Refutation of the Letter of the King of Armenia

NICETAS OF BYZANTIUM

REFUTATION AND OVERTHROW OF THE EPISTLE SENT BY THE PRINCE OF ARMENIA, WHICH MALICIOUSLY CALUMNIATES OUR ORTHODOX FAITH AND THE HOLY AND ECUMENICAL FOURTH SYNOD.

BY ORDER OF OUR CHRIST-LOVING AND MOST PIOUS EMPEROR.

(It was written to the prince in the person of the patriarch.)

(From Leo Allatius, *Graecia orthodoxa* vol. I, p. 665.)

1. ^A Since, by the philanthropy of God and the divine judgments, and by the benevolence of our most pious and orthodox emperors, I have received the supreme pontifical see to govern the Queen of Cities, in the midst of the chief pastors, that it is right and fitting to instruct and guide with all diligence the flock of Christ, our Lord, who is committed to me; and because it is frequently suggested to me by divine dogmas—lest the sower of tares, the devil, find a place in the house of the Lord and among our own divine flock, so as to disseminate heretical opinions, that is, to sow tares, and to torment some of the Lord’s sheep—since it is permitted that those who have not entered the fold of the Lord, but have become participants of the wicked, to be led astray afterward by certain reckless men, ^B whether out of ignorance or oppressed by ancestral stubbornness, and do not rightly declare the rationale of the truth and the pure sentiment of Christians, I now strive to address these—whom I cannot address in person because of the long distance between our regions—through epistles and to confirm them in the truth and in the right dogma, and to correct and build them up in the word of the truth and the right dogma; and likewise, as much as my ability allows, and as the word is opened to me by the mouth of the Lord, I have endeavored with all diligence to nourish them with unadulterated and pure wheat—that is, with the sound and right faith and doctrine, in which the catholic and apostolic Church stands firm and unshaken—so that the sower of tares, the devil, may not find a place to sow his tares among the wheat that is pure and uncontaminated by any heretical thoughts ^C among those who have been deemed worthy, by the grace of God, to partake of the mystery which is among us, and who now, having been dragged away by certain foolish men, and being overcome by ignorance and long-standing ancestral corruption, do not hold to the precise word of the truth and the pure belief of Christians. ^D I purpose to correct and build up these, both those with whom I am able to speak face to face...

and those whom, as being removed to a distance, we are unable to reach, to strengthen them through letters; and to put it simply, to urge all the peculiar people and the royal priesthood ^A of the Lord, as they stand in need of the better benefit, as far as is possible, to lead them onward—this is necessary. For this duty is always incumbent upon those who are devoted to the high priesthood. With this disposition of soul, therefore, both for the glory of our most beloved son, whom we cherish, and because of the long-standing love we have established toward him, and because of many things, as is natural, we were strongly compelled to write—or rather, I know not how, we were incited to write, seeing that for a long time in the regions of the Armenians the dogma of the righteous has been sown and attacked by some heresiarch, I mean Severus, who has corrupted all those there, to the injury of all the inhabitants. ^B Wherefore, our epistle, using many demonstrations, by which we thought that you would the more quickly be persuaded to that which is right, and would be refreshed in the truth of the blameless and pure faith of the mystery of Christ, and stand with us—and at the same time recognize Christ and Lord and our God as being of two natures, and in two natures, and having two natures, while acknowledging but one hypostasis—which has been received and proclaimed for a long time, and I almost say by the whole world, and by the five archiepiscopal ^C sees of the Catholic and Apostolic Church, which at that time, having gathered in the metropolis of Chalcedon, and having followed as peers and like-minded in all things to the three previous holy synods, having in nothing differed, defined and decreed. Therefore, from that time until today, those who rightly and piously desire to live with the Catholic and Apostolic Church ^D gladly accept the holy and oecumenical fourth synod held there, alongside the other three, and always hold by it. A clear hope moreover possesses us, that through this our epistle, having cast off all hesitation, you will return from your mistaken opinion to the correct dogma of the truth which we confess—namely, to confess two natures and one hypostasis in the economy of Christ—and will easily be converted.

2. Since then that which we hoped for did not reach its end, but you were even offended at what was written, and not only that, but also attempted to write against us and to formulate opposing arguments, for this cause, being inflamed with divine zeal, we deemed it worth the effort that the silence and the accusation of your neglect should not be left unrefuted and incurable. For whatever in your letter is brought forward to calumniate our true belief, and is not worthy of consideration, we will attempt to refute by bringing it into the open. Therefore, immediately after the introduction of your epistle, as you make a pretense of binding and joining the possession of love with the one confession of the true and blameless faith, endeavoring that in the house of the Lord all might be illuminated and set right—if some have escaped from this good and right confession, which the holy apostles delivered, and which the holy three synods established, and so forth, which are most clear to us through those...

REFUTATION AND OVERTHROW OF THE EPISTLE SENT BY THE PRINCE OF ARMENIA, WHICH INVIDIOUSLY CRIMINATES OUR ORTHODOX FAITH AND THE HOLY AND OECUMENICAL FOURTH SYNOD, BY COMMISSION OF OUR CHRIST-LOVING AND MOST PIOUS EMPEROR. Written to the Prince, and the Patriarch speaks.

1. By the philanthropy of God, and by divine judgments, and by the benignity of our most pious and orthodox emperors, having undertaken to steer the archiepiscopal rank of the Queen of Cities, I strive with all diligence and zeal to regulate and direct according to law the rational flock of our Chief Shepherd, Christ; and, as strength admits, and word is granted by the Giver of all in the opening of the mouth, I have consistently ^B hastened to train them by divine dogma, so that the devil, the sower of tares, might not find a place in the guileless and purest wheat—that is, in the sincere and correct faith and teaching, in which the Catholic and Apostolic Church stands firm and unshaken—to sow tares, that is, certain heretical notions, and to corrupt some of the divine flock. Because of this, although some, having come within the court of the Lord, and having been deemed worthy to partake of our mystery, then being dragged away by certain reckless men, or being held fast either through ignorance or ancestral perversity, and not rightly cherishing the precise word of the truth and the pure glory of the Christians, we are eager to correct them, at one time by face-to-face conversation ^C and to confirm them in the word of the truth and the right dogma; and at another time, in the case of those whom, because of the great distance of places, we cannot address in person, we strive to confirm them through letters.

^A And, to speak simply, it is necessary for us to guide, as far as we are able, the entire chosen people, who have been called the royal priesthood of the Lord, and who are in need of something better for their edification. For this is a duty that has always been assigned permanently to the high priests. Therefore, with this disposition of soul, both toward the glory of our beloved child, and because of the long-standing love we have held for him, and—as is natural—with many things compelling us to write, it seemed better to be moved to write because of a non-orthodox dogma, introduced I know not how long ago into the regions of Armenia and having taken hold, specifically that of a certain Severus, a heresiarch, who has corrupted all those there. ^B Thus, using many proofs in our letter—by which it seemed that you might the more quickly be persuaded toward what is necessary, and, being reminded of the truth of the blameless and pure faith of the mystery of Christ, stand with us—we also sought to have you rightly confess the one Christ and Lord and our God, who is from two natures, and in two natures, and possesses two natures, while being in one hypostasis. This is what from ancient time, and almost, so to speak, the entire inhabited world and the five high-priestly thrones of the Catholic and Apostolic Church, when gathered together at that time in the metropolis of the Chalcedonians, and being in all things followers and like-minded with the former three holy synods, did synodically define and decree, without at all dissenting. Therefore, from that time even to the present day, those who desire to live rightly and piously with the Catholic and Apostolic Church, welcoming the holy and ecumenical fourth synod gathered there along with the other three, have always reverenced it. ^C And indeed, we had no small hope that, persuaded by our letter, you would as quickly as possible depart from the worse opinion and easily transition toward the orthodox dogma of the truth which is confessed by us—namely, to acknowledge two natures. 2. Since, however, what we hoped for has not come to pass, but you were even embittered by what was written; and not only this, but you also attempted to speak against us and to write refuting discourses, for this reason, being inflamed with divine zeal and fearing the charge of silence, we did not think it right to leave you neglected and untreated. Wherefore, whatever is contained in your letter against our true confession, as being in some way worthy of consideration, we have brought into the middle to attempt to refute. Therefore, shortly after the preface of your letter, as if binding and tying together the acquisition of love with one confession of the true and blameless faith, and zealous that those of similar mind in the house of the Lord be enlightened and instructed: "Though some," you say, "have departed from this excellent and right confession, which the holy apostles delivered and the holy three synods perfected," and what follows—by these things you have most clearly indicated to us that you maintain one hypostasis in the dispensation of Christ, ^D while you demonstrate your own glory, and deeming those to be blessed who, with divine love and the confession of true faith, have one presence. What is this most truthful confession, which the apostles delivered and the holy synods accomplished, and if some have fallen away from this right faith? You will certainly say, "Of yourself," who confess that one Christ and God of ours is brought to pass from differing natures after the union, and that He has two natures, and you deny that He is in one hypostasis. Truly you clearly set forth such a mode of composition in the union of the divine Word with the flesh. Alas for the matter! How is it that, when you belittle the eyewitnesses and divine heralds of truth, and furthermore those who were gathered synodically at differing times, holy and God-bearing men, with such great blame? For who among those who know how to judge rightly would say that to confirm a doctrine, which those who received it from the Word, or the Fathers, define—which you profess to be your sentiment, asserting that Christ is one nature after the union, and fashioned from two unions, but actually inflecting or denying two natures after the union? Therefore, let the prince of the apostles, Peter, draw near through his confession, which you obviously prove to be false, and through him the entire company of the apostles. For Christ the Lord and God said to the prince of the apostles, Peter: "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." [C (cont.)] Furthermore, when the Lord said this to Peter, and had declared him to be called Peter by the Lord himself in regard to humanity, you said: "You are Christ the Son of the living God." [D (cont.)] And it was concurred in by Christ the Lord and God of us both, that He is both Word and man, and God. If therefore both are words—that of the deity, I say, and that of the humanity—they are attributed to the one Christ and Lord and our God after the union, and the one and same is the eternal Son, who is begotten before all ages by the Father without time and without passion, who is the hypostasis of the Holy Trinity, God equal to the Father in eternity, possessing the paternal essence and nature in Himself, but in the latter days incarnate by the Holy Spirit and Mary the Virgin, and having become man, this is the eternal Son, immutable and unchanging, and having become one from among men, in all things except sin, which He Himself did not have; and having accepted our nature into that which He possesses from eternity, it is manifest that in two natures, and possessing two natures, the one is Christ after the union, if the words "God" and "man" indicate natures, as they are referred to by many.

The Definition of the holy and ecumenical synod of the holy Fathers of Chalcedon, defining Christ as having two natures, a divine nature and a human nature.

^A And you have displayed your own opinion, extolling it and deeming those blessed whose confession of true faith is one with godly love. But what is this most truthful confession which the apostles delivered and the three holy synods established, even if some have acted wretchedly regarding this right faith? You will certainly call it your own, which professes that Christ, our one God, is of one nature after the union, having been formed from diverse natures, and denies that He has two natures, or exists from two natures, in one hypostasis. For you clearly proclaim below that this manner of composition occurred in the union of the divine Word with the flesh. O, the wonder! How do you heap so much blame upon the eyewitnesses and divine heralds of the truth, and not only upon them, but also upon the holy and God-bearing men gathered in synod at different times? For who, among those who know how to judge soundly, would say that the opinion you advocate—which asserts that Christ is of one nature after the union, and that while the union was formed from two, it denies that after the union there are two, or that He exists in two natures—was handed down or confirmed by the ministers of the Word or by the divine Fathers? Therefore, let the foremost of the apostles, Peter, approach, showing through his own confession that you speak falsely, and through him the entire assembly of the apostles. For Christ our Lord and God said to the foremost of the apostles, Peter: "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it" ^B. The Lord spoke this word to Peter when, as the Lord called Himself the Son of Man, Peter said: "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God." And both sayings were brought together in Christ our Lord and God, and it was proved that He is both God and man. If, therefore, both reasons—I mean of the divinity and of the humanity—are predicate of the one Christ and Lord and our God after His union, and He is one and the same, the eternal Son, who was begotten of the Father before all ages timelessly and impassibly, who is one hypostasis of the holy Trinity, God equal to the Father according to eternity, having the paternal essence and nature eternally within Himself, but in the latter days became incarnate and made man of the Holy Spirit and Mary the Virgin, this eternal Son, remaining without change and alteration, and having become as one of men in all things, without sin, having accepted our nature which He did not have, with the divine nature which He possessed eternally remaining with Him—it is manifest that after the union ^C the Christ who is one in hypostasis is in two natures and possesses two natures, provided that the names "God" and "man" are indicative of natures, as being predicated of many. Therefore, the true dogma of the Apostle concerning the confession of Christ is rightly defined by the canon of the holy Fathers of the divine synod assembled at Chalcedon, defining Christ as being one hypostasis from the holy Trinity, having two natures, a divine nature and a human nature.

^A and an essential union of two natures—that is to say, of the divinity and of the humanity—in the one Christ, observe that they are considered in the one hypostasis. In no way, therefore, does the holy synod, in condemning the opinion of the mad Nestorius, which falsely imagined two persons in Christ, absolutely force one to confess one nature in Christ. For even in the theology, the first holy synod, while it refuted the opinion of Arius regarding the plurality of natures in the divine, did not thereby deny the trinity of hypostases. So too, the third holy synod at Ephesus, by pronouncing anathema upon the opinion of two hypostases, did not thereby abolish the diversity of natures. Nay, rather, to establish the union of the natures of the one Christ—I mean of the divinity and humanity—according to hypostasis and essence, it used the example of man, who is composed of two natures, I mean the corporeal and the incorporeal, and who is considered in two natures, although every individual man is but one hypostasis. And it is not that the example of a man is in all respects similar to the union in Christ, but it was used solely for the refutation of the insane opinion of Nestorius, who openly asserted that there is no nature without its own person, and that it is impossible to see two natures united according to hypostasis and essentially in one hypostasis ^B without also introducing two persons—which creates a relative union, and for this reason the wretch preached two sons and two Christs. It was to refute this false opinion that it made use of the example of a man. Furthermore, blessed Cyril brought forward many of the God-bearing Fathers in that holy third synod at Ephesus, establishing the union according to hypostasis in one hypostasis, which is Christ recognized in diverse natures. But that which is recognized in diverse natures is entirely in those things in which it is recognized. Since, therefore, the argument has demonstrated that the confession of one nature of Christ was neither uttered by any of the apostles, nor confirmed by the three holy synods, you falsehood-monger in vain, saying that it was handed down from the holy apostles and confirmed by the holy three synods; for the argument rather set forth the diversity of natures in the one Christ. But again, to assert that if some ^C have escaped from this opinion (that is, the opinion that says Christ is of one nature after the union), as if they were those who confess that Christ has two natures after the union, what ignorance could that not be full of? For who does not know that a part is wont to escape from the whole, the lesser from the greater, and not the other way around? Therefore, if those who are of your opinion are compared with those who uphold ours, they would be found to occupy the smallest and least part. Wherefore you act indecorously in saying that we have fled from your opinion. Nay, rather, to speak the truth, you have departed from us.

4. Proceeding further in your letter, and being ill-disposed toward the acceptance of the holy and ^D ecumenical fourth synod, because we count it among the other three holy synods,

^A and because they desire us to receive1 this synod, yet you write that "I know indeed that it is not hidden from you what is the manner of the fourth synod, that in its document its holiness made mention of this synod, and ordered it to be received together with the other three synods." And if our Fathers and our teachers, knowing its emptiness ^B from the other three synods, who diagnosed and preached to the whole world one Christ and Son and Lord, incarnate from two natures, without confusion, and without change, and without separation—the same synod speaking of two natures separated, and energies, and wills, agreeing with Nestorius, save that regarding the two persons of that one, he indeed says two persons, but she says one—and for this reason [it] mocking the orthodox, because it does not agree with Nestorius. You wonder at me for writing such things? For you have not gathered, as it seems to me from your words, ^C the intention and the matter of the holy fourth synod. For such a holy synod does not appear in any way to be as you say, and existing as two natures subsisting separately in the mystery of Christ, as it is wrongly slandered by you—or rather, it has cast out the excesses and defects of either side of the "mean," that is, of the truth—I say the excess and the deficiency, the aberrations of the "mean," and for this reason, having cast out the false, it firmly held the belief having the "mean" rank, touching the truth. For indeed in the theology ^D the "mean" appears to possess the truth of the holy, catholic and apostolic Church; but the excess and the deficiency are falsehood (for he who would distinguish the "three" of the hypostases and the "different," and even the "three" of the natures—nay, even he who, on account of the oneness of the nature and the monadicity of the hypostasis, would introduce them, perhaps he seems to have apprehended, by excess and deficiency, the belief in the truth). What Arius suffered, and Sabellius, and Libya, is evil from diametrically opposite directions, yet of equal impiety.

But the "mean" of the truth, being in the middle, and having the triad of natures and the monadicity of the hypostasis, casts out those things, and proclaims clearly one essence and nature, and three consubstantial hypostases in the theology, as the holy and ecumenical first synod established and defined. In the same way also regarding the holy fourth synod, one must observe. For just as Nestorius, on account of the double confession of the natures, introduced two hypostases, and on account of this, [on account of] the economy, thought there were two sons; and Eutyches, and Dioscorus, and Severus, and those who agreed with them on all sides, on account of the oneness of the hypostasis, and saying there is one nature—it is manifest that the former thought in terms of excess, and [the latter] in terms of deficiency. But the ordinance of the holy synod at Chalcedon follows the "mean" way...

of truth and, having imitated the first holy and ecumenical synod—which established the mean way of truth—it also strengthened the mean path for itself by rejecting the absurdities of either side: the doubling of the hypostases, which creates two sons and two Christs, which is according to excess; and indeed also the deficiency, which, because of the unity of the hypostasis, ascribes to the nature oneness, and it proclaims that in the union according to hypostasis of Christ, there are two natures, which are joined together and hold the order of parts in the one Christ, but one hypostasis. Since a "mean" partakes in something with the extremes and differs in something—and in those things in which it differs by excess, it partakes in deficiency, and in those in which it differs by deficiency, it partakes in excess. ^B For example: the mind of the Church, while differing from that of Arius regarding the natures, partakes with that of Sabellius in declaring one nature; but while differing from Sabellius regarding the oneness and confusion of the hypostasis, it agrees with that of Arius regarding the trinity of the hypostases. Thus it is possible to observe, even in the economy, the mean way of truth, that in some things it partakes with and differs from the extremes, and in those things in which it differs by excess, it partakes in deficiency, and in those in which it differs by deficiency, it partakes in excess.

What do I mean? Let there be proposed, I say, the opinions of Nestorius, Eutyches, and Severus—the former proclaiming two natures and two persons, the latter claiming one nature and one hypostasis. It is clear that they will be opposed in accordance with excess and deficiency, since they are completely opposed in this way and possess no communion of nature or hypostasis with one another. Therefore, let some opinion be taken that holds the mean of truth; this opinion then must surely partake in something with the extremes and differ in something, and where it differs from the excess, it must agree with the deficiency, and where it does not agree with the deficiency, it must be joined with the excess. ^C Such is the sentence of the holy fourth synod, declaring two natures and one hypostasis in Christ, which, while differing from Nestorius regarding the hypostasis (for he proclaims two, but it [the synod] one), it agrees with Eutyches and Severus in that they also acknowledge one hypostasis. But again, while differing from Dioscorus, Eutyches, and Severus regarding the nature (because they proclaim one nature in the economy, while it [the synod] two), it agrees with Nestorius in that it acknowledges the two and only two natures in Christ.

And one ought not to reckon that from the fact that someone communicates with another in some point, he communicates with him in everything, nor that one should consider him to be of the same mind as the one with whom he agrees in some point, and loathe him for it; since the true opinion of the Church, because it agrees in some point with the extremes, Arius, I say, and Sabellius, as the argument has demonstrated, would be proscribed. And who could bear such blasphemy? ^D By the same reasoning, one must piously discourse about the holy fourth synod. Because it agrees in some point with Nestorius, shall we therefore say that we hold the same view as him? Away with that! This synod, therefore, in making known the mean way of truth in this manner, is not to be calumniated or adjudged with wicked intent and extreme ignorance, but rather, once you have embraced its correct dogma, it is to be cherished and numbered with the other three holy synods, because, as the argument has demonstrated, it has introduced nothing new compared to the other three holy synods; nay, if we wish to confess the truth, it holds exactly the same and altogether all things...

^A studied, and it wished to harmonize with them, as one that has kept the middle road of truth. Therefore, one ought not, through malice and ignorance, to slander or reject such an holy synod, which has preached the middle road of truth, but rather one ought to confess its orthodox dogma, receive it, and count it among the other three holy synods. Thus, the discourse has shown that the fourth holy synod introduced no empty-headedness alongside the other three holy synods; nay rather, if one must speak the truth, it bears the greatest harmony, because it too walked the middle road of truth, just as they did.

5. We may also gather from the synod itself what it wills to proclaim concerning Christ. For, following the Fathers, as it says itself, it declares exactly thus: It teaches us to confess “one and the same Lord of ours, Jesus Christ” in harmony. By the word “in harmony,” it cuts off beforehand that suspicion—which supposed that the exposition before us was not composed by all the bishops gathered [there], but by a few only, to whom alone the things said were pleasing. ^B After this, having applied a medicine to error as if it were a most connective—I mean the division of Nestorius’s impiety—which was being introduced into the immaculate economy, [the synod] says: “to confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ”; by the designation of “one and the same,” it root and branch removes the opinion of division, and more so by the masculine pronunciation. For it said “one” [unus], not “one thing” [unum], and by this it signifies the whole composition, and not a part of it, which it was likely that the other pronunciation would indicate; in this it also imitated the saintly Gregory, who through the expression “one and another” [alius et alius] indicated the whole, and through “another and another” [aliud et aliud] indicated the parts. After this, it removes the suspicions of the opposing wicked opinion ^C by saying, “perfect the same in divinity, and perfect the same in humanity,” saying nothing different, I think, unless one should suppose that through the designation of “one,” it signifies the divinity having fulfilled the economy while stripped of human nature, or having undergone change into the human nature; but rather, that it exists as perfect in both—I mean in the divinity and in the humanity—as recognized truly as God, and truly as man, consisting of a rational soul and body, in the whole of its own parts; and not simply as God or man, but as consubstantial with the Father according to divinity, and the same with us according to humanity. So that he who applies his mind with a right intention to these words, will desire nothing further from the synod for a perfect exposition of the immaculate economy. ^D Foreseeing also that some would dare to confess that the divine and immaculate body of the Lord was by nature not subject to passion, nor death, nor corruption, from its very first conception—and by this would overturn the whole economy—it adds: “in all things like us, without sin.” This is both from Holy Scripture, and, being placed here opportunely, it bridles the insolence of those who think such things. For if neither passion of the body, nor death, nor even dissolution—which we are accustomed to call corruption in a specific sense—is a sin; and if it is, apart only from sin, in all other things of the same nature as we are—that most immaculate and most holy body—it is manifest that God, who was pleased to take upon Himself our poverty, took upon Himself such a nature, which we are not wrongly accustomed to call poverty, all

^A things that are ours by nature and are essential to it. Therefore He says: *"In all things like unto us, without sin."* But again, because it did not please the followers of Nestorius that the immaculate Virgin is the Theotokos, the synod added: *"Born of the Father before all ages, but in the last days the same, for us and for our salvation, from Mary the Virgin and Theotokos, born according to His humanity."* These few things from the fourth synod, so that I may not bring forth longer extracts, may suffice. ^B Indeed, anyone who wishes can gather many more things from it, by which it will be established most certainly that it has disagreed in no respect with the three holy synods, but has been in harmony with them in all things; that it confesses the same one Christ, and Lord, and our God, from two natures, and in two natures, and that there are two natures after the union; and that it has banished far away as absurd the extremes that deviate from the middle path, whatever they may be, and has remained firm and unshaken in the middle path of truth. Since these things were defined, pronounced, and proclaimed by the fourth holy synod in those very words ^C regarding the mystery of Christ, who, unless he is delirious and out of his mind, would assert that the fourth synod thinks the same as Nestorius and is led astray by his false opinion? Rather, it must be asserted that Dioscorus, and Nestorius, and Eutyches were struck by anathema by that same synod, as being diametrically opposed to one another, yet equal in their wicked impiety.

6. But if the duality of natures troubles you, and the mention of the number two immediately suggests to your mind a division of things, and you think that every number indicates things subsisting by themselves, you determine this more out of ignorance than prudence. Let us determine, then, briefly, in what ^D way an accurate understanding of the number two and all other numbers can be obtained. For number is spoken of in two ways: one simply and by itself, and the other considered in relation to things, just as "white" denotes whiteness and that which is endowed with whiteness. The nature of number by itself neither joins nor divides, for it does not have things subject to it; for number itself by itself neither connects nor separates, but admits of both according to this or that aspect. Just as the binary and quaternary number, if you look at the units of which it is composed, is divided into them; ^A if you seek the unit of these, it is composed of them; for two and two, if it happens, pass into four, and four is divided into two and two. Wherefore it would be most true to say that the nature of number has nothing prescribed, nor separated, nor united, but that it exists in the connection and composition of things. Therefore, you would determine ignorantly and wrongly that the division of things necessarily follows the nature of number, and that one should not rather take the number as a sign of the quantity of the subjects, based on the united or divided nature of the things themselves—for it is another reason, and not the number, that divides and connects them. For when we say ten cubits of ^B continuous wood, for instance, we do not divide the unity that is in the ten-cubit wood by the number; and again, when we say ten bushels, we recognize them as divided. The matter stands thus in other things as well. If number is predicated of natures,

[… ^A] we give them the thought? Certainly not. Therefore it is not necessary to slander and reject such a holy synod, which preached the middle path of truth, through ill-counsel and ignorance, but rather, having confessed its orthodox dogma, one ought to accept it and number it with the remaining three holy synods. Thus the discourse has shown that the holy fourth synod introduced no vain babbling alongside the remaining three holy synods, or rather, if one must speak the truth, it showed the greatest harmony because it too traversed the middle path of truth, just as they did.

5. It is possible also to observe from the synod itself what it intends to preach concerning Christ. For following, as it says itself, the Fathers, it speaks thus word for word: "It teaches us to confess concordantly one and the same Lord our Jesus Christ"; through the word "concordantly" it cuts off in advance that suspicion which supposed that the underlying exposition had not been composed by all the gathered bishops, but by some few, who alone were pleased by the things said. And after this, having treated the error that is, as it were, most cohesive—I mean the division of the impiety of Nestorius—which brought itself into the immaculate economy, for this reason it says: "To confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ," by the naming of "one and the same" rooting out the opinion of division by its very base, and especially by the masculine pronunciation. For it said "one" [unus], not "one thing" [unum]; and by this, signifying the whole composition and not part of it—which it was likely that the other pronunciation would indicate—it follows in this also Gregory who is among the saints: for by "another and another" it signifies the whole, but by "other and other," the parts.

After these things, it removes the suspicion of the wicked opinion from the opposite, saying: "Perfect the same in divinity, and perfect the same in humanity," meaning nothing else, I think, unless someone might suppose through the naming of "one" either that the divinity fulfilled the economy denuded of human nature, or that it underwent change into human nature, but [it means] the same one existing perfect according to both—I mean the divinity and the humanity—as one recognized whole in his own measures, truly God, and truly man, from a rational soul and body; and not simply God, or man, but consubstantial with the Father according to divinity, and the same with us according to humanity.

And for those who correctly attend to the things said, there was nothing left over for the synod [to offer] for the explanation of the immaculate economy, which, foreseeing even the future—I mean that some would dare, from the very first conception, to confess that divine and immaculate body of the Lord as exempt from passion and death, and indeed even corruption, and by this to overturn the whole economy—it says: "In all things like us, without sin." This is from the holy Scripture, and, being well-placed here, it bridles those who think such things. For if neither the passion of the body, nor death, nor indeed the dissolution which we are accustomed to call corruption in a specific sense, is sin; and if the immaculate and most holy body is of the same nature as us in all things except for sin alone, it is manifest that God, who willed to assume our poverty, assumed such a one, which [it is] right to call poverty.

^A Ten measures of wheat, however, or ten cubits of wood, and again saying ten modii, we understand these by division. Thus, therefore, it also holds for other things: if number is predicated of natures, it does not hold forth their quantity primarily, but their difference in kind. For when we say three natures—of a horse, and a man, and an ox—we do not mean their division according to quantity, but their distinction according to species. But when we say three men, if it should happen to be Peter, Paul, and John, we point out rather their division and that they are "so many," but not "such." Likewise, also in the economy, when we say "two natures," we designate their difference in kind, not their separation, excluding from them (even if they were not subsistent) the number of the hypostases, knowing full well that not even in the case of those separated in hypostasis and essence—such as this horse and this ox—is nature [the sign of] separation, but of difference, just as the hypostasis is [the sign of] separation. Much more so in the case of those which do not appear by themselves but exist and are becoming at once within one another: nature will indicate not separation but difference, whether in theology, or in the economy, or in any thing whatsoever. ^B And otherwise, because even if we number the two natures of Christ, calling them two, we do not introduce a division in act of the natures and properties. For every number belongs to things that differ; and it is impossible for things that do not differ in any way to be numbered, but according to that in which they differ, they are also numbered. For example, Peter or Paul, in that which they are united, are not numbered; for being united by the principle of essence, they cannot be called two natures, but because they differ in hypostasis, they are called two hypostases. So that the number belongs to those that differ, and in the way that different things differ, in the same way they are also numbered. The natures of the Lord are united inconfusely according to hypostasis, but they are divided indivisibly by reason and by the mode of difference. And in the way in which they are united, they are not numbered; for we do not say that the natures of Christ are two according to hypostasis. But in the way in which they are indivisibly divided, they are numbered; for there are two natures of Christ by reason and by the mode of difference, united indeed according to hypostasis, and having the *perichoresis* [co-inherence] within one another, they are united inconfusely, each preserving its own natural difference. Therefore, in the mode of difference only are they numbered ^C by us, and are not divided in act and existence, as you suppose. And otherwise, to the same point, that not every number is indicative of things existing by themselves; and this is manifest from hence. For while whatever is self-subsistent is indeed entirely in number, not everything that is found in number would be self-subsistent. For those things in composites—not to speak at length—which are complementary to one another, and are composed according to one continuity, nevertheless do not have their own existence by themselves; but becoming complementary to one another, they demonstrate their own proper existence in the composite. Just as, indeed, the animal, the rational, the mortal, are not seen existing by themselves, but in the whole—in the man, I say—they manifest their own proper existence. And numbered by reason and mode of difference, they do not introduce a division of the man; for they will be called parts of the man, but

surely they do not possess their existence of themselves. Thus it is manifest that not every number is indicative of things that have their own proper existence. ^B And by attaching a stain of the properties to the holy and ecumenical fourth synod, as though it said two natures and properties of natures, and for this reason entirely agrees with Nestorius, producing a division of the natures, and [claiming] that for this reason this synod is not to be accepted by us—we, in defense, and explaining the argument regarding division and property, say: the natures of Christ, I mean the deity and the humanity, from which and in which the one [subject] of the hypostasis is contemplated as a whole—if someone divides the properties ^C along with the natures by conception and reason, and not by existence and act, he will not speak outside of what is probable; for all the Fathers, one might say, cry this out explicitly. Hear also Gregory the Theologian saying: "When the natures are distinguished by conceptions, the names are also subdivided," as if to say that what is spoken of by conception is for the purpose of distinguishing it from the division that is according to act and existence, which, having pushed as far away as possible, they state that the natures exist and are called [so] by act, but they received the division of these by conception, proposing as divided by reason those things which are not divided in the things themselves, on account of the immutable difference and property ^D of the united things even after the union. So it is clear to speak of a division of natures and properties, which is called one by conception, and we would in no way stray from the truth, even if the holy and ecumenical fourth synod said nothing regarding this; but we, nevertheless, say it. For when we look to the wholeness of the hypostasis in Christ, considering the whole, since the whole is composed of parts, and is considered in the parts, and most especially when the whole is composed of dissimilar parts, with the parts being preserved unconfusedly in the union—since the parts existing in the whole are reckoned as the whole, and the properties of the parts will be reckoned as of the whole, even if a discourse, dividing by conception, judges the parts to be as they are—for example, I say: vision is accustomed to occur in the sensory organ, that is the eye, and likewise walking in the legs; but we do not say that the eye sees or the legs walk, but the man who has these as parts is said to see and walk. Thus it is also in the case of the hypostasis of Christ. For when we look at the wholeness of it, we say: of the same one of the Holy Trinity, that is of the Son of God, are both the miracles and the passions, even if he undergoes the passions according to another part, according to the humanity, and according to another he performs the signs, as consubstantial with God and the Father, and with the Spirit. But when again we look at the parts from which the whole is composed, the parts being preserved unconfusedly in the union, and the difference being found in the union (where there is difference, there also is number entirely introduced), we say that there are so many parts by reason and mode of difference, and we do not err from our purpose. For since there is a union of those things which are united, and it is a union, and what is united is united by a union, and the whole is also united in the same way, being a whole of parts, and the parts are parts of the whole: if one of the two exerts an activity, it necessarily follows that the difference of these also exists. If this is true, then as is also true, one who does not confess that the parts are so many, would not say that the whole is one, but by the difference being removed, the whole also will be destroyed. And who would not understand the absurdity? It is manifest therefore, that all who acknowledge the one hypostasis of Christ as being composed of deity and humanity, if they confess, even if you do not wish it, those in Chalcedon explicitly declared, ^B that the parts are two natures, and this the holy synod clearly proclaimed. 8. Furthermore, to say that the fourth synod agrees with Nestorius because it speaks of two natures, and that he, likewise speaking of two natures, is of the same mind as Nestorius—they differ, however, in the two persons, he speaking of two persons, while it holds to one; and for this reason, reproaching the orthodox for agreeing with Nestorius, you clearly carry the accusation from his [Nestorius'] discourse, which does not in fact agree with Nestorius, as you falsely charge. For if he acknowledges two persons, it is clear that he also acknowledges the two natures as being separated and having their own proper existence; ^C and for this reason he speaks of the union as relative. The holy synod, however, as you say, by decreeing one person and one hypostasis, is clearly seen to say that the natures are united in one person and one hypostasis not otherwise than essentially and substantially; for it is not possible to speak of two natures in one person and one hypostasis, unless they are united according to hypostasis and essence. That this is so is clearly shown by your own discourse, that it does not speak of the natures and activities as separated in Christ, but as united according to hypostasis. And in another way the same thing: If on account of the union alone, that is, the one according to hypostasis, the pupils of the Church differ from Nestorius, as also St. Cyril says, ^D and on account of the two natures you yourself say that the synod differs from Nestorius in the person, which makes the one the union of the natures—it is clear that the synod differs from Nestorius according to the correct faith of the Church. And if this is so, it is clear that it does not even agree with him. You are therefore unjustly accused by you. And that this is true, hear Cyril to Eulogius in a letter in these very words: "Certain persons are spreading slanders about the exposition which I have made, and they say: 'Why, when they call it two natures, did he tolerate it and approve it,' [the letter] of the Alexandrian? But those who hold to Nestorius, distorting the words of the one who does not believe this, lead astray those who do not know the exact truth. But it is necessary for those..."

^A who are complaining, to say, 'Not everything which the heretics speak is to be fled from and rejected.' For they confess many things, which we also confess, as when they say 'The Father is the Creator of all things, and Lord.' We must not on that account flee, because it follows that we must flee such confessions. So too, in the case of Nestorius, even if he says two natures, signifying the difference of the flesh and the Word of God (for the nature of the Word is one thing, and that of the flesh is another), yet he does not confess the union with us. We, having confessed the union, know one God, and confess the same one Lord. And after a little: Therefore, if the knowing of the difference of the natures is to divide the one Christ into two, it is [something to be rejected]. And to Nestorius ^B he says again: 'Cease to divide the natures, after the union, that is, to partition them; not in the enumeration.'

9. But since you have accused the holy fourth synod as having introduced novelties, and for that reason as agreeing with Nestorius: that you have not merely affirmed this, but have also brought forward the epistle of Pope Leo, by which the fourth synod was confirmed, as well as the testimonies of the same synod which are uniform with the sayings of Nestorius, so that the synod itself is not unlike what Nestorius posited, come, let us set the same in the middle and weigh whether, as you say, they speak in terms of Nestorius, or otherwise. The authorities speak for themselves. Nestorius writes first in his dominant ^C chapter: 'I profess two immutable natures of God, God truly of God truly, and perfect man from the son of David and Abraham.' He writes also in his epistle in this way: 'I profess God, since it is written: In the beginning was the Word, and I also profess him as man, insofar as the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.' Let us examine these other words of Nestorius, whether they have been correctly or incorrectly stated. For he does not profess the two natures of the Word absolutely, nor does he specify them towards the incarnation, and it does not seem to have been said rightly. Since the eternal Son and Word of God, before he assumed the flesh, was of one nature, namely a divine one, only: after ^D the incarnation, he assumed our nature. It did not behoove him to speak absolutely, regarding the Word, not defining him after the incarnation, or the human nature assumed. If he again, saying two immutable natures, meant them as assumed: if he did not affirm them as being according to habit, but as subsistent in one, namely in Christ, and said the same was one Christ, and the Lord, and would call him God, God truly of God truly, and the same man perfect, as from a man perfect, the Virgin, and Son of David and Abraham, and divine eloquence testifies, he seems not to be reaching the truth: when however asserting two natures of the Word, he states them to be not according to hypostasis in one, namely in the hypostasis of Christ, but by relation and relative union, or dignity,

^A or by parity of will, or good pleasure, saying that the Word is one thing toward the flesh, and—dividing them part by part—asserting the Word to be one thing, and the one from Mary another, and speaking of a personal union, while yet understanding the hypostatically united person—what is proper to the one whom he determines—rather, he judged it otherwise according to his own will (as when one undertakes the person of another, and speaks words on his behalf, though he does not consider this properly a union, but rather a relative union for the whole). For some call persons the relation of certain ones toward each other. Now he is not unaware that the convention of this person is what is signified. We say that the ruler, or the king, ^B holds the person, and according to this Nestorius perverted the personal union: for this reason he is justly subject to anathema. But the Pope Leo, since he confesses the same Christ and Lord and our God to be in one hypostasis, and confesses the one who is God and man, both co-eternal with the Father, and begotten timelessly from the Father, and consubstantial with God and the Father, and with the Holy Spirit; and in the last days having become flesh for our salvation, that is, having become man, and having been born of the Holy Spirit and Mary the Virgin, as the Theologian proclaims with his tongue, and as the rest of the Oracles testify, and as the voices of the apostles set forth, and the teachings of the God-bearing Fathers clarify—it is evident that Pope Leo stands in the truth, ^C and does not agree with Nestorius. Again Nestorius writes: "Not is the Word of God clothed by the hands of Joseph in rags, but the body of the Lord." Leo writes, however, that the one shone through signs, the other yielded to passions. Clearly by these phrases Nestorius makes the Word of God one thing, and the one born of Mary another, and called the latter a distinct person. It behooved him, if he was truly orthodox, to speak thus: "Not is the Word of God, as Word, inapprehensible and uncircumscript and co-eternal with the Father, clothed in rags by the hands of Joseph, but as having become man for our salvation, according to all things like to us without sin, and having reached infancy, he was clothed in rags by the hands of Joseph." Thus, by saying this, it is manifest that he did not make the division ^D deemed fitting for the one hypostasis of Christ into two persons, cutting it thus: for this reason he is justly subject to anathema. And Pope Leo, in that the one shines through signs, and the other yields to passions, says that these are not two, but he introduces the division of natures while they are known with their own properties, but for this reason he does not say there are two persons and two hypostases, but two of one complete being, which are supplementary. For he did not say, "The one, and the other," nor even that he might confuse them, but the one, without addition, and the other. But he says: "The one of himself, and the other, clearly, of him through whom he is of the whole," saying that the one is the complement.

^A And it is taken into his synthesis and shines forth in miracles, while the other, also being ^B a complement of the whole in that same synthesis, falls subject to sufferings. And yet, if we understand it thus, as has indeed been said, by the holy Pope Leo, nothing is absurd, nor does any blasphemy occur. And again Nestorius writes: "The Word became flesh, and dwelt among us." Leo writes: "The Wisdom built for itself a house, and the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us." These utterances neither the defiled Nestorius brought forth of his own, nor did Leo utter them, but having taken them from the divine Scripture, they placed them into their own writings. ^C But Nestorius did not bring forth the evangelical saying according to an ecclesiastical intention, but rather from his own perverted mind. For the "Word became flesh," possesses this pious thought, that the selfsame Word of God, being one in the hypostasis of the holy Trinity, remaining unchanged and immutable, which he was—that is, God—took upon himself animate flesh endowed with a rational and intellectual soul, and having accomplished the union of this in his own hypostasis, that is, of the divinity, substantially and according to hypostasis, as believing in one hypostasis even after the incarnation, or the becoming man, of the holy Trinity, he is comprehended with the flesh, and without the addition of any person is the holy Trinity increased. In this sense the evangelical statement is interpreted by the sincere commentaries of the Church. Concerning that however, "dwelt among us," the Theologian rightly added immediately: that you may not conceive it to mean that the two, which signify the inhabitant, and that in which the habitation is, have been changed into flesh, but rather that he inhabited in the flesh, and as it were in a temple of the body, which had its beginning from the holy Virgin.

10. Furthermore, when the Evangelist spoke about the habitation of the Word of God in his own flesh, he determined in how many ways God is said to dwell in us: for the holy temple of God is spoken of, in which God dwells: but you would rightly say that he dwells in these by action. The Virgin also is called the temple of God: for in her God the Word dwells essentially, which has something exceptional compared to other saints; in his own flesh, which he used as his own body, he is said to dwell as God united in essence and in hypostasis by the holy Virgin. And this indeed is the pious opinion of the Church. But Nestorius perversely accepted the saying; for he attributed to an order of dignity, or by counsel, or by good pleasure, that the Word became flesh, by making two Sons, one the Word of God, and the other another individual man from Mary; and thus he interpreted "dwelt among us" by operation or good pleasure, wherefore he rightly pronounced Jesus a mere man: on account of which he was struck by anathema. Leo then saying, "Wisdom built for itself a house: for the Word became flesh," piously understanding it, and according to the mind of the Church, as we declared before, is not snatched away by the perverted intellect of Nestorius, ^D and for [[note: the text continues from the image's Greek/Latin text]]

other, being in like manner also a completion of the whole, when taken up into the composition of that one, is subject to sufferings. And to one who understands it thus, just as it has been said by the pope of holy memory, Leo, nothing absurd or blasphemous will occur. And again Nestorius writes: "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us." Leo writes that "Wisdom built for herself a house; for the Word became flesh and dwelt among us." These expressions neither did the impious Nestorius bring forward from his own mind, nor indeed did Leo utter them [of his own], but drawing them from the divine Scripture, they inserted them into their own writings. But Nestorius did not take the evangelical text according to the ecclesiastical intention, but according to his own perverted mind. For the saying, "The Word became flesh," possesses this pious meaning: that the divine Word himself, who is one in the hypostasis of the holy Trinity, having remained unchangeable and immutable—being God, that is to say—assumed flesh animated by a rational and intellectual soul, and united this to the divine nature in His own hypostasis—making the union according to essence and according to hypostasis—so that He is believed to be one hypostasis even after the incarnation, or "in-humanation," the holy Trinity having admitted no addition of a person; and even with the flesh He is understood and exists. In this sense the accurate perception of the Church interprets the evangelical text. And as for the words, "dwelt among us," the Theologian properly and immediately added them, so that by understanding the two things indicated—both the one dwelling and that in which the dwelling takes place—you might not think that He was turned into flesh, but rather that He dwelt in the flesh as in a body used as His own, the temple from the holy Virgin.

^B 10. Since it was said by the Evangelist concerning the dwelling, or habitation, of God the Word in relation to His own flesh, one must define in how many ways God is said to dwell within us. For the saints are also called the temple of God, in whom God dwells, but in their case, a right understanding would say that it is spoken of according to operation. Again, the Virgin is also called the temple of God; for in her, God the Word dwelt essentially, which is more than in the rest of the saints, and incomparably so. But in His own flesh, which He used as a body proper to Himself—the temple from the holy Virgin—God the Word is said to dwell by being united to it essentially and hypostatically. And this is the pious mindset of the Church. But Nestorius understood the text perversely; for he said the words "The Word became flesh" in the sense of an appropriation and according to a relation of dignity, or identity of will, or good pleasure. Since he makes two sons—one the Word of God, and another a distinct man, the one from Mary—so also he expounded "dwelt among us" as being by operation or good pleasure; whence he confessed Jesus to be a mere man; and for this reason he is justly subject to the anathema. But Leo, saying that "Wisdom built for herself a house; for the Word became flesh and dwelt among us," understanding it piously and according to the mind of the Church, as we declared before, is not snatched away by the perverted intellect of Nestorius; therefore ^C

the Chalcedonian Synod, spoke of two separated natures. There, he seems to represent the holy Cyril as being at variance and not in agreement with the Synod at Chalcedon, saying that he proclaimed one nature of the Word after the incarnation, while the Synod proclaimed two natures after the union. But as the argument shows, Cyril is rather in complete agreement with the holy fourth Synod, and not at variance. Since Nestorius, whenever he spoke of two natures in Christ, immediately brought that utterance down to his own intention and gathered two persons—for he said, "It is not a nature without a person, that is, without its own person." Seeing the perversity of this genius, the holy Cyril said there is one nature of the Word, and that clearly as incarnate—not meaning that he is one nature united with flesh according to ^B hypostasis, that the whole became one nature; for if he had meant that, he would have spoken as you contend, and would be pronouncing things contrary to himself, saying, as you say, that there is one nature of the Word of God after the incarnation—that is, the divinity and the humanity brought together into one, and, as you say, composite; whereas, in other places, not only in the second letter to Sucensus, but almost, I might say, in all places where he acts concerning the mystery of the economy of Christ, he is caught asserting Christ in two natures, and that there are two natures after the union, speaking openly: neither only this, but also that he is opposed by the Fathers, which is truly false and an injury to the truth. For almost all clearly speak of Christ—that is, one hypostasis in two natures, and two natures after the union. If God and man are the same, perfect after the union, one has, in passing, handed down the whole, Christ, that is, the nature of the Word incarnate; out of the parts, he signified the whole—for just as the nature of the Word, and of the Father, and of the Holy Spirit, when he adds "incarnate," indicates what it is that is ensouled, rational, and intellectual, and as he says, he entirely indicates our own nature, which he expresses, that there are two natures of Christ, the divine and the human: if this is so, it is manifest that he conforms to the holy fourth Synod, and ^C he also, in passing, signifies that there is one Christ and Lord in two natures, and our God. Hear nevertheless what Cyril says in the second letter to Sucensus, responding, since you said: "We maintain one nature," not adding "incarnate," as if the mystery of the economy were adulterated, for it is perhaps not without plausibility that they pretend to ask: "Where is the perfection in humanity? Or how does it subsist according to us as an essence?" But since both the perfection in humanity and the indication of our own nature is introduced, by our saying "incarnate," they should cease ^D from considering that "incarnate" was placed there to manifest our essence, the doctor [index: entries preserved]

^A has introduced this—saying that there is one nature of the Word and of our essence—in order to show that, because of it being "incarnate," it is demonstrative of two natures, divinity and humanity.

And after a few words in the same epistle: "Most rightly, ^B and with the highest perfection, is the account of the saving passion set forth; he himself, the only-begotten Son of God, in so far as he is understood to be and is God, does not suffer in his own nature, being invincible to the power of the body, but rather suffers according to the earthly nature. For it is necessary that both be preserved in truth in the one Son, both that he does not suffer divinely, and that it be said that he suffers humanly; for that which suffered is flesh." See how he says that the divine nature is in the one Christ, and even after the union, even if you are angry and do not concede that there are two natures, the divine nature and the earthly nature subsist. But hear Cyril again ^C in another place, in his account of the Trinity: "Does the most wise Paul—or rather, the whole gathering of the holy ones—acknowledge a twofold account of the Son, and do they hand it down after the union with the flesh? Does he set forth a twofold account according to hypostasis, or according to nature?" If according to hypostasis, you confirm the heresy of Nestorius, which is impious; but if according to nature, then I say that Cyril also agrees in this point with the holy fourth synod, which declares that there are two natures in Christ—which is exactly what you find in almost all his commentaries—asserting a twofold Christ after the union. Let there be added nonetheless, ^D again, Gregory, who is versed in theological matters, in his oration on the Son, writing to the holy fourth synod: "God is said to be not of the Word, but of that which is seen; since in the account of the Word he is properly God, just as the Father, not of that which is seen, that is, of the Word; for the account is indeed twofold, so that the one is properly predicated of both, the other is not properly so." The same person, concerning the birth of Christ in the flesh: "For he was sent as man, but he was twofold." Let there be admitted also the account of Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, to the Emperor Gratian, which Cyril brought forward in the Council of Ephesus against Nestorius: "Let us guard the difference between the divinity and the flesh, for in each one speaks, because the Son of God is in it and each nature is present." These are enough

to demonstrate

^A gathering of many men, when the kings ordered the synod and lawfully decreed everything that was done in it—I mean Marcian and Pulcheria—greatly adorned the authority of the Church along with the rest of the good order. So great was the respect of Pulcheria toward the all-holy Theotokos Mary, the Mother of the Lord, that she faithfully called her Theotokos, and having great faith, she revered her as such, and even in the imperial city she built churches, especially in the name of the Theotokos, magnificent and beautiful, and decorated those which were already built, each in the locations where they were constructed, taking for herself the memory of her faith toward the Mother of God, and showing her to all as the all-holy Theotokos Mary. For this reason, it is not necessary to account her as thinking like Nestorius, even if you yourself are the one speaking slander against her.

12. This also was implied in the letter of your magnitude: "Many testimonies we could have concerning this, as we maintain, namely, how things after the union from the one nature of Christ provide an agreement of one nature, and much to say, but because in the letter of your holiness there is no mention of the testimonies of the God-bearing men, nor did we collect them." Nevertheless, having regard for your glory, we now declare to you instead of these: It is not fitting that, just as you have brought forward, you should gather the testimonies of the Fathers regarding the faith and the dogmas; for in this way you bring the divine Fathers into accusation and do not retain the faith intact for yourself. For many things are found to have been spoken by the Fathers either metaphorically, or equivocally, or by transposition, or by some other way of using words improperly. ^B Indeed, the divine Scriptures and custom treat names in this way. And you may see before me the blessed Cyril himself, taking hypostases for natures, and natures for hypostases. As for instance: *If one divided the hypostases.* And yet the same man says: *Inconfused are the natures,* meaning the hypostases. The great Athanasius also contends that there are two persons in Christ, and if one does not say this, he will be judged as an heretic, as if the things said by the Fathers, using words improperly, were to be brought into infamy, and from those orations, gathering testimonies for yourselves and others, you would compare them most incongruously. Yet, if anyone wishes to select such authorities from the divine Fathers, they determine these things, declaring their own intention—what the nature and hypostasis is, as decreed by the great Basil, who when he places a distinction between them, does not set them as something else, but as universal and singular differ between themselves: or what they themselves, although they abuse these terms in many other works, yet in some they explain the cause of the abuse; or those things in which many of the Fathers agree, and which have been confirmed by synodal decree, but which they themselves have handed down in writing differently, in which they are often busy expounding, while someone acts somewhat carelessly, and abuses words—your thoughts, being distracted by this, or having no readiness in hand—when you... ^{C D}

^A align yourself against others, or against certain heterodox persons, and for other reasons neglect the precise significance of words. From similar citations, one should not collect testimonies, as we said above. This you also doing, you would not find testimonies of the Fathers establishing your doctrine of one nature of Christ.

13. In your letter you proceed, as if indignant and annoyed because we have written that those who assert one nature in Christ are Eutychians, and you are subject to the same anathema and judgment, writing as follows: "And we say, Master, that we do not act incorrectly in this; therefore we attempt to clarify the Eutychian opinion—namely, that he introduces confusion and commingling in the economy—and he has not said that the Word of God assumed nothing from the immaculate and holy blood, but he proves ^B that He does not introduce confusion, and another asserting one nature in Christ, and for this reason does not rightfully fall under the same anathema." But if indeed your reasoning is different from that opinion, I mean that of Eutyches and your own confession, you wish to show that from this you are not carried away even into the same anathema against Eutyches, it seems to us—though our demonstration of the reason for one nature in the union of Christ, even if we do not find it so from the first, yet from what you say, it leads completely to the mode of commingling, and this is evident from this. There are, therefore, three ^C higher opinions concerning the union of the natures in Christ: divisive, commingling, and what is properly called unitive. The two former were brought forth and played with by heretics. For the divine Gregory

[Gregory of Nazianzus]

^A so that it does not cause the things united to one another to be entirely the same, nor entirely different. If, therefore, it does not mean that they are entirely the same, nor does it define them as being entirely different as a result of the union, the logic of truth must be sought elsewhere: where they are the same according to hypostasis, and where they are different according to nature. For conversely, even regarding the Trinity, the divine Gregory holds that which is not contrary to the nature of the matter. If the opponents do not prove that, then let them collect the conclusion themselves. For if they were not the same in hypostasis, they would surely concede it in nature; and if this were entirely the case, and there were the same account of deity and humanity for the union, even if it were the same in unit and nature—for the same thing is predicated of both—just as where the nature is one, the account of them is also the same, so it must follow ^B that those whose union is simultaneous and in the same thing, according to themselves and their nature, must be held in common. If the opposite is true—that the natures are one, but their hypostases are diverse—and one person restricts one nature, what follows from that? That there is one nature of flesh and deity, and for this reason, there is a transfusion, but two hypostases. But if it is neither in nature nor in hypostasis that they have one numerical unity, in which they might be joined, how would the identity of the united things come to pass? And if they are one with each other both in nature and in hypostasis, then the logic of immutability and lack of confusion will be preserved for the union. Therefore, this argument is drawn up entirely against those who say there is one nature in Christ, refuting the very mode of confusion, even if they themselves deny it. Others say—this argument is proven—that they are those who assert there is indeed one nature ^C in Christ, but they fall into the mode of confusion. Therefore, we ask you: Are those things that have come together recognized as unconfused in the union, or not? You will certainly say "unconfused," if you wish to avoid Eutychianism. But if those things that have come together are, as you say, deity and humanity, by what logic do you not admit that they are two, even after the union, if they were not confused in the union? And if you do acknowledge this, why do you not admit it? And if you admit it, why do you refuse to count them, whose nature and properties remain unconfused even after the union? For if you do not recount them, as divine Basil says, you do not even acknowledge them. But if you do not recount them, it is clear that you do not acknowledge them; and if you do not acknowledge them, and you do not say there are two things that have come together, then their nature, which has come together, has already been changed into one nature. ^D This same reasoning is also found elsewhere: Universal integrity has its existence either from parts that are similar, or from those that are dissimilar. If it consists from similar parts, it is entirely simple and uncompounded; if it consists from dissimilar and different natures, it is entirely composite. If it is composed from diverse natures, it is composite. Since Christ's integrity has its composition from dissimilar parts—namely, from different natures—it has a composition of deity, I say, and humanity, and these remain different in the union; in which there is difference, there is assuredly also the number of the dyad, at the very least. If this is so, it denotes number. But if you say that there is only one in the union and no difference is counted, it is clear that there is none. But if you do not

^A distinguish them, it is manifest that they are confused. But if you who claim one composite nature in Christ do not have the difference, it is evident that you are forced to say that the natures are confused, even if you do not wish to. And so much for these points. 14. Since, however, you reject and cast off Eutyches' confusion because of the exposition in your epistle, and you endeavor to set forth your own confession in few words, so that from this it might be shown to be irreproachable, you write as if you wish to appear to acknowledge the correct dogma of the Church: "Just now we will speak our confession in simple words, because we say one nature in Christ, which is known to all in two ways. ^B For one nature is understood and spoken of in two ways: the one simple and incorporeal, and without harmony, as Michael and Gabriel; the other with harmony, as Adam and Noah." Having set aside these two ways, do not apply them to the union in Christ, since the former, namely the simple and incorporeal one, happens to imply that the Lord did not become incarnate, but was naked and without incarnation; the latter, indeed, that which is in harmony, implies that Christ is not God, but a mere man. You propose a third way of a composite nature, which you admit is not unlike the human in Christ. Therefore, adopting a paradigm, you write thus: "And Christ becomes ^C as a paradigm, just as the Fathers spoke and narrated, what belongs to the body, and what belongs to the soul." But a human is called having two natures. And if someone opposes and says there are two natures in a human, hereafter Christ also has three natures—two of humanity and one of divinity. So now, from these three ways which we have just said—since we have chosen based on the aforementioned natures: if we hold to the body, we are Eutychianizing; if we hold to the human soul, we become like Apollinaris; if we hold to the divinity, we become like the Jews who say, "Being a man, why do you make yourself God?" Now, therefore, we clearly say that one nature is of the ^D tranquil natures that have come together. Having arrived at the unassailable fortress, for the sake of the paradigm of your confession, we have taken up the human. Therefore, since the method has been clarified by you in your confession, before the argument of those who oppose you—who admit that before the union, Christ was of one nature—let us define what nature is, and essence, and hypostasis, I say, and person, and what is intended by "hypostatic," and how those who are masters in the divine mysteries regarding us, and those who are teachers of the Word, distinguish these terms from one another, and to what significations they are assigned, lest confusion regarding our dogmas and error from elsewhere creep in. Almost everyone, as I might say, who maintains heresies understands these terms incorrectly, and as if not according to the judgment of the Church, they stray from the truth. Nevertheless, they assign the same meaning everywhere to essence and nature, and the sacred Nicene synod, and the councils that followed, the Constantinopolitan, the Ephesian, and the first [all], handed down, in common and universal, etc.

^A and individual things, ^B clearly indicate that the parts have merged, where the difference is not found. It is therefore evident to those who claim [there is] one composite nature in Christ, that it follows—even if they do not wish it—that they are saying the natures are confused.

And so much for these things.

14. Since you have rejected and abhorred the confusion of Eutyches through the exposition in your letter, and have attempted to set forth your own confession in a few words—so that you might be shown to be irreproachable from that point on, and seem to profess the correct dogma of the Church—you therefore write as follows: "But now, in simple words, we shall set forth our own confession, because we say 'one nature' into Christ, which is clear to all. Which 'one nature' is understood and spoken of in two ways: [one] of the simple and incorporeal and without harmony, as for instance Michael and Gabriel; and [one] with harmony, as for instance Adam and Noah." Having set aside these two modes, [claiming that] neither the former—namely, that of the simple and incorporeal one nature—applies to the union in Christ because it suggests the Lord has not become man, but is bare without incarnation; nor the second—namely, the harmonic [one]—because according to that Christ would not be God, but a mere man, you posit a third mode of a single composite nature, which you confess also exists in Christ in a similar way. Wherefore, taking man as an example, you posit and write: "And man becomes an example, according to how the Fathers spoke and declared, of what belongs to the body, and what belongs to the soul. But man is not said to have two natures. If, however, someone resists and says [there are] two natures in man, then Christ also has three natures: two of humanity, and one of deity." Now then, of these three modes, which of these mentioned natures do we say is to be assumed? If the body, we are Eutychianizing; if the human soul, we become like Apollinaris; if the deity, we are likened to the Jews, who were saying, "Being a man, why do you make yourself God?" Now then, we clearly say that [there is] one nature in the union of two undisturbed natures. You have fled as if to an impregnable fortress, taking man as an example of your confession. Therefore, since you have deliberated to clarify the mode of the "one nature," according to which Christ is confessed by you to be of one nature after the union, before we touch upon the refutatory arguments against you, let us define concerning nature and essence—and I mean hypostasis and person, and the "hypostatic"—how the teachers of our mystery, and those outside our own discourse, distinguish these names, and to which significations they assign them, so that there may be no confusion in our dogmatizing, and error might not spring up from somewhere. For almost all, if I may say so, who have strengthened heresies, taking these names incorrectly, and not according to the mind of the Church, have deviated from the truth. ^C Nevertheless, that the sacred Scriptures, and the holy Nicene synod, and the Constantinopolitan and the Ephesian [synods] that followed it, indicate to us everywhere that essence and nature are the same, and [that they] handed down [this truth] regarding common and universal...

things — things which are predicated of many — through which the holy faithful everywhere possess and cherish the creed, which handed down to us one nature and essence of the most holy Trinity, and three persons and hypostases. For they demonstrated that nature and essence [are] the same, and [that] person and hypostasis [are] the same, as applied to individual and particular things. The Fathers likewise took up the name of "form" for essence and nature. For this reason, the great Basil, interpreting the text, "Being in the form of God" (Phil. II, 6), said that it is equivalent to "Being in the essence of God." And [the Scripture] signifies that by the Lord having assumed the form of a servant, He is in the essence of humanity. ^A However, they posit the "hypostatic" as distinct from the "hypostasis." For in defining hypostasis they said: "Hypostasis is that which exists with a property, or properties, in an individual manner, and is some whole in itself," while the "hypostatic" [they define as] an essence with a property, or properties, not existing in an individual manner and as a whole in itself, but as a part of some whole.

Those outside our discourse define the name of nature, similarly to the Church, in regard to some universal thing, saying that to be a nature is one thing, and to have a nature is another; and they say that "to have a nature" [refers to] the particulars, which among us are called hypostasis and person; and they say that this very thing, the hypostasis, is a substrate. For this reason, it is called *hypostasis*, not (as some have imagined) because it simply exists [hyphestanai], but rather because it stands under [hypo stênai] something, that is, under the nature as a substrate, while the nature is subsistent,—that is, it is spoken of according to some hypostasis; which they also define, saying: "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, primarily and in itself." ^B Many have followed [this line] regarding essence in regard to the common and the individual—that is, the universal and the particular—among whom John, surnamed Philoponus, [by following them] is shown to be a Tritheite.

Severus, however, uses the name of essence in the same way as the Church, for a common thing, but as regards the name of nature, having become peculiar in this, he follows neither common usage, nor the outsiders, nor indeed the Church, but instead, contrary to this, he holds it to be of the particular; and going further, you will demonstrate with proof [that he does this] concerning both common and individual nature.

XV. These things having been clarified and examined for us in this way, it is time to examine what you have written. It is as follows: "And man is brought forward as an example, just as the Fathers spoke and explained what the body is and what the soul is; but man is not said to have two natures. But if anyone opposes and says there are two natures in man, then Christ also has three: two of humanity and one of divinity," ^C and so on. See, most clearly, you dogmatize that Christ is of one composite nature, and ^D and, wishing to demonstrate this, you have used man as an example; for just as man [is] composed of diverse natures, [he is] of one composite nature after the union. The Fathers explained that the [nature] of Christ is to be held in the same way in the union, as you claim. And as [you argue], maintaining the example—that man is of one nature—you add that man is not said to have two natures. But if anyone opposes you, saying that he does have them, it follows that Christ has three. Therefore, you seem to lead us towards the opinion that there are two natures in the union of Christ, [a view you deem] absurd. Nor is it strange, O friend, that of one absurd [premise], countless [absurdities] should result. For the proof of the composite is not said to be from those things which compose [it]—the definition of what is composed is not said to be from disparate things, which you wrongly write against us—but from those things that are far off, which perhaps might have had a place in what we wrote. But no one of sound mind would say [it comes] from those things that are far off, but from those that are immediate and proximal, and, as it were, the parts or elements that occupy the order in the composition of what is composed, which is [a claim] weak and vain, as you have written. For it is necessary, according to your view of man, that he be constructed of at least five natures: from the four elements and the soul. Similarly, electrum is not [constructed] from two [things], that is, gold and silver, but from many more, I say, from gold, and silver, and the four elements, and from those even more remote—I mean [those of] matter and form. For we do not consider the number of parts, when we inquire from what [things] this or that is composed, but rather its proximal and immediate [components]. Therefore, even though we say that man consists of two natures, and that the divinity is one, it does not follow [as you wish] against us. For here, that is, in our Lord Jesus Christ, one must not consider the parts of parts, that is, the body and soul of the humanity, but those that are immediately and proximally united, I mean divinity and humanity. For if we say that man has two natures, according to you, we [would] be forced to say that Christ has three natures, and you, then, in saying that man [has] two natures, and not one, but saying there is one nature, would dogmatize [that there are] three natures for Christ. And thus you would be entangled in your own arguments. But that is not how it is. We do not say that Christ has two natures, even if we say that man has two natures, so that the three against us might be brought together. And besides, regarding the same thing: [Is] man universal, or is he particular, that is, the individual? That no one who knows how to judge disagrees that the individual is [a person], that is, the individual, no one would deny—for neither is the body immortal, but corruptible, nor is the soul mortal, but immortal; nor is the body invisible, nor is the soul perceived by the bodily eyes—but it is rational, and intellectual, and incorporeal, while [the body] is coarse and visible, and not of the same nature [such] that they are opposed—for the soul and the body are not of one and the same essence. Again, if the definitions of these are different, their natures also are different; the definition of the body is different from that of the soul; therefore the nature of the soul [is different from the nature of the body].

^A living, and wishing to demonstrate this, you have used man as an example; for just as man, being composed of different natures, is of one composite nature after the union—this example, you say, the Fathers indeed proclaimed as holding true for the union of Christ, as you assert. And, as if verifying the example, you conclude that man is of one nature. But man is not said to have two natures. If, however, anyone opposes this, contending that he does, it follows that Christ also must have three. Thus, you think that by our affirming two natures in the union of Christ, we are being led into an absurdity. It is nothing strange, my friend, that when one absurdity is granted, countless others follow. For if every composition were not said to be composed from the things immediately joined, but from those far removed, then perhaps what you write against us would have a place. But if no one who has any sense would say that it is composed from those far removed, but rather from those which are proximate and immediate—as if having the rank of components or elements within the whole—then what you write is weak and vain. Since, according to you, one would have to say that man is composed of at least five natures, namely the four elements and the soul. Similarly, electrum is not composed of two, that is, gold and silver, but of many more; gold, I mean, and silver, and the four elements, and those still further removed, I speak of matter and form. For when we inquire into what something is composed of, we do not consider the parts of the parts, but its proximate and immediate components. Therefore, even if we say that man has two natures, and that the Godhead is one, what you intend against us does not follow. ^B For here, that is, in our Lord Jesus Christ, one must not look to the parts of the parts, namely the body and soul of the humanity, but to those things which are immediately and directly united, the Godhead, I mean, and the humanity. And if, by our saying that man has two natures, we would be compelled, according to you, to say that there are three natures in Christ, then you too, by saying that man is from two natures—even if you say not two, or in two, but a single nature—would nevertheless establish that Christ is from three natures. And thus you would be refuted by your own argument. But this is not the case; therefore, by our saying that Christ has two natures, even if we say that man has two natures, it does not follow that three are imputed to us. And there is another way to look at this: man is either in the universal or in the part, that is, the individual. But that the individual is composed of two natures, body, I mean, and the incorporeal, no one who knows how to judge rightly will deny; for the body is not immortal, but subject to corruption, nor is the soul mortal, but immortal; nor is the body invisible, nor is the soul perceived by bodily eyes; rather, the latter is rational, intellectual, and incorporeal, while the former is dense, visible, and tangible. These things which are opposed to one another are not of one nature; therefore soul and body are not of one essence. ^C And again: If those things whose definitions are different also have different natures, and the definition of the body is different from that of the soul, therefore the nature of the soul too will be different.

^A And yet these are preserved in the individual man immutably; for the individual man will be said to have two natures. For he preserves both even after the union, in their natural property, from which and in which the reason is observed. But the generic, that is to say the universal man, when one cuts him down to the things from which he is composed—I mean soul and body—and these being generic and universal—for it is not possible for anything generic to be brought into being from two individuals and particulars—one would say that the universal man has two natures. But when one contemplates into that very wholeness, taken from two essences in the universal, into the completion of this, as some one generic being brought into effect as man, because there are many individuals under him, having no difference according to species, and partaking of his definition equally, one will reasonably confess the universal man to be one essence and nature. And whenever he is taken into the composition of another, as one thing, both one nature and essence will be taken. Therefore, the eternal Son, our Lord and God, having become man, is not said to have assumed the individual man, lest the Nestorian madness creep in, but the universal, which He also individualized in His own hypostasis. It has been demonstrated that this being is of one nature if one looks to the wholeness. ^B It is manifest, therefore, that Christ is preached by us, justly and by right, as having two natures, existing from two natures, and in two natures. And nothing absurd or blasphemous will follow, even if we say that man has two natures, since all things that are composed are said to consist of the things that immediately compose them, and not of those from which those components are themselves composed. In vain, therefore, while we say Christ has two natures, and man similarly has two, is the "three" gathered against us.

16. Moreover, even if man were rendered as a single nature from two natures, different and inconfusibly united, it is not possible that Christ should be rendered as a single nature, even if He Himself is composed of different natures—I mean, of the Godhead and the humanity—and this is clear from the following. 1. Everything composed of different natures is rendered as one nature, when the composite does not admit the names, nor indeed the definitions, of the components. For example, I say that man is rendered as one composite nature, since he does not strictly admit the names and definitions of the parts. For it is not possible to say that man is strictly called soul or body, nor does he admit their definitions, even if he be said to have soul and body. But Christ, our God, being composed of the Godhead, I say, and the humanity, admits both the names and the definitions of the parts. ^C For the same one is God and man by nature, admitting their definitions. It is not possible, therefore, for Him to be rendered as one nature. 2. Every composite thing rendered from different natures as one nature is something other than the things from which it was composed. But Christ is the same as the things from which He was composed; for the same one is God and man. Therefore, Christ is not of one nature after the union. 3. Whatever, becoming of one nature after the union, whether by confusion or by inconfuse union, at the same time is rendered as ^D a single nature, is not that from which it was composed. But Christ is the same [as the things from which He is composed]; therefore, He is not of one nature.

^B or does any nature, being one, become receptive to contradictory essential differences? For how is it possible for the same nature to be at once created and uncreated, mortal and immortal, comprehensible and incomprehensible? Yet Christ possesses this. Therefore, Christ is not of one nature, even if a human being is of one nature.

9. Further: If, according to you, Christ is of one nature after the union, one must absolutely say what this one nature is: either divine alone, or human alone, or divine and human together, or neither divine nor human. But if this one nature is divine alone, then Christ will be God and not human. If this one nature is both divine and human together, it is the nature neither of the Father nor of the Holy Spirit, nor indeed of human beings; and the charge of blasphemy from both sides will cling to one who thinks this, and he will fall away from a sound mind. If this one nature is neither divine nor human, then Christ is neither God nor human. Therefore, wherever we turn our arguments, we are led to say that Christ is one hypostasis of the holy Trinity, possessing two natures, a divine nature and a human nature. And for this reason, both accounts converged in Him: of Him saying about Himself, "Whom do they say that I, the Son of Man, am?" and of Peter answering, "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God."

10. Item: If Christ is of one nature after the union, it is necessary that the nature according to which Christ is of one nature be either common or singular. If you concede that it is common, it is already spoken of regarding many; but to find or for there to be other Christs regarding whom this common nature would be predicated is completely impossible. If it is singular, it will be the same as the hypostasis. And if this is so, it would be absolutely necessary for you to reckon the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit as three particular natures, and to call them three gods and three deities, which surpasses all blasphemies; indeed, it is an abjuration of the entire Christian faith. For it is not possible to call nature a hypostasis, or hypostasis a nature, lest all Christians be forced to assert that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three natures, which is three hypostases, or that they have one hypostasis in the same way that they have one nature; both are alien to the Christian faith.

11. Further: If He brought forth into the completion of the universe the parts of man—being of one nature—simultaneously from non-existence into existence, and it is possible for things contemporary with one another to form one composite nature, receiving such a decree and natural law from the Creator so that by the law of nature, like things might be procreated from like by succession; yet in the Lord, of the united natures, the one is without beginning and timeless, while the other has a beginning and is under time. And they were not made as species for the completion of the universe, since God ceased from His works on the seventh day; nor did they flourish naturally, nor are they subject to the law of nature, ^D so as to be begotten from Christ and to constitute a species of Christs, capable of many hypostases, but [He is] one hypostasis composed of two natures, and in two natures, and possessing two natures, each nature after the union having its own definition, and law, and mutual difference.

^B 12. Item, If diverse species are not compared by hypostasis, or separated by difference, but by nature, and if the hypostases of the same species are not compared by nature but by difference, not by hypostasis, and as it is impossible that those which are distinguished by hypostatic difference should be one hypostasis, so it is impossible that those distinguished by natural difference should be one nature: therefore, it is not possible to say that there is one nature of our Lord Jesus Christ, but rather that from two perfect natures, divine and human, the union happened according to the hypostasis immutably, and inconfusedly, and indivisibly, and inseparably, while the two natures perfectly having one composed hypostasis were completed ^C as acknowledged of the Son of God, and incarnate, saying that the same hypostasis of his deity and humanness, while acknowledging the two natures to be preserved in him after the union, and not setting each individually, but joined to one another in the one composite hypostasis, saying that the union is essential, but not essential in the way that two natures are completed, for it has been proven that one composite [hypostasis], this is entirely impossible, but rather having been joined to one another according to the truth in the one composite hypostasis of the Son of God; and we define the essential difference of them to be preserved, for that which is created has remained created, and the uncreated, uncreated: similarly also the remaining oppositions. 13. Item, If Christ is of one nature after the union, tell me, of which? And what has become of the other? But if both are existing, ^D how are they one, if not composed from both of yours? If this is so, Christ will be of another essence than the Father, being composite; and similarly from the Spirit. But this is blasphemous and alien to the Christian religion. 14. Item, If man is made from two natures into one composite nature, as if something else than those from which he is composed, then by no reason will he be said to be of the same essence or the same nature as those from which he is constructed; because others are his definitions, and others those of his parts: nor are those who have the same human nature in a single individual, even of the same nature and essence with souls, which are subject to a common nature, nor with bodies which are subject to a common nature; but Christ, with the hypostasis of the things which are divine, of the Father, I say, and of the Holy Spirit, is of the same essence and co-essential, and by nature is truly God, and is God who is same to us and to the Mother by essence and co-essential, as truly man, and by nature is man, and is one of the Holy Trinity: for the same hypostasis accepts for itself the definitions of the two natures, and the definition which anyone attributes to deity, he will find the same in Christ, and whatever he will prove to belong to humanness, he will find the same fitting for Christ: so that it follows of necessity that Christ is not of one nature ^A after the union. 3. If everything that is completed into one nature after the union, whether it is completed by melting together, or by unconfused union, its parts are co-hypostatic; I speak for example: man, being completed into one nature, has co-hypostatic parts; but Christ is not so, but the Lordly man subsisted in the hypostasis of the Word of God, as of another hypostasis, not as an accident, far from it; for accidents are everywhere as in a subject, but humanity is considered in another, I speak for example, in Peter, or in Thomas, with a proper subsistence. Therefore, the Lordly man did not subsist in the hypostasis of the Word of God as an accident, but as an essence with the assumption of properties, which are separating Christ from the remaining [men] by becoming hypostasically, and not a hypostasis. 4. Item, If in all things composed from two different natures according to hypostasis, not co-hypostatically, but otherwise, that is to say, united with another hypostasis, one hypostasis is completed, [and] not one nature, it is manifest that the Word of God united with the human nature not co-hypostatically, but having it subsisting in his own hypostasis, is not completed into one nature. 5. Item, If everything in common and in many is considered, not belonging to one more and to another less, but equally, and becoming complementary, those of which it is defined are called essence according to the Church; but the whole man is composed from soul and body, and man does not differ from man, insofar as he consists of soul and body, according to any difference of nature, but all men having the constitution and being referred under one definition all together, according to this are said to be of one nature; but concerning the hypostasis of Christ we cannot say one nature; for both the natures are preserved even after the union, and it is not possible to find a species of Christs; for there did not come to be another Christ from deity and humanness, God and man the same; therefore Christ is not completed into one nature after the union. 6. Item, If it is not the same, the one according to the species of man, and the one according to the essence of soul and body; for the one according to the species of man indicates the non-difference in all men, but the one according to the essence of soul and body impairs the very being of them, leading it to a complete non-existence; for the body is not the same as the incorporeal according to the reason of essence; there is no necessity, therefore, for us, while saying one nature in man, not because of the sameness of the essential quality of soul and body, but because of the non-difference of individuals referred under the species, to affirm one nature in Christ, where no species comprehends the hypostasis. 7. Item, If all things that happen paradoxically and supernaturally do not make a nature; for we do not say the nature of a bush holding converse with fire and not being consumed, nor the nature of a human body being cooled in fire, but we say these are paradoxes happening around one hypostasis; but the Word of God was united supernaturally with the human nature; because of this, also in one hypostasis even what is completed is not made a composite nature, but a hypostasis. 8. Item,

^A if hypostases of a different species are not compared or distinguished by a hypostatic difference, but by a natural one, and if hypostases of the same species are not compared or distinguished by a natural difference, but by a hypostatic one, and just as it is impossible for things that differ by a hypostatic difference to be of one hypostasis, so it is impossible for things that differ by an essential difference to be of one nature. Therefore, we cannot speak of one nature in our Lord Jesus Christ, but rather that the union according to hypostasis occurred from two perfect natures, the divine and the human, unchangeably, inconfusedly, unalterably, indivisibly, and inseparably; acknowledging in two natures, which perfectly possess one composite hypostasis, the Son of God, and the incarnate one, we assign the same hypostasis to his divinity and his humanity, acknowledging that the two natures are preserved in him after the union, not setting each one apart and by itself, but united to one another in the one composite hypostasis; we call this a substantial union, yet substantial not in the sense that the two natures, having been completed, form one composite nature—for this has been shown to be entirely impossible—but that they have been united to one another in truth into one composite hypostasis of the Son of God. And we define that their substantial difference is preserved; for what is created has remained created, and what is uncreated, uncreated; and likewise with the other oppositions. ^B 13. Furthermore: If Christ is of one nature after the union, tell us, of what kind? And what has become of the other? If both exist, how is it one; unless one composite is formed from both, as you claim? But if this is so, Christ is of a different essence from the Father, who is simple, and likewise from the Spirit, which is blasphemous and alien to the company of Christians. 14. Furthermore: If man is formed as one composite nature out of different natures, as if becoming something else besides that out of which he was composed, and in no way could he be described by anyone as being of the same essence or the same nature as those from which he was composed—for the definitions of him and of his parts are different—nor indeed do those who fall under the same nature of man as individuals share the same nature or substance with those who fall under the common nature of souls, nor with those who fall under the common nature of bodies. But Christ, being one specific hypostasis among those who come under the divine nature—I mean the Father and the Holy Spirit—is of the same nature and essence, and is truly God, and is God by nature, and is of the same essence and nature with us and with his Mother, as being properly man and man by nature, and one of the Holy Trinity; for the same hypostasis came down from heaven, the Son of Man. ^C And indeed we do not say that the flesh came down from heaven, but that it was fashioned from the holy and immaculate blood of the Virgin. By the mode of *exchange* (antidosis), therefore, this also has been said. Other things, again, are said by the mode of *appropriation* (oikeiosis), as when we also say: "A few drops of blood of God sanctified the whole world." And again, "Christ-killing Jews," since the flesh became the property of the Word, and subsisted in his own hypostasis. The Word therefore appropriates the passions of his own flesh, and considers them as his own; this you yourself in your essay concerning Christ went through, that it is said by the divine Scripture, even if you did not... [gap] ...think regarding the composition of man. Similarly, you [find that] the three modes are found in the Scripture, concerning Christ—I mean the synecdoche, the exchange, and the appropriation—as if from this you were drawing the similarity of the composition of man to the union of Christ, ^D and because of this you said that Christ is of one nature after the union, just as the human being... [gap] ...is of one nature, even though the human being is of one hypostasis; since therefore the discourse, through common notions and very many physical arguments, has demonstrated that Christ is not of one nature after the union, nor is the composition of the human being similar to that of Christ, according to the hypostasis of the two natures in Christ, it is clear that your doctrines are false, and therefore one must withdraw from them, and you maintain a confession different from that of Christ, from which it is necessary to depart.

^A and it is also said of man. Do you not see that you are weaving together things that cannot be joined, and mixing things that cannot be mixed? For the divine Scriptures do not speak of the economy of Christ and the union with him in the same way as they do of the union of man; but regarding man, the Scripture employs the synecdochical manner—speaking of the whole from the part, or the part from the whole—as you yourself mentioned; we can find it signifies the whole man either from the soul alone, or from the body, or the part from the whole. But the mode of appropriation you have been unable to demonstrate regarding Christ, much less have you done so regarding his humanity. In the same way, you have also expounded erroneously on the mode of exchange—that which communicates what belongs to the body to the soul, or what belongs to the soul to the body; for the mode of exchange or of appropriation cannot be found spoken of regarding the soul and body in the way you have asserted through your examples. For in saying that in the divine Scripture the soul is spoken of in place of the body, in the Lord’s saying: *Do not be anxious for your soul, what you shall eat or what you shall drink* ^B, you are mistaken; for it is manifest that eating or drinking is not the property of the body, but of both together—that is to say, of the living being. For it has been said by the wise that some things are proper to the soul alone, such as understanding; while others are of the composite, that is, of the living being, such as eating, drinking, moving, sleeping, waking, and things of that sort, which exist because of it. Likewise also [it is taught] by the great Basil: some things are proper to the body, such as being cut or being burned; others are proper to the animate body, such as being exhausted; others to the soul which uses the body, such as being affected by sadness or grief, which are things of both [soul and body] by way of synecdoche. Thus the saying, *Do not be anxious for your soul, what you shall eat or what you shall drink*, signifies "yourselves." ^C In like manner, whatever else you expounded on this matter—things said by way of synecdoche—you have transferred to the mode of exchange, doing so ignorantly and without discernment. And this is sufficient concerning these matters.

18. Furthermore, in your letter you, as if clearing yourself of the charge because we had written that if you acknowledge one nature in Christ, it would follow either that this is merely divine, or human, or that the divine has been changed into the human, or the human into the divine, or—since Christ is of a composite one nature, while the natures are preserved ^D evidently unchanged—that the nature of the Father must also be composite, because even after the union Christ is of the same nature and essence as God and the Father and the Holy Spirit, or else that the Son is not of the same nature and essence as God and the Father even after the union; and one might perhaps gather many other absurdities from this line of argument—you yourself, as if wondering at such a text and establishing yourself as free from blame, write thus: "I wondered at what you wrote in this letter." And after a few words: "For if we..."

say a mixed blending in the natures of Christ, just as we say of water and wine that they are mixed, and just as we say that gold and uncoined metal being smelted in a furnace are completely fused and blended—for if I spoke in that way, it would have some similarity. But if Christ is outside of these things, and if I speak of a blending of the Word of God with His own body, just as light with a ray, or fire with gold, or spirit with a body, inseparably and unchangeably, then you wrongly reproach us, trampling upon justice," and the rest. ^B And confirming that the union of the natures is without confusion, he brings forward Gregory the Theologian and his colleague, the other wonder-worker Gregory, as asserting the same thing. And we agree with you on this point alone. Thus you seem indeed to escape the accusation of saying that the union in Christ took place without confusion, which you also profess. Therefore, the things that you confess in your writings ^C are far from you, so that you might the rather be caught by your own wings, as it were. For from these things it is manifest: we say that every composite thing makes one nature from composition, or from commixture, or from confusion, or from an unconfused union. Commixing, or confusion, or unconfused union, we say is brought about; commixture, most of all, which makes one thing out of four elements, an effect of one nature, and the corruption of the parts which came together in the union from which this whole is constituted; which neither depart altogether from their own nature when they come together—for then the composition which they came together to form, if the parts were entirely destroyed, would not deserve to be called a composition, but would be seen to be destroyed in one thing, and preserved in another. ^D But if in these things the whole is spoken of as one, made from the parts that have come together, they themselves may not be properly said to be in no way in act, unless one speaks by potentiality. Our body, as we said before, is made by commixture and not confusion out of four elements, and is said to be from four elements, for they exist in four by potentiality, but it is never said to be [from them] by act. But a body, although it is asserted to have four elements, is in no way said to have that same nature and essence as those of which it is composed: for in no way does it obtain the denominations of the parts gathered into the composition, nor their definitions. Nay, not even do individual human bodies, which are reduced to the universal elements, say they are of the same essence or nature as those elements. And if one again says there is an unconfused union, man—for two things, body and soul, came together without confusion to constitute the body and the living creature. But this possesses a diverse union and a diverse mode of union. For it is of composite things, namely soul and body, and it deserves to be called one being, seeing that those things which came together in the union are preserved whole, and are so in act. And to have parts, man is said by them, as those who judge things as they are, but as to the "being," namely two natures, man is in no way [two natures].

of the whole are in no way attributed to it. Since the thing composed has become different from those from which it is, and they are not the same, therefore the one, namely man, in relation to those from which he has been composed, in relation to the soul and the body, I say, might be called of one nature or of the same substance; but he is not. Since he does not, strictly speaking, admit of their names, nor does he admit of their definitions; nor indeed can the individual things, for instance, Peter, or Paul, be said, in relation to the individual souls of men, or the human bodies, to be of one nature, or of the same substance, since they are not at all of the same nature in general. Therefore, if anyone were to say that man is joined together without confusion from different natures, he would be saying he is of one nature and of the same substance as the human soul, ^B or further, that the soul is composed of the same and of the body; or if this were not so, because of the obvious absurdity, that the soul is not of the same substance and of the same nature as the single composed nature of man. We have done the same thing in our Epistle, saying: Since you speak of one nature of the union of Christ, it is absolutely necessary, either that you say it is divine, or human only, or that both have been changed into each other. If the union be of one nature of Christ, it is absolutely necessary that the nature of the Father be found in that compound, or in that nature, equal even after the union of Christ, so that it may be preserved with him. But if it is not so, because of the blasphemy, the Father will not be of the same nature as the Son, which also exceeds every blasphemy. You, therefore, avoiding the power of the arguments, and the diversity ^C of the union according to confusion, and not according to confusion, have brought it into the middle, as if you were also unworthily calumniated by us. To write that we have been changed into another nature by those who claim that it has been made according to infusion, is not something we abhor. But it follows that the nature of God and of the Father is found to be as a compound, which after the union Christ is of the same nature and substance, and is believed to be with God and the Father; if this is not granted because of the blasphemy, that Christ is not of the same substance with God after the union, which indeed exceeds the limits of blasphemy and absurdity. But since also in the nature after the union unconfusedly and immutably united, just as the discourse by the demonstration from man has established, ^D the same absurd and blasphemous [conclusion] is inferred, in no way can he evade our examinations, since he dogmatizes that Christ is of one nature, and that the union is unconfused. For the discourse has proved from both sides that it is absurd and blasphemous to prove to those who are examined by us, [that Christ is of] one nature, and [that he] has brought together the union unconfused. Likewise, the bringing forward of examples to demonstrate that which is by you falsely called two natures, as having come about unconfusedly after the union, was rightly understood. For those things [which are brought forward] for the destruction of the one compound nature, and for the introduction of your dogma, such as gold mixed with fire: it is certain that in the one hypostasis the gold, receiving the fire, makes a compound hypostasis, having two natures, that of the gold and that of the fire, and very many illustrious and God-bearing Fathers [use this] for the demonstration of the two natures in the one Christ.

in the judgment of those who judge rightly. For a man is by no means said to be two natures, just as the natures of the whole are in no way attributed to it. Since that which is composed has become something other than those things from which it is composed, and not the same, neither could the whole itself—that is, the man—be said to be of the same nature ^A or the same essence as those from which he was composed—I mean the soul and the body. For he does not even strictly admit their names, nor indeed their definitions; nor, again, could individual human beings, such as I say, Paul or Peter, be called the same nature or essence as the individual souls or human bodies of men, because neither are the universals of the same species. Therefore, if anyone were to say that a man, united inconfusedly from different natures, is of the same nature and essence as the human soul, it would necessarily follow either that the soul is composed of itself and the body, or, if this is not the case because it is patently absurd, that the soul is not of the same essence and nature as the one composite nature of the man. We attempted something of the same kind in our epistle, saying: If you speak of one nature in the composite union of Christ, you must necessarily say that it is either divine, or human only, or that both have been transformed into one another; or, if there is one composite nature of Christ, it will necessarily be that the nature of the Father is found to be composite, so that the consubstantiality after the union of Christ with Him might be preserved; or, if this is not the case, due to the blasphemy, the Son will not be consubstantial with the Father, which is itself the height of all blasphemy. You, therefore, thinking to escape the refutations, have brought forward the difference of the union according to confusion and not of such a kind, as if you were not also ^B justly calumniated by us. For our writing that one nature has been transformed into the other, according to those who report it to be by infusion, has the same weight. But the consequence that the nature of God and the Father is found to be composite, because after the union Christ is and is believed to be of the same nature and essence with God and the Father; or, if this is not the case due to the blasphemy, that the Father is not after the union consubstantial with the Son—this is something that exceeds the bounds of every blasphemy and absurdity. But since, also in the case of the union which is united inconfusedly and immutably, just as the discourse has shown through the demonstration drawn from man, the same absurd and blasphemous conclusion follows, you will by no means escape our refutations by dogmatizing that Christ is of one nature, even if you should profess the union to be inconfused. For the discourse has demonstrated on both sides that it leads to an absurd and blasphemous conclusion. Likewise, the adduction of examples to represent the one nature which you profess, as having come to be according to an inconfused union, was not rightly taken. For some are for the destruction of the one composite nature and for your own dogma, such as gold mixed with ^C fire: since altogether gold, receiving the fire in its own hypostasis, creates a composite hypostasis, having two natures, that of the gold and of the fire; which many even of the Fathers, truly divine and renowned, have used in their own commentaries to represent the two natures in the one Christ, that is to say in one hypostasis. Other [alt-version omitted]

^A matters are far removed from that unconfused and immutable union of natures according to Christ. For no one of sound mind would say that light is combined or put together with its own ray. For nothing that exists is ever said to be composed with its own proper activity or its own result; nor indeed does the soul and the man have a union of such unconfused nature as that which concerns Christ. This has been demonstrated before, that one exists together with the soul, whereas the other [exists] in a different way. 19. And again, in your letter, objecting, you write: "Why were the Fathers acting in disagreement, calling it 'mixture' and 'union,' because mixture contains no separation, nor does union [contain] division? But by these words the Fathers spoke, that just as things that are separated are not called mixed, so neither are things that are mixed called separated; just as properties remove the union, so also the union suppresses the properties." If, therefore, they were not mixed without confusion with the body, why do they say that he was incarnate? And if he was not united with the humanity, why do they say that he became man? Since these things are worthy of no consideration, because they have been sufficiently resolved by us in what precedes, we need to take little thought for them. However, lest anyone think to vaunt himself in these matters, we respond ^B briefly. The holy Fathers, teaching the union and mixture in Christ of the two natures—I speak of deity and humanity—to be unconfused and immutable, assert clearly that it occurred hypostatically and substantially in the one Christ; and they condemn those who, by act and by existence, place the two natures separately and apart, as did Nestorius—that object of divine hatred—whom they justly subjected to anathema. For it is impossible for things united hypostatically and substantially to be separate and apart individually; just as things that are separate in existence and activity and apart cannot have a hypostatic and substantial union. Therefore, we do not [commit] any such thing when we contemplate as parts the two natures and the two properties of the natures that are in the one Christ. For number in itself does not produce a division of realities, nor does it represent things that are independently subsistent. Nor indeed, because we count ^C and merely by the rule of difference acknowledge the natures, and their activities, and the wills appropriate to [those] natures, do we introduce a division according to act and existence among the natures and properties, so that what you have written might have a place. But if nothing of what you write touches upon us, you stir up the argument to no purpose hither and yon, slandering the truth. And these matters are thus. 20. Since we have also included this in our letter—that the holy synod at Chalcedon proclaimed one person and one hypostasis for this reason, because both the passions and the miracles are reckoned to belong to the one of the holy Trinity, that is to say, to God the Word, and ^D refer back to him...

^A I know not how you incautiously deride our words, and contradict what has been written, and, expressing astonishment, write thus: "And we have learned another strange thing in your letter, that the synod of Chalcedon spoke of one person and two natures in Christ for this reason, that the passions are reckoned as belonging to the Word of God, and refer back to him, to which the blessed Cyril rightly replied." Thus you mix things that cannot be mixed, and consider in the same way things that have absolutely no communion according to intellect, and whether you do so willingly or unwillingly, God alone knows, but you do not wish to understand the difference between our writing and the madness of Nestorius. For he, thinking that nature, person, and hypostasis were the same, and ignorant of what the difference was between the two, and considering every nature as subsisting by itself, was ill-disposed toward the union according to hypostasis, as if the natures were thereby contracted in the union of the one person. ^B He therefore thinks dangerously of the divine Word, to whom the saintly Cyril pointed, from the example of man, that two natures are observed in one hypostasis—I mean, for instance, of body and incorporeal soul—if the man is said to suffer anything, such as being burned or cut, he suffers this according to his body, while the soul is kept unharmed and intact. In the same way, one must think of God the Word. For while the divine Word suffered corporally, He remained impassible, insofar as it concerned Him, as He is God without beginning and incorporeal. Thus Nestorius, thinking [this way], wrote contrary things to Cyril. But the aim of the holy fourth synod was different, and not [like that of] the detestable Nestorius. Rather, [it understood] the difference of nature which it has to hypostasis, having learned it clearly from the synodal and Patristic [teachings], and knowing that not every nature is self-subsistent, and precisely understanding the union according to hypostasis and essence in Christ, and [it knew] that the eternal Word sustained our nature in His own hypostasis, and by the rationale of appropriation—natural and essential, I mean, and not that which is considered according to person and relation, perish the thought, which Nestorius declared the Word to have toward the man—but rather, as we have said, the natural and essential, which is observed in the union according to hypostasis, and correctly knowing, and knowing the eternal Son to have become man, it said what Athanasius and Cyril, the prelates of Alexandria, and all the Fathers said: that having created for Himself from the all-pure Virgin Mary a flesh animated by a rational and intelligent soul, He made the human flesh and the human soul proper to His own hypostasis. ^C And in the same way that Peter, or someone else possessing a human body and a human soul is a man, in that same way the eternal Son, having created unto His own hypostasis a human body and a human soul, and having made both proper to Himself, truly became man. Just as the body and soul of Peter are both proper to his own hypostasis, and not of another's hypostasis, and therefore possessing them he altogether has a human nature, which exists not of his hypostasis alone, but [is] the hypostasis of every man alike, therefore [the synod says] the eternal Son possesses these, and [He] altogether has the human nature, which is not of His hypostasis alone, but is common also to the hypostasis of every man; ^D for this reason, the holy fourth synod dogmatized one hypostasis and two natures in Christ. Nestorius thought otherwise about the Word in [His] passion, as we have said. But Cyril of Alexandria rightly refuted him. And this is proven to you to be empty and thoroughly powerless.

21. Let us now see what you write in the subsequent [part of your letter], for your writing is as follows: "But you object, saying with opposite words, as we read in the epistle; for if they separate the natures, and affirm the uniting persons, it follows, and you add that it becomes a person, that the Apostle writes for two persons, who though he was in the form of God, took the form of a servant: he said 'form'. Therefore, how do they wish from these two to burden the person, which they call one? If they incur the error of Sabellius, if that which it was, they truly saw the Lord in the form of a man? Here indeed, you compose the argument as if from [our] adversaries against us, and when we are seen to assert two natures in Christ [and] one hypostasis, you attempt to drag [it] into absurdity, so that you might lead us into [that] absurdity, that you might confirm your own dogma, namely that Christ is of one nature. Wherefore you decide against us as certain, what it is that, although you have foolishly blurted out, since truly not without error [is] nature and hypostasis, person namely, even if one signifies the same thing in the mystery of the economy: as many as are the natures, so many also are the hypostases,"

or persons, you concede; and when we affirm two natures and one hypostasis in Christ, straightway you conclude for your own pleasure that it is necessary that a mixture of persons should occur. And if it is absurd to say that there is a mixture of persons, it is necessary to say that there is one hypostasis, and likewise one nature. O the ignorance of those who say such things! For they have not understood what they say, nor of what they decide; for who, while his mind possesses wisdom and prudence, would say that the common or universal is the same as the individual or singular, which is the person or hypostasis? For this is not wont to be referred to many, as man is to Peter and Paul, but to one, which is both person and ^B hypostasis; nor is it necessary that the nature and the person should correspond to each other reciprocally—for to him who affirms that there is a hypostasis, it is not necessary that there be nature, provided that person or hypostasis is nothing else than nature with a property or properties, a whole said per se; but the universal, or the declared nature, is not necessarily also the singular, namely, the person or hypostasis. For universals considered in individuals contribute to their wholeness, and not as the singulars in the universals. Therefore, from the fact that we say two natures in Christ, one need not also conclude that a mixture of persons occurs. For no reason forces it, since nature and person are not the same, nor does it convert, in such a way that however many natures there are, so many there are also [necessarily] persons.

For in many things it is possible to see two natures contemplated in one hypostasis, and yet not from the two natures come a mixture of two persons into one person, as in the case of the individual man, and in that of heated iron, and in many others, two natures are said to be united without confusion, but not two persons, so that they might also become [two] by mixture. Likewise, also, what the Apostle said, which you have badly understood: ^C "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant." The great Basil, therefore, in ^D being able to signify by "form" that which is in the essence and nature of the Father, namely the Son, and "the form of a servant" as the nature assumed by the Lord, and as many as have made an interpretation of this saying, the Fathers, have perceived the name of "form" to mean essence and nature. You, therefore, also conclude this as nothing else than person, exactly as you conclude the nature, rashly and without any demonstration. And otherwise the same thing: If we were to dogmatize that the natures are separated, namely subsisting by themselves, as being in themselves, then the Word of God together with His own divine nature, and again man subsisting by himself before, and fashioned, then saying the union of the natures, and confessing them as two, [658, A] that is not another hypostasis of those men; for this reason the holy fourth synod dogmatized one hypostasis and two natures in Christ. And Nestorius, having understood the passion of the Word in another fashion, just as we said behind, for this cause Cyril of Alexandria rightly replied to him. And this also has been demonstrated to you as stale and altogether weak. Since he possessed these, he entirely has the human nature, which does not exist of his hypostasis alone, but also exists of each of the hypostases of men; for this sake the synod says that the eternal Son, being one of the Trinity, has two natures in one hypostasis, not privately, with each nature differing by its own hypostasis, but with the divine nature indeed common to him and to the Father and to the Holy Spirit, and the human nature common to him and to those who are such in part. The hypostasis of him, however, has been determined differently, to him alone apart from the Father and the Holy Spirit, and his body and his soul, both of them properly of his hypostasis apart from all men. Therefore, all that the flesh of the eternal God and his human soul endured and suffered, the eternal Son himself is said to have subsisted and suffered, and it happened to him in truth, and it is ascribed to him, in the same manner as whatever the flesh and soul of Peter suffers happens to Peter, and is in truth ascribed to him. For this reason, confessing the truth, we say that the eternal Son himself hungered, and thirsted, and was in agony, and became weary, and his person was struck with a lash, and he was spat upon, and scourged, and the hands and feet of the eternal Son were pierced with nails, and he himself was hung upon a cross, and died, and was buried, and rose on the third day. Yet all these things happened to the eternal Son. But he suffered these things in the way he was able to suffer, that is, by his own human flesh and soul, not by his own divine nature. By the argument, therefore, of natural and essential appropriation, all these things happened to the one Word, not as he was the Word, as we said.

21. Let us see also in what follows what you write; for your letter also contains this: "But offering a counter-objection, let us speak from the opposite words which they themselves say, as we read in the letter. For if they separate the natures and while uniting the persons say that it is a mixture, then it behoves a person to come into being, because the Apostle writes concerning two persons, that 'being in the form of God, he took the form of a servant.' He mentioned form, therefore, and form. Now, therefore, which of the two do they love to load upon the person of which they say there is one? If of the deity, they will weaken the feebleness of Sabellius; if of humanity, what is that which they saw in truth in the form of a man the Lord?" Here, then, you shape the speech as if it were being thrown against us from the opposite side, and you attempt to twist us, who say two natures in Christ and one hypostasis, into an absurdity, so that supposedly by leading us into an absurdity, you might construct your own dogma, that Christ is of one nature. Wherefore, that which is dogmatized by you against us is of this kind, even if you have uttered it senselessly, since you wrongly take [the meaning] of nature and hypostasis, namely, the name of person, as if it signifies the same thing in the mystery of the economy: and as many as are the natures, so many also are the hypostases.

But if this is foreign to the orthodox faith of Christians (for we abhor the mind of Nestorius as such), you conclude such things against us in vain. ^A For we say that the divine Word, possessing the divine nature perfect in Himself, subsequently individualized the human nature with its prescribed properties in His own hypostasis, and made the Lordly man hypostatic, united to Him at the very moment of conception, and not formed beforehand in the womb of the Virgin; but that at the very first production of this man, these three things took place simultaneously: the assumption, the existence, and the deification of him by the Word; and thus the holy Virgin is understood ^B and called Theotokos, not only because of the nature of the Word, but also because of the union of the human, of which the conception and the existence were wrought by miracle simultaneously—the conception of the Word, and the existence of the flesh in the Word itself, through the Mother of God herself, who supernaturally provided what was to be fashioned to the Fashioner, and what was to be made man to God, and to the Maker of all things who deifies the assumption. The union preserves those things that were united as they were when they came into union, ^C not—I say—only the divine, but also the human of Christ, which was both above us and according to us. And if this is so, it is rash for you to contend that a mixing of persons is inferred from the fact that we speak of two natures and one hypostasis in Christ. And indeed, here let our responses and arguments against your complaints, and against your criminations and insults toward the correct doctrine of the great and ecumenical Council of Chalcedon—by which all those who think in common with this holy council are vindicated from calumnies—be set forth for those who desire to embrace what is right and just, and let them end here. ^D

22. Furthermore, the matters concerning your profession are to be examined, not so much as being led astray and maintained from malice as from the tyranny of an received mindset (for it would be grievous to say that it proceeded from ignorance and a spirit of contention). You have not fallen away entirely from the right reason concerning the faith, but only in part, unless someone should wish to apply to you that proverbial saying: *He who despises small things will fall little by little;* and everything that leads to a fall, and a fall from God, is worthy of execration and avoidance. For you rightly hold, in accordance with the catholic and orthodox Church, the pre-eternal existence of the Son and Word of God with His unoriginate Father and His all-holy and life-giving Spirit. Furthermore, you also rightly hold the habitation of the Word of God in the womb of the ever-virgin and Theotokos Mary, brought about by the good pleasure of God the Father and the cooperation of the all-holy Spirit, and the unconfused and inseparable union of our nature, with the Word of God having remained immutable in His own nature, that is, in His divinity, and with His humanity—that is, the human nature—having been kept immutable, and truly presenting all things that belong to man, with the exception of sin alone, that is to say, body, soul, and mind. And these things you confirm, perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity...

BY THE WATCHFUL PRAYER OF YOURS, GIVE ME VIGILANCE, O MAIDEN, DRIVING FAR AWAY THE DROWSINESS OF SLOTH.

Grant me a share in your compassion, you who gave birth to the Word, who is full of compassion, O blessed, most pure Virgin; and in the hour of judgment, stand by me, so that you may deliver me from the sentence of condemnation there. We joyfully bring to you the voice of the divine Gabriel, and we cry aloud: Hail, Paradise, bearing always in your midst the Tree of Life, O most glorious palace of the Word; hail, O Virgin, all-blameless.

From the Canon for Friday at Matins.

A sword, as Simeon said, pierced your heart, O Lady, when you saw Christ alone, crucified and pierced by the lance; whence, crying out, you endured sorrows. Through you the restoration of Eve was seen, O Virgin, truly God, born in the flesh, and lifted upon the cross, and casting down the demons, O Lady full of divine grace. The handwriting of Adam is torn up, while you are pierced by the lance, O Master, the Theotokos cried out, standing by the cross, O Lord, and wailing in pain. When you saw Christ, whom you had brought forth in the flesh, O woman full of grace, hanging upon the wood, you were filled with lamentations, and you truly marveled at his long-suffering; whence you magnified his condescension.

Be a harbor to me, O all-hallowed one, as I toss on the sea of evil, you who saved the whole nature of men, having suffered shipwreck, by your birth-giving, O Maiden, Mother of God, now preserved. O Bride without stain, palace of the Creator, untilled earth, you have been shown as a throne of fiery form, O all-blameless one; whence we cry to you: Hail, Lady, who deified mortals by your divine childbearing. Seeing Him who grants divine and saving vigilance to all sleeping upon the wood, the all-blameless Mother wailed in a loud cry and shouted: What is this most strange wonder? He who gives life to all things dies voluntarily?

Illumine, O chaste one, those who with longing praise you and magnify you; dissolve the darkness of our passions, O Maiden; calm the tempest; put away from our midst the stumbling-blocks of the evil one; under your intercessions, bring the children of Hagar into subjection to the pious emperor.

From the Canon for Saturday at Matins.

The Son of God, in order to deliver us from the ancient condemnation, was well-pleased, O chaste one, even to be called your Son; for those the body of his mother, it was fitting that they should be devoid of these, and should be altogether immaculate, lest the Son of God should have had any stain of original sin about him in his Mother. And if it was not fitting that the Mother of God should have had the physical stains of nature—namely, the stains of natural birth—how much more? Items of this sort, if the pain of childbirth is called a reproach of nature, since it is not a fault but its punishment, and therefore removed from the Mother of God, how much more should the original fault itself, which is a greater reproach of human nature, have been excluded from her?

REFUTATION OF THE EPISTLE OF THE KING OF ARMENIA

^A and mind. While these things are confessed by you, one and the same Christ, our God, is shown to be perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity. If, therefore, God the Word, being united to the humanity, while having a perfect divinity, is confessed to preserve his perfect humanity even according to you, by what logic do you not believe that he is from two natures, and in two natures, and that he has two natures, but instead proclaim him to be of one nature? If, therefore, you confess that the same one has appeared perfect in each nature, it is manifest that you subject these—I mean the divine nature and the human nature—to be numbered by the manner of the difference, and not by the determination of existence; and by us and the holy fourth synod ^B decreeing that it be said thus, you stand within the truth by confessing the two natures in Christ in this way. But if, while confessing that both the divine and human nature are in the one Christ, you do not number these natures according to their difference, saying that he is in two natures and has two natures, it is plain that you are discordant with yourselves, at one time confessing and at another time denying. For through not numbering the difference you take away the natures, and through taking away the natures, you also take away that which is unconfused and immutable after the union; and if this be so, you also take away that which is consubstantial with the Father according to divinity, and with us according to humanity. He who declares the same thing at one time as having such a nature, and at another time asserts that it is not the same thing ^C as he had previously said, is either deranged or acts with malice—neither of which we pray you to suffer; for the former is wretched and worthy of pity, whereas the latter is worthy of punishment. If, however, you imagine yourselves to be free from such charges, by confessing that the Son of God has the consubstantiality according to divinity with God and the Father, and with us according to humanity, and of course you number them, saying, "Christ has two natures, and is, after the union in one hypostasis, in two natures and of two natures," and you venerate the synod of Chalcedon which decreed this along with us—then you may be confident that you are living in an orthodox manner. But to say, "We do not confess a simple union of the natures,"—that is, of divinity and humanity—if you should agree that the composite is of one hypostasis and has two natures, you will be rightly and truly counted to be in the truth; but if you ^D confess it in such a way that the composite nature results from diverse natures, just as one nature is formed in a human being from soul and body, it is manifest that you destroy your own confessions. For it has been demonstrated through many arguments above that things which are united unconfusedly and form one nature are not consubstantial or of the same nature with those from which they are composed, nor are they the individuals referred to under their commonality. If this is so, Christ is not consubstantial with God and the Father according to divinity, and with us according to humanity. But if you wish to preserve the consubstantiality even in the union, cast away from yourselves the notion of holding to one nature in Christ. And these are the absurdities that follow from those things which are asserted by you concerning the incarnation of the Son of God, because they do not correspond

NICETE BYZANTINI De Filii Dei incarnatione, quod vos non sequimini rectam Christianæ fidei traditionem a sanctissima et oecumenica Chalcedonensi synodo traditam.﴿ Ex eo porro quod vos illius sana exquisitaque decreta improbatis inverecunde, imo stulte intelligitis, erratisque circa ea, quæ de incarnatione unigeniti Filii Dei et Domini nostri Jesu Christi dicuntur, hæc sunt.

κγ'. Τὴν δὲ λεγομένην συνδρομήν, ἡ μὲν τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ ἀγυρτώδους λαοῦ χρῆσις, ἐπί τινων δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ἁμιλλωμένων, ἱππαζομένων τε καὶ πεζῇ τὸν δρόμον ἐξανυόντων παραλαμβάνει· ἡ δὲ τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν διάνοια, οὐ τοῦτο μόνον σημαίνειν τὴν συνδρομὴν βούλεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν δύο τινῶν ἢ καὶ πλειόνων πραγμάτων ὀξείαν καὶ ἀκαριαίαν εἰς ταὐτὸ περάτωσιν παντὸς χρονικοῦ διαστήματος ἄνευ, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ παραλυτικοῦ τοῦτο γεγονὸς ἔγνωμεν. Ἅμα γὰρ ἔφη ὁ Κύριος, Ἔγειραι καὶ περιπάτει, Εὐθέως, φησὶν ὁ εὐαγγελιστής, ἀνέστη καὶ περιεπάτει. Τὴν οὖν ὀξεῖαν τῆς προστάξεως τοῦ Κυρίου πλήρωσιν μετὰ τῆς τοῦ παραλύτου ὑγείας, συνδρομὴν οἱ σοφοὶ λέγουσι. Συνέδραμε γὰρ τῇ Δεσποτικῇ κελεύσει καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑγεία. Ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ Πέτρου πενθερᾶς, καὶ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως τῆς θαλάσσης, καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Οἱ οὖν Πατέρες συνδρομὴν λέγοντες τῶν δύο φύσεων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἑνὶ Χριστῷ τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο δηλοῦν φαίνονται, ἢ ὅτι πάσης ἀναμονῆς ἐκτὸς καὶ παντὸς χρονικοῦ διαστήματος ἅμα ἐπεσκίασεν ἡ τοῦ Ὑψίστου δύναμις τῇ Ἀειπαρθένῳ Θεοτόκῳ, ^B τὴν τῶν δύο φύσεων ἔνωσιν ἀπειργάσατο. Ὑμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν προτέραν σημασίαν τῆς συνδρομῆς τὴν ἕνωσιν τῆς θεϊκῆς φύσεως μετὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐκλαμβανόμενοι, διαιρετὴν, καὶ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν ὑφεστάναι ἑκατέραν τῶν οὐσιῶν τοὺς Πατέρας εἰρηκέναι συκοφαντεῖτε, καὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν ἄγνοιαν, Πατρικὴν βλασφημίαν οἰόμενοι, μακρὰν τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ταὐτὸν φάναι, τῆς σωτηρίας, ἀποπεπλάνησθε. Μεμαθηκότες οὖν καὶ ταύτης τῆς συνδρομῆς τὴν σημασίαν, καὶ τὸ ταύτης χρειῶδες εἰς τὴν τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνανθρώπησιν, ἀπόστητε τῆς κατ᾿ ἄγνοιαν ὑμῶν δυσφημίας, καὶ εἰς ἀκριβῆ ἔνωσιν τῶν δύο ἐν Χριστῷ φύσεων ταύτην, καθὼς ἡμεῖς, προβάλλεσθε. Ἔψεται γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐκ τούτου, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ σοφοὺς καὶ εἰδήμονας πεφηνέναι, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀληθεῖς, ἐν οἷς δογματίζετε, διαγγέλλεσθαι. Εἰ δὲ καί τινες τῶν αἱρετιζόντων τὸ τῆς συνδρομῆς ὄνομα κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον σημαινόμενον ἐξελάβοντο εἰς τὴν τοῦ οἰκείου δόγματος κακουργίαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παραιτεῖσθε ταύτῃ ἐπὶ τῇ ἑνώσει τῆς θείας καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως τοῦ ἑνὸς Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, νῦν τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον ταύτης κατανενοηκότες, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτου ἀσφαλὲς περὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν μεμαθηκότες, τοῦ λοιποῦ ταύτην μὴ ἀπαγορεύσητε. Οὐδὲ γὰρ λυμαίνεται ἡ ὁμωνυμία τῶν μὴ οὕτως ὑπαρχόντων τὰ κυρίως ὄντα πράγματα. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἶναι ὁμολογεῖτε τὰ ἐν Εὐαγγελίῳ φερόμενα ταπεινά τε καὶ ὑψηλὰ, ^C τοῦ (σώματος καὶ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου ἀπαρασπάστως καὶ ἀσυγχύτως ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ φυλαττομένων, πότερον ποῖα τῶν συνελθουσῶν φύσεων ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ Χριστῷ τὰ ταπεινὰ δώσετε, τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ, ἢ τῇ θείᾳ, τουτέστι τὸ προκόπτειν ἡλικίᾳ, καὶ τὸ βαπτίζεσθαι, τὸ δεσμεῖσθαι, τὸ ἥλοις πεπερονῆσθαι, τὸ τεθνάναι, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; Εἷς μὲν γὰρ ἀληθῶς καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ὁ ταῦτα ὑπομεμενηκώς· ἀλλ᾿ οὐδεὶς νοῦν ἔχων κατὰ τὴν θεϊκὴν ταῦτα ὑπομενηκέναι φύσιν ἐρεῖ. Ἀπαθὴς γὰρ ἡ θεία φύσις, καὶ αὐξήσεως ἀνεπίδεκτος. Ὅμως γε πέπονθε ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Κύριος ἀληθῶς. ^D Ἄρ᾿ οὖν οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ λίθοι κεκράξονται, κἂν ὑμεῖς σιγήσητε, ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην αὐτοῦ ταῦτα φύσιν ὑπέστη ὁ τέλειος ἐν θεότητι, καὶ τέλειος ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, εἷς Κύριος Ἰησοῦς; Εἰ δὲ κατὰ ἀνθρωπίνην αὐτοῦ ταῦτα φύσιν ὑπέστη, δῆλον ὅτι ἐν δύο φύσεσι θεωρεῖται ὁ εἰς τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει Κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς. Τὰς δὲ κατὰ τοῦ Νεστορίου τοῦ ἐπαράτου μέμψεις καθ᾿ ἡμῶν τῶν ἐν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν εἰδότων ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν, ἀφρόνως ἐπιφημίζετε. Ἡμεῖς γὰρ τὴν καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ ὁμολογοῦντες, καὶ ἐν αὐτοῦ προσώπῳ καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν δοξάζοντες, καὶ τὴν ἐν γαστρὶ τῆς ἀειπαρθένου σκήνωσιν ἀνυμνοῦντες, καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ πανάμωμον Μητέρα Θεοτόκον κυρίως δοξάζοντες, καὶ ἕνα τὸν αὐτὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Υἱὸν τῆς Παρθένου ὁμολογοῦντες, ὧν ἁπάντων οὐδὲν ὁ μάταιος ἐκεῖνος καθωμολόγει, πῶς τῆς αὐτῆς αὐτῷ μέμψεως κριθείημεν ἄξιοι παρ᾿ ὑμῶν; Εἰ μὴ τι ἄρα τό δῆθεν ὑμῖν ἐφαρμόζοντα ψόγον διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀμαθείας τοῦ ὀρθοῦ δόγματος παρατροπὴν ἀποτρέψαι βουλόμενοι, διὰ τῆς καθ᾿ ἡμῶν τῶν ὀρθῶς φρονούντων ἀλόγου διαβολῆς τοῦτο ποιεῖν προαιρεῖσθε. Ἡ δὲ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς ἀμώμητος καὶ ἀδιάβλητος δόξα, περὶ τε τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἁγίαν Τριάδα θεολογίας, περὶ τε τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἔνσαρκον οἰκονομίαν τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὀρθοτομίας ἐκ τοῦ παρ᾿ ἡμῶν ὁμολογουμένου ἱερωτάτου καὶ θείου συμβόλου δείκνυται, ἀρξαμένου μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τριακοσίων δέκα καὶ ὀκτὼ ἁγίων ἐν Νικαίᾳ συνόδου Πατέρων, καὶ διὰ τῶν λοιπῶν ἁγίων τε καὶ οἰκουμενικῶν ἓξ συνόδων βεβαιουμένου, ὅπου ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο κακῶς ὑμεῖς νοοῦντες)

νοοῦντες) you try to disparage? And these things are beyond measure, since satiety of speech is an enemy to the ears.

ADMONITION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING WORK OF NICETAS OF BYZANTIUM

^A Frederick Sylburg, in the preface to his booklet which he entitled *Saracenica* and published in the year 1595, writes as follows: "It is said that in the Vatican Library at Rome there exists a book by the philosopher Nicetas of Byzantium against Mohammed and a refutation of the letters sent by the Hagarenes to Michael the Emperor of Constantinople, the son of Theophilus. But since we were unable to obtain the Greek copies of either that or this, another occasion for editing them had to be awaited." You see, then, that 250 years or more have passed since Sylburg, having indicated the Vatican codex, hoped to edit this Nicetas of Byzantium, whom we, at long last, after such an interval of time, are bringing into eternal light. Moreover, the statement of Sylburg, as happens with things absent, is not entirely accurate; for there are not one, but two letters of the Hagarenes, and the title says they were sent unto the Emperor. However, it does not explicitly state that Nicetas wrote a refutation of them to Michael.

Ten years after Sylburg, Antonius Possevinus, in his *Apparatus* (first edition, Venice, Vol. II, p. 477, and Vol. III, in the *catalog*, p. 16), recited a fuller and more accurate title of the work of Nicetas, ^B yet only to that extent was he in error, insofar as he wrote of Theophylact in the same place in his writings. I omit the others who have drawn from these aforementioned sources, except, however, Leo Allatius, who in the postscript of the first volume of his *Graecia orthodoxa* explicitly maintains that this Nicetas of Byzantium is the same person as Nicetas David, the Paphlagonian, and also bishop of Dadybra. He flourished, he says, in the age of the Emperors Michael, Basil, and Leo, as is gathered from the preface of the life of St. Ignatius the Patriarch—which he wrote neither clumsily nor unlearnedly—and from his latter works (understood as those designating Nicetas as [their author]). I think that Allatius refers particularly to the refutation which our Nicetas made of the letters sent to the Emperor Michael. ^C Allatius proceeds to review the works of Nicetas, of which he places nearly at the end this [work] written against Mohammed and the Hagarenes; nor does he name the Vatican codex which contains them, though he shows that he knew it. Indeed, Allatius certainly has another excellent work of Nicetas concerning the Council of Chalcedon and the Prince of Armenia; and this he inserted into the aforementioned volume of *Graecia orthodoxa*, unquestionably affirming that it is the work of this same Nicetas of Byzantium; and this I judge to be most true, because, apart from the similarity of style, the ending of the aforementioned work is entirely the same as that which is seen in the refutation of the two letters to the Emperor Michael. ^D Concerning this, Nicetas and his works, Allatius has spoken more extensively in an unpublished dissertation of his concerning the twenty Nicetases, a portion of which, discussing our Nicetas, I have published in the preface to Vol. IX of the *Scriptores veteres*; neither, however, did I give this part of the dissertation in its entirety, as it was beyond the scope of my original intent. Why some bibliographers place this Nicetas of Byzantium in the twelfth century, I truly do not know, nor do I see any documents produced for this fact, unless perhaps they have brought the confusion of so many Nicetases into their own history. But that I might approach closer to the matter, though I had not yet inspected the testimonies of Sylburg, Possevinus, and Allatius, nevertheless, in the Vatican Library, which I presided over some years ago for my examinations, I observed this codex under number 681; a beautiful one indeed, on parchment, and most intact. However, occupied by other editions, I delayed, but now at last, thinking on the uncertain fates of the codex—which, being unique, could someday perish by some contingency—as well as [its value], for without doubt it is alluring for its goodness and usefulness, I decided to have it transcribed, my own Latin labor included, and to carry through with it, all other delays abruptly abandoned.

Now, something must be briefly prefaced concerning the work itself. Ludovicus Maraccius, who surpassed all others in the praise of the Alcoran—refuted—complains in the preface of his *prodromus* of the small number of those, at least among the ancients, who whetted their pens against Mohammed and his book; and he cites only a few names, such as John of Damascus, John Cantacuzenus, Peter the Venerable, and two Chaldeans. And yet he could have extended the number somewhat, having cited Euthymius Zygabenus with other short works of that kind, edited by Sylburg; and Theodorus Abucara, edited by Gretser, although the latter is very slight compared to Zygabenus. But indeed in the Roman Greek codices there were [others]: 1. The chapter of Nicetas Choniates in the *Panoplia*, which we have entitled in Latin in our *Spicilegium*. But what surpasses all abundance were the Arabic Vatican codices, the catalog of which, instructed for us by Assemani, displays a line-up of Christian writers against the Alcoran; namely in Arabic codices 99, 112, 113, 114, 118, 119, 127, 128, 135, 141, 143, 180, 504, 545, 550, 645, and perhaps others. The great Maraccius in the aforementioned preface, p. 7, mentions in general that there were Arabic codices of the various Roman libraries which served as an aid, as he demonstrated afterward in his scholia and through polemical disputes, where he laid out the lavish resources of the Arabs concerning this controversy; he would have done better, or certainly more accommodating to our day, if he had written out the catalog or notice of the codices by name.

Now indeed the fruit of this our edition of Nicetas is manifold, I hope, and will be. 1. A new defense of the Christian religion, and an accusation and subversion of the fraudulent superstition of Mohammed. 2. Scholastic theology, as it were, a genuine speculative image, we see here, and by the method which utilizes dialectic and communal notions, or senses, and powers; particularly the most difficult and most obscure mystery of the Trinity among the pagan Mohammedans, they will commend to Christians: in which indeed our Nicetas is admirable in the part of the dispute; and he provides a distinguished example of Greek genius and learned, solid subtlety. 3. With the refutations of the individual books of Satan, the text of Mohammed is recited in Greek, or by Nicetas as interpreter, or by the translation of some Greek man, which now I believe can be seen neither in printed books nor in the manuscript codices themselves. Certainly, that the Greeks not only once, but perhaps many times, translated the Alcorans into their own tongue cannot be doubted; since they had the savage sect in view, indeed, in the very vitals of the empire, and necessarily had to contend with its teachers; which the Greek monuments of the dispute testify. Now therefore it is noteworthy to see how sometimes the text of the Alcoran in Nicetas differs from the Arabic, as we commonly read it: which fact, partly must be believed to have occurred due to the translator’s lack of Greek, partly because of the polysemous words of the Arabic language, and finally partly because of the variations in the edition of the Alcoran itself. For

Herbelot names seven critical and diverse editions of the Arabic Koran: two Medinese, and in addition the Meccan, the Cufan, the Bassoran, the Syriac, and the *κοινή* or Vulgate; their variety offered a most abundant supply of material for the interpreters of the Arabs. Furthermore, that no translation of the Koran seems to survive among the Greeks at this time, I believe to be a consequence of hatred. For they did not even have the Koran among them until Peter the Venerable, who caused it to be translated from the Arabic in Spain by Robert of Ketton, and sent it to the divine Bernard of Clairvaux; and Theodore Bibliander committed it to the press in Switzerland in the year 1550. Nevertheless, before this edition, the Italians had published the Koran in their own language from the Latin text of Ketton in the year 1547, with Andrea Arrivabene, a Venetian printer, as editor; whom the later ones, in their ignorance, have described as the possessor of the book, that not being easily found. More recent are the editions of Ryer and Savary in the French language, as well as two editions in German, which Bern. Rubeus, my master in Arabic Lexicon, mentions. Lastly, in 1698, the excellent interpretation of Maracci saw the light, to which all those well-versed in Arabic have deferred. And though this edition of the work of Nicetas seemed to demand many critical and historical annotations, and even grammatical ones where the dissidents are concerned, I for my part shall pass over all things with a light step, as almost everything is kept in suspense by my preoccupations; unless perhaps, given some leisure later, some place is seen to be explained a little more accurately.

NICETAS OF BYZANTIUM, PHILOSOPHER. CONFUTATION OF THE FALSE BOOK WHICH MOHAMMED THE ARAB WROTE

^A 1. Since such a great heap of merits, beyond our estimation, belongs to the most beloved Emperor of God, we are by no means able to adorn their sublimity with words, or to encompass their infinity with any measure. But indeed, the stupor that draws every mind to admiration, and impels men of excellent spirit to commend those who are to be praised, has also compelled me, a lowly man, to compose this little work. Nor, however, shall I speak of all his deeds, for that can by no means come to pass, but I shall speak of one of his principal achievements; nor shall I reward the Emperor with praises, for abundance of golden words is lacking to me, such that I might describe in golden letters—as the saying goes—his splendor and the sweetness of his virtues, which are like various flowers luxuriating in a meadow overflowing with many blooms; for where shall I place the all-wise rudder of the Empire? Where the untroubled conduct of the Church? Where the ^B

(1) In the codices it is written *Mōamed, Mōameth, Mōamhet, Machoumeth*. In the Latin version I follow the first, although the second and third indeed occur (in which I also hit upon the second, as does God, *Deus*), although Nicetas holds to the third. (2) There is a gap in the original. (3) He refers to the golden writing on parchment; especially splendid exemplars of this kind of royal or divine subject survive in the library codices.