Preparation for the Gospel

^A and being refuted by the disputations of their own disciples, I most clearly demonstrated in the previous book. From all of which, may the readers understand the sincerity and integrity of our mind, and that it may be evident by the clear and certain witness, so to speak, of the things themselves, how it was that we did not inconsiderately, but by a prudent and mature judgment, prefer the ancient and true philosophy and piety of the Hebrews to that of the Greeks. And this has been definitively settled by us through the express authority of Greek testimonies.

As for the final treatise of this matter, which is the fifteenth book of the work we have undertaken, we have postponed it until now, so that in it we may weave together those things which remain from the previous discussions, ^B and bring into the light those specious mysteries of the noble philosophy of the Greeks, and set before the eyes of all how entirely devoid of any solid and true erudition they truly are. In this matter, first and foremost, it will be the aim that everyone may recognize that it was not through any ignorance of those things they so greatly admire, but through a contempt for their hollow study, that we have cast off almost all care for them, having devoted our souls to the practice and exercise of better things. Therefore, when the seal of truth has been impressed upon this, with God as our guide, we shall place the final garland upon our *Preparation*.

Proceeding from there to the more perfect argument of the *Evangelical Demonstration*, I shall link the beginning of the second part of this discussion to the remainder of the charge against us. ^C For we were accused of this: that while we have preferred the oracles of the Hebrews to our ancestral laws, we have not, however, proposed to lead a life similar to that of the Jews. To this accusation, by God's help, I shall attempt to reply after the completion of the present discourse. For in this way I believe that the later parts, being joined to the first under a single tie, as it were, will form one general purpose for the whole work.

Now, that we may stick to what we are at present doing: since in the preceding books we have clearly shown that the philosophy of Plato sometimes agrees with the doctrines of the Hebrews, and at other times disagrees with the same; indeed, that it even sometimes refutes its own decrees; and furthermore, that the opinions ^D of the other philosophers, those who are commonly called "naturalists," both the successors of Plato and those [who followed] Xenophanes and Parmenides, and still further Pyrrho and those who introduced the suspension of judgment, and all the others in order, whose opinions the preceding discourse refuted, are seen to be in open and direct conflict with the doctrines of the Hebrews and of Plato, and indeed with the truth itself, and not only that, but [are seen] to have been struck down by their own weapons—it is time now to view from a higher place, as if from a stage, that other arrogance of the philosophers of Aristotle and the Stoics, and to observe all the remaining natural philosophy of those who lift their eyebrows, so that we may learn both the things they speak of so loftily and the things that, in turn, have been refuted by their own colleagues.

For in this way, the judgment we have formed may be absolved of every accusation of unreasonableness, in that it was not by ignorance of the august things among them, but by an examined and scrutinized judgment, that we have preferred the truth and piety of those reckoned as barbarians to all the things of the Greeks. I shall begin with Aristotle. Now, others have also [discussed] the life of the man...

and they are not obscure philosophers. But as for me, I do not like to hear a man ill-spoken of, even by his own people. Therefore, I shall set forth the apologies on his behalf from Aristocles the Peripatetic, who writes as follows concerning him in the seventh book of his *On Philosophy*. ^A

CHAPTER II. On Aristotle, and on those things that have been handed down concerning him. From the seventh book of Aristocles the Peripatetic's *On Philosophy*.

"How is it possible," he says, just as Epicurus relates in his letter concerning ways of life, "for him, while still young, to have consumed his paternal estate, and then to have been compelled to join the military? And having fared poorly in these tasks, to have turned to pharmacy? And then, when Plato’s Peripatos was open to all, to have taken it over?" Or how could one accept Timæus of Tauromenium, saying in his histories that, late in his life, neglectful of the doors of some obscure medical shop, he kept them locked? ^B And who would be persuaded by the things said by Aristoxenus the musician in his life of Plato? For he says that during his wanderings and his time abroad, [the disciples] rebelled and built an opposing Peripatos for themselves, being foreigners. Some think that he says these things about Aristotle, although Aristoxenus always speaks well of Aristotle. One might also reasonably say that the memoirs of Alexinus the Eristic are laughable. ^C For he portrays Alexander, while still a boy, conversing with his father Philip, despising the teachings of Aristotle, and approving of Nicagoras, who was surnamed Mercury. And Eubulides also clearly lies in his book against him, first by citing some cold poems, as if others had written them about his marriage and his intimacy with Hermias; then by claiming that he fell into disfavour with Philip, and that he was not present at the death of Plato, and that he destroyed his books. For why should one dwell on the accusation ^D of Demochares against the philosophers? For he spoke ill not only of Aristotle, but also of others. Yet, if one looks at the slanders themselves, one may perceive...

Aristotle himself says—that there were letters of Aristotle ^A claiming that the city of the Athenians was captured, and that he betrayed his own fatherland, Stagira, to the Macedonians. Furthermore, after Olynthus was razed, it alleges that he indicated the wealthiest of the Olynthians to Philip at the public auction of spoils. Cephisodorus, the disciple of Isocrates, is also an insipid and futile slanderer; he called him a voluptuary and a glutton, and other things of that sort. ^B Yet everything said by Lycon the Pythagorean (as he calls himself) surpasses all madness. For he says that Aristotle used to offer the same sort of sacrifice to his deceased wife that the Athenians offer to Demeter, and that he used to wash in hot oil and then sell it. And when he was departing for Chalcis, he says that the tax collectors found seventy-five bronze pots on his ship. And these were just about the first to slander Aristotle: some of whom lived during his own time, and others who came shortly after; but they ^C were all sophists, contentious men, and rhetoricians, whose names and books have perished even more thoroughly than their bodies. For those who came after them, or who drag up the same charges, are to be completely disregarded and ignored, especially those who, having not even laid eyes on their books, have rashly invented insults themselves. Such are those who count his pots as three hundred; for you will find nothing of the sort about the philosopher among any of those who lived at that time, if you except that Lycon, who, however, as I have already said, ^D only mentions that seventy-five pots were discovered. And one might infer that all the things said are false, not only from the times and the nature of the accusers themselves, but also from the fact that they do not all slander him with the same things, but each one says something different of his own. If any of these things had been true in the slightest, he surely ought to have been put to death by those of that time not once, but a thousand times over. It is evident, therefore, that just as it happened to many others, so it also happened to Aristotle that, because of his friendships with kings and his superior excellence in learning, he was envied by the sophists of that time. [D (continued)] But those who are of a sound mind ought not to look only at those who slander him, but also at those who praise and admire him. For there would be found to be quite a few more, and better, of these as well. The rest of the charges, then, openly show their own emptiness; but these two seem to be believed, for which some criticize him: first, that he married the daughter of Hermias, Pythias, by nature a sister, but adopted—

^A Pythias, the natural sister of Hermias, whom he took by adoption, winning the man's favor by this act. There exists, indeed, this epigram of Theocritus of Chios:

Eunuch Hermias' and Eubulus' empty tomb Has foolish Aristotle reared, Who for the sake of his gluttonous belly's nature chose to dwell Instead of the Academy, in the outpourings of Borborus.

^B Another point is that he was ungrateful to Plato. As regards Hermias and the friendship of Aristotle toward him, many others have written, and especially Apellicon, whoever reads whose books will cease slandering them. Concerning his marriage to Pythias, he himself has sufficiently apologized in his letters to Antipater. For after Hermias had died, out of goodwill toward him, he married her, she being otherwise a sensible and good woman, though unfortunate due to the disasters that had befallen her brother. ^C Then he says next: "After the death of Pythias, the daughter of Hermias, Aristotle married Herpyllis of Stagira, from whom he had a son, Nicomachus. They say this son was raised as an orphan by Theophrastus and that he died in war while still a youth." But let these things be laid down from the aforementioned writing of Aristocles. Now it is time to look at the dogmatic philosophy of Aristotle.

CHAPTER III

Regarding the dogmas of Aristotle, and how they differ from the Hebrews and Plato, concerning the goal of the good.

Since Moses and the prophets among the Hebrews assumed that the goal of living happily is the knowledge and friendship of the God of all, realized through piety, and taught that true piety is the pleasing of God through every virtue ^D (for this is the cause of good things, since all things lie in the power of God alone, and all things are provided by Him to those who love Him), and since Plato, establishing things consistent with these, declares that the goal of blessedness is virtue—Aristotle, walking the other path, says that3 someone will not be happy unless he also possesses bodily well-being and an abundance of external goods, without which virtue itself provides no benefit. How the followers of Plato attacked him and refuted his opinion as false, is available to learn from what follows.

[index: entries preserved]

CHAPTER IV.

“For while all philosophy, by the common consent of those who have philosophized, promises human happiness, and is divided into three parts according to the creative distribution of all things, this Peripatetic ^B will be found so far from teaching anything of Plato’s in this area, that among the many who differ from Plato, no one appears to have departed further from him. In the first place, he abandoned Plato in that which is the most common, greatest, and most authoritative of all things; and, having stepped beyond the bounds and measure of happiness, he denied that virtue was sufficient for it by itself. For the power and strength of virtue escaped him, and he thought that it needed the works of fortune to obtain happiness; and if one were to rely on virtue alone, he held that it was impossible and unattainable to reach happiness. While it is not the present occasion to demonstrate how slothful and full of error his opinion is in this and other matters, this at least I believe is clear: that because the goal and happiness are not the same or equivalent according to Plato and Aristotle—but the former constantly proclaims and declares that the most just man is the happiest, while the latter does not allow happiness to accompany virtue unless the dignity of birth and fine appearance, and a heap of other things, are added— ^C (For he was carrying gold, to go to war, like a maiden [golden] :) it is necessary that, according to the difference of the end, the philosophy that leads to it must also be different. For one who walks along a certain single path, which by its nature leads to something small and lowly, can never aspire to greater and higher things, set as they are at a height.

Dost thou see how this hill rises with its high ridge? Rugged and harsh, on whose summit sitting, The bird lifts its wings.

This sharp and wily beast can by no means ascend to that high hill; for if the eaglets and the fox were to meet in the same place, it must be that either they, their nest being scattered and broken, fall to the earth by a deadly stroke of fate; or the fox himself, ^D which is not his nature to produce, must clothe himself with swift wings, by which, once lifted up, he might fly to the highest ridge. Certainly, as long as each species remains in its own place and rank, there can be no communion for those of the earth with those of the heavens.” After other things, he adds: “These things being so, and since Plato attempts to draw the souls of the young upward toward the divine Power, and in this way attaches them to virtue and nobility, while persuading them to despise all other things, tell us, whether by some private fortune…

I beseech you, good Peripatetic, how you intend to hand these things on, and what way you will lead the way for the lovers of Plato? Does your school possess any power and excellence of doctrine so great that you might dare, full of the same sense and confidence as those sons of Aloeus, to devise a path to heaven? They thought that by piling mountains upon mountains, this would be ready and easy for them: yet in truth this is gained, as Plato taught, only by the removal of human desires. Therefore, to attain these things, what help do you show to the younger generation? Where is there any kind of discourse that might vote in favor of virtue? From which of the works of Aristotle? Or of any other who has set out from his school? Come, from what writings at all? Why, lie, if you wish; you have my leave, provided only that we hear something noble from you. But you have nothing whatever to say yourself, nor would any of the leaders of this school allow you to say it if you did. The treatises of Aristotle on these matters, whether the *Eudemian*, the *Nicomachean*, or those inscribed as the *Great Ethics*, taste of nothing ^A but what is small and humble, and altogether common; such things as unlettered and rough men, adolescents, and little women might think of.

For the diadems, so to speak, and the royal scepter, which virtue has received from Jove—the one that cannot be taken away, since:

*...It remains irrevocable, whatever* *He has nodded with his head:*

—they dare to strip virtue of this. For they do not permit her to make men happy; rather, they make her similar to wealth, fame, birth, health, beauty, and all the other things that are common to vice. For just as none of these, present without virtue, is sufficient to render its possessor happy, so too, virtue, without these, is not sufficient to make the one who possesses her happy. How then has the dignity of virtue not been pulled down and cast into the dirt? ^B "Yes," someone says, "but they say that virtue far surpasses the other goods." What of it? Indeed, they say that health also surpasses wealth; but the fact that none of them is sufficient for happiness without the mutual assistance of the others is a common trait of them all. When, therefore, someone following these dogmas and this school teaches one who is seeking the whole of the human good within the soul itself, they say that he is not climbing upon the wheel of happiness; nor could one who is gripped by Priam’s fortunes be happy and blessed. Yet it is not unlikely that one who possesses virtue might fall into such things. ^C It follows from this that happiness does not necessarily accompany those who are endowed with virtue, nor, if it should accompany them at times, can this association be perpetual.

*The wind casts the leaves on the ground, and in turn,* *The leafy wood brings forth others:* *So grows the race of men, and so it perishes.*

If this is so, the happy man could never be miserable; yet he would not be blessed, if he should fall into Priam's fortunes. ^D

^A Exilis adhuc nimium ac timida, mi poeta, tua hæc similitudo est: *Succedunt tempora veris.* (For the time is vast, and he for whom it comes is not). If you wish to represent the fragile and crumbling state of human generations more accurately, compare it to the happiness of Aristotle. It springs up and departs more easily than any leaves, not waiting for the year to revolve, nor for a year's end, nor for a month's end, but within the same day and the same hour it is born and perishes. For the things that destroy it are many, and all depend on chance: the fatal diseases of the body—and these are myriad—as well as poverty, disgrace, and things of that sort, for which the beloved virtue offers no defense at all, and is quite sufficient for nothing; it is weak, that is, both in averting misery and in preserving happiness. ^B How then could anyone bred in these teachings, and pleased by these arguments, ever agree with the doctrines of Plato, or strengthen others to accept them? For there is no way that someone starting from those premises could ever receive those Herculean and divine dogmas: that virtue is a strong and altogether beautiful thing, that it never lacks anything for happiness, and is never stripped of it; but even if poverty, disease, disgrace, or pitch and the cross, or all the things from tragedies should flow together at once, the just man is still happy and blessed. He even proclaims him through this loudest of heralds, like some victorious athlete, this most just of men, saying that he is the most happy, as one who reaps the fruit of happiness from justice itself. ^C Divide, therefore, if you like, and variegate your classification of goods into three, or four, or many parts. It is all quite beside the point. You will never by this road lead us to Plato. For what does it profit, if you say that among goods some are to be worshipped, like the gods; others are praiseworthy, like the virtues; others take the form of power, like wealth and strength; others are defined by their utility, like medical treatments? And what if, with a finer and more subtle division, you say that some goods are ends and others are not? Calling "ends" those for whose sake other things are, and not calling those things "ends" which are obtained for the sake of others? And what if one learns that some goods are good ^D simply, and others not so for all; or that some are goods of the soul, others of the body, and others external; or again, that some goods are powers, others dispositions and habits; or, finally, that some are ends, others materials, others instruments? Even if someone knew how to distribute the "good" by a ten-part classification into the ten categories, what would all these dogmas have to do with the mind of Plato? Indeed, you may call virtue good—either equivocally or in whatever way you please—but as long as you deny that it has in itself sufficient strength, and while you—taking virtue as merely necessary for happiness—strip it of its sufficiency, whereas Plato seeks after other things as a surplus, possessing the fullness of happiness from virtue itself, there would be nothing in common between you in this respect; you require different arguments, not those of Plato.

^A Null faith exists among men and savage lions: Neither do lambs and wolves maintain a like spirit. ^B In this greatest and primary tenet of happiness, there can be no fellowship between Plato and Aristotle. For indeed, even if they do not think ill of one another, at the very least they openly contend in the whole of their discourse regarding things that most highly pertain to this matter.

CHAPTER V.

Furthermore, Moses and the Hebrew prophets, whom Plato also supports, have established clearly and distinctly that Providence encompasses the universe. Aristotle, however, sets a limit and boundary for the Divinity at the lunar sphere, and withdraws the remaining parts of the world from His care and governance. For this reason, he is rebuked by the aforementioned Atticus in these words: "Since, among the things that contribute to happiness," he says, "this is also the greatest and most important, that we have a certain confidence regarding Providence; inasmuch as it would be of the highest utility for directing the principles of human life, if it were not hidden from us whether the race of earthly men walks by a straight and level path, or through the oblique twists of error—Plato refers all things to God, and from God he weaves all things together; he teaches that He thus encompasses the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things, so that He always executes them by a straight advance. He further teaches that He is good, and that one who is good never envies another in anything: hence, that He makes all things outside Himself as good as possible, arranging them into order out of disorder: finally, that He who cares for all things, and directs them according to His supreme power, also provides for the human race." And after a few words intervening: "But Plato, indeed," he says, "ordains it thus. But in truth, as for Aristotle, while he drives away that excellent and divine nature, he simultaneously severs all hope of the future from the mind, and at the same time he destroys all observance and piety toward the powers above; what fellowship can there ultimately be with Plato? How can he exhort anyone to embrace the mind and sense of Plato, and in any part confirm his doctrine? On the contrary, he clearly professes himself an assistant to the wicked and a minister of crime. For any man whoever he is, and entangled in human desires, if he has once despised the gods, and ^D realizes not that they have any concern for him...

it is not impossible for him to escape ^A escaping the notice of men in his wrongdoings; but surely it is not necessary to seek to escape observation by every means, seeing that it is possible to prevail over those who have discovered him. Thus, the despair of Providence is a ready-made tool for injustice. For that man is indeed a very "gracious" benefactor who, while holding out pleasure to us as a good and providing us with immunity from the gods, still imagines he is supplying a mechanism to prevent wrongdoing—acting much like a physician who would neglect to provide any assistance to a patient while he is still alive, but who, after the patient is dead, would try to weave ^B some devices for the health of the deceased.

The case of the Peripatetic is surely very similar to this. For it is not so much the pursuit of pleasure that strengthens injustice, as it is the disbelief regarding the Divine, namely, that It cares for us. "What then," someone might say, "will you put Aristotle and Epicurus in the same category?" Assuredly, in regard to the matter at hand. For what difference does it make to us whether you banish the Divine from the world and leave us no communion with It, or whether you shut the gods up in the world but remove them from all commerce with affairs on earth? For the neglect of men by the gods is equal in both doctrines, and the immunity from the gods for those who do wrong is equal. ^C But even if we do derive some benefit from the movement of the things in the heavens, this is, for the most part, shared also by irrational and inanimate things; and yet, in this way, even according to Epicurus, some advantage comes to men from the gods. For they say that the better emanations from them become the causes of great goods for those who partake of them. But it is not right that either this one or that one be reckoned in the account of Providence. For if, according to Epicurus, Providence is gone—even though, according to him, the gods contribute all care for the salvation of their own goods—then Providence would likewise be gone according to Aristotle, even if the things in the heavens are governed in some order and arrangement. For we seek a Providence that concerns us, of which there is no share for one who does not concede that either demons, or heroes, or souls in any way at all can exist everlastingly.

And yet, to my mind, Epicurus seems to have acted ^D more modestly. For as if despairing that the gods could abstain from the care of men if they once associated with them, he migrated them to the same place, and having established them as if in a foreign land, and somewhere outside the world, he renounced their inhumanity through this separation and through their complete lack of communion. But this "gracious" finder of nature and accurate observer of divine things, by placing human affairs under the very gaze of the gods, left them unattended and uncared for, governed by some nature and not by divine reason. Whence, he could not easily escape that charge which is brought against Epicurus.

^A Some conjecture that he did not do this out of conviction, but rather out of fear of men, that he stationed the gods in the universe as a spectator in a theater. They take as proof of this man's opinion that he deprived them of any influence over us, from which influence alone could one rightly believe in the existence of the gods. For Aristotle does the very same thing. For by removing them, and leaving belief in them to sight alone—a sense weak for judging things at such a distance—he might perhaps seem out of reverence to say that there are gods present here. For not having left the gods outside the world, yet not having brought them to those on earth, he was under the necessity of either confessing himself a complete atheist, or else, to preserve the reputation of not having abandoned the gods, he transplanted them ^B somewhere here. But he who, by his aloofness, has rejected the precision of the superior beings, seems to disbelieve in the gods in a seemly manner." These are the words of Atticus against Aristotle, for cutting away the argument concerning Providence. The same man adds these further points to what has been said, addressing the same person who did not wish the world to be generated.

Chapter VI

^A that pertain to the doctrine and mind of Plato, we place our faith in those very utterances which he himself, being a Greek, addressed to us Greeks in clear and articulate speech. For he says that God, having taken all that was visible, which was not resting, but was being driven by a faulty and disordered motion, brought it into order out of that disorder, having judged this to be altogether better than that. And furthermore, since he did not accept the generation of the world through riddles, nor indeed because of any need for clarity, he reveals it through those words by which the Father of all things speaks to him after the creation of the universe. For, he says, "Since you have been generated" (he is speaking to the gods), "you are not indeed immortal, nor entirely indissoluble, yet you shall not be dissolved, having attained the bond of my will." But as I said, we might discuss this controversy in a friendly and peaceful way, using milder arguments, with those who speak to us from within our own household, as being friends. For it seems that Aristotle also caused these men to shift their position, as they were unable to resist the accusation against their dogma, yet were unwilling to condemn as false what they attributed to Plato. ^B But according to our understanding, since Plato grants that the world was generated as the most beautiful of works by the most beautiful of creators, and attributed to the maker of the universe a power through which he made the world out of what did not previously exist, and having made it, he desires for it to be protected for all time, and in this way the world is, according to his understanding, both generated and underlying in an incorruptible state—who among the Peripatetics can confirm these things for us? But we must console the champion of these men by showing that it is not at all necessary that if something has been generated, it must be destroyed, nor again, if something is not destroyed, that it is therefore necessarily ungenerated. For one should not concede to the incorruptible a single cause derived from the ungenerated, nor should one leave the generated without assistance in regard to its fall into destruction. From where, then, could we derive help for these things from the doctrines of Aristotle, a man who does not merely act for the sake of appearances, nor does he approach this kind of discourse of his own accord, but is carried directly into opposition against Plato, and imposes upon the generated the necessity of perishing, and says that what is not destroyed ^C is strengthened solely by not having been generated, without, however, leaving to God a power whereby, by employing it, he might create something good? For, he says, that which has not yet come to be, could not even come to be. And he is so far from using these points to assist Plato’s argument that he has already caused some who had been devoted to Plato to shrink back from the dogma because of what he said; they were unable to perceive that, according to the very nature of things—which one might conceive of even without the will and power of God—neither is the generated incorruptible, nor is that which will not be destroyed generated. But when one has established the best cause, which is from God, one must take this as the guide for all things, so that one does not declare it to be an inferior cause compared to the others. For it is ridiculous... ^D

to think that because something was created, it therefore must perish; or, if God wills it, that it should not perish; and that while there is something unbegotten which has the power not to perish, the will of God should be lacking in order to preserve things that have been brought into being. ^A For the builder is capable of constructing a house that did not exist; and someone is also capable of making a statue that did not exist before; and another, having fashioned a ship from raw material, provides it to those who have need of it. And each of the other craftsmen, as many as possess the productive arts, have this power, so as to bring something out of non-existence into being. Is it then the case that the Universal King and master craftsman will not partake even to the degree of human craftsmanly power, but will be deprived of all generation by us? Not at all, if we are able to grasp, by even a small 88 calculation, the divine cause. But is He able to create and willing to create good things—for He is good, and in the good there is no envy regarding anything—yet not able to preserve and guard what has been created? ^B And yet, the other craftsmen are capable of both. For instance, the builder and the shipwright not only construct new ships and houses, but are also able to assist those damaged by time, by substituting other parts for those that have worn out. So it must certainly be conceded that God also possesses at least this much. For if one is capable of creating the whole, how would one be incapable of creating a part of it? And thus, if it is to be a work that is good,, if one is to be a creator at all 90, it must be preserved in every respect. For to desire to undo that which has been well created is the mark of an evil man. And there is no bond greater for the salvation of created things than the will of God. ^C If many things that have partaken of human effort and will—nations, cities, and works—remain for an inconceivable amount of time after having been created, even when the one who willed them no longer exists, will those things that have partaken of God’s intention, and have been created through Him and by Him, vanish and not remain while the Maker is present? What cause is it that would constrain the mind of God? Is it the necessity arising from the created things themselves? But this very thing, by the very fact that it has been adorned, has confessed its defeat at the hands of God. Or is it some external cause contending against God? But such a cause does not exist, nor, in matters where God has already prevailed and adorned, is it worthy to diminish Him, unless we are altogether ignorant of ourselves while disputing about the greatest and most divine power. ^D But we seem to have been carried away by our own eagerness into this discourse concerning the truth. It is clear, even from what we have proposed, that those who have not even left behind the origin of generation for the cosmos cannot be teachers concerning its creation. And indeed, concerning the fifth essence of bodies, which Aristotle introduced, these points must be noted.

CHAPTER VII.

• The elements, as they are commonly called, from which as first principles bodies are composed, Plato, following their evident nature and the authority of the philosophers before him, posited to be four, accepted by the confession of all: fire, earth, air, and water, from which, when mingled and transformed among themselves, all other things are generated. But Aristotle, as it seems, hoping to appear more excellent in wisdom if he were to add some new body over and above these, numbered a fifth essence ^B besides the four phenomena. In this, he certainly used nature in a very brilliant and generous way; but he did not perceive that it is not the role of one who professes to be a student of nature to lay down laws, but only to explain diligently what belongs to nature. Therefore, to the force of his demonstration—that there are four first natures of bodies, which indeed the Platonists need—the Peripatetic not only contributes nothing, but he alone almost opposes it. For when we say that every body is either hot or cold, moist or dry, soft or hard, light or heavy, rare or dense; and when we find that no other thing can participate in these besides the four (for if it is hot, it is fire or air; if cold, water or earth; and if it is dry, fire or earth; if it is moist, water or air; and if it is soft, air or fire; if hard, water or earth; and light and rare, such as fire and air; heavy and dense, water and earth) and when we understand from all the other simple faculties that there can be no body outside these, he alone stands ^C in opposition, asserting that a body can exist devoid of these—a body, I say, neither heavy nor light, neither soft nor hard, neither moist nor dry; so that he is all but saying that a body is not a body. For he has left it the name, but has removed all the faculties from which a body is naturally composed. Therefore, either by persuading us he will recall us from the opinion of Plato, or, if he confirms the doctrine of Plato, he will be turned away from his own decrees. Thus, he can contribute nothing at all to the explaining of Plato’s mind. Furthermore, because we see that there is one and the same matter of all bodies, Plato wished that they be converted and changed into one another; but Aristotle ^D altogether...

[Beginning of the translation, anchored to the PG page 1321-1322 text.]

the case of the sculptors. For those men, having imitated the head of this man, the chest of another, and the belt of yet another, sometimes joining together things that do not belong with one another, have persuaded themselves that they have produced something original. And in truth, the whole, which anyone might blame for being disproportionate, is theirs, but the parts stitched together within it, while having some beauty, are not theirs. Likewise, too, Aristotle, hearing from Plato that there is a certain substance ^A intelligible in itself—both incorporeal, and colorless, and intangible, neither becoming, nor perishing, nor changing, nor altering, but always existing in the same way and in the same state—and again hearing about those things in the heavens, that they are divine and incorruptible and impassible bodies, he joined and glued together things from both that do not go together. For having taken the idea of "body" from some, and the idea of "being impassible" from others, he fashioned an impassible body. Now in the case of statues, even if the [resulting] creation from differing parts is not beautiful, it is at least not impossible for it to come into being. Therefore, even Homer teaches such things:

"For the eyes and the head," he says, "he resembled Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt, The belt Ares, and the chest Poseidon."

^B But there could never be an impassible body. For since it is bound to a nature that is subject to passion and is mutable, it necessarily must suffer sympathy with that to which it is yoked. But if something were impassible, it would need to be released and free from that which suffers; so that it would be apart from matter, and having been separated from it, it would necessarily be acknowledged as incorporeal. Let us furthermore apply our mind to the matters in which he shows Aristotle to differ from Plato.

CHAPTER VIII

Of the same against the same, and how he differed from Plato also in his theories concerning the heavens, which Moses did not trouble himself with.

"Next," he says, "follow many things in which they differ. For the one says that the form of celestial things for the most part consists of fire; but the other says that celestial things have ^C no share of fire at all. And the one says that God ignited light in the second [(94)] period toward the earth, so that the celestial race of gods [(92)]... [(93)] the most brilliant, and to look upon most beautiful might be. ^D

Ille [Plato] oculosque caputque Jovis, qui fulmine gaudet, Cingula Mavortis, Neptuni pectora gessit.

But there cannot be any body that is not subject to passion. For whatever is associated with a subject that is passible and mutable, it is necessary that it should suffer along with that companion of its. But that which is not passible must be separate and free from the passible, and therefore removed from matter; if it were devoid of matter, it would necessarily be devoid of body." Hitherto that man. But let us look further at other things in which he himself shows Aristotle to differ from Plato.

CHAPTER VIII

Of the same against the same, and how he differed from Plato in the treatment of celestial things; which matters Moses cared little for.

"There follow," he says, "other things, in which both dissent, and indeed a great many. For Plato indeed makes the species of celestial things mostly out of fire; Aristotle denies that they have any commerce with fire at all. The former says that God [ignited light] toward the second [period] above the earth."

^A In explaining this of the sun, he declares that it most of all would be seen to illuminate the entire heaven. But he, ^B as one not wishing the sun to be fire, and knowing light to be pure fire, or something of fire, does not permit light to be ignited around it. Furthermore, the one, attributing immortality in kind to all things in heaven, says that certain proportional recessions and accessions ^C of them take place. Necessity forces him to say these things: the recessions, which are the rays of the sun and heats coming to be by its flowing forth; and the accessions, to account for the fact that its size appears equal. For it would not have wished to appear equal, if it did not receive something in place of what it gives off. But Aristotle wishes them to remain always in the same substance, with nothing departing from them, and nothing approaching. Furthermore, the one, in addition to the common motion of the stars, ^D by which all the stars, both the fixed and the wandering, move while bound in their spheres, assigns to them another motion, which has turned out to be in another way the most beautiful, and proper to the nature of their body; for since they are spherical, it is reasonable that each should move in a certain spherical motion, whirling about. But the other takes away from them even this motion, which they possess because they are animate, and leaves only that which happens to them as if they were inanimate by the agency of other surrounding things. And indeed he says that the impression occurring to us from the stars as if they were moving is a passion of our own vision, which is powerless and, as it were, shaking, and is not the truth; just as if Plato were taking his conviction about their motion from this impression, and not rather from reason, which teaches that it is necessary for each of these, being a living being and having a soul and body, to move its own motion (for every body, to which moving comes from without, is soulless; but to which [it comes] from within and from itself, is animate); and [it being] moved, inasmuch as it is divine, [moves] the most beautiful [motion].

If it moves, being of a nature to be borne otherwise, and moves continuously, it must be tireless, and removed from all ease of mind; if not even as is the soul of mortal beings, there is rest—that relaxation of the body which occurs during sleep; but it is necessary that it have the portion of some Ixion, eternal and relentless.

For the vision, being stretched out far, wanders due to weakness; which is perhaps the cause why the stars that are fixed appear to twinkle, while the planets do not twinkle. For the planets are near; so the vision arrives at them being in control. But toward those that are fixed, it vibrates on account of the length, being stretched out very far; and the trembling of it makes the motion appear to be of the star; for it makes no difference whether the vision moves, or the object seen.

^A And animating it at the same time, it is moved by a motion of its own, inasmuch as it is divine, to move with the most beautiful motion; and since circular motion is the most beautiful, it is moved by this. Now sense might bear witness to the account, as truthful, but it is not this which provided the conviction of the motion. Regarding the motion of the universe, that it does not occur in a circle, being overcome by evidence, he—that is, Plato—had no argument to counter. But even here, this noble invention of this body provided him with a distraction. ^B For Plato, since there were four bodies, and all of them moved by nature with a simple and straight motion—fire toward the outside, earth toward the center, and the others toward the space in between—assigned circular motion to the soul. But he, ^C assigning a different motion to a different body, and thus also the circular motion—as if it were some sort of bodily property—to the fifth body, easily deceived himself in everything. For in the case of those things moved in a straight line, weights and lightnesses provided the principle of the motion; but the fifth body, participating neither in weight nor in lightness, possesses rather a cause of rest, but not of circular motion. For if in the case of those moved in a straight line, it is not the shape that provides the cause of the motion, but the impulse—a similar body placed in the middle of a similar object will have no cause for an inclination toward anything, whether they move toward the right, toward the dawn and the sun, or toward the left, or forward, or backward. ^D Furthermore, for the other bodies, when they have been driven from their own places, their relationship toward these places provides the means to move again; but for that fifth body, which never departs from its own places, it would be appropriate for it to remain at rest. And concerning the other bodies, the fifth being removed, Aristotle appears to be contentious, not saying the same things as Plato. For when Plato had inquired whether there was by nature a heavy body or a light one, and since these appeared to be spoken of in accordance with their relationship toward the upward and downward, and he had examined whether there is anything by nature below and above, or not; and had demonstrated precisely that, in accordance with the kinship of the bodies toward their places...

^A, what is called "below" for each thing is the direction toward which it might move, and "above" for each is the alien place from which it might depart, and has distributed "heavy" and "light" according to the same relationship. And in addition to this, he has demonstrated that neither the center 11 nor that which surrounds them can justly be called "above" or "below." But he opposes this 12, thinking that he must overthrow that man’s arguments from every side, and he struggles to call "heavy" that which is moved toward the center, and "light" that which is moved toward the surroundings; and he says the place which is in the center is "below," and the place which surrounds it is "above." But as for the cosmos, and the things from which it is made, and the things in the heavens, they are so far removed from one another. These things, then, are known. But Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews do not busy themselves with any of these matters, and deservedly so; for they considered that it was of no profit for the correction of life to those who occupied themselves with such things. This much, however, must be thought about all of them: that the path toward the kinship being in each case for each thing makes what is moved "heavy," and the place toward which such a thing is moved, "below"; and those possessing a relation to these otherwise are the opposite. For the place which is in the middle of it [the cosmos] has no right to be called "below" or "above," but rather, it is in the middle; and that which surrounds it, neither being in the middle, nor having any other part of itself more toward the middle than any of the parts opposite, has no right to be called either, from common terminology. For some things are naturally moved from the middle, while others are always moved toward the middle; and of these, I call that which is moved from the middle [as moving] "above," and that [moving] toward the middle, "below." For it is absurd not to believe that there is something in the heaven that is "above" and something that is "below," as some claim. For they say that one thing is not "above" and another "below," if it is entirely uniform ^B and someone walking from every direction will be antipodal to himself. But we say that the extreme part of the whole is "above," and by its position it is above, and by its nature it is first. And since there is an extreme part of the heaven, and a center, it is clear that there will be both "above" and "below" in the heaven...

CHAPTER IX

"But what are we to say concerning the soul?" he says. "For these things are clear not only to those who practice philosophy, but almost to all ordinary people: that Plato leaves the soul to be immortal, and composes many arguments concerning this, proving in various and manifold ways that the soul is immortal. And great is the ambition of those who have made a study of Plato’s teachings, contending alongside the doctrine and alongside Plato. For this is almost the bond that holds together the entire sect of the man. For the thesis of the moral doctrines followed upon the immortality of the soul-the great and brilliant and youthful ^C nature of virtue through the..."

divinity of the soul could be preserved: and all things of nature are excellently ordained for the administration of souls. For every soul, he says, undertakes the care of everything inanimate; and it revolves through the whole heaven, assuming at one time one form and at another time another. Moreover, even the things of knowledge and wisdom are bound by Plato to the immortality of the soul. For all learning is recollection [(15)]; and he does not think that search and learning, from which knowledge is derived, can otherwise be preserved. But if the soul is not immortal, neither is there recollection; and if not this, then neither is there learning. Since, therefore, all of Plato's dogmas are strictly hung from and suspended upon the divinity and immortality of the soul, he who does not concede this overturns the entire philosophy of Plato. Who, then is the first to have attempted ^B to set himself against these demonstrations, and to strip the soul of its immortality and every other power? Who else but Aristotle? For while others of the ancients granted that it survives for some time, or if they did not prove this, they at least assigned to the soul some power and motion in the body, as well as works and actions. But he—insofar as Plato exalted the matter of the soul, declaring it to be the origin of generation, the education of God, and the directress of all things—contended against it to tear it down and dishonor it, and to declare, one might almost say, that the soul is nothing. For it is neither spirit [(15)], nor fire, nor body at all, but not even incorporeal, such that it might be in itself and move; but not even to the extent of being in the body; it is motionless, and so to speak, soulless. For what sort of thing is this which he dared, or rather was compelled to do, so as to strip the soul even of its primary motions [(16)]—to deliberate, to think, to anticipate, to remember, to reason! For these are not the movements of the soul, says this clerk of nature. Indeed, this man is very trustworthy, for he has understood something about external things, while having gone so far astray regarding his own soul that he does not even perceive that he is thinking. For the soul, he says, is not what performs each of these, but it is the man; as for the soul, it is motionless. Following this man, therefore, comes Dicaearchus [(17)], and in proportion to the extent that it ^C—the soul, indeed, leads all things in heaven, and on earth, and in the sea, by its own movements, which have names: to will, to consider, to take care, to deliberate, to opine—rightly or falsely—rejoicing, grieving, being confident, fearing, hating, loving; and receives all the secondary movements of bodies, which are akin to these or are primary movements, and leads all things into growth, and decay, and separation, and combination. But to say that it is the soul that grows angry is like saying that it is the soul that weaves or builds. For it is perhaps better not to say that the soul pities, or learns, or thinks, but that the man does so by the soul. That, therefore, is what is called the mind of the soul; I mean the mind, by which the soul thinks and opines. ^D As to the mind, by which the soul thinks and opines, Aristotle says—and it is thought that he considered it the principle of justice. That Dicaearchus, the philosopher, was from the city of Messana in Sicily, as Suidas writes. Concerning him, Cicero speaks much in various places, as in the *Tusculan Disputations* 1, section: "Dicaearchus, however," he says, "in that discourse which he sets forth as having been held at Corinth in three books, in the first book he makes many people speak; while in the two he introduces a certain Pherecrates, an old man from Pthiotis, whom he calls a descendant of Deucalion, arguing that there is absolutely no soul, and that this name is altogether empty, and that it is in vain that animals and living beings are so called." And section: "But most fiercely," he says, "my favorite Dicaearchus argued against this immortality." For he wrote three books, which... [index: entries preserved]

^A he was capable of observing as a consequence, he has destroyed the entire subsistence of the soul. For that the soul is something invisible and hidden is clear; so that we could not say the soul exists merely on account of the activity from the senses. But because its movements are invisible, they seem to force us to acknowledge that the soul is something. For everyone appears to understand these things as belonging to the soul: deliberating, reflecting, and reasoning in whatever way one may. For when we see the body, and its powers, and consider such activities as not belonging to the body, we grant that there is something else within us that deliberates; and this we say is the soul. For whence else have we come to believe in the soul? If, therefore, someone takes these things by which the soul is most clearly manifested and attributes them to some other object, he has left behind no indication of whence the soul appears, nor of what use it might be thought to be. What help, then, can one who wants the soul to be immortal expect from one who kills the soul? ^B And what teaching regarding the mode of its movement—by which we call it self-moving—can be expected from those who grant it no movement at all? Yes, but regarding the immortality of the intellect, one might say that he agrees with Plato. For even if he does not wish the entire soul to be immortal, he at least acknowledges that the intellect is divine and incorruptible. What the substance and nature of the intellect is, from where it is, and whence it is introduced into men, and where it departs again, he himself might know—if indeed he understands anything of what he says about the intellect, and does not rather, by shrouding the impenetrability of the subject in the obscurity of his language, evade examination, like the cuttlefish, procuring for himself darkness in order to be more difficult to capture. ^C But he surely differs from Plato in these matters as well. For the one says it is impossible for the intellect to exist without the soul; but the other separates the intellect from the soul. And as for immortality, the former grants it to the intellect together with the soul, as being otherwise impossible; the latter says it occurs for the intellect alone, when it is separated from the soul. And he did not think it fitting for the soul to depart from the body, because this pleased Plato; yet he compelled the intellect to be torn away from the soul, because Plato judged such a thing to be impossible." Thus speaks Atticus. I shall append to these the words of Plotinus, which are as follows.

CHAPTER X.

"The matter regarding the entelechy," he says, "is to be examined in this way, just as the Lesbians are so named, because of the language spoken in Mitylene, ^D by which he wishes to prove that souls are mortal. I do not think there is frequent mention of this same thing in Plutarch, Athenaeus, and others. For my part, only the second book

^A usurp it, let it be understood thus. They say that the soul, in relation to an animated body, is compared like matter, and that it holds the status of form in the composite. But they accept the body, not just any kind, nor insofar as it is body itself, but as natural, organic, and existing with the potential for life. If, therefore, it is like the thing with which it is compared, and behaves in the same way as the form of a statue is compared to bronze, it follows entirely that where the body is divided, the division of the soul must also occur at the same time; and when a part of the body is cut off, a portion of the soul must also be part of what is cut away. Furthermore, it follows that no withdrawal of the soul in sleep occurs, if the entelechy is supposed to be inherent in that of which it is the entelechy; indeed, it is concluded that sleep itself would not exist at all. Then, if the theory of entelechy is proven ^B, there would be no struggle left of reason against desires, but the whole would be affected in one and the same sense, so as not to be at variance with itself. Perhaps it is possible for the senses to function only in this way, but it is impossible for the acts of the intellect to do so. Therefore, they bring in another soul, namely the mind, which they posit as immortal. A different method, then, than that which is explained by those men, will necessarily have to be brought forward, by which the soul endowed with the faculty of reasoning may be called an entelechy, if it pleases to retain this word. Furthermore, that soul which is the principle of perception, and which preserves the forms of things perceived by the senses even when they are absent, could not itself preserve them without the body. But if this is granted, they would reside in the soul like figures and images; yet if they were in it in this way, they could not be received by it in any other way at all. So, if it is an entelechy, it is not, however, of the sort that cannot be separated. From which it is also elicited that even the desire itself—not now for food and drink, but also for those things which are outside the body—cannot be an entelechy of that kind. There remains the soul which grants the power of growth, regarding which one might perhaps rightfully doubt whether this theory of entelechy can fit it. But not even that. For if the principle of every plant dwells in the root, and as the rest of the body grows, it does so in the lower part, which is closer to the root, as is wont to happen in many plants, the soul clearly leaves the other parts and gathers itself into one. Therefore it was not in the whole plant such as an entelechy is, which cannot be separated. And indeed, before the plant grows, it is contained in a very small bulk. If, therefore, it comes into a small space from a larger plant, and from a small space into the whole, what prevents it from being completely separated? ^C And how could it, being indivisible, become a divisible entelechy of a divisible body? Or can the same soul become a different one from a different animal? How, then, could the soul of the prior one become that of the next, if it was the entelechy of only one? But this is apparent from animals that are transformed into other animals. Therefore it does not get its existence from being the form of something; rather, it is a substance, not receiving existence from being established in a body, but being what it is before coming to be in this one; for example, the body of an animal (21) will not generate the soul. What then is its substance? But if it is neither body nor an affection of a body, but is an activity and a creative power, and many things are both in it and from it; since it is a substance existing ^D apart from bodies, what kind of thing is it? Or not even a grunt?

^A how, strictly speaking, can something that lacks parts and is incapable of division be subject to the same division of the body whose entelechy it is said to be? And how can the same soul become the soul of one living creature after another? Just as therefore, how can that which was the soul of an earlier creature be the soul of another, if it is the entelechy of one? This, moreover, is manifestly refuted by those living creatures which change into others. Therefore, the soul does not have its essence in the fact that it is a form of something; rather, it is itself a substance, which did not receive its being from the fact that it was placed in a body, but it already existed as such before it became the soul of this or that particular creature, in so far as it is an animal whose body would generate that soul. But what then is its essence? For if it is neither body nor an affection of body, and yet functions, actions, and many things of that kind are both in it and proceed from it: since it is consequently a substance outside the order of bodies, what sort of thing is it? Is it not sufficiently clear by itself what we truly and properly call substance? For generation, not substance, should be the name given to everything corporeal, since it is generated and perishes in its turn, and never truly exists, but is preserved only by some communion with that which truly is, in so far as it is a participant of it. These are the words of Plotinus. Having pursued these matters at this point, we will have done nothing irrelevant if we next append what Porphyry writes to Boethus regarding the soul.

CHAPTER XI. De eodem, ex Porphyrii ad Boethum opere De animo.

^B « Now, » he says, « against him who calls the soul an entelechy, and thus wishes it to be immovable while yet moving other things, one must first dispute: whence comes that inspiration of the living creature, when it itself understands nothing of what it sees or says, but the soul foresees both the future and that which is not yet present, and is moved accordingly? Whence also, in the very constitution of the living creature, come the counsels, deliberations, and volitions of the soul of the living creature, which are assuredly impulses of the soul, and not of the body? » To which he subsequently adds: « To make the soul similar to weight, or to certain corporeal and immovable qualities of a single form, through which that which is subject to them is either moved or becomes such and such, would be the act of a man who, either willingly or unwillingly, has completely strayed from the dignity of the soul, and who in no way perceives that by the presence of the soul the body of the living creature has become vital, just as by the presence of fire, water—which is cold by itself—is made hot, and the air which otherwise remains dark without the sun's light is illuminated by its rising. But neither is the heat of the water the heat of the fire, nor is the fire itself, nor is the aerial light the light inherent in the sun. Likewise, the animation of the body, which is conferred with a certain weight and corporeal quality, is not that soul which, placed in the body, infuses into it by its own power a certain vital spirit. » And the same writer later says: « What is said about the soul by others certainly fills us with shame. For who would not be ashamed of a definition by which the soul is constituted as the entelechy of a natural and organic body? To whom would the discourse not appear full of that indignity, ^D which teaches that either spirit, or a spiritual fire ignited and forged by the cooling and as if by the quenching of the surrounding air, is contained therein; or which declares it to be an aggregation of atoms, or absolutely professes it to be generated by the body? » This doctrine, indeed, he declared to be impious even in the laws of the impious. Therefore, all these discourses are full of shame. And regarding [alt-version omitted]

^A one who settles that the soul is something self-moving, of him, he says, no one should rightfully be ashamed.

CHAPTER XII.

Against the same man, who disagrees with Plato also in that discourse regarding the Soul of the universe. From Atticus.

^B Furthermore, since Plato states that the soul adorns all things, and permeates through all things, and that it is the very thing from which the rest—each taken individually—would concede that they are governed, and that nature is nothing else than soul, and evidently a soul not devoid of reason, and from these things logically concludes that all things come to pass according to providence, insofar as they come to pass according to nature: Aristotle agrees with us in none of these points. For he denies that nature is soul, and that the things on earth are governed by a single nature. For he says there are different causes for each of the things, and ^C others still. Indeed, for the heavenly things which always remain in the same state and act in the same way, he proposes fate as the cause; but for those things below the moon, he proposes nature; and for human affairs, prudence, providence, and soul; providing elegance in such divisions, but failing to perceive what is necessary. For if there were not one ensouled power permeating through the whole, binding and holding all things together, it would never be possible for the whole to be reasonably or well governed. It was a sign of the same lack of foresight ^D to hope that a city could ever subsist well without unity, as it is to think that one can defend by reasoning the preservation of this whole universe—which appears so exceedingly beautiful—without having bound and fitted it together through the communion of one similar [power]. And while he says that the thing which governs each of the individual things is a principle of motion, he is unwilling to admit that this is soul; even though Plato himself has shown that soul is the principle and source of motion for all things that are moved. And that which would be the work of a rational and wise soul—to do nothing in vain—he attributes to nature, but does not grant it the name of soul; as if the beginnings and powers of things were taken from names, and not from their faculties.

CHAPTER XIII.

Against the same man, who mocks the Ideas in Plato—ideas which we have already seen in previous testimonies were not unknown even to the Hebrews. From the same.

815 Finally, he says, that which is the head and hinge of the Platonic philosophy, namely the arrangement regarding intelligible things, has been dishonored. [index: entries preserved ] Socrates replies, "The Ideas, and the patterns of existing things. For as many things as you see—the earth, the things upon the earth, the heaven, the sea—beyond all these exist the invisible images of all these things." "Where do they stand?" "Nowhere [at all]; for if they were somewhere, they would not be," etc.—in which Lucianus is also ridiculous in his usual manner, and makes Socrates ridiculous.

^A And thus the doctrine of the Forms, as much as it was in Aristotle, has been mocked, trampled underfoot, and cast out with every kind of reproach. For being unable to understand that the greatest and divine things, which far surpass all others, require a similar power for their apprehension—and trusting in his own minute and humble sharpness (which, although it was able to penetrate into the nature of earthly things and see the truth in them, was yet not able to behold the most pure and sincere light of the truth itself)—he used as a canon and judge of things far superior to his own grasp, and ordered these special natures, such as Plato recognized, to be null and void, and dared to call those things, the highest of all beings, trifles, insipid cant, and the fables of mountebanks.

For that is the highest and final dogma of the Platonists, which consists in this spiritual and eternal nature of the Ideas. ^B Wherefore the highest labor and struggle is set before the soul. For he who has partaken of it and reached it is altogether blessed; but he who is left behind and is unable to become its spectator is left utterly void and stripped of all happiness. Therefore, Plato struggles everywhere to demonstrate the power and efficacy of these natures. For he says that it is not possible to render well the cause of anything at all, unless it leans upon the communion of these, nor can any knowledge of truth be held, unless it be referred back to them. Nay, he even argues that there is not the slightest bit of reason in any of these things, for those who do not confess their substance. And indeed, those who have determined to add authority and weight to the Platonic doctrine are usually in this dispute—and this for necessity, for they can no longer defend the Platonic [system] at all, unless one grants them those primary and original natures of Plato. ^C For these are the things by which it excels all others most of all. For when he himself recognized God as the father, creator, lord, and guardian of all things, and understood from these works of ours that the craftsman, before he is about to create anything, must hold the object comprehended in his mind, and then at last, having formed in his thought the image of it, express it in the things themselves by a certain likeness—[recognizing] these divine notions, which are older than the things and are the patterns of what comes into being, incorporeal and perceived by the mind alone, always the same and remaining in the same state; and finally, as existing first in a certain primary way, and then as the cause for the rest of why they are in the way that each is, according to its own likeness to those first principles; since he perceived that these notions could not be seen easily nor explained sufficiently by speech—^D having prepared those who were about to follow him, and having organized his whole philosophy toward this end, he says that the knowledge of these things is wisdom and intelligence, through which the human end and a blessed life result. So much from Atticus. More even than these things could be brought forward from the writings of the man which have been mentioned; but those things that have been set forth are sufficient.

^A Since we have reached this point, we shall pass on to the sect of the Stoics. Socrates, then, had an auditor named Antisthenes, a man who was Heracleotic in his character; he used to say that it was better to go mad than to feel pleasure. For this reason he advised his acquaintances never to extend a finger for the sake of pleasure. Diogenes the Dog became his auditor, who, seeming himself also to be of the most beastly way of thinking, drew many after him. Crates succeeded him, and of Crates was Zeno of Citium, who became the founder of the sect of the Stoic philosophers. Cleanthes succeeded Zeno, and Chrysippus succeeded Cleanthes; after him was another Zeno, and those who followed. It is said that all these, in a distinguished manner, took care of both a steadfast life and the art of dialectic. The dogmas of their philosophy are somewhat like this.

CHAPTER XIV. On the philosophy of the Stoics; and how Zeno rendered the account concerning principles. From the seventh book of Aristocles On Philosophy.

• They say that fire is the element of existing things, just as Heraclitus did; but its principles are matter and God, just as Plato ^B taught. But these [Stoics] say that both are bodies, both the active and the passive; whereas the former [Plato] said that the first active cause was incorporeal. Furthermore, they say that at certain predestined and fixed times the whole world is conflagrated, and then again it is rearranged. They say, however, that the first fire is as it were a seed, having the seminal principles of all things and the causes of things that have happened, of things that are happening, and of things that will happen; and that the interweaving and sequence of these is fate, and knowledge, and truth, and a law of existing things that is in a manner unavoidable and inescapable. And by this, they say, all things in the world are managed, as if in a very well-ordered state.

CHAPTER XV. What opinion the Stoics introduce concerning God, and concerning the constitution of the universe. From the Epitome of Arius Didymus.

• They call the whole world together with its parts God. They say that this is one only, ^C and finite, and a living being, and eternal, and God. For within it all bodies are contained, and nothing void exists in it. For that which is fashioned from the whole of substance is called "qualified" in accordance with the suchlike arrangement and order. Therefore, to them... ^D

^A the world is considered eternal in its first aspect, but generated and mutable in its decoration, according to infinite periods that have elapsed and are to follow. And that which is a qualified world from the whole substance is said to be eternal and God; but the world is called a system composed of heaven, and air, and earth, and sea, and the natures within them. And the world is said to be the dwelling-place of gods and men, and of those things created for their sake. For in the same way that a city is spoken of in two ways—both as the habitation and as the system composed of the inhabitants together with the citizens—so too the world is, as it were, a city composed of gods and men, the gods holding the leadership, and men being subject to them. There exists a communion between them because they share in reason, which is by nature law; and all other things have come to be for their sake. ^B Consistently with this, one must believe that God, who rules over all, provides for men, being beneficent, and good, and lover of mankind, and just, and possessing the sum of all virtues. For this reason, the world is also called Zeus, since he is the cause of life to us. Insofar as he governs all things immutably from eternity by a connected reason, he is also named Fate; and Adrasteia, because there is nothing that can escape him; and Providence, because he manages each thing as its utility requires. As for the leading part of the world, it pleased Cleanthes that it is the sun, because it is the greatest of the stars and contributes most to the administration of all things, creating day and year, and the other seasons. But to some among the sect, the earth appeared to be the leading part of the world. To Chrysippus, it was the ether, ^C the purest and most clear, as being the most mobile of all things and driving the whole revolution of the world. Thus far from the Epitome of Arius Didymus. Now it shall sufficiently suffice against the same Stoic opinion concerning God to adduce the words of Porphyry in the writings he addressed to Boethus, *On the Soul*, which are as follows.

CHAPTER XVI

Porphyry against the Stoics' opinion concerning God. From the work to Boethus, On the Soul.

"They do not hesitate," he says, "to call God a certain spiritual fire, to leave it eternal, and to say that it consumes and feeds upon all things, as if such fire were like this fire of ours, which is common. And they do not doubt to contradict Aristotle, who does not allow it to be accepted from himself that the ethereal region should consist of a similar fire. Being asked, then, how such fire survives for so long, they do not say it is a different fire; but by saying it is such [as ours], and desiring that one should believe them, they add to this irrational faith that it ^D is also eternal fire, partly that the ethereal [part] is extinguished and...

partly that it is kindled. But what point is there in dwelling further on their stupidity, or on the contempt of the ancients in this discussion? ^A

CHAPTER XVII

That that which truly is, is not a body, as the Stoics think. From the first book of Numenius "On the Good."

"But," he says, "what then shall we say truly is? Are these the four elements: earth, fire, and the two other natures between them? Are these things, then, that which truly is—either taken collectively, or some one of them? And how can that be, since they are both generated and perish, as it is possible to see them coming into being from one another and departing, being neither elements nor syllables? These things, therefore, in such a state, would not be that which is. But is matter, then, able to be that which is? But even this is more impossible than everything else, due to the weakness of its endurance. For matter is a river, flowing and rapid; [it possesses] neither depth, nor breadth, nor length that is defined or endless." And after a few words, he adds: "Thus the discourse has well said, that if matter is infinite, it is undefined; if it is undefined, it is irrational; and if it is irrational, it is unknowable. And since it is unknowable, it is necessarily ^B disorderly; for it would surely be very easy to know things that are ordered; but that which is disorderly does not stand fast; and whatever does not stand fast, could not be that which is. And this was what we ourselves agreed upon before: that it is unlawful for all these things to be attributed to that which is. Let this be an opinion, if not for everyone, at least for me. Therefore, I say that neither matter nor bodies are that which is. What then? If we have something else in the nature of the universe beyond these? Yes indeed; but it would not be a complicated matter to state this, if we should first attempt to discuss it among ourselves. Since bodies are by nature dead and inanimate, ^C and are carried about, and do not even remain in the same state, do they not need something to hold them together? Assuredly. If they did not happen upon this, would they remain? Far from it. What, then, is that which will hold them together? If this also were a body, it seems to me that it would need Zeus the Savior, as it would be breaking up and scattering. If, however, it must be free from the condition of bodies so that it may be able to defend those things that possess corruption and to hold them together, it does not seem to me to be anything else than solely the incorporeal. For this alone of all natures stands fast, and is firmly fixed, and is in no way corporeal. For it is not generated, nor does it grow, nor is it moved by any other motion, and for these reasons it has well appeared right to advocate for the incorporeal." ^D

CHAPTER XVIII.

What the Stoics think about the conflagration of the universe.

^A "It pleases," he says, "the most ancient and primary members of this sect, after certain very great periods of conversion, for all things to change first into air, and then finally to be dissolved into ethereal fire." And he adds immediately after: "From these things it is furthermore manifest that Chrysippus did not attribute this confusion to their substance—for this is absolutely impossible—but only to that which is spoken of in place of a change. For when they speak of the customary corruption of the world after the longest conversions, they do not accept the term 'corruption' in a proper sense—those who dogmatize concerning the dissolution of all things into fire, which they indeed call 'conflagration'—but they use that word 'corruption' in place of the change that happens in nature. For it pleases the Stoic philosophers to change the whole substance into fire, as if into a seed, and from this for the ordered world ^B to be formed again, such as it was before. And this dogma of the sect was accepted by its first and most ancient members: Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. For they say that Zeno, a student and successor of his in the school, maintained his assent in that question concerning the conflagration of the world."

Chapter XIX.

How the Stoics philosophize about the repeated origin of the universe.

"After," he says, "the common reason and common nature had progressed to that point, and having grown greater and larger, dried up all things at last, and took them into itself, it is established in the whole substance, inasmuch as it has returned to that first-mentioned reason, and to that resurrection which makes the great year, according to which the restoration happens again from itself alone ^C into itself. Having returned, it proceeds by the order from which it had likewise begun to arrange, and according to reason, it again carries out the same process, such periods recurring from eternity without any cessation. For it is not possible that things should have a cause of their beginning, nor the moderator of all things themselves. For it is necessary that a certain substance should underlie things that come into being, which is by its own nature capable of receiving all changes, and besides that, something which may fashion it out of itself. For just as we see among us a certain fashioning nature, so it is necessary that something of that kind ^D be posited in the world itself, but it is free from generation: for it is not possible that there be a beginning of generation in this nature. And in the same way that it is ingenerate, it is also impossible that it should be destroyed, neither by itself from itself, nor by anything else destroying it from without."

CHAPTER XX. How the Stoics feel about the soul.

^A • "Semen," Zeno says, "is that spirit which man emits joined with moisture, a particle of the soul and an offshoot, and a tempering of the parents’ seed, and a mixture gathered together from the parts of the soul. For it possesses within itself the same faculties as the whole; when it is released into the womb, having been caught by another spirit, it becomes a part of the soul of the female, and grows as one with it; and being hidden, it develops, moved and fanned by that spirit, always taking into the moisture and increasing from itself." ^B And after a few words he adds: "Regarding the soul, Cleanthes, setting Zenon’s dogmas alongside (57) those of other natural philosophers, says that Zeno defines soul as sense or exhalation, just as Heraclitus does. For wishing to demonstrate that souls—being exhalations—are always intelligent, he likened them to rivers, speaking as follows: ‘Into the same rivers, other and yet other waters flow; and souls are exhaled from moist things.’ Zeno therefore defines the soul as an exhalation, in agreement with Heraclitus. And he says that it is sensitive for this reason, ^C that its leading part is capable of being shaped by existing things (38) through the sense-organs, and of receiving the impressions. For these things are properties of the soul." And after some other things: "They say that there is a soul in the whole, which they call aether, and the air around the earth and sea, and the exhalations from these; and that the remaining souls—as many as are in living creatures, and as many as are in the surrounding air—have grown onto this; for the souls of those who have died remain. Some, however, say that the soul of the whole is eternal, but that the others are mixed together; and at the end of time they return to it. Every soul has a leading part within it, which is life, sensation, and impulse." And again after a little: "They say that the soul is created and perishable; ^D that it is not destroyed immediately upon being released from the body, but remains for some time by itself; the soul of the wise until the dissolution of all things into fire, and that of the foolish for some specific times. And they say that the souls remain in this way, that we ourselves remain as souls, having come to be, when the body has been separated and has changed the substance of the soul into a lesser form. But the souls of the foolish and of unreasoning animals are destroyed together with their bodies." Such are the dogmas of the Stoic philosophy, gathered together from the *Epitome* of Arius Didymus (39). Against the absurd opinion of these men concerning the soul, what has been briefly argued in opposition by Longinus, who lived in our own time, is sufficient.

CHAPTER XXI.

“For my part,” he says, “to speak generally, all those who have declared the soul to be a body seem to me far removed from the true method of philosophizing. For how is it at all admissible to posit that which pertains to it as being akin and twin to any of the elements? And where is there room to bring in the mixtures and fusions? These, occurring in many ways, are by nature suited to generate the forms of other unspeakable bodies—in which, if not perpetually, yet from afar one can discern the cause of the elements, and the impetus from the first toward the secondary and tertiary things. But of those things that pertain to the soul, there is no trace or evidence to be found in bodies, even if one were to be ambitious, as Epicurus and Chrysippus were, to ‘move every stone’ and investigate every power of body to find the origin and source of the soul’s functions. For what could the thinness of that spirit contribute to our thinking or reasoning? Or what such power and capacity for change, beyond the others, do the shapes of the atoms have, so that when they are intermingled in the composition of a different body, they produce wisdom? I, for my part, am not at all persuaded that this could happen—not even if someone were to happen upon the tripods and handmaidens of Vulcan, ^C (which Homer mentions (40), saying that the former go of their own accord into the gathering, while the latter assist their master, and are not surpassed by any living being in any kind of gift or ability, let alone being surpassed by those fortuitous filings), and one would have no more reason to believe that they – any more than stones lying on the shore – would have the virtue and skill to produce anything excellent and wonderful to behold. For who, indeed, would not rightly be indignant at Zeno and Cleanthes for having philosophized so insultingly about the soul, and for both of them having asserted that the soul is an exhalation of solid ^D (41) body? For what, I ask by the gods, does an exhalation have in common at all with a soul? And where is it possible, if one is convinced that our essence and that of other living beings is similar to this, for the latter to be sufficient to preserve (43) lasting impressions and memories, or to account for the impulses and deliberations of things profitable for understanding? Or indeed, does this also apply to the gods... [alt-version omitted]