A Furthermore, if there is a certain infinite number of inanimate spirits, and yet they wish for "spirit" to be something that "has itself in a certain way"—this very thing, "having itself in a certain way," that is, that peculiar disposition, must either be something or be absolutely nothing. If it is nothing, then spirit alone truly exists, and that which "has itself in a certain way" is an empty and meaningless term. It follows, therefore, that they must say there is nothing besides matter, and thus they mean that mind, and God, and absolutely all other things exist only in name, and that spirit alone strictly exists. But if that disposition is indeed something real, and different from that which underlies it—and thus different from matter itself, which, while being in matter, remains free from matter because it is not, in turn, composed of matter—then it is certainly not a body, but a rationale (ratio), and a nature dissimilar to a body.
Moreover, that the soul can be no body at all, anyone may understand from this: for it is either hot or cold, hard or soft, moist or solid, black or white, and endowed with other qualities of this kind, which are wont to be found here and there in different things. Now, if it is hot, it will only heat; if cold, it will refrigerate; if light, it will bring lightness wherever it is present; if heavy, it will bring heaviness; if black, it will affect things with blackness; if white, it will likewise affect them with whiteness. For fire is not of such a nature as to make things cold, nor is cold of such a nature as to make things hot. But the soul produces different things in different living beings, and even contrary things in the same one: for at one moment it compacts, at another it liquefies; it makes one thing dense and another rare, this black and that white, one light and another heavy: and whereas it ought to produce only one thing—in accordance with the quality of the body and its other color—it operates many things simultaneously. B
"But what of the motions," they say, "which are so many and diverse, and not one, for there is but one motion for every body? But if they charge the causes of these partly to choices and partly to preceding reasons, they speak rightly indeed. But neither is the choice the soul’s, nor are the reasons—being many—those of one simple body, which does not even possess such a reason, except insofar as it has received from the one who made it that it should be hot or cold.
And furthermore, how could growth in time C and by a certain measure happen to the body itself, to which it belongs to be increased, but which is itself devoid of the power of increasing, except insofar as the soul communicates that power to it within the mass of its matter, through which the soul performs its work? For if the soul were a body, and increased along with it—since it would have to be equal to the body that it had increased by its own power—it would necessarily have to be increased by the addition of a similar body. And what would be added to it? Either it would be soul, or an inanimate body. If it is soul, from where and how does it enter, and how is it added? If that which is added is an inanimate body, D how will this be ensouled, and how will it agree with the former, and become one, and share with it the same opinions? But it will not be like a guest and a stranger; this soul will be in ignorance of things that the former knows. And just as the rest of our mass, of which one part flows away and another part arrives, with nothing remaining the same—how then would we have memories? How the knowledge of what is our own, if we are never using the same soul? And indeed, if it is a body, and the nature of a body is divisible into many parts, then each part is ensouled.
A For if the soul is a magnitude of such a sort, that if it be smaller, it will not be a soul—just as is the case with every quantity—then by subtraction it has changed from what it was before. But if something having magnitude, when its bulk is reduced, remains the same in quality, it is indeed different as a body and as a quantity, but in its quality—since it is different from quantity—it is able to preserve its identity. What, then, will those who say that the soul is a body reply? First, concerning each part of the soul that is in the same body, is each part a soul, as the whole is? And again, is the part of a part a soul? The magnitude, therefore, contributed nothing to its essence (although it ought to have, since it is something measurable), and it is all in many places at once, which is impossible for a body, for the same whole to be in many places, and for the part to be the same as the whole. But if they say that each of the parts is not a soul, a soul will come to be in them from soulless things. And furthermore, if the magnitude of each soul is to be defined by both B limits, or at least toward the smaller or toward the larger, it will not be a soul. When, therefore, twins are produced from one union and one seed, or, as happens in other animals, many offspring are created—the seed being divided into many places, in each of which some whole [individual] exists—how does this not teach those who wish to learn, that where the part is the same as the whole, in that [being] the quantity has been transcended in its essence, and therefore it is of necessity non-quantitative? For thus it would remain the same, though the quantity be taken away, since it is not concerned with quantity and bulk, as it is something different from essence. The soul is therefore non-quantitative, and so are the reasons.
C That if the soul were a body, neither sensing, nor thinking, nor knowing, nor virtues, nor anything of the goods would exist, is evident from the following. If someone is to sense something, it must itself be one, and apprehend the whole by the same [power]. And if through many sensory organs more things are entering, or many qualities [pertain] to one thing, and by one thing [it perceives] the diverse, such as a face: for it does not perceive the nose with one part and the eyes with another, but the same thing perceives all at once. And if one thing should enter through the eyes, and another through hearing, it must necessarily be some one thing to which both [arrive]. Or how could one say that these things are different, if the perceptions did not come together at once into the same place? It must therefore be like a center, and the lines converging from the circumference of a circle—that is, the sensations from all sides—must terminate at this point, and that which perceives must be such in very truth.
A For if it were divided, and the sensations were to receive both extremities as if on a line, they would either converge again into one and the same point, such as the center, or each would have a sensation of the other, just as if I were to perceive some things and you others. And if the sensation were one, as a face, it would be condensed into one, which is indeed what appears; for it is condensed even in the pupils themselves, or else how would the largest things be seen through them? Therefore, proceeding still more into the governing principle, they become as it were indivisible thoughts. And this will be indivisible; for if it were to be shared by this being of magnitude, then one part would perceive one thing and another another [(72)], and none of us would grasp the perception of the whole of the sensible object. But in fact, the whole is one; for how could it even be divided? For the equal will not fit the equal, because the governing principle is not equal to every sensible object. In how many parts, then, is the division [(74)]? Or will it be divided into as many parts as the incoming sensation has variety [(75)]? And thus, will each of those parts of the soul perceive through its own constituent parts [(76)]? Or will the parts of the parts be insensible [(77)]? But that is impossible. Since everything is naturally capable of being divided into infinite parts, it would happen that there would be infinite sensations for each sensible object, such that infinite images of the same thing would exist in our governing principle. B Furthermore, since that which perceives is a body, the act of perception could not happen in any other way than as impressions are made in wax by signet rings, or as sensations are inscribed into the blood or the air. If, then, it is like something in wet bodies—which is reasonable—as in water, it will be agitated, and there will be no memory; but if the forms remain, either it is impossible for others to be inscribed while those occupy the place, so that no other sensations will exist; or, if others occur, those earlier ones are destroyed, so that there will be nothing left to serve as memory. But if it is possible to remember and in turn to perceive others after others, with those preceding not offering any impediment, then the soul can in no way be a body. C Moreover, one may clearly understand this same thing from the sensation of pain. For when a person is said to be in pain in his finger, the pain itself is indeed in the finger, but the sensation of that pain, it is clear that they themselves will admit, occurs in the governing principle of the human being. Therefore, while one thing is the D governing principle, and another the thing suffering, the governing principle perceives the pain, and the soul is the whole, and it is the same…
A thing that suffers. How then does this happen? By propagation, they will say, when the pneuma of the soul about the finger suffers first, and then transmits it to the next, and this to another, until it arrives at the governing principle. It is necessary, therefore, if the first perceived pain, that the sensation of the second should be different, if the sensation is by propagation, and that of the third also different, and that there should be many and infinite sensations about a single pain; and that the governing principle should perceive all these last of all, and its own sensation besides these. But the truth is that each of those is not of the pain in the finger, but the one next to the finger B perceives that the instep is in pain; the third perceives that something else is toward the top, and there are many pains. And the governing principle does not perceive the pain at the finger, but the one at itself, and it knows this alone, and lets the others be, not knowing that the finger is in pain. If, therefore, it is by propagation, sensation cannot possibly be of such a kind, nor, since it is a corporeal mass, can one part suffer and another have knowledge. For of every magnitude, if one thing is one part and another is another, the perceiving thing must be C posited to be of such a kind that it is everywhere the same to itself; and this is fitting to be done by some other thing of those that exist, rather than by a body.
That it is not even possible to think, if the soul were a body of any kind, must be demonstrated from the following.
For if to perceive is for the soul, using the body, to apprehend things perceived by the senses, then to think would either not be perceiving through the body, or it would be the same as to perceive. If, therefore, to think is to apprehend without a body, much more must the thing that thinks not be a body, since perception belongs to perceivables D and thinking to intelligibles. But if they are unwilling [to admit this], yet there will be thoughts of intelligibles, and perceptions of things without magnitude. How then will a thing that is a magnitude think what is not a magnitude, and how will a divisible thing think what is not divisible? Or will it think by some indivisible part of itself? And if this is so, the thing that thinks will not be a body. For there is no need of the whole for touching; for one point is enough. If, therefore, they concede the primary thoughts—which is the truth—to be of things entirely most devoid of body, each one by itself, it follows necessarily that the thinking thing is body...A If, however, they will reply that those notions are of forms which adhere to matter, yet they cannot be grasped except by things separated from bodies, and indeed separated by the power of the mind. For the separation of a circle, a triangle, a line, and a point, does not take place with bodies or matter at all: therefore, it is necessary that the soul itself, which effects this, should be separated from the body, and therefore it is necessary that it itself should not be a body.
Moreover, the beautiful B and the just, and indeed the comprehension of both, have no magnitude. Wherefore both will be received by a certain indivisible power of the soul, and will remain in it without any parts.
• What then? If we were to say that the soul is a body, how in the world could temperance, justice, fortitude, and the rest be its virtues? For indeed, are those virtues merely some sort of spirit or blood? Unless, perhaps, fortitude is a certain distress of the spirit, and temperance a commodious tempering of the same, and that true beauty is a certain fair species adumbrated by figures, which, when we see it in some people, we call those persons elegant and beautiful of body. C Truly, for a certain spirit, having only some shadowy and superficial fortitude or beauty, such a condition and nature might be appropriate. But what need has a spirit of temperance? Nay, on the contrary, in embraces and touches, it would rather pursue some convenience, whether it be that it is warmed, or moderately captures the cold, or clings to soft, tender, and smooth things. But to render to each what is due according to worth, what has that to do with a spirit? Furthermore, are those notions of virtue, and other spiritual things of that kind in which the soul is occupied, eternal; or, on the other hand, is virtue born, and will it again perish? But who is the maker of it, and from whence? For then this question necessarily remains. They must surely be eternal and always-remaining, such as are those things which pertain to geometry. But if they are eternal and always-remaining, they are certainly not bodies. And besides, that in which they will exist must be something similar, and therefore it must not be a body. For no nature of body remains; rather, every such nature flows incessantly.
• But if, while they see the functions of bodies—which heat, cool, propel, and depress—they place the soul there, establishing it as if in an active location: they are ignorant, first, that these bodies themselves, D by certain incorporeal powers that are in them...
perform these things. Furthermore, we do not consider these powers to exist concerning the soul, but rather that to think, to perceive, to reason, to desire, and to manage all things wisely and well, requires a different essence. A Having therefore transferred the powers of incorporeal beings to bodies, they leave nothing for those incorporeal beings. But that even bodies are able to do what they can, by means of incorporeal powers, is clear from the following. For they will acknowledge that there is a difference between quality and quantity, and that every body is a quantity, and yet that not every body is quantity, just as matter is. By acknowledging these things, they will acknowledge that quality is something other than quantity, and other than body. For how will it be a body if it is not a quantity, since every body is a quantity? And indeed, just as was said somewhere above, if every body is divisible, and every mass is, that which it was is taken away; yet when a body is divided, the same whole quality remains in each part; as, for instance, the sweetness of honey is none the less sweetness in each part: therefore, sweetness could not be a body; and likewise in the case of other qualities. B Next, if the powers were bodies, it would be necessary for the stronger of the powers to be of great bulk, and those able to do little to be of small bulk. But if, of two bulks, there are instances where the small and minute hold the greatest powers, the acting cause must be attributed to something other than magnitude; therefore, it is something without magnitude. And as for the claim that the same matter is a body, and yet creates diverse qualities by taking them on, does it not clearly show that the things which are added are themselves formal principles and incorporeal? C Nor let them argue against us, saying that when spirit or blood departs, living creatures die. For [the creature] cannot exist without these, nor yet without many other things, and not even the soul could exist [without them]. And yet, neither spirit nor blood is diffused through everything.
Jam vero, if the soul, being a body, were to pass through the whole [body], it would also be mixed, in the way that mixture occurs in other bodies. D But if in the mixture of bodies, none of the elements mixed remains in its actual state, then the soul also would no longer exist in the bodies in actuality, but only in potentiality, having lost its state of being a soul. Just as if the sweet and the bitter should be mixed, the sweet would no longer exist; so we would have no soul. Moreover, if a body is mixed within a body, whole through the whole, so that wherever one is, the other is also, being equal in bulk to both, and occupying the whole, and no growth having occurred upon the addition of the other, nothing will be left that is not divided. For not by large parts does it alternate...
A in a certain mutual change (for thus they say that juxtaposition will come to be): but as to the whole, permeating the other, even if one should introduce the greater into the lesser (which indeed is impossible, that the lesser should become equal to the greater); but still, as it permeates, it cuts the whole everywhere. Therefore, it is necessary, if this very thing happens at any point whatsoever, and there is no body in between that is not cut, that the division of the body should result in points, which is impossible. But if the division is to infinity (for whatever body you take is always divisible), then they will be infinite, not only in potentiality but also in actuality. Therefore, it is not possible for the whole body to permeate the whole of another; but the soul permeates through the whole: therefore, it is incorporeal.
B That they say the same spirit is naturally prior, but that having come into a cold place and been tempered, it becomes soul, becoming thinner in the cold—this itself is absurd; for many living things are born in warm places, and possess a soul that has not been cooled. But they say, at any rate, that the nature of the soul is prior, coming to be according to the chances of external things. It follows, therefore, for them that they make the worse thing first, and before this, another thing that is less, which they call "state" (ἕξις). And the Mind is last, obviously coming into existence from the soul; or if the Mind is before all things, they ought to have made the soul next, and then nature; and always the latter is worse, if it is naturally so. If, therefore, God himself is also according to them subsequent to the mind, and created, and possesses an acquired mind, it might be concluded that there is neither soul, nor mind, nor God; if that which is in potentiality—since there is nothing prior to it in actuality—should come to be, it will not arrive at actuality; for what will be the motive cause, if there is no other cause prior to it? But if it shall lead itself into actuality, which is absurd, yet even looking toward something, it will lead; which will exist not in potentiality, but in actuality. And yet, that which always remains the same, if it should possess that which is in potentiality, it will arrive at actuality by itself, and this will be better than the one having the potentiality, like an object of desire to that one. Therefore, that which is better is prior, and possesses a nature different from body, and is always in actuality; therefore, Mind and Soul are prior to nature. Soul, then, is not in this way as spirit, nor as body. But that it is not body, might be said, and is thought, and as for cool, soul, and other things for others, these things are sufficient.
A But since it is of another nature, we must inquire what this is. Is it then something different from the body, and yet something of the body, such as a harmony? For certain followers of Pythagoras, in a different manner, thought that harmony itself was something of this kind, just as is the harmony in strings. For as, when the strings are tightened there, a certain affection arises upon them, which is called harmony, in the same way, regarding our own body, they thought that from a mixture of unlike things, a qualitative mixture arises, working to produce life, and that the soul is this affection that results from the mixture.
That this is impossible B has already been stated at length against this opinion. For it has been said that the soul is prior, and harmony is posterior; and that the one commands and oversees the body, and often struggles against it—a thing that harmony, if it existed, could not do; and that the one is a substance, whereas harmony is not a substance; and that the mixture of the bodies of which we are composed, if it were in reason, would be health; and that if each part were mixed differently, there would be a different soul, so that there would be many. Moreover, this 14 is the greatest point, that there is a necessity for there to be another soul for this soul, the one that produces this harmony 15; just as in the case of musical instruments, the musician 16 who imparts the harmony to the strings, having the principle within himself according to which he will tune them. For neither the strings there of themselves, nor the bodies here 17, will be able to bring themselves into harmony. In general, these men create ensouled beings out of soulless ones, and from disordered things, they claim that the ordered ones took their order 18 and subsistence by chance. This, however, is impossible to occur either in the parts or in the whole 19. Therefore, the soul is not a harmony.
These, then, are [the arguments] from Plotinus against the opinion of the Stoics concerning the soul, who asserted it to be corporeal. But since I have already set forth in summary C enough against Aristotle and the Peripatetics, as well as against the Stoic sect, it is time to return again, and together to contemplate the wonderful philological inquiries of all the noble philosophers: that the Greeks, almost universally, considered and worshipped as gods the visible [gods]—the sun, and the moon, and the remaining stars, and the other parts of the world which are perceived by sight—and [also considered and worshipped] their D mythical and nonsensical [stories] concerning the polytheistic... And thus far from Plotinus against the opinion of the Stoics concerning the soul, who said it was corporeal. But since we have brought forth enough, albeit in summary, against Aristotle, all the Peripatetics, and the sect of the Stoics, it remains that, returning again to the beginning, we may see those excellent commentaries of all the preeminent philosophers together: seeing that the Greeks, almost to a man, have held and worshipped as gods the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars, and the remaining parts of the world, which are perceived by sight, and [have held] their fabulous and absurd [notions] about...
the vanity of the gods, have transferred these stories to the elements and other members of this universe through more specious explanations. Wherefore it seems necessary to me to collect also their opinions concerning these matters, and at the same time to contemplate their dissensions and the arrogant vanity of men. Moreover, we shall derive these things from no other source than that work of Plutarch, where he sets forth the opinions of the ancients as well as the moderns regarding these topics A in this manner.
Chapter XXIII. The opinions of the natural philosophers concerning the sun.
Anaximander B maintains that the sun is a circle twenty-eight times the size of the earth, equipped with an orbit similar to chariot wheels, but hollow, however, and full of fire, which shines forth in some part of it through a narrow opening, as if through the nozzle of a pipe: and that this is the sun. Xenophanes [says it is made] of certain glowing sparks, which, coming together from moist exhalation, cause the sun itself to be formed from burning clouds. The Stoics, a kind of ignited, intelligent substance emerging from the sea. Plato, from a great quantity of fire. Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus, [a mass or] a red-hot stone. Aristotle, a sphere from the fifth body. Philolaus the Pythagorean, a disc similar to glass, which, receiving the reflection of the fire existing in the world, transmits the light to us through the air, acting as a kind of sieve: so that that fiery brilliance of the sun in the heavens C is similar to the splendor which is transferred to us by reflection from a mirror. For this sun, as it were a likeness of a likeness, is what we call by that name. Empedocles sets down two suns; the one, that primordial [fire] which is in the other hemisphere of the world, having filled that hemisphere, which hitherto has always stood opposite to the reflection of its own light; the other [sun], that which appears to us, is a certain repercussion of light in this other hemisphere, which is full of air mingled with heat; which repercussion, falling from the earth, which is spherical, onto a sun similar to crystal, is at the same time carried along in the motion of the other fiery orb; this is, to express it more briefly, nothing else but the reflection of that fire which is around the earth. Epicurus, finally, [thinks it is] a terrestrial mass, similar to a pumice stone or a sponge with frequent holes, and ignited by fire. D
CHAPTER XXIV
Concerning the magnitude of the sun.
Anaximander A says the sun is equal to the earth, but that the circle from which it draws its breath and by which it is carried is twenty-seven times larger than the earth. Anaxagoras says it is many times larger than the Peloponnesus. Heraclitus says it is the width of a human foot. Epicurus, for his part, says that all the aforesaid are possible; it is either as large as it appears to us, or slightly larger, or slightly smaller.CHAPTER XXV
Concerning the shape of the sun.
Anaximenes says the sun is flat, like a leaf. Heraclitus [says it is] like a boat, being somewhat hollowed out. The Stoics [say it is] spherical, just like the universe and all the stars. Epicurus [maintains] that these opinions are all not without their own probability. Such is the great god of celestial phenomena as conceived by these philosophers. But Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews are far removed from this vanity of curious opinions. BCHAPTER XXVI
Concerning the moon.
Anaximander says [the moon] is a circle nineteen times the size of the earth, just like that which he attributes to the sun, being entirely full of fire, and that its eclipse of light arises from the rotation of the wheel. For he says it is like a chariot wheel, having a hollow rim and being full of fire, with only one vent. Xenophanes says it is a compressed and thickened cloud. The Stoics [say it is] a mixture of fire and air. Plato [says it] has for the most part an earthy nature. Anaxagoras and Democritus [say it is] a solid and glowing body, C containing within itself plains, and mountains, and ravines. Heraclitus [says it is] earth surrounded by mist. Pythagoras [says it is] a body similar to fire that approaches the moon.CHAPTER XXVII
Concerning the magnitude of the moon.
The Stoics declare it to be larger than the earth, just as they do the sun. Parmenides [says it is] equal to the sun and that it receives its light from it.CHAPTER XXVIII
Concerning the shape of the moon.
The Stoics [say it possesses] a spherical shape, no less than the sun. Heraclitus [says it is] boat-shaped, Empedocles [says it is] disk-shaped, others [say it is] cylinder-shaped.CHAPTER XXIX
Concerning the illumination of the moon.
Anaximander maintains that it has its own proper D light, but one that is somewhat rarer. Antiphon [says it shines] with [its] own radiance...but the part around it that is hidden by the sun’s approach is darkened, since it is the nature of a stronger fire to darken a weaker one; and this happens with the other stars also. Thales, and those with him, maintain that the moon is illuminated by the sun. Heraclitus maintains that the same thing happens to the sun and the moon: for since the stars are shaped like vessels, they receive the vapors from the moist exhalation, and are thus illuminated in appearance; the sun more brightly, for it travels through purer air, but the moon in more turbid air, and for this reason it appears darker. A
CHAPTER XXX. On the nature of the wandering and fixed stars.
Thales [maintains] that the stars are indeed earthy, but inflamed. Empedocles [says they are] fiery, made of that fiery substance which the ether, once it had embraced it, squeezed out during the first separation of things. Anaxagoras [says] that the ether encompassing us is fiery in its essence, and by the violent force of its rotation it tore stones from the earth, and by setting them on fire, turned them into stars. Diogenes believes that the stars are pumice-like in nature, and are the vents of the cosmos. Furthermore, he believes that they are invisible stones, which often fall to earth and are extinguished, just like that fiery stone-like star which fell near the town of Aegospotami, which we commonly call the Goat’s River. Empedocles thinks that the fixed stars are fastened to the crystal of the heaven, but that the wandering stars are loose and free. Plato [says they are] for the most part fiery, but that they also admit particles of the other elements, like a kind of glue. Xenophanes holds that they are composed of inflamed clouds; which, when they are extinguished during the day, are then rekindled at night like coals: for he says that rising and setting are nothing other than their being ignited and extinguished in turn. Heraclides, and the Pythagoreans with him, [hold] that every star is an entire world, containing earth, air, and ether, in an infinite space. And this doctrine is celebrated here and there in the Orphic poems, which make worlds out of each of the stars. Epicurus rejects none of these opinions entirely, holding to his own [standard of] ‘that which is possible.’ B C
CHAPTER XXXI. On the shape of the stars.
The Stoics [say] that the stars are spherical, just like the cosmos, D and the sun and the moon. Cleanthes attributes to them the shape of a cone. Anaximenes, that they are fixed into the crystalline body like nails. Some [say] that they are fiery filaments, like painted figures. Such are the excellent discoveries which this philosophy has devised for us regarding those whom they call visible gods. Now, understand what they also pronounce regarding the universe from the words of the same Plutarch.
CHAPTER XXXII. On the manner in which the world was constituted.
A It is in this way, then, that the world 39—which we see to be of a circumflex figure 40—was formed. Since the atomic bodies possessed a movement that was unprovoked by providence and entirely accidental, and since they were moved continuously and with the greatest speed, many bodies were gathered into the same place, and for this reason possessed a variety of shapes and sizes. As these were gathered into the same place, those of them that were larger and heavier than all else settled at the bottom; but those that were small and spherical, smooth and prone to slipping, were squeezed out during the meeting of the bodies and were carried up into the heights. When the striking force that caused them to rise ceased, and the impact no longer drove them upward, and yet they were prevented from being carried downward, they were pressed toward those places that were able to receive them. These were the regions around and about. B And towards these 41, the multitude 41 of bodies was folded; and by being entangled with one another in this folding, they generated the heaven. The atoms that were of the same nature, being (as has been said) varied in kind, were pushed toward the heights and constituted the nature of the stars. The multitude of exhaled bodies struck the air and squeezed it; and this air, becoming wind-like through the movement and encompassing the stars, carried them along with it and preserved their current revolution in the heights. Thereafter, from those things that settled at the bottom, the earth was produced, and from the things that were lifted up, the heaven, the fire, and the air. Since a great deal of matter was still contained within the earth, and as this was thickened by the blows from the winds and the breezes from the stars, all of its finely-parted configuration was squeezed out, and it generated the moist nature. As this was fluid in its disposition, it was carried toward the hollow places that were capable of receiving and containing it; or else the water, having subsided by itself, hollowed out the places beneath it. C Such, then, is their wonderful cosmogony.
Joined to these is another, most extensive, word-battle concerning all matters that leave thinkers in doubt. Whether one must hold the All to be one or many; whether the world is one or whether there are several; whether this world is animate and happens to be governed by the providence of God, or the contrary; whether it is indestructible or corruptible; and by what it is nourished; and from what point God began to fashion the world; and concerning the order of the world; and what is the cause of its inclination; concerning the exterior circumference of the world, and which are the right and left sides of the world; concerning heaven; and in addition to all these, concerning demons and heroes; concerning matter and ideas; concerning the order of the whole; furthermore, concerning the course and movement of the stars; and whence the stars are illuminated; and concerning the so-called Dioscuri; concerning D those who hypothesize atoms, whether one must consider the All...
All to be composed of them. Concerning the eclipse of the sun and moon; and concerning its appearance; and why it appears terrestrial; concerning the distances of the same; further, concerning years. Since Plutarch, by gathering these together, has summarized in a few words the opinions and disagreements of all—which were established through myriads of arguments by those of whom we speak—I consider it not useless to set them forth for their reasonable refutation. For if they stood diametrically opposed to one another, and kindled, as it were, wars and conflicts, achieving nothing else against themselves except to refute the opinions of their neighbors through a vain ambition of words, who would not admit that we have reasonably and prudently withheld assent to them in these matters? B Now, therefore, to those former things which they discussed in this place concerning other matters also closer to the earth—such as the figure of the earth, its position and inclination, and also concerning the sea—I will subjoin these, so that you may know that those noble men disagreed not only concerning the celestial and supernal, but also concerning things pertaining to the earth. And that you may admire the wisdom of these wise men even more, I will further add what they disputed concerning the soul, and the ruling faculty within it, not even recognizing themselves what kind of nature they possess. But let us return to the first of the things mentioned.
CHAPTER XXXIII
Whether this whole is one.
C The Stoics declared that the world is one, and that by this name they understood both the universe itself and also its corporeal nature. Empedocles, however, confesses that the world is one, but he does not wish for this world to be the universe, but only a small part of the total, while the rest is void and idle matter. Plato, as he thinks, conjectures by three arguments that the world is unique and that this universe is one thing: because, if it did not contain all things, it would not be perfect and whole; because it would not be similar to its paradigm if it were not unique; and lastly, because it could not be free from all corruption if anything existed outside it. But one could respond to Plato that a thing is not necessarily perfect because it contains all things; for a man is perfect, yet he does not contain all things. Furthermore, there are many paradigms, as happens in the case of statues, buildings, and paintings. But how is that [world] perfect, if something can revolve outside of it? And finally, that which is generated can neither be free from corruption, nor can it be so. Metrodorus says it is just as absurd for one world to have come into existence in an infinite space as it is for one D single ear of corn to grow in a vast field. Moreover, that the number of worlds is infinite is clearly concluded from the infinite multitude of principles. For if the world is finite, but the causes from which this world has been generated are all infinite, it is necessary that they be infinite. For where all the causes have come to be, there are also the effects. And the causes are either atoms or the elements.
world is indeed a world, yet if the principles which concur to its production are infinite, it must be the case that there are infinite worlds. For where all the causes concur, there also the effects must necessarily exist: but the causes are either atoms or elements. A
Chapter XXXIV: Whether the world is animate and governed by Providence
All others, save for those mentioned, maintain that the world is animate and governed by Providence. Democritus, Epicurus, and the rest of the teachers of atoms and the void, deny both; they entrust its administration and governance to a certain irrational nature. Aristotle does not wish for the whole of the universe to be animate in all its parts, nor does he grant that it is universally endowed with sense or reason, and therefore it is not, in his view, universally spiritual or governed by Providence. He holds that all these things belong only to celestial objects, which possess animate and vital spheres, while terrestrial things possess none of these qualities; and that such order as is found in them arises from mere chance, not B from any preceding reason.
Chapter XXXV: Whether the world is subject to destruction
Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics [maintain that the world was] generated by God, and that by its own nature it is subject to corruption, because it is sensory, since it is corporeal: [yet] by the providence and preservation of God, it will never perish. Epicurus [argues that it] will perish, because it was generated, like an animal or a plant. Xenophanes [holds that it is] without birth, sempiternal, and immune to all corruption. Aristotle [holds that] the part of the world subject to the moon is something subject to change, in which also all terrestrial things die by a certain fated lot.
Chapter XXXVI: Whence the world draws its nourishment
Aristotle says, if the world is nourished, it will also perish; but it stands in need of no nourishment: therefore it is sempiternal. Plato [says that] the world provides itself with nourishment from those parts which are corrupted through change. Philolaus [says that] there is a twofold kind of destruction, one from fire falling from the heavens, the other from lunar water poured out through the conversion of the air; and that the exhalations of these provide the nourishment for the world. C
Chapter XXXVII: From what beginning did God start to create the world
The natural philosophers say that the generation of the world began from the earth, as if from a center; for the center is the beginning of the sphere. Pythagoras [says it began] from fire, and the fifth element. Empedocles [says that] the ether was first secreted, then fire, then earth, from which, when it was compressed by the rush of the sphere's excessive motion, water gushed forth. From this, air was exhaled; and the heaven was formed from the ether, the sun from the fire; and the things near the earth were solidified from the others. Plato [says that] the visible world was created after the model of the intelligible world; and D of the visible, [he held that] the soul was prior, and after this the corporeal [was created]: but the visible
A part of the universe—which first emerged from fire and earth, and later from water and air—was created first. Pythagoras, seeing that there are altogether five solid figures, which are also accustomed to be called mathematical, says that the earth is formed from the cube, fire from the pyramid, air from the octahedron, water from the icosahedron, and finally the sphere of the universe from the dodecahedron. In this respect, Plato also imitates Pythagoras.