Gregory Akindynos, Monk and Theologian

ANNO DOMINI MCCCL GREGORIUS ACINDYNUS NOTITIA

Gregorius Acindynus, a Greek monk and theologian, flourished during the same period as Barlaam of Calabria, and entered the same arena as him, suffering a similar fate. For when, according to Spondanus in his *Annales ecclesiastici* for the year 1337, no. 11, a certain Gregory Palamas—an Asiatic by birth, educated in the imperial court, more eminent in his doctrine than the other monks, and who later became Archbishop of Thessalonica—had undertaken to defend the doctrine or error of the Hesychast or "Quietist" monks living on Mount Athos, who perversely asserted that that Light which the Apostles saw on Mount Tabor at the Transfiguration of the Lord was an uncreated light, that is, the divine essence: and that they themselves, while becoming fervent in their prayer, could see and contemplate it with their bodily eyes; Gregorius Acindynus, deeming these notions to be heretical, along with Barlaam the Calabrian, set himself as an adversary to Palamas. Acindynus accused Palamas and the monks whose heresy he defended of Messalianism, and argued rightly and in a Catholic manner: If that light was seen with bodily eyes, then it is not uncreated, since whatever can be seen with bodily eyes must necessarily be created. Hence, therefore, grave troubles and disputes arose; but the aforementioned Gregorius Acindynus refuted with great abundance, and in accordance with the matters then under controversy, the arguments of his adversaries, all of which—together with an account of this entire discord composed by a certain monk named Daniel—are said to exist in manuscript in the Bavarian and Augsburg libraries in Germany, as testified by Jacobus Pontanus in his *Notes to Cantacuzenus’ History*, book II, ch. 40. But eventually, through the agency of Emperor John Cantacuzenus, Barlaam and Acindynus were condemned after their deaths. Cantacuzenus, *History*, book IV, ch. 23. Thus, Gregorius Acindynus was condemned in the council of the Palamites, which Henricus Spondanus reports in his *Annales ecclesiastici*, for the year 1350, no. 30. But he was condemned unjustly and posthumously, at a time when he could no longer speak for himself, through the agency of his adversary, the Emperor—or rather tyrant—John Cantacuzenus, who was the head and master of this council. These things, however, according to Pontanus, are so far from harming the memory of Gregorius Acindynus that they serve, on the contrary, as a great argument for his orthodoxy and probity. A short work by Gregorius Acindynus *On the Essence and Operation of God*; the *Letters* of the same Gregory Acindynus, and other things, exist in Greek in manuscript 124 of the most serene Duke of Bavaria. Likewise, in the Royal Library of France, manuscript 1379 contains *Refutations of Acindynus for Palamas*, as Philippus Labbeus records in his *Nova Bibliotheca mss. librorum Bibliothecæ Regiæ*, part II, page 86, manuscript 1379. There exists a iambic poem by the same Gregory Acindynus on the heresies of Palamas in volume 1 of *Græcia Orthodoxa* by Leo Allatius, page 756, under this title: Γρηγορίου τοῦ Ἀκινδύνου, etc. It begins with: Σπουδῇ Παλαμᾶν εὐσεβὴς πᾶς φευγέτω, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖ, etc. Nicephorus Gregoras treats of Gregorius Acindynus in his *History*, book XI, final chapter. John Cantacuzenus, his enemy, treated of him in *History*, book II, chaps. 39 and 40, and book IV, ch. 23. Jacobus Pontanus discusses him at length and not without many praises in his notes on *Cantacuzenus’ History*, book II, ch. 40; Henricus Spondanus in his *Annales ecclesiastici* for the year 1337, no. 11, and for the year 1350, no. 20.

GREGORY ACINDYNUS, TWO BOOKS ON THE ESSENCE AND OPERATION OF GOD

Once written against the ignorance of certain Greeks, but now published in Greek against the Calvinist ignorance of Conrad Vorstius and the Vorstians. Edited by Jacob Gretser, theologian of the Society of Jesus.

PREFACE OF JACOB GRETSER

^AAt the time when John Cantacuzenus held the Constantinopolitan empire, most grave controversies arose concerning the essence and operation of God. Some affirmed that the essence and the operation and other properties of God are distinguished, just as the light of the sun is distinguished from the substance of the sun. Among these, those who easily took the first place were Philotheus, first a monk of Mount Athos, afterwards Bishop of Heraclea, and finally Patriarch of Constantinople; and Gregory Palamas, Archbishop of Thessalonica, who, along with many others, brought Cantacuzenus himself over to his own opinion. Hence those praises with which Cantacuzenus in his History extols Philotheus and Palamas, celebrating them as sincere and invincible defenders of orthodoxy, while casting Barlaam and Gregory Acindynus down to the very lowest depths, and declaring them heretics, condemned by a quadruple synod, together with all their followers, among whose number was also finally Nicephorus Gregoras, against whom Cantacuzenus rose up sharply more than once, and Patriarch Philotheus even more sharply.

^BBut if anyone desires more regarding this entire controversy, let him approach those things which we have noted from almost unpublished writers at the final chapter of the second book of the History of Cantacuzenus. There we have also discoursed concerning the Thaboric light, which Philotheus and Palamas maintained was uncreated, with Barlaam and Acindynus struggling against it and stoutly protecting the truth.

I do not doubt, however, that this Barlaam is that very person whose letters to the Greeks were published in the fifth volume of *Antiquae Lectiones* by D. Henricus Canisius, V. C. For he returned from Greece to Italy and was constituted Bishop of Hieracium, as Cantacuzenus himself testifies in book II, chapter last.

^CFor the rest, those things which the Greeks once dreamed and raved might seem tolerable, compared to the impious and three and four times execrable assertions which Conrad Vorstius the Calvinist vomited forth from his most impure jaws in his book *On the Attributes of God*. With brazen face and mind, he denies that God is immense, infinite, incorporeal, and free from all composition and mutation. He just as sacrilegiously adds: that the decrees of God are true accidents, distinct from the substance of God; that the eternity of God is not indivisible and whole all at once, but successive; that God is not entirely in every thing in which He exists, and other things of this kind that are utterly opposed not only to theology, but to philosophy and to natural reason itself.

^DBut has no one from the camps of Luther and Calvin been found who would oppose himself to this most foul impiety? Indeed, not just one. For from Frisia emerged Sibrandus Lubertus, Joannes Bogermannus and, by a common name, the ministers of Leeuwarden, and others from elsewhere, such as Acronius, Fraxinus, Bogaert, Plancius, Becius, and Festus, who launched no less an assault upon Vorstius and his disciples than the Lapiths did against the Centaurs; although the Centaurs, that is, the Vorstians, did not desert themselves. For besides the standard-bearer Vorstius himself, Hugo Grotius, advocate of the Dutch treasury, also took up and donned arms, having published a book to which he gave the title: *The Piety of the Estates of Holland and West Frisia*. But Sibrandus and Bogermannus received this *Piety* a little later, or rather beyond measure piously, so that perhaps Grotius already regrets his piety, and wishes that the time he spent on this *Piety* had been consumed in settling the treasury accounts, or in emending some poet.

But since the opponents of Vorstius are utterly crude and ignorant of true and solid theology and philosophy, it happens that they not only conduct the matter against Vorstius unskillfully and ineptly, but also more often accumulate errors upon errors, as anyone will admit who has perused the polemical libels published by them on this subject, or, if there is not enough leisure for that, has at least inspected them a little more curiously; to whom I advise that they submit themselves for instruction to Acindynus alone, who will teach them to think soundly and truly regarding the essence and operation of God; whom I am publishing in Greek only; would that it had been permitted to be entire and complete. But the manuscript codex was not only mutilated, but also most faulty. Perhaps there exists somewhere a more complete and correct one, from which those things that are lacking in ours might be supplied and restored. That this may happen, I hope. Whether the desired event will respond to the one hoping, I do not know. Fare thee well, my Reader.

OF THE MOST REVEREND AMONG THE HIEROMONKS, GREGORY ACINDYNUS, ON ESSENCE AND OPERATION.

THE CHAPTERS OF THE FIRST BOOK.

BOOK ONE.

All those who have discussed the essence and operation of God, whether these are one thing or whether they are the same in reality, have first overlooked the need to distinguish in how many ways this operation is understood: for it is considered in many ways. However, in every argument, investigation into the various senses of the predicate or the subject is of great benefit, both for us to discover the truth, and for us to deceive others, if we should so desire, and for us not to be deceived by others, ^B and that we may proceed in our reasoning in an orderly fashion, beginning where we ought, and tending toward the proper end; and furthermore, for giving order to the DISCOURSE,

that all things may be set forth clearly and evidently, and that words may correspond to the things defined. ^A These men, as has been said, not grasping this, and not having determined in advance the various senses, neither enter the contest as the question requires (for the battle would be forced upon them from elsewhere), nor do they bring their arguments in order to the necessary conclusion; but like wanderers, where the power of speech fails them, they fall away, nor do they understand one another, or, I might almost say, even themselves, because their discourses do not tend toward anything solid and compact, and therefore they battle in a disorganized way and in darkness. ^B We, therefore, must, while avoiding all such stumbling blocks, strive with all our might to accurately present all the meanings of the aforesaid operation, so that we may not fall away from the principle proper to the question, but may proceed in order and with decorum according to our argument toward the proper end, neither omitting anything necessary nor tarrying over superfluous matters; but presenting everything so clear and distinct that the truth of our discourses may be easily grasped by those who wish to learn, and falsehood easily refuted—for many, by affecting obscurity so that they may not be refuted, ignorantly darken the truth itself, and therefore render their own labor entirely vain. Thus the matter stands. ^C

Cap. II. On the division and order of the books of this work.

For I am not now making a rigorous division, but only sketching a general outline of what I intend to speak. ^A And the power opposed to this is called speculative, such as to contemplate, and to will, and to sense. For from the contemplating, nothing of the things contemplated is produced; but the contemplating agent, inasmuch as it claims the truth more for itself, becomes a perfection of itself, insofar as for everything the end proposed is the truth. Moreover, from the willing, nothing of the desired things is produced, but for the one willing ^B the greatest good is that he himself becomes what he is.

The other part of the active operation is the perfection of some external effect: for it leads some being from potentiality into act. This power and operation, however, is twofold: one is by nature, and the other by will; for every agent acts by nature or by will. But it differs in that nature is concerned with one thing; for fire always generates fire, and man generates man; but the will is concerned with diverse things; for example, it makes a house or does not make one, and indeed such a one or another one, unless the object of will be of such a kind that without it we cannot attain our end—for to not will this is not possible, just as I will bread, without which I am unable to live. The power and operation subject to the will are again twofold: one produces something from nothing and is called creative power and operation; the other makes something from something already existing, and can be called simply operative power and operation. But to call an operation the effect of an operation, just as art is called the effect of art, is permitted for now.

Since, therefore, operation is spoken of in so many ways, ^C it must be examined whether in any respect it can be said that God's essence is different from his operation. And first, indeed, concerning the operation which signifies form and perfection; for this is first and the principle in the order of operations, because just as each thing, insofar as it is potential, suffers, so insofar as it is in act, it acts; for every agent acts insofar as it is in act. Therefore, as the keel is the principle of a ship, and the heart of life, and the foundation of a house, so the discourse concerning operation must begin from the aforementioned operation.

If, therefore, it be demonstrated that there is no passive power in God, nor matter in which this operation might be as a form in matter, but that he is a form subsisting in itself, nay rather that his very being is the same as his essence, it is altogether necessary to confess that the operation of God is his own essence: which all perfectly conceive. ^D But it is one thing to show that there is no passive power in God, and another that there is no matter; since all matter is passive power, but not all passive power is matter; for immaterial things do not indeed have matter, but they do have some passive power for receiving being, insofar as it is their being, but they relate to this just as things which are diaphanous relate to light. Therefore, concerning each of those...

^A things whose demonstration is sought, this will be the proper question: for from the fact that there is no passive power in God, it will be shown that His essence and His being are identical; and from the fact that there is no matter in Him, it will be demonstrated that His operation, which is perfection and form, is not a part of the essence; and thus that the operation of God and His essence are the same, which is what is now proposed for investigation.

Chapter III. That there is no passive power in God.

1. That it is impossible for there to be a passive power in God is shown from this: for everything in whose substance power is admixed, insofar as it is of this kind, is able to be and not to be; for that which can be, can also not be. But God, in Himself, cannot not be, for He is eternal. Therefore, there is no power for being in God.

2. Furthermore, even if everything that is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act is prior in time in potency than in act, nevertheless, acts are simply prior to potency; for potency does not lead itself out into act, but is led out by something that is in act. Everything, therefore, that is in potency has something prior to itself. But God does not have anything prior to Himself, for He is the first being and the first cause of all things. There is not, therefore, in Him any passive power.

3. Furthermore, that which is of itself necessary cannot in any way be merely possible; for that which is necessary of itself has no cause. But everything that is possibly being has a cause. And if it has itself as a cause, then it would be its own cause, which is impossible; but if it has another as a cause, then it will not be ^B necessary of itself. But God is necessary of Himself; therefore, there is no such power in Him.

4. Furthermore, everything that acts, acts insofar as it is in act. When it is not entirely act, it does not act with its whole self, but with some part of itself. But that which does not act with its whole self is not the first agent; for it acts by participation in something, and not by its own essence. The first agent, therefore, which is God, has no power admixed with itself, by which it does nothing, but is wholly pure act.

5. Furthermore, if everything that acts acts insofar as it is in act, and God were not pure act, but an act admixed with potency, just as He would not act with His whole self, so He would not achieve anything as a whole; but He would be in need of some subject power ^C for the sake of acting, just as other things are, which are such acts in subject powers. And if this were so, He would not create (for to create is to make something out of nothing), which is contrary to the authority of the Holy Scripture. There is not, therefore, in God any passive power, according to which He suffers something merely and does not act.

6. Furthermore, just as each thing acts insofar as it is in act, so it also suffers insofar as it ^D is in potency; for motion is the act of that which exists in potency, insofar as it is in potency.

But God is entirely impassible and immutable. For "with Him," it is said, "there is no variation or shadow of turning." ^A He has, therefore, nothing of passive potency.

7. Again, we see something going from potency into act; and since that which is potentially is not yet, and therefore cannot act, it is necessary that there be something else prior, by which it is led into act. If, therefore, this also goes out from potency into act, it is necessary that something else again be presupposed, leading it from potency into act. And since it is not possible to proceed into infinity, it is necessary to arrive at something which is only in act; and this we call God. Therefore, etc.

8. Furthermore, such a potency is something imperfect; for if it is possessed, it is perfected by a form. But nothing is imperfect in God; therefore, there is no such potency. And if anyone says that such a potency is never without existence and form, nothing follows from that; for that which is perfected by another is, when considered in itself, imperfect. ^B

9. Moreover, we see something which is in potency and act, like natural things, and another which is only in potency, like prime matter. There must, therefore, be something also which is only in act, without potency; and this we say is God. Therefore, there is no passive potency in God.

10. Furthermore, if there is such a potency in God, it will be like the possessor to the thing possessed in operation; for according to potency, a thing is receptive of something. But Boethius clearly refutes this in his book *De consolatione*. For after he said that God is full of the supreme good, he adds, assuming the role of philosophy: ^C "I beseech you to judge most holily and purely that the supreme Good is most full of the supreme good, so that you might not dare to think that the Father of all things either receives from without that good with which it is testified that He is filled, or that it is natural to Him but diverse from His substance, as if God were a possessor and that were a possessed beatitude; for if you think He received it from without, you can suspect that the receiver is inferior to the giver, yet we rightly confess Him to be superior to all; but if those goods are in His nature, but are diverse in works, when we speak of the principle of things, let him who can devise who joined these unlike things." Therefore, there is no such potency in God. ^D

11. Finally, even if such a potency does not possess in some respects a tendency toward another form, as for instance the celestial bodies, they do, however, have a potency toward non-being; for each thing brings this forth from nothing as if it were a remainder of its former non-existence: therefore, according to this, each thing is nothing, and if anything is left to itself

not being conserved by God, it will abide for not even a moment, but will straightway depart and fall to ruin, as Augustine says. But God does not tend toward nothing, nor therefore toward such a potentiality. And for this reason, He is called impassible in Holy Scripture.

Chapter IV. That the essence of God is His being.

1. From these things it is evident ^A that the essence of God is His being. For every essence which is not its own being is in potency relative to this; but in God there is no such potency. The essence of God, therefore, is not an essence whose being is other than itself. Therefore, the essence of God and His being are the same.

2. Moreover, we see among existing things some that are possible to be and not to be, namely, things subject to generation and corruption. But everything that is possible to be and not to be has a cause of its existing, if it should exist. For if that which equally relates to being and not-being should proceed into being, it must have obtained this from some cause. But in causes, it is not possible to proceed to infinity; therefore, it is necessary to posit something that is necessarily existing. This, moreover, has the cause of its necessity either from elsewhere or not, but is necessary through itself. ^B But it is not possible to proceed to infinity in necessary things that have the cause of their necessity from elsewhere; therefore, it is necessary to posit some first necessary being, which is necessary through itself. And this is God, who is the first necessary being. Moreover, this "being-necessary-through-itself" is necessarily existence for that which is necessary through itself, just as "possible-to-be" is possible existence for that which is possible. If, therefore, this "being-necessary-through-itself" were the essence of something, it would either be contrary and repugnant to it, just as "to exist through itself" is repugnant to the color of whiteness; or it would be consonant and akin to it, just as "to be in another" is to whiteness. ^C If in the first way, it would not be fitting for that essence to be what is necessary through itself, just as it is not for whiteness to exist through itself. But if in the second way, then either this kind of being depends on the essence, or both depend on another cause, or the essence depends on the being. But the first two are contrary to the definition of that which is necessary through itself; for everything is necessary inasmuch as it does not depend; but from the third it follows that that essence accidentally arrives at the thing which is necessary through itself, because everything which follows upon the being of a thing is accidental to it, and thus it will not be its essence. God, therefore, does not have an essence which is not His being. ^D

3. But if someone says that that being does not depend absolutely on that essence, so that it would not exist at all if that were not, but that it depends as far as the conjunction by which it is conjoined—and thus that being is necessary through itself, but the being-conjoined is not necessary through itself, but because of the essence—this response does not escape the aforementioned absurdities. For if that being can be conceived

^A without that essence, it is clear that that essence stands in an accidental relation to that being. But that being is necessary being through itself; therefore, that essence stands in an accidental relation to what is necessary being through itself. Therefore, it is not its quiddity. For that which is necessary being through itself is God. Therefore, that is not the essence of God, but is posterior to the essence of God. But if that being cannot be conceived absolutely, it depends on that essence from which its conjunction also arises. And thus the previous difficulties return.

4. Item, everything is by its own being. He, therefore, who is not his own being is not necessary being through itself. But God is necessary being through itself; ^B therefore, God is his own being.

5. Furthermore, if the being of God is not his essence (nor can it be a part of it, since the divine essence is simple), it must be that such being is something other than his essence. Moreover, everything that belongs to something, even if it is not of its essence, belongs to it through some cause; for those things which are not one, if they are conjoined, must be united through some cause. Therefore, the being of God himself belongs to his essence through some cause. Consequently, it must be either through something which is of his essence, or through his essence, or through some other thing. ^C If by the first or second mode (since the essence is by that being), this is impossible; for the cause is prior according to the intellect than the effect. If, therefore, anything were understood to be to itself the cause of being, it would be understood to be before it had being, which is impossible, unless it is understood that the cause of being is according to accidental being, which is being in a certain respect; for this is not impossible, for there is found some accidental being caused from the principles of its subject, before which the substantial form of the subject is understood; but now we are not speaking of accidental being. ^D But if that being belongs to it through some other cause; and everything that acquires being from another cause is caused; and God, however, is the first cause not having a cause: that essence, therefore, which acquires being from elsewhere is not the essence of God; it is necessary, therefore, to say that the being of God is his essence.

6. Furthermore, everything that cannot be except by the concurrence of many is composite; but no thing in which the essence is one thing and the being is another can be except by the concurrence of many, namely of the essence and the being. Therefore, every thing in which the essence is one thing and the being is another is composite. But God is not composite. Therefore, the very being of God is his essence.

7. Finally, everything that is, is by that which it has for being; therefore, no thing, whose essence is not its own

being, is by its essence, but by participation in something else, clearly in its own being. But that which is by participation in something, cannot be the primary being. For that which is participated in by something for the sake of being, is prior to that which participates. But God is primary being, than whom nothing is prior. Therefore, the being of God is his essence.

Chapter V. Objections of the adversaries and their solutions with the proposition.

1. ^A It might appear that this essence of God is not his being. For the Damascene says in the first of his theological books: "That God is, is clear to us; but what he is according to essence or nature, is entirely incomprehensible and unintelligible." Therefore, essence and the being of God are not the same.

2. ^B But if someone says that even the very being of God is incomprehensible to us as to what it is, just as his essence is, ^C on the contrary, "whether it is" and "what it is" are different questions; we know how to answer one of them, but not the other, as is evident from the aforementioned text. Therefore, what we answer to the question "whether God is," and what we answer to the question "what he is," are not the same. For to the question "whether it is," we answer by the word "being"; but to the question "what it is," we answer by the word "essence." Therefore, the being of God and his essence are not the same.

3. But he said that the being of God is not perceived in itself, but through the likeness of the creature.

4. But on the contrary, in the creature there is both being and essence, and yet both are created by God, and according to both they are assimilated to God, because an agent acts to make something like itself. If, therefore, the being of God is known through the likeness of created being, it follows that his essence must also be known through the likeness of created essence; and thus we shall know concerning God not only that he is, but also what he is.

5. ^D Furthermore, everything is distinguished from anything whatsoever by its own essence, but by that which is common to all, nothing is distinguished from anything. Hence the Philosopher also says that "being" should not be placed in definitions. For that which is defined by nothing, by what shall it be distinguished? If, therefore, nothing differed from anything else, essence would be its very being, insofar as this is common to all. But God is something distinguished from all other things; therefore, his being is not his essence.

6. Furthermore, there are no different things, unless their being is different. But the being of this thing is not different from the being of that thing, insofar as it is "being," but insofar as it is in this or that nature. If, therefore, there were some "being" that was not in some nature different from the "being" itself, this would not differ from any other "being." And from this it follows

if the divine nature is His "being," that He is the common "being" to all. 12

Item: the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th objections are missing. The responses to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth arguments are missing.

To the sixth: the response is taken from this reasoning, that an addition cannot be made in God: for that is divine "being" to which nothing can be added, and it appertains to its very nature that an addition cannot be made to it; therefore, the divine "being" is not a common "being." Just as in the definition of a common animal the difference of "rational" is not added, yet it is not of the essence of the animal that an addition cannot be made to it, as is clear from the rational animal, which is the form of the animal.

To the seventh: it must be said that the mode of naming, in the names that are imposed by us upon things, follows our mode of understanding: for names indicate the passions of the souls, as is said in the preface ^B to *De Interpretatione*. Our intellect, however, understands "being" in the mode in which it is found in accidental things, from which it derives its cognitions; in which "being" is not subsisting of itself, but is accidental. But reason finds some being that is subsistent of itself. And therefore, although that which is called "being" is signified as a concrete, the intellect nonetheless, abstracting from the mode of signifying, expresses that which is signified.

To the eighth: it must be said that the statement of Boethius is understood of those things to which "being" belongs by participation, and not by essence: for that which is "being" by its own essence is more aptly said to be its own "being," than that it is some "being."

To the ninth: it must be said that this which I call "being" is the most perfect among other things: which is clear thus. For an operation is always more perfect ^C than a potentiality. Since, therefore, a form is not understood to be an operation, except according to the way in which it is brought into "being" (for humanity or igneity can be understood as it is in the potentiality of matter, or as in the potentiality of the agent, or even as in the intellect, but according to the way in which it has "being," it is a being in act, as is clear through what has been said, that "being" is the first act of all acts), therefore it is also the perfection of all perfections. But that which I say is "added," let it not be understood as being more specific, and determining that thing, as act determines potentiality: for every thing that is of such a kind is something other according to quiddity from that to which it is ^D added for the sake of determination; but nothing is added to "being" that is alien to it, in so far as nothing is non-participating in "being," except nothingness, which can be neither a potentiality of "being," nor a form, nor a difference. Therefore "being," in so far as it is "being," is not determined by other things, as potentiality is by act,

^A for in the definition of forms, the proper materials are placed in the category of differences; for instance, when the soul is said to be the perfection of a natural, organic body, in the same way this "being" differs from that "being," insofar as it is of such and such a nature. Therefore the divine Dionysius says: "Even if living things are better than beings, 'to be' is nevertheless better than 'to live,' because living things not only live, but at the same time possess 'being' with their living."

To the tenth, it must be said that the order of ends corresponds to the order of agents; for the primary end is subordinate to the primary agent, and in like manner other ends to other agents. ^B If one considers the ruler of a city, the commander of an army, and a single soldier under him, it turns out that the ruler of the city is first in the order of agents, at whose command the commander leads the army into battle, and under whom the soldier, according to the rank he has attained in the army, performs his duty by fighting with his hands. Now, the end of the soldier is to defeat the enemies; further than this is intended the victory of the army, which is the end of the commander; and further still, it is directed toward the utility of the city or kingdom, which is the end of the primary agent, and necessarily holds the place of the ultimate end. The end, which is first in intention, is nevertheless last in execution, and is the effect of other causes, specifically intended by the primary agent; for "being" comes from other principles, and the first cause is the first principle.

To the eleventh, it must be said that there is a certain proposition known in itself, that is, from itself, which however to this or that person is not known in itself, specifically when the predicate is included in the definition of the subject. ^C And if the definition of the subject is unknown to someone—for instance, if someone does not know what a "whole" is—it is clear that the proposition "Every whole is greater than its part" would not be known to him. For such propositions become known once the terms are known, as is said in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*. Therefore this proposition, "God is," is, as far as it is concerned in itself, known in itself—for the same thing is in the predicate and in the subject—but as far as we are concerned, it is not known in itself; for we do not know what God is, hence among us it requires demonstration, though not among those who see the essence of God.

Chapter VI. That God is not matter.

1. From what has been said, it appears that God is not matter. For matter is that which is in potentiality; but it has been demonstrated that there is no potentiality in God; therefore, there is no matter.

2. Again, matter is not the principle of action, ^D for matter and the efficient cause are different causes, according to the philosopher, of which the former—namely, the efficient cause—is appropriate to God; therefore, He is not matter.

3. Furthermore, it follows that natural things exist by chance to those who reduce all things to matter ^A as to a primary cause, against whom it has been argued in the second book of the *Physics*. If God, who is the primary cause, were the material cause of things, it would follow that all things come into being by chance.

4. Finally, matter is not the cause of any act ^B unless it is altered and changed. If, therefore, God is immutable and unchangeable, He can in no way be the cause of things by way of matter. The Catholic faith confesses this truth, asserting that God created all things not from His own substance, but from nothing. In this, the madness of David of Dinant is confounded, for he dared to say that God is the same as the first matter, because if He were not the same, it would be necessary for them to differ by some differences, and thus they would not be simple; for in those things which differ from another by a difference, that very difference causes composition. But this proceeded from an ignorance in which he did not know what the difference is between a "difference" and a "diversity." For the "differing," as is said in the tenth book of the *Metaphysics*, is relative ^C; for everything that differs, differs by something. But "diverse" is said absolutely, from the fact that it is not the same. A difference, therefore, is to be sought in those things which agree in something; for it is necessary that something be assigned in them according to which they differ, just as two species agreeing in a genus must necessarily be distinguished by differences. But in those things which do not agree in anything, one ought not to seek by what they differ, but they are diverse by themselves. For thus also opposite differences are distinguished from each other; for they do not participate in a genus as a part of their essence, and therefore it is not to be asked by what they differ, for they are diverse by themselves. Thus also God and prime matter are distinguished, of which the one is pure act, the other pure potentiality, and which do not agree in anything.

Cap. VII. Objections of adversaries against our proposition, and their solutions showing that there is no matter in God.

1. Perhaps someone might suspect that there is matter in God ^D from what is said in the eleventh chapter of Job: "He is higher than the heaven, and what will you do? Deeper than hell, and how will you know? The measure of him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea." Since, therefore, God is subject to dimensions, and indeed the proper subject of dimension is matter, it seems that there is matter in God.

2. Again, God is clothed in a figure [(i.e., a shape)]; for otherwise, man would not be to His image, as is witnessed in the first chapter of Genesis, saying on behalf of God: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." But figure is a quality concerning quantity, whose subject is matter, as we have said. Therefore, there is matter in God.

3. Furthermore, everything that has bodily parts is a body. God, however, has bodily parts, according to the...

Holy Scripture attributing them to Him. For it is said in the first volume of Job: "If you have an arm like God?" ^A And in the Psalms: "The eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous, and His ears are open to their cry." Therefore, He is a body, and it is likely that He is in matter; for no physical body exists without matter. To say that He is a mathematical body is altogether senseless; for this does not exist by itself, but only in the mind.

4. Furthermore, things pertaining to posture do not befit anyone but bodies; yet God is said in the Holy Scriptures to have a posture. For it is said in the sixth chapter of Isaiah: ^B "I saw the Lord sitting." And elsewhere: "The Lord stands to judge." Therefore, God is a body, and so on.

5. Furthermore, nothing can be the limit of a body, whether from which or to which, unless it is a body. But God is said to be a bodily limit, according to what is said in the Psalms: "Draw near to Him, and be enlightened." And as a limit from which, according to the words of Jeremiah in the seventeenth chapter: "Those who turn away from You shall be written in the earth." Therefore, God is a body, and a form in matter.

Response

It must be said that Augustine says in the first chapter of the first book *De Trinitate* that Holy Scripture, accommodating itself to infants, has not declined either of the kinds of terms pertaining to creatures—that is, the bodily or the spiritual—from which as if by steps our mind, striving toward ^C divine and higher things, may ascend. For, in speaking of God, it uses words taken from bodily things—as when it says: "In the shadow of Your wings You will protect me"—and it designates many of the intellectual creatures by metaphors, by which it shows that they are not so in reality, but should be so spoken of, as is that: "I am jealous," and that: "I repent." But those things which are said properly of God, and are not found in any creature, Scripture sets down rarely. This doctor, therefore, brings forward one cause why such names are used.

Dionysius, besides this one, adds others. For when he says that our intellect cannot be raised to that immaterial imitation and contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies ^D unless it uses a guidance appropriate to it, he seems in a way to say the same thing as Augustine. But afterward he touches upon other points; he says, for example, that it is fitting for mystical discourses to be wrapped in hidden and sacred enigmas, and to make the sacred and secret truth of heavenly spirits inaccessible to the many.

He gives a third reason for the use of such names, namely, that the things signified by them have some likeness to God; for he says that these are, as it were, reflections of the divine beauty, by which, therefore, it is possible to be led back to the immaterial archetypes.

^A Since, therefore, although various sciences may be concerned with the same object, each is nonetheless occupied with it according to its own proper principle—just as physics and mathematics deal with bodies, yet the one considers these within matter, while the other abstracts from matter—and since a doctor and an astrologer both judge concerning health, yet the astrologer does so from higher causes, namely the inspection of the stars, while the doctor does so from more proximate ones, namely the strength of the suffering body and the nature of the disease: it is evident that, even if the object of inquiry for the theologian is the same as for the physicist and mathematician—for example, dimensions, figures, and propositions—they do not judge them according to the same principle. Rather, while those others, as has been said, each inquire into their own proper subjects according to their respective sciences, the theologian inquires into what they are from God, and in God, and to God, and how they manifest Him.

Since, therefore, although every agent produces something like itself, it nevertheless produces some things univocally and others equivocally, and those things which are equivocal differ greatly according to the higher and lower principle: it is manifest that although the theologian attributes to God—Who is the efficient Cause of all nonequivocal things—figures, dimensions, propositions, and other such things, he does not attribute them as they are in themselves, but as they are in God and as they bear some likeness to Him; so that only the names are the same for God and for creatures, but the realities designated by them differ completely according to the principle of superiority and inferiority: for those things which are in effects exist eminently in their causes, according to the great Dionysius. ^{B C}

To the first point, therefore, it must be said that Holy Scripture transmits spiritual and divine things to us under the likenesses of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes three-fold dimensions to God, it designates the virtual quantity of His power under the likeness of corporeal quantity: for example, by "depth," the power to know hidden things; by "height," the excellence of His power over all things; by "length," the perpetual duration of His being; by "breadth," the disposition of His love toward all things. Or, as Dionysius says in the ninth chapter of *The Divine Names*, by the "breadth" of God is understood the supereffusion of God upon all things; by "length," the power that is extended above all things; by "depth," the incomprehensibility that remains hidden from all creatures. ^D

To the second point, it must be said that man is said to be "according to the image of God" not according to his body, but according to that whereby he excels other animals. Whence, immediately after it is said, "Let us make man," it is added, "That he may rule over the fish of the sea," etc. Now man excels other animals insofar as he possesses the incorporeal reason, according to which he is indeed the image of God.

To the third point, it must be said that certain corporeal parts are attributed to God, but it is because their acts ha-

have a similarity to the acts of God; for because God acts—which is the property of hands—and sees—which is the proper act of the eyes in us—therefore what acts in God is named ^A hands, and what sees, eyes.

To the fourth point, it must be said that those things which pertain to position are not attributed to God except according to a certain similarity; just as it is said that he is sitting, on account of his immobility, immutability, and authority; and standing, on account of his strength to overcome everything that opposes him.

To the fifth point, it must be said that one does not approach God with bodily steps, since he is everywhere, but by the affections of the mind. Therefore, Augustine says in the book *On the Confession of Faith* that he is in all things, but not all are in him, ^B save for those who have become similar to him through virtue. In the same way, one also departs from him; and thus, an approach and a withdrawal denote, under the likeness of bodily motion, a spiritual affection.

Cap. VIII. Conclusion of the first book.

From what has been said, it is manifest that the essence of God is his operation. For everything which is not a form in matter is a form subsisting by itself. But God is an immaterial form, as has been demonstrated; therefore, he is a form subsisting by itself. Furthermore, the form and perfection of a thing has been said to be its operation. Therefore, the essence of God is his operation, ^C insofar as it is neither matter, nor a form in matter, nor is there in him any passive potency, but it is most especially his being, which is called pure act, the act of all things. Therefore, those who have said that God is not simply his own operation have not asserted this correctly. For it has been shown that he is, in a certain way, his own operation, for this very reason: that it seems impossible in itself to say that the essence of God is not his operation. For there is present a contradiction in the same thing, just as if someone were to say that the essence of God is not his essence, insofar as essence and operation signify one and the same thing in forms ^D that subsist by themselves.

BOOK SECOND.

CHAPTERS OF THE SECOND BOOK.

1. That the operations perfective of the one possessing them are fittingly placed before other operations, which are perfective of exterior effects. 2. That there is no sense perception in God. 3. That God is intelligent. 4. That God is willing. 5. That there is in God an intellective and appetitive power. 6. That the habits of these powers are attributed to God.

Cap. VII. That such operations and their habits and powers are one and the same in God. ^A Cap. VIII. Objections of the adversaries, and their solutions with a proposition. Cap. IX. Again on the same argument. Cap. X. That the intellectual power of God is His essence. Cap. XI. That the intellectual power of God is His operation. Cap. XII. That God understands by no other intelligible species than His own essence. Cap. XIII. That God perfectly understands Himself. Cap. XIV. That in God there is no habit of science. Cap. XV. That the wisdom of God is His essence. Cap. XVI. That the truth of God is His essence. Cap. XVII. That the will of God is His essence. Cap. XVIII. That the principal object willed by the divine will is the divine essence. Cap. XIX. Reasons for which these things appear distinct from one another, and their solutions with a proposition. ^B Cap. XX. How God is to Himself as an object willed within the One willing. Cap. XXI. That God is His own life. Cap. XXII. Objections of the adversaries and their solutions. Cap. XXIII. That God is His own goodness. Cap. XXIV. That God is blessed. Cap. XXV. That God is His own blessedness. Cap. XXVI. That these names are not synonymous. Cap. XXVII. Whether these names are said univocally of God and of creatures. Cap. XXVIII. That these names are not said equivocally of God and things. Cap. XXIX. That these names are said analogically of God and things. Conclusion of the second book. ^C

SECOND BOOK

These things having been said, therefore, concerning the first operation, now we must speak of the second: for the former relates to the latter as the first perfection to the second. But when we distinguished operation in two ways, saying that one is perfective of the one possessing it, and the other perfective of some exterior effect, we must now first discourse upon the operation that is perfective of the possessor, namely, understanding, willing, and sensing. For by right, the operation that is considered as form and perfection has been placed before this, because it is its principle: for nothing acts insofar as it is potential, but insofar as it is act. We place this again before the others, because the others are for the sake of an end, but this is itself the end. For the generator intends the form of the thing generated, which is the end of generation; and further, the communication and likeness of the divine being, with its proper species, in those things for which the elements are not common; and furthermore, its own likeness to God, insofar as it is a cause. And the architect acts for the sake of the form of the house, and further for the sake of the protection of his goods: for this, in intention, is prior—the form of the house—in action ^D

it is posterior; and he proceeds even further, acting for the sake of his own good. For he produces the form of the house and the protection of the goods in order to receive the wage, which is his own proper good. We understand, and we will, and we sense each thing for its own sake, and not for the sake of something else. Since, therefore, every agent acts for the sake of an end, if there be no end of acting to which the operation is terminated, the operation itself is the end. It is manifest, moreover, that the end is always better than those things which are for the sake of the end: for that for the sake of which something is desirable, that thing is more desirable itself. Since, therefore, the operations perfective of the one possessing them—namely, to understand, to will, to sense—are as an end, while the operations effective of certain external results are as [being] for the sake of an end, it is necessary that the former be better than the latter. Wherefore, we must speak first concerning the former, and determine whether they are the same as the essence of God or something else.

Cap. II. That there is no sensation in God.

And indeed, there is no difficulty in the fact that there is no sensation in God: for sensing requires bodily organs; God, however, does not have an organic body, for it has been demonstrated that He is pure from all matter. Therefore, God does not sense.

2. Furthermore, sensation arises from passion: for it comes about by the mutation and alteration of the sensory organs. But in God it has been demonstrated that there is no passive power; therefore, there is no sensation.

3. Furthermore, the operation of sensing is the acting according to a sensible [form], in that it is a subject of sensible forms. But God is not a subject of any sensible form; therefore, He does not sense.

4. Furthermore, the sensible is prior to the sentient, as the philosopher says in the Categories. But God is not sensible, for there is no sensation of Him, says holy Dionysius. Therefore, a fortiori, He is not sentient: for there is nothing prior to God, either in reality or in understanding. Therefore, He does not sense.

5. Furthermore, sensation does not know universals and eternal things, but this thing and now. But God knows universals and eternal things, and whatever He knows of individual and present things, He knows as universals and eternal things, in so far as He knows all things in Himself. Therefore, He does not sense.

6. Furthermore, to sense is to have apprehension from things. But God does not have apprehension from things, but rather communicates it to things; therefore, He does not sense. But these things are sufficient.

Cap. III. That God is intelligent.

That there is no sensation in God is manifest from what has been said; that God is intelligent is demonstrated from this: for in [the case of] movers and things moved, it is not possible to proceed to infinity. First, indeed, because all things of this sort—the infinite ones—must be bodies; for every

^A body that moves is necessarily moved, and is moved simultaneously while it moves. Therefore all these infinite things will be moved at the same time, while one of them is being moved. But the one among them which is finite is moved in a finite time. And all those other infinite things are moved according to a finite time. But this is impossible, whether they are one mobile [object] through continuation or through contiguity. Therefore, it is impossible in moving and moved things to proceed to infinity.

Second, because in moving and moved things that are ordered—of which one is moved in order by another—it is necessary for this to be found, that if the first mover is removed, or if the motion ceases, none of the others will move or be moved; for the first is the cause for all of moving and being moved. But if there are moving and moved things in order to infinity, there will be no first mover, but all will be as it were intermediate movers. Therefore none of these will be able to be moved, and thus nothing in the world will be moved: which is refuted by the senses. ^B

Third, the argument is that that which moves instrumentally cannot move unless there be something that moves principally. But if one proceeds to infinity in moving and moved things, all will be as it were instrumental movers, for they will all be like moving things which are moved; but there will be nothing like a principal mover: therefore nothing will be moved: which can be refuted by the induction of the many things that are moved in the world. For this reason, it is necessary to reduce all mobile things to one first mover of itself. ^C But that which moves itself moves itself through appetite and apprehension; for only these are found to move themselves, inasmuch as in them there is [the capacity] to move and be moved. Therefore, it is necessary that the part in the first mover that moves itself be appetite and apprehension. But in the motion which is through appetite and apprehension, the one desiring and apprehending is the mover being moved, but that which is desirable and apprehensible is the mover not being moved.

Since, therefore, that which is the first of all movers, which we call God, is entirely unmoved, it is necessary that it be compared to the mover which is the mover of itself, as the desirable is to the desiring, but not as the desirable is to a sensual appetite; for ^D sensual appetite is not of the good simply, but of this particular good, since the sensual apprehension also is not unless of a particular good. But that which is good and desirable simply is prior to that which is good and desirable here and now. It is necessary, therefore, that the first mover be desirable as an object of intellect, and thus it is necessary that the mover which desires it be intelligent. Therefore, much more will the first desirable thing itself be intelligent; for the one desiring it becomes intelligent in act through this, that it is united to it as to an intelligible. It is necessary, therefore, that God be intelligent, given the supposition that the first moved thing moves itself, as the philosophers wished.

Further, the same consequence must follow, if there were a reduction

^A of moved things, not to something that moves itself, but to something that is altogether immovable. For that which moves primarily is the principle of all motion in general. It is necessary, therefore, since everything that moves, moves according to some form—which it keeps in view while moving—that the form which the first mover keeps in view be a universal form and a universal good. But form is not found in a universal manner except in the intellect. It is necessary, therefore, that the first mover, which is God, be intelligent.

β. Furthermore, it is not found in any order of moved things that that which moves intelligently is the instrument of that which moves without an intellect; but rather the contrary is true. Now, all things in the world are compared to the first mover. Since, therefore, there are many things in the world that move through an intellect, it is impossible for the first mover to move without an intellect; it is necessary, therefore, that God be intelligent.

γ. Furthermore, it follows from this that whatever is intelligent is without matter, of which the sign is that forms become intelligible in act by abstraction from matter. Whence the intellect is of universals, and not of particulars, because ^B matter is the principle of individuation. But the intelligible forms become one with the intellect that is actually thinking. Wherefore, if the forms become intelligible in act because they are without matter, it is necessary on this account that there be some intelligent thing, because it is without matter. Now it has been shown above that God is altogether immaterial: He is, therefore, intelligent.

δ. Furthermore, no perfection of those found in any genus of beings is absent from God; but among the rest of the perfections of things, the most powerful is that something should be intelligent. Therefore, intelligence is in God.

ε. Furthermore, everything that tends toward some end either appoints the end for itself, or the end is appointed for it by another. Otherwise, it would not tend toward this end rather than that one any more. But natural things tend toward definite ends. For natural benefits do not follow from chance. For thus they would not always exist, or for the most part, but for the least part. For chance and fortune belong to these. ^C Since, therefore, they do not appoint the end for themselves, because they do not know the reason of the end, it is necessary that an end be appointed for them by another, which is like one leading them to the end. But this is He who provides existence to all, and is necessary being through Himself, which we say is God, as is plain from what was said above. But He could not appoint an end to nature unless He were intelligent. God, therefore, is intelligent.

ς. Furthermore, everything imperfect proceeds from something perfect. For things that are perfect are naturally prior to the imperfect, as act is to potency. But the forms that exist in individual things are imperfect because they exist particularly and not according to the reason of their own commonality. It is necessary, therefore, that they be derived from some perfect forms, and not ^D from particular ones. Such forms, however, cannot be unless they are

in the intellect, since no form is found in its universality except in the intellect; and consequently, it is necessary for them to be intelligent if they are subsistent in themselves, for in this way alone can they be operative. Therefore, it is necessary that God, who is the first act subsisting in Himself, from whom all other things derive, be intelligent. ^A This truth is also confessed by the Catholic faith; for in the ninth chapter of Job it is said of God: "He is wise in heart and mighty in strength," and in the twelfth: "With Him is strength and wisdom," and in the Psalms: "Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me," and in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans: "O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God!" The truth of this faith has so prevailed among men that the name given to God is taken from the act of understanding—that is, "the Seer"—for He does not see with eyes, since He does not possess sense.

Chapter IV. That God is willing.

1. Having said these things about the divine intellect, it follows that we must confess Him to be willing; for from understanding, willing follows. Since the understood good is the proper object of the will, it is necessary that the understood good, insofar as it is such, be something willed, and indeed by one who understands, but not by one who does not understand. ^B It is necessary, therefore, that he who understands the good, insofar as it is such, be willing. Now God understands the good; for since He is perfectly intelligent, He understands being together with the reason of the good: He is therefore willing.

2. Again, whoever possesses any form has through that form a relationship to the things which are in the nature of things; just as a white piece of wood, through its whiteness, is similar to some things and dissimilar to others. But in one who understands and perceives, there is the form of the thing understood and falling under sense, since all cognition is through some likeness. Therefore, there must be a relationship of the one who understands and perceives to those things which are in the intellect and in sense, according to how they exist in the nature of things. ^C This is not, however, brought about through the fact that they understand and perceive; for through that, the relationship of things to the one understanding and perceiving would be more considered, because understanding and perceiving exist according to how things are in the intellect and sense according to the mode of each. But the one perceiving and understanding has a relationship to the thing which is outside the soul through the will and appetite: whence all perceiving and understanding beings desire and will. Nevertheless, the will is properly in the intellect, for the will is the appetite of a rational nature. ^D Since, therefore, God is understanding, He is necessarily willing.

3. Furthermore, that which follows every being is appropriate to a being insofar as it is being; and that which is of such a nature must be found most truly in the First Being. But it is appropriate for every being to desire, in the highest degree, to attain its own perfection and the preservation of its own being, to each according to

^A its own mode: to intellectual beings through the will, to animals through sensible appetite, and to those lacking sense through natural appetite; differently, however, to those that possess their own perfection, and differently to those that do not. For those that do not possess it, through the appetitive power of their own being, hasten to acquire what is lacking to them; but those that do possess it, find rest in it. This, therefore, cannot be lacking in the First Being, which is God. Since, then, He is intelligent, it is evident that will is present in Him, by which His own being and His own goodness are pleasing to Him.

4. Furthermore, to understand is the more delightful, the more perfect it is for the one who understands. But God understands, and His understanding is most perfect, as was shown above; therefore, His act of understanding is most delightful to Him. But intellectual delight is through the will, just as sensible delight is according to the appetite of desire. Therefore, there is will in God.

^B 5. Furthermore, the form considered by the intellect does not move nor cause anything, except through the mediation of the will, whose object is the end and the good by which one is moved to act. But the form of the Divine intellect is the cause of motion and of being in others; for He brings things into being through His intellect. Therefore, it is necessary that He be a willing agent.

6. Furthermore, in motive powers and in those that possess intellect, the will is found to be prior; for the will applies every power to its own act. For we understand because we will, and we imagine because we will, and so on for the rest. And this is because the object of these is the end. For the intellect does not move the will after the manner of an efficient and moving cause, but after the manner of a final cause, by proposing to it its proper object, which is the understood good. Therefore, it is most appropriate for the First Agent to possess will.

^C 7. Furthermore, the end and that which is directed towards the end are always found to be of the same order. Whence also that which is directed towards the end, which is proportionate to the agent, falls into the same species as the agent, as is the case in natural things, and even in artificial things. For the form of art, through which the artist acts, is the species of the form which is in the matter, which is the end of the artist; and the form of the fire that generates, through which it acts, is of the same species as the form of the generated fire, which is the end of the generation. But to God, nothing is coordinated as if it were of the same order, except Himself to Himself; for otherwise there would be many first principles. He Himself, therefore, is the principle acting for the sake of an end, which is He Himself; He Himself, therefore, is not only the desirable end, but He also desires Himself as the end, and indeed with an intellectual appetite, inasmuch as He is intelligent; but this appetite of a rational nature is the will. Therefore, there is will in God.

8. Furthermore, that is free which is the cause of its own acting for itself; and thus the free has the nature of that ^D which is through itself. But the will is primarily free in acting; for in as much as anyone acts voluntarily, he is said to act freely in whatever action. Primarily

then, it is fitting for the agent that acts by will, to whom it is most fitting to act for his own sake. ^A

9. Furthermore, the universe has some end. For all things in beings would happen by chance, unless it were said that the first creations do not exist for the sake of an end, but by material necessity, while the creatures after them exist for the sake of an end; just as Democritus argued that the celestial bodies came to be by chance, but the things below them from determined causes. This is refuted in the second book of the *Physics*, on the grounds that better things cannot partake less of order than worse things. It is necessary, therefore, to acknowledge that in the procession of creatures from God there is some most purposeful end. Now, both nature and will are found to act for the sake of an end, yet in one way and another. For nature, not knowing the end, nor the reason of the end, nor the relation of that which is to the end, cannot set an end for itself, nor move itself toward an end, nor order, nor direct; but all these things belong to one who acts by will, inasmuch as he who can understand both the end and all the aforementioned. ^B Whence, he who acts by will acts for the sake of an end in such a way that he proposes the end to himself, and in some manner moves himself toward the end, ordering his operations to it; but nature tends toward the end directly and as if moved by someone intellectual and willing, as is evident in an arrow, which tends toward a determined end because it is directed by the archer: according to which manner it has been said by the philosophers that the work of nature is the work of intellect. But that which is by another is always posterior to that which is by itself; whence it is necessary that the first ordering toward an end orders by will. And thus God brought creatures into existence by will. He has, therefore, a will. ^C

10. Furthermore, nature is determined to one thing, but will to diverse things. And because every agent acts in a way similar to itself, it is necessary for nature to tend toward that likeness which is determined to one. But since equality takes its origin from unity, while inequality is born from the many that are diverse—whence something is not equal to another except in one way, but is unequal by various degrees—it is necessary that nature should always make what is like itself, unless it be hindered by the weakness of the active power or of the receptive and passive power. But the inability of the passive power is not in God, who has no matter, as has been shown; nor is His active power weakened, since it is infinite. Whence, things that are similar and equal to Him proceed from Him only naturally, as the Son and the Holy Spirit; ^D but creatures, which proceed as unequal, proceed not by nature but by will; for there are many other degrees of inequality according to which creation could occur; for the divine power cannot be said to be determined to one thing only, since it is infinite. Whence, since the divine power is such that it can extend to many degrees of inequality in creation, and not to a determined degree, and yet He produced the universe by free choice: it is necessary, therefore, that they proceed from will, and not from nature. Therefore, God wills.

^A Furthermore, if every agent always produces something similar to itself, it is necessary that the effects of these agents should exist within their own cause. And everything that is in something, is in it according to its own mode. Whence, since God Himself is Intellect, creatures pre-exist in Him in an intelligible manner; for the blessed Dionysius says that the divine intellect does not know beings by learning from existing things, but from Himself and in Himself, He possesses the knowledge, cognition, and essence of all things by way of cause. That which is in the intellect, however, does not go forth from it except by means of the will; for the will is what brings to pass those things which are in the intellect, since the thing understood moves the will, and by this it is necessary for God to will. With this the words in the Psalms also harmonize: “Everything that He willed, He did” (Ps. CXIII, 20); and in the Epistle to the Romans: “But if God, willing to show,” etc.

Chapter V. That there is in God an intelligent and volitional power.

That such operations at least exist in God, and are the perfecting principles of the One possessing them, I believe has been sufficiently demonstrated from what has been said.

1. Let us inquire whether the powers corresponding to these—such as the intelligent, the volitional, and in general the active power—exist in Him or not. Therefore, it seems that no such power exists in Him. For power is the principle of an operation. But the operation of God, which is His essence, as will be demonstrated hereafter, does not have a principle: for it is neither generated, nor does it proceed. In God, therefore, there is no power.

2. Furthermore, everything that is most perfect must be attributed to God. Therefore, that which looks toward something more perfect than itself must not be attributed to Him; but every power looks toward something more perfect than itself—evidently the passive, toward the form, and the active, toward the operation. Therefore, power ought not to be attributed to God.

3. Furthermore, a habit is more perfect than a power, as being closer to acting. But a habit is not in God, as will be demonstrated in what follows. Therefore, neither is a power.

4. That every power, when separated from its own operation, is imperfect. And since nothing imperfect is fitting for God, it would not, therefore, seem fitting to attribute power to God.

5. And if anyone should say that such power is never separated from its own operation, even so, it does not achieve anything; for what is perfect by means of something else, when considered in itself, is imperfect. Therefore, there is no power in Him.

6. Furthermore, the category of essence is better than the other categories. But essence is not attributed to God—as Augustine says. Much less, then, could one attribute the category of quality to Him. But power is placed in the second species of quality. Therefore, power ought not to be attributed to God.

^A But to the contrary is what is said by the blessed Dionysius in the eighth chapter of *The Divine Names*: "God is power, as possessing and exceeding every power within Himself." For if He possesses every power, it is manifest that He also possesses the intellective and the volitive.

Furthermore, everything that understands and wills can understand and will. For whatever cannot understand and will is incapable of understanding and willing; and what is incapable of understanding and willing, of necessity neither understands nor wills. But God is understanding and willing, as was shown above. Therefore, He has the power to understand and to will.

*Response.* It must be said that, for the demonstration of this question, it is worth knowing that power, as we have said, is compared to operation. Operation, however, is twofold: namely, one which is form, and another which is action. And it seems that to this action, from the common intelligence of men, the name of operation was primarily given; for thus almost everyone understands operation. Secondarily, however, this name was transferred to form, because form is the principle and end of operation or action. Whence power also is twofold: one active, upon which depends the operation that is called action, and to this it seems that the name of power was primarily given. But because nothing acts except by reason of active power, and it pertains to God to be pure and primary act, therefore active power belongs most especially to Him, and so much the more, because it is the operation ^B of the intellect.

To the first point, therefore, it must be said that power is not only called the principle of operation, but also of the effect, when the operation is the producer of some exterior effect. ^C When, therefore, power is the principle of the effect, it is necessarily also the principle of the operation, unless it is first shown that the power is other than the operation, and that the latter proceeds from the former really. For it is worth knowing that in the divine realm a twofold distinction is found: one real, by which the persons are distinguished from one another, such as paternity and filiation, because the persons are distinguished from one another really, and not merely by reason, which is the heresy of Sabellius; and another, which is only according to reason. When it is said: "Operation flows from the divine essence, or from the power," or, "God acts through His own essence," these propositions designate certain distinctions of reason: for if these distinctions were real, they would distinguish the persons. That these are distinctions of reason is proven thus. When, in fact, an operation is attributed to God according to its nature, which requires a principle, there is also attributed to Him a distinction of that which is from a principle, situated in the fact that something is from another. Whence this distinction is only of reason. It is, however, of the nature ^D of operation, not of the nature of essence: whence, although the divine essence does not have a principle, nor ac-

- cundum rem, nevertheless the divine operation, although it be the same as the essence, has a principle according to its own reason. For if something is the same as another thing *secundum rem* (according to the thing itself), but not *secundum rationem* (according to reason), it does not follow that what is predicated of one *secundum rationem* must necessarily be predicated of the other. ^A What I say, I shall make clearer by an example: For in a line, the beginning and the end are the same *secundum rem*, as both are a point; but it is not necessary that the things which are predicated of the beginning should also be predicated of the end, because the beginning and the end are not the same *secundum rationem*. So, therefore, even if the essence of God and the operation were the same *secundum rem*, it is not necessary, since it is of the reason of the latter to be from a principle, that this should consequently apply also to the essence, because the essence and the operation are not the same *secundum rationem*.

^B Regarding the second point, it must be said that our intellect intends to attribute to God that which is most perfect. And because it cannot attain to Him except through the likeness of effects, and since there is not found in creatures anything supremely perfect that is entirely devoid of imperfection, for this reason it endeavors to attribute to Him the various perfections found in creatures, even though there is something imperfect in each of these perfections; yet in such a way that whatever imperfection is inherent in each of these perfections, all of it is removed from God. For instance, "to be" signifies something full and simple, but not subsisting in itself; ^C but "essence" signifies something subsisting, but as a subject to another. We say, therefore, that God is an essence, but an essence in terms of the reason of subsisting in itself, not in terms of the reason of being a subject to another; likewise we attribute "to be" to Him, but "to be" in terms of the reason of simplicity and fullness, not in terms of the reason of existing and inhering in another. In this way we also say that God is power and operation; but we say He is operation by reason of perfection (for operation, compared to power, is more perfect), not by reason that operation is something produced; but we say He is power, because He always remains and is the principle of operation, not in the sense that He is perfected through operation. Although, therefore, it is necessary to attribute every most perfect thing to God, ^D yet not everything that is attributed to God can be perfect, because it is not, as we have said; but it is necessary, for example, that the reason of perfection inherent in that which is attributed as most perfect should have something perhaps more perfect than itself, to which in turn that perfection is lacking which the other has; because there is nothing so entirely perfect that it contains all perfections in itself, except God.

Regarding the third point, it must be said that a habit exists in a passive power, and it is more perfect than it, as its form; such a power is not in God.

Regarding the fourth and fifth points, it must be said that the power attributed to God is not something other than His essence and operation, as will be shown below; whence nothing can be considered more perfect than it, nor can it be understood separately from the operation, but the name and reason of power is attributed

^A to the essence, in so far as it befits it to be the active principle.

To the sixth point, it must be said that Augustine does not attribute to God an essence which is under the genus of essence or a genus, but an essence which is a principle, not only of the genus of essence, but also of the other genera. Qualities, however, should not be attributed, because they are in passive potency, which is not in God, as has been demonstrated.

Chapter VI. That habits are attributed to God corresponding to these operations.

That habits corresponding to these operations are attributed to God is manifest. For wisdom, and science, and truth, and goodness are said of God, all of which are habits; for by derivation from these someone is called wise, and true, and good: which follows from habits, in so far as they are qualities. That these arise from intellection and volition is clear. For wisdom is the comprehension of caused things in their superior and primary causes; but God, who is the supreme and primary cause of all things, knows himself: therefore he is wise. And the divine Scripture cries out, saying: «To him who is able to do all things more superabundantly than we ask or understand—to the only wise God, to him be glory for ever and ever.» ^B

Science, moreover, is the comprehension of universals from primary and necessary principles. But God knows universals from primary and necessary principles, which are himself; he is therefore all-knowing, or rather the inventor of every path of science. Truth, moreover, according to the Philosopher, is not strictly in things: for truth is the conformity and adequation of the intellect and the thing; whence being and the true are convertible. For whether things are considered, the intellect is true when it is conformable and adequate to them; or if the intellect is viewed, it is true as being conformable and adequate to things. Such is the state of things. But God does not ignore himself, but knows himself as he is; and this knowledge of his is the measure of beings, by which the things that inhere in each one are limited. For his knowledge is compared to beings as the knowledge of an artisan is to the things crafted. Whence he is entirely true. Wherefore Paul says: «But let God be true.» ^C And the will of God is called good, taking its form from the opposite. For the object to which the will is carried is the good. Therefore the Spirit, who as will proceeds from the Father according to a certain proper mode, is called holy and good, although the Father and the Son are also holy and good; just as he is also properly called Spirit, although the Father and the Son are also called Spirit. For some things which pertain to the three simultaneously and commonly are nevertheless attributed properly to one; just as truth also to the Son, for he says: «I am the truth»; for truth is proper to the Word, although the Father himself and the Holy Spirit are also truth. ^D

Chapter VII. That such operations, and the habits and powers corresponding to them, are one and the same in God.

^A It must be inquired whether these operations, and the powers and habits corresponding to them, are one and the same relative to essence and to one another, each signifying something simple and perfect in a particular way, insofar as they are appellations and particular reasons of particular things; or whether they are different in reality and in reason, yet coherent and undivided from one another, as in us: so that the essence is reduced to the first category, while understanding and willing are reduced to action, and the powers and habits to various species. For it is difficult, when all things are different, for a simple being to be formed from them, such as the common sense of men declares God to be. ^B Some indeed affirm and attempt to prove that God is simple, even though he consists of such things—namely, that the essence of God is simple, as being in no way coalescent from many parts, just as the essence of the soul is; and yet, they understand that God himself, composed of so many different things, even if these things differ in reality according to the hypotheses of many, is nevertheless simple. For otherwise the essence of the soul would not be simple, since in this essence, power and operations are different from one another. Therefore, Augustine says in his book ^C *On True Simplicity* that the simplicity of God alone is manifold, because in Him is found not only the simplicity of essence, but also that of power; and that this manifoldness is simple in a certain respect, and that the essence, and the power, and the other attributes are one thing and simple. But this statement would be appropriate for them if they did not suppose that these are not things, but only notions, as some of the ancient theologians used to term them when speaking of differences, affirming that they are not things, but ideas of our intellect, just as genera and species are said to be. ^D But now it is difficult, or rather impossible, to call God simple and at the same time consisting of so many different *real* things: for thus He would be one in subject but many in accidents, one in whole but many in parts, and consequently, He would not be one and simple absolutely, but only in a certain way and in a certain respect.

Thus far the Bavarian codex. All the rest is lacking, as is the solution to those things which are here objected against the simplicity of God from the person of the adversary.