Against Arius and Sabellius

^A to Himself, the great Paul is a sufficient and wealthy witness. But if the script-writer thinks that a multitude of gods is being introduced by us into the proclamation because we confess that in Christ God was reconciling the world to Himself, ^B as if God were coming to be among many men, we offer this defense: If there were many mothers who were virgins, and if the secret message of Gabriel was to many, and if to each one the descent of the Holy Spirit and the presence of the power of the Most High occurred; and if the prophets preach the grace in regard to many, so as to speak in the plural, "Children were born to us" (and "sons were given to us"), and "Virgins shall conceive in the womb," and for all those born the name is Emmanuel; if all walk on foot upon the waves, and by an ineffable power feed so many ^C thousands in the desert, increasing with the basket the bread that is cultivated in the hands of the disciples; if all raise to life those who have been dead four days from the earth; if all become lambs of God and are sacrificed as our Passover, and nail sin to the cross, and destroy the power of death, and ascend into heaven before the eyes of the disciples, and sit at the right hand of the Father; if all are to come to judge the inhabited world in justice, and at the name of all, the tongues of those in heaven, ^D and on earth, and under the earth confess Him—then we would grant that there are many gods, if those many were recognized by these marks. But if Jesus is one Lord, through whom are all things, and from whom, and through whom, and in whom are all things, and if this enumeration of divine attributes pertains only to Him, what danger is there that many gods will be dreamed up when we say that God was manifested through an ensouled flesh? For who is so ignorant of the evangelical teachings as not to know what was said by the Savior Himself to the Jews: "But now you seek to kill me, a man, who has spoken to you the truth"? Do you see in what is said what it is that is being killed, as He clearly indicated by saying, "You seek to kill me," not the truth, but the man through whom the truth was speaking? For it was not a man who was speaking the truth; but clearly, He who spoke was God, while the man was mediating to men the message being spoken in his own voice. Wherefore he also became a mediator of God and men, since the human nature was not able to approach the pure communion of God, and for this reason needed a voice kindred to it and natural, by which it is likely that the power from above could be received. This also must be left behind, and the discourse must be turned to what follows. Nothing, he says,

is as equally conjoined to God as that flesh which He assumed. O, the discerning judgment of the man! Nothing is so tightly conjoined to God as the flesh; not goodness, not eternity, not incorruption, not omnipotence, nor any other of those notions which most befit God, but all these things are secondary to the flesh, when compared with God and with the union of God to this, and to the flesh that was acquired. The writer ^A himself confesses this very thing: for by saying that it was assumed, he declared its adventitious nature.

XLIV. But, leaving these aside, we also wrap those things which follow in silence, inasmuch as they can in no way harm the readers, and contain within themselves the refutation of the fiction of a fable that is nowhere consistent with itself. For when he had first posited that no other of those things which are affirmed of God is as equally conjoined to the Lord as that flesh which He assumed, he straightway adds in conclusion that those things which are not conjoined in such a manner are not to be adored in the same manner, and he even adds this further climax: "But nothing is so much to be adored as the flesh of Christ." Since these things appear absurd even to children themselves, we shall deliberately be silent about them; for the very children who sit in the market and play would reason thus: "If nothing is so much to be adored as the flesh, then the flesh of Christ is more to be venerated than the majesty of the Father Himself, and His omnipotence, and His supreme rule over all things, and whatever else our nature is able to utter concerning the divine power; so that, omitting the adoration of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we ought to venerate and adore only the flesh preferred by this man to all else, and ascribe omnipotence to it."

The argument that follows is similar to the preceding ones: "The flesh of the Lord," he says, "is adored, inasmuch as it is one person and one animal with Him." Making mention of two things, namely, the Lord and the flesh of the Lord, he makes one animal out of these two ^B. Now it is clear what he signifies in the title of the treatise, while he promises to teach us concerning the divine incarnation, made after the likeness of men; for since human life consists of the convergence of soul and body, out of the coupling and mixing of these heterogeneous things, and since one could not define our constitution otherwise than by the union of body and soul, the writer, having imagined this same thing also ^C concerning the divine nature, ^D

^A promises immediately, even in the very title of this treatise, that he will demonstrate that the conjunction of divinity with flesh is to be viewed according to the likeness of man. And now, in this part of the same treatise, he manifestly strives to establish that the flesh and the Lord are one person and one animal, as if he were to say that in Paul, because of the conjunction of body and soul, that which is hidden is the same as that which is seen by the eyes of all. Why, then, is it fitting to refute with accurate disquisition those things which we have just mentioned? And who would not deservedly accuse us of foolishness for spending our time refuting these wrongly devised arguments? Therefore, let us ponder what follows. If, he says, no created thing is to be adored equally with the Lord as his flesh. Who will preside over the contest and award the prizes to Apollinaris and Eunomius as they compete with each other for the primacy of impiety? Which of them will be deemed worthy of the rewards for their labors against the truth? Perhaps, because of the equal ardor of those struggling to assert impiety, the victory will be uncertain and inclined to neither side. For the one, while asserting that the Only-Begotten God is a creature, does not deny that he is endowed with mind and is alien to corporeal nature; but the other, imagining that he was from the beginning composed of things of a different nature, establishes ^B that the same being is one animal, fashioned from flesh and divinity, after the likeness of human nature. For the adoration of the creature is equal in both cases; but the former says that the intellectual and incorporeal nature was created; while the latter adds also that the nature around the creature is fleshly, and that this is to be adored more than other creatures, as if adoration were extended to other creatures as well, which even those who respect the dogmas of Eunomius admit to be impious. Therefore, let him carry off the victory prizes against Eunomius, and let him exult, adorned with the crowns of impiety; for by as much as the body is inferior to the soul in human nature, by so much is he who ordains that the flesh be adored far more inept in his impiety than those who adore the intellectual creature among those who adore created things, especially if he himself says that not one, but many creatures are to be adored, compared to which the flesh deserves to obtain greater adoration. For no created thing, he says, is to be adored ^C equally with the flesh of the Lord. For all things that are numbered among created things, whether they be corporeal or incorporeal, are equally beneath the divine power; yet, nevertheless, created things, if compared among themselves, have some more or less dignity than others, since the incorporeal nature is ^D possessed of it...

whereas the one that prefers the flesh to the intellectual nature surpasses the other in impiety. Let the disciples of this error hear with whom, and concerning what matters, the contention with their teacher is.

^A XLV. Let us now examine those shackles—to speak in the manner of Apollinaris’ master—rendered fast by the indissoluble chains of syllogisms, with which he strives to bind his readers. If anyone, he says, thinks that man is more joined to God than other men and angels. It would be worth the effort to examine the meaning of these words as well, but to extract any sense—if not a good and refined one, then at least one somewhat conducive to the confirmation of his impious dogma—from the stated words would be just like looking for a soul in stones, or intelligence in wood. Further, from the things he adds in the same tenor and with the same intent, it can be confirmed how incomprehensible his words are. Angels, he says, and humans will be despoiled of their freedom of choice, just as the flesh is deprived of freedom. But the corruption of a creature endowed with free choice is the loss of being in control of oneself and one’s own power; yet nature is not corrupted by its Creator: therefore, man is not at all joined to God. O the power of such arguments! How indissoluble are these snares of syllogisms! He takes away from man and the angels that free choice which exists in the union with divinity, and the corruption of a creature endowed with free choice is its loss of self-determination; and if these things be accepted, it is proven that man is not joined to God. What such things do those ventriloquists utter? What similar things do those who speak from the earth and have been trained in internal divinations babble forth in comparison to these? The self-determination of men and angels is taken away, if the human ^B is united to God. Was He not a man, He who said, "But now you seek to kill me, a man who has told you the truth?" Was not He, who demonstrated all divine power within Himself, acting by His own authority as He willed, mingled with the divine nature? If, then, this did not take place in Him, the evangelical testimony must be set aside; and Paul, and the prophets, and all who foretold the miracles concerning the Lord, and those who related what happened afterward, will altogether be convicted of falsehood. But if this did truly happen, and God was manifested in the flesh, and the flesh, being mingled with the divine nature, became one with it, then, according to the poetic myth, self-determination has perished for the human nature, and angels have been enslaved, since this has come to pass, having been deprived of the grace of self-determination. O the absurdity of this strange speech! Of what sort also is the inference to say, "The corruption of a creature endowed with free choice is its loss of self-determination." ^{C D}

Does he then remove from the list of living things those who are servants, because ^A they are not governed by free choice, but are enslaved to the prevailing power? For the writer defines the creature as being in a state of free choice. But he legislates that one in whom the sovereign motion of the will is not present is not even to be considered a living creature. Therefore, that Canaan was dead when he was enslaved to his brothers because of his disorder; the servant of Abraham was dead; Giezi, the boy of Elisha, was dead; and in later times Onesimus was dead; all the centurions working as servants were dead. And why do I say these things? All who are subjected to the authorities of those who rule over them, in whom the free-choosing will is obstructed, are dead. But even those to whom Paul gives instruction to submit to the higher authorities are altogether dead, even if they possess souls, corrupted by the absence of their free choice, and no longer able to be living creatures. ^B For this is what the fable of Apollinaris directs, so that he may unite that soul-less flesh to the God who is above all, whether it be soul-less or mind-less, for the fable looks equally to both. But the soul-less is a corpse. That which has a soul but is devoid of intellect is a beast, which not even he himself avoids as an absurdity, stripping that flesh of free choice; for it is the property of irrational creatures not to be their own masters, but to be subject to the authority of man. But let these things be passed over, and let us move on to the next parts of the discourse; I will relate the opponent’s opinion in my own words for the sake of brevity. ^C He says that man consists of three things: spirit, and soul, and body, as the Apostle also defines this in the Epistle to the Thessalonians, and he adds this part of the canticle of the three children: "Bless, O spirits and souls of the righteous"; then also, "In spirit," he says, "it is necessary to worship the Lord"; and he brings forward the word of the Gospel, by which we are taught that those who worship God must worship in spirit. Having gone through these, he adds that there is something besides this, the flesh which is at war with the spirit; and he says that this is not soul-less, in order to show by this means that the spirit is a third thing, distinct from the soul and the body. If, therefore, he says, man consists of three things, and the Lord is a man, ^D then the Lord also consists altogether of three things: spirit, and soul, and body. In order, therefore, that his error in the apprehension of the divine Scriptures may become manifest, we shall briefly deal with each of the things he has mentioned. And first of all let us examine the apostolic saying. For it is not

^A into those three parts into which we divide it that Paul divides the human being, when he writes to the Thessalonians and prays to the Lord that they may be sanctified in their entirety, in body, soul, and spirit. But there is a certain way of philosophizing about the resolution of our life which is much loftier, not only here, but also where he speaks to the Corinthians. For he knows there a certain "carnal" human being, and again another "spiritual" one, and between these two a "soulish" (animal) human being: calling him "carnal" who is subject to perturbations and clings to earthly things; calling him "spiritual" who is not burdened by the weight of the body but has his mind set on things above; and finally calling him "soulish" who is strictly neither of these, yet has communion with both.

In asserting these things, however, he does not say that the carnal man is destitute of the activities of mind or soul, nor does he show the spiritual man to be alien from the conjunction with soul and body, nor does he maintain that the soulish man is lacking in either mind or flesh; but he imposes the name on each of them from that which is most prominent in his way of life. For, he who "judges all things and is judged by no one" is both possessed of flesh and endowed with a soul, yet is called spiritual; and he who ^B raged with the passion of the flesh against his father’s bed was not without a soul, nor was he deprived of intellect. Likewise, he who stands in the middle between the praiseworthy and the condemned is in both, having mind within himself and being clothed in the nature of flesh. But, as has been said, because the appellation is properly applied according to the visible signs of one's life, those who are self-indulgent and pleasure-loving, and who are eager for contentious disputes, are called "carnal." Those who judge all things but afford those who wish to examine them no handle for judgment, on account of the loftiness of their conduct, are named "spiritual." And he calls "soulish" the one who stands between them, who has fallen as far below the latter as he has risen above the former.

Since, therefore, he wishes the person who is perfected through virtue not only to be testified to for a lofty life, but also, when he is compelled to serve the necessities of the body, to look toward God, and, if he does anything else that pertains to the faculties of soul or body, not even then to be forgetful of God—"For whether you eat," he says, "or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God"—so that even while occupied with the necessities of the body they might always be intent upon glorifying God. ^C For this reason, to the Thessalonians, who were already believed to be striving toward what is better in all respects, he grants full sanctification through this blessing, saying, "And may God sanctify you entirely, and may your whole body, and soul, and spirit," that is, every bodily, soulish, and spiritual pursuit, "be kept for sanctification." This is our account. But if the Apo- ^D

Apollinaris says that the mind is ^A thereby blessed separately, and that to distinguish the body and the soul again, he separates the power of the blessing in each individual case, how is the whole body kept—that which falls away entirely and in every respect in death? How is that whole which is pressed down and shriveled by abstinence, and made frail by harsher subjugation? How could anyone say that the poor Lazarus did not miss out on this blessing, teeming as he was with such sores, and being consumed by his own discharge? But, even if it seems strange to say, the blessing of Paul achieved its full effect in that body which was running with sores; for his body was kept whole by his soul through the discipline of the spiritual life, since he was not led by the violence of the flesh from a higher hope to think anything unseemly; for the flesh did not provide distraction for the soul, nor was his mind agitated by bodily passions.

^B XLVII. The hymn of the three children, too, which invites the spirits and souls of the just to the communion of glorification together, does not command the souls to praise God separately, and the spirits separately from the souls, as Apollinaris thinks. For what sort of praise of the soul could there be, if it were not fulfilled through the mind? For a soul separated from the mind, as has already been said often, is a beast devoid of rational and intellectual activity. If, therefore, he separates the mind from our soul, as he says, let it be granted that it is possible for praise to be rendered to God by the spirits, since he himself understands the mind under the name of "spirits." But if he thinks that the soul is something else, distinct from the mind, how will the mindless one praise God? What hymn of praise from foolishness will be pleasing to God? And what further need would there be for the soul to have a mind, if, in the matter of divine glorification, it were sufficient ^C on its own, singing the hymn by itself and having no need of the assistance of the mind to perform it? But we have not learned such things from those who have interpreted for us. But since souls are equal to the angels, having been loosed from bodily bonds, as the Lord says, for this reason the discourse indicates the equality of souls with the angels through the union with the spirits; for the angels are spirits, according to the Prophet who says, "Who makes his angels spirits," with whom the three children also invite the souls of the just to sing. But the Savior, in saying that one must worship God in spirit, does not mean the mind by the name of spirit, but that one must not ^D occupy oneself with bodily things.

For since the Samaritan woman says to the Lord that one ^A must worship God on the mountain, as if he were circumscribed by place, which is not outside of bodily conception, for this reason the Word says to the one who had wandered away from the truth, that God is spirit, that is to say, incorporeal; and that those who worship Him cannot draw near to the incorporeal in a bodily way, but must fulfill their worship in spirit and truth. For He distinguishes the corrective words according to the double ignorance: truth from figure, and spirit as opposed to bodily suppositions. For this reason Paul also says he serves the Lord neither in figure nor in body, but in spirit, following the truth. But to say that the flesh is not subject to the law of God provides from itself the refutation of the deceit contained in their dogma; for to fight against, to take captive, and not to be subject, and all such things, are acts of the power of choice. But if there were no mind, there would not be a power of choice. Therefore, the flesh that Apollinarius calls ensouled and having a power of choice, he himself acknowledges is not separated from the mind either. But even if flesh alone is spoken of, it contains within itself the formula of humanity, so that if one of the things that complete the nature is missing, it cannot be called a person. ^B

XLVIII. "But," he says, "man consists of three things." Let this be granted, even if that argument does not necessarily draw us to assent. "But," he says, "the Lord, when He is called man, also consists of three things: spirit, soul, and body." We would not strongly oppose this opinion either; for if someone were to say that all things which complete our nature existed in that Man, he would not err from the truth. "But He is also the heavenly Man" (he says this of Christ) "and a life-giving spirit." And we approve of these things as well; for this is our own opinion, if, however, the understanding is taken from Him and directed toward the One toward whom it ought to be directed. For he who is commingled with the heavenly, and through this commingling with the more excellent thing transforms what is earthly into something better, would rightly and deservedly be called not earthly, but heavenly. The same must be said of the life-giving Spirit; yet He who works good acts in us is Himself also a life-giving spirit. But let us see to what end the writer uses the arguments brought forward in this way. "If," he says, "the heavenly Man consists of all things equal to us, the earthly, (so that He also possesses a spirit equal to the earthly ones), ^C he is not heavenly but of the heavenly God..." ^D

^B There is much obscurity in the things said, and it is difficult to discern, on account of the feebleness of the interpretation; but it is easy to uncover his intention. For he says, if that man is deficient in mind, he is heavenly; but if he is complete, he is no longer heavenly, but becomes a receptacle of the heavenly God. In these things, which of the points made should one abhor more? The belief that completeness is a hindrance to the Godhead, as if the flesh, destitute of mind, were more suitable and convenient for receiving the Godhead; or the belief that God is heavenly, yet he who receives the heavenly God within himself is not where God is believed to be, but is somewhere else than in heaven and is named by another title? For if, says Apollinaris, man is a receptacle of the heavenly God, and God is above in heaven, as the Ecclesiastes says: therefore ^C he who has contained God within himself is with Him who was contained, and is rightly called heavenly instead of earthly. As is also evident through what the writer says; if he understood what logically follows from his own arguments, the dogma of the truth is clearly established, being strengthened by the wisdom of its enemies.

XLIX. But let us examine what follows.

^A For whatever you may say of the two, you will not remove from the Word the composition of the two natures. For the one who said that the flesh was from above does not set it up as not being flesh; but the flesh, being governed by a soul-endowed nature and having within itself a vital power, as Apollinaris himself wishes, properly possesses the appellation of man; but He who took it and through it manifested Himself is, in nature, entirely different from it; for the very name of "assumption" indicates the difference in nature of the one who is assumed from the one who assumes. ^B What, then, will prevent, even if these things be the case, God who appeared in the flesh from being insulted by that absurd invention of a name, so that He who is constituted in this way should, according to the rash language of Apollinaris, be called "Man-God"? For the fable did not impose such a name on the goat-stag ^C because the goat portion was attached in part to the whole stag, or conversely in the mixing of those animals such that the stag-part was attached to the entire goat; but the composition of the names explains that it in some way partakes of each nature. So, according to the writer, if the same one is both man and God, having the union in some way, whether because the whole of the nature has come together or because it is in a deficient state, he will not escape that absurd synthesis of the name. And if the Greeks, having learned such things from him, should mock our mystery, the one who provided the occasion for the blasphemy will certainly fall under the prophetic curse, as he says, "Woe to those through whom my name is blasphemed among the Gentiles!"

^D Let us also consider what he adds again to the preceding arguments. "If," he says, "it consists of two perfect things, neither is he who is God also man, nor is he who is man also God." But if, according to his argument, the conjunction were conceded to be of a perfect and an imperfect thing, would it not be said in the same way by those who dare to utter such things, that the man is not in that in which God is, and God is not in that in which the man is? For the principle of the divinity is in every way different from that of the humanity, and no one would ever have thought that the divine nature could be defined by the mutilation of human nature; for the principle of divinity does not consist in the fact that it is not human nature or that human nature is imperfect, but each thing, if grasped separately by the mind, is understood by its own proper concept. For he who hears the "God," receives together with this appellation everything that it is appropriate to conceive regarding God, and he who accepts the appellation of a man, [is understood to have ...]

^A understands his entire nature, and the signification of those terms suffers no confusion, so that in the one appellation the other is understood. For neither is that signified by this name, nor this by that, but each of the names retains the meaning appropriate to its nature, and in no way can their implications be interchanged. But "imperfect" and "perfect" imprint altogether different notions upon the minds of the hearers; for we call that "perfect" which, according to the definition of its own nature, is complete and absolute, while the "imperfect" is that which is contrary to this. Neither of these, however, when spoken of in isolation, signifies man or God, but to whatever thing or name it is attached, it makes us understand that which is expressed by those utterances to be either complete or maimed. How, then, if a man were imperfect, does Apollinaris deduce that God is present in that which is imperfect, as if the mutilation of our nature were more ^B becoming to divinity?

LI. Proceeding next to what follows, he says: "Man cannot save the world, being a man and subject to the common corruption of men." I also say this: for if human nature were sufficient to provide the good for itself, the mystery would be superfluous. But since it was impossible to exist apart from death without God providing the salvation, therefore the light shines in the darkness through the flesh, that through the flesh it might banish the destruction born of darkness. "But neither are we saved," he says, "by God, if he were not mixed with us." In these words, the writer seems to think rightly and to turn his mind toward wiser reflections; for he who speaks of a mixture of things that are naturally distinct signifies union. "He is mixed with us," he says, "when he became flesh," that is, when he became man, just as the Gospel says: when he became flesh, then he tabernacled in us. ^C Nor do these things disagree with sound doctrine, unless something of the darnel-like seed is immediately sowed among them by him thereafter. For this discourse of ours—or rather, of the truth itself—is that he tabernacled in us then, when he became flesh, and conversely, he became flesh when he tabernacled in us. If, therefore, the flesh existed from the time when the indwelling began in us, then before Gabriel proclaimed it to the Virgin, the Word was not yet flesh; and he is a liar who says that the human element descended to us from above—and that before the created human nature, that human element already existed—through which the divinity was mixed with human nature, for he who says that the humanity of the ^D Word descended to us from heaven (and that already before the human nature was created, it already existed as a man), through which the divinity was mixed with human nature, gives the lie to the truth.

dax est. Sed neque, ait, peccata hominum delet, ^A τὴν κατὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦ θανάτου βασιλείαν καταλύει, εἰ μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀπέθανε, καὶ ἀνέστη. Εἴθε μέχρι τέλους ἦν εὐγνώμων, τὰ ἐκ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας φθεγγόμενος! Πάλιν δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπανέρχεται καί φησι, τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν αἰτιώμενος λόγον, ὅτι περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον θεωροῦμεν τὸ πάθος, καὶ ἐπάγει τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, εἰς ἔλεγχον τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἡμῶν, ἔχοντα οὕτως· Ἀνθρώπου δέ, φησί, θάνατος οὐ καταργεῖ τὸν θάνατον. Τί κατασκευάζων ταῦτά φησιν; Ὅτι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς ἡ θεότης, αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια, αὐτὴ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν σταυρὸν πάθει ἀπενεκρώθη, ὥστε κατὰ τὴν τριήμερον ἐκείνην τοῦ χρόνου περιγραφήν, μὴ ζωὴν εἶναι, μὴ δύναμιν, μὴ δικαιοσύνην, μὴ φῶς, μὴ ἀλήθειαν, μὴ αὐτὴν τὴν θεότητα. Οὐ γὰρ μιᾶς ^B ἀποθανούσης θεότητος, ἑτέραν ὑπολελείφθαι λέγει, διότι πολλαχοῦ δείκνυται Ἀρείῳ περὶ τούτου μαχόμενος, καὶ μίαν εἶναι κατασκευάζων τῆς Τριάδος θεότητα, ἧς ἐν τούτῳ νεκρωθείσης, καθὼς συγκατασκευάζει τῷ λόγῳ, πάντως ἑτέρα οὐκ ἦν. Καὶ πῶς ἄν τις ὑπονοήσειεν αὐτὸν μὴ θνητὴν ποιεῖν τὴν θεότητα, συνιδεῖν οὐκ ἔχω. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου θάνατος, εἰ μὴ τοῦ συνθέτου διάλυσις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται λυομένου, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ συνδιαπίπτει τῇ διαλύσει τοῦ σώματος· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν σύνθετον διαλύεται, τὸ δὲ ἀσύνθετον ἀδιάλυτον μένει. Εἰ οὖν ψυχῆς οὐχ ἅπτεται θάνατος, πῶς ἡ θεότης ἀπονεκροῦται, λεγέτωσαν οἱ μὴ εἰδότες ἃ λέγουσι.

LII. Τὰ δὲ ἐχόμενα τούτων, ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι κατασκευῆς, ὑπερβήσομαι. Φησὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς, κατασκευάζων τὸ αὐτὴν τεθνάναι τοῦ Μονογενοῦς τὴν θεότητα, ὅτι Ἀνθρώπου θάνατος οὐ καταργεῖ τὸν θάνατον, οὐδὲ ἀνίσταται ὁ μὴ ἀποθανών· ἐξ ὧν, φησίν, ἁπάντων δῆλον, ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς ἀπέθανε, καθό, φησίν, οὐκ ἦν δυνατὸν κρατεῖσθαι τὸν Χριστὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θανάτου. Ἅπερ ὡς πρόδηλον ἔχοντα τὴν ἀτοπίαν, παραδραμεῖν οἶμαι δεῖν ἀνεξέταστα, παντὸς τοῦ γε νοῦν ἔχοντος καθ' ἑαυτὸν συνιδεῖν ^C δυναμένου τὸ ἀσεβές τε καὶ ἄτοπον τοῦ διαφορήδην ἀποφαινομένου αὐτὸν τὸν Θεὸν τεθνάναι, τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ὑποστάντα τὸν θάνατον. Πλὴν τοσοῦτον εὔλογον ἴσως ἐστὶ παρασημήνασθαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ ἡμετέρου προσώπου λέγει, καθαρεύει τοῦ ψεύδους, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἃ συκοφαντικῶς ἐπὶ διαβολῇ συμπέπλασται τοῦ ἡμετέρου λόγου. Λέγει γὰρ μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν παρ' ἡμῶν λέγεσθαι, ὥστε τὸν Λόγον εἶναι Θεόν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ ἐπ' ἐσχάτων ἡμερῶν διὰ σαρκὸς πεφανερώσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν σοφίαν, καὶ τὸ φῶς, καὶ τὴν ζωὴν, ἅπερ πάντα ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα· τὸ δὲ λέγειν μὴ εἶναί ποτε ταῦτα, τὸν

τὸν ^A διὰ τούτων δηλούμενόν τε καὶ ὀνομαζόμενον, Κύριον καὶ Χριστὸν, οὐδὲν ἀνεκτότερον εἰς ἀσέβειαν τῆς παντελοῦς ἀρνήσεως τοῦ ὀνόματος κρίνομεν. Ὁ γὰρ μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγων εἶναι Χριστὸν (Χριστὸς δὲ Θεοῦ δύναμις, καὶ Θεοῦ σοφία, καὶ πᾶν ὑψηλόν τε καὶ θεοπρεπές ἐστιν ὄνομα), οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἄλλο τι λέγοι εἶναι, ὃ διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου τούτου νοεῖται ὀνόματος. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου προσηγορίᾳ τὸ λογικόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο γνωριστικὸν τῆς φύσεως ἰδίωμα λέγεται· εἰ δέ τις μὴ εἶναι λέγοι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, συνανῄρηται πάντως τῇ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀθετήσει καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς φύσεως ἰδιώματα· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν ἡ δύναμις, ἡ σοφία, ὁ χαρακτήρ, τὸ ἀπαύγασμα· ὁ ἐκεῖνον ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ εἶναι λέγων, ἀθετήσει πάντως καὶ τὰ μετ' ἐκείνου νοούμενα. Διό φαμεν διὰ τῶν ἁγίων ^B Γραφῶν ὁδηγούμενοι, ἀεὶ τὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, τῇ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀϊδιότητι συνθεωρούμενον. Ὡς γὰρ πάντοτε Θεὸς ὁ μονογενής Θεὸς, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ μετουσίας γίνεται, οὐδὲ διά τινος προκοπῆς ἀπὸ ταπεινοτέρας καταστάσεως ἐπὶ τὴν θεότητα μέτεισιν· οὕτως καὶ ἡ δύναμις, καὶ σοφία, καὶ πᾶν θεοπρεπές ὄνομα, συναϊδιόν ἐστι τῇ θεότητι, ὡς μηδὲν ἐπιγίνεσθαι κατὰ προσθήκην εἰς δόξαν τῆς φύσεως, ὃ μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἦν. Τὸ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὄνομα, διαφερόντως φαμὲν ἐξ ἀϊδίου περὶ τὸν Μονογενῆ θεωρεῖσθαι, ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐμφάσεως πρὸς τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην χειραγωγούμενοι. Τῆς γὰρ ἁγίας Τριάδος διδασκαλίαν περιέχει ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου ὁμολογία, ἑκάστου τῶν πεπιστευμένων προσώπων ἐμφαινομένου τῇ προσηγορίᾳ ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸ πρόσφορον. Καὶ ὡς ἂν μὴ παρ' ἑαυτῶν λέγειν τι δοκοίημεν, τὰ τῆς προφητείας παραθησόμεθα ῥήματα. Ὁ θρόνος σου, φησὶν, ὁ Θεὸς, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, ῥάβδος εὐθύτητος, ἡ ῥάβδος τῆς βασιλείας σου. Ἠγάπησας δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐμίσησας ἀνομίαν· διὰ τοῦτο ἔχρισέ σε ὁ Θεὸς, ὁ Θεός σου, ἔλαιον ἀγαλλιάσεως παρὰ τοὺς μετόχους σου. Ἐν τούτοις γὰρ διὰ μὲν τοῦ θρόνου τὴν ἐπὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν διασημαίνει ὁ λόγος. Ἡ δὲ ῥάβδος τῆς εὐθύτητος τὸ ἀδέκαστον ἑρμηνεύει τῆς κρίσεως. Τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀγαλλιάσεως ἔλαιον, τὴν τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος παρίστησι δύναμιν, ᾧ χρίεται παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ Θεὸς, τουτέστι, παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὁ Μονογενής, ἐπειδὴ ἠγάπησε δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐμίσησεν ἀδικίαν. ^C Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦν ποτε, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν φίλος τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἐχθρὸς δὲ τῆς ἀδικίας, ἀκόλουθον ἦν τὸ μηδὲ κεχρίσθαι ποτὲ λέγειν, τὸν διὰ τοῦτο κεχρίσθαι λεγόμενον, ὅτι ἠγάπησε δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐμίσησεν ἀδικίαν. Εἰ δὲ πάντοτε φίλος δικαιοσύνης, οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἑαυτὸν μισήσειε, δικαιοσύνη ὢν, πάντοτε δηλονότι καὶ ἐν τῷ χρίσματι θεωρεῖται. Ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ δίκαιος οὐκ ἄδικος, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἄχριστος ἂν εἴη ποτὲ ὁ χριστός· ὁ δὲ μηδέποτε ἄχριστος, ἀεὶ πάντως χριστός. Ὅτι τοίνυν ὁ ἄδικος; ^D

ἄδικος ^A has iniquity. But if he always loved justice—nor indeed could it ever happen that he should at any time hate himself, since justice itself always existed—then he was surely not anointed from the beginning, but from all time; that is, he is understood to be Christ. And just as the just man is in no wise unjust, so too he could never be Christ without unction, nor can he be. Wherefore, no one will deny that He who anoints is the Father, and that the unction is the Holy Spirit, unless he has his heart covered by the Jewish veil.

LIII. How, then, does he say that we do not claim Christ to have been from the beginning?

He himself is life; and therefore, at the end of the human life, when our wickedness had already increased to its utmost point, so that nothing of our malice might remain unhealed, he then receives the commingling with our lowly nature, and taking man into himself, and himself coming to be in man—as he says to the disciples: “I in you, and you in me”—he made that which had been commingled with him [to be] what he himself was. But he himself was always the Most High; therefore, he also exalted that which was lowly, for the One who is above all need not be exalted. The Word, however, was Christ and Lord, and that same [Word] also becomes the One who was assumed and commingled with the divinity; for he who is Lord is not re-appointed to lordship, but the form of the servant is raised to the same dignity of the Lord. Wherefore, “One Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things,” is likewise called Christ—the One who before the ages put on the glory of the Spirit (for this is what the anointing signifies through symbols), and after the Passion, adorning the man united to him with that same unction, makes [him] Christ; for, “Glorify me,” he says, ^C as if to say, “Anoint me,” with the glory which I had with thee before the world was. But the glory which is seen before the world and the creation of all things, and before all ages, with which the Only-begotten God is glorified, could not, in our opinion, be any other ^D than the glory of the Father; for only [the] progenitor who...

^A prior is what the true faith teaches us. He who is before the ages, says the prophet, is of the Father, and concerning the Only-begotten Son, "Through him," says the Apostle, "the ages were made"; and the glory which is understood to exist before the ages in the Only-begotten God, is indeed the Holy Spirit. Therefore, what was proper to Christ while he was with the Father, before the world was, this also becomes proper to Him who was united to Christ at the end of the ages. For Jesus, he says, the one from Nazareth, whom God anointed with the Holy Spirit—so let no one slander our discourse, as if we said that Christ the Only-begotten God is not always; but rather, Christ is always, both regarding the dispensation and after this. But the man was neither before this, nor after these things, but only in the time of the dispensation. For neither was the man before the Virgin, nor after the ascent into the heavens is the flesh ^B still in its own properties. For if we have known Christ according to the flesh, he says, yet now we know him no longer. For because God was manifested in the flesh, the flesh did not remain; but because the human is mutable, while the Divine is immutable, the Godhead is immovable towards every change, neither being altered toward the worse (for it does not admit the worse, and the better it does not have). But human nature in Christ ^C uses the change towards the better, having been altered from the corruptible to the incorruptible, from the ephemeral to the inviolable, from the short-lived to the eternal, from the corporeal and configured to the incorporeal and unconfigured.

LIV. Concerning the fact that they assert that we say that the man suffered, and not God, let them hear this from us: that we confess the Godhead to be in him who suffered, but not that the impassible nature has become passible. And that what is said may become clearer, having this... ^D

^A our opinion: Human nature, endowed with an intellectual soul, has its subsistence joined to a body. And this conjunction of both takes place through a certain material substance, which is placed as a foundation before its constitution. That matter, having been formed into a living being by divine power, becomes a man; so that if one were to grant, by way of hypothesis, that the creative power of God does not intervene in forming the living being, the matter would remain entirely idle and unmoved, not being brought to life by the productive energy. As, therefore, we understand a certain life-giving power to supervene upon matter in us, by which man, consisting of soul and body, is formed: so it happened in the Virgin Mary that the power of the Most High, immaterially insinuated into the immaculate body through the life-giving Spirit, and assuming the incorrupt purity of the Virgin into the material of the flesh, received that part contributed from the virginal body for the forming of the fetus. And in that way a new man was truly fashioned, who alone and for the first time demonstrated in himself such a mode of subsistence, having been formed in a divine and not human fashion—the divine power flowing through the entire nature of that composition ^B in such a way that neither part was devoid of the Godhead, but the Godhead coalesced and harmonized with both, I mean soul and body, suitably and fittingly according to the measure of each. As, therefore, at the birth of man, the Godhead had no need to be born—being before all ages and remaining for eternity—but once having become united in the constitution of the man, it appears along with him at his very birth; so neither does It need to rise again, being eternally living; but It rises again in the one who is brought back to life by the divine power, not Itself being raised (for It has not fallen), but in Itself raising up the one who had fallen. If, therefore, the Divine ^C generally has no need of birth or resurrection, it is evident that the Passion also is accomplished, not as the Godhead suffering, but as Existing in the one who was suffering, and, through the union entered upon with him, rendering his suffering proper to Itself. For the divine nature, as has been said, having been suitably insinuated into both soul and body, and having become one with each—since, it says, "The gifts of God are without repentance"—does not withdraw from either of these, but remains perpetually. For there is nothing that separates any man from union with God, except sin; but whose life is immune from every stain of sin, his union with God can in no way be severed. ^D LV. Since, therefore, sin had no place in either, that is, in soul or body, in both accordingly it was…

^A present after the manner of either nature. But when death brought about the separation of the soul from the body, that which was composite was indeed dissolved, but that which is incomposite was not divided; rather, it existed in each part indivisibly. A proof that God was in the body is that the flesh was preserved in incorruption after death—for incorruption is entirely proper to God—and a proof that he did not depart from the soul is that through it the way into paradise was opened to the thief.

Since, therefore, the mystery was fulfilled, the divine power having entered into the twofold human nature, and having deposited the life-giving energy in each ^B related part—through the flesh in the body, and through the soul in the soul (I mean the intellectual soul, not the irrational one, for that which is mindless is beastly and not human)—then the divinity, which from the beginning was mingled with the body and the soul and had remained throughout, is raised in the resurrection of him who had died. And so Christ is said to have risen from the dead—the same being both Christ and having become so: being Christ according to his pre-eternal kingdom, but having become so when the angels announced to the shepherds the great joy which was to be for all the people at the birth of the Savior, who is, he says, Christ the Lord, appropriately named according to the word of Gabriel, who said that the Holy Spirit would come upon the Virgin and the power of the Most High would overshadow her.

He who was thus born is therefore rightly called both Christ and Lord: Lord on account of the power of the Most High, and Christ on account of the Spirit of unction. For he who is eternal is not then anointed, but rather he of whom he says, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee" (Ps. II, 7). For "today" is the middle between the two parts of time, the past and the future. But how can the creator of the ages be born and anointed in a part of time? So the divinity ^C has neither died nor been raised: it has not died, because that which is uncompounded is not dissolved; but it is raised, because, being in that which was dissolved, it caused that which had fallen according to the law of human nature to rise again together with itself, so that by being present in each part, offering what is proper to it, it might heal the nature of bodies through the body, and that of souls through the soul; and again, by uniting through itself that which had been separated, it rises in the one who is raised.

And just as there is nothing to prevent the mystery of the dispensation concerning the resurrection from being indicated corporeally: just as if, therefore, a reed were split in two, and one were to unite the tips of the pieces of the reed at one end, the whole piece of the reed would of necessity be fitted to the other, by being joined to the opposite end through the meeting and fastening at the first end; so too the ^D presence of the soul to the body in him...

^A by means of the resurrection, brings the entire human nature—which had been cloven in two by death and divided into soul and body—into a synthesis, having harmonized in the hope of the resurrection the gathering together of those things that had been separated. And this is that which is spoken by Paul: that Christ has risen from the dead, the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep, and as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. For according to the example of the reed, on the one hand, from the side that takes its beginning from Adam, our nature was cloven through sin, with the soul being divided from the body by death. But from the side that pertains to Christ, nature again takes itself back, the division in its entirety being grown together again in the resurrection of the man who is in Christ. For this reason, therefore, we die together with Him who died for us—I do not mean this necessary and common death of our nature, for this happens even to those who do not wish it—but since it is fitting that we should die willingly and gladly with Him who died ^B voluntarily, it follows that we must discern a death that is in our own power, for it is not possible for that which happens by necessity to be an imitation of that which is voluntary. Since, then, the death that is imposed by nature upon each one happens to everyone and in every way, both to those who wish it and those who do not, and no one would ever call that which happens of necessity voluntary, for this reason we die together with Him who died voluntarily in another way, being buried by the mystical water through baptism. For, We were buried with Him, he says, through baptism into death, that the imitation of the resurrection might follow upon the imitation of the death.

LVI. But let us proceed to the next part of the discourse.

^A Therefore, the human mind is equal to the divinity, if, as Apollinaris says, the divine nature became the mind of man. For if the human nature receives in like manner either our mind, or God in the place of the mind, these would be equal to each other in magnitude and on an equal footing, if indeed the divinity is also contained in that in which the mind is contained. Just as if one were to measure out grain, or any other of the seeds, into some empty vessel, no one would say that what is measured by the same measure differs from the other in quantity; for the grain of oats is equal to the wheat, when the bushel is emptied of those seeds and applied to a different task. Therefore, if the divinity occupies the place of the mind, no one would say that the divinity is more excellent than the mind, since the human nature receives it just as it receives the latter. Either, then, the mind is equal to the divinity, as Apollinaris wishes, and in passing from its own state into that one it was not changed; or the mind is inferior to the Divine, and this, having been made from the former, was changed into the baser state. But who does not know that everything conceived within creation has fallen far short of the inaccessible and unapproachable nature, so that if anyone were to say the ^B Divine has been changed, even into a creature or a mind, the change would be equal? So if Apollinaris does not think that becoming a mind constitutes a change, nor that being mixed with man without a faculty of understanding implies change, he bears witness to that which was commingled as being immutable. But if it was not changed when it became flesh, much more did it remain in the immutable state while making the commingling with the mind. But if he accuses the change by the fact of it becoming a mind, then the appropriation to the flesh does not entirely escape the accusation of alteration.

He says further (for I omit the things in between): If after the resurrection He became God and is no longer man, how will the Son ^C of man send forth His angels? And how shall we see the Son of man coming upon the clouds of heaven? How also, even before He was united and deified, does He say: "I and the Father are one"? He discusses these things, establishing through the aforementioned points that the nature of the body was transformed in no way toward the more divine, but that the hairs, the nails, the form, the ^D figure, the description of the mass, and—

^A the interior and exterior parts of the same body remain in Christ unchanged. I, however, consider it superfluous to prove at length that one ought not to have such base and groveling thoughts about God, since the very discourse of the adversaries reveals how absurd this opinion is. But lest they think that the divine oracles contribute anything to the fabrication of this myth, I will briefly run through each of their sayings. Since, he says, the one who sends the angels at the consummation of the universe is called the Son of Man, he thinks for that reason that one must believe he will remain forever in those things that are proper to the human body. He does not remember the word of the Gospel, where in many places the Lord by his own words called God, who is over all, a man. “A man was a householder,” who let out his vineyard to tenants; and after the slaughter of his servants, he sent his only-begotten Son, whom the same tenants, casting him out of the vineyard, killed. Who was that man who sent his only-begotten Son? And who was the son who was killed outside the vineyard? And in that parable of the one who made a marriage feast for his son, does not the Scripture describe this very one as a man? What if we were to say that Christ, intending to provide for the infirmity of those who, because they despised in him a nature similar to their own, could not be brought to believe in his divinity, therefore said that the Son of Man would send angels in the last judgment, so that he might strengthen their weak and infirm minds, seized by fear, in the faith, and by the expectation of terrible things might heal their unbelief regarding those things which they saw with their own eyes? “But you will see,” he says, “the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven with much power and majesty.” This surely agrees perfectly with what we previously taught, whether concerning that man who planted the vineyard and made a marriage for his son, ^C or according to the previously given meaning. And that the discourse is entirely removed from the base supposition of Apollinaris, and that such a discourse suggests that one should conceive of nothing bodily concerning him, is a clear proof from the fact that it is added to the word which signifies his appearance at the end of the ages, that then all will see the Lord in the glory of his Father—so that it must necessarily be concluded from what is said either that the Father is also endowed with a human form, so that the Son, who is to be seen in human form, may appear in the glory of the Father; or, if the majesty of the paternal glory lacks any form or visible appearance, one must acknowledge ^D the rest—namely, all that is both visible and whatever else is invisible—and also think that the Father is formed in a human way, so that the Son who appears according to the human shape may appear in the glory of the Father. But if the majesty of the paternal glory is pure from every form viewed in an outward appearance, then one must not think that he himself is fashioned in a human way, he who is promised to be seen in the glory of the Father. For the glory of a man is one thing, and the glory of the God who is over all is another. But, he says, through

speaking of the flesh to men, that "I and the Father are one." O the folly of imagining a proof that His manifestation in human form would occur after this, because the Lord said, while speaking through the flesh, that He is one with the Father! ^A Does he not then, by this statement, absolutely establish that the Father also lives precisely in the flesh? For if he who said that he is one with the Father intends for the unity to be understood not in a spiritual sense, but in a human one, as Apollinaris thinks, then the Father is that same thing which the Son was then seen to be according to man. But since the Divine is outside of all bodily concepts, the union of the Son with the Father was not, therefore, according to a human form, but according to the communion of the divine nature and power. And that these things are in this state is most clearly shown from those words which He says to Philip: "He who has seen me has seen the Father." For the precise understanding of the Son's majesty prepares one to see the archetype ^B as in an image.

As for the things that follow, because of their incoherence and unintelligibility, I shall pass over them, so that I may not spend my time in vain on foolish things; for through them he does not even make clear what he wishes to say to those who carefully follow his writing. For I cannot see what it contributes to his argument for him to say that no one snatches the sheep given to Him by the Father out of His hand, and that by the Father’s divinity He draws the sheep to Himself, and, "If Christ," he says, "is united with the Father ^C before the resurrection, how is He not united with the God who is in Him?" For this, as if he intentionally wanted to refute his own fabulations, he inserts into his own arguments, through which the separation and union of the human with the Divine is demonstrated. For he who says, "If Christ is united with the Father, how is He not united with the God in Him?"—thus also the man in Christ, being another, is united with the God in Him. These things, therefore, as they refute the error and instability of his doctrine by their very reading, I shall pass over in my discourse; but I will mention only this one thing. ^D "The Savior," he says, "suffered hunger, and thirst, and fatigue, and anguish, and sorrow." Who is this Savior? He is God, he says in the previous parts, not two Persons, as if one Person were God and another were man. Therefore, God has suffered those things which he said He suffered; and He suffers what is in no way capable of suffering, not by the necessity of a nature that is forced—as is the case with man—but by the consistency of His nature. Indeed, who will be sufficient to refute such vain notions? In what does he see a difference between the necessity of nature and the consistency of nature? For truth sees the same meaning in each; for example, what I am saying,

that it follows that one who is not healthy in his eyes should have weak vision. And again I say the same thing, that it is necessary, if one is not healthy in his eyes, that he should have weak vision. Is the sense of both statements not the same? For he who speaks of necessity indicates what happens as a consequence; and he who mentions what follows indicates what is necessary. Why, then, does the wisdom of our writer wish to attribute the passions of our nature to the Savior, ^B not by the necessity of nature, but by the consistency and accompaniment of nature? "It was necessary," he says, "that the passions be stirred according to the likeness of men." He who said "it was necessary," has he not clearly pronounced that it is a necessity? Is this not the usage of Scripture? Indeed, from the Gospels themselves it is easy to take proofs of this locution: "It is necessary that scandals come," for "these things must also happen." Is the meaning of both expressions not one and the same? For he who said that it is necessary that scandals come, indicated by those words that it must be that scandals come; and he who said, "These things must happen," indicated what necessarily must be brought to effect.

LIX.

it mingles itself with men. But as for the things which he breathes out like souls at the end of his treatise, as if they were certain mere gasps, he entangles them with bodiless concepts, which I think should be passed by without examination; for where he is pressed, he calls upon the Greeks to defend his own fables. And regarding all other things similar to these, whoever loves to discern the weakness of this heresy throughout its entire length should proceed to the things written. We, however, do not have so much leisure as to delve into such words, which of themselves manifestly carry the evidence of their own absurdity, and possess the refutation of their strangeness even before they are examined; whoever desires to have the futility of this heresy thoroughly recognized and perceived, let him run through his writings; for we do not have enough leisure to be able to spend much time discussing discourses of this kind, which obviously carry in themselves the cause from which one may, without any examination, refute their ineptitudes and errors. ^A

OF THE SAME GREGORY AGAINST APOLLINARIUS TO THEOPHILUS BISHOP OF ALEXANDRIA

The great city of the Alexandrians is prolific not only in secular wisdom, but the fountains of true and genuine wisdom have flowed from the beginning among you. For this reason it seems right to me, as it appears to my judgment, that if to those who have the greater power for the promotion of what is right, more support should be contributed to them for the defense of the mystery of the truth; for as the sublime Gospel says somewhere, "To whom much is given, from him the more shall be required." ^B Therefore you would be just, if you were to oppose with all the power that is in you—by divine grace and in your Church—the falsely named knowledge of those who are always inventing something new against the truth, by which the harmony according to God is severed, the great and venerable name of the Christians is shrouded in silence, and the Church is divided into human appellations; and what is most terrible of all, that men rejoice to be named after those who lead them into error. If, indeed, it were possible for the prophetic prayer to come to its fulfillment at all, and for sinners and the lawless to vanish from the earth, so that ^C

they no longer existed, that would be a thing to be preferred above all else. But since the words of the wicked prevail, strengthened by the cooperation of the adversary to gain power against the truth, it ought to be welcomed if we can at least diminish and hinder these evils, lest the augmentation of worse things, which is produced day by day, be carried too far.

What, however, do these words imply? ^A For those who favor the dogmas of Apollinaris, because of the censures prepared against us, attempt to establish their own cause by making the Word a creature of flesh, the maker of the ages the Son of man, and the divinity of the Son mortal. For they pretend, as if there were some in the Catholic Church who worship two sons in their creed—one, indeed, according to nature, and another subsequently acquired according to adoption. I know not from whom they have heard such things, nor against what person they are contending; for I have yet to meet one who has uttered such things.

Nevertheless, since they set forth this charge against us, and by seeming to impugn such an impiety they corroborate their own opinions, it is well that your perfection in Christ, as the Holy Spirit may put it into your mind, should cut off the pretexts of those who seek pretexts against us, and persuade those who calumniously attribute these things to the Church of God that no such dogma exists among Christians, nor is it preached. For it is not because the Maker of the ages was seen on earth in the last days, and conversed with men, that therefore two sons are numbered in the Church: the one the Maker of the ages, ^B and the other he who appeared in the flesh to the human race at the consummation of the ages.

For if anyone, from the appearance of the only-begotten Son of God in the flesh, which was effected for the sake of the dispensation, concludes that another son has been produced, he must, if he also counts up all the theophanies that were offered to holy men before the manifestation of the only-begotten Son of God in the flesh, and those which were offered to the saints again after that, set down a multitude of sons in proportion to the number of the divine manifestation. And there will be for him one son, he who conversed with Abraham; another, the one who appeared to Isaac; another, he who wrestled with Jacob; another, different still, who showed himself to Moses in various apparitions—in the light, in the darkness, in the pillar of cloud, in the vision face to face, and in the hindermost parts; another son, again, who stood in the battle line with the successor of Moses; and another who spoke to Job through the whirlwind; and he who appeared to Isaiah on a high throne, and he who was described by Ezekiel in human form by his narrative; and he who later flashed around Paul in the light; and before that, he who appeared to those with Peter upon the mountain in higher glory.

^{C D} If then it is absurd and utterly impious to divide the various theophanies of the only-begotten Son of God into a number of sons, it involves an equal absurdity to consider the appearance through the flesh as a pretext for

^A another son’s construction. For we consider that, in proportion to the capacity of the powers of those who received the divine manifestation, the vision of the super-eminent nature has always occurred—greater and more worthy of God to those capable of attaining that height, but lesser and more humble to those unable to contain the greater. ^B For this reason, He does not offer Himself to human life in the dispensation through the flesh in the same way as in previous manifestations. But since all, as the Prophet says, have turned aside and together become unprofitable, and there was not, as it is written, anyone who could understand and seek out the height of the Godhead, for this reason the only-begotten Son, appearing to a more carnal generation, becomes flesh, contracting Himself according to the smallness of the one receiving Him; or rather, as the Scripture says, emptying Himself, so that as much as the nature contains, so much it might receive. For that we have learned clearly from the Lord’s voice that that generation was, beyond those which had preceded it, liable to condemnation, in that He says the Sodomites and Ninevites were more tolerable than they, and the Lord decreed that that generation would be condemned in the resurrection by the Queen of the South. If, indeed, all had been able, like Moses, to enter into the darkness in which Moses saw the things that cannot be seen; or, like the sublime Paul, to be caught up above the three heavens, and in paradise to be taught the ineffable things regarding matters beyond reason; or, like the zealous Elijah, to be caught up by fire to the ethereal region, and not be burdened by the weight of the body; or, like Ezekiel and Isaiah, to behold Him sitting upon the throne of glory, or being exalted by the Cherubim, or being glorified by the Seraphim, there would have been no need at all for this manifestation of our God through the flesh, if all had been such. But since, as the Lord says, that generation was an ^C evil and adulterous generation—evil, because, as the Gospel says, the whole world at that time lay in wickedness; and adulterous, because it had abandoned its good bridegroom and had been mingled with the one who through wickedness defiles souls with adultery—for this reason, the true physician, healing those who were ill, applied his care to the sufferer just as the disease required the cure, and in a way, He Himself conformed to the sickness of our nature, and became flesh, which in its own nature has inherent weakness, as the divine voice teaches, that “the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.” If, therefore, the divine, having been placed in the human, and the immortal in the mortal, and the powerful in the weak, and the unchangeable and incorruptible in the changeable and corruptible, had allowed the mortal to remain in mortality, or the corruptible in corruption, and the rest in like manner to the others, one might reasonably have perceived a duality in the Son of God, numbering each of the things viewed as opposites separately by itself. But if the mortal, having become in the immortal,

^A has become immortality, and the corruptible has likewise changed into incorruption, and all other things have similarly been transformed into that which is impassible and divine, what reasoning remains for those who divide the One into a dual distinction? For the Word was the Word both before the flesh and after the dispensation in the flesh, and is so; and God was God both before the form of a servant and after it, and is God; and the true light, both before it shone in the darkness and after these things, is the true light.

^B If, therefore, every concept befitting to God concerning the Only-Begotten is seen to be immutable and unchangeable throughout, and He is ever the same, subsisting in the same way in Himself, how does anyone compel us to call the manifestation of Him that took place through the flesh a duality of sons, as if there were one Son, He who was before the ages, and another Son who came into the light when He was born of God through the flesh? For we have learned from the mystery and we believe that the human nature, being united to the Word, has been saved; but that a carnal Son of God is viewed privately by Himself, we have neither learned, nor do we understand from what logical ^C consequence this could be gathered. For when He became sin and a curse for our sake, as the Apostle says, and took upon Himself our infirmities, as Isaiah bears witness, He did not leave the sin, and the curse, and the infirmity unhealed in His own person; but the mortal was swallowed up by life, and He who was crucified through weakness now lives by the power of God; and the curse has been transformed into a blessing; and whatever was weak and transient in our nature, once it was mingled with the Godhead, became that which the Godhead is itself. How then could anyone conceive of a duality of sons, as if led by some necessity through the dispensation in the flesh to such an assumption? For He who is always in the Father, and always has the Father in Himself, and is united to Him—as He was formerly, so He is now, and shall be—neither was, nor ^D became, nor shall be any Son other than Him. But the firstfruits of human nature which have been taken up by the omnipotent Godhead are—if one were to use a fitting comparison—like a drop of vinegar mingled in an immense ocean: they are indeed in the Godhead, but not in their own peculiar properties. For in this way a duality of sons would consistently be suspected if, within the ineffable Godhead of the Son, a nature of a different kind were recognized by its own peculiar signs, such that one part were weak, or small, or corruptible, or transient, while the other were powerful, and great, and incorruptible, and eternal. But since all things viewed along with the mortal in the state of mortality have been transformed into the properties of the Godhead, such that no difference is discovered in any respect—for whatever one sees of the Son is Godhead, wisdom, power, sanctification, impassibility—how could the One be divided into

how can that which is one be divided in its conception, when there is no difference upon which a distinction of number can be based? For the Divinity has superexalted that which was humble, and has bestowed upon that which was called by a human name the name that is above every name, and has made that which was subject and servile both Lord and King; just as Peter says, that "God hath made Him both Lord and Christ" (Acts 2:36). For indeed we understand ^A His kingdom through Christ, and because of the exact union of the assumed flesh and the assuming Godhead, the names are exchanged, so that the human is named after the divine, and the divine after the human. Wherefore, also, He who was crucified is called "Lord of glory" by Paul (1 Cor. 2:8), and He who is adored by every creature of things in heaven, and of things on earth, and of things under the earth, is named Jesus (Phil. 2:10). For by these things the true and indivisible union is interpreted, from the fact that the ineffable glory of the Godhead is signified by the appellation of the Son, when "every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father," so that He who underwent the sufferings of the cross, and was pierced with nails, and wounded with a spear, is called "Lord of glory" by Paul. If therefore the human is not shown in the properties of nature, but is the Lord of glory, no one would dare to affirm two Lords of glory, having learned that there is one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things: whence, I ask, do they cast the duality of sons in our teeth, or allege a fabricated accusation against us, as a specious opportunity to establish their own opinions? These are, therefore, the things which we can bring forward for our defense; but from your perfection in Christ, we ask for a greater and more perfect aid for the defense of the faith, so that no handle may be left for those who attack the truth, who strengthen their own fabrications by our censure. ^{B C}

PREFACE OF ANGELO MAI ON THE TWO FOLLOWING OPUSCULA

1. It was the fate of the authors of the ancients, and of their books, that after the invention of printing they did not immediately appear in a complete edition, but were produced repeatedly and at intervals, as each work offered itself to those seeking it. Certainly that great Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, after some minor editions, was at last collected into two volumes, appearing in Paris in the year 1615 and shining with a more splendid light. But behold, in the following year, 1616, Jacob Gretser produced a magnificent addition to Nyssen from German codices; which the Parisian printer Morellus, having hastily reprinted it in the year 1618, made an appendix to his later volume. But the matter did not rest there; for L. A. Zacagni, the prefect of the Vatican Library, displayed new and abundant additions to Nyssen in his famous volume of *Collectanea*, published at Rome in the year 1698. Finally, J. B. Caracciolus, a professor from Pisa, brought to press seven unpublished epistles of Nyssen, found in the Medicean codex at Florence. Now we, the last to...

^A supply the editions of Nyssen, add two more dogmatic treatises of so great a Father, which vellum codex 1906 of the Vatican, an ancient, large, and comprehensive collection of Nyssen’s works, has provided us. Since we had printed these two writings in the final portion of our volume of ancient writers some years ago, in haste and without any exposition, we now re-examine the codex; having corrected errors, filled in missing portions, added our own Latin interpretation along with some scholia, and cited testimonies from the Holy Scriptures, we bring them from the end of that old volume to the beginning of this new one.

II. But so that readers may form a just estimation of these sermons, I ask that they turn their minds to the times in which Gregory lived, which were full of Arians and other heretics, under the Arian emperors Constantius and Valens, who exhausted the resources of the supreme empire in order to destroy orthodoxy and stabilize a most foul heresy. Then, in addition to other miseries, came the impious Macedonius, who, having twice occupied the Byzantine see, poured out his venom primarily against the divine dignity of the Holy Spirit. But behold, under the great Emperor Theodosius, the first general council was celebrated ^B in the year 381, at which sat, among others, the most illustrious Fathers of the Church and hammers of the heretics of their time: Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Amphilochius of Iconium. It was around those times, indeed, that these sermons of Nyssen, especially the latter one, were written. The former, in fact, appears to be a certain address [Greek: προσφωνητικός] sent to a specific man—whether he was orthodox or stationed in the enemy’s camp—whose author attempts to persuade him of the divinity of the Son. For, having set before himself the objections of Arius and Sabellius, and especially those of Achilles, a chief of the Arians, taken from the Gospel and the Apostle Paul, he dissolves them very acutely and strengthens the truth of the faith on all sides. And this, a notable point, occurs immediately on the first page, where Nyssen says that the Father was called [Greek: υἱοπάτωρ] by the Sabellians, because, confounding the Father with the Son, they denoted by that combination of words that the Father and the Son were one and the same. Nor does Nyssen dissent from himself in *Orat. II contra Eunomium*, t. II, p. 733, where he says: "Those who refer the word 'Son' not to the person, but to the nature, will fall into the error of the heretics who are called [Greek: υἱοπάτορες] (Hyopatores)." Naturally, since there is one nature of the Father and the Son, no distinction of persons would remain. More clearly still, Cyril in *Joan. cap. VIII*, p. 243: "The Father is distinct from the Son, and one must not introduce a 'Hyiopator' or 'Filiopater,' as has seemed proper to some unlearned heretics." Likewise, the seventh Constantinopolitan canon: "Those who teach the Sabellianism of the 'hyiopatoria,' etc." Finally, Ammonius in the *Catena on Job* 1, 1: "He overturns the heresy of Sabellius," he says, "designating the hypostasis of the Father and the Son; for the Church does not admit a 'hyiopatoria'." Suicer reports all these testimonies, except for our new one, yet he dissents from Nyssen and is mistaken while thinking that the name 'Hyiopator' was given by the Sabellians to the Son rather than to the Father. For, besides the fact that the authority of Nyssen is clear, it is established from elsewhere that the Sabellians did not admit [the distinct existence of] the Son, but only of the Father. However, Allatius seems to me to be more seriously mistaken than Suicer (whose testimonies I have invoked in order to correct him, if it is permitted to dare such a thing against so great a man). For he, against Creyght., *exercit.* 10, in the argument p. 165, proposes to define what the heresy of the [Greek: υἱοπατορίας] is. Then ^C on p. 189 he writes as follows: "Under the papacy of Damasus, a heresy arose—whether disseminated by the Arians or born of others—which asserted that, as the Father is the generator of the Son, so the Son is the generator of the Holy Spirit; and thus it posited two sons in the Trinity, the Son and the Holy Spirit; and two fathers, the Father and the Son." And again on p. 187: "Therefore, the authors of the [Greek: υἱοπατορίας] held that the Spirit was generated by the Son; and therefore they asserted that the Son was the Father of the Spirit; and by this they introduced two fathers in the Trinity, the unbegotten Father and the begotten Son; and two sons, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit." I say that Allatius seems to me to be mistaken; for in the aforementioned testimonies there is never any question of the Holy Spirit, nor is it ever asked whether the Holy Spirit is the Son of the Son. Therefore, 'hyiopatoria' is not spoken by the aforementioned sacred authors regarding the Son as generating the Holy Spirit, but only regarding the error of Sabellius, who, so that he might confound the Son with the Father, called the Father [Greek: υἱοπάτωρ] by joining the words. But if Allatius wishes to assign the name of 'hyiopatoria' to the heresy condemned by Damasus (*Labb. Concil.* t. II, p. 895 and 901), he certainly does not speak according to the mind of Nyssen, Cyril, and others; for among them, the 'hyiopator' is the Father confounded with the Son, not the Son [as] the father of the Holy Spirit. But as for this controversy regarding the term, let the judgment be that of more learned men.

III. The latter and longer sermon of Nyssen defends the majesty of the Holy Spirit and His equality with the Father and the Son against the Macedonians; the arguments of the Pneumatomachians are set forth and refuted, and confirmations of great weight are added from his own part. Now, indeed, it happened that I also obtained testimonies of the ancients for this second sermon, which I set forth on page 20 (col. 1307) in a Scholium. And regarding Allatius, whom I also cited there, I warn the readers that the same testimony is repeated by him in the [Greek: Vindiciae] of the Council of Ephesus, ch. 70. And that we may depart a little from our boundaries, Bandinius likewise relates in the *Catalogus Bib. Laur. Gr.* t. III, p. 324—relates, I say—that in the eighth Medicean codex, *Plut.* 86, among various excerpts of the Fathers, there is also read a fragment of Gregory of Nyssen from his oration on the Holy Spirit against the Macedonians. Whether it is identical to that cited by other Greeks (as is our note) or whether it is different, I truly cannot define without an inspection of the Florentine codex. But even if it perchance were not read in our pages, there remains a place for it in the lacuna ^D into which the end of the Vatican sermon sinks.

A SERMON OF GREGORY, AMONG THE SAINTS, AGAINST ARIUS AND SABELLIUS.

^A "My heart has poured forth a good word," 1 the Psalmist said just now. Those who follow Arius and Achillius, 2 in bringing forth this good word of God with most impious speech, have dared to proclaim it a creature and a work, and have dragged many into their own error. Those, on the other hand, who follow Sabellius, holding the contrary to these, attempt to take away the subsistence of the Son; and believing the Father himself, being one, to be adorned with two names, they call him "Son-Father" (hyiopator). 3 Both of these opinions are set as two traps by those aforementioned; but there proceeds a path, narrow and strait, which leads into life, according to the Gospel; from this, many men turn aside and become prey to the other. ^B You, however, seem to me 4 to fear the falls on either side, and for this reason to avoid the very path of truth, thinking that one ought not to make words about God. Take care, therefore, lest, fearing the error of both, you incur the punishment of impiety; for the Savior himself, standing at the head of the true way, cried out, saying: "I am the way and the truth." Turn not to the right hand nor to the left, that you may not fall into either of them. And again: "I am the door of the sheep; he who does not enter by me, but climbs up another way, is a thief and a robber," who also will be caught in a trap and perish. Let those, therefore, who have turned their minds to the error of either side hear—let them hear, I say—that our Savior Jesus Christ is ^C indeed the Son of God by nature and is so called, and is not a creature, used by abuse

^A in a human manner to be called Son; nor that He had a beginning, but that He is eternal; and therefore that He shall reign with the Father in His own hypostasis through infinite ages.

2. Yet perhaps someone will say: "Everything that lacks a beginning will also be unbegotten. How then can the Son rightly be called 'without beginning,' when His very name carries the suggestion of a beginning? For He is named Son from the fact that He has been begotten." And that generation includes the notion of a beginning, no one would deny. If, therefore, He is the Son, it is evident to us that He has received a beginning from His generation; and perhaps He will also have an end, someone might say, following philosophical reasoning. And the Apostle also says that He shall be subject to Him who subjected all things to Him, and shall deliver up the kingdom to God the Father; so that it may be supposed that He did not exist before He was begotten, and again will pass back into non-existence. Ascend with me to the safe citadel of faith, lest, as if swept away by a violent blast by the deceit of such arguments, like dust which the wind carries off, you be thrown from the narrow and straight path into the chasms of destruction. For if the universal Father is unbegotten and eternal, wise and powerful, and the Apostle, while proclaiming faith in Jesus, announces Him to all as Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God, how do they dare to enclose His generation within the limits of time, and not consider Him eternal and without beginning? For if, according to the opinion of some, the generation of our Savior is confined within a span of time, the honor ^B is violated not only of the Son, but also of the Father, according to the word of the Son Himself: "Neither do you know me, nor my Father. He who does not honor the Son, does not honor the Father"; implying as if He did not exist before He was begotten, or as if the latter did not have power and wisdom before the Son existed. Furthermore, it will be consistent for such people to think that God Himself did not exist before He became the Father of the Son; for how could He be God, if He did not possess power and wisdom? But if it has been proclaimed to us by the divine Scriptures that God is eternal, then He must be believed to have always possessed wisdom and power, that is, Christ, with Himself.

3. I remember that I promised before ^C that I would show you the image of those things concerning the Father and the Son as if in a mirror, since divine matters are not subject to human speech. For God Himself does not converse with us according to the proper power of His greatness, but attempers His voice to human hearing, so that it may be possible for us to receive the divine voice with our ears. Just as He also adapts His immense and incomprehensible greatness to human sight, and being God, He appeared as man; for He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant ^D , so that we men might be able to see God. Just as, therefore, we believe that, although He is not man, He appeared as man, although by His own nature He was and is God, because He circumscribed His immeasurable greatness in a body, and through Himself, as if through a mirror, the whole...

^A of God's greatness is shown to us, that using it as a sort of lens, we might become spectators of the Father as well. For as He is the image of the invisible God, according to the Apostle, He has said: "He who has seen me, has seen the Father." 10 So, too, through those things which are spoken in the Scriptures according to the measure of our hearing—things which, however, for the most part do not befit the Godhead because of the weakness of language—let us contemplate Him proportionally in our mind. For just as God, circumscribed by a body, appeared to our sight, so too the Word, being less than God, is proclaimed for our hearing.

4. ^B It has been demonstrated, as we said before, by this Scripture, that human language could not convey God and the things pertaining to Him. Since no part of speech remained to signify the eternity of the Son, the Scripture signifies, as if by an enigma, that the Son is contemporary with the Father by saying: "Before the morning star I begot you," 11 and "Before all the hills He begets me," 12 and of every creature. By placing this part of the discourse first, the Scripture declares Him to be without beginning; for that which transcends all things, especially when it is said to exist before the ages, turns our mind toward eternity and the negation of an origin. How, therefore, is He who sits [communal-seated] with the Father inscribed as being the Son and begotten? I offer you an image of these things, since human language does not reach into the things of nature: the ray from the sun. Why would you not say that light is ordered from a lamp? But just as the sun is not first, and then the ray, but at the same time as the sun exists or comes to be, the ray also exists and is begotten; and at the same time as the lamp exists, the light also exists; and that which is begotten by the lamp does not appear after some time, but it appears begotten along with it: so is it not first God and afterwards His wisdom, but together with the God of all who always existed, there was also Wisdom, that is, Christ; although, being begotten by God, Wisdom is reasonably called the offspring of Him who manifests it. ^C The phrase, "Before all the hills He begets me," indicates that the Savior is always being begotten for human beings by the Father. And the phrase, "Today I have begotten you," 13 even though He was begotten before and always exists with Him, by taking "today" as a part of time, the Scripture signifies that He is always being begotten for those coming after Him, until "today" is called. But if "today" shall be limited to this world by its end, He is no longer begotten, but, having been begotten once for all, and having sat down as the judge and arbiter of the living and the dead of all, He shall reign eternally with the Father.

5. ^D That the saying, "The Lord created me the beginning of His ways for His works," 14 may not stir up thoughts in those whose mind is corrupted, this also must not be passed over. For the interpreters, considering some small part of the Hebrew accuracy of the Scriptures,

while turning it into Greek, declined and said *created*: but in reality, upon a scholarly examination, you will find it is rather *made*. Although even the expression *created me*, if it be carefully considered, will not appear to differ from the locution *made me*. For if He had said only, "The Lord created me," He would have left a question for some; but because He added, *the beginning of His ways for His works*, it is clearly understood to say: "The Lord made me, that I might preside over His works, and He entrusted to me the beginning of His ways." For when did the Father have a beginning of His ways? Or when was He not operative? Or from whom did He receive the power and efficacy? For if one is said not to have always had all things with Himself, he is known to have received them from someone else, so that some other God, senior to Himself, is imagined. ^A "Who has first given to Him, and it shall be paid back to him?" says the Scripture. But if all things are from Him, then no beginning of His ways and His works shall ever be found, but it will be established that He was always operative. But if all things were made through the Son, and without Him was not anything made, then it is ^B plainly shown that He has always had the operative Wisdom with Himself. But if the Father is always working, and without the Son nothing has been done, how do they presume that *to be created* means to have been made at some later time so that He might work? But the phrase, *He created me the beginning of His ways*, signifies that "He entrusted His ways to me, that they might be under my authority"—for it speaks not of a temporal authority, but of a sovereign one. For the apostles also say that God "made Him both Lord and Christ." But if the term *made* ^C were to designate a thing created and a creature, there would be two whom He made, one being the Lord, and the other Christ. That Christ is called King, no one is ignorant; but the word *made* signifies two authorities entrusted to Him by the Father—the Lordly and the kingly, or rather one authority honored by two or more appellations. Therefore, let both parties, who are entangled in their respective errors, be persuaded that the Son has always existed with the Father, being both begotten and at the same time without beginning. Without beginning in that He has always been with the Father, yet begotten in that He has had the Father as the cause of His existence—just as we said ^D of the lamp, which is the cause of the brightness, yet is not before the brightness, but is contemporary with it. So, too, shall He be to eternity, and He shall never cease to reign; for since He did not begin, but declares that He is always working with the Father, when He says, "My Father is working until now, and I am working." Now, because the words "until now" refer to another, namely "from when"—since "from when" falls within time—by omitting the phrase "from when" and saying only "until now," He demonstrated that He has always worked all things with the Father. For He works until now, bringing forth, vivifying, increasing, and governing all things; and He will never cease; nor is it fitting for God to be idle, nor will He grow weary in working, so that He should have need of rest.

^A They use the Evangelical voice which says, "The one who sent me is greater than I," [note: John 14:28] from which they argue that Christ is a creature and a creation. Furthermore, because Jesus answered the one who called him "good teacher," saying, "No one is good except God alone," [note: Matt. 19:17] they say that this opinion was injected into them, that while He was a man, he held the appellation of Son only abusively. And this word, "No one knows the last day or the hour, not even the angels of heaven, nor the Son," as it is in Mark, "except the Father alone," [note: Mark 13:32] leads them, I suppose, to the suspicion that the Son is alien to the Father’s substance.

But those who follow Sabellius, because they read the words, "I and the Father are one," [note: John 10:30] and "He who has seen me has seen the Father," [note: John 14:9] and finally, "When he delivers the kingdom to God the Father," [note: 1 Cor. 15:24] without accurate judgment, have fallen into the greatest error of impiety, imagining that on account of man’s defection from God, the Son proceeded from the Father temporally, but that again, after the correction of human transgressions, having dissolved, He has entered into and been mixed back into the Father. Have you not read, O Sabellian, this passage of the apostolic Scripture, which might stand against your opinion? For it says, after other things: ^B "According to the working of the power of his might, which he worked in Christ, raising him from the dead, and seating him at his right hand in the heavenly places, above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this age, but also in the coming one." [note: Eph. 1:19-21]

Does not the Evangelical voice persuade you that the Son is not temporal, but that even in the coming age the judgment of all things has been entrusted to the Son? "For the Father," it says, "judges no one; but has given all judgment to the Son, that all may honor the Son even as they honor the Father." [note: John 5:22-23] And elsewhere the Apostle says: "In the revelation of the Lord Jesus," he says, "from heaven with the angels of his power, in flaming fire, giving vengeance to those who do not know God and to those who do not obey the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ." [note: 2 Thess. 1:7-8] See how those who do not obey will pay the penalty, he says, eternal destruction, when He comes to be glorified among His saints. They will pay it to the Son, whom you imagine to exist no longer.

^C 7. If you wish to know what the saying, "When he delivers the kingdom to God the Father," [note: 1 Cor. 15:24] means, it must not be hidden from you, even if you are slow to receive the truth.

^A And it seems to me that you oppose the command of Christ: "Do not cast your pearls before swine." But imitating God, I shall retain a good hope, and I will not conceal the truth even from the irreligious. For God rains equally, and sheds the light of day alike upon the just and the unjust. And you, having experienced such charity, will you not seek the truth? Will you not lend the ear of your mind, so that you might be persuaded that no part of the Scripture contradicts another, but that the whole is consistent and harmonious with the whole? Therefore, the phrase is not to be understood according to your notions: ^B "Then he himself will be subject to him who subjected all things to him," or, "When he delivers the kingdom to God the Father." For if in all things he became like the human race and suffered with it, according to the prophet: "He himself bears our iniquities, and is in pain for us; and he himself took our weaknesses and bore our infirmities," since he has clothed himself with that flesh capable of such sufferings, and for us, he says, "he made him sin," not that he committed sin, but as having taken it upon himself that we might be justified, and having become a curse for us that he might redeem us from the curse, and was even called a curse, choosing by his compassion to assume a name equal to ours; and thus, having accepted all these things in himself, having become like the human race, and having assumed the very form of a servant, as if he himself had sinned, and voluntarily offering his own person for the human race, he appeased the Father and turned him to mercy. And since the whole human race was not yet subject to the Son, while He himself, although in reality subject, yet seemed to bear the disobedience of the people before the Father, and was believed to have taken it upon himself—if all things shall eventually be subject to the Son (for we do not yet see all things subject to him), then he will say: "All things are subject to me." But when all things are subject to him, then he himself shall appear subjected to him who subjected all things to him; for if we were all of Christ, Christ would also be of God, and would be subject. But if we are not yet of Christ, then Christ is not yet of God, he who suffers for us. When therefore we have all become of Christ, then Christ will also be of God, through himself bringing all into subjection to the Father whom he had previously received from him, "that God may be all in all." Since he seems somehow not to be subject to the Father, because those entrusted to him, whose image he bears, are not yet subject to him. But when all things shall have been subject to him, ^D then he shall appear delivering the kingdom to God the Father. Furthermore, by "kingdom," we must not understand the dignity of the scepter; for the Father does not stand in need of royal dignity to receive from the Son what he had previously granted to him for his use and later calls back. For you seem to me to suggest such a thing. Moreover, you act impiously not only against the Son, by destroying his hypostasis, but also against the Father, whom you deny to be king;

^A nor to those who have reigned from him and been subjected to him. Having brought and delivered this kingdom, he will say: "This is a kingdom, this a priesthood, a holy nation, a people for my own possession"; and, "Behold I and the children which God has given me." For He Himself gave them to him, having subjected all the nations to him: "For I will give you the nations as your inheritance, and the ends of the earth as your possession."

8. Know, moreover, that the words, "I and the Father are one," do not in any way destroy the hypostasis of the Son. For they are one in essence, one in dignity, one in opinion, one in prudence, but not one in hypostasis. It will be shown ^B also from the Apostle that "the one" is not predicated of one and the same hypostasis, as it is often used, as in the case of "he who plants and he who waters." For the distributive name truly distinguishes the person, as: "Each shall receive his own reward according to his own labor." Thus, let "the one" be understood in such a way that it does not destroy the other hypostasis. Since, then, it has been demonstrated that neither of these expressions contradicts the other, but rather that both conspire to assert the true faith, cease from holding the Sabellian error, turn aside from evil belief, and do what is good, believing in the truth. May these things alone be sufficient for you to demonstrate that you think perversely.

9. Know also, you who are an Arian, Achillius ^C, for me. Having fared poorly in your faith, why have you abandoned the straight path and driven yourself into the chasms of dishonor against the Son, supposing him to be a creature and alien to the substance of God? Are not the names alone—that he is called the Wisdom and Power of God—sufficient for you as a proof that he has been begotten of the Father? You would surely agree that Wisdom and Power are not made by hands nor constructed, but are virtues of the soul and, as it were, fruits of a mind rooted in the sprout of wisdom. But if wisdom was created and constructed at some time, as you say, ^D then look lest you seem to me to contradict your own conceit by declaring the very one who is the most ancient of all time and creation—that is, the Son—to be one of whom it is said: "Without him was not anything made." Or if you should say that this [Wisdom] could be created, try also to show this to us openly, as if there were some other wisdom more ancient than this one, through which the second was constructed. For without wisdom it is impossible for anything to be constructed. For this reason, wisdom is with the Father, and is the firstborn of all creation, so that through it all things might be constructed. And the Son is also called the Word, so that he might be shown to be begotten and not be supposed to be a creature; for a word is begotten, but not created, being uttered indeed by the mouth, but moved from the heart. The Father bears witness

to me, saying: “My heart hath uttered a good word” (Ps. XLIV, 2). The Son likewise confesses: “I came forth from the mouth of the Most High” (Eccli. xxiv, 5). How then does your mind sustain ^A such a weight of audacity, as to suppose Him to be a creature?

10. You have heard the previous statements regarding the Son; hear now also that which follows, since the word “was” used in the imperfect tense conveys the meaning of eternity: “In the beginning was the Word” (Joan. I, 1). Now the beginning of God cannot be conceived by the human mind. Therefore, as we have said before, understand this portion of the discourse employed by Holy Scripture—namely, “in the beginning”—as a divine beginning that is eternal. And consider the word “was” to signify the same thing. Furthermore, the term “Word” declares the consubstantial hypostasis with the Father. But lest we should think that the Son was at some time hidden, lying concealed within the Father, and lest we should suppose Him to be a spoken word ^B and interior (for in what conception or writing would such a word be, if it had no hypostasis in itself?), for this reason John also said: “And the Word was,” not in God, but “with God,” describing His own proper hypostasis, which exists in the Word from the Father's substance. In the same way, lest this be understood as an artificial wisdom, which has its existence in some thing, whether in a man or in some other creature, he said, “He was with God,” so that God might be understood as existing from God. And He also took the title “with,” and “The Word was God.” Now God is He who has no beginning; otherwise He would not be God—a fact which not only we, but also the sons of philosophy decree, from whom it does not become you to possess inferior knowledge ^C regarding God.

11. But in order that we might believe Him to be a subsistent God, existing from Himself, the Father fashioned Him humanly, circumscribing Him with flesh, that He might manifest the Son to human eyes. Knowing Him to be subsistent God, do not imagine the Son to be inferior or lesser because He said: “The Father who sent me is greater than I” (Joan. XIV, 28). For it was fitting that He, having become man, should manifest His own greatness in humble words. For He Himself has said: “Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth” (Prov. XXVII, 2). For why should it not be fitting for Him, in humble fashion, to ^D declare Himself lesser than the Father, who is uncircumscribed and fills all things—He who was then circumscribed by flesh and defined by the measure of human sight? Furthermore, to call Him who was the cause of His existence “greater” was not alien to the truth. For if God had not existed, where would be the Wisdom? And if the Father had not existed, where would be the Son? Observe with me now, in every way and altogether, the Son acting humbly, and at the same time manifesting the divine greatness,

and yet, at the same time, giving insight into His divine majesty, first by saying to the young man who had called Him good: "Why do you call me good? No one is good, except one, God." And He ^A rightly declared this, for as if to say, "I have appeared to you, young man, as a human being, but you, by calling me a teacher like one of the scribes, have added the epithet 'good.' But no human being is good, and this designation belongs to God alone. Therefore, you have called him 'good' in vain, who up to now has appeared to you only as a human being." Thus, by declaring this, He showed His humility to the man, saying, "No one is good, of those whom you take into account." But the addition, "except one, God," while He Himself and the Father are one, shows that He, appearing mystically and humbly, had unfolded the truth, and had shown Himself to be a partaker of the Father's goodness. Therefore, the words, "I and the Father are one," and the words, "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me," show Him to be equal to the Father. For the Son must be perfect, born of a perfect Father.

12. But perhaps you might say this as well: If the Father, being perfect, fills all things, what is left for the Son, who is also perfect, to contain? But I say that they have become receptive and containing of each other; for He says, "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me." And if they contain one another, they must be equal to one another in magnitude. How, then, they could be in one another, you have certainly intended to hear; for it is necessary that the one be contained by the other. Now, the contained is in the container; but the container would not, in its turn, be contained by the contained. Do not imagine that God has a void within Himself where He receives the contained. For regarding humans, this must be supposed, since we are not capable of containing others, nor do we pass into another to be contained. And even if we were to enter into one another, we would be contained and grasped within a void. But in the case of God, one must think of it in such a way as this: Just as in the soul of a human, two or more branches of knowledge—such as medicine and philosophy, and as many others—happen to be present together, and are not crowded by one another in the mind and in the space of the soul, although they are many in number, and find room and yield the whole to one another—and although they fill the soul and do not depart from one another, so as to provide the most penetrating men with the impression of a single essence, since they are established in one and the same mind—yet they differ from one another, in that one is medical science and the other is philosophical; so, truly, both the Father and the Son, having entered the same place and having become receptive of one another, and being one, as we said a little before, differ from one another only in person and designation, while they are nevertheless in one another. And just as the scent of an ointment diffused through the air, since both the scent and the air happen to exist in the same place, seems to be intermingled, yet in truth you will find the air to be one thing, and the scent another. And now, indeed, the light from the sun, and the breath of the winds,

possess a great difference; for light and winds are not least separated from one another. To these, liken the Godhead, and being thought of as something greater than can be proven by logic, you would find both to be one in essence and concord, and the one divided—as we have previously stated—into Father and Son, in subsistence and appellation. ^A

13. You will surely rouse this point against me: If the Father has filled all things, and likewise the Son, what place is left for the opposing power? For it would not be fitting for God to have an adversary with Him. But if, wherever the prince of malice resides, God is by chance not there, it follows that God would be demonstrated as circumscribed and divisible. ^B But I maintain that He is everywhere, and that there is nowhere where God is not, even if the prince of malice happens to be somewhere. For the rays of the sun are not defiled when they fall into mire and filth, but rather purify them by drying them with heat; thus also "our God is a consuming fire" is said; and, "fire shall burn before him," so that to the beloved indeed He might be a lamp and light, but to the enemies, a consuming flame: for Scripture says, "He shall inflame his enemies round about." Wherefore, also, the prince of malice, wishing to avoid the fiery missiles of God, traverses every place; yet finding God everywhere, he passes through all humanity: then he discovers some who are fervent in the Spirit, and he flees the heat from them. ^C But finding a hiding place in one who lacks the Spirit of God, having been cleansed and adorned with brooms, he dwells there for a short time, and will perish together with his host; for the guest will rightly be seen as an enemy, he who has received the adversary of God into friendship.

14. I think I have already discoursed sufficiently for the sake of proof. Yet let not even this escape me through forgetfulness, or because I am carried off to other things by haste, as if by a violent storm: namely, how the Son, just as other men, is ignorant of the last day, although He had the Father in Himself, and He Himself was in the Father? But in truth, this also shows the excess of His humility. ^D For it behooved the Son of God to humble Himself exceedingly, since He had adopted the rest of the manner of living according to the human custom to the highest degree. By saying, therefore, that He did not know, He revealed His own humility to those who were listening. But lest He seem a liar, He added, "Unless the Father alone," denying by the word, indeed, that He knew, yet by the power of the enigma affirming that He was privy to it; for the matter which the Father alone knows, the Son also knows, who is one with the Father. Thus, two accomplishments have resulted from this.