OF THE SAME GREGORY, BISHOP OF NYSSA, ON THE PYTHONESS: A LETTER TO BISHOP THEODOSIUS
He who said to his own disciples, *Seek and ye shall find* (Matt. 7:7), will certainly grant also the power of discovery to those who diligently search according to the Lord's commandment and investigate the hidden mysteries. For He who promised is not a liar, but bestows beyond what is asked with the magnificent bounty of His gifts. Therefore, attend to the reading, my son Timothy; for it is fitting, I think, to use the words of the great Paul to address your goodness, and may the Lord give you understanding in all things, so that you may be enriched in every word and in every knowledge. Now, however, concerning those things which you commanded, I deemed it worthwhile, as the Lord may suggest, to comply with your desire in a few words, so that from these things you might learn that we ought to serve one another in love, while fulfilling each other's wishes.
First, therefore, since the sought-after meaning concerning Samuel was set forth among the other headings, I shall set it forth in a few words, as far as it lies within me, God granting. It has pleased some before us to think that the evocation of souls by that trickster in the case of Samuel was real, and they bring forward a certain argument of this kind in defense of their opinion: that because Samuel was afflicted with grief over the rejection of Saul, and because he always set before God the fact that Saul—as he wished—had purged from the people the witchcraft brought about by ventriloquists, through which men were being lured into deception; and because the prophet was therefore vexed that the Lord would not be reconciled to the one who had been rejected, they say that God permitted the soul of the prophet to be brought up through this kind of sorcery, so that Samuel might know that he had falsely alleged in his own defense to God, saying that he (Saul) was an enemy A unto and a foe to the ventriloquists, B when he (Saul) had (in fact) purged from the people the sorcery that occurs by means of ventriloquists for the deception of men. C
A And he who at that time, while consulting the oracle, had been the one to seek the ascent of his soul through their sorcery. But I, looking toward that Gospel chasm [b] which is fixed between the evil and the good, as the patriarch—or rather, the Lord of the patriarch—says, that it is impossible for those who are condemned to ascend to the rest of the righteous, or for the saints to cross over to the company of the wicked; I do not accept that such notions are true, having been taught to believe that only the Gospel is true.
Since, therefore, Samuel was great among the saints, and sorcery is an evil possession, I am not persuaded that Samuel, being established in such great repose of his own, crossed over that impassable chasm toward the ungodly, neither willingly nor against his will. For had he been against his will, he would not have endured being unable—that the demon could cross the chasm and, having come into the choir of the holy ones, move the saint from his place. And willingly he would not have done this, since he neither wished to be mingled with the wicked, nor was he able; for in one who is in good things, there is no change to those things that are contrary. But if one should grant that he even wished it, the nature of the chasm would not permit the passage. B
What, then, is it that we think regarding these things? The enemy of human nature is the common foe of all, to whom every device and endeavor is directed toward wounding man in those points that are vital. And what other such vital wound could be inflicted upon men, than to be cast off from God who gives life, and to desert voluntarily to the destruction of death? Since, therefore, there is a certain eagerness in the life of those who are lovers of the body to have some knowledge of future things—by which they hope either for the avoidance of evils or for guidance toward what they desire—it is for this reason that, so that men might not look toward God, the deceptive nature of the demons has devised many ways of foreknowledge: augury, divination by symbols, oracles, inspection of livers (haruspicy), necromancy, frenzies, obsessions, inspirations, and many other such things. C And whatever kind of foreknowledge any person might deem to be true due to some deception, that deceptive demon appears to confirm the deceived person's deluded opinion. Thus, the demon also arranges for the flight of an eagle to coincide with the hope of the one watching, and the fluttering of the liver, and the disturbance of the membranes caused by inflation, and the rolling of the eyes, and every observation noted according to the deception—the craftiness of the demon shows these to those who are being deceived, so that men, having departed from God, give heed to the care of the demons, by whom they believe such things are brought to pass.
Therefore, the way of the ventriloquists was also a kind of deception, whose sorcery was believed to be able to draw the souls of the departed back again to the life above. Saul, therefore, having fallen into despair of his salvation, because every foreigner had been moved against him with their entire host, and having come upon this idea of having Samuel suggest to him some way of salvation—the fact that... D
the demon A lurking within the ventriloquist, by whom the woman was customarily deceived, was fashioning shadow-like shapes in various forms before the woman’s eyes, while nothing of what the woman saw appeared to Saul. For as soon as she began her incantation and the phantoms and specters were already moving before the woman’s eyes, the demon schemed to gain belief for its apparitions, declaring the person of him who was hidden in the guise of his appearance, through which Saul was all the more astonished, neither the woman nor the sorcerous power being any longer perceived as false by him in the common guise. Since she said she saw gods ascending and a man standing upright in a mantle, how shall those who are servants B of the letter take their stand on the history? For if he who appeared was truly Samuel, then the gods seen by the sorceress were also truly gods; but Scripture calls demons gods: "For all the gods of the gentiles are demons." Is, then, the soul of Samuel among the demons? God forbid! Rather, the demon that was always obedient to the sorceress did indeed take along other spirits to deceive her and the woman, and Saul who was deceived through her; and it brought it about that the demons were considered gods by the ventriloquist, while it itself was fashioned into the desired form and mimicked his voice, and, as far as was possible by plausible conjecture from the circumstances, it pronounced an utterance that was expected as the outcome, as if in the form of a prophecy. C But the demon also convicted itself, against its will, by telling the truth when it said, "Tomorrow you and Jonathan [shall be] with me." For if it was truly Samuel, how could it be that he who was convicted of all wickedness would be with him? But it is clear that in place of Samuel, that wicked demon appeared, and when it said Saul would be with it, it did not lie. Yet if Scripture says, "And Samuel said," let not such words disturb the expert reader; but let him consider it an addition, [referring to] him who was thought to be Samuel. For we discover this custom in Scripture, in many places to describe what appears in place of the reality; as in the history of Balaam, now when he says, "I will hear what God says in me," and then after that, D when Balaam knew that it was pleasing to God that the Israelites should not be cursed, he no longer went as was his custom to meet the omens. For someone who is inconsiderate will think that even there the true God is speaking to Balaam. But the addition shows that Scripture thus named the god thought of by Balaam, not the God who is truly God. So therefore here too, the one who seemed to be Samuel mimicked the words of the true Samuel, with the demon ingeniously imitating prophecy from what was likely to happen. However, the matter concerning Elijah requires more contemplation, though not in the present question. For since he was ordered to drink water from the torrent, he was secretly being counseled by God, so that the pronouncement of the drought against the Israelites, uttered by the prophet, might be undone again through him. For he was given [command] to drink from the torrent alone, not [to partake] of the customary...
εἰκὸς A in the droughts drying up, and no other consolation for his thirst being found for the prophet, because he was forbidden to drink from elsewhere, it was necessary for him to ask for rain so that the water might not fail in the torrent. And the ministry of the things necessary for life is performed for the prophet by the ravens, God showing through these things to the prophet that there are many who have remained in the true worship of God, from which source the food was supplied to the prophet through the ravens; for they would not have brought bread defiled for him, or meat sacrificed to idols. So that through these things Elijah was led to slacken somewhat his anger against the impious, having learned through what was happening that there are many who look to God, whom it is not just to condemn together with the guilty. And the bread is served to him in the morning, and in the evening the meat. Perhaps what is happening holds through an enigma a zeal for a virtuous life, because it is necessary for those beginning to have the solid food of the more perfect, according to the voice of Paul, who says that solid food is for the perfect, for those who have their senses trained by practice. You will not be ignorant of what the veil of Moses looks toward if you converse with the Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians. B And as for the things you asked about the sacrifices, you will do well to examine the whole of Leviticus more diligently, and with greater constancy to consider generally the law therein. For thus a part will be understood along with the whole; for by itself this alone could not be clarified before the study of the whole. And in those questions concerning the opposing power, the solution is manifest: that the one who became a deserter was not simply an angel, but was stationed among the archangels. It is clear, therefore, that with the authority, the subordinate rank is indicated as well, so that the question as to how he was one and is yet with a multitude is resolved; for by his subordinate army deserting with him, the thing sought is made clear. The final chapter of the questions asked, I mean how the Spirit arrives before baptism, being in need of a broader examination and consideration, we shall, having encompassed it in a separate discourse, God granting, send to your reverence.
OF THE HOLY GREGORY, BISHOP OF NYSSA, THAT THERE ARE NOT THREE GODS; TO ABLABIUS.
A It is right for you, who in your inner man are vigorous with all strength, to struggle against the adversaries of the truth and not to shrink from labors, so that we, the fathers, might take delight in the noble sweats of our children (for such is what the law of nature suggests). But since, reversing the order, you send toward us the attacks of the darts with which those who oppose the truth strike, and ask that we, in our old age, should extinguish with the shield of faith these "coals of the waste" and the arrows sharpened by false knowledge, we accept the task. In doing so, we become an example of obedience to you, so that you yourself might offer us in return an equal recompense for similar commands, should we ever stir you up to such contests, O noble soldier of Christ, Ablabius.
This question that you have proposed to us is not small, nor is it of such a kind that, if it is not treated and examined fittingly and worthily, it will not bring with it no small harm. For it is inevitable, by the force of the theorem, according to the understanding that presents itself at first glance, that one must fall into one of two entirely disparate errors: either to say that there are three Gods (which is unlawful), B or else, by our testimony, not to bear witness to the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit—which is both impious and
A absurd. Furthermore, what is said by you is of this sort: Peter, and James, and John, since they are in one human nature, are called three men. And it is in no way absurd that those who are joined together according to nature, if they are many, should be enumerated in the plural from the name of the nature. If, therefore, custom permits this there, and no one forbids calling two "two," and those who are more than two "three," how is it that, when we acknowledge the three hypostases in mystical tenets, and conceive of no difference in nature among them, we are in a certain way at odds with our confession, declaring one divinity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, while forbidding the calling of them three gods? The argument, then, as I said before, is very difficult to handle. But for us, if we could find something by which the ambiguity of our mind might be bolstered, and our doubts no longer waver and hang upon an absurd dilemma, it would be a fine thing. If, however, our discourse should be shown to be too weak for the problem, we shall keep B the tradition that we received from the fathers through succession, firm and unshaken forever. But we shall seek from the Lord a discourse that defends the faith, and if it is discovered by any of those who are endowed with grace, we shall give thanks to him who has granted the grace; but if that does not fall to us, we shall nonetheless retain a stable and firm faith in those things that have been decreed and established.
Why, then, in our custom, when we have enumerated one by one those who are shown to exist in one and the same nature, do we use a plural name, saying "so many men," and not "all [are] one," whereas in the divine nature the logic C of the dogma excludes a multitude of gods, and while enumerating the hypostases, does not admit a plural signification? And indeed, it might seem to say something, if one were to tell the simpler sort what is ready to hand: that the logic of the dogma, avoiding the likeness of the multitude of gods celebrated by the Greeks, has refused to enumerate many gods, lest there be thought to be some community of dogmas [between us and them], if the Divine were to be numbered not singularly, but also plurally by us, following the likeness of the custom prevailing among them. And this—if it is said to the more sincere and simple—might perhaps seem to say something. But among others, who desire the other [side] of the proposition to remain firm and stable for themselves—either not to confess the divinity in the three, or to absolutely name them three who are participants and sharers of the same divinity—what we have said is not yet such D as to be able to generate and introduce any solution to the question.
Therefore, it is necessary to respond at greater length, as best we can by investigating the truth of the matter. For the question is not about something trivial or common. We say, therefore, that this is first of all a certain abuse of custom, that those who are not divided in nature are named and called in the plural by the very name of the nature, [saying] "Many men"; to which it is similar to say that there are "many human natures." And that these things are so, it is clear
A to us from hence. For when we call someone, we do not name him by his nature, lest the community of the name might cause some error, with each of those who hear thinking that it is he himself who has been called, because the naming is done not by a distinguishing appellation, but from the common name of nature. Rather, by uttering the proper name imposed upon him (I mean the one significative of the subject), we thus separate him from the multitude. So that although many have obtained the same nature—for example, disciples, or apostles, or martyrs—one is the man in them all. Since, as it has been said, "man" is not of the individual, but of the commonality of nature. For Luke is a man, or Stephen is a man; yet it is not the case that if anyone is a man, he is necessarily Luke or Stephen. But the account of the hypostases, on account of the properties considered in each one, admits of division, and is considered in number according to composition. B But nature is one, itself united with itself, and is an indivisible, strictly speaking, monad; it is not increased by addition, nor diminished by subtraction, but that which is, being one and one remaining, even if it appears to be in a multitude, is without division, continuous, whole, and perfect, and is not divided along with the individuals who are participants in it. And just as plebs, people, army, and assembly are all spoken of in the singular, yet each of these is understood to be in a multitude; so, according to the more exact and refined reasoning, man could also properly be called one, even if those who are exhibited in the same nature be a multitude. So that it would be much more correct to correct the erroneous custom among us and no longer extend the name of nature to a multitude, than, by serving custom, to transfer the error which lies hidden here even to divine dogma. But since the correction of custom is difficult (for who could be persuaded not to call them "many men" who are exhibited in the same nature? For in every matter custom is difficult to change), regarding this inner nature, if we do not oppose the prevailing custom, we shall not have sinned so greatly, since no harm exists from the incorrect use of names. C But regarding divine dogma, the indiscriminate and indifferent use of names is no longer equally safe and free from danger. For here, that which is "a little" is not a small thing.
Therefore, one God must be confessed by us according to the testimony of Scripture: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord," D even if the word of the Godhead permeates the holy Trinity. But I say this according to the account rendered regarding human nature: in which we have learned that we ought not to extend the appellation of nature with a plural character. But we must examine the very name of the Godhead more exactly, so that through the signification inherent in the word, some help might come to us for the declaration of the proposed question. Therefore, the word of the Godhead, while to the common people ...
A it seems to be applied to nature as a name particularly assigned to it, just as the heaven, or the sun, or anything else of the elements of the world is denoted by peculiar words signifying the subjects: so they say that in the supreme and divine nature also, the name "Godhead" is applied to the one who is declared by it as a kind of proper name. But we, following the instructions of the Scripture, have learned that it is unnameable and inexpressible; and we say that every name, whether it has been invented by human nature or handed down by the Scriptures, has the power of signifying something of those things which are understood concerning the divine nature, but does not contain the signification of the nature itself. And that these things are so, can be demonstrated without great difficulty. For as for the rest of the names which have been imposed upon creatures, one might find that they are applied to the subjects casually, without any original notation (which we call etymology), since we are content to signify the things by any words imposed upon them whatsoever, lest the knowledge of the things signified be confused for us. But of those things which have been put forth to lead us to the knowledge of God, each one contains in itself a peculiar meaning comprehended within, and you would not find any word among the more divine names that is devoid of some intellectual content. B From this, therefore, it is demonstrated that the divine nature itself is not denoted by any of those names, but that something of the things which are about it is indicated by what is said. For we say, for example, if the case requires, that the Godhead is incorruptible, or powerful, or whatever else it is the custom to say. But we find for each name a peculiar significance, which it is fitting to understand and to say concerning the divine nature, yet this significance does not signify that which the nature is according to essence. For whatever it is, it is incorruptible; but the notion and understanding of "incorruptible" is this: that what is, is not brought to corruption. Accordingly, when we have said "incorruptible," we have said what the nature does not suffer; but what that is which does not suffer corruption, we have not presented. In the same way, if we say "life-giving," when we have signified by the appellation that which it effects, we have not by that word indicated the [nature of the] producer itself, and the nature which causes the effect. C And in all other cases, for the same reason, from the signification which is inherent in the more august words, we find either things that forbid us to think of the divine nature what ought not to be thought, or things that teach us what it is fitting to think, but not things that contain the signification of the nature itself. Since, therefore, perceiving the various operations of the supreme power, from each of the operations known to us we adapt the appellations; and since we have supposed that this operation also is one, the supervisory and visual, and, as one might say, the contemplative, by which it observes all things and oversees all things, seeing the thoughts and penetrating with a contemplative power even to things that cannot be looked upon: D we [have supposed] that it is named "Godhead" [theotēs] from "seeing" [thea], and that our God is addressed as "viewer" [theatēs] both by custom and by the teaching of the Scriptures. But if it grants...
that A to look [theasasthai] is the same as to see [blepein], and that God, who oversees all things, is and is called the overseer [ephoron] of all, let one consider this activity, whether it belongs to one of the persons believed in the Holy Trinity, or whether this power pertains to all three. For if the interpretation of "Godhead" is true, and that visible things are "seeable" [theata], and that which sees [theōmenon] is called "God," then it could no longer reasonably be answered that any one of the persons in the Trinity is separated from such an appellation due to the signification inherent in the word. For Scripture by its own testimony attributes "seeing" equally to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. "Our protector, look, O God," says David. From this we learn the aspect of God, insofar as God is understood, to have the peculiar activity of seeing, from the fact that he said, "Look, O God." But Jesus also sees the thoughts of those who condemn him because he forgives the sins of men by his own authority. For, he says, "Jesus, seeing their thoughts." And concerning the Spirit, Peter says to Ananias: "Why has Satan filled your heart so that you should lie to the Holy Spirit?"—showing that the Holy Spirit was a truthful witness and arbiter of the things that Ananias had dared in secret, through whom even the things that were hidden were made manifest to Peter. For that man indeed became a thief, hiding from everyone, as he thought, and concealing his sin. But the Holy Spirit was at once in Peter, and perceived that man's mind, which was dragged toward greed, and through himself gave to Peter the ability to see the hidden things—which he evidently would not have done if he were sightless regarding secret things.
C But someone might say that the argument does not yet look toward what is being asked. For even if it were granted that the term "Godhead" is a common designation of nature, it would not follow that it is thereby proven that one ought not to say "gods"; on the contrary, from these very things we are actually forced to say "gods." For we find in human custom that not only those who have the same common nature, but even those who are of the same pursuit and office are not mentioned in the singular when the many are referred to. For this reason we call many people orators, and geometers, and farmers, and cobblers, and everything else in the same way. And if "Godhead" were a name of nature, it would be more fitting and appropriate, according to the reason previously given, to encompass the three hypostases in the singular and to call them one God, since nature is such that it cannot be cut or divided into parts. But since it has been affirmed by the things that have been said that the name of "Godhead" signifies an office and an activity, and not nature, the argument is turned in a way to the contrary sense from what is being asserted, so that for this reason it would be more necessary to say three gods, those considered under the same activity, just as they say three philosophers, or orators, or whatever else [one may choose].
when many are participants in the same thing. I have worked these things out more laboriously, introducing A the argument of the opponents, so that the doctrine might be more firmly fixed in us, being strengthened by the more strenuous objections. Therefore, the argument must be taken up again. Since it has been moderately demonstrated by us from the construction of the case that the term of divinity refers not to nature, but to activity, perhaps someone might reasonably suggest this as the cause why, among men, those who share the same activities are counted and named in the plural, while the divine is referred to in the singular as one God and one divinity, even if the three B hypostases are not distinguished by the meaning apparent in the divinity. For although among men there may be several of the same activity, each one works his assigned task by himself, sharing nothing in his individual activity with those who pursue the same goal. For even if they be many orators, the pursuit is one, and the same name is applied to the many; but those who practice it work each by himself: one orator speaks individually, and another speaks individually.
Therefore, among men, since the activity of each in the same pursuits is distinct, they are properly named as many, as each one of them is cut off from the others into his own limitation C according to the idiosyncrasy of his activity. But in regard to the divine nature, we have not learned that the Father does anything by himself, in which the Son does not also participate with him; or again, that the Son works anything peculiarly without the Spirit. But every activity that extends from God toward creation, and is named according to various concepts, originates from the Father, proceeds through the Son, and is completed in the Holy Spirit. For this reason, the name of the activity is not split among a multitude of agents, because the concern for some matter is not assigned to each and individualized; but whatever is done, whether reach- D ing to our providence, or toward the administration and constitution of the universe, is performed by the three, yet the things that are done are not three. Let us understand what is said by means of one specific thing: I mean by that very source of benefits, life, which all have obtained who have participated in this grace. Searching, therefore, for the source from which such a good has come to us, we find through the guidance of the Scriptures that it is from the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But because we posit three persons and names, we do not think that three lives have been given us, one provided separately by each of them; rather, the same life is energized by the Father, prepared by the Son, and depends on the will of the Spirit. Since, therefore, according to the likeness of what has been said, every activity is not performed divisibly according to the number of...
A the Hypostases, the Holy Trinity acts in every operation; but there is one movement and disposition of the good will, which is conducted and directed from the Father, through the Son, to the Spirit. For just as we do not call them three life-givers, those who provide one life, nor three good ones, those who are contemplated in the same goodness, nor do we declare all other things in the plural, so neither can we name them three Gods, those who exercise this divine—that is, B the inspectorial—virtue and activity, both in us and in every creature, jointly and inseparably through one another. For as we have learned from Scripture, which says concerning the God of all things that He judges all the earth, we declare Him the judge of all things through the Son. And again, having heard that the Father judges no one, we do not suppose that Scripture conflicts with itself. For He who judges the whole earth through the Son, to whom He has given all judgment, does this; and whatever is done through the Only-Begotten has its reference to the Father, so that He is both judge of all things and judges no one, because—as it has been said—He has given all judgment to the Son, and all the judgment of the Son is not alien to the Father’s will. And no one could reasonably say that there are two judges, or that one is deprived and despoiled of the virtue and power of judging; so also in the reasoning of the Godhead, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God. And the inspectorial and C spectatorial virtue, which we surely call the Godhead or Divinity, the Father exercises through the Only-Begotten, while the Son perfects every virtue in the Holy Spirit, and judges, as Isaiah says, in a spirit of judgment and a spirit of burning, and works according to the voice of the Gospel which He uttered toward the Jews. For He says: "If I, however, cast out demons by the Spirit of God,"—comprehending the whole kind of benefit by a part, through the unity concerning the efficacy. For in those who work through one another, the one name of the efficacy cannot be distributed and divided among many. For since the principle of the inspectorial and spectatorial power is one in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, as has been said previously, and proceeds—as it were—from a fountain from the Father, is exercised by the Son, and in the power of the Spirit perfects the grace; and no efficacy is divided according to the Hypostases, so as to be performed D peculiarly and separately by each Hypostasis without that which is considered one—but all providence and care, and the governance of all things, both those concerning the sensible creation and those concerning the supramundane nature, and that power which both preserves things, corrects faults, and teaches what is rightly done, is one and not three, which is indeed performed by the Holy Trinity, yet not divided in a threefold manner according to the number of the persons which are considered in the faith, so that each of the operations is considered to be of itself, or of the Father alone, or of the
Unigenite especially, or A separately through the Holy Spirit; yet the Spirit distributes blessings to each individually, as the Apostle says, "one and the same Spirit." Nor is the impulse of the good from the Spirit without a principle, but we find that the power which is previously conceived of this, or who the Unigenite God is, does all things, without whom nothing of things that exist comes into being; but even He Himself, again, the fountain of good things, takes His starting point from the Father’s will.
If, therefore, every good thing and name, depending on the power and counsel which is without beginning, is brought to completion and fulfillment in the power of the Spirit through the Unigenite God without distinction and without interval of time, nor is any delay in the movement of the divine purpose and destination from the Father through the Son to the Spirit occurring or conceived; and among good names and concepts is also the Deity; the name would not reasonably be diffused into a multitude, since the unity according to the operation forbids the plural enumeration. And just as one Savior of all men, especially of the faithful, has been named by the Apostle, and no one from this phrase says either that the Son does not save those who believe, or that salvation comes to those who partake without the Spirit; but the God who is over all becomes the Savior of all, the Son working salvation by the grace of the Spirit, and for this reason they are none the more called three Saviors by Scripture, even if salvation is acknowledged from the Holy Trinity: in the same way, neither are there three gods according to the rendered meaning of Deity, even if such a title applies to the Holy Trinity. C But to contend with those who object that one ought not to conceive of Deity as an operation does not seem to me to be entirely necessary, as far as the present argument is concerned. For we, believing the divine nature to be unlimited and incomprehensible, think of no limitation of it, but we maintain that the nature is to be conceived in every way in infinity. Now, that which is altogether infinite is not limited by one thing and not by another; but infinity escapes limitation in every respect. Therefore, that which is outside of a definition is not defined even by a name at all. So that if the concept of the unlimited remains regarding the divine nature, we say that the divine is above every name, and the Deity is one of the names. Therefore, it cannot be that the same thing is both a name and is considered to be above every name.
Nevertheless, if this should please the adversaries, that D the meaning is not of operation but of nature, we shall return to the argument which we posited at the beginning, that custom wrongly leads the name of nature to the meaning of a multitude, nor, according to the true account, does any increase or decrease accrue to the nature, when it is in more or fewer [persons].
A For only those things are counted by composition which are considered by their own circumscription; and circumscription is grasped by the surface of a body, by magnitude, place, and the difference in figure and color. But that which is considered outside of these escapes the circumscription that is produced by such things. That which is not circumscribed is not numbered, and that which is not numbered cannot be considered as a multitude. For example, even if we say that gold is divided into many forms and figures, we affirm that it is one and is called one; yet we name many coins and many staters, finding no redundancy in the nature of gold in the multitude of staters. Hence, "much gold" is also said when it is viewed as having greater weight, either in vessels or in coins, but they are not called "many golds" on account of the multitude of the matter—unless someone speaks this way, "many golden [coins]," such as Darics or staters, in which it is not the material but the coin and the currency that admit the signification of a multitude. For, properly speaking, it is not "golds," but "golden [pieces]" that it is fitting to say. Therefore, just as there are many golden staters but one gold, so also B there are many individuals shown in the human nature—such as Peter, James, and John—yet there is one man in them. And if Scripture broadens and extends the name to a plural signification when it says, "Men swear by the greater" (Heb. vi, 16), and "Sons of men" (Ps. iv, 3), and other things of this sort, we must know that it is using the convention of the prevailing language, which we call dialect, and is not laying down a law that it is necessary to use words in this way rather than in another; nor is it establishing some technical doctrine regarding words when it says these things, but it makes use of language according to the prevailing convention, looking only to this: that the discourse might be useful to those receiving it, without being at all precise about the diction, in those places where no harm to the meaning arises from the words.
C It would be a long task to collect from Scripture for the proof of what has been said those constructions that have the appearance of a solecism; but where there is danger that some part of the truth might suffer detriment, there the indiscriminate and indifferent usage, nor the negligence of discussing and examining, is found in the words of Scripture. For this reason, it allows "men" to be named in the plural, since no one, because of such a figure of speech, would slide into suspicion of a multitude of humanities or think that many human natures are signified because the name of the nature is expressed in the plural. But the word "God" it expresses with caution and observation through a singular figure, D taking care and avoiding this, that diverse natures might not be surreptitiously introduced into the divine essence through the plural signification of "gods." Therefore, it says, "The Lord God, the Lord is one" (Deut. vi, 4). But it also proclaims the Only-begotten God by the voice of deity, and does not dissolve the One into a dual signification, as if to name the Father and the Son two gods; even if e
A For God is proclaimed by the saints as one; yet the Father is God, and the Son is God. But the God is one in the same proclamation, because no difference of nature or operation is contemplated in the Godhead. For if the nature in the Holy Trinity were changed, according to the suspicious misconceptions of some who have been led astray, the number would consequently be extended into a multitude of gods, being divided along with the difference of the essence of the subjects. But since the divine, simple, and unchangeable nature rejects all difference of essence, as it is one, it does not admit into itself the meaning of a multitude. And just as the nature is called one, so also are all other things named in the singular: God, good, holy, Savior, just, judge, and whatever other of the titles proper to God is conceived, whether one says it looks to the nature or to the operation, we shall not dispute.
B But if anyone should slander our argument, as though by not admitting a difference of nature it constructs a certain commingling and confusion of the hypostases, we shall respond to such an accusation thus: that while we acknowledge the unchangeability of the nature, we do not deny the difference concerning the cause and what is caused, in which alone we perceive that one is distinguished from another, namely, that we believe the one to be the cause, and the other to be from the cause. And regarding that which is from the cause, we conceive of a further difference: for the one is immediately from the First, and the other is through that which is immediately from the First, so that the Begotten remains beyond doubt in the Son, and it is not doubted that the Spirit is from the Father—the intercession of the Son both preserving the property of the Only-Begotten for Him, and not excluding the Spirit from the natural relation to the Father. C Yet in saying "cause" and "what is from the cause," we do not signify nature by these names. For no one could offer the same account of cause and of nature, but we indicate the difference regarding *how* something is. For by stating that the one is from a cause and the other is without cause, we did not separate the nature by the account, but only demonstrated that the Son is not unbegotten, nor is the Father through generation. It is necessary first for us to believe *that* a thing is, and then to examine *how* that which is believed exists. Therefore, the account of *what a thing is* is one thing, and the account of *how it is* is another. Consequently, to say that something is unbegotten explains *how* it is, but what it is is not indicated by this word at the same time. D For if you had asked a farmer about a certain tree, whether it were planted or grew spontaneously, and he replied that the tree was either not planted or grew from planting, did he indicate its nature by the answer? By no means. But by saying how it is, he left the account of the nature uncertain and unexplained. Thus, even here, having learned that one is unbegotten, we have been taught how it is fitting to conceive of him, but we have not heard by the word *what* he is. Therefore, declaring such a difference in the Holy Trinity—that one is believed to be the cause and the other from the cause—we would no longer be accused of confounding the account of the hypostases in the commonality of the nature. Since, therefore, the hypostases of the Holy Trinity...
causæ ratio discernit, aliud quidem absque causa, aliud vero ex causa esse postulans: divina autem natura et variationis et divisionis per omnem considerationem expers esse deprehenditur : idcirco proprie una deitas, et unus Deus est, et alia omnia Deo convenientia nomina singulariter efferuntur. A
OF OUR HOLY FATHER GREGORY ON THE FAITH TO SIMPLICIUS, OR CONCERNING THE FATHER, THE SON, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT
(Translated by Laurentius Sifanus)
God commands through the Prophet that we should not consider any new god to be God, nor worship a strange god. A It is manifest that what is called "new" is that which is not from eternity; and, conversely, that which is not new is called "eternal." Therefore, he who does not believe that the Only-begotten God is from the Father from eternity does not deny that He is new; for what is not eternal is altogether new; and whatever is new is not God, according to what the Scripture says: "There shall be no new God in thee" (Ps. LXXX, 10). Therefore, he who says that there was a time when the Son was not, he denies His divinity. Again, He who says, "Thou shalt never worship a strange god" (Exod. XXXIV, 14), forbids the worship of a strange god; and a "strange god" is considered in distinction to our own God.
A Who, then, is our own God? Clearly, it is the true God. And who is the strange one? By all means, he who is of a nature alien to the true God. If, therefore, the true God is our own God, and the Only-begotten God is not of the nature of the true God, as the heretics say, then He is a strange God and not our own. But the Gospel says that "the sheep will not follow a stranger" (John X, 5). He who says that He is a created being will prove Him to be alien to the nature of the true God. What, then, do they do, those who say that He is a created being? Do they worship Him who is created, or no? For if they do not worship Him, they are following the Jews, denying the worship of Christ; but if they do worship Him, they are idolaters, for they are worshipping one who is strange to the true God. But it is equally impious either not to worship the Son or to worship a strange God. It is necessary, therefore, to declare the Son to be the true Son of the true Father, so that we may worship Him and not be condemned as those who worship a strange god. B And to those who cite what is in the Proverbs, "The Lord created me" (Prov. VIII, 22), and who imagine that by this they are bringing forward some firm argument to prove that the Founder and Creator of all things is a created being, it is appropriate to say that the Only-begotten God became many things for our sake. For, being the Word, He became flesh; and being God, He became man; and being incorporeal, He became a body; and furthermore, He became sin, and a curse, and a stone, and an axe, and bread, and a sheep, and a way, and a door, and a rock, and many such things, although He is none of these by nature, but became such by dispensation for our sake. C Just as, then, being the Word, He became flesh for our sake, and being God, He became man, so also, being Creator, He became a creature for our sake, since flesh is a created thing. As, therefore, He said through the prophet, "Thus says the Lord, who fashioned me from the womb to be His servant" (Isa. XLIX, 5), so also He said through Solomon, "The Lord created me as the beginning of His ways for His works" (Prov. VIII, 22). Therefore, even the One formed in the womb of the Virgin according to the word of the prophet is a servant, not the Lord—that is, the man according to the flesh in whom God was manifested—and there, the One created as the beginning of His ways is not God, but the man, D in whom God was manifested to us in order to renew again the way of human salvation which had been corrupted. Since, therefore, every creature is a slave of the Creator, according to the Prophet who thus speaks to God: "All things are your servants" (Ps. CXVIII, 91); but the Spirit offers freedom and adoption.
A We know two things concerning Christ: the one divine, the other human; the divine in essence, and the human in the economy. Consistently, we attest the eternal for His divinity, and we reckon the created to His human nature. For just as according to the prophet He was formed as a slave in the womb, so also according to Solomon He was manifested in the flesh through this servile creature. But when they say, "If He was, He was not begotten," and, "If He was begotten, He was not," let them be taught that it is not right to apply the properties of carnal birth to the divine nature. For bodies that were not, are begotten; but God makes things that were not to be; He does not Himself come into being from that which is not. Therefore, Paul also calls Him the "splendor of glory," so that we might be taught that just as the light from a lamp is from the nature of the one who gives off the light, and exists with it (for at once the lamp appeared, and the light that is from it shone forth as well), so the Apostle bids us understand here, too, that the Son is from the Father, and that the Father is never without the Son; for it is not possible for the glory to be without the splendor, just as it is not possible for the lamp to be without the splendor. It is manifest, moreover, that just as the existence of the splendor is testimony to the existence of that which is in glory (for if there were no glory, the splendor emitted from it would not be), so to say that the splendor was not is proof that the glory itself was not, at the time when the splendor was not; for it is impossible for the glory to be without the splendor. As, therefore, it is not possible in the case of the splendor to say, "If it was, it was not produced," and, "If it was produced, it was not," so it is vain and absurd to say these things concerning the Son, since the Son is the splendor. C But those who speak of a "lesser" and a "greater" in reference to the Son and the Father, let them learn from Paul not to measure things that no one can measure; for the Apostle says that the Son is the character [or stamp] of the Father's substance. It is clear, therefore, that just as great as the substance of the Father is, so great also is the character of the substance; for it is not possible for the character to be smaller than the substance that is contemplated in it. Indeed, the great John teaches the same things when he says: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God" (John I, 1). For from his having said that "in the beginning He was," and not "after the beginning," he showed that the beginning was never without the Word. And from his showing that the Word was with God, he signified the D subsistence of the Son in relation to the Father; for the Word is contemplated entirely with the entire God. For the Apostle proclaims the Lord not as a product of the will, but as the proper splendor and character of the very essence of the Father; as he is a character of the ring, etc.
it was with the Father, signified that nothing is lacking A to the Son in comparison to the Father; for the Word is considered together with the entire Godhead in its entirety. For if the Word were lacking in its own magnitude, so that it could not be present with the entire Godhead, it would be absolutely necessary to think that which exceeds the Word is without the Word. But indeed, the magnitude of the Word is considered together with the entire magnitude of God. Therefore, the distinction of greater and lesser has no place in divine dogmas. Let those who say that the begotten is by nature dissimilar to the unbegotten learn, from the example of Abel and Adam, not to speak foolishly. For Adam was not begotten according to the natural generation of men, B but Abel was begotten from Adam. Yet he who was not begotten is called unbegotten: but nothing prevented Adam from being a man because he was not begotten; nor did the birth of Abel make him anything other than human by nature, but both this one and that one were men, even if the one was begotten and the other existed without generation.
Therefore, even in divine dogmas, being unbegotten C or begotten does not produce a difference of nature; but just as in Adam and Abel there is one humanity, or human nature, so also in the Father and the Son there is one divinity. Regarding the Holy Spirit, those who blaspheme say the same things as they do about the Lord, that it too is created. But the Church, likewise, as it believes concerning the Son, so also believes concerning the Holy Spirit, that it is uncreated, and that all creation becomes good from participation in the super-existing good (but the Holy Spirit has no need of one who makes it good, for it is good by nature, D as the Scripture testifies), and that creation is led by the Spirit, and the Spirit bestows the leading; creation is led, and the Spirit leads. Those who posit unbegottenness and generation as natures of homonymous gods might perhaps alienate from one another by nature even Adam and Seth, because the one was not from flesh (for he was a molding), and the other was from Adam and Eve. What then? Are Eve and Seth not from the same Adam? For from whom else? Or are both begotten? By no means. But what? The one is a portion, the other is an offspring, and yet both are the same as one another.
A The creature undergoes, but the Spirit bestows; the creature receives consolation and exhortation, but the Spirit consoles and exhortates; the creature serves, but the Spirit liberates; the creature is taught wisdom, but the Spirit bestows the gift of wisdom; the creature partakes of the gifts, but the Spirit distributes them according to His own authority. For "all these worketh one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as He will" (1 Cor. XII, 11). And it is possible to find countless other proofs from the Scriptures that all the lofty and God-befitting names, which are applied by Scripture to the Father and the Son, these are also considered regarding the Holy Spirit: incorruptibility and integrity, blessedness, the good, the wise, the powerful, the just, holiness; every honorable name is spoken of the Holy Spirit just as it is spoken of the Father and of the Son, except for those by which the hypostases are clearly and distinctly B separated from one another without confusion. Now I say that neither is the Father called the Holy Spirit, nor the Son; but all other names by which the Father and the Son are called, these are also adapted by Scripture to the Holy Spirit.
Through this, therefore, we clearly perceive that the Holy Spirit is above nature: wherefore where the Father is understood and where the Son is understood, there the Holy Spirit is also understood; for the Father and the Son are above nature, which the sequence of the argument also confirms for the Holy Spirit. Whoever, therefore, places the Holy Spirit above nature consequently receives the correct and sound account and opinion. For he will confess one uncreated nature, which in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is contemplated. C But since, for the sake of proving, as they suppose, that the Holy Spirit is created, they bring forward the voice of the prophet to us, which says: "Who stablisheth the thunder, and createth spirit, and declareth unto men His Christ," it is fitting to understand this as meaning that the prophet says a different spirit is created in the firmness of the thunder, and not the Holy Spirit; for the mystical discourse calls the Gospel thunder. Those, therefore, in whom faith in the Gospel becomes firm and steadfast, these through faith pass over from being flesh to becoming spirit, just as the Lord says: "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" (John III, 6). D God, therefore, is He who, through the establishing of the evangelical voice for those who believe, makes the believer spirit. He solves the same objection taken from the place of the Prophet against the divinity of the Spirit, Athanasius in the epistle to Serapion and Ambrose in book II, *On the Holy Spirit*, chapter 7, who reads or brings forward this verse as it is in the Vatican edition and in the German Bibles: "Behold, I am He who stablisheth the thunder, and createth spirit," not as in the Complutensian and Plantinian: "Because the Lord is He who stablisheth the thunder."
"» for by that evangelic thunder He makes firm those who believe, He makes spirit of him who believes; and he who is born of the Spirit, and has become spirit through such thunder, announces Christ, just as the Apostle says, that no one can say: «"Lord Jesus Christ," except by the Holy Spirit.»
OF OUR HOLY FATHER GREGORY BISHOP OF NYSSA AGAINST FATE
S. P. N. GREGORII EPISCOPI NYSSENI CONTRA FATUM SEU DISPUTATIO CUM ETHNICO PHILOSOPHO.
(Incerto interprete.)C You surely remember what happened to me when, some time ago, that great mountain of unbelief D among you was—to use the evangelical word—removed into faith; when the wisest Eusebius, as befitted his gray hairs, took counsel in his old age—if it is right to call that the counsel of a man to consider...
A and not some divine assistance of Him who governs the human race for our benefit. Then indeed, struck as I was by the strangeness of the wonder—how such a man, formerly steeped in disbelief, surpassed with the greatness of faith the measure of his prior unbelief—when in the course of our conversation a discourse fell upon the questions involving fate, you commanded me, O holy and revered head, to recount by letter the discussion held with a certain philosopher in the great city of Constantine regarding this subject. Having therefore obtained a little leisure, I set forth for you in a simple and unadorned narrative, having compressed the account as much as possible, being especially careful not to let the discourse, by extending into the length of a history, exceed the proportions of a letter.
I spoke some words about our religion to a man who was, as could be conjectured from his remarks, not uneducated in secular philosophy, and I endeavored to persuade him to go over from Greek superstition to our doctrine. But since he was insistent upon maintaining that the choice of opinions is not in our power, but that human life hangs upon a certain necessity B without which nothing that happens in us could occur—and with this reasoning he would parry my argument, as if to say that if it were fated for him to become a Christian, he would become one even against our will, whereas if he were prevented by the necessity of fate, it would be impossible for him to adopt any device that would compel fate—when he said these things, I supposed, as was likely, that he was avoiding the learning of anything regarding the faith that lay deep within the Greek mindset, and that in this way he was parrying the logic of our argument. But since he did not cease, persisting in the same things, saying that everything is subjected to the necessity of fate, and that it is she who presides over existing things, and that all existing things bow to her turning—the measures of life, differences of character, choices of living, constructions of bodies, and inequalities of status; so that the one coming to power is ruler by fate, and he who serves is likewise under that same cause; and to be rich or poor, to enjoy health or suffer infirmity in body, and the short-lived and long-lived—all have the same cause. For he who has shared in life for a short time, and he who has prolonged his life over a long time, becomes such in each case not by his own impulse, but out of that necessity; and that both spontaneous and compelled death are assigned by none other than her, along with the manifold varieties of violent death occurring in accidents C or stranglings, or judicial sentencing, or even through impending plots. And he added to these the even more universal and comprehensive calamities: earthquakes, shipwrecks, inundations of waters, and misfortunes from fire, and all such kinds of evils, hanging them all upon that same cause, and he added further that not even the occupations of life fall under the judgment of the one who chooses them, but that all serve the power of fate: whether they apply themselves to philosophy, or to eloquence, or cultivate fields, or engage in navigation, or establish a married or a celibate life. And he said that the same cause applies to virtue and vice, so that by that immutable allotment one man...
is destined to adhere to a higher life, living in poverty and freedom, while another is destined to violate sepulchers, or practice piracy, or live extravagantly, or be effeminated by the life of a companion. Having gone through all such things, he thought he had provided a strong reason for not accepting our argument, namely, that it is not in our power to B choose whatever we wish, but that we must await that necessity which, having given the signal for such an impulse, makes it necessary for one to assent to the argument, even if unwilling; and that without it, even if someone desires it greatly, it is impossible for it to come to pass.
I, when he had gone through these and similar things, asked him if he supposed that there is some God who possesses power over all things, called by the name of Fate, by whose will he believed that all things were administered. He, having accused me of great ignorance in my question, said, "You do not seem to me to have perceived anything of celestial matters; otherwise you would surely have known the power of Fate, and how the power of things happening according to an immutable chain and connection was discovered."
I, being astonished at the novelty of his discourse, and requesting that he teach me a little more clearly whether the Fate which his mind fashioned was some voluntary, free, self-governing, and supreme power, or if he supposed it to be something else different from that, he repeated the same discourse: "He," he said, "who has observed the motion of the heavenly bodies, C the zodiacal circle, and its twelve segments, which are seen in it, separated from each other by the division of the constellations therein, and has understood the power of each of the stars, what strength each has individually by nature, and what their conjunction effects from the particular tempering of one with another, by the property of the power of each being mixed by approach to the other, and separated by distance; and again what the base of a lower one effects, and what the eclipse of an upper one during passage, and again its restoration, and the various formations of those coming together and departing, described in triangular or scalene D figures, or forming any other figures contemplated by geometry; he who has understood these and such things will know what is signified by the name of Fate, namely, that which is necessarily brought about by a certain immutable chain according to the particular conjunction of the stars, is interpreted by the name of Fate."
But since this also again puzzled me—for I understood nothing of what was said, as I was not instructed in that discipline—I asked him to make clear to me the meaning of the word in such a way that I might be able to attain the notion of Fate. For that the celestial circles are situated one within another, and are moved with a motion contrary to the rotation of the firmament or the constant stars, and that all these revolve within the zodiacal circle—these things, I said, I have also heard from others, and accordingly that the splendor of the luminaries now advances and now recedes according to the revolution proper to each heaven, and that a higher star or planet is removed from our sight by the lower one approaching and being directly opposed to the inferior, and whatever could properly be inferred from this, whether they formed some shape, as when a circle encompasses the space which it contains with its motion, so that a star in its transit either in a straight line
relative to what is above it, or moves obliquely in its passage, and whether the period of each of these occurs in a short time or a longer one, according to the magnitude of the proportion of each of the circles, the revolution necessarily moving either faster or slower.
A I chose to leave all these things and the like in silence, only asking that the power of Fate be clearly unveiled for me: whether by the name of Fate one understands some God, the ruler of this universe, endowed with supreme power, holding all things in his hand and governing them according to his will; or whether he posits the power of Fate as the servant of some other higher power, so that it too is in some way made subject to another Fate, as a partner in the administration of a more excellent cause. For if it were to be believed that it holds sway over all things, reason would lead us to think that nothing supervenes above it. But if he were to assert that Fate follows the motion of the stars, and only thus governs all things by a certain violent necessity, it would have been safer to attribute this omnipotent power to the primary cause rather than to the secondary, and to call the stars the causes of these things, or the revolution of the firmament, or the circles that are seen within it, or indeed the circle inscribed obliquely upon the heavens. For if one were to concede, by way of hypothesis, that these are not in motion, nor through eternal revolution do they come to be one within another or apart from one another, but always maintain the same configuration, B Fate would not exist. If, therefore, the motion of the stars gives birth to Fate, then it is surely in vain that it is thought to hold sway over the rest, since it is a servant to a superior cause, and would not exist at all if motion did not exist. "But our argument does not tend toward that," says that philosopher, "as if Fate were some nature in itself, but since it is a certain mutual harmony and conjunction of things, and the universe coheres in every part, just as in one body a certain concord is seen of all members sympathizing with each other, and since the upper portion of the world is more excellent, therefore the lower things are governed together with the primary portion, and accommodate themselves to its sign as if to its nod, with the heavenly motion, since necessarily and in many ways, as has been said, they are moved together by the power of each star. As in a medicine, the qualities of the species, mixed together by a certain technical method, bring about something else in that common tempering, and not what each one was before the mixture; C so also, the properties of the celestial powers being contemplated in different ways, the manifold interweaving of the different properties, occurring according to their approaches and distances, the manifold
A differences of the things being accomplished in life take effect, as if from some pouring out B flowing steadily from there unto us. For this reason, even among those who philosophize more carefully about such things, the predictions of future events are not mistaken. For just as the expert in medicine, if a hot or narcotic drug be mixed with one that is salty or astringent, predicts the property that will come into being from the mixture of different natures, and what it produces, and up to what point it will have strength, and for whom it becomes lethal and for whom it becomes an antidote; so too he who with diligence has applied himself to those above, and has understood the nature of each of the things which exist, will know what the power from their specific interweaving will produce. But this pouring out does not behave the same way even for a brief moment toward itself. But because the motion of the stars interweaving with one another is always unsettled, that B pouring out is necessarily also changed along with it through the continuity of the difference in motion; always being mixed together with the variety of the motion, and changing its own energies along with the motion of the stars. Of this, each one among those being brought into life, having grabbed the portion which fell to him in that infinitesimal point of time, becomes that which the property of that part indicated and accomplished. For it is absolutely necessary that, just as in a mold the form of the carving is imprinted upon the wax placed into it, so also the life of a man, into whatever portion of the pouring-out power from the motion of the stars he chances to fall, be molded according to the property of that part, and become that which the portion of the pouring-out, which he grabbed immediately as he began his life, contained within itself. Being once imprinted according to the power seen there, he is necessarily molded in the property of his own life: doing or suffering those things whose beginnings or causes the first encounter with that starry pouring out laid down.
I, however, when these things were being said, "Will you not cease," I said to him, "from recounting to me trifling words and nonsense, and from trying to establish that indivisible part of a momentary participation, producing as the cause of all things within us that which, as you say, flows unto us from above, while you neither say whether this is animate and a participant in will and choice, nor are you able to show by what account the inanimate and unsubstantial rules over animate things, having no individual impulse from nature, but instead you make of this inanimate and non-voluntary, unstable and transient, and indivisible, and unsubstantial thing a kind of tyrant or master over all counsel and foresight from reasoning, C and discipline and diligence, and the practices according to virtue, setting it against Reason? You hang the constitution and governance of existing things upon that power, and do you not see to what absurdities the argument is carried? For if that fortuitous pouring out has such power as to govern not by following, but by preceding the constitution of things, it will certainly precede the one being born, and will no longer be a servant to the chances of one already born. For here it is uncertain D what is prior to what, since they move toward the point in time equally and at the same time. For both the man is moved by a certain motion even before he is brought into the light—namely, that of natural decrease and increase, which are indeed types of motion—and the star is moved, and does not remain quiet even before the man sp-
A draws breath; B and the coincidence of those who meet one another equally by way of motion makes the judgment of which precedes the other difficult. For the stars are moved by their circles, and the man is moved while progressing through nature. But if the conjunction of both occurs in one part of time, what is the difference between them, so that one should think the one is more the cause than the other? For if through the stars the man [were brought forth], nature would always be flowing through generation, showing not even a momentary interruption in human succession. But if there are many intervals between the things that occur, it is clearly proven that human generation does not follow the motion of the stars. For the one is always in motion, but the other is not always being born; but this happens in its own sequence, and that again is moved uniquely on its own, with no necessity binding together what are separated by nature. But if your argument C intends that we should believe the cause of all things that happen in human life is situated in that particle of time, consider how many myriads of masters and tyrants every day and night likewise produces according to those minute and indivisible divisions of time; as you say, divided into twenty-four hours of night and day, with each hour divided into sixty parts, and again each of these parts being broken down into the same number; and as those of you who delve into the more subtle observation of such things say, that each of these so-called parts is again thinned out by a division of the same number. Therefore, the total derived from these—of those instantaneous gods, or masters, or tyrants, or whatever one should call them—is more than twenty-one myriads. Now, if one hour provides us with so many myriads of parts, twenty-four, multiplied proportionately to the one, will produce infinite myriads of fates. But you confirm that each of these is endowed with inevitable power; from which it follows that there is none of them that is not active. For you would not say that it is the property of power not to be active, since all power is perceived D in action. The effects of the power are therefore also equal; wherefore it is necessary that for as many segments of time, there must also be born just as many humans in the single hours. Furthermore, if equal power is to be assigned to every fate, all will be equally kings, long-lived, powerful, fortunate, happy, and will acquire whatever else is counted among goods. For if there is a defect in any of them, it must certainly be judged as something more feeble and imperfect. For you would not attribute equal power to one who has achieved great things and one who has achieved small. For example, one has exceeded his hundredth year, an old man, wealthy, happy, having experienced propitious fortune in all things; surrounded by grandchildren, joyful at the sight of great-grandchildren, healthy, unharmed, honored, free from pain, abounding in wealth, and—if there is anything else precious in this life—blessed in all respects. Another, as soon as he has emerged from the mother's womb, is suffocated. For many infants are indeed born of harlots or adulterers, whom the mothers themselves, as they are base-born, kill with their own hands, and suppress the shame by slaughter. What power of fate shines forth in these? Or can it not grant a long life to those just as it does to the others? If you assert
A that your argument deems it necessary to attribute power to it, then its power should appear equally in all beings. For it will not hold that it has power in one respect and is unable in another, if it is to be truly understood as existing in power; now, power is known through its effects. Consequently, life will manifest no anomaly, as all would show forth for themselves the highest measure of felicity, since, according to your argument, all are subject to fate, and you maintain that it can always do everything. B If, therefore, this fate can do all things and always, it will be able to do all things in all men. Yet there are many and varied differences in life among men, regarding honors and wealth, the measures of time, the temperaments of bodies, and everything through which one is named fortunate or wretched. Does the inequality of effects not clearly demonstrate that the lot or fate imagined by your argument is not capable of all things? For if we deem a long life to be a work of power, then a short life is certainly of powerlessness. Therefore, one must postulate that some of the things of fate are weak and others powerful. Since the short-lived is contrary to the long-lived, C each of these must necessarily arise through contrary principles. For no one would attribute both beatitude and misery to the same cause; but if we obtain the former through power, the latter will exist entirely through the lack of power. Miserable condition indeed consists precisely in the fact that one cannot attain beatitude. Since, however, more people live a miserable life, the powerlessness of fate is shown to be greater and more effective than its power. Where, then, is that unconquered, omnipotent, and ineluctable necessity, so that we might think the authority of all human affairs is placed in it, which we have shown to be weak in most cases D through the sequence of logic? But you will say that it wills this for this person, and does not will the same for another; yet it can do what it wills in both cases. You will therefore certainly add the cause for the difference between these free choices. Here is one man, and here is another; you see no difference in nature between them, neither in this one nor in the other as regards the good or the bad originating from preference. But this one, having arrived a little earlier in time, emerged from the maternal womb, as nature had happened to ready him, while that one did so after him, either immediately or a little later. Yet after this, not the same life is allotted to both; but the one, perhaps, is fortunate, or a king, if it so happens, wrapped in gold and purple at his very birth; the other, the son of some pauper or slave, is not even covered in tattered rags by those who gave him birth. What, then, did he commit as a fault, whether having anticipated or having delayed slightly in time, not by his own design but by the motion of nature, that for this reason he should be allotted a dishonored life? What defense will you bring forth here for that mistress of yours? Where is justice, where is piety, where is divinity? Will you say that fate cares for none of these, nor has any regard for virtue, nor provides for any good man? If it is not concerned with these, it will surely be occupied with the contrary pursuits, because it is established that what abhors the good is conjoined with evil. Neither this, you will say, nor that
A does it care for? Then you assert that it is inanimate and without purpose, and insensible to both the good and the worse. But if it possesses neither soul nor purpose, nor is considered to have an independent subsistence, how is it attested among you to have such power that it should govern animals capable of purpose, and that the non-subsistent should rule over those that do subsist, the thing lacking life over the participants of life, the inanimate over the animate, the thing without purpose over those who live by purpose, the thing incapable of virtue over those who pursue virtue—in general, that the non-being should rule over being? For in what is the subsistence of this much-vaunted name found? It is not an animal, it is not seen within a description, it is not considered God. For how could it be God, which does not look toward virtue and justice? But the one that is none of these things, what is it? B Indeed, it seems that you call "fate" that which is the always-present moment of time; for time extends itself to every motion, whether of rivers, or of stars, or of men. And it makes no difference whether you designate the indivisible segments of any passing instant of time by the motion of a river, or of a ship driven by the force of the winds, or of men traveling, or of moving stars. For there is one boundary of motion for all things that move from place to place, namely, a transition from that in which they are, to that in which they are not. But if neither the motion of rivers, nor of ships, nor the walking of men, which mark out the intervals of time, produces fate: why do you fashion fate to come into being from the points of time arising from the motion of the stars? Why do you call the other motions "times" or "indicators of time," but maintain C that fate arises from the motion of the stars? Why are men not born at every single moment? For I shall repeat the earlier argument. Since the same cause is responsible for a man being happy or miserable, and for his existing at all; if the stars are the causes of the events that follow a man's birth, they are necessarily also the causes of his birth itself; but if they are not the causes of the latter, they are certainly not of the former. But that the stars are not the causes of birth is evident also from this, that the birth of men does not correspond at all to the continuously flowing time, but is interrupted; whereas those fates are born from the flowing time and the eternal motion of the stars without any interval that could be perceived by either sense or intellect. What, therefore, is this fate? Whether it be something one and general, or many things finely cut into sections of time, I have not yet been able to gather by reason. You say the stars are moved; we, in turn, put forward D the motion of rivers. Yet those are always in motion, and these likewise perpetually; those in time, and these not outside of time; and in the former we cannot find the beginning of motion, nor in the latter. The reasoning for those and for these is therefore equal and identical. Nor could anyone assign a contrary motion to these, since water naturally flows always from a higher place to a lower one. Since these things are so, either grant that the motion of rivers also produces certain fates, or we will not grant such power to the motion of the stars. But that power, he says, belongs to Aries, Taurus, and any planet, such that if someone is born under one of them, whether some wandering star alone, or with others in
period, is whirled around by the circle, the conjunction of this power shapes the life of the person born at that very hour. O what vain babbling! Is it because this animal is broken in by the yoke that you call the Taurus B a slave? And because it bears wool, you call the Aries a benefactor? And if someone is born under either of these, or another, being removed from the middle, you say that by a mixing of properties a certain destiny falls to those being born. What then? Tell me, is the Taurus of his own will a beast of burden? And do you say the Aries rejoices to be shorn? Does the power that resides in the one that orbits the highest pole C possess the faculty of doing harm and causing numbness, or the heat that belongs to Mars, or whatever is in any other star, is it voluntary or involuntary? If they are in wickedness because they are willing, and become harmful by choice, anyone who says this openly condemns them as wretched, because while they have a better lot in their own power, they take pleasure in the worse one. But if they are not such as you think of their own volition, but are necessarily such as they were made, then some other higher fate has determined their nature and the properties of their virtues. From which it follows that other stars superior to these must be sought, together with the motion they claim for themselves, the conjunction of which by a certain fatal necessity has made the Taurus a slave, or the Aries harmful, or the Cancer headless, or whatever else the sophists trifle about regarding each of these. And if these things that appear to us are such by the necessity of some fate, certainly the argument will also have to conceive another necessary cause for that superior necessity of such a constitution, and another for that one, and again another for that, and so on with the argument proceeding to infinity, nowhere stopping, but forging D fate upon fate, lot upon lot, and necessity upon necessity.
As I was thus arguing, and by such reasonings was driving the discourse to an absurdity, the philosopher with whom I was debating interrupted my discourse, which was flowing onwards in a continuous stream, and said, "Why do you struggle against the force of evidence? Why do you not follow those who have investigated the truth of things through numbers, and having accurately known the time, predict the whole subsequent life of the person born, their age, character, habits, dangerous circumstances, marriages, and procreation of children, or on the contrary, childlessness, diseases, disgraces, brevity of life, and the evils of poverty? Since these things are accurately foretold, and the outcome is a witness to the truth, what remaining reason have you why you do not believe that the necessity of fate exists?" Then I, having promised that I would a little later bring forward the causes of such predictions, asked,
A whether the cause of such outcomes is irrational and a matter of chance, or if they find some rationale for this observation, so that what comes to pass does not happen outside the bounds of probability. "And indeed," he said, "there is also a rationale underlying what comes to pass. For when, from the specific configuration of qualities in the stars, such a constitution of body is established for one being born, he who has perceived the theory of celestial phenomena with accuracy also foresaw the constitution that would be formed for the one born, and that he would be able to sustain life up to such-and-such a measure—a longer one, B indeed, in the case of a stronger constitution of body, but shorter, on the other hand, in the case of a more sickly one."
Then I, smiling at what had been said, "I had failed to realize," I said to him, "that you considered the teachings of fate to be the offspring of Galen and Hippocrates and those like them. For they, too, setting aside the motion of the stars, predict the future by making conjectures from the physical facts provided: as when they predict death because the eyes are hollow, the temples sunken, and the forehead skin is taut and barely adhering to the flesh. And yet, for many who are sick and expecting death at any moment, the medical art has, as it were, unraveled and pulled back the threads of this fate; just as the account of Plato recorded concerning the trainer Herodicus, that by means of gymnastic experience, he was unable to restore the body to perfect health, since the disease was fatal, yet by his cleverness he always warded off impending death, C not securing life, but delaying death for himself. Whence he even lasted into old age, having devised a way to avoid dying by a long death. Therefore, not even according to this argument is the necessity of fate found by you to be unbreakable, if some art is found that relaxes that necessity." But he said, "Such a line of reasoning does not dissolve the proof concerning fate derived from predictions. For it could be that this, too, is foretold by those who have contemplated the motion of the heavens with accuracy; so that for some death is foretold as certain, and for others as doubtful."
But I said, "The discourse concerning necessity does not assert this. For the discourse regarding what is contingent—that it might happen in one way or another—is one thing, and the discourse regarding what is immutable—which cannot be applied to contingent things—is another; but rather, it is definitely this or the other. But to waver in one's expectation toward both outcomes is far removed from the discourses of necessity." Nevertheless, I asked him on what foundation the prediction of future events relied? "Why," said he, "do you ask me about this, even now, when you have already heard it from me so often? There are certain powers D proper to the stars, which, according to the infinite, diverse conjunctions arising from their perpetual motion, produce infinite and various faculties. What, then, is the configuration of the stars at that time, and the power of the hour into which the birth of each one happens to fall, such must his life turn out to be, and the matter is not otherwise." "What then," I said, "of the calamities of war, earthquakes, the ruin of cities, the shipwrecks of great freighters, inundations, conflagrations, gaps in the earth, and other kinds of destruction of this sort? How do these agree with the prediction? How many things have happened in our memory and in the memory of our fathers—such as the flood in the age of Noah, the burning of Sodom, the drowning of the Egyptian army in the Red Sea,
and the massacres of the foreigners that followed, those ten thousand murders; or the sudden death in a short space of time of the Israelite people, shattered in many tens of thousands; or the one hundred and eighty-five thousand Assyrians, dead in a single moment of time, and the stories of the evils that followed thereafter, occurring in Median and Hellenic disasters, in great naval and land battles, and all such things of which memory becomes the teacher for those who follow? Even if we were to pass over all these things, enough evidence for what is being said could be found in the events that have occurred in our own time. For who does not know the great metropolis of Bithynia, numbered among the most eminent of cities; who is ignorant of the broad and wide-reaching Thrace—how the former was utterly destroyed by war, and the latter by earthquake and fire, in an instant of time? How many boys there, how many infants, young men, old men, free and slave, victors and vanquished, rich, poor, healthy, and sick, all perished in a single moment of time? The fire took them all equally; their houses became their tombs. Where are the conjunctions of those stars, which predetermine different forms of life for men? Were they all born under the same configuration of the stars? Was the birth-star of all of them Cancer, and did it destine that fate for everyone? Yet the diversity—I would almost say infinite—of ages and honors is testimony that they were not all born at one time. Therefore, if everyone is born at a different time, yet nonetheless meets with a similar calamity, do these events not convict the prediction of flimsiness and inconsistency? C But, he says, there is a fate for a ship, and for a city, and for a whole nation, which from the first position of the stars determines the entire state that follows, and essentially assists the containing and higher cause in governing the things contained and inferior. What, then, I ask, is the birth of ships? What is that of a city? From what beginning do we observe the origin of a nation? The woodcutter fells the timber, he who trades in wood sells it, the shipwright buys the material for money, and divides the craft among the workmen. For one man cuts the wood into planks with a saw; another fashions the keel; another applies his efforts to erecting the decks; this one builds the prow, that one the stern; the mast is the care of one, the yard of another; some weave the flax into ropes, the helmsman attends to the rudder; some fashion the decks and the sail, some even adorn the ship with paintings. Others smear the joints with pitch, and construct the bilge in the middle. Nor do they all do their work at the same time, but one man does it now, another a little later; that one has already brought his work to an end, while this one is still laboring. In what time, therefore, will the wise ones place the fate of the ship? Is it when the wood is bought, or cut, or handled, or when the iron is
A applied, or when it is joined with nails? For since there are many and diverse efforts exerted in shipbuilding, and they are not established at one and the same time, what time will they assign to fate, so that, having received the necessity of sinking, it may perish along with those sailing in it? What, then, would you say concerning cities? At what point do they think fate gains control over them? Is it when some plan for founding the city occurs to those who are diligent? Or when they consider the natural advantages of the place, or when they sketch out the design, or when they already apply the iron to the work, or deposit the stones, or gather the materials? What among these is the beginning of its formation? And what would you say concerning a nation that has been worn away by the calamities of war? What fate, or from where, taking its beginning against them, has slaughtered some and enslaved others through captivity? B How is it that Hannibal, or Caesar, or even Alexander of Macedon—beside whom they happened to be fighting—wrought an equality of fate for all, being so much stronger than that necessity that they compelled all things to be gathered into the same measures of evil? But that the notion of cities having their fates determined by the concurrence of stars during earthquakes is far from likely, anyone can perceive from the fact that it is known to all that such affections of the earth occur not only in inhabited places, but also in uninhabited ones. If anyone has either seen for himself or heard from others the Sangaean mountain situated in the borders of Bithynia, he will find that what I say is true: that the entire ridge has subsided into the road, and provides a terrible spectacle for those passing by. Of a similar kind also are the affections of Paphlagonia, where even the dwellings of men have often been convulsed C in these ways. And therefore, when such movements arise, that place is deserted by its inhabitants. What need is there to speak in detail of the Cypriots, the Pisidians, and the Achaeans, among whom there are many proofs of such things? But I will say what was the reason we made mention of them: that all such things are affections of the earth. If, therefore, it happens that a human habitation is also found in that place, they too necessarily participate in that misfortune of the place; but if it is empty of inhabitants, the misfortune of the place inflicts no damage upon men. What, then, is the necessity of fate, when both inhabited and uninhabited places are equally subject to such affections? For if they could demonstrate that the earth was made bit by bit, and not all together, that prating might perhaps bear some appearance of truth—that by D a certain conjunction of the stars connected to a certain part of the earth, this or that necessarily happens. But since all things embrace one another—heaven, earth, sea—and, as Moses says, the earth was even fashioned prior to the stars with their movement, why do they refer the cause of things happening in certain parts of the earth to the motion of the stars? Wherefore, since the earth is coeval with the stars and does not derive from them any cause for either collapsing or enduring, and since such affections arise in certain parts of it: this is surely not the necessity of fate, but some other cause peculiar to those places for these occurrences. When, therefore, such
A calamities happen to the earth, and those who inhabit it are overwhelmed together in the downfall, what will they say who worship fate and hold the opinion that the motion of the stars presides over all things? Why does it fall to the infant, the youth, the man, the father, the old man, the noble, the patrician, the hireling, the prisoner? Why does neither the time of birth nor any distinction of rank save them from being involved in a common disaster?
Furthermore, who is unaware that the ultimate of all pollutions is to have intercourse with one's daughter, or to violate one's mother? Now, if this were to happen by some necessity of fate, it would certainly be practiced also in our own lands; but since this abomination is committed only among the nation of the Persians and those who have been taught their customs, it is clear from the consequence that the choice of each individual is his destiny and fate, choosing by his own authority what seems best to him.
B Furthermore, so that they may not even have this to say—that in certain places there are found to be peculiar motions of the stars, and that because of this some marry their mothers, others murder guests and eat human flesh, because a certain position of the stars exerts its power privately upon them (although such speech is altogether that of unlearned men, and of those who do not contemplate the nature of things, but imagine that the spaces of the earth are marked off by certain portions of the heavens—for thus, if the constitution of the celestial bodies depended on the condition of those below, earthly things would be found to be more authoritative than the heavenly)—yet I will add this argument as well, by which their false opinion may be further refuted. Almost all parts of the earth have been inhabited by the race of the Jews—Eastern, Southern, Mediterranean, Western, Northern—and almost all nations have dwelt promiscuously with the Jews. How then did no necessity of the stars have power over any of them to grant to any of that nation an injury-free life, but rather, despite the infinite configurations of the stars, as each born being happens to be met, he remains in the same state, with his nature suffering the injury at the determined period of days?
Then he says: "These things have not yet been examined by us—by what reason the matters established by laws among many nations avoid the necessity from the stars; yet the prediction of future events would be no small proof that what is fated for each is inevitable. For how could anyone not be deceived in predicting how many years this or that person will live, and what events will befall him throughout life, unless some necessity had decreed for him that these things would surely be so, such that they cannot fail to happen, and had made it plain to the predictor D through a certain observation of numbers?"
I said, indeed, that it is better in such matters to seem ignorant than to provide cause for laughter to those who are unlearned in our doctrines; nevertheless, disregarding what is ridiculously cast against us, I will set forth the whole cause of these things in as few words as I can. It is, I say, the property of human...
the nature of the enemy of the human race, a certain power adverse to the good nature. Of this matter, six hundred evident arguments can be brought forward, but I do not consider it necessary to examine in order at the present time all those things by which one might be able to create belief. Since, therefore, to the divine nature every good—whether thought of or named—is appropriate, from which proceeds life, light, truth, justice, wisdom, immortality, and whatever good a benevolent mind can conceive; since, I say, such is the divine nature, and such are its gifts, we conclude from every kind A that there is a certain adverse power opposed to every good. This power, therefore, instead of life brings death, instead of truth brings fraud, and instead of each of the better things it brings upon men the wickedness that is the opposite of them; for that is pleasing to it which becomes destructive to human nature. But just as those who practice poisoning often make the lethal drug sweet with honey, not with the intention to delight the palate of the one eating, but so that its lethal nature might not be perceived, so too that death-dealing nature, since it has in mind to induce man to fall away from the good nature, puts on the forms of good things and covers its frauds, so that miserable mortals, intent upon that and thinking it to be good, may not be held by any desire for what is truly good by nature. But how does it happen that someone, through some fraud, professes that he will predict something of the future? So also do fraudulent demons act in the inspection of the liver, in auguries, in omens, in the evocation of spirits, and in prophecies sought from the nativity, although each of these signifies the future not in the same, but in a different way. Therefore, as he who makes a conjecture from an inspected liver, or from some omen, or from the sight of a flying bird, does not promise that he is predicting these things through the necessity of fate; so, since there is a single cause for this vaticination—namely, fraud and the works of demons—because something that has been predicted is sometimes accomplished (if indeed it is accomplished at all), the power of fate is not thereby demonstrated, as though every kind of vaticination were to be said B to have its power from fate. Thus, one fate would consist of dreams, another from palpitations, another from auguries, or omens, or certain symbols. But if in these things nothing prevents vaticination from being without fate, and if some fortuitous events happen to agree with a prediction, this is not enough to prove that such things do not easily come to pass. Although neither are the divinations of those who profess that art certain and indubitable, but they provide themselves with many loopholes, so that if a contrary event convicts them of vanity, they may be able to escape by bringing forward reasons which they have premeditated. From this it is concluded that there is no knowledge on their part, except that they cast the blame of the error upon the one who erred in calculating the hour, and thus they formulate predictions that are ambiguous and prepared for either outcome, so that whatever happens, it may appear to have been predicted. For often he who has considered the hour of nativity has predicted to someone that something exceptional and above others will happen: but when he afterwards has fallen into extreme evils and calamities of no ordinary sort, the prophet has affirmed that he did not err from his prediction; C just as [to those who hold] the things regarding us in derision, [shortly after] D of the [power] concerning the deceptive operation of the demons,
A but they prepare for themselves many ways of retreat at the outcome, if the argument should be refuted to the contrary; and they concoct a certain technical excuse for themselves to those who are concerned with these matters, so that the failure may not be attributed to the science, in the case of one who has erred, but rather to the observation made at the time. Their predictions, for the most part, are oblique and become ambiguous, oscillating towards the twofold nature of the outcomes, so that whatever happens, it may seem to have been foretold. For often, one who has observed the hour of birth has revealed something manifest and superior to other men. Then, when an extraordinary catastrophe has befallen this person, he has insisted that he did not err at all in his prediction. For he had, beyond other men, a greater share in calamities; and the history of our own time is a witness to this. For when Valens the emperor was holding the government of the Romans, some such deceit instigated him toward the subversion of his rule. And he rushed forward, having as provision for his audacity the proclamation of those who cast nativities; but the end of the undertaking was such that he who was known for the highest offices became more famous because of the magnitude of his disaster; and this was considered by many to be a cooperation of genethlialogy, because the magnitude of the calamity happened to the man in place of the magnitude of his honors.
But I do not consider the fact that predictions regarding these things are mistaken to be a great proof that the account of fate does not hold true; rather, it is because the deceptive power of the demons cunningly contrives its prognostications by many other devices as well. For indeed, there is a kind of prophetic water that induces confusion of mind and madness in those who have tasted it, and a spirit coming from below through some aperture, which, if it be received into a woman’s belly, causes the belly to swell, and brings about an alienation of the intellect and a distraction of the stable mind. B All these things seem, to those who are deceived by error, to be divine and prophetic; and even those who conjecture the future from the liver, or from certain signs of fire, or from the flight of birds, do not attribute the power of the prediction to fate, but refer such things to a certain inspiration of demons.
Wherefore I say that either there is no divination at all, because predictions are refuted by many contradictions, or if someone proves it to be predicting some of the things that are to come—which we grasp in the case of every other instance of successful prediction—we believe that we must think the same in this sort of divination. For in all these matters the reasoning is equal: that while they err in most cases, in some they seem to have attained the truth of future events through divination. And the purpose, both by the deceptive nature of the demons and through this and every [other] device, is accomplished in the same way: for the demons strive above all else to estrange man from looking toward God, and from preparing for himself from Him his share of good things. Therefore, to be persuaded, as those easily deceived are, that the things pertaining to life do not depend upon the divine will, but upon such and such a configuration of the stars and the power flowing therefrom, looks most of all towards the goal of the harmful nature of the demons. If, then, it is pleasing to the demons to estrange man from God, and this error regarding these matters estranges him, it is clearly proven to be a certain demonic operation, which by deceit leads astray those who think that all power resides in these things, and who do not turn their eyes toward the almighty power of God. C D