OF THE SAME GREGORY: ON THE SOUL. DISCOURSE I.
A Almost all the ancients differ in their account regarding the power and nature of the soul. For Democritus and Epicurus, and the whole system of the Stoic philosophers, declare the soul to be a body; and even these people, who assert that the soul is a body, disagree among themselves about its essence. For the Stoics say that it is a spirit of an igneous force and divinely inspired; Critias says it is blood; the philosopher Hippon says water; Democritus says fire; for he says that rounded figures of atoms, when joined together, form fire and air, and thus constitute the soul. Heraclitus maintains that the soul of the universe is a vapor from moist elements; but that the soul which is in living beings consists of external evaporations and that which is implanted within itself, being of the same kind.
B Again, among those who say that the soul is incorporeal, there has arisen an infinite disagreement: some say it is a substance and immortal, while others say it is incorporeal, but not a substance, nor indeed immortal. For Thales was the first to say that the soul is ever-moving and self-moving. Pythagoras called it a number moving itself. Plato called it an intellectual substance, having motion from itself according to a harmonic number. Aristotle called it the first actuality of a natural, organic body having life potentially. Dinarchus called it a harmony of the four elements; for he does not mean a harmony consisting of musical sounds, but he intends the harmonic blending and concinnity of the hot, moist, cold, and dry C elements in the body. It is also evident from these that some of them declare the soul to be a substance, while Aristotle and Dinarchus consider it to be something substantial. Furthermore, some think that there is one and the same soul of all things, fragmented into individuals and again converging into itself, as the Manichaeans and certain others do. Others think there are many souls, and different in kind; others, that there is one and many. Therefore it is necessary to extend our discourse, arguing against so many opinions. Wherefore, in general, against all those who say the soul is a body, the things said by Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus, and by Numenius the Pythagorean will suffice; and these are as follows:
A Bodies, by their nature, are changeable and entirely dissoluble, and divisible to infinity, with nothing immutable remaining in them; they require an agent that binds, gathers, and, as it were, constrains and keeps them together, which we call soul. If, therefore, the soul is a body—whatever kind it might be, even if extremely fine—what, then, is the agent that keeps that one together? For it has been shown that every body requires something that holds it together; and thus one proceeds to infinity until we arrive at what is incorporeal.
But if they should say, as the Stoics do, that there is a certain "tonic" motion around bodies, moving at once both inward and outward—and that the motion outward is productive of magnitudes and qualities, while that inward is the cause of union and essence—they must be questioned: Since every motion originates from some faculty, what is this faculty, and in what does its essence consist? If this power is itself some kind of matter, we shall use these same arguments again. If it is not matter, but is "material" (in the sense of inherent in matter), then that which is material is something other than matter itself. For that which participates in matter is called material. What, then, is that which participates in matter; is it matter itself, or is it immaterial? If it is matter, how can it be "material" and yet not be matter? If it is not matter, then it is immaterial. But if it is immaterial, it is not a body, for a body is material.
If they say that bodies possess three dimensions, and that the soul, extending through the whole body, also possesses three dimensions, and that therefore we must necessarily call it a body—because every body is defined by three dimensions—the reply is that not everything which has three dimensions is a body. For place and quality, though incorporeal in themselves, are viewed per accidens in bulk and quantity. Thus, B in its own nature, the soul is without dimensions, but per accidens, by being in that which has three dimensions, it is observed as having three dimensions along with it.
Furthermore, everything is moved either from the outside or from the inside. If from the outside, it must necessarily be inanimate. If from the inside, it is animate. If the soul is a body: if it is moved from without, it is inanimate; if from within, it is animate. But it is absurd to call the soul both animate and inanimate. Therefore, the soul is not a body.
Moreover, if the soul is nourished, it is nourished by something incorporeal; for learning nourishes it. But no body is nourished by something incorporeal; therefore, the soul is not a body.
C Xenocrates argued thus: if the soul is not nourished, it is not a body. These arguments apply generally against all those who say the soul is a body, but specifically against those who imagine the soul to be blood or breath, since when the breath or blood is separated, the animal is overcome by death. One must not say what some of those who think the soul to be a certain "part" have written, alleging: "Whenever some blood flows away, a part of the soul flows away." Such talk is trivial and empty; for in things constituted of similar parts, the remaining part is identical to the whole. Water, certainly, be it much or very little, is the same; and so are silver and gold, and all things whose parts do not differ from one another in essence. Thus, then, the...
remaining blood, how much soever it be, is the soul, if indeed soul is blood. But it should rather be said that if this is soul—that upon whose removal the animal dies—then phlegm too is soul, and both kinds of bile; for whichever of these is lacking, it brings an end and destruction to the animal. The same applies to the liver, and the brain, and the heart, and the stomach, and the kidneys, and the intestines, and many other parts; for upon the removal of which of these would the animal not die? Besides, there are many creatures that are bloodless but yet animate, such as cartilaginous fish A without scales, and the soft-bodied, like cuttlefish and calamaries, and sea-snails, and all the testaceans, and the soft-shelled creatures, such as the locust, the crab, and the crayfish. If, therefore, they are animate but bloodless, it is clear that the soul is not blood.
As for those who say that water is the soul, because water is seen to animate all things, and it is impossible to live without water: there are many objections to this. For one cannot live without food, and so all foods generally must be spoken of as the soul; furthermore, there are many animals that do not drink, as is recorded of certain eagles, and the partridge too can live without drinking. But why water rather than air? For it is possible to abstain from water for a long time, whereas to abstain from breathing air is not possible even for the shortest moment. But neither is air the soul. For many things live without breathing air, such as all insects—for example, bees, wasps, and ants—and the bloodless creatures, and many of the sea-dwellers, and all things whatsoever that do not possess a lung. For nothing that does not have a lung breathes air, and conversely, nothing that breathes air lacks a lung B.
Since there are also certain not-to-be-despised arguments attributed to Cleanthes the Stoic and Chrysippus, their solutions must also be set forth, just as the disciples of Plato resolved them. Cleanthes weaves the following syllogism: "We are born similar to our parents not only according to the body, but also according to the soul, in passions, in character, in dispositions. But similarities and dissimilarities belong to body, not to the incorporeal; therefore, the soul is a body."
But first of all, the universal is established from particular cases; and furthermore, the claim that what is similar cannot be incorporeal is false. We say that numbers are similar whose sides are proportional, such as six and twenty-four. For the sides of the number six are two and three; and of twenty-four, C four and six. And there is a proportion of two to four, and of three to six; for they are considered to be in a double ratio. For four is double of two, and six is double of three; yet numbers are incorporeal. And figures are similar to figures, such as have equal angles and sides proportional about the equal angles; and they also admit that figure itself is incorporeal. Furthermore, just as the proper characteristic of quantity is the equal and the unequal, so too is the similar and the dissimilar the proper characteristic of quality; but quality is incorporeal; therefore, the incorporeal is also similar to the incorporeal. Moreover, Cleanthes says, no incorporeal thing suffers along with a body, nor does a body suffer along with an incorporeal thing, but rather body with body; but the soul suffers along with the body when it is diseased, and when it is cut, and D
the body is tormented with the soul; for when the soul blushes and is ashamed, the body becomes red, and when it is afraid, it becomes pale; therefore, the soul is a body.
C There is also another of the assumptions that is false, composed according to a pre-conception—that which says, "Nothing incorporeal suffers along with a body." For what if this belongs to the soul alone? Just as if someone were to say, "No animal moves its upper jaw," yet the crocodile does move its upper jaw. Behold, for the crocodile is both an animal and moves its upper jaw. In the same way, whenever he says that "nothing incorporeal suffers along with a body," he is assuming in his statement the very point that is being sought. But if someone were to suppose it true that "nothing incorporeal suffers along with a body," the conclusion drawn is not something agreed upon, namely that the soul suffers along with the body when it is sick and being cut. For it is a matter of debate whether it is the body alone that feels pain, having received sensation from the soul, while the soul itself remains impassive, or whether it also suffers along with the body. The former opinion prevails more among the more reputable authorities, and no one draws logical conclusions from disputed premises, but rather from those that are agreed upon; and it is proved more than sufficiently that some incorporeal things also suffer along with bodies. Qualities, therefore, being incorporeal, while bodies suffer, they themselves also suffer along with them, undergoing an alteration along with the body in both its decay and its generation. Chrysippus says that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and nothing incorporeal is separated from a body. For an incorporeal thing does not even touch a body; but the soul both touches and is separated from the body; therefore, the soul is not incorporeal. Of these statements, that death is a separation of the soul from the body is true; but that an incorporeal thing does not touch a body is false when stated generally, though it is true in the case of the soul. It is false because a line, being incorporeal, touches a body and is separated from it; likewise also whiteness. But in the case of the soul, it is true. For the soul does not touch the body. For if it touched it, it would clearly be adjacent to it; and if this were the case, it would not be adjacent to it in its entirety. For it is impossible for one body to be adjacent to another body in its entirety to its entirety; and thus the animal would not be entirely animate. So if it touches, the soul will be a body, and the animal will not be entirely animate. But if the whole is animate, the soul neither touches nor is a body; yet the animal is entirely animate; therefore it neither touches nor is a body, and it is separated, being incorporeal. That the soul is not a body is therefore clear from what has been said; but that it is not devoid of substance, must be discussed next.
B Since Dinarchus also defined the soul as a harmony, and Simias, opposing Socrates, said that the soul was a harmony, asserting that it was like a harmony and the body like a lyre, one must set forth the solutions to these views which are contained in Plato’s *Phaedo*.
A One of these is from the points previously proven by him; for it has been proven that learning is recollection. Having taken this then as granted, he constructs the argument thus: If learning is recollection, our soul existed before it came to be in the human form; but if it is a harmony, it did not exist before, but came to be later, once the body had been fashioned. For every composite thing has no other state than that of the things from which it is composed. For a harmony is a certain communion of the things composed, and a composite nature, and B nothing prevents it from not preceding those things from which it was composed, but rather from following them. Therefore, that which asserts that disciplines are recollections is in conflict with the proposition that says the soul is a harmony; but the proposition concerning recollection is true; therefore, it is false that the soul is a harmony. Furthermore, the soul opposes the body and holds a commanding principle, inasmuch as it rules over it; but a harmony neither leads nor opposes. Therefore, the soul is not a harmony. Furthermore, harmony admits of "more" and "less" in terms of harmony; for harmony consists in slacking and tension; but the *logos* (the rational principle or ratio) of a harmony does not; for it is impossible for a *logos* to have "more" and "less," whereas this is found in harmony. For if a high-pitched tone and a low-pitched tone are blended, and then they are relaxed, they preserve the same ratio in the magnitude of the sounds, but it undergoes a change according to the tension of the musical arrangement, becoming more or less intense. But a soul is not "more" or "less" a soul; therefore, the soul is not a harmony. Furthermore, the soul admits of virtue and vice, but harmony does not admit of harmony and disharmony; therefore, the soul is not a harmony. Furthermore, the soul, in its reception of opposites, is a substance and a subject, whereas harmony is a quality, and is in a subject; but substance is distinct from quality; therefore, the soul is distinct from harmony. It is not absurd, however, for the soul to participate in harmony, but it is not on this account a harmony; for just because it participates in virtue, the soul is not therefore virtue itself. Galen, however, does not assert anything, but protests in his demonstrative discourse that he has affirmed nothing about the soul; yet it is probable, from the things he says, that he favors the view that the soul is a temperament. For he establishes a commentary from the sayings of Hippocrates, that the difference in characters tends toward this. If this is so, it is clear that he opines that the soul is mortal—not the whole soul, but only the irrational soul of man; but concerning the rational soul, he is ambiguous, speaking thus: That the temperament of the body cannot be the soul is manifest from this: Every body, C both animate and inanimate, is tempered from the four elements. For the mixture of these produces bodies. If, therefore, the temperament of the body is the soul, there will be nothing inanimate, as the argument has shown. For thus the temperament of the body will be the soul. Again, if the body has a temperament, and every body has a soul, and if every body is a soul, then no body would be inanimate; therefore, neither stone, nor wood, nor iron, nor anything else would be inanimate. If, however, he does not say that every temperament of a body in general is a soul, but only a certain kind, one must ask: what kind of temperament is it that makes a living creature and holds the place of a soul? For whatever kind of temperament he might name, such D
we will find also in inanimate things. For since A there are nine temperaments, as he himself showed in his work *On Temperament*—eight of the ill-tempered ones, and one of the well-tempered (according to the well-tempered, he says, man is compounded, though not every man, but he who is of the median temperament; whereas according to the other ill-tempers, other animals are found, each according to its species, with the intensifications and remissions of the degree)—even in inanimate things there are temperaments, with intensification and remission, just as he himself again proved in the case of simple bodies.
Furthermore, the soul is a temperament. But temperaments change according to ages, seasons, and diets; therefore, the soul changes. And if it changes, we do not have the same soul, but rather, according to the temperament, sometimes we have that of a lion, sometimes of a sheep, at other times of some other creature, which is absurd.
Moreover, a temperament does not oppose the desires of the body, but actually cooperates with them. For it is this which moves [the body]; but the soul opposes [the desires]. Therefore, the soul is not a temperament. Furthermore, if the soul is a temperament, and a temperament is a quality, and a quality comes and goes without the destruction of the underlying subject, then the soul would be separated without the destruction of the underlying subject; but this is not true. Therefore, the soul is not a temperament, nor is it a quality. For certainly, no one would say that one of the contraries is naturally present in an animal—as heat is in fire, for this is unchangeable—but a temperament is seen to be subject to change. Indeed, it is they themselves who, through the medical art, change temperaments. Furthermore, the qualities of every body are perceptible, but the soul is not perceived by the senses, but is intelligible. Therefore, the soul is not a non-corporeal quality.
Furthermore, the good temperament of the body and spirit, along with the disposition of flesh and nerves and the rest, is strength; and the good temperament of hot and cold and dry and wet things is health; and the moderate symmetry of the limbs, along with a good complexion, makes for the beauty of the body. If, therefore, the soul is the harmony of health, strength, and beauty, it would be necessary D that a living man neither be ill, nor infirm, nor deformed. But it often happens that not merely one, but all three of these good temperaments at once are lost, and yet the man still lives. For it often happens that the same person is at once deformed, infirm, and ill. Therefore, the soul is not the good temperament of the body.
How, then, do some natural vices and virtues follow human beings? This arises truly from the temperament of the body. For just as people are naturally healthy or sickly because of their temperament, so some are naturally bilious and are irascible, others fearful, others prone to base desires; yet some prevail and overcome [these tendencies]. It is clear that they prevail over the temperament; and that which prevails is something different from that which is being prevailed over. Therefore,
A temperament is one thing, and the soul another; for the body was B the instrument of the soul: if it is constructed suitably, it works for the soul, and it also possesses [the capacity] in a suitable manner; but if it has not functioned well because it was not suitable, then the soul has need of [other] things. For, struggling against the unsuitability of the instrument—unless it be very vigilant—it is distorted along with it, just as a musician errs along with the discord of the lyre if he does not first tune it well. Hence, the soul has need of care for the body, in order that it may establish it as an instrument suitable for itself; and this it does through reason and habits, as in a harmony, now slackening [the strings], now tightening them, so that it may make it consonant for itself and use an instrument that is suitable; and so that it may not itself be distorted along with it, for this also happens.
Aristotle, in calling the soul an "entelechy," nonetheless leans toward those who say it is a quality; but let us first clarify what he calls an "entelechy." He speaks of substance in three ways: first, as matter underlying it, which in itself is nothing, but has the potential for coming into being; second, the form and species, in accordance with which the matter is specified; third, that which is composed of both, that which has been generated from matter and form, which is, consequently, ensouled. Thus, matter is potentiality, while form is actuality. And this is understood in two ways, as knowledge and as the considering of knowledge: that is, the one as a disposition, the other as an activity; for knowledge, in that it exists while the soul is healthy, and while it sleeps, and while it wakes; but the first is the waking state for contemplating, while sleep is for seeing without acting. Knowledge is prior to the activity. Hence, he calls the form "first entelechy" and the activity a "second" difference; just as the eye is composed of a subject and a form; the subject in it, which receives the sight, is the matter of the eye; this too is equivocally called an eye. But the form and first actuality of the eyes is the very sight, which provides it the capacity to see. The second actuality of the eye is the operation, in accordance with which it sees. Just as, therefore, a puppy just born D does not possess [the action as] a first actuality, but possesses the potentiality to receive the actuality, so must one understand the nature and power of the soul. For just as there, the sight that has come into being perfects the eye, so here, the soul that has come into being in the body perfects the animal, so that the soul can never be without the body, nor the body without the soul. However, he calls the living body a "work of the soul," separating from it the rational part. But he should have taken the human soul in its entirety, and not have delivered an opinion about the whole based on a part, and that the weakest one at that. Afterward, he says that the body possesses life potentially even before the soul has come into existence. For he says the body has life in itself transitionally. But the body that possesses life potentially must first exist as a body in actuality; and it cannot be a body in actuality before it has received its form. For matter is without quality, and it is not the body. It is impossible, therefore, for that which does not exist in actuality to have the potentiality for something to come into being from it. But if it is both a body and [exists] in potentiality—how can the body in potentiality possess life in itself in potentiality? Furthermore, in the case of…
A others having something, it is possible for them not to use it, just as one having sight may not use it; but in the case of the soul, this is impossible. For he who is asleep is not without the operation of the soul. Indeed, he is nourished and grows, and imagines, and breathes—which is the greatest proof of life. From these things, therefore, it is manifest that life cannot belong to anyone in potentiality, but altogether in actuality. For that which primarily constitutes the soul is nothing else but life. For to the soul, life is innate, but to the body, it belongs by participation. Therefore, he who says that health is analogous to life is not speaking of the life of the soul, but of the body; and thus he utters a sophism. For the corporeal substance is capable of contraries by turns or alternately; but that which is according to the species is not so at all. For even if the difference is changed according to the species, the animal itself is also changed; so the substance is not capable of contraries according to the species, but according to the underlying subject, that is, the corporeal essence. Therefore, the soul cannot in any way be the actuality of the body, but is a self-sufficient, incorporeal substance. For it admits contraries by turns, namely vice and virtue; which the form could not admit.
Next, he says that the soul, being an actuality, is B immobile in itself, but is moved by accident; and there is nothing absurd in it moving us, while being itself immobile. For beauty, while being immobile, moves us. But even if that which is immobile moves, it moves that which has the nature to be moved, and not also that which is immobile. If, therefore, the body also had motion in itself, there would be nothing absurd in it being moved by an immobile thing. But now, it is impossible for an immobile thing to be moved by an immobile thing. Whence, then, comes motion to the body, if not from the soul? For the body is not self-moving. Desiring, therefore, to demonstrate the first genesis of motion, he did not show the first, but the second. For if that which is not moving were to move (something), he would be making a first motion. But if that which is moved by itself moves also in another way, he explains the genesis of a second motion. Whence, then, comes this being moved, if not from the soul? For the body is not self-moving. Whence, then, is the first genesis of motion for the body? For to say that the elements move of themselves, some being light by nature and others heavy, is a lie. For if lightness and heaviness are motions, and they move of themselves, the light and heavy things would never come to rest. But they do come to rest once they have reached their proper place. Therefore, heaviness and lightness are not the source of first motion, but are qualities of the elements. And if this is granted, how can anyone think and opine and judge that these are the works of lightness and heaviness? But if they are not of these, then not of the elements either. And if not of the elements, then not of the bodies either. Furthermore, if the soul is moved by accident, and the body moves of itself, C and even without the soul the body would be moved of itself—if this be so, then there would be an animal even without the soul; but these things are absurd; it is absurd...
to say that everything which is moved by nature is also moved by force, and that everything which is moved by force is also moved by nature. For the world, which is moved by nature, is not moved by force; this also rests according to nature. For the world, and the sun, and the moon, being moved according to nature, cannot rest according to nature; in the same way, the soul, being by nature eternally moving, cannot by nature rest. For rest is the destruction of the soul, and of every eternally moving thing. A Moreover, the problem raised at the beginning remains solved: whence the body is naturally held together, being formed to be also dissipated. These things are sufficient, from among many, to prove that the soul is neither an act, nor immobile, nor coming into being in a body. Pythagoras, indeed, being accustomed to compare always both God and all things to numbers, defined the soul as a number moving itself; to which Xenocrates also adhered, not that he maintained the soul is a number, but because it is among things that are numerable and among the multitude, and because it is the soul that distinguishes things by imposing forms and figures upon each. For it is this which separates species from species, and declares them to be different from one another, both by the diversity of kinds and by the multitude of number, and therefore makes things numerable; whence they are not altogether free from communion through numbers. B But that which moves itself, he also himself bears witness to it. Now, that the soul is not a number is gathered from this: Number is a quantity, but the soul is not a quantity, but a substance; therefore the soul is not a number; even though they desire, as we shall say in the things that follow, that number also, in the intelligible realm, is a substance. Further, the soul is continuous, but number is not continuous; therefore the soul is not a number. Further, number is increased by addition, but the soul is not increased by addition; further, a number is either even or odd, but the soul is neither even nor odd; therefore the soul is not a number. Further, the soul is self-moving, but a defined number is immobile. Further, while number remains one and the same in nature, it changes no quality that comes to be in numbers; but the soul, while being one according to essence, changes qualities, passing from ignorance to knowledge, and from vice to virtue; therefore the soul is not a number. C Such, then, are the dogmas of the ancients concerning the soul. Eunomius, however, defined the soul as an incorporeal substance, created in a body, agreeing at once with Plato and Aristotle. The incorporeal he took from Plato; but that it is created in a body is from the teaching of Aristotle; not perceiving, however sharp and clever he may be, that he is attempting to gather into one things that are utterly at variance with one another. For everything that has a beginning, being at once corporeal and temporal, is fleeting and mortal; and the writings of Moses harmonize with this. For he posits the origin of all things in matter, as those of the school of Plato suppose. D
A If, however, anyone imagines that the soul is inserted after the molding of the body, that is, that it has come into being after the body, he wanders from the truth. For neither does Moses say that it was created at that time, when it was being cast into the body, nor is this conformable to reason. Therefore, let them either deem it mortal, as did Aristotle, who said that it is generated within the body, and the Stoics; or, asserting that it is an incorporeal substance, let them hesitate to say that it is created within the body, lest they present to us the concept of a mortal, or even altogether irrational, soul. Furthermore, according to their view, the world is not full, but is even now semi-perfect, and always in need of additional increment. At the very least, fifty thousand intelligible essences are added to it each day. And most distressingly, when it has attained its perfection, then it will be dissolved at the time of the last men who fill up the number of souls at the moment of the resurrection—than which what could be more contrary to reason B than to say that the world is destroyed when it has been filled? For such is the manner of little children who, in the sand where they play, as soon as they have constructed some toy, immediately confuse and scatter it. For to say that souls come into being now by the principle of providence, and not by creation (since one does not induce a common substance nor any other beside that which is, but rather completes what already exists by providence), is the mark of those who are ignorant of the difference between creation and providence. For it is the work of providence to preserve the substance of corruptible animals by the vicissitude of generation—I mean, of those which are not born from putrefaction, since C another putrefaction in turn preserves their succession—but the most excellent work of creation is to bring something into existence out of nothing. If, therefore, souls come into being through generation, they are also mortal, like the other things that are produced by the succession of the species. But if they are produced from what was not, what comes into being is a creation, and what Moses says is not true, namely: *God rested from all His works* [Gen. II, 2]. But both are absurd. Therefore, souls do not come into being now. For the saying, *My Father worketh hitherto* [John V, 17], is meant not of creating, but of providing; and it seems to Apollinaris himself that souls are generated by souls, just as bodies are from bodies. For he wishes the soul to proceed by transmission through succession from the first man to those who were born from him, just like the corporeal succession. D For neither are souls stored up, nor are they created now, for those who say such things make God a collaborator with adulterers, because children are also born from these. And they assume that that which is written, *God rested from all His works which he began to make*, is a falsehood if He indeed still creates souls even now. But if everything that comes into being by succession through generation has been proved to be mortal—for it is for this reason that it generates and is generated, so that the species of corruptible things might remain—it is necessary, in regard to these also, either to say that the soul is mortal, being generated through succession, or that the souls are not generated through succession by way of generation. For we leave the case of those born from adultery to the principle of providence, being unknown to us. But if one must conjecture anything concerning providence, it surely knows that...
what is created will be useful either for life or for itself; and for that reason it permits the migration of souls to happen. We draw a strong argument for this from Solomon, who was brought forth from the conception of Uriah’s wife and the sowing of David, as if he were born according to the divine law.
A Next, let us also examine the opinion of the Manichaeans concerning the soul. For they say that it is incorporeal and immortal, but that there is only one soul for all things, broken into fragments and cut up into individual bodies, both animate and inanimate. And they say that some possess a greater part of it, others a smaller: the animate possess more, the inanimate less, and the celestial bodies possess much more, to such an extent that the individual souls are, as it were, certain particles of the universal soul. And if they had said that this soul is divided indivisibly, like a voice among those who hear it, this evil B would have been moderate. But as it is, they say that the very substance of the soul is divided, and, which is the most grievous thing of all, they wish for it to be properly within the elements, and to be distributed along with them in the generation of bodies, and again to come together into the same state and be reduced to the same unity when the bodies are dissolved, just like water being divided and again collected and mixed. And they say that pure souls go to the light, being light themselves, but those contaminated by matter go to the elements, and then from the elements to plants and brute animals. Thus, while cutting up its essence and subjecting it, as if it were corporeal, to affections, they assert that it is immortal, but they fall into contradictions. For while they proclaim that the polluted souls return to the elements and are mixed together with one another, they say that they are again tormented in the migration into other bodies, according to the gravity of their sins, joining them and again separating them according to subsistence. For indeed, shadows can be separated while the light remains, and united by a close conjunction—a thing which cannot happen in an intelligible nature. For shadows are indeed reflections of goods, even if one were to concede that they can be separated and again united.
C Furthermore, Plato declares that there is both one soul and many souls. For he says that there is one soul of the universe, but there are also others that are particular, so that the universe is animated in one way by the universal soul, and the particular parts are animated in another way by the soul peculiar to each. He says, therefore, that the soul of the universe is extended from the center of the earth to the limits of the heavens, not saying that this extension is local, but intellectual. And that this is the soul which rotates the universe spherically and gathers and binds together the corporeal mass of the world, and that it penetrates the bodies of the universe, was demonstrated in what we have discussed previously. D The soul that gives form causes this. For each of the beings lives its own life and is destroyed by its own destruction. For as long as it is joined
A and held together, it is called a body; but when it is dissolved, it perishes. And while all things live, not all things are animals. For they distinguish plants from inanimate things by the fact that they grow and are nourished—that is, by the nutritive and natural power—and they distinguish other animals from plants by sense-perception, and rational beings from irrational ones by the faculty of reason. And so, while saying that all things live, they distinguish the nature of each. Thus, they say that even all inanimate things live a "habitual life," inasmuch as they are contained by the soul of the universe, so that they merely exist and are not dissolved. And they say that this is the soul which governs the universe and which sends down the particular souls created beforehand by the Creator—of course, the Creator himself having also given to it the laws by which it ought to govern this universe, which it also calls "fate," and it provides a power sufficient to govern us. These things have been stated also in the books *Concerning Fate*.
Commonly, then, all Greeks who have pronounced the soul to be immortal teach the doctrine of metempsychosis; but they differ concerning the species of souls. For some say that there is one species, the rational, and that this transitions also into plants and into the bodies of irrational creatures. And some say that this happens according to certain fixed periods of time, while others say it happens as it may chance. Others say that there is not one species of souls, but two: the rational and the irrational. Some say many, as many as there are species of animals. Especially those who follow Plato think that B some souls, being furious, irascible, and rapacious, put on the bodies of wolves and lions, while those given over to incontinence and luxury take on the bodies of asses and suchlike creatures. Some took this literally regarding lions, wolves, and asses, while others judged it to have been said figuratively, signifying characters through the animals. For Cronius, in his *On Palingenesis*—for that is what he calls metempsychosis—wishes for all souls to be rational. In like manner also Theodore the Platonist, in his book *That the Soul Is All Species*, and Porphyry likewise. But Iamblichus, pursuing a path contrary to these, says that the form of the soul is according to the species of the animal; or at least he recognizes two, or [different] species. Indeed, a single book has been written by him, with the inscription that metempsychoses do not occur from humans to animals, nor from animals to humans, but from animals to animals, and from humans to humans.
And to me it seems that he has hit the mark well in this regard, C not only regarding the opinion of Plato but also the truth itself, as it is possible to demonstrate from many other things, but especially from these. For not even one of the rational movements appears in irrational animals. For neither arts, nor studies, nor deliberations, nor virtues, nor any other of the things belonging to the intellect exist in them; from which it is evident that they do not possess a rational soul. For it is indeed absurd to call the irrational beings rational; for even if, when they are entirely young, D
B only an irrational motion is present in infants, yet we say that they possess a rational soul, because as they grow they manifest a rational operation. But an irrational, in no state manifesting that which is rational, would have possessed a rational soul to no purpose, since the rational power would have been entirely useless. For it is agreed by all, with one accord, that nothing has been made by God in vain. If this be so, a rational soul would have been bestowed upon the cattle and beasts in vain, never being able to display its own work; and this would be a charge against the Giver, of having fitted a soul to the body inappropriately. For this is the work neither of a craftsman, nor of one who understands order or harmony.
But if someone says that animals move with a rational disposition, but that their physical constitution is incapable of skillful action, justifying this argument from the experience of men—for if the fingers are merely removed from the hands, most skills perish—he does not at all solve the question. For there still remains the same absurdity: that God should have joined to the body a soul that was in no way appropriate to it, but superfluous, useless, and ineffectual, since it would have been a hindrance to them in their own functions throughout their whole life; in addition to the fact that he derives the argument itself from what is unknown and not conceded. For whence is it derived that animals move with a rational disposition? It is better to believe that a soul has been fitted to each body appropriately, and that the animals have nothing more in their disposition and affection than the natural simplicity apparent in their works. For each species C of irrational animals moves according to its own natural inclination, for which it was created from the beginning, as well as according to its need and function, and it has a disposition fitted to these things.
Yet the Creator has by no means left them destitute of all help; but He has implanted in each a natural, not a rational, intelligence. To some He has even given craftiness and cunning, as an image and shadow of skill, for two reasons: both to avoid present ambushes and to guard against future ones, and also to join all creation to itself, as has been said before. That they do not do these things rationally is clear from the fact that each animal of the same species does the same things, and their soul’s operations do not vary among the multitude, except in terms of greater or lesser degree; but the whole species is moved in accordance with a single inclination. For every hare hides in its burrow in the same way, and every wolf is treacherous in the same way, and every ape mimics in the same way; but this is not the case with man. For there are countless paths of human actions; for the rational faculty is something free and self-governing, whence there is not one and the same work for all men, as there is for each species of irrational animals. For these are moved by nature alone; and things that are by nature are the same in all, whereas rational actions differ from one to another, not being the same in all by necessity.
But if they say that the soul is sent into such bodies as a punishment D for those things committed previously in human life, they are forming their proof from what comes later. For why were rational souls withheld from the bodies of animals that came into existence first? For surely it is not because they had sinned in human bodies, before they had even come to be in a human
form. It seems that the admirable physician Galen also holds this opinion, and thinks that for each species of animal there is a different kind of soul. Indeed, he says at the very beginning of the first book of his treatise *On the Uses of the Parts*, the following: “And if this is so, there will be many parts of animals; some larger, some smaller, and some entirely indivisible into another form; yet the need for all of these belongs to the soul. For the body is its instrument. And for this reason, the parts of animals differ greatly from one another, because the souls do too.” And again, proceeding further in the same book, he adds this regarding the ape: “And you should not, O most wise accuser (nature might say to you jokingly), have had the soul of animals given as a perfect thing for the construction of the body.” Thus he clearly recognized that different souls reside in bodies that differ by species. B And so much for these matters. If, therefore, we have demonstrated that the soul is neither a body, nor a harmony, nor a mixture, nor any other quality, it is clear from these points that the soul is an incorporeal substance. For that it exists is agreed upon by all; and if it is neither body nor accident, it is manifest that it is an incorporeal substance, and nothing of what has its being in another; for such things appear and disappear without the destruction of the subject. But when the soul is separated, the body perishes entirely.
By the same arguments, it is possible to demonstrate that the soul is immortal. For if it is not a body—which has been shown to be by nature dissoluble and corruptible—nor a quality, nor a quantity, nor anything else of those things which perish, it is clearly immortal. There are, then, many proofs of its immortality in Plato and others; but those are overly intricate and difficult to understand, and barely recognizable even to those nurtured in such disciplines. But to us, the teaching of the divine oracles is sufficient for the proof of its immortality, having the power to produce faith in itself because it is divinely inspired. And to those who do not accept the dogmas of the Christians, it is enough to show that the soul is none of those things that perish. For if it is not D of the things that perish, it is incorruptible, and thus also immortal; so that this, being sufficiently established, may be passed over. But we must investigate how the union of the soul and the inanimate body comes about; for the matter is difficult. And if man consists not only of these, but also of the mind, as some have said, it is even more difficult. For all things that come together into the subsistence of a single essence are necessarily united; and all things that are united are altered, and do not remain what they were before, as will be shown in the case of the elements; for when they are united, they become something else. How then, if the body united to the soul still remains a body, or conversely, the soul being incorporeal and essential in itself, how is it united to the body, and becomes a part of the
animal, while preserving its own essence unmixed and incorrupt? For it is necessary that either the soul and body are united, and both altered and corrupted together, like the elements; or else they are not united, due to the aforementioned absurdities, but lie adjacent like dancers in a chorus, or one pebble next to another, or are mixed and confused, like water and wine. But that the soul cannot merely lie adjacent to the body, has been demonstrated in the treatise *On the Soul*. For only that part of the body which is closest to the soul would be animate, while that which is not conjoined would be inanimate; besides the fact that things which exist by apposition—for example, wood or iron or something of that sort—cannot be called 'one.' Moreover, the mixture of wine and water corrupts both at the same time: for neither the water nor the wine is a pure mixture, even if such a tempering occurs by apposition, which eludes the senses because of the fineness of the parts of the mixed things; yet it is evident from the fact that they can once again be separated from one another. A sponge, for instance, when oiled, absorbs the pure water, as does papyrus. But to separate what is accurately united by sensory means is altogether impossible. B But if it is neither united, nor mixed, nor adjacent, what is the reasoning for the animal being called 'one'? Plato, then, because of this difficulty, does not wish the animal to consist of soul and body, but rather considers the soul as mixed with the body, and as though clothed in the body. But this theory also has some doubt. For how can the soul be one with its garment? For the tunic is not one with the person who is clothed. Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus, resolved this question in this way: he said that intelligible things have such a power and nature that they allow themselves to be united to those capable of receiving them, just like those things which are corrupted and united together, and yet remain unconfused and incorrupt, like those which are merely adjacent. For in the case of bodies, union certainly produces an alteration of what comes together, since they change into other bodies—as elements into composite things, and nourishment into blood, and blood into flesh and the other parts of the body. But in the case of intelligible things, union indeed takes place, but alteration does not follow. C For an intelligible thing is not formed by nature to be altered in its essence, but either it withdraws or it perishes into non-being; yet it does not admit of change, nor does it perish into non-being. For the soul would not be immortal, being life itself, if it were changed in the mixture; for it would be altered and would no longer be life. And what would it contribute to the body if it did not supply life to it? Therefore, the soul is not altered in the union. Having demonstrated, therefore, that intelligible things are unalterable in essence, it necessarily follows that the soul does not perish together with the body to which it is united. That it is united, D sympathy shows; for the whole animal sympathizes with itself, as being one. That it also remains unmixed is clear from the soul's being, in a certain manner, separated from the body during sleep, and leaving it to lie as though it were dead, while merely exhaling life into it so that it may not be utterly destroyed, and by itself exercising itself in dreams, prophesying the future, and drawing near to intelligible things. The same thing happens also when it contemplates any of the intelligible things. For even then, as far as possible, it separates itself from the body.
separates it, and it becomes by itself, so that in this way B it may apply itself to existing things; for being altogether incorporeal, it has passed through them, as things that are co-corrupted; remaining incorrupt and unconfused, and abiding by itself, and in whatever things it may be, it transforms them according to the life that is in it, and is not transformed by them. For as the sun by its own presence changes the air into light, making it luminous, and the light is united to the air, being poured out with it without confusion; in the same way, the soul also, being united to the body, remains unconfused, differing in this only, that the sun, being a body and circumscribed by place, is not everywhere that its light is, just as fire is not; for it remains even in wood or constrained in a wick, as in a place; but the soul, being incorporeal and not circumscribed by place, passes through by the whole, through both its own light and the body; and there is no part illuminated by it in which it is not present as a whole; for it is not held by the body, but it itself holds the body; nor is it in the body as in a vessel or a wineskin, but rather the body is in it. For intelligible things, not being hindered by bodies, but passing through and traversing and moving through every body, are not able to be held by corporeal things; for being intelligible, they are in intelligible places. For it is either in them, or in the superior intelligible things; as the soul is sometimes in itself, as when it reasons, and sometimes in the mind, when it understands. Therefore, when it is said to be in the body, it is not said to be in the body as in a place, but as in a relation, and we say the soul is bound by the body according to a certain inclination and disposition towards something, just as we say the lover is bound by the beloved, not corporeally, nor locally, but according to relation. For being without magnitude and without bulk and without parts, it is superior to local description by parts; for that which has no part, in what place can it be circumscribed? For place is the limit of the container, insofar as it contains the thing contained. But if someone should say, "Then my soul is in Rome and in Alexandria, and everywhere," he escapes his own notice by again speaking of place; for indeed the being in Alexandria, and in general the being in this or that place, is a place; but it is not in a place at all, but in a relation; for it has been shown that it cannot be comprehended by place. When, therefore, an intelligible thing comes to be in a relation, to a certain place or to a thing that is in a place, we speak of it more improperly as being there, on account of its operation, taking the place there instead of the relation and the operation. For whereas we ought to say, "It operates there," we say, "It is there." This discourse would fit more purely, and most of all, the union of the Word of God with man, according to which, being united, He remained unconfused and incomprehensible, not in the manner of the soul. For that, being of the things that make up number, seems also to suffer along C
A with the body due to their close familiarity, and sometimes to contain and coerce it, and to be coerced by it. But God the Word changes in nothing from the communion He has with body and soul, nor is He a partaker of their infirmity; but while sharing with them the power of His divinity, He remains the same in the same state in which He was before the union. And this mode of mixture or union is very new; He is both mingled and remains altogether unmingled, unconfused, incorruptible, and immutable, suffering nothing, but only cooperating, since He is not corrupted at the same time, nor altered at the same time: for the former things may be reconciled, but He, not diminished by them, remains devoid of mutation and confusion, since He is B entirely exempt from all variation and alteration. A witness to this assertion is Porphyry, who has moved his tongue insolently against Christ. But even the testimonies of enemies are valid for us, since they admit no contradiction at all. This Porphyry, therefore, in his second book of *Miscellaneous Questions*, writes word for word as follows: "It is by no means then to be doubted that it is possible for some essence to be taken along for the completion of another essence, and to be a part of the essence, while remaining according to its own nature after it has filled another essence, and both becoming one with another, and preserving what it has as one by itself; and C what is greater, not being changed itself, it changes those things in which it might be into its own operation by its presence." He says these things regarding the union of God the Word and the body. And if the account is true in the case of the soul, because it is incorporeal, much more so is it in the case of God the Word, who exists as incorporeal in a way more incomparable and in truth. And this flatly stops the mouths of those who undertake to accuse the union of God with man. For many have rashly declared it ridiculous, and death highly improbable, and the union even unseemly, since they supposed the divine nature to be united by mixture D and union. But we, using their own approved witnesses, provide the explanation. It is said by some, and especially by the Eunomians, that God the Word was united to the body, not according to essence, but according to the respective faculties. For they argue that the substances are not united or mixed, but the faculties of the body are mixed with the divine faculties. Furthermore, they say that the faculties of any organic body, according to Aristotle, are the senses. With these, therefore, the divine faculties being mingled, according to them, brought about the union. But no one, I suppose, would grant them that they should declare the senses to be corporeal faculties. For it was clearly defined in the foregoing what things are proper to the body, what to the soul, and what to both together; and we said that in what is proper to both, the senses are the instruments of the incorporeal, and that the union of the essences occurs unconfusedly, the more divine in no way being harmed by the inferior, but rather assisted by the more divine; since the nature that is purely incorporeal passes through all places with impunity,