himself, because He revealed that necessity to be such? And why does He even threaten us? Or why are we, as if we were masters of this, wasting away with hunger? But even if something of that city is restored by us, or is not, whichever happens, this has been fated. Cease then, O Zeus, architect of famine, your anger; for that which is fated exists, and this your chain has been ordered to execute: we, however, if we are to be joined with it, are nothing. And you, too, Apollo, cease your vain oracles; for that which is to be will surely come to pass, even if you remain silent. But we, O Zeus and Apollo, what are we to suffer, being in no way the cause of your legislation, or rather, your necessity-making? And what have we to do with your punishments, which you yourselves ought by rights to endure and sustain, for the very things by which we have been constrained by force? ^B

*Oetai, cæco mens improba motu* *Abripiat.*

But we are not hastening, Apollo, but are being driven; and not by madness, but by your necessity. And this Lycurgus, in particular, O Apollo, why do you praise him, who was not good, neither willingly, nor by choice, but clearly against his will? If, indeed, anyone can be good against his will. But you act just as if someone were to praise and reward the elegant and the beautiful, while blaming and punishing the ugly. For the wicked could justly say to you, O gods, "You did not allow us, O gods, to become good; not only that, but you forced us to be wicked." And if the good were to go about with their elbows stiffly extended, no one will allow them to be so, but one will say, "O Chrysippus and Cleanthes, and all of you of this same circle, (for you attribute probity to yourselves;) I indeed praise virtue, but I do not praise you who are virtuous." And furthermore, Epicurus, whom you, Chrysippus, ^C have so vehemently blasphemed, I, on your own terms, declare free from all blame. For what else could he do, who was not of his own will soft, nor unjust, just as you often reproached him? ^D

*In placidos hominum inclinant pia numina mores,* *Horum etiam cultu, et sacro lætantur honore.*

I am indeed fully persuaded that you would never speak in this way unless you believed that men are led to the things that follow, not by any force, but by their own will. For of those things which belong to our will, no one ever, neither...

God, nor man, would dare to assign the cause to necessity. But if there is such a person, let us not contend with him with words, but, having seized him like a stubborn boy (as is wont to be done to the contumacious), let us flay his sides thoroughly with a harder lash. ^A Such are the things that Oenomaus the oracle-monger inveighs against. But if this is not enough for you, read what is said by the other philosophers regarding fate—things which utterly overturn not only the oracles mentioned above, but also whatever else is customarily devised for the establishment of this dogma. For since not only the ignorant and unlearned, but also many who pride themselves greatly on education and philosophy, have been dragged into this same opinion, I think it necessary to set forth the disputes of the philosophers themselves against one another, for an accurate examination of the problem. First, therefore, I will read to you from the works of Diogenianus regarding fate, as he has argued against Chrysippus. They go ^B thus.

CHAPTER VIII

"But it will be worth the effort," he says, "on top of all these things, to add also the opinion of Chrysippus the Stoic on this matter. For he, in his first book *On Fate*, wishing to show that absolutely all things are held fast by the necessity of fate, uses among other things the following testimonies of the poet Homer:

‘But fierce fate ^C has consumed me, Which led me into the vital air at my birth.’

And: ‘...Afterwards he will suffer things in the measure that Fate spun for him with the thread at his birth, when his mother bore him.’

And: ‘No man, I say, has escaped his fate.’

In this category, he did not see that there are many other passages in the same poet that are completely contradictory to these, which he himself uses in the second book, wishing to demonstrate the force and power of our own will in most matters; such as this:

'They were ruined by their own transgressions.'

And: 'Alas, how mortals blame the gods! ^D For they say that evils come from us, whereas they themselves, Through their own transgressions, suffer pains beyond their fate.'"

[Diogenianus proceeds to argue that while Chrysippus agrees with the above in a way, he attributes some of the evils that infest human life to divine will (which he understands as fate) without any fault of theirs, while other evils he attributes to the fault of men themselves or to their negligence or wicked disposition, yet he does not teach that they happen apart from the counsel of divine Providence. The same author further observes how one might prefer to read the "beyond fate" (that which is beyond the proper measure of fate) and how it can be explained, since the term is sometimes used to mean "contrary to what is fitting," so that *poros* is taken for duty. However, in this present passage, the words of the poet do not permit this meaning; for he has woven it in to show that blame is undeservedly conferred upon the gods.]

^A For it is not taught by these and similar things that all things happen by fate. Indeed, he [Chrysippus] could not even see this, that Homer by no means supports his dogma in those former verses. For he does not propose that all things happen by fate, but rather he will be found to imply that only some things happen according to it. For:

*But grim fate seized me, Which obtained me even as I was born,*

does not mean that all things happen according to fate, but only the very fact of dying. For, as is true, it is fated for every living creature that is born to die. And indeed the following:

*But later he will suffer whatever Aisa Spun for him with her thread when his mother bore him,*

intends the same. For he does not say that all subsequent things will happen to him by fate, but that certain things will happen to him by necessity. For what else does the distinction of the word "whatever" indicate than this very thing? Furthermore, it is certain for us that, if not all things, many things impend by the force of necessity. Also that:

*No man of men has ever escaped fate,*

is well said. For who could avoid those things which necessarily befall all living creatures? llbracketB So far, therefore, is Homer from supporting Chrysippus, who places the reasons for all things in fate, that he even fights against him; for while the former has clearly and often spoken of many things as being within our own jurisdiction, he would nowhere be found explicitly stating that all things happen by necessity. And for a poet, who does not promise us the truth of the nature of things, but heaps together the manifold and various perturbations of men, and the reasons for their characters and opinions, it might be permissible to speak inconsistently; but it would not befit a philosopher to speak inconsistently, nor to abuse the testimonies of poets for such an end. And having interposed a few things, he says: ^C “Chrysippus thinks he brings another strong proof of fate in all things from the position of names of this kind. For he wishes the *pepromenē* [fated] to be called a kind of finished and completed administration, and the *heimarmenē* [fated] to be a kind of connection, whether from the will of God or from any other cause. But also that the Moirai [Fates] are named from the fact that a portion has been allotted and distributed to each of us. And thus also the *chreōn* [necessity] is said to be that which is incumbent and proper according to fate. And he relates the number of the Fates to those three times in which all things revolve and are perfected; ^D and that Lachesis is so named from the fact that she allots to each that which is fated; and Atropos, according to the unbending and immutable nature of the distribution; and Clotho, from the fact that all things are spun together and woven together, and that there is one orderly sequence for them. For he is babbling these things and things like them, and thinks he is demonstrating the necessity in all things. But to me

^A it is truly a matter of wonder how he, while saying these things, did not perceive how empty and frivolous were the things he was saying. For let us grant, if you will, that the men whose sense and thought he follows when he uses such-like names, truly believed that all things are held fast by fate, and that the causes of those things which are and those which come to be are immutable and have been fixed from all eternity. Why then, Chrysippus, do you approve of all human opinions? And does none appear to you to be mistaken in any respect? Are all men, then, speculators of the truth? How then do you say that there is no man who does not seem to you to be mad, equal to Orestes and Alcmaeon, except for the wise man? And that you say only one or two have ever been wise, while all others, on account of their folly, are mad just like those aforementioned? And how do you refute those opinions of theirs as being erroneous—for example, those concerning wealth, ^B and glory, and tyranny, and pleasure in general, which the majority have considered to be goods? And why do you say that all established laws and constitutions are erroneous? Or for what reason did you compile a multitude of such books, if men had no erroneous opinions concerning anything? For we will not say that when they opine the same things as you, they think correctly, but when they opine different things, they are mad. For first of all, you do not even say yourself that you are wise, let alone we, such that we might make you the criterion of who, at any given time, thinks correctly, because they do not run in parallel with your opinion; and next, even if this were true, why was it necessary to say that all are equally mad, and not, insofar as they appeared to share your opinions, to praise them for that reason as having grasped something ^C correct; and insofar as they disagreed, to assume that they were in error? To consider as a sufficient witness of the truth that which seems to them; nor was this necessary by nature, and not that they are mad, as you think, but rather that they are very far removed from all wisdom, as anyone would admit. It is ridiculous, therefore, that you also use these men as witnesses through the imposition of names, men whom you would not say differ in any way in their judgment from yourself; unless, perhaps, it happens that those who initially established these names were wise, which you will in no way be able to demonstrate. But indeed, let it be granted to you that this is the case, and that those names were established as you wish, having those meanings, and not because of false opinions. Where then, through them, is it indicated that all things ^D absolutely exist according to fate, and not (if at all) only those things of which there is fate? For both the number of the Fates, and their names, and the spindle of Clotho, and the thread attached to it, and the spinning of this, and whatever other such things are

^A assigned by custom from the beginning as necessary causes, all that has been determined to happen, and all that is prevented from being otherwise—many such things there might be. But as for things that do not come to pass in this way, some of these men have proclaimed gods to be the administrators and creators; of others, they have assumed *us* ourselves to be the causes; of others again, they have assigned nature, and of others, fortune—whose fickleness and instability, and behavior now in one way, now in another, they desiring to demonstrate, having fashioned this quality as an idol of events, have depicted fortune as standing upon a globe. Or has not this view also been held by men? For they are always ^B confusing the causes, and things that occur according to fate, or according to fortune, these they judge to be brought about by divine power; but things dependent on us, these—according to fate. But that they judge all these causes to exist in the things that are, this is surely clear to everyone. So it happens that neither the opinions of men, nor the naming of such things of this sort, serve to bear witness to the opinion of Chrysippus. To these, he adds in the next place: “In his first book *On Fate*, he used such proofs as these: but in the second, he attempts to resolve the absurdities that seem to follow for one who says that all things are determined by necessity—things which we ourselves also proposed at the beginning—as, for example, the fact that through this [theory], the impulse that arises from us ourselves is utterly destroyed, whether one blames, or praises, or exhorts, or does any other of those things for which we are accustomed to be the causes. Therefore, in the second book, he admits freely that many things come to be through us, and that this is manifest: but that these things are no less co-fated ^C with the administration of the whole; and he makes use of such examples as these. For the fact that a garment is not destroyed, he says, was not fated absolutely, but with the condition of its being cared for; and that this one or that will be saved from his enemies, [it is] with the condition of his fleeing the enemies; and the begetting of children, with the desire to consort with a woman. For just as, he says, if one were to say—while someone was maintaining that Hegesarchus the boxer would certainly depart from the contest unhurt—if one were to claim bizarrely that the boxer Hegesarchus should fight with his hands lowered, since it was fated that he would depart unhurt—the one who made the pronouncement, because of the man’s extra precaution against being struck, would have said this—so also in the case of ^D things [that are co-fated].” He proceeds: If it were said: "Milo will wrestle," and someone retorted (this is, if one were to reason by counter-objection), "Therefore, whether he has an adversary or not, he will wrestle," he would be mistaken; for it is a composite statement, "he will wrestle," because there is no wrestling without an adversary. All, therefore, of that kind of captious reasoning are refuted in the same way: "Whether you call a physician or do not call one, you will recover," is captious; for it is just as fated to call the physician as it is to recover. These, as I have said, he terms co-fated.

^A For he claims that many things are able to come about without our willing it, and even that we may exert the most intense eagerness and zeal regarding them, since, he says, it was fated that they should happen along with this. Once again, one might marvel here at the man's unexamined and thoughtless approach, and [his failure to perceive] the evidence of plain facts (97), and the inconsistency of his own arguments. For I think that, just as what is called sweet happens to be most contrary to what is called bitter, and black to white, and hot to cold; so too is "that which depends on us" contrary to "that which is fated." For he has previously claimed that those things are called "fated" which happen entirely regardless of whether we are willing or unwilling; while "that which depends on us" are those things which reach their end because we are diligent and active, or fail to be accomplished because of our neglect and sluggishness.

If, then, it is from my diligence in keeping my cloak that it is preserved, and from the desire to have relations with my wife that children are born, and from the desire to flee the enemy that I do not die at their hands, and from fighting bravely against an opponent and guarding against his blows that I emerge from the struggle uninjured: how then will the "fated" survive here? For if these things happen according to destiny, they would not be said to happen "by us"; but if they are "by us," clearly they would not be according to destiny, because these two things cannot run concurrently. ^B But he says they will be "by us," while being nevertheless encompassed by destiny. And how, I would ask, encompassed? If the guarding of the cloak, and the not guarding of it, were a matter of my own power? For in that way, it is clear that I would be the master of its being saved. And from this very distinction which Chrysippus makes, it becomes clear that the cause which "depends on us" is freed from destiny. For it is fated, he says, for the cloak to be saved, if you guard it; and for children to be born, if you have the desire; otherwise, that none of these things will be. But in the case of things predetermined by destiny, we would never employ such premises. For we do not say that every man will be dead, if a certain thing should happen; and not be dead, if it should not; but rather, that he will simply die, even if anything whatsoever were to happen to prevent his dying at all. Or [that] a man will not be capable of pain, even if he should do such and such; but rather, that every man is capable of pain, whether he wills it or not. And all other things that are fated are so, and not otherwise. ^C Since, therefore, it is necessary that such-and-such should happen [only] if we wills it, but otherwise it is not, it is manifest that our willing or not willing a thing was not predetermined by any other cause, but was autonomous. And if this was unconstrained, then the coming to pass of such-and-such was also clearly not predetermined from eternity; unless the very willing to guard the cloak, or the not willing, might be [fated].

On the administration of the universe and its fated nature

^A For if it were otherwise, our power of choice would be completely destroyed, and the cloak would no longer be preserved or destroyed on account of my own agency; wherefore, even if I were responsible for its destruction, I would be justly blameless (for some other cause would be making it perish), and if it were preserved, I would by no means be praised, since I would not even have been the one performing this act. But you, as if able to save everything, have extended your argument in this manner." This is what the aforementioned man said. Let us now join to these remarks the words of Alexander of Aphrodisias, a man very distinguished in philosophical discourse, who himself, in his works *On Fate*, employed the following arguments for the refutation of that doctrine. ^B

CHAPTER IX.

Of all things that come to be, he says, the principles are divided into four kinds of causes, as the divine Aristotle has taught. For of these principles, some have the power of efficient cause, others the character of matter. Added to these is the formal cause; and besides these three, a fourth principle must be counted, the end, that is, for the sake of which that which is produced comes to be. And the distinctions of the principles are thus correctly established. For whatever is a principle of any thing, you will find it to belong to one of these causes. For although not all things that come to be require so many causes, yet those that do require multiple causes never exceed the assigned number. ^C But the reason for their diversity will be clearer if it is seen in a certain example of things that come to be. Let there be, then, for us the distinction of principles presented by the example of a statue. The efficient principle of a statue is therefore the craftsman himself, whom we on this account call a statuary; as for matter, it is the underlying bronze, or stone, or whatever else is shaped by the craftsman according to his art; for this is also a principle of the existence of the statue. To both is added the form, which is introduced by the craftsman into the underlying material, and which is likewise a principle of the statue. Wherefore, if you regard the form, whether it be of one throwing a discus or hurling a javelin, or any other peculiar and singular figure, the image is expressed. Nor are these the only ^D principles for the casting of a statue; for in this genus, the end for which it is worked yields to none of these, such as, for instance, the honor of some person, or some piety toward God. For without such a cause, the statue would not have even come into being in the first place. Since, therefore, there are so many of these causes, and they have a manifest difference from one another, fate

^A should justly be numbered among the efficient causes, maintaining a proportionality to what comes into being, along the lines of the craftsman’s art of the sculptor. This being the case, it would be appropriate to conduct a discussion concerning the efficient causes; for in this way it will be clear whether one must blame fate for all that occurs, or whether we must concede this to other things also, as being efficient causes of certain things.

Aristotle, in making a division of all that comes into being, says that some things come to be for the sake of something, the maker of them having set before himself a certain aim and end; while others are for the sake of nothing, insofar as they do not come about in accordance with any intention of the maker, nor do they have a reference to a defined end. Such, for example, are the clutching of some straws, or rotations, or the touching and stretching of hairs, and whatever else comes about in a similar way to these. For that these things do come about is clear; yet they do not possess the cause that is according to the end and for the sake of which they happen. Now, those things that come about in such a way, coming about aimlessly and simply, have no rational division; but of those which have a reference to something and come about for the sake of something, some come about according to nature, and others according to reason. ^B For those things that have nature as the cause of their coming into being proceed according to certain numbers and a defined order toward some end, in which, once they have come to be, they cease to come into being, unless something should happen to them that stands in the way of their path according to nature toward the end set before them.

But things that come about according to reason also have an end. For nothing that comes about according to reason comes about as it happens, but the reference for all of them is toward a certain aim. Those things are said to come about according to reason that come about by those who make them when they deliberate about them, and assemble them in the way in which they should come to be; such are all the things that come about according to the arts, and according to intention. And this differs from things that come about by nature, in that the things that come about by nature have the starting point and the causes of such a coming-to-be within themselves (for such is nature); and they come to be according to a certain order, yet the nature that makes them does not employ reasoning about them in the same way that the arts do. But those things that come about according to art ^C and intention have the starting point of the movement and the causing cause from the outside, not within themselves, and the deliberation of the maker concerning them takes the lead in their coming into being.

There is a third type among those things that come to be for the sake of something, namely those that are believed to come about by chance and by spontaneity; and they differ from the aforementioned things that come to be for the sake of something, in that in the latter case, the things preceding the end occur for the sake of the end, but in the case of the former, while the things that occur prior to the end occur for the sake of something else, what is called coming about by spontaneity and by chance happens to them while they are coming about for the sake of something else, as an end.

Since these things are so, and all things that come into being are distributed into these modes, it is subsequent to this to see in which of the efficient causes fate ought to be placed. Is it, then, among those that come about for the sake of nothing? Or is this utterly irrational? For we always use the name of fate in relation to some end, saying that a thing comes about according to fate ^D...

so it is necessary to assign fate to those things which are done for the sake of something. By these very words, the man ^A previously mentioned distinguishes, and subsequently confirms through many arguments, that fate is nothing other than those things which come to pass according to nature; for the necessity of fate is not to be observed in things done according to our own reasoning and accomplished by art. He says, however, that most things that come to pass according to nature happen in such a way that they are hindered, and these are also called "contrary to nature," just as in things done by art, those things are called "contrary to art." But if it is granted that some things occur entirely contrary to nature, then it would follow that they occur also contrary to fate, if indeed those things which are according to nature are the same as those which are according to fate. ^B "We see, for instance," he says, "that the body, in being of such and such a nature, comes to be in diseases and corruptions in accordance with its natural state." Yet this does not happen in the same way to all, nor by necessity; for painstaking care, changes in mode of life, the prescriptions of physicians, and the counsels of the gods are often sufficient to ward off such a condition. In the same way, one might find in the soul, contrary to its natural constitution, different inclinations, actions, and modes of life in each person, improved by training, by teachings, and by better reasonings. When, for example, the physiognomist once said certain absurd things about the philosopher Socrates, which were very far removed from his habitual mode of life, and was laughed at on this account by those who were with Socrates, Socrates did not say that Zopyrus was mistaken; for he would have been such a man, so far as nature was concerned, had he not ^C become better than his nature through the training of philosophy. Such are the things according to nature, which he says differ in no way from those according to fate. But those things which are said to come to pass by chance are of this sort: when, for the sake of something else, a thing is happening, but that comes not to him for whose sake it was done, but something else which no one would have thought of at the beginning as likely to happen. He says, for example, that one has found a treasure by chance when, for the sake of something else—and not with the intention of finding a treasure—he happened upon the treasure. They also say that one received money by chance when, having gone out into the market for the sake of something else, he happened upon a debtor and received ^D what was owed to him. And that horse is also said by some to have been saved by chance, when it fled from those holding it in the hope of food or for the sake of something else, and in its flight and running happened upon its masters. Since these things are so, even these would not be according to fate. There are also some causes that are hidden to human reasoning, which are believed to occur according to some sympathies, the cause being unknown for why they happen; such as certain amulets which are thought to have some effect, although they have no reasonable or persuasive cause for producing these results, and likewise incantations and certain sorceries of this kind. For it is agreed by all that the cause of these is unknown; wherefore they call them "causeless." And they say that there are many things besides these, both possible and such as happen by chance, which not even these would be according to fate. It is said that these things happen in a contingent way, in which even the non-happening has a place, as the very term "by chance" makes clear. For example, moving something of one's own

a part of the body, turning the neck at random this way or that, extending a finger, raising the eyelids, causing a seated person to stand or a moving person to become still, or silencing one who is speaking—in these and countless other cases one could find a power existing in us capable of the opposites, which could not come from Fate; for things that come from Fate do not admit of the opposite of that in which they exist.

Furthermore, man’s deliberating is not in vain for him; he would be deliberative in vain if he performed his actions by necessity. It is clearly apparent, however, that man alone among all other animals possesses this as an extra gift from nature: not to follow impressions as they do, but to have reason as a judge of what happens to him. Using this, if the items that are scrutinized appear such as they did at the beginning, he gives his consent to the impression and thus carries them out; but if they appear otherwise, he no longer persists in his first apprehension, as reason has tested them through the process of deliberation. We deliberate, then, only about those things which it is in our power to do; and if we ever do things without deliberation, we often repent and blame ourselves for our lack of counsel. But even if we see others acting without deliberation, we reproach them as having sinned, and we think it proper for them to use advisors, as if such matters were within our power.

That their theory about Fate was false is a sufficient proof in the fact that not even the champions of this theory are able to obey what they themselves say. For they promise to exhort and teach, and they advise people to learn and to be educated; they rebuke and reprimand those who do not act as they should, as if they were sinning according to their own choice. They even leave behind many writings through which they expect young people to be educated. They would have ceased from this ambition in their speeches if they had noticed that they also deem those who sin involuntarily worthy of pardon, while they say those who do wrong voluntarily are worthy of punishment, as if the power for both the doing of wrong and the refraining from it clearly resides in us. This also, according to them, abolishes the necessity of Fate and confirms that free will exists in us according to nature, along with the fact that there are many things not in our power, as is the case with natural events and chance happenings, which are also things other than what is taught by the doctrine of Fate, as has been shown beforehand.

Seeing that our discussion on free will is quite extensive in our own doctrines, and that I have had to shorten it here, I have brought forth these statements from the philosophers as having harmonized with our divine scriptures, and as refuting the opinions regarding Fate held not only by the mass of men, but also by the oracles of the so-called wonderful gods as being false. Some of these oracles were disposed of in a somewhat cynical manner in regard to the noble oracles, and others were disputed by the acquaintances of the wonderful philosophers themselves. It is time, then, to examine the arguments of those who offer this mischievous sorcery of astrology as a kind of science to the Chaldeans. I shall also set before you the proofs of these matters from a man who was Syrian by race, but who attained to the pinnacle of the Chaldean science—

this was Bardesanes, whom they mention as philosophizing in the following manner in the dialogues he wrote to his associates. ^A

CHAPTER X.

That the vanity of fate can be refuted even from mathematical disciplines. From the writings of Bardesanes.

"By the laws of nature," he says, "man is generated, nourished, waxes, procreates, eats, drinks, sleeps, grows old, and dies; and this is common to every man, and to every irrational animal. And other animals, being psychical and existing entirely by combination, are carried almost entirely according to nature. The lion eats flesh, and it defends itself if it is wronged; and for this reason all lions eat flesh and defend themselves. Sheep eat grass, do not touch meat, and if they are wronged, they do not defend themselves; and the same manner of life belongs to all sheep. The scorpion eats earth, and it wrongs those who have not wronged it, striking with a venomous sting; and the same wickedness belongs to all scorpions. The ant, by nature, knows the approach of winter, and throughout the whole summer, laboring, it stores up food for itself; and in like manner all ants work. The bee produces honey, ^B from which it is also nourished; and the same industry is found in all bees. And it would have been possible for me to set forth many species of animals which, because they cannot depart from the force and impulse of their own nature, could have provided you with great wonder; but I considered it sufficient to make the demonstration from those at hand, namely that other animals, according to the commonality and the difference, and according to the nature given to each, are necessarily and gladly borne along. But men, who alone possess the extraordinary, both the mind and the reason which proceeds from it, while they follow nature according to commonality (as I have said before), yet according to the extraordinary, they do not live according to nature. For not indeed—" ^C

(98) Another reading from the manuscripts, through which the reading is more common. Saint Epiphanius, in heresy XXXVI (which it calls LVI), mentions those who are his followers, and he is a man of such note that he needs no illumination. You have here a fragment of a very elegant and accurate work, which this man, most eloquent in the Syrian and Greek languages, composed against the astrologer Avida, as Epiphanius writes. He had inscribed the book to Antoninus, as our Eusebius is the author in *Ecclesiastical History*, book IV, the last chapter. And understand this Antoninus to be not Pius, but Verus, as Epiphanius advises. Jerome also, in his book *On Ecclesiastical Writers*, a most bitter judge of masculine speech, not only proclaims him but even admires him. Although he was such a vehement opponent of fate—how, as it crept in according to Saint Augustine in heresy XXXV, one might wonder, he could have added of his own accord that he attributed the conversations of men to fate—yet the manuscript codices expunge that clause. Furthermore, twin to this dispute of Bardesanes is that which Caesarius instituted for a similar cause, and at good length, in the volume of the *Bibliotheca Patrum*, new edition, in Greek and Latin, page 610, in dialogue II, in the response to question 109. ^D

^A one food for all; some are nourished like lions, others like lambs; they do not have one form of dress, nor one custom, nor one law of society among them, nor one movement of desire for things. But each of the humans chooses for himself a life according to his own will, not imitating his neighbor, except in matters he chooses. For his freedom is not subject to slavery, and if ever he willingly chooses to serve, even this is of his freedom—the ability to serve willingly. How many people, and especially those of the Alans, eat raw flesh like wild beasts, not tasting of bread, and not because they lack it, but because they do not desire it? Others do not taste of flesh, like tame animals; others eat only fish; yet others do not taste of fish, not even if they are starving. Some drink water, others drink wine, others drink strong drink. And, simply put, there is a great difference in foods and drinks in humanity, even to the point that they differ in the consumption of herbs and fruits. ^B Furthermore, some, like scorpions and asps, do harm when they have not been harmed; others, like the irrational beasts, defend themselves when they are harmed; yet others, like wolves, plunder, and like weasels, steal; others, like lambs and ewes, are driven by those who are of like passions, and they do not harm those who harm them. And some are called good, others bad, others just. From this, it is possible to understand that humans are not entirely led by nature (for what nature of his shall we name?), but he is carried in one part by nature, in another by choice. Therefore, he has praise, blame, and condemnation in those things that are according to choice; but in those things that are according to nature, he has blamelessness, not according to mercy, but according to reason. And further he says: “Humans have established different laws in every land, some written, some unwritten, from which I shall recount, as I know and as I remember, beginning from the creation of the world. The law among the Seres ^C is that no one should murder, nor commit fornication, nor steal, nor worship idols. And in that, the greatest land, it is not possible to see a temple, nor a prostitute, nor a woman called an adulteress, nor a thief being dragged to judgment, nor a murderer, nor one murdered. For the power of choice of no one has the star of Ares, shining with fire, which is in mid-heaven, compelled to kill a man with iron; nor has Cypris, being with Ares, compelled anyone among them to mix with the wife of another, at any day when Ares is in mid-heaven, nor at any hour or day when the Seres are born. Among the Indians and the Bactrians there are many thousands of those called Brachmans, who, according to the tradition of their ancestors ^D and statutes, neither murder, nor worship idols, nor invoke demons; and there is no image at all among them, nor harlot, nor adulteress; no plunderer, no murderer, no thief.”

all theft, and every worship of images is prohibited. Wherefore, in that most spacious region, thou shalt see no temple, no harlot, no adulteress, no thief brought to justice, no murderer, nor any killed. No necessity, arising from the flammivomous star of Mars, ^A even though it revolves in the midst of heaven, has hitherto imposed upon any man’s free will the necessity of slaying with the sword. Venus, in conjunction with Mars, has impelled no one among them to the embrace of another man’s wife, although that Mars ascends to the midst of heaven not a day, nor an hour, that the Seres are not born daily. Among the Indians and Bactrians, there are many thousands of them whom they call Brachmans. They, in accordance with the tradition of their ancestors as well as their laws, abstain from all slaughter and the worship of images; they taste nothing that has life; they are never without sobriety, since they spare wine and strong drink; and while they have leisure for the one God, they are never polluted by the communion of any wickedness. The rest of the Indians, meanwhile, are given to homicides, uncleanness, drunkenness, and the worship of images, and in almost all things they are subject to fate. Nay, indeed, in the same climate of India, ^B there is found a certain race of Indians, who, catching the strangers who fall into their hands, slaughter them after the manner of sacrificial victims and devour them. And neither have the beneficent stars prevented these from committing murder and unlawful marriages, nor have the maleficent stars compelled the Brachmans to do evil. Among the Persians, it was a law to marry one’s daughters and mothers. And not only in that country, and in that climate, did the Persians perform these unholy marriages, but also as many of them as emigrated from Persia, who are called Magusaei, commit the same lawlessness, delivering the same laws and customs to their children by succession, from whom there are many even now in Media, and in Egypt, and in Phrygia, and in Galatia. And surely Cypris, in the borders and houses of Cronus, did not exist at the nativities of all, with Mars accompanying Cronus. Among the Geli, it is a law that wives…

On the Indians, those called the Callatiae, who eat their parents

^A dyed garments, and they all go barefoot; although the Geli men adorn themselves in soft raiment and in garments of diverse colors, and they wear gold and use perfumes. And this is not because of any effeminacy, for they are manly, and very warlike, and most expert in hunting. Nor did all the Geli women happen to have Cytherea in Capricorn or in Aquarius, manifesting misfortune, nor do all their men have the Paphian with Mars in Aries, where those who observe the Chaldean arts say that men are manly and wanton.

Among the Bactrians, ^B the women use every elegance of adornment and every kind of perfume, being served by handmaids and young men even more than the men are. They go forth with much display on horseback, adorning their horses with much gold and precious stones. They are not chaste, but they have communion indifferently with slaves and strangers; having such license, and not being reproached by their husbands, they almost rule over them. And it is not the case that in every nativity of the women in Bactria, the laughter-loving Aphrodite culminates with Zeus and Ares in their own bounds.

In Arabia and Osrhoene, not only are adultresses put to death, but even those who are only suspected are not left unpunished. Among the Parthians ^C and the Armenians, murderers are put to death, sometimes by the judges, and sometimes by the kinsmen of the murdered. And if any man kills his own wife, or his brother who is childless, or his sister who is unmarried, or his son, or his daughter, he is not accused by any law, such a custom existing in those regions; but among the Greeks and Romans, the murderers of their own kin and relatives are subjected to greater punishment. In Hatra, he who steals anything worth an obol is stoned; among the Bactrians, he who steals a small thing is spat upon; among the Romans, he is tortured with scourges; for such are their laws. From the Euphrates ^D river, and up to the Ocean, as one goes towards the east, those reviled as murderers or thieves are not adulterated. But the men are heaped with soft clothing and flowered raiment; the Geli who do base things are praised by their own laws. Gelas and Legas, Gellas and Ligyas, briefly Gelai; Geli, Geloi, Gelai, Gellae, Gelaioi, or Gellae, Gelaioi, Gelissai, Gelooii, Gelaioi, Gellaioi, Geloous, Geloni. And in Susa, of Babylon, the women use every perfume and adornment, and are served as they go forth joyfully, with haughtiness and much dissipation. [alt-version omitted]

^A They are greatly indignant; but he, being reviled as a sodomite, defends himself even to the point of murder. Among the Greeks, even the wise are not blamed for having male lovers. In that same East, those who are outraged, if it becomes known, are put to death by brothers, or fathers, and kinsmen, and are not deemed worthy of manifest burial. Among the Gauls, the young men marry with boldness, not considering this a reproach because of the law that exists among them. And it is not possible that all those in Gaul, who are so godlessly outraged, should happen at their births to have the Evening Star [Vesper] setting with Mercury in the houses of Saturn and the territories of Ares. In Britain, many men have one wife; but in Parthia, many wives have one husband, and all live temperately, obeying him according to the law. The Amazons all have no husbands, but like brute animals, once a year about the vernal equinox, they go beyond their own borders and have relations with the neighboring peoples, who consider this time as a sort of solemn festival. From these they conceive and return, and of necessity at one time they bring forth children by the law of nature; and the males that are born they cast away, but the females they rear. They are warlike, and look after their exercises. ^B Hermes with Aphrodite in the houses of Hermes creates sculptors, and painters, and bankers; but in the houses of Aphrodite, perfumers, or voice-trainers, and actors of poems. And among the Taeni, and Saracens, and in the upper Libya, and among the Moors, and among the Numasi who live by the mouth of the Ocean, and in outer Germany, and in upper Sarmatia, and in Scythia, and in all the nations of the arctic parts of the Pontus, and in all of Alania, and Albania, and Etene, and Sannia, and in Chryse, it is not possible to see a banker, or a sculptor, or a painter, or an architect, or a teacher of singing, or an actor of poems, but the mode of energy of Hermes and Aphrodite is wanting in the whole of this circle of the inhabited world. The Medes all cast out their dead even while still breathing to dogs reared with eagerness; and not all, with the Moon, have Ares of diurnal birth in Cancer under the earth. The Indians burn their dead, with whom they burn their wives who are willing; and surely not all the Indian women who are burned alive have the Sun in Leo, in the bounds of Ares, under the earth at a nocturnal birth. Most Germans die a hanging death, and not altogether does the multitude of the Germans have the Moon and the hour intercepted by Saturn and Ares. For every nation, and every day, and every place ^D human beings are born.

[alt-version omitted]

yet everywhere the laws of the men themselves, their customs, and the free choice of the will prevail. And so, neither the Seres are compelled to homicide, nor the Brachmanes to the eating of flesh, nor the Persians to refrain from incestuous marriages, nor the Indians to fly from the pyre, nor the Medes to avoid the teeth of dogs, nor the Parthians to refrain from a multitude of wives, nor the women of Mesopotamia to intemperance, nor the Greeks to reject the exercises of naked bodies, nor the Romans to cast off their empire, nor the Gauls to flee the defilement of female nuptials, nor the remaining barbarian nations to the custom of the Muses (as the Greeks call them), by their condition of birth, compelled against their will and desire. ^B But, as we said before, individual nations and individual men use their own liberty, wherever and as often as it pleases them; although in part each one complies with his condition of birth, and in part with his own nature, which clothes each one with his own body, sometimes willingly and voluntarily, and at other times against his will and involuntarily. For indeed where the multitude of the Germans ^C die, having broken their necks with a noose, it cannot be that such a great multitude of the Germans could have had the moon and the hour of their birth intercepted by Saturn and Mars. For every day, and in every manner of birth, men are born among all peoples; yet everywhere the laws of those men themselves, their customs, and the free choice of the will prevail. Thus neither the Seres to murder, nor the Brachmanes to the eating of meat, nor the Persians to abstain from incestuous marriages, nor the Indians to flee the pyre, nor the Medes to avoid the dogs' teeth, nor the Parthians to abstain from a multitude of wives, nor the women of Mesopotamia to intemperance, nor the Greeks to reject the exercises of naked bodies, nor the Romans to cast off their empire, nor the Gauls to avoid the shame of female marriages, ^D nor the remaining barbarian nations are, by the condition of their birth, forced against their will and desire toward the habit of the Muses (which the Greeks call so). But just as we said before, individual nations, and individual men, use their own liberty whenever and as often as they wish: although each man yields, sometimes willingly and voluntarily, and other times against his will and involuntarily, partly to the condition of his birth, and partly to his own nature, which clothes each one in his own body. Indeed, where 36 degrees of the zodiac are established and divided into decans, whose leaders, termed decani, are named according to the practice of Roman military service; all therefore being thirty-six.

^A they look forward to his presence, not swayed by the power of any climate, nor led by the law of a foreign land; but whether they happen to be in Syria, or in Gaul, or in Italy, or in Greece, or in Parthia, or wherever they may be, they do this. Which is not according to birth; for it is not possible that all Jews should have one birth. But also, for seven days, all, wherever they may be, rest from every work; and they neither travel, nor do they use fire. Nor does birth compel a Jew not to build a house, not to tear one down, not to work, not to sell, not to buy on the days of the Sabbath, although on that very day some Jews are born and others begetting, and some are sick, and some are dying; for these things no longer belong to the power of the will. In Syria and in Osrhoene, many were cut by Rhea; and in this, by one impulse, the king Abgar ordered the genitals of those being cut to be cut off, and their hands; and from that time, no one has been mutilated in Osrhoene. But what shall we say concerning the sect of the Christians, of which we who are believers are many, and have arisen in different climates, in every nation and climate, we who are many, and are called by one name? And neither do the Christians in Parthia practice polygamy, being Parthians, nor do those in Media cast out their dead to dogs; ^B nor do those in Persia marry their daughters, being Persians; nor among the Bactrians and Gauls do they corrupt their marriages; nor do those in Egypt worship the Apis, or the dog, or the goat, or the cat. But wherever they are, they are neither overcome by poorly established laws and customs; nor does the birth, governed by the rulers (15), compel them to practice the evils forbidden by their teacher. But they are subject to disease, and poverty, and passions, and the deemed disgraces. For just as our free man is not compelled to be a slave, and even if he is compelled, he resists those who compel him; so also our apparent slave cannot easily escape from subjection. For if we had power over all things, we would be the all, so that, if we had no power, we would be, as I said before, the instruments of others, and not of ourselves. But with God’s consent, all things are possible and unhindered; for nothing can resist his will; and indeed, those things that seem to resist, with Him being good, and allowing each nature to have its own property and the self-determination of the will, resist. » So much for the Syrian. But ^C having mentioned one other thing, I will bring the discourse to a close. For since what is from external writings has been sufficiently set forth, and those things from the holy scriptures are lacking, which we most especially need for the Preparation for the Evangelical Demonstration, it would be well to look into these as well, so that the discourse may in no way be lacking in those things viewed toward the problem. Whence I shall also make these clear to you. Not that you would be able to understand the holy oracles, as they are mostly veiled.

But I shall bring forward to you their interpreter. And unless you happen to begrudge those superior minds, you know the man well, who even now, while still dancing amongst the assemblies of Christ—by the labors he has left behind—is not unknown even to those outside, due to the zeal for learning he has manifested toward their disciplines as well. Consider, then, how many things and of what sort the wonderful Origen has determined in his commentaries on Genesis regarding the subject at hand, and how he has traversed the argument concerning fate.

CHAPTER XI.

^A “That which is held here,” he says, “that the luminaries—which are indeed nothing else than the sun, moon, and the rest of the stars—been created as signs, this in truth requires diligent explanation, and is especially necessary. For not only do those nations which are alien to the faith of Christ stumble at this place concerning the argument of fate, because they think that everything which occurs on earth, and everything pertaining to individual men, and indeed even to brute animals, comes to pass through a certain combination and relation of the stars which they call wandering, with those that are fixed to the zodiac; but many even of those who are believed to be believers are distracted, lest the affairs of men be necessitated, and it be impossible for them to come about otherwise than as these [stars] arrange their interweaving with one another.

^A It follows for those who dogmatize these things that they utterly abolish that which is in our power; whence also praise and blame, and commendable actions, and again those that are reprehensible, vanish. If these things are so, the claims of the proclaimed judgment of God depart, as do the threats against those who have sinned, as if they were to be punished; and likewise honors for those who have devoted themselves to higher things, and the hope of beatitude; for nothing of these would any longer reasonably come to pass. And if one were to look at the consequences for himself of that which he dogmatizes, even faith would be vain, and the coming of Christ would accomplish nothing, and all the dispensation through the law and the prophets, and the labor of the apostles to establish the Churches through Christ the God, would be for nothing—unless indeed Christ himself, according to those who dare such things, had his birth taken up under the necessity of the movement of the stars, and had done and suffered everything, not because the God and Father of all granted to him the miraculous powers, but because of the stars. To these atheistic and impious arguments there follows also the claim that those who believe are led by the stars to believe in God. We would ask them: what was God willing when he made such a world, that men in it should suffer the things belonging to women, not being at all the cause themselves of the licentiousness into which they have fallen; while others, having taken on the nature of wild beasts, because the rotation of the universe has made them such, and because God has thus adorned the whole, give themselves over to the most cruel and utterly inhuman deeds, to murders and acts of piracy? ^B And what need is there for us to speak about the things that happen among men, and the myriad of evils committed by them, the responsibility for which those who stand forward as the champions of these doctrines—while absolving them of every charge—ascribe to God as the cause of all evils wickedly committed? If, however, some of them, as if to defend the cause of God, say that there is another good being, having no part in the origin of these things, but ascribe such things to the Creator of all; first, not even as they wish will they be able to prove that he is just; for how could the father of so many evils, according to them, be reasonably called just? Secondly, as to what they think of themselves, it must be examined. Are they subjected to the rotation of the stars, or are they free, and, while living in the world, have they nothing active in them from that source? For if they say that they are subjected to the stars, it is clear that the stars have granted to them this insight, and the Creator will have been the one who subjected the discourse concerning the higher God they have fabricated through the movement of the universe, which is not what they want. But if they answer that they are outside the laws of the Creator regarding the stars, so that what is said by them may not be an unproven assertion, let them try to lead us more compellingly [to their view], by demonstrating a difference of a mind subjected to birth and fate, and another from this. ^{C D}

^A For it is clear that if such persons were required to give an account of these things, they would by no means be able to do so. Furthermore, prayers are also invoked in vain alongside what has been said. For if it is absolutely necessary that such and such things come to pass, and the stars bring this about, and nothing can happen apart from the combination of these with one another, we are thoughtless to ask God to grant us any of these things. And why should I extend the argument further, demonstrating the impiety of the place concerning fate, which has been beaten into a path by the many without examination? For what has already been said is sufficient by way of an outline.

But let us remind ourselves of how we arrived here, investigating the passage, “Let there be signs for luminaries.” Those who learn the truth about certain things—either by becoming eyewitnesses of the facts, or by looking upon the sufferings and the actions of those who have suffered or acted, or by hearing from those who are in no way the causes of what has taken place—they come to know these things. ^B (Let it be set aside for now, from the argument, the ability of those who have done or suffered things, as they describe what they have done or suffered, to lead one who was not present into knowledge of the events.) If, therefore, the one being taught by a person who is in no way the cause of the events that such and such has happened or will happen to certain people, fails to distinguish (20) that the one teaching about something as having happened or as about to happen is not for that reason the cause of the matter’s being so, he will suppose that the one who provided the information about the thing’s having happened or being about to happen, has made or will make those things about which he teaches; and he will suppose this, clearly, in error.

Just as if someone, having encountered a prophetic book that reveals beforehand the matters concerning Judas the traitor, should think, upon learning what was to be, and seeing it being accomplished, that the book itself is the cause of such an event having happened later, since he learned from the book the things to be done by Judas later; or, again, should he think that the book is not the cause, but rather the one who first wrote it, or the one who set it in motion—say, for instance, God. ^C Just as in the case of the prophecies concerning Judas, the very words, when examined, reveal that God is not the author of Judas’s betrayal, but has only declared that He foreknew the things to be done from his wickedness, apart from His own causality—so if anyone should delve into the argument concerning God’s foreknowing all things, and should understand the expressions in which He, as it were, imprinted the reasons for His own foreknowledge, they would realize that neither is the One who foreknows in any way the cause of the things foreknown, nor are those who receive the imprints of the reasons of the foreknowledge of the One who foreknew.

That God knows long beforehand that each of the future things will happen, ^D and that this is clear even without Scripture to one who understands the concept of God as a premise of power...

But if it is necessary to demonstrate this from the Scriptures as well, the prophecies are full of such examples. Even after Susanna, she ^A who knew that God knows all things before they come to pass, speaks thus: "O everlasting God, who knowest the hidden things, who knowest all things before they come to pass, thou knowest that they have borne false witness against me" (Dan. XIII, 4).

Most clearly, in the Third Book of Kings, the name of the king himself and the deeds done by him were recorded many years before they saw the light, prophesied in this way: "And Jeroboam ordained a feast in the eighth month, on the fifteenth day of the month, according to the feast that was in the land of Judah. And he went up unto the altar in Bethel, which he had made for the calves, which he had made." Then after a few words: "And, behold, there came a man of God out of Judah by the word of the Lord unto Bethel: and Jeroboam stood by his altar [to burn incense]. And he cried against the altar in the word of the Lord, and said, O altar, altar, thus saith the Lord: Behold, a child shall be born unto the house of David, Josiah by name; and upon thee shall he sacrifice the priests of the high places that burn incense upon thee, and men's bones shall he burn upon thee. And he gave a sign the same day, saying, This is the sign which the Lord hath spoken: Behold, the altar shall be rent, and the ^B fat that is upon it shall be poured out." And after a few words it is shown that the altar was also rent, and the fat was poured out from the altar according to the sign that the man gave by the word of the Lord. And in Isaiah, who lived long before the captivity to Babylon, after which captivity later on Cyrus the Persian king appears, helping in the building of the temple—this happened ^C indeed in the times of Ezra.

Notes

(21) "O God." Just as in the age of Origen, that history of Susanna is held to be inspired—surely no less than the subsequent books from which the same Origen produces testimonies. Nor is there any place here for the straw-like distinction of the innovators; while they expunge books from the number of the sacred ones, if they see anything from them brought forward by the Fathers as if from Scripture, they object that it is called Scripture, which might be fit for forming morals, but not suitable for establishing articles of faith. This is indeed ridiculous; for by this calumny, faith could be abrogated in any part of Scripture. But nevertheless, the faith of divine knowledge is asserted here also by Origen; which, I think, those men will never deny to be one of those decrees, however much they may be of a very harsh tongue.

(22) "In the eighth month." Which he himself invented of his own heart, as the Scripture states explicitly in the following verse: that is, which he had instituted by himself, without any example of the Jews, so that a feast of impious consecration might be celebrated on that day.

(23) "According to the feast." Whose example does Jeroboam follow? It does not please me that some [feast] is understood which had no affinity with this dedication. For the Scripture adds, "in the similitude of the solemnity," etc. In vain also is mention made here by some of the Encaenia, which Jeroboam, being so much older than them, could not have had in mind. Others more probably accept it as the Feast of Tabernacles, the beginning of which was led from the fifteenth day of the seventh month (Lev. XXIII, et seq.). Yet I do not see sufficiently what similitude of that Jeroboam expressed, unless perhaps that he chose the fifteenth day of the eighth month. For the celebration of Tabernacles is instituted in that place of Leviticus only so that posterity might learn (the words are of God) that I made the children of Israel dwell in tabernacles when I brought them out of the land of Egypt. I would much prefer to understand the dedication of the altar celebrated by Solomon, which, begun on the eighth day of the seventh month, was carried on to the twenty-second, on which the celebration of the Tabernacles was also concluded. Read II Reg. VIII and Paralipom. VI, where, in the verse about Solomon, it is had: "And he made a gathering on the eighth day, because he had dedicated the altar seven days, and had celebrated the solemnity seven days."

(24) "In the land of Judah." More correctly in the Heb., Septuagint, and Vulgate in Juda.

(25) "The altar that was in Bethel." It must be pointed out as it is in the Septuag., etc. Certainly, it can neither be omitted, nor changed into the particle ἐν without wickedness. Moreover, the Vulgate interpreter has for ἐν, "did likewise," as in the Heb., that is, I think, as it was wont to be done in Judah. But the Septuagint understood it in the Heb. ^D as, as elsewhere passim.

(26) "For the calves." In the Septuagint. The Vulgate, however, is in the masculine, "vitulis quos" (the calves which). See the notes on page 117, where there is much on the Egyptian Apis and the Israelite calves.

(27) "The fat." In the Septuagint and Vulgate; however, it is "ash." The Heb. is דֶּשֶׁן, which signifies ashes and fat.

^A And he contributed to the building of the temple, having come to be in the times of Ezra; these things are prophesied regarding Cyrus by name: "Thus says the Lord God to my anointed Cyrus, whose right hand I have taken hold of, to cause nations to obey before him, and I will shatter the strength of kings; I will open doors before him, and the gates shall not shut. I will go before you, and will level the mountains; I will shatter bronze doors, and I will break in pieces the iron bars; and I will give you hidden, secret, invisible treasures, that you may know that I am the Lord God, who calls your name, the God of Israel. For the sake of my servant Jacob, and Israel my chosen, I will call you by your name, and I will receive you."

For it is clearly shown even from these things that it was for the sake of the people—who did not know Him—that the Lord God bestowed upon him the ability to rule over many nations, because of the righteousness he practiced. One may learn these things also from the Greeks who have written accounts regarding Cyrus, who was prophesied. ^B Furthermore, in Daniel, while the Babylonians were reigning at that time, the kingdoms to follow after Nebuchadnezzar are shown to him. They are shown by means of the image: the gold denoting the Babylonian rule, the silver that of the Persians, the bronze that of the Macedonians, and the iron that of the Romans. And again, in the same prophet, regarding Darius and Alexander and the four successors ^C of Alexander the king of the Macedonians, and Ptolemy, who ruled over Egypt, who is called the son of Lagos, it is prophesied thus: "And behold, a male goat of the goats came from the west upon the face of all the earth; and there was a horn between the eyes of the goat. And it came even to..."

the ram having horns, which I had seen standing before it, and ran toward it in the strength of its power. And I saw it reaching as far as the ram, and it was moved with rage against it, and struck the ram, and broke both its horns; and there was no power for the ram to stand before it, and it cast it down upon the ground, and trampled it; and there was none to deliver the ram out of its hand. And the male goat of the goats grew very great; and when it became strong, its great horn was broken; and other horns grew up beneath it toward the four winds of heaven. And out of one of them came forth one strong horn, and it grew exceedingly toward the south and the west." ^B Why need I recount the prophecies about Christ, such as his place of birth, Bethlehem, and the place of his upbringing, Nazareth, and his withdrawal into Egypt, and the miracles which he performed, and in what manner he was betrayed by Judas, who had been called into the number of the apostles? For all these things are signs of God's foreknowledge. Even the Savior himself says, ^C "When you see Jerusalem surrounded by armies, then you will know that its desolation has drawn near." For he foretold the later event, the end of the destruction of Jerusalem. Since, therefore, it has been demonstrated to us that God is a foreknower, it is not untimely that we should relate how the stars serve as signs. It must be understood that the stars are so set to move, the so-called planets moving in opposition to the fixed stars, in order that they may serve as signs. ^D

^A This was ordained with the purpose that from the varied arrangement of the stars, signs might be derived regarding those things that happen, partly to individuals and partly to the world in general—not, certainly, by men (for to be able to grasp the truth about the actions or sufferings of each individual from the movement of the stars is an undertaking far beyond human capacity), but by those superior natures which, as we shall demonstrate in what follows according to our ability, it is necessary to know for many reasons. But men, having learned some things of this kind either from observations or from the instruction of angels—who, having themselves transgressed their own boundaries, taught these things to the destruction of our race—thought that those from whom they believed they received the signs were the causes of the things which the word says they signify; about them, we shall treat more carefully as in a summary and according to our ability immediately hereafter.

The following questions, therefore, are proposed: First, how is human free will preserved, given that God has foreknowledge from eternity concerning all that is thought to be done by each person? Second, in what way are the stars not the causes of what happens to humans, but merely signs? Third, that men cannot possess an accurate knowledge of these things, but that these signs are positioned for natures superior to men. ^B Fourth, we shall examine what is the cause of God having made the signs for the awareness of those [superior] powers.

Let us first examine the first point, which many of the Greeks, fearing that things are compelled and that human free will is in no way preserved if God foreknows the future, have dared to embrace as an impious doctrine rather than accept what they call the glorious view of God—which, however, destroys human free will, and because of this, destroys praise and blame, as well as the acceptableness of virtues and the blameworthiness of vices. For they say: If God has known from eternity that this person would commit injustice and perform such and such ^C wicked deeds, and the knowledge of God is unerring, then whoever is foreseen as one who will do these things must necessarily be unjust; and it is impossible that he should not commit injustice, and he is compelled to commit it, and it will be impossible for him to do anything other than what God has known. And if it is impossible for him to do anything else, and no one is blameworthy for not doing what it was impossible to do, then we blame the unjust in vain—and from the unjust man and his injustices, they proceed to other sins as well. Then, conversely, they proceed to what are considered righteous acts, and they say it follows that if God foreknows the future, human free will cannot be preserved.

To them it must be said that God, in the beginning of the creation of the world, since nothing happens without a cause, ^D proceeds in His mind through each of the things that are to be, seeing that, since this has happened, this follows; and if this that follows happens, this results; and when this has come to be, this will happen; and having thus proceeded to the end of things, He knows what will be, without being the cause of any occurrence for each of the things that are known. For just as if someone, seeing a man who, out of ignorance, is headstrong, and because of this headstrong nature is walking mindlessly along a slippery path, and foresees that he will fall if he slips, does not become the cause of the fall for that man...

^B In the same way, it must be understood that God, since He foresees what each person will be like, also perceives the reasons why he will be such, and that he will sin in such-and-such a way, or perform such-and-such a righteous act. And if one must say so—not that the foreknowledge is the cause of the things that happen (for God does not touch the person who is foreknown to sin at the time he is sinning)—we shall state something more paradoxical yet true: the future event is the cause of the foreknowledge regarding it. For it is not because it is known that it happens, but because it was going to happen that it was known. But it needs to be distinguished. For if one interprets "that it will certainly be" in such a way that there is a necessity for the foreknown thing to come to pass, we do not grant it to him. For we do not say that because it was foreknown that Judas would become a traitor, there was any absolute necessity for Judas to become a traitor. At any rate, in the prophecies concerning Judas, reproaches and accusations against Judas are written down, demonstrating to everyone his blameworthiness. And blame would not have been attached to him if he were a traitor by necessity, and if he did not ^C have the capacity to become like the other apostles. Consider whether these things are not made clear by the words which we shall set forth, which are as follows: “Neither let there be any one to show mercy to his orphans, because he did not remember to show mercy. And he persecuted the poor and needy man, and him that was broken in heart, to slay him; and he loved cursing, and it shall come to him: and he desired not blessing, and it shall be far from him.” If someone explains “it will certainly be” according to what that signifies, saying that such-and-such things will indeed happen, but that it was possible for them to happen otherwise, this we admit as true. For it is not possible for God to lie, but regarding things that are possible to happen or not to happen, it is possible for Him to have a mind about their happening or not happening. We shall state this more clearly as follows: If it is possible for Judas to be an apostle just like Peter, it is possible for God to think regarding Judas that he will remain an apostle like Peter. If it is possible for Judas to become a traitor, it is possible for God to think regarding him that he will be a traitor. But if Judas is to be a traitor, God, in His foreknowledge of the aforementioned two possible outcomes, foreknowing the truth within them, will foreknow that Judas will become a traitor; but concerning the thing that is known, it is possible for it to happen otherwise. And the foreknowledge of God would say that it is possible for this person to do this, but also the opposite. But since both are possible, I know that he will do such-and-such. For just as God, if He were to say that it is not possible for some person to fly, would not—to give an example—give an oracle to someone saying that it is not possible for this person to be temperate. For the power to fly is not at all in man, but the power ^D of being temperate and of being licentious—if both powers exist…

the one who does not pay attention to the exhortations and educational discourses gives himself over to the worst; but [the one who is] better, having sought the truth, [desires] to live according to it. ^A Yet this one here does not seek the truth, since he leans toward pleasure, while this other one examines them, having been chosen by common notions and the exhortatory word. Again, on the other hand, this one chooses pleasure, not because he is unable to look directly at it, but because he does not struggle [against it]; but this other one despises it, seeing the ugliness that often exists within it.

That indeed the foreknowledge of God does not impose necessity upon those things concerning which He has apprehended [them] will be said, in addition to the things previously stated, [by the fact] that in many places of the Scriptures God commands the prophets to proclaim repentance, not pretending ^B that He knows whether those who hear will turn back or will persist in their own sins. As it is said in Jeremiah: "Perhaps they will hear, and will repent." For God does not say "Perhaps they will hear, and will repent" as one who does not know whether they will hear or not; but as if demonstrating the balance of the powers by what is being said, so that His foreknowledge, having been predicted, might not cause the hearers to fall, presenting an appearance of necessity, as if it were not in their power to turn back, and this might become the cause ^C of sins; or again, [that] the foreknowledge might [not] become a cause of slackening for those who, through ignorance of the foreknown good, are able to struggle and to resist wickedness by living in virtue, as they are no longer standing decisively against sin, as if the aforementioned [event] were absolutely going to happen. For in this way, the foreknowledge of what is to come could become an obstacle to the good.

At any rate, since God manages all things in the world usefully, He reasonably blinded us even regarding future things. For knowledge of them would have released us ^D from struggling against wickedness, but it would have permitted us—having seemed to have been grasped—not to wrestle against sin, [and thus] more quickly to become subject to it. At the same time, it also became a conflict for someone to become noble and good, [in that] the foreknowledge had come down to such and such a person, that he will certainly be good. In addition to which we have, and vehemently…

strive for what is noble and good; but the knowledge, having been anticipated, that one will certainly become noble and good, relaxes the exercise of virtue. Therefore, it is beneficially that we do not know whether we will be good or evil. But since we have said that God has blinded us regarding future events, ^A see if we can explain the quoted passage from Exodus as follows: "Who has made the slow of hearing, and the deaf, and the seeing, and the blind? Is it not I, the Lord God?"—so that He might be said to have created the same person both blind and seeing: seeing with regard to the present, but blind with regard to the future. For the matter regarding the slow of hearing and the deaf does not belong to the present time to explain. That, however, many of the things which are in our power [depend] as causes upon many things which are not in our power, we also will confess; and if these latter, I mean those things not in our power, had not come to pass, certain things that are in our power would not have been done. ^B Yet certain things in our power do take place following those things which were foreknown, it not being possible, while these same things were foreknown, to do other than what we do. And if anyone seeks to have the things in our power released from the whole, so that we would not choose these things because of those things that have happened to us, he has forgotten that he is a part of the world, and is contained by the communion of men and by the surrounding atmosphere.

^C I think it has been demonstrated moderately, and as it were in summary fashion, that God’s foreknowledge does not at all impose necessity upon the things foreknown. Let us proceed, therefore, ^D and struggle also regarding the stars, in no way [to be the causes of] these things. For the rest, since we have said that it was done by divine counsel that we should be blind regarding future events, let us see if perhaps some light might be brought by us to this question from Exodus, "Who has made the slow of hearing, and the deaf, the seeing, and the blind? Is it not I, the Lord God?" so that in this sense He is said to have made one equally blind and well-sighted: sighted in present matters, blind in future ones. For it is not the place here to inquire into the reason and distinction between the slow of hearing and the deaf. Although we ourselves surely admit that very many things which are not under our jurisdiction are sometimes the cause of many things that are within our power; and therefore, unless those things—that is, the things over which we have no power or jurisdiction—precede, neither would those things follow which nevertheless depend upon our own freedom. Moreover, some things that are based in us and others that are not under our power follow in such a way upon preceding events that, even with those things having preceded, other things besides those which do happen are possible for us to do. And if there shall be anyone who wishes the power and authority of our will to be held in such a way, without any connection to the universe, that he denies that this or that, which certain things have preceded them, can sometimes be chosen and desired by us, he will surely have forgotten that he is a part of the world and is contained by the communion of men and the ambit of the surrounding air. And for me, according to the reason of this place, it seems that I have demonstrated moderately and as if in a compendium that nothing at all is brought of necessity by divine foreknowledge to those things which He has foreknown. Let us do this next:

let us show that not even the stars themselves are the causes of human affairs, but only certain signs of them.

First, then, this is clearly established: even if we grant—for the sake of the present inquiry—that a certain configuration of the stars is the cause of certain things that happen to a person, that configuration which exists on this day, for instance, cannot be conceived as having caused events that happened to him long before ^A this present time. For everything that causes must be older than what is caused.

Now, according to the teachings of those who profess such arts, the matters foretold concerning people are held to be prior to the configuration itself. For they claim that by taking the hour of a person's birth in a certain way, they discover how each of the wandering stars was situated perpendicularly, or in such-and-such a degree of the zodiac, or in its minutes; and which star of the zodiac was at the eastern horizon, which at the western, which at the meridian, and which at the anti-meridian. And when they posit the stars—which they conceive to have formed a configuration for themselves—as being configured in this way at the moment of a certain person's birth, they examine at the time of the nativity of the subject ^B about whom they are inquiring, not only future events, but also past events, and those that occurred before the birth and conception of the subject: for instance, what sort of father he has, whether he is rich or poor, whole in body or maimed, better or worse in character, property-less or wealthy, or experienced in this or that trade. They ask the same things about the mother and about older brothers, if he happens to have any.

Now, though we were to grant for the present that they can successfully discover precisely what is true in this matter—a point we shall disprove later ^C —let us ask those who hold that human affairs are compelled by the stars in what way a configuration of today can have caused things that occurred long ago. For if this is impossible, all the more so since it is found that the truth about events prior in time is established, it is clear that the stars moving thus in the heavens did not cause the past events that had already happened before they were positioned such.

But perhaps if someone, admitting that they speak the truth, reflects upon what is said about the future, he will say that they speak the truth not by the stars *causing* events, but merely by *signifying* them. If anyone claims that the stars do not cause past events, but that other configurations were the causes of the knowledge of those events, and that only the present configuration signifies them, yet that for the future ^D and...

the configuration of the present ^A must be shown—let him demonstrate the distinction of being able to show from the stars that some things are understood as true because they are causes, and others as signs only. If they are unable to provide the distinction, they will generously agree that nothing concerning human affairs is brought about by the stars, but, as we have said, if anything, it is only signified; just as if one were to obtain knowledge of past and future things not from the stars, but from the mind of God, through some prophetic word. For just as we have previously demonstrated that it causes no harm to the argument concerning our free will that God knows what will be done by each person, so too the signs which God has ^B appointed to signify do not hinder our free will; but rather, the whole heaven can contain future things prophetically in the manner of a book, being, as it were, the book of God. Therefore, in the prayer of Joseph, the statement made by Jacob may be understood in this way: "For I have read in the tablets of heaven all that will happen to you and your sons." Perhaps also the words, "The heaven shall be rolled up like a book" (Isa. XXXIV, 4), signify the words contained in it, which are signs of things to come that will be brought to completion, and, if I may put it so, fulfilled, just as prophecies are said to be fulfilled once they have come to pass. And thus the ^C stars will be for signs, according to the voice that says, "Let them be for signs." But Jeremiah, turning us toward ourselves and removing the fear surrounding what is supposed to be signified—and perhaps also supposed to come from there—says: "Be not afraid of the signs of heaven" (Jer. X, 2). Let us also look at a second argument: how the stars cannot be efficient causes, but, if anything, are signifiers. For from the vast number of births possible, one can take the circumstances of a single man—and this we say by way of hypothesis, granting that knowledge of them can be grasped by men—for instance, to say that this person will suffer this fate, will be killed having fallen among robbers, he says that one can gather this from his own ^D birth, and if he happens to have many brothers, from the nativity of each of them. For they believe that the birth of each one contains the brother who is to be killed by robbers, and likewise that of the father, and that of the mother, and that of the wife, and of his children, his servants, and his dearest friends—and perhaps even of the robbers themselves. How, then, is it possible for one person—if this were to be granted to them—to be contained in so many different births by the configuration of the stars: this birth rather than those? For it is implausible to say that the configuration of the stars at the birth of this specific man has brought these things about, while the configuration of the stars at the births of those others has not brought them about, but has only signified them. For it is foolish to say that the birth of all those people contained in each one the efficient cause of this man being killed, such that in their births...

^A say, by hypothesis, fifty of those slaughtered are contained, perhaps included in the birth itself. How, then, can it be that one who is, let us concede it for the moment, involved in the nativities of so many others, is assigned to the position of the stars presiding over this birth rather than the others? ^B It is incredible that the position which presided over the singular birth of one particular person should have been the cause of such an outcome, while it was not the cause for the others in whose nativities it appeared, but only gave some signification of it. Nor would it be less absurd to include the cause of one man’s murder in the nativities of all and every one of those many people, as if the killing of a certain single man were contained by hypothesis in fifty births. I am truly unable to understand how they can maintain that all Jews are born under such a configuration of the stars that it is necessary for them all to be circumcised on the eighth day, and thus to have the skin cut, to be tormented, to be inflamed with a burning swelling, to be lacerated with wounds, and finally, barely born, to have need of the art and hands of physicians. ^C They say that the Ishmaelites who occupy Arabia are brought into the light in such a position that it is necessary for all of them to be circumcised around their thirteenth year; for this is what is recorded concerning this race of men. Furthermore, how does it come about that among certain peoples of Ethiopia, the kneecap is removed, and among the Amazons, one of the breasts is cut off? How, indeed, can the force of the stars effect such similar things only in certain nations? I for my part believe that nothing true can be devised and asserted by us in this genre, in which one might even lightly linger. However, since so many arts of foreknowledge are circulated, I do not see why people have plunged into this one above all, so that they deny the power of producing results to augury and hepatoscopy, granting them only the power of signifying, yet do not feel the same way about that art which concerns the consideration of the stars and nativities. For if future events can be known—let us grant this for the present—and the principle of their knowledge is the same as the principle of their effectuation, why is the cause of what happens attributed to the stars rather than to birds? Or why to birds rather than to the entrails of victims or to shooting stars?

^D Thus far, as much as this place demanded, we have refuted that opinion which held that the effectuation of human affairs depends on the stars. But let us now at last inquire whether that which we conceded a little while ago, as it did not hinder our proposed disputation—that those celestial positions, the signs, and the things of which those signs are signs, can be understood by the powers of human faculty—is true. First, therefore, the masters of this art teach that he who aspires to the true and perfect knowledge of genethlialogical matters must hold not only which twelfth-part [zodiacal sign] a so-called star is in, but also in which particle of that twelfth-part, or rather, in which sixtieth-part it moves. Those who examine the matter more accurately add: in which sixtieth of that sixtieth. They instruct that the same must be done for any of the wandering stars, while tracing the mutual comparison and relation of each of them with those they call fixed. Then, upon the eastern horizon itself, they say it is necessary to see not only what twelfth-part was upon it, but also the degree, and the sixtieth of the degree, the first or the second sixtieth. How then, when the hour...

if you consider the matter broadly, comprises half of a twelfth-part, can anyone who does not understand the analogy of the division of hours hold [the sixtieth part]? For example, who could know that this particular man was born at the fourth hour, and at half of an hour, and a fourth, and an eighth, and a sixteenth, and a thirty-second? ^B For they say that the meanings differ greatly, due to ignorance not only of the whole hour, but also of its minute portion. For in the case of twins born, there is often an interval of a fleeting moment of an hour, and many variations in what happens and what is done by them occur, as they say, because of the cause of the relationship of the stars, and the portion of the twelfth-part that is by the horizon, which is not grasped by those who believe they have kept the [precise] hour. For no one can say that the interval between the birth of one and the other is a thirtieth of an hour. But let this be granted to them, according to their way of grasping the hour. A theorem is produced, demonstrating that the zodiacal circle, in the same way as the wandering stars, moves from the west to the east, by one degree every hundred years, and that this in a long time alters the position of the twelfth-parts; one being the intelligible twelfth-part, and another that which is as it were the form ^C (57); but [it is taken] from the intelligible sign, which is not at all capable of being grasped. But let this also be granted, that the intelligible twelfth-part can be grasped, or that the true one can be obtained from the perceptible twelfth-part. But the "mixture," as they call it, of those that happen to be in these configurations, they themselves will admit they cannot preserve in every respect, since the thing signified—for example, the lesser—is obscured by the greater [(58)], because the former is looked upon by the latter, the more powerful one, and is obscured to this or that extent. Often, again, when the obscuration of the lesser by the observation of the greater is hindered by the fact that the other is configured in such a way, it is a signifier of worse things. And I think that anyone who has applied their mind to these places will renounce the grasping of these matters, which is by no means accessible to humans, but, if it reaches anywhere, goes only as far as being signified. And if anyone has had experience of the facts, he will know better how fallacious is the conjecture of those who speak, and of those who wrote it down, ^D rather than what is thought (59) to be successful. Isaiah, then, as though these things cannot be discovered by humans, says to the daughter of the Chaldeans, who of all people most profess these things: "Let them stand and save you, the astrologers of the heavens; let them announce to you what is about to come upon you." For through these things we are taught that it is not possible...

the very studious in these matters, to reveal what the Lord has willed to bring upon each nation.” Thus far the aforementioned man.

But our whole discourse here may be reduced to two main points: first, that those who were reputed to give oracles in the cities were not gods, nor even good demons, but on the contrary were certain sorcerers, deceivers, and impostors, who brought about the destruction and corruption of true piety by spreading errors among men, both generally and specifically regarding the ^A necessity of fate; from which, since no one from the beginning of time—except Jesus our Savior—has redeemed the entire human race, it is reasonable that at the beginning of our *Evangelical Preparation* all these present matters have been set forth with diligence, so that we might learn by the work itself from what ancestors we are descended, by what deception we were once held fast, from how great and how profound [an error] we have recovered, and how we ourselves, and the whole life of humanity, have found the cure for long and protracted demonic activity, ^B and for our blindness and godlessness, through the teaching of our saving Gospel alone.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL: BOOK SEVEN

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL, BOOK VII.

^C

CONTENTS OF THE SEVENTH BOOK

1. On the life of the ancient Hebrews, and how we have reasonably preferred their divine Scriptures to ancestral traditions. 2. A recapitulation of the theology among other nations, and of what evils it has been the cause for human life. 3. An exposition of the customs of the Hebrews, and how they thought concerning the Maker and Creator of all things. 4. How they thought regarding the immortality of the soul and the substance of bodies. 5. How, having become lovers of God, they were deemed worthy of written theophanies and oracles. 6. How they were outside of Judaism before Moses was born, yet shone with piety. 7. How Moses himself recorded the lives of the Hebrews before his own time in his own writing.

^A 8. With a mature judgment and sound reason we have accepted the history of these things; and a summary of the lives of those mentioned, both of the men before the flood who were dear to God, and of those who lasted after that time down to the generation of Moses. 9. On the doctrinal teachings among the Hebrews. 10. On general providence, and on the constitution and creation of the world. 11. The Hebrews' opinion regarding God, who is indeed the first cause of all things. 12. On the theology of the second cause. 13. Philo on the second cause. 14. Aristobulus on the same. 15. On the constitution of rational beings. 16. On opposing powers. 17. On human nature. 18. Philo on the soul. 19. On the fact that matter is not unbegotten. 20. On the same, from Origen’s commentary on Genesis. 21. Philo on the same. 22. That matter is not unbegotten, nor the cause of evils.

CHAPTER I. The institutions of the most ancient Hebrews; and that we have rightly preferred their sacred writings to the monuments of our ancestors.

^B It follows that we must now describe the way of life of the Hebrews, whose form of philosophy and piety we have preferred to all ancestral rites, along with their reasons for living and their institutions. For since we have now achieved this—that it be established that we have not inconsiderately or rashly, but with a mature and chastened judgment, abandoned and repudiated that vain and spurious theology of all the Greeks and barbarians alike—a second question must now be solved for us, and the reason rendered which impelled us to undertake and test the doctrine of the Hebrew scriptures. And that it is not to be reckoned as a crime or a disgrace for us that we should borrow something of utility from the barbarians, we shall demonstrate at a more suitable and greater leisure, when we show that everything that has ever been found among the Greeks, and even among their most celebrated philosophers—not only the disciplines they have drawn from philosophy, but also everything involving the common life of men and the usage of public affairs—has been gathered and stitched together from the disciplines and laws ^C of the barbarians. But as for the fact that no such good has ever been found among any other nation as that which has come to us from the Hebrews, anyone, I think, will understand from the following.

CHAPTER II. The main points of the theology of the remaining nations, and what a cause of grave evils that has been for human society.

The rest of all mankind, from the very beginning of human society and down to the subsequent times, since they had established nothing concerning their own soul, clung only to the senses of the body, and thinking that there was absolutely nothing beyond what is seen by the eyes to exist in reality, they set ^D up bodily pleasure in place of what is honorable, useful, and the only good. And judging this alone—as if there were nothing else beyond it, nor any other good, nor anything pleasant or sweet to be found, and as if this alone were sufficient by itself for living happily—to be worthy of study and love, they considered it the greatest of gods, and have deified it; neither desiring life itself, if it does not partake of the pleasure of the body, and not

even ^A for their own children did they pray for any other good but this. Hence, some, having suspected that the sun, the moon, and the stars were the dispensers of embodied life, and being struck by the sight of the light, proclaimed them to be the first gods, declaring them alone to be the causes of all things. Others again have honored with the name of gods the fruits of the earth, and the moist, the dry, and the warm substance, and the other parts of the universe, through which their own bodies were nourished and fattened, and ^B chased after both embodied life and pleasure at once. Others, long before these, with brazen and uncovered face, deified their own passions, and their mistress, Pleasure, and Love, and Lust, and Aphrodite, asserting that they held sway even over the gods themselves. Others made gods of certain tyrants and potentates who had become to them the dispensers and inventors of pleasurable things—both while they were still living and breathing, and after their death—because of the sweetness of the benefits they had received from them. Others, having become playthings of wicked spirits and demons, increased still more the passionate part of their souls, procuring ^C pleasures from them through their customary rites of worship. Others, enduring none of these things, introduced atheism, as being far better than such a theology. Others, more shameless still than all of these, declared that the philosophic and thrice-blessed life was nothing other than the pleasant life, defining pleasure as the end of all good things. Thus, therefore, the whole race of men, as if enslaved to Pleasure—a bitter and most cruel mistress and god, or rather a base and licentious demon—became mired in all manner of miseries. ^D “For their females,” as the holy Apostle says, “exchanged the natural use for that which is against nature. And likewise also the males, leaving the natural use of the female, burned in their lust for one another, males with males working indecency, and receiving in themselves the recompense which was due for their error” (Rom. I, 26). In this way, both Greeks and barbarians, wise and simple, falling down upon the ground and upon their bellies, worshiped Pleasure as a god. Prostrating themselves like reptiles, they both considered it an invincible and inexorable god and cherished it, even in odes and hymns, and in public spectacles, being initiated into and performing the orgies and obscene mysteries of this sole base and licentious Pleasure; so that, if anything else is rightly abolished among us, this is too: for the beginning of fornication is the invention of idols. And this much, to speak briefly, is the extent of the multiformity that the theology of the other nations has taken; tied to one primal source—that unclean and base pleasure—after the manner of a hydra, many-necked and many-headed, it has spread into many and varied divisions and [cont.]

^A offshoots of error. Since, then, they were prone to such deception, it was only natural that for them, pleasure being their god and an evil demon their master, evils were heaped upon evils: frenzied lusts for women, corruption of males, incest with mothers and daughters—all life was defiled by them, and their wild, beastly nature was overcome by an excess of baseness. Such, then, is the manner of the ancient nations, and their false theology has been demonstrated through the Greek historians and philosophers gathered by us in the preceding books.

CHAPTER III

What the customs of the Hebrews were, and what they thought concerning the Author and Creator of all things.

Now, truly, since you have an examined account of the life of the ancients, consider next, with an attentive mind, how the Hebrews alone of all men followed a path contrary to such a multitude. For they were the first and only ones of all mankind who, from the earliest beginning of life, applied their minds with rational contemplation ^B and piously directed their attention to the natural study of the universe. First, they reasoned that the elements of bodies—earth, water, air, fire, from which this whole is composed—as well as the sun, the moon, and the stars, were not gods, but the works of God. For they rightly understood the proper nature of corporeal substance: that just as it is fluid and subject to decay, so it is also devoid of reason and soul.

Then, reflecting that it is impossible that the arrangement of this universe, so aptly and wisely formed ^C and abounding in such a multitude of living creatures, both rational and irrational, could be assigned to a fortuitous and chaotic cause; or that the maker and creator of living beings could be soul-less, or the creator of rational beings be irrational: for since neither could a house ever be built of wood and stone by chance, nor could a garment be finished without the industry of a weaver, nor could cities and states subsist without laws and the arrangement of rulers, nor could ships exist without a governor, nor could even the smallest instrument of art exist without the hand of an artisan, nor could any ship ever reach a lucky port if deprived of the guidance ^D of a wise master—much less, then, could this nature of the elements, from which this world is compounded—being itself devoid of soul and reason—obtain life and reason by its own native power, if that supreme wisdom of the divine deity were excluded. These things, I say, and others like them, the fathers of the Hebrew piety pondered, and with eyes of the soul purified and clear, [v. 19-20/Ps. XVIII] they gazed upon the Creator of all things, God, from the greatness and beauty of the things that have been created.

^A

CHAPTER IV. What they themselves perceived in part concerning the immortality of the soul, and in part concerning the nature of the body.

Deinde, since they perceived that they themselves were no small part of the universe, they judged that one of their two parts (which they called the true human being, and which can be known only by the mind) was to be held in high esteem; but the other, namely the body, was like a kind of enclosure in which the former is held. Having established this distinction, they thereafter devoted all their care and zeal to the ordering of the life of the inner man. And they recognized that this was highly pleasing to God, the Creator of all things, from whom man had received this mandate, that he should rule over all things contained within the circuit of the earth, not by the strength of the body, but by the faculty of the soul. (For among things, some are inanimate, such as stones and wood; others share in a vital power, such as all earth-born vegetation; others are endowed with the faculty of sensation and are moved by an impulse applied from without, such as irrational animals. And all these things were made subject to the service of the human race, compelled not by the strength and power of the body, but by reason and the virtue of the soul, ^B by which they understood that the ruling and royal prerogative over all things on earth had been granted from above by the Cause of all.) Moved by this thought, they judged that the body and the pleasures of the body were to be regarded as no different from the rest of the beasts of the earth; but that which rules within them, as something akin to the Ruler of all, and the rational and intelligent part of the soul—that which is divine and learned, and which bears the image of God who is above all—they held in sole esteem. Furthermore, because they understood that there was no other good at all besides God, the source and author of all goods, and that He alone possesses within Himself the causes and reasons for life, soul, body, and all things necessary for them, they declared that the end of all happiness was the knowledge and love of Him. Therefore, they dedicated themselves to Him entirely, in body and soul, hanging their whole life upon Him, and deemed it worthy to attend only to Him, and to no other of the things that are seen. Thus, having truly appeared as lovers of God and beloved of God, they proved themselves to be in some sense ^C ministers and priests of the Most High God, or rather were deemed worthy to be called a "holy race," a "royal priesthood," a "priesthood of God," and a "holy nation" (1 Pet. II, 9), having left the seed of this true piety even to their descendants and posterity. Does it therefore seem to you that we have acted with reason in preferring these men to the Greek, and even more so to the Phoenician and Egyptian gods, and in choosing the accounts of the holy men among the Hebrews over the shameful and absurd tales concerning the gods?

CHAPTER V.

^A Behold, then, to what a degree those we have indicated attained a virtue dear to God. For the Divine, having welcomed the men for both their other piety of life and philosophy, and for their worship of Him, already deemed them worthy of even more divine oracles, divine manifestations, and angelic visions—partly to relieve the helplessness of mortal nature by suggesting what needed to be done, and partly to reveal to them the knowledge of doctrines and teachings worthy of God. Thus, they no longer possessed minds illuminated by arguments or conjectures, but by the light of truth itself; and, inspired by the Divine, they perceived things to come as though they were present, and prophesied whatsoever was destined to happen to the human race. Such are the celebrated and truly God-beloved records regarding the virtue of the Hebrews, which we have preferred to the Hellenic myths and trifles; for the one contained the most shameful things regarding the gods, while the other contained the pious teachings regarding men beloved of God.

CHAPTER VI.

^B These things, moreover, were already known among the forefathers of the Jews long before Moses—and indeed the Jewish race itself—came into existence, and even from an ancient time. For it is right to clarify also this: that Judaism did not yet exist at that time, but the aforementioned Hebrews were not yet what were then called Jews, nor did they exist as such, either in name or in manner. One might perceive the difference between Hebrews and Jews in this way: the former received their name from Judah, from whose tribe the kingdom of the Jews was established many years later, whereas the latter were named from Eber, who was the forefather of Abraham. ^C The sacred writings also teach that the Hebrews were more ancient than the Jews. As for the mode of worship itself, Moses was the first legislator of the Jews; he it was who delivered the day of the Sabbath, prescribing the utmost watchfulness for that day in remembrance of the rest from divine words, as well as the distinction between animals that may be eaten and those that may not, annual festivals, and certain purifications of the body, along with other long periods ^D fulfilled according to certain symbols of a more divine nature. But the Hebrews, having existed in time centuries before Moses, were entirely [free] from the whole of the legislation through Moses.

^A Since they were observers of this, they maintained a free and relaxed way of piety, ^B being adorned by a life according to nature, such that they had no need of laws in the beginning on account of the utter passionlessness of their souls, and having received a true knowledge of the doctrines regarding God. But since these things have been spoken of in this manner, it is time also to come to the written records.

CHAPTER VII.

The great theologian Moses, then, being a Hebrew from Hebrews, and knowing the ancestral customs well, if anyone else did, as in the introduction to the holy laws, committed to indelible memory the lives of the forefathers of the Hebrews. ^C He deemed it necessary that those who were to be instructed by his laws should possess as a lesson—both for the avoidance of the similarity to the habits of base men, and for the encouragement of the life of the pious—the good things which these men were accounted worthy to receive from God, and, in turn, the ways and punishments of others who were godless and impious. For it was necessary, also, that they should not be ignorant that, even before his written laws, many of the forefathers had already been adorned by the excellence of godliness through right reasoning; ^D and these, having become friends of God and prophets, attained to eternal memory with Him, and the race of those to whom He was giving the laws was not alien to them. Therefore, it was much more necessary that they, having been born descendants of God-loving and just men, should be shown to be zealots of the piety of their forefathers, and should hasten to obtain the same things from God as their progenitors had; and not to backslide, nor to shrink, as though at impossibilities, having despaired of the hope of good things for themselves. For these things were possible, and were fully accomplished in their own forefathers; the images of whom he delivered to those being instructed in divine things, recounting the lives of the ancients, and describing the individual virtue of each one, as if painting them in a portrait.

(65) "Free and relaxed." We must take "free" here as implying a life-style which, without any force or necessity of laws, cultivates virtue and piety, and is not weighed down by a heavier burden of so many ceremonies. Thucydides uses this typically in Book II, where Pericles, preferring the freer manner of life of the Athenians to the harsher discipline of the Lacedaemonians, which was bound by the chains of laws, puts it forward; although a little later he used it in a better and more laudable sense. He says: "We decide to come to the enduring of dangers... where he opposed... but joined it with [the right] manner." To this also pertains the result of that custom, or plan, which follows: "We gain from this that we are not worn out by the harshness of future troubles before the time, nor, when we have come into them, do we appear more fearful or sluggish than those who are perpetually in contention." (66) "Relaxed." It seems that "relaxed" should be answered to the former phrase, where he says: "By life, indeed, insofar as they were adorned according to nature."

CHAPTER VIII.

^A Nor indeed would it be inappropriate to run through their history briefly in this place. First, therefore, before the deluge, as we understand from the records of Moses himself (for I do not think matters of the Hebrews should be drawn from anywhere else than from their own sources, since we learn Egyptian matters from the Egyptians, Phoenician matters from the Phoenicians, and likewise Greek matters from those who flourished in reputation among the Greeks—and indeed from philosophers, not from those who were guests and strangers to philosophy regarding the rational principles and decrees of philosophy. For whom would you more justly consult about the precepts of medicine than those skilled in that art? With the same right, clearly, I maintain that Hebrew matters must be sought from no others than the writings of the Hebrews): through many, then, as their history teaches, in the long time before the deluge, and from the very first origin of men and throughout the long series of following ages, God not only embraced them with special love, but also commended the highest praise of their integrity. And him in particular, ^B who "hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God" (67). By which manner of speaking, Scripture declares that no other but the very framer of all things and Lord of the universe, and at the same time God, was chosen by him as guardian and quasi-patron for himself and his affairs: provided that he was thoroughly persuaded that the universe was not only well and wisely constituted by the power of His creative force, but was also contained under His empire and dominion just like some huge commonwealth, and that all its parts were governed by the will and arbitration of Him as the supreme Father of the family, or rather as the true and legitimate Lord, King, and God: the concepts and appellations of whom, as Lord and God, he ^C who is mentioned as the beloved of God, being the first to harbor in his mind, in place of every possession, and appellation, and wealth, or rather in place of every good, "hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God," having acquired this for himself as a treasure of goods of both soul and body. For this reason, he is also recorded among the Hebrews as having first been called a true man. Truly, he was named Enos, which is "true man," with a very suitable and apt reason for the name. For they judged that the appellation of a true man applied to him alone, ^D who had attained to the knowledge of God and sense of piety, the one truly wise and pious at once. That indeed the Scripture teaches to call those who are not such—who differ in nothing from brute beasts, and who are as it were cast down headlong toward their belly and pleasure—beasts rather than men, the Scripture is accustomed to speak with precision in its appellations. For which reason it is accustomed to call such people sometimes wolves and dogs, sometimes swine (who use and delight in filth), and again reptiles and serpents, according to the various and manifold shapes of wickedness. And if indeed...

it were necessary to identify the common and ordinary man, and the species itself, it would be by using a familiar and appropriate designation, indicating every man by the name of Adam; for this, being a name proper and fitting for the progenitor and forefather of all men, signifies "earth-born" according to the interpretation in the Greek tongue. ^A Now, Enos is recorded among the Hebrews as the first of those who love God, because he was the first who "hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God," demonstrating the rational and truly knowing part of the soul, and that which is learned in piety towards the Divine. Of these, the first would be a proof of true knowledge of God, and the second of the hope which is in the God who has been known. For not to remain idle, nor to place the things of divine knowledge in the second rank, but always and through everything to hope to call upon the name of the Lord God—sometimes as servants of a Master, sometimes as of a merciful and good Father—this would be the thrice-blessed end of all things. Such, then, is he who is introduced among the Hebrews as the first and true man, not the earth-born one called Adam, who through the transgression of God's commandment fell from the lot of better things, but the first of the lovers of God, who "hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God." Having ourselves decided with sober reason, we have loved to emulate such a one, and we have accepted this telling of the word as profitable and most useful for us, setting it as our prayer to call upon the name of the Creator and Master of all things with firm and good hope, equal in honor to the image of him who has been mentioned. ^B But indeed, after the aforementioned, another "pleased the Lord, and was not found," as Moses says, "because God translated him" ^C on account of the perfection of his extreme virtue. For he who is truly wise is hard to find. Such a one would be he who is perfect in God, who has been translated from the daily life of the many. For he who is not such, but is pursuing the marketplace, the law-courts, the retail trades, and the commerce, and the great crowd, being pushed and pushing, is swallowed up in the middle of the deep of wickedness. But he who is taken by God, and translated from these things to those places, is invisible and unfound by men but, having become a friend to God, has been found by God—this one the Hebrews name Enoch, as a friend. And the name might signify "grace of God." And therefore, we have judged it blessed to emulate his life as a good image. ^D Third after these, another righteous man appeared, Noah, who was witnessed to in his generation. Indicators of his righteousness would be these. A great drought and darkness of unspeakable wickedness had taken possession of the race of all men; and the giants, who were bruited about on the lips of all, were perfecting the wars against God that have been proclaimed even until now by godless and impious undertakings; and already even those who were the causes of their generation, whether they were of some superior lot or according to the nature of mortals, having started, and having been in any way prepared, having departed from the teachings that look to what is among men, are said to have handed down the contrivances of sorcery and the rest of the evil-minded magic to men.

^A So that the whole human race might be judged by a single verdict before God. And when all were destined to be destroyed by a single nod, this one alone, who is now indicated to us, was found "righteous in his generation," along with his own family. Indeed, as all things on earth were being destroyed by the flood, and the earth itself was being cleansed of former evils by a sudden inundation of waters, this man, beloved of God, together with his children and wives, was kept by God as a most paradoxical seed of life for the life that followed. He could also be an archetypal image, living and ensouled, having provided those born from him with an example of a life pleasing to God. And such were those before the flood; but after this, there were others again distinguished for piety, whose memory the sacred oracles preserve.

^B Of these, one is declared a priest of the Most High God, a just king, who obtained the designation of Hebrew. Among all these, there was not even a single mention of bodily circumcision, nor even of the Mosaic Jewish observances. Wherefore it is not right to call them Jews, nor yet Greeks, because they did not worship a plurality of gods in the manner of the Greeks or the rest of the nations. But they might more properly be called Hebrews, either from Heber, or rather from the meaning of the term. For some interpret them as "Passers-by" (Peratici), who crossed over from the things here to the contemplation and vision of the God of the universe. For they are recorded as having directed the straight path of virtue by natural reasoning and unwritten laws, and having passed beyond the pleasures of the flesh, they have stepped forth toward a life of all-wisdom and godliness.

Indeed, among these, let there be numbered for us all the famous progenitor of the whole nation, Abraham, to whom the oracles testify righteousness—not that which is from the law of Moses again, for it did not yet exist; for Moses appeared in the seventh generation after Abraham—but yet he is also declared to be righteous and godly, if any other has been declared so, similarly to those declared above. The Scripture says: "And Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned to him as righteousness." The divine oracle predicts that this man would be a father of many nations, and states in express terms that "all the nations of the earth and all the tribes" will be blessed in him, clearly prophesying the things now being fulfilled in our time. But this Abraham, after his perfection in righteousness, and not through the law of Moses, but through faith ^C made perfect, after the unwritten sacrifices, when he was in old age about to beget a legitimate son, was the first of all, according to the oracle, to circumcise his flesh, handing this down for those born of him to perform, whether as an evident sign of the multitude of his children, or as a traditional mark by which the children might hold themselves together, either living according to the zeal of their ancestors, or falling short of their virtue; or for whatever other causes, which there is no leisure to investigate now. Such a man, then, was he who is set forth for imitation; and after him Isaac, together with the ancestral

^A knowledge of God and fellowship with God, is shown to be the heir, having received this as the most beautiful and thrice-blessed inheritance of all from his father. They say that the divine oracles came to him with only one wife, and that he used only one procreation of children; according to which, having been shown to be the father of a twin birth, he is said to have limited his intercourse with his wife by an excess of temperance. Let Jacob, who is also Israel, be introduced to you here; a man who became of dual name in accordance with the shining progress of his own virtues. For when he was training himself in the practical habits and modes of life, and was making trial of the struggles for piety, his name was Jacob, ^B and the appellation calls him—when translated into the Greek tongue—an ascetic and an athlete. But when, finally, he receives the tokens of victory over his rivals and is crowned, and is already enjoying the good things of contemplation, at that moment God, who is manifesting Himself, changes his name, at once deeming him worthy of the vision of God, and bestowing upon him the rewards of more divine honors through the appellation. The oracle says to him: "Thy name shall no longer be called Jacob, but Israel shall be thy name, because thou hast prevailed with God, and art powerful with men," pointing to the man who is a seer and a contemplator of God; since the name, when changed, signifies a man seeing God. Such a man indeed is this one, from whom the twelve-tribe race of the Jewish nation arose. Much could be said concerning the life of these men, and their philosophic endurance and discipline; things viewed literally, and things allegorized through underlying meanings. Regarding these, it has been spoken of by others ^C as well, but also by us, in the works where we have treated the topic of the numerous offspring of the men of old. Such then were they. I have another whom I can also mention to you among them, Job by name, whom the sacred oracles testify to have been a man blameless, truthful, righteous, God-fearing, and abstaining from every evil action. This person, though not belonging to the race of the Jews, is witnessed to concerning all the accomplishments of piety. Indeed, the sons of Jacob, having loved the ancestral knowledge of God and piety, raised the reputation of the Hebrews of old to a great height of glory, so that they already took hold of the rule over all of Egypt. For Joseph, having been crowned beforehand with the rewards of temperance, and having then accepted the leadership of the Egyptians, demonstrated the God-beloved manner of the Hebrews. Even he, we have made it our wish to emulate—he who became a slave through the plotting of his own kin, and a slave to an Egyptian ^D man. For the other things, whatever fell to his lot regarding the beauty and strength of body and comeliness, I pass over, even if the oracles record that he surpassed everyone in the bloom of his beauty; but what could one portray that is worthy of his soul, if he intended to recount the praise of the man’s virtue according to its merit? For by nature, speech was to him the mark of nobility, and of his character.

^A And he was excellently exercised in the adornments of piety, so that in temperance and justice, in prudence and fortitude, his soul shone forth far more in the knowledge and piety of the God of all, which they who gave him birth are said to have instilled into his soul from his swaddling clothes. When, therefore, his master’s wife became inflamed toward him, and attempted to drag his body—still young—into licentious and erotic intimacies, first trying to deceive him with words, then entreating him with supplications, and finally daring to lay hands on him more violently, using shameless and brazen embraces, the hero, calling to mind the pious instruction of his fathers, and proving himself a God-fearing and truly Hebrew man in both deeds and words, shook off the shameful and wanton woman. By passing by her with a stronger hand, fled as from some terrible and maddened beast, he secured his salvation by flight. Afterwards, he reasoned with himself in a temperate mind, and said: “If my Lord knows nothing of what is in his house, and has given all that is his into my hands, then how shall I do this great evil, and sin before God?” On account of which, as one victorious, God, the Lord of all, having crowned him with the rewards of virtue, delivered to him the kingdom and authority even over his masters and over Egypt itself. But this man, a Hebrew of the Hebrews—and not yet a Jew, because the things of the Jews did not yet exist—is numbered among the most God-beloved and thrice-blessed.

After the aforementioned Hebrews, since the race of their descendants was increasing into a multitude, and the nation of the Jews was already formed from them, and was daily increasing and multiplying, the manner of the pious conduct of their ancestors, those men of old who were beloved by God, was gradually weakening and becoming dulled among them. And the way of life among the Egyptians grew so strong among the multitude of those mentioned, that they came to forget their ancestral virtue, and had their lives so carried away by the assimilation to the Egyptians that they seemed to differ in no respect from the Egyptians in their manner of life. ^C Here, indeed, among those who had come to such a state, the God of their forefathers sends Moses as a leader and lawgiver, confirming the promises given through the oracles to their ancestors. Then, through him, having performed the recorded wonders and wondrous divine signs, he sets forth the law suitable for the character of those who were to hear it. For, as they were not capable, owing to the dullness of their character, of emulating the ancestral virtue—being such as they were, with souls that were passionate and diseased—they received the appropriate polity, regulated openly by the manifest law of Moses; while as for other things, he hinted at them through allusions, suggesting that they keep and observe symbols and shadows, and not yet the naked truth. And indeed, the polity of the Jews, beginning from there, from Moses, down to the coming of our Savior Jesus Christ,

was destined to flourish and thrive, ^A as the prophets of the Jews themselves had sung in their own oracles. For it was predicted long ago, partly by Moses himself, and partly by the prophets who followed, that the laws sanctioned by Moses would not be abolished before Christ established those tables of the New Testament, which now at last, by the gift of our same Savior, we see have been unsealed and explained to all nations everywhere, and the truth of those predictions thus confirmed by the very outcome of events. But since we have touched briefly upon the way of life of those Hebrews who were famous before Moses, and have presented their religion marked with its own character, it is logical that we should now contemplate the heads of their doctrine, drawn from the writings of Moses himself and of the prophets who came after him.

CHAPTER IX. The doctrines of the Hebrews.

^B The first of all, that wonderful theologian and lawgiver, when he was laying the foundations of a polity appropriate to piety for the nation of the Jews through his own writing, did not think he should use those common and worn-out starting points for his discourses. But having already beforehand grasped in his mind the whole law—by which some things were commanded to be done, others were forbidden, and at the same time the public and civil rules for their mutual dealings were prescribed—he understood that he had to begin the instruction of his doctrine from the ancestral theology, and that no other discipline of laws was suited to the beginning of his teaching.

He begins, therefore, ^A from God, in accordance with the ancestral theology of the Hebrew forefathers; for it was not a matter of indifference to him, as it was to the Egyptians and Phoenicians or the rest of the nations who cast down the venerable title into the common multitude, and who believe that the gods are those visible luminaries in the heavens, but also the invisible ones—those departed from among men—or even the chthonic and aerial demons, as we have proved in the preceding arguments. But, having taken the beginning of his whole discourse from the very Author of all things, the Creator of both invisible and visible things, he teaches that He is the lawgiver of the constitution of the universe, having established Him as King of the world, just as if it were some one great city. He instructs them, therefore, at the beginning, ^B that they should consider Him to be not only the master and lord of the laws that were to be ordained for men later, but also of those that are in the nature of all things. For he represents Him as the King and lawgiver of the entire world.

Chapter X. On general Providence, and the constitution and creation of the world.

Videlicet, by His nod and power, the essence and nature of all things consist; and by His laws and boundaries, in a fitting and orderly manner, the courses and successions of time are marked out. And first of all, by the divine voice and law, the ^C heaven attained its firmness, and the heavy mass of the earth, contrary to the condition of its nature, was suspended and balanced in a wondrous manner in the midst of the lighter elements; by the divine voice and law, the mutual and alternate conversion of night and day occurs; by the divine voice and law, the sun itself, the moon, and the dance of the remaining stars complete their orbit with elegant and harmonious motion. By the law of the supreme King, the changes of turnings, the distinctions of times, the cycles of years, and the annual seasons are fulfilled with the admirable consensus and harmony of the whole universe. By divine law, winter yields to spring, and this to the turns of the seasons that follow; by the same, the high and deep ^D vortices of the Ocean, swelling with wintry heats and floods, are enclosed within the boundaries of their own seas, which they dare not cross; the same law, by irrigating the dry and arid nature of the earth with flowing rains and gently falling snows, produces infinite kinds of plants and living creatures. In a word, that nature, the common parent of all things, serving the Divinity of the prepotent God, obeys His divine laws and counsels. For surely this great and most beautiful work of art did not come into being by chance and rashly, nor by a fortuitous and irrational motion, nor is it the product of an uncaused nature.

^A but is the handiwork of the all-wise Architect of all things, and is governed by His own reasons and holy laws. Beginning from this point, the prophet—having first prescribed the laws concerning the nature of all things before the legislation for men—exhorted them, first of all, to attend to the king of all, God, and not to be sluggish regarding His laws. This is because the sun itself, and the heaven and the world, and the earth and all things upon the earth, and whatever is considered to be a work of nature, serve His commands and ordinances, His holy laws and reasons. Wherefore the human race, being no small part of the whole, ought all the more, in accordance with what is fitting, to attend to the divine ordinances, and not be inferior to the individual elements. For the earth, in the beginning, was legislated by Him who said, "Let the earth bring forth the grass of hay, sowing seed according to its kind, and the fruit-bearing tree producing fruit"; and the earth, at once with the word, ^B displaying its obedience to the law, has not up to this day neglected the divine ordinance. So too the liquid substance, when God said, "Let the waters bring forth crawling creatures of living souls, and birds flying according to the firmament of heaven," at once with the word rendered the work, and even to this day it still shows its obedience to the law. And if the sun, and the moon, and the stars, being bound by the divine law prescribed to them as well, do not neglect the legislation in rendering their proper courses, and being for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years, what escape from pardon could remain for you, ^C if you neglect the divine laws? Having given these preliminary lessons, the admirable one won us over, and rightly made us emulators of His own knowledge of God and piety, because we have been unable to find anything similar to these among the theologians of the aforementioned nations. After the first theology, he proceeds to the second doctrine, which is both natural and philosophical. After the knowledge regarding God, therefore, and the ordering of the whole, he proceeds in order to that which is also second by nature. This was the discourse concerning the nature of man; for after the knowledge of God, it is necessary for one to know himself. Wherefore he instructs us next on what man is, and what leads him to the knowledge and piety of God, and what is the life of man ^D according to its primary purpose. Having thus divided the discourse concerning soul and body, he defines the true man as the soul, a participant in an intellectual, incorporeal, and rational substance, as having been created according to the image of God; while the body is the earthy covering of the soul. A third element he adds to these, the breath of life, a certain unifying power, joining what is taken from the earth to that which is made according to the image of God. And he records that the first dwelling of the man indicated was in the thrice-blessed paradise of God, filled with immortal and eternal goods. Yet he relates that this man, having likewise been subjected to the law of God as were the others at the beginning of all, was deprived of that thrice-desired life through heedlessness and the transgression of the divine command. These are the things which Moses philosophizes in the preambles of his holy laws, [as if...]

^A proclaiming that one should not neglect one’s own dignity, and the likeness to the Divine which we have obtained, from which the immortality of the soul has also been inherited by us. For it is surely not permissible for the image of a king to be obliterated; but the archetype and true image of the God of all is His Word, which is Wisdom itself, Life, Light, and Truth, and whatsoever one might conceive of as good and noble. The human mind, however, is an image of the image, wherefore it is acknowledged to have been made in the image of God. It was necessary for those who were to attend to these holy laws to be pre-instructed in these matters, and to keep in mind what part of them was taken from the earth and would be dissolved again into the earth, and what part in us is superior and resembles God, and how one must conduct oneself toward each of these mentioned, so as not to commit outrage and impiety against the man who is the image of God, nor to defile him with shameful and lawless deeds; but rather to carry always the longing for that first and thrice-blessed way of life and dwelling, ^B and to hasten to return, making it their prayer to obtain that first and thrice-blessed life and dignity; and furthermore to prepare themselves from this moment for the journey to that place, since it is not otherwise possible for the profane and the unpurified to gain access to those sacred things, from which the first man fell through heedlessness and the contempt of a divine commandment.

In addition to these things, the hierophant adds another most essential dogma, teaching us not to be in doubt that there is present to each person some evil demon, lying in wait, envious and hating what is good, and from the beginning a plotter against the salvation of men. He terms him a dragon and a serpent, and describes him as black and akin to darkness, full of venom and wickedness; whom he also says even now, out of envy of our divine life, trips us up, and attempts to drag down each of those who are attached to God; by whose deceit also the ancestors of our race fell from their more divine lot. ^C For this reason, one must be ever wakeful against the cunning machinations of the one indicated. And what need is there for us to linger on these matters, when it is time to go through each of the revealed things from the very writings themselves? Let us then make a new beginning from God, having first invoked Him as our helper in the name of our Savior.

CHAPTER XI. What the Hebrews thought about God, the first cause of all things.

^A The beginnings of this sublime theology take their origin from the very power that brings all things into being; the discourse concerning them, according to their way, sets forth the matter not by syllogisms nor by persuasive arguments, but in a more dogmatic and instructive manner, being divinely inspired by the Holy Spirit. ^B Moved and impelled by this, Moses begins the mysteries of his theology in this fashion: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." Then he proceeds thus: "And God said, Let there be light, and there was light." And again: "And God said, Let there be a firmament, and it was so." And again: "And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed after his kind, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit, whose seed is in itself, after his kind, upon the earth: and it was so." And again: "And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven, to give light upon the earth, and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and years: and it was so." And again: "And God said, Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature that hath life after his kind, and all the fowls of the air after his kind: and it was so." And again: "Let the earth bring forth the cattle, and creeping things, and beasts of the earth after his kind: and it was so." In all these things, the Scripture, by employing the formula "And God said," signifies that the divine will and the desire of God for existing things to come to be in such and such a way was sufficient, and that it is not at all necessary for us to think of any voice or syllables. ^C Furthermore, the same prophet, summarizing the whole account, concludes thus: "This," he says, "is the book of the generations of the heavens and of the earth, in the day that the Lord God made the heaven and the earth, and all that is in them." Such is the theology of the Hebrews, teaching that all things have been brought into existence by the creative Word of God. Thereafter, it teaches that the whole world, having been established by Him, is not left like an orphan by a father, but is governed at all times by the providence of God, so that God is not only the creator and maker of all things, but also their savior, governor, king, and leader, presiding forever over the sun itself, the moon, the stars, and the entire heaven and world, observing all things with a great eye and divine power, present to all heavenly and earthly things, and arranging and governing ^D everything in the world. Just as, indeed, the prophets who came after him, consistently singing by the same Divine Spirit, have testified, sometimes speaking in the person of the Divine Himself: "I am a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off. Shall a man hide himself in secret places, and I shall not see him? Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord." At other times, theologizing in this way: "Who hath measured the waters with the hollow of his hand, and the heaven with a span, and all the earth with a measure? Who hath weighed the mountains in scales, and the forests in a balance? Who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor?" And again: "Who hath established the heaven as a canopy, and stretched

^A it out as a tent to dwell in." And again: "Lift up your eyes to the height, and see who hath shown all these things." And following: "The Lord God who made the heaven, and fixed it, who strengthened the earth and the things therein, and giveth breath to the people upon it, and spirit to them who walk upon it, I am the Lord God." And following: "I stretched out the heaven alone, and I established the earth; I am the Lord God; there is none besides me." And again: "Thus shall ye say to them: The gods who have not made the heaven and the earth, let them perish from the face of the earth, and from under the heaven. The Lord who made the earth in his strength, set right the world in his wisdom, and in his understanding he stretched out the heaven, and brought up clouds from the end of the earth; he made lightnings for rain, and brought forth winds from his treasuries. Every man is become foolish from knowledge." And again: "Whither shall I go from thy spirit, and from thy face whither shall I flee? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, thou art present; if I take my wings in the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me." ^B But these things, and those similar to them, belong to the theologians who came after Moses, being themselves Hebrews, who spoke in harmony with the most ancient forefathers. But as for the God-beloved and thrice-blessed men who lived before Moses, being themselves also, the first of the Hebrews, and the first of all, Abraham himself, who is also called the forefather of the whole Jewish nation, listen: "And Abraham said to the king of Sodom: I will stretch out my hand to God the most high, who created the heaven and the earth." And even before Abraham, Melchisedec is introduced as the priest of the Most High God, blessing Abraham with these words: "Blessed be Abraham by the Most High God, who hath delivered thine enemies into thy hands; and blessed be God, who created the heaven and the earth." Moreover, the account ^C brings in Abraham speaking to his own servant in this way: "Put thy hand under my thigh, and I will adjure thee by the Lord God of heaven, and the God of the earth." And he adds: "The Lord God of heaven, and the God of the earth, who took me from my father's house, and from the land in which I was born." To all these things can also be joined that which Moses heard from God, who had appeared to him. For when he asked how he should think of God, the oracle responded thus: "I am who I am: thus shall thou say to the sons of Israel: He who is hath sent me unto you." Let these few things, then, be set forth from the infinite number of things in the theology of the Hebrews. Is it therefore worth comparing them in a contest with the theologies ^D of the wise Greeks, of whom some have declared there to be no God at all, while others have asserted that the stars are [Gods], which even happen to be glowing stones embedded in the heaven like nails and plates; and others that [the world] is an artificial fire proceeding on its way; and some that the world is not governed by the providence of God, but by some irrational nature; while others...

although they acknowledge the guidance of Divine Providence in celestial things, deny it entirely in earthly things. Others again say that the world had no origin, or deny that it was fashioned by God, claiming that it came into being and coalesced by its own accord and by some chance; while others maintain that the bulk of the universe was compacted from certain indivisible and most tenuous corpuscles, which were themselves devoid of both soul and reason. But enough has been said regarding the supreme God of all things, as drawn from the oracles of the Hebrews. It follows next to see how they have philosophized regarding the principle of created things, with the ruler of the universe established. ^A

CHAPTER XII

The Theology of the Hebrews Concerning the Second Principle.

Thales of Miletus asserted that water was the principle of all things; Anaximenes, air; Heraclitus, fire; Pythagoras, numbers; Epicurus, together with Democritus, indivisible corpuscles; Empedocles, the four elements. Let us therefore consider also the oracles of the Hebrews. After the unoriginated and unborn substance of the God of all things, which is unmixed and beyond all comprehension, they introduce a second substance ^B and divine power, the principle of all created things, which was the first to exist, and was begotten of the first cause, calling it the Word, and Wisdom, and the Power of God.

Job was the first to teach this, saying: "Whence then is wisdom found? And what is the place of understanding? Man knows not the path of it, nor is it found among men; yet we have heard the fame thereof. The Lord has established the path of it, and he knows the place of it." And David also, somewhere in the Psalms, assigning another name to this wisdom, says: "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens established," ^C thus celebrating this creative Word of God of all things in this way. And moreover, his son Solomon speaks in the person of this same Wisdom, saying: "I, Wisdom, have dwelt in counsel and knowledge, and I have called upon understanding. By me kings reign, and princes decree justice." And again: "The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways for his works. Before the age he founded me: in the beginning, before he made the earth, before the abysses came to be, before the mountains were set firm, before all the hills he begets me. When he was preparing the heaven, I was present with him; and as he was placing the foundations of the sources ^D under heaven, I was with him, fitting them. I was the one delighting day by day; and I rejoiced before him at all times, when he was rejoicing in the finished..."

world. These things Solomon mentions in the Proverbs. And these things are said by his person: “And what wisdom is, and how it came to be, I will relate, and I will not hide mysteries from you, but I will trace it out from the beginning of creation.” To which he continues: ^B “For it is an intelligent spirit, holy, unique, manifold, subtle, mobile, eloquent, unpolluted, omnipotent, overseeing all things, and pervading all spirits that are intelligent, pure, and most subtle. For Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things; it passes through and pervades all things because of its purity. For it is a vapor of the power of God, and a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty. Therefore, nothing polluted falls into it. For it is a radiance of eternal light, and a spotless mirror of the working of God, and an image of his goodness. And it reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things gracefully.” ^C And indeed, the divine Scripture introduces this divine Word as having been sent by the Father for the salvation of men in various ways. It testifies that he not only showed himself to be seen by Abraham and Moses and the other prophets most dear to God, but also that he taught them many things and prophesied the future, whenever it records that God and Lord appeared to the prophets or conversed with them. It further proclaims that he came into the knowledge of all men as the savior of those laboring and the physician of souls sent by the greater one: “He sent his Word, and healed them, and snatched them from their destructions.” And elsewhere it says again: “His word runs with speed.” Whence also the evangelical teaching, renewing that prophetic and ancient doctrine, illuminates the same type of theology in this way: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. This was in the beginning with God: all things were made through him, and without him was made nothing that was made. In him was life, and the life was the light ^D of men.” ^D Very properly indeed, Moses, that most wise man, being inspired by the same spirit, at the very beginning of the creation of the world which he describes, asserts that God in that same beginning made heaven and earth: and he introduces God as conversing with his own and first-begotten Word, as it were, concerning the creation of man, in the words where he writes: “And God said, Let us make man according to our image and likeness.” The Psalmist also hinted at this, when he was discussing the first cause: “He himself,” he says, “spoke, and they were born; he himself commanded, and they were created,” directly confirming the arrangement and exhortation of the first cause to the second, as of a Father to a Son. For it is clear to everyone, surely, that whoever says something, speaks to another, and he who commands, commands someone other than himself. And Moses, again, expressly mentioning both Lords, the Father, that is, and the Son, records the matter concerning the punishment of the ungodly, saying: “And the Lord…”

rained from the Lord upon Sodom and Gomorrah, sulphur and fire.” 75 To which David, in harmony, singing, said: “The Lord said to my Lord, Sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies a footstool for your feet.” 76 And proceeding further, hinting at that hidden generation of His, which can be explained by no one’s words, 77 he says: “From the womb before the morning star I have begotten you.” [(78)] But that you may not think that I am acting craftily, I shall present to you a Hebrew man as interpreter of the sense in the Scripture, one who understands his own ancestral traditions accurately, and who learned the doctrine from teachers—if, indeed, you are persuaded of Philo in such a way. Hear, therefore, also this man, in what way he interprets the divine utterances.

CHAPTER XIII. Philonis de secundo principio sententia.

“Why,” he says, as if speaking of another God, “does he say, ‘I made man in the image of God,’ and not rather in his own?” This has been delivered by oracle both most beautifully and wisely. For nothing mortal could be modeled after the highest and Father of all, but only after the second God, 79 who is the Word of Him. For it was necessary that the rational form in the soul of man be engraved by the divine Word, since the God who is before the Word is superior to all rational nature; and it was not permissible for any created thing to be made like unto Him who exists above the Word in the best and a certain preeminent Idea. These things I take from the first of Philo’s *Questions and Solutions*. The ^C same man, in his earlier work *On Agriculture*, calls this Word of God His first-begotten Son, in this manner: “These things, the shepherd and king God governs with justice, having established as law His own right Word, and first-begotten Son, who will receive the care of this sacred flock, as if he were the lieutenant of a great king.” And in the second [(80)] work, again, the same man writes these things word for word: “If anyone wishes to escape the difficulties [(81)] that are in the points at issue, let him say with courage…”

^A that nothing among material things is so strong that it has the power to carry the weight of the world. But the eternal Word of the eternal God is the strongest and most firm support of all things; this extends from the middle to the ends, and from the extremities to the middle, running the invincible course of nature, gathering and binding together all its parts. For the Father who begat it made it an ineffable bond of the universe. ^B With good reason, therefore, neither will the whole earth be dissolved by the mass of waters which its deep hollows have contained, nor will fire be extinguished by air, nor, conversely, will air be set aflame by fire, since the divine Word, acting as a boundary, sets itself as a vowel among mute elements, so that the whole may harmonize as if in musical notation, mediating and presiding over the threats of opposites by a persuasion of concord.” These things are from Philo. And Aristobulus, another learned man among the Hebrews who flourished during the reign of the Ptolemies, confirms this doctrine as ancestral, dedicating the interpretation of the sacred laws to Ptolemy himself, in which he says these things.

Chapter XIV

The words of Aristobulus on the same subject.

And in this way the Hebrews themselves have philosophized about the divine Word. But who would not acknowledge that this manner of speaking is most becoming to divine Majesty, by which the origin and fabrication of the universe is attributed to its intelligent and most wise Divinity, or, to speak better, to his very Wisdom and Reason, rather than to certain soulless and irrational elements? But enough concerning the origin of things according to the sense and doctrine of the Hebrews. Now let us see what they thought further about the production of endowed, rational creatures, according to those first beginnings of the nascent world.

Chapter XV.

On the production of endowed, rational creatures.

^A universe, they teach that it is not begotten from elsewhere than the Father himself, and is thus the firstborn, and the co-worker of the Father’s counsel, and the one shaped after his image. They are accustomed to say that this essence holds the first place among all things that came into being after it, and they call it the image of God, and the power of God, and the wisdom of God, and the Word of God, and indeed also the commander-in-chief of the power of the Lord, and the angel of the great counsel.

As for the intellectual and rational powers that follow this origin, they declare that they are not subtle beyond human nature, both on account of their multitude and the difference in their forms, except insofar as it is possible to venture and conjecture via analogy from the objects that are seen—the sun, the moon, the stars, and the heaven itself, which encompasses all things within its circuit. "For there is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars," says the divine Apostle; "for star differs from star in glory" (1 Cor. xv, 41).

In this way, therefore, one ought also to think of the world of immaterial and intellectual substances, as the indescribable and infinitely vast power of the God of the universe embraces ^B all things at once in their entirety, while the demiurgic and illuminating power of the divine Word follows as second after the Father; for which reason the Hebrews are accustomed to call Him the true light and the Sun of righteousness. Third, after this second essence, the nature of the holy Spirit takes its place, as it were, in the position of the moon; and him, too, they classify in that primary and royal rank and honor of the principle of the universe, as the origin of those things that came into being after it—I mean those that are subordinate and in need of the bounty provided by him, and that have been set in order by him before the Creator of the universe.

Indeed, while holding this third place, it provides a portion of the powers that are superior in it to those that are subordinate, but it also receives from another—that is, from the God the Word—who is indeed higher and better, he whom we previously stated occupies the second place after the most high and unbegotten essence of God, the King of all. From him, the God the Word himself also receives provision, and, just as from an eternal spring of springing-up divinity, he draws and distributes the rays of his own light, abundantly and freely, to all things at once—and indeed to the very holy Spirit himself, who is closer to him and nearer than all others—and to the intellectual and divine powers that follow after.

But as for that unbegotten origin of all things, who is the source of all good things, the cause of divinity and life alike, and of light and every virtue, and is the first among the first, the origin of origins, or rather, even above even origin and the first, and beyond all intellectual and graspable thought—all things whatsoever that he has embraced within his ineffable powers he shares with the first offspring alone, as he alone is able to receive and hold the abundance of the Father of good things, which is not accessible or graspable by others; ^C but he distributes that which is in part to those worthy according to their measure, through the service and mediation of the second, according to individual... ^D

^A dignity and capacity; yet so that those things which are perfect and holy in the highest degree are granted only to him who is numbered third from Him, and who is the leader and guide of those that follow, mediated through the Son to whom the affairs of the Father are committed. Hence, all the theologians of the Hebrews, after the God over all and after His firstborn Wisdom, name the third and holy power, the Holy Spirit, as God, by whom they too were enlightened, being filled with God.

Following this, concerning the heaven, the sun, and the moon, they affirm that star differs from star in glory. For mortal nature cannot indeed find the number of the stars, but they say that the oracles of the Hebrews state that to God the King of all, the multitudes and the names of the celestial host are not unknown; wherefore it is said among them: "He who numbers the multitudes of the stars, and calls them all ^B by name" (Ps. CXLVI, 4).

Thus, indeed, after those first things conceived among the incorporeal powers—the stars, which are preeminent in the power and substance of intellectual light—there is among us an immense and inconceivable difference, and numberless tribes and kinds, yet not so to the Maker of all things. Therefore, one of the theologians, setting forth that their comprehension belongs to God alone, says: "Ten thousand times ten thousand ministered to Him, and thousands of thousands stood before Him" (Dan. VII, 10). By the number, he shows that they are comprehensible to God, but by the magnitude, that they are infinite to us; wherefore we are accustomed to call the many and the infinite "ten thousand" for the sake of emphasis.

Another prophet, discoursing upon their nature, ^C thus theologizes about the Maker of all things, saying: "O Lord my God, how You have been greatly magnified; You have put on confession and majesty, clothing Yourself with light as with a garment, stretching out the heaven like a curtain; who makes His angels spirits, and His ministers a flame of fire" (Ps. CIII, 1-4). Do not think that the things indicated participate in the substance of the mortal and earthly fire among us, nor of the spirits of air belonging to a mindless nature; rather, as they name God Himself, they are incorporeal, immaterial, and self-intelligent—or rather, above intellect and every concept in nature. But metaphorically, they are also named spirit, fire, light, and by other titles appropriate to mortal ears; ^D and thus the oracles of God, calling the intellectual and rational essences angels and archangels, spirits and divine powers, heavenly hosts, principalities and authorities, thrones and lordships—as if saying "ten thousand times ten thousand stars and luminaries"—declare that the Sun of righteousness and His co-equal, the Holy Spirit, rule and preside over all.

And the divine and prophetic Scripture grants the fitting hymn and the appropriate theology to the God over all, who is the Father of all things—to Him in whom all things are gathered together at once, both rational and intelligent creatures, along with4 those visible in the heavens, the heaven itself, and all that it contains within it—as to the One who through all and in all is King over all, and Supreme Leader, and Cause of all things, as the Creator, Maker, Sustainer, and Savior of all.

^A And do not think that those natures are composed of this mortal and earthly fire, or of winds and substance devoid of reason. But just as they are accustomed to speak of God Himself—who, being incorporeal and removed from all matter, and being Mind in Himself, and indeed in the perfection of His nature transcending all mind and reason, is yet called by metaphors such as spirit, fire, light, and other such names that fall upon the ears of mortals—so too, when the sacred letters name angels, archangels, spirits, divine virtues, heavenly hosts, principalities, thrones, and dominations, as well as an infinite number of stellar and luminous genera, and spiritual natures endowed with reason that follow in succession, they teach that all of these are subject to and commanded by the Sun of justice and His twin and companion, that holy Spirit. ^B Finally, it exhorts the entire universe, together with the same Son and the holy Spirit, as well as the spiritual and rational creatures that are seen in heaven, and even heaven itself and all that it contains within its embrace, to sing a fitting hymn to the almighty one God and the supreme King and Prince of all things, the Cause of all, as to the Creator, Architect, Moderator, and Savior of the universe, and with joined voices to modulate a prompt song of true theology, with these words: "Praise God from the heavens, praise Him in the highest. Praise Him, all His angels; praise Him, all His virtues. Praise Him, sun and moon; praise Him, all stars and light. Praise Him, ye heavens of heavens; and ye waters that are above the heavens, let them praise the name of the Lord. For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created. He established them for ever and into the age of the age; He has set a decree, and it shall not pass away." We have accepted these doctrines of the Hebrews, and have deemed them better than the error of the Greeks, which had introduced a multitude of gods with demons as authors. For while we recognize certain divine virtues as handmaids and ministers of the almighty God, and render to them their just and proper honor, we yet confess that God is one, and worship Him alone, whom even heaven and all things contained by heaven or existing above heaven have learned to venerate, celebrate, proclaim as God, and bear witness to; since the Only-begotten of God Himself, who is also the Primogenitus of all things and the principle of the whole universe, encourages us by His own prayer to acknowledge His Father as the only true God and to worship Him alone. ^C

CHAPTER XVI. On contrary and opposing virtues.

Now it follows that we must see what the Hebrew writings have handed down concerning the contrary virtue. Therefore, just as they teach that those divine virtues which preside by the will of the supreme Father over the whole world, and also those "ministering spirits, sent for service for the sake of those who shall inherit salvation," and likewise the holy angels and archangels of God, and finally the entire intellectual and luminous nature that ministers to good things—which, being brilliant in itself, also adapts its own work to the distribution of all those goods which are derived from God to men—first of all surround the sides of the almighty Emperor of all things in the manner of Praetorian soldiers, and then, as if they were certain heavenly stars, encircle the Sun of justice and His companion the holy Spirit, drawing their light from both, and are therefore rightly and deservedly compared to the torches of heaven. Thus that other sort of virtues ^D

^A genus, which was led astray, cut itself off from the fellowship of the better by its own fault and wickedness, and exchanged its former light for darkness, being called by names that are indeed contrary to the former ones, but which harmonize perfectly with the depravity of its ways. And as for him who, having been the first of all to fall, afterward dragged the others down with him in the same defection from the better, because he had altogether fallen from that divine piety to the earth—partly being the author and contriver for himself of that poison with which his crime and impiety teems, and partly having voluntarily wrapped himself in madness and darkness as a deserter of the light—they are wont to call him now a dragon and a serpent, that black and earth-creeping thing, parent of lethal venom, now a savage and monstrous beast, and even a lion fed on human blood, and now the king ^B of all reptiles. But the divine records do not have any other cause for so dire a fall of his than a certain madness of soul and lunacy of mind, while they describe both the gravity of his fall and the magnitude of his insanity in this way: "How did Lucifer, who rose in the morning, fall from heaven? He was dashed to the ground, he who sent to all nations. But you said in your heart, I will ascend into heaven, I will set my throne above the stars of heaven, I will be like the Most High." And again: "Thus says the Lord: Because your heart was lifted up, and you said, I am God, I have dwelt in the habitation of God." And again: "You are the seal of resemblance and the crown of beauty; you were born in the delights of the paradise of God; you were adorned with every precious stone," and the rest. Then: "In the holy mountain of God you were born, in the midst of fiery stones you were born. You were perfect in your days, from the day you were created until iniquities were found in you; your heart was lifted up on account of your beauty, your knowledge was corrupted with your beauty; on account of the multitude of your sins, I cast you to the ground." From this speech we clearly understand that he of whom we are speaking, while previously joined in fellowship with those more divine powers, afterward fell utterly through his own arrogance and rebellion against God, in regard to the communion and enjoyment of the better things. Furthermore, ^C under him there is a certain innumerable and infinite nation of others, guilty of similar crimes, who on account of their impiety were excluded from the lot of the pious, and by the most just sentence and judgment of the almighty God, exchanged that splendid and divine dwelling, and the dignity which they enjoyed in the palace, and the happy fellowship of the angelic hosts, for Tartarus—a place altogether fitting for all the wicked, which the divine writings are wont to call the abyss and darkness, not such, however, as are denoted by these names among us, but of the kind which the divine oracle represents by this similarity of names. From this number, a small part—which might be material and a field of virtue for the athletes of piety—was left around the earth and below the moon; this has become a joint cause of the polytheistic error among men, which in no way differs from atheism. The divine Scripture has also applied appropriate names to these, more plainly when it calls them ^D evil spirits and demons, principalities and powers, and world-rulers, and spiritual forces of evil; but symbolically, when it urges the lover of God not to fear the troop of hostile demons, through which it says: "You shall tread upon the asp and the basilisk, and you shall trample the lion and the dragon." A proof of these things...

^A that they are filled with enmity toward God is their desire to be proclaimed as gods themselves and to snatch up for themselves the honors due to God, and to attempt to lure the easily led by divinations and oracles, as if by certain baits and hooks, and to draw them away from looking up to the God of all, and to drag them down into the bottomless pit of impious and godless superstition. Therefore, those of the Hebrews alone have from ancient times been zealous in fleeing from their deceits, explicitly teaching that all the gods of the nations are demons. But now, it must be said with God’s help, through the gospel teaching of our Savior, all nations everywhere in the inhabited world have been freed from the bonds of demons and sing hymns of praise to God, whom we have learned is alone the Savior, the King, and the God of all.

CHAPTER XVII. Concerning the nature of man.

ground, and formed the man, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." And the Hebrew Philo, when he explains these same words, adds yet these things further to those he has set forth. ^A

CHAPTER XVIII.

Philo's opinion concerning the soul.

"The rest of philosophers," he says, "calling our mind a portion of the ethereal nature, have wished man to be joined in kinship with the ether. But the great Moses did not make the form of the soul endowed with reason similar to any of the things that have been born, but rather asserted it to be a genuine coin of that divine and invisible Spirit, impressed and stamped with the seal of God, whose character is the eternal Word. ^B For he says, 'God breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.' So it was necessary for him who received that spirit to reflect the likeness of Him who inspired it; and for this reason man is said to have been made in the image of God, and not in the image of any created thing. It was fitting, therefore, that the soul of man, having been fashioned according to the archetypal Word of the Cause, should also have its body raised up, and its eyes directed toward heaven, which is the purest part of the universe." Thus far he.

Rightly indeed does the divine Scripture say that man was not created in the same manner as the rest of the animals; for the others came forth from the earth at the single command of God the sovereign of all, and others flew into existence from the moist substance by His same will. ^C Yet, of all the animals on earth, one alone, the most dear to God—namely, we ourselves—has had our soul created according to the image and likeness of God, in view of which our nature is seen to be princely and kingly, and is the only one among those on earth to be rational, creative, judicial, legislative, and capable of grasping arts and sciences. For there is only the soul in man, an intellectual and rational essence, in which other earthly animals have no share. Wherefore they serve, as it were, and provide the place of domestics for man; while he, as lord and master, subdues them and places them under his control, though they are much superior to him in the strength of their bodies, ^D yet inferior because of their lack of an intellectual essence.

That he was brought into existence by God Himself, according to the image and likeness of God with a certain distinguishing excellence, the divine oracles testify. For this reason, he is able to form within his thoughts notions of God, and to perceive the reasons and power of wisdom, justice, and all other virtues; and he alone among mortals is shown to have the capacity—by reason of the kinship with things above—to reckon the courses of the sun, the moon, and the stars, and the cycles of days and hours. But that which is externally wrapped around him, being of a different kind in its substance and earth-born, is nonetheless also a work of God, taken from the earth and returning to the same. Therefore, he ought to take care of it, using it as a master uses a beast of burden that is heavy and unruly, and to guide it gently and nourish it as a servant, for the sake of the human life.

But that inner master, because it is a free and noble nature and joined in kinship with God himself, must be adorned with noble and liberal virtues, since it was also adorned by the Creator of all things himself. ^A For the sacred scriptures add that the supreme and all-powerful King, when He had decorated the primary nature of man with divine faculties and the likeness of God, and the man was subsequently also called into the society of the divine assemblies, assigned to him his first dwelling place of life, consistent with his gifts and rewards, in a paradise overflowing with every good thing. But man, who had received so great a store of riches from Him, as from an excellent parent, at the very beginning, fell of his own volition from the lot of that more divine condition, and because of the violation of the command of the divine law, was sent away and relegated to a mortal dwelling. ^B Therefore it is altogether true that we must dedicate a certain special effort to piety, so that we may amend the things that have happened since the sin by the happier auspices of our subsequent life, and finally that we may be seized with every zeal and contention to recover the possession of the riches that were once ours. For the end of human nature is not fixed here, on earth—that is, in destruction and death—but rather in that state and rank from which the head of the human race fell. Thus we must strive and act so that we may restore that former radiance of our spiritual nature and the ornaments of the divine likeness, and such must be the constant and perpetual care of all those who are held by any zeal for piety and virtue.

These, therefore, are the things which the Hebrews have taught concerning the nature of man from the furthest memory, when no race of the Greeks yet existed; who, having raised their heads from the earth only yesterday or the day before, decided to steal the riches of the barbarians, and did not spare the proper goods of the Hebrews, as we shall show presently in the progress of this discussion. ^C But since this was the proper and principal heading of the Hebrew doctrines—that they established the all-powerful God as the one artificer and maker of all things generally, and also of that substance which underlies bodies, which the Greeks call "matter"—the infinite force of the barbarians and Greeks at the same time has attacked this: for some have claimed that matter is the source of all wickedness and that it lacks a beginning; others have argued that it was indeed by its own nature stripped of every quality and figure, but that by the power of God it adopted the qualities of the world. It must be shown how the opinion of the Hebrews holds the much better position, being supported by logical proof in the question at hand and refuting the argument with the correct reasoning of contradictory words. I shall set forth the voices of those who, before us, have defined the doctrine with precision, and first of Dionysius [(87)], who in the first of the books he composed against Sabellius writes as follows regarding the subject at hand.

CHAPTER XIX. That matter is not without origin.

^A It is also an act of impiety, he says, that many would submit matter—whose origin they claim is non-existent—to the divine power for arrangement and ornamentation, while they declare that it is, by its own nature, passive and tractable, and easily undergoes transformations imprinted by the divine. Indeed, let them explain how it is that both similarity and dissimilarity could apply to God and to matter. For one would have to conceive of something greater than both, which it is not even lawful to think concerning God. For if the "unbegotten," which is said to be common to both, is understood as something else beyond either, whence did it arise in them? For if God himself is the unbegotten, ^B and this unbegottenness is His essence, as one might say, then matter could not be unbegotten; for matter and God are not the same thing. But if each is what it is—that is, matter is matter and God is God—and the "unbegotten" is present in both, it is evident that it is something different from each of them, and older and higher than both. ^C And entirely refutatory of the notion that these things coexist is the very difference of their opposing conditions—or rather, the fact that matter exists of itself, distinct from them. For let them explain the cause for which, while both are unbegotten, God is impassible, immutable, unmoved, and efficient, while matter is the opposite: passive, mutable, unstable, and subject to being transformed. And how did they adapt and come together? Did God craft matter by accommodating Himself to the nature of matter? But this is absurd; it is like humans working in gold or stone, or working in other crafts wherein materials can be shaped and molded, for God to work by hand. But if it is said that God made matter as He willed, ^D according to His own wisdom, and stamped upon it the multiform and omnivariant shape and type of His own creation, this argument is both sound and true, and furthermore, it confirms that God, who is the life and foundation of the whole universe, is devoid of all origin. For, along with that negation of origin, it joins a proper rationale for His existence. But many things could be said against that class of men, though this discussion belongs to another place. Nevertheless, if they are compared with the most wicked fabricators of so many gods, they will be considered to speak less impiously. Thus far Dionysius. Now receive the words of Origen.

CHAPTER XX. De eodem, ex Origenis in Genesin Commentariis.

If anyone, he says, is caught in that error, by reason of human

^A artisans, that they cannot accept that God is able to construct existing things without unbegotten matter underlying them—since neither can a sculptor create his own work without bronze, nor a carpenter without wood, nor a builder without stones—we must ask him concerning the power of God, whether, if God has wished to bring into existence whatever He wills, and His will is neither wanting nor lacking in strength, He is able to bring into existence what He wills. For by what logic did He establish those qualities (which, according to all who introduce Providence, did not previously exist) into the adornment of the universe by His own Word, through His ineffable power and wisdom? By that same logic, His will is sufficient to cause the matter which He requires to come into being.

For we shall raise ^B this objection to those who do not wish things to be this way: if it does not follow for them that God was fortunate in having found the substance to be unbegotten—which substance, if the unbegotten nature had not been lying before Him, He would have been able to make no work at all, but would have remained neither Creator, nor Father, nor Benefactor, nor Good, nor any other of the things reasonably said of God—whence also did He have the measure of the underlying substance, as much as would be sufficient for the existence of so great a world? For it is as if some Providence older than God had necessarily placed the matter before God, providing that the art inherent in Him should not be exercised in vain, when there was no substance with which He could converse in order to decorate the beauty of such a world. And whence, furthermore, did it become receptive of every quality that God wills, unless God Himself had made for Himself such a quantity and such a quality as He wished it to have?

^C Having accepted for the sake of argument that matter is unbegotten, we shall say these things to those who wish it so: that if it had turned out to be such without Providence placing the substance before God, then if Providence were actually established, what more would It have done than what happens by chance? And if He Himself, when there was no matter, wished to construct it, what more would His wisdom and divinity have accomplished than what comes into being from an unbegotten entity? For if the same thing is found to be generated by Providence as that which came into being even without Providence, why shall we not also abolish the Creator and the Architect in the case of the world? For just as it is absurd in the case of the world, which is so skillfully constructed, to say that it came into being by such-and-such an automacy without a wise architect, ^D so also it is irrational that matter—so great and of such quality, and thus receptive to the Divine Word—should have existed as unbegotten.

However, to those who argue that no creator creates without matter, it must be said that they compare things unfairly. For Providence provides matter to every artisan, coming from a prior art, whether human or divine. These things, then, will suffice for the present against those who, because of the saying, "But the earth was invisible and unconstructed," imagine the corporeal nature to be unbegotten. So much for him. And the Hebrew Philo also, in his *On Providence* (89), discusses these things regarding matter.

CHAPTER XXI. From Philo on the same argument.

^B "Now," he says, "we must determine whether this great mass of nature had some beginning. God, therefore, when He was planning the construction of this world, provided such a specific amount of matter that nothing was entirely lacking to it, nor was there anything at all in excess. For it would be completely absurd ^C to suggest that the common run of our own craftsmen, whenever they produce something—especially things of great value—carefully weigh out exactly how much matter is sufficient for the task, while He who discovered the numbers, measures, and the exact proportions and equalities of things among themselves, would have given no thought to the necessary quantity of matter. I will say, therefore, quite freely, that for the creation of this world there was need of neither less nor more matter. Otherwise, it would never have attained such perfection, nor would it have been so completely and solidly constructed in every one of its parts, had it not been fashioned from a whole and perfect nature. ^D For it is the mark of a prudent and skilled craftsman, before he begins a work, to have before his eyes the amount of matter required. And human beings, though they may excel others in knowledge, yet can scarcely ever be entirely liberated from the error that clings to mortals by a certain kinship, and may perhaps occasionally stray in their works from the just proportion of matter, so that it becomes necessary for them to add something to a lesser amount, or to subtract something from a larger one. But God, the fountain, I say, of all cognition and science, could not have applied more or less than was fitting, since He makes use of all the principles of measures and weights, tempered by a thoroughly accurate and perfect moderation. ^A Indeed, whoever wishes to trifle otherwise will, of course, immediately object to all the works of other craftsmen, whose construction succeeds better and more successfully in the eyes of the common people through some addition or subtraction of material. But it is the work of a sophist to hunt for clever arguments; it is the work of wisdom to investigate each of the things in nature." And let these matters of Philo have it in this way.

But against Maximus—no obscure man of the Christian discipline—there has also been written a relevant work titled *On Matter*, from which I think it useful to set forth moderate excerpts, so that the truth of the problem may be accurately investigated. ^B Indeed, let the sophist seek out his clever arguments; the wise man is occupied with searching into the truth of natural things. So much, then, for Philo. Furthermore, since Maximus, a professor of the Christian religion, is no obscure figure, he also wrote a separate and personal book *On Matter*.

might understand: even though this Maximum, whoever he may be, is described by him with some coldness, just as Dionysius of Alexandria was before him. Nevertheless, that this whole discussion was a dialogue regarding matter is evident to the reader.

CHAPTER XXII: That matter is neither without an origin nor the cause of evils.

^A "Indeed," he says, "I do not doubt that you understand with me that it is impossible for two things to exist simultaneously that lack an origin, although you seem to posit this and to add further that of the two, it is necessary to say that either God is separated from matter or that He is entirely joined with it. Whoever, therefore, wishes Him to be so joined will posit only one thing that lacks an origin; for then one would inevitably be a part of the other. But things that have a mutual relationship of part to part—the same things that lack an origin—cannot be two at the same time. For just as we say that a human being was created by God in such a way that he is not actually different parts distracted into several generated things, but—as logic itself demands—is one single generated thing though constituted from various parts, so it is clearly necessary, if you deny that God is separated from matter, to acknowledge only one thing that is ungenerated. But if you wish Him to be separated from it, something must necessarily be established between the two by which the division of the two is demonstrated. For it is impossible for something to be examined in a state of separation from something else without a third thing existing, by which the separation of each occurs; and this does not stop there, but applies to a great many other things. ^B For the argument which we have stated in the case of two ungenerated things, the same would necessarily likewise proceed if three ungenerated things were proposed. For regarding these as well, I would ask if they are separated from each other or if, conversely, each is joined to its neighbor. If one were to say they are joined, he will hear the same argument as the first; if he says they are separated, he will not escape the substance that necessarily does the separating.

But if one should also mention a third argument—as being suitable to be said regarding ungenerated things—that is, that God is not separated from matter, nor yet joined as a part, but that God is in matter as in a place, or matter in God, let him hear the consistent logic: that if we say matter is a place for God, we must necessarily also call Him circumscribed 95, and encompassed by matter. Moreover, it is also necessary that He be moved in the same disordered way as matter, and that He neither stand nor remain fixed in Himself, since that in which He is exists is carried hither and thither in various ways. Furthermore, it is necessary to say that God has come to exist in worse conditions. ^C For if matter was once disordered, and He decided to fashion it by turning it toward something better, there was a time when God was in disorder. I would justly ask this question too: whether God filled the matter, or was in some part of it. If one wishes to say that God is in some part of matter, he says that He is much smaller than matter; if 96 a part of it, it contained Him entirely. But if he says that He is in all the matter, one must say how He labored as a craftsman over it. For it is necessary to speak of some contraction of God, upon which, when it occurred, He fashioned that from which He had withdrawn, or that He fashioned it while joined to the matter, not having a place to withdraw to, as it were. ^D ...not except against those who would imagine a corporeal God, could have any weight.

likewise be logically compelled to conclude that it is unbegotten; and one must inquire whether He is divided from Himself—as there are genera of animals in the air which, in order to receive things that come to pass within it, suffer a division and partitioning of parts—or rather as a place, that is to say, as water is situated in earth. For if we say that it is as in the air, we are compelled to call God divisible; but if it is as water in the earth, and the matter was disorderly, unshaped, and in addition to these things containing evils, it is necessary to call God the place of the disorderly and the evil. This seems to me not pious, but rather perilous. For you hold that matter exists so that you may not call God the author of evils, and in choosing to flee from this, you say He is a container of evils. If you were asserting that matter exists unbegotten from the things that come into being, I would have set forth a long argument concerning it to prove that its existence is impossible; but since you said that the genesis of evils is the cause of such an assumption, for this reason I think I must attend to the examination of these matters. ^B For when the argument has become clear as to the manner in which evils exist, and that it is not possible to call God not responsible for evils if one posits that He is matter, then such a supposition seems to me to be destroyed. You affirm, therefore, that matter without quality co-exists with God, out of which He fashioned this genesis of the world. That is how it seems to me. If, then, matter happened to be without quality, and the world was brought into being by God, and the qualities are in the world, then God became the creator of the qualities. It is so. And since I also heard you say before that it is impossible for anything to come into being from non-being, answer my question. You seem to me to hold that the qualities of the world did not come into being from underlying qualities, but that they exist as something different alongside the substances. It is so. If, therefore, God did not fashion the qualities from underlying qualities, nor from the substances, it is necessary to say that these things were brought into being by God from non-being, since they themselves are not substances. ^C Whence you seemed to me to speak superfluously; it has been reasoned that it is not impossible to hold that things were brought into being by God from non-being. But let the argument concerning this stand thus. For even among us we observe men creating certain things from non-being, even if they appear most of all to be making them *in* something; let us take the example of architects. For these men create cities, not from cities, and likewise temples, not from temples. If, however, because substances underlie these things, you think they make them from existing things, you are mistaken in your argument; for it is not as has been reasoned that it is impossible... ^D [alt-version omitted]

that anything should be produced from nothing. For even the world exists, and qualities are in the world, and of these qualities God is surely the author. Assuredly. Since, therefore, I was hearing from you a little while ago that absolutely nothing can come from nothing, I would wish for you to answer this for me. You imagine, if I am not mistaken, that the world’s qualities were not made from [underlying] ^A qualities, and yet they are entirely distinct from the natures. If, therefore, the qualities are from God, and were not produced from quality-bearing subjects, nor even from natures, since they are not natures, it is certain that they must have been produced from nothing. Wherefore, in my opinion, it is in vain for you to say that your arguments proved that God could not be believed to have made anything at all out of nothing. Although it is permissible to discuss this matter in this way also. We see at times among humans that some things come to be from what is nowhere, so that they seem most of all to execute a work undertaken upon some other material. For, to take the example of architects, they build cities, yet not from cities; and temples, too, not from temples. For if you think that because certain substances are subject to them, they produce those things from what was already existing, your argument deceives you. ^B For such a substance does not make either a city or a temple, but only that art which is concerned with the substance. That art, moreover, does not exist from some prior kind of art that is contained in those substances, but is perfected without any art whatsoever having preceded it in them. But you will object that an artisan brings into being an art in the substance only from the art with which he is endowed. Yet, not even in man himself is that art perfected from some preceding art. For it is not legitimate to posit any art that exists in and of itself, since it is of the class of accidents, and thus of those things which only begin to be by the benefit of another, when they are produced within a substance. For even if architecture should not exist, a house will [still] be; but the same [art], if a man were not first, could not exist at all. So it must necessarily be concluded that the nature of ^C such arts is that they arise in men from what previously did not exist. But if we show this to be true in men, could anyone henceforth dare to deny that qualities, or even substances themselves, can be made by God from nothing? For whatever reason demonstrates that anything can at all be made from nothing, the same must hold true in the case of substances as well. ^D

But since you are eager to hear something about the generation of evils, I shall now enter into that discussion. And first, I would like to ask you a few questions. Do you think, then, that evils are substances, or are they qualities of substances? You say they are qualities of substances. Yet matter was despoiled of quality, as it was of form; for this was already posited before, and I followed that line of argument. Therefore, if evils are also qualities of substances, and matter lacked every quality, and you have confessed that God is the author of qualities; then He will also be the architect of evils. Thus, it is unnecessary to attach matter to God, since not even in this way can you have a God absolved and immune from the procreation of evils. You, if you have anything to answer to this argument, begin now. And indeed, if this discussion were undertaken by us out of a zeal for contention and fighting, I would not allow the account of evils to be called into question again. But since friendship, and the utility of one’s neighbor, have brought us into this kind of discourse, come, let us be permitted to discuss this question anew. I do not doubt that my sentiment, and what I follow in this, is already abundantly known and explored by you: that I am doing this, certainly, not in order to defeat the false with plausible arguments, but that the truth might be shown after accurate examination. And I am well aware that you are likewise disposed. Wherefore, by whatever mode you think you are able to find the truth, use it without

being shamed. For you will not only benefit yourself by using the better way, but certainly me as well, regarding those things of which I am ignorant. It seems to me, ^A you clearly show that evils also are certain substances; for I do not see them existing apart from substances. Since, therefore, my good sir, you also say that evils are substances, it is necessary to examine the definition of substance. Does it seem to you that substance is some bodily constitution? It does. Does that bodily constitution exist of itself, not needing anything, upon the occurrence of which it will receive existence? It is so. Does it seem to you that evils are the actions of someone? So it seems to me. And do actions receive their existence when the one who acts is present? It is so. And if the one who acts does not exist, will that which he does ever exist? It will not. Therefore, if substance is some bodily constitution, and this does not need anyone, upon becoming present with whom it will receive existence, but evils are the actions of someone, and actions do need someone, upon becoming present with whom they receive existence; evils will not be substances. ^B And if evils were substance, and murder is an evil, it is an action of someone; therefore murder is not a substance. But if you wish for those who act to be substances, I agree with you. For example, man, the murderer, insofar as he is a man, is a substance; but that which he performs, murder, is not a substance, but a work of the substance. And we call a man sometimes evil, on account of his murdering, and sometimes again, on account of his doing good works, good. And these names are attached to the substance from the things that happen to it, which it itself is not. For neither is murder the substance, nor again is adultery, nor any of the similar evils; but just as from grammar the grammarian is named, and from rhetoric the rhetorician, and from medicine ^C the physician, the substance being neither medicine, nor rhetoric, nor grammar, but receiving the appellation from the things that happen to it—from which it seems to be named thus, not being either of them—it seems to me in the same way it receives the name of substance from those things that are thought to be evils, without being either of them. And consider similarly, if you fashion in your mind some other cause of evils for men, as that one—insofar as he acts in these things and incites to commit evils—is himself also evil from the things he performs. For this reason that one too is said to be evil, because he is the creator of evils; but the things which someone performs are not himself, but are his ^D actions, from which he receives the name of being evil. For if we were to say that he himself is that which he performs—and he performs murders and adulteries and thefts, and as many things as are similar to these—he is these things. But if he is these, and these things have their constitution when they come to be, and when they do not come to be they cease to exist, and these things come to be through men; men will be the creators of these, and responsible for their coming into existence and for their ceasing to exist. But if you say these things are his actions, from which he obtains the being evil, it is not from things that the substance is. And we said that evil is spoken of from the things which happen to it.

which are not the substance, as from medicine one is called a physician. But if from the things by which he acts, he takes a beginning of being, he began also to be evil, and these evils began also. But if it is so, he will not be without beginning as evil, nor will evils be unbegotten, since they are said to be begotten by him. As for the argument directed to the other, my friend, you seem to me to have constructed it sufficiently; for from those things you previously assumed in your argument, you seemed to draw the conclusion well. For truly, if matter happened to be without quality, and God is the creator of the qualities, and the evils are qualities, then God is the creator of the evils. So let this argument directed to that person be well spoken; but to me it seems false to say that matter is without quality. For it is not even possible to speak of any cause whatsoever as without quality; for in that very thing in which one says it is without quality, he indicates its quality, by describing what kind of thing matter is, which is a species of quality. Wherefore, if it pleases you, take up the argument with me from the beginning. For to me, matter seems ^A to possess qualities from the beginning; for thus I also say that the evils are from its outflow, so that God may be blameless of the evils, and matter be the cause of all these. I accept your readiness, my friend, and I praise your zeal in these discourses. For it was indeed fitting that each lover of learning should not simply and as it happened agree to what is said, but should make a precise examination of the arguments. For even if the one inquiring, having defined a fallacious premise, offered it to the one conversing to draw a conclusion as he wishes, this will not also persuade the listener; but if anything seems possible to be said well, this he will say; from which one of two things will happen: either he will be perfectly benefited having heard the one toward whom he seemed to be moved, or he will refute the one conversing as not speaking the truth. But ^B you do not seem to me to have properly said that matter possesses qualities from the beginning. For if this is so, of what will God be the creator? For whether we say [he is the creator] of substances, we say these existed beforehand; or again of qualities, and these [also] existed. Therefore, if substance exists and qualities exist, it seems to me redundant to call God a creator. But that I may not seem to be constructing a certain argument, answer now when asked: in what way do you say God is the creator? Is it that he changed the substances so that those which were once no longer exist, but others came to be besides them, or that he preserved those substances which were before this, but changed their qualities? It does not seem to me that any change of substances has happened; for it seems absurd to me to say this. But I say that a certain change of the qualities has happened, in accordance with which I say that God is the creator. And just as if it should chance to be said that a house has been made out of stones, in which case it is not possible to say that the stones no longer remain in their substance, having become a house; for by the quality of the substance ^C acting, they are not now his own, but his actions are certain ones, from which it draws the name of evil. For indeed, if we were to say that things done by anyone are the same as the being of the person himself, then when murders, adulteries, thefts, and other crimes of that kind are perpetrated by someone, all these would at once be one and the same person. Moreover, if it is of such a kind: since all these things exist only when they are done, and at the same time cease to be when they cease to be done, but are performed by men, then men themselves, as their creators, will also be the causes of why they exist at one time and not at another. But if you concede that these are his actions, he has it that he is evil from those things which he did, not from those of which the substance consists. For we said that the appellation of evil is to be sought from those things which happen to the substance, and which are not the substance itself, just as we name a physician from medicine. But now, if, according to the condition of the things done by him, he begins to be of a certain kind, he also begins to be a creator at the same time, and evils themselves began at the same time. If this is true, then neither will the creator lack a beginning of his malice, nor will the evils themselves lack an origin, since they are said to have proceeded from him. You have indeed excellently and abundantly refuted the error of the previous opinion, O friend, with such a lucid discussion; for from those things which you had previously assumed, the matter is excellently settled. For indeed, if matter was stripped of all quality, and consequently if God is the author of qualities, and those qualities are evils, it follows clearly that God is the author of evils. Wherefore, ^D as far as that former opinion is concerned, I have been led away from it by this reason of yours. So be it. But now that seems false to me, that matter was devoid of qualities. For no substance can be said to lack every quality; since by the very fact that one might say that matter is stripped of every quality, he would be indicating its proper quality, while explaining what kind of thing matter is, which itself is indeed a certain singular type of quality. Therefore, if it is not burdensome, take up this discussion for me again from the head. For I now defend that matter was already endowed with qualities from all eternity, and that at the same time all evils were born from a certain outflow of it, so that the cause of evils is not assigned to God, which should be attributed only to matter. To me, indeed, your spirit, O friend, is very pleasing; this studious effort in this kind of contest is welcome. And indeed, the intention of all those who profess to be desirous of learning ought to be the same, so that they might not simply and rashly snatch at whatever is said by others, but might accurately and diligently weigh the force and weight of the arguments in their own moments.

^A But I say that the house has come to be a composition, with the original quality of the stones having undergone change; so it seems to me that God also, while the substance remained, has performed some kind of change of its qualities, according to which I say that the genesis of this world has come to be from God. Since, therefore, you say that some change of qualities has come to be from God, answer me a little, as you are willing to set forth your position. Tell me, then, does it seem to you also that evils are qualities of substances? It does. Were these qualities in matter from above, or did they have a beginning of existence? I say that these qualities coexist unbegotten with matter. And do you not say that God has performed some change of the qualities? This I say. Whether, then, toward the better or toward the worse? It seems to me right to say, toward the better. ^B Therefore, if evils are qualities of matter, and the Lord turned its qualities toward the better, whence evils come is a matter of necessary inquiry. For either the qualities remained whatever they were by nature, or if indeed they were not previously evil, but you say that because they were turned by God these first qualities regarding matter became such, then God will be the cause of evils, having turned qualities that were not evil into being evil. Or does it not seem to you that God turned the evil qualities toward the better, but that you say the rest alone—those which happened to be indifferent—were turned by God for the sake of the ordering? That is how I held it from the beginning. Why, then, do you say that He left the qualities of wicked things as they were? Was it because He was able to remove even those, but did not wish to, or because He did not possess the power? For if you shall say that He was able but did not wish it, it is necessary to call Him the cause of these things, because, being able to cause them not to be evil, He allowed them to remain as they were, and especially when He began to fashion the matter. For if He had no concern at all for the matter, He would not be the cause of what He allowed to remain. Since, however, He was fashioning some part of it and left some part thus, being able to turn those also toward the better, it seems to me that He is worthy to incur blame, having left a part of matter to be evil, to the destruction of the part which He fashioned. Moreover, it seems to me that even the greatest things are wronged by this part, the very part of matter which He fashioned, being now ^C receptive of evils. For if anyone were to examine the facts with accuracy, he will find the matter to be suffering more severely now than in its former disorder. For before it was distinguished, the state of not even perceiving evils was present to it; but now each of its parts receives a perception of evils. Take the example for me of man. Before he is fashioned and becomes a living being by the art of the Creator, he had this from nature, not to perceive evils; but from the moment he becomes man by God, he also takes possession of the perception of the encroaching evil. And that which you say is a goodness ^D of matter, having come to be from God, is found rather to have come to it for the worse. But if, from the inability of God to remove the evils, you say that he has not ceased, you will say that God is nonexistent. But—

this impossibility will be either because he is by nature weak, or because he is conquered by fear, being enslaved to some greater power. Now if you dare to say that God is by nature weak, you seem to me to be endangering his very salvation; but if you say he is conquered by fear of a greater power, then evils will be greater than God, as they overcome the impulse of his will—which seems to me absurd to say concerning God. For why would not these rather be gods, since they are able, according to your argument, to overcome God, if indeed we call him God who holds authority over all things?

But I wish to ask you a few questions regarding matter itself. Tell me, bringing your proof, is matter something simple or composite? For the difference in existing things brings me to such an examination of this doctrine. ^B If matter happened to be simple and uniform, while the universe is composite, and has its constitution from diverse substances and mixtures? For that which is composite indicates a mixture of certain simple things. But if, on the other hand, you should wish to call matter composite, you will say that it is in every way composed of certain simple things. And if it was composed of simple things, the simple things existed at some time by themselves, from which, being composed, matter came to be—from which point it is shown to be generated. For if matter is composite, and composite things have their constitution from simple things, there was a time when matter was not, that is, before the simple things came together. But if there was a time when matter was not, and there was never a time when the ungenerated was not, then matter will not be ungenerated. And from this it will follow that there are many ungenerated things. For if God was ungenerated, and the simple things from which matter was composed were also ungenerated, there will not be only two ungenerated things.

Does it seem to you that none of the things that exist is contrary to itself? It does. And is water contrary to fire? It seems so to me. Likewise also darkness to light, the cold to the hot, and in addition to these, the moist to the dry? It seems so to me. Then if nothing of the things that exist is contrary to itself, there will not be one matter, nor will it be from one matter. ^C But I wish to ask you another argument similar to this. Does it seem to you that the parts are not destructive of one another? It does. And are fire and water parts of matter, and likewise also the rest? It is so. But what then? Does it not seem to you that water is destructive of fire, and light of darkness, and whatever things are similar to these? It does. Then if the parts are not destructive of one another, they will not be parts of one another. And if they are not parts of one another, they will not be of one matter. Yet neither will they themselves be matter, since none of the things that exist is destructive of itself, according to the argument concerning the contrary. For no thing is contrary to itself; for things that are contrary are by nature suited to be contrary to other things; for instance, white is not contrary to itself, but is said to be contrary to black; and light likewise is shown not to be contrary to itself, but to darkness.

are considered to be in the place of gods, if, as you say, they can excel even God, and if we recognize that to be God, finally, which possesses supreme power over all things? But it is useful, furthermore, to inquire of you regarding some things concerning matter. Tell me therefore, I pray you, do you think that matter was simple or composite? For the great diversity of things leads me to the examination of this question. If matter was simple, and of one form and figure only, how, then, was the world composed out of it, consisting of such a great variety of substances and temperaments? For that which is called composite certainly involves a mixture of many simple things. But if you wish it to have been composite, then it was composed out of simple things. And if that is true, those simple things already existed of themselves long before, from the composition of which matter was formed. From this it follows that matter was generated. For if matter is composite, and it is built up from simple things, there certainly was a time when matter did not yet exist, that is, before that conjunction of simple things among themselves took place. But if there was some such time when matter did not yet exist, and yet there never was a time when a thing lacking birth and beginning did not exist, matter could not have been lacking in birth. Moreover, we shall then establish several things that lack birth. For if both God and those simple things, of which matter is concreted, lack birth, not only two things will be considered as lacking birth. Lastly, do you grant that a thing which is fundamentally nothing, which fights against itself, can exist? Not at all. Does water fight with fire? It certainly does. Likewise, does darkness oppose light, cold oppose heat, and moist oppose dry? Certainly. If, therefore, no thing fights against itself, it follows entirely that neither is there a single matter, nor does the universe consist of matter alone. ^C This is very similar and akin to what follows. For why, do you not confess that parts create destruction and ruin for other parts? Indeed. And do you grant that the parts of matter are fire, water, and the rest? I do willingly. Do not fire and water, light and darkness, and other things of this kind appear to destroy and kill each other? Clearly. If, therefore, no parts bring mutual destruction upon themselves, they can neither perform the function of such parts, nor consequently be a single matter, nor indeed be matter at all, since no thing creates destruction and ruin for itself, as contraries are wont to do to contraries. For the same thing is not contrary to itself, since contraries are contrary only to ^D others, just as white is not contrary to white, but only to black; nor is light contrary to light, but to darkness, and you may philosophize similarly concerning most other things. Wherefore, if matter were also some one and simple thing, it would never fight against itself. From which, at length, by the proper reasoning of contraries, it is concluded that no place at all remains for this matter. Thus far Maximus. But we, since it is of sufficient and just magnitude for this volume, shall present in the eighth book, which follows, the discussion that is next desired, with the favor of the divine Will.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL, BOOK EIGHT

CONTENTS OF THE EIGHTH BOOK

1. Prologue, and concerning the pious Mosaic polity. 2. From Aristaeus, concerning the interpretation of the Scriptures among the Jews. 3. Epistle of Demetrius of Phalerum to Ptolemy, king of Egypt. 4. Epistle of King Ptolemy to Eleazar, the high priest of the Jews. 5. Epistle of Eleazar the high priest to King Ptolemy. 6. From Philo, concerning the departure of the Jews from Egypt. 7. By the same, concerning the pious Mosaic polity.

8. From Josephus, on the form of the Mosaic commonwealth. ^A 9. Eleazar the high priest explained the notion of the allegorical meaning in the sacred laws; from the writings of Aristeas. 10. Aristobulus, concerning those things called limbs in reference to God. 11. That the life of the ancient Hebrews was connected with the greatest virtue. 12. More concerning the same. 13. From Philo, concerning God, and that the world was brought into being. 14. From the same, that the world is governed by the providence of God.

Chapter I. Proem, and concerning the pious institutions of the Mosaic commonwealth.

The life of the ancient Hebrews—those men who, even before any Moses appeared, had truly earned ^B the name and praise of being most dear to God, having adorned themselves with the ornaments and badges of every virtue, just as they held to religious and pious doctrines, and the most true and holy principles of their theology, of which we have confessed ourselves to be captivated by love and longing—having gone through these in the previous book, I now proceed, following the order, to the Mosaic commonwealth, which holds the second rank of piety after that first one, and which was ordained for the Jewish nation alone. For we shall demonstrate at the proper time that those laws given through Moses were appropriate and fitting only for the Jews then, and not for the remaining nations of the entire world, nor could it be that the whole human race—I mean all the Greeks and barbarians who lived far away from the land of Judaea—were able to observe them. ^C But even regarding this, I mean the manner of life under Moses, I shall not present it in my own words, but again, as I have done until now, through the voices of those alone who have excelled among those men in their knowledge of ancestral customs; for I believe it is appropriate for me to proceed in this way, just as I began, supplying the testimony of proofs through those who are each one’s own. Since, therefore, I summoned as witnesses the Phoenicians, Egyptians, and Greeks who were distinguished among their own people in their own country, so too does the present occasion seem to me to fittingly call for these men also, rather than that we ourselves be thought to be inventing ^D our national customs. But before I come to that, I think it is a necessary task to set forth for the readers of this work how the oracles among them passed over to the Greeks, and what the method was of the interpretation of the divine Scriptures entrusted to them, and by how many and what kind of men, and with how much royal zeal, the translation into the Greek language was achieved; for this explanation will not be without profit to me for the certain demonstration of the Evangelical Preparation. For since the time was all but at hand when the light of the saving, life-giving proclamation of our Savior was about to shine forth upon all men under the Roman Empire, and a word of no small importance was raising up the prophecies concerning Him, and the life of the ancient God-beloved Hebrews, and the teachings of their pious instruction—which had been covered 349 for a long age in their ancestral tongue—were now at last to pass over into all the nations to whom the knowledge of God was about to be dispensed; God Himself, the cause of these good things, anticipating the future...

^A by His foreknowledge, and having perceived that the Savior of all men—who would shortly appear and would be established as the teacher of godliness in the knowledge of the one God over all unto all nations under the sun—was soon to have His prophecies revealed to all and brought to light, and that these, having been translated with precision, were to be deposited in public libraries, He set this in motion, casting it into the mind of King Ptolemy to do this, in preparation, as it seems, for the coming participation in these things which was soon to be extended to all the nations. For we could not have obtained these from the Jews in any other way, as they would have hidden the oracles among them out of envy toward us; but we were deemed worthy of this translation, which was ordained by God and rendered by men among them who were proven both in wisdom and in their native learning. Aristeas writes these things, a man learned in other respects, and moreover one who was present at the events under the second Ptolemy, surnamed Philadelphus, during whose reign the interpretation of the Jewish Scriptures was brought about with great zeal from the king, and was deemed worthy of receiving a place in the libraries at Alexandria. It is time to hear him now, as he narrates the manner of this event word for word.

CHAPTER II. From Aristeas regarding the interpretation of the Jewish Scriptures.

^B Demetrius Phalereus, he says, the prefect of the royal library, having received a large sum of money from the king to collect books from the entire world, purchased some, and caused others to be transcribed and translated, so that, as far as it lay within his power, he might satisfy the king's intention. And when we were present on one occasion, the king asked him how many thousands of books he had already collected; and he replied, "More than two hundred," and added straightway that he would apply his efforts so that in a short time the number might be filled to five hundred thousand. "And it has been reported to me," he added, "that the laws of the Jews are also worthy of transcription and of being in your library." "What, then," the king replied, "is to prevent you from doing this? For everything necessary is at your disposal." Demetrius said, "They need interpretation. For they have characters of their own, according to the land of Judea, and they use them, just as the Egyptians do with the arrangement of their letters, in that they also have their own peculiar speech. Some indeed think they speak Syriac; but they are mistaken, for it is another manner of writing." Then the king, having understood these details, said that he would write to the high priest of the Jews, so that the aforementioned matters might reach their completion. And after other things, four thousand and eight hundred, more or less. He ordered it to be written.

issue a decree regarding the registration of the Jewish books. For everything among these kings was conducted by mandate and with great precision, and nothing was done carelessly or at random. Wherefore, I have also recorded the copy of the publication and of the letters, as well as the number of those sent, and the equipment of each one, due to the magnificence and the technical skill that distinguishes each of them. But the copy of the publication is as follows.»

Chapter III. The Letter of Demetrius of Phalerum to Ptolemy, King of the Egyptians.

^B «To the great King, from Demetrius. Since you gave orders, O King, concerning the books lacking for the completion of the library, that they should be collected, and those that have fallen into disrepair should receive the proper restoration, I, having applied myself to this care not perfunctorily, report to you. The books of the law of the Jews, along with a few others, are still missing. For they happen to be written in Hebrew characters and in that language. They have been recorded carelessly and not as they exist, as is reported by those who know; for they have not enjoyed kingly providence. Yet it is necessary that these too should exist with you, accurately represented, because this legislation is more philosophical and uncorrupted, as being divine. For this reason, both the writers and the poets, and the multitude of historians, have kept far from mentioning the aforementioned books and the men who lived according to them, because the philosophy within them is of a certain pure and solemn nature, as Hecataeus of Abdera says. If, therefore, it seems good, O King, a letter shall be written to the high priest in Jerusalem, that he may send men who have lived the most upright lives, elders who are experienced in their laws, six from each tribe, so that, having examined the agreement among the majority and having obtained the accuracy of the interpretation, we may place them significantly, worthy both of the subjects and of your own intent. Fare well always.» ^C

^D

^A When this had been established, the king ordered a letter to be written to Eleazar concerning these matters, signifying also the ransom that had been made for the captives. He also gave for the construction of bowls, vials, and a table, and for libation vessels, fifty talents of gold, seventy talents of silver, and a not inconsiderable quantity of precious stones. He ordered the treasurers to give to the craftsmen whatever they chose for the selection, as well as coinage for sacrifices and other things, up to one hundred talents. We shall show you regarding the construction once we have gone through the copies of the letters. The king’s letter was of this form.

CHAPTER IV. The letter of King Ptolemy to Eleazar, the High Priest of Jerusalem.

^B King Ptolemy to Eleazar the High Priest, greeting and good health. Since it happens that many of the Jews have been settled in our country, ^C having been taken captive from Jerusalem by the Persians during the time they held power; and since many others also came into Egypt with our father as captives—of whom he enrolled many into the military order at higher rates of pay, and likewise, judging those who were already there to be trustworthy, he built fortresses and handed them over to them, so that the Egyptian nation might have fear of these—we, having received the kingdom, treat all with greater humanity, but much more so your citizens; we have liberated over one hundred thousand captives, having paid the just price to their masters, and having corrected if anything had been done amiss due to the agitation of the crowds. In this, we have wished to provide a monument of our own piety and of our grateful will toward the almighty God, who has kept our kingdom in peace and in the greatest glory throughout the whole world to this day. To these we have not only assigned a place in the army to those in the flower of their age, but those who were fit and could be near us, I have examined and appointed as worthy of trust in our own court. Wishing also to grant a favor to you, and to all the Jews throughout the world, and to those who shall come after, we have resolved that your law be translated...

into the Greek tongue from the Hebrew scrolls, as you call them, so that these also may be in our library alongside the other royal books. You will do well, therefore, and act in a manner worthy of our zeal, to select men who have lived well, are elders, possess experience of the Law, and are capable of interpreting it, six from each tribe, so that from the majority the consensus may be found, for the investigation concerns matters of greater importance. For we believe that, once this is accomplished, we shall carry off great glory. We have sent to you concerning these things Andreas, one of the chief bodyguards ^A (42), and Aristaeus, who are highly honored by us, to converse with you and to bring the first-fruits of our offerings for the temple, and for sacrifices and other things, one hundred talents of silver. Write also to us concerning whatever you wish, for you shall be gratified, and you will perform a service worthy of our friendship; for we shall bring to completion as quickly as possible whatever you choose. Farewell.» To these things Eleazar replied in a manner fitting ^B (43) as follows.

CAPUT V. Letter of Eleazar the High Priest to King Ptolemy.

• Eleazar the High Priest to King Ptolemy, his true friend, greeting. If you, and Queen Arsinoe, your sister, and your children are well, it is good, and as we would have it; we ourselves are in good health. Having received your letter, we greatly rejoiced at your purpose and your most excellent counsel, and having gathered the whole multitude, we read it to them, so that they might know the piety which you possess towards our God. We showed them the vessels also which you sent: ^C twenty of gold, thirty of silver, five bowls, and a table for dedication, and for the bringing of sacrifices, and for the repairs that the temple requires, one hundred talents of silver, which Andreas, one of those honored by you, and Aristaeus, men good and noble, and excelling in learning, and worthy of your instruction and justice in all things, brought. They also shared with us your messages, to which they have heard from us a response fitting for your affairs. For everything that is profitable to you, even if it be ^D contrary to our custom (44-45), we will obey. For this is a sign of friendship and affection. For you have benefited our citizens in many ways, with great and unforgettable gifts; immediately, therefore, we offered sacrifices on your behalf, and on behalf of your sister (46), and your children, and your friends; and the whole multitude prayed that it might be for you as you should choose at all times, and that the Lord of all might preserve your kingdom in peace with glory.

^A And that it may happen advantageously, and with the security of the holy law having been transcribed, with everyone present, I have selected good and honorable men, elders, six from each tribe, whom we have also sent to you, having the law. You will therefore do well, most righteous king, by ordering that the copying of the books might be done, so that the men may be safely restored to us. Farewell."

Following these, after having said many things in the intervening space regarding the proposed undertaking, he adds to them, after the interpretation of the Scriptures, exactly these words: "As these volumes were read, the priests and the elders of the interpreters, and those from the administration, and the leaders of the multitude, stood up and said: 'Since it has been interpreted well and piously, and is in every way accurately well-ordered, let it remain as it is, and let no alteration take place.' And when all had voiced their approval of what had been said, they commanded that a curse be pronounced, as is their custom, upon anyone who should make an alteration, either by adding, or by changing, or by taking away anything whatsoever in the entire text of what had been written; doing this well, so that it might be kept remaining continuously through all time."

^B When these things were also conveyed to the king, he rejoiced greatly; for he felt that the purpose he had in mind had been safely brought to fulfillment. And everything was also read to him, and he was greatly astonished at the mind of the lawgiver, and he said to Demetrius: "How is it that with such great things having been accomplished, no one of the historians or poets took it upon themselves to mention them?" And he said: "Because the legislation is sacred and has come to pass by God, and some of those who attempted it were stricken by God and departed from their attempt." For he said that he had heard from Theopompus that when he was about to report some of the things previously interpreted ^C somewhat recklessly from the law, he was seized with a disturbance of mind for more than thirty days. And at the request to appease God, it became clear to him for what reason the thing was happening. And having learned through a dream, that God wishes for divine things to be kept from being scrutinized and brought out to common men, he desisted, and was thus restored. I also received word from Theodectes, the poet of tragedies: that because he was about to transfer some of the things written in the book to a certain drama, he was struck with blindness in his eyes, and having taken it as an omen that this had happened to him for that reason, he appeased God and was restored after many days. ^D

The king, having understood all these things from Demetrius, as I said above, embraced the translation with the highest veneration and ordered the sacred books to be kept pure and entire with the greatest diligence. Let what has been taken from Aristeas and contracted into an epitome suffice. But now let us contemplate the very form of the Mosaic commonwealth and Law, as expressed in the writings of those who flourished most among the Hebrews. We shall take our start from Philo, and we shall repeat from the first of those books which he entitled *Hypothetica*, where he undertakes the defense of the Jews against their accusers, what he records concerning the migration of the Jews from Egypt [undertaken] under the leadership of Moses. He speaks in this manner: ^A

CHAPTER VI. From Philo, concerning the departure of the Jews from Egypt.

"Indeed, that their most ancient ancestor was from the Chaldeans, but this people had risen up having migrated from Egypt, whither they had long ago come from Syria, abounding in countless myriads, and the land not being sufficient [for them], and furthermore ^B being nurtured with a youthful, high-spirited disposition; and at the same time God, through visions and dreams, manifesting to them an exodus, and no less falling into a longing for their ancestral and ancient land by [divine] inspiration: whence that ancestor of theirs also migrated into Egypt, whether it seemed [best] to God, or by some Providence that they might prosper in all things above all others, so that from that time to the present day the nation has both come into being and remains for them, and exceeds them to such an extent in population." ^C And after a little he says: "A man, indeed, led them both in the exodus and in the journey, who [was] in no way different from the multitude, if you will—" ^D

^A for they even used to abuse him as a sorcerer and a cunning trickster of words. Truly, however, [it was] a noble sorcery and swindle, by which he preserved the entire people, not only in thirst and famine and ignorance of the ways and lack of everything, safe and sound, as if in the greatest abundance and supply from the nations situated between, but he kept them also without faction toward one another, and most obedient to himself. And this not for some short or little time, but as long as it is unlikely that even a single household could have remained in harmony with all abundance. And neither thirst, nor famine, nor destruction of bodies, nor fear of future events, nor ignorance of what was to happen, incited the peoples—who were deceived and perishing—against that sorcerer. For what, I ask, do you wish us to say was such an art, or power of words, or wisdom in him, that he might prevail over so many and such strange things, and all those leading to destruction? For either the natures of the people under him were not ignorant or difficult, but obedient and not without foresight of the future; or, though they were very bad, God was soothing their difficulties, and, as it were, governing the affairs of the present and the future. For that which seems to you most true from these things, it appears to prevail for praise and honor and zeal concerning them all. And these are the things of the exodus. ^B But because they came into this land, how they were established at some point, and held the country, the sacred records declare; but I do not see fit to go through [the matter] according to history, rather than by some reasoning as to what is probable concerning them. For whether you prefer [to think that], while they were still flourishing in the multitude of their bodies, although broken in the end, they were nevertheless persisting, and having arms in their hands, they then conquered the country by force, fighting at once against Syrians and Phoenicians in that very land of theirs; or [if] we assume them to have been unwarlike and cowardly, and altogether very few, and unprepared for all things necessary for waging war, [that] they nevertheless inspired some sense of reverence in others for themselves, and received the region from those willingly and voluntarily yielding; ^C and then, immediately and not long after, built the temple, and established other things for piety and religious service? For these things, as it seems, declare them to have been acknowledged as most beloved of God, even by their enemies; for enemies they were by necessity, against whose land they suddenly came as if to take it away. But then, obtaining reverence and honor from these, how do they not appear to surpass others in good fortune? And what are we to say are the secondary matters in succession, or the third things in addition to these? Is it the matter of their good order and obedience, or of their holiness and justice and piety? But that man, whoever he was, who gave them the laws, they admired so strongly, that whatever he seemed [to suggest], was so to them. Whether, then, having reasoned [it out] himself, or hearing [it] from a daemon, he spoke, he attributed this all to God, and many years having passed, ^D though I cannot say exactly how many,

^A not even a single word among those written by him did they alter; rather, they would sooner endure death ten thousand times than be persuaded to accept anything contrary to his laws and customs."

Having said these things, he cuts short the form of government established for the Jewish nation by the laws of Moses, writing as follows.

CHAPTER VII. By the same [author], concerning the God-fearing constitution according to Moses.

^B "Does anything of these things, or anything resembling them, have a place among them, which might seem to possess some appearance of gentleness and ease: procedural indictments, and pretexts, and postponements, and valuations, and again, valuations in reduction (56)? Nothing at all, but everything is simple and clear. If you practice pederasty, if you commit adultery, if you violate a boy (do not even mention a male, but even if a female)—likewise if you debauch yourself, if you suffer or intend or plan something shameful beyond your years—the penalty is death. If you commit an outrage against a slave's body, or against a free man, if you hold [someone] in bonds, if you kidnap and sell [someone], if you steal something profane or sacred, if you act impiously not only by deed, but also if by any word whatsoever—against God Himself (may God be gracious to us, and may the very thought of these things be far from us, it is not even fit to mention it), but [if it be] against a father or mother, or your own benefactor, the penalty is death likewise; and this is not a common one, nor just any, but the one who said it must be stoned alone, as one who has committed an act no less than impiety.

And again, other things, such as these: that wives should be subject to their husbands, to the point of outrage ^C indeed...

(56) *Valuations in reduction*: The term is solemn, and in forensic matters, the meaning of this word is most emphatic. It meant nothing else than that the defendant or the defendant's friends should beg for a more severe penalty and exchange it for a lighter one. But it seemed otherwise to the learned translator of Xenophon, who renders that passage from the *Apology for Socrates* thus: "Being ordered to pay a fine, he neither paid it from his own [means], nor allowed his friends to do so; but he even said that the payment of a fine was to concede that he had been unjustly behaving." Yet Socrates had already been condemned to a capital penalty, not a pecuniary fine: and it is not for those paying, but for those estimating. Furthermore, through that act of Socrates, Xenophon wished to demonstrate clearly how much [Socrates] was held by no desire to prolong his life. The meaning, therefore, is that Socrates, having been condemned to death, because it was permitted to all defendants to propose a lighter penalty for themselves—exile, prison, or a monetary fine—or to allow it to be done by friends, did not wish to suffer [it]. Among Plato, in his *Apology*, Socrates accepts [it] with Demosthenes and others in the same sense... ^D ...He therefore observed the necessity and the danger, neither speaking of a 'valuation' as before, nor using it as a pretext, but immediately sustaining the generalship.

^A For there is none, toward obedience in all things. Let parents rule their children for their salvation and respect. Of his own possessions, let each man be master, unless he have designated them as God's, nor as if he should grant them to God. 57 But if he should have happened to mention it merely in speech, it is not possible to touch or handle them, but immediately he must be excluded from all things. Do not, I say, plunder the things of the gods, 58 nor rob the offerings of others, 59 but even of his own things, as I said, if a word should slip out at random, he shall dedicate it. Once he has spoken it, he shall be deprived of everything; but if he repents or amends what was said, he shall even have his life taken away. And the same rule applies to other things over which he has lordship. If a husband should designate his wife's food as sacred to God, he must abstain from those provisions. If a father does so concerning his son, or a ruler concerning his subject, it is the same. And the release of such designated things, the most perfect and greatest, is by the priest having declared it so; for the Lord has placed him as the one to receive this ^B from God. And after this, the holy way, from those who are always the masters, is to show that God is propitious, so that one does not even receive the offering out of necessity. There are ten thousand other things besides these, as many in unwritten customs and laws, as in the laws themselves. 61 Whatever one hates to suffer, let him not do to another. What you did not deposit, do not take away, not from a garden bed, not from a winepress, not from a threshing floor; do not steal from a heap, whether great or small, absolutely nothing. Do not begrudge fire to one who needs it. Do not exclude [others] from streams of water; but even toward the poor and maimed who beg sustenance, ^C help them piously for God's sake. 62 Do not hinder the burial of the dead, 63 but contribute even as much land as is necessary for the rite; do not disturb the tombs or burial places of the departed at all. Do not inflict bonds, do not inflict any evil beyond what is necessary upon those in need. Do not mutilate the seed of men, do not cause abortion in women, or by other contrivances. Do not treat animals in a manner contrary to what either God or some lawgiver has ordained. Do not destroy seed; do not enslave offspring. Do not impose an unjust yoke, do not use an unjust measure, do not use unjust money. Do not reveal the secrets of friends in enmity. Where, then, by God, are those Būzygian laws of ours? ^D See other things besides these. Do not separate parents from children, not even if you have captives; do not separate a wife from her husband, even if you are a master who has bought them legally. Are these not more venerable and greater things? Yet there are other small and incidental matters. Do not, he says, desolate a domestic bird's nest, do not kill the suppliant animals, such as sometimes seek refuge. Do not [neglect] if any such thing is [implied] as less than these. You could not say these are worth nothing. But the law concerning them is great, and is the cause of all care, and the pronouncements are great, and the curses against those who neglect these things before God.

^A And, a little later, he says: "But for the whole day, if it should so happen, or rather not for one day only, but for many, and these not immediately one after another, but at intervals (and these also at intervals of seven, the custom of excluding profane days prevailing, as is reasonable), that not even one of the things prescribed should be transgressed—do you not admire this? Do you think (64) that this is for them merely a matter of training in self-control, so that they might be accustomed to seeing things done equally, and be able to abstain from tasks if necessary? By no means. But the legislator thought it necessary that, for the sake of some great and marvelous work, they should not only be capable of the same, but also be well-versed in the ancestral laws and customs.

What, then, did he ordain for these seventh days? He required them to assemble in one place, and sitting together, to listen to the laws with reverence and order, so that no one might be ignorant of them. And in fact, they do always assemble and sit together; the majority in silence, except if it is deemed appropriate to add something by way of acclamation to what is being read; and one of the priests who is present, or one of the elders, reads the sacred laws to them and explains each one until nearly late evening. From this, they are dismissed, having become well-versed in the sacred laws and having advanced much in piety. Does this not seem to you more necessary for them than all diligence? Consequently, they do not go to oracle-mongers about what should be done, nor do they act recklessly through ignorance of the laws; but whoever you stir up among them, and inquire of concerning their ancestral customs, he is ready and able to speak with ease; and a husband seems able to impart the laws to his wife, a father to his children, and a master to his servants.

Moreover, concerning the seventh year, it is likewise easy to speak, though perhaps not the same thing. For they do not refrain from work as they do on those seventh days, but they leave the land fallow for the sake of its future fruitfulness. ^B For it makes a great difference to give it a rest itself, and then for it to be cultivated the following year, rather than to be worn out by continuous labor. And you would see the same thing happening to bodies for the sake of vigor; for doctors do not only command rest and certain pauses from work for the sake of health; for continuous and uniform activity, especially in labors, is likely to cause harm. A sign of this is: if anyone were to suggest that they cultivate the land itself much more before (68) this seventh year, and that he would concede all the fruits, they would not accept it at all; for they do not think they ought only to refrain from labors (although even if they did this, it would be nothing wondrous), but that the land should also have some respite and relief for them, for the beginning of another period of care. ^C And so, while the habit of profane days possesses, as is natural, the greatest force, yet no commandment is ever violated? Was this instituted perhaps only for the sake of proving and exercising self-control, so that they might be able to intermit their functions no less than to do something if the need arose? Do not believe it. But the legislator thought this should be placed in the position of a great and excellent work, so that they might not only be fit for other things, both in intermitting and in performing them, but also that they might be knowledgeable and expert in their ancestral laws and customs. What, then, did he institute for those seventh days? He surely wished them to assemble in the same place, so that sitting with silence and the greatest modesty, they might adapt their ears to the recitation of the laws, and thus nothing at all might escape them. And this custom of assembling and sitting together, they maintain so perpetually that the entire multitude is silent, unless it accompanies what is read with favorable and joyful acclamations; ^D while from the priests or senior men...

someone reading the sacred laws publicly explains everything item by item, until late in the evening when all depart, having been instructed in the knowledge of divine commandments and having also increased significantly in piety. Does this not seem to you more necessary than any other kind of study? Indeed, there is no reason why they should consult these expounders of the laws regarding the affairs of life, for although they lack their responses, yet they will never, through ignorance of the laws, act wrongly either among themselves or in anything else. For whomsoever of them you might call upon, and have questioned about the ancestral institutions, not only will he be able to reply conveniently and easily of his own accord, but he will also certainly appear to be of the sort who could inform any person—be it a husband his wife, a father his children, or a master his servants—in the understanding of the laws. ^B The system of the seventh year is also easy and straightforward, although perhaps different. For they do not, in the same way as they do on the seventh day, refrain from all work; rather, they allow the land to lie fallow in the following year in expectation of a more abundant harvest. For they feel that it contributes much to the fertility of the soil that, after this interval of rest, it should begin to be cultivated again in the next year, and not be worn out by constant and continuous plowing. We recognize that this same principle applies to the strength and vigor of bodies as well, since physicians prescribe these breaks and cessations from daily functions not only for the sake of health—because any constant and perpetual uniformity, especially of labors, is accustomed to bring some detriment—but also so that this counsel of theirs in this regard might rest upon a more certain argument: let there happen to be someone who, in the seventh year, promises to exert both his own labor in cultivating those very fields much more diligently than before, and yet to yield the entire harvest to them; they would never accept this condition, inasmuch as they are unwilling for the soil to be vacant of labors (a thing which, if they did it, would justly seem strange to no one), but they judge that the soil itself also must be called into some part of a truce and rest, so that it may tolerate the new labor of cultivation thereafter more pleasantly and easily. For if this reason were not present, why, by the immortal God, would they not lease this soil to others in the year prior, and receive the entire fruit and yield of the following year from their work? Assuredly, they can in no way approve any of these things, as I have said, except for the care and study with which they treat the land itself—a thing which, it seems to me, they cannot in any way approve. And what follows is a certain preeminent proof of their humanity. For since they have been idle in that seventh year, the produce which has grown of its own accord they do not deem it proper to harvest or store themselves, because it came about by no labor of theirs; but, assigning this spontaneous product of the earth to divine kindness, they willingly allow anyone—whether he be a traveler or whoever else it may be—to use it securely at his own discretion. But of these things, let this now suffice. For as to the fact that this law has ordained the seventh day especially as a day of rest, I think you would not seek the reason from me, as you have perhaps already heard often from many physicians, physiologists, or philosophers how great a power this number seven possesses over the nature of all things, as well as over human nature itself. Such, then, was the rationale of the Sabbath. » And thus far Philo. Twin are the things which Josephus records in the second book of his *Antiquities of the Jews* with these words:

CHAPTER VIII. From Josephus on the form of the Mosaic commonwealth.

and has neither acted contrary to the laws of piety, nor failed to make them accessible to all mankind, but has taught that God is not to be worshiped by means of libations and sacrifices and offerings—which is the practice of other nations—but by works and ^A a life of moral excellence?»

It is possible to observe this by comparing the laws themselves; for we must now speak of these matters. Now, though the variations in custom and law among all people are infinite in their particulars, one might summarize them [610/609 B ] this way. For some have entrusted the authority of their governments to monarchies, some to the rule of the few, and others to the masses. But our legislator did not ^B view these as having any significance at all; yet, if one might say it by forcing the language, he established as his system of government a "theocracy," attributing the rule and power to God, and persuading all to look to Him as the cause of all good things—both those which come to all men in common, and those which they themselves obtain by their own prayers and petitions in times of difficulty. He further taught that it is impossible for the divine knowledge to be hidden from God, nor any deed that is done, nor any thought that one might harbor. ^C He declared Him to be unbegotten and immutable throughout eternal time, excelling in beauty every mortal form, known to us in power, but unknown as to what He is in essence. Whether the wisest among the Greeks were taught these things about God, with Him providing the principles, I omit to say for now; but that they are good and appropriate to the nature and majesty of God, they have strongly testified. For Pythagoras, and Anaxagoras, and Plato, and the Stoic philosophers who came after him, and nearly all, appear to have thought thus ^D concerning the nature of God. But whereas they philosophized only with the few, and dared not bring the truth of this doctrine to the masses, who were occupied with other opinions, our legislator, since he provided works that were in harmony with his laws, not only persuaded those of his own time, but also instilled an immovable faith concerning God in those who were to be born from them in every age. The reason for this is that he far excelled all others in the manner of his legislation, for the sake of utility. For he did not make piety a mere part of virtue, but he comprehended other parts within it, and ordained them as the structure of all his laws, providing them both commonly for all men and individually for each. Nor is this all: but even in the things he forbade, he traced the prohibition back to God.

^A He saw these things, and he established them—I mean justice, temperance, fortitude, and the harmony of citizens one with another in all things. For all actions, and pursuits, and words, are referred to the piety towards God ^B which we hold. For he left nothing of these unexamined, nor indefinite. For there are two methods of all education and of the formation of character: one, the didactic method through instruction, and the other, through the discipline of character. Now, other lawgivers were divided in their opinions, and choosing one of these which seemed best to each, they left the other aside. For instance, the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans educated by customs, not by instructions; but the Athenians and almost all the Greeks prescribed by law what ought to be done or not done, yet they were negligent in accustoming men to these things through their actual deeds. But our lawgiver combined both of these with great care; for he neither left the discipline of character ^C as something senseless, nor did he allow the word of the law to remain ineffective. But beginning at once from our first nurture and from the domestic manner of life of each individual, he left not even the most trivial matter to the choice and discretion of those who would use it. Nay, he described by certain boundaries and rules of law what foods one should abstain from and what ones it is permitted to eat, who should be called into the communion and society of life, what intensity of exertion one should apply to works, and what measure one should maintain in times of rest; so that, living under him as a father and lord, we might not sin either through willfulness or through ignorance. For he did not leave behind ^D that penalty for ignorance under the earth, but he demonstrated that the law itself is the finest and most necessary form of discipline, not for those who have heard it once, nor twice, nor often; but he commanded that on each Sabbath, abandoning their other works, they should gather for the hearing of the law and learn it accurately. And this is precisely what all the other lawgivers seem to have neglected. And so far are the majority of men from living according to their own laws, that they hardly even know them; but when they commit a sin, then they learn from others that they have transgressed the law. Even those who hold the greatest and most sovereign offices among them admit their ignorance; for they station alongside themselves supervisors of the administration of affairs, individuals who profess to have experience of the laws. But of our laws, if one were to choose, anyone could tell you every one of them more easily than his own name. Therefore, from the very first sensation

^A of learning them, we have them as if inscribed in our souls. And rare indeed is a transgressor, and impossible is any plea to excuse the punishment. This is the first thing of all that has produced for us such admirable concord. For to have one and the same opinion concerning God, and in one's life and customs to differ from one another not at all, produces a most beautiful ^B harmony in the disposition of men. For among us alone will one hear no accounts of God that are in contradiction to one another, such as are found in abundance among others (for it is not only by those of ordinary understanding that the passion which happens to befall each one is proclaimed, but even among some of the philosophers, attempts have been dared, some having undertaken by their arguments to destroy the entire nature of God, while others have stripped Him of His providence over men); nor in the pursuits of life will one see any difference, but there are common works for all among us, and one single doctrine ^C agreeing with the Law concerning God, saying that He oversees all things. Moreover, one might hear from women and from servants that all other things in life must have piety as their end. Hence, the accusation brought against us by some, that we do not bring forth men as inventors of new deeds or words, has its origin in this. For others believe it to be a fine thing not to abide by any of their ancestral customs, and they testify to the sharpness of wisdom in those who dare most to transgress these things; we, on the contrary, have assumed that there is one ^D wisdom and one virtue: to neither do nor even contemplate anything at all contrary to what was legislated from the beginning; which would rationally be a proof that the Law was most beautifully established. For things that do not possess this character are tested and proven by experiences that stand in need of correction; but for us, who have been persuaded that the Law was established from the beginning according to the will of God, it was not even pious to fail to keep it. For what would one move from it, ^A or what better could we discover, or what did we bring over from others that was better? Shall we say the entire constitution of the polity? And what could be better or more just than one that has been fashioned to consider God as the leader of all things, entrusting the managing of the greatest affairs to the priests in common, and again having entrusted the leadership of the other priests to the high priest of all? To these men, ^B who do not excel in wealth or in any other such advantages, the Lawgiver immediately by the first legislation appointed them to the honor; but whosoever among those with him excelled the others in persuasion and temperance, to these he entrusted the service of God. This ^C was the precise care of the Law and of all other pursuits; and ^D among them are such men who do not acquiesce in none of their ancestral customs, and they consider it a glorious thing and worthy of praise, and those especially who...

^A are overseers of all things, and judges of those matters in dispute, and punishers of the condemned—these are the priests appointed. What authority, then, could be holier than this? What honor could be more appropriate to God? For while the whole multitude is fashioned for piety, it is the particular care of the priests that is entrusted to them, just as it is a ^B holy initiation of the whole administered commonwealth. For what things others cannot manage to observe for more than a few days, calling them mysteries and initiations, these we observe with great pleasure and unchangeable determination throughout all time. What, then, are these proclamations and prescriptions? They are simple and well-known. First and foremost is that which concerns God, saying: God contains all things, being perfect and blessed, sufficient to Himself and to all, the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things; manifest in deeds and graces, and ^C clearer than anything else, but in form and magnitude most invisible to us. Every material thing, even if it be costly, is dishonorable compared to His image; every human art is artless when it comes to the idea of imitation; we conceive of nothing similar to Him, nor is it holy to conjecture any. We see His works: the light, the heaven, the earth, the sun and moon, the waters, the birth of animals, the producing of fruits. These God created, not with hands, nor by the toil of some who labored, but by His own will alone; it was good, and it was immediately well-wrought. ^D All must follow Him and serve Him by practicing virtue; for this is the most holy manner of worshipping God. One temple of one God, for like is always dear to all; He is common to all, the common God of all. The priests serve Him in this throughout all time; and the first of them, always by descent, leads them. He, along with the other priests, will sacrifice to God, will keep the laws, will judge those matters in dispute, and will punish the convicted. Whoever does not obey him will pay the penalty, as one committing impiety against God Himself. We shall offer sacrifices, not for our own drunkenness; for this is unwanted by God, and would become a pretext for wantonness and luxury, but we shall offer them to be sober, orderly, and disciplined, so that those sacrificing may be temperate. And in the sacrifices, one must first pray for the common salvation, and then for one's own. For we are made for community, and he who prefers this to his own private interest would be most pleasing to God. And let the prayer to God be made through supplication and

^A petitionem, not that He might grant us good things (for He has given them of His own accord and has laid them out in common for all), but that we might have the capacity to receive them and, having received them, to guard them. The law has distinguished certain requirements of purity for sacrifices, separating them from companionship, from the marriage bed, from the intimacy with a wife, and from many other things which would be tedious to recount now. Such is our doctrine concerning God and His service; for He himself is also the Law.

What then are the laws regarding marriage? The law knows only the union according to nature with a woman, and that only if it is intended for the sake of begetting children. It abominates the union of male with male, and death is the penalty if one should attempt it. It commands that one should marry, not looking to a dowry, nor through violent abductions, nor by having persuaded one through deceit; but by courting with the consent of the one who has the authority to give her away, and in accordance with what is appropriate by kinship. "A woman is in all things worse than a man," it says. "Therefore let her be obedient, not that she may be humiliated, but that she may be ruled; for God has given power to the man." The one who has married must live with her alone; to attempt that of another is unholy. If anyone were to do this, there is no remission from death; neither if he should force a virgin who is betrothed to another, nor if he should persuade one already married. It ordered all children to be reared. And it forbade women both to abort what has been sown and to destroy it. But if one were seen to do so, she would be a slayer of her offspring, destroying a soul and diminishing the race. Therefore, not even if one were to approach the bed for defilement could he be considered clean at that time. ^B And it held that even after the lawful union of a man and wife, they should bathe, as this allows for a separation of the soul in relation to other realms. For it is troubled when it is implanted in bodies, and again separated from them by death. Wherefore it ordained purity for all such things. Moreover, it did not even permit for feasts to be held at the birth of children, and for excuses for drunkenness to be made; but it ordered the beginning of their upbringing to be temperate from the start, and commanded that they be taught letters, the matters concerning the laws, and to know the deeds of their ancestors—the former, that they might imitate them; and the latter, that by being raised with them they might neither transgress nor have a pretext of ignorance. It made provision for the piety towards those who have passed away, not through lavish funerals nor through the construction of conspicuous monuments, but it commanded that the rites for the funeral be performed by those closest to the deceased, and that those present should also ^C come to join in the mourning. It commanded that the house and those dwelling therein be cleansed, and regarding the bed and the couch…

and many other things which it would be tedious to recount now, the defilement should be expiated. And this is the kind of doctrine concerning God that has been delivered to us, and the manner of divine worship, which itself also holds the force of law. ^A What then of marriages? Our law approves only that intercourse which nature concedes with a wife, provided however that it is entered into for the sake of begetting children. It execrates intercourse between males, and condemns those guilty of such a crime to capital punishment. As for contracting a marriage, it desires that no account be taken of a dowry, nor that a wife be carried off by force, nor enticed by guile, but that she be requested from him who has the authority to bestow her; yet so that account is also taken of kinship and blood. ^B "And the woman," says the Scripture, "is in all things inferior to the man." Therefore let her obey the man, not indeed for the sake of contumely, but that she may follow the command and leadership of another: for God has granted authority and power to the man. Furthermore, the intercourse of one only, with whom you have been joined in marriage, is to be sought; for to covet the wife of another is an impiety. Whoever shall have fallen into this crime, the punishment of death is certain; just as if someone should have offered violence to a virgin betrothed to another, or should have enticed one who is wedded to another. Our law commands that whatever children are born be reared. It forbids any woman to either cast out or extinguish the seed she has conceived: and it wills that she who does otherwise be held as a murderess of her children, just as if she had in very deed suppressed the life of the fetus and prohibited the propagation of her race. Whoever, therefore, has approached to violate another's marriage bed, cannot remain pure and intact. ^C And so, even after legitimate intercourse between a husband and his wife, the law commands the body to be washed: because some sort of filth is smeared upon the body and the soul from this, as if the soul had journeyed into some foreign region by this act. For indeed the soul, when it is entangled in bodies, is accustomed to suffer some damage and detriment; by the concretion of which, by the benefit of death, it is again ^D cleansed, and ^A ordered to cleanse both the house and those dwelling therein of the mourning, that it may be as far removed as possible from the appearance of being pure for one who has committed murder. ^B It has ranked the honor of parents as second after that toward God; and him who does not requite the graces received from them, but fails in any way, it hands over to be stoned. And it says that the young should show honor to every elder, since God is the most ancient of all. It permits nothing to be hidden from friends; for it says there is no friendship that does not entrust everything. And if any enmity should chance to arise, it has forbidden the speaking of secrets regarding these things. In judging, if anyone should receive gifts, the penalty is death. He who neglects a suppliant, when it is in his power to help, is held accountable. What one has not placed, he shall not take away; he shall touch none of the possessions of others; having lent, he shall not receive interest. These and many things similar to these hold our society with one another together. ^C But how the Lawgiver has also thought concerning kindness toward foreigners, it is worth seeing. For he will appear to have provided for all things in the best manner, so that we might neither destroy our own things, nor envy those who choose to partake of ours. For as many as may wish to live under the same laws as we do, he receives benevolently, considering the kinship to be not only of birth, but also of the choice of life; the others, however, who come by chance he does not desire to be mixed into our custom. But he has commanded the rest, the sharing of which is necessary: to provide to all who are in need fire, water, food, to point out the ways, and not to overlook the unburied. And he ordained that we be kind ^D also toward those adjudged as enemies; for he has not permitted their land to be ravaged by fire, nor to cut down cultivated trees; but he also forbids despoiling those who have fallen in battle, and has made provision for captives, that abuse may be absent from them, and especially from women. Thus he has instructed us in gentleness and philanthropy, so that we might not even be neglectful of irrational animals; but he allowed only the lawful use of these, and forbade every other. And those which flee to our houses as if entreating, he forbade being taken; nor did he permit the parents to be snatched away from their nestlings; and he commanded us to spare even in war the animals that labor, and not to kill them. Thus from every side he has provided concerning kindness, by didactic [index: entries preserved]

^A laws using those before mentioned, and having appointed those that are punitive toward transgressors, not without reason. For the penalty for most of the transgressors is death; if one should commit adultery, if he should violate a maiden, if he should dare to offer an attempt upon a male, or if he who is tempted should suffer the act. And the law is likewise inexorable concerning slaves. Furthermore, also ^B regarding measures, if one should commit a crime, or weights, or concerning a sale that is unjust and done with deceit; and if one should take away another’s property, or if he should take what he did not deposit—for all these there are punishments, not such as exist among others, but for the greater part. For concerning injustice toward parents, or impiety toward God, even if one is only intending it, he is immediately destroyed. To those, however, who practice all things according to the laws, the reward is not silver, nor gold, nor again a crown of wild olive or celery, and such a proclamation; but each one having his own conscience bearing witness, is convinced (the lawgiver ^C having prophesied, and God having established the faith to be strong) that for those who have kept the laws, even if it were necessary to die for them, having died willingly, God has granted for them to be again, and to receive a better life through the cycle of time. I would be ashamed to write these things now, if it were not clear to all from the facts ^D that many, and frequently, of our people, for the sake of not uttering even a word contrary to the law, have chosen to suffer all things nobly. And yet, if our nation had not happened to be known to all men, and our voluntary obedience to the laws held in the open; but if one were to say that he himself read these things to the Greeks, or claimed to have encountered men outside of the known world, having such a solemn opinion concerning God, and having firmly persisted for a long age in such laws; all, I think, would marvel, because of the constant changes among them. Indeed, those who have attempted to write anything similar concerning a constitution and laws, are accused as if they had composed wonderful things, claiming that they took immortal subjects. And I pass over the other philosophers, those who have practiced…

On the laws of the Jews compared with human laws

is released: and therefore the lawgiver instituted certain fixed kinds of expiations. He would not even have the birthdays of children celebrated with too sumptuous feasts, lest some color and appearance of drunkenness be sought thereof: but he willed that they, from the very beginning of their dawning age, should both become accustomed to a moderate diet, and be instructed in letters, and at once in the precepts of the law, and in the deeds gloriously performed by their ancestors: that they might be excited to the imitation of the latter, and drawing in the former with their very milk, they might not henceforth attempt to violate them, nor be able to excuse their ignorance of them. He also provided for the obsequies of the deceased in such a way that luxury might not be nourished by extravagant funeral expenses, nor by a great display of illustrious sepulchers: but that those things which were necessary for the care of the funeral should be committed to his kin: and whoever, while the corpse was being carried out, should happen to be passing by, they should join the funeral procession and their own lamentations. He also willed that the entire home and family be purified from the funeral, so that from this rite anyone might understand how contaminated he was considered to be who had committed any murder. He commanded that the reverence of children toward their parents should hold the second place after divine worship: and whoever in any matter whatsoever should neglect to return mutual thanks for their benefits, he decreed that he should be stoned. He commanded the younger to show honor toward all their elders, because God is the most ancient of all things. He permits nothing to be mutually secret among friends, for there is no friendship where one does not entrust all his own things to the faith of his friends. But if hereafter enmities should arise, he forbids their secrets to be divulged to the public. If a judge shall have received gifts, he pays with the capital penalty. He who has neglected a suppliant, whom he could have helped, is held guilty. What you have not deposited, you may not take away. No one may touch anything of another’s; no one may demand interest for a loan. By these and similar bonds is mutual society among us contained. But it will also be worth the effort to see with what fairness and facility our legislator here has willed us to be even toward strangers themselves. For if anyone in his writings—furthermore, there is a place in Demosthenes, in *Midiana*, most similar in sense and thought to this, concerning the law prohibiting slaves from being insulted: he says, in whom this passage is thus conceived, of which the interpreter in Eusebius… [alt-version omitted]

^A understands that the best provision and foresight have been made by him, so that we neither undermine the integrity of our own ancestral rites, nor yet grudgingly refuse to share our resources with those who desire them. For he receives with great affection all who have chosen to live by our laws, judging that this community is bound together not only by race but also by a voluntary association of intent. But those who did not come to us except in passing, and while busied with other affairs, were not allowed to be fully admitted into his custom. Moreover, he decreed other things, of which it is necessary that there be an abundant supply for all: such as providing fire, water, and food to all who are in need, showing the way, and letting no one go unburied. Nay, he even wished for his equity to be sustained ^B towards those called enemies, for he did not permit their fields to be ravaged by fire, nor their fruit-bearing trees to be cut down. Furthermore, he forbade the victors to plunder those who had fallen in the battle line, and protected captives, especially women, from all injuries. And he has indeed taught us to be so instructed in gentleness and humanity through persistent and extended precepts, that he has not even neglected the care of brute animals. For whenever you depart from the lawful use of them—which alone he allows—he has utterly forbidden any other usage. He has forbidden those which fly to our houses like suppliants to be slaughtered; or for parents to be taken with their young from the nest; or for those animals whose labor men are accustomed to use to be killed even in hostile territory. To such a degree did he desire that kindness should be consulted in every respect: in part by establishing the laws which have been mentioned so far, and which pertain to the formation of character; ^C and in part by sanctioning other certain laws, by which penalties are determined without any excuse for those who violate the former. For he has proposed the death penalty for most cases: for him who has committed adultery; for him who has done violence to a maiden; for him who has dared to solicit a male for debauchery, or for him who has willingly followed after the solicitor. There also exists a law of this kind concerning servants, which no one could pray to be excused from. Regarding measures and weights also, if anyone should commit this kind of flagrant act, or should sell anything unjustly and with evil intent: or if anyone has stolen something from the property of others, or has taken what was not deposited with him: the penalties for all of these are established, not such as those which prevail among others, but such as the highest severity almost demanded. For either in the case of injury to parents, or for impiety towards God, whoever has even thought of this within himself is immediately hurried to death. Now, for those who cling to the precepts of the law in all things, the reward proposed for them is not silver, or gold, or a crown of olive or celery, or any commendation of that kind: but trusting in the testimony of their own conscience, which the legislator also foretold, and God confirmed with a pledge of most certain faith, they believe that it will surely come to pass that for those who have constantly kept the laws, for those indeed who have sometimes had to die cheerfully and courageously for their sake, God himself will grant a new birth hereafter, and in return the fruit of another and far better life. These things I certainly would never write, unless it were known ^D that he who is marvelled at among the Greeks, Plato—even if he excelled in the dignity of his life, and surpassed all who have existed in philosophy in the power of his words and in his persuasiveness—is constantly nearly mocked and ridiculed by those who profess that political affairs are a serious matter. And yet one might find many things in him, even while he is mocking, that are closer to the customs of the multitude. But Plato himself has admitted that it was not safe to bring forth the true opinion concerning God to the ignorance of the crowds. But some consider the words of Plato to be empty, written with much vanity. And most of all, they have admired Lycurgus among the lawgivers, and all hymn Sparta, because they persevered in his laws for the longest time. Therefore, let this be acknowledged as a proof of virtue, that one is obedient to the laws: but let those who admire the Lacedaemonians compare their time to the more than two thousand years of our own polity; and let them further consider that the Lacedaemonians, for as long a time as they possessed their liberty, were thought to keep their laws accurately; but when changes of fortune came upon them, they almost entirely forgot all their laws; whereas we, having been placed in myriad misfortunes on account of the changes of those who have reigned over Asia, have not let go of our laws even in the extremity of evils. These things indeed also Josephus says concerning the polity of the Jews according to Moses. But concerning the veiled and allegorical interpretation of the laws set down by him, having much to say, I think that the accounts of Eleazar and Aristobulus are sufficient, men who were of the Hebrew race by descent, and who distinguished themselves in the times of the Ptolemies. Of whom Eleazar, having been honored with the dignity of the high priesthood, was shown to us a little earlier; who, to those who came to him from the king for the sake of an embassy, while outlining the manner of the rendering of the Hebrew scriptures for Greece, has made such a teaching of the discourse concerning the idea allegorized in the sacred laws.

CHAPTER IX.

"And here," says Aristeas, "it would be worth the effort, regarding the questions proposed by us, to record a few of the things which he himself answered; for many people think that the legislator’s diligence in certain matters was excessively minute: such as the things established regarding the distinction of foods and drinks, and likewise the condition of impure animals. When we asked, therefore, why, since there is one single underlying structure for all, yet to eat some things and even to touch others was held to be a sin—for these things are for the most part established by law superstitiously, and guarded no less superstitiously by the Jews—he began to answer in this manner: 'You see for yourself,' he said, 'how great is the power of mutual custom and society, since even from the association of the wicked, a corruption of character ^B results; for having kept company with the evil, men take on distortions, and are miserable throughout their lives; but if they live with the wise and prudent, they obtain a correction of their ignorance and a change for the better in their manner of life. Having therefore distinguished the matters of piety and righteousness, our legislator first of all, by teaching each of these things, did not merely forbid..."

^A them in a prohibitive way, but in a demonstrative way (57), both making the harms manifest and pointing out the visitations which come from God upon the guilty (for he 58 demonstrated first of all, that God alone exists, and that His power is made manifest throughout all things, with His sovereignty filling every place, and nothing of what is done on earth by men in secret escapes Him, but whatever anyone does is manifest to Him, as also what is about to happen. By working this out precisely, and setting it forth clearly, he showed that even if someone intends to commit evil, he would not escape notice—to say nothing of having actually done it—thereby demonstrating through the whole of the legislation what God is capable of). Having therefore made this the beginning, and having shown that all other men besides us imagine there to be many gods, though they themselves are ^B far more powerful than those whom they vainly worship (for, having fashioned statues out of stones or wood, they affirm them to be images of those who discovered something useful for their life, whom they worship, while having before their eyes their lack of sensation: for even if 59 someone were to base it upon that—the discovery—it is utterly senseless; for having taken some things which were already in creation, they put them together, and they 60 further demonstrated them to be most convenient, yet they did not make them themselves; therefore it is vain and foolish to deify others like themselves. For even now there are many who are more inventive and more learned than the men of old, and they would not hasten to worship them. And the poets and the wisest of the Greeks who fashioned these things consider them to be such). For what need is there to speak of the other ^C multitudes of wanderers, those of Egypt and the like, who have placed their hope in beasts and most of the creeping things, and in the basest of creatures, and worship these, and sacrifice to them both while they are alive and when they are dead? Having therefore considered 61 each of these things, the legislator, being wise and having been prepared by God for the knowledge of all things, fenced us about with unceasing palisades and walls of iron, so that we might not mingle with any of the other nations in any respect, remaining pure in body and in soul, liberated from vain opinions, worshipping the one God and Power over all creation. Whence the leading priests of the Egyptians, having looked deeply into many things, and having shared in affairs, call us people of God; ^D a title which does not belong to the rational, unless one worships the God who is in truth. For they are only people of foods, and drinks, and shelter; for their whole disposition flees toward these things. But to those among us, these things are accounted as nothing, and their contemplation is throughout the whole of life upon the sovereignty of God. So that, therefore, nothing might...

be defiled, nor might we in our associations with the base receive any distortions, He has fenced us in on every side with purities—both by foods, and drinks, and by touch, and by hearing, and by legal sight. For in general, all these things remain consistent with the natural reason, ordered by one power, and according to which each thing 62 has a deep reason, both for those from which we abstain in their use, and those which we use.

As an example, I will mention one or two for you in passing. For do not let your mind descend into the fallen logic that Moses was legislating these things out of curiosity regarding mice, or weasels, or other such things; but rather for pure inquiry and the formation of character, everything has been solemnly arranged for the sake of justice. For of the birds that we use, all are tame and excel in purity, feeding on wheat and legumes, such as doves, turtledoves, francolins, partridges, and also geese and others like these. But regarding the birds that are forbidden, you will find them to be both wild and carnivorous, and dominating the rest by the power they possess over them, and obtaining their food—the consumption of the aforementioned tame ones—along with injustice. And not only these, but they also snatch lambs and kids, and they harm men, whether dead or living. He therefore set a badge through these, naming them beforehand as unclean; but that it is 63 for the soul, to which the legislation has been ordained, to use justice, and for no one to tyrannize—trusting in their own strength—nor to take away anything, but to manage life from the most just conduct; just as the aforementioned birds, the tame animals 64 consume the products of the legumes on the earth, and do not tyrannize for the purpose of destruction, neither over those who are lower, nor their own kin. Through these, therefore, the Lawgiver surrendered this to be noted by the prudent: to be just, and to perform nothing by force, nor, trusting in the power they possess, to tyrannize others. For where it has not even been proper to touch the aforementioned ones, due to the disposition concerning each, how must it not be guarded at all costs that our ways be not shut up into such a state 65?

He has set forth everything permitted concerning these and the beasts in types. For the cloven hoof and the parting of the claws is a sign of distinguishing each of the actions toward what is good. For the strength of the whole body has its support 66 upon the shoulders and the legs with action. He compels us, then, to perform everything with distinction for the sake of justice, by marking it 67 through these things. And furthermore, because we have been distinguished from all men. For the majority of others pollute themselves by mixing, contributing to a great injustice; and lands and entire cities are proud of these things; for not only toward males 68

^A they bring these things, but even toward those who bore them, and indeed even daughters, they defile. But we have been separated from these.

Now, regarding the method of discrimination [(69)] that has been mentioned, it is marked out in relation to the memory of this. For everything that is cloven-hoofed and brings up the cud is clearly set forth to those who understand as a sign of memory; for rumination is nothing else than a reminder of life and subsistence; for it is considered that life consists through food. Therefore, He exhorts through Scripture, saying thus: "You shall remember the Lord your God, who did for you great and marvelous things." For when considered, they appear glorious: first, the putting together of the body, and the management of food, and the distinction regarding each part, but much more the adornment [(70)] of the senses, the operation of the mind, and the invisible movement, and the sharpness toward doing each thing, and the discovery of arts, contain ^B a marvelous [(71)] way. Therefore, He exhorts us to keep memory, as the aforementioned things are held together by divine power. For He has appointed every place and time, in order that we might at every moment remember the God who rules, preserving [(72)] both the beginnings, and middle periods, and ends. For even regarding food and drink, once we have offered the first fruits [(73)], He commands us then immediately to make use of them. Moreover, He has given us a mark of memory from our garments; likewise also concerning cities and dwellings, because of being sheltered [(74)], and He has commanded us to place the oracles upon gates and doors, so that there may be a memory of God; and He expressly commands that the sign be bound upon the hands, clearly demonstrating that every action must be performed with righteousness, having memory of one's own construction, and above all, the fear [(75)] of God. And He commands that when lying down, and rising up, and going about [(76)], we meditate on the constructions of God, not by speech alone, but also by contemplation, observing the movement and the understanding of ourselves when we enter into sleep, and the awakening, as the changing of these is something divine and incomprehensible. And it has been shown to you also what is the abundance of the logion concerning discrimination and memory, as we explained the cloven hoof and the rumination. For it has not been legislated in vain, or according to what happens into the soul, but for truth and the signaling of right reason. For having given order concerning food and drink, and concerning the senses, He commands that we do nothing in vain, neither acting ^C nor…

turning toward injustice. And one may find the same thing in the case of wild animals. ^A For the nature of the weasel, the mice, and those similar to them, as has been recounted, is destructive. For mice ruin and destroy everything, not only for their own food, but in order to be completely useless to man, whatever it may be that they undertake to destroy. And the genus of the weasel is peculiar; for besides the aforementioned, it has a destructive character. For it conceives through the ears; but it gives birth through the mouth. And for this reason, such a nature is unclean for men. For the things which they have taken through hearing, these they embody in speech, and have involved others in evils, and have accomplished no ordinary impurity, being themselves completely polluted with the contagion of impiety. And your king, doing well, destroys such people, as we understand. But I said: I think you mean the informers; for indeed he constantly exposes them to torments and deaths for their struggles; for they are sleepless for the ruin of men, which is unholy. But our law orders us neither by word nor by deed to harm anyone. And thus, concerning these things, having ^B briefly set forth to you, because everything is regulated toward justice, and nothing is ordained in the Scripture at random nor mythically; but in order that throughout our whole life, and in our actions, we may exercise justice toward all men, mindful of the God who rules. Therefore, concerning foods and unclean things, creeping things and wild animals, the whole discourse reaches out toward justice, and the just association of men. For my part, he seemed to have defended each point well. For he spoke also concerning the offered calves, and rams, and goats: that one must take these from the herds and flocks and make them tame, and nothing wild, so that those offering the sacrifices may not bear witness to themselves of any haughtiness, employing the sign of the One who ordained it. For he who presents the sacrifice makes the offering of the whole manner of his own soul. And concerning these ^C things, therefore, I think that they stand worthy of discourse according to the lecture, because of the solemnity.

^A Thus the high priest explained to those among the Greeks who heard him concerning the nature of the allegory in the holy laws, and how they ought to approach the interpretations of the Scriptures that were to be delivered. Now it is time to hear from Aristobulus, who had added the study of Aristotelian philosophy to his ancestral wisdom, how he discoursed concerning those things which are current in the Holy Scriptures as if they were members of God. This is the very same man whom the second book of the Maccabees mentions at its beginning; in the treatise which he wrote to king Ptolemy, he himself also explains this matter in this way:

CHAPTER X.

Of Aristobulus, concerning those things which are attributed to God by name.

"But since," he says, "when enough had been done by us regarding the questions proposed, you exclaimed, O king, asking why our law attributes hands, arms, a face, feet, and walking to the Divine power—it would be helpful, in addition to the previous discourse, to append this, which in no way conflicts with them. In this, I would first have you prevailed upon to accept these traditions physically, and to maintain steadfastly a worthy conception of God, lest you fall into a mythological and human state of mind. For they are signified in many ways." ^B Such are the things which the high priest explained to the Greeks sent to him, regarding the allegorical meaning of the sacred laws, so that they might understand how they ought to handle the interpretation of them that they had received. Now it is time to hear Aristobulus, who added the study of Aristotelian philosophy to domestic wisdom, as he discusses those members which seem to be attributed to God throughout Scripture. He himself is the one whom the second book of the Maccabees mentions at the beginning. Therefore, in the little book which he wrote to King Ptolemy, he discourses upon this matter in this manner:

"But since," he says, "when the questions proposed had been sufficiently dealt with by us, you exclaimed, O king, and yourself also asked why our law attributes hands, arms, a face, feet, and walking to the Divine power, it would be helpful to append to the previous discussions this, which in no way conflicts with them. In this general respect, I would first ask you to accept these traditions physically, and to maintain steadfastly a worthy notion of God, lest you fall into a mythological and human configuration. For they are signified in multiple ways."

^A Indeed, our legislator Moses is accustomed to expressing the notions of his mind in many ways when, as far as they fall under the senses, he borrows the words and names of other things to commemorate certain natural affections and the execution of great works. And those who have a sharper power of understanding marvel greatly at his wisdom, and at that divine Spirit by whose blowing he attained the name and fame of a prophet. Among this number are the philosophers already mentioned by me, and many others, as well as poets who, having drawn from him the greatest subjects for their writing, dwell in the admiration of men. But those whose capacity and natural talent are more limited, while they cling to the mere husk of the Scripture, imagine that nothing very august or excellent is related by him. I shall therefore set out, as much as lies within my power, to open up the meaning of each. If I should miss the mark or fail to convince others, I would especially wish that you not derive the blame for this on the legislator, but solely on my own lack of skill in not being able to explain the things so wisely devised by him.

For the term "hand" also, with us, is commonly understood in a wider sense. For when you yourself, O king, being about to accomplish something, send forth troops, we say, "The king has a great hand," implying to those who hear it the power you possess. In this sense our legislator Moses is frequently heard speaking in the Law, as when he says, "In a strong hand God brought you out of Egypt," and again, "I will send, says God, my hand, and I will strike the Egyptians." And concerning the death of the beasts, Moses says to Pharaoh, "Behold, the hand of the Lord shall be upon your beasts, and upon all that are in the fields, a great destruction." Thus "hands" are to be understood as the power of God. For it is understood that the entire strength of men and their activities reside in their hands. Therefore, the legislator rightly transferred ^B this expression to the divine majesty, calling the works of divine power the "hands of God."

^C Now, as to what is said about God "standing," it may be accepted in a more august sense concerning the arrangement of the world. For God is himself over all, and all things are subject to God, and have received from him the degree in which they persist, so that men might understand that for this reason these things cannot be moved from their own place and state. For truly, heaven has never changed into earth, nor earth into heaven, nor has the sun changed into the moon, nor the moon into the sun, nor rivers into seas, nor the sea into rivers. The same principle obtains regarding living creatures. For neither shall man become a beast, nor a beast man. And the same holds true for the rest, for plants and other things as well; while they cannot be changed into one another, they are constant in undergoing the same cycles of change and decay within themselves. In this sense, then, because all things obey the divine Power, God himself may not unworthily be said to "stand." Likewise, at the time he was sanctioning this Law, at that time on the mountain of the Law itself

^A the legislator says, because God had descended, there were the sounds of trumpets, and fire burning intolerably. For the whole multitude—not less than a million, excluding those under age, gathered around the mountain—within a period of no less than five days, in every place of vision around them, as they were encamped, saw the fire burning; so that the descent was not local, for God is everywhere. But he showed the power of the fire, marvelous beyond all others because of its consuming everything, burning ^B intolerably, yet consuming nothing unless the power of God was inherent in it. For of the plants growing on that mountain, although it burned fiercely, it consumed nothing; but the green of all things remained untouched by the fire, and the sounds of trumpets were heard more intensely alongside the lightning-like manifestation of the fire, though no such instruments were present, nor was there one sounding them, but all things were occurring through divine construction; so that it is clear from these things that the divine descent had occurred, because those who observed it understood each thing distinctly—that neither the fire had burned, as has been mentioned, nor did the trumpet sounds occur through human energy or the construction of instruments, but God was showing His own majesty ^C without any agent. Thus far Aristobulus.

Since we have finished the precepts of the sacred laws and the mode of the philosophy allegorized among them, it would be the next step to note this as well, that the entire Jewish nation is divided into two factions. The multitude indeed Moses commanded to be bound by all those rites just as they were conceived in the very words of the laws. But others, whose mind and character were more steadfast, were not only liberated from that outer husk but were also accustomed to attend to a more divine philosophy—one superior to the common mass of men—and to the contemplation of those things signified in the laws according to their inward meaning. ^D This was the race of the Jewish philosophers, whom myriads regarded for their exercise of life and for their external appearance. And the most famous of their own number, whom even they deemed worthy of everlasting memory, were Josephus and Philo, and many others. Passing over the majority of their works, I shall be satisfied for the present with the testimony of Philo alone as an example, which he set down concerning the things manifested in many of his own personal records. From these, then, taking this from the Apology for the Jews, do you read these things.

CHAPTER XI. On the virtue of the life of those who practiced philosophy among the Hebrews in ancient times.

^A "Our legislator," he says, "trained a vast multitude of those who delivered themselves to his discipline for the communion of mutual society; they are called Essenes, being deemed worthy of this appellation, in my opinion, because of their holiness. They inhabit many cities of Judea, and many villages, and great and populous assemblies. Their way of life is not determined by race (for race is not ascribed to those who choose it voluntarily), but because of their zeal for virtue and their craving for philanthropy. At any rate, among the Essenes, no one is a mere infant, nor even a first-bearded youth or a minor; since the unstable habits of these, lacking maturity, change along with the instability of their age. But they are perfect men, and already leaning toward old age, no longer being overwhelmed by the surge ^B of the body, nor driven by the passions, but enjoying the only truly unfalsified liberty. The witness to their liberty is their life. No one is permitted to possess anything whatever as his own private property, neither house, nor slave, nor field, nor livestock, nor as many other things as are prepared and provided by wealth. Instead, they deposit everything collectively into the common store, and enjoy the benefit of all in common. They dwell in the same place, forming clubs and communal meals, and they continue to manage everything for the common good. But different people have different occupations, to which they apply themselves tirelessly, not using the cold, or heat, or any disturbances of the air as an excuse; and before the sun rises, ^C they turn to their customary work, and they hardly return before it sets, rejoicing no less than those who are tested in gymnastic labors. For they assume that whatever exercises they pursue are more useful for life and more pleasant for soul and body, and more enduring than those in athletic contests, as they do not wither with the flowering of the body. For some of them are field-workers, skilled in matters of sowing and agriculture; others are herdsmen, masters of every kind of livestock; some manage swarms of bees; others are craftsmen of the arts, so that they might suffer nothing of the things which necessary needs impose, refusing to delay anything that leads to blameless acquisition. From those who thus differ, each one, having received his wage, gives it to the one elected as treasurer; and that man, having received it, at once purchases the necessities and provides abundant supplies of food ^D and other things which human life requires. They are fellow-diners and comrades at table every day, delighting in the same things, lovers of frugality, avoiding extravagance as a disease of soul and body. And not only is their table common, but so is their clothing. For in winter, coarse cloaks are laid out,

^B and in summer lighter wraps, so that it may be easy for anyone who wishes to take whatever he desires, since the things of one are held to belong to all, and the things of all, conversely, to belong to one. And if any of them should fall ill, he is nursed at the public expense, being cared for by the attentions and diligence of all. And the elders, even if they happen to be childless, are accustomed to end their lives in a most fortunate and prosperous old age, not merely as if they had many children, but as if they had exceptionally fine ones, being accounted worthy of such great honor and esteem, which those about them choose to provide by their own free will rather than by any necessity of nature.

Furthermore, perceiving more keenly what was likely to dissolve their fellowship, or at least to do so in the highest degree, they shunned marriage, while at the same time practicing self-restraint in a distinguished manner. For no Essene takes a wife, because woman is by nature selfish, and excessively jealous, and dreads upsetting the temper of a man, and is easily led by constant sorceries. For having practiced flattering words and the rest of the hypocrisy, just as on a stage, when she has beguiled the eyes and ears, she deludes the leading mind as if it were a subject led astray. And if children are born, having become filled with arrogance and boldness, she calls forth ^C those things which formerly she hinted at deceptively, and out of a more daring insolence, acting shamelessly, she compels them to perform things—every one of which is hostile to friendship. For whoever is bound by the charms of a wife, or by the necessity of nature is preoccupied with the care of children, is no longer the same toward others, but has become different, having transformed from a free man into a slave without even noticing it. Such, then, is their way of life, which is highly enviable. So much so that not only private citizens, but even great kings, admiring these men, stand in awe of them and increase their dignity and honor still more by their endorsements and tributes. Let these things stand as cited from the aforementioned work. And from the work, *That Every Good Man Is Free*, I shall set forth the following. ^D

CHAPTER XII. Further concerning the same.

There is also in Palestine, Syria, which is not barren of this excellence and virtue, a region which a considerable portion of the most populous nation of the Jews occupies and inhabits. He says-

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^A There is among them a certain race of men, numbering more than four thousand, whom they call Essenes—a name derived, as it seems to me (though not strictly according to the structure of the Greek language), from "holiness," because they have become worshippers of God in the highest degree, not by sacrificing animals, but by resolving to cultivate their own minds in a manner worthy of holiness. These people, in the first place, live in villages, avoiding the cities because of the habitual iniquities of those who live in them; for they know from the company of such people that an incurable infection is apt to settle upon the soul, as a disease might arise from a pestilential atmosphere. Some of them cultivate the land, while others pursue those crafts—all of them fellow-workers for peace—which benefit both themselves and their neighbors; they do not hoard silver and gold, nor do they acquire vast tracts of land out of a desire for profit, but only provide what is necessary for the requirements of life. ^B For they alone, perhaps, of all men, having become moneyless and propertyless (which they achieve more by deliberate choice than by lack of fortune), are considered most wealthy, regarding their limited needs and contentment as true abundance. You would not find among them any maker of arrows, javelins, daggers, helmets, breastplates, or shields, nor any manufacturer of weapons or engines of war, nor anyone who pursues any of the trades connected with war. Moreover, they do not even know of those pursuits which in peace are prone to slide into vice: for they do not even dream of commerce, shopkeeping, or shipping, since they cast away the grounds for greed. There is not a single slave among them, but all are free, ministering to one another; they condemn masters, not only as unjust for destroying equality, but also as impious for violating the law of nature, which, having begotten and nurtured all men alike like a mother, made them not merely sisters and brothers in name, but true brothers in reality—a kinship which insidious greed has nevertheless broken down, ^C replacing intimacy with estrangement and turning friendship into enmity. As for philosophy, they leave the logical part aside, as being unnecessary for the acquisition of virtue; and the physical part they leave to those who prattle about the heavens—save for that part which concerns the existence of God and the creation of the universe, which they study. They labor most diligently on the ethical part, using the ancestral laws as their instructors—laws which it is impossible for the human soul to devise without divine inspiration. They are instructed in these things at other times as well, but especially on the seventh day. For the seventh day is considered holy, on which...

having ceased from every other work, they arrive at the ^A sacred places, which they call synagogues. There, arranged by age, the young sit beneath the elders, listening with the appropriate order and decorum. One person takes the books and reads, while another, one of the most experienced, steps forward and interprets what is not understood; for most things are philosophized among them through symbols, according to an ancient style of zeal. ^B They are instructed in piety, holiness, righteousness, household management, civic life, and the knowledge of those goods, evils, and indifferent things that lead to truth, as well as the choices they should make and the avoidance of their opposites. They utilize three standards and rules: love for God, love for virtue, and love for humanity.

Myriad examples of love for God 6 are provided by their continuous and uninterrupted purity throughout their entire life, their avoidance of oaths, their truthfulness, and their belief that the Divine is the cause of all ^C good, but the author of no evil. Examples of the love for virtue include detachment from wealth, glory, and pleasure, as well as self-control, endurance, and furthermore, moderation, simplicity, affability, humility, law-abidingness, stability, and all things similar to these. Examples of the love for humanity include goodwill 7, equality, and a fellowship that transcends all words, regarding which it would not be out of place to say a few things here.

First, then, there is no one who has a private house, but it happens that it belongs to everyone ^D alike. For beyond the fact that they are distributed into groups and live together, the house is also open to those of the same way of life who arrive from elsewhere. Next, they all have a common treasury and common expenses; they have common clothing and common food, and they hold common meals. For you would not find anywhere else that the practice of living under the same roof, or having the same daily life, or sharing the same table is more firmly established—and not without reason! For whatever they earn through their labor during the day, they do not keep, but putting it into a common pool, they provide a shared benefit for those who wish to use it. Even the sick are not neglected, as if they were unable to provide for themselves, but having from the common funds a ready supply for their medical care, they use what is more than enough with complete confidence. There is also much reverence and concern for the elders, whom the genuine offspring treat as if they were parents, serving them with endless zeal of hands and minds 8 in the abundance of their senior years.

Philosophy makes such men athletes of virtue, without the need for Greek nomenclature, setting forth as its exercises the praiseworthy deeds from which untrammeled freedom is confirmed. A sign of this is that many tyrants have arisen at various times in the land, men who have employed both natures and purposes of divergent kinds. The former, indeed, having striven to overcome the tameness of man with the ferocity of wild beasts, leaving undone nothing that pertains to cruelty, slaughtering their subjects in herds, or even while they are still alive, like butchers, piece by piece and limb by limb,

^A And they did not cease until they had endured the same calamities at the hands of that Justice which watches over human affairs. But others, having transformed their frenzied and maddened state into another form of vice, and having cultivated an unspeakable bitterness, talking quietly, and hypocritically assuming a grave character under a simulated tone of quietness, having grown poisonous and deadly in the manner of dogs, having become the causes of incurable evils, left behind in the cities monuments of their own impiety and inhumanity, namely, the unforgettably painful calamities of those who suffered them. But no one—neither of the utterly cruel, nor of those who were deceitful and treacherous in times past—had the power to accuse the aforementioned sect of the Essenes, or Holies. ^B Everyone, having been overcome by the true goodness of these men—as if they were autonomous and truly free by nature—has treated them with respect, praising their communal meals and their sharing of all things, which is a most clear proof of a perfect and most blessed life.

Thus, let the accounts of the philosophy of the conduct and manner of life among the Jews be set forth through these things; the rest of their manner of life, which the divine laws proclaimed to the entire multitude of the nation, the discourse has already anticipated. What, then, remains after these things, than to demonstrate that the theology of the moderns is in agreement with the piety of their ancestors, so that our discourse might be rendered complete on this subject as well? Since, therefore, the oracles of the divinely inspired Scripture have been set forth through the previous work, come now, let us observe in the present work the reasoning of the wise among the Jews, so that we may learn what kind of men the children of the Hebrews have turned out to be, both in theology and in the excellence of their own words. Once again, therefore, passing over Philo, let us begin from the first of his writings on the Law.

CHAPTER XXIII. Philon's account regarding God, and that the world is created.

^C “For some,” he says, “having admired the world (9) rather than the Maker of the world, have declared it to be uncreated and eternal, having falsely claimed it to be ^D [independent of] God (10).”

CHAPTER XIII. From Philo on God, and that the world had a beginning.

“The world,” he says, “many people, rather than the Creator of the world, have admired, and they have wished it to be without beginning and eternal. In which, indeed, they have shamefully erred...”

for they ought, on the contrary, to have been struck with awe at his powers as Creator and Father, and not to have exalted it beyond due measure. But Moses, having reached the very pinnacle of philosophy, and having been instructed by divine oracles in many of the most vital secrets of nature, realized that it is most necessary ^B that there be in the nature of things two principles: the one an active agent, which is the mind of the universe, most pure and most clear, superior to knowledge, and superior to goodness itself and beauty itself; the other a passive, soulless and self-motionless subject, which, when moved, reshaped, and ensouled by the mind, was transformed into this most perfect work, this world. Those who assert that it is unbegotten, fail to perceive that they are cutting away the most useful and necessary thing for piety: Providence. For reason dictates that a father and maker should take care of what has been brought into existence. For a father cares for his children, and a craftsman for the things he has fashioned, looking to their preservation, using every means to ward off whatever brings harm, and striving in every way to provide whatever is useful and beneficial. But toward what is not brought into being, the one who has not produced it owes no care. It is a doctrine both contentious and void of utility to establish in this world—as though it were a city—a state of anarchy, having no governor, arbiter, or judge, by whom it is fitting that all things be ordered and dispensed. But the great Moses, regarding it as most absurd that the same thing should be an object of sight and yet lack any beginning (for everything that is perceived by the senses, whether it is in the process of coming to be or is continually changing, never remains the same), assigned eternity as something akin and ^C brotherly to that which is invisible and intelligible, while he attached a proper name to that which is perceived by sense. Since, therefore, this world is both visible and sensible, it must necessarily also be created; hence, it was not without purpose that he recorded its generation, having theologized with great solemnity. So much, then, for the world being created. The same man, in his work *On Providence*, discusses with great vigor the fact that the whole is governed by Providence, having first set forth the objections of the ungodly and then responding to them in turn. And while these arguments might seem somewhat long, I shall, because I consider them necessary, transcribe the greater part of them, though abridged in fewer words. He begins his discourse in this way.

CHAPTER XIV.

That the world is administered by Divine Providence.

“Do you then,” he says, “in such a disturbance ^D of affairs, say that there is a Providence...

^A and a confusion of things? For what in human life is ordered? Or what is not full of disorder 14 and corruption? Or are you the only one who does not know that to the basest and most wicked men there flows an abundance of good things—wealth, reputation, honors among the masses; again, power, health, keen perception, beauty, strength, the unhindered enjoyment of pleasures, through an abundance of resources and through the most peaceful constitution of the body? But the lovers and practitioners of wisdom and every virtue are—I am almost ashamed to say—poor, obscure, inglorious, humble?” Having said these things and ten thousand others more than these for the subversion of the argument, he next resolves the objections with these considerations: “God is not a tyrant, who practices cruelty and violence and all the works of a savage rule, but a King, who having taken up a gentle and lawful rule, administers the whole heaven and world with justice. And for a King there is no title more appropriate than ^B ‘Father.’ For what parents are to children in kinship, this a King is to a city, and God is to the world, having fitted together the two most beautiful and unchanging natural laws in an indissoluble union: authority along with providence. Just as, then, parents do not disregard their profligate sons, but taking pity on their misfortune, they attend to them and cherish them, thinking that it is the work of implacable enemies to trample on failures, but the work of friends and kin to lighten faults. And often they even bestow favors more upon these than upon the temperate, knowing clearly that for the latter, self-control is an abundant source of prosperity, but for the former, the parents are the only hope, and if they were to fall from them, they would be in want even of necessities. ^C In the same way God, being the Father of rational intelligence, cares for all who have a share of a rational nature, and exercises providence even for those living in a blameworthy manner, at once giving them time for amendment, and at the same time not transgressing His own merciful nature, of which virtue and philanthropy 15 have become worthy.

Take this, O soul, as a kind of deposit of His, and add to it another which follows it, in harmony and agreement with it. For far be it from you to wander so far from the sense of truth as to esteem any of the wicked to be happy, even if he should surpass Croesus in wealth, Lynceus in sharpness of sight, Milo of Croton in strength, and Ganymede in beauty—

Whom the gods snatched up, to pour wine for Zeus, For the sake of his beauty. ^B

For he who has made his own daemon—I mean his own mind—a slave to a thousand masters, I mean to love, to lust, to pleasure, to fear, to grief, to folly, to licentiousness, to cowardice, to injustice, could never be happy, even if the multitude, being deceived in their true judgment, should think so, having been bribed by that twin evil of pride and vain glory, which must unsettle and mislead unstable souls regarding those things which bring destruction to the greater part of mankind.

If, however, stretching the eye of the soul, you should wish to contemplate God's providence, insofar as it is permitted to human understanding, having gained a clearer vision of what is truly good, you will laugh at those things among us which you once admired. For always, while better things are absent, those which are worse, which take their place, are held in esteem; yet when the better things have appeared, they are immediately cast down and can hold only second place. ^C Having been struck with wonder, then, at that divine, good, and beautiful nature, you will surely understand that, in the sight of God, none of the things mentioned before is deemed worthy of the good portion. For the mines of silver and gold are the basest part of the earth, inferior in every way to the soil that is set aside for the production of crops. For there is nothing like food, without which it is impossible to live, among the abundance of wealth.

One very clear test of these things is famine, by which what is truly necessary and useful is judged. For everyone would gladly trade all the treasures in the world at any time for a little food. But when the abundance of necessary things, having flowed in ^D with an irresistible and myriad-fold deluge of corruption, is poured out through the cities, we consider it unworthy to settle for the goods of nature alone, but rather, having made arrogant satiety the master of our life, we throw ourselves into the acquisition of silver and gold, [communicating] with all from whom we might hope to gain anything, like the blind, no longer seeing with our mind because of avarice, that they are but lumps of earth about...

which we are tormented in a perpetual and unending war, without any thought of peace. ^A For garments are truly the flower of sheep, as the poets are wont to say, or, if you prefer to consider the art of their working, the praise of weavers. If anyone grows arrogant on account of glory, taking pleasure in the acceptance of the base, let him know that he himself is also base. For like rejoices in like. Let him pray, having partaken of purifications, to cleanse his ears, through which the great diseases of the soul invade. ^B Let those who are puffed up with conceit also learn not to walk with a high neck, looking toward the countless herds of tame and wild animals, to whom strength and vigor are innate. For it is one of the most absurd things for a man, who is surpassed by beasts in their natural excellences, to be vainglorious. And why should any sensible person take pride in bodily beauty, which a short time extinguishes, dimming its deceptive bloom before it has blossomed for very long? And this, while seeing in inanimate things the prize-winning works of calligraphers, sculptors, and other craftsmen, in paintings, and in statues, and in the variety of woven fabrics, excelling in every city in Greece and among the barbarians. Therefore, of these things, as I said, nothing has been deemed worthy by God of the good ^C portion (22). And why should we be surprised if not by God? For not even among human beings who are beloved of God—among whom those things that are truly good and fine are honored—are they esteemed, even if they have obtained a fortunate nature and have adorned that nature with practice accompanied by discipline, of which the ascent is philosophy. But those who have concerned themselves with a bastard education have not even imitated the physicians, who treat the body as the slave of the soul, while they themselves claim to heal the mistress. For those physicians, when someone fortunate falls ill, even if he be the great king, ^D setting aside everything that is superfluous, or the men’s apartments, or the women’s quarters, or paintings, or silver, or gold, whether unminted or coined (23), or the multitude of goblets or woven fabrics, or the other acclaimed adornment of kings; and furthermore, having discarded the crowd of servants, and the attendance of friends or relatives, or subjects (24) of those in authority, and of the bodyguards, having arrived at the bed, and having disregarded those things concerning the body itself—neither marveling at beds inlaid with stones and made of solid gold, nor at bedspreads that are spider-web thin or decorated with stone (25), nor at the diverse styles of garments; and furthermore, having stripped off the cloaks surrounding him, [they touch...]

the hands, and pressing the veins, they anxiously investigate the pulses, to see if they are life-giving; and often, having lifted the tunics, they examine whether the belly is swollen, whether the chest is inflamed, or if the heart is beating in disorder; and then they apply their own particular remedy. ^A It would have behooved those philosophers who profess to practice the art of healing for the soul—that queen by nature—to hold in contempt all things that empty opinions fashion ^B (26). They should instead enter within, and examine its mind, to see if it is being moved by pulses of anger, unequal in speed and contrary to nature. They should examine the tongue, to see if it is rough and prone to slander, if it has played the harlot and is unbridled; they should examine the belly, to see if it has swollen in an insatiable posture of desire. In short, they should investigate each of the passions, diseases, and infirmities, if it appears that the soul is affected by any of them, so that they might not fall short in applying the means to save it.

But now, dazzled by the brilliance of external things, as if unable to behold the intellectual light, they have spent their life wandering; unable to reach the kingly intellect, they barely arrive at the entrance-halls, ^C and, having marveled at the wealth, glory, health, and related things that stand at the doors of virtue, they worship them. For truly, just as it is the height of madness to use the blind as judges of colors, or the deaf as judges of musical tones, so too is it to use wicked men as judges of the goods that pertain to truth; for these men are blinded in the most sovereign part of themselves, their intellect, which is possessed by the deep darkness of folly. ^D Do we then wonder now if Socrates, or this or that man among the earnest, spent his life in poverty (27)—they being men who never practiced any of the arts of gain, nor even deemed it worthy to accept what was offered them, whether by wealthy friends or by kings offering great gifts, because they considered the possession of virtue the only true good and fair thing, and, struggling for this, gave no thought to all other goods? Who, indeed, would not disregard what is bastard in favor of keeping watch over what is genuine? And if, having shared in a mortal body and being full of human corruptions, and living among such a multitude of unjust men—of whom it is not easy even to find a number—they suffered treachery, why do we blame nature, when it is the cruelty of those who attacked them that we ought to rebuke? For if they had been in a pestilential atmosphere, they would have been bound to fall ill; [E] and vice is indeed a more—or at least no less—destructive force than a pestilential state. Just as when it is raining, the wise man, if he happens to be in the open, must necessarily get wet; or when the cold north wind blows, he must be overcome by shivering and chill; or when summer is at its height, he must grow hot—for it is a law of nature that bodies suffer along with the yearly changes—in the same way, for the man dwelling in such places, where there are murders, famines, and the brood of other plagues, it is necessary to be affected by the evils arising from such things. For indeed, regarding Polycrates (28), for the terrible crimes he committed and...

for the impiety ^A he practiced, he met with a fate worse than his life of misery; add to this that he was punished by the Great King (29), and was fixed to a stake, fulfilling a prophecy. I know (30), I myself have related—not long ago having appeared to see it—that he was anointed by the sun and washed by Zeus. For these enigmatic phrases, spoken by way of symbols and long obscure, received their most clear confirmation through the events themselves. Nor were they obscure only at the end, but throughout his whole life from the beginning, he had lived with his soul suspended before his body. For always fearing and trembling at the multitude of those plotting against him, he was distraught, knowing clearly that not one person was well-disposed toward him, but all were implacable enemies in his misfortune. ^B And witnesses to this ceaseless and continuous anxiety are those who have composed the Sicilian histories, who say that he even held his most beloved wife in suspicion. A sign of this: he ordered the entrance to the bedroom, through which she was expected to come to him, to be laid with wooden planks, so that she might never escape his notice by creeping in; but that by the sound and clatter of her approach, she might reveal her arrival. And not only that she should not be dressed, but that she should come in stripped of all parts, that it might not be permitted to be seen by men. Besides this, he had the floor along the path constantly dug to the breadth and depth of a peasant's trench, through fear lest anything be secretly concealed for some plot, which could be detected either by leaping or by ^C wide strides. How many evils, therefore, was he full of, watching and devising these things against a wife, whom he ought to have trusted before all others? But he was like those who, through a broken crag of a mountain, in order to perceive more clearly the natures in the heavens, walk along precipices; they, barely being able to reach as far as their neck inclined forward, are neither able to turn back, having given up on the remaining height, nor do they dare to descend, becoming dizzy at the sight of the chasms. For having conceived a passion for tyranny, as if it were a divine and much-contended-for matter, he supposed it was safe neither to remain nor to flee; for to the one remaining, countless evils poured down one after another; but to the one wishing to flee, the danger regarding his life hung over him, from those armed, if not with bodies, yet with ^D their minds against him. The deed, too, which they say Dionysius used against the one who prided himself on the life of tyrants, reveals this. For having invited him to a most magnificent and costly banquet, he ordered a sword to be suspended over him from a very thin thread. And when, having reclined, he suddenly saw it, being neither bold enough to rise because of the tyrant, nor able to enjoy the things prepared because of his fear—having disregarded the affluent and rich pleasures—he kept stretching out his neck and eyes, awaiting his own destruction. And Dionysius, understanding, said: "Do you already perceive, then, our famous and much-contended-for life? For it is such, if one does not wish to deceive himself."

^A It abounds indeed with wealth, but contains deep, inescapable evils; ^B it is full of constant fears and incurable dangers, and of an ailment more severe and harder to heal than any creeping or wasting disease, always carrying certain destruction. The multitude of the unexamined, deceived by its brilliant appearance, have suffered the same fate as those lured by unsightly harlots, who mask their deformity with clothing, gold, and facial makeup, lacking genuine beauty, and create a bastard counterfeit to ensnare those who behold them. Such a heavy doom do the most prosperous abound in, the depths of which they themselves judge within, yet cannot bear. But just as those who are compelled to speak of the unspeakable utter cries of genuine passion, they live in a communion of punishments, both present and expected, just like animals fattened for sacrifice. For these too receive the utmost care in being slaughtered for the sake of a feast of much flesh. There are some who have even rendered not obscure, but public, accounts for their impious wealth, the multitude of whom it would be a tedious labor to recount; one example suffices to stand for all. It is said, then, by those who committed to writing the Sacred War in Phocis, that by a law laid down, the temple-robbers were to be either cast down a precipice, or drowned, or burned. They distributed the punishments among the three who had plundered the temple at Delphi—Philomelus, Onomarchus, and Phayllus—in such a way that the first was cast down a rough and rocky cliff and shattered, the second perished after his horse bucked and ran down to the sea, where it plunged into an open abyss, and Phayllus wasted away with a wasting disease (for there is a twofold account concerning him), or was consumed by fire in the temple at Abae. Indeed, it is most contentious to argue that these things happened by chance. For if some had been punished at different times or by different torments, it might be reasonable to plead the instability of fortune. But that all were punished together, at once, and not by different torments, but by those contained in the laws, it is reasonable to say that God, having judged, drove them. ^C But if some of the others who remained, the violent ones who revolted against the masses and enslaved not only other peoples but their own nations as well, lived on unpunished, this is not surprising. For first of all, a human does not judge in the same way as God, because we investigate only what is manifest, but He penetrates even into the soul’s deepest thoughts, and as though in sunlight, He illuminates a brilliant mind, stripping away the amulets ^D with which it is covered and beholding it bare, and, as far as they have been found, He judges them. For "the word of God is living and active, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing to the division of soul and spirit, of joints and marrow, and discerning the thoughts and intentions of the heart. And no creature is hidden from His sight, but all things are naked and laid bare to His eyes."

^A And immediately discerning both what is counterfeit and what is genuine. Let us never, therefore, prefer our own judgment to the divine tribunal, and say that it is more truthful and wiser; for that is not holy. For in the former [our own judgment], there are many things that lead us astray: deceptive senses, treacherous passions, and the heaviest fortification of vices. In the latter [the divine tribunal], however, there is nothing for the sake of deception, but justice and truth, and it is natural for each one to be corrected and praised under judgment.

Furthermore, noble sir, do not think that tyranny is an unprofitable ^B timing. For punishment is not unprofitable; rather, to assign penalties to the righteous is either more beneficial or at least not improper. For which reason, it has been included in all rightly written laws; and those who wrote them are praised by all. For what the executioner is in a democracy, that is punishment in the eyes of the law. Therefore, when poverty and a dire lack of virtue take hold of cities, and an abundance of folly abounds, then God, like the current of a mountain torrent, desiring to divert the flow of wickedness so that He may cleanse our race, gives strength and power to those who are of a princely nature. For wickedness is not purged except by a soul that is savage. And just as cities raise up executioners for murderers, traitors, and sacrilegious men—not accepting the character of the men, but examining the usefulness of their service—in the same way, the guardian ^C of this great city of the universe appoints tyrants over cities as public executioners, in places where He perceives that violence, injustice, impiety, and other evils are overflowing, so that having finally stood, they might cease. Then, He also deems it fit to pursue the guilty ones—who acted out of a soul that was difficult to cleanse and pitiless—in all things, just like certain ringleaders. For just as the power of fire, when it has consumed the fuel placed before it, finally consumes the fuel itself; in this way, those who have received power over the multitudes, when they have wasted the cities and made them empty of men, are themselves destroyed, paying the penalty for all. And why do we marvel if, through tyrants, God diverts wickedness that has been poured out over cities, regions, and nations? For often, without using other ministers, He performs this through Himself, ^D by bringing on famine, plague, an earthquake, and all other things sent by God, by which large and populous crowds perish daily, and a large portion of the civilized world is laid waste, for the sake of the providence of virtue.

Enough, then, for the present, has been said—as I believe—concerning the fact that none of the wicked are happy; by which it is most clearly demonstrated that Providence exists. If you are not yet convinced, speak boldly of the doubt that still remains in your mind; for by working through both sides together, we shall know where the truth lies. And after other things, He adds again: "The movements of winds and rains are not for the harm of those sailing, as you supposed,

at the proper time.

^B Indeed, it is not for the sake of the farmers that God works, but for the benefit of our whole race. For He cleanses the earth with waters and the whole space beneath the moon 37 with winds; and by both He nourishes, increases, and brings animals and plants to perfection. And if at times He harms those sailing or farming out of season, it is nothing to be wondered at; for these are a small part, whereas His care is for the whole human race.

Just as, therefore, an ointment in the gymnasium is applied for the sake of benefit, yet the gymnasiarch often shifts the customary order because of civic needs, on account of which some of those being anointed are late; so too God, as a city’s overseer, caring for the entire cosmos, is accustomed to make summers wintry and winters spring-like for the benefit of the whole, even if some ship-masters or tillers of the earth are destined to be harmed by the irregularity of these things. ^C Therefore, He provides, as a most necessary work, the transformations of the elements into one another, out of which the cosmos has been fastened and consists, without hindrance; and frosts and snows, and whatever is of that kind, follow upon the cooling of the air, and again, lightnings and thunders follow the clashing and friction of clouds. Of which, perhaps, not one happens by Providence, but the rains and winds, which are causes of life and food and growth for those around the earth, are what these are concomitants of.

Often, when a gymnasiarch out of ambition makes lavish expenditures, some of the unrefined, being showered 38 with oil instead of water, let drops fall onto the floor; and the most slippery spot instantly becomes mud. But no one of sound mind would say that the mud and the slipperiness have come about by the provision of the gymnasiarch, but that these have incidentally followed upon the abundance of the supplies. ^D The rainbow too, and the halo, and whatever is of a like kind, are again concomitants of these, as they are mixed 39 into the clouds; they are not primary works of nature, but happen incidentally to natural works. Not but that even these provide some necessary need for the more prudent; for they conjecture and foretell from these the lulls and the winds, the clear weather and the winters.

Do you not see the colonnades in the cities? Most of them face toward the south, so that those walking about may be warmed in winter and shaded in summer. But something else follows, which does not come about by the design of the builder. What is this? The shadows that fall from their feet make known to us the hours by our own observation, but [they exist] for the benefit of our whole race. And indeed, fire is a most necessary work of nature; and smoke is a concomitant of it; but yet it provides some benefit.

^A And the same is sometimes true [in other matters]. In the case of daytime signal fires, for instance, when the fire is dimmed and obscured by the sun’s rays, the smoke reveals the approach of enemies. The logic applied to the rainbow is the same as that applied to eclipses. For eclipses of the sun and moon follow from the divine nature of the bodies, yet they are signals either of the death of kings or the destruction of cities—a thing which Pindar also hinted at when an eclipse occurred, through the things mentioned above. And the circle of the Milky Way, while it shares in the same substance as the other stars, is difficult to explain in terms of cause; yet if it exists, let not those accustomed to investigating the nature of things refrain [from the inquiry]. For discovery is a most useful thing, and the search itself is most pleasant ^B to those who love learning. Just as the sun and moon exist by Providence, so do all things in heaven, even if we, unable to trace the nature and powers of each, remain silent. Earthquakes, plagues, lightning strikes, and occurrences of that kind are said to be "god-sent," but in truth they are not; for God is the cause of no evil at all, but the mutations of the elements give birth to these things—not as primary works of nature, but as those following from necessities, and following upon the primary matters. And if some of the virtuous [are caught up] in the harm coming from these things, one must not blame the administration. First of all, because some who are thought to be good among us are not so in truth, ^C since the judgments of God are more precise than all things according to human reason; and secondly, because Providence loves to look to what is most cohesive for the things in the cosmos—just as in kingdoms and military commands it looks to the cities and the camps, not to any one of the neglected and obscure individuals who might happen to be there. But some say that, just as in the killing of tyrants it is lawful for the kin also to be destroyed, so that the enormity of the punishment might curb the wrongdoing, in the same way some of the innocent perish in plague-ridden diseases, so that others from afar might be brought to their senses; ^D this is apart from the fact that it is necessary for those who wander into plague-ridden air to fall ill, just as those tossed about on a ship are equally in danger. And the wild beasts were made (for one must not keep silent, lest, even if one thinks himself clever at speaking, after anticipating the defense, he should [have] torn it apart) for the sake of exercise for the conflicts of war. For the training and the constant hunting consolidate and brace the bodies quite well, and before the bodies, they accustom the souls to disregard the sudden attacks of enemies through the endurance of their strength. But for those of a peaceful nature, it is possible to live safely not only inside walls, but also [dwelling] in secluded chambers, having for their enjoyment—

^A a most abundant flock of days. Since boars, and lions, and creatures of like habits, being moved by a voluntary nature, are driven far from the city, content to suffer no harm from the plotting of men. But if some, through sloth, are unarmed and unprepared and dwell fearlessly in the dens of wild beasts, let them blame themselves for what befalls them, and not nature, because, when it was possible to take precautions, they neglected to do so. Indeed, I have already seen some in the hippodromes who yielded to irrationality, who, instead of keeping their seat and watching with order, stood in the middle and, being pushed by the speed of the four-horse chariots, were crushed by feet and wheels, receiving the rewards of their folly. So much for these matters. The venomous among reptiles did not come into being according to providence ^B but by way of consequence, as I said before. For [living creatures] are brought to life when the moisture within shifts toward the warmer. And some are even enlivened by decay, as, for instance, worms from food, and lice from perspiration. But those that have their generation from their own substance according to a seminal and primary nature belong rightly to what is inscribed as "Providence." I have also heard two accounts concerning them, as if they had come into being for the benefit of man, which I would not conceal. The one is as follows: Some have said that venomous creatures cooperate in many things for physicians, and that those who practice the art, by using them skillfully for such purposes, provide antidotes for those who are in the most precarious, unexpected peril. And until now it is possible to see those who do not attempt to heal sluggishly and carelessly using each of them in the compounding of medicines with no little diligence. The other account was not medical ^C but philosophical, as it seems. For he said these things were prepared by God as instruments of chastisement against those who sin, just as scourges or the sword for generals and rulers; wherefore, while remaining quiet for the rest of the time, they are provoked to fierceness against those who have been condemned, whose nature in the incorruptible tribunal has judged itself to deserve death. That they lurk in houses is, rather, a falsehood; for it is outside the city, in the field and in the wilderness that they are seen, fleeing from man as from a master. Yet even if it is true, it has some rationale. For rubbish is heaped up in corners, and a multitude of refuse, into which it loves to creep, in addition to the fact that the smell of fat also has an attractive power. If swallows also dwell with us, it is no wonder, for we refrain from hunting them. But a desire for survival is implanted in souls not only in rational beings ^D but also in irrational ones. But among things [meant] for enjoyment, there is nothing that lives with us, on account of the plotting [that comes] from us, except where the use of such things is forbidden by law. There is a city in Syria by the sea, Ascalon by name; having become in—

- ^A that place, at the time I was traveling to the ancestral temple to offer prayers and sacrifices, I observed a countless multitude of doves in the crossroads and in every house. When I inquired of the reason, they told me that it was not permitted to capture them, for the use of them had been forbidden to the inhabitants from long ago. Thus has the animal been tamed by [this] freedom from fear, so that it not only becomes roof-dwelling, but also keeps company at table, and delights in the periods of truce. In Egypt, moreover, a more wonderful sight is to be seen. For the man-eating crocodile, the most formidable of beasts, while being born and reared in the most sacred Nile, senses the benefit [afforded to it], even though it lives deep underwater. For among those by whom it is honored, it multiplies most greatly; but among those who plunder it, it does not appear even in a dream. So much so that, while those sailing where [the crocodiles] are at their most ferocious dare not dip even the tip of a finger [in the water], fearing them as they swarm up in herds, elsewhere, even those who are extremely cowardly jump in and swim for play. ^B The land of the Cyclopes (since their race is a figment of myth) does not bring forth mild fruit without sowing and the labor of men, just as nothing is born from non-existence. Nor should Greece be accused of being wretched and barren; for in her also there is much deep-soiled land. And if barbarous territory excels in the abundance of its fruits, it gains in sustenance but is diminished in those who are nourished, for whose sake the sustenance exists. For Greece alone truly begets men, a heavenly plant and a divine, consummate growth, bringing forth a faculty of reason that makes itself familiar with knowledge. The reason for this is that the fineness of the air is naturally inclined to whet the intellect. Hence Heraclitus also does not speak wide of the mark when he says: "Where the earth is dry, the soul is wisest and best." One might also find proof in the fact that those who are sober and have few needs are more intelligent, while those who are always filled with drinks and victuals are least prudent, as their faculty of reason is drowned by the things that enter into them. Wherefore, in barbarous lands, there are indeed shoots and stalks of great length due to the abundance of nourishment, and the most fertile of irrational animals, but intellect is not born, or is born only in the least degree; because the succession of dense and continuous exhalations from the earth and water has prevailed, ^C preventing it from being elevated from the air. Nor are there any complaints against nature regarding the kinds of fish and birds and land animals, as if she invites us to pleasure; rather, this is a severe reproach of our own incontinence. For it was necessary for the completion of the whole, that a universe might exist in every part, for the ideas of all animals to come into being; but it was not necessary for man, the being most akin to wisdom, to rush to the enjoyment of these, changing into the wildness of beasts. Wherefore even until now, those who have a doctrine of temperance abstain from all such things entirely, using the vegetable greenery and the fruits of trees for their victuals, which is the most pleasant enjoyment. But to those who deemed the feasting on the aforementioned things to be "according to nature," teachers, correctors, and lawgivers were set over them throughout the cities, who took care to restrain the excess of their desires, not permitting the use of all things to be without fear. And if there are roses, and saffron, and the rest of the ^D bloom. Just as, therefore, there is sun and moon, and likewise everything that is in heaven, so that we may decide to abstain from scrutinizing the natures and powers of each, [despairing of attaining them], it has been brought to perfection by divine Providence. But indeed earthquakes, pestilences, lightning strikes, and other things of that kind are said to be sent by divine power, yet less truly; for God is the cause of no evil at all; but they are generated from the mutations of the elements in such a way that they are not some special and primary works of nature, but follow only from necessary and primary ones. And if even some of those who seemed to be upright men are sometimes involved in these calamities and destructions, there is nevertheless no cause for the reason of divine government to be accused. For, in the first place, not all who are thought to be upright are in fact so, since human thoughts and counsels are surpassed by far and in many ways by the certainty of divine judgments. Secondly, that power of Providence is accustomed to look to and moderate the things and principal parts of the world, just as we see happens in kingdoms themselves and in military commands, so that the care of kings and commanders embraces the safety of cities and of entire armies, not of some cast-off and obscure individual. By way of this, some also add that, just as in the slaughter of tyrants, relatives and kinsmen are also removed by the authority of the laws, so that others may be deterred from similar injuries and crimes by the magnitude of the punishment: so too, some innocent persons perish by the contagion of fatal diseases, so that the rest, having been instructed by these examples long beforehand, may learn to moderate and restrain themselves: to pass over the fact that a necessity of contracting disease is imposed upon those who are surrounded by unhealthy air, not otherwise than upon those who are carried on a ship tossed by storms, [in order that they may] equally undergo the danger. Now those fierce and powerful beasts (for this must not be passed over, even though you have anticipated this defense of ours, with the faculty you have in speaking) were created for the exercising of men for the struggles of war. For the assiduous practice—both of gymnastic games and of hunting—increases the strength and vigor of the body to a greater degree, and what is far better than the body, it habituates the mind itself to deride sudden incursions of enemies with the constancy of an unconquered heart. For those who are of a milder disposition can live securely, enclosed by city walls and barred doors, abounding in the greatest herds of tame animals for daily use. Indeed, we see that pigs, lions, and others of the same kind that retain the freedom of nature, are kept far from cities so that they may not suffer anything more serious from the plots of men. If anyone should happen to venture carelessly into their lairs, naked of weapons and protection, whatever misfortune may then befall them, they should blame themselves rather than nature, for they could have avoided that danger.

^A Moreover, the variety of flowers is for health, not for pleasure. "For their powers are immense, and they benefit even by their own scent, filling all with fragrance, and much more so in the ^B mixtures of medicines. For some, when mixed, provide their own powers more distinctly, just as the union of male and female for the generation of an animal, which neither is of its own nature able to effect, but which both together do when they have come together." These things have been stated necessarily in relation to the rest of the arguments brought forward by the skeptic, being able to produce sufficient conviction for those who are not contentiously disposed regarding the fact that God attends to human affairs. ^C But these things I have excerpted from the aforementioned man, at once showing what kind of people the young Hebrew children were, and at the same time making manifest their pious conception concerning God and the unanimity they held with their ancestors. And now it is time to pass on from here to the testimonies of outsiders regarding these same matters.

Book Nine

One thing is commonly recounted by certain physicians: that venomous serpents are useful for many things, and to those skilled in this art, if they only use them knowingly when there is need, they provide a very great power of amulets, by which, contrary to human expectation, health and safety are restored to those who are suffering in the most dangerous ways. Thus you may see even today those who treat medicine not sluggishly or perfunctorily, but who add something from every kind to the daily preparation of remedies, and that not incidentally. ^D The other point seemed to be drawn from the sources of the philosophers rather than those of the physicians. It held that these things were prepared by God as instruments of punishment against the wicked, just as whips and iron itself are sometimes accustomed to be used by leaders and emperors. Therefore, while they are elsewhere accustomed to be quiet and to act more mildly, they are roused as if with new strength against the condemned, upon whom nature herself, in that most upright and chaste forum of hers, has passed a capital sentence. For that this class of animals lies hidden in our houses for the most part is utterly false, since we see it generally living outside the cities, in the fields and in deserts, where it flees from man as its master. Yet when this sometimes happens otherwise, it is not even then without its own logic, as in some places where there is an accumulation of a huge mass of dung and filth, into which they immerse themselves more avidly, besides the fact that the lair itself has its own power of attraction. Now, that swallows dwell with us is truly nothing strange, since we abstain from pursuing them, and the desire to protect health is fixed and embedded not only in animals endowed with reason but even in those lacking it. But as for those which men can use and eat, none of them dwell with us because they fear our snares, unless where their use has been forbidden by law. There is a certain maritime city of Syria, which they call Ascalon, where, when I was once staying at the time I was going to the ancestral temple for the sake of prayer and sacrifice, I saw an infinite number of doves in the streets, and even in every single house. When I asked the reason, they answered that it was forbidden to capture them, because long ago the use of them had been interdicted to the citizens. To such an extent is this kind of animal tamed by security that it is assiduous not only under the same roof but even at the same table, and, peace having been granted, exploits it for pleasure. However, there is something in Egypt that you would admire more vehemently. For that crocodile, the devourer of men and the most savage of beasts, because it is born and nurtured in the most holy River Nile, has some sense of present convenience, so that it usually hides under the water. By those among whom it is worshipped, it is usually found in great numbers; but those whom it might treat as enemies, among them it is not seen even in a dream. Therefore, those who sail the Nile, even if they are very bold and travel in groups, do not dare to dip even the tip of a finger into the water: at other times, even the most timid men leap voluntarily and swim about for sport. In the region of the Cyclopes (for that class of men is a myth and a certain fiction), because there is no sowing there, no farmers, no milder fruits are born at all, just as nothing can be produced from nothing. But Greece is certainly not to be accused as being too arid and infertile; for it has many regions of deeper and softer soil. But if some barbarian lands excel in the fertility of fruits, so that they abound with food, they nevertheless suffer from a scarcity of those who are to be nourished and for whose sake alone food is produced. Indeed, Greece alone, if we wish to speak the truth, is the progenitor of men, insofar as it brings forth a completely heavenly plant, a divine germ, and in every way perfect, that is, intelligence itself, joined with native knowledge through a certain kinship. The reason for this is that by the thinness of the air, the mind of man is sharpened.

so that Heraclitus did not speak without reason when he said that where the ground is driest, there the mind is most alert and excellent. This you may understand even from the fact that sober and frugal men are more capable in intellect; whereas those who are perpetually heavy with drink and food become dull and obtuse, because the power of their intelligence is overwhelmed by the mass of matter infused into it. Therefore, when in a barbarian land not only do trees and massive trunks grow, but also, because of the quality and abundance of nutrients, creatures devoid of reason are commonly born in great numbers; then an excellent intellect either does not exist at all, or is very rare: because of that perpetual and continuous abundance of exhalations bursting forth from earth and water alike, which is wont to be carried aloft through the very air. Furthermore, that vast variety of fish, birds, and land animals, as if nature were enticing us to pleasure, ought not to be a disgrace; rather, it yields to the most serious reproof of our intemperance. For it was absolutely necessary for the perfection of the universe and the dignity of its individual parts that living beings of every kind should be born; but it was certainly not necessary for that man—I mean that man—so closely akin to wisdom, to clothe himself in the ferocity of wild beasts and hunt these delicacies of mere gluttony with such desire. And so, while those who care for temperance once and for all decide to abstain from all these things, enduring life most sweetly with budding herbs and the fruits of trees in place of meat, their teachers, censors, and legislators in their respective cities are arrayed against those who think that the eating of such animals is in accordance with nature; it is their duty and task to curb the immoderate power of desires, and not to grant to everyone an indiscriminate use of all things. Finally, if the rose, if the crocus, and the rest of the variety of flowers exist, they exist for the sake of health, not for pleasure. For they possess infinite powers, and while they delight us with the sweetness and fragrance of the scent with which they fill all things, they are especially useful in the preparation of remedies. For there are some things which, when mixed together, prove their power more brilliantly and certainly, as is understood from the union of male and female, since they could in no way accomplish separately what they both accomplish together. And these are the points by which we thought your remaining doubts would be sufficiently resolved: certainly of such a kind that everyone who has been led by them, provided he is not contentious, will confess that human affairs are governed by Divine Providence. I have thus summarized these points from Philo, so as to show not only what kind of people the descendants of the Hebrews were according to the testimony of later writers, but also how piously and religiously they felt about God, and how well and gloriously they agreed with their ancestors. Now it is time to move on to the testimonies of foreign writers concerning the same matters.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL: BOOK NINE

THE NINTH BOOK OF THE PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL

CONTENTS OF THE NINTH BOOK

1. How many of the Greek writers made mention of the Jewish nation. 2. From Theophrastus on the Jews, from the first book of Porphyry’s *On Abstinence from Living Creatures*. 3. From Porphyry ^A on the philosophy that once flourished among the Jews. 4. From Hecataeus on the Jews. 5. From Clearchus on the same, from the first book of *On Sleep*. 6. From Clement on those who have made mention of the Jewish nation, from the first book of the *Stromateis*. 7. From Numenius the Pythagorean philosopher on the Jews, from the first book *On the Good*. 8. From the same, on Moses and also on the Jews, from the third book of the same subject. 9. From the poet Choerilus on the Jews. 10. From the oracles of Apollo, that were in our time, concerning the Hebrews, in Porphyry. ^B 11. From Josephus’s *Antiquities*, how many of the external writers made mention of the Deluge according to Moses.

12. From the writings of Abydenus, concerning the Deluge. 13. From Josephus’s *Antiquities*, touching on the fact that many mention the long life of the ancients. 14. From the writings of Abydenus, concerning the construction of the tower. 15. That many others also made mention of the same, from Josephus’s *Antiquities*. 16. Concerning Abraham, the forefather of all the Hebrews, from the same. 17. Eupolemus concerning Abraham, from the writings of Alexander Polyhistor regarding the Jews. ^B 18. Artapanus concerning the same, from the same writings of Polyhistor. 19. Molo concerning the same, likewise from the same writings. 20. Philo concerning the same. 21. Demetrius concerning Jacob. 22. Theodotus concerning the same. 23. Artapanus concerning Joseph. 24. Philo concerning the same. 25. Aristeas concerning Job. 26. And Eupolemus concerning Moses. 27. Artapanus concerning the same. 28. Ezekiel concerning the same. 29. Demetrius concerning the same. 30. Eupolemus concerning David and Solomon, and concerning Jerusalem. 31. Solomon’s letter to Vaphres, king of Egypt. 32. Vaphres’s letter to King Solomon. 33. Solomon’s letter to Souron, king of Phoenicia. 34. Souron’s letter to Solomon. 35. Concerning Jerusalem, from Timochareus, as it is found in the same book regarding the affairs of Antioch. 36. From the Syrian Surveyor, concerning the same. 37. Philo concerning the waters that are in Jerusalem. 38. Aristeas concerning the same. 39. From the prophet Jeremiah, from Eupolemus. 40. From Berossus, concerning the captivity of the Jews under Nebuchadnezzar, and concerning the kings of Babylon from Nabopullussar down to Cyrus, from Josephus. 41. From the writings of Abydenus, concerning Nebuchadnezzar, and the founding of Babylon by him. 42. Concerning those who make mention of the Jewish nation, from the first book of Josephus’s *Antiquities of the Jews*.

CHAPTER I. How many of the Greek writers made mention of the Jewish nation.

^C Since it has now been demonstrated by sure arguments that the oracles of the Hebrews were received and approved by us not lightly or rashly, but with a mature and accurate evaluation of judgment, forasmuch as the grounds of proof are connected together, it is time to see that even the most celebrated writers of the Greeks were not ignorant of Hebrew matters. Rather, some, by their own testimony, have both praised their life and institutions and have borne witness to the truth of the histories which are accustomed to be circulated among them, while others have followed a theology and doctrine not unlike theirs. And first, indeed, I shall set before your eyes what is most prominent in this regard—namely, how many of the Greek writers have made mention, by name, of the Jews and Hebrews, and of the philosophy that flourished among them of old, and of the history of their forefathers from ancient times. And my discourse shall begin from the life of these men, so that you may know...

that we have preferred their discipline to the philosophy of the Greeks with prudent and sound judgment. For witnesses of this are not only the sacred scriptures of the Hebrews, but also those philosophers who have flourished most highly among the Greeks and are most celebrated even to this day, who testify that they maintain a manner of life and of character consistent with those things which we carefully examined in the previous book. Come then, read through for me the things which Porphyrius, in his books *On Abstinence from Animal Food*, has reported from Theophrastus in this manner.

CHAPTER II. On the Jews from Theophrastus, whom Porphyry praises in the first book of 'On Abstinence from Animal Food'.

^B«And indeed,» he says, «if the Jews, who are from Syria—since this type of sacrifice has been an institution among them now from the very beginning—were to command us to offer sacrifices in the same rite as they do, we would never allow ourselves to be brought to do so. For they are not accustomed to use the sacrificed victims for food, but they consume the sacrifice at night, burning them whole and pouring much honey and wine upon them, hastening to finish the sacrifice quickly, so that that all-seeing eye may not behold an unworthy deed. And this they do while fasting on the days in between; and during all this time, being philosophers by race, they engage in discourse among themselves about the Divine, while at night they occupy themselves with the contemplation of the stars, looking toward them and calling upon God ^C through their prayers. For these were the first to begin offering to God not only other living creatures, but also themselves, led by necessity, indeed, and not by craving.»

CHAPTER III. Ex Porphyrio, de prisca et insigni apud Judaeos philosophandi ratione.

^DNow truly, what follows in the fourth book of the aforementioned work, Porphyrius himself recalls regarding these same people: «The Essenes,» says he, «are indeed Jews by race, but they love one another beyond all others. They recoil from pleasures as though from a crime; they consider self-restraint and victory over desires to be the place of virtue. They abstain from marriage, but they undertake to educate the children of others while they are still soft and flexible for learning, whom they esteem as kinsfolk and relatives, and imprint upon them their own customs; the marriage, however, and the...

rest that follows in the succession, they do not abrogate, but they guard against the sexual excesses of women, and are convinced that none may be kept for one man alone. ^A They are despisers of wealth, and among them the sharing of goods is wonderful; nor can one find any among them who excels the others in possessions. For it is a law that those who enter the sect must confiscate their property to the order, so that in all things neither the humbleness of poverty nor the excess of wealth may appear, but that with the possessions of each one mixed together, there may be, as it were, one single estate for all as brothers. They consider oil to be a defilement, and if any one be anointed by chance against his will, he wipes his body clean; for they consider it a point of honor to be unkempt, and to be in white clothing at all times. The stewards of their common goods are elected, and ^B they are undivided for each one in providing for all needs. They do not have one single city of their own, but in every city many of them dwell, and to those of the sect who arrive from elsewhere, everything among them is thrown open, and those who see them for the first time go in to them as to those they have known. Therefore, they carry nothing at all with them when they go on a journey for the sake of expenses. Nor do they change their clothing or their shoes before they are worn out completely or destroyed by time; nor do they buy or sell anything among themselves, but each one gives to him who is in need that which he has, and receives in turn from him that which he finds useful; and even without the exchange, there is for them, without hindrance, the enjoyment of what they wish from whomever they please. Moreover, in their piety and religion toward the Divine, they are distinct. For before the sun rises, they speak not a word of profane things, but offer to it certain prayers handed down from their fathers, as if supplicating it to rise. After this, they are sent by their stewards to the crafts which each one of them understands, and having worked strenuously until the fifth hour, they then gather again into one place, and being girded with cloths, they thus wash their bodies with cold water; and after this purity, they come together into a private house, into which it is permitted to no one of the differing opinion to enter. But they themselves, clean, as if into some holy temple, come to the dining room.

When they are seated quietly and peacefully, the baker places bread in order, and the cook sets before each person one vessel containing a single dish. The priest ^A precedes the meal, it being pure and holy (and it is forbidden for anyone to taste it before the prayer). After he has eaten, he prays further, and both at the beginning and the end they honor God. Then, having laid aside their sacred garments, they return again to their work until evening. Returning, they dine in the same way, with the guests who happen to be present sitting with them. Neither shouting nor noise ever defiles the house, but they yield the place for speaking to one another in order, and to those outside, the silence of those within appears like some awesome mystery. The cause of this is their continuous sobriety and the fact that their food and drink are measured out by them for satiety 66.

Those who desire the sect do not gain access immediately, but for a year they remain outside and are prescribed the same way of life, having been given a little axe and a loincloth, and a white garment ^B. When, during this time, he gives proof of self-control, he approaches closer to the way of life and partakes of purer waters for purification, but he is not yet admitted to the common life; for after the demonstration of endurance, his character is tested for two other years, and if he appears worthy, he is then enrolled into the company. But before he touches the common food, he swears awesome oaths to them: first, that he will revere the Divine, and then that he will uphold justice toward men, and that he will injure no one either on his own judgment or by order, but will always hate the unjust and join in the defense of the just. He will offer loyalty to all, but especially to those in authority; for no one gains power without God. And even if he himself should rule, he will never behave insolently to his authority, nor will he outshine those subject to him with clothing or any greater finery. He will always love the truth and reject those who lie; he will keep his hands pure from theft and his soul from unholy gain, and he will neither hide anything from those of his own sect, nor reveal anything of theirs to others, even if one should force him to the point of death. In addition to these things, he swears to communicate the doctrines to no one in a way other than he himself received them, and that he will abstain from robbery, and will keep safe equally the books of their sect and the names of the angels. Such are the oaths. Those who are caught and expelled perish by a miserable fate; for, bound by their oaths and customs, they are not able to partake of the food of others; and, eating herbs and wasting away with hunger, they perish. Hence, feeling pity for many, they have taken them back in their final straits, deeming the suffering unto death a sufficient punishment for their sins. They give a trowel to those who are about to join the sect, since they themselves do not otherwise ease nature than by digging a pit of a foot in depth, having covered themselves with their cloaks, so as not to insult the rays of God. So great is their austerity regarding their way of life. ^{C D} [alt-version omitted]

^A and their moderation, that they do not feel the need to evacuate during the week. From this discipline they have acquired such fortitude that, even when being stretched, bound, burned, and suffering every instrument of torture in order that they might either blaspheme the Lawgiver or eat some forbidden thing, they endure neither one nor the other. They demonstrated this in the war against the Romans. For they do not show flattery to those who torture them, nor do they shed tears; but smiling in their pains, and mocking those who bring the tortures upon them, they cheerfully dismiss their souls, as though they were to receive them back again. For this opinion is firmly held among them: that bodies are indeed perishable, and their substance not lasting, but that souls live forever and are immortal; and that, coming from the most refined ^B ether, they are drawn down by a natural force and entangled in bodies as in a prison, but when they are freed from the bonds of the flesh, as if released from a long servitude, they then rejoice and are carried aloft. Accordingly, from such a way of life, and from this practice of truth and piety, it is natural that many among them should possess foreknowledge of future events, being trained from childhood in sacred books, various purifications, and the sayings of the prophets; and it is rare for them to go astray in their predictions. These things Porphyry ^C has testified, drawing from ancient records, as anyone can easily understand, concerning the religion of the Essene sect and their method of philosophizing, in the fourth book of his work *On Abstinence from Animal Food*.

CHAPTER IV. From Hecataeus, concerning the Jews.

Hecataeus of Abdera, a man who was not only a philosopher but also remarkably capable in active affairs, ^D devoted a special book to the subject of the Jews. These are his books concerning the poetry of Homer and Hesiod. He lived in the time of the successors of Alexander.

^A Since when he commemorates many things about them, it will be sufficient to record these things from him for the present: “There are, indeed, many fortresses and villages belonging to the Jews throughout the country, but one city is highly fortified, Jerusalem, the circumference of which is not less than fifty stadia. Approximately one hundred and twenty thousand people live there, and they commonly call it Jerusalem. In the middle of the city there is a stone enclosure of the sanctuary, about five plethra in length and one hundred cubits in breadth, having double gates; and inside there is a square altar ^B constructed of gathered, unhewn, raw stones; and each side is twenty cubits, and the height is twelve cubits. Beside it is a great house where the altar and the lampstand are, both golden, two talents in weight; and upon them there is a light that is inextinguishable by night and day. There is no statue there, nor any votive offering whatsoever, nor even a plant, nor anything of a sylvan nature, nor anything of that sort. Priests spend their time there both by night and by day, performing certain purifications, and it is entirely forbidden to drink wine in the temple.” Having said these things, and subsequently testifying that they served in the army with King Alexander and afterwards with his successors, he adds to this. I shall set forth what he himself says he witnessed, as it occurred ^C through a Jewish man during the campaign. He speaks as follows: “At any rate, when I was journeying to the Red Sea, there accompanied us, along with the rest of the cavalry escorting us, a Jew named Mosomamus, a man of considerable spirit, robust, and acknowledged by all, both Greeks and Barbarians, to be the most expert archer. Now this man, as many were walking along the road and a certain diviner was observing birds and demanding that everyone stop, asked why they were waiting. When the diviner showed him the bird ^D and said that if it remained there, it was advantageous for all to wait; but if it flew forward, they should proceed; and if it flew backward, they should withdraw,"

The Jew said nothing in return, but with his bow aimed, he shot and pierced the bird through. When the soothsayer and some others were extremely indignant and cursed him, he ^A said, "Why are you raging, you wretches?" Then, taking the bird into his hands, he said, "For how could this creature, which did not foresee its own safety, have told us anything sound concerning our journey? For if it were able to foresee the future, it would not have come to this place, fearing that it would be shot and killed by Mosomamus the Jew." Thus far Hecataeus.

CAPUT V. OF THE SAME SUBJECT, FROM THE FIRST BOOK OF CLEARCHS ON SLEEP.

^B Clearchus the Peripatetic philosopher, in the first book *On Sleep*, introduces Aristotle speaking about the Jews in the following manner: "It would be long," he says, "to recount very many things; but whatever in this man shall appear to have something of admiration and to taste of philosophy, it will be none the less useful to follow it up in the same way. But to you, Hyperochides, things that are plainly admirable, and very like to dreams, will, I well know, appear to be related by me." To which Hyperochides modestly replied: "Indeed, for this very reason, the desire to hear is stirred up in us all." "Therefore," Aristotle continues, "as the teachers of rhetoric prescribe, let us first describe his race, lest we appear to be such as have not listened to the masters of narrative." ^C "But tell us as you please," said Hyperochides. "He was, then, of the race of the Jews, from Coelesyria. These people, moreover, derive their origin from the Calani of the Indian nations, who among the Syrians received the name of Jews from the place; for the region which they inhabit is commonly called Judaea. The name of their city, however, is very tortuous and difficult, for it is called Hierusalem. This man, since he was received as a guest by many, and was coming down from the upper regions to the maritime places, was Greek not only in speech but also in soul. It happened, therefore, that while we were ^D staying in Asia, this man, having arrived at those same places, met with us and with certain others of the scholars, testing our wisdom. And as to many of those who are in education..."

he imparted something more than he had received." These are the words of Clearchus.

CHAPTER VI. Of those who have made mention of the nation of the Jews, from the first book of the Stromata of Clement.

And our Clement, in his first book of the *Stromata*, also makes mention of this person, in which he says the following: "Clearchus the Peripatetic says that he saw a certain Jew who had spent time with Aristotle, and tells of it." And after some other things, he adds: "Numa, the king of the Romans, although he was a Pythagorean, having derived benefit from the writings of Moses, forbade the Romans to fashion an image of God in the likeness of a man or of any living creature. And so, for the first one hundred and seventy years, ^B though they were building temples, they did not make any image, either cast or painted. For Numa showed them, through a hidden teaching, that it is impossible to approach the Supreme Being with the tongue, but only with the mind."

In addition to these things, he continues, saying: "Most clearly, the historian Megasthenes, who lived with Seleucus Nicator, writes as follows in the third book of his *Indica*: 'All that has been said by the ancients regarding nature is said also by those who philosophize outside of Greece, partly by the Brahmans among the Indians, and partly by those in Syria called Jews.'"

Furthermore, Clement mentions Aristobulus the Peripatetic and Numenius the Pythagorean, saying: ^C "'Aristobulus, in the first of the books he wrote to Philometor, speaks in this manner: Plato also followed our legislation, and it is evident that he examined thoroughly each of the things spoken of therein. For while it had been translated before the time of Demetrius by others, before the supremacy of Alexander and the Persians, both the events concerning the exodus of the Hebrews, our fellow citizens, from Egypt, and the manifestation of all that happened to them, and their taking possession of the land, and the explanation of the whole legislation. So that it is evident that the aforementioned philosopher [Plato] had taken many things, for he has become a man of great learning, just as Pythagoras also transferred many of the things from us into his own system of philosophy.' And Numenius the Pythagorean philosopher writes point-blank: 'For what is Plato but Moses speaking in the Attic tongue?'" These are the words of Clement. ^D

CHAPTER VII. Of Numenius the Pythagorean philosopher, concerning the Jews, from the first book *On the Good*.

From the same Pythagorean philosopher, I mean Numenius, I shall add these words from his first book *On the Good*: "But to this it will be necessary, having spoken and having marked it with the testimonies of Plato, to [connect...]

it with the words of Pythagoras; and to call upon those nations which are held in high repute, bringing forward their initiatory rites and their doctrines, and the established rituals which agree with those of Plato, as many as the Brahmins, the Jews, the Magi, and the Egyptians have ordained." Such are his words on these matters.

Chapter VIII. Concerning Moses, and also the Jews, from the third book of the same work.

The same author, in the third book of his work, makes mention of Moses with these words: "Afterward, indeed," he says, "Jannes and Jambres, Egyptian sacred scribes, at the time when the Jews were being driven out of Egypt, became famous; men who, in the judgment of all, yielded to no one in the science of magic. Both of them, in fact, were chosen by the common consent of the Egyptians to oppose Musaeus, ^B the leader of the Jews, whose prayers to God were most powerful, and they were seen to be capable of dissolving and dissipating the most grievous calamities which Musaeus brought upon Egypt." By these words, indeed, Numenius has left a confirmed and attested faith both in the miracles performed by Moses and in the divine love shown toward him.

Chapter IX. From the poet Choerilus, concerning the Jews.

Now, Choerilus also, a very ancient poet, makes mention of the Jewish nation, and testifies that very many of them were companions in the expedition undertaken by King Xerxes against the Greeks, in these words:

Then crossed a race, wondrous to behold, Speaking the Phoenician tongue from their mouths, Dwellers in the Solymian mountains, by a broad lake, With shorn heads, and unkempt locks—a terrifying sight; For helmets, they bore the skins of horses, Dried by the smoke.

That the Jews are intended and indicated by him in these words is manifest from the fact that Jerusalem is situated in those mountains which the Greeks call the Solymian, and that it is not far from the Asphaltite lake, which, as the poet says, is very broad, and the largest of all the lakes in Syria. Thus much, then, from him as well.

Chapter X. From Porphyry of our own time, the oracles of Apollo concerning the Hebrews.

Porphyry, in his first book *On the Philosophy of Oracles*, introduces his own god praising the wisdom of the Hebrew nation, together with other peoples famous for their reputation for prudence, by his own testimony. The response of Apollo is that which he sets forth, and to which he adds these words following upon the oracles previously published concerning sacrifices, by which he enjoins those to whom they are addressed to attend more diligently, as they are full of all divine wisdom.

^A Steep indeed is the way of the blessed, and rugged, and at first it opens with gates bound in bronze. But paths immeasurable are set there, which they of mortal men first revealed for an endless task, who drink the sweet water of the Nilotic land. Many paths of the blessed did Phoenicians learn, and Assyrians, and Lydians, and the race of the Hebrews.

And concerning things that follow these, which the author adds: “For the way that leads to the gods is bound in bronze, and steep, and rugged; though barbarians found many tracks and byways of it, yet Greeks wandered from it, and they who held power already even destroyed it. But God testified that the discovery of it belonged to the Egyptians, and to Phoenicians and Chaldaeans (for the Assyrians are these), and to Lydians and Hebrews.” Furthermore, in another oracle Apollo says:

Only the Chaldaeans inherited wisdom, and the Hebrews too, Who worship the self-begotten King, God, purely.

And again, when asked with what reason they speak of many heavens, he responded thus:

One is the circle that is curved in the whole world, but with ^B [seven] [zones it is carried into the starry path, Which indeed the Chaldaeans and the illustrious Hebrews Named heavenly, to creep in a seventh course.]

So much for the designation of the Jews and Hebrews, and for the merit of piety and philosophy that formerly distinguished them. Now, however, attend to how many agree with the truth of their ancestral history. For while Moses in the universal chronicles narrates the flood, and how he who is called Noah among the Hebrews was saved in a wooden ark with his kindred, Berossus the Chaldaean, and Hieronymus the Egyptian, and Nicolaus of Damascus, ^C historical writers, have mentioned the same things; and Josephus in the first book of his *Antiquities* presents it in this manner.

CHAPTER XI

“Of this flood and of the ark all have made mention who have written the histories of the barbarians, among whom is Berossus the Chaldaean. For when he narrates the matters concerning the flood, he goes on to say thus: ‘It is said, moreover, ^D that a part of the ship still exists in Armenia, upon the mountain of the Cordyaeans, and that some, by scraping off, take away some of the bitumen, and the people of the land are accustomed to use it especially for the sake of averting evil.’ Hieronymus the Egyptian, who wrote the Phoenician history, also makes mention of these things, as do Mnaseas and very many others. And Nicolaus of Damascus also, in his [book] *Concerning the Successors*…

in the ninety-sixth book, relates regarding them, saying thus: "There is above the Minyas a great mountain in Armenia, called Baris, to which many fled at the time of the flood, and it is said that they were saved, and that one person carried on an ark upon the summit grounded there, and that the remains of the timbers were preserved for a long time. This person would be he whom also Moses, the lawgiver of the Jews, wrote about." These things, then, [says] Josephus.

CHAPTER XII.

From the writings of Abydenus, concerning the flood.

I, for my part, that you may have something also from the chronicles of the Medes and Assyrians, will set before you, from the commentaries of Abydenus, this passage concerning the same matter. ^B To this man, he says, among others, Sisithrus succeeded in the empire, to whom Saturn predicted that there would be a great multitude of rains on the fifteenth day of the month Daesius, and commanded that whatever was related to writings should be hidden and stored away at the city of the sun, in Sippara. Sisithrus, having performed these things, immediately sailed toward the Armenians, and straightway that which was from God overtook him. On the third day, then, after the storm had ceased to abate, he sent forth birds to explore, in case they might see land that had emerged and existed from the waters. And they, as the sea was boundless and they were waiting, being in doubt as to where they should fly, returned back to Sisithrus, and others after them. But when he was successful with the third set, for they arrived covered in mud on their feet, the gods carried him away from among men; but the ship in Armenia provided ^C to the inhabitants amuleta (that is, lucky charms) made of its timbers, which they might wear suspended from their necks. Thus far he.

[alt-version omitted]

CHAPTER XIII

Furthermore, that those men who were born in the beginning were of long duration of life—as Moses asserts—testes of this fact are also cited by Josephus from the writings of the Gentiles, in these words: "Let no one, he says, considering the lives of the ancients by the brevity of our own years, think that what is recorded concerning them is false; nor, because our own spans of life are much shorter, should he conclude that those ancients could not have reached such an extent of life. For they were dearer to God, and had been created by His own hand; and because they used foods that were more conducive to maintaining their strength and integrity for a longer period, they were able to conveniently extend their lives to such a number of years. Add to this the truth that God granted them a longer life both as a reward for their virtue and for the sake of a more accurate and certain practice and experience of astrology and geometry, which they had themselves invented; for unless they had lived for at least six hundred years—which is the period that completes the 'Great Year'—they could have handed down nothing certain to posterity regarding these matters. ^A Indeed, I have as witnesses for this fact as many Greeks and foreigners as have compiled records of ancient history. For Manetho, who wrote the Egyptian history, and Berosus, who collected the Chaldean history, and Molus, and Hestiaeus, and besides these, the Egyptian Hieronymus, and those who compiled the Phoenician history, all agree with what I say. Hesiod, too, and Hecataeus, and Hellanicus, and Acusilaus, and in addition to these, Ephorus and Nicolaus, record that the ancients lived for a thousand years. ^B Regarding these, one may think as he pleases." ^C

CHAPTER XIV

Again, [there is an account] regarding what Moses [says] concerning the construction of that tower, and how, from one language, they were dispersed into many... ^D

^A The writer mentioned a little earlier, who recorded [the history] of the Assyrians in the work already mentioned, testifies to the same things, speaking as follows: "There are also those who say that the first men born of the earth, relying on both their strength and the size of their bodies, and desiring a power greater than the gods themselves, undertook [the building of] a tower of immense height where Babylon is now situated; and when it was already near to heaven, the winds, acting as ministers to the gods, overturned the vast and huge structure onto their heads; from the ruins of which there arose that which they call Babylon. Furthermore, the men, who up to that time had one and the same language, from that moment emitted a manifold and discordant voice, and later a war was kindled between Saturn and Titan." ^B The place in which they were building the tower is today called Babylon, on account of the confusion of the previously pure and more illustrious speech that occurred there; for to the Hebrews, confusion is Babel.

CHAPTER XV.

How many others also remembered the same thing, from the Antiquities of Josephus.

And the Sibyl likewise remembers this tower and the division of languages among men in this way: "When all men were of one language, some began to build a most high tower, as if they would ascend into heaven by it. But the gods, having sent forth winds, overturned the tower and gave to each his own language, and for this reason the city came to be called Babylon." Regarding the plain called Senaar in the Babylonian region, Hestiaeus makes mention in these words: ^C "The priests who had escaped the destruction, having snatched away with them the sacred objects of Enyalius (or Jupiter Enyalius), first betook themselves into the Senaar plain of Babylonia; from there, they were dispersed in every direction of the earth, and as each had been assigned a common language, they likewise established common dwellings everywhere, each occupying whatever region chance offered them."

CHAPTER XVI. On the progenitor of all the Hebrews, Abraham, from the same author.

^A Furthermore, Josephus is witness that the pagan historians agree with the history which Moses writes at such length concerning Abraham, the progenitor of the Hebrews. For he speaks thus: "Berosus, indeed, mentions our progenitor Abraham, although he suppresses his name, yet he speaks in these words: 'About the tenth generation after the flood, a certain man lived among the Chaldeans, a man of great righteousness and stature, and skilled in the knowledge of the heavens.' Hecataeus, moreover, has done more than merely mention him, for he has left behind a complete volume written about him. ^B Nicolaus of Damascus, in the fourth book of his *Histories*, speaks in this manner: 'Abrahames reigned in Damascus, having come there with an army after setting out from the land of the Chaldeans, which is situated beyond Babylon. Not long after, having removed from that region, he went with his own people to the land then called Canaan, but now Judea, and he inhabited it, and his descendants multiplied in number and multitude, the history of whom I keep for another place to relate. Even now, in the region of Damascus, the fame of the name of Abrahames is celebrated, and a certain village is shown which they call the Domicile of Abraham.' ^C But when a severe famine later took hold of the land of Canaan, Abrahames, learning that the Egyptians were abounding in the necessities of life, was eager to go to them, partly so that he might enjoy their abundance, and partly that he might be a listener to the priests, regarding what they might say concerning the gods; for he intended either to follow them if they were found to be better informed, or, if he himself held more correct views, to bring them over to a sounder mind and opinion. ^D And he then adds: 'When he associated with the most learned of the Egyptians,' he says, 'he added new luster and splendor not only to his own virtue, but also to the reputation of his name. For, because the Egyptians were delighted with disparate customs, and were wont to extol their own rites while deprecating others, and were for that reason held in mutual hatred, he interacted specifically with each of them, and refuting the arguments which they brought forward concerning their own matters, he demonstrated that they were empty and contained nothing of truth. It came to pass, therefore, that in their daily and mutual congresses, they marveled at him as most wise, and endowed not only with singular power of understanding, but also as most powerful in persuading others of whatever he undertook to prove. Therefore, he taught them arithmetic and also astronomy, in which arts the Egyptians had been entirely total strangers and novices, for before the arrival of Abraham, the Egyptians had been ignorant of these. For these things came into Egypt from the Chaldeans, and from thence they reached the Greeks.' These things are told by Josephus.

CHAPTER XVII. On Abraham, from Eupolemus, whom Alexander Polyhistor praises, where he writes about the Jews.

To these things Alexander Polyhistor also agrees, being a man of high intelligence and great erudition, and one who, for the Greeks who had not treated the fruits of learning in a light or perfunctory manner,

is the most well-known—he who, in his writing concerning the Jews, relates the story of this Abraham word for word in this manner: ^A Eupolemus (25), in his book regarding the Assyrians of the Jews, says that the city of Babylon was first built by those who were saved from the flood; these were giants. He says that they built the renowned tower. But when this had fallen through the operation of God, the giants were scattered over the whole earth. In the tenth generation, he says, in a city of Babylonia called Camarina—which some people call the city of Urie (26), and which is interpreted as a city of the Chaldeans—in the thirteenth generation Abraham was born, who excelled all in nobility and wisdom, and who also discovered astrology and the Chaldean lore, and having set out upon the path of piety, pleased God. ^B Being commanded by God, he went into Phoenicia (27) to dwell there, and having taught the Phoenicians the revolutions of the sun and moon and all other things of this kind, he became well-pleasing to their king. Later, when the Armenians made war upon the Phoenicians, and having conquered them, took captive his nephew, Abraham, bringing help with a band of his servants, gained control of the captors and took the children and wives of the enemy captive. When ambassadors came to him so that by taking money he might ransom them, he chose not to trample upon those who were in misfortune, but having accepted provisions for the young men, he returned the captives, and he was entertained by the city sanctuary, Argarizin (28), which is interpreted as Mountain of the Most High. And he received gifts from Melchizedek, the priest of God, who was reigning there. ^C When a famine occurred, Abraham departed with his whole household into Egypt and dwelt there, and the king of the Egyptians took his wife in marriage, for he had claimed that she was his sister. He relates further that the king could not have intercourse with her, and that it happened that his people and his house were afflicted by a very severe pestilence. The king, having consulted seers, and being told that the woman was not a widow, the king of the Egyptians thus recognized that she was the wife of Abraham, and returned her to her husband. Living with the Egyptian priests in Heliopolis, Abraham taught them many things, both astrology and the rest of his...

(25) Eupolemus. Hear this author, who, while excusing him along with two others, Josephus says in book I against Apion: "Yet Demetrius the Phalerian, and Philo the Elder, and Eupolemus did not stray far from the truth; it is fitting to forgive them, for it was not in their power to follow our scriptures with complete accuracy." (26) Urie. It should perhaps be read Ure. Josephus calls this city by this name in *Antiquities* book I, ch. 7. It is a place also mentioned by Pliny, in that region, b. V, c. 24; at the end of Genesis it is called Ur, which the Septuagint prefers to translate as "land of the Chaldeans." ^D Chaldean *Ur*, signifies light, fire, and valley. Hence the name of this city, either because it is situated in a valley, or because fire is especially worshipped there. And so if it is interpreted in Greek, Eupolemus does not tell a lie. But it is more credible that his other name is explained from this: so that by Chaldeans he understands not so much the people as the priests or philosophers, whom the Hebrews call *Chaldei*, to whom this city was properly attributed, and therefore called Camarina. This conjecture is owed to Scaliger. (27) Into Phoenicia, etc. It is not to be demanded of this author that he agree exactly with the sacred scriptures. (28) Argarizin. Perhaps it is a compound, Mount Garizim, as a division, or divided; for it is called "two-headed" by many. Therefore it is false what Eupolemus says, that this name signifies [Mountain of the Most High]; though it is permitted to say so, because the Samaritans worshipped God there especially, just as the Jews did in Zion, it could truly be called the Mountain of the Most High. Cf. Deuteronomy ch. 11, v. 29, and ch. 27, v. 12; Joshua ch. 8, v. 33; Judges ch. 9, v. 7.

regarding the instruction to introduce these, declaring that the Babylonians had discovered these things and that he himself reached back to Enoch in the discovery of them; and that he was the first to discover astrology, not the Egyptians. For he says that the Babylonians claim that, first to exist was Belus, whom they commonly call Saturn; and that from him was born Belus and Chanaan; and that this Chanaan begat the father of the Phoenicians. And that of him was born a son, Chus, whom the Greeks call Asbolus, and that he was the father of the Ethiopians, and brother of Mestraim, the father of the Egyptians. But the Greeks say that Atlas discovered astrology; and that Atlas is the same as Enoch. And that Enoch begat a son, Mathusalam, who learned all things through angels of God, and thus we also have learned of them. ^B

CHAPTER XVIII.

Artapanus says in his Jewish History that the Jews are called Hermiuth, which name, if you wish to speak in the Greek tongue, signifies Jews; ^C and that they are called Hebrews from Abraham. He says that he traveled with his whole household into Egypt to the king of the Egyptians, Pharethon, and taught him astrology; and, having stayed there for twenty years, he departed again to the regions in Syria; but many of those who had come with him remained in Egypt because of the fertility of the land. In anonymous works, we have found that Abraham came to the giants, who were living in Babylonia. These, because of their impiety, were destroyed by the gods, of whom only one, Belus, escaped death, lived in Babylon, and built a tower, and dwelt in it, which indeed from its builder Belus was called Belus. But Abraham, having been instructed in the science of astrology, first went into Phoenicia, and taught the Phoenicians astrology, and later arrived in Egypt. ^D

CHAPTER XIX.

But Melo, he who wrote the work against the Jews, says that after the flood, the man who had been left behind departed from Armenia with his sons, being driven out by the natives from his own possessions; [index: entries preserved]

having traveled through the intervening country, he came to the mountainous desert of Syria. After three generations, Abraham was born, which name is interpreted as ^A *Friend of the Father* (31); he, having become wise, pursued the desert. Having taken two wives—one an indigene and kinswoman, the other an Egyptian who previously served in slavery—he begat twelve sons by the Egyptian (32), who departed into Arabia and divided the land among themselves, and were the first to rule over the inhabitants: hence, up to our time, there are twelve kings of the Arabs named after them. By his lawful wife, one son was born to him, who in Greek is called *Gelōs* [Laughter]. And Abraham died in old age; but to Gelōs (33) and his native wife, eleven sons were born, and a twelfth, Joseph, and after him, the third ^B was Moses." So much for Polyhistor; to which, after other things, he adds, saying: "Not long after, God commanded Abraham to offer his son Isaac to Him as a holocaust. And he, having led the boy up to a mountain, piled up a pyre and placed Isaac upon it; and as he was about to slaughter him, he was stopped by an angel, who brought a ram to him for the sacrifice; and Abraham took the boy down from the pyre and sacrificed the ram."

CHAPTER XX. On the same, from Philo.

Philo says the same thing about this man in the first book of his work on those things pertaining to Jerusalem, in these verses:

He heard from the founder of old, through divine laws, Abraham, a name of high fame, in the bond of sacred ties; All-shining, overflowing, with haughty reasonings, The God-beloved enticements; for he left the bright fence Of the *Ainophytai*. Holding the fire of noble-spirited praise, He made his fame immortal, from the time that he, Of the noble-born, obtained the many-hymned glory. And the following lines; to which, after a few words, he adds: With ready hand, preparing the sword-bearing edge For the decree, and the ram gathered aside from the slaughter, But he, in his hands, offered the horned ram.

^B(31) *Friend of the Father*. "Father," ^C and by the addition of one letter, *Abraham*, a fuller and more sonorous word, meaning "father of many nations," says Blessed Jerome, in his Hebrew Traditions on Genesis. This seems to be a summary, made from the following three syllables, *Ab-ra-ham*, that is, "High father of a multitude," with the last syllable *ham* removed and the *D* that follows it. And because *ham* signifies both a multitude and a sound or rumbling, Philo the Jew, who is by the way far more learned in Greek than in Hebrew, in his book *On the Giants* near the end, says... Such are his words, which to me seem designed to grasp the mind of the man rather than the meaning of the words. You will more fully understand this from his book *On the Change of Names*. What Melo followed when he gave this derivation—if it is not even worth asking—you might still conjecture, as he did not hear *Ab-ra-ham*: for *ra-ham* means not only to have mercy, but also to love vehemently. ^D (32) *Begat twelve sons*. Polyhistor confuses this with Abraham's father. Josephus, however, in *Antiquities* book I, ch. 15, is the authority that Ishmael married an Egyptian woman, by whom he begat twelve sons, whose names he also recounts. These are they who inhabit all the land from the Euphrates as far as the Erythraean Sea, having named it Nabataea. These are the nation of the Arabs, and they call the tribes after them, both because of their virtue and because of the dignity of Abraham. These are his words. Nor are they at odds with Scripture: for Genesis ch. xvii says: "As for Ishmael (God says to Abraham), I have heard thee: behold, I will bless him, and will multiply him, and will make him very great. Twelve princes shall he beget, and I will make him a great nation." And ch. xxv, his twelve children are numbered as princes of their tribes. (33) *Gelōs*. I believe that he confuses everything. (34) *Philo*. He counts him among Demetrius and Eupolemus, and calls him an older Philo: perhaps to distinguish him from Philo the Jew and Philo of Byblos, who are both younger. But the following verses of this older poet are, to me at least, darkness. Nor do the manuscript codices help at all. I chose, therefore, to pass over these with a leap, rather than stumble over almost every word.

^A And those things which follow these. These things, then, are from the aforementioned writing of the Polyhistor. Josephus, too, in the first book of the *Antiquities*, makes mention of this same thing through these words: "It is said," he says, "that this Afer, having undertaken an expedition into Libya, seized it, and his grandsons, having settled in it, named the land 'Africa' after his name." Alexander the Polyhistor bears witness to my account, speaking thus: "Cleodemus the prophet, who is also called Malchus, while recounting matters concerning the Jews, just as Moses their lawgiver also recounted, says that Abraham had many children from Chettura." He even states their names, naming three: Afer, Asur, and Afran. "And from Asur, Assyria was named; from the two, Afran and Afer, both the city of Afran and the entire continent of Africa were named." These men, he says, were companions of Hercules in his campaign against Libya and Antaeus; and Hercules, having married Afran’s daughter, fathered a son by her, Diodorus, who then fathered Sophon, from whom the barbarians are called Sophai. ^B Let these things, then, be set forth briefly concerning Abraham.

CHAPTER XXI.

Concerning Jacob, from Demetrius.

Let us turn again to the Polyhistor. Demetrius says that Jacob, having become seventy-five years old, fled to Charran of Mesopotamia, having been sent by his parents because of the secret hatred of his brother Esau, on account of his having received the father’s blessing—he who appeared to be Esau—and in order that he might take a wife from there. Jacob, therefore, started off for Charran of Mesopotamia, having left behind his father Isaac, who was one hundred and thirty-seven years old, while he himself was seventy-seven years old. ^C Having spent seven years there, he married the two daughters of his maternal uncle Laban, Leah and Rachel, being eighty-four years old. And within the next seven years, fourteen children were born to him; in the eighth year, on the tenth month... ^D [For] the meaning of these words is that [Laban] would give him Rachel as a wife under the agreement that, having entered into the marriage, he would serve seven other years; not, as Josephus thought, that after he had served another seven-year period, it would come to pass that he would marry her. ^D

^A And in the ninth year, in the eighth month, [he begat] Simeon; and in the tenth year, in the sixth month, Levi; and in the eleventh year, in the fourth month, Judah. Rachel, seeing that she did not bear children, envied her sister and caused her own handmaid, Zilpah, to sleep with Jacob 45 at the same time that Bilhah had conceived Naphtali 46, in the eleventh year, in the fifth month, and she brought forth a son in the twelfth year, in the second month, whom Leah named Gad. And by the same [handmaid], in the same year and in the twelfth month, she brought forth another, whom Leah also called Asher. And again, in exchange for the mandrake apples which Reuben had brought to Rachel, Leah conceived 47 by her handmaid Zilpah at the same time, in the twelfth year, in the third month, and she brought forth a son in the same year, in the twelfth month, and gave him the name Issachar. And again, in the thirteenth year, in the tenth month, Leah brought forth another son, named Zebulun; and she—the same handmaid—brought forth in the fourteenth year, in the eighth month, a son named Dan 48; at which time Rachel also conceived in the same period in which Leah brought forth her daughter Dinah, and she brought forth a son in the fourteenth year, in the eighth month, whom she named Joseph, so that in the seven years while he was with Laban, twelve children were born.

Wishing to return to his father in Canaan, but yielding to the entreaties of Laban to remain for six other years, Jacob remained with Laban in Haran for twenty years in all 49. As he was traveling to Canaan, an angel of God wrestled with him and touched the broad part of Jacob’s thigh; and becoming numb, he went lame. ^B Whence it is that the sinew in the thigh of cattle is not eaten. And the angel said to him that from then on he would no longer be called Jacob, but Israel. And he arrived from the land of Canaan at the city of Shechem, having children: Reuben, 12 years and two months old; Simeon, 14 years and four months old 50; Levi, 14 years and six months old 51.

...time later, Joseph, the son of Rachel, was born to her. All this time, which is twenty years, he shepherded for his father-in-law, all this time, adding eleven years, a chronological... ^{C D}

^A count of the limbs of the thighs of the Jews reaches no one).

Judah, nine years and eight months old; Nephthalim, eight years and ten months; Gad, eight years and ten months; Aser, eight years; Issachar, eight years; Zabulon, seven years and two months; Dinah, six years and four months; Joseph, six years and four months. Israel sojourned near Emmor for ten years (52), and Israel’s daughter, Dinah, being sixteen years and four months old, was defiled by Sychem, the son of Emmor. The sons of Israel, leaping into action—Simeon being twenty-one years and four months old, and Levi twenty years and six months old—killed both Emmor and his son Sychem, and all the males, because of the defilement of Dinah. Jacob was at that time one hundred and seven years old. When he came to Luz of Bethel, God told him to be no longer called Jacob, but Israel. From there he went to Caphratha, and thence arrived at Ephratha, which is Bethlehem, and there she bore him Benjamin, and Rachel died, having given birth to Benjamin; Jacob had lived with her for twenty-three years. Thence Jacob went to Mambre of Hebron, to his father Isaac. Joseph was at that time ^B seventeen years old, and he was sold into Egypt, and remained in prison for thirteen years, so that he was thirty years old, and Jacob was one hundred and ten, at which time also Isaac died one year previously, being one hundred and eighty years old. After Joseph interpreted the dreams for the king, he ruled Egypt for seven years, during which time he cohabited with Aseneth, daughter of Pentephres the priest of Heliopolis, and had Manasses and Ephraim, and two years of the famine had passed. For nine years Joseph prospered, but he did not send for his father, because he and his brothers were shepherds; and to be a shepherd was a reproach to the Egyptians. He himself had made clear that this was the reason he did not send for him. For when his relatives arrived, he told them that if they should be called by the king and asked what their work was, they should say they were livestock farmers. As for the question of why Joseph ever gave Benjamin a portion five times larger at the meal, as he could not consume so much meat—he had done this because seven sons had been born to his father from Leah, ^C and two from his mother Rachel; for this reason he set five portions before Benjamin, and he himself took one (53) —thus there were seven, as many as the sons from Leah had received. Likewise also regarding the... [alt-version omitted] ...or otherwise he would have had only six, not seven parts.

distribution of the garments, to each he gave two; but to Benjamin five and three hundred pieces of gold; and to his father he sent likewise, so that his mother’s house should be equal. And they dwelt in the land of Canaan from the time when Abraham was chosen from the nations and moved away into Canaan. Abraham was twenty-five years old, Isaac sixty, and Jacob one hundred and thirty, making in all two hundred and fifteen years in the land of Canaan (54). And in the third year, there being a famine in Egypt, Jacob came into Egypt, being one hundred and thirty years old. Reuben was 45, Simeon 44, Levi 43, Judah 42 years and three months, Asher 47, Gad 41 years and three months, Zebulun 40, Dinah 39, Benjamin 28. Joseph, he says, lived in Egypt for 39 years (56). From Adam (57) until the entry of Joseph’s relatives into Egypt is 2224 years; and from the flood until the arrival of Jacob into Egypt is 1360 years; and from the time Abraham was chosen from the nations and came from Haran into Canaan until the arrival of Jacob’s party into Egypt is 215 years. Jacob came from Haran to Laban being 80 years old (58), and begot Levi. Levi lived 17 years in Egypt after he had come from Canaan, so that he was 60 years old, and he begot Caath (59). In the same year that Caath was born (60), Jacob died in Egypt, having blessed the sons of Joseph, being 147 years old (61), leaving Joseph 56 years old. Levi died at 137 years old. Caath, being 40 years old (61'), begot Amram (62), who was 14 years old when Joseph died in Egypt at the age of 110. Caath died at 133 years old. Amram took as a wife the daughter of his father’s brother, Jochebed, and being 75 years old, begot Aaron and Moses. ^A Benjamin… golden pieces, and to his father he sent the same, so that his mother’s house should be equal. And they dwelt in the land of Canaan, ^B from the time that Abraham was chosen from the nations and moved away into Canaan, Abraham being twenty-five years old, Isaac sixty, and Jacob one hundred and thirty, so that the total years in the land of Canaan were 215 (54); and in the third year, there being a famine in Egypt, Jacob came into Egypt, being one hundred and thirty years old. Reuben was forty-five years old, Simeon forty-four, Levi forty-three, Judah forty-two years and three months, Asher forty-seven, Gad forty-one years and three months, Zebulun forty, Dinah thirty-nine, Benjamin twenty-eight. Joseph, however, is said to have lived in Egypt for thirty-nine years (56). ^C Thus from Adam (57) until the time when Joseph’s kin entered Egypt is 2224 years; but from the flood until Jacob’s arrival in Egypt is 1360 years; and from the time Abraham was chosen from the nations and came from Haran into Canaan until Jacob’s party reached Egypt is 215 years. Jacob came from Haran to Laban when he was 80 years old (58), and begot Levi; Levi lived 17 years in Egypt after he had come from Canaan, so that he was 60 years old when he begot Caath (59); and in the year in which Caath was born (60), Jacob died in Egypt, having blessed Joseph’s sons, being 147 years old (61), leaving Joseph 56 years of age. Levi died having reached 137 years; and Caath, being 40 years old (61'), begot Amram (62), who was 14 when Joseph died in Egypt at 110 years of age; Caath died at 133 years of age. Amram took as his wife the daughter of his paternal uncle, Jochebed, and being 75 years old, begot Aaron and Moses.

And finally, having lived 136 years, he died. Let this much be laid down for us from the writings of Alexander Polyhistor. Henceforth, let the following also be appended.

CHAPTER XXII. Of the same, from Theodotus.

^B Theodotus, in his work *On the Jews*, says that Shechem received its name from Shechem, the son of Hermes, for that he also founded the city. He says that it lies in the aforementioned region of the Jews as follows:

For this is a fertile land, most fit for tender goats, And of well-watered soil; whence the path to the city is short. But the glades do not here refresh the weary with soft down; Twin mountains rise with peaks joined near together, From which they catch both herbs and groves. Between them a narrow and thin path breaks the way, A trail cut out, through which one may pass. And elsewhere: The holy city of Shechem appears, a sacred town, Built beneath the root of the mountain; and a double wall Surrounds the foothills, and a barrier runs beneath it from above.

He further says that it was later captured by the Hebrews when Hamor was reigning; for he says that Hamor begot Shechem. He sings thus:

From there, O guest, finally the wandering Jacob left The pastures and went into the great city of Shechem, While Hamor was ruling over the peoples, and his son Shechem, Both of them very destructive men.

Then he follows with an account of Jacob and his arrival in Mesopotamia, the marriage to the two women, the birth of the children, and the arrival from Mesopotamia to Shechem:

Jacob went to cattle-breeding Syria, and left The broad stream of the Euphrates, the resounding river. For he came thither, having left the bitter chiding Of his full brother. Willingly Laban welcomed him into his home, He who was his uncle, but at that time alone Ruled over Syria, having obtained a recently-born bloodline. To him he promised and pledged the marriage of his youngest Daughter; but he did not intend to fulfill it at all, (Thus badly is faith kept,) he changes the promised marriage of his daughter,

and sent Leah into the marriage bed—she who was the elder—nor did he escape notice, but recognized the treachery. And he received the other child, and indeed took both to wife as sisters. From her, sons were born to him, clever in mind, eleven in number, and a maiden, Dinah, possessing a beautiful form, and a gentle body, and a blameless spirit.

He writes that Jacob came from the Euphrates to the Shechemites to Emmor; and that he received him kindly and gave him a portion of the land. Jacob himself engaged in agriculture, and his eleven sons were involved in herding, while his daughter Dinah, along with the other women, worked in wool. But it happened that on the day a solemn assembly was being held in Shechem, Dinah, although still a virgin, entered the city with the desire to see it; and Shechem, the son of Emmor, seeing her, fell in love with her, and having seized her, brought her to his house and violated her. Afterward, having come to Jacob with his father, he asked for her in marriage; but he said he would not give her until all those who dwelt in Shechem had been circumcised and had accepted Jewish rites; and Emmor said he would persuade them. Jacob declares thus concerning the necessity for them to be circumcised:

The Divine oracles forbid the Hebrew race to invite foreign sons-in-law into their homes; only this native blood knows these dealings.

And then, concerning circumcision:

He who led the great Abraham from his native shores, Himself commanded from heaven that he remove the prepuce with the sharp steel, with all his house; and he fulfilled it. And it stood firm, since God Himself had spoken.

When Emmor had returned to the city ^B and urged his subjects to accept the rite of circumcision, one of the sons of Jacob, Symeon, because he bore the wrong done to his sister more unjustly and more heavily, decided to slay Emmor and Shechem; and having communicated the plan with his brother Levi, he took him as a partner and companion in the crime, since he alleged that ten nations had been promised by a divine oracle to the descendants of Abraham. Thus Symeon addresses Levi:

For I keep deep within my heart the words of God, remembering that He once said He would give ten nations to the children of Abraham.

That God Himself cast this mind into them, because those in Shechem were impious, he bears witness with these words:

God overwhelmed the Shechemites in burning wrath, for no man who loved virtue could approach them inviolate; here no reverence for justice held the citizens, but only the mad lust for unspeakable wickedness.

Therefore, he describes how Levi and Symeon came into the city armed, and having first slain those they met, then killed Emmor and Shechem:

Then Symeon, standing tall, amputated the head of Emor with a mighty blow, and on his left hand he delights to hang the headless trunk.

^A

Neck; until, because the fight grew more fierce, he left him gasping on the ground. But Levi, burning with greater violence, caught up with him as he rolled on the ground, having dared the monstrous impiety of Shechem, and clutching his hanging hair, he attacked him. The sword was driven into his throat, soon burying its whole blade into his chest, and drove out his soul. ^A

Afterwards, the other brothers, when they heard of the deed, with joined forces plundered the city, and brought their sister, along with the very band of captives, back to their father’s estate. Thus Polyhistor.

CHAPTER XXIII. On Joseph, from Artapanus.

^B To these he adds subsequently a commemoration of the affairs of Joseph, in this manner: "Artapanus, in his commentary concerning the Jews, says that Joseph was the grandson of Abraham and the son of Jacob; and because he excelled the others in intellect and wisdom, he was plotted against by his brothers. Having foreseen the conspiracy, he begged the neighboring Arabs to transport him into Egypt, and they consented to his entreaties. For the kings of the Arabs were descendants of Israel, sons of Abraham, and brothers of Isaac. And so, shortly after Joseph reached Egypt, he was received with such favor and benevolence by the king that he was appointed by him as governor of the entire realm. ^C And whereas the Egyptians had previously cultivated the land in a disorderly fashion, because the region was not divided, and those of humbler fortune were treated unjustly by the powerful, he first of all divided the land, marking it out with fixed boundaries and limits here and there, and thus rendered a large portion of the soil, which was previously uncultivated and overgrown with woods, usable and convenient for farming, and assigned to the priests their own distinct and private fields. He also invented measures, by which services he bound the good will of the Egyptians to himself to a great degree. Furthermore, he took to wife Aseneth, the daughter of the Heliopolitan priest, and had children by her. ^D Afterward, however, his father and all his brothers came to him with much wealth and resources, and having fixed their dwellings in the city of Cæsana, the offspring of the Syrians in Egypt were greatly increased and propagated. Moreover, the same people constructed the temples which are at Athon and at Heliopolis, which are commonly called the Hermiutheia. Finally, Joseph and the king of the Egyptians died. And Joseph indeed, while he ruled over Egypt, brought into the public stores the immense amount of grain which had been produced during the seven-year period, and became master of all Egypt."

CHAPTER XXIV. On the same, from Philo.

Furthermore, the testimony of Philo also supports the divine scriptures. For in the fourteenth book concerning Jerusalem, he writes as follows:

To them the powerful prince freely grants wide acres, And incorrupt Joseph settles them on fertile soil, Grandson of Abram and Isaac, whom kindly Jacob Raised, to whom the obscure dreams of night were clear, Who, sitting on the throne, guards the Egyptian realms, Tossed in various ways by the uncertain tide of fate.

And what follows. These things, then, are about Joseph.

CHAPTER XXV.

Concerning Job, from Aristeas.

Now, I pray you, hear also what the same author records concerning Job. "Aristeas," he says, "in his History of the Jews, is the author of the statement that Esau, having taken a wife named Bassara, begat Job in Idumaea, and that he chose for himself a residence in the Ausitid region, on the very border of Idumaea and Arabia. He was eminent for his justice and possessed of abundant wealth; for he counted seven thousand sheep, three thousand camels, five hundred pairs of oxen, and an equal number of she-asses of the flock. He also had sufficient land cultivation. This Job, moreover, was previously called Jobab. ^A Furthermore, that God, for the sake of exploring and testing the man's virtue, exercised him with prolonged and grievous calamities. For first, the herds of asses and cattle were carried off by force by robbers; then the sheep, together with the shepherds, were consumed by fire that fell from heaven; soon after, the camels were likewise driven away by robbers; and then all his children were crushed by the fall of their house. On the same day, his own body was also afflicted with ulcers. While he was in this wretched state, there came to visit him Eliphaz, king of the Themanites; Baldad, tyrant of the Sauchaeans; Sophar, king of the Mannaans; and Eliun, son of Barachiel, the Zobite. When they comforted him with their discourse, he—even though he lacked all consolation—replied that he would nevertheless maintain the praise of his piety constant in the midst of such great bitterness of evils. And God, having been moved more greatly by this strength of his integrity and constancy, not only delivered him from his disease, but subsequently heaped upon him vast wealth and fortunes." These things, then, are from the Polyhistor.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Concerning Moses, from Eupolemus.

The same author also records many things concerning Moses that are worthy of being heard. ^C "Eupolemus," he says, "relates that Moses was the first wise man, and that he was the first to deliver letters to the Jews; from whom the Phoenicians received them, just as the Greeks received them from the Phoenicians. And that he, as prince, established laws for the Jews."

CHAPTER XXVII.

Concerning the same, from Artapanus.

Artapanus, in his work on the Jews, writes that when Abraham was dead, and his son Mempsasthenothe—who was likewise king of the Egyptians—had ended his life, Palmanothes, another of his sons, assumed the empire of Egypt and treated the Jewish people more harshly. ^D By him, first Cessa was founded, and in it a shrine, and soon afterward a temple at Heliopolis.

^A He had a daughter named Merrhin, whom he betrothed to a certain Chenephres, who ruled over the regions above Memphis; for many indeed ruled over Egypt at that time. Being barren, she substituted for herself the child of a certain Jewish woman, whom she named Moyses; and when he grew to manhood, he was called Musaeus by the Greeks. They relate that this Moyses was the teacher of Orpheus, and that when he was grown, he handed down many things very useful to mankind. For they credit him with the invention of ships, of machines by which stones are moved and subsequently joined together, of Egyptian arms, of instruments partly for the drawing or conveying of water and partly necessary for war, and even of philosophy itself. In addition to this, they say he divided the city into thirty-six ^B prefectures, and assigned to each prefecture the god to be worshipped, and [distributed] the sacred writings, such as the figures of cats, dogs, and ibises, to the priests, along with a singular and peculiar region assigned to them. He did all these things with the design of stabilizing the supreme reign for Chenephres; for previously, the multitude, being in no settled order, would at one time cast out kings, and at another time create them, and often the same ones, but sometimes others. For these reasons, therefore, Moyses was beloved by the crowds, and being deemed worthy of honor equal to the gods by the priests, he was called Hermes on account of his interpretation of the sacred writings. But Chenephres, while admiring the virtue of Moyses, grew envious of him, and sought some plausible pretext to destroy the man. And so, when the Ethiopians at some point invaded Egypt, Chenephres, thinking that he had found a convenient opportunity, sent Moyses against them as general with an army. He collected a multitude of his own kinsmen, thinking that [Moyses] would easily be destroyed by the enemy because of the weakness of the soldiers. But Moyses went to the prefecture called Hermopolite, which contained about one hundred thousand farmers, and campaigned from there. He sent out as generals those who presided over the country, and in the battles they achieved obvious superiority. It is said that this war lasted for ten years. ^C Those around Moyses, therefore, because of the size of the army, founded a city in that place, and consecrated the ibis therein, because it destroys the animals that harm men. And he named it Hermopolis. Thus, even the Ethiopians, though they were enemies, became so attached to Moyses that they learned from him the rite of the circumcision of the privy parts; and not only they, but all the priests as well. But Chenephres, when the war was finished, while pretending benevolence with his words, in reality proceeded to plot against him secretly. He therefore took away his crowds, and sent some to the borders of Ethiopia for the sake of a garrison; and he ordered others to tear down the temple in the city of Zeus, which had been built of baked brick, and to build another of stone, having quarried it from the nearby mountain. He appointed as overseer of the construction one Nacheros. When this man arrived in Memphis with Moyses, he inquired of him whether there was anything else useful to men. And he said, the breed of oxen, because the land is plowed by them. ^D

^A Chenephren, having given the name Apis to the bull, ordered the crowds to set up a temple for it, and commanded that the animals previously consecrated by Moyses be brought there and buried, wishing to bury with them the creative inventions of Moyses. But when he perceived that the minds of the Egyptians had been alienated from him on this account, he secretly bound his friends under oath not to disclose to Moyses the plot that was being prepared against him, and he designated those who were to kill him. Because no one responded, he bitterly rebuked Chanethothen—the one whom he especially names from among them all—who, moved at length by the king's anger, promised that he would perform the deed at a convenient time. Therefore, when it happened that the death of Merrhis occurred in those days, Chenephren granted to Moyses and Chanethothen the authority to transport the body beyond the borders of Egypt and bury it there, supposing that Moyses would be killed by Chanethothen. But when the plot on the journey was revealed to Moyses by one of those who were privy to it, he, while keeping watch over his own safety, buried Merrhis, and gave the name Meroe to the river and to the city built by the river (for even to this day this Merrhis is worshipped by the natives no less than Isis herself). Aaron, the brother of Moyses, who himself had discovered the conspiracy, was the one who advised his brother to flee into Arabia. ^B Following his brother’s counsel, Moyses departed from Memphis, crossed the Nile, and arrived in Arabia. Chanethothen, however, when he learned of the flight of Moyses, lay in wait, intending to kill him. Seeing him coming, he drew his sword against him. But Moyses, having forestalled him, seized his hand and, drawing his own sword, slew Chanethothen. He then fled into Arabia and lived with Raguel, the ruler of those regions, having taken his daughter to wife. Raguel wished to campaign against the Egyptians, desiring to bring Moyses back and secure the sovereignty for his daughter and his son-in-law. But Moyses dissuaded him, being concerned for his own kinsmen. Raguel, yielding on the matter of the campaign, ordered the Arabs to plunder Egypt. ^C During the same time, Chenephren, the first of all men, died of elephantiasis. He happened upon this malady because he had commanded the Jews to wear linen garments and forbade the use of wool, so that being distinctive he might more easily rage against them. But Moyses, who was assiduously entreating God concerning the miseries of his people, at that time finally found the Divine Power to be propitious, and he says that a fire suddenly burst forth from the earth and continued to burn, even though the place was devoid of any wood or other material suitable for feeding a fire. ^D Because of this, he says, Moyses feared for his race and fled, but a divine voice spoke to him, commanding him to take the field against Egypt, and after having delivered the Jews, to lead them into their ancient homeland. Taking courage, he resolved to lead a hostile force against the Egyptians. First, he went to his brother Aaron. The king of the Egyptians, having learned of the arrival of Moyses, summoned him to himself, and inquired for what purpose he had come. He replied,

^A by the command and in the name of the Governor of the universe, that he should let the Jews go free and untroubled. For which reason, when he had been cast into prison by him, by night all the doors of the prison opened of their own accord, and the guards were some of them carried off by a sudden death, and some were relaxed in deep sleep, with their arms lying broken on every side. Moyses immediately betook himself into the palace—the gates even opening voluntarily—and, while the soldiers on guard were also buried in a deep sleep, he awakened the king. The king, astonished at what had happened, at first was stupefied, but soon, as if Moyses were playing games, commanded him to reveal the name of the God by whom he had been sent. When Moyses whispered this into his ear, the king instantly fell speechless, until he was seized by the same man and restored to himself and to life. He indeed wrote the revealed name upon a tablet, which he afterward sealed; but a certain priest who disparaged the majesty of the name written on the tablet was seized by a sudden spasm and perished. Furthermore, when the king requested some prodigy from Moyses, he suddenly converted the rod which he held in his hand into a serpent, and while all were stupified, he seized it by the tail and restored it again to its former shape as a rod. ^B A short time later, he struck the Nile with the same rod, and the river, becoming swollen with water, flooded the whole of Egypt; and from that time, its overflows have continued to occur at set intervals. Next, the collected and stagnant waters everywhere began to boil, bringing not only destruction to the fish, but also a fatal thirst to men. And so the king, terrified by such prodigies, promised that he would let the Jews go after a month, if the former state of the river were restored by Moyses. He touched the water again with his rod, and at that same moment its insolent surge was stilled. But the king, having summoned the priests who dwelt beyond Memphis, threatened them all with death unless they too exhibited similar prodigies. Using certain prestidigitations and incantations, they quickly presented the appearance of a dragon and changed the color of the river; by which fact the king, becoming more arrogant and swollen with pride than before, subsequently vexed the Jews with every kind of punishment and torture. When Moyses saw this, he performed many other miracles, and striking the earth with his rod, he sent forth a certain winged creature, which vexed the Egyptians most grievously, and branded a foul ulcer upon the bodies of all men with its bites and stings. When the physicians could find no remedy for this disease, the Jews once again enjoyed some respite. Moyses, however, by the touch of the same rod, furthermore let forth frogs, ^C

^A which were the cause that the Egyptians consecrated a rod in their temples, and worshipped it with the very same religion as Isis herself; for they deemed Isis to be the earth, which, when struck by the rod, had brought forth so many forms of miracles. But as the king continued to rage, Moyses added nightly earthquakes to the calamity of the hail, so that those who tried to escape the earthquake might be struck and bruised by the hail and perish, while those who avoided the force of the hail might perish in the shaking of the earth. And indeed, entire houses and very many shrines fell; and the king, broken by so many evils and disasters, though late, finally let the Jews go. These, having borrowed from the Egyptian many drinking vessels and garments, and other varied treasures, crossed the rivers of Arabia, and after completing a great journey, finally arrived on the third day at the Red Sea. And the Memphites narrate it thus: that Moyses, being most knowledgeable about the whole region, observed the time of the ebbing tide, and led the entire multitude across the sea on dry ground. But the Heliopolitans say otherwise; namely, that the king pursued the departing Jews—who were carrying away what they had received from the Egyptians—with a great army, together with the consecrated animals. However, Moyses, being divinely admonished to strike the sea with his rod, touched the water with it, and the waves immediately departing, he led his forces across by a dry path. When the Egyptians tried the same path and pressed upon the backs of the fugitives, fire suddenly flashed against them, and the sea once again overwhelmed the path with its returning waves; and thus, some by fire and others by the maritime surge, the Egyptians all perished to a man. The Jews, indeed, liberated from imminent danger, wandered through the desert for thirty years continuously, and sustained their lives with flour that God rained down upon them from heaven, resembling millet in shape and having the whiteness of snow. Moreover, he relates that Moyses was taller than average, of a reddish complexion, with hair already promise of gray, and more august in his whole body, and that he accomplished ^B all these things at about the eighty-ninth year of his age.

CHAPTER XXVIII. On the same, from Ezechiel.

Now, how Moyses himself was also exposed to the marsh by his mother, and was received and raised by the king’s daughter, Ezechiel the tragic poet relates at length, having taken up the history from the arrival of the family of Jacob into Egypt to Joseph. He therefore introduces Moyses himself speaking in this manner:

After Jacob, leaving the land of Chanaan, Came down into Egypt, girt with seventy souls Beside him; and he fathered a numerous Seed, which, vexed until now by heavy fate, Has borne the dire yoke of an impious race And the savage blows of a ruling hand. For when King Pharao saw that the Hebrew race Was swelling, he sought our head with many frauds, Pressing the wretches with brick-making labor, And commanding them to raise vast masses of cities And towers in vain toil toward the heaven. Thereafter, he commanded that every male born Seen by the day be drowned, immersed in the river. But my mother, as I remember with joy, not having Told it once, hid me for three months. Having been discovered at last, where the marshy pool lies, She exposed me to the waves, marked with many a sign. From afar my sister Mariam stood watching. Lo, the king’s daughter approaches with her handmaids,

^A and seeing the infant, she took him up. She knew he was a Hebrew, and Mariam, the sister, running to the princess, says: “Do you wish me to quickly find a nurse for the child for you from the Hebrews?” And she nodded to the girl. She went and told the mother; and promptly the mother herself was present, and she took me to her bosom. The king’s daughter said: “Woman, rear this child, and I will pay your wages.” She gave him the name Moses, because she had taken him safe from the liquid river.

To these, he adds other things, and concerning these points Ezekiel in his tragedy introduces Moses saying:

When the time of infancy had passed for me, My mother brought me to the palace of the princess, Having told all, and having related to me My ancestral race, and the gifts of God. So long as we had the time of childhood, With royal nurture and teachings She promised all, as if out of her own bowels; But when the full bosom of days arrived, I went forth from the royal houses (for my spirit And the king’s stratagem urged me to deeds). I see first, by the law of hands, two men, One of Hebrew race, the other Egyptian. Seeing them desolate, and no one present, I rescued the brother, but the other I slew. I hid him in the sand, so that no one might see Another person, or uncover the murder. On the following day, seeing two men again, Especially kin to one another being harmed, ^B I say: “Why do you strike one weaker than yourself?” But he said: “Who sent you as judge, Or inquisitor to us here? Will you kill me, As you did the man yesterday?” And I, having feared, Said: “How did this become manifest? Who quickly reported all these things to the king?” And Pharaoh seeks to take my life; But I, having heard, depart out of the way, And now I wander upon an alien land.

Then concerning the daughters of Raguel he adds thus:

I see these seven virgins before me.

And upon his asking whose the virgins were, Sepphora says: “The whole land which you see afar, stranger, Is called Libya; nations of all kinds inhabit it, Black-skinned Ethiopian men. One, however, Rules this land, and as tyrant and commander alone, He rules this city, and judges mortals, A priest, who is father both to me and to them.” ^C

Then, having gone through the watering of the flocks, he adds concerning the marriage of Sepphora, introducing Choum and Sepphora speaking to one another by turns:

“Still, it is fitting for you to tell this, Sepphora, To the stranger: My father has given me to him as a bride.”

CHAPTER XXIX

Concerning the same, from Demetrius.

Demetrius, concerning the killing of the Egyptian, and the dispute he had with the one who informed [the king] regarding the killing, ^D

^A in the same manner as the sacred history commemorates. For it notes that Moses, when he had fled to the Midianites, took to wife the daughter of Jothor, by the name of Sepphora; from which name he conjectures that she was born of the grandsons of Chettura and from the lineage of Abraham. For [he says that] Abraham begat Jexan by Chettura, and from Jexan came Dadan, and from Dadan came Raguel, and from Raguel were begotten Jothor and Abab; and finally that from Jothor came Sepphora, whom Moses married. And the generations also harmonize. For Moses is the seventh from Abraham, and Sepphora is the sixth. For while Isaac, from whom Moses draws his origin, was already living with him, Abraham, being one hundred and forty years old, married Chettura and begat Isaar from her as his second son; and Isaac, being one hundred years old, begat [Jacob], so that Isaar was born about forty-two years later, from whose lineage Sepphora was descended. There is, therefore, no reason why Moses and Sepphora could not have lived at the same time. Moreover, they dwelt in the city of Madiam, which received its name from one of the children of Abraham. For he says that Abraham sent his children toward the East for the sake of seeking a habitation; and for this reason, Aaron and Maria spoke at Aseroth, because Moses had married an Ethiopian woman. Ezechielus also speaks of these things in his *Exagoge*, having added in addition the dream which was seen by Moses and interpreted by his father-in-law. Thus, therefore, he introduces Moses speaking in turn with his father-in-law:

The Dream of Moses

The Interpretation of the Father-in-Law

^C I seemed to see on the heights, somewhere, a great throne That rose up as far as the heavens, On which sat a certain noble light, Wearing a crown, and a great scepter in his hand Especially his left; but with his right he ^D Beckoned me, and I stood before the throne. He handed the scepter to me, and bade me sit On the great throne. He gave me a royal Diadem, and he himself willingly departs from the throne. I saw the whole earth circular, And beneath the earth, and above the heaven, And a certain multitude of stars fell at my knees. I counted them all in order, And they passed by me like an army of mortals. Then, struck with fear, I rise from sleep.

His father-in-law interprets the dream for him thus: "O guest, God has signaled this good thing for you. May I live when these things ever happen to you! You shall surely raise up some great throne, And you yourself shall be judge, and you shall lead mortals. And that you beheld the whole earth inhabited, And the things beneath, and the things above the heaven of God, You shall see the things that are, and the things of old, and the things to come."

IX. Concerning the burning bush, and his mission to Pharaoh, he again brings in Moses conversing with God by way of dialogue. Moses says:

^A "Come, what sign is this to me from the bush? A miracle, and for mortals incredible? Suddenly the bush burns with much fire, Yet the whole growth remains green. Why is this? Moving forward, I shall see a great Miracle. For it brings no belief to men."

Then God converses with him:

"Stop, good man, do not approach, Moses, before you loose the binding of your feet. For holy is the ground where you stand; From the bush the divine Word shines for you. Take heart, child, and listen to my words. For to behold my form is impossible For one who is mortal. But it is permitted for you To hear my words, for the sake of which I have come. I am the God of those, whom you name, your ancestors, Of Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob the third. Mindful of them, and yet of my own gifts, I am here to save my Hebrew people, Having seen the affliction and labor of my servants. But go, and signify with my words, First to all the Hebrews together, Then to the king, what has been ordained by me, So that you may lead my people out of the land."

Then, interposing some alternate remarks, Moses himself says:

"I am not gifted with speech, and I have a tongue Which is difficult to move, stammering, so that my words May not be spoken before the king."

Then to these things God answers him:

"Send your brother Aaron quickly, To whom you will say all the things spoken by me, And he himself will speak before the king; You on my behalf, and he taking them from you."

And concerning the rod and the other wonders, he has spoken thus by way of dialogue:

^B D. "What is that which you have in your hands? Tell me quickly." M. "A rod, the punisher of beasts and men." D. "Cast it upon the ground, and withdraw quickly; For it shall be a fearful dragon, so that you wonder." M. "See, it has been cast. But be gracious to me: How fearful! How monstrous! Have pity on me; I tremble having seen it, and the limbs of my body shake." D. "Fear nothing; but stretch out your hand and take The tail, and it shall again be the rod which it was. Put your hand into your bosom, and bring it out." Behold what was commanded, it has become like snow. "Put it again into your bosom, and it shall be as it was."

^C To these he adds, after some intervening things that he had said: "These things," he says, "in this way also Ezechielus says in the *Exagoge*, bringing in God speaking concerning the signs as follows:

'With this rod you shall perform all wicked things. First, the deep river shall flow with blood, And all the springs and systems of water. And a multitude of frogs, and I will cast lice upon the earth. Then I will scatter ash as from a furnace; It shall bring forth bitter ulcers upon mortals. And the dog-fly shall come, and shall harm many Of the Egyptians. After these things there shall again be A plague, and those who have a hard heart shall die. And I will embitter the heaven; now hail Mixed with fire shall fall, and shall crush with heavy...'" ^D

weights ^A the rebels; the field will see the crops crushed and the cattle struck down by a cruel beating. Dark night, thick with shadows, shall roll over the sky and lands for three days: locusts, breaking forth from the ground, shall thoroughly consume all food and everything of the crops that is green in the fields. Whoever the mother has first brought to light shall be mown down by the sword. Then the savage madness of the threatening people shall fall. Pharaoh shall bear nothing of these things, unless, seeing his eldest son lying dead, with no delay he grants the people a free departure. But you, address the Hebrew race with this voice: Behold, this will be for you the first month of the year, in which the course joyfully lies open into those lands which I granted to the fathers of the Hebrew race, confirmed by an oath that shall not be moved. Command these things also: in the month which I point out as certain, when the full moon shall shed its light, in the night before, let them make a sacrifice to the Thunderer, and let the blood of the victim mark the high doorposts, so that the cruel angel, the minister of slaughter, may spare the sprinkled houses. On this night roasted meat shall be eaten by all. The king himself, trembling, shall urge on your flight. Since this is now imminent, the whole people, relying on my grace, shall grow rich: accumulated wealth, finery, and garments, and the heavy and immense weight of gold and silver—whatever the journey demands—woman shall freely offer to woman into her bosom, so that your labor may receive its just rewards. From then on, when the march has stood in its own place, as soon as the first day on which you take flight has passed, from that time, for seven days every year, let them eat unleavened bread, and let them be suppliant to God, offering to God whatever the first-born of the cattle brings forth into the air, or the first male child which the mother, having given birth, shall bring forth to life, opening the mother's womb as a holy thing. »

Then he writes that God himself commanded the rites of this same feast more clearly: When the tenth day of this month shall shine through the houses related by the Hebrew blood, take the chosen offspring of sheep and oxen: let them be kept for him until the fourteenth day of the month shines upon the world. ^C Then in the evening let the family duly consume the roasted feast which it has sacrificed. With sides girded, feet clad, and holding a staff in hand, let all the people feast. For the trembling Pharaoh himself, with the rest, shall urge on your flight. When the lamb is sacrificed, the blood shed shall bedew a bundle of hyssop, which shall sprinkle both doorposts of your holy house, so that the deadly sword may transfer death far from the Hebrew home. From then on, let this feast remain for the Father forever. And let the whole nation spend seven solid days without leaven. For truly God, establishing the end of these evils in this month, reveals the departure. And this month shall be the head of times for you.

After other things, he subjoins these also: « Moreover, Ezekiel, he says, in that drama which he entitled *The Exodus*, attributes the following speech to an angel, by which he commemorates both the condition and state of the Hebrews, and at the same time the destruction of the Egyptians: “For when King Pharaoh set out from his ancestral home with the throng, with countless weapons, and all his cavalry, and four-horse chariots, along with leaders and guards alike, the army, drawn up in order, was terrible to all. The infantry, on foot and in phalanxes, were in the middle, having places between for the chariots. But he stationed the horsemen, some on the left, ^D

and assigned certain ones to the Egyptian army. I asked regarding their total number, and I heard that a hundred myriads of valiant men were under arms. ^A And when we saw the Hebrew camp from afar, some lay scattered in various groups along the shore of the Red Sea. Others, broken by the labor and the harsh journey, were relieving the hunger of their little children and their wives. Everything was scattered: household goods and wandering herds. As soon as the Hebrew saw the new battle line, he suddenly cried out a deadly, tearful sound to heaven, stretching his hands and eyes, and calling upon the ancestral Deity. There was a great throng of men. But joy took hold of us all in turn. We then pitched our camp beneath them. The city of Beelsephon is called so by mortals. ^B And when the Titan sun approached the setting, we refrained, wishing to engage in battle at dawn, trusting in the people and our terrifying weapons. Then divine wonders began, marvelous to behold. For suddenly a great, cloudy pillar stood in front of us, between our camp and that of the Hebrews. Then Moses, their leader, taking the staff of God—by which he had previously contrived evil signs and wonders in Egypt—struck the back of the Red Sea and tore the depths of the sea in the middle. And they all passed quickly on foot through the salt path. ^C We, however, followed quickly in their tracks, entering at night with a war-cry. But suddenly the wheels of the chariots would not turn; they were held fast as if bound. A great radiance, like fire, appeared to us from heaven; to conjecture, God was present as their helper. But when they had already reached the other side of the sea, and a great wave was roaring close to us, someone shouted when he saw it, "Let us flee; the hand of the Highest is before us! For He is a helper to them, but brings destruction to us, the miserable!" And the channel of the Red Sea was flooded together, and it destroyed the army.

And again, after a little: "Thence they traveled for three days," as Demetrius himself also says, and the sacred Scripture agrees with this. And since there was no sweet water there, but bitter, at God's command he cast a certain wood into the spring, and the water became sweet. Thence they came to Elim, and found there twelve springs of water and seventy palm trees. Regarding these things, and the bird that appeared, Ezekiel introduces in his *Exagoge* someone saying to Moses regarding the palms and the twelve springs, as follows: ^D "Most excellent Moses, pay attention to the place we have found near this shady grove. For it exists, as you yourself also happen to see. From there a light shone forth, and a sign of joy, like a pillar of fire. There we found a meadow which is shady, and moist glades; a plentiful, deep place, drawing twelve springs from one rock. And there are many sturdy palm trees with fruit—seventy of them—and the flowing grass is grown for fodder for the flocks."

Then further on, he discusses the bird that appeared: "And besides these we saw another strange animal, a wonder, such as no one has ever seen before."

^A Its length was ^A double, almost like an eagle, with variegated wings and colors. Its breast appeared purple, its legs vermilion-colored, and it was decked out with golden-yellow feathers about its neck; its head was like a bed-chamber, resembling a tame creature, and it looked about with a yellowish pupil in a circle, while the pupil itself appeared like a burning berry. It had the most excellent voice of all; it appeared to be the king of all birds, as one might perceive. For all the winged creatures followed behind it in fear, while it went before, exulting like a bull, and walked with a swift step, bearing the weight of its foot. »

And after a few words: "But one might ask how the Israelites had arms, having gone out unarmed. For they said that after they had gone a journey of three days and offered sacrifice, they would return again. It is easily understood, therefore, that those who were not drowned ^B used the arms of the others."

CHAPTER XXX

Concerning David, Solomon, and Jerusalem, from Eupolemus.

Eupolemus, in a certain work *On the Prophecy of Elijah*, asserts that Moses fulfilled the office of prophet for forty years. Then Jesus, son of Nave, succeeded him for thirty years, his life being extended to one hundred and ten years, and he set up the sacred tabernacle in Shiloh. After these, Samuel became prophet. Then, by the will of God, Saul was chosen king by Samuel; and having reigned for twenty-one years, he died. Then his son David came to power, who conquered the Syrians living by the river Euphrates, and Commagene, and the Assyrians held in Galadene, and the Phoenicians. He also waged war against the Idumeans, Ammonites, Moabites, Itureans, Nabataeans, and Nabdaeans. Furthermore, he marched against Suron, king of Tyre and Phoenicia, whom he also compelled to pay tribute to the Judeans; and he made an alliance with Vaphres, king of the Egyptians. ^C And desiring to build a temple to God, David entreated God to show him the place for the altar; whereupon an angel appeared to him, standing over the place where the altar is established in Jerusalem, and ordered him not to establish the temple, because he had been defiled by human blood and had been occupied for many years in waging wars. He reports that the angel’s name was Dianathan, and that he commanded David, leaving to his son the care of carrying out the building, to diligently provide beforehand the things pertaining to the construction—gold, silver, bronze, stones, cypress wood, and cedar wood. David, having heard this, built ships at the city of Achana in Arabia, and sent metal-workers to the island of Urphe in the Red Sea, which is abundant in gold mines, and the workers brought back a great deal of gold from there to Judea. After David had reigned for forty years, he handed over the rule to his son Solomon, who was twelve years old, in the presence of ^D Eli the high priest and the fourteen tribal leaders, and he handed over to him the gold, and the silver, and the bronze, and the stone, and the cypress and cedar wood. And he himself died, and Solomon began to reign, and he wrote to Vaphres the...

king of Egypt the letter which follows.

CHAPTER XXXI.

CHAPTER XXXII.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

CHAPTER XXXIV

^A Suron to Solomon, the great king, greeting. Blessed be God, who created the earth and the heaven, who chose an excellent man from an excellent father. As soon as I read your letter, I took the greatest pleasure in my soul and gave thanks to God that you have received the kingdom. Regarding what you write to me concerning the peoples among us, I have sent you eighty thousand Tyrians and Phoenicians. And I have sent you an architect, a man of Tyre, born of a Jewish mother from the tribe of David; whatever you may ask him concerning all things beneath the sky that pertain to architecture, he will instruct you and will carry it out. As for what is necessary for the men being sent to you, ^B you will do well to write to the governors of the region, so that they may be supplied with what is necessary.

Solomon, having read this, and relying on the help of his father's friends and escorted by a company of Sidonians and Tyrians, toured Mount Lebanon. He transported all the timber that had once been cut by his father by sea to Joppa, and from there by land to Jerusalem; and he began to build the temple of God, being thirteen years old. And the previously mentioned subject nations and the twelve tribes of the Jews were to labor, and they were to provide for the one hundred and sixty thousand men the necessary things, each tribe being assigned one month for this task and provision. ^C Therefore, the foundations of the temple were laid, which occupied a space of sixty cubits in length and the same in width, while the base of the foundations themselves occupied exactly ten cubits each. For so had Solomon been commanded by Nathan the prophet of God. And he willed the entire structure to be joined together in such a way that alternating rows of stone and cypress beams should receive one another, and both skins were to be fastened together with certain bronze ties, talent-weight, in the manner of axes. Now that the mass of the entire edifice was standing, he covered the exterior face of the stones with cedar and cypress boards, so that it would not offend the eye, and thus he clothed it; but he gilded the interior in such a way that he filled it with golden bricks of five cubits, with four silver nails, talent-weight, arranged in the likeness of breasts upon the walls. And thus from the floor to the very top ceiling, the whole house shone with gold; even the golden ceiling of the roof was entirely finished in this way, while the outer ridge was made of bronze—that is, it was covered with bronze tiles cast from molten bronze. He further set up two columns in the temple, these indeed of bronze, but covered with pure gold to the thickness of one finger, one on the right hand and the other on the left; both of them were of such a size that in length they reached the very roof, each being in circumference...

^A ten talents. He also had golden candelabra made, each ten talents in weight, which were modeled after the pattern of that which had been placed by Moses in the tabernacle of testimony. Both of these were set in like manner on each side of the temple, one on the right and the other on the left, and seventy golden lamps were added, so that seven lit lamps were supported by each candelabrum. He also covered the doors of the temple with gold and silver and arched the ceiling above with cedar and cypress boards. He then opened a huge portico on the northern side of the temple, supported by forty-eight bronze columns. He also added a bronze laver, ^B having a length and width of twenty cubits and a height of only five cubits. A rim, projecting one cubit outwardly and curving downwards towards the base, surrounded it, so that the priests might more easily ascend the laver to wash away the filth from their feet and hands. To the same he added twelve turned and cast steps, proportioned to the proper size of a man, placed at the rear part of it and to the right of the altar. Furthermore, a bronze base was added, not far from the laver, having a height of two cubits, upon which the king was to stand when praying, so that he might be more easily seen by the surrounding Jewish people. In addition to this, he erected an altar, ^C the circumference of which was forty-five cubits, and the height twelve cubits only. Finally, he had twin bronze rings made, intertwined with chains, and attached to certain machines rising twenty cubits above the peak of the temple, whose shadow might fall over the entire roof above, and from every net or chain he hung four hundred bronze bells, each weighing a talent; these, when set in motion by the chains, would repel the birds by their ringing and noise, so that they would not settle on the temple or build nests in the boards of the doors or porticoes, and defile the sacred house with refuse. Furthermore, he also fortified the city of Jerusalem itself with walls, towers, and moats, and raised a magnificent royal palace for himself. ^D Now that sacred building was first called the temple of Solomon; but afterwards, the city itself was called Jerusalem, through a corruption and alteration of the name of the temple, which the Greeks later called Hierosolyma by a similar and related term. After the temple had been built and the city fortified, the king went to Selom and offered to God a burnt offering of a thousand oxen; and later he had the tabernacle, the altar, and whatever sacred furniture had been prepared by Moses—the ark, the golden altar, the lampstand, the table, and whatever else there was—brought to Jerusalem, and deposited the sacred objects in the house by the command of the prophet. At the same time he made an immense sacrifice to God, slaughtering two thousand sheep and three thousand five hundred young cattle. The total weight of gold spent on the two columns and the whole temple was four thousand six hundred talents; of silver, for the nails and the rest of the equipment, one thousand two hundred and thirty-two talents; and of bronze, for the columns, the laver, and the portico, eighteen thousand and fifty talents. Furthermore, he sent away the Egyptians and the Phoenicians, having distributed to each of their own [people], giving to each ten shekels of gold.

He lived fifty-two years, of which he reigned in peace for forty years.

CHAPTER XXXV

Timochares, in his history of the deeds of Antiochus, teaches that the circumference of Jerusalem ^B is forty stadia, and that it is difficult to capture, inasmuch as it is surrounded on all sides by precipitous ditches and valleys. Furthermore, that the entire city is washed by waters, by the flowing of which all the gardens are irrigated everywhere; and although at a full forty stadia from the city there is a severe shortage of water, yet from there, the ground appears to be well-watered again.

CHAPTER XXXVI

Furthermore, he who surveyed all of Syria, in the first book of his work, reports that Jerusalem was situated on a high and rugged ridge, and that some parts of the wall were built of dressed stone, but the greater part of flint; and that the city had a circumference of twenty-seven stadia; and that at the same place there exists a spring, gushing forth water in great abundance.

CHAPTER XXXVII

Philo also mentions the same spring in those books which he wrote concerning Jerusalem, [saying] that it dries up in the winter, and flows abundantly again in the summer. He speaks in the first book in this manner:

Swimming from above, I saw then other most wondrous Spectacles, with song, into the baths of the lord of greatness, He fills the deep stream, releasing it from the flow,

and what follows: upon which, adding further comments concerning its flow, he says:

For the stream, rushing down from the high peak, amidst rainy snows, A hallowed, most joyful [stream], above the mountainous towers It rolls, and, irrigating the fields fading under dry dust round about, Displays the verdant miracles of its mantle,

and the rest. And likewise, again, concerning the high priest’s fountain and the aqueduct, he continues thus:

For pipes, rich in water, spew forth streams beneath the earth.

And all other things which follow these. So much for those things from Alexander Polyhistor.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

Moreover, concerning the waters in Jerusalem, Aristaeus also, in that book which he wrote concerning the interpretation of the Jewish Law…

records these things: "The temple," he says, "looks towards the east, and its rear towards the west. The entire ground is paved with stone, and is made with slopes towards the appropriate places, for the sake of the flowing of waters, which happens for the washing away of the blood of the sacrifices; for many myriads of cattle are brought in during the days of the feasts. ^A There is an inexhaustible supply of water, as if a fountain with a plentiful flow were naturally gushing forth from within, and moreover there are wondrous and indescribable reservoirs under the earth, as they have pointed out, of five stadia in circumference around the foundation of the temple; and from these, countless pipes in every part connect the currents to themselves. And all these have been coated with lead on the floors and walls; upon these a great quantity of plaster has been poured, all of which has been efficiently accomplished." ^B

CHAPTER XXXIX. Concerning Jeremiah the prophet, from Eupolemus.

Furthermore, since the aforementioned Polyhistor has also made mention of the prophecy of Jeremiah, it would be most absurd for us to pass this over in silence. Let this also be put forward then. "Then Joakim. In his time Jeremiah the prophet prophesied. He, having been sent by God, caught the Jews sacrificing to a golden idol, which had the name of Baal. He declared to them the misfortune that was imminent. Joakim desired to burn him alive; but the prophet replied that he would prepare food for the Babylonians with those pieces of wood, and that they, having been taken into captivity, would dig the canals of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The king of the Babylonians, Nabuchodonosor, hearing what had been predicted by Jeremiah, entreated Astibares, the king of the Medes, to campaign with him. Having taken the Babylonians and the Medes, and having gathered eighteen myriads of infantry, and twelve myriads of cavalry, and ten thousand chariots of infantry, he first destroyed Samaria, and Galilee, and Scythopolis, and the Jews ^C living in the region of Galaad; and again, he took Jerusalem and captured the Jewish king Joakim. He also took the gold that was in the temple, and the silver and bronze, and sent them to Babylon, except for the ark and the tablets that were inside it. This, however, Jeremiah kept." ^D

CHAPTER XL. From Berossus, concerning the captivity of the Jews by Nabuchodonosor; and concerning the kings of Babylon from Nabopallasar up to Cyrus. From Josephus.

It is necessary to add to these also the things concerning the captivity of the Jews under Nabuchodonosor...

who, having warred against the rebel and having drawn up his forces, gained control of both ^A him and his land, and again brought the region under his own kingship. And it so happened to his father Nabopallasar, who in the meantime had fallen ill, that he ended his life in the city of the Babylonians, having reigned twenty-one years. Perceiving the death of his father not long after, Nabuchodonosor, having settled affairs in Egypt and the remaining country, and having entrusted the captives of the Jews, Phoenicians, Syrians, and the nations in Egypt to the care of some of his friends, arrived in Babylonia. And after some other things, he says: Nabuchodonosor then, after he had begun the aforementioned wall, having fallen into illness, departed this life, having reigned forty-three years. His son Evilmerodach became lord of the kingdom. ^B This man, having managed affairs unlawfully and wantonly, was conspired against by the person who had his sister, Neriglisar, and was slain, having reigned two years. After he was slain, the one who had conspired against him, Neriglisar, having succeeded to the rule, reigned four years. His son Chabaessoarachus obtained the kingdom, being a boy, for nine months; but having been conspired against, because he revealed many wicked traits, he was put to death by his friends. When he had perished, those who had conspired against him came together and by common counsel bestowed the kingdom upon a certain Nabonidus, who was from Babylon and of the same confederacy. Under him, the walls by the river of the city of the Babylonians were adorned with burnt brick and bitumen. While his kingdom was in the seventeenth year, Cyrus came with a great ^C force from Persia and, having ravaged all the rest of the kingdom, rushed upon Babylonia. Nabonidus, having perceived his incursion, went to meet him with his forces, and having joined battle, was defeated in the fight and, fleeing with a few, was shut up in the city of the Borsippians. Cyrus, having taken Babylon and having ordered the outer walls of the city to be razed—because the city appeared to him very well-fortified and difficult to take—marched out against Borsippa to besiege Nabonidus. But Nabonidus, not enduring the siege, but having surrendered himself beforehand, Cyrus treated him humanely; having given him Carmania as a habitation, he sent him out of Babylonia. Nabonidus then, having passed the remainder of his time in that country, ended his life. This account has truth that agrees with our scriptures. For it is written in them that ^D Nabuchodonosor in the eighteenth year of his reign desolated our temple, and it remained desolate for fifty years; but in the second year of the reign of Cyrus, when the foundations were laid, it was completed again in the tenth year of the reign of Darius. These are the words of Josephus.

CHAPTER XLI.

Concerning Nabuchodonosor, and Babylon founded by him, from Abydenus.

found also these things: ^A “Megasthenes,” he says, “records that Nabuchodrosorus was endowed with greater fortitude and spirit than Hercules himself, and that having made an expedition into Libya and Iberia, he brought colonies of both, once subdued, to the right region of the Pontus. These things having been accomplished, the Chaldeans report that, climbing the palace, he was suddenly divinely inspired, and uttered the following oracle: ‘I, that Nabuchodrosorus, O Babylonians, announce to you a coming calamity, which neither Belus, the author of our race, nor the queen Beltis will ever be able to persuade the Fates to avert. A Persian mule will come who, using the aid of your demons, will impose a harsh yoke upon your necks. ^B And the author of this slaughter shall also be a certain Mede, of whom the Assyrians formerly boasted greatly. O that he, before he betrayed my citizens in this way, had either perished swallowed and absorbed by some Charybdis or the deep sea, or else, borne away to other places, had wandered through pathless solitudes, where no trace of city or man appears, but where only wild beasts graze freely and birds fly around, and that he might have been tossed alone amidst cliffs and whirlpools. As for me, before this nefarious intent was injected into him, may it be granted that I meet a happier end.’ Having spoken these things, he was suddenly snatched from the eyes of men and vanished. And he had Evilmaluruchus his son as successor to his kingdom; but he having been killed by him, Neriglisares, the husband of his sister, left behind a son, Labassoarascus. ^C When he also had been removed by a violent death, they create Nabanidochum, who had no kinship with him, as king, to whom Cyrus later, having taken Babylon, granted the principality of Carmania. ^D The same writer also narrates as follows concerning the foundation of Babylon by Nabuchodonosor: ‘They say,’ he reports, ‘that all these places were from the beginning covered by waters and called sea; but that Belus assigned to each its own region, and surrounded Babylon with walls, and subsequently cloaked it from the eyes of mortals: but that this enclosure, distinguished by bronze gates, was later built by Nabuchodonosor, which stood until the empire of the Macedonians.’ And again, with some things interposed, he says: ‘Nabuchodonosor, having taken possession of the kingdom, surrounded Babylon with a triple wall in fifteen days, and diverted the Armacalen river, being a branch of the Euphrates, and the Aeracanus. And for the sake of the city of the Sippareni, he dug a marsh, the circumference of which was forty parasangs, and the depth twenty fathoms, and set up gates, which by opening they would irrigate the plain; and they call them Echetognomones. He also checked the inundation of the Red Sea and built the city of Teredon against the incursions of the Arabs; and he adorned the royal palaces with trees, calling them hanging gardens.’” And let these things be set before me from the aforementioned writing, because it is recorded in the prophecy of Daniel that Nabuchodonosor, walking in the palace of his kingdom, which was in Babylon, and feeling pride, spoke boastfully: “Is not this great Bab-

Babylon, which I have built into a royal house by the strength of my might and for the honor of my glory?” And while the word was still in his mouth, he felt the avenger immediately following such great pride. ^A

CHAPTER XLII.

Of those who have made mention of the Jewish nation, from the book of Josephus, On the Antiquity of the Jews.

These testimonies of those authors are sufficient for our purpose. We shall add only the words of Josephus from his History of the Jewish Antiquities, where, having cited the statements of almost countless writers, he concludes at the end in these very terms: “Yet the accounts of the Syrians, Chaldeans, and Phoenicians are sufficient for the demonstration of our antiquity; and besides these, there are so many writers among the Greeks; furthermore, in addition to those mentioned, Theophilus, Theodotus, Mnaseas, Aristophanes, Hermogenes, Euhemerus, and Comon, and Zopyrion, and perhaps many others—for I have not read all the books that have made mention of our affairs in a serious way. Most of the aforementioned men wandered from the truth of the events as they occurred from the beginning, because they did not encounter our sacred books; nevertheless, by common consent, they all bore witness to the same antiquity, ^B which I had set out to speak about just now. However, Demetrius Phalereus, and Philo the elder, and Eupolemus did not wander far from the truth; to whom it is proper to grant pardon, for they could not follow our scriptures with absolute accuracy.” Thus far Josephus. ^C Whoever wishes to peruse the books written by him On the Antiquity of the Jews will find there many other testimonies, joined in the greatest agreement with those we have already cited. Although we ourselves have at hand a great abundance of such witnesses, both ancient and modern, who would add their own vote to the authority of those we have brought forward, yet, that we may not seem to exceed the measure, we shall leave them for the studious to examine and investigate, and shall go on to complete our argument. ^D

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL, BOOK TEN

CAPITULA OF THE TENTH BOOK

1. That excellent disciplines were translated from the Barbarians to the Greeks, and concerning the antiquity of the Hebrews. 2. From Clement, concerning the theft of the Greek writers. 3. From Porphyry, concerning the fact that the Greeks are thieves, from the first book of the *Philological Lecture*. 4. That it is not without reason that we have preferred the theology of the Hebrews to the philosophy of the Greeks. 5. That the Greeks have received all benefits from the Barbarians. 6. On the same subject, from the works of Clement. 7. From Josephus, on the same subject. 8. From Diodorus, who wrote the *Bibliotheca*, on the same subject. 9. Concerning the antiquity of Moses and of the prophets among the Hebrews. 10. On the same subject, from Africanus. 11. On the same subject, from Tatian. 12. On the same subject, from Clement. 13. On the same subject, from Josephus. 14. That the times of the Hebrew history are younger than the age of the Greek philosophers ^A.

CHAPTER I

That excellent disciplines were translated from the Barbarians to the Greeks, and concerning the antiquity of the Hebrews.

By what arguments we have been led and moved to prefer the philosophy of the Hebrews over that of the Greeks, and with what purpose we have accepted their sacred scriptures—since this has heretofore been explained by us, and it has been shown further that this race of men was not unknown even to the Greeks, inasmuch as they have mentioned them by name and have praised their ways of life in a marvelous manner; and finally, since they have made mention both of their royal metropolis and of their other affairs in the greatest detail: come, let us further observe ^B how it is that they have not only wished to celebrate their memory in their own writings, but have also become emulators of the doctrine akin and related to them in many of their decrees pertaining to the formation of the soul.

And indeed, just as the admirable Greeks, traveling around to the Barbarians, one from one place and another from another, collected the rest of the disciplines—geometry, arithmetic, music, astronomy, medicine, and those very first elements of grammar, and thousands of other technical and life-benefiting pursuits—^C ... ^D

the infinite strength of which our excellent and distinguished Greeks gathered from elsewhere, shall now be demonstrated by me. Furthermore, just as we proved in our previous books that they borrowed from the barbarians their opinion regarding the plurality of gods, the rites of sacred mysteries, their histories, and their fabulous tales about the gods, and their allegorical interpretations of myths into some kind of natural philosophy, and whatever else remains of superstitious error; since we have discovered that those most ancient Greeks, by wandering through remote regions with great labor, stitched together their own theology from ^A the beggarly gathering of doctrines in which the barbarians flourished—so we shall shortly demonstrate that whatever concerns the religion of the one and supreme Moderator of all things, God, or that portion of His doctrine which is most especially designed for the benefit of the soul—which are indeed the chief and most powerful headings of the whole of philosophy—they drew from no other source than the fountains of the Hebrews alone. And if this should seem less than convincing to anyone who might argue that they were led into this similarity of opinions by concepts implanted by nature, this very thing will be most significant for our argument: that we have resolved to emulate those truths which have not been delivered by men to the Hebrews only—men illustrious in theology and prophecy from every age since time began—but also to the Greeks; if not to all of them, at least to some, and those indeed most famous throughout all Greece, and so thoroughly examined in the disputations of the philosophers themselves. I understand, indeed, that there were only a few ^B of such men (for as the common saying goes, "things that are noble are also difficult"), yet they are those who easily held the first place among the rest of the philosophers, so that by the clarity of their reputation they obscured the fame of all the others. Nor indeed should it seem wonderful that we say that the sententiae of the Hebrews could have been investigated and more curiously explored by the Greeks, since they not only assembled their other doctrines from the spoils of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and other barbarian nations, but are even now held fast by that same ambitious spirit of rivalry, while one does not shrink from being a plagiarist of another. Indeed, you may see anyone at random having stolen the words and opinions of his neighbors, and sometimes their works in their entirety, and boasting of them as if they were his own labors. Nor should you think this assertion of mine originated with me; you will hear this again from those very "darlings of Wisdom," as they mutually cast the accusation of plagiarism upon one another. And since we have once set our hand to this task, it is necessary first of all to see through it, that we may have a clearer insight into the character of these men. And since our own Clement ^C treats this discussion at great length in his sixth *Stromate*, read these words of his to me first.

CHAPTER II. On the thefts of Greek writers, from Clement.

"Now then," he says, "since we have illuminated that arcane power of Greek thought with the light of the truth we have drawn from the Scriptures, once we have ^D demonstrated the impression made by Greek ingenuity, which has been shone upon by the truth given to us through the Scriptures, according to which..."

we have shown—let us bring the Greeks themselves forward as witnesses against themselves regarding this theft. For those who so openly plunder their own affairs from one another, while indeed they confirm that they are thieves, even against their will, are shown to be stealthily communicating the truth from us to their own kin. For if they do not even spare one another, they would hardly spare ours. And I shall be silent about the dogmas pertaining to philosophy, since those who have divided the sects acknowledge in writing—so that they might not be convicted of ingratitude—that they received the most important of their dogmas from Socrates. But having used a few testimonies of men who are well-known and held in high esteem among the Greeks, and having refuted their style of thievery, using the times indiscriminately, I shall turn to what follows. ^A Having said these things by way of introduction, he then brings forth the refutations, using every kind of proof; and first he censures the poets for having stolen from their peers, by setting the expressions of each side by side. He then adds the following thereafter: "So that we might not leave philosophy and history, nor indeed rhetoric, without the same refutation, it is reasonable to set forth a few things from these as well." Then, in sequence, he adduces Orpheus, Heraclitus, Plato, Pythagoras, Herodotus, Theopompus, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Lysias, Isocrates, and countless others, whose words it is superfluous for me to enumerate, since the man's own writing is at hand, in which, after the refutations of those mentioned, he says again: "These ideas, then, of the Greek theft, understood by the mind, are sufficient as a clear example for him who is able to discern. ^B Indeed, they have been caught not only plundering and paraphrasing thoughts and expressions, as will be shown, but also stealing the works of others entirely, which they published as their own, just as Eugammon the Cyrenaean published the entire book on the Thesprotians, which he stole from Musaeus, under his own name." And again, having brought forth many proofs for these statements, at the end he adds this: "Life will fail me if I should attempt to go through each one, refuting the self-loving theft of the Greeks, and how they arrogate to themselves the discovery of the most beautiful dogmas, which they have received from us. ^C For now they are shown not only to be plundering dogmas from the barbarians, but also to be imitating what is from us, which from above through divine power, through those who have lived holily, ^D into our...

^A midst had been wondrously brought about, while they themselves engaged in Greek mythology and monstrosities. And indeed, we shall ask them whether these things which they relate are true or false. They would not say they are false; for they would not willingly condemn themselves of the greatest folly, to write falsehoods; they would of necessity admit them to be true. And how then can the miracles performed through Moses and the other prophets appear to them to be unbelievable? For the Almighty God, in His care for all mankind, converts them to salvation—some by commandments, others by threats, others again by wondrous signs, and some by gentle promises. However, the Greeks say that once, when a drought had been wasting Greece for a long time and a long lack of fruit was prevailing, those who were still surviving, for the sake of warding off famine, went as suppliants to Delphi. When they inquired how they might be delivered from so great an evil, the Pythia opened up to them this one way for the alleviation of the calamity: if they should make use of the prayers of Aeacus. Aeacus, therefore, complying with them, ascended a mountain in Greece, and spreading out his pure hands to heaven, called upon the common Father, God, and prayed Him to have compassion on the exhausted Greece. And at the moment of his prayer, a tremendous thunder rumbled, and the whole sky round about was clouded over, and violent and continuous rains, rushing down, flooded the whole country. From this, a blessed harvest ^B resulting from the crops cultivated by the prayers of Aeacus, was led to a rich maturity. "And," it says, "Samuel called upon the Lord, and the Lord gave voices and rain in the day of the harvest" (I Reg. XII, 18). Do you see that there is one God, who "rains upon the just and the unjust through the powers subjected to Him?" And the things that follow. And Clement adds innumerable such things, by which he has clearly exposed the thefts of the Greeks by irrefutable proofs. But if this man is suspect to you, because he too preferred the philosophy of the barbarians to that of the Greeks just as we do, let him be passed over, although he has arranged this argument not with his own words, but with the words of the Greeks themselves. What, then, will you answer if you hear things entirely similar and twin to these from your own noble and illustrious philosophers? Come then, and receive the testimonies of these as well.

CHAPTER III

"Longinus," he says, "had entertained us at Athens at a dinner to celebrate the memory of Plato, and had invited many others besides, including Nicagoras the sophist, Maeoras, Apollonius the grammarian, Demetrius the geometer, Prosenes the Peripatetic, and Calietes the Stoic. With these he himself sat down—the seventh—and as the dinner was progressing, and a question had arisen among the others about Ephorus: 'Let us hear,' he said, 'what the disturbance about Ephorus is.' Now those inquiring were Caystrius and ^D Maximus; for the one was preferring him even to Theopompus, while the other was calling Caystrius a thief...

^A And what, he said, is proper to Ephorus, who, from the works of Daimachus, Callisthenes, and Anaximenes, sometimes transfers whole thousands of lines word for word? To whom Apollonius the grammarian replied: 'Do you not know, then, that this same malady has seized Theopompus, whom you prefer? In the eleventh book of his *Philippica*, he transcribed word for word from Isocrates' *Areopagiticus* that passage: "that neither good nor evil things come to men of themselves," and what follows.' Yet he despises Isocrates, and boasts that he, the teacher, was defeated by him in the contest held in honor of Mausolus. Moreover, he has made a subtraction of facts, having moved things that belong to some over to others, so that in this way he might be convicted as a liar. For when Andro in his *Tripod* had recorded matters concerning the philosopher Pythagoras, and how he had once been thirsty at Metapontum and, having drawn water from a certain well and drunk, had predicted that there would be an earthquake on the third day; and having added other things to these, he continues: ^B 'These things, therefore, did Andro record concerning Pythagoras, all of which Theopompus stole; for had he spoken of Pythagoras, perhaps others would have had knowledge of him and would have said: "I could have spoken these things myself." But now the change of name has made the theft plain. For he has used the same facts, but has introduced a different name. For he has made Pherecydes the Syrian the one predicting these things.' And he hides his theft not only by this name, but also by the displacement of places; for Theopompus says that what was stated by Andro regarding the prediction of the earthquake at Metapontum happened in Syria; and he says that the ship was seen not from Megara in Sicily, but from Samos; and he has transferred the destruction of Sybaris ^C to Messana. And in order that he might seem to say something extraordinary, he added the name of a guest, saying that he was called Perilaus. 'And I,' Nicagoras said, 'in perusing the Greek texts, both his and Xenophon's, have grasped that he has transferred many things from Xenophon into his own history, and, what is more serious, that he has made them worse. For that meeting of Pharnabazus with Agesilaus, which took place through the mediation of Apollophanes of Cyzicus, and the mutual negotiations of both for establishing a treaty, which Xenophon recorded in his fourth book very gracefully and appropriately for both, Theopompus, ^D having transferred into the eleventh book of his *Hellenica*, has made tedious, motionless, and inactive. For in his eagerness to display the power of his discourse and to insert it on account of the theft, he appears slow, lingering, and hesitant, destroying the liveliness and energy of Xenophon's account.'

^A When Nicagoras had said these things, Apollonius replied, "And why should we be surprised," he said, "if the passion for theft took hold of Theopompus and Ephorus, men who were truly sluggish, when even Menander was filled with this malady? Regarding this, Aristophanes the grammarian—due to his exceeding affection for the man—gently and mildly censured him in those selections of his where he compares him with those from whom he stole. But the Latin [author], in the six books he published titled *Concerning what is not Menander's own*, laid bare the multitude of his thefts; just as Philostratus the Alexandrian compiled a standard work on the thefts of the poet Sophocles. And Caecilius, as if he had discovered something great, asserts that Menander transcribed the entire play of Antiphanes, which he had titled *The Augur*, from beginning to end into his own *Superstitious [Man]*.

"And since," he says, "it has seemed good to you, I know not how, to bring the thieves into the midst, I myself also inform against the fine Hyperides, who stole many things from Demosthenes, both in the speech *Against Diondas* and in that which he left *Concerning the Donations of Eubulus*. And that one borrowed from the other is evident; but since they were contemporaries, it would be your task, Apollonius, to track down the thief by the vestiges of time. For my part, I suspect that it is Hyperides who has pillaged; but as long as it is not certainly clear, I greatly admire Demosthenes, if he borrowed from the other, for he was able to improve the speech so aptly; but I am ^B greatly annoyed with Hyperides if, having taken from Demosthenes, he distorted it for the worse."

And after a few things he says, "And why should I tell you how the Barbarian customs of Hellanicus have been gathered from the writings of Herodotus and Damasus; or how Herodotus in his second book carried over many things from the *Periegesis* of Hecataeus of Miletus word for word—having altered a few things slightly—those things concerning the phoenix bird, and concerning the river-horse, and the hunting of crocodiles? Or how the matters spoken concerning torture in Isaeus in the [speech] *Concerning the Estate of Cylon*, and in Isocrates in the *Trapeziticus*, lie also in Demosthenes in his *Against Onetor* concerning ejectment, expressed almost through the same words? Or how Dinarchus, in his first [speech] *Against Cleomedon* for assault, has carried over many things in the very same words from the speech of Demosthenes *Against Conon* for a similar injury? Or that sentiment of Hesiod:

'For nothing better than a good wife can a man ^D Plunder, and naught worse than a bad one.'"

'" ^A Simonides in his eleventh book adopted this sentiment in this fashion: 'A man can plunder no possession better than a good wife, Nor anything more wretched than a bad one.' Euripides in his *Melanippe the Captive* says: 'Than a bad woman nothing worse comes to be, Nor by any means is anything of a good one Born better; yet their natures differ.' And since Euripides said: 'We women are an most wretched growth,' Theodectes in his *Alcmaeon* says: 'A word is clearly sung among mortals, That there is no more wretched growth than a woman.'

This man not only took the intent from there, but also used the very same words, and wished to pass it off craftily as being rather a proverb, and to use it as if it were said by many, rather than to appear to have taken it from its originator. Antimachus, while stealing from Homer, corrects him. For Homer having said: 'And Ideus, who became the mightiest of men on earth,' Antimachus says: 'And Ideus, who was the mightiest of men on earth.' And Lycophron praises the alteration, as if the verse were supported by it. For he considers ^B the one, 'And Ideus, who became the mightiest of men on earth,' and ^C 'And Ideus, who was the mightiest of men on earth.' 'Him then, answering, the lord Diomedes addressed.' I pass over in silence that Homer was mocked by Cratinus for the repetition in 'Him then, answering,' which, worn out as it was, Antimachus did not hesitate to change. And since that which is Homeric, 'Of the people over whom he ruled, and the father was as gentle,' is said elsewhere, and 'Him then, answering,' and 'But when they from both sides had arrayed the phalanx,' Antimachus, having exchanged the hemistichs, has made: 'Of the people over whom they ruled, they arrayed the phalanxes.'

But that I myself, while accusing others of theft, may not be caught as a thief, I will report those who have dealt with [the subject of] these [thefts]. There are two books by Lysimachus, *On the Thievery of Ephorus*; and Alcaeus, the poet of abusive iambics and epigrams, parodied the thefts of Ephorus, exposing them. And we have the *Epistle to Soterindas* by Polion ^D *On the Thievery of Ctesias*; and a book by the same author *On the Thievery of Herodotus*; and in the one entitled *The Trackers*, many things are said about Theopompus. There is also a work by Aretades, *On Accidental Coincidence*, from which many such things can be learned. And after

^A other things, Prosenes says: "You have exposed others as plagiarists; yet that this very divine Plato himself, in whose name we celebrate this feast today, makes excessive use of those who lived before him—for I am ashamed to use the word 'theft' in his case—none of you have yet realized." "What are you saying?" said Callicles. He replied: "I do not merely say it; I also provide proof with my argument. The books of those who lived before Plato are indeed rare; since, if there were a bounty of them, perhaps more of the philosopher's thefts would have been exposed. However, I have chanced upon some. For when I was reading Protagorus' book *On Being*, I found him employing such responses against those who introduce the 'One Being'; for I made an effort to remember the things said in his very words." And having said these things, he sets forth his proofs at length. But of what sort is the manner of the Greek writers, and that they did not even spare themselves from mutual criticism ^B, I consider the things already mentioned to be sufficient out of the myriad examples. Furthermore, for the preparation of the benefit that has flowed to the Greeks from Hebrew accounts, I think it good and necessary to prove generally that all the vaunted learning and philosophy of the Greeks, and their primary studies and the serious aspects of logical science, have been gathered for them from the barbarians, so that no one of them may any longer blame us, thinking that we have preferred the piety and philosophy among the barbarians to their own sacred mysteries.

CHAPTER IV

That it is not without mature and sound deliberation that, having set aside Greek philosophy, we have preferred the theology of the Hebrews, you might understand if you were to learn how even those of the Greeks themselves who have engaged with philosophy the most correctly, and who have thought about the gods something more and greater than the common, trite hearsay, have not discovered ^C true dogmas other than those that had been sanctioned and established so long before among the Hebrews. For while some, led astray by various 16 false opinions, were swept into a deep abyss of babbling, others indeed, using a somewhat more sincere judgment in the matters about which they formed a true notion in their minds, in these very things have proven to be sharers in the Hebrew teaching. It is reasonable, therefore, that having become learned in many things, and having examined more curiously the customs and studies of nations, they should not have been ignorant of the philosophy ^D of the things described, being younger in time, so to speak, than all—not only than the Hebrews, 18 nor yet than the Phoenicians and Egyptians, but even than the ancient Greeks themselves. To whom, indeed, Cadmus the son of Agenor from Phoenicia...

The work of philosophy, some say, began with the barbarians; for there were Magi among the Persians, Chaldeans among the Babylonians or Assyrians, and Gymnosophists among the Indians; among the Celts and Gauls, those called Druids and Semnotheoi.

^A Likewise, as to the matters from Egypt regarding the gods—or from wherever else their mysteries and initiations, the setting up of carved images, and their hymns, songs, and incantations originated—the Thracian Orpheus, or some other Greek or foreigner, became the leaders and authors of this error. For the Greeks themselves would not confess that they knew of anyone more ancient than these. At any rate, they say that Orpheus first of all, then Linus, and after him Musaeus, flourished around the time of the Trojan War, or slightly before. But in their time, nothing else prevailed among the Greeks besides the highly deceptive theology of the Phoenicians and Egyptians. And indeed, among the remaining nations, in every land and city, both in temples and in mysteries, these very same things, and whatever was similar to them, were kept. For a common notion about the gods, as set forth before, prevailed among all; marvelous temples, adorned with every kind of statue and offering, were cultivated everywhere among all; and, furthermore, carved images of every material, fashioned with artistry in the image of every sort of mortal living creature, were crafted. ^B There was also a very great and abundant supply of oracles among all people. A certain god, who was honored among the Greeks as being especially great and august, was at that time most flourishing—the Pythian, I say, along with the Clarian and the Dodonaean; then followed Amphiaraus, Amphilochus, and after these a countless throng of other soothsayers, rather than poets and rhapsodes. When philosophy came to the Greeks in very much later times, finding nothing among their own forefathers that pertained to it, it discovered that the solemn and ancient things of their ancestral theology—those very things that were admired and clamored about by everyone, the divine oracles and the rites that were considered both extraordinary and holy—were in reality pointless and unprofitable. ^C Therefore, it deferred these things to a second place, as they contributed nothing to the search for necessary and true things; but as for the rest, being foreign and barbarian, and as it were stripped bare and destitute of its own proper arguments and teachings, it went about searching, procuring for itself what was useful from every side, gathering and gleaning whatever it could find among each of the nations. For it perceived that the Greeks were lacking not only in the things of true theology, but also in the most life-beneficial of the other arts and sciences. The Greeks themselves indeed admit ^D that after Orpheus, Linus, and Musaeus—who were indeed the most ancient of theologians and the first to initiate them into the error of polytheism—the seven men among them were admired for their philosophy, whom they even named the Wise Men. And they know that these flourished around the time of Cyrus, the king of the Persians. This was the time in which, among the Hebrews, the final of all the prophets were prophesying, being more than six hundred years later than the Trojan events, and not less than one thousand five hundred years from the age of Moses. This comparison of the times for you...

will be made manifest ^A a little later as you go through the writings.

At this time, there are recorded seven Sages, new in chronology, noted for the achievement of a more refined discipline, though nothing more than their celebrated sayings is remembered of them. But it is only quite late, and indeed at a much more recent period, that the philosophers among the Greeks are mentioned as having flourished. Of these, Pythagoras was the first—a disciple of Pherecydes, who coined the name "philosophy"—who was, as some say, a Samian, but as others assert, a Tyrrhenian. Some, however, say he was a Syrian or a Tyrian; so that you must acknowledge that the first of the philosophers, celebrated on the lips of all the Greeks, was a barbarian and not a Greek. ^B Indeed, it is recorded that Pherecydes himself, under whom they say Pythagoras studied, was a Syrian. Pythagoras is said to have associated not only with him, but also to have passed time among the Magi of the Persians, and to have been a disciple of the prophets of the Egyptians, at the time when the Hebrews appear to have made their migration, some to Egypt and others to Babylon. But the man in question, investigating the wisdom found among each people, traveled through Babylon, Egypt, and Persia, becoming a disciple of the Magi and the priests. He is also reported to have heard the Brahmins—these are the philosophers of the Indians—and having gathered astronomy from some, geometry from others, arithmetic and music from others, and other things from still others, he could derive nothing from the Greeks alone; for they were laboring in such a state of poverty of wisdom and ignorance of all things. On the contrary, he himself, ^C being laden with foreign arts and doctrines, opened the fountain of all erudition in Greece. And such was Pythagoras. From him thereafter the first type of philosophy was propagated, which, from Italy where it flourished most, they termed the "Italic." Then followed that other, which Thales, one of the seven Sages, instituted, and which they called the "Ionian." To this succeeded the "Eleatic," which claims Xenophanes of Colophon as its parent. But Thales himself, as some record, was a Phoenician; as others have supposed, a Milesian. He too is said to have consorted with the prophets of the Egyptians. Plato is our witness that Solon, also one of the seven Sages, who is commonly said to have given laws to the Athenians, likewise associated with the Egyptians at the time when the Hebrews were again inhabiting Egypt. He introduces him in the *Timaeus* being instructed by the barbarian, where the Egyptian says to him among other things: ^D "O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, and no Greek is an old man, nor is there any learning among you that is hoary with age." And this Plato himself, having spent time with the Pythagoreans in Italy, was not content with the discipline among them alone. It is said that he also went to Egypt, and bestowed much time upon their philosophy. This is indeed what he himself testifies in many places in his own discourses regarding the barbarians, and he seems to me to do well, and not to deny acknowledging in good faith that he imported the most beautiful things into his philosophy from the barbarians. It is possible to hear him in many places, and not least in the *Epinomis*, where he mentions the Syrians and Egyptians together in this way: "The cause of this is the first man who observed these things, being a barbarian. For an ancient region turned the first men to these things."

^A Whence they were everywhere, and here too, examined with a myriad and infinite stretch of time." And continuing, he adds: "Let us consider that whatever the Greeks receive from barbarians, they finish it off better." These are the words of Plato. And Democritus, even earlier, is said to have composed moral discourses from the Babylonians. And in one place, boasting about himself, he says: "I have traveled over more land than any of the men of my time, investigating the most distant places, and I have seen the most climes and lands, and I have heard the most learned men, and in the composition of lines with proof, no one has surpassed me, not even those among the Egyptians called 'Arsepedonaptae' ^B, with whom I spent eighty years as a stranger." For he too visited Babylon and Persia and Egypt, studying under the Egyptians and their priests.

But if I were to recount to you Heraclitus and the other Greeks, through whom it is refuted that the Greek commonwealth was for a long age in poverty, and remained destitute of all learning? It prettified itself with the temples of the gods, with statues and images, with divinations and oracles, and with the great arrogance of the deceitful demons, but it was utterly widowed of true wisdom and life-benefiting learning. Not even the useless oracles contributed anything to them for the discovery of good doctrines; ^C nor did the wonderful Pythian himself help them in the least toward philosophy, nor did any other of the gods assist them in the practice of anything necessary. But wandering here and there, and traversing their whole life, they decorated themselves with strange feathers, according to the fable; so that for them the whole of philosophy came together as if from a collection. For, scraping together learnings from one another, they got geometry from the Egyptians, astrology from the Chaldeans, and again ^D other things from others; but nothing among them such as some of them found the good from the Hebrews. This was the knowledge of the God of all, and the knowledge of the true gods, which the discourse as it proceeds will show a little.

But for the present, this much suffices to indicate to those who encounter it, that the ancient Greeks were deprived not only of true theology, but also of the branches of learning useful for philosophy, and not even of these alone, but also of common and political practices. I think that this observation of mine contributes to the demonstration of the proposed aim; if it is proposed to undertake an apology, so that we may not be thought to have unreasonably preferred the theology among the Hebrews—which, as they themselves might say, is "barbarian"—to the Greek philosophy. If, then, they are seen to have procured everything from the barbarians long before, and nothing at all from their own gods for the sake of philosophy,

^A but rather to have censured their gods, and some among them to have preferred atheism itself to the service of their gods, what reason have we to censure—and not rather to accept and commend—the fact that we, having loved the better, and having found and received that which alone is true, have withdrawn from falsehood, not having fallen into godless reasoning in the manner of the wise men of the Greeks; nor, again, having mingled the polytheistic error with the knowledge of the God over all in the manner of the wonderful philosophers; nor having confounded falsehood with truth? But let these things be for now; instead, run through those points for me first whereby the Greeks are convicted of having stolen everything from the barbarians—not only philosophical studies, but also common and life-benefiting discoveries.

CAPUT V. That the Greeks have derived everything from the barbarians.

^B The first, therefore, among those to introduce to the Greeks the common letters—the very first elements of grammar—was Cadmus, who was by race a Phoenician, wherefore some of the ancients have even called those letters Phoenician. Others there are who say that the Syrians first invented letters. But these Syrians would be the Hebrews, who occupied the region bordering on Phoenicia, which was called Phoenicia of old, then Judæa, and in our time is named Palestine. And indeed, the nomenclature of the Greek letters approaches most closely to the names of the Hebrews. For since a name with a certain unique and proper significance was attributed to each element among the Hebrews—which has absolutely no place among the Greeks—it follows entirely that we should confess they are by no means proper to the Greeks. The elements among the Hebrews are twenty-two in all. The first ^C is called *aleph*, which, translated into the Greek language, would mean "discipline." The second is *beth*, which is translated "of a house." The third is *gimel*, which is "fullness." The fourth is *deleth*, which signifies "of scrolls." The fifth is *he*, which is "itself." If you join all these things together, you form a sentence of this sort: "Discipline of a house, fullness of scrolls itself." Next after these is the sixth element, called among them *vau*, which is "in it." Then is *zai*, which is "it lives." After that *heth*, which signifies "the living one." So that the whole stands as: "In it lives the living one." After this is the ninth element, *teth*, which is "good." Then *iod*, which is translated "beginning." The two together form: "A good beginning." Followed by these is *kaph*,

which is "verily." The twelfth is *labd*, which is "learn"; so that both together are: "Verily learn." The thirteenth is *men*, which signifies "from them." The fourteenth is *nun*, which is "eternal." The fifteenth is *sanch*, which is explained as "help," so that the sense arises: "From them eternal help." The sixteenth is *ain*, which signifies a fountain or an eye. The seventeenth is *phe*, "mouth." The eighteenth ^A is *sade*, which is "justice"; from which you may elicit this sentence: "A fountain, or eye, and the mouth of justice." The nineteenth is *coph*, which is "calling." The twentieth is *res*, which is "head." The twenty-first is *sen*, which is "teeth." The twenty-second, and last, is called by them *thau*, from which you may interpret signs: in this sense, "The calling of the head and the signs of teeth."

Such is the naming of the letters among the Hebrews, having a meaning from which indeed the sense of an entire phrase arises, which fits quite beautifully and aptly with the knowledge of these letters and a certain promise. You will find nothing similar among the Greeks, whence, as I said, it is necessary to admit that they are not native to the Greeks, but were openly brought over from the barbarian tongue with a slight ^B change of voice. That which anyone can understand from the Greek naming of the individual elements. For how does *alpha* differ greatly from *aleph*? Or *beta* from *beth*, or *gamma* from *gimel*, or *delta* from *delth*, or *epsilon* from *he*, or *zeta* from *ze*, or *theta* from *theth*, and the rest in order? Therefore, let it remain that those words are not of the Greeks, but of the Hebrews, among whom a meaning is attributed to each of them. When they had been born there, they came in time to others, and then finally to the Greeks themselves. And let these things be enough for me regarding the first elements of letters. But Clement also, having touched upon the same subject as us, hear what ^C he says.

CHAPTER VI. On the same subject, from the words of Clement.

"They tell us that medicine," he says, "was first discovered by a certain Egyptian named Apis, and afterwards increased by Asclepius. That Libyan Atlas first built a ship and first sailed the sea. And the Egyptians, along with the Chaldeans, were the first to introduce astrology to the human race. And there are those who say that the art of foretelling from the stars was devised by the Carians. The Phryges were the first to observe the flight of birds. ^D The Tuscans, neighbors of Italy, were highly skilled in the art of haruspicy. The Isaurians and Arabians cultivated the science of augury, just as the Telmissians cultivated divination drawn from dreams. The Tyrrhenians invented the trumpet, and the Phrygians the flute; for Olympus and Marsyas were of Phrygian origin. The Egyptians were the first to show how to light lamps, and the"

they divided the year into twelve months, and prohibited intercourse with women in temples, and enacted that no one should enter the temples unpurified after contact with women. The same people were also the discoverers of geometry. ^A Telmis and Damnameneus, 30 the Dactyls of the Jews, were the first to discover iron in Cyprus. Another Jew, Delas, 31 discovered the mixing of copper, or as Hesiod prefers, a Scythian. Furthermore, the Thracians were the first to discover what is called the harpe, which is a curved sword; and they were the first to use shields on horseback. The Illyrians likewise discovered the shield. They say, moreover, that the Tuscans invented the art of molding; and that Itanus, who was a Samnite, first constructed a buckler. For Cadmus the Phoenician discovered stone quarrying, and invented the gold mines around Mount Pangaeum. Already another nation, the Cappadocians, [b] were the first to discover the instrument called the nabla, just as the Assyrians discovered the dichord. For the Carthaginians were the first to build a quadrireme; and it was built by Bosporus, a native. 32 Medea, the daughter of Aeetes the Colchian, first invented the dyeing of hair. But also the Noropes (an ethnic group of Paeonia, now called Noricans) first worked copper and refined iron. ^B Amycus, king of the Bebrycians, invented boxing thongs. Concerning music, 33 Olympus the Mysian refined the Lydian mode; and the so-called Troglodytes discovered the sambuca, which is also a type of musical instrument. They say that the Phrygian Satyrus discovered the side-blown flute; and likewise the trichord, 34 and the diatonic mode, was discovered by Hyagnis, who was also a Phrygian; and the rhythms were discovered by Olympus, who was also a Phrygian; and the mixophrygian and mixolydian modes by Marsyas, who was from the same country as those previously mentioned; and the Dorian mode by Thamyris the Thracian. We have heard that the Persians were the first to manufacture the chariot, the bed, and the footstool, and the Sidonians the trireme. The Sicilians bordering on Italy were the first to discover the phorminx, not much different from the cithara, and they invented the rattles. And in the time of Semiramis, queen of the Assyrians, 35 linen garments were invented.

Atossa, formerly queen of the Persians, is recorded by Hellanicus as the author of letter-writing. All these things Scammon the Mytilenaean, and Theophrastus the Ephesian, and Cydippus the Mantinean, as well as Antiphanes and Aristodemus and Aristotle, and in addition to these Philostephanus and Strato the Peripatetic, have recorded in their books *On Inventions*. I have cited a few things from them to confirm the inventive and life-cultivating nature inherent in the barbarians, from whom the Greeks themselves have drawn their skills and disciplines. These are the very words of Clement in his *Stromata*. ^B To what has been said, I think it well to attach also the passage from the writing of Josephus the Hebrew, which he composed in two books *On the Antiquity of the Jews*, concerning the fact that the Greeks are recent and have benefited from the barbarians, and have written things that are mutually contradictory; these things will contribute to the accurate and firm proof of what has been said. Hear, then, just how he writes, word for word.

CHAPTER VII

From Josephus to the same effect.

«First, then, I am quite amazed at those who think that one must pay attention only to the Greeks concerning the most ancient deeds and inquire from them for the truth, while disbelieving us and other men. For I see that the complete opposite is the case, ^C if one must not follow vain opinions, but rather take the truth from the facts themselves. For among the Greeks everything is new, and as one might say, came into existence yesterday or the day before; I speak of the foundations of cities, and the inventions of the arts, and the recording of laws; but the most recent thing of all among them is the care for writing history. But the Egyptians, and the Chaldeans, and the Phoenicians (for I pass over counting our own people with them for now), all admit that they possess the most ancient and most stable preservation of memory. For they inhabit regions that are in no way subject to the destructions ^D that come from the environment, and they exerted great care to ensure that nothing of their own deeds would be left unremembered, but rather that everything would be dedicated in public records by the wisest of men. But as for the region of Greece, myriad destructions have laid hold of it, erasing the memory of what had happened; and as they were always establishing new ways of life, each one thought himself the beginning and head of the whole. For it was late, and with difficulty, that they learned the nature of letters. For those who wish to learn of their most ancient use take pride in the Phoenicians and Cadmus.

^A Yet not even from that time could anyone show that there exists any surviving record, neither in sacred nor in public dedications; when even regarding those who campaigned at Troy so many years later, there has been much difficulty and inquiry as to whether they used letters. And the truth rather prevails that they were ignorant of the current use of letters. In general, among the Greeks, there is nothing found to be an acknowledged writing older than the poetry of Homer; and he also appears to have lived after the Trojan events. And they say that not even he left his own poetry in writing, but that it was remembered and later composed by way of letters ^B, and that this is why it contains many discrepancies. Those, however, who attempted to write histories among them—I mean those around Cadmus the Milesian, and the Argive Acusilaus, and with them any others who are said to have existed—preceded the Persian expedition against Greece by only a short time. ^C But indeed, all agree unanimously that those who were the first among the Greeks to philosophize about heavenly and divine matters, such as Pherecydes the Syrian, Pythagoras, and Thales, were students of the Egyptians and Chaldeans, and that they wrote but little; and yet these things the Greeks consider to be the most ancient of all, and they barely believe that those things were written by them. How, then, is it not irrational for the Greeks to be puffed up as if they alone understood ancient things and were accurately handing down the truth about them? Or who could not readily learn from those same writers that they wrote nothing with certain knowledge, but as each one conjectured about the matters? At any rate, they refute one another through their books and do not hesitate to say the most contradictory things about the same subjects. For my part, it would be troublesome and tedious to teach those who know better than I do how much Hellanicus disagrees with Acusilaus regarding genealogies; how many things Acusilaus corrects in Hesiod; or in what way Ephorus shows Hellanicus to be lying in most things, and Timaeus shows Ephorus to be, and those who lived after him show Timaeus to be, and all show Herodotus. ^D But neither did Timaeus deign to agree with those around Antiochus and Philistus, or Callias, regarding Sicilian matters; nor, again, did those who wrote the Atthides or those who recorded affairs in Argos regarding Argolic matters follow one another. And what need is there to speak of matters concerning the individual cities and narrower regions, when even regarding the Persian expedition and the events that occurred within it, the most approved authors have disagreed? And Thucydides himself is accused by some of being a liar, even though he is thought to have written the most accurate history of his time. And the causes of such disagreement are many, perhaps, and others exist for those who wish to inquire from the songs,

...where the greatest of writers are often in disagreement? Assuredly, as even Thucydides, although he appears to have recorded the most accurate history of his times, is nevertheless accused by some of error and vanity. And indeed, while many other causes for such discord might perhaps occur to those inquiring into the matter, I perceive these two as being of the highest importance. And to begin with that which seems to me the more significant: since the entire preoccupation with recording public events as they occurred was neglected by the Greeks from the very beginning, this omission opened the path to error and granted to all who might later think to write about ancient affairs the license to lie with impunity. Nor was it only the rest of the Greek nation that allowed this care for the compilation of records to lie idle; not even among the Athenians—whom they claim to be autochthonous and exceptionally studious in the disciplines—can you find anything of the sort having been done. For they say that the most ancient of their public records were the laws concerning homicide written for them by Draco, a man who had seen the light only shortly before the tyranny of Pisistratus. What, then, is the point of mentioning the Arcadians, who, while they boast so excessively of their antiquity, only began to be instructed in letters long after those times? Thus, plainly, since no more ancient chronicle existed that could provide instruction to those desiring to learn or refute those who were lying, a great discord arose among the writers. To this cause you may add this second one. For those who applied themselves to writing were not guided by a desire for truth—although to profess this is everywhere a solemn and customary thing for all—but they were demonstrating the power of their eloquence; and in whatever style each believed he would most surpass others, in that he labored most. Therefore, some began weaving myths, others began coaxing the favor and goodwill of cities or kings with panegyrics, and some preferred to carp at and vituperate the deeds of others or their recorders, because they hoped that in doing so they could more easily excel. But these men fight in every way against the laws of history. For since the truth of history is proven by this argument above all—that all narrate and write the same things concerning the same events—these men thought they would most surpass all others in the reputation for truth if they dissented from all the rest as much as possible. So far also Josephus. Let the testimony of Diodorus, which I shall produce from the first book of the Library he compiled, serve as a kind of seal for all these things. For it reads word for word as follows:

Chapter VIII. From Diodorus, to the same effect.

^D «These things having been diligently explained by us, we must show how many of the Greeks, not less distinguished for their prudence than for their learning, went in ancient times to Egypt, in order to learn the customs and the type of doctrine of that people. For the Egyptian priests confirm, by the authority of the sacred books, that to them once came Orpheus, Musaeus,

^A Melampus, and Daedalus, and in addition to these, Homer the poet, and Lycurgus the Spartan; further, Solon the Athenian, and Plato the philosopher. They say that Pythagoras the Samian also came, and Eudoxus the mathematician, and furthermore Democritus the Abderite, and Oenopides the Chian. And of all these they show tokens: of some, statues; of others, names given to places or structures. Moreover, they offer demonstrations from the particular kind of learning that each pursued, asserting that they brought from Egypt everything for which they were admired among the Greeks. For Orpheus borrowed from the Egyptians most of his mystical rites and the accounts regarding his own wanderings. For the initiation of Osiris is the same as that of Dionysus, and that of Isis is most similar to that of Demeter, with only the names changed; and he introduced the punishments of the impious in Hades, and the meadows of the pious, and the fabrications concerning the dead which are common among the many, having imitated the rites of burial as practiced in Egypt. For according to the ancient custom among the Egyptians, Hermes—the conductor of souls—having led the body of Apis as far as a certain place, used to deliver it to one who had put on the mask of Cerberus. And when Orpheus had pointed this out to the Greeks, Homer logically followed him in his poetry:

^B “Cyllenian Hermes called forth the souls of the heroes; he holds his wand in his hands.”

Then, having mentioned other things to the same effect, he continues: “They say that Melampus also brought from Egypt the rites customarily performed among the Greeks in honour of Dionysus, as well as the myths told about Cronus, and those regarding the battle with the Titans, and in general the entire history of the sufferings of the gods. And they say that Daedalus imitated the design of the labyrinth, which remains even to this day, and was built, as some say, by Mendes, or as others affirm, by King Marus, many years before the reign of Minos; and that the style of the ancient statues of Egypt is the same as those fashioned by Daedalus among the Greeks. And because he built the most beautiful vestibule of the temple of Hephaestus in Memphis with admirable skill, he was admired and received as a reward a wooden statue fashioned by his own hands in the aforementioned temple; and finally, by reason of his skill, he was deemed worthy of great glory—and having discovered many things—he received divine honors. ^D For in one of the places near Memphis, there were shown both the houses of the priests, and the schools of Plato and Eudoxus.

^A They also point out other signs of Homer’s presence, and especially the potion which Helena gave to Telemachus at the house of Menelaus, to bring forgetfulness of the evils that had happened. For he seems to have accurately investigated the *nepenthes* 50 potion, which the poet says Helena obtained from the Egyptians 51, from Poly 52 damna, the wife of Thon. For they say that even now the women there use the aforementioned power, and they claim that it is only among the Diospolitan women that a remedy for anger and grief has been found from ancient times; and that Thebes and Diospolis are the same city. Moreover, that Venus is called Golden by the natives according to an ancient tradition; and that there is a field called the Field of Golden Venus near the so-called Momemphis 55. They also say he derived the myths regarding the union of Jupiter and Juno, and his departure to Ethiopia, from the same source. For they say that every year among the Egyptians, the temple of Jupiter is carried across the river into Libya, and after a few ^B days it returns again, as if the god were present from Ethiopia; they also describe the union of these gods during the public festivals of the temples, when both are brought to a mountain covered with all kinds of flowers by the priests 54. And Lycurgus, Plato, and Solon also transferred many of the Egyptian customs into their own systems of laws. Pythagoras also learned the sacred discourse, the theorems of geometry, the doctrine concerning numbers, and the migration of the soul into every animal from the Egyptians. They ^C also suppose that Democritus spent five years among them, and was taught many things concerning astrology, and that Oenopides 55 likewise, having spent time with the priests and astrologers, learned other things, and especially the solar circle, which has a slanted path, and makes its revolution in the opposite direction to the other stars. Similarly, Eudoxus 56 also learned astrology—

and because he subsequently shared many things of the highest utility and benefit with the Greeks, he won for himself very great praise. Finally, ^A all those among the ancient sculptors who were most on the lips of men and held in high esteem visited Egypt, and among others, Telecles and Theodorus, both sons of Rhoecus, who fashioned that statue of Apollos Pythius for the Samians.” Up to this point Diodorus. I am content to end my discussion, which has been abundantly illustrated by the preceding testimonies, at this point. And may these people cease for the future to accuse us of rashness, in that we ourselves, out of a desire for true piety, have turned to the teachers of the wise Greeks and their own philosophers—I mean the barbarians, if indeed the Hebrews are barbarians. It will be fitting to examine the times in which Moses and the prophets who came after him flourished; for this will be one of the most essential tasks for the matter set before us, to ^B determine beforehand their antiquity. Thus, if those recognized by the Greeks should be found to agree with the prophets and theologians of the Hebrews, we shall no longer be in doubt as to whom it is reasonable to think borrowed from whom—whether the elders from the juniors, that is, the Hebrews from the Greeks and the philosophers of the barbarians, to whom they could not even have heard speak; or, as is far more probable, the juniors from the elders, and that the Greeks, who so curiously investigated the institutions of many nations, could not have been ignorant of the writings of the Hebrews, which had been translated into the Greek language so long before.

CHAPTER IX.

Concerning the antiquity of Moses and the Hebrew prophets.

^C As for the antiquity of Moses and the prophets who came after him, many others have left behind very diligent and careful proof and testimony in their own works, from which I shall presently add a few things. However, I have decided to enter upon a new path, different from those already trodden by the others, and to employ the following ^D method. Since it is agreed by all that the birth of our Savior occurred in the times of the Emperor Augustus, and that Christ began the sowing of the Gospel in about the fifteenth year of Tiberius Caesar: if anyone should wish to calculate the sum of years from that time, advancing to the earlier times, those as far as Da-

- ^A rius, king of the Persians, and the restoration of the temple in Jerusalem under him—which occurred after the return of the Jewish nation from Babylon—he will find from Tiberius to the second year of Darius five hundred and forty-eight years. For the second year of Darius falls in the first year of the sixty-fifth Olympiad, and the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius, the Roman emperor, falls in the fourth year of the two hundred and third Olympiad. There are, therefore, one hundred and thirty-seven Olympiads between Darius, the Persian, and Tiberius, the Roman emperor, which make a sum of five hundred and forty-eight years, with four years attributed to each Olympiad.

Since, however, the second year of Darius was the seventieth year of the desolation of the temple in Jerusalem, as the history of the Hebrews shows, if one goes back again from there, from the second year of Darius to the first Olympiad, there would be counted two hundred and fifty-six years—sixty-four Olympiads. You would find just as many years from the last year of the desolation of the aforementioned temple up to the fiftieth year of ^B Osias, king of the Jews—the time during which Isaiah and Hosea, and as many as were contemporary with them, prophesied—so that the first Olympiad according to the Greeks is concurrent with the prophet Isaiah and his contemporaries.

Again, if you go back from the first Olympiad to the earlier times, until the fall of Troy, you will find a total sum of four hundred and eight years, as the records of the times among the Greeks contain. And according to the Hebrews, going back from the fiftieth year of Osias, king of the Jews, to the third year of Labdon, who was a judge among the Hebrews, you will collect an equal number of years: four hundred and eight. So the fall of Troy would be in the times of the judge Labdon, seven years before Samson ruled the Hebrews; they say that in the strength of his body he was irresistible, resembling the Hercules who is celebrated by the Greeks.

And proceeding from there to the ages above, and by collecting at the same time a sum of four hundred years, you would find at the time of ^C Moses among the Hebrews, Cecrops the earth-born among the Greeks. Events later than the times of Cecrops are what are celebrated by the Greeks. For after Cecrops, the flood in the time of Deucalion takes place, and the conflagration in the time of Phaethon, the birth of Erichthonius, the abduction of Kore, the mysteries of Demeter, the foundation of the Eleusinian rites, the agriculture of Triptolemus, the abduction of Europa by Zeus, the birth of Apollo, the arrival of Cadmus at Thebes, and further, younger than these, Dionysus, Minos, Perseus, Asclepius, the Dioscuri, and Hercules.

Moses, however, proves to have been older than all of these, as he flourished in his lifetime at the time of Cecrops. If you go back again from Moses to the first year of the life of Abraham, you will find five hundred and five years; and counting back the same number of years from the aforementioned year ^D of the reign of Cecrops to the earlier times, you will arrive at Ninus the Assyrian, whom they say was the first to rule over the whole of Asia, except for the Indians; the city of Ninus, which is called Nineveh by the Hebrews, is named after him, in whose time Zoroaster the Magian reigned over the Bactrians.

Ninus' wife, Semiramis, succeeded him in the kingdom: and in their age, therefore, Abraham must have lived. But you will find all these things established by us with certain arguments in our Chronological Canons. ^A Now, however, to confirm the antiquity of Moses, I desire to add to those previous statements a single testimony of a man who is most hostile and inimical both to the Hebrews and to us—I mean our contemporary philosopher—who, invested with an overflowing hatred in the work he published against us, has subjected not only us, but even the Hebrews themselves, and Moses himself, and the prophets after him, to the same insults. For I believe that an argument adopted by us in this way, attested by the confession of our enemies themselves, will leave no room for doubt for anyone. Porphyry, therefore, in the fourth book of his work against us, speaks in this manner, using these very words: ^B "Sanchoniatho of Berytus recounts the affairs of the Jews most truthfully, because he received reports that are most consistent with their places and names from Hierombalus, priest of the god Ieuo, who, having dedicated his history to Abelbalus, king of the Berytians, was approved by him and by those who were his counselors in the investigation of the truth. Their times are even more ancient than the Trojan times, and are but little removed from the age of Moses, as the successions of the kings of Phoenicia indicate. Now Sanchoniatho, who according to the dialect of the Phoenicians truthfully gathered and wrote down the entire ancient history from the records of the cities and the sacred inscriptions, flourished in the time of Semiramis, queen of the Assyrians." ^C These are the words of Porphyry. We must, therefore, reason about these proposed facts in this way. If Sanchoniatho lived in the time of Semiramis, and it is agreed that she reigned long before the Trojan War, it must be that Sanchoniatho was also more ancient than the Trojans. But he is said to have received the records from others who were senior to him in time; and they, being themselves more ancient than he, are said to have approached almost the times of Moses, not being contemporary with Moses themselves, but approaching near to his times—so that Moses is as much older than Sanchoniatho as the latter falls short of his own seniors, who were acknowledged to approach the age of Moses. But how many years it is likely that Moses preceded the aforementioned, it is difficult to say; wherefore I think I should pass that over. ^D But even granting that Moses lived at the same time as that Sanchoniatho, and not before, I will pursue the refutation in this way. If Sanchoniatho was known in the time of Semiramis, the queen of the Assyrians, and let us suppose that Moses did not precede him at all, but flourished in his time, he would then also be a contemporary of Semiramis. But our account showed that Abraham lived in her time; while the philosopher’s account establishes Moses as being more ancient. Now Semiramis [existed] eight [hundred years before] the Trojan [War]... ^A a woman, and successor to the kingdom, Semiramis; so that... ^B [s. he has received.] Most truthfully, because Having received. These few things are added: "Before the Iliadic [times], or even about those times, it is recorded to have happened; but the works of Sanchoniatho were translated into the Greek tongue by Philo of Byblos. ^{C D}

she would be, according to the philosopher, by so many years prior to the Trojan events. ^A First of the Argives ruled Inachus, while as yet the Athenians had neither a city nor a name. The first of the Argives to rule was in the fifth generation after Semiramis, the king of the Assyrians, one hundred and fifty years after both her and Moses, a period during which no remarkable event is recorded by the Greeks. During this time, the Judges ruled among the Hebrews. Then again, at a later time—when more than four hundred years in total had already passed since Semiramis—Cecrops, called by them "earth-born," became the first king of the Athenians, while Triopas ruled Argos, who was the seventh after the first Argive, Inachus. ^B Between these, the flood in the time of Ogyges is mentioned, Apis was the first in Egypt to be named a god, and Io, daughter of Inachus—whom the Egyptians, having renamed her Isis, worship—as well as Prometheus and Atlas, began to be known. From Cecrops to the capture of Ilium, other years are added, nearly four hundred, in which those things among the Greeks which are celebrated as miracles are mythologized: the flood in the time of Deucalion and the conflagration in the time of Phaethon, many such destructions of the earth having occurred in various places, as is likely. Cecrops is said to be the first to call God Zeus, a name not previously given Him among men; he is also said to have been the first to erect an altar among the Athenians, ^C and again the first to set up a statue of Athena, as if even these things did not exist from ancient times. After him, all the gods among the Greeks are genealogized. Meanwhile, among the Hebrews, the descendants of David were reigning, and the prophets who succeeded Moses were flourishing; so that everything from Moses to the capture of Ilium sums to more than eight hundred years, according to the testimony of the philosopher set forth. Moreover, things relating to Homer, Hesiod, and the rest are mentioned as being much more recent than the Trojan events. But yesterday and the day before, after these, around the fiftieth Olympiad, those around Pythagoras and Democritus and the philosophers who followed them appeared, approximately seven hundred years after the Trojan War. Therefore, Moses and the Hebrew prophets after him ^D are shown to precede the philosophers among the Greeks by fifteen hundred years, according to the admission of the man mentioned.

And so much for these things from us, in brief. It is time to examine the proofs of those before us concerning the same subject. For there have been among us learned men, second to none in education, who have not occupied themselves superficially with divine matters; they, having clarified this present subject with precision, established the history among the Hebrews, using a rich and varied construction of proof. For some have calculated the times from certain agreed-upon histories; others have confirmed the testimony with more ancient writings; and some have used Greek records, while others have used the accounts of the Phoenicians, Chaldeans, and Egyptians.

^A But all of them, having gathered the Greek and the barbarian records, and having placed the histories of all peoples side by side, and having cross-examined one against another, have investigated the events that took place among all peoples during the same periods. Then, each one, having constructed his proof through his own methods, brought forward a demonstration that is consistent and generally acknowledged. For this reason, I have thought that I ought to yield the present discourse to these same voices, so that the fathers of the accounts may not be deprived of their own fruits, and so that, through the testimony of many, and not just of one, the establishment of the truth might receive an indisputable confirmation.

CHAPTER X.

From the third book of the Chronography of Africanus.

^B “Before the series of the Olympiads,” he says, “you will find nothing certain or explored in Greek history, as everything is so confused, and none of the things reported to have happened before that time agree with one another. But in the recording of the Olympiads, many have engaged in accurate and diligent work, because the Greeks did not record their affairs across a long span, but only within the four-year period defined for each. For this reason, having touched briefly and cursorily upon those fabulous stories which, by reputation and in the opinion of men, have prevailed over the rest up to the first Olympiad, I shall then connect the events that occurred afterward, chronologically, one by one; and if any are notable, I shall combine the Hebrew with the Greek, narrating the Hebrew ^C affairs and touching upon the Greek, and I shall apply this method: taking one Hebrew event contemporary with an event recorded by the Greeks, and holding to this, by subtracting and adding, I shall note which Greek, Persian, or whosoever else was contemporary with the Hebrews, ^D and perhaps I shall attain my goal. Now, the most famous event for the Hebrews is the migration when they were taken captive by Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, which lasted seventy years, as Jeremiah had prophesied. Berossus the Babylonian also makes mention of Nebuchadnezzar. After the seventy years of the captivity, Cyrus reigned over the Persians, in which year the fifty-fifth Olympiad was held, as it is possible to find from the Bibliotheca of Diodorus, the histories of Thallus and Castor, as well as those of Polybius and Phlegon; and indeed of others who have recorded the series of the Olympiads, for all agree in defining this time. Cyrus, therefore, in the first year of his reign, which was the first year of the fifty-fifth Olympiad, through Zerubbabel, under whom Joshua the son of Jozadak was, carried out the first and partial liberation of the people, the seventy years having been completed, as it is recorded in the book of Ezra among the Hebrews. The histories therefore run in parallel, both as regards the reign of Cyrus and the end of the captivity; and thus, according to the Olympiads, they will be found to be in agreement for us; for following these, we shall apply the remaining histories to one another in the same manner.”

^A And, a little further on, he adds: “We say, therefore, from this very work, that Ogyges, who became eponymous of the first flood, having been saved though many perished, existed at the time of the exodus of the people from Egypt with Moses, and this in the following manner. To the first Olympiad from Ogyges will be shown as 1020 years; from the first Olympiad to the first year of the 55th, that is, the first year of King Cyrus, which was the end of the captivity, there are 217 years; therefore, from Ogyges to Cyrus there are 1237 years. But if anyone, in calculating, refers back 1237 years from the end of the captivity, by analysis the same interval is found to the first year of the exodus of Israel from Egypt through Moses, as from the 55th Olympiad to Ogyges, who founded Eleusis. Whence it is more notable to understand the Attic chronology.” And after other things: ^B “And so much for what precedes Ogyges. But it was during his times that Moses came out of Egypt. And how it is not incredible that these things happened then, we demonstrate thus: From the exodus of Moses to Cyrus, who reigned after the captivity, there are 1237 years. For the remaining years of Moses are 40; of Joshua, who led after him, 25 years; of the elders, 30 years; of the judges after Joshua, as contained in the Book of Judges, 450 years; of the priests Eli and Samuel, 40 years; and of the subsequent kings of the Hebrews, 420 years, the last year of which ^C was the first year of the reign of Cyrus, as we have said before. But to the first Olympiad from Moses there are 1020 years, if to the first year of the 55th there are 1237. Thus, the time in the Greek records coincides. But after Ogyges, because of the great destruction from the flood, there lacked a kingly succession, ^D and he was a contemporary and associate of Jesus the son of Jozadak, when the sum of seventy years had already been completed, and he first released some part of the Judaic people, as we read in the Hebrew historian Ezra. And since the beginning of the reign of Cyrus concurs with the end of the Judaic captivity by the agreement of all historians, and is similar also in the years of the Olympiads—since the consistency of both of these, and of the others in succession, is brought down to our own time, inasmuch as, having progressed from him as from a hinge, we are to join and weave together the following histories in that same manner. But in recording the earlier times, if one wishes to follow the logic of Attic chronography, from Ogyges, whom they believe to have been born in that place, under whom that huge and first deluge, while Phoroneus was reigning at Argos, attacked Attica (as Acusilaus is the author), even to the first Olympiad, whence the Greeks thought a precise series of times should be drawn, there are gathered 1020 years; which number both agrees excellently with the previous ones and will be established from the explanation of the following. For Hellanicus and Philochorus, who wrote the *Attica*, and likewise Castor and Thallus, who have followed the Syriac [histories], and Diodorus, who included the history of all the nations in his *Bibliotheca*, and Alexander Polyhistor have handed this down to memory: of whom also some of our own writers, more diligently than all the Attics, have made more accurate mention. Therefore, if any history slightly more notable occurs in the space of 1020 years, we shall provide it in its convenient place.” And the same author, with a few words interposed: “We wish, therefore,” he says, “relying also on the authority of this writing, that that Ogyges, who—because he had escaped safe and sound from the greatest force of waters—gave his name to the first flood, existed about the time when the people migrated from Egypt with Moses. This we conclude in this way. From Ogyges to the first Olympiad, there are thought to be 1020 years: from the first Olympiad to the first year of the 55th, which is also the first year of King Cyrus, and likewise the end of the Judaic captivity, there are 217 years: therefore, from Ogyges to Cyrus, 1237 years are gathered in total. Now, whoever wishes to count upward from the exit of the captivity, he will count by turning back 1237 years, which is exactly the same interval to that year in which Israel was first led out from Egypt by Moses, which from the collection of the following years will not exist, unless you add these seventy in addition: although, if nothing at all were missing, there would be a need for seventy-two. For with the seventy removed, there are only 1165, to which if you add seventy, you will have it. But, I suppose, he counts the 80th-year portion of Moses, and thinks the 70th year of the captivity extended some months beyond the first year of Cyrus. For that this sum was not formed from the error of scribes, but from the mind of Africanus, is apparent from the following, where the same thing is oft repeated.

^A And the land that is now Attica remained without a king until Cecrops for one hundred and eighty-nine years. For Philochorus asserts that Actaeus, who is recorded after Ogyges, and the names subsequently appearing, did not even exist. And again: “From Ogyges, then, unto Cyrus, is as much time as from Moses unto the same period, namely, 1237 years.” And some of the Greeks also record that Moses lived during the same times. Polemon, in the first book of the *Hellenic Histories*, says: “In the time of Apis, son of Phoroneus, a portion of the Egyptian army departed from Egypt, and settled in that part of Syria called Palestine, not far from Arabia; these, clearly, were the people who were with Moses.” Apion, son of Poseidonius, most inquisitive of grammarians, in his book *Against the Jews* and in the fourth book of his *Histories*, says that during the reign of Inachus, king of Argos, while Amosis was king of Egypt, the Jews led by Moses revolted. Herodotus also makes mention of this defection, and of Amosis in his second book, in a certain manner, and even of the Jews themselves, numbering them among the circumcised and calling them the Assyrians in Palestine, perhaps because of Abraham. Ptolemy of Mendes, who recounts the history of the Egyptians from the earliest times, agrees with all of these; so that there is not even any significant variance in the chronology. ^C It is to be noted, moreover, that whatever is recounted by the Greeks as extraordinary on account of its antiquity, all of it is found to be subsequent to Moses: the deluges and conflagrations, Prometheus, Io, Europa, the Spartoi, the rape of Proserpina, the mysteries, the giving of laws, the deeds of Bacchus, Perseus, the Argonauts, the Centaurs, the Minotaur, the affairs of Ilium, the labors of Hercules, the return of the Heraclidae, the colonization of the Ionians, and the Olympiads.

It seemed good to me to set forth the aforementioned chronology of the Attic reign, since I intend to place the Greek histories alongside the Hebrew ones. ^D For it will be possible for one who wishes—having received the starting point from me—to calculate the sum just as I have. Therefore, of the one thousand and twenty years set down between the first Olympiad and the times of Moses and Ogyges, the first year coincides with the Passover and the departure of the Hebrews from Egypt, and in Attica, the deluge under Ogyges occurs. And this is reasonable. For since the Egyptians were being scourged by the wrath of God with hail and storms, it is likely that parts of the earth suffered with them, and that the Athenians should likewise have been affected—being, as others say, and as Theopompus in his *Tripharenus* records, colonies of those people. The intervening time is left out, in which nothing extraordinary is recorded by the Greeks. But four and ninety years later was Prometheus, as some say, who was mythologized as having molded humans; for being a wise man, he remolded them from their extreme boorishness toward education.” These were the words of Africanus. But let us pass on to another matter.

CHAPTER XI. On the same subject, from Tatian's work against the Greeks.

^A “Now,” he says, “it seems to me that we should prove our philosophy to be more ancient than those practices of the Greeks. ^B For this purpose, we shall take Moses and Homer as our hinges and boundaries. Since both are the most ancient—the one having preceded all poets and historians in time, and the other having been the leader and prince of all 'barbarian' wisdom—let them be taken up by us for comparison. For we shall find that not only the instruction of the Greeks, but even the very invention of letters, is surpassed by our own matters. And I shall not take witnesses from among my own people, but shall rather use the Greeks themselves as my assistants. For as the former method would be ill-advised, and would not be accepted by you at all; so, if we can accomplish this, it will be something truly singular and remarkable, that by attacking you with your own weapons, we press you with arguments that are beyond all suspicion. ^C For regarding Homer's poetry, his family, and the time in which he flourished, those most ancient writers—Theagenes of Rhegium, who lived under Cambyses, Stesimbrotus of Thasos, Callimachus of Colophon, Herodotus of Halicarnassus, and Dionysius of Olynthus—have already carefully inquired. After them, following in the same work, were Ephorus of Cyme, Philochorus of Athens, Megaclides and Chamaeleon the Peripatetics; then the grammarians: Zenodotus, Aristophanes, Callimachus, Crates, Eratosthenes, Aristarchus, and Apollodorus. ^D Among these, the followers of Crates declare that he flourished before the return of the Heraclidae, within eighty years of the Trojan events; those following Eratosthenes say after the hundredth year from the taking of Troy; and those following Aristarchus, at the time of

the Ionic migration, which is one hundred and forty years ^A after the Trojan events. Philochorus says that forty years after the same colony, in the archonship of Arxippus at Athens, it was one hundred and eighty years after the fall of Troy. Those following Apollodorus say it was one hundred years after the Ionic migration, which would be two hundred and forty years after the Trojan events. Some said that he lived before the Olympiads, that is, four hundred years after the taking of Ilium. Others pushed the time forward, saying that Homer lived with Archilochus; but Archilochus flourished about the twenty-third Olympiad, in the time of Gyges the Lydian, five hundred years after the Trojan events. And as for the age of the poet already mentioned, I mean Homer, and the dispute and disagreement of those who have set down the facts of his history, let it suffice for us to have touched upon these things summarily, since we could investigate the matter accurately if we wished. ^B For from this very fact, any person could convict the narratives of all these men of vanity and falsehood. For whoever has once blundered in the description of times can never retain the truth of history. » And after a few words: » But let Homer be not only later than the Trojan events, but let him be assumed to have lived at the very time of that war, and even to have joined the expedition with the company of Agamemnon; and if anyone wishes, let him even be thought to have existed before the discovery of letters; for the aforementioned Moses will appear to be very many years older than the very fall of Ilium itself, and far more ancient than the building of Ilium that took place, and than Tros and Dardanus. For the sake of proof, I will use as witnesses ^C the Chaldeans, the Phoenicians, and the Egyptians. And what more need I say? For it is necessary that he who...

promises to establish his credibility should explain the matter clearly to a very few hearers at most. ^A Berosus, then, a Babylonian man, and a priest of Bel among them—which was their deity—lived in the time of Alexander. In the history of the Chaldeans, which he wrote in three books for Antiochus, the third after Seleucus, where he commemorates the deeds of the kings themselves, he makes mention of a certain Nabuchodonosor, who led an expedition against the Phoenicians and the Jews, which we know to have been proclaimed by our own prophets. This happened long after the age of Moses, but seventy years before the hegemony of the Persians. Now Berosus is a most capable man; and the testimony to this is Juba, who, writing about the Assyrians, says that he learned the history from Berosus. He had two books concerning the Assyrians.

After the Chaldeans, the matter of the Phoenicians stands thus. There were three men among them: Theodotus, Hypsicrates, and Mochus. Asitus—who also meticulously treated the lives of the philosophers—translated the books of these men into the Greek tongue. ^B Indeed, in the histories of those mentioned above, it is declared that during the time of one of the kings, the abduction of Europa took place, as well as the arrival of Menelaus in Phoenicia, and the affairs concerning Hiram, who gave his own daughter in marriage to Solomon, the king of the Jews, and bestowed a great quantity of every kind of wood for the construction of the Temple. Menander of Pergamum also made a record concerning the same events. The time of Hiram already approaches the Trojan era; but Solomon, who was contemporary with Hiram, is much later than the age of Moses.

The Egyptians, however, have precise records of their times. The interpreter of their writings was Ptolemy—not the king, but a priest of Mendes. This man, in expounding the deeds of the kings, says that the departure of the Jews from Egypt occurred under Amosis, king of Egypt—to the places which they wished—with Moses as their leader. ^C He speaks as follows: "And this Amosis lived during the time of King Inachus." After him, Apion the grammarian, a most reputable man, in the fourth of his Egyptian histories—for there are five writings of his—tells many other things, and says that Amosis razed Avaris, having lived during the time of the Argive Inachus, as Ptolemy of Mendes had previously written in his Chronographies, ^D and the time from Inachus until the fall of Ilium fills twenty generations. And the method of this demonstration is as follows. There were kings of the Argives: Inachus, Phoroneus, Apis, Argios, Criasus, Phorbas, Triopas, Crotopus, Sthenelaus, Danaus, Lynceus, Abas, Proetus, Acrisius, Perseus, Eurystheus, Atreus, Thyestes, Agamemnon, under whom...

Troy was captured in the eighteenth year. Now it will be ^A incumbent upon the prudent and intelligent reader to observe diligently, above all, that it is evident even from the tradition of the Greeks themselves that there was no written history among them at that time. For Cadmus, who handed down the form and system of letters to those mentioned, did not enter Boeotia until many generations later. After Inachus, however, under the guidance and auspices of Phoroneus, men were at last, with difficulty, led away from a wild and wandering mode of life to a more civilized and liberal culture. Wherefore, if we hold that Moses was a contemporary of Inachus, it is necessary that he preceded the Trojan times by four hundred years. This is ^B manifest from the succession of kings, not only of the Athenians, but also of the Macedonians, the Ptolemies, and the Seleucids of Antioch. Hence you may also conclude that if all the most famous events of the Greeks began to be recorded in writing and to exist in human knowledge under the time of Inachus, the same must have equally occurred under the age of Moses. For the Athenians make Ogyges a contemporary of Phoroneus, who reigned after Inachus, in whose time the first flood occurred; then, in the time of Phorbas, Actaeus, from whom Attica received the name Actaea; then, in the time of Triopas, Prometheus, Epimetheus, Atlas, the double-formed Cecrops, and Io. To the time of ^C Crotopus they refer the conflagration under Phaethon and the inundation under Deucalion. With Sthenelaus they associate the kingdom of Amphictyon, the arrival of Danaus in the Peloponnese, the founding of Dardania by Dardanus, and the deportation of Europa from Phoenicia to Crete. Under Lynceus, they place the abduction of the Maiden (Proserpina), the building of the Eleusinian temple, the agriculture of Triptolemus, the arrival of Cadmus in the city of Thebes, and the reign of Minos. In the time of Prœtus, they place the war of Eumolpus against the Athenians; to the time of Acrisius they refer the crossing of Pelops from Phrygia, the arrival of Ion in Athens, the second ^D Cecrops the younger, and the deeds of Perseus. Finally, Troy was captured when Agamemnon was reigning. Therefore, from the preceding account, it is understood manifesty that Moses was older than the heroes themselves, the cities, and the demons. But it is surely more true to place more faith in a man who was senior in age than in the Greeks, who, though they drew his doctrines as if from the very source, did not follow the guidance of true knowledge. For they had very many sophists who, indulging their own curiosity, attempted to adulterate everything they had received either from Moses or from those who taught a similar philosophy: first, that they might seem to say something singular and their own; and secondly, that by masking what they understood less through a sort of feigned oratory, they might disparage the truth itself as if it were mere mythology. Now, concerning our own polity and the history according to our laws, as well as how many of the learned among the Greeks have mentioned them, and who they are, this will be demonstrated in the work against those who have made pronouncements concerning God. For the present, however, we must hasten to clarify with all accuracy that Moses is older not only than Homer, but also than the writers before him: Linus, Philammon, Thamyris, Amphion, Orpheus, Musaeus, Demodocus, Phemius, and the Sibyl.

^A Epimenides the Cretan, who migrated to Sparta, Aristaeus of Proconnesus, the author of the Arimaspeia, Asbolus the Centaur, Isatis, Drymon, Euclus the Cyprian, Oro of Samos, and Protænides the Athenian. For Linus was the teacher of Hercules, and Hercules lived just one generation before the Trojan era. This is evident from his son Tlepolemus, who was a companion in the Greek expedition against Ilium. Orpheus lived at the same time as Hercules; and furthermore, they say that what is attributed to him was composed by Onomacritus the Athenian, who lived under the rule of the Pisistratidae, around the fiftieth Olympiad. Musaeus was a disciple of Orpheus. But Amphion, who preceded the Trojan era by two generations, prevents me from adding more to those previously listed for the sake of those who are studious. Demodocus and Phemius ^B existed during the time of the Trojan war itself; for the one spent his time among the suitors, and the other among the Phaeacians. Thamyris and Philammon are not much older than these.

So, as I believe, we have recorded the account of each individual’s studies and the chronology of their lives with all possible accuracy for you. But, in order to fulfill even what has been lacking up to this point, let us also provide the proof concerning those who are considered wise men. Minos, who was thought to have surpassed all in wisdom, mental acuity, and legislation, lived ^C in the time of Lynceus, who reigned after Danaus, in the eleventh generation after Inachus. Lycurgus, long after the capture of Ilium, legislated for the Lacedaemonians no more than one hundred years before the Olympiads. You will find that Draco lived around the thirty-ninth Olympiad, Solon around the forty-sixth, and Pythagoras around the sixty-second. We have demonstrated that the Olympiads were established four hundred and seven years after the Trojan era. With these things thus established, let us also briefly record the age of the Seven Sages. For as regards the oldest of those mentioned, Thales, who lived around the fiftieth Olympiad, the details regarding those of his time have also been briefly stated by us.

These things, men of Greece, have been composed for you by Tatian, who philosophizes according to the barbarians, having been born in the land of the Assyrians, and having been educated first in your ways, and second in those which I now profess. ^D Knowing then who God is, and what his creation is, I present myself ready for your examination of these doctrines, while the rule of life according to God remains for me something that cannot be denied. So much from Tatian. Let us now move on to Clement.

CHAPTER XII. On the same subject, from the first book of the Stromateis of Clement.

^A “It has indeed been accurately discussed,” he says, “regarding these things by Tatian in his *Address to the Greeks*, and it has also been discussed by Cassian in the first book of his *Exegetica*. Yet the plan of the work I have undertaken demands that even I should briefly and summarily review what has been said by others on this matter.”

Apion the grammarian, therefore, who is called Pleistonices, in the fourth book of his *Egyptian Histories*—although he was hostilely disposed toward the Hebrews, being an Egyptian by race, to the point of composing a book even against the Jews—when making mention of Amosis, formerly king of the Egyptians, and of the deeds performed by him, cites as a witness Ptolemy the Mendesian. And his words are as follows: “Amosis,” he says, “razed Avaris, being contemporary with Inachus the Argive, as Ptolemy the Mendesian recorded in his *Chronicles*.” This Ptolemy was a priest, who, having set forth the history of the Egyptian kings in three complete books, says that during the reign of Amosis in Egypt, the Jews, with Moses as their leader, departed from Egypt; from which it is understood that Moses flourished in the times of Inachus. ^B

Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his commentary *On Times* is the authority that Argive matters, which date from Inachus, are celebrated as the most ancient of all Greek affairs. Tatian himself says in so many words that Attic matters, which had their beginning from that Cecrops whom they call twofold and earth-born, are later than these by forty generations in all; and that Arcadian matters, which date from Pelasgus—who is also said to be earth-born—are nine generations later. And Phthiotic matters, which flow from Deucalion, are later than these two by another fifty-two. ^C From Inachus, then, down to the time of the Trojan war, twenty-two generations are counted, or perhaps one more; and the years, to speak generally, approach four hundred and more.

Now, whether the affairs of the Assyrians preceded the Greek affairs by many similar years will be known from what is written by Ctesias. For in the four hundred and second year of the Assyrian Empire, and in the thirty-second year of the eighth dynasty of Belochus, the departure of Moses from Egypt took place, under the Egyptian Amosis and the Argive Inachus. ^D Furthermore, in Greece, in the time of Phoroneus, who was later than Inachus, the Ogygian flood occurred, and the Sicyonian kingdom, which Aegialeus was the first of all to hold, then Europs, then Telchin, and also the reign of Cres in Crete. For Acusilaus says that Phoroneus was the first of men; whence the poet of the *Phoronis* also called him the father of mortal men. Hence Plato in the *Timaeus*, having followed Acusilaus, writes: “And once, wishing to bring forth…”

...all the more because he is called the father of all mortals by the poet who wrote the *Phoronis*. Wherefore Plato himself, following Acusilaus in the *Timaeus*, says: "And when he did this, in order to draw them into a discussion concerning ancient matters, he said that he had made mention of those things which were held to be most ancient among us, such as those which are customarily ^A bruited about concerning Phoroneus, whom they name as the first, and concerning Niobe, and indeed the events that followed that flood." Furthermore, Actaeus lived in the time of Phorbas, from whom Attica found the name Actaea; then, in the time of Triopas, were Prometheus, Atlas, Epimetheus, the twofold Cecrops, and Io. To the grandfather of Crotopus they refer the conflagration of Phaethon, and the deluge of Deucalion. With Sthenelaus, they connect in the same period the kingdom of Amphictyon, the arrival of Danaus in the Peloponnese, and the founding of Dardania by Dardanus—whom Homer says was the first created by cloud-gathering Zeus—as well as the bringing of Europe from Crete ^B to Phoenicia. Under Lynceus, they place the rape of the Maid, the founding of the temple at Eleusis, the agriculture of Triptolemus, the arrival of Cadmus in the city of Thebes, and the kingdom of Minos. To the times of Proetus, they refer the war of Eupolemus against the Athenians; to Acrisius, the crossing of Pelops from Phrygia, the arrival of Ion at Athens, the second younger Cecrops, the deeds of Perseus and Dionysus, and finally Orpheus and Musaeus. In the eighteenth year of the reign of Agamemnon, Ilium was taken, in the first year of the reign of Demophon, son of Theseus, at Athens, on the twelfth day of the month of Thargelion, as the Argive Dionysius is the author; but as Agis and Cercylus write in their third book, on the twenty-second of the month of Panemus; Hellanicus, agreeing with Dionysius, says the twelfth of Thargelion, but some others who have written of Attic affairs say the twenty-second of the same month, while Menestheus was in the last year of his reign, at the full moon; whence that verse of the poet who wrote the *Little Iliad*: ^C

*And now in the midst of the night, the golden-faced moon was rising.*

Others say it was on the same day of Scirophorion. Now Theseus, being an emulator of Heracles, was one generation older than the Trojan events; for Homer himself mentions Tlepolemus, who was the son of Heracles, as having campaigned against Ilium. Therefore, it is demonstrated that Moses preceded the apotheosis of Dionysus by 624 years, if he was deified in the thirty-second year of the reign of Perseus, as Apollodorus says in his *Chronicles*. From Dionysus to Heracles and those heroes who were with Jason, those who sailed on the *Argo*, there is a sum of 63 years. Asclepius and the Dioscuri sailed with them, as the Rhodian Apollonius testifies in his *Argonautica*... ^D

From the Argive reign of Hercules to his own consecration and that of Asclepius, 38 years are counted by the chronographer Apollodorus. ^A From that point to the similar consecration of Castor and Pollux, there are 53 years, at which time the capture of Ilium also took place. If we must also believe the poet Hesiod, let us hear him:

*To Zeus, the Atlantid Maia bore glorious Hermes,* *Who entered the sacred bed to invoke the herald of the immortals.* *And the Cadmean Semele bore a glorious son,* *Mingling in love, the joy-bringing Dionysus.*

Cadmus, indeed, came to Thebes during the reign of Lynceus and discovered the Greek letters. Triopas was a contemporary of Isis ^B, the seventh generation from Inachus. There are some who call her Io, because she wandered over the whole world. Istrus, in the book *On the Egyptian Colony*, calls her the daughter of Prometheus, who was a contemporary of Triopas and seven generations later than Moses; so that Moses lived even before the lineage of mankind as reckoned by the Greeks. Leo, too—he who wrote the history of the Egyptian gods—teaches that Isis is called Demeter by the Greeks, and she lived in the time of Lynceus, the eleventh generation after Moses. Furthermore, Apis, king of the Argives, founded Memphis, as Aristippus writes in the first book of his *Arcadian Histories*; and Aristeas the Argive asserts that this man was named Sarapis, and that he is the one whom the Egyptians worship. But Nymphodorus of Amphipolis, in the third book of his *Customs of Asia*, says that Apis was a certain bull ^C, which, after its death, was macerated with salt and deposited in a coffin in the temple of the demon who was chiefly worshipped among them; and from this, it was first called Soroapis, and later Sarapis. Apis was the third from Inachus. And, moreover, Leto was a contemporary of Tityus:

*For Leto drew the glorious consort of Zeus,* *And Tityus was a contemporary of Tantalus.*

With good reason, therefore, the Boeotian Pindar writes: *In due time Apollo was born.*

And it is not at all surprising, when he himself is found serving Admetus ^D for hire, together with Hercules: *...as the great year revolved.*

Zethus and Amphion, the inventors of music, emerged during the time of Cadmus. And if anyone says to us that Phemonoë first uttered oracles for Acrisius, let him know that twenty-seven years after Phemonoë, there flourished the circle of Orpheus, Musaeus, and Linus, the teacher of Hercules. Homer and Hesiod, however, were much later than the Trojan times, and long after both of them came the lawgivers among the Greeks, Lycurgus and Solon, and those by some custom of the locals.

Moreover, Moses is proven to us to be more ancient than most of the gods ^A among the Greeks, and not only than those called wise men and poets. Thus far Clement. But since before our own time the Hebrews have also busied themselves with this kind of study, it is worthwhile to consider what they have to say. I shall use the words of Flavius Josephus in preference to all others.

Chapter XIII

From the first book of Flavius Josephus, Against Apion, on the antiquity of the Jews.

“I shall begin,” he says, “from the Egyptian records. It is not possible for us to have their original texts at hand; but Manetho, an Egyptian ^B by birth, a man who had participated in Greek education, as is evident—for he wrote his native history in the Greek tongue, having translated it, as he states, from the sacred books—is the very man who refutes Herodotus on many points for having erred through ignorance of Egyptian matters. This Manetho, then, in the second book of his Egyptian history, writes the following about us; and I shall set forth his own words, bringing him forward as a witness himself: ‘We once had a king named Timaeus; in his time, God being somehow angry with us, men of obscure origin, ^C but full of boldness, from the parts to the East, invaded our country and easily took it by force, without a battle.’ And after a few phrases he adds: ‘They were called the Hycsos,’—this signifies ‘king-shepherds.’ For *Hyc*, in the sacred tongue, signifies a king, and *Oussos*, in the common dialect, signifies a shepherd—or shepherds—and thus, being combined, it becomes *Hycsos*. Some indeed say they were Arabians; and in another copy it is not expressed by the name *Hycsos* that they were kings, but on the contrary, that they were captive shepherds. For *Hycsos* ^D is in Egyptian, and *Hac* in the form aspirated, expressly signifies captive shepherds. And this appears to me more probable, and consistent with ancient history. Manetho says that these aforementioned kings, designated as shepherds, and their descendants, held dominion over Egypt for about five hundred and eleven years. After this, he says that there occurred a rebellion of the kings of the Thebaid and the rest of Egypt against the shepherds, and...

a great and long-lasting war was kindled between them. ^A Under a certain king, whose name was Misphraguthosis, he says that the shepherds were defeated, and having been expelled from the rest of Egypt, they were enclosed in a place having a perimeter of ten thousand acres. Avaris was the name of the place; Manetho says that the shepherds surrounded this entire place with a large and strong wall, so that they might preserve all their possessions and plunder in safety and security. But Misphraguthosis's son, Thmuthosis by name, he says, besieged the walls with an army of four hundred and eighty thousand men, and attempted to take them by force. But when he despaired of the outcome of the siege, he made an agreement with them that, upon leaving Egypt, they might depart wherever they wished, all of them unharmed. ^B Accordingly, they, with all their families and all their possessions—being no fewer than two hundred and forty thousand people—set out from Egypt through the wilderness toward Syria. But fearing the domination of the Assyrians (for they held Asia at that time), they built in the region now called Judea a city large enough to contain so many myriads of people, and named this place Jerusalem. Following these, after having enumerated the succession of the kings of Egypt and the time of their rule, he adds: "This is what Manetho says. It is clear from the calculation of the years mentioned that the so-called shepherds, who were our ancestors, left Egypt and settled this land three hundred and ninety-three years ^C before Danaus arrived in Argos, even though the Argives consider him to be of the most ancient time. Thus, two things—and these truly the most important—have been confirmed for us by Manetho through the testimony derived from the Egyptian records: first, that they had arrived in Egypt from elsewhere; and second, that they migrated from there to another place, which was also so ancient that it preceded the Trojan era by nearly a thousand years." These things Josephus recounted from the Egyptian history somewhat loosely. The same author, by bringing forward the writers of Phoenician affairs themselves, clearly proves that the temple at Jerusalem was built by King Solomon one hundred and forty-three years and eight months before the Tyrians founded Carthage. ^D Then, proceeding to the Chaldeans, he repeats testimonies concerning the antiquity of the Hebrews from their records as well.

CHAPTER XIV

But what need is there to heap demonstration upon demonstration, when there is no one who, provided he wishes to be a lover of truth rather than a lover of contention, and who is satisfied with what has been said, [could fail to see that they contain a varied...]

and manifold proof of the subject at hand? For the goal we set before ourselves was to demonstrate that the times of Moses and the prophets are more ancient than those of the Greeks. Seeing, therefore, that it has been demonstrated that Moses lived a long time before the Trojan War, ^B come, let us look at all those who followed him. Now, that Moses appeared in life long after those true Hebrews, Heber and Abraham, from whom this name was given to their race, and long after the rest of those God-beloved men of old—yet that he was at the same time younger and later than them all—is evident from his own history. After Moses, then, Jesus [Joshua] presided over the nation of the Jews for, as some say, thirty years. For eighteen years, as the Scripture says, foreigners held dominion. Then Gothoniel for fifty years; after whom Eglon, king of Moab, for eighteen years; then Aod for eighty years; after whom foreigners again for twenty years. Then Deborah and Barak for forty years; then the Midianites for seven years; then Gideon for forty years; Abimelech for three; Thola for twenty-three; Jair for twenty-two; the Ammonites for eighteen; Jephthah for six; Esbon for seven; Aialon for ten; ^C Labdon for eight; foreigners for forty; Samson for twenty. Then Eli the priest, according to the Hebrew text, for forty years; during his time it happens that the fall of Ilium occurred. After the priest Eli, Samuel leads the people; after whom Saul first reigned over them for forty years; then David for forty years; then Solomon for forty years, who also was the first to build the temple in Jerusalem. After Solomon, Roboam reigns for seventeen years; Abia for three; Asa for forty-one; Josaphat for twenty-five; Joram for eight; Ochosias for one year; Gotholia for seven; Joas for forty; Amasias for thirty-nine; Ozias for fifty-two, in whose time Hosea, Amos, Isaiah, and Jonah prophesied. After Ozias, Joatham reigns for sixteen years; after whom Achaz for sixteen years. In his time the first Olympiad was held, in which Coroebus the Elean won the stadion race. Achaz ^D is succeeded by Ezekias for twenty-nine years, in whose time Romulus founded Rome and reigned. After Ezekias, Manasses reigns for fifty-five years; then Amon for two; then Josiah for thirty-one, in whose time Jeremiah, Baruch, Olda, and other prophets prophesied; then Joachaz for three months; after him Joachim for eleven years; after him, last of all, Sedecias for twelve years. In his time, Jerusalem having been besieged by the Assyrians and having undergone the burning of the temple, the entire nation of the Jews is taken away to Babylon. And there Daniel and Ezekiel prophesied. Then, after a count of seventy years, Cyrus reigns over the Persians, who also delivered the captivity of the Jews, having granted those who wished to do so the right to return to their own land and to rebuild the temple. Whence also Jesus the son of Josedek and Zorobabel the son of Salathiel go up and lay the foundations, while Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi—after whom no prophet appeared among them—prophesied as the very last of all. And in the time of Cyrus, Solon the Athenian was becoming known, and those called the Seven Sages among the Greeks, than whom no older philosopher is recorded among them. Of these seven, Thales the Milesian—who was the first of the Greeks to be a man of science—discussed the turnings of the sun, eclipses, the illuminations of the moon, and the equinoxes. The man became most distinguished among the

^A Greeks. Thales’ student was Anaximander, the son of Praxiades, also a Milesian by birth. He was the first to construct gnomons for discerning the solstices, the seasons, the hours, and the equinox. Anaximander’s acquaintance was Anaximenes, the son of Eurystratus, a Milesian; and Anaxagoras, the son of Hegesibulus, a Clazomenian, was the student of this man. He was the first to clearly and explicitly articulate the doctrine of primary principles. For he did not merely discourse on the substance of all things, as those before him, but also on the cause that moves them. “For the world in the beginning,” he says, “was a confused mass; but Intellect, having entered, brought them out of disorder into order.” There were three students of Anaxagoras: Pericles, Archelaus, and Euripides. Now Pericles was foremost among the Athenians, surpassing all his peers in both wealth and nobility. Euripides, having turned to poetry, was even called by some a “theatrical philosopher.” Archelaus, finally, succeeded to Anaxagoras’ school at Lampsacus. Then, upon moving to Athens, he sustained the same office and duty of teaching there, and had very many Athenians as students, among whom was Socrates. ^B During the same time as Anaxagoras, the natural philosophers Xenophanes and Pythagoras flourished. Pythagoras was succeeded by his wife Theano and his sons, Telauges and Mnesarchus. Empedocles became a student of Telauges, in whose time Heraclitus the Obscure was known. It is said that Parmenides succeeded Xenophanes, Melissus succeeded Parmenides, and Zeno the Eleatic succeeded Melissus. It is told of this Zeno that, having been apprehended as the leader and instigator of a conspiracy against the tyrant of that time, when he was being tortured by the tyrant to betray his fellow conspirators, he showed complete contempt for the tyrant’s torments as if they were of no concern to him; he bit through his own tongue and spat it at him, and thus in the midst of his torments died with the greatest constancy. Leucippus was a student of his, Democritus was the student of Leucippus, and Protagoras, in whose time Socrates flourished, was his student. And one can find other natural philosophers scattered about who lived before Socrates; but all of them, beginning from Thales, appear to have flourished after Cyrus, the king of the Persians. ^C It is clear that Cyrus lived long after the captivity of the Jewish nation in Babylon, since the prophets among the Hebrews had already ceased, and their holy metropolis had been besieged; so that you must acknowledge that the philosophies of the Greeks—and especially that of Plato—are much later than Moses and the prophets who came after him. Plato, having first been a student of Socrates, and having subsequently conversed with the Pythagoreans, surpassed everyone before him in discourse, intelligence, and philosophical doctrines. Plato lived toward the end of the Persian empire, a little before Alexander of Macedon, and no less than five hundred years before Augustus the Emperor. If, therefore, Plato and those after him are shown to have philosophized in agreement with the Hebrews, it is time to examine the period in which he lived, and the instruction of the theologians and prophets among the Hebrews. ^D

to measure their age against that of all the Greek philosophers. But since these things have been demonstrated, it is time for us to turn back and look at the Greek sages who became followers of the Hebrew doctrines; so that our detractors might no longer reasonably find fault with us if we ourselves, having learned to love things similar to those of their philosophers, have resolved to honor the oracles of the Hebrews. ^A Since it is established that [Plato] lived after Cyrus, king of the Persians, and it is evident that Cyrus lived many years after the Hebrews were carried away to Babylon, at a time when the prophets had already ceased to exist among the Hebrews and their sacred metropolis had been captured. It remains, therefore, for you to admit that the philosophy of the Greeks, and especially that of Plato—who, having first been a hearer of Socrates and then having applied himself to the Pythagoreans, surpassed all his predecessors by a long interval in eloquence, wisdom, and his method of philosophizing—is much younger than Moses and the prophets who came after him. For he flourished towards the end of the Persian empire, a little before Alexander of Macedon, and not much more than four hundred years before Augustus. If, therefore, it is established that Plato and those who followed him sometimes philosophized in the same way as the Hebrews themselves, then it will be worth the effort to consider the time in which he lived, and thus to compare that antiquity of the Hebrews—whether we call them theologians or prophets—with the age of all the Greek philosophers. But since we have once completed this demonstration, it is indeed time for us to return and look more closely at those Greek sages, the emulators of Hebrew dogmas, so that importunate calumniators may henceforth have nothing by which to blame and reproach us on the grounds that we have decided to embrace and highly value those decrees of the Hebrews which are so akin to the tenets of their philosophers.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL: BOOK ELEVEN

CHAPTERS OF THE ELEVENTH BOOK

1. That the philosophy according to Plato follows that of the Hebrews in the most essential points. 2. On the tripartite philosophy according to Plato, from [Atticus]. 3. On the philosophy according to Plato, from Aristotle. 4. On the moral teaching among the Hebrews. 5. On the philosophy of the Hebrews in discussion. 6. On the correctness of the imposition of names among the Hebrews. 7. On the physiology among the Hebrews. 8. On the physiology of intelligible things. 9. On the Existent, from the doctrine of Moses and Plato. 10. On the same, from Numenius the Pythagorean. 11. From the treatise of Plutarch, entitled, On the EI at Delphi. ^C 12. That the Divine cannot be expressed in words. 13. That God is one alone. 14. On the second cause, of the Hebrews and Plato. 15. From Philo, on the second cause. 16. From Plato, on the second cause. 17. From Plotinus, on the same. 18. From Numenius, on the same. 19. From the theology of Amelius appearing among us, of the evangelist [John]. 20. On the three primary substances. 21. On the essence of the Good. 22. From Numenius, on the Good. 23. On the ideas according to Plato.

24. From Philo, On the ideas according to Moses. 25. From Clement, on the same. 26. On the opposing powers, of the Hebrews and Plato. 27. On the immortality of the soul, of the Hebrews and Plato. 28. From Porphyry, on the same. 29. That the world was created. 30. On the luminaries in the heavens. 31. That all the works of God are good. 32. On the alteration and change of the world. 33. On the resurrection of the dead, from the same. 34. On the end of the world. 35. That Plato also records that the dead have been raised, similarly to the Hebrew accounts. 36. From Plutarch, on the same. 37. On how Plato also discourses on what is called the heavenly earth, ^B similarly to the Hebrews. 38. On how Plato also believes that the judgment after death will be, similarly to the Hebrews.

PROEMIUM TO THE UNDERTAKEN ARGUMENT

The preceding tenth book of the Evangelical Preparation, not now by my own words but by the very testimonies of the Gentiles themselves, made it clear how likely it is that the Greeks, apart from merely their power and elegance in speaking, produced nothing wise or learned from their own resources, but rather stole everything from the barbarians. Indeed, it has shown that they were not even ignorant of the Hebrew oracles, but rather touched upon them at least in part; for even in the works of their own people, written with such great ambition, they could not keep their hands pure and free from all theft. For that they were thieves, as I already said, I demonstrated not by my own voice, but by their own. Furthermore, just how young they are in both intelligence and age, and how widely they are separated from that Hebrew antiquity, we learned in that same book from the comparison of time between them. These were, in fact, the two parts of the previous book. But now, the one we have in hand aims to fulfill the promise we made—a sort of debt—and to reveal the agreement, if not in all, then certainly in some of the doctrinal teachings of the Greek philosophers with the Hebrew oracles. But passing over others as less necessary in this place, it will summon the coryphaeus of all, Plato, whom alone it considers should be used as a rule for the argument in place of all others. Since he alone seems, by his reputation, to have surpassed everyone, we believe he will be sufficient for us to establish the matter under investigation. And if anywhere it should be necessary to illustrate the man’s thought, I will also ^C bring forward the testimonies of those who have adhered to the principles of his own philosophy, producing their very own words for the greater faith and certainty of the proposed argument. But if some things were rightly stated by the man, I would still have it observed and kept in mind, that he did not always philosophize correctly in all things, as the case required. This we will also demonstrate in its own place, not with a spirit of condemning the man, but for the sake of defending our own purpose, in that we confess the barbarian philosophy to be superior to the Greek. ^D

CHAPTER I. That the philosophy according to Plato coincides with that of the Hebrews in the things that are most necessary.

^A Since Plato divides the whole account of philosophy into three parts—the natural, the ethical, and the logical—and again divides the natural into the contemplation of sensible objects and the understanding of incorporeal things; you would find this tripartite division of teaching also among the Hebrews, in that the same things were philosophized by them even before Plato was born. But it is worth hearing [what is said] by Plato first, and then in this way to examine [what is said] by the Hebrews. I shall set forth the tenets of Plato from those who advocate his views, of whom Atticus, an illustrious man among the Platonic philosophers, sets forth the opinions of that man in this way, in the passages where he stands against those who claim to maintain the philosophy of Plato by means of the doctrine of Aristotle.

CHAPTER II. On the tripartite philosophy of Plato, from Atticus.

^B "Since, therefore," he says, "the complete and perfect philosophy is divided into three parts—that is, into the doctrine of manners, of nature, and of discourse; the first of which not only makes each of us good and virtuous, but also fashions whole families to the most chaste way of life, and prepares the entire populace with an excellent form of state and most accurate laws; the second, however, pertains to the knowledge of divine matters, so that it contemplates both those primary and causal factors and all the rest that come into being from them, which Plato has called the history of nature; and the third, finally, is assumed for the more certain discussion and discovery of both of the former—that Plato was the first to gather into one all the parts of philosophy, previously scattered and dispersed, like the limbs of Pentheus, as someone has said, and displayed philosophy as a complete body and a living creature, is manifest to all. ^C For neither are those surrounding Thales, and Anaximenes, and Anaxagoras, and all who have lived in the same time as these, unknown to have spent their time solely on the investigation of the nature of existing things; nor, again, are Pittacus, and Periander, and Solon, and Lycurgus, and those similar to them, unknown to any for having cast their own philosophy into the care of the state; ^D and Zeno, and that entire Eleatic school, surely everyone knows that they applied themselves especially to the art of discourse. But Plato, succeeding these men, a man complete in all parts and respects by nature, and excelling the rest by far—as if sent truly as a gift and present from the gods, in order that through him the complete philosophy might at last be seen—left nothing out, and he brought each point to its own maturity so that he neither omitted anything necessary, nor strayed toward anything useless. Since, therefore, we have said that all these things belong to the Platonic [philosophy]—both that it discourses on nature, and speaks on manners, and engages one in dialectic—come, let us examine each point." These are the words of Atticus.

To these is added the testimony of the Peripatetic Aristocles, who in the seventh book of his work *On Nature* speaks in the following explicit terms:

CHAPTER III. On the Platonic Philosophy, from Aristocles.

"Plato," he says, "possessed a genuine and perfect method of philosophizing, if anyone else ever did. For the followers of Thales spent their time entirely in the study of nature; the Pythagoreans shrouded everything in mystery; while Xenophanes and his disciples, by stirring up eristic arguments, caused a great deal of vertigo among philosophers, but afforded them no help or assistance. Socrates, in particular, added fire to fire, as the saying goes, even as Plato himself insisted. For endowed with a singular genius, and being remarkably adept at raising questions about absolutely anything, he ^A introduced both ethical and political inquiries, and was, furthermore, the first to attempt to define the theory of Forms; yet, as he was raising every sort of argument and inquiring into all things, death overtook him. Others, having cut off certain parts [of philosophy] for themselves, remained occupied with those alone: some pursued medicine, others the mathematical sciences, and some poetry and music. Most, however, were enthralled by the power and faculty of speech, and some of these called themselves rhetoricians, others dialecticians. ^B Yet those who succeeded Socrates became very diverse and even diametrically opposed in their opinions. For some lauded the Cynic and squalid way of life, and a soul simple and void of all sense of disturbance; others, on the contrary, preached pleasures. The former boasted of knowing everything; the latter, absolutely nothing. Some spent their time in the middle of the crowd and before the eyes of all, constantly with the lowest of the rabble; others could be approached or spoken to by no one.

Plato, however, understanding that there is one and the same science of divine and human things, ^C was the first to partition it, assigning one part to the task of explaining the nature of the universe, a second to the handling of human affairs, and a third and final part to the ordering of discourse. He maintained that we could not possibly discern human affairs unless divine things were first perceived and known. For just as physicians, in order to treat certain parts, first apply themselves to the healing of the whole body, so he thought that he who would observe our own condition must first know the nature of the universe; since man is a part of it, and of two goods—of which one pertains to us, the other to the universe—the good of the universe is the primary one, because the other is produced for its sake. ^D And Aristoxenus the musician testifies that this is the doctrine of the Indians; for he says that one of them met Socrates at Athens and inquired of him what he was occupied with in his philosophy, and when Socrates replied that he was inquiring into human life, the Indian laughed, saying that no one could discern human affairs if he were ignorant of things divine. Whether this is true, one cannot assert with absolute certainty. In any case, Plato divided philosophy into the study of the universe, politics, and logic. Such being the

^A Platonic method of philosophy, it is time for us to contemplate the philosophy of the Hebrews as well, who surely, long before Plato was born, possessed a very similar way of philosophizing. For you will find among them a tripartite division of disciplines, corresponding to that of the Platonists, whether related to morals, or to the power of reasoning, or to nature itself, if you wish to consider the matter in this way.

CHAPTER IV. Concerning the discipline of morals among the Hebrews.

^B Now, as for the moral teachings, which were most excellent of all, they were studied by them with great zeal, and much more in practice than in words, as you would learn if you were to examine the lives of those men. Since they held that the end of all goods and the ultimate goal of the blessed life is piety, and that friendship with God is attained and pursued through the perfection of one's morals—not through the pleasure of the body, as Epicurus held, nor the triple classification of goods according to Aristotle, who valued the goods of the body and external things equally with the goods of the soul—nor did they succumb to that ultimate ignorance and lack of learning which some have masked under the more honorable name of "suspension of judgment." ^C Nor did they focus merely on the virtue of the soul itself: for how great could that be among men, or what could it possibly accomplish by itself, if you were to set God aside, in rendering life free from trouble? Wherefore, having suspended all things from the hope in God as from a strong cable, they declared that only the man who is dear to God is happy. For since God is the steward of all good things, the provider of life, and the very source of virtue, as well as the dispenser of all bodily and external goods, He alone suffices for the blessed life to one who has entered into friendship with Him through true and genuine piety. ^D Whence the all-wise Moses, who was the first of all to record in writing the life of those Hebrews who before his time had been partakers of this friendship with God, assumed a historical mode of exposition to set forth not only a form of government, but a form of life. Beginning from general principles, he framed his instruction by positing God as the cause of all things, and describing the creation of the world and the birth of mankind. Then, proceeding from the general to the particular, and by the memory of the ancients urging his readers and hearers to emulate their virtue and piety, he himself, appearing as the authoritative framer of the holy laws which he established, clearly showed how he had provided for the care of a God-loving way of life through the discipline of morals—a point which our discourse has already made manifest in what preceded. It would be a long task to recount here the prophets who followed Moses, those whose words encourage virtue and dissuade from all vice. What if I should bring forward for you the moral teachings of the all-wise Solomon? To whom he dedicated a work of his own words, naming it Proverbs, as a compendium of gnomic...

^A utterances. By this, the Hebrew youth were trained in the moral way from of old, even before the Greeks had learned their first elements, and they shared this same training liberally with all who approached them.

Chapter V. On the dialectical philosophy of the Hebrews.

Now, as for that part of philosophy which concerns the method of dialectic, they did not think it ought to be cultivated by tortuous sophisms and deceptive syllogisms, as is the custom of the Greeks, but rather through a zeal for grasping the truth; ^B to which, indeed, those among them who professed divine wisdom, having their souls illuminated by a more divine light of understanding, happily aspired. In order to sharpen the minds of those whom they undertook to imbue with their teachings so that they might grasp it, they instilled in them from their earliest tender years sacred sentences and histories full of gravity and honesty, along with modulated and alternating songs comprehended by a certain law of numbers, as well as problems and enigmas ^C and certain learned questions wrapped in allegories, combined with elegance of words and a sweetness of diction appropriate to the character of their language. Moreover, they had certain 'seconders' of the primary disciplines (for thus were they accustomed to call the interpreters of their letters), who would open up by a clearer explanation those things shadowed in enigmas, not indeed to the common crowd promiscuously, but to those who were judged fit for their understanding. The most wise Solomon among them clearly followed this, and from this fact he made the beginning of his work of Proverbs, ^D testifying that he was brought to this genre of writing for almost this very reason, when he says in eloquent and set words: "That every man may know wisdom and discipline, and understand the words of prudence: to take up the sophistries of speech, and to understand true justice, and to direct judgment. That he may give to the innocent acuteness, and to the young man sense and intelligence. For the wise person, hearing these things, shall be wiser; and the understanding person shall possess helms, and shall understand the parable, and the dark saying, the words of the wise, and their enigmas." Since the promises of this work are of such a kind: then, too, anyone who would only take the books containing the monuments of his speech and scroll through and read them at leisure will be able to observe the individual propositions of what has been said, and their solutions, and finally that art of dialectic, congruent with the wisdom and language of those men, which exists everywhere in all their prophetic letters. Furthermore, if anyone by chance has an honest desire for the language itself

he will surely acknowledge them to be men most skilled in dialectic among the barbarian race, who yield nothing either to the sophists or the orators in the force and reason of their own language. They also possess their own works composed in verse, such as that great song of Moses, and the hundred and eighteenth Psalm of David, both of which are contained in that style of verse which the Greeks call heroic, since they say both consist of hexameters of sixteen syllables. The other kinds of poems among them consist of trimeters and tetrameters, fashioned according to the propriety of their own tongue. And indeed they have a manner of speech that embodies the force and cleverness of dialectic. For as to those things that pertain to the sense and meaning, it would be wrong to compare them with men: since they embrace the oracles of God and truth itself expressed in those words, as well as divine responses and prophecies, along with disciplines that school one in piety, and precepts that look toward knowing the nature of things. Moreover, one may judge how much they excel in the mature faculty of discourse from the correct imposition of names among them, to which topic Plato also adds his own suffrage, agreeing with the opinion of the Hebrews and consenting to their philosophy openly and clearly, as will be easily understood from the following.

CHAPTER VI

Of the correct imposition of names among the Hebrews.

^A Having said these things, after a great deal more, he again brings up the mention of barbarians, and then he explicitly confesses that many of the names came to the Greeks from the barbarians, saying in these precise terms: "I suspect that the Greeks, especially those who lived under the rule of barbarians, have received many of their names from the barbarians. What then? If anyone were to seek whether these things are situated fittingly according to the Greek language, and not according to that from which the name happens to be derived, you know that he would be at a loss." Quite so. ^B Such are the words of Plato. But Moses anticipates him, being, as he was, an exceedingly wise lawgiver and at the same time a dialectician; hear what he says: "And God formed out of the earth all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the sky, and brought them to Adam to see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called any living soul, this was its name." For by saying, "this was its name," what else does he indicate than that their appellations were established according to nature? For he says that what was just now called by that name was already contained in nature long before, and that this name was present and pre-existed for each of those things named, which the man being depicted here, by a superior power, put upon them. ^C And the very name Adam, which is a Hebrew name, would be, in the account of Moses, a surname for the earth-born man, because among the Hebrews, "Adam" is called "the earth"; whence the first earth-born man was aptly named Adam by Moses. The appellation might also have another meaning, if transferred to "the red" [earth], and representing the nature of the body. But he signified the earthy, and earthen, and earth-born, or the bodily and fleshly man, by the name of Adam. The children of the Hebrews also call man by another name, terming him Enos, whom they say is the rational [element] in us, being different in nature from the earthy Adam. ^D Enos also contains a meaning of its own, which is forgotten when translated into the Greek tongue. Such then is the nature of what is in us. Unless, perhaps, just as the tragedians, whenever they are at a loss, take refuge in the machines by bringing in gods, we too, by saying this, get away by asserting that the gods established the first names. Is this, then, the strongest of the arguments for us? Or is it the one that we have received them from certain barbarians? (But the barbarians are older than us.) Or [that it is the argument] that it is impossible to investigate them because of their antiquity? For these would all be excuses, and very clever ones, for someone who does not wish to provide an account regarding the first names, as to how they are rightly established.

^A For it is possible that there is another rationale for this name, as if it were derived from a "red" color, representing the nature of the body. But regarding man, the Hebrews signify him specifically with the name "Adam," as one who is earthly and fashioned from the earth, or indeed compounded of body and flesh. But when they wish to name man properly, they are accustomed to use the word "Enos," by which that human of ours, endued with reason and separated by nature from the earthly Adam, is expressed. This "Enos" also has a unique quality, in that the Greek language signifies "forgetful." For indeed, this usage applies to that part of us which has reason conjoined to it, on account of its association with what is mortal and devoid of reason. For that which is completely pure, which is without body, which is divine and endowed with reason, embraces not only the memory of things past, but also the knowledge of things to come, on account of its supreme power of contemplation. But that which is immersed in the flesh as in mud, which is compacted of bones and nervures, which is oppressed by the imposition of the body as if by a great weight—inasmuch as the Hebrew understood such a being to labor under much forgetfulness and ignorance, he called him "Enos," a name quite fitting and signifying forgetfulness. And indeed we read in a certain prophet: "What is man, that you are mindful of him? Or the son of man, that you visit him?" At which point the Hebrew tongue has used the word "Enos" for that first naming of man; as if it said more clearly: "What is this forgetful creature, that you, O God, are mindful of him, even though he is forgetful?" But as for what is added, "or the son of man, that you visit him," the Hebrews read: "or the son of Adam." ^B Thus, since either word signifies one and the same person, the bodily man is designated by the name of Adam, while the man endued with reason is designated by "Enos." And in this way they distinguish the etymology of both words according to Hebrew letters.

But indeed, Plato contends that in the Greek tongue, man is named from contemplating: "For man," he says, "as soon as he has seen something—which the Greeks call *opope*—he contemplates that very thing he has seen, and reflects upon it himself, so that he is called *anthropos*, as if contemplating (*anathron*) what he has seen." Furthermore, the Hebrews call a man *is*. This name is derived for them from *es*, by which they signify "fire," so that the man is named from the hot and igneous nature of the male. And the woman, since it is said that she was taken from the man, also shares in that name; for the woman is called *issa* among them, just as the man is called *is*. But Plato, when he defends the view that *aner* (man) is so named from the "upward flow," then adds: "But woman seems to me to be called *gone* (offspring, or fetus)." ^C Again, Moses truly and properly calls the heaven "firmament" in the Hebrew tongue, as it is the first thing after the incorporeal and intellectual substance to be the solid and perceptible body of this world. And Plato says that the name "heaven" (*ouranos*) is rightly bestowed upon it, because it causes one to "look upward" (*ano horan*). Again, the Hebrews hold that the proper name of the most high God is ineffable and unutterable, nor can it be grasped by any phantasy of the mind; but this very thing, according to which we name him God, they call *Elohim*, from *El* ^D (which, as it seems, they interpret as strength and power), so that the name of God among them is calculated from the power and strength surrounding him, by which he is understood to be omnipotent and all-powerful, as having established all things. But Plato says that God and the gods are so called from *theein*, which is "to run," because of the luminaries in the heaven. Such are the things, to speak in summary, that have been distinguished among the Hebrews and among Plato regarding the correctness of names. And Plato also says that the appellations among men were established with a certain understanding; and he renders the account...

of them. For example, he conjectures that Hector was so called for having and holding, because he was king of the Trojans; Agamemnon, because he persisted too much and remained firmly and steadfastly in the plans which he had undertaken against the Trojans. Thus Orestes, because of his mountainous—that is, wild and brutal—habit; Atreus, because he had become of a ruinous character; Pelops, as one who did not see things far removed, but only those which were near; and Tantalus, as the most wretched, because of the magnitude of the miseries by which he was oppressed. These and six hundred other such things you might find said by Plato, in his attempt to teach that names were established by nature, and not by convention for those first men.

But you would not say that the things in Moses were strained, nor were they invented by some sophistical subtlety. For you will recognize that what the Hebrews call Cain signifies "emulation" among the Greeks; and the wicked man was called by this name because he burned with emulation and envy against his brother. And Abel is interpreted as "mourning," having been himself the cause of such an affliction for his parents, who, moved by some more divine instinct and counsel, gave these ^A names to their children.

What if I present to you Abraham? He was a stargazer, and knowledgeable in the theory of the stars and the heavenly sciences of old, while he was still occupied with Chaldean wisdom, and was called Abram; this word in the Greek tongue signifies "sublime parent." But God, leading him away from earthly things toward the manifest and those that are beyond the objects of sight, employed a fitting change of name, saying: "Thy name shall no longer be called Abram, but Abraham shall be thy name, for I have made thee a father of many nations." What this implies in its meaning would be a long discourse. But it suffices to cite Plato as a witness to this argument, who says that some names were established by a more divine power. He says in these very words: "For it is becoming that the imposition of names should be regarded with ^B deep concern here; and perhaps some of them were even brought about by a more divine power than that of men."

This very thing is confirmed by the holy Scripture among the Hebrews through many examples. Moses is the first of all who taught that Abraham, and his son Isaac, and furthermore Israel, were named by a more divine power. For Isaac is interpreted as "Laughter," bringing with it the symbol of virtuous joy, which God has promised to give as a special prize to those who are dear to Him. And his son Israel—he who had previously borne the name of Jacob—God, instead of Jacob, bestows upon him the name of Israel, having transferred him from the ascetic and practical life to the contemplative. For ^C Jacob is interpreted as "Supplanter," as one who struggles in the contest of virtue; but Israel is "Seeing God," such as the gnostic and contemplative mind might be in man.

Why must I now, by means of a thousand other examples, prove from the all-wise Moses or the holy scriptures of the Hebrews the ^D

^A accuracy of the imposition of their proper names, which would require a longer discussion? For the Greeks themselves would be unable to provide the etymologies of the primary elements of grammar; not even Plato himself could declare the reason or logic behind the vowels or consonants. But the children of the Hebrews could tell you the cause of alpha, which they call *alph*, and which signifies "learning"; and of beta, which it is their custom to call *beth*, the word they use for a house, so as to express the meaning "learning of a house," as if one were more clearly saying a certain instruction or learning of household management. And the third letter, gamma, is called by them *gimel*, by which they signify "fullness." Then, since they call tablets *delth*, they gave this same name to the fourth element, signifying together by these two elements that written learning ^B is the fullness of tablets. And if one were to go through the remaining elements of grammar, one would find each of them named by them with a specific reason and logic. For they say that the combination of the seven vowels into one contains the pronunciation of a certain ineffable name, which the children of the Hebrews, denoting it by four letters, arrange as the highest power of God, being something unutterable to the many, a secret received from their fathers. And among the wise men of the Greeks, I know not from where someone learned this and enigmatically hinted at it, when he said in verses: Seven vowels sing the praises of me, the great, immortal God, The letters, the tireless father of all things. I am the immortal lyre of all, or the... [restoring the] Harmony of the revolving sphere. You would find that the remaining elements among the Hebrews each have their specific meaning, if you were to attend to each one. This has already been established for us in the preceding pages, when we proved that the Greeks obtained all things from the barbarians. And one could learn how much accuracy in names is carried among the men of that nation if one were to investigate the Hebrew tongue extensively; for the very common name of the whole nation is derived from... ^C 520 and the accurate propriety of nouns among them, for even the very common name of the whole nation [is derived from...]

The translation continues from the Latin corresponding to the Greek text above, here provided by Migne:

...the fact that the very common name of the whole nation is derived from those who pass through [the crossing], for both the crossing and the one who crosses are called *Heber* in the Hebrew language.

The concept teaches us ^A to cross over and advance from the things here to divine things, and in no way to remain or stand still in the contemplation of visible objects; but from these to pass over to the unseen and invisible [realms] of the theology concerning the Maker and Creator of all things. Thus, indeed, they called those who dedicated themselves solely to the supreme Ruler and Author of all things, and who devoted themselves to a pure and true piety, *Hebrews*—calling such persons, as it were, "passers-through" and those who have crossed over in their minds. But why should I need to lengthen my discourse further, gathering together everything regarding the correctness and precision of Hebrew names, which requires a study proper to the subject? Nevertheless, to speak in summary, I believe I have provided the demonstration, even through what has been said, of the logical instruction among the Hebrews; if, indeed, according to Plato, it was not the work of common or ordinary men, but of some wise and dialectical legislator, to find the nature of names appropriate to things—just as Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews have been shown to us. What, then, follows after the logical [inquiries], if not to examine the natural ones, to see how the sons of the Hebrews fared regarding these also?

CHAPTER VII.

On the Natural Philosophy of the Hebrews.

The third part of this Hebrew philosophy, ^C which is called natural, and which is divided among them both into the contemplation of things perceived by the mind alone and devoid of all body, and into the treatment of those things which are grasped by the senses, the most praiseworthy prophets knew both by themselves and, when the occasion demanded, interwove into their own oracles. Yet they had learned this neither by any conjectures nor by the industry of mortal thought, nor did they boast of the authority of any human teacher, but they attributed all that knowledge to the power of a certain divine, superior authority and to the inspiration of the divine Spirit. Following this ^D indeed, just as they predicted infinite things concerning future events by divine inspiration, so also they disputed about the creation of the universe infinite things, just as nature required; and they discussed infinite things about the very natures of living creatures; to which they also added in their respective prophecies six hundred things about plants. And certainly Moses, who was also very well versed in the powers of stones, did not treat them in a passing or perfunctory manner when he discussed the vestments of the high priest, but was engaged in the consideration of them. But truly Solomon, if anyone else, is attested by the very testimony of divine Scripture to have reached the highest praise in this part of natural philosophy. For thus it says: "And Solomon spoke," it says, "three thousand proverbs, and his songs were five thousand. And he spoke about trees, from the cedar that is in Lebanon even to the hyssop that grows out of the wall. And he spoke about beasts, and about birds, and about reptiles, and about fishes. And all peoples came to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and"

he received gifts from all the kings of the earth who heard of his wisdom. ^A And being moved by this, while attributing that parent of all virtue—Wisdom—to her own benefaction, he spoke in this manner: "For He," he says, "gave me the true knowledge of these things that are, that I might know the constitution of the world and the virtues of the elements, the beginning and the end and the middle of the times, the changes of the turns and the permutations of the seasons, the cycles of the years, and the positions of the stars, the natures of animals and the impulses of wild beasts, the force of the winds and the reasonings of men, the differences of plants and the virtues of roots; whatever is hidden and invisible, I have learned. For the Artificer of all things taught me Wisdom." Again, the same Solomon, reasoning about the fleeting nature of bodies, says in ^B Ecclesiastes: "Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity. What surplus has man in all his labor with which he toils under the sun?" And he adds: "What is that which has been? It is that which will be; and what is that which has been done? It is that which will be done; and there is nothing new under the sun." For these and such things have been philosophized by him concerning physical substance.

You might also find that, if you go through the other Hebrew wise men, they were not lacking in the same knowledge. For, as I said before, they have spoken about plants, and about animals, both those of the land and those in the water, and furthermore about the nature of birds. Nay, ^C even about the stars in the heavens; since there is mentioned in their writings not an occasional mention of the Bear, and the Pleiades, and Orion, and Arcturus, whom the Greeks are accustomed to call Arctophylax and Bootes, as if he were the guardian of the Bear. But also about the constitution of the world, and matters concerning the turning and changing of the whole, and the abundance of the soul, and the nature of all rational things—both the visible and the invisible creation—and of the general providence, and even before these, the matters concerning the First Cause of all things, and the theology of the second, and the others which are grasped by the mind alone; they have encompassed these accounts and theories well and accurately, so that one would not err to say that those among the Greeks who later investigated the nature of these things, being ^D younger, followed in the footsteps of those ancients.

These things, then, concerning the physiology of the universe. Dividing the account of these matters, they did not think it necessary to bring the account of sensible things to a high degree of complexity before the many, nor to teach the masses the causes of things, except to know as much as this: that the whole has not come about by chance, nor has it risen from an aimless motion as it happened, but it is guided by a charioteer—the Word of God—and is governed by the power of an ineffable Wisdom. But concerning the intelligible things, that they exist, and what they are, and how they have their arrangement, power, and difference, this has been spoken of and placed within the sacred books, and handed down for all to hear, as far as it is necessary for those who pursue piety to know.

But they left the deep and hidden account regarding these things to be sought for and learned by those able to remember such things in secret. It would be well, concisely and as it were in summary, to go through the contemplation of these, and to show how Plato, in this matter too, held views friendly to those things declared. ^A

CHAPTER VIII.

On the physiology of spiritual things.

Indeed, that it is evident from his own words that the wondrous Plato, whom all so greatly admire, followed not only the most wise Moses but also other prophets of the Hebrews in this doctrine and method of explaining spiritual and incorporeal things. Whether he received this by report and listening, since it is certain he spent time among the Egyptians at the time when the Hebrews, having been driven a second time from their own land, were dwelling ^B among the Egyptians while the Persians were in power; or whether he grasped it through the nature of things himself; or whether by any other means he was deemed worthy of knowledge by God. "For God," says the Apostle, "manifested it to them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and divinity, so that they are without excuse." You may learn the truth of this matter by considering it thus. ^C

CHAPTER IX.

On Being, according to the doctrine of Moses and Plato.

Moses, in his holy revelations, utters an oracle from the person of God: "I am who I am. Thus shall you say to the sons of Israel: 'He who is' has sent me to you." And thus he declares that God alone truly is of all things, and that this kind of name belongs to him alone properly and fittingly. Similarly, concerning the origin and destruction of things perceived by the senses and endowed with a body, Solomon speaks thus: "What is that which has been? The very thing that shall be. And there is nothing new under the sun. Nor can anyone say: 'Behold, this is new,' for it has already ^D passed in the ages which were before us." Fittingly, they divide all that is into two genera—the spiritual (noetic) and the sensible. And they decree that things spiritual are free from body, but by nature endowed with reason, and are devoid of destruction and death; whereas, on the contrary, things obvious to the senses are considered to exist in flux and corruption, and in the constant mutation of their nature. And as all things are traced back to one beginning and head, and as they dogmatize that one thing is unbegotten, and that which is truly and properly being—remembering all incorporeal things.

as well as the cause of bodies—see how Plato, having transferred to himself not only the thought, but also the very expressions and words of the Hebrew ^A Scripture, appropriates the dogma, explaining it more broadly: "What is that which always is, and has no beginning of coming-to-be? And what is that which is always coming-to-be, but never is? The one, indeed, is graspable by intelligence with reason, always being in the same state; the other is the object of opinion by unreasoning sense, coming-to-be and perishing, but never really being." Does not the admirable man clearly reveal the oracle of Moses, "I am who I am," having transformed it through himself into: "What is that which always is, and has no beginning of coming-to-be?" And this he explained more clearly ^B stating, "That the being is nothing other than that which is not seen by the eyes of the flesh, but is grasped by the mind." Having asked, then, "What is that which is?" he answers himself, saying, "That, indeed, which is graspable by intelligence with reason." And having translated the Solomonic phrase, "What is that which has been? That which is about to be; and what is that which has been made? That which is to be made," in almost the same words, it is clear that he means: "The one is the object of opinion by unreasoning sense, coming-to-be and perishing, but never really being." To these he adds: "For all such things are parts of time, 'was' and ^C 'shall be'; which we mistakenly apply to the eternal substance. For we speak, saying that it was, is, and shall be; but according to the true word, only 'is' properly belongs to it. But 'was' and 'shall be' are proper to be said of that which is in temporal becoming; for they are motions. But that which is always in the same state without motion is not proper to be made older or younger through time; nor to have come-to-be at any time, nor to have come-to-be now, nor to be about to be in the future at all, nor as much as coming-to-be has attached to those things carried along in sense perception; but these are forms of time, mimicking eternity and circling by number, which have come-to-be." And in addition ^D to these, he further says: "That which has become is, that which is becoming is, and that which is about to become is." And so that no one may think we are misinterpreting the words of the philosopher, I shall use commentaries, of those things which...

^A disclose their meaning. For even if many have applied themselves to the theory of these matters, it suffices for me for the present to set forth the words of the illustrious Pythagorean, Numenius, which he explains in this way in his second book, *On the Good*.

CHAPTER X.

From the second book of Numenius the Pythagorean, On the Good.

"Come then," says he, "let us aspire, as much as we are able, toward that which is, and let us pronounce that 'that which is' never was, nor will it ever be, but it exists always in a definite time, in the present only. If anyone wishes to call this present time 'eternity,' I would advise him to do so. As for the past time, we ought to consider that it has already fled, escaped, and slipped away into non-being; and as for the future, it is not yet, but it promises that it is of such a nature that it will come into being. It is therefore not reasonable to think in any way that 'that which is' either is not, or is no longer, or is not yet. Thus, since this is stated in this way, a great absurdity arises in the argument, that it is at once the same thing to be and not to be. And if this is the case, it could scarcely be anything else, since 'that which is' does not exist by its own nature as 'that which is.' For ^C that which is, is eternal, and is fixed, always according to the same, and is the same; and it has not come to be, and then wasted away, nor has it grown, and then diminished; nor has it not yet been, more or less; and moreover, it will not be moved locally either. For it is not right for it to be moved, nor even backward, or forward; neither upward ever, nor downward, nor to the right, nor to the left will 'that which is' ever be transferred; nor will it ever be moved around its own center; but it will rather stand firm, and it will be fixed and standing, being always according to the same and in the same way." And after some other things, he adds in sequence: "So much for me by way of prologue. But as for myself, I shall no longer be circumspect, nor will I say that I am ignorant ^D of the name of the incorporeal; for it runs the risk of being something distinctive to say it now, rather than not to say it. And truly I say that its name is that which has been sought for so long. But let no one laugh if I say that the name of the incorporeal is 'substance' and 'that which is.' The reason for the name 'that which is' is that it has not come into being, nor will it waste away, nor does it admit of any motion, nor of any change, whether for the better or for the worse; but it is simple and unchangeable, and in the same form, and neither departs from its identity voluntarily, nor is it constrained by another. And Plato also said in the *Cratylus* that names are themselves markers resembling the things. Let it then be granted and given that 'that which is' is the incorporeal." And having descended a little further, he adds: "The..."

or to perish: nay, it is not subject to any kind of motion, or mutation, or any degree of change for the better or the worse, but is entirely simple and immutable, and therefore perists for ever in the same state of its own nature, from which it deviates neither of its own accord nor by any foreign force or necessity. And Plato himself in the *Cratylus* teaches that names are imposed from a certain natural likeness to things. Let it remain, therefore, and let it be accepted as a truth, that that which *is* is incorporeal. To this he adds, a little later: "That which is incorporeal, and grasped by the mind alone, they said exists." And these are what I remember were discussed at that time. But for my part, if any one requires that discourse of Plato, I am pleased to alleviate and soften his labor by first warning him that if the things discussed in that place belong less to the dogmas of Plato, they should certainly be assigned to some other person, but a preeminent man, endowed with the highest power of philosophizing, such as you might say Pythagoras was. Thus, therefore, Plato—for we must endeavor to remember the words—says: "What is that," he asks, "which always is, and yet has no birth? And what, on the contrary, is that which is born, and never *is*? The former is indeed perceived by the intelligence alone through reason: the latter, which is born and perishes, and never really *is*, exists only in that opinion which a sense void of all reason produces." Plato asks what that is which *is*, establishing that it is without birth; for he denies that birth has any place in that which *is*, for otherwise it would change; but if it were changed, it would not be eternal. Advancing a little from there, he adds: "If that which is is entirely eternal and immutable, and never at any time deviates from itself by any variety, but remains forever in one and the same state, that must undoubtedly be the one thing which is grasped by intelligence with reason. On the contrary, if a body flows and is swept away by sudden mutation, it fades away, and therefore is not. Wherefore he would not be altogether foolish who said that body cannot be defined, but is of such a kind that, as Plato says, it exists only in opinion, while it is born and perishes simultaneously, and never truly *is*."

^A Thus Numenius, by whom the doctrine of Plato, and long before his time of Moses, is illustrated for the sake of clarity. Justly, indeed, is that saying which is celebrated in this matter circulated: "For what else is Plato, than Moses speaking Attic Greek?" But nevertheless, see, if you will, whether Plutarch, explaining the force of the same opinion more fully, agrees with the cited discourse of the philosophers of old, and at the same time with the theology of the Hebrews explained in various places; while these words are now attributed to God: ^B "For I am the Lord your God, and I change not," and now the Prophet, looking toward Him, pronounces thus: "For all visible things shall pass away and be changed; but Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail." See, I say, whether as if it were a question proposed, with the [teaching] of Him who spoke thus to Moses, "I am who I am," and again, "I am the Lord your God, and I change not," and, "But Thou art the same," Plutarch would appear to interpret the meaning in his *On the E at Delphi*, saying these things word for word.

CHAPTER XI.

"I do not think that this syllable denotes either a number, or an order, or a connective, or any other of the incomplete parts of speech; but it is a self-sufficient address and invocation of God, which at the same time brings to the mind of the speaker a sense and conception of the divine power. For God, as if greeting each of us who approach Him here, addresses us with 'Know Thyself,' which is in no way inferior to 'Hail.' And we, in turn, answering God, say 'Thou art' (EI), ^B as if acknowledging Him as true and unerring, and bestowing upon Him alone the address of 'Thou art'—a name that belongs to Him alone. For in truth, we have no share in being; but every mortal nature, having come into existence between destruction and generation, presents only a shadowy, feeble, and unstable notion of itself. If you wish to fix your mind upon it, in order to grasp it—like one who tries to hold water with a powerful grip, pressing and gathering it into one place—the water flows away and is lost as it slips through the fingers; so too, the mind wanders and is mocked as it pursues the nature of things that are subject to passions and change, because it ^C stumbles partway into that which is coming into being, and partway into that which is perishing, and is unable to grasp anything that remains or that truly is. For just as no one can step twice into the same river, as Heraclitus was accustomed to say, so can no one physically reach a mortal nature in the same state, but rather it is dissipated instantly by the sudden impulse of change, and is gathered again; or rather, not even again or afterwards, but it exists at the same moment that it ceases, and approaches at the same time that it departs. Hence, no part of it reaches the state of 'being,' because its generation never ceases nor stands still; but from the seed it is always changing, forming an embryo, then an infant, then in succession a child, a youth, a man, an elder, and an old man, destroying the first generations and ages by those that succeed them. But we ^D foolishly fear one death, having already died many times and dying many times over. For it is not only, as Heraclitus said, the death of fire that is birth for air, but it is more clearly evident in our own selves. The man in his prime is destroyed by the coming of the old man, the young man was destroyed into the one in his prime, the child into the young man, the infant into the child; he who was yesterday has died into the one of today, and the one of today into the one of tomorrow. No one remains, nor is there any one person, but we become many, around one phantom and common mold of matter being driven about, and...

^A continually slipping away. Indeed, if we remain the same, who are the ones who are now pleased by different things than before, who are led by different things formerly? Who love or hate the opposites, or preach or condemn them? Who, finally, speak or are affected now in one way and then in another, no longer retaining the same appearance, the same countenance, or the same mind? For neither is it likely that one suffers other things without change, nor that one who changes is the same. But if he is not the same, he does not even exist, but, by changing, he becomes another from another; and the sense perception is deceived by ignorance of what truly is, thinking that the phenomenon is what is. What, then, is that which truly is? That which is eternal, unbegotten, and incorruptible, upon which time brings no change; for time is something movable, and being imagined along with the moving matter ^B, and always flowing, and not holding, like a vessel of corruption and generation. From which, the "afterward," and the "before," and that which "will be" is spoken, and that "it has come to be"—here is an admission of what is not. For to say that that which in the order of being has not yet come to be, or has already ceased being, "is," is foolish and absurd. But in that upon which we especially rest our thought of time—that it "stands," and is "present," and we say "now"—this, again, the discourse, being dissolved, destroys; for it is pressed out into the future and the past, being compelled to fly apart ^C like a ray for those wishing to see. And if the nature which is measured suffers the same things as the one measuring, it is not even itself alone, nor is it that which is, but is becoming and perishing according to the distribution in relation to time. Whence there is nothing of such a kind that one can say concerning that which is, that "it was," or "it will be"; for these are certain inclinations, and changes, and shifts of that which is not naturally disposed to remain in being. But God is, if one must say so, and exists not according to any time, but according to the age, which is motionless, and timeless, and unchangeable ^D, and before which nothing is, neither later, nor future, nor

^A past, nor older, nor newer; but it is one, and having filled with itself the "now" of time. For it neither has come to be, nor will it be, nor has it begun, nor will it cease. Thus, therefore, to greet and address that which is worshipped, or at least, as some of the ancients also said, to call it "One," is not because it is composed of many differences, as we each are, a collection of myriad ^B qualities mixed together, and manifold, as a festive crowd. But it is one, just as "the One" is not "the other," but because there is no movement of the being, it diverts into generation from that which is not.

CAPTER XII.

That the Divine cannot be explained in words.

CHAPTER XIII.

That God is one and alone.

by no means departing from himself, but remains according to the same things and stands in the same way; this, surely, would be that which is comprehensible to the intellect through reason. But if the body flows and is carried along by straight change, it escapes and does not exist. Hence, is it not a great madness not to hold that this is indefinite, and only representable by opinion alone, and, as Plato says, coming to be and perishing, but in reality never truly existing? These things Numenius says, interpreting at once the things of Plato and, much earlier, those of Moses toward clarity. Quite consistently, then, that saying is brought around to him, through which he is remembered as saying: "For what is Plato but Moses speaking Attic Greek?" Observe, besides these things, whether Plutarch, while expanding this present thought further, might not coincide with the aforementioned utterances of the philosophers and with those of the Hebrews lying in other theologies, through which at one time the God who speaks is introduced, saying: "Because I am the Lord your God and I have not changed"; and at another time, the prophet, looking toward him, directs his words, that while all visible things might at some time be turned and changed, you are the same, and your years shall not fail. Consider, then, if, as in a proposition of him who says in Moses, "I am who I am," and "I am the Lord your God and I have not changed," and "You are the same," Plutarch would not seem to interpret the meaning in his work *On the E at Delphi*, saying these things word for word:

12. FROM THE WORK OF PLUTARCH ENTITLED ON THE E AT DELPHI

I think the letter does not signify a number, nor an order, nor a conjunction, nor any other of the deficient parts; but it is a complete address and greeting to God, at the same time establishing the speaker in the thought of the power of God with the word. For God, as if greeting each of us who approach here, addresses [us] as "Know thyself," which is nothing less than "Hail." We, in turn, answering God, say "EI" (Thou art), ascribing as true and unfailing, and belonging to the Alone, the address of "being." For of existence, nothing really pertains to us, but every mortal nature, having come into the midst of decay and generation, affords an illusion and a dim and unstable opinion of itself. And if one wishes to grasp it by applying his intellect, just as the violent clutching of water by pressing and gathering it into the same place causes the leaking [substance] to perish—the very thing being grasped—so too, the discourse pursuing the excessive manifestation of each of the suffering and changeable things slips, partly into what it is becoming, and partly into what it is perishing, being unable to grasp anything that remains or that truly exists. For it is not possible to step twice into the same river, according to Heraclitus, nor to touch a mortal substance twice in its state, but through the sharpness and speed of change it scatters and again gathers, or rather, not even again, nor later, but at the same time it is established and leaves, and approaches and departs. Whence it does not attain to being in its becoming, since its generation never ceases nor stands still, but is always changing from seed to form an embryo, then an infant, then a child, a youth in succession, a young man, a man, an elder, an old man, destroying the first generations and ages with those that come after. But we laughably fear one death, having already died and dying so many times. For not only, as Heraclitus said, is the death of fire the generation of air, but even more clearly in ourselves: the mature person is destroyed as the old person comes into being, and the young person was destroyed into the mature one, and the child into the young one, and the infant into the child; and he who was yesterday has died into the one who is today, and the one today into the one tomorrow. Not one remains nor is one, but we become many, around a certain phantom and common mold of matter being driven about and slipping. Since how do we who remain the same take pleasure in different things now than we did before, love and hate and admire and blame the opposite things, use different words, [experience] different passions, no longer having the same form, nor shape, nor thought? For it is not likely that one experiences other things without change, nor that, while changing, he would be the same. But if he is not the same, he does not exist either, except by the fact of his own changing, becoming another from another; and sense perception is deceived by ignorance of the being that exists. What then is that which truly exists? That which is eternal and unbegotten and incorruptible, to which no time brings change. For time is something movable, and being imagined alongside moving matter, and always flowing, and not holding, as a vessel of decay and generation. Of which, that which is called "then" and "before" and "will be" and "has happened" is, from that very fact, an acknowledgment of that which does not exist. For to say of that which is in existence that it has ever happened or ceased to be, as if it exists, is foolish and absurd. And that upon which we most apply our thought—the "is present" and "is here" and "now" of time—the discourse, stripping this off, destroys it. For it is driven out into the future and the past, like a ray of light to those wishing to see, separating by necessity. And if the nature being measured suffers the same things as the one measuring, it is not itself stable nor existing, but is becoming and perishing according to the distribution toward time. Whence it is not possible to say of the "Being" anything such as "it was" or "it will be"; for these things are certain inclinations and changes and deviations of not being naturally stable in existence. But God is, if one must say so, and he is according to no time, but according to the aeon which is immovable and timeless and uninclined, and before which there is nothing, nor after, nor future, nor past, nor older, nor younger; but being one, he has filled the "always" with the one "now." And that which is truly being according to him is alone, not having happened nor destined to be, nor having begun nor destined to cease. Thus, therefore, one must worship him with reverence and address him, or, by Zeus, as some of the ancients [did], "EI HEN" (Thou art One). For the divine is not many, as each of us is, a manifold and festive assembly mixed together from myriad differences arising in the passions; but that which exists must be one, just as the One exists. But otherness, a difference of that which exists, departs into the generation of that which does not exist.

13. THAT THE DIVINE IS INEFFABLE

Since Moses and all the prophets among the Hebrews teach that the divine is ineffable, and signify the symbol of the ineffable appellation through the unuttered designation among them, Plato also agrees with these very words in the Great Epistle; listen to what he says: "For it is by no means expressible as other branches of learning, but from much dwelling together on the matter itself and from living together, suddenly, as if from a leaping fire, a light becomes kindled in the soul and then feeds itself." And another prophet of the Hebrews, having anticipated this example of the light, set it forth, saying: "The light of your face has been marked upon us, O Lord." And again another: "In your light we shall see light."

Let these things concerning the first Cause of all things thus be accepted by us as established. Now, however, enter into the contemplation of the second, which the oracles of the Hebrews teach to be the Word of God, and God from God, a theology in which we ourselves have been imbued and instructed. Moses, indeed, clearly acknowledges and declares two Lords, while he says: "And the Lord rained brimstone and fire from the Lord upon the city of the impious." In this place, according to his custom, he used a similar transposition of the characters among the Hebrews in both instances; this is the theology expressed by the four-letter name of the Divine Being, which is unpronounceable among them. David also, who was another prophet and at the same time a king of the Hebrews, agreeing with this, says: "The Lord said to my Lord, Sit at my right hand." By the first 'Lord' he indicated the Most High God, and by the second designation, he declared the one who is second to Him. For to whom else is it permissible to think that the right hand is granted by the Unbegotten Godhead but to Him alone of whom we speak? The same prophet clarifies this more clearly in other places, positing that it is the Word of the Father who is being theologized as the Maker of the universe, where he says: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established." And he also introduces the same one as Savior to those in need of his healing, saying: "He sent his word and healed them."

His son, also, and successor Solomon, expressing the same thought with a different term, calling Wisdom instead of the Word, recounts these things in her person: "I, Wisdom, have dwelt with counsel, and I have called upon knowledge and understanding." Then, a little later, he continues thus: "The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways for his works. Before the age he founded me, in the beginning before he made the earth, before the mountains were established. Before all the hills he begets me. When he was preparing the heaven, I was present with him." Of the same one, again, are these things: "God in Wisdom founded the earth, he prepared the heavens in prudence." Furthermore, these things are also said by the same one: "And all things that are hidden and manifest I knew; for Wisdom, the craftswoman of all things, taught me." Then he continues: "What, then, is Wisdom, and how was it begotten? I will declare it, and I will not hide mysteries from you, but I will trace it out from the beginning of its birth." And he subsequently clarifies such things as these: "For she is a spirit that is intelligent, holy, unique, manifold, subtle, easily moved, clear, undefiled, all-powerful, all-viewing, and permeating through all spirits that are intelligent, pure, and very subtle. For Wisdom is more moving than any motion."

CHAPTER XIV. Concerning the second principle of the Hebrews and Plato.

She passes and goes through all things because of her purity. ^A “For she is a breath of the power of God, and a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty. Therefore, nothing defiled enters into her. For she is the brightness of eternal light, and an unspotted mirror of the active power of God, and an image of his goodness.” ^B “She reaches from one end to another mightily, and she orders all things well.” This is what the Scripture says. Philo the Hebrew, interpreting this meaning of the doctrine more clearly, sets it forth in this manner.

CHAPTER XV. Concerning the second principle, according to Philo.

“For it is fitting,” he says, “for those who have entered into a society with knowledge of that which is, to be possessed by the desire of living; or, if they cannot do that, at least [to be possessed] by the image of him, that is, the most sacred Word.” ^C In the same book, he also has what follows: “Whoever is not yet worthy to be called a son of God, let him strive to adorn himself according to his firstborn Word, who is the most ancient of angels, and exists as an archangel with many names. For he is called Beginning, and Name of God, and Word, and the Man according to his image, and he who sees, Israel. Therefore, I was moved a little before to praise the virtues of those who say that we are all sons of one man. For even if we are not yet deemed capable of being God’s children, we can nevertheless be children of his most sacred Word, who is the image of God; for the Word is the most ancient image of God.” ^D And again he adds: “I have also heard one of the companions of Moses utter such a saying: ‘Behold, a man whose name is Rising [Oriens].’ A very strange way of addressing—if, indeed, you think he is to be called that who is composed of body and soul. But if you accept him as that incorporeal one, bearing the divine archetype, then you will most readily and willingly acknowledge that this name ‘Rising’ was most appropriately bestowed upon him. For the Parent of the universe caused this most ancient Son to rise, whom he also elsewhere called ‘Firstborn.’ And he, begotten of God, looking toward the archetypal patterns of him, adorned the forms.” Let this much from the Hebrew Philo be set down here, taken from the scroll which bears the title: *That the inferior is always hostile to the superior.* But since I have already elsewhere set forth the dogmas of the ancient Hebrews concerning piety and religion in this work of the *Evangelical Preparation*, and those things which pertain to the second principle have been sufficiently discussed by me according to my purpose, to which I now refer those who are eager for knowledge. So many things having been theologized among the Hebrews—and in this manner—concerning the second principle of all things, it is now time to hear also what Plato says in the *Epinomis*.

Chapter XVI. On the second principle, from Plato.

^A "And let us render honors," he says, "yet in such a way that we do not assign to one a year, to another a month, to others days, or any time at all in which each might complete its own revolution, while it hastens toward the perfection of the world, which the Word, most divine of all, has fashioned. This Word, whoever is blessed is wont, first, to admire, and then to be captivated by the love and study of knowing him, in so far as it is permitted to mortal nature."

The same author, in the letter which he wrote to Hermias, Erastus, and Coriscus, inserted the opinion of this dogma very prudently in these words: "It is fitting that this letter be read by you three, when you are gathered together; or, if not, by two, by turns and joined together, and that this be done as often as possible. Furthermore, let a pact and a law, ratified and fixed among you, be observed, such that you swear by that which is fair and good, and thus, bound together by mutual interest in learning—a sister to studiousness—you swear by God himself, the Ruler of all things, both present and future, and indeed the Master and Father of this Ruler and Principle; whom, if we but philosophize rightly, we shall all clearly and plainly know, in so far as blessed men are capable."

Does it not seem to you, while Plato says these things, that he is insisting upon the dogma of the Hebrews? For whence otherwise would it have entered his mind to call God a second—a being himself superior to the principle of all things that are procreated—nay, even the Father of the very moderator of the universe? Whence, further, to impose upon this very Father of the creator of all things the name of Lord? Which, in truth, had never before him touched the ears of the Greeks, nay, not even the minds of any mortals. But if, again, we need other testimonies for an indisputable demonstration of the philosopher's thought and the construction of his argument, hear what Plotinus, in the work he composed *On the Three Principle Substances*, sets forth in his writing. ^B

Chapter XVII. On the second principle, from Plotinus.

"If anyone," he says, "admires this visible world, its magnitude, its beauty, the order of its eternal revolution, and those who dwell within it, and the other stars—of which he speaks there as if they were true divinities—he speaks impiously."

^A

He then adds: "...considering also the animals and all the genera of plants—the same being its exemplar—and rising in thought to that which is far truer, let him behold all things there as spiritual; and there, in its own proper cognition and eternal life, let him behold that immutable mind, the moderator of all things, and the wisdom which is higher than any estimation."

Following these, he adds: "Who, then, has begotten this? The Simple One, who is prior to such a multitude, the Cause of why this exists and is manifold, the one who creates number? For number is not the first thing; for the One is prior to the dyad, and the dyad is second, and is generated from the One."

And again, proceeding, he adds: ^B "In what manner, then, and what must we think concerning that which remains the same? It is a certain radiance surrounding it, flowing indeed from it, but while it itself remains the same: such as the bright light of the sun moving around it, which is being produced from it continuously, while it yet remains the same. And indeed, whatever exists, as long as it remains, from its own substance, it inevitably transmits something outward that clings to it and always depends upon it—something which is, as it were, an express image of its exemplar from which it has proceeded. Even fire pours out its heat outside itself, and snow does not keep its coldness merely ^C enclosed within. But this is especially proven by every kind of odor; for from them, as long as they exist, something is exhaled around them, which communicates its power and fruit even to things adjacent to its nature."

Everything, since it reaches maturity and perfection, generates that which is always perfect and eternal; and it generates something less than itself. What, then, must one say about the Most Perfect One? That nothing comes out from it, except the things that are greatest after it. The greatest thing after Him is the mind, and it is second. For the mind beholds Him, and has need of Him alone; but He has no need of it. And that which is generated from the superior mind is itself mind; and the mind is superior to all things, because all other things are after it." Following these, he adds: "Everything, both that which has begotten and that which has been ^D begotten, desires..."

...in this way, it must look also toward the mind. But the mind likewise looks toward Him, so that it may be mind; and it beholds Him, not as being separated, but because it is after Him and there is nothing between them, just as there is nothing between the soul and the mind. For he says that the Mind is the Word of God who is according to us, since we ourselves also call it Wisdom. Yet we do not place Him among things that are lesser or second, as regards the preeminence and glory of the Father; nor, indeed, do we say that He is being perfected by gazing upon the Father, as if He did not possess self-perfection, as it seems to these men. They, indeed, thinking in this way and dragging down things that are admired by them into a dissimilarity of natures, pride themselves on cold and childish concepts. But we say that the Father is all-perfect, and likewise the Son, as perfect from Perfect; and indeed the Holy Spirit also.

Unfolding the thought of Plato, both Plotinus and Numenius say that he spoke of three things that are beyond time and eternal: The Good, and the Mind, and the Soul of the universe—that which we call the Father, naming Him the Good; and the Mind, which we call the Son and the Word; and that which animates all things and is the life-giving Power, which we call the Soul, which the divine oracles call the Holy Spirit.

^A This it loves, and especially when they are alone, both the generator and the generated. And when the generated is also perfect, the generator is of necessity present with it, so that they are separated by otherness alone. We say that the mind is an image of that one; for one must speak more clearly. And again he adds to these: "And for this reason also, Plato’s principles are threefold. He says that everything revolves around the King: the first around the first things, the second around the second things, and the third around the third things." He also says that the Father of the Cause exists, calling the mind the cause, for according to him the mind is the demiurge. This, he says, makes the soul in that mixing-bowl. But the Good, which is beyond mind and beyond essence, he calls the Father of the causal, intellectual Being. In many places he calls Being and Mind the Idea; so that Plato knows the mind from the Good, and the soul from the mind. And these accounts are not new, nor are they ^B today’s; rather, it is said that they were spoken of old, but not openly. The present accounts have become interpreters of those, confirming by testimonies that these opinions are ancient, by the very writings of Plato. So much for Plotinus. Numenius, on the other hand, who champions the doctrines of Plato, in his work *On the Good*, interprets the matter for himself while speaking about the second cause in this way.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Of the same, from Numenius.

"Whoever aspires to the knowledge of God, both the first and the second," he says, "must first distinguish each in its proper place and order elegantly and fittingly; and then, when it seems that things are already in good order, it is necessary to attempt to speak in an orderly manner; otherwise, not. For to attempt it in a more eager manner before the first things have been established—it is said that the treasure becomes ashes. ^C Do not—”

^A let the same thing, therefore, happen to us; let us be studiously on our guard, and consequently beseech God that He may be pleased to be the canon and rule of this our disputation, and to open to us the treasure of thoughts, so that we may thus finally make a beginning. For prayers must first be poured forth, and then one must proceed to an explained treatment of the subject. The first God, as He is in Himself, is altogether simple, because He who is entirely and perpetually conversant with Himself can never be severed or distracted. But the second and third God is one, yet the same, because He is borne about together with matter, which is indeed ^B a dyad, that He might conjoin it; yet He is divided by it, because it has a certain power of desiring and is fluid. Because, therefore, it is not directed toward the intelligible—for otherwise it would be directed toward itself—it becomes, because it looks at matter and takes care of it, unmindful of itself. And it touches the sensible and provides for it, and leads it back ^C as well, stretching toward its own character away from matter. » And after other things, he says: « For it is not proper for the first to be a creator, and it is necessary that the Father, the first God, be considered the Father of the creating ^D God. If, then, we are inquiring about the Creator, saying that the one who existed before must in this way act differently, this approach of the argument would be appropriate; but if the argument is not about the Creator, but we are inquiring about the first, I shrink from what has been said, and let those things be unspoken, and I will proceed to take the argument from elsewhere. However, before the argument of the exposition, let us agree with ourselves upon an understanding, which no one who hears could reasonably dispute: that the first God is free from all works and is King of the universe, but the creative God is the one who rules, passing through the heaven. And through Him is our procession also, the mind being sent down into the passage to all those who are arranged to have communion. For when God looks at and is turned toward each one of us, it happens that our bodies live and are sustained, as He tends to them with the shooting forth of God; but when God turns to His own vantage point, these things are extinguished, but the mind lives, enjoying a blessed life. » These are the words of Numenius. But do you set alongside these the things that were sung long ago among the Hebrews from the prophecy of David in this manner: « How magnified are Thy works, O Lord! In wisdom hast Thou made them all. The earth is filled with Thy creation; all look to Thee to give them their food in due season. When Thou hast given it to them, they will gather it; when Thou hast opened Thy hand, all things shall be filled with goodness. But when Thou hast turned away

^A Thy face, they shall be troubled; Thou shalt take away their spirit, and they shall fail, and they shall return to their dust. Thou shalt send forth Thy Spirit, and they shall be created, and Thou shalt renew the face of the earth." For how would these things differ from the opinion of the philosopher who asserts that, inasmuch as God looks upon and is turned toward each one of us, it comes to pass that our bodies both live and are kept in being by God’s darting rays; but when God turns toward His own lookout, these things are extinguished? Again, when the Savior’s Word says to us, "I am the vine, my Father is the husbandman, you are the branches," listen to what Numenius ^B theologizes regarding the second cause: "Just as again there is a rationale for a husbandman in relation to the things being planted, the same rationale applies, in the highest degree, to the first God in relation to the Creator. For the one, being the seed of every soul, sows into all things that participate in his possessions; but the legislator plants, and distributes, and transplants into each one of us the things that have been deposited from thence." And further on, regarding the question of how the second originated from the first cause, he says the following: "Whatever, having been given, passes over to the recipient, having departed from the giver, is ^C treatment, money, hollow coin, a mark; these things, therefore, are mortal and human. But the divine things are such as have been communicated, brought into being there from here, and yet have not departed from here—and having come into being there, they have benefited the one, while not harming the other, and have profited [the recipient] by the recollection of those things of which he had knowledge. And this good thing is the good knowledge, by which the one who has received it has benefited, yet the giver is not deprived of it. Just as you might see a lamp lit from another lamp, having light, which the former has not been taken away, but the material in it having been lit by the other’s fire; such a thing is knowledge, which, having been given and received, remains perfectly with the giver, and is present with the recipient." ^D

^A For the reason for this, O guest, is nothing human, but rather that the habit and essence which possesses knowledge is the same in the God who has given it as it is in the recipient, in both me and you. Hence, Plato also said that wisdom came to mankind beneath Prometheus, along with a most brilliant fire. And again, proceeding further, he says: “These are the lives: the one of the first, the other of the second God. Clearly, the first God shall be standard, while the second, conversely, is moving. The first, then, is concerned with intelligible things, the second with both intelligible and sensible things. Do not be surprised if I have said this; for you shall hear something even more amazing. For in place of the motion belonging to the second, I affirm that the station belonging to the first is a natural motion; from which the order of the cosmos, the eternal stability, and the salvation of all things are diffused.” ^B In addition to these things, in the sixth book he adds these words: “Since Plato knew that among men the Creator is known alone, but the first Intellect—which is what he is called—is altogether unknown to them, he spoke in this manner, just as one might say: ‘O men, the intellect that you suppose to exist is not the first, but there is another intellect besides this one, older and more divine.’” And after other things, he adds: “He says that a steersman, as it were, is borne in the middle, and sitting high above the rudder, directs the ship with the oars; his eyes and his mind are stretched straight through the ether towards the high places, and his path leads upwards through the heavens, while he sails below upon the sea. In this same way, the Creator, having bound together the matter—that it might neither clash ^C nor become disentangled—by means of harmony, is himself established above it, as one above a ship on the sea; he directs the harmony by steering with the oars, and instead of the heavens, he turns his eyes toward the higher God, and he receives the critical faculty from contemplation, and the impulsive faculty from desire.” And the Savior’s word among us says: “The Son can do nothing of himself, unless he see the Father doing something.” But indeed, such are the things that Numenius says concerning this. And there is no need to add anything to his own statements to clarify that these were not Plato’s own views. But that Plato did not use these interpretations for the first [God], even the fact that he was not seen to do so is evident. ^D For those around Simon wish to be made like unto the standing one, whom they worship. Regarding the one who is called the standing one, and the one who is moved, and that which is to be struck, and to be disentangled, and what is established above this—these are things that appear in his own words.

^A Having previously grasped those matters from the wise men of the Hebrews, it has been demonstrated through the things set forth. ^B Amelius, being distinguished as well, and himself, if any other, a keen student of Plato’s philosophy, yet having called the theologian of the Hebrews a "barbarian" (although he did not deign to mention the name of the evangelist John), nevertheless bears witness to his own words, writing these very things word for word.

CHAPTER XIX.

Concerning the theology of John, the evangelist among us, according to Amelius.

"And this Word," he says, "was indeed that through which, as it was eternal, all things that came into existence originated, just as Heraclitus would claim; and, by Zeus, it is he whom the barbarian considers to be established in the rank and dignity of the beginning with God, and to be God; through whom all things without exception have been made; in whom that which came into being was living, and life, and had its nature; and that He descends into bodies, and having put on flesh, appears as a man, while yet manifesting at that time the greatness of His nature; and, indeed, when dissolved, He is again deified, and is God, such as He was before He descended into body, and flesh, and man."

These things, which are certainly no longer obscurely shadowed but—as they say—openly and bare-facedly translated from that theology of the barbarian, no one can fail to see. But who, then, was that "barbarian" he speaks of, if not the evangelist of our Savior, John, who was a Hebrew of the Hebrews? His theology, at the very beginning of his own Gospel, is as follows: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. This was in the beginning with God. All things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made; in Him was life, and the life was the light of men. And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us. And we beheld his glory, glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father."

^A But hear what another theologian, also a Hebrew, declares regarding the same: "Who is," he says, "the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature, for in him were all things created, in heaven and in earth: and all things were set up through him, and all things were created in him, both visible and invisible." And as for what concerns the constitution and essence of the second Cause, thus far have the wise men of the Greeks been found to agree with the doctrine of the Hebrews. Let us then proceed to other matters.

CHAPTER XX.

On the three foundational substances.

^B The Hebrew oracles, after the discourse concerning the Father and the Son, count the Holy Spirit in the third rank, and declare the holy and blessed Trinity to be constituted in such a way that whatever generated nature exists, it is surpassed by this third potentiality. They describe it as being the first of the intelligible substances created through the Son, and the third from the first Cause. Observe how Plato also hinted at such things in his letter to Dionysius, saying: "It must be told to thee in riddles, so that if any tablet, whether by sea or by land, should suffer an accident, one who reads it might not understand. For this is how it stands: All things are around the King of all, ^C and on his account are all things, and he is the cause of all beautiful things; the second around the second, and the third around the third. Therefore the human soul is eager to learn what these things are, looking to those which are akin to itself." Those who attempt to interpret Plato refer these words to the first God, and to the second cause; but as to the third, they identify it as the soul of the world, calling it the third god. The divine scriptures, however, rank the holy and blessed Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—at the beginning of the discourse, according to what has been ^D acknowledged. It follows after these to examine the essence of the Good.

CHAPTER XXI.

On the essence of the Good.

The divine Scripture of the Hebrews testifies in many ways that the essence of the Good, and the Good itself, is nothing other than the nature and goodness of God, through such words as where it says: "The Lord is good to all who wait for him, to the soul that seeks him," and, "Confess to the Lord, for he is good, for his mercy is for ever." Through which also our Savior, when asked regarding this, declared, saying: "Why do you ask me about the good? There is no one good except one, God." Hear what Plato says in the Timaeus: "Let us say, then, for what cause the author and artificer decided to give rise to generation, and to fashion this universe. He was good; but in the good, no jealousy concerning anything ever arises." Let us say, then.

that ^A envy is far from Him; and, being outside of this, He desired that all things should be as similar to Himself as possible. And in the *Republic*, he says these things: "Does the sun, although it is not itself sight, appear to be the cause of it?" "Most certainly," he says. "Then understand," I said, "that I call this the offspring of the Good, which the Good generated analogous to itself: as that is in the intelligible realm in relation to intellect and the things understood, so this is in the visible realm in relation to sight and the things seen." And he adds thereafter: "This, then, which furnishes truth to the things known and bestows upon the knower the power [of knowing], say that it is the idea of the Good." And again he says: "You will say, I suppose, that the sun provides to visible things not only the power of being seen, but also their generation, growth, and nourishment, even though it is not itself generation; for how could it be?" In the same way, then, for the things known, say that it is not only through the Good that they are known, but that their very being ^B and their essence is present to them from it, the Good not being essence itself, but exceeding essence in dignity and power. Through these words, Plato most clearly says that not only is the being known to the intelligible essences present from the Good—that is to say, from God—but that they possess their very being and essence from Him; and that the Good is not an essence, but is beyond essence, exceeding it in dignity and power. So that they are not to be considered consubstantial, nor even to be thought of as unbegotten, since they have received both their being and their essence from Him who is not an essence, but is beyond essence, exceeding it in dignity and power; whom, indeed, the Hebrew oracles rightly proclaim as the only God, as He who is the cause of all things. Therefore, ^C it is not reasonable to consider those things as gods which possess neither their being nor their essence from themselves, nor even share in the nature of the Good, since the Good is not naturally present in them. For this must be attributed to one alone, and to no other, to the one Good, whom Plato wonderfully proclaimed as being beyond all essence, and exceeding it in dignity and power. Again, Numenius, in his books *On the Good*, interpreting the thought of Plato, discusses it in this way.

CHAPTER XXII. Words of Numenius concerning the Good.

"We are able," he says, "to grasp the nature of bodies, while we look partly at the states of other similar things, ^D and partly at the marks that are innate and obvious to everyone in things at hand. But there is no way whatsoever to grasp the nature of the Good, neither from the sight of any present thing, nor—

^A of any sort, which can be perceived by the senses, we cannot. But it is necessary, just as if someone, sitting on a high watchtower, were to look with a keen eye and at a single glance perceive in their entirety one tiny boat in the middle of the sea—one of those fishing vessels which alone usually appear, stripped of all company and hemmed in by alternating waves—so too, anyone at all, separated far from every use and intercourse of things which are perceived by sense, should converse with the Good alone, solely in a place where neither man, nor any ^B other animal, nor any body, whether large or small, occurs, but a certain vast and entirely unspeakable, and truly divine, solitude: in which the character, the habits, and the delights of the Good dwell, and it itself enjoys the Good in the greatest peace and in a certain most placid tranquility of soul, and as the prince it resides over the entire nature that is propitious to all. For anyone who, while being assiduous and entirely occupied with those things which strike the senses, forms a notion of the Good as if it were flying down to him, and then, as a man of refined ^C and luxurious habits, thinks he has acquired familiarity with the Good, is vehemently mistaken. For it must be sought not by an easy or ludicrous method, but by a certain plainly divine art and industry. In which kind it will be excellent indeed to pass over all those things which fall under the sense, to apply oneself courageously and ardently to the mathematical disciplines, and when one has perceived the distinctions and reasons of numbers, then at last to occupy oneself with constant meditation on this question: What is the One and what sort of thing is it? 544 These things are in the first book of Numenius; but what follows, in the fifth: ^D "Now," he says, "if both essence and idea are something spiritual, and if we confess that the Mind is older than both, and is even the cause of both, it is necessary that it alone be the Good. For if the artificer God is the principle of generation, the Good itself will be the principle of essence. Indeed, even as that artificer God has something of likeness and affinity with the Good, whose emulator he is, so too generation has a certain likeness and affinity with essence, of which it is a kind of image and imitation. But if the artificer of generation is good, the artificer of essence will be goodness itself, and immersed in the reason and nature of essence. For the second, indeed, being himself twofold, and he also an artificer, first creates both his own idea and this world, but then he is entirely occupied in contemplation. Therefore, that we may collect the four names of things, these four may be: the first God, who is the Good itself by itself; his emulator, the good artificer; essence, which is twofold, the one of the first, the other of the second, of which the beautiful world is an imitation, as the nexus of the discourse requires. However, it must either be added or certainly supplied: he calls [it] the discourse, I think, the common and, by the mouth of philosophers, well-worn discourse, which would have nothing at all of the exquisite, of which kind is what follows, of the Good of the Good, and thus that the idea of the divine artificer is."

^A And in the *Republic* he calls the Good, "the idea of the Good," as if indeed the Good were the idea of the Creator, who is revealed to us as good by participation in the first and only Good. For just as men are said to be fashioned by the human idea, and oxen by the idea of the ox, and horses by the idea of the horse; so also, reasonably, if the Creator is good by participation in the first good, the first intellect would be the idea, which is the Good-itself.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Concerning the Platonic ideas.

"Thus, therefore, having been generated," (that is to say the world,) "it was fashioned according to the imitation of something capable of being grasped by reason and intelligence, and which always remains in the same state." ^B And these things being so, it is altogether necessary for this world to be an image of something. For the intelligible living beings encompass all that within themselves, just as this world does us. These things Plato says in the *Timaeus*. I shall bring forth the meaning of what has been said from the writings of Didymus concerning the doctrines of Plato. He writes as follows: "By defining certain fixed patterns for the things naturally perceptible as being according to species, which he called ideas, Plato established that for these things, knowledge and definitions are appropriately formed. For over and above all men, a man is conceived; and over and above all horses, a horse; ^C and in general, over and above all animals, an animal [that is] ungenerated and imperishable. Just as many impressions are made from one seal, and many images of one man [are produced]; so from each single idea, countless natures of perceptible bodies exist; for example, from the idea of humans, all humans, and similarly for the others according to nature. And the idea, he wills to be an eternal essence, the cause and principle for each thing being such as it [the idea itself] is. Therefore, just as the particular [things] follow the archetypal, as it were, of the perceptible bodies, so that [idea], containing in itself all things, being most beautiful and perfect, exists as the pattern of this world. For having been assimilated to this, ^D the world was fashioned by the God who created it, according to providence, out of the whole of essence." These things [are] also from the aforementioned man. Moses the all-wise is ahead of these things, [speaking] before the visible sun and stars, and before the visible heaven, which indeed...

^A he calls the firmament, and before the dry land of our world, and before our day and night, teaching that a light distinct from that of the sun, as well as day and night and the rest, were made by God, the universal governor and cause of all things. But the sons of the Hebrews who came after Moses also define a certain incorporeal sun, not visible to all nor subject to mortal eyes, as the prophet says in the person of God: "But unto you that fear me shall the sun of righteousness arise." And another Hebrew prophet, speaking of God, knew this righteousness itself—not as some quality in men, but as its very idea—when he said: "Who has raised up righteousness from the east? He has called it to his face, and it shall go as it were before the nations." ^B And our shared discourse also recently presented, from the earlier parts of the Hebrew Scriptures, the divine Word, incorporeal and essential. Concerning this Word, the following is also said among them: "Who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption." It is also called life, it is called wisdom, it is called truth; and the Hebrew discourses teach that all things that exist and subsist according to essence—if, indeed, the Hebrews, as well as the apostles and disciples of our Savior, who are numbered among the Hebrews, are to be trusted—[likewise teach of] ten thousand other incorporeal powers, both beyond the heaven and all material and flowing substance, whose images they say have been stamped upon sensible things. ^C Wherefore they have already taken up the name of "image;" for they say distinctly that man is an image of the intelligible exemplar, and that the whole life of man passes through in an image. Moses says: "And God made man, in the image of God made he him." And again, another Hebrew, philosophizing according to the ancestral rite, says: "Nevertheless, man passes through entirely in an image." And now, hear how the interpreters of the sacred laws make clear the meaning in the writings of Moses. The Hebrew Philo, interpreting the ancestral rites, says in these very words:

CHAPTER XXIV. On Mosaic ideas, from Philo.

^A If any one, he says, wishes to use plainer words, he would say that the intelligible world is nothing other than the Word of God for one already busied in creating the world. For the intelligible city is nothing other than the reason of the architect who is already pondering how to build the city that he has formed in his mind. And this doctrine is Moses', not mine. For when he describes the creation of man, ^B proceeding a little further, he confesses explicitly that he was fashioned after the image of God. If a part of the world is an image of an image, it is evident that the whole species, this entire sensible world, if it be greater than man, is in turn an imitation of the divine image; and the archetypal seal, which we call the intelligible world, would itself be the pattern, the archetypal idea of ideas, the Word of God. He says that in the beginning God made heaven and earth; taking "beginning" not, as some think, in the sense of time—for time did not exist before the world, but either came into being with it or after it—for since time is an interval of the world's motion, and there could be no motion prior to that which is moved, ^C but it must necessarily follow or exist simultaneously with it, therefore time must necessarily have come into being either equal in age to the world or more recent than it; for to assert that it is older is to speak like a man unversed in philosophy. If then "beginning" is not here taken as having to do with time, it is likely that it signifies "in number," so that "in the beginning he made" is equivalent to "first he made heaven." Then he says immediately after: Therefore the Creator, God, being without body, first created heaven, and invisible earth, and the idea of air and void. One of these he called darkness, because air is dark by nature; the other, the abyss—for the void ^D is deep and vast; and then the bodiless substance of water and spirit; and above all, the seventh, light, which was again bodiless, and an intelligible archetype of the sun, and of all those light-bearing stars that were to be established in heaven. And the spirit and the light were deemed worthy of privilege; for he termed the spirit God's, because spirit is most vital, and God is the cause of life; and the light, because it is surpassingly beautiful. For the intelligible is so much brighter and more luminous than the visible, as the sun, I think, is brighter than darkness, and day than night; and the criteria of the whole soul is the mind, the ruler, [index: entries preserved]

^A the exemplar of those stars which were to be produced thereafter. For he desired the Spirit and the light to be something exceptional and preeminent: for the former he named the Spirit of God, because the Spirit most especially fosters life, of which God is the author; and the latter, the light, because it is conspicuous for its excellent beauty. For that light which is perceived by the mind is certainly as much more illustrious and splendid than this visible light, as the darkness of the sun or the night of the day, or the power and faculty of sensation, is surpassed by the splendor of the mind, the ruler of the whole soul, or indeed by that of the body of the eyes. Furthermore, that light, perceived by the mind alone and not by sight, expressed the image of the divine Word, the interpreter of its own origin, a star higher than the heaven and a fountain of visible stars, which you might rightly and significantly call the universality of light, from whence the sun, the moon, and the other stars, both fixed and wandering, draw a fitting splendor according to the strength of each, while that pure and simple radiance gradually grows dim, when it has begun to change from this spiritual state into the visible one. For nothing which falls under the senses is pure. » And after a few words he adds: « But when the light had come into existence, and the darkness had withdrawn and given way, and boundaries had been fixed and established in the intervening spaces, namely evening and morning, as the necessary measure of time demanded, that which was perfected was immediately called by him day; and not the first day, but one day, and that on account of the solitude of that spiritual world, which has a unity annexed to it by nature. And now that incorporeal ^B world had attained its own perfection, established in the divine Word, when this visible world was finished according to the exemplar of it. Of this, the Architect fashioned the heaven as the best part of all, and its prince, which he truly and properly called the firmament, inasmuch as it is endowed with a body. For a body is by its nature firm, and likewise capable of three-fold division. For what other notion of the firm and of a body is there, than that of a thing which you can divide from every part? Therefore, with good reason, contrasting this visible and corporeal one with the spiritual and incorporeal one, he called it firm. » Thus far Philo. And Clement, in his sixth [Stromata], pursues what is plainly akin and similar to him in this manner.

CHAPTER XXV. Of the same, from Clement.

^A Well then, does Plato seem to you to follow this, while, in the world which the mind alone conceives, he leaves behind the ideas of living creatures, and struggles on behalf of the variety of spiritual genera? Yet, Moses justly proclaims this body—which by Plato is called a terrestrial tabernacle—to have been fashioned from the earth; but he recounts that the soul, endowed with reason, was breathed from above by God into the face. For there, they say, the ruling faculty is established, interpreting the entry of the soul into the first-formed man as an arrival by way of the senses; hence also it is said that man was made according to the image and likeness. For the image of God is the divine and kingly Word, man exempt from suffering; but the image of the image is the human mind. But let us hear what follows.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Concerning contrary natures, according to the doctrine of the Hebrews and Plato.

Furthermore, Plato, having followed the doctrine of the Hebrews, posits not only non-corporeal and benign natures, but also others that are hostile and destructive, writing in the tenth book of the *Laws* in this manner: ^B “Must we not necessarily admit that the soul which governs all things, and dwells in all things that are moved everywhere, also governs the heaven itself? What then? Shall we posit one or several? Several, I shall answer in your place. Let us at any rate not posit fewer than two: one that is beneficent and benign, and the other endowed with a contrary power and capacity.” Then, progressing further, he says: “For since it has now been agreed among us that the heaven is full of many good things, but also of contrary things, yet with which no other kind is mixed, it is certain that this contest is immortal and requires unique caution. But even as gods and demons assist us, so in turn we are a kind of possession of the gods and demons.” ^C Whence these thoughts came into Plato’s mind, I cannot for my part say; but this I can truly pronounce, that six hundred years before Plato was born, the Hebrews had already professed this same kind of doctrine. Indeed, in their sacred writings it is thus recorded: “And it was the day that the angels of God arrived, that they might stand before God, and the devil also arrived in their midst, when he had circled the earth and walked about it.” In which place, by the name of the devil, that hostile nature is designated, while by the name of the angels of God, other, beneficent natures are signified. These better natures they call divine spirits and ministers of God, while they say, “Who makest thy angels spirits, and thy ministers a flaming fire.” ^D But [the Apostle] also sets forth the conflict of these contraries, saying: “Our struggle is not against blood and flesh, but against authorities, against the world-rulers of the darkness of this age, against the spiritual forces of wickedness.”

^A Indeed, it seems that Plato clearly interprets the saying of Moses, which states, “When the Most High divided the nations, when He scattered the sons of Adam, He set the boundaries of the nations according to the number of the angels of God,” through whom He determined that the entire race of men should be the possession of gods and demons.

CHAPTER XXVII.

On the immortality of the soul, according to the doctrine of the Hebrews and Plato.

Now, regarding the immortality of the soul, Plato does not differ in opinion from Moses. For the latter did not simply fix the soul in man as an immortal substance, but taught that it exists as an image of God, or rather, that it was made according to the image of God. For he says, “God said, Let us make man according to our image and likeness. And God made man; according to the image of God He made him.” And subsequently, dividing the composite being in his discourse into both the visible body and that which is understood by the soul, he adds: ^B “And God took dust from the earth, and fashioned man, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.” Moreover, he says that he was also made the ruler and king of all things upon the earth. He says, therefore: “And let them rule over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the sky, and over the cattle of all the earth. And God made man; according to the image of God He made him.”

But how else could the image and likeness of God be conceived, if not by the imitation of the divine faculties and the likeness of virtue? In these matters, Plato, as if he had been a disciple of Moses, philosophizes thus in the ^C *Alcibiades*: “Can we then say that there is anything in the soul more divine than that in which intelligence and wisdom reside? We cannot. That part of it, therefore, is like the divine; and anyone looking into this, and knowing all that is divine—God and wisdom—would thus also know himself most perfectly. For it appears that, just as mirrors are much clearer and purer and brighter than the reflection in the eye, so God is purer and brighter than that which is best in our own soul.” “It is so, Socrates.” “Looking then to God, we would use Him as the most beautiful mirror, and to the virtue of the soul in human affairs; and thus we would most clearly see ^D and know ourselves.” “Yes.” These things are indeed in [the *Alcibiades*].

But in the dialogue *On the Soul*, treating this topic more fully and at greater length, he speaks as follows: “Shall we assume, tell me,” he said, “two kinds of things: the visible and the invisible?” ^B “Let us assume it,” he said. “And the invisible as always remaining the same, while the visible never remains the same?” “Let us assume this too,” he said. “Come now,” he said, “is there any other part of us that is body, and another that is soul?” “Nothing else,” he said. “To which kind, then, would we say the body is more similar and related?” “To everyone,” he said, “this is clear: that it is to the visible.” “And what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?” “Not to human beings, Socrates,” he said. “But we were speaking of things visible and invisible according to human nature, or do you think otherwise?” “According to human nature.” “What then? Do we say the soul is visible or invisible?” “Not visible.” “Invisible, then?” “Yes.” “Therefore, the soul is more similar to the invisible, and the body to the visible?” “This is absolutely necessary, Socrates.” “And did we not also say this: that the soul, when it uses the body to examine something, either through seeing, or hearing, or some other sense (for this is what it means to examine something through the body, that is, through the senses), is then dragged by the body into the realm of things that never remain the same; and it itself wanders and is confused and becomes dizzy, as if it were drunk, because it is in contact with such things?” “Exactly.” “But when it ^C examines something by itself, it departs to that realm which is pure, and always existing, and immortal, and unchanging; and as it is related to it, it is always with it, whenever it happens to be by itself, and it is permitted to do so. And it ceases from its wandering, and with respect to those things, it is always the same and unchanging, since it is in contact with such things. And this state of the soul is called wisdom.” “You speak, Socrates, absolutely well and truly.” “To which kind, then, does it seem to you, both from what was said before and what is being said now, that the soul is more similar and related?” “Everyone, even the dullest, I think, would agree, Socrates, from this method of reasoning, that the soul is in every respect more similar to that which is always the same than to that which is not.” “And what of the body?” “To the other.” “Consider this also: that when soul and body are together, nature commands the one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. And according to this, which of the two seems to you similar to the divine, and which to the mortal? Or does it not seem to you that the divine is innately suited to rule and lead, while the mortal is suited to be ruled and to serve?” “It does indeed.” “To which, then, does the soul appear similar?” “Clearly, Socrates, the soul to the divine, and the body to the mortal.” “Consider, then,” he said, “Cebes, if it results for us from everything that has been said: that the soul is most similar to the divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and uniform, and indissoluble, and that which is always the same and remains the same as itself; while the human, and mortal, and unintelligent, and multiform, and dissoluble, and that which never remains the same as itself, is most similar ^D

to the latter. Can we say anything to the contrary in this, my dear Cebes, or do you think otherwise? We do not. What then? Since these things are so, does it not become the body to be quickly dissolved, and the soul to be absolutely indissoluble, or something very near to it? How could it be otherwise? Consider then, he said: when a man dies, his visible part—the body—which is laid in a visible place, which we call a corpse, which is subject to dissolution and falling apart and breathing away—does it not immediately suffer these things, but rather remains for a considerable time? And if someone dies while their body is in a fair state, or in that season, even for a very long time. For the body, when it has collapsed and been embalmed, as those embalmed in Egypt, remains almost whole for an unimaginable length of time. Or even some parts of the body, should it decay—such as bones and sinews and all such things—are they, so to speak, immortal, or not? Indeed. ^B But the soul, then—that invisible thing which is departing into another place such as this, noble, and pure, and invisible, into Hades, truly, to the good and wise God, to whom, if God wills, my soul also must go forthwith—is this, then, which is of such a nature and so constituted, immediately upon being released from the body, dispersed and lost, as most men say? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias. But it is much rather the case as follows: If it departs pure from the body, dragging nothing with it, as it did not willingly participate with it in life, but fled from it and collected itself into itself, inasmuch as it was always practicing this—(and this is nothing else but truly philosophizing and easily practicing how to die; or would this not be a practice of death? —Most certainly)—then, being in such a state, it departs to that which is its own, the invisible, the divine, the immortal, and the wise; having arrived at which, it falls to its lot to be happy, freed from wandering, and folly, and fears, and wild loves, and the other evils of humanity. As is said of the initiated, it truly spends the remaining time with the gods. Shall we say this, Cebes, or otherwise? So it is, by Zeus, said Cebes. ^C But if, I suppose, it departs polluted and impure, as it was always with the body, and serving it, and loving it, and enchanted by it—by its desires and pleasures—so that it thinks nothing else to be true except that which is corporeal, which one could touch, and see, and drink, and eat, and use for carnal pleasures; and that which is for the eyes dark, and invisible, and intelligible, and which philosophy chooses, this it has become accustomed to hate, and to shudder at, and to flee: do you think a soul in such a state will depart unto itself pure and unalloyed? Not in the least, he said. These are Plato's words. Porphyry unfolds the thought, writing in the first of his works *Against Boethus On the Soul* in this manner.

CHAPTER XXVIII. On the same matter, from Porphyry.

^A To defend the immortality of the soul, he says, that argument seemed prompt and firm to Plato which is derived from the principle of similarity. For if the divine nature, which is both immortal and cannot be seen, or dissipated, or dissolved, but holds its essence established in integrity itself, is akin to the soul; why should the soul not be of that same kind, which imitates its own archetype? For when, where two supreme things are found to be opposed to one another—such as that which is endowed with reason and that which is devoid of reason—there is doubt about some third thing as to in whose class and number it should be placed: then that method of demonstration is also wont to be employed, by which it is shown to which of the two it is similar. For thus, even though the first age of the human race labors under a lack of reason and judgment, and many besides, even unto old age, stumble in many things through imprudence and rashness: yet because the human race is conjoined through the society of many similarities to that nature whose reason is integral and sincere, it is believed to have been possessed of reason from the very beginning. ^B Since, therefore, that divine assembly of the gods, as is agreed, can never suffer any detriment, while on the contrary, the terrestrial race is seen by everyone to be subject to corruption: in that doubt, truly, in which some hesitate as to whether they ought to join the soul to [the divine] genus, Plato judged that the truth should rightly be investigated from similarity. ^C And since it has no affinity with that nature which can be dissolved, which lacks both mind and life, and which, being accustomed to be perceived by touch and the other senses, is born and extinguished at the same time: but it has very much in common with that which is divine and immortal, which is perceived not by sight but by the mind, which is a participant in life and akin to truth, and furnished with the other gifts which the philosopher recognizes in the soul: he could never be induced to concede that other similarities of God were to be found in it, while denying the conjunction and affinity of essence, for the sake of which alone it is called into the communion of the other endowments.

For just as those things that are dissimilar to God in their operations were at once widely separated in the constitution of their essence, so it is consequent that those things which are partakers of the same operations should attain to a similarity of essence as well. For because of a certain kind of essence, the operations also are of a certain kind, as if flowing from it and being its own blossoms. Boethus, therefore, attempting to remove the force of this argument—hearken to his words, written at the very beginning of his discourse: «If the soul is immortal, and is a nature superior to every destruction, it is necessary that it should have awaited many and should have searched...»

≫ ^A for arguments to demonstrate this. However, that there is nothing in our experience more similar to God than the soul, one might believe without much difficulty; not only because of the continuous and unceasing motion which it imparts to us, but also because of the intellect that belongs to it. Regarding this, the natural philosopher of Croton (83) also looked, saying that it is immortal and by nature shuns all stillness, just like the divine bodies. And indeed, if one considers the whole idea of the soul, and especially the intellect that governs us—how immense are the plans and what kind of impulses it often stirs up—a great likeness to God will appear to the observer. ^B And subsequently he adds: «For if the soul is shown to be most similar to the divine of all things, what further need is there for other arguments to prove its immortality, in the way of a preface, and not to count this one among the many, which is enough to overturn the well-disposed? For it surely would not have shared in the activities similar to the divine, were it not itself divine? For if, even though it is buried in the mortal, corruptible, and mindless body—which is in itself a corpse, always perishing and flowing away into the change of destruction—it still acts and holds it together, and reveals its own divine substance, even though it is obstructed and hindered by the thoroughly destructive form of the body placed before it; how much more, if it were separated by reason, like gold from the surrounding mud, would it not then immediately reveal its own form, not only as similar to God, but also, because it partakes of Him and preserves the likenesses in its activities, and because it is not dissolved in its mortal state (as it is when it is imprisoned in the mortal), because it is of a nature devoid of corruption?» And descending, he says: ^C «It is also reasonably seen as divine from its likeness to the indivisible; and mortal from what it approaches in the mortal nature, and it descends, and ascends, and is mortal-like, and similar to the immortal. For man is both he who gluttonously stuffs himself and strives to be sated, like the cattle; and yet man is also he who, through science, is able to save the ship in the dangers of the sea, and to save it in sickness; and he who finds truth, and devises methods for the grasping of knowledge, and for the discovery of fire and the observation of horoscopes, and for the fashioning of imitations of the Creator's works. For man has devised ^D on earth the creation of the cycles of the seven planets with their movements, imitating by machines those in the heavens. And what has he not devised, demonstrating the divine intellect within him that is rendered equal to God? From these, displaying the feats of the Olympian and divine, and by no means mortal [intellect], he has persuaded the many—who, because of their own selfish inclination toward earthly things, are unable to see it—to think of it as mortal-like, similar to themselves, based on external appearances; this being the one way that comfort is sought from vice: that by comparing their own wretchedness with the things appearing externally, they persuade themselves that all men are inwardly the same as they are outwardly.»

(83) The natural philosopher of Croton: Pythagoras, it is believed. For Pythagoras is said to have been the school of Italian philosophy in Croton above all others.

^A Moses, it has turned out, was the teacher of all these things, who, in setting forth the first generation of man according to the aforementioned expressions, confirmed the arguments concerning the immortality of the soul through likeness to the Divine. But since the account concerning the incorporeal and invisible substance is consistent and in agreement between Moses and Plato, it is time to examine the remaining parts of the philosophy of Plato, and to show that the man was, in all respects, a lover of the Hebrews; unless perhaps, having been led astray, he was moved to utter some argument more human than true. Immediately, as many of the things said by the man as have been spoken successfully would harmonize with the doctrines of Moses; while as many as he supposed that were not pleasing to Moses and the prophets could not have a consistent argument. This, however, we shall demonstrate in its proper time. For the present, since it has been discovered that what has been posited in the contemplation of intelligible things is consistent and in agreement, it is time, having moved on again to the natural philosophy of sensible things, to run over briefly the agreement of the man with the Hebrews.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Moses having declared that this whole was created by God; for beginning his own writing, he says: «In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.» And again, after the individual parts, he adds: «This is the book of the generation of heaven and earth, when the day was made in which God created the heaven and the earth.» Hear now how Plato does not deviate from that sentiment, writing in this manner himself also: «Everything that comes to be must necessarily come to be by the agency of some cause; for it is entirely impossible for anything to have a coming-to-be without a cause.» And he adds: «Let this, then, be the name for the whole heaven and world (85), or whatever other name it might most especially accept.» We must consider concerning it, therefore, first, which is the thing that must be considered at the beginning regarding everything: whether it was always, having no beginning of generation, or whether it has come to be, having started from some beginning; for it is visible and tangible and has a body. And all such things are sensible; but sensible things are by opinion

and perceptible phenomena which have come to be. Hence, we say that whatever has come to be must necessarily have done so by some cause. Now, to find the maker and father of this universe is a task, and having found him, it is impossible to speak of him to all." And again, he proceeds: "Thus, then, according to the likely account, we must state that this world has come to be a living creature, endowed with soul and intelligence, in truth by the providence of God."

Chapter XXX. On the lights of heaven.

Moses, furthermore, assigned the origin of the heavenly luminaries to God with these words: "And God said: Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven, to shine upon the earth, and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years. And God made the two great lights, and the stars; and he set them in the firmament of the heaven." ^B In which sentiment Plato says: "By the reason, therefore, and divine mind, the course of time was invented for the origin of the sun and moon and the other five stars, which are called wanderers, for the distinguishing and preserving of the numbers of time. And when God had made the bodies of each of them, he placed them in their revolutions." Observe here, then, whether what Plato said—"by the reason and divine mind"—might be very similar to what is said among the Hebrews: "By the word of the Lord were the heavens established, and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth." Moreover, when Moses said: "And he set them in the firmament of the heaven," Plato also employs a similar expression, for he says: "And when God had made the bodies of each of them, he set them in their revolutions." ^C

CHAPTER XXXI. That all the works of God are good.

And since the Hebrew Scripture, at each of the works of creation, declares: "And God saw that it was good," and when it summarizes everything, stating: "And God saw all things, and behold, they were very good," hear also Plato speaking: "If then this world is good, and its Artificer is good, it is manifest that he looked to the eternal." And again: "For it is the most beautiful of generated things, and he is the best of causes."

CHAPTER XXXII. On the alteration and mutation of the world.

^D The whole Hebrew Scripture testifies to the alteration and change of the world, as when it says: "And the heaven shall be rolled up like a book" (Isa. xxxiv, 4); and again, when it adds: "And there shall be a new heaven and a new earth, which I make to remain before me, saith the Lord" (Isa. lxv, 17); and yet again elsewhere: "For the figure of the world passeth away."

^A And hear how Plato establishes this doctrine concerning these things, saying in the Timaeus: "From this conjunction, he says, the heaven was fashioned, visible and tangible; and for this reason, from these things and from the four elements, the body of the world was brought into being, having attained harmony through proportion; and it possessed friendship therefrom, so that, having been joined together in itself, it should be indissoluble by any other, except by Him who bound it together." Then he proceeds to say: "Time, therefore, came into being together with the heaven, so that, having been born at the same time, they might also be dissolved at the same time, if any dissolution should ever come to pass for them." And again, having said, "Ye gods of gods, of whom I am the creator, and the father of works, which, having been fashioned by me, are indissoluble because I so will it," he adds the following: "Whatever has been bound is indeed dissoluble; but to wish to dissolve that which has been beautifully joined and is well-ordered is the act of a wicked being. Therefore, since ye have been born, you are not immortal, nor entirely indissoluble. ^B Yet you shall not be dissolved, nor meet with the fate of death, having obtained a bond and a more sovereign principle than those with which you were bound when you were brought into being." And in the *Statesman* the same author says: "For this entire universe, at one time God himself guides it, going along with it and revolving it; and at another time he leaves it alone, when the periods have already fulfilled the measure of time proper to it; and then again it is turned back of its own accord in the opposite direction, being a living creature, and having received wisdom from Him who originally fashioned it. And why does it need to go back again in this way? For what reason? - Because to remain doing the same things and in the same way, and to be the same, belongs only to the most divine things of all; but the nature of a body is ^C not of this order. Which heaven and world that we have named has indeed shared in many and blessed gifts from its Maker; but nevertheless, because it has also shared in a body, it is impossible for it to be completely exempt from change for all time. Yet, according to its ability, it moves in the same way and by the same path as much as possible, because it has obtained a rotation with the smallest possible deviation from its own motion. But for it to revolve itself eternally is not possible for anyone, except for Him who leads all things that are moved. But to move it at one time in one way, and again in the opposite way, is not fitting. Therefore, from all these things, the world should not be declared to be always revolving itself, nor to be turned about by God in two opposite rotations; nor again that there are two gods, thinking opposite things, who turn it. But as was just said, only one thing remains: at one time to be guided by another divine cause, once again gaining life, and receiving immortality, and being repaired [as it were]."

^A And to go by its own path when it has been released at the proper time, so as to travel back for many myriads of periods, because, "being the greatest and most perfectly balanced, it travels upon the smallest possible pivot." It clearly appears, then, and that most reasonably, that everything you have gone through has been well said.

"But having considered the matter, let us understand the effect from what has now been said, which we claimed to be the cause of all these marvels. For it is indeed this very thing."

What is it?

"That the rotation of the universe should at one time be carried in the direction in which it now revolves, and at another time in the opposite direction."

How so?

"This change must be considered the greatest and most perfect change of all the shifts occurring in the heavens."

It certainly seems so.

"Therefore, we must consider that the greatest changes occur at that time to those of us dwelling within it." ^B That is probable.

"And are we not aware that the nature of living creatures puts up with neither many, nor great, nor varied shifts occurring at once?"

How could we not be?

"Therefore, of necessity, the greatest disasters befall the other living creatures at that time, and the human race itself is left behind only in small number. And along with these, many other strange and marvelous calamities occur; but the greatest, and one that follows upon the reversal of the universe, is when the shift occurs that is contrary to the one now established."

Having paved the way with all this, he connects it in sequence to the resurrection of the dead, being moved in a manner similar to the beliefs of the Hebrews, and adds these words.

CHAPTER XXXIII. Of the resurrection of the dead, from the same.

"But then, my friend," he says, "what was the origin of living creatures, and in what manner were they generated from one another?"

"It is clear, Socrates, that in that state of nature, none were generated from one another; but that the species called 'earth-born,' which is said to have existed formerly, was that which was then, at that time, ^C reverting back again from the earth."

"And this was recorded by our first ancestors, they who were neighbors to the time immediately following the final revolution, and who were born at the beginnings of this current age. For they were the heralds of these accounts to us, which are now..."

CHAPTER XXXII. De resurrectione mortuorum, ex eodem.

"Tum vero, mi hospes, inquit, animantium ortus qui tandem erat? aut quemadmodum ex aliis alii gignebantur? Enimvero liquet, Socrates, eo naturæ statu, alia ex aliis genita fuisse nulla; sed tum illud fuisse genus, quod ex terræ sinu rursus effusum ^D esse perhibetur. Quod quidem principes illi majores nostri commemorarunt; qui cum sub conversionis hujus initia sati essent, tempore proxime postremam illam excipiente vixerunt. Quippe huius illos famæ..."

famæ, ^A of which many are today too rashly and lightly disbelieved, we have had as heralds. For what follows from this, I think, we ought primarily to consider. For it is logically consistent that, since old men return to the nature of children, and conversely those who have died and been buried in the earth are once again gathered together and come to life there, they should follow the cycle, as the process of generation revolves in the opposite direction. And those who are earth-born of necessity in this manner, and thus have their name and their account, remain as many as God has not transferred to another lot. This, then, follows entirely from what has been said before. ^B And further, proceeding in order, he discusses the end of the world in a way similar to the doctrine of the Hebrews, as follows.

CHAPTER XXXIV. Of the supreme end of the world.

For when the time for all these things was completed, and a change had to occur, and the whole earthly race had already been exhausted—since every soul had rendered its entire generation, and each had cast into the earth as many seeds as had been assigned to it—then the Governor of the universe, as if letting go of the tiller of a rudder, withdrew to his own watchtower; and the world began to be turned back again by destiny and innate desire. ^C Then all the gods who rule with the greatest divinity in each of their regions, observing what was happening, released the parts of the world from their care. But the world, reversing itself and colliding, and driven by an impulse contrary to its beginning and its end, caused a great earthquake within itself, and brought about another destruction of all kinds of living creatures. But after this, when a sufficient amount of time had passed, and it was already ceasing from commotion and confusion and those earthquakes, it became calm, and it immediately returned to its accustomed course, taking up for itself the administration and control of the things within itself and of itself. And after a few words he again says: ^D "Wherefore, then, the God who had ordered it from the beginning, seeing it in difficulties, and caring for it so that, tempest-tossed, it might not be dissolved by confusion and sink into the infinite region of unlikeness, again taking hold of the rudders, turns and arranges the parts that had become diseased and loose in the period assigned to it, and coming back, renders it immortal and ageless." And this is said to be the end of all things.

CHAPTER XXXV. That Plato writes that certain dead have come to life again, agreeing in this respect also with the Hebrews.

"These things, then," said I, "are not in number or..."

...of the magnitude, if they are compared with those things which remain for each after death. And it will be profitable to hear these things, so that both may accurately perceive whatever is fruitful in this narrative. "You," he said, "may relate these things, not as if they were many future events, but as if one were listening gladly." Indeed, I said, I will not tell you the tale of Alcinous, ^A but of Alcimus, that is, of the brave man Er, the son of Armenius, of Pamphilian descent. For when he had fallen in battle, and the corpses of the rest, already corrupted, had been carried off after the tenth day, he was taken up whole. And being brought home, when he was about to be buried on the twelfth day, lying upon the pyre, he came back to life. Having revived, he told what he had seen there. He said that when his soul had departed, it traveled with many others, and they arrived at a certain divine place, in which there were two chasms in the earth, close to one another, and opposite these, two others in the heaven above. Between these, judges were seated; and when they had finished judging, they ordered the righteous to proceed to the right and upward through the heaven, having bound to them the signs of what they had been judged; ^B but the unjust to take the way to the left and downward, and they also carried in their back signs of all that they had done. When he approached, they told him that he must become a messenger to men of the things there, and they ordered him to listen to and to see all that was in that place. This is what Plato says; and Plutarch reports things akin to this in the first book of his *On the Soul*, in this manner.

CHAPTER XXXVI

From Plutarch, on a similar matter

"We were present with Antyllus," he says; "but let us tell the story to Sositeles and Heracleon. When he was sick a short time ago, he seemed to the physicians to retain no further trace of life. But when he had recovered a little from sleep, and that not a very heavy one, he did nothing and said nothing at all that was proof of insanity; he only confirmed that he was indeed dead, but that ^C he was released again, and would not die at all from that illness." ^D

^A And he had heard it badly from those who brought him at the Lord's command. For those who had been sent to Nicandas were bringing him to come in (the other's) place. Now this Nicandas was a shoemaker, but otherwise one of those in the wrestling school, and to many a common acquaintance and well known. Whence the young men, approaching, mocked him as having run away and corrupted the servants from there. He himself, however, was clearly immediately troubled and annoyed; and finally, a fever having fallen upon him, he suddenly died on the third day. But this man came back to life, and he survives, doing well, a most pleasant guest for us. ^B I wished to relate these things because even in the Hebrew Scriptures survivals of the dead are recorded. And since they also contain promises that a certain land will be given exclusively to those who love God, according to the saying, "The meek shall inherit the earth," and the discourse says this earth is heavenly, as the (Scripture) says, "The Jerusalem which is above is free, which is our mother," ^C the prophet indicates in a way of allegory that this same land is composed of precious and valuable stones, saying: "Behold, I will prepare thy stone as a carbuncle, and I will lay thy battlements with jasper, and thy foundations with sapphire, and thy circumference with choice stones." See how even Plato, in the *Phaedo*, confesses that these very things, or things similar to them, are true, ascribing the discourse to Socrates in some such way.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

"But yet, O Simmias, it does not seem to me to be the art of Glaucus to explain what kind of thing it is, and to demonstrate how these very things are true; it seems to me to be a more difficult thing than the art of Glaucus. And at the same time, I myself, perhaps, might not be capable of it; ^D and at the same time, even if I were capable, I do not believe that, for the magnitude of the subject, enough of my life remains. Yet, nothing prevents me from telling of the appearance of that earth, as I am persuaded it is, and its regions." "But," said Simmias, "this also suffices." "I am persuaded, then," he said, "I, first of all, that if it is in the middle of the heavens, being spherical, it requires nothing to prevent it from falling, neither air, nor any other such necessity; but that it is sufficient to maintain itself by the uniformity of the heaven itself in every way, and the equilibrium of the earth. For an object in equilibrium, placed in the middle of something similar, will have no tendency to incline more or less in any direction; and being balanced, it remains motionless. First of all, then," he said, "I am persuaded of this." "And rightly so," said Simmias. "Furthermore," he said, "I am persuaded that it [the earth] is something very great, and that we, who dwell from the Pillars of Hercules to the Phasis, occupy a small portion of it, like ants or frogs dwelling around a marsh by the sea, and that many others dwell elsewhere in many such places."

^A For there are everywhere around the earth many hollows, diverse in both form and size, into which water, mist, and air have converged. But the earth itself, pure, lies in the pure heaven in which the stars are, which is what most of those accustomed to speak of such things call the ether, of which these are the dregs, always flowing into the hollows of the earth. We, therefore, who dwell in its hollows, are unaware of this, and think that we are living above on the earth; just as if someone, living in the middle of the bottom of the sea, might think that he was living on the surface of the sea, and, seeing through the water the sun and the other stars, might consider the sea to be heaven; but because of sluggishness and weakness, he had never once reached the boundaries of the sea, nor had he emerged and looked up from the sea into this place here—how much purer and more beautiful it is than the place among them—nor had he heard from another who had seen it. ^B This same thing has happened to us; for we dwell in some hollow of the earth, and yet we think that we dwell above it, and we call the air "heaven," as if the stars traveled through this heaven. But the fact that we are unable to reach the farthest air is due to our weakness and sluggishness; for if someone were to come to its boundaries, or, having become winged, were to ascend, he would see—if he looked up—just as fish here in the sea, when they look up, see the things there, so would someone here also see those things. And if nature were capable of enduring the sight, he would know that that is the true heaven, the true light, and the true earth. ^C For this earth of ours, and the stones, and the entire place here are corrupted and eaten away, just as things in the sea are by the brine; and nothing worthy of mention grows in the sea, nor is there anything, so to speak, that is perfect; but there are only crags and sand and mud beyond measure, and filth, wherever there is earth, and they are not even remotely worthy for comparison with the beauties among us. But those things there, in turn, would appear to differ even more from ours. For if it is worthwhile to tell a myth, it is worth hearing, Simmias, what manner of things happen to be on the earth beneath the heaven. ^D "Indeed, Socrates," said Simmias, "we would gladly hear this myth." "It is said, then, my friend," he replied, "first, that the earth itself, if one were to view it from above, is such as the balls made of twelve pieces of leather, variegated, marked out with colors, of which the colors here are, as it were, samples that painters utilize; but there, the whole earth is made of such things, and of colors far more brilliant and pure than these. For one part is purple and of wonderful beauty, another is golden, and another is white—whiter than gypsum or snow—and it is composed similarly of other colors, and of more and more beautiful ones than those we have ever seen. For even these very hollows of the earth, being filled with water and air, present a certain appearance of color, glistening in the variety of the other colors; so that there is seen a consistent whole, colorful and diverse.

^A And in that land, being such as it is, it is natural that trees and flowers should grow in proportion, bearing fruits; and likewise that the mountains and hills ^B should possess, according to the same principle, perfection, transparency, and more beautiful colors. And that our little stones here, which we so desire—the sardius, the jasper, the emerald, and all such—are but particles of those; but there, everything is of such a kind, and even more beautiful than these. The cause of this is that those stones are pure, and not eaten through or corrupted, as those here are by rot, salt, and the things flowing together hither, which bring shame and disease to stones, earth, and other living things and plants alike. And that the earth itself is adorned with all these things, and further with gold and silver and other such things. For they appear to be have been born with brilliancy, of which there are many ^C multitudes and they are large, throughout many places of the earth, so that it must be a sight for blessed spectators.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

That Plato also believes that the judgment after death will be, in like manner to the Hebrews.

Finally, since the writings of the Hebrews foretell that souls, after they have migrated from the body, will receive a divine tribunal and judgment—among six hundred other places, also in this: "The judgment," he says, "was set, and the books were opened, and the Ancient of days sat. A river of fire flowed forth before him: ten thousand times ten thousand ministered to him, and thousands of thousands stood before him." Hear now Plato, how he makes mention by name both of the divine judgment and of the river of fire, and describes, in accordance with the sense and doctrine of the Hebrews, the many dwelling-places of the pious and the various punishments of the impious. For he speaks thus in his dialogue *On the Soul*: "The third river," he says, "bursts forth from the midst of these, and near its outlet flows into a certain vast place, burning with much fire, and makes a marsh larger than our sea, seething with water and mud. Thence it is carried around, ^D turbid and muddy, and winding about the earth, it arrives among other places at the edge of the Acherusian marsh, not mingling with its water; but after it has been coiled many times under the earth, it discharges deeper into Tartarus. This is the one which men also call the Pyriphlegethon, from which even the streams throw off fragments..."

wherever they happen to be on the earth. ^A Opposite this one, the fourth falls out into a place that is first described as terrible and wild, and which has a color all its own, like azure, which men call the Stygian [river]. It creates the lake into which the river discharges, the Styx; for the one who falls in here, having taken on terrible powers in the water, sinks under the earth and, coiling around, proceeds opposite to the Pyriphlegethon, and meets it at the Acherusian lake from the opposite side. And his water does not mix with any other, but he too, having traveled in a circle, discharges into Tartarus opposite to the Pyriphlegethon. The name of this one, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

Since these things are naturally so, when the dead arrive at the place to which the daemon brings each one, first of all, those who have lived well and piously and justly, and those who have not, are judged. And if they seem to have lived a middling life, they journey to the Acheron, and having boarded the ^B vessels that are theirs, as it were, they arrive in these at the lake. And there they dwell, and being purified, and paying the penalties for their misdeeds, they are released if anyone has committed any wrong; and they receive the honors for their good deeds, each according to his merit. But those who appear to be incurable because of the magnitude of their sins, or who have committed many great sacrileges, or many unjust and illegal murders, or any other such things, the fitting portion casts these into Tartarus, from where they never emerge. But those who appear to have committed sins that are great, yet curable—such as those who, in a fit of anger, have done some violent act against ^C father or mother and then live the rest of their lives in repentance, or those who have become murderers in some other such way—it is necessary for these to fall into Tartarus; but once they have fallen, and have been there for a year, the wave casts them out, the murderers by way of the Cocytus, and the parricides and matricides by way of the Pyriphlegethon. And when, as they are being carried along, they arrive at the Acherusian lake, they shout and call out, some to those they have killed, others to those they have insulted; and having called them, they entreat them and beg them to allow them to step out into the lake and to receive them. And if they persuade them, they emerge and end their sufferings; but if not, they are carried back to Tartarus, and from there again into the rivers, and they do not cease suffering these things until they have persuaded those they have wronged. For this is the penalty imposed upon them by the judges.

But those who appear to have excelled specifically in living piously, ^D these are they who are liberated and released from these places in the earth, as from prisons, and arriving above at the pure dwelling, they make their home upon the earth. And of these, those who have been sufficiently purified by philosophy live forever entirely without toils, and arrive at dwellings even more beautiful than these, which it is neither easy to describe, nor does the time [allow]...

and having been transported to some purer abode and dwelling, they live above the earth. Furthermore, from among their number, those who have been purified by the works of philosophy depart entirely, living not only without troubles for an eternal age, but also arriving at dwellings far more noble still, which it is neither easy to describe in words, nor is there time for me now to recount. But we must see to it, my Simmias, that being persuaded by the things I have recounted, we strive with all our effort to attain virtue and prudence in this life. For the reward is worthy, and a great hope is set before us.” Thus far Plato. ^A But you, indeed, may compare with those words of his— “they arrive at dwellings far more noble still, which it is neither easy to describe in words, nor is there time for me now to recount”—our own text: “Because eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, the things which God has prepared for those who love him”; and along with those many dwellings mentioned, that which is in the Gospel: “There are many mansions prepared with the Father” for those who love God. And along with the things said concerning the Pyriphlegethon, ^B consider the eternal fire announced to the impious, according to the Hebrew prophet who says to them: “Who shall announce to you that fire is burning? Who shall announce to you the eternal place?” And again: “Their worm shall not die, and the fire shall not be extinguished, and they shall be for a vision to all flesh.” And observe how Plato, too, agreeing with these things, after saying that the impious will go into Tartarus, adds, “From whence they never emerge.” And again, having said that the pious will live in blessed places, he adds, saying, “Absolutely, and for the time to come.” But also that which is said by him, “Without labors,” ^C would be similar to, “Pain and sorrow and sighing have fled away.” And in stating that those journeying to Acheron do not arrive there simply, but first mount what are indeed for them vehicles, what on earth does he wish to signify by “vehicles” if not the bodies, into which the souls of the deceased have re-entered, to be tormented together with them, according to the beliefs of the Hebrews? But since this book also has reached its proper size, I shall pass on to the twelfth volume of the *Preparatio Evangelica*.

PRAEPARATIONIS EVANGELICAE LIBER DUODECIMUS

Book Twelve

4. That children’s minds must be informed by the guise of fables, as initial instructions. 5. That fables should not be sung to children if they are harmful, but only those which are useful. 6. That Plato accepted faith not merely in word, but confessed that he believed and was convinced by the very disposition of his soul in those things in which we ourselves believe. 7. That the profound dogmas of the truth should not be brought forth before everyone. ^A 8. What kind of rulers Plato says should be appointed; and that he does not reject unlearned men and those without letters, if only they be adorned with integrity of morals. 9. That magistracies are to be avoided. 10. Concerning justice according to Plato. 11. Concerning the paradise of Moses. 12. That both men and women are to be taught, and that woman is taken from man. 13. Concerning the life of the first men. 14. That they lived even with irrational animals. ^B 15. How they remember the flood. 16. How rightly it is for our teaching to begin with divine things and end in human things. 17. How noble it is to train children from their earliest age in the habits of piety. 18. That discipline is to be considered only that which promotes virtue, and not that which serves for profit or any manner of earning a living. 19. That Plato, in a way similar to the Hebrews, supposed that earthly things are images of more divine things. 20. That young people should be prepared for the acquisition of virtue through the learning of upright hymns and odes. ^C 21. What sort of thoughts the odes should contain. 22. That it is not for everyone to be able to compose upright odes and melodies, but only for God, or a certain divine man. 23. Concerning those who are able to judge odes composed according to God. 24. That odes should also be received in banquets, like certain laws of the feast. 25. That permission to drink wine is not to be granted to all indiscriminately. 26. That Plato was not unaware that the laws he legislated were practiced by certain barbarians in their republics. ^D 27. That our war is against ourselves and the passions within us. 28. That it is not the body, but the soul, that is the cause of the evils committed by us. 29. Concerning one who philosophizes purely and sincerely. 30. Concerning that whole class of sophistry which is wont to be found among men. 31. That one must sometimes use falsehood as a medicine, for the benefit of those who have need of such a manner of speech. 32. That not only men, but also women, and every race of men should be called to the aforementioned discipline. 33. That the whole nation should not be defamed because of those among us who do not live according to reason. 34. How Plato rendered the oracles in Proverbs into Greek, more purely and elegantly. 35. Concerning wealth and poverty. 36. Concerning the honor of parents. 37. Concerning the possession of servants. 38. How he changed, "Remove not the ancient landmarks, which thy fathers have set." 39. Similar to, "Rendering the sins of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation to them that hate me."

40. Concerning thieves. 41. Concerning a thief being put to death. 42. Concerning a beast of burden. 43. That Plato uses the same examples as the Hebrew scripture. 44. Again concerning similar examples. 45. Again concerning the same. 46. Again concerning the same. 47. That Plato also holds that citizens must be divided into twelve tribes, in imitation of the Hebrew nation. 48. Plato legislates that the city be settled in a river place; he describes it as similar in some ways to that in Jerusalem. 49. How Plato rejects the materials of Greek elementary education, as proving harmful. 50. Concerning the opinion of the atheists, from the tenth book of the Laws. 51. How Plato constructs the argument concerning God. 52. How he explains that God provides for the universe.

CHAPTER I

This twelfth book of the *Evangelical Preparation* will render, from this point on, whatever was lacking in our previous discourse concerning the harmony of Plato with the Hebrew oracles, like the well-attuned resonance of a harmonious lyre, taking our beginning from a defense of our faith, which is slandered by the many. And Plato indeed, in the first book of the *Laws*, very conveniently for our purpose, says: "Whether one might rightly rebuke the Lacedaemonian and Cretan state or not, is another question. To me, however, it is perhaps more permitted than to either of you to state what is said by most people. For to you, since the entire system of your laws is constructed in a measured way, these would justly be deemed one of the best. That not one of the youths should be allowed to inquire which of the laws are well or poorly constituted, but rather that all should agree with one voice and from one mouth that everything is well established, as having been laid down by the gods; and if anyone says otherwise, not to endure hearing it at all. But if any of the elders should conceive of anything, he should communicate it only to a magistrate or to his own peers, with no youth listening." ^B "Most correctly, Stranger, do you command this."

It is with good reason, then, that the Hebrew scripture, having anticipated this, puts faith before the understanding and contemplation of divine Scriptures, through the words it says: "If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not understand," and again: "I believed, therefore have I spoken." Hence, even among us, for those who are but newly introduced and as trainees are still imperfect—as if their souls were infants—the reading in divine Scriptures is handed down more simply, with the admonition that they must believe the recorded words as the words of God. But for those who have advanced in practice, and are grey-headed in their understanding, the permission is given to go deep and test the mind of what is being said. And it was customary to call such people "Seconders" among the Hebrew children, as being interpreters and expositors of the meaning of the Scriptures.

CHAPTER II

"We, therefore," says Plato, "would say, Tyrtæus, that those are to be praised and celebrated most of all by you, who have shown a kind of excellent virtue in hostile and foreign war." He would, I think, concede this. And why not? But we, while we acknowledge these to be excellent, yet contend that those who have given outstanding proofs of the highest virtue in the greatest war are far more excellent. And we also have as a witness to this matter the poet Theognis, a citizen of the Megarians in Sicily, whose couplet is this:

Cyrnus, with silver and with gold, one might redeem thee, But in a bitter faction, faith remains.

^B And we say that this man is, in a more serious war, by far superior to the other, by as much as that equity is more excellent which is conjoined with temperance, prudence, and fortitude itself. For he who remains faithful and sound in the midst of dissension must surely possess every virtue. But many mercenaries, as Tyrtæus himself sang, when they have crossed into an enemy territory, fight strenuously and gladly die in war; many of them, however, are bold, injurious, insulting, and, if you except a very few, the most senseless of all men. ^C But where, then, does this kind of discourse end, and what does it wish to make clear and demonstrate by saying these things? Clearly this: that before all else, both the lawgiver here, who is inspired by Zeus, and everyone else who in any way wishes to be of service, will look to nothing else at all when establishing laws than the greatest virtue. This virtue, as Theognis says, is that faithfulness in harsher times, which one would rightly name perfect justice. And these things agree most excellently with the saving Gospel, where our Savior also, joining prudence with faith, commends and approves in His own words the one who is endowed with both: "Who, then, is the faithful and wise steward?" And again: "Well done, good and faithful servant; you have been faithful over a few things, I will set you over many." By these things, indeed, He clearly manifests that the faith He desires is not a thoughtless one, ^D but one conjoined with the greatest virtues, such as are understood by the names of prudence and probity.

CHAPTER III

"For at what time," says Plato, "do we seem to"

^A have established by the previous discussions that the souls of the departed, after they have migrated from the body, undertake a care for human affairs by a certain power of their own? And this is accustomed to be proven by those true indeed, but longer arguments. But in this matter, along with those other rumors on such things—which are so many and most ancient—faith must be held; and also because the legislators have laid down that these things are so, unless indeed you would wish to say that they were entirely out of their minds." So says Plato. And yet, in the Book of Maccabees, Jeremiah the prophet is seen, after he had finished his life, praying for the people ^B as if he were looking out for the salvation of those people still living on earth. Plato declares that these things should be believed.

CHAPTER IV.

That the minds of boys should be informed by the appearance of fables in their first instruction, from the second book of the Republic.

"Furthermore, of accounts," says the same, "there are two kinds, the true and the false. Yes. And the boy must be instructed in both; but first in the false ones. I do not understand, said he, how you mean this. Do you not understand, I said, that we are accustomed first to tell fables to children? And this, to speak in general, contains both falsehoods and truths. But we use fables for children before gymnastics. That is so." Thus Plato. It is similarly a custom among the Hebrews that for those who are still in their infancy in soul, they pass on the histories of the divine Scripture more simply, just like certain fables; but to those whose habit of mind has been made more robust by exercise, they allow ^C the more profound sort of teaching and one full of contemplation to be handled, which they call *deuterosis*, and which is contained in a certain more illustrious explanation of the meanings hidden from the crowd.

CHAPTER V.

That no pernicious fables, but only useful ones, should be sung to boys.

"But you know," says Plato, "that the beginning of every work is of the greatest importance, especially in a young person who is still tender and flexible: for then that form which one wishes to impress upon each one is molded and put on. That is certainly true. Shall we then allow children simply to hear any fables whatsoever invented by anybody, and at the same time to receive into their souls opinions that are, for the most part, contrary to those which we wish them to have when they are more mature? ^D That we shall in no way allow. First, therefore, we must, as I see, carefully look into those makers of fables; and if they construct a good fable, it is to be approved, but if it is not, it is to be rejected. And those that have been approved, we will persuade nurses and parents to tell to their children, and by these fables to mold their souls much more than they mold their bodies with their hands. But those which they now sing to them, most of them must be cast out." And these things were guarded among the Hebrews before Plato. For those who possessed the divine Spirit, being discerning of spirits, judged the

things which were rightly said and written under the teaching of the Holy Spirit by their own authority; but they rejected things that were otherwise, such as the voices of the false prophets. Nay, even parents and nurses were accustomed to sing to ^A their tender children stories from the divine Scriptures, as if they were certain fables, in order to prepare the way for that piety and religion which it would be their duty to profess when they reached manhood.

CAPUT VI. That Plato accepted the faith not by word alone, but acknowledged that he believed with his very soul in those things to which we ourselves also give credence. From the Gorgias.

"Hear then," he says, "a very fine story, which you may deem a fable, as I do, but I hold it to be a story; for what I am about to tell, I will tell as being true." ^B And after a few words: "He who has passed his life justly and holily, when he dies, departs to the islands of the blessed, and dwells in all happiness, free from evils; but he who has lived unjustly and godlessly, goes to the dungeon of recompense and justice, which they call Tartarus." And again after a few words: "Then they must be judged naked of all these things; for it is necessary that they should be judged dead. And the judge himself must be naked and dead, and with his own soul observing the soul of each one immediately after death, ^C destitute of all his kinsfolk, and having left upon earth all that world, so that the judgment may be just." And immediately he adds: "These are the things, O Callicles, which I have heard and believe to be true; and from these arguments I consider that what happens is of this kind: death, as it seems to me, is nothing else than the dissolution of two things, the soul and the body, from one another. But after they are dissolved, each of them holds its own disposition no less than when the man was living: the body, its own nature, and the treatments and the sufferings all manifest. For if any ^D one’s body was large by nature or by food, or both, when living, then, when he dies, the corpse also is large; and if he was fat, the corpse is fat when he has died, and so with the rest. And if again he was in the habit of wearing long hair, the corpse also has long hair; or if one was a slave and had the marks of scourging, scars in the body, either from whips or from other wounds while living, the body is seen to have these things being dead; or if any one’s limbs were broken or twisted when living, these are also visible when dead.

^A In a word, whatever the body was prepared to be while living, these things remain manifest, or at least the greater part of them, for a certain time even when one has finished this life. It seems to me that the same holds true, Callicles, regarding the soul. When it is stripped of the body, all things are manifest in the soul—both the features of its nature and the affections (51) that the man possessed in his soul as a result of the pursuit (52) of each thing.

Therefore, when they arrive before the judge—those from Asia before Rhadamanthus—Rhadamanthus, having set them before him, examines the soul of each, without knowing whose it is. But often, catching hold of the Great King or any other king or potentate, he perceives that there is nothing healthy in the soul, but that it is scourged ^B and full of scars from perjuries and injustices—things which the practice of each has imprinted upon the soul—and that everything is distorted by falsehood and arrogance, and nothing is straight, because it was nourished without truth; and he sees the soul full of power, luxury, insolence, and intemperance of actions, and full of disproportion and shamefulness. Seeing it, he sends it away in disgrace straight to the place of confinement, where, upon arriving, it is destined to suffer its proper torments.

It is fitting that everyone who is under punishment, if they are justly punished by another, should either become better and benefit, or else serve as an example to others, so that others, seeing what they suffer, may become better through fear. ^C Now, those who are benefited—those who pay the penalty at the hands of both gods and men—are those who have committed curable sins (53); yet the benefit comes to them through pains and agonies, both here and in Hades, for it is impossible to be rid of injustice in any other way. But those who have committed the ultimate crimes, and have become incurable because of such crimes, serve as examples (54) from that point on; and they themselves are no longer benefited at all, since they are incurable, but others are benefited who see them suffering the greatest, most painful, and most fearful ^D torments for all time, truly hanging there in the prison in Hades as spectacles and warnings to those who are ever arriving—the unjust. I declare that Archelaus will be one of these, if what Polus says is true, and anyone else who is such a tyrant. I think, indeed, that most of these examples are those who have become tyrants, kings, and potentates, and those who have managed the affairs of cities; for these, by reason of their power, commit the greatest and most unholy sins. Homer also bears witness to this; for he depicts kings and potentates there [as those being punished forever], Tantalus, and Sisyphus, and Tityos.

[alt-version omitted]

(51) Plato, *Gorg.* (52) Plato, *ibid.* (53) *Curable sins.* Synesius draws on this in his epistle, in which he urges that man who was suspected of parricide, that a voluntary penalty might redeem the weight and perpetuity of future punishment. *For I say*, he says, *that when many garments* [are dirty], *the filth adheres so strongly through the depth that it is impossible to cleanse; and it comes to pass that it is corrupted before it returns to its nature, because the affection has become nature to them, either through the length of time or through its magnitude.* So, when a soul is in such a state, it would be well if it were corruptible; but as it is, sins have a ratio to stains that cannot be washed away; but the soul is no longer like that garment, filthy and not holding together; but being immortal, it pays an immortal penalty, when it sins in ways that are hard to dye and impossible to wash away. For in whatever life one has sinned, when paying the penalties, one does not have the affection altogether fused and clinging, but, as one might say, the soul, being freshly dyed, is most quickly washed, *examples*? (54) *Examples are made.* Just as he who, in Virgil, cried out continuously: *Learn justice, being warned, and do not despise the gods.* To whom, however, these *examples*? *To the dead*, who, according to Plato, are to live again.

^A Indeed, concerning those who have been hanging, paying the penalty for all time—Tantalus, and Sisyphus, and Tityus—it is by no means in the power of any person to place Thersites, or any other private individual who might be wicked, among those held by such great punishments as incurable. For, I suppose, he did not have the means; and for this reason he was even happier than those who did. ^B But, Callicles, even among those who have the power, there are men who become exceedingly wicked; nor, however, does this fact prevent good men from arising even among them. And it is indeed highly worthy to admire those who do so; for it is difficult, Callicles, and worthy of much praise, for one who has attained great power to live justly, even while being free to commit injustice. But few are such men; since they have existed both here and elsewhere, and I believe there will be other good men who handle this virtue of acting justly—whatever anyone may entrust to them. And one, too, has become very renowned, even among the other Greeks: Aristides, son of Lysimachus. But the majority, my excellent friend, of those in power become wicked. But as I was saying, whenever that Rhadamanthus takes hold of such a person, he knows nothing else about him at all, neither who he is, nor from what parents he was born, except only that he is a wicked man; and having observed this, he sends him away to Tartarus, having marked him, whether he appears to be curable or incurable. And he, having arrived there, suffers what is fitting. But sometimes, when he catches sight of another soul that has lived piously and with truth—of a private individual or of some other man (most of all, as I say, Callicles, the soul of a philosopher who has done his own tasks and has not been a busybody in his life)—he admires him and sends him off to the islands of the blessed. These same things are done also by Aeacus. Both of these men deliver judgment holding a staff. But Minos sits as overseer, alone ^C holding a golden scepter, as Homer’s Ulysses testifies that he saw him, *Holding a golden scepter, dispensing justice to the dead.* I, therefore, Callicles, am persuaded by these arguments, and I am considering how I might present myself to the judge having a soul that is as healthy as possible. Having thus bid farewell to the honors of the many, I shall strive to cultivate the truth and, in actual fact, to live as the best man I can, and, when the time comes to die, to die as the best man. And I encourage all other men as well, as much as I am able; and indeed I exhort you in turn to this life and to this struggle—the one, which I say is worth more than all the struggles here. And I reproach you ^D because you will not be able to defend yourself when the trial and judgment of which I spoke comes to you; but when you go before that judge, the son of Aegina, and he takes hold of you and drags you up, you will gape and be dizzy there, just as I would be here, and perhaps someone will strike you on the side with impunity and insult you thoroughly. Perhaps these things seem to you to be a fable, like the stories told to children, and you despise them. And it would be no wonder if we despised them if by searching we could find something better and truer. But as it is, you see that you three, who are the wisest of the Greeks at the present day—you, and Polus, and Gorgias—are unable to prove that one should live any other life than this one, which is clearly advantageous even there in the world to come. But among so many arguments, while others are refuted, this one alone remains unshaken: that one should be more afraid of doing injustice than of suffering it, and that one should busy oneself, not with appearing to be a good man, but with being one, both in private and in public.

^A Thus far Plato. And while he declares that Aeacus, Minos, and Rhadamanthus will be the judges of the dead, the divine Word also testifies to us that "We must all be made manifest before the judgment seat of God, that each one may receive according to what he has done in the body, whether it be good or bad." ^B And again: "On the day," it says, "when God shall judge the secrets of men, He will render to each according to his works: to those who by patient continuance in doing good seek glory and honor and immortality, eternal life; but to those who are contentious and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that works evil, of the Jew first and also of the Greek. For there is no respect of persons." ^C And who would you be, having departed from the body, whether by a violent judicial process or in some other way, and then having beheld the soul itself by the soul itself, when you have no tongue left to deny with, but carry the evidence of your deeds branded upon you? Will you not tremble and be at a loss, and be dragged along in silence to the judgment? And I myself—and everyone whom repentance publicly declared has not first purified—will we not all be so? "If any man has become evil in any way, he should be punished." And this is a second good thing, after being righteous: to become so, and by being punished, to make atonement. And every form of flattery, whether toward oneself or toward others, whether toward the few or toward the many, is to be avoided. Therefore, if you are persuaded by me, you will follow me to that place where, having arrived, you will be happy, both while living and when you have died. And permit someone to despise you as a fool and to insult you if he wishes; yes, by Zeus, do you yourself even boldly endure this ignominious blow, for you will suffer no evil if you are truly a good and noble man, practicing virtue. But you must be a man, my noble friend—for you should be noble—and you must despise the pleasures which we pursue when we act unjustly. And you should not be ashamed before men, but you should acknowledge your deed to the Judge, ^D and appease the punishments below by the immediate penalty. For since the greatest good is not to do wrong, the second good is to be justified. But whoever remains unchastened for a long time while doing wrong, this man one must consider the most unfortunate, whom neither God nor man cares for.

Chapter VII. That the weightier dogmas of the truth should not be published to all indiscriminately.

^A "Beware, however," says Plato, "that these things never fall upon the ears of uneducated men; for there is almost, as it seems to me, no kind of discourse which the multitude would more ridicule, or, conversely, one that would seem more admirable and full of divine inspiration to men of excellent disposition. And things of this kind, even though they may be celebrated by many years of frequent preaching and habitual hearing, can yet barely be purified by diligent work and study, just as happens with gold in its use." To which matter, our saving Word also teaches, saying: "Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine" (Matt. vii, 6). And likewise: "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him" (1 Cor. ii, 14).

Chapter VIII. What kind of magistrates and princes Plato wishes to be created: that he does not reject unlearned men and those without literary knowledge, provided they excel in integrity of character. From the third book of the Laws.

^B "And indeed," says Plato, "when the noble discourses existing in the soul of one man accomplish nothing further, but rather the very opposite of these, I would count all these most grievous ignorances of both the state and each individual citizen, but not those of the craftsmen, if you understand what I mean, strangers." ^C "We do, my friend, and we grant what you say." "Let this, then, be set down as agreed upon and declared, that to those of the citizens who are ignorant of these things, nothing whatsoever that is connected with the office of a magistrate is to be entrusted; and further, that those who are such ought to be branded with infamy, just as fools, so that they may be most proficient in the faculty of discourse, and in all those things which either possess some elegance, or in any way pertain to sharpening the swiftness of the mind, they should be studiously and diligently versed. But those who are otherwise disposed in mind, even if (as the saying goes) they neither know letters nor how to swim, yet if they are considered wise, they are to be called wise, and they are to be adorned with magistracies as truly prudent men. ^D For how, O friends, could even the slightest species of prudence exist without a place for consensus? It cannot be. But surely the most beautiful of all, and the highest consensus, would with the best right be named wisdom; with which, as that man endowed...

with it, he who avoids being overly zealous about names, shall appear wealthier in old age in understanding. ^A

CHAPTER IX.

That magisterial offices should be avoided. From the first book of the Republic.

The Hebrew history teaches that Moses, first of all, deprecated the leadership of the people, when he addressed his guide in oracles and counsel: "I pray Thee, Lord, send someone else who is able, whom Thou wilt send." ^B Then it makes Saul also, who sought hiding places so as not to accept the kingdom, and the prophet Jeremiah, who deprecated the task imposed upon him, seem similar. Hear how Plato praises this resolution of deprecating magistracy as being just and honorable: "It is therefore manifest, my Thrasymachus, that no art and no authority provides what is profitable for itself, but rather, as we have said long ago, it both prepares and commands that which is for the subject, considering the interest of the one who is the lesser, and not that of the stronger. For this reason, my dear Thrasymachus, I was saying just now that no one is willing to rule voluntarily and to take the burden of correcting the ills of others, but instead demands a reward, because he who is to act well by his art never acts for his own best interests when ordering according to art, but for the subject’s interest. For which reason, as it seems, a reward must exist for those who are to be willing to rule, either money or honor; or a penalty, if they do not rule." ^C

CHAPTER X.

Concerning the just man, according to the mind of Plato.

We understand from the oracles of the Hebrews that both their prophets, and others also who were preeminent in integrity, endured all the most unworthy outrages and insults, and every peril, with fortitude. In this regard, you will perceive how remarkably Plato agrees with them, from those things which he wrote in the second book of the Republic: "Now therefore," he says, "having established this species of the unjust man, let us compare with him in our discourse the just man; a man simple and noble, who, as Aeschylus says, wishes to be, not to seem, good. But the appearance of a good man must be removed from him. For if he shall seem to be just, there will be honors and ^D rewards for him, because he appears to be such. It will therefore be impossible to know whether he is such for the sake of justice, or for the sake of the rewards and honors. He must therefore be stripped of everything except justice, and his situation must be made the opposite of the former one. For, doing no wrong, let him have the reputation of the greatest injustice, so that he may be tested for justice, in that he is not softened by ill repute and the things which spring from it. But let him be unchangeable

^A until death, seeming indeed to be unjust through his life, while being just. And a little after he adds: « It must be said then. And indeed, even if it be stated rather crudely, do not think, O Socrates, that it is I who say it, but those who praise injustice over justice. They will say the following: That the just man being so disposed will be scourged, will be racked, will be bound, will have his eyes cut out; and in the end, having suffered every evil, will be impaled, and will know that one must desire not to be just, but to seem so. » These things Plato says in words. But in deeds, long before, the righteous and prophets among the Hebrews are recorded to have suffered everything said; they who, being most righteous, were stoned, sawn asunder, died in the slaughter of the sword, went about in sheepskins ^B and goatskins, being destitute, afflicted, tormented, wandering in deserts and mountains and caves, and in the holes of the earth, of whom [Hebr. XI, 37, 38] the world was not worthy. And the apostles of our Savior, pursuing the highest justice and piety, while being invested with the reputation of injustice by the many, it is possible for us to hear what they suffered from their own voices as they say: « We have been made a spectacle to the world, and to angels, and to men. » [I Cor. IV, 9] And, « Even unto this present hour we both hunger, and thirst, and are naked, and are buffeted, and are unstable. Being reviled we bless, being persecuted we suffer, being defamed we entreat: we have been made as the filth of the world. » But even unto this day the valiant martyrs of our Savior, throughout the whole inhabited world, ^C not practicing the seeming, but the being righteous and pious, have suffered all those things which Plato enumerated; since they too were scourged, and endured bonds and racks, and indeed even had their eyes cut out, and at the end, having suffered all terrible things, were impaled. Of whom you would find no one similar among the Greeks; so that one might reasonably say that the philosopher did nothing else through these words than to prophesy concerning those among us who are distinguished in piety and true justice.

CHAPTER XI. Concerning the Paradise according to Moses.

^D Moses, according to certain secret accounts, having said that in the beginning of the constitution of the world, there was a certain paradise of God, and in this man was deceived through the woman by the serpent; Plato having all but transformed the words outright, listen to how he himself, allegorizing, set them down in the Symposium. For what he called the paradise of God, this man called the garden of Jupiter; for the place of the serpent and the deception concocted through him, he introduced Paupertas lying in wait; in place of the first man, whom the counsel and providence of God...

had produced as a kind of newborn son, he substituted a certain Porus, son of Metis, that is, of Counsel; and finally, in order to speak of the cradle of the created world, he preferred to speak of the birth of Venus, that by this type of allegory he might foreshadow the appearance and beauty of the world. Thus, therefore, he speaks verbatim: ^A “When Venus was born,” he says, “the gods feasted, and among them lay Porus, the son of Metis. At the end of the banquet, Paupertas had come to beg, as if for a feast, and was hanging about the doorway. Now Porus, drunk with nectar—for wine did not yet exist—having entered the garden of Zeus, was seized by a deep sleep. Here Paupertas, acting secretly and craftily in order to conceive a child by Porus for the sake of relieving her own poverty, lay down beside him and conceived Love.” These are the sort of things that Plato obscurely shadowed forth, in accordance with Moses. ^B

CHAPTER XII.

That they say woman was taken from man.

Chapter XIII. De prima hominum vita.

^A Moyses writes that the first life of mankind was spent in the paradise of God, where God Himself took care of them without any commerce of wealth or riches; and that all things grew for them without any sowing or cultivation of fields, while in the meantime they were naked of the clothing that followed later. Hear the philosopher, for he explains these very things in Greek in almost the same words. “God,” he says, “pastured them, He Himself presiding over them, just as now humans, having been allotted the nature of a more divine animal, are accustomed to pasture certain other animals of an inferior and lower condition. While He was performing this office, there were no states, nor were wives taken, nor children begotten (for all were reborn from the earth, forgetting all that had gone before); but all such things were absent, and they had abundant fruits from oaks and many other trees, which the earth produced of its own accord ^B without any cultivation. Moreover, they were naked and had no garments, and for the most part lived in the open air, for they enjoyed a sufficiently mild tempering of the seasons; and they had an abundance of soft beds, as the grass grew up from the bowels of the earth. — You have heard, Socrates, the life of men under Saturn; and you have perceived for yourself the present life, as the story is that it is under Jove.”

Chapter XIV. That they lived even with brute animals.

^C Moyses also wrote that the serpent was more clever than all the beasts, and he set forth the words with which the serpent spoke with the woman and the woman with the serpent, and even the very manner of the serpent’s acting. Now hear what Plato wrote in a similar vein. “If, therefore,” he says, “the alumni of Saturn, possessing such great leisure and power, used these for the study of philosophy—not only with men, but also being able to associate with beasts through discourse—and by associating both among themselves and with the beasts themselves, and inquiring from every nature whether it perceived anything different from others by ^D some singular and unique power, they might acquire their own share of wisdom from each one: it is entirely clear that the men of that age surpassed ours by infinite means for living happily. But if, serving their bellies, stuffing themselves with food and drink, they spoke to one another and to the beasts only the fables that are commonly circulated about them in that mutual intercourse with one another and with the beasts, this also, in my opinion, is quite easy to judge, provided that a sufficient supply of an informant is clearly established for us. But let this matter be left aside, until some capable indicator appears to us, as to whether the men of that age were led by any desire for learning or for speaking well and wisely.”

CHAPTER XV. How both make mention of the deluge.

^A Moses, being engaged in the thought of establishing laws for men, considered it necessary at the very beginning to call to mind ancient history. He makes mention of the deluge and of the life of men thereafter; then he expounds the customs of the ancient Hebrews—both those whom God had loved with a special love, and those whom their wickedness had made notorious—thinking this kind of history to be joined in the first place with the laws he had in hand. Plato in a similar way, when he applied his mind to writing laws, emulated the same path and method as Moses. Hear, therefore, how he speaks at the very beginning of his *Laws*: "Do you then, he says, believe those ancient stories to be true? What specifically? That many destructions of men have occurred through deluges and diseases and many other things, in which a small remnant of the human race was left. Truly, this is entirely convincing to everyone. Come then, let us imagine one of these many, the one that happened in the deluge. Of what sort, then, are we to understand it? That those who at that time escaped the destruction would have been almost exclusively mountain shepherds, who had been preserved somewhere on the summits as small seeds of the human race. And these, of course, would necessarily have been inexperienced in other arts, and in the machinations that exist in the cities for the sake of gains, and quarrels, and all the other misdeeds that men devise against one another. That is likely. Let us suppose, then, that the cities in the plains and those dwelling by the sea were utterly destroyed at that time. Therefore, we must say that all implements, and whatever had been ^B diligently discovered in any art, whether political or of any other science, altogether perished and were buried in the same ruin at the same time. Then, after a few things have been interposed: Let it be settled, therefore, he says, that the affairs of men were in such a state through such a disaster; for there was a vast and horrible solitude, and an immense power of the most fertile lands."

Having prefaced these and similar things, he recounts the lives of the men who lived after the deluge. Then, following the example of Moses, who appends the polity of the ancient God-beloved Hebrews to his exposition of the history of things after the deluge, Plato likewise, after the lives of those who lived after the deluge, attempts to relate the *archaeology* of the Greeks, just as that one did for the Hebrews. He makes mention of the events at Troy, and of the first polity in Lacedaemon, and of the Persians and those among them, whether they had lived rightly or not. Then, after the ^C history of these, he begins the exposition of his *Laws*, in this also having followed Moses.

CHAPTER XVI.

^AHow splendidly our doctrine begins with divine things and ends in human affairs. From the first book of Plato’s *Laws*.

Moses, when he wished to suspend the general system of his laws and his polity ^B from the religion of the supreme God, began it from the same Creator of all things; then he taught that all human goods flow from divine ones, and he referred those divine things to that Mind which is the directress of all, that is, to the very God of the universe. Following in his footsteps, see how the philosopher, after having censured the legislators of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, teaches that law established by Moses.

“Do you wish,” he says, “that I should tell you frankly in what way and order I would gladly have heard you instituting this whole kind of discourse?” “Most gladly.” “Such, then, my guest, should your speech have been. Not undeservedly are the laws of the Cretans celebrated by all the Greeks with the highest praise. For they are correctly established in this very respect, that they make those who live by them blessed, as they enrich them with all goods. For there are two kinds of goods: human ones and divine ones. And those others depend upon the divine; and if a city receives the greater ones, it also acquires the lesser; but if not, it is deprived of both. The lesser ones are those led by health; the second is beauty; the third is the strength of the body for running and for all other movements; the fourth is wealth, which will then at last not be blind, but gifted with the sharpest ^C sight, if only it follows the hand of prudence. This prudence is a certain leader even of divine goods; and just as a mind, constant temperance follows it close behind; from these two, joined with fortitude, justice arises; and last of all, fortitude accompanies them. All these excel those human ones in the dignity of their nature. Wherefore this order also must be observed by the legislator. Then, indeed, he shall instruct the citizens in other institutions, which nevertheless should always look to those prior ones; so indeed that human affairs may be referred to divine things, and all divine things to the mind which is their prince. Then, after mutual marriages have been contracted between them, he will studiously provide for the procreation and education of children, and whether they be male or female, whatever is done by them, whether while adolescents or when they are now more mature in age, even up to old age, in their mutual ^D association, whether rightly or wrongly, he will affect the one with honor, and the other with ignominy; at the same time he will also [examine] whatever is to them a cause of pain or pleasure, by which either desires…

may declare them to follow upon temperance and justice, and not upon wealth or love of honor. Thus, O strangers, I wished, and still do wish, to explain how it is that in the laws called those of Zeus, and those of the Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus established, all these things are present, and how 89 having taken order 90 they are manifest to one experienced in laws, in craft, and in certain customs, while to the rest of us 91 they are in no way manifest.” And among us it has been said: “Seek first the kingdom and justice [of God] 92, and all these things shall be added unto you.” But Moses also, long before, having made his beginning from the teaching concerning God, and having subsequently adapted the polity according to him, and the ordinances concerning contracts and those concerning communal life, establishes as rulers and guardians over all those consecrated to God, as the oracles also teach, men who are just, who hate arrogance, some advancing through prudence, others through true glory. Such was his line of reasoning. Nor is it unlike that which is written among us: “Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.” Furthermore, Moses himself, having started long before from that doctrine which proclaimed God himself, when he subsequently arranged the form of his commonwealth—and whatever pertained either to mutual contracts or to the reasons and institutions of communal life—fittingly and consistently according to that principle, he then creates for all, guardians and prefects, men who are themselves consecrated to God, and, as the Scripture testifies, as they are preeminent in equity, so they are entirely alien to all arrogance, and men whom he had known to have entered upon the path of, in part, prudence, and in part, true glory.

CHAPTER XVII.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΖ'.

That it is noble to accustom children from their earliest age to pious and religious habits.

Ὅτι καλὸν ἐξ ἔτι νέας ἡλικίας τοὺς παῖδας τοῖς τῆς θεοσεβείας ἔθεσιν ἐγγυμνάζειν.

“I say, therefore,” 93 Plato says, “and I claim that he who is to be any kind of good man must practice this very thing from childhood, both playing and working seriously in those things which are fitting for each task. For instance, he who is to be a good farmer or builder: the one must play at building some of the childhood structures, the other at farming; and he who is rearing them must provide each with small tools that are imitations of the true ones. Moreover, whatever knowledge is necessary, he must learn beforehand; for instance, the builder to measure or weigh, and the soldier to ride on horseback while playing, or to do some other such thing 94; and he must attempt through these games to turn the pleasures and desires of the children toward that place at which, when they have arrived, they ought to have their goal. And we call education the right nurture, which, by playing, will most of all lead the soul to the love of that which it must…”

being a perfect man regarding the excellence of the matter.” And Moses, anticipating this, legislated stating: “And these words which I command you this day shall be in your heart and in your soul, and you shall instruct them to your children” (Deut. vi, 6, 7). This is what the sons of the Hebrews were accustomed to do, raising all their youth from their tender years in the instructions of piety. And this is observed even until now, according to a certain ancestral custom, among the Jewish nation.

CHAPTER XVIII. That we must consider as education only that which leads to virtue, and not that which aims at money-making or some trade for the sake of livelihood.

^B “Let us not, therefore,” says Plato in the same place, “let the name of education remain something undefined. For now, while blaming and praising the upbringing of each one, we say that one of us is educated, and another uneducated, even though sometimes of the number of the latter are those who are most expert in shopkeeping, or ship-owning, or other similar arts. For the present discourse does not, as it seems, consider these things to be education; but it would call education that training from childhood unto virtue, which makes one desire and strive to become a perfect citizen, knowing how to rule and be ruled with justice. This nourishment, defined by this discourse, as it seems to me, is what it would now wish to call education alone. But that which tends toward money, or strength, or some other wisdom without intelligence and justice, it deems to be vulgar and servile, and not worthy at all to be called education. But let us not dispute with them about the name, but let the discourse which has now been agreed upon by us remain: namely, that those who are rightly educated nearly always become good men. And it is necessary never to despise education, as it is the first of the most beautiful things coming to the best men; and if it ever goes astray, it is possible, according to one's power, to correct it, and this must always be done throughout life according to one's power.” And in the second book of the *Laws*, he adds: “I call education the virtue which is the first to come to children. When pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred are rightly produced in souls, even before they are able to take hold of reason; and when they have taken hold of reason, they agree with reason, having been rightly habituated by the customs of those who are assigned to such duties—this entire agreement is virtue; but the part of it that has been nurtured concerning pleasures and pains, ^{C D} of the children, to which they must attain and have as their end. But we call education the right nourishment, which would lead the soul of those playing toward the love of that for which we are in need...

^A from the beginning to the end, that they might love what ought to be loved, and hate what ought to be hated; by severing this itself through reason, and calling it education, you would, in my opinion at least, rightly term it so.” These are the words of Plato. But David had forestalled him in the Psalms, teaching to hate what ought to be hated, and to love what ought to be loved, saying as follows: “Come, children, listen to me; I will teach you the fear of the Lord. Who is the man that desires life, and loves to see good days? Keep your tongue from evil, and your lips from speaking guile. Turn away from evil, and do good; seek peace, and pursue it.” And Solomon likewise says: “Hear, children, the discipline of a father. For I give you a good gift; do not forsake my law.” And again: “Get wisdom, get understanding, do not forget.” And: “Say that wisdom is your sister, and procure acquaintance with prudence to yourself.” And: “Do not enter the paths of the ungodly, nor covet the ways of the lawless.” And you might find countless other such things in the Hebrew writings, instructive toward piety ^B and the acquisition of virtue, suitable for both the young and those mature in age.

Chapter XIX. That Plato, in a way similar to the Hebrews, supposed that the things here are images of more divine things.

The divine oracle having formerly admonished Moses, saying, “See that you make all things according to the pattern shown to you on the mountain,” and the sacred word having more clearly explained, “Who serve the pattern and shadow of heavenly things,” by which words it clearly teaches that those more divine things, which are contained in the rank and order of spiritual matters, are involved as though in certain symbols and marks in those things which we read in Moses. Truly hear now how Plato philosophizes ^C on things akin and similar to these, while in the sixth book of his *Republic* he writes in this manner: “The philosopher, therefore,” he says, “as he uses the utmost familiarity with God and beauty itself, so he becomes a participant in the divinity and beauty, as much as is permitted to man. But calumny reigns everywhere.” “It is indeed so.” “If, therefore, I said, there should be a necessity for him to exercise ^D into the characters of men what he contemplates there, and to establish it both privately and publicly, and not only to fashion and conform himself; do you think he will be a poor craftsman of temperance, and justice, and of the whole of popular virtue?” “Not in the least,” he said. “But if the many should perceive that we speak the truth about him, will they be harsh toward the philosophers, and will they disbelieve us when we say that a city could never otherwise be happy, unless it is outlined by those painters who use the divine pattern?” — not

^A at all, he replied. “But tell me,” I continued, “what kind of outline do you mean?” ^B “Taking, as I would say, a canvas,” I said, “they would first make the city and the characters of men clean, which is not at all an easy task. But you surely know that in this they would immediately surpass all others, in that they would not be willing to take in hand either an individual or a city, nor to write laws, unless they had first received it clean, or had made it so themselves.” — “And correctly so,” he said. — “And do you not think that after this they would sketch out the form of the state?” — “Why certainly.” — “Then, I suppose, while working at it, they would look often in both directions, both to that which is by nature just and beautiful and temperate and all such things, and to that which they, in turn, might produce in men, mixing and blending from their [human] practices that which is 'man-like'—inferring it from that which Homer himself also called that which is engendered in men, the 'god-like' and divine form.” — “Correct,” he said. — “And, I suppose, they would erase one part and write in another, until they had made human characters, as far as is possible, pleasing to God.” ^C

CHAPTER XX

“It seems to me,” the same speaker says, “that the discourse has come round for a third or fourth time to this same point: that education is nothing other than the guidance and training of children toward the account that has been rightly stated by the law, and confirmed by those who are most upright and most advanced in age by reason of their experience, to be truly correct. ^D In order, therefore, that the soul of the child may not be accustomed to rejoice and suffer in ways contrary to the law and to those things established by the law, but should follow along, rejoicing and suffering at the same things as the old man — for this reason, what we call 'odes' (these are truly 'incantations' for souls, which have come to be for the sake of such harmony as we speak of, and have been studied for that purpose; but because the souls of the young cannot bear [such] seriousness, they are called 'play' and 'odes' and are performed accordingly) — just as those who are sick and have weak bodies, [are given] pleasant foods and drinks...

^A but those that are harmful are mixed with less pleasant things, so that they may become accustomed to loving the one and rightly hating the other. And the same [standard] the upright legislator will also apply to the poet, persuading him—or if not persuading, compelling him—with fair and praiseworthy words to represent the ways of men who are temperate, brave, and in every way virtuous, whether by figures in rhythms ^B or by melodies in harmonies, performing his work correctly. It is, therefore, reasonable that among us, too, our children should become accustomed to practicing the odes and hymns to God composed by the divine prophets.

CHAPTER XXI

Of what sort the sentiment of those odes ought to be.

You impose this necessity upon the poet, says Plato, that he must pronounce the good man, because he cultivates temperance and justice, to be ^C happy and blessed, whether he be tall and strong of body or, on the contrary, short and weak; and likewise whether he abounds in riches or not. But if, even if he should surpass Cinyras himself and Midas in wealth, he is nevertheless unjust, [he must declare] him to be miserable and living a bitter life. Truly (for this is how the poet speaks among you, provided he speaks rightly), I would not even remember such a man, nor would I consider him of any account at all, who does not fulfill and embrace all the duties of honesty and justice. But if he is such, then he bears to fight the enemy ^D toe to toe. But if he be unjust, he would neither dare to look upon bloody slaughter, nor be able to outstrip the Thracian North Wind in swift running; nor should he obtain any other of those things which are called good. For those things which the common herd of men is accustomed to call good, this name is falsely applied to them. For health is indeed proclaimed to be the best of all; in the second place they count beauty; in the third, strength; in the fourth, riches. Although there are infinite other things which the common people call good. For to be endowed with sharp sight and hearing, and to enjoy all the faculties of the senses whole and perfect; and to be able to do, while in supreme power, whatever may please the mind: this is thought to be good. Finally, [they think] the end of all blessedness is to have acquired all these things, and to have become immortal as quickly as possible. But you and I, I imagine, say the following: that all these things are excellent possessions for just and holy men; but for the unjust, they are all most evil, beginning from health. Indeed, and to see, and to hear, and to fail at some time so greatly, that having produced the words [and melodies] of men, one should return the form of women and the melody; and having composed the melody of free men and [their] forms, [one should] fit the rhythms of slaves and the base-born.

^A And, in total, to exist for the entire time as an immortal possessing all so-called goods, yet devoid of justice and every virtue, is the greatest evil; but it is a lesser one if such a person lives for the shortest time possible. I believe you will persuade, and indeed compel, the poets among you to say these very things, and furthermore to adapt the rhythms and harmonies that follow these instructions, so as to educate your youth. For do you see? 23 I, for my part, state clearly that what are called goods are evils for the unjust, but evils for the just; while the good are truly good for the good, but evils for the bad. So, as I asked, are we in agreement, I and you, or how is it?” ^B These statements are not far removed from the Psalms of David, which he, having been inspired by divine Spirit beforehand, composed through odes and hymns, teaching who the truly blessed man is, and who is his opposite. From there, indeed, the book begins for him, when he says: “Blessed is the man who has not walked in the counsel of the ungodly,” and similar things. Plato, having changed these, says that the poets must say that the good man, being temperate and just, is happy and blessed; but if he happens to be rich but unjust, he is miserable. This he himself, David, again set forth in the Psalms in this way, saying: “If wealth flows, do not set your heart upon it,” and again: “Do not fear when a man becomes rich, or when the glory of his house is increased.” At your leisure, you would find each of the things said by the philosopher laid out word for word throughout the entire holy writing of the Psalms.

CHAPTER XXII.

CHAPTER XXIII.

^A many, that music should be judged by pleasure; yet let us not acquiesce in the pleasure of the common people, but let us establish that to be the best muse, which delights those who are the best and sufficiently instructed, and especially that which delights the one man who excels in virtue and education. Therefore, we argue that virtue is necessary in the first place for the judges of such songs, since they ought to be endowed not only with prudence, but also with steadfastness. For it would not be fitting that an impartial and true judge should either bring forth a judgment educated by the theater itself, and stunned partly by the clamor of the multitude and partly by his own ignorance; or even [while] recognizing the truth, should through sloth and fear, with that very mouth with which a little before, when he approached to judge, he called the gods to witness, unworthily pronounce a false and vain opinion. For he does not sit as a disciple, but as a master of the spectators, as is fitting, and as one who will constantly resist them if they show pleasure in an unrestrained manner and in an improper place. In exactly the same way, among the Hebrews of old, it did not belong to the ^B multitude either to judge those who were brought forward as if inspired by the Divine Spirit, or to decree concerning the divine songs themselves; but there were few, inspired themselves by the Divine Spirit—whose proper power that of writing is—to whom alone it was permitted to judge of these things, and to consecrate the very books of the prophets, while rejecting the others as adulterous and spurious.

CHAPTER XXIV. That songs must also be received in banquets, as certain convivial laws.

“Furthermore,” says Plato, “what the discussion we first undertook sought, so that it might bring some aid toward duly instructing the choir of Bacchus, this we have discussed so far according to our ability. Now, therefore, let us see whether the thing has been perfected by us. For it is in a way necessary that a gathering of this kind, while the drinking party grows ever more and more fervent, should become more turbulent; which we also posited from the beginning as happening of necessity in these matters which are now under discussion.” ^C “It is necessary, indeed.” “Then, each man, lighter than usual, indulges himself, and being loosened by joy, speaks more freely and effusively; meanwhile, he hears no one among his neighbors, but rather seems to himself a certain suitable moderator of himself and of all the others.” “Certainly.” “But we said that when these things happen, the minds of the drinkers, after they have conceived [a state] like iron in the fire, become softer and younger, so that, just as when they were still more tender, they offer themselves as more compliant and tractable toward him who is able and knows how to instruct and mold them. Now, we establish as this molder that same person who was also to us a good legislator. This man will also set down convivial laws, by which that petulance of the confident and ^D audacious man, who no longer [observes] any order, nor any [rules] of silence and speaking, nor any of drinking and singing

comes to be checked, and impudence is recalled to the duties of contrary honesty and modesty; and thus against unbridled and gradually increasing insolence, that most honorable fear is opposed, which, joined with equity, we have called shame and reverence, and truly divine fear. Such is the case. Moreover, we have wished that the guardians of these laws, who would devote their efforts to them, be quiet and sober men. So he says. Rightly, therefore, is this custom received among us also in our banquets, to sing odes and hymns composed to the praise of God, in which kind of activity our own leaders also keep watch and provide for honesty and modesty.

CHAPTER XXV. That the drinking of wine is not to be permitted to all indiscriminately.

«If any city,» says Plato, «as is customary in a serious matter, wishes to adopt this practice as the reason of laws and order shall demand, just as if it were using a certain exercise for the sake of acquiring temperance; and if, in like manner, it will not abstain from other pleasures with the same intent, so that it may at length be victorious over them by this art, then in this way I would allow it to use all these things. But if it is all to be a game, and if it is permitted to any person who wishes, and whenever he wishes, and with whomsoever he wishes, to drink in such a way that he may combine with it any other sort of pastime he fancies; I would never be the one to advise that anyone, whether in the commonwealth or as a private individual, be allowed to indulge in more copious draughts. For then I would approve the law of the Carthaginians far more than the custom of the Cretans or Lacedaemonians: that no one should ever taste this beverage while in the army, but should be accustomed to drink only water throughout the whole time of military service; and that at home, neither male nor female slave should ever taste it; nor magistrates during that year in which they govern the state, nor those who are overseers and judges while they are exercising their functions, nor anyone who is about to give their opinion in council on any matter of importance; and indeed, I would grant it to no one at all to use wine during the day, unless the exercise of the body or the condition of some illness requires it; nor at night, whether it be a man or a woman, if they intend to beget children. These things and many others might be brought forward as reasons why those who follow the guidance of mature judgment and right law ought to abstain from wine. From which it surely follows that no city should stand in need of many vineyards, but rather that all other cultivation of the fields, and the whole manner of life, should be included within entirely moderate bounds.» Thus Plato. Whom Moyses had already anticipated, when he forbade wine to the priests at the time they were to perform sacred rites, saying in these words: «And the Lord spoke to Aaron, saying: You shall not drink wine and strong drink, you and your sons with you, when you enter into the tabernacle of testimony, or when you approach the altar, lest you die; it shall be a law forever throughout your generations.» [Levit. x, 9.] The same person, for men and women alike who make vows, declares this law: «A man or a woman, whoever shall make a great vow, to separate themselves to the Lord in purity, he shall abstain from wine and from strong drink; and he shall not drink vinegar from wine, or vinegar from strong drink.» But Solomon also restrains princes and judges from the use of it, saying: «Do everything with counsel; drink wine with counsel. Rulers are prone to anger, let them not drink wine.»

Moreover, the Apostle also permits Timothy to use wine on account of infirmities, saying: «Use a little wine for your stomach’s sake and your frequent infirmities.»

CHAPTER XXVI.

«Whether, therefore,» he says, «there is a necessity for men well-versed in philosophy to organize a republic, either in those last and most ancient times, or even today among some barbarian people, situated far outside the sight and eyes of us, or indeed whether it shall be so sometime in the future: on this matter, we are ready to contend in argument that the aforementioned republic has existed in the past, and even now exists, and certainly will exist when this very Muse gains control of the city. For those things which it is impossible to happen, we also do not say are possible.»

CHAPTER XXVII.

«But concerning oneself,» he says, «ought one to think of oneself as of an enemy, or otherwise? — O Athenian stranger (for I would not wish to address you as an Attic one; for you seem to me worthier of being addressed by a name derived from God), for by correctly leading the discourse back to its beginning, you have made it clearer; so that you will more easily understand how rightly it was said by us a little before, that publicly everyone is an enemy to everyone, and privately and individually each one is an enemy and hostile to himself. What is this speech of yours, most excellent sir? — In this war, my guest, as to conquer oneself is the first and best of all victories, so to be conquered by oneself is the basest and worst of all. For this sort of speech signifies that there is a certain civil war of each of us with himself.»

Then, after many other things have been inserted, he continues: «Do we therefore declare any one of us to be a single individual? — Certainly. — But so single, that he possesses within himself two counselors, opposing and foolish, to whom we give the names of pleasure and pain? — It is so. — And besides these two, again, opinions of things to come, of which the common name is hope, but the special names are fear, which is the hope before pain, and confidence, which is the hope before the contrary. And over all these is reason, ^D which, whatever it may be of them, signifies that the seeds of war and peace are primarily in each soul. And whoever is able to conduct peace toward himself, that man is able also to conduct peace toward external, hostile wars (for what is the benefit of having peace toward the enemy, if one cannot have reconciliation toward oneself?). But for whom reconciliation with himself is impossible, such a man would hardly ever value truces with others. For there is also in each person a barbarian race, very willful and disobedient — I mean anger, and insatiable desires — taking post against reason, just like Romans, Scythians, and Germans, etc.

^A And he says further: “We know that these passions within us, being like nerves or certain cords, pull us and draw us against one another, as they are contrary and lead to contrary actions, where indeed (45) virtue and vice are set. For, says the discourse, there is one of the pulls that we must always join, and never depart from it, each of us drawing with the other cords; and this is the guidance of reason, golden and sacred, called the common law of the city, while the others are hard and iron, and the soft relaxation is golden, and the others are like all manner of forms. And we must always assist the most beautiful guidance of the law; for since the guidance of reason is good, and gentle, and not violent, it needs ministers in order that the golden race in us may overcome the other races. And thus (45) the fable concerning the wonders, assuming we are the subject, would be saved as a fable of virtue, and the manner in which one is superior or inferior to oneself would become in a way clearer to understand. And that both a city and an individual, having received in themselves the true discourse concerning these pulls, ought to live following it, and a city, having received this discourse from some god or from one who has known these things, having established it as law, ought to converse both with itself and with other cities. Thus vice and virtue would be more clearly articulated for us.”

And with us too, the divine Word teaches similar things, saying: ^B “I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind.” And again: “Their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another,” and whatever else is similar to these.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

“But we remember (46) having agreed in what went before, that if the soul should appear to be older than the body, whatever belongs to the soul would also be older than things of the body.” ^C “Very true.” ^D “And we remember that we also agreed that the soul’s impulses, and desires, and reasonings, and habits, if they were prior to the body, then the works/actions of the soul would be prior.” “Certainly.” “So then, the modes and habits, and desires, and reasonings, and true opinions, and diligent cares, would be prior to the things that happen in the body.”

“It is necessary.” “Must we not then allow that it is a necessary consequence that the soul is also the cause of good things and evil, of honorable and base, of just and unjust, and of all contraries, if we are to propose it as the cause of all things?” And let these points be set forth from the tenth book of the Laws. Moses is in agreement with them, having said often in his laws: “And if a soul shall sin and commit iniquity,” and whatever else is said by him in many places to the same effect.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Concerning him who philosophizes sincerely and perfectly. From the Theaetetus.

^B The Hebrew scriptures declare concerning the one who philosophizes seriously and truly: “It is good for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth; he shall sit solitary and keep silence, because he has taken it upon himself.” And it teaches concerning the prophets most dear to God, that in order to aspire to the highest peak of philosophy, they dwelt in deserts, mountains, and caves, ^C having their minds fixed upon the contemplation of the one God. But do you hear how Plato also elevates this manner of life, discoursing in this way concerning him who philosophizes in the highest degree: “Let us speak then, as is fitting, since you think it right, concerning those leaders of philosophy (for why should one speak of those who occupy themselves with philosophy in an inferior way?). These men, to be sure, from their youth do not know the path to the market-place, nor where the court or the senate or any other public council of the city is held; they neither see nor hear laws and decrees, whether spoken or written. ^D As for the pursuit of associations for the sake of obtaining office, and factions, assemblies, dinners, and revelries with flute-players, it does not even enter their mind to take part in such things. Whether anything has been done well or ill in the city, or what evil has happened to anyone from his forefathers, whether from men or from women, escapes him more than the number, as they say, of the sands. And he is so ignorant of all these things that he does not even know that he is ignorant of them. For he does not separate himself from the communion of these things for the sake of winning praise; but in truth, only his body is situated and dwells in the city, while his mind, deeming all these humbler things small and counting them as nothing, flies everywhere, according to Pindar, measuring both what is beneath the earth and what is above the earth, astronomizing those things beyond the heavens, and searching out the whole nature of each of the beings, in every way, never letting itself down to any of the things near at hand.” “How do you mean this, O Socrates?” “Just as it is said, O Theodorus, that when Thales was astronomizing and looking upwards, he fell into a well, and a clever and graceful Thracian maid-servant mocked him, saying that he was eager to know the things in the heavens, but that the things in front of him and by his feet escaped him. The same jest holds for...

all who pass their lives in philosophy. For, in truth, such a man is so little known by his neighbor and his acquaintance—not merely as to what he is doing, but it is almost a question of whether he is a man or some other creature; as to what man is, and what is the nature suitable for such a being to perform or to suffer different from others, he seeks and has much trouble in investigating. You understand me, I suppose, Theodore? — I do; and you speak the truth. — Therefore, my friend, when such a man is in private association with anyone, or in public, as I was saying when I began, when he is compelled in a court of law or elsewhere ^A to carry on a discussion about things before his feet and before his eyes, he provides laughter not only to Thracian maid-servants but to the rest of the mob, falling into wells and every sort of perplexity out of inexperience; and the awkwardness is terrible, producing an impression of stupidity. For in personal abuse, he has nothing of his own to use to abuse anyone else, ^B since he knows no evil of anyone, from never having concerned himself with such things; so, being at a loss, he appears ridiculous. And in praises and the boastings of others, as he laughs not out of pretense, but in truth and openly, he seems to be a fool. For when he hears a tyrant or king being praised, he thinks he is hearing one of the herdsmen—a swineherd, for instance, or a shepherd, or a cowherd—being celebrated as happy, ^C because he spends much time milking—an animal more difficult to manage and more treacherous than those he herds and thinks he milks. And he thinks that the man in question is, by reason of his busy life, no less rustic and uneducated than the herdsmen, having a wall built around his stall in the mountains. And when he hears of ten thousand ^D plethra of land, or even more, which someone possesses as a marvelous hoard, it seems a very small matter to him, who is accustomed to look at the whole earth. And as for the singing of lineages—one who is so noble as to show that he has seven wealthy ancestors—he regards this praise as altogether dull and coming from those who see only a little, because of their poor education, being unable to look ever at the whole, nor to calculate that ancestors and forebears for every man have been numbered by the myriads, in whom there have often been ten thousand of each—wealthy and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks. But to be arrogant about a list of twenty-five ancestors, or to trace them back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, seems absurd to him.

^A Indeed, he considers that the philosopher, who by the nature of things is unaccustomed to such trivial matters, ^B laughs at those who cannot calculate and cannot rid their minds of the vanity of a foolish soul. In all these affairs, such a man is laughed at by the multitude, partly for seeming arrogant, and partly for being ignorant of what lies before his feet and being at a loss in every situation. "You speak of things that truly come to pass, Socrates."

^C If, however, he should draw anyone upward, if someone would be willing to depart from the question, "What wrong have I done you, or you me?" and move into an examination of justice and injustice, what each of them is and how they differ from all other things or from one another; or from the question, "Is the king happy who possesses much gold?" into an examination of kingship and human happiness and wretchedness in general, and what they are, and how it is fitting by nature for a man to obtain the one and avoid the other—whenever that man, small-minded and sharp and litigious of soul, must again render an account of all these things, he in turn provides the opposite response. For, feeling dizzy and hung suspended from a height, looking down into the abyss from above, he is distressed by the truth ^D and is at a loss, and stammers; he does not provoke laughter among the Thracians or any other uneducated person, for they do not perceive his state, but he does provide laughter to those who are the opposite, for he is raised like a slave among them all. This, Theodorus, is the way of each: the one, truly reared in freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher, to whom it seems unexceptionable to appear simple and to be nothing when he falls into servile tasks, such as not knowing how to bundle a bedroll, or cook a meal, or make flattering speeches; the other, in turn, is able to perform all such tasks keenly and sharply, but does not know how to wrap his cloak about himself in a free and noble manner, nor how to

gain the harmony of speech

"If you could persuade all men, Socrates, as you have persuaded me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among men."

But it is not possible for evils to be destroyed, Theodorus (for it is necessary that there always be something contrary to the good), nor is it possible for them to be established among the gods. They necessarily wander about our mortal nature and this sphere of ours. Therefore, one must try to flee from here to there as quickly as possible. And flight is the becoming like God, as far as is possible; and becoming like Him is to become just and holy with wisdom.

But indeed, excellent friend, it is not at all easy to persuade men that the reasons why the many say one must flee wickedness and pursue virtue are not the reasons why one should practice the one and not the other—namely, so that one does not seem evil, but rather good. This is what is called the "old wives' tale," as it appears to me. But the truth we state in this way: God is in no way and in no manner unjust; rather, He is as just as it is possible to be. And there is nothing more like Him than the one among us who becomes as just as possible.

^A Regarding this, there is also the true shrewdness of a man, and his nobility, and his courage. For the knowledge of this is wisdom and true virtue, whereas ignorance is stupidity and manifest vice. The other so-called shrewdnesses and wisdoms, when they arise in political power, are burdensome, and when they arise in the arts, are vulgar. Therefore, for the one who acts unjustly and says or does unholy things, it is by far best not to allow him to be considered shrewd through craftiness. For they delight in the reproach, and they think they are being told that they are not trifles or mere burdens upon the earth, but men such as those who are to be saved in a city. ^B One must therefore speak the truth, that they are so much more what they do not think they are, precisely because they do not think they are. For they are ignorant of the penalty of injustice, which is the very thing they ought least to be ignorant of. For it is not, as they think, stripes and deaths—which they sometimes suffer even while doing no injustice, but which it was impossible to escape. What, then, do you mean? Examples, my friend, that stand in reality: the divine being most happy, and the godless being most miserable. Not seeing that this is how it is, due to their stupidity and extreme nonsense, they go unnoticed, becoming like the former through their unjust actions, and unlike the latter—for which they pay the penalty, living the sort of life that is appropriate to that which they resemble. But if we say that, unless they are rid of their shrewdness, even when they have ended their lives that place which is free from evils will not receive them, but that here they will always have their own likeness of conduct—evildoers together with evildoers—these things will be listened to by some foolish people as if they were indeed the words of shrewd and crafty men. ^C Indeed, Socrates. I know it, my friend. Yet one thing befalls them, when at some point they must render an account and receive one concerning the things for which they are blamed, and they wish to endure it manfully for a long time, and not run away in a cowardly manner. Then, my good sir, in a strange way, when they finish, they are not pleased with themselves regarding what they say, and their rhetoric somehow withers away, so that they seem to be no different from children. ^D There is, therefore, a true shrewdness and a nobility and a courage, just as there is a true lack of nobility and cowardice. For virtue is contrasted with ignorance and vice; concerning this, regarding this, and for this person. Even if the unjust sometimes escape, or rather do not escape—for they are mistaken in thinking they escape—yet the one who acts unjustly pays the penalty. The sense of this is what we have expressed. And Ficinus, having followed this latter interpretation, seems to have read it thus, for he adds, "and the unjust are often avoided." To this reading I am very favorable.

or by death, as they believe, since those often pursue even those who have committed no sin; but that is the final one, which no wicked man can escape. — What punishment do you mean? — Since there are in the nature of things, my Theodore, two patterns, one divine and also most blessed, the other impious and also most wretched: while they do not see that the situation is such, in what stupor and dementia are they, that they do not perceive themselves to become, on the one hand, most like the wicked in their shameful deeds and crimes, and on the other, most unlike the divine? They certainly pay the penalties for this very transgression, in that they live a life most consonant with that to which they are made similar. And if we further threaten them with what is to come, unless they depart from this power of wickedness, so that that place, removed from all contagion of criminals, might not receive them after death, but rather that they might have there forever a manner of life most similar to themselves and their ways, that is, that they might be forced to associate with the wicked as the wicked: this they will hear as nothing other than the dream of certain delirious people, and they will regard them as simpletons and turncoats. — So it is entirely, Socrates. — I know that well, Theodore. But yet this much at least happens to them, that if at any time they ought to weigh the arguments on both sides privately regarding those things which they are wont to despise and ridicule, and to fix their position a little more firmly and steadily in this disputation, they might not wish to flee shamefully: then, indeed, they themselves are not pleased with their own speech, and their rhetoric withers away I know not how; so that they appear to differ in no way from children. ^A

CHAPTER XXX. Of that whole sophistic kind which is wont to be found among men.

In our books, too, many things are said concerning that whole sophistic kind which has occupied the minds of men: For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written: I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the discernment of the prudent I will set aside. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Similarly, by those who wish to profess divine philosophy, we are taught by these words that nothing small or petty should be thought: Considerating not the things which are seen, but the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. And

^A

CHAPTER XXXI.

CHAPTER XXXII.

women called to the sharing of these same studies, even though in all things a woman is far weaker than a man? — Exactly so. — What then? Shall we entrust everything to men and nothing to a woman? — Why indeed should we? — From among women, as we shall say later, you will find some fit for medicine, others not; likewise some prepared by nature for music, while others shrink from it of their own accord. — Truly so. — Others, furthermore, are suited for public exercises and for warfare, while others are unfit for both. — That is my opinion as well. — What moreover of wisdom? Do not some women pursue it with diligence, while others pursue it with hatred? Do not others, in turn, possess a fiercer spirit, while others have a more humble one? — To this also I agree. — There are also some who are fit for guarding, while others are not. — Indeed, have we segregated any nature of men fit for guardianship? — We ^A certainly have. — Therefore the nature of the man and of the woman is the same for the guardianship of the state, except that the one is weaker, and the other is stronger. — It appears so. — Therefore, such women as these are to be chosen by such men to dwell with them and to keep watch with them, since they are capable and are of the same nature as them. — Thus Plato. With justice, therefore, and deservedly do our laws also admit the whole class, as much of women as of men, as much of slaves as of the free, and as much of barbarians as of Greeks, into the communion of divine doctrine and philosophy. ^B

CHAPTER XXXIII. That the whole class is not to be maligned because of those among us who do not live according to the rule of reason.

And let us philosophize in this manner regarding this matter, says Plato. Come, if someone were to praise the raising of goats, and the animal, and likewise the property, as being profitable; while another, on the contrary, having seen goats somewhere feeding without a goatherd and doing harm to certain cultivated fields, were to disparage it; and having seen the whole flock either without a shepherd or with bad shepherds, were to immediately tear the whole thing to pieces; do we suppose that for this reason, in a sane and mature judgment, he would repudiate any other kind of flock? — And why should he? — And after a few words: "What then? Do we suppose that anyone who praises or blames any society, which by its nature ought to have a leader and is very useful when joined with one, but who has never seen it ^C living correctly with its own leader and instead either always lacks any magistrate or is accustomed to bad magistrates—shall we suppose, I ask, that such spectators of such societies can rightly blame or praise anything of the sort?"—How could they? — Therefore, it should not be the case that if any among us should happen to be seen behaving wrongly, either without a leader and director or with wicked magistrates, we should immediately blame this whole class of our schools; but rather, we should admire the religious and pious institution of the state from the conduct of those who conduct themselves rightly and properly within them. ^D

^A

CHAPTER XXXIV. How Plato expressed certain oracles from the Proverbs more purely and elegantly in Greek phrasing.

CHAPTER XXXV. Concerning wealth and poverty.

CHAPTER XXXVI. Concerning the honoring of parents.

CHAPTER XXXVII. Concerning the possession of servants.

^A Plato, in his *Republic*, similarly commands: "Let no Greek possess a Greek slave, neither themselves, nor advise other Greeks to do so." "Certainly," he says. "For thus they would more readily turn their arms against barbarians, and keep away from their own."

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

He says: "Let no one move the boundaries of land, neither of their own citizen-neighbor, nor of any other borderer, even an alien, who possesses land up to the outer limits of his own field; counting it truly the act of one who moves the immovable, as they say, to move these." Then he adds: "If anyone, crossing the fixed boundaries, cultivates the neighbor's field, let him not only make restitution for the damage, but, as a remedy for his impudence and lack of nobility, let him pay double the loss to the person harmed."

CHAPTER XXXIX.

"To sum up the matter in a word," he says, "let neither the infamy nor the punishment of the parents attach to any other of their children, unless it be that a father, and a grandfather, and a great-grandfather, successively incur the penalty."

CHAPTER XL.

The law of Moses says: "If anyone steals a calf or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five calves for the calf, and four sheep for the sheep. But if the theft be found and discovered in his hand, from calf and ass even unto sheep, he shall restore them alive twofold." Hear now how Plato provides similar things, saying: "If a thief, whether he steals a great thing or a small, let one law be set over all, and one penalty of judgment for all: First, that he shall pay double what was taken by theft; whoever is convicted of theft, provided that he has the means from his remaining property to pay above the amount of the lot; but if not, let him be in chains until he shall either pay or obtain pardon from the one by whom he was convicted of theft."

CHAPTER XLI.

Furthermore, when Moses had established: "If a thief be caught digging through a wall, and having received blows, dies, it shall not be reckoned as murder for the other," Plato similarly ordains: "If anyone catches a night-thief entering a house with the intent of stealing money and kills him, let him be pure."

^A

CHAPTER XLII. On a beast of burden.

"If," says Plato, "a beast of burden or any other animal kills someone—unless it should happen that whilst it is being trained for public and solemn games, it does some such thing in the very heat of the contest—let the relatives of the slain proceed against the killer for murder; and let the curators of the fields decide, according to whom and to how many the relative may assign the task. And let them determine, if the beast is found guilty, that those who killed it shall cast it outside the borders of the country." These are the words of Plato. But Moses, anticipating this, says: "If a bull should gore a man or a woman, and he die, the bull shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the bull shall be innocent." ^B

CHAPTER XLIII. That Plato uses the same examples as the Hebrew scripture.

The voice of the prophet is: "Son of man: behold, the house of Israel has become to me all mixed with bronze, and tin, and iron, and lead. In the midst of the furnace they are mixed with silver. Therefore say: Thus says the Lord: Because you have all become one mass, therefore I will gather you, even as silver, and bronze, and iron, and lead, and tin are gathered in the midst of a furnace, that fire may be blown upon them, to smelt them." And listen now to what Plato says in the same manner: "Hear, then, the rest of the story. For we all who are in the city are brothers, as we shall say to them in telling the story. But, as they say, God, when framing those of us who are fit to rule, mixed gold into them at their birth, because they are most precious; but for those who are auxiliaries, he mixed silver; and iron and bronze for the farmers and the other craftsmen. ^C Since, therefore, we are all akin, we would for the most part beget those like ourselves; but it happens at times that from gold a silver descendant might be born, and from silver a golden descendant, and all the rest likewise from one another. To the rulers, therefore, God gives commandment first and most strongly, that they should be as good guardians of nothing, and that they should guard nothing as diligently, as the offspring, because there is something of these mixed into their souls. And if their own offspring should be found to be base-bronze or base-iron, they must have no mercy in any way, but assigning the honor appropriate to their nature, they must rank them either as craftsmen or as farmers. And if again from these anyone should spring up who is gold-tinged or silver-tinged, they shall honor them and promote the former to the guard and the latter to the auxiliary force; as it is useful that the city should perish when it is guarded by an iron or a bronze guardian. Have you, then, any contrivance for how they might be persuaded of this story?" ^D

CHAPTER XLIV.

On the same similar points.

There is another prophecy among the Hebrews, by which the princes of the people are addressed in this way: "O shepherds of Israel, do shepherds not feed themselves? Do the shepherds not feed the sheep? Behold, you eat the milk, and you slaughter the fat, and you clothe yourselves with the wool, but you do not feed my sheep. And that which was lost you did not seek, and that which was broken you did not bind up, and that which had wandered you did not bring back." ^A To which that saying of the saving Gospel also pertains: "The good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep; but the hireling, and he who is not a shepherd, and whose own the sheep are not, leaves them." Now hear Plato, and how he interprets these very things in the first book of *The Republic*:

"But now you see, my Thrasymachus (so that we may repeat those things above), that after you defined the true physician at the beginning, you nevertheless did not wish the true shepherd to be one who diligently and carefully guards the flock, but rather that he should feed his sheep, insofar as he is a shepherd, not looking to the best interest of the sheep, but like some guest-master—and one intending to prepare a feast—is attentively concerned for the banquet; or indeed, just as some hawker might sell them for his own profit, and not as a shepherd. For the pastoral art has no other concern ^B than to provide all that is best for the flocks entrusted and committed to its care. For as far as the art itself is concerned, it is abundantly provided with all the things necessary by its own nature, so that it might be entirely the best and truly pastoral. Thus, then, I thought it necessary for us now to confess that every rule, insofar as it is a rule, is of such a kind that it looks to nothing else—whether it be a public or a private rule—than to the best interest of that which is ruled and cared for. But do you think that those who are truly princes in cities willingly undertake to rule?"

CHAPTER XLV.

On the same matters.

Another voice of a Hebrew prophet is: "From your fear, O Lord, we have conceived in the womb, and we have been in labor, and we have brought forth the spirit of salvation." ^C Plato, however, in the *Theaetetus*, introduces Socrates speaking thus: "Those who associate with me, he says, are like women in labor. For they are in pain and are filled with perplexity for nights and days, even much more than those women are. And my art is able to both arouse and relieve this pain of childbirth."

CHAPTER XLVI. Concerning the same.

^A It is the prophet Ezekiel who says: *And the hand of the Lord was upon me, and I saw, and behold, a stormy wind came from the North*; and a little later: *And in the midst, as it were the likeness of four living creatures. And this was their appearance: there was the likeness of a man upon them, and four faces to one. And the likeness of their faces: the face of a man and the face of a lion on the right to the four, and the face of a calf on the left to the four. And the face of an eagle to the four.* Now hear how similarly Plato speaks:

"Now," I said, "let us discuss, since we have agreed upon what power to commit injustice and to do just acts each possesses."

"How?" he said. ^B

"By creating an image of the soul in speech, so that he who tells those things may know what it was he was talking about."

"What kind?" he said.

"One," I said, "of such kinds as are told in myths to have existed in ancient times—those of the Chimera, or Scylla, or Cerberus, and many other such creatures that are said to be composite, many forms having grown together into one."

"They are indeed told of," he said.

"Fashion, then, one image of a motley and many-headed beast, having all around heads of tame and wild beasts, and being able to change and sprout all these from itself."

"That is the work of a clever shaper," he said; "however, since speech is more malleable than wax and such things, let it be shaped."

"Now, one other image of a lion, and one of a man; but let the first represent the greatest, and the second the second."

"These," he said, "are simpler to shape."

"Now join them into one, making three in total, so that they have ^C grown together with each other."

"They are joined," he said.

"Fashion around them on the outside an image of one, the man, so that to one who is unable to see what is within, but only sees the outer husk, the one creature appears to be a man."

"It has been fashioned around," he said.

"Let us then say to the one who says that it is profitable for this man to commit injustice, while to do just acts is not profitable, that he is saying nothing other than that it is profitable for him to feast the motley beast, and to make the lion and the things around the lion strong; but to starve the man, and to make him weak, so that he is dragged wherever either of those might lead him, and to accustom none of the others to one another, nor to make them friends, but to let them bite each other and devour one another while fighting."

"For truly," he said, "that is what he who praises injustice would say."

"And again, would he who says that just acts are profitable not say that one must do and say these things, from which the man within ^D will be most in control; and he will take care of the many-headed creature, like a farmer, feeding and domesticating the tame parts, and preventing the wild ones from growing, making the nature of the lion an ally..."

*It appears, then, [that the soul is] like the naturally coalescing power of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer.*

But why a mortal and immortal living creature was so called, one must try to say. Every soul takes care of everything that is inanimate, and travels over the whole heaven, at one time becoming...

...taking on other forms. Now, while perfect and winged, it flies aloft and manages the whole world. But that which has lost its wings is borne until it takes hold of something solid; and having settled there, and having taken an earthly body, which seems to move itself because of its power, the whole was called a living creature, soul and body joined.

^A For he says: «Having created the nature of the lion and taking thought for all in common, having made them friendly to each other and to himself, he will so nourish them.» For he who praises justice speaks these things altogether rightly.

CHAPTER XLVII.

That Plato also ordains the citizens into twelve tribes, following the example of the Jewish nation.

The entire nation of the Hebrews had been divided into twelve tribes. Following this example, Plato ordained that the same should be observed in the distribution of his own citizens, speaking thus: «To us, the whole land should be divided into twelve portions, as equal as possible. To each portion, let one tribe be allotted, and let it provide five men annually, as, for instance, surveyors of fields and tribal chiefs.» And again he says that the elected generals should also be created as commanders for them, twelve in number, one commander assigned to each tribe.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Plato ordains that the city be founded in a place having a river; he describes things similar to that which is in Jerusalem.

The Hebrews had long ago founded their royal metropolis in such a place and situation, that while it was far from the sea, being built on mountain ridges, it enjoyed land most fertile in all things. Plato desired that the one he founded in his *Laws* should be similar to this, and wrote as follows: «But I inquire rather, whether that city is to be maritime or inland?» — «Actually, stranger, the city of which we have just been speaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea.» — «And what of harbors? Are there any near it, or is it entirely harborless?» — «It is, in fact, possessed of excellent harbors, as far as is possible, stranger.» — «Good heavens! What sort of thing do you mention? And what of its territory? Is it fertile in all things, or lacking in some?» — ^D Nearly...

^A in its entirety, like the rest of Crete. — «Would you call it rather rugged or level?» — «Indeed, rugged.» — «Then it would not be incurable as regards the acquisition of virtue. For if it were to be maritime and have good harbors, and not be fertile in all things, but rather lacking in many, it would have required some great savior and some divine legislators, lest it should happen to have many and varied and base customs, being of such a nature; but as it is, it has the solace of the eighty stadia. It lies, however, nearer to the sea than it should, as you say that it is rather more provided with harbors; yet even this is tolerable. For the sea is a neighbor to the territory, agreeable indeed from day to day, but in truth a truly salt and bitter neighbor. For by filling itself with trade and profiteering through shopkeeping, it begets treacherous and faithless customs in the souls of men, making the city itself untrustworthy and unfriendly toward itself, and likewise toward other men; but it possesses as a solace ^B against these things that it is fertile in all things. Being rugged, it is clear that it would not be at once very productive and fertile in all things. For if it had this, it would provide a large export, and would in turn be filled with silver and gold coinage again; than which evil, if one is to institute a contention of individual evils, no evil, to speak at once, could be more serious for a city, or more obstructive to the acquisition of noble and just customs.» Thus far Plato. But as for us, since we have sufficiently shown thus far what things he has established as akin to the Hebrews, let us see next how he who so greatly approved the method of Hebrew discipline in the same way rejects the Greek. This you will understand from these words of the tenth book of the Republic.

CHAPTER XLIX.

How Plato rejects that primary instruction of children which was used by the Greeks, as being pernicious.

«As for what is said to you,» says Plato, «(for you will not denounce me to the tragic poets, and all others who occupy themselves in imitation) — all such things seem to be a ^C pestilence to the mind of the hearers, as many as do not have the remedy of knowing them, what kind they happen to be.» — «In what way, pray, do you mean this?» — «I must speak,» said I, «although a certain affection and reverence which I have had from childhood regarding Homer prevents me from speaking. For he seems to have been the first teacher and leader of all these noble tragic poets; but indeed a man should not be held in higher honor than the truth; but ^D I say it must be spoken.» — «Certainly, then,» said he. «Then what follows...»

^A regarding the others, let us not ask Homer, or any other of the poets, whether any of them was a physician, and not merely an imitator of medical discourses. For what man, whether among the ancients or the moderns, is said to have made any one healthy, as Asclepius did? Or what disciples of medicine did he leave behind, as he did his descendants? Let us not, then, ask him about the other arts, but let us pass them by. But concerning the greatest and most beautiful things which Homer attempts to speak about—wars, I mean, and military commands, and the administration of cities, and the education of men—it is surely just to question him, inquiring: ^B "My dear Homer, if you are not third from the truth regarding virtue, a creator of an image—if we have defined you not as an imitator, but as second, and such a one as is able to know what sort of pursuits make men better or worse, both privately and publicly—tell us which of the cities was better governed through you, as Lacedaemon was through Lycurgus, and many other cities, both great and small, through many others? And what city credits you with having been a good legislator, and having benefited them? For Italy and Sicily credit Charondas, and we credit Solon. But what city will anyone be able to name for you?" "I do not think there is one," said Glaucon. "At any rate, not even the Homeridae themselves claim this. But is there any war in Homer's time that is recorded as having been waged successfully under his leadership or counsel?" "None." "But are there any inventions and ingenious devices in the arts or other pursuits that are attributed to him, as the work of a wise man, as is the case with Thales of Miletus, or Anacharsis the Scythian?" "Nothing of the sort at all." "But if not publicly, is Homer said to have been a guide of education in private to some who loved him for his company, and who handed down to posterity a certain Homeric way of life? Just as Pythagoras himself was especially beloved for this, and his followers, even now, by calling their way of life 'Pythagorean,' seem in a way to be distinguished from others?" "No, not even this is said," he replied. "For ^C Creophylus, O Socrates, the companion of Homer, would seem even more ridiculous regarding education, if what is said about Homer is true. For it is said, I suppose, that there was great neglect ^D concerning him while he was alive."

(98) *Others.* Plato, p. 512, F. (99) *Creophylus.* Iliad, B, p. 550, extreme, and Suidas, Creophylus, write, *per v.* Suidas calls him the son of Astycles, native of Chios or Samos; Eustathius calls him a Samian. Having received Homer into his hospitality, he received from him the inscription of the poem which they call *The Capture of Oechalia*; that is, he received as a return-gift from Homer the right not to inscribe the book to himself, but to his friend Creophylus. "I am the work of the Samian, whom divine Homer once received into his home; but I am called a Homeric composition; to Creophylus, O dear Zeus, this is a great [honor]." It is a pentameter, [though] it should have been a hexameter; the third and fourth [feet] are intact. Nothing, however, is detracted from the sense. Eustathius adds that some called this Creophylus the tutor of Homer. But to Plato in this place, he is ridiculous not only in name, but also in instruction, in that he should fall to being Homer's tutor. And it is obscure what he implies, how ridiculous he himself was, [which may] be understood from those things which are handed down about Homer, unless one takes the cause from the fact that he allowed his own name to be inscribed on that poem, whose parent was Homer. (1) *Great neglect.* It is uncertain whether Creophylus was more negligent toward Homer, or Homer toward Creophylus; or, finally, whether Creophylus was neglected by his own [people] even while Homer was alive. He retained in the version the same ambiguity, [implying] that the contempt falls upon Creophylus; this also becomes probable from the fact that he is called ridiculous by Plato. It is not, however, improbable that it fits Homer, whom all his own people, as he signifies a little later, allowed to wander and roam everywhere.

^A It is said, then, I said. But do you think, Glaucon, that if Homer had truly been able to educate human beings and make them better, not merely mimicking these things but able to know about them, he would not have acquired many companions and been honored and loved by them? But Protagoras of Abdera 2, and Prodicus of Ceos, and many others, are able to stand by those of their own time in private meetings—since they would be unable to manage either their own house or city unless they themselves oversaw their education—and they are loved for this wisdom of theirs so intensely that their companions almost carry them around on their heads. But were those of Homer's own time, if he were able to profit human beings in virtue, or Hesiod, going to allow them to go around reciting, and not rather cling to them more than to gold, and compel them to stay at home with them? Or if they could not persuade them, would they not have acted as their attendants wherever they went, until they had partaken sufficiently of their education? —By all means, he said, it seems to me, Socrates, that you speak the truth. —Shall we not, then, positing that beginning from Homer, all the poets are imitators of the images of virtue, and of the other things about which they make poems, but do not touch upon the truth? But, just as we were saying just now, the painter will make a cobbler who seems to be one, himself having no knowledge of cobbling, and to those who have no knowledge, they examine them from colors and shapes? —By all means. ^B —So then, I think, we shall say that the poet also paints with words, as it were, colors of each of the arts, himself having no knowledge, but only mimicking, so that to others like him, who examine them as presented in words, it seems they have spoken well; whether he says something about cobbling in meter, rhythm, and harmony, it seems to be spoken quite well, and the same if it be about generalship, or anything else whatever. So by nature these very things have a certain great allure; but when they are stripped 7 of the colors of music, the works of the poets, when spoken by themselves, I think you know how they appear. For have you seen them, or not? —I have, he said. And ^C these things being so, it seems good to me to go through a few small points from Plato, through which he logically constructs his argument concerning God and providence, standing with the doctrines of the Hebrews even in this. But first let us see how he sets forth the opinions of the atheists.

^D As Pythagoras, when he himself had gained a clearly singular approval of many in this type of life, others also arose thereafter who, professing the Pythagorean manner of life, as they call it, even today appear to excel among the rest. —Not even that. For indeed, Creophilus, Socrates, who is said to have been a companion of Homer, might appear ridiculous, perhaps more in his discipline than by his very name, if what they circulate about Homer is true. For they tell that he, even while he lived, was greatly neglected by his own contemporaries. —They tell it indeed, I said. But do you think, O Glaucon, that if Homer had truly been able to instruct men and make them better, as though living among them in knowledge rather than imitation, he would not have acquired very many friends and companions by whom he would be observed and loved? In truth, when Protagoras of Abdera and that Prodicus of Ceos, and very many others, are able to persuade the contemporaries with whom they familiarly associate that they could never manage their own household or the public affairs unless they were first in their studies and learning, and by the power of such wisdom reconcile to themselves such and so vehement a love of their followers that they almost carry them on their heads: would they, I beseech you, allow Homer or Hesiod, if they could have bestowed labor upon men for the attainment of virtue, to go wandering and roaming everywhere, reciting their poems to the men of their age, and not rather hold them dearer than gold itself, and place them in a part of their own houses, or if they could not obtain this from them, at least be informed by their precepts wherever they might be dwelling, until they had sufficiently profited from their discipline? —Most truly, Socrates, I think that is well said by you. —Let it remain, therefore, that all the poets, with Homer himself leading the train, imitate only images of virtue and of the other things concerning which they sometimes write, and never attain to the truth itself. Videlicet, just as we were saying a little before, a painter, who has never heard anything about the tanning art, yet depicts a tanner in such a way that to those ignorant of the same art, and looking only at the mere appearance of colors and figures, he seems to be a tanner. —Assuredly. —In exactly the same way, I shall say, the poet, being otherwise a guest and a stranger in the arts which he only knows how to imitate, nevertheless introduces names and vocabularies of each thing with certain colors, so that those who attend only to the appearance of the speech think they see the thing itself. Wherefore, whether he sings about the tanner's art, or the general's, or any other matter, in verse, numerously and with modulation, he is thought to have spoken very excellently. Such power does a sweeter harmony have by its own nature to soothe the mind. For the works of the poets, when they are heard by themselves and stripped of those musical colors, are such as they are accustomed to appear.

And having established these things, it is pleasing here to add a few things from Plato, by which he philosophizes much more wisely both about God and about divine Providence, having followed in this instance the doctrine of the Hebrews. And let us first see how he sets forth the opinions of those impious men who utterly exterminate the divinity.

CHAPTER L.

On the opinion of the atheists. From the tenth book of the Laws.

^A "Some people," says Plato, "teach that all things which are currently coming into being, have come into being, or shall come into being, arise partly by nature, partly by art, and partly by chance." — "Well said." — "It is indeed probable that wise men have spoken correctly. Nevertheless, let us, following in their footsteps, see what those who have set out from their school might really have in mind." — "By all means." — "They say, it seems, that the greatest and most beautiful things are produced by nature and chance, while the smaller things are produced by art; which, receiving from nature the generation of the great and primary works, shapes and fashions all the very small things, which we all commonly call 'artificial'." — "What do you mean?" — "Take it more clearly in this way. They claim that fire, water, earth, and air exist all by nature and by chance, and that none of them depends upon art. Similarly, they claim that the things which are listed after those in the second place—that is, the bodies of earthly things, the sun, the moon, and all the stars—have come into existence ^B through these, although they are altogether void of soul; and that each of them is carried along by chance according to the power of each, as it happens to meet, in a manner fitting together warm with cold, dry with moist, and soft with hard, and all such things as are necessarily mixed by the chance combination of contraries. In this way, and by the same method, they claim the whole heaven and all things contained within the heaven have come into existence, and animals as well, and all plants, and the seasons resulting from these—not through reason, they say, nor through some god, nor through art, but, as we were saying, by nature and chance. And they say that art, being itself mortal and born of mortals, arose later from these things, and later brought forth certain trifles which possess very little of the truth, but rather are certain images akin to themselves, such as painting produces, and music, and all the arts that are fellow-workers with these. But if there are any arts that also produce something serious, they claim that these are the ones that have joined their power to nature, ^C such as perhaps medicine, agriculture, and gymnastics. They also say that political science is a small part that shares in nature, but in the greater part shares in art. And thus they assert that all legislation is not from nature, but from art, the positions of which are not true." — "What do you mean?" — "By the gods, my good friend, they say that they, the gods, exist first by art, not by nature, but by certain laws, and these are different ones in different places, according to how each people agreed to legislate for themselves. And indeed, they hold that the 'noble' is one thing by nature and another by law, but that the 'just' does not exist by nature at all."

^A Since this is the case, both nature and art are much more commonly called (a matter of) communion and society. Thus, they believe the whole system of making laws arises from art rather than from nature, the sanctions and principles of which lack truth. — In what sense, my good sir? — They mean, first of all, that these things do not exist by nature, but by art—that is, by certain laws—and therefore they assume different forms among different people, according to how one group or another agrees among themselves by legal institution. In the same way, some things become 'good' by nature, others by law. Thus, they argue that there are no truly just things by nature at all, but that in defining them, men are perpetually at odds with one another and are constantly establishing new things. And whatever they may have decreed to be so, at that moment it begins to hold force, established not at all by nature, but by art and laws. These things, my friends, are celebrated in part by learned men, in part by commoners and poets among the young, whose common voice holds that the most just thing is whatever one has been able to extort by force. ^B Whence it comes about that those young people imbibe impiety, because they do not believe in the kinds of gods that the laws command them to consider; and because of this, they labor under mutual dissensions while they attempt to drag others toward a life that they consider to be in accord with nature—which, in truth, is nothing other than living as master of others, and not serving others by the mandate of law. — O what a thing, my friend, and what a grave pestilence of the youth, grass-fed both publicly in cities and privately at home, you have revealed! — And with a few words interposed: "True," he says, "my Clinia, but answer me this again, for these arguments must be shared with you. Does he who speaks in this way not seem to posit those four things—fire, water, earth, air—as primary above all else, to describe them as nature itself, and then to claim that the soul is formed later from them? Although this does not seem to be the case, yet it is clearly what this way of speaking signifies to us." — "Yes, entirely." — "Have we then discovered a certain fountain, as it were, of the foolish opinion of those men who have never touched upon questions of natural philosophy? Consider the whole argument carefully, for it is no small matter if those who take up such arguments should appear as those who initiate others into impiety, and not even using these arguments well, but rather misusing them." ^C "It seems to me that matters are indeed as you say." — "You speak well, but try to explain it further." — "It seems, then, that I must take up some more unusual arguments." And after a little bit, he adds: "Those people, my friend, are likely to be ignorant of what the soul actually is, and what power it possesses, as well as everything regarding its generation, (they are ignorant that it is) among the primary things, having come into being before all bodies, and that it rules over their every change and rearrangement more than anything else. If these things are so, must it not follow by necessity that the things kindred to the soul are prior to those which pertain to the body, since the soul itself is older than the body?" — "Necessity compels it." — "Then 'opinion,' 'care,' 'mind,' 'art,' and 'law' would be prior to 'hard,' 'soft,' 'heavy,' and 'light.' And indeed, the great and primary works and actions of art would come to be, as they exist among the first things; while things that exist by nature—and 'nature,' which they themselves name incorrectly—would be later than these, and would take their beginning from art and mind." ^D "How so?" — "They wish to correctly call 'nature' the generation of primary things. But if it appears that soul is the first thing—not fire, nor air—but soul as the one having been generated among the first things, it would be most correctly said to be nature, in a preeminent sense."

You speak most truly. ^A And after a few words, he says: "Do you not think, my friend, that the majority of men have been ignorant of what the soul is, and what powers it possesses, and that they have been strangers and wanderers not only regarding other matters proper to it, but even regarding its birth, since they have failed to know that it is in the number of the first principles, and prior to all bodies, and that it is therefore, more than all things else, the cause and fountain of all change and diversity? If this is true, does it not follow immediately that those things which pertain to the nature of the soul must necessarily be held to be prior to all those things which are attributed to the body, since the soul is more ancient than the body?" It follows entirely. "Therefore, opinion, care, mind, art, and law must be prior to hard and soft, heavy and light. Indeed, those great and primary works and similar actions are to be referred to art, as many of them as were reckoned in the class and number of the first things. But those things which are generated by nature, and nature itself—which these people erroneously call by this name—were later than those things, and took some origin from art and mind simultaneously." How, then, is that? "For they do not rightly defend their view that nature is to be called the generation that is occupied with the first things. But if it were established that the soul was born either as the first thing, or certainly among the first things—not fire or air—then it might be said with a preeminent and special right that those things themselves consist by the power of nature, provided you are able to demonstrate that the soul is more ancient than the body; ^B otherwise, never." You speak most truly.

CHAPTER LI

How Plato philosophizes about God.

"Come then," says Plato, "if God is ever to be invoked by us, now certainly this must be done. Therefore, let us implore their aid with every effort for this inquiry, which is entirely about the gods, inasmuch as we undertake to demonstrate that they exist; and at the same time, having grasped this as a certain and secure rope, let us enter upon our proposed discussion. And to me, indeed, this method is highly approved in this kind of inquiry: that, just as if someone were to query me with certain fixed questions, so I should in turn respond to him in this manner. 'Whether, my friend—should someone ask me—do all things thus stand, so that nothing is moved; or is it entirely otherwise? Or do some things move, while others are at rest?' To which I respond, 'Some things move, others are at rest.' 'Do they, therefore, either rest or move in a certain fixed place?' 'Exactly.' 'And some things, indeed, do this in one single place, others in more than one. Do you mean,' I ask, 'that those things which act with the power and system of those standing in the midst move in one place, just as the rotation of those circulations which we say are fixed ^C revolves?' 'Yes.' And he continues: 'Come, let us also say this, and respond again to ourselves. If all things were standing still together, as most of such people dare to say, what, then, is the necessity for the first motion to be generated among those mentioned?' The self-moving one, of course. For it would never be changed beforehand by something else, since there was no change in them beforehand. Therefore, we will say that the beginning of all motions, and the first [motion], which occurs in things resting and is present in things moving—the one that moves itself—is necessarily the most ancient and the most powerful of all changes; but the one changed by another, while it moves other things, is the second." You speak most truly. "Since, therefore, we are at this point in the discourse, let us respond to this." What is that? "If we see such a one generated in the earthy, or the watery, or the fiery [element]." ^D

whether it exists in separation or in mixture, what shall we say is the disposition present in such a one?" ^A — Are you therefore asking me if we shall call it living when it moves itself? Yes, living; for how could we not? — What then? When we see soul in some things, must we not agree that "living" is the same as this? It is not otherwise. — Attend now, by Zeus; would you not be willing to conceive of three things with respect to each? What do you mean? One is the essence, one is the definition of the essence, and one is the name; and indeed, there are two questions concerning everything that exists. — In what way two? Sometimes that each of us, when the name is proposed, demands the definition itself, and sometimes, when the definition is proposed, asks in turn for the name. Is it such a thing as this that we wish to say now? — What is the thing? — It is something, I suppose, ^B that is divided into equal parts, both in other things and in number. Of this thing, according to number, the name is "even," while the definition is "a number divided into two equal parts." — Yes. — This is what I mean; are we not calling the same thing by both names, whether, being asked for the definition, we render the name, or, being asked for the name, we render the definition, calling the same thing that is an even number by name and by definition, divided in two? — Entirely so. — And so, the name is "soul"; what is its definition? Have we any other, besides the one just now stated, the motion that is able to move itself? Do you say that moving oneself has the same definition as the essence that corresponds to the name, which we all call "soul"? — I do indeed. — If this is so, do we still need any more proof that soul is the same thing as the first motion, and the generation of things that exist, and things that have existed, and things that will exist, ^C and all that is contrary to these, since it has appeared as the cause of all change and all motion for all things? — No. — But it has most sufficiently been demonstrated that soul is the oldest of all things, having become the beginning of motion. Is therefore the motion that occurs in another through something else—but which never provides any capacity for itself to be moved by itself—is this not second, and—however many numbers one might wish to count it as being—is it not merely the change of a body that is truly soulless? — Correctly said. — Correctly, then, and properly, and most truthfully and completely, would we have said that soul became prior to body, or not? That body is second and posterior, being moved according to nature by a soul that rules? — Most truthfully, indeed. — And do we recall agreeing previously that if soul were shown to be older than body, then the things of the soul would also be ^D older than those of the body? — Most certainly. — And would not traits, and dispositions, and volitions, and reasonings, and true opinions, and attentions, and memories be prior to the length, breadth, depth, and strength of bodies, if soul is also prior to body? — It is necessary. — Is it therefore necessary to agree to what follows this, that soul is the cause of both good and evil, and of the beautiful and the shameful,

^A and of all their opposites, if we shall indeed posit it as the cause of all things? — For how could it not be? — Now, since soul governs and dwells within all things that are everywhere in motion, is it not also necessary to say that it governs the heavens? — Why should it not? — Are there more than one? — There are more. I shall answer on your behalf. We must certainly posit no fewer than two: one, the benefactor, and the other, the one capable of producing the opposite. — You have spoken very correctly. — ^B Very well. Now, does soul drive all things in heaven, and earth, and sea, with its own motions—to which the names are: to will, to consider, to care for, to deliberate, to opine, whether truly or falsely, to rejoice, to grieve, to take courage, to fear, to hate, to love—and all motions that are akin to these or are primary, taking on in turn the secondary motions of bodies, which lead all things to growth and decay, and to separation and combination, and those which follow these: heat, cold, heaviness, lightness, hard and soft, white and black, ^C harsh and sweet, and bitter, and all things which soul, by employing—when it takes on intellect—God itself, being God—rightly and happily guides all things; but when it joins with folly, it produces all things the opposite to these? Shall we posit that these things are so, or are we still in doubt as to whether it is otherwise? — Not at all. — Therefore, shall we say that the genus of soul is master of heaven and earth and the entire circuit, being wise and full of virtue, or does it possess neither? Would you like us to answer this in the following way? — How? — If, my admirer, we say that the entire path and movement of heaven, and of all things that are therein, ^D has a nature similar to the motion and revolution and calculations of intellect, and proceeds in an orderly manner, it is clear that we must say the best soul takes care of the whole cosmos and leads it in that path of such a kind. — Correct. — But if it proceeds madly and disorderly, then the evil one. — This too is correctly said. What, then, is the nature of the motion of intellect? This is already difficult, O friends, to answer wisely if questioned. Therefore, it is right for me to anticipate the answer for you. — You speak well. — Then, let us not, as if staring at the sun and bringing night upon ourselves at midday, make our answer, as if we will ever be able to grasp and know intellect sufficiently with mortal eyes. But by looking at the image of the thing asked, it is safer to see. — How do you mean? — Does intellect resemble the motion of those ten motions? Let us take the image, which I, having called to mind with you, will together form the answer. — You would speak most excellently. — We remember, then, this much from those former things, that we posited that of all things, some are in motion and others at rest. — Yes. — And of those in motion, some are moved in one place, and others are carried in several. — That is so. — Therefore, of these two motions, that which is always moved in one place...

^A being akin to the motion, conversion, and cogitations of the intellect, establishes a course related to it; it follows necessarily that we must acknowledge that that best soul cares for the whole universe, and conducts it along this very path. — That is indeed correct. — But if it revolves furiously and turbulently, we must attribute this same thing to an evil soul. — And that also is correct. — But now, of what nature do we finally believe the motion of the intellect to be? To this question, friends, it is difficult to answer wisely. Wherefore it will be appropriate in the present instance for me to undertake this task of answering for you. — You speak well. — Let us therefore take care, lest looking at the sun as with an adverse countenance, and bringing on night at midday, we answer as if the intellect itself could ever be perceived and thoroughly known by mortal eyes. It will be safer, therefore, to contemplate it by fixing our gaze upon its image. — How do you understand this? — That we should select the image of whichever of those ten motions the intellect is more akin to; and when I have recalled that to your memory, I will then submit the answer on behalf of all. — You speak excellently. — In the beginning, we at least remember it having been established by us, that of the whole multitude of things, some are moved, others are at rest. — We remember. — Then, of those that are moved, some are moved in one place, others in several. — It is so. — Therefore, of these motions, we see that which is always moved in one place, around some fixed center, being agitated like circles made with a lathe, ^B and it is necessary that it approaches the conversion of the intellect by imitation and likeness as closely as can be. — Explain that more clearly, I pray. — Namely, that we should say that both, I mean the intellect and that motion which is always moved in one place, in the way we are accustomed to see some sphere revolve, are always turned in one and the same manner, in the same place, around the same things, and toward the same things, and in one order; and no one, I think, would deem us to be wrongly fabricating outstanding images in our reasoning. — That is indeed excellent. — Therefore, that other motion, which is never revolved similarly, nor according to the same things, nor in the same place, nor around the same things, nor toward the same things, nor in one place, nor in a fitting and elegant order, nor by a certain reason, must be held to be joined with the utmost madness. — And this also is most true. — Now, therefore, let it be openly declared that, since it is the soul that turns everything, the very conversion of the heaven ^C is also governed by the judgment and guidance of some soul, whether good or contrary. — Truly, my guest, from the things that have just been said, it would be a sin to establish anything other than that one soul, or even several, ^D that possess every virtue, convey all things. — Most excellently, Cleinias, have you listened to the discourses. But listen still further to this. — What is that? — When the sun, and the moon, and the other stars exist, if soul conveys all things, does it not also convey each one individually? — Why should it not? — Let us make our discourses about one, which will also appear to us to be applicable to all the stars. — Of which one? — Every man sees the sun’s body, but no one sees its soul; nor indeed the soul of any other body, either living or dead, of any of the animals. But there is great hope that this genus is altogether imperceptible to all the senses of the body, and is intelligible [note: the text continues after the provided column break...]

^A by the mind and intellect, which is what we add concerning it. ^B What is that? If the soul moves the sun, we shall not, I think, err if we say that it does one of three things. What three do you mean? Certainly, that it either has the soul enclosed within that round body, which we see, and carries it about in every direction, just as we are carried about by our own soul; or that, having clothed itself with a body from elsewhere, either fiery or airy, as some prefer, it drives the body by the force of the body; or finally, that it is itself altogether without a body, yet being furnished with other transcendent powers, it leads the sun in an admirable way. Truly. Since the soul effects one of these things, it is necessary that all things should be controlled and ruled by it. And these things the philosopher set forth in his Laws. Hear now how he maintains his opinion in the Philebus. "All wise men," he says, "who have any right to glory in this name, agree that intellect is the king of heaven and earth." And perhaps indeed he is right. But if you please, let us treat the whole matter more fully and richly. But you, Socrates, as it shall seem best, do not fear any length in this matter, since you will not be troublesome to anyone. Excellent. Let us begin our inquiry in this manner. What, I pray you? Whether, Protarchus, we are to determine that all things and this so-called universe are governed by the power of the irrational and the random, and as chance may have it; or on the contrary, as those before us said, ^C that a mind and a certain wonderful wisdom order and govern them? No such thing, most admirable Socrates. For what you say does not seem to me even pious now to affirm; but to say that mind orders all things, and that this is worthy of the view of the universe, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars, and of all their revolution, is something I would never speak of, nor would I think otherwise. Do you wish, then, that we should agree with those who were previously in accord, that these things are so? And that we should not only think that we must speak of another's views without danger, but even run the risk together, and share in the censure, whenever a clever man says that these things are not so, but are in disorder? How could I not wish it? Go then, and look to the argument that is now coming to us regarding these matters. Speak only. Are we to see in the nature of the bodies of all animals, fire, and water, and breath, and earth, as those who are caught in a storm say, contained within the composition? Very much so. For we are truly in a storm from the difficulty of our present arguments. Come then, take the following regarding each of those things among us. What sort? That each of these is something small among us, and base, and in no way whatsoever pure, and lacking a power worthy of its nature. But if you take one, think the same regarding all; for instance, fire exists, I suppose, among us, and exists in the universe. What then? Is the portion among us small, and weak, and base, while the portion in the universe is wonderful in multitude and beauty, and in all the power that is in fire? Most true is what you say. What then? Does the fire of the universe feed and come into being from this, and is it ruled by the fire among us, or on the contrary, does mine, and yours, and that of the other animals, all receive these things from that? This is not even worthy of being asked, it is a question of judgment. Rightly. For you would say the same, I expect, regarding the earth among the animals here, and that which is in the universe; and thus you would answer regarding the others about which I asked a little earlier. ^D For who, being in his right mind, would ever appear to answer otherwise? Hardly anyone at all; but follow what comes next. Since we have now spoken of all these things, did we not name them a body, having seen them composed into one? What then? Take the same regarding this which we call the universe; for in the same way, one might perhaps call it a body, being composed from the same things. You speak most correctly. Does the body among us then derive from this whole body, or does it derive from that among us, both the nourishment and all the things we have now mentioned about them, which it has received and possesses? This, too, Socrates, is not worthy of being asked. What then? Is it perhaps worthy of being asked? Or how will you speak? Speak what...

τὸ ^A ποῖον. — Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρ᾽ οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν; — Δῆλον, ὅτι φήσομεν. — Πόθεν, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὃν ἐτύγχανε, ταύτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ, καὶ ἔτι πάντη καλλίονα; — Δῆλον, ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες. — Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας, καὶ ἄπειρον, καὶ κοινὸν, καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνὸν, τοῦτ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχήν τε παρέχον, καὶ σωμασκίαν ἐμποιοῦν, καὶ πταίσαντος σώματος ἰατρικὴν, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθὲν καὶ ἀσκούμενον, πᾶσαν καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι· τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐν ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ, καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι καλῶν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτοις δὲ οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν; — Ἀλλ' οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοι. — Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, μετ' ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἂν ἑπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν, ὡς ἔστιν, ἃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἄπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολὺ, καὶ πέρας ἱκανὸν, καί τις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαιότατα ἄν. — Δικαιότατα δῆτα. — Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην. — Οὐ γάρ οὖν. — Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι, διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν· ἐν δὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλὰ, καθότι φίλον ἑκάστοις, λέγεσθαι. — Σείᾳ ^B δὴ καὶ ταύτῃ τυγχάνει ἑπόμενος ὁ λόγος, ὡς οὐκ ἀτάκτως πάντα ῥέει ^C, ἀλλὰ τεταγμένως. — Τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βουλοίμην; — Ἴθι δή. — Τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἁπάντων σώματα συνέστηκε, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, πνεῦμα, γῆ, ταῦτα ἆρα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ συνεστώσει πως ἀναγνωριζόμεθα, καθότι δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν χειμαζομένων ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ βίου ζάλης ἀνθρώπων λέγεται; — Πάνυ γε. — Τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τῆς λέξεως εἴδει τῷ τῆς ἀπορίας καταιγισμῷ δῆθεν ῥιπτούμεθα. — Ἄγε δὴ, καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων ὧν ἔχομεν, τοιοῦτόν τι λάβε. — Ποῖον, αἰτῶ; — Τὸ μικρόν τι καὶ εὐτελὲς ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν μερῶν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι, ὃ μήτε καθαρὸν μήτε εἰλικρινές ἐστιν, μήτε τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως ἀξίαν ἔχει. Ὃ δ' ἂν περὶ ἑνὸς τινος ὁρίσῃ, καὶ περὶ πάντων ὡσαύτως νόει. Πῦρ, οἷον, ὡς ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ παντί ἐστιν. — Πάνυ γε. — Ὅτε τοίνυν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστι, καὶ σφόδρα σμικρὸν, καὶ ἀσθενὲς, καὶ νωθὲν, ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ ὅτε ἐστὶ, ἅμα τῷ πλήθει καὶ τῷ κάλλει, καὶ πᾶσι ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀπαραμίλλοις δυνατοῖς, ἅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἴδια, παντάπασιν ἀξιοθαύμαστόν ἐστιν. — Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. — Τί δέ; ἐφεξῆς τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν, ὡς ὑπὸ τούτου τρεφόμενον, διοικούμενον καὶ βασιλευόμενον οἴει εἶναι, ἢ μᾶλλον ἀπ' ἐκείνου τό γε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων πῦρ, πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν λαμβάνειν; — Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲ ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἡγοῦμαι. — Οὐδὲ μὴν ἄλλως, οἶμαι, καὶ περὶ τῆς γῆς ταύτης, ἣν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ^D ὁρῶμεν τετάχθαι, οὐκ ἀτάκτως, ἀλλὰ τεταγμένως, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως τῆς ἄλλης ἁπάσης ἑτέρας ἑκάστοτε, περὶ ὧν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἐζητοῦμεν, τὸ αὐτὸ πάντως ἀποκρίναι. Τίς γὰρ, εἴπερ σωφρονοίη, ἄλλο ποτέ τι ἀποκρίναιτο; — Οἶμαι, οὐδείς. — Ἀλλ' ἴωμεν ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπά. Μῶν τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, ὅταν ἐν ἑνὶ συνελθόντα συμφυῇ, σῶμα καλοῦμεν; — Ναί. — Τὸ αὐτὸ τοίνυν καὶ περὶ τούτου, ὃ κόσμον καλοῦμεν, ἐννόει. Καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ὡσαύτως σῶμα δεῖ νομίζειν εἶναι, ἅτε ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν συνεστώς. — Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. — Πότερον οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῷ παντὶ σώματος τὸ ἡμέτερον τρέφεται, ἢ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐκεῖνο, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἃ νῦν δὴ προσεθήκαμεν, εἴληχε; — Οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον. — Τί δέ; τὸ τρίτον τοῦτο; ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἔσται, ἢ μή; — Εἰπέ μοι. — Τὸ ἡμέτερον τοῦτο σῶμα ψυχῆς μετέχειν φήσομεν; — Φήσομεν πάντως. — Πόθεν δ' ἂν αὐτὴν ἑλκύσειεν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰ μὴ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ἦν, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οἷς καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον, καὶ πολὺ γε ἀμείνοσι κοσμούμενον; — Δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδαμόθεν. — Ἦ μὴν, οὐχ οἰόμεθα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας, ἄπειρον, τὸ μεικτὸν, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον αἰτίας γένος, ὃ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐνὸν, καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν ἐγχέει, καὶ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, εἴ τι ταλαιπωρεῖ, τὴν θεραπείαν παρέχει, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθέν, ἀνασκευάζοντα ἐπισκευάζει· τοῦτο, φημὶ, ἄξιον εἶναι τῆς ἀκροτάτης καὶ τελείας σοφίας ὀνόματος. Ὃ δὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ εἴδει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ καθαρότητι πλεονεκτοῦν, τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσει κέχρηται. Ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐναντίον πάσης λόγου ἀλλότριον ἦν. Εἰ ἄρα τοῦτο ἀποδοκιμάζομεν, περιλείπεται τῇ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμει χρωμένους, βέλτιον οὕτω τιθέναι, εἶναι δὴ, ὃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, τοῦτο ἐν τῷ παντὶ, ἄπειρόν τε καὶ πέρας ἱκανὸν, αἰτίαν τινὰ οὐ κοινὴν καὶ βέβηλον, ἥτις ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας διατάττει, καὶ κυβερνᾷ, σοφίαν καὶ νοῦν ὀρθότατα προσαγορευτέον. — Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν. — Σοφία δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς χωρισθῆναι οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο. — Οὐδαμῶς. — Κατακλείειν οὖν δεῖ, τῇ τῆς αἰτίας ταύτης δυνάμει, καὶ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς φύσιν, βασιλικὴν ψυχὴν καὶ βασιλικὸν νοῦν κεκτῆσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα, ὅσα τούτων τυγχάνει, ἄξια ὀνόματα, καθότι ἑκάστοις πρέπον ἐστίν. Ἄχρι τούτου Πλάτων.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΝΒ΄.

ὅτι μὲν ἡγῇ θεοὺς ^A συγγένειά τις ἴσως σε θεία πρὸς τὸ ξύμφυτον ἄγει τιμᾶν καὶ νομίζειν εἶναι· κακῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀδίκων τύχαι ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀληθείᾳ μὲν οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι σφόδρα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμμελῶς, ἄγουσί σε πρὸς ἀσέβειαν, ἔν τε μούσαις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμνούμεναι ἅμα καὶ ἐν παντοίοις λόγοις. Ἢ καὶ πρὸς τέλος ἴσως ἀνοσίους ἀνθρώπους ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας γηραιούς, παῖδας παίδων καταλιπόντας ἐν τιμαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις, ταράττῃ τανῦν (45), ὅταν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδὼν, ἢ δι᾽ ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος, ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτῶν τινι αὐτόπτης προστυχών, πολλῶν ἀσεβημάτων καὶ δεινῶν γενομένων τισί, δι᾿ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὁρᾷς ἐκ σμικρῶν εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀφικομένους, τότε διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα δῆλος εἶ μέμφεσθαι μὲν θεοὺς ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας τῶν τοιούτων διὰ ξυγγένειαν οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλων, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπό τε ἀλογίας ἅμα καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος δυσχεραίνειν θεοὺς, εἰς τοῦτο νῦν τὸ πάθος ἐλήλυθας, ὥστ᾽ εἶναι μὲν δοκεῖν αὐτοὺς, τῶν δ' ἀνθρωπίνων καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων. Ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἔλθῃ σοι πάθος πρὸς ἀσέβειαν τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν πως οἷον ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι λόγοις αὐτὸ προσιὸν τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον, ᾧ πρὸς τὸν παράπαν οὐχ ἡγούμενον θεοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διεπερανάμεθα, τούτῳ τανῦν προσχρήσασθαι. Σὺ δ᾽, ὦ Κλεινία τε καὶ Μέγιλλε, ὑπὲρ τοῦ νέου, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ἀποκρινόμενοι διαδέχεσθε. Ἐὰν δέ τι δύσκολον ἐγγίγνηται τοῖς λόγοις, ἐγὼ σφῶν, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ, δεξάμενος, διαβιβῶ τὸν ποταμόν. — Ὀρθῶς λέγεις, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ταῦτα δρᾶ, ποιήσομέν τε ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν, ἃ λέγεις. — Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲν τάχ᾽ ἂν ἴσως εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσι θεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τῷ μεγέθει διαφερόντων. Ἤκουον γάρ που, καὶ παρῆν τοῖς νῦν δὴ λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀγαθοί γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειοτάτην αὐτῶν οὖσαν κέκτηνται. — Καὶ σφόδρα γε ἐπήκουον. — Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν κοινῇ συνεξετάζωμεν, τίνα λέγοντες ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν, ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶνται. Φέρε, τὸ σωφρονεῖν νοῦν τε κεκτῆσθαι, φαμὲν ἀρετῆς τὰ δὲ ἐναντία, κακίας; — Φαμέν. — Τί δαί; ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ κακίας; — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. — Καὶ τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ τούτων, τὰ δὲ καλὰ φήσομεν; — Ἀνάγκη. — Καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ ὁπότα φλαῦρα, θεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἐροῦμεν; — Καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ὁμολογοῖ πᾶς ἄν. — Τί δαί; ἀμέλειάν τε, καὶ ἀργίαν, καὶ τρυφήν, εἰς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς θήσομεν; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; — Καὶ πῶς; ^C — Ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τοὐναντίον; — Ναί. — Τἀναντία ἆρα τούτοις εἰς τοὐναντίον; — Τοὐναντίον. — Τί οὖν; τρυφῶν, καὶ ἀμελής, ἀργός τε, ἂν ὁ ^D

ὁ ^A ποιητὴς (45) κηφῆσι κοθούροισι μάλιστα εἴκελον ἔφασκεν εἶναι, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος (46) πᾶσιν ἡμῖν; — Ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών. Οὐκοῦν τόν γε Θεὸν οὐ ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον, ὅ γέ τοι αὐτὸς μισεῖ· τῷ δέ τι τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι πειρωμένῳ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον. Οὐ μὲν δή· πῶς γὰρ ἄν; — Ὧ ^B δὴ προσήκει μὲν πράττειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διαφερόντως τινός· ὁ δὲ τούτου τοῦ γένους τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖται, τῶν σμικρῶν δὲ ἀμελεῖ, κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἐπαινοῦντες τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον, οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι πλημμελοῖμεν; Σκοπῶμεν δὲ ὧδε. Ἄρ' οὐ κατὰ δύο εἴδη τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττει ὁ πράττων, εἴτε Θεὸς εἴτε ἄνθρωπος; — Ποίῳ δὴ λέγομεν (47); — Ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ, ἀμελουμένων τῶν σμικρῶν, ἡ ῥᾳθυμία καὶ τρυφή, εἰ διαφέρει ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ· ἢ ἔστιν ἄλλως πως γιγνομένη ἀμέλεια; Οὐ γάρ που, ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον ᾖ τῶν πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων, μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ, ὧν ἂν δυνάμει Θεός, ἢ φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐλλιπής, καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται. — Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; — Νῦν δὴ δύο ὄντες τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθωσαν, οἱ θεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι, παραιτητοὺς δὲ ἕτερος, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖς τῶν σμικρῶν. Πρῶτον μὲν θεοὺς ἀμφότεροι φατε γινώσκειν, καὶ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ἀκούειν πάντα, λαθεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι τῶν ὁπόσων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. Ταύτῃ δέ γε λέγετε ἔχειν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς; — Οὕτως. — Τί δαί; δύνασθαι πάντα ὁπόσων αὖ δύναμίς ἐστι θνητοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις; — Πῶς γὰρ οὐ συγχωρήσονται καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; — Καὶ μὴν ἀγαθούς τε καὶ ἀρίστους ὡμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πέντε ὄντες. ^C — Σφόδρα γε. — Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μὲν καὶ τρυφῇ ἀδύνατον αὐτοὺς ὁμολογεῖν πράττειν ὁτιοῦν τὸ παράπαν, ὄντας γε οἵους λέγομεν; Δειλίας γὰρ ἔγγονος ἔν γε ἡμῖν ἀργία, ῥᾳθυμία δὲ ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς. — Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. — Ἀργίᾳ μὲν δὴ καὶ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ οὐδεὶς ἀμελεῖ θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ μέτεστιν αὐτῷ που δειλίας. — Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. — Οὐκοῦν τὸ λοιπὸν, εἴπερ ἀμελοῦσι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων τῶν περὶ τὸ πᾶν, ἢ γινώσκοντες, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, δρῷεν ἂν τοῦτο, ἢ τί τὸ λοιπὸν πλὴν τοῦ γινώσκειν τοὐναντίον; — Οὐδέν. — Πότερον οὖν, ὦ ἄριστε καὶ βέλτιστε, θῶμέν σε λέγοντα, ὡς ἀγνοοῦντάς τε, καὶ, δέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀμελοῦντας, ἢ γινώσκοντας ὅτι δεῖ (καθάπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγονται ποιεῖν, εἰδότες ἄλλα εἶναι βελτίω πράττειν, ὧν δὴ πράττουσι), διά τινας ἥττας ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν οὐ ποιεῖν; — Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; — Οὐκοῦν δὴ τά γε ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα τῆς τε ἐμψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα, καὶ θεοσεβέστατον αὐτό ἐστι πάντων ζώων ἄνθρωπος. — ^D Ἔοικε γοῦν. — Θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμεν εἶναι πάντα ὁπόσα θνητὰ ζῶα ἢ νοερά, ὧνπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.

ὅλον. ^A — Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — Ἤδη τοίνυν ἢ σμικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταῦτα εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς· οὐδ᾽ ἑτέρως γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς ἀμελεῖν ἂν εἴη προσῆκον, ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι καὶ ἀρίστοις. Σκοπῶμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις. — Τὸ ποῖον; — Περί τε αἰσθήσεως καὶ δυνάμεως· ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοιν πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ χαλεπότητα ἔστον πεφυκότε; — Πῶς λέγεις; — Ὁρᾷν μέν που καὶ ἀκούειν τὰ σμικρὰ χαλεπώτερον ἢ τὰ μεγάλα· φέρειν δὲ αὖ, καὶ κρατεῖν, καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων, παντὶ ῥᾷον ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων. — Καὶ πολύ γε. — Ἰατρῷ δὴ προστεταγμένον ὅλον τι θεραπεύειν βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ, τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελὲς ἔσται, τῶν μορίων δὲ καὶ σμικρῶν ἀμελές· εἶθ᾽ ἕξει ποτὲ καλῶς αὐτὸ τὸ πᾶν; — Οὐδαμῶς. — Οὐ μὴν οὐδέ γε κυβερνήταις, οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς, οὐδ᾽ οἰκονόμοις, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τισι πολιτικοῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενὶ χωρὶς τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ σμικρῶν, πολλὰ ἢ μεγάλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι. — Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; — Μὴ τοίνυν τὸν Θεὸν ἀξιώσωμέν ποτε θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἳ τὰ προσήκοντα αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσι, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα μιᾷ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται· τὸν δὲ Θεὸν ὄντα τε σοφώτατον, βουλόμενόν τε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ δυνάμενον, ὧν μὲν ῥᾷον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, σμικρῶν ὄντων, μηδαμῆ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἀργὸν ἢ δειλόν τινα διὰ πόνους ῥᾳθυμοῦντα, τῶν δὲ μεγάλων. — ^B Μηδαμῶς δόξαν τοιαύτην περὶ θεῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἀποδεχώμεθα· οὐδαμῇ γὰρ οὔτε ὅσιον, οὐτ᾽ ἀληθὲς τὸ διανόημα διανοοίμεθ᾽ ἄν. — Δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι νῦν ἤδη καὶ μεγάλα μετρίως διειλέχθαι τῷ φιλαιτίῳ τῆς ἀμελείας πέρι θεῶν; — Ναί. — Τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸν μὴ λέγειν ὀρθῶς. Ἐπιδῶν γε μὴν προσδεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ μύθων ἔτι τινῶν. — Ποίων, ὦ ἀγαθέ; — Πείσωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις, ὡς τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ᾽ ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα, ὧν καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστον τὸ προσῆκον πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. Τούτοις δέ εἰσιν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρότατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως, εἰς μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον τέλος ἀπειργασμένοι· ὧν ἂν καὶ τὸ σὸν, ὦ σχέτλιε, μόριον, εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει βλέπον ἀεὶ, καίπερ πάνσμικρον ὄν. ^C Σὲ δὲ λέληθε περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ, ὡς γένεσις ἕνεκα ἐκείνου γίνεται πᾶσα, ὅπως ᾖ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχουσα εὐδαίμων οὐσία, οὐχ ἕνεκα σοῦ γινομένη, σὺ δ᾽ ἕνεκα ἐκείνου. Πᾶς γὰρ ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημιουργὸς παντὸς μὲν ἕνεκα πάντα ἐργάζεται, πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυντείνων βέλτιστον, μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου, καὶ οὐχὶ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται.

ἀπεργάζεται. ^A You are indignant, unaware of how what concerns you is for the best, happening to the whole and to you according to the capacity of the common generation. And since the soul, always ordered with a body, now with one, now with another, undergoes every kind of change for its own sake or for the sake of another soul, no other work remains for the Player than to shift it—the soul that has become better in character to a better place, and the one that has become worse to a worse one—according to what is fitting for each, so that it may obtain the portion it deserves. — What do you mean? — I think I can explain it in the way that the leisure of the Providence of the God of all things would have it. For if one were to shape things while looking always at the whole, transforming everything (for instance, water from fire, [56] animate things), and not making many things out of one or one out of many, having shared in the first, second, or even third generation, it would be infinitely numerous, ^B of the changing order. But as things are, there is a marvelous ease for the One who cares for the whole. — How do you say it again? — Like this. Since our King saw that all our actions possess soul, and that there is much virtue in them, but also much vice; and that soul and body, if they were to become immortal, but not eternal—as are the gods according to the law (for there would never be a generation of animals if one of these were lost)—and that it is natural for the good to benefit the soul, and for the bad to harm it [58]; having seen all these things, He devised where each of the parts might be laid so that, in the whole, the prevailing virtue and the defeated vice might be exhibited as easily and as excellently as possible. He has indeed devised for all this, to what sort a thing is always becoming, what seat it must take upon settling, and what places; but as for the generation of the "what sort," He has left the causes to the wills of each of us. For in whatever way one desires, and being of such a sort in soul, in that way, and as such, each of us mostly becomes. — That is indeed likely. ^C Everything that is partaker of soul undergoes change, possessing within itself the cause of change; but when they change, they are carried according to the order and law of destiny, changing their characters less, [59] moving according to the plane of the region. But those that become more and more unjust fall into the depths, those places called "the lower," such as Hades and the names associated with them, which they who are living fear greatly and dream of, and when they are dissolved from their bodies. When a soul [60] changes more in vice or virtue, by its own will and by the association that has become strong—when, upon mingling with divine virtue, it becomes remarkably such as these—it changes ^D and is transformed. Our King knows that all actions are ensouled, and that they possess as much vice as they do virtue; likewise, regarding soul and body, that while they have no pestilence from themselves, they nonetheless are lacking in immortality.

^A And so, being transported to a better place, it changes its entire holy station; but when contraries shift to contraries, it changes its life. This, O boy and young man, is the justice of the gods who inhabit Olympus: that one who seems to be neglected by the gods—becoming worse, he goes to worse souls; becoming better, he goes toward those who are better—in life and in every death, is to suffer and to do what is fitting for those who are akin to their likes. Neither you, nor any other who has become unfortunate, will ever pray to prevail over this justice of the gods, which those who ordained it have set above all other judgments, and which it is altogether necessary to avoid. For you will never be neglected by it; you will not be so small that you will sink to the depths of the earth, nor will you be so exalted that you will fly up into heaven; rather, you will pay the fitting penalty to yourself, whether you remain here, or travel to Hades, or be transported to a place even more holy than these. The same argument applies to you also regarding those whom you, having observed them becoming great from small beginnings, having committed impious acts or something similar, have thought to have become happy from wretched ones, and as in a mirror you thought you had seen in their actions the neglect of all the gods, not knowing their final state, nor where it contributes to the whole. But to understand it, O most courageous of all men, you think is for nothing; and if someone does not know it, they would never see a pattern, nor would they be able to contribute an argument regarding life, concerning happiness and unfortunate lot. If these things persuade you, Cleinias, and this entire council of ours, regarding the gods that you do not know what you are saying, may God himself rightfully assist you; but if you are still in need of words, listen to us speaking to the third party, if you have any understanding at all. ^B The deeper meaning of these things, if not the very words, has been laid down in the Hebrew oracles, most concisely and within a few expressions covering the intellect. For the statement: "You will not be so small that you will sink to the depths of the earth, nor will you be so exalted that you will fly up into heaven," is similar to that which is found in David, having this manner: "Where shall I go from your Spirit, and from your face where shall I flee? If I go up to heaven, you are there; if I go down to Hades, you are present. If I take my wings and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there your hand shall lead me." ^C And also this: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the work of his hands." And again in Isaiah: "Lift up your eyes to the heights, and see who has shown all these things." And this: "From the greatness and beauty of created things, the Creator is known proportionately." And this: "For his invisible attributes, from the creation of the world, are perceived and understood by his works, even his eternal power and divinity." ^D And also the passage: "I was jealous..."

seeing the peace of sinners upon the ungodly.” ^A This same thing, you should conclude, must also be determined concerning those whom you considered to have become happy from wretched estates, having seen them emerge from small to great, after some grievous instance of impiety or other crime; and in whose misdeeds you seemed to see, as in a mirror, how all things are neglected by the gods, being ignorant, forsooth, of how or in what part the end and outcome of these people is connected with the reasons of the universe. Furthermore, that person, most noble sir, whom you can knowingly and willingly neglect, is nevertheless such that one who is unprepared in his knowledge can never conceive anything in his mind, nor institute any disputation concerning human life, whether of happiness or misery. If this Clinias here could persuade you of the gods, and this senate of ours, you would receive a singular benefit from God Himself, not knowing yourself what you are saying. But if you have need of a longer speech, come then, and attend to us as we discourse on that third point, if you have any mind at all.” ^B Such is Plato. Their meaning, if not the very words themselves, existed long before in the writings of the Hebrews, but the sentiment was comprised in very brief and few words. For that saying, “Nor shall you become so small that you can withdraw yourself from his eyes into the hidden folds and recesses of the earth; nor, indeed, so sublime that you can fly up into heaven,” is very close to this statement of David: “Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me.” ^C Then follows this from the same prophet: “The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth his handywork.” Likewise that of Isaiah: “Lift up your eyes on high, and behold, who hath created these things.” And this: “For by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionably the maker of them is seen.” And this: “For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.” Finally, this: “I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked.” ^D All these things Plato seems to have interpreted when he says, “This same thing must be determined concerning those whom you considered to have become happy from wretched estates, having seen them emerge from small to great, after some grievous instance of impiety or other crime.” And the rest that are said to the same effect occupied that more extensive explanation of Plato in the monuments of the Hebrews. If you weigh each of these things accurately and diligently, you will find them to agree with the doctrine of the Hebrews. By the name of Hebrew books, I do not understand only the oracles of Moses, but also those of the others who wrote after him, men most beloved of God, whether they were prophets or even the apostles of our Savior, to whom, because of the total agreement of their dogmas, one and the same appellation is justly attributed.

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL BOOK THIRTEEN

PREPARATIO EVANGELICA BOOK THIRTEEN

CONTENTS OF BOOK THIRTEEN

1. How Plato refuted the absurdity of Greek theology. From the Timaeus.

^A 2. From the same work, also from the Epinomis concerning the same. 3. From the second book of the Republic, concerning the same, and that God is not the author of evil. 4. That the accounts concerning the Greek gods contain nothing more than shameful myths, because of which the Athenians killed Socrates for not believing them. From the Euthyphro. 5. From Numenius, out of the secret doctrines of Plato, concerning the same. 6. That one should not pay heed to the opinions of the many, nor change one's own chosen course for fear of death. ^B From the Crito. 7. That one must not return injury upon those who have prepared to do us injustice. From the same. 8. That one must not abandon what has once been rightly judged, even if someone imposes death. This will be appropriate for those who renounce their piety in times of persecution. 9. Of what sort one will be in disposition who renounces his own purpose for fear of death. 10. That one must not flee from death on behalf of the truth. From the Apology of Socrates. 11. How one ought to honor the death of those who have departed this life with glory; from Plato. 12. How also Aristobulus the Peripatetic, who lived before us, admits from the philosophy of the Hebrews that the Greeks drew their inspiration. 13. As also Clement similarly shows that the things well spoken by the Greeks happen to be in agreement with the doctrines of the Hebrews. ^C From the fifth Stromateis. 14. That not everything was spoken successfully by Plato; for which reason we have not foolishly abandoned his philosophy, but rather embrace the oracles of the Hebrews. 15. That Plato did not discourse at all rightly concerning intelligible substances, but the Hebrews did. 16. That Plato did not at all think rightly concerning the soul in the same way as the Hebrews. 17. That according to Plato, the nature of the soul is not composed of an impassible and a passible substance. From the work on the soul by Severus the Platonist. 18. Concerning the heaven and the luminaries within it, that Plato did not think at all rightly. From the Epinomis, and the Timaeus, and the tenth book of the Laws. Which things Moses forbids to be worshipped, as also the Hebrew Philo interprets. 19. What sort of ordinances Plato made concerning women, not rightly. 20. What sort of ordinances he himself made in the Phaedrus concerning unrestrained love, to which Moses enacts contrary laws. 21. Concerning the murderous laws of Plato, which are not worthy of his greatness, with which the laws of Moses are to be compared. ^D

PROEMIUM

^A it would be more fitting for us, being Greeks, to follow the Greek than the barbarian. But, hesitating to confront this, out of deference to the philosopher, I defer this discussion to a later time; but I shall first examine those things which I have previously said. Take then and read what sort of opinion Plato held regarding the Greek theologians and poets, and how he rejected all the ancestral beliefs concerning the gods and exposed their absurdity.

CAPUT I.

How Plato exposed the absurdity of Greek theology. From the Timaeus.

^B “But to speak of the other demons, and to know their generation, is a task greater than our power. We must believe those who have spoken before us, who since they were offspring of the gods, as they themselves said, clearly must have known their own ancestors. It is impossible, therefore, to disbelieve the sons of the gods, even though they speak without probable and necessary demonstrations; but since they claim to report their own family affairs, we must follow the law and believe them. Thus, then, let our generation concerning these gods be according to them, and let it be stated thus: Children of Earth and Heaven were Oceanus and Tethys; and of these were Phorcys, Saturn, and Ops, and all who were after them; and from Saturn and Ops, ^C Jupiter, Juno, and all those whom we know as their brothers, and furthermore their other descendants.”

In thus exhorting us to believe the myths concerning the gods, and the poets who composed those myths themselves, as being descendants of the gods, it seems to me that he first mocks the poets by calling them descendants of the gods, implying that the gods were once human and had a nature similar to their descendants. But next, he openly disparages the very theologians whom he had said were descendants of the gods, by the words he adds, saying, “Though they speak without probable and necessary demonstrations,” and by the phrase he adds, “as they said.” And he seems to be playing when he says, “Clearly knowing their own ancestors,” and, “It is impossible to disbelieve the sons of the gods.” And he clearly ^D shows that he is stating these things contrary to his own opinion for the sake of the laws, having admitted that it is necessary to believe them by following the law. But that this was his meaning, listen to how, with a plain and uncovered voice, he disparages all the aforementioned theologians, striking at them in the *Epinomis* with these words...

^A “It is necessary, therefore, for me first to describe the generation of the gods and living beings—a subject on which those before me have theorized poorly—in a better way, according to the latter discourse, having taken up the argument which I have initiated against the impious.”

That he reasonably rejects the theology of the ancients, he teaches in the second book of the *Republic*, where it is worth turning one’s attention to how many and what kind of things he sets forth concerning these same poets and those theologians who have handed down to us from olden times the matters concerning the Greek gods, speaking in these very words:

CHAPTER III.

“In the greater myths,” I said, “we shall perceive the lesser ones also; for there must be one and the same character, and the same power, for both the greater and the lesser, or do you not think so?”

“Yes,” he said; “but I do not understand what you call the greater ones.”

“Those,” said I, “which Hesiod and Homer, and the other poets relate to us. For they, having composed false stories for mankind, both in the past narrated them and do so today.”

“Which, then,” he asked, “and what is it in them that you censure?”

“That which is first and most of all to be censured, especially when someone does not lie correctly.”

“What is that, further?”

^C “When someone represents the nature of the gods and heroes badly in his discourse, just as a painter might do who paints a picture that is in no way like the subject which he had undertaken to express with his brush.”

“These,” he said, “are indeed most worthy of censure; but explain those things more clearly and distinctly, if you please.”

“I will: First, I say, that greatest and most momentous lie regarding the most important matters—the one narrated by Hesiod, about what was done by Heaven, and what vengeance Saturn in turn took upon him—is entirely falsely constructed. Moreover, the deeds which this same Saturn performed, or suffered at the hands of his son, even if they were true, would not seem to me to be such as to be easily and rashly bandied about ^D before foolish men or youths; but rather, they should, in the first place, be kept altogether silent. If there were some necessity to disclose them, they should be heard in secret by the fewest possible people, having sacrificed not a pig, but some great and rare offering, so that the number of those who have heard them might be as small as possible.”

“And indeed,” he said, “these stories are harsh.”

“And they are not, Adeimantus,” I said, “to be told in our city.”

^A Nor should it be told to a young listener that he would be doing nothing strange if he were to commit the most extreme crimes, nor even if he were to punish a father for wrongdoing in every way, but would be doing exactly what the first and greatest of the gods do. “By Zeus,” he said, “this does not seem suitable to me to say, even to myself.” Nor, said I, [should it be said] at all, that gods wage war against gods, and plot, and fight—for it is not even true—if indeed those who are to guard our city for us must consider it the most shameful thing to be easily at odds with one another; and far less should we tell them myth-tales of the battles of giants, or embroider them, and many other diverse enmities of gods and heroes against their own kin and relatives. But if we are in any way to persuade them that no citizen has ever been at enmity with another, and that this is not holy, such things should rather be told to children from the start, and to old men and women, and to those as they become elders, and the poets must be forced to compose poems close to these. But Hera’s bonds by her son, and the casting of Hephaestus by his father when he was about to defend his mother who was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods that Homer has composed, must not be admitted into the city, whether they have been composed with allegories or without allegories. For the young man is not able to judge what is an allegory and what is not; but whatever opinions he takes in his own mind at such an age are wont to become unerasable and unchangeable. On this account, perhaps, we must see to it that the first things they hear, as being most beautifully told, are told with a view toward virtue. ^B “That,” he said, “is reasonable. But if someone should ask us again, what these are, and what the myths are, what should we say?” And I said: “O Adeimantus, you and I are not poets at the present time, but founders of a city. But for founders, it is fitting to know the patterns in which poets must compose their myths, and within the boundaries of which they must not be allowed to deviate; but they themselves do not have to compose the myths.” “Right,” he said; “but this very thing, what would the patterns of theology be?” “Something like these, I said, as to how God happens to be, he must always be represented, whether someone composes him in epic, or in lyric verse, or in tragedy.” “For he is.” “And indeed, God is truly good, and he must be spoken of as such.” “Why should he not be?” “But nothing good is harmful, is it?” “It is not.” “Does that which is not harmful bring harm?” “By no means.” “And does that which does not bring harm do any evil?” “Not that either.” “And that which does no evil could not be the cause of any evil.” “How could it?” “What then? Is the good beneficial?” “Yes.” “It is, therefore, the cause of success.” “Yes.” “It is not, therefore, the cause of all things, but it is the cause of things that go well, but it is the cause of no evil.” “Entirely so,” he said. ^C “Neither then,” said I, “could God, since he is good, be the cause of all things, as most people say; but he is the cause of a few things for men, and the cause of no things for many. For the good things are far fewer for us than the evil ones. And for the good things, no other must be held responsible, but for the evil ones, we must seek for other causes, but not God.” “You seem to me,” he said, “to speak most truly.” “Neither then,” said I, “is this sin to be accepted, whether from Homer or any other poet, of one who foolishly sins and speaks thus about the gods.” ^D

^A Ὡς δοιοὶ πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει, Κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι· ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν. Καὶ ᾧ μὲν ἂν μίξας ὁ Ζεὺς ἀμφοτέρων δῷ, Ἄλλοτε μέν γε κακῶν ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ’ ἐσθλῶν· Ὁ δ’ ἂν μὴ, ἀλλ’ ἄκρατα τὰ ἕτερα, Τὸν δὲ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει.

Neither, again, can one tolerate the one who says that Zeus is the dispenser of both good and evil things for us. Furthermore, if one were to write that the violation of oaths and treaties, which Pandarus committed, was done by the counsel of Minerva and Zeus, we shall in no way approve it; just as the contention and judgment of the gods must not be brought back to Themis and Zeus. Similarly, we must take care that the following from Aeschylus is not heard by the young:

^B “God plants a cause in mortals, When he wishes to utterly destroy a house.”

But if someone were to put into iambic verse the sufferings of Niobe, or those of the Pelopidae, or the Trojan calamities, or anything else of that kind, we must either not allow him to say that these things were done by God, or if they are to be attributed to God, we must search out for them the sort of account that we are now seeking; and we must say that it was God who performed things that are just and good, and that those who were being punished were benefited by their chastisement. But that the poet should be allowed to speak of those enduring punishment as being wretched, while God sees these things—this is not to be permitted. But if they were to say that they needed to be punished, that is acceptable; but we must not allow them to say that it was God who caused the suffering of those who were punished.

^A For the poet to sing that God is the cause of any evil, being as He is good, is a thing that must be resisted by every means; no one in his city—if that city is to be well-governed—should speak such things, nor should anyone hear them, whether younger or older, whether weaving them into meter or without meter, as such accounts are neither holy if spoken, nor beneficial to us, nor consistent with themselves. —I am in agreement with you, he said, concerning this law, and it pleases me as well.— This, then, I said, would be one of the laws and patterns regarding God, to which both those who speak and those who act must adhere: that God is not the cause of all things, but only of those that are good. —And most certainly, he said, that is sufficient. —What, then, of the second? Do you think God is a wizard, and that He is capable of appearing in guises, craftily changing Himself at one time into one form after another, sometimes actually becoming and changing His own shape into many forms, and at other times deceiving us and making us think such things about Him? Or is He simple, and least of all likely to depart from His own form? —I cannot, he said, answer that question at the moment as simply as that. —What about this? Is there not a necessity that if anything departs from its own form, it must be changed either by itself or by another? —Necessity, indeed. —And yet, those things that are in the best state are least of all changed or moved by anything else; for instance, the body by food and drink and labor, and every plant by sunshine and winds and such occurrences—is it not that which is most healthy and most excellent that is least changed? —How could it be otherwise? —And would any external influence easily disturb or change a soul that is itself most brave and most wise? —No. —And further, all composite things, such as tools, buildings, and garments, according to the same principle, those that are well-crafted and in good condition are least of all changed by time or other influences. —That is true. —Therefore, everything that is in a good state, either by nature or by art, or by both, admits the least change from anything else. —It seems so. —But surely God and the things of God are in all respects most excellent. —How could they not be? —In this way, then, God would least of all possess many forms. —Least of all, indeed. —But would He change or alter Himself? —It is obvious, he said, that if He is changed at all, it must be so. —Does He change Himself, then, for the better and for the more beautiful, or for the worse and for what is baser than Himself? —Necessity, he said, compels Him to change for the worse, if He changes at all. For we shall not suppose that God is lacking in beauty or excellence. —Most rightly, I said, you speak. And if this is the case, do you think, Adeimantus, that anyone, whether god or man, would willingly render himself worse in any respect? —Impossible, he said. —It is impossible, therefore, I said, for God to wish to alter Himself; but as it seems, being as beautiful and excellent as possible, each of them remains forever simply in his own form. ^{B C D}

^A — It seems to me entirely necessary. — Let any poet, my excellent friend, therefore cease to sing this to us:

*With foreign guise, the gods (80)* *In every shape, walk through our towns.*

Let no one henceforth tell lies about Proteus and Thetis; nor in tragedies or any other kind of poetry let anyone introduce Hera transformed into a priestess, gathering alms for the life-giving children of the Argive river Inachus; and let them not tell us many other such lies. And let not mothers, persuaded by these stories, terrify their children by recounting these myths badly, as if certain gods were wandering about at night in the likeness of many strangers of all kinds, so that they may not at the same time blaspheme the gods and make their children more cowardly. — They should not, he said. — But, I said, while the gods themselves are not such as to change, do they perhaps cause us to think that they appear in every guise, deceiving us and bewitching us? — Perhaps, he said. — What then? I said, would God wish to lie, whether in word or deed by putting forward phantoms? — I do not know, he said. — Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if one can call it that, is hated by all gods and men? — How, he said, do you mean? — Thus, I said, that to lie in the most proper part of themselves and about the most important things, no one is willing, but of all things they most fear to possess it there. — Not even yet, he said, do I understand. — You think I am saying something profound; but I say that for the soul to be told lies about things that are, and to have been deceived, and to be ignorant, and to have and possess the lie there, all would least of all choose, and they hate it most in such a case. — Very much so, he said. — ^B But surely that which I was just now calling the true lie would most rightly be what I called the ignorance in the soul of the one who has been deceived; since that which is in words is a kind of imitation of the affection in the soul (81), and a subsequent image, not an altogether pure lie; or is it not so? — Certainly. — The lie which is in truth is hated not only by gods, but also by men. — It seems so to me. — ^C What then of the lie in words, when and to what extent is it useful, so that it is not worthy of hatred? Is it not useful as a medicine against enemies and some of those called friends, when through madness or some folly they attempt to do some evil, then for the sake of deterrence it becomes a useful remedy? And in the myths which we were just mentioning, because of not knowing where the truth lies regarding ancient things, by assimilating the lie to the truth, as far as we can, we make it useful; [does it not seem so]? ^D — It seems most useful in that way. — [As for him in whose soul the lie is present]… [index: entries preserved]

^A in what respect, then, is the lie useful to God? Is it perhaps because, being ignorant of things of old, he would lie by assimilating them to the truth? — That would be ridiculous, he said. Therefore, there is no poetical liar in God? — Far from it. — But what if he were fearing enemies? — By no means. — But what if it were due to the ignorance or madness of his own people? — But no one, he said, who is foolish or mad is dear to God. Therefore, there is no reason for which God would lie. — There is none. — The divine and the godhead are therefore in every way truthful. — Absolutely so, he said. — Therefore, God is altogether simple and truthful in deed and in word. And he neither changes himself, nor does he deceive others, neither by fantasies, nor by words, nor by the sending of signs, neither when awake nor in a dream. — In this way, he said, it appears to me as well, while you are saying it. — Do you agree, then, ^B he said, that this is the second type, in which one must both speak and act concerning the gods, so that they neither appear as wizards transmuting themselves, nor lead us astray with lies in word or in deed? — I agree. — Therefore, while we praise many other things about Homer, we shall not praise this, the sending of the dream by Zeus to Agamemnon; nor [shall we praise] Aeschylus, when Thetis says that Apollo sang at her nuptials:

To feast upon my noble children’s lot, And long-lived years, and all things, did he sing, And calling me dear to the gods, he spoke Of my prospects of fortune, cheering me, And the healer, Paean, sang in merry mood. I thought the sacred mouth of Phoebus was ^C Truthful, and teeming with prophetic art. But he who sang, he who was present at the feast, He who himself spoke these things, he himself is the one Who has killed my son.

When anyone speaks such things about the gods, we shall be indignant, and we shall not grant a chorus, nor shall we allow teachers to use such things for the education of the young, if our guardians are to be religious and godly, as far as it is possible for a man to be. — Absolutely, he said, I agree with these types, and I would use them as laws. » These things, then, are ^D from Plato. You would find that the Hebrew scripture contains no shameful myths about the God who governs the universe, nor even about his divine angels, nor yet about men who are dear to God, similar to the Greek mythologies; but you would find that the type established by Plato—that God happens to be good, and that

everything that has come to pass by Him is such—agrees with the truth. ^A Indeed, regarding each of the works of creation, the marvelous Moses adds: "And God saw that it was good," and concerning all things together, he summarizes the account of the whole, saying: "And God saw all that He had made, and behold, it was very good." It is further a dogma of the Hebrews that God is not the author of evils; for if God did not make death, neither does He delight in the destruction of the living—for He created all things to be, and the generations of the world are wholesome in themselves. Nevertheless, "by the envy of the devil, death entered into the world." ^B Therefore, God is also introduced by the prophet expostulating in this manner with one who has become evil by his own choice: "But I planted you a fruitful vine, all true; how then have you turned into a strange vine?" If, however, it is ever said that evils happen to the wicked from God, it must be understood homonymously, in that those punishments are so called, which God, being good, is said to inflict—not for the destruction of those being punished, but for their benefit and advantage; just as a physician, who would apply a painful and severe method of treatment for the health of those suffering, might be considered to be bringing evils upon them. ^C Therefore, even in the divine Scriptures, wherever it is said that evils are inflicted upon men by God, what is said by Plato must be employed: that while God works what is just and good, and brings upon the deserving those things which are somber and commonly considered evils for men, those who are punished ^D benefit, not only according to the philosopher, but also according to the Hebrew Scripture, which says: "For whom the Lord loves, He disciplines; and He scourges every son whom He receives." But as for the notion that those who pay the penalty are miserable, and that God who beholds these things is the one who causes them—one must not allow this to be said of the Creator. But if, because they stood in need of chastisement, they might say that as miserable sinners paying the penalty they were benefited by God, this may be allowed; but that God, being good, should be the cause of evils to anyone must be resisted in every way. ^D Moreover, the Hebrew prophet teaches that God cannot change, where He speaks in His own person: "Since I am the Lord your God, and I do not change." Similarly, David in his theology exclaims, saying: "They shall all grow old like a garment, and as a cloak You shall roll them up, and they shall be changed. But You are the same, and Your years shall not fail." And if in any way the Hebrews' letters represent the Word of God as appearing in human form and shape, it must be said that it is not as the Greek fables tell of Proteus, Thetis, and Hera, nor as those gods we were just hearing about, who wander about at night looking like many and all kinds of animals, that the Hebrew writings introduce the Word of God appearing to men; but rather, just as Plato himself says it is sometimes necessary, for the benefit of friends, when they are attempting to do some evil because of madness or some folly, that the intervention of God to men should serve as a useful medicine for deterrence. Since, then, there was no race of earthly creatures more beloved by God than man, being akin and familiar to the Word of God, by whom even the rational nature of the soul had been fashioned, it is reasonable that, as a beloved creature...

it should be the object of the care of the heavenly Word, who is proclaimed to have come for the healing of the whole race, which had fallen into such insane disease and madness that it ^A neither knew God the Father, nor the essence of its own rational nature, nor the providence of God, the Savior of all, but had degenerated almost into the condition of a brute animal. Therefore, I say, they testify that the Savior and Physician came to men, yet in such a way that He neither stripped Himself of His own nature, nor offered any illusion to those who beheld Him, but preserved both things as true, both that which was invisible and that which was seen. For He was seen as a true man, and He was the true Word of God, not using sorcery, nor deceiving those who looked upon Him; since it seemed right also to Plato that the Divine is free from falsehood. ^B "The Word of God, therefore, being simple and true in both word and deed, neither changed Himself, nor deceived others, neither by fantasies, nor by words, nor by the showing of signs, neither in reality, nor in dreams."

For everything that he did, as a physician of rational souls, for the salvation of the whole race of men, he accomplished truly, and not in appearance, through the man whom He had assumed, bestowing upon us all, through the knowledge of God and true piety preached by Him, both friendship with and a return to His own Father. And such are our affairs. But as for those who speak otherwise, we shall take it ill, nor shall we grant them the power of a choir ^C of readers and teachers, nor shall we allow them to influence the younger generation, if we desire to have, as the philosopher most preferred, religious and divine guardians of our commonwealth.

CHAPTER IV

That the tales concerning the Greek gods contain nothing more than shameful myths, for whose sake the Athenians slew Socrates for not believing in them. From the Euthyphro.

"But they themselves," says Plato, "happen to believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and yet they admit that he bound his own father because he unjustly devoured his sons, ^D and that he himself in turn mutilated his own father for other similar misdeeds. And they are angry with me because I prosecute my father for wrongdoing. And thus they contradict themselves when they speak of the gods and when they speak of me." For indeed, the sort of words one has, such also are the deeds; and such as the deeds are, such is the life. Christ is the whole life of men, for those who have come to know Christ.

^A “...the true reason is this, Euthyphro, that it is because I find it hard to accept such things when someone speaks of the gods, that I am, as it seems, to be branded as a sinner. Since, therefore, you also agree with this — for you are an expert in such matters — it is necessary, I suppose, that we allow it to be so. For what are we to say, when we ourselves confess that we know nothing of these things? But tell me, by Zeus, the protector of friendship, do you truly believe that these things happened in this way?” — “And even more wonderful things than these, Socrates, which the many do not know. Do you therefore think that there is truly war among the gods, and grievous hatreds and battles and many other such things, of the kind that are told by the poets? And by good writers, just as our other sacred things are adorned, and indeed, even at the great Panathenaea, the robe full of such patterns is carried up to the Acropolis. Are we to say that these things are true, Euthyphro?” — “Not these alone, Socrates, but, as I just said, I will tell you many other things about the gods, if you wish, which I know well that you will be astonished to hear.” These are the things which Plato wrote in the *Euthyphro*. Numenius clarifies the meaning in his book *On the Secrets of Plato*, speaking somewhat as follows.

CHAPTER V.

From Numenius’s book *On the Secrets of Plato*. Concerning the same matter.

^C “If Plato, intending to write about the theology of the Athenians, had then spoken harshly against it and had accused it—containing, as it did, mutual dissension among the deities, and the unions or the devouring of children by their parents, and instead of these things, penalties imposed by children upon parents, or by brothers upon brothers, and celebrating other such things—if, I say, Plato had openly and plainly accused these things, it would seem to me that he would have provided the Athenians with an occasion for putting him to death, as they did Socrates. ^D But since he was not more desirous of life than of truth, and he saw that he could defend both safely, he introduced in the character of the Athenians Euthyphro, a man who was arrogant and foolish, and who, if anyone else did, discoursed about the gods in a wicked manner; and he exhibited Socrates himself, in his own character and in his own customary manner of discourse, which he used with everyone, refuting him.

CHAPTER VI.

That one must not yield to the opinions of the many, nor depart from one's own resolve due to fear of death. From the *Crito*.

“O friend Crito (90), your eagerness is of great value, if it were accompanied by some rectitude; but if not, the greater it is, the more troublesome it is. We must, therefore, consider whether these things are to be done or not. For I am not only now, but always, of such a mind that I will listen to nothing of my own, except to the reason which, upon calculation, appears to me best. The words which I used to say before, I cannot now cast away because

^A my fortune has become such as it is; indeed, they appear to me almost the same, and I hold them in the same honor and esteem as I did before. If we have nothing better to say at the present moment, know well that I will not agree with you, not even if the power of the many were to frighten us like children more than the present reality, by sending upon us bondages, and deaths, and confiscations of property. How then could we examine these matters most reasonably?

First, if we were to take up again that argument which you speak of, concerning opinions, whether it was well said each time or not: that one must pay heed to some opinions and not to others; or whether, before I was under the necessity of dying, it was well said, but now it has become clearly evident that it was spoken otherwise merely for the sake of argument, and was in truth only play and nonsense. I myself desire, Crito, to examine it in common with you, to see whether it appears any different to me now that I am in this state and fortune, or the same, and whether we shall bid it farewell or yield to it. It was said somehow, as I think, each time by those who imagine they have something to say—just as I was saying now—that of the opinions which men hold, one ought to value some and not others.

By the gods, Crito, does this not seem to you to be well said? For you, as far as human matters go, are outside the danger of dying tomorrow, and this present calamity would not lead you astray. Consider, then. Does it not seem sufficient to you to say that one should not honor all the opinions of men, but some and not others? Nor of all men, but of some and not others? What do you say? Is this not well said?

— It is well said. — Therefore, one should honor the good ones, and not the evil ones? — Yes. — And are the good ones not those of the wise, and the evil ones those of the foolish? — How could they be otherwise? — Come then, how again were such things said? A man exercising himself and doing this, does he pay heed to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of that one alone who happens to be a physician or a trainer? — Of that one alone. — Therefore, he ought to fear the blames and welcome the praises of that one alone, and not those of the many? — Clearly. — Therefore, he must act, and exercise, and eat, and drink in the way that seems right to that one who is his master and has more understanding, rather than to all the others. — This is so. — Very well. And if he disobeys that one and dishonors his opinion and his praises, while honoring those of the many and of those who have no understanding, will he not suffer some evil? ^{B C D}

^A — How could it be otherwise? — And what is this evil? And whither does it reach? And into which of the things belonging to the disobedient person? — Clearly, into the body; for this is what it destroys. — You are right. — Therefore, Crito, let us pass over the others in the same way, that we may not review everything. But as regards just and unjust things, and shameful and honorable, and good and evil — concerning which our present consultation is held — whether we ought to follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or that of the one, if there is anyone who understands, whom we ought to revere and fear more than all the rest together; ^B if we do not follow him, shall we not be destroying and ruining that which was made better by the just and destroyed by the unjust? Or is this nothing? — I think it is, Socrates. — Come, then, if we are to destroy that which is made better by what is healthy and ruined by what is diseased, by not obeying the opinion of those who understand, is life worth living for us once it is corrupted? And is this not the body, or is it not? — It is. — Then is life worth living for us with a wretched and corrupted body? — By no means. — But is life worth living for us once that is corrupted, ^C which the unjust harms and the just benefits? Or do we assume that what is ours, concerning which justice and injustice exist, is inferior to the body? — By no means. — But more precious? — Much more. — Therefore, my excellent friend, we must not consider at all what the many will say about us, but what the one who understands concerning just and unjust things will say, the one, and the truth itself. Hence, first of all, you are not rightly suggesting that we should care for the opinion of the many regarding just, honorable, and good things, and their opposites. ^D And the saving Word also says: "You seek glory from men, and the glory that is from the one alone, you do not seek." Wherefore we also, in the struggles undertaken for piety, rightly do not look to what the multitude may say about us, but only to what the one Word of God demands; for having once determined to fix our gaze upon Him, it is fitting that we should observe Him then, just as we did before, and never change, not even if the power of the multitude, as if to frighten children, should threaten us. Such were also those among the Hebrews of old who shone forth in martyrdom.

CHAPTER VII.

"Do we say," says Plato, "that one must never intentionally do wrong, or that in one way we must do wrong, and in another not? Or is it that to do wrong is never good nor noble, as has frequently been acknowledged by us in the past, and as was also just now being said? Or have all those former confessions of ours been discarded in these few days? And is it the case, Crito, that we, old men of such an age, debating seriously with one another, have unnoticed by ourselves been no different from children? Or is it the case that the matter stands absolutely as it was then argued by us, whether the multitude says so or not? And whether we are to suffer things even more grievous than these, or milder ones, do we nevertheless maintain that to do wrong is in every way both evil and shameful to the one who does it, or not?" — "We do." — "Therefore, in no way should one do wrong?" — "Certainly not." — "Neither should one, when wronged, retaliate with wrong, as the multitude believes, since it is in no way right to do wrong?" — "It does not appear so." — "What then? Should one do evil, Crito, or not?" — "One certainly should not, Socrates." — "What about retaliating with evil when one has suffered it, as the multitude says is just—is it just or not?" — "By no means. For, I suppose, doing evil to men differs in no way from doing wrong." — "You speak well." — "Therefore, one must neither retaliate with wrong, nor do evil to any man, not even if one should suffer something at their hands. But see, Crito, in agreeing to these things, that you do not agree contrary to your opinion. For I know that to a few this seems so, and will seem so. Thus, for those to whom it has seemed so, and for those to whom it has not, there is no common counsel; but it is necessary that these should despise one another, seeing each other's plans. Consider well, then, even you, whether you share this view and it likewise seems good to you, so that we may begin from this point to deliberate, that it is never right to do wrong, nor to retaliate with wrong, nor, when suffering evil, to defend oneself by doing evil in return; or do you secede, and not partake in this principle? For to me, as it has long seemed so, it still seems so now. And if it seems otherwise to you in any way, say so and teach me; but if you abide by what was said before, hear what follows." — "But I do abide by it, and it seems good to me. But speak." — "I say, then, again, the next thing, or rather I ask: whether what one has acknowledged to be just ought to be done, or is it to be disregarded?" — "It ought to be done." ^B To these things, set alongside: "Rendering to no one evil for evil"; and "Bless those who curse you; pray for those who despitefully use you and persecute you, that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven, who makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust." And further, "Being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we endure; being defamed, we entreat," as is contained in our sacred scriptures. And the prophet also among the Hebrews says: "If I have repaid evil to those who repaid evil to me." And again: "With those who hate peace, I was peaceful." ^D

CHAPTER VIII.

"For then indeed you boasted—so the laws speak to Socrates—that you would not bear even death itself with an ill-will, which you even said was preferable to exile for you. But now, you neither fear the testimony of that speech, nor are you moved by our authority, so as to strive to infringe and overturn it. Furthermore, you are doing what the most wicked slave would do, while you think of flight against those compacts and conditions by which you agreed with us to live in the republic. First, therefore, answer us this: are we speaking truly, claiming that you agreed to live by our ways, not in word only, but in deed, or is it not true? What shall we answer to these things, Crito? Is it anything other than that we must agree? It is necessary, Socrates.

"What then, they will say, are you doing other than violating those compacts and agreements which you made with us? And this, when you did not approve them under any necessity or force, nor did you have a narrow window of time to deliberate, but seventy full years, in which you could have departed if we did not please you, or if our conditions did not seem just. Yet, you preferred neither Lacedaemon nor Crete, whose laws and institutions you often praise, nor any other Greek or barbarian city. Nay, you went abroad from it even less than the lame, the blind, and other such physically disabled men. ^B To such a degree did you, more than the other Athenians, find contentment in this city and in us ourselves. For to whom could any city please without laws? Now, however, you repudiate what you yourself agreed to—but you will surely keep them, if you listen to us, O Socrates."

CHAPTER IX.

"For whoever," the laws continue, "is clearly a corrupter of the laws themselves, he may very easily be considered a corrupter of youth and of ignorant men as well. ^C Whether, therefore, will you avoid well-ordered cities and the society of the most honorable men? Or will you, while doing this, think that life is to be retained for yourself? Or will you rather dwell with them, and will you not blush to engage with them in those discourses to which you, Socrates, have long been accustomed—concerning virtue, justice, laws, and those things which are practiced according to the prescription of the laws, as being of the greatest value ^D to men? And do you not think that the conduct of Socrates will appear shameful?"

should be regarded as having value? Or do you think Socrates' conduct would not appear base? Surely it must be thought so. But if you leave these places, obviously you are thinking of Thessaly, to go to Crito's friends. For there is a great deal of disorder and licentiousness there. And perhaps they would gladly hear from you how ridiculously you fled from the prison, having put on some disguise or taken a skin, or other such things as those who flee are accustomed to prepare, and having changed your appearance. And that an old man, with little time of life left, as is likely, has dared to desire to live so greedily, having violated the greatest laws; will there be no one who will reproach you? ^A Perhaps, if you do not offend anyone; if not, you will hear many things, Socrates, unworthy of yourself. You will live as an underling to all men, and acting as a slave; doing what? Or feasting in Thessaly? Just as if you had traveled to Thessaly for dinner. And those discourses of yours concerning justice and other virtues, where will they be for us? But are you wishing to live for the sake of your children, so that you may rear and educate them? Or, having brought them to Thessaly, will you rear and educate them, having made them foreigners, so that they might receive this benefit from you? Or is this not so; but if they are reared here while you are alive, will they be better reared and educated, even if you are not with them? For those who are your associates will take care of them. But whether, if you depart to Thessaly, will they take care of them, and if you depart to Hades, will they not take care of them? If those who claim to be your associates are of any use at all, one ought to think so. ^B But, O Socrates, being persuaded by us, your foster-parents, do not prioritize your children, nor life, nor anything else before what is just: so that when you arrive in Hades, you may have all these things to plead before the authorities there. For neither here does it appear to you that it is better to do these things, nor more just, nor to any other of your own, nor will it be better when you have arrived there. But now you will depart having been wronged (if you depart), not by us, the laws, but by men; but if you go out so shamefully, returning wrong for wrong and evil for evil, having violated your own agreements and covenants with us, and doing harm to those whom you least should, yourself, and your friends, and your fatherland, and us; we ourselves will be angry with you while you live, and there, our sisters, the laws of Hades, will not receive you kindly, knowing that you also attempted to destroy us, so far as in you lay. »

CHAPTER X. That one ought not to flee death for the sake of truth. From the Apology of Socrates.

^D «But perhaps, ^D one might say: "Are you not ashamed, O Socrates, to have pursued such a way of life, from which you are now in danger of dying?" To this man I would make a just reply, that you do not speak well, O man, if you think that one ought to calculate the danger of living or dying; ^C if there is any merit in a man, he ought not to consider this, but only whether he is acting justly or unjustly in what he does, and doing the deeds of a good or a bad man.

^A For according to your own argument, those demigods who died at Troy would be contemptible, as well as others, and especially the son of Thetis, who so despised danger compared to enduring any disgrace that, when his mother, who was a goddess, said to him when he was eager to slay Hector, "My son, if you avenge the murder of your comrade Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself will die; for immediately after Hector," she said, "a ready fate awaits you," he, upon hearing this, made light of death and danger, and fearing much more to live as a coward and not to avenge his friends, he said straightway, "May I die at once after having exacted justice from the wrongdoer, that I may not remain here by the curved ships, a laughingstock, a burden to the earth." Do you think that he took thought of death and danger? For so it is in truth, O men of Athens: in whatever station a man has placed himself, believing it to be best, or has been placed by a commander, there he ought, as it seems to me, to remain and face danger, taking no account of death or anything else before dishonor. I would be having done a terrible thing, O men of Athens, if, when the commanders whom you chose to rule over me stationed me—both at Potidaea and at Amphipolis and at Delium, and elsewhere too where they commanded—I remained ^B where they stationed me like anyone else and ran the risk of dying, yet when God stationed me, as I supposed and believed, to live the life of a philosopher and to examine myself and others, I were then to abandon my station out of fear of death or any other thing whatsoever. That would indeed be a terrible thing, and one for which someone could justly bring me to court on the charge that I do not believe there are gods, by disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myself to be wise when I am not. For to fear death, O men of Athens, is nothing other than to seem to be wise when one is not. It is the pretense of knowing what one does not know. For no one knows death, not even if it happens to be the greatest of all goods for man, but they fear it as if they knew for certain that it is the greatest of evils. And yet, how is this not that most shameful ignorance: to think that one knows what one does not know? I, O men of Athens, perhaps differ from the majority of men in this, and if I were to say that I am wiser than anyone in anything ^C it would be in this: that, not knowing enough about what is in Hades, I also think that I do not know. But that it is an evil and shameful thing to commit injustice and to disobey one who is better, whether God or man, I do know. Therefore, I will never fear or flee from those things which I do not know, in preference to those evils which I know to be evil. So, even if you were to acquit me now, contrary to Anytus—who said that either I should not have come here in the first place, or, since I have come, it is impossible not to put me to death, saying to you that if I should escape, your sons, by practicing what Socrates teaches, would all be utterly corrupted—if you were to say to me concerning this, "O Socrates, we will not listen to Anytus now, but we acquit you, upon this condition, however, that ^D

you no longer spend your time in this inquiry nor go on philosophizing; but if you are caught doing this again, you shall die." If, then, as I said, you were to acquit me on these terms, I would say to you: "I, O men of Athens, greet you and love you, but I will obey God rather than you; and as long as I breathe and am able, I will never cease philosophizing, and exhorting you, and pointing out to whomsoever of you I may always happen to meet, saying just what I am accustomed to say." ^A And after a little he adds further: "Let us consider, then, also in this way, how great a hope there is that it is a good thing. For to die is one of two things: for it is either as if one were nothing, and the dead person has no perception at all; or, according to what is said, it is a kind of change, and a migration of the soul from this place to another place. And if there is no perception, but it is like a sleep in which he who is sleeping sees not even a dream, death would be a wondrous gain. For I think, if one had to select this night in which he had slept so soundly as to see no dream, and compare to this night all the other nights and days of his own life, and if one had to consider and say how many days and nights he had lived in his own life better and more pleasantly than this night, I think that not a private individual, but the great king ^B himself would find these to be easily countable in comparison with the other days and nights. If, therefore, death is something like this, I call it gain; for thus the whole of time appears to be nothing more than one night. But if, again, death is like a journey from here to another place, and the things that are said are true, that all the dead are there, what greater good could there be than this, O men and judges? For if one, having arrived in Hades, and having been delivered from these who claim to be judges, shall find those who are truly judges, who are also said to judge there—Minos, and Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus, and Triptolemus, and as many others of the demigods as were just in their own lives—would this migration be a paltry one? Or again, to consort with Orpheus and Musaeus, and Hesiod, and Homer, for how much would one of you be willing to pay? For my part, I am willing to die many times over if these things are true. ^C Since to me myself the life there would be wonderful, when I should meet Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other of the ancients who died through an unjust judgment; and to compare my own sufferings with theirs, as I think, would not be unpleasant. And indeed the greatest thing, to spend my time in examining and searching those there, just as I do those here, as to who among them is wise, and who thinks himself to be so, but is not." And among us it has been said: "We must obey God rather than men," and, "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body, but cannot ^D kill the soul."

We must also know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle be dissolved, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens; and that to be absent from the body is to be present with the Lord; who also promises to all who have hoped in Him that they shall rest in the bosom of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and in the company of the other prophets and just men who were dear to God among the Hebrews, and spend the long age in blessed life.

CHAPTER XI.

^B "But, come now," says Plato, "regarding those who have died in war, whoever ends his life having won renown, shall we not first say that he is of that golden race?" "Most certainly." "And shall we not believe Hesiod, when others of such a race end their lives, that they become,

Pure, earthly spirits, noble, averters of evils, Guardians of mortal men?"

"We shall indeed believe him. And so, having consulted the Divinity as to how we ought to account the demonic and divine ones, and by what distinction, we shall establish it in that way which He dictates." "Why should we not?" "And for the rest of time, we shall treat them as having become spirits, and we shall worship their tombs. And we shall consider these same terms to apply whenever anyone dies of old age or in any other way, of those who are judged to have been exceptionally good in life."

^C These things also fit well with the death of those beloved of God, whom you would not be wrong to call soldiers of true piety. Hence, it is our custom to go to their tombs and to offer prayers there, and to honor their blessed souls, in the belief that these things are rightly done by us. Now, these are the passages we have culled from the works of Plato; any studious person might find even more than these in him, and perhaps in others as well, which are in harmony with our doctrines. And since others before us have ^D also occupied themselves with this same subject, it seems to me worthwhile to examine what has been worked out by them as well. I shall put forward first—

^A of Aristobulus, the Hebrew philosopher, words which are thus expressed.

CHAPTER XII

"It is sufficiently clear," he says, "that Plato followed our system of laws, and it is manifest that he diligently and studiously read through each of their chapters. For even before that Demetrian of Phalerum, and indeed before the empire of Alexander and the Persians, those things that concerned the exodus of the Hebrews, our citizens, from Egypt, as well as the revelation of all that happened to them, the taking of the land, and the exposition of the whole Law, had already been translated into Greek by others, so that it can be doubtful to no one that the aforementioned philosopher derived many things from there for his own books. For he was a man of much learning, just as Pythagoras was also, who incorporated into his own doctrinal system many things he had taken from our stores. Later, in the time of King Ptolemy, surnamed Philadelphus, your grandfather, who surpassed all others in this kind of zeal and magnificence, they elaborated the entire translation of all things that pertained to our laws, with Demetrius of Phalerum chiefly managing the whole business." ^B Then, having said some things in between, he continues, saying: "For we must take the 'divine voice' not as some speech enclosed and expressed in set words, but as the very bringing to pass of works, in which sense that legislator Moses speaks of the voice of God in the creation of the whole world. For with regard to each work he says continuously: 'And God said, and it was made.' I think that Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, having curiously searched into all our affairs, followed this entirely, when they said that they heard the voice of God, fixing their gaze upon the contemplation of the construction of the universe, which, having been so accurately perfected by God, persists forever like to itself and entire." Furthermore, Orpheus also, in those poems which he composed after the manner and principle of sacred discourse, sang in this manner that all things are contained by divine power, and that they have had their origin, and that God presides over all:

^C I will speak to those whom it is lawful; ^D but close the doors, you profane, Who hold in hatred the sacred laws which the author, God himself, has brought and established for all. But you, Offspring of the shining Muse, take this into your ears. For I will sing true things. Do not let your former Error deprive you of the happy ages of eternal life. But rather, taking the divine oracles into your settled mind, Store them deep within your chaste breast. Therefore come, take the way, and look only to the maker of the world, Who is exempt from destruction.

Orpheus, then, who became, as one might say, the first teacher of your polytheism, ^D I must remind you, later preaches regarding one and only God, saying just this to his son Musaeus and the rest of his genuine hearers.

^A Immortal. An ancient story regarding this shines forth. One is self-complete, and under him all things are perfected; His offspring are all things that have been made. One exists, and out of himself he is self-complete, and under him all things are perfected. He is invisible to the eyes of mortals, but is seen by the soul. He himself sows no evil for mortals, Nor war, nor grievous griefs. But he bestows good upon mortals, And war, and grievous griefs. ^B But he himself moves around within them, and no one Among mortal souls beholds him, but by him he is beheld. He himself does not send evil to mortal Men; but grace and hatred attend him, And war, and plague, and tearful griefs. Neither is there any other. And you, if you see him Before you ever see him here upon the earth— My son, I will show you, when I see His footprints, and the strong hand of the powerful God. But him I do not see; for a cloud is set about him. (19) What remains for me; but ten veils stand before men. For no one of mortal men could see him who rules, Unless he is a unique one, of a lineage from above, Of the Chaldeans. For he was wise in the movement of the stars, And how the sphere moves round the earth, Turning in a circle evenly, and according to its own Creature; and he steers the winds, and around the air, and around the stream Of the water (21): and brings forth the gleam of fire inexpres- sible. He himself again establishes the great one on high, On a golden throne; and the earth is beneath his feet (23) He has extended his right hand to the ends of Ocean; The base of the mountains trembles within in its spirit, Nor can it bear his mighty strength. And he is entirely ^C He himself is heavenly, and accomplishes all things upon the earth, Having the beginning in himself, and the middle (25), and the end, As the story of the ancients, as the unique one ordained, Receiving from God by his counsels according to the twofold decree.

^D [Interpretations and variants omitted]

^A That is a sin to speak of otherwise: with limbs loosened, Revolving in my mind with trembling, for he himself rules all things From above in order. You, son, turn your mind, Powerful in a bridled tongue, keep the matter in your breast. To which Aratus also sings in this manner: From Jove is the beginning, whom at no time Shall we be able to pass by: whose divinity fills all things far and wide, Crossroads, and every forum, and the depths of the swelling sea, And all harbors, and no one could be able to lack his powerful Aid. For every race draws its origin from him Who, cherishing men with gentle piety, Grants them happy signs with his hand, and of his own accord Arms the frequent peoples for work, captivated by the sweetness of life. He teaches what is useful for oxen, for the clod, and for the hard mattock Beforehand, and also under what star it is safe To hide plants in trenches, and seed in the earth.

Clearly, I believe it has been shown that the power of God is through all things. And as we have remarked, we set aside the Zeus and Jupiter who are spoken of through the poets; for their mental conception refers back to God; and therefore it has been stated by us in this way. Not unsuitably, then, have we brought forward these things for those who are searching. For it is agreed by all philosophers that one must have holy conceptions concerning God, which the persuasion that is among us most especially commends. And the entire construction of our law is set down concerning piety, justice, and self-restraint, and the rest of the virtues that are according to truth. ^B Following these, he adds other things: "In sequence, it is said that God, having fashioned the whole world, and because life is full of suffering for all, gave us the seventh day for rest, which day might also be called the first, naturally, the genesis of light, in which all things are grasped together. It could also be transferred to wisdom. For the entire light is from it. And some have said, among those of that sect from the Peripatos, that it holds the rank of a lamp; for those who follow it continually will be rendered untroubled throughout their whole life. But someone of our ancestors, Solomon, said more clearly and better that it existed before heaven and earth. And this is consistent with what was said before. But as for what is made clear through the legislation, that God rested on it, this is not to be understood, as some suppose, that God is established as no longer doing anything, ^C but rather that He had completed the order of them, and thus ordained them for all time. For it signifies that in six days He made the heaven and the earth and all that is in them, so that He might declare the times and foretell the order of what takes precedence over what. For having ordained them, thus He holds them together and does not alter them. He has clarified for us that this is legal for the sake of the sign of the seventh-day principle established among us, in which we have knowledge of human and divine affairs. And by weeks the whole world of all living and growing things is cycled. And for it to be called the Sabbath is interpreted as being a rest. And Homer and Hesiod also ^D declare it to be sacred, having drawn from our books. Hesiod, indeed, thus...

[Line 1] First, the fourth, and the seventh, a sacred day. [Item 6] And again he says: [Line 3] Seventh again, the bright light of the sun. [Line 4] And Homer says thus: [Line 5] The seventh then came down, a sacred day. [Line 6] And again: [Line 7] The seventh day it was, and by it all things were completed. [Line 8] And: [Line 9] The seventh day we left the stream of Acheron. [Line 10] By this he signifies that by the truly seventh Word, that oblivion and vice of the soul is abandoned, and we receive the knowledge of the truth, as has been said before. Linus ^B also says thus: [Line 13] On the seventh day all things accomplished are made perfect. [Line 14] And again: [Line 15] The seventh is among the good, and the seventh is a birth. [Line 16] The seventh is among the first, and the seventh is perfect. [Line 17] And: [Line 18] All things are perfected in the starry heaven by the seven, [Line 19] Appearing in the cycles of the revolving years.

Such are the words of Aristobulus. What Clement has also said concerning the same subject, you may understand through these things.

CHAPTER XIII

That Clement also shows how the things well said by the Greeks are in agreement with the doctrines of the Hebrews. From the fifth Stromateus of Clement.

"Let us also weave together what follows, and let us more clearly display the Hellenic theft from the barbarian philosophy. For the Stoics say that God is a body, and spirit by essence, just as indeed they say of the soul. You will find all these things explicitly in the Scriptures. For do not think of their allegorical meanings for me now, as the Gnostic truth delivers it—if they show one thing, as is usually done by skilled wrestlers ^C, but in reality signify another. But they say that God permeates through the whole essence, while we call Him solely the Maker, and the Maker by the Word. They were led astray by that which is said in Wisdom: 'It pervades and reaches through all things by its purity,' not understanding that this was said concerning that Wisdom which God, the Prince of all, created first. Indeed, they say, but the philosophers also posit matter in the beginning, both the Stoics, and Plato, and Pythagoras, but also Aristotle the Peripatetic, and do not posit one principle. Let them know, however, that what is called matter, ^D being without quality and without form, is said..."

by Plato also not to be a certain thing, or that which is not, and therefore not something; which indeed must be considered very mystical and recondite. For he who recognized that true one principle has these very words in the Timaeus: “But now,” he says, “let our account of this be as follows: as to the one principle or principles of the universe, or however one may think about them, it is not to be spoken of now, for no other reason than that it is difficult ^A in our present mode of discourse to explain what seems to us to be the case.” Moreover, that prophetic utterance: “And the earth was invisible and unarranged,” provided them an occasion for fashioning this material substance. And Epicurus, indeed, so that he might say that all things happen by chance and fortuity, brought into his mind that which did not grasp the force of that saying: “Vanity of vanities, all is vanity;” just as Aristotle, in order to limit Providence to the lunar sphere, drew from that Psalm: “O Lord, in heaven is thy mercy, and thy truth unto the clouds.” For the meaning of the prophetic mysteries was not yet revealed before the coming of the Lord. And the punishments to be endured after death and those torments of fire were stolen by the entire poetic Muse, ^B and also by Greek philosophy, from the philosophy of the barbarians. Plato, for instance, in the last book of the Republic, says in these very words: “Then indeed,” he says, “savage men, fiery to behold, standing by and discerning the cry, seized some and led them away; but Aridaeus and the others they bound hand and foot, and having cast down their heads and flayed them, they dragged them outside the road, turning them over thorns.” For these fiery men signify, in his view, the angels who seize and punish the wicked: according to the text: “Who makes his angels spirits, and his ministers a burning fire.” And from these things it follows that the soul is immortal. For that which is punished or disciplined, ^C being in a state of sensation, lives, even if it is said to suffer. What then? Does Plato not also know of rivers of fire and the depth of the earth, which is called Gehenna by the barbarians, while he himself poetically named it Tartarus, as well as Cocytus and Acheron and Pyriphlegethon, and introduces such things as instruments of punishment for the sake of sobering discipline? And regarding the small and least things, according to Scripture...

^A, which see God Himself and the diligent and watchful care which is derived unto us from the presiding and guardian angels, he does not hesitate to write: "When, however, as each soul had chosen its own kind of life, according as its lot had fallen, then they approached Lachesis in order; and she sent with each one the guardian of his life that he himself had chosen, to be the fulfiller of what had been selected." Perhaps the daemon of Socrates also hinted at something like this. Furthermore, the philosophers accepted from Moses the account of the origin of the world, and taught it. Regarding which Plato says expressly: "Whether it had no beginning of generation, or whether it has come into being, starting from some beginning; for it is visible, and tangible, and has a body." And again, when he says: "To discover the creator and father of this whole universe is a task," he shows not only that the world is generated, but also signifies that it came into being from Him, as if from the only one who has come into being, and existing from what was not. The Stoics also consider the world to be generated. Moreover, the devil, whom you hear spoken of so often in the barbarian philosophy as the prince of the daemons, Plato in the tenth book of the *Laws* calls a maleficent soul in these words: "Must we not say that the soul which governs and dwells in all things that are moved in every direction, also governs the heaven itself? — Undoubtedly. — One, or more? — More, I shall answer on your behalf. Let us not posit fewer than two: one the beneficent, and the other capable of working the opposite." ^B Similarly, in the *Phaedrus*, he writes these things: "There are indeed other evils, but some daemon has mingled present pleasure with most of them." But also in the tenth book of the *Laws*, he clearly demonstrates that apostolic truth: "We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the spiritual things of those in the heavens" (Eph. vi, 12), writing in this way: "For since we have agreed among ourselves that the heaven is indeed full of many good things, and also full of their contraries—and these, more numerous—we therefore say that such a conflict is immortal, and stands in need of marvelous ^C guardianship." Barbarian philosophy also recognizes that the world is once again twofold: one perceived by the intellect, and one perceived by the senses; the former being the archetype, and the latter an image of the fair pattern. And it assigns the former to the monad, as being intelligible, and the latter to the hexad; for among the Pythagoreans, the six is called marriage, as being a generative number. And in the monad it establishes an invisible heaven, and a holy earth, and an intelligible light: "For in the beginning," it says, "God created the heaven and the earth; and the earth was invisible." Then it adds: "And God said, Let there be light, and there was light." And in the sensible cosmogony, He fashioned ^D a solid heaven (the solid signifies the sensible—just as he is called son, but his father is said to be from the only generated one).

^A Does it not seem from this that Plato leaves behind the ideas of living things in the intelligible world, and that the sensible forms are created by the intelligible ones according to their kinds? ^B Rightly, therefore, does Moses say that the body was fashioned from the earth, and Plato calls it the earthy tabernacle; but the rational soul ^C was "breathed in from above by God into the face." For they say that the ruling faculty is established here, interpreting the soul's ingress through the senses into the first-formed man. And for this reason, man is said to have been made "according to the image and likeness of God." For the image of God is the divine and kingly Word, man impassible; but the image of the human image is the mind. If, however, you wish to adopt another term for this assimilation, you might find it in Moses called a divine following. For he says: "Walk after the Lord your God, and keep His commandments." ^D And I consider that all who are virtuous are followers and servants of God. From this, the Stoics have declared the end of philosophy to be living in accordance with nature; but Plato, assimilation to God, as we have shown in the second *Stromateis*. And Zeno the Stoic, having taken it from Plato, while Plato took it from the barbarian philosophy, says that all good men are friends to one another. For Socrates says in the *Phaedrus* (46): "As it is fated not for the bad to be a friend to the bad, nor for the good not to be a friend to the good." Which he also demonstrated sufficiently in the *Lysis* (47), that friendship could never be maintained alongside injustice and wickedness. And the Athenian stranger (48) likewise says that an action is friendly and follows God, and possesses one ancient reason: when the like is a friend to the like, being in due measure, but things without measure are friends to neither the unmeasured nor the measured; and God would be the measure of all things for us. Then, following up, Plato adds: "For every good man is like the good man; and according to this, being also like God, he is a friend to every good man and to God." ^A Arriving here, I remembered this too: for at the end of the *Timaeus*, he says that the observing one must assimilate the observer to the object of observation, according to the ancient nature; and upon assimilating, one reaches the end of the best life proposed by the gods to men, both for present and future time. And after a few words (49) he adds: "That we are brothers, as being of the one God and one teacher, this too appears to be stated well by Plato somewhat in this way: 'For you are all brothers, as we shall say to them in our mythological account. But God, in fashioning you, mixed ^B gold into such of you as are fit to rule—therefore they are most precious; but to the helpers, silver; and iron and bronze to the farmers and other craftsmen.'" Whence of necessity, he says, it has come to pass that ^C and ^D [index: entries preserved]

some grasp at those things which belong to knowledge, others at those which belong to belief. For perhaps he divines that this elect nature longs for knowledge; unless one, positing three natures, should describe three regimes, as some have conjectured; the silver one for the Jews, the third for the Greeks, and for the Christians, in whom the royal gold, the Holy Spirit, is intermingled. And displaying the life of Christians, he writes verbatim in the *Theaetetus*: "Let us speak, then, of the chief ones; for what indeed could one say of those who waste their time in philosophy? These men, for instance, do not know the way to the market, nor to the court-house, nor ^B to the senate-house, or to any other common council of the city. Laws and decrees enacted or written, they neither see nor hear. The rivalries of factions, and meetings for the sake of offices, and revels with flute girls, do not even enter into their dreams to undertake. But if anything has happened ill in the city, or if any evil has occurred to anyone from his ancestors, it escapes them more than the so-called drops of the sea. And even these things they do not know that they know not. But in truth, only their body lies in the city and has its residence there, while they themselves fly, according to Pindar, underneath the earth, and above the heavens, studying astronomy, and searching out ^C every nature everywhere." Again, to the word of the Lord, "Let your speech be, Yea, yea; and Nay, nay," one may liken those things: "But it is in no way right for me to concede a falsehood, or to destroy the truth." And this statement in the tenth book of the *Laws* conforms to the prohibition about swearing: "Let praise and the oath be absent from everything." And in general, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, saying that they hear the voice of God, contemplating the construction of the universe, as it has been precisely brought into being by God and is held together without ceasing, have heard Moses saying: "He spoke, and it was done," describing the Word of God as being the work. And as they dwell upon the formation of man out of dust, the philosophers everywhere declare the body to be earthly; but Homer does not hesitate ^D to place it in a location of a curse:

^A *But you all, may you return to earth and water.* Just as Isaiah says: *And trample them like mud.* And Callimachus writes explicitly:

"That was the year in which the tribe of those that fly, And those beneath the waves, and the four-footed, thus Spoke with a voice, like the mud of Prometheus."

And the same author again:

"...If Prometheus himself Molded you, and you were not made of other mud."

Hesiod says of Pandora:

"And he ordered the renowned Hephaestus, with all speed, To moisten earth with water, and to place in it a human voice And mind."

The Stoics define nature as an artificial fire, proceeding by a path towards generation; while Scripture allegorically signifies God, or His Word, by the name of fire and light. What then? Does not Homer himself paraphrase the water separated from the earth, and the manifest uncovering of the dry land, when he speaks of the discord between Tethys and Ocean:

"For now, for a long time, bitter discord keeps them From their bed and love"?

Again, the most learned among the Greeks attach to God the power over all things. Epicharmus (who was a Pythagorean) says in these verses:

"Nothing escapes the Divine; you must know this: He himself is the onlooker of us; God lacks nothing."

And the lyric poet [says] thus:

"To God it is possible out of dark Night to call forth pure day, And to cloak in black shadows The bright radiance of the day."

He who alone, he says, is able to make night when day is present, this is God. And Aratus, in the work inscribed *Phaenomena*, says:

"From Zeus let us begin, whom we men never Leave unspoken. For full of Zeus are all the paths, Full are the marketplaces of men; and full is the sea, And the harbors. And in every way we all have need of Zeus."

He adds:

"For we are also his offspring," (meaning his creation).

^C And if he is kind to men, he signifies it by prosperity:

"For he himself fixed those signs in heaven, Discerning the stars; and for a year he marked out The stars, which might most clearly indicate to men The seasons, so that all things might grow steadily. And they always pray to him first and last."

^D

^A Hail, Father, great wonder, great to men, skilled craftsman, boon. And before this, Homer, in that shield which Vulcan wrought, describing the creation of the world after the archetype of Moses, says: He made the earth, and the heaven, and the salt, deep [sea, And all the constellations wherewith heaven is crowned. For Zeus, who is celebrated through the voices of poets and prose writers, altogether signifies God. Already, too, as one might say, Democritus writes that there are but few among men who raise their hands to that which we Greeks now call the air. For Zeus speaks all, and knows all, and gives and takes away, and he is the king of all things. More mystically, however, the Boeotian Pindar, as a Pythagorean, [teaches] of the primeval matter, and calls the one creator of these things the "skilled craftsman" and Father, who has also bestowed advancements according to desert regarding divinity. For I pass over Plato, who appears openly and clearly, in the letter which he writes to Erastus and Coriscus, to be revealing the Father and the Son, I know not how, from Hebrew writings, exhorting them verbatim thus: "Swearing by, with a zeal by no means graceless, and by the sister of that zeal, philosophy, the God who is the cause of all things, and swearing by the Lord, the Father of the ruler and cause, whom, if you philosophize rightly, you shall know." And in his discourse in the *Timaeus*, he calls the creator Father, speaking in this wise: "Gods of gods, of whom I am the Father and the creator of works." So even when he says, "Around the King of all are all things, and because of him are all things, and he is the cause of all ^B good things; and the second around the second, and the third around the third," I myself understand nothing else than the holy Trinity being signified. For the third is the holy Spirit, and the second is the Son, through whom all things came to be according to the will of the Father. And the same [Plato], in the tenth book of the *Republic*, mentions Erus, the son of Armenius, of the race of Pamphilus, who is Zoroaster. Zoroaster himself indeed writes thus about himself: "These things wrote Zoroaster, son of Armenius, Pamphylian by race; when I had fallen in war, I learned these things from the gods among the dead." This Zoroaster, then, Plato says rose to life on the twelfth day, lying upon the pyre. Perhaps it is not the resurrection, but he hints at those things: that the path for souls to their ascent becomes through the twelve signs of the zodiac. And he says that the same descent also occurs for birth. These things are to be understood, as well as the labors of Hercules, as being fifteen, after which the soul attains to the release from all this world. ^{C D}

To the Olympian, in this manner he refers:

^A I do not overlook Empedocles either. This physicist mentions the restoration of all things, as though a transformation into the substance of fire will one day occur. Heraclitus the Ephesian is most clearly of this opinion, having judged one world to be eternal, while another—the one consisting of ordered arrangement—is perishable, though he knows these are not distinct from one another, but somehow the same. But that he recognizes a world, produced eternally from the whole of substance, he already makes clear, speaking thus: "The same world of all things, neither any god nor man has made, but it ever was, and is, and shall be, an ever-living fire, kindled by measure, and extinguished by measure." That he also taught that it is generated and perishable, he indicates by what follows: "Turnings of fire: first sea, and of sea the half is earth, the half is a lightning-flash." For in effect he says that fire, by the governing Word and God of all things, is turned through air into moisture, which he calls "sea," as the seed of the ordered arrangement, and from this, in turn, come heaven and earth and the things they contain. How it is taken up again and burned, he clearly reveals through these words: "Sea is dispersed and is measured to the same account as it was before it became." And he says the same regarding the other elements. Those most learned among the Stoics dogma- ^B tize in a way similar to this, discussing both the conflagration and the government of the world, and what the world and man are in their own specific character, and the persistence of our souls.

Furthermore, Plato, in the seventh book of the Republic, called the day here a "nocturnal day," on account of the rulers of this darkness, I suppose; and he called the path to the body an "ascent of the soul" as sleep and death, following Heraclitus. And might not the Spirit have prophesied this concerning the Savior, through David saying: "I laid me down and slept; I awoke, for the Lord will take me to himself"? For he allegorizes not only the resurrection of the Savior Christ from sleep as the Lord’s descent into flesh. Immediately the same Savior exhorts, "Watch," that is, study to live, and attempt to separate the soul from the body. ^C Plato also surmises the Lord’s Day in the tenth book of the Republic through these words: "Since for those in the meadow each had seven days, they must rise from there on the eighth and journey, and arrive in four days." We must understand the "meadow" to be the fixed sphere, as a gentle and pleasant place, and a region of the holy; and the "seven days" as each of the seven movements, and every practical art, hastening to the end of rest. The journey after the wandering [planets] leads to the heaven, that is, the eighth movement and day. And he says the souls arrive "in four days," signifying the journey through the four elements. But also the seven- ^D [day period...].

is known to be sacred not only by the Hebrews, but also by the Greeks, by which the whole universe of all living and growing things is cycled. Consequently Hesiod speaks of it thus: ^A

First comes the next day, the fourth and the seventh, a sacred day. And again: And the seventh day again, the bright light of the sun. And Homer: And then the seventh day came, a sacred day. And: The seventh was sacred. And again: The seventh day was here, by which all things were brought to completion. And again: When the seventh day had risen, we left the waves of Acheron. The poet Callimachus matches these sentiments: The seventh day it was, and all things were accomplished. And again: The seventh is among the good, and the seventh is a birthday. And: The seventh is among the first, and the seventh is perfect. And: And that the changes of the sun occur according to a week, the Elegies of Solon show, in this way: A child, while still an infant, not yet having grown pubic hair, As the barrier of his teeth grows, he sheds the first ^B in seven years; And others, when God has completed seven years, He fulfills the seeds of coming youth, etc. And all things in the starry heaven were fashioned in sevens, Appearing in cycles of revolving years. But even the Elegies of Solon greatly divinize the week. And are these not similar to what the Scripture says: "Let us take away the righteous man from us, because he is troublesome to us"? ^C Plato, all but prophesying the saving dispensation of Christ, speaks thus in the second book of the *Republic*: "The righteous man, being so disposed, will be scourged, will be bound, will have his eyes put out, and at last, after having suffered all manner of evil, will be crucified." Moreover, the Socratic philosopher Antisthenes, paraphrasing that prophetic utterance, "To whom have you likened Me? says the Lord," explains it by saying that God is like no one; for which reason no one can learn Him from an image. ^D And Xenophon the Athenian says similar things in his own words: "For the one who orders and holds together the whole world, though he is seen doing the greatest things, is yet invisible to us. And consider that even the sun, which seems visible to all, does not allow men to look at it accurately; but if one attempts to look at it insolently, he is deprived of his sight."

shaking and calming all things, as a great and mighty being, is manifest; but what he is in form, is invisible.» Nor indeed does even the sun, which seems to be all-radiant, permit itself to be looked upon; but if one should look at it brazenly, he is deprived of his sight.

For what flesh is able with its eyes to see the heavenly and true immortal God, who dwells in the heavens? And not even directly against the rays of the sun are human beings capable of standing, mortals as they are, predicted the Sibyl. Correctly, then, Xenophanes the Colophonian, teaching that God is one and incorporeal, adds: ^A

One God is greatest among gods and men, In no way like to mortals in body, nor in thought.

And again: ...But mortals believe that gods are born, And have their own clothing, and voice, and form.

And again: ...But if oxen or lions had hands, Or could draw with their hands, and execute works just as men, Horses like to horses, and oxen like to oxen, Would depict the forms of the gods, and make their bodies Just such as the form they themselves possessed.

Let us hear then again what Bacchylides the lyric poet says concerning the Divine: They are always free from painful diseases, And blameless, and in no way like to mortals.

And hear what Cleanthes the Stoic written in a certain poem concerning God: ^B

You ask me what is good? Listen then. Ordered, just, holy, pious, Self-controlled, useful, noble, necessary, Severe, self-sufficient, always beneficial, Fearless, painless, advantageous, painless, Useful, secure, friendly, honorable, satisfying, agreeable, Glorious, unhaughty, diligent, gentle, vigorous, Enduring, blameless, always remaining the same.

And the same man, tacitly rebuking the idolatry of the many, adds: He is not free, whoever looks to reputation, As though he might obtain some good from it.

Therefore one ought no longer to form a judgment concerning the Divine according to the opinion of the many: ^C ...For I do not think that the Divine Takes on the likeness of a wicked man, To enter thy chamber, as men are wont to do; And possesses the same feeling, voice, and form. ^D

^A Amphion says to Antiope. But Sophocles writes yet more boldly: For Zeus did wed the mother of this child, Not gold-transformed, nor adorned in wings Of swan, as he did force the Pleuronian maid, But as a man in every way complete. Then, approaching, he adds: And quickly he stood upon the adulterous steps, The adulterer. Whereupon, still more clearly, he sets forth the incontinence of the fabled Zeus, speaking thus: But he, touching neither food nor water, Went to the bed with heart stung sore, And spent that whole night in revelry.

Let these things, then, be left to the madness of the theaters. ^B Heraclitus says clearly that men are ever without understanding of the necessary Word, both before they hear it, and when they have heard it for the first time. And the lyric poet Melanippides sings: Hear me, O Father, wonder of mortals, Who governest the ever-living soul. And the great Parmenides, as Plato says in the *Sophist*, writes thus concerning the Divine: Much like, as being unborn and imperishable, it is Sole, monogenetic, and unshaken, and unborn.

But also Hesiod: For he himself, he says, is king and sovereign of all The immortals, and no other shares his power.

Indeed, even tragedy itself, by drawing us away from the worship of idols, teaches us to look up to the heavens. ^C For Sophocles, as sayeth Hecataeus the historian in the book he wrote concerning Abraham and the Egyptians, cries out plainly from the stage: In truth, there is one, one God alone, Who fashioned heaven and the wide regions of earth, The sea’s glaucous swell, and the violence of the winds. But we, miserable ones, wandering in heart, Have fashioned as a solace for our woes Images of gods out of stone or bronze, Or of molten gold, or of elephantine ivory. And by sacrificing to these, and observing fair festivals, We think we are being pious.

Euripides, in the same tragedy, performs upon the stage: Seest thou, he says, this boundless ether on high, Which encompasses the earth in its moist embrace? Consider this to be Zeus, deem this to be God. ^D And in the drama which he entitles *Pirithous*, he also writes these tragic lines: Thee, self-begotten, thee, who in the ethereal Whirlwind dost involve the nature of all things: Whom brilliant day, whom the dark night...

^A And multicolored; whom every star Of the sky, shining with no single light, Circles in constant orbit.

For he called the self-originate, the Demiurge intellect, the one who is; what follows refers to the cosmos, in which there is also the conflict of light and darkness. Similarly, Aeschylus, the son of Euphorion, says of God in a very solemn manner: Jove is the ether, Jove the earth, Jove heaven, Jove is the All, and that which is above it.

I know also that Plato agrees with Heraclitus, writing in this manner: "What is one, the wise, it wills not to be called by itself, and yet it wills the name of Zeus." And again: "The law and the counsel to obey the one." And if you wish to apply that utterance: "He who has ears to hear, let him hear," you would find it here indicated by the Ephesian: "The senseless, when they hear, are like the deaf; the saying bears witness for them that they are absent when they are present."

But if you desire to hear from the Greeks themselves that there is a single principle, Timaeus the Locrian in his work on *Nature* will bear testimony to me in these very words: "One is the principle of all things, without birth; for if it were born, it would no longer be a principle, but that from which the principle was born." ^B For from that source the true glory proceeds: "Hear, he says, O Israel: The Lord thy God is one, and him only shalt thou serve."

This is, see, plain to all, wandering into no error, as the Sibyl says. And Xenocrates the Carthaginian, by calling one Jove the supreme and another the lowest, leaves a certain indication of Father and Son. And what is most paradoxical ^C is that the divinity seems to be known by one who introduces gods with human passions; whom nonetheless Epicurus does not even reverence. For he says: Why, mortal Achilles, do you pursue me, An immortal god, with swift feet? Not yet indeed Have you known me, that I am a god. For he has shown that the divine is not to be captured by a mortal, nor is it to be grasped, neither by feet, nor by hands, nor by eyes, nor in any way by the body. "To whom have you likened the Lord? or to what likeness have you likened him?" says the Scripture. "Has the craftsman made an image, or the goldsmith, having melted gold, covered it with gold?" and what follows after these. And the comic poet Epicharmus clearly speaks thus concerning the Word in his *Republic*: ^D

^A

Human life is thoroughly in need of reason and number; We live by number and reason; both nourish us.

Then he declares explicitly: The Word rules over men, according to the standard, and saves whom it will. If there is human reasoning, there is also divine Word; The Word is innate in man concerning the changes of life. But the divine Word accompanies the arts for all, Teaching them itself what is profitable to do. For man did not discover any art; God brings this forth. And indeed the human word has its nature from the divine Word.

^B Furthermore, seeing that the Spirit cries out through the voice of Isaiah: "To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? says the Lord; I am full of the burnt offerings of rams, and I do not desire the blood of bulls." And after a little, he adds: "Wash yourselves, become clean, remove your wickednesses from your souls." And in addition to these, Menander the comic poet [(89)] writes in these very words:

If anyone, Pamphilus, while offering a sacrifice Of a multitude of bulls, or of kids, or, by Zeus, Of other such things, or fabrications, Having made golden cloaks, or purple ones, Or images [(91)] of ivory or emerald, Believes that he has rendered God propitious; That man is deceived, and has a frivolous mind. For it is necessary for a man to be upright, Not defiling virgins, nor committing adultery, Not stealing and slaying for the sake of money. Do not even desire the thread [(92)] of a needle, Pamphilus; for God sees you, being present nearby.

"Am I a God at hand, and not a God afar off? Shall a man do anything in secret, and I shall not see him?" says God through Jeremiah. And again Menander, paraphrasing that Scripture: "Sacrifice a sacrifice of righteousness, and hope in the Lord," writes as follows:

... Nor ever, O dearest one, desire [(93)] Any needle that belongs to another; for God delights in righteous deeds, And not in unrighteous ones; but He allows the one who labors To exalt his own life, tilling the earth by night and By day. Sacrifice to God at all times, Being righteous, and bright in your heart, As you are in your cloaks. If you should hear thunder, do not flee, If you are conscious of nothing within yourself, O master. For God sees you, being present nearby.

^A "And while you are still speaking," the Scripture says, "I will say: Behold, I am present." Diphilus, the comic poet, again discourses on this very matter of judgment:

Do you imagine, Niceratus, that the dead, Who have spent their every day in every luxury, Could have escaped the divine, as if they were hidden? There is an eye of justice that sees all things. For, because we suppose there to be two paths, One for the just, and another fixed boundary for the wicked, Go, though you may plunder, steal, defraud, and stir up confusion, And even if the earth, they say, covers both in time— Do not be misled; there shall be judgment even in Hades, Which God, the Master of all, will perform, Whose name is fearful, which I would not even speak, He who grants a long life to those who sin. But if any mortal thinks, as he does some new wickedness Day by day, that he has eluded the gods, He thinks evil, and, thinking so, is caught Whenever Justice happens to have leisure. Behold, all you who think there is no God; For He is, He is. But if any man acts wickedly, Being evil by nature, let him count his time a gain. For in time, this man shall later pay the penalty.

The tragedy also harmonizes with these things through these lines:

For there shall be, there shall be that time of the age, When the golden ether shall unleash the treasure ^B Filled with fire; and the fire, having been fueled, Shall burn all things terrestrial and high up, Having become mad.

And after a few lines he adds again:

And when the All fails, The entire abyss of the waves shall be gone, And the earth, bereft of its foundations, and not even any Winged flocks shall sprout, being scorched, And then it shall save all that it had perished before.

We shall find things similar to these also in the Orphic writings, written down in this manner:

For having hidden everything, again into the joyful light, He brought them forth from his sacred heart, performing wondrous deeds.

If we live holily and justly, we shall be blessed indeed here, but after our departure from this life, we shall be far more blessed, our happiness ^C not being limited by any time, but being able to rest in eternity,

Dwelling with the immortal ones, Sharing their table—free from the evils of the Achaean heroes (as the philosophical poetry of Empedocles says). No one shall be so great, according to the Greeks, as to surpass justice, nor so small as to escape notice. And the same Orpheus also says these things:

But looking to the divine Word, attend to him, Directing the intellectual vessel of your heart, and walk well. ^D

^A Walking with consistent step upon an untrodden path, And seeing only the King of the universe, The Immortal.

Furthermore, regarding God, he declares Him invisible, stating that He is known to only one of the Chaldean race, whether he speaks of this Abraham, or of his son, through these verses:

Unless one be offspring born of the Chaldean race from above; for he was skilled in the movement of the stars, And the motion of the sphere around the earth, how it revolves, Rounded in equal measure, and by its own impulse; And he guides the winds, and about the air and around the current.

Then, as if paraphrasing that saying, «Heaven is my throne, and earth the footstool of my feet,» he adds:

^B He himself, again, is firmly set high above the vault of heaven Upon a golden throne; his feet rest upon the earth. He has stretched out his right hand to the ends of Ocean; And the base of the mountains trembles within its heart, Nor can it bear his mighty force; and he is everywhere, Himself heavenly, and he brings all things to completion upon the earth, Possessing at once the beginning, and the middle, and the end. But it is not lawful for you to speak, and I tremble in my limbs In my mind. He rules from the highest place.

And what follows these. For by these things he has clearly indicated all those prophetic words: «If you should open heaven, trembling will seize it; and mountains will melt from your presence, just as wax melts from the face of the fire.» And those things through Isaiah: «Who has measured the heaven with a span, and all the earth with his fist?» Again, when he sings thus:

O Ruler of the ether, and of Hades, of the sea, and of the earth, Who with thunders shake the firm threshold of high Olympus, Whom the demons shudder at, and the company of the gods fears, Whom the Fates obey, though they be unyielding; Imperishable Father of the Mother, by whose spirit all things are shaken, Who moves the winds, and covers all things with clouds, Cleaving the wide ether with lightnings. Yours is the Order among the stars, running in unchanging harmonies; And around your fiery throne stand the industrious Angels, to whom it is a care how all things are accomplished for mortals. By your spring, the fields shine anew with purple blossoms; Your winter rages, driven under cold clouds, And to you is owed the vintage fruit of Bromius.

^D Then he continues, addressing God in explicit terms as the Almighty:

Imperishable, immortal, speakable only to the immortals. Come, greatest of all gods, with mighty necessity, Dread, unconquered, great, imperishable, whom the ether crowns.

For indeed, while he calls Him Father of the Mother, he not only indicated the creation out of nothing, but also provided starting points for those who introduce emanations, perhaps even to conceive of a consort.

^A of God. He also paraphrases those prophetic scriptures, both the one through Hosea: "Behold, I am he who establishes the thunder, and creates spirit, whose hands founded the host of heaven." And the one through Moses: "See, see, that I am, and there is no God other than me. I will kill, and I will make to live; I will strike, and I will heal. And there is no one who shall deliver out of my hands."

"To mortals he plants evil from good things, And grievous war." According to Orpheus. Something similar says the Parian Archilochus: "O Zeus, thine is the rule of heaven, and thou, Sendest works upon men, both grievous and lawless." Again, let the Thracian Orpheus sing to us: "His right hand he hath stretched forth about the ends of the Ocean On all sides, and his holy foot hath stepped upon the earth." These things were manifestly taken from those scriptures: "The Lord will save the cities that are inhabited, and will take possession of the whole world with his hand like a nest." And, "The Lord who made the earth in his strength," as Jeremiah says, "and set up the world in his wisdom." Further to these, Phocylides, calling angels by the name of demons, distinguishes some of them as good and others as evil, as we also have accepted that some are rebels: "But the race of demons has not one power over men, For to some is the right to avert a coming plague." Rightly, therefore, the comic poet Philemon cuts away idolatry through these words: "There is no god called Fortune among us, There is not; but whatever happens to each man By chance, they call Fortune." And the tragic poet Sophocles says: "Not even to the gods do all things yield, Apart from Zeus; for he holds the end and the beginning." And Orpheus: "One power, one divinity has come to be, the great Heaven, And in it all things have been wrought, in which all these things ^B are contained, Fire, and water, and earth." And what follows these. The lyric poet Pindar, as if possessed by a Bacchic frenzy, speaks clearly: "What is God? Everything." And again: "God who creates all things for mortals." But when he says: "What wisdom, man, do you expect to gain from man Beyond what is small? To search out the counsels of the gods is difficult for mortal nature, For it is born of a mortal mother." From there he drew the sentiment: "Who has known the mind of the Lord?"

^A And Hesiod too, through whom he writes, agrees with what has been stated before: "No prophet is there among earth-born men, Who might know the mind of Zeus, the aegis-bearer." Rightly, then, Solon the Athenian, in his *Elegies*, having himself followed Hesiod, writes: "The mind of the immortals is entirely hidden from men." Again, regarding Moses’ prophecy that, because of the neglect of God's commandment, the woman would bring forth children in great pain, a certain poet of no mean standing writes: "... nor by day shall they cease from toil and woe, nor by night shall they be relieved; for the gods will send them heavy cares."

^B Furthermore, Homer, when he says, "And the Father balanced the golden scales," points to the justice of God. And Menander the comic poet, declaring God to be good, speaks thus: "To every man a guardian spirit stands near, From the moment he is born, a guide of his life, A good one; for one ought not to think a spirit evil That harms a good life." Then he adds: "That God is entirely good"—meaning either that God is entirely good, or, which is closer to the truth, that God is good in all things. Then too, Aeschylus the tragedian, in declaring to us the power of God, does not hesitate to call Him "the Highest" in these verses: "Separate the Deity from mortals, and do not think That He is of like nature, fleshly. You do not know Him. At times He shines forth as fire, Untouchable in His onset; at times as water, and at times as darkness; And He becomes like wild beasts, Like wind, and cloud, and lightning, thunder, and rain. The sea serves Him, and the rocks, And every spring, and the gatherings of water. The mountains tremble, and the earth, and the vast Abyss of the sea, and the height of the cliffs, when ^C The great, piercing eye of the Lord looks down; For the glory of the highest God is supreme." Does it not seem to you that this paraphrases the words, "The earth trembles before the face of the Lord"? In addition to these, Apollo, most gifted in divination, bearing witness to the glory of God, is compelled to speak concerning Athena, at the time when the Medes were invading Greece, how she was begging and supplicating Zeus on behalf of Attica. The oracle is as follows: "Pallas cannot appease the Olympian, Though she beseeches Him with many words and cunning craft; She will cast many temples of the immortals into consuming fire, Which now, perhaps, stand dripping with sweat, Trembling with terror." For all things are possible, and the glory of God is supreme.

And what follows. ^A Thearidas, moreover, writes in his work *On Nature* in this manner: “The beginning of the universe, the beginning indeed truly real, is one.” For that is from eternity one and alone.

“There is no other besides the great king,” says Orpheus. Whom Diphilus the comic poet followed, saying he is the most general father of all,

..... him with pious mind forever worship, From whose sole hand so many good things spring.

Jure ergo Plato justly accustoms the most excellent natures to attain that kind of discipline which we said before to be the greatest, that is, to the perception of the knowledge of the Good, and to arrive by ascending to that ^B ascent. And this, as it seems, would not be the turning of a shell, but the turning of the soul from a kind of nocturnal day to the true return to that which is, which indeed we shall call true philosophy. And he judges those who have partaken of this to be of the golden race, saying, “You are all brothers indeed.” But those who are of that golden race are most accurate, and in every way naturally and untaught, they apprehend of the Father and Maker of all things everything from everybody; the inanimate things ^C sympathizing, but of animals, of those endowed with life, some are already immortal, and others labor from day to day. And of mortals, some are in fear, even while they are still carried in the womb by their mother; others are already masters of themselves, guided by their own reason. And of men, all are Greeks and barbarians. But no race anywhere of those who till the soil, nor of the nomads, nor even of those who live in a state, can live without being previously possessed by faith in the one who is superior. Wherefore every nation, whether it touches the eastern ^D or western shores, or the northern, and all those toward the south, has one and the same anticipation concerning him who established this rule, if indeed the most universal of his benefits have also equally spread to all. But the philosophers among the Greeks, who are much more inquisitive, having set out from the philosophy of the barbarians, gave the prerogative to the invisible, and only, and most powerful, and most skillful, and the cause of other most beautiful things, not knowing the consequences of these things unless they had been instructed by us, nor even him in what way

nature itself prescribes we should come to know God; but only, as we have often said, they circumscribe him by a certain circumlocution. Thus far Clemens.

Now, indeed, since we have shown that the reasoning of Platonic philosophy in many things agrees with the writings of the Hebrews (for which reason we truly praise the man, both for his sharpness in discerning the truth and for his liberal and noble fairness in other matters), we must at last come to those things in which we cannot similarly approve of him, and [show why] we hold the philosophy of his doctrine to be superior to that which is commonly called "barbarian."

CHAPTER XIV

The oracles of the Hebrews, which contain certain divine predictions and responses, and which show a power truly more divine than human—and therefore claim God himself as their author—since they have their own indications, confirmed by the prediction of future events and by the very outcome of things corresponding to the prophecies, are rightly said to be far removed from every false notion. For, indeed, ^B "The divine words are pure, and silver tried in the fire, proven in the earth, purified seven times" are so called. But those of Plato are not of this kind, nor are those of any other of the number of wise men among men, who, with the eyes of mortal understanding and with certain vain and futile conjectures, sleeping as it were, and not as those who keep watch, while they form the nature of things in their mind, ^C have mixed much of the alloy of falsehood with the truth of nature, so that you cannot find a single head of doctrine among them pure and immune from all error.

And that you may not go further, if you will relax a little of this private and domestic affection and look upon the light itself through the power of reason, you will yourself truly recognize that that even admirable philosopher, who alone of all the Greeks touched the threshold and vestibule of truth, ^D defiled the name of the gods with decaying and perishing matter, and with images fashioned into human form by the hands of base workmen; and after that sublime height of magnificence, by which he stretched himself to know the Father and Creator of this whole universe, he [descended] from somewhere above, from the super-celestial vaults, into the lowest abyss of God-hated idolatry to be accepted and learned by the common people.

[alt-version omitted]

^A Thus indeed, seeing that he was not ashamed to write that Socrates, in order to fulfill a vow to the goddess and to be present at that barbarian festival which was then being celebrated for the first time by the citizens, had descended into the Piraeus—nor did he blush to admit that he had ordered a cock to be sacrificed to Asclepius, or to call that daemon sitting at Delphi a god, as if he were a certain national interpreter for the Greeks—he may justifiably be charged with the guilt of that superstitious error which misled the unintelligent multitude.

Now, call to mind, I pray you, a little of what was said a moment ago, and observe what sort of things this "all-wise" man, after his discourse on the incorporeal and indestructible Ideas, and after his mention of the First God and the second principle, and after the spiritual and immortal essences, has seen fit to legislate regarding this common, popular belief, which was even ratified by his own laws: ^B "As for the other daemons, to explain or to know their generation is a task beyond our power. Therefore, in this matter, we must place our faith in those who have spoken before us, who were, as they claim, the descendants of gods, and who surely must have had clear knowledge of their own ancestors. It is impossible, then, to disbelieve the children of gods, even though they speak without probable or necessary demonstrations; but since they profess to report what concerns their own kin, we must follow the law and believe them. Thus, then, let the generation of these gods according to them be held and stated by us: Of Earth and Sky were born Oceanus and Tethys; from them came Phorcys, Saturn, and Ops, and all who follow them; and from Saturn and Ops were born Jupiter, Juno, and all those whom we know as their brethren, as well as the other descendants of these."

For this reason, then, we must abandon this philosopher, for he acts not as a philosopher should, nor does he even agree with himself, since he adopts the mythical genealogies of the poets. For hear how he himself speaks in the *Republic*: ^C "'In the greater myths, I said, we shall easily see the lesser ones also. For it is necessary that there be one single form and power common to both the greater and the lesser. Do you not think so?' 'Indeed,' he said, 'but I do not understand which you call the greater.' 'Those,' I said, 'which Hesiod and Homer, and the other poets, have told us. For these, I suppose, have composed and still compose false myths for men, such as those we set forth a little while ago.' And again, it was his own discourse through which he said: 'We shall then erase, I said, beginning from this verse, all such things: ^D *I would rather be a serf in the land of some other*.'

And what follows; through which he adds: 'Again, we shall request of Homer and the other poets not to represent Achilles as the son of a goddess, *Now on his side, and now lying supine*.'"

' ^A And the things that follow these. To which he adds: "Or of Jupiter, and the bond of Mars and Venus by Vulcan, and other such things."

If these things have been said in this manner, what then does he mean by his subsequent language, which labels the poets as sons of gods, and asserts that it is impossible not to believe them, although he has long since ^B testified without any necessary or probable demonstration that these myths about the gods were fabricated by them? And what is that unreasoning faith, which he wishes to be guarded and fortified even by the fear of the laws? And how are Heaven and Earth first among the gods, and then their offspring, Ocean and Tethys, and Saturn, and Rhea, and Zeus, and after all these, Juno, and all the sons and brothers and grandsons of theirs who are fabulously recounted by Homer and Hesiod, since he himself pulls these very inventions up by the roots by saying: "Which, I said, is the first and most reprehensible of all things, especially when a person does not lie correctly." What is that, moreover? "When a person represents the nature of gods and heroes badly in discourse, just as a painter would do if he were to paint a tablet that was in no way similar to the thing he had undertaken to express with his brush." And likewise: "First, I say, the greatest lie, and the one concerning the most important matters, which Hesiod related—namely, what was done by Heaven, and what in turn Saturn retaliated upon him—he fabricated quite wrongly." And what follows. How then, pray, can the same poets whom he here calls vain and mendacious be held to be (as he claims) the grandsons of the gods? With justice, certainly, and deservedly is he to be abandoned by us, who was soothing the Athenian populace after the manner of actors through fear of death; ^C on the other hand, Moses is to be observed, and the oracles of the Hebrews are to be embraced, which excel in piety that is entirely sincere, and at once true and devoid of any error. Behold now this other matter.

CHAPTER XV.

That Plato did not in all respects rightly conduct the discourse concerning spiritual natures, but the Hebrews.

The Hebrews teach that the intermediate nature, consisting of those who partake of reason, has had a beginning of its coming-to-be, and is not unbegotten. Distributing these by account into various orders of spiritual substances, they name them spirits, virtues, ministers of God, angels, and archangels. ^D From the number of these, who fell by their own fault, they derive the race of demons and every sort of activity that is hostile and injurious to men. Wherefore they do not allow even these to be held in the place of gods, who do not have the good and the noble, which is inseparable from their nature, not merely from themselves, but do not even have their very being from themselves, but from the cause of all things.

^A Plato, however, although he agrees with the Hebrews that there are certain rational, incorporeal, and spiritual natures, yet he fails in consistency; first, by asserting them to be unbegotten, as he does of every soul; and next by saying they were formed from an emanation of the first cause—for he is unwilling to grant that they came into existence from nothing. Hence, he posits a race of many gods, regarding them in his logic as certain emanations or processions of the first and second cause; and he considers them to be good in nature, and in no way capable of falling away from their own proper virtue, for which reason he deems them gods. He thinks that the tribe of demons is different from these, being one of wickedness and malice, and susceptible to turning for the worse; ^B some of whom are called good, and others evil. But since he proposes this view in a way contrary to the Hebrews, he does not provide an account of how it is likely that demons came into being. For no man of sense would say they arose from the matter of incorporeal [c] things, since that is irrational; yet demons are rational, and one would never be born from the irrational. But if these are from the emanation of the superior beings, how are they not also gods, equal in status to those who begat them? And if the source is good, how are its products not similar? Or whence did the sprout of evil grow in the second order, while the root from above proceeded from good things? How could the bitter be produced from the sweet? And if the race of wicked demons is heavier than all darkness and all bitterness, how could it be said to have flowed from the emanation of the nature of the superior beings? If it did flow from thence, it would never have swerved from its own proper state. If it is changed, its nature would not have been impassible from the beginning. ^C And if it was not such a lot that it possessed—but if they were neither from the emanation of the superior beings, nor yet from the matter of bodies—it is time either to call them unbegotten, and to draw up, alongside the unbegotten matter of bodies, a third rank of unbegotten rational beings against God, and no longer acknowledge God to be the maker and creator of all things; or else, by acknowledging this, to confess along with the teachings of the Hebrews that He makes things which do not exist. What, then, do they teach regarding these? They say that the intermediate race of rational natures came into being, not from the matter of bodies, nor from an emanation of that nature which is unbegotten and always exists in the same way and condition; but that when they were not existence before, they came into being by the productive power of the Cause of all things. For this reason they are not gods, nor are they worthy of this title in the strict sense, because their nature is not equal to that which made them, ^D nor is it as inseparable from God as it should be; it is drawn towards the good, but it is also capable of turning to that which is contrary to the noble, through a neglect of the attention it ought to pay to the superior—over which each person is rightfully master, being endowed with his own impulse and judgment. These things we have said regarding these matters. Let us now move on to other things.

CHAPTER XVI.

Plato, having followed the Hebrews in positing that the soul is immortal and like to God, subsequently departs from them; for he sometimes wishes its substance to be composite, as though it possessed one part derived from the indivisible and ever-identical nature, and another part taken from the divisible nature of bodies. Indeed, he expresses this in the very words of the *Timaeus*: "He," he says, "constructed the soul, both in origin and in virtue prior to the body, as a master to rule over a subject, out of these elements and in this manner: since there are two natures—one indivisible, which is always the same, and the other divisible, which has its place in bodies—he blended a third type of substance, of an intermediate nature, from both; ^B and he joined the nature of the Same and the nature of the Other, and established it in the middle of their indivisible nature and of that which is divisible according to bodies. And having taken these three, he blended them into one form, forcing the nature of the Other, which is hard to mix, into the same." From this, it is with reason that the passionate part is joined to the rational part of the soul in his doctrine.

But while he holds this view concerning the substance of the soul at one time, at another time he attaches to it something worse and more absurd, claiming that that divine and heavenly nature—which passes beyond the heavenly vaults through the greatness of its virtue, being itself immaterial and rational, like to God, and eminent above the world—descends from those highest regions into donkeys, wolves, ants, and bees; and he contends in his discourse that we should believe this without any demonstration. For in the dialogue *On the Soul* he has this: "And they wander," he says, "until, ^C by the desire for the body-like nature which follows along, they are again bound back into a body. They are consigned, as is natural, to such customs as they happened to have practiced in their life." — "What kind of customs do you mean, Socrates?" — "Such as those who have practiced gluttony, and violence, and drunkenness, and have not taken care, into the ^D [kinds of animals]..."

[alt-version omitted]

^A that are likely to be; or do you not think so?" — "Certainly, what you say is likely." — "And those who have preferred injustice, and tyrannical power, and rapine, into the kinds of wolves, and hawks, and kites; or to what else could we say that such people would go?" — "Assuredly," said Cebes, "into such things." — "And therefore," he said, "it is evident that the others also, whichever way each goes, will go according to the resemblances of their own practice." — "Evidently so," he said; "for how could it be otherwise?" — "And are not the most fortunate among these," he said, "and those who go to the best place, those who have practiced that social and civic virtue, which they call temperance and justice, which have been formed by habit and practice without philosophy and [intellectual] mind?" — "In what way, then, are these the most fortunate?" — "Because it is likely that these will arrive again at such a civic and gentle ^B kind, perhaps of bees, or wasps, or ants, or also back into the human race itself."

And in the *Phaedrus* also, listen to what sort of things he relates: "For no soul arrives at the same place ^C from which it came for ten thousand years; for it does not grow wings before that much time, except for the soul of one who has practiced philosophy without deceit, or who has loved boys along with philosophy. These, in the third millennium cycle, if they choose this life three times in succession, being winged in this way, depart in the three-thousandth year. But the others, when they finish their first life, they obtain judgment. Being judged, some go into the prisons under the earth and pay the penalty; others, being lightened by Justice, arrive at some place in heaven, and spend their time in a manner worthy of the life they lived in the form of a human. At the thousandth year, both groups arrive at the casting of lots and the choosing of the second life, and each chooses whatever it wishes. And there a human soul arrives at the life of a beast, and from a beast, which was once a human, back into a human." And these things are in the *Phaedrus*.

But in the *Republic*, listen to him writing the following: "For to see," he said, "the soul that was once Orpheus choosing a swan's life, out of hatred for the female sex, due to his death at their hands, not wishing to be born by being conceived in a woman. And to see the soul of Thamyris choosing a nightingale; and to see a swan changing into the choice of a human life, and other musical animals likewise, as is likely. And the soul that attained [the lot] to choose, chose the life of a lion; and it was the soul of Ajax, son of Telamon, shrinking from becoming a human, remembering the judgment of the armor. And after this, the soul of Agamemnon, also hostile to the human race because of his sufferings, exchanged it for the life of an eagle. And in the midst, the soul of Atalanta attained the lot, and beholding the great honors of an athlete, she could not pass them by, but took them. And after this one, to see the soul of Epeus, son of Panopeus, passing into the nature of a craftsman woman." ^D

^B Far off in the last place, he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites, putting on the form of an ape. And by chance, the soul of Ulysses, which had fallen to the last place of all, was to choose. Remembering its former labors, and having been cured of ambition, it wandered for a long time, seeking the life of an ordinary and private man, and with difficulty found one lying somewhere, neglected by the others, and upon seeing it, said that it would have done the same even if it had come first, and chose it gladly. And likewise from other beasts into men, and among one another; changing the unjust into wild beasts, and the just into tame ones, and mixing all manners of unions. ^C Such are the things Plato said regarding the soul, and it is evident that he is Egyptianizing in this doctrine. For this is not a Hebrew teaching, and it is not even consistent with the truth. But this is not the time to refute it, since he himself did not even attempt to support the problem with proofs. Yet one might reasonably point out how it is not consistent for the same man to say that, immediately upon death, the souls of the impious departing from here give accounts in Hades for what they have done, and are punished there forever; and then, on the other hand, to say that they themselves choose their lives here according to their own judgment. For he asserts that they clothe themselves in a body out of a desire for the corporeal; and those who have been nurtured in insolence and gluttony become asses, and take on the bodies of other beasts, choosing these things according to their own judgment and not by way of a judge’s punishment; and the unjust and rapacious become wolves and kites, coming to this of their own will. Then, that the soul of Orpheus desired to be a swan; that of Thamyris, a nightingale; and that Thersites chose the life of an ape. Where then would the judgment following the departure from here be, which he describes in the *On the Soul*, saying: ^D "As soon as the dead arrive at the place to which their daemon conveys each one, those who appear to have lived middling lives, having gone to the Acheron, and having boarded the vehicles which exist for them, they arrive in them at the lake, and there they dwell, and being purified, and giving satisfaction for their injustices, they are released, if anyone has done any injustice, and for their good deeds they receive honors according to the merit of each; but those who appear to have behaved incurably on account of the magnitude of their sins, or who have committed many great acts of temple-robbery, or many unjust and unlawful murders, or other such things—the appropriate fate casts them into Tartarus, from whence they never emerge." And so he speaks about the impious in this way; but regarding the pious, listen to what he says: "Those of these same ones who have been sufficiently purified by philosophy live for all time after this without bodies at all, and they arrive at dwellings even more beautiful than these, which it is neither easy to describe, nor is there sufficient time in the present." And in the *Gorgias* observe what he says: "He who has lived his life justly and piously, when he dies, departs to the islands of the blessed, to live in all happiness, free from evils; but he who has lived unjustly and impiously, into the prison of account and justice—that is, which they call Tartarus—is sent. Those who have committed the ultimate crimes, and on account of their ^A

into... the place which they call Tartarus. ^A But those who have committed the most extreme injustices, and because of such injustices have become incurable, of these the examples are made. And these themselves are no longer helped, inasmuch as they are incurable; but others are helped, those who see them, because of their greatest sins, suffering most painful and fearful punishments for all time, truly as examples suspended there in the prison of Hades, spectacles and warnings for the unjust who are always arriving. How could these things be made to agree with those arguments regarding the exchange of bodies, which they claim the soul chooses when it departs? For how could the same soul undergo punishment, and prisons, and such retribution for all time after its death from here, and yet again, as if set at liberty and free from bonds, choose whatever lives it may wish? And if it is to choose again according to pleasure, then where is the prison of retribution and justice? Countless other things could be taken up from the argument at leisure, for which it is not the time to lengthen the discussion. And the first slip of Plato’s opinion concerning these matters has thus been displayed; but the other part of the refutation of the dogma, by which he determined that one part of the soul is divine and rational, while another part of it is irrational and subject to passion, has been condemned by his own acquaintances, as one may learn from the following arguments.

CHAPTER XVII

Regarding the soul, according to Plato, which he says was composed by God from an impassible and a passible substance, as a mixture of colors from white and black, we have this to say: That there is a necessity, as a separation of them occurs in time, for it to be destroyed, just as the composition of the intermediate color, toward the proper natures of each...

their own nature, gradually dissolved back into their own proper kinds, must needs pass away. And if this is once proven, we shall certainly posit that the soul is subject to death and not immortal. For if it be admitted as confessed that in this nature of things there is absolutely nothing which lacks an opposite, and that all things which are contained within the compass of the world have been adorned by the hand of God from opposing and warring natures, He having infused into them mutual friendship and communion—as, for instance, dry to moist, and hot to cold, heavy to light, white to black, sweet to bitter, ^C hard to soft, and to all such things yet another communion of all things, and that of a substance immune to passion with one that is subject to passion—and if those things which have been blended and mixed together admit by their nature a separation from one another in time, and if the soul is assumed to have been generated from both an impassible and a passible substance; then it is necessary, just as with the intermediate color, that it too should in time, by nature, be destroyed, as the opposites in its constitution hasten back to their own nature. For do we not see that what is by nature heavy, even if it be carried upwards by us or by some natural lightness added to it from without, is nevertheless snatched downwards by the force and weight of its own nature? Similarly, does not what is by nature light, although it be carried downwards by some similar ^D force impelling it from without, yet struggle upwards by its own powers? For it is impossible that things which have come together from two opposites into one something should always remain in the same state, unless some third thing from the nature of existing beings is always present within them. But the soul is certainly not a third thing, composed of two opposing and warring natures, but rather one simple thing, and by its own nature free from all necessity of suffering and from bodily mass; for which reason Plato and the followers of Plato have determined that it is immortal. But since the common voice of all is that man consists of soul and body, and the commotions which arise in us without bodily commerce, whether we will it or not, are all assigned to the soul, most men, inferring from this that its substance is subject to passion, contend that it is mortal and corporeal, and not devoid of a body. Plato, however, was compelled to attach this other part, which is passible of itself, to that part of it which by its own nature would exclude all necessity of suffering. And that this is not otherwise in the reasoning of both, both of Plato and of the others, we shall endeavor to show by our discourse, by setting forth the faculties that are operative within us, so as to bring them to light. ⟩ Thus far the words of Severus the Platonist. Now let us see what Plato thought regarding the heaven and the beginning of the lights within it.

CHAPTER XVIII.

In agreement with the Hebrews, Plato gives an account regarding heaven and the things that appear within it, ^B by which he acknowledges that they are generated, brought into being by the Cause of all things, and consist of a corporeal and perishable substance. Yet he does not go on to legislate, as the Hebrews do, that we should worship them and consider them gods; rather, he asserts in the *Epinomis*: "Whom, then, am I commending to you as God, Megillus and Clinias? Heaven, I should say, which we all should worship and pray to especially, as he is most righteous, just as we would all agree that he is for us the cause of all other goods." Next, in the same passage, he adds these things: ^B "But the visible gods, the greatest and most honorable, and those who see everything most sharply—the first [gods], the nature of the stars, and whatever came into existence along with them—must be proclaimed. And after these, and next in order beneath them, the daemons; the airy race, holding the third and middle seat, the cause of interpretation, whom it is very necessary to honor with prayers for the sake of a favorable outcome." By these words, having stated that those mentioned are gods, he goes on to explain, in the *Timaeus*, the nature of their first formation: ^C "That fire is to air, as air is to water; and that as air is to water, water is to earth; [God] bound together and constructed a heaven visible and tangible. And for this reason, from these elements, such as they are, and being four in number, the body of the world was brought into existence through an agreement of proportion. It possessed a friendship arising from these, so that when it had been gathered into unity with itself, it became indissoluble by any other, save by Him who bound it together." He then adds: "And placing the Soul in its midst, he extended it through the whole, and ^D further wrapped the body around it on the outside, and..."

[As for the Latin text provided:]

CHAPTER XVIII.

Concerning heaven, and the stars shining within it, Plato philosophizes in accordance with the mind of the Hebrews, in that he teaches that they had some beginning, were perfected by the Creator of all things, and consist of a corporeal nature subject to destruction. Yet, having abandoned that line of reasoning, he later prescribes and sanctions by his own laws their worship and divinity, while he speaks in this manner in the *Epinomis*: "Whom, indeed, I ask, do I commend to you, Megillus, and to you, Clinias, so greatly as God? Heaven, I think, which truly deserves to be worshipped along with the other daemons, and to be implored with highest prayers. For we may rightly acknowledge that he himself also became for us the cause of all other good things." Then, having interposed several points, he adds this in the same place: "But we ought to hold those gods who fall under our sight—the greatest and those worthy of the greatest veneration, and who most sharply perceive all things everywhere—to be the leaders of all the gods, I mean those stars, and all things that we recognize as having come into existence along with them. Then, after them, and under them, we must worship the daemons. But that airy race, which holds the third and middle seat, and which acts as an interpreter between those on high and men, is especially necessary to appease with prayers, that they may wish this task of theirs to be happy for us." These are his words, whereby he clearly attributes divinity to them. But he philosophizes regarding their first formation in the *Timaeus* thus: "By elements fitted and connected among themselves in such a way that by the proportion with which fire is to air, the same air is to water, and in turn as air is to water, so likewise water might correspond to earth; he bound and strengthened this world in such a way that it could be simultaneously seen and touched. And therefore, since it is from those [elements] and such by its nature," he argues that that soul is not only diffused through all parts of the world, but is also wrapped around and diffused over its whole body. This may be inferred from what follows. For after he tempered this soul at his own will, he then discusses its position and arrangement in the universe thus: "Hitherto the Virgilian lines: *Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus / Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.* What then? Hear: *Quam postremam periodum Tullius ita vertit, Sic animus a medio profectus (quasi traductus, atque transmissus) extremitatem cœli a suprema regione, rotundo ambitu circumjecit, seseque ipse versans, divinæ, sempiternæ sapientisque vitæ induxit exordium.* Therefore that *κύκλῳ* [he] restores [as] *rotundo ambitu circumjecit*. If the authority of Cicero is removed, to wish..."

to form even one alone ^B, the heaven, as if it were desolate, he has constituted. And again, lowering his tone, he adds, saying: «From this reason (56) and thought of God, concerning the generation of time, so that time might be generated, the sun, and the moon, and five other stars, having the name of planets, came into being for the definition and keeping of the numbers of time; and God, having made the bodies of each of them, placed them in the orbits which the revolution of the other was traversing.» And he adds: «And the bodies having been bound with ensouled bonds, they became living beings, and learned what had been ordained.» And in the tenth book of the *Laws*, he speaks generally about all soul, saying thus: «Everything that is endowed with soul changes (57), possessing in itself the cause of change. And having changed, it is carried ^C according to the order and law of fate; those which have changed in lesser ways in their habits move in lesser ways along the plane of the region; but those which have sinned in more and graver ways are swallowed into the deep gulf.» If, therefore, everything that is endowed with soul changes (59), possessing in itself the cause of change, and the heaven and the sun and the moon are endowed with soul, according to Plato himself, then these also would change, possessing in themselves the cause of change, according to his own argument. How then does he again say that they are eternal, and for this reason gods, although they exist in a corruptible body, and are capable of being dissolved? For he says again in the *Timaeus*: «Since, therefore, all those who visibly revolve in heaven and those who are seen, as far as they wish to be gods, had a generation, the one who generated ^D this whole says to them: Gods of gods, of whom I am the creator and father of works, that which is bound by me is indissoluble if I do not wish it. That which has been well adjusted and is well, to wish to dissolve it is the part of an evil one. Wherefore, since you have been generated, you are not indeed immortal, nor entirely indissoluble, but you shall not be dissolved, nor shall you attain the lot of death, having obtained my will as a bond even greater and more sovereign than those by which you were bound when you were generated.» These things [speaks] Plato. With good reason indeed Moses, and the oracles of the Hebrews, forbid the worship of these, and the considering of them as gods, but leading [the mind] up to the King God on high, [they command] to consider as God alone, and to worship him alone, the maker of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars, and of the whole heaven and world, who bound and adjusted all things by his divine word.

^A For by me they were made, they cannot be dissolved against my will: but it is by no means good to wish to dissolve that which is bound by reason. But since you have been born, you are not indeed immortal and indissoluble: yet you will by no means be dissolved, nor will any fates of death destroy you. For my counsel is a greater bond for your perpetuity than those by which you were bound when you were being created.” So far he. With good reason, therefore, does Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews forbid us to attribute worship and divinity to them: and on the contrary, they command us to lift our minds upward to the very God, the manager of all things, I say, the maker of the sun, and of the moon, and of the remaining stars, and indeed of the whole heaven and world, and that we should hold him alone as God, and follow him with that august worship. For thus indeed Moses commands: “Lest, seeing the sun, and the moon, and all the stars, and all the adornment of heaven, you beled astray by error and adore them.”^B

Philo, most learned in Hebraic matters, explaining this interdiction of his more fully, speaks in this manner: “There are those who have supposed the sun and moon and other stars to be all-powerful gods of themselves, and to them they have attributed the causes of all things that come to pass. But to Moses, the world has appeared to be both created and the greatest city, having rulers and subjects; rulers, namely, all those in heaven, such as the wandering and fixed stars; but subjects, the natures after the moon, in the air and upon the earth. But he did not hold the aforementioned rulers to be autonomous, but rather the lieutenants of the one Father of all; imitating whose supervision, they govern by regulating each of the things that have come to pass in accordance with justice and law. But those who do not see the charioteer sitting upon the creatures that are harnessed, have attributed the causes of the things happening in the world to them as though they were the active agents. The most holy lawgiver changes this ignorance into knowledge, saying thus: ‘Lest, seeing the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and all the adornment of heaven, you be led astray by error and adore them.’ ^C He very pointedly and well called the reception of the aforementioned as gods a straying. For those who saw the annual seasons constituted by the approaches and retreats of the sun, in which the generations of living creatures, and plants, and fruits are brought to perfection at determined periods of time; and the moon as the servant and successor of the sun, which has taken upon itself the care and protection by night of those things over which the sun has charge during the day, and who saw the other stars acting and working myriad things for the persistence of the whole according to the sympathy towards earthly things—these were led into a boundless error, supposing these alone to be gods. But if they had exerted themselves to walk along the unerring path, they would have straightway known that just as sense-perception has become a sub-servant of Intellect, in the same way all the perceptible things have been established as servants of the intelligible.” And he adds, saying: ^D “So that, having passed beyond in our reason all visible substance, let us go up to the honor of the unseen, and invisible, and only intelligible [God], who is not only the God of intelligible and perceptible things, but also the creator of all. But if anyone should assign the worship of the eternal and the creator to another who is more recent and created, let him be recorded as deranged, and guilty of the greatest impiety.” These are the teachings of the Hebrew piety, which are in truth pure and divine, before the puffed-up philosophy.

For what need is there for me to speak at length, and to bring to light the other things of Plato, when from these things that are present, it is possible for one to conjecture even those things currently passed over by me in silence? Yet I have not been induced to say these things for the sake of slander, ^A since I truly admire the man. Nay, more than all other Greeks, I consider him a friend, and I honor those things which to me are friendly and akin, even if he has not thought in all things exactly as I do; but when compared with Moses and the prophets among the Hebrews, I show the deficiency of his thought. Although it was in my power, having prepared myself to find fault, to accuse him of a myriad of things, such as the solemn and wise things set down by him in the *Republic* concerning women, or such as the things spoken with solemnity in the *Phaedrus* about lawless love. But you, if you desire to hear these things also, read them, having taken these very words of his. ^A Why must I lengthen this, when we have already honored him? The one who legislates these things did not even remember the words of the wife of Candaules; for she, when her husband ordered her to show her body naked, said most prudently that, in putting off her tunic, a woman also puts off her shame. Yet the philosopher strips the brides of their shame, and teaches shamelessness. The authors of this most foul institution, as of many others, were the Lacedaemonians; as can be seen in Thucydides, book I, and Plutarch in his *Lycurgus* and *Apophthegmata*. He seeks in vain for some appearance and coloring for this disgrace.

CHAPTER XIX.

“Perhaps,” I said, “many of the things being said here, because we now hold another custom, may seem ridiculous if they are carried out as we ordain.” “Indeed,” he said. “But what, pray,” said I, “do you see as the most ridiculous of them?” “Obviously this: that we would want women to exercise naked in the wrestling schools with men, not only the young, but even the older ones as well, just as we see old men in the gymnasia, even though they are wrinkled and unpleasant to look upon, yet studying to engage in this exercise.” Then with more things inserted, he adds this: “The man, he says, who laughs at women naked and engaging in this exercise for the sake of what is honorable, as if he were catching at laughter, reaps the fruit of wisdom from the ridiculous, and does not even know, as it seems, at what he is laughing.” He says in the seventh book of the *Laws* that it will be necessary for the...

^A boys and girls to learn to dance and to exercise; and for the boys there should be male dance instructors, and for the girls female ones, as this is more suited to physical training. He sets down in the same work these things also: “But our girl, too, who is a lady, having been delighted by the instruction of the dance, did not think she should amuse herself with empty hands, but having adorned herself with a complete suit of armor, she should thus carry out the dance. And it would be proper for both choirs and girls to imitate this in every way.”

He also legislates in this way concerning women going to war: “In all these matters, there must be teachers for each subject, who are content with pay, and who are foreigners residing ^B there, to teach those who attend all the subjects that pertain to war, as well as those that pertain to music; not so that one may attend if his father wishes, and if he does not, he may leave instruction; but, as they say, every man and child, as far as possible, since they belong more to the city than to their own parents, must necessarily be instructed. And my law would declare that the same things apply to females: that they must practice the same things as the males. And, without fear, I would say this word: neither of horsemanship nor of gymnastics, as if it were fitting for men but not for women.”

And again, proceeding further, he says: “Let us establish exercises ^C and all the tasks of the body that relate to war: archery and every kind of throwing, peltastic exercise, and all armed combat, and tactical maneuvers, and every type of marching, encampments, and setting up of camps, and whatever lessons relate to horsemanship. For there must be common teachers for all these, receiving pay from the city, and their students must be those in the city—boys and men, and country folk, and women—well-versed in all these things; the girls, while they are still in that state, having practiced all dancing in armor and fighting; and the women [having practiced] maneuvers, and ranks, and positioning, and ^D the destruction...” [alt-version omitted]

…⟪A⟫ of armor.” But the argument of the Hebrews will not assent to these things either, but will absolutely respond with the contrary, not attributing even to the strength of men, much less of women, victory in wars, but referring all things to God and the alliance from Him. He says, therefore: “Unless the Lord build the house, in vain have they labored who build it. Unless the Lord keep the city, in vain did the keeper watch.” But the admirable philosopher, see how he even introduces women into the gymnastic contest, speaking thus: “And for women, for maidens who are not yet of childbearing age, let there be [contests of] naked running, and the lap, and the double course, and the horse race, and the long race, all in the same racecourse, competing; and for those thirteen years old, remaining until marriage, their association shall be for a duration of no more than twenty years and no less than eighteen, and, dressed in attire appropriate to them, they must descend to the contest of these races.” And let these things be about races for both men and women. But as to strength, instead of wrestling and such like, which are heavy things, let there be fighting in armor, fighting one against one, and two against two. And subsequently, having said: “The same, then, it is necessary to command those who are expert in fighting in armor to legislate,” he adds, saying: “Let the same be legislated concerning females, until their marriage.” ⟪B⟫ Then, again, having joined to these ^C the laws concerning the target-shield-bearing, and the pankration, and the bow, and the throwing of stones from the hand and by sling, and concerning the horse race, again here too he adds concerning the females, saying: “It is not worth forcing females into association [in these things] by laws and commands; but if by their own education from outside, entering into custom, nature admits and does not complain of boys or maidens participating, allow it and do not blame it.” So much for Plato concerning women. And of the same man is this admirable law: “If anyone leaves behind female children, let the judge, examining the measure and lack of measure of the time of marriage, judge, proceeding through brothers and nephews, first among the males, then afterward among the females in a single line, viewing the males naked, and the females naked up to the navel.” But he also says they must dance naked at the festivals, in the sixth of his *Laws*, saying thus: “For the sake, then, of such an ambition, they must hold their education, with youths and maidens dancing, and at the same time being viewers and being viewed, with argument and with a certain age, having reasonable pretexts, naked and naked up to modest shame for each.” In addition to all these, listen also to those laws in the *Republic* concerning the sharing of women: “Following these, I said, there follows a law also for the others, ⟪D⟫ as I suppose, this one: that these women of all these men shall be common, and no one shall consort with a woman privately; and the children, in turn, shall be common, and neither shall a parent know his own offspring, nor a child his parent.” And he adds in succession: “It is to be expected, then, I said; the legislator will choose them for them, just as the men, and will hand them over as much as possible like-natured. And they, having common houses and common meals, and no one possessing anything of the sort privately, will be together, and, being mixed together in gymnasia and in the rest of their upbringing, they will be led by necessity, I think, the innate one, to mixing with one another. Or do I not seem to be saying necessary things?” “Not by geometric, he said, but by erotic necessities, which are likely to be sharper than those [geometric ones] for persuading and drawing the common crowd.” But perhaps someone will interpret the meaning of the argument differently regarding these things, saying that he does not suggest what is commonly believed. For he did not say, without distinction, that all women are common, so that it is permitted for whoever happens upon them to be licentious, but that their distribution to the men rests upon the authority of the rulers. For in this way they are common, just as someone might say that public funds are common, distributed to those to whom it belongs by those in charge. And let these things be so. But what would you say, having learned that he also commands not to bring to light what is conceived, saying thus: “To a woman, I said, starting from her twentieth year, to bear children for the city; and to a man, when he has passed the sharpest peak of his race, that from this point he should generate for the city until fifty-five.” To which he adds: “But when, I think, both the women and the men have passed the age of childbearing, we shall perhaps leave them free to consort with whom they wish.”

For in place of wrestling and such like, he introduces ^A war in armor, in order to pit two against two. He then continues, saying: “And the same applies to those who are expert in fighting in armor; these ought to be legislated for, that these things be ordained for the females as well, up until the time of their marriage.” Again, joining these with what follows concerning the light-armed soldiers, and the pancratium, and archery, and casting of stones by hand, and the javelin-throw, and horse-racing, he again speaks here concerning the females, stating: “As for the females, let the laws be such as not to authorize any violence to them, but let the nature of those who come forward to learn these things by habit, and the difficulty [of doing so], be considered, and let not the maidens be prevented from sharing in them.” So much from Plato concerning women. ^B And of the same author, this is also a wonderful law: “If one leaves behind daughters, let the return be made to the brothers and the brothers' children, preceding the males; afterwards, let the judge, having observed the symmetry and asymmetry of the time of marriage, consider the females, the males being naked from the navel upwards, and the females being naked up to the navel.” ^C “But also,” he says, “on the festival days it is necessary that they should dance naked,” and he says this in the sixth book of the *Laws*, speaking as follows: “For the sake of such diligence, they ought to perform these games and dances—boys and girls together, and at the same time those who are watching and those who are watched—on the pretext of a certain age, naked boys and naked girls, until each one attains an appropriate sense of modesty.” ^D In addition to all these things, listen to the law concerning the wives being common, in the *Republic*. “To this,” I answered, “is added another law.” — “What?” — “That these wives of all these men should all be common to all, individually to no one, and that neither the children be common, nor the parents know their own offspring, nor the offspring know their parents.” And he immediately adds: “It is to be expected,” he said. — “I, then,” said I, “the lawgiver, just as I elected the men, so I shall give the women to consort as much as possible with those of like nature; and since they will have common houses and common mess-halls, and no one will possess anything of this sort, they will be together, all mixed together, and in sports, and in other sustenance, by necessity, ^A perhaps, driven by innate needs, they will be inclined toward mutual intercourse.” — “Do you not think the things you are saying are necessary?” — “Not for geometry, to be sure, but for erotic necessities, which might, I suppose, be sharper to persuade and draw the crowd.” But perhaps someone else will relate his opinion on these matters. ^{B C D}

^A For one might say that he does not suggest what is generally thought. For it is not the case that, to speak unequivocally, all women are common, so as to permit whoredom to anyone who happens by, but that the distribution of them among the men lies within the authority of the magistrates. For that is how they are common, just as one might say public funds are common, which are distributed to those to whom it is proper by those entrusted with them. Let this be assumed as it is. But what would you say, having learned that he orders that even what is conceived should not be brought to light? Saying thus: “For a woman,” said I, “beginning from twenty years of age, until forty, to bear for the city; and for a man, when he has passed the ^B swiftest prime of life, to beget for the city until fifty-five years; to which he adds, ‘But when, I suppose, both the women and the men have moved beyond the age for begetting, we shall leave them free to associate with whomsoever they wish.’” And he adds: “Ordering them to be eager, if possible, not even to bring any fetus to light, if it should be born; but if anyone should prevail, to expose it in such a way, as there being no nourishment for such a creature.” Such, then, are his teachings concerning women. But hear what he holds regarding lawless love.

CHAPTER XX.

What Plato determined regarding lawless love in the Phaedrus, to which the things ordained by Moses are contrary.

“But if he continues ^C to do this for a longer time, and approaches nearer, and touches him in the gymnasia and in other associations, then that fountain of that flow, which Zeus, smitten with love for Ganymede, called desire, flowing in great abundance upon the lover, partly enters into him, and partly, when he is full, flows out; and like a breeze, or some echo, rebounding from smooth and solid surfaces, to where it first arose, is carried back again: so the stream of beauty, flowing back into the beautiful one through the eyes, where it is natural for it to pass into the soul, having arrived and leaping up the passages of the wings, irrigates them and impels ^D them to grow wings, and in turn fills the soul of the beloved with love. He loves indeed, but he is at a loss as to what he is suffering, and neither knows what has befallen him, nor can he explain it; but as if he had received ophthalmia from someone else, he has no pretext to give.” And he adds thereafter, as in Plato.

^A “He desires, he says, though less vehemently, to see, to touch, to kiss, to lie down with him; and indeed, as is natural, he quickly does these things thereafter. Therefore, in the sharing of the bed, the lover's wanton horse has something to say to the charioteer, and deems it right to enjoy some small reward for many labors. But the horse of the beloved has nothing to say; but, swelling and being at a loss, he embraces the lover and kisses him, as if warmly greeting one very dear to him. And when they lie down together, he is of such a nature as not to refuse, on his part, to grant what the lover desires, should he ask. If, then, the better parts of the mind prevail toward a disciplined life and philosophy, they lead here a blessed and harmonious life, being self-controlled and orderly.” Then, after some other things, he adds: ^B “But if they shall use a way of life that is rather burdensome and unphilosophical and ambitious, perhaps in drunkenness or some other negligence, their two wanton yoke-fellows, finding their souls off guard, having brought them together to the same point, have chosen and carried out that pursuit which is deemed blessed by the multitude; and having carried it out, they occupy themselves with it for the rest of their time, but rarely, since they are not doing what is approved by the whole mind. They are indeed dear to one another, though less so than the former, and live together both through love and when beside themselves, thinking they have given and received the greatest pledges for one another, which it is not holy to break and ever come into enmity. And at the end, wingless but eager to sprout wings, they depart from the body. So that they bear no small prize for their erotic madness. For it is not the law for those who have already started on the heavenly journey to go into the darkness and the journey under the earth, but, having led a bright life, to be happy walking with one another, and for the sake of love to be winged together.” These things, so great, ^C O son, and in such a way, will the friendship from a lover bestow upon you. Such are the things of Plato; but not so those of Moses, who expressly legislates things contrary to these, with a great voice bringing forward the punishment befitting those who practice pederasty. He says, therefore: “Whoever shall lie with a male as with a woman, both have done an abomination; let them be put to death, they are guilty.” And: “Cursed is everyone who lies with a male as with a woman.” Why is it necessary now to refute how the wisest man, ^D concerning the pederast—for he did not even deem it worthy in his Laws to define a death penalty against pederasts—orders that a slave be punished with death who has not reported a treasure found by someone else? But listen to these also, that you may not suppose that I am slandering him.

CHAPTER XXI. Regarding the laws of Plato concerning murders, which are unworthy of his greatness of mind, and with which the laws of Moses should be compared.

^B Listen also to this from his laws which he ordained concerning murderers: “If anyone kills a free man with his own hand, but the act has been committed unpremeditatedly, in some fit of anger, let him suffer whatever else is fitting for one who has killed without anger; but he must go into exile for two years, to chasten his own anger.” And next to this he adds another such law: “But he who kills with anger, but with premeditation—as regards the other matters, it shall be as in the previous case, but he shall go into exile for three years, just as the other went for two, punished with a longer time for the magnitude of his anger.” ^C Then next, concerning the person who has committed a second murder, he legislates as follows: “But if, having returned to his country, one or the other of them, overcome by anger, again commits this same crime, having fled, let him not return again.” And again next he says: “But if it happens—though it happens rarely—that a father or mother, through anger, kills a son or daughter with blows, or in some violent manner, let them undergo the same purifications as the others, and go into exile for three years. And when the killers have returned, let the wife be separated from the husband, and the husband from the wife, and let them never again beget children together.” ^D And to these he adds: “But if a husband kills his own wedded wife through anger, or a wife kills her husband in the same way, let them be purified by the same purificatory rites, and let them serve three years in exile. And having returned, let the person who has done such a thing have no communion in sacred rites with his own children, nor ever be partaker at their table. And if a brother kills a brother, or a sister a sister, in anger, as regards the rites of purification and the years of exile, let it be said that the rules which have been spoken for parents and their offspring must also be observed for these, whom he has bereft of brothers and parents; and let him never be at the same hearth with them, nor a partaker of sacred rites. But if a brother kills a brother in uprisings, when a battle has occurred, or in some such way, defending himself against one who was the first to lay hands on him, just as if he had killed an enemy, let him be clean. And if a citizen...

^A should kill a foreigner, or a foreigner a citizen, in like manner, let him be clean. And if a slave should kill a slave, likewise. But if a slave should kill a free man in self-defense, let him be held liable to the same laws as one who has killed a father. Whoever shall have killed one of his own people, premeditatedly [anonymized citation] and unjustly, let him first be excluded from lawful things, neither defiling the market, nor sanctuaries, nor harbors, nor any other gathering of any kind, whether any man forbids the doer of these things or not; for the law forbids it. And he who does not pursue him, when he ought, or who does not give warning, let him be excluded from those within the degree of cousins. Secondly, let him be liable to anyone who wishes to take vengeance on behalf of the deceased. And if a woman should wound her husband with intent to kill from a plot, or a husband his own wife, let him be perpetually exiled. Such are the laws of the philosopher. But if you wish also to compare those of Moses with these, listen to what is ordained concerning murders: «If anyone strikes a person and he dies, let him be put to death. But if he did not do it intentionally, but God delivered him into his hands, I will appoint for you a place to which the manslayer shall flee. But if anyone should set upon his neighbor to kill him ^B by craft, and he should flee, you shall take him from my altar to put him to death. He who strikes his father, or his mother, let him be put to death. And if two men should quarrel, and one strikes his neighbor with a stone or with his fist, and he does not die, but lies in his bed; if he should get up and walk abroad upon his staff, let the one who struck him be innocent, except that he shall pay for his loss of time and for the medical expenses. And if anyone should strike his manservant, or his maidservant, with a rod, and they should die under his hands, he shall be held guilty. And if anyone should strike the eye of a bondservant, or the eye of his handmaid, and blinds him, he shall send them away free, in return for their eye [Exod. XXI, 12-26 ].» Such are the things of Moses as well. But hear further in what manner, and for what causes, Plato orders the servant to be scourged with inescapable blows: «Whenever anyone wishes to pluck the grapes ^C now called noble, or the noble figs so named, if he takes them from his own, let him reap them as he wishes and whenever he wishes. But if from others, without having persuaded the owner, following the principle of not moving what one did not deposit, let him always be punished. And if he be a slave, having not persuaded the master of the fields, and touches any of such things, for every grape and every fig of the fig tree, let him be scourged with an equal number of lashes.» Such are the laws concerning these matters, not worthy of Plato’s greatness of mind. Yet how solemn and humane are the things of Moses! ^D There are also subsequent notes [index: entries preserved]

others. In this regard, how generous and humanitarian Moses showed himself, you may understand from his words that follow: "If you have entered your neighbor's vineyard, eat grapes as much as your soul desires, but you shall not put any into a vessel." And again: "If you have entered into the grain crop of your neighbor, gather ears with your hands, but you shall not put a sickle into the harvest of your neighbor." And again: "If you have reaped your harvest in your field, and have forgotten a sheaf in your field, you shall not return to take it; it shall be for the poor, and the stranger, and the orphan, and the widow, so that the Lord your God may bless you in all the work of your hands. ^A If, however, you have gathered olives, you shall not return to glean what you have left behind; it shall be for the stranger, and for the orphan, and for the widow." Thus far Moses. Plato also has many things that are free from reproach. We embrace whatever is most honest and excellent from these, and bid the rest to depart far away. But since we have already pursued these matters at length, and have brought forward the cause for which we have not willed to follow the philosophy of Plato, it is now time to complete the discussion we have undertaken, and to explore the other sects of Greek philosophy. ^B

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL BOOK FOURTEEN

CHAPTERS OF THE FOURTEENTH BOOK

1. Proemium, in which the argument of the book is explained. 2. Concerning the mutual dissension and conflict of the philosophers. 3. Concerning the agreement of those according to the Hebrews. 4. How Plato refutes those before him. From the Theaetetus. 5. Concerning the first succession according to Plato. From Numenius the Pythagorean. 6. Concerning Arcesilaus, who instituted the second Academy. From the same. 7. Concerning Lacydes, who succeeded Arcesilaus. From the same. ^C 8. Concerning Carneades, who instituted the third Academy. From the same. 9. Concerning Philo, who succeeded Clitomachus, who had received Carneades. From the same. 10. That there are conjectures, and word-battles, and much error among the Greek philosophers. From the epistle of Porphyry to Nectanebo, and other things. ^D

11. On geometry, astronomy, and calculation. From Xenophon’s Memorable Acts. 12. On those who boasted of explaining the nature of things. From the same. 13. On the arts of gymnastics and music. From Plato’s Republic. 14. Opinions of philosophers concerning first principles. From Plutarch. 15. On the opinion of Anaxagoras. From Plato. 16. Opinions of philosophers concerning the gods. From Plutarch. 17. Against those around Xenophanes and Parmenides, who abolish the senses. From Aristocles. 18. Against the skeptics according to Pyrrho, or those called ^A eph-ectics (suspensive), who declared that nothing can be comprehended. From the same Aristocles. 19. Against those around Aristippus, the philosophers who say that only the passions are comprehensible, and that all other things are incomprehensible. From the same. 20. Against those who say that one should trust only in the senses: Metrodorus and Protagoras. From the same. 21. Against those who define pleasure as the end, according to Epicurus. From the same. 22. Again, against those who define pleasure as the good. From Plato. 23. Against those who, according to Epicurus, deny Providence and attribute the whole universe to atomic bodies. From the works of Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria. 24. That the dogma of the Epicureans is refuted by common examples from among men. From the same. 25. The same, from the constitution of the whole universe. From the same. 26. The same, concluded from the nature of man. From the same. 27. That the performance of His works is not laborious or irksome to God. From the same. ^B

CHAPTER I. Prooemium, in which the subject of the book is explained.

Having gone through in the preceding book the arguments of the Platonic philosophy, so far as it was worth the while to recount or hear them, as well as its agreement with the oracles of the Hebrews, for which reason I have greatly admired the man, and again his disagreement with them, for which no sensible person would follow him, I now turn to the remaining sects of those who have attained fame for philosophy among the Greeks. And I shall set before the eyes and in the sight of those who read, their divergence from the truth—not by my own words or on my own authority, but again through the testimony of the Greek writings themselves; ^D not that I am hostile to any of these men—whom, indeed, I profess to admire greatly, so long as I compare them with others, that is, when I compare men with men. But when they are compared with the theologians and prophets of the Hebrews, and with God himself, who through them both foretold the future and performed such great miracles—nay, who also established the rites of the most holy religions and the teaching of the truth—I certainly think that no one can reasonably find fault with us if we prefer God to men, and truth itself to the mortal reasonings and conjectures of men. The entire scope of this present Preparation is ambitious to demonstrate this one thing, as an answer and defense at once to those who inquire what good or noble thing we saw in—

^A the writings of the barbarians, that we have deemed them preferable to our own native and noble philosophy—I mean that of the Greeks. But let the demonstration proceed through actual deeds.

Chapter II. Concerning the dissension and conflict of the philosophers among themselves.

It seems to me that I must first of all begin from the very first foundation of the philosophers among the Greeks, to inquire into those who lived before Plato—those called "naturalists"—to understand who they were and what kind of philosophy it was that flourished in their age. Then I must move to the succession of Plato, and see who they were, and how they fought with each other in words and opinions. Then we shall look at the discord ^B of other sects, and the contradictions of their dogmas, in which I shall present to the spectators, as if on a stage, these noble combatants, striking and sparring with one another with great zeal. We shall see, right away, how Plato mocked those before him, and how, in turn, others mocked Plato’s own friends and successors. Again, we shall see how Plato’s companions refuted the ingenious ideas of Aristotle’s multi-faceted mind, and how those who boast of Aristotle himself and the Peripatetic name showed that the things brought forward by the defenders of the opposing faction were nothing at all. ^C Furthermore, you will see the keen and subtle hair-splitting of the Stoics mocked by others, and all of them everywhere covered in dust, strenuously engaging in battle and wrestling against their neighbors, as if, no longer just by hand and tongue, or rather by pen and ink, they were preparing a mutual war, striking and being struck by one another with the javelins of their arguments and all manner of weaponry. Our theater in this gymnastic contest will also contain, besides those previously mentioned, those athletes stripped of all truth who have taken up arms against the entire crowd of philosophers whom we call "dogmatists"—I mean the followers of Pyrrho, who declared that nothing in human experience is graspable; and those of Aristippus, who said that only sensations of pain are graspable; and again, those following Metrodorus and Protagoras, who asserted that one must trust only in the sensations of the body. ^D Against these, on the other hand, we shall bring into the fray the disciples of Xenophanes and Parmenides, who set themselves in opposition and utterly stripped away all reliability from the senses. Nor shall we omit the champions of pleasure; rather, we shall add their leader, Epicurus, to the rest. In every kind of question, they shall be refuted by me with their own missiles and weapons; and as for all those who bear the name of "naturalists," I shall bring to light the discord of their dogmas and the useless chatter and frivolous contentions of their research. And this I do, not at all out of any hatred for the Greek name or for liberal education, from which I am very far removed, but to free myself from the cause of reproach regarding why I have so little esteemed Greek philosophy—having, as it is said, preferred the oracles of the Hebrews.

CHAPTER III. On the complete harmony of the Hebrew doctrines.

^A The Hebrews, from an ancient time and, so to speak, from the very first human generation, having diligently and thoroughly investigated the true and pious philosophy, have transmitted it healthy and intact to those who followed; and their children, having received it from their fathers as a kind of treasure of the words of truth, have guarded it so that they dared neither to add to nor take away anything from those things once decided. Consequently, the all-wise Moses—who, as is clearly evident from what has been said before, is more ancient than all the Greeks, yet was the youngest in age of the Hebrews who lived before him—decided to move or change nothing of the dogmatic theological principles which had been sanctioned by the most ancient fathers, but only established for his own people, whom he governed, a suitable and appropriate manner of life and a form of moderate ^B government tempered by laws. Nor did the prophets who came after him, who flourished many thousands of years later, dare to utter a single word that was discordant either with themselves or with those things which were considered as established by Moses and those who were dear to God of old. Furthermore, neither does the school which is ours, which originated from that same source and which by divine power has filled both the entire Greek and barbarian world, contain anything discordant with the things that came before—unless one should say that it delivers to us not only the dogmas of theology, but also in the manner of life, the same teaching which was given to those Hebrews who were dear to God before Moses. And our own affairs are such that, testified to with one voice by the first, the middle, and the ^C last practitioners, the certainty of true piety and philosophy is sealed by the votes of all, and it fills the entire world, putting forth new life and flourishing every day, as if it had only just begun to grow. Neither the decrees of laws, nor the plots of enemies, nor the swords of opponents, which have often been sharpened against us, have been able to demonstrate any strength greater than the virtue of the words we have pursued.

But let us now behold what kind of strength the philosophy of the Greeks, which is tossed and agitated on shoals, has exhibited, by bringing forward first of all those who are called the natural philosophers. ^D How they struggled against one another, even before Plato shone forth, one can learn from Plato himself, who refutes the contention of those around Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles with Parmenides and his followers. For Protagoras, who was a companion of Democritus, labored under the opinion of atheism. It is said, indeed, that he used the following opening in his work *On the Gods*: "Concerning the gods, I am unable to know either that they exist, or that they do not exist, or what their form may be." And Democritus said that the principles of all things are the void and the solid; calling the solid "what is" and the void "what is not." For which reason he also says that what is, is no more than what is not, because the things that are are continually and rapidly moved in the void from eternity. Heraclitus said that fire is the principle of all things, from which all things come to be and into which they are dissolved. For he says that all things are an exchange, and that the time of their

resolution into fire, and of their generation back again from fire, is fixed. Now these men argued that all things are in motion. But Parmenides, an Eleatic by birth, taught that the universe is one, and is unbegotten, immovable, and spherical in shape. He had Melissus as a follower, who held the same opinions as Parmenides. Now hear how Plato discusses all these matters in the *Theaetetus*.

CHAPTER IV. How Plato refutes the earlier philosophers; from the Theaetetus.

"‘For it is from flow (96) and motion, and the mixing of things with one another, that all things come to be, of which we say that they are, speaking incorrectly. For nothing ever is, but all things are always coming to be.’ And regarding this, all the wise men in succession, except Parmenides, agree: Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and the chief of both kinds of poetry—of comedy, Epicharmus, and of tragedy, Homer. For having said,

‘Ocean, the origin of the gods, and mother Tethys,’

he has said that all things are the offspring of flux and motion. Or does this not seem to you to be his meaning?" "It seems so indeed." "Who then, henceforth, could escape laughter who wishes to fight against such an army, and Homer himself as its general?" Then, proceeding further in his argument, he adds: "‘We must therefore approach closer,’ he says, 'as the argument in defense of Protagoras commanded, and testing it more diligently, explore whether this agitated nature utters a sound that is healthy or defective. Regarding it, the dispute is certainly neither ordinary nor stirred up by a few.’" "By heaven, it is far from being ordinary, for it thrives and spreads mightily throughout all Ionia. For the followers of Heraclitus support this doctrine (99) very vigorously." "Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we must consider it all the more from the beginning, as they themselves propose." "Certainly. For indeed, Socrates, regarding these Heracliteans, or—as you say—Homerics and those even more ancient, it is no more possible to debate with those around Ephesus themselves, who claim to be experts in these matters, than with those stung by the gadfly. For they are borne along just according to their writings (2); but to remain in an argument and to answer and ask in turn quietly they are no more able than… [alt-version omitted]

… ^A to converse with the insane and the furious. For in truth they are carried away by the very impulse which they display so greatly in their writings. And there is nothing at which they are so little capable as the ability, in their own discussions and questions, to sustain themselves somewhat and quietly to ask and answer in turn; nay, to do even this—what we say—to concede that one thing is not another, is too much, as if it signified that this class of men has not even the smallest amount of moderation. By heaven, if you ask them anything, immediately, as if from a quiver, they shoot out little words like riddles; and if you seek to get an account of this—what it is they have said—you will be struck by another, newly renamed term; ^B and you will never accomplish anything at all with any of them, nor indeed can they do so with each other, but they are very careful not to let anything be stable, neither in discourse nor in their own souls, thinking (as it seems to me) that it is their own stability. This position they fight against with all their might, and as far as they are able, they cast it out from every side. Perhaps, Theodore, you have seen these men fighting, but you have not associated with them when they are at peace; for they are not your companions. But, I suppose, they explain these things at their leisure to those disciples whom they wish to make like themselves. — To what disciples, my good sir? Why, no one of such men ever becomes a disciple of another, but they spring up spontaneously, from wherever it may happen, each of them seized with his own inspiration, ^C and each deems that the other knows nothing. Now, from these, as I said, you would never get an account, neither if they were willing nor if they were unwilling; but we must take them ourselves as a problem and examine them. — And you speak with moderation. But what other problem, pray, have we received, than that which we had from those ancients who, through poetic coverings, wished to hide from the common herd that Oceanus and Tethys are the parents and sources of all things, and that everything is in a constant flow, and nothing stands still? Or that which we have from the later thinkers, who, as if they were wiser, reveal themselves and indicate it openly, so that even the cobblers may understand their wisdom by hearing it, and cease to think foolishly that some existing things stand still while others move; but having learned that all things are in motion, ^D may they honor them? But I nearly forgot, Theodore, that others again have expressed themselves quite the opposite to this. As, for instance:

*One is the name for the All, which remains unchanging,*

and whatever other things of that kind Melissus and Parmenides, opposing all these, maintain with the highest contention: that all things are one, and that it stands in itself, having no place in which to move. What, then, my friend, shall we do with all these? For by advancing little by little, we have unawares fallen between both parties. And if we do not find some way to break through and escape, we shall pay the penalty for our rashness, just as happens to those who play on the line in the wrestling schools, when, having been caught by both sides, they are dragged in opposite directions. These things are in the *Theaetetus*. Passing on next to the *Sophist*, he says the following about the natural philosophers who had preceded him: “It seems to me that Parmenides—”

^A and anyone who has ever attempted to define for us the *what* and the *how many* of beings—has taken his turn at a cursory judgment. Each one of them seems to me to be telling us a sort of myth, as if we were children. One says that beings are three, and that some of them are sometimes at war with each other, while at other times they become friends, providing marriages, and births, and the feeding of their offspring. Another says there are two—maybe moist and dry, or hot and cold—and joins them together and gives them away. Our own Eleatic nation, starting from Xenophanes and even earlier, goes through their myths on the assumption that what is called 'all' is one. But some Ionian and Sicilian Muses later on ^B thought it safer to combine both, and to say that what is is both many and one, and is held together by hatred and love. 'For while disagreeing, it is brought to agreement,' as the more intense Muses sing. The softer ones have relaxed this—that it is always thus—but occasionally they say that the whole is one and is made friendly by Aphrodite, and at other times that it is many, and at war with itself because of some strife. Now, whether any of these have spoken the truth or not, it would be a serious and offensive thing to reproach such great and ancient men.” And after a few words, he adds: “We have not, then, gone through all those who have argued more precisely about what is and what is not; ^C nevertheless, let this suffice. We must look at those who argue differently, so that we may see from all of them that it is not easier to say what that which is not is. We must therefore proceed to these as well. And yet, there appears to be something like a battle of gods and giants among them, because of their dispute with each other about existence. — How so? — Some bring everything down to earth from heaven and from the invisible, literally grasping rocks and oaks with their hands. For they touch all such things, and insist that only that which provides resistance and some kind of touch exists, defining body and existence as the same thing; but if any of the others says that something exists which does not have a body, they despise it entirely, and are unwilling to hear anything else. — You have described ^D a formidable sort of men. Indeed, I have already encountered many more of them than these. — Therefore, those who dispute against them defend themselves very cautiously from above, from some invisible place, insisting that certain intelligible and bodiless forms are the true existence; but it is their bodies, and what they call the 'truth' of these, that they break into small pieces in their arguments, calling it a kind of 'becoming' in motion rather than 'existence.' And in the midst of these, Theaetetus, there has always been an implacable battle for both sides. — True.” It is by way of such things that Plato has brought disrepute upon the natural philosophers before him. As for the opinion he himself held regarding these questions, we have discussed it in the preceding pages, where we showed that he agrees with the doctrines of the Hebrews and coincides with the teaching of Moses concerning the Existent.

Let us now, in due course, examine the successors of Plato himself. They say that Plato, having established his school in the Academy, was the first to be called an Academic, and that he founded the philosophy which has been named Academic. After Plato, Speusippus, who was the son of Plato's sister, Potone, took up the school; then Xenocrates; and after him, Polemo. ^A They say that these men, right from the start, began to dissolve the Platonic doctrines, distorting what seemed true to their teacher by the introduction of foreign dogmas. So do not hope that the power of those wonderful dialogues will last for long, or that the succession of doctrines will finally cease with the death of the man himself; for from this point a battle and faction began, which has never ceased down to the present day, to those who zealously embrace what is dear to him—of whom there are none, unless perhaps one or two in the whole of life, or a few others very small in number; and even they are not entirely free from superficial sophistry, since even those who first succeeded Plato are themselves tainted by this. For they say that Arcesilaus succeeded Polemo, a man about whom there is a tradition that he abandoned the doctrines of Plato and established a foreign, and, as they say, a second Academy. For they say that he maintained that one must suspend judgment on all matters, for all things are incomprehensible, and the arguments on both sides are of equal weight, and the senses are untrustworthy, as is every logos. ^B Indeed, he used to praise this maxim of Hesiod:

For the gods keep the mind of men in suspense.

He also attempted to innovate with certain paradoxical notions. After Arcesilaus, they say that those around Carneades and Clitomachus, having turned away from the opinion of their predecessors, were the authors of the third Academy. Some also add a fourth, that of the followers of Philo and Charmidas. Others even count a fifth, that of the followers of Antiochus. Such was the nature of the succession of Plato himself. If you wish to know what kind of men they were in this regard, take and read the words of Numenius the Pythagorean, which he has set down in the first of those books he wrote entitled *On the Schism of the Academics from Plato*.

CHAPTER V.

On the first succession according to Plato. From Numenius the Pythagorean.

"Plato," he says, "had a nephew by his sister, Speusippus; to him succeeded Xenocrates, whom ^C

^A Polemon followed in the direction of the school. Throughout [the tenure of] Xenocrates, the character of the doctrines remained approximately the same, on account of this much-talked-of epoch, and if there were any other such things. Although they departed in many respects 8 in other matters, and distorted some, they did not abide by the first succession. Starting from him, they divided—sooner or later—whether through choice or ignorance, or for some other cause, which was perhaps not a contentious one. And I do not wish to say anything disparaging for Xenocrates' sake, but rather I wish to [say it] for Plato’s sake. For it stings me that they did not suffer and act in all things so as to preserve for Plato an agreement in all things and in every way. Yet Plato was worthy of them—no better than the great Pythagoras, but perhaps not worse than him either—whom his acquaintances followed and venerated, and were the primary cause of Pythagoras being so highly honored. The Epicureans, indeed, did not achieve this, but having learned it, they were seen in no single instance to set themselves against Epicurus in any way, but having acknowledged that they were joined to a wise man, they themselves also ^B enjoyed this reputation, as was fitting. And from this it came about for a very long time for the later Epicureans neither to say anything contrary to him, nor to one another, nor to Epicurus in anything, in any matter worth mentioning. But for them, it is a transgression, or rather an impiety, and what is innovated is condemned. And for this reason, no one even dares [it]. For the doctrines rest in great peace among them due to the perpetual consensus that always exists between them. And the school of Epicurus resembles a true republic, most free from sedition, having one common mind, one thought. From which they were, and are, and, as it seems, will be followers. But the affairs of the Stoics are divided by faction, beginning from the leaders, and not yet ending even now. They carry out refutations 9 with bitterness—being themselves examined by an adversary—some of them having remained, others having already changed their positions. ^C It seems, therefore, that the first ones were more oligarchic, who, having dissented, were the cause of great rebuke among the later ones towards the previous ones, and great [rebuke] towards each other, with others being even more "Stoic" than others; and all the more so, the more they were seen to be pedants obsessed with technicalities. For these very people, surpassing others in meddlesomeness and in quibbles 11, found fault with them sooner. Yet long before these, those from the school of Socrates suffered these same things, after they had dragged away the discourses in different directions: Aristippus on his own, Antisthenes on his own, and the Megarians on their own in another place. ^D [The following is a representation in verse:]

To engage in dignified discourses, And in quibbles of trifles, To idle away the time, Is the mark of a deranged man.

Scholars also used to say, more comically, as Aristophanes [does] in the *Clouds*, page 164: "whoever is learning some small trifles." The Scholiast explains [these] as "small shavings," and absolutely minute thoughts, and "quibbles." From this he slanders Socrates, as if the things he teaches are cheap and worth no discourse.

^A And the Eretrians, or whoever else there may be along with them. The cause is that, since Socrates posited three gods and philosophized about them in rhythms appropriate to each, those who listened to this were ignorant of it, and were accustomed to say that he spoke everything at random, and according to the prevailing chance that happened to be blowing at any given time. But Plato, being a Pythagorean (for he knew that Socrates spoke and said these same things from no other source than that, and knowing it had spoken), bound the matters together in this way, neither in the usual manner nor openly; but having led each thing where he thought best, and having kept it hidden in the middle of being clear and not-clear, he wrote it down securely, yet he himself provided the cause for the contention and drawing-apart of doctrines that occurred after him, not indeed through envy or malice. But I do not wish to speak words against older men that are not fitting. ^B This, however, we must learn, in order to turn our opinion more toward that place, and just as we proposed from the beginning, to separate him from Aristotle and Zeno; so now, too, with the Academy, if God helps, we shall separate him, and we shall allow him for now to be a Pythagorean by himself. For as it is, he suffers in his members, being drawn apart more crazily than ought to happen to some Pentheus, yet he is in no way entirely displaced and interchanged from his whole self. As therefore a man mediating between Pythagoras and Socrates, having led the solemnity of the one as far as humanity, and having led the elegant and playful quality of the other from that irony of Socrates to a Pythagorean, he appeared more populist than the one and more solemn than the other. But I have not come to judge these things, since the investigation is not currently about them. What had been predetermined, to that I go, and I think I am running away as if into thin air, lest perhaps I be knocked off the road that leads there. ^C Now, Arcesilaus and Zeno became acquaintances of Polemo; for I shall mention them again at the end. I remember having said that Zeno studied with Xenocrates, then with Polemo, and afterward became a Cynic with Crates. But let it now be considered that he also participated in Stilpon, and in the Heraclitean discourses. For since, while studying together under Polemo, they vied with one another, they took into the battle against each other: for the one, Heraclitus, and Stilpon, and at the same time Crates, by whom he was made a fighter by Stilpon, severe by Heraclitus, and a Cynic by Crates; ^D and Arcesilaus took Theophrastus, and Crantor the Platonist, and Diodorus, and then Pyrrho; by whom he became persuasive through Crantor, a sophist through Diodorus, and through Pyrrho he became versatile, and slippery, and nothing at all. Which also gave rise to a verse spoken about him that is mocking and abusive: "Before a lion, and behind a dragon, and in the middle a chimera."

Diodorus.

And Timon says that he was equipped and armed with a certain sharpness by Menedemus. For thus he writes concerning him:

He, rushing, shall bear in the middle of his breast the lead of Menedemus, Or the high acorns of Pyrrho, or Diodorus.

^B 730 Therefore, weaving together the thorny subtleties of Diodorus the dialectician with the doubtful and ambiguous thoughts of Pyrrho, he sought to add to his trifling and inept loquacity some ornament from the power and faculty of Plato: a man of this sort, affirming simultaneously the same thing and denying the same thing, turning and revoking himself suddenly and rashly from here, from there, from both sides, or rather from all sides—of uncertain and ambiguous meaning, a crafty old fox, headlong, and, as he himself quite frankly confesses, knowing nothing at all, yet afterwards somehow appearing to those who knew as one who was like them: thus to every man he suddenly appeared as a shadowy phantom of discourse.

CHAPTER VI. Concerning Arcesilaus, who established the second Academy. From the same.

^C Nevertheless, he says, Arcesilaus was unknown, just as that Homeric Diomedes was ambiguous, wandering between the Trojans and the Achaeans. For he could never bring himself to say the same thing, nor did he think that such a thing at all belonged to a skillful mind. Therefore, he was called a sharp and vehement sophist, and one who slaughtered those less versed in this art. For just as those Empusae are accustomed to do, in the prestidigitations of his own disputations, he took pains and gave himself to composing and presenting himself; he played the fool, knowing nothing himself, nor allowing others to know; he cast terror and perturbation upon everyone: and he defended the primacy of his own sophistries and crafty diction so that he might delight most pleasantly in this reproach, and for that very reason he looked around himself in a wonderful manner, because he was ignorant of what was base or honorable, what was good or what was evil: but rather, where what was first in his mind ^D was toward Pyrrho. Or rather toward Pyrrho, but instead of [the reading of] Pyrrho and Diodorus, since he might rather emulate both, than be carried to one or the other, or both. But in our own verses, to what end he would bear the lead of Menedemus in his breast, as he would run, I do not see.

^A cut by his own hand, both of them 19 indiscriminately, and without thought for what was necessary. Yet it was enough for those who heard him, seeing that he was presentable to those who listened to him at the same time; he was therefore most pleasant to hear and to see, since they had been accustomed to receive the words from him, coming from a fair face and mouth, and not without a certain friendliness in his eyes. But one must not hear these things simply, but rather understand how they stood from the beginning. For having met with Theophrastus in his youth—a man gentle and not unskilled in amatory matters because of his own beauty, while he himself was still in his prime—and having chanced upon the Academic Crantor as a lover, he joined himself to him. But because he was by nature not untalented, using his own quickness—which was ready and heated by rivalry—he gained from Diodorus those clever and persuasive 21 arguments; yet having associated with Pyrrho (and Pyrrho had his start from Democritus, ^B or wherever else), he was trained by him, and, apart from the name, remained a Pyrrhonist, in the sense of the subversion of all things. Mnaseas, indeed, and Philomelus, and Timon, the Sceptics, call him a Sceptic just like themselves, as he also was one who destroyed the truth, and the lie, and the persuasive alike. Being called a Pyrrhonist, then, because of the Pyrrhonian 22 arguments, he endured, out of respect for his lover, being called an Academic still. He was, therefore, a Pyrrhonist, except for the name; and he was not an Academic, except in name. For I do not believe the Cnidian Diocles, who maintains in his so-called *Diatribes* that Arcesilaus, for fear of the followers of Theodorus and Bion the Sophist—who used to attack those who were philosophizing and would shrink from no opportunity ^C to refute them from every side—had been cautious, so he would not have trouble, to state no opinion that seemed to be held; for just as the cuttlefish does with its ink, he used the *epochē* (suspension of judgment) to shield himself. I do not believe this. But those who took their starting point from there, both Arcesilaus and Zeno, supported by such helpers—both warring with arguments—forget the beginning from whence they started from Polemon, and having stood apart, and having armed themselves:

"And they clashed, 23 shields and spears and the bronze-clad ^D might of men; And the bossed shields were pressed against one another, And a great roar arose; Shield pushed against shield, helmet against helmet, and man against man. Thereupon were the groans and the boasts of men, Slaying and being slain."

Of the Stoics; for the Academics were not attacked by them, because they were ignorant of the side on which they could be more easily captured. But they would be defeated then, when their foundation was shaken, if

they should have neither a principle nor a pretext for fighting. ^A The principle, indeed, was the not refuting them while they spoke Platonic doctrines; but that they should not even possess any pretext—which I just mentioned—they turned it around by removing it from the definition regarding the apprehensive impression. This is not the time for me to explain this; I shall mention it again when I am about to engage especially with this matter. ^B Having stood apart, therefore, into the open, it was not that the two were throwing missiles at each other, but Arcesilaus was throwing at Zeno. For Zeno had indeed something solemn and weighty in his battle, and not better than the orator Cephisodorus. This Cephisodorus, when he saw his teacher Isocrates being attacked by Aristotle, although he was unskilled and inexperienced in Aristotelian doctrine, yet—because he saw the glorious elements of Plato’s work and thought that Aristotle was philosophizing according to Plato—he waged war on Aristotle, but threw his missiles at Plato. ^C He began his accusation from the ideas, ending with other matters, which he himself did not even know, but suspected what was said as being implied about them. Yet this Cephisodorus, with whom he warred while not fighting, was fighting with whom he did not wish to wage war. Zeno, however, for his part, since he was refraining from Arcesilaus—if he were not even warring against Plato—would have been, in my judgment, a philosopher of the greatest worth for the sake of the aforementioned peace. But if, not being perhaps ignorant of the things of Arcesilaus, yet being ignorant of the things of Plato—as he is refuted from the things he wrote to him—he acted in opposite ways, striking neither him whom he knew, while he most shamefully and basely reviled him whom he ought not to have, and this much worse than a dog would do. ^D Yet he showed himself to have refrained from Arcesilaus out of magnanimity. For either by ignorance of those things, or by fear of the Stoics...

he turned the huge mouth of the war of pine-wood ^A to another direction, towards Plato. But concerning those things which Zeno wrongly and without any sense of shame devised against Plato, I shall speak more fully at another time, should I ever have leisure for philosophy. Yet may I never have such leisure, at least for these reasons, unless it be in jest. Zeno, then, seeing that Arcesilaus was his rival and worthy of victory, kept tearing down the arguments brought forward by him, and felt no regret. As for the other matters regarding which he contended with him—either I am unable to tell, or, even if I could, there is no need now to make mention of them. But as for that doctrine ^B of his, which he was the first to discover, and seeing the very name of it, the "comprehensive phantasia," highly esteemed in Athens, he applied every device against it. But the other, being in a weaker position, and keeping quiet, unable to be wronged, left Arcesilaus alone, though he had many things he could have said, but he did not wish to; or perhaps, rather, in another way: he fought against Plato, who was no longer among the living, like one fighting with a shadow, and he kept shouting out all the scurrility that comes from a cart, saying that since Plato was not there to defend himself, it was no one else's concern to speak for him; or whether it did concern Arcesilaus, he himself thought he would gain by turning Arcesilaus away from himself. This is noted by him as the same trick that Agathocles the Syracusan used against the Carthaginians. The Stoics, however, listened in astonishment; for their muse was still in its infancy, and not yet adept in those witticisms by which Arcesilaus, partly by refuting, partly by cutting short, and partly by tripping up ^C Zeno's arguments, overwhelmed them with his tongue, and even persuaded others. Accordingly, those against whom he argued were defeated and prostrate, and those present in the circle where he spoke remained struck and astonished; so that it was held for certain by the people of that time that there was neither word, nor misfortune, nor deed, however slight, nor anything at all that could be seen as useless or its opposite, unless it seemed so to Arcesilaus the Pitanaean. But to him, in fact, nothing seemed so, nor did he declare anything more than that these were mere trifles and terrors. ^D

CHAPTER VII

"Now, in truth," he says, "I have decided to relate something witty and charming about Lacydes. For he was somewhat sordid,"

and as the saying goes, notoriously 'economical' ^A in the eyes of many. He would open his own storeroom, and he would lock it himself. He would choose for himself what he needed, and he did all such things by his own hand—not, I suppose, because he was praising self-sufficiency, nor because he lived in poverty, nor because of a lack of servants, for he had as many as he wished, though the reason for this may be conjectured. But I shall relate the witty tale I promised. For, managing his own provisions, he did not think he ought to carry the key about his person. Instead, after locking the door, he would put it into a hollow box. After sealing it with a ring, he would let it roll through the hole of the lock and fall ^B inside the house, so that later, when he returned and opened it with the key, he might take up the ring, and then again lock up, and then seal it, and then throw the ring back inside again through the lock. When his servants perceived this clever trick of his, whenever Lacydes would go out for a walk or anywhere else, they would open it themselves, and then, according to their whim, after they had eaten some things and drunk others, and carried off still others, they would do these things in turn. They would close the storeroom, seal it, and then, not without the greatest laughter at the philosopher, throw the ring inside through the hole of the lock. Consequently, Lacydes, finding empty the vessels he had left full, and being perplexed by what was happening—since he heard it taught among ^C the school of Arcesilaus that things are 'incomprehensible'—thought that this was exactly what was happening to him regarding his storeroom. And, starting from this point, he began to philosophize with Arcesilaus, asserting that he could neither see nor hear anything clear or sound. And once, having drawn aside one of those who were conversing with him into private, he vehemently insisted to him—as it seemed—regarding the 'suspension of judgment,' and said, 'This much I can tell you without any doubt, having learned it from my own experience, and not having been tested by that of another.' And then, beginning from the start, he related the whole affair concerning his storeroom that had befallen him. 'What, then,' he said, 'would Zeno still have to say against such an evident suspension of judgment in such matters, agreed upon for me by all? For, since I locked it with my own hands, and it was I myself who sealed it, and I myself who let the ring inside, and yet, upon returning and opening it, I see the ring inside, but not the other things, how can I not justly be distrustful of external things? For I would not venture to say that someone has ^D come inside to steal these things, given the ring.' And he, hearing this—for he was an insulter, having taken the whole tale as he heard it, and only with difficulty holding back—broke into laughter… of the accuser, who asked for the ring; he quietly set it down, but Lacydes, sensing it, stepped upon it with his foot and covered it. And the proof was in that. After the acquittal, as Cephisocrates was greeting the judges, one of them, as it seems, having observed what had occurred, ordered them to thank Lacydes; and he related the matter, even though Lacydes had told no one.

But he, ^A hearing this, and being further ^B provoked to burst into laughter, simultaneously exposed his own vainglory. Consequently, Lacydes, starting from that time, no longer dropped his ring inside, nor did he use the storeroom for ^C unobservance, but he would seize those things that were left behind, and he had philosophized in vain. Not, however, that the servants were not ^D *phortakes* (57), as they were not easily apprehended; rather, such were these comic—and Getae, and Daci (58)—who were polished in the Dacian *stōmylēthra* (59), whether having heard the sophisms of some Stoic, or having learned them otherwise, they would proceed straight to the daring act, and would loosen his seal; and sometimes they would substitute another in its place, and sometimes they would apply none at all, due to supposing that even to him these things would be unobservable, and thus, and not 40 otherwise.

And he, having entered, would inspect—and seeing the document (41) unsealed, or sealed, but with a different seal, he would be indignant. And when they said that it had not been unsealed—and because for them the seal was seen by them to be his—he would refine his argument (42), and would demonstrate it. And when they were worsted by the demonstration, and would say that if the seal was not present, perhaps he himself had forgotten and had not sealed it; and yet he himself said that he remembered having sealed it, and would demonstrate it, and would go around with his speech, and would lament towards them, thinking that he was being mocked, and he would swear besides. But they, having anticipated his additions, these indeed thought that they were being mocked by him; since, being a wise man, it had been decreed for Lacydes to be without reputation, so that even of those things which were not remembered, there was memory, for this was glory; recently, at any rate, of the time, they said they heard these things.

[35] *Catelembane ta apheimena*. This means, I think, he perceived it, and surely understood how many things he had squandered, having held them in neglect.

[36] *Kai matēn*. What is meant by "and in vain"?

[37] *Phortakes*. These appear to be named from a new example, which is easily understood from the following. It is Attic laughter, but immoderate and troublesome. Aristophanes in *Plutus*: "And we might escape the *phortos*." Having removed these evils, and the *phortos*, and vulgar buffoonery, "He made a great art for us." The *phortika* are ridiculous things, insults of arrogance. "But we have a little speech, having a thought, of you yourselves, not more clever, but more wise than vulgar comedy." Vulgar comedy, in which they introduce some vulgar things.

[38] Getae and Daci. You find *Daci* more often than *Daxoi*. Stephanus in *De urbibus*, under the entry *Daxia*, has it so: *Daci*, whom we call *Daoi*. For the Getae are those called so near the Pontus, and the east; but the *Daoi*, those towards the opposite, towards Germany, and the sources of the Ister. And among the Attics, of the names of slaves, *Daoi* and *Getae*. But *Daci*... whom I think were called *Daoi* in the old way; from which also among the Attics the names of slaves became common, *Getae* and *Dauoi*. Whom they call *Daas*.

[39] *Stōmylia*. *Stōmylia* is vulgar buffoonery; *stōmylēthras* refers to the guests; *stōmylēthroi*, *stōmylēthros*, *stōmylethros*. *Bombostōmylēthra*: Eubulides says, of the eristic asking the "horned" arguments, and by false-braggart speeches, tumbling the orators, "He went away having the *hrombostōmylēthra* of Demosthenes." About this, one of the comic poets says: "And the abusive Eubulides, asking the 'horned' [arguments], And by false-braggart speeches tumbling the orators, He went away having the *rhōbostōmylēthra* of Demosthenes." *Oūristikos* (says one of the comic poets) Eubulides, *oūbristikos*, *oūristikos*, *hybristikos*, *eristikos*; of the eristics, asking the 'horned' [arguments]; questions; and "With false-braggart," [meaning] with false, braggart [speeches]. *Rhombostōmylēthra*, *rhōbostōmylēthra*, *rhōō*, *boao*.

^A And if, as he was confirming it, he could not remember the place. Nay, he would say that he remembered very well that he had sealed it, and while demonstrating it with a long oration, and feeling that he was being mocked, he would even interpose an oath and exaggerate it more vehemently. His household servants would react to these outbursts in such a way that they would persuade themselves that he was also joking and playing with them, from which it seemed to the wise Lacydes that he was leaving himself neither an opinion nor any memory—for indeed, memory is a kind of opinion—and that this, in the hearing of others, had recently been confirmed to him by some of his friends. When he refuted these claims in such a way as to replace everything with things other than what Academics are accustomed to say, the servants would approach some Stoic and learn from him what they ought to say. Starting from there, they would counter-sophistry with sophistry, and by opposing art with art, they proved that the Academics themselves were truly thieves. At that point, he would even go on the offensive against the Stoics, while the servants, conversely, would dissolve all his criticisms by denying the possibility of comprehension, and this, as expected, not without laughter and wit. ^B There, therefore, were the squabbles of everyone, the arguments, and the wordy battles, with nothing left over meanwhile—not a vessel, not any of the things that were stored in vessels, nor anything else that pertained to his household furnishings. Therefore, Lacydes was in a ferment, finding absolutely no aid at all in the defense of his own tenets; soon, reckoning to himself that unless he caught the thief, all his affairs would subsequently go to ruin, he finally, at his wit's end, began to shout at his neighbors and call upon the gods. "O woe is me!" "O wretched act!" he would repeat, invoking all gods and goddesses and other emotional arguments of that kind, which nature, without art, supplies to a man in the midst of grievous complaints when he does not obtain trust. All these things, bewailed with loud clamor, certainly displayed a great show of probability. Finally, in this struggle and domestic warfare, he played the Stoic before his servants; but since they were strenuously and constantly defending Academic tenets, in order that he might suffer no further annoyance, he subsequently remained at home perpetually and would sit outside the doors of his own cell. But when he achieved nothing, reflecting with himself on where his own versatility was leading, he finally opened up his mind openly and without pretense: "My servants," he said, "we speak of these things in the school in one way, but we live in another." And thus far concerning Lacydes. ^C He had very many auditors, among whom the Cyrenaean Aristippus excelled. However, of all his disciples, Evander succeeded him in the leadership of the school, and others followed him in turn. Succeeding them all in this teaching office, Carneades established the Third Academy. He employed the same manner of discourse as Arcesilas; for he himself also practiced the habit of arguing on both sides of a question and would refute everything that was said by others. ^D He differed from him only in the argument concerning the suspension of judgment, saying that it was impossible for a man to suspend his judgment on all matters. He held that there is a difference between that which is unknown and that which is incomprehensible; and that while all things are incomprehensible, they are not all unknown. He also had a share in the Stoic arguments, and by standing contentiously against them, he increased all the more, aiming at what seemed probable to the many, but not at the truth itself. Hence, he also caused much annoyance to the Stoics. Now, Numenius writes the following about him:

CHAPTER VIII. On Carneades, who founded the third Academy. From the same.

^A Carneades, having taken up the duty and roles of teaching, rejected the man whose legacy he ought to have preserved—whether the things were yet sound and undisturbed, or whether they had already been disturbed by others—and having referred everything to Arcesilaus, whether for better or for worse, he renewed the battle after a long interval. And next he adds: "He therefore led, and brought forward, and contributed to the combat subtle contradictions and twists, diversifying them; and he was at once negative and affirmative, and argumentative from both sides. And if ever ^B some subject required astonishing arguments, he would become impetuous, like a roaring river flowing fiercely, filling everything here and there, and he would rush in, and he would sweep away his listeners with a great uproar. Therefore, by leading the others astray, he himself remained undeceived; a quality which Arcesilaus did not possess. For the latter, being caught in the sorcery of those who were joining him in his Corybantic frenzy, failed to realize that he himself was the first to be deceived—failing to perceive it—and yet he was convinced that the things he said were true through the total annihilation of all things. But it would be an evil laid upon ^C an evil, for Carneades [to be] to Arcesilaus; without relaxing even a little, by which they would not be rendered actionless, according to the positive and negative impressions called by him 'probable'—that a thing is a living being, or is not a living being." Having thus given way, just like wild animals that retreat, only to throw themselves more violently and with greater force upon the spears, he himself, having yielded, attacked more powerfully. Whenever he encountered resistance and the argument was well-founded, then he would willingly disregard even what he had previously conceded. ^D For he acknowledged that truth and falsehood exist in things, as if cooperating with the method of inquiry; having given a grip to a skilled wrestler, he would overcome him from that point. For by offering each side according to the inclination of the 'probable,' he said that neither could be firmly apprehended. He was, therefore, a more cunning thief and sorcerer. For by taking a falsehood similar to the truth, and a perception similar to an apprehensive impression, and by bringing them to the same level, he did not allow either the true to exist or the false, or rather, [he argued] that one was not more [true] than the other, or [that it was] more likely than what is probable. They were, therefore, dreams instead of dreams, because the false impressions were similar to the true ones, as a wax egg is to a real egg. And so, bad things resulted, and more of them. Furthermore, while speaking, Carneades would enchant and enslave [his audience]. He was a thief in secret, but in appearance a robber, taking captive by both guile and force those who were very thoroughly prepared. All of Carneades' thought, at any rate, was victorious, and none was in any way otherwise; since even those against whom he fought were, so to speak, more powerless. And so Antipater, his contemporary, was about to write something in his anxiety; but as for the arguments brought daily from Carneades, he was never [able] to carry them and bear them.

to light, not in the lecture halls, not in the walking-places, nor did he speak, nor utter a word, nor did anyone hear him, they say, not even a syllable. He would only hold forth in written replies and, taking to a corner, he left behind books written for those who came after him—books which, neither then nor even now, could possibly stand up to such an exceedingly great man as Carneades appeared to be, and as he was reputed to be by the people of that time. Nevertheless, although he himself caused confusion in public by his Stoic contentiousness, yet among his own companions he confessed the truth in secret, and declared that which any other person of those available might say. Then he says further: “Carneades had as his first pupil Mentor, but not as his successor. For while Carneades was still living, having found him with his mistress—not because of a plausible impression, nor as one who had not grasped the truth, but trusting most fully in his own eyes, and having perceived the reality—he dismissed him from the school.” The one who had withdrawn retorted with sophistry and became a rival in the craft, exposing the lack of comprehension in his [Carneades’] words. ^B And again he adds, saying: “Carneades, philosophizing as it were in reverse, adorned [his positions] with falsehoods, and beneath them caused the truth to vanish. He used falsehoods, therefore, as veils, while the truth lay hidden within, in a more shopkeeper-like fashion. He experienced, therefore, the same condition as legumes, of which the hollow ones float on the water and remain on the surface, while the good ones are below and out of sight.” These things are also said concerning Carneades. Cleitomachus was established as his successor in the school; after whom came Philo, of whom Numenius mentions these things.

CHAPTER IX. Concerning Philo, who succeeded Cleitomachus, who had succeeded Carneades. From the same.

“This Philo, he says, in the beginning, when he had recently received the direction of the school, was struck with a very great joy and, being very desirous of showing gratitude, kept honoring the decrees of Cleitomachus and illustrating them more and more, and attacking ^C the Stoics with radiant sword. But as time progressed, while the retention of these [doctrines] gradually vanished through daily use of the Academics, he no longer felt things according to his former custom, but the very evidence and confession of events and evils turned him entirely in the opposite direction. Thus, while he was now perceiving most things clearly and plainly, he was very desirous only of being convinced by those who would refute him, so that he might not appear to have turned his back and fled of his own accord. Moreover, Antiochus became a ^D student of Philo, having started another Academy. At any rate, having studied with Mnesarchus the Stoic, he held thoughts contrary to Philo, his teacher, and added ten thousand strange things to the Academy.” These and things similar to these, ten thousand of them, are found in Plato’s succession

^B It is time, therefore, having taken up the account from the beginning, to examine the false beliefs and contrary arguments of the natural philosophers; for those who wandered over most of the earth, and who held the discovery of truth in the highest regard, and who were familiar with the opinions of all the men of old, and who had investigated the theology of Phoenicians, Egyptians, and even Greeks themselves, much earlier, must be asked what fruit of their labors they found, that we might learn if anything god-worthy came down to them from their elders. For initially, from the ancient age, polytheistic superstition held sway among the nations, and temple-rites and sacred mysteries of the gods were customarily observed by all in cities and lands alike. There was, therefore, no need for human philosophy, if it had anticipated the matters of divine wisdom; nor was there any necessity for the wise men to innovate, if the ways of their ancestors were well-established; nor, indeed, for the noble philosophers to be factional and at variance, if the ancestral opinion concerning the gods had been judged to be consistent and true. And why was it necessary to war with one another, and fight, or to run up and down the long road, wandering about and plundering the wisdom of the barbarians, when they ought to have remained at home and learned from the gods, if indeed there were any gods, or from the theologians, the true and infallible accounts concerning those things sought after in philosophy, concerning which they labored ^C on ten thousand things and disagreed, falling far short of the discovery of the truth? Why also was it necessary to strive to seek out newer things concerning the gods, or to clash and box with one another, if the safe and sure discovery of the gods, and the true knowledge of piety, were contained in the sacred rites and mysteries, and in the rest of the theology of the most ancient men, which it was at hand to tend as a fixed and unanimously agreed-upon thing? But if these men should appear to have learned nothing true about God from those who came before them, and rather to have applied themselves to the investigation of nature through their own conceits, and to have used guesswork rather than apprehension—what remains but to agree that the ancient theology of the nations possessed nothing more than the history presented in the preceding books? That philosophy among the Greeks arose, therefore, from human conjectures, much word-wrangling, and error, and not from any accurate apprehension, you may learn from the letter of Porphyry to the Egyptian Nectanebo, and hear him admit this very thing in these words. ^D

CHAPTER X. That there are conjectures, and logomachies, and much error among the philosophers of the Greeks. From the letter of Porphyry to the Egyptian Nectanebo, and from his book "On the Soul" written to Boethus, and from the book which he published "On the Philosophy from Oracles."

^A "I shall begin," he says, "my duty of benevolence toward you from the gods and good demons, and from the treatises of philosophy related to these, concerning which very much has been said, even among the philosophers of the Greeks, but which, for the most part, draw the principles of their credence from nothing else but mere conjecture." And having interposed other matters, he proceeds thus: "For among us there is a great conflict of words, inasmuch as we base our judgment of the good only upon human estimation. But as for those who apply themselves to attaining that conjunction with the superior nature, if they neglect this part of the investigation, they spend their labor and pains in the study of wisdom in vain." ^B The same author, in the writings which he addressed to Boethus "On the Soul," confesses this very thing in express terms, while he says: "That the soul is immortal, the power of understanding and reasoning proves without any doubt. Yet, whatever arguments produced by the philosophers are brought forward to demonstrate this, the whole seems very easy to refute, on account of the skill in disputation and contentiousness which sharp-witted men have discovered in all things. For what argument in philosophy is not open to dispute by those who think otherwise, when even regarding those things that seemed self-evident, some of them have preferred to withhold all assent?" And in the book he entitled "On the Philosophy from Oracles," he expressly confesses that the Greeks have wandered, ^C bearing witness to his own God, as having declared this through oracles, and as having testified to the discovery of truth by the barbarians rather than by the Greeks, and having even made mention of the Hebrews among those testified to. For, after the quotation of the oracle, he immediately proceeds to these concluding remarks: "You have heard how much labor is exhausted, for one to offer a sacrificial atonement merely for the sake of the body, and not because he has found the salvation of the soul? For the way to the gods is bound with bronze, steep and rugged, of which the barbarians indeed have found many paths, ^D but the Greeks have wandered away from it; and those who were already in possession of it have corrupted it. But God has attributed the discovery of it to the Egyptians, the Phoenicians, and the Chaldeans (for these are the Assyrians), to the Lydians and the Hebrews." These things says this philosopher, or rather the God whom he worshipped. Who, then, can hereafter justly find fault with us, because we have left the wandering Greeks, to follow the Hebrews, by whom it is established that the truth was apprehended, by the very testimony of the gods? For what, pray, do we expect to learn from philosophers? Or what help or utility can we hope for from them thereafter, if the things said among them for the most part happen to be derived from conjectures and surmises as the principles of their faith? And what is the fruit of logomachy, if all the arguments of the philosophers have been proven easily refutable, because of the sophistry found in all things? These things were heard not recently from us, but from themselves. Wherefore it seems to me that we have rightly and after examined judgment, and not irrationally, as it were, despised such things. And that we have embraced the matters among the Hebrews, not because it is testified to by the demon, but because the divine virtue and power

^A therein clearly shine forth. And so that you may perceive for yourself the verbose contentions of these illustrious philosophers, and their disagreements concerning primary principles, gods, and the constitution of the universe, I shall set forth their very words for you a little later.

But first, since they are constantly bringing up and harping upon these mathematical studies, and professing that it is absolutely necessary for those who intend to attain a grasp of the truth to pursue astronomy, arithmetic, geometry, and music—studies which, indeed, we have already shown came to them from the barbarians (for they claim that without these, no one can become a learned man or a philosopher, nor even touch upon the truth of existing things, unless these have first been delineated in the soul by knowledge)—and since, by elevating themselves in the study of these matters, they are lifted up into the air and think that they are walking on high, as if they were carrying God Himself around in their numbers; and further, because they think that we, ^B since we do not covet the same things, differ in no way from cattle, and therefore declare that we can know neither God nor any holy thing: come, let us first refute this incorrect notion, setting before them the true reason in place of light.

For the truth will demonstrate that among the Greeks, as well as the myriads of barbarian nations, there are some who, despite being equipped with the aforementioned studies, have recognized neither God, nor a temperate life, nor anything at all that is best and advantageous; whereas others, despite being destitute of such varied disciplines, have nonetheless proven to be most pious and most wise. You may learn what the opinion of that Socrates, who is so highly celebrated by all of these men, was concerning these matters, if you trust Xenophon, who records it in his *Memorabilia* in this way: ^C

CHAPTER XI. On geometry, astronomy, and calculation, from Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*.

"He also taught," he says, "to what extent a well-educated man ought to be skilled in each subject. In the first place, he said one should apply oneself to geometry only so far as to be able, should the need arise, to properly accept, give, divide, or mark out land by measurement. And this is so easy to learn that one who pays close attention to the measuring can, at the same time, know how great the earth is and depart with that knowledge. And as for the study of *calculation* [arithmetic] in regard to encampments, the capture of positions, the gathering and extending of an army, and whatever other formations camps might ^D require, he clearly [original-script column: see facsimile] compared with the movements in the heavens. As to what he holds regarding astronomy, it is somewhat obscure, except that he wishes men not to be overly curious; and concerning the revolutions of the celestial spheres and the stars, he recognizes them as a shadow or likeness of the truth rather than the truth itself.

And as for the geometry of diagrams, he forbade learning it, for he said he could not see what use it was; indeed, he was not unskilled in these things. He said, rather, that they were sufficient to wear out a man’s life and to prevent him from learning many other beneficial subjects. He also advised becoming acquainted with astronomy, but only to the extent of being able to determine the time of night, the month, and the year, so that one might use such knowledge for travel, for navigation, and for night watches, and for everything else that is done by night, by month, or by year, employing the stars as signs to distinguish the times of these things. ^B And these things, he said, were easy to learn from night-hunters, ship captains, and many others who make it their business to know them. But to study astronomy to the point of knowing things not in the same revolution—the planets and erratic stars—and to waste one's energy investigating their distances from the earth, their periods, and their causes, this he strongly discouraged. For he said he could not see any benefit in these things either, although he was not unlearned in them. He said that these too were sufficient to wear out a man’s life and to prevent him from many other useful pursuits. In general, he discouraged becoming a busybody with regard to the ways in which God regulates celestial things, for he did not believe that such things could be discovered by men, nor did he think that one who sought what the gods did not wish to make clear would find favor with them. He said that anyone who worried about these things would risk becoming insane—just as Anaxagoras lost his mind, he who prided himself greatly on explaining the machines of the gods. For that man, while saying that fire and the sun are the same, did not realize that men can easily look at fire, but cannot look directly at the sun; ^C and that those who are tanned by the sun have darker complexions, but this does not happen with fire. He did not realize either that of the things which grow from the earth, nothing can grow well without the light of the sun, whereas everything is destroyed if it is heated by fire. And while claiming that the sun is a red-hot stone, he did not realize that a stone, when placed in fire, neither shines nor lasts for long; yet the sun remains for all time, being the brightest of all things. He also advised learning arithmetic, but in this, just as with the other subjects, he urged against vain labor. He himself always examined everything and went through it with his associates only up to the point of usefulness. ^D These things Xenophon writes in his *Memorabilia*. In a letter to Aeschines, the same author writes as follows regarding Plato and those who boasted of their physiology of the universe.

Chapter XII.

On those who boasted of explaining the nature of things. From his letter to Aeschines.

^A That the divine is beyond us, everyone sees. It is sufficient for us to worship such things with the greatest possible piety, but what their nature is, is neither easy to discover nor permitted to investigate. For it is not proper even for slaves to know the character or actions of their masters, except insofar as is necessary for their service. And, most importantly, the more one ought to admire those who occupy themselves with human affairs, the heavier the burden weighs upon those who hunt for glory out of many useless and vain things. For who, my Aeschines, has ever heard Socrates discoursing about heavenly things, or persuading others to learn the figures of geometry for the improvement of their character? For we know that he understood music only as far as it reached the ears. But he always discoursed among his own people about what is noble, and about courage, justice, and the other virtues. He called these human goods; as for the rest, he said that they were ^B either impossible for men to grasp, or akin to myths, such as those which sophists with arched brows used to recount as mere play. And he did not merely say these things; he acted accordingly. But to write down for you—though you know them and it would not be unpleasant—the things he did, would take time, and I have already written them elsewhere. Let those, therefore, who have been refuted and who did not find favor with Socrates, either hold their peace or move toward what is reasonable—that Socrates to whom, while he was alive, God himself bore witness of his wisdom, while those who killed him found no way to cleanse themselves of their repentance for the crime. Truly, it is a fine thing that they became enamored of Egypt and of the monstrous wisdom of Pythagoras. How vain and inconsistent their disposition toward Socrates was, is manifestly ^C and openly proven by that love of tyranny, and by their supplanting a simple and frugal diet with a Sicilian table that serves an immoderate belly. Thus Xenophon, hinting obliquely at Plato. But Plato himself, in the *Republic*, recounts the following words said by Socrates regarding the arts of gymnastics and music.

CHAPTER XIII.

On the arts of gymnastics and music. From Plato's Republic.

"What then, Glaucon, could be a kind of study that is able to draw the soul from things that are coming into being toward that which is? I am thinking of this as I speak. Did we not say that these men must be athletes of war when they are young?" ^D "We did say so," I replied. "Is there then any such study as I am describing?" "Which is that?" "Is it, then, necessary to pay attention to this study as well?"

^A Mmm, that it not be useless to men engaged in war. It is necessary, he said, if it be possible. But were they not already trained by us in gymnastic and music? - That is so, he said. - Gymnastic certainly is concerned with what is coming into being and passing away, for it oversees the growth and decay of the body. - It appears so. - This then would not be the study we are seeking. - Certainly not. - But is it perhaps that music that we treated before? But that, he said, if you remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic, educating the guardians by habits ^B, imparting not knowledge, but by harmony a certain harmony, and by rhythm, rhythm, and having in the discourses other habits akin to these, and such as were fabulous, and as many as were truer. But there was no study in it that would lead to such a thing as you are now seeking. - Most accurately, I said, you remind me. For in truth it had nothing of that kind. - But, my dear Glaucon, what, then, could be of that kind? For the arts were all judged to be somewhat vulgar. - And why not? ^C He proceeds further and adds: "Perhaps they may not attempt to teach to those whom we shall rear anything incomplete, and not always going to the place to which all must tend, such as we were just saying about astronomy. Or are you not aware that they do the same thing regarding harmony? For they measure the audible consonances and sounds against one another, working themselves to death just as the astronomers do." "By the gods," he said, "and they even call them 'densities' ^D, and apply their ears as if they were eavesdropping on the sound from their neighbors; some say they hear a sound in the middle and that this is the smallest interval by which it must be measured, while others dispute, claiming that they are already emitting the same sound; both place their ears ahead of their intelligence." "You, indeed," I said, "are speaking of the good fellows who trouble the strings, and put them to the torture on the pegs and stretch them. That the parable may not become too long, by the striking of the plectrum, and about the accusations, and denials, and the arrogance of the strings, I cease the analogy, and I do not say that they are the ones of whom we spoke just now regarding harmony. For they do the same as those in astronomy. For they seek the numbers in these audible consonances, but they do not rise to reconsider the problems, which numbers are consonant and which are not, and why each are." But let these things also lie before us on the path, protesting that we have not ignored the useless learning of such things without a straight understanding. Let us consider, then, at last, having begun from above, the views of the aforementioned Natural Philosophers.

^A Plutarch gathers together in one place the contradictory opinions of them all—the Platonists and the Pythagoreans, the more ancient ones known as the Natural Philosophers, and in turn the more recent ones, the Peripatetics, the Stoics, and the Epicureans—in the work he entitled *On the Natural Dogmas that Pleased the Philosophers*. From these I shall set forth the following.

CHAPTER XIV. The Opinions of the Philosophers Concerning First Principles. From the book of Plutarch, *On the Natural Dogmas that Pleased the Philosophers*.

^B Thales the Milesian, one of the Seven Sages, declared water to be the principle of all things. This man seems to have been the beginner of philosophy, and from him the Ionian sect was named, for there were very many successions from him. Having studied philosophy in Egypt, he returned to Miletus now advanced in years. He says that all things are from water, and into water all things are resolved. He conjectures this first from the fact that the seed of all living things is the principle of everything, and it is moist; thus it is likely that all things have their origin from fluid. Second, that all plants are nourished by moisture and bear fruit, while lacking it they dry up. Third, that even the very fire of the sun and the stars, and indeed the world itself, is nourished by the exhalations of waters. For this reason, Homer also posits this birth as proper to water, with this verse:

Ocean, who is the source of birth for all things.

Such are the views of Thales. Anaximander the Milesian says that the principle of existing things is the infinite. For from it all things are born, and into it all things perish. Wherefore also infinite worlds are generated, and in turn pass away into that from which they spring. He says, therefore, that it is infinite so that birth ^C might never fail. But he too errs by not saying what the infinite is—whether it is air, or water, or earth, or some other bodies. He errs, therefore, while revealing the matter, but removing the efficient cause. For the infinite is nothing other than matter; yet matter cannot be in act unless the efficient [cause] is posited. Anaximenes the Milesian declared air to be the principle of existing things; for from it and ^D into it all things are born and again resolved.

^A Just as our soul, he says, is air—for it holds us together—so also does spirit and air encompass the whole world. Air and spirit are used as synonyms. But he also errs, thinking that living beings are constituted from simple and uniform air and spirit. For it is impossible that matter alone should act as the principle of existing things; one must also posit the efficient cause. For instance, silver is not sufficient in itself for a cup to be made, unless the efficient cause—that is, the silversmith—is added; the same must be assumed of bronze, wood, and other matter. ^B Heraclitus and Hippasus of Metapontum attribute this primacy to fire. For they claim that all things come to be from fire and that all things end in fire; and that when this is extinguished, all things are fashioned into a world. For first, the thickest part of it, being compressed and gathered together into itself, becomes earth; then the earth, being melted by the nature of the fire, becomes water; and as it evaporates, it becomes air. Again, the world and all bodies are consumed by fire ^C in the conflagration. Fire, therefore, is the principle, because all things come from it, and it is the end, because all things are resolved into it. ^D Democritus, whom Epicurus followed at a long interval, posited the principles of existing things to be indivisible bodies, observable by reason, void of emptiness, unbegotten, eternal, indestructible, impossible to be broken, nor able to receive shape from parts, nor to be altered, but being observable by reason. Yet these move in the void, and through the void; and the void itself is infinite, and the bodies are infinite. And these three things characterize the bodies: shape, size, and weight; but Democritus said there were two, size and shape, while Epicurus added to these a third, weight. For he says there is a necessity for bodies to be moved by the impact of weight, ^D since otherwise they would not move. And the shapes of these atoms are not infinite in number; for they are not like hooks, or tridents, or rings; for such shapes are easily broken, but the atoms are impassible and unbreakable; they have their own proper shapes, observable by reason. And it is called an atom, not because it is the smallest, but because it cannot be cut, being impassible and void of emptiness; so that if one speaks of ^D an atom, as unbreakable, he means impassible and void of emptiness. That it is an indivisible body is clear; for there are elements, and empty living beings, and the unit. Empedocles of Meton, the Acragantine, [posited] four elements,

fire, air, water, and earth, and two primary forces, love and strife, of which the former is unifying, and the latter dividing. He says as follows: Hear first the four roots of all things: Aetherial Zeus, and life-giving Hera, and Aidoneus, And Nestis, who moistens the fountains of mortals with tears. ^A

He says that by Zeus is meant heat and the aether, by life-giving Hera the air, by Aidoneus the earth, and by Nestis the fountain of mortals, meaning as it were the seed and the water. Such is the disagreement of the first natural philosophers; and such is their opinion regarding the principles, in that they posited as principles neither God, nor a maker, nor a creator, nor any cause of the universe at all, nor indeed gods, nor incorporeal forces, nor intellectual natures, nor rational substances, nor anything at all outside of the senses. Anaxagoras, therefore, is mentioned as the first of the Greeks, in his discourses on the principles, to have declared Mind to be the cause of all things. They say, indeed, that he admired natural philosophy more than those before him; he even neglected his own land, [leaving it to be] grazed by sheep, for the sake of it, and was the first of the Greeks to set out the theory of the principles. For he did not only declare his views concerning the substance of all things, as those before him did, but also concerning the cause that moves it. ^B For in the beginning, he says, all things were together and mixed; but Mind, entering in, brought them from disorder into order. It is a matter for wonder that he, having been the first among the Greeks to theologize in this manner, was suspected by the Athenians of being an atheist, because he did not theologize [about] the sun, but [about] the maker of the sun, and he nearly died by being stoned. It is said, however, that not even he kept this doctrine sound. For he set Mind in authority over all things, but did not then provide the natural philosophy concerning existing things according to mind and reason. Listen, then, to how Socrates, in Plato’s *Phaedo*, faults the man in these matters.

CHAPTER XV. On the opinion of Anaxagoras. From the disputation of Socrates in Plato, *Phaedo*.

"But, having heard," he says, "at some time from a certain book, as he said, of Anaxagoras reading, and saying that it is Mind that orders and is the cause of all things, I was pleased with this cause, and it seemed to me in a way to be good, that Mind should be the cause of all things." ^C

(76) *Grazed by sheep.* They say that the opposite happened to Anaxagoras than to you; for having been left much wealth, he neglected it and lost everything. Diogenes Laertius: He was distinguished for nobility and wealth, but also for greatness of soul, for he ceded his patrimony to his relations; when accused by them of neglect, "Why then," he said, "do you not take care of it?" And a witty remark: better than [would be expected of] a philosopher. "Do you not care for your country?" "Hush," he said, "for I do indeed care greatly for my country," and he pointed to the heaven. ^D It begins as follows: "In the beginning all things were together, and Mind separated and ordered them," calling "things" [by the word] "goods."

A worthy voice, in a better language and a better sense.

(77) *For in the beginning.* Plutarch above, p. 876, has this a little differently: "He begins thus," he says: "All things were together, and Mind divided and ordered them." Consult Diogenes.

(78) *But, having heard.* Plato’s passage is in the *Phaedo*, page 98, Ficino’s edition.

^A I thought, if this is the case, that the Mind which orders and arranges all things, would order each thing ^B and place it where it would be best. Therefore, if anyone wished to find the cause for each thing—how it comes to be, or perishes, or exists—it would be necessary for him to find this out regarding it: how it is best for it either to exist, or to suffer or to do anything else. From this reasoning, it would be appropriate for a person to investigate nothing else, both regarding himself and other things, except what is best and most excellent. It is necessary, then, for this same person to know also the worse, because there is the same science regarding both. Pondering these things, I was glad to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher regarding the cause of things according to Mind to my own satisfaction; and he would tell me, first, whether the earth is flat or round. And when he had spoken, I expected him to explain the cause and the necessity, saying what is better, and that it was better for it to be such. And if he said it was in the middle, I expected him to explain further how it was better for it to be in the middle. And if he declared these things to me, I was prepared to no longer ask for another kind of cause. I was prepared, in the same way, to ask about the sun, and the moon, and the other stars, regarding their speed toward one another, and their turnings, and their other phenomena—how it is better for each of them to do and to suffer what they do suffer. ^C For I would not have believed that he, asserting that they were ordered by Mind, would bring in any other cause for them than that it is best for them to be as they are. So, attributing to each of them the cause, and to all in common what is best for each, I expected him to explain the good common to all. And I would not have traded these hopes for a great price; but with much eagerness, having taken the books, I read them as quickly as I could, so that I might know as quickly as possible the best and the worst. I was carried, then, by an astonishing hope, oh my friend. But as I went on ^D and read, I saw a man who made no use of Mind, and did not attribute any causes to the ordering of things, but blamed airs and ethers and waters and many other strange things. And it seemed to me that he had suffered something very similar, as if someone, saying that Socrates did everything he does with mind, then, attempting to state the causes of each thing that I do, were to say, first, that I sit here now because of this: that my body is composed of bones and sinews; and that the bones are solid and have intersections separate from one another, and the sinews, being such as can be tightened and relaxed, covering the bones with the flesh and skin, hold them together. Thus, with the bones suspended at their joints, the sinews relaxing and tightening make me able to bend my limbs; and for this cause I am sitting here bent. And again, regarding the... [alt-version omitted]

^A causes of my conversing with you, he attributes them to sounds, air, hearing, and six hundred other things of that kind, as if they were causes, while meanwhile omitting the true ones: namely, that when it seemed better to the Athenians to condemn me, for that very reason it seemed better to me to sit here, and more just to remain and undergo the punishment which they might order. For by the Dog, I think that long ago these very sinews and bones would have been either in Megara or in Boeotia, carried by the opinion of what is best, had I not thought it more just and honorable, instead of fleeing and running away, to undergo the punishment which the city assigns, whatever it may be. But to call such things causes is truly absurd. If, however, someone were to say that without having these things—bones, sinews, and whatever else I have—I would not be able to do what seemed right to me, he would be speaking the truth; but to say that it is because of these things that I do what I do—and that I do it with my mind, and not because of the choice of what is best—would be a great and long-winded account of laziness.” Then he adds: “And so ^B one man, placing a vortex around the earth, makes the earth remain by the power of the heavens; another makes the air a pedestal beneath it, like a wide kneading-trough. But the power that has fashioned these things as well as possible, so that they are now disposed as they are, they neither search for, nor do they think it has any divine strength; rather, they think they will discover an Atlas stronger than this, and more immortal, and one that holds all things together more, and in truth, they think that goodness and duty bind and hold nothing together.” So much says Socrates regarding the opinion of Anaxagoras. There was also a successor to Anaxagoras, both of his school and of his opinion, Archelaus. It is said that Socrates became a hearer of Archelaus. Nevertheless, other natural philosophers, such as Xenophanes and Pythagoras, who flourished with Anaxagoras, philosophized concerning the incorruptibility of God and the immortality of the soul. From these men, and after them, the various sects of Greek philosophy ^C arose, some following these men, others those, and some even devising their own peculiar opinions. Once again, therefore, Plutarch writes the opinions of these same men regarding the gods in the following manner.

CHAPTER XIII. Opinions of the philosophers concerning the gods. From Plutarch.

“Some of the philosophers,” he says, “as for instance Diagoras the Milesian, Theodorus the Cyrenaean, and Euhemerus ^D the Cyrenaean, and Callimachus the Cyrenaean, hint at them in his Iambics. And Euripides the...

tragedian, though he did not wish to reveal himself, fearing the Areopagus, yet indicated it in this way. For he introduced Sisyphus as the advocate of this opinion, and he agreed with his sentiment. ^B Following these, he again introduces Anaxagoras, claiming first that he thought rightly about God. He speaks as follows: “Anaxagoras, he says, teaches that in the beginning the bodies were stationary, but that the Mind of God arranged them and made the generations of all things. Plato, however, did not posit that the primary bodies were stationary, but that they were moving in a disorderly fashion; wherefore he says: ‘God, taking control, since order is better than disorder, arranged them.’” To which he adds: “Therefore, both ^C err in common, in that they made God concerned with human affairs, and posited that the world was constructed for their sake. For that blessed and immortal living being, filled with all good things and incapable of any evil, which centers its whole existence on the preservation and guardianship of its own happiness and immortality, is turned away from human affairs. It would be wretched, laboring like a worker or a carpenter, bearing burdens and struggling to construct the world.” And again: “They say that God, either in that whole prior age, when bodies were unmoved, did not yet exist; or when they were moving in a disorderly manner, was either asleep or awake, or neither of these. It is not possible to accept the first; for God is eternal. Nor the second; for if God were asleep from eternity, he would be dead; for eternal sleep ^D is death. But God is free from sleep; for the immortality of God is very far removed from that which is close to death. If, indeed, he were awake, he either lacked happiness or was filled with blessedness. And God is not blessed according to the first; for that which lacks happiness is not blessed; nor according to the second; for since he lacked nothing, he was not about to undertake empty actions. Furthermore, if God exists and human affairs are governed by his providence, how is it that a base and unworthy person prospers, while a noble one suffers the opposite? For Agamemnon, for instance, ‘Both a noble king and a mighty spearman,’ was overcome and murdered by an adulterer and an adulteress; and his kinsman Hercules, after cleansing human life of much that plagued it, was murdered by a poisoned robe from Deianira. Thales says that Mind is the God of the world; Anaximander...

designated the heavenly stars as gods; Democritus placed God in fire, as a spherical soul of the world. Pythagoras, among his first principles, called the Monad God and the Good, which is the nature of the One itself, that is, Mind; but he called the indefinite Dyad a daemon and evil, around which is the material multitude, and the visible world itself. ^B Now hear how those who were younger in time thought: "Socrates and Plato establish as one the self-begotten, self-originated, monadical, and truly existing Good; all these names hasten toward Mind." Therefore, Mind is God, a separate form, that is, unmixed with any matter and combined with nothing capable of suffering. Aristotle deemed the most supreme God to be a separate form, presiding over the sphere of the universe, which is the ethereal body called the fifth element by him. And since the universe is divided into spheres, which are contiguous by nature but separated by the power of reason, he believes that each of the spheres is a living being, composed of body and soul, of which the body is ethereal, moving in a circular motion, while the soul is an immovable reason, the cause of the motion in act. ^C The Stoics more commonly declare that God is an artificial fire, proceeding by a path toward the generation of the world, having encompassed all the seminal reasons according to which all things come to pass by fate. And they say that Spirit passes through the whole world, receiving different names because of the changes of the matter through which it has passed. And they consider the world, the stars, and the earth to be God, and the Mind that is highest of all to be in the ether. Epicurus reasoned that all the gods were human in form, but visible to reason alone because of the subtlety of the nature of the images. And the same man added four other natures, indestructible by genus: atoms, the void, the infinite, and the homoeomeries ^D and elements. Such are the divisions and the blasphemies concerning God of these natural philosophers, the first of whom our discourse establishes to be those around Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, and Socrates, who set Mind and God over the world. These are shown to be mere children in time, according to the times in which these things are recorded in the *Archaeology of the Hebrews*. Therefore, the knowledge of the God of all was not the most ancient among all the Greeks and those of old who introduced the polytheistic superstition among the Phoenicians and Egyptians, which Anaxagoras and those around him were the first of the Greeks to bring forth. And yet the polytheistic superstition prevailed among all nations; but it was, as it seems, not that which contained the true theology, but that which the Egyptians and Phoenicians were the first of all to be witnessed as having established. And this was a system which did not deify gods or any divine powers, but men long since dead, as the truth

...let us compare this with the antiquity of the Hebrews. Indeed, there was among all the Greeks, or among the Phoenicians and Egyptians, or whoever else introduced that ancient superstition concerning the multitude of deities, a very old understanding which Anaxagoras and his contemporaries among the Greeks were the first to bring forward. For that superstitious error concerning many gods had indeed invaded all nations: yet it was of such a kind that it did not contain true and proper theology, but only that which we have shown by so many testimonies above to have been forged first by the Egyptians and Phoenicians. Furthermore, it spoke of neither any gods at all, nor any divine powers, but only of men buried long ago, as the very oracles of truth had predicted so long before. Come then, let us repeat this entire discussion afresh. Since among those 756 natural philosophers, some recalled everything to the senses, while others, like Xenophanes of Colophon and Parmenides the Eleatic, defending other things, abolished the senses and said that nothing could be comprehended by their power, and that therefore faith must be placed in reason alone: let us now see the refutation of those men.

CHAPTER XVII. Against Xenophanes and Parmenides, who abolished the senses; from the eighth book of Aristocles' On Philosophy.

^B "There is," he says, "a far different voice and discourse of others. For they believe that the senses and everything seen are to be utterly rejected, and that faith must be placed in reason alone. And first indeed, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus were occupied with that doctrine, which Stilpo and the Megarian philosophers later defended. They maintained that whatever exists is one alone, and that what was different from it did not exist; that nothing is generated, nothing is corrupted, and that nothing at all is moved. There will be another place for a more extended philosophical discussion against them; now, however, as far as this point is concerned, we argue thus. We ourselves also acknowledge that reason is the most divine part of us: but yet we also stand in need of sense, just as we do of body. And indeed that sense is also naturally equipped ^C for producing the truth is manifest from this argument. It is impossible for one who senses not to undergo some affection; and he who undergoes an affection must know that which he undergoes. Therefore, sense is a certain kind of knowledge. But if to sense is to undergo something, and whatever undergoes something is affected by something, it is absolutely consequential that that which effects is different from that which is affected. Thus we have first that which is called different, such as color and sound; and then that whatever exists is not some one thing. Add that it is not even immobile, since the very process of sensing is a certain motion. Wherefore there is no one who would not wish to have senses, as nature demands: I believe because all place greater trust in healthy ^D senses than in those suffering from any defect. And deservedly, therefore, a certain vehement love for them is deeply inherent in us; nor could anyone be found so insane as to wish to lose even one sense in order to enjoy all other goods. But those who malign them—those who have once been brought to this opinion, that they consider the senses useless—ought to apply to the senses themselves what Pandarus in Homer said concerning his bow:

'May an enemy immediately take off my head, Unless I cast this broken quiver into the midst of the flames With my hands, when it hangs as inert weight Across my shoulders:'

' as a consequence of this, to destroy all their own senses. For in this way alone would one believe those who teach by deeds, that they had no need of any of them. But now, this is most absurd. For while pronouncing them useless by their discourse, they persist in using them most of all in their deeds. For Melissus, wishing to demonstrate that none of the things that appear and are placed before our eyes have any real existence, brings forward arguments from those very things that appear. 'For if,' he says, 'there is earth, and water, and air, and fire, and iron, and gold; and what is living, and what is dead, and black, and white, and all other things that men say truly exist, or which we correctly see and hear; then the thing that is must necessarily be such as it first appeared to us to be, and not shift, nor become another thing, but rather be identical and constant in whatever it is.' But now we said that we correctly see, and hear, and understand; yet it appears to us that what is hot becomes cold, and what is cold becomes hot; and what is hard becomes soft, and what is soft becomes hard. When he and others say many such things, someone might very reasonably ask him, 'Did you learn by perceiving it that what is now hot afterwards becomes cold?' Similarly, too, regarding the other things. For what I said holds: nothing would be found, except by destroying and refuting the senses, because he relies upon them most of all. But such arguments have now already given a sufficient account of themselves; for they have become so effete, just as if they had not been spoken ^B at all. Now, however, let us confidently say that those who invite both the senses and reason to the knowledge of things are the ones who philosophize correctly. Such then, were the followers of Xenophanes, who is said to have flourished at the times of Pythagoras and Anaxagoras. For Parmenides was the auditor of Xenophanes; Melissus, of him; Zeno, of him; Leucippus, of him; Democritus, of him; and Protagoras and Nessas, of him; and Metrodorus gave attention to Nessas, Diogenes to Metrodorus, Anaxarchus to Diogenes, and Anaxarchus had Pyrrho as a disciple. Pyrrho instituted the sect of the Sceptics; and it is possible to learn from the aforementioned writing, which speaks word for word as follows, how those who held the contrary opinion refuted them, in that they determined that nothing at all could be apprehended, either by sense or by reason, and that they therefore withheld assent in all things.

CHAPTER XVIII.

^A Pyrrho of Elis was indeed a keen and ardent champion of this opinion, yet he left nothing in writing. But his disciple Timon says that he who aspires to happiness must look to these three things: first, what is the nature of things; second, in what manner we ought to be disposed toward them; and lastly, what will be the outcome for those who are so disposed. As to the nature of things, he asserts that they are all equally indifferent, immeasurable, and inestimable; and for this reason, neither our senses nor our opinions can be either true or false. Therefore, we ought not to trust them, but be without opinion, uninclined, and unwavering, saying of each individual thing that it is no more than it is not, or that it both is and is not, or that it neither is nor is not. Timon says that those who are thus disposed will attain first to speechlessness, and then to peace of mind, to which Ænesidemus adds pleasure. These are the main points of what is said. Let us see if they speak correctly. Since, therefore, they say that all things are equally indifferent, and for that reason counsel that one should not assent to anything nor hold any opinion, one might reasonably, I think, ask them: "Do they err who consider that there is a difference between things, or do they not?" For in any case, if they are in error, they cannot be thinking rightly. Thus it would be necessary for them to say that there are some who hold false opinions about existing things, and that they themselves are the ones who speak the truth; and thus it would follow that there is something true and something false. But if we, the multitude, do not err in thinking that things differ, what has come over them that they attack us? For they themselves would be the ones who err in asserting that they do not differ. Moreover, even if we were to grant them that all things are utterly without difference, it is clear that they would not be any different from the multitude. What, then, is this wisdom of theirs that they finally show us? Or why is it that Timon rails against all others, but praises Pyrrho alone? Furthermore, if there is no difference in things, they will not even be subject to the distinction of whether they differ or do not differ, or whether one should hold an opinion or not. For why should these things be rather than not be? Or, as Timon himself is accustomed to say, why so? Why not? Indeed, to what end even the "why" itself? For it is evident that every inquiry must be utterly abolished. Let them therefore cease to cause us further annoyance. For they are surely insane, while, forgetful of their own art, they simultaneously command us to hold no opinion and yet command us to do this very thing; and they say that one ought not to make pronouncements about anything, and then they make pronouncements. And they claim that one should agree with no one, yet they command us to obey them; then, saying they know nothing, they rebuke everyone as if they knew everything well. It is necessary for those who assert that all things are uncertain to do one of two things: either remain silent, or pronounce and say something. If they were to keep silence, it is clear that there would be no discussion with such people; but if they were to make pronouncements, they would entirely and in every way either say that something exists or that it does not exist, just as they currently say that all things are unknown and inestimable to all, and that nothing is anywhere known. He, therefore, who asserts that he either declares a thing and it is possible to understand what is being said, or it is not—but if he does not declare it, no discussion can be had with such a person in any case; but if he does signify it, he must necessarily speak of either infinite or finite things. And if

^A he speaks of infinite things, he will again destroy all facility for discussion with him, because the knowledge of an infinite thing is impossible. But if he signifies some finite things, or even just one thing, he who does this must necessarily define that one thing and pass judgment upon it. How then could all things be unknown and exempt from judgment? If he says that these things both are and are not, first of all, the same thing will be both true and false; then, he will both say something and not say it, and while using discourse, he will destroy discourse. Furthermore, while confessing that he is speaking untruths, he says that one ought to believe him. It is worth investigating from where, having learned what, they say that all things are obscure. For they must first know what it is that is manifest; only then would they be able to say that things are not as such. For one must first know the affirmation, and then the negation. But if they are ignorant of what the manifest is, they would not be able to know what the obscure is. Whenever, moreover, Aenesidemus in his Outlines goes through the nine modes (for by so many he attempts to demonstrate that things are obscure), shall we say that he speaks of them knowing them, or in ignorance? For he says that animals differ, and we ourselves, and states, and lives, and customs, and laws. And he says that our senses are weak, and that many things from without corrupt knowledge: intervals, and magnitudes, and motions; and besides, that there is no similarity of disposition between the young and the old, and those awake and those sleeping, and the healthy and the sick; and that we grasp nothing simple and pure. For all things are confounded, and said in relation to something. To him who speaks these and such things ^B with affectation, one would gladly ask: Does he speak knowing well that things are in this state, or in ignorance? For if he did not know, how could we believe him? But if he did know, he would be a total fool, at once declaring all things to be obscure, and at the same time saying that he knows so many things. And yet, whenever they go through such things, they do nothing else but speak of a kind of induction, showing what the phenomena and the particulars are like. And such a thing both is and is called belief. If, therefore, they assent to it, it is clear that they are forming opinions. If they do not believe, then we should not pay attention to them. Timon, however, in his *Python* tells a long story of how he met Pyrrho walking at Delphi, by the temple of Amphiaraus, and what they conversed about with each other. Would it not be reasonable for one to stand by him as he is writing these things and say, "Why, you rascal, do you vex yourself writing these things, and recounting things you do not know? For why did you any the more meet and converse with him, or not converse?" And that very same wonderful Pyrrho, did he know why he was walking to see the Pythian games, or was he wandering along the road like a madman? And when he began to rail against men and their ignorance, shall we say that he was telling the truth, or not? Are we to say that Timon also suffered something, and gave credence to his words, or did not pay attention? For if he was not persuaded, how did he become a philosopher instead of a dancer, and follow ^C Pyrrho...?

^A Indeed, absurd it would be for anyone to be a philosopher himself, while preventing us from being so. But, simply put, one might wonder what the purpose of Timon’s *Silli* [(2')] is, and all the blasphemies against all mankind, and the base elements of Aenesidemus, and all such a mass of words. For if they wrote these things thinking to make us better, and for this reason think it necessary to refute everyone so that we might cease our babbling, they evidently want us to know the truth and to suppose that things are as Pyrrho claims. So, if we were persuaded by them, from worse we would become better, having judged the more advantageous things and having accepted those who speak better. How then could things be equally indifferent and undecided? And how could we become unassenting and dogmatically neutral? But if there is no benefit in these words, why do they trouble us? Or why does Timon say: "He finished by admiring"?

^B But if he did agree with what was said, Simon Apollonides says that Timon was the son of Timarchus and of Phliasian origin. Abandoned as a youth to dance, he later condemned this, and traveled to Megara to Stilpo. Then he traveled to Elis to Pyrrho with his wife.

"No other mortal could vie with Pyrrho; For one would no more admire Pyrrho than that Corybus, or Melitides, who are thought to excel in folly."

Indeed, one must also reflect on these things. For what sort of citizen, or judge, or councillor, or friend, or, to put it simply, what sort of human being would such a person be? Or what evil would he not dare to do, he who truly believes nothing to be shameful, or just, or unjust? For no one would say that such people fear the laws, the judges, and punishments. For how could they, being themselves impassive and untroubled, as they say? For Timon says these things about Pyrrho:

^C "I saw the one who was distinct, neither arrogant nor conquered By all things by which it is conquered, both by the unspeakable and the spoken, The light-headed tribes of people, weighed down now here, now there, By passions, and reputation, and thoughtless legislation."

There are three books of the *Silli*, in which, as a Skeptic, he rails against everyone and mocks the Dogmatists in the form of a parody. The first of these has its explanation as self-narrated, while the second and third are in the form of a dialogue. ^D "Tell me now, all you who are busybodies..." [The text continues regarding] the work he wrote and dedicated to Tiberius Caesar, on which Diogenes himself had published commentaries. Then, regarding the works of Timon, he says, he delivers this as the beginning of the work: "Tell me now, all you who are busybodies, you sophists."

^A Moreover, when they pronounce that excellent and wise dictum, that in ordering one's life one ought to follow the guidance of nature and custom, while at the same time teaching that one should not assent to anything whatsoever, they act most ineptly. For if faith is to be withdrawn from all other things, it must at least necessarily be held toward this, and it must be squarely established that the matter is so. But why should we follow the guidance of nature and custom rather than depart from it, when we either know nothing at all, or have no power by which any judgment can be formed? For what they add is of an extreme sort of stupidity: just as purgative medicines, in which there is the power of purging, are excreted together with the substances they purge, so they say that the very reason which declares all things to be uncertain also destroys itself along with the rest. For if it refutes itself, he who uses it acts senselessly. Let these men, therefore, remain silent and not even utter a sound. Yet their reasoning does not actually have anything in common with a purgative medicine. For a medicine is excreted, so that it does not remain in the body; but this reasoning must always exist firmly in the mind, and gain our perpetual faith, as it is the only thing that causes us not to assent to anyone. Furthermore, that they do not even steal away the power of opinion from man, you may understand from this: he who perceives cannot, in any way, stop perceiving; but to perceive is to know. And that they do have faith in perception, no one fails to see. For, wishing to see more accurately, they are accustomed to rub their eyes, and to approach more closely, and to blink as they look. ^B And what of the fact that we perceive both joy and pain? For it is impossible for anyone to be unaware that he is being burned or cut. Who would not say that memories and recollections are also linked with opinion? ^C Regarding common notions—that such a thing is a man—and furthermore regarding the sciences and arts, what could one say? Nothing of these would exist if we were not naturally disposed to form opinions. But I leave other matters aside. If we either believe or disbelieve what is said by these men, we necessarily find ourselves having to hold opinions in every way and altogether. That it is impossible, therefore, to philosophize in this manner is clear; and that it is contrary to nature and contrary to the laws, we may discern thus. For if things were truly such as they say, what would be left for us but to live as if in a dream, at random and impulsively? Thus, legislators, and generals, and teachers would all be prattling in vain. But to me, all other men seem to live according to nature, while only those who prattle such things seem to be demented—or rather, to be suffering from a very robust madness. One might discern this no less from the following. ^D For Antigonus of Carystus, who lived during those same times and who wrote an account of their lives, says that Pyrrho, when pursued by a dog, took refuge in a tree; and when he was mocked by those who were present, he replied that it was difficult to strip off the human. Furthermore, when his sister Philista was offering a sacrifice, and one of his friends had promised the items for the sacrifice but did not provide them, Pyrrho, having purchased them himself and being indignant—since the friend was saying that he had not acted in accordance with his teachings, and that it was not worthy of his imperturbability—replied: "In the case of a woman, at any rate, one ought not to demonstrate it." And yet the friend would have rightly said that it is vain in the case of a woman, and a dog, and all things.

And if it seems to you that there is some profit to be gained from this discourse, it will not be out of place to learn both who the followers of this man were, and whom he himself emulated. Pyrrho, therefore, was a disciple of one Anaxarchus, who at first was a painter, though with little success; but afterward, having fallen upon the books of Democritus, he found nothing good in them, nor did he write anything himself, but only heaped insults and reproaches upon all gods and men. Later, while suffering from this kind of arrogance, and yet calling himself free from arrogance, he left nothing behind in writing. He had as a disciple Timon the Phliasian, who had previously been a dancer on the stage, but when he had heard the man, he published mordant and stinging verses, with which he attacked the whole race of earlier philosophers. For he was the author of the ^A *Silloi*, of which number are those that follow:

Wretched men, mere shames, bellies, Fashioned from such strifes and groanings. And: Men, bags full of empty conceits.

^B When no one paid any attention to them, as if they had never come into existence at all, just the other day in Alexandria in Egypt a certain Aenesidemus began to rekindle this struggle. And these are, by common opinion, almost the principal ones who have trodden this path of philosophizing. And it is certain that no one in his right mind would say that such a sect, or school, or by whatever other name one might wish to call it, is straight. For my part, I do not think it should even be called philosophy, since it utterly subverts the very principles of philosophizing. ^C Let these things, then, be said against those who are thought to philosophize according to Pyrrho. Congenial and akin to these, perhaps, could be the things by which those are refuted who, following the opinion of Aristippus the Cyrenaean, taught that nothing can be grasped except what is experienced through suffering. Now, Aristippus was a companion of Socrates, and he established what is called the Cyrenaic sect, from which Epicurus took the occasion for his own exposition of the end. Aristippus was a man very soft and fond of pleasure; although he himself never spoke openly about the end, yet by the power of his discourse he taught that the foundation of ^D happiness is placed in pleasures. For, by always speaking about pleasure, he led those who came to him to the suspicion that he meant the end to be living pleasurably. He had as disciples a certain Synallus and his daughter, Arete. She, having given birth to a son, named him Aristippus, who, having been led by her into the study of philosophy, was commonly called "mother-taught." This man clearly defined the end to be living pleasurably, setting down pleasure in accordance with motion. For he said there are three states concerning our constitution: one,

in which we suffer, resembling a storm at sea; another, in which we rejoice, similar to an even wave (for he considered pleasure to be an even motion, most similar to a favorable wind); and a third, a middle state, in which we neither suffer nor rejoice, being close to calm and tranquility. He claimed that we have perception of these states alone. Following these, he may be refuted.

CHAPTER XIX. Against the followers of Aristippus, who say that only internal states [the *pathe*] can be comprehended, while all other things are incomprehensible. From the same author.

^B Next, let us consider those who say that only the states which we suffer can be comprehended. Certain Cyrenaics were of this school. They were so disposed, as if pressed down by a deep sleep, that they said there was nothing at all, unless someone stood by and beat and pricked them. For they said that, when being burned or cut, they realized they were suffering something; but whether it was fire that burned or iron that cut, they could not say. One might immediately ask those who say these things if they know even this—namely, that they are suffering and perceiving something. For if they do not know it, they could not even say that they know only the suffering; but if they do know it, then it would not be the case that only the "sufferings" are comprehensible. For the statement, "I am being burned," is a proposition, not a suffering. Moreover, there must necessarily be these three things coexisting: the suffering itself, the agent, and the patient. Therefore, the one perceiving the suffering ^C must surely perceive it. It is not possible that, if he happens to be getting warm, he will know it, but will not know whether it is he himself or his neighbor; or whether it is now or last year; or whether he is in Athens or in Egypt; or whether he is alive or dead; or, furthermore, whether he is a man or a stone. Therefore, he will also know by what he is suffering. For they do, in fact, recognize one another, as well as roads, cities, and food. Craftspeople, for their part, know their own tools. Physicians and sailors foresee future events. And even among animals, dogs find their tracks. Furthermore, the one suffering is necessarily aware of whether the suffering is something proper to them or something foreign. How, then, will he be able to say that this is pleasure and that is pain? Or that he is suffering something while tasting, seeing, or hearing—suffering something by tasting with the tongue, seeing with the eyes, or hearing with the ears? ^D Or how do they know that this thing ought to be chosen and that thing avoided? If they knew none of these things, they would have no impulse or desire, and thus they would not even be living creatures. They are ridiculous when they say that these things happen to them, yet they do not know how or in what manner they happen. For these people could not even say if they were human beings or if they were alive; consequently, they could not even say if they were speaking and making assertions. What argument could there be against such people? One might marvel if they are ignorant of whether they are on earth or in heaven; but it is far more marvelous if they do not know, even while claiming to philosophize, whether the number four is greater than the number three, and what one and two amount to. For these very people cannot even say how many fingers they have on their hands, nor whether each of them is one person or more. So they do not even...

know their own name, nor their country, nor Aristippus; nor can they tell if they love, hate, desire, laugh, or weep; and consequently, they cannot pronounce whether this is pleasant or that is painful. It is evident, therefore, that they do not even understand what we are saying at this moment. Such people, then, would differ in no way from gnats or flies; yet even those creatures know what is consistent with their own nature. ^A Well, as for those who are in such a state, though there is a myriad of things that could be said, these are enough. It follows, therefore, that we should examine those who take the opposite path and defend the view that one must in all things trust the senses of the body—among whom are Metrodorus of Chios and Protagoras of Abdera. It is said that Metrodorus was a pupil of Democritus and that he posited as his principles the plenum and the void, the former being "being," and the latter "non-being." When he was about to write on nature, he used this opening: "None of us knows anything, not even this very thing, whether we know or do not know." This opening gave a wicked occasion to Pyrrho, who came after him. Advancing further, he asserted that all things are that which each man conceives them to be. As for Protagoras, tradition holds him to have been called an atheist. Writing on the gods, he himself used this opening: "As for the gods, I have no knowledge, neither that they exist, nor that they do not, nor what their form might be. For there are many things that prevent me from knowing each of these." The Athenians condemned him to exile and publicly burned his books in the middle of the marketplace. Since, therefore, these men said we should believe in the senses alone, let us consider the refutations against them.

CHAPTER XX

"There have been some, moreover, who said that one must place faith only in the senses and appearances. ^C Nor are there wanting those who would have it that something similar was hinted at by Homer when he called Ocean the beginning of all things, on the grounds that things exist in a perpetual flux. Metrodorus of Chios asserts the same thing, and Protagoras of Abdera does so clearly and explicitly. For he maintains that man is the measure of all things: of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not. For whatever things appear to each person, those things also are. And regarding other matters, we can assert nothing with certainty." How rightly one might object to these men, even as Plato ^D does in the *Theaetetus*: "First of all, why does it happen that one person feels this so, and another feels it otherwise? And to a great degree? Should we say then that the wind itself is cold or not cold, or shall we be persuaded by Protagoras that it is cold to the one who is shivering, and to the one who is not, it is not?" He mocks him with many interjections, so that it seems he is thinking about the man himself: "What shall I do? For I am someone who laughs with a petulant spleen."

^A Since those things exist, they deemed man to be the measure of truth; yet did they not grasp the main point? ^B Furthermore, how could they say that they themselves were wise, if everyone is their own measure of truth? Or how do they refute others, if to each person that which seems true to him is indeed true? Do we not remain ignorant of certain things, even though we frequently perceive them, just as when we listen to barbarians? He who has seen anything, and then remembers it, certainly knows it, but he no longer senses it. And if one were to close one eye while looking with the other, it is clear that he will both know and not know the same thing. ^C Besides this, if what appears to each is also true, yet what is said by those people does not appear true to us, then it would be true that man is not the measure of all things. Furthermore, skilled people differ from the unskilled, and the experienced from the inexperienced; and for this reason, the pilot, the physician, and the general foresee the future more clearly and accurately. ^D Simply put, these people abolish [the concepts of] the "more" and the "less," the "necessary" and the "contingent," the "natural" and the "contrary to nature"; and thus the same thing would be both existent and non-existent. For nothing prevents the same thing from seeming to exist for some, and not to exist for others. And the same thing could be both a man and a log. For there are times when it appears to be a man to one person, and a log to another. ^A Every statement would be true, and for that same reason, also false. And those deliberating or judging would have nothing to do. And most terribly, the same people would be noble and base; the same thing would be both vice and virtue. One could have many such things to say. But there is no need for further words against those who do not believe they have [any need for them].

The beginning of the argument

^B

And since, he says, there are even now some who maintain that every sensation and every appearance is true, let us say a few things about them too. For these men seem to fear that if they were to say that some sensations are false, they would not have a certain and reliable criterion and rule. But they do not see that they would immediately run into the absurdity of declaring all opinions to be true—for we are naturally inclined to judge by them in many cases—and yet they nonetheless deem some of them to be true and others false. Furthermore, if one were to examine it, one would see that even among other criteria, there is nothing that is always and in every way unfailing; I am speaking, for instance, of a balance, or a carpenter's square, or anything of that sort; rather, each of them, in this way, is accurate, but in that way, defective; and using it this way, it tells the truth, but using it that way, it lies. And indeed, if every sensation were true, there would be no need for them to differ so much. For there are those things perceived from nearby and from afar, and those of the sick and the healthy, and of the skilled and the unskilled, and of the wise and the foolish. And it would be altogether absurd to call the sensations of the insane true, as well as those of people who see or hear incorrectly. For it would be a silly thing to say, regarding one who sees incorrectly, that he either sees or does not see. For someone might say that he does see, but not correctly. Yet, when they say that sensation, being non-rational, neither adds anything nor takes anything away, it is evident that they do not see what is right before their eyes. For in the case of the oar in the water, and in paintings, and in ten thousand other things, ^C it is sensation itself that deceives us. Hence it is that we all blame not our own mind in such cases, but the appearance. For the argument refutes itself by claiming that every appearance is true. For it declares our own [view], because of which we do not believe every appearance to be such, to be altogether false. It follows, therefore, that according to them, every appearance is both true and false. Furthermore, they err generally by maintaining that things are exactly as they appear to us. For on the contrary, they appear as they are by nature, and we do not make them to be so; rather, we are affected by them in a certain way. For it would be ridiculous if, should we think of puppies or chimeras, as painters and sculptors do, we were to demand that they be real immediately, and that because we imagine them, they should therefore be present as though they were ready at hand. That those who claim that every sensation and every appearance is true, do not speak correctly, is evident from these things. ^D

But even with things standing as they do, once again, those around Epicurus, setting out from the succession of Aristippus, hung everything upon pleasure and sensation, defining only the modifications of the soul as strictly apprehensible and pleasure as the final good. Epicurus is said by some to have heard no one, but to have encountered the writings of the ancients; but by others, that he heard Xenocrates, and later became a follower of Nausiphanes the Pyrrhonean. Let us now observe what has been argued against him.

CHAPTER XXI. Against the Epicureans, who would have pleasure to be the end. From the same.

^A "Since," he says, "there is a twofold species of cognition: one by which we perceive external things, and another by which we sense what is to be sought and what is to be avoided by us, there have existed some who established pleasure and pain as the source and rule of choice and avoidance in us. And even to this day, those around Epicurus say similar things. It is therefore necessary to consider this matter also. I am so far from saying that the affection is the source and rule of goods and evils, that it seems to me that it itself requires a different rule of judgment. For that it exists, it shows of itself; but what sort it is, requires something else to judge it. For whether it is innate or foreign, sense pronounces; but whether it is to be sought or to be avoided, reason decides. They themselves, indeed, say that they do not embrace every pleasure, nor avoid every pain. And this happens very reasonably. For criteria show both themselves and the things being judged; ^B but an affection shows only itself. And they themselves testify that this is the case. For although they claim that every pleasure is good and every pain is evil, they nevertheless say that one should not always choose the one and avoid the other; for they are measured by quantity, even if not by quality. It is clear, therefore, that quantity is judged by nothing else than reason. For the statement, 'It is better to endure certain pains so that we may enjoy greater pleasures,' and the statement, 'It is expedient to abstain from certain pleasures, so that we may not suffer more severe pains,' and all such things, are judged by reason. In general, senses and impressions are like mirrors and images of things; but affections, pleasures, and pains are changes and alterations of ourselves. In this way, while we are sensing and forming impressions, we look to external things; but while we are enjoying or suffering, we turn back only to ourselves. For our senses are produced by outward things, and whatever those things are like, such are the impressions they produce; but these affections are of a certain quality because of us, and according to how we are. For this reason they appear now pleasant, now unpleasant, and sometimes more so and sometimes less. Thus, if we wish to examine them, we shall find that those who best determine the principles of knowledge are they who make use of both the senses and the mind. ^C It seems that sense is like the nets and the traps and other such implements of hunters, while the mind and reason are like the dogs that track and pursue. For these reasons, it is necessary to consider those as better philosophers who neither use the senses just as they happen, nor just accept the affections for the discernment of the truth. For it would be terrible indeed if men, being what they are by nature, were to surrender themselves to irrational pleasures and pains, abandoning the most divine judge, the mind." These things [are] from Aristocles.

CHAPTER XXII. Again, against those who define pleasure as the good. From Plato's Philebus.

^A "Let us, therefore," he says, "compare each of these three things with pleasure and the mind, one by one. For we must see to which of these we should assign each thing as being more akin. You understand beauty, truth, and moderation?" "I do." "Take first the truth, O Protarchus, and having taken it, looking toward the three—mind, truth, and pleasure—after waiting for a long time, answer yourself: which is more akin to truth, pleasure or the mind?" "What need is there of time? For, in my judgment, it makes a great difference. Pleasure is the most arrogant of all things; and concerning those related to Venus, which are considered to be the most intense of all, it is commonly ^B said that if one commits perjury in these matters, one easily obtains pardon from the gods, because they, just like some children, are completely devoid of any mind. But the mind is either the very same thing as truth, or it is the most similar and most true of all things." "Will you not, therefore, consider moderation in the same way? Does pleasure possess more of it, or prudence?" "You have also proposed an easy question for consideration. For I think one could never find anything in existing things more immoderate than pleasure and excessive joy, nor, on the other hand, anything more moderate than the mind and knowledge." "Well said. But still tell me the third thing. Does the mind participate more in beauty than the class of pleasure, so that the mind is more beautiful than pleasure, or is it the reverse?" "But did anyone ever, ^C O Socrates, either awake or dreaming, see or conceive of prudence and mind being shameful anywhere, in any way, whether coming into being, or existing, or about to exist?" "Correct. But indeed, whenever we see anyone indulging in pleasures, and those almost the greatest, because either laughter or the greatest shame follows upon them openly, we ourselves are ashamed, and, hiding them, we bury them as much as possible, consigning all such things to the darkness of night, as if they feared the scrutiny of the light. Will you not then, O Protarchus, proclaim everywhere, both by the mediation of messengers to those who are absent and by voice to those present, that pleasure is not the first possession, nor the second, but that the first is in some way concerned with measure, and the moderate, and the timely, and ^D all such things as must be considered to have been declared the eternal nature?" "It seems so from what has been said just now." "The second is concerned with the proportionate, and the beautiful, and the complete, and the sufficient, and all such things as belong to this class of generation." "It seems so. Therefore, the third..."

as I conjecture, ^A if you were to place mind and wisdom, you would not be far from the truth." "Perhaps." "Are there not then a fourth," (16) which we have attributed to the soul itself, as sciences, and arts, and correctly spoken opinions, which are to be considered as fourth in relation to the three? If indeed they are more akin to the good than to pleasure." (17) "Very likely." "Fifth then, the pleasures which we defined as painless, calling them pure, of the soul itself, and following upon the senses." "Perhaps."

"And in the sixth generation," says Orpheus, "conclude ^B the song."

Indeed, it is likely that our discourse should also be concluded in the sixth judgment. For there is nothing remaining, except to place, as it were, a crown upon what has been said. "And so it should be." Come then, let us testify to the same Savior, and resume this discourse of ours which we have now gone through for the third time. "Which one, pray?" Philebus posited that all pleasure was the good, complete and entire. "The third, Socrates, as you seem to have said just now, is that the discourse must be taken up from the beginning." "Yes. Let us hear what follows. For I, having perceived what I have now gone through, and being displeased at the argument of Philebus, not only, but also of countless others, said that mind is, by far, ^C better and more excellent for human life than pleasure." "That was so." "But suspecting that there were also many other things, I said that if anything should appear anywhere better than both, I would struggle for mind against pleasure in the matter of the second place, if pleasure were to be deprived of the second place." "You did indeed say so." "And after these things, it appeared that neither of these was sufficiently adequate for all things." "Most true." "Therefore, in this discourse, both mind and pleasure were entirely cast out, and the good itself was not considered to be either of them, as they were both lacking self-sufficiency and the power of the sufficient and the perfect." "Most correctly." "But another, something better than both of these, having appeared, mind was found to be, by a great measure, more akin and ^D more naturally related to the idea of that which wins than pleasure." "How could it be otherwise?" "Therefore, the power of pleasure, as the discourse has now declared, would come in fifth in the judgment." "It seems so." "And let this be the first: even if all oxen, and horses, and all other wild beasts were to say so, pursuing pleasure—to whom the many, believing them as if they were soothsayers, judge that pleasures are the most excellent for us to live well, and think the loves of the beasts to be more authoritative witnesses than those of the discourse which is, at each time, inspired by the Muse of philosophy." "Most truly, Socrates, we all now say that you have spoken well."

These are the words of Plato. And I [provide] to you also [that] of Dionysius,

^A a man of the philosophy according to Christ, bishop, taken from his own words as they stand, having [these] translated from the [works] that argue against Epicurus.

CHAPTER XXIII.

"Whether," he says, "the universe is one and coherent, as it appears to us and to the most wise of the Greeks, Plato and Pythagoras, and those from the Stoa, and Heraclitus; or two, as perhaps someone might have supposed; or rather many and even infinite, as it has seemed to certain others who, through many deviations of their thought and varied ways of naming things, have attempted to fragment the substance of the whole, and propose it to be infinite, and unbegotten, ^B and devoid of providence? For some, calling them 'atoms'—certain incorruptible and very small bodies, infinite in number—and introducing some 'void' space, not circumscribed by any boundaries, declare that these atoms are moving about at random in that void, and as they collide with one another by chance through an irregular motion, and, because of their many-sided forms, become entangled and grasp one another, and thus they effect the world and the things in it—or rather, they effect infinite worlds." Epicurus and Democritus have shared in this view; but they differed to the extent that Epicurus held all atoms to be the smallest, and therefore imperceptible by the senses, while Democritus held that some atoms at ^C least are very large. Both, however, teach that they are called and are indissoluble because of their unbreakable firmness. There are some, however, who by the name of 'atoms' understand certain bodies which themselves lack parts, yet are parts of the universe, from which, being indivisible, all things are composed and into which they are dissolved. Of these parts lacking internal division, they say Diodorus was the originator of the term; as for the name, they say Heraclides gave them another, calling them 'masses' (*ogkoi*), from whom also the physician Asclepiades inherited the name. ^D Having said this, he proceeds to refute the doctrine through many [points], and among other things, with the words that follow.

CHAPTER XXIV.

"How, then, can we tolerate these men, when they say that works full of wisdom, and therefore good, were made by chance? And [they say this regarding works] every one of which, having come into being separately or all together, appeared good to Him by whose command all things had existence. 'For God saw,' he says, 'all things that He had made; and behold, they were very good.' (Gen. I, 31). And yet not even..."

^A from small and customary examples, and those near at hand that provide instruction, can they learn that nothing useful and beneficial is produced without care or by mere chance, but is rather established through skillful labor. But when it falls into uselessness and is scattered by chance, it is because wisdom, by which it was to have been constituted, no longer handles or directs it. For a garment is not woven without a weaver, with the warp threads being established, nor does the woof interweave itself automatically. And if it should be worn out, the shredded pieces are cast away as rags. A house or a city is built, not by accepting some stones that settle of their own accord into the foundations, and others that leap upward into the superstructures, but the mason puts the suitable stones in their place. But once it has been razed, each part falls wherever it may, and is scattered. And in the construction of a ship, neither does a keel place itself, nor does the mast in the middle rise upright of its own accord, nor does each of the other timbers occupy the position it caught by chance; nor are the so-called hundred timbers of a wagon joined together into whatever empty space each happens to find. But the carpenter brought together what was needful for each ^B. But if the ship, while sailing the sea, were to be broken up, or a wagon being carried along the land, the timbers are scattered wherever chance may take them, some by the waves, others by the force of the momentum. Thus it would be fitting to say to them that those atoms of theirs, remaining idle, unmade by hand, and useless, are carried about at random. For let those invisible ones look, and let those without understanding perceive, not like him who, having this made manifest to himself by God, confesses it to God himself with these words: "Your unformed substance my eyes beheld." (Ps. CXXXVIII, 16). And when they also say that the fine-woven fabrics come from atoms, and yet say that these things are produced by them without wisdom and without perception, who will tolerate hearing of these atoms that are without order, of which even the spider is wiser, crafting by its own skill? ^{C D}

very elegant, which they say are woven from their atoms, while at the same time they add that they were perfected by those same atoms without design or sensation? Who, pray, could tolerate them when they thrust upon us indigestible and crude atoms, which a spider’s wisdom far surpasses, since it constructs its own work by its own industry?

CHAPTER XXV.

A Who could listen with a fair ear to the assertion that this vast house, consisting of heaven and earth, which on account of the great and manifold wisdom inherent in it is called the world, has received all its order and adornment from atoms that are carried about without any order, and that disturbance itself has been changed into a world? Who could believe that those set motions and revolutions spring from some inconstant impulse? Who could believe that the absolute harmony of heavenly things is tempered by unorganized and discordant instruments? ^B Moreover, how is it that, while the essence of all is one and the same, and their nature is the same incorruptible one, yet—merely by the difference of magnitude and shape, as they say—some bodies are nevertheless, as they themselves might call them, divine, superior to fate, and everlasting, or at least, as someone has preferred to say, of longer life? Some of these are perceived by sight, such as the sun, moon, stars, earth, and water; others escape the senses, such as gods, demons, and souls. For these exist, and they cannot deny it, however much they might wish to. ^C Others, again, possess a very long life, whether they are of the genus of living creatures or of plants. Of living creatures, as they themselves assert, there are among birds, eagles, ravens, and phoenixes; among land animals, stags, elephants, and dragons; and among sea creatures, what are called whales. Among trees, there are palms, oaks, and persea trees. Some of these retain a perpetual greenness, of which kind fourteen are enumerated by someone; others bloom at a certain time and are also stripped of their leaves. Finally, others, and indeed these are by far the most numerous, whether they spring from the earth or are born, are included within the most severe limits of a very brief life, among which is man himself, as the divine Scripture speaks of him in one place, saying: “But man, born of a woman, living for a short time.” ^D I suppose they will reply that the diverse connections of the atoms are the causes of such a great difference in persistence. For they say that some, evidently, are bound together more closely and tightly by them, and because they are thus denser, they are for that reason far more difficult to dissolve; whereas others, because they are bound by a looser and more relaxed connection of atoms, and this, moreover, with some distinctiveness, are therefore more quickly or more slowly removed from their arrangement and connection. Lastly, that some are composed of certain things, and others of other things, which are shaped in a certain way and which behave otherwise among themselves. But who, then, is the judge of these various, so to speak, tribes, who gathers some and dissipates others? Who brings them together among themselves in such a way that from them now a sun arises, and now a moon? Who, finally, [assigns to the natures of individual stars those things which are specific and natural to each]?

^A And if, indeed, the composition of these things happened without sensation, as if they were inanimate, they had need of a knowledgeable creator; but if the union was involuntary and by necessity, as if they were irrational, some wise shepherd of the flock drove them together and presided over them; but if they have been assembled voluntarily for a work of their own, some wonderful architect and taskmaster of them has led them; or, just as a well-ordered general does not leave the army confused [and everything mixed together, but in order designates the cavalry, and separately the heavy infantry, and the javelin-throwers by themselves, and the archers apart, and the slingers where it was necessary, so that those in similar gear might fight in alliance with one another]. If they think this example is a laughingstock because I am making a comparison of large bodies with the smallest, we shall pass on to the smallest things. ^B Next, following these things, he adds: “And if neither a word, nor an election, nor an arrangement of a commander were to be imposed upon them, but they themselves, directing themselves from the great turbulence of the flux, and having passed through the great tumult of collisions, were to lead the likes to their likes, not by God, according to the poet, but were to run together and herd together, recognizing their kin—what a wonderful democracy of atoms this is, of friends greeting friends and embracing, and hastening to dwell in one neighborhood! And of some being turned automatically into a great light, the sun, so that they might make the day; and of others being ignited into perhaps many pyramids of stars, so that they might crown the whole heaven; and of others, being arranged so that they might randomly solidify the aether and vault it into a stepping-ground for the lights, and the assemblies of common atoms might choose for themselves units, and allot the heaven into homes and stations for themselves.” ^C Then, after other things, he says: “But not even the obvious things do the un-provident see themselves, and they are far from being able to comprehend the unseen. For they seem not even to suspect the ordered risings and settings, neither of the others, nor the most conspicuous of the sun; nor to use the aids gifted through them to men, being ignited for work by day, and shielded by night for rest. ^D ‘For man shall go out,’ it says, ‘unto his work, and to his labor until the evening.’ But not even the other revolution of it do they inspect, according to which it performs appointed hours, and timely seasons, and unalterable turnings, guided by the atoms of which it consists. But even if the miserable ones do not wish it—yet as the righteous believe—great is the Lord who made it, and in His words He has hastened the course. For atoms, O you blind ones, bring you winter and rains, so that the earth may yield food for you and for all the animals upon it; and they bring summer, so that you may also take the fruits from the trees for your enjoyment. And why do you not worship and sacrifice to the atoms that yield fruit? You are ungrateful, not even dedicating to them a few first-fruits of the many gifts which you have from them.” And after a little he says:

^B “Moreover, that manifold nation of the stars, which the erratic and ever-scattered atoms have brought together, has distributed places to itself in the manner of a colony or fellowship, by a common pact, following the authority of neither a founder nor the head of a family. And thus, in succession, they all observe the laws of neighborliness with their neighbors, religiously and with deep peace, and they never cross the boundaries which they received from the beginning, exactly as if they were ruled by the laws of certain royal atoms. But those do not rule, in truth. For how could they rule, being nothing at all? But listen to the voice of the divine oracles: ‘In the judgment of the Lord are his works. From the beginning and from their creation, he distinguished their parts. He adorned his works forever, and their beginnings to their generations’ (Ps. CXI, 23; Eccli. XVI, 26). And he adds a little after: ‘Or what army,’ he says, ‘has ever crossed the field in such disciplined rank, with no one running ahead, no one straying, no one offering an impediment to the others, or falling behind the others? With how steady a rank, and with shields pressed together as it were, does that perpetual host of stars advance, never interrupted, never disturbed, or slowed by any obstacle? And yet, by certain transverse inclinations and movements, their changes sometimes become obscure. Be it so. Yet they always observe the just and proper time, and they foresee the places from which each one arises, as those who are occupied in this kind of study observe. Let the illustrious sectators of atoms, therefore, tell us—they who both divide the indivisible, and associate things that are separated and disjointed, and define infinite things with their mind—whence comes, at long last, that circular and conjoined course and revolution of the heavenly bodies: when not just one heap of atoms is revolving at random like a sling, but such a great chorus advances with a composite and equal step, and revolves in a circle as one? Or by what means does it happen that so many participants in the same journey, ordered by no one, possessed of no reason, and all unknown to one another, perform the journey they have undertaken with such great harmony at the same time? For the prophet rightly brought this forward, as one of those things which can neither be done nor shown, as when two strangers happen to meet, while he says, ‘Will two come together into the same inn, if they have not known one another?’” ^C He said this. Having pursued six hundred other things, he subsequently confirms the argument he has undertaken with many points, partly from the individual elements of the universe, partly from the multitude of all kinds of living creatures which they contain, and partly also from the nature of man itself. From these, when I have added a few things to what has been said above, then at last I shall put an end to this book. ^D The manifold and multi-mixed crowd of stars, which the ever-wandering and always-scattered atoms have brought together, have portioned out places for themselves according to agreements, as if they had taken up a colony or a common dwelling-place, with no founder or master of the house presiding over them. And they observe the neighborliness toward those who dwell nearby, keeping their oaths and living in peace, not exceeding the boundaries which they received from the beginning, as if they were legislated for by queen-atoms. But those do not rule! For how could they, who do not even exist? But listen to the divine words: “In the judgment of the Lord are his works. From the beginning and from their creation, he distinguished their parts; he adorned his works forever, and their origins unto their generations.” And after a little he says: “Or who has guided a phalanx in such orderly fashion through the plain of the earth, with no one running ahead, no one turning aside, no one stumbling, no one being left behind by those ranked with them? How do they always advance ^D as fellow-elementals and shield-bearers, this continuous and inseparable, unharassed, and unobstructed army of stars? And yet, by inclinations and sideways movements, some of them become obscure in their paths. And yet they are always keeping the time and seeing ahead to the regions from which each one arises—for those who have applied themselves to these things. Let the dissectors of atoms, therefore, tell us, and the dividers of the parts—the assemblers of the uncompounded—and those who scrutinize the infinite: whence comes the circular company and revolution of the heavenly bodies, not having been slung thus by one irrational heap of atoms, but as a great circular chorus, moving equal in rhythm and revolving together? Whence are they, who are disorganized, without any power of choice, and ignorant of one another, but so many fellow-travelers mixed together? The prophet did well to place this among the impossible and non-demonstrable things, even for two strangers to travel together: “Will two come along to the same inn,” he says, “unless they have recognized one another?” Having said these things, and having brought many other things to bear upon them, he subsequently builds up the problem at greater length, from the individual elements of the whole, from the all-kinds of living creatures in these, and indeed also from the nature of man. Adding a few things to these which have been said, I shall bring the present discourse to a close.

^A *CHAPTER XXVI.*

*It is concluded from the nature of man. From the same author.*

"And they do not see even themselves, nor the things that are proper to their own nature. For if any one of the founders of this doctrine of impiety were to consider with himself who he is and whence he came, he would surely, as if coming to his own senses, at once become wise, and with this voice, no longer calling upon atoms, but upon the Father and Creator himself, would say: 'Thy hands have fashioned me, and made me.' And he would further elaborate upon the wondrous manner of his own making: 'Didst Thou not milk me as milk, and curd me like cheese? Thou didst clothe me with skin and flesh, and didst knit me together with bones and nerves. Thou hast granted me life and mercy, and Thy visitation hath preserved my spirit.' ^B For how many, I ask, and of what kind were the atoms that the father of Epicurus poured forth from himself when he was begetting Epicurus? And how, when they were enclosed in his mother’s womb, did they coalesce, receive shape and form, move, and grow? And how did that tiny drop, having called forth the many atoms of Epicurus, clothe some of them, turned into skin and flesh, while others it set upright, turned into bones, and others it bound together, stitching them with nerves? And how did it fit together the many other members, the inward parts, the entrails, and the organs of sense, some within and others without, by which the body was given life? Of these, nothing idle or useless was added; for not even the meanest things, neither hairs nor nails, were [superfluous]: all things contribute, some to the benefit of [the body's] constitution, others to the beauty of [its] appearance. For Providence is concerned not only with need, but also with grace. ^C For the hair is a defense and covering for the whole head, while the beard is an ornament to the philosopher. And the nature of the whole human body is fitted together from all the necessary parts; and upon all the members, [Providence] has bestowed both communion with one another and has measured out the provision [needed] from the whole. Of these, some things are manifest and known by experience even to the unlearned, such as the power [possessed by each]: the head’s sovereignty, and around the brain, as if it were a ruler in an acropolis, the bodyguard of the senses—the eyes going forth, the ears acting as messengers, the sense of taste like an officer of supplies, the sense of smell tracking and searching out, ^D and touch directing everything subject to it. (For we are now cursorily running through a few of the works of all-wise Providence, and shortly, God willing, when we dispute against him who is thought to be more learned, we shall examine all things more fully and richly.) The ministry of the hands follows, by which all sorts of works and clever crafts are accomplished, being articulated with their particular faculties into one cooperation; the burden-bearing of the shoulders, the clenching of the fingers, the bending of the elbows—turning inwards to the body and receding outwards, so that they may be able to draw in and push away; the service of the feet, by which all the terrestrial creation has been made subject to us, the earth walkable, the sea navigable, the rivers passable, and there is a commerce of everything with everything. The belly is the storehouse of food for all the parts organized...

in their own proper place and order, distributing the just ration by itself and casting out whatever is superfluous. And the rest, by the power of which the rationale of human strength and preservation is contained. The use of these things is the same for the foolish and the wise alike, but the understanding of them is different. For some, according to the divinity they have ^A conceived in their minds, refer the whole rationale of this economy to it, as being the most knowledgeable of all things and most beneficent toward themselves, believing it to be the work of a higher and truly divine wisdom and power. Others, on the contrary, very insipidly defend the administration, so worthy of the highest admiration, as being the product of fortune and chance. But let those who have examined the more efficacious consideration of these things, and the rationale of the inner parts—the physicians, who have searched more deeply and diligently, and have been vehemently struck with wonder—attribute this to the divinity of nature; we, too, later, according to the measure allowed us, will ^B revisit them, even if only superficially. But in general, to sum up: who has fashioned this entire tabernacle in such a way—sublime, tall, upright, well-proportioned, sensitive, nimble, effective, and capable of all things? It is, they say, the irrational multitude of atoms. But even those, if they were to come together, ^C could not fashion an image of clay, nor polish a statue of stone, nor cast an idol of silver or gold; all of which the industry of men has devised, with arts of the hands suited for shaping bodies. If, therefore, their species cannot even be sketched or formed without wisdom, how did their true and original versions come to be automatically? And the soul, and the mind, and reason—from where did the philosopher get these? Did he beg them from inanimate, mindless, and irrational atoms, which breathed into him their own individual notion and dogma? And just as Hesiod’s myth tells of Pandora [being formed] by the gods, was the wisdom of man thus perfected by the atoms? And as for all poetry, all music, astronomy, geometry, and the other sciences, will the Greeks no longer say they are the discoveries and teachings of the gods, but that the only wise and knowledgeable "muses" of all things are the atoms? For the Theogony of Epicurus, [derived] from the atoms, has been exiled from the infinite worlds and cast into an infinite vastness of disorder.

CHAPTER XXVII

‘To work, to administer, to do good, to provide, and other such things, might perhaps be burdensome to the idle, the foolish, the weak, and the wicked—the number into which Epicurus has included himself, while holding such thoughts about the gods.’ ^D

^A But to the zealous, the capable, the prudent, and the temperate—such as philosophers ought to be (and how much more so the gods?)—these things are not only not unpleasant or arduous, but are most delightful and above all things most welcome; for them, negligence and the procrastination of virtuous deeds is a source of shame. To them belongs that counsel of the warning poet:

...Put not off till tomorrow. ^B And to this he adds an immediately following threat:

The procrastinator always struggles with dire losses.

But the prophet instructs us more seriously, declaring those actions that are joined with virtue to be truly worthy of God, and calling him detestable by whom they are neglected: “Cursed is he who does the work of the Lord negligently.” Furthermore, just as those who are inexperienced and beginners in any art whatever suffer hardship in their undertakings due to the novelty of the experience and the unaccustomed nature of the tasks—while those who have made progress, and still more those who are already perfect, take pleasure in easily accomplishing what they take in hand, and would prefer performing their accustomed tasks to finishing them, rather than to possess all the goods of men—so too does it stand here. ^C Democritus himself, indeed, as they say, claimed he would rather find one single causal explanation than become king of the Persians; and this he said while seeking causes in vain and without reason, as one starting from an empty principle and an erroneous hypothesis. Not seeing the root and the common necessity of the nature of things, he considered the highest wisdom to be the understanding of that which happens foolishly and unintelligently, established Fortune as the mistress and queen of universal and divine matters, and declared that all things happen according to her; yet he denied her any part in the life of men, and exposed as senseless those who venerated her. And so, beginning his precepts, he says: ^D “Men have fashioned an image of Fortune as a pretext for their own folly (for by nature, understanding fights against Fortune), and they have asserted that this, the greatest enemy of prudence, holds sway; or rather, while they entirely abolish and destroy the latter, they set the former in her place; for they do not praise prudence as fortunate, but they praise Fortune as most prudent.” ^D Those who are in charge of useful life-tasks rejoice in the aid they give to their fellow-kind, and they desire praise and glory for the toils they undertake for the general welfare: some by feeding, others by governing, others by healing, and others by conducting state affairs; and the philosophers themselves, as they strive to instruct men, show great enthusiasm. Will Epicurus or Democritus dare to say that they are distressed while they philosophize? But they would not propose any other delight than this; for even if they opine that the good is pleasure, they will surely be ashamed to say that the act of philosophizing is not pleasant to them; but as for the gods, regarding whom the poets among them sing that they are givers—

^A of good things, these philosophers, with mockery, proclaim that they are incapable of giving and have no share in any good. And by what line of reasoning are they induced to think them gods? They do not see them present or doing anything—unless, as we suppose, they were led to call them "gods" (*theous*) from their "running" (*theein*), through a consideration of their marvelous movement, having looked at the sun, the moon, and the stars. And they do not assign to them any act of creation or configuration, whereby they might call them gods from their "constituting" (*theinai*), that is, making—for it is for this reason that the Maker and Creator of all things is truly and alone God. Neither do they propose that there is any administration, or judgment, or grace extended from them toward men, so that we might worship them from fear or out of a sense of obligation.

Did Epicurus, peering forth beyond the world...

testimony of the Lord, "And everything according to His command turned out well." These points I have gleaned from the many things written by Dionysius, our contemporary bishop, against Epicurus. But it is time to move on to Aristotle, and to the sect of the Stoic philosophers, and to examine the remaining arguments of those admirable natural philosophers, so that we may provide an apology on our own behalf to those who are eager to find fault with us.

PREPARATION OF THE GOSPEL BOOK FIFTEEN

PREPARATION FOR THE GOSPEL BOOK FIFTEEN.

CAPITA OF THE FIFTEENTH BOOK

1. Proem in which the argument of the whole work is explained. 2. Concerning Aristotle and the history recorded about him. From Aristocles the Peripatetic. 3. Concerning the dogmas according to Aristotle, and how he differed from the Hebrews and from Plato in establishing the end of what is good. 4. Atticus the Platonist against Aristotle, regarding his disagreement with Moses and Plato in establishing the reasoning of the end. 5. The same against the same, attacking him for his disagreement with Moses and Plato on the question of Providence. 6. The same against the same, disputing his disagreement with Moses and Plato concerning the world, whose generation he denied. 7. The same against the same, regarding his putting forward a fifth essence of bodies, which neither Moses nor Plato knows. 8. The same against the same, regarding his disagreement with Plato also in the theories concerning the heavens, which Moses does not concern himself with. 9. The same against the same, and concerning his disagreement with Plato and the doctrines of the Hebrews on the question of the immortality of the soul. 10. Plotinus, from the second book of his *On the Immortality of the Soul*, against Aristotle, who asserted that the soul is an entelechy. 11. Porphyry on the same subject. From the works *To Boethus On the Soul*.

12. Against the same man, concerning his dissenting from Plato in his discourse on the universal soul. 13. Against the same man for mocking the ideas of Plato, which we have already seen from earlier testimonies of the Hebrews were not unknown to them. 14. Concerning the philosophy of the Stoics, and how Zeno rendered his account of principles. From Aristocles. 15. What opinion the Stoics hold concerning God and the constitution of the universe. From the *Epitome* of Arius Didymus. 16. Porphyry, against the Stoic opinion concerning God. From his work *On the Soul*, addressed to Boethus. 17. That which truly exists is not a body, in opposition to what the Stoics maintain. From the first book of Numenius *On the Good*. 18. How the Stoics think concerning the conflagration of the universe. 19. How the Stoics think concerning the palingenesis of all things. 20. How the same people think concerning the soul. 21. Longinus, a refutation of the Stoic opinion concerning the soul. 22. Against the Stoics, that the soul cannot be corporeal. From the *On the Soul* of Plotinus. 23. Opinions of the natural philosophers concerning the sun. From the works of Plutarch. 24. Concerning the size of the sun. 25. Concerning the shape of the sun. 26. Concerning the moon. 27. Concerning the size of the moon. 28. Concerning the shape of the moon. 29. Concerning the illumination of the moon. 30. What is the substance of the stars, both wandering and fixed. 31. Concerning the shapes of the stars. 32. How the world was constituted. 34. Whether the world is ensouled and governed by providence. 35. Whether the world is incorruptible. 36. Whence the world is nourished. 37. From what first principle God began to fashion the world. 38. Concerning the order of the world. 39. What is the cause of the world being inclined. 40. Concerning the area outside the world, whether it is a vacuum. 41. What parts of the world are the right, and what are the left. 42. Concerning the heavens, and what its substance is. 43. Concerning demons and heroes. 44. Concerning matter. 45. Concerning form (idea). 46. Concerning the order of the stars. 47. Concerning the motion and movement of the stars. 48. Whence the stars are illuminated. 49. Concerning those called the Dioscuri. 50. Concerning the eclipse of the sun. 51. Concerning the eclipse of the moon. 52. Concerning its appearance, and why it appears earthly. 53. Concerning its distances. 54. Concerning years. 55. Concerning the earth. 56. Concerning the shape of the earth. 57. Concerning the position of the earth. 58. Concerning the movement of the earth. 59. Concerning the sea, how it was constituted, and why it is bitter. 60. Concerning the parts of the soul. 61. Concerning the ruling faculty. 62. That even the wisest of the Greeks, Socrates, showed those who boast greatly in the physiology of the aforementioned subjects to be fools, as those who exhaust their study and labor on things empty of any fruit for life and incomprehensible.

Chapter I. Preface, in which the argument of the whole work is explained.

Thinking that I would be performing a task of great value if I were to refute, at the very threshold of the *Preparation for the Gospel*, that multitude of gods which the common error of all nations had introduced—so that my departure from them might afterwards be more easily approved as a plan full of equity and wisdom—I first of all, in the initial three books, thoroughly examined not only the fables which their own theologians and poets have recounted in a truly comic manner ^A concerning their gods, but also those seemingly dignified and secret natural interpretations of theirs, which the power and faculty of noble philosophy has transferred somewhere up into the heavens and the other parts of the world. And this I did, although the theologians themselves have declared that there is nothing at all of solemn theology in these [fables]. One must observe, therefore, that the most ancient of their theologians ^B are attested to have known nothing more than history, and to have adhered only to their myths. Hence it is that naturally in all cities and villages, according to the accounts of the ancients, the rites and mysteries of the gods are handed down in harmony with the mythical narratives of those before them; so that even now the marriages and procreations of children, sorrows and drunken revels, errors and lusts of the gods, their angers and other misfortunes and accidents of every kind ^C are, as was handed down and prescribed by those most ancient ones, practiced in a solemn rite, both in sacred ceremonies and in hymns, and in songs composed in honor of the gods themselves. Nevertheless, it pleased me to act more liberally, and to set before the eyes the whole pomp and appearance of those naturalistic interpretations also, which were so boastfully touted with such ambition of words, ^D and were invented by the sophists and philosophers. Then, I unmasked and refuted by clear arguments in the next three books those matters which pertained to their celebrated oracles, and the opinion concerning fate which is talked about by the many, though it is vain; having used for this purpose not only domestic reasoning but also the very testimonies of the philosophers most esteemed among the Greeks. Having advanced from there to the oracles of the Hebrews, I set forth in an equal number of books of discourse the dogmatic theology contained within them, and the entire history concerning them, which is even attested to by the Greeks themselves. Next, after I had refuted the Greek way, and shown how all things were derived from the barbarians, and that they bring forward no teaching of their own that is of any dignity; and after having brought to light the comparison of the times during which those who are glorified among the Greeks and the prophets of the Hebrews lived—I again, through the three books that followed, demonstrated the agreement of the philosophers esteemed among the Greeks with the views of the Hebrews, having again made the very voices of those men themselves my witnesses. Nor did I only this, but I also [refuted] those among the Greek philosophers who hold views contrary to us, being divided not only from us but also from their own kin,

^A and being refuted by the disputations of their own disciples, I most clearly demonstrated in the previous book. From all of which, may the readers understand the sincerity and integrity of our mind, and that it may be evident by the clear and certain witness, so to speak, of the things themselves, how it was that we did not inconsiderately, but by a prudent and mature judgment, prefer the ancient and true philosophy and piety of the Hebrews to that of the Greeks. And this has been definitively settled by us through the express authority of Greek testimonies.

As for the final treatise of this matter, which is the fifteenth book of the work we have undertaken, we have postponed it until now, so that in it we may weave together those things which remain from the previous discussions, ^B and bring into the light those specious mysteries of the noble philosophy of the Greeks, and set before the eyes of all how entirely devoid of any solid and true erudition they truly are. In this matter, first and foremost, it will be the aim that everyone may recognize that it was not through any ignorance of those things they so greatly admire, but through a contempt for their hollow study, that we have cast off almost all care for them, having devoted our souls to the practice and exercise of better things. Therefore, when the seal of truth has been impressed upon this, with God as our guide, we shall place the final garland upon our *Preparation*.

Proceeding from there to the more perfect argument of the *Evangelical Demonstration*, I shall link the beginning of the second part of this discussion to the remainder of the charge against us. ^C For we were accused of this: that while we have preferred the oracles of the Hebrews to our ancestral laws, we have not, however, proposed to lead a life similar to that of the Jews. To this accusation, by God's help, I shall attempt to reply after the completion of the present discourse. For in this way I believe that the later parts, being joined to the first under a single tie, as it were, will form one general purpose for the whole work.

Now, that we may stick to what we are at present doing: since in the preceding books we have clearly shown that the philosophy of Plato sometimes agrees with the doctrines of the Hebrews, and at other times disagrees with the same; indeed, that it even sometimes refutes its own decrees; and furthermore, that the opinions ^D of the other philosophers, those who are commonly called "naturalists," both the successors of Plato and those [who followed] Xenophanes and Parmenides, and still further Pyrrho and those who introduced the suspension of judgment, and all the others in order, whose opinions the preceding discourse refuted, are seen to be in open and direct conflict with the doctrines of the Hebrews and of Plato, and indeed with the truth itself, and not only that, but [are seen] to have been struck down by their own weapons—it is time now to view from a higher place, as if from a stage, that other arrogance of the philosophers of Aristotle and the Stoics, and to observe all the remaining natural philosophy of those who lift their eyebrows, so that we may learn both the things they speak of so loftily and the things that, in turn, have been refuted by their own colleagues.

For in this way, the judgment we have formed may be absolved of every accusation of unreasonableness, in that it was not by ignorance of the august things among them, but by an examined and scrutinized judgment, that we have preferred the truth and piety of those reckoned as barbarians to all the things of the Greeks. I shall begin with Aristotle. Now, others have also [discussed] the life of the man...

and they are not obscure philosophers. But as for me, I do not like to hear a man ill-spoken of, even by his own people. Therefore, I shall set forth the apologies on his behalf from Aristocles the Peripatetic, who writes as follows concerning him in the seventh book of his *On Philosophy*. ^A

CHAPTER II. On Aristotle, and on those things that have been handed down concerning him. From the seventh book of Aristocles the Peripatetic's *On Philosophy*.

"How is it possible," he says, just as Epicurus relates in his letter concerning ways of life, "for him, while still young, to have consumed his paternal estate, and then to have been compelled to join the military? And having fared poorly in these tasks, to have turned to pharmacy? And then, when Plato’s Peripatos was open to all, to have taken it over?" Or how could one accept Timæus of Tauromenium, saying in his histories that, late in his life, neglectful of the doors of some obscure medical shop, he kept them locked? ^B And who would be persuaded by the things said by Aristoxenus the musician in his life of Plato? For he says that during his wanderings and his time abroad, [the disciples] rebelled and built an opposing Peripatos for themselves, being foreigners. Some think that he says these things about Aristotle, although Aristoxenus always speaks well of Aristotle. One might also reasonably say that the memoirs of Alexinus the Eristic are laughable. ^C For he portrays Alexander, while still a boy, conversing with his father Philip, despising the teachings of Aristotle, and approving of Nicagoras, who was surnamed Mercury. And Eubulides also clearly lies in his book against him, first by citing some cold poems, as if others had written them about his marriage and his intimacy with Hermias; then by claiming that he fell into disfavour with Philip, and that he was not present at the death of Plato, and that he destroyed his books. For why should one dwell on the accusation ^D of Demochares against the philosophers? For he spoke ill not only of Aristotle, but also of others. Yet, if one looks at the slanders themselves, one may perceive...

Aristotle himself says—that there were letters of Aristotle ^A claiming that the city of the Athenians was captured, and that he betrayed his own fatherland, Stagira, to the Macedonians. Furthermore, after Olynthus was razed, it alleges that he indicated the wealthiest of the Olynthians to Philip at the public auction of spoils. Cephisodorus, the disciple of Isocrates, is also an insipid and futile slanderer; he called him a voluptuary and a glutton, and other things of that sort. ^B Yet everything said by Lycon the Pythagorean (as he calls himself) surpasses all madness. For he says that Aristotle used to offer the same sort of sacrifice to his deceased wife that the Athenians offer to Demeter, and that he used to wash in hot oil and then sell it. And when he was departing for Chalcis, he says that the tax collectors found seventy-five bronze pots on his ship. And these were just about the first to slander Aristotle: some of whom lived during his own time, and others who came shortly after; but they ^C were all sophists, contentious men, and rhetoricians, whose names and books have perished even more thoroughly than their bodies. For those who came after them, or who drag up the same charges, are to be completely disregarded and ignored, especially those who, having not even laid eyes on their books, have rashly invented insults themselves. Such are those who count his pots as three hundred; for you will find nothing of the sort about the philosopher among any of those who lived at that time, if you except that Lycon, who, however, as I have already said, ^D only mentions that seventy-five pots were discovered. And one might infer that all the things said are false, not only from the times and the nature of the accusers themselves, but also from the fact that they do not all slander him with the same things, but each one says something different of his own. If any of these things had been true in the slightest, he surely ought to have been put to death by those of that time not once, but a thousand times over. It is evident, therefore, that just as it happened to many others, so it also happened to Aristotle that, because of his friendships with kings and his superior excellence in learning, he was envied by the sophists of that time. [D (continued)] But those who are of a sound mind ought not to look only at those who slander him, but also at those who praise and admire him. For there would be found to be quite a few more, and better, of these as well. The rest of the charges, then, openly show their own emptiness; but these two seem to be believed, for which some criticize him: first, that he married the daughter of Hermias, Pythias, by nature a sister, but adopted—

^A Pythias, the natural sister of Hermias, whom he took by adoption, winning the man's favor by this act. There exists, indeed, this epigram of Theocritus of Chios:

Eunuch Hermias' and Eubulus' empty tomb Has foolish Aristotle reared, Who for the sake of his gluttonous belly's nature chose to dwell Instead of the Academy, in the outpourings of Borborus.

^B Another point is that he was ungrateful to Plato. As regards Hermias and the friendship of Aristotle toward him, many others have written, and especially Apellicon, whoever reads whose books will cease slandering them. Concerning his marriage to Pythias, he himself has sufficiently apologized in his letters to Antipater. For after Hermias had died, out of goodwill toward him, he married her, she being otherwise a sensible and good woman, though unfortunate due to the disasters that had befallen her brother. ^C Then he says next: "After the death of Pythias, the daughter of Hermias, Aristotle married Herpyllis of Stagira, from whom he had a son, Nicomachus. They say this son was raised as an orphan by Theophrastus and that he died in war while still a youth." But let these things be laid down from the aforementioned writing of Aristocles. Now it is time to look at the dogmatic philosophy of Aristotle.

CHAPTER III

Regarding the dogmas of Aristotle, and how they differ from the Hebrews and Plato, concerning the goal of the good.

Since Moses and the prophets among the Hebrews assumed that the goal of living happily is the knowledge and friendship of the God of all, realized through piety, and taught that true piety is the pleasing of God through every virtue ^D (for this is the cause of good things, since all things lie in the power of God alone, and all things are provided by Him to those who love Him), and since Plato, establishing things consistent with these, declares that the goal of blessedness is virtue—Aristotle, walking the other path, says that3 someone will not be happy unless he also possesses bodily well-being and an abundance of external goods, without which virtue itself provides no benefit. How the followers of Plato attacked him and refuted his opinion as false, is available to learn from what follows.

[index: entries preserved]

CHAPTER IV.

“For while all philosophy, by the common consent of those who have philosophized, promises human happiness, and is divided into three parts according to the creative distribution of all things, this Peripatetic ^B will be found so far from teaching anything of Plato’s in this area, that among the many who differ from Plato, no one appears to have departed further from him. In the first place, he abandoned Plato in that which is the most common, greatest, and most authoritative of all things; and, having stepped beyond the bounds and measure of happiness, he denied that virtue was sufficient for it by itself. For the power and strength of virtue escaped him, and he thought that it needed the works of fortune to obtain happiness; and if one were to rely on virtue alone, he held that it was impossible and unattainable to reach happiness. While it is not the present occasion to demonstrate how slothful and full of error his opinion is in this and other matters, this at least I believe is clear: that because the goal and happiness are not the same or equivalent according to Plato and Aristotle—but the former constantly proclaims and declares that the most just man is the happiest, while the latter does not allow happiness to accompany virtue unless the dignity of birth and fine appearance, and a heap of other things, are added— ^C (For he was carrying gold, to go to war, like a maiden [golden] :) it is necessary that, according to the difference of the end, the philosophy that leads to it must also be different. For one who walks along a certain single path, which by its nature leads to something small and lowly, can never aspire to greater and higher things, set as they are at a height.

Dost thou see how this hill rises with its high ridge? Rugged and harsh, on whose summit sitting, The bird lifts its wings.

This sharp and wily beast can by no means ascend to that high hill; for if the eaglets and the fox were to meet in the same place, it must be that either they, their nest being scattered and broken, fall to the earth by a deadly stroke of fate; or the fox himself, ^D which is not his nature to produce, must clothe himself with swift wings, by which, once lifted up, he might fly to the highest ridge. Certainly, as long as each species remains in its own place and rank, there can be no communion for those of the earth with those of the heavens.” After other things, he adds: “These things being so, and since Plato attempts to draw the souls of the young upward toward the divine Power, and in this way attaches them to virtue and nobility, while persuading them to despise all other things, tell us, whether by some private fortune…

I beseech you, good Peripatetic, how you intend to hand these things on, and what way you will lead the way for the lovers of Plato? Does your school possess any power and excellence of doctrine so great that you might dare, full of the same sense and confidence as those sons of Aloeus, to devise a path to heaven? They thought that by piling mountains upon mountains, this would be ready and easy for them: yet in truth this is gained, as Plato taught, only by the removal of human desires. Therefore, to attain these things, what help do you show to the younger generation? Where is there any kind of discourse that might vote in favor of virtue? From which of the works of Aristotle? Or of any other who has set out from his school? Come, from what writings at all? Why, lie, if you wish; you have my leave, provided only that we hear something noble from you. But you have nothing whatever to say yourself, nor would any of the leaders of this school allow you to say it if you did. The treatises of Aristotle on these matters, whether the *Eudemian*, the *Nicomachean*, or those inscribed as the *Great Ethics*, taste of nothing ^A but what is small and humble, and altogether common; such things as unlettered and rough men, adolescents, and little women might think of.

For the diadems, so to speak, and the royal scepter, which virtue has received from Jove—the one that cannot be taken away, since:

*...It remains irrevocable, whatever* *He has nodded with his head:*

—they dare to strip virtue of this. For they do not permit her to make men happy; rather, they make her similar to wealth, fame, birth, health, beauty, and all the other things that are common to vice. For just as none of these, present without virtue, is sufficient to render its possessor happy, so too, virtue, without these, is not sufficient to make the one who possesses her happy. How then has the dignity of virtue not been pulled down and cast into the dirt? ^B "Yes," someone says, "but they say that virtue far surpasses the other goods." What of it? Indeed, they say that health also surpasses wealth; but the fact that none of them is sufficient for happiness without the mutual assistance of the others is a common trait of them all. When, therefore, someone following these dogmas and this school teaches one who is seeking the whole of the human good within the soul itself, they say that he is not climbing upon the wheel of happiness; nor could one who is gripped by Priam’s fortunes be happy and blessed. Yet it is not unlikely that one who possesses virtue might fall into such things. ^C It follows from this that happiness does not necessarily accompany those who are endowed with virtue, nor, if it should accompany them at times, can this association be perpetual.

*The wind casts the leaves on the ground, and in turn,* *The leafy wood brings forth others:* *So grows the race of men, and so it perishes.*

If this is so, the happy man could never be miserable; yet he would not be blessed, if he should fall into Priam's fortunes. ^D

^A Exilis adhuc nimium ac timida, mi poeta, tua hæc similitudo est: *Succedunt tempora veris.* (For the time is vast, and he for whom it comes is not). If you wish to represent the fragile and crumbling state of human generations more accurately, compare it to the happiness of Aristotle. It springs up and departs more easily than any leaves, not waiting for the year to revolve, nor for a year's end, nor for a month's end, but within the same day and the same hour it is born and perishes. For the things that destroy it are many, and all depend on chance: the fatal diseases of the body—and these are myriad—as well as poverty, disgrace, and things of that sort, for which the beloved virtue offers no defense at all, and is quite sufficient for nothing; it is weak, that is, both in averting misery and in preserving happiness. ^B How then could anyone bred in these teachings, and pleased by these arguments, ever agree with the doctrines of Plato, or strengthen others to accept them? For there is no way that someone starting from those premises could ever receive those Herculean and divine dogmas: that virtue is a strong and altogether beautiful thing, that it never lacks anything for happiness, and is never stripped of it; but even if poverty, disease, disgrace, or pitch and the cross, or all the things from tragedies should flow together at once, the just man is still happy and blessed. He even proclaims him through this loudest of heralds, like some victorious athlete, this most just of men, saying that he is the most happy, as one who reaps the fruit of happiness from justice itself. ^C Divide, therefore, if you like, and variegate your classification of goods into three, or four, or many parts. It is all quite beside the point. You will never by this road lead us to Plato. For what does it profit, if you say that among goods some are to be worshipped, like the gods; others are praiseworthy, like the virtues; others take the form of power, like wealth and strength; others are defined by their utility, like medical treatments? And what if, with a finer and more subtle division, you say that some goods are ends and others are not? Calling "ends" those for whose sake other things are, and not calling those things "ends" which are obtained for the sake of others? And what if one learns that some goods are good ^D simply, and others not so for all; or that some are goods of the soul, others of the body, and others external; or again, that some goods are powers, others dispositions and habits; or, finally, that some are ends, others materials, others instruments? Even if someone knew how to distribute the "good" by a ten-part classification into the ten categories, what would all these dogmas have to do with the mind of Plato? Indeed, you may call virtue good—either equivocally or in whatever way you please—but as long as you deny that it has in itself sufficient strength, and while you—taking virtue as merely necessary for happiness—strip it of its sufficiency, whereas Plato seeks after other things as a surplus, possessing the fullness of happiness from virtue itself, there would be nothing in common between you in this respect; you require different arguments, not those of Plato.

^A Null faith exists among men and savage lions: Neither do lambs and wolves maintain a like spirit. ^B In this greatest and primary tenet of happiness, there can be no fellowship between Plato and Aristotle. For indeed, even if they do not think ill of one another, at the very least they openly contend in the whole of their discourse regarding things that most highly pertain to this matter.

CHAPTER V.

Furthermore, Moses and the Hebrew prophets, whom Plato also supports, have established clearly and distinctly that Providence encompasses the universe. Aristotle, however, sets a limit and boundary for the Divinity at the lunar sphere, and withdraws the remaining parts of the world from His care and governance. For this reason, he is rebuked by the aforementioned Atticus in these words: "Since, among the things that contribute to happiness," he says, "this is also the greatest and most important, that we have a certain confidence regarding Providence; inasmuch as it would be of the highest utility for directing the principles of human life, if it were not hidden from us whether the race of earthly men walks by a straight and level path, or through the oblique twists of error—Plato refers all things to God, and from God he weaves all things together; he teaches that He thus encompasses the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things, so that He always executes them by a straight advance. He further teaches that He is good, and that one who is good never envies another in anything: hence, that He makes all things outside Himself as good as possible, arranging them into order out of disorder: finally, that He who cares for all things, and directs them according to His supreme power, also provides for the human race." And after a few words intervening: "But Plato, indeed," he says, "ordains it thus. But in truth, as for Aristotle, while he drives away that excellent and divine nature, he simultaneously severs all hope of the future from the mind, and at the same time he destroys all observance and piety toward the powers above; what fellowship can there ultimately be with Plato? How can he exhort anyone to embrace the mind and sense of Plato, and in any part confirm his doctrine? On the contrary, he clearly professes himself an assistant to the wicked and a minister of crime. For any man whoever he is, and entangled in human desires, if he has once despised the gods, and ^D realizes not that they have any concern for him...

it is not impossible for him to escape ^A escaping the notice of men in his wrongdoings; but surely it is not necessary to seek to escape observation by every means, seeing that it is possible to prevail over those who have discovered him. Thus, the despair of Providence is a ready-made tool for injustice. For that man is indeed a very "gracious" benefactor who, while holding out pleasure to us as a good and providing us with immunity from the gods, still imagines he is supplying a mechanism to prevent wrongdoing—acting much like a physician who would neglect to provide any assistance to a patient while he is still alive, but who, after the patient is dead, would try to weave ^B some devices for the health of the deceased.

The case of the Peripatetic is surely very similar to this. For it is not so much the pursuit of pleasure that strengthens injustice, as it is the disbelief regarding the Divine, namely, that It cares for us. "What then," someone might say, "will you put Aristotle and Epicurus in the same category?" Assuredly, in regard to the matter at hand. For what difference does it make to us whether you banish the Divine from the world and leave us no communion with It, or whether you shut the gods up in the world but remove them from all commerce with affairs on earth? For the neglect of men by the gods is equal in both doctrines, and the immunity from the gods for those who do wrong is equal. ^C But even if we do derive some benefit from the movement of the things in the heavens, this is, for the most part, shared also by irrational and inanimate things; and yet, in this way, even according to Epicurus, some advantage comes to men from the gods. For they say that the better emanations from them become the causes of great goods for those who partake of them. But it is not right that either this one or that one be reckoned in the account of Providence. For if, according to Epicurus, Providence is gone—even though, according to him, the gods contribute all care for the salvation of their own goods—then Providence would likewise be gone according to Aristotle, even if the things in the heavens are governed in some order and arrangement. For we seek a Providence that concerns us, of which there is no share for one who does not concede that either demons, or heroes, or souls in any way at all can exist everlastingly.

And yet, to my mind, Epicurus seems to have acted ^D more modestly. For as if despairing that the gods could abstain from the care of men if they once associated with them, he migrated them to the same place, and having established them as if in a foreign land, and somewhere outside the world, he renounced their inhumanity through this separation and through their complete lack of communion. But this "gracious" finder of nature and accurate observer of divine things, by placing human affairs under the very gaze of the gods, left them unattended and uncared for, governed by some nature and not by divine reason. Whence, he could not easily escape that charge which is brought against Epicurus.

^A Some conjecture that he did not do this out of conviction, but rather out of fear of men, that he stationed the gods in the universe as a spectator in a theater. They take as proof of this man's opinion that he deprived them of any influence over us, from which influence alone could one rightly believe in the existence of the gods. For Aristotle does the very same thing. For by removing them, and leaving belief in them to sight alone—a sense weak for judging things at such a distance—he might perhaps seem out of reverence to say that there are gods present here. For not having left the gods outside the world, yet not having brought them to those on earth, he was under the necessity of either confessing himself a complete atheist, or else, to preserve the reputation of not having abandoned the gods, he transplanted them ^B somewhere here. But he who, by his aloofness, has rejected the precision of the superior beings, seems to disbelieve in the gods in a seemly manner." These are the words of Atticus against Aristotle, for cutting away the argument concerning Providence. The same man adds these further points to what has been said, addressing the same person who did not wish the world to be generated.

Chapter VI

^A that pertain to the doctrine and mind of Plato, we place our faith in those very utterances which he himself, being a Greek, addressed to us Greeks in clear and articulate speech. For he says that God, having taken all that was visible, which was not resting, but was being driven by a faulty and disordered motion, brought it into order out of that disorder, having judged this to be altogether better than that. And furthermore, since he did not accept the generation of the world through riddles, nor indeed because of any need for clarity, he reveals it through those words by which the Father of all things speaks to him after the creation of the universe. For, he says, "Since you have been generated" (he is speaking to the gods), "you are not indeed immortal, nor entirely indissoluble, yet you shall not be dissolved, having attained the bond of my will." But as I said, we might discuss this controversy in a friendly and peaceful way, using milder arguments, with those who speak to us from within our own household, as being friends. For it seems that Aristotle also caused these men to shift their position, as they were unable to resist the accusation against their dogma, yet were unwilling to condemn as false what they attributed to Plato. ^B But according to our understanding, since Plato grants that the world was generated as the most beautiful of works by the most beautiful of creators, and attributed to the maker of the universe a power through which he made the world out of what did not previously exist, and having made it, he desires for it to be protected for all time, and in this way the world is, according to his understanding, both generated and underlying in an incorruptible state—who among the Peripatetics can confirm these things for us? But we must console the champion of these men by showing that it is not at all necessary that if something has been generated, it must be destroyed, nor again, if something is not destroyed, that it is therefore necessarily ungenerated. For one should not concede to the incorruptible a single cause derived from the ungenerated, nor should one leave the generated without assistance in regard to its fall into destruction. From where, then, could we derive help for these things from the doctrines of Aristotle, a man who does not merely act for the sake of appearances, nor does he approach this kind of discourse of his own accord, but is carried directly into opposition against Plato, and imposes upon the generated the necessity of perishing, and says that what is not destroyed ^C is strengthened solely by not having been generated, without, however, leaving to God a power whereby, by employing it, he might create something good? For, he says, that which has not yet come to be, could not even come to be. And he is so far from using these points to assist Plato’s argument that he has already caused some who had been devoted to Plato to shrink back from the dogma because of what he said; they were unable to perceive that, according to the very nature of things—which one might conceive of even without the will and power of God—neither is the generated incorruptible, nor is that which will not be destroyed generated. But when one has established the best cause, which is from God, one must take this as the guide for all things, so that one does not declare it to be an inferior cause compared to the others. For it is ridiculous... ^D

to think that because something was created, it therefore must perish; or, if God wills it, that it should not perish; and that while there is something unbegotten which has the power not to perish, the will of God should be lacking in order to preserve things that have been brought into being. ^A For the builder is capable of constructing a house that did not exist; and someone is also capable of making a statue that did not exist before; and another, having fashioned a ship from raw material, provides it to those who have need of it. And each of the other craftsmen, as many as possess the productive arts, have this power, so as to bring something out of non-existence into being. Is it then the case that the Universal King and master craftsman will not partake even to the degree of human craftsmanly power, but will be deprived of all generation by us? Not at all, if we are able to grasp, by even a small 88 calculation, the divine cause. But is He able to create and willing to create good things—for He is good, and in the good there is no envy regarding anything—yet not able to preserve and guard what has been created? ^B And yet, the other craftsmen are capable of both. For instance, the builder and the shipwright not only construct new ships and houses, but are also able to assist those damaged by time, by substituting other parts for those that have worn out. So it must certainly be conceded that God also possesses at least this much. For if one is capable of creating the whole, how would one be incapable of creating a part of it? And thus, if it is to be a work that is good,, if one is to be a creator at all 90, it must be preserved in every respect. For to desire to undo that which has been well created is the mark of an evil man. And there is no bond greater for the salvation of created things than the will of God. ^C If many things that have partaken of human effort and will—nations, cities, and works—remain for an inconceivable amount of time after having been created, even when the one who willed them no longer exists, will those things that have partaken of God’s intention, and have been created through Him and by Him, vanish and not remain while the Maker is present? What cause is it that would constrain the mind of God? Is it the necessity arising from the created things themselves? But this very thing, by the very fact that it has been adorned, has confessed its defeat at the hands of God. Or is it some external cause contending against God? But such a cause does not exist, nor, in matters where God has already prevailed and adorned, is it worthy to diminish Him, unless we are altogether ignorant of ourselves while disputing about the greatest and most divine power. ^D But we seem to have been carried away by our own eagerness into this discourse concerning the truth. It is clear, even from what we have proposed, that those who have not even left behind the origin of generation for the cosmos cannot be teachers concerning its creation. And indeed, concerning the fifth essence of bodies, which Aristotle introduced, these points must be noted.

CHAPTER VII.

• The elements, as they are commonly called, from which as first principles bodies are composed, Plato, following their evident nature and the authority of the philosophers before him, posited to be four, accepted by the confession of all: fire, earth, air, and water, from which, when mingled and transformed among themselves, all other things are generated. But Aristotle, as it seems, hoping to appear more excellent in wisdom if he were to add some new body over and above these, numbered a fifth essence ^B besides the four phenomena. In this, he certainly used nature in a very brilliant and generous way; but he did not perceive that it is not the role of one who professes to be a student of nature to lay down laws, but only to explain diligently what belongs to nature. Therefore, to the force of his demonstration—that there are four first natures of bodies, which indeed the Platonists need—the Peripatetic not only contributes nothing, but he alone almost opposes it. For when we say that every body is either hot or cold, moist or dry, soft or hard, light or heavy, rare or dense; and when we find that no other thing can participate in these besides the four (for if it is hot, it is fire or air; if cold, water or earth; and if it is dry, fire or earth; if it is moist, water or air; and if it is soft, air or fire; if hard, water or earth; and light and rare, such as fire and air; heavy and dense, water and earth) and when we understand from all the other simple faculties that there can be no body outside these, he alone stands ^C in opposition, asserting that a body can exist devoid of these—a body, I say, neither heavy nor light, neither soft nor hard, neither moist nor dry; so that he is all but saying that a body is not a body. For he has left it the name, but has removed all the faculties from which a body is naturally composed. Therefore, either by persuading us he will recall us from the opinion of Plato, or, if he confirms the doctrine of Plato, he will be turned away from his own decrees. Thus, he can contribute nothing at all to the explaining of Plato’s mind. Furthermore, because we see that there is one and the same matter of all bodies, Plato wished that they be converted and changed into one another; but Aristotle ^D altogether...

[Beginning of the translation, anchored to the PG page 1321-1322 text.]

the case of the sculptors. For those men, having imitated the head of this man, the chest of another, and the belt of yet another, sometimes joining together things that do not belong with one another, have persuaded themselves that they have produced something original. And in truth, the whole, which anyone might blame for being disproportionate, is theirs, but the parts stitched together within it, while having some beauty, are not theirs. Likewise, too, Aristotle, hearing from Plato that there is a certain substance ^A intelligible in itself—both incorporeal, and colorless, and intangible, neither becoming, nor perishing, nor changing, nor altering, but always existing in the same way and in the same state—and again hearing about those things in the heavens, that they are divine and incorruptible and impassible bodies, he joined and glued together things from both that do not go together. For having taken the idea of "body" from some, and the idea of "being impassible" from others, he fashioned an impassible body. Now in the case of statues, even if the [resulting] creation from differing parts is not beautiful, it is at least not impossible for it to come into being. Therefore, even Homer teaches such things:

"For the eyes and the head," he says, "he resembled Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt, The belt Ares, and the chest Poseidon."

^B But there could never be an impassible body. For since it is bound to a nature that is subject to passion and is mutable, it necessarily must suffer sympathy with that to which it is yoked. But if something were impassible, it would need to be released and free from that which suffers; so that it would be apart from matter, and having been separated from it, it would necessarily be acknowledged as incorporeal. Let us furthermore apply our mind to the matters in which he shows Aristotle to differ from Plato.

CHAPTER VIII

Of the same against the same, and how he differed from Plato also in his theories concerning the heavens, which Moses did not trouble himself with.

"Next," he says, "follow many things in which they differ. For the one says that the form of celestial things for the most part consists of fire; but the other says that celestial things have ^C no share of fire at all. And the one says that God ignited light in the second [(94)] period toward the earth, so that the celestial race of gods [(92)]... [(93)] the most brilliant, and to look upon most beautiful might be. ^D

Ille [Plato] oculosque caputque Jovis, qui fulmine gaudet, Cingula Mavortis, Neptuni pectora gessit.

But there cannot be any body that is not subject to passion. For whatever is associated with a subject that is passible and mutable, it is necessary that it should suffer along with that companion of its. But that which is not passible must be separate and free from the passible, and therefore removed from matter; if it were devoid of matter, it would necessarily be devoid of body." Hitherto that man. But let us look further at other things in which he himself shows Aristotle to differ from Plato.

CHAPTER VIII

Of the same against the same, and how he differed from Plato in the treatment of celestial things; which matters Moses cared little for.

"There follow," he says, "other things, in which both dissent, and indeed a great many. For Plato indeed makes the species of celestial things mostly out of fire; Aristotle denies that they have any commerce with fire at all. The former says that God [ignited light] toward the second [period] above the earth."

^A In explaining this of the sun, he declares that it most of all would be seen to illuminate the entire heaven. But he, ^B as one not wishing the sun to be fire, and knowing light to be pure fire, or something of fire, does not permit light to be ignited around it. Furthermore, the one, attributing immortality in kind to all things in heaven, says that certain proportional recessions and accessions ^C of them take place. Necessity forces him to say these things: the recessions, which are the rays of the sun and heats coming to be by its flowing forth; and the accessions, to account for the fact that its size appears equal. For it would not have wished to appear equal, if it did not receive something in place of what it gives off. But Aristotle wishes them to remain always in the same substance, with nothing departing from them, and nothing approaching. Furthermore, the one, in addition to the common motion of the stars, ^D by which all the stars, both the fixed and the wandering, move while bound in their spheres, assigns to them another motion, which has turned out to be in another way the most beautiful, and proper to the nature of their body; for since they are spherical, it is reasonable that each should move in a certain spherical motion, whirling about. But the other takes away from them even this motion, which they possess because they are animate, and leaves only that which happens to them as if they were inanimate by the agency of other surrounding things. And indeed he says that the impression occurring to us from the stars as if they were moving is a passion of our own vision, which is powerless and, as it were, shaking, and is not the truth; just as if Plato were taking his conviction about their motion from this impression, and not rather from reason, which teaches that it is necessary for each of these, being a living being and having a soul and body, to move its own motion (for every body, to which moving comes from without, is soulless; but to which [it comes] from within and from itself, is animate); and [it being] moved, inasmuch as it is divine, [moves] the most beautiful [motion].

If it moves, being of a nature to be borne otherwise, and moves continuously, it must be tireless, and removed from all ease of mind; if not even as is the soul of mortal beings, there is rest—that relaxation of the body which occurs during sleep; but it is necessary that it have the portion of some Ixion, eternal and relentless.

For the vision, being stretched out far, wanders due to weakness; which is perhaps the cause why the stars that are fixed appear to twinkle, while the planets do not twinkle. For the planets are near; so the vision arrives at them being in control. But toward those that are fixed, it vibrates on account of the length, being stretched out very far; and the trembling of it makes the motion appear to be of the star; for it makes no difference whether the vision moves, or the object seen.

^A And animating it at the same time, it is moved by a motion of its own, inasmuch as it is divine, to move with the most beautiful motion; and since circular motion is the most beautiful, it is moved by this. Now sense might bear witness to the account, as truthful, but it is not this which provided the conviction of the motion. Regarding the motion of the universe, that it does not occur in a circle, being overcome by evidence, he—that is, Plato—had no argument to counter. But even here, this noble invention of this body provided him with a distraction. ^B For Plato, since there were four bodies, and all of them moved by nature with a simple and straight motion—fire toward the outside, earth toward the center, and the others toward the space in between—assigned circular motion to the soul. But he, ^C assigning a different motion to a different body, and thus also the circular motion—as if it were some sort of bodily property—to the fifth body, easily deceived himself in everything. For in the case of those things moved in a straight line, weights and lightnesses provided the principle of the motion; but the fifth body, participating neither in weight nor in lightness, possesses rather a cause of rest, but not of circular motion. For if in the case of those moved in a straight line, it is not the shape that provides the cause of the motion, but the impulse—a similar body placed in the middle of a similar object will have no cause for an inclination toward anything, whether they move toward the right, toward the dawn and the sun, or toward the left, or forward, or backward. ^D Furthermore, for the other bodies, when they have been driven from their own places, their relationship toward these places provides the means to move again; but for that fifth body, which never departs from its own places, it would be appropriate for it to remain at rest. And concerning the other bodies, the fifth being removed, Aristotle appears to be contentious, not saying the same things as Plato. For when Plato had inquired whether there was by nature a heavy body or a light one, and since these appeared to be spoken of in accordance with their relationship toward the upward and downward, and he had examined whether there is anything by nature below and above, or not; and had demonstrated precisely that, in accordance with the kinship of the bodies toward their places...

^A, what is called "below" for each thing is the direction toward which it might move, and "above" for each is the alien place from which it might depart, and has distributed "heavy" and "light" according to the same relationship. And in addition to this, he has demonstrated that neither the center 11 nor that which surrounds them can justly be called "above" or "below." But he opposes this 12, thinking that he must overthrow that man’s arguments from every side, and he struggles to call "heavy" that which is moved toward the center, and "light" that which is moved toward the surroundings; and he says the place which is in the center is "below," and the place which surrounds it is "above." But as for the cosmos, and the things from which it is made, and the things in the heavens, they are so far removed from one another. These things, then, are known. But Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews do not busy themselves with any of these matters, and deservedly so; for they considered that it was of no profit for the correction of life to those who occupied themselves with such things. This much, however, must be thought about all of them: that the path toward the kinship being in each case for each thing makes what is moved "heavy," and the place toward which such a thing is moved, "below"; and those possessing a relation to these otherwise are the opposite. For the place which is in the middle of it [the cosmos] has no right to be called "below" or "above," but rather, it is in the middle; and that which surrounds it, neither being in the middle, nor having any other part of itself more toward the middle than any of the parts opposite, has no right to be called either, from common terminology. For some things are naturally moved from the middle, while others are always moved toward the middle; and of these, I call that which is moved from the middle [as moving] "above," and that [moving] toward the middle, "below." For it is absurd not to believe that there is something in the heaven that is "above" and something that is "below," as some claim. For they say that one thing is not "above" and another "below," if it is entirely uniform ^B and someone walking from every direction will be antipodal to himself. But we say that the extreme part of the whole is "above," and by its position it is above, and by its nature it is first. And since there is an extreme part of the heaven, and a center, it is clear that there will be both "above" and "below" in the heaven...

CHAPTER IX

"But what are we to say concerning the soul?" he says. "For these things are clear not only to those who practice philosophy, but almost to all ordinary people: that Plato leaves the soul to be immortal, and composes many arguments concerning this, proving in various and manifold ways that the soul is immortal. And great is the ambition of those who have made a study of Plato’s teachings, contending alongside the doctrine and alongside Plato. For this is almost the bond that holds together the entire sect of the man. For the thesis of the moral doctrines followed upon the immortality of the soul-the great and brilliant and youthful ^C nature of virtue through the..."

divinity of the soul could be preserved: and all things of nature are excellently ordained for the administration of souls. For every soul, he says, undertakes the care of everything inanimate; and it revolves through the whole heaven, assuming at one time one form and at another time another. Moreover, even the things of knowledge and wisdom are bound by Plato to the immortality of the soul. For all learning is recollection [(15)]; and he does not think that search and learning, from which knowledge is derived, can otherwise be preserved. But if the soul is not immortal, neither is there recollection; and if not this, then neither is there learning. Since, therefore, all of Plato's dogmas are strictly hung from and suspended upon the divinity and immortality of the soul, he who does not concede this overturns the entire philosophy of Plato. Who, then is the first to have attempted ^B to set himself against these demonstrations, and to strip the soul of its immortality and every other power? Who else but Aristotle? For while others of the ancients granted that it survives for some time, or if they did not prove this, they at least assigned to the soul some power and motion in the body, as well as works and actions. But he—insofar as Plato exalted the matter of the soul, declaring it to be the origin of generation, the education of God, and the directress of all things—contended against it to tear it down and dishonor it, and to declare, one might almost say, that the soul is nothing. For it is neither spirit [(15)], nor fire, nor body at all, but not even incorporeal, such that it might be in itself and move; but not even to the extent of being in the body; it is motionless, and so to speak, soulless. For what sort of thing is this which he dared, or rather was compelled to do, so as to strip the soul even of its primary motions [(16)]—to deliberate, to think, to anticipate, to remember, to reason! For these are not the movements of the soul, says this clerk of nature. Indeed, this man is very trustworthy, for he has understood something about external things, while having gone so far astray regarding his own soul that he does not even perceive that he is thinking. For the soul, he says, is not what performs each of these, but it is the man; as for the soul, it is motionless. Following this man, therefore, comes Dicaearchus [(17)], and in proportion to the extent that it ^C—the soul, indeed, leads all things in heaven, and on earth, and in the sea, by its own movements, which have names: to will, to consider, to take care, to deliberate, to opine—rightly or falsely—rejoicing, grieving, being confident, fearing, hating, loving; and receives all the secondary movements of bodies, which are akin to these or are primary movements, and leads all things into growth, and decay, and separation, and combination. But to say that it is the soul that grows angry is like saying that it is the soul that weaves or builds. For it is perhaps better not to say that the soul pities, or learns, or thinks, but that the man does so by the soul. That, therefore, is what is called the mind of the soul; I mean the mind, by which the soul thinks and opines. ^D As to the mind, by which the soul thinks and opines, Aristotle says—and it is thought that he considered it the principle of justice. That Dicaearchus, the philosopher, was from the city of Messana in Sicily, as Suidas writes. Concerning him, Cicero speaks much in various places, as in the *Tusculan Disputations* 1, section: "Dicaearchus, however," he says, "in that discourse which he sets forth as having been held at Corinth in three books, in the first book he makes many people speak; while in the two he introduces a certain Pherecrates, an old man from Pthiotis, whom he calls a descendant of Deucalion, arguing that there is absolutely no soul, and that this name is altogether empty, and that it is in vain that animals and living beings are so called." And section: "But most fiercely," he says, "my favorite Dicaearchus argued against this immortality." For he wrote three books, which... [index: entries preserved]

^A he was capable of observing as a consequence, he has destroyed the entire subsistence of the soul. For that the soul is something invisible and hidden is clear; so that we could not say the soul exists merely on account of the activity from the senses. But because its movements are invisible, they seem to force us to acknowledge that the soul is something. For everyone appears to understand these things as belonging to the soul: deliberating, reflecting, and reasoning in whatever way one may. For when we see the body, and its powers, and consider such activities as not belonging to the body, we grant that there is something else within us that deliberates; and this we say is the soul. For whence else have we come to believe in the soul? If, therefore, someone takes these things by which the soul is most clearly manifested and attributes them to some other object, he has left behind no indication of whence the soul appears, nor of what use it might be thought to be. What help, then, can one who wants the soul to be immortal expect from one who kills the soul? ^B And what teaching regarding the mode of its movement—by which we call it self-moving—can be expected from those who grant it no movement at all? Yes, but regarding the immortality of the intellect, one might say that he agrees with Plato. For even if he does not wish the entire soul to be immortal, he at least acknowledges that the intellect is divine and incorruptible. What the substance and nature of the intellect is, from where it is, and whence it is introduced into men, and where it departs again, he himself might know—if indeed he understands anything of what he says about the intellect, and does not rather, by shrouding the impenetrability of the subject in the obscurity of his language, evade examination, like the cuttlefish, procuring for himself darkness in order to be more difficult to capture. ^C But he surely differs from Plato in these matters as well. For the one says it is impossible for the intellect to exist without the soul; but the other separates the intellect from the soul. And as for immortality, the former grants it to the intellect together with the soul, as being otherwise impossible; the latter says it occurs for the intellect alone, when it is separated from the soul. And he did not think it fitting for the soul to depart from the body, because this pleased Plato; yet he compelled the intellect to be torn away from the soul, because Plato judged such a thing to be impossible." Thus speaks Atticus. I shall append to these the words of Plotinus, which are as follows.

CHAPTER X.

"The matter regarding the entelechy," he says, "is to be examined in this way, just as the Lesbians are so named, because of the language spoken in Mitylene, ^D by which he wishes to prove that souls are mortal. I do not think there is frequent mention of this same thing in Plutarch, Athenaeus, and others. For my part, only the second book

^A usurp it, let it be understood thus. They say that the soul, in relation to an animated body, is compared like matter, and that it holds the status of form in the composite. But they accept the body, not just any kind, nor insofar as it is body itself, but as natural, organic, and existing with the potential for life. If, therefore, it is like the thing with which it is compared, and behaves in the same way as the form of a statue is compared to bronze, it follows entirely that where the body is divided, the division of the soul must also occur at the same time; and when a part of the body is cut off, a portion of the soul must also be part of what is cut away. Furthermore, it follows that no withdrawal of the soul in sleep occurs, if the entelechy is supposed to be inherent in that of which it is the entelechy; indeed, it is concluded that sleep itself would not exist at all. Then, if the theory of entelechy is proven ^B, there would be no struggle left of reason against desires, but the whole would be affected in one and the same sense, so as not to be at variance with itself. Perhaps it is possible for the senses to function only in this way, but it is impossible for the acts of the intellect to do so. Therefore, they bring in another soul, namely the mind, which they posit as immortal. A different method, then, than that which is explained by those men, will necessarily have to be brought forward, by which the soul endowed with the faculty of reasoning may be called an entelechy, if it pleases to retain this word. Furthermore, that soul which is the principle of perception, and which preserves the forms of things perceived by the senses even when they are absent, could not itself preserve them without the body. But if this is granted, they would reside in the soul like figures and images; yet if they were in it in this way, they could not be received by it in any other way at all. So, if it is an entelechy, it is not, however, of the sort that cannot be separated. From which it is also elicited that even the desire itself—not now for food and drink, but also for those things which are outside the body—cannot be an entelechy of that kind. There remains the soul which grants the power of growth, regarding which one might perhaps rightfully doubt whether this theory of entelechy can fit it. But not even that. For if the principle of every plant dwells in the root, and as the rest of the body grows, it does so in the lower part, which is closer to the root, as is wont to happen in many plants, the soul clearly leaves the other parts and gathers itself into one. Therefore it was not in the whole plant such as an entelechy is, which cannot be separated. And indeed, before the plant grows, it is contained in a very small bulk. If, therefore, it comes into a small space from a larger plant, and from a small space into the whole, what prevents it from being completely separated? ^C And how could it, being indivisible, become a divisible entelechy of a divisible body? Or can the same soul become a different one from a different animal? How, then, could the soul of the prior one become that of the next, if it was the entelechy of only one? But this is apparent from animals that are transformed into other animals. Therefore it does not get its existence from being the form of something; rather, it is a substance, not receiving existence from being established in a body, but being what it is before coming to be in this one; for example, the body of an animal (21) will not generate the soul. What then is its substance? But if it is neither body nor an affection of a body, but is an activity and a creative power, and many things are both in it and from it; since it is a substance existing ^D apart from bodies, what kind of thing is it? Or not even a grunt?

^A how, strictly speaking, can something that lacks parts and is incapable of division be subject to the same division of the body whose entelechy it is said to be? And how can the same soul become the soul of one living creature after another? Just as therefore, how can that which was the soul of an earlier creature be the soul of another, if it is the entelechy of one? This, moreover, is manifestly refuted by those living creatures which change into others. Therefore, the soul does not have its essence in the fact that it is a form of something; rather, it is itself a substance, which did not receive its being from the fact that it was placed in a body, but it already existed as such before it became the soul of this or that particular creature, in so far as it is an animal whose body would generate that soul. But what then is its essence? For if it is neither body nor an affection of body, and yet functions, actions, and many things of that kind are both in it and proceed from it: since it is consequently a substance outside the order of bodies, what sort of thing is it? Is it not sufficiently clear by itself what we truly and properly call substance? For generation, not substance, should be the name given to everything corporeal, since it is generated and perishes in its turn, and never truly exists, but is preserved only by some communion with that which truly is, in so far as it is a participant of it. These are the words of Plotinus. Having pursued these matters at this point, we will have done nothing irrelevant if we next append what Porphyry writes to Boethus regarding the soul.

CHAPTER XI. De eodem, ex Porphyrii ad Boethum opere De animo.

^B « Now, » he says, « against him who calls the soul an entelechy, and thus wishes it to be immovable while yet moving other things, one must first dispute: whence comes that inspiration of the living creature, when it itself understands nothing of what it sees or says, but the soul foresees both the future and that which is not yet present, and is moved accordingly? Whence also, in the very constitution of the living creature, come the counsels, deliberations, and volitions of the soul of the living creature, which are assuredly impulses of the soul, and not of the body? » To which he subsequently adds: « To make the soul similar to weight, or to certain corporeal and immovable qualities of a single form, through which that which is subject to them is either moved or becomes such and such, would be the act of a man who, either willingly or unwillingly, has completely strayed from the dignity of the soul, and who in no way perceives that by the presence of the soul the body of the living creature has become vital, just as by the presence of fire, water—which is cold by itself—is made hot, and the air which otherwise remains dark without the sun's light is illuminated by its rising. But neither is the heat of the water the heat of the fire, nor is the fire itself, nor is the aerial light the light inherent in the sun. Likewise, the animation of the body, which is conferred with a certain weight and corporeal quality, is not that soul which, placed in the body, infuses into it by its own power a certain vital spirit. » And the same writer later says: « What is said about the soul by others certainly fills us with shame. For who would not be ashamed of a definition by which the soul is constituted as the entelechy of a natural and organic body? To whom would the discourse not appear full of that indignity, ^D which teaches that either spirit, or a spiritual fire ignited and forged by the cooling and as if by the quenching of the surrounding air, is contained therein; or which declares it to be an aggregation of atoms, or absolutely professes it to be generated by the body? » This doctrine, indeed, he declared to be impious even in the laws of the impious. Therefore, all these discourses are full of shame. And regarding [alt-version omitted]

^A one who settles that the soul is something self-moving, of him, he says, no one should rightfully be ashamed.

CHAPTER XII.

Against the same man, who disagrees with Plato also in that discourse regarding the Soul of the universe. From Atticus.

^B Furthermore, since Plato states that the soul adorns all things, and permeates through all things, and that it is the very thing from which the rest—each taken individually—would concede that they are governed, and that nature is nothing else than soul, and evidently a soul not devoid of reason, and from these things logically concludes that all things come to pass according to providence, insofar as they come to pass according to nature: Aristotle agrees with us in none of these points. For he denies that nature is soul, and that the things on earth are governed by a single nature. For he says there are different causes for each of the things, and ^C others still. Indeed, for the heavenly things which always remain in the same state and act in the same way, he proposes fate as the cause; but for those things below the moon, he proposes nature; and for human affairs, prudence, providence, and soul; providing elegance in such divisions, but failing to perceive what is necessary. For if there were not one ensouled power permeating through the whole, binding and holding all things together, it would never be possible for the whole to be reasonably or well governed. It was a sign of the same lack of foresight ^D to hope that a city could ever subsist well without unity, as it is to think that one can defend by reasoning the preservation of this whole universe—which appears so exceedingly beautiful—without having bound and fitted it together through the communion of one similar [power]. And while he says that the thing which governs each of the individual things is a principle of motion, he is unwilling to admit that this is soul; even though Plato himself has shown that soul is the principle and source of motion for all things that are moved. And that which would be the work of a rational and wise soul—to do nothing in vain—he attributes to nature, but does not grant it the name of soul; as if the beginnings and powers of things were taken from names, and not from their faculties.

CHAPTER XIII.

Against the same man, who mocks the Ideas in Plato—ideas which we have already seen in previous testimonies were not unknown even to the Hebrews. From the same.

815 Finally, he says, that which is the head and hinge of the Platonic philosophy, namely the arrangement regarding intelligible things, has been dishonored. [index: entries preserved ] Socrates replies, "The Ideas, and the patterns of existing things. For as many things as you see—the earth, the things upon the earth, the heaven, the sea—beyond all these exist the invisible images of all these things." "Where do they stand?" "Nowhere [at all]; for if they were somewhere, they would not be," etc.—in which Lucianus is also ridiculous in his usual manner, and makes Socrates ridiculous.

^A And thus the doctrine of the Forms, as much as it was in Aristotle, has been mocked, trampled underfoot, and cast out with every kind of reproach. For being unable to understand that the greatest and divine things, which far surpass all others, require a similar power for their apprehension—and trusting in his own minute and humble sharpness (which, although it was able to penetrate into the nature of earthly things and see the truth in them, was yet not able to behold the most pure and sincere light of the truth itself)—he used as a canon and judge of things far superior to his own grasp, and ordered these special natures, such as Plato recognized, to be null and void, and dared to call those things, the highest of all beings, trifles, insipid cant, and the fables of mountebanks.

For that is the highest and final dogma of the Platonists, which consists in this spiritual and eternal nature of the Ideas. ^B Wherefore the highest labor and struggle is set before the soul. For he who has partaken of it and reached it is altogether blessed; but he who is left behind and is unable to become its spectator is left utterly void and stripped of all happiness. Therefore, Plato struggles everywhere to demonstrate the power and efficacy of these natures. For he says that it is not possible to render well the cause of anything at all, unless it leans upon the communion of these, nor can any knowledge of truth be held, unless it be referred back to them. Nay, he even argues that there is not the slightest bit of reason in any of these things, for those who do not confess their substance. And indeed, those who have determined to add authority and weight to the Platonic doctrine are usually in this dispute—and this for necessity, for they can no longer defend the Platonic [system] at all, unless one grants them those primary and original natures of Plato. ^C For these are the things by which it excels all others most of all. For when he himself recognized God as the father, creator, lord, and guardian of all things, and understood from these works of ours that the craftsman, before he is about to create anything, must hold the object comprehended in his mind, and then at last, having formed in his thought the image of it, express it in the things themselves by a certain likeness—[recognizing] these divine notions, which are older than the things and are the patterns of what comes into being, incorporeal and perceived by the mind alone, always the same and remaining in the same state; and finally, as existing first in a certain primary way, and then as the cause for the rest of why they are in the way that each is, according to its own likeness to those first principles; since he perceived that these notions could not be seen easily nor explained sufficiently by speech—^D having prepared those who were about to follow him, and having organized his whole philosophy toward this end, he says that the knowledge of these things is wisdom and intelligence, through which the human end and a blessed life result. So much from Atticus. More even than these things could be brought forward from the writings of the man which have been mentioned; but those things that have been set forth are sufficient.

^A Since we have reached this point, we shall pass on to the sect of the Stoics. Socrates, then, had an auditor named Antisthenes, a man who was Heracleotic in his character; he used to say that it was better to go mad than to feel pleasure. For this reason he advised his acquaintances never to extend a finger for the sake of pleasure. Diogenes the Dog became his auditor, who, seeming himself also to be of the most beastly way of thinking, drew many after him. Crates succeeded him, and of Crates was Zeno of Citium, who became the founder of the sect of the Stoic philosophers. Cleanthes succeeded Zeno, and Chrysippus succeeded Cleanthes; after him was another Zeno, and those who followed. It is said that all these, in a distinguished manner, took care of both a steadfast life and the art of dialectic. The dogmas of their philosophy are somewhat like this.

CHAPTER XIV. On the philosophy of the Stoics; and how Zeno rendered the account concerning principles. From the seventh book of Aristocles On Philosophy.

• They say that fire is the element of existing things, just as Heraclitus did; but its principles are matter and God, just as Plato ^B taught. But these [Stoics] say that both are bodies, both the active and the passive; whereas the former [Plato] said that the first active cause was incorporeal. Furthermore, they say that at certain predestined and fixed times the whole world is conflagrated, and then again it is rearranged. They say, however, that the first fire is as it were a seed, having the seminal principles of all things and the causes of things that have happened, of things that are happening, and of things that will happen; and that the interweaving and sequence of these is fate, and knowledge, and truth, and a law of existing things that is in a manner unavoidable and inescapable. And by this, they say, all things in the world are managed, as if in a very well-ordered state.

CHAPTER XV. What opinion the Stoics introduce concerning God, and concerning the constitution of the universe. From the Epitome of Arius Didymus.

• They call the whole world together with its parts God. They say that this is one only, ^C and finite, and a living being, and eternal, and God. For within it all bodies are contained, and nothing void exists in it. For that which is fashioned from the whole of substance is called "qualified" in accordance with the suchlike arrangement and order. Therefore, to them... ^D

^A the world is considered eternal in its first aspect, but generated and mutable in its decoration, according to infinite periods that have elapsed and are to follow. And that which is a qualified world from the whole substance is said to be eternal and God; but the world is called a system composed of heaven, and air, and earth, and sea, and the natures within them. And the world is said to be the dwelling-place of gods and men, and of those things created for their sake. For in the same way that a city is spoken of in two ways—both as the habitation and as the system composed of the inhabitants together with the citizens—so too the world is, as it were, a city composed of gods and men, the gods holding the leadership, and men being subject to them. There exists a communion between them because they share in reason, which is by nature law; and all other things have come to be for their sake. ^B Consistently with this, one must believe that God, who rules over all, provides for men, being beneficent, and good, and lover of mankind, and just, and possessing the sum of all virtues. For this reason, the world is also called Zeus, since he is the cause of life to us. Insofar as he governs all things immutably from eternity by a connected reason, he is also named Fate; and Adrasteia, because there is nothing that can escape him; and Providence, because he manages each thing as its utility requires. As for the leading part of the world, it pleased Cleanthes that it is the sun, because it is the greatest of the stars and contributes most to the administration of all things, creating day and year, and the other seasons. But to some among the sect, the earth appeared to be the leading part of the world. To Chrysippus, it was the ether, ^C the purest and most clear, as being the most mobile of all things and driving the whole revolution of the world. Thus far from the Epitome of Arius Didymus. Now it shall sufficiently suffice against the same Stoic opinion concerning God to adduce the words of Porphyry in the writings he addressed to Boethus, *On the Soul*, which are as follows.

CHAPTER XVI

Porphyry against the Stoics' opinion concerning God. From the work to Boethus, On the Soul.

"They do not hesitate," he says, "to call God a certain spiritual fire, to leave it eternal, and to say that it consumes and feeds upon all things, as if such fire were like this fire of ours, which is common. And they do not doubt to contradict Aristotle, who does not allow it to be accepted from himself that the ethereal region should consist of a similar fire. Being asked, then, how such fire survives for so long, they do not say it is a different fire; but by saying it is such [as ours], and desiring that one should believe them, they add to this irrational faith that it ^D is also eternal fire, partly that the ethereal [part] is extinguished and...

partly that it is kindled. But what point is there in dwelling further on their stupidity, or on the contempt of the ancients in this discussion? ^A

CHAPTER XVII

That that which truly is, is not a body, as the Stoics think. From the first book of Numenius "On the Good."

"But," he says, "what then shall we say truly is? Are these the four elements: earth, fire, and the two other natures between them? Are these things, then, that which truly is—either taken collectively, or some one of them? And how can that be, since they are both generated and perish, as it is possible to see them coming into being from one another and departing, being neither elements nor syllables? These things, therefore, in such a state, would not be that which is. But is matter, then, able to be that which is? But even this is more impossible than everything else, due to the weakness of its endurance. For matter is a river, flowing and rapid; [it possesses] neither depth, nor breadth, nor length that is defined or endless." And after a few words, he adds: "Thus the discourse has well said, that if matter is infinite, it is undefined; if it is undefined, it is irrational; and if it is irrational, it is unknowable. And since it is unknowable, it is necessarily ^B disorderly; for it would surely be very easy to know things that are ordered; but that which is disorderly does not stand fast; and whatever does not stand fast, could not be that which is. And this was what we ourselves agreed upon before: that it is unlawful for all these things to be attributed to that which is. Let this be an opinion, if not for everyone, at least for me. Therefore, I say that neither matter nor bodies are that which is. What then? If we have something else in the nature of the universe beyond these? Yes indeed; but it would not be a complicated matter to state this, if we should first attempt to discuss it among ourselves. Since bodies are by nature dead and inanimate, ^C and are carried about, and do not even remain in the same state, do they not need something to hold them together? Assuredly. If they did not happen upon this, would they remain? Far from it. What, then, is that which will hold them together? If this also were a body, it seems to me that it would need Zeus the Savior, as it would be breaking up and scattering. If, however, it must be free from the condition of bodies so that it may be able to defend those things that possess corruption and to hold them together, it does not seem to me to be anything else than solely the incorporeal. For this alone of all natures stands fast, and is firmly fixed, and is in no way corporeal. For it is not generated, nor does it grow, nor is it moved by any other motion, and for these reasons it has well appeared right to advocate for the incorporeal." ^D

CHAPTER XVIII.

What the Stoics think about the conflagration of the universe.

^A "It pleases," he says, "the most ancient and primary members of this sect, after certain very great periods of conversion, for all things to change first into air, and then finally to be dissolved into ethereal fire." And he adds immediately after: "From these things it is furthermore manifest that Chrysippus did not attribute this confusion to their substance—for this is absolutely impossible—but only to that which is spoken of in place of a change. For when they speak of the customary corruption of the world after the longest conversions, they do not accept the term 'corruption' in a proper sense—those who dogmatize concerning the dissolution of all things into fire, which they indeed call 'conflagration'—but they use that word 'corruption' in place of the change that happens in nature. For it pleases the Stoic philosophers to change the whole substance into fire, as if into a seed, and from this for the ordered world ^B to be formed again, such as it was before. And this dogma of the sect was accepted by its first and most ancient members: Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. For they say that Zeno, a student and successor of his in the school, maintained his assent in that question concerning the conflagration of the world."

Chapter XIX.

How the Stoics philosophize about the repeated origin of the universe.

"After," he says, "the common reason and common nature had progressed to that point, and having grown greater and larger, dried up all things at last, and took them into itself, it is established in the whole substance, inasmuch as it has returned to that first-mentioned reason, and to that resurrection which makes the great year, according to which the restoration happens again from itself alone ^C into itself. Having returned, it proceeds by the order from which it had likewise begun to arrange, and according to reason, it again carries out the same process, such periods recurring from eternity without any cessation. For it is not possible that things should have a cause of their beginning, nor the moderator of all things themselves. For it is necessary that a certain substance should underlie things that come into being, which is by its own nature capable of receiving all changes, and besides that, something which may fashion it out of itself. For just as we see among us a certain fashioning nature, so it is necessary that something of that kind ^D be posited in the world itself, but it is free from generation: for it is not possible that there be a beginning of generation in this nature. And in the same way that it is ingenerate, it is also impossible that it should be destroyed, neither by itself from itself, nor by anything else destroying it from without."

CHAPTER XX. How the Stoics feel about the soul.

^A • "Semen," Zeno says, "is that spirit which man emits joined with moisture, a particle of the soul and an offshoot, and a tempering of the parents’ seed, and a mixture gathered together from the parts of the soul. For it possesses within itself the same faculties as the whole; when it is released into the womb, having been caught by another spirit, it becomes a part of the soul of the female, and grows as one with it; and being hidden, it develops, moved and fanned by that spirit, always taking into the moisture and increasing from itself." ^B And after a few words he adds: "Regarding the soul, Cleanthes, setting Zenon’s dogmas alongside (57) those of other natural philosophers, says that Zeno defines soul as sense or exhalation, just as Heraclitus does. For wishing to demonstrate that souls—being exhalations—are always intelligent, he likened them to rivers, speaking as follows: ‘Into the same rivers, other and yet other waters flow; and souls are exhaled from moist things.’ Zeno therefore defines the soul as an exhalation, in agreement with Heraclitus. And he says that it is sensitive for this reason, ^C that its leading part is capable of being shaped by existing things (38) through the sense-organs, and of receiving the impressions. For these things are properties of the soul." And after some other things: "They say that there is a soul in the whole, which they call aether, and the air around the earth and sea, and the exhalations from these; and that the remaining souls—as many as are in living creatures, and as many as are in the surrounding air—have grown onto this; for the souls of those who have died remain. Some, however, say that the soul of the whole is eternal, but that the others are mixed together; and at the end of time they return to it. Every soul has a leading part within it, which is life, sensation, and impulse." And again after a little: "They say that the soul is created and perishable; ^D that it is not destroyed immediately upon being released from the body, but remains for some time by itself; the soul of the wise until the dissolution of all things into fire, and that of the foolish for some specific times. And they say that the souls remain in this way, that we ourselves remain as souls, having come to be, when the body has been separated and has changed the substance of the soul into a lesser form. But the souls of the foolish and of unreasoning animals are destroyed together with their bodies." Such are the dogmas of the Stoic philosophy, gathered together from the *Epitome* of Arius Didymus (39). Against the absurd opinion of these men concerning the soul, what has been briefly argued in opposition by Longinus, who lived in our own time, is sufficient.

CHAPTER XXI.

“For my part,” he says, “to speak generally, all those who have declared the soul to be a body seem to me far removed from the true method of philosophizing. For how is it at all admissible to posit that which pertains to it as being akin and twin to any of the elements? And where is there room to bring in the mixtures and fusions? These, occurring in many ways, are by nature suited to generate the forms of other unspeakable bodies—in which, if not perpetually, yet from afar one can discern the cause of the elements, and the impetus from the first toward the secondary and tertiary things. But of those things that pertain to the soul, there is no trace or evidence to be found in bodies, even if one were to be ambitious, as Epicurus and Chrysippus were, to ‘move every stone’ and investigate every power of body to find the origin and source of the soul’s functions. For what could the thinness of that spirit contribute to our thinking or reasoning? Or what such power and capacity for change, beyond the others, do the shapes of the atoms have, so that when they are intermingled in the composition of a different body, they produce wisdom? I, for my part, am not at all persuaded that this could happen—not even if someone were to happen upon the tripods and handmaidens of Vulcan, ^C (which Homer mentions (40), saying that the former go of their own accord into the gathering, while the latter assist their master, and are not surpassed by any living being in any kind of gift or ability, let alone being surpassed by those fortuitous filings), and one would have no more reason to believe that they – any more than stones lying on the shore – would have the virtue and skill to produce anything excellent and wonderful to behold. For who, indeed, would not rightly be indignant at Zeno and Cleanthes for having philosophized so insultingly about the soul, and for both of them having asserted that the soul is an exhalation of solid ^D (41) body? For what, I ask by the gods, does an exhalation have in common at all with a soul? And where is it possible, if one is convinced that our essence and that of other living beings is similar to this, for the latter to be sufficient to preserve (43) lasting impressions and memories, or to account for the impulses and deliberations of things profitable for understanding? Or indeed, does this also apply to the gods... [alt-version omitted]

all that reaches us, likewise of terrestrial and celestial things, into exhalation and smoke and such-like drivel? And are we not ashamed of the poets who, although they do not possess an accurate understanding of the gods, nevertheless, partly from the common conception of men and partly from the suggestion of the Muses, which naturally moves them toward these things, have spoken more reverently concerning them, and not of exhalations, nor of airs, nor of spirits and such trifles? ^A This is what Longinus has to say to you. Hear now also Plotinus, debating gravely against the same people.

CHAPTER XXII. Against the same Stoics, that the soul cannot be corporeal. From the book of Plotinus, *On the Soul*.

"Whether," he says, "each one of us is immortal, or whether we perish entirely; or whether rather one part perishes and dissolves, while the other, which is the man himself, remains forever: this can finally be understood by one who considers the matter according to the principles of nature. First of all, man is certainly not something simple, but possesses a soul and also a body. And whether it is attached to us as some instrument, or in any other way, yet we must grant that in this way the nature and essence of each is to be distinguished. ^B Indeed, the body itself, being also composite, cannot, as reason suggests, remain, nor can the senses see it dissolving and wasting away and undergoing every kind of destruction; ^C for each of the things contained in it is carried toward its own, and one destroys another, and changes it into another, and perishes—and especially when the soul, which makes them friendly to one another, is not present to the masses. And if each becomes solitary, being no longer one, they receive a dissolution ^D into form and matter, of which even the simple bodies must necessarily be composed; and furthermore, having magnitude, since they are bodies, they are cut and broken into small pieces, and in this way would endure destruction. So if this is a part of us, we are not entirely immortal; but if it is an instrument, it ought to have been given for a certain time as such in its nature. But the most important thing, and the man himself, would be that which is according to the form, as against matter the body is, or according to that which uses it, as against an instrument—and in either way, the soul is himself."

^A Since, therefore, if another part of us is a body, we certainly are not immortal—for every body is composite; but if it should not be body, but of another nature, even that must be considered either in the same way or in another. But first it must be considered 55 into what things this body, which they call soul, must be resolved. For since life is present to the soul by necessity, it is necessary that this body—if it be composed of two or more bodies—that either each of them, or every one of them, has an innate life; or that one has it and another does not; or that neither has it. If, then, it be that to one of them life is present, this very thing itself would be the soul. What, then, could be the body, having life from itself? For fire and air and water and earth are devoid of soul of themselves, and to whatever soul is present among these, it makes use of life that is adventitious. ^B But there are no other bodies besides these. And as for those that seem to be elements, different bodies 54 of these have been spoken of, not as souls, nor as having life. But if, while none of them has life, the union has made life, it is absurd. But if each has life, even then it is not sufficient; rather, it is impossible for a concourse of bodies to produce life, and for things void of intelligence to beget intelligence. And indeed, they will not say that these have been compounded in any way whatever. There must therefore be that which orders, and the cause of the mixture; so that this would have the rank of soul. For not only a composite body, but not even a simple body [in the nature of things] could exist without soul being present in the universe; if indeed, when reason approaches matter, it creates a body, and reason could approach from nowhere else but from the soul.

If anyone, however, ^C not in this way, but says that atoms or indivisible things coming together make the soul, he would be refuted by their union and shared affection, and by their juxtaposition not being through the whole—since one thing cannot be made from bodies that are neither able to undergo any affection nor to be joined together, nor from those that are not able to be sympathetic, whereas the soul is sympathetic to itself; and furthermore, a body or magnitude would not even be generated from parts that lack dimension 55. And indeed, if they shall say that the body being simple, the material part does not have life from itself (for matter is without quality), but that the part ordered according to the form brings life; if they shall say that this form is substance, and not the compound of both, then one of these two will be the soul; and it will not be a body again (for neither is it from matter); or we shall resolve it again in the same way. But if they shall say that it is a condition of matter, and not a substance, then these are elements, and these are other bodies, not souls. Therefore, turn to this: And if it pleases some that there are certain elements besides these, they themselves do not call them souls, but bodies, nor do they wish them to have life from themselves.

^A For it must be said to them from whence the affection and life came into the matter. For matter does not form itself, nor does it insert a soul into itself. Therefore, there must be something that is the provider of life—whether that provision be for the matter or for any of the bodies whatsoever—which is external to and 56 beyond the nature of bodies. Since no body would exist if the power of soul were not present. For its nature flows and is in 57 motion, and it would perish as quickly as possible if all things were bodies, even if one were to give the name "soul" to one of them. For it would suffer the same things as the other bodies, since they are all of one matter. Or rather, it would not even come to be, but all things would stop in the matter, there being nothing to form it. Perhaps indeed even the matter would not exist at all, and this universe would be dissolved, if one were to entrust it to 58 a bodily conjunction, granting it the rank of soul merely in name, such as air or a most scattered spirit, and [claim it] to be the one having [life] not from itself. ^B For how, when all bodies are being divided, would anyone attributing this whole to whatever [body] he chooses, not make it mindless and borne about at random? For what order is there in a spirit that is in need of order from a soul, or reason, or intellect? But when soul exists, all these things are its ministers for the constitution of the world, and of each living thing, while one power that contributes to the whole [comes] from another. But if this power were not present in all things, none of these would exist, let alone be in order.

^C But they themselves, driven by the truth, testify that there must be, prior to bodies, a form of soul better than them, positing as they do spirit endowed with reason and intellectual fire, as if the superior portion could not exist in things without fire or spirit, and were seeking a place to be established; whereas it is necessary to seek where they will establish bodies, since it is these—the bodies—that must be established in the powers of the soul. But if they acknowledge nothing beside spirit, and life, and soul, what is that much-vaunted phrase among them, "the manner of existence," to which they flee for refuge when they are compelled to posit something else beside bodies that is naturally active? If, therefore, not every spirit is a soul, because there are myriad soulless spirits, but they speak of "the spirit that has a certain manner of existence," they must say whether this "manner of existence" and this relationship is one of the things that exist or nothing at all. But if it is nothing, the spirit 59 would be merely a name, and [the "manner of existence"] would be a name; and thus it would happen that they would have nothing else to speak of besides matter; and soul, and God, and all things 60 would be a name, and that alone would be the reality. But if the relationship is one of the things that exist, ^D and if they hold that it holds the place of form, they will say that it brings about life; if they set that form as the essence and nature, [alt-version omitted] it will no longer be both at once, but the soul will be only one of them, nor will it retain the condition of a body any longer, since it would be devoid of all matter; for otherwise, we would be dividing that same thing in the same way again. But if they would rather have it be an affection of matter than the essence itself, it is necessary for them to explain from what source both that affection and also life are derived into the matter. For matter does not pour the form or the soul into itself. It will therefore be necessary for there to be some author of life, whether this becomes a benefit of matter or of any body; and indeed an author of such a kind who is both void of body and has most distantly surpassed all bodily nature. For indeed, if there were no power of soul, every body would likewise be destroyed. For its nature is flowing and is whirled about in motion: and so, if all things were bodies, they would perish most quickly, even if the name of "soul" were imposed upon one of them. For then that "soul" would suffer exactly the same things as the other bodies, since it would be one and common matter for all. Yea, certainly, absolutely nothing would come to pass, and they would consist in universal matter, since there would be nothing from which it itself could receive form. Moreover, matter would perhaps not exist at all, and this whole universe would be dissolved, if one were to entrust it to the bonding of some body to which he would, in name only, attribute the power and reason of a soul—for instance, air and spirit, which could be very easily dissipated, and does not have [existence] in itself as one single thing. For since all bodies can be divided and cut, who would entrust this universe to any one of them, without at the same time making it void of mind and agitated by some rash movement? For what order, or reason, or intellect could there be in that spirit, which should need to have order only by the benefit of a soul? And once the soul is set in place, all these things are immediately, as it were, at its service, so that not only for the world itself, but also for each living thing, its own integrity and perfection may subsist, with one thing contributing power to another for the common good of the universe. If this soul were absent from that same universe, it is so far from being that each thing would have its own order that they would rather be nothing at all.

^A Furthermore, if there is a certain infinite number of inanimate spirits, and yet they wish for "spirit" to be something that "has itself in a certain way"—this very thing, "having itself in a certain way," that is, that peculiar disposition, must either be something or be absolutely nothing. If it is nothing, then spirit alone truly exists, and that which "has itself in a certain way" is an empty and meaningless term. It follows, therefore, that they must say there is nothing besides matter, and thus they mean that mind, and God, and absolutely all other things exist only in name, and that spirit alone strictly exists. But if that disposition is indeed something real, and different from that which underlies it—and thus different from matter itself, which, while being in matter, remains free from matter because it is not, in turn, composed of matter—then it is certainly not a body, but a rationale (ratio), and a nature dissimilar to a body.

Moreover, that the soul can be no body at all, anyone may understand from this: for it is either hot or cold, hard or soft, moist or solid, black or white, and endowed with other qualities of this kind, which are wont to be found here and there in different things. Now, if it is hot, it will only heat; if cold, it will refrigerate; if light, it will bring lightness wherever it is present; if heavy, it will bring heaviness; if black, it will affect things with blackness; if white, it will likewise affect them with whiteness. For fire is not of such a nature as to make things cold, nor is cold of such a nature as to make things hot. But the soul produces different things in different living beings, and even contrary things in the same one: for at one moment it compacts, at another it liquefies; it makes one thing dense and another rare, this black and that white, one light and another heavy: and whereas it ought to produce only one thing—in accordance with the quality of the body and its other color—it operates many things simultaneously. ^B

"But what of the motions," they say, "which are so many and diverse, and not one, for there is but one motion for every body? But if they charge the causes of these partly to choices and partly to preceding reasons, they speak rightly indeed. But neither is the choice the soul’s, nor are the reasons—being many—those of one simple body, which does not even possess such a reason, except insofar as it has received from the one who made it that it should be hot or cold.

And furthermore, how could growth in time ^C and by a certain measure happen to the body itself, to which it belongs to be increased, but which is itself devoid of the power of increasing, except insofar as the soul communicates that power to it within the mass of its matter, through which the soul performs its work? For if the soul were a body, and increased along with it—since it would have to be equal to the body that it had increased by its own power—it would necessarily have to be increased by the addition of a similar body. And what would be added to it? Either it would be soul, or an inanimate body. If it is soul, from where and how does it enter, and how is it added? If that which is added is an inanimate body, ^D how will this be ensouled, and how will it agree with the former, and become one, and share with it the same opinions? But it will not be like a guest and a stranger; this soul will be in ignorance of things that the former knows. And just as the rest of our mass, of which one part flows away and another part arrives, with nothing remaining the same—how then would we have memories? How the knowledge of what is our own, if we are never using the same soul? And indeed, if it is a body, and the nature of a body is divisible into many parts, then each part is ensouled.

^A For if the soul is a magnitude of such a sort, that if it be smaller, it will not be a soul—just as is the case with every quantity—then by subtraction it has changed from what it was before. But if something having magnitude, when its bulk is reduced, remains the same in quality, it is indeed different as a body and as a quantity, but in its quality—since it is different from quantity—it is able to preserve its identity. What, then, will those who say that the soul is a body reply? First, concerning each part of the soul that is in the same body, is each part a soul, as the whole is? And again, is the part of a part a soul? The magnitude, therefore, contributed nothing to its essence (although it ought to have, since it is something measurable), and it is all in many places at once, which is impossible for a body, for the same whole to be in many places, and for the part to be the same as the whole. But if they say that each of the parts is not a soul, a soul will come to be in them from soulless things. And furthermore, if the magnitude of each soul is to be defined by both ^B limits, or at least toward the smaller or toward the larger, it will not be a soul. When, therefore, twins are produced from one union and one seed, or, as happens in other animals, many offspring are created—the seed being divided into many places, in each of which some whole [individual] exists—how does this not teach those who wish to learn, that where the part is the same as the whole, in that [being] the quantity has been transcended in its essence, and therefore it is of necessity non-quantitative? For thus it would remain the same, though the quantity be taken away, since it is not concerned with quantity and bulk, as it is something different from essence. The soul is therefore non-quantitative, and so are the reasons.

^C That if the soul were a body, neither sensing, nor thinking, nor knowing, nor virtues, nor anything of the goods would exist, is evident from the following. If someone is to sense something, it must itself be one, and apprehend the whole by the same [power]. And if through many sensory organs more things are entering, or many qualities [pertain] to one thing, and by one thing [it perceives] the diverse, such as a face: for it does not perceive the nose with one part and the eyes with another, but the same thing perceives all at once. And if one thing should enter through the eyes, and another through hearing, it must necessarily be some one thing to which both [arrive]. Or how could one say that these things are different, if the perceptions did not come together at once into the same place? It must therefore be like a center, and the lines converging from the circumference of a circle—that is, the sensations from all sides—must terminate at this point, and that which perceives must be such in very truth.

^A For if it were divided, and the sensations were to receive both extremities as if on a line, they would either converge again into one and the same point, such as the center, or each would have a sensation of the other, just as if I were to perceive some things and you others. And if the sensation were one, as a face, it would be condensed into one, which is indeed what appears; for it is condensed even in the pupils themselves, or else how would the largest things be seen through them? Therefore, proceeding still more into the governing principle, they become as it were indivisible thoughts. And this will be indivisible; for if it were to be shared by this being of magnitude, then one part would perceive one thing and another another [(72)], and none of us would grasp the perception of the whole of the sensible object. But in fact, the whole is one; for how could it even be divided? For the equal will not fit the equal, because the governing principle is not equal to every sensible object. In how many parts, then, is the division [(74)]? Or will it be divided into as many parts as the incoming sensation has variety [(75)]? And thus, will each of those parts of the soul perceive through its own constituent parts [(76)]? Or will the parts of the parts be insensible [(77)]? But that is impossible. Since everything is naturally capable of being divided into infinite parts, it would happen that there would be infinite sensations for each sensible object, such that infinite images of the same thing would exist in our governing principle. ^B Furthermore, since that which perceives is a body, the act of perception could not happen in any other way than as impressions are made in wax by signet rings, or as sensations are inscribed into the blood or the air. If, then, it is like something in wet bodies—which is reasonable—as in water, it will be agitated, and there will be no memory; but if the forms remain, either it is impossible for others to be inscribed while those occupy the place, so that no other sensations will exist; or, if others occur, those earlier ones are destroyed, so that there will be nothing left to serve as memory. But if it is possible to remember and in turn to perceive others after others, with those preceding not offering any impediment, then the soul can in no way be a body. ^C Moreover, one may clearly understand this same thing from the sensation of pain. For when a person is said to be in pain in his finger, the pain itself is indeed in the finger, but the sensation of that pain, it is clear that they themselves will admit, occurs in the governing principle of the human being. Therefore, while one thing is the ^D governing principle, and another the thing suffering, the governing principle perceives the pain, and the soul is the whole, and it is the same…

^A thing that suffers. How then does this happen? By propagation, they will say, when the pneuma of the soul about the finger suffers first, and then transmits it to the next, and this to another, until it arrives at the governing principle. It is necessary, therefore, if the first perceived pain, that the sensation of the second should be different, if the sensation is by propagation, and that of the third also different, and that there should be many and infinite sensations about a single pain; and that the governing principle should perceive all these last of all, and its own sensation besides these. But the truth is that each of those is not of the pain in the finger, but the one next to the finger ^B perceives that the instep is in pain; the third perceives that something else is toward the top, and there are many pains. And the governing principle does not perceive the pain at the finger, but the one at itself, and it knows this alone, and lets the others be, not knowing that the finger is in pain. If, therefore, it is by propagation, sensation cannot possibly be of such a kind, nor, since it is a corporeal mass, can one part suffer and another have knowledge. For of every magnitude, if one thing is one part and another is another, the perceiving thing must be ^C posited to be of such a kind that it is everywhere the same to itself; and this is fitting to be done by some other thing of those that exist, rather than by a body.

That it is not even possible to think, if the soul were a body of any kind, must be demonstrated from the following.

^A If, however, they will reply that those notions are of forms which adhere to matter, yet they cannot be grasped except by things separated from bodies, and indeed separated by the power of the mind. For the separation of a circle, a triangle, a line, and a point, does not take place with bodies or matter at all: therefore, it is necessary that the soul itself, which effects this, should be separated from the body, and therefore it is necessary that it itself should not be a body.

Moreover, the beautiful ^B and the just, and indeed the comprehension of both, have no magnitude. Wherefore both will be received by a certain indivisible power of the soul, and will remain in it without any parts.

• What then? If we were to say that the soul is a body, how in the world could temperance, justice, fortitude, and the rest be its virtues? For indeed, are those virtues merely some sort of spirit or blood? Unless, perhaps, fortitude is a certain distress of the spirit, and temperance a commodious tempering of the same, and that true beauty is a certain fair species adumbrated by figures, which, when we see it in some people, we call those persons elegant and beautiful of body. ^C Truly, for a certain spirit, having only some shadowy and superficial fortitude or beauty, such a condition and nature might be appropriate. But what need has a spirit of temperance? Nay, on the contrary, in embraces and touches, it would rather pursue some convenience, whether it be that it is warmed, or moderately captures the cold, or clings to soft, tender, and smooth things. But to render to each what is due according to worth, what has that to do with a spirit? Furthermore, are those notions of virtue, and other spiritual things of that kind in which the soul is occupied, eternal; or, on the other hand, is virtue born, and will it again perish? But who is the maker of it, and from whence? For then this question necessarily remains. They must surely be eternal and always-remaining, such as are those things which pertain to geometry. But if they are eternal and always-remaining, they are certainly not bodies. And besides, that in which they will exist must be something similar, and therefore it must not be a body. For no nature of body remains; rather, every such nature flows incessantly.

• But if, while they see the functions of bodies—which heat, cool, propel, and depress—they place the soul there, establishing it as if in an active location: they are ignorant, first, that these bodies themselves, ^D by certain incorporeal powers that are in them...

perform these things. Furthermore, we do not consider these powers to exist concerning the soul, but rather that to think, to perceive, to reason, to desire, and to manage all things wisely and well, requires a different essence. ^A Having therefore transferred the powers of incorporeal beings to bodies, they leave nothing for those incorporeal beings. But that even bodies are able to do what they can, by means of incorporeal powers, is clear from the following. For they will acknowledge that there is a difference between quality and quantity, and that every body is a quantity, and yet that not every body is quantity, just as matter is. By acknowledging these things, they will acknowledge that quality is something other than quantity, and other than body. For how will it be a body if it is not a quantity, since every body is a quantity? And indeed, just as was said somewhere above, if every body is divisible, and every mass is, that which it was is taken away; yet when a body is divided, the same whole quality remains in each part; as, for instance, the sweetness of honey is none the less sweetness in each part: therefore, sweetness could not be a body; and likewise in the case of other qualities. ^B Next, if the powers were bodies, it would be necessary for the stronger of the powers to be of great bulk, and those able to do little to be of small bulk. But if, of two bulks, there are instances where the small and minute hold the greatest powers, the acting cause must be attributed to something other than magnitude; therefore, it is something without magnitude. And as for the claim that the same matter is a body, and yet creates diverse qualities by taking them on, does it not clearly show that the things which are added are themselves formal principles and incorporeal? ^C Nor let them argue against us, saying that when spirit or blood departs, living creatures die. For [the creature] cannot exist without these, nor yet without many other things, and not even the soul could exist [without them]. And yet, neither spirit nor blood is diffused through everything.

Jam vero, if the soul, being a body, were to pass through the whole [body], it would also be mixed, in the way that mixture occurs in other bodies. ^D But if in the mixture of bodies, none of the elements mixed remains in its actual state, then the soul also would no longer exist in the bodies in actuality, but only in potentiality, having lost its state of being a soul. Just as if the sweet and the bitter should be mixed, the sweet would no longer exist; so we would have no soul. Moreover, if a body is mixed within a body, whole through the whole, so that wherever one is, the other is also, being equal in bulk to both, and occupying the whole, and no growth having occurred upon the addition of the other, nothing will be left that is not divided. For not by large parts does it alternate...

^A in a certain mutual change (for thus they say that juxtaposition will come to be): but as to the whole, permeating the other, even if one should introduce the greater into the lesser (which indeed is impossible, that the lesser should become equal to the greater); but still, as it permeates, it cuts the whole everywhere. Therefore, it is necessary, if this very thing happens at any point whatsoever, and there is no body in between that is not cut, that the division of the body should result in points, which is impossible. But if the division is to infinity (for whatever body you take is always divisible), then they will be infinite, not only in potentiality but also in actuality. Therefore, it is not possible for the whole body to permeate the whole of another; but the soul permeates through the whole: therefore, it is incorporeal.

^B That they say the same spirit is naturally prior, but that having come into a cold place and been tempered, it becomes soul, becoming thinner in the cold—this itself is absurd; for many living things are born in warm places, and possess a soul that has not been cooled. But they say, at any rate, that the nature of the soul is prior, coming to be according to the chances of external things. It follows, therefore, for them that they make the worse thing first, and before this, another thing that is less, which they call "state" (ἕξις). And the Mind is last, obviously coming into existence from the soul; or if the Mind is before all things, they ought to have made the soul next, and then nature; and always the latter is worse, if it is naturally so. If, therefore, God himself is also according to them subsequent to the mind, and created, and possesses an acquired mind, it might be concluded that there is neither soul, nor mind, nor God; if that which is in potentiality—since there is nothing prior to it in actuality—should come to be, it will not arrive at actuality; for what will be the motive cause, if there is no other cause prior to it? But if it shall lead itself into actuality, which is absurd, yet even looking toward something, it will lead; which will exist not in potentiality, but in actuality. And yet, that which always remains the same, if it should possess that which is in potentiality, it will arrive at actuality by itself, and this will be better than the one having the potentiality, like an object of desire to that one. Therefore, that which is better is prior, and possesses a nature different from body, and is always in actuality; therefore, Mind and Soul are prior to nature. Soul, then, is not in this way as spirit, nor as body. But that it is not body, might be said, and is thought, and as for cool, soul, and other things for others, these things are sufficient.

^A But since it is of another nature, we must inquire what this is. Is it then something different from the body, and yet something of the body, such as a harmony? For certain followers of Pythagoras, in a different manner, thought that harmony itself was something of this kind, just as is the harmony in strings. For as, when the strings are tightened there, a certain affection arises upon them, which is called harmony, in the same way, regarding our own body, they thought that from a mixture of unlike things, a qualitative mixture arises, working to produce life, and that the soul is this affection that results from the mixture.

That this is impossible ^B has already been stated at length against this opinion. For it has been said that the soul is prior, and harmony is posterior; and that the one commands and oversees the body, and often struggles against it—a thing that harmony, if it existed, could not do; and that the one is a substance, whereas harmony is not a substance; and that the mixture of the bodies of which we are composed, if it were in reason, would be health; and that if each part were mixed differently, there would be a different soul, so that there would be many. Moreover, this 14 is the greatest point, that there is a necessity for there to be another soul for this soul, the one that produces this harmony 15; just as in the case of musical instruments, the musician 16 who imparts the harmony to the strings, having the principle within himself according to which he will tune them. For neither the strings there of themselves, nor the bodies here 17, will be able to bring themselves into harmony. In general, these men create ensouled beings out of soulless ones, and from disordered things, they claim that the ordered ones took their order 18 and subsistence by chance. This, however, is impossible to occur either in the parts or in the whole 19. Therefore, the soul is not a harmony.

These, then, are [the arguments] from Plotinus against the opinion of the Stoics concerning the soul, who asserted it to be corporeal. But since I have already set forth in summary ^C enough against Aristotle and the Peripatetics, as well as against the Stoic sect, it is time to return again, and together to contemplate the wonderful philological inquiries of all the noble philosophers: that the Greeks, almost universally, considered and worshipped as gods the visible [gods]—the sun, and the moon, and the remaining stars, and the other parts of the world which are perceived by sight—and [also considered and worshipped] their ^D mythical and nonsensical [stories] concerning the polytheistic... And thus far from Plotinus against the opinion of the Stoics concerning the soul, who said it was corporeal. But since we have brought forth enough, albeit in summary, against Aristotle, all the Peripatetics, and the sect of the Stoics, it remains that, returning again to the beginning, we may see those excellent commentaries of all the preeminent philosophers together: seeing that the Greeks, almost to a man, have held and worshipped as gods the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars, and the remaining parts of the world, which are perceived by sight, and [have held] their fabulous and absurd [notions] about...

the vanity of the gods, have transferred these stories to the elements and other members of this universe through more specious explanations. Wherefore it seems necessary to me to collect also their opinions concerning these matters, and at the same time to contemplate their dissensions and the arrogant vanity of men. Moreover, we shall derive these things from no other source than that work of Plutarch, where he sets forth the opinions of the ancients as well as the moderns regarding these topics ^A in this manner.

Chapter XXIII. The opinions of the natural philosophers concerning the sun.

Anaximander ^B maintains that the sun is a circle twenty-eight times the size of the earth, equipped with an orbit similar to chariot wheels, but hollow, however, and full of fire, which shines forth in some part of it through a narrow opening, as if through the nozzle of a pipe: and that this is the sun. Xenophanes [says it is made] of certain glowing sparks, which, coming together from moist exhalation, cause the sun itself to be formed from burning clouds. The Stoics, a kind of ignited, intelligent substance emerging from the sea. Plato, from a great quantity of fire. Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus, [a mass or] a red-hot stone. Aristotle, a sphere from the fifth body. Philolaus the Pythagorean, a disc similar to glass, which, receiving the reflection of the fire existing in the world, transmits the light to us through the air, acting as a kind of sieve: so that that fiery brilliance of the sun in the heavens ^C is similar to the splendor which is transferred to us by reflection from a mirror. For this sun, as it were a likeness of a likeness, is what we call by that name. Empedocles sets down two suns; the one, that primordial [fire] which is in the other hemisphere of the world, having filled that hemisphere, which hitherto has always stood opposite to the reflection of its own light; the other [sun], that which appears to us, is a certain repercussion of light in this other hemisphere, which is full of air mingled with heat; which repercussion, falling from the earth, which is spherical, onto a sun similar to crystal, is at the same time carried along in the motion of the other fiery orb; this is, to express it more briefly, nothing else but the reflection of that fire which is around the earth. Epicurus, finally, [thinks it is] a terrestrial mass, similar to a pumice stone or a sponge with frequent holes, and ignited by fire. ^D

CHAPTER XXIV

Concerning the magnitude of the sun.

CHAPTER XXV

Concerning the shape of the sun.

CHAPTER XXVI

Concerning the moon.

CHAPTER XXVII

Concerning the magnitude of the moon.

CHAPTER XXVIII

Concerning the shape of the moon.

CHAPTER XXIX

Concerning the illumination of the moon.

but the part around it that is hidden by the sun’s approach is darkened, since it is the nature of a stronger fire to darken a weaker one; and this happens with the other stars also. Thales, and those with him, maintain that the moon is illuminated by the sun. Heraclitus maintains that the same thing happens to the sun and the moon: for since the stars are shaped like vessels, they receive the vapors from the moist exhalation, and are thus illuminated in appearance; the sun more brightly, for it travels through purer air, but the moon in more turbid air, and for this reason it appears darker. ^A

CHAPTER XXX. On the nature of the wandering and fixed stars.

Thales [maintains] that the stars are indeed earthy, but inflamed. Empedocles [says they are] fiery, made of that fiery substance which the ether, once it had embraced it, squeezed out during the first separation of things. Anaxagoras [says] that the ether encompassing us is fiery in its essence, and by the violent force of its rotation it tore stones from the earth, and by setting them on fire, turned them into stars. Diogenes believes that the stars are pumice-like in nature, and are the vents of the cosmos. Furthermore, he believes that they are invisible stones, which often fall to earth and are extinguished, just like that fiery stone-like star which fell near the town of Aegospotami, which we commonly call the Goat’s River. Empedocles thinks that the fixed stars are fastened to the crystal of the heaven, but that the wandering stars are loose and free. Plato [says they are] for the most part fiery, but that they also admit particles of the other elements, like a kind of glue. Xenophanes holds that they are composed of inflamed clouds; which, when they are extinguished during the day, are then rekindled at night like coals: for he says that rising and setting are nothing other than their being ignited and extinguished in turn. Heraclides, and the Pythagoreans with him, [hold] that every star is an entire world, containing earth, air, and ether, in an infinite space. And this doctrine is celebrated here and there in the Orphic poems, which make worlds out of each of the stars. Epicurus rejects none of these opinions entirely, holding to his own [standard of] ‘that which is possible.’ ^{B C}

CHAPTER XXXI. On the shape of the stars.

The Stoics [say] that the stars are spherical, just like the cosmos, ^D and the sun and the moon. Cleanthes attributes to them the shape of a cone. Anaximenes, that they are fixed into the crystalline body like nails. Some [say] that they are fiery filaments, like painted figures. Such are the excellent discoveries which this philosophy has devised for us regarding those whom they call visible gods. Now, understand what they also pronounce regarding the universe from the words of the same Plutarch.

CHAPTER XXXII. On the manner in which the world was constituted.

^A It is in this way, then, that the world 39—which we see to be of a circumflex figure 40—was formed. Since the atomic bodies possessed a movement that was unprovoked by providence and entirely accidental, and since they were moved continuously and with the greatest speed, many bodies were gathered into the same place, and for this reason possessed a variety of shapes and sizes. As these were gathered into the same place, those of them that were larger and heavier than all else settled at the bottom; but those that were small and spherical, smooth and prone to slipping, were squeezed out during the meeting of the bodies and were carried up into the heights. When the striking force that caused them to rise ceased, and the impact no longer drove them upward, and yet they were prevented from being carried downward, they were pressed toward those places that were able to receive them. These were the regions around and about. ^B And towards these 41, the multitude 41 of bodies was folded; and by being entangled with one another in this folding, they generated the heaven. The atoms that were of the same nature, being (as has been said) varied in kind, were pushed toward the heights and constituted the nature of the stars. The multitude of exhaled bodies struck the air and squeezed it; and this air, becoming wind-like through the movement and encompassing the stars, carried them along with it and preserved their current revolution in the heights. Thereafter, from those things that settled at the bottom, the earth was produced, and from the things that were lifted up, the heaven, the fire, and the air. Since a great deal of matter was still contained within the earth, and as this was thickened by the blows from the winds and the breezes from the stars, all of its finely-parted configuration was squeezed out, and it generated the moist nature. As this was fluid in its disposition, it was carried toward the hollow places that were capable of receiving and containing it; or else the water, having subsided by itself, hollowed out the places beneath it. ^C Such, then, is their wonderful cosmogony.

Joined to these is another, most extensive, word-battle concerning all matters that leave thinkers in doubt. Whether one must hold the All to be one or many; whether the world is one or whether there are several; whether this world is animate and happens to be governed by the providence of God, or the contrary; whether it is indestructible or corruptible; and by what it is nourished; and from what point God began to fashion the world; and concerning the order of the world; and what is the cause of its inclination; concerning the exterior circumference of the world, and which are the right and left sides of the world; concerning heaven; and in addition to all these, concerning demons and heroes; concerning matter and ideas; concerning the order of the whole; furthermore, concerning the course and movement of the stars; and whence the stars are illuminated; and concerning the so-called Dioscuri; concerning ^D those who hypothesize atoms, whether one must consider the All...

All to be composed of them. Concerning the eclipse of the sun and moon; and concerning its appearance; and why it appears terrestrial; concerning the distances of the same; further, concerning years. Since Plutarch, by gathering these together, has summarized in a few words the opinions and disagreements of all—which were established through myriads of arguments by those of whom we speak—I consider it not useless to set them forth for their reasonable refutation. For if they stood diametrically opposed to one another, and kindled, as it were, wars and conflicts, achieving nothing else against themselves except to refute the opinions of their neighbors through a vain ambition of words, who would not admit that we have reasonably and prudently withheld assent to them in these matters? ^B Now, therefore, to those former things which they discussed in this place concerning other matters also closer to the earth—such as the figure of the earth, its position and inclination, and also concerning the sea—I will subjoin these, so that you may know that those noble men disagreed not only concerning the celestial and supernal, but also concerning things pertaining to the earth. And that you may admire the wisdom of these wise men even more, I will further add what they disputed concerning the soul, and the ruling faculty within it, not even recognizing themselves what kind of nature they possess. But let us return to the first of the things mentioned.

CHAPTER XXXIII

Whether this whole is one.

^C The Stoics declared that the world is one, and that by this name they understood both the universe itself and also its corporeal nature. Empedocles, however, confesses that the world is one, but he does not wish for this world to be the universe, but only a small part of the total, while the rest is void and idle matter. Plato, as he thinks, conjectures by three arguments that the world is unique and that this universe is one thing: because, if it did not contain all things, it would not be perfect and whole; because it would not be similar to its paradigm if it were not unique; and lastly, because it could not be free from all corruption if anything existed outside it. But one could respond to Plato that a thing is not necessarily perfect because it contains all things; for a man is perfect, yet he does not contain all things. Furthermore, there are many paradigms, as happens in the case of statues, buildings, and paintings. But how is that [world] perfect, if something can revolve outside of it? And finally, that which is generated can neither be free from corruption, nor can it be so. Metrodorus says it is just as absurd for one world to have come into existence in an infinite space as it is for one ^D single ear of corn to grow in a vast field. Moreover, that the number of worlds is infinite is clearly concluded from the infinite multitude of principles. For if the world is finite, but the causes from which this world has been generated are all infinite, it is necessary that they be infinite. For where all the causes have come to be, there are also the effects. And the causes are either atoms or the elements.

world is indeed a world, yet if the principles which concur to its production are infinite, it must be the case that there are infinite worlds. For where all the causes concur, there also the effects must necessarily exist: but the causes are either atoms or elements. ^A

Chapter XXXIV: Whether the world is animate and governed by Providence

All others, save for those mentioned, maintain that the world is animate and governed by Providence. Democritus, Epicurus, and the rest of the teachers of atoms and the void, deny both; they entrust its administration and governance to a certain irrational nature. Aristotle does not wish for the whole of the universe to be animate in all its parts, nor does he grant that it is universally endowed with sense or reason, and therefore it is not, in his view, universally spiritual or governed by Providence. He holds that all these things belong only to celestial objects, which possess animate and vital spheres, while terrestrial things possess none of these qualities; and that such order as is found in them arises from mere chance, not ^B from any preceding reason.

Chapter XXXV: Whether the world is subject to destruction

Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics [maintain that the world was] generated by God, and that by its own nature it is subject to corruption, because it is sensory, since it is corporeal: [yet] by the providence and preservation of God, it will never perish. Epicurus [argues that it] will perish, because it was generated, like an animal or a plant. Xenophanes [holds that it is] without birth, sempiternal, and immune to all corruption. Aristotle [holds that] the part of the world subject to the moon is something subject to change, in which also all terrestrial things die by a certain fated lot.

Chapter XXXVI: Whence the world draws its nourishment

Aristotle says, if the world is nourished, it will also perish; but it stands in need of no nourishment: therefore it is sempiternal. Plato [says that] the world provides itself with nourishment from those parts which are corrupted through change. Philolaus [says that] there is a twofold kind of destruction, one from fire falling from the heavens, the other from lunar water poured out through the conversion of the air; and that the exhalations of these provide the nourishment for the world. ^C

Chapter XXXVII: From what beginning did God start to create the world

The natural philosophers say that the generation of the world began from the earth, as if from a center; for the center is the beginning of the sphere. Pythagoras [says it began] from fire, and the fifth element. Empedocles [says that] the ether was first secreted, then fire, then earth, from which, when it was compressed by the rush of the sphere's excessive motion, water gushed forth. From this, air was exhaled; and the heaven was formed from the ether, the sun from the fire; and the things near the earth were solidified from the others. Plato [says that] the visible world was created after the model of the intelligible world; and ^D of the visible, [he held that] the soul was prior, and after this the corporeal [was created]: but the visible

^A part of the universe—which first emerged from fire and earth, and later from water and air—was created first. Pythagoras, seeing that there are altogether five solid figures, which are also accustomed to be called mathematical, says that the earth is formed from the cube, fire from the pyramid, air from the octahedron, water from the icosahedron, and finally the sphere of the universe from the dodecahedron. In this respect, Plato also imitates Pythagoras.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. On the order of the world.

CHAPTER XXXIX. Why the world is inclined and depressed.

CHAPTER XL. Whether that which is outside the world is a vacuum.

^A itself is dissolved by conflagration. Posidonius says it is not something infinite, but only such as is sufficient for its dissolution, as he teaches in the first book *On the Vacuum*. Aristotle denies that there is any vacuum; and Plato rejects a vacuum both outside the world and within it.

CHAPTER XLI

Which parts of the world are right, and which are left.

Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle hold that the right part of the world is the eastern part, from which its motion takes its beginning; and the left is the western. Empedocles designates the right as those parts toward the summer tropic, and the left as those toward the winter tropic.

CHAPTER XLII

On the proper nature of the heaven.

Anaximenes says that the outer ambit of the heaven is of an earthy nature. ^B Empedocles says that the heaven is a solid body, formed from air solidified by the heat of fire in the manner of crystal, and that it comprehends whatever fire and air there is in each of the two hemispheres. Aristotle composes it of a fifth body, or of a mixture of hot and cold.

^{C D}

^{C A}

CHAPTER XLIII. Concerning demons and heroes.

To the inquiry concerning the gods, one must immediately add the treatment concerning demons and heroes. Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics [assert] that demons are psychic substances; and that heroes are souls separated from their bodies, and among these, the good are the good souls, and the bad are the evil ones. Epicurus approves of none of these.

CHAPTER XLIV. Concerning matter.

Matter is that which is subject to generation, corruption, and other changes. The followers of Thales, Pythagoras, and the Stoics declare that this matter is something changeable, alterable, and flowing, and that it undergoes every kind of change throughout all things. Those following Democritus [say] that those first principles are impassible—the atom, the void, and the incorporeal. Aristotle and Plato [say] that matter is indeed corporeal, but—if you consider it in its own nature—devoid of form, shape, and quality; yet, as it is a receptacle of all forms, it might be called their nurse, a kind of archetype, and mother. Those who say that either water, fire, air, or earth is matter no longer call it formless, but a body; those who posit the indivisibles and atoms [say] it has a shape.

CHAPTER XLV. Concerning idea.

An idea is an incorporeal substance, both existing in and of itself, and imaging the formless matters, and becoming the cause of their manifestation. Socrates and Plato presume the ideas to be substances separated from matter, in the notions [that] exist in the mind of God — indeed, in the mind itself.

Aristotle left behind forms and ideas, yet not separated from matter; he was estranged from that [notion] which is [derived] from God. The Stoics, following Zeno, [regard] ideas as our own mental conceptions.

CHAPTER XLVI. On the order of the stars.

CHAPTER XLVII. On the proper motion of the stars.

CHAPTER XLVIII. Whence the stars receive their light.

CHAPTER XLIX. On those whom we commonly call the Castors and Gemini.

^A

CHAPTER L. On the eclipse of the sun.

Thales was the first to teach that the solar eclipse occurs when the moon, being of a certain terrestrial nature, passes perpendicularly beneath the sun, and that this is clearly perceived as in a basin placed beneath, as if in a mirror. Anaximander [held it occurs when] that small aperture through which fire breathes out is closed. Heraclitus [held it occurs by] the turning of a vessel-like body of that sort, so that the concave part is turned upward, and the curved and globe-like part is turned downward toward our sight. Xenophanes [held it occurs by] the extinction of the sun itself, in such a way that another is born in its place toward the east. He writes further that a solar eclipse may sometimes persist for an entire month, and that it may at other times be so full and perfect that day seems to have turned into night. There are not wanting those who have thought that certain clouds, fleeing from sight, cast themselves before the body of the sun. Aristarchus, placing the sun in the class of the fixed stars, wishes the moon to move around the solar orbit and thus, by certain inclinations, to cast a shadow upon its body. Xenophanes, moreover, posits many suns and many moons according to the variety of the earth's climates, sections, and zones; [he says] the body of the sun, therefore, at a certain time falls upon some portion of the earth which is not at all frequented by us, and thus, borne as it were through a certain vacuum and void, undergoes such a defection. Furthermore, the same [author says] that the sun proceeds further and further into infinite space, but that it seems to us to be moved and revolved in a circle on account of the excessive distance of the interval. ^B

CHAPTER LI. On the eclipse of the moon

Anaximander [held it occurs by] the closing of the wheel’s aperture. Berossus [by] the turning toward us of the other part, which lacks fire. Heraclitus, by the turning of the curved part and vessel shape. Some of the Pythagoreans think this is a certain rejection or exclusion of light, which either our earth or the counter-earth brings about. But the more recent [philosophers] say the whole thing happens according to a certain communication of that flame, which is lit little by little and in an orderly fashion until it produces a full moon, and so in turn is diminished with a certain proportion up to its conjunction with the sun, in which it is finally completely extinguished. Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics declare by common consent that the monthly phases of hiding occur because the moon, coming into conjunction with the sun, is overwhelmed by the excessive light of the latter; but the eclipses [occur] because it falls into the shadow of the earth, occurring between both of the stars—or rather, the moon being obstructed—the shadow falls upon it or it is obstructed. ^C

CHAPTER LII. On the aspect of the moon and why it appears terrestrial.

The Pythagoreans [say] the moon appears terrestrial... ^D

because it is inhabited, just as our own earth is, by larger animals and more beautiful plants. For the animals upon it are fifteen times larger ^A than ours, having no bodily excretions, and the day there is correspondingly longer in length. Anaxagoras [says it is so] because of the unevenness of its composition, and because it is cold and at the same time earthy; for the dark is mixed with the fiery, which is why the star is called falsely bright. The Stoics [say] that because its nature is mixed with air, its composition is not free from corruption.

CAPUT LIII. How far it is distant from the sun and the earth.

Empedocles [says] it is twice as far from the sun as it is from the earth. The mathematicians [say] the latter distance is eighteen times the former. Eratosthenes [says] the sun is at a distance of four hundred and eighty thousand stades from the earth, and the moon is at a distance of seven hundred and eighty thousand stades from the earth.

CAPUT LIV. Of years.

The year of Saturn is a period of thirty years; of Jupiter, twelve; of Mars, two; of the sun, twelve months; Mercury and Venus have the same, for they have an equal course; of the moon, thirty days—for this is the perfect month, from its first appearance until its conjunction with the sun. Now, some place the great year ^B at eight years, others at nineteen, and others at fifty-nine. Heraclitus assigns it eighteen thousand solar years. Diogenes, three hundred and sixty-five years—this being the same logic as the year of Heraclitus. And such is the disagreement among our philosophers concerning the nature and theory of celestial and supernal things. But let us come to the earth.

CAPUT LV. Of the earth.

Thales and his followers [say] there is one earth. Icetas the Pythagorean [says there are] two: this one, and the counter-earth. The Stoics [say] that the earth is one and bounded. Xenophanes [says it is] rooted into the infinite from its lower part, and was formed together out of air and fire. Metrodorus [says] that the earth is the subsided sediment of water, ^D and the sun is [the sediment] of air.

CHAPTER LVI. Concerning the shape of the earth.

^A Thales and the Stoics attribute a spherical shape to the earth. Anaximander prefers to compare it to a stone column with flat surfaces; Anaximenes to a table, Leucippus to a drum, while Democritus compares it to a disk in its breadth, though he holds that it is hollow in the middle.

CHAPTER LVII. De terrae situ.

The disciples of Thales say the earth is in the center. Xenophanes says it is the first, founded upon infinity in its depth. Philolaus the Pythagorean says that fire is in the center, for this is the hearth of the universe; the second is the counter-earth; the third is this earth which we inhabit, which is situated opposite [the counter-earth] and revolves around it; hence, those who dwell on the opposite side cannot be seen by those who are on this side. Parmenides was the first to distinguish those places on the earth which are habitable, situated beneath the two tropical zones.

CHAPTER LVIII. De terræ motu.

While all others declare that the earth is at rest, Philolaus the Pythagorean thinks it moves around the fire in an oblique circle, just as the sun and moon do. Heraclides of Pontus and Ecphantus the Pythagorean do indeed say that the earth is moved, yet not by change of place, but by a rotating motion, ^B like a wheel turning on an axis from west to east around its own center. Democritus says that the earth originally wandered here and there due to its small size and lightness, but with the passage of time it became condensed and, through greater weight, became established. Having briefly set forth the dissensions of these noble philosophers regarding the earth, hear also those regarding the sea.

Chapter LIX. On the sea, how it coalesced, and why it is bitter.

Anaximander defends that the sea is nothing else than the remains of the primordial moisture, the greatest part of which fire dried up, while what remained was transformed by the heat of the burning. Anaxagoras says that that primordial moisture, ^C spread out like a lake, was burned up by the heat of the sun's revolution, and then, with the thicker parts evaporated, what remained turned into saltiness and bitterness. Empedocles says it is the sweat of the earth, which, being soaked with moisture even in its upper parts, the sun's heat scorched. Antiphon, [that it is] the sweat of heat, from which the enclosed moisture was separated out.

^A Metrodorus, [that it is] because the sea, having been filtered through the earth, has participated in the thickness surrounding it, just as things filtered through ashes [do]. The followers of Plato, [that] the part of the elemental water which condenses from the air by cooling becomes fresh; but the part which breaths forth from the earth by heat and burning becomes salty. So much, then, concerning the sea. But that those who professed to understand the nature and reasons of the whole universe, of celestial and ethereal things, and of the comprehension of all things, did not even know the things concerning themselves, you may learn from the way they have disagreed about these matters as well.

Chapter LX. Of the parts of the soul. ^B

Pythagoras and Plato, if one wishes to take the division from the highest reason, [say] the soul is twofold: for one part possesses the rational, the other the irrational. But according to more proximate and precise analysis, [it is] tripartite: for they divide the irrational into the irascible and the concupiscent. The Stoics maintain it consists of eight parts: five of the senses—the visual, the olfactory, the auditory, the gustatory, the tactile; the sixth the vocal, the seventh the seminal, and the eighth the ruling [part] itself, from which all these are ordered through their respective organs, [functioning] in a manner similar to the tentacles of a polyp. Democritus and Epicurus [say] the soul is twofold, having the rational part established in the chest, and the irrational part dispersed throughout the whole composition of the body. And Democritus [holds that] all things naturally participate in some sort of soul, even the corpses of bodies; because they participate, invisibly, in some heat and sensory [power], of which the greater part is exhaled. ^C

Chapter LXI. Of the ruling faculty of the soul. ^D

Plato and Democritus [place it] in the entire head. Strato, in the middle of the eyebrows. Erasistratus, around the membrane of the brain, which he calls the "epicranis." Herophilus, in the ventricle of the brain, which is also its base. Parmenides, in the whole chest. Epicurus and all the Stoics, in the whole heart. Diogenes, in the arterial ventricle of the heart, which is pneumatic. Empedocles, in the composition of the blood. Others, in the diaphragm. Some of the more recent ones [place it] extending from the head to the diaphragm. Pythagoras places the vital [part] around the heart, but the rational and intellectual [part] around the head. So much, then, concerning these matters. Do we not, therefore, seem to you, out of sound judgment and great reason, to have justly departed from such a vain and error-filled curiosity of all these men? And [to have chosen] to investigate none of the aforementioned things (for [we see] no utility in them, nor [do we see] them directly contributing to benefit or to the acquisition of the good for men), but only...

^A rather to cultivate piety toward God, the Creator of all things, and to endeavor to live in a manner pleasing to the God who is over all, by means of a temperate life and a walk of life that is dear to God and embraces every virtue? But if, seized by a certain malice and envy, you are too reluctant and annoyed to bear this true testimony for us, Socrates, the wisest of all the Greeks, shall forestall you once again, having truthfully delivered the verdict in our favor. For he used to demonstrate that those idle chatterers about the heavens were acting like madmen, and he would say that they did not differ at all from those who are deranged; openly refuting them, he showed not only that they were reaching out for the unattainable, but also that they were wasting their efforts on things that were useless and of no benefit to life. Xenophon, the most renowned of the companions of Socrates, will bear witness for you to these things as well, writing thus in his Memorabilia.

CHAPTER LXII

That Socrates, the wisest of the Greeks, also demonstrated that those who were so filled with pride regarding the physiology of the aforementioned things were acting like madmen, because they were wasting their efforts on things that were useless to life and impossible to grasp.

^B “No one,” says Xenophon, “ever saw Socrates do or heard him say anything impious or unholy. For he did not dispute about the nature of the universe, as most others did, curiously investigating how what is called the ‘cosmos’ by the sophists is ordered, or by what laws of necessity each of the heavenly bodies comes into being; but he actually demonstrated that those who concern themselves with such things were acting like madmen. And first of all, he used to examine this: whether, having deemed ^C that they already knew human affairs sufficiently, they moved on to concern themselves with these things, or whether, neglecting human affairs, they thought they were performing their proper duty by examining divine matters. And he also wondered that it did not occur to them that it was impossible for humans to discover these things, since even those who prided themselves most on speaking about these matters did not hold the same opinions as one another, but felt toward one another just as madmen do. For among the mad, some do not even fear things that are fearful, while others fear things that are not to be feared; and to some it seems ^D not shameful to say or do anything whatsoever, even in a crowd, while others think it is not even fitting to go out among men; and some revere neither temple nor altar nor any other divine thing, while others worship stocks and stones of any sort, and beasts. And among those who examine the nature of the universe, you may see some who are pleased to think that everything that exists is one, while others want there to be an infinite multitude of things. And some think that everything is always in motion, while others think that nothing can ever be moved. And some think that all things come into being and perish, while others that nothing can ever come into being or perish. He used to examine the following about them as well: ‘Just as those who learn human affairs think that whatever they have learned, they will do for themselves and for whomever they wish, so do those who seek after divine things think that, once they have come to know...