who, after the capture of the city by Hadrian, presided over the Church of Jerusalem. See Lequien. A Secondly, the same Eusebius records our Maximus among the “ancient ecclesiastical men who, at the time when Severus held the reins of power, left behind monuments of laudable diligence.” After recounting these, he immediately mentions a work of this same Maximus,
On the Origin of Evil and on the fact that matter exists as a created thing,
which is the question most commonly disputed among the heretics. By “heretics,” understand the Valentinians and Marcionites. Since, therefore, Eusebius calls the Maximus in question “a man illustrious among Christians,” who he later reports “flourished among the ancient ecclesiastical men” at the time when B Maximus II was established as prelate of Jerusalem (both in point of name, of dignity, and also of time, we are led to believe that our Maximus presided over the Church of Jerusalem).II. Furthermore, the book of this Maximus was composed in the form of a dialogue, and was entitled
On Matter
, as the same Eusebius testifies, who also brings forth a very brilliant fragment from it, from which we too have copied it. An excerpt of the same work, likewise copied by Eusebius in the same place, exists in the [i]Philocalia[/i] of Origen and in the dialogue of Adamantius,On Right Faith in God
, wrongly ascribed to Origen; concerning which matter, after Tillemont, the most learned editor of the Origeniana has written sufficiently. CMAXIMUS, BISHOP OF JERUSALEM, FRAGMENT
From the book on matter, or on the fact that matter is created and is not the cause of evils. (In EUSEBIUS, [i]Preparatio Evangelica[/i], book vii, chapter 22.)
I. I do not doubt that you understand with me that it is impossible for there to be two things at the same time which are without origin; although you may seem to wish to lay down and add this further point, that of the two it is necessary for one or the other to be the case, that God should be spoken of as either segregated from matter, or joined with it entirely. He, therefore, who wishes for Him to be so joined, will posit only one thing that is without origin; for then the one would surely be a part of the other; but things which have a reciprocal relationship of part to one another cannot both be without origin at the same time. For just as we say that man is so created by God that he is not actually diverse parts, or distracted into many created things, but rather, as reason itself demands, is a single created entity, though constituted of various parts: so it is absolutely necessary, if you deny that God is separated from matter, to acknowledge only one thing which was not created. But if you wish Him to be separated from the same, a certain medium will necessarily have to be posited between both, by which the disagreement of each is shown. D I do not doubt, I say, that you understand that it is impossible that two things which are without origin exist. And you seem, in particular, to have anticipated and added this to the argument: that as a matter of necessity one must say either that God is separated from matter, or, conversely, that He is indivisible from it. If, then, one should wish to say that He is joined to it, he will be calling the unbegotten thing one; for each of these would be a part of its neighbor; but being parts of one another, they will not be two unbegotten things.
As therefore divided and fragmented parts cannot be called many created things, but only one, as reason requires—that is, man—in that he was made by God, so it is necessary, if God is not separated from matter, to say that the unbegotten is one.
But if one should say that He is separated, there must be something in the middle of both, which also demonstrates their separation. For it is impossible for something to be examined as separated from something, without there being a third thing [as medium] by which the separation of each occurs. Which is an argument that does not stop at this point alone, but extends to many other things. For we have spoken this argument regarding the two unbegotten things, [a principle which] must necessarily proceed in the same way, if three unbegotten things were to be granted. For indeed, in the case of these…I would ask, are they separated from one another, or again is each one united to its neighbor? For if one says they are united, he will hear the same argument as with the first. But if again he says they are separated, he will not escape the A necessity of their having a substance that separates them. If, however, someone should say there is a third argument, as appropriate to be said concerning the unbegotten—that is, that God is not separated from matter, nor again united as if in a part, but that God is in matter as in a place, or matter [is] in God—let him hear [those] who contain it: that if we say that matter is the place of God, it is necessary to say that he is also "containable," and is circumscribed by matter. Moreover, it is necessary that he too, like matter, be carried about in disorder, and not stand [still] nor remain by himself, because that in which he is [contained] is carried about in different directions. B Furthermore, it is necessary to say that God has come to exist in inferior things. For if matter was once unordered, and he chose to reshape it into a better state, there was a time when God was among unordered things. Justly, I would ask this further question: was God filling all of matter, or was he in some part of matter? For if one should wish to say that God is in some part of matter, he speaks of him as being much smaller than matter; but if [in] a part of it, it contained him in his entirety. But if he says he is in all of matter, it must be stated how he created it. For it is necessary either to say that there is some contraction of God, through which contraction he created that from which he withdrew, or that he co-creates himself with matter, having no place to withdraw to.
It is necessary to examine similarly whether [he is within it] as if he were separated from himself, and just as there are genera of animals in the air, [himself] being divided and partitioned for the reception of things coming to be in him, or as if [he were] in a place, that is, just as water in the earth. For if we say it is as in the air, it is necessary to say that God is divisible. But if it is as water in the earth, and matter was unordered and unadorned, and in addition to this contained evils, it is necessary to say that God is a place for unordered things and for evils. Which seems to me not to be a pious statement, but C rather a perilous one. For you wish matter [to exist], in order that you might not call God the creator of evils; and in choosing to avoid this, you say that he is a container of evils. If, then, you were saying that matter is unbegotten, [deducing it] from the fact that it is among things that have come to stand, I would have set forth a long argument regarding it, in proof of the fact that it is impossible that it should exist. But since you [claim that] the genesis of evils... D
gave rise to such a suspicion in you, for this reason I thought it necessary to examine these matters. For once the argument becomes clear, in what manner evils exist, and that it is impossible to call God the cause of evils from the fact that He posits matter as their underlying substance, such a suspicion appears to me to be refuted.
III. You contend, therefore, that matter, devoid of all quality, co-exists with God, out of which He created this genesis of the world. That is how I think it is. So then, if matter happened to be devoid of quality, but the world was created by God, and qualities are in the world, God became the maker of the qualities. It is so. Since, however, I heard you say before that it is impossible that anything should come into being out of nothing, answer my question. You believe, if I am not mistaken, that the qualities of the world were not made from underlying qualities, and yet that they exist as something different B from the substances. That is so. If, then, God did not create the qualities from underlying qualities, nor from the substances—inasmuch as they are not even substances themselves—it is necessary to say that they were brought into being by God from nothing. Hence, it seemed to me that you argued superfluously that it is impossible to believe that anything came into being from God out of nothing. But let the argument about this stand thus: for we also observe among men some things being created out of nothing, even if they indeed seem to create in something; let us take the example of architects. For these men build cities, yet not out of cities, and likewise temples, not out of temples. But if you think that because substances underlie these things, they make them out of things that already exist, you are deceived in your reasoning. For it is not the substance that creates C the city, or again the temples, but the art that concerns the substance. And art does not come into being out of some art pre-existing in the substances, but it comes into being out of that which did not exist before in them. But you think you will counter my argument saying that the craftsman makes the art that is in the substance out of the art which he possesses. To this, it seems to me, one should say that it [that art] does not exist in man out of any underlying art either. For it is not possible for it to exist in and of itself and give the art; for it is among the accidents, and among those things which receive being only then, when they come to be in a substance. For the man will exist even without the architectural art; but the [architectural] art will not exist unless a man exists first. Whence it is necessary to say that arts naturally come to be in men out of nothing. If, therefore, this is the case D regarding men, as you have inferred, that it is impossible to believe [otherwise concerning the origin of things from nothing]...
A for if it were the case that there is no man, man will nonetheless be; yet the same, if there were no man previously, could in no way exist. It must be concluded then, of necessity, that such is the nature of the arts, that in men they arise from that which is nowhere. If we show this to be true in men, will anyone henceforth dare to deny that qualities, or even substances themselves, can be made by God from nothing? For the same logic which demonstrates that anything can come into existence from nothing at all, must also hold true for substances.
IV. But since you are eager to hear something about the generation of evils, I shall proceed to that discussion. And first of all, I would like to ask you a few things. Do you think that evils are substances, or are they qualities of substances? You say that they are qualities of substances. But matter was stripped of all quality, and likewise of every form; for I pursued the established discussion with this already assumed beforehand. B If, therefore, evils are qualities of substances, and matter was devoid of all quality, and you have said that God is the author of qualities, then God will also be the creator of evils. Since, then, it is not possible to call God blameless of evils even in this way, it seems to me that it is redundant to attach matter to Him. But if you have something to say in response to this, begin your argument. If this discussion had been undertaken by us out of a spirit of contention and strife, I would not allow the question of evils to be called into debate again. But since it is rather out of friendship, and for the benefit of our neighbor, that we are conducting this examination of the arguments, I ask for your permission to define these things from the beginning. My own intent, I think, has long been clear to you, as well as my zeal in these discussions: that I do not wish to win by saying things that are merely persuasive, but that the truth should be shown C through accurate investigation. And I know clearly that you are disposed in the same way. Therefore, use whatever method you believe will allow you to find the truth, without feeling any hesitation. For you will not only profit yourself by using the better way, but certainly me as well, regarding those things of which I am ignorant.
[alt-version omitted]
V. It seems to me, good sir, that you wish some substances to be evil; because they are not seen anywhere at all, except in substances. Since, therefore, you say that evils are substances, it is necessary to examine the definition of substance. Does it seem to you that substance is some corporeal constitution? It does. Does this corporeal constitution exist by itself, not needing anything else, upon the occurrence of which it would receive existence? It does. Does it seem to you that evils are D the actions of something? So it seems to me. And do actions receive their existence at the time when the agent is present? It does. And if the agent does not exist, will that which he does ever exist? It will not. Therefore, if substance is a certain corporeal constitution, and this does not need something else in which, having come into being, it would receive existence; but evils are an action, and they exist [by the action] of something, and actions need something in which, having come into being, they receive existence; then evils will not be substances. But if evils are substances, and murder is an evil, it is an action of something; then murder is not a substance. If, however, evils were not substances, and murder is an evil,
A you wish those things which act to be substance, I also agree, as for instance the man who commits murder; in the respect in which he is a man, he is a substance, but the murder which he commits is not a substance, but the work of a substance. We call the man now evil, because he murders, and now again good, because he performs a benefit; and these names are attached to the substance from the accidents which happen to it, which are not itself. For the substance is not murder, nor again adultery, nor any of the similar evils. But just as from grammar one is called a grammarian, and from rhetoric a rhetorician, and from medicine a physician—the substance being neither medicine, nor rhetoric, nor grammar, but receiving the appellation from the things that happen to it, by which it seems to be so named—so too it seems to me that the substance receives the name of evil, not being any one of them. And conceive for me in the same way, if you imagine some other B author of evils to men in your mind, that he, in so far as he is the principle and a certain cause of acting evilly in these things, is also himself evil from the things which he does. For he is called evil for this reason, that he is a maker of evils; but the things which anyone does are not himself, but his actions, from which he receives the appellation of being called evil. For if we should say that he exists [as] the things which he does—and he commits murders, and adulteries, and thefts, and as many things as are similar to these—he would be these things. But if these things are him, and these things have their constitution when they come to be, and cease to exist when they are not coming to be, and these things come to be from men, men will be the makers of these, and the causes of both their coming to be and their ceasing to be. But if you say these are his actions, from the things which he does, C he has the quality of being evil, not from the things of which his substance consists. And we said that being called evil comes from the accidents to a substance, which are not the substance, as from medicine [one is called] a physician. But if he receives the beginning of existence from the things he does, then he too began to be evil, and these evils also began. If this is so, he will not be evil without a beginning, nor will evils be unbegotten, since they are said to be begotten by him. VI. Your discourse to the other, O friend, you seem to me to have constructed sufficiently; for you seemed to conclude well from those things which you had previously taken in the argument. For truly, if matter happened to be without quality, D and God is the creator of qualities, and evils are qualities, then God is the creator of evils. Let this argument toward the other then be well spoken. But to me it seems a falsehood to say that matter is without quality. For indeed
in that he says it is without quality, he reveals its quality, describing what kind of thing matter is, which is a species of quality. Wherefore, if it pleases you, take up the argument with me from the beginning; for to me it seems that matter possesses qualities from eternity. For in this way I also say that evils come from its flux, so that God is not the cause of evils, but matter is the cause of all these things. I accept your zeal, my friend, and I praise your diligence in these matters. For it was fitting that every lover of learning should not simply and as it happened agree to what is said, but should make a precise examination of the arguments. For even if one who inquires, having defined a fallacious occasion, A provides the one debating with him an opening to deduce as he wishes, this will not convince the listener; but if anything seems capable of being said well, he will say that. From which one of two things will happen: either the listener, hearing what seems to be presented, will be perfectly benefited, or he will refute the one debating with him for not telling the truth. But you do not seem to me to have rightly said that matter has qualities from the beginning. For if this is so, of what will God be the creator? For whether we speak of substances, we say these existed beforehand. Or again, of qualities; and we say these also exist. Therefore, B both substance and qualities being already in existence, it seems to me redundant to call God a creator. But in order that I may not seem to be constructing some kind of argument, answer me now, when asked, in what way do you say God is the creator? Whether it is because he changed the substances so that those which once were no longer exist, but others came into being besides them, or that he kept those substances which were before this, but changed their qualities? It does not seem to me that any change of substances has occurred. For it also seems absurd to me to say this. I say that a change of the qualities has occurred, according to which I say God is a creator. And just as if one were to happen to say that a house has been made out of stones, C in which case it is not possible to say that the stones in their substance no longer remain, having become a house—for I say the house has come to be by the quality of the composition, the former quality of the stones having evidently been changed—so it seems to me that God, the substance remaining, has made a certain change of its qualities, according to which [he is the creator of this...]. D
VII. But lest I myself seem to want to devise some crafty argument, tell me yourself, I beseech you, by what reasoning you think God is the creator. Is it because he changed the nature of the substances, so that, casting off what they had previously attained, they put on some new and foreign nature? Or rather, because the substances being preserved in the proper reasoning of their nature, he nevertheless changed their qualities? I, for my part, believe that no change has occurred in the substances. For that would certainly be absurd. I say, therefore, that the qualities were changed; which sort of change has conferred the name of creator on God. For just as if we should say that some house has been made out of stones, it would not necessarily be true that the stones, having shed their former substance, have been converted into a house; for I contend that the house has come into being by a certain kind of composition, with the prior quality of the stones changed: so it seems to me that God, the substance remaining intact, [has wrought] a certain [change] of its...
A composition by God, I say.
Since, therefore, you say that a certain change of the qualities has been brought about by God, answer me, for I wish to inquire a little. Tell me, I pray. Do you likewise consider those evils to be qualities of the substances? I do. Now, were these qualities in the matter from the beginning, or did they have a beginning of their existence? I assert that these qualities were co-existent with matter without generation. But do you not say that God has brought about some change in the qualities? This I assert. Whether, then, for the better, or for the worse? To the better, it seems to me. If, then, the evils are qualities of matter, and the Lord turned its qualities to the better, it is necessary to seek whence the evils [come]. For either the qualities remained such as they were by nature, or if you say that they were not previously evil, but that upon being turned by God, the primary qualities around the matter became such, then God will be the cause of the evils, having turned qualities that were not evil into ones that are evil. B
VIII. But perhaps you do not think that God turned the evil qualities into better ones, but only the rest, which happened to be indifferent, for the sake of [its] adornment. That is what I thought from the beginning. How, then, do you say that he left the qualities of the base things as they were? Was it because, while being able to remove them, he did not wish to, or because he did not have the power? For if you say that he was able, but did not wish to, it is necessary to call him the cause of these things, because, being able to make them not evil, he permitted them to remain as they were, especially when he began to fashion the matter. For if he had had no concern at all for the matter, he would not have been the cause of what he permitted to remain. But since he fashioned one part of it, and left another part thus, being able to turn even those to the better, it seems to me that he deserves to incur blame for having left a part of the matter as evil to the destruction of that part which he fashioned. Moreover, it seems to me that the greatest injury is done to this part by the fact that he thus prepared that part of the matter [so that it] now perceives the evils. For if anyone examines the matters accurately, he will find the matter now to be suffering more severely than its previous lack of order. For before it was distinguished, the fact that it did not even perceive the evils was present in it; but now, each of its parts perceives the evils. C
IX. And take for me the example [drawn] from man. For before he was fashioned and became a living creature by the art of the Creator, he had from nature the [attribute] of perceiving none of the evils at all. But from the time that man is created by God, he is also affected by the sense of encroaching evil; so... D
and that which you say is a benefit A of matter, provided by God, is found rather to have resulted in her worsening. But if, because God is unable to remove evils, you say He has not ceased from them, you will imply that God is powerless. Now, if He is powerless, it will be either because He is naturally weak, or because, being enslaved by fear, He is overcome by something stronger. But if you dare to say that God is naturally weak, you seem to me to risk the salvation itself. If, however, He is overcome by the fear of a greater one, the evils overcoming Him will be greater than the impulse of His own choice—which seems to me an absurd thing to say about God. For why, according to your argument, will these not rather be gods, since they are able to overcome B God, if we call "God" that which has authority over all things?
X. But I wish, moreover, to ask you a few brief questions concerning matter itself; tell me, pray, whether you think matter was simple or composite. For the diversity of generated things brings me to such an examination of this argument. If, indeed, matter happened to be simple and uniform, how is the world composite, and does it possess its constitution from diverse substances and mixtures? For that which is composite implies a mixture of certain simple things. But if, again, you wish to say that matter is composite, you will certainly say that it was composed from certain simple things. And if it was composed from simple things, the simple things C of which matter became composed once existed by themselves; from which, indeed, it is shown to be generated. For if matter is composite, and composite things have their constitution from simple things, there was once a time when matter was not—that is, before the simple things came together. But if there was once a time when matter was not—and there was never a time when the unbegotten was not—matter will not be unbegotten. And from this it will follow that there are many unbegotten things. For if God was unbegotten, and the simple things from which matter was composed were also unbegotten, there will not be only two unbegotten things, not to mention that I would then ask what these simple things are: matter or form. D Does it seem to you that nothing of existing things is opposed to itself? It does. Is water opposed to fire? It seems so to me. And likewise darkness to light, and cold to heat, and in addition to these, dry to wet? It seems so to me. Therefore, if none of the things that exist is opposed to itself, but these things are opposed to one another, they will not be one matter, nor indeed will they be from one matter. I wish to ask you again for an argument similar to this. Does it seem to you that the parts are not destructive of one another? It does. And that fire and water, and likewise the rest, are parts of matter? This is so. What then? Does it not seem to you that water is destructive of fire, and light of darkness, and all the rest that are similar to these? It does. Therefore, if the parts are not...
destructive of one another, they shall not be parts of one another; and if they are not parts of one another, they shall not be parts of one single matter. Indeed, they shall not be matter at all, for nothing among existing things can be destructive of itself, according to the principle of opposites. For there is nothing contrary to it. For things that are contrary are naturally contrary to other things; for example, white A is not contrary to itself, but is said to be contrary to black; and light similarly is shown not to be contrary to itself, but appears to be so in relation to darkness; and there are many such cases as well. If, therefore, there were one such matter, it would not be contrary to itself. Thus, with things as they are regarding opposites, it is shown that matter does not exist. For things that are destructive of one another, if they were parts of matter, they would be destructive of one another B—but they are not. And, since things are as they are regarding opposites, it is concluded from the proper nature of opposites that no place remains for this matter at all.
POLYCRATES BISHOP OF EPHESUS
NOTICE
(Galland, *Vet. Patrum Biblioth.*, II, Proleg., p. xix)I. Polycrates was administering the Ephesian Church at the end of the 2nd century. At the age of 65, he wrote a letter to the holy Pope Victor, in which he professes that the Passover must be celebrated on the 14th day of the first month according to the Jewish custom. For this reason, the Roman pontiff attempted to cut him off from the unity of the Church. But the peace, which had been disturbed between the Westerners and the Easterners, was soon restored.
II. Testimonies of the ancients regarding this dissension. The text of Epiphanius is corrupted. What the learned think of Sozomen. Fragments of the epistle of Polycrates brought forth from Eusebius.
I. Polycrates was ruling the Ephesian Church in the year 196, and he testifies that he was the eighth of his family to reach the episcopate: «There were seven of my relatives who were bishops, and I am the eighth.» Whether his relatives, whom he mentions, were all bishops of the city of Ephesus, or whether, as I would rather believe, they held the priesthood in various cities of Asia, is not clear. At the age of 65, he wrote an epistle to the holy Pope Victor, in which he explains the tradition propagated in Asia down to his own times regarding the celebration of the Paschal solemnity according to the custom of the Jews on the 14th day of the first month. Because Polycrates showed himself more tenacious of this tradition than was right, the Roman pontiff, as Eusebius testifies, attempted to cut him off from the unity of the Church as one dissenting from catholic doctrine; and by letter, he denounced all the brethren who were there as being alien to communion. But the peace, which had been disturbed, was restored in its entirety a little later, with Irenæus acting as mediator, as Bishop Anatolius is the authority.
B
Bishop of Laodicea writes: «A certain contention,» he says, «arose among their (Peter and Paul’s) successors, namely, between Victor, the bishop of the city of Rome at that time, and Polycrates, who then seemed to hold the primacy among the bishops of Asia; however, this was most rightly pacified by Irenæus, then prelate of the Gallic part, with both parties persevering in their own custom, and not declining from the established manner of antiquity.»
II. Epiphanius also mentions a dissension of this kind regarding Victor and the Asians in these words: «Regarding the celebration of that feast (the Paschal), various tumults and contentions of ecclesiastical discipline arose; especially in the age of Polycarp and Victor, C at which time the Orientals being divided from the Occidentals, they received no peaceful letters from one another.» Yet, no one fails to see that the name of Polycarp had wrongly crept in there for Polycrates. The most learned Petrus de Marca attempted the same emendation in Sozomen. But in vain, in the judgment of the illustrious Abbot de Longuerue; since Polycrates ...