Refutation of Mohammed

REFUTATION OF MOHAMED

Nicetas of Byzantium, Philosopher: Refutation of the False Book Written by the Arab, Mohameds. PROGRAMME

^A There is so great a mass of merits belonging to our most God-beloved Emperor, that we shall be utterly unable to adorn their sublimity with words, or to comprehend their infinity by any measure. But that very astonishment which ravishes every mind toward admiration, and compels those who are lofty in spirit to proclaim and openly commend [such men], has driven me also, a humble mortal, to compose this little work. I shall not, however, speak of all his deeds—for that is altogether impossible—but of one of his primary achievements; nor shall I crown the Emperor with praises. For whence should I obtain such a store of golden words as to write in gold ^B the splendor and sweetness of his virtues, which flourish like a meadow of many flowers? For what shall I say of his most wise art of ruling? What of the imperturbable and peaceful administration of the Church? What of the universal good governance of the polity; where is that ocean of long-suffering and mildness; where those showers of benevolence and kindness? Where is that orthodox dogma of the faith; where is that apostolic—if I may so call it—preaching of the Gospel of Christ? For he, not tolerating that barbarian bodies alone should be put to flight, but that the souls also combating against God should be divided, calls them to true religion, confounding the erroneous and deceptive claim through the twofold word of truth; ^C being confident, forsooth, in Christ our God, the victor over them—whom they persecute with curses—that he would triumph over the refutation of the blasphemy of those impious men, and over their very armies and military expeditions. Therefore, what the Emperor accomplishes in the arena daily by his deeds, we have undertaken to proclaim by our unrefined but sonorous speech. Would that the Lord, the treasurer and giver of all good things, might grant to the Christ-loving Emperor health of soul and body, that he may live long and report victories over his enemies; and may He strengthen our tongue, that we may speak as is worthy of the Christian faith; and may He turn the barbarian impiety into shame through the prayers of the most glorious ^D Theotokos and all the saints. Amen.

THESE ARE IN THE PRESENT WORK

§ 1. Exposition and demonstration, primarily of our true and orthodox Christian faith, and the refutation of all the blasphemies which are contained in the book of the Arab, Mohameds; and at the same time a confutation of his evil dogma in the first chapter.

§ 2. The sixteen refutations of his false doctrines.

§ 18. Exposition and triumph over those things which were separately and impiously moved by him in the following chapters.

§ 19. Against the same, concerning the title "Word."

§ 20. Against the same, saying that God is the cause of sin.

§ 21. Against the same, saying that men will live in marriage after the resurrection.

§ 22. Against the same, saying that the angels are female.

§ 23. Against the same, concerning the intercession of the angels.

§ 24. Against the same, saying that God is spherical.

§ 25. Demonstration that the Ishmaelite people are aliens to the covenant of God.

§ 26. Against the Hagarenes, concerning circumcision.

§ 27. On the same subject.

§ 28. On the God of the Mohameds.

§ 29. That although they may erroneously think that they worship the one God of the patriarch Abraham, yet it does not behoove the Hagarenes to call themselves God-fearers.

§ 30. Against the Hagarenes, concerning their arrogance.

^A Where is the public, upright governance of the state? Where is that sea of forbearance and mildness? Where are the downpours of kindness and beneficence? Where is the orthodox dogma of the faith? Where is the apostolic—so to speak—proclamation of the Gospel of Christ? For the Emperor, not content with merely putting into flight the wretched, barbarous bodies, unless he also cuts asunder—as if with a two-edged sword, the word of truth—those souls that are at enmity with God, also calls the Arabs to true religion, piercing their irrational and deceived ungodliness through the refutation of the words of truth. He trusts, indeed, in Christ our God, Who gives victory and is reviled by them, that through the refutation based upon truthful exposure of their blasphemy, victory over their lawless armies will also follow through His strategies. ^B Therefore, we slothful ones have been brought forward to exercise ourselves in the task which the God-minded Emperor has brought to completion by his deeds; and what he accomplishes daily by his actions, we have eagerly sought to trumpet aloud with bare words. May the Lord, the repository and provider of every good thing, lavish upon the Christ-loving Emperor salvation for soul and body, crowning him with long years of life and victories over his enemies; and may He strengthen our own tongue to speak something worthy of the pious faith of the Christians, and to refute the barbarian ungodliness; may this happen through the intercessions of the most glorious Theotokos and all the saints. Amen. End of the Preface.

THESE ARE THE CONTENTS OF THIS WORK.

Cap. I. An exposition containing, first, a demonstration of our true and orthodox Christian faith; and an attack upon all the blasphemies contained in the book of the Arab Mohamet; and at the same time a refutation of the things that appear wrongly held by him in the first discourse. II. Sixteen refutations of his falsely-named discourses. XVIII. Exposition and triumph over all the things impiously put forth scattered throughout the subsequent impure discourses in their particular categories. XIX. To the same, concerning the concept of the "Word." XX. To the same, who says that God is the cause of sin. XXI. To the same, who says that men will live in marriage after the resurrection. XXII. To the same, who says that angels are female. XXIII. To the same, concerning the intercession of the angels. XXIV. To the same, who says, "God is spherical." XXV. A demonstration that the Ishmaelite people are strangers to the covenant of God. XXVI. Against the Hagarenes, concerning circumcision. XXVII. On the same. XXVIII. Concerning the God of Mohamet. ^{C D} [index: entries preserved]

CHAPTER ONE. An exposition, with proof of the Christian dogma, derived from common notions, the dialectical method, natural arguments, and a varied syllogistic technique; together with a refutation, overthrow, and exposure of the most irrational and abominable book falsely written by the Arab Mohamet, or the pseudonymously named faith of the Hagarenes.

^A Many excellent works of virtue tending toward the glory of God are performed daily by our good and most Christian emperor, and especially concern the pious worship of God; for this form of zeal is indeed a preoccupation of his most serene majesty, namely, that the deceived and most irrational doctrine, falsely inscribed in the book bearing the name of the Arab Mohamet, should be refuted. Wherefore he exhorted our unworthiness—since we are considered to have some small measure of learning and are well-disposed toward his God-guarded empire—to expose and demonstrate, as far as we are able, that this doctrine is far removed from the truth, not only regarding the clear conceptions of the Divine, but also regarding those notions which are readily recognized by the common race of mankind. Therefore, having invoked the God-pleasing and world-saving prayers of the same Christ-loving master and great emperor ^B of ours, and having fortified ourselves with the power of the Holy Spirit, and having taken up the breastplate of faith, and having seized the shield of hope, and having put on the helmet of salvation, we are moved to fulfill his exhortation. Since the logic of refutation is twofold—one part establishing what is proper, the other overturning the opposing view—we shall first set forth our pious Christian faith by means of natural reasonings, with demonstration as far as possible, and then we shall attempt to refute those things that seem to support his impious doctrine: partly by natural means from common notions about God, and partly by Scripture from which the very author of such a book appears to wish to admit testimony. I shall begin from this point.

^C The all-wise, good, infinitely powerful, and all-holy God, while bringing about the constitution and existence of the world from things that did not exist, either created and produced it as being powerful in power, or as not being powerful in power. If not in power, then those accurate and common notions about God which are customary and prevalent among men are false; for how could the same Being have bound and fitted these things together and brought them into existence? Or how could He be the producer and creator, and how could the very name of creation, or of such an operation, be firmly attributed to Him, if He were circumscribed by powerlessness and the infirmity of nature, and were thought of and believed in as an impotent God? For the name of God is, as I think, none other than that which is significatory and indicative of creative ^D activity; since to be...

^A defined and characterized by a limited power in its being. But if this is so, then it is not eternal; it follows, therefore, that God is not eternal, which is absurd. But if, on the other hand, God produces all generated things by multiple limited powers, the Divine is in no way infinite in power; and it will coincide with the same former hypothesis; and from either hypothesis, it follows that the Divine is in no way infinite in power. Since, therefore, the eternal is by nature infinite power, or as it were an infinite space, as it happens to seem to the sciences and to the truth, it is clear that what is eternal is also infinite in power. ^B It is syllogized, therefore, as follows: That which is eternal is infinite in power, and what does not have infinite power is therefore also not eternal. If, therefore, in neither hypothesis God has infinite power, in no way is He eternal. But if He is not eternal, He is necessarily subject to time: for of existing things, some are eternal, others are bounded by time, and are subject to the creator of time. But if this is so, He has a beginning and an end, and there will be some other cause of His existence, and regarding that, we will encounter the same difficulties; and this will go on to infinity, which is absurd. It remains, therefore, of the remaining two, that the other ^C is true, which asserts one and infinite power; but that it is improper to speak of God as having multiple and infinite powers

against the many, and infinite in all respects, which is truer and more fitting to concepts of God

7. And otherwise: If God, as we have said, at some time receives this power, it is clear that this is an acquired power, if God is, indeed, eternal; and that which is received adventitiously is received later than His being, and is received by progress and as if He were lacking. It follows, therefore, that God will be incomplete and perfected by progress; which is the same as saying and thinking blasphemy regarding God. And otherwise: If the power of God is not always present, but is received later; and if this is so, whether it is from Himself

or from another. But if it is from Himself, it is as though He possessed this power—or as though He did not possess it, and then took it. For it is impossible for one who does not possess something to be able to do anything; and for one who possesses it, it is impossible for that which he possesses to be—first, because the barrier is eternal, and it is not possible not to possess it; second, it will be found that it is a power over and above that which is already defined as power, which ^A has been proven to be false. If, then, He did not receive it from Himself, it remains that He received it from another. But if from another, whether from an equal, or from one lesser, or from one greater. But that it cannot be from an equal—for by this it is clear: the one being perfected is perfected by the greater; the one that is lesser is inferior; and the one that is equal to the similar is greater ^B than God is not possible. For if there were such, there would be God, and then another God, and this to infinity. Therefore, God did not receive His power from another.

8. Since, therefore, God receives His power neither from Himself, nor—and much less—from another, it is clear that He has it congenitally. And He is always Himself; therefore, also His wisdom, by which He is powerful and by which He acts, always is. That which is eternal is also perpetual and timeless. Now, that which always is, is eternal and perpetual and timeless, ^C and unbegotten, and not made. It is gathered, therefore, that the power of God, by which He is powerful, and by which He acts, and without which He does nothing, is unbegotten and uncreated. But if that which is produced is not from the unproduced, in so far as it is not produced, and the uncreated is not from the created, then in nature there is no difference between them; and if they do not differ, they are the same; and if they are the same, they are likewise consubstantial, and whatever is of this kind. But God is unbegotten and uncreated; ^D therefore, His power is likewise. Moreover, since they hold common notions correctly that nature and that which is uncreated are the same, it is gathered, therefore, that the power of God, by which He is called powerful, and by which He acts, and without which He does nothing, is consubstantial and of the same nature as God. As these things are so, the power of God itself also arises from these things in a way that we do not foolishly shout, as the Agarenes do against us, but as our argument will demonstrate; since the Spirit Himself, who is in God as of the same nature and consubstantial with God of His power, and as the Word of God and the Wisdom of God is called, it would clearly declare—but that the power of God by which He is called powerful, and by which He acts, and without which He does nothing, and the Word of God is called an image [(4)], is not subsequent in nature, as you say, but of the same nature and consubstantial with God as unbegotten and uncreated, and this here is clear.

9. God is extremely simple and superior to any composite notion, as the common [index: entries preserved]

notions dictate to us. For everything that is ^A incidental to that with which it is involved, is composite and is reckoned as such. But if this is so, and it is dissoluble, or exists by act or by potentiality, that is, it is reasoned or subsists somehow; therefore it is to be syllogized thus: God is most simple; whatever is incidental to that with which it is involved is not simple and is reckoned as such; it is concluded therefore that God is ^B incapable of accidents. But He has power, as has been demonstrated; therefore this also is not an accident; just as this is to be concluded: God is incapable of accidents; God is possessed of power: it is concluded therefore that power is not a piece of an accident, but rather possesses self-subsistence and is per se, and requires nothing else; it is also and always, as this also has been demonstrated. That which is always, possesses neither temporal beginning nor end. Everything that is self-subsistent, ^C having neither temporal beginning nor end, is uncreated and unbegotten. It is found therefore that the power of God is self-subsistent, and is both Word and Wisdom alongside the divine Scriptures plainly stated, is uncreated and unbegotten; and the uncreated and unbegotten, and the common notions are not accustomed to say it is of another, but ^D of God: the power therefore of God, which is also called His Wisdom and Word and Son by us, is God, and is consistent as like to God and the Father, and is believed and reckoned by those who properly believe as Christians. For that one, the power of God, is not said merely, but it is by which He acts, and without which God does nothing, the Word and consubstantial with Him and of the same nature as God and the Father, with precise demonstration, has made clear.

10. But that the same is the Son of God and Word and Wisdom, and is deservedly so confessed and believed by us Christians, is made manifest thus. God, if He is the true God and is said and believed by those of correct thought to be glorified and preached, that is, from those that are of Him, that is, from His substance, is known, in which He is glorified and preached and believed to be, and from those that are about Him, that is, His creatures. But for those that are about Him, that is, to be known from His substance, is impossible and unthinkable by angelic powers, because by human ^D nature, and common notions teach us this. For God, according to the account of substance, is unnameable and ineffable and anonymous, and the divine Scriptures and common notions hand this down; of which there is clear proof, if one wishes, as he sees, that truly none of His names are indicative of the substance itself; for indeed each of the names taken for the guidance of the divine nature has a particular meaning embraced in it; and you would not find any word without some meaning among the most divine of names. If then it is impossible to know Him from the substance, as we have said, it is evident that from those things that are about Him, just as any upright person indicates; for from greatness and beauty [index: entries preserved]

^A of creatures, the Creator is known. And if someone should not grant even this—namely, that He is known from the things about Him, that is, from what is in us—our being entirely ignorant of God would necessarily follow, which is absurd. If, then, God is to be known from what is in us, it is evident that He is known from the things which are more esteemed and more honorable among us—this we described and affirmed—and we do not exclude from Him things which are in us as accidents, for we designate them as attributes of God. ^B Therefore, whatever is best in us, we affirm of Him, or rather we negate all things from Him. And we do not think that affirmations conflict with negations, because both are not taken from the same source. But let our speech be clearer, so that I may speak.

11. In us, indeed, there are many and diverse things, and some are taken in a contrary sense: some are worthy and better, others have a worse condition. It is clear, therefore, that if we are led by the hand toward the knowledge of God from what is in us, we describe and affirm God ^C according to our better qualities. For there is light and darkness in us, life and death, mortality and immortality, justice and iniquity; and the former are placed in better categories, such as life and immortality, justice, charity; the latter, however, in worse ones, such as death, mortality, iniquity, hatred. It is explored that life and immortality, justice and charity, and what is consistent with these, are to be attributed to God by us, and He is described and defined by them to us; nay, to speak more properly, we deny that these are in Him ^D as they are in us. For God is above light, above immortality, above justice, and whatever is of this sort. Likewise, in us there is sight and blindness; namely, if we omit blindness, we say God is impassible in sight; that is, apart from those things which occur to us by visual means; for in all things God is impassible. For even if we possess these scriptures, we do not investigate God by these traces. And so, because there is fertility and barrenness in us, generation and sterility, fruitfulness and unfruitfulness; the better, indeed, are generation and fertility, germination and such like: the worse, however, are sterility, unfruitfulness, and the privation of growth; but we describe and define God through the better qualities, apart from those things that occur to us as accidents, as we say; that is, indubitably, apart from those things that have generation, fertility, and fruit and such like. Yet if someone in these matters should contend, I will also contend, that death is better than life, darkness than light; which is ridiculous. Therefore it is evident that God is fertile, and the progenitor of the Word.

^{A B C D} known through the analogy of the creatures; for if anyone should not grant that He is to be known from things that pertain to Him—that is, from things within ourselves—and yet we have never known Him according to the account of His essence, it would be necessary that we remain in total ignorance of God, which is absurd. If, therefore, God is known from things within us, it is evident that we describe Him from those things in us that are more worthy and honorable, without the accidents that happen to us; for we remove these from what is said of God. For this reason, we affirm of Him all things that are better in us, and yet we deny all of them of Him more fundamentally. And we do not consider the affirmations to be in conflict with the negations, for they were not taken from the same things. In order that my discourse may be clear to us, I shall speak thus: 11. In us, there are many and various things, some taken as if in opposition, with some being more worthy and better, and others having the part of the worse. It is evident, then, that when we are led by the hand from things within us toward the guidance of God, we describe and affirm Him from that which is better and more honorable in us. If, therefore, there is in us light and darkness, life and death, mortality and immortality, justice and injustice, and some are placed in the category of the better—such as life and immortality, justice and love—while others are in that of the worse—such as death, mortality, injustice, and hatred—it is clear that we attribute life and immortality, justice and love, and whatever is consonant with these, to God, and through these we describe and affirm Him; and, to speak more precisely, we deny these of Him; for God is beyond light, beyond immortality, beyond justice, and whatever is similar to these. Likewise, there is in us sight and blindness. Leaving aside the blindness, we shall say that God is sighted impassibly, that is, without the passions that occur in us along with sight; for in all things God is impassible. Even if we had never received the Scripture, we would trace God by such footprints and methods. Since, therefore, there is in us both fertility and barrenness, generation and sterility, fruitfulness and unfruitfulness, sprouting and the privation of this, and the better are, for example, generation and fertility, sprouting and all that is similar to these, while the worse are, for example, barrenness, sterility, unfruitfulness, and the privation of sprouting; and since we describe and affirm God through the better things, without the accidents that occur in us, as we have said, it is evident that we shall say He possesses fertility, generation, a sprout, fruit, and things similar to these. For if anyone were to contend in these matters, I too would contend that death is better than life, and darkness than light, which is ridiculous. Therefore, it is manifest that God is fertile and the producer of the Word; for it is beyond all controversy that the generative power is more honorable than sterility and [original-script column: see facsimile]

barrenness; if this be so, it is clear that God possesses a Son. For it is possible to argue thus: 12. We aptly describe God as generative and fertile, blossoming forth from the superior qualities that exist within us; and everything that exists in such a manner has an orientation toward a son, or a sprout, or a fruit, or offspring. It is gathered, therefore, that God, being appropriately described from the things that are in us, also has a Son (and this is rightly believed and glorified among us), namely the Word who was generated from Him enhypostatically, and impassibly, and without flux. But if this is so, it is manifest even to those able to see only dimly that the enhypostatic power of God and His Wisdom—by which He is powerful, and through which He acts, and without which He does nothing—which also our discourse has demonstrated to be consubstantial with God the Father and similar in all respects, leaving aside the generation, is indeed the Son of God, and Wisdom, and Word, and is deservedly confessed and believed by us Christians. If this is true, as it has been demonstrated to be true, then the barbarian and irrational Mohammed in the book forged by him mocks us in vain as "associators" and "partners," as though we were bringing in from the outside another God, the Son of God the Father, in addition to the one God by nature and in truth. If, therefore, our discourse, from common notions and logical methods, has clearly shown the power of God—by which He is powerful, and through which He acts, and without which He does nothing—which also is and is called the Wisdom and Word of God the Father, to be enhypostatic and consubstantial and in all respects similar to God the Father, and to be the same as the Son, as is rightly believed among us, it has most clearly banished and cast away, and exposed as liars, you who—while you confess the things after the unity of nature and the things in the property, that is, the hypostasis—do not accept the Father and the Son as consubstantial and identical in all things, except for the unbegottenness and the generation. Therefore, the discourse of our construction appeared to us perfect, and lacking nothing for those who desire—insofar as it is possible from common notions and physical arguments—to receive demonstrations for things exceeding nature: namely, that God the Father has a Son similar to Himself in all things, whom He has begotten impassibly and intemporally and without flux; who also is the Word and Wisdom and enhypostatic Power of God, and is rightly believed by us.

13. But since the Spirit who proceeds from God the Father, and who together with the Son vivifies the world and recreates it and transforms it toward a better life, is of the same nature and consubstantial with the Father and the Son and of equal honor, being one hypostasis of the one true Godhead (as it is also rightly believed and proclaimed among us Christians), come, I will also institute a discourse concerning Him, and I will present the demonstrations rather from common notions and from scriptural sayings, so that the doctrine of faith concerning the holy Trinity according to the properties, that is, the hypostases and the one Godhead and lordship and authority and monarchy ^A may be kept intact and be rejected by no one of the other faith. For it is evident to us from the use of common notions; but besides this, the inspiration of the prophets is supplied by the divine Spirit, and it clearly preserves and cherishes, vivifies, and bestows divine instincts and charisms and different methods of sanctification upon those who are worthy, just as your own scripture also speaks in harmony with these things; for it is explored that God is far prior, and is holy, and by divine custom guards the world and leads it to a condition of better morals ^B. Now if by chance some madman would not concede this, and would say that God is lacking in all holiness. But how does He offer the bounties of divine grace to all who desire to draw from them without any diminution of His own? For if He Himself lacks holiness, surely He does not sanctify: for no one gives what he does not have to anyone; for he who labors under poverty himself, would doubt it to others. If God, therefore, is not a participant in holiness, without doubt the whole of creation will be far more deserted of grace and divine gift. And yet creation is not at all established without the protection of grace and holiness; for otherwise how would it subsist? Therefore it is manifest that He who bestows these things, that is, God, is the more substantial in the fullness of holiness, and by that ^C holiness governs the world. If, therefore, God in His holiness sanctifies and directs the world, and fills the existing world with divine inspirations and doctrines and charisms, it is manifest that He Himself is not without that holiness. Furthermore, whatever has holiness has it either as adopted or as natural. Now if it has it as adopted, it can be known by a syllogism to be absurd. For if God has adopted holiness and inspiration, yet since everything is possessed in this way, it is perfected by progressing: it is concluded, therefore, that God is perfected by progressing. Which cannot be said of God without blasphemy.

14. Item, otherwise. If God has his holiness and inspiration in an adopted ^D way, it is manifest he received it from the outside: but everyone who has so received, receives from another; for no existing thing gives itself to itself and is given, is sanctified and is an illuminator; just as the same man does not teach and is taught. If therefore God receives holiness from another, he either receives it from a lesser, or from an equal, or from a greater. But since he receives from none of these, it follows that: for he who receives holiness from another, is sanctified by the one who gives; but he who is sanctified by receiving, receives from a greater and is sanctified. Furthermore, one of these is inferior, the other equal; but common sense persuades us that no one is better than God. Therefore God did not receive his holiness from another. And if not...

from another, it is clear that he did not receive it ^A from outside, nor by adoption; for everything that is adopted is likewise so.

15. Furthermore: If God has his holiness by adoption, it is clear that it has been added to him. Whatever is added is limited, and it is evident that it exists in a created nature. It follows, therefore, that God is a created being, and possesses a created nature. If this is so, then he was either created by himself or by another. But if he were created by himself, he would be at once the producer and the product, the creator and the created, the one making and the one being made; but nothing among things that exist is of such a nature. So God is not created by himself. ^B Indeed, he is not created by another; for if anyone were to concede this, there would be a God of God, and the same ambiguity would follow regarding him; and so on to infinity. Therefore God does not have his holiness and the inspiration of his gifts by adoption. If, then, the Logos, through many arguments, has shown it impossible for God to possess his holiness and inspiration by adoption, it is evident that he possesses it by nature. If, then, he possesses it by nature, whether necessarily or mostly, it is clear—for that which happens only mostly is a defect of nature; for nature sometimes fails ^C in those things which mostly happen, and even in necessary things. But failure does not befall the divine nature; since all failure is not without passion. God is entirely above every passion. Therefore, God possesses his own holiness not mostly, but necessarily. If it is necessary, and he is always, since such things are necessary, then the holiness and the inspiration of God is always in him, ^D that is to say, it is enhypostatic, and has existence in itself, and is not heterohypostatic nor an accident; but since it is not an accident that exists in another, it is clear how it subsists.

16. God is most simple, and is above every mental composition or composite concept, as common notions hold; whatever is an accident in that to which it is added is composite and is so reckoned. Therefore, to reason thus: God is most simple; but whatever is an accident in that to which it is added is not simple and is so reckoned; it follows, therefore, that God, being without accident, possesses in himself the holiness and inspiration, which is also called the Spirit of God, to which your scripture also bears witness—that is, the book of Muhammad. Since it is not an accident, it is enhypostatic and has existence in itself; and it is always—for everything that is enhypostatic, and has existence in itself, and is, has neither temporal beginning nor end. What is in such a state is by all means uncreated and unbegotten. It follows, therefore, that the holiness and inspiration of God, which is also called the Spirit by divine Scripture, is unbegotten and uncreated; and being unbegotten with the unbegotten,

^A and uncreated with the uncreated, it is the same in nature; and since it is the same, it is homogeneous and consubstantial. It is evident, therefore, that the holiness of God is enhypostatic, and is clearly called Spirit by the divine Scriptures, and is truly God, consubstantial with God and the Father and His Son.

17. If, therefore, God the Father, as is agreeable to all common conceptions, is enhypostatic and has His existence always and in Himself: it has been demonstrated that the power of God also, by which He is powerful and by which He acts, and without which He does nothing, and which is called the Word and Wisdom of God, always exists and is enhypostatic. Similarly, holiness, which is called the Spirit of God, is also enhypostatic and perpetual, and has subsistence in itself. But whatever is perpetual, together with that which is perpetual and enhypostatic, and with the enhypostatic, is found to be three homogeneous and consubstantial hypostases. And herein for us are God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: the one, the Begetter and the Progenerator, if I may so speak, impassibly, timelessly, and incorporeally; the other, the generation; the third, the procession. For if the Father is the true God, ^B and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of the same and one Godhead, indivisible as they are undivided; thus, for us, they are contemplated—yet they are not three gods. And that this is true, as I promised above, I shall endeavor to show. All number is indicative of the quantity of the subjects, but not of the nature of the things; and it is so not insofar as they are the same, but insofar as they are diverse. Likewise, also, enumeration, that is, a gathering into one number, is in a way an otherness, or is a synthesis; and this is clear if one takes gold and breaks it down into five characters: he will not say five golds as to the nature, but five golden characters, so as to signify the quantity of the things underlying. And these are the same, yet different; ^C and in like manner, when they are enumerated, that is, gathered into one number of five, they introduce the otherness of the synthesis. For number is of diverse things, and is inclusive and comprehensive insofar as they are diverse.

18. Having set these things forth for us, mark well what is proved. Since the divine and blessed nature is entirely, as our discourse shows, in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Spirit; and there is not in this anything prior or posterior, nor is it signified by a predicate, but it is rather strictly coeternal and in every way similar: for it is thought of as the whole, either as parts, or in the participants themselves; and this is again viewed as one whole, as a whole indivisible, or even in the others. I say "whole," not that which is composed and agglutinated from parts; far be it; but that which is viewed as a nature in its own ^D hypostases.

^A Since that which is not originated is the same in nature as the underived, and that which is uncreated is the same in nature as the uncreated, if they are the same, they are also of the same nature and consubstantial; hence it is manifest that the enhypostatic holiness of God, which is also clearly called "Spirit" by the divine Scriptures, is true God, consubstantial with God the Father and his Son. ^B 17. If, therefore, God the Father, as follows from all common notions, is enhypostatic and possesses his being always and in himself; and it has been demonstrated that the power of God—by which he is powerful, and through which he acts, and without which he acts in nothing, which also is and is called the Word and Wisdom of God—is also both eternal and enhypostatic; likewise also the holiness, which is also called the Spirit of God, is enhypostatic and possesses its being always and in itself; then one would find the eternal and eternal and eternal, and the enhypostatic with the enhypostatic and the enhypostatic to be of one nature and consubstantial. And this to us is God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; the one being the Generator and Producer, I say, impassibly, timelessly, and incorporeally; of the others, the one is the generation, the other the procession. For even if the Father is true God, and the Son and the Holy Spirit likewise, as of one and the same divinity, viewed indivisibly as in things that are divided, so to speak, nonetheless they are not three gods. And that this is true, as I promised above, I shall attempt to show. Every number is indicative of the quantity of the subjects, not of the nature of the things; and this not insofar as they are the same, but insofar as they are different. Similarly, all enumeration—that is, the gathering into one number—of diversities, insofar as it is other, is a composition and a gathering; and this is clear if someone were to take gold and break it into five coin-stamps, he would not say "five golds" so as to designate the nature, but "five gold stamps," so as to indicate the quantity of the subjects; and these not insofar as they are the same, but insofar as they are different. Likewise, these things too, when enumerated—that is, when the five are gathered into one number—introduce a composition of the things that are different in some way. For indeed, the number of different things, insofar as they are different, would be encompassing and inclusive. ^C It is being established [that] the divine and blessed nature, as a whole, insofar as it is whole, is viewed indivisibly in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, as the discourse has shown; and not more in one and less in another, but the predication is made equally and in like manner; and the predication signifies not one thing prior and another posterior, but something coeternal and in all respects like. For the whole is conceived either before the parts, or in those that partake of it; and of these, the whole is viewed as a whole indivisibly either in the one or in the rest. I call "whole," however, not that which is composed and compounded from parts—far be it—but that which, being as a nature, ^D is viewed in its proper hypostases. From what has been said, I say, it is evident that the Father...

^A and the Son and the Holy Spirit, according to one divinity, power, and lordship, are identified and are one, since they possess the same and single divinity equally. If, therefore, God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in respect to the one divinity and power, possess it equally, they are one and are believed to be so. It is acknowledged that every number is indicative of the quantity of subjects, and not of the nature of things, and of these things not as they are identical, but as they are different. Furthermore, every enumeration—that is, the reduction of diversities under one number, as they are different—is a composition. It is therefore evident that when we speak of the Father individually, and likewise the Son and the Holy Spirit, we do not introduce three gods by numbering the nature; for then the number and the enumeration would belong to the nature and not to the quantity of the subject things, and [to the nature] as they are identical, not as they are different, which is not admitted. Therefore, when we confess the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we do not declare that they are one as Father, Son, or Holy Spirit (for these are different), but as there is one divinity and power, and one God is considered, even if three are believed in their hypostases.

^B 21. It is possible in another way to demonstrate that we do not introduce three gods in respect to the one divinity, even if we confess three hypostases. If, therefore, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, as we have accurately demonstrated, possess the one, uncreated, and ingenerate divinity co-eternally, and one nature is predicated of the three, and not one [nature] for one and another [nature] for another, it is evident that saying "three hypostases" does not also introduce three gods. For if anyone charges this upon us, he says nothing else but that the same being is both one and many, that the contradiction is true, and that the lesser are predicated of the greater and are made equal to them; which corresponds neither with logical rules nor with the truth. And so that what is said may be clear to us, I will take the human nature as an example, and ^C through the things predicated of it, I will make the statement evident to you. Let the human nature be predicated as in a subject of three hypostases only, for instance, say, Peter, Paul, and Thomas. This nature, therefore, as a whole, is predicated indivisibly of Peter, Paul, and Thomas; for each of these is a rational, mortal animal, receptive of mind and knowledge. It is evident that these participants, in that they participate in the same and single nature, are one and the same; but in that they are different in their hypostases, they possess the number three. If, therefore, anyone uses the word "man," which is indicative of nature, which is one and the same and is predicated indivisibly of the three hypostases, and then, as if they were three enumerated things, he should necessarily enumerate this word "man" with the persons, calling them "three men," he says nothing else but that ^D three natures are viewed in the three hypostases; for the word "man" is indicative of nature. But if this is so, it will surely be found that the same thing, according to the same respect—that is, the human nature—is both one and the contrary; and that which is a contradiction will turn out to be true, which is absurd.

And not only this, but it results that the lesser things, that is, the persons, are predicated of the greater, that is, the natures, and are equalized to them; and this is clear in the following way:

^A κ'. Human nature, when predicated of the three persons, is neither predicated convertibly of them, nor does it convert, because it is in excess of each person. For if something is Peter, it is also man; but if it is man, it is not necessarily Peter. For among predicables, those that are equal convert with one another, such as "man" and "capable of laughter"; for if something is man, it is also capable of laughter, and if it is capable of laughter, it is also man. But those that are in excess do not convert with one another, because of the excess. For instance, if something is man, it is also animal; but if it is animal, it is not necessarily man. If, therefore, human nature is in excess of each of the three persons individually, but the number "three" is predicated of the three persons—not absolutely, but according to the specific quantity of the underlying subjects—and you predicate the same number, which we call "numerable" (as it is numbered rather than acting as a number), of the term "man" as equal to the number of persons, then each person will be found to be equal to the nature, and predicated convertibly. For "three" and what is numbered as "three" are not in excess, but are equal. For even if there are two things, and one is predicated of another—for instance "capable of laughter" of "man"—if it is shown that the other is equal, it happens of necessity that the predication converts, and "man" is predicated of "capable of laughter." Wherefore it is evident that if anyone numbers the name of their nature along with the persons, he compels the lesser to be predicated of the greater and to be ^B equalized; which is discordant with logical methods and with the truth, as we have said.

κα'. The same holds true regarding the divine nature, that we may be guided by this example to grasp the truth and ward off the falsehood. For when we confess three persons in the divine nature, there is no necessity to introduce three gods, on account of the absurdities already shown. Thus it has been made manifest to us that, by confessing three persons according to their properties in the one divine nature, we do not introduce three gods, but one God, because there is one deity, and those things which are of Him have their reference to One. For the names "Father" and "Son" do not signify a nature, but a relation, and how the Father stands in relation to the Son, or the Son to the Father. For just as with us these appellations signify a genuine generation, so there they signify the consubstantiality of the begotten with the begetter. Likewise, the "Spirit" also does not signify a nature, any more than the others do; for the difference in their relation to one another has created a different appellation for them. Therefore, ^C when we look toward the deity, the first cause, and the monarchy, we see one thing; but when…

we look toward those things in which the Godhead consists—those which shine forth from the first cause intemporally and with an equality of honor—there are three to be worshiped; and these are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in whom we believe and have been baptized, and whom we serve with latreutic worship.

22. If the descendants of Hagar, in their shamelessness, should proceed against the things spoken, saying: "Even if the name of 'nature' is not properly enumerated, yet it is said to be used abusively according to common parlance, just as we say 'three men' and 'three horses'; therefore, according to you, let the Trinity which you worship be called by an abusive term 'three gods,' just as there are 'three men,' or any other thing that is enumerated"—we respond to them: that the name of 'nature' is then enumerated with its proper persons abusively, when the persons do not possess a circumincession 6 with one another, but stand apart from each other by a great distance, and in addition possess a different will, energy, and intent, and possess a very great difference, but a minimal communion. But for those whose judgment is one, and whose intent is inseparable, and who possess identity of nature, one authority, will, and energy, and everything in common—except for the one difference of the hypostatic properties alone—and for whom the inseparable separation from one another and the circumincession into one another exists, the name of their nature is in no way found to be numerable, neither properly nor abusively. For this reason, even if we confess the Father to be God, and likewise the Son and the Holy Spirit, we do not introduce three gods; nor are we required to enumerate them, neither properly nor abusively, since circumincession is present, and inseparability, and indivisibility, and one judgment, and intent, and energy, and the other things we have mentioned.

But if they should again object, saying that the name 'God' is not indicative of the divine nature, but of an operation 7, and that the names of operations are enumerated—for instance, we say "three orators" and "three philosophers" or "three builders"—we also reply to these points: that such names of operations are enumerated in those cases where a change of judgment slips in, and a diversity of intent is present, and a difficulty calls for a need, and the energy is not one, but different and disjointed. But for those in whom one natural, undivided energy is present, the names of those operations are in no way enumerated. Since, therefore, the supersubstantial Trinity—that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, which is piously and rightly believed and worshiped by Christians—possesses one indivisible energy, it is therefore evident that even if the name 'God' is indicative of an operation, it will have no place for being enumerated in this regard. Whence our faith is exalted above every calumny and accusation, just as has been demonstrated.

23. It is also possible for us, by way of a scientific and inescapable division, to express the things concerning the consubstantial and holy Trinity, and to show the proofs here as well. If God is true God and is believed to be such, he is either one by nature and by hypostasis, or the other way around: one by hypostasis, but many by nature, or one by nature and many by hypostasis—or he is many by nature and many by hypostasis. But if he is many by nature and many by hypostasis, this is clearly an absurdity; for if it is so, it would be polyarchic and seditious; and that which is seditious is anarchic and disordered, and that which is disordered is the beginning of dissolution; and if this is so, it is also corruptible and perishable. But if it happens to be one by hypostasis, but many by nature, this also is an absurdity; for whatever is of such a kind is composite. For everything that is constituted of diverse natures is placed among composite things. Now, the composite is dissoluble; and corruption follows upon dissolution; and annihilation follows upon corruption. Therefore it results that God would be corruptible and non-existent; and this is more absurd than anything. Consequently, since he is proven to be many by nature and by hypostasis, and likewise one by hypostasis but many by nature, it remains that he is one of the two, and that the latter is true. If, therefore, he is one by nature but many by hypostasis, the Word shows that this is the true and firm view, and it is evident that the rest are refuted. And that he is one by nature, but many by hypostases, is clear from this: nature, or the common element, is one thing, and the individual property is another. For nature is something common, or a property; if it is a property, it is individual; and if it is individual, it is a certain atom: and if it exists as such, or if it is an atom that has been destroyed, it is necessary that nature also be destroyed at the same time. For if of those which are identical, one or the other be destroyed, it is necessary that the other also be destroyed. If, therefore, with the death of Moses, human nature had been destroyed, it follows that human nature would have perished. But with the death of Moses, nature was not diminished. Therefore it is not singular nature. Because if it is singular, it is not nature, since it is a property.

24. And otherwise. If nature is a property, it must be predicated of one thing only; but it is predicated of many, like 'rational mortal animal,' of Peter, of Paul, of Thomas, and of each of the humans: therefore it is not a property of a thing. If it is not a property, then it is common. Likewise otherwise. If, therefore, nature is a property and person is a property of the thing of which it is pronounced, it will certainly be found to be a property of the thing, which it cannot actually be at all. Therefore, it is no property; and what is in no way a property is common. Furthermore, if, therefore, nature is common and universal, and is predicated of many; and nature is thus constituted; it follows that nature is something common and universal. Therefore, since the supersubstantial and uncreated divine nature is the divine nature, it is clear that it also is something common and universal; for it has been shown that nature is something common and universal. And the divine and blessed nature is indeed common and universal.

^A And we may set forth the demonstrations here as well. If God is truly God and is believed as such, He is either one in nature and in person, or one in nature but many in persons; or, conversely, one in person but many in nature; or, finally, many in both nature and person. But if He were many in both nature and person, the absurdity is apparent; for to be so is polyarchy. Polyarchy, moreover, is seditious, and what is seditious is anarchic and disordered; and what is disordered is the beginning of dissolution; if this is the case, it is also corruptible and perishable. If, on the other hand, He were one in person but many in nature, this is also absurd; for that which is of such a kind is necessarily composite. For all that is constituted as one thing from diverse natures is placed in the category of composite things. Now, a composite thing is dissoluble; dissolution is followed by corruption; and corruption is followed by non-existence. It is concluded, therefore, that God is corruptible and lapses into non-existence, which is the height of absurdity. If, then, the position that He is many in nature and person is proven false, and likewise the position that He is one in person but many in nature, it remains that one of the two [remaining] hypotheses must be true. If, therefore, the reasoning shows that to be one ^B in nature and many in persons is true and certain, it is evident that the rest are refuted, and that this is true: that He is one in nature and many in persons becomes clear from the following: Nature is either a common thing or a peculiar thing. But if it is peculiar, it is according to the individual; if it is according to the individual, it is an atom. It is concluded, therefore, that nature is an atom; if this is so, then with the removal of one atom, it would be necessary for nature to be removed as well. For of those things that are identical, if the one is removed, it is necessary that the other also be removed simultaneously. Consequently, with the demise of Moses, it would follow that human nature would be removed. But, in fact, with the demise of Moses, nature is not diminished. Therefore, nature is not among the particulars; and if it is not among the particulars, it is not a peculiar thing, because a peculiar thing is of such a nature.

24. Otherwise: If nature is a peculiar thing, it must be predicated only of one; but it is predicated of many, as "rational mortal animal" is predicated of Peter, Paul, Thomas, and every individual man. Therefore, ^C it is not a peculiar thing; and if it is not peculiar, it is common. Or otherwise: If nature is a peculiar thing, and person is likewise a peculiar thing, and nature possesses persons of which it is spoken, it would be found that a peculiar thing is inherent to a peculiar thing, which is not found to be the case. Therefore, it is not a peculiar thing; and if it is not peculiar, it is common. Or otherwise: If that which is predicated of many is a common and universal thing, and nature possesses this, then nature is a common and universal thing. Since, therefore, the supersubstantial, uncreated, and unbegotten substance is a certain divine nature, it is manifest that it itself is also a common and universal thing, because it has been shown that nature is a common and universal thing. If, therefore, the divine and blessed nature is a certain common ^D and universal thing, and divine nature [original-script column: see facsimile]—

[Proceeding from the Latin column as the Greek is cut off] ...not as if it were dictated briefly (to provide these demonstrations thus): God, if indeed He is true God and is believed, either is one thing in nature and person; or one in nature, but many in regard to persons; or vice versa, one in person, but many in nature; or finally, many in both nature and person. But an absurdity emerges from this at once: for that which is in this ratio is polyarchic; and polyarchic is seditious; and, finally, seditious is anarchic and inordinate. But that which is inordinate is the beginning of dissolution; and if this is so, it is also corruptible and about to perish. Now, if perhaps the person is one, but the nature is many, this also is absurd: for that which is of such a kind is composite. For everything that constitutes one thing out of diverse natures is placed in the lot of composite things. Moreover, a composite thing is dissoluble; dissolution is followed by corruption; corruption is accepted by annihilation. It is concluded, therefore, that God is corruptible and falls into nothingness; which is the highest absurdity. If, therefore, being many in both nature and person is proven false; and likewise being one in person but many in nature, it remains that one of the two propositions must be true. If, therefore, our reasoning shows that to be one in nature but many in persons is true and firm; it is clear that the remaining ones are argued to be false, and that this is said truly. That He is one in nature but many in persons is made certain from this. Nature is either a common thing or a property: but if a property, it is individually; which, if individually, is a certain atom: but if it is thus, even with one atom extinguished, it is necessary for nature also to be extinguished at the same time. For if of those things which are the same, one or the other be destroyed, it is necessary that the other also be destroyed together with it. Thus, therefore, with Moses dying, it would have happened that human nature would die. But with Moses dying, nature was not diminished. Therefore, nature is not singular. But if nature is not singular, it is not even a property, because a property is such as to be predicated ^C of one only: but it is predicated of many, as "rational mortal animal," of Peter, of Paul, of Thomas, and of individual men: therefore, it is not a property. And if it is not a property, it is common. Item otherwise: If, therefore, nature is a property; and person is likewise a property; and nature has persons, of which it is pronounced; it is found consequently that a property is something peculiar to a property; which cannot be found in reality. It is not, therefore, a property; and if it is by no means a property, it is common. Furthermore otherwise: If, therefore, that which is predicated of many is a common and universal thing; and nature is so; it follows that nature is something common ^D and universal. Because, therefore, the supersubstantial and uncreated and not-made substance is the divine nature, it is apparent that it itself is also something common and universal; since we have already shown nature to be a common and universal thing.

CONFUTATION FIRST.

26. After our discourse has laid out, by means of a doctrinal method and no less by syllogistic demonstration, the consubstantiality and parity of the Holy Trinity, and the unity and monarchy (as much as can be done in those things that are above reason and are believed),

is a thing, just as nature itself is a thing. But a common thing is not common to one, just as the nature of an angel and of a human is not of one, but of many. Likewise, the universal thing—that which is spoken of over many, as the methods of logic declare—makes it clear, therefore, that the divine nature also belongs to many, if indeed it is a common and universal thing; for this has been agreed upon. 25. If, then, the divine nature belongs to many, as a common and universal thing, and each nature, being common and universal, is common to nothing else but those in which it is contemplated and of which it is predicated—and these would be the proper hypostases—it is concluded, therefore, that the divine nature, being common, is predicated of many hypostases and is contemplated in many, which is true and consonant with the notions of the Scriptures. If, therefore, that which is one in nature is many in its properties, that is, in its hypostases, as our argument has truly shown, it is manifest that that which is one in nature is proven so in hypostasis. But if the divine and blessed nature is one by nature, yet many in the hypostases in which it is contemplated as a common and universal thing, and it transcends all created nature, being characterized more by the "one" than by the "many" (for the difference in God is somehow brief and faint, while there is unity and identity in all things, unchangeably, except for the unbegotten, the begotten, and the proceeding; whereas in creatures it is the reverse: there is much difference and little identity), it is manifest that the many hypostases in which the one and unchangeable nature is contemplated are not an infinite multitude; for an infinite number is not connate with the one, but is alien to it, nor can it simply be extended beyond the number three. Since the multitude itself stands aloof from the one, it is clear that an infinite multitude is entirely alien and abhorrent to it. For if the beginning were a multitude, that which immediately participates in it would necessarily be more of a multitude than that which is more remote. But since unity is the beginning of the divine nature, the number of the divine hypostases that are connected to it must of necessity be the absolute minimum and the most remote from a multitude. Such, therefore, is the Trinity; for neither can duality exist, because it would not be a multitude, nor anything else, because it would not be primal. It is manifest from these things, therefore, that God, being one by nature, is known and rightly believed and glorified by those who think rightly as Christians in three hypostases; and this God for us is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

FIRST REFUTATION AGAINST THE THOUGHTS OF MOHAMMED IN HIS FIRST CHAPTER

26. ^A Since therefore the discourse has, by scientific method and syllogistic demonstration, well represented—as far as possible regarding things that are above reason and yet exist and are believed—the consubstantiality and identity of the holy Trinity, and the one divinity and monarchy, ^B and has established its own dogma, it is now time to consider that most filthy and pseudonymous book written by the Arab Mohamed with a deceitful pen, and to see whether it contains anything of truth or soundness. We therefore begin our refutation of these things here. For, since the most impious book of Mohamed is open to many refutations—for the whole thing is rotten and, as it were, a crumbling ruin of an edifice built of putrid material, having nothing firm or stable—we propose, above all, the argument that the whole foundation of the edifice seems to be missing; for we who pursue the overthrow of such buildings—namely, those who wish to overturn them when their supports appear to be destroyed—all at once bring the whole building to the ground. ^C The first mechanism against this rotten structure is its comparison with the divine Scripture. For because Mohamed, having abandoned every kind of doctrine—or rather, having rejected it—constituted as the head of his own speech the claim that he had received an allocation from God, and since we ought in the first place to compare the Scripture which was divinely dictated to us with his book, so that once the light of an accurate comparison has caught hold of his absurdity and incoherence, all his things may be revealed as false, vain, and therefore to be rejected and spat upon, having been shown to be, for the rest, entirely false, vain, and for that reason having been exposed as worthy of blame.

27. ^C Each book of the divinely inspired Scripture, if looked at separately and by itself, even if it aims at one scope of religion, yet nevertheless contains particular matter, as its title indicates, which openly displays the whole of the argument: just as the inscription of each of the individual volumes invites any profane person, to say nothing of the initiate, to hearing and reading. For example, for the sake of example, Moses and the rest, they have the whole of the argument that corresponds to their title, and that which pertains to their argument, and thus they narrate. Therefore, Genesis, those things which are proper to Genesis; Exodus, those things in Exodus ^D that were accomplished; Deuteronomy, finally, those things which were again sanctified; the later books also, respectively, and, so to speak, have been inscribed in a manner suited to their nature. Similarly in the Prophets, in the Sapientials, in the books of Kings, if you inquire, you will find, with the Holy Spirit as guide in this also, that they display their sincerity and wisdom. For it behooves the teacher of the human mind, concerning the things which produce sound belief, to present them beforehand without error; and after a person has tasted of the intellectual sense of righteousness, then he may become a student of the things further on.

28. ^D But the most deplorable and foolish little book of the Arab Mohamed, beyond the blasphemies with which it teems against the Most High, with all its chaotic and

^A loathsomeness, neither preserves the series of common and similarly related subjects—for it provides neither the form of prophetic discourse, nor historical, nor legislative, nor theological, nor of anything else issuing from a sound and prudent mind—but possesses everywhere a completely unadorned and utterly perturbed composition; nor does it even offer titles conformable to the subject matter. If, therefore, he is seen to be perfect in his knowledge of all men, how can he be lacking? How will he be able to show as a superior-to-human opinion that which seems to be carried off from heaven, which — as he says — he affirms to have been sent down? Since it is so far removed from human understanding, as far as the nature of the irrational is distinguished from the rational; and not just from that, but from that invincible and superhuman power and wisdom, in which are all the treasures of wisdom ^B and hidden knowledge. For when he aims to write something to God, or to write what he claims to represent as by God, he cannot tell when, or how, whether by vision, or by some other manifestation, or by what witnesses—as it were, for Moses, more than six hundred thousand people bore witness; and indeed it was written on tablets, as on stone—in the law given to Moses. For he says so himself, that he received it unwritten, neither on parchment, nor in the work of human hands, and to be unable to demonstrate what is expected—since it is destitute of all wisdom, divine and human. And what is most grievous, since he—of that blessed and divine nature, ^C as something foreign and extraneous, or rather hostile—brazenly lies; for what is more hostile to the goodness of God than to say that He rejoices in the perdition of men, and sets nothing by their destruction? What sufficient argument can one bring forward, if he does not deny that this is the result of demonic inspiration?

29. Therefore, whatever must be done or said is divided into three parts: namely, the divine, the human, and the demonic. And the Arab, destitute of the former two—that is, the divine and the human—has necessarily fallen into the third. That he possesses neither divine illumination nor human wisdom is admitted, and is frequently made manifest from other things; for human wisdom is either theological, or physiological, or ethical, or historical, or something of this sort. And these are noteworthy. But the author ^D of this trifler’s writing, having enjoyed neither, but having rambled on in his theology in a somewhat stammering fashion—having been carried away into it, calling it, as he does, spherical—that is to say, [original-script column: see facsimile]

^A that God is a sphere, or rather, as he himself put it, he who surrounds all things. For the shape of a sphere could not be received in any other way; and according to them, if it is a material sphere, it can neither be heard, nor will it be understood, nor will it act, if it happens to be moved by another, and especially if it is borne headlong irrationally. Have mercy on us, O God! When he speaks about God as having the heaven, he is speaking of something that many of the Greeks have refuted, and thus the argument is confirmed as demonic. He knew nothing of natural philosophy, even if he dared to propose it, saying ^B (15) that man is formed from a leech, and that the sun immerses its hot water toward the evening. But as for ethics, what do they say? "Be reconciled to your souls, and be an enemy to all, according to what is hostile to you." And as for history, as much as he misrepresents the Lord, and our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, as having done and said such and such things—and those who read it realize this—for he even says that the Mother of Christ was the sister of Moses, and that Christians lived with Moses in the desert (19). That I may not now enumerate everything without proof, I shall reserve these matters for refutation by demonstration later, by the grace of God. In the meantime, I have recounted, in brief, only as much as was necessary to show that the mind of ^C Mohamed was devoid of divine and human wisdom, and that he was completely unendowed with the gifts commonly given to men by God.

30. This entire little book consists of one hundred and thirteen chapters; in the first, indeed, after that which seems to take the place of a prologue, he exhorts men—those who have been deceived—not to harbor doubt in their minds concerning this fraudulent writing of his, as if it were written falsely.

On the theology of the Arabs: that they are destitute of all wisdom.

But since every discourse and action is divided into three parts—the divine, the human, and the demonic—the Arab, being deprived of the two—namely, the divine and the human—has been carried by necessity into the third. That he is deprived of divine illumination and lacks human wisdom is evident from this ^D and from many other factors. For human wisdom either deals with theology, or natural philosophy, or ethics, or history, or something of that nature; and these things in a worthy manner. But the author of this nonsense, having been gifted with none of these in a noble way, not even in any introductory classification—or even if he babbled—was carried into theology, and he broke out into this godless utterance (15) that God is spherical.

Nay, he says, “[the] solid, the spherical, is the seed of generation;” for he deems Him entirely bodily. For it would not otherwise accept the shape of a sphere. Since the sphere is, according to him, material, it will neither hear nor see—intellectually, that is—nor will it act, if it happens to be moved by another, and especially [by] being swept headlong irrationally. Spare us, O God, those who say his words, even if they are against him! But if he says that the heaven itself is God, as many of the Greeks have babbled, then the statement will be true, in having called him demoniacal.

Regarding physiology, he either knew nothing at all, or if he dared to peer into it, he says that man is generated from a leech, and that the sun is submerged into warm water as it is carried toward evening. As for ethics, what does he say? “Coalesce with your souls, and be hostile to everyone, just as everyone is hostile to you.”

As for history, how many things he falsely alleges about Moses, and about our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, as if He had done and said these or those things, even as you who read [it] perceive! For both he claims the Mother of Christ is the sister of Moses, and that the Christians were with Moses in the wilderness. And so that I may not seem to refute these things without proof by enumerating them all now, I shall save these for the refutation that shall, by the grace of God, be made for each of them later. ^B But for now, as much as was needed only to show that the arrogant mind was devoid of divine and human wisdom, and [lacking] the gifts divinely given to men of which he was deprived, I have enumerated in summary.

30. For the whole of this little book is issued in one hundred and thirteen chapters. In the first discourse, in the writing that seems to hold the place of a prologue, he makes an exhortation to those misled by him not to harbor any doubt in their minds concerning this deceptive writing of his, [thinking] that it was written falsely. ^C And just as to make his deceit credible, when he knows that the former holy Scriptures must be accepted, he commands that this one also—ignorant barbarian that he is—be accepted by his followers, not knowing that he is working toward his own undoing. Moreover, he provides an excuse everywhere against those who do not believe his irrational, blasphemy-filled speech against him who swears by himself—even God, who is good and loves mankind, who does not wish for the death of a sinner, but [wishes] for him to turn and live. The meaning of such words is indeed that God renders this scripture believable to those who understand; he does not hold back those who do not believe ^D from [the act of] believing. Yet when the opposite is the case—which is to say, those who are foolish and believe this [scripture] do not wish to be deceived, and those who do not believe, he himself helps so that they may not be deceived. And that these sayings may become clearer, it results from this: that those whom God wishes to save, He prepares for obedience to His command; but those whom He does not wish to save, He denies the intelligence and ability to listen, and the ability to carry out what is pleasing to Him; and thus He condemns [them] to punishment. And from this comes the consideration of enormous blasphemies: that God prevents those who were intended for good works; that He acts against His own laws by ordaining [them]; and that although He does not wish for all to be saved, He yet proffers saving precepts to all, not as an aid to receiving a reward, but as a pretext for reproach. Thus God behaves as if He refused to reward everyone, or as if He were mocking His creatures, having no one for this truth to whom He shows reverence, either because He rejoices altogether in the destruction of men, or because He retains a vengeful will, because of the enmity felt toward our progenitor, or because He is naturally the cause of evils and cannot help but do evil.

34. Such and so great are the sentiments the most ignorant barbarian utters, putting them forth from the beginning to resolve the doubt, as if he thought that those who wish to be entangled by his other deceits would be satisfied. And it should be noted in all that rustic libello, that the ignorant author knows that it is quite unbelievable to Christians that he has fabricated this myth and barbaric religion, and that he purloins the divine promises contained in the divine Scripture, and that he does not even promise all these things, but only paradise in exchange for inheritance to those who obey him—and this most miserably to women.

And, in order ^A that the deceit might be shown as plausible, he commands that it be accepted equally with the first holy Scriptures, and that this one be added to them, the barbarian not knowing that this is being done for his own overthrow. Continually, and always against those who disbelieve the unsuitability of his words, he sets forth an apology that is full of blasphemy against the good and merciful God who has sworn by Himself that He does not want the death of the sinner, but that he should repent and live; it is this: that God makes those who have trusted in such a writing understand so as to believe, but those who disbelieve, He Himself prevents from believing; yet the matter is truly the reverse, because God does not want those who trust in this vanity to be deceived. And so that what is said may become clearer, the argument relies on this: that God, wishing to save those whom He saves, adjusts them to be obedient to every command of His; those, however, whom He does not wish to save, He does not give to them understanding or the ability to listen and do what is pleasing to Him, and according to this He hands them over to punishment. From this, it is possible to perceive the multitude of absurd blasphemies: that God is a hinderer of those destined for good; that He legislates things contrary to Himself, not wishing to save all, yet proposing the saving commands to all, as an occasion for blame and not as a contribution to rewards; that He does this entirely out of envy, or because He is unable to reward all, or as if mocking His own works, having no one whom He will revere on account of such truth; or as if He simply takes pleasure in the destruction of men; or as if He remains resentful because of the indignation felt toward our forefather; or because He is by nature the cause of evils and cannot but do evil. ^B 31. These and such things the most ignorant of barbarians pontificates, thinking right from the opening to resolve the difficulty regarding why not all have wished to be subjected to his deceit. And this must be noted throughout that rustic little book: that having known, the one who trifled this together, that his fabricated mythology and barbaric religion were altogether unacceptable to Christians and Jews, he has purloined the divine promises lying in the divine Scripture—and not even all of these, but he lies about the paradise alone, bequeathing it in promise to those who obey him; and this he does most wretchedly with [the promise of] women, following the portion of the writing that is thought to hold the place ^C of an introduction.

^B With fair and beautiful women they will have intercourse; and what is even more horrible, before the very sight of God—for God, he says, is not ashamed. He fabricates their resurrection as being so entirely fleshly and material, and in no way different from the present life, that they partake of food and drink and the evacuations of the body. To those, however, who do not obey him, he brandishes the punishment threatened in the Gospels against those who commit insults against God, so that by using what is familiar to those who remember them as objects of desire or aversion, he may be easily accepted.

And it is necessary not to be ignorant of this artifice: that he does not refuse to mention the names of the holy prophets, so that by the appellation of these venerable men, the deceit of his godless Agarenism may be unsuspected. For he attempts to refute the truth, which is proclaimed only in name, by openly showing it to be a fraud by his actions; [he acts] as if the Law were not sufficient to save those who are tutored by it, unless they were to be persuaded by him also.

Furthermore, he makes various mentions of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, and declares Him to be one of the remaining prophets, having only this as an exception: that as the Word of God, He was born of a Virgin through the Holy Spirit, and on account of His impassibility toward Him, was assumed into the heavens—though he who says this does not know what he is saying. In this way, it is clear that he is employing deceit, since indeed he openly slanders Him. For he says ^C that He was asked by the Father if He were God, and that He denied having proclaimed Himself to be God; for he thinks it likely that this was unknown to His Father.

32. In addition to these things, it is also safe to know that everything which he brings forward from the Old Testament and from the New is falsified; and not only this, but also whatever is not even written at all, nor is in agreement with Divine Scripture—his perversity being clearly stripped bare and triumphed over by this fact. There are also collected many monstrosities of his Manichaean abomination: names of certain demons, and oaths through them concerning blasphemous things; invocations to the dwellings of demons; and confessions that apostles and prophets were very often chosen by the God who is proclaimed in such a scripture of his. And a letter [of the alphabet] written in a sorcerous manner, and sentences altered by him, are very often found with him. When [the question was put to him], God answered him: "I know that you spoke this word."

^A And he teaches by symbols that it is not, he says, either old or new, but something in between, [having] a saffron color, wild and untamed; and he barely persuades them to believe this—these are the triflings of his own inventions, which were put forth so that the incompatibility of his agreement with the Divine Scripture might be shown; through which things he hopes to be believed to be the truth.

34. But that atheist, ^B truly manifesting his own impudence and raving against the glory of God the Father, and trying to draw this to himself in a diabolical madness—just as he was once accustomed to speak with Moses, and as he also says that he sent our Lord Jesus Christ—he says: "We brought [proof] to Moses, and we sent Apostles with him; and we brought to Jesus, the Son of Mary, the revelation; and we strengthened him through the Holy Spirit." ^C When writing these things, what does he think he is proving? Indeed, he says that this barbaric writing is to be accepted as if it were divine: not knowing, however, that he is very far from the mark that he hoped to attain. For who, if he were to speak with him, and having nothing to rebuke in Moses, would say, "Did you send Jesus?" For if it is right, and it was truly done, he will reply: "There was nothing to rebuke in Moses, ^D but Jesus was sent for the perfecting of his instruction; and not only was he sent to change the burdensome carnal custom to a more suitable manner of the Spirit, but also, in turn, to this very one [I would respond]: 'But you, oh [person] who has known Jesus, why have you issued this newer and third writing? Is it because it is the same and equal, or greater, or does it even teach lesser things?' But greater things are impossible for human nature. For what is greater than to hate the world and the body for the sake of God's commandment, and furthermore to be able to hate one's own soul clearly? Yet it is established that nothing of this sort is contained in this barbaric book; indeed, nothing at all that is lofty or good is contained therein; but, on the contrary, it is entirely full of beastly stupidity and atheism. Again, if he is said to teach [them], what is the use of the Law and the Gospel if there is a need for the Law and the Gospel to rise up? For if he had the former, he would be saying the Law, [and that too] perfectly; and as for the Gospel, I mean that which makes [them] firm and serves both [if one] has neither—for the sake of salvation, let him take heart, [even if] some cause imperfect things, and others [reject] the lofty as being above human nature. But nothing of the sort is seen in his teaching: it remains, therefore, that Mohamet's writing, or [that which teaches] lesser things, was given. But if this had been the cause, it is very ridiculous: for sublime things—namely, the middle ones—having been abandoned, to follow a life that crawls on the ground and is beastly, which looks to nothing lofty. Besides, that which is in the highest degree naturally repugnant! And those things which are in a better lot are opposed by worse [things]: which is truly the case of this book, for it is in every way exactly contrary to the Gospel of Christ. If, therefore, the Gospel is the perfect Law; and perfection confirms that which is more; barbaric writing attempts to overturn [it].

^A It attempts to overturn both that which perfects and that which is perfected; it is not, therefore, the Scripture of God, but the scripture of the barbarian who fights against God. It remains, therefore, that it is the work of the Antichrist.

35. Then he makes mention of Solomon, and contends that he was not deceived by any error, even though divine Scripture openly affirms that he gave himself over in his old age to the worship of idols; a sentiment which is completely contrary to holy Scripture. He also mentions two angels, whom he says came to Babylon, whose names he says are Arioth and Maroth, and says that they were teachers of evil to those who wanted it. Furthermore, he says that the marriages of the androgynous are dissolved by them, and that they [the demons] do these things; but he says that they received this as a concession from God. But divine Scripture ^B does not know of these angels; unless, perhaps, this barbarian claims they are demons known only to Satan and by him alone. One must also observe this in the vanity of this barbarian’s words, that he mentions demons by name and proclaims them; yet in this place he pretends to call them abominable, and likewise their leader, the devil; so that he may entice the simple, persuading them that these things are not a figment of a wicked spirit, but come from the One who reproves demons. Paul, having made more progress in these trifles, thinking himself now to be above everyone, immune to the opposite opinion, and made a teacher for others to mend, slanders the Jews and Christians as being at odds with one another. ^C He claims that some are pressing forward towards the glory of the Father, while others are trying to surpass him with another opinion, though he says both have fallen from their hope due to the error inherent in each dogma; but he decides for himself that he alone is the heir of paradise, without being asked. He is like someone who, when others are litigating among themselves over a talent and citing their own justifications, injects himself into the middle, declaring that none of you are right, because you are at odds with each other; for I claim that I have done nothing, nor have I fought with anyone. And the one who reproved others for contending one against another, ^D is not ashamed to do the same against them.

36. Furthermore, what demonstration does he have that he received this book from heaven, when he cannot even say, as he does well in truth, that if he were not sent from God he would be subjected to endless reproofs and vituperations? He hopes to dispel the suspicion of a lie; he swears by the sun, the moon, and the stars, and by the lampyris, by the beasts, by the runner-dogs, by trees, and by other unknown barbaric names (which I believe are in fact the demons, and thus he swears by them).

^A And he seems therefore to destroy the Law as well; and to destroy the things that are perfect and that are being perfected is not the office of God. Therefore the writing is not from God, this book of the barbarian which opposes God; it remains, then, for it to be the work of the Antichrist, that is, of the adversary of Christ.

35. Afterwards, he mentions Solomon and maintains that he was not led into deception, although the divine Scripture openly shows that in his old age he gave himself to the worship of idols; in saying these things, he speaks everywhere in opposition to the Scripture. He also mentions two angels whom he says came down to Babylon, whose names are Haroth and Maroth, whom he calls teachers of evil to those who desire it. Furthermore, he says that these angels broke up the marriages of those who were joined together, and he speaks of them as doing evil, yet he feigns that they themselves also received this permission from God. Now, the tradition of the divine Scripture does not know these angels, unless perhaps one might say that they are the demons of his father, Satan, known only to him alone. ^B It is necessary to observe this too, regarding the vain speech of the barbarian, that he clearly knows and proclaims the demons by name, but he pretends, as it were, to call them abominable, along with their leader, the devil, in order that by this means he might be able to catch the simple-minded, persuading them that his myth-making is not from the evil spirit, but from one who rebukes the demons. Having advanced a little in these foolish trifles, he thinks he is showing himself to be preferable to all and immune from condemnation, and that he is teaching these things for the correction of others, while he slanders Jews and Christians who are arrayed against one another; and he maintains that those who stand for one opinion, thinking it superior to the other, have more deserved divine familiarity and the delights of Paradise. Afterwards, he says that both have fallen from their hope on account of the error inherent in each doctrine; ^C but he declares himself alone to be the heir of Paradise, without being asked. He has done something like this: if some people, for example, were arguing among themselves about a talent, and he were to push himself into the middle and say, "This belongs to none of you because you are quarreling with one another; but it has been determined for me, as I have done nothing and have not struggled with anyone." And he who keeps condemning the one who is quarreling with the other is not ashamed to do this himself against the two.

36. And as for what proof he has that he received this book from God, it is not necessary to say, and he even calls down curses upon himself—in this one thing truly doing well—and attaches countless condemnations and reproaches to himself if he has not been sent by God, ^D evidently hoping to cover over the suspicion of a lie. He swears by the sun and the moon, and the stars, and by the lampyris—beasts—and by runner-dogs, and by trees, and by other unknown barbaric names (which I believe are in fact the demons, and thus he swears by them).

The wretched man, moreover, having forgotten what he has uttered, a little later says: “Those who are in doubt about the scriptures are in deep apostasy.” ^A Could anything be found more shameless or more senseless than this? For just as an ape, while imitating the onslaught of a lion, is convicted of making a simian and not a leonine leap, so this miserable man, having attributed to himself the dignity of the highest lawgiving, is caught having nothing more than the name of the most inferior absurdity. For he has put on not only the name, but (what is more) the very form and likeness of godliness without the reality itself. Being desirous, therefore, to impose the law of fasting upon the wretched barbarians, he says this: ^B “The month is Ramadan, in which the reading was brought down unto you; fast it. You may have intercourse with your wives at night; for they are raiment for you, and you are raiment for them. God knew that you were defrauding your souls in the fast, so He has been indulgent to you. Consort with them for solace; and eat and drink in the evening until the black thread seems to you to be white by day. And again observe the fast until the evening. And do not consort with them while you remain in the oratory.” ^C This is the law of God! And do not approach them. Is there not as much difference between a lion and an ape, as there is between this person and the one who has legislated the divine Scripture in a filthy and cursed manner?

40. ^D As for this lawless fasting, he incites them to the war that is waged against us, saying: “Kill them wherever you encounter them.” Then, establishing the law of charity among them as is proper, he says: “And whoever nurtures wrath against you, treat him as he has treated you.” As for self-denial and temperance, he falsely exhorts them to these, saying: “Your wives are your fields; enter your fields from whence you wish, and unite with your souls—that is, fulfill the desire of your souls.” Is this life not beastly, or rather diabolical? Recalling the dismissal of a wife by a man, he speaks thus to them: “If anyone puts away his wife, it shall not be lawful for him to take her back until she has been united to another man; and if the second puts her away, there is no condemnation in them if they return to one another; for these, he says, are the laws of God.” O the barbaric debauchery!

40. Furthermore, inciting the barbarians to homicide, he seems to bring forward the historical account as an enticement to them.

^A to be set before them, and to confuse the persons, as he always does, and having changed them (54), he attributes those things which were done by Joshua to Gideon; and again he attributes the deeds of Gideon to Saul; and he says that David was a contemporary of theirs (55). He claimed that the Ark was carried by angels, and not by men; thus, he knew and taught the divine Scripture, and was an imposter and godless! Since the Lord blinds the minds of his own worshipers in such a way that he proceeds exactly as he behaved, he might be led astray. For there is no need for force in matters of faith; indeed, what is to be rightly admitted, is known from the false contrary, as it is said (56): “There is no compulsion in faith, for it was made manifest that what is acceptable is distinct from the erroneous.” ^B Indeed, he often introduces Abraham in his fables, foolishly conversing with God and disputing with Him about the resurrection of the dead; and about the four birds which were placed, as mentioned above, on the four mountains, and were then recalled, from which Abraham received the faith of the resurrection: of which matter the most ancient Scripture makes no mention. And yet, he does not sin only by being shameless, but he also seems to disapprove of usury and encourages the giving of alms to the poor; so that, appearing to be a good counselor, he might secretly inflict mortal harm, the wretch! And in these things, after he has prayed for victory over us, he puts an end to his first piece of nonsense.

REFUTATION II

41. The second chapter of the fable of Muhammad is inscribed to the family of Amran. ^C Right from the beginning, he affirms that this scripture was given by God, and adds the cause of this thing, namely, that it is confirmed by that previous time, that is to say, the Law and the Gospel, as a guide to men and salvation. Observe, therefore, whether according to this promise the support of the Law and the Gospel subsequently shows itself to be true, and whether those things lying in the scripture are excellent and sound; or whether, being defective, they need supplementation. Because, if there is nothing of this kind in it, or if it is inverted, he certainly lies, and is convicted of uttering these things with a deceitful mouth, and of originating from the father of lies. ^D Therefore, he jokes at length in what follows about a certain maid of Amran, who supposedly came from somewhere; and he relates her prayer and supplication for the conception of Mary, who, he says, was the Mother of Jesus; and that she presented this [Mother] in the temple and she was accepted by the Lord, and received by Zechariah. For this reason, when he entered the temple, and beheld her there by divine provision, he asked from whence she came. He says that she replied that God had spoken; that she herself had requested a child of God there; and that a promise was made to her that she would have a child, John, a just man and a prophet. He immediately, without doubt, how...

^A he should have a son in his old age, received a penalty of silence for three days. Then he brings in the angels saying to Mary: God has chosen you before all women. But as for the narration to Mohammed of this unknown matter, he says as he who speaks to him says: "What we brought down to you, you were not there; when the angels explained whose Mary was to be." But you were not there. The angels, however, are said to have told him: God, he says, sends glad tidings to you of his Word, Christ Jesus, the son of Mary, existing in this life and in the future, one of those nearest to God, conversing with men even from infancy, and from among the just. Then he introduces her as wanting to know how she could have a son without a man. To them, he says: "What God wills, that happens." And he does not say that he told the angels about the wisdom and the Law and the Gospel, and that he was sent as an apostle to the children of Israel. Then ^B he introduces Christ as having made birds from clay, and having breathed life into them, and as healing the blind and lepers, and resurrecting the dead, and as all-knowing; and that he called his own God the God of men; and that he chose for himself the apostles; and that God said to him: "I will subject you to death, and I will raise you up to me, and I will purify you from those who deny; and I will establish those who have followed you above those who have denied, on the day of resurrection." But he will punish those who have denied with a heavy punishment in the future, and there is no helper for them. But the nature of the likeness: Jesus, he says, is like the nature of the first Adam whom God formed. And he adds saying: This is the true narration.

42. Having said this that is true, he undoubtedly rejects the history of the divine Gospels; for if among the divine Gospels the mother of the Theotokos is not proclaimed by Jambra, what shall we do with those who are placed in Luke, ^C the nine months of silence of Zacharias, and the three days only which he says this happened for; where are the birds fashioned and animated by Jesus from clay? But as it is, how truly these things are invented from an unknown source by his madness; this is the confirmatory writing of those before it; but it seems he has forgotten what he promised; and perhaps he does mischief here, even if it does not escape us. For since two things are proposed to him concerning our Lord Jesus, which he strives to demonstrate, one is that he in no way came, and the other is that he denies that, even if Christ did come, he was God, and wishes him to have been nothing but a man, as the first way ^D

^A of refutation seems too evident to him, he flees to the second; and having run through the history of the incarnation in such a way, he hoped to overturn his divinity, while mentioning none of those who preached his divinity. And so, acting consistently with what he had previously propounded, he carries over to those who are Christians regarding the humanity of Christ the following: ^B (For he calls those who are under the Gospel here those who are among us), "Come, let us come to the word that is current among us and you, that we should serve no one but God, and that we should not attribute anything to him." Since, as we said just now, he had spoken humble things about Christ, and even called him the "God of men"—a term he also applied to himself—he now exhorts us by this common invocation of the one God, both Christians and "Agarenes" (that is, Saracens), to confess no longer that Christ is of the Father’s majesty—that is, neither consubstantial nor sitting upon the same throne. If this is granted, nothing prevents Christians from becoming Agarenes. To this extent, he brings to end the annunciation of Mary by the angels and the words and miracles of the Father to Christ.

43. But who among us would not be struck with dismay by the madness of this vain man, who calls the sister of Moses the Mother of Christ, and says that she was with Moses in the desert? Furthermore, he says that in Solomon’s temple, in the time of Zechariah, the Virgin was foretold by the angels of the birth of Christ; so that one must think that his narratives have no coherent order. For he should have considered that Solomon is prior to Moses, while Moses, Miriam, and Zechariah are later in time; and after many years from the building of the temple, that Moses wandered in the desert. O demonic ^C intoxication! O drunk with atheism! O wretched men who believe that a book contains such falsehoods as divine! Let those who are aliens to our faith interrogate men—the Samaritans, I mean, or the Jews—let them interrogate the Greek authors and historians, if they are devoid of all logic and have blinded eyes; and let them learn from them that Moses is older than Solomon, but Solomon is more recent than Christ; indeed, Christ was not a contemporary of Moses. If Moses was not a contemporary of Christ, nor was Mary the sister of Moses, then if he deserves faith, he who proclaimed such a lie against the truth of the One who is truly God? ^D Truly, wickedness is blind, whether it wishes to see or to hear, and truly the one who slanders the one who is truly God is blind.

44. In his usual manner, the deceitful and mendacious one again says that the first holy house was built for men by Mahomet—

^A and that there are manifest signs in it in the mouth of Abraham; but nothing of this sort has been found to this day, as even those from among their number who are baptized confess. The ungodly man deceived the barbarians with his foolish sort of empty verbiage; truly, the partridge cried out and gathered eggs that it did not lay. Then, after long rantings about himself, as though speaking in the person of the savage demon breathing within him, he says the following: “Mahomet is nothing but an apostle.” For it seems that, because of his myriad false claims, he feared that someone might assume a greater opinion of him ^B and suspect him to be either an archangel or an angel. “Mahomet,” he says, “is nothing but an apostle; and apostles passed away even before him. If he should die, the slaughter turns backward.” ^C How admirable is the god of the barbarian, who did not perfectly foresee what was to happen to his own apostle! But he says, “If he should die, the slaughter turns backward.” Then he states precisely: “The barbarians, who had kept the command of their God, turned backward.” Yet it was fitting that, from these things, they should discern the error brought upon them by the deceiver; and by such reflection, they ought to have assumed one or the other of these things: either that it was by some chance that we gained control of such a territory (for it is no wonder that barbarians would suspect this), or that those who previously held these places were worthy of myriad tortures because of their sins, and God, demanding from them an account of their debts through us, caused us to prevail. ^D Yet this has nothing to do with Mahomet, even if he thrust himself into the center and appeared to be something, when he was nothing. But truly, the foolish man will not know, and the senseless man will not understand. Afterwards, he begins to instruct the barbarians for war, and he urges them always to be ready for it. “For if you fight in this way,” he says, “fear will seize your adversaries.” Having delivered these and other such warnings, and having goaded the barbarians to the slaughter of men, he brings the end to his nugatory tale.

CONFUTATION III.

45. The third chapter of the mythology of Mahomet is inscribed “The Women.” He prescribes with whom one must and with whom one must not have intercourse on account of kinship, departing little from the ancient law. Afterward, he returns to the previously laid foundation, striving that the barbarians should not think these things to be human writings, but rather things of the most high nature; and he tries to probe their thoughts, saying: “But if, as is likely, you are in doubt, saying, ‘Whence shall we know if this scripture is from God?’ create no trouble for yourselves by searching the writings or comparing them with others; but reserve them for the day of judgment, and there you shall learn whether these things are true or false.” As if to say: “Have nothing of those things by which the image of God in man is...

marred; become irrational, close the eyes of your understanding, and follow me, ye blind. Do not exert the power of discerning between good and evil.” For he knew—he surely knew—that what is produced by him would be judged as things of great value only if they were not tested against the divine Scripture, or even by a sound human faculty of reason.

46. That which was said at the beginning, that his god is the cause of them that perish, he says even now: “You would wish to lead astray those whom God has led astray;—but the one whom God leads astray, no path can be found for him.” For it was necessary, as is likely, that the herald of such a god should be of such a sort. But if those who have been trapped by his deception would turn away to our discourse, it is clear to them, if they do not call his god a ^A deceiver, that the God of all is not a deceiver. For He is both the truth, and is called such in divine Scripture; for deception is a falsehood, and to lie is not at all a trait of a man [who is]—let alone the one who teaches others—a knower of humanity. But if, because you say that your apostle’s god is a deceiver, this also seems right to you, we truly say [the same] of him who commanded him to write such things. But if they are still indignant at our saying that the god Mohammed has is different from the true God, then they should show this not by our accusation, but by his own admission. For to be a deceiver, and to be a wrongdoer, when one cannot prove it openly, or even ^B defend oneself otherwise, is not within the power to make it manifest; a thing which, in the case of the true God, has no place. Wherefore we rightly say that the god of Mohammed is different from the true God, since he is also a deceiver, and clearly the author of all the things depicted by him; and this is true also in this vehement accusation of God. For if we say that this life was pronounced by God, God bears witness against Himself that He is a deceiver. But if this is impossible, and the Apostle must speak the truth, it remains that it is the voice of Mohammed’s god, and thus his god is a deceiver. ^C But if his god is not a deceiver, then Mohammed lies, saying his god is a deceiver; he is a false prophet and apostle, whom we do not refute as a deceiver while present, but while absent we anathematize. Thus, if Mohammed speaks the truth, he is godless; and if he lies, he is a deceiver.

47. Proceeding next, he gathers some nonsense and babbling [discourse] to prevent himself from being disbelieved; and he threatens the poor barbarians with fear if they attempt to obtain assurance that these things were spoken by God. Knowing well that, were he to say, “I received these from God,” someone would certainly be ^D doubtful, and would demand proof for complete certainty, saying: “If you truly received these from God, and your god is your friend, he could certainly request such a thing to be granted even while we look on,” he says—as if from the Python he inspired—: “They ask of you…

^A a book from heaven.” And indeed they asked of Moses greater things than these, and said: “Show us God manifest.” And divinity took them for their iniquities. Yet it is not written that they were destroyed by sulfur, but rather that they begged that the glory of God might not appear to them. Although this falsifier distorts all the testimonies of divine Scripture toward his own fraud and destruction. For this reason, he persuaded those who were troubled in mind concerning his tortuous fable that, if they were to seek anything of this kind from him, they would certainly perish; in another way, taking care of two kinds of persuasion, as he thought; one aiming equally at this: that he should not be disbelieved, and the other: that he might render the entire mystery of the Christian hope vain. For from this, thinking to accuse the Jews as being unbelievers in God and slayers of the prophets, he imagined that he obtained patronage for his cause from the anger of God against them, saying: ^B “Because of the iniquity of those who Judaize, we forbade them those things which had been spoken over them; and we prepared for them a severe punishment, also because they killed the prophets against what is right.”

48. The malice of his wickedness against the mystery of the Christian religion is of this kind. He pretends, forsooth, to support Christ, and to remove the injury inflicted upon him by the Jews—that of the cross and death—so that, after he himself appears benevolent toward Christ and is thus believed, the resurrection may thereafter vanish; and this being neither done nor believed, the hopes of Christians will vanish into nothing. He says therefore: “But as for what the Jews say, 'We killed Christ Jesus, son of Mary, the legate of God,' in reality they did not kill him nor did they crucify him, but the likeness of this thing was presented to them. Truly, those who doubt about him in ambiguity have no knowledge concerning him, but only the pursuit of opinion; nor did they truly kill him, but rather God raised him to Himself.” ^C Hence we learn that the devil transforms himself into an angel of light; and it is not to be wondered at if his servants also do the same. And now it is time to remember the words of the Lord, namely that if it were possible, even the faithful would be led into error. For you see a benevolence full of treachery, and an apology full of accusation, and a doctrine that subverts the whole economy of God. For even if he does not allow that Christ rose again as the Son of God, why not at least as a legate of God, as he himself names him? He does this for two reasons: First, because he thinks that, if I am truly a legate of God, the barbarians will demand that I too rise from the dead, just as He did; and if this does not happen to me, my bones ^D

^A and what I have written will be burned up. Another reason is that if he were to concede that the resurrection should be believed, my discourse would not suffice to have him called an apostle. For if He truly rose, then whatever He says will also be believed; yet by saying that He is the Son of God, He utterly destroys the Agarism, since the whole fable rests upon the deceit of a single person. He therefore preferred to agree that He had been taken up just like another Elijah, rather than that He had been raised from the dead. Such is the malice of the devil!

40. And shortly after, this foolish man again puts himself to shame, and without even perceiving what he is suffering, says: “Christ Jesus, son of Mary, is the legate of God, and His Word which He cast into Mary, and a Spirit from Him.” O witless and insane man! If Christ is the Word of God, as you say, He will speak all things truthfully. But He says that He is the Son of God; for you yourself have said that He learned the Gospel from God. Therefore, Christ must be believed; and once He is believed, your impiety will be overturned by your own testimony. Yet it is a marvelous thing that, while calling Christ the Word of God ^B and saying that the Spirit is from Him, he has not been able to understand that those things which proceed from the substance of God and exist individually are consubstantial with Him, and thus that one God is to be worshipped in three persons. But nonetheless, blinking in crude ignorance and adding yet a few more trifles, he ends his fable.

CONFUTATION IV

50. The fourth chapter of the mythology of Mahomet ^C is entitled The Table. He babbles about the eating of meat from animals killed by the sword, except for swine; declaring that by this means the barbarians are pure. He condemns perjury and fornication, so that he may appear a good legislator. Yet he forgot his own previous words, namely: "Come together according to the judgment of your souls." He also wishes them to be purified as they go to prayer—if water is available, with water; if it is not, with dust; which, as everyone knows, has the power not of cleansing, but of defiling.

Again, he consults his own fear; for since he had heard Christ saying that John is the end of the prophets, and also the Apostle proclaiming, "Christ is the fullness of the law for justification to everyone who believes," he feared lest anyone say to him: "We have no promise of another prophet after Christ; why then do you call yourself a legate ^D of God and a prophet?" Fearing, I say, that he might appear a liar, he admits that he himself also knows the matter to be that way, but he poses the cause of his coming as being "so that you might not say," he says, "that no evangelist has come to you," attempting to prove from this that Christ lied for your own benefit. But it happened that he himself became a total liar, because he did not know what was to be; so that, with my arrival, He proved to be a liar. But he who lies is not even God. This is the kindly appearance of an inhuman man, and the fable produced by him

and the things written by me ^A are proven to be nothing. Such is the humane shape of the inhumane one, and the staging of his myth-making; yet he is refuted by the fact that no prophetic sign is found in him.

51. Now, blathering his customary lies against the Divine Scripture, he mentions the death of Abel and says that a raven was sent to bury his corpse, while Cain looked on, and that Cain was thereby struck with compunction. These are the proper utterances of people playing on a stage, or of drunkards and madmen. ^B Yet, in order to soften the hearts of the barbarians to receive his own blasphemies, he mentions Christ and the Gospel again, not seeing how he overturns himself. For he says: "We sent, in the footsteps of these—all the prophets, namely—Jesus the son of Mary, to confirm the truth of the law that was before him; and we handed down to him the Gospel, in which there is guidance, light, and justice, in accordance with the power of the law before him, for the guidance and admonition of those who fear, and so that the followers of the Gospel might exercise judgment. Therefore ^C God sent it down to him. And whoever does not judge by those things which God has handed down, these are law-breakers." Truly, do you suppose that this fool himself knows what he is saying? For if Christ came to confirm the truth of the law that preceded him, and if He provided the Gospel as a light and a guidance—as you yourself confess—and if He is the one who will perform the judgment, what remains for you to contribute to mankind? Nothing else, except that by your own testimony you demonstrate that the things which existed before you were false, and you offer darkness and a misleading guide to mankind, and at the time of judgment you will be condemned ^D along with those who have accepted you.

52. A little later, relapsing as it were into his own madness, he says this: "O you who believe (he cries out to the barbarians), do not be supporters of the Jews or the Christians. For whoever of you patronizes them, he is one of them." These are the honors you bestow upon the people living under the evangelic guidance of Christ, for the sake of piety toward God, as you were saying. Fitting indeed; for what else would the devil and his satellites offer to their enemies? Let it be that he wishes the Christians, who confess the all-creating and life-giving holy Trinity, to suffer this insult from him; but as for the Jews, who claim to hold the faith of Abraham whole and intact, why does he inflict equal injury upon them? Yet even this is not foreign to his malice. For he knows that the law demonstrates the divinity of Christ; and for this reason he commands them to be enemies to both, because he is generally a fighter against God. That he writes these things—and the former ones, or rather all of them—not without delirium, will be clear from this. For he appends other similar things to these, and addresses the Jews and Christians thus: "O people of the Book, you are nothing as long as you do not follow the law and the Gospel, and that which has been handed down to you by your Lord." For there is added, from those things which were handed down to us by the Lord, error and infidelity. What are we now to say regarding

and the things written by me will be burned. Another reason is that, if he were to concede that the Resurrection should be believed, my discourse would not stop at calling him a legate. For if he rose truly, whatever He also said must be believed; and by saying that He is the Son of God, he altogether destroys the Agarism, since the whole fable relies on the delusion of a single person. He therefore preferred to say that He was taken up, like another Elias, rather than raised from the dead. Such is the malice of the devil!

49. And a little later, the vain man again brings disgrace upon himself, not even feeling what he is suffering, and says: "Christ Jesus, the son of Mary, is the legate of God and His Word, which He cast into Mary, and a Spirit from Him." O senseless and insane man! If Christ is the Word of God, as you say, He will speak all things truthfully. But He says that He is the Son of God; for you yourself have said that He learned the Gospel from God: therefore, Christ must be believed. And if faith is granted to Him, your impiety will be overturned by your own testimony. This indeed is to be wondered at, that although he calls Christ the Word of God and says that the Spirit is from Him, he has not been able to understand that those things which proceed from the substance of God and exist in their own right are consubstantial with Him, and thus that one God is to be worshipped in three persons. But nonetheless, blinding himself with uneducated ignorance and adding a few other trifles, he ends his fable.

CONFUTATION IV

50. The fourth part of the mythology of Mahomet is entitled "The Table," and he raves about the eating of meats slaughtered by the sword, except for pork; as if he could declare the barbarians "pure" from this. He condemns perjury and fornication so that he might appear as a good legislator. But he forgot what he said earlier: "Come together from the sentiment of your souls." He wants them to be purified when they go to prayer—if there is a supply, with water; if it is lacking, with dust—which, as everyone knows, has the power not of cleansing but of dirtying. He again consults his own fear, for since he had heard Christ saying that John was the end of the prophets, and the Apostle pronouncing that "Christ is the end of the Law for righteousness to everyone who believes," he feared that perhaps some might say to him: "No other prophet is promised to us after Christ; why, therefore, do you name yourself a legate of God and a prophet?" Fearing, I say, that he might seem a liar, he confesses that he too knows the matter to be so; but he sets forth a reason for his advent, "Lest you," he says, "should say that no evangelist had come to you," proving from this that Christ lied for your benefit. But it happened that He was entirely a liar, because He did not know what was to come; wherefore, with me having come, He became a liar. But he who lies is not even God. This is the kindly appearance of an inhuman man, and the fable he has…

^A of the Lord as a delusion and a denial. What then, brothers, shall we say regarding these things? In truth, our discourse is with madmen, who have no sense of either good or evil. In the same way, regarding these, he lied and spoke foolishly about many other things, and he dared to slander Christ from the humility of His incarnation, and he accused monks and priests because they are filled with deep compunction and tears upon reading his writing, which is irrational; and taking up again concerning Christ, he brought Him in being reminded by God of the signs which he says He performed through Him. And he is asked if he allowed men to hold himself and his mother as gods, and he denies it, as if by this denial he said he had proved that he is not God, and [he seeks] to cause Christians to stop confessing Christ as God. But where did this most ignorant man read these things? Or through what divine epiphany did he learn them? Or, rather, it is more appropriate to say that he neither read nor learned any of the things he ought; but according to the display of his own ravings, having smeared himself with Manichaean filth and darkness, he has exhaled the stench of these things, and in these he has ended his fourth essay.

CONFUTATION V

53. The fifth myth of Mohammed is entitled "Concerning Birds"; for he seems to discuss again clean and unclean animals, and he urges the barbarians to eat all animals, except the pig; and [he permits] them to partake without fear of all beasts of burden, both donkeys and mules and camels, and absolutely any four-footed creature. "And do not follow," he says, "the way of Satan," meaning by Satan, clearly, he who delivered the ancient legislation, or rather, even the evangelical proclamation. For the rest, his whole purpose in this essay is to struggle against there being any unbelief that these prestidigitations have been received from God. But those little sayings of his which seem to establish these things not only demonstrate nothing, but they even cause aversion because they proceed from ignorance—he is of an unilluminated mind and one deprived of divine radiance, and the matter itself has no nature to sustain [itself]. For it is a repetition of words, the same things again according to the same, and from the same toward the same; and mentioning Christ, he mentions Him in no less that way which we have described. And thus, babbling, he concludes his foolish tale.

CONFUTATION VI

54. The sixth myth of Mohammed is inscribed "Concerning the Signs," that is, concerning the demonstrative tokens and proofs that such a writing was delivered to him by God. And straightway from the beginnings, the demon that spoke to him chants this to him, so that he too may seem, as is likely, to be ordered to say these things, and thus become unsuspected of deceit. For he teaches him the primeval origin of men, that they were created from clay according to the [divine] image.

and their substance originate from mud according to the image, and that all the angels were commanded to worship Adam; and while the others worshipped, Beliar alone refused to pay homage; and that when asked why he did not worship, he gave as the cause that Adam was created from mud, but he himself from fire; and that he was rebuked by God, and that he contradicted God, and threatened Adam because of the indignation he felt toward him, saying he would leave none of his descendants alive except a few who would be saved. He continues by narrating the history of Paradise and the exile of Adam. Well then, you who have been nurtured in the Holy Scriptures, you certainly understand the wanderings and foolish additions of this deceiver.

55. His aim in this matter is to say that those who disregard the commandment of God perish, while those who keep it are saved; and he maintains this sequence for his own followers, constructing it starting from Adam and those who followed thereafter, hoping that for this reason his own words will be trusted. Immediately, therefore, he introduces some unknown and absurd ravings from hidden and anonymous persons who came to preach before Noah; and wherever they were believed, they are said to have brought about divine blessing, but where they were disbelieved, a very great curse. After Noah, he introduces a certain prophet and messenger named Zalet, the brother of Thamoth, a man who never existed and was never named by anyone; yet he came to this same office and, having preached, he too made God propitious to those who believed him, while those who were unbelieving perished, he says, being cursed in their own dwellings by an earthquake. After him, he speaks of another prophet and messenger, a Midianite sent to his own nation, Saic by name; that he likewise testified and acted according to those before him—men whom neither Moses nor any of the illustrious authors recognizes. After these, he mentions Moses and says that in matters where he was obeyed, the aid of God preceded him, but where he was disobeyed, judgment consumed those responsible. And having used such a line of reasoning, he speaks immediately of himself: 56. "O people, I am a messenger of God to you all." Well done indeed! Carrying with you no work of divine power, nor any wisdom or virtue worthy of mention, you have taken upon yourself, by self-appointment and without any proof or earlier announcement, the status of a messenger. But who, even among the most foolish and those utterly devoid of the knowledge of God, is unable to do this? If, because Moses is a legislator, you must be one too, why should Pharaoh not also be a legislator? But as for the things you thought you were doing, even if it was for evil, you should at least have mentioned them as a plausible argument; but since you had nothing to boast of, you passed it over in silence. I, however, will remind you of this: Moses was not only a legislator, he was also a prophet, and we see the outcomes of his prophecies daily. What of yours shall we admire? Your debaucheries? Your slaughters? Your arsons? Your plunderings? Your blasphemies? And ^A what of the stoning of the holy Scriptures? For your words are more wretched than stones. God, he says, [am I] an apostle; for he is truly an apostle of God, who is a god-hater, a slanderer of the divine guide—who possesses nothing more than that which the apostolic word teaches; even if he attempts to put to shame those who hear him, through the name of the truly divine, [he is] a reprobate, and he blasphemes and subverts God himself, and attributes to Him things that even the nature of things does not allow. For how shall Satan exist, who destroys Satan along with you? or are not the commandments of God called His ways, which you say are the ways of Satan?

57. After this, as a messenger and prophet of the father of lies, he mingles in the miracle of the splitting of the rock certain spurious myths of his own, so that he might appear to be Moses to the simple-minded, and an accurate historian; and therefore he adds: "And out of it gushed twelve fountains." And shortly after he adds: "And when the stubborn Jews were in it, we said to them: Be as apes, and some were made apes, bound in bridles." Thus, although he was using a way of speaking that was not altogether unseasonable, he adds the same things as commandments. Again, however, he returns to those among whom his entire speech is woven with blasphemies, namely that God is the cause of evils, saying: "Whom God leads, he is the directed one; but those whom He makes to err, they are the ones who are deficient." And soon after, he confirms this, saying: "The soul has no power to benefit or harm itself, except what God wills." But he forgets that he formerly called himself a prophet, and says: "If I knew everything, I would certainly be multiplied in good, and no evil would touch me. I am nothing but a herald and evangelist to the people who believe." Then he rebukes them for some idolatrous deeds; for he always assumes this persona for himself, and with the addition of some detestable and absurd things, he breaks off his nonsense.

CONFUTATION VII.

58. The seventh fable of Mohammed is entirely redundant with human slaughter and killing; for it is titled The Division of Spoils. And indeed he incites the barbarians in every way to act like barbarians against the Christians; especially as he prepares them, saying that to those who perish fighting near them, a reward is to be given by God in paradise, and to his messenger; for it was not right that the spoils should have share in the cause of perdition, but rather it was fitting that the bloodthirsty people and the more bloodthirsty messenger should have blood-stained deeds. And he himself ironically bids them use irony. To those of us who ask about this and similar things, he was silent. It must be known, however, that he is aware that it happens to us because of the

- τὴν διὰ τὰς ἀμέτρους ἡμῶν πλημμελείας ἐπενεχθεῖ- σαν ἡμῖν ὀργὴν ἐκ Θεοῦ, ὁ ἄθεος οὗτος βάρβαρος ἥρπασέ ^B τον καιρὸν εἰς τὴν κατὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ βλασφημίαν, καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἑτέραν αἰτίαν φησὶν ἡμᾶς εἰς χεῖρας αὐτῶν παραδίδοσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ σύνθρονον τῷ Πατρὶ τὸν Χριστὸν ὁμολογεῖν· διὸ συνεχῶς ἀποφαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ὁδηγεῖ ὁ Θεὸς λαὸν τῶν παρανόμων· πολλαχόθεν δέ ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἀπελέγξαι τοῦτο κακῶς τεκμαιρόμενον, φυσικῶς τε καὶ Γραφικῶς· Γραφικῶς μὲν ἀπό τε τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς Ἰακὼβ καὶ τοῦ βεβήλου Ἠσαῦ, Ἰωσὴφ δὲ καὶ Πετερφῆ, Δαβὶδ τε καὶ τοῦ ἀγνώμονος Σαούλ, Ναβουχοδονόσορ καὶ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων προφητῶν, καὶ ἑτέρων πλείστων ὁμοίων· φυσικῶς δὲ ἀπό τε τῶν προβάτων καὶ ἀγρίων θηρίων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἃ οὐχ ὡς χείρονα καὶ τῆς εἰς Θεὸν εὐχαριστίας ἀνεπιτήδεια τὴν ἅλωσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὑπομένει· ἀλλ' ὡς ἕτερόν τινα ἔχοντα λόγον ἀπόρρητον ^C οὕτω τέτακται.

ΕΛΕΓΚΤΙΚΟΣ Η'

νθ'. Ὁ ὄγδοος μῦθος (95) τῷ Μωάμετ ἐπιγέγραπται μὲν, Εἰς τὴν μετάνοιαν· παραινεῖ δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις ὡρισμένον τινὰ καιρὸν τῷ πότε χρόνῳ προσμεῖναι τοὺς Χριστιανούς, ὡς ἂν βούλοιντο τὰ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς διαθέσθαι, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑαυτῶν ἐγκρατεῖς γένοιντο, καὶ ἀποδιαστῶσι τῆς τῶν βαρβάρων περικρατήσεως, πόλεμον ἀναιρεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μετ-αγνοῖεν, φησί, καὶ θρησκεύουσι τὴν αὐτοῦ δυσσέβειαν, ἀδελφοὺς αὐτοὺς προσλαμβάνεσθαι· παραινεῖ οὖν τοῖς Χριστιανοῖς ὅτι κάλλιόν ἐστι μετανοῆσαι καὶ ζῆν, ἢ Χριστιανίζοντας ἀποθνήσκειν· αὖθις τε ἀναιδῶς κατατυπεῖ τοὺς ἀθλίους βαρβάρους ἔν τε ἀπειλαῖς καὶ ἐλέγχοις καὶ ὀνείδεσιν ὡς καταραθυμοῦντας τοῦ σεβάσματος αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις κατὰ τὸ πρότερον εἰρημένον πανούργημα ἐν ἑνὶ ἐλέγχῳ ἀμφοτέρους πειρᾶται ἐπιστομίζειν, Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Χριστιανοὺς οὕτω παραλῶν·

ξ'. « Λέγουσιν Ἰουδαῖοι (96) ὅτι ὁ Ἰσραὴλ (97) ἐστιν υἱὸς Θεοῦ· καὶ λέγουσιν οἱ Χριστιανοὶ ὅτι ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ· τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν διὰ τῶν στομάτων αὐτῶν· ἰσοφωνοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις τῶν ἀρνησαμένων ἐκ πρὶν· φονεύσει αὐτούς ὁ Θεός, ἕνεκεν τῶν ἀρνοῦνται· ἐπελάθοντο τοὺς ἀποστόλους αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἱερεῖς κυρίους παρέξ Θεοῦ· καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν υἱὸν τῆς Μαρίας καὶ οὐκ ἐκελεύσθησαν δουλεύειν εἰ μὴ Θεῷ ἑνί. » Δύςνους ὁ βάρβαρος, ἐπεὶ ἀμαθὴς καὶ ἀπαίδευτος· εἰ γὰρ ὅλως προσῆν αὐτῷ λογικὴ σύνεσις, ἔδει τὰ πρός τοῦτο τοὐνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀναφωνῆσαι, καὶ τοῖς γε πρὸς αὐτὸν μὴ σφόδρα ἐναντίως φερομένοις ὁμαλώτερον ἐπιτιμῆσαι· τοὐναντίον δὲ τοῖς τὰ μάλιστα αὐτῷ διαμαχομένοις· οὐ τε γὰρ Ἰουδαῖοι οὐ γνήσιον υἱὸν Θεοῦ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ ὀνομάζουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅση ^D ἀποδείξεται τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπερκειμένην πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ ἔθνη διὰ τοὺς πατέρας στοργήν· πῶς οὖν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ

τοῦ ^A ἐπιλαβέσθαι πάρεξ Θεοῦ; ἐρωτάσθωσαν Ἰουδαῖοι εἴ ποτε τοῦτο ἐντεθύμηνται, ἢ ἐν Γραφαῖς αὐτῶν εἴρηται· ὁ δὲ Χριστιανὸς τῷ ὄντι ἀληθῶς, καθ' ὃ πρέπει Θεῷ γνήσιον Υἱόν, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς οὐσίας τὸν Χριστὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν τῇ θεϊκῇ οὐσίᾳ, κατὰ τὴν καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ βαρβάρου ὁμολογουμένην ἐκ Θεοῦ δεδόσθαι γραφὴν τοῦ Εὐαγγελίου. Εἰ γάρ, ὡς ὁμολογεῖ, θεόθεν δέδοται τὸ Εὐαγγέλιον, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ γέγραπται, ὅτι τρίτον ἄνωθεν ὁ Θεὸς ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ ἐπεβόησεν· πῇ μέν, «Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός»· πῇ δέ, «καὶ ἐδόξασα, καὶ πάλιν δοξάσω»· τί ἄτοπον καὶ ξένον ποιοῦσιν οἱ Χριστιανοί, Θεὸν καὶ Θεοῦ Υἱὸν τὸν Χριστὸν ὁμολογοῦντες; τοῦ Θεοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο μαρτυροῦντος, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἐπαινουμένης παρ' ^B αὐτῷ βίβλου τῶν Εὐαγγελίων· ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐκ ἀνέγνω πώποτε τὴν τῶν θείων Εὐαγγελίων γραφὴν ὁ βάρβαρος, μόνην δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν προσηγορίαν ἀκούων ἐξεθείαζε· καὶ οὐκ ᾤετο ἐν αὐτοῖς γεγράφθαι ὅτι ἀληθῶς Υἱὸς Θεοῦ ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός.

ξα'. Ἐκ δὲ ἀπείρων τῆς προγενεστέρας τῶν θεοπτικῶν καὶ προφητικῶν Γραφῆς· ἀστέρων γάρ τις ἀριθμῷ ἀμιλλωμένην εὑρήσεις τὰς ἀποδείξεις, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πρωτογράφου βίβλου Μωϋσέως ἕως Δανιὴλ τοῦ προφήτου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. Ὅτι γὰρ Μωϋσῆς ᾔδει τοῦ θείου τῆς φύσεως μοναδικὸν, καὶ τῶν ἰδιοτήτων, ἤγουν τῶν ὑποστάσεων, τὸ διάφορον, φανερὸν· ἡνίκα ἔγραψε, «Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν». Καὶ ὅτε ἔφασκεν, «Ἰδοὺ γέγονεν Ἀδὰμ ὡς εἷς ἐξ ἡμῶν». ^C Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτε ἔγραφεν, «Ἄκουε, Ἰσραήλ, Κύριος ὁ Θεός σου, Κύριος εἷς ἐστι» τῷ αἰτίῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ συμπνοίᾳ ἐνομιζομένην ἐγίνωσκε τὴν Τριάδα φανερὸν· ἦ γὰρ ἐναντίᾳ ἐῷ ἔγραφεν, ἄνω μὲν τεθεὶς διάφορα πρόσωπα διαλεγόμενος, μετέπειτα δὲ ἓν μόνον ἐκήρυττεν εἶναι πρόσωπον τὸ τε λέγον καὶ ἀκοῦον καὶ ποιοῦν· ὅπερ ἀθέμιτον. Καὶ οἱ πάντων δὲ τῶν πάλαι προφητῶν ἐμφανικώτατος Δανιήλ, τρανῶς καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἐδήλωσεν τῆς Χριστοῦ ἐλεύσεως, καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀξίαν ἐσήμανεν, ἡνίκα λέγει· «Ἐθεώρουν, καὶ ἰδοὺ ἐπὶ τῶν νεφελῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὡς υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου· καὶ αὐτῷ ἐδόθη ἡ τιμὴ, καὶ ἡ προσκύνησις, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς»· καίτοι τοῦ Παλαιοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν καθεζομένου ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου.

^D ξβ'. Ἀλλ' ἀφείσθω τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων Γραφῶν. Ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ προῤῥήσεων, καὶ πᾶν τοῦτο ἐκβάσεων, εἴ γε συνιέναι ὁ μάταιος ἴσχυε, τὸ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Ἰωάννου μαρτυρίας, ὃν προφήτην καὶ ἄνδρα δίκαιον αὐτὸς καταγγέλλων ἀποδέχεται· ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν θαυματουργιῶν τῶν αὐτοῦ συμβόλων, τοῦ τάφου, φημὶ, καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τούτων συνεώρακεν ὁ λοχαγωγός· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ θείας φροντίδος ἐπιγνώσεως πώποτε, πλὴν ὅσον τοῦ.

πλάσαι ψεύδη καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἣν οὐκ ἔσχε δόξαν περιθεῖναι, καὶ ἀπάτῃ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ^A μωρίαν ἐπικρύψαι. Ὡς γὰρ ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας ἥλιος οὐκ ἀνατέλλει τοῖς πεπηρωμένοις, οὕτω οὐδὲ ἡ τοῦ Χριστοῦ θεότης τοῖς τὸν νοῦν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπάτης τυφλωθεῖσι.

ξδ'. Ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτός που πάλιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν Ἑβραίων τὰς δόξας ἀνατρέπων, πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους τῆς πλάνης αὐτοῦ διαλέγεται, ἣν ἡμεῖς ἀληθείαν ὀνομάζομεν, πνεῦμα δὲ ἀκαθάρτου πλάνην ἐπιστάμεθα· ἀναγκαῖον οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς τὰ ἐκείνου, ὡς ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων στρεβλούμενα, προφαίνεσθαι. Φησὶ γάρ οὗτος ὁ ἀπατεὼν ἐπὶ τῆς ἑβδόμης γραφῆς τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ Ἀλκοράν· «Εἴπατε, ὦ Ἰσραηλῖται, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Θεὸς γεννήσας, οὐδὲ γεννηθείς· οὐδὲ γέγονεν αὐτῷ ἴσος οὐδείς.» Ὦ τῆς ἀνοίας! Ὦ τῆς ἀκρατοῦς καὶ δυσσεβοῦς ^B ἀπατεωνίας! Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐγέννησε, οὐκ ἔστι Πατήρ· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι Πατὴρ, οὐδὲ Υἱὸν ἔχει. Εἰ δὲ παρρησίᾳ ὁμολογεῖ μὴ εἶναι Πατέρα τὸν Θεὸν, πῶς τὸν Ἰησοῦν οὐχ ὡς Υἱὸν ἀπορρίπτει; Ἀλλ' ὅμως πάλιν ἐν ἀλλοίαις γραφαῖς Υἱὸν Θεοῦ ἀποκαλεῖ τὸν Χριστόν. Οὐκοῦν ἐναντία αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὧν ἔγραφεν, ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ φησὶν, ἀποφαίνεται. Εἰ δὲ ἀντιῤῥητικά ἐστι τὰ γραφέντα, ἆρα οὐκ ἔστι ψευδῆ; Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀλλήλοις μαχόμενον καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐκπίπτει. Εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ τὰ Γραφῆς, διὰ τί πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ὁμολογίαν οὐκ ἀνάγεται; Ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὴν τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ πίστιν, ἣν ὡς κανόνα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πλάνης προβάλλεται, ^C ἐπιφέρει· «Οὐκ ἦν Ἀβραὰμ Ἰουδαῖος, οὐδὲ Χριστιανός, ἀλλ' ἦν εὐθείας καὶ ὀρθῆς πίστεως, καὶ οὐκ ἦν ἐκ τῶν πολυσέβων.» Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐδὲ αὐτὸς οἶδεν ὅ τι φησὶν, ἢ τίνα οὕτω προσηγορεύει· εἴτε γὰρ Ἰουδαῖος ὁ Ἀβραὰμ, δικαίως τῶν Ἰουδαίων ὁ Θεὸς Θεός ἐστιν· εἴτε Χριστιανὸς, δικαίως ἡμεῖς αὐτῷ λατρεύομεν. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνος μηδέτερος τούτων ἦν, ἀλλὰ μόνον Θεοῦ φίλος, ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὸν αὐτὸν Θεὸν καὶ Πατέρα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ Θεὸν Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακὼβ πρεσβεύομεν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον. Τί οὖν τὸ παράδοξον, εἴτε Ἰακὼβ εἴτε Ἀβραὰμ, ἡμεῖς τὸν αὐτὸν σέβομεν Θεόν; ^D Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔσμεν τῆς αὐτοῦ χάριτος κληρονόμοι, οἱ τὴν αὐτοῦ πίστιν κατέχοντες; Ἀλλὰ φησὶν ὁ ματαιόφρων· «Εἴπατε, οὐκ ἔστι Θεὸς Θεοῦ Υἱός.» Ὦ τῆς πωρώσεως! Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐν ἑτέροις οὐκ ἐπαίσχυνται ὁμολογῶν· «Ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐστι τὸ Εὐαγγέλιον, ὅτι Θεός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς, καὶ Υἱὸς Θεοῦ.» Πῶς οὖν ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔστι, κἀκεῖ ὄντως ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀληθῶς ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκεῖ ψευδῶς; Ἢ ἐκείνη ἡ ἐπιγραφή ψευδής ἐστι, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔφησεν, ἢ αὕτη ψευδής, κἀκείνη ἀληθής. Ἐν γὰρ τοῖς αὐτοῖς οὐ δύναται καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος συνυπάρχειν· ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθεύειν, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ψεύδεσθαι.

ψεύδεσθαι. ^A θηρᾶσαι διὰ τῆς προσηγορίας τῶν Γραφῶν τοὺς ἀκούοντας. Τί γάρ, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ἀληθῶς λέγων στοιχεῖν τῷ τοῦ φίλου αὐτοῦ λόγῳ ἐπὶ βεβαιώσει τινῶν πραγμάτων διηρημένῃ, ἐπὶ ἔργῳ τίθεται τὴν ἐκείνου πίστιν; Εἰ δὲ καί τίς που εὑρεθείη τοιοῦτος, ὑπὸ κατάραν ἐστί, κατὰ τὴν Γραφήν· Οὐαὶ γάρ, φησίν, ἁμαρτωλῷ ἐπὶ δύο τρίβους πορευομένῳ! ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀπάνθρωπος· οἱ μέν φασιν εἶναι τὸν Ἰσραὴλ υἱὸν Θεοῦ, οἱ δὲ τὸν Χριστόν. Τί οὖν τοῦτο ἐναργὲς σημεῖον ψεύδους ἀεὶ κρίνεις, τὸ διαφόρων προσώπων ἀμφιβαλόντων περί τινος μὴ συμφωνεῖν ἀμφοτέρους; καὶ ἀναίρεσιν οἴει τοῦ πράγματος παντελῆ γίνεσθαι ὁπηνίκα τινὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφόρους ἔχωσι δόξας, καὶ τῇ τῶν ἑτέρων μερῶν ἀποφάσει; ἢ οὐδέτερον τούτων, ἢ παντάπασιν οὐκ ὢν ἀπελέγχεσθαι νομίζεις; ὑπέρευγέ σου τῆς ^B φιλαλήθους γνώσεως· τί οὖν ποιήσεις ἡμῶν μὴ πιστευόντων τῷ Θεῷ σου, ἀλλὰ τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν, καὶ σοῦ τῷ νομιζομένῳ θεῷ σου πιστεύοντος, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν, εἰπέ; Σοῦ γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τὸν προφήτην ἀφρόνως εἰπεῖν, Οὐκ ἔστι Θεός· εἰ ἕτερος παρ' ἑκατέρων Θεός, ἴδε ποῦ αὐτῷ ὁ κραταιὸς ἔλεγχος αὐτοῦ κατέστραπται· Ὄντως ἐπιστρέψει ὁ πόνος αὐτοῦ εἰς κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπὶ κορυφὴν αὐτοῦ ἡ βλασφημία αὐτοῦ καταβήσεται· εὐλόγως δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς παιδίσκης υἱός, φύσει δοῦλος, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, τυγχάνων, τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίαν, οὐδὲ κατὰ χάριν κατὰ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ φαντασθῆναι ἰσχύει· δουλοπρεπῶς ἀνηνεγμένος, καὶ δουλοπρεπῶς μεμυημένος, καὶ τούτου πλέον οὐδέν. ^C ξγ'. Ἐφεξῆς δὲ τὸ περὶ τὸν Ἀντίχριστον εἰρημένον σημεῖον τῷ Ἀποστόλῳ, ἐναργῶς ἐν τούτῳ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν· « Κἂν ἀηδῶς ἔχωσιν οἱ ἀρνησάμενοι, Θεός ἐστιν ὁ πέμψας τὸν ἀπόστολον αὐτοῦ, εἰς ὁδήγησιν καὶ εἰς πίστιν ἀληθινήν, τοῦ δεσπόζειν αὐτὸν ἐπάνω πάσης πίστεως.» Τοῦτο ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ, Ἀντικείμενος καὶ ὑπεραιρόμενος ἐπὶ πάντα λεγόμενον Θεὸν ἢ σέβασμα· ἁπλῶς τοῦ δεσπόζειν αὐτὸν ἐπάνω πάσης πίστεως· ἐφαυλίσθη ἄρα παρ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ πίστις, καθ᾽ ἣν αὐτὸς πιστεύειν ἐνόμιζε· καὶ οὐχ ὁ νόμος μόνον οὐδὲ τὸ Εὐαγγέλιον· ἐπάνω γὰρ πάσης πίστεώς φησιν· τὸ δὲ ἀληθινήν, εἴρηται, ὡς πρὸς τὰς λοιπάς· οὐκ ὀκνῶ τοῦ λοιποῦ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι καὶ οὗτος ^D Ἀντίχριστός ἐστιν ἀληθῶς· μετ' ὀλίγον δ' ὅποι φέρεται ὁ σύμπας τῆς θεομαχίας σκοπός, ἔκδηλος γίνεται· ὁ γάρ τοι ἕως τοῦ νῦν διισχυριζόμενος ὅτι Θεὸς Υἱὸν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐ θαῤῥῶν ἑαυτῷ ταῦτα φιλονεικοῦντι, ἀλλὰ διαλογισάμενος ὅτι τυχὸν καὶ ἔχει, οὐκ ἀναδύεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο προσάψαι τὸ πρόσωπον· εἰ καὶ ἐκ πλαγίου τοῦτο ἐπήγαγεν, καὶ προσποιεῖται οἱονεὶ σχηματίζεσθαι βλακείαν πάνυ αἰσχράν, καί φησιν· «Τινές σιαίνουσι τὸν προφήτην, καὶ λέγουσιν ὅτι αὐτὸς Υἱός ἐστι Θεοῦ.» Καὶ οὐκ εἶπεν ὅτι ὁ Υἱός, λογιζόμενος ὃν ἀνελεῖν ἀγωνίζεται, ἵνα μὴ γυμνὸς παντελῶς τοῦ δούλου καταληφθῇ συσκεδασθῇ, ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς Υἱός ἐστιν, ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι, εἰ θέλετε Υἱὸν Θεοῦ ὁμολογεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῦ λαλουμένου ἐγγύτερον· εἶτα βαττολογήσας τινὰ ἀσέμνως, καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ φλυαριῶν διὰ φλυαρίας τὰς ἀποδείξεις πιστοῦσθαι ἀβρυνόμενος, μέμνηταί τινων καὶ Μαδιάμ, καὶ Ματευχάματ, πρὸς οὓς, φησίν, οἱ ἀπόστολοι αὐτῶν τὴν φανέρωσιν, ἀδήλων ὄντων τούτων καὶ ἀναποδείκτων, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ αὐτός· καὶ εὐθέως ἐκστρατεύει καθ' ἡμῶν τοὺς βαρβάρους, καὶ τὰ εἰς τοῦτο αὐτοὺς ἐρεθίζοντα καθυλακτήσας, ἀποκλείει τὸν Φλήναφον.

ΕΛΕΓΚΤΙΚΟΣ Θ'

ἀγνωσίας Θεοῦ ἐπὶ Θεῷ· καὶ μάρτυς ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ· ἀπὸ Ἀβραὰμ ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον προκοπὴ ἀληθινή· καὶ μαρτυρεῖ ἡ εὐταξία τῆς νομοθεσίας· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ νόμου ἐπὶ τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν προκοπὴ ἀληθινή· καὶ μαρτυρεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς τῆς εὐαγγελικῆς πολιτείας· οὐκ ἔστι ξένον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅτι ἀπεκάλυψεν ὁ Θεὸς πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἐξ αὐτῶν τοῦ διαμαρτύρασθαι καὶ εὐαγγελίσασθαι τοῖς πιστεύουσιν ὅτι ἔστι προκοπὴ ἀληθινή. Εἴδωμεν λοιπὸν εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Μωάμετ τοῦτο γεγονὸς εὕρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ σεμνύνειν καὶ τὴν Ἀβραὰμ πίστιν, καὶ τὸν νόμον, καὶ τὸ Εὐαγγέλιον· καὶ τὸ μὲν Ἀβραὰμ καὶ τὸν νόμον, αὐτὸς οὐκ ὀφείλει παραυξῆσαι, τὸ μέντοι Εὐαγγέλιον ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Ἐπισκεψώμεθα οὖν τίνα τῶν ἐντολῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐπήυξησεν· ἆρά γε τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀκτημοσύνης; ἆρά γε τὰ περὶ σωφροσύνης; ἆρά γε τὰ περὶ ἀοργησίας; ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲν τῶν παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ καθορᾶται· μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀπεναντία τούτοις πᾶσιν ἔγραψέ τε καὶ ἔδρασε· λείπεται ἄρα ἐννοεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὴ ἐκ Θεοῦ αὐτὸν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι· ἢ ὡς ἐμὸς διαμαρτυράμενον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μηδὲ εὐαγγελισάμενον τοῖς πιστεύουσι, προκοπὴν ἀληθινήν, ἀναστροφήν, μᾶλλον δὲ καταστροφὴν καὶ ἀπώλειαν· ἰδοὺ δὴ τὸν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγον, γνώμονα καὶ κανόνα λαβόντες, δι᾿ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸν ἀπληλέγξαμεν μὴ ἀποκαλυφθέντα ^C παρὰ Θεοῦ· ἀλλ᾿ ὡς αὐτὸς μέν ἔφη, φαρμακός ἐστιν, εἰ βούλοιτο· πλὴν γε θεόθεν οὐδὲν ἔλαβε· τούτου δὲ ἐκπεσὼν, ὅποι δὴ καὶ τετάξεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· καὶ ἀληθεύσει ὁ εἰρηκώς, Πεσοῦνται ἐν ἀμφιβλήστρῳ αὐτῶν οἱ ἁμαρτωλοί· τούτων αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀφαυροτάτων λογίων, ἔτι σαθρότερα ῥησείδια ὑποτιθέμενα, διὰ τὴν παντελῆ χαύνωσιν καὶ ἀδράνειαν, εὔλογον παριδεῖν ἐκρίναμεν· φύσεως μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὄντι πονηρᾶς καὶ πολυλάλου, μᾶλλον δὲ φλυάρου καὶ γραποπρεποῦς ἐτύγχανεν· ἔτι δὲ καὶ δειλῆς καὶ ὀργίλου καὶ ὑπούλου καὶ μεγαλορήμονος· καὶ οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅ τι κακὸν ἐνέλιπε τῷ διαβόλῳ ὅπερ αὐτῷ οὐ προσῆν· ὀρθῆς δὲ κρίσεως καὶ διανοίας, εὐστόχου πάντάπασιν ἄμοιρος αὐτοῦ ὁ πᾶς λόγος τυγχάνει· διὸ αὐτὸν παρήσομεν ἐν τούτοις ἀδολεσχοῦντα καταλῦσαι τὸν φλήναφον.

ΕΛΕΓΚΤΙΚΟΣ Ι'.

ξϛ'. Ὁ δέκατος μῦθος τῷ Μωάμετ, Λόγος Χοῦδ, ἐπιγέγραπται (6), καὶ τὸ προοίμιον καυχήσεως πεπλήρωται κομψῶς, ὅτι, φησὶν, ὑπὸ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐσοφίσθη καὶ ἐστίχθη καὶ διεκρίθη· τέως μέντοι τῆς παρ᾿ ἀνθρώπων γνώσεως ἐπιδεῖ ὅμολογεῖ τὸν Θεοῦ αὐτοῦ Γραφήν· ἄρχεται δὲ πάλιν καταπλήττειν τοὺς βαρβάρους, ὅτι δὴ Θεοῦ εἰσιν νομοθεσίαι· τὰ τοιαῦτα παίγνια· καὶ καταφοβεῖ αὐτοὺς, εἰ μὴ πείθοιντο, ἀπὸ

ἀπὸ ^A τῆς μελλούσης κολάσεως, ἀπό τε τῶν συμβαινόντων παρὰ προσδοκίαν ἀνιαρῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· εἰ τι δ’ ἂν γὰρ, φησὶ, συμβαίνῃ ὑμῖν, εἰ τε ἐν γῇ εἴτε ἐν θαλάσσῃ, διὰ τὴν περὶ ταῦτα ἀπιστίαν πείσεσθε· καὶ παράγει εἰς μαρτυρίαν προφήτην καὶ ἀπόστολον γεγονότα τὸν Νῶε· καὶ ὅτι πάντων ἀρνησαμένων, οἱ πάντες ἀπώλοντο· καὶ ὅτι εἷς τῶν αὐτοῦ υἱῶν μὴ πιστεύσας ἀπεπνίγη δρώμενος τοῦ γέροντος· καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ἑκάστου εἴδους ζώων, οὐχ ἑπτὰ καὶ δύο ζυγὰς, ἀλλ’ ἀνὰ μίαν μόνην ζυγὴν μετ’ αὐτοῦ ἔλαβε· καὶ προστίθησιν ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν δῆθεν ἐμπνέοντος, ὅτι Ἐκ τῶν ἐξηγήσεων τῶν ἀπόντων δηλοποιούμεν ταῦτα πρός σέ· οὐκ ἧς γινώσκων αὐτὰ σὺ· οὐτέ ὁ λαός σου πρὸ τούτου· ἰδοὺ δὲ αὐτὸς περὶ αὐτοῦ ὁμολογεῖ ὅτι τὴν Μωσαϊκὴν Γραφὴν οὐκ ἀνέγνω, ^B ἐπειδὴ αὐτὴν οὐ προφέρει ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἐνδιαστρόφως καὶ ἀκαταλλήλως πρὸς ἑαυτήν· πρόδηλον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ ὑπαγορεύσαντος αὐτήν ἐστιν ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμιλία, ἀλλὰ ἡ τῆς Γραφῆς νόθευσις, ἀλλ’ ἢ παρὰ ἀνδρὸς Μανιχαίου, ἢ παρὰ δαίμονος, ἢ τάχα καὶ ἐθελοντὴς κακουργεῖ, ὑπὲρ Μωϋσέα ἑαυτὸν ἐπᾶραι θέλων. Καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸν Ζάλεθ εἰσηγεῖται προφήτην (7) καὶ δάσκαλον λαοῦ ἀγνώστου· καὶ ὅτι διεστείλατο αὐτοῖς τοῦ μὴ βλάψαι κάμηλόν τινα νεμομένην ἐν ἀγροῖς· καὶ ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι παραβάντες, ἐφόνευσαν αὐτήν, καὶ κατελείφθησαν διὰ τὴν κάμηλον ἐν ὀργῇ Θεοῦ εἰς τὰς αὐλὰς αὐτῶν ἐξαρώμενοι ὡς μὴ φανέντες· φοβερὸν τὸ τοῦ βαρβάρου ὑπόδειγμα ἐν πᾶσι, πλὴν τὸ ἀληθὲς πεφηνέναι· μέμνηται δὲ καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν ᾿Αβραὰμ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μεσημβρίας ὀπτασίαν, καὶ τοῦ Λὼτ· καὶ παρασολοικίζει πάντα καὶ συγχεῖ· ὅμως τὴν ἐπὶ Σόδομα κατενεχθεῖσαν ὀργὴν ἐξέθετο· πάλιν δὲ τοῦ ἀδήλου ^C Σωαὴπ μέμνηται τοῦ Μαδιανίτου, εἴ τις ἄρα καὶ ἐγένει, καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Φαραὼ· καὶ ἐπισυνάπτει, καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ματαιοκηρύξιαν, ὅτι Ἐνός τινος τούτων ἴσον, καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὺς παραδέξασθε λόγους· καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὸν φλήναφον ἐπετέμετο· σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ τὸ τοῦ βαρβάρου ἀλόγιστον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις αὐτοῦ ὑποδείγμασιν, ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἐνδόξων προσώπων ἀδεῶς ἐμνημόνευσεν, τὴν ἐναντίαν δὲ αὐτοῖς πορευόμενος, δυοῖν θάτερον ἔπασχεν· ἢ γὰρ οὐ συνίει τοῦτο πεπονθώς, ἢ λαθεῖν πάντως ἐνόμισεν· ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀνοίας ἁπλῶς, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον παρανοίας ^D καὶ ἀναισχυντίας.

ΕΛΕΓΚΤΙΚΟΣ ΙΑ.

γραμμάτων. Καίτοιγε ἀλλαχοῦ φησιν ὅτι ἀγράφως τὰς τερθρείας ταύτας δέδεκται· ὁ δὲ σκοπὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου τοιοῦτος· ὅτι Εἰ τὸν Ἰωσὴφ ἡ Αἴγυπτος παρεδέξατο, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐμὲ δέξασθαι ὑμεῖς ὀφείλετε· τοσοῦτον αὐτῷ τὸ περίσσευμα τῆς ἀνοίας· καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὴν φλήναφον ἀπεστόμισεν.

ΕΛΕΓΚΤΙΚΟΣ ΙΒ'.

^A 68. Τὸ δωδέκατον μυθάριον τῷ Μωάμετ ἐπιγέγραπται μὲν Εἰς τὴν Βροντήν· ὑπομιμνήσκει δὲ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὅτι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν ὁ Θεὸς ἐποίησεν, καὶ αὐτὸς βρέχει, καὶ χάλαζαν καταφέρει· ὡσανεὶ οὐδέπω ἄλλοτε τούτου φημισθέντος, ὅτι τε ὁ Θεὸς ταῦτα ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἐκέλευσεν· καὶ λοιπὸν ὥσπερ ἀρχάς τινας ὁμολογουμένας ταύτας προσθεὶς, ὡς ἀναγκαίως ἕπεσθαι ὀφειλομένην τὴν ἑαυτοῦ νεκρομαντείαν ἐπισυνάγει, καὶ τοιαῦτά τινα παραληρεῖ· Ὁ Θεὸς βροντᾷ, ἐκ τούτου γνῶτε ὅτι προφήτης αὐτοῦ ἐμι ἐγώ· ὁ Θεὸς ἀστράπτει, γνῶτε ὅτι προφήτης αὐτοῦ ἐμι ἐγώ· ὁ Θεὸς ἔθηκεν ἐν τῇ γῇ πᾶν ζῶον καὶ φυτόν· γνῶτε ὅτι προφήτης αὐτοῦ ἐμι ἐγώ· ^B ἰδὲ πόθεν εἶπε τοὺς ἀθλίους βαρβάρους. Λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὡς ἐκ τούτου μαθόντες, καὶ τὰ κατὰ μέρος κατανοοῦντες, καθ᾽ ὃ αὐτὸς διδάσκει εὐφυῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν δυνάμεθα· Ὄνος ὀγκᾶται· γνῶτε, ὦ βάρβαροι, ὅτι Μωάμετ Θεοῦ αὐτοῦ προφήτης· βόες μυκῶνται, γνῶτε οἱ βάρβαροι, ὅτι Μωάμετ Θεοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπόστολος· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ περὶ κυνῶν ὑλακῆς, καὶ βομβύθρων ἦχῆς, καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων· τίνι τῶν δυσσεβῶν αὐτὸν ἀπεικάσαι; δι᾽ ὑπερβολὴν θεομαχίας, οὐκ ἔχω· καὶ οὐδὲ συναισθόμενος ὁ παραπαίων τῆς ἀθέου φλυαρίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγα ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ φρονῶν, ὅτι δῆθεν ἀκούει βροντῶντος Θεοῦ καὶ ἀστράπτοντος ^C ὁρᾷ, καὶ ἄλλοις ταῦτα λέγει· ἐκδοάτω τοῦτο μέγα καὶ ἐξαίσιον ἔργον ὡς ἐκ στόματος τοῦ πηρώσαντος αὐτοῦ τὰς νοητὰς αἰσθήσεις οὕτως·

69. Ἀπεστειλάμεν σε πρὸς ἔθνος οὗ παρῆλθον παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἔθνη τοῦ ἐντυγχάνειν ἐπάνω αὐτῶν τὰ δηλοποιηθέντα πρός σε. Ὢ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνωτάτω σοφίας τῷ Μωάμετ! ὄντως νῦν εὔκαιρον τὸ Γραφικὸν ἐκεῖνο φάναι ῥητόν· Ὁ μωρὸς μωρὰ λαλήσει, καὶ ἡ καρδία αὐτοῦ μάταια νοήσει· περὶ δὲ τῆς βροντῆς, δι᾽ ἣν καὶ ἡ ἐπιγραφὴ κεῖται, φησί· Καὶ δοξάζει ἡ βροντὴ ἐν τῇ εὐχαριστίᾳ αὐτοῦ· τουτέστιν εὔνους καὶ λογικὴ φωνή ἐστιν ἡ βροντή· τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ἐγκρινομένης γραφῆς οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ εἰκότως· ἦν γὰρ ἂν καὶ περὶ φλοίσβου θαλάσσης, ^D καὶ ῥοίζου ἀνέμου, καὶ ἑτέρων πλειόνων τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι· ἀλλ᾽ ἔσονται τινὲς ἀπηχέστατοι ψόφοι, οἷς οὐχ ἁρμόσει τὸ εἰρημένον· τῆς δὲ δυσφήμου αὐτοῦ δόξης τῆς τὸν Θεὸν αἴτιον τῶν κακῶν τιθείσης, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ τῶν καλῶν, ἀναιδέστερον ἐπιμνησθεὶς, φησίν· Ἐὰν γὰρ ἤθελεν ὁ Θεὸς, ὁδηγῆσαι εἶχεν αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους πάντα· καὶ ὃν πλανᾷ ὁ Θεὸς, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ὁδήγησις. Ὄντως οὗτος [alt-version omitted]

οὗτος ^A ἐν τόποις οἷς οὐκ ἐπισκοπεῖ ὁ Ὕψιστος. Πάλιν δὲ τῆς περιδεοῦς αὐτῷ ὑποθέσεως τοῦ μὴ ἀπιστηθῆναι ἀντέχεται, καί φησι· « Λέγουσιν οἱ ἀρνησάμενοι, Οὐκ εἶ ἀπόστολος· εἰπέ· Ἀρκεσθῇ μοι ὁ Θεὸς μάρτυς μεταξὺ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ ὑμῶν · καὶ ὅστις ἐστὶν παρ’ αὐτοῦ εἴδησις τῆς Γραφῆς. » Θεὸν προβάλλεται μάρτυρα τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀποστολῆς · Θεοῦ δὲ οὐδέν τι ἄξιον. ἐπιφέρει σὺν τῷ συμβόλῳ, οὐ θαυματουργίαν, οὐ προφητείαν, οὐ βίον ἐξησκημένον, οὐδὲ ἁπλῶς γνῶσιν · ἀλλ’ ἀναποδείκτως, Θεὸς μάρτυς, φησίν · εἶτα αἰσθόμενος τῆς κατὰ θεοῦ συκοφαντίας, καὶ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ψεύδους (οὐ γὰρ εἶχε πόθεν πιστώσεται), καταφεύγει εἰς τοὺς εἰδότας τὴν Γραφὴν, ἐν τῷ τέως τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀγνώστους ὄντας διαπαῖξαι καὶ λαθεῖν ἰσχύσας · καὶ ὅστις ἐστὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ, φησίν, εἴδησις τῆς Γραφῆς · ποίας Γραφῆς; ὅλως γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲ ἀληθῆ τὴν Γραφὴν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τοῦ μαρτυροῦσαν · εἰκὸς τὰ περὶ τοῦ βδελύγματος τῆς ἐρημώσεως περὶ σοῦ εἴρηται · ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν περιλείπεται τοῖς συνιοῦσι διανοεῖσθαι περὶ σοῦ · εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο αὐτὸς ἀνέχοιτο, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον τι ὑψηλὸν ἀπαιτεῖ, δὸς τὴν θεόπνευστον μελετᾶτε Γραφὴν, αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθε ὅσας προαγγελίας περὶ Μωάμετ ἀποστόλου ὁ Θεὸς ἔγραψε, καὶ τῆς τούτου προσδοκίας · εὑρήσετε δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ τούτου συγγραφῇ τὰς ἐκ τῆς θείας Γραφῆς μαρτυρίας εὐστόχως ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ δόγμασιν ἐξαγομένας ^B ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ προφητῶν καὶ τοῦ Εὐαγγελίου, ἃ ἐκθειάζειν δοκεῖ, καὶ ὧν ὑπὸ τὴν πρόφασιν τῆς εἰδήσεως τοὺς βαρβάρους λαθὼν, τὰ φλήναφα ἐπαυσεν.

ΕΛΕΓΚΤΙΚΟΣ ΙΓ'.

70. Τὸ τρισκαιδέκατον (13) μυθάριον τῷ Μωάμετ. Εἰς μὲν τὸν Ἀβραὰμ ἐπιγέγραπται, οὐδὲν δὲ ἄξιον λόγου περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐξηγεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν πρὸ τούτου μῦθον ὀλίγα περὶ τῆς κτίσεως · καταλέξας ὅτι θείῳ Πνεύματι διοικεῖται, ἐπάγει τὰ οἰκονομούμενα παρ’ αὐτοῦ · καὶ φησὶ τὴν συνήθη βλασφημίαν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς ὃν θέλει πλανᾷ, καὶ ὃν θέλει ὁδηγεῖ · καὶ αὖθις μέμνηται Θαμοὺδ καὶ Ἀάδ, κατὰ τὸν πάλιν λῆρον αὐτοῦ · καὶ ὅτι Διὰ τοῦτο κἀγὼ ὀφείλω πιστωθῆναι ὡς Θεοῦ ἀπόστολος· τῆς δὲ τούτου ἀποστολῆς γνώρισμα τοῦτό φησιν· « Ἔσονται, φησὶν, οἱ πιστοὶ ἐν τῇ κρίσει ^C γελόμενοι (14) · οἱ δὲ ἄπιστοι, φησὶν, ἐν τῇ κρίσει · τὰ καμήσια αὐτῶν ἀπὸ κέδρας, καὶ καλύπτει τὰ πρόσωπα αὐτῶν τὸ πῦρ · » καὶ οὕτως καταπαίζων τῆς φοβερᾶς ἡμέρας, τοῦ φληνάφου ἀπέστη. Ἐπιστῆσαι δὲ δεῖ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν κακουργούντων ἴδιον τὸ μὴ γυμνὰς προτιθέναι τὰς ἄρκυς · ἢ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ἑάλωσαν · οὐ χρὴ ξενίζεσθαι, εἰ καὶ παρ’ αὐτῷ τῶν ἐπαινούμενων θεωρηθείη · ἀλλὰ τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῦ καταισχυνόμενα βασανίσαι δεῖ · εἰ μὴ σφόδρα διαμάχεται τοῖς ἐξ ὧν ἐλήφθησαν αὐτοῦ τὰ δελέατα καὶ αἱ ἀπάται θεογράφους νόμοις.

νόμοις.

REFUTATION XIV.

^A 71. The fourteenth fable is entitled *Noger*, which he mentions toward the end of the fable, namely, that he was a companion of the Sodomites. The entire scope of this fable is that belief in him should not be denied; therefore he says: “They will surely say, ‘You are a demoniac,’ if you affirm that you have received these things from God. For if you were truthful, you would have brought angels.” He himself sets forth two reasons why an angel should not arrive: first, because it is prohibited by certain people; and second, because upon their arrival, all things would be consumed. What grace, then, would there be for men? “But if we were to open the very heavens,” he says, “they would surely gaze upon them in amazement.” Therefore, none of these things happens. But in their place, he says, knowing the celestial things well, “Behold the height of heaven and the stars, and the shooting of the stars, at the time when Satan ascends, desirous to hear what is spoken in heaven. Therefore believe that I am an emissary; for no one before me taught this.” Then he mentions again the creation of Adam, and the origin of Belial, and his disobedience, and also Abraham, and the history of Lot. Then, having inserted some things taken from elsewhere, and considering that by this narration he had reconciled belief to himself, he subsequently rebukes those who attribute a companion to God. And thus he puts an end to the empty fable.

REFUTATION XV.

^C 72. The fifteenth fable is entitled *The Bees*, and indeed he mentions bees around the middle of the fable, because they make wax and honey; yet he adds his own invention, namely, that these things were delivered to him by God. And he seems to touch upon the power of God in creating, and that God made the beasts and rules all things; and he swears a great oath by the name of God, that as many as say that God has daughters—the angels—will pay the penalty; the full explanation of which prediction you shall see, not without amazement, in his succeeding fable. Again he mentions the eating of meats, saying: “Do not say that this is permitted, but that is forbidden, lest you utter a blasphemous lie against God”; labeling the law of God a blasphemy and a lie; and he exhorts them to imitate Abraham in the belief of the one God. For he says, “He established the Sabbath over those who were in disagreement about it.” Yet Abraham was ignorant of the observance of the Sabbath. Whence you may infer from this that he also wanted the barbarians to observe the Sabbath; but since they perhaps would not listen to his urging, he did not dare to establish anything regarding it. And with these things his fable concludes.

REFUTATION XVI.

73. The sixteenth fable is inscribed... [Here the text breaks off, to be continued on the following page.]

Scripture to Moses," and that "We judged among the sons of Israel in the Scripture that there would be a second devastation in the land, and a great upraising." Consider then from what follows, whether this is truly he who gave the Scripture to Moses. For a little further on, babbling, he says: "And we have fastened the lot of every man about his neck; and at the day of resurrection a book shall meet him: Read your book." Now it is clear to almost everyone that Moses did not just refrain from teaching fate and the notion of a written destiny, but did not even consent to mention it. If, therefore, to admit fate contributes to the glory of God, it is no wonder if things that were formerly passed over in silence were later given to him. But if it shows Him to be the cause of evils, just as it makes Him the cause of good, and from this proves that His legislations and threats of punishment were instituted in vain, this is impossible. Therefore, the writer necessarily lies, in that he attributes this inept fable to the same one who gave the law to Moses.

Those things which follow have the same aim. He says: "When we wish to destroy a city, we command its inhabitants to live luxuriously; and thus the sentence upon them was just: We exterminated them with extermination; and truly we have destroyed many generations after Noah." Do these words better befit the man-loving God, or the man-hating demon? Does God command luxury, or the devil? Who could ask for a more evident demonstration in order to persuade himself that the entire book of Mohammed was issued by Satan? But if some of them should say: "How was Satan able to destroy many generations after Noah?" we shall reply that it was not by divine power or authority in any way, but by fraud and temptation, through which they provoked God to anger, that he was able to do it; which he is able to do even now. And in this, he fortuitously and inadvertently speaks the truth, saying that he himself destroys men.

74. If they are not yet persuaded by these refutations, they will at least believe in the following. For, continuing the narrative about Noah, he proceeds to connect that which was also said by Moses concerning the sons of God and the daughters of men, saying thus: "And our Lord chose sons for you, and took females from the angels. But you speak great words." Behold the impiety, behold the madness of the barbarian! For since it was said to Moses that ^C *the sons of God, seeing the daughters of men that they were fair, took them as wives for themselves,* and that from those whom they bore there were giants, he is evidently ignorant of which God Moses calls "God"—namely, Enos—and ignorant of who His sons are. Since he is ignorant of this, after so much toil of preceding arguments, in the present chapter his entire hope ^D manifestly collapses. For ...

when Moses calls them "sons of God," it was his ^A concern that no one should concede such a thing to him; and just as if he were possessed, he exchanges the characters/subjects and the forms, and instead of the "daughters of men" he fabricates female angels, according to the Greek myth:

*Iris then came as a messenger to white-armed Helen* (22)

—and in place of the "sons of God" he takes the "sons of men." And thus he bestows the nations of his own senselessness and blasphemy upon the wretches of the barbarians.

75. That which is most pitiful of all is that he proclaims this to have come from God. "For the Lord our God chose sons for you; and He took females from the angels. But you speak great words." He refers to those who speak about God, as if to say, "You claim that God has sons, and that He has made these the sons-in-law of men; whereas in fact He has rather given female angels as brides to the sons of men." Such things he says, as if for the correction of the Mosaic history. For this reason, in the preceding myth, he swears that female angels are not the daughters of God; nevertheless, he contends stubbornly that they are ^B female angels. But alas, me, the greatest sinner of all flesh! For I am compelled, since I wish to confute the enemy of God, to speak these and suchlike words. What, then, will the God-denying Saracens say further to these things? Will they contend after this to call Mohammed a "seer of God"? Or will they not rather spit upon him, as having been revealed as a charlatan, a magician, and a deceiver? Having babbled and blasphemed even more similar things, as though he had already made them clear and irrefutable demonstrations, he adds: "And say: Praise be to God who has not taken a son!" And with these words, he puts an end to his fable. ^C

CONFUTATION XVII.

76. The seventeenth little fable of Mohammed is inscribed, *To the Companions of the Cave*. It relates the flight, the death, and the resurrection of the seven holy youths of Ephesus at the cave. This unlearned and barbarian man records them for two reasons: one, that he might appear expert in many scriptures; the other, that he might claim for his own dogma the miracle that befell them. But because he knew clearly that they were Christians and had been preserved whole after death for many years, he feigned a laudable ignorance; and by framing an assumption regarding God that is safely shielded—namely, that He Himself knows what He does and how He does it—he thinks to avoid the investigation of many matters, which he could not have grasped even if he had wanted to. Nevertheless, he does not even let them be without blame. For he says: "You would think them awake, but they are asleep; and you turn them to the right and to the left, and their dog extending its arms in the dust. The Lord knows their affairs." ^D

^A

OF THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL

The following passages have the same aim. He says: "When we determine to destroy a town, we command its inhabitants to live luxuriously; and thus the sentence upon them was just: We destroyed them by extermination; and truly we have destroyed many generations after Noah." Do these words befit the God who loves mankind, or a demon who hates mankind? Does God command luxury, or the devil? Who could ask for a clearer demonstration to be convinced that the entire book of Mohammed was produced by Satan? If some should say, "How was Satan able to destroy many generations after Noah?" we answer that it was by no means through divine power and sovereignty; but he was indeed able to do so through deception and by inciting them to provoke God to anger, which is something he is still able to do today. And in this, he speaks the truth by chance, saying that he destroys men. ^C

If they are not convinced by these proofs, they will surely believe what follows. For, continuing the narration concerning Noah, he proceeds to connect that which was also said by Moses concerning the sons of God and the daughters of men, saying thus: "Our Lord has chosen sons for you, and has taken females from the angels. But you speak great words." Observe the impiety, observe the folly of this barbarian! For because it was said by Moses that, "The sons of God, seeing the daughters of men that they were beautiful, took them as wives for themselves," ^D and that giants were born of them, he does not know who Moses calls "God"—namely Enos—nor who his sons are. Being at a loss, after so much labor in the preceding discourse, his entire hope manifestly collapses in this present chapter. For

^A Mohamed presents his god as swearing an oath of this sort: "By those that scatter, and by the burdens of the burdens, and by things that occur to the memory; for your God is one Lord of the heavens and the earth and all things between them; and Lord of the easts." Then he proclaims as if from the person of many, saying thus: "We have adorned the heaven that is near with the ornament of the stars; and we have guarded it against every rebellious Satan. They do not hear the high hosts, and they are struck by arrows, driven off from every side." He says that paradise has four rivers: of pure water, and of milk the taste of which does not change, and of sweet wine, and of strained honey. Writing these things, he reaches up to the fiftieth fable. In the fiftieth fable, he makes God swear thus: "By the lickers licking, and those bearing burdens, and those running straight, and those dividing matters," swearing, that is, the truth, and that the judgment is about to arrive. In the fifty-first fable, he swears thus: "By the mountain, and the writing inscribed on thin parchment, and the house built, and the ceiling raised, and the sea," the vengeance of the Lord shall come.

79. Then also in the fifty-second fable, ^B which is inscribed *The Star*, he swears thus to the Arabs on behalf of Mohamed: "By the setting star; your companion has not been led astray, nor has he transgressed; he did not speak from his own will; there is nothing in him but revelation. He who is strong in power, who is easily seen, showed it to him; and he sat. He is in the higher firmament; and he approached, and was suspended, and there was an interval of two bows or closer; and he revealed to his servant what he revealed; he did not lie about what he saw within; for he indeed saw it. He delivered another descent near the *sideritin* (lote-tree)." And a little later he defines it clearly, saying: "How can the angels who are in heaven profit if their intercession is of no avail?" In the fifty-third fable, ^C wishing to speak about the phases of the moon, and not knowing that it is darkened by the shadow of the earth, he says: "The hour has approached and the moon has been split. And if they see a sign, they turn away and say: It is a trick that is being shown, and they have acted mendaciously." And so, babbling, he proceeds up to the sixtieth fable. In the sixtieth fable, covering himself as if with the darkness of ignorance or lack of perception, he gives himself headlong into the abyss of unheard-of falsehood, and thus he ^D falls.

^A And when he says (45): “O children of Israel, I am the messenger of God to you, confirming what was before me in the Law, and bearing tidings of a messenger coming after me, whose name is Muḥammad,” and together he brought to them the revelation. This is sorcery! And how can it be that one who speaks blasphemies against God, and is a sinner, can refrain from speaking upon such great matters? For if it had been true that such great things had been pronounced by Christ, they ought necessarily to be expounded. Wherefore no one assigns this utterance to any person by name, neither place, nor time, nor any compelling reason, nor why at that time it was necessary to happen, because these and similar things are far removed from those by whom truly they are said. Otherwise, even if he had simply pronounced “When Jesus said,” he would not have made any saying of Christ odious to Christians, but he spoke as one who mocks foolish boys, as if they were still ignorant children.

80. In the sixty-seventh fable he swears thus: “By the pen, and by those things which are written, you are not, by the grace of God, a demoniac; and to you there is a reward without end; and he is in a magnificent creation.” In the sixty-eighth fable, which he inscribes *Acca*, he begins: “Acca; what is Acca? And from where do you know what Acca is?” And he denies the false hour of Thamud and Ad. He babbles this, deceiving the barbarians as if he knew some unknown things; and he proceeds all the way to the seventy-fourth [fable] boasting. In the seventy-fourth, which he inscribes *The Resurrection*, he swears: “I do not swear by the day of the resurrection, nor by the soul that shapes itself.” In the seventy-sixth fable, which he inscribes *The Mission*, it begins: “By the missions ordained, and by the storm of storms, and by those spreading out the spreading, and by those separating the separation, and by the one casting forth the memorial, the apologetic and the protestation; what was promised shall come to pass.” The seventy-eighth fable he begins with an oath: “By those dragging away the rope, and by those swimming the swimming, and by those casting forth the projection, and by those moderating the business.” The eighty-fourth fable this author begins: “By the towered heaven, and by the day promised, by the witness and the witnesses, abolished are the sodalities of Alachut, which had fire for burning.” The eighty-fifth fable, this author begins: “By the heaven and the altar-like [star]. And how do you know what the altar-like [star] is? The star piercing through. For over every soul that exists, a guardian presides.” ^D And the eighty-eighth fable begins with an oath: “By those who are pulled out, by the twisting, and by the swimmers, and by the ones leading, and by the one setting in motion the shaking, and by the day when the earthquake shall shake.” It begins the eighty-ninth fable: “By the heaven, and the day of the union, and by the witness and the one witnessed, the companions of the [ala-]

-]hum ^A (55), the fire having the burning.” The eighty-fifth fable (56) begins from an oath as follows: “By the heaven and the altaricum (57); and how will you know what the altaricum is? The star piercing, which presides over every soul that exists.” The eighty-eighth fable (58) begins from an oath as follows: “By the morning light, and the ten nights, and the even and the odd, and the night when it passes away: is there in these an oath for a man of intellect (59)?”

81. The eighty-ninth fable begins with such an oath: “I do not swear by this region, and you are a resident in this region; and by the begetter, and what he begat, for we have fashioned man in strength (61).” The ninetieth fable begins from such oaths (62): “By the sun and its rays, and by the moon when it follows them; and by the day when it shines upon them; and by the night when it covers them; and by the heaven and what built it; and by the earth and what spread it out ^B and the soul and what fashioned it.” Now he swears by the whole earth. The ninety-first fable begins with an oath: “By the night when it is present; by the day when it becomes clearer; by Him who fashioned the male and the female; certainly your life is manifold.” The ninety-second fable begins with an oath: “By the morning time, and the night when it is dark, your Lord has not forsaken you nor abhorred you (64).” The ninety-third fable concludes thus: “And when you have leisure, give effort that you may pray to God (65).” The ninety-fourth fable begins: “By the figs and the olives; by Sinai and the secure region. For we have fashioned man in a noble stature, and soon we depressed him to the lowest (66).” How great is the oath of the author of the humans ^C, greater than which he swear concerning? “And we depressed him, he says, to the lowest.” Rightly indeed, it was fitting for Mohammed that this should be God. The ninety-sixth fable begins thus: “We brought him down in the prescribed night. And from where do you know what the prescribed night is ^D? It is better than a thousand months. The angels descend, and the spirit in it by the permission of their Lord for every affair; it is peace, until the morning light rises (67).” The ninety-seventh fable is entitled, *To those who denounce*; and it seems to persuade the readers that his scripture is true, since he brings forth purified books, which contain rectitudes. However, let the listeners judge concerning their uprightness. The ninety-eighth fable is inscribed, *Earthquake*, as he cries aloud against those, just as also against Mohammed who blasphemes, that they be judged. The ninety-ninth fable is inscribed, *Those who run*, and it begins with an oath as follows:

"By the snorting steeds, and those that strike fire, and those that make incursions at dawn, and stir up dust, and cleave through the midst of a host (75); for man is ungrateful to his Lord (74)."

82. The hundredth fable is inscribed, *The Calamity*. And it begins thus: "The Calamity (76), and what do you know what the Calamity is? The day when men shall be like scattered moths." The hundred and second fable is inscribed, *The Striking*, and it begins thus: "By the striking (77), and what do you know what the striking is? The day when men shall be like scattered moths." The hundred and fourth fable is inscribed, *The Elephant*, and it begins thus: "By the elephant (79), for man is wretched." The hundred and seventh fable is inscribed, *The Beetle* (81). It begins thus: "We have given you the beetle, and pray to the Lord, and if one hates you, he shall be cut asunder." Let us inquire further regarding the beetle. The hundred and sixteenth fable is inscribed, *The Bulaak* (82-83), for he who admits an unjust man will be burned in his wife's own furnace. The hundred and eleventh fable is as follows: "Say: He is God, the One, the Absolute (the *holosphyros*), who has neither begotten nor is begotten, and there is no one equal to Him." Even though the word *holosphyros* does not signify "dense and solid," which is the proper quality of a body. The hundred and twelfth fable is inscribed, *The Refuge*; and it is a deceptive exclamation, for it is as follows: "Say: I take refuge in the Lord of the dawn, from the evil of what He has created, from the evil of falling stars, from the evil of breathings in knots, from the evil of the envious one who envies." The hundred and thirteenth fable is a deceptive exclamation as well. It is inscribed, *Refuge*, and it is as follows: "I take refuge in the Lord of mankind, the King of mankind, the God of mankind, from the evil of the whisperings of demons who whisper in the hearts of men, from demons and men." And with these words, the whole of Mohammed’s mythology and fraud falls silent, putting an end to the blasphemous initial premise.

83. But if one looks at all these things by which Mohammed swears, it is easy to discern who this god of his is; nay, rather, it is evident through this intermediary that there are many such gods, and without any further proof it is manifest.

^A And he is convicted of being a worshiper of creatures and superstitious, as well as one who has acted insanely against the divine Scripture, sinned against the majesty of God, and blasphemed against His holy angels. Add to this his profound ignorance. Therefore, the foolish Saracens boast in vain of this impostor, as if he had taught them a true knowledge of God. For he merely wore the name of the one God as a cloak, while secretly introducing idolatry and paganism to them. And this is evident, as I have said, from such oaths of his. For how could the true God swear by a swift dog, by the night shadows, and by things even worse than these? But because it would have been burdensome and unacceptable to them if Muhammad had led them directly to the worship of the creature and demons, he initially transmits the knowledge of one God, in order that he might thus avoid the suspicion of polytheism. ^B Likewise, he does not brazenly proclaim that they should keep creatures as gods, but he keeps silent the name of God; nevertheless, he gives to the creatures the honor which is appropriate for God, which is rendered through swearing. From which it necessarily follows that those who worship the god of Muhammad, through this intermediary, worship both creatures and demons. Moses, indeed, introduces the God of Abraham swearing, but by no other thing except by Himself: "By Myself I have sworn," He says (Gen. xxii, 16). Wherefore, he who worships the God of Abraham does not worship ^C another god through this intermediary, but that very One Himself. The Muhammadans, however, while they worship God, through that same intermediary adore nights, and dogs, and fig trees, and olives, and all the aforementioned myths. Therefore, having recognized the error and understood the deceit, let them depart, if they truly wish, from the erroneous guidance of this fool; and, adhering to the divine Scripture alone, let them learn from it the perfect and only true knowledge of God; when compared with which divine Scripture, the empty fables of this man are found to be the ruin of the devil, just as if dung were compared with refined gold.

CONTRADICTION XIX. Against Muhammad, who understands the word VERBUM in a simple sense, regarding the enhypostatic Word and Son of God.

^D 84. Of whom the substances, that is, the natures, are different, they themselves are altogether substantially diverse; and those things which differ among themselves in this way have also substantial properties of their natures that are diverse and, indeed, dissimilar. Therefore, those whose substances, that is, whose natures, differ, their substantial properties of their natures are also diverse and dissimilar. If, therefore, God, and angel, and man have different substances, they themselves will also be diverse among themselves. And if these differ among themselves, their substantial properties of their natures will also be, among them, diverse and altogether dissimilar. Therefore, different is the rational [faculty] of God, of angels, and of men.

^C Not only as Creator toward creature, and immaterial toward material, but insofar as in the one there is a word only internal; in another, also enuntiative; and in the third, finally, more than internal and enuntiative. And although for them the word is not substantive—for it does not proceed outside of that in which it is, since it is naturally disposed so that the word in creatures does not depart from its subject, but subsides in it—the substance of God, however, is the Word and [is] inherent, although indivisible and inseparable from Him from whom it proceeds, and in whom it is; because it is also uncreated and ingenerate. ^D Badly, therefore, the unlearned Mohammed, whose substance is diverse, thought that there was one and the same property of natures: and he affirmed that the Word of God, which subsists per se and has existence, is similar to the word of men, which slips away and is dissipated.

XX. Against the same man, saying that God is equally the cause of evils as well as of goods.

85. Of those things that act involuntarily, some act per se, others by accident. As fire, per se, indeed heats, but by accident, because of a contrary circumstance, it cools; also, per se it illuminates, but through the privation of some body it creates darkness. ^A Likewise also in regard to all other things, if one follows the analogy of the operation, one will find it to be so. Of those things, however, that act voluntarily, save for failure, everything acts per se. If, therefore, God, acting, is not subject to failure, then He acts everything per se; and acting per se, He acts both good and evil effectively. Therefore, according to Mohammed, He acts contraries. Thus, from the same cause, both good and evil proceed. But those things that proceed from one cause per se cannot be contrary to each other, lest the cause from which contraries proceed be shown to be simultaneously evil and good. ^B If, however, this is blasphemous and incurable, then evils are not from God; and by evils I mean sins, which are also the cause of punishments. Badly, therefore, the impious Mohammed says that God is the cause of sin.

XXI. Against the same man, wickedly saying that men will lead a conjugal life in paradise.

86. Every sensory nature, acting materially, has as its goal of acting, according to the striving of material things, its own sensory organs; and its end is birth. But since for every change or motion, rest is appropriate, ^C change or motion is contrary; and to generation, therefore, corruption is contrary. Because both ascent and rising again are promised in the divine Scripture—not as man now comes into corruption through birth, so also shall he return again from corruption to the first birth; since corruption knows neither unions nor intercourse nor birth. For were these granted to it, corruption would be divided into male and female; but this is impossible. Not, therefore, as birth brings man forward, so also does corruption multiply him through birth.

Otherwise, generation and corruption would be the same thing, which is impossible. If, therefore, man is not brought forth by generation in the resurrection, he will not afterwards perform those functions which are proper to generation; for he does not look forward again to corruption. If, therefore, he does not perform what is proper to generation, why is there a commingling of male and female through sexual union? For the end not being proposed, the performance of the act ceases. But if there is no longer to be any use for the sexual union of male and female after the resurrection, what is the camel-driver Mohammed saying and doing, while he maintains that men, divided into males and females, live in a marital state in paradise? But if someone objects with the formation of Adam from the dust, and his subsequent generation, let him know that then there was a transition from non-existence to existence, and [this occurred] so that the human race might be preserved ^B after the fall. Now, however, there is no necessity for the earlier state, because the present state surpasses the former: inasmuch as the resurrection destroys corruption, and the passions that are the cause of corruption; which is indeed a reformation, but not a generation, nor a passion of generation, which precede corruption, and which corruption itself necessarily follows.

XXII. Against the same man, who foolishly and impiously claims that angels are female, and that men in the time of Noah cohabited with them.

^C 87. Whatever things consist of heterogeneous elements by way of generation in relation to one another, either there is something entirely different from those from which they have emerged, and it partakes of them in part, and is distant [from them] in another respect; and it is either better than those which produced it, or worse. If, therefore, any offspring were produced from the union—as Mohammed fabricates—of men and angels, there must necessarily have been something apart from both; and let the offspring born of them be part angel and part man, that is to say, part mortal and part immortal, part flesh-bearing and part incorporeal, just as a mule partakes of the ability to neigh and the ability to bray; but here there is no medium between mortal and immortal, nor between the material and the immaterial. For the giants were also dying, and they were material men. Therefore, it was not by the generation of men ^D cohabiting with angels, but something else was being born, or those things which are being born, in one respect partaking of their progenitors, and in another differing. Let it, therefore, differ according to the mortality of man, or partake of the material; let it differ again from the angel according to the immortality, and partake of the incorporeal; and let it be mortal and immortal, and material and incorporeal; but this is impossible. For humans were solely material and solely mortal; the giants were of that kind. Therefore, it was not that men were cohabiting with angels, with the offspring partaking of these in one way and differing in another; but it has been shown that there is nothing other than these. Therefore, it is impossible for anything to be born from the unions of men and angels; nor can anything be born from heterogeneous elements outside what has been mentioned; indeed, the thing has no such nature. For even if it were granted—which is impossible—that a man could have intercourse with an angel, in what womb would it contain and bring to life the incorporeal body? And what likeness

of consistent and appropriate material would increase the mass of the conception? How would it carry it in the womb? How would it provide milk? How would an exsanguine and immaterial nature supply the nutritive humors which a living creature is accustomed to absorb? Therefore, an angel will not conceive from a man. Nor is it possible for a man to approach the coupling of an angel, for the body of men is tangible, whereas an angel is intangible. But a human does not communicate with that which does not fall under the senses. Now, if an angel cannot be drawn into such a communion, it would not be subject to the coupling of a man. Therefore, Mohamed wickedly and impiously invents that there are female angels, and blasphemously asserts that men have intercourse with them. ^B

XXIII. Against the same man, who says that the intercession of the holy angels who are in heaven is of no avail.

88. Unless Mohamed had confessed the intercession of the angels, it would be a question whether he thought it could exist. But since he concedes this, but asserts that it is useless, it remains to be asked what the cause of this failure might be. If indeed it exists, is it perhaps that God is inexorable to every petition, or do the angels ask inappropriately? Since the first is not even accepted by him—as is evident from his exhortation to pray—it remains for the angels to think that they are not heard because they ask badly. But to ask badly is the same as wishing badly. Consequently, the angels are, by the same token, those who wish for evil. But someone is a wisher of evil either through ignorance or through wickedness. But how could any sensible person think that those who stand near His wisdom are in ignorance of the Good? Or how could those who are eternally filled with the Good be wicked? If these things are impossible, then Mohamed lies, or rather blasphemes, by declaring the intercessions of the holy angels to be useless. ^C

XXIV. Against the same man, who says that God is solid (holosphyros); and that He neither begot nor was begotten.

89. He who produced all things from nothing must be infinitely better than the things produced, in all respects: in substance, in power, in will, in eternity, and in energy. For if he is not, then He does not bring them forth from nothing. And if He does not bring them forth, then all things attain the same glory of the Uncreated and Beginningless One. Consequently, they would be equal in power and would have extended themselves along with the Beginningless One. But if they are equal in power, the Beginningless One would be the same as all things. ^D But we do not see all things being all things, but rather all things being led as one. And yet, among all things, some appear better and others worse, but none of them is unchangeable and immovable. So if all things change, and are not led as all things, but as one, then all things are not equal in power to the Beginningless One. And if they are not equal in power, they are not co-eternal. And if they are not co-eternal, it is evident that, since they exist, they were brought forth by the Beginningless One. And if He Himself brings forth all things, then He is surely better.

^A in substance, powers, perpetuity, will, and efficacy. Since there are three kinds of created substances—the corporeal, the incorporeal, and that which is mixed from both; and since the evidence for a body is the triple extension, density, and rarity; and for the incorporeal, that it is neither everywhere nor above all things (for though it be incorporeal, it is nevertheless circumscribed), what shall we determine regarding the substance of the Creator? Indeed, if those things are substances and are so called, as has been demonstrated, what will He be, or what shall the Creator Himself be called? For we shall find no definition for Him. But so that He may be exalted above them, we call Him supersubstantial. If, therefore, the Creator is supersubstantial, rarity and density and triple dimension will be far from Him, and Mohamed’s ^B solid thing—by which he fearfully called Him, lest there be a void due to the production of the Son and Word—perishes. Similar things must be said about the attributes of power, movement, and efficacy; for He must be believed to be superior to every power, movement, and efficacy. If these things are so, let not Mohamed be afraid when he hears that the Word, who is natural and co-eternal with the Father, is the maker and restorer of all creation, and the Son who went forth from the mind of the One who generates. For He went forth without separation, and remains in Himself, not according to relationship, not according to conjunction, nor according to memory, but in a way more sublime than all these: for He is supersubstantial, because He is from the Supersubstantial and supersubstantially.

90. Let him not, therefore, say any longer: If He was not begotten, He did not beget either. For behold, we perceive that just as He is not begotten, so He is not created; for he who is without beginning necessarily possesses these two. Yet we clearly perceive that, even though He was not created, He nevertheless created. If, therefore, Mohamed concedes that one thing was accomplished by Him, and holds this dogma (of creation), why does he despoil God of the other attribute? And indeed, He does not have as much glory from creation as He does from the Son; for the substance of the Son excels the substances of creatures by much. Wherefore, if he were to think correctly, it ought rather to have been said of Him: Since God is not begotten, therefore He has begotten the more; just as, because He is not created, He has created. But that Christ, the Son and Word, is consubstantial with God the Father, his own coming has demonstrated. For His coming after many prophecies is also an indubious proof of this, namely, the conversion ^D of men to a better fruit, not only of the barbarians, but also of the Greeks, and of those who lived under the old law. And indeed, the grace of Christ, compared with the law, is as the stature of a mature man to the age of a child; but compared with the other gentiles, it is as the nature of a man to the nature of an irrational animal. For it was necessary for Him, by nature and by the power of simple speech, to teach and to do things more exalted, as in reality [...]

^A Refutation of Mohammed. Thus, circumcision pertains to the relation of servitude, but is not the relation itself. Yet idolatry not only possesses nothing of the divine relation in itself, nor of the things pertaining to it, but even takes a stand against that very relation, splitting it apart. From this it is made manifest who is near to God, Abraham or Mohammed: which law introduces the God of Abraham? Is it the one that says, "You shall not worship another god, but only the Lord your God," or the one that bids worship to Chubar, a likeness ^B of Venus? Do not, I pray, let them boast in the name of the God of Abraham, while they think things contrary to the God of Abraham, and be thus deceived, as if they had the God of Abraham as their own and gracious to them; for they parade the name alone, without the reality, falsely applying it to something utterly dissimilar. For they err by taking a recognizable sign from the surroundings, but are convicted by the reality itself of suffering alienation. Unless, perhaps, we appear to ourselves to be constrained to have one God, while they confess two most contrary gods, a true one and a false one; or, to speak that which is more true, they have neither.

XXVIII. Demonstration that Mohammed does not introduce the truly real God, nor do the Hagarenes worship Him, but an apostate demon that has usurped the divine title for itself.

XXIX. That the Divine is sovereignly exalted above all existing things, its immutability and unchangeability clearly characterize it, both in its very being, and in its deliberation, and in its speech, and in its action; as it is written: "They shall all be changed, but You are the same" [Ps. c, 28]. And: "The counsel of the Lord remains forever" [Ps. xxxii, 11]. And: "Forever, O Lord, Your word remains" [Ps. cxviii, 89]. And: "All Your works are true" [Ps. cxL, 5]; it being understood that these things are to be thought of in a more divine, rather than a more human sense. It must be considered now whether the camel-driver, the legate of the wicked one, who has concocted a third and newer testament, allows these things to be maintained in God.

XXX. Therefore, since God is confessed to be utterly immaterial and incorporeal, while being viewed by analogy from His own works, and recognized from divine words—whenever the utterances are in harmony with the works—and celebrated for His divine-fitting wills—whenever they are manifested from Him, since they also adhere to the purpose consistent with the words and works—should any one of these be found to exist in opposition to the rest, he who adheres to such error would be convicted of having fallen away from the religion toward the Divine. Now let us observe this in the case of the Arab: concerning the matters of Pharaoh and the Red Sea, I know not how—but as I am able to perceive—even he accepted that saying: "The sinners shall fall into their own net" [Ps. cxL, 10]. Yet the Law of Him who divided the sea he rejects; clearly, after his words, he also repudiates His wills, and it is manifest that he introduces a God of his own appointment, and not the true God. For He who divided that sea, for no other reason...

than as the first consequence of the context; for the sequence would have preserved the bond of the covenant, had not another beginning been separated from it. But what, finally, do you say concerning Ishmael? "As for Ishmael," He says, "behold I have blessed him, and I will increase him very greatly." But you have bestowed this same sort of blessing upon the birds of the heaven and the fish of the sea; and this is not a blessing worthy enough for men. "He will beget twelve ^A nations." But what is this, if he is to be alien to the divine benevolence? Nay, he would not even have had the increase of a multitude, had not Abraham prayed for him. "For behold," says God, "I have heard you." Otherwise, Ishmael was far inferior to Ham. And to what purpose is a multitude, if indeed he should turn out to be unprofitable? For rightly would you hear from Isaiah: "You have been born to me for loathing." 31 O the foreknowledge of God! Abraham, praying to God for Ishmael, obtains nothing else than the increase of a people: but that he is alien and a stranger to the covenant of God, this is established by the very mouth of God, as if Isaac alone were worthy to possess it, on account of the blessed Christ and God who was to spring from him. And this, too, is a thing to wonder at, that regarding all other nations it has been said by prophecy that the ends of the earth shall remember and turn to the Lord. 32 But that the Ishmaelites would not be partakers of the covenant, God Himself judged, precisely because they worship the demon who is His adversary.

^B 93. If, therefore, God Himself excluded them from His own covenant, and this is manifest from the fact that even until now they do not accept being instructed by the angelic proclamation of the divine Scripture; from whence did that camel-driving impostor bring the third covenant, shamelessly lying against God that he received nonsense and fables and debaucheries and drolleries, full of all ignorance and stupidity, from heaven? If he says that Mary, the sister of Moses, gave birth to Christ (96), does there not remain an excess of folly and a pinnacle of ignorance, which this fool ^C brings upon himself? For how much do you suppose he is mocked on this account by the Jews, by the Samaritans, and simply by all those who study the Old and the New Covenant? From whence then, he says, did he dare to call his book a heavenly one? From being inspired by him who said: "I will set my throne above the clouds of heaven, and I will be like the Most High," 33 he who exists and is called the father of lies. For who, upon encountering the divine Scripture at all, would not be astonished at the magnitude of the lie, which says that Christ was born of Mary the sister of Moses? O [the folly of] the long age of the Virgin! For almost two thousand years ^D of time had passed until the birth of Christ, from the time when Mary played the cymbals 34

^A Was it [miraculously] brought about? And David, the son of Jesse, is shown to be descended from Him—is this Divine Scripture? Is this a heavenly book? O, the folly of it! O, the ignorance of the wretched barbarians!

94. Since this cursed book of theirs is completely alien and foreign to the mind of Divine Scripture; and since God Himself has judged them unworthy of His covenant—we can sufficiently recognize that the author of this camel-haired book is the demon who fell from heaven. Indeed, whatever is alienated from God migrates to the opposite, demonic side. For if it is a manifest indication that Isaac belongs to God—to the true God, I say—that He established a covenant with him ("For I shall establish," He says, "my covenant with him, to be his God and to be the God of his seed after him"), inversely, the indication that they are not the peculiar people of God—even if He is their God by way of creation—is the fact that God refused to establish His covenant with the Ishmaelites. Therefore, the devil is their god, he who pretends to be God; even though, fearing that he might fail in such a goal, he craftily keeps silent about his own name, which is infamous among all men, and instead bears the title of the true God. This is indeed the accustomed artifice ^B of this wicked one. If, therefore, these barbarians desire to have the God of Abraham as their own god, let them abjure that impious and fraudulent book and its wicked author, that foolish man, and let them assent solely to Divine Scripture and be guided by it. But if they wish to place their book above this one, and to worship the adversary of the God of Abraham, let them be covered with shame, because they boast only in name of the God of Abraham, and they are proven to be vainly bringing forward irreconcilable things and Scriptures. For he who asserts that Pharaoh and Augustus reigned at the same period differs in no way from a madman. For this is the necessary consequence if the sister of Moses gave birth to Christ: that Christ, born two thousand years before, appeared before Pilate with such old age, and that Mary lived just as many or even more years.

XXVI. That there is no benefit for the Agarenes in circumcising themselves, and therefore thinking that they have the God of Abraham as their own God, in order to show from this that the God of Abraham is truly their God. ^D Some of the master's commands result in profit for the subjects if they are kept; others benefit the master; others benefit both. Similarly, acts of disobedience bring harm, some to the subjects, some to the masters, and some to both. Now, it is plain to all that if anyone violates some commandment of his master and appoints himself as his own master, he still retains the hope of moving his [true] master back to his former benevolence. However, if he has altogether assigned to himself another master, he provokes an intolerable wrath from his [original] master against himself, even if he happens to have diligently performed all of his mandates. Nor does that servant demonstrate so much that he is the servant of his master by executing his will, as he declares himself to be alien from him by appointing another master for himself. [KϚ']

For what proof ^A does the servant of a physician bring forward, that the physician is now his master, when he knows and performs the arts of his master well, as his master himself wills, but describes himself as the slave of another master? For the remaining commandments of God are nothing other than a healing and benefit for men; but faith in God redounds to His glory, as we affirm that God truly is, and that the relationship with the Lord is kept sound. Just as, therefore, the neglect of the remaining commandments becomes our own destruction, the subversion of His lordship insults the Lord Himself. When, then, will He be more severely angry with us? Surely when He is denied by us, as everyone knows.

Let us then examine this reasoning in the case of Abraham and Mohammed regarding God. God said to Abraham: "You shall circumcise the foreskin of your flesh"; Mohammed does this also. God said to Abraham: "You shall not worship any other god, except your Lord God"; Mohammed cannot bear to do this. For he worships the idol Chubar, which is very ancient in the Ethribian desert, and Macach, which they say was fashioned in the likeness of Venus. Mohammed cannot therefore have as his own God the God of Abraham, even if he bears the symbol of His commandment, circumcision, since he has transferred himself to another god. For He had ordered: "You shall worship no god except your Lord God." For simple circumcision is only the removal of the flesh of the one being circumcised, but it is not a demonstration of the relationship between servitude and lordship; just as the fact that a servant who has run away from a physician ^B makes use of the art of medicine, after having retreated to another master, is not a proof that he is the servant of the physician. Empty, therefore, is the claim of the Hagarenes that their god is the God of Abraham; for they are shown to be lying. For even if He was once their god, nonetheless now, with Chubar and Mohammed, He is not their god.

XXVII. On the same argument.

96. Everything that truly exists is known at once by its name and its reality; but if it be divided into two—into name only and reality only—it deceives. I call "name only" that which is truly devoid of its proper reality; and "reality only" that which is devoid of its own true name, but is not, for all that, nameless. From both, indeed, a true knowledge is constituted, but from one or the other, error. And this is what causes men to agree or disagree among themselves about anything. The deception of a "name only" is twofold: when it signifies nothing at all, and when, being removed from its proper reality, it is assigned to one that is alien. That which signifies several true things is called the proper name ^D of each, and at the same time is said to be. A thing, however, is true—and is said to be true—which preserves the account of its substance without defect and without redundancy. A true name, finally, is that which the account of the thing intends to signify. For neither does a thing, insofar as it is a thing, deceive; nor does a name, insofar as it is the name of a proper reality, lead into

^A error.

97. It is easy to refute this barbarian people, who rashly deceive themselves with the name of the God of Abraham; for He is not truly worshipped by them, even if they bear and acknowledge some particular marks of His, namely, circumcision and the boast that they are the people of the God of Abraham. For just as it is not enough to set forth the knowledge of a man to say he is "bipedal and mortal"—even though a man is truly bipedal and mortal—but these do not immediately define man, because they do not state the principal and proper mark of human nature; so, when these people say they have the God of Abraham as their God, and circumcise their flesh, they by no means demonstrate that very One who is properly and truly God, because they omit the symbols that denote Him preeminently. For when the leader of their nation commands things contrary to the law of the God of Abraham, does he not introduce another God under His name? And observe by what reasoning we say this deception occurs. The God of Abraham said to his sons: "You shall not adore any icon of idols, nor shall you render them worship," that is to say, as God. The God of the Agarenes said, as they claim, through their messenger: "Adore Chubar, as if he were God," though he is an idol and an image of Venus. Let us see, therefore, what is common between Abraham and Muhammad, and in what they differ. Let us also see in what things God is better characterized—being ^B known as God by men—and in what things He seems to be, but is not; and in what things He is provoked to anger all the more.

98. In those commandments by which they are merely adorned, the manifestation of the Divine is lesser and dim; there are times when it is not even lesser, when He Himself is fought against. But in those matters wherein His glory is established, it is true and exceedingly greater; just as it is the other way around. Abraham received circumcision after he had already acknowledged God and rejected the idols of his father. When, therefore, did he please God more? By the negation of idols, or by the circumcision of the flesh? It is manifest that it was by the negation of the cult of idols; for it was not as anything else that he received the sign of the circumcision of the foreskin except as a sign of faith. The trickster messenger of the Agarenes also introduces circumcision, but he also introduces idolatry. Did he, therefore, also please God like Abraham? Or did he rather provoke His anger? Or, as it seems, did he perform both? But if he performed both, did he please God by circumcising, or did he provoke Him much more by worshipping idols? It is manifest that he provoked Him all the more; for those whose observance is of greater importance, for those same, an equal violation is worse. For the nature of things is known either from the things themselves or from their ^C circumstances. And the knowledge from circumstances is weaker, but that which emerges from the things themselves is safer and more sincere. One demonstrates the nature of servitude and lordship by the thing itself, when the relation is kept immutable; but not by the thing itself, when one shows something pertaining to the matter, but not the ...

relation; it possesses it not. ^A Thus, circumcision is about the relation of servitude, but is not the relation itself. But idolatry not only has no divine relation in itself, but it opposes it and separates itself therefrom. Hence it is clear who is near to God, Abraham or Mohammed: which law exhibits the God of Abraham; is it that which says, "Thou shalt not adore another god, but the Lord thy God"? or is it this one [of Mohammed] which bids one to adore Chubar, the image of Venus? Let them not, I pray, glory in the name of the God of Abraham, while they believe things contrary to the God of Abraham, and are thus deceived, as if they had the God of Abraham as their own proper and benevolent God. For they boast of the name alone, without the reality, and falsely worship it by assigning it to a different and unalike being. Certainly, they err by taking the indicative mark from the circumstances; ^B but by the thing itself they are convicted of being strangers to true worship. Unless perhaps we seem to be forced to have one God, while they confess two entirely contrary gods, a true and a false one; or, what is more consonant with the truth, they possess neither.

XXVIII. Demonstration that Mohammed does not introduce the truly real God, nor do the Agarenes worship Him, but an apostate demon who has usurped the divine appellation for himself.

XXIX. That the Divine is surpassingly removed from all beings, if indeed anything else characterizes it, is clearly defined by its being immutable and unchangeable, both in regard to its being, and to its thinking, and to its speech, and to its acting; as it is written: "All shall be changed, but Thou art the same." Likewise: "The counsel of the Lord abides forever." Likewise: "Forever, O Lord, Thy word abides." Likewise: "All Thy works are true." ^C It is clear that these are to be understood in a more divine rather than a more human sense. It must be considered now whether the camel-driver, the legate of the Devil, who cobbled together a third and neoteric testament, concedes that these things are maintained in the Divine.

C. Since the Divine is admitted to be entirely immaterial and incorporeal, yet contemplated through analogy in His works, and recognized through the divine words, when the words conform to the works, and celebrated also by His magnificent volitions, when these are manifested by Him—which likewise follow their own purpose through word and work—if anything contrary to the others is found among these, he who clings to this error will be seen to have fallen completely from the true religion of God. ^D Let us observe this now in the Arab, regarding the Pharaoh and the Red Sea; I know not why—unless, as I think, that saying, "Sinners shall fall into their own net," he himself has experienced. But he rejects the law of Him who divided the sea; certainly, by rejecting the volitions after the words, he openly constitutes another God for himself by his own choice, but certainly not the true God. For He who divided that sea, for no other reason

but that his sermons should be observed. Therefore, he who abolishes his sermons abolishes the author himself; he who abolishes the author denies at the same time the miracle performed by him. Yet ^A since Muhammad confesses that miracle, he must surely say it was performed by another god, not by Him who is the author of the sermons in which this very miracle is narrated. Wherefore Muhammad's impiety is double, or rather triple; for he strips the miracle from God the author, and because he attributes it to one by whom it was not performed. Who, moreover, is the one who from the beginning has exalted himself against the divine glory, we know well. It is necessary, therefore, that this one be worshipped by Muhammad, since he thinks in such a way. Or, according to Muhammad’s opinion, God has surely been changed and has turned; and His word no longer remains for eternity, nor are all His works true. But may this absurd blasphemy be cast back upon the heads of the guilty. But if God remains unconvertible and immutable, rather let Muhammad be perverted, who impiously blasphemes God as changed and turned, and destroys His sermons. We, however, partake of the grace of divine steadfastness, we who accept His miracle, and observe and carry out His laws, and from them we learn and understand lessons worthy of God and prophecies both concerning Christ and all things present and future.

101. From these things, therefore, it is concluded that Muhammad must be convicted of saying either that God does not exist, or at any rate that there is a different god; or if He does exist, that He does not remain in His own state, but, as happens to those things that come into being and subsequently suffer corruption, He departs from His own habit of life, changed by time: how great the impiety of this opinion is, is easily discerned. Whoever loves the truth above all should use this rule: even if Muhammad admits some other thing from either the Old or the New Testament—for he himself dares, even if unwillingly, to confess the virgin birth—let him convict him from his own confession. For the barbarian is very unlearned and uneducated. ^B

XXIX. That those are mistaken who say that the nation of the Hagarenes retains the worship of God the Father.

102. Since our Lord Jesus Christ is called and is the Truth, it is necessary for those who have believed in Him not to concede that the God of Abraham, and the God of Moses, and the God of Aaron is worshipped by the Hagarene nation. For the Lord says: He who does not honor the Son, does not honor the Father; clearly as all those holy patriarchs and prophets remembered and worshipped the Son of God, foreknown. For Christ says: Abraham, your father, rejoiced that he might see my day, and he saw it and was glad. Moses wrote about him; and the subsequent prophets, partly by work and partly by words, mystically revealed him. How then does this impious nation, which toward [destructive]

destruction of the Son aspires, worship His Father? Or how would the Father Himself accept that the One who is truly His Son and Word and God should, by their blasphemous mouths, be seen to be consigned to non-existence? No father is a friend to the enemies of his only-begotten; for if they truly worshipped the Father, the Father Himself would have revealed the Son to them. For the Lord says: "No one knows the Son except the Father, and anyone to whom He chooses to reveal Him"; which we see having happened in the case of the ancient saints, who left behind their knowledge and faith concerning the Son written in scrolls as if on pillars. Otherwise, how could they have come to know the Father, if the Son did not reveal Him to them? "No one knows the Father except the Son"; so that all the distinguished and righteous men of the Old Testament, worshipping God and Father, remembered and were initiated into the knowledge of the Son of God.

^B ργ'. And the Son has given this clear sign, both for them and for those after them who worship the Father, that one must honor the Son; for we see this truly established both in the Law and in grace. It is evident, therefore, that the Agarenes do not worship the God of Abraham and Moses, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, since they deny the knowledge of the Only-Begotten; but rather, they worship the father of lies—as this follows by necessity, because they do not worship the Father of Truth. For he who departs from the one falls into the other; and the word of the Lord is untruth-proof, that "he who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father." It is necessary, therefore, for those who believe in Christ to be forbidden from saying that the Agarenes worship the true God. If they say this, they will be forced to say that Abraham and Moses did not worship the true God, and that the Lord is lying—which is impossible for the Truth-itself to do; and that the Scripture of the ancients ^C does not signify in various ways the persons of the Father and the Son, such as: "From the womb, before the morning star, I have begotten you." And: "Your throne, O God, is forever and ever; a rod of justice is the rod of your kingdom. You have loved justice and hated iniquity; therefore God, your God, has anointed you forever," and the like. But if the faithful confess that the truth is not a lie, and that the followers of Abraham were God-fearing, they will necessarily pronounce the Agarenes to be impious and atheists, and not by any means God-fearing.

^D

XXX. Against the Agarenes who blaspheme the divinity of Christ, and who foolishly say, "He is not God," and on that account think that the region of the Christians has been given to them as a spoil.

ρδ'. Although it was to be expected that they would be rebuked from the very beginning, that is to be overlooked, because there is One who will rebuke them as they deserve; yet, having preemptively adopted common notions for the solution of such an impasse, we shall refute them from those things admitted by them, as they think wrongly in all things and in this. The divine, as we teach them, they confess to be good, benevolent

^A toward men, wise, just, and powerful, even if they worship another under his name. As he is therefore good, he wishes to benefit our souls, if possible, and our bodies, stirring the soul from sensible things to intellectual ones; and as he is wise and just and powerful, he always prefers the soul to the body. For of men, some are religious, others not. And of the religious, some are good, others wicked. Of these, some are curable, others not. Curable ones are cured partly through prosperity, partly through calamity. Again, some heal themselves, others are amended by others. And of the good, some are saved in tranquility, others through labors obtain grace. But of these, some suffer on their own account, others on account of others. Some suffer both on account of others and on account of themselves, either as being about to become more approved, or as still lying in defect. Of the wicked, some fare prosperously, others calamitously: perhaps for those who are not evil in mind, future punishment is subtracted, on account of present pain; or they are punished on both sides on account of their consummated malice. But the wicked live prosperously, with every delay taken away from them. Therefore, pain and joy, being opposites, yet happening to the same human race, ^B have caused error in many, as if those dear to God are always in good spirits, while those hated by God suffer. But it is not to be thought so; rather, it is to be known that the genus of joy is twofold: one is sensible and temporal, the other intellectual and eternal. And the account of pain is the same. Thus, the just also rejoice, as Abraham; the unjust also rejoice, as those who were under Pharaoh. Conversely, the just suffer, as Jacob fleeing from Esau and serving Laban; also the unjust suffer, as Amalek and the Egyptians. Behold therefore, in one and the same just man, there is pain and sadness; and in one and the same state of an unjust man, there are pain and sadness. Someone will perhaps say: Why these things, and whence the inequality in equals? For cold and heat are not seen together in fire. I concede, indeed; for neither is the just [person] equal at once and unequal: but in those capable ^C of justice and injustice, pain and joy are found.

105. Since therefore it has been said that pain is either temporal and tolerable, or eternal and intolerable; and likewise that joy is either temporal and briefly pleasing, or eternal and long-blessing; the Lord, the lover of our souls, whose benefits are hidden and perpetual, alternately according to his wisdom granting each of these — for temporal joy giving eternal pain, and for temporal pain giving eternal joy — he did not hesitate to lead Adam, who had been deceived by pleasure, from joy into joy, and to thrust Cain ^D from pain into pain. This is what creates perplexity for the barbarians, and on that account drives them to speak foolishly. But come, the fact that Christians are religious is by no means to be learned from the barbarians: for "the sons of men are liars; and every man is a liar," but from the innate truth which is Christ, and from the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father, and who spoke under the Law and the prophets; and finally from the grace itself which perfects us. That

the Agarenes are impious has already been demonstrated, is currently being demonstrated, and will surely be demonstrated. However, that among us there are both the useful and the useless, we ourselves see and confess. But since our affairs are steered by the wisdom and goodness of God (for it is not the case that, because of us, He ceases to be good and wise and just and powerful in word, as we have said, for all divine Scripture teaches this), how then will those ignorant barbarians, having with difficulty grasped a judgment in the matter of distinction, and that too in a most wretched way, be able to limit that divine wisdom so ignorantly, as if God knew nothing more than the Agarenes? If, therefore, Christians are religious—and among them some are useful and others not, yet it is the office of God to provide for the salvation of both—they do not therefore plunder us as if we were atheists, but as those corrected by God for our stubbornness, sustained when we have grown weak, checked when we have been arrogant, and chastised by His incomprehensible wisdom in various and manifold ways. Nor, again, are those people religious just because they enjoy temporal prosperity; for neither were the Egyptians religious, who nonetheless oppressed the good servants of the Lord with the yoke of slavery. And just because someone may truthfully say that migration from place to place is motion, it is not therefore to be believed that there is no other kind of motion; for by mentioning one, he has omitted all other kinds. Nor, because the just have sometimes prevailed over the impious, as Israel over the land of Canaan, will these Agarenes be believed in claiming that they have prevailed over us in the same way. For impious men have also existed who have prevailed over the pious most cruelly; the Psalmist is a witness: "O God, the nations have come into your inheritance, they have defiled your holy temple." It is not, therefore, because Christians hold a perverse view of God that the Agarenes devastate their territory and that it has been handed over to their looting; but rather, as the word of truth affirms, they are being corrected for their sins.

106. We, then, being weak but following the word that loves the truth and refutes falsehood, have inflicted certain blows against the most shameless face of the lying word of Muhammad. But those who possess greater strength and confidence in demonstrating the solidity of the truth, to them, without a doubt, a reason of invincible eloquence will counsel that they should rightly subject the blasphemies of Muhammad to appropriate scourges and tortures, and finally, bind him with indissoluble chains, shut him away in inaccessible prisons, and condemn him to silent muteness; so that the saying might be fulfilled: " The mouth of those who speak wicked things shall be stopped."

The end of the refutation against the impious Muhammad.

BY THE SAME NICETAS OF BYZANTIUM

^A 1. Truth is a thing difficult to capture, and one that can escape even those who are extremely sharp-sighted; unless, perhaps, the soul, by dispersing the density of this bodily darkness, and persuading the senses to close or rest, manages to reach some trace of the truth itself. Certainly, as long as the intellectual eye is still occupied by the smoke of material things, experiencing a sort of stinging passion from them, it will perhaps not recognize the truth lying even before its feet, let alone that which is very far removed; and the more intensely it feels the attraction of these [material] things, the more dense an ignorance of the truth it will suffer. Since, therefore, the knowledge of truth is twofold—the one considered concerning the creation, the other concerning the Creator—as much as creatures are below the Creator, so much does the pure knowledge of the Creator excel. Hence, those who have attributed the knowledge of all things to reasonings alone have been found to have wandered far from it. But those who, having sent word to every pleasure of life, are exclusively occupied with the investigation of this knowledge, with God offering them a helping hand, both surely grasp it themselves and lead others who follow in their footsteps along the straight path to it. Therefore, by the former way, found among those who wish to discourse upon divine things, the second will undoubtedly follow; and conversely, this one will not follow unless that first one is attained. If, therefore, those who are held by ignorance or sloth follow those who have reached that goal, they will enjoy excellence no less than them. But if, having excluded the first, they will not even endure to hold this second course, they will no longer be able to escape the charge of wickedness. For if they neither take care to practice a life of virtue throughout, through which it would be necessary to arrive at a certain knowledge of God, nor obey those who have obtained it, but rely solely on their own reasonings, how can it be that they, running along a different path, can grasp what proceeds by another? Nevertheless, free will truly suffers no force. Therefore, because you rather desire, most erudite friend, the demonstrations of the proposed questions from natural reasonings—for your letter clearly requests this in its very introduction; although the account of our faith does not allow this in a primary place, because God deems every mind, not only human, but even angelic ^B

^A to be beyond his essence, for the sake of your favor, we shall first set forth our opinion concerning God as demonstratively as possible, to the extent that it is feasible; and then we shall examine the strength of your objections that attack our religion. I shall begin from this point. Nicetas repeats from here his long demonstration of the Christian religion, which he had written in the preceding work (in our edition col. 373 to 707); namely: "The most wise and lover of goodness," etc., ^C he confirmed the dogma. Omitted, however, in this repetition are two short passages, namely concerning Mohammed (col. 689), and another concerning the Hagarenes (col. 697), and this for the sake of euphemism, as I think, lest the Mohammedan friend to whom Nicetas is writing be offended. We therefore have not judged it necessary to repeat that entire part of the Christian apologetic, because it is already available in our volume.

^B 2. It is time henceforth to examine also the accusations in your writing against our faith, to see if they are set forth correctly. I shall begin from this point. Your writing says as follows: "And God gave to them," that is, to the created human beings, "a mind to know that the creation is separate, and stands far removed from the likeness to the Creator; and that every work is in need of its maker." I also agree with this, that everything produced is alien to the substantial likeness of the one who produces it; for which reason, let this be accepted as having been admitted by us as well. Then follows the sentence joined to this, which says: "Every parent is prior to his own offspring." Regarding some things, when said simply, this is true; regarding others, however, it is false; and because this is alien to God, and has no place in Him, I will neither admit it nor confess it. But I shall refute it, and I shall explain when it occurs. You, however, taking this as if it were conceded, seem to be trying to trip us up, whether as regards the principle of consubstantiality, or as regards the relation of the begetter and the begotten. The mode of this thing I will now state. For while we confess that the Father and the Son both hold one and the same substance; and that the one indeed, as begetter, is called Father; and the other, as being begotten, is called Son; you have borrowed an axiom from human affairs which says that "every parent is prior to his own offspring," and you have wrongly applied this to the divine nature; which happens rather in the generated and created nature, but does not hold in God. ^C For otherwise many things, indeed, to speak the truth, even numberless things, occur among us which are entirely alien to God. But you, taking this as true concerning God, conclude almost thus: If every parent is prior to his own offspring, then the Son who is believed by us will not be coeternal and consubstantial with the Father. But if, on the other hand, the Son is coeternal with the Father; and the statement is true that "every parent is prior to his own offspring"; the relationship is necessarily separated from the other.

3. It is not strange, O best of men, if an absurdity being granted, a myriad follow; for if anyone were to claim that a man is a stone, he would attach to him many absurdities, or rather, endless ones. In almost the same way, you too, having taken this little premise concerning God—that "every parent is prior to his own offspring"—

"—^A you have insidiously constructed a fallacy. Having refuted this, therefore—since it cannot be pronounced of God—we shall avoid absurdity on both sides. For the present case is absent from the contrary. If, therefore, the statement "every parent," being wrongly taken from created nature, leads the discourse of the one speaking into absurdity, since it has no place in God, it is evident that we shall avoid the absurdities, and we shall preserve untouched the coeternal and consubstantial, and the relation of fatherhood and sonship.

"Every parent is prior to his own offspring." O, the amazing thing! This is valid in me and in you, who are human beings by faculty, ^B or anything else, but we become such by being in potentiality, such as parents or learned men, or something else. But in those cases where potentiality will have no place, it is evident that the priority of the parent over the offspring is not maintained. If, therefore, potentiality is alien to God (for potentiality is accompanied by passion, potentiality needs something from without, potentiality is of the genus of that which is imperfect; but God is above all these), it is sufficiently clear that priority does not attach to Him either, because priority does not exist without some potentiality. ^C "Every parent is prior to his own offspring." This is proper to created nature, this is proper to generation through flux. For of those whose existence is diverse, their generation is equally diverse. Therefore, three contraries having been taken—I mean the created and the uncreated, the passible and the impassible, the prior and the simultaneous—if the corporeal is passible, and after this follows the prior and the posterior, it is clear that the incorporeal is impassible and simultaneous. For in this way logical methods teach us.

4. "Every parent is prior to his own offspring." This is said by one who wishes to establish a law for God, but not by one who speaks the truth. Therefore, the term "parent" is either of the number of those things which are per se, or of those which are relative. But it is not of those things which are per se; for it would not have a relation to an offspring; therefore it is of those things which are relative. ^D But those things which are relative are simultaneous by nature; and those which are simultaneous by nature are at once both and are not; therefore, the parent, insofar as he is a parent, has a relation to that toward which he has the reference, and will not have "prior" and "posterior." If, therefore, the parent will not have "prior" and "posterior," but you say that every parent is prior to his own offspring, it is clear that the parent is not so insofar as he is a parent, but according to something else, just as Socrates or Peter. Since, therefore, the name of parent in God the Father is hypostatic, and according to this alone the property of the hypostasis is denoted; and it has been demonstrated further that what is relative does not have "prior" and "posterior"; it is certain, therefore, that God the Father, who is the parent of his own offspring, does not have "prior." But if he has it not, it is certain that he is simultaneous; and if he is simultaneous, he is also coeternal. Therefore, the Son is coeternal with the Father; and thus, in that in which you thought to circumvent, you have been circumvented. "Every parent is prior to his own offspring." This has place in us; and that it is so, is evident from hence: Every power—to what end? It is evident that it is simultaneous

and that to be able to do anything, one will also do it, if nothing stands in the way. If, then, there is in us an innate power to beget children, but we are hindered, it is evident that something is hindering us. But in God nothing resists or hinders. It is evident, therefore, that generation is also co-natural. And if it is co-natural, it is also simultaneous; and if it is simultaneous, it is not "prior" or "posterior." Whence it is evident that "prior" and "posterior" have no place in God. ^B "Every parent is prior to his own offspring." Whence, my good sir, have you taken these principles? For they who posit nothing in common between the Creator and the creatures deceive themselves, in the same way taking divine utterances concerning God and creatures; and the first lemma is excluded by the second, and again the second by the first. For if every work is inferior to its maker on account of the dignity of priority, but the Word, who is from the Begetter, argues the Maker to be prior to his works, then He would be both inferior and not inferior, the same and not the same, which is impossible.

5. Let us look also at what follows. It is thus: "Since, if you suppose one principle for both, namely of the Father and the Son, the order of the relation which exists from the Begetter to the begotten perishes; and the designation of both is forcibly separated from the Giver of birth and the begotten, the pre-existent and the posterior." ^C You have freed me from difficulty, my friend, by explaining the mystery. For if I had persuaded myself that the proposition you stated, which says, "Every parent is prior to his own offspring," had place in God, perhaps, even if unwillingly, I would have been compelled by the truth to confess this second one also. But because our discourse has shown that that former one is futile and entirely false in regard to God and foreign to Him, certainly reason will not compel me to weigh the implied proposition. For if there be two things, of which one is held in the place of the antecedent and the other in that of the consequent, it is clear that if the antecedent is conceded, the consequent will also be conceded; but it will not be conceded if the antecedent is in no way admitted. This is explained thus. Let there be man and animal: and let man be taken as the antecedent, and animal as the consequent. It is evident that if man is posited, ^D the animal also will necessarily follow; but it will not follow if the former is not posited. Such is the argument dramatized by you. Therefore, if the statement "Every parent is prior to his own offspring" had place in God, as we confess the Father and the Son to be co-eternal, it is evident that the designation would necessarily be forced to be separated from one another. But since the former is not true, neither is the second; and thus what was said by you has appeared foolish.

6. And otherwise: If on account of the co-eternity of the Father and the Son you say that their relations must necessarily be separated, reason will rather compel, on account of the relation

^A of co-eternity also to be introduced. And this is shown as follows. The name "Begetter," since it is among those things which are relative, has a relation to the Son. But those things which are relative are simultaneous by nature; and those which are simultaneous by nature both are and are not. It is concluded, therefore, that on account of the relation they are simultaneous; which is true. And why, my friend, do you introduce the contrary? For on account of the co-eternity you seem to us to snatch away the relation of fatherhood and sonship, while on account of the relation of the begetter and the begotten, you seem to destroy the co-eternity and consubstantiality. Another way: If the name "Begetter" bestows existence simultaneously, but those things which are taken by you as simultaneous in existence destroy the relation which subsists between the begetter and the begotten, it is concluded then that the name "Begetter" and the "Begotten," being in a relation, are unrelated; which is absurd.

^B 7. You add again thus: "Since if you suppose one principle for both, the Father and the Son." I am struck with wonder, my friend, as to what kind of principle you wish to place in God. For the term "principle" is used in many ways: for one is efficient, such as the architect of buildings; another is material, such as the planks of a ship; another is formal, such as the shape of a statue; another is final, such as the ship for the transport of supplies; another is instrumental, such as the builder's axe; another is exemplary, such as the prototype of a work produced; another is temporal, such as things that are made ^C in time, which come to be and are; another is causal only, just as Seth sprang from a certain principle and cause, namely from Adam. Now, if as from a certain principle and cause you say that there is one principle for the Father and the Son, you will no longer preserve the one as "begetter" and the other as "begotten." For of whom would he be the begetter, if you say the Father and the Son arose as from another principle and cause? You certainly will not call it an efficient principle; for if you concede this, there will be a God of God, and again another of this one, and so on to infinity. Nor will you call it a material principle; for God is not composite and material. But neither is it a formal principle; for what formal principle could the Father and the Son have had? Other than the fact that they would not escape composition. Nor, finally, a final one, for God comes from no cause. It remains for you that it is a temporal ^D principle of the Father and the Son. But if this is so, it happens to them to be generated and to be corrupted, and countless other things. For those things which are in time are such. It is evident that it is impossible to find a principle more ancient than God, and how, my friend, do you weave together a paralogism, assuming that it is to be believed by us? Truly, it has been demonstrated to you that this is foolish.

8. But let us see what you write a little further on: "And God governed all things by His wisdom." I agree to this most gladly; for by His enhypostatic wisdom, which our discourse clearly demonstrates

The definition of "enhypostatic"

His works, and that God is one above all, supersubstantial, just as one of our theologians said in harmony with these things: "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead" [Rom. 1, 20], and matters consonant with ^A these things. Therefore, whether you will or no, you agree with our confessions. But proceeding a little further to the unity and supersubstantiality of God, you write as follows: "For if He had a partner in His kingdom, He would have been liable to opposition, or He would have been in need of an assistant to govern His creation." I am astonished that you write such things; for I see no necessity to introduce any partners of the kingdom, or any need of an assistant for the governing of His world, or whatever you add to these. For since we confess that God the Father has His Son, in all things similar to Himself except for the ^B unbegottenness and the generation—and yet we do not say at all that there is a partnership between the Father and the Son—I do not see how you can be trying to deceive us, or rather catching yourself in your own snares. Your sophism is of this kind: If two things exist, and one is more general while the other is partial, such as raining and the earth being moistened—for raining is less than the earth being moistened; for it does not convert; yet if it is, it is clear that the rest will be, such as raining and being moistened—then, if the rest exists, someone will say that the other thing also exists; he makes a paralogism, as it is called, from what does not convert and from what follows.

9. You have done something similar in what you have written; for there being two things, "common" and "communicant," and the one being more extensive, such as "common," ^C and the other more restricted, such as "communicant"—for he who communicates is called a "communicant" insofar as he has something in common; yet it is not necessary that whoever has something in common with another be called a communicant to him; for a stone is not called a communicant to a stone, because the substance of both is common. Likewise, a horse is not called a communicant to a horse, since they have one common substance. If, therefore, "common" is more extensive and "communicant" is more restricted, yet we say that the Father has His kingdom common and indivisible with His own Son, you, distorting the language, write: "If the kingdom and power is common with the Son, then the Son will entirely be a communicant of the kingdom of His Father." You are mocking ^D yourself rather than us, making a paralogism in that which does not alternate, and in doing so, you appear rather to be ignorant of the things of which the term "communicant" is rightly and properly said, and for that reason you badly transfer it to God; for the term "communicant" does not appear to be applied to anything else than those for whom the work of each one is accomplished separately and distinctly, and by a voluntary agreement, and by a joining together in the same act, [or] that which is enhypostatic, which exists really as common to the individuals which are under it, and is not [merely] according to substance; that is to say, the species which is considered in the mere thought of the mind.

^A If two or three or more of these come together for the same thing—for instance, if someone is practicing the art of rhetoric by himself, and then some other person approaches him, and they come together harmoniously to the work of rhetoric by prior agreement and consent—each of these might be called a 'partaker' in this. But as for those in whom there exist by nature, inseparably, the work and the will, the desire and the operation, and an indivisible harmony, how would the name of 'partaker' find place for them? It certainly would not. Therefore, when we speak of the Father doing something, we speak of the Son and the Holy Spirit as doing it together inseparably. And the operation of the One is not divided among the Three. For every operation that proceeds from God, and is named according to various concepts, ^B originates from the Father, proceeds through the Son, and is brought to perfection in the Holy Spirit. For this reason, it is not right to apply the term 'partaker' to the Holy Trinity.

10. You proceed to the [term] "partaker," writing thus: "It was about to experience contrariety and sedition." Oh, the foolishness of your words! If indeed the name 'partaker' had a place with God, perhaps both contrariety and sedition would be found. But since this is not granted, neither will the consequence of it be granted. And thus, although unwilling and against your intent, from what you have added, you have made the proposition clear to us as to how it is properly spoken. For if, when the name 'partaker' is applied to something, contrariety and sedition follow, it will be clear that the term 'partaker' ^C will be appropriate for those who conduct affairs by prior convention and consent—whence sedition and contrariety also arise. For it is only to them that sedition and contrariety occur, due to the mutability of their will. But how could contrariety and sedition gain entry to those whose goodness is immutable? And after a few words, you write thus: "Or, at least, he would be in need of a helper for the administration of the world created by him." Rightly, friend, did you speak. For if the name 'partaker' had a place with the Son, he would have, according to you, [a share in] the contrariety and sedition, and the need for a helper. But since that [term] has been shown to be hollow and invalid, it is clear that these [consequences] are so, too. For if by the positing of something, certain things are posited, then by the destruction of that thing, it is clear that the others are also destroyed. ^D

11. Your letter further says this: "And according to the extension of the ages, and the contrariety between them, the lordship of him would be extinguished along with the creatures, and one would lord it over the other, and the sympathy of the works would be cut off." This accusation, therefore, O friend, of two principles and contrariety does not apply to us; rather, it ought to be directed by you toward others, who indeed introduce two principles and two gods, a good one and an evil one; and they say that one of them created and maintains and controls the sensible world, and the other, the intelligible world; an opinion which we loathe and strongly turn away from, and those who cherish it we subject to capital punishment; while you...

favor and cajole them. ^A For us, one principle is worshipped with religious devotion, because there is one God, even though he is believed to be threefold in his properties, or persons. But if the diversity of persons suggests to you that there is also a different nature—and that there are as many natures as there are persons—this is the mark of an unlearned, rather than an educated, mind. For nature and person are not the same thing; otherwise, there would be nothing homogeneous among existing things, and what is common would be the same as what is peculiar, a thing which has never been found.

12. And in another way: If the difference in persons grants you that a different nature is introduced, it is necessary that what does not differ naturally, also does not differ personally. It follows, therefore, that those things ^B which are one naturally, are also one personally. Thus, Paul and Peter would be the same naturally and not different, and at the same time the same person, which is ridiculous. For your sophism is what is called a sophism of homonymy. Since the term "one" is said in many ways, as the rules of logic teach—either by genus, or by species, or by number, or by analogy—it is clear that the same applies to "many." For in as many ways as the subject is proposed, in just as many ways is it opposed; for this is what we have been taught. Yet, to those who acknowledge the trinity of persons, you attribute also a diversity of natures. But the matter is not so, as the evidence of things clearly shows and as the disciplines teach. And thus, all your accusations against our faith have been shown to be futile, incredible, and false. Furthermore, with all the accusations destroyed, all the rest ^C will follow for you. But we have already run beyond the proper measure, for ears hate a surfeit of speech. Wherefore, let these things suffice for those who are willing to consider them a little, and by a comparative choice of better things, to follow the truth and repel falsehood. And for this reason, I shall make an end of speaking here.

BY THE SAME NICETAS

Refutation and eversion of the second epistle sent by the Hagarenes to the Emperor Michael, son of Theophilus, for the purpose of accusing the Christian faith.

1. I would have wished, O friend, to first subject the discourse regarding our faith—the Christian dogma, I mean—to demonstrative necessities, ^D and to render it as firm and exact as possible by means of natural reasoning; and then, in turn, to refute those absurd arguments written by you for the sake of slandering our religion. For this is what an antithetical discourse absolutely demands. Now, since against your other epistle, the dogma...

of our faith has—as was fitting—been treated at great length with constructive demonstrations ^A and clearly concluded, let us not seem to falter in writing to you now, if we only construct our retorts from the arguments you sent for the overthrow of our blameless faith. Wherefore, if your slanders against our faith and your other contradictions are rightly aimed, let us examine them here. Your letter runs as follows: "God is one, having no sharer in his own power; and because he has no sharer, he has not a son." I am truly amazed that you write such things; for I do not discern what necessity there is to introduce the Son as a sharer—as it were—or an assistant in the kingdom of God the Father, and all the other things of this kind that you frequently write. For when we confess that God the Father has his own Son in all things similar, except for unbegottenness and birth, and when we do not in any way confess the Son to be a sharer of the Father, I do not know how you wish to deceive us, or how you might be caught by your own wings. For your ^B sophism is of this kind: "If there are two things, and one is greater and the other lesser, such as man and animal; for man is less than animal (because they do not reciprocally alternate), but animal is greater; with these things being so, as if where there is man, there is also animal; but it is not the case that where there is animal, there is also man; if, while animal exists, someone were to say that man also exists, he commits a paralogism, because these do not alternate nor follow one another."

^C In this place Nicetas repeats the whole ninth article of the prior epistle, namely from the words *toidūton ti* [something of this sort] up to *epi tēs hagias Triados tithesthai* [to be set down concerning the holy Trinity]. We, however, omit it, in order not to appear to be doing what has already been done.

2. Again, he says: "God is one, having no sharer in his own power." That God is indeed one over all things, and that he is the one who grants to all existing things both simple being and well-being, and possesses absolutely no sharer or assistant in any of existing things, as you say, has been demonstrated and confessed and believed by us above. But that the Son of God believed by us is also true God, equal to God the Father, and is rightly confessed and spoken of by us as one God together with the Father and the Spirit—not as a sharer of the God and Father, nor as introduced by us as a sharer of the one principle and one God who is contemplated in the Father and Son and Holy Spirit—becomes clear thus: The one who is called by us the Son of God and true God, if he is, as you say, a sharer of God, that is, of him who is called by us God and Father; or of the one principle and one God who is contemplated in the Father and Son and Holy Spirit. But if indeed he is a sharer of the one God who is contemplated in the Father and Son and Holy Spirit; and it has been demonstrated by us in the refutation of your prior epistle that the Son is one God and one principle with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and is rightly called God by us; therefore it happens that the Son...

is a participant in himself, which is absurd; for no existing thing is said to be a participant in itself. Therefore, the Son is not a participant in the one principle and the one God who is contemplated in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; nor indeed of God the Father; for only in those cases is it possible to find a son called a participant of his own father, where there is an entering in of a change of mind, and a presence of diversity of will, and a lack of resources calling for help, and an operation separately cut off. But in those where there is one mind, and an will always unceasing, and an identity of nature, and one power, and an unchangeable will is present, how could a participant enter in? Therefore, those who theologically posit the Son and Spirit in theology do not introduce a participant in the one God, even if they are wrongly slandered by you. ^B

3. Item alter: "God is one, not having a participant in his own power; and because he has no participant, he has not even a son." You have relieved me of a task by declaring the secret; for if I saw the word "participant" as connected to and subsisting in the theological generation, perhaps, though unwillingly, led by the truth, with the extinction of this word I would also remove the principal point from the middle: that is, I would not allow the Son to be proclaimed as God. But because our discourse shows this to be altogether futile and false and not at all following in the theological generation, no reasoning compels me to exclude the principal point, that is, the Son, from the designation of God. For in those things which cohere by a necessary bond, it is evident that with them removed, the principal points also perish; yet it is not so in those things which do not cohere with one another, as the disciplines teach. Therefore, this was the force of your syllogism: "If the divinity of the Son is believed, we shall find that one God has someone participating in him; but God is universal and one, having no participant: therefore, the Son is by no means found in theology." And first indeed, as philosophical methods teach us, the consequence is mistaken. For it has been demonstrated that it does not follow in the theological generation that the Son is called a participant of the Father; therefore, that assertion is without demonstration. Soon we shall consider our theology somewhat, so that we may show more evidently to all the weakness and incredibility of the dogma brought forward by you. ^{C D}

4. What is therefore truly said by us concerning theology is said partly in common regarding the three persons, as concerning one substance or deity, and one God being; for instance, I say the name God, and Lord, and philanthropist, and similar things, which are not numbered together because they are said singularly, as has been demonstrated. But they are partly said privately, which are also in the first place and especially proper to the persons; for instance, I say the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which, because they are said privately, are also numbered together: for the numbering together is mainly the cause of those things which are said privately, not of those which are said in common, as has been shown elsewhere; and sometimes it is even found in two

^A thearchic persons, for example, procession from a cause. And those things which are said in common, and are said in common at the same time of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, as being one God who is also thought of as one, are stated as such, and are predicated properly and particularly of the persons. For the Father is truly God; and the Son is God as from God, and light from light; and likewise the Holy Spirit. But those things which are said privately of the persons are indeed said privately, but they are by no means said in common; because the lesser cannot be predicated of the greater, nor be made equal to them. You may find this also stated regarding created nature, as for example, for the sake of clarity: the term "man," and "mortal," and "rational," each of these is spoken of both in common when taking all individual men together, and privately when considering each one. For Peter and Paul and individual men are at once spoken of by the common term "man," and each is also spoken of privately. For Peter is called a man, and so is Paul, and others similarly.

5. But if, even in our theology, some things are said in common of the three persons, and others privately; and some are predicated both in common, and in common at the same time, and privately as to the part: for when the name of God or Lord is spoken of in common at the same time regarding the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, it is clear that the three are spoken of as one God, in whom divinity exists, and among us it is rightly theologized in this way. ^C But when the name of God or Lord is spoken of privately and as to the part regarding the Father, or regarding the Son or the Spirit, then the Father is called God, not however as if the Father were one God privately and in part and of a different nature; and again the Son as another God; and likewise the Holy Spirit. Away with such blasphemous polytheism from us! Since for us the object of worship is one principle, and there is one God, even if in properties, that is, persons, three are believed. Whence, when we theologize the Son of God, we say he is one other than the Father in person, but not one other in essence and divinity, but the one and the same, as was shown in the former epistle.

6. Therefore, the theology we hold, hanging from common notions and the divine prophets, and having acquired certainty and stability, theologizes the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit as one God, the Trinity. But you, not understanding it thus, but thinking and imagining that the Father is called the one God privately and as to the part; and then that the Son is introduced as it were from outside that one God, have concocted a paralogism; wherefore you falsely conclude thus: ^D "If there is a Son in God, he is also a participant; but no one is a participant in God; therefore, there is no Son." By saying this, you fall into many absurdities. And first, you make person and nature the same in God, which has already been refuted. Next, you do not grant that the Son, together with the Father and the Spirit, is also one God, which is otherwise rightly asserted in our theology; and this, too, has already been demonstrated by us; for this reason

and because of what you have asserted, it has appeared foolish. ^A Let us see also what is added; it runs thus: "He who made the faith of the Saracens, like light; and there is no other faith through which one can approach God," and whatever else you write in praise of your own faith. But to attack another's faith with abuses, simply and without proof, and to exalt one's own greatly, is most easy and simple for anyone who wishes; but to demonstrate that one's own faith is useful, beneficial, and given by God through arguments, is the business of a man who is religious and possessed of reason. Therefore, you also ought to have done this, and not simply boastfully assert that your faith was made and given by God like light; wherefore we shall endeavor to demonstrate with proofs the error and falsehood of your faith, and the truth and beauty of our own. ^B

7. All who possess reason admit that a good and useful faith functions as a light, and exhorts those who hold it to approach God; the precepts of this faith have the casting aside of the worst and most harmful things, and translate the human race from those things which are contrary to nature to those which are according to nature and supernatural. But the faith whose precepts command the flight from virtue and the intimacy of vice, and drag the human race from those things which are according to nature or even supernatural to those which are contrary to nature, this is entirely base and harmful, and no one can approach God through it. Since therefore your faith commands the intimacy ^C of vices and the casting aside of virtues, and drags those who embrace it from things supernatural, or at least natural, to those that are contrary to nature, it is manifest that it is base and harmful, and that no one approaches God through it. And that this is true, understand from this: all prudent people know that what is contrary to nature is a transition from the natural to the worse; but the supernatural is a transition from the natural to the better. Since, therefore, man was in a way created as a medium between the sensible and the intellectual creation, for this reason he participates in both, that is, in the irrational and in the angelic ^D nature. And he participates in the angelic according to reasoning and discretion, but in the irrational according to the irascible and the concupiscible. However, man is preserved and contained within the boundaries of nature when the rational part dominates the irascible and concupiscible. Likewise, he approaches more closely to the angelic nature and is lifted up to supernatural things when the irrational part of the soul is repressed and suppressed. But when the opposite is observed in man and the passions prevail over reason, and reason succumbs (this occurs in people who use a luxurious and savage manner of life), it is evident that man, doing worse things, migrates from natural or even supernatural things to those which are contrary to nature. Wherefore, the more the irascible and concupiscible lack a rein, the more the passions erupt; and the more they erupt, the more they are increased; and the more they increase, the more man makes common cause with the irrational beasts; and

by doing this, he hastens to be brutalized. ^A For this reason, the prophetic word also describes the man who wallows in the passions, having been made like the beasts, saying: "Man, being in honor, did not understand; he was compared to the senseless beasts, and was made like unto them." (Ps. XLVIII, 13).

8. Since, therefore, your faith proposes and sanctions an intemperate life, and rather the increase and dominion of the passions than of reason, and drives men to gape after worse things—this is precisely what we have said, that it drags men away from the natural and supernatural toward those things which are contrary to nature—it is agreed among us that that faith whose statutes are of such a kind is harmful and vicious, and that no one through it approaches God. Hence, the conclusion is reached that your faith, O Saracens, should be called darkness rather than light, and that no one through it approaches God. But if this is so, it was not given by God either; and you boast and pride yourselves in vain about a faith of false name, or, to speak more truly, an infidelity, and you speak against us. But since our faith prescribes the contrary to yours—for yours prescribes luxury, ours modesty; yours gluttony, ours temperance; yours lechery, ours purity of character—it has been demonstrated that yours is depraved and harmful, neither reconciling one to God, inasmuch as it causes one to communicate rather with the brute beasts; while it is established that our own is good and useful, ^B and renders us friends of God, because it raises men to the condition of angels. And therefore we can confidently say that there is no faith other than our own, we who are Christians, by whose help anyone can draw near to God and participate in the true good. And let this suffice for what has been said so far regarding your faith and ours.

9. But advancing a little further, you strive to show that man was by no means created in the image and likeness of God, as we, trusting in the history of Moses and the realities themselves, have written to you. Wherefore, ^C when you seem to write with a specious pretext as follows: "God is ineffable, indefinable, and incomprehensible. For God always was, and there is none like unto Him. For His height is infinite, and He made His handiwork without any likeness to Himself," you seem from this to conclude that man has not been created in the image and likeness of God. For since God is incomprehensible and invisible and so forth, and no thing that exists is comparable to Him, it is evident that not even man is made in the image and likeness of God, since he also is one of the things that exists; and if this is so, he has not been formed in God's image and likeness. These are the words of a man prescribing laws for God and His creations, yet saying nothing that is true. Surely, if we, while we affirm that man has been made in the image and likeness of God, were to speak of a likeness of substance, ^D which would be undifferentiated, or rather the same as God, and were immediately to confess God to be ineffable,

^A furthermore, in confessing God to be ineffable, illimitable, incomprehensible, and infinite—and that nothing among existing things is such—we would perhaps be contradicting ourselves, and what you write would seem probable. But since, when we say that man was made in the image and likeness of God, we do not mean a similarity of essence, but rather an analogy that he has toward God, which is also found in creatures, there is nothing absurd in our writing that man was molded in the image and likeness of God. For the history of the genesis of the world according to Moses also persuades us to acknowledge this; therefore, we say "in the image," according to [the faculty of] initiation and free will. Furthermore, there is in man mind, word, and spirit; and the mind is the progenitor of the word within us; and the word is the offspring of the mind; and the spirit is issued through the word. And just as there is no irrational mind without word, so too no irrational word is found without mind, but they coexist at once, and neither precedes the other; and in like manner the word is not without spirit, nor is the spirit, which is expressed into utterance, without word.

10. Since, therefore, the supersubstantial and uncreated substance, which is God, is contemplated in three hypostases—that is, in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit—as has been demonstrated to us and is rightly believed, our mind, being the progenitor of the word within us, has an analogy to God the Father, who eternally and timelessly begat His own Son; and the word within us, being an offspring of the mind within us, has an analogy to the Son who was begotten from God the Father without flux and without passion, and is the true God; and the Spirit within us [has an analogy] to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and is poured out and distributed to existing things through the Son. And according to this, man is again said to have been molded in the image of God. And [we say] that man was made in the likeness of God again [through] the perfection of virtues and the participation of goods; because all things that the creative cause—which is God—possesses primarily and causelessly, these man possesses secondarily, participatively, and causally. For instance, He is the first and supersubstantial, life, light, wise, powerful, good, mild, just; and this man also is wise, and life, and powerful, and good, and mild, and just; but God is this by nature and essentially, while man is this by adoption, by grace, and non-essentially. ^D If this is so, we rightly say that man has been made in the likeness of God, bearing as it were the final echo of a reflection. And thus again your writing has been shown to be foolish.

11. Proceeding to another of the things written by us, and attempting to refute this too, you write again: “We behold in the species of wild beasts that the stronger rises up against the weaker, and the

^A The stronger against the weaker, and the better against the worse, and often it makes its own food of it; there are times when it also destroys it, competing to drive it from its lair, and so forth. In this you seem to have been ignorant of how arguments ought to be brought forward, and how they ought not. For if what we wrote concerning every irrational animal—as regards both those that are of the same species and those of a different one—promised that they all congregate and unite by reason of mutual gentleness, as if sparing their own salvation; and then, finding this not to be observed in some animals, but rather the contrary—that the stronger rises up against the weaker, and the better against the worse, as you indicated in your writing, for example the lion, I say, or the bear and the like—you would indeed have been able to refute our argument stoutly. But because what we wrote does not declare this concerning every irrational animal, you are babbling foolishly, introducing a poorly constructed drama and playing a part. For who, even with the slightest discernment, is unaware that not all kinds of animals are naturally constituted to congregate and follow a social life? For of animals, some are solitary, others gregarious; and of the gregarious ones, some are ordered under a leader, others not. And of both of these, some are civil, and others not, as their physiologies and histories teach. If, therefore, some are solitary and others not, it is evident that it is their nature for some to congregate with those of the same species, and others not to. If this is so, no one possessing a sound mind would ever think or write that "all animals are accustomed to congregate with one another and live together." Nor have we said this. But since there is in the animal that is properly social a most particular sign and characteristic—namely, reason, prudence, and judgment with reason—for this very reason man needs external speech, so that the thoughts lying in the depths may be brought forth into the light and shared with his neighbors. Hence man is by nature a tame animal, and is here properly a social animal. But in all irrational animals, sociability and natural gentleness are not primarily present; yet in some, a desire to converse, live together, and communicate is discerned. But this is established much more among humans. For if what seems to be less exists, how much more exists that which is more; that is to say, how much more convenient and useful is it for a man—being an animal that is pre-eminently social and by his own nature tame—to converse and live together with one of his own kind? For it is with this in view that we have written to you.

12. And again, passing on to another of the points written by us, and attempting in the same way to refute it, you write as follows: ^D "Of killings, some are lawful, others unlawful; and it is unlawful, as it is actually forbidden by God, to kill a believer by a private decision; but it is lawful and permitted to kill him who suggests that a companion is to be given to God, and imagines this one to be endowed with equal power." While you write these things, un-

- ^A learned and entirely uninitiated in these matters, you reveal yourself; for you have not understood that every killing, in so far as it is killing, is to be shunned and abhorred, inasmuch as it is an evil; and that all evil is not permitted. And that killing is an evil, is clear from this: Every killing, in so far as it is killing, is a destruction of a man, or is the cause of the destruction of a man. But there is nothing more beautiful or better upon the earth than man, since he is the foremost creature of God among those on the earth. Therefore, it is concluded that every killing, in so far as it is killing, is a destruction of some good or a cause of destruction; and if this is so, it is evil in itself. For the destructions of good things, and the causes of them, are entirely evil; just as the destructions of evil things and their causes are good; for thus our common notions and philosophical disciplines teach us. ^B If, therefore, all killing, in so far as it is killing, is demonstrated to be evil, it is clear that it is also not permitted; for every evil is not permitted. Yet, sometimes it becomes good by accident. For, of existing things, some are good in themselves, and become evil by accident, such as almsgiving; others are evil in themselves, but become good by accident, such as a lie (7); others are of a neutral nature in themselves, but by accident incline to one side or the other, such as wealth, strength, and the like. And those things which are good in themselves ought always to be done, or at least for the most part; for such is the nature of goods in themselves. The opposite logic applies to things that are evil in themselves, which either ought never to be done, or rarely, and in minimal quantity. For such is their nature. ^C Those which are of a neutral nature in themselves, it is similar whether they are done or not. That killing is in the number of things evil in themselves, we have already shown. But that which is evil in and of itself and principally, that either ought not to be done at all, or rarely; and this is primarily good: but that which is done rarely by accident [as a] good, that is good in the second place and to a lesser degree. Now, that which is good in a primary sense and in a greater degree is certainly more desirable and better than that which is good in the second place and in a lesser degree, just as the rules of logic instruct us. Therefore, not to kill is better and more desirable than to kill, even if the latter sometimes becomes good by accident. If this is the case, those who strive to abolish killing among men appear better and worthy of greater praise than those who have not determined to act in this way; for the former have embraced ^D the better good. It is therefore proven that we are better, who strive to exterminate killing from among men.

13. But that the killing (8) which is perpetrated by you against us every day is neither of those [things] happening as a good by accident, (7) For instance when someone lies, so that it may profit someone. Nevertheless, Augustine also censures this, enarr. in Ps. V, n. 7: "There are two kinds of lies, in which there is no great fault, but yet they are not without fault, when we either joke, or we lie so that we might benefit [someone]. The first is such, etc." The second is therefore milder because it retains some benevolence. See the rest there; then many other things... (8) He speaks of the superstitious and fanatical savagery of the Mahomedans against the Christians, which, beyond the suras cited earlier, we see also in the third epistle of Nicholas, the Greek patriarch, among those published by us in Spicilegium Rom., T. X.

^A from this it becomes clear: What comes to be as a good per accidens, comes to be by an economy; what comes to be by an economy, comes to be for some good; therefore, what comes to be per accidens, comes to be for some good. But the slaughter of our people by you does not come to be for any other reason, as you yourselves say, except for the sake of your being Saracens; but this is not good: it follows, therefore, that the slaughter of our people by you is not even a good per accidens. And that the sect of the Saracens is by no means good is shown thus: Saracenism is nothing other than the enticement of people away from things natural or even supernatural, toward things contrary to nature; for this we have already demonstrated. Now, that to do this is evil, everyone sees. If, therefore, your slaughters of our people are good neither per accidens nor in themselves; and if that which is good neither in itself nor per accidens ought not to be done at all, then your daily slaughters of our people ought not to be done. For what ought not to be done, is not even lawful. “Some slaughters are lawful, you say, others are unlawful.” I also agree that some slaughters are lawful, namely per accidens, if indeed they are of the number of those goods which turn out thus per accidens. But they are unlawful in themselves; since slaughter, insofar as it is slaughter, has been shown to be of the number of evils per se; therefore let this be taken as something clearly confessed by us as well.

14. Come then, briefly you append what follows, saying: ^B “It is lawful and innocent to slay him who thinks a partner should be given to God, and one gifted with equal power.” I say, how proudly and arrogantly is this spoken by you—or, to speak more properly, with what great stupidity and madness it teems! For, owing to your great stupidity and faithlessness, judging I know not how without reasoning, and not as we preach, but fighting in vain and foolishly blathering, you mock us without cause, as if we introduced certain participants and beings equipollent to the one God and unique principle. For who among us, whether small or great, ever thought or imagined that anyone was a partner to the one God and unique principle or equipollent to Him? Under what pretext do your slaughters of our people turn out to be “just,” as you say? For even if the Son of God is spoken of and glorified by us as true God, and as being Himself homogeneous with God and the Father, nevertheless, it is not defined in our theology that He is a partner ^C to the one principle, or a God existing outside the Father and added to Him as you think (for this also has been demonstrated by us); but He is one God with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and is rightly believed in and glorified by us Christians. If this is so, you rashly cast at us the reproach of the term “partner”; and furthermore, you consider the slaughter of our people by you to be divinely inspired and lawful, as you write; for if, because you say we invent a partner and an equipollent of God, it is lawful to be slain by you,

it is manifest that it is also unlawful to put us to death, after we have refuted this false imputation; and it stands to reason that the slaughter with which you rage against us is unjust. But if the distinction of the persons ^B of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit perturbs and terrifies you, as if it thrust from without, into the one God and one principle, a Son as a partaker and different from the nature of God the Father, this is the mark of an unlearned man rather than a learned one. For nature and person are not the same; otherwise, no existing things would be homogeneous, and the same thing would be both common and particular; which does not happen.

15. Item; if the distinction of persons were to introduce a distinction of nature, it would be necessary that what is not distinct in nature should not be distinct in person either. It follows, therefore, that whatever is the same in nature would also be the same in persons. Socrates, then, would also be Peter, and if by nature they are the same and ^C indistinguishable, they would also be the same in person; which is ridiculous. For this sophism is so called from homonymy. For since the term "one" is said in many ways, as the rules of logic teach us—namely, by genus, or by species, or by number—it is certain that the term "many" also has the same rationale; for by as many ways as the proposition is stated, in just as many ways is the opposite; for that is what we have been taught. Since, therefore, we give the number three to the persons, you introduce the distinction of natures as well. And these matters stand thus, and are evident both from the reality of the facts and as the disciplines teach. And in this way all your calumnies and contradictions against our ^D faith have been demonstrated to be futile, incredible, and false. Now that the calumnies have been refuted, all the rest follows of its own accord. But what has been said so far is more than sufficient, and the superfluity of words is tiresome to the ears. Therefore, these things suffice for those who willing to consider them even a little, and, by the addition or comparison of better arguments, to attain the truth and dispel the falsehood. Here, therefore, I will make an end of speaking.

Theognostus the Monk; Notitia

The man who was cast out by the Byzantines, and by the philosopher and golden-tongued lord Nicetas, the Arab Muhammad, was an orphan, a foreigner, a beggar wandering in every country and city. But coming into Arabia, and making his stay there, he approached a rich widow and hired himself out as a servant to serve her and tend her camels. Being wicked and ironic in his speech, he deceived her and married her, being himself a master. The woman was distressed when she learned this, and was grieved, saying that she had perished by taking a beggar and a demoniac; and she was about to drive him away from her. This wicked man, perceiving this, attached himself to a friend of his who was a monk, who had been exiled from the Great City, and gave him these instructions, saying: "I know that you are known to my wife, and that she wishes to tell you about my affairs, and how I fall down in a daze. You, to this, support me by saying that this was nothing else but a vision of an angel of God, named Gabriel, and that I am a prophet of God." At these things the woman rejoiced greatly and was persuaded; and from that time on until today, what was heard from her has been held fast in Arabia.