Barlaam of Seminara

GREGORY ACINDYNUS, POEM ON THE HERESIES OF GREGORY PALAMAS

THE SAME, EPISTLES AND ADHORTATORY IAMBICS TO NICEPHORUS GREGORAS

ANNO DOMINI 1350

BARLAAM OF SEMINARA NOTITIA

^A Seminariensis, according to Leo Allatius lib. II, cap. 17, *de eccles. Occid. et Orient. perpet. consensu*, was a monk of the institute of St. Basil, abbot of St. Savior in the city of Byzantium, though promoted by Andronicus Caesar, as Maimbourg cites below; later, in the year 1342, Bishop of Hieracium: a man very learned in both languages, and in Greek indeed the teacher of Francis Petrarch, as the same Petrarch writes in Epist. 11, *Rerum senilium*, to Hugo Siberenate. "Our age," he says, "has had in Calabria some men very learned in the Greek language, among them two: Barlaam the monk, and Leo, or Leontius the Thessalonian; both were familiar to me: the former had even been my teacher."

Furthermore, this Leo, or Leontius Pilatus, whom Petrarch calls a Thessalonian (perhaps solely by reason of origin, for our Tafurus counts him among ours), says that he was also a pupil of Barlaam, and also the teacher of Giovanni Boccaccio in the Greek arts; the latter describes him in the 15th book of *De Genealogia Deorum*, cap. 6: "After these, I often cite Leontius Pilatus the Thessalonian, and, as he himself asserts, a pupil of the aforementioned Barlaam: a man who is indeed horrifying to look upon; with a foul face, an overgrown beard, black hair, and occupied in constant meditation: a man uncultivated in his manners and not sufficiently urbane; yet, as experience has ^B made known, he is an inexhaustible archive of Greek histories and chronicles, even if he is not yet sufficiently instructed in Latin matters: I have seen no work of his, and I have perceived whatever I recite from him from his own living voice; for I heard him reading Homer, and conversing with me in singular friendship, for almost three years; nor, with the passage of other care for souls, would my memory have been sharp enough for the infinite things recited by him, had I not committed them to notes."

These are his words, which it was pleasing to record, both because the glory of the learning of the pupil Leontius—whether he be a Calabrian by birth or a Thessalonian—redounds to his teacher Barlaam; for they return to the seeds of the cause. Furthermore, when Leontius had been entrusted by Petrarch with an *Iliad* translation in the work we just praised, *De Genealogia Deorum*—from whom he began to learn to insert Homeric verses into Latin writings, and to impose Greek titles upon Latin books; whence he obtained the chair of the Greek language at Florence, as we have stated elsewhere in our *Histor. Corsin. colleg.*—I also believe that the kinship of the name between Leontius and Pontius Pilatus is the origin of the fable about Pontius Pilate tarrying for a while in Calabria, whence he allegedly brought back with him to Judea the torturers of Christ; just as there is a similar affinity of name between Iscariot and Scalio-

- ta, the latter and that very old woman’s fable about Judas which he ^A propagates to defame the Lucanians before the sect.

But let the discourse return to Barlaam, from whom it turned aside. Regarding him, therefore, the praised Boccaccio writes in the place cited: “I draw in besides, at times, Barlaam, a monk of Basil of Caesarea, a Calabrian man, once small in body, yet very grand in knowledge, and so erudite in Greek matters that he held the privileges of testimony from emperors, Greek princes, and learned men, not only at that time among the Greeks, but he was a man endowed with such distinguished and great knowledge that he had not even been surpassed in many centuries. Should I not, therefore, believe him—and especially regarding matters pertaining to the Greeks?” After the aforementioned Boccaccio (loc. cit.), Volaterranus, in his *Anthropologia*, also notes that Paul of Perugia, himself a student of Barlaam in the Greek language, profited in the compiling of his own works. At about the same time, a certain Calabrian Barlaam, a monk of Saint Basil, learned in both languages, brought together in one volume many things pertaining to these disciplines. Paul of Perugia, a jurist and his disciple—who, as prefect of the library of Robert, King of Sicily, was plainly lettered—imitated him and left behind many compilations of his own.

^B He defends [that the Greeks and Latins] were previously lacerated by language and script. Cit. Lib. II, cap. 17, pag. 839. Moreover, Joannes Cantacuzenus, a Greek author, lib. II, cap. 39, inveighs against Barlaam because of his recantations: “A certain monk,” he says, “having set out from Calabria, educated in the customs and laws of the Latins, by name Barlaam, otherwise sharp and perceptive, and most fluent in the explanation of intelligence; furthermore, well-versed in Euclid, Aristotle, and Plato, and for that reason having an illustrious reputation, he arrived at Thessalonica to the calamity of the Roman Empire; for he filled the pacified Church with many and great seditions. When he had feigned that he was going to destroy the dogmas of the Latins, having composed pamphlets against them, he demonstrated by the conclusion of his arguments that they were hallucinating and slipping in the doctrine of religion, and he gave the most open indications—as was apparent—that he was enjoying our institutions and laws, and that the ceremonies and dogmas of the Latins were heartily condemned by him,” etc. Nicephorus Gregoras says almost the same thing in book XI; and he began to be in such hatred to the Greeks after he withdrew from them that, as Allatius testifies (ubi supra), at the synod celebrated in Constantinople, Barlaam was condemned: Barlaam, although he had obtained a favorable emperor (Andronicus the Younger), was nevertheless harsher toward the affairs of the Greeks and the monks (for his quarrels with the monks of Mount Athos, see Maimburg, l. c.), whom he pursued and harassed with the bitterest hatred; and therefore, he was condemned at the synod held in the great temple of the Holy Wisdom, in the presence also of the emperor, along with the senate, princes, and other most learned men. But the same Cantacuzenus mentioned above also says: “Finally, the emperor and the patriarch spoke to both parties as was proper about peace, and dismissed the synod. Barlaam, having delayed for not a long time at Byzantium, the emperor having soon died, stirred up the dispute about the dogmas just as he had before, clamoring that the judgment had been very closed; and fleeing into Italy, he felt as he had before, with the Latins, and was created bishop of Hieracium by them.” ^C From this, Maimburg clearly concludes the assertion regarding the double Barlaam to be waning: “That Barlaam, who is even now a great problem among scholars, some of whom wish him to be a schismatic and others a Catholic, was a Calabrian monk who in truth was both the one and the other, because he changed his religion three times,” etc.; and the author continues to narrate at length about the same in his *Histoire du schisme des Grecs*, tom. II, pag. ccx.

Barlaam wrote many and varied things, due to the instability and variety of his mind. For first, coming to Constantinople, he began to favor the errors of the Greeks with his writings; then, after he had first turned back to himself and soon after to Italy, and had obtained the dignity and honor of the bishopric of Hieracium, he renounced the errors of the Greeks, which he had previously defended, and went into exile. From this, the ambiguity concerning a double Barlaam crept in among the learned, who, however, as Allatius testifies, are babbling. “From this,” he says, “they clearly seem to babble, who, when they do not understand how one and the same man wrote for the Roman Church against the Greeks and for the Greeks against the Roman Church, constitute two Barlaams; and they remove those things which are against the Latins from this Hieracian one, and attribute them to others, I know not whom, whom even they themselves do not know. Let them distinguish the times. Barlaam, dwelling in Constantinople, nurtured by doctrine, the favor of princes, and the hope of new things, favors the errors of the Greeks, and attacks the Latins; having been ejected and defamed in Greece, and having returned to Italy and been enriched with dignities, lest he appear ungrateful—and perhaps also because he was truly and firmly wise—he inveighs against the Greeks, whom he had previously defended.” ^D

An enumeration of the works of Barlaam followed, which Fabricius, who is soon to be adduced, provides accurately, and therefore it is omitted here.

SECOND NOTITIA

Barlaam, from the city of Seminara ^A in Calabria (just like Gennadius Scholarius, mentioned above), has been discovered to be one person, although he was previously thought to be two completely different individuals, from which it happened that he was divided by some into two Barlaams. ^B But he is one and the same man who initially wrote for the Latins and for their union with the Greeks, and who subsequently wrote sharply against the Latins, ^C and who finally, having become a monk of St. Basil and bishop of Gerace ^D or Hierace in the Neapolitan kingdom, wrote again for the Latins. The same man was a fierce adversary of the Hesychasts and Gregory Palamas [E] in the synod held at Constantinople in the year 1337, along with Gregory Acindynus, and was in other respects, in terms of learning [F] and eloquence and knowledge of philosophy, second to no one of his age, [G] of whose writings these have come to my attention:

*For the Latins.* Two Orations for the union of the Greeks with the Church ^A (Rome, addressed to Pope Benedict at Avignon). The former begins: *Quoniam divinum et adorabile mandatum*. The latter: *Licentia mihi data a vestra sanctitate*. Both were edited in Latin by Bzovius in *Annales ecclesiastici* for the year 1339, nos. 25 and 28, and by Odoric Raynaldus under the same year, no. 19.

*Against the Greeks.* Allatius ^B brings forward the Greek text in *De consensu*, p. 786. From the second oration on concord, which begins: *Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἡμᾶς*, pp. 123 and 591, against Hottinger. And from the first oration, p. 135, which begins: *Ὅτι μὲν πάντες οἱ ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχοντες*. Both are preserved in codex Matritensis 77. See Iriarte, *Cat. codd. gr. Matr.*, p. 280 sq. and Venetiis in codex Marcianus 152. See *Cat. codd. Gr. Marc.*, p. 84. and Paris in the public library, codex 1278, nos. 3 and 4. The first oration is in Venice in codex Nanianus 114, no. 30, vol. 1, pp. 342-349. Finally, an iambic poem, with which the whole work is concluded and which was written by the hand of the scribe of the codex, he placed in Greek with a Latin version: Montfaucon there, p. 732, E. A, in the codices of the Paris library. Gregory of Thessalonica against Barlaam and David, *Dyshypatos on the blasphemies of Barlaam*; p. 770 A; in the library of Radulphus, ibid., against Barlaam and Acindynus. At Madrid, in the Royal codex 77, near the end, *David's History of how the perverse heresy of Barlaam and Acindynus arose*. See Iriarte, *Cat. codd. Gr. Matrit.*, p. 286 seq. At Vienna, in the Imperial codex 266, *Tomus (the third) of the condemnation of the followers of Barlaam and Gregory Acindynus*, composed by the synod of Constantinople and published in the year of Christ 1351, in the month of August, with the subscriptions of many, which Lambeck, vol. V, p. 419 sqq., rendered in its entirety and reviewed the codex. Ibid., no. 16, exists the *History* of David mentioned above. In codex 274 of Macarius, metropolitan of Ancyra, a work *against the Latins and against Barlaam and Acindynus and their followers*, divided into 120 chapters. See Lambeck, vol. V, p. 458 sqq. And in codex VI, no. 14, the *Apologetic Tome of the Hesychast monks against the followers of Barlaam and Acindynus*; and no. 15, the *Tome of the Council of Constantinople for the condemnation of the errors of Barlaam and Gregory Acindynus*, with subscriptions. See Lambeck, vol. VI, part 1, 64 sqq. ed. Kollar, who in a note praises Petavius, *De theolog. dogmatibus*, vol. 1, lib. 1, chapters 12 and 13. David's *History*, etc., Augustae Vindelicorum, codex V, *Reiseri Ind. mss.*, p. 27. — *Of Mark the monk against Barlaam and Acindynus*, in codex Coislinianus 288, regarding which see Montfaucon, *Bibl. Coisl.*, p. 404 seqq. Ibid., p. 167, in codex 98, *Gregory, archbishop of Thessalonica, On the errors ascribed to Barlaam and Acindynus*, added p. 168 sqq.; and in codex 99, and in Venice in the Marciana library, p. 274, *On the errors of Barlaam and Acindynus*. But enough thus far.

2. Cat. codd. Gr. Nan. p. 252. In the Mazarin library. Viennese, in the Imperial codices. See note qq. to n. 1, add. Montfaucon, Bibl. biblioth. mss. p. 559 D, cod. 37, and p. 562 B. — At Turin, in the Royal codex 315, are Barlaam’s works, or six sermons against the Latins on the procession of the Holy Spirit. See Cat. codd. Gr. Taur. p. 397. — At Venice, in the Marciana library, codex 152, ten sermons, namely in Fabricius n. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 17, 18, 21, 9, 8, and 1; and codex 153, twenty sermons. In codex 525, eight sermons, and codex 510, n. 5. Fabricius against the Latins. See Cat. codd. Gr. Marc. p. 84, 85, 284, and 274. — Paris, in the public library 1278, n. 6, is according to the order of Fabricius n. 2, but begins "If there is any virtue," n. 7 and 8; but in Fabricius n. 20 and 21. — Ibid. in codex 1185, n. 3. (And in codex Mazarin, see Montfaucon, Bibl. biblioth. mss. p. 1314 C.) Dispute of Barlaam and Acindynus concerning the light seen on Mount Tabor. In seven codices on the procession of the Holy Spirit. In three codices, a refutation of those [things] which were said by the legal Pope; and in four codices, on the primacy of the Pope. At Venice, in the Nanian library, codex 114, seventeen orations, which Mingarelli catalogs in Cat. codd. Gr. Nan. p. 231 sqq. — Ibid. p. 280, n. 7, codex 127, is the seventh oration, index of our Fabricius. — Oxford, in the Bodleian library, codex Selden 47 f. n. 3377, Cat. mss. Angliæ etc. 1, Barlaam on the primacy of the Pope, the procession of the Holy Spirit, etc. — Ibid., in codex H. Savilii 10, f. n. 6557 of the said catalog, an Eclogue from Barlaam’s book on the procession of the Holy Spirit against the Latins. In codex Th. Gale 109, s. n. 5943, Cat. of the procession of the Holy Spirit, and in codex 235, s. n. 6067 of the said catalog vol. II, excerpts. — Milan, in the Ambrosian library, six disputations on the Holy Spirit and on the primacy of the Pope. See Montfaucon, Bibl. biblioth. mss. p. 493 E. (Harl.)

Against the Latins

(i) Since with these writings, which Allatius mentions that he has read through, Barlaam’s demonstration in twelve chapters seems to contain much of the same, *Demonstration to the ambassadors of the Pope, that having supposed that the Holy Spirit has existence from the Father alone, it does not follow that anything at all [is] impossible, nor [is] any of the dogmas confessed by the Church destroyed.* Incipit: "The divine Apostle in the Epistle to the Galatians." — infra, n. 6. See Lambec. VIII, p. 378 seq. V. p. 181, s. VIII, p. 806 sq. ed. Kollar n. 2, col. 37; and vol. V, p. 381, n. 6, codex 290, in which there are also sermons, n. 7 sqq., infra n. 8, 20, 10, 11, 12, 43, 14, 15, 16, Add. Lambec. and Kollar to n. 3 (or n. 19 in Fabricius) col. 80, in vol. III, p. 478 sq. (Harl.)

I. That having supposed the Holy Spirit has existence from the first cause, the identity of essence of the Father and the Son is not taken away. P. "If we had some judge, both of us." II. That having supposed the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, the personal differences of the three persons toward one another are not taken away. P. "Consequently, one must also understand concerning these and the personal properties." IV. That having supposed the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, the [dogmas] ^D acknowledged by the Church are not destroyed.

V. That having supposed the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, many of the acknowledged [truths] are destroyed, and such a hypothesis would be contrary to many sayings of the saints. When we enter into discussions with one another. ^A VI. That having supposed the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, absolutely nothing absurd follows, nor is any of the dogmas acknowledged by the Church destroyed. The divine Apostle in the Epistle to the Galatians. VII. That this is not a simple hypothesis, to think that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, but for those who choose to be pious, it is an absolute necessity to lead forth from the First Cause alone those things that have shone forth from Him without time, and the summary exposition of our dogma. That, therefore, having supposed the First Cause alone. ^B VIII. A dogma of the Latins, written [by] the envoys of the Pope, then the refutation of the same. The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. IX. *Legatus*, or concerning the Holy Spirit. You have seen the letter which was sent to the Patriarch. X. Against Thomas, who says that the divine Persons do not differ from one another by relations alone. Thomas, therefore, thinks there is no mode of difference in the Trinity. XI. To those who say that only the Paternity is constitutive of the hypostasis of the First Cause, but the Unbegotten [is] not at all. P. Those around Thomas distinguish by the difference of relations alone. ^C XII. To the envoys, that they fall into contrary opinions. [alt-version omitted] XIII. To the envoys, a common refutation of all the syllogisms which the Latins set forth concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit. P. Every well-formed syllogism must needs be demonstrative. XIV. To the envoys, a demonstration: that the divine Fathers who succeeded the apostles also supposed that both caused [things] have their being from the First Cause alone. P. That, moreover, is entirely not unknown, that even those after the holy ones. XV. Answer to the arguments which the Archbishop of Bosporus brought to him concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit. P. He says that the will of the Father and of the Son is one. ^D XVI. An oration composed of various portions of the Theologian’s discourses, which is also appropriate for the great Basil and fitting to be spoken to the learned among the Latins. P. Since the simple and straightforward [nature] of our divine [faith]. XVII. To the controversialists among the Latins. That it is impossible for them, when conversing with Greeks, to demonstrate through syllogisms that the Father is not alone the principle and fountain of the Godhead. P. That the Latin hypothesis is contrary to many sayings of the saints. XVIII. To the principal Latin hypotheses, from which they think they can demonstrate that the Holy Spirit has his existence also from the Son. P. Regarding the other struggles of life. XIX. Concerning the authority of the Pope. Those who are skilled in the sciences. [index: entries preserved]

^A Migne’s note: [Cf. Nicodemus, *Addizioni* A, cit. p. 59 seq.] And after the work of the same Salmasius, now a man of reputation, *De primatu papae*, Lugd. Bat. 1645, 4. Also, it is read in a Latin translation from the Dutch in Goldast’s *Monarchia imperii*, vol. I, p. 242 seq., Francof. 1668, fol. And in Greek at London in 4to, ff., pp. 22-30, with a treatise by Nilus and an exposition by Gabriel Severus, *Against those who accuse the Oriental Churches of schism*.

XX. To Archbishop Nicholas Cabasilas, *On the authority of the Pope*. It begins: *Mē touto oiou* [in Codex Caes., *oion* in Codex Matrit.] Ms. Lambec. V, p. 181, 182. Allatius mentions it, who professes to have read it on page *De consensu*.

XXI. To the same, on the same subject. It begins: (p) ^B (*Id.*)

XXII. There is also attributed to Barlaam a booklet *On purgatorial fire*, which begins: *Ei men peri hon allēlois amphistbumen, aidesimōtatoi kyrioi*. It appeared in both Greek and Latin with a book by Alexander Alesius against Ludovico Nogarola *De traditionibus*, Leipzig 1556, 8vo, without the author’s name, under this title: *Apologia Graecorum de purgatorio igne in concilio Basileensi* (ann. 1438) presented. Compare Crusius, *Turco-Graecia*, p. 186. And in the previous edition of the *Orthodoxographa* with a translation by Joannes Hartungus, Basle fol., and with the translation of Bonav. Vulcanius, it was added to Nilus’s *De primatu papae*, Hanov. 1608, 8vo, and at the end of Salmasius’s *De primatu papae*, Lugd. Bat. 1645, 4to [LAT. Lugd. Bat. 1595, 8vo; it appeared in the Vulcanius edition in the following pages]. There were those who attributed it to Mark of Ephesus, a claim which Allatius refutes in his book *De purgatorio*, p. 239 seq., where he also denies that it is by Barlaam, under whose name Petrus Arcudius edited and refuted it with a new translation, Rome 1632, 4to, as I have said above, p. 417, old ed.

XXIII. There are also those who attribute to Barlaam the *Dialogue of an Orthodox (Greek) with a Latin concerning unleavened bread and the procession of the Holy Spirit*, a manuscript in the Vatican library, from which Allatius produces testimony in *De Joanne papissa*, p. 48, and Blondel, p. 28. (Fabric.). Venice in Bibl. Marc. cod. 152, which contains certain works of Barlaam. An anonymous work *On unleavened bread* is put first. It begins: *...prothemenois zētēsai skopēteon*. V. Cat. codd. Gr. Marc. p. 84. (Hart.)

Many have attacked the opinions of Barlaam and Acindynus, as well as those of Gregory Palamas, regarding the *kyrias doxas* (principal doctrines) and those things which are discordant from the usage of the Church, concerning which [read] in *Palamas* (in the previous volume). ^C

Inter alia, it is argued by Simeon of Thessalonica (c. 13) *On the faith, rites and ecclesiastical mysteries*, p. 51, that Barlaam, or those who taught with certain pseudo-mystics, held that it is not necessary for the prayers which they offer to be understood by those who pray. See H. Wharton’s *Auctarium* to Ussher’s *Historian dogmatica de Scripturis sacrisque vernaculis*, p. 440.

*Other writings of Barlaam.*

1. From *Barlaam’s Epistle to Nilus Triclinius*, the recluse monk, in which he chooses him as judge of his controversy with Palamas; Allatius brings forward some Greek portions in *Diatriba de Nilis*, p. 84 (q). (Fabr.) In Moscow, in Codex Synod. 302, n. 58-60, and n. 66-70, there are several letters of Barlaam: 1) to Gregory Palamas: beg. *Sy men, ō thaumasie, tēn anōtatō*; 2) to Nilus Triclinius: beg. *Aretē te kai logō*; 3) to Greg. Palamas: beg. *Aper kai epi tōn proterōn logōn*; 4) one to Joseph; 5) two to Ignatius; 6) two to Dysypatus. Venice, in the Marcian Library, Codex [number omitted] contains eight epistles, namely, the two mentioned to Palamas, and the epistle to Nilus Triclinius, and the same two to Ignatius, and two to Dysypatus. V. Cat. codd. Gr. Marc. p. 152. (Hart.)

2. *Solutions to the difficulties proposed to him by the most wise Georgius Lapithas*. It begins: *Pros men oun Platōna, ō gennaie*. Allatius mentions this in *De Georgiis*, below p. 666, old ed.

3. *Logistica or Arithmetic*, in six books, edited in Greek and Latin, Strasbourg 1572, and in Greek by Joannes Chamberus, a fellow of Eton College among the English, Paris 1600, 4to; and the Latin translation separately, ibid., to the Queen of England, Elizabeth. I believe it is the same work that Gesner calls a *Geometrical demonstration of numbers*. (Fabr.) Compare above, vol. V, p. 648, § 13, where also vol. IV, p. 75, § 7, is on Barlaam’s demonstration of properties which Euclid proved in book [number omitted] of the *Elements*. Add vol. IV, p. 86, end, and 212. In the *Cat. bibl. Pinell.* vol. I, n. 1935, appears an edition of the *Logistica*, Paris 1594, 4to; and in Maittaire, A. T. vol. III, p. 832, ed. Chamberus with his scholiast, the first part, Greek, Paris 1599, 4to, typogr. Steph. Prevosteau, and the second part, i.e., the Latin translation, ibid. ^D by Guil. Auvray, is said to have appeared. Ms. Venice in the Marcian Library, cod. 302, *Logistica* in six books, and a work distinct from the other (Fabric. had thought otherwise),

Geometric demonstration of numbers in 10 chapters, XXVII in the *Bibliotheca Patrum*, Lyon edition, p. 231, and also the work beginning Ἐπεὶ εἶδον πολλαχοῦ τοὺς μαθηματικούς (When I saw in many places the mathematicians). See the Catalogue of Greek Codices of the Biblioteca Marciana, p. 142. And again in another Marcian codex, as attested by Montfaucon in his *Bibliotheca bibliothecarum manuscriptorum*, p. 471 G. In Paris at the public library in codices 1381, no. 384, four books of *Logistica*: 2486, no. 1, and the following work *On Arithmetic*. In Moscow in the Cod. Synod. 302. See Matthaei's Notes cited, p. 198, 63. In Florence in the Laurentian library 48, no. 5, plut. 89. See Bandini's Catalogue of Greek codices, 3. In Oxford in the Bodleian library, H. Savilii codices 1, s. n. 6548, and 6, s. V. 6553, Catalogue of the manuscripts of England, etc., vol. I. In the latter codex, books I, II, and III are missing. There are, however, Latin notes added. In Milan, in the Ambrosian library, several works of Barlaam, namely: *Rationalis pragmatica*, 4 books; also *On the Eclipse* according to Ptolemy; also *On the Invention of Easter*; *On the Holy Spirit*; 6 books of *Logistica*; *Arithmetic Demonstration*; *Refutation of certain chapters of Ptolemy’s Harmonics*; *Disputation on the Holy Spirit* VI; and *On the Primacy of the Pope*. In the codex of the Bibliothèque de Mesme, *Arithmetic*. See Montfaucon, l. c. p. 493 E, and 1326, E. (Harl.)

4. *Ethics according to the Stoics*, in 2 books, published in the sixth volume of the *Lectiones antiquae* of H. Canisius, Ingolstadt, 1604, 4 [see vol. IV, p. 405 ed. of Basnage], and from there in the *Bibliotheca Patrum* vol. XXVI, Lyon edition, p. 28.

5. Furthermore, there are those who attribute to Barlaam the *Enchiridion of Epictetus*, contracted and interpolated for Christian sentiments, which is in the *opuscula* of St. Nilus, printed in Greek and Latin by Joseph Maria Suaresius, bishop of Vaison, Rome, 1673, fol. 327–358. It exists in Latin in the volume after the treatise of D. Theophilus Spizelius, *On the Pious Retirement of a Learned Man*. This is different from the paraphrase of the Christian *Enchiridion* by a Greek writer, which Mericus Casaubonus published in both languages, London, 1659, 8, about which I spoke in lib. IV, c. 7 [cap. 9, vol. V, p. 79].

6. *Theological speculation on the invention of the feast of Easter*, Gesner in *Bibl.*, Fabr. In Moscow in Cod. Synod. 302, no. 65, *Exposition on the canon of the Apostles regarding Easter*; begins: *The present canon*. See Matthaei, Notes cited, p. 198. The same in Venice in the Marcian library, codices 332 and 323. See the Catalogue cited, p. 152 and 153. —Regarding the Ambrosian Catalogue, see the note to no. 3. (Harl.)

7. *Geometry*. [See note to no. 3.] 8. *On the Lunar Eclipse* from the large *Syntaxis* of Ptolemy. Begins: *I thought it necessary*. (Fabr.) MS in Moscow in Cod. Synod. 302, no. 71, and more fully in no. 72. Begins: *Some of the causes and the first principles*. See Matthaei’s Notes cited, p. 198. The same work in Venice in the Marcian library, 522, and again in codex 319. See the Catalogue of Greek Marcian codices, p. 152 and 153, as it is in the Moscow codex. See Bandini l. c. III, p. 413. In these codices, however, for "lunar eclipse" it reads "solar eclipse," *ἡλιακὴ ἔκλειψις*. (Harl.)

Paris, in the library codex 2382, no. 5, is Barlaam’s commentary on three chapters of Ptolemy’s *Harmonics*; begins: *When I saw the script*. Cf. supra vol. V, p. 294, § 13, end. Regarding the Milanese codex, see the note to no. 5 above, vol. p. 655, no. 7. (Harl.)

(r) See Heumann’s *Acta philosophorum*, vol. I, page 739.

EPISTLES OF THE LORD BARLAAM, BISHOP OF GERACE, On the Union of the Roman Church and the Procession of the Holy Spirit

I. Epistle of Lord Barlaam, bishop, to his friends settled in Greece, concerning the union of the most holy Roman Church (1). ...because of this division of the Church, and for this to pray to God, that He, putting an end to this, may join the ends of the world to Himself: for discourse seems to me in no way to be in need of persuading these things. For I judge that there is no one among those who have a mind who does not think thus concerning these matters.

BARLAAM AGAINST THE LATINS.

(1) Ut hominis versatile ingenium innotescat, iis quae pro Latinis hic scribit, ea subiungimus, sed Graece tantum, quae contra eos scripserat in libello De primatu Papae, ab Claudio Salmasio Hanoviae 1608 edito.

^A and the particular ones, and the Acts of the Apostles, the Revelation of the Theologian, the canons of the apostles, the canons of our divine Fathers who gathered in the seven holy ecumenical synods. These are the principles. From these I will not refuse to refute others, and I shall accept being refuted.

CAP. II.

For if there is no longer any discourse with him, I see this [as] seeking ecclesiastical ends. For those who appear to use the same principles, about everything proposed for discussion it is indeed possible to enter into conversation; but to those with whom the same things are not agreed, it is altogether impossible. It is necessary, therefore, if we intend to initiate discourse regarding the matters currently under inquiry, to agree upon the same principles; but if not, let each remain at peace. But since you, acting rightly, have already happened to confess that you guard the principles and the things that are correctly shown from them, but do not accept what is contrary to these, I thought it necessary, fraternally and in a friendly manner, to discuss briefly with you, starting from the same principles, those things upon which we disagree. And I pray for the all-good loving-kindness of God, that He may enlighten the mind of both of us, and give to me to speak correctly, and to you ^B a right judgment of what is said. And I ask of your love, that when you see in the things said by me something that is displeasing to you, first you should read it with forbearance, until you grasp the mind of what is said; then that you raise it to the principles agreed upon in common. And if you see it differs from these, or is contrary, refute it, and we shall readily accept the refutation. For it is better to be refuted by a brother and friend than to hear the things most dear. And I think it necessary to remind you of the principles again. These are: the four Gospels, the writings of the apostles, and the catholic epistles.

I must begin the argument here. Regarding [the claim] that our Lord Jesus Christ entrusted His own Church to the blessed Peter, and commanded him to be established as her shepherd and common teacher, and that it is necessary for the Bishop of Rome, being his successor, to rule over all, to hold authority over all, having power over everyone, and that whatever he wishes it is permitted to him to define with great authority, and that it is permitted to no one among all to speak against the things defined by him, but that all must receive his dogmas without investigation as the voices of God. As for me, that the blessed Peter was established as the catholic ^C shepherd and teacher of the entire Church of God, I say [this is] very true indeed; yet not he alone, but each of the twelve [was] ^D equal in honor to him. For it is thus: He promised to give to Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and that these are the authority of binding and loosing, by which He indicated what followed. But indeed, he is shown to have given this also to the rest of the apostles. For...

^C what you bind, he says, on the earth, shall be bound in the heavens; and what you loose on the earth, shall be loosed in the heavens. And again, receive the Holy Spirit; if you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain any, they are retained. But the holy and most mystical sacrifice He commanded not to Peter alone, but to all in common to perform. For this, He says, do in remembrance of me. And if it was said to Peter alone, Feed my sheep, yet in its power it extends also to the rest, as is evident from the deeds themselves. For what Peter did, did not all the others do this too? After the descent of the divine Spirit, did not each one, taking for himself some part of the inhabited world, teach the wandering and illuminate the darkened? Did they not establish churches? Did they not ordain presbyters? Did they not ordain bishops? Did they not ordain deacons? And when was any one of these, prompted to these tasks, performing them by the commandment of Peter? Did not each one of them, having received the same authority from the Master Christ, and in whatever part of the inhabited world he happened to be teaching, perform these things of his own accord, just as the blessed Peter did in the places where he was preaching?

But if it be the case, as part of our piety, not to pay attention to the difference of words, ^D but to the identity of the facts, what do you think? Did you not receive power from on high when the Holy Spirit came upon you, and you were witnesses to me in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria and even to the end of the earth, which was spoken in the plural to all? And the command, Go into all the nations, and preach my Gospel to every creature, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to keep all things whatsoever I have commanded you? What then? Did He not by these words ordain all of them as shepherds and teachers of the entire world? Wherefore no one of them was titled bishop of this or that city or region, but everywhere he happened to be, he possessed the same authority. But those who were ordained by them after them, each one was recognized already as a partial shepherd of a city and region. How then is the blessed Peter called the chief and first-throned of the apostles, if these things are so? Wait a little, and we shall provide the solution to this, not from our own reasonings, but bringing our proofs from the divine oracles. For we ourselves do not attempt to say anything at all regarding the things handed down to us in mystery from human reasonings.

BARLAAM AGAINST THE LATINS

(a) Aliter plane Barlaam disputans adversus primatum papæ apud Salmasium. Hunc consule tractatum ut plenius dignoscatur sententiarum diversitas. Bas. — Is est quem Græce subjicimus. (Evit.)

^C

BARLAAMUS CONTRA LATINOS.

We will not endure, nor will we incline our ears to the profane babblings of those who—without fear and with audacity—dare to propose such things, which the others would not dare. I look, indeed, at Peter, when there is need to appoint someone else to fill the number of the twelve; I see him standing up and being the first to begin the discourse. Likewise, surely, after the descent of the Holy Spirit, one would find him leading the teaching. That, then, is his precedence: that the others concede to him the honor of speaking first. But if you, while dividing the priestly ranks, say that this rank was given to Peter, while that one was given to the rest, show this from the divine oracles, putting aside your own reasonings, and we will accept it. For I do not find whence anyone could surmise such a distinction. Neither from those words which the Master spoke to them can one conjecture this, nor from what they themselves did afterward. But to me you seem to think of these matters as though Peter alone had been ordained by Christ, and all the rest of the apostles had been ordained by him. Because of this, you force everything under the authority of the Pope, and you do not allow anyone to escape his jurisdiction; and you annul every ordination which was not approved by him, as if it were necessary that it should either come from him or be deemed altogether void. But we shall speak later about ordination; for now, concluding what we have proven at length, we say this:

^D As for all the others, they were, as has been said, equal in honor in the Church. And as for their holy Twelve, the blessed Peter led them; having in this alone more than the others—the others being present—that he himself led the teaching and was perhaps regarded as worthy of the first seat.

CHAPTER III.

The disciples of the Word, as has been said, were generally shepherds and teachers of the inhabited world; but they appointed individual shepherds to different cities or regions, whom they called bishops. Just as, therefore, Dionysius was appointed by the divine apostles as shepherd of the Athenians, Timothy of Ephesus, Titus of Crete, and another of another place; so also the holy Clement of Rome was ordained by Peter, and entrusted with the leadership and administration of only the holy Church of God in Rome. Later, however, through the providence of God, the imperial power came to us, and it was decreed by the edicts of our most pious emperors and our holy Fathers that the see of Rome should be the first, because it was the imperial city, and that the Churches throughout the inhabited world should have one authority. But before this, the bishop of Rome was neither first nor last, just as none of the others was. And if you have the means to show this—that the holy Clement was not only bishop of Rome, but was appointed by Peter as shepherd of the entire Church of God

and left none of those whom the other apostles ordained, but rather already even those whom the Chief Apostle appointed in other cities—show these things from the principles we have mentioned, and we shall accept it. But if you have no such thing to show, while it is easy for us to show the contrary, then you should be persuaded, for God’s sake, to cease from unjust contentiousness. For who has ever called Peter the bishop of Rome, or Clement the Chief Apostle? But since many bishops were appointed by the Chief Apostle Peter in various other cities, what law commands that only the bishop of Rome be named his successor and rule over the rest? And what argument could still prevent the bishop of Alexandria from also being the successor of Peter, and possessing the primacy over all? For just as Clement was bishop of Rome, so the evangelist Mark became bishop of Alexandria under the divine Peter.

FRANCIS. But the Apostle met his end according to God in Rome. It is necessary, therefore, that its bishop occupy his place.

BARLAAM. Then, since our Lord Jesus Christ suffered death for us in Jerusalem, the bishop of Jerusalem should be the head of all, as occupying the place of our first high priest; and he would be as much greater than the one in Rome as Christ is greater than Peter. Furthermore, how is it not absurd and irrational to make each of the rest of the apostles a common shepherd and teacher, yet not to allow their successors to be in like manner equal to the successor of Peter, if one wished to leave successors for the other apostles—namely, the bishops ordained by them? Or for those who administer the churches in which each happened to have died or departed to God, how can you command that all be ordained by the Pope? For you cannot claim that the apostles were ordained by the holy Peter. But if this is not true, how do you expect their successors—the successors of Peter, as you say—to be ordained by him? That successors were indeed left for the rest of the apostles as well, and that no one among them was either first or last, but all were of equal rank, although they might not be convinced by my words alone, they could not contradict the credible witness who provides this. This is the holy and divine Dionysius the Areopagite, who, in his writings to the monk Demophilus, says: "As for himself, let him judge according to his merit by desire, and by wrath, and by word; but for you, the divine ministers, and for them, the priests; and for the priests, the hierarchs; and for the hierarchs, the apostles and the successors of the apostles. And if, somewhere, someone should happen to fall short of what is fitting for them, he will be corrected by the holy ones of equal rank." So then, this man, having associated with the apostles and having known accurately the things of that time, says that the successors of the apostles are of equal rank and are to be corrected by one another; but you... ^{C D}

demand that the Pope rule over them, and that he correct others while he himself is corrected by no one, even while he acts and defines whatever he pleases?

CHAPTER IV

It is very evident that it was later that the throne of Rome became the first, through the holy Fathers and the most pious emperors-at-law, and from the reasons for which they themselves legislated this. For if the bishop of Rome were previously the first, and the pastor of the world, established by the divine Peter, then those most divine emperors, Constantine and Justinian—being themselves masters of the affair—would not have enacted laws, saying, "We decree that the bishop of Rome be the first of all priests." Firstly, because there was no need for a law, and second, because they would have seemed impious, dragging the authority and legislation of Peter unto themselves; and what he had legislated ages before, they would be acting audaciously to decree themselves.

CHAPTER V

The final proof of this argument, to which no one who accepts the holy canons could find an answer to gainsay, is the twenty-eighth canon of the Fourth Council, which says: "Everywhere following the definitions of the holy fathers, and acknowledging the canon of the one hundred and fifty most God-beloved bishops just now read, we define and ^C decree the same things concerning the prerogatives of the most holy Church of Constantinople, New Rome. For the Fathers rightly granted the prerogatives to the throne of older Rome, because that city was the royal one. And moved by the same purpose, the one hundred and fifty most God-beloved bishops awarded equal prerogatives to the most holy throne of New Rome, judging reasonably that the city which is honored by the sovereignty and the senate, and which enjoys equal prerogatives to the elder royal Rome in ecclesiastical matters, should also, like that one, be magnified in matters, being second after it." Clearly, therefore, this canon declares from whom the see of Rome became first, and the reason: that it was by the Fathers, and because the city was royal.

CHAPTER VI

Regarding the prerogatives of the throne of this Great City, the third canon of the Second Council, which the present text ^D mentioned, says: "The bishop of Constantinople, however, shall hold the prerogatives of honor after the bishop of Rome, because it is New Rome." And the thirty-sixth [canon] of the Sixth [Council] says: "Renewing the enactments of the one hundred and fifty holy Fathers gathered in this God-guarded and royal city..."

we ordain that the throne of Constantinople shall enjoy equal privileges to the throne of Elder Rome, and should be magnified in ecclesiastical matters just as it is, being second after it; after which the throne of the great city of Alexandria shall be numbered, then that of Antioch, and after this, that of the city of Jerusalem." And the one hundred and thirty-first ^B Novel of the most pious emperor Justinian says thus: "We decree that the most holy Pope of Elder Rome is the first of all priests, but that the most blessed archbishop of Constantinople, the New Rome, shall hold the second rank after the most holy throne of Elder Rome, and be preferred before all others. In dignity, therefore, they decreed him to be equal, and to be magnified like that one in ecclesiastical matters, but in rank [to be] second—yet not so second as to be ordained by him. For neither this one, nor any other of the patriarchs was ordained by the Pope. For the laws have decreed that the metropolitans in each place have the authority for the ordination of bishops, and that these [metropolitans] are to be ordained by the patriarchs under whom each belongs; but no law has commanded that patriarchs be ordained by the Pope." If you have taken the holy canons ^C of the six hundred and thirty [Fathers] who gathered at Chalcedon and of the divine apostles and of the seven holy ecumenical councils, read them carefully. And if you find anywhere a canon ordaining that the Pope must have the authority for the ordination of patriarchs, show this to us, and you have won. But if you could never find this, by what necessity shall we accept what you claim from your own mind? Furthermore, what reason is there for the bishops of Jerusalem to be ordained by the Pope? For neither was James, the brother of God, ordained by Peter, nor is it reasonable that his successor should be anyone other [than one] whom the Pope would ordain.

CHAPTER VII

How has that escaped you, that just as the canons ordained the bishop of New Rome to be second in rank from the Pope, so indeed they also decreed the [bishop] of Alexandria to be second after him, and in order after him the [bishop] of Antioch, and after this one [the bishop] of Jerusalem? If, therefore, it is necessary for the bishop of New Rome to be ordained by the Pope because he holds the second rank after him, then it ought to follow in order that each of the patriarchs should always have the power of ordination over the one after him. But this never happened so, and in fact neither does it happen. And a clear proof of the things said is the custom that has prevailed from above. For each of the patriarchs was ^D elected by his own bishops

^C as is still the case today. For instance, our own patriarch is elected by the metropolitan of Heraclea; the patriarch of Jerusalem by the metropolitan of Caesarea. The same applies to the others.

CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

contrary to the handed-down ecclesiastical order, it has seemed good to the holy synod that the canon be maintained inviolately in the Church of the Romans, which says: If any cleric is found fasting on the holy Lord’s day or on the Saturday, except for the one and only one, let him be deposed; but if he is a layman, let him be excommunicated." From these canons, therefore, it is manifest that the synods legislated even against the Church of Rome.

Chapter XI

As for the assertion that the divine Fathers decreed that only the Western churches should be governed by the Pope, while the rest are to be led by another patriarch, and that no one should go out to a parish that does not belong to him—what need is there to speak, when so many canons determine these things? Leave the others aside; read the sixth and seventh canons of the first synod, the second of the second, and the twenty-eighth of the fourth, and you will clearly know what I have just said.

Chapter XII

But it is not permitted to any of the patriarchs, or to the metropolitans, or to the Pope, to dogmatize or to enact any canon without the consent of all [those] under him; many other canons command this, but specifically the thirty-fourth of the Apostles, which says: "The bishops of each nation must recognize the one among them who is First, and regard him as their head, and do nothing extra ^A without his judgment; but each of them should only do those things that concern his own parish and the regions that belong to him. But not even he should do anything without the judgment of all. For thus there will be harmony, and God will be glorified through the Lord Jesus Christ."

Chapter XIII

But you, on the one hand, keep putting forward up and down what the Fathers decreed concerning the privileges of the throne of ancient Rome, and you condemn as impious those who resist in any way; but you disregard as nothing what the same [Fathers] decreed not once, but many times, concerning the equal honor of the throne of new Rome. And that they ordained the Pope to be first among others, you have carefully known; but that they legislated that the bishop of new Rome be deemed worthy of the same ^B prerogatives as that one, and that he be magnified in ecclesiastical matters just as that one—this you willingly pass over. And what kind of justice, in the name of God, is this consistent with? I, for my part, would never be prompted to speak anything blasphemous concerning you; but if someone, to whom you happen to care even a little, accuses [you] of love of power, and calls [you] grasping and arrogant, what in the world will you answer to him? Accordingly, the Pope neither has the authority for the ordination of the patriarchs, nor is it permitted to him without the common consent of all—

to dogmatize anything new. And for our patriarch to be accounted worthy of the same prerogatives, and as him to be magnified in ecclesiastical matters, as the divine laws enjoin—how is it that you compel us to obey and submit to the Pope, when the law dictates that we be shepherded by our own most holy patriarchs? Then how is it that you do not command [us] to obey him, when he keeps the boundaries of the divine Fathers unmoved and commands nothing contrary to the divine dogmas? But may it never come to pass that we have been driven so far into madness as to deprive him of the honor which the Fathers have given him, [provided he is] orthodox and keeping everywhere to the Fathers. But if he is a transgressor of the divine laws and dogmas, what loss do you think it is if we do not perish with you? If you say that there is nothing to prevent [even] one who is a heretic and a teacher of false doctrine from being, in this way, a successor of Peter and holding the keys of the kingdom of heaven, we do not contradict [the title]. He will be a successor, indeed, but as disease is to health, and a storm to calm, and darkness to light. He will possess not the keys of the kingdom of heaven that open, but rather those that close and allow no one of those who follow him to enter. ^C

CHAP. XIV.

FRANCIS. But it is impossible for the Pope to be a heretic. BARLAAM. What are you saying, man? I see a corpse, and you tell me it is impossible for it to be dead?

FRANCIS. But many patriarchs in ancient times became heretics, but not a single Pope [has]. BARLAAM. Then let the followers of Macedonius also say that, because there was no heretical bishop of Constantinople before him, he himself [could not be one]. Or rather, to use a more appropriate example, if someone were willing to apologize for that licentious woman who became Pope, let him say that because no one before her was a woman, neither, therefore, was she—and how is this consistent with a sound mind? ^D

CHAP. XV.

Since you admit that you believe in the Roman Church and the Roman faith, and compel others to believe in the same, it is necessary to speak about these things too. There is a difference among our holy Fathers between saying "the Roman Church" and "the Catholic Church." For when they say "Catholic Church," they understand the system of orthodox Christians throughout the entire world, who keep the dogmas of piety unmoved and unshaken. But when they say "Roman Church," they signify this, by way of distinction from other partial churches throughout the world, just as the...

^C forty-fourth canon of the Council of Carthage, whose dogmas we also happen to keep, says: "It pleased that regarding the disagreement of the Roman and Alexandrian Church, one should write to the most holy Pope Innocent, so that each Church might keep the peace with the other, which the Lord commands." And no one, instead of saying "Catholic Church," ever said "Roman." In the same way, when they speak of the "Catholic faith," they mean that which all orthodox Christians confess, wherever they may happen to be. But "Roman faith"—no one, not even a madman, ever called the faith of the Christians that. They did not legislate for us to believe in a "Roman" faith or Church, but in a "Catholic" or "common" faith and Church; which faith and confession we have kept, and, with God guarding us, shall keep until the end. Or what witness, standing before a tyrant, or what heretic returning from the path of error, ever said in his confession of faith: "I believe in a Roman faith or Church"? And who ever required such a confession of anyone, an act which would destroy our piety? Thus, it is not right for us to say we believe in a Roman Church, nor for you to believe in a "Catholic" one. For we, as those who abide by the laws of the Catholic Church, and who keep its traditions safe and entire, it is most necessary to confess that we believe in it; but you, who have set aside the traditions of the Catholic Church and regard them as nothing, and who introduce strange and alien dogmas—how could you be right to confess that you believe in the Church which you have set aside? Therefore, it is necessary to propose "Roman Church" by way of distinction. For in this way you would clearly demonstrate that you have fallen away entirely from the Catholic Church. For those things which were legislated for all the Church of God in common ^D by the divine apostles and our holy Fathers, you confess to keep—being ashamed and reproached by your conscience; but if anyone asks you, "How do you transgress this or that law?", you take refuge immediately in authority, as in some acropolis, acting somewhat like the tyrants who, being unable to persuade the martyrs by reason, do not hesitate to act with the utmost cruelty against them through their power. But enough of this.

CHAPTER XV

I must now summarize what has been proven at greater length and bring the discourse to an end. First, I have demonstrated that each of the holy apostles was appointed as a catholic shepherd and teacher of the entire inhabited world directly by the Master Christ; second, that the blessed Clement was not bishop of the inhabited world, but specifically of Rome,

^A and as another is ordained by the head, so the see of Rome was neither first nor last, but by the legislation of our holy Fathers and pious emperors it became the first; third, that they decreed the see of New Rome should be magnified in ecclesiastical matters just as that one; fourth, that no law or custom has prevailed that the patriarchs should be ordained by the Pope, and in fact this never happened; fifth, that it is not the Pope who presides over the councils, but the councils that lay down the rule for the Church around him; sixth, that it was decided by our divine Fathers which of the churches of the inhabited world ought to be subject to the Pope, and which to each of the remaining patriarchs; seventh, that it is not permitted for any of the patriarchs or for the Pope to define any superfluous dogma without the opinion of all; eighth, that [if the Pope does not abide by the dogmas of the Fathers, one should not accord him such honor as the canons prescribe; for it is just that if he does not abide by them, he should be shunned as a wolf and a destroyer of the Church, ^B and he should be known as being in the Catholic Church and faith, and not in a partial one, for thus it was legislated from the beginning]; ninth, that all Christians ought to believe in the Catholic Church and faith, and not in a partial one; tenth, above all, that those who have abolished the traditions of our holy apostles and divine Fathers, and who confess that they believe in a partial Church and faith, are a severed and dead part of the whole of the Catholic Church. Those, however, for whom nothing is held more precious than the tradition of the Catholic Church, these surely are the healthy part, to whom alone it is reasonable to say that they believe in the Catholic Church. These things, then, I have judged to be just in relation to your...

FOR THE LATINS

...set the primacy of the same Church, in part that a general council be made; and if it be made, that it [should] have, not that those doing this [lack] piety, but manifestly determining that the Roman Church ought to have concern for all the rest, and that it is fitting for it to rule over all, and to retract all things, and that things everywhere concerning faith and dogmas that are doubted be referred to it, and there attain fitting examination and definition; and they likewise establish that the canons of the Council of Sardica, and the judicial sentences of all other pontiffs, if anyone shall have appealed to it, it ought to retract, and confirm, or irritate; and they decide that certain general councils, wishing to honor the new bishop of Rome, ought to grant him the primacy after the bishop of ancient Rome; and, which is the greatest of all, that which is in the canons and laws [decrees] that the apostolic see of no Church is named, unless only that of Rome. Whence many great men of the Oriental Church, thinking that they had suffered injury, fled to that see: the great Athanasius, Saint Maximus; but neither did the blessed Chrysostom ignore his head. For having suffered the greatest injuries, he referred all things to the then most holy Pope. Who, as much as was in his power, did not in any way neglect to extend a helping hand to one who had suffered injury. But also the most holy Pope Agapetus, when he had arrived at New Rome in the time of the Emperor Justinian, ^C because he saw Anthimus the patriarch defending a certain heresy, he indeed deposed him from the see: but he created Menas, an orthodox man, as patriarch. And when at one time four patriarchs together with the Emperor had waged war against the venerable images, and for not a few years had persisted in this heresy, and had celebrated certain common councils, which they maintained to be and to be called general, and had wished to force the blessed Stephen to subscribe to their decrees: that holy man rejects them, for no other reason than that they did not have the Roman pontiff consenting, saying: that a synod of this kind ought not to be called general, with him absent, without whom...

For what other cause can be found, on account of which even before the incarnation of the Word, the four great kingdoms of those, according to Daniel, were entrusted by the providence of God to the last [one] alone and of the Romans, except that the Romans used their subjects more humanely and civilly, and more legally, and with more equality?

BARLAAM AGAINST THE LATINS

^A itself, freed from every worldly tyranny, has imparted the same liberty to all its members.

The third and greatest point: it would be fitting for the principality of the immortal Church to have its strength and firmness in something incorruptible, and not in something corruptible, so that, should the latter be corrupted, ecclesiastical affairs might not fall. This mostly happens to kings, who, possessing their power in money, armies, the counsel of men, human laws, and other civil virtues, find their subject cities—when things change and they see that it is possible for them, and safe, and expedient for their own affairs—not fearing to cast off the yoke of servitude. But those things in which the firmness of the Roman Church consists are more permanent than heaven and earth. For by the power of the Lord’s words to Peter, the nations subject to it tremble and fear it, and all believe that to depart from it is to depart from God, by the virtue of those words.

^B Likewise, if it is inquired what are the fitting works of the Church that divinely dominates all, one will find these same ones in the Roman Church. For it behooves the one dominating all by divine will to be most solicitous that the evangelical sermon be preached everywhere, to everyone, and always; so that, if nothing else, at least those things which are ready and can be brought forth—the sacraments of our religion, and the salutary precepts and counsels of the Lord, and what is required of each person—no one who is esteemed by a great name and signed with divine light should be ignorant of. Likewise, it is fitting to strive to call back schismatics to itself by letters and by envoys, by refuting, rebuking, admonishing, exhorting, or begging; to assist the afflicted Christians as much as possible with money, if it has it, and to help those who ask by exhortation, and to defend those who have suffered injury and take refuge with it, and to endeavor to correct the sins of all in any way possible.

To do all these things, and whatever else legally befits one in authority, the Roman Church seems to do in the highest degree. Indeed, there is no other church in the world that has and does whatever it behooves a divinely appointed ruler of others to have and to do.

Since, therefore, moving my thoughts, I find from every side that it is better in all things ^C that there be some Church under which others are ordered, and searching for these, I see that only the Roman Church has and does whatever it ought to have and to do, by divine pleasure, as the ruler of all: I cannot, believing in providence, attribute the majesty and sublimity of the Roman Church to fortune and chance, and not count this among the greatest and most solemn works of providence.

From these things, therefore, I believe the primacy of that Church is sufficiently demonstrated. I come again to the procession of the Paraclete.

BARLAAM AGAINST THE LATINS

Up to this point Barlaam on the primacy, or rather, against the primacy of the Pope.

On the procession of the Holy Spirit

^A Since the same Church, many years after the seven general councils, saw some of those who had become accustomed to relapsing again into heresies, asserting that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and not at all from the Son, and affirming this dogma with persuasive arguments from the human mind; while the multitude closer to itself, and always slower to [embrace] heresies, [had] from the beginning held that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son: what was it proper for her to do, who had always been accustomed to impose a fitting end to such controversies and to demonstrate unity to all? Was she to pass over the matter in silence and desert her own order? But that was not her way. Was she to have recourse to Aristotelian methods, Platonic divisions, mathematical demonstrations, and human cogitations, and from those to seek the truth of the matters in question? But she did not decree to do this either, knowing full well that this matter transcends every human mind, method, and demonstration. What, therefore, did she do? She had recourse to her own teachers, whom for long ages past she had held as saints—the blessed Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, and Gregory—and having searched their writings, she sees them, as if with one mouth, in many places and quite frequently, asserting that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. And she does not stop even at this. But she also searches the Fathers of the Eastern Church, and sees that most of the more principal ones among them similarly hold the same [view], while the rest do not at all say otherwise, except for one, namely, the Damascene, who appears to say the contrary. Although he himself does not say that the Holy Spirit is not from the Son, but that he is not said to be from the Son. ^B Indeed, he himself also appears to say that the Holy Spirit emanates from the Father through the Son, and that the Spirit is the image of the Son, and that the Son and the Spirit are related to the Father just as the radius and the illumination are related to the sun—both of which are indeed from the sun, but he says that the illumination is given to us *through* the radius. From which it appears that even he does not hold a completely contrary position. For to say that the illumination is from the sun through the radius, and again from the sun and the radius, is true; just as it is in the Trinity. For since the Father and the Son are commonly the cause, it is true to say it in both ways: both "from the Father through the Son," and "from the Father and from the Son."

Having therefore seen the concord of so many Fathers, and because she was not yet content with these, given the magnitude of the matter, she convokes to herself all the prelates of the Churches to share in an inquiry. Therefore, with one word, having gathered those who wished to be present, and with all of them, after a fitting inquiry into the matter had been made, consenting to the same thing, she finally determines—declaring with apostolic authority that this is what must be believed—and decrees those who say the contrary to be in the faction of heretics.

What then will be my excuse now, if I should refuse quiet obedience, and against the sentiment of so many Fathers and of the Mother of Churches, regarding a matter overcoming the strength of natural reason, prefer my own understanding? And not being able to consider that it was unworthy of divine providence not only to elevate that Church—and to make her the head of the Catholic Church from the beginning—whom He knew would incurably fall and was going to drag infinite multitudes with her, but also, when she fell from right dogmas, to magnify her even more and enrich her with all goods, while permitting her who righteously stood from the beginning to suffer the contrary? ^C But I also think another thing, that the gates of hell will never prevail against the Church, since it is most true. The gates of hell long ago prevailed against the Church of God, since the Roman Church has fallen. For if the Church is only of this party, such that according to the multitudes they may convert them to themselves, with no one whatever existing who would publicly preaching strengthen the people to persevere in the faith, and [if] matters still stand as they do, as I recited in the first sermon sent to you: then the gates of hell have already prevailed against the Church. But if this is falsely existing, I am compelled to think the Roman Church is orthodox in all things, and that this alone is, with the multitude subject to it, the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church, in which we are commanded to believe, and against which the gates of hell have not prevailed, nor ever, God regenerating it as a new Israel, will prevail.

Letter of Alexios Kalokethes to Lord Barlaam, Bishop of Gerace, requesting from him the translation of certain Latin books for the sake of union.

When we had seen the letters sent by you in common to [our] friends, I and the friends of yours in our city found nothing in them that could be rightly contradicted. But we saw many things completely unknown to us. For you say in the second letter that it is a sign that the Roman Church ruled over all from the beginning, because the Roman pontiffs, starting from the blessed Clement, immediately began to administer universal matters, as if needing to take charge of the whole world; sending regular letters to all, and endeavoring everywhere to correct sins and [deciding] what were to be done. ^D From which letters many of those things that are now even done in the Church of the Greeks had their beginning. We, however, have neither seen these letters, nor did we think they were currently in the Greek tongue. Likewise, you say the blessed Ambrose, Gregory, [and] Jerome say in their writings that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son: which writings we similarly have not seen. Likewise, you say that the Roman Church convoked all the prelates of the Churches concerning that same thing, to share in an inquiry of this, and with those who wished to be present having been gathered together, and with all, after the convenient inquiry made, agreeing to the same

the sentient, finally declares that this must be believed, and she decreed that those who say the contrary be ranked in the portion of heretics: in these, as it were, a general council has been held by design, of which we have not heard even up to now. We ask you, therefore, all of us together, by God himself, that if it is possible for you, you transmit to us both the aforementioned letters of those holy pontiffs, and the sermons of the said three blessed men, in which the proposed question is contained, and also the acts of the aforesaid common congregation, translating them into the Greek language. For if we see these things about which you speak, we shall be informed; know well that our controversies with the Latins will be, for the most part, resolved.

Letter of the most wise and most learned Demetrius of Thessalonica to the same Lord Barlaam, Bishop of Gerace: in which, setting forth all his doubts concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, he asks to be taught by him, by what ways he was led to believe that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son.

When you formerly took your leave of our parts and went away to the West, intending to remain there for the future, we, who had been illuminated by the rays of your wisdom and thought ourselves freed from the many shadows of ignorance, again falling into the shadows of your absence, lived our lives as if in the night—like those mourning the deprivation of the sun that has set, and is hoped never to rise again. But recently, a rumor being suddenly heard and spreading everywhere and crying out brilliantly, that you would not long after arrive at the new Rome, we were changed; who could worthily explain what great joy we were filled with? But because they were announcing for certain that you had already arrived at Byzantium, not coming from afar to us, we no longer seemed like sober men for joy: such did the love for you make us go mad. For truly it seemed like morning joy, having succeeded to the weeping that had lasted until evening, again shining in the East like the brilliant sun and making the most pleasant day for us.

And so, as many of us as are your friends prepare, as swiftly as possible, to come to you. But with all things prepared for the journey, and as we were proposing to depart immediately from there, some men came, reporting that you had again departed from the city and had gone away to the Black Sea. Upon hearing this we were struck, and plunged into deep sadness; we could scarcely compose ourselves, considering the mutability of human affairs and consoling ourselves. Yet they said they had heard from you such things—that it is a matter of absolute necessity to confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and that those who deny this are necessarily heretics and schismatics. Concerning these things, therefore, before all others, I would value hearing from you yourself and inquiring about everything with you, not because of any contention, as someone might think, but because it is not likely that you—whom we know differently, cultivating virtue and truth with your life, and taking no pleasure in contentious words about any matter, nor being eager for victory—would have ever disputed unreasonably, having thus turned yourself to preaching that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and that he also proceeds from the Son, unless some suitable necessity, which could satisfy a philosophizing soul so that it would need nothing else, had compelled you to this. I would gladly wish to learn from you in a meeting what that necessity was which led you to this. I, always making much of this, would arrive at something certain concerning these things. And although hearing much from many—both from those who refer the Holy Spirit to the Father alone, and from those who refer him to the Father and the Son—I have not yet, up to this day, been able to understand any necessity from their words that would have sufficiently established in me a movement of the mind favoring either of the stated opinions. Therefore, if that which compelled you to this is something of those things that can be handed down by Scripture, I pray you by the guardian of friendship, that since God did not grant that you come to words, you in no way neglect to signify this to me through Scripture. But if some hidden illumination was made to you from above for this, first indeed I ask that, with the prayers of the saints for friendship, you seek this same thing from God for us; next, that you also admonish us through Scripture, by which exercises, purging our principle faculty, we may become capable of such an illumination.

In order, therefore, that you may be better able to know in what way you ought to care for us, it seems necessary to me to explain in particular how, until now, the words of neither party have been able to compel me to assent to them. And first, one must speak of the opinion of the Latins. There are four classes of arguments by which they always attempt to strengthen their conclusion. The first of these is that which creates a common argument through the substantial and natural identity of the Father and the Son. For it is supposed, as if conceded by everyone, that the Father and the Son are one God, and one substance, or nature, or essence; from this they come syllogistically to the proposal. The second is that they attempt to find the question out of the personal difference of the Son and the Holy Spirit. For either inquiring how the Spirit can be personally distinguished from the Son, or supposing two emanations specifically expressed, and proceeding by means in order, they arrive at their conclusion. The third is that they attempt to gather the same thing from the sayings of Divine Scripture. The fourth is that they think to demonstrate their proposal through notions implanted in us by nature.

Arguments of the first class do not compel me to this cause. We have received that there are two modes of those things which are predicated about God. For some of them are of nature and substance, and, as it were, substantial: those, namely, which are predicated separately of each of the three persons, and together of the three singularly, as good, wise, omnipotent, truth, and others. For we do not say the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three wise, or good, or omnipotent, or

one, but rather that the three are one, wise, and omnipotent and good, just as they are one God. Other things, however, are personal and signify the relation of the persons among themselves; these, clearly, can in no way be predicated singularly of the three together. For the three are not one Father, or one Son, or one Unbegotten. To such, therefore, belongs both to breathe forth the Spirit and to be the principle of the same. For the three persons are not one breather. Wherefore, that this is posited in the unbegotten person alone will not create a substantial difference between him and the Son, nor will it corrupt their identity according to substance. For since the unbegotten ^A person has equally both to beget and to breathe forth, and is no more one than the other, although it is named Father from the other, as from the more known: just as the substantial identity of him and the Holy Spirit does not force the Spirit that he himself also begets, but rather, with him not begetting, his identity according to substance with the unbegotten person is saved; so surely the substantial identity of him, the Father and the Son, will not force the Son to breathe forth the Spirit, but rather, with him not breathing it forth, his substantial identity with the Father will be saved. Wherefore I can be moved no further by arguments of this sort.

But I come to the second matters, which, namely, construct a syllogism from the personal difference of the Son to the Spirit. It is certain that from a matter utterly unknown, and one able neither to be understood nor to be spoken of, nothing can be syllogistically concluded and found. But indeed, by the testimony of our illustrious holy doctors, although they confess that the Son differs personally from the Spirit, yet they forbade us to investigate the mode of this difference, saying that it is utterly impossible for it to be distinctly understood and expressed by any one living in the flesh. Wherefore, what can be concluded from it?

I see again some of the Latins expressing so openly and distinctly the difference by which the Holy Spirit differs from the Son, that it could be understood even by any men whatsoever, if they only use their minds in the slightest degree. Therefore, since there appears no reason why these should be considered more trustworthy or of greater authority than those in such matters, I am unable to believe those—or from that source conclude—more than the others; and therefore I cannot be persuaded by arguments of this sort.

We must proceed, therefore, to those things which are argued from the divine Scripture. For regarding these, I first consider in common that if it were impossible for any one to adapt another reasonable and sufficient sense to the words proposed by them, then what they themselves conclude from them would be the only necessary one. But since the same cannot be understood more as they understand it than as others do, the discourses of neither side have the power to force me. For this very thing, that the Holy Spirit is in many places of Scripture said to be the Son’s, because of the sole unity which he has with him according to ^B substance—the virtue, the will, the wisdom, and the act, and on account of these alone he is said to be his—is just as, conversely, the Word of God is called the sword of the Spirit according to the Apostle. One, again, might say that not only because of what you say, but also so that we may understand from this that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son himself as well: I, considering that the Holy Spirit could also sufficiently be said to be the Son’s according to that meaning alone, hesitate and have not that to which I might more assent.

Similarly, the Spirit is sent in many places of Scripture by the Son. Therefore, if one should say that just as the Son, on account of the manifestation and advent to us in the flesh, is said to be sent also by the Holy Spirit, as it is written in Isaiah, so too the Holy Spirit, since he was manifested to us in certain signs and is said to have come to us temporally—which signs indeed signified the Spirit himself, but were done by the whole Trinity—is for this reason alone, and not for any other, said to be sent also by the Son; and another, in turn, should say that not only because of this, but so that along with these we may also understand that the Spirit proceeds from the Son as well: I, seeing again that even if the Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would nevertheless also be sufficiently said to be sent by him according to that meaning alone, am held by the same doubt similarly.

Again, in sacred Scripture the Spirit is said to receive from the Son, and to be given by him as he breathes. Therefore, if one should say that because the Son of God himself had said great things about the Holy Spirit: that blasphemy against him is irremissible, and that he himself will teach and announce all things and will lead into all truth, and he had simply attributed the distribution of charisms to him: so that the apostles, or the faithful after them, might not think the Spirit to be of greater dignity and power than the Son; for that reason alone, and not for another, he said that the Holy Spirit will receive from him the things he will announce, and by breathing he showed that he gives him, in order that we might not think the Spirit greater than him, and might believe that the deifying charisms are common to the Son and the Holy Spirit; and another, in turn, should say that it is both because of this, and also so that we may understand the procession of the Spirit from the Son himself: ^C I, considering that the Scripture could hold itself sufficiently according to that meaning alone, do not see the reason why I should believe the Latin more.

I see again some of the Latins expressing so openly and distinctly the difference by which the Holy Spirit differs from the Son, that it could be understood even by any men whatsoever, if they only use their minds in the slightest degree. Therefore, since there appears no reason why these should be considered more trustworthy or of greater authority than those in such matters, I am unable to believe those—or from that source conclude—more than the others; and therefore I cannot be persuaded by arguments of this sort.

We must proceed, therefore, to those things which are argued from the divine Scripture. For regarding these, I first consider in common that if it were impossible for any one to adapt another reasonable and sufficient sense to the words proposed by them, then what they themselves conclude from them would be the only necessary one. But since the same cannot be understood more as they understand it than as others do, the discourses of neither side have the power to force me. For this very thing, that the Holy Spirit is in many places of Scripture said to be the Son’s, because of the sole unity which he has with him according to substance, is just as, conversely, the Word of God is called the sword of the Spirit according to the Apostle. One, again, might say that not only because of what you say, but also so that we may understand from this that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son himself as well: I, considering that the Holy Spirit could also ^D sufficiently be said to be the Son’s according to that meaning alone, hesitate and have not that to which I might more assent.

Similarly, the Spirit is sent in many places of Scripture by the Son. Therefore, if one should say that just as the Son, on account of the manifestation and advent to us in the flesh, is said to be sent also by the Holy Spirit, as it is written in Isaiah, so too the Holy Spirit, since he was manifested to us in certain signs and is said to have come to us temporally—which signs indeed signified the Spirit himself, but were done by the whole Trinity—is for this reason alone, and not for any other, said to be sent also by the Son; and another, in turn, should say that not only because of this, but so that along with these we may also understand that the Spirit proceeds from the Son as well: I, considering again that even if the Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would nevertheless also be sufficiently said to be sent by him according to that meaning alone, am held by the same doubt similarly.

Again, in sacred Scripture the Spirit is said to receive from the Son, and to be given by him as he breathes. Therefore, if one should say that because the Son of God himself had said great things about the Holy Spirit: that blasphemy against him is irremissible, and that he himself will teach and announce all things and will lead into all truth, and he had simply attributed the distribution of charisms to him: so that the apostles, or the faithful after them, might not think the Spirit to be of greater dignity and power than the Son; for that reason alone, and not for another, he said that the Holy Spirit will receive from him the things he will announce, and by breathing he showed that he gives him, in order that we might not think the Spirit greater than him, and might believe that the deifying charisms are common to the Son and the Holy Spirit; and another, in turn, should say that it is both because of this, and also so that we may understand the procession of the Spirit from the Son himself: [D cont] I, considering that the Scripture could hold itself sufficiently according to that meaning alone, do not see the reason why I should believe the Latin more.

Item: it is written in Scripture that the Father and the Son are one, and that all things which are of the Father are also of the Son. And from this they conclude their dogma. But indeed, if someone should say: O Latins, nothing is more necessary from these than that the Son is the principle of the Spirit, because it could also be said from the person of the Holy Spirit: I and the Breather are one, and all things whatsoever the Breather has are mine. But the Father would be the Holy Spirit no more from this. Therefore, if someone says these things, what

^A more persuasive thing will the Latins say? For I, for my part, do not perceive it.

Item, where the Apostle says: "The Lord Jesus shall destroy Antichrist with the spirit of his mouth" [II Thess. II, 8], those who believe that the Holy Spirit Himself is spoken of there, conclude this very thing. But it can also be said here, since we do nothing easily, but rather that which we do by merely breathing; the Apostle, wishing to show from our own translation how very easy it is for Christ to destroy Antichrist, and that he has no difficulty in it, said he is to be destroyed by the spirit of his mouth, by no means wishing the Holy Spirit to be understood there. Therefore, if anyone were to say these things, it seems to me that one would have to hesitate as to whom one should the more grant it.

Item, where it is written that God is charity [I Joan. IV, 8], and that charity is from God: those who receive it as said of the Holy Spirit, that is, the charity by which the Father loves the Son and the Son the Father, conclude this, while adding certain things in between and saying that He proceeds from both; they do not persuade me any the more by these things. Why? First, because it is not too certain whether the blessed John intended the Holy Spirit there; for nothing prevents us from explaining it such as he says, where it is written: God is charity, that the charity itself is predicated of the Triune God Himself, in the way that blessed Dionysius says, that the names of all beings can be predicated ^B of God according to cause, and especially the most noble and divine ones, such as Goodness, Life, Beauty, Light and the like; whereas where it is said: Charity is from God, it is said that the affection of charity itself, by which we are united to God and to one another, is present to us from the Triune God Himself, in the way in which we say that every good and honest thing is from God.

Then, if the Apostle names the Holy Spirit Himself charity in those books as much as possible, whence is it clear whether he understands that same charity by which the Father loves the Son and the Son the Father? But he did not name the charity itself in a more indifferent or similar way: just as the Son or the Father, or the whole Trinity together, is named charity: just as other charisms are attributed singly to the Holy Spirit, which nevertheless concur in the same way to the whole Trinity. Furthermore, the Son is indeed named the wisdom of the Father [I Cor. I, 24], but it is not that wisdom by which the Father understands the Holy Spirit, and the latter the Father, so that from this it is concluded that the Son Himself is generated from the Father and the Holy Spirit simultaneously.

I, therefore, to unveil the passion of my mind to you, find it much more difficult to accept that the love of the Father and the Son for one another constitutes another person, the Holy Spirit Himself, than to accept that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son. For when I think about this desire for his truth, no suspicions enter my mind, lest perhaps that dictum of Aristotle be true: The more I search and ponder in thought, the more incredible it seems to me; for it does not appear thus from divine Scripture, so as to remove the soul from every ambiguity for one seeking the truth by itself. But if, utterly departing from sacred Scripture and the faith handed down to us, we wish to recur to natural reason, I marvel if we shall be able to find the one, most simple God in three perfect persons by natural reason alone, as if it were one of those things which are demonstrated mathematically.

Age, therefore, let us, embracing this by way of faith, see what necessity there is that the charity of the Father and the Son be the Holy Spirit in that way. Thus, if it is strictly the same for the Father to generate the Son and to love the Son; then generation is strictly the same as the charity by which the Father loves the Son, and consequently, the very generation of the Son is the Holy Spirit, which is no small thing to wonder at, and especially if the generated one is the principle of his own generation. But if it is one thing for the Father to generate the Son, and another to love or understand Him, it is even more to be wondered at how the generation by which the Father generates the Son does not constitute another person, nor does the intellection by which the Father understands the Son; yet the love of Him cannot exist unless that love constitutes a third person: and especially since it is possible to say that the Spirator loves and understands the Spirit, and the Spirit loves and understands the Father and the Son; from which love or intellection no other person is constituted.

Item, to say the Spirit is the unity and bond of the Father and the Son, so that it is concluded to be from both: neither does Scripture itself compel me, nor does natural reason persuade me any more to accept that the principiated (things having a principle) are united by a principle, than that the principles are united by a principiated. For that many things have being from the same source is reasonable to me. But to say that the principiated have being ^C from the principles, while the principles have being from the principiated, seems to be entirely lacking in reason. But if there is another reason for these things, truer than my reason, which I do not now understand, yet as long as I do not understand it, it is necessary that I be held by this which I now understand. The sayings of Scripture which they allege are almost those mentioned before. I, however, can understand neither from these nor from others any indubitable necessity for this, nor a conclusion that entirely establishes my mind in their view.

It remains, therefore, to see the fourth genus, which makes an argument for the proposition from common notions. These which are called common notions, whether, as seems to Aristotle, they are impressed upon the mind from sensible things through the senses, or, as seems to Plato, they are themselves the intellectual substance of the soul: in either way they concern those things which, by understanding, we grasp and touch, and which, as we understand them, we comprehend and embrace by intellection itself. Therefore, we also think that those things which are demonstrated from them are indubitably demonstrated.

^A But we say that those things which are of God are supersubstantial, above intelligence, and incomprehensible; and especially those things which are spoken concerning the Triad of persons, which are indeed believed by the tradition of the sacred Scripture, yet escape our natural intelligences, because no mode of the Trinity is seen in those things which are understood by us, but it behaves itself indifferently through all things toward that Trinity which is above intellect.

Who then is so dull of mind as to think that such common notions, which correspond to the things that are perfectly understood by us, agree simply to all things, even to those which are above our intelligence? Whereas the things which are true in natural objects do not now also fit the mathematical, or conversely; nor do those that correspond to arithmetic or musical matters reach to geometric or perspective things. Therefore, much less is it to be thought that supersubstantial things are subject to the same necessities as those which are under our intellect. It is not therefore necessary that everything which is predicated affirmatively or negatively of that thing which is comprehended by our intelligence must likewise be predicated of that thing which transcends our intelligence.

Therefore, either no notion of this kind reaches as far as that supersubstantial and incomprehensible essence, or some do and some do not. But even this suffices. Therefore, this being conceded, since I have no necessity by any discretion to see which of those notions that are true in existing things should be transferred to the superficial and supra-intelligent, and which should not, when I hear the Latins arguing from propositions of this kind on the proposed question, even if they are true propositions in all existing things, yet being unable to distinguish enough of what genus they are—whether that which reaches from existing things to the super-essential can or not—I am utterly in doubt, and I hesitate to assent to the conclusion of such a syllogism. Let this have been shown by me in a general way, for what reason I am not yet persuaded by their words to believe them. It will not perhaps be worse to commemorate some of their particular syllogisms.

I once heard some Latins syllogizing in this way. For, positing as a minor proposition that the Holy Spirit really differs from the Son, and adding as a major that all things which differ from one another without matter differ either as contraries, or as habit and privation, or as affirmation and negation, or as relatives; then showing that the three preceding modes of these can in no way accord with those divine persons; they concluded, therefore, that the Holy Spirit can only be distinguished from the Son according to relatives, and thus proceeding by order, they arrived at the final conclusion. But they did not move me at all by this. For when I came to angels and souls, ^B and mathematical numbers, and most especially the superficial and solid ones of these, I saw many things that were purely understood without matter, and yet were distinguished from one another by none of these four aforementioned modes.

^A Although even in all existing things a major proposition might seem to exist, it would still remain a point of doubt whether it is of those propositions which can be verified in existing things and in the superessential, or not. But the Spirit indeed differs personally from the Son, yet not according to any of the modes known to us in existing things. And is that sentiment of the Fathers true, that in this life it is impossible to know distinctly and expressly that by which the Spirit differs from the Son? For no one would dare to say that it is necessary, either that such a difference be known and reduced to some of the marks known to us, or that it does not exist at all.

Likewise, I also heard such a syllogism as this, in which the following was supposed as the minor proposition: "As breathing is to proceeding, so is generating to being generated." And this was assumed as the major: "As it is generally in all existing things, if the first is to the second as the third is to the fourth, and taken conversely, it is as the first to the third, the second to the fourth." And from these it was concluded that just as breathing is to generating, so should proceeding be to being generated. And because they said that breathing and generating, occurring simultaneously in one person, namely the Father, do not make a personal difference, therefore proceeding and being generated do not of themselves make differing persons. And thus, seeking another personal difference of the Spirit toward the Son, they finally came to conclude that the Spirit proceeds also from the Son. I am unable to follow them; for seeking existing things within myself, I found in many cases the major proposition to be false, having seen many [instances] in substances, in quantities, and in relatives. But the first position of the first to the second, and of the second to the third, and of the second to the fourth, did not preserve the proportionality; although, as I said a little earlier, even if in all things which are below our mind it should seem that this is true, it would still remain uncertain whether it is true in that thing which excels every mind.

^C Likewise, some also argue thus: Everything is common to the Father and the Son, except those things in which their relation to one another is opposed. But the relation of the Father to the Son, or of the Son to the Father, is not opposed to the spirating power; therefore the spirating power is of the Father and the Son. But I do not assent to this syllogism either; for it certainly has a defect; for that which is sought is taken as manifest; for in the major proposition, through common [terms] and other words, it covertly begs the question.

For none of those who doubt the conclusion will grant the major proposition. For since that person who is such that He is from no one, equally has both to generate and to breathe, the question is whether these are simply His own—the Son and the Spirit having neither—or whether they are indeed His own toward the Spirit, but toward the Son not both, but only generating, while He has breathing in common with Him. This, therefore, when it is asked, to take it simply ^D

^A even up to a general council, so far as I know, has been ratified. Therefore, even if this very thing is said by many saints, it seems to me there is no danger in being unwilling to assent to it. It remains, therefore, to consider the authority of the Roman Church, lest it be necessary, since she is the mother and the first of all Churches, to believe simply whatever she always dogmatizes about God. But as to this, it happens that I hesitate again, lest perhaps in the dogmas of the faith, by which the believer is distinguished from the infidel, the authority of that Church might not be sufficient, but that of the universal Church must also be sought. And I doubt this for many reasons.

First, because in the Symbol of faith we do not say that we believe in the Roman Church, but in the Catholic. Although, what would prohibit us from saying that as well, if it were sufficient?

I wish, however, to show you how I stand regarding the sayings of our holy Fathers, who say in their writings the very thing that the Latins say. I have indeed found many who think this—namely, Saint Augustine, Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Saint Cyril in his sayings in the *Thesaurus* and in his other dialogues, Saint Athanasius, and certain others. But I consider that I think rightly in this: that of all things which these teach, we have the necessity of receiving only those which are either shown most openly and indubitably from Holy Scripture itself, or which, having been explicitly examined and determined by a general council, have obtained the final sentence, so that all must admit them, or which are able to be sufficiently demonstrated by our natural reason. Whatever things are not such as these, it does not seem to me that there is an obligation to admit them, nor does it seem that there is danger in not believing them and casting them aside. For we do not consider those men to be of such profound authority, of which the prophets and apostles—whom we must obey through all things exactly as they are—are, that we should obey them in the same way. The argument, moreover, is that the prophets and apostles say nothing that is contrary to themselves in essence. According to these teachers, however, they say things that are contradictory to one another in essence, concerning very many and not minor matters, both in interpreting Scripture and in dogmatizing: so that it becomes safe for us to decide to whom we wish to assent. But indeed, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son seems to me neither comprehensible by our natural reason, nor shown most certainly from the Holy Scripture itself without any ambiguity. ^B

^C Then, long ago in different parts of the world, when many heresies and questions had arisen, both concerning the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and the Incarnation, these questions were not referred to the Roman Church, that they might there be examined and determined and handed down to all; nor did others look only to this, as to what that Church had determined about them, but general councils were gathered, and the knowledge and judgment of the whole Church was called upon concerning the matters in doubt: since this was much more difficult than the other. And what is more, those councils were not gathered by the command of the Pope, but as is apparent, both through chronicles and imperial letters, and through the addresses of the emperors themselves to those who were in those councils, they were celebrated by imperial commands. In which councils, although the Pope or his legates obtained the first place, nevertheless the canons and the determined dogmas were not set forth from the person of the Pope, but from the person of the whole council.

Looking to these things, therefore, it seems to me most necessary, even in the present question, that the authority and knowledge of the whole Church should concur together with the Roman Church. Since, if this is truly the case, it will be believed out of the duty of necessity. What, then? Do I say that I hesitate to believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and that I judge that it is correctly said by many that He proceeds solely from the Father? I am very much lacking in this. But if it can be said, I hold it to be much more doubtful and unbelievable.

For, first, it seems to me impossible to demonstrate it through common and natural notions, for the same reasons I already stated. Then, in the entire holy and divine Scripture, no such saying is found by which—I will not say it is demonstrated openly, but—it can be perceived even by conjecture and suspicion that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. For neither, because the Lord said, *Who proceeds from the Father* (John xv, 26), ^D should it be immediately thought that He does not also proceed from Himself. For it is the custom of the Savior Himself, when He speaks of His own and the Father’s common [attributes], to attribute them to the Father

^A, not adding to the word [referring] to Himself. As in these: *Every plant which my heavenly Father has not planted will be rooted up*; and: *No one can come to Me unless My Father draws him.* Although, who would presume to deny that the Son Himself also plants [the truth] in the minds of the faithful and draws them to salvation? Wherefore it remains even regarding the proposition to have doubts, lest perchance it be similar to those things which, while attributed to the Father, are nevertheless common to others. For many such things are found in the Gospels; where, even if He had said, in distinguishing: *Who proceeds from the Father alone*: not even thus would the seeking be entirely removed, lest He also proceed from Him. For in another place He says: *This is eternal life, that they may know You, the only true God*, although He Himself is also the true God existing. And that: *No one knows the Son except the Father*, and, *No one knows the Father except the Son*; although the Holy Spirit similarly knows both the Father and the Son. Wherefore even in that [instance], if it had been said similarly, it could indeed be doubted whether perhaps such a thing were the kind that was attributed to the Father alone, but was nonetheless existing of the Son also. Furthermore, even if it had been said openly: *Who proceeds, not from Me, but from the Father*; and thus nothing less could be doubted. For He said many common things [that one would say] He neither has nor does [by Himself]. *My teaching*, He says, *is not Mine, but the Father’s*; and: *I have not come to do My own will, but the will of Him who sent Me.* And: *To sit at My right hand and at My left is not Mine to give, but to those for whom it has been prepared by My Father*; and: *That hour, neither the Son knows, but the Father only.* Wherefore if that had been said similarly, there would still be room for doubt, lest perhaps it had been said with these meanings, however common. Where, therefore, it is both customary for Christ to attribute common things to the Father, and He neither said in distinguishing: *Who proceeds from the Father alone*; nor, *What is not from Me*; it becomes entirely doubtful and ambiguous how the Savior said this: whether so that it might be understood to be proper to the Father alone, or desiring it to be understood as common, that is, to Himself and the Father: just as also other things, which were similarly said by Him. Similarly also in the Creed of the faith, which the Nicene Council began, and the Constantinopolitan finished, it is indeed read simply thus: *Who proceeds from the Father.* But whether they did not add, *and from the Son*, because the Fathers of those councils themselves did not hold this opinion, is in no way certain to me.

For, first, besides those dogmas which are in the Creed, there are many other dogmas too necessary for the faith, both regarding God, and regarding providence, regarding the two natures and wills and operations, regarding the one person, regarding penance, regarding the sacrament of the Eucharist, regarding the non-preexistence of souls, or the substantial principle of evils, and regarding many others. Concerning which it was likely that those Fathers ^B held the truth, yet they did not place them in the Creed. Wherefore it remains to doubt, lest perchance this one also be of those things which, indeed, are not said in the Creed, but are otherwise believed by them. Although Saint Athanasius, and the great Basil, and his brother, who are said to have been present at the aforementioned councils, manifestly seem to hold the same view as the Latins. Or will someone say that the writings of these are corrupted? But I, while this remains uncertain, rightly doubt in any event.

Then, they did not even strictly observe this in the Creed, that they would assign common [attributes] of the three persons or the two as common, but [only] assign proper [attributes] specifically to each one; but, on the contrary, they did so in many cases for the sake of brevity, as I estimate. For although Omnipotent is common, by saying *the Father almighty*, they did not grant this to the Son or the Spirit. But, conversely, they did so regarding Lord, by calling the Son and the Spirit *Lord*: likewise, the Holy Spirit is indeed the *maker of all*, but by attributing this to the Father and the Son, they said nothing of these regarding the Spirit. But, conversely, they attributed being *life-giving* and *having spoken through the prophets* to the Spirit, although they were common, and not to the Father or the Son. Again, being *light from light* and *true God from true God* are common to the Son and the Spirit: yet they said these things regarding the Son, not regarding the Spirit. Who, therefore, knows that they did not consider it similarly common to the Father and the Son, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from them, [and thus] thought it sufficient to place this in the Father? I, indeed, from this consider that I can conclude neither [case], neither that He proceeds from the Father alone nor that He proceeds from the Son, just as neither [can I conclude] regarding the evangelic saying commemorated above.

But I am also very surprised at those who think they have something certain from these things: for concerning the writings of our holy Fathers, which have come to my hands, I have seen the sayings of three [authors], which seem to provide some difficulty for the proposition: holy Dionysius the Areopagite, and holy Gregory, and holy John Damascene. Where holy Dionysius indeed says the Father is the only fountain of the supersubstantial Deity. But the Theologian ^C calls the Son and the Holy Spirit the twofold ray of the Father. Damascene truly says that the Spirit is not said to be from the Son. Regarding which, I first consider this, that even if it were most clear that they themselves by these sayings held the opinion that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and not also from the Son; since this has not yet been explicitly examined and confirmed by a general council, there would be no danger in not believing [it]—for the very same reason which I said before: and [because] many other holy [Fathers] say the contrary, and explain [it], and discuss the problem more broadly, such as Saint Augustine, and Saint Cyril, and those having many [other] sayings from the holy Scripture, which provide no minimal suspicion of this dogma. And furthermore, the mother of all Churches, which never in ^D

earlier times has been caught defending any such heresy, with the person himself affirming it. What? Must we rather believe these three, saying this once, and having nothing of the testimonies of the Scriptures themselves for this matter? ^A

Next, sayings of this kind are deeply ambiguous. And to speak first of the first, since if the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, the Son has this from the Father, and the Father is the Fountain, who has [it] from no other, so that He is the Fountain, or emanates from no other: the Son, however, becomes as it were a fountain from a fountain, just as the Principle is said to be from the Principle, it becomes utterly uncertain in what sense that saint said this: whether he is wise, because the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, or whether he is wise also from the Son. But saying that word, as if he meant, "the sole supersubstantial fountain of the Deity, who does not emanate from another fountain, and from whom another has it, so that he is a fountain," is the Father, with whom is the fountain, the Son, who is, namely, the Spirit. For that word can well enough apply to both senses. ^B

Again, concerning the twin ray. First, there is doubt about that statement in which this is written, whether it is the Theologian’s, for it differs much from his style: next, nothing prevents both being understood, and that the twin ray is the Father’s Son and the Spirit, in as much as both perfectly have their being from the Father. And again, that the Spirit proceeds also from the Son, by the same one and simple procession by which He proceeds also from the Father, with the spirative power being one in the Father and the Son, it is no wonder if the example of this is not seen in visible rays. It is uncertain, therefore, from this word, what he who said this intended. And especially because the Theologian himself, speaking of the Son, [says] that He is "sole from sole"; concerning whom no one would have suspected that perhaps, according to the Deity, He is not from the Father alone. Of the Holy Spirit, he never says: "Sole from sole." From which he provides no small suspicion that perhaps he thinks of Him also from the Son. ^C

But Damascene seems almost to differ only in word from those who say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, though not in reality. [He describes] the relation to the Father, Son, and Spirit, as the ray and the illumination stand in relation to the sun: both of which indeed are from the sun. But he says the illumination is conveyed to us through the ray. But indeed, this is almost the same as what they feel, when they say the Holy Spirit is also from the Son. ^D For just as the ray proceeds at the same time from the sun, and receives from it that it might emit illumination: so also the Son, as they say, is at the same time born from the Father, and receives from Him to breathe the Spirit. And just as whether the illumination itself is said to be both from the sun and from the ray, or from the sun through the ray, it is not said that the illumination is from two principles—the sun and the ray—so they too by no means say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles; but as from one. Wherefore Damascene also seems to feel almost the same as these.

But without this example of the ray and the illumination, that saying by itself, in which he says: "The Spirit is not said to be from the Son," is ambiguous. For it is not the same thing to say, "This is not said," and, "This is not"; for in many things it disagrees, since there are many things that are not said, and yet are. As if someone were to say, "The Holy Spirit is not said in Scripture to be 'true God from true God'." Therefore, since Damascene did not say that the Holy Spirit is not from the Son, but that He is not said to be from the Son, it is at any rate uncertain what he thought about this: whether [he meant] merely that it is neither existent nor said, or as not said, but existent. But let this suffice regarding these.

Let us see, therefore, the very strong syllogisms of theirs on this matter. I will set them forth, however, not by my own learning, but as a certain wise man of our own sets them forth, word for word, in his treatise against the Latins. For he says thus: If the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, as the Latins say, it follows necessarily that the Son is one person with respect to the Spirit. For we know there are two differences of those things which are spoken of God. For some are substantial and natural, whatever are predicated both separately of each person, and singularly at the same time of the three; as good, wise, and similar things. Others are personal, of which each one is predicated either of one single person, or if it is predicated separately of several, it is nevertheless impossible that it be predicated of the same ones singularly at the same time. As "to emanate from another," since it is personal, is predicated both of the Son and of the Spirit; and the Son is emanating, and the Spirit is emanating; yet these two are not one emanating, but two emanators. For it is truly impossible that one personal property be predicated singularly of two persons, even if they are of the same substance. For although some two hear the same thing, or see, or understand, or will, or whatever they do; yet we cannot say that one hears, or sees, or understands, or wills, but two. Therefore, since to be the principle of the Spirit, and to breathe the Spirit, is not a substantial property, but a personal one—for it is not predicated of the Spirit, since, as they themselves say, it is also predicated of the Son—it is necessary to say that the Father and the Son are two breathers, and two principles of the Holy Spirit. Which is, for certain, an inconvenience.

But if someone says that, since He proceeds from both in one and simple and the same way, therefore the Father and the Son are simply one breather of the Holy Spirit: he necessarily falls into the other inconvenience. For of those things of which one personal property or difference in number is predicated singularly, those at any rate are numerically the same according to one predicative statement in number. Why? Because to be a breather is a personal property or difference, the Father and the Son are gathered according to the very thing that they are one Breather into one person. Therefore, the Father and the Son, in as much as they are referred to one another, are two persons. Yet by the fact that they are one breather, they are one person. But if someone says that, just as the Father and the Son...

and the other substantial attributes, are predicated singularly of the Father and the Son, they represent their one substance and essence: yet more so, because that which is theirs is simply and supremely one substance; and it happens that these substantial [attributes], each one being predicated of them, [it happens] that the state of being a breather [should also be predicated in like manner]; since [if] this is a personal property or difference, and is predicated singularly of the Father and the Son, it will assign them to be one person in accordance with this. But it follows all the more from this, because it would be [the case] that according to their breathing they are one person, that this should ^B happen to be predicated singularly of them. But if this is impossible, then that from which this arises is also impossible.

This is the argument of him who claims that many others in no way fall short of the necessity of a geometric demonstration. Yet the whole force of it depends upon two common notions: the one which posits that it is impossible for one personal property to be predicated singularly of two persons. The other, however, which assumes that those for which one numerical personal property is predicated singularly, are one and the same in number according to it. And truly, if I knew for certain that these common notions were true even in the supersubstantial essence, I would certainly accept the conclusion. But I am overly ignorant of this. And the same hesitations occur to me as those about which I was formerly doubtful concerning the syllogisms of the Latins. For even if it is granted in these things which are under our mind, ^C of which, clearly, we have mastery through understanding, and which we touch and comprehend, that these said common notions are true—which indeed itself can have many contradictions—what necessity is there that they should be true also in things that are dissimilar and otherwise constituted, and which infinitely flee our own weak, finite intelligences, and are therefore incomprehensible and super-intelligible? For if we were speaking truly above, that not all common notions in beings are true, and [that one] cannot ascend all the way to the supersubstantial: whence shall we know for certain, of these [notions] that exist, whether they are of those that extend all the way up there, or not? For neither are there found two other things in matters known to us that behave in every way towards each other, as the Father and the Son behave towards each other there. For perhaps even if the Father and the Son are one breather of the Holy Spirit, and the Deity ^D transcending [even our categories], the two said common notions also [being transcended], it in no way happens that the Father and the Son are one person with respect to the Spirit. And as for how this does not happen, it is no miracle that we are ignorant of that by which the procession is distinguished from the generation. Furthermore, since it is necessary either to think that those who believe these said common notions are true in divine matters are deceived—both the holy Augustine, and the holy Cyril, and others, who manifestly say that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son—or else to believe those assenting to them.

Let us see, if it pleases, another argument of the same kind. Since, he says, the Father and the Son are both one, and are two. Either the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, in so far as they are one, or in so far as they are two; but if in so far as they are two, there will be two processions and two principles; if, however, in so far as they are one, since this one is substance and nature and Deity, the Father therefore and the Son, by the fact that they are one substance and nature and Deity, breathe the Spirit. But yet, according to that by which they breathe the Spirit, they also differ from it. The Father, therefore, and the Son, according to the one substance and nature and Deity which they have, differ from the Spirit. The Spirit, therefore, is not at all of the same substance and nature and Deity as the Father and the Son; which is contrary to our faith. But this is a paralogism, by the fact that it assumes simply that which is granted in a certain respect. For the Latins do not say that the Spirit proceeds from those [the Father and the Son] because they are two, nor because they are simply one, but because they are one [in] some [respect], namely, according to one [property], which they share, of breathing power. What then? They grant it according to some [respect]: he, assuming it simply, has made a paralogism. But there is also such an argument of the same [person].

We, he says, by saying that the Son and the Spirit have their essence from the Father alone, assert what is proved to be true throughout all beings. For in all things, the unity is the principle of duality. They, however, by saying that the Spirit is from the Father and the Son, have all beings contradicting [them]. For nowhere is duality the principle of unity. In these things, first indeed, he seems to perceive the progress of superficial number from unity, but not also the progress of linear number. For in the former, two proceed immediately from one: in the latter, however, both two proceed from one, and a third unit proceeds from the first and second. But I, neither because of the phantom of superficial number, will say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone; nor because of the phantom of linear number, will I affirm [it] from the Son. For I think it neither safe nor religious to use such-like imaginings of ours as rules in supersubstantial matters. Furthermore, the Latins do not say that duality is the principle of unity; but that the Father and the Son, by the fact that they have something as one, are one principle, not two of the one. Regarding their syllogisms, let these things said suffice. For these are those which I have seen, which appear to be the strongest. But I think thus: Since that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone is neither sensible, so that it can be perceived through the senses, nor natural, or [one] of the contingent things, so that it can be known by that which is properly called opinion and imagination, but is above sense and everlasting: it is necessary

^A that one either assents to it rightly, or [knows it] by science or by faith. But I consider that to think this can be known or demonstrated and is comprehensible by our common notions, is to lack true knowledge. Faith, therefore, remains. But regarding those dogmas, we say that we rightly believe those things which, when someone who has great authority says them—someone whom it is salutary to believe and dangerous not to believe—we accept. To whom, therefore, of such standing, would I, by believing, seem to myself to act rashly? To Holy Scripture? But it says nothing of the sort. To general councils determining and dogmatizing this? But not this either. To many saints who, in explaining Holy Scripture, openly and through many [writings] hand this down, and assert that they have this from it? And how can this be said? To the mother of the Churches, finally? But she says the contrary. Is it not, therefore, the height of madness to say that one believes something regarding God, yet is unable to point to the one by believing whom one rightly admits this? Or will anyone say, as the only alternative, that he felt this through some secret and divine illumination? But I have not yet attained this. You have the causes, therefore, through which I judge it to be neither necessary, nor safe, nor of any prudence to assent to such a dogma. But since I said above that I find the idea even more incredible than that which the Latins say, I wish to show you this compassion.

^B Primum, I see that it is of greater audacity to deny that the Spirit proceeds also from the Son, than the opposite. For with saint Dionysius saying, in his *On the Divine Names*: "One must not dare to think or say anything at all about the Holy Trinity beyond those things which have been divinely revealed to us by the most sacred utterances themselves," those who say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone are indeed guilty of this audacity. For what cannot be shown in the slightest by the most sacred utterances, this they have dared to conceive about God. But the Latins, when many things in Holy Scripture provide no small suspicion, and *they*, as I believe, think that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and that this is signified by those texts, receive this with reverence and religion toward Holy Scripture, and with a desire to be obedient to it. Wherefore this differs much from the other. It appears to be of no, or at least the smallest, audacity.

Item, it is without doubt of no small audacity and presumption, in dogmas concerning the Most Holy Trinity, to prefer one's own cognition to the cognition of the saints and great doctors. But he who says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone necessarily thinks himself wiser and more religious than many great saints, and especially saint Augustine and saint Cyril, who teach the contrary more broadly and more openly. From the Latins, however, nothing of this sort is faulted, as no saint has openly and indubitably handed down that [He proceeds] from the Father alone.

Then, supposing on one side that both are false, and inquiring which, being false, involves greater danger, I find the dogma of the Latins much safer. For even if this were false, it adds something as if it were worthy of God, without removing anything. For it detracts nothing from the Spirit. For the Spirit does not, on this account, become of less dignity than the Son. Nor does it take anything away from the Son, nor does it subtract anything from what the Father has; it adds that He is not only the perfect spirator, but also generated a spirator. But that which the Greeks say, if indeed it is false, what a great blasphemy it is against the Pope! Adding nothing, yet detracting much, [it implies] that the Son indeed does not breathe the Spirit, but that the Father generated a spirator. And it is similar, as if someone, adding to the miracle of the Lord regarding the four-day-old Lazarus, were to say that he did not die, but that a certain passion had happened to him at the heart, and he seemed to be dead, but the Lord on the fourth day had freed him from that passion; another, on the other hand, were to say that he had been dead for thirty days, or even longer, when he was resurrected by the Lord. For both would be false. But the one detracts from that miracle, the other adds to it, so that the sin is not equal.

Consequently, again inquiring whether, being false, one can have more reasonable excuses in judgment, I find that it makes a lot of difference. The Latins, if one says it is false, by giving the reason for this, will be able to have many good refuges: that there were many things in Divine Scripture which seemed to conclude this, and that he himself wished to hold himself reverently toward it; that he believed out of faith, zeal, devotion, and love for the Lord Himself against whom he was ^C blaspheming, unless he believed that the Holy Spirit proceeded from Him; that many of the saints, who had been pleasing to Him in judgment, had handed this down openly and through many [writings]; that the mother of the Churches had always taught this. And indeed, the one who is on the other side, if he errs, I find that nothing of these things is available for an excuse in judgment; nor anything else, so to speak, that is worthy of reason.

Item, since men say many things against those things which they opine out of some contention, or self-love, or some other passion, I, inquiring which it is more likely were moved from the beginning by some such passion—whether the Latins, because [of the procession] from the Son, or the Greeks, because this is heresy and error—I find again the same difference. For in many of these our people subject to that Church, and in many here, while esteeming that they suffer injury from those greater than them and fleeing to her, and so by excommunication and other commands and in every way restraining them, here the greater ones strive against the injury: and this, as is likely, being not a little displeasing to them, to the former it seemed that by defaming that Church in dogmas, and persuading others of this, there would come a great liberation from evils: and ^D that of course, with those doing all things according to their own pleasure, no one would wish to recur to the other, and they might appear reasonably to refuse to obey the commands of the Pope. Thus it happens to the emperor, which he did not have before, to confirm and propose patriarchs, and that there be left no Church which is able to oppose him in anything

to resist. As for the patriarchs of the new Rome, that he might be named universal and not second after the first, but be esteemed the first among the consecrators in the Church. For neither of these existed before the schism. Yet for the Latins, from saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, there followed neither the liberation from any evils nor the acquisition of goods not then present. Whence it appears that saying they were agitated by passion from the beginning can be said more aptly of the Greeks than of the Latins.

From these and suchlike things, although it has not yet ^A seemed right to me to place faith in the dogma of the Latins, nevertheless it appears to me much more reasonable that what the Greeks say should not be believed than that. For the rest, may it be yours, as I also prayed in the beginning, to be willing to reveal and signify to us in writing what it is that has persuaded you to believe for certain that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and from this to consider those who do not hold and confess this as heretics and schismatics. All your friends greet you. And upon this letter being read before them, they say that they themselves also hesitate and ask the same of you.

The Epistle of Lord Barlaam, Bishop of Gerace, to the same Demetrius of Thessalonica, responding to his requests; he exhorts him to the union of the holy Roman Church.

When I had received, O my dear friend, your ingenious, admirable, and most eloquent letter, and had read and understood, as I believe, what is in it, I respond to your questions thus.

I knew not before, nor do I think I know now, whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. For I believe that a problem of this kind, both now and then, just as you seem to me to state very well in your letter, is above all human science and mind, and method and demonstration. But I believed formerly that it was from the Father alone, and now again I believe that it is also from the Son. I receded, however, from that belief for the same reasons and the same thoughts through which you, in the same letter, showed in many ways that one ought not to believe those who say it is from the Father alone; but you discern that these are to be considered much more incredible than others.

Those things, however, which led me to firmly believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son are chiefly three. Two of which are contained also in your letter: namely, that many of our Fathers, and those of great opinion, in explaining the holy and divine Scripture, say they have understood from it that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. And therefore they teach this most openly and in many places in their writings, such as Saint Augustine and Saint Cyril. And secondly, that the Roman Church—which surpasses all in dignity and dominion, and in diligent study regarding Scripture, and which always defends orthodox dogmata—teaches and holds this same thing from the beginning. To these two, O friend, a third is added, which you seem still to ignore, that a general council ^B was celebrated regarding this very thing at Lyons: which established that it [the union] should be held. This, I say, remaining free from all ambiguity, makes the whole of this dogma. For from this synod, having and doing whatever it is fitting for a general synod to have and do, having examined and determined that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son: he who does not receive this, as now contemning the authority and dogma of the Catholic Church, will justly and deservedly be considered a schismatic and a heretic. And I believe that if you had been informed of this synod, it would not still seem to you not necessary to receive this dogma. And now indeed I transmit to you the determination of this synod, written at the end of the letter. But afterwards, if God wills, I will send you its acts as well: from which you will be able to know both that it was general and that it omitted nothing of those things which it ought to have had and done.

But concerning the exposition of certain sayings of Scripture, from which the Latins conclude their dogma, of which you spoke, for which they can have a double exposition, that you hesitate and do not have one to whom you may more assent; you can certainly also consider that they indeed who explain them, so as to conclude that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son, are divine men: namely, the saint among others, Augustine, and Saint Cyril. For I omit other Latin saints who similarly explained the same things. For you seem not to have found them. But those who explain the same things otherwise, adding that it is impossible that there be any other intellect of the same besides this one, are Greeks: who after the schism contradict the Latins. Since the older Greeks, who similarly explain the same things to the modern Greeks, in no way add that it is impossible that there be another sense of the same. For you know that it can well happen in very many things that the intellects of the same things are diverse, not repugnant to themselves, and not all opened by all, but some by some. What kind of intellects are repugnant, you also showed in many sayings and [those] more necessary for concluding the Latin conclusion from them. For the Latins, admitting entirely that other sense of the same things that you mentioned could exist, nevertheless held their own. Wherefore, when the holy and blessed men—who understand sayings of this kind in both ways and conclude from them that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son—are indeed not such as those who, just as they wish, understanding the same things, deny that sense through which the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is concluded: we ought not to place equal faith in both. Although that gift of the Spirit through the insufflation, if you will consider it a little more diligently, you will find can have only the sense according to the Latins, and by no means another: unless someone wishes to explain it altogether constrainedly and sophistically.

Attend then thus. You said those explaining differently wish to say that we understand from this that Scripture says that the Spirit is no greater than the Son, and that the deifying charismata are common to both the Son and the Spirit. But indeed for understanding or believing these, it sufficed

^A only to say: *Receive the Holy Spirit*; for the breath itself contributes nothing to such a meaning. For neither was the substance of the Spirit itself, nor its grace, that breath coming forth corporally from the holy mouth, nor did the apostles, by inhaling it, receive grace, since they could not otherwise have done so. What then did that insufflation intend? If, even with Him saying only: *Receive, or, I give to you the Holy Spirit*, the interpretation that the Greeks desire is already contained, then surely, as Saint Augustine says, just as in many places Scripture, by means of sensible and temporal things, whether done or said, leads us to the contemplation of intelligible and eternal things, so too did the Savior here provide some sign, leading us from it to understand or to believe in the intelligible—or rather, the suprarational—procession of the consubstantial Spirit from Himself. If, therefore, it is reasonable that this alone be understood, it is certainly also reasonable to believe it.

Regarding their syllogisms and arguments, which ^B you say do not necessarily conclude the proposition, nor have the power to satisfy a skeptical mind fully, this is not to be wondered at. For you know that in many matters, even while the conclusion exists as true, the arguments offered for it are formed in a very faulty manner—not always because of the ignorance of those speaking, but sometimes because of the very nature of the subject proposed, when there is a lack of better and stronger arguments. Sometimes, indeed, the speaker himself assumes that the audience can be most persuaded by such arguments. For it often happens that the very things by which some are persuaded are considered ridiculous by others. Nor, furthermore, does one always strive to persuade others by the same things through which he himself is convinced; rather, he attempts to lead them by the path he judges they will follow. Therefore, do not think that the Latins, by these syllogisms and arguments, hold to what they say because of them; for they believe this from those three things which I have mentioned. But since the matter itself exists above reason, and many who ^C are unwilling to believe this on the basis of those three things rather seek to show the opposite through human arguments and syllogisms worthy of God, the Latins, desiring to convert these people to themselves, always speak of what they think is appropriate to refute their syllogisms, and perhaps to persuade them to accept what is sought. They speak—not, as I said, because they themselves believe the same thing through these same arguments, but because of the incredulity of others, and for the sake of contradiction via similar syllogisms, they are forced to use such arguments through which it is not impossible that many may be persuaded.

The reason, therefore, why their syllogisms seem deficient to the sharp and investigative nature of your God-formed soul, is the sublimity of the proposed question, which does not admit of more efficacious syllogisms; and the fact that they fashion them according to the posture, as they conjecture, of those who do not believe and who defend the opposite through similar syllogisms—so that, even if they are not fully persuaded, they might nevertheless ^D be brought to lose confidence in their own syllogisms, and to those who are still weaker in faith, some support is granted, so that they might not be moved by similar syllogisms. But if everyone were of the frame of mind that I see in you from your epistle, they would certainly not use such terminology. Pay attention, however, to it in this way.

Behold, to reason with the human mind about that matter concerning which Saint Dionysius says that the negations of all that we say and think are more verified than the affirmations, is now common to both the Latins and the Greeks who defend the opposite. But faith is by no means common; the Latins, however, have those three things I mentioned, which hold the greatest authority, dignity, and magnitude for faith, and believing in them religiously, they say that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son. But those who say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone have nothing of the sort to which they can reduce [the argument]. Wherefore, all syllogisms aside, faith remains for the Latins; but for these others, both faith and rationale have been taken away. And do not think that the Latins, believing the Spirit proceeds from the Son, deem that the Spirit’s procession is either identical to the Son’s generation, or different indeed, but differing from the generation of the Son by some perfectly known difference. For in this they, too, believe the same as our holy Fathers: that the manner in which generation and procession differ is not altogether known to men. If, in disputes with the Greeks, as you say in your epistle, they do not seem to observe this, know that they do this just as your own Fathers do, who, while saying in many places that there is no example of the mystery of the most Holy Trinity, whether in sensible or in intelligible things, nevertheless condescend to many examples. Thus, the incredulity and infirmity of others also call these men to condescend to certain known similarities, by which they seem to distinguish procession from generation, so that from these things they may arrive at the conclusion that ought to be held by faith; not thinking it absurd if they can call back to health those who cannot be cured by things that are simply medicinal, by using things that are otherwise harmful to them. But of these things, enough has been said.

I think it necessary, however, to show you one more thing: that although I said above that there are three things that compelled me to believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son—that is, that many of the great saints teach this most clearly, that the Mother of Churches always says this, and that this was also affirmed by a general council—I consider that any one of these, even without the others, having power in itself, is sufficient to lead one to believe the same, even without the other two opposites. And you, who still seem to be unaware whether a general council was ever held regarding this, if you will to consider within yourself the thoughts in your own epistle, joining them together, you will find what necessarily follows from them; you will find it highly necessary to believe—whether from the sole authority of the saints you mentioned, or from the sole authority of the Roman Church—that the Spirit proceeds also from the Son. But pay attention in this way.

^A If many great saints, in interpreting the divine Scripture, say something about God, the opposite of which is shown from Scripture itself, is not demonstrated by reason, is not openly handed down by the saints, is not determined by a general council, and is not taught by the mother of the Churches, it is considered too ^B necessary to be believed. But if you are hesitant and doubtful about this—whether it is necessary—at least you will not doubt that it is entirely without danger to believe what is of such a nature, if indeed you do not doubt that those who believed, taught, and handed it down in writing are among the saints. Therefore, since this is without danger, see what it is to say that it proceeds from the Father alone. For you say that neither authority nor demonstration compels you to accept this, and that many great saints, along with the mother of the Churches, openly teach the opposite. Therefore, from the desire to hold this, some suspicion of danger is soon stirred up. Therefore, since this is certainly dangerous, while that is completely without danger, and since there are only two parts of the Church—one that holds what is completely without danger, and another that is manifestly dangerous—and since the Church is not gathered from such men as you still say you are, holding neither of the extremes; and since, all else being equal, that which is without danger is to be chosen more than that which is dangerous, do you not already see from your own thoughts that it is concluded to be too necessary for the Latins to hold the same thing by intention, and in the same way? And having likewise looked at the authority of the Roman Church and passing through similar means, do you not necessarily arrive at the same conclusion? Wherefore, even if a general council had not yet been held on this matter, it is nevertheless necessary to accept that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and to consider those who deny this to be in no way a part of the Church, but rather as those who are completely cut off from the Church and falling into the position of a schismatic. But what if it is shown that the first of those Greeks who separated themselves from the communion of the Latins did so not by reason, but by a certain irrational passion? Would it not be revealed that these are schismatics? Yet nothing can be made so clear. For one must consider that in order to avoid the communion of the mother of the Churches reasonably, two things will necessarily have to occur: one, that the Roman Church at that time first began to hold and dogmatize something about the dogmas of the faith which it did not previously teach or believe. The second is that what was newly dogmatized stands in opposition and contradiction to some of those things which are explicitly determined in the ^C councils, so that when this is the case, that can in no way be the case; and when that is the case, this can in no way have a place. For it would be most reasonable to separate from those who dogmatize such things. Since neither of these occurred, it remains irrational to wish to be separated at all. But in fact, neither of these things occurred at the beginning of the schism of the Roman Church. For regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son, those saints whom the Roman Church soon believed, and by which it holds this, existed before the schism began—some three hundred, some four hundred, and some even five hundred years earlier. And to mention one above all others, who speaks of this very thing not transitively but principally, and teaches it most openly—I mean the great Augustine—he flourished about the times of Theodosius the Great, ^D more than five hundred years before the schism; the Roman Church, having his writings, since it was of the same language, venerated his dogmas. But to say "and from the Son" is not to add something contrary to "from the Father." For if it proceeds also from the Son, it is not taken away that it proceeds from the Father; but rather, that being first conceded, it follows necessarily that it proceeds also from the Father. Things which are thus related to one another are not contradictory. Therefore, even though divine Scripture says first that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and councils later say the same thing, the Roman Church, by saying "and from the Son," does not dogmatize anything repugnant to them, nor does it destroy their statements, but rather [states] such a thing that, once conceded, the former is necessarily inferred. For if it had not yet been said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, and it were believed by the Roman Church that He proceeds from the Son, that would certainly be concluded necessarily from this. For if He proceeds from the Son, who has everything He possesses from the Father, He therefore proceeds also from the Father. Wherefore, what was previously believed is not taken away by this, but is rather reinforced even more. Therefore, if at the beginning of the schism the Roman Church did not begin to dogmatize anything new or repugnant to any of those things which were believed by the whole Church, how is it not entirely without reason that they refused its communion, or how did they not suffer this from some elation and pride, or ambition and avarice, or some such passion? For one cannot say that which is of the many, that because a synodical canon prohibited adding to or taking away from the Creed of the faith, they deservedly departed because of the boldness to add something. For, first of all, no such canon is found in the [general] councils. Second, the Roman Church—not before the schism, not at its beginning, not shortly after, but many years after this—when it had previously warned and exhorted the Greeks through many legations to depart from the wretched schism, and as it did not have them obedient, finally, by holding a council on this matter for those obedient to it, not undeservedly added this to the Symbol. For if a similar great nation of Christians had denied that the Son is omnipotent or life-giving, and many things were added...

daily to this heresy, surely it would not lack reason if sound Christians, in order to refute the heresy, placed this in the Symbol. ^A Therefore, with no preceding rational cause for which those first ones separated themselves from the mother of the Churches, it is certain that both they and all who have followed them are without doubt schismatics. For we call no others schismatics except those who, setting themselves in opposition to those who hold the more principal and dignified positions in the Church, withdraw from their due recognition and communion because of some other passion regarding what is either openly said in the holy Scripture, or expressly determined in the general councils, or commonly believed by the whole Church, whether they be many or few; for it makes no difference, since not by number or minority is a schismatic marked, but by the aforementioned reason, for they too, by completing it legally, will have been deemed worthy of this name. Or let them therefore show what happens to the Latins, while saying that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father, so that what is said in the Symbol, and in the Gospel, and believed by the whole Church, is thus destroyed; ^B or if this is impossible, let them know that they are outside the Catholic Church and differ in no way from schismatics.

But since they themselves, being pressed on all sides, finally taking refuge in the Gospel and the seven general councils, think to find from them an excuse for the schism, it must be said to them: If indeed, O friends, when the Mother of the Churches sins either against the Gospel or the councils, you withdraw from her, you do rightly: but if she sins in nothing, either against the Gospel or the councils, and you nevertheless refuse her communion, there is certainly no relief for you at all from the Gospel or the councils. Therefore, it must be diligently investigated: what is it to sin against the Gospel or the councils? For if you think that to sin against them is to speak and dogmatize simply about God something which is not found either in the Gospel or in the councils, whether it be contrary to any of those things which are manifestly stated there, or not—in this way, indeed, all the saints who write about God also sin in the same way. For not only do they say and dogmatize countless things ^C about God which are not found in the Word in the Gospel or in the councils: but they also say many things which cannot be concluded even through the sense of the things that are there. Therefore, to sin against them is not simply to say those things which are not found there in any way, but it must be added: if they are also repugnant to them. Therefore, to sin against them is to say something standing in opposition to any of those things which are said by them, so that one is necessarily taken away by the other. And this alone is what we call "paradogmatizing." For thus alone do we dismiss as guiltless all who have ever said anything about God, if we define sinning against the dogmas as "paradogmatizing." But the Roman Church, in saying that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son, sins in nothing at all regarding the dogmas of piety—the person whom we also call a paradogmatist and a heretic is one who thinks and teaches something standing so much in opposition to any of those things which are either openly said in the holy Scripture ^D or expressly determined by any of the general councils, that when this is, that is taken away, and when that is, this cannot be. But the Roman Church thinks or teaches nothing of the sort. Therefore, it does not sin concerning the dogmas of piety. Wherefore it neither paradogmatizes, nor incurs any heresy, and while it possesses the most dignified, most dominant, most principal, highest, and first place in the whole Church, the Orientals, now existing as of lesser and lower dignity, rank, and order in the whole Church, withdraw from the respect, obedience, and communion due to it. But indeed, all those who, existing of lesser and lower dignity, rank, and order in the Church, withdraw from the more dignified, more dominant, more principal, prior, and superior ones in the Church—those who have sinned in nothing against the dogmas of piety, and have incurred no heresy—are without doubt schismatics. It happens, therefore, that these are necessarily schismatics now; that is, they are separated from the Catholic Church.

But perhaps someone doubting might say: If the Church has lost its integrity and perfection, and this not from a small part, since four of its five principal parts (from which, as it were, its entire body was made complete as if by certain senses) have fallen, while only the first remained: how is it, not being integral, any longer catholic, or of which body is the Roman Church the head, when that which was united to it in the beginning has departed from it, or how can it be totally alive? To these, first indeed it ought to be considered that, if someone were to object the same things to the Greeks themselves, who say that they alone live in the faith and that from them alone the Catholic Church is made complete, having lost its head, which in any case they themselves would similarly [object] to those [other] things.

had they replied, it would be much more reasonable for us to say these things in answer.

Furthermore, if we wish to follow the analogy of an animal, it is certainly not true, on account of their schism, to say that the entire body of the Church has departed from its head. For the head of the Church is not the whole of the West and the North, but the Church of the Roman city alone possesses this dignity. So many and such great other Western and Northern Churches, and other classes of pure Christians on the mainland and the islands, have remained with it, such that all of these together are able to correspond to the rest of the body of the animal, and remain continuously with the united head. Those patriarchs, however, who have separated from it, might have the proportion of hands or feet: ^B which, once cut off from the body, are indeed necessarily dead, but do not always bring about the destruction of the body. Furthermore, it is not as in animals, where once limbs are corrupted, the head cannot provide others—such is the case in the Church also; rather, it is always permitted to the head, in place of those that fall, to provide others, so that it may always remain with the body intact. For we know that the Pope can certainly create patriarchs, but patriarchs cannot create a Pope. And for this reason, they themselves have never attempted this; but the Roman pontiffs, before the schism, are seen both deposing and promoting patriarchs.

Therefore, because it neither thinks nor teaches anything contrary to the Gospel or the councils, as has been shown, it has certainly not lost the power and virtue of creating patriarchs.

Therefore, since these patriarchs had departed from it without any reason, and in their dioceses there lived many Christians united to it, while it—having from the beginning the just power of appointing a suitable patriarch for each of them—the Roman Church, having the character of a head and always providing others in place of the fallen members, is both alive and has the remaining entire body united to itself; but those who have deserted it are necessarily henceforth without a head and dead. Wherefore, if you think it necessary for general councils to have the four patriarchs present for the completeness of the whole, and you hear that after the schism certain general councils were held by the Pope: do not ask whether the schismatic patriarchs attended them, but whether those living in the faith of the same patriarchs and united to their own head attended those patriarchs; it is not necessary to inquire further than this. ^D For general councils ought to be assembled not from heretics and schismatics, but from the orthodox and those united to the Church. God has granted this to me to answer you, O head dear to me. May He Himself grant you the rest.

Epistle of the same lord Barlaam to Alexius Calochetus, in which he shows that the Greeks not obedient to the Roman Church be not only schismatics, but also heretics.

I heard that you wondered at me, because I [1310 A] repel those who are not in communion with the Roman Church as schismatics. But I think I should rather wonder at you, since you think it a thing to be wondered at if those who are called by that name perfectly fulfill its definition. For if you wish to see what the definition of a schismatic is, you will find that it no less applies to those who are called schismatics by me than the definition of a human being does. Therefore, let this be demonstrated.

Since, therefore, in the Church some are more dominant, more principal, and superior to others, those who are of a lesser and humbler order, and to whom it is fitting to be under the dominion of others and to follow others, having no just cause to accuse their superiors of any heresy, separate themselves from their society in religion; they immediately establish for themselves the definition of schismatics. For they themselves also, looking to no other definition than this, call those who avoid their own greater communion schismatics; characters whom you know are not few in the reigning city, and who are called by the same name by others for the reason now assigned. But, whereas the Roman Church holds the oldest, most principal, and highest rank in the Catholic Church, these people, being of a lesser and inferior order, flee its communion to such an extent that they do not think its priesthood to be a true priesthood, nor do they wish to communicate with it in ecclesiastical sacraments; and many of them even fear to eat simple food with any of the Latins. Therefore, if that Church were falling—which God forbid—into the definition of a heretic, then their separation would be irreprehensible, and the reason for the schismatics would be imperceptible; but if it is joined to no heresy and they flee its communion, they fall purely into the definition of a schismatist. Therefore, one must inquire whom we call a heretic, with whom it is a crime to communicate in anything; in whom, however, not to communicate in anything is not only irreprehensible but also necessary; and whom, after the first and second admonition, we ought to avoid, according to the Apostle to Titus. Therefore, the definition of him who is thus called a heretic must be sought, so that we may know whether anything of it applies to the Roman Church. Since, however, to be a heretic is the same as to be a ^C paradogmatist, and to sin regarding the dogmas of piety; it must be inquired: who is a paradogmatist? And who sins regarding the dogmas of piety?

Therefore, since there are three things from which we have such dogmas: first, Divine Scripture; second, the universal councils; third, our holy doctors, who after the apostles explained the Scripture to us: if we call that man a heretic who thinks and says anything, whether about God or about any other subject, which is not found entirely in Holy Scripture, nor in the councils, nor in the writings of the doctors, we shall not name him well; ^D because by this reasoning many of our own holy doctors would be heretics: the Areopagite, the Theologian Nyssenus,

17 Tit. III, 10.

^A for not only do they say such things, which are not even in agreement with others in terms of sense, but some are completely distinct, even if not opposed. We do not therefore recognize a heretic by this reasoning, whose communion we should shun; but neither shall we admonish as a heretic one who says other things besides all others about any matter, provided he does not say things contrary and opposed to matters laid down. For he who does not abolish manifest dogmas does not sin against them. Furthermore, even if someone disturbs nothing at all of those things which are in Holy Scripture or in the councils, yet disagrees with any of the holy doctors about any matter, we shall call him a certain bold and presumptuous person, and proud, and such like, but not a heretic. For by this reasoning also, many of the saints would be heretics, who in many and great matters say things contrary to one another. For regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit itself, they say that what Damascene says—that the Spirit is not said to proceed "from the Son"—he thinks, insofar as he is in no way from the Son.

^B But St. Cyril, who was many years before him, in his discourse on the Spirit, in his work *Thesaurus*, says seven times that the Holy Spirit both is, exists, and proceeds from the Son, assigning also the words of Scripture from which he had understood this very thing. But St. Augustine, existing even earlier than this, in his work *On the Trinity*, extended his discourse on this very long, both in the fourth, and in the fifth, and in the fifteenth book of that same work. What then? Will they call Damascene a heretic for contradicting those aforementioned, according to themselves? Or rather, will they call themselves heretics for contradicting so many great saints on these same matters, or will they not? It is possible, therefore, that he who disagrees with the saints about God is not yet a heretic.

Who then is a heretic and a teacher of false doctrine, whom we should shun after a second admonition? Is it not certainly he who thinks and says something in matters of dogma that is so opposed to any of those things that are either openly said in Holy Scripture or expressly determined in general councils, that when this exists, that is abolished, and when that exists, this cannot be? And such a one is at odds with those things because of that which is censured as heresy. But he who neither says nor thinks any such thing, but errs in any other matter, is indeed to be admonished, and called by another name, but is not to be shunned as a heretic.

Therefore, since this is the reason by which a heretic is marked, let us see how the Roman Church stands in relation to it. There are two things for which those who accuse it rightly say they are divided from it. One is that it says the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son. The other is that it performs the sacrifice with unleavened bread. But by the first, it abolishes nothing of those things which are in Scripture or in the councils. For since Holy Scripture says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and all the councils say the very same, the Roman Church, in saying also "from the Son," says nothing opposed to that, nor does it abolish it. For even if He proceeds from the ^C Son, it does not necessarily happen that He does not proceed from the Father; but rather He is necessarily referred to the Father. For if He proceeds also from the Son, who has everything He possesses from the Father, He consequently proceeds also from the Father. Therefore, that which is drawn at the same time is not abolished.

But neither is any other of those things which are in Holy Scripture or the councils abolished by the fact that it is said that the Holy Spirit proceeds "also from the Son." Therefore, according to this, that Church does not fall into the reasoning of heretics. Nor does it by the unleavened bread. ^D For, first, it is not opposed to any council by this, since none has determined anything about it. Secondly, it is not repugnant to Holy Scripture by this. Nor do I say now that that bread which the Lord sacrificed was unleavened, and that unleavened bread in Scripture bears the image of sincerity and truth; but it suffices now that the divine Scripture, when calling bread both unleavened and leavened, nowhere commands this or that distinctly; hence it certainly fights against neither Scripture, nor the unleavened-bread user, nor the leavened-bread user. For we shall not say what some fools do, that it is inanimate. For every bread is inanimate according to its own nature, and none is animate; but having been converted by divine power, it is by no means inanimate, or entirely of the substance of bread, but is the living flesh of the living Christ, who assumed from us and for us a human body and a rational and intellectual soul. Therefore, that Church does not fall into the reasoning of a schismatic either by the procession of the Spirit or by the unleavened bread; since by neither does it abolish any manifest truth. But for these things alone, and for no other reason, they say they are divided from it. Therefore, that Church is not heretical for those things on account of which they themselves say they are divided, because according to them it does not fall into the definition of a heretic. It remains, therefore, that these are necessarily schismatics, since they omit nothing of the definition of schismatics. Wherefore, I think you will no longer wonder at this.

But that you may not wonder even if you hear me call a heretic him who asserts that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, I wish to give you the reason for this too. We said above that a heretic is he who in matters of piety thinks and says something opposed, either to divine Scripture or to a general council. But being opposed to Holy Scripture happens in two ways: either when someone rightly understands what Scripture says, and proposes to say things contrary to it, imagining it to be lying—which is by no means the action of a Christian; or else, asserting that he completely venerates Scripture, he understands and explains its statements, which he contradicts, otherwise than the truth holds—which is the only way of a heretic. Therefore, when we find someone such as this, who indeed fights against divine Scripture, though not asserting that he fights against it, to what judgment shall we refer this, knowing without doubt that he is fighting it and will rightly avoid him after a second admonition? Or [shall we refer it] to the majority? But those who understand Holy Scripture better and more diligently are the fewest. Or to those who...

are there among them ones wiser and more learned in divine matters? Yet perhaps that one person is the wisest of all: and it is possible that he himself understands that very thing most truly of all. Or do you go to those who are more worthy, more authoritative, and more principal? But Scripture says: *If something is revealed to the one who is sitting by, let the first be silent.* Whence it is not always necessary that he who is first understands more truly. Or to those who have never at any other time fallen into any heresy? Yet every Church, which first fell into some heresy, was always catholic in earlier times. Wherefore it is possible that that which was always previously orthodox might afterwards fall into heresy. Or to some saints, who, as we say, interpret the Scriptures? But perhaps even he whom we contradict is a saint. And just as among them others contradict others, yet they are not heretics, so also here. It remains, therefore, to have recourse to the judgment of a general council. But if we shall see that same person determining the sense of certain sayings of Scripture, against which sense he here dogmatizes and holds, it is absolutely indubitable that he himself is a heretic. Therefore if anyone says such a thing in his dogmas, so that not one or two, but all the things mentioned above and a general council concur to the contrary, and he appears at once to the prejudice of all to fight against sacred Scripture: he is the most manifest heretic of all. But he who says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone is such a person.

These things, moreover, I write both to you and to others, not out of any malevolence or abusiveness, but out of a desire that the Church of Christ may be united and return to herself, and that all Christians may think the same thing in faith and truth, and be joined to one another by the link of charity: which, as I suppose, would not happen in a long time if these things alone, which I write to you, came into everyone's mind. For if they had been convinced of the evil state in which they are, they would easily seek its liberation. Wherefore, as I estimate, nothing more benevolent can be done for all in common than if such things are said and written to them.

And that we may pass through all the aforesaid: First, if anyone seeks and proposes the judgment of many, since he says "many"—not the rude and illiterate, but those reading holy Scripture and following to some extent the understanding of the readers—he will certainly not find here so many such, as the hundreds of such that can be found among them. ^B If, however, you prefer the judgment of those who are wiser in divine things and more learned, among them indeed an infinite number will be found, so well exercised in holy Scripture that, upon hearing any saying from it, any one of them is immediately able to assign from what book and chapter it is, and what the sense of this saying is, and furthermore be ready to answer probabilistically to all doubtful points. When I had spoken with the wisest of them, I had not yet found such a person. I think, however, that there is no such person among them. But if you seek the more worthy, the more principal, and more dominant, it is the Roman Church, which holds the highest and most dignified place in the universal Church. But if you seek those who have not yet otherwise fallen into heresy, it is the only one of the five Churches which can rightly boast of this. But if you seek the saints, you will find Saint Cyril and Saint Augustine, while expounding the sayings of Scripture, most plainly teaching that the Spirit also is from the Son. But if you seek a general council, this too is for us. For because these patriarchs deserted the apostolic see, and gave themselves up rather to imperial proposals, and, as has been shown, fell into the way of the schismatic: first indeed the mother of the churches, lest such sees should be ^A vacant, established and ordained for each of them its own patriarch. Then, after many years, celebrating a general council, with the assent of all concerning this very same matter, it declares that it is concluded by Scripture that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as from one principle. Wherefore, he who denies this, and thinks the contrary, already fights against sacred Scripture by the judgment of a general council. And on that account, falling manifest-ly into the definition of a heretic, he is a pure heretic.

Proof by Sainted Barlaam, Bishop of Gerace, through Holy Scripture, that the Holy Spirit is also from the Son, just as He is from the Father

By our Lord Jesus Christ commanding us to search the Scriptures, we understand two things from this. One, that the dogmas of piety are not only those things which are transmitted immediately from the words themselves in Scripture, but there are also others which shine forth to us as we investigate the sense of the sayings. Another is that we are debtors not only to hold those things which are promptly signified by the words, but also those which emerge through the sense of them. For if, beyond those things which are signified by the word, there were no other things appearing, which similarly existed for them as necessary for faith through the sense of the sayings, he would not have said: *Search the Scriptures* 18. For to do those things which are immediately signified by the word, and to hold those things alone, there would be no need for searching, but for reading alone. Wherefore he would have said: Read the Scriptures. We understand the same thing, and with the Apostle saying to the Corinthians: *The letter kills, but the Spirit gives life* 19: by "the letter" he means that which is promptly signified in Scripture by the voice, but by "the Spirit" he means that which is gathered in Scripture through the sense by diligent searching. Therefore, if anything of those things which are understood concerning God stands in Scripture in such a way that it appears through all Scripture by a right investigation made of it, while the opposite of it is not necessarily concluded from the voice nor from the sense of Scripture, and there are, moreover, some of our holy doctors who, in expounding divine Scripture, manifest-ly conclude and teach the same: it is manifest that it is necessary that this be admitted and believed: as, I say, it is not written in divine Scripture that the Holy Spirit is a substance, nor that He is an accident; but that it is written that He is a substance, from all-

the things said about Him in Scripture is concluded; but that He is an accident, can by no means be concluded. ^A Furthermore, our holy doctors, explaining holy Scripture, say that it is concluded from it not only that He is a substance, but even an uncreated substance and consubstantial with the Father. Therefore, it is necessary for you also to believe and confess this. Similar, therefore, to this is the fact that the Holy Spirit has His being from the Son, as from the Father. For this is apparent to those who lawfully investigate clearly through holy Scripture: and many of our holy doctors, explaining Scripture, manifestly declare this very thing: just as holy Augustine in many of his writings, and holy Cyril in his *Thesaurus*, as anyone who wishes may see by inspecting their works. But the opposite of this, which is that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and not from the Son, can by no means be concluded through Scripture. For they who defend this opinion believe that they have the most powerful argument in what the Lord says: *Who proceeds from the Father*; but it is not at all concluded from this that it is from the Father *alone*; for it matters greatly to say something simply, and to say the same thing with a distinction, namely, *only*. For in many matters, one thing is true and another is false: as, for instance, if it is said that the Son is true God from true God, it is true. But if it is said that *only* the Son is true God from true God, it is false. You will find the same thing in many other instances. It is not, therefore, concluded from the statement that the Spirit proceeds from the Father that it is necessarily concluded from this that it is from Him *alone*: but as much as is gathered from this, the rest remains uncertain. Neither, therefore, from the stated word, nor from any other part of holy Scripture is it concluded that it is from Him alone. But that the Spirit is also from the Son, all divinely inspired Scripture bears witness. But we must begin from there. ^B

First Argument.

Concerning the unbegotten person, who has two persons having their being [from Him], one might ask: what is the cause, that the principal person, insofar as He is the author of one of the originated persons, has attained a proper name, and is called Father to Him; whereas, insofar as He is the principle of another person, He has attained no name, as later expositors have named the Father, that is, the breather of the Holy Spirit. But holy Scripture itself has put forward no name by which the Father must be called in respect to the Spirit. And I do not ask this, whether the Word has His being from the unbegotten person in one way, and the Spirit in another; for I believe that the mode by which each has his being is different, coming from a common principle. And that the difference between these two modes is unknown to men, I have no doubt. But this I ask: why does one mode have a special name, and the principal person is called Father according to it: whereas according to the other mode, by which the same person is the principle of the Spirit, there is no name in Scripture? But I think that I am not unreasonably asking this. But looking toward the fact that among us names like Father, Son, generation, generated, and the like are properly said of animals and especially of men: I, however, leaving these words aside, contemplating the things themselves according to those that have been handed down to us, and comparing the mode by which the Word of God has His being from the Father to the generation of children among us: I see that it is very dissimilar to it; but the resemblance I apprehend of the one to the other, I see to be indifferently the same in the mode by which the Father is the principle of the Spirit. For observe, so that I may first speak of their dissimilarity. ^C Seth is not from Adam alone, but from him and Eve: and not simultaneously, nor in the same way. But the Word there is from the Father alone. And Seth is not wholly from the whole Adam, but that which is emitted primarily from Adam is neither man nor animal, but the seed through which Seth was fashioned in the womb of his mother, not proceeding from the whole Adam. There, however, the whole Son is from the whole Father. And this Seth, born of a temporal Adam, is not his contemporary. For the one preceded, the other survived. But there, the Word born of the eternal Father is co-eternal with Him. And here, he who is born is not in the begetter: nor is he who begat in the begotten; nor are two one man; nor is their will always one; nor is their virtue and action one; nor is their knowledge the same. There, however, the Son is in the Father, and the Father is in the Son, and the two are one God, and their will, and virtue, and knowledge, and external action are one. In what, therefore, is that divine generation similar to this human one? Or surely, just as here man is from man, and from a consubstantial one: so there the Word is from the Father, consubstantial from a consubstantial one, and God from God? But indeed the Holy Spirit is also the same God from God, and consubstantial from a consubstantial one. Therefore, in what the generation of the Son is similar to the generation of men, in the same [way] also the procession of the Spirit is similar to it. But rather, in what the procession of the Spirit is dissimilar to the generation of men, in the same [way] the generation of the Son is dissimilar to it, although they are believed to differ among themselves. Why, then, is He called Father of the one, but of the other nothing? Is it surely because the unbegotten person, being the principle of two persons, is the sole principle of one, but of the other not the sole principle? Therefore, of the one of which He is the sole principle, He has a specified name for it, by which their consubstantiality is most clearly understood, and He is called its Father: but of the one of which He is not the sole principle, He has no name for it, lest it be thought a common property. And it happens that names in God hold contrary to those in Adam, and Eve, and Seth. For among them, Adam, of whose person [Eve] is the cause alone, does not have a name for her, as to whose principle he is, namely Eve. But of the one of whom he is not the sole author, but is with Eve, he is called father: with the Holy Spirit dispensing such a permutation of names for us, providing for us, lest we imagine carnal copulations, and flows, and dissections, and imperfect births, and passions of this kind in the Trinity. ^D Therefore, for this reason, lest it be thought a common property, the unbegotten person, having indeed a person from Him

^A alone, is named Father, whereas the person who does not have existence from Him alone, has no (such) name. For my part, I believe this; but as for him who struggles to contradict these things, while not showing any other reasonable cause why one is named and the other is unnamed, I think he says nothing relevant to the matter.

Second Argument.

In all things that exist, of which we properly speak of an image and an exemplar, since the image always has a relation of inferiority to the exemplar, and in no way reaches equality with the exemplar, while in the Father and the Son there exists in all respects equality and substantial identity: who is it that wishes the divine Scripture to name the Son the image of the Father, but the Father not at all the image of the Son? Is it perhaps because of the principle of origin? Because the Son is from the Father, the Father is not from the Son. Just as every exemplar is the principle of its own image. Therefore, the divine Scripture, by naming the Son the image of the invisible God, at the same time shows both that He is from Him, and that He is like Him: the minority (of status) being omitted, as being in no way appropriate. But whereas the Son is called the image of the Father, and not the Father the image of the Son, so the Holy Spirit in the same Scripture is called the image of the Son, and not the Son the image of the Spirit. For the Apostle says to the Romans: "For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son." And to the Corinthians: "As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us also bear the image of the heavenly," calling the Son heavenly. And ^C again: "But we all, with unveiled face beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the same image from glory to glory, just as by the Spirit of the Lord." That the Holy Spirit Himself is called the image of the Son in these passages, we have (this testimony) through Saint Cyril in his *Thesauri*, in which he himself concludes from the same words that the Spirit is also from the Son. Therefore, we too, concluding the same thing through these same words, and understanding it also from the fact that the Spirit is called the image of the Son, and from that based upon the reason assigned above, we understand, conclude, and say it most rightly.

Third Argument.

Again, since God is incorporeal and has no bodily members, what is it that He is called the Spirit of His mouth? For He says: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of His mouth all their power." Can it be, so that from this we understand that the Holy Spirit is from Him as from a principle? But just as He is said to be the Spirit of the Father's mouth, so also He Himself is said in the same Scripture to be the Spirit of the Son's mouth. For Isaiah says concerning the Son: "And He shall strike the earth with the rod of His mouth, and with the Spirit of His lips He shall slay the wicked." And Paul to the Thessalonians: "Whom the Lord Jesus will slay with the Spirit of His mouth." And John in the Apocalypse, because of the reason for slaying, (describes Him) as a two-edged sword—he saw the same one. For he says concerning the Son: "And from His mouth proceeded a two-edged sword, that with it He might strike the nations." And after a few words: "And the rest were killed with the sword of Him who sat upon the horse, that proceeded from His mouth." Therefore, the divine Scripture, by naming the Holy Spirit the Spirit of the Son's mouth and the sword proceeding from His mouth, what else does it teach us through signs of this kind, except that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, just as He is from the Father?

Fourth Argument.

Likewise, the Son, according to Isaiah, is called the arm of the Father; the Holy Spirit in the Gospels is the finger of God. For blessed Matthew relates that Christ said: "But if I by the Spirit of God cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you." Saint Luke indeed says in the same passage: "But if I with the finger of God cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you." Therefore, the Holy Spirit is called the finger of God. Having therefore passed over those things which cannot agree with the Trinity from these (passages)—namely, that one is the whole, another is the part, and one is nearer, another further from the common principle—what remains to be understood through these names, except that the Son is indeed as an arm from the Father alone, but the Holy Spirit is as a finger from the Father and the Son?

Fifth Argument.

Likewise, at the Jordan, the Father bore witness from above to the Son: the Son himself was being baptized below, but the Holy Spirit, descending from above in the form of a dove, did not rest obliquely on the side of Christ, which would indeed be a sign that the Son and the Spirit have their existence from the Father alone, as equally divided; but He rested above Him, that is, in the middle of the two: which is a sign that He is common to them. But He would not be common unless He were proceeding as from both, and that which was seen descending from above as a dove from the Father to the Son, creates a sign: that although the Spirit is from eternity from the Son just as from the Father, nevertheless the Son has this from the Father, and not the Father from the Son. Moreover, nothing stands against this speculation that it is said that the dove remained upon the Son. For to remain in Him and to be from Him are not contrary things. For just as He is simultaneously in the Father and from the Father, so ^D simultaneously both in the Son and from the Son.

Sixth Argument.

Since there is one substance, power, and action of the Father and the Son, and all things that happen are not more from the Father than from the Son, what is the cause that the Father is said in the divine Scripture to do things for the Son, and through the Son, while the Son is said to do nothing for the Father or through the Father? For "By the Word of the Lord," says the Psalmist, "the heavens were established." And the Evangelist: "All things were made through Him." And the Apostle: "One Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through Him." And elsewhere: "In these last days He has spoken to us in the Son," whom He appointed heir of all things, through whom also...

He made the ages. But that the Son, conversely, does anything through the Father, or from the Father, is nowhere written. Although the Son is not an instrument of the Father, such that it might be said the Father does something through Him as through an instrument and by means of Him. Nor, on the other hand, are the things which are done by the Son produced immediately and proximately, while being produced mediate and more remotely from the Father, such that in this sense it might be said the Father acts through the Son; for all things are done immediately by the Father and the Son, as by one Creator, by one and simple act. Why, then, does Scripture speak of them in that manner? Is it so that we may understand the principle and that which is from it, because their being is one simple substance, power, and action, and all things are common, existing from the Father as from the proper principle, and are present to the Son, but not from the Son to the Father? Yet for the understanding of this speculation, the Father is said in Scripture to do things by the Son and through the Son, whereas the converse of this is nowhere written in the Scriptures.

Similarly, since there is one simple substance, power, and action for the Father and the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit is neither an instrument of the Father, nor are the things which are done produced more proximately by the Spirit than by the Father, it is nowhere written in the Scriptures that the Holy Spirit Himself does anything by the Father or through the Father. But because the Father does things by the Spirit, and through the Spirit, this is carried throughout all Scripture. For by the Spirit, according to the Psalmist, God "stablishes the heavens," and strengthens our souls. And the Apostle to the Romans says: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts ^C by the Holy Spirit who is given to us"; and again: "He who raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, will quicken our mortal bodies also, by His Spirit that dwelleth in us." And to the Corinthians: "But to us, God hath revealed them by His Spirit." And to Titus: "But according to His mercy, He saved us by the laver of regeneration of the Holy Spirit." And to the Hebrews: "God also bearing them witness by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Spirit." And blessed Luke in the Acts: "Lord, Thou who by the Holy Spirit, by the mouth of David Thy servant, hast said." And again: "How God anointed Him with the Holy Spirit and with power." And you will find many such things in the Scriptures by searching; but the converse of this, in no way.

And it is certain that there is the same cause for why Scripture disputes thus concerning them, namely that the actions of the Father and of the Holy Spirit toward creatures are common and the same. From the Father as from a principle, it is present to the Holy Spirit, and not to the Father from the Holy Spirit. For us to understand this, Scripture says that the Father does things by the Spirit and through the Spirit, but it never says that the Spirit does anything by the Father or through the Father. But conversely, the whole of divine Scripture is full of the fact that the Son does something through the Spirit and by the Spirit; whereas that the Spirit does anything by the Son or through the Son, is nowhere stated in the Scriptures. For in the Gospels it is said that Christ baptizes with the Holy Spirit, and casts out demons; and the Apostle to the Romans says: "For I dare not speak of any of those things ^A which Christ worketh not by me, for the obedience of the Gentiles, by word and work, by the virtue of signs and wonders, in the power of the Holy Spirit." And to the Thessalonians: "Whom the Lord Jesus shall kill with the Spirit of His mouth." And to the Hebrews: "How much more the blood of Christ, who by the Holy Spirit offered Himself unspotted unto God." And in the Acts: "Until the day wherein, giving commandments by the Holy Spirit to the apostles whom he chose, He was taken up." And Isaias: "And with the Spirit of His lips He shall slay the wicked."

Therefore, since the Holy Spirit is not an instrument of the Son, so that through this it might be said the Son does things by Him and through Him; nor, on the other hand, are the things which are done produced more proximately by the Spirit than by the Son—for by one simple act, and immediately by the Son and the Holy Spirit, but more truly by the whole Trinity, are all things done—what does Scripture mean by saying that the Son does things by and through the Spirit, but never that the Spirit does anything by or through the Son? Is it certain that, according to the reason assigned above, the fact that Scripture is consistent with itself is the cause for these words being written in this way? Since the operations of the Son and Holy Spirit toward creatures are common and the same, [they are] present to the Spirit from the Son as from a principle, just as they are from the Father, but not to the Son from the Spirit: either, therefore, the Spirit is also from the Son, or Scripture is not at all consistent with itself.

The Seventh Argument.

Item: The Son is called the Word of the Father, and from this designation we understand Him to be co-eternal with the Father and to have His being from Him. But just as the Son is called the Word of the Father, so the Holy Spirit is called the Rhema (Word) of the Son. For the Apostle says to the Hebrews concerning the Son: "Who, being the brightness of His glory, and the figure of His substance, upholding all things by the Rhema of His power." Now, that by this Rhema of the Son's power he signifies the Holy Spirit Himself, is evident from other parts of Scripture. For certainly, that by which the Son purifies souls, casts out demons, and performs signs and wonders, by the same He upholds all things. But it is written that He does these things by the Holy Spirit: therefore, He also upholds all things by the Holy Spirit. Moreover, in the proposed text it is said that He upholds all things by the Rhema of His power; therefore, the Holy Spirit and the Rhema of the Son's power are the same. This is evident also from this [fact]: to which of the three Persons is "to quicken" most attributed in Scripture? To the Holy Spirit. For the Lord says: "It is the Spirit that quickeneth." And the Apostle to the Romans: "He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, shall [also] quicken our mortal bodies, by His Spirit that dwelleth in us." Again: "If by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." Who, moreover, is said to proceed from the three? Certainly the Spirit. Who, furthermore, is said to be the mouth of the Father? The Spirit. But the Lord Himself, comprehending at once the quicken-

-^Aing, the procession, and the mouth/utterance, says: *Not in bread alone shall man live, but in every Word proceeding through the mouth of God.* Therefore, every Word proceeding through the mouth of God, in whom we live, is the Holy Spirit Himself. The Apostle made this most manifest to the Ephesians, saying: *And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God.* For since in the Greek language "sword" (*gladios*) is of the feminine gender, and "Spirit" (*pneuma*) is of the neuter, he did not say "which [feminine] is the Word of God," in order that the sword might be understood; but "which [neuter] is the Word of God," so that from this the Spirit might be understood: as if it were said in the Latin language: *Which Spirit is the Word of God.* Therefore, the Spirit is the Word of the power of the Son, by which He carries all things. And just as where the Son is called the *splendor of the glory of the Father*, it is said by way of circumlocution in place of the fact that He is called the Father’s, so also the Holy Spirit is said to be the Word of the power of the Son, for the reason that He is called the Word of the Son. Therefore, what else can be understood from this naming, except that the Spirit is from the Son? Since every Word is from Him whose it is said to be.

It must be noted, moreover, that while *logos* is said in the Greek language to be both in voice and in the heart, *rema* is only in the voice and mouth: the Holy Spirit is indeed said to be the Word (*rema*) proceeding through the mouth of God, and the Spirit of the mouth of God; but the Son is called the *logos* of the heart of God. For He says: *My heart has poured forth a good logos*, which Saint Dionysius testifies to have been spoken concerning the Person of the Father; but He is not called the *logos* of the mouth of God. From these terms, as if from certain mystical marks, we understand that just as the *logos* of the heart is from the mind alone, while the *rema* of the voice is from the mind and the *logos* which is in the heart; so the Son is indeed from the Father alone, whereas the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son.

Eighth Argument.

The Holy Spirit is said in Scripture to be of both the Father and the Son. For the Apostle says to the Romans: *If anyone has not the Spirit of Christ, he is not His*; and to the Galatians: *God sent the Spirit of His Son*. But indeed, those things which are common to the Father and the Son are not of the Father in one way and of the Son in another, but similarly and in the same manner: which the Lord shows in some places. He says: *Whatever the Father does, the same also the Son does similarly*; and again, *As the Father raises the dead and gives life, so also the Son gives life to whom He wills.* Since, therefore, to act and to give life is common to the Father and the Son, and is of both similarly: so also if there is anything else common to the Father and the Son, it is of the two by the same reason and manner, saving, of course, that distinction by which we understand that the things common to the two are present to the Son from the Father, and not from another Father. And the Lord signifies the same thing, saying: *As the Father has life in Himself*. Therefore, to have life in Himself, being common and existing similarly in both, yet the Son has this from the Father from eternity. Because, therefore, it is the Holy Spirit of the Father and of the Son, namely, ^Bthe Holy Spirit is of the Father and of the Son, by that very fact that the Son has this from eternity from the Father, so that He is called His Spirit.

But indeed the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Father because He is from Him. For if He existed as "other" than the Father, He would not be from Him, and would by no means be said to be His. The evangelists also signify this. For those who say "Spirit of the Father" do not say "Spirit from the Father": John alone, however, who wrote his Gospel after all others, saying that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, does not say "Spirit of the Father" in his Gospel. Do you suppose they were ignorant, either they of whether the Spirit is from the Father, or he of whether He is of the Father? Not at all. But it is certain that those who say He is the Spirit of the Father wished by this to signify that He is from the Father: and this one, saying He is from the Father, by that same fact signifies also that He is of the Father. Therefore, if it is necessary that the Holy Spirit be of the Son in the same way as He is of the Father—and He is of the Father as existing from Him—He is therefore also of the Son as existing from Him. And this same thing is manifest, and that it is not convertible; for though the Son is named with many names in Scripture, in none of them is He said to be the Spirit, as the Spirit Himself is said to be of the Son. For when the Apostle says, *the sword of the Spirit*, he does not name the Son as the sword, as some understand it. But it is clear from the above. For when he had said: *Put on and take the armor of God*, and by this had signified the Father; proceeding, he adds: *And take the helmet of salvation*, naming the incarnate Son as the salvation. For *All flesh shall see the salvation of God*; and *Because my eyes have seen Thy salvation*. Then consequently he says: *And the sword of the Spirit*, signifying the Spirit Himself by these two names. Rightly, however, he attributes the armor to the Father, but the helmet and the sword to the Son and the Spirit. Since the armor is the genus or the whole, while the helmet and the sword are species or parts: and the whole and the genus always have the nature of a principle in relation to parts and species; but the Father is also the principle of the Son and of the Holy Spirit: rightly he attributes the armor, having the nature of a principle, to the most principal Person of the Father, ^Cbut the helmet and the sword, of which the armor is the principle, to the Son and the Spirit, of whom the Father is the principle. Not because genus and species and whole and parts are there, but only according to the reasoning of principle, and of those things which are from it. And since the head has the nature of a principle relative to the hand, he attributes the arms of the head to the Son, but the arms of the hand to the Spirit: so that from this we may understand that the Son is the principle of the Spirit. But that which the discourse began to say is this: that the Son is not called the Spirit by any of His names, just as the Spirit Himself is said to be of the Son. Therefore, the reason that the words are not convertible is that the things are not convertible. Since, in Scripture, words are rendered in harmony with the things. For not...

^A even according to this mode can they be convertible; and deservedly are the words in Scripture not convertible. But the Spirit is said to be the Spirit’s, while the Son is not said to be the Spirit.

Ninth Argument. The Father in Scripture sends the Holy Spirit. But here it does not send the Father. Whence it may be asked, how is He who is everywhere, and fills all things, sent elsewhere? For where is He not, that He might be sent thither? Or how, to whom He is inseparably united, is He sent elsewhere by Him? Or He who is entirely immutable and unalterable, how does He suffer anything in time? But if someone should say that the person of the Spirit is not itself sent, but that His grace, being sent, is said to be sent, first, it must be doubted whether the grace of the Holy Spirit is sent as those things are which move from place to place; secondly, whether the grace of the Spirit is different from that of the Father. For grace is simply one of the three persons: and the Spirit possesses no grace which is not likewise the Father’s. What is more familiar and congruent, that the Spirit be said to be sent by the Father by a shared grace, than the Father by the Spirit? For if it had been written that the Spirit sent the Father, we could similarly say that He Himself is not sent, but His grace, being sent, is said to be He Himself. What then does Scripture intend, that it introduces the Father as sending the Spirit, but the Spirit not at all as sending the Father? Is it because He who sends, in relation to the one who is sent, inasfar as He sends, holds the status of principle; and since the Father is the principle of the Spirit, it would most incongruously be said that the Father is sent by the Spirit? But it is most congruously said that the Spirit is sent by the Father: that by this, it may be signified that the Father is the principle of the Spirit. And that the Father sends the Spirit to us is nothing else than to make known to us that the Spirit is from Him untemporally: for the Spirit is indeed from the Father untemporally. But we do not know or believe this untemporally, but in time. Therefore, since this is manifested to us in time, it is written that the Spirit Himself is sent by the Father to us, which is to say that what is from Him becomes manifest to us from Him. But the Son also similarly sends the Spirit to the Father, and is not sent by Him. For although Isaiah says from the person of the Son: ^D *The Lord hath sent me and His Spirit*; and again, *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He hath anointed me; He hath sent me to preach to the poor*; nevertheless, by the nature by which it behooves the Son to call the Father Lord, by that same, He says He is sent by the Spirit. For He did not say the Spirit of God, or of the Father, but *the Spirit of the Lord hath sent me*. But He calls the Father Lord, not according to His divinity, but humanity. Therefore, according to humanity, in these stated matters, it is understood ^A to be sent by the Spirit, and not according to divinity, because it is His humanity which calls God the Father its Lord, and not His divinity. Therefore, since it is common to the Father and the Son to send the Spirit, and not to be sent by Him: by whatever reason the Father sends the Spirit, for the same reason the Son also sends Him. Moreover, the Father sends the Spirit, showing us that He is from Him. Therefore the Son also sends the Spirit, signifying to us that He Himself is from the Son. But observe also the diligence of the Apostle concerning this chapter elsewhere. For because he knew that the Son was indeed from the Father alone, but the Spirit from the Father and the Son: therefore, concerning the Son, he says to the Galatians: *God sent His Son*; but concerning the Spirit, after a few words, he did not say so: *God sent His Spirit*, lest it be signified as from Him alone, but how? *God sent the Spirit of His Son*: signifying both by each; for by saying: *The Father sent the Spirit*, he signifies that He is both His and from Him: and by saying, *the Spirit of His Son*, he signifies that He is also from the Son, and is sent by Him.

Tenth Argument. God the Father gives the Spirit to men. For the Lord says in the Gospel of Luke: *How much more will your heavenly Father give the good Spirit to them that ask Him?* And the apostles in the Acts: *We are witnesses of these words, and the Holy Spirit, whom God hath given to all them that obey Him.* And again: *Who am I, that I could hinder God to give the Holy Spirit to them that believe in the name of Jesus?* And * ^B John in the first: *In this we know that we abide in Him, and He in us, because He hath given us of His Spirit.* And the Apostle to the Galatians: *Who therefore hath given you the Spirit and worketh miracles in you.* And to the Ephesians: *May the Father of glory give you the Spirit of wisdom and revelation.* And to the Thessalonians: *But God, who also hath given His Holy Spirit in you.* But that the Holy Spirit gives the Father, it is nowhere written; therefore, since the Trinity was inseparable and indivisible, it is rendered a matter of doubt, how one person gives another, or how it is possible for the Holy Spirit to be received by us without receiving the Father at the same time? But if we nevertheless receive the Father just as we receive the Spirit, when we receive the Spirit, what is the reason that it is not likewise written that the Father is given by the Spirit? But if someone should say that to receive the Holy Spirit, when we are received by Him, and suffer some spiritual operation from Him, and receive some spiritual gift from Him, either wisdom, or tongues, or prophecy, or the power of binding and loosing, or something such, and this is what we receive Him—because conversely we are received and well-suffered by Him, with Him remaining unalterably and immutably: this is indeed, as I believe, a sufficient expression of the reception of the Spirit, but what is searched for, is no more discovered, nor is the doubt resolved. For if we are no more received and helped by the Holy Spirit,

and we receive gifts, as from the Father; for the benefits of this kind come to us equally from the three persons. This is the reason that, although we receive such benefits equally from the Father and the Spirit, the Father is said to give us the Holy Spirit, while the reverse is by no means written. Or is it certain that, because he who gives something, in so far as he gives, has the nature of a principle in relation to that which is given, and since the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit, it would be most absurd to say that the Father is given by the Holy Spirit? But since the Father gives the Spirit, it is most congruently said, so that from this we may understand the one as the principle, and the other as from him; and thus the giving of the Holy Spirit, spoken of in time, leads us back to his eternal procession from the same. ^A But indeed the Son also gives the Holy Spirit in Scripture. For He breathed, and said to the disciples: “Receive the Holy Spirit.” And in his first catholic Epistle, blessed John says concerning Christ: “In this we know that he abides in us, by the Spirit whom he gave us.” But that the Holy Spirit gives the Son is nowhere written. Since, therefore, to give the Spirit and not to be given by him is common to the Father and the Son, and common things are indifferently common; by understanding the giving and receiving in the Son and the Spirit similarly, as in the Father and the Spirit, it is necessary to understand from this very fact that the Son is the principle of the Spirit, and the Spirit is timelessly from him.

Eleventh Argument

The Father pours out the Holy Spirit in Holy Scripture. He says: “I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh.” Regarding this, who would not rightly doubt how that which is not of a fluid or flowing nature is poured out, or how that which is completely impassible suffers anything? But if the operation of the Father and the Holy Spirit is true, and the act of pouring out is a kind of operation, then He pours out himself. But how, when He is most simple, does He do this to Himself and suffer from Himself? But if someone says that He is said to be poured out because His grace is poured out, as it is written in Acts, that “on the Gentiles also the grace of the Holy Spirit was poured out,” this is on account of the copious and abundant distribution of gifts suddenly passing to many. But since the grace of the Father and the Holy Spirit is the same, why is the Father said to pour out the Spirit, rather than the Spirit the Father, when the grace poured out is common? The solution to this is the same as the previous ones. For because he who pours out has the nature of a principle in relation to that which is poured out, as far as he pours it out—and the Father is the principle of the Spirit—rightly, when common grace is poured out, the Father is said to pour out the Spirit, but the Spirit is not said to pour out the Father; so that from words of this kind ^B we may be guided to understand that the Father is the principle of the Spirit. For it is necessary that eternal things, through those things which are spoken of temporally in the Scriptures, be signified as through certain signs and according to some likeness. But indeed the Son is also said in Scripture to pour out the Spirit. For the Apostle says to Titus: “He saved us according to His mercy, through the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit, whom He poured out upon us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Savior.” He says the Spirit is poured out through the Son, because the Son has from the Father that He should pour out the Spirit, which is signified by another Scripture. For it is written in Acts: “Having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, He poured out this which you now see and hear.” But that the Spirit pours out the Son is not written. Wherefore, from this also, it is concluded that the Son is the principle of the Spirit.

Twelfth Argument

“Having received,” he says, “from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, He poured out this which you now see and hear.” He does not say this because the Father has something that the Son does not always have, and subsequently receives that same thing from the Father. For when He was timelessly born from the Father, by this very fact that He was timelessly born from Him—having from eternity from the Father all things that He has—He is said to receive from the Father; not things He did not have before, but eternally having what He possesses, as existing from Him. ^C Which is why what is written, that He receives from the Father, signifies that He eternally is from the Father, and has whatever He has. But indeed, just as the Son is said to receive from the Father and pour out to the apostles, so the Holy Spirit is said to receive from the Son and announce to the same. For He says: “He will receive of mine, and will announce it to you.” Wherefore, this will likewise signify that the Holy Spirit himself is eternally from the Son and has whatever He has, just as He is also from the Father. This is also clear through the preceding words; for He said: “When that Spirit of truth comes, He will teach you all the truth.” Then, because from this some diminution might be thought to belong to the Son—in that He Himself did not do the thing, which is the teaching of the apostles all the truth, so great a matter, while He says the Holy Spirit will do it—He adds: “For He will not speak from Himself; but whatever He hears, He will speak, and He will announce to you the things that are to come.” As if He were saying: That He leads you into all truth and announces to you things to come is My glory, since just as I, receiving from the Father, pour out to you, so He, receiving from My own, will announce to you. This is: Just as I, existing timelessly from the Father, have from Him timelessly whatever I have and do; so the Spirit, existing timelessly from Me, has from My own all things that He has and does. Wherefore, in leading ^D you into all truth, [receiving] of mine timelessly...

^A and corporally—that is, the breath from His mouth—as a sign or figure of the timeless, incorporeal, and inseparable procession of the Holy Spirit from the Godhead of the Son, so that through this we may understand that the Spirit proceeding from the Father also proceeds likewise from the Son? There are two proofs for this. One, which the holy Augustine also explains and deduces from this place of Scripture; the other, that unless the one breathed upon is opened in this way, it is left as having been done without reason, which is impossible. Therefore, the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son: for He first breathed, and then said: "Receive," to show that He has the power to give the Holy Spirit to men temporally, He who eternally proceeds from Him; since it belongs to Him to give Him, who is indeed the principle of His substance.

The Thirteenth Argument.

John says in the Apocalypse: "And he showed me a pure river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding from the throne of God and of the Lamb" (Apoc. XXII, 1). In these, the river of water of life is to be named as the Holy Spirit, and the Lamb as the Son of God; and since the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, not insofar as the Son is man, but insofar as He is God, and of the same throne as the Father: therefore he says that the river proceeds from the throne of God and of the Lamb, which is from that nature ^B by which the Lamb is co-throned with the Father, so that through this it may be signified that the Lamb is the author insofar as the Lamb Himself is God.

The Fourteenth Argument.

Likewise, John says in the Gospel concerning Christ: "He breathed, and said to the disciples: Receive the Holy Spirit" (Joan. XX, 22). But how the Holy Spirit, or His gifts, are given or received, and what it is for Him to be given and received, and to what kinds of intelligences befitting God we ought to be led by such words, has been opened above. Now, however, the act of breathing itself must be examined. For it is certain that the Lord, saying: "Receive the Holy Spirit," does not bid the apostles receive Him as a corporeal Spirit proceeding humanly from His precious mouth, so that by absorbing Him they could remit and retain sins. Therefore, if the apostles received the same grace without the act of breathing, purely by the remaining words spoken: what did He intend by breathing? Was that corporeal spirit an existing sign of the Holy Spirit, just as the dove was formerly, and the body of the Lord a symbol of the Godhead, to which it was personally united? ^C

The Fifteenth Argument.

After these things, it is necessary to compare the demonstration we have made concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son, with the discourses of those who strive to show the opposite, and to see how great the difference is. For they either strike at us with insults and blasphemies, using such a breed of discourses, or, by misrepresenting our words, or the expositions of certain sayings, or arguments, not as we understand and say and expound them, but as they themselves think we say and understand them: or even by feigning our words themselves, in such a way as it is easy for them to destroy, they thus reason against us. They, however, who from the Sacred Scriptures—by which they are able to show nothing by mixing in external knowledge—assert that the Holy Spirit is from the Father alone, attain no power. We, however, in this set-forth discourse, while abstaining from all insults and misrepresenting nothing calumniously, and assuming nothing of vain knowledge through the sacred oracles themselves, show that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Wherefore, if anyone thinks that this our demonstration ^D is not sufficient, but still doubts and fears to assent to the conclusion: how much more such a one ought to doubt and fear receiving that the Spirit is from the Father alone, when no such demonstration of this can exist. For to fear to admit that which is shown by many things, and yet boldly to affirm that which does not appear by any saying of Sacred Scripture, is a passion entirely devoid of reason.

The Sixteenth Argument.

But since it is possible for something to be shown through Divine Scripture, which is not said by the very words, but is concluded through the sense of the things said in various ways, and the present question is well and sufficiently shown, it is manifest from thence: that the Holy Spirit is uncreated and consubstantial with the Father and the Son, and this while Divine Scripture does not say it in the very words themselves, but those reading it diligently discover the same thing through many other things.

^A If, however, anyone wishes to compare the proofs through which the Holy Spirit is shown by Scripture to be uncreated and consubstantial with the Father and the Son, with those through which we show the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, he will find the latter in no way inferior to the former, but rather stronger, as Divine Scripture provides greater power for these than for those, as I shall demonstrate.

Regarding all the sayings of Divine Scripture through which the Fathers prove the Holy Spirit is the uncreated God, heretics used to invent another interpretation—not a true one, but one so persuasive and having such an appearance of truth that those who did not scrutinize the Scriptures, nor were assisted by the Spirit Himself, were sufficiently deceived into agreeing with their blasphemy. But as for those passages through which we demonstrate that the Holy Spirit is also from the Son, no other interpretation can be found that is so opposed to ours that, if believed, ours is necessarily excluded. For the matter stands thus: in those places where Divine Scripture discusses the Son and the Spirit, while revealing Them, It sets down certain points that are not convertible, as has been shown; these signify nothing else than that the Son is the principle of the Spirit. For instance—since nothing prevents us from summarizing them and placing them side-by-side—it is written that the Son is the arm of God, and the Spirit is the finger of God. And although every finger depends on the arm, the converse is not written.

Again, it is written that the Holy Spirit is the mouth of the Son, and His Word. But that the Son is the Word of the Father is written; yet that the Word is of the Spirit, or the mouth of the Spirit, is nowhere written.

Again, it is said in Scripture that the Holy Spirit is of the Son and is His image; but that the Son is of the Father and is His image is written. That the Spirit is either simply or in an image is by no means written.

Again, in Scripture the Son sends, gives, and pours out the Spirit; but the Son is not said to be sent or given or poured out by the Spirit, although He is said to be sent and given by the Father.

Again, by the Spirit and through the Spirit the Son is said to perform works befitting God. But that the Father performs works through the Son is written; that He does so through the Spirit, is not.

Again, the Holy Spirit in Scripture receives from the Son. But the Son is said to receive indeed from the Father; it is not written that He receives from the Spirit.

Therefore, since these non-convertible points appear in Scripture, if anyone does not say that the cause is that the Son ^B is the principle of the Spirit, he will find no other cause. Seeking, and with these, the procession of the river of living water from the throne of God and the Lamb, and the breathing upon them after the resurrection—it is impossible for these to signify anything else than that the Spirit is from the Son.

Furthermore, I also reflect upon the fact that those who once contended against the opponents of the Spirit could not reduce themselves to the older doctors, who were commonly regarded on both sides as saints and clearly taught in their writings that the Holy Spirit is the uncreated God, so as to compel the heretics by their testimony to depart from blasphemy. But we now have Saint Augustine, blessed Cyril, Saint Athanasius, and many others, who are held in the highest honor even by those who contradict us, and who clearly bear witness that the Holy Spirit is also from the Son. Therefore, it is easier for us in many ways to show that the Spirit is from the Son than it was for the ancient Fathers to show that the Spirit is the uncreated God.

This very thing can also be shown from the fact that it is certain that what is less certain and more obscure in the things sought is always shown through what is more certain and clearer. Now, blessed Cyril, in his *Thesaurus* disputing against heretics, first shows and concludes through Scripture that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. Then, through this, he concludes that He is consubstantial with the Father and the Son. Wherefore, in Divine Scripture itself, this is clearer and more evident than that.

That this is the same also appears through the opposites. For the demonstrations of those who try to show that the Spirit is from the Father alone are much weaker than those which the opponents of the Spirit used ^C, which, not duly read and understood, seemed to support their blasphemy: such as the fact that the Holy Spirit is sent, given, poured out, and does not speak from Himself; but whatsoever He hears, He desires, and makes intercession for the saints with groanings that cannot be uttered, and such things which, not duly examined, appear to be of a servile nature. But those who affirm that He is from the Father alone have no support whatever from Scripture: not a word, not a statement, not a symbol or figure, nor anything else through which their opinion could stand. Therefore, there is no doubt that our position is well demonstrated through Scripture, and those who do not believe it are heretics and alien to the Catholic faith. ^D

BARLAAM'S ORATION FOR UNION

Delivered at Avignon before Pope Benedict XII.

(Allat. *De consensu*, p. 787.)

Benedict XII, having been informed by the envoys of Andronicus the Younger that the Greeks wished to be reconciled with the Roman Church, immediately dispatched two legates to Byzantium with letters addressed to Andronicus and his wife, as Gregoras recounts in his tenth book, so that they might discuss the peace and concord of the Churches; the same author relates that the Byzantines were not averse to this, as they pressed the patriarch to undertake the business, though not without tumult. Let us hear what Benedict XII himself narrates concerning this same matter to Robert, King of Sicily, from the Barberini Library: “To our dearest son in Christ, Robert, the illustrious King of Sicily. Barlaam, abbot of the monastery of our Lord Jesus Christ the Savior of Constantinople, having recently come into our presence as an envoy, as he asserts, of his great prince Andronicus, the illustrious governor of the Greeks, has proposed before us a certain matter touching upon the making of a union of the Greeks with the holy Roman Church; concerning these things we intend to write more fully to your royal serenity. Indeed, because the said abbot returns to him who sent him with our good pleasure, we commend him all the more readily to your royal benevolence. Given at Avignon, the third of the Kalends of September, in the fifth year.” In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, in the year 1339 from His Nativity, Barlaam, the aforementioned abbot of the monastery of our Lord Jesus Christ the Savior of Constantinople, coming into the presence of the most holy father, our Lord Pope Benedict XII by divine Providence, at the city of Avignon, where he resided with his curia, together with the noble man Stephen de Dandulo, a knight, and bearing letters of the lords Philip, King of France, and Robert, the illustrious King of Sicily, containing, among other things, that the same Barlaam with the aforementioned knight had been sent to these parts on behalf of the great prince Andronicus, governor of the Greeks, for the business of the union of the Greek Church with the Roman and the unity of that same Church, ^A proposed in effect before our aforementioned lord the supreme pontiff and his sacred college of cardinals the following: namely, that in a general council to be convoked by the same lord our supreme pontiff, the article concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit might be brought into agreement between the Latins and the Greeks through discussions and debates there, and that before all else, concerning the recovery of three or four great cities, ^B which are said to be occupied and held by the infidel Turks to the prejudice of the Greek empire, aid should be provided by the lord supreme pontiff himself, and the aforementioned kings, and other faithful Christians, and that other graces of no small weight should be exhibited to the aforementioned Greeks by the apostolic see. And although the aforementioned Barlaam and the knight, when asked by our same lord the supreme pontiff and his college whether they had, concerning the aforementioned matters or others to be proposed and said, any letters or mandate from him who calls himself the patriarch of Constantinople in those parts, or from the aforementioned governor, or from other magnates of those parts, either ecclesiastical or secular, so that the proceedings might not be carried out in a vain or delusory manner—since, as is gathered from the ancient acts, when solemn treaties were held in times past regarding the aforementioned union and the business settled, after John, then patriarch of Constantinople, and the late Michael Palaeologus, governor of the Greeks, had been professed in the general Council of Lyons ^C through their solemn apocrisiaries supported by suitable mandates in the Catholic faith, which the same Roman Church holds, teaches, and preaches, they nonetheless turned back and damnably fell away from such profession and returned to their vomit, with the same Roman Church, as far as it depended upon them, remaining ultimately deluded—Barlaam and the aforementioned knight replied that they had no such letters or mandate. Nevertheless, our aforementioned lord and his college, desiring the aforementioned union, from which, if it were granted by the Lord, the salvation of many souls would without doubt result, caused those things which the said Barlaam and the knight wished to propose to be given to them to test whether any fruit could be elicited therefrom, whence a useful way could be opened for the business of the aforementioned union; they follow in this manner: — “Since the divine and adorable command has been laid upon me by your holiness, that I should speak of the method by which I consider it possible for the Eastern Church to be united to the Western Church, obeying your command, I shall now do so as this discourse proceeds. ^D But first of all I beseech God that, just as I shall speak of these things with all truth and purity of heart, so may He also send forth into your holy soul that which is for the glory indeed and the praise of your magnificence.

ORATION FOR UNION

The destruction of the wicked, but the perfection and unity of all Christians. Most Holy Father, there are two ways by which one may consider the aforementioned union to be possible. The first is violent; that is, if those who inhabit the East were to suffer force and, unwilling, receive your communion. The other, however, which is free, is that by which men, educated and humbled through doctrinal words, might willingly unite with you. The former of these two methods, therefore, is to be cast aside entirely, since it is not pleasing to you. The second, however, which is voluntary, is twofold. For there is one way by which it is possible for our wise men to be brought into concord with you, and another by which the common people may be. The method for the wise is simple and easy: for if thirty or forty of our wise men, or however many there may be, were to come to your most holy majesty, I know well that they would be brought into concord with you most easily and at once. Why? Because neither do you seek that irrational appetite should prevail, nor do they; but both you and they seek that the truth should prevail. Therefore, since both of you desire the truth, it must be believed that you will both find it quickly and will quickly be brought into concord.

But those men, after they had been brought into concord with you, upon returning to the East, would not be able to bring our people to belief, because they had been brought into concord with you while the dogmas of the holy Fathers were still preserved ^A intact. Rather, certain others will arise, either out of envy, or vainglory, or perchance thinking they are doing well, and they will teach the people entirely the contrary, and will say: "Brethren, see that you are not seduced, nor listen to them; for these men, having been corrupted by bribes and vainglory, say what they say; do not, therefore, remove anything of what you hold." Therefore, Most Holy Father, by saying such words, these men will encourage the populace to believe them. The wise men, however, who have been brought into concord with you, will be able to do nothing, but will rather be in danger of perishing at the hands of the rabble.

Whence the aforementioned mode is sufficient for the wise men, but for the people, not at all. What, then, is the mode that will bring both the people and the wise men together into your union? I will tell you. The common people, hearing that a General Council has been held six times, ^B and that, as often as it was held, it was held for the perfection of the Church and for the correction of errors—which were, in those times, accepted by all in their souls as the true and sound determination of a General Council—would believe it. Therefore, if a General Council is now held regarding the differences you have with the Greeks, as we shall show, whatever shall be ordained by the General Council, all the Orientals will willingly receive, and there will be no one who will contradict these things; and thus unanimity and union will be established at once.

But if anyone should say that a General Council regarding these matters was already held at Lyons, at which Greeks were present, let him know that no one will be able to humble the people of the Greeks so that they receive that council without another council. Why? Because those Greeks who were present at that council were not sent by the four patriarchs, ^C who govern the Oriental Church, nor by the people, but by the emperor alone, who attempted to bring about union with you by force and not voluntarily. If, therefore, your Holiness grants that a General Council be held concerning this, let its initiation be as follows: Let legates be sent from you to the Oriental Church, men, religious and fearing God, and full of the spirit of humility and patience, and let them bring from you letters having this tone: "Brethren, you know that our common enemy, the devil, has placed scandals between you and us, and has separated us one from another. We ought, therefore, both we and you, to be saddened by this, and to count this separation a common injury. We ask you, therefore, as brothers in Christ, ^D the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the Patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, and other pontiffs and chosen men, that we may come together in some place, and may search together with spiritual affection concerning the matters proposed, and whatever the Holy Spirit shall reveal to us, this shall be determined; and we hope in the mercy of God that scandals will be cast out, and unanimity and love will dominate among you."

If thus, Most Holy Father, the Orientals hear gentle words, the emperor and the patriarchs and the people will rejoice greatly; they will immediately begin to work toward the proposal, and with your nuncios will arrange the method, time, and place in which the universal council is to be held, in which, without any doubt, it is to be believed that union will be firmly made. Afterward, as many as shall have attended this council will go out to the common people and say: "Brethren, the holy and General Council has determined this and that; you ought, therefore, to receive these things." And all will receive them without doubt.

This, Most Holy Father, is the only mode, as it seems to me, by which the union of the Church can come to pass. I advise, however, even this further; nay, I rather entreat it. In Turkey there are four cities, great and wealthy, which heretofore were those of the Greeks, and because of our sins have long since been delivered into the hands of the wicked: but now, those who hold and guard them were indeed Christians, but by force have become Turks. These, therefore, wishing to return again to the Christian faith, have made it known to my lord the emperor, that he should go with an army to them, ^C and they themselves will deliver the aforementioned cities. The emperor, however, not trusting in his own people alone, sent us to the most Christian King of the French, seeking help for this purpose. For if those cities should be taken and returned to us, first of all, the entire strength which the Turks possess by sea, they will immediately lose, and the evils which Christians suffer by sea will cease; from them also the regions and cities which are between the aforementioned cities and all of you will be delivered to us; and a great gate will be opened for the holy passage. And the King of the French, hearing these things, sent us to you, that you might say what pleases you concerning this. Whence we supplicate you, Most Holy Father, that you might grant that help be sent to those parts, either before your aforementioned legates go there, or

^A together. I say this, moreover, for two reasons. First, because naturally all men are more willing to be brought under subjection by those who treat them well than by those who act against them. Even the Jews, though they are the most ungrateful of all men, yet when Christ nourished them from five loaves in the desert, they wanted to make him their king. Therefore, the Greeks, seeing that your aid has already been afforded them, would be more prepared to receive the words of your legates and to fulfill them; and we, who desire the union of the Church, will be able to teach the people the union with confidence; and our emperor, taking this opportunity, will be able to say to the patriarch and to the other pontiffs: See how the Latins are good men, and how they seek us with fruitful works and gracious words! We must, therefore, also love them in return and seek the way by which we may be in concord with them. The second reason is this: the emperor will not be able to set himself to ordaining a general council unless first the war he has with the Turks is resolved; for as long as war persists, he will be able neither to gather the four patriarchs and other pontiffs into one place, nor will he be able to attend the council, and therefore it is necessary that those rivals be first driven somewhat further from the empire; and then the emperor, having gained tranquility, will be able, so far as he is concerned, to fulfill it perfectly. Truly, what some of you say, that it is necessary first that the Greeks be united with you, and then we shall go against the Turks, does not seem to me well said, for six arguments. First, because the Turks do not harm only the Greeks, but also the Armenians, and the Cypriots, and the inhabitants of Herod, since all are our subjects, and all inhabiting the islands. Whence, when you do not wish to send aid against the Turks on account of the Greeks, you ought at least for the sake of the miserable Armenians who are already desolate, and for the sake of other Christians who are our subjects, to send your aid to those parts. Second, because the Turks oppress the Greeks not as Greeks, nor because they differ from you, but because they are worshippers of the cross. Whence they oppress the cross itself primarily, and the Greeks only accidentally. If, therefore, you go against the Turks, you will go not to aid the Greeks, but the cross, which is the common salvation of all Christians. It is therefore just that, as the Greeks are defenders of the cross, you likewise should be. Third, because now, while the empire of the Greeks stands safe, and exists in its rights, it is easiest for the Latins to overthrow the Turks together with the Greek emperor. Why? Because, first of all, the Greek military understands well through experience the method of Turkish warfare; and moreover, throughout all of Turkey and Saracenia are mixed many, both still Christians and others now renegades, who greatly desire the dominion of the Greeks; these, therefore, when they hear that the emperor goes against them with an army, will immediately and unanimously submit to him: if, however—which God forbid—they were to overthrow the empire of the Greeks, by that much will they be stronger, from the nature of the place and of affairs: for it will be ^C altogether impossible and extremely difficult for you to overthrow them; whence, as long as it is easy to overthrow them, do not let it weary you, and do not let slip that time in which it will be a matter of consideration for you, not how you will go against them, but how you will guard yourselves from them, and it will be a great thing for you to be avenged by them. Fourth, if only the Turks had come to you, saying: O Latins, we indeed wish to be Turks at least, yet we ask you that we might extinguish the Tartars and Saracens together with you, and destroy them, you would surely have accepted their supplication; why? Because it would have been more useful to you to extinguish the Tartars and Saracens with the Turks than if you alone had extinguished all three. By a like token, therefore, it is more useful to you, with the Greeks, whether they are in concord with you or not, to extinguish the impious than if you alone extinguish the Turks and the impious. Fifth, know also this truly, because not so much the difference of dogmas separates the hearts of the Greeks from you, as the hatred that has entered into their souls against the Latins from many and great evils which the Greeks have suffered at the hands of the Latins throughout various times, and still suffer through every passing day; which hatred, unless it be first cast out from them, union will not be able to come about. Nevertheless, unless a great benefit is first done for them by you, neither will the aforementioned hatred be cast out, nor will anyone be able dare to speak to them of those things which pertain to union. Sixth, know also this, because not the common people of the Greeks sent me, that I might seek aid and union from you, but the emperor alone in secret; who, unless aid is first sent to those parts, will not be able to reveal to his people that he desires your union. Behold, I have said and recounted everything to you. May God do what is better. The aforementioned method of union I hold to be manifest, and if it is possible for you to effect it, thanks be to God. If, however, not, I will tell you another method which, while indeed in doubt, yet God can effect union even through it. The great hatred which I already mentioned has entered into the souls of the Greeks against the Latins from the many evils they have suffered from them; which hatred, unless it is first cast out, no one will be able to teach the Greeks your union. In order, therefore, that the aforementioned hatred be first cast out, we supplicate that you fulfill for us these three supplications: first, that you concede to the King of the Franks to send aid to those parts; second, that you grant an indulgence of sins to all willing to assist with their resources, and to all dying in the war against the Turks; third, that all Greeks who have been sold by the Latins, wheresoever they may be, be liberated, and for the future, that Greeks not be sold, and if they formerly sold them, or bought them, or go against them, let them be excommunicated; and, before these things have been done, let doctors be sent by you to those parts, and let them teach the people, with the emperor granting them safe passage; and perhaps that people, seeing first your benefits, will be ashamed, and will be humbled to receive, even without a general council, your union. Nevertheless, I supplicate your holiness that if you find another method, through which it will be possible for the people to re

receive your union, show it to us, and we are prepared to bring it to fulfillment.” ^A To these requests, having been seen and diligently understood by the same lord our supreme pontiff and the college, and mature deliberation having been held upon them, they briefly replied that, since long ago by holy Fathers and catholic men in the Ephesian council for the parts of Greece—which is one of the four principal councils—as well as in the Toletan, the Lugdunensian, and various other councils celebrated by Roman pontiffs and the Roman Church, or by their authority in various parts of the world, both Oriental and Occidental, it was solemnly determined catholically and also defined that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, as from one principle and breathing, and any contrary opinion has been adjudged reprobate and condemned; it would not be becoming nor expedient for our aforementioned lord, and for the holy Church of God, and the assembly of the faithful, to revoke into doubt—through new disputes or altercations or otherwise in any way—a dogma of faith so clear, determined, and defined, which the Greeks in the most ancient time, with Pope Hormisdas of pious memory and John, Patriarch of Constantinople, presiding over the Churches, and under the reign of Emperor Justinian, had explicitly professed, and subsequently, after the lapse of a long time ^B regarding the profession of this same article, John, then Patriarch of Constantinople, and Michael Palæologus, then moderator of the Greeks, after a synodical council had been celebrated by the same patriarch, sent a solemn epistle to Pope John XXI of revered memory. Nor does the circumspect providence of the apostolic see, which is accustomed to observe maturity in its acts and processes—especially regarding those things which concern the orthodox faith—departing from the path of uprightness and truth, customarily bring into superfluous contestations or disputes the things which have been through it providently, solemnly, and catholically determined and defined, especially through the instigation or insistence of schismatics and heretics: and if this were to be done regarding the aforementioned article, determined according to catholic truth, and especially if it were to permit doubt concerning it—which God forbid. Again, when the aforementioned Barlaam and the knight, having heard such a response, said that at least, if the Greeks could perhaps not be induced to profess the said article, after a ^C reunion had been made, the Greeks might be permitted themselves to believe what they hold regarding the same article, and the Latins would believe catholically that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son according to catholic truth, as they believe; the response stood that this was in no way to be tolerated, because in the catholic Church itself, in which one faith is known to exist, to allow double faith in this regard would be less than truthful; and the said lord our supreme pontiff, together with the Church itself, by not resisting such an obvious [proposal], would seem to consent to the same error, which may the Lord avert. However, to expel such errors from the hearts of the Greeks and to induce them to the truth of catholic unity, the same lord our pontiff [proposed] to show the aforementioned Barlaam and the knight another method more easy and accommodating, which occurred to him and the said college of lords cardinals, namely: that through him who calls himself Patriarch of Constantinople in those parts, and the moderator of the Greeks who now is, those who are named ^D as prelates of the Alexandrian, Antiochene, and Jerusalem Churches in those parts being gathered, and from the principal clergy of those same parts, and the nobles and elders of the people, certain wise men should be assumed in a synodatical council and sent to these Western parts, supported by suitable mandates, who, with other wise men, learned in the law of the Lord, and expert, to be deputed for this by the apostolic see, might have—not by way of dispute or contention, but of instruction regarding the Greeks themselves—matters healthily and diligently treated, so that finally regarding the aforesaid article, and other doubts which the said Greeks might have concerning the faith, having perceived the light of catholic truth, and the shadows having been driven from their hearts, they might return to the Lord’s sheepfold, of which there is one shepherd, and outside of which there is neither grace nor salvation for anyone. For the convocation of a general council, which would require the passage of a long time, and various and intolerable expenses and labors, regarding the Western prelates and ecclesiastical persons, as well as the kings, princes, and others to be summoned to it, does not seem, especially in this present troubled and unpeaceful time, our sins, alas, demanding it, to be expedient. But as for this, that aid be provided to these same Greeks before all else, and other favors shown, as is expressed, was sought above and bolstered on behalf of the said Barlaam by certain reasons given by him in writing, as follows in this manner: “By the license given to me by your holiness to reply, I will reply confidently. Some say it is inconvenient if we put back into examination that which we have already as manifest, but to me it seems quite the contrary; if it is manifest, it is much more conv[enient] that it be put to examination, if some doubt about ^D it, for four reasons, of which the first is this. You confess now that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, just as from the Father; but this is doubted by the Greeks. If, however, it is true, and it is placed into common examination, just as it is now manifest to you, so then it will become manifest to the Greeks also; which you ought especially to consider. For just as with the nature of aromatics, the more one moves them with one's hands, the more odor they emit, so also with the nature of truth, the more it is examined by disputation, the more pure and clear it appears. For no examination is accustomed to make doubtful those things that were first manifest, but the contrary. For those things which were previously doubtful, the examination itself has by nature the power to lead to clarity. Those things, therefore, which were previously manifest, the examination itself...

^A makes even more manifest. The second reason is this: It is just that you should take your example from the holy Fathers. They indeed possessed the certainty that the Son is of the same substance as the Father; yet because the Arians had doubted this, they placed it in examination, so that they might save others. Similarly, in other councils, the orthodox Fathers possessed as manifest those things about which the heretics doubted, yet because they desired to help them as well, they placed them in a common examination. For there was nothing in them to prohibit them from doing so; and they believed truly that the things which they themselves held to be manifest, once placed into examination, would become still more manifest and would help many. Therefore, if you also wish to do likewise, it will redound to your glory. The third reason is this: I, indeed, know well that the Latins never hold any blasphemy regarding these things; for I know them to be prudent and most wise men; but other Greeks, who do not know them as I do, will say that through timidity they refused to come to an examination, fearing lest perchance the Greeks appear to speak more true things than they themselves. For he who trusts in himself and firmly considers that he possesses the truth does not flee from examination; but he who flees from it provides a suspicion of timidity. For if anyone, exchanging gold, refuses to have it tested on a touchstone when the recipient asks for this to be done, he provides a suspicion that he does not believe his gold to be pure. Thus also, one who is called into judgment and examination regarding some matter, and is unwilling to approach, provides a suspicion that he does not trust in himself, nor does he consider himself to be firmly established in the truth. Watch therefore if it is good ^B to give such an opinion of yourselves to any, because in my opinion you differ from all men in wisdom and magnificence. The fourth reason is this: No one ought to fear that some desolation might happen to the Church of God from this council, considering that as often as a general council has been held, it has always been held for the exaltation and honor of the Church, and for a greater firmness of the truth; therefore, it must be believed now also that, if a general council is held as proposed, a great exaltation of the Church will follow. But if anyone wishes to say that this work requires much time and great expense, let him know that for this work we ought not to count only money and time as nothing, but we ought to be willing to pour out our blood for it, if it were necessary; for a greater work than uniting the Greeks with the Latins, no man will be able to find under heaven. What remainder of the way of union I have, therefore, I shall now declare, only protesting that most certainly I cannot say whether union will be brought about by this method, yet I believe that it is possible with God. You can, if you wish, send your legates to the four patriarchs of the Oriental Church, and to the emperor, saying: "Brothers, since both you and we confess in divine matters one substance, and three persons, and also one principle; and neither you nor we bring into divine ^C substance either confusion or identity of persons, or division, let these things suffice for us that we may have union. But concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, let us not be divided from one another; but let some of our wise men dispute with yours regarding this question, if they wish. For commonly we should not have on account of this a division, but hold you what you wish concerning this, and we likewise, and let us not condemn one another on account of this; but let the fact be merely this. You indeed yield to the Roman Church that honor which the ancient patriarchs gave in the time of union, which both the laws of the emperors and the canons of the holy Fathers have determined, and we do not ask more from you. We, however, are prepared to yield and to confirm to the Oriental Church, and especially to the Church of Constantinople, and to the Constantinopolitan empire all rights, which are either from ancient custom, or determined by the laws of the emperors, or the canons of the holy Fathers." Whether the Greeks hearing these words, most holy Father, will all receive them, I cannot say; yet I believe that most will receive them, and perhaps by this method God will give us union. Nevertheless, we beseech your holiness, do not leave us without carrying back some favor from you to my lord the emperor, so that his desired union of the Church [not] be ^D but rather be illuminated. The aforementioned lord our supreme pontiff, with his aforementioned college, replying, said that, since the same reasons do not in any way stand in the way, the aforementioned petition does not seem unjust on that account; because if they were fortified, enriched, exalted, and comforted by the apostolic see, the kings, princes, and Catholic peoples before the aforementioned reunion, afterward they might turn their backs and not their faces to the Roman Church, just as they are known to have done at other times, when they were believed to be reunited, as has been expressed above; without a doubt, the same lord supreme pontiff, the Church, and other faithful would remain deceived, and it could be called no small disgrace, that they had helped and fortified their own enemies and foes of the faith, and had participated in scandalous things with them; but if through Him who illuminates every man coming into this world, their hearts—the hearts of those same Greeks—being illuminated by the infusion of spiritual grace, by a straight path through the same our Lord, or another suitable and honorable one, had taken care to return with effect to obedience, unity, and devotion to the Roman Church, then, with joys poured out, and with graces and favors abundantly dispensed, as if they were returning from a land of unlikeness, the Lord our God himself and the apostolic faith would receive them, embracing them with charitable arms, ready then to exhibit to them, as much as can be done with God and with honor, not only concerning the things they ask, but concerning their other needs, aids, counsels, and favors. Furthermore, after the aforementioned things, the said Barlaam, who was, as he asserted, about to return to the aforementioned parts of Greece, although he considered a response of this kind to be just and reasonable, yet the way which had been proposed regarding sending wise men on behalf of the aforementioned Greeks, as

1341 being premised, he judges it difficult or impossible, unless God, for whom nothing is impossible, might deign to accomplish it by His power alone: explaining the causes of such difficulty through a certain slip, which he delivered in writing in this form: — “Most Holy Father, although I have received a perfect response from you, I still implore your holiness that you might deign to hear these few words; for they are necessary both for me to say and for you to know. Regarding what your holiness already told me concerning the fact of the union of the Orthodox Church, that legates might come from those parts, holding imperial and synodical letters, I pray to God that He might make this possible, as of itself it is very difficult, for many reasons. Namely, because the emperor does not dare to reveal himself, that he wishes to be united with you; for if he had revealed himself, many of his princes, and even among the people, fearing that perhaps if he should wish it, as Michael Palaiologos did to them, they would seek an opportunity to kill him. Furthermore, the Constantinopolitan Church would not send its legates to this business without the counsel and consent of the patriarchs—Alexandrian, Antiochene, and Hierosolymitan; wherefore it behoves them to gather together; which is difficult on account of the wars. And besides this, it is uncertain whether, if called, ^B they would have wished to come; and granted that they had already come, and all had unanimously agreed to send legates regarding the foresaid, they would never grant full power over this to such legates, nor promise to hold as ratified that which had been done by the legates themselves, unless under certain terms and agreements; which agreements you would by no means admit. Wherefore it seems to me that such legates would in no way come, for the reason that they would know the articles of the agreements would by no means be admitted by you. Hence, if it happens that such legates come to your holiness, have what is from God, to whom nothing is difficult. If, however, they do not come, let it not be imputed to the emperor, nor let it be suspected that his negligence is the cause, since he himself has long been well-disposed to the said union.” The aforementioned Barlaam later added orally that, notwithstanding that the things promised—the aforementioned difficult or impossible things—might seem to be, he would nevertheless labor faithfully concerning them. — And thus, from the same lord our supreme pontiff, explaining more expressly that it did not seem possible to the same lord and the said college otherwise than as he had said above and touched upon, for the foresaid business to be accomplished; returning, as he said, the aforementioned Barlaam departed to the aforementioned parts of Greece.

ETHICS ACCORDING TO THE STOICS.

PARS PRIMA.

CAP. I. What beatitude is called. We think that one man lives better than another, in so far as he is a man, and we judge one state of men to be more desirable, another less desirable. Therefore, since our nature is finite and not capable of infinite goodness, taking one life as better than another by reason, we shall not proceed to the infinite, but shall arrive finally at some limit of living well, which our nature, of its condition, can by no means transcend. For although we do not possess that which we might assign to have reached it purely: yet because we have a limited substance and life by nature, it is necessary that the highest degree of our perfection, and the best state of living, according to what our proportionality demands, is ^D foreordained and known by that same nature. For to opine that a finite nature can proceed to the infinite, and be perfected, without exceeding its own limits, is not ^C only contrary to common notions, but also removes all appetite. Truly there is no extreme of things to be sought where appetite might finally attach itself. Let us therefore seek this limit, and this best life of man, as far as it is possible—calling it, just as others do, beatitude—what it is and in what it consists. From this, however, let us take our beginning.

CAP. II. True beatitude of man, as he is man. We seek the true beatitude of man: but such cannot be, unless it be of man as he is man. For if we shall assign a beatitude of man which will not be of man as he is man, it will not be true. Therefore, it is necessary that it consist of all those goods which are of man, in so far as he is man. Because if it is from others, and not from such, we shall not have that which we seek. For if it does not consist of all goods of this kind, it will not be the highest good, because if there is any beatitude, if it lacks some things of man, in so far as he is man, it will not be complete.

It is manifest that, if those things were added, it would be increased. But whatever can be increased is not the highest; yet we wish the beatitude which we seek to be the highest good of man.

Therefore, from all the goods mentioned, and indeed from those alone, it will be established. Because if there are any other goods of man, yet not as he is man, it is manifest that those, when added to that beatitude which consists of the goods of man as he is man, will not increase it, so that on that account it might be more the beatitude of man as man: because in such a composition the whole complex formed from goods of both kinds would not be called, nor understood, nor be the beatitude of man as man, except on account of those goods of man which are the goods of man in so far as he is man.

Chapter III. Vera beatitudo augeri non potest.

Therefore, true beatitude cannot be increased by the addition of those things. And deservedly so. For no aggregation can be increased by the addition of other things different in kind. For neither are lines increased by the addition of points, nor surfaces by the addition of lines, nor solids by the addition of surfaces, nor is the mixture of diverse liquids increased by adding colors or flavors.

Chapter 4. Of what things the happiness of man, as man, chiefly consists.

Therefore, if the goods of man as he is man are different in kind from those which are not of man as he is man, it is manifest that the beatitude which consists of the goods of man as he is man will not be increased by the addition of those goods which are not of man in so far as he is man. And so the perfect and highest beatitude of man will consist of those alone, so that we may now, comprehending the form of this beatitude most briefly, posit its definition for the purpose of inquiring and demonstrating.

Chapter V. Quid est beatitudo hominis vera, et quid ejus miseria.

That true human beatitude is the accumulated complex of all the goods of man as he is man; and consequently, that the highest misery of man is the accumulated complex of all the evils of man as he is man: so that he in whom this resides is said to be the most miserable man. Moreover, beatitude is to be sought for its own sake, and misery to be shunned.

Chapter VI. What is virtue.

Let us also posit the definition of virtue, which is as follows according to all philosophers. Virtue is the best affection of the soul from which proceed good and praiseworthy volitions, opinions, and actions: each of which is best in its own place; which makes those themselves in whom it exists, good and praiseworthy.

Chapter 7. All arts are excluded from the happiness of man, as man.

With these points premised, it is evident that one and all of the arts of craftsmen are excluded from those goods which pertain to the form of beatitude. For just as in all other things we understand those goods of each individual thing, as that thing is, which make that thing itself good and praiseworthy, and from which the thing itself is justly praised and called good: so also do we understand those goods of man as he is man, which make the man himself good and praiseworthy, and from which he is justly praised and called good. ^A

Chapter 8. In what things the true happiness of man, as man, is chiefly situated.

But the beatitude of man is situated in those goods only which are of man as he is man: therefore only those things formally perfect the blessed life which make a man truly good and praiseworthy, and on account of which he is justly praised and called good. But man merits these by no skill of craftsmen. For however much a man is a good workman, or shoemaker, or writer, he is not called good by reason of this art; just as a wise man, or a prudent or intelligent one, is simply called good. Therefore, the arts of craftsmen are not to be called to the form of beatitude. ^B

Chapter IX. Scientia in bonis hominis minime locanda.

And similarly with sciences, the end of which is not an extrinsic effect, but the intrinsic vision of truth; although all science is computed among the goods of the mind itself as it is mind: yet whatever things are such that a man cannot be called simply good by them, or that a man as wise and intelligent or prudent cannot be rightly praised: they are not to be held among those goods which constitute the beatitude of man himself, in so far as he is man. For we do not call man the mind or reason itself, but an animal participant of reason and mind, whose beatitude we are now seeking, namely, the thing by which, while one lives, his life is led in the best way. ^C

Chapter 10. Things common to men and beasts are not to be placed among the goods of man, as man.

But indeed, neither whatever things are, or can be, common to man and beasts, are to be held among those goods from which the beatitude of man consists. For all those things, as it has been predefined, are goods of man as he is man. But those things which are, or can be, common to man and beasts—and consequently whatever are required for the sake of these, as effective or conservative, and if any are said to be the virtues of the same—are not goods of man as he is man, and therefore they are not to be held among those goods which pertain to beatitude. ^D

Chapter 11. The definition of the most miserable, or who is truly called miserable.

Item, because the most miserable man is neither he who is nowhere, nor he who is not a man: for a horse is not called a most miserable man: it is manifest that there are some common things for the blessed and the most miserable man. But when he is said to be most miserable who has all the evils of man as he is man, so that nothing of the good of man as he is man is left for him: it follows—

that nothing of those things which exist, or can exist, is to be held as common to the blessed and the most miserable; and whatever things are required by reason of them, [are] the good of man as he is man. Wherefore, those things of this kind are not to be held as included in the definition of beatitude.

Cap. XII. What things are rightly to be held among the goods of man.

Item, if only those goods make a man blessed by themselves which make the man himself, as has been shown, simply good and praiseworthy, and on account of which he is rightly praised and called a good man; and if all things of this kind are voluntary, and lie in the power of man, and are such that they cannot be lost against one's will: then nothing fragile, and passing, and foreign, not existing in our power, and capable of being extinguished or lost against one's will, is to be held in that class which the blessed life embraces.

Cap. XIII. That external corporeal goods do not pertain to the beatitude of man, as he is man.

It is clear, therefore, from the conclusions that neither freedom from pain, nor corporeal pleasure, nor at all any of those things which are called corporeal and external goods, pertain to the beatitude which we seek. For some of these things are common to man and beasts; others [are common] to the blessed man and the most miserable; and all things commonly are outside our power, and are fragile and passing, and can be extinguished or lost against one's will; and neither all together, nor any of them by their presence, make a man good, nor is a man rightly praised and called good by them. Therefore, since all things of this kind were excluded from beatitude, those corporeal and external things themselves are necessarily excluded.

Cap. XIV. What things are included in the form of beatitude.

Therefore, with all other things circumscribed which might be doubted as to whether they are to be included in the form of beatitude, having left only the virtues of the soul—and their praiseworthy actions, which clearly cannot be common to man and beasts, nor to the blessed and the most miserable, and which cannot be lost against our will, and which truly make a man good and praiseworthy, and by which a man is rightly praised and called good—it is manifest that beatitude consists in the virtuous life alone; and virtue is self-contained for living well and blessedly.

As for the rest, nothing pertains to true beatitude; but while a man is imbued with virtues, and regularly keeps and directs all his thoughts and actions and life by the virtues, nothing is taken away from or added to him by all other things that are born and perish and are in whatever state they may be, whereby he might be more or less blessed.

Cap. XV. Whether the second and third things, which are called such, ought to be included in the form of the beatitude being sought.

As for sciences and arts, no philosopher doubts whether it is necessary that either all sciences or some arts should be included in the form of the beatitude being sought. But regarding the aforementioned corporeal goods and external things, which are called the second and third, there is great question.

For some indeed do not doubt that there is no good for man, in so far as he is man, beyond the virtues, but adding the final addition to the aforementioned definition, and simply positing that beatitude is a collection of human goods, they strive to gather all bodily and external things to complete the blessed life, as if without these that [life] could in no way be complete. They are convicted of erring vehemently, from those things which we feel commonly and naturally concerning the blessed life. For we all understand beatitude as the supreme good; by which the thing itself is made supremely good in its own kind. Therefore the supreme good of man must also be understood as that, by whose presence man is made a supremely good man. Therefore, the virtues alone possess the primacy of beatitude.

Cap. XVI. What kind of person the blessed man ought to be.

Item, we wish him whom we understand to be perfectly blessed to be safe, impregnable, fortified, protected, inerrably confident in his own goods, always possessing what he wills, and never what he does not will: never to doubt whether beatitude is present to him wholly or not; never to fear that he might lose it against his will; to be of strong and robust and exalted and great soul, and always to have tranquility and security, and most placid peace, and constant cheerfulness in his soul, and to be void of terrors and anxieties and sadness.

Cap. XVII. What beatitude contains within itself.

Now the reasoning ^D of the completed conclusion contains all these things. For if anyone, while being virtuous, has such a concluded judgment about beatitude—a living and efficacious one, and one penetrating the whole soul through all its parts, so that every appetite is consonant with it, and no repugnant opinion lies hidden in the soul which could at some time distract the soul to a contrary appetite—he, since he has nothing in goods except virtue and what is done by it, and considers nothing of the rest of things as a good or evil for himself, and sees that the only good he knows is always wholly present to him and that he does not suffer it to be lost against his will, must necessarily possess all those things which we have explained are commonly and truly understood concerning the blessed man. For such a one is safe, impregnable, inerrably confident in those things which he knows are his own goods: he always has what he wills, and never what he does not will. For he is free from vices, which he does not wish to have; and if terrors, and sadnesses, and anxieties, and other perturbations—which happen to all men—arise on account of corporeal and external things: because they think them to be evil or good, and that they pertain to their good or evil state; it is manifest that if anyone has deeply removed such an opinion and appetite from those same things, nothing in any way will happen that will be able to frighten and perturb him, or cause him to be vexed and depart from constancy and to mourn. And therefore he will always be tranquil and placid to himself. Because of this, [he is] strong and magnanimous, always unconquered,

patient, and not easily broken or cast down in spirit. For he knows how to hold human affairs in contempt, and is neither puffed up nor broken by them, for he judges them to be neither good nor evil for their own sake. Similarly, whatever else is understood about the blessed man concurs fully with the aforementioned conclusion.

Cap. XVIII. Whether the second and the third are necessary for perfect blessedness.

If, however, we assume someone who has, together with the goods of the soul, also those which are called goods of the body and all external goods, and has in his mind the opinion, and an appetite consistent with that opinion, that these second and third [goods] are necessary for perfecting full blessedness: it is impossible for all those things which we understand of the blessed man to concur in him. And therefore, consequently, although he believes that he has everything that suffices for a blessed life, he will not, however, be blessed. For when he knows that strength, health, soundness, speed, beauty, the integrity of the senses, the absence of pain, and finally life itself; and furthermore kingdoms, empires, offices, dignities, honors, faculties, resources, wealth, powers, riches, the benevolence of subjects, and the company of the best friends and kinsmen: that all these are in their nature perishable, and can at once be lost against one's will, and their opposites come to pass; how will he be blessed if he does not trust that he can possess full blessedness—without which he does not reckon it to be whole—and sees so many things that he judges to be evils, and destructive of blessedness, threatening him? For such a wise and intelligent man, desiring that those goods remain to him and not slip away, since he wishes to be always blessed, how will he not always have a mind full of terror, and anguish, and anxiety? But indeed, he will not easily be able to contemn and despise human affairs, he who has believed that they have some weight toward blessedness or misery. But without the despising of human affairs, fortitude and magnanimity and nobility do not seem capable of being generated in the soul; instructed in which virtues, the virtuous man maintains equality in every fortune. He who thinks himself to be blessed will therefore lack these virtues. And it can also come to pass that a contingency occurs in which, while all external goods are safe for him, he does not know whether they are safe or not; he will therefore doubt whether complete blessedness is present to him. Therefore he will not have what he wishes; for he would wish not to doubt. Tranquillity and the peace of his mind are therefore overturned by his lack of constancy. He is not, therefore, within, like the master of his own goods; he is not unassailable, nor quiet; and therefore not blessed. That opinion, therefore, which aggregates bodily and external things to blessedness, makes the one whom we suppose to be blessed, not to be blessed; therefore it is false. For nothing is true from which an impossibility arises. Moreover, the dignity and splendor of the opinion which we defend will appear from this.

Cap. XIX. A comparison of two who are not blessed.

Let us suppose two men who are not blessed, suffering a similar defect in soul, body, and external circumstances; and ^A regarding those things which seem to be more excellent of the body and external things, possessing none, and as for some of them which are missing, their acquisition is despaired of—and so, with all things that pertain to the mind, to nature, and to fortune being in every way equalized—if one of them be persuaded that all blessedness turns upon the virtues of the soul, but the other [is persuaded by] that tripartite opinion, and they have an equal appetite for blessedness: it is therefore manifest that the first will lead his life less painfully, and less anxiously, more pleasantly, and more tranquilly than the second; for three causes. That [he sees] fewer things missing for his full blessedness; and that for him the acquisition of those things is not despaired of; and that of the things which he has, he does not think that any are in the power of fortune as if they were pertained to blessedness, by the loss of which he might be ^B more miserable. But the other not only sees that many things are missing for the fulfilling of blessedness, and of those which he has, senses that some can slip away, whereby he might be more miserable, but also, for him, the attainment of complete blessedness is entirely despaired of.

Cap. XX. To which of the two the acquisition of virtues is more difficult.

But indeed, the acquisition of virtues has more difficulties for this latter than for the former. For the primary difficulty is to be able to know how much the goods of the soul exceed the goods of the body and those external goods for the completion of blessedness, and proportionally to distribute and compensate one's appetite for blessedness with these. But that other man of ours, when the ^C opinion of blessedness [is held, the difficulty] of this kind does not belong to him; nay, he even has a more vehement appetite for the virtues than he who distributes parts of an equal appetite to bodily and external things. And this also is manifest, that the more strictly bodily and external things are loved, so much the more is one hindered from acquiring virtues. The acquisition of virtues is therefore easier for ours.

Cap. XXI. Which of the two is stronger in the acquisition of virtues.

Nor is there any doubt that that disposition of soul which is so constructed and firm that it is able to maintain equality in every case and fortune, so that it is neither broken by adversities, nor suffers anything soft and abject, effeminate and anxious; nor is carried away by excessive joy in favorable circumstances, nor lifts itself up by levity to arrogance and pride: this disposition, I say, is better and more blessed than that which is not of such constancy. But it is manifest that it is easiest for our man, out of the two men proposed, with exercise and habit joined to it, to arrive at such a disposition. For the tripartite one, it is either impossible or most difficult. Therefore, if this opinion of ours makes a man to be in a better condition in every way than that tripartite one, there is no doubt which is more to be approved.

Cap. XXII. In what goods the action of virtues most especially consists.

But indeed one must not fall into the error that the actions of the virtues consist in goods of the body and external...

things; and it must necessarily be concluded that as much as these things slip away, by so much is the blessed life lacking. For there is no turn of events in life, nor fortune, nor time, in which a good man cannot act virtuously. For it is decent and rational to think, lie down, sit, stand, walk, be silent, speak, provide what is necessary for the body, see or hear something, move the limbs of the body, agree with and obey someone; or, in order to preserve constancy and fidelity, not to refuse pains and losses: which a virtuous person can at no time entirely lack; these are the actions of the virtues, and they proceed from virtue. I omit saying that strength, and greatness, and excellence of soul have their full force in adverse circumstances, and it is of supreme prudence to know how to use adversities well. Indeed, many things which seem to be of a negative character have a place in supreme actions. For whereas the virtuous man, poor and ignoble, deformed, lame, and infirm, may admire the noble and rich, and the powerful and healthy, and may rate himself miserable and them blessed and happy, and therefore hate and envy them, and burn with immense greed, and waste away and be depressed by anguish, sadness, and grief, and — through an error of judgment — deem Divine Providence to be either non-existent or unjust: the good man, totally of our opinion, when in a similar case, suffers none of these things, nor does he reckon them to be in a better situation than himself. And therefore he lives with a tranquil and minimally turbulent mind, and is most ready for internal actions, and, if there are any, for external ones. Therefore, to such firmness and constancy of mind, the actions that the virtuous, rich, and powerful can perform are not to be set aside. As long, then, as the good man lives and exists, he is not idle from virtuous actions. Wherefore, not in this way, either, will the so-called bodily and external goods be parts of true blessedness.

Cap. XXIII. The division of bodily goods, and what are called external.

^A But so that we may not seem to wish to labor only over a name, by calling them "comforts," which all label "goods," so that by a change of vocabulary they may seem to be separated from blessedness, let us proceed thus. Of all, what are called bodily and external goods, some are referred to our substance itself. Which indeed exist in such a way that we cannot be and live without them. But others have their force for this: that we might lead a life less troubled and more delightfully. Which indeed have reference ultimately to freedom from pain and to the pleasure which is perceived through bodily senses.

Cap. XXIV. On the first member.

Therefore, let it be said first concerning the first member: because our substance and our very being is indeed a good for us, but a good such that it is not any part of the form of blessedness, but is commonly subjected both to supreme misery and to blessedness. For it differs for a man to be, and for a man to be ^B blessed, and for the same man to be able to be under both; it follows necessarily that even bodily and external goods themselves, which are required so that we may simply be and live, should similarly be and be termed goods: so that, clearly, they are not placed in the form of blessedness, but are submitted to blessedness as things common to both misery and blessedness. And so, just as our being is indeed referred to blessedness, yet not as a part but as a subject, without which the form does not exist: in a similar way, those goods too which are referred to our being itself are, through our very being, to be referred to blessedness. Therefore, just as he who is, in so far as he is, is not more blessed than he who is not: so he who has more of such goods is not on that account more blessed than he who has fewer. For a man is made blessed and less blessed by the addition and subtraction of those goods which are parts of the form of blessedness. But our being, and the goods which are referred to it, are not parts of the form of blessedness, as has been shown. But let it be seen, if you please, what is the remaining member of the aforementioned division.

Cap. XXV. Second member. Freedom from pain and pleasure, not blessedness.

And primarily it must be shown that freedom from pain and bodily pleasure can in no way be placed in the form of blessedness. For they can fulfill a blessed life neither with the virtues, nor without (them). But if, without the virtues, they were placed in the highest seat, it would happen that a most vicious man—one having a completely ^C depraved and corrupted soul and being impious and inconstant—could be blessed: which is contrary to common notions. But indeed, neither with the virtues can they effect blessedness; for since blessedness is the best state of the whole life, it is fitting that it should consist not of things that are sometimes discrepant and ^D repugnant, but of things that are always concordant and consonant. For all goods always delight in friendship and concord. But between freedom from pain and pleasure, and the virtues, there is for the most part great repugnance. For in most cases it is impossible to attain freedom from pain and pleasure, unless we omit the honorable and the seemly, and commit the base and the unseemly. For if we wish to follow—everywhere—what the reason of fortitude, justice, temperance, and altogether the nature of the honorable demands, it is necessary not only to postpone pleasures, but even to undergo great labors and endure bitter pains. And on the contrary, if we were to establish this in ourselves, that we should follow bodily pleasure and freedom from pain in every way, there would be no crime, no act of violence, no evil whatever, to the undertaking of which, given the license, we would not be impelled. Therefore, neither with the virtues nor without them can pleasure and freedom from pain be counted in the form of blessedness. And for that reason, all bodily and external goods, in so far as they are referred to freedom from pain and pleasure themselves, must be separated from the form of blessedness. Moreover, it has been shown that this is the same even in so far as they are referred to the essence itself.

Cap. XXVI. On goods and advantages which come about in three ways.

Therefore, these things which are commonly called goods besides the virtues, and which the Stoics call advantages—and their opposites, disadvantages—come about in a threefold way: from virtue, from fault, or from neither.

From virtue (to begin with advantages), such as whatever is bestowed upon a person by men on account of virtue. Or, if someone has an excellent son, having educated him well himself; or, household wealth acquired and increased through prudence without injury; or the preservation of health and strength through abstinence and a diligent regimen, and any such things.

From fault, as if someone were to produce a good son from adultery; or if someone increases his own possessions by injuring others, and anything of that sort.

From neither, as whatever comes to someone naturally, by fortune, by chance, by succession, by divine providence, or in any way without his own effort.

Cap. XXVII. The division of disadvantages.

Likewise, there is the same division concerning disadvantages. For they occur from virtue, such as any losses and pains inflicted upon someone because of an insistence on justice. Or, if someone is poor, having transferred his faculties to works of justice and liberality, or having let them slip away in the pursuit of better things.

From fault, they occur as whenever disadvantages are inflicted upon someone on account of previous injuries committed by him; or if he himself, incited by some perturbation, either failed to repel ruin from his loved ones when he could have, or brought ruin upon them himself; or if he has fallen into laziness, inertia, and sloth regarding his domestic affairs; or, overcome by pleasure, has lost the advantages of the body through an evil regimen, and many such things.

From neither. Things which occur through neither virtue, nor vice, nor strictly through any effort: such as natural defects of the body, and whatever disadvantages occur by chance, fortune, or are inflicted by men moved by injury.

Cap. XXVIII. That an advantage coming from virtue is to be sought, and why.

From the three ways, therefore, the first, whereby advantages or disadvantages, when they have occurred because of virtue, increase blessedness by their presence through themselves, is due to the virtuous disposition and action concerning their consumption.

The second way, whereby advantages or disadvantages are received from fault, is to be shunned and is miserable; on account of the similarly vicious disposition and action concerning them.

The third way, whereby the same things occur through neither virtue nor fault, has no significance for blessedness or misery; but since they are taken as advantages or disadvantages in some way, how they are to be used will be told where we treat of the virtues.

Cap. XXIX. Not advantages, but the disposition toward them, contribute to blessedness or misery.

But now let it be manifest that neither advantages are parts of blessedness, nor disadvantages parts of misery; but the disposition, act, and use, whether virtuous or vicious, concerning the acquiring, taking, maintaining, suffering, using, and losing of both, pertains to blessedness or misery.

There are, therefore, advantages to be acquired, maintained, and used, so long as it is permitted to do these things rightly, and they are by no means to be rejected, unless either to prepare or carry out better things, or to serve the utility of those for whom it is proper. Conversely, however, disadvantages are either to be rejected or borne with equanimity, unless either to decline more disadvantageous and worse things, or to provide decently for the utility of men. But let us proceed to the rest.

Cap. XXX. What is the honorable.

It has been posited in the beginning that blessedness is to be sought for its own sake. And it has been shown that a blessed life is the same thing as a virtuous one: therefore a virtuous life is to be sought for its own sake. But it is also praiseworthy, as was stated in the definition of virtue. But that which is so good that, with all emolument removed, it can be rightly praised and sought for its own sake: this is what we perceive as honorable. Therefore, a virtuous life is the same as the honorable. And because a good and blessed life is the same as a virtuous one, therefore a good and blessed life is the same as the honorable. And because no one doubts that what is honorable is also good, it is concluded conversely that whatever life is honorable is also good, blessed, and virtuous.

And also, if the decorous is that which is consonant with the excellence of man, in that wherein his nature differs from the rest of living things, then that very decorum, and what is becoming, is rendered the same as virtue and the honorable.

Cap. XXXI. What is useful and useless.

Next, it must be spoken of concerning the useful and the useless. Both are spoken of in a dual way. One, the advantages or disadvantages themselves, such as a house, a horse, a servant, strength, and similar things; which, clearly, do not come to the same thing as the honorable or the dishonorable. For none of the advantages or disadvantages is honorable or base, as far as the blessedness of man is concerned.

In another way, human actions themselves are called useful and useless, which are about the taking, using, disposing, suffering, or rejecting of advantages or disadvantages. These which are useful or useless are the same as those which are honorable and base. For if every base action proceeds from a defect of virtue; and a defect of virtue harms blessedness; and nothing can be useful to anyone which is against his blessedness: therefore, a base action is useful to no one. Furthermore, that which is done usefully without baseness is also done reasonably and rightly. But what is done reasonably and rightly is also done honorably. From which it is concluded that every useful action is honorable. And also, if that which is honorable to do and pertains to blessedness is of the greatest utility, it is concluded that every honorable action is useful. Therefore, only the honorable and

a virtuous life is a useful life, and only the dishonest and vicious life is useless. Therefore, these six things—the good, the blessed, that which is perfected by virtue, the honest, the becoming, and the useful; add, if you wish, the upright and the reasonable—all come to the same thing and mean almost the same. And therefore their opposites—namely, the evil, the miserable, the vicious, the dishonest, the unbecoming, the base, the useless, ^A sin, the irrational; add, if you wish, the depraved, the flagitious, the foul, the loathsome, the detestable—all these are of the same calamity. From all the foregoing, therefore, comes finally the concluding point, for the sake of which everything in this reasoning has preceded, which is this:

Conclusion. That if anyone leads a virtuous and honest life, no matter what comforts or discomforts befall him, provided it is not through his own fault, nothing is lacking to him for a true blessedness. And conversely, if anyone is so depraved and corrupt that not a trace of virtue and honesty exists in him, to him, even though he abounds in all comforts, nothing is lacking for total misery.

CAP. XXXII. That there is no blessed man in this life, according to the Platonists.

Here certain Platonists, devoting themselves to the immortality of souls and imagining some excellent happiness for them, compare this life to it and assert that it is impossible for a man to be blessed in this life. Many, giving their assent to them, think that we deviate from the truth. However, the controversy between us and them is not in the reality, but in name only. For we do not call the same thing blessedness as they do, such that there should be a negation and affirmation about the same subject. For we call "blessedness" the best life that is most appropriate to a composite being, according to what the nature of man is capable of (and adding nothing alien or incongruous to it), and we assert that men can attain this.

They, however, considering the blessedness of separated souls, rightly deny that a man existing in this life can attain it. Therefore, both are true. For we cannot, by natural power while we live, be made blessed with that blessedness. Nor does our blessedness fit or suffice for them.

CAP. XXXIII. The division of blessedness.

Therefore, let the first blessedness be the very best state of life, to which we can ascend, but which we cannot transcend by natural power, concerning which blessedness these books treat.

Let the second be that which, once the first is assumed, still includes whatever excellent goods a man can acquire even in this life through divine aspiration, as Plato teaches in the *Phaedrus*.

Let the third be that which receives the wise after death, as the same Plato hands down in the *Phaedon*.

Therefore, because those who have been partakers of the first deserve the second and third, we have thought it right to undertake this labor only concerning the first.

CAP. XXXIV. Natural goods, how they are perfected in us.

But it must also be noted that, according to the same Plato, not even natural goods can be perfected in us without divine aid. For from the same source from which all things have being, they must also have their perfection. And all things, according to Plato, have their being from God. Likewise in the *Timaeus*, when he proposed to speak of the nature of the world, and its origin, and the connection of all things from the first principle, he prayed and implored divine aid for his projects; although, in those things, he was not about to say anything excellent that our natural intellect could not, yet he does not think he can attain them unless divinely aided. But if, according to the same author, in that highest good there is the likeness of all goodness, perfection, and blessedness, in this way our substance is perfected, in this way it is made blessed; if it tends toward that, looks to that, and imitates that.

PART TWO

CAP. I. How manifold is the power of the soul.

The power of our soul is twofold. By one, we understand and seek the truth, distinguish it from the false, pass from doubtful things to manifest ones, and perceive in them what is consequent and what is repugnant. And in our actions, we inquire and judge what is useful, what is useless, what is good, and what is evil; and to whom, and how much, and of what kind. Which power, since it is intellective, is accustomed to be called "mind."

^D There is another, by which the good or evil judged in actions pleases or displeases us. And those things indeed we accept, embrace, and cling to. But the contrary we spurn and flee; which power is accustomed to be called "appetitive." Moreover, the movements or acts of this in the soul can happen both rightly and wrongly. So that this may be distinguished, certain things which pertain to this subject must first be distinguished.

Cap. II. On the true and false opinion of good and evil.

False opinion regarding good or evil actions happens in many ways. For if anyone opines that what is not good is good, or the reverse, or whether it is good, he judges it to be less or greater than it is. Or, since it is good in itself, he reckons it to be worth only as much as another thing, and perhaps a less good thing; or he is ignorant of whom it is good for.

^A Likewise, even an opinion about evil is false. A true opinion and a true judgment, however, exist regarding these same things when there is no error in any of the aforementioned. For if one thinks that what is good is indeed good, and is not ignorant of its quantity, its quality, and for whom it is, and similarly regarding evil, all will concede that such a judgment is true and sound. Therefore, a false judgment about anything is simply bad and to be blamed; a true one, however, is simply good and to be praised.

Likewise, just as it sometimes happens to the eyes of the body that the sharpness of vision is blunted, and from some movement a certain shadowing, or dimness, or obscuration happens to the eye, so that it can either not see at all, or sees and discerns visible objects less clearly, more obscurely, and worse. And when this happens to this sense, it is reckoned to be an evil for it. For its good is always to remain in its vigor, and for the sharpness of vision to be preserved inviolate and ready. Otherwise, the condition of vision deteriorates. It sometimes happens to the human mind that something of this kind occurs, from which the mind itself incurs a certain shadowing and obscuration, and the sharpness of understanding is so blunted that it is able to attain the task of understanding and judging either less, or more obscurely and slowly: and it may be either entirely led away from doing the thing, or, in urging and moving a man toward exterior actions, it may be either unable, or able only with greater difficulty and trouble, to preserve decorum and honesty in them. Who, having a mind, does not understand that this accident is an evil to the mind? From the likeness of the eyes, therefore, for the sake of teaching, such an accident is called an obscuration of the mind, or dimness, or rather, darkness.

Yet the error of opinion in actions is a greater evil. For this is not only an evil to the soul in itself, but even without the obscuration of the mind and an evil will, it can generate most terrible exterior actions, and especially in punishing.

Of the three noted, the worst, separated from the others, is an evil will. ^B For it is so evil that it adheres to the soul even without a sudden and turbulent movement of the mind, and without false opinion, so that it can allege no ignorance; it is the worst of all evils and less curable than the others.

Cap. III. How many kinds of evil will there be?

An evil will is indeed twofold. For it is either caused by a sudden obscuration of the mind, which upon ceasing, recedes, as often happens in anger; or it is grafted into the soul, and without a sudden dimming of the mind, which is much more hideous than that which arises and perishes simultaneously with the obscuration of the mind. Wherefore, if it is necessary to choose the least of evils, the obscuration of the mind with a beneficial will is much more eligible than an evil will without the obscuration of the mind.

Regarding the goods noted, one compared without the others, the minimum good is the equability of the mind. For although this might be good for the mind in itself, as it is a mind, nevertheless, separated from a true opinion regarding actions and a beneficial will, it is no good regarding exterior actions.

When the mind so stably preserves its vigor that none of the aforementioned happens to it, from which the sharpness of understanding might be deteriorated in any way: such a state, for the sake of teaching, is likewise called equality.

It is therefore manifest that the obscuration of the mind is an evil to the mind and to be blamed; equability, however, is a good and to be praised.

Likewise, when our soul has an appetite either for committing what is not fitting, or for omitting what is fitting, it may be called an evil will. But when the appetite tends toward doing what is fitting, and leaving aside what is not fitting, it may be called a beneficial will.

It is therefore manifest that an evil will is simply evil and to be blamed: a beneficial will, however, is simply good and to be praised. ^C Yet of the three isolated evils, if it is necessary that one of them be in the soul without the others: the obscuration of the mind is the minimum evil. Although it is an evil to the mind itself, as it is a mind, yet when associated with a true opinion in actions and a beneficial will, regarding exterior actions, and especially those in which the society of men is contained, if only moderation is present to them, it is not only not an evil, but a great good.

A true judgment regarding goods and evils is a slightly greater good, separated from the other two goods. For it sometimes even effects something of good exteriorly by accident. The best of all, however, is the beneficial will. For it is good to the soul in itself, and even separated from the other two goods, it can nevertheless generate many good actions outwardly.

Cap. IV. How many kinds of beneficial will?

There is a twofold beneficial will: one which is caused by some sudden, dimming movement of the soul: which likewise arises and perishes, as often happens in joys and mercies. The other is grafted into the soul and permanent, and depends on a living and effective reason: which is the best of the three proposed.

Cap. V. Whether the three aforesaid, true judgment, equability of mind, and beneficial will can concur together in the soul, or in the appetitive power.

Since therefore from the superior divisions there are three notes of simply good and laudable things in our soul, namely, the true judgment of goods and evils, and the equability of mind, and the beneficial will, it can come to pass that when the appetitive power is in act, the aforementioned three goods may concur at the same time in the soul: so that

it is pleasing or displeasing, and judged truly, and the mind does not incur any dimness, and a beneficial will exists in the soul. When this happens, it is called constancy. It may, however, happen that the opposites of these occur: that one has evil feelings about objects, the keenness of the mind is obscured, and a malevolent will is present. It may also happen that there are two of the evils and one of the goods; this can vary in three ways, or conversely, two from the goods and one from the evils; which similarly occurs in three ways.

CAP. VI. The seven combinations of the aforementioned.

Beyond constancy, therefore, there are seven combinations of these. Constancy, indeed, since it is an equability of mind in the act of the appetitive power, with a true opinion of the object and a beneficial will, there is no doubt that it is simply good and praiseworthy. And because, as was defined in the first part, beatitude is ^A the accumulated combination of all the goods of man, as he is man, and constancy itself, according to the assigned meaning, is a good of man as he is man. The one, therefore, whom we seek, whom we understand to be perfectly blessed, will by no means lack the good of constancy. He will, therefore, always be constant.

CAP. VII. Concerning perturbations; and what these perturbations are called.

Those seven combinations, by which the obscuration of the mind is comprised, which happens in four ways, are called perturbations. The worst of these is when something pleases or displeases us such that there is ^B both a false opinion of the object and a malevolent will towards acting present in the soul along with the obscuration of the mind. It is, however, less evil when, along with the obscuration of the mind, one of the other evils is present, and the mind is free of the other. This happens in two ways; yet that perturbation is the least evil in which the obscuration of the mind is joined with a true judgment of that which pleases or offends, and a beneficial will for action. Therefore, if someone, when he was so disposed as to incur that worst perturbation, changed his disposition of that kind to this perturbation, which I have said to be the least evil, he has improved his soul not a little.

CAP. VIII. To what purpose the three remaining combinations are useful.

There remain three combinations, in addition to constancy and the quadripartite perturbation. The first, when the equability of mind is associated with a false opinion and a malevolent will, which is called *elythiotes* (insanity). The second, when the equability of mind lacks a false opinion, but not a malevolent will: which is called *malitia*. The third is when the equability of mind lacks a malevolent will; it has, however, a false opinion concerning the object: which is called *afelia* (simplicity).

CAP. IX. The division of perturbations.

Concerning perturbations, however, since they vary in four ways, as has been said, the first is that which is ^C an obscuration of the mind, with a true judgment of the good or evil, and a beneficial will. Which, so far as exterior actions are concerned—if only it preserves moderation in them—is a great good. The second is that which is an obscuration of the mind with a false opinion and a beneficial will. The third is that which is an obscuration of the mind with a true judgment and a malevolent will. The fourth is that which is an obscuration of the mind with a false opinion and a malevolent will. This is the worst of all perturbations, as was noted above.

CAP. X. Another division of the same.

Item: according to another division, there are four genera of perturbations. For because every perturbation is an obscuration of the mind, received from an opinion of a good that pleases or an evil that offends: yet goods or evils which befall man are either already past, or present, or future: that perturbation, then, which strikes and dims the soul from an opinion of a past or present evil, is called affliction. If this is excessive, it is called anguish; if it is received from an opinion of the future, it is called fear or dread. Item: if it happens from an opinion of a past or present good, there are many names, with little difference, such as joy, pleasantness, delight, and others, but let "joy" be chosen; if, however, it is from an opinion of a future good, it is called cupidity, and libido or desire. Delight and love are also directed toward imagined goods.

CAP. XI. The definition of perturbations.

Let these four genera therefore be defined thus. Affliction is a perturbation of the soul from an opinion of a present or past evil, biting the soul and casting it down. Fear is a perturbation of the soul from an opinion of an impending evil, humiliating and breaking the soul, and causing a certain withdrawal and flight of the soul, and pushing man to decline that which is feared. Joy is a perturbation of the soul from an opinion of a past or present good; as if the soul were to exult effusively, a certain desire and sense of pleasure, causing a pervasive hilarity. Libido is a perturbation of the soul from an opinion of a future good, when the soul is snatched away, inflamed toward that which seems good. There are, therefore, many and various species of the individual genera: ^D which it is not necessary to discuss in the present work, but it should only be noted concerning them that there are some that cannot vary through the four degrees assigned above, but fall into only one, in which the obscuration of the mind is associated with a false opinion and a malevolent will; which mode was the worst of all. Such perturbations are, therefore, in the genus of affliction, envy and detraction: and in the genus of joy, malevolence, boasting, and pride: in the genus of libido, enmities, discord. For these always perturb the soul through the error of opinion and a malevolent will. There are also others, which vary through all the degrees, such as mercy, penitence, anger, love, and innumerable others. For, to speak of one for all:

^A it can happen that he who is disturbed, even if he does not truly form an opinion about another's evil, nor possess a beneficent will to assist when he could, may yet have a condition of soul that is, in this accident, from a true judgment and joined to a good will. If he is able to maintain mediocrity in his action, it is a great good. The same is to be understood of anger, penitence, love, and other things. For any of these, if the obscuration of the mind is not stirred up by an opinion of error, and it lacks a malevolent will, and it achieves mediocrity in action, is a great good. For it has two goods in the soul: namely, truth regarding the object and a will toward beneficent action; and it produces an excellent action. Why I did not say it is the maximum good, but a great one, will appear when I speak of the consistencies.

Cap. XII. What is consistency.

Consistency, therefore, because it is the tranquility and equanimity of the mind in that which is judged as good or evil—which are accepted, and please or displease with a true judgment and a beneficent will—also has its own parts, according to the temporal variety of goods and evils, and certain other differences of the same. However, they are not all assigned their own names, but for the most part they are called by the same names as the ^B perturbations. For if the evils which consistently displease are past, and were committed by oneself, it is called likewise penitence; if by another, it is called anger; but if the evils, past or present, have occurred to others, and they have suffered or are suffering them, it is called mercy. If he himself has suffered or is suffering evils; if it is of the mind, it is called in the same way penitence or mercy; if it is of the body and external, it is called patience. If, however, they are future and impending, it is called caution or fear and dread, taken equivocally. It does not differ if, in these things, they are called evils by common usage which the Stoics call inconveniences; for this distinction matters nothing to the proposed question.

Likewise, when our soul feels that it has consistently enjoyed or is enjoying some good, or vehemently accepts the good of others, it is called contentment, placability, joy; these can also be called equivocally, just as those things were called in the third genus of perturbations. But if the appetite consistently tends toward a future good, it is called a will, or desire, taken equivocally, in which there is also hope. Moreover, in good things, love is similarly ^C understood; but charity is a species of the will.

Cap. XIII. The difference between perturbations and consistencies.

But so that it may be clear what difference there is between the consistencies and the equivocal perturbations, let one be taken for all, such as love. Let something be loved, so that it is considered truly good, and the sharpness of the mind is not blunted, and there is a beneficent will in the soul; which we said is the appetite for doing what is proper, and of not committing what is not proper. And let this love be called the first degree for those who are beginning from above; afterward, having left in the soul a true judgment and a beneficent will, it incurs a certain fog and obscuration of the mind in loving: and let this love be the second degree.

^D Item, with the beneficent will left in the soul in love, let there be present in the soul, with a turbid motion of the mind, also a false judgment about that which is loved; and let this kind of love be the third degree. But if in loving the judgment is indeed sound regarding what is loved, but there is in the soul a malevolent will for acting—which was an appetite for omitting what is proper and committing what is not proper: let this kind of love be called the fourth degree. But if the mind also fails in three [aspects] in loving, when there is in the soul an obscuration of the mind, and a malevolent will for acting, and a false judgment about that which is loved: let this kind of love be the fifth degree. It is therefore manifest that the love of the first degree is simply good and the best of all, and it falls under the definition of consistency assigned above. The remaining four degrees, however, since obscuration of the mind is posited in each, are comprehended in the genus of perturbations, according to how perturbation was defined above.

There is, therefore, of all perturbations the best, which is placed in the second degree; yet it falls short of consistency in three things: first, that it does not preserve the clarity of the mind in its rigor, as does consistency. Second, that while for consistency it is easy, because of the clarity of the mind, to impose mediocrity upon an external action, for the perturbation itself, because of the turbid commotion of the mind, the same is not so easy. Third, consistency excels in that the beneficent will in it, because it hangs from clarity of mind and live reason, is innate and permanent in the soul, and therefore more efficacious; and because what proceeds prudently from it never leads to penitence: but that beneficent will which is in a perturbation, since it is caused by a sudden and turbulent motion, often ceases when the mind is calmed. For it is not innate, nor is it bound by the chains of reason. And therefore it often happens that, concerning what was done rightly and laudably, when the cloud has receded, a man may repent of having done this same thing: as sometimes happens in works of mercy.

The fifth, however, which was posited as a degree, is simply evil, and the worst of all. For there is nothing of good in it. The third and fourth, according to that in which they are participants of good or evil, are to be praised or vituperated. If, however, it is necessary to ascend from the worst of the explained degrees of perturbation, step by step and not suddenly, to consistency: first let the malevolent will or false opinion be subtracted; and with these first removed, finally let the obscuration of the mind be subtracted: and

^A in this way, when those moved to ^B consistency follow, many good things are attained in life, and bad things are avoided: but those so disposed are to be considered as possessing the simulacra of virtues, not the true virtues themselves. Therefore, if we wish to name both consistencies and perturbations by the name of "passion," it is manifest that what we say is that some passions are simply good, others simply bad, others more good than bad, and conversely; others equally mixed, according to the quadripartite division, not of genera, but of the degrees of perturbation. If, however, we wish to name "passion" in the soul as nothing other than the very obscuration of the mind, a turbid motion, and a blunting—since the tranquil clarity of the mind and the vigorous keenness of understanding is always a good—we shall not doubt to say that all passions are to be rooted out from the soul and plucked out utterly; provided that neither an innate malevolent will, nor a slowness for necessary and honest actions, nor the rashness of opinions remains in the soul, so that one may purely arrive at consistency.

Theophrastus, indeed, after Aristotle, the prince of the Peripatetics, does not seem to think that every perturbation is inimical to consistency. But just as hunger and thirst and things of this sort occur to a man without a false opinion, without a malevolent will, without an obscuration of the mind, and simply ^C without the consistency of the mind being at all injured: so he says that sometimes in the soul, according to its weaker parts, a turbid commotion occurs from some chance cause, neither depending on a false opinion, nor exciting a malevolent will, nor bringing an obscuration upon the mind. The signs of this commotion sometimes appear even on the mouth, on the face, and in the eyes. Although this is a perturbation, it does not, however, at all conflict with consistency.

To which it must be replied that these things do not conflict, in substance, with our previous arguments concerning perturbation. For if consistency is comprised by one definition, if its definition is assigned through unequivocal words: it is manifest that the perturbation which conflicts with consistency, of which we were treating above, varying it through four degrees and dividing it into four ^D kinds, and that perturbation of Theophrastus, which does not conflict with the consistency of the mind, enjoy the name of "perturbation" equivocally; and also the higher quadripartite perturbation, which brings an obscuration to the mind, is predicated of the mind. For it is true to say that in that passion the mind of a man is perturbed. But the perturbation of Theophrastus, because it does not injure the above-described equability of the mind, cannot truly be predicated of the mind. For while the equability of the mind remains uninjured, it is not to be said that the mind of a man is perturbed. Therefore, from this also their equivocation is clear. Just as, by the definition assigned to a terrestrial dog, it can be said boldly that every dog is a mortal animal, or a four-footed animal: so, with the quadripartite definition of perturbation described, through which it is necessarily distinguished from any other equivocal perturbation, it can be truthfully determined.

that there is no perturbation without the obscuration of the mind, and that it is opposed to constancy and must simply be rooted out from the soul. For if there is some agitation of the soul about which these things cannot be said, it is not called a perturbation in these books.

Cap. XIV. A twofold question concerning the perturbation of Theophrastus.

Indeed, concerning the perturbation of Theophrastus, which is not opposed to constancy, two things are to be asked. One: whether it happens to a person at any time, or never? The other: whether it falls to the blessed person, or not? For since the definitions of the obscuration and the evenness of the mind have been described above, one will rightly doubt whether there can happen in the mind a turbid agitation which in no way partakes of the definition of the obscuration of the mind, nor in any way harms the definition of the evenness of the mind? Or is this impossible? I think the truth of this question can be understood better if one considers the passions of his own soul than if he follows the words of a demonstration.

As to the second point, it is clear beyond doubt that if there is some agitation of the soul not repugnant to the constancy of the mind—whether one wishes to call it a passion or a perturbation—it in no way harms blessedness. But if it is not voluntary, like hunger and thirst, according to Theophrastus, it pertains neither to virtues nor to vices. As if it were said: if it is excessive, it is to be attributed to a vice; if moderate, to a virtue; for that of which our will is not master, however it happens, makes one neither blessed nor miserable; as was shown in the first book. But if it is voluntary and happens in regard to that which is pleasing or displeasing, and depends upon a true judgment of the object and a beneficent will, and does not in any way impair the acuity of the mind; nor does it disturb tranquility; even so, Theophrastus differs from the Stoics only in name. For that same thing which we consider praiseworthy, and deem to pertain to blessedness, and call constancy, he abusively calls a perturbation. For it often happens that, when those discussing something assert something universally, either affirmatively or negatively, if the listeners see that the predicates do not agree with all the things that are under the name of the subject, they think that they are lying; they are, however, themselves more deceived, being ignorant of the usage of the words of those discussing. For if the disputants extend the name of the subject only to those things to which the predicates correspond, their opinion must necessarily be true.

It is therefore in order that one may not fall into such a deception in these our readings, that such a rule should be given: In any universal proposition, if it seems to someone that the predicate does not agree with all the things which are signified by the name of the subject, let him know that we, in the manner of the Stoics, ^A use the name of the subject only for those things to which the predicate generally applies. But if more things are signified by the same name according to others, to which the predicate cannot belong, it is nothing to the Stoics! Just as it is not for geometers, if something other than what is defined by them is called a circle.

Cap. XV. Whether perturbation is to be rooted out entirely.

Resuming, therefore, we say concerning perturbations that, since we call by this name that agitation of the soul in which the mind departs from constancy, and is obscured, and the acuity of understanding is blunted, it is manifest that it is not to be pruned or moderated, but entirely rooted out. ^B For in those things in which both are to be blamed—both to exceed too much and to lack altogether—a mean is correctly sought. But to be free from perturbation, and not to depart in the least from constancy, and to preserve the acuity of the mind unimpaired, is to be given great praise. Our effort, therefore, is to be directed not to pruning perturbation, but to rooting it out entirely.

Chapter XVI. Whether perturbations can be rooted out.

But since it is possible, it must next be shown. There is a twofold opinion which disturbs the soul. One, by which one opines that some transient thing, and one newly incident to the imagination, is good or bad, with its circumstances, which for the most part is false; for we judge as good things that are not good, or things that are small to be great. Similarly also as to evils, we are for the most part perturbed. The other is that by which something is seen to be real, so that it is perturbed: which can never be true. For whether it is good or whether it is bad that happens, there is no reason that it should on that account alone be brought into the mind as an evil: nor can it be right in any way that, because of other whatever evils or goods, that which is most excellent in us should be defiled. For a guard is to be moved to goods, and not-evil remedies to evils, and especially those by which the mind is harmed. Therefore, since they are false opinions which are wont to disturb souls, and since it is impossible to have a right and true judgment concerning whatever we opine falsely, it is manifest that, those opinions having been removed from the soul, and the judgment totally changed, nothing remains ^C which can disturb the soul. It is therefore possible to be free from perturbations. ^D