A
III. That which is uncircumscribed is either of the same order as that which is circumscribed, or of a different order. If it is of the same order, then the Word of God would be consubstantial with the assumed flesh, for it is uncircumscribed; for the properties of the same category and the same nature are inseparably linked. But if it is of a different order, then the Word is by all means of a different essence from the flesh, and yet is circumscribed according to it—namely, according to each of the two essences of His divinity and His humanity—being circumscribed and uncircumscribed due to the conjunction of the two properties: just as He is seen and not seen, touched and not touched.
IV. If the properties of material and composite things are material and composite, how then can Christ be uncircumscribed according to His bodily character? For that which is uncircumscribed is immaterial and simple, whereas the body is material and composite. For the property must be absolutely similar to the nature itself, and must not admit any separation whatsoever which might be thought to arise from difference. But indeed, if it is not circumscribed, the one is different from the other, since the material is not the same as the immaterial, nor the composite the same as the simple. Therefore, Christ is not uncircumscribed in body, so that there may be no discrepancy in things which are entirely similar, and no composition in that which is simple. B
V. If Christ is God and man, and is not man by the same nature by which He is God; clearly, neither is He circumscribed by the same property by which He is uncircumscribed, since one property differs from the other; and they cannot enter into a communion of substantial likeness—neither the natures themselves, nor the properties co-existing with them. If this is so, how could Christ, being from both and known according to both, not be both representable and not representable? C
VI. Was God seen by those on earth in a form that is representable, or one that is not representable? If in an unrepresentable one, then clearly it was an invisible one also, since these two—I mean that which is not representable and that which is not visible—are conjoined. And how, then, do the disciples say: "We have seen the Lord"? (John xx, 25). Therefore, it was in a representable form, even though He is invisible according to His divine nature. But if it was in a representable form, who—unless he has reached the height of insanity—could bring himself to say that a form which is representable cannot be represented? D
VII. If to call Christ only circumscribed is to strip Him of the divinity, for which it is characteristic not to be circumscribed, it is equally clear that to call Him only uncircumscribed is to strip Him of His humanity, for which it is characteristic to be circumscribed. These absurdities are equal—the one raved by Paul of Samosata, who called Christ a mere man and not also God; the other foolishly prated by Manes the Persian, who called Him bare God, but not also
Aman, asserting Christ to be such. See, you who are of this party, the precipice on both sides. Therefore, being caught in the middle as if between these sides, whichever of the two impious dogmas you wish to flee, you must necessarily embrace the other. For if you were to deny that you are on the side of Paul, why do you follow Manes, not circumscribing Christ as the incorporeal Word? This is what Paul avoids. But if you were to say you do not follow Manes, why do you follow Paul in dogmatizing that Christ is a corporeal man? This is what Manes avoids; so that, in following Manes, you also follow Paul, and vice versa.
VIII. If Christ is confessed by you in divinity and in humanity, and you do not limp concerning this, why do you stand back from saying that He is circumscribed in the one, and in the other He is not circumscribed, being known by the property of each nature? Insofar as He is God, He transcends circumscription, just as He transcends being seen and grasped; but insofar as He is man, He is subject to circumscription, just as He is subject to being seen and to quality. Unless, perhaps, you have confessed Christ to be in divinity and humanity only in word, while cunningly understanding Him to be strictly incorporeal, and therefore unable to be depicted.
IX. Do you think that what is simple and what is composite are one and the same thing, or are they different? And if the former, then you must certainly say with us that Christ is both circumscribed and uncircumscribed, as He is from both. For in contrary properties, the nature of either is observed—I mean of the simple and the composite, that is, of the divinity and of the humanity. As in the example of fire and water: fire does not tend downward, nor does water fly upward; nor is dryness humidity, nor is humidity dryness. Therefore, circumscription is not the same as being uncircumscribable, nor is being uncircumscribable the same as circumscription. For the one is opposed to the other by a natural contrariety B that is greatest, and much more so in this third instance than in the two others. But if you say He is uncircumscribed only, how do you not posit the second? And even if you do not say it, you are surely asserting one simple, composite nature of divinity and humanity, as if, with Severus, you were preaching fire and water in a state of confusion. For by the singularity of the property, the singular account of the nature is likewise manifested.
X. If affirmations and denials are opposed to each other, and are not the same, neither are they understood or named as the same—with affirmation being "to be circumscribed," and denial being "not to be circumscribed"—and yet Christ consists of both, divinity and humanity, surely He must have the properties of the natures, from which it is possible to distinguish them relative to one another, and not merged into one, and which, following the duality of the essences, are themselves also dual, from which He is understood and named as both circumscribed and uncircumscribed. But if this is not so, and He is only uncircumscribed, then the unmixed things have been mixed together in confusion, and things differently named have become homonymous. And it will come to pass that walking will be the same as not walking, both in thought and in name; and talking, the same as not talking; and being, the same as not being; and finally, being circumscribed, the same as not being circumscribed; which is entirely foolish C.
XI. From the uncircumscribed and the circumscribed, O good men, there does not result something that is merely uncircumscribed, just as from divinity and humanity there does not result one who is merely God. For if the natures, united according to hypostasis, have not undergone change into one another, certainly they have not exchanged their proper appellations either; but after the union in one person, they preserve the distinction of both things and names. Therefore, in this way are their properties also; neither has their natural quality been changed, nor have they lost the distinction of names, but they remain in Christ uninjured: from which he is both circumscribed and uncircumscribed, as is confessed, however much you, O impious ones, may deny it. A
XII. If, as the divine Epiphanius says, whatever things are in man are man, and if anything is man, these the Only-Begotten came and took up, so that in the perfectly human he might perfectly accomplish the whole of salvation, being God, leaving nothing of that which is man absent—for if he lacked circumscription, he would have left something out, and that not merely anything, but the very thing that is most proper and chief, since the first property of man is the ability to be represented in bodily form—whoever forbids Christ to be depicted, O men, is he not, just as the same Saint demonstrated in the thirty-second chapter of his *Adversus Haereses*, kin to him who denies the flesh of Christ? Which the blessed Sophronius also anathematizes in his synodical letters. B
XIII. To those who contend more stubbornly, and who say that by depicting Christ one divides him into two sons according to Nestorius, it must be answered that to do this is not to divide Christ, but rather to hold the most correct opinions. For as in theology that which is proper to the persons does not divide the singular nature of the divinity, but that which has a common nature is distinguished by the persons, so in the economy, on the contrary, that which is proper to the natures does not divide the singular person of the Word of God; but that which has a common person is distinguished by the natures. But if, in circumscription, that which is proper to human nature were to induce division, then also in those things which are the unbegotten, the begotten, and the proceeding, that which is proper to the three persons would divide the singular nature. But it certainly does not divide it, however much those may be diverse among themselves. Therefore, neither is the singular person of Christ divided C there by the uncircumscription of the divinity and the circumscription of the humanity, however much they may be opposed to each other.
XIV. If it is not permitted, from the fact that God the Word put on flesh, to affirm that the Father and the Holy Spirit were embodied, although the Trinity is indivisible according to nature, likewise it is not permitted, from the fact that he was circumscribed according to his humanity, to affirm that the divinity is circumscribed at the same time, although it is, according to hypostasis, D undivided from the flesh, its natural...
that power, according to the person, be not divided from the flesh: nor that there the conjunction of natures confuse the persons, nor here the singularity of person move the natures from their proper bounds. B
XV. If Christ cannot, by reason of his divinity, be figured as we are [figured], so also by reason of his humanity he is not incircumscript as is the Father: but he [would have] lost both these properties, or rather exchanged the one with the other, being circumscript as he is God, and incircumscript as he is man. If, however, because he has all that is the Father's, he therefore also has the property of being incircumscript, [then] likewise, since he has all that is man's, he also has the property of being circumscript, inasmuch as he is perfect in both respects, and not semi-perfect on either side.
BY THE SAME ADVERSUS ICONOMACHOS SEVEN CHAPTERS
I. C Against those who say that Christians make gods out of images, when they adore the image of Christ, of the Theotokos, or of any of the Saints.
To "make a god" is — to begin the discussion from the very composition of the word — for that which is not God to be constituted and worshipped by someone as God, according to that which was said by the Apostle: "And changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things" (Rom. I, 23). That is to say, as regards the first nature — for it is good to set forth the quaternion — Saturn and Jupiter, Juno and Venus, and many others in both divisions D of these genera; as regards the second, the eagle, the griffin, or any other of the different species of the same nature; as regards the third, the calf, the goat, or any other of the different species of the same nature; and as regards the fourth, the serpent, the lizard, or any other of the