the nature of the enemy of the human race, a certain power adverse to the good nature. Of this matter, six hundred evident arguments can be brought forward, but I do not consider it necessary to examine in order at the present time all those things by which one might be able to create belief. Since, therefore, to the divine nature every good—whether thought of or named—is appropriate, from which proceeds life, light, truth, justice, wisdom, immortality, and whatever good a benevolent mind can conceive; since, I say, such is the divine nature, and such are its gifts, we conclude from every kind A that there is a certain adverse power opposed to every good. This power, therefore, instead of life brings death, instead of truth brings fraud, and instead of each of the better things it brings upon men the wickedness that is the opposite of them; for that is pleasing to it which becomes destructive to human nature. But just as those who practice poisoning often make the lethal drug sweet with honey, not with the intention to delight the palate of the one eating, but so that its lethal nature might not be perceived, so too that death-dealing nature, since it has in mind to induce man to fall away from the good nature, puts on the forms of good things and covers its frauds, so that miserable mortals, intent upon that and thinking it to be good, may not be held by any desire for what is truly good by nature. But how does it happen that someone, through some fraud, professes that he will predict something of the future? So also do fraudulent demons act in the inspection of the liver, in auguries, in omens, in the evocation of spirits, and in prophecies sought from the nativity, although each of these signifies the future not in the same, but in a different way. Therefore, as he who makes a conjecture from an inspected liver, or from some omen, or from the sight of a flying bird, does not promise that he is predicting these things through the necessity of fate; so, since there is a single cause for this vaticination—namely, fraud and the works of demons—because something that has been predicted is sometimes accomplished (if indeed it is accomplished at all), the power of fate is not thereby demonstrated, as though every kind of vaticination were to be said B to have its power from fate. Thus, one fate would consist of dreams, another from palpitations, another from auguries, or omens, or certain symbols. But if in these things nothing prevents vaticination from being without fate, and if some fortuitous events happen to agree with a prediction, this is not enough to prove that such things do not easily come to pass. Although neither are the divinations of those who profess that art certain and indubitable, but they provide themselves with many loopholes, so that if a contrary event convicts them of vanity, they may be able to escape by bringing forward reasons which they have premeditated. From this it is concluded that there is no knowledge on their part, except that they cast the blame of the error upon the one who erred in calculating the hour, and thus they formulate predictions that are ambiguous and prepared for either outcome, so that whatever happens, it may appear to have been predicted. For often he who has considered the hour of nativity has predicted to someone that something exceptional and above others will happen: but when he afterwards has fallen into extreme evils and calamities of no ordinary sort, the prophet has affirmed that he did not err from his prediction; C just as [to those who hold] the things regarding us in derision, [shortly after] D of the [power] concerning the deceptive operation of the demons,
A but they prepare for themselves many ways of retreat at the outcome, if the argument should be refuted to the contrary; and they concoct a certain technical excuse for themselves to those who are concerned with these matters, so that the failure may not be attributed to the science, in the case of one who has erred, but rather to the observation made at the time. Their predictions, for the most part, are oblique and become ambiguous, oscillating towards the twofold nature of the outcomes, so that whatever happens, it may seem to have been foretold. For often, one who has observed the hour of birth has revealed something manifest and superior to other men. Then, when an extraordinary catastrophe has befallen this person, he has insisted that he did not err at all in his prediction. For he had, beyond other men, a greater share in calamities; and the history of our own time is a witness to this. For when Valens the emperor was holding the government of the Romans, some such deceit instigated him toward the subversion of his rule. And he rushed forward, having as provision for his audacity the proclamation of those who cast nativities; but the end of the undertaking was such that he who was known for the highest offices became more famous because of the magnitude of his disaster; and this was considered by many to be a cooperation of genethlialogy, because the magnitude of the calamity happened to the man in place of the magnitude of his honors.
But I do not consider the fact that predictions regarding these things are mistaken to be a great proof that the account of fate does not hold true; rather, it is because the deceptive power of the demons cunningly contrives its prognostications by many other devices as well. For indeed, there is a kind of prophetic water that induces confusion of mind and madness in those who have tasted it, and a spirit coming from below through some aperture, which, if it be received into a woman’s belly, causes the belly to swell, and brings about an alienation of the intellect and a distraction of the stable mind. B All these things seem, to those who are deceived by error, to be divine and prophetic; and even those who conjecture the future from the liver, or from certain signs of fire, or from the flight of birds, do not attribute the power of the prediction to fate, but refer such things to a certain inspiration of demons.
Wherefore I say that either there is no divination at all, because predictions are refuted by many contradictions, or if someone proves it to be predicting some of the things that are to come—which we grasp in the case of every other instance of successful prediction—we believe that we must think the same in this sort of divination. For in all these matters the reasoning is equal: that while they err in most cases, in some they seem to have attained the truth of future events through divination. And the purpose, both by the deceptive nature of the demons and through this and every [other] device, is accomplished in the same way: for the demons strive above all else to estrange man from looking toward God, and from preparing for himself from Him his share of good things. Therefore, to be persuaded, as those easily deceived are, that the things pertaining to life do not depend upon the divine will, but upon such and such a configuration of the stars and the power flowing therefrom, looks most of all towards the goal of the harmful nature of the demons. If, then, it is pleasing to the demons to estrange man from God, and this error regarding these matters estranges him, it is clearly proven to be a certain demonic operation, which by deceit leads astray those who think that all power resides in these things, and who do not turn their eyes toward the almighty power of God. C D
BY THE SAME GREGORY: TO THE GREEKS, FROM COMMON CONCEPTS
A If the name "God" were significant of persons, when we say "three persons," we would by necessity have to say "three gods." But if "God" is a name significant of essence, then by confessing one essence of the holy Trinity, we rightly glorify one God, because for one substance there is one name, which is "God." Therefore, consistently with both the substance and the name, God is one, and not three. For we do not say "God and God and God," as we say "the Father and the Son and the holy Spirit," connecting the conjunction "and" to the names that signify the persons, because they are not the same persons, but rather diverse, and differing from one another according to the meaning of the names.
But to the name "God," which is significant of the essence because of a certain property inherent in it, we do not join the conjunction "and," so as to say "God and God and God," since the essence which the persons are, and which the name "God" signifies, is the same; and therefore God himself is the same person. And the same being is never connected to himself.
But if we say "the Father is God," and "the Son is God," and "the holy Spirit is God," or "God the Father, and God the Son, and God the holy Spirit," we link the conjunction "and" in our thought to the names of the persons—namely, to the Father, to the Son, and to the holy Spirit—so that it becomes "the Father, the Son, and the holy Spirit," which is to say "person, and person, and person." Hence also there are three persons.
But the name "God" is predicated absolutely and in the same way of each of the persons without the conjunction "and," so that we cannot say "God and God and God." Rather, we understand the name as being spoken three times in word B because of the underlying persons, but presented in the second and third repetition without the conjunction "and," because it is not the case that there is one God and another God. For it is not in respect of the difference that the Father maintains with the Son that the Father is God. For if that were the case, the Son would not be God; for if the Father is God because he is the Father, then because the Son is not the Father, the Son would not be God. But if the Son is God, it is not because he is the Son. Similarly, the Father is not God because he is the Father, but because he is such an essence, the Father is one, and the Son C is God. And for what reason is the Father God, and the Son God, and the holy Spirit God? It is not...
A because, with the essence not being divided in each of the persons, such that there are not three essences according to the persons; it is clear that neither will the name that signifies the essence be divided, nor will God be divided into three gods. But just as the Father is essence, the Son is essence, and the holy Spirit is essence, and yet they are not three essences, so also the Father is God, the Son is God, and the holy Spirit is God, and yet they are not three gods. For there is one and the same God, since there is also one and the same essence; even if each of the persons is said to be both "essential" and God. For if it were necessary to say that there are three essences of the Father, the Son, and the holy Spirit, because each of the persons is an essence, then that would be illogical. For we do not say that Peter, Paul, and Barnabas are three essences; but saying that there is one essence, of which the Father, the Son, and the holy Spirit consist, we consequently say there is one God, even though we believe that each of the persons is both "essential" and God. For just as we say there are three persons because the Father differs from the Son and from the holy Spirit, so too, since they do not differ in B essence, but there is an identity of the persons in this regard, there will also necessarily be an identity according to the name of God. For this name is indicative of the essence—not presenting what its essence is, since it is incomprehensible, but being taken from a certain property belonging to it, it indicates it. For it is a property of the eternal essence, which the Father, the Son, and the holy Spirit are, to oversee, behold, and know all things, even those that are hidden. Hence the name "God," when used properly, takes its meaning and signifies that essence. Since, therefore, there exists one such essence, and one name that signifies it (I mean, "God"), there will strictly be one God in accordance with the rationale of the essence; because the name "God" does not signify the person, but the essence. For if "God" signified the person, then only one of the persons would be called God, to whom such a name would be applied; just as, therefore, the Father alone is called Father, because this name has the power of signifying a person.
If, however, someone should say that we call Peter, Paul, and Barnabas three essences, meaning C particular—that is, individual—essences (for this is the most proper way to speak), because in saying "particular essence," that is, "individual essence," we wish to signify nothing else but the individual, which is the person. But the name "God" does not follow the persons, as has been demonstrated. What, then, must be said in response to the fact that we call Peter, Paul, and Barnabas three humans? It is not because they are persons, for persons are not signified by the name that signifies the common essence. Nor is the so-called particular, or individual, essence the same thing as the person; why, then, do we call them three humans, even though they exist as one essence, of which "human" is the significative term? If we do not say this because of the persons, nor because we call it a particular or individual essence, we say it because we use this term catachrestically and not strictly, due to a certain custom that has prevailed D for necessary reasons.
A For these are the facts: the definition of man is not always perceived in the same individuals, or persons. For when the former die, other individuals are established in their place, and again, while the same ones often remain, certain others are added; so that it is perceived in some B or in others, sometimes in more, sometimes in fewer. And by the subtraction, departure from life, and birth of the individuals in whom the definition of man is perceived, we are compelled to speak of many men and few, through the change and alteration of persons, having expelled common custom and reason itself of substance, so that in a certain way substances are counted along with the persons.
In the holy Trinity, however, nothing of the kind ever happens, because the same persons—and not others at different times—are spoken of, and they are and remain the same in the same way; nor does the Trinity itself admit any increase, so as to advance to a tetrad, nor any diminution, so as to be reduced to a dyad. For neither is something generated or does it proceed from the Father C or from one of the persons such that the Trinity ever becomes a tetrad, nor does one of these three persons ever die, so that the Trinity becomes a dyad. Since no addition or diminution, no change or alteration ever occurs to the three persons, it would be absurd to speak of three Gods in reference to the three persons.
Again, not all persons of man have their existence from the same person in an unbroken continuity; but one is from this one, another from that one, into many and diverse ones, with causes existing beside the caused. But in the holy Trinity, the matter is not so; for one and the same is the person of the Father, from whom the Son is generated and the Holy Spirit proceeds. Therefore, we rightly call Him one D God, who is the one Author of those things that depend on Him as their cause; since He also co-exists with them. For the persons of the Godhead are not divided from one another by time, nor by place, nor by will or counsel, nor by purpose, nor by operation, nor by any affection of the sort that is perceived in men; but only by the fact that the Father is the Father, and not the Son; and the Son is the Son, and not the Father; and similarly, the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son. Therefore, no necessity compels us to say that the three persons are three gods, just as we call many persons of men many men for the reasons stated, and not according to a necessary logic, because it is impossible for the same thing by itself to be one and many. For Peter and Paul and Barnabas are, according to "man," one man, and according to this very thing, insofar as they are man, they cannot be many. However, they are called many men catachrestically and not strictly; but what is said catachrestically should by no means be preferred, by those who are wise, to what is said strictly. Therefore, it is by no means to be professed that there are three Gods in the three persons of the divine essence, insofar as they are God; but one and the same is God, because of the identity of the essence of which "God" is significant, as we have said.
A If someone should say, "And how does Scripture enumerate three men as an abundance?" let him see that Scripture, in handing down the Son and the Holy Spirit—and in handing down God the Word and God not the Word, that is, God the Father and God the Holy Spirit—refuses altogether to speak of three gods, considering polytheism an impiety, and preaching one God throughout; neither confounding the persons B nor dividing the divinity, but rather preserving the identity of the divinity in the properties of the hypostases, or as three persons. If he who speaks such things wishes to learn the truth, let him know that Scripture speaks of three, even though it knows the whole human race to be one man, according to the text, "Man, as grass are his days" [Ps. 102:15], and like a good nurse, it considers human beings as its own children; and sometimes it lisps with them, and uses some of the same names that they do, not failing to overlook that which is perfect. For the same [Scripture], when it says that God has ears and eyes and the rest of the parts of a body, does not transmit a doctrine of this kind, defining the Divine as composite; but it sets forth its decrees in the manner mentioned, by a transference from our own [properties], for the sake of the advancement of those who are not able to ascend directly to incorporeal things. By saying that God is Spirit, it instructs us that His simple and illimitable nature is present everywhere that anyone might go. In the same way, by speaking of "three men" out of custom, it ensures that what is common and in the usage of the many might not appear strange. And it calls Him one for the sake of precision, so that it might not deviate from the end that is contemplated in the nature of things. And we suppose the former to be a condescension, made for the usefulness and benefit of the more immature; but we define the latter as a decree set forth for the confirmation and tradition of perfection. But again, some say that, just as we say "Hypostasis of hypostasis is hypostasis," there is no difference, and yet not on account of this are all hypostases one hypostasis; and just as "essence of essence" is no different, and yet not on account of this are all essences one essence; so we might say, "God of God" is no different, and yet not on account of this are the three hypostases—of which "God" is predicated—one God. And again, saying "Man of man" is no different, we do not abolish the fact that there are three men: Peter, Paul, and Barnabas. For essence differs from essence, and not C as essence, but as such-and-such an essence; and hypostasis from hypostasis [differs] as such-and-such a hypostasis, and man from man as such-and-such a man. And again, God from God as such-and-such a God; but "such-and-such" is wont to be said of two or more. D But these are their arguments; we, however, will show the whole thing to be a sophism, using those very things that have been said, and demonstrating that one ought not to say "such a God" and "such a God," or "such a man" and "such a man," but rather "such an hypostasis of God" and "such an hypostasis of man." For we rightly say there are many hypostases of the one man, and three hypostases of the one God. Therefore, that which is called "such" intends to distinguish something from something [else] that shares in that name to which "such" is added; for example, we call man "such" an animal, wishing to distinguish him from a horse,